Norm Diffusion Beyond the West: Agents and Sources of Leverage 3031250087, 9783031250088

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Contributors
Introduction: Agency and Norm Diffusion Beyond the West
1 Diffusion and Agency: State of Art
2 Book Organization
3 Theoretical and Methodological Framework
References
Norm Diffusion by Rising Global Powers
Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation
1 Introduction
2 ‘Donor Accountability’ as a Sticky Soft Norm in International Development
3 The Rise of the South and the Normative ‘Fusion and Confusion’ in the Field of International Development
4 Disputes Over What Accountability Means and How Should It Be Practiced by Southern Providers: Normative Resistance and Innovation Regarding Measurement
5 Conclusion
References
Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond
1 Introduction
2 Japan as a Norm Entrepreneur in Development Cooperation
2.1 Japan and the Norms of Commercial Development
2.2 The Origins of the CD Norms
3 The CD Norms Beyond Japan: The Case of China
4 Rethinking International Norm Diffusion: From Teaching to Learning?
4.1 Limits of the Western Norm Diffusion Models
4.2 Alternative Pathways of Norm Diffusion: Policy Transfer through Active Learning
4.3 Learning and Change: China’s Localization of the CD Norms
5 Concluding Thoughts
References
China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West
1 Introduction
2 China’s Outline of Cyber Sovereignty
3 Diffusion of Cyber Sovereignty
4 Facilitating Factors of the Norm’s Promotion
5 Conclusion
References
Norm Diffusion by Middle Powers and Small States
From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline
1 Introduction
1.1 From Mandela to African Renaissance
1.2 Populism, Fragmentation and Protest: South Africa Under Zuma
1.3 A ‘New Dawn’ and a Middle Path?
2 Conclusion
References
Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion
1 Introduction
2 Conceptual and Methodological Approach
3 An Overview of Indonesia’s Norm Enactment and Promotion
4 Promoting Democracy and Human Rights
4.1 Political Opportunity and Norm Adaptation
4.2 Democracy and Human Rights in Political Discourse
4.3 Democracy and Human Rights in Political Practice
5 Conclusion
References
Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation
1 Introduction
2 Diaspora/kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion: Why/how?
3 Imagining Turkishness—The Making of Ethnonational Norms and Categories
4 Ethnonational Norms in circulation—The Kemalist Era (1923–1938)
5 Ethnonational Norms in Circulation—The Post-War Era
6 Ethnonational Norms in Circulation—The AKP Era
7 In Lieu of a Conclusion
References
Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS
1 Introduction
1.1 SIDS Contexts and Climate Change Governance
1.2 Agency and Norm Diffusion
1.3 Content of Norms and SIDS’ Agency
2 Agency—Actor Nexus
3 Agency-Receiver Nexus
3.1 Agency—Structure, Agency-Action Nexus—Norms and SIDS’s Agency
3.2 SIDS’ Place in International Climate Governance
References
Norm Diffusion by and within Multilateral Institutions
Redefined, Repackaged and Redeployed: Diffusion of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank
1 Introduction
2 Citizen Security: Emergence and Conceptualization
2.1 Democratic and Citizen Security as an Antidote to National Security Doctrine
2.2 Citizen Security as Protection from Crime and Violence
3 Mainstreaming of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank
3.1 Policies of Citizen Security Diffusion
3.2 Critical Reflection of the IDB's Diffusion Practices
4 Conclusion
References
ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges
1 Introduction
2 ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur and Its Mechanisms for Norm Diffusion
3 Review of the Creation of SEANWFZ
4 ASEAN’s Norm Diffusion in Action
4.1 Practicing the ASEAN Way
4.2 Framing for Legitimacy-Building
4.3 Issue Linkage
4.4 Counter-Dominance and Soft Balancing Strategy
5 Conclusion
References
The EU Presidencies of Central Eastern European Members: A Framework for Mutual Socialisation and Normative Influence on the EU's Agenda?
1 Introduction
2 Influencing EU’s Agenda: The Specific Field of Foreign Policy
3 (Mutual) socialisation into the Council presidency’s rules and foreign policy approaches
3.1 The Slovenian Experience
3.2 The Czech Experience
4 The Impact of the CEECs on the EU: Evolvement of the European Policy Towards Post-Communist Countries (Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood)
4.1 A Strong Support to the Western Balkans
4.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Further Key Priority
4.3 The Role of Social Norms: Which Impact on EU’s Agenda?
5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Conclusion: Norms, Diffusion and Power Dynamics Beyond the West
1 Sources of Leverage/Power
References

Citation preview

Norm Research in International Relations Series Editor: Antje Wiener

Šárka Kolmašová Ricardo Reboredo   Editors

Norm Diffusion Beyond the West Agents and Sources of Leverage

Norm Research in International Relations Series Editor Antje Wiener, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

This book series offers an outlet for interdisciplinary research on norms in the context of international relations and global governance. It features scientific and scholarly studies which examine the way norms are created and re-created through interactions between actors at the international level, taking into account the reflexive nature of governance relationships and their impact on state behaviour through the reconstitution of norms. Norms in international relations are defined as ideas of varying degrees of abstraction and specification that concern fundamental values, organising principles or standardised procedures. They resonate across states and global actors in the form of official policies, laws, treaties and agreements, while their meaning may be stable or contested. Norm Research in International Relations (NRIR) welcomes proposals for research monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from a variety of disciplines that seek to advance theories and applied research in international relations and to arrive at a better understanding of the role and impact of norms. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, issues of international justice, research on contestation, human rights, international treaties in areas such as energy, environment or security, and constructivist norm research in international relations theory, recognition theory and international law. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for consideration, please contact the Johannes Glaeser (Senior Editor Economics) Johannes.glaeser@ springer.com.

Šárka Kolmašová · Ricardo Reboredo Editors

Norm Diffusion Beyond the West Agents and Sources of Leverage

Editors Šárka Kolmašová Metropolitan University Prague Strašnice, Czech Republic

Ricardo Reboredo Metropolitan University Prague Strašnice, Czech Republic

ISSN 2522-8676 ISSN 2522-8684 (electronic) Norm Research in International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-25008-8 ISBN 978-3-031-25009-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This research project was funded by the Czech Science Foundation [grant number GA20-07805S]. Hereby, we would like to thank the Czech Science Foundation for providing funding, which allowed us to establish the initial team of contributing authors. This book resulted from a larger project that aimed to analyse the complex dynamics of social norms in international order, including norms dissemination, contestation and transformation. Reflection of norms’ transfers beyond the West was one of the core thematic clusters as the initial ambition of this larger project was to emphasize the role of non-Western countries—emerging powers as well as small peripheral states. We simply wanted to demonstrate that countries such as China, Indonesia, Colombia or Trinidad and Tobago can represent influential norm-makers and their agency fundamentally matters in norm transfers within particular regions and beyond them. All contributing authors shared our vision that more research is needed with regard to non-Western agency (however we are fully aware of the problematic connotations associated with the labels “Western”, “non-Western” or “beyond the West”). Our strongest gratitude belongs to the contributing authors of this book, who drafted, patiently revised and completed their chapters but also provided comments to each other and generally participated in discussions on the book composition and main arguments. In January and February 2022, we have organized three webinars via zoom to present the first drafts of individual chapters and provide feedback on the level of the project team. These sessions were open to our colleagues from the Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Metropolitan University Prague (MUP), who kindly joined our debates. Hereby, we would like to thank Martina Varkoˇcková, Mats Braun, Michal Kolmaš and Vít Beneš for their valuable insights and general support of our project. These webinars were organized in times we were all hit by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemics. Our initial plans to conduct field research trips and travel to countries that were subject to our research were unfortunately unfulfilled. At the same time, as online meetings suddenly became a standard of communication, we managed to organize three amazing sessions attended by all contributing authors and our colleagues from very distant areas of the world. Many of v

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us conducted personal interviews and consultations online, which was acknowledged by the authors in their chapters. We would like to also thank Springer and its team working on the Norm Research in International Relations book series. Based on the external review process, we have introduced an additional chapter on environmental norms and the agency of Caribbean small islands and developing countries (SIDS) written by Michelle Scobie. Besides this major change, we have improved the general composition of the book thanks to the constructive feedback of the external reviewers. The manuscript was also reviewed by the series editor, Prof. Antje Wiener, who provided valuable comments and helped us to clarify the core arguments. Last but not least, we would like to thank Johannes Glaeser, the publishing editor of the series, for his tireless support and guidance throughout the whole publishing process.

Contents

Introduction: Agency and Norm Diffusion Beyond the West . . . . . . . . . . . Šárka Kolmašová

1

Norm Diffusion by Rising Global Powers Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . Laura Trajber Waisbich Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kazushige Kobayashi China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West . . . . . . . . . . . . Aleš Karmazin

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Norm Diffusion by Middle Powers and Small States From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ricardo Reboredo

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Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anna Grzywacz

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Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Hüsrev Tabak Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Michelle Scobie

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Norm Diffusion by and within Multilateral Institutions Redefined, Repackaged and Redeployed: Diffusion of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Šárka Kolmašová and Arlene B. Tickner ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges . . . . . . . 165 Guangyu Qiao-Franco and Randy W. Nandyatama The EU Presidencies of Central Eastern European Members: A Framework for Mutual Socialisation and Normative Influence on the EU’s Agenda? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Elsa Tulmets Conclusion: Norms, Diffusion and Power Dynamics Beyond the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Ricardo Reboredo

Contributors

Anna Grzywacz Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland Aleš Karmazin Department of Asian Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Prague, Czech Republic Kazushige Kobayashi College and Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan; Centre On Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland Šárka Kolmašová Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Strašnice, Czech Republic Randy W. Nandyatama Department of International Relations, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia Guangyu Qiao-Franco Department of Political Science, Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark Ricardo Reboredo Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Prague, Czechia Michelle Scobie The Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies (UWI), St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago Hüsrev Tabak Faculty of Economics, Zihni Derin Campus, Recep Tayyip Erdogan University, Rize, Turkey Arlene B. Tickner Faculty of International, Political and Urban Studies, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia

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Elsa Tulmets Europa-University Viadrina, Frankfurt, Germany Laura Trajber Waisbich Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Introduction: Agency and Norm Diffusion Beyond the West Šárka Kolmašová

Norms indicate collective expectations of what should be done in a particular situation (Ben-Josef Hirsch and Dixon 2020) and therefore represent a very important research agenda across scholarly disciplines. This book aims to find out how norms transfer and what mechanisms or sources of leverage facilitate their diffusion. We explore these questions beyond the West, which has been widely associated with innovation, norm entrepreneurship, and norm diffusion. We intend to build on recent critical studies that have given primacy to local agency and acknowledged the possibility of norm contestation due to resistance in the receiving society to exogenous normative expectations and thus demonstrated the importance of agency and normmakers within non-Western societies. Particular contributions to this volume provide further evidence that countries among emerging powers, but also small states from the periphery, play increasingly important roles in global or regional politics by diffusing their normative expectations of appropriate action. While they might not necessarily be successful norm entrepreneurs, it is worth studying the ambitions of non-Western agents to influence norm-making processes. The case studies presented in this book will be divided into three broad parts, each reflecting the emergence and increasing significance of non-Western, or Global South agents in the international sphere over the last decade. The first part will explore norm diffusion by rising global powers. We focus here on China, Brazil, India—three members of the original BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) grouping—and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, and interrogate the characteristics and mechanisms behind the diffusion of particular norms across multiple scales. The second in turn explores norm diffusion on an (inter-)regional scale, initiated by middle powers (South Africa, Indonesia), small states (small island developing states [SIDS] of the Caribbean), or a transnational community (Turkish diaspora) Š. Kolmašová (B) Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Dubeˇcská 900/10, 100 31 Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_1

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toward specific localized constellations of actors. Finally, the third part analyzes norm diffusion within multilateral structures (e.g., the Inter-American Development Bank [IADB], the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], and the European Union [EU]). All chapters present practically oriented studies that contextualize norm diffusion within development assistance, democracy promotion, security, or protection of the environment. On the theoretical level, we aim to contribute to general understanding of norm diffusion as a dynamic, fluid, and messy process, which might involve a wide range of agents and has complex implications across different societies. On the empirical level, individual chapters demonstrate the important role of agency in norm diffusion processes and recognize the norm-making capacities beyond the powerful Western players.

1 Diffusion and Agency: State of Art Debates on norm diffusion have evolved enormously in the past three decades, especially thanks to social constructivist scholars, who were widely considered the pioneers in norms’ research (Engelkamp & Glaab, 2015). They indisputably brought new insights into the specific mechanisms of how norms transfer. Proponents of sociological institutionalism stressed persuasion and teaching channeled by international organizations or epistemic communities (Finnemore, 1993; Meyer, 1977; Meyer et al., 1997; Strang & Chang, 1993). According to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, bureaucratic structures shaped national policies by formulating, establishing, and transmitting the standards of appropriate behavior in a given situation (1999, p. 713). Norm diffusion was generally regarded as a conscious process initiated by norm advocates, including formal institutions, activist networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Sikkink, 1998), states (Young, 1999), or individuals. The question of who can be a norm entrepreneur demonstrated clear ontological divisions regarding the major sources of authority, which were vital for successful persuasion. On one hand, Finnemore and Sikkink stressed the moral compassion of individual activists mostly operating in the non-governmental sphere (1998, p. 897). Norm advocates were able to set the agenda, frame new policies, or persuade wider audiences precisely because they were seen as unselfish, principled, or moral. On the other hand, various foreign policy analysts demonstrated the narrow conceptualization of non-state entrepreneurs through case studies of particular state secretaries (Hillary Clinton in Marsh & Jones, 2017), foreign ministers (Loyd Axworthy), and other state representatives diffusing specific norms without strategically calculating the gains of such actions (Ingebritsen, 2002). When it comes to agency of the norm protagonists, a wide range of perspectives emerged and scholars defined very different models of what drives specific actors to diffuse norms. In contrast, reflections on actors subject to norm diffusion were largely statecentric (Risse & Sikkink, 1999), especially within the field of International Relations (IR). Successful transmission was indicated by communicative, behavioral, or institutional shifts on the national or international level. The most influential works

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included U.S. recognition of the anti-apartheid norm (Klotz, 1995); German and Ukrainian compliance to the citizenship norms (Checkel, 2001); the effects of EU conditionality norm on Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey (Schimmelfennig, 2008); and many other country-specific cases. Thomas Risse-Kappen similarly argued the diffusion processes varied according to the ability of transnational advocacy networks to interact with the intra-state social structures and domestic conditions (1995). A wide range of variables were presented to explain why states comply to diffused norms, including models based on rational calculation, logic of appropriateness as well as their synthesis (Börzel & Risse, 2012). In his early work, Jeffrey Checkel stressed the mechanisms of persuasion and social learning, thereby he inclined to the conceptualization of diffusion as a communicative action (2001, p. 580). At the same time, he refused the essentially competing nature of instrumentalism and social learning. This argument was further elaborated in his later study, where he proposed three different modes of socialization, including (i) strategic calculation (in cases such as conditionality of the EU, which could be instrumentalized by accession countries but still might have longer term learning effects); (ii) role playing (in cases where an actor is aware of the expectations and accepts certain norms to demonstrate compliance); and (iii) normative suasion (in cases where actors change their perception of what is appropriate due to discursive interactions and social learning) (Checkel, 2005, pp. 804–805). These scholarly attempts to offer an alternative perspective to traditional rationalist theories are today considered mainstream, and themselves challenged by more critical understandings of norm transfers. The vast majority of the early constructivist theories treated norm transfer as a one-dimensional process and neglected the possibility of mutually constitutive interactions, which might result in discursive, behavioral, or legislative shifts on the side of the norm entrepreneur. This is the case especially when discussing norm diffusion by regional organizations, such as the EU or global institutions. In their recent edited volume, Laure Delcour and Elsa Tulmets offer a novel understanding of norm transfer as a circulatory process, which counts on adaptation and reinterpretation, especially if particular norms are contested by the receiving agents (2019). Critical constructivist studies have also paid attention to contestation (Wiener, 2004, 2007, 2014), resistance (Bloomfield, 2016; Bloomfield & Scott, 2016; Richmond, 2010; Zimmermann, 2016), and the problematic neglect of local agency within diffusion processes (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014). In these studies, the agency of local actors was considered crucial for the construction of particular meanings based on cultural background and specific social experiences, which in turn might lead to norm contestation and ultimately strengthen its validity (Wiener, 2018, p. 11). Therefore, in this perspective, local perceptions were positively affirmed as important drivers of normative change. Critical constructivist scholars have likewise challenged the idea of passive norm internalization by developing extensive research on contestation but also by explicitly addressing the Global IR project and its call for greater acknowledgement of local contexts and agency beyond the West (e.g., Merschel et al., 2022; Wiener, 2018; Wunderlich, 2020). In mainstream IR, including early constructivist studies, there was a great deal of essentialist diffusionism reproducing global hierarchies by

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treating particular actors as primary norm entrepreneurs, while keeping the “targets” of norm diffusion trapped in a subordinate position (Dussel, 2000). For instance, a great proportion of research on norm transfer focused on the EU and its member states. The teachers of norms were statically associated with the West, while the “pupils” were typically located in the East, South, in the Third World, or at the periphery. Amitav Acharya (2004, 2011, 2012, 2013) responded to the marginalization of non-Western agents in diffusion research by alternative models of localization (2004) and subsidiarity (2011). With regard to the former, he argued global norms needed to merge with the cognitive frames of the local norms, and therefore they got localized (2013, p. 469). This reinvented the constitutive power of local agents, who reinterpreted the external ideas in the local context. With regard to the latter, he challenged the static content of norms being transferred back to the global structures after they undergo contestation and localization. His norm circulation model therefore recognized the impact of local actors on global normative frames, stressed the complex dynamic of top-down as well as bottom-up norm diffusion, and disputed the uncontested universality of global norms. In more recent critical works, Acharya’s arguments were elaborated in several other fruitful models, which stressed the constitutive effects of norm contestation on one hand and challenged Western-centrism in diffusion studies on the other (Dunford, 2017). Antje Wiener, who analyzed norm contestation in numerous works, in her latest research wondered “whose practices count?” and aimed to contribute to Acharyas Global IR project (Wiener, 2018, p. 1; emphasis added by Kolmašová). In contrast to mainstream constructivist approaches, she endorsed “the co-constitution of local contestation and global conflicts” and argued norms were subject to contestation at all stages of norm implementation (Wiener, 2018, p. 2). “Affected stakeholders” actively participated in norm-making processes precisely through the constitutive effects of contestation (Wiener, 2018, pp. 4–5; emphasis added by Kolmašová). While contestation gained primacy over implementation, the concepts of appropriation and translation replaced top-down/one-way perspectives on diffusion and expected some degree of revisionism within the content of the norm (Draude, 2017, p. 578). Empirical case studies demonstrated appropriation was both strategic, indicated by partial or reinterpreted norm implementation (Lorentzen, 2017; van Hüllen, 2017) and cultural—inevitably resulting from different local frames and implicit/explicit resistance (Chakrabarty, 2000; Binsbergen et al., 2004; Hart, 1997; Ziff & Rao, 1997). Translation was understood as a mechanism to diffuse external norms to local audiences and institutional structures of local governance through domestic intermediaries, for instance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with transnational ties (Berger, 2017; Merry, 2006). Lisbeth Zimmermann elaborated on the studies in translation and proposed a model, which identified specific forms and actors involved, namely, (i) translation into domestic discourse, (ii) translation into law, and (iii) translation into practical implementation (2016, p. 106). When it comes to the local response to external norms, she refused the full acceptance versus resistance dichotomy and argued there were various forms of reinterpretation and reshaping

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linked to the three spheres of translation. This allowed her to study more specific types of contestation depending on the resistance to the content, procedural aspects, or outcomes of a transferred norm. Zimmermann, together with Nicole Deitelhoff and Max Lesch, argued that local contestation provided important “feedback” on global norms thereby stressing the possibility of bottom-up transfer (Zimmermann et al., 2018). Overall, the turn to “local” brought new insights into the cultural norm validation and adaptation to particular cultural context, as well as exploratory research on local capacities to (re)shape global norms. While this book builds on the assumption that local agency matters and non-Western players contribute to global or regional normmaking processes, we focus on processes by which non-Western agents actively strive to diffuse their normative expectations on a regional or global scale. In particular, the question of how agents in disadvantageous positions gain influence to the level that they manage to become true agenda setters and norm entrepreneurs makes for an interesting puzzle. In other words, how do the marginalized agents set standards recognized and followed by others, including the more powerful? Three ongoing global phenomena brought novel perspectives on policy/norm entrepreneurs: decentralization of national policies, continuous regionalism, and critical revisionism of Western global superiority. With regard to the first, recent studies have paid more attention to intra-state or transnational policy transfers across cities (McCann & Ward, 2011; de Oliveira & Pal, 2018; Saraiva et al., 2021; Sugiyama, 2012; Wood, 2014, 2019), which show the narrow understanding of diffusion dynamics limited to central governments. While there have been many fruitful studies dealing with regionalism in Europe, recent works have focused on diffusion toward and within Asia, Latin America, and Africa (de Oliveira 2021; de Oliveira et al., 2020; Goodfellow & Huang, 2021; Howlett et al., 2018, Allison-Reumann, 2017; Langer, 2007). Finally, post-colonial studies and other critical reflections have challenged the false universalism of Western liberal thinking, which has underpinned many existing models of diffusion. Many authors noticed that there was a systematic neglect of policy transfers in the global South and expanded existing research by novel empirical case studies of diffusion and circulation in South–South cooperation (Bergamaschi et al., 2017; Saguin & Sha, 2021; Waisbich et al., 2021). While there are a growing number of publications dealing with case studies beyond the West, they usually do not have the ambition to replace or fundamentally revise existing knowledge regarding sources of leverage and diffusion mechanisms in general. Studies conceptualizing sources of leverage exist but are rather rare in the norm diffusion literature that considers particularly non-Western agents. For instance, Phillip Stalley traced the norm of common but differentiated responsibilities in international environmental politics and argued its global recognition was a product of economics, legal experts, government leaders, and delegates to global environmental agreements from developing countries (2018, p. 5). Although the emergence and diffusion of the norm was significantly facilitated by existing global platforms (such as the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in 1972 in Stockholm or the United Nations Environmental Program), representatives and experts from the developing world initiated and mainstreamed the principle. Stalley

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stressed three factors of successful norm diffusion in his particular case, namely, resonance of the emerging concept with existing norms (linkages), general scope of the concept (to be open for deliberations and reinterpretation), and bargaining leverage of the norm entrepreneurs (2018, pp. 14–15). At the same time, he argued all three were necessary conditions and especially without the bargaining power, the persuasiveness of the concept itself would not be enough. We would like to elaborate on these conditions to be examined in other cases and to analyze in greater detail various sources of leverage used in the diffusion process. These can be based on rationalist logic, in line with Stalley’s argumentation on the negative power of the developing states to block initiatives unless those would incorporate their normative preferences. He thereby demonstrated an alternative model to the mainstream studies, which stressed the importance of powerful states’ backing. For instance, Kathryn Sikkink in her reflection of the Latin American contribution to human rights norms concluded “less powerful groups are more likely to succeed, when they have allies within powerful states” (2014, p. 395). In contrast, Stalley focused on coalitions among the developing countries themselves, which had a decisive impact on the deliberations. At the same time, there might be alternative sources of leverage, including specific knowledge, diplomatic ties, or networking skills, which go beyond strategic calculation but make the difference between successful and failed norm diffusion. Therefore, we would like to address the question of what are the sources of power in norm transfer processes initiated by the actors beyond the West. This does not mean we would like to stress the logic of appropriateness and reject any sources traditionally associated with power. Even countries from the global South can operate in a strictly calculative manner and use material power to diffuse norms. However, we still expect a different dynamic in norm transfer processes if the actors do not belong to the Western core and especially if they cannot rely on strong material capacities.

2 Book Organization All three parts of the book aim to shift scholarly attention from the exclusive role of the West in norm transfer processes. As noted above, the first part focuses on rising powers, by which we mean countries whose global influence has increased significantly in recent years, whether through increased bilateral or multilateral engagement (though the case of Japan stretches back to the 1970s when that country was rapidly expanding its reach). The questions guiding the research here are: How do (or did) these actors leverage their newfound position to diffuse specific norms toward both poorer, less developed, or insecure states at the global periphery and pre-eminent states and international organizations? Are non-Western states more sensitive toward the local context and agency, or do they impose particular models more as to present a competing alternative to the West without necessarily considering other problematic aspects of one-way norm transfer?

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The second chapter by Laura T. Waisbich explores the ways in which the norms of accountability, and responsibility more broadly, are being negotiated and informing the practice of Southern development partners engaged in South–South cooperation (SSC). Looking at the case of emblematic “SSC protagonists” (De Bruyn, 2019), namely, Brazil, China, and India, and to their diplomatic stances in and around the issue of accountability and responsibility in international development cooperation in the context of the 2030 agenda, this chapter offers an illustration of the complexities of ongoing forms of international development norm contestation and norm entrepreneurship in a multiplex world. Based on the illustrative case study of Japan– China development cooperation, the third chapter by Kazushige Kobayashi offers two novel insights on norm diffusion theory and foreign aid practices. Theoretically, it challenges conventional models of norm diffusion and proposes an alternative, bottom-up model based on policy learning. Empirically, it challenges the common view that China’s “predatory” aid policy is an outgrowth of its domestic authoritarianism. Instead, this chapter suggests that China’s aid policy can be better understood as a diffused version of Japan’s aid policy which emphasizes the norms of mutual beneficiality, self-reliance, and sovereign rights. The fourth chapter by Ales Karmazin intends to deal with China’s approach to the global governance of cyberspace and the Internet. Internet governance is an emerging issue area of global governance that is contested as the international community has not established a set of universally accepted norms to cover relevant issues. China is one of the players in this realm as it strives to utilize every opportunity to assert itself as a leader in global governance, especially if the Western liberal countries do not control the agenda. The chapter primarily focuses on the norm of cyber/internet sovereignty as a bedrock of the Chinese approach. While China hopes to establish the norm at the global level, the key fora where China tries to advance the norm and its overall approach are the following ones: international conferences it organizes (e.g., World Internet Conference), bilateral diplomatic contacts with other non-Western (global South) countries, and the Belt and Road Initiative (and its branch “Digital Silk Road”). All of these are interrelated and show that China mobilizes its geopolitical instruments and ambitions to boost its prestige in global governance. The second part builds on the first and focuses on (regional) middle powers, or those whose reach in recent history has been limited to specific geographical spaces (for instance, South Africa has generally been seen as a “sub-imperial” power in southern Africa—see Bond [2004]) but also small states. Here, the inquiry is guided primarily by the following questions: What sources of leverage establish mechanisms of effective norm transfer? Are the processes of norm transfer subject to the same processes of norm appropriation or translation if they are not associated with the Western culture and politics? Are such norms treated as universal or do they reach only secondary status of recognition? The authors mostly focus on diffusion processes within a regional scope rather than on a global level, which might be motivated by an ambition to become a regional hegemon but also by shared cultural and institutional traditions that might facilitate the process. At the same time, while individual case studies demonstrate preparedness of particular actors to upload their normative expectations to regional formal and informal platforms, they

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struggle to maintain their leverage over specific actors. In contrast, the case study on SIDS pinpoints leverage based on vulnerability of states strongly effected by climate change and their capabilities to shape regional and global environmental governance. The fifth chapter by Ricardo Reboredo traces South African norm entrepreneurship, particularly in terms of democracy and human rights promotion, throughout the post-apartheid period, focusing on the diffusion of specific norms toward African states and regional institutions. It argues that the shift in South Africa’s promotion of certain norms can be explained by domestic dynamics, particularly the African National Congress’ (ANC) hegemonic decline, and decisions undertaken by the party to restore its popular support. The resultant contradictions, alongside ideological shifts within the party and novel multilateral alliances (in the form of the BRICS), have made previous positions untenable. The sixth chapter by Anna Grzywacz aims to demonstrate, on the example of Indonesia, that non-Western actors are essential to norm promotion as they provide credibility and legitimize acceptance and inclusion of new norms by merging its own values with appropriateness, and that they may exercise their power by promoting values that are associated uniquely with them. The arguments are illustrated by the analysis of Indonesia’s engagement in the promotion of democracy and human rights within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Bali Democracy Forum. In both instances, Indonesia’s engagement is shaped by its ideas and regional expectations, and the state coherently promotes a set of values derived from its cultural background: dialogue and inclusiveness, making them a hallmark of its politics in norm promotion. The seventh chapter by Husrev Tabak challenges the state-centric approaches in diffusion studies and focuses on the role of diasporas and kin spaces as important channels of transmission. Diasporic spaces function as settings for making and remaking homeland’s norms, they thus turn into overseas settings for running normative contestations of the homeland abroad. In particular, it traces the mechanisms of how Turkey circulated the ethno-nationalist norms in the Balkan region in various historical periods. On one hand, the case study provides an alternative approach to agency by considering Turkish diasporas. On the other, it indicates the fluidity of the ethno-nationalist norms related to the idea of Turkishness that are appropriated to changing strategic preferences of the political elites. In the eighth chapter, Michelle Scobie focuses on the agency of SIDS and their contribution to norms governing climate change, including common but differentiated responsibilities; common heritage and common concern of humankind; the duty to provide prior notification of potentially harmful situations; the duty to consult in good faith; state responsibility and the duty not to cause and to prevent environmental harm; the duty of good neighborliness and the duty to cooperate; or environmental justice including an equal right of access to justice. Her chapter demonstrates the power of vulnerability and how SIDS use their small size and particular location as a source of leverage in climate governance, which makes a very important contribution to the prevailing assumptions regarding small states’ marginalization in the global normative order. As Part III foregrounds international organizations, the focus turns to multilateral norm diffusion. The case studies in this section cast a broad net, analyzing policy diffusion from Asia Pacific, Latin America, and Central/Eastern Europe. The

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ninth chapter by Šárka Kolmašová and Arlene B. Tickner traces the emergence and diffusion of citizen security in the Americas, which represents an interesting case of hemispheric norm transfer. Initially developed in Latin America, the concept was mainstreamed by the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, Organization of American States, and most recently by the Inter-American Development Bank. The chapter critically analyzes how the concept was appropriated, repackaged, and then redeployed through development policies back to the Global South. The tenth chapter by Guangyu Qiao-Franco and Randy W. Nandyatama examines the increasing visibility of ASEAN as a norm entrepreneur in the international governance of nuclear non-proliferation. Since the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was adopted in 1995, ASEAN and its member states have been engaged in promoting international recognition of the notion of SEANWFZ at multiple levels to ensure regional security. In particular, ASEAN is actively negotiating with nuclear weapon states to advance the prospect of their accession to the SEANWFZ Protocol. Drawing upon the ASEAN centrality and norm diffusion literatures, the authors argue that the viability of ASEAN as the driving force in norm development is underpinned by this regional grouping’s competent deployment of several mechanisms—practicing the “ASEAN Way” to sustain the involvement of powerful actors in consensus-based confidence building processes; constructing frames to build the legitimacy of ASEAN’s claims in advancing international peace and security as a group of non-nuclear countries; issue linkage by associating SEANWFZ with the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the maintenance of regional stability efforts; and performing neutrality and a balancing act between major powers. Finally, the last chapter by Elsa Tulmets concentrates on the case of the EU Council presidencies, looking into more detail at the impact of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and further Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) on the European foreign policy agenda during their respective EU presidencies since 2004. Policies developed for potential candidates and previous communist countries—the countries of the Western Balkans and those of the Eastern Partnership—represent the most interesting cases to detail how social norms, which are part of CEECs traditional foreign policies, have been transferred and adapted to EU’s foreign policy. The chapter concludes that, even in still apparent asymmetrical situations—as it is said that the EU’s agenda is set in advance—there is always some leeway for negotiations and discussion, especially on social norms.

