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North Africa, Colonialism And The EU
 3030295885,  9783030295882,  9783030295899

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Chapter 1: Introduction to the King’s European Morocco......Page 8
Chapter 2: Creation of Hybridity in Morocco: 1912–1925......Page 19
2.1 The Essence of the French Protectorate in Morocco......Page 20
2.1.1 Valuing the Locals......Page 22
2.1.2 Paying Honor to the Sultan......Page 23
2.1.3 La politique musulmane......Page 24
2.1.4 Secular Education Coexisting Alongside an Islamic One......Page 27
2.2 The Image of Lyautey in Blad al Makhzen: 1912–1925......Page 28
2.3 Assessment......Page 32
Secondary Sources......Page 37
Chapter 3: Nullification of French Protectorate and Colonialism Impacts: 1956–1984......Page 39
3.1 Deviation from Respect for Islam in the  Post-Lyautey Period: 1930–1956......Page 40
3.2 Nullification of the French Protectorate Impacts Through Moroccan-ness......Page 44
3.3 Nullification of European Colonialism with African-ness......Page 48
3.4 Assessment......Page 51
Primary Sources......Page 57
Secondary Sources......Page 58
Chapter 4: The King’s European Morocco......Page 59
4.1 The King’s European Morocco......Page 62
4.1.1 Declarations......Page 65
4.1.2 Support for Morocco’s Application to EEC in Morocco......Page 68
4.1.3 Challenge to Morocco’s Application to EEC in Morocco......Page 72
4.1.4 Reflection of Morocco’s Application to EEC in European and American Media......Page 75
4.1.5 Reflection of Morocco’s Application to the EEC in the French Media......Page 78
4.1.6 Reflection of Morocco’s Application to the EEC in the European Commission......Page 79
4.2 Assessment......Page 82
Primary Resources......Page 90
Secondary Sources......Page 91
Chapter 5: Engagement with Europe: The Cases of Tunisia-Algeria-Malta-Cyprus-Turkey......Page 93
5.1 The Cases of Tunisia and Algeria......Page 94
5.2 The Cases of Malta and Cyprus......Page 102
5.3 The Case of Turkey......Page 104
5.4 Assessment......Page 107
References......Page 109
Chapter 6: Conclusion to the King’s European Morocco......Page 111
References......Page 123
Index......Page 125

Citation preview

North Africa, Colonialism and the EU Volkan Ipek

North Africa, Colonialism and the EU

Volkan Ipek

North Africa, Colonialism and the EU

Volkan Ipek Yeditepe University Kayısdagi Caddesi, Istanbul, Turkey

ISBN 978-3-030-29588-2    ISBN 978-3-030-29589-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover pattern © Harvey Loake This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

The publication of this book would not have been possible without the contribution, endless support and encouragement of many institutions and individuals. First and foremost, I am grateful for the assistance provided to me by the officers at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives in Nantes, the National Library of Kingdom of Morocco in Rabat and the street book vendors of Rabat and Casablanca. Furthermore, I would like to thank all interviewees who shared their competence and time to answer my questions. It is also my pleasure to thank my editors, Sylvia Zeybekoğlu and Bob Savage, for their grammatical and corrections and copyediting services. Moreover, I would like to extend my appreciation to my PhD supervisors, Professor Alev Çınar, Associate Professor Jack Kalpakian, Associate Professor Jeremy Salt, Associate Professor Ioannis Grigoriadis and Associate Professor Aslı Çırakman. I could never have written this book without their insights and academic contributions. Special gratitude goes to Ayşe Alibeyoğlu, who always believed that I would finish this book successfully. It would have never been completed without her delicate support. Associate Professor Mehtap Kacar also deserves great thanks too, because she stood by me during the whole process and tried her best to support me. Last, but not least, I owe a great thanks to Wafa Abyad since she supported me during the whole process, and even when this book was a PhD thesis. I had the privilege to meet the interviewees thanks to her. I would like to dedicate this book to all academics and professionals who are conducting research on a region or country by tasting its water, speaking to its people, savoring its food, getting lost in its streets and v

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breathing its oxygen. I am also dedicating it to my family members Selim Terzi, Tayfun Ipek, Nilgün Ipek, Yağmur Ipek Özen, Togay Özen, Nalan Terzi, Asuman Candemir, Haldun Candemir, Tolga Candemir, Çağlar Candemir and sweet family boy Lucca, the two angels who are always with me; my grandmothers Sevim Ipek and Melahat Terzi, my beloved grandfather Hulki Ipek who is watching me from the sky, and people in history who are great inspirations to me, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Karl Marx, Fyodor Dostoyevski, Charles Darwin, William Wallace, Alex de Souza and Leo Africanus. I believe this book was worth the effort that went into it. All in all, it is my original study and I claim for all responsibility for any spelling or content mistakes.

Contents

1 Introduction to the King’s European Morocco  1 2 Creation of Hybridity in Morocco: 1912–1925  13 3 Nullification of French Protectorate and Colonialism Impacts: 1956–1984  33 4 The King’s European Morocco  53 5 Engagement with Europe: The Cases of Tunisia-Algeria-­ Malta-Cyprus-Turkey 87 6 Conclusion to the King’s European Morocco105 Index119

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction to the King’s European Morocco

Abstract  The author argues that Morocco’s membership application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987 involves an identity issue, whereby King Hassan II justified Morocco’s European-ness according to article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. He did this by instrumentalizing the hybridity that had been created between the French and locals during the French Protectorate through an emphasis on respect for Islam during the tenure of Resident General Hubert Lyautey’s between 1912 and 1925. Keywords  Morocco • European Economic Community (EEC) • King Hassan II • Identity • European-ness Brexit, the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU), is currently one of the hottest topics in European politics. In the referendum held on June 23, 2016, 51.9% of the British people voted to leave the EU.  Recognizing the validity of the referendum results, the British government has been making a major effort to implement the Brexit decision by 2020. Such a decision to leave the EU has created an environment of uncertainty and growing separatist sentiment across Europe. However, the EU is not a stranger to these kinds of attempts and decisions. Prior to Brexit, there was Grexit, the Greek government’s endeavor to leave the Eurozone © The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9_1

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through a referendum held on July 5, 2015. The attempt was stopped in its tracks by 61.31% of the Greek people who rejected the proposal. It did, however, ignite discussions on the stability of European integration. It reminded Switzerland’s rejection of membership in European Economic Area in 1992, Norway’s rejection of EU membership in 1994, France’s and the Netherlands’ repudiation of the European Constitution in 2005. Attempts or decisions to leave or to reject EU or EU institutions memberships have mainly been covered by studies dealing with European integration. Their primary focus has been on how the EU has been integrated thus far and what it is about the entity that appeals to its member states. Some of these studies have specifically delved into whether the rejection of or departure from the EU impacts European integration in the short or long term. They have approached European integration not only in political or economic terms but also with respect to identity. In addition, they have tried to understand how the European-ness of the states, or their sense of being European, is impacted by their decision to leave the EU. In Europe where European-ness is defined mostly with EU membership at least according to the European Commission, such studies try to see if there is erosion of a sense of European-ness within the states that have sought to leave or reject the EU. However, there is another dimension that is often neglected. European-­ ness and European integration do not only depend on whether a state rejects or leaves the EU. A state might also not be part of European integration if the EU rejects its membership application, without the need that this state rejects being its part. An example to this happened in July 1987, when Morocco applied for full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). In accordance with the procedure set out in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which declares “Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community,” Morocco officially applied for full membership in July 1987. Morocco’s membership application to EEC actually meant its application to the European Communities, which required an application to the EEC as the only sub-organization open to further members, unlike the European Atomic Energy Committee (EAEC) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). These three pillars structured the European Communities in 1987 before their transformation into the EU in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty.1 Morocco’s application was rejected outright by the European Commission in October of the same year. Among the very limited sources that analyzed this application, a report published by the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet on October

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18, 1987 requires attention. The report referred to the Belgian journal Le Soir where it was stated that the European Commission would reject the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco who would eventually be disappointed. Le Soir, then, added that the European Commission would look for a way to kindly reject the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco. As the European Commission officer responsible for the Mediterranean Affairs by that time Claude Cheysson said: The membership applications of Morocco and Turkey, two countries from another part of the world, are quite similar. The European [Economic] Community believes that it is quite important to develop bilateral relations with Turkey and Morocco in the final analysis. However, the club of twelve, as the founders of the European [Economic] Community, are deeply concerned about these states’ membership applications to the organization. The application of Morocco, which is not geographically part of Europe, encountered judicial obstacles and therefore was rejected with no hesitation. The membership application of Turkey, on the other hand, was sent to the European Commission to be discussed in more detail. However, I do not believe that the Commission will respond to Turkey in a short time. In any case, the answer of the Commission will not be clear. I believe that another compromise solution must be found for the membership applications of Turkey and Morocco to the European [Economic] Community.

Mr. Cheysson’s declaration concerning the future of the membership applications of Morocco and Turkey membership applications to the EEC was far from passionate. When all is said and done, he was a rational European bureaucrat who was working for a European organization that had already determined who was and was not European. He openly described Turkey and Morocco as actors of another world that did not belong to Europe. Even though he cared more about Turkey’s application, he recommended a different engagement other than full membership for both Turkey and Morocco. Mr. Cheysson considered Turkey’s claims to European-ness, within the framework of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, to be more valid than those put forth by Morocco. Indeed, he did not believe that Morocco had any realistic chance of being accepted. Among the applications of these two, Morocco’s one does not seem at first glance to be out-of-the-ordinary foreign policy behavior. The European Commission gave all states the right to apply for membership as long as they were European. What Morocco had to do was to justify how

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European it was and did so accordingly. Eventually, its application was rejected because it was judged not to be European, at least geographically, as Mr. Cheysson’s comments above demonstrate. So both Morocco’s application for membership and the position of the European Commission can be viewed as normal according to the terms of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. However, the bases for its application were already quite weak because Morocco was not located on the European continent. The Strait of Gibraltar in the Mediterranean Sea has separated Morocco from Europe for centuries. However, before submitting its letter of application, Morocco was already aware of its geographical location. The stipulation in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome that membership applications could only come from European states, and the requirement that states applying for EEC membership also had to be members of the European Council. It was King Hassan II who took the initiative of the membership application, and he most certainly was not unaware of these criteria when he took this initiative. Because of all these reasons, the response to the King’s application was negative. Politically speaking, the non-European Morocco in terms of geography was left outside the EU. That was normal, ordinary and expected. But political scientifically speaking, there was an anomaly, something extraordinary and unexpected. A state located beyond the geographic confines of Europe would even claim that it was European. Yet, here was Morocco, an obviously non-European country in the eyes of the Europeans making up the EEC, laying claim to European-ness, an identity it had hoped would enable it to attain membership in the organization. King Hassan II’s claim of European Morocco despite Morocco’s position out of the European geography is not the only extraordinary fact to analyze in the King’s European Morocco. Considering the struggle given to Europe in Morocco by the fifteenth century, which reached to an anticolonial level by the 1930s, the claim of European Morocco located European-ness just near other components of postcolonial Moroccan national identity such as Islam, Moroccan-ness and African-ness. Islam had come to the country through Arab conquest in the eighth century. It fueled its struggle with Europe as the missionary activities of the Portuguese were fought against in the fifteenth century. Moroccan-ness, as distinct from Muslim-ness (Islam), became a component of national identity with the rise of nationalism in the mid-1930s when the locals unified against the French and the Spanish Protectorates. African-ness became an element of national identity as the country fought against European colonialism within the framework of the 1961 Casablanca Conference with Morocco

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eventually gaining independence from France. All three components were essentially used in Morocco’s centuries-old fight with Europe and served as the basis for its postcolonial national identity vis-à-vis Europe. Related with this, the King’s European Morocco shows that Morocco adopted European-ness to its postcolonial national identity which was created against Europe. When King Hassan II sent his application letter to EEC in 1987, he admitted that Morocco was one of these “any European states.” That is why the King’s European Morocco also tries to answer how the postcolonial national identity of Morocco which had been constructed by a process of unification against Europe evolved and came to a point to admit European-ness to itself. It argues that Morocco for King Hassan II had an amalgamated national identity with the unification of Islam, Moroccan-ness, African-ness and European-ness. To get an idea of how this identity evolved and came to be used as the basis to the King’s European Morocco, it is necessary to critically examine the dynamics of postcolonial nationalism. This involves scrutinizing such subthemes as critique of colonialism (the feelings that make the colonized subjects stimulated to nullify the impacts of the colonizer on their lands after colonialism), inbetweenness (the mixed feeling coming from the cultural attribution of the colonized subjects to both their local culture and to the culture their former colonizer after colonialism) and admiration for Europe (the feeling that leads especially the rulers to model Europe after colonization). In short, it entails an examination of the ongoing impact of the former colonizer on the identity of the former colonized after independence and regards the concept of hybridity within the orbit of inbetweenness. This influence can be found in symbols such as flags, languages and names of the former colonized states. For example, the British flag appears on the national flags of the former British colonies Australia, New Zealand, Bermuda and Tuvalu, while the French flag can be seen on the national flags of the former French colonies Central African Republic, Guadeloupe and Seychelles today. The widespread use of the English, French, Spanish and Portuguese and the current names of cities in former colonies are also major artifacts of colonialism. Examples of city names include Franceville and Libreville in the former French colony of Gabon, Malanville in the former French colony of Benin, Francistown in the former British colony of Botswana and Buenos Aires in the former Spanish colony of Argentina. The King’s European Morocco does not look for a French flag in the Moroccan one or French names in Morocco. Instead, it examines the role the French, through the French Protectorate, had on

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the development of postcolonial Moroccan identity, and how King Hassan II justified that Morocco was a European state according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. All in all, it regards the membership to EEC as an impact of France on Morocco by referring to the French Protectorate in Morocco between 1912 and 1956. To fully understand the basis to the King’s European Morocco, Morocco’s status needs to be compared to countries having similar positions as well. In this regard, three major questions need to be answered. First, why has no other previously French-ruled African state applied to the EEC? Second, why did King Hassan II primarily refer to the French Protectorate and France to justify Morocco’s European-ness and hardly touched at all upon the Spanish Protectorate and Spain that ruled the north of Morocco? Third, if the rejection of Morocco’s claim of European-­ ness because it was not located on the European continent is valid, then how is it that the applications of Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, countries that also are not technically part of the European continent, have been accepted? To answer the first question, some knowledge of the location of the geography of states in French Africa is needed. Only the countries in the northern tier of Africa—Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria can stake any claim to having a border of any kind with Europe: the Mediterranean Sea. Geography plays a major role in identity construction and sharing the Mediterranean with Europe provides a strong sense of belonging to Europe. In addition, these countries formed part of what is referred to as the Maghreb. So this meant that they shared certain political and cultural elements that put them into greater proximity to the Arab world, in the Middle East, than other African countries. In the late-1980s, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were preoccupied with domestic issues, such as civil wars, military coups and famine. The very idea that they could be European, and thus be eligible to apply for membership in the EEC, never rose. However, even among the countries in the Maghreb, there were major differences in how they interacted with the French. These differences go a long way in explaining why Tunisia and Algeria, cultural neighbors of Morocco, did not apply for membership in the EEC. Contrary to the case of Morocco, elites in Tunisia and Algeria did not, or perhaps, could not instrumentalize any hybridity that may have formed between the French and locals to construct their postcolonial national identity. The French had ruled Morocco by respecting the important role Islam had in the country’s identity. The successful interaction the French had with the locals allowed for a hybridity to form. It was under the French Protectorate,

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especially under General Lyautey’s tenure between 1912 and 1925, that King Hassan II had the occasion to instrumentalize this hybridity to construct a postcolonial identity in 1987. So, it was the positive interaction between the French and the locals during General Lyautey that led King Hassan II to think that Morocco was European. The interaction between the French rulers and the locals in Tunisia and Algeria was not as efficacious as it had been in Morocco. This was due primarily to the difference in how French rule was perceived. Many factors went into making this perception different in Tunisia. For instance, right from the beginning of its rule there the French had attempted to rule Tunisia directly through civil controlleurs.2 who had much more authority and power than the ones in Morocco. Tunisia also had a significant Italian population that hampered the French to interact with the locals as they did in Morocco. Discriminatory policies, such as the imposition of anti-­ Semitic laws, economic problems and the opposition of the French to Tunisian independence, acted as impediments to successful interaction between the French and the locals. In the case of Algeria, which had the status of being an integral part of France rather than a colony, while an assimilationist approach towards the locals existed, respect for Islam was not shown at all until the end of 1950s. This failure to respect Islam was a major obstacle for the formation of a successful interaction between the French and the locals there. To answer the second question, the influence, authority and policies of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco need to be covered. The Spanish, unlike the French, did not have the room or occasion to create the same impacts as the French did for a successful interaction with the locals. Geographically, while the French ruled over an area of 180,000 m2, the Spanish exercised sovereignty over only 21,000 m2. Spanish and French attitudes concerning why they were in Morocco also differed. The Spanish behaved as if they were obliged to establish a Protectorate in Morocco. The French, in contrast, were there because they wanted to be and tried to develop their Protectorate by respecting Islam, particularly the Lyautey period. In an interview given to Correspondia Militar on August 23, 1911, one of the Spanish deputies, Francisco Cilvela said: We should banish from our thoughts the idea that the situation in Morocco represents profit and wealth for us, when, on the contrary, it is the source of poverty, sterility, and stagnation for Spain.

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Another reason for the differential impact of the Spanish and French in Tunisia and Morocco has to do with the way the two colonial powers dealt with resistance. The Spanish were brutal in their attempts to pacify resistance. While both powers used military means to quell opposition, the French also employed non-military means such as education. Its policy distinguishing the Berber (Amazigh) locals from the Arabs on the educational front is an example of this. Spain, in contrast, went so far as to use chemical weapons as in the Rif War between 1920 and 1926. The Spanish were also far less efficacious compared to the French in Morocco. This is illustrated by their need to ask for assistance from the French in catching the leader of the Rif resistance, Abd el Krim. The official bulletin of the French Protectorate on October 4, 1920, referred to the gas used in the Rif region Melilla: In the region of Meknes, two small rebellions broke out—one in Meknes and another in Ifrane, in the center of the Beni Mtir territories. The people seem incensed over the chemical gas incident in Melilla.

Last but not least, Spain was already very problematic for King Hassan II, who had mobilized 350,000 unarmed Moroccans to claim rights for Western Sahara as a formerly Spanish colonized land. These were the main reasons why Spain was never able to achieve the same kind of relations with the locals that the French had developed with them. Therefore, King Hassan II referred to the Spanish only once in his membership application letter. The third question concerns identity and geography simultaneously. Turkey and Morocco are both Muslim-majority countries. However, Turkey has long envisaged itself as being part of Europe, and has regarded Europe and being in Europe as a measure of advanced civilization. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, strove to achieve sustainable civilizational progress, which he saw as being attainable by reaching, and even surpassing Europe in this regard. Turkey’s engagement with the EEC and the EU today can be seen as a vestige of this vision. The notion of a European Turkey was envisaged by President Turgut Ozal when the country applied for EEC membership at the same month and year as Morocco did. Turkey’s justification as well was based on a presumed common history and culture shared with Europe. However, Turkey and Morocco’s experiences with Europe are different. Turkey never experienced direct European colonial rule while Morocco was very much f­ amiliar

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with such rule as a French protectorate. It is interesting that both Turkey and Morocco used the same argument to lay claim to European-­ness despite their very distinct histories. Turkey and Morocco’s geographical proximity to Europe is also different. While Morocco’s only geographical claim being part of Europe comes from its sharing a common Mediterranean border with France via the Strait of Gibraltar, through its Western Thrace region, Turkey shares a contiguous land mass with Europe. This puts Turkey at an advantage vis-à-vis Morocco in its claim of being European. Malta and Cyprus, on the other hand, also referred to their colonial past with Europe (albeit via the British legacy there) to claim European status during their application to the EEC in 1990. However, as was the case for Portugal, the European Commission had significant reasons, as well, to allow Malta and Cyprus to become members. As the product of the transformation of the ordinary into the extraordinary, the King’s European Morocco tells the story of Morocco’s attempt to become part of the EEC. It details the unfolding of an ordinary political tale into one having rather significant ramifications in terms of political science. It looks at the efforts of Morocco to be an EEC member not through the eyes of the European Commission which knew Morocco was not European. Rather, it tries to develop a perspective from the eyes of Morocco which thought of itself as European. The King’s European Morocco is then an analysis of how King Hassan II tried to justify the European-ness of Morocco according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome that says “Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community.” The King’s European Morocco looks at how this justification was formulated in the King’s speeches and how it was discussed in Morocco, France and Europe during the evaluation of the application letter between July and October 1987. It stands apart from many other works in the literature since it explains how rather than why Morocco applied for EEC membership and what was used for its justification for doing so. The King’s European Morocco makes wide use of primary sources. These include speeches made by King Hassan II where he addressed Morocco’s membership application to EEC, found in Moroccan newspapers in the archives of the Rabat National Library (BNR), the French Protectorate documents in the Center of Diplomatic Archives in Nantes (CADN), the archives of French newspapers in National Library of Bordeaux and the Bordeaux University Library. Interviews were also conducted with Moroccans living at the time the membership application was

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made, in Rabat and Casablanca, the two cities from which the French ruled the Protectorate. The research shows that King Hassan II instrumentalized the hybridity that had formed between the French and the locals during the French Protectorate, using it to superimpose European-­ ness onto the Moroccan national identity. This formed the backbone to his justification that Morocco had the right, as a European state, pursuant to the requirements of Article 237 to apply for membership in the EEC. The King not only refers to Europe and France both directly and indirectly to justify his application for membership in the EEC but also to the support he received for and challenges to his decision to seek admission. Thus, the King had imbued Morocco in a European-ness, an identity that served as the basis for his European Morocco project. Suffice it to say, the King’s European Morocco is a book about how King Hassan II uses Morocco’s historical experience with Europe to justify identifying Morocco as European, within the framework of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. It argues that respect for Islam during Lyautey’s administration between 1912 and 1925 resulted in successful interaction between the French and locals, which led to a kind of hybridity stemming from the inbetweenness of the two further. It maintains that the King was able to instrumentalize this hybridity to create a postcolonial Moroccan national identity that laid claim to be European. It examines the image of Europe in different periods of Moroccan history to show how European-ness was amalgamated with other elements to produce a postcolonial Moroccan national identity, despite having been forged through a unification of the country against Europe (the French) by King Hassan II. Chapter 2 focuses on the role of respect for Islam under the 1912–1925 Lyautey administration played in creating successful interaction between the French and the locals. The respect Lyautey had for Islam in Morocco under the Protectorate gained him favor in the eyes of Moroccans. The King was later able to draw upon this historical respect to instrumentalize a hybridity between French and locals to formulate a postcolonial Moroccan identity. In examining how this came about, this chapter also shows how Moroccans during the time of the protectorate perceived Lyautey and France. It underscores the successful interaction between the French and the Moroccans under the French Protectorate. Chapter 3 analyzes postcolonial Morocco between 1956 and 1987  in terms of how the country was able to come to terms with and nullify the negative impacts of both the French and Spanish Protectorates. The chapter provides numerous examples of areas where Moroccan elites and

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­ on-­elites tried to neutralize the French and Spanish impacts on Moroccan n national identity. It relies upon a critique of postcolonial nationalism by focusing on how Moroccan-ness and African-ness were used to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate and colonialism in general on Morocco. Chapter 4 analyzes the Ming’s European Morocco in terms of inbetweenness and admiration for Europe, which are themes of postcolonial nationalism. It covers how King Hassan II formed his application letter, and how this application was welcomed in France, Morocco and the European Commission. Chapter 5 provides a comparative perspective of the King’s European Morocco vis-à-vis Tunisia, Algeria, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey in order to understand the essences of engagement with the EEC. Chapter 6 is the conclusion, which summarizes key findings, ideas and outcomes that need to be sorted out to ultimately appreciate the King’s European Morocco.

Notes 1. European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community were the three pillars of the European Communities, that were later associated with the 1965 Merger Treaty. European Economic Community was turned into European Community in 1993 Maastricht Treaty, that also became a pillar to the European Union, with Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. 2. Civil controllers.

CHAPTER 2

Creation of Hybridity in Morocco: 1912–1925

Abstract  By looking at the French Protectorate in Morocco, the author in this chapter tries to show how the French managed to create a hybridity between themselves and Moroccan locals. The author specifically refers to the respect for Islam that the French adopted during Resident General Hubert Lyautey tenure between 1912 and 1925 as an implementation of successful interaction between the French and locals that much later led King Hassan II to instrumentalize this hybridity to assert that Morocco was European according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Keywords  French Protectorate in Morocco • Respect for Islam • Resident General Hubert Lyautey • Hybridity The King’s European Morocco bases its premise on the basis of instrumentalization of hybridity between the French and locals during the French Protectorate episode with specific emphasis to respect for Islam at General Lyautey’s period. As a subtheme of postcolonial nationalism, hybridity is a component of inbetweenness that repudiates the notion of pure culture in former colonized states and that maintains instead that the culture of those states in the postcolonial context is the result of a combining of local culture and the culture of the former colonizer (Dirks 1992: 6). An example of this is the dualism of identity and soul found in the contemporary African’s psych, which results in his historical encounter © The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9_2

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with the European (Gilroy 1993: 30). Another form it assumes is hybridity, as in the hybridity upon which the King’s European Morocco is based. This hybridity results from the cultural intertwining of the colonizer with the colonized during colonization, which leads to an intermingled culture. Conceptually, it is best exemplified in the notion of “almost the same but not white,” hybridity (Bhabha 1994: 91). In addition, hybridity is regarded as the feeling peculiar to colonial subjects from Asia or Africa who have created a balance at their culture by mixing their local one and the culture of their former colonizer. Is the postcolonial culture of the once colonized subjects composed of their local culture and the culture of their former colonizer? In order to achieve this hybridity, a successful interaction between the colonizer and the colonized is necessary. The 1912–1925 years under the rule of General Lyautey illustrates such a successful interaction. It would be hard to understand King Hassan II’s instrumentalization of hybridity between the French and locals while justifying how Morocco was European according to Article 237 without how the French interacted with the locals between 1912 and 1925.