3 Theoretical and Methodological Framework Considering the organization of the book, it is necessary to briefly elucidate our view of what constitutes a “western” or “non-western” country. As Hellmann et al. (2017) note, “the West” is an elusive concept that too often serves as a poorly defined catch-all for (relatively) varied systems and actors. Our conceptualization of the terms draws from both IR and Critical Theory. We view “the West” in a narrow fashion, using the

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term to refer to the United States and powerful Western European countries whose norms and practices were violently spread throughout the world during the colonial period and then codified in the post-war international order—though, of course, the roots of the term stretch significantly further back. We put this conceptualization into practice by including case studies on Japan and central/eastern Europe—countries that have adopted many “western” norms but were not historically part of the cultural construction and thus represent economic/cultural/political peripheries. It is important to mention that although we find the term well suited for our study given the immediacy with which it brings to mind particular histories, geographies, and political structures, we acknowledge its oftentimes fuzzy boundaries as well as its problematic usage in reproducing static images and caricatures of particular spaces and places (see Hall, 1992). The latter point being one that we actively seek to disrupt through this study. Regarding theoretical perspectives, we follow an interdisciplinary approach to open the debate on norm diffusion beyond IR. We acknowledge the contribution of social constructivism and sociology on one hand and critical theories on the other (as discussed in the first part of this chapter); however, we would like to open the debate to a wider set of paradigms and use their theoretical assumptions or methods. Firstly, there are very relevant concepts within the study of diffusionism in development and political economy studies. Diffusionism represents one of the main mechanisms used to “assist” less developed countries in moving closer to developed ones. This was a starting point of (neo-liberal) economic theories of development, disputed repeatedly in critical works of Andre Gudner Frank (1967) and his followers (Blaut, 1987). In another example, research in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) has studied the diffusion and adoption of a wide variety of norms, ideas, and policies in both North–South and South–South contexts. In terms of North–South diffusion, IPE scholars have studied the spread of market-led development practices, deepening financialization, and the construction of “market societies” in east Asia, showing how the regions’ former developmental states are increasingly judged through their adherence to market disciplining norms and international performance rankings (Carroll & Jarvis, 2013; Carroll et al., 2019; Stubbs, 2009). Yet other IPE studies have also examined how norm diffusion is not always coercive or top-down and how selective diffusion can be used as an empowerment strategy by sub-state actors (Bell & Feng, 2019; van Heijster & DeRock, 2020). In terms of South–South diffusion, scholars have explored China’s economic statecraft, in particular, the use of infrastructure financing and service delivery as institutional vehicles for promoting Chinese international norms through consensus building (Bräutigam & Tang, 2014; Du Plessis, 2016). As these examples show, the IPE literature on norm diffusion prioritizes theoretical approaches that cut across scales and attempt to account for the objectives and strategies of domestic actors. Some, including Schindler and Kanai (2021), have added a historico-geographical lens to this framework and sought to periodize the diffusion of North–South politicoeconomic policy, parsing out the particular imperatives and corresponding strategies (e.g., good governance reforms, empowerment of civil society) that IOs have pushed onto the developing world. Regarding methodology, IPE studies tend to prioritize

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qualitative methods, though mixed-methods research is conducted at times. For the most part, scholars in this field have sought to bring together case studies, comparative studies, and documentary analysis toward the production of “grounded” theory in a fashion reminiscent to the practice-turn in International Relations. As the name suggests, IPE research largely privileges political and economic processes; however, recent approaches have begun exploring the integration of the social sphere into the field. One of the more insightful theoretical approaches to emerge from the IPE literature in recent years is Hameiri and Jones’ (2015) state transformation framework. In broad terms, the framework argues that the Weberian/Westphalian conceptualization of the state is a relatively recent historical contract—as opposed to the “natural” way that it is presented in much of the mainstream IR literature—that is coming partly undone under conditions of globalization. The framework holds that three interrelated transformations are underway: the fragmentation of state authority, which can be best understood as the general shift away from the top-down command and control structure that characterizes the Weberian/Westphalian state; decentralization or devolution in policymaking/control to regional or municipal governments; and internationalization or the growing international reach of formerly domestic ministries, agencies, and departments. The framework is distinct from others in that foreground domestic politics in that it relies on Gramscian state theory (along with theorizations from Bob Jessop and Nicos Poulantzas) and thus situates socio-political conflict within the broader context of global capitalist development. This aspect places it firmly within the Political Economy literature and differentiates it from IR. The framework has been used to challenge top-down models and instead emphasize the varied and often co-constructed nature of South–South norm and policy diffusion (Abadi, 2021; Jaganathan, 2019; Jones & Zeng, 2019; Zeng, 2019). Using similar cross-scalar frameworks to IPE, scholars in Political Geography, Critical Geopolitics, and Development Studies have sought to explore the diffusion of norms both from North–South and South–South. While sharing some elements with norms research in IR, a primary divergence in these disparate traditions is the introduction of a Marxian analytical lens and thus a foregrounding of the transnational capitalist practices and systems of production itself into the diffusion process. Much of this research is informed either by Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1979) World Systems Analysis or Robert W. Cox’s critical theory of International Relations. World Systems Analysis defines the spatial extent of society as the scope of modes of production, rather than through political borders. As the capitalist world economy is necessarily unequal, productive processes cluster geographically and divide the world into core/periphery areas (though these may exist within the same spaces). Norm diffusion analyses based on Wallerstein’s work may, for instance, situate the North–South spread of policies, practices, and knowledge as a way to create space for or attain resources necessary for core processes (Flint & Waddoups, 2021). Cox’s critical theory, on the other hand, builds on Gramsci’s ideas, moving beyond the Marxist base-superstructure thesis—insisting that material conditions, institutions, and ideas can influence socio-political formations and structures—and internationalizing Gramsci’s concept of Hegemony. Like IPE scholars, geographers and critical

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theorists largely use qualitative methodologies. With a broader study area, ethnographic studies, discursive analyses, and visual data are used along with case studies and documentary analysis to inform theory. However, while many studies in these fields are fieldwork oriented, there are myriad exceptions considering the breadth of the disciplines. Finally, there has been an important debate on norm diffusion within Anthropology, which mirrors the critique of mainstream social constructivism and the models of appropriation, translation, and the local turn in IR in general (Tabak, 2021). Although the scholarly discourse did not center on norms, processes of cultural transfers provide another useful analytical framework to discuss the aforementioned questions. Diffusionism has represented an influential school of thought since the second half of the nineteenth century when anthropologists studied how specific cultural traits were transferred from one specific society to another (Katz et al., 1963). Despite their fundamental ontological differences, the diffusionist theories problematically tended to identify particular cultures as more advanced, innovative, and therefore diffused. From the most extreme model of one superior culture (Egyptian) diffused worldwide, introduced by Elliot Smith (1928), to the German and Austrian reflections on various cultural circles, these intellectual foundations got widely rejected due to their essentialist understanding of the innovative core diffusing cultural traits to the periphery. By the mid-twentieth century, they were marginalized due to methodological advancements within the discipline and the emergence of acculturation concepts, which paid more attention to merging cultures, especially in the context of widespread immigration to North America (Leal, 2011; Tabak, 2021). During the Cold War, Marxist thinking strongly influenced anthropologists, who turned to historical studies and World system theories to study cultural assimilation as an outcome of capitalist modes of production. Critical anthropology blossomed in Mexico with studies focusing on specific commodities, which demonstrated the importance of global interconnectedness with unequal benefits. Ángel Palerm focused on the importance of Mexican silver for the constitution of Mexican central yet dependent position vis a vis colonial powers (1980); Sidney Mintz studied global trade with sugar to reach similar conclusions on cultural asymmetries caused by economic exploitation (1985). Historical trajectories which lead to globalization brought new insights into evolutionary anthropology by stressing the role of capitalist ideology in worldwide assimilation on one hand and diversification on the other. According to Eric R. Wolf, “Within an ever more integrated world, we witness the growth of ever more diverse proletarian diasporas” (1982, p. 383). From a methodological point of view, the aforementioned historiographies of imperialism, colonization, and worldwide dissemination of capitalist systems problematized the essentialism of earlier diffusion theories. This led to development of more careful ethnographies of local perspectives, which no longer assumed passive acceptance of imported cultural traits but acknowledged possible resistance and appropriation. James Blaut criticized diffusionist anthropology for reproducing the duality of central—innovative versus peripheral—underdeveloped and suggested an expectation of cultural creativity “regardless of whether for the landscape as a whole

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the overall propensity to invent is high or low” (1987, p. 34). To overcome the diffusionism trap, he suggested an analysis of cultural transfers, which would consider reciprocal effects, such as reinvention of the original traits. According to Hüsrev Tabak, anthropology shares many critical assumptions resonating in IR debates on norm diffusion beyond the West; however, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication and rather tacit co-existence of analogous concepts, including appropriation, translation, and localization on one hand and diffusion as a multi-directional and multi-sited practice on the other (2020, p. 18). In line with this argument, we would like to open the debate across various disciplines, including international relations, sociology, political economy, geography, or anthropology. There is a clear and logical overlap in research agendas related to diffusion, despite semantic differences and various considerations of what circulates and gets diffused. Although this project aims to primarily explain the transfer of norms, empirical case studies presented throughout individual chapters might offer various conceptualizations of what constitutes a norm and how the transfer is manifested on a policymaking level. Rather than being tied by a uniform conceptual framework, the contribution of individual chapters and the book as such rests on shared interest to move beyond the essentialist, linear, dualistic, and West-centric understanding of norm transfers. Norms as such will be treated as works in progress, which are subject to constant contestation and reinterpretation. This might be analytically challenging since norms are widely associated with their taken-for-granted status, which can be traced by lack of contestation or through various indicators of internalization, however we would like to maintain the fluidity of norms. Both meaning and status of a norm may change due to pluriversality of perspectives across various agents engaged in the norm transfer. The temporal process of norm transfer is not linear and sequential but rather messy and subject to unique conditions (Chabot & Duyvendak, 2002, p. 56). Notwithstanding power asymmetries, which exist in international order and provide an important context to norm diffusion, we acknowledge the possibility of norm innovation by both powerful and marginalized agents. Therefore, norm alternation is not necessarily a reactive mechanism (to contest, to translate, or to appropriate) but a process driven by intellectual creativity, epistemic communities, and their platforms, which channel knowledge transfer through wider networks. These might be located in G8 countries as well as in the global periphery. The contribution of the specific case studies is twofold. Firstly, we would like to examine norm diffusion in the context of power asymmetries, which involve non-Western agents. Secondly, we want to identify specific sources of leverage that were used to advance particular norms on a regional or global level. Overall, the project aims to elaborate on critical responses to West-centric norm diffusion and limited scholarly reflection of changing power dynamics in the contemporary international order.

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Strang, D., & Chang, P. M. Y. (1993). The International Labor Organization and the welfare state: Institutional effects on national welfare spending, 1960–80. International Organization, 47, 235– 262. Stubbs, R. (2009). What ever happened to the East Asian developmental state: The unfolding debate. The Pacific Review, 22(1), 1–22. Sugiyama, N. B. (2012). Diffusion of good government: Social sector reforms in Brazil. 1st edition. University of Notre Dame Press. Tabak, H. (2021). Diffusionism and beyond in IR norm research. Global Society, 35(3), 327–350. Van Binsbergen, W. M. J., van Dijk, R. A., & Gewald, J.-B. (2004). Situating globality: African agency in the appropriation of global culture: An introduction. In Situating globality: African agency in the appropriation of global culture. African Dynamics (pp. 3–54). Brill. van Heijster, J., & DeRock, D. (2020). How GDP spread to China: The experimental diffusion of macroeconomic measurement. Review of International Political Economy, 29, 65–87. Van Hüllen, V. (2017). Resistance to international democracy promotion in Morocco and Tunisia. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2(5), 637–657. Waisbich, L. T., Pomeroy, M., & Leite, I. C. (2021). Travelling across developing countries: Unpacking the role of South–South Cooperation and civil society in policy transfer. In O. Porto de Oliveira (Ed.), Handbook of policy transfer, diffusion and circulation. Edward Elgar. Wallerstein, I. (1979). The capitalist world-economy. Cambridge University Press. Wiener, A. (2004). Contested compliance: Interventions on the normative structure of world politics. European Journal ofInternational Relations, 10(2), 189–234. Wiener, A. (2007). Contested meanings of norms: A research framework. Comparative European Politics, 5(1), 1–17. Wiener, A. (2014). A theory of contestation. Springer. Wiener, A. (2018). Contestation and constitution of norms in global international relations. Cambridge University Press. Wolf, E. (1982). Europe and the people without history. University of California Press. Wood, A. (2014). Moving policy: Global and local characters circulating bus rapid transit through South African cities. Urban Geography, 35(8), 1238–1254. Wood, A. (2019). Disentangling the nexus of global intermediaries: The case of bus rapid transit. Problemy Rozwoju Miast, 62(1), 17–27. Wunderlich, C. (2020). Rogue states as norm entrepreneurs. Black sheep or sheep in wolves’ clothing? Springer. Young, P. H. (1999). Diffusion in social networks (Working Papers 2). Brookings Institution. Zeng, J. (2019). Narrating China’s belt and road initiative. Global Policy, 10(2), 207–216. Ziff, B. H., & Rao, P. V. (Eds.). (1997). Borrowed power: Essays on cultural appropriation. Rutgers University Press. Zimmermann, L. (2016). Same same or different? Norm diffusion between resistance, compliance, and localization in post-conflict states. International Studies Perspectives, 17(1), 98–115. Zimmermann, L., Deitelhoff, N., & Lesch, M. (2018). Unlocking the agency of the governed: Contestation and norm dynamics. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 2, 691–703.

Norm Diffusion by Rising Global Powers

Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation Laura Trajber Waisbich

1 Introduction Accountability is a ubiquitous term in international development cooperation. As a ‘development buzzword’, accountability gains purchase and power by embracing multiple meanings and a normative resonance that places ‘the sanctity of its goals beyond reproach’ (Cornwall, 2007, p. 472). More than a prevalent concept accountability is a set of norms and tools guiding the behaviour of ‘rich/Northern donors’ and ‘poor/Southern recipients’ engaged in multiple forms of development exchanges. Concerns with ‘aid/development accountability’ are not new but have significantly expanded in the early 2000s, under the so-called ‘Aid/Development Effectiveness Agenda’ (McGee, 2013). These series of high-level debates, which took place in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011), aimed at reforming Aidland and coincided with—and in many ways were fostered by—profound global geoeconomics and geopolitical shifts taking place at the time. A major factor behind this shifting global development landscape was the ‘rise’ or ‘(re)emergence’ of Southern countries (including rising powers like China, India and Brazil, among many others) as key ‘development actors’ (Gu et al., 2016; Mawdsley, 2012). In the following decades, not only Southern powers kept challenging existing aid/development paradigms by promising alternative and allegedly more effective development partnership models, but also the very notion of aid/development accountability was being contested from within Aidland. Indeed, domestic pressures mounted inside traditional Northern/Western donor countries as to reform existing foreign aid programmes so they could better reflect their ‘national interests’ and use the instruments of development cooperation to secure a broad range of national goals under a rapidly shifting global economic and power configurations (Gulrajani, 2017). L. T. Waisbich (B) Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford, 12 Bevington Road, Oxford OX2 6LH, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_2

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Truly, aid/development accountability was never a purely technical matter in the context of North–South cooperation, neither for domestic policy debates nor for ‘donor–recipient’ relations. Yet, developing countries own transition from ‘recipient to donors’ and, more than that, their championing of a reinvigorated ‘Southern-led’ development cooperation modality—known as South–South cooperation (SSC)— has also prompted new normative debates around ‘rightful donor behaviour’ as well as Southern countries’ roles and responsibilities in a rapidly changing field. This chapter explores the ways in which norms, policy ideas and policy tools related to accountability are circulating and being negotiated in the context of South–South development-related exchanges. While doing so it offers an illustration of the complexities of unfolding norm contestation and norm entrepreneurship, as well as mutual socialisation taking place in the field of international development cooperation. The chapter is divided as follows. First, it discusses ‘donor accountability’ as a norm in the field of international development cooperation and the impacts of the exponential growth of SSC on existing normative frameworks shaping the aid/development cooperation system. This is followed by an analysis of how accountability, as a sticky soft norm in the field, is being simultaneously diffused to and well as contested and re-invented by Southern development cooperation champions, including the so-called ‘rising powers’ like China, India and Brazil.

2 ‘Donor Accountability’ as a Sticky Soft Norm in International Development International development is in many ways a suis generis field of world affairs. It is a highly hierarchical field—historically crafted upon the divide between ‘rich/Northern donors’ and ‘poor/Southern recipients’—and characterised by the absence of a universal and unified regime (Milani, 2018).1 As a political field, international development is permeated by power relations and by multiple forms of competition over legitimacy, recognition and control (Milani, 2018; Zoccal & Esteves, 2018). Competition and friction have been constitutive of the so-called ‘aid system’ since its early days, in the 1960s (Lancaster, 2007). Yet, fragmentation has intensified in the 2000s, in tandem with growing geopolitical shifts related, among other things, to the ‘rise of the South’ and an unfolding crisis of the existing ‘liberal international order’ (Acharya, 2017; Adler-Nissen & Zarakol, 2020). Historically, normative production related to development and international development cooperation has been largely concentrated in a few major normative hubs, notably the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank, with key countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom acting both within those spaces and outside them as pivotal state norm 1

The notion of ‘regime’ here follows refers to common expectations on principles, norms, rules and procedures guiding any given field of world affairs (Krasner, 1982).

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entrepreneurs (Lancaster, 2007; Yanguas & Hulme, 2015). At the same time, the field has been largely ruled by soft law: non-binding rules and codes of conduct (Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Paulo & Reisen, 2010). Most development-related soft norms were crafted inside a ‘closed space’: the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD (Eyben, 2013). Nested within the Paris-based ‘club of the rich’, the DAC gathers developed countries acting as ‘donors’ or ‘providers’ of Official Development Assistance (ODA or ‘development aid’). Traditional donors and their institutions are therefore the ones who historically acted as norm-setters in this field. Accountability features as a major component of the broader patchwork of DACled soft law. It refers to the continuously negotiated relationships of power and obligation between public powerholders (elected and non-elected officials, bureaucrats and those acting on behalf of the state) and those subjected to or affected by their development cooperation-related actions (citizens at home, citizens abroad, other governments and non-governmental development actors in the field) (Hickey & Mohan, 2008). It also concerns the underpinning values and the very mechanisms of power control (political, social, legal, financial and/or managerial) being negotiated between powerholders and these different groups (Berghmans et al., 2017). Unavoidably, discussions on aid accountability, in general, and donor accountability, in particular, also relate to broader normative debates on international responsibility (as well as on moral agency and legitimacy in global governance) (Hansen-Magnusson & Vetterlein, 2020), a nexus I will return to later in this chapter. The ‘accountability wave’ in the field of international development dates back to the 1990s. Concerns with accountability (or rather its absence) originally targeted the ‘accountability deficits’ (i.e. poor governance and corruption) of Southern aid recipients and the workings (i.e. transparency, performance and impact) of donor organisations such as development/humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), bilateral development agencies from DAC members and development banks, to name a few (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; McGee, 2013). Since then, aid/development accountability became not only a ubiquitous discourse but also something alike a ‘sacred cow’ or a ‘magic potion’ a goal beyond any criticism and inherently useful or good (Honig, 2020). Despite the alleged ‘softer’ nature of the aid norms (when compared to other realms of world affairs, such as international security or trade and investment), their socialisation effects are far from absent. Rather, international development norms— accountability included—function as a boundary-making, disciplining, ranking and hierarchisation devices (Towns & Rumelili, 2017; Zarakol, 2017). For long these soft norms helped cementing and dividing a ‘rich North’ from a ‘poor South’ along a ‘donor–recipient’ divide. They also helped solidifying different roles and duties to ‘rich Northern donors’ and ‘poor Southern recipients’ (Swedlund, 2017). Donor countries are, for instance, expected to fulfil certain ‘special international responsibilities’2 related to an agreed upon duty to alleviate poverty ‘in the South’. Donors are also subjected to a set of expectations on rightful donor behaviour, which includes complying with a range of DAC-led standards and ‘best practices’ for aid donors. 2

On special responsibilities, see Bukovansky et al. (2012).

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Being a ‘good donor’ means therefore meeting the internationally agreed 0.7% ODA/GNI target to alleviate poverty ‘in the South’, do no-harm when engaging in development projects on the ground, as well as publicly report and account for the overall progress on promoting development abroad. Importantly, throughout the 2000s, as the ‘Aid/Development Effectiveness Agenda’ progressed, donor accountability became less and less related to the moral imperatives/responsibilities towards global equity and increasingly responsive to financial and managerial (or performance-based) understandings of accountability (Eyben et al., 2015; Honig, 2020). As such, from all the donor-related obligations, following OECD-led standards and tools to measure (quantify, assess and report ODA flows to the DAC) and evaluate the impact of development aid on the ground became a structuring component of ‘good donorship’ (Waisbich, 2022). With the ‘rise of the South’, in the early 2000s, existing development norms started to create other types of boundaries between so-called ‘traditional donors’ in the DAC and (re-)emerging development cooperation actors, namely, major ‘Southern providers’ like China, India and Brazil. In the early days of the re-emergence of SSC, Southern providers, and in particular the largest ones, were often ‘Othered’ and taken as unaccomplished copies of DAC donors: incomplete, deficient and deviant from the DAC ideal type (Lauria & Fumagalli, 2019; Mawdsley, 2018). While deficit concerns targeted all Southern providers, China has been particularly singled out. Alongside the more openly anti-China criticism that depicted China’s development engagement as ‘rogue aid’ (e.g. Naím, 2009), more subtle critique of China’s deviance from aid transparency and accountability standards are also prevalent. This includes shaming China for its overall ‘rejection’ of the global transparency agenda (Honig & Weaver, 2019) and claiming that China’s ‘alternative aid model’ creates conceptual and practical challenges to transparency (Paulo & Reisen, 2010). In many ways, ‘Othering’ China alongside other major ‘Southern providers’ functioned as a discursive tool to control, socialise and integrate them, repeating the historical disciplining modus operandi of the DAC (Kim & Lightfoot, 2011). While increasingly focussed on the managerial dimension of ‘aid/development’ accountability, these debates are not disconnected from other normative debates around responsibility in international relations, broadly speaking, and in the field of development cooperation, in particular (Waisbich, 2022). Today, besides a ‘special responsibility’ Western/Northern countries have, more and more ‘aid/development’ accountability debates touch the issue of managing global public goods. At their core is the very principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ (CBDR) and its shifting instantiations under a multipolar world. Initially forged within United Nations (UN) environmental negotiations and later brought by Southern countries to the development realm, the principle acknowledges that all countries have a shared obligation to address global challenges (such as environmental destruction but also poverty and inequality). At the same time, the principle rejects equal responsibility of all states with regard to how to solve these common challenges, stressing differential duties and capacities, including when it comes to mobilising resources. By bringing CBDR to this field, Southern powers attempted to ensure Northern donors would not backtrack from their historical duty and aid-related commitments towards the

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developing world or force fast-developing or middle-income countries in the South to abide by the same rules. Current aid/development accountability negotiations ultimately implicate both moral issues of (unfulfilled) North–South historical reparations as well as pressing governance issues related to finding solutions to the management crisis of global commons in the twenty-first century and the never-ending burden-sharing negotiations between ‘old’ and ‘new’ powers. This is why while strong advocates of the CBDR principle, Southern powerhouses have a hard time navigating these debates. Being seen as ‘responsible actors’ by existing great powers in the name of the common good ‘becomes the key precondition for emerging powers to attain international influence’, even when emerging powers have legitimate divergences regarding not only what ultimately constitutes responsible conduct, but also on how to assign such responsibilities (Kenkel & Destradi, 2019, p. 10). Moreover, ‘to accept existing definitions of responsibility is, for emerging powers, to accept the constellations of power in which these notions were born’ (ibid.). As such, Southern providers’ engagement with existing accountability discourses, norms and tools, as discussed here, illustrate both particular forms of contestation of norm interpretation and a reaction to hierarchies of responsibility.

3 The Rise of the South and the Normative ‘Fusion and Confusion’3 in the Field of International Development The field of international development cooperation has been experiencing major changes since the early 2000s. The new geographies of poverty, inequality and development and the (re-)emergence of South–South cooperation (SSC) have profoundly altered the ‘aid landscape’ (Eyben & Savage, 2013; Horner & Hulme, 2017). Together these shifts have accelerated the advent of what some call a ‘post/beyond aid world’ (Janus et al., 2015; Mawdsley et al., 2014) and set in motion new convergence and divergence politico-normative dynamics between two competing ‘sub-fields’ (Esteves & Assunção, 2014): North–South cooperation (the traditional development aid or ODA) and South–South cooperation, driven by Southern countries themselves and in particular by major ‘emerging economies’ like China, India and Brazil, among many others large and small developing countries. Greater political, material and symbolic importance of Southern development cooperation providers has prompted numerous questions in the policy and academic worlds on the effects of these ‘changing geographies’ of aid and development. A lively scholarly debate emerged on how SSC and ‘traditional aid’ providers interact and on who is socialising whom, and on what (Esteves & Klingebiel, 2021; Waisbich & Mawdsley, 2022). Three major dynamics were identified: ‘co-optation’, ‘convergence’ or ‘Southernisation’. The first one described the pressures on Southern 3

Here I borrow the expression ‘fusion and confusion’ from Esteves and Klingebiel (2021).

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providers to comply with existing DAC-led norms, standards and practices. Pressures can take on different forms, ranging from open discursive stigmatisation of what is seen as deviant donor behaviour by Southern providers as well as opening-up, outreach efforts by DAC donors, multilaterals and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) (Bracho, 2017; Eyben, 2013; Paulo & Reisen, 2010). An early and emblematic example of this strategy is the 2009 creation of the China-DAC Study Group. Opening-up or ‘engaging’ rising powers efforts also include partnering with governments or with knowledge actors within these countries to reform SSC management systems, produce knowledge about their development cooperation practices and impact (Waisbich, 2021a), and/or to work together with rising powers in the benefit of third countries through triangular cooperation (Abdenur, 2007; Leite et al., 2015; Zhang, 2017). Both outreach and partnership can be understood as influencing strategies to socialise rising powers into existing norms, standards and ‘ways of doing’ development cooperation. The second visible dynamic is convergence, understood as Southern providers’ integrating into the existing OECD-DAC standards on how to practice development cooperation. Convergence not only derives from the pressures described above but also results from Southern providers’ agency and from their own will to learn, emulate, integrate or harmonise (at least partially) with the existing ‘aid regime’ (Esteves & Assunção, 2014; Mawdsley, 2019). Yet, rather than bending to existing norms and standards, Southern providers demonstrated a will to integrate differently keeping certain ‘Southern characteristics’ and ways of doing development cooperation (Waisbich, 2022). Alongside Southern providers importing and internalising global donorship norms developed by the DAC, there is a parallel phenomenon taking place: a ‘Southernisation’ of global development. ‘Southernisation’ reflects the substantive, ideational and ontological challenge posed by the ‘rise of the South’ and SSC to the existing aid paradigm. In many ways, ‘Southernisation’ is captured by what Zoccal and Esteves (2018) once described as the ‘BRICS effect’. The phenomenon, they argue, can be understood through three main impacts on the structures of the field. These are: (a) the articulation of new positions beyond the ‘donor–recipient’ dyad; (b) the induction of new modes of development cooperation and (c) the transformation of the institutional architecture and governance mechanisms in the field of international development cooperation. When it comes to unpacking these ‘new modes of development cooperation’, many observers have emphasised the attractiveness of a so-called ‘Beijing consensus’ on win–win economic cooperation and infrastructure building. A (new) infrastructural turn in the field (replacing the predominant poverty alleviation paradigm) is seen as appealing to other developing countries that seek new funding sources for building connectivity as well as for Northern donors increasingly concerned to leverage aid spending to ‘national interests’ (Gulrajani, 2017). Besides a focus on economic infrastructure building, another sign of ‘Southernisation’ is found in certain shifts in existing poverty alleviation paradigms in the context of South–South policy transfers based on the rural and agricultural development, social protection or food security

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experiences from Southern powerhouses, notably Brazil and China (Milhorance & Soule-Kohndou, 2017; Pomeroy et al., 2019; Urbina-Ferretjans & Surender, 2013). Far from mutually exclusive, simultaneous processes of ‘co-option’, ‘convergence’ and ‘Southernization’ illustrate unfolding ‘mutual’ or ‘two-way socialisation’ dynamics in the field of development cooperation (Abdenur, 2014; Alden & Alves, 2017; Milhorance & Soule-Kohndou, 2017). Behind these mutual or twoway socialisation processes, multiple negotiations between ‘traditional/Northern’ and ‘new/Southern’ providers unfold. Negotiations reveal a rocky path to the formation of new shared development norms, understandings and/or agreed expectations on rightful and appropriate development cooperation donor/provider behaviour and organisational structures for managing and doing development cooperation, as well as points of enduring tension. Indeed, mutual socialisation processes do not take place in the void. Rather they are shaped by the ‘ambivalent, multidimensional and politicized’ relations between larger Southern providers and the broader apparatus of international development (Cesarino, 2013, p. 25) as well as by an uneasy loss of monopoly—and thus loss of their hegemonic discourse—from ‘traditional’ Northern/Western development aid actors (Bracho, 2017; Esteves & Assunção, 2014). An important feature of the mutual socialisation dynamics taking place relates to Southern countries’ norm entrepreneurship. Indeed, since the early 2000s Southern powerhouses have shown a will to act not only as norm-blockers but also as global development norm entrepreneurs. In other words, ‘to influence debates about the principles and values governing development assistance’ (Abdenur, 2014, p. 1877). Southern providers have not only sought to mainstream key SSC principles such as horizontal, demand-driven and win–win cooperation to the rest of the development community but also brought the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) to development-related multilateral negotiations. Normative influence by major Southern powers is also seen in the workings of international organisations from the UN development system, as their political leadership and thematic priorities increasingly reflect the developmental models and values from countries like Brazil and even more so China (Milhorance & Soule-Kohndou, 2017). Growing funding from emerging economies to the UN development system for mainstreaming SSC at the UN (Haug, 2021; Lima & Santana, 2020) as well their growing power and leadership in UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) exemplify the ways through which normative influence is slowly—and not without tensions—entering traditional international development agencies. What these different examples show is that—similarly to other realms of international policymaking—countries like Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea and many others attempted to craft alternative, differentiated and innovative ways to participate in international development-related debates, either simultaneously accepting international development norms’ content and rejecting their implementation in practice (Kenkel & Destradi, 2019) or dealing with existing norms in innovating ways based on ‘particularist practices’ (Leveringhaus & Sullivan de Estrada, 2018). By doing so, Southern powers have adopted a ‘dual innovation’

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approach in relation to global norms: localising, domesticating and hybridising them during the internalisation process (Acharya, 2004) as well as creating new alternative global understandings, something noticeable in matters of development cooperation accountability, as discussed below.