2.1   The Essence of the French Protectorate in Morocco Hybridity between the French and locals started in the French Protectorate of Morocco, which was established in 1912 with the Treaty of Fez. Nevertheless, there were already European settlers who were interested in Morocco and their conquest of today’s Moroccan lands began by the early fifteenth century. The subjugation of the city of Ceuta by the Portuguese in 1415 was followed by the arrival of the British, the Dutch and the French, an influx that continued until the settlement of French and Spanish Protectorates, which lasted from 1912 to 1956. Europeans were drawn to Morocco for what they could gain commercially and as part of missionary zeal. Over time, their motives became more political resulting in increased imposition of political structures. In the century, France turned its colonial sights on Morocco having conquered Algeria and Tunisia and placing them under its colonial yoke. Transforming Morocco into a French Protectorate in 1912 formalized the French conquest. Yet the state of affairs was quite different from what existed in classic French colonialism, under which full assimilation of the subjugated land was vigorously implemented. What the French put in

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place in Morocco was an associationist model. Accordingly, the Protectorate would not be ruled by the French government in Paris but rather by a local leader. This model was patterned after British colonial policy in Africa. France appointed Hubert Lyautey as the Resident General, or colonial governor, of the Protectorate. The everyday rule of the country would be in the hands of the local elite called the moulay. This meant that the Moroccan sultan, already the traditional leader of these elite, continued to serve in this capacity. As Lyautey said: Morocco is a Protectorate. Before the war, people resisted direct government, suffering great pain, and even death. The war forced us to change our view of Morocco. We do not seek to impose political domination on or restrict the liberties of its people. We want to administer Morocco peacefully by establishing minimal political control and working in close association with its own governmental organs and in line with its own customs and liberties.1

The French were most interested in two regions within the Protectorate. One was Blad al Makhzen around the western and southern parts of Morocco, where the French centrally governed the Protectorate through the sultan and his subjects who had accepted his authority and were paying taxes. Another was Blad as Siba, mostly the eastern part of Morocco, where there were Arabs and Amazighs who did not accept the authority of the French and the sultan. The people of Blad as Siba, as Muslims, thought of the French as infidels because they were Christian. They found it difficult to accept the dominance of Christianity in Morocco. The French were forced to pacify the resistance movements arising in Blad as Siba throughout the entire duration of the Protectorate. They ended up administering the Protectorate from Blad al Makhzen, along with the sultan and his subjects. The French policies in Blad al Makhzen under the rule of Resident General Lyautey between 1912 and 1925 were respectful of Islam in general. As he stated: It would be wrong not to respect Islam in Morocco since I see that it has become its core possession. Our administration should never disrespect Islam here, because it can make our job here increasingly more difficult. We must achieve pacification as soon as possible.2

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Lyautey fully understood that Islam constituted the central component of national identity in Morocco and took hands-off approach to the faith of its people. Lyautey attempted to respect Islam by valuing the locals, paying honor to the sultan, enabling people to go on with their daily life by maintaining la politique musulmane,3 and providing a secular education coexisting alongside an Islamic one. 2.1.1   Valuing the Locals As the first Resident General of the Protectorate, Hubert Lyautey placed great importance on the locals living in Morocco. As a result of his military experience, he had found out that the Moroccan soldiers were the strongest the French had ever fought. In a letter to the French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré, he said: The Tunisian is a woman, the Algerian is a man, and the Moroccan is a lion. On all French fronts, the Moroccans seem to be the most heroic soldiers of all the overseas troops.4

Lyautey also praised the military capabilities of the locals in Morocco to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Theophile Delcassé: The Moroccans are descendants of the Berbers (Amazighs), who made North Africa a part of the Roman Empire arsenal. Morocco is an artifact of the Moroccans, without any trace of Europeans.5

Lyautey had a constructivist image of the Protectorate. However, this clashed with what the French government had in mind. Lyautey often opposed Raymond Poincaré, who insisted that Morocco should be administered in such a way as to benefit France and not the locals. General Lyautey had a different idea. He believed that the Protectorate should serve the development of Morocco and its people as well. In a letter sent to Theophile Delcassé, Lyautey underlined how the French needed to develop the Protectorate in Morocco on behalf of the Moroccan sultan. The letter shows how Lyautey did not want any military or police action to be taken against the locals. He also criticized colonialism: I do not think that the colonial war is as dirty and destructive of civilization as it is in Europe. It alone makes life, and is constructive. Second, the imagery of the pacification must be in the name of the sultan. This type of

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­ ropaganda suggests that in Morocco, there is no military operation but p rather police actions to establish order within the Makhzen. Furthermore, France does not conquer a foreign country; it re-establishes the order threatened by anarchy. It restores the state here in Morocco, it unifies an Empire.6

2.1.2   Paying Honor to the Sultan The French Protectorate assured the survival of Moroccan institutions and the sultan’s religious powers (Esperandieu 1947: 11). The French administration in Morocco would just introduce some reforms that would contribute to the Moroccan development. While doing it, the sultan’s religious prestige would be protected. Lyautey was particularly vehement about reforms since he regarded the Moroccan sultan as the sultan of the whole Muslim world. He once said: For all the Muslims of the Maghreb until the southwest Wahran and to Timbouktou, the Moroccan sultan was the legitimate power of Islam without any comparison between the bey of Tunis and the khedive of Egypt.7

Lyautey had also accepted the role of the Moroccan sultan before the French came and set up the Protectorate. As the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, the Commander of the Faithful, and the head of Churafa, the sultan was able to use his judicial power over the community. He would appoint naqibs and quaidas to rule on his behalf (Bidwell 1973: 90). The sultan was the central unit of the Protectorate for Lyautey. He said: The Sultan is the key to this system. He is the Moroccan atom.8

Lyautey considered Morocco in a different light than he did Tunisia or Egypt. It was the position of the Moroccan sultan as the actual ruler in the Protectorate that put Morocco in a class by itself: Morocco is not Tunisia or Egypt. The Residency invokes the theoretical nature of the sharifian9 powers. The Tunisian beyliks10 and Egyptian khedives11 were different.12

Lyautey not only called for holding the sultan in esteem. In fact, the Treaty of Fez also specified that the sultan was to be the final authority in the Protectorate. In addition, Moroccan laws were to be respected, efforts

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were to be made to raise the educational level of the locals while respecting religion, and the French settlers in the country were to be expected to respect the social relations of the locals. As the first and third articles of the Treaty of Fez stipulated: 1—The government of the French Republic and his Majesty the Sultan have reached an agreement regarding Morocco whereby new political, judicial, military, economic and finance institutions will be established through new reforms. This regime will accept the current religious and traditional values of the Sultan, and the exercise of the religion Islam religion and its institutions. It will create a reformed Makhzen. The government of the French Republic will also recognize the Spanish interests in the country. Tangiers will retain its international status. 3—The Government of the French Republic agrees to take all the steps necessary in the event that the personality or the power of the Sharifian Majesty is endangered. (Lugan 2011: 237)

Once the Treaty of Fez was ratified, General Lyautey embarked upon the Blad al Makhzen reforms, beginning at the level of the sultanate. Before the creation of the French Protectorate, as the descendant of the Prophet, the sultan enjoyed absolute power and his religious authority went hand in hand with his political authority. General Lyautey decided to protect the powers of the sultan in the Protectorate as well. Once he had guaranteed the survival of the sultan’s religious and political prestige so that there would be no more Islamic rebellion, he replaced Moulay Youssef with Moulay Abdelhafed. The viziers, except for the vizier in charge of foreign affairs, also continued their work. Lyautey once said: In order to preserve the prestige they had due to the religious nature of their governments, they had to live isolated from Europe. The quaidas and the religious chiefs had to find the vizir sitting on the carpet, as was the ancient custom.13

2.1.3   La politique musulmane Lyautey’s respect for Islam covered the sultan’s authority, customs, traditions and human rights of Moroccan locals (Cherif, 1988: 112). Opposing assimilation, he developed a philosophy to maintain a Protectorate in Morocco; la politique musulmane. Accordingly, the integrity of Moroccan locals and the inalienability of Islamic institutions in Morocco would be respected (Rivet 1996: 131). General Lyautey wanted to combine respect

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for Islam with la mission civilisatrice, which would be used to instill French civilization in Morocco (Hoisington Jr. 1995: 33). At the same time, la politique musulmane would make General Lyautey protecting the local customs that safeguarded the role of Islam in daily life. It was again la politique musulmane that guided the administrative and educational reforms that he undertook during the first twelve years of the Protectorate. However, these reforms only covered the lands of Blad al Makhzen, where the sultan’s sovereignty was recognized, and not Blad al Siba, where the sultan lacked authority and the French subsequently had to try to quell Amazigh resistance (MacMillan 1992: 13). La politique musulmane was directly reflecting the concerns of Moroccan locals, one of which was the French women’s prostitution activities. French prostitutes were working in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca, which was particularly disconcerting to the conservative Moroccan locals. Subsequently, a dahir14 that imposed restrictions on the activities of these women was promulgated by the General Residency on December 18, 1912. This law called for their imprisonment in the event that they were caught in one of the brothels located in quarters of these cities. Another concern was the alcohol consumption. La politique musulmane entailed the strict prohibition of the sale of alcohol by the French settlers or soldiers to Arabs and Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen. This issue had been brought to the attention of General Lyautey by the Grand Vizir Mohammad al Moqri, who complained about the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in the city of Fez. Moqri said that the French settlers were selling alcoholic drinks near the mosques and madrasas. He also argued that the French soldiers were being bribed not to control the sale of alcoholic drinks in the city of Azrou. In a letter he addressed to Moulay Youssef on January 10, 1913, he said; Considering the opposition to European foreigners in our Cherifien Empire who are selling alcoholic beverages, it is important to be reminded that the consumption of these beverages is forbidden to Muslims. I urge you to pass a law that strictly prohibits this practice.15

Upon Moqri insistence, Moulay Youssef asked Lyautey to take measures to halt the sale of alcoholic drinks in Blad al Makhzen. In response, on January 14, 1913, Lyautey issued a dahir that prohibited the sale of alcohol to locals there.

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As part of la politique musulmane, on August 30, 1914, a dahir forbidding French people from entering Islamic places such as mosques, zaouias, turbas and cemeteries was issued. This dahir was followed by another, on October 3, 1914, that expropriated the lands of Islamic buildings. Accordingly, the lands of the Islamic buildings would merely belong to the Sharifian Empire and would not be possessed by the French settlers. Two years later, on June 26, 1916, Lyautey decreed yet another dahir that prohibited photographing or filming of religious buildings and the sultan’s palace. It said: Islamic residences including the sultan’s palace would not be filmed or photographed.16

However, the prohibition on foreigners entering Islamic places was challenged by French settlers who had taken their complaints to Quai d’Orsay in Paris. This resulted in a new dahir on May 18, 1921, that made possible the entrance of the French colons to such places so long as they got special permission from the General Residency. Even so, Lyautey himself refused to enter the harem of Moulay Idriss in Fes in 1923 when he was sick, for instance. Another aspect of la politique musulmane had to do with leaving religiously important traditions such as the quaidas untouched. This included, for instance, the hadiyya custom whereby a gift was offered to the sultan on religious days and festivals when he was addressing the people. Since he saw that religious customs were of profound importance to the locals in Morocco, Lyautey did not want to change or touch them in any way. In the letter Lyautey wrote to Lieutenant Le Glay on February 3, 1916, he said: We must continue to live with the qaida. We must not deprecate it when it annoys us. Instead, we must consider the qaida as if it were a young woman who does not hate the fact that we have wisdom of it and know how to practice it.17

To demonstrate the respect he had for Islam in Morocco at that time, General Lyautey even gave permission for the religious Aid al Kebir festival to be celebrated in the streets during his residency. He even provided assistance to poor Moroccans who were not able to buy an animal to sacrifice. As the official bulletin on October 17, 1916, states:

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Aid el Kabir was celebrated with minimum incident. In the city of Meknes, assistance was provided to the poor people who could not afford to buy and sacrifice sheep in the market.18

This practice continued even in 1917. As the official bulletin on September 14, 1917 states: The Aid el Kabir festivities passed without any incidents. The local chiefs and notables while returning from Fez were very satisfied with the reception that was shown to them when they were in Fez before they returned.19

2.1.4   Secular Education Coexisting Alongside an Islamic One For Lyautey, education was one of the most important tools he could use to modernize the Protectorate. Initially, he considered instilling a secular education by having the French language taught without touching the religious schools. This was a reflection of the respect Lyautey had for Islam in the Protectorate. He did not want to do anything that would undermine the ascendancy of religious schools that trained Arabs, so Lyautey decided to start out by having French taught to the Amazighs. As he said, Linguistically, we must directly switch from Arabic and Amazigh to French. To do this, we need to have our educational officers work on studying Amazigh dialects. Moreover, we must establish Franco-Amazigh schools where we teach French to young Amazighs. We will set up these schools in the mountains, away from the Arabic influence.20

Accordingly, French education began to be provided to the Amazigh in Blad al Makhzan. This educational system had three main goals. First, it would be implemented in Morocco under the leadership of the Protectorate administration. It would involve, in part, decreasing the authority of the mosques in education and requiring official permission to open a school. Second, the schools would be divided into schools for Europeans and the Jewish population and schools for Muslims (Rivet 1996: 242). Koranic schools and their curriculums would not be considered part of the official educational system. The Ecole Superieure de Langue et des dialects Amazighs (E.S.L.D.B)21 was founded in 1921 to train the future leaders of Morocco. The school was designed to be a linguistic study center

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and training institute having two goals: to produce functionaries for the Protectorate by training children in such areas as interpretation, linguistics and local law, and to prepare them to take examinations in literature in the faculties at the University of Algiers and Bordeaux. The third goal of the French educational system was to open Franco-Arabic schools in Fez and Rabat. These schools would provide both a religious and scientific education, but the elite schools would be private ones offering Islamic education. The French placed special importance on public schools since they would train artisans that would work in French interests in the future. They were supposed to train agriculturalists, merchants and artists who would work in the production circuit and exchanges with Europe (Merrouni 1993: 20). In the final year of Lyautey’s post in Morocco, Protectorate education was divided between schools for Europeans and Jews, on the one hand, and Franco-Arabic schools and the E.S.L.D.B., on the other. In the first thirteen years of French rule in Morocco, the educational system designed by Lyautey worked properly. The locals received both an education in the positive sciences and religious training (Bensamoun 2007: 268). Between 1925 and 1930, the number of Franco-Arabic schools dramatically increased. However, the nationalist uprising in 1925 had a negative impact on this system. Qarayiwin University, which had been the center of higher religious studies, became a bastion of political discourse and Moroccan nationalism. The Moroccan Action Committee was also founded at Qarayiwin University in 1934. In 1941, the Protectorate decided to separate girls from boys in classes and created a special college for girls in Rabat. In 1944, this system was extended to all schools in Morocco and continued until 1956.

2.2   The Image of Lyautey in Blad al Makhzen: 1912–1925 The practices embodied in Lyautey’s administrative policy of respecting Islam led to a successful interaction between the French and the locals in Blad al Makhzen. They enabled the French to readily win the hearts of both the elites and the locals. The number of naturalizations performed by the French grew, as did the desire of the locals to become naturalized French citizens. Letters about Lyautey and his administration were quite positive. One of them is the letter written by Moulay Youssef to General

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Lyautey on March 11, 1916. He was the political elite of the colonial Morocco by that time, just like King Hassan II in independent postcolonial Morocco in 1987. In the letter, where Moulay Youssef shows his support of Lyautey, he said: I have the pleasure to admit that in all the regions I have passed, I have seen the most perfect order and peace thanks to the collaboration that increased the quality of the relationship between the French and Sharifian authorities, and united them. This collaboration may just be an advantage of a union in our imperial city Rabat. Spurred on by the greatest desire to ameliorate the conditions of my Muslim subjects, I am resolute to continue the most loyal and active progress and civilization construction that has been amalgamated by the government of your Republic.22

Another example of this support by Moulay Youssef for General Lyautey from Moulay Youssef is seen in a telegram dated November 2, 1917. In it, Moulay Youssef wrote that Lyautey was a friend of Moroccans since he was able to recognize the Muslim identity of the locals: On the occasion of the fifth year of your entrance to the glorious French army in Morocco, we congratulate with the best wishes that our friend and collaborator is still in our hearts. He was so integrated with the Muslim community and with the rights of our ancestors. We express the unanimous thought of our people by wishing you a great glory for France protecting of our state. We owe you a lot for the pacification and progress you gave to us.23

The importance of Lyautey’s positive regard for Islam in Moulay Youssef’s support of him can also be seen in a letter dated July 4, 1924. Moulay Youssef asserted that he would remember the respect Lyautey had shown to Moroccan religious institutions and local customs as a form of integration of the French with Islam in Morocco; We will try, Mr. Marechal, to continue what you have done in this country. We know very well that you will always take care of this country since you responded to the call of duty to work here in your long career. History then will remember this great artifact, the just and equitable man who did a lot for this Sharifian Empire. It lets us remember with gratitude, in this meeting, all the respect that you showed us, our religious institutions, our traditions, and our local customs, with order and peace.24

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One year later, Moulay Youssef made the same claim to Lyautey in a letter dated February 6, 1925. Youssef once again showed how much he admired France: About you, your Excellency, member of Makhzen, Pachas, Notable residents of Rabat and Salé, let me reread the feelings we have for you. We have in common everything that is essential to life: respect for religion, traditions, social hierarchies, love of order and peace. We understood among the Muslim population sympathy and a reciprocal confidence that led us to accomplish together in this country your pacification and reconstruction of the progress France wanted for us; you are the implementer of the French state’s pacification and reconstruction.25

As in the case of Moulay Youssef, who was part of the elite, the locals, as well, were quite happy with Lyautey’s administration. A local called Mohammad Guebbas wrote to General Lyautey on July 14, 1914, saying that the people of Morocco love General Lyautey a lot because he had respected the Muslim traditions during his rule: We have great confidence in your love for this Sharifian Empire, love also for the people of Morocco. The best proof of this love is in the respect that you have for the religious rites, also to the religious institutions and Muslim traditions, since Islam is not a religion of obscurity and abuse. You also conquered the hearts of Moroccan people through your gestures. The order and the peace established in this country are as important as the friendships in these lands. Be certain General, the Moroccan people will never forget your services, and all Moroccans would like to see you among them. This empire will take its place among the most civilized nations thanks to you.26

An anonymous telegram sent to Lyautey also displayed the sympathy people had for Lyautey. It highlighted how Lyautey had understood the Muslim soul in Morocco within the context of education and social life: Everything has been said concerning the life of the colonial construction. This magnificent construction made at the same time the great soldier, a pacificator, a builder of cities and organization in of the French Morocco. He attained among Moroccans an incomparable prestige thanks to the charm brought by his personality, his qualities of heart, and also his comprehension of the Muslim soul. He liked the Muslims and in return the Muslims formed an attachment to him. He was a Christian who liked the Muslims. We can say that the secret of Lyautey’s success in indigenous politics was

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based on his love for the Muslims while at the same time he knew how to administer them. Thanks to Lyautey, the reorganization of high Islamic education, institutions of the Muslim colleges, the schools of notables, and Muslim primary schools was carried out.27

Lyautey’s respect for Islam was also highlighted by Si Abdellah el Fassi when he wrote: The idea that pervaded the whole program of the Protectorate was to enable the Moroccan people to progress and to raise the country up to the same level of other civilized nations, by introducing reforms that would bring progress, well-being and peace, without touching religion, by assisting and empowering the Makhzen and by offering its Sharifian sovereigns power to it.28

Many others demonstrated their great admiration for General Lyautey by referring to him as the founder of Morocco. Salah ben el Fqih Zaroui el Marrakech, in his telegram to Lyautey, wrote: You are the great, the powerful, the universal, the wise, the clever, the recoverer, the light, the sun, and the guide of our Maghreb, the one who made the order, the prosperity, the birth, and glory of this country. God bless you General. I one more time glorify your angels, your saints, people who always obey you and people who know your felicity. I wish that your great name be exalted as the Great Recoverer.29

Even Jewish locals supported Lyautey’s administration. A Jew by the name of Moqarram el Hamzaoui expressed the admiration he had for Lyautey and the French rule in a letter dated on October 5, 1915: On behalf of the universal Israelite people, on behalf of the professors and students of the Israelite community in Morocco, I wish you a warm welcome. We greet the French occupation in our country because we believe that the honor to work under the three colors of France will bring our families dignity and prosperity. Our love for your beautiful and noble France is more than esteem; it is an admiration. Our teachers taught us to praise France by talking to us in our history courses about how France emancipated human history. Moreover, we want you to believe that if we are Moroccan by birth, we definitely hope to be called French one day, French at heart.

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The positive image the French had in Morocco during the Lyautey administration was not only manifested with letters. In contrast to the classic colonialism, identified by naturalization of locals by the colonizers, the locals in Morocco actually asked to be naturalized. As General Jambon stated to General Lyautey on June 9, 1923, even the Moroccans living in the Spanish Protectorate cities like Tangier asked to become naturalized French citizens: A Moroccan local, originally of Tangiers, having done three years of military service in one of our regiments, and currently working at the Casablanca Hospital, asked me how to go about becoming naturalized. This local had lived two years in the Metropole, which means I believe there is no obstacle to making him French.30

2.3   Assessment The French Protectorate in Morocco had been administered in a way that was different from what had come to be expected under classical French colonialism. It was also the best implementation of French indirect rule in the Maghreb region. With eighty years of colonial experience in Algeria and twenty-five years of experience in Tunisia, the French were fully confident about how to rule Morocco. For the French, Morocco was a good example of the efficient administration of a Protectorate. The key component of the efficiency behind the Protectorate rule was the respect given to Islam, which in the Protectorate was crystallized with valuing the locals, paying honor to the sultan, la politique musulmane, and secular education coexisting alongside an Islamic one. These four implementations led to the creation of a successful interaction between the French and locals, which is clearly seen, thanks to selected letters written for and about Lyautey from state and non-state elites. This successful interaction on the basis of respect for Islam at the end managed to create a hybridity between the locals and the French. King Hassan’s justification of European Morocco, therefore, stands on this hybridity that was created out of this interaction. Morocco then used this claim of European identity to justify that it had the right, under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, to apply for membership to EEC in 1987.

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Notes 1. Le Maroc est un protectorat. Avant la guerre, on résistait avec peine et déjà presque sans conviction à cette poussée que beaucoup croient fatale vers le gouvernement direct, vers l’annexion de fait, précédant l’annexion légale. La guerre nous a fait une nécessité absolue de changer de voie. Le protectorat c’est la pénétration économique et morale d’un peuple, non par l’asservissement à notre force ou même à nos libertés, mais par une association étroite dans laquelle nous l’administrons dans la paix par ses propres organes de gouvernement, suivant ses coutumes et ses libertés (Gruner 1984). 2. Letter to Poincaré from Lyautey: Ça sera une erreur de ne pas respecter l’Islam ici. L’Islam est dans la possession des Marocains. Notre administration ne doit jamais cesser de montrer du respect à l’Islam. Sinon nos affaires seront plus difficiles. Nous devons achever la pacification de ce pays le plutôt possible (Rivet 1996). 3. Muslim politics. 4. Letter to Poincaré from Lyautey: Le Tunisien est une femme, l’Algérien est un homme, Le Marocain est un lion. En effet, sur le front de la France, les Marocains semblent avoir été les hommes de guerres les plus héroïques parmi tous les contingents originaire d’outre-mer (Rivet 1996). 5. Letter to Delcassé from Lyautey: Les Marocains sont les descendants des Berbères qui avaient fait de l’Afrique du Nord un des greniers de l’Empire Romain. Le Maroc est une œuvre des Marocains sans traces des Européens (Rivet 1996). 6. Letter to Delcassé from Lyautey: Je pense que la guerre coloniale n’est pas une guerre sale et destructive de la civilisation comme en Europe. Elle est seule faite de vie, elle est constructive. Deuxièmement, l’imagerie de la pacification doit être pour e compte du sultan. Cette trouvaille de propagande suggère qu’il n’y a pas au Maroc des opérations militaires, mais des actions de police pour régler le makhzen. Ainsi la France ne conquiert pas un pays étranger, elle rétablit l’ordre menacé par l’anarchie. Elle restaure l’Etat ici au Maroc. Elle unifie un Empire (Rivet 1996). 7. Pour tous les musulmans du Maghreb et même au-delà, jusqu’au sud-ouest oranais et même à Tombouctou, il est le vicaire légitime de l’Islam sans comparaison avec le bey de Tunis ou l’khédive de l’Egypte (Rivet 1996). 8. Le sultan est la clé de voute du système, l’atome marocain. (Rivet 1996: 130). 9. There are basically two explanations for this concept. One says that the word sharifian comes from Moulay Ali Sharif, the founder of the Alaouite dynasty, which is believed to be the origin of Morocco’s royal family. The second one states that the word means the descendants of Prophet Muhammad, which Morocco’s royal family adopted as a symbol of status.

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10. The local ruler in Tunisia. 11. The local ruler in Egypt. 12. Le Maroc n’est pas la Tunisie n’est pas l’Egypte. La résidence invoque la nature théocratique du pouvoir chérifien. Le beylik tunisien et le khédive égyptien sont différents (Rivet 1996). 13. Le sultan et ses vizirs en raison du caractère religieux de leur gouvernent devaient, pour conserver leur prestige, vivre plus isolés de l’élément européen. Les caïds et les chefs religieux qui se rendent dans une beniqa du makhzen pour y trouver le vizir entouré de ses secrétaires travaillant assis en cercle sur des tapis, selon l’ancien coutume” (Rivet 1996: 179). 14. Decree. 15. Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Letter to Moulay Youssef from al Moqri, January 1, 1913: Considérant que l’accroissement de la population européenne dans notre empire chérifien a mené l’installation de nombreux débitants de boissons alcoolisées dans certains de nos villes fortunées. L’usage de ces boissons étant interdit aux Musulmans, il emporte d’empêcher ceux-ci de contracter des habitudes contraires aux perceptions de notre religion. Je vous prie d’arrêter ça par un règlement rigoureux. 16. The dahir of June 28, 1916: Tous les moyens qui seront utilisés à filmer ou photographier les résidences islamiques, ainsi que la palais du sultan, seront interdites. 17. CADN, Letter to Le Glay from Lyautey, February 3, 1916: Il faut continuer à vivre avec la qaida. Il ne faut pas la maudire quand elle nous gêne, mais plutôt la considérer comme une bonne fille qui ne déteste pas qu’on a la lutine, si l’on sait y faire. I didn’t understand this citation, check the original one. 18. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, October 17, 1916: L’Aid el Kabir a été célébré partout sans le moindre incident. Dans la ville de Meknes, l’aisance étant cette année générale et les moutons affluant au marché, les pauvres qui n’avaient pu célébrer la fête ces dernières années ont pu acheter et sacrifier leurs moutons. 19. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, September 14, 1917: Les fêtes d’Aid el Kebir se sont passées sans incidents. Les chefs indigènes et notables de retour de Fez ont été très satisfaits de l’accueil, qui leur a été réservé en tous lieux ainsi de leur séjour à Fez. 20. CADN, Letter from Lyautey to Marty and Bremont, April 2, 1916: Au point de vue linguistique, nous devons tendre à passer directement du berbère au français. Pour cela, il nous fait des Amazighisants et nos officiers de renseignements doivent se mettre résolument à l’étude des dialectes ­berbères, il faut créer aussi les écoles franco berbères ou l’on apprendra le français aux jeunes berbères. C’est dans la montagne qu’il faut les former et les garder pour protéger de toute imprégnation arabe.

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21. Superior School of Arabic Language and Amazigh Dialects. 22. CADN, Letter from Moulay (This should be before his first name on every note) Youssef to Lyautey, March 11, 1916: M. Le General, J’ai eu le plaisir à me rendre compte que toutes les régions où je suis passé règnent l’ordre le plus parfait, la paix la plus complète grâce à la collaboration si exemplaire qui unit les autorités françaises et chérifiennes. Cette collaboration ne peut que se rassurer davantage par la Réunion dans notre ville impériale de Rabat. Animé du plus grand désir d’améliorer la condition de mes sujets Musulmans, je suis résolu à continuer mon concours le plus entier et le plus loyal à l’œuvre de la civilisation entreprise par le gouvernement de votre république. 23. CADN, Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, November 2, 1917: A l’occasion du cinquantenaire de votre entrée dans la glorieuse armée française, où vos illustres services vous ont permis de conquérir le premier rang, nous vous félicitons et partageons nos vœux les cordiales pour que nous puissions conversez longtemps encore auprès de nous, notre ami si cher à notre cœur, et éminent collaborateur qui nous aide dans nos devoir envers notre communauté musulmane et nos droits souverain que nous ont légué nos ancêtres sanctifiés. On exprime la pensée unanime de notre peuple en vous souhaitant longue vie pour la plus grande gloire de la France protectrice et le témoignage de notre pays pour les bienfaits de pacification et de progrès dont il vous est redevable. 24. CADN, Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, July 4, 1924: Nous ne cesserons point, Monsieur le Marechal, de glorifier ici l’œuvre admirable que vous avez réalisé dans ce pays. Nous savons bien que vous ne vous laisserez jamais éblouir par les élues et les louanges, car vous estimez que, durant votre longue carrière, vous n’avez fait que répondre à l’appel du devoir. Il appartiendra donc à l’histoire, ce grand arbitre, de rendre le juste et l’équitable hommage à celui qui a tant fait pour cet empire chérifien. Il nous ait permit de rappeler avec gratitude, dans cette Réunion, tout le respect que vous avez toujours témoigné, pour nos institutions religieuses, nos traditions, et nos coutumes locales, les portant avec ordre et paix. 25. CADN, Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, February 6, 1925: Quant à vous excellence, membre du Makhzen, Pachas, Notables habitants des villes de Rabat et de Salé, ai-je à vous relire les sentiments qui nous cassent. Tout ce qui fait l’essentiel de la vie nous est commun, respect de la religion, des traditions, des hiérarchies sociales, et l’amour de l’ordre et de la paix. Nous nous sommes compris et il s’est noué entre le peuple musulman et moi une sympathie et une confiance réciproque qui nous ont permis d’accomplir ensemble dans ce noble pays, qui est le vôtre, l’œuvre de pacification, de reconstruction, et de progrès que la France s’y était donné.

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26. CADN, Letter from Guebbas to Lyautey, July 14, 1914: Nous avons pleine confiance dans votre amour pour cet empire chérifien, amour aussi grand que celui du peuple marocain pour votre personne. La meilleure preuve en est dans le respect que vous professez à l’égard de rites religieux, ainsi qu’à l’égard des institutions musulmanes et des traditions nationales qui, d’ailleurs, méritent bien d’être conservées. Car islam n’est pas une religion d’obscurité et d’abaissement. C’est ainsi que vous avez conquis les cœurs de tous les Marocains, à tel point que toutes les bouches chantent vos louanges et ne cessent dı citer vos fait et gestes. Et y a aucune exagération, car l’amitié est fondée sur les bienfaits, et quel bienfait plus important que la sauvegarde des personnes et des biens et l’établissement de l’ordre et de la sécurité de tout le pays. Le peuple n’oubliera jamais vos bienfaits. Tous les Marocains veulent vous voir demeurer parmi eux, sain et sauf. Le Maroc va se placer parmi les pays les plus civilisé grâce à vous. 27. CADN, Anonymous telegram to Lyautey, April 3, 1915: Tout été dit sur la vie de l’œuvre coloniale. Cette œuvre magnifique appartient désormais à l’histoire et la postérité que Marechal Lyautey a été en même temps qu’un grand soldat, un pacificateur, un bâtisseur des villes, et organisateur de Maroc français. Il a exercé sur les Marocains un prestige incomparable, grâce à la séduction qui menait de sa personne, à ses qualités de cœur, et aussi à sa compréhension institue de l’âme musulmane. Il a aimé les musulmans et en retour ceux-ci lui ont voué un attachement que l’épreuve de la grande guerre a révélé sincère. Il était un chrétien qui aimait les Musulmans. On peut dire que le secret de l’étonnante réussite de Lyautey en politique ingénieux réside en grande partie dans le fait qu’il a aimé les Musulmans en même temps qu’il a su les gouverner. Grace à Lyautey, une réorganisation du haut enseignement islamique, institutions des collèges Musulmanes, des écoles de notables, des écoles primaires musulmanes ont été construites. 28. CADN, Letter of el Fassi to Lyautey, September 24, 1918: L’idée qui résume tout le programme de Protectorat est de faire progresser le peuple marocain et de l’amener au même niveau que les nations civilises, en introduisant les reformes qui amèneront les progrès, le bien-être et la paix, sans toucher la religion, en assistant et en renforçant le makhzen et en lui conservant sa puissance chérifienne souveraine (Rivet 1996). 29. CADN, Letter of Zaroui to Lyautey, February 26, 1923: Toi le grand, le puissant, l’universel, le sage, le clément, le Miséricordieux, le Guérisseur, accorde la guérison de celui qui a rétabli l’ordre, la prospérité l’aisance, la gloire de ce pays. Dieu guérie Mr le Maréchal, j’intercède auprès de tes prophètes, tes saints, des gens qui t’obéissent, et de ceux qui jouissent de ta félicité, que ton nom soit exalté, Toi le Grand guérisseur. 30. CADN, Letter of General Jambon to Resident General Lyautey, June 6, 1923: Un indigène marocain, originaire de Tanger, ayant accompli 3 ans de service militaire dans un régiment tirailleur et employé actuellement à

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l’hôpital de Casablanca, m’ayant demandé la marche à suivre pour se faire naturaliser français. L’Indigène en question serait disposé à faire séjour de deux ans dans la métropole, si, comme il l’a entendu dire, ce séjour devait favoriser sa naturalisation.

References Primary Sources The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, October 17, 1916 The official bulletin of the French Protectorate in Morocco, September 14, 1917 Letter to Delcassé from Lyautey on March 23, 1912 Letter to Poincaré from Lyautey January 3, 1912 Letter to Delcassé from Lyautey on December 24, 1913 Letter to de la Roca from Lyautey November 11, 1921 Letter to Poincaré from Lyautey on December 4, 1913 Letter to Moulay Youssef from al Moqri, January 1, 1913 Letter to Le Glay from Lyautey, February 3, 1916 Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, March 11, 1916 Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, November 2, 1917 Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, July 4, 1924 Letter from Youssef to Lyautey, February 6, 1925 Letter of el Fassi to Lyautey, September 24, 1918 Anonymous telgram to Lyautey, April 3, 1915 Letter from Guebbas to Lyautey, July 14, 1914 Letter of Zaroui to Lyautey, February 26, 1923 Letter of al Hamzaoui to Lyautey, October 5, 1915

Secondary Sources Bensamoun, Yvette Katan 2007. Le Maghreb: De l’Empire Ottoman à la fin de la colonisation française (The Maghreb: From the Ottoman Empire to the End of French Colonization). Paris: Editions Belin. Bhabha, Homi. 1994. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge Classics. Bidwell, Robin. 1973. Morocco Under Colonial Rule. London: Routledge. Cherif, Rachida. 1988. Le Makhzen Politique au Maroc: Hier et Aujourd’hui (The Political Makhzen in Morocco: Yesterday and Today). Casablanca: Afrique Orient. Dirks, Nicholas. 1992. Colonialism and Culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Esperandieu, Pierre. 1947. Lyautey et Protectorat (Lyautey and the Protectorate). Paris: Editions Pichon-Durant.

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Gilbert, Bart Moore. 1997. Postcolonial Theory: Context, Practices, Politics. London and New York: Verso Editions. Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gruner, Roger. 1984. Du Maroc traditionnel au Maroc moderne: Le Contrôle Civil au Maroc: 1912–1984 (From Traditional Morocco to Modern Morocco: Civil Control in Morocco: 1912–1984). Paris: Nouvelle Editions. Hoisington, Jr, William. 1995. Heritage de Lyautey: Nogues et la politique française au Maroc 1936–1943 (Heritage of Lyautey and the French Politics in Morocco: 1936–1943). Paris: Editions Harmattan. Hoisington, William, Jr. 1984. The Casablanca Connection, French Colonial Policy 1936–1943. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press. Lugan, Bernard. 2011. Histoire du Maroc: Des origins à nos jours (History of Morocco: From Origins to Nowadays). Paris: Editions Ellipses. MacMillan, James. 1992. Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898–1991. New York: Hodder Headline Group. Merrouni, Makki. 1993. Le problème de la reforme dans le système educatif Marocain (The Problem of Reform in Moroccan Education System). Rabat: Editions Okad. Rivet, Daniel. 1996. Lyautey et l’Institution du Protectorat Français au Maroc: 1912–1925 (Lyautey and the Institution of the Protectorate in Morocco: 1912–1925), Tome 1, Paris: Editions L’Harmattan.

CHAPTER 3

Nullification of French Protectorate and Colonialism Impacts: 1956–1984

Abstract  Since the author links the identity dimension of Morocco’s membership application to the EEC in 1987 to postcolonial nationalism that comes with the subthemes of critique to colonial, inbetweenness and admiration for Europe, the author in this chapter depicts how Moroccan state elites tried to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate and colonialism through Moroccan-ness and African-ness compatible with the first two subthemes. The chapter is a prerequisite for King Hassan II’s application to the EEC, as an implementation of the admiration of Europe. Keywords  Moroccan-ness • African-ness • Inbetweenness • Critique to colonial • Admiration for Europe The French Protectorate in Morocco was established in 1912 and abolished in 1956. With the independence coming in 1956, efforts to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate and colonialism began in Morocco. These nullification efforts meant to erase the impacts of the French Protectorate on Morocco and were reflection of the critique of the colonial subtheme of postcolonial nationalism pioneered by Aimé Cesaire, Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi. In Discourse on Colonialism, Cesaire called for the African people not to accept the definitions created by the colonizers for them (1955: 77). This theme was repeated in Black Skin White Masks by Frantz Fanon, who recommends the black man stop © The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9_3

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­ roving himself to the white man by rejecting every dogma, institution p and identity he created (1955: 10) and cut all the ties with Europe in order not to be evaluated within slave-master context after decolonization, as said in the Wretched of the Earth (1963: 57). Memmi, in The Colonizer and the Colonized, also contributes to the rejection of colonial impacts after decolonization by arguing that the European-African relationship that was defined in the framework of colonizer and colonized must be rejected (1965: 84). The critique of the colonial subtheme of postcolonial nationalism formed the backbone of modern postcolonial studies. Bart Moore Gilbert in Postcolonial Theory reviews postcolonialism as a set of actions that challenges the dominance of Europe as the colonizer on the colonized in the context of imperialism and neocolonialism (1997: 12). Leila Gandhi, too, in Postcolonial Theory regards postcolonialism as a forgetting process about the painful years of colonialism (1998: 5). Last but not least, Robert Young, in Postcolonialism, defends it as the challenge of the colonized versus the colonizer in the postcolonial era by launching an investigation on the impacts of the Western cultures on the non-Western ones (2011: 6). The efforts of the state and non-state elites to nullify the impacts of the French on Morocco between 1930 and 1956 stemmed from the deviation of the French from respect for Islam.

3.1   Deviation from Respect for Islam in the  Post-­Lyautey Period: 1930–1956 Resident General Hubert Lyautey’s tenure as an administrator of the French Protectorate expired in 1925 because of both personal reasons and the wishes of the French state. In the post-Lyautey period, the Protectorate was administered by sixteen different Resident Generals. Several factors prevented these Resident Generals from working as effectively as Lyautey. These included rising nationalism that led to the establishment of political parties by the 1930s, the invasion of France by Germany in the Second World War, and the intervention of American troops in Morocco by the 1940s. More importantly, there was a deviation from the respect for Islam that had been observed during the Lyautey administration. In 1930, Resident General Theodore Steeg promulgated a dahir that prohibited the Amazighs in Blad al Makhzen from practicing Sharia law alongside French laws. The 1930 dahir obliged the Blad al Makhzen Amazighs to adopt only secular French laws. Resident General Auguste Henri Ponsot,

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who ruled the Protectorate between 1933 and 1936, also promulgated a dahir on May 3, 1935, that aimed to settle the Muslims in the Jewish quarters called mellahs in Blad al Makhzen. The 1935 dahir also forced Muslim women to work as cleaning ladies in Jewish houses. All these internal and external factors created a strong antipathy towards the French in Blad al Makhzen, which had once been the hub of Lyautey’s Protectorate. By the 1930s, a small network of young Arab nationalists had started to come together in Fes, Rabat, Salé, Tetouan and Casablanca to discuss what they could do to abolish the Protectorate. The groups were greatly inspired by Salafi reformism, Wilsonian principles of self-determination, the military success of Ataturk in Turkey, Abdelkrim’s Rif Republic, the rise of the Pan-Islamic movement, and stirrings of nationalism in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent (Wrytzen 2011: 231). According to the official bulletin published on May 10, 1934, a group had declared the French rule in Morocco as assimilationist, illiberal, obscurantist and racist. The deviation from respect for Islam was answered by a deviation from respect for Lyautey: The politics of France, in a country where 200,000 French and seven million Moroccans live is characterized as follows. It is racial: People are divided into Europeans and Moroccans. It practices fiscal and budgetary favoritism: Islamic justice is not included in the general budget. It is obscurantist: The French director of Muslim education in Morocco said that European politics will be taught to students. It is illiberal: Moroccans, currently, do not have even a single publication to express their own opinions. It is colonialist: The best, most fertile lands are being distributed to the Europeans. It is assimilative: It inspires direct administration and an organized struggle.1

Of the two dahirs, the one that caused the most consternation in society was the one promulgated in 1935. In a letter dated June 4, 1935, Commander Brat admits that the 1935 dahir was a problem in the Blad al Makhzen. He said: Dear Commander, the question of the habitation of Muslims with the Jews in the same quarter, or the employment of Muslim women in Jewish houses has occupied Makhzen for a long time now.2

Vizier al Moqri had also referred to it in a letter he sent to Resident General Charles Hyppolite Nogués on October 20, 1941. Al Moqri asked General Nogués to reconsider the validity of this dahir. He said:

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The sultan wants to keep his religious principles and his sacred traditions. The Muslims were settled in the same houses with the Jewish whereas their beliefs and values are totally different. The sultan started to conduct a survey on the possibility of such implementation. Please proceed with this survey.3

The 1935 dahir was not the only problem in Blad al Makhzen. The international status of Islam in that period was also troublesome to the locals. The official bulletin on November 9, 1943, expressed how the locals had been influenced by the attacks from Europe in the Middle East: The Cairo Pan-Arabe Congress sparks a vital interest at Rabat nationalists where it is said that the nationalist structure would be formed after the Ouhadia al Arabia war by the adoption of Cairo delegates. It is equally precise that the Arab Union would group within Egypt, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, Muslims of Russia and North Africa. It is indicated that the delegates of Algeria and Tunisia would depart to Cairo soon. Morocco has already been represented by Hadj Mohamed Ben el Yamani Naari. Nationalists in Rabat criticized the position of the French government, which had opposed the formation of such a union. They added that France was the chief enemy of Islam.4

The deviation from respect for Islam was also highlighted by some French intellectuals. As Felix Ferdinand Taillard argues in Moroccan Nationalism: French girls bicycling in short skirts menaced the entire future of the Protectorate. This lack of respect for Islam could be seen even in the officials: the Controlleur Civil Pussié used to send his clerk to preach in the mosque, while in 1934 the Government permitted Catholics to hold a Eucharistic Congress in Fez. (1947: 163)

The French were aware of the critical situation in Morocco that had triggered nationalist movements. It was stated in the official bulletin on August 28, 1942, that there was an anti-French attitude in the city of Fez, where Lyautey had once been highly admired: When General Juin came to Fez, the population was quite hostile. The increase in the costs of living (transportation, tobacco etc…) had made them angry. These increases coincided with the Af Seghir Feast and were very badly received and triggered nationalist feelings. General Juin was

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accused of provoking the Moroccan population. These price increases will definitely be used in the anti-French propaganda in Morocco.5

It was stated in another official bulletin on September 7, 1944, that nationalists were dangerous for the French Protectorate: We signal the possibility of a regrouping of the partisans of El Hassani el Ouazzani in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca, where the Khoumiyyas were numerous. These people ask for compulsory education, protection of indigenous property, increased protection of cultural legacies, creation of industries, freedoms to organize trade unions, and justice reforms.6

Moroccan-ness as a result of the deviation from respect for Islam was being used by Moroccan political parties. Between 1930 and 1956, the Communist Party, the Istiqlal Party, and the Democratic Party for Independence worked systematically to make Morocco independent. Among these, Istiqlal Party was quite central. Its leader, Allal al Fassi, wrote a letter on January 1, 1947, to the French Ambassador, reminding him of the importance of the manifesto and Moroccan independence: The Istiqlal Party, faithful to Moroccan aspirations, affirmed in a manifesto dated January 11st 1944 the impossibility of the evolution of the country in the context of the Protectorate. However, we see today that the French Republic wanted to adapt a political system in Morocco on behalf of the Istiqlal Party that is not suitable to the dignity and the blood of the Moroccan community. It is only the establishment of Moroccan independence that guarantees the integrity of its territory.7

Allal al Fassi also threatened the Ambassador of the Netherlands because he thought that the representative office of the Netherlands worked in favor of the French rule. In a letter addressed to him, he said: We have the honor to inform you that we are not criminals but nationalists. We are the seed from which the youth of Morocco have germinated. Now we are writing to you on behalf of the Moroccan population. Here is the case: your consulate in Rabat works for the deterioration of relations between the two countries. The Moroccan people ask you to change your consulate in Morocco. If you do not do it, military measures will be taken by us. We will also sabotage your commercial existence in Morocco.8

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The positive image of Europe, thanks to Lyautey’s respect for Islam, was obfuscated by the rising Moroccan-ness. Nevertheless, Lyautey was still admired by Moroccan people. In an essay competition, an essay about Lyautey’s tolerance for Islam, which was written by a student named Kadri Mohamed, came in third: If one needs to clarify one of Lyautey’s greatest qualities, it was his ability to bring together young intellectual collaborators capable of working with him. In Algeria and Tunisia, he chose functionaries who were distinguished professionals. Morocco also had French administrators that knew the Muslims for a longtime. As a consequence, they were able to understand and direct Moroccans through a new way that would touch them. Plus, Morocco is the first ring of an alliance between the French and the Moroccans for the greatest glory of the two states. Pacifying a state where dissidence ruled it for centuries was not easy. Lyautey knew the qualities of the Moroccan people. He always attributed a particular value to the evolution of clans, and did not pay off Muslim organizations bringing civilization to their villages Therefore, education was methodically organized in Morocco.9

3.2   Nullification of the French Protectorate Impacts Through Moroccan-ness The antipathy towards the French that came with the deviation from respect for Islam in the post-Protectorate years between 1925 and 1956 led to the rise of Moroccan-ness. This was the first time Moroccan-ness had become a component of national identity after the process of a unification of the locals with an awakening movement. The Istiqlal Party, employing it, became the driving force behind the process that led Morocco to independence and formed the first postcolonial government in 1956. Having adopted a critique of the colonial, it started to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate within Morocco. The Istiqlal Party’s first plan was to change agrarian policy. On September 27, 1957, it embarked upon a comprehensive agrarian reform that distributed the lands once possessed by the French to Moroccan villagers. This reform aimed at liberating Moroccan villagers from the previous French agrarian policy, which had favored the French over the local peasants. As al Fassi, as the leader of the party, said:

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Moroccan villagers will make their own revolution. Our rural world, which played a fundamental role in the national history, has unfortunately remained in a state of stagnation over the past couple of centuries due to invaders. History will say that the Moroccan nation has had to pay a high cost to keep its integrity and sovereignty. And it is our villagers who have suffered the most in this secular self-defense. That is why we declare an agrarian revolution today. We want the villager make his own revolution by understanding his own interest and that of the nation.10

Istiqlal Party’s effort to nullify the impact French rule had had on the country was supported by non-state actors too. Non-state actors called upon the state to take action in specific fields while nullification attempts were being made. Once the agrarian reform was completed, a civil society organization called La Manutention Marocaine highlighted the impacts of French and Spanish Protectorates on language. La Manutention Marocaine emphasized the necessity of using Arabic as the working language in order to nullify the impacts of French Protectorate on the Moroccan language. It said: It is not beneficial to point out the difficulties of Arabic as the language of labor because of the richness we observe in the French language in terms of style (common style, literature, scientific, journalistic). But the Arabic language remains dependent on stylistic standards. It is true that we do not want to use [Modern Standard] Arabic names on a daily basis, but this is a style that we want to design by using Arabic as the language of labor.11

L’Union Marocaine de Travail12 Editorial Board also supported Istiqlal Party. In an article where the necessity of abstaining from the common market proposed by the Treaty of Rome in 1955 was emphasized, the Board said: The common market is one of the problems that is currently occupying the governments of Western Europe. It seems that this project, if it sees the light of day, will no doubt constitute a radical solution to all of western capitalism’s difficulties, which have resulted in an economic gigantism that traverses the colonized states. What is left to Morocco is to show prudence and not to tie up its future in these unnecessary engagements. It is not beneficial for us to take this subject into account. What we can add is that the common market is just an aspect of the appetite of the imperialist capitalism born in Europe. It is up to us not to participate in it.13

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A day after the article was published, Istiqlal Party member and editor of Al Istiqlal journal Mohammad Lahbabi in his column wrote that administrative reforms in the French Protectorate had led to a dysfunctional Moroccan government and institutions. He said: The Protectorate was counting on the realization of the depersonalization of the Moroccan state and the consolidation of the colonial regime. The reforms of the Protectorate had the official goal of liquidating Moroccan institutions, in order to erase their efficiencies, and their character. The government of the French Republic and the Government of his Sherifian Majesty established a regular regime founded on internal order and general security that would allow the introduction of reforms providing economic development, which is not legitimate. Since August 1953, policies were taken by lost rulers.14

Citizenship was another area where efforts were made to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate. A journalist by the name of At Talia pointed how the French were still regarding the Moroccans as “colonized locals” and how the French air and navy forces were still active in Moroccan lands and seas. He said: It is even the same in the countries of the East, under socialist regimes, or in the states of America. We are considered as foreigners. But it is completely different in the European countries where Moroccan citizens continue to be called indigenous. In France, for instance, Moroccans are arrested and imprisoned for anything; sometimes for nothing, through the execution of extraordinary laws that were made against our Algerian brothers. The well-­ being of Moroccan citizens is not respected when they are subject to having their airplanes chases, or their frontiers and water supplies continually violated. In order to prevent such events, it is necessary to be independent, and to want it in real terms.15

Moroccan-ness, which was used to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate, was also used for the Great Morocco Project. Mohamed V who was the Moroccan sultan at that time gave great support to Istiqlal Party. Related to this was the issue of Western Sahara which was put on the agenda. In a regular visit of his to the city of M’hamid in southern Morocco near the Western Sahara border, Mohamed V criticized the Spanish interests in the lands of Morocco. He said:

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Faithful subjects of the Sahara! One of the dearest wishes we have long held is to pay a visit to this part of the Moroccan Sahara, to find ourselves among these people, to show you our interest in this region of our country. Our grandfather Moulay Hassan paid two visits to the Sahara in order to consolidate the unity of Morocco and its sovereignty over the total parts of our national territory when the foreigners were ruling our lands. We are determined to continue to work to improve your living conditions and to assure progress in meeting your religious, social, economic and cultural needs and to enable you to benefit from independence and the liberty of our country. We solemnly swear that we will follow up with these actions for the return of our Sahara to us, in the context of our historical rights and the wish of Sahara residents to join our state. It is for us an encouragement to realize the aspirations of the Sahara residents, who are already ours, and all the free Moroccan citizens who want their state to recognize the dignity and greatness of the Sahara region.16

The intention to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate also concerned the territories drawn by that time. Four days before the Moroccan army had moved on Algeria, which had asked Morocco to return the cities of Tindouf and Bechar. King Hassan II who replaced Mohamed V upon his death said that no other state could invade Moroccan lands in any way suggestive of colonial policy: If we claim that we are a strong nation, are independent, and reject all colonialism in any form, we must take what belongs to us from the colonial policies. Our neighbor Algeria is invading our lands and they do not respect Morocco like Morocco respects them. We cannot leave our lands to Algeria. If we do this, we endanger our territorial integrity for which our ancestors gave their blood.17

Moroccan-ness was also used to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate on language. The Istiqlal Party launched an Arabization program that aimed at the purification of Arabic. As Abdellah Memmes, a columnist said: We must speak Arabic or French. Arabic French, this meaningless language, denaturalized, cacophonic magma, issue of two languages for their poetries, starting to be implanted among us. Meanwhile, if anybody is happy to use such words or expressions in their conversation by respecting their accent, the other completely denaturalizes the language and conjugates the Arab verbs in French. Rani m’elegati (je suis degati), marocanisaw (ils sont marocains) are exemples.18

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By the end of 1960s, critique of the colonial was addressed with respect to Spain and the Spanish Protectorate with the intensification of the Western Sahara issue as a domestic problem due mostly to Algerian and Spanish provocations. Allal al Fassi maintained in a speech that the Western Sahara did not belong to Spain: We do not accept such claims, and we are aware that the authorities that are close to Paris would like to shift the Moroccan character of the Western Sahara to the Spanish. They do not want to accept that the phosphate exploitation rights belong to the Moroccans. To offer to France and Spain the possibilities, concessions, and advantages of the exploitation of phosphate of the Moroccan Sahara could constitute the effective propaganda declared only by the Spanish.19

The Moroccan state’s refusal of any claim on Western Sahara by Spain was supported by non-state actors too. After the Green March that King Hassan II had mobilized with almost 300,000 people in 1975, journalist Akram al Yassaoui wrote in his column that the problem of the Sahara was a problem of imperialism. He said: The Arab lawyers stigmatize the colonization of our Sahara and denounce the conspiracy conducted by Spain and imperialism. Stigmatized once again by the pursuit of colonization by Spain of our Sahara of an Arab-African nation, we condemn the waves of repression engaged by the occupation forces.20

Imperialistic aspect of Western Sahara was also lamented by the journalist Mohnir Rahmani. He said: The recuperation of our Sahara is a question of life and death. It is a colonial occupation: there are palaces on the dunes of our Sahara. The Moroccan youth is conscious of the role it would play to liberate our Sahraoui brothers from the hands of colonialism and the unconditional return of the territories occupied to the motherland, Morocco. The occupation of Sebta, Melilla, Sahara and Jafariya Islands cannot be accepted.21

3.3   Nullification of European Colonialism with African-ness Moroccan-ness was strongly used to nullify the French impacts in general and Spanish impacts on the Western Sahara issue. It was a direct movement against the impacts of the French Protectorate, both before

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and after the Lyautey period. A second component of this goal was African-ness, but it was not as direct as Moroccan-ness with respect to the French Protectorate. Rather, it regarded European colonialism in general. The first time African-ness was used and became a component of the postcolonial national identity was at the 1961 Casablanca Conference. Upon the invitation of Sultan Mohamed V, delegations from certain sub-Saharan African states gathered in Morocco to discuss the Congolese and the Algerian independences, racial discrimination against African citizens, the unity of Africa, the organization of institutions in Africa, the nuclear proliferation of the French in the Sahara Desert, and the Ruanda Urundi ethnic conflict. On January 4, 1961, Sultan Mohamed V made an opening speech that emphasized independence, liberation and sovereignty of all the states in Africa. In this speech, where he touched upon the full support of independent states for nonindependent ones in Africa, the sultan emphasized the African-ness of Morocco and underlined how Morocco would fight against the future colonization of Africa. He said, We, the chiefs of African states, brought together in Casablanca between January 4th and 7th 1961, are conscious of our responsibilities towards the African continent. By proclaiming our determination to make liberty triumph all over Africa, and to realize its unity, by affirming our wish to conserve and consolidate our unity of vision and action to keep the independence, sovereignty, territorial, and national integrity of Africa in our international relations, by proclaiming our wish to liberate African territories under foreign domination and to deliver them help and assistance, to liquidate colonialism and neocolonialism in all forms, not to encourage the establishment of troops and foreign military bases that would endanger the liberation of Africa, to employ ourselves to fight against the political interventions and economic pressures, by proclaiming the necessity of all African states to use the natural resources for the benefits of their own people and nation, we express our aim to free Africa, our fight for its unity and provide its security.22

African-ness was used on other occasions to nullify impacts of colonialism too. Sultan Mohamed V gave another speech on March 22, 1961, to the African delegations about that the need to get rid of the racist attitude of the European colonialism as soon as possible. He intended to liberate all of the African nations from the colonial system in Africa, which was still racist and neocolonialist. For this purpose, Sultan Mohamed V called for African states to cooperate under the shadow of the United Nations. He said:

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Let us map the course for a new Africa, through the vital interest of the people of Africa who are obsessed with peace and liberty. In fact, the regime of the classical colonialism that we know accepted its defeat at last. We, who trust the mission of the United Nations, who believe in the benefits of international cooperation decided to liquidate the remaining colonial regime. We are the men of good standing whose principal desire is to put an end to the colonial system. Africa lived a period in its history in which it was colonized, divided, exploited and humiliated. The main aim of this summit is then to liquidate the colonial regime, eliminate racism, fight against neocolonialism, defend the independence of African states, provide the non-alignment movement in Africa, and evacuate all foreign forces from our lands.23

At the end of the conference, the resolution called the Casablanca Charter for the establishment of the African Union for an Independent Africa was signed by the participants. In addition, the African-ness of Morocco was added to the 1962 Constitution: Article 1: Morocco is a constitutional monarchy that belongs to Africa, with Islam as the official state religion and Arabic as its official language.24

Two years after the summit, the Organization of African Unity was founded and Morocco became a member in 1963. On the twelfth anniversary of Morocco’s membership, King Hassan II highlighted the importance of freedom in Africa in a speech he gave to the Moroccan parliament: The date of August 20th constitutes the starting point of the eradication of colonialism on our African continent. It is evident that the ones who sacrificed their liberty and their lives are the heroes of this history.25

The African-ness of Morocco was also affirmed by Prime Minister Dr. Azzeddin Laraki. In an interview he gave about Morocco’s cooperation with the Latin American states, he said: Morocco is an African state and nation. We are perhaps the African state that can best cooperate with Latin America because we have the instrument of Spanish language. Morocco represents a unique case of decolonization. If we take into account 50 years of colonization, it is a parenthesis in a long history.26

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Princess Laila Fatima Zahra underlined African-ness of Morocco at the Women African seminar in Casablanca: Together we will treat together the problems and will find solutions by assuring that our people will be in good shape and with a better future. I estimate that these meetings will have the same success on the African continent, of which Morocco is part.27

3.4   Assessment Between 1956 and 1984, Moroccan-ness and African-ness were used to nullify the impacts of the French during the Protectorate times. When the post-Lyautey Resident Generals began deviating from the respect for Islam previously practiced under the Protectorate, both state and non-­ state actors began getting involved in challenging the French Protectorate. This resulted in the advent of a sense of Moroccan-ness, which was later to become a component of postcolonial Moroccan national identity. The rise of Moroccan-ness in turn led to the independence of Morocco in 1956 from both Spain and France. The rise of Moroccan-ness and subsequent independence spawned a critique of the colonial in Morocco, which was a mostly Istiqlal Party endeavor. As a tool for criticizing colonialism in general African-ness had also been superimposed onto the Moroccan national identity by the 1961 Casablanca Conference. All in all, the Moroccan state and non-state elites used Moroccan-ness and African-ness to nullify the impacts of the French. While they were working on it, the images of Europe and France were quite negative, naturally. European-ness that was added by King Hassan II to the postcolonial Moroccan national identity that the next chapter dwells upon was amalgamated with Moroccan-ness and African-ness in given conditions.