4 Disputes Over What Accountability Means and How Should It Be Practiced by Southern Providers: Normative Resistance and Innovation Regarding Measurement An issue area where aid/development accountability norms are being contested and (re)negotiated is around measuring development cooperation. As mentioned, international organisations and the DAC above all institutions perform a key norm and standard-setting role in shaping donors’ behaviour. International organisations are important actors in the global diffusion of norms and policies and in processes of international socialisation through social influence, persuasion or even stigmatisation (Finnemore, 1993; Stone, 2004; Zarakol, 2014). In the development field, the OECD-DAC but also other entities in the UN development system have not only disseminated ‘the development/underdevelopment dialectic generating institutionality and fostering values, practices and symbolisms’ but also generated the ‘theoretical and technical knowledge that substantially contributes to formulate the concept of development and the policies and actions that must be implemented to achieve it’ (Morasso & Lamas, 2020, p. 5). The most significant creation by the DAC has been the very concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA)—the official and concessional part of resource flows from DAC members to developing countries—and its body of statistics. Due to the peer nature of the DAC, the need to generate quantifiable and comparable data on donors’ aid flows became a major feature of its accountability regime and the ODA statistics its main infrastructural response (Waisbich, 2021a).4 As a social measure, ODA definition and statistics attempt to harmonise practices within the field (Hynes & Scott, 2013). At the same time, as a measurement and reporting tool to count aid spending, ODA statistics are a proxy for ‘state aid efforts’ and an indicator of performance as much as of ‘generosity’ (Veen, 2011). Though ODA metrics are inherently political ‘moving targets’ (Sears, 2019), OECD-DAC quasi-monopoly on these debates has mainstreamed an accounting-based notion of accountability and conditioned changes in ODA definitions and statistics to the preferences of governments and epistemic communities of traditional/Northern donors (Waisbich, 2021a). Besides ODA metrics, donor accountability is also operationalised in what is known as the DAC Peer-Review Mechanism: a compliance instrument used to put ODA soft law in practice (Paulo & Reisen, 2010). Peer reviews are a type of accountability mechanism where donors ‘hold up a “mirror” to one another’ (Oxford Policy 4

On accountability infrastructures, see McGee (2013) and Jensen and Winthereik (2013).

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Management, 2008, p. 22). The mechanism works through peer pressure and soft persuasion. Every 5 years, each DAC member is evaluated by its peers against a set of references including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and DAC ‘best practices’. The DAC then makes recommendations and suggestions for donors to improve their aid-related practices. The DAC is not alone. International organisations from the UN development system are also key actors in the diffusion of donor accountability-related norms. In particular, UN entities have contributed to the institutionalisation of SSC in several Southern countries, middle-income countries or to making and shaping them as ‘development cooperation providers’. This was done through direct funding or technical support to build/strengthen SSC-related management structures as well as through more subtle mechanisms such as ‘partnering with Southern providers’, namely, rising powers, in triangular development cooperation projects in/with other (poorer) developing countries. When designing and implementing triangular initiatives, international organisations tend to diffuse their own development cooperation management and measurement standards: from financial accountability procedures and templates to project monitoring and evaluation tools (Waisbich, 2021a). Besides joint initiatives, international organisations like the UNDP, UNCTAD or the UNDPaffiliated United Office for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC) have also partnered with ‘knowledge actors’ in the South (those belonging to the emerging SSC epistemic community) in funding studies on SSC, in general, and on transparency and accountability in/of SSC in particular (e.g. Besharati & MacFeely, 2019; Esteves, 2018; Network of Southern Think-Tanks, 2019). Traditional donors are also major actors in promoting transparency and accountability norms and tools, through political influence and peer pressure as well as through funding ‘SSC bureaucracies’ and also knowledge actors within Brazil, India and China. Northern funding has been, on the one hand, key to the socialisation of Southern countries by international organisations, mentioned above. On the other hand, traditional/Northern donors have also worked directly with state and non-state actors within Southern providers to strengthen the ‘management and knowledge components’ of emerging SSC programmes. For example, in the early 2010s, the United Kingdom (UK) government funded the ‘knowledge component’ (another international development jargon for policy studies and impact evaluations) of several Brazilian bilateral and triangular SSC initiatives, like the Brazil-FAOWFP Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) programme. The UK has also financially backed the creation of the China International Development Research Network (CIDRN). The Network, which gathers around 20 other Chinese institutions, has published several studies on the impact of China’s development cooperation initiatives on the ground, notably in African countries (Waisbich, 2021a). In line with the importance of knowledge politics in the field, measurement activities such as those conducted or sponsored by the OECD-DAC, UN entities and traditional bilateral donors are political attempts to integrate and socialise Southern powers into the existing aid/development accountability norms. Hence, rather than revealing the ‘transparency and accountability shortcomings’ of Southern providers, these attempts to frame and measure SSC under the established categories of ODA illustrate a political dispute within the development aid landscape (Zoccal & Esteves, 2018).

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As a response, however, major Southern powers have been both resisting to existing DAC norms and tools to count and account for their development cooperation and creating new ways to measure their development flows (Waisbich, 2022). On the one hand, most SSC champions have resisted to fully embrace accountability and measurement (accounting, reporting and evaluating) as a compass for their development-related engagements with other developing countries. This can be seen at the multilateral level, where countries like Brazil, China, India and South Africa have not fully embraced the ‘effectiveness agenda’. They have not only refused to join the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) but also raised several concerns about the attempts to devise a new metrics to account for all SDGs-related resource flows, such as the TOSSD (Besharati, 2017; Sumner et al., 2020). While refusing to be called ‘emerging donors’ and strongly advocating for the mainstreaming of the CBDR principle in global development debates, Southern countries resisted to adopt existing DAC-tools to count and account for their development flows and impact. Countries like China and India also opposed the creation of common frameworks to measure SSC flows and their developmental impact, arguing instead for the plurality of ways of knowing and counting SSC among Southern providers (Network of Southern Think-Tanks, 2021). Different degrees of unease and even resistance can be seen in the diplomatic stances of major Southern providers. In the words of a representative of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC): ‘developing countries have been witnessing other international actors trying to quantify horizontal/South-South flows based on criteria conceived for other realities and purposes. The consequences of this process are: underaccounting, unilateral segregation of data, or inaccurate classification of horizontal/South-South cooperation’ (ABC, 2015). A similar defensive stance is found in India’s diplomatic stances during the most recent UN-led High Level Conference on South–South Cooperation, held in Buenos Aires, in 2019. There, Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, stated: ‘more and better South-South Cooperation now is on account of the global South enjoying more rapid and sustained economic growth. Yet, South-South Cooperation retains its distinct nature and values, as well as diversity of forms and flows. It defies easy categorization. (…) The trajectory of global growth and the declining share of ODA during the last decade or so has seen attempts to subsume South-South cooperation in the international aid architecture. Such efforts are not helpful. They do no justice to either its historical heritage or its future potential. Let us not venture to strait jacket South-South cooperation into a format that it cannot fit into’ (GOI/MEA, 2019). On the other hand, certain SSC champions have invested in generating Southernled debates on accountability and measurement (both quantification and evaluation of SSC) as well as creating country-specific methodologies and initiatives to generate SSC-specific information on flows and results (Waisbich, 2021b, 2022). While the Indian government has hosted several policy dialogues emphasising the plurality and diversity of Southern approaches to measuring Southern-led development cooperation, others went one step beyond and generated their own SSC accountability tools. Governments and experts in Latin America, like Brazil and Colombia, for instance,

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have put in place complementary ‘non-DAC’ measures capable of attributing value to South–South development exchanges, termed ‘non-monetary quantification’ or ‘value-adding/valuation’ (SEGIB, 2020). Others, like Mexico and Turkey, have developed their own methodological adaptations. In its accounting efforts, Mexico has, for instance, applied Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or adjusted national experts’ work values to standard international (mostly UN or World Bank) salary tables. While Turkey has decided to include in its national reporting to the DAC all the costs related to in-country humanitarian assistance, mostly to Syrians now settled in Turkey. The rationale behind these methodological innovations is to better capture and showcase the ‘development effort/contribution’ by Southern countries to overall international development, which often financially contribute with less dollars (when compared to DAC donors) because their cooperation efforts and experts are either different in nature or cheaper. Measuring the quality of SSC is another arena in which Southern providers have started to challenge existing norms and practices and started to experiment and innovate. Innovation is mostly taking place at the epistemic level, where a range of Southern actors have engaged in conceptual, lexical-semantic and methodological negotiations over how to assess SSC impact on the ground. While still incipient (Esteves, 2018; Waisbich, 2021b), the growing number of official and independent evaluations of South–South and triangular cooperation initiatives in the past decade illustrate the increasing openness by SSC practitioners (based in major Southern providers or working for UN development agencies) to craft alternative ways to conceive results, impact and social/policy change. Here their methodological innovations seek to acknowledge that the impacts of SSC initiatives on ‘final beneficiaries’ on the ground (be that partnering governmental institutions or local communities) can be long term, intangible and/or unmeasurable (Waisbich, 2021b). Divergences within the South are also found. While agreeing on a critique from the South to existing DAC-led tools and an unwillingness to fully incorporate those into their own development cooperation managing practices, countries traditionally closer to the OECD (like Mexico and Turkey) have often largely aligned with OECD-DAC measurement standards. Brazil initially adopted a critical-conciliatory diplomacy and invested, since the early 2010s, in crafting its own nationally appropriate tools and frameworks to quantify and report SSC moving. From 2016 onwards, with changes in the political coalition in power, Brazilian measuring efforts have moved closer and closer to OECD standards (Baumann et al., 2021). As for China, Beijing has not vocally led any accountability debates at the global arena while also investing in finding measurement solutions ‘with Chinese characteristics’ and putting them in place at home. This contrasts with India, which has adopted very critical-resistance stances at the diplomatic level, while refraining from putting in place any specific initiative or tool to measure its SSC flows at home (Esteves, 2018; Waisbich, 2021b). Indian stances are marked by a will to assert country’s identity in opposition to both a ‘Northern/Western’ paradigm but also to alleged ‘Chinese’ or ‘Latin American’ models (Waisbich, 2022).

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As these examples show debates around whether and how to measure SSC illustrative of North–South and South–South epistemic and normative battlefields. As critical development scholars have extensively argued, measurement tools and performance targets serve not only to guide projects and initiatives, and improve their performance on the ground, but also to demonstrate performance (Eyben et al., 2015; Honig, 2020; Rottenburg, 2009). Here, however, the challenge for Southern powers is to being able to demonstrate performance under a highly politicised field. Thus, ongoing ‘measurement battles’ related to Southern-led development cooperation (see Waisbich, 2021a) are revealing of not only pervasive normative dynamics in the field of development but also of ongoing power and identity struggles between ‘old’ and ‘new’ providers as well as within the South.

5 Conclusion This chapter discussed one example of a development-related international norm, namely, ‘donor accountability’, and the ways it is currently being negotiated between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ development cooperation providers. Since the 1990s, accountability-related debates have been a major arena in which compromises over norms, policies and behaviour of actors (‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ alike) are constantly negotiated and constituted. Rather than dislodging this first layer of donor– recipient negotiations, more recent ‘aid/development’ accountability debates taking place in the context of SSC are illustrative of current negotiations over development cooperation norms, but also relations and practices beyond the West. Using the ongoing epistemic and normative disputes over whether and how to measure Southern-led development cooperation, the chapter highlights how accountability in international development is currently a hybrid norm: both imported and home-grown. It describes the ways in which the so-called ‘traditional donors’ (i.e. countries in the DAC and international organisations in the UN development systems) have worked to disseminate donor accountability-related norms and thus socialise major Southern providers—like China, India, Brazil and many others—into existing ‘good donorship’ standards. It also describes the efforts by Southern actors (governmental agencies in charge of development cooperation activities and/or national policy and epistemic communities) to domesticate global norms and create new understandings and operationalisations of accountability in this field. Emerging powers’ normative resistance when it comes to accountability in/of Southern-led development cooperation but also their multiple innovation stances illustrate both particular forms of normative contestation and a reaction to hierarchies of responsibility. Alike in other realms of world affairs, ongoing tensions and frictions not only reveal disputes over power and responsibility in a shifting world, but also the challenges to build new agreements over how to manage common challenges. While structural inequalities and the legacies of colonial and post-colonial exploitation and stigmatisation can explain much of the resentment by the so-called ‘rising South’ vis-à-vis existing global development norms. It is also time for the community

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of major economies (Southern and Northern alike) to genuinely re-imagine ways to operationalise common but differentiated responsibilities towards global challenges—including poverty and inequality. Behind the many ‘measurement battles’, the unfolding ‘burden-sharing game’ is not only unsustainable but also irresponsible in face of the challenges to build more prosperous and just societies in a world ravaged by a global pandemic and an ever accelerating climate crisis.

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Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond Kazushige Kobayashi

1 Introduction Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China’s foreign aid policy has received ever-growing scrutiny from international observers. Many seem to assume that China’s emerging development cooperation policy is an outward projection of its domestic “authoritarian” governance model. While endogenous factors such as regime type certainly matter, such interpretation cannot explain the congruence between development cooperation policies conducted by China and Japan, which is widely considered as a “democratic” regime. Indeed, since the 1980s, Japan has been the single most important ODA (official development assistance) provider to China, and its model of commercial development (CD)—with an emphasis on the norms of mutual benefits, self-reliance, and sovereign rights—has played a key role in China’s meteoric rise (see Blaise, 2005). For example, Japan’s ODA was used to modernize offices and factories of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 1980s and 1990s, while China also learned Japan’s best practices of state capitalism, developmentalism, and mercantilism. As an emerging donor, China This article was produced as an outcome of the research project “Peace by Other Means? Alternative Practices of Building Peace in a Changing Global Order,” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 207615). The author gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support provided by the SNSF. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the EISA Pan-European Conference in 2022 and the workshops organized by the editors of this edited volume. The author thanks Šárka Kolmašová, Ricardo Reboredo, Oliver Richmond, Pascal Abb, Keith Krause, Oliver Jütersonke, Xinyu Yuan, and the participants of the EISA conference and the workshops for their constructive comments and suggestions. K. Kobayashi (B) College and Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan e-mail: [email protected] Centre On Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_3

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(consciously and unconsciously) replicates its own experience of development cooperation with Japan. Though the process of policy learning between Japan and China has been already explored by existing research (see below), this chapter adds new insights into this debate by analyzing the rise of China’s development cooperation policy from the theoretical perspective of norm diffusion. The primary purpose of this chapter is to challenge the common narrative that China’s aid policy is an outgrowth of its domestic “authoritarian” governance. Instead, this article argues that Chinese aid can be more accurately understood as an updated version of Japan’s CD model. This chapter entails five sections. Following this short introduction, the second section articulates the core norms of Japan’s development cooperation policy and discusses how these interrelated norms are organically packaged into the CD model of development assistance. The third section investigates the congruence of development cooperation policies conducted by Japan and China. Building on these discussions, the fourth section investigates how the Japanese model of state-led development assistance has diffused to China, and how this diffusion process has (re)shaped Beijing’s aid practices. The final section concludes with suggestions for further research.

2 Japan as a Norm Entrepreneur in Development Cooperation 2.1 Japan and the Norms of Commercial Development This section reviews the contents and contexts of key development cooperation norms advanced by Japanese policymakers, corporations, and development specialists. Japan is a major “aid great power” (Yasutomo, 1989) that has a considerable presence in the arena of global development. In 1989, the amount of Japan’s annual ODA exceeded that of the US, becoming the world’s largest donor. Despite the prolonged economic stagnation after 1991, Japan largely retained the position of the largest ODA contributor until the late 1990s. Though its pre-eminence as the top donor has steadily declined since the 1990s, Japan’s total ODA in 2019 increased to 15.59 billion USD, making it the fourth largest donor in the world (after the US, Germany, and the UK, see MOFA, 2021a, p. 19). Despite its major donor status within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Japan has advanced a distinctive policy of development cooperation that clearly “deviates” from the mainstream OECD norms (see e.g., Manning, 2016; Sasada, 2019; Yamada, 2021, Chapter 2.2). As Hiroko Ogawa highlights: “Every Peer Review [at the OECD] has criticized Japan for not fully complying with the norms advocated by DAC [Development Assistance Committee]” (Ogawa, 2019, p. 10). Richard Manning (2016, p. 276) summarizes that there are (at least) five unique features of Japan’s development cooperation policy: “a strong focus on self-help; a preference for loans over grants, projects over programs, and economic

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infrastructure over basic services; low levels of conditionality; a close relationship with Japan’s private sector; and a strong geographical focus on Asia” (see also Kato, 2016; Sasada, 2019, p. 1045). Among these key traits, this chapter focuses on the aspects of mutually-beneficial development cooperation, self-help and self-reliance, and respect for state sovereignty, which together constitute the normative basis of Japan’s CD model.1 In the pages to follow, I briefly describe the content of these norms and their historical contexts. The first pillar of the CD model is the norm of mutual benefit. From the viewpoint of many Japanese policymakers, conventional Western aid is driven by “Christian mentality” which emphasizes the necessity of altruistic charity for the less fortunate (see Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016).2 Aid programs driven by such a worldview tend to construct an asymmetrical relationship between a savior and a beggar, often resulting in paternalism and dependence. In contrast to the Western practice of international charity, Japan emphasizes that the ultimate purpose of development cooperation is to foster self-reliance through win–win cooperation between equal development partners (see also Shimomura, 2012, p. 134; Yamada, 2021, Chapter 2.2). In line with this, Tokyo frames development cooperation as a practice of mutually beneficial cooperation that brings tangible benefits to both donors and recipients. Take, for example, the case of Japan–Thailand development cooperation. In Thailand, much of Japanese aid was used “for the construction of industrial estates reserved for Japanese companies. The companies were exiting from Japan to escape quota restrictions on Japanese imports to OECD countries and environmental standards for industrial production, and to tap cheap Thai labour” (Wade, 1996, pp. 6–7). Indeed, many of the massive infrastructures built with Japanese ODA subsequently formed the basis of the expansion of Japanese business operations in recipient states, especially in Southeast Asia. While Japanese aid contributed to spurring local economic growth in recipient states, it also “helped Japan expand exports, and its focus on raw materials like cotton or timber, energy, industry, and mining was designed for mutual benefit” (Brautigam, 2009, p. 141). Of course, this does not mean that Japanese policymakers conceive aid purely as a strategic tool of self-enrichment,3 but the norm of mutual benefit envisions that development cooperation based on win–win collaboration between 1

Here, it must be noted that the term “commercial development” (CD) is not an official policy concept articulated by the Japanese government, but instead an analytical concept developed by various scholars to describe Japan’s aid practices (see e.g. Kondoh 2015). The “commercial” qualifier here does not refer to the concept of free market fundamentalism often associated with neoliberal economic policy (e.g., liberalization and privatization). Rather, it denotes the spirit of free commerce that celebrates mutually beneficial win-win deals. See Soderberg (1996) for an overview of “the business of Japan’s foreign aid.” 2 By and large, this discourse grossly simplifies and essentializes Christian culture, which is neither coherent nor homogenous. For example, emerging “Christian” donors such as Brazil and Russia may not have the same emphasis on altruism. The altruistic discourses of Western aid can also be seen as “cheap talk” rather than a reflection of Christian charity values. Some existing comparative studies show that humanitarian concerns play a marginal role in the distribution of Western aid (Schraeder et al., 1998; de Mesquita & Smith, 2009). 3 For an overview of change and continuity in Japan’s ODA policy discourse since the 1960s, see Oyama (2019).

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equal partners is more sustainable than the conventional charity model based on an unequal donor–recipient relationship. The second pillar of the CD model is the norm of self-reliance. Since development assistance is not mere charity but win–win cooperation that serves national interests of both donors and recipients, Japanese policymakers have for long insisted that concessional loans—and not grants—shall be the main instrument of development cooperation. It is argued that the practice of borrowing development loans cultivates the spirit of autonomy, self-help, and self-reliance as an independent state (Kato, 2016, p. 7; Sasada, 2019, p. 1050), in contrast to the provision of grants which supposedly deepens a sense of external dependence. Based on this worldview, the provision of yen-loans has been the main instrument of Japan’s aid practices. In the 1970s, loans constituted around 70% of the total Japanese ODA, many of which were used to finance mass-infrastructure projects implemented by Japanese firms in recipient countries.4 While its prominence steadily decreased over time (mainly due to heavy criticisms raised by other OECD donors), loans still constituted around 50–60% of Japan’s total ODA between 2009 and 2018 (see Fig. 1 below).5 This stands in clear contrast to the practice of the mainstream OECD donors, where loans constitute around 15–20% of total ODA (see van de Poel, 2019). Beyond the provision of development loans, Tokyo has also promoted the “trinity of aid-trade-investment” (Shimomura & Ping, 2013), emphasizing that a synthetic integration of aid, trade, and investment is needed to spur rapid economic growth, based on the worldview that the narrow focus on grants (whose overall size tends to be much smaller than loans and other commercially driven instruments) limits the possibilities of national development for recipient states. For example, Japan has led the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) since 1993, advancing the aid–trade– investment trinity to maximize development impacts in Africa (MOFA, 2013, 2021b; see also Stallings & Kim, 2016, p. 128). The third pillar of the CD model is the norm of sovereign rights. Since development cooperation is win–win collaboration between equal partners, donors should refrain from paternalistic behaviors and fully respect the national autonomy of recipient states. Based on this norm, Japan developed the “request-based system” (youseishugi) where foreign assistance is undertaken based on an explicit request from recipient governments (see Asahi, 2013; Fukuda-Parr & Shiga, 2016, p. 23; Kato, 2016, p. 7; Sasada, 2019, p. 1060; Watanabe, 2019). As Sasada (2019, p. 1046) articulates, “The Japan model was based on the assumption that economic development could be achieved most effectively under the leadership of the central government, and 4

Sasada (2019, p. 1051) shows that, until the 1970s, almost all of Japan’s ODA was provided in the form of tied loans to recipient states, where a select number of Japanese firms (with close ties to the government) played a leading role in aid project implementation. This practice was heavily criticized by other OECD donors and Japan subsequently reformed its policy. By 1994, almost all of Japan’s ODA became untied. 5 It is worth noting that there is a significant regional variation in Japan’s aid practices. As Stallings and Kim (2016, p. 127) point out, most of Japan’s aid to East Asian recipients are provided in the form of loans, while most of Japan’s aid to sub-Saharan African recipients are provided in the form of grants.

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Fig. 1 Japan’s bilateral ODA by aid category, 2009–2018 (USD billions, gross disbursements) (Source This figure is created by the author based on the OECD’s aid data statistics [OECD, 2020])

that this in turn would bring improvements in living standards, income, health, and so forth.” In practice, this means that Japan designs its development cooperation programs in line with development strategies articulated by national governments, and hence generally refrains from imposing Western-style aid conditionality. For instance, JICA’s summary of “Japanese-style” legal and governance reform assistance explicitly states that “the external imposition of an ‘advanced’ legal system on recipient nations can never succeed” (JICA, 2018, p. 4, author’s translation). The norm of sovereign rights also applies to the cases where the Japanese government collaborates with non-government actors in recipient countries. For example, Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects—which has funded more than 10,000 small-scale civil society projects in developing states—almost exclusively focuses on socio-economic projects while its internal regulations specify that the grants are prohibited from financing “political” projects (MOFA, 2016a, p. 5). Taken together, the norms of mutual benefit, self-reliance, and sovereign rights reinforce each other and organically make up the normative basis of Japan’s CD model. As summarized above, this model prioritizes facilitating the growth of aid recipients as independent international actors capable of taking ownership of their own development and of advancing their national interests through self-help. Within the OECD, Japanese practices of CD norms have been extensively criticized, with some Western officials and experts even perceiving Japan as a “rogue” donor that challenges the liberal development order (see Ogawa, 2019, p. 10; see below for more details). Since the 1990s, Japan has gradually reformed its policy to seek more conformity with the OECD aid norms (see Manning, 2016; Rix, 1993; Sasada, 2019), but it still largely retains the core normative elements of the CD model (Huang, 2016,

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p. 146; Shimomura, 2012, p. 135). Indeed, Japan’s emphasis on the CD norms grew stronger in recent years, notably exemplified by the Abe Administration’s explicit framing of Japan’s aid practice as “Development Cooperation Serving National Interest” in 2016 (see Ogawa, 2019).

2.2 The Origins of the CD Norms Though a detailed historical analysis of the origins of the CD norms goes beyond the scope of this chapter,6 existing research has identified (at least) three major sources of normative influence that have shaped the evolution of the CD model in postwar Japan: European state developmentalism of the twentieth century, American occupation after 1945, and dialogue with developing nations in Asia and beyond. While the CD norms are often thought of as a reflection of Japanese domestic values, the model’s evolution has been eclectically influenced by Japan’s global interactions in many aspects. First, historical research shows that statist developmentalism of Imperial Japan laid the foundation for the CD model, which also supposes the critical role of a strong centralized state. After the 1868 Meiji Restoration, Imperial Japan engaged in extensive and concerted efforts to promote state-led modernization and industrialization, primarily modeled after Prussia and other cases of state developmentalist policy in Europe. In the early twentieth century, Imperial Japan also learned from America’s state-led development programs under the Roosevelt Administration (see Moore, 2020). After consolidating its position as a rising power in Asia, Japan’s “imperial engineers” (Yamada, 2021) exported these experiences of state-led development to its newly acquired imperial domains (e.g., Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia). After the end of the Pacific War, the knowledge and practices of state developmentalism were passed down to the new generation of Japanese policymakers and laid the foundation for Japan’s subsequent ODA policy. Second, the CD model is shaped by Japan’s own experiences of miraculous economic growth after the Pacific War (see Fujikura & Nakayama, 2016). After 1945, the American occupation authority promoted state-developmentalist approach to postwar reconstruction, through which government–business consultative councils and other mechanisms of state capitalism flourished (see Johnson, 1994; Kishi, 2018; Stubbs, 2018; Wade, 1996, p. 20).7 In this context, Japanese firms, businesspersons, and consultants connected to government officials played an outsized role in designing and implementing development assistance projects in the initial years of

6

For a comprehensive, two-volume overview of the historical evolution of Japan’s aid policy, see Shimomura (2020). For other historical overviews, see also Fujikura and Nakayama (2016); Maemura (2019); Kobayashi (2020). 7 For useful overviews of America’s occupation policy, see Ward and Sakamoto (1987); Dower (1999); Hosoya (2018).

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Japan’s foreign aid (Arase, 1995, pp. 109–110).8 Japan’s miraculous postwar growth was also catalyzed by a number of massive infrastructure programs (such as the shinkansen bullet train system) financed by American-led lending institutions such as the World Bank. This historical experience convinced many Japanese policymakers that loans are the most effective catalyzer of rapid national development (see Sasada, 2019, pp. 1048–1049; Yamada, 2021).9 Third, the formation of Japan’s CD model was also shaped by Tokyo’s interactions with developing nations in its neighborhood and beyond. Japan’s postwar foreign aid initially began as a tacit compensation for the sufferings inflicted by Imperial Japan (see Kato, 2016, pp. 1–2; Yamada, 2021, Chapter 1). This negative historical legacy constrained Japan’s ability to advance assertive value-based diplomacy in the region. Japan’s postwar national identity as a former aggressor also compelled Japanese leaders to be more sensitive to the views of its former victims in Asia. For example, Acharya (2016, p. 349) shows that, as a participant at the 1955 Bandung Conference, Japan chose to prioritize economic issues and refrained from actively advocating for particular political values. Though Japan’s aid policy documents in the 1950s and 1960s did not make an explicit reference to the Bandung Conference, the core normative claims of the CD model exhibit uncanny resemblance to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which also aspired to catalyze win–win development cooperation based on “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (see Jiabao, 2004). Indeed, one of the reasons Japan’s CD model finds a strong resonance among developing nations may be that the model is partially rooted in the Bandung discourse of win– win cooperation. In this sense, the CD model is not entirely of Japan’s own making, but instead a hybrid policy practice born out of the confluence of multiple historical contexts.

3 The CD Norms Beyond Japan: The Case of China In this section, I sketch out potential pathways through which Japan’s practice of the CD norms has influenced the formulation of China’s development cooperation policy. As discussed above, the common (Western) view is that China’s aid practices are an extension of its domestic authoritarian governance (see e.g., Edel & Shullman, 2021; Halper, 2010). Yet, this endogenous explanation is highly problematic since it neglects the insights from existing studies showing that China’s development cooperation policy is deeply informed by the CD norms advanced by Japan (see e.g., 8

Unlike Western development consulting firms (which tend to generally focus on impact evaluation, governance reforms, and other soft-skill tasks), many of the Japanese development consulting firms are construction companies with civil engineers who specialize in industrialization and massinfrastructure development (see Yamada 2021). 9 This is in line with John Ruggie’s argument that states often engage in outward projection of their own domestic experiences (Ruggie 1982).