Notes 1. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, May 10, 1934: La politique de France, dans un pays qui compte, à cette époque 200.000 Français et 7 million de Marocains, y est ainsi caractérisé: Elle est raciale: On est traité selon qu’un Européen, ou Marocain. Elle pratique le favoritisme fiscal et budgétaire: le contribuable marocain est surimposé. Il est plus imposé que l’Européen. La Justice islamique n’est même pas inscrite au Budget Générale. Elle est obscurantiste: le directeur français de l’enseignement

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musulman au Maroc a dit: l’école se contente d’accroitre la valeur normale de la capacité professionnelle du Marocain. La politique au sens européen et actuel de mot ne peut convenir à l’œuvre du progrès qui s’accomplit ici. Elle est antilibérale: les Marocains, à l’heure actuelle, n’ont pas une seule publication pour exprimer leurs opinions, même dans le cadre rigide des lois en vigueur. Elle est colonisatrice: en ce sens qu’elle se préoccupe de rafler les meilleures terres des Marocains pour les distribuer a des colons parfois improvisés. Elle est assimilatrice: elle s’inspire de l’administration directe et se traduit par une lutte organisée. 2. CADN, Letter from Commander Brat to General Ponsot, June 4, 1935: Cher Commandant, Les questions d’habitation des Musulmans et les juifs dans un même quartier, ou d’emploi des femmes musulmanes chez des Israelites préoccupent le Makhzen d’une manière qu’a toujours été jusqu’à présent. 3. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, October 20, 1941: Sa Majesté veut garder ses principes religieux et leurs traditions sacrés. Les juifs ont commencé à loger avec des musulmans dans la même maison, alors que leurs croyances et leurs valeurs sont totalement différentes. Sa Majesté Chérifien a commencé à organiser une enquête sur la possibilité de cette implication. Procédez s’il vous plait cette enquête. 4. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 28, 1943: Le congrès panarabe du Caire suscite un vif intérêt dans les milieux nationalistes de Rabat où est dit que le projet tendant à la création après la guerre de el Ouhda al Arabia (Union Arabe) aurait été adapté par les délègues du Caire. Il est également précisé que le ‘union Arabe grouperait: L’Egypte-Iraq-Syrie-Liban-Afghanistan-Iran-Musulmans de la Russie-­ Afrique du Nord. On indique que les délègues d’Algérie et de Tunisie partiraient prochainement pour le Caire. Le Maroc était déjà représenté sur place par Hadj Mohamed Ben el Yamani Naari. Les nationalistes de Rabat critiquent la position de gouvernement français contre ce projet. Ils ajoutent que la France se place au premier rang des ennemis de l’Islam. 5. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, August 28, 1942: Au moment de l’arrivée de Général Juin, la masse de population de Fès était hostile à toute manifestation susceptible d’entrainer des troubles. Il n’en est plus de même aujourd’hui à la suite de la récente augmentation du prix de la vie (transports, tabac, farine, charbon etc…). Ces augmentations coïncidant avec les fêtes de l’Aid Seghir ont été très fâcheusement commentées en médina et les nationalistes ont su exploiter le mécontentement ainsi crée. Le General Juin est accusé d’affamer la population marocaine. 6. CADN, The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, September 7, 1944: On signale la possibilité de regroupement des partisans d’ EL Hassani el Ouezzani dans les villes de Rabat et Casablanca où les Khoumiyyes sont nombreuses. Ils demandent alors l’instruction primaire

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obligatoire, une protection de la propriété indigène, l’amélioration de la conservation de la culture, la création d’industries, la liberté syndicale, et la réforme de la justice. 7. CADN, Letter from Al Fassi to the French Ambassador, January 1, 1947: Le Parti d’Istiqlal, fidèle interprète des aspirations marocaines, affirma dans un manifeste de 11.Janvier 1944, l’impossibilité d’assurer l’évolution du pays dans le cadre de protectorat. Alors que la France vient de donner naissance à la 4ème république, le peuple marocain, par la voix de Istiqlal, non seulement dénonce l’abus d’un régime de tutelle incompatible avec sa dignité, mais encore réclame à son droit à la liberté par laquelle il a généreusement versé son sang sur les champs de batailles. Seule, le rétablissement de l’Independence du Maroc garantie l’intégrité de son territoire. 8. CADN, Letter from al Fassi to the Netherlands Ambassador, June 20, 1955: Nous avons l’honneur de vous informer que nous ne sommes pas des criminels, nous sommes des nationalistes d’origine. Nous représentons la cellule de la main de la jeunesse abatie. Voilà le cas, c’est que votre consulat à Rabat travaille pour le trouble des deux pays; Maroc-Hollande. Le peuple marocain demande le changement de ce consul, et si le gouvernement ne décide pas à le changer, la main de jeunesse va le faire avec une mitraillette et nous faisons ballotage de votre commerce. 9. CADN, Mohamed essay on October 3, 1954: Si une des plus grandes qualités de Lyautey fut de s’entourer de collaborateurs jeunes, actifs, intellectuels, capables de le seconder, il choisit en Algérie, et en Tunisie les fonctionnaires qui distinguaient leurs qualités professionnelles. Le Maroc se trouva ainsi pourvu d’administration qui connaît les musulmans, par conséquent qui étaient susceptibles de les comprendre et de les orienter vers la voie nouvelle qu’il leur était tracée. Ainsi le Maroc veilla de renforcer l’alliance entre les français et les marocains pour la plus grande gloire des deux pays. Pacifier un pays où régnait depuis des siècles une dissidence qui ébrouait même parfois jusqu’au trône des souverains, Lyautey connaissait les qualités de peuple Marocains. Lyautey a toujours attribué une valeur particulière à l’évolution des clans, et pouvait se désintéresser de l’organisation musulmane pour que la civilisation entre dans leurs villages. 10. BNR, L’Opinion, September 28, 1957: Le paysan marocain fera sa propre révolution: Notre monde rural qui a joué un rôle fondamental dans l’histoire nationale est malheureusement resté durant les derniers siècles dans un état de stagnation à cause des envahisseurs. L’histoire dira que la nation marocaine a dû payer un lourd tribut pour sauvegarder son intégrité et souveraineté. Et ce sont nos paysans qui ont supporté les plus lourds chargés de cette lutte séculaire de self-défense. C’est pour ça que nous déclarons une révolution agraire. Nous voulons que le paysan, par lui-même, comprenne son propre intérêt et l’intérêt de la nation d’en faire sa révolution.

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11. BNR, L’Opinion, October 28, 1957: A quand la langue arabe de travail? Il est inutile de signaler les énormes difficultés auxquels l’équipe Arabe du travail, car la langue française est riche en variété de style (style commun, style mondain, littérature, scientifique, journalistique). Mais la langue arabe demeure encore dans une grande mesure tributaire des normes qui la figent dans un style. Il est vrai que déjà ce qu’on ne veut pas appeler d’un nom d’Arabe moderne fait sa place de jour en jour. Mais c’est un style que nous voulons designer par l’arabe de travail. 12. The Moroccan Union of Labour. 13. BNR, Al Istiqlal, November 8, 1957: Impérialisme d’un nouveau genre, le Marché commun: Parmi les problèmes qui préoccupent à l’heure actuelle les gouvernements d’Europe occidentale, figure celui du marché commun. Il semble que ce projet, s’il voit le jour, soit susceptible de constituer la solution radicale à toutes les difficultés dans lesquelles ce débat sur le capitalisme occidental et qui résultent d’une part par le gigantisme économique qui traverse les pays colonisés. Il appartient donc au Maroc, qui ne cesse d’être sollicité par le Marché Commun, de faire preuve de prudence et de ne pas compromettre son avenir à des engagements inutiles. Il n’est donc pas utile de nous étendre davantage sur ce sujet. L’on peut seulement ajouter que le marché commun n’est que l’un des aspects de l’appétit du capitalisme impérialiste qui est né en Europe. A nous de ne pas y exposer. 14. BNR, L’Opinion, November 9, 1957: Le Protectorat comptait réaliser la dépersonnalisation de l’état marocain et la consolidation de régime coloniale »: Le Protectorat n’a jamais cessé de se trouver placé sous un régime légal d’état siège. Les reformes du Protectorat ont eu comme but officiel la liquidation des institutions marocaines, d’effacer ses efficacités, et son caractère. Le gouvernement de la République Française et le gouvernement de sa majesté chérifienne, soucieux d’établir au Maroc un régime régulier, fondé sur l’ordre intérieur et la sécurité générale, qui permet l’introduction des réformes et assure le développement économique du pays. 15. BNR, Al Istiqlal, January 1, 1958: Sommes–Nous vraiment indépendants?: Il en est de même dans les pays de l’Est, sous régime socialiste, ou des chefs d’Etats d’Amérique. On y jouait de la considération d’un étranger. Mais il en est tout autrement dans les pays Européens ou le Marocain continue d’être l’indigène. En France par exemple, les Marocains sont arrêtés et emprisonnés pour n’importe quel motif, et parfois sans motif, en application des certaines lois exceptionnelles prises à l’encontre de nos frères algériens. Les biens des citoyens marocains ne sont pas respectés, sans parler des comportements bien plus graves, tel l’arraisonnement d’un avion marocain ou la violation continuelle de nos frontières et de nos eaux territoriales. Pour éviter cela, il faut évidemment être vraiment indépendant et le savoir.

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16. BNR, L’Opinion, February 28, 1958: Le discours de Mohammed V à M’Hamid: Fidèles sujets du Sahara, L’un de nos vœux les plus chers que nous nous nourrissions depuis longtemps était de rendre visite à cette partie du Sahara Marocain, de nous trouver parmi ses habitants, pour leur montrer notre intérêt à cette région de notre pays. Notre grand père Moulay Hasan a effectué deux voyages dans le Sahara pour consolider l’unité du Maroc et sa souveraineté sur l’ensemble des parties de son territoire national au moment où il était l’objet de converties étrangères. Nous sommes bien décidés à continuer à œuvrer pour améliorer vos conditions d’existence, à continuer de vous assurer le progrès dans les domaines religieux, social, économique et culturel, et à vous faire ainsi participer aux bienfaits de l’Independence et de la liberté. Nous proclamons solennellement que nous poursuivrons notre action pour le retour de notre Sahara, dans le cadre du respect de nos droits historiques et conformément à la volonté de ses habitants. C’est pour nous un réconfort et un encouragement pour réaliser les aspirations des habitants du Sahara qui sont les nôtres et celles de tous les citoyens marocains libres qui veulent que leur pays connaisse la dignité et la grandeur. 17. BNR, Le Petit Marocain, March 9, 1963: Si nous disons que le Maroc est un état fort, si nous disons que le Maroc est un état indépendant, et si nous disons que nous refusons toutes les politiques coloniales dans notre pays, nous devons prendre en retour ce qui nous appartient de ces politiques. Notre vision [est que ?] Algérie envahit nos terres et ne respecte pas le Maroc comme le Maroc la respecte. Nous ne pouvons pas laisser nos terres à l’Algérie. Si nous laissons nos terres, ça sera dommage pour notre intégrité territoriale dont nos ancêtres ont sacrifié leur sang pour l’obtenir. 18. BNR, L’Opinion, October 14, 1968: Il faut parler arabe ou le français. L’arabo-français, ce langage broutard, dénaturé, magma cacophonique, issue de deux langues réputées pour leur poésie, commence triomphalement à s’implanter parmi nous. Cependant, si certains se contentent d’employer dans leurs conversations des mots ou des expressions françaises en respectant leur accent, d’autres dénaturent complètement la langue en conjuguant en arabe des verbes français, ou vice versa. Rani m’degati (je suis degati), marocainisaw (ils sont marocains). 19. BNR, La revue spécialisé européenne Chemical News a dit l’exploitation des gisements des phosphates du Sahara était espagnole. On n’accepte pas ça. On remarque, néanmoins, que pour la première fois, des sociétés françaises et non des moindres, dont plusieurs sont très proches du gouvernement de Paris, sont cités parmi les trusts s’intéressés à l’exploitation du gisement miner du Sahara Marocain. Offrir à la France et à l’Espagne les possibilités, concessions et avantages dans l’exploitation des gisements de phosphate du Sahara Marocain peut constituer la campagne de charme déclenchée par L’Espagne.

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20. BNR, L’Opinion, November 29, 1975: Les avocats arabes stigmatisent la colonisation de notre Sahara et dénoncent le complot trompé par l’Espagne et impérialisme. Stigmatisé une nouvelle fois la poursuite de la colonisation par l’Espagne notre de Sahara, la nation arabo-africaine, condamne les vagues de répression engagées par les forces d’occupation. 21. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, November 29, 1975: La récupération de Notre Sahara: Une question de vie ou mort. L’occupation coloniale c’est des châteaux sur le sable de notre Sahara. La jeunesse marocaine est consciente du rôle qu’elle a joué en vue de la libération de nos frères Sahraouis du joue du colonialisme et du retour inconditionnelle des territoires occupés à la mère patrie, le Maroc. L’occupation de Sebta, Melilla, et les iles des Jafariyas (Tarfaya) ne peuvent pas être acceptés comme le Sahara. 22. BNR, Le Petit Marocain, January 5, 1961: Nous, chefs d’états africains réunis à Casablanca du 4 au 7 Janvier 1961, conscients de nos responsabilités à l’égard du continent africain. En proclamant notre détermination de faire triompher la liberté dans toute l’Afrique et de réaliser son unité, en affirmant notre volonté de conserver et de consolider notre unité de vue et d’action dans les affaires internationales pour sauvegarder l’Independence chèrement acquise, la souveraineté, l’intégrité, et la nationalité territoriale de nos états, de renforcer la paix dans le monde en pratiquant une politique de non-alignement, en proclamant notre volonté de libérer les territoires africains encore sous domination étrangère, de leur prêter aide et assistance, de liquider colonialisme et le néocolonialisme sous toutes leurs formes, de ne pas encourager l’établissement des troupes et des bases étrangères qui met en danger la libération de l’Afrique, et de nous employer également à débarrasser le continent africain des interventions politiques et des pressions économiques, en affirmant notre volonté d’intensifier nos efforts en vue de créer une coopération effective entre les Etats Africains dans les domaines économique, social et culturel, nous expressions notre but de consolider la liberté de l’Afrique, de bâtir son unité, et d’assurer sa sécurité. 23. BNR, Le Petit Marocain, March 22, 1961: Elaborons la charte de l’Afrique nouvelle avec un vif intérêt par tous les peuples près de la paix/liberté, aboutisse à des résultats positifs pour la libération de l’Afrique. En effet, le régime colonial classique tel que nous le connaissons a refusé à admettre sa défaite. Nous, qui avons foi en la Mission des Nations Unis, qui croyons aux bienfaits de la coopération internationale et qui sommes décidés à liquider le régime coloniale qui existe encore, sommes en force. On est des hommes de bonne volonté dont le principal souci est de mettre une fin au système coloniale. L’Afrique a connu une période de son histoire durant laquelle elle a été colonisée, divisée, exploitée, privée de ses droits et humiliée. Notre objectif doit être la liquidation du régime colonial, l’élimination du racisme, la lutte contre le néocolonialisme, la défense de l’Independence des pays africains, le non alignement de l’Afrique à l’Ouest, l’évacuation de toutes les forces étrangères de nos pays.

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24. Article 1: le Maroc y est une monarchie constitutionnelle appartenant à l’Afrique, dont l’islam est religion d’état et l’arabe langue officielle. 25. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, August 20, 1975: La date de 20 août constitue le début de l’effondrement du colonialisme dans notre continent africain. Il est évident que ceux qui ont sacrifié leur liberté, leur vie, leurs biens furent les héros de cette épopée. 26. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, July 12, 1980: Le Maroc est un pays et une nation africaine. On est peut-être le pays africain le mieux situé pour la coopération avec Amérique Latine parce que sur le plan culturel, nous avons l’instrument de la langue espagnole dans notre pays. Le Maroc représente dans le processus de la décision un cas unique. C’est une parenthèse dans une longue histoire avec 50 ans de colonisation. 27. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, October 8, 1984: Nous traiterons ensemble les problèmes et trouverons les solutions en vue d’assurer à nos peuples le bienêtre et un avenir meilleur. Je souhaite également que ces rencontres réalisent le même succès par le continent africain dont le Maroc fait partie.

References Primary Sources The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, May 10, 1934 The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, October 20, 1941 The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 9, 1943 The official bulletin of the French Protectorate, November 28, 1943 Letter from Commander Brat to General Ponsot, June 4, 1935 The dahir of June 28, 1916 L’Opinion, September 28, 1957 L’Opinion, October 28, 1957 Al Istiqlal, November 8, 1957 L’Opinion, November 9, 1957 L’Opinion, December 12, 1957 Al Istiqlal, January 1, 1958 L’Opinion, February 28, 1958 Le Petit Marocain, March 9, 1963 L’Opinion, October 14, 1968 Le Matin de Sahara, November 5, 1975 L’Opinion, November 29, 1975 Le Matin de Sahara, November 29, 1975 Le Matin de Sahara, July 9, 1979 L’Opinion, November 2, 1984

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Le matin de Sahara, November 11, 1984 Le Matin de Sahara, October 29, 1984 Le Matin de Sahara, June 6, 1983 Le Matin de Sahara, October 9, 1984

Secondary Sources Cesaire, Aimé. 1955. Discours sur le colonialisme (Discourse on Colonialism). Paris: Editions Presence Africaine. Fanon, Frantz. 1955. Black Skin White Masks. New York: Grove Press. ———. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Gandhi, Leila. 1998. The Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction. London: Allen & Unwin. Gilbert, Bart Moore. 1997. Postcolonial Theory: Context, Practices, Politics. London and New York: Verso Editions. Memmi, Albert. 1965. The Colonizer and the Colonized. New York: Beacon Press. Taillard, Ferdinand. 1947. Le nationalisme marocaine. Paris: Editions du Cerf. Wyrtzen, Jonathan. 2011. Colonial State Building and the Negotiation of Arab and Berber Identity in Moroccan Protectorate. International Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2): 227–249. Young, Robert. 2011. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. New  York: Wiley and Blackwell.

CHAPTER 4

The King’s European Morocco

Abstract  In this chapter, compatible with the admiration of Europe subtheme of postcolonial nationalism, the author discusses Morocco’s membership application to the EEC. The author here refers to King Hassan II’s speeches, how the application was welcomed in Morocco, in Moroccaninternational and the French media, and in the European Commission. The chapter tries to analyze the importance of France in Morocco’s European-ness according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, while analyzing the dynamics of the instrumentalization of hybridity to create a postcolonial Moroccan national identity. Keywords  The King’s European Morocco • European Commission • French media • Admiration for Europe The powerful critique of colonialism also extensively used Morocco’s experience under the French Protectorate. The Moroccan state, as well as nonstate actors, first used Moroccan-ness and then African-ness between 1956 and 1984 to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate and European colonialism. Moreover, the positing of Morocco between Europe and Africa, first in the form of a tree and then bridge in the course of the critique of the colonial, was not a coincidence. It was a reflection of both a position of inbetweenness and admiration for Europe, which were the two other subthemes of postcolonial nationalism. Critique to colonialism and © The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9_4

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inbetweenness were explained in previous chapters in detail. Reference to the French Protectorate in the King’s European Morocco, admiration for Europe needs to be explained as well. As a possible outcome of the inbetweenness, admiration for Europe signifies that some former colonized states might want to seem closer to their former colonizers with regard to foreign policy, economic relations and identity. France, for instance, has played a great role in inculcating this admiration postcolonially by means of francophonie and French linguistic policies that encourage the use of the French language and the operation of French schools in former colonies (Emerson 1995; Guibernau 1996; Harbeson and Rotschild 2013; Martin 2012; Gordon and Gordon 2006). The King’s desire to become a member of the France-Africa Group in 1983 is another illustration of the power of francophonie. Despite the blossoming of Moroccan-ness and African-ness and the efforts to nullify the impacts of the French Protectorate and European colonialism, relations with Europe persisted. While contrary to Fanon’s suggestion that all relations with Europe be cut, ties to France and Spain in particular were maintained. Special economic and cultural attention was paid to the EEC. Successive cooperation agreements were signed with the EEC, one in 1969 and another in 1976. Culturally speaking too, Europe continued to hold a special place within the context of Moroccan national identity for King Hassan II. When describing Morocco, he used the metaphors of tree and bridge, through which he posited Morocco situated between Europe and Africa. He did this while engaging in a critique of the colonial. The King simultaneously acknowledged Morocco’s status as an African state and positioned Morocco within Europe. Referring to the French Protectorate years, he maintained that Morocco could not break from its past. Using the tree metaphor, he said: Morocco resembles a tree whose roots lay in Africa and which breathes through leaves turned towards Europe by the wind. For this reason, life in Morocco is not only vertical. It also extends horizontally to the West, with which we are united through cultural links and secular cults. We neither want nor can sever them.1

On another occasion, King Hassan II referred to the importance of not breaking with the past. Believing that a nation must not forget its past, he specifically added France and Spain to his line of reasoning:

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I do not really think that it is beneficial for a nation to completely forget about its past. Our Soviet friends are praising their ancient wisdom as they praise the heroes of the Soviet revolution. Nations without roots are unhappy. A tree with no roots bears no fruit. It is a dead tree. The tree of Morocco is closer to Spain and Portugal than Federal Germany and Britain. The tree of Morocco is rising on the way to Rabat-Madrid-Paris. France, Spain and Morocco have been intertwined by the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and they also have common cultural ties to new and old culture and civilization.2

The importance of France for King Hassan II’s European and African Morocco was visible in subsequent years too. In an interview he gave to the Marrakech paper Le club de la presse du tiers monde,3 he pointed out how he had grown up in a culture that was both French and locals. He said: I want to tell the French people that I am closer to them regarding state and nation than they could ever imagine. Some of my attitudes were the result of the notions of state I had, but I govern without any emotions. I govern the state. Many times, I respond in ways that might seem absurd to the French people. But the French also respond in absurd ways to us. These are visceral reactions. Why? Because half of my culture is French. Half of my language is French and when I started to speak my first words, I spoke both French and Arabic at the same time, with my Moroccan nanny and French governess.4

Situating Morocco between Europe and Africa as a foreign policy objective was initially used in 1983, a year before the King talked to the French President François Mitterrand at the Fontainebleau Summit about applying to the EEC for membership in the organization. The instrumentalization of hybridity between French and locals used in 1987 to justify Morocco’s membership in the EEC, for which he got the support of Mitterrand in 1984, was rehearsed in 1983, when he applied to make Morocco a member of the France-Africa Group. It was also the first time the King had used bridge metaphor with respect to Morocco: Morocco must join the France-Africa Group. Morocco is a bridge between Africa and Europe through the Gibraltar Strait. It also shares the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, Morocco is a part of both Africa and Europe. We have existed in Africa since the time we were created. This makes Morocco Euro-African, and thus the biggest contributor to this organization.5

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The King also referred to Morocco as a bridge between Europe and Africa a year later when, for the first time, he ambitiously used European-­ ness as a component of national identity. At the same time, he referred to the presence in Morocco of European norms such as a multi-party system, constitution and public liberties that were all created under or as a result of French Protectorate: We will soon have a bridge on the Strait of Gibraltar. This has already been decided upon. Affairs in the Maghreb will be well organized one day. If we can bring gas and petrol one day to Europe over this bridge, Europe will not be able to ignore Morocco, which I think is more European than Greece. Plus, Morocco made a choice. It is a multi-party, and has a constitution and public liberties.6

King Hassan II’s use of the bridge metaphor to refer to Morocco’s being situated between Europe and Africa within a context of Arab-ness, Amazigh-ness and African-ness was praised by Leopold Sedar Senghor. Speaking at the Marrakech National Congress of poets on December 13, 1984, he said: King Hassan II is one of the most cultivated among the African chiefs in all domains. His state is one of the countries that work actively to help form the symbiosis between Arab-Amazigh Africa and Negro African Africa.7

The King’s efforts to portray Morocco as European had a significant outcome. The European Federation of Zootechnics accepted Morocco as a member at its 38th session.8

4.1   The King’s European Morocco King Hassan II submitted an official membership application to the EEC on July 8, 1987. Morocco had many reasons for applying when it did. The literature underlines three important reasons for King Hassan II wanting to make Morocco a full member in the EEC.  These are to modernize Morocco, to provide stable support for Moroccan foreign policy in Africa, and to strengthen the economy through ties with the EEC. As a statesman who envisaged Morocco as a tree with leaves in Europe and roots in Africa, modernization of Morocco was crucial for King Hassan II. Enabling Morocco to become a member of the EEC was one

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of the policies he pursued during his reign to reach this goal. Mark Tessler argues that membership in the EEC would have meant liberalization of political life and monarchy in Morocco. Tessler bases his argument on King Hassan II’s interest in Europe, especially France, as a result of his childhood and youth, which were spent under the French Protectorate. Modernization of Morocco through such membership was also highlighted by Mohsine el Ahmadi. In his view, the road to EEC membership was an outcome of King Hassan II’s progressivist policies, which aimed at modernizing the Moroccan people while protecting the country’s religious morality. In El Ahmadi’s view, application for full membership in the EEC was a concrete step taken by King Hassan II, who had begun modernizing Morocco at the beginning of the 1980s, a process that was accelerated in the 1990s (2006: 43–44). King Hassan II stressed the importance of EEC membership in modernizing both the Moroccan state and the people. However, this was not enough. In order to reach the goal of a modernized state and people, a sustainable and peaceful foreign policy was also necessary. King Hassan II thought of getting the support of the EEC members in Morocco’s foreign policy, especially toward the Maghreb states, with which Morocco was having issues. Flory Maurice argues that full membership in the EEC would bring an interlocutor status to Morocco. Eventually, this status would render Morocco advantageous to its neighbors in the Maghreb, especially Algeria, which was already involved in the support given to POLISARIO in the Sahara case. The advantage King Hassan II expected in Moroccan foreign policy with the full membership in the EEC was also contextualized by Rachid el Houdagui. Accordingly, full membership in the EEC would end Morocco’s feeling of loneliness in the Maghreb against Algeria and the African Union, which were opening supporting the independence of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic. In addition, el Houdagui believes that membership in the EEC would bring more to Morocco than just support in the region. Full membership would demonstrate the continuation of the links between Morocco and Europe, especially with France and Spain (2003: 130). The support expected from the EEC members in Morocco’s foreign policy would not only be against Algeria, however. Abdallah Laroui argues that King Hassan II needed the support of the EEC to slow down, or to annul the plans of a federation among the Maghreb states, something about which Muammar El Qaddafi was greatly lamenting (2005: 112).

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Modernizing Morocco and getting EEC support for foreign policy were the political goals of King Hassan II, but they were not as important as the economic ones. Morocco had serious economic concerns at that time and King Hassan II believed that a full EEC membership would solve all of them. The first concerned the export quota implemented by the EEC, as Ahmed Aghrout and Keith Sutton Source pointed out. In their view, King Hassan II did not want Morocco to remain outside of the EEC orbit primarily due to the quotas that would be imposed on Morocco after the accession of Greece and Spain, in 1981 and 1986, respectively. Similar quota concerns were raised because of Turkey and Cyprus seeking membership in the organization in 1987. The expansion of the body culminating in the creation of the “Europe of the Twelve” posed the ultimate threat to exports. Aghrout and Sutton reckoned that Morocco could face with the danger of not to be able to sell its citrus fruits, tomatoes, table grapes, wine and olive oil to Europe, which could obtain all these products from members such as Spain, Greece, Portugal, or Turkey in the future. As a result, the fear of losing the European market led King Hassan II to apply for full membership in the EEC (1990: 131). King Hassan II also wished to benefit from the potential funds provided by the EEC to member states. Bassma Kodmani Darwish argues that Morocco applied to the EEC to obtain some credits from Brussels, which, for example, gave 160 milliard pesetas to Spain when Spain applied for membership. In addition, King Hassan II hoped that with full membership in the EEC, Morocco would receive from the EEC investments in irrigation, which it needed to produce high-quality agricultural products to export (1990: 90). Full membership in the EEC also had the potential to contribute to economic growth in Morocco, which had an enormous public budget deficit. C. R. Pennell maintains that the deficit was equivalent to 14% of the Moroccan GDP in 1981 and membership would solve this problem. According to Pennell, without the support of the EEC, the government would be hard-pressed to reduce this because it had been dealing with an inflation rate that had been dramatically escalating since 1983 (2000: 358). In addition, as Ahmed Rhazaoui says, problems such as the devastating droughts, severe recessions, high unemployment, social unrest and impacts of the Structural Adjustment Program by the World Bank and IMF would be solved with the full membership to the EEC. Taking aside the reason why Morocco applied to EEC, how Morocco applied to EEC considered by the King’s European Morocco regards six sections in its dynamics. First is the King’s declarations about Morocco’s

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right to be a member of the EEC, second is the support for Morocco’s EEC application in Morocco, third is the challenge to Morocco’s EEC application in Morocco, fourth is the reflection of Morocco’s EEC application to EEC in European and American media, fifth is the reflection of Morocco’s application to EEC in the French media, and sixth is the reflection of Morocco’s application to EEC in the European Commission. 4.1.1   Declarations Although many, these motives were insufficient to make Morocco a member of the EEC. The King would also have to justify how Morocco was European vis-à-vis the terms of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, which required that applicant states be European. The tree and bridge metaphors were this time employed to illustrate Morocco’s European-­ness. To justify the degree to which Morocco was European and to emphasize this component of postcolonial Moroccan identity, the King instrumentalized the hybridity that had evolved between the French and Moroccan locals in the French Protectorate. In a letter addressed to Uffe Elleman Jansen as the Head of Enlargement, he aimed to explain how Morocco met the conditions of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome by demonstrating that Morocco and Europe shared a common culture and history. The letter pointed out that Spain and Portugal, two states that had already been accepted as EEC members, were not unlike Morocco. The King argued that Morocco should be considered in the same light as these two countries, given the Mediterranean’s importance to the EEC. His argument, expressed using long sentences in standard French (that reflected just how ingrained French culture was in Morocco), contained references to Europe, Africa, Morocco and the Atlantic, which emphasizes the geographical dimension. Having indirectly referred to the French Protectorate by using the term “interpenetrated civilizations,” he wrote: Mister President, On the 15th of June 1984, we sent a letter to President François Mitterrand, the President of the European Council at that time, in which we talked about the wish of Morocco to adhere to the Treaties that instituted the European Community. Clearly, we were guided by our conviction that it was then important to give an institutional framework to ancient, multiple, and privileged links that unite the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, within the context of solidarity and intensification of relations

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between the two sides. The option taken by Morocco for the biggest rapprochement with the European Economic Community finds its justification in many orders, which have the same significance and importance. Close geographically, Europe and Morocco have been closely united by history, our civilizations are extremely interpenetrated, and our destinies are intimately maintained. Two world conflicts this century have demonstrated that Morocco, crossed by the Mediterranean and Atlantic on the doors of the Arab world and Africa, integrates perfectly in the same place of peace and stability with European nations. Committed to its fundamental choices, the Kingdom of Morocco has never stopped consolidating and deepening a democratic and liberal experience that not only approaches free Europe, but also that leads the country to adopt an institutional analogy created between the government systems of Europe and Morocco. This political choice, which we acted upon even before it was implemented in Moroccan laws, corresponds to the society and to the civilization that has contributed to the unanimity of the Moroccan nation. We consider it reasonable that Spain and Portugal have been added to the European Community since it highlights the boundaries on the two sides and accentuates the Mediterranean sensibility of the Community. More than ever, we have the conviction that Morocco is not the only party that believes that Europe and Morocco will benefit from the economic and political integration; Europe also thinks so. In addition, we officially submit you a request for membership from the Kingdom of Morocco to the European Communities. Please accept our best salutations, Mister President9

Shortly after the application letter, the King reemphasized the position of Morocco between Europe and Africa in an interview to BBC. Speaking in standard English, again consistent with his European Morocco argument, he said Morocco’s membership in the EEC would provide Europe and Africa with a stable relationship: Interviewer:

Do you think that, for example, on the plan of relations between Morocco and European Community, there are particular points that you would like to state when you meet Margaret Thatcher? King Hassan II: One must say that the position of Britain on Morocco is one of the most flexible, let’s say one of the most hospitable. This is because it is a country in Northern Europe that does not have any particular problems with its agricultural policy. Therefore, we may be able to draw up plans regarding sheep and milk. We are now

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ready to discuss this chapter with Britain. In this context, effectively, the British part was the most comprehensive, or one of the most comprehensive to us, regarding the discussions that we have had with the European Economic Community over the past few months. Interviewer: You are always a long-term candidate… King Hassan II: More than ever, we cannot imagine a fixed relation between Europe and Morocco and Africa without trying to reattach Morocco to the European Communities, in all respects.10 On another occasion where he addressed the British media, the King called attention to the political and economic characteristics Morocco shared with Europe to stress why Morocco should become a member of the EEC. To highlight the degree to which this similarity between Morocco and Europe was entrenched, he went as far back as the twelfth century, well before the establishment of the French Protectorate. While asking for the support of the British in achieving Morocco’s goal of becoming a member of the EEC, he pointed out that Morocco had the kinds of political institutions that should be possessed by a European state: Our democracy, our liberalism, our potentials, our richness lead us to becoming a member of the European Economic Community. Our ambition for Europe is even bigger than it seems for Europe. We have been a part of Europe since the 12th century. We personally addressed a demand to the ex-president of the Community and we wish that it will contribute to our ambition to convince the United Kingdom to support our demand and that we become a member of the Community.11

A week after he spoke with the British media, the King addressed the Moroccan Parliament. In his speech, he stated that he had been assisted by the French President who was the head of the EEC at the time. He also indirectly referred to the French Protectorate, while stating that Morocco was politically and economically similar to Europe. History shows that such concepts as institutions, liberties, public freedoms, political organizations and trade unions were either the product of the French or opposition to them in Morocco. In addition, to justify the membership application, the King argued that Morocco was at least as close to Europe as Greece was. Making his argument with sophisticated French that

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reflected its importance in his education, he once again demonstrated how Morocco had a critical position between Europe and Africa. The official letter of request was submitted to the Community. I received assistance from my friend President Mitterrand [the French President] to do this. The reason behind Morocco seeking EEC membership is more political than commercial or economic. In fact, we want to be a part of the EEC for the very same reasons other European countries want to be. This has to do with having shared values and institutions, liberties, public freedoms, political organizations, and trade unions… Moreover, Morocco is closer than Greece is to Europe. It is certain that the states of the Common Market are divided into two groups: the Southern group and the Northern group. Climatically, the states of the Southern group are concurrent with Morocco. The Northern states are another subject. We have a geopolitical ambition to bring Southern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe via the Mediterranean.12

The last time the King spoke about Morocco’s membership application to the EEC, he once again compared Morocco to Spain and Portugal. He divided Europe into northern states and southern states and put Spain and Portugal into the latter category and saw Morocco as being on par with the two countries. The King also called attention to the economic dimension of Morocco’s justification of being in the EEC once Spain and Portugal were accepted. Writing in French, he also made indirect reference to the French Protectorate years: Morocco is a part of European [French] history, making it a European state eligible for membership in the European Economic Community, which is divided into two parts. One part is composed of southern states, and the other of northern states. We, Morocco, are similar to the southern states of the Common Market. Today, if the EEC accepts Spain and Portugal as members, we also must be accepted as a member. If we cannot be a member of the EEC as Spain and Portugal are now, what will our commercial relations be like with these two countries? It would be difficult to speak of justice.13

4.1.2   Support for Morocco’s Application to EEC in Morocco Morocco’s membership application to the EEC was both supported and challenged. King Hassan II’s instrumentalization of the hybridity between the French and Moroccans to create a postcolonial Moroccan national identity to justify the extent to which Morocco was European

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was supported more than challenged in Morocco. For instance, it was stated in Al Bayane that Morocco should be accepted as a member of the EEC once the French Economic and Social Council evaluates Morocco’s demand: The French Economic and Social Council evaluate the situation of Morocco and the problems posed by the enlargement of the European Economic Community. Morocco was under the aegis of the Protectorate in the 20th century. It is, therefore, Morocco’s right to be regarded as a European state.14

The Minister of Fisheries, Benselem Slimi, also supported Morocco’s application to the EEC by referring to the common past, political systems, economy and culture shared by Morocco and Europe: Morocco could play a determinant role in the rapprochement between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Morocco and the EEC share a convergence of interests that will explain history, cultural affinities, political systems and economy.15

The day after the King had submitted the application letter, the chief editor of Le Matin de Sahara, Ahmed Alaoui, and journalist Mohamed Benissa participated in a conference at the Summer School of al Mouatamid Ibn Abbad d’Asilah. At the conference, to which they were invited as speakers, the authors underlined Morocco’s multicultural identity that included European-ness: Morocco possesses a multidimensional culture because it has managed to enrich its culture through numerous contacts with other civilizations. There is then a harmonious mixture of African-ness, European-ness and Latin American-ness in Moroccan culture. One cannot deny the European side of Moroccan identity as one cannot deny the African, Latin American and the Arab aspects of Moroccan national identity.16

The belief in the intersectionality of Morocco, Europe and Africa, which the King expressed through his use of the metaphors of tree and bridge, was shared by Abdelkader Berramdane. In his article, Berramdane showed that the culture of Morocco was formed over a century ago by the great powers of Europe:

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Morocco and the Occident; for a century, Morocco has been at the intersection of the grand strategies of foreign powers, which have shaped their authority, art and sensibility. These relations have structured today’s Morocco.17

Morocco’s membership application to the EEC received a great deal of support from contemporary Moroccan people. In order to clarify better that France was symbolizing Europe in the King’s declarations, interviews were done in a snowball sampling. Interviews addressing the King’s instrumentalization of the hybridity between the French and Moroccans on postcolonial Moroccan national identity to justify Morocco’s European-­ ness according to Article 237 show that King Hassan II was clearly understood among Moroccan population who witnessed these days. Three main questions were asked to interviewees: . Do you think Morocco is a European? 1 2. How do you think that King Hassan II justified Morocco was European according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome that says Any European state might apply for the full membership? 3. What is the role of France in Morocco’s European feeling for King Hassan II? Almost all the interviewees who had supported the application acknowledged the role of France in justifying Morocco’s European-ness. Among the interviewees was an officer of the Liberal Party who was a deputy of the Independents in the Moroccan parliament when the application letter was submitted. He said that Morocco must have been regarded as a European state by that time because it had a history with France that made her suitable for the membership: History defines a lot. It tells us who we are and where we came from. So Hassan II said Morocco comes from Europe and Morocco is European. He was right; no one could challenge him because no one can deny the French Protectorate here in Morocco. So Hassan II used the European part of Moroccan national identity to be a member of the EEC. He was wise, and intelligent. He believed in Morocco’s future with Europe. In this sense, he used France to be counted as European in the eyes of the European Commission. If the Liberal Party comes to power, we will follow King Hassan’s path and we will apply for the European Union again. We currently have the advanced status we achieved in 2012. If we work hard, we can turn this status into full membership.

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Another person to be interviewed about Morocco’s application to EEC is now a businessman. As the head of an investment consulting company that assists foreigners who want to do business with Morocco, he has extensive experience working with Europeans. In his view, Morocco had long history with Europe. All of the institutions, public liberties, and trade unions he mentioned had been structured by the French. By using the example of the darija language, which was a combination of French and Arabic, he believed that King Hassan II was right to maintain that Morocco was European as well as African and Arab: Hassan II was right to say that Morocco shared a common culture and history with Europe. Morocco could never get rid of the French influences, and actually it does not want to, if you ask me my opinion. Since our independence, we have been speaking French in this country. We also have our own language, darija, which was composed of French and Arabic words. But classical Arabic is not understandable here in Morocco. And if you think of the French Protectorate years, all these factors place Morocco in the middle of Arab-ness, Islam, African-ness and European-ness. We are a culturally mixed country, and that’s why our national identity is highly mixed.

Another interviewee was a journalist working as the chief redactor at a media agency in Morocco. He was at the beginning of his journalism career when King Hassan II submitted the application letter. In his view, King Hassan II was very wise because he knew how to use the history of Morocco with France. That is why Morocco’s application to EEC was a good foreign policy strategy. He said: The French gave Morocco a lot, by introducing their language and lifestyle. In the end, even some Moroccans became French and preferred to belong to the French culture. I do not believe that the King must be criticized because of his wish to make Morocco European because we cannot deny our history. The European Communities on that day cannot be called capitalist and imperialist because these were the times when Europe was recovering in the middle of the Cold War.

Also interviewed was a person who currently works as the General Secretary of a Moroccan Bank. When the King sent the application letter, she was an officer at the Moroccan Central Bank. When asked what she thought of Morocco’s application to EEC, she replied that Morocco could be regarded as a European state and nation because of its culture, but now

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Europe has changed the criteria for evaluating who is to be considered European and is emphasizing, for instance, economic performance: With this application, Hassan II drew the attention of the Europeans to the past. Even in Spain, there were Moroccans living there during the Middle Ages. A great amount of evidence of Moroccan can be found in Europe along the Mediterranean. I believe he made a right choice. It is through identity that a state could be European, not with reforms or economy. After our application to the European Union, they changed the criteria for being European. Now they are defining a country’s European-ness according to economic and human rights criteria. I think that Morocco is the black face of the Maghreb in Europe, unlike Algeria, which is the black face.

Another interviewee, who is now a writer, was working at a private newspaper when King Hassan II applied to the EEC. In her view, Morocco had the right to be among the other members of the EEC in 1987. About whether the King was right to instrumentalize hybridity between French and Moroccans to show Morocco’s European-ness, she replied that the King referred to the French Protectorate years whenever he mentioned Europe. She also supported the argument of this book, stating that the King liked General Lyautey’s policies: King Hassan II did not hesitate to apply to the EEC because he admired Lyautey. He had said in his letter that Morocco was European, and he was right, actually. Morocco was also called French Morocco during the protectorate years, which made Morocco a French possession. In his letter, then, Hassan II said that Morocco has a European side in addition to its other known identities—Arab, Islam, and African. He tried to show Europe that Morocco was part of Europe by highlighting the European dress Moroccans wore. He played a clever game with Europe by using the French history card.

4.1.3   Challenge to Morocco’s Application to EEC in Morocco Besides support, the membership application was also challenged. One critique emphasized the economic risks adhering to ECC measures would pose for Morocco: Instead of continuing to show how the Moroccan economy suffers with its current chronic lack of diverse commercial partners, national interest necessitates that Morocco looks for partners outside the European Economic Community. How many times have we underlined the fact that there must

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be no place for emotions in commerce? Our past experience with the European Economic Community is here to prove it. By accepting the membership of Spain and Portugal, Brussels shows that it is insensitive not only to the arguments appealing to emotions, but also to the common history of Morocco and cultural affinities with Europe.18

The EEC was seen not only as a risk in purely economic terms. Its colonialist attitude was also viewed as a possible future threat to Morocco. As it was stated in Le Matin de Sahara: We think that there is no formal nature of the relations with the European Economic Community, whatever its content. Currently, our diplomats are negotiating with Brussels for a fishery agreement, the end of an accord which follows the enlargement with Spain and Portugal. What must we choose—maintaining dependence or the fight for the independence? The relations between Morocco and the Community are not on equal terms. The Community does not respect even the engagement towards us. Their aim is to make Morocco a market annex of Old Europe. In their view, Morocco would be nothing more than a subjugated partner, dependent, and not a member of the club.19

This concern with the EEC’s colonialist approach was also expressed in the newspaper Al Bayane. It was stated that Morocco should have been alert to the potential reincarnation of imperialism: By forgetting of the lessons of the recent past, world imperialism guided by the United States now wants to conquer the Gulf under the pretext of protecting it and providing free navigation. What does imperialism want? To give another lesson to the mullahs? Morocco’s acceptance into the European Communities will be a total victory for colonialism, something that Morocco has been fighting since independence.20

The dangerous position of Morocco in the EEC was lamented by the Istiqlal Party leader Mohamed Boucetta as well. Boucetta was concerned with the colonialist and Christian character of the EEC and stressed the importance of this within the context of Islam. He said: We must learn lessons from history. The war was not against Portugal before the Protectorate, but against the entirety of Europe and against Christianity. What is the reason for taking Morocco and putting it in the middle of a European Christian club? What can Morocco do there with the Christians?

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Was it not the European Christians who killed our men, women and children during the Protectorate? What kind of common history can we share with this Europe?21

Another criticism of the King’s European Morocco in 1987 came from the newspaper Al Alam. French official Thierry de Beaucé was visiting Morocco, where he affirmed the importance of francophonie. Al Alam challenged Beaucé, who stated that the French language and culture were parts of the Moroccan identity: Our identity is not a French identity, our language is not French language, and our culture is not French culture. But it made the declaration in French. In 1988, King Hassan II dismissed the all or nothing Arabisers as suffering from an inferiority complex. (Pennell 2000: 383)

Another critic of the King’s European Morocco came from a radio programmer in Rabat. In his view, Morocco could not be European because the King did nothing for the Jewish Moroccans: King Hassan II wanted to continue the historical tradition of Morocco with France, in a period where Morocco tried hard to get rid of France. But he forgot something. He tried to pluralize Moroccan identity with European-­ ness, but he did nothing about the Jewish element. How about Jewish Morocco? I think he should have initiated a campaign for Jewish Morocco before European Morocco. But then he used Jewish people for Europe. He liked the idea that if we have a Jewish population, then it means we are European. He thought “if the mountain does not come to me, I would go to the mountain”. Did he succeed? He succeeded in explaining his raison d’être for EEC membership, but Europe did not accept it. I really wonder what the Africans thought of a European Morocco. Probably they laughed.

In Rabat, there was also a lawyer who talked about some street protestors who gathered in front of the Parliament and boycotted the application: I remember that some workers had met in front of the parliament and shouted that they did not want European capitalism in Morocco. But this was arranged against capitalism I think, not for the protection of Islam and Arabism against Europe. Even these workers knew that Morocco needed Europe so that they would live in better conditions.

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4.1.4   Reflection of Morocco’s Application to EEC in European and American Media Morocco’s application to the EEC was not discussed merely in the Moroccan media and among Moroccans. The media in Europe and the United States also covered King Hassan II’s initiative to apply for membership in the EEC. The Financial Times introduced a strategic angle to the King’s European Morocco, to which Spain and France had made great contributions: Morocco’s request to join the Community has a strategic dimension. One million Moroccans live in the Community states and 1.5 million tourists go to Morocco from Europe every year. For some period of time, the sovereign of a state that had cultural, economic and military relations with Spain and France was administered from Fez and Marrakech in the Middle Ages. Such a request deserves to be considered with serious respect and not with skepticism.

In addition to the Financial Times, the Belgian Geopolitique Africaine referred to the political character of the King’s European Morocco. It proved the Financial Times correct and added that cultural relations of Morocco with Europe that were having crystallized with France was used by King Hassan II to justify membership to EEC: Morocco’s demand to join the EEC is a political act. Logically, the Community can only effectively furnish a political response to a political demand, and not a response that remains prisoner to Article 237 [of the Treaty of Rome]. The Wall Street Journal was right to say that Article 237 does not limit non-European countries in applying to be a member. The article in the FT is correct in saying that Moroccan cultural, economic and military relationships have been administered by the French in Fez and Marrakech for more than fifty years.22

Another Belgian journal Europolitique evaluated the King’s European Morocco within the context of a specific status that needed to be given to Morocco: According to President Jacques Delors, relations between the European Community and Morocco should be based on confidence and recognition of mutual interests. He stated that the respect for these principles would enable the parties to resolve their current difficulties. He also stressed that

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these immediate problems should and would be dispatched today without delay. The Commission president stressed that the exchange of letters between Hassan the Second and the Community’s Presidency was a major event opening new prospects for European-Moroccan relations. (Morocco submitted a membership letter to the European Communities this year.) The President of the Council’s position is shared by the Commission President, who stressed that the Community’s responsibility vis-à-vis neighboring countries wishing to be a part in the European undertaking and share in Europe’s future. Indeed, Mr. Delors stated that a new political constellation should be considered, given the heterogeneity within the Community and the diversity of many countries wishful of themselves in one way or another with the Community’s political and economic project. He ended by asserting that he had fully grasped the message King Hassan the Second had addressed to him, that a new dealing of political cards, based on recognition of Morocco’s political, economic and cultural specificity, was within the Community’s reach.23

Europe was another journal that announced Morocco’s application to the EEC. It showed how King Hassan II was aware of procedure required to make Morocco a member: President of the Council Mr. Elleman Jansen said in his closing press conference that the General Affairs Council will examine Morocco’s membership application in September. We were very happy to receive this letter, he said, because we interpreted it as a very clear signal of this country’s European orientation and its desire to develop and strengthen relations with the Community. Mr. Elleman Jansen admitted that legal obstacles exist, concerning the type of country that may apply to join the Community, and said that his Moroccan counterpart was aware of this. Mr. de Clerq said that the Twelve were touched by King Hassan’s initiative, which is a positive fact in itself.24

Negative comments were also made in the European and American media. The Los Angeles Times, for instance, concluded that King Hassan II should not have had some expectations regarding the EEC: Morocco on Monday asked to join the European Communities [through the European Economic Community], a move reflecting the North African country’s concern for its farm exports to Western Europe, but the bloc’s foreign ministers said Morocco is ineligible. Diplomats said Morocco’s King Hassan II must have expected the negative response after being told that only European countries could join when he first extended informal feelers two years ago.25

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Concomitantly, Europe Report touched upon the problem of timing with respect to Morocco’s application to the EEC. It maintained that the EEC did not have sufficient economic strength to support a new member: The request for accession to the European Economic Community submitted by Morocco on July 8th came as a surprise to a number of observers, not because of the move in itself, (which has been expected for the past three years) but rather because of the wrong timing. The European Community is going through a particularly difficult period with intense negotiations just underway to enlarge Morocco’s bilateral fisheries agreement with Spain to the Community’s other member states. Morocco’s request is far from being the end of a result of harmonious procedure towards closer relations with the Community and the gradual removal of all major obstacles. On the contrary, since early 1986 with Spain’s and Portugal’s accession to the Community, countless difficulties have appeared on the horizon. Morocco is considered to be hardest hit amongst third countries by member state enlargement, mainly because of direct competition from Spain with farm products such as citrus fruit or tomatoes on the common market. Another area of contention was the permission granted to Canary Islands, which are not an integral part of the European Economic Community, to export tomatoes on the same conditions as Mediterranean countries. The conclusion is that the Community’s offers do not constitute a basis for acceptable negotiation and do not take into account Morocco’s specific position. Morocco wants a special treatment, affected more than other Mediterranean countries.26

Europe Report, which at the outset negatively evaluated the King’s European Morocco, later stated that the EEC already agreed on the non-­ European-­ness of Morocco and argued that the European Commission now had to declare this to Morocco without offending it: The addition of Morocco to the EC is not possible because it is incompatible with Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which reads as follows: Any European state may apply to become a member of the European Community [through the European Economic Community]. However, Morocco is not European. On the legal side, it is clear and definitive. What now remains to be done is A: to detail these concepts in written form to Morocco’s application, in such a way not to offend Morocco’s sensitivity and susceptibility and B: to define the ways that might be followed or explored in order to deepen relations, which is unanimously desired.27

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In its next issue, the Europe Report expressed a clearer message with regard to Morocco’s membership in the Community. According to the Europe Report, King Hassan II’s European Morocco claim was unfounded even though the Treaty of Rome was not entirely clear as to what it meant by saying, “Only European states can apply”: Although none of the member states, meeting in the General Affairs Council on July 20th, seemed to have any fundamental objections to the Moroccan request, the majority of them underlined that there would be major legal difficulties. Article 237 of the Treaty in fact states that any European states may apply to become a member state of the Community. Although what is meant by European is not defined in the Treaty, the criteria which have been accepted until now has been membership in the Council of Europe. This is not Morocco’s case. Mr. Elleman Jansen emphasized that considerable legal obstacles lay in the path of the Moroccan request. Bernard Bosson, French Deputy Minister for European Affairs, made the same remark, although he admitted to being touched by the application.28

4.1.5   Reflection of Morocco’s Application to the EEC in the French Media Unlike the European and American media, which evaluated the application in more descriptive ways, French newspapers simply overlooked the membership application. They mentioned that Morocco could not become a member of the EEC because it had not met the requirements, such as being a member of the European Council. La vie Economique was one of them: Morocco is the second state this year after Turkey to apply for membership in the EEC. But unlike Turkey, Morocco is not a part of the Council of Europe. It is linked to the community only through a cooperation and association treaty, within the framework of the Treaty of Rome. This is not satisfactory to consider the state as European.29

Similarly, Le Matin expressed the view that Morocco could never become a member because it was not a part of the European Council. A letter from King Hassan II was delivered for that goal [becoming a member of European Economic Community] by the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdellatif Filali to the chief of Danish diplomacy, Uffe

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Elleman Jansen. The Moroccan demand shall not proceed since Morocco that is not a part of the Council of Europe, and does not fulfill the required conditions for an eventual integration to the EEC.30

For Le Monde, not being a member of the European Council was not the only impediment to Morocco’s application being accepted. It also voiced concern over the fact that it was a Muslim country. In an analysis of Morocco and Turkey, Le Monde argued that Morocco could obtain a cooperation treaty instead of membership: Morocco officially took action to apply for EEC membership. This state is the second Muslim one, after Turkey, to make a demand for adhesion. But unlike Turkey, Morocco is not a member of the Council of Europe (that consists of 21 European states). It is not linked to the communitarian construction by an adhesion treaty. Only by a cooperation treaty, which is less demanding.31

Sud Ouest also compared Morocco’s membership application to the EEC with Turkey’s. It maintained that member states were not interested in accepting Morocco for two reasons. First, the country was not geographically part of Europe. Second, the EEC was experiencing economic problems. Spain and Portugal, to which King Hassan II had made reference, were used to demonstrate the difficulties the EEC was experiencing: The Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community examined yesterday, respectfully but coldly, the candidacy of Morocco to the entrance of the Common Market. The ministers of the Twelve did not take very seriously this request, interpreting it mostly as a sign of Morocco’s wish to develop relations with the Community. Among the obstacles to Morocco’s entry are its not being a part of Europe and the fact that Turkey, too, had recently submitted a membership application. This came across as bad timing when the Community is still dealing with Spain and Portugal.32

4.1.6   Reflection of Morocco’s Application to the EEC in the European Commission The response to King Hassan II’s application letter was received in three months. The European Commission rejected Morocco’s request for membership. This was also a repudiation of its European-ness. Instead of a full membership, privileged partnership was offered to Morocco. As written in the letter:

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Your Majesty, I am much honored and thank his Majesty for his letter of July 8th 1987 that I discussed with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Community. We considered with very great attention the message of your Majesty at our meeting on September 14th 1987. My colleagues shared their diverse considerations that I wanted to share with Mister Filali when I met him on July 20th 1987. They expressed all their appreciation for the wish of your Majesty for a greater rapprochement between the community and the Kingdom of Morocco, where we also give the same importance as you give to economic and political cooperation. The ancient and diverse links between Morocco and the member states of the Community in multiple domains—cultural, political, economic, and social, our common destiny, the eminent role that your Majesty possesses makes and will make the Kingdom of Morocco a privileged partner particularly important for the European Community. The Community, on the basis of its recent enlargement, wished to open a new phase in its relations with Morocco. The negotiation accords will always provide the pursuit of a reinforced cooperation by taking into account the specificity of our relations and our common interests. In the light of our common desire, we will follow our reflections in a positive spirit on the possibilities of getting more advantage from other domains that we can cooperate with for the well-being of our populations and our common aspirations for the peace and liberty in the world. I would present you my highest respect.33 Your Majesty, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen President of the Council of European Communities

Several European Commission publications also discuss Mr. Jansen’s proposal to see Morocco as a privileged partner. One underlined that the point that the Community wanted to extend its cooperation with Morocco in a partnership status: On July 8th 1987, the Moroccan King Hassan II submitted an application for Morocco’s accession to the Community. The President of the Council replied on October 1st, pointing out that the Community wished to continue strengthening and extending its cooperation with Morocco, in view of the special nature of existing relations and joint interest.34

Another report also emphasized that the community would strengthen its relations with Morocco in partnership: In response to the application for accession to the Community submitted officially by King Hassan II in July, the President of the Council recalled the points made when the application was submitted and emphasized the

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various factors which make Morocco a special partner of the Community. The agreements being negotiated between the Community and the Kingdom of Morocco should enable cooperation to be strengthened and extended, taking into account the specific features of the relations between and the common interests of the two partners.35

In a press conference, Jacques Delors and Claude Cheyyson, as the officers responsible for the Community enlargement held Morocco in an exceptional position due to its plural identity. Delors and Cheyyson referred to Turkey while talking about Morocco: Jacques Delors:

I think we have a lot to do in order to recognize the exceptional position of Morocco in the world. Claude Cheyyson: Morocco’s position, like that of Turkey, is situated in one or two extreme points of the Arab-Islam world. These two states want to justify their desire to access Europe more with their intrinsic qualities.36 At the end of the press conference, Mr. Delors stated that their reservations about Morocco’s application did not stem from their not seeing Morocco as a European state. Rather, they were based on the internal concerns they had about Community enlargement at that time: The states around Europe, from Norway to Turkey, from Austria to Morocco, are concerned about one issue: Whether they will be excluded from European dynamism. We are now twelve but we can enlarge three or four times in the future. The question we ask to ourselves is how the European Communities can afford this enlargement and this deepening and manage our projects. This is the question we are thinking about when considering the reply we will give to Morocco’s membership demand.37

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen commented, too, on Morocco’s membership application to the EEC. Referring to Morocco’s position between Europe and Africa, in a vein similar to King Hassan II, he maintained: Morocco is a state situated between the Arab and the European world. The EEC and Morocco have been linked commercially, financially and in term of other forms of cooperation since 1978. Morocco is now renegotiating now that Spain and Portugal have been admitted to the EC.38

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A number of European media not only commented on the rejection of Morocco’s membership application but also criticized it. The Europe Report, for instance, blamed the Commission President Uffe Ellemann-­ Jensen since he had not provided a clear message to Morocco about its membership application before the King sent the application letter: How does one reject Morocco’s request for membership without seeming negative? This painful dilemma was at the heart of the EEC Foreign Ministers’ debates in Brussels on September 14th as they officially examined Rabat’s application to join the E.E.C submitted on July 20th. While the answer is clear, the form it will take definitely creates a Ministerial predicament. The first difficulty is to explain to the Moroccans that there is a legal problem. (Morocco does not meet the conditions stipulated in the Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, for it is neither a European state nor member of the Council of Europe, the two criteria used till now to accept applications). The second is how to explain that the request cannot be considered without striking the hand that King Hassan II has extended. Bernard Bosson, the French Minister charge of European Affairs, who voiced these concerns, suggested creating a special form of cooperation to meet this request concretely. The French Minister failed, however, to specify what form this new type of cooperation might take. This might at the same time serve as a standard answer for other membership requests offered by the third states of the Mediterranean. Beyond questions of pure diplomatic control, the Community’s member states have a decidedly difficult problem of not alienating by too cut and dry a refusal, which could offend. This is a moderate Arab state that vaunts its ties to the Western world, calls itself Islamic while combating severely all forms of religious fundamentalism, and with which, furthermore, the EEC has been entangled in delicate trade negotiations that have dragged on since Spain and Portugal’s accession on 1986. However, it is hard to imagine such cooperation would work. Morocco is already the Community’s leading trade partner in the Mediterranean and many member states like Denmark, which advocates a no without appeal to Rabat’s request, are not ready to open their doors any wider to Moroccan products.39

4.2   Assessment The King’s European Morocco evaluates Morocco’s membership application to the EEC taking a number of dynamics into consideration. The most important is the King’s justification of the country’s claim to European-ness within the confines of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. In addition to analyzing the declarations he made in this regard, it also

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examines the support for and challenges made to this application within the European and American media, in general, and the French media, in particular. It also looks at how official European Commission documents review the application. As it has been argued, the King preferred to instrumentalize the hybridity between French and locals created in the French Protectorate as a result of the successful interaction between the French and locals by Resident General Lyautey’s respect for Islam. Moreover, the King also had both directly and indirectly referred to the French Protectorate to demonstrate Morocco’s European-ness. An identity perspective pervades both the support of and challenge to Morocco’s application to the EEC in Morocco. Moroccans interviewed referred more directly to the French Protectorate to explain the membership application than did King Hassan II himself. The King may not have been expected to directly refer to France in a letter written to the European Commission. However, previous chapters have shown that while the King may not have directly referred to the French Protectorate, he did do so indirectly. To understand the position of France in Morocco’s EEC application, the French Protectorate and its later impacts must be well understood. The French media, on the other hand, approached Morocco’s application to EEC in a rational way, stating that Morocco’s not being a member of the European Council was a handicap. The European and American media viewed Morocco’s application to the EEC as an action that would be met with a negative response from the European Commission because Morocco was not a European state. Nevertheless, official EEC documents make no mention of the non-European-ness of Morocco. Instead, they point to the issue of “bad timing”—Morocco simply applied at the wrong time. Whether the purpose of framing rejection of Morocco in this way was to avoid breaking the King’s heart, the outcome of the refusal of the European Commission to accept the membership application was the same. Morocco could not become a member of the community. It was the end of the King’s European Morocco as well, at least the end of European-ness as a component in postcolonial Moroccan national identity.