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Huang, 2016; Kondoh, 2015; Shimomura, 2012; Wang, 2012; Shimomura & Ping, 2013; Stallings & Kim, 2016; Watanabe, 2013). For example, Deborah Brautigam traces the origin of the use of commercial loans for mass-infrastructure projects— widely considered a hallmark of Chinese aid practice—to Japan’s past development cooperation with China. In particular, China’s “model of finance used for development and repaid with resources grew in part from China’s earlier experience as the recipient of aid, particularly aid from Japan” (Brautigam, 2009, p. 56, emphasis in original). Hisahiro Kondoh concurs that “The uniqueness of Japanese aid—loans in the infrastructure sector to invite FDI from Japan, and repayment of loans by means of mineral exports—is hence reflected in the current Chinese aid policies” (Kondoh, 2015, p. 32). In a similar vein, Hwang and Black (2020, p. 14) argues that “the ‘uniqueness’ of China’s developmental approach can be questioned, as China learned from the Japanese model of development, incorporating key aspects of Japan’s aid policy” (see also Shimomura, 2012, p. 132). Indeed, China has been the single most important recipient of Japanese aid, while “Japan provided half or more of China’s bilateral ODA during most years from the early 1980s through the mid-2000s” (Stallings & Kim, 2016, p. 129). Japan’s ODA to China begin with the rise of Deng Xiaoping’s “opening up” policy in 1979, which aimed at attracting foreign investment within the confines of state-led industrialization. Between 1979 and 2016, Japan provided approximately 3.32 trillion yen in loans and 157.2 billion yen in grant aid to China (MOFA, 2016b). This demonstrates the overwhelming prominence of loan aid in Japan’s engagement with China since 1979. Much part of the yen-loan aid was spent on mass-infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads, highways, ports, airports, power stations, medical facilities, and schools (see Yamada, 2021, Chapter 8). The Japanese government asserts that these mass-infrastructure projects financed by Japan’s yen-loans “have played a significant role in the realization of China’s current economic growth” (MOFA, 2016b), showcasing the exceptional effectiveness of the CD model. In line with the norm of mutual benefit, Japan’s ODA was used to provide support for Japanese firms newly entering into and/or operating in the Chinese market, while it also financed the modernization of offices and factories of more than one hundred Chinese SOEs (see JICA, 2021). In the last decade, the success story of Japan’s aid policy has been increasingly replicated by Chinese development actors in Asia, Africa, and beyond. Contemporary practices of China’s development assistance are well-documented elsewhere (see e.g., Shimomura & Ohashi, 2013; Zhang & Smith, 2017), and thus this chapter does not go into their details. Here, it is suffice to note that China’s development cooperation policy centers on the familiar norms of mutual benefit, self-reliance, and sovereign rights (see also Huang, 2016, p. 143; Shimomura, 2012; Stallings & Kim, 2016; Wang, 2012). James Reilly (2012, p. 77) emphasizes that “Underpinning China’s divergence from DAC norms is a profound skepticism toward claims of altruism and disinterested benevolence.” As discussed above, such a worldview also constitutes the basis of Japan’s CD model. In terms of concrete policy practices, China’s development cooperation policy is also heavily reliant on concessional loans,

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which constituted nearly half of Chinese foreign aid between 2013 and 2018 (UNDP, 2021, p. 4). More importantly, the alternative view to see China’s aid policy as an outcome of the diffusion of Japan’s CD model—rather than an endogenous outgrowth of its domestic authoritarian governance—explains why both Japan and China received stunningly similar criticisms from Western officials.10 Contemporary Western observers maintain that China’s autocratic regime is seeking to undermine the existing international development order by advancing unfair economic practices, checkbook diplomacy indebting poor nations, unconditional aid with little human rights concerns, and predatory mass-infrastructure projects with destructive socioecological consequences, among others (see e.g., Edel & Shullman, 2021; Naim, 2009; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010). Yet none of these “predatory” aid practices can be considered as inherent characteristics of autocratic aid policy, since Japan’s democratic regime in the past received the same kind of criticisms from Western OECD members (see e.g., Roach, 2019; Wade, 1996). In the 1980s, Western officials, pundits, and activists formed a united front to condemn Japan’s CD model, alleging that Tokyo was indebting poor countries with development loans and taking advantage of corrupt political systems in developing nations in order to advance its parochial commercial interests (see Wade, 1996). “For some time, other donors heavily criticized Japan for its tied aid and the links between its ODA and contracts for Japanese firms” (Stallings & Kim, 2016, p. 122), while “Japan was also criticized for paying little attention to human rights, democracy, and environmental conservation in recipient countries” (Sasada, 2019, p. 1050). These criticisms were not entirely unfounded. In Indonesia, for instance, the Kotopaniang Dam constructed by the Japanese ODA destroyed local villages and forcibly displaced more than 3,000 inhabitants (Japan Times, 2002; see also Yamada, 2021, Chapter 3). To cite another example, internal documents publicized after the ouster of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 revealed that as much as 10–15% of the entire Japanese ODA to the Philippines was kicked back to Marcos and his associates through a scheme of organized collusion involving more than 50 Japanese aid contractors (Brautigam, 2009, p. 141). In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan’s apparently “predatory” aid practices prompted strong resentments from local communities in recipient countries, resulting in anti-Japanese riots and demonstrations across Southeast Asia and beyond (see Shimomura, 2020, Chapter 4). In light of this, Kondoh (2015, p. 36) notes that “China, learning from the Japanese aid of the 1970s and 1980s that was at the time criticized by some DAC members, has built a commercial aid model.”11 In a similar vein, Black also points out that, 10

On the similarity between Japanese and Chinese positions with regard to international interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states, see Prantl and Nakano (2011); Jütersonke et al. (2021). 11 As Yale economist Stephen Roach (2019) emphasizes: “Back in the 1980s, Japan was portrayed as America’s greatest economic threat—not only because of allegations of intellectual property theft, but also because of concerns about currency manipulation, state-sponsored industrial policy, a hollowing out of US manufacturing, and an outsize bilateral trade deficit.” On Japan’s “economic Cold War” with the United States, see Huntington (1993).

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even though Japan is now critical of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), “What is striking about Japan’s critique of the AIIB is that many similar attacks were leveled at Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy during the 1990s” (Black, 2017, p. 160). Taken together, these illustrative examples show that regime type alone cannot explain the evolution of China’s aid practices.12 Rather, China’s development cooperation policy is better understood as an emulation of Japan’s CD model, which received the familiar criticisms of “rogue” aid from Western OECD members in the past.

4 Rethinking International Norm Diffusion: From Teaching to Learning? 4.1 Limits of the Western Norm Diffusion Models The previous section highlighted the evidence of a close resemblance between Japanese and Chinese development cooperation policies in their most basic aspects. This section seeks to explain this congruence from the viewpoint of norm diffusion. As briefly discussed in the introductory section, conventional research on norm diffusion tends to privilege top-down models where norm entrepreneurs seek to “socialize” other members of the international society through a mixture of material manipulation, normative persuasion, social influence, and other means (see Zürn & Checkel, 2005). These conventional models largely assume an asymmetrical relationship between norm-maker and norm-taker, often exemplified in the metaphor of teacher–student relationship (e.g., Finnemore, 1993; see also Kolmašová’s Introduction in this edited volume). A salient example of such hierarchical norm diffusion is post-communist Europe. After the end of the Cold War, NATO and the EU sought to diffuse the Western norms of domestic governance (e.g., democracy, free market, the rule of law, and human rights) to Eastern European nations (Checkel, 2007; Gheciu, 2005; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2000, 2005). In this process, a clear relational asymmetry emerged. Even though Brussels and Eastern European elites established collaborative working relationships, the former still retained the upper hand over the norm diffusion processes and conducted extensive monitoring, evaluation, and disciplining activities within the framework of accession negotiations and membership conditionalities. The case of Japanese–Chinese interactions examined in this chapter exposes the critical limitations of such unidirectional diffusion models. To begin with, the conventional models presuppose an explicit intention of norm entrepreneurs to diffuse their domestic norms to other actors. This assumption is not applicable to the case of Japan. As Fukuda-Parr and Shiga (2016, p. 27) emphasizes, Japan has never sought 12

Watanabe (2013) shows that, in addition to Japan, China had also learned from Soviet practices of foreign aid in the 1940s and 1950s.

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to actively export its development cooperation model, even though Japanese policymakers were highly confident that the CD model outperformed the Western aid model. In the OECD, for example, Japanese representatives never claimed that other donors should adopt Japanese development cooperation norms; instead, their core claim is that Japan has a unique model of development cooperation and it has the right to be different from other donors (see Iimura, 2000). More importantly, none of the key mechanisms of norm diffusion identified in the conventional models seems to be applicable when it comes to the case of Japan– China interactions. As discussed above, the conventional unidirectional models (explicitly or implicitly) assume an asymmetrical relationship where the agent of diffusion (“teacher”) exercises leverage over norm-takers (“students”) through monitoring, evaluation, and other mechanisms of “carrot and sticks.” In the case of postcommunist Europe, for example, existing research shows that membership conditionality played a decisive role in the diffusion of Western norms to Eastern Europe (see Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2000, 2005). In the case of Japan–China interactions, in contrast, Tokyo had no or limited leverage over Beijing. Japan’s CD model rests on the request-based system, which prioritizes the ownership of aid recipients without the imposition of stringent conditionality (see Soderberg, 1996).13 This made it difficult for Japan to exercise any kind of meaningful leverage over China. Indeed, China refused to receive large-scale development assistance from Western powers and instead opted for mutually beneficial development cooperation with Japan in part because Tokyo exhibited no intention of imposing aid conditionality. In fact, given the historical context that postwar Japan’s aid to other Asian states began as a substitute for reparation, one could argue that Beijing had certain moral leverage over Tokyo in the context of a victim–aggressor relationship. Taken together, these factors and contexts clearly limit the applicability of the unidirectional diffusion models to the case of Japan–China interactions.

4.2 Alternative Pathways of Norm Diffusion: Policy Transfer through Active Learning Though the conventional diffusion models may not be applicable to the case of Japan– China interactions, this does not mean that the concept of diffusion is irrelevant in this case. For instance, critical constructivist scholars have shown that there are alternative pathways of norm diffusion which do not rely on hegemonic leverage exercised by powerful and assertive norm entrepreneurs (see e.g., Towns, 2012; Wiener, 2018; Wunderlich, 2020). Inspired by these critical approaches, and inductively informed 13

As Sasada (2019, p. 1066) shows, however, the nature of this request-based system evolved over time and Japan has come to take a more proactive stance in designing and implementing its aid projects since the late 1990s.

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by the insights from the case of Japan–China interactions, this chapter proposes an alternative hypothesis of bottom-up diffusion based on the concept of policy learning, which emphasizes the active and proactive agency of norm learners. Thus, this alternative framework of diffusion defines norm-takers not as passive “recipients” of norms but instead as active learners of norms (see also Kobayashi et al., 2022). Put differently, we need to shift the analytical focus of norm diffusion from teaching to learning. In so doing, my suggestion is that there is a promising avenue of cross-fertilization between IR norm research and the public policy literature on “policy learning” and “policy transfer.” According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p. 357), “Policy transfer refers to the process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop programmes and policies within another.” In contrast to the conventional IR norm research predominantly oriented towards compliance (see Hofferberth & Weber, 2015), the policy learning literature centers on the (pro)active agency of policymakers to learn from the best practices of other countries (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Though these two research streams deal with similar topics, they have evolved largely in parallel without much interaction with each other.14 One reason for this interesting disconnection may be that, as discussed above, the conventional IR norm research tends to focus on the top-down viewpoint of “teaching” (i.e., how to diffuse norms to others) while the policy learning literature looks at diffusion processes from the bottom-up viewpoint of “learning” (i.e., how to identify and internalize foreign models and best practices). Here, of particular importance is the findings of the policy learning literature that certain policy norms can diffuse and come to constitute a community of shared practices even in the absence of a disciplining normative authority (see e.g., Bennett, 1991; Drezner, 2005; Gerven et al., 2014; Lee & Strang, 2006; Meseguer, 2005; Weyland, 2005). For example, Li (2003) shows that the Japanese norms of state developmentalist governance diffused to other countries in its neighborhood, eventually coming to constitute Asia’s developmentalist regional order (see also Stubbs, 2009). In a similar vein, Asian nations learned how to manage complex processes of global integration from their neighbors’ policies (Carroll & Jarvis, 2013). In both cases, conditionality and other disciplining mechanisms played a marginal role; instead, diffusion occurred primarily through horizontal collaboration and voluntary learning activities in the absence of disciplining authority. Though the Asian economic model literature primarily focuses on the diffusion of domestic governance norms (e.g., the so-called “flying goose” model of diffusion from Japan to other Asian states),15 the present chapter takes this argument a step further and maintains that these insights can be also applied to analyze foreign policy practices, including development cooperation policy. 14

For an exception, see a recently published edited volume on policy transfer and norm circulation (Delcour and Tulmets 2019). 15 The literature on the East Asian economic model (Li 2003, pp. 663-664) shows that the norms of state developmentalism has diffused over time from Japan (generation 1.0), to South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (generation 2.0), to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand (generation 3.0), and finally to China and Vietnam (generation 4.0).

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In light of this, I argue that International Relations (IR) norm research can benefit from integrating policy learning (and other bottom-up diffusion mechanisms) into existing theoretical frameworks.16 The utility of policy learning as an alternative pathway of norm diffusion can be illustrated by the case of Japan–China development cooperation. My suggestion is that norm diffusion took place primarily through China’s active norm learning, without any pressure or leverage exercised by Japan. This is in line with many existing studies on Japan–China development cooperation, which document the evidence of Beijing’s voluntary learning from Tokyo (see e.g., Huang, 2016; Kondoh, 2015, p. 32; Shimomura, 2012; Wang, 2012; Shimomura & Ping, 2013; Stallings & Kim, 2016; Takamine, 2016; Watanabe, 2013; Yamada, 2021, Chapter 8). For example, Chinese officials, experts, and scholars have extensively studied Japan’s ODA policy as a “successful” model and sought to emulate its key features (Wang, 2012). Japan’s official policy documents also highlight the remarkable scale of learning opportunities generated by Japan–China collaboration. Between the 1970s and 2019, JICA’s technical cooperation programs trained as many as 37,900 Chinese officials and experts in the field of industrialization and development assistance, while the agency also dispatched more than 9,500 experts to China (JICA, 2021; MOFA, 2016b). Most recently, JICA also played an important role in facilitating the establishment of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018 (MOFA, 2019). Beyond the case of China, existing research also documents similar self-directed learning processes in the diffusion of Japan’s CD model in its neighborhood. For example, Japan played an equally critical role in the establishment of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which is explicitly modeled after JICA (Kim & Oh, 2012; Kondoh, 2013). Like the case of China, Japan had no intention of exporting its model to South Korea; instead, the diffusion happened primarily through the mechanism of voluntary policy learning, where “[s]taff members of KOICA were sent to JICA for operational training for three to six months” (Kondoh, 2015, p. 34; see also Stallings & Kim, 2016, p. 130). In a similar vein, Japan also played a meaningful role in the making of India’s development cooperation policy, which also emphasizes the importance of the CD norms within the context of SouthSouth cooperation (see Shiga, 2013; Shimomura, 2012). In order to attribute and determine the actual causal impact of policy learning in the diffusion of Japan’s CD model in Asia, more detailed (and ideally comparative) process-tracing studies would be necessary. At the very least, however, these illustrative examples offer tentative clues to advance further theorization of norm diffusion processes from alternative, bottom-up perspectives.

16

Here, it must be noted that bottom-up/voluntary norm learning and imposed norm internalization may not be neatly differentiated from each other, since there is a high degree of subjectivity when it comes to defining what counts as “voluntary” action. The author thanks Šárka Kolmašová for emphasizing this point. In this chapter, bottom-up/voluntary norm learning is simply defined as a practice of norm internalization in the absence of external conditionality.

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4.3 Learning and Change: China’s Localization of the CD Norms Policy learning as a mechanism of norm diffusion entails critical implications for related concepts such as norm localization. For instance, this chapter argues that norms diffused through the mechanism of voluntary policy learning are likely to entail a higher degree of mutation, adaptation, and transformation, since there is no central disciplining authority that monitors and enforces the uniformity of discourses and practices associated with the diffused norms. In light of this, outcomes of bottomup diffusion may be better captured by methodological approaches based on “family resemblance” (Collier & Mahon, 1993), which allow for a variety of policy discourses and practices within the basic parameters of shared norms. For this reason, it is important to discuss key differences between the Japanese and Chinese CD models,17 even though they are both anchored in the common norms of state developmentalism. Here, I suggest that there are (at least) three major differences when it comes to the practice of the CD norms by Japan and China. First, China frames its development cooperation as an integral part of South–South cooperation, and hence retains its state identity as a “developing country.” In line with this, the 2021 White Paper (State Council Information Office, 2021) prominently features the new South–South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) as a key component of China’s development cooperation policy (see also UNDP, 2021). This stands in stark contrast to the Japanese worldview, which frames development cooperation as win–win cooperation between an advanced nation (i.e., Japan) and developing countries.18 Despite this critical difference in self-identification, Japan and China largely share the core CD norms, frequently resulting in similar policy discourses and practices of non-conditionality, non-interference, state developmentalism, and win–win cooperation (as discussed above). This indicates the CD norms of development cooperation may be appealing to a wide range of political regimes and actors with different identities. Second, an important feature of China’s development cooperation practices is its adventurism. Japanese development actors have a general tendency of risk aversion, preferring to stay away from fragile and conflict-affected settings. This stands in stark contrast to China’s approach, where Chinese development actors do not hesitate to dive deeper into precarious contexts with high security/safety risks, in search of greater opportunities for win–win cooperation. For example, while the majority of Japan’s aid is delivered to relatively stable developing countries in Asia, more than 40% of China’s aid goes to Africa (see UNDP, 2021, p. 4), including many fragile and conflict-affected states. It is in this sense that China’s development cooperation 17

For comparative analyses of Japanese and Chinese aid practices, see Watanabe (2013); Yamada (2021, Chapter 10.2). 18 Despite this, Japan has also played a key role as a facilitator of South–South cooperation since the 1970s. In 1975, for example, Japan launched a policy scheme of “triangle cooperation” to systematically promote mutual learning between developing countries (Shimomura 2020, Chapter 3.4).

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policy may be interpreted as a more “activist” or “adventurist” version of Japan’s more cautious CD model. Third and finally, China is relatively less constrained by the Western pressure to conform to the mainstream OECD norms. Though Japanese policymakers resent that the West is seeking to suppress Japan’s “unique” development approach by imposing the OECD “party line” (see e.g., Wade, 1996), Japan has spared considerable efforts to demonstrate its obedience to Western leadership in the global development order. In many aspects, Japan has mostly engaged in tactical modifications (e.g., “cheap talk” and “window dressing”) that have not led to fundamental changes in actual policy practices on the ground, but such superficial conformity to the OECD norms has enabled Japan to maintain amicable relationships with other liberal Western donors, especially the United States. For example, though many Japanese policymakers feel that the Western insistence on aid “harmonization” and “coordination” results in the suppression of Japan’s CD model (Iimura, 2000), Japan has actively participated in Western-led aid coordination groups (such as in-country working groups among donors and UN agencies). China, in contrast, largely avoids participating in such aid coordination groups (see Reilly, 2012, p. 75), and hence Beijing appears to enjoy a greater degree of freedom when it comes to designing and implementing its aid policy. Though the Chinese version of the CD model is much more activist and assertive than that of Japan, it is still rooted in the common CD norms that had informed Japan’s ODA to China in the past. In this sense, I argue that it is fruitful to analyze the rise of China’s development cooperation model through the lens of norm diffusion, rather than treating it as a unique model of “aid with Chinese characteristics,” as advertised by China’s 2011 White Paper on Aid (State Council Information Office, 2011).19 The comparison of Japanese and Chinese CD models also indicates that the effect of regime type on aid policy should not be exaggerated. For example, China’s unconditional aid to Myanmar, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere has been criticized as a practice of “autocracy promotion” (see Bader et al., 2010; Burnell, 2011) in which Beijing supposedly utilizes development assistance to prop up “like-minded” authoritarian regimes in its neighborhood and beyond. Such a crude narrative seems to inflate the effect of regime type on aid practices. Indeed, Japan has also advanced similar practices of unconditional aid to Myanmar (see Reilly, 2013), Cambodia, and Sri Lanka. As discussed above, this suggests that the CD model can be adopted and localized by various international actors regardless of their relative power, state identity, and foreign policy orientations.

19

Based on a comparative study of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian foreign aid policy, Shimomura (2012, p. 132) also suggests that China’s approach should be better understood as a version of the “Asian donor” model.

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5 Concluding Thoughts Tracing norm diffusion is a challenging task, not least because it involves multiple flows of normative influence. This complexity makes it inherently difficult to identify, disaggregate, and attribute the causal impact of respective normative influence in a definitive manner. Such causal attribution requires an in-depth process-tracing which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Despite these methodological limitations, the illustrative examples provided in this chapter point to the multiple and compelling evidence with regard to the diffusion of the CD norms from Japan to China. As discussed above, this diffusion appeared to have occurred primarily through active policy learning practices undertaken by China itself, without any explicit top-down attempts on the side of Japan to impose these norms. By and large, Tokyo was neither able nor willing to exercise meaningful leverage over Beijing through conventional disciplining mechanisms; instead, Japanese policymakers framed development assistance as win–win cooperation between equal partners and facilitated policy learning through collaborative programs. As a result, China took ownership of its learning process and retained its sovereign agency to localize the CD norms. Indeed, the successful diffusion of the CD norms from Japan to China seems to rest on the fact that China does not see the CD model of development cooperation as a “Japanese” or “foreign” model, but instead as a model of its own making. These findings challenge the underlying assumptions of the conventional norm diffusion models and suggest that researchers may need to fundamentally rethink the effects of power and leverage on norm diffusion outcomes. The insights offered in this chapter elucidate three major avenues for further research. First, more research is needed to determine if and to what extent different mechanisms of diffusion lead to a different degree of norm internalization and localization. How does relational (a)symmetry affect norm diffusion outcomes?20 In the field of education, pedagogical constructivists show that bottom-up, student-driven processes of active learning result in more enduring learning experiences than topdown teaching (see e.g., Singham, 2005). In this light, we may stipulate that norm diffusion driven by bottom-up mechanisms may catalyze deeper and more enduring internalization than those prompted by top-down mechanisms based on conditionality, monitoring evaluation, and external disciplining. While we should be careful in drawing interdisciplinary insights, such an alternative hypothesis can stimulate further debate on the varying outcomes of norm diffusion. This question appears to be particularly pertinent to the recent developments in Eastern Europe, where the political regimes once considered the “successful” cases of liberal norm diffusion (e.g., Poland and Hungary) are now quickly reverting to various types of illiberalism. Second, the framework of norm learning may help us better understand the politics of policy reform in comparative contexts. After receiving heavy criticism for its advancement of the CD norms, Japan gradually reformed its aid policy in the 1990s and 2000s (Manning, 2016; Sasada, 2019). In recent years, China has also sought similar modifications to its aid practices aimed at muting Western criticisms. For 20

The author thanks Šárka Kolmašová for raising this question.

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example, Reilly’s study of selective compliance with OECD aid norms demonstrates that China has generally internalized the principles of “ownership,” “alignment,” and “results-based management,” while it has not fully endorsed others such as “harmonization,” “mutual accountability,” “conditionality,” “support for local civil society,” and “aid-only benefits recipients” (Reilly, 2012). More recently, China also introduced new policy schemes such as “locally constructed projects” where the project implementation is mainly undertaken by recipient countries (UNDP, 2021, p. 5). Here, what is interesting is that China’s selective adoption of certain OECD norms somewhat resembles Japan’s past aid policy reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, which also engaged in selective compliance with certain OECD norms while retaining the core norms of the CD model. As Meibo Huang (2016, p. 145) emphasizes, “Many problems that China is currently facing [in the domain of development cooperation] are similar to those Japan has faced in the past, and therefore the Japanese experience may be useful for China in many ways.” In this vein, insights into the evolution of Japan’s aid policy reforms may provide us with tentative clues to look into the direction of China’s aid policy reforms. Finally, the learning-centered perspective on norm diffusion points to the viability of bottom-up international ordering. To date, the IR literature on international order has been generally led by top-down perspectives, where dominant powers and their associated institutions (e.g., the United States and the Bretton-Woods institutions) are assumed to play a vital role in the diffusion and enforcement of international norms. In contrast, this chapter suggests the possibility of more decentralized mechanisms of international ordering, which resonates with the emerging literature on the “practices” of international order (see e.g., Adler & Pouliot, 2011). For example, the CD model of development cooperation has attracted a wider global learnership beyond China, where non-conditional aid is emerging as a potentially alternative global norm practiced by a wide range of new donors such as Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa (see e.g., Jütersonke et al., 2021; Seabra, 2021; Shimomura, 2012).21 More importantly, China and other norm learners who learned and localized the CD norms through their collaborative interactions with Japan in the past are now seemingly becoming new facilitators of global norm learning. For example, in 2013, China hosted more than 14,500 officials from more than 150 countries for the purpose of short-term policy training, providing ample opportunities for further collaborative learning of the CD norms by other countries (Benabdallah, 2019, p. 102; see also Huang, 2016, p. 142).22 Further research is required to investigate if and to 21

In the case of India, for instance, Saran (2018, p. 105) articulates that: “Unlike Western aid, India’s development cooperation is recipient-led and projects are determined on the basis of priorities set by the recipient country. No conditions are attached to the assistance; and the government, as opposed to civil society organisations, is the main conduit for implementing projects.” 22 For example, in 2014, the North-East Asia Development Cooperation Forum was established to promote mutual learning on innovative development cooperation policies and practices, bringing together China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. More detailed information on the forum can be obtained at its official website: https://www.unescap.org/subregional-office/east-north-east-asi a/dcf. For an overview of mutual learning among Asian donors, see also Stallings and Kim (2016, pp. 130–131).

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what extent such concentric circles of international learning communities reshape the global development order through the processes of decentralized norm diffusion.

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China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West Aleš Karmazin

1 Introduction As information and communication technologies (ICT) get closely intertwined with current international affairs, and simultaneously, their normative regulation remains underdeveloped in many respects (McCarthy, 2017), the global politics of technology represents a window of opportunity for norm entrepreneurship. It is especially attractive for actors who have not dominated the global normative environment thus far but whose ambitions are on the rise. China is a prime example of such actors, and cyber sovereignty (sometimes called internet or network sovereignty) is one of the most important emerging norms regarding ICT. The politics of technology in nonWestern or developing countries is particularly intriguing because it intertwines their aspiration to influence the global order, their growing power and their reflections and concerns regarding developmental (socio-economic) questions. Global governance of cyberspace has been dominated by liberal-oriented and non-state-centric views established as an offspring of (neo-)liberal globalisation and liberal internationalism. However, cyber sovereignty represents a key normative challenge. To provide an initial definition, cyber sovereignty stands for an emphasis on the rights of each country to enforce its own laws and policies over its own cyberspace and an effort to interconnect territorial demarcation of the sovereign state with demarcations of cyberspace. In this chapter, I examine how China tried to establish and diffuse the norm of cyber sovereignty among non-Western actors. While the notion of cyber sovereignty is sometimes discussed as China’s contribution to cyberspace governance (e.g. Fang, 2018; Hao, 2017; Hong & Goodnight, 2020; Kolton, 2017), I show that cyber sovereignty has developed in a broader context and interactions. While China took over a conception of cyberspace sovereignty originally developed by Western A. Karmazin (B) Department of Asian Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_4

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actors and referred to by some non-Western states, it continued to adjust it according to its views related to sovereignty, its refusal of the US hegemony in international politics and other discourses that dominated and defined China’s understanding of the global international environment and its aspirations in it (such as the ‘community of shared destiny’ discourse) at the time when China was specifying its understanding of cyber sovereignty. As such, I understand China’s conception of cyber sovereignty as of hybrid origin; in other words, inspired by some preceding formulations but mainly framed through its domestic discourses. Since the late 2010s, China has been playing the role of the most important advocate of the norm due to the simple fact of its global power but also because it has actively positioned itself as the norm’s advocate at different international platforms such as the UN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or bilateral relations. To be sure, other countries, especially Russia, have also promoted cyber sovereignty, but, arguably, none of them has evinced such a level of activity at the intersection of the global, sub-global and bilateral levels of international politics. In this chapter, I mainly focus on China’s promotion of the norm at sub-global fora, namely SCO, BRICS, ASEAN and the China-initiated World Internet Conference. China has been involved in cyber security dialogues with the EU or the USA, and global cyber governance bodies and defends cyber sovereignty vis-à-vis these actors; however, the non-Western meetings and fora have become particularly important for the norm’s diffusion. As the Western actors have continued to oppose the norm, China relied on interactions beyond the West to mobilise support for cyber sovereignty and increase its credibility in the norm’s promotion. While it got popularised in the second half of the 2010s, the norm continues to be institutionalised only loosely. This situation can be attributed to China’s rather patient approach to the promotion of the norm and its insistence on cooperative, equal and mutually beneficial negotiations between involved actors. Moreover, I argue that while the promotion of the cyber sovereignty norm is important for China, the institutionalisation (consolidation) of the norm is not the only or, perhaps, the ultimate goal. The broader goal is threefold. First, challenging the dominance of the USA (or the West, more broadly) in cyberspace in itself is an important motivation. Second, promoting norms is one of the means to achieve a positive role and establish its own agency in this realm. Third, making other actors lean on China’s side may be more valuable than codifying a particular norm. Or in other words, finding allies and building partnerships is a critical test for China’s rise to the position of a superpower, and the processes of norm promotion (not necessarily codification of a particular norm) may be a tool for accomplishing that. Rather than approaching norms as stable, confined and self-contained units, I understand them as phenomena that get reconstituted through political interactions. However, my approach presupposes that norms are not contested ‘all the way down’ and in every single moment (cf. Niemann & Schillinger, 2017). Norms typically retain a minimal common meaning that is relatively stable while more specific ‘content’ that co-defines norms may be added and dynamically unfolding (cf. Winston, 2018). This is also what characterises the story of China’s approach to cyber sovereignty. China defined the key features of cyber sovereignty early on, yet only vaguely, and has

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continued to develop (and adjust) them ever since. As one of the early contributions to the International Relations literature on norms suggested (Payne, 2001), norms are intertwined with broader discourses, diplomatic interactions or strategic interests that frame norms and make them practically (politically) meaningful and significant. Through such engagements, norms are advanced, disseminated and made relevant. In this sense, there might be different goals connected with norm promotion that lie in articulating, popularising, institutionalising norms but also achieving other ends that may include power, prestige, recognition or attention. The chapter is divided into three main sections. These sections address the research questions of this book project in the following order. First, what is the norm, and where does it come from? In this section, I trace key developments of cyber sovereignty. Second, how was the norm diffused? Or in other words, how China tried to diffuse the norm towards non-Western (typically, developing and post-colonial) countries? I predominantly focus on sub-global and non-Western institutions as they represent the most important instances with the help of which China could challenge the global mainstream. Third, what sources of leverage helped China to diffuse the norm? I particularly examine two structural facilitating factors that create enabling conditions for the norm’s diffusion. These are China’s extensive technological trade and ideological affinities with many post-colonial (non-Western, developing).