Notes 1. Une décennie de réformes au Maroc, 2010: Le Maroc ressemble à un arbre dont les racines nourricières plongent profondément dans la terre d’Afrique, et qui respire grâce à son feuillage bruissant aux vents de l’Europe. Cependant, la vie du Maroc n’est pas seulement verticale. Elle

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s’étend horizontalement vers l’Orient auquel nous nous sommes unis par des liens culturels séculaires. Même si nous le voulions-et nous ne le voulons pas, il nous serait impossible de les rompre. 2. Fas Kralı Hasan’ın anıları: Direniş (Memories of the Moroccan King Hassan: Resistance), 1976: Bir ulus için eskiyi tamimiyle unutmak da pek yararlı bir şey değildir. Sovyet dostlarımız eski büyük bilginlerini bir ihtilalin kahramanlarını övdükleri gibi övüyorlar. Kökleri olmayan halklarda mutsuzluk vardır. Kökleri olmayan ağaçlarda ne yaprak ne de meyve bulunur. Ölü bir ağaçtır. Fas ağacının dalları İspanya ve Fransa’ya Federal Almanya ve İngiltere’dekinden daha yakındır. Fas ağacı Rabat-MadridParis genel yönüne doğru yükselir. Paris-Madrid-Rabat’ın müşterek ekonomik yararları mevcuttur. Fransa, İspanya ve Fas Atlantik ve Akdeniz’le birbirlerine bağlı olduğu gibi, evvelce söylediğimiz gibi eski ve yeni kültür ve medeniyetle de ortak bağları bulunmaktadır. 3. Third World Press Club. 4. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, June 13, 1987: Je voudrais dire au peuple français que je suis plus près de lui qu’il ne le pense comme Etat et nation. Certaines de mes attitudes, commandées par la Notion de l’Etat, que l’on gouverne sans états d’âme, car on gouverne l’Etat. J’ai des réactions, quelquefois, qui peuvent lui paraitre bizarres. Comme je le disais tout à l’heure, les Français ont des réactions bizarres à Notre égard. Ce sont des réactions viscérales. Pourquoi? Parce que la moitié de ma culture est française. La moitié de ma langue est française et quand j’ai commencé à balbutier les premières paroles, j’ai parlé en même temps le français et l’arabe, avec ma nourrice qui était marocaine et avec ma gouvernante qui était française. 5. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, June 6, 1983: C’est une nécessité pour le Maroc à joindre le Groupe France-Afrique. Le Maroc est un pont entre l’Europe et l’Afrique. A travers Gibraltar, il partage la méditerranée avec l’Europe Le Maroc alors appartient à l’Europe et à l’Afrique. Nous existons sur l’Afrique depuis que nous avons été créés. Tout ça fait du Maroc un pays Euro-­Africain, et le plus grand donneur de cette organisation. 6. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, October 9, 1984: Dans quelques années nous aurons le pont sur Gibraltar. C’est réglé ensuite, les choses du Maghreb vont bien s‘arranger un jour. Si on peut emmener le gaz et le pétrole un jour à l’Europe, par ce pont, alors l’Europe ne peut pas ignorer le Maroc et Afrique du Nord. Car, en définitive le Maroc est plus européen que la Grèce. Puis, il a fait une option, il est pluripartiste, plurisyndicaliste. 7. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, December 13, 1984: Marrakech au Congrès National de poètes Leopold Sedar Senghor a dit: Hassan II est l’un des plus cultivés parmi les chefs Africains dans tous les domaines et son pays est l’un de ceux qui travaillent activement pour aider symbiose de l’Afriquearabe-­berbère et de l’Afrique-negro-africaine.

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8. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, October 2, 1987: Le Maroc adhère à la Fédération européenne de Zootechnie. 9. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Transparency Service, Access to documents, no: 1049/2001: Monsieur Le Président, Nous avons, en date du 15 Juin 1984, adressé une lettre à Son Excellence le Président François Mitterrand, en exercice du Conseil Européen, par laquelle Nous lui faisons part de la volonté de Royaume du Maroc d’adhérer aux Traités instituant les Communautés Européennes. Ce faisant, Nous étions guidés par notre conviction qu’il importait désormais de donner aux liens anciens, multiples et privilègiés, qui unissent la Communauté Européenne et ses membres au Royaume du Maroc un cadre institutionnel garantissant, à travers un choix irréversible, la pérennité et l’intensification des relations étroites établis entre l’ensemble communautaire et notre pays. L’Option prise par le Maroc pour un plus grand rapprochement avec la C.E.E trouve sa pleine justification dans des considérations de divers ordres, aussi pertinentes, et aussi fondées les unes que les autres. Proche géographiquement, l’Europe et le Maroc ont été si intimement unis par l’histoire que nos civilisations se sont fortement interpénétrés et que notre communauté de destin a été maintes fois en mise évidence. Deux conflits mondiaux ont démontré au cours de ces siècles que le Maroc, à la croisée de la Méditerranée et de l’Atlantique et aux portes de l’Afrique et du monde arabe, s’intégra parfaitement dans un même espace de sauvegarde et de paix que les pays d’Europe Occidentale. Fort de ses choix fondamentaux, le Royaume du Maroc n’a cessé de consolider et d’approfondir une expérience démocratique et libérale qui, non seulement le rapproche de l’Europe libre mais lui permet de y s’insérer du fait de l’analogie institutionnelle qui s’est ainsi créée entre les systèmes de Gouvernement européen et marocain. Ce choix politique, auquel Nous avons procédé bien avant sa consécration dans les lois écrites de notre pays correspond en réalité à des choix de société et de civilisation qui ont fait l’unanimité de la nation marocaine. L’adhésion de l’Espagne et du Portugal aux Communautés Européennes que nous avons salué comme un évènement politique considérable, accentue la sensibilité méditerranéen de la Communauté et en rapproche les frontières de nos rives septentrionales. Plus que jamais, nous avons la conviction que l’intérêt bien compris, non seulement du Maroc mais également celui de l’Europe, rend nécessaire une meilleure intégration économique et politique de Notre pays avec les Douze. Aussi, nous avons décidé de vous soumettre officiellement une demande d’adhésion du Royaume du Maroc aux Communautés Européennes. Nous vous prions d’agréer, Monsieur Le Président, l’expression de notre très haute considération, Hassan 2, Roi du Maroc, July 8, 1987.

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10. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, July 12, 1987: Pensez-vous que, par exemple, sur le plan des relations entre le Maroc et la Communauté Européenne, il y a peut-être certains points que vous voudrez évoquer plus particulièrement avec Mme Thatcher? R: Il faut dire que la position anglaise à l’égard du Maroc est l’une des plus souples, des plus flexibles, disons les plus hospitalières, si ce terme peut être employé parce qu’elle fait partie de ce pays de nord qui n’ont aucun problème de concurrence particulière sur le plan agricole. Nous l’aurions peut-être sur le plan de la laine et de mouton mais enfin nous sommes prêts à passer sur ce chapitre. Donc effectivement, au cours des discussions que nous avons eus avec la CEE ces derniers mois, la partie anglaise était la plus compréhensive ou l’une des plus compréhensives. Q: Vous êtes toujours candidat à long terme…R: Plus que jamais, on ne peut pas imaginer la liaison fixe entre l’Europe et le Maroc et l’Afrique sans essayer de rattacher le Maroc a la Communauté Européennes, d’une façon ou d’autre. 11. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, July 17, 1987: Notre démocratie, notre libéralisme, nos potentialités, et les richesses sont à même de nous permettre de devenir un membre de CEE. Notre joie est d’autant plus grande après ce que nous venons d’entendre dans votre allocution pertinente dans laquelle vous aviez traité avec précision des principes historique entre le Royaume Uni et le Maroc depuis le 12ième siècle de notre époque. On a adressé personnellement une demande dans ce sens à l’ex président de la communauté et nous espérons que celle-ci saisira le bien fondé de notre démarche pour convaincre le Royaume Unis d’accepter notre demande afin qu’on soit membre de la CEE. 12. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, October 7, 1987: La lettre de demande officielle est déposée sur le bureau de la C.E.E. J’ai profité de la présidence de mon ami le Président Mitterrand pour la lui faire parvenir. Avant d’être économique ou commerciale, la demande d’adhésion du Maroc revêt un caractère politique. En effet, nous pensons que nos choix correspondent à ceux de l’Europe dans les domaines des institutions, des libertés, des libertés publiques, l’organisation politique et syndicale. Nos options sont donc similaires. Par ailleurs, le Maroc estime être plus proche de l’Europe que l’est un pays comme la Grèce. Il est certain que les pays du Marché Commun se divisent en deux: le groupe Sud et le groupe Nord. Climatiquement, les pays du groupe Sud sont forcément des concurrents du Maroc. Le Nord c’est autre chose. Notre demande n’est pas commerciale, mais une demande et une volonté politique et aussi culturelle. Nous avons l’ambition géopolitique d’approcher l’Afrique du Sud et Sous Saharien à l’Europe par la Méditerrané. 13. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, October 2, 1987: Le Maroc est une partie de l’histoire de l’Europe [France] qui nous fait aussi un pays européen pour la

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CEE. Aujourd’hui, la CEE est divisée entre deux: les pays du Sud et les pays du Nord. Nous, le Maroc, est similaire à des pays de sud comme l’Espagne et le Portugal. Si la CEE les accepte comme membres, alors le Maroc doit aussi être un membre de la Marché Commune. Si la CEE accepte l’Espagne et le Portugal comme membre, et nous accepte pas comme membre, alors ça serait difficile de parler d’une justice. 14. BNR, Al Bayane, July 12–13, 1987: Conseil Economique et sociale Français analyse la situation au Maroc, et les problèmes posés par l’élargissement de CEE au Maroc. Le Maroc s’est trouvé depuis le début de 20ème siècle sous l’égide du protectorat, et c’est donc son droit d’être considéré comme un pays et une nation Européenne. 15. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, July 29, 1987: Le Maroc peut jouer un rôle déterminant dans le rapprochement entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée. Le Maroc et le CEE disposent d’une convergence d’intérêts qui relient l’histoire, aux systèmes politiques et économiques. 16. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, July 30, 1987, pp. 11–12: Le Maroc possède une culture pluridimensionnelle car il a réussi à enrichir sa culture par de nombreux contacts avec d’autres civilisations. Il y a alors un métissage harmonique africain-européen et latino-américain. On ne peut pas ignorer le côté Européen de l’identité Marocaine, comme on ne peut pas ignorer le côté arabe, Africain de l’identité nationale Marocaine. 17. BNR, Al Bayane, August 2, 1987: Depuis un siècle, Le Maroc se trouve à l’intersection des grandes stratégies des puissances étrangères qui ont influencé son autorité, son art, et sa subtilité. Ce sont ces relations qui ont formé le Maroc d’aujourd’hui. 18. BNR, Al Bayane, July 16, 1987: Au lieu de continuer à montrer que l’économie marocaine souffre d’un manque chronique de diversification de ses partenaires commerciaux car le bon sens veut que l’intérêt national, milite en faveur de la prospection de nouveaux partenaires en dehors de l’Europe communautaire. Combien de fois on a souligné qu’en matière de commerce il n’y a pas de place pour les sentiments. L’expérience passée de nos relations économiques avec CEE est là pour le prouver. Bruxelles n’est nullement sensible à des arguments faisant appel aux sentiments, à l’histoire commune, aux affinités culturelles de Maroc en acceptant l’adhésion du Portugal et de l’Espagne. 19. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, July 23, 1987: On pense que ce n’est pas toute la nature formelle des liens avec la CEE mais bien leur contenu qui importe. A l’heure où, notre diplomatie négocie avec Bruxelles la conclusion d’un Accord de pêche, nous bâtissons déjà les suites de l’élargissement du Marché Commun sur l’Espagne et le Portugal. Que faut-il choisir, le maintien de la dépendance ou la lutte pour l’Independence? Le contrat Maroc-CEE est léonine. La CEE ne respecte pas les engagements solennels

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envers nous. Faire du Maroc un marché annexe de vieux continent est leur objectif. Dans leur optique, le Maroc ne saurait être autre chose qu’un partenaire vassalisé et dépendant et non un membre du Club. 20. BNR, Al Bayane, September 20, 1987: Oubliant les enseignements d’un passé récent, l’impérialisme mondiale guidé par des Etats-Unis veut repartir à la conquête du Golfe sous prétexte d’en protéger l’accès et d’y assurer la liberté de navigation. Que veut l’impérialisme? Donner une autre leçon aux mollahs? L’adhésion du Maroc au CEE sera la victoire contre le colonialisme dont le Maroc lutte pendant l’indépendance. 21. BNR, L’Opinion, July 28, 1987: Nous devons tirer les leçons de cette épopée historique. La bataille n’a pas été donnée contre le Portugal avant le Protectorat, mais contre l’Europe entière et contre le christianisme. Qu’elle est la raison de prendre et mettre le Maroc au milieu d’un club qui est bien Chrétien et Européen? Qu’est-ce que le Maroc peut faire avec des Chrétiens? N’étaient-ce pas les Chrétiens Européens qui ont tués nos hommes, femmes et enfants durant la période du Protectorat? Quel genre d’histoire commune nous pouvons partager avec cette Europe? 22. BNR, Géopolitique Africaine édité à Brussels, October 7, 1987: L’adhésion du Maroc au CEE est un acte politique. Logiquement, la CEE ne peut effectivement fournir qu’une réponse politique à une demande politique, et non une réponse qui reste prisonnière de l’article 237. Wall Street Journal à raison de dire que l’article 237 ne limite pas les pays non-­ européens de ne pas appliquer à être un membre de CEE. L’article en FT a raison en disant que les relations culturelles, économiques et militaires du Maroc sont été administrées par les Français dans Fez et Marrakech pour plus de 50 ans. 23. BNR, Europe Report, October 14, 1987, no: 1348. 24. BNR, Europe Report, July 21–22, 1987, no: 4594. 25. BNR, Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1987:5. 26. BNR, Europe Report, July 29, 1987, no: 1334. 27. BNR, Europe Report, September 16, 1987, no: 4618. 28. BNR, European Report, July 22, 1987, no: 1332. 29. La Vie Economique, July 17, 1987: Le Maroc est le second Etat musulmane à se porter candidat à la CEE, après la Turquie. Mais à la différence d’Ankara, le Maroc ne fait pas partie de Conseil D’Europe. Il est seulement lié à la construction communautaire par une traite de coopération, association, selon le Traité de Rome. Il est insuffisant pour le considérer comme un pays européen. 30. Le Matin, July 20, 1987: Une lettre de roi Hassan II a été remise à cette fin par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères marocain, Abdellatif Filali au Chef de la diplomatie danoise, Uffe Elleman Jansen. La demande marocaine ne devrait aboutir car le Maroc qui n’appartient pas au Conseil de l’Europe,

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ne remplit pas les conditions requises à une éventuelle intégration au sein de la CEE. 31. Le Monde, July 22, 1987: Le Maroc a officiellement fait acte de candidature à la CEE. Ce pays est le second état musulman, après la Turquie, à déposer une demande d’adhésion en bonne et due forme. Mais à l’inverse de la Turquie, la Maroc n’est pas membre du Conseil d’Europe (qui regroupe 21 pays européennes). Il n’est pas lié à la construction communautaire par un traité d’adhésion. Seulement par un traité de coopération, moins exigeant. 32. Sud-Ouest, July 22, 1987: Le conseil des ministres de la CEE a examiné hier, poliment mais froidement, la candidature de Maroc a l’entrée dans le marché commun. Les ministres des Douze n’ont pas pris trop sérieux cette requête, l’interprétant plutôt comme le signe d’une volonté du Maroc de développer les liens plus étroits avec la CEE. Outre les obstacles à l’entrée de Maroc, qui ne fait pas partie de l’Europe- dans la CEE, sa candidature, tout comme celle récemment déposé par la Turquie, intervient au mauvais moment où la CEE intègre l’Espagne et le Portugal. 33. General Secretariat of the European Union, Document no: SP01101987, October 1, 1987: Majesté, très honoré je remercie votre Majesté de sa lettre en 8 Juillet 1987 dont j’ai fait part à mes collègues les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de la Communauté. Nous avons considéré avec la plus grande attention le message de votre majesté dès notre rencontre du 14 Septembre 1987. Mes collègues ont partagé les diverses considérations que j’avais fait valoir lors de mon entretien du 20 Juillet avec Monsieur Filali. Ils ont exprimé toutes leurs appréciations pour le souhait de votre Majesté d’un plus grand approchement entre le Royaume du Maroc et la Communauté auquel nous attachons de notre côté également la plus grande importance politique et économique. Les liens anciens et multiples qui nouent le Maroc et les Etats membres de la Communauté dans les multiples domaines; culturel, politique, économique et social, la communauté de destin que nous partageons, le rôle éminent que joue Votre Majesté, font et continueront de faire du Royaume du Maroc un partenaire privilège particulièrement important pour la Communauté. La Communauté, suite à son récent élargissement, a souhaité ouvrir une phase nouvelle dans ses relations avec le Maroc. Les Accords en négociation devraient assurer la poursuite d’une coopération renforcée et plus étendue, tenant compte de la spécificité de nos relations et de nos intérêts communs. A la lumière de notre désir commun de relations aussi étroites que possible, nous poursuivrons dans un esprit positif de nos réflexions sur les possibilités d’étendre davantage encore notre coopération à d’autres domaines au service du bien-être de nos populations et de nos aspirations communes à la paix et à la liberté du monde. Je vous prie, votre majesté, d’agréer l’expression de mon très profond respect, 1st of October 1987.

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34. BNR, Article 749, 21st General Report on the activities of the European Communities, 1987: 306. 35. BNR, Article 2.2.20, Bulletin of the European Communities, Volume 20, No: 9, 1987: 64. 36. BNR, Le Matin de Sahara, October 9, 1987: Jacques Delors: Je pense que nous avons beaucoup à faire pour reconnaitre la position exceptionnelle du Maroc dans le monde. Claude Cheysson: la position du Maroc, comme celle de la Turquie, situées aux deux extrêmes points du monde arabo-­ islamique. Ces deux pays justifient leur désires d’accéder en Europe en plus de leurs qualités intrinsèques. 37. BNR, L’Opinion, October 11, 1987: Jacques Delors: Les pays autour de l’Europe, de la Norvège à la Turquie, de l’Autriche au Maroc, se demande s’ils vont rester en dehors de ce dynamisme. Nous sommes douze maintenant et nous aurons largement trois ou quatre fois dans la future. La question que nous demandons nous même c’est comment là CEE peut comporter l’élargissement et aussi l’approfondissement pour réussir ses projets. Voilà la question qui s’est posée d’une manière générale avec aucun traitement particulier désagréable pour le Maroc. 38. BNR, L’Opinion, October 19, 1987: Le Maroc est un pays en lien avec le monde arabe et européen. Ils sont liés depuis 1978 par des termes financière, commerciale et coopératif. Le Maroc est maintenant en cours de renégociation pour tenir compte de l’entrée de l’Espagne et du Portugal à la CEE en 1986. 39. BNR, European Report, September 16, 1987, no: 1340.

References Primary Resources Le Matin de Sahara, October 2, 1987 Al Bayane, July 12–13, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, July 12, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, July 17, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, July 29, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, July 30, 1987 Al Bayane, August 2, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, October 7, 1987 Al Bayane, October 9, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, October 9, 1987 L’Opinion, October 11, 1987 L’Opinion, October 19, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, July 14, 1987

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Al Bayane, July 16, 1987 Le Matin de Sahara, July 23, 1987 L’Opinion, July 28, 1987 Al Bayane, September 20, 1987 L’Opinion, October 31, 1987 MAP Bulletin, June 1, 1987 MAP Bulletin, June 2, 1987 MAP Bulletin, June 3, 1987 Financial Times, July 21, 1987 Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1987 European Report, July 22, 1987, no: 1332 Europe, July 21–22, 1987, no: 4594 European Report, July 29, 1987, no: 1334 European Report, September 16, 1987, no: 1340 Europe, September 16, 1987, no: 4618 Geopolitique Africaine editée a Brussels, October 7, 1987 European Report, October 14, 1987, no: 1348 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Transparency Service, access to documents, no: 1049/2001 Le Figaro, July 17, 1987 Le Matin de Paris, July 21, 1987 Sud Ouest, July 21, 1987

Secondary Sources Aghrout, Ahmed, and Keith Sutton. 1990. Source in Regional Economic Union in the Maghreb. The Journal of Modern African Studies 28 (1): 115–139. Darwish, Bassma K. (ed.). 1990. Les années de transition (The Years of Transition). Paris: Ifra-Masson. El Ahmadi, Mohsine. 2006. La monarchie et l’Islam (Monarchy and Islam). Najah el Jadid: Ittisalat el Salon. El Houdagui, Rachid. 2003. La politique étrangere sous le regne de Hassan II (Foreign Policy Under the Reign of King Hassan II). Paris: L’Harmattan. Emerson, Rupert. 1959. Sömürgelerin Uluslaşması (Nationalization of Colonies). ̇ ̇ Istanbul: Türkiye Siyasi Ilimler Derneği. Flory, Maurice. 1984. Note sur la demande d’adhesion du Maroc a la C.E.E. (Note on Morocco’s Quets to Be a Member to the European Economic Community). Annuaire d’Afrique du Nord, CNRS, 705–709. Gordon, April, and Donald Gordon (ed.). 2006. Understanding Contemporary Africa. New York: Lynne Rienner Publications. Guibernau, Montserrat. 1996. Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the 20th century. London and New York: Polity Press.

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Harbeson, John, and Donald Rotschild. 2013. Africa in the World Politics. London and New York: Westview Press. Laroui, Abdellah. 2005. Le Maroc et Hassan II (Morocco and Hassan II). Casablanca. Press Inter Universitaires. Martin, Guy. 2012. African Political Thought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pennell, Richard. 2000. Morocco Since 1830: A History. London: Hurst & Company.

CHAPTER 5

Engagement with Europe: The Cases of Tunisia-Algeria-Malta-Cyprus-Turkey

Abstract  The author in this chapter discusses the reasons why states similar to Morocco in terms of geography, history and identity did not feel European and thus did not apply for membership in the EEC. By scrutinizing the cases of Tunisia and Algeria, the author elaborates on the absence of successful interaction the French got with the locals which later paved the way to the postcolonial leaders’ non-instrumentalization of hybridity on their postcolonial national identity to feel European. By looking at the cases of Malta and Cyprus, the author shows how these states felt European and applied to the EEC on the basis of the similar religion they had with the United Kingdom which had allowed for a successful interaction that could be used to instrumentalize hybridity to form their postcolonial national identity. By examining Turkey aside, the author tries to show how European-ness developed out of hybridity but within modernization, that started with Ataturk and continued till today. The author also analyzes relations of these five states with today’s European Union, after its transformation in 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Keywords  Tunisia • Algeria • Malta • Cyprus • Turkey Morocco’s membership application to the EEC is the story of how King Hassan II undertook to justify his claim that Morocco was European as construed by Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. The keywords he used in this application were Europe, France, Islam, colonization, geography and © The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9_5

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hybridity. However, history and contemporary world politics show that these terms are not peculiar to Morocco. Tunisia, Algeria, Malta, Cyprus and Turkey have also used their past and current experiences to combine the notions of Europe, France, Islam, colonization, and hybridity to depict their relations with EEC.  The unique cases of these five countries are examined vis-à-vis the case of Morocco to formulate a comparative perspective of their historical relationship with Europe. The issue is then raised as to whether the countries in question sought EEC membership and the reason why they did or did not, given their histories. Hence, this chapter looks at the French Protectorate in Tunisia, French integrality in Algeria, references to the United Kingdom made by Malta and Cyprus and their having been isolated geographically from continental Europe, and Turkey, another Muslim-dominated country that applied for membership at the same time as Morocco.

5.1   The Cases of Tunisia and Algeria In the cases of Tunisia and Algeria, the focus is on the reasons why they did not seek membership in the EEC as did Morocco. The concept of hybridity is useful in this regard as developed by Homi Bhabha as part of the inbetweenness subtheme of postcolonial nationalism. Hybridity within the context of the inbetweenness, as discussed previously, was created in every colonial administration by the colonizer. As the case of Morocco shows, instrumentalizing it to create a postcolonial national identity requires a successful interaction between the colonizer state and the locals. Not every colonial administration managed to achieve this in colonial history. In Morocco, General Hubert Lyautey’s respect for Islam served as the catalyst for this to happen. Between 1912 and 1925, the French tried to safeguard the political and religious status of the sultan, placed importance on the daily lives of the locals, and allowed Islamic education to continue alongside more secular forms in Blad al Makhzen. Lyautey’s respect for Islam was later used by King Hassan II to instrumentalize hybridity between the French and locals to create a postcolonial Moroccan national identity that included European-ness. The King then used this aspect of Moroccan identity to argue that Morocco was European and thus met the criteria stipulated in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. The history of French Protectorate in Tunisia and Algeria, on the other hand, shows that the French did not achieve the same degree of success in its interaction with the locals there as it had in Morocco. One reason for

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this was that style of administration used by the French in Tunisia was different. Unlike what they had done in Morocco, the French tried to transform Tunisia into colony with direct administration from the very beginning. As M. Chresteil said, Protecting nation is like a formula: In reality, Tunisia is a French possession. (Peterson 2015: 243)

Direct rule in Tunisia did not allow for any space where respect for the religious and political status of the Tunisian Bey could be practiced. Resident Generals in Tunisia reduced his role by concentrating power in their own hands and by appointing French officers to critical government posts. These Resident Generals also ruled the Tunisian Protectorate through orders received from the French state, in contrast to the semi-­ independent policies used in Morocco under Lyautey. Direct administration in Tunisia was crystallized by controlleurs civiles, for example, which were adopted by the first Resident General Paul Cambon at the very inception of the Protectorate. Being appointed directly by the decree of the President of the French Republic and on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, controlleurs civiles were the highest authority in Tunisia. Supervising local officers, collecting the ushur tax, commanding the gendarmerie, and dealing with judicial issues with qadis were among their most important responsibilities. They were also the agents of the direct administration of the French in the Tunisian Protectorate (Balsney 1980: 89). In Morocco, there were less controlleurs civiles compared to Tunisia, and the ones in Morocco were controlled by Resident General Lyautey between 1912 and 1925. Direct rule in Tunisia was not the only reason for the lack of successful interaction between the French and locals. The French had to deal with a sizable Italian population in Tunisia, which had not been the case in Morocco. Tunisia was a matter of dispute between the French and the Italians, who had been poised to possess lands and take over the political sphere since the mid-nineteenth century. The existence of the Italian population in the city of Tunis was used by the Italian government to bolster its claims on Tunisia. It formed the backbone to the argument that Tunisia, even if not political, was a cultural, economic and demographic colony of Italy. In 1902, 35,000 out of 70,000 of the Europeans living in Tunisia were Italians. This number nearly tripled to 80,000  in 1903. Albert Memmi, in his book The Colonizer and the Colonized, pointed to the

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Italians to support his claim that the Arabs and Berbers were not the only ethnic groups the French encountered in Tunisia. The Italians were not only large in number, they also had a great degree of influence, too. Plans to open a French Chamber of Commerce to attract French merchants were cancelled when they said that they were scared to leave the Italian Chamber of Commerce. Italian missionaries did not leave Tunisia until the Vatican ordered them to do so, Italian schools were being administered by the Italian Ministry of Education, and mail service between Italy and Tunisia was being charged at domestic rather than foreign rates (Choate 2007: 97–109). Instead of interacting with the locals, the French expended considerable effort on an anti-Sicilian and an anti-Italian campaign to pacify the Italian population. In order to break their power, such discriminatory policies as the anti-Semitism program were adopted. As an endeavor initiated by Marechal Petain who wanted to open new possibilities to reinforce French political and economic control over the Protectorate, the anti-­ Semitic program involved the confiscation of Jewish property and elimination of Jews from positions to extend direct control over Tunisian and Italian Jews. In total, 923 million francs (300 million euros in 2011) from 1440 Jewish people were confiscated in 1941. Jewish access to certain professions in Tunisia was restricted as well. They were banned from certain professions (only 5% of the Jewish population could become doctors or lawyers), civil service, film and radio, advertising, finance and real estate, agricultural trade, metallurgy, mining sector, landed property and retail business (Peterson 2015: 248). Regardless of their efforts, though, this anti-Semitic program failed to reduce the influence of the Italians in Tunisia. With the invasion of France by Germany in 1940, the French had to accept Italian ascendency in Tunisia. In the letter sent to the Italian General by the French Resident General Marcel Peyrouton, it was said that the French were pleased to hand Tunisia over to the Italians, who were expected to retain it at least a month. In a private meeting, Marechal Petain also told the American Ambassador William Bullit in Paris that he expected Italy to seize Tunisia as well as part of metropolitan France (Peterson, 2015). Economic problems also kept the French from having a flourishing interaction with the locals in Tunisia. After the defeat of the Germans at the end of the Second World War, the French resized the Protectorate. However, the bill for the damage caused by the war led to a budget deficit of 4.5 billion francs. Basic transportation services were also heavily d ­ amaged. 50% of

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the port and port installations in the cities of Sfax and Sousse were damaged; this reached 77% in Bizerte. The entire port in the city of La Goulette was destroyed. The French also did not want to give up the Flandin Charter, which assured that French officials in France and Tunisia would be paid the same salary. In addition, the French officials in Tunisia were earning bonuses of 33%. There was great opposition to the Flandin Charter by the locals in Tunisia who were experiencing serious food and water shortages (S.E.C 1948). The contradictory declarations against Tunisian nationalism made by the French were also a factor impeding successful interaction between the French and the locals in Tunisia. For example, Robert Schuman, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1950, once said that France had undertaken to lead Tunisia to total independence and to put an end in this country to the policy of direct administration. But this contradicted what he would say a year later, that the Protectorate in Tunisia would continue and that the French community there demanded to have a share in all the institutions of the country (Youssef 1954: 58–59). When French Prime Minister Pierre Mendes stated in 1954 that the French had recognized the fundamental Tunisian claims, recognized unequivocally the exclusiveness of national sovereignty and accorded to the government of the bey, and guaranteed that Tunisians would be masters of their own domestic affairs without any interference of France or by French nationals in 1954, people hardly believed him (Catroux 1954). Without successful interaction between the French and locals, at least in the same level as in Morocco, there would be no hybridity that could be instrumentalized when forming the postcolonial Tunisian nationality. After the independence, leaders did not have a sense that they were European, which is why they did not apply for EEC membership. However, they looked forward to developing relations with the EEC after attaining independence which they did in 1956 and after its transformation into EU by 1993. In 1969, an association agreement was concluded with the EEC, which was followed by a cooperation agreement in 1976. These granted Tunisian industrial exports free access to the European market. Tunisia joined the Euro-Mediterranean Union in 1995, just like Morocco, but with a difference. It became the first Mediterranean non-member state to sign an association agreement with the EU that was ratified by all EU members (Cassarino 1999). A second association agreement signed with Tunisia in 1998 provided diversity of business-friendly institutions and private sector investment in the national economy within the context of

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privatization programs. EU has paid close attention to the exercise of democracy in Tunisia. The 1996 constitutional referendum there was closely monitored, as were developments during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings for a modern democracy based on freedoms, economic development and social justice. It openly supported Tunisia’s democracy endeavors by using whatever instruments it had at its disposal to support the Tunisian people, accompany the electoral process, promote human rights, support democratic and socioeconomic reforms, improve security and strengthen civil society. Tunisia was offered particular ties across the borders through an enhanced economic and trade integration. The conclusion with Tunisia in 2012 of the privileged partnership agreement which reinforced European Union’s attitude toward democratization in Tunisia was followed by the Joint Communication Strengthening EU support for Tunisia and the launch of EU-Tunisia Youth Partnership in 2016.1 The signing of the negotiation agreement for deep and comprehensive trade2 in June 2018 was followed by the Strategic Priorities agreement, which was emphasized in the EU-Tunisia Association Council in July 2018. The latter one prepared the necessary background for the privileged partnership for the period 2018–2020. Algeria is another case of how successful interaction between the French and the locals failed to spawn the kind of hybridity that could be instrumentalized into a postcolonial national identity by its postcolonial leaders who did not feel European. The French had regarded Algeria as an integral part of France from the very beginning of French rule in 1830. This had been determined by the African Commission of 1833 where King Louis Philippe decided to keep and colonize Algeria (Naylor 1980). Algeria was to be regarded as a region of France rather than a colony subject to direct or indirect rule, as had been the case in Morocco and Tunisia. The French were forced to place a special system of administrative autonomy. This meant that the interaction between the French and the locals was markedly different than it was in either Morocco or Tunisia. It created a more assimilationist administration that would be less tolerant to local culture. Unlike in Morocco, Islam was not respected in Algeria. Moreover, identity politics were more fragmented in Algeria. While Moroccan society was divided into Arabs and Amazigh, Algerian society was divided into many more categories: true French, Algerian, French, français d’algerie, neo-French, algerieniste, pieds noirs, fellaghin, berber, evolvés, indigénes, Muslim Algerians, Jew and Valencian (Zack 2002: 55–97). The Jews in Algeria experienced this fragmentation even more than any other group.

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They became subject to discriminatory policies, as they had been in Tunisia. French settlers launched an anti-Semitic propaganda in Algeria, too, by the mid-1890s, when the Jewish soldier Alfred Dreyfus was caught while spying for the Germans in France. Jewish people in Algeria were subjected to a series of violent attacks and property confiscation in the western region of Oran by 1895. 12,200 Jews were affected by this anti-­ Semitic propaganda. An anti-Semitic newspaper and an anti-Semitic political party served as instruments for this propaganda (Lizabeth 2002: 67–70). Similar to what happened in Morocco and Tunisia, a nationalist movement in Algeria rose up against the French by the mid-1930s. Having been inspired by the Moroccan Al Istiqlal and Tunisian Neo-Destour parties, Algerian nationalists united under the National Liberation Front to take further actions toward independence. The French, refusing to accept the validity of Algerian independence, waged a propaganda war that stressed instead a French Algeria. For the next seven years, Jacques Soustelle, who had been appointed in 1955 to Algeria, organized pressure groups, made hundreds of speeches in France and abroad, and wrote pamphlets and books explaining his French Algeria claim. Soustelle maintained that Algeria was not a colony but rather a province of France, no different from Normandy or Bretagne. Accordingly, he rejected any notion of Algerian nationality. In his view, returning Algeria to Algerians meant returning France to the Romans. He once said: Tell France that this is not a colonial war. Algeria is not far away. It is French soil, so close to our soil, so close to us, so close to our heart, to our will, that it is a province of the continent. Tell the country that the moment has come to choose between an effort that brings salvation or an incurable decline. (Murphrey 1982: 78)

Soustelle believed so strongly in his French Algeria that he opposed John F. Kennedy. In response to accusations that France was preventing Algeria from achieving independence, he said: They must understand in Washington that the Algerian question is vital for France; that we will no more accept the secession of Algeria from France than they would accept the secession of their South, and the Western alliance will not endure the loss of Algeria, especially if America seems to have contributed to this abandonment. (Murphrey 1982: 80)

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Soustelle’s French Algeria failed to neutralize Algerian nationalism. The Pan-Arabist movement launched by the Egyptian Cemal Abdel Nasser in 1955 further encouraged the National Liberation Front’s nationalist tendencies. The French who were determined to thwart Algerian independence initiated a strategy of armed repression to pacify the growing nationalism in 1955. Troops, tanks, planes and American-manufactured helicopters were mobilized between 1956 and 1962 against the Algerian people in an effort to crush the bourgeoning Algerian independence movement (El Farra 1956). In 1958, General Charles de Gaulle tried to appease the National Liberation Front with his program called Perspectives Decennales. Designed as a five-year plan, the Perspectives Decennales projected enrolling two-thirds of the Algerian children in school, providing housing to a million people, redistributing 517,000 acres of land, creating 400,000 jobs and opening the door to private capital investment for the locals in Algeria. The Perspectives Decennales was then followed by the Constantine Plan which pledged more technical and cultural aid, development of infrastructure and the encouragement of industrialization in Algeria. The Constantine Plan also had a respect for Islam dimension, as had been the case in Morocco under General Hubert Lyautey, by treating Muslims as des français a part entiere. Through this plan, the French would speed up the education of Muslims, train more Muslim servants, give them better opportunities in administrative circles in France, and provide better housing for the Muslim community (Pickles 2015). Both plans were rejected by the National Liberation Front and struggle against French continued until 1962 when Algeria became independent. Taking the position that Algeria was an integral part of France engendered strong military resistance to Algerian nationalism, distinct from what occurred in Morocco and Tunisia. The French refused to tolerate Algeria’s independence and used armed struggle against nationalists who were demanding secession from France. The French military operations in Algeria intensified especially between 1954 and 1962. The mass killings carried out during this period were also a major factor leading to the interaction between the French and the locals being counterproductive. Leaders such as Houari Boumedienne and Ahmed Ben Bella embraced a very strong Arabism and socialism against a possible future French conquest of Algeria. As stated by Houari Boumedienne on June 19, 1966, European-ness was not a component of the postcolonial Algerian national identity:

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Algeria belongs to predetermined political communities. She belongs to the Arab Maghreb, the African community and also the Arab community and also the Third World. (St. John 1968: 339)

The lack of successful interaction between the French and locals was not the only obstacle for the postcolonial Algerian state applying for the EEC membership. The country also had major internal problems during the postcolonial period. Between 1991 and 2000, Algeria had to cope with a civil war between the National Liberation Front and various Islamic groups such as Islamic Armed Movement, Armed Islamic Group and Islam Salvation Army united under the Islamic Salvation Front. The outbreak of civil war in Algeria makes it distinct from Morocco and Tunisia which were not confronted with similar conflict in their postcolonial episodes. Colonial and postcolonial events may have pushed Algeria away from Europe, but this does not mean that relations with the EEC were totally absent. On the contrary, Algeria had actually been a member of the EEC due to the fact that it was an integral part of France as one of the signatories to the Treaty of Rome. That founded the EEC. However, Algeria’s membership was suspended once it had declared its independence from France in 1962. Like Tunisia, which also did not apply for EEC membership, Algeria also developed a foreign policy toward the EEC and after its transformation into EU by 1993. Relations between Algeria and the EEC began with the 1972 Mediterranean Global Approach Program. The EEC signed a cooperation agreement with Algeria, too, in 1976, in addition to four extra protocols of economic and financial cooperation between 1976 and 1995. Algeria also became part of Barcelona Declaration in 1995 and the European Neighborhood policy in 2004. The 2005 Association agreement became the legal basis for bilateral relations between Algeria and the European Union. In 2012, an action plan between Algeria and European Union was prepared on the basis of the first association agreement that was signed in 2005 as the legal basis of bilateral relations. In 2017, Algeria signed the Partnership Priorities Agreement within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy with the European Union. As part of the European Neighborhood Initiative, which specializes in the sectors of economic governance and support to diversification of economy, territorial development and participatory democracy, and energy-environment issues, assistance totaling €108–132 million were sent to Algeria.3 In 2017 too, Algeria and EU signed a second association agreement, which

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c­ onstituted a political framework to guide the EU member states’ relations with Algeria till 2020. The same year, the European Union allocated €40 million to support projects in Algeria in the areas of renewable energy, public finance reform and public services.4 In the area of stabilization of regional security and stability, Algeria also became eligible for funding from the EU Trust Fund to aid in establishing stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa.5

5.2   The Cases of Malta and Cyprus Assertion of European identity, which Morocco had justified by referring to its colonial past, was also put made by Malta and Cyprus in their membership applications to the EEC. Like Morocco, which is not geographically located on continental Europe, Malta and Cyprus had also developed a definition of European-ness for themselves despite being very small island communities in the Mediterranean Sea. They maintained that they met the stipulations laid out by Article 237 in the Treaty of Rome requiring that applicants for EEC membership be European. In justifying how European they were, just as Morocco had referred to its colonial ties with France, Malta in particular referred to its colonial ties with the United Kingdom. This is why Maltese European-ness may be seen as the British version of the King’s European Morocco. Malta and Cyprus managed to instrumentalize hybridity on their postcolonial national identity by referring to the successful interaction between the British and the locals. Religion played an important role here. Catholicism of the UK successfully associated with Catholicism in Malta and Cyprus, especially in the Southern Cyprus. Malta is peculiar in the history of British colonialization for having tried to join the UK instead of seeking self-determination. So the fact that it referred to the UK to assert its European-ness for the purpose of becoming a member of the EEC is not outlandish. Given the small population on the island, people worried that the conditions necessary for forming a state did not exist in Malta. Therefore, the idea of seceding from the UK was not very appealing. Many at the time thought that joining the UK would increase the living standards in Malta. However, the island country did secede from the UK in 1958 and became independent in 1960 (Basque 2015: 109). After its independence, Malta formally sought to integrate with the EEC in 1990 when it submitted its membership application. Six years later, the European Commission included Malta among a group of a

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six European countries marked to become full members in the next enlargement. However, in 1996, the Malta Labor Party opposed the full membership and the membership process was suspended. Instead, the party wanted to negotiate for an industrial free trade zone to access the EU in the future. The suspended process was reshuffled by the Nationalist Party’s coming to power in the next elections. Meanwhile, Malta’s membership application to the EEC was also supported by the Confederations of the Malta Trade Unions. As its president said in Nicosia, Malta is a European country. With Europe, we share a common history, common culture and common beliefs. (Rizzo 1998: 144)

The integration of Cyprus into the EEC was much more complex than it was in Malta’s case. Relations between the EEC and Cyprus go back to 1962, when Cyprus signed the cooperation agreement with the consent of two founding communities—Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. When the UK applied for EEC membership, Cyprus worried about losing its main export market. This concern became particularly pressing after the UK became a full member in 1973. As a consequence, Cyprus also wanted to seek full membership in the EEC. UK initiatives led to the first association agreement between Cyprus and the EEC being signed in 1973 with the goal of establishing a customs union involving free movement of goods and services between Cyprus and the EEC. Cyprus was founded within the framework of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee between Turkey, Greece and the UK. After the 1974 military intervention of Turkey on the island, Turkish Cypriots were excluded in relations between Cyprus and the EEC. Turkish military presence on the island has continued to be a major source of contention between the EEC and Turkey, as well as between Turkey and Greece. It has also had a negative impact on both the integration of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish state with the EEC. Turkey has had to deal with the Cyprus problem every time its full membership to the European Union is brought to the agenda. The EEC intensified relations with Cyprus through the Greek Cypriots with the signing of second association agreement in 1987. This agreement foresaw the membership of Cyprus in the Customs Union in 2002. In 2004, Cyprus became a member of the EEC, together with Malta. Turkey protested vehemently, reminding the parties that it was not possible for Cyprus to become a member of an organization that did not include both Turkey and Greece as members (Sertoglu and Ozturk 2003: 56). Turkey

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also objected to Cyprus’s full membership to the EU in 2004 by pointing to the fact that 75.8% of Greek Cypriots had refused the Annan Plan. It argued that rejection of the Annan Plan contradicted the EU’s principle of resolving the Cyprus problem before granting it full membership. Cyprus’ membership in the EU meant accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots even before a political solution was found to the Cyprus problem (Villotti 2012: 66). Although they are not located on continental Europe, Malta and Cyprus became members of the European Union in 2004. Both states had to provide justification for their claim of being European they had submitted their applications in 1990, prior to the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. Malta and Cyprus used a strategy like the one used by Morocco. Just as Morocco had used France as a proxy for Europe, Malta and Cyprus referred to the common history they shared with the United Kingdom as evidence of their European-ness. Moreover, they were members of the Commonwealth, which they believed put them squarely within Europe. European-ness was not the only criterion the European Commission used to assess whether Malta and Cyprus qualified for membership. The religious makeup of their populations also was a consideration. The fact that 78% of Maltese were Orthodox Christians and 98% of Cypriots were Catholic made them more European in the eyes of the Commission than Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, which had Muslim-­ majority populations. More importantly, there was an economic dimension to the assessment. The EU would benefit from the maritime transportation, commercial transactions and banking systems of Malta and Cyprus. The European Commission believed that the EU would become the world leader in maritime transportation given large capacities of Greece (47.9m tons), Malta (43.3m tons) and Cyprus (35.6m tons). With these three countries as members, the total annual maritime freight capacity of the EU would surpass Panama (181m tons), Liberia (76.6m tons) and the Bahamas (46.7m tons). In addition, full membership of Malta and Cyprus would enable the EU to better control migration in the Mediterranean (Rognon 2005: 389).

5.3   The Case of Turkey Two other countries applying for membership in the EEC at the same time were Turkey and Morocco, which submitted their applications in July 1987. Despite being a Muslim-majority country, Turkey believed that it

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was European according to Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. However, compared to Morocco, Turkey had more reason to be optimist, thanks to its geopolitical location. Turkey had greater geographical contiguity with Europe via the western Thrace region, including Istanbul. This is in sharp contrast to Morocco, whose only really claim to geographical proximity to Europe comes through the Strait of Gibraltar, a seaway that separates Morocco from continental Europe. Given the greater geographical proximity of Turkey to the Europe, Turkey’s claim of European-ness, at least in geographical terms, was more valid than Morocco’s. Just like King Hassan II, Turkey based its European-ness on the common history and culture it had with Europe. Contrasting with Morocco, but not with Malta and Cyprus, Turkey did not refer to the rule of former European countries (e.g., France or Britain) in Turkey to justify its European-ness since Turkey had no such colonial experience. While its lands had been shared by the British, the French, the Greeks and the Italians for a very short time at the beginning of the twentieth century, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s military and political successes saw to it that there was no official colonization, either directly or indirectly, of Turkey. Instead of referring a history of having been ruled by a European colonial power to justify its cultural and political proximity to Europe, and hence, its European-ness, Turkey referred to the Kemalist view of a western-­ oriented Turkish state and society. Turkey aspired to be a member of the club of civilized countries. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk believed that in order to achieve this aspiration, Turkey had to turn toward Europe: Our object now is to strengthen the ties that bind us to other nations. There may be a great many countries in the world, but there is only one civilization, and if a nation is to achieve progress, she must be a part of this one civilization… The Ottoman Empire began to decline the day when, proud of her success against the West, she cut ties that bound her to the European nations. We will not repeat this mistake. (Bozdaglioglu 2003: 51)

Mustafa Kemal’s vision of Europe as the nest of civilizations and Turkey’s duty to be part of Europe was also adopted in further years. Ismet Inonu, the second president of Turkey, maintained that diplomatic engagement was very important in Turkey’s western-oriented foreign policy and a significant component of this involved being institutionalized as a Europe state:

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After the Second World War, Turkey institutionalized its Western-oriented foreign policy by becoming a member of the Western organizations; namely, the OECD in 1948, Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952. The establishment of political, economic and cultural relations with the West through membership of these organizations thus enabled Turkey more than anything to institute itself as a “European power”. (Muftuler-Bac 1997: 53)

This path was taken by later presidents like Turgut Ozal who thought that Europe was the natural hub of the Turkish state and society. He said once: Turkey would never give up its effort to take its natural place in Europe.6

For Turgut Ozal, Turkey’s membership in the EEC, within the context drawn by Ataturk and Inonu, was a major step taken toward achieving progress at the civilizational level: The aim of the contemporary level of civilization set by Ataturk, is a long-­ desired step that no one had previously dared to take due to Turkey’s earlier troubles.7

In its membership application, Turkey based its European-ness on being part of common European civilization. This was in contrast to Morocco’s emphasis on hybridity to justify its European-ness. Turkey had to meet a number of requirements in order to be judged ready for EU membership. It had to take official measures as part of a reform package outlined by the European Commission. On many occasions, the EEC expressed confidence that these reforms would be sustained. It eventually invited Turkey to present a framework for negotiations on October 3, 2005.8 However, Turkey has had difficulty complying with demands made by European Commission with respect to solving the Cyprus issue and stabilizing relations with Greece. The inability to resolve these problems, despite all of the efforts Turkey has made to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, has delayed full membership of Turkey in the EU. The experience of Morocco and Turkey, two countries that applied for EU membership at the same time, has been both similar and different. While having had its application rejected outright, Morocco has actually had more engagement with the European Union than Turkey if only the number of agreements signed is taken into account. Participating in the Barcelona Process in 1995, signing association agreements in 1996 and

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1998, partnering the Agadir Free Trade Agreement in 2004, partnering Fisheries Agreement in 2006 and 2019, receiving advanced status in 2008, participating in EU-Morocco Summits held regularly since 2010, partnering the European Neighborhood policy, and signing the partnership agreement in 2013 put Morocco in a much more active position vis-à-vis the EU than Turkey. Turkey joined the Customs Union in 1995 and signed the negotiation agreement in 2005 which was modernized in 2016. The same year, Turkey and the EU also signed a migrant agreement that would be valid until 2018. On the other hand, both Turkey and Morocco seem to be well on their way to solving their respective problems. The Cyprus conflict for Turkey and the western Sahara referendum issue for Morocco seem to be obstacles for further improvement in their relations with the EU. The rejection of Morocco’s membership application to EEC also makes up a critical dimension of the evaluation of Turkey’s negotiating status. It demonstrates that if the European Commission wants to reject an application, it will do so right from the start. Rejection of Morocco’s application, all in all, shows how baseless the concerns of Euroskeptics have been since it shows that when the EU decides not to include a state, it does it without any manipulation or tricks. It also shows that a full adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria would be a good step for Turkey if the government and people still want full membership. Even though the last report prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee and submitted to the European Parliament calling for the suspension of Turkey’s candidacy has plunged the country’s full membership process into chaos, any sustainable reform has always the potential to revive bilateral relations.

5.4   Assessment The French experience with locals in the countries it ruled produced different outcomes with respect to postcolonial national identity of the former colonies. Even though a hybridity was formed in all the ruled lands, a successful interaction between the French and locals of these rules lands was not assured. This explains why successful interaction did not form in Tunisia and Algeria, like it had in Morocco. So, there was nothing that could be instrumentalized to create a European-ness that could be superimposed on postcolonial national identity in those two countries. France’s policies in Tunisia and other conditions there were not conducive to successful interaction with the locals. Indirect rule, discriminatory practices, the presence of a sizable Italian population, and economic bottlenecks are

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just some of the reasons why relations with the locals were not favorable. Less than fortuitous relations evolved between the French and the locals in Algeria for different reason. France held that Algeria was an integral part of France, so when nationalism rose in Algeria, France responded violently with armed repression. Clearly, these factors created an environment in Algeria where the interaction between France and the locals did not reach anywhere near the level of success that had been reached in Morocco under Lyautey during French Protectorate. While a degree of hybridity had developed in Algeria in its postcolonial period, the country was not inclined to instrumentalize it to create a postcolonial national identity. The experience it had with the French did not lend itself to such an instrumentalization. The same applies to Tunisia. Neither Algeria nor Tunisia could feel European, so applying to the EEC as a European state would never have crossed the minds of their leaders. Malta and Cyprus, on the other hand, referred to their common history with the United Kingdom while asserting that they were European when they applied to EEC in 1990. Turkey’s claim to European-ness was not based on any reference to a colonial past with Europe, but rather was presented as crucial to achieving advanced civilization and modernization.

Notes 1. Tunisia–European Union relations, available at https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia_en. 2. EU and Tunisia complete second round of negotiations for deep and comprehensive trade agreement, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ press/index.cfm?id=1855. 3. Algeria–European Union relations, available at https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/algeria_en. 4. EU–Algeria: EU adopts €40 million projects to support Algeria’s renewable energy, public finances reform and to facilitate trade, available at https:// www.europa-nu.nl/id/vkchgw7q0xzo/nieuws/eu_algeria_eu_adopts_40_ million_projects?ctx=vhzdoz8tvhxp. 5. Algeria and Europena Union have same objectives and terms, available at https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/south/stay-informed/news/ mogherini-algeria-european-union-and-algeria-have-same-objectives-terms. 6. Hürriyet October 7, 1986. 7. Electoral Manifesto of the Motherland Party (1987), p. 2. 8. European Commission Enlargement Newsletter published on December 21, 2004.

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References Balsney, Daphne J. 1980. The Recruitment and Role of the Civil Controllers During the Early Years of the French Protectorate in Tunisia. Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 5: 88–97. Basque, Maria But. 2015. A Historical and Political Review: The Challenges and Successes of Malta and Cyprus in Their Path Towards the Commonwealth and EU. Journal of Mediterranean Studies 24 (1): 105–121. Bozdaglioglu, Yucel. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach. New York: Routledge. Catroux, Georges. 1954. France, Tunisia and Morocco. International Journal 9 (4): 282–294. Cassarino, Jean Pierre. 1999. The EU-Tunisian Association Agreement and Tunisia’s Structural Reform Program. Middle East Journal 53 (1): 59–74. Choate, Mark I. 2007. Identity Politics and Political Perception in the European Settlement of Tunisia: The French Colony Versus the Italian Colony. French Colonial History 8: 97–109. El Farra, Mohammed. 1956. The Algerian Strategy. Africa Today 3 (4): 7–9. Lizabeth, Zack. 2002. Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French ruled Algeria. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 16 (1): 55–97. Muftuler-Bac, Meltem. 1997. Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Murphrey, Elizabeth H. 1982. Colonial Propaganda: Jacques Soustelle in defense of French Algeria: 1955–1962. Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 6/7: 76–85. Naylor, Philip Chivigies. 1980. Algeria and France: The Postcolonial Relationship: 1962–1975. Proceedings of the Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society 5: 58–69. Peterson, Terence. 2015. The Jewish Question and the Italian Peril: Vichy, Italy and Jews of Tunisia 1940–1942. Journal of Contemporary History 50 (2): 234–258. Pickles, Dorothy. 2015. Algeria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation. London: Routledge. Rizzo, Saviour. 1998. Malta’s Accession to the EU—A Lack of Consensus. Journal for Labor and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 1 (4): 139–150. Rognon, Pierre. 2005. Chypre et Malte: deux états insulaires dans l’Union Européen. Annales de Géographie 644: 383–398. S.E.C. 1948. Tunisia: A Convalescent Protectorate. The World Today 4 (6): 261–272. Sertoglu, Kamil, and Ilhan Ozturk. 2003. Application of Cyprus to the European Union and the Cyprus Problem. Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 39 (6): 54–70.

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St. John, Peter. 1968. Independent Algeria from Ben Bella to Boumedienne: II. Foreign Policy. The World Today 24 (8): 339–345. Villotti, Julia. 2012. EU Membership of an Internally Divided State—The Case of Cyprus. Archiv des Völkerreschts 50 (1): 21–60. Youssef, Salah Ben. 1954. Tunisia’s Struggle for Independence. Pakistan Horizon 7 (2): 56–61.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion to the King’s European Morocco

Abstract  The author makes his final remarks about the King’s European Morocco which covers Morocco’s membership application to the EEC in 1987. The author then refers to King Hassan II’s views on the compatibility of Islam with the West, which explains how respect for Islam during Lyautey’s period was the catalyst for the instrumentalization of hybridity between the French and locals that was used to create postcolonial Moroccan national identity. The author also states that Morocco’s application to European Union under the leadership of King Mohamed VI today could come to the agenda again amidst the disengagement process ignited by the Brexit process. Keywords  Brexit • European Union • King Mohamed VI • Morocco Morocco applied for membership in the European Economic Community in July 1987 at the initiative of King Hassan II. To be accepted as a member, the King had to show that Morocco was a European state, within the framework of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which stipulated that applicants to the organization had to be European. Only then would Morocco have the right to apply for full membership. The King tried to justify Morocco’s European-ness by instrumentalizing the hybridity between the French and locals that had been created during the French Protectorate, and which subsequently formed a component of Moroccan © The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9_6

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national identity. However, the European Commission rejected Morocco’s membership application three months after the application letter was sent. It meant that the justification the King gave for Morocco being a European state had also been repudiated. Representatives of European Commission such as Claude Cheysson and the international media claimed that Morocco did not qualify to claim European status. But official documents of the Commission did not mention anything about Morocco’s European-­ ness. The response from the European Commission signed by Uffe Ellemann-Jensen stated that Morocco’s application had been rejected due to wrong timing and difficult conditions within the community. This may have simply been a polite way of saying “no.” History shows that major components of Moroccan postcolonial national identity were constructed vis-à-vis Europe, particularly France. Islam was a unique component of Moroccan national identity since the eighth century with the conquest of the Maghreb region by the Arabs. It assumed even greater importance to Moroccan identity with the opposition to the missionary activities of Europeans, chiefly the Portuguese in the fifteenth century, before the French had come. Moroccan-ness itself was added to this identity through the struggle Moroccans waged against the French in the post-Lyautey period’s deviation from respect for Islam. African-ness became a component as well with the 1961 Casablanca Conference, where Morocco assumed pioneering role in the struggle against colonialism. The period 1956–1984 witnessed attempts to nullify the legacy of the French Protectorate and colonialism by asserting Moroccan-ness and African-ness. These attributes had evolved with the struggle against the French, both in the post-Lyautey period between 1930 and 1956 and in the legacy nullification efforts. The King’s European Morocco is an extraordinary tale in that it is not only an analysis of how a state located beyond the geographic perimeters of Europe felt European but also how a state distanced itself from Europe actually ended up adding European-ness to this identity. The King’s European Morocco analyzes the impact former colonizers had on the formation of the national identity of their former colonies by examining the critique of the colonial, the concept of inbetweenness and the development of admiration for Europe. It shows that all of these subthemes were intertwined in Morocco. Critique of the colonial was derived from statements made by state and non-state actors between 1956 and 1984 to nullify the legacy of the French Protectorate after Lyautey. The concept of inbetweenness blossomed ­during the same period. King Hassan II used the terms tree and bridge by

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the mid-1970s, during the heyday of the critique of colonialism in Morocco, as a metaphor to characterize Morocco’s position between Europe and Africa in particular with reference to France. This demonstrates that it is possible for a state to assume aspects of its former colonizer even though it may otherwise be highly critical of it. Admiration for Europe comes here when he stressed the importance being included in the France-Africa Group and in la francophonie even before applying for EEC membership. The fact that relations between Morocco and EEC that began with a 1969 cooperation agreement and further expanded by a 1975 association agreement occur in the middle of the efforts to nullify the impacts of colonialism shows this intertwining. Relations even continued thereafter. In 1976, the Moroccan dirham was given a preferential rate that put it on a par with the French franc in order to improve the inflow of foreign currency from the 350,000 Moroccans working in France at that time. $175 million in the form of gifts and long-term loans also flowed to Morocco within the framework of the 1975 agreement (Price 1978). The 1983 Fisheries agreement signed with Spain and Portugal provided a continuum of the relations with EEC. This study, then, looked at what went into Morocco developing a sense of being European, which it attempted to justify in its application for EEC membership. It examined a wealth of material concerning Morocco’s application for membership in the EEC and reactions to it. This includes speeches King Hassan II made about the application, the support and challenges to this application in Morocco, how it was seen in European, French and American media and official statements made by the European Commission which evaluates membership applications. Historically, a state of dependence develops in subjected populations, whether under colonial regime or foreign trusteeship. Two factors explain how Moroccan elites were caught up in this dependence. First, the country possessed a civilization, history and personality that were all national in scope. Second, elites in Morocco, fed on French culture and immersed in the demographic principles taught in French schools, wanted to apply such principles in Morocco. The elites reproached France because she conceived of her protectorate as a medium of political regeneration. The research conducted shows that the King’s European Morocco is a practical reflection of this rapprochement between France and Morocco. King Hassan II instrumentalized the hybridity that had developed between the French and locals during the French Protectorate in order to create a postcolonial