2 China’s Outline of Cyber Sovereignty In this section, I identify which debates and positions preceded China’s turn to cyber sovereignty, how official Chinese portrayals of cyber sovereignty developed and what can be understood as a definitional core of China’s cyber sovereignty. While Chinese official and unofficial debates on the topic were influenced by external dynamics, China’s conception of cyber sovereignty was also largely tailored according to its own perceptions and discourses. As such, China’s delineation of cyber sovereignty can be understood as of a hybrid (mixed) origin. Chinese official representatives mentioned the concept of cyber sovereignty for the first time in 2010 (State Council of PRC, 2010). However, the concept of cyber sovereignty originated before that. Although the mainstream Western discourse originally portrayed cyberspace as a realm of free interactions between multiple actors, including (global) civil society, private and non-governmental actors (Barlow, 1996), some Western scholars argued against this view and called for interconnecting cyberspace with nationally based jurisdictions (Goldsmith, 1998). Similar debates also spilled over to the UN. While the state-centric positions continued to play a minor role there (Mueller, 2020), they were closely observed by Chinese diplomats (Fang, 2018), but China’s foreign policy did not showily and consistently align themselves with any of the Western actors or arguments at international fora. Chinese actors also reflected cyber politics of Russia and authoritarian countries in the Middle East, which were ahead of China in some cyberspace control measures in the 2000s (Deibert, 2008; Harnisch, 2021). However, these countries served as

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indirect inspiration rather than as a model to mimic. The Chinese party-state and Chinese experts were also particularly interested in the role of the internet in a series of uprisings during the Arab Spring (2010–2012). Being fuelled by the online mobilisation of civil society, the Arab Spring pointed to what can happen if the statecontrol approach fails. For many Chinese academics (Wenzeng Lu, 2019; similarly, Liu & Gao, 2020; C. Lu, 2014a, 2014b; Wang, 2014), this understanding of the Arab Spring only accentuated a need for the norm of cyber sovereignty. The Snowden leaks that followed shortly after the Arab Spring further propelled Chinese debates in this regard. These external influences were not ignored in China. Still, when it came to formulating an official demarcation of cyber sovereignty, the Chinese government built on a repertoire of its own frames, discourses and motivations. These included the Chinese official portrayal of sovereignty, the five principles of peaceful coexistence (also known as Panchsheel), China’s official discourse on peace and development (later transformed into sovereignty, security and development) and policy focused on social management. The 2010 White Paper on the Internet in China was the first official document to use the notion of cyber sovereignty although it was briefly mentioned rather than carefully elaborated (State Council of PRC, 2010). Unsurprisingly, this white paper closely followed the official ideological frameworks and slogans of the Chineseparty state that pointed to the importance of pursuing peaceful development through international cooperation, non-interference and effective role of national governments or state security and social stability (cf. State Council of PRC, 2005, 2011). Around 2010, one of the central discourses that defined China’s ‘peace and development’ worldview was transforming into the ‘sovereignty, security, development’ discourse (Karmazin, 2020; Zhang, 2012). The latter highlighted a more nationalistic standpoint and was accompanied by the emerging policies of social management (later renamed to social governance). Through social management, the topics of regime stability, social dissent, foreign ideological influences and or access to alternative information were securitised more severely than previously. As the nationalistic and security-oriented trends in Chinese politics were not yet entirely dominant, these themes do not completely monopolise the content of the white paper. Nonetheless, they were noticeable when the document highlighted the importance of ‘securing information flows’. The white paper also represented one of the early calls of the Chinese regime for the establishment of an inter-governmental institution for coordinating cyberspace globally. The official outline of cyber sovereignty was further advanced at the World Internet Conference and its first (2014) and, especially, second (2015) iteration. The conference was organised by China to promote its views worldwide and mobilise potential allies (more on that in the following section). At the second conference, China proposed the ‘Community of Shared Future in Cyberspace’ defined through the following values: respect for cyber sovereignty, safeguarding peace and security, stimulating open cooperation and building a good order in cyberspace (Xi, 2015). This vision was intentionally presented to invoke the five principles of peaceful coexistence (Cai, 2018). The five principles (defined as mutual respect for each other’s

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territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existing) were proposed in the 1950s and, since then, China has been using these principles to imply and spur cooperation among Asian or non-Western countries while trying to portray itself as a leader of these countries (Karmazin, 2019). Xi Jinping also outlined the international role and position of cyber sovereignty. He claimed that this norm derived from the principle of sovereign equality embedded in the UN Charter. He also defined it through non-interference, non-hegemony and respect for each country’s cyberspace management model, internet policies and developmental path (Xi, 2015). It needs to be highlighted that these formulations were very closely intertwined, or rather derived from, the general political discourse in China of that time. The community of shared destiny was a broad discourse intertwined with Xi Jinping’s international aspirations, his slogan of China Dream and intertwined with his signature project of the Belt and Road Initiative (Karmazin, 2019, 2020). Shortly after the second conference, China adopted a series of strategic documents—National Cyberspace Security Strategy (CAC, 2016), Cybersecurity Law (NPC, 2016) and Strategy for International Cooperation in Cyberspace (MOFA PRC, 2017). They not only developed the previously described themes but also reflected the growing importance of the ‘sovereignty, security, discourse’ and Xi’s turn to the concept of comprehensive security that reveals his obsession with ideological challenges and domestic threats to regime stability. Hence, China needed to ‘prevent, curb and punish the online dissemination of harmful information endangering national security’ that originates at home or abroad (CAC, 2016). At the same time, cyberspace was understood as a critical realm where social management (governance) needs to be reinforced. Although Chinese official demarcations of cyber sovereignty are sometimes vague and not completely settled, we can nevertheless identify a relatively coherent core of the norm. I outline it with the help of Carla Winston’s (2018) analytical conceptualisation of three dimensions that define norms—problem (that should be regulated), value (that should be protected) and behaviour (that should be adopted). First, as regards the key problem, it is understood that the cyberspace realm may magnify and trigger threats destabilising political order. While this generalised formulation is rather uncontroversial, China typically discusses these threats in a more specific way that causes divergences from how many Western actors approach cyberspace. Nonstate actors, including individuals, civil society, enterprises or transnational actors, are seen as likely agents setting off these threats if they are not adequately controlled. Second, preserving the autonomy, agency and stability of the political regime is the key value. These values are also interconnected with the rights of each country to enforce its laws and policies over cyberspace. Relatedly, the importance of territorial demarcations and boundaries of states is highlighted as a principle that should be reflected in how cyberspace is governed. In other words, cyberspace needs to be understood as an extension of real space. Since the first relevant documents on cyberspace politics in China, state security has been a central imperative. However, as understood by the Chinese leadership, state security hinges upon the stability of the Chinese party-state regime. Hence, China’s cyber sovereignty is different from

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the multistakeholder. Other values are also connected with the core presumptions. For example, the internet’s potential to contribute to (national) development and stimulate economic exchange is also seen as important. Third, behaviour that should be followed is derived from these values. Most generally and most importantly, the state should be engaged in the active management of cyberspace. To do that, the adoption of technical solutions that facilitate this task and help control information flows on the internet is desirable. Practically speaking, China adopted indigenisation strategy according to which domestic actors should construct the physical infrastructure as well as the software background of national cyberspace (Creemers, 2020). China also calls for establishing a new international organisation or taking advantage of an institution of a state-centric character that should be responsible for global governance of the internet (Cai, 2018; Creemers, 2020; Zeng et al., 2017).

3 Diffusion of Cyber Sovereignty In the 2000s, China was a relatively passive actor in global diplomatic discussions about cyberspace, like those at the UN Group of Government Experts on the Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (Segal, 2017). China’s more active approach in the following decade was stimulated by domestic developments as described in the previous section but also accelerated by events in international diplomacy. Around 2010–2011, the USA started to promote the so-called Internet freedom agenda, which China perceived as a tactic for limiting other countries’ space for defining their own national cyber policies (Segal, 2017). Another impetus for China’s more active engagement came after the initiation of the process leading to the Tallinn Manual on cyber warfare and law dominated by NATO (Zhu, 2014). Due to that, China as well as Russia understood the Tallin Manual as an attempt to strengthen the Western control over legal regulations of cyberspace. Hence, neither China nor Russia accepted the manual although it is guided by the principle of national (territorial) sovereignty in many respects (Mueller, 2020). As a response to these initiatives, China, Russia and other countries from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) proposed an ‘International Code of Conduct for International Security’ at the UN in 2011. Although the proposal did not use the notion of cyber sovereignty, it called for reassessing the then dominant principles of global cyberspace governance in a manner that is similar to what China defined as cyber sovereignty later on (Embassy of RF, 2011). The proposal emphasised the role of states as key actors in managing the domestic level of cyberspace as states should ‘lead all elements of society’ in this realm (Embassy of RF, 2011). The inter-governmental level was seen as a crucial element of international cooperation, and a quest again terrorism, secessionism or extremism (key goals of SCO) was particularly highlighted. However, the document was ‘rather vehemently rejected’ by the majority of Western states (Zeng et al., 2017, p. 440).

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After that, China started to focus on gaining support for its arguments about the state-centric organisation of cyberspace among non-Wester and developing countries. Later on, the approach based on building support among non-Western and developing countries was recognised in a semi-explicit manner in China’s official documents. They argue for a more decisive role of developing countries in cyber issues and China’s leading role in bridging the divide between developed and developing countries (cf. esp. MOFA PRC, 2017). Hence, China continued to be involved in cyber security dialogues with the EU or the USA, and global bodies like the World Summit on the Information Society, but non-Western meetings and fora came to be particularly important. More specifically, China explored the potential of at least four platforms for advancing cyber sovereignty—SCO, BRICS, China-ASEAN Forum and the World Internet Conference. Within the scope of this chapter, it is not possible to fully explore the full breadth of interactions regarding cyber sovereignty at these fora and future research may be needed to completely depict them, but I point to the key modalities of China’s promotion of cyber sovereignty via these platforms. SCO continued to be an essential platform. The International Code of Conduct for International Security was updated and promoted globally even after the original proposal, but without achieving greater success (Mueller, 2020). Alongside this process, internal discussions at SCO led to reemphasising the importance of cyber security and cyber (internet) sovereignty so much so that it might be argued that the norm of cyber sovereignty was (loosely) institutionalised at SCO (Grace, 2018). This is not surprising as individual SCO states typically embedded cyber sovereignty in their domestic politics, security documents or legal systems in a way that is roughly similar to China’s approach (Harnisch, 2021). At the regional level, the norm is rather vaguely institutionalised and semi-formalised. This characterisation corresponds with the fact that cooperation in security and cyber politics remains relatively limited and loosely formalised at SCO (Harnisch, 2021). BRICS negotiations about cyber security engaged in debates primarily relating to technical and infrastructural issues, but conceptual and normative aspects were not ignored either (Belli, 2021a). China, together with Russia, promoted the norm of cyber sovereignty, but without putting too much emphasis on formalising and institutionalising it (cf. CISSAR, 2021). In similar regard, China did not formulate cyber sovereignty as one of its key priorities regarding BRICS’s approach to cyberspace. While it was trying to advance its normative views within the BRICS group, China was rather careful and patient, typically seeking a consensus. The BRICS countries initially formulated a common stance on and limited (not deeply institutionalised) cooperation against cyberterrorism and cybercrime in the first half of the 2010s (Gao, 2018). At that time, BRICS stated equal participation in cyberspace as a principle that should be followed. China seemed to be among more active members of the group who was promoting it within the group (Gao, 2018), but the group was not particularly active in its wider international promotion (Belli, 2021b). Important initiatives proposed or drafted by BRICS at the global scale in the first half of the 2010s, like ‘Strengthening International Cooperation to Combat’ (submitted to the UN), did not press for new global normative principles in cyberspace.

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However, since 2016 and the summit in Goa, the BRICS countries have explicitly promoted a view akin to what China defines as cyber sovereignty. They agreed that states should have a leading role in cyberspace, the internet is a developmental resource, and mutual cyber-developmental relations should take place on an equal footing (Kleinwächter, 2017). This position apparently resulted from China’s and Russia’s norm entrepreneurism in the group (Belli, 2021b; Kleinwächter, 2017). As regards the rest of the group, Brazil and South Africa were willing to acknowledge the importance of territorial foundations of cyber governance (Beeson & Zeng, 2018, p. 1971). Nonetheless, there was no complete agreement among the BRICS countries. Compared to China’s and Russia’s stance, Brazil, India and South Africa put less emphasis on state-led control of the internet and more or less cherished the idea of a people-centric approach (Beeson & Zeng, 2018; Belli, 2021b). Hence, after agreeing on a relatively unproblematic position, the above-mentioned cleavage precluded achieving consensus on China’s understanding of cyber sovereignty. To prevent further clashes with other BRICS countries (or even Western countries), China cautiously signalled that its preferred inter-governmental and multilateral approach could accommodate non-governmental actors as well (Belli, 2021b; Hong & Goodnight, 2020). However, this adjustment in China’s meant that the topic of cyber sovereignty got partially sidelined at SCO in the very late 2010s rather than the group would establish a robust shared view on cyber sovereignty. China’s cooperation with ASEAN, whose members often promote the conservative understanding of sovereignty and non-interference (cf. Martel, 2020), was another option for promoting the norm of cyber sovereignty. In 2014, the ChinaASEAN Forum on Cyberspace Development was launched, and the then head of the Cyberspace Administration of China indicated China’s ambition to cooperate and put forward a cyber sovereignty-like view at and through this diplomatic platform (Wei Lu, 2014a, 2014b). Nonetheless, this kind of cooperation between China and ASEAN lost momentum very early on. Around the same time, China’s attempt to present its Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as tools of economic cooperation with the region came to be critically assessed by ASEAN countries (Ferdinand, 2016; Karmazin, 2019). Moreover, discussion on cyber norms in ASEAN proved to be generally underdeveloped, fragmented and slowly developing in the mid-2010s and the late 2010s (Tran Dai & Gomez, 2018). Xi Jinping’s overall activism in China’s foreign policy, his ambition to initiate China-led institutions and the aforementioned hindrances led China to establish the World Internet Conference, also known as the Wuzhen Summit. The conference is organised annually in Wuzhen (Zhejiang province, China). Although the conference was open to global participation, ‘it has served as a summit for those [non-Western] countries to openly align themselves against the current global and private sector-led regime promoted and dominated by the United States’ (Zeng et al., 2017, p. 440). As Wuzhen is close to Alibaba’s headquarters, it was hoped that the conference ‘would galvanize more attention from developing countries in relation to closing the digital gap and embarking upon the information highway, in comparison with the more elitist and expensive model of “Silicon Valley”’ (Shi, 2018, p. 46). While China portrayed itself as a leader capable of bridging developed and developing countries,

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it expected that Western actors would not play a leading role at the conference. This situation resembles how China portrayed and advanced its other key projects initiated around the very same time (the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) (Karmazin, 2019). China’s focus on non-Western and developing countries can also be illustrated by the fact that at the second summit (which fully revealed China’s ambitions in the area of cyberspace), keynote speeches were delivered by leaders of China, Russia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Tonga, rather than Western countries (Shi, 2018). While China’s promotion of cyber sovereignty was patient and nonconfrontational at the other sub-global fora, China acted as a (much more) selfconfident norm entrepreneur at the Wuzhen summits. The first World Internet Conference took place in 2014. The declaration which was circulated by China at the summit emphasised vital principles of internet governance—each country’s right to development, state-led governance of the Internet and cyber sovereignty (Creemers, 2020, pp. 113–114). At the second summit, Chinese representatives built upon these principles but introduced an even more elaborated vision. Xi Jinping brought out the idea of the Community of Shared Future in Cyberspace which invoked the five principles of peaceful coexistence (as discussed above) and outlined general principles of developing cyberspace (Xi, 2015). While issues like the digital divide, e-commerce, cybersecurity, cyberterrorism and technological infrastructure were highlighted as essential, China also put a great emphasis on putting cyber sovereignty on the table (cf. also Gady, 2016). Cyber sovereignty was delineated rather broadly as it envisioned multilateral cooperation of government on an equal footing, mutual nonintervention in cyber affairs and the right of each country (government) to regulate its cyberspace as it wishes, but it was promoted very actively at this summit as well as all the following ones (Creemers, 2020; Hong & Goodnight, 2020; Shi, 2018). Despite all of that, these summits did not lead to formalisation of cyber sovereignty in a strict sense. Nonetheless, mobilising symbolic and rhetoric support of developing countries for the norm can be counted as the primary outcome. In that atmosphere, China also tried to persuade Western actors, including Western companies, to accept the norm but eventually failed to succeed (Hong & Goodnight, 2020). In short, if any initiative actively seeks to realise China’s International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace (MOFA PRC, 2017) that calls for actively building a new normative environment in global governance and establishing international cooperation to achieve this end, it is the World Internet Conference. The Wuzhen summits were also important because they prefigured the key domestic documents (National Cyberspace Security, International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace, Cybersecurity Law).

4 Facilitating Factors of the Norm’s Promotion In international politics of cyberspace, China arguably has three primary aspirations: shape cyberspace to increase Beijing’s power and influence, limit cyber threats to the stability of the Chinese regime and counter the US dominance in cyberspace (Segal,

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2017). These goals are intertwined with China’s promotion of the norm as well as mechanisms that facilitate the norm’s dissemination. In this section, I identify two principal structural mechanisms that provide China’s norm entrepreneurship with greater leverage and, also, help China achieve its more general goals. These are diplomacy of technological exports and post-colonial ideological affinities. Besides normative and institutional aspects, China understands physical infrastructure as a part of the game in cyber politics and cyber sovereignty (CAC, 2016; MOFA PRC, 2017). This perspective has at least three implications. First, for establishing the norm of cyber sovereignty in China, technological infrastructure has been a crucial component as it provides physical underpinnings of the norm (CAC, 2016; MOFA PRC, 2017). Second, exporting ICT or cooperating on international projects related to technological infrastructure are understood as countermoves against the US (Western) hegemony (Cai, 2018; Hong & Goodnight, 2020). Third, and most importantly for my discussion in this section, China’s technological and normative entrepreneurism goes hand in hand, and the Chinese leadership has arguably accepted the presumption that its material and technological presence will help convince others to adhere to Chinese views (cf. Callahan, 2016). A very similar logic was embedded in China’s promotion of the so-called Beijing consensus, which dates back to the 2000s and which was intended as an alternative developmental model propelling China’s revisionist attempts in international politics (Karmazin & Hynek, 2020). Moreover, it could be argued that China (subconsciously) mimics its own historical experience with technological modernisation. In the aftermath of the Opium Wars in the second half of the nineteenth century, the weakened Chinese empire launched a self-strengthening movement aspiring to preserve the Chinese ‘essence’ (culture, values, philosophy) while at the same time incorporating the Westen ‘function’ (technologies) (cf. Keith, 2009). However, after three decades of self-strengthening reforms, it became clear that the essence-function distinction was untenable. Together with Western technologies, new modes of thinking and new normative perspectives were embedded in China and eventually changed China’s political identity. China’s current leadership is arguably replicating this historical lesson vis-à-vis other actors as it hopes that exporting Chinese technologies will create like-minded countries adhering to Chinese norms. When BRICS articulated initial ambitions to construct physical ICT infrastructure, including the so-called BRIC cable (an optical fibre communications cable system) in the early 2010s, China was a rather reactive actor, but became much more proactive around 2014–2015 (Beeson & Zeng, 2018; Belli, 2021b). Once BRICS agreed to establish a working group on cooperation in ICT in 2015, China quickly tried to position itself as its leader. Alongside that, Huawei started to create ICT training centres to assist the other BRICS countries (Gao, 2018, p. 128). At the same, China was trying to take a leading role in other technological and infrastructural projects as well (Belli, 2021b). There were some discussions and inceptive cooperation between China and ASEAN in the area of cyberinfrastructure and capacity building (Yuen, 2015). Additionally, China also launched the project of the so-called Digital Silk Road, an offshoot of the Belt and Road Initiative, which serves

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as a (loosely institutionalised) platform for advancing technological partnerships and China’s technological presence in the world (Hemmings, 2020). China did not publicly and vehemently press for the cyber sovereignty norm when it was launching or entering into these projects. However, it is noticeable that China tried to connect its discourses on cyberspace and cyber sovereignty with these projects. When the BRICS cable was being prepared, the Chinese diplomacy supported the narrative that the project helps democratise cyberspace, which—for China—stands for opposing the Western hegemony. In (embryonic and rudimentary) interactions with ASEAN, a similar pattern of connecting technological cooperation with (potential) normative change appeared as well (Wei Lu, 2014a, 2014b; cf. Yuen, 2015). Likewise, the Digital Silk Road enabled China to rhetorically highlight the importance of cyber sovereignty alongside technological cooperation with countries in Central Asia or Africa. While cyber sovereignty is rather well established in Central Asia, China’s technological expansion to Africa allowed it to promote cyber sovereignty in this region as well. Typically, China signed memoranda of understanding with African partner countries, which argued for principles related to cyber sovereignty, especially equal developmental cooperation or sovereignty and non-interference in the cyber realm (Hemmings, 2020; Tugendhat & Voo, 2021). However, although the norm of cyber sovereignty has been promoted in a vague and loose form, this approach has served to balance (diminish) the global dominance of the USA in cyber politics. The other factor that facilitates the cyber sovereignty norm’s diffusion is the existence of an ideological stance that is common to non-Western developing countries. Manjari Chatterjee Miller (2013) calls it post-imperial ideology. It comprises a sense of being victims of the previous (or continuing) Western imperialism and combines it with two additional goals that are maximising territorial sovereignty and maximising status (Chatterjee Miller, 2013, p. 2). In other words, it calls for not only guaranteeing the territorial basis of these countries but also recognising their agency and culture. By analysing interactions and debates at the UN and conducting other case studies, Chatterjee Miller documents that this ideology is widely shared by post-colonial countries. I do not intend to determine whether China is or is not aware of the existence of the ideological affinities among post-colonial countries or whether it utilises such commonalities consciously. However, it is noticeable that China’s formulation of cyber sovereignty corresponds with this ideological perspective. As described above, China’s articulation of cyber sovereignty emphasises non-interference, the importance of territorial sovereignty and state authority in cyberspace and denounces hegemonic attitudes of the West (or the USA in particular). China has tried to work with this ideological orientation actively. Since the first Chinese white paper on the internet, China has made sure to underline that international cooperation in cyberspace politics should respect mutual equality, developmental interests and cultural specifics of individual countries. In other words, ‘China maintains that all countries should, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, […] jointly shoulder the responsibility of maintaining global Internet security, promote the healthy and orderly development of the industry’ (State Council of PRC, 2010). Similarly, China’s

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International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace claims that ‘no country should […] condone or support cyber activities that undermine other countries’ national security’ (MOFA PRC, 2017). By engaging in such discursive performances, China has tried to position itself as a fellow partner of other developing or post-colonial countries. When doing so, China has replicated a tried and tested strategy developed in diplomatic interactions with, especially, African countries and its promotion of Beijing consensus. Technological exports and economic incentives (as discussed above) come together with China’s promotion of normative stances referring to the developmental or post-colonial character of mutual interaction. To sustain the economic-normative nexus and its compatibility with the post-colonial framing, China emphasises that such interactions are based on the principles of non-conditionality, non-interferences and win–win cooperation. Simultaneously, China claims that each country’s developmental path may be unique, and no global actor has a right to demand such (universalist, Westerncentric) solutions. In this sense, cyber sovereignty is supposed to ensure that each state can define its ‘network management model’ according to its cultural and civilisational values while states should not ‘interfere in other countries’ internal affairs’ (Xi, 2015). In other words, developing states should not fall victim to the (Western) hegemony in cyberspace (as implied, for example by MOFA PRC, 2017). Moreover, by proposing these arguments, China connects itself to the discourses castigating the Western imperialism, the US hegemony and the humiliation of nonWestern, developing or post-colonial states by the West that are well-established among, for example, the members of SCO or BRICS (cf. e.g. Costa Buranelli, 2020). As noted by a number of scholars, the tropes and the values of anti-hegemonism and recognition-seeking are often connected with BRICS and its effort to define its approach to global governance (Beeson & Zeng, 2018) as well as have often been used at SCO (Sakwa, 2020).

5 Conclusion The basic definitional core of cyber sovereignty lies in an emphasis on the rights of each country to enforce its laws and policies over its cyberspace and an effort to interconnect territorial demarcation of the sovereign state with cyberspace. However, China’s construction of cyber sovereignty develops the basic meaning of cyber sovereignty in a specific way. China’s formulations of cyber sovereignty typically highlight anti-regime or anti-state threats as a problem that should be addressed, agency and stability of a given political unit (intertwined with territorial underpinnings of cyberspace) as a key value that should be cherished, and active state-led management of cyberspace as behaviour that should be adopted. In other words, some countries may acknowledge that cyber sovereignty appropriately evokes the importance of territory and national jurisdiction in cyberspace. However, they may not favour extensive control of information flows and actors, which is what China’s conception implies.

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China officially referred to cyber sovereignty for the first time in 2010. It is possible to identify China’s increasing effort to demarcate the norm more clearly and promote it more coherently in the mid-2010s (in 2014 and 2015). Following that, the norm more widespread internationally in the second half of the 2010s. China’s active promotion contributed to that while two structural reasons underpinned China’s norm entrepreneurship. First, China’s techno-economic diplomacy (trade with ICT) that China pursued in bilateral and multilateral ties was a channel through which a new normative agenda could be set and supported. In other words, alongside selling its technologies and organising infrastructural projects, China was also trying to point out the importance of normative adjustments of cyberspace governance. Second, the leverage based on China’s economic importance was combined with ideological affinities between post-colonial (typically developing non-Western) countries on the basis of what could be called post-imperial ideology. The post-imperial ideology emphasises the recognition of the status of post-colonial countries and the respect for their territorial sovereignty. China’s articulation of cyber sovereignty and related discursive frames actively construct overlaps with this common ideological posture by highlighting the importance of non-interference, equality of nation-states or recognition of each state’s right to define its own policies and developmental path. Although the norm has become one of the most significant challenges to the dominant multistakeholder approach to global governance of cyberspace, the state of cyber sovereignty’s diffusion at the turn of the 2010s and the 2020s can be characterised as popularisation rather than straightforward institutionalisation. While the countries that agree with the norm share some cognisance of the norm’s meaning, there is no formalised consensus as regards the norm’s meaning and implementation. Besides non-binding declarations of the World Internet Conference prepared by China, no (sub-)global organisation has institutionalised the norm. SCO under China’s and Russia’s leadership was active in the norm’s global promotion, but the norm has not been officially formalised at SCO. China’s effort to promote the norm at ASEAN and BRICS had a limited impact on these organisations. This state of the norm’s diffusion is not surprising considering China’s motivations, style of the norm’s promotion and facilitating factors (leverages). First, China’s fundamental goal is to counterbalance the US hegemony in cyberspace, for which China does not necessarily need to institutionalise cyber sovereignty. In fact, building an (informal) coalition of non-Western states might be more useful than insisting on a particular norm. Second, China’s diplomatic style connected with the norm’s diffusion was patient and non-enforcing. Third, both structural facilitating factors are not only substantial but also of a general character rather than tailor-made to this norm’s promotion. They may bolster centripetal tendencies supporting China’s cyber sovereignty, but they do not directly create a strong normative or ideological consensus. Even in the case of post-imperial ideology, its ideological vision is rather vague. In a sense, nationalism and territorialised sovereignty are reactive and conservative postures concentrated around particularism and community-specific visions of order that facilitate a thin consensus rather than a specific normative goal.

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Hemmings, J. (2020). Reconstructing order: The geopolitical risks in China’s digital silk road. Asia Policy, 27(1), 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0002 Hong, Y., & Goodnight, G. T. (2020). How to think about cyber sovereignty: The case of China. Chinese Journal of Communication, 13(1), 8–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2019.168 7536 Karmazin, A. (2019). The Asian infrastructure investment bank and China’s strategic course. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 31(2), 293–308. Karmazin, A. (2020). Slogans as an organizational feature of Chinese politics. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 25(3), 411–429. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-019-09651-w Karmazin, A., & Hynek, N. (2020). Russian, U.S. and Chinese Revisionism: Bridging domestic and great power politics. Europe-Asia Studies, 72(6), 955–975. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136. 2020.1776221 Keith, R. C. (2009). China from the inside out: Fitting the people’s republic into the world. Pluto Press. Kleinwächter, W. (2017, January 6). Internet Governance Outlook 2017: Nationalistic Hierarchies vs. Multistakeholder Networks? CircleID. https://circleid.com/posts/20160106_internet_ outlook_2017_nationalistic_hierarchies_multistakeholder. Accessed 22 November 2021. Kolton, M. (2017). Interpreting China’s pursuit of cyber sovereignty and its views on cyber deterrence. The Cyber Defense Review, 2(1), 119–154. Liu, S., & Gao, H. (2020). Zhongdong jubian beijing xia zhongguo zhongdong daguo waijiao lun xi [On China’s diplomacy in the Middle East against the backdrop of the upheaval in the Middle East]. Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa], 5, 82–116. Lu, C. (2014). Zhuquan gainian de yanjin ji qi zai wangluo shidai mianlin de tiaozhan [The evolution of the concept of sovereignty and the challenges faced in the internet age]. Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu [Journal of International Relations], 1, 73–81. Lu, Wei. (2014, October 22). Shoujie zhongguo-dongmeng wangluo kongjian luntanshang de zhuzhi yanjiang [Lu Wei’s keynote speech at the first Sino-ASEAN cyberspace forum]. People’s Daily. http://media.people.com.cn/n/2014/1022/c390063-25887386.html. Accessed 22 November 2021. Lu, W. (2019). Wangluo zhengzhi yu shehui yundong—yi alabo zhi chun wei li [Network politics and social movements: Taking the Arab spring as an example]. Bijiao Zhengzhi Xue Yanjiu [Comparative Political Studies], 2, 235–262. Martel, S. (2020). The polysemy of security community-building: Toward a “people-centered” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? International Studies Quarterly, 64(3), 588– 599. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa040 McCarthy, D. R. (Ed.). (2017). Technology and world politics: An introduction. Routledge. MOFA PRC. (2017, March 1). Strategy of International Cooperation in Cyberspace. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/china/2017-03/01/c_136094371. htm. Accessed 22 November 2021. Mueller, M. L. (2020). Against sovereignty in cyberspace. International Studies Review, 22(4), 779–801. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viz044 Niemann, H., & Schillinger, H. (2017). Contestation ‘All the way down’? The grammar of contestation in norm research. Review of International Studies, 43(1), 29–49. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0260210516000188 NPC. (2016, November 7). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo anquan fa [Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China]. National People’s Congress, PRC. http://lawinfochina.com/ display.aspx?id=22826&lib=law. Accessed 22 November 2021. Payne, R. A. (2001). Persuasion, frames and norm construction. European Journal of International Relations, 7(1), 37–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007001002 Sakwa, R. (2020). Stasis and change: Russia and the emergence of an anti-hegemonic world order. In E. Parlar Dal & E. Er¸sen (Eds.), Russia in the changing international system (pp. 17–37). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21832-4_2

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Norm Diffusion by Middle Powers and Small States

From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline Ricardo Reboredo

1 Introduction Following the establishment of its first democratic government, the South African state launched an international rehabilitation programme. The isolationism of the apartheid regime was replaced by a stated desire for integration into regional and continental formations. Likewise, a new reformist agenda based on a series of seven principles relating to human rights, democracy and peace, was positioned at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. Drawing on its position as Africa’s most diversified economy and Nelson Mandela’s moral authority, South Africa developed an activist role in the latter half of the 1990s and leveraged this to increase its international standing to the point that some began portraying the country as a norm entrepreneur1 (Geldenhuys, 2006). Yet as many commentators have noted, in recent years, beginning with the Jacob Zuma administration, South Africa has taken a more pragmatic and perhaps less principled stance vis-à-vis its engagements with both African countries and regional institutions. Analyses on the matter largely contend that the shifts in South Africa’s foreign policy are resultant from fluctuations at the top of the state apparatus—particularly Zuma’s ascension to the presidency—however many of these leave unexplored the role played by politico-economic factors and in doing so neglect a critical dimension. This chapter aims to engage this lacuna and analyses South Africa’s post-apartheid activism in the international sphere through the lens of political economy. It puts forward two primary arguments. Firstly, while South Africa’s attempts at leadership 1 Per Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 8), ‘norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms’.

R. Reboredo (B) Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Dubeˇcská 900/10, 100 31 Strašnice, Prague, Czechia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_5

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in the early post-apartheid era relied indeed relied—at least partially—on the instrumental promotion of norms relating to democracy and human rights, the embedding of these into broader initiatives relating to market-led socio-economic organization (via integration into ‘good governance’ initiatives) engendered significant pushback from other African states that hindered Pretoria’s attempts to position itself at the fore of the regional order. Secondly, the chapter argues that the shift in South Africa’s foreign policy (i.e. its turn towards pragmatism, economic diplomacy, and security) can be explained by the inability of the neoliberal project to resolve the politicoeconomic contradictions at the centre of the post-apartheid order; that is, the need to simultaneously create suitable conditions for capital accumulation while confronting massive redistributive pressures (Hart, 2014). Although by no means dismissing the effects that changing personnel at the top of the South African state apparatus have had, the chapter contends that the failure of the neoliberal project—articulated as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) suite of macroeconomic policies—produced a mixture of pressure and policy space that allowed the Zuma administration to adopt a more pragmatic, ‘BRICS-centred’ foreign policy (which itself entailed the adoption of BRICS and particularly Chinese promoted norms regarding the primacy of state sovereignty). Moreover, the tensions resultant from the neoliberal project’s failure have led to both the fracturing of the South African state along ideological lines and to the partial social collapse on display across the country today; in particular, the outbreaks of xenophobic violence and the ongoing construction of ‘fortress South Africa’ (Crush, 1999), both of which in turn have made the continuation of previous positions regarding human rights and democracy more difficult, if not untenable. The chapter will be organized as follows: the first section will detail South Africa’s regional position during the Mandela and Mbeki administrations. This will largely explore the claim that the African National Congress, South Africa’s governing party, implicitly tied the promotion of free market logics to its normative leadership project and that this in turn caused tensions that weakened said project. The second section will then interrogate how the failure of the neoliberal project within South Africa led directly to both growing domestic crises and a re-focusing of the country’s foreign policy away from the West and towards the BRICS. Likewise, it examines how the adoption of BRICS and Chinese norms have been articulated into policy and practice. Finally, the third section examines South Africa’s contemporary normative role in the continent and interrogates its position vis-à-vis the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). To unpack these varied threads, the chapter takes an interdisciplinary perspective, utilizing theoretical innovations from both political economy and international relations. The chapter thus contributes to debates on South Africa’s post-apartheid trajectory as well as those on South–South norm diffusion.

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1.1 From Mandela to African Renaissance As Alden and le Pere (2004) note, the ANC’s initial proposal for South Africa’s foreign policy foregrounded the promotion of civil liberties and democratic governance. Nelson Mandela made this exceedingly clear with his statement that ‘human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy’ (Mandela, 1993). The particularities of the early agenda were detailed in a 1994 policy document. The document listed seven principles that would guide South Africa’s foreign policy: (1) human rights, (2) the promotion of democracy, (3) the belief that South Africa’s foreign policies would reflect African interests, (4) the promotion of international law, (5) the belief that South Africa’s foreign policy would reflect a commitment to consolidating its own democracy, (6) the belief that South Africa’s economic development would be dependent on regional cooperation and (7) the promotion of international peace (Louw-Vaudran, 2016). While South Africa’s activist role encompassed a number of vectors, this chapter focuses on two of the most visible: its expanded role in multilateral organizations and formations,2 both within Africa and beyond, and renewed engagement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). With regards to multilateral fora, South African actors quickly sought to leverage the country’s high moral standing and undertake an activist role in line with its agenda. Upon gaining membership into the Organization of African Unity (OAU— the precursor to the African Union), for instance, South Africa quickly signed on to the African nuclear weapon Free Zone Treaty. As per Grant and Hamilton (2016, p. 168), this not only supported the OAU’s call for de-nuclearization in Africa but also ‘illustrated a normative commitment to completely overhauling an identity that had been fashioned during apartheid’. South Africa also played a major in the 1997 Ottawa Process on the banning of land mines, the adoption of the Rome Statute to set up the International Criminal Court in 1998 (more on this below), and in the creation of the African Union (AU) (le Pere, 2014). Likewise, the Mandela administration positioned itself as a peacemaker and advocate for Human Rights, assisting in conflict resolution in Libya, Swaziland, Burundi, Cote d’Ivore and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Yet the South African agenda was not always well received. At the 1995 Commonwealth Conference, for example, Mandela called for sanctions against Nigeria on the grounds of its execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other environmentalists. The OAU quickly panned Mandela and rejected his calls for an international boycott, describing the president’s claims as ‘not an African way to deal with an African problem’. South Africa was thus forced to retract its call for sanctions. As Vale and Maseko (1998, p. 3) note, South Africa’s early post-apartheid involvement across Africa was scattered and disorderly. However, the spectre of South Africa’s acquiescence to, and promotion of, market-led socio-economic organization loomed large across the country’s initiatives. South African actors, for instance, sought to construct and popularize the narrative that the country’s future was tied 2

As Grant and Hamilton (2016) note, South African membership in IO’s rose from 27 in 1993 (pre-transition) to 37 in 1995 (post-transition).

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to that of the broader continent, and that it would thus have to lead Africa towards a particular vision of capitalist modernity. Mandela himself commented that ‘South Africa could not escape its African destiny’. Grant and Hamilton (2016) note that South African officials saw the rest of the continent as ‘requiring leadership to develop’. Likewise, Vale and Maseko (1998) argue that all South African leaders, irrespective of ideology, have seen their country as being in a leadership position within the continent. Such a view was enthusiastically embraced by the United States and to a lesser extent Western Europe—countries with deep ties to, and economic interest in, South Africa. The support of these larger powers significantly enhanced South Africa’s reputation for norm entrepreneurship. Yet the colonial assumptions behind this worldview were immediately evident to other African actors and led to tensions as well as claims that South Africa was following a ‘Western imperialist agenda’ (Louw-Vaudran, 2016, p. 3). Putting this worldview into practice meant that the South African state sought to create space for domestic capital across the continent by embedding its neoliberal views into broader normative content. Taylor (2011, p. 5) highlights how a central plank of South Africa’s economic foreign policy was based on ‘maximum engagement’ with transnational and domestically based capital and how corporate vehicles were conceptualized as the best way to promote growth and establish ‘good governance’—both across the region and beyond. It was through this concept that human rights and the promotion of democratic governance were tied to neoliberal state restructuring. As Ayers (2008, p. 6) notes, good governance is among the main pillars of neoliberal developmentalism and regularly associated with ideals of democratic governance and human rights promotion by IFIs. In essence, it can be understood as a particular form of political and economic organization characterized by ‘minimal, neutral, transparent, accountable and participatory government with an effective bureaucracy’. In the African context, its implementation meant a redefinition of both the public sphere and what is ‘acceptable’ vis-à-vis economic policy (Taylor, 2004). Returning to South Africa, the emphasis on creating discursive and policy space for the expansion of domestic capital is deeply tied to the nature of the settlement that ended apartheid. Carmody (2002, p. 7) explains how the core of the previous system, an alliance between the state and large-scale mining capital that Fine and Rustomjee (2019) term the minerals energy complex (MEC) was to be kept intact. Additionally, the new government sought ‘extreme neoliberalism’ in trade, fiscal, and investment policy. Promises of redistribution and internal resource mobilization were put aside for the sake of giving capital space to operate and attracting investment from overseas. South Africa’s economic agenda in this sense served the interests of an outwardly oriented historic bloc that sought to construct an environment conducive to the ‘unimpeded operation of capital within southern Africa’ (Taylor, 2011, p. 5). In this manner, regional and continent-wide calls for ‘good governance’—along with the politico-economic restructuring that these entailed - were thus intertwined with the expansion of South African corporate interests. The economic agenda was particularly visible in terms of South Africa’s role within the SADC. While the country was instrumental in the establishment of the

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SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (1996) and Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (2001), South African officials generally proposed norms with the understanding greater involvement in regional trade, combined with joint development of Southern African infrastructure—both physical and institutional—would promote growth and development. In essence, the ANC believed that South African-led, neoliberal economic development could function as a lever with which to address issues regarding governance, social disintegration and ultimately human rights. This economic foreign policy was explicitly linked to norm promotion, particularly in terms of ‘good governance’ as far back as the Mandela administration, though it reached its height during Thabo Mbeki’s ‘African Renaissance’. Mbeki’s African Renaissance programme, which was partially inspired by the Pan-African movement of the 1960s, sought to simultaneously focus and reinvigorate South Africa’s foreign policy and African development more broadly (Alden & le Pere, 2004). African Renaissance was to engage with the continent across five axes: (1) cultural exchange, (2) mobilization of youth, (3) broadening and deepening of democratization, (4) the emancipation of women from patriarchal systems and (5) the initiation of sustainable economic development (Vale & Maseko, 1998). Mbeki argued that ‘South Africa ha[s] the potential in terms of its economy, in terms of its politics, and so on, to strike out on this new African path [the Renaissance]’—leading by example and exhortation as it were’ (Taylor, 2011, p. 6). In this manner, African Renaissance combined the aforementioned worldview of South African continental leadership, the country’s commitment to activism and norms promotion and a neoliberal emphasis on open markets and the attraction of foreign investment. However, despite Mbeki’s proclamations, South Africa’s influence throughout the region/continent remained highly constrained, and its normative pronouncements were sometimes seen with distrust among other African actors. Moreover, there appeared to be very little policy content within the Renaissance programme. As Taylor (2011, p. 7) argues, the political economy of southern Africa also worked against Mbeki. The regional agenda, defined as ‘promot[ing] sustainable and equitable economic growth and socioeconomic development through efficient production systems, deeper cooperation and... good governance’ was meant to go hand in hand with the advancement of democratic norms. Yet the neo-patrimonial nature of governance across the region meant that good governance, democratization and liberalization initiatives could not be implemented without undermining the position of state elites. Stated differently, without an autonomous capitalist class, state elites themselves control the primary methods of accumulation and are thus able to construct systems of patronage to secure their position (Jepson, 2020). Given that the SADC is an ‘enterprise of state elites’ (Taylor, 2011, p. 15), the Mbeki project was doomed from the start. As Fatton (1988) pointed out at the time: ‘It is highly unlikely that African ruling classes will choose to adopt the principles of market rationality when they know full well that their power depends on their capacity to use the state as a predatory means to acquire wealth and build political clientele’. In this manner, the tying of neoliberal market reform to democratic norms significantly hindered the ability of the South African state to leverage its norm diffusion in a

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bid for regional leadership. The processes described above meant that South African actors in many ways overestimated their ability to implement their visions and project power. Another example of this can be seen in the 2001 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD, designed to (1) eradicate poverty, (2) promote growth and development, (3) empower women across the continent and (4) integrate Africa into the global capitalist system, was excitedly promoted by both African states and their European partners. However, in practice, NEPAD amounted to an agreement whereby African governments would practice neoliberal ‘good governance’ and Western elites would provide aid to narrow economic programmes. The initiative was immediately criticized by observers. Taylor (2010) details how the East African newspaper wrote, ‘in its expression, NEPAD exemplified an elitist approach to African issues that sought to integrate Africa into the Western hemisphere’s economic and political scheme of things’. Critiques of this manner quickly de-legitimized the project, though it remains in place in a reduced role to this day.

1.2 Populism, Fragmentation and Protest: South Africa Under Zuma This chapter has thus far analysed the Mandela and Mbeki-era embedding of neoliberal economic policy into broader attempts to promote norms regarding democracy and human rights—and the effects of these efforts. It now turns to the domestic sphere, particularly towards the inability of the neoliberal project to resolve the politico-economic contradictions at the centre of the post-apartheid order; that is, simultaneously creating suitable conditions for capital accumulation and confronting massive redistributive pressures. This in turn directly led to the election of Jacob Zuma as South African president and the oft-described ‘shift’ towards a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Moreover, the project’s failure has led to increasing cleavages across both society and state. With regards to the former, deteriorating economic conditions have led to bouts of xenophobic violence and, in response, the construction of what Crush (1999) terms ‘fortress South Africa’—which itself contradicts many of the previous government’s commitments. Regarding the latter, ideological divisions have led to the fragmentation of policy and the South African political structure has come to be defined by factionalism and ‘internal strife’ (Bhorat et al., 2017). Altogether, these domestic transformations have not only altered South Africa’s role regarding international activism and norm promotion but also made the continuation of previous positions regarding human rights and democracy more difficult, if not untenable. As mentioned above, the negotiated nature of the settlement to end apartheid meant that ANC promises of redistribution and nationalization were almost immediately jettisoned. South Africa’s neoliberal turn, articulated via the GEAR suite of macro-economic policies, led to the acceptance of apartheid-era debt, fiscal

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austerity, the wide-ranging deregulation of microeconomic markets, the privatization of certain state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the implementation of free-trade policies (Reboredo, 2018). Officially adopted in 1996, GEAR represented a broad reorganization of state priorities towards the global orthodoxy—which significantly increased South Africa’s reputation among Western governments and IFIs. As in other parts of the developing world (see Carroll et al., 2019; Quiggin, 2019), such policies engendered significant transformations in the domestic economic sphere. In particular, the manufacturing sector, now open to international pressures given the dismantling of import substitution, shrunk considerably. In 1990, manufacturing constituted approximately 24% of the gross domestic product (GDP), yet by 2016 this number had fallen to 13.4% (Schneider, 2018). Likewise, manufacturinglinked employment has been decreasing year-on-year since the 1990s. Unemployment, which had held at approximately 30% throughout the 1990s rose to 33% in 2002 and then fell to 22% in 2008 before beginning a climb that continues to this day (World Bank, 2021). Currently, South Africa’s unemployment rate is at 34%, with youth unemployment rates holding at approximately 64% (StatsSA, 2021). Alongside these shifts were significant increases in service-related protests—a phenomenon that Peter Alexander (2010) terms ‘a rebellion of the poor’. As Mkhize (2019) notes, the situation has largely been exacerbated by the ANCs repeated campaign of unrealistic and unachievable promises. For instance, in the run-up to the 2014 elections, Public Enterprise Minister Malusi Gigaba stated that an infrastructure investment plan worth $380 billion would result in ‘radical socio-economic transformation3 ’ and generate ‘inclusive and equitable growth’ in the form of ‘millions of sustainable and decent jobs’ (quoted in Desai, 2015, p. 23). Yet notwithstanding these promises, the jobs never appeared. The ANC has also been plagued by corruption scandals across all levels of government, stoking further disillusionment across vast swaths of the population and significantly damaging their hegemonic position (in a Gramscian sense). In response to these domestic issues, and as part of its nation-building strategy4 ; the ANC has undertaken a programme that Hart (2014) terms ‘re-nationalization’.5 Hart focuses on three key dimensions of this strategy. The first of these is the promotion of inclusive discourses falling under the umbrella of Desmond Tutu’s ‘Rainbow Nation’. Yet for most of the part, these only papered over pre-existing geographies of exploitation and racialized dispossession and were plainly ineffective in remedying the worsening social situation by the end of the Mandela period. Secondly, the ANC has leaned on the theoretical constructs and discursive frameworks developed during the resistance period. Finally, and most importantly for this chapter, is the repackaging of specific apartheid-era legislation with regards to immigration. Termed ‘Fortress 3

Transformation in the South African context is understood as the integration of black South African’s into the formal economy. 4 Nation building refers to the ‘process whereby the inhabitants of a state...[become] loyal citizens of that state’ (Bloom, 1993, p. 55). In this context, it is directly related to the legitimacy of the ANC and the South African state more broadly. 5 A strategy that is partnered with the ‘de-nationalization’ or international expansion of South African capital.

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South Africa’ by Jonathan Crush (1999), the ANC’s focus on control, exclusion, and expulsion of immigrant populations has—alongside incidents of police brutality and popular vigilantism—fed into extant xenophobia and at times coupled protest with xenophobic violence. While intermittent, the worst of these incidents occurred in 2008 when 2 weeks of violence left 62 dead and 700 wounded (Hart, 2014, p. 65). As (Louw-Vaudran, 2016) notes, the 2008 incident—alongside a similar outbreak of violence in 2015—significantly tarnished South Africa’s reputation regarding human rights and the fair treatment of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Likewise, Isike and Ogunnubi (2017) detail how the events, in combination with the faltering economic situation, have constrained South Africa’s soft power, undermined its credibility, and brought its moral authority—something that was particularly well regarded during the Mandela years—into question. As per Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), norm advocates can frame policies, advance norm diffusion and set agendas only when they are viewed as principled or moral. As such, it is necessary to link South Africa’s domestic struggles to its attempts at undertaking activism at the international level. The period between 2007 and 2008 also led to landmark changes within the ANC itself. The collective resistance against GEAR by various state/society groups culminated in the removal of Thabo Mbeki as President of the ANC at the party’s Polokwane conference in 2007 (Haines, 2015). Mbeki had sought to run for a third term as party leader, even though the constitution forbade him from running for a third consecutive term as president of South Africa. Into this vacuum stepped Jacob Zuma. As le Pere (2014, p. 3) notes, ‘the Zuma presidency itself was a product of intense intra-party politics and factionalism but which ultimately sought to place renewed emphasis on the welfare concerns of the ANC’s broader constituencies, particularly in addressing the legacies of poverty, inequality, and unemployment’. Running ostensibly as a populist, Zuma had both cultivated and leveraged popular discontent in the lead-up to the party conference. Zuma’s appeal was particularly strong among those who felt they had been betrayed or left behind by the turn towards neoliberal reform. As Mde and Brown (2005, quoted from Hart, 2014) stated at the time: Now it is true that the SA built over the last 11 years has been a roaring success for some. It is equally true that the beneficiaries of the past decade stand to lose should the seeming tide of a populist revival under Zuma fail to be arrested. That is why support for Mbeki is a class preference… The Zuma base—sometimes derided as the ‘masses’, or the ‘crowd’— generally are not privy to the apocalyptic predictions peddled in ‘quality’ newspapers… [The Zuma/Mbeki fallout] represents a full-frontal assault on the class consensus that has until now been our developmental paradigm.

The fallout from Zuma’s election as South African president in 2009 reverberated for the better part of a decade and had substantial implications for the country’s activist role within regional multilateral assemblages. Landsberg (2010, p. 274) describes how Zuma’s foreign policy was underpinned by a ‘developmental agenda’ whose goals included: consolidating and expanding an ‘African agenda’ in the form of maintaining regional integration strategies, deepening South–South cooperation (i.e. that between countries in the ‘Global South’), cultivating South–North relations,

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joining in the global system of governance and strengthening politico-economic relations with foreign countries more broadly. The shift in foreign policy was supplemented by a significant ideological pivot within certain elite circles. This saw the Zuma faction within the ANC move away from South Africa’s traditional Western partners and instead attempt to cultivate elite-level partnerships with the BRICs,6 and China in particular. The move was the result of both ideological proximity with the BRICs countries as well as a perceived need to leverage China’s growing economic footprint to spur South Africa’s lagging economic performance. Some scholars have conceptualized this pivot as a move away from ‘western-based humanistic values’ and towards ‘developmental pragmatism’ (Alden & Wu, 2016, p. 2), while others see it as an embrace of a ‘Chinese model’ in which the participation of civil society in government is muted on the premise of economic growth (Carmody, 2017, p. 871). In essence, state officials believed that the failure of neoliberalism to resolve long-running crises could be resolved via integration into Sino-centric production assemblages. This is evidenced by the large number of development projects (e.g. the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co [BAIC] and First Auto Work’s [FAW] assembly plants, the Longyuan-Mulilo wind power project, the Energy-Metallurgical Special Economic Zone, Hisense’ Atlantis assembly plant and the Bakubung Platinum Mine) that involve Chinese capital and whose objectives include large-scale employment creation for historically marginalized populations.7 Likewise, the South African state began shaping a discursive vision of what Alden and Wu (2016, pp. 3–4) term a ‘new South African identity’ that was increasingly defined by its ‘Southward’ orientation and thus looked to China for political and developmental assistance. Yet as noted above, the move was fragmented and uneven. As per one South African analyst, ‘every department seemingly has a different perspective on Chinese engagement’ (Interview, Analyst, October 2017, Pretoria). This has led to a lack of policy cohesion and consistency across the board, which has been exacerbated by the tendency throughout the Zuma administration to diffuse policymaking power throughout the state rather than concentrating it within the Presidency itself—a significant change from the previous era (Le Pere, 2014). For their part, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)8 generally favoured the ideological shift towards the BRICS during the Zuma administration. As per Alden and Schoeman (2013, quoted from Carmody, 2017), South Africa during this period sought to project a ‘BRICS-centred’ foreign policy. However, it is important to note that a certain continuity, particularly in relation to South Africa’s leading role on the continent, remained. One high-ranking DIRCO official interviewed during the course of this research stated: ‘Our involvement with BRICS is based on an African agenda, we are not in BRICS for ourselves but for the whole 6

BRICs would become BRICS in 2010 with South Africa’s inclusion into the group. Of note here is also the attempt to leverage Russian linkages to build a new nuclear power station in South Africa. 8 DIRCO is the successor to the Department of Foreign Affairs and is responsible for South Africa’s diplomatic relationships with other countries. 7

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continent and Global South’. The official likewise described South Africa’s foreign policy goals in the following manner: ‘BRICS is becoming a main component of [South Africa’s] foreign policy, but it is not the primary [component]. We focus on Africa and prioritize the African Union and SADC’ (Interview, DIRCO, October 2017, Johannesburg). The move towards the BRICS introduced a type of pragmatism and realpolitik to South Africa’s foreign policy (Carmody, 2017) that can be understood as the adoption of BRICS and China-centric norms, principally regarding non-interference and sovereignty. In practice, the implementation of these norms led to foreign policy positions that are in near direct opposition to the normative content diffused in the earlier era. South Africa’s evolving relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC) is highly indicative of how the country’s fluctuating policies affect its normative commitments. As Grant and Hamilton (2016) detail, South Africa was the first African country to sign on to the statute creating the ICC. Likewise, South Africa’s leadership alongside other early adopters led to widespread acceptance of the ICC throughout the continent. Yet its commitment to the court began to diminish early on in the Zuma administration. In March 2009, the ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. While Bashir was invited to Zuma’s inauguration in May of that year, South African officials advised him to stay away, which indicated that the country would adhere to the ICCs pronouncements. Yet in the years following the arrest warrant, South Africa—along with other African countries—allowed Bashir to travel freely within their borders. Grant and Hamilton (2016, p. 15) detail how between 2013 and 2015, a ‘clash of constitutive norms consistent with the ICC on the one hand, and the norm that senior state officials should have immunity from international prosecution while in office on the other, occurred within South African government circles’. The latter viewpoint gained by primacy was evidenced by the decision to allow Bashir to land in Johannesburg for the 2015 AU Summit as well as that to allow him to leave via Waterkloof Air Force Base after the South African High Court issued an arrest warrant. Alongside this example, South Africa also abstained on the UN vote to refer North Korea to the ICC (Carmody et al., 2020). In 2016, South Africa stated its intention to leave the ICC. Per the government’s press release, this step was taken for three main reasons: the courts incompatibility with South Africa’s diplomatic mandate, the ICCs alleged bias against African countries, and a desire to preserve diplomatic immunity. However, officials revoked the notice of withdrawal in 2017 (BBC, 2017). The Zuma administration’s ICC saga is thus representative of not only the shift away from the relative policy continuity of the Mandela and Mbeki administrations but also the corresponding adoption and partial institutionalization—though given the fragmented nature of policy implementation the extent to which these norms are applied varies depending on the particular department—of Chinese norms concerning sovereignty and institutional reform. Onis and Kutlay (2020) detail how Chinese norms generally prescribe neutrality on specific regime type, that is, not pushing for democratization, indirect promotion of authoritarianism by providing assistance for such regimes, and general non-interference regarding governance reforms, institution

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building, and emphasis on rule of law. In short, the Chinese approach to engagement with other countries in the Global South is pragmatic. Carmody and Taylor (2010) have termed this system ‘flexigemony’ and describe it as Chinese actors adapting their strategies to ‘suit the particular histories and geographies of the African states in which they engage with’. Moreover, as Breslin (2010, p. 6) notes, China’s alternative norms generally seek to develop what he terms ‘definitional power’, in essence the construction of reinterpretations and redefinitions that suit Chinese interests. For instance, Chinese scholars have sought to ‘defin[e] what democracy and human rights mean in the Chinese context in ways that do not contradict or undermine continued one-party rule’. The Zuma administration’s ideological and normative proximity to the Chinese worldview not only engendered a shift in policy but predictably also led to perceptions that the country was not upholding human rights and freedoms (Louw-Vaudran, 2016). In a particularly visible example, the Zuma administration refused to allow the Dalai Lama entry into the country. While Chinese actors never publicly pushed for the move, support for Chinese rule in Tibet is a prerequisite for diplomatic relations with the country. Carmody, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov (2020) view this as an example of the country—alongside other African states—turning against the human rights agenda in order to prioritize domestic autonomy and sovereignty. Zuma’s shift away from previous normative positions is thus indicative of how politico-economic factors—in this case, the administration’s ‘BRICS’-centric positioning and its growing reliance on Chinese capital and Sino-centric production networks—determine which norms are instrumentalized and diffused.

1.3 A ‘New Dawn’ and a Middle Path? The Zuma administration ended in February 2018. Zuma, facing a vote of no confidence and under massive pressure stemming from the state capture scandal9 announced his resignation. Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the ANC since the party elections in December 2017, took over immediately. Ramaphosa’s administration has been largely focused on a combination of intra-ANC factionalism and addressing the country’s worsening domestic economic situation. However, in terms of foreign policy, he has sought to suture the paths of his antecedents, retaining a certain pragmatism while simultaneously bringing the matter of human rights back to the fore. In his 2018 State of the Nation address, Ramaphosa spoke of a ‘new dawn’ for South Africa and a repositioning of the country both within the region and beyond— which some have turned a return to South African ‘protagonism’ (Otavio, 2021). Shortly after, he commissioned a panel to review South Africa’s foreign policy. This panel found that ‘South Africa had turned away from its previous commitment to 9

This was a long-running scandal in which in which ANC-tied actors and their allies systematically plundered the country’s assets.

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normative leadership across the region/continent and recommended a return to the policies of the Mbeki era and to the ‘African Renaissance’ framework (Spies, 2022). Lindiwi Sisulu, at the time the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, similarly argued that South Africa needed to return to the role it undertook during the Mandela era, when it was ‘viewed as a moral compass and a voice of reason in a world increasingly overcome with selfish and narrow interests’ (Otavio, 2021). For the most part, the discourse constructed by administration officials has indeed reintegrated the concept of African Renaissance and South Africa’s leadership position within the continent. Ramaphosa assumed the role of Chairperson of the African Union in 2020 and throughout the one-year tenure sought to coordinate an African response to the COVID-19 pandemic and address the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Likewise, he served as Chairperson of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Defence, Politics and Security Cooperation, during which time he sought to help defuse crises in eSwatini and Mozambique. Finally, between 2019 and 2020, South Africa occupied a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Yet despite these positions and the return of the lofty rhetoric of the Mandela/Mbeki era, the administration remains cognizant of the challenges of leadership, with Sisulu commenting that ‘a country mired in its own problems can hardly expect to make any impact on the world stage’ (Sisulu, 2018: 9, quoted from Hendricks & Majozi, 2021). One area where the economic issues have directly led to difficulties in norm activism is the military. South Africa’s capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations has greatly diminished over time. Its current peacekeeping force in Mozambique is limited to some 1500 troops. With the next South African elections in 2024, the Ramaphosa administration has time yet to move the country towards its ideal positions. However, it remains to be seen whether the administration will be able to negotiate the issues that diminished South Africa’s activist role in earlier eras. Ramaphosa has for the most part sought pragmatism in the economic sphere, leveraging Zuma-era relationships with China while likewise courting traditional western partners in the search for investment. A dual-track system, highly fragmented in its implementation has thus appeared. South African actors in essence aim to highlight what remains of the neoliberal shift for western investors, while emphasizing elite-level relationships in discussions with Chinese and BRICS actors. At the regional and continental level, Ramaphosa has sought to tie efforts to create policy space for the expansion of South African capital to the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). This embedding creates added legitimacy via its fashioning of economic liberalism as a mutually beneficial project and may help allay some of the criticisms of earlier initiatives. During a recent tour of West Africa (in particular, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivore, and Senegal), Ramaphosa stated: ‘As part of our economic diplomacy efforts, we are giving renewed attention to promoting trade and investment with countries on our continent’ (Simon-Handy & Djilo, 2021). Contradictions between the administration’s positions regarding democracy, and human rights on the one hand, and respect

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for sovereignty have yet to come to the fore, partly due to the overwhelming necessity to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, Pretoria’s reluctance to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent domestic and international fallout hints at the intricate nature of this balancing act.

2 Conclusion Following its emergence in 1994, post-apartheid South Africa sought to position itself as a continental and even global leader in terms of norm activism and promotion. However, the country’s ability to put these commitments into practice has been repeatedly beset by contradictions and contestations. In addition, the 2010s saw South Africa move away from its previous commitments and instead undertake a more pragmatic foreign policy based not on activism, but on economic and security imperatives instead. This paper has sought to analyse South Africa’s normative activism in the postapartheid period through the lens of political economy. It has argued that despite the bold pronouncements of the Mandela and Mbeki eras, South Africa’s embedding of neoliberal policy prescriptions into its overarching initiatives for activism and norms promotion left it open to allegations of collaboration with Western interests at the continental level and significantly weakened its attempts to leverage norm diffusion towards regional/continental leadership. Likewise, the paper contends that the failure of the neoliberal project—articulated domestically as the GEAR suite of macro-economic policies—to resolve the social-economic contradictions at the heart of the post-apartheid order led directly to the changes at the top of the state apparatus and engendered the policy space for the Zuma-led shift towards a ‘BRICS-centred’ foreign policy, that is, the cultivation of elite-level partnerships with the BRICS and China in particular. The failure of the project also spurred societal tensions (particularly xenophobia) that have further weakened South Africa’s capacity to act as a norm activist. For his part, Cyril Ramaphosa has sought to bring together the policies of his predecessors. Yet considering the contradictions between them, suturing these into a coherent foreign policy is a nearly impossible task. While the COVID-19 crisis has created the space for South African leadership across the continent, the Ramaphosa administration has sought to at least partially carry on the legacy of South African continental leadership and commitment to neoliberal reform. Embedding these elements to African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) may allow the administration to moderate some of the criticisms that derailed the Mbeki agenda, but it remains to be seen how Pretoria will negotiate the Zuma-led adoption of BRICS norms vis-à-vis sovereignty and their stated commitment to human rights and democracy. As this chapter has shown, the South African case highlights the treacherous terrain that mid-level powers must traverse in order to take on an activist role. Likewise, it has shown how geographically and contextually determined particularities

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can impede the internalization of certain norms. As Hart (2014) notes globalization (including dominant norms) is always locally produced, assembled, and constructed. Therefore, geographies of place must be accounted for in understandings of how norms are diffused across space. In the South African case, despite Mandela’s moral authority and the transition to democracy, a combination of historical, political, economic and social factors have largely derailed the country’s attempts at leveraging its norm diffusion.

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Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion Anna Grzywacz

1 Introduction Extensive literature on norm diffusion implies that international norms are transformed once they are ‘moved’ to a new location (Winston, 2018, p. 646), mainly through contestation that has been acknowledged to be an immanent factor in norm diffusion and promotion. A number of studies imply that norm contestation leads to a merger of the global with the local, suggesting rather a one-way process, in which weaker actors comply with norms promoted by powerful entities. But norm adoption is followed by norm adaptation. The latter may not necessarily be just a passive acceptance of what is offered, it may be a manifestation of power (see e.g. Stacey, 2020). Moreover, ‘not so powerful’ actors may significantly contribute to the promotion and diffusion of norms. Thus, this chapter aims to analyse how a non-Western actor performs its actorness and exercises its power in the normative dimension. I use the example of Indonesia’s contribution to norm promotion to illustrate that: first, non-Western actors are essential in norm diffusion as they provide credibility and legitimise normative changes within their regions, but also appropriate a means of norm promotion to the regional context they operate in, and second, that they manifest their power by promoting values, that derives from their cultural background and that are uniquely associated with them. The arguments are substantiated by an analysis of Indonesia’s performance in the area of democracy and human rights promotion within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). In both cases, Indonesia coherently promotes a set of norms: dialogue and inclusiveness through their political initiatives of promoting democracy and human rights. The chapter is structured as follows. After the introduction, I briefly explain the article’s conceptual and methodological approach. Then, I provide an overview of A. Grzywacz (B) Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Polna 18/20, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_6

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Indonesia’s political performance and norm promotion. The following section illustrates the arguments I make, by examining Indonesia’s policy and norm promotion in the above-mentioned area. The chapter closes with a conclusion highlighting at least two points. First, contestation may be a positive process, because when non-Western actors go through this process, they assure the credibility and legitimacy of normative changes within their regions. Moreover, they may contribute to norm promotion not only by adopting Western and/or liberal norms but also by merging these norms with cultural background and regional expectations, proving their actorness and ability to exercise power in international affairs. Second, norm diffusion requires not only that non-Western actors engage with this process, but the power and actorness of their projects also need to be recognised. The latter also implies that non-Western actors should not be considered as competitors, norm challengers, or revisionists only, but also, and perhaps more importantly, as genuine contributors to norm diffusion and promotion.

2 Conceptual and Methodological Approach As already discussed in the Introduction (Kolmašová & Reboredo, 2022) to this book, norm diffusion and norm localisation are extensively studied by numerous scholars. The variety of approaches and theoretical concepts hardly makes it easier to understand when and how norms become international standards, how they change once they are implemented by their recipients, and how norm-takers become normmakers (Wiener, 2018). Following Amitav Acharya’s framework of localisation, the central assumption is that a global idea becomes localised when it has reached a local environment. The scholar defines localisation as “a complex process and outcome by which normtakers build congruence between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and local beliefs and practices” (Acharya, 2004, p. 241). It helps to differentiate this concept from traditionally understood norm diffusion, that is adaptation of practices to an external idea, implying a top-down approach. However, as already noticed by the same scholar, norm-takers should not be taken for granted and they may be normative agents too (Acharya, 2014b). An essential component is that local actors ensure legitimacy (Acharya, 2004) and localisation highlights a circular process of norm adaptation.1 The credibility of norm-makers also matters. Norm-takers are ambiguous about enacting, implementing, and promoting norms that are violated by norm-makers (which is most often associated with the Western influence and its political agenda). Moreover, actors are more likely to pick up the norms that have something in common with the local culture. The resemblance narrows down the hesitance to accept a new norm by making it more familiar. This has been saliently explained and presented in the literature and is referred to as a ‘cultural match’ (Cortell & Davis, 2000). Norm 1

This is how A. Acharya (2004) explains the difference between adaptation and localisation.

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localisation as a process involves the reinterpretation and modification of norms. I follow this understanding of norm diffusion, but I focus on a state’s ‘original’ contribution to conveying and promoting norms. In this case, a state’s actorness is demonstrated by providing new and distinct values to norm promotion. Actorness is most often defined as “capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt, 1977). While this definition is very broad and thus prone to criticism, a variety of different approaches were proposed to make it operationalisable.2 As an analytical framework, actorness includes both internal and external dimensions. Internal dimensions focus on cohesion and credibility,3 while external ones on recognition, attractiveness, and political opportunity. Cohesion denotes narrating a political decision or issue consistently and in line with the adopted argument. Credibility is built upon experience, trust, and capability. Recognition and attractiveness are defined as recognised by others as an actor which provides international public goods, and further as creating an image of a partner, with whom cooperation is beneficial. Last, a political opportunity denotes a recognition of a situation, in which the actor may play a role (TRIGGER Model, 2020; Brattberg & Rhinard, 2013). The literature develops a variety of approaches, but the above-enumerated variables capture the concept well.4 Additionally, I draw from Lisbeth Zimmermann’s (2016, pp. 102–104; 2017) work on norm diffusion, which argues that the rhetorical adoption of norms is followed by more substantial legal and institutional adoptions, facilitating internationalisation at the end. Just as many studies on norms, this one also focuses on how a state as a recipient deals with new norms domestically, not necessarily how a norm-taker becomes a norm-maker. Nevertheless, a twofold encapsulation of norm promotion, that is discursive enactment (sayings) and political initiatives (doings), is proven to reflect state actors’ agency well (Wiener, 2004; Zimmermann, 2016). The two above-mentioned approaches allow me to draw a framework for this analysis. The case studies are analysed as follows. First, by referring to the concept of actorness, I assess Indonesia’s status and credibility as a norm promoter. A focus on actorness helps to move beyond discussions on the (in)ability of actors to diffuse norms and to include their willingness to promote norms not as transmitters, but as contributors drawing from their culture and regional contexts. This approach adds to the current debates on norm diffusion centered around contestations and behavioural changes by showing an actor may not only adapt to international norms but may also appropriate its normative politics to accommodate the targeted audiences’ expectations. Second, I discuss the case study by discussing sayings and doings in the area of norm promotion. The discursive part is analysed based on speeches and other materials available at the ASEAN and BDF websites, the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the President’s site.

2

Actorness has been developed primarily by analysing the European Union’s external politics. Credibility, however, touches upon both internal and external dimensions. 4 This is one of the approaches, summarising different concepts, see for example: (Bretherton & Vogler, 2002; Kratochvil, 2013). 3

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A few caveats must be made here. First, I focus primarily on the Asia–Pacific. The area falls within what Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2019, p. 72) describes as ‘concentric circles’ of Indonesia’s engagement. Indonesia’s politics is mostly focused on Southeast Asia, next East Asia, and then it extends to the Asia–Pacific and other regions. It is also consistent with Indonesia’s declarations about its foreign policy objectives— concentrating on the Asia–Pacific (Marsudi, 2019). Second, in this chapter, I do not focus on the outcomes of Indonesia’s performance, that is whether values and norms affect behaviours, but rather on how the values and norms are narrated, and then on whether this is reflected in politics. This is not to suggest the outcomes of norm diffusion are not important, but only to point out that the chapter focuses on the processes, not the ends. Third, actorness is most often employed to analyse international organisations’ ability to pursue their interest. It does not mean, however, that actorness cannot be implemented to investigate state actors (see for example Murau & Spandler, 2016). I refer to the concept of actorness for its analytical value.

3 An Overview of Indonesia’s Norm Enactment and Promotion The literature discussing Indonesia’s normative performance is focused most often on localisation. If new norms resonate with the local culture they are more likely to be accepted, what ensures a smoother societal acceptance of new norms. Research discussing how norms are localised tends to focus on what happens when ideas clash with Indonesia’s domestic context, most often with the negative outcomes of ideas rather than the local political agenda.5 To complement the discussed literature in the previous section, but also to show the actorness of non-Western states, I go beyond these discussions and my aim is to show how Indonesia performs its actorness by adapting norms to the regional context and by adding its own idea about how these norms should look like. Thus, the following sections will show that appropriating norms to regional context is neglected yet an important part of norm diffusion. Indonesia’s transformation to a democratic state brought changes to the state’s foreign policy and international visibility. As a new democracy, Indonesia has been expected to behave as a reliable and responsible actor in international relations, by not only promoting international (and liberal) norms but also by providing them. It required not only to invest in its regional position but also to increase Indonesia’s international visibility. Since the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as the president of Indonesia in 2004, the state has been raising its international profile significantly. By initiating regional initiatives, such as the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) in 2008, strengthening regional cooperation through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, cooperation with the Pacific islands states, promotion of the Indo-Pacific concept, or recently launched Indonesia Aid, an agency providing 5

A number of studies investigate how Indonesia failed to localise international norms rather than embrace them.

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development assistance, accompanied by Indonesia’s efforts to increase its visibility in international organisations, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the Asia– Pacific (Fitriani, 2015; Grzywacz & Gawrycki, 2021, pp. 2634–2635), the state has strengthened its position as a norm-oriented actor. Indonesia’s contribution to international and regional development enhances the state’s credibility and contributes to its recognition as a responsible actor. Indonesia’s long way to build its international position has recently been damaged. Although the recent democracy decline may undermine Indonesia’s commitment to the promotion of international ideas (Power & Warburton, 2020), since its democratisation, Indonesia has been quite a consistent promoter of a set of norms and values (Rüland, 2021). However, Indonesia’s story of norm entrepreneurship does not start with the end of the authoritarian rule at the end of the 1990s, but in the middle of the 1950s. In April 1955, Sukarno, an Indonesian leader, opened the first Asian-African Conference, widely known as the Bandung Conference. The normative outcomes include the promotion of non-interference, non-alignment, mutual cooperation, and consultation, alongside the heritage of anti-colonialism, less important today (Acharya, 2014a; Tan & Acharya, 2008). Cooperation, consultation, and consensus have their roots in the Indonesian tradition of gotong royong6 and musyawarah and mufakat. This is a direct reference to the local culture and tradition, later expanded, in particular, into multilateral cooperation and the ASEAN Way (Katsumata, 2003). According to A. Acharya (1998, pp. 62–67) consensus and consultation as principles derive from the Javanese village style of making decisions. A leader practices consensus to strengthen community, its identity, and to establish unity. Through understanding and inclusiveness a leader can act, but it does so for the sake of the whole community. This is referred to as tut wuri handayani, a leading from-behind concept (Anwar, 2005, p. 66). Consensus as a decision-making process highlights inclusiveness as the key aspect of building trust and unity. The ASEAN’s prime principle is the ASEAN Way,7 but it includes some of universal ideas. A. Acharya summarises it: “ASEAN’s adoption of these norms therefore was not so much a matter of the conceptual invention, but of their incorporation into a socialisation process to redefine the regional political and security environment. (…) Socio-cultural norms played a crucial role in moulding this interaction and compromise involving divergent national positions” (Acharya, 2014a, p. 55). Moreover, the Bandung Conference gave a push to initiate the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 as well as to form other groupings of developing countries. Thus, Indonesia has a significant contribution and historical legacy of being a norm entrepreneur—all contributing to Indonesia’s credibility.

6

Gotong royong is most often translated as mutual assistance. The main set of ASEAN’s principles is encapsulated by the ASEAN Way, differently interpreted by scholars as well as politicians, and changing over time (Yukawa, 2018), though it is generally understood as a non-interference and consensus-based process, also as a set of norms: consensus, consultation, informality, and inter-governmentality.

7

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Indonesia’s performance is not only the result of its primus inter pares status in Southeast Asia, but also, and more importantly, of investing into its middle power status. Middle powers are known for their preference to uphold multilateral cooperation, to support institutions, and promote peace and ethics in international relations (see for example Robertson, 2017; Jordaan, 2003; Efstathopoulos, 2018). It all contributes to middlepowermanship, which facilitates the creation of an image of a responsible and benign actor in international relations. Indonesia has invested in its rise as a middle power (and a regional power and leader), but its performance in these areas has been assessed critically. Indonesia has even been called an ‘awkward middle power’ (Teo, 2022). But Indonesia’s politics of strengthening its position in regional affairs, international organisations, its support for developing states and South-South cooperation, as well as initiating new regional projects, has enhanced Indonesia’s credibility and legitimacy in the area of normative development. Active participation in international structures and regional initiatives enhances Indonesia’s image of an attractive actor. Hence, it is a state with the capacity and capability to diffuse norms and set a normative agenda. Equally important, Indonesia’s history and experiences with democratic transitions legitimise its efforts to promote democracy and human rights through soft means. The following section explains how and why Indonesia provides credibility, how it understands and implements norms, and what values within those norms are promoted. The case studies also reflect well Indonesia’s ability to identify a political opportunity to push forward its own political agenda.

4 Promoting Democracy and Human Rights 4.1 Political Opportunity and Norm Adaptation Whether democracy and human rights are Western concepts or not has been a subject of numerous discussions for many years. Whatever the right answer is, democracy and human rights promotion are associated with the West and the Rest division, quite often fuelled by colonial and imperial history, and discussions on cultural imperialism. This was quite well reflected by the ‘Asian values’ debate in the 1990s (see Barr, 2017). The discussions themselves do not, however, imply that the concepts are worthless, but rather show what happens with a concept when it becomes the centre of political rivalry and is instrumentalised for political purposes. It matters because Western actors have been the ones not only equipped with the capacities to promote democracy and human rights and promoting them but also the ones accused of unethical practices and coercive actions towards weaker actors. The tensions reached their peak when the debate on so-called Asian values emerged. The politicisation of democracy and human rights as values resulted in the transition of the debates from the value of concepts to its origins and attempts to prove their universalism or relativism.

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Whatever the outcomes of the debates, for Indonesia, like for many other states, its own transition to democracy was the right moment for a change in its foreign policy and the development of its normative agenda (Rüland, 2018). Indonesia’s transition to democracy was accompanied by hopes and fears as the fall of the Suharto regime and the transition to democracy meant a fundamental change for the state in its domestic environment, but also in foreign policy (Anwar, 2010; Poole, 2015). The promotion of democracy and human rights was substantiated by an initiation of the Bali Democracy Forum in 2008. This platform is not the only one promoting democracy and human rights in Indonesia, but it is the brightest one. Alongside, Indonesia is credited for including democracy and human rights in ASEAN, and into one of its pillars, the Political-Security community, and for strong lobbying for the inclusion of democratic values and protection of human rights, inter alia, to the ASEAN Charter (Nandyatama, 2021). Moreover, Indonesia supports democracy and human rights bilaterally, particularly by coopering with Myanmar, but also other regional states (see Rosyidin, 2020). While Indonesia deserves to be criticised for many ambiguous decisions in its foreign policy in the area of democracy and human rights, even those moderate changes would not be possible without Indonesia’s engagement. Thus, the way how Indonesian leaders sought to embrace democracy and human rights is a merger of its own values and regional expectations. Indonesia’s enactment of democracy and human rights was a result of its own experience, but also international and regional context. The state was not part of the West, but a country respecting other regional principles, the ASEAN Way in particular. While the outcomes of Indonesia’s efforts are questionable, to say the least, the following part of this section focuses not on how values are translated into behaviours, as suggested by the norm diffusion literature (Winston, 2018), but rather on how Indonesia sees and shapes its contribution to these areas.

4.2 Democracy and Human Rights in Political Discourse8 While the idea of democracy and human rights is understood quite universally, values surrounding their promotion are something that helps to distinguish Indonesia’s efforts from the already known practices, in most cases Western ones. The norm diffusion literature seems to focus more on how values are translated into behaviours, a little less on the means with which this translation should be achieved. This difference is heavily utilised by Indonesian leaders by pointing to a clear attachment of Indonesia to consensus and consultation.

8

In the section analysing political discourse I provide some citations substantiating the findings. I provide citations assessed as representative. In this part I draw heavily from my work on democracy in Indonesian narratives (Grzywacz, 2020).

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From the very beginning, Indonesia has promoted democracy through nesting the discourse around the values of inclusiveness, openness, and dialogue. BDF was established to “promote and foster regional and international cooperation in the field of peace and democracy through dialogue based on sharing experiences and best practices that adhere to the principle of equality, mutual respect, and understanding” (BDF n.d.). It clearly corresponds with Indonesian leaders’ embracement of musyawarah and mufakat. Documents summarising BDF meetings and opening speeches portray the international system as unjust and challenging, as the democracy backsliding has been observable worldwide. Moreover, democracy itself is a challenging system, but it is necessary for just economic and social development (for example Marsudi, 2018, p. 3). Throughout the years, Indonesian politicians have referred to quite the same set of values. S. B. Yudhoyono from the very beginning portrayed BDF as a forum excluding coercion, supporting home-grown democracy, and based on respect and dialogue: “(…) this Forum should be inclusive, with the participating states sharing its ownership. Its dialogue-based on equality, mutual respect and understanding-should be a sharing experiences and best practices” (Wirajuda, 2008, p. 2). The same approach applies to ASEAN. In this case, however, consultation and consensus are an inherent element of regional identity and cooperation. Indonesian leadership meant not only to provide international public goods, but more importantly, the adoption of Indonesia’s soft leadership was acceptable to other members due to its commitment to those principles (Pero, 2019; Acharya, 1998). Indonesia’s contribution to democracy and human rights stays in line with its informal leader status and an image of a back-seat driver of ASEAN’s development. Considering Indonesia’s aggressive politics in the 60 s of the twentieth century and its profound input into the establishment of the association, it was understandable that Suharto, president of Indonesia between 1967–1998, would follow a low-profile approach in foreign policy to embrace Indonesia’s non-hegemonic stance (Pero, 2019, p. 71). This is even more clear when legitimacy is considered. Playing a role of a ‘benign’ leader implies listening to the targeted audience. Following consensus and consultation, not only protects ASEAN’s non-democratic states from external, and undesirable, engagement, but also keeps Indonesia’s activity on a certain, preferred, and comfortable to all level (Pero, 2019, p. 155). Following the rules results in dismissing any signs of ‘intrusiveness’ under a shield of interests protection (Suzuki, 2019), which is the main point of criticism towards ASEAN, however, after all, the outcome is shaped not only by a need to not be associated with the Western-style of democracy promotion, often synonymised with imperialism (Bridoux & Kurki, 2014) but also to follow the regional principles. This resonates well with the critical assessment of coercive approaches in democracy promotion.9 As suggested “perhaps one reason for the great interest in this Forum is the unique approach we have taken” (Yudhoyono, 2008, p. 5). By the 9

Non-coercive approach is one of the counterarguments used in a response to critical remarks directed at BSF: e.g. “I can conclude that democracy is not something that comes out on its own. Neither is it something that can be imposed from abroad. Democracy must be grown from its own society, through the creation of wider opportunities and greater room for the people’s empowerment.

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‘unique approach’ Indonesian leaders mean non-coercion, openness, inclusiveness, and dialogue, which derive from consultation and consensus.

4.3 Democracy and Human Rights in Political Practice After the transition to democracy, it was already clear that Indonesia wants to raise its profile in international affairs, first by investing in its regional position and status. The state already actively participated in the development of ASEAN and its pillars and continued to lobby for the inclusion of democratic values and human rights. Indonesia was not able to persuade all of its fellow members to accept all of its ideas but was able to push for the inclusion of democratic and human rights values, starting in 2003 and the pressure to include these norms into ASEAN’s Political Security Pillar. Lobbying for the inclusion of the norms resulted in further commitments. The ASEAN Charter, effective since 2008, addresses the need to promote democracy and to ensure human rights protection in rather an ambiguous way, e.g. by declaring that one of the ASEAN’s purposes is: “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN” (ASEAN, 2007, p. 4). The establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009 and the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012 are signs of changes, but the instruments do not provide mechanisms of human rights protection and effective promotion of democracy,10 although moving beyond the formal design, the commission is less criticised for its vagueness and lack of power than other ASEAN’s initiatives. While for many ASEAN has not effectively addressed and implemented these values, Indonesia was the first and perhaps the most important contributor in this area. Human rights are deeply, if not the most, politicised issue for the ASEAN members (see for example Nandyatama, 2021; Berger, 2015). Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were against the creation of any human rights body, and remain to be at the top of members with the poorest human rights record, which aligns with a democratic-authoritarian division among the members. Any improvements in this area were able only after the commitments to follow the ASEAN Way principles, and consultation and consensus in particular (Munro, 2011). The discussion on why ASEAN opened itself to embrace democracy and human rights is still open to debate. Whether it was for “external regional legitimacy” (Poole, 2019) or as argued by Anja Jetschke (2015, p. 108) changes were “not only a windowdressing exercise for its members geared towards silencing external criticism. It is a collective effort towards diminishing the direct costs of human rights violations,”

Democracy that is imposed from abroad may lead to political complications and run out of steam” (Yudhoyono, 2010, p. 18). 10 ‘Effective promotion’ means here promotion that translates into actual political changes.

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Indonesian decisions to follow its vision of democracy and human rights promotion stays in line with its values and regional expectations. Indonesia initiated the Bali Democracy Forum in 2008. BDF promotes democracy, including principles of accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness. As declared, BDF opens discussions on democracy and supports democratic changes. BDF is criticised for being a non-binding forum with no institutionalised organs (Weatherbee, 2013, pp. 30–32). Opening a discussion on democracy, but not necessarily providing sources to actually facilitate democracy transitions is the key point of criticism. In the early years of BDF, the forum gathered mainly authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Today, BDF is quite a successful forum, organised every year for more than a hundred participants, including state and non-state actors. Despite the criticism, BDF has not changed its modus operandi and upholds the same values as in the beginning. The criticism did not frighten democratic states and international organisations from joining the Forum. By 2021 more than a hundred actors were involved, including European states, major international organisations, and non-state actors. BDF has its implementing body, the Institute of Peace and Democracy (IPD). The IPD provides support in democratic transitions, knowledge-building, as well as training, lectures, and programmes on democracy. The IPD has been focusing primarily on Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but in recent years its role has declined. The IPD provides summaries and overviews of its work, but while their work is important, it is of secondary importance to political decisions. While BDF is highly criticised and politicised, IPD is the one managing depoliticised work on the ground. The agency suffers significantly from the lack of funding and this is one of the main issues affecting the institute. In its first years after its establishment, IPD was operating in Southeast Asia and the MENA region. While politicians were arguing over the relevance of inviting authoritarian representatives to the forum, IPD was providing trainings, forums, and it supervises the implementation of projects aimed to include civil society, provide assistance, educational trainings, and other programmes aiming to raise political awareness. BDF might be but a talk-shop, but it constitutes an initial step in enacting the discourse on norms. Moreover, Indonesia is not only not able to ‘coerce’ democratisation, but neither does it seek to do so. It is clear not only from the discursive surroundings of its engagement, but also from practice. This, however, is a result of not only limited capacities in terms of regional influence, but also adjusting politics to the targeted audience. By becoming a norm-oriented actor and by conveying a norm, the question of how to ‘sell’ a norm becomes particularly relevant. If the localisation is something between acceptance and rejection, then embracing the norm and its promotion is also between the actor’s potential and recipients’ expectations. As such, it requires not only enacting a norm but also its refinements to shape it in a way that would be acceptable for the target audience, that is authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Indonesia did not want to resemble a Western agent, but rather an agent who has experienced democracy and argues for its relevance on a basis of its (and wider regional) culture and underlines the respect for the regional culture. A number of ASEAN states were unhappy with the enactment of democracy and human rights rhetoric. While picking up this discourse was essential to place Indonesia higher in

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the international system, and to gain credibility and legitimacy, it was also essential to accommodate regional expectations. The two are, to a large extent, mutually exclusive as a number of ASEAN members have a very poor record in terms of democracy and human rights.11 Importantly, Indonesian leaders labelled its political activities ‘home-grown’ democracy support drawing a clear line between the Western approaches and the Indonesian way (Rosyidin, 2020). If Indonesia’s leaders and elites questioned anything, it was not democracy itself, but a means of spreading democratic values. While BDF as a forum is criticised by many for its ineffectiveness and legitimising authoritarian regimes’ international presence, less scrutiny was directed at the IPD, embodying the idea of working on the ground and from a bottom-up approach. This way, Indonesia follows its values and principles of cooperation through openness, inclusiveness, and dialogue, and manages to fit into regional expectations.

5 Conclusion This chapter’s aim was to demonstrate that non-Western actors may exercise their power in norm promotion not only by localising them, but more importantly, by promoting them regionally, and that these actors are essential in norm diffusion as they provide the kind of credibility that other actors (norm-makers) may lack due to historical and cultural determinants. I illustrated that on the example of Indonesia in the area of democracy and human rights promotion. In both cases, Indonesia has the capacity and capability to play a significant normative role, and it combines international norms, its own experience, values and principles, and regional expectations. Indonesia’s efforts may be questioned. Due to its inclusive stance and a strict following of the ASEAN Way principles it also, if not primarily, serves as a shield to the ASEAN authoritarian members hesitating or simply, declining to comply with the international democracy and human rights standards. Thus, Indonesia’s engagement hardly translate to major changes of behaviours in the region. However, it should be acknowledged that Jakarta invested in its actorness. The state has been actively participating in international organisations, peacekeeping operations, and regional structures by supporting and developing ASEAN and the ASEAN-linked infrastructure. Moreover, Indonesia proved its (limited) effectiveness in enforcing the enactment of international norms. But, at the same time, Jakarta builds its leadership position in ASEAN and in the Asia–Pacific, which requires the observance and promotion of regional and local rules in the form of the ASEAN Way. It all raises Indonesia’s credibility, recognition, and attractiveness, which is built upon its values of cooperation, consultation and consensus—values translating into dialogue, openness, and inclusiveness in politics. While the majority of works discussing Indonesia’s contribution to norm promotion are located somewhere between Indonesia’s insincere commitment, lack of 11

For an overview of human rights in ASEAN see Duxbury and Tan 2019.

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power, and or a need to protect non-democratic states for the sake of regional unity, less attention is paid to the decision to merge local values with the process of appropriateness to meet regional expectations. This is what this chapter highlights. Indonesia was able to find its own way of promoting norms. The state was able to make use of political opportunities and push for the acceptance of its ideas or to establish its own platforms of cooperation by combining its heritage and values with regional appropriateness. Leaving effectiveness aside,12 in the analysed cases Indonesia coherently promotes the values of dialogue, inclusiveness, respect and equality. This consistent promotion of how norms should be promoted in order to take roots in the regional settings is the hallmarks of Indonesian politics.

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Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation Hüsrev Tabak

1 Introduction As a recent scholarly discussion, non-western norm research is necessary for its value in enabling the scholarship to observe the locally justified (and ever-changing) normative strategies of the non-western agents. To contribute to this discussion, this chapter proposes diaspora and kin spaces as one more venue in which we can discuss and observe the taking place of non-western possibilities of norm diffusion. Taking diaspora and kin spaces as settings for non-western norm diffusion is crucial. They represent a long-neglected domain for studying norm diffusion both in western-centric and non-western norm research. This is the case despite that such spaces have been the settings even the states hesitant to or unable to internationalize local norms globally or regionally—as often seen in the non-western contexts—can transfer norms. This is because states’ access to diaspora and kin spaces is relatively easy due to the fewer boundaries a diaspora/kin community would have toward a local norm of the putative homeland. Moreover, states tend to see kin localities as cultural/political extensions of the mainland thus intend to tune them with the homeland both culturally and politically—this is why those localities often turn into the spaces where the homeland’s government-opposition relations are maintained abroad (Tabak, 2020). Within this very ground, this research studies diaspora and kin spaces as a category facilitating observing the functioning of non-western norm diffusion and the normative strategies of the non-western agents. Diaspora and kin spaces’ relevance to norms research has also some methodological grounds. Accordingly, diaspora and kin spaces represent a context in which the non-Western peripheral actors’ capacities and efforts for developing norms and putting them into circulation globally/regionally can be unfolded. Through this, the idea of thinking of the non-west in a void of normativity can be challenged, confirming H. Tabak (B) Faculty of Economics, Zihni Derin Campus, Recep Tayyip Erdogan University, Rize, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_7

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Towns (2012), Acharya (2014), Bettiza and Dionigi (2015), Bettiza and Lewis (2020), Casier (2021), Steinhilper (2015), Stefan (2016), Stalley (2018), Wunderlich (2020), and Tabak et al. (2022, 2023). Moreover, diasporic categories enable scholarship to rethink norm diffusion as a multi-sided, multi-sited, and multi-directional process, against the diffusionist accounts’ thinking of the diffusion as a unilinear relationship of the centre with the periphery, the centre being the inherently superior and legitimately dominant, while the periphery being a subordinate and passive recipient of the externally invented/imposed standards (Tabak, 2021). So, the diasporic categories as a research subject for the non-western norm discussions would allow showing that the target groups are part of the making and diffusion of the homeland’s norms, as diffusion progresses in the form of circles of feedback by which the target audience contributes to the evolution of the norm in question. In an empirical sense, the research surveys Turkey’s historical and contemporary efforts for transferring ethnonational norms towards the diaspora and kin community spaces in the Balkans and beyond. Turkey’s norm politics in doing so and the resistant responses articulated against the diffusing norms are both covered, along with the mechanisms by which norms are transferred or their diffusion is facilitated/interrupted. The paper initially discusses the scope of considering diaspora spaces as sites for non-western norm diffusion and Turkey as a non-western norm diffuser. It then moves on to an extended discussion of Turkey’s historical and contemporary practices of norm diffusion towards the diaspora and kin spaces. The paper concludes with a reflection on the diaspora/kin spaces and non-western norm diffusion relationship.

2 Diaspora/kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion: Why/how? In the norm research, physical boundaries are often treated as borderlines separating territorially bounded normative orders—it is understandable particularly considering that the governments are the principal targets for norm compliance within their jurisdiction and that the global governmental and non-governmental mechanisms for institutional norm promotion practically require the scholarship to take normative orders as bounded by governmental controls. Therefore, I am aware that this tendency is not a form of cultural essentialism; it is rather a practical treatment, and it never ignores the transnational forms of communication, interaction, and norm transfer nor treats national normative orders as uniform structures (see Tabak et al., 2022, 2023). However, such a conception is relevant to this research, as it makes it clear that diaspora and kin spaces represent a form of cultural/political junctures embodying intersecting normative orders; the one the host country enforces and the one the putative homeland imposes cohabitate in there. The dynamics of whether they are in conflict or co-exist in harmony or how the diasporic/kin communities deal with the multiplicity of orders are out of the scope of this research. Yet the diaspora/kin

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spaces’ distinctive characteristic of hosting intersecting/multiple normative orders is key for us to introduce one more venue in which we can discuss and observe the non-western possibilities of norm diffusion, particularly when the homeland is a non-western political entity. Diaspora and kin are real-world categories for International Relations (IR) research—they are often treated as community or group designators. As groups, diaspora and kin are thought as practising transnationality, multi-loyalty, and multilocationality across borders. The diasporic/kin localities, at this juncture, are considered settings in which trans-state and transnational practices take place for the sake of enabling the linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and religious development or survival of a genuine communal identity. This is why in IR, diaspora and kin communities are long considered “part of a complex triadic relationship” among the ethnic diaspora/kin, their host country, and the homeland (Sheffer, 1986, p. 1). For today’s world, due to the complex global minority governance mechanisms and to the making of digital transnational spaces and forms of diasporic activities, this triadic relationship model practically took a multi-dimensional shape (see Tabak & Beyaz, 2022). Yet, still, diasporic categories continue “operat[ing] as a bridge or intermediary between homeland and host-land, transmitting values and normative understandings” (Ogden, 2008, p. 4; emphasis added). This often also led to the idea that the diasporic presence functions as a form of cultural and political infiltration of the abroad into the domestic (this is yet more a national condition conception, see Beck, 2000). Whether one sees the diasporic presence favourably, as empirical reality, diaspora and kin have come as categories leading to unavoidable encounters between a homeland and a host country by which an enforced cohabitation of the abroad and the domestic beyond the homeland in a host country is created—something I call as the overseas extension of the homeland’s normative order (also see Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Laguerre, 1999; Varadarajan, 2010: 32). However, diaspora/kin should not be merely seen as unitary actors with a capacity to act domestically and internationally and to exert influence on the foreign policies of the homeland, the host country, and the third parties (for such a leaning see Esman, 1986; Constas & Platias, 1993; Melvin & King, 1998; Shain & Barth, 2003; Shain, 2007; Sheffer, 1986). This often leads us to frame diaspora as a group or a substantial entity with a collective action capability—yet, the critical scholarly discussion on diasporic categories long established that speaking of diasporas as the conductor of a struggle or politics is fallacious because the real conductors are the organizations or the organizational components, political parties, paramilitary organizations, media or religious institutions which claim acting on behalf of a putative bounded group (Brubaker et al., 2004). Hence, in the analysis of those conducts, a distinction is needed to be set between the category of diaspora/kin and the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs who are speaking and acting in the name of diaspora/kin, ethnicity, or nation, who are in the business of building such groups, and who are in reality “the chief protagonists of” such conducts (Brubaker, 2002, pp. 170–172). Therefore, other than diasporic groups it would be more coherent “to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices and so on”, by which the perspective may be switched from the “group” as a substantial entity to “groupness” as a political,

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social, cultural, and psychological process or project (Brubaker, 2005, p. 13; also see Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002; Wimmer, 2009). Methodologically speaking, this is where this research urges the scholarship to take diaspora as a category by which (i) a country to which homelandness is attributed, (ii) the host country of a specific minority group, and (iii) the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs of a group to which diasporic qualities are attributed all practice inclusionary or exclusionary groupness. The diasporic spaces, within this very scope, come to be the settings in which this triadic encounter turns into trans-state and transnational practices for norm transfer, norm resistance, and norm change. With regard to the norms research, such a perspective would show that diaspora and kin are political projects in which the ethnocultural or ethnonational norms (of the homeland) facilitate organizational and entrepreneurial performances for groupmaking and reification. Upon this, we see that the diasporic spaces function as a “domestic abroad” in/by which national and state identities, in the case of homeland politics, are made and remade (see Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Varadarajan, 2010, p. 32). In relation to this, norms would provide the necessary cultural idioms in demonstrating the resemblance of diasporic space with the homeland. Accordingly, the entrepreneurs in the putative homeland or in the diasporic locality are in the business of norm transmission through foreign policy or transnational relations for making a group gain the quality of being part of an authentic extraterritorial community (either religious or national) or a normative order. This is a move for making a transnational nation or a transnational ethnic community beyond the homeland or for making an extraterritorial setting a cultural/normative extension of a putative homeland. Norm diffusion to diasporic spaces thus is an entrepreneurial practice of socializing the target diasporic/kin community into certain understandings, mindsets, or identities of the putative homeland. However, in the making of the diffusion, it is the institutionalization of certain norms in the homeland by which the foreign policy of a country is driven (see Boekle et al., 2001; Burley, 1993; Herman, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). It is at this juncture that a norm translates into a policy, hence, gains international mobility and that its meaning is negotiated and reconstructed in a way to actualize the expansion of the homeland’s cultural normative order to overseas localities (see Wiener, 2007, p. 5).

3 Imagining Turkishness—The Making of Ethnonational Norms and Categories The building of Turkey’s homelandness to an extraterritorial and transnational nation thus of its kin-statehood has been a historical practice and dates back to the early 1920s. It would even be claimed that it is a legacy of the late Ottoman Empire, taken over by the new nation-state. Accordingly, the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 as the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire, yet on a smaller territory. The new Republic’s borders were drawn against the presence of Turkish-speaking

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communities beyond its boundaries. This led to mass population movements toward the ‘new’ homeland from mainly the Balkans and the Caucasus. In order to regulate this, the Turkish republic signed population exchange and migration agreements with the neighboring countries to ease the movement of Ottoman remnant Turkishspeaking people to Turkey (Ça˘gaptay, 2001: 8). However, not all remnants made their way to Turkey and remained as minority communities in the form of accidental diasporas (Brubaker, 2000) in their relevant states with a great nostalgia towards Turkey and their Ottoman past. Nonetheless, following the territorial shrinking, the founding Kemalist cadre of the new republic launched a programme for building the new territory (Anatolia) as a true home for the Turkish nation. Accordingly, both the geography and the people within the borders of the new country were reimagined: Anatolia became considered a home to seven thousand years of Turkish civilizational presence, while the people residing in there were redefined and rebuilt as ethnic Turks by the Kemalist regime (Zürcher, 1999). The Kemalist imagination of the new Turk was however secular in character and showed endorsement to certain localized international norms, which this study calls the Kemalist norms. The Kemalist norms were the principal representations of the ‘new’ ethnic Turk created in Kemalist Turkey. These norms’ emergence was through the localisation of several international norms related to nation-state and modernism, some of which were long adopted by the bureaucratic and elite circles of the late Ottoman era. In their localisation, however, there were contentions between those international norms and the local values and culture; Kemalist localisation of these norms appeared to be a state-run method for resolving this contestation. To this end, the foreign norms were modified, localised, and locally institutionalised in the form of ideal and authentic Turkish norms. Such a process, however, was upheld in the name of Kemalist revolutions (inkılab or devrim) of language, education, political, social, legal, and economy and some of the localised and institutionalised Kemalist norms can be listed as follows: secularism (in education, law, state-affairs, and religious affairs), nationalism (in education, language, history, culture, ethnicity, societal organisation), and westernism (in clothing, gender relations, organisation of social life). This new Turk was secular in daily life, public appearance, and education; it was ethnically conscious and was acting in a nationalist manner when it comes to language, geography, and history; and it had a sense of belonging to the new Turkish state rather than to the ancien régime. The Kemalist norms secured the building of ethnic Turks inside Turkey, however, they were utilized to transform also the mostly religiously identified Turkish-speaking Ottoman remnant Muslim communities in the surrounding countries. So, those communities were strived to be socialized into Kemalist Turkishness in order for securing the parallel development of their national identity in their ‘home’ abroad. However, the Kemalist regime in the homeland was not alone in this, the ethnonationalist norm entrepreneurs resided amongst the Turkish-speaking Ottoman remnants also involved in this project and collaborated with the Kemalist regime in the socialization of the Turkish-speaking communities into new ethnic norms.

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This norm transfer did not target only the former Ottoman hinterland. The newly formed migrant and diaspora spaces in particularly Europe following a Turkeyoriginated mass worker emigration in the 1960s and onwards were alike targeted. As a continuity, the state-initiated policies concentrated on protecting the secular and national Turkishness of the emigrants living in the diaspora, and in response, the emigrant Turks cooperated with Turkey’s diplomatic missions in actualizing such a ¸ 2013; Tabak, 2020). mission (Aksel, 2014; Senay, In the 2000s, the historical diasporic and kin spaces have continued functioning as the cultural extension of the mainland, yet the official state position began to “distance from the Kemalist nationalist project of building the ‘Kemalist-Self’ outside Turkey in favour of an Ottoman conception of nation, geography and Turkishness” (Tabak, 2016a, p. 41). In this sense, the Ottoman–Islamic sources of Turkish nationhood have been revived and become imagined as a complementary bond between the diasporic/kin Turks and Turkey (Bulut, 2004). The new diasporic and kinstate mission was thus to imagine Turkishness along cultural and religious lines. This is the context in the justifications for Turkey’s ‘intervening will’ have transformed and become equipped with atavistic arguments of reviving Ottoman-Turkish civilizational memory and legacy abroad (neo-Ottomanism). This ever-changing politico-normative and politico-cultural context is the ground I discuss Turkey as a non-Western home country involving in diffusing its own norms. The governments from diverse political backgrounds, in collaboration with diverse local and overseas ethnopolitical institutional/organizational entrepreneurs, developed strategies to keep the extraterritorial communities with diverse forms of connections to Turkey in tune with cultural and political terms. They thus saw those spaces as cultural and political extension sites. The country also founded institutions with capacities to act transnationally or transnationally redefined the functions of some of the domestic institutions, and the diaspora/kin ethnopolitical entrepreneurs participated in the homeland such ethnicity-building efforts. Both the entrepreneurs of the homeland or of the diaspora/kin spaces benefitted from the lowering of the politico-normative boundaries they otherwise would have towards unrelated parties. This interrelationship, I argue, would well document the functioning of the nonwestern norm diffusion.

4 Ethnonational Norms in circulation—The Kemalist Era (1923–1938) In conveying Kemalist norms to diasporic/kin localities thus in making the Turkishspeaking communities outside Turkey to emulate the new model of Turkishness, the state employed several instruments with the involvement of diplomatic mission members and local ethnopolitical norm-takers. The diplomatic mission members were the official missionaries and the government provided financial aid and equipment in particularly education and media domains of the target minority spaces. The

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local norm-takers in return long cooperated with the members of Turkey’s diplomatic missions in introducing the Kemalist norms into their respective localities thus in teaching Kemalist norms to their fellow community members. The education sector was a primary means for norm diffusion and socialisation. Turkey paid particular attention to the schooling of the Turkish-speaking communities, their attending of education in Turkish language, and their use of Latin alphabets other than Arabic alphabets in Turkish education. Turkey, in this sense, openly urged the Turkish-speaking communities to adopt the Latin script in Turkish schools, supplied their school with Latin script textbooks and education materials, and funded the opening of new Turkish schools. Relatedly, Turkey sent teachers to the kin/diaspora localities to contribute to the Kemalist transformation of the target. These teachers built new schools and introduced Kemalist principles to the community first-hand, similar to the work being done by the diplomatic missions. Furthermore, in media, Turkey subsidized “the newspapers of the pro-Kemalists among the Turkish minorit[ies]”, as they were seen “as easy and influential devices for spreading reformist and secular [Kemalist] ideas to the public” and “a more powerful weapon in any campaign against its opponents” (Boyar & Fleet, 2008, p. 782; Köksal, 2010, p. 207). Turkey’s governmental efforts for norm transfer were participated in by the local community members. In Bulgaria, as organizational platforms for running the ethnopolitical norm entrepreneurship, “the Teachers’ Union attempted to strengthen Turkish identity based on educational reforms, in line with Turkey’s secular reforms” thus promoted the adoption of the Latin scripts in Turkish schools (Köksal, 2010, p. 204). Based on this, the Latin alphabet was adopted to be used in Turkish schools throughout the country in the First National Congress of the Bulgarian Turkish Minority in 1929 (Memi¸so˘glu, 1990). Media outlets as well joined the campaigns thus it was their selfattributed duty to promote Kemalist principles and included an extended coverage of the Kemalist principles and Kemalist interpretation of history in their pages (Boyar & Fleet, 2008). In Greece as well teachers and media were the key norm promoters and worked closely with Turkey’s diplomatic missions. Accordingly, while the Kemalist teachers were exerting themselves heavily for the Turkish-speaking community’s learning the Latin alphabet, the local newspapers were propagating intensely the idea that “learning the new alphabet is the first and the foremost mission of the modern Turk” (Öksüz, 2001, p. 4). In colonial Cyprus, it was the Legion of Teachers campaigned to “educate the Turkish Cypriots to become nationally aware, modern, progressive, and Kemalist persons” (Nesim, 1989, p. 339). With the approval of the British Colonial Authority, they changed the alphabet from Arabic to Latin as soon as Turkey introduced the relevant legislation, and inserted Kemalist revolutions and Turkish history courses in Turkish schools. Pro-Kemalist outlets joined the teachers’ campaigns and socialising efforts. They opposed the wearing of the hijab (headscarves) by Turkish women, while promoting the wearing by the men on the island of the new Turkish hat and western trousers as Kemal Atatürk himself was using (Akgün, 2006, p. 10; Nevzat, 2005, p. 348; Demiryürek, 2003).

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Kemalist ethnonational norms were powerful, as they were promoted by Turkey and the local entrepreneurs, yet the intra-communal contention was not resolved swiftly, as some groups within the remnant communities never renounced their commitment to the ancient regime, religio-cultural identification, and socio-cultural norm structure. In Bulgaria, the pro-Ottoman and pro-Caliphate intellectuals in the community worked hard to keep “the Bulgarian Turks away from any Kemalist influence” (Boyar & Fleet, 2008, p. 776; Köksal, 2010, p. 206). To prevent the Kemalist socialization of the community, they opposed Turkish schools and newspapers that adopted the Latin alphabet and initiated a vigorous campaign to re-introduce the Arabic script in schools that started teaching with the new alphabet, and from 1934 Bulgarian Turkish schools began to return to the old script (Boyar & Fleet, 2008). Similarly, in Greece, pro-Kemalist engagements were not always welcomed by religiously motivated opponents of Kemalist Turkishness, and eventually, hostility to everything related to Kemalism emerged in Greece. Later, a struggle for the control of educational institutions began and both sides attacked each other through the press. In Cyprus as well, the opponents of Kemalist ethnonational norms resisted the socialization efforts. They routinely opposed the Latin alphabet, Kemalist dress codes, secular education, and even the use of ethnic Turk as a social identity (Demiryürek, 2003; Nesim, 1989; Ozdemir, 1999, p. 193). In the long run, however, as the Kemalists controlled the education system and the press in all post-Ottoman Turkish speaking diasporic/kin communities, they institutionalized the Kemalist ethnonational norms and eventually achieved mass ethnic consciousness in society in line with Kemalist Turkey.

5 Ethnonational Norms in Circulation—The Post-War Era Turkey’s ethnonational norm diffusion to overseas diaspora/kin spaces continued even after Kemal Atatürk’s death thus those accidental diasporic spaces continued to function as a cultural extension of the mainland during the post-war era. Yet, a new domain of diasporic space will emerge in this period, particularly by the 1960s onward when a Turkey-originated mass worker emigration particularly to Europe took place. As a continuation of Turkey’s building of ethnic Turks abroad, the nationalist norm promotion was evident in post-colonial Cyprus, Greece, and Bulgaria. In post-colonial Cyprus, Britain’s failure to peacefully giving an end to its mandate and the Greek Cypriots’ aspirations to unite with Greece led to the eruption of intercommunal political and military conflicts between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. For the ethnic Turkish community, this led to fervent nationalism, something the Kemalist ethnopolitical entrepreneurs used to further control the politics of the Turkish-speaking community (Beckingham, 1957, p. 8; Xupolia, 2011, p. 116). The island’s Kemalist elites thus organized a counter-struggle with the backing of

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Turkey against the Greek Cypriots and in return gained the chance to increase nationalist attraction among the Turkish community by forcibly imposing nationalist and ethnic practices of ‘Turkishness’ (Kızılyürek, 2002, p. 337; Uzer, 2010, p. 124). They, for instance, ran a ‘Citizen Speak Turkish’ campaign similar to the one prevalent in Turkey in the 1930s to keep the community ethnically self-conscious, established a ‘Department for People’s Education’ responsible for homogenizing society in terms of language education “based on the same curriculum as that of Turkey”, changed the names of the “villages and towns where Turkish Cypriots lived” or the personal names and local business emblems, which were formerly Persian or Arabic, with pure Turkish names (Kızılyürek & Gautier-Kızılyürek, 2004, pp. 46–7; Kızılyürek, 2002, p. 338; Hatay, 2008, p. 149). Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, as a result of which a de facto independent state was established in the northern part of the island in 1983 (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, TRNC), was a development that massively advances the ethnonational project on the island. Under Turkey’s military presence and watch, the new republic adopted Turkey’s national days and the national anthem as its own and the Kemalist principles became part of the constitution (Killoran, 1998, p. 187). The Kemalist secular and nationalist elites within the ethnic Turkish minority in Greece as well continued working for the ethnonational cause after the 1940s. Turkey continued to send teachers to Turkish schools and supported the opening of new schools (Popovic, 1995, p. 350). However, the developments in Cyprus and Turkey’s military intervention had negative and even devastating effects on the ethnic Turks in Greece. As part of a deliberately repressive campaign, Greek authorities replaced Turkish place names with Greek ones, the use of Turkish names was officially banned, the number of Turkish schools dwindled, Turkish religious leaders and foundations (waqfs) were subjected to official pressure, and the ethnic identity of Turks was rejected in legal and official historiography (Küçükcan, 1999; Poulton, 1997). However, these policies were counterproductive and with Turkey consistently promoting a Turkish national identity, ethnic Turks in Greece remained firmly rooted in Kemalist principles, and their nationalist appeal further increased. At this point, Turkey maintained intense and collaborative relations with the secular nationalist elites of the society. In Bulgaria, similarly, by the 1950s and 1960s, the religiously conscious Turkishspeaking community that existed in the 1930s was fully transformed into an “ethnically conscious Turkish minority” (Höpken, 1997, p. 61). No doubt, the communist regime and the nationalities policies of it facilitated this process as well, however, the ethnopolitical elites of the community maintained an uninterrupted communication with Turkey and even a “[l]ocal Turkish literature” heavily influenced by Turkey’s secular and Kemalist literary writings “began to emerge, along with the language and culture of the Turks in Bulgaria” (Karpat, 1995, p. 733; Eminov, 1986, p. 506). Turkey’s ethnonational support turned into a new phase when the communist regime in Bulgaria began a campaign of denial against the ethnic rights of the community in the 1980s. Turkey heavily criticized the Bulgarian government and started helping the Turkish society in their demands for ethnic rights in the international

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arena when Turkish education was banned, Turkish language and cultural institutions were closed down or the Turks were forced to take Bulgarian names (Bojkov, 2004; Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2003; Küçükcan, 1999). Finally, when this intolerance resulted in the forced mass exodus of approximately 340,000 people in 1989, Turkey welcomed them with open arms (Karpat, 1995, p. 725). The newly formed migrant and diaspora spaces in particularly Europe in the 1960s and onwards as well served as the target of Turkey’s overseas kin/diaspora politics and norm transfer (Tabak, 2020). Similar to Turkey’s ethnonational involvements in the former Ottoman spaces surrounding the country, the Kemalist transnational involvements targeted the Turkish migrant communities and the newly formed diasporic spaces. The state thus initiated policies concentrating on protecting the secular 2013). and national Turkishness of the emigrants living in the diaspora (Senay, ¸ Moreover, Turkey’s diplomatic missions tried to create Turkish political lobbies that would fulfil certain tasks on behalf of the Turkish state, including organizing petitions against the anti-Turkish and anti-Kemalist initiatives the Armenian and/or Kurdish lobbies pursue. The diplomatic missions also organized national day ceremonies and commemorations, promoted Turkish culture and Turkish secular Islam, and provided Turkish schools with textbooks published by the Ministry of National Education in Turkey. The ethnopolitical entrepreneurs of the now diaspora communities, in return, “commit[ted] themselves [in]to the propagation of the Kemalist ideology of Kemalism in their everyday lives” of the diaspora community (Senay, ¸ 2013, p. 164). They considered themselves part of the Turkish state’s transnational political project and developed mechanisms for political lobbying in the host countries to defend the Turkish state’s national causes—mostly related to Armenian and Kurdish issues—and to suppress anti-secular Turkish-Islamic groups within the diaspora (Baser, 2016).

6 Ethnonational Norms in Circulation—The AKP Era The ethnonational norm diffusion to kin and diaspora spaces continued also under the religious conservative AKP rule, yet this time the norm in circulation was redefined in a way to represent more the religio-cultural legacy of Turkish history. So, while the intention behind and the means of diffusion remained similar, a religiocultural consciousness and an atavism to the civilizational past of the Turkish-Islamic history were included in the normalcy of living as an ethnic Turk both in Turkey and in the diaspora and kin localities (Tabak, 2016b). Within this scope, under a religious conservative government, the historical practice of providing overseas religious services for protecting the secularly defined religio-cultural character of the diaspora and kin communities went through a slight change in format—Turkey initiated campaigns rather for promoting ethnoreligious re-identification of Turkishness. Diaspora and kin communities have been accordingly redefined as the contemporary holders and representatives of a distinctive and superior Turkish/Ottoman culture, nation, and civilization (Tabak, 2016a, p. 128). This meant for the kin and diaspora

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communities that they are asked to redefine their ethnic identity along religio-cultural lines and to maintain a strong attachment to Ottoman historical and cultural legacy while keeping a sharp distance from rival forms of ethnocultural Islamic practices, particularly Salafism. In the transmission of these frames, two institutions with capacities to act transnationally and with public diplomacy missions have been particularly employed, namely, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Yet, along with them several other governmental bodies with transnational norm diffusion missions have been included, such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Yunus Emre Institute, Turkish Maarif Foundation, together with the cultural and political attachés within the diplomatic missions. In fact, the local humanitarian aid organizations or religious groups as well joined the governmental transnational mission of diffusing particularly ethnocultural norms to the diasporic/kin spaces. The YTB, as the primary institution founded in 2010 with a mission of strengthening Turkey’s relations with Turkish citizens or kin and related communities abroad, has facilitated the diffusion of this ‘new’ Turkishness and its norms through campaigns such as the fight against ethno-religious assimilation. For instance, the YTB initiated campaigns in the diaspora spaces in cooperation with diasporic civil society organizations for preventing “the placement of foster children of Turkish descent with non-Turkish and non-Muslim foster parents in Europe”—the idea endorsed was that “these children need to be placed with Turkish foster parents and, if not, Muslim foster parents”, the abeyance of which “would come to mean changing the religion of the children” (Altınok, 2012, p. 7). This has been a mission promoted as “protecting Hasan [a traditional Turkish/Muslim name] from being Hans [a German name] [Hasanlar Hans Olmasın!]”—thus making the diasporic communities to maintain their attachment to a Turkish Islamic religious identity has been the prime concern (Tabak, 2016a, 2016b, p. 47). Diyanet as well joined the campaign of protecting the Turkish Islamic religious identity of the diasporic and kin communities. It sponsored the building of theology faculties and religious schools in kin spaces or provided students from these communities to study at religious schools and theology faculties in Turkey (Aydın, 2008; Bulut, 2004; Korkut, 2010). Diyanet also developed official ties with the religious authorities and campaigned for the employment of Turkey graduates (the locals who received religious/theology education in Turkey) in mosques as imams and preachers, particularly in the places populated by Turkish-speaking communities (Tabak, 2016a, 2016b). The local Turkey Alumni Unions (Türkiye Mezunları Birli˘gi), established with the support of the YTB in the countries receiving funds for higher education opportunities in Turkey, closely cooperate with Diyanet in this regard. Again, Diyanet, in collaboration with TIKA, initiated campaigns for the restoration or for the building of Ottoman-style mosques, by which the diasporic and kin places could be redecorated as Turkish Islamic spaces. Turkey renovated tens of mosques in the Balkans and built several others throughout Europe (Aydın, 2008). The new ethnonational frame was welcomed by some within the diaspora and kin spaces, yet it also caused certain contestations. The ethnonational entrepreneurs still

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embracing the Kemalist frames resisted Turkey’s new ethnoreligious Turkishness and maintained ethnically defined conceptualizations of nationhood, geography, and Turkishness in imagining Turkey and the Turkish diasporic and kin spaces. Such a reaction was also because the diasporic ethnopolitical entrepreneurs already independently invented Ottoman/Turkish Islamic frames or discursively utilized Ottoman legacy as a means of resistance to local hostilities targeting their very presence, for instance, in Kosovo, where the ethnic Turks often face public denials regarding their ethnic identity. So, the Ottoman religio-cultural past of Kosovo long served to their ethnic cause and Turkey’s new frames were rather detrimental to the ethnic cause (Tabak, 2016a, 2016b). Also, since diaspora voting was introduced in Turkey in 2012, the diaspora communities established uninterrupted contact with the now counterhegemonic Kemalist dissident groups in Turkey and collaborated with them in their reactions to the religious approach Turkey bears (Tabak, 2020, p. 151). This in return revealed that after the Kemalist era, the diaspora and kin localities one more time turned into extraterritorial spaces the government-opposition relations of Turkey are maintained.

7 In Lieu of a Conclusion This research studied the non-western possibilities of norm diffusion in the example of Turkey’s, as a non-western agent, targeted policy of norm transfer to diasporic and kin localities abroad. For the non-western norm research, the empirical scrutiny made it clear that diaspora and kin spaces stand out as a venue in which non-western possibilities of norm diffusion can be traced. Diaspora politics is a form of engagement almost all states pursued historically and the interactions between the diasporic category and the so-called homeland have been in the form of gives and takes—ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in both spaces involved in practices for moulding each other due to the idea that both categories are considered as an extension to each other. This is a practice involving the transfer of norms and accompanying frames including culture and identity, benefitting from easy access and fewer boundaries both categories provided to each other. However, the interactions between the homeland and the diasporic categories were not a mere centre-periphery relationship. While the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs within the diasporic communities tend to look up to the mainland in group-making and ethnicity building, they also independently invented the norms of the mainland without necessarily a need for direct diffusion from or involvement of the home¸ (2013) confirmingly showed that both the land. Tabak (2016a, 2016b) and Senay historical and contemporary local agents have been heavily involved in either transferring or borrowing Kemalist frames in their efforts for ethnically and nationally transforming the historically confessionally identified communities. In the study of the non-western norm-diffusion, therefore, the scholarship does not categorically need to treat the norms as static, nor should consider the target agents as passive

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norm receivers—as seen in the diasporic ethnopolitical entrepreneurs’ practices, the receivers are active participants of the norm diffusion process and they can reinvent norms without overseas influence. Relatedly, the norm receiving localities have been in global span in the case of Turkish diasporic and kin spaces, so the norm diffusion was a multidirectional process, other than unidirectional or unilineal one as the diffusionists assumed. Moreover, having been thought together with the above-mentioned reinvention of Kemalist norms outside of Turkey, it would be highly likely that the ethnopolitical entrepreneurs in the diasporic localities would give to the norms of the homeland further mobility towards other overseas localities. In the end, diasporic spaces cannot be considered static settings as well, people maintain dispersion away from their homeland and they bring contestations with them to the new localities. Tabak (2016a, 2016b) informs us that the Yüzellilikler—the Ottomans who fled the country after being de-nationalized by the Kemalist government due to their oppositional involvements during the national liberation war—travelled between diasporic localities in the Balkans and Cyprus throughout the 1920s and ‘30s and in each diasporic space they went they initiated or joined the anti-Kemalist local resistances and proOttoman campaigns. Therefore, the Kemalist and anti-Kemalist frames were made and remade in the course of such mobilization in distinct diasporic settings. The contemporary contestations that emerged out of the AKP’s religious-favouring policies confirm this as well. However, further research may be needed for drawing a complete picture of the spreading of such contentions throughout diasporic spaces in various countries. Turkey’s course of ethnonational norm diffusion to diasporic spaces also showed that the country—concomitant to the changes in the government—endeavoured to unmake the former norms the country historically promoted. The Kemalist nationalist norms within the diasporic spaces, within this scope, were challenged by the ethnoreligious Turkishness norms of the post-Kemalist governments. Plus, the success and failure of the diffusion of Turkey’s norms were also determined by the existing normative orders within the diasporic spaces—in the historical context, the Kemalist norms’ diffusion led to fierce contestations and crises of validation in diasporic spaces due to their challenging the existing religio-cultural norms. In return, in the contemporary context, a similar contestation emerged when Turkey began initiating the transfer of religio-cultural Turkishness norms as rival frames of the existing Kemalist and secular ethnic normative frames. Therefore, as an example of a practice of non-western norm diffusion, Turkey’s diaspora politics involve both successful and failed cases of norm diffusion.

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Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS Michelle Scobie

1 Introduction This chapter used the concepts of agency and norm diffusion to explain norm dynamics in climate policy and the agency of SIDS. Are SIDS norm shapers or norm takers and what forms of leverage have SIDS in their exercise of agency in governance? Traditional norm diffusion theory explains how norms, shaped by powerful actors, emerge, enter new spaces, sometimes amidst contestation and opposition before becoming modified or adjusted and finally embedded in policy and institutions. Climate norms of interest to SIDS include those around mitigation and adaptation, including climate justice, high ambition to reduce GHG emissions, care for nature and future generations, the polluter pays principle, inter and intra generational justice, and the rights of nature. Agency in the environmental governance literature considers agents as purposive and authoritative actors that contribute to shape governance outcomes. Agency thus relates to the types of actors but also to the types of actions, the structures within which the actor acts as well as those other subjects -receivers- with whom the actor or agent interacts. This chapter argues that SIDS use their unique vulnerabilities as leverage to exercise agency in the climate arena. SIDS are not always norm takers nor marginalized subjects of norm penetration and diffusion. However, SIDS’ agency over outcomes, funding, policy, and global climate ambition is still limited, because of their limited political and economic leverage, their economic and environmental vulnerabilities and dependence on development assistance for implementing domestic climate policy. The chapter first explains the context of SIDS in relation to climate change, second it develops a norm diffusion and agency framework of agency-norm diffusion that can be applied to actors and norm diffusion in climate change governance and points M. Scobie (B) The Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies (UWI), St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_8

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to the content of some of the norms under discussion. Third, using norm diffusion and agency framework it provides evidence of SIDS’ existing and potential points of power and leverage, the instances where SIDS are norm takers or agency receivers, and the architectures and structures that limit SIDS agency in norm diffusion. The chapter concludes suggesting that norm diffusion theory can benefit from a greater focus on the nature of agency and include the power of vulnerability to shape the direction of norms. Small size can be the source of power and leverage even when global structures limit power and agency.

1.1 SIDS Contexts and Climate Change Governance Pacific, Indian, Mediterranean, and Caribbean small island developing states (SIDS) account for a substantial proportion of world’s political space: they are fifty-eight countries and territories and over sixty million people. SIDS must shape their foreign and national climate policies by navigating through a complex web of global norms and actors. They share common challenges to their precarious economic and environmental survival, exacerbated by the social, economic, and environmental transformations of the Anthropocene (Kuruppu & Willie, 2015; Popke et al., 2016; UNESCO, 2016). They are increasingly affected by rising temperatures, more intense storms, droughts, changing rainfall patterns, sea level rise, storm surges, invasive species and coral bleaching, all of which, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report, are intensified by climate change (IPCC, 2022). SIDS battled the effects of natural hazards like hurricanes, volcanoes, storm surges and drought for centuries, but climate change is a new existential threat (LaRocque, 2017), that has further magnified their economic vulnerabilities and development challenges. SIDS struggle to offer globally competitive exports because they lack economies of scale and have high production and transport costs also because of their remoteness from global markets. SIDS are net energy importers, heavily dependent on all imports, and are dangerously exposed to the vagaries of global markets (Sanders, 1997). These islands, formerly colonies of metropolitan states, transitioned from subsistence agriculture to export-oriented economies, primarily to serve the interests of more developed metropolitan countries (Niles & Lloyd, 2013). SIDS’ economies are vulnerable to external economic shocks and crumble with a contraction of the global economy or with an interruption of local production after a natural disaster (Sanders, 1997). Their undiversified economies are less resilient (Lowitt et al., 2015) than those of other developing states. Many SIDS have unsustainable levels of debt, limited fiscal space (Alleyne et al., 2014) and have high levels of inequality (CARICOM, 2013). SIDS’ climate policy include adaptation and mitigation targets. SIDS’ motivations towards renewables are more economic than environmental. Their contribution to global emissions is negligible (together less than one percent). Reducing fossil fuel use is a priority for their economic viability and energy security. Caribbean islands, other than Trinidad and Tobago, are net energy importers, as much as 90% of

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commercial energy is imported in some islands (Scobie, 2019b). Inefficiencies in the power sector and expensive fuel imports result in high electricity costs. High production cost render Caribbean islands less attractive for foreign investors, their products less competitive in international trade (McIntyre et al., 2016), expose the states to worsening terms of trade and negative fiscal imbalances. Energy independence may reduce the shocks to their economies caused by global oil price fluctuations and is the main motivation for SIDS to adopt green energy norms. For instance, early studies showed that Jamaica’s target to increase energy efficiency by 71 percent would lead to a 69 percent reduction in imports and a 14 percent increase in GDP. A 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency in Antigua and Barbuda may reduce its energy bill by 13 percent, oil imports by 20 percent and over the long term contribute to a 4 percent growth in GDP (McIntyre et al., 2016). Renewables in SIDS can contribute to national development and job creation (Ochs et al., 2015). The Caribbean populations have 100% access to energy in urban and rural populations