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Moroccan national identity that asserted that Morocco was European. The locus of this instrumentalization was the successful interaction between the French and locals during the tenure of Resident General Hubert Lyautey that was achieved through respect for Islam which was embodied in a number of ways. It included venerating the Moroccan sultan’s religious and political prestige, embracing a policy of respecting the everyday lives of the local people, referred to as la politique musulmane, and preserving religious schools alongside secular French ones. Without this respect for Islam, King Hassan II would not have been able to instrumentalize the hybridity between the French and the locals to create a European Moroccan national identity in the postcolonial period. Attribution to respect for Islam as the basis to instrumentalize hybridity between the French and locals on postcolonial Moroccan national identity shows how compatible Islam was with the West in Morocco for King Hassan II. Many of his speech or thoughts refer to the harmony between Islam and Europe. In one of them, for instance, he said: The geography—essential component of history—has placed us at the intersection of two seas, at the crossroads of two continents, at the point of maximum convergence between Europe and Africa. In Morocco, we act first as Muslims. But we are Muslims without complex. We respect both the demands of our time and its values ​​and the virtues of Islam.(…)Democracy of the institutions is a rule of the game which did not regulate everything, but with which everything began. It is also a matter of mentality. The state of mind matters a lot. In Morocco, it is linked to the fundamental respect of the values ​​of Islam. Or, if you want, it is prepared by Islam.(…)Openness and modernity are undoubtedly natural attitudes of ours, we the Moroccans. Progress on the basis of a public order defined by the rule of law is the surest guarantee for a continually improved future. There is no well living or well-­ being without democracy, without social peace, without constant effort to build a healthy economy. That’s what Islam wants(…)Islamic way of life provided a right, a law, a way of life built on mutual respect, men being all sons of Adam and Adam state clay, as said the Prophet. But the curiosity for Islam continues to assert itself because Islam is the closest and most accessible East. It is a geographical neighbor, a spiritual parent, a partner in the intellectual history of the West. Morocco is thus called extreme Occident. Morocco embodies links. Between Islam and the West, interpenetration has been settled.(…)Western Europe is for Moroccans their closest neighbor. We are, reciprocally, the first Muslim, Arab and African neighbor to Europe. The neighborhood has, as we have seen, a particular importance for Islam. Neighbors are condemned to hear each other. We are careful to safeguard

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what geography has given us, which culture has strengthened us. As far as Europe is concerned, our historical ties are so old that they erase maritime separation. Our idea of a​​ fixed link between Europe and Africa at the legendary bridge is inscribed in history and geopolitics.1 (Laurent 2000: 35–54)

With reference to the King’s speech above, the King’s European Morocco shows that Islam actually had a role to play in defining the boundaries of Morocco’s European-ness while often regarded as a non-­ existing part of Europe. This had not been the case in Tunisia or Algeria, for example, due to the reasons discussed in the previous chapter. In Morocco, this successful interaction later led King Hassan II to instrumentalize this hybridity on Moroccan postcolonial national identity. In other words, successful interaction between the former colonizer and the locals becomes a sine qua non for the instrumentalization of hybridity between the former colonizer and the locals on the postcolonial national identity of the former colonized state, if that state wants to be regarded as European. Incorporating European-ness into postcolonial Moroccan national identity was a difficult process. Not many formerly colonized states feel such a postcolonial cultural attachment to Europe. The graffiti Nou Pa Ewopeyen (We are not European) written on many walls by the people of Guadeloupe attests to this non-attachment to Europe. The people of Saint Martin Island, which had been colonized by the French and the Dutch, is a model to this non-attachment too. After independence people there speak neither French nor Dutch, but rather an English creole. This is because they do not want to appear European by referring to their past with France or the Netherlands (Piermont 1991). On the other hand, Indians did not think they were European as they were also ruled by the British because of Amritsar 1919 incident where the British massacred many locals stopped the Indian elites to instrumentalize this hybridity on their national identity. The Amritsar 1919 incident is an example to how successful interaction between locals and the colonizer cannot come up. The role of the King’s European Morocco deserves some attention in European integration too. It showed that even states that are not located in Europe could develop a definition of European-ness. Second, it contributed to the formation of the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, which made candidacy contingent upon a number of political and economic criteria. This was in sharp contrast to the criterion of identity that had previously been adopted in the Treaty of Rome under Article 237, which stipulated that “any European state may apply for membership.” In its place came a

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number of conditions that had to be met. These conditions included political commitments regarding democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities in addition to some economic ones. Candidates to the EU were expected to have a functioning market economy and to accept the acquis communautaire, as well as various other EU objectives. The European Commission seems to have been surprised by Morocco’s membership application. However, they could not prevent Morocco from applying since, at the time, it was sufficient for Morocco to feel European to be able to apply for membership. The King’s European Morocco indicates that Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome did not say that non-­European states could not apply or that a country had to be European to join the Community (Redmond 2007: 314). European-ness in Article 237 was open to any interpretation of the applicant state since it did not have an official geographical, economic, political or even cultural definition of European-ness that could be used by the European Commission to make a judgement. In addition, European-ness was not only subject to interpretation by the applicant states but also the European Commission. In 1988, the German Environment Minister Walter Wallmann said that the application of Portugal to the EEC was accepted not because the Commission had reached a consensus about the European-ness of Portugal in the Commission. Portugal was declared as European because she could develop further relations with Africa by using her experiences with colonialism (Heintz 1991). The difficulty of how to react to the claim of European-ness of a state that is not even geographically in Europe seemed to push the European Commission to change the definition of European-­ ness for membership in the European Union. The establishment of the Copenhagen Criteria was not only designed to lay out the membership application mechanism but also to determine how to determine if an applicant state is actually European. The King’s European Morocco contributed to the transformation the principle characterized by the motto “Be like a Roman in Rome” described in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome into one highlighted by the motto “Behave like a Roman in Rome,” embodied in the Copenhagen Criteria. In short, the King’s European Morocco digitalized who the European was and was not. Instead a qualified definition of Europe, it brought a quantitative one. Some words should also be spent on the developments between Morocco and the EU after the King’s European Morocco. The rejection of Morocco’s membership application did not mean the halt of bilateral relations. In 1988, 1992 and 1995, Morocco signed new fisheries ­agreements

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with the EEC that permitted a limited number of European ships to fish a fixed maximum amount of each species of fish in Moroccan waters. In return, the EEC would provide technical and financial assistance to Moroccan fishing industry (I Fanes 2003). After the membership application, the EEC, which later became the EU in 1993, paid political attention to Morocco. King Hassan II took important steps to improve public relations which included the release of the previously banned book Notre ami le Roi and organization of a large press conference for the release of Maroc d’espoir written by the French author Michel Laurent in 1996. Morocco and the EU signed the 1995 Partnership Agreement that led to the development of the trade zone over the next 12 years. In 1994, Morocco became a part of the MEDA Democracy Program, which would provide financial support to civil society in the Mediterranean for further democratization. In 1995, a new fisheries agreement that reduced the number of EU boats in Moroccan waters (White 1997; Damis 1998) was signed. That same year, Morocco joined the Union for the Mediterranean headed by France as its project to continue its colonial past in the Maghreb (Martin 2009). The Union was intent on strengthening relations between the EU and the Maghreb by defining a common area of peace and stability and by constructing a zone of shared prosperity and approaching people through social partnership. In turn, Morocco would be a part of a vision of an open and integrated Mediterranean Union tied to and politically oriented towards the European Union (Behr 2002). In 1996, Morocco and EU signed another association agreement with the aim of establishing a free trade regime by 2012. The agreement was part of the Euro-­Mediterranean Initiative and the 1996 Barcelona Protocol, too, through which the EU had decided to negotiate free trade agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries. As a result, the EU market came to account for over 71% of fruits and vegetables exports from Morocco and close to 95% of clothing in 1997 (Elbehri and Hertel 2006). That same year, Morocco also became part of the MDO-Europe Aid, through which 48 projects would be funded by the EU between 1996 and 2001 (Haddadi 2003). In addition, it stabilized Morocco’s position in the Euro-­ Mediterranean Partnership which had established the legal basis for bilateral relations. According to a 2007 report prepared by the Moroccan state, this agreement laid the ground for free exchange of industrial products, free access of Moroccan goods to the European Union market, the right to settle, liberalization of services, free movement of capital, rules of competition, consolidation of economic, social and cultural cooperation and a new migration policy.2 Last but not

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least, it made the EU a strategic partner to Morocco and contributed to accelerating the pace of change and modernization of the Moroccan national economy (Idrissi 2011). In 2003, Morocco became the first country to agree to the establishment of subcommittee on human rights, democratization and governance as part of the EU-Moroccan Association Council. The same year, Morocco also became part of the European Neighborhood Policy and started to negotiate with the EU a Readmission Agreement (EURA) concerning the role of Morocco in migration to Europe. Negotiations were followed in 2002 by the Euro-Med Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP). These programs brought long-term profits, risk capital, innovated financial capitals and environment projects to Morocco. As the report concluded, the FEMIP agreement led to the signing in 2003 of the new EU-proposed European neighborhood policy to the East and the South with the aim of broadening the scope of relations with states that had no prospect of membership. The Morocco-Europe Action Plan that was signed in 2005, on the other hand, launched programs on political dialogue and reforms, economic and social reforms, commerce and market reforms, cooperation on justice affairs, cooperation of energy, transport, information technology and science and contact with people. The plan brought the New Indicative Program which provided Morocco €654 million in financial assistance between 2007 and 2010 for the target sectors crucial to social economic and development of the country. In 2006, Morocco signed the First Fisheries Partnership Agreement which would provide fishing opportunities to EU vessels within the limits of surplus stocks available for four years.3 In 2007, along with Ukraine, Morocco became the first European Neighborhood Program partner country to receive extra allocations from the governance facility, as additional funds that went to rewarding countries that made most progress in the field of democracy and human rights. Between 2007 and 2010, €654 million flowed from the EU into Morocco. In 2008, Morocco became a part of the New Union for the Mediterranean, an organization that aimed at reinforcing political and security dialogue, sharing prosperity and, again, approaching people through social cultural and human partnership. The new Union was an attempt to provide Morocco with an advanced status through which Morocco could achieve incremental integration into the internal European market. It also provided financial support, the right to participate in a number of EU programs and agencies and further integration with the Common Security and Foreign Policy and the European

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Security and Defense Policy ALTHEA, which were operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Krausch 2009). The same year, Morocco received advanced status, which provided more privileged relations with the European Union, more common market opportunities with the European Union, free exchange built on the single market, an open investment regime, business opportunities, the right to join the Marco Polo program for transport, the 2007–2013 public health program, and the Customs and Fiscalis Program in 2013, the European network of Information and Security Agency (ENISA), the European Air Security Agency (EASA) and the European Maritime Security Agency (EAMA). In addition, the advanced status assured Morocco greater opportunity to enhance political dialogue, the right to participate in the civil-military operations organized by the European Union, a parliamentary cooperation where the Moroccan parliament would earn observer status at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the right to participate in common projects within the European Police College and the European Monitoring Center for drugs and drug addiction. In 2009, once the advanced status was given, Morocco signed the finalization of negotiations of the association agreement, which revised the concessions on agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and fishery products. This agreement was complemented by the March 2010 Granada Summit, which accelerated the intensifications of negotiations on liberalizing trade (Idrissi 2011). The first EU-Morocco Summit was organized in 2010 to consolidate bilateral relations. At this summit, an action plan for the implementation of the advanced status was adopted for the years 2013–2017. European Union had a positive impact on the democratization process in Morocco after the Arab Spring (Catalano and Graziane 2016). In 2011, Morocco became the first state in the European Neighborhood policy that received the partnership for democracy status. The same year, the second Morocco-EU Fisheries Partnership Agreement, which was an extension of the first one in 2006 for another four years, was signed (Jönsson 2011). In 2013, Morocco signed the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFT) agreement with the European Union, together with Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. Morocco wanted to suspend the agreement in 2014 because of the European Union’s support for self-determination in Western Sahara, an ongoing problem between Morocco, Algeria and Spain since 1975. In February 2015, the 10th session of the Morocco-EU Association Committee, which provided Morocco’s participation in the Community’s programs and agencies, was

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held. In November of the same year, the first ­Morocco-­Council of Europe meeting that started the implementation of the South Program II was held. Morocco’s relations with the European Union started to deteriorate in 2015, just after the signing of the Farm Trade Agreement with the European Union. In response, the European Union decided to cancel the reciprocal liberalization measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fisheries products and protocols amendments on the 2000 European Union-Morocco Association Agreement upon Morocco’s asking for the MINURSO Representative Mr. Christopher Ross not to visit Western Sahara lands again. In addition, when the Court for Justice of the European Union decided that the Farm Trade Agreement signed in 2015 should have excluded the Western Sahara coasts upon the demands of POLISARIO in 2012, Morocco suspended relations with the European Union in February 2016.4 Relations normalized when Federica Mogherini, as the Foreign Minister of the European Union, stated that the trade agreements signed between Morocco and the European Union would not be affected by the decision of the Court for Justice of the European Union.5 Nevertheless, relations since that time have been tense since the European Union does not recognize Morocco’s territorial claim on the Western Sahara. A new fishing accord was signed between Morocco and EU in January 2019 and ratified in February 2019 by the European Parliament. To conclude, the King’s European Morocco is an example to how identity in politics might result in a sense of belonging through the practice of inclusion and exclusion. Inclusion consists of sharing the same civic space with other actors, while exclusion entails totalizing or homogenizing diversity and conflicting interests within some such community around an imagined, transcended notion of community self (Bellamy 2008). The King’s European Morocco shows King Hassan II used identity for the inclusion of Morocco in the EEC. The post-1987 engagements with the EEC reveal that it was a critical action that brought significant advantages to Morocco in a period where globalization had yet to start. With this membership application, the King demonstrated how courageous Morocco was to share a seat in a European organization founded by former European colonizers. Morocco’s application for membership to EEC was an initiative of King Hassan II, who attempted to show that Morocco was no different from the members of the EEC. It was a challenge to colonialism, which could be

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made by referring to the colonial past, or by using it to the advantage of Morocco. Much more than the European-ness to which the ECC member states could lay claim, the King’s European Morocco presented Morocco’s potpourri national identity, one that included an amalgam of Muslim, Arab, African, Moroccan, Maghrebi, Amazigh and European components. The turmoil that threatens to intensify even further in the near future in the European Union because of Brexit might make the acceptance of new members more palatable to the European agenda. In the event that Morocco’s application is reevaluated, King Mohamed VI is in a position of being able to demonstrate that Morocco meets the Copenhagen Criteria. He also seems determined to enhance relations with France, which played a critical role in the King’s European Morocco. With full membership in the European Union, Morocco would take its place among EU decisionmakers. It would be able to get its voice heard within its governing bodies and have an impact on the whole of Europe. Particularly important to its own interests, it would have a chance to have a greater role in how its disagreements with Algeria on the Western Sahara issue are resolved. This increased role would apply to all European treaties and European law. It would acquire increased security in military and national security areas, and benefit from fundamental freedoms membership in the EU bestows upon its members, including the right to settle and the right to movement in Europe. As Abderrahman Mekkaoui has said, the consistently sound relations with France in the economic, political and social fields since the end of the Protectorate have always been able to overcome critical periods, and are strengthening with increased numbers of officials of Moroccan origin in Emmanuel Macron’s government.6 In addition to the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria, good relations with France would always help Morocco to have a seat in the European Union. The French President Emmanuel Macron’s advocacy of European identity7 in the last months would also be a good helper to Morocco if it wants to renew its membership application. As long as European-ness would be defined and defended by the French Emmanuel Macron, the King’s European Morocco will always find a new meaning for the European integration. Regardless of how the EU members today define European-ness of their own, the non-­ member Morocco’s definition was very clear. This is why Morocco shall be more in the story of European integration books and articles, even though its application was rejected.

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Notes 1. La mode de vie musulmane apportait un droit, une législation, un mode de vie bâti sur le respect mutuel, les hommes étant tous fils d’Adam et Eve comme le dit le Prophète. Mais la curiosité pour l’Islam continue à s’affirmer, car l’Islam est l’Orient le plus proche et le plus accessible. C’est un voisin géographique, un parent spirituel, un partenaire de l’histoire intellectuelle de l’Occident. Le Maroc est ainsi appelé extrême Occident. —La géographie-­ composante incontournable de l’histoire—nous a placé à l’intersection de deux mers, au carrefour de deux continents, au point de rapprochement maximum entre l’Europe et l’Afrique. Au Maroc, nous agissions d’abord comme Musulmans. Mais nous sommes des Musulmans sans complexe. Nous respectons à la fois les exigences de notre temps et les valeurs et les vertus de l’Islam. —La démocratie des institutions est une règle de jeu qui, ne règle pas tout, mais avec laquelle tout commence. Elle est aussi une affaire de mentalité. L’état d’esprit importe beaucoup. Au Maroc, il est lié au respect fondamental des valeurs de l’Islam. Ou, si vous voulez, il est préparé par lui. —Ouverture et modernité sont incontestablement notre attitude naturelle, nous Marocains. Le progrès sur la base d’un ordre public défini par l’Etat de droit est le gage le plus sûr pour améliorer notre avenir. Il n’y a pas de bien vivre ni bien être sans démocratie, sans paix sociale, sans effort constant pour l’édification d’une économie saine. C’est ce que veut l’Islam. Le Maroc incarne des liens entre l’Islam et l’Occident, l’interpénétration a été la règle. —L’Europe de l’Ouest est pour les Marocains leur voisin le plus proche. Nous en sommes, réciproquement, le premier voisin musulman, arabe et africain. Le voisinage revêt, comme on l’a vu, une importance particulière pour l’Islam. Les voisins sont condamnés à s’entendre. Nous veillons à sauvegarder ce que la géographie nous a donné, ce que la culture nous a consolidé. Concernant l’Europe, nos liens historiques sont si anciens qu’ils effacent la séparation maritime. Notre idée d ‘un lien fixe entre l’Europe et l’Afrique à l’endroit du pont légendaire est inscrite dans l’histoire et la géopolitique. 2. Morocco-EU relations: Towards and advanced status membership, available at https://www.finances.gov.ma/Docs/2007/depf/5491_morocco_eurelationstowardsanadvancedstatuspartnership_2.pdF. 3. Briefing: EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement available at http:// w w w. e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / R e g D a t a / b i b l i o t h e q u e / b r i e f ing/2013/130703/LDM_BRI%282013%29130703_REV1_EN.pdf. 4. Morocco suspends contacts with EU over court ruling on farm trade available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-morocco-westernsahara/ morocco-suspends-contacts-with-eu-over-court-ruling-on-farm-tradeidUKKCN0VY273.

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5. Morocco and EU discuss amending agriculture deal available at https:// www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/10/232022/morocco-euagriculture-ecg-western-sahara-nasser-bourita-federica-mogherini/. 6. Maroc Hebdo,12 May 2017. 7. Macron tells MEPs to defend Europe’s unique identity, available at https:// www.ft.com/content/00a616ae-4222-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b.

References Bellamy, Richard. 2008. Evaluating Union Citizenship: Belonging, Rights and Participation Within the EU. Citizenship Studies 12 (6): 597–611. Behr, Timo. 2002. The EU’s Mediterranean Politics After the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? Amsterdam Law Forum 4 (76): 77–88. Catalano, Serida L., and Paolo R.  Grazione. 2016. Europeanization as a Democratization Tool: The Case of Morocco. Mediterranean Politics 21 (3): 364–386. Damis, John. 1998. Morocco’s 1995 Fisheries Agreement with the EU: A Crisis Resolved. Mediterranean Politics 3 (2): 61–73. Elbehri, Aziz, and Thomas Hertel. 2006. Comparative Analysis of the EU-Morocco FTA vs. Multilateral Liberalization. Journal of Economic Integration 21 (3): 496–525. Haddadi, Said. 2003. The EMP and Morocco: Diverging Political Agendas? Mediterranean Politics 8 (2–3): 73–89. Heintz, Regina. 1991. Sefalet Yaratan Bolluk: AT’nin Tarım politikası ve Üçüncü Dünya in Wahl, Peter. Niçin Aztekler Avrupa’yı Keşfetmedi? (Warum ̇ ̇ Montezuma nicht Europa entdeck hat?) Istanbul: Iletiş im Yayıncılık. I Fanes, Jordi Vaquer. 2003. The Domestic Dimension of EU External Policies: The Case of the EU-Morocco 2000–2001 Fisheries Negotiations. Mediterranean Politics 8 (1): 59–82. Idrissi, Boutaina I. 2011. Analysis of Morocco-European Union Partnership Within the Framework of the Advanced Status: Main Features and Challenges. Oslo: Europautredningen. Jönsson, Hakan. 2012. The EU-Moroccan Fisheries Partnership Agreement: A Process-Tracing Case Study of the Potential Extension in 2011. Master’s Thesis. Lund: Lund University Libraries. Krausch, Kristina. 2009. The European Union and Political reform in Morocco. Mediterranean Politics 14 (2): 165–179. Laurent, Eric. 2000. La Génie de la Modération (Genius of a Moderation: Reflections on the Truth of Islam). Paris: Libraire Plon. Martin, Ivan. 2009. EU-Morocco Relations: How Advanced Is the Advanced Status? Mediterranean Politics 14 (2): 239–245.

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Piermont, Dorothie. 1991. 500 yıl oldu hala sürüyor: Avrupa’nın son sömürgeleri in Wahl, Peter. Niçin Aztekler Avrupa’yı Keşfetmedi? (Warum Montezuma ̇ ̇ nicht Europa entdeck hat?) Istanbul: Iletiş im Yayıncılık. Price, David Lynn. 1978. Morocco: The Political Balance. The World Today 34 (12): 493–500. Redmond, John. 2007. Turkey and the European Union: Troubled European or European Trouble? International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 83 (2). White, Gregory. 1997. The Advent of Electoral Democracy in Morocco? The Referendum of 1996. Middle East Journal 51 (3): 388–404.

Index1

A Abdelhafed, Moulay, 18 Abdellah Memmes, 41 Admiration for Europe, 5 Africa, 53–56, 59–63, 75, 107, 108, 110 Algeria, 6, 7, 11, 14, 26, 41, 87–102, 109, 113, 115 Amazighs, 16, 19 Amritsar 1919, 109 Annan Plan, 98 Assimilation, 14, 18 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 99 B Barcelona Process, 100 Blad al Makhzen, 15, 18, 19, 22–26, 35, 36 Blad as Siba, 15 Brexit, 1, 115

C Cambon, Paul, 89 Casablanca Conference, 43, 106 Cesaire, Aimé, 33 Cheysson, Claude, 3, 75, 106 Colonialism, 4, 5, 11, 16, 42, 45, 53, 54, 67 Colonized, 39, 40 Colonizer, 14, 34 Common Security and Foreign Policy, 112 Communist Party, 37 Copenhagen Criteria, 98, 100, 101, 109, 110, 115 Council of Europe, 113 Cyprus, 6, 9, 11 D Dahir, 19, 20, 28n16, 35 Delcassé, Theophile, 16

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 V. Ipek, North Africa, Colonialism and the EU, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29589-9

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INDEX

Delors, Jacques, 69, 75, 84n36, 84n37 Democratic Party for Independence, 37 Dreyfus, Alfred, 93 E Education, 16, 21–22, 24–26 Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe, 72–76, 82n30 Euro-Mediterranean Union, 91 Europe, 1–6, 8–10, 34, 53–77, 77n1, 78n5, 78n6, 79n9, 80n10, 80n12, 80n13, 81n18, 82n21, 82n23, 82n24, 82n26, 82n27, 82n29, 82n30, 83n31, 83n32, 84n36, 84n37, 112 European Commission, 2, 3, 9, 11, 59, 64, 71, 73–77, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102n8, 106, 110 European Communities, 2, 11n1, 60, 61, 65, 67, 70, 74, 75, 84n34, 84n35 European Constitution, 2 European Economic Area, 2 European Economic Community (EEC), 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 54–56, 59–77, 87, 88, 91, 95–98, 100–102, 105 European integration, 2 Europeanity, 66, 71 European Neighborhood Policy, 95, 101, 112 European-ness, 2–4, 6, 9, 10, 56, 59, 63–66, 68, 73, 76, 77 European Parliament, 101 European state, 2, 6, 10 European Union (EU), 1, 11n1, 64, 66, 79n9, 83n33, 87–102, 110, 111, 115 Euroskeptics, 101 EU Trust Fund, 96

F al Fassi, Allal, 37, 38, 42, 47n8 Fez, 36 Fisheries Agreement, 101 Fontainebleau Summit, 55 France, 2, 5–7, 9, 10, 55, 64, 65, 68, 69, 78n5, 87, 90–94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 106, 107, 111, 115 Francophonie, 54, 68 French Economic and Social Council, 63 French Protectorate, 14–22, 28n18, 28n19, 33–45, 45n1, 46n3, 46n4, 46n5, 46n6, 53, 54, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64–66, 77, 105–107 French Republic, 18, 40 G Gandhi, Leila, 34 Gibraltar, 55, 56, 78n5, 78n6 Gilbert, Bart Moore, 34 Greece, 56, 61, 62 Grexit, 1 H Hassan II, King, 4, 6–10, 41, 42, 44, 54–56, 60–62, 64–66, 68–70, 72–77, 87, 88, 99, 105–107, 109, 111, 114 Hybridity, 13–26, 55, 59, 62, 64, 66, 77, 88, 91, 92, 96, 100, 101, 105, 107 I Imperialism, 34, 42 Inbetweenness, 5, 11, 13, 53, 88, 106 Independence, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44 Indirect rule, 26 Inonu, Ismet, 99

 INDEX 

Islam, 4, 6, 7, 10, 15, 17, 18, 20–25, 27n2, 27n7, 36, 46n4 Istiqlal Party, 37–41, 45, 67 J Joint Communication Strengthening, 92 K Kingdom of Morocco, 2, 74, 75 King’s European Morocco, 10, 11, 13, 14, 68, 69, 71, 77, 105–115 L La francophonie, 107 Lahbabi, Mohammad, 40 La mission civilisatrice, 19 La politique musulmane, 16, 18–20, 26, 108 Lyautey, Hubert, 15, 16 M Macron, Emmanuel, 115 Maghreb, 6 Malta, 6, 9, 11, 87–102 Malta Labor Party, 97 MEDA Democracy Programme, 111 Mediterranean Sea, 4, 6, 55, 62, 66 Mendes, Pierre, 91 MINURSO, 114 Mitterrand, François, 55, 59, 79n9 Mohamed VI, King, 115 Mohamed V, 40, 43 al Moqri, Mohammad, 19 al Moqri, Vizier, 35 Moroccanity, 40 Moroccan locals, 18, 19

121

Moroccan national identity, 10, 45, 54, 62–64, 105–106, 108, 109 Moroccan-ness, 4, 11, 45, 53, 54 Morocco, 1–11, 13–26, 28n18, 28n19, 35, 36, 39–42, 45, 53–77, 87, 89, 91–96, 98–101, 105–110, 114, 116n2, 116n3, 116n4, 117n5 N Nasser, Cemal Abdel, 94 Nationalist Party, 97 National Liberation Front, 93–95 The Netherlands, 37, 47n8 Nogués, Charles Hyppolite, 35 O Organization of African Unity, 44 Ozal, Turgut, 100 P Paris, 55, 78n2 Partnership Priorities Agreement, 95 Petain, Marechal, 90 Philippe, Louis, 92 Poincaré, Raymond, 16 Ponsot, Auguste Henri, 34 Portugal, 55, 59, 60, 62, 67, 71, 73, 75, 76, 79n9, 81n13, 81n18, 81n19, 82n21, 83n32, 84n38 Postcolonial nationalism, 5, 11 Postcolonialism, 34 Protectorate, 5–10, 14–18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 35, 36, 39, 40 Q Quai d’Orsay, 20

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R Rahmani, Mohnir, 42 Resident General, 34, 35

Tunisia, 6–8, 11, 14, 17, 26, 87–102, 109, 113 Turkey, 3, 6, 8, 11, 87–102

S Spain, 6–8, 45, 54, 55, 59, 60, 62, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 76, 113 Steeg, Theodore, 34 Strait of Gibraltar, 99 Sub-Saharan Africa, 62 Successful interaction, 7, 10 Sultan, 16–18, 20, 27n6, 27n8, 28n13, 28n16, 36

U Union for the Mediterranean, 111 United Kingdom, 88, 96–98, 102

T Treaty of Fez, 14, 17, 18 Treaty of Rome, 2–4, 6, 9, 10, 87, 88, 95, 96, 99, 105, 109, 110

Y Young, Robert, 34 Youssef, Moulay, 18, 19, 22–24, 28n15

W Wallmann, Walter, 110 Western Sahara, 40, 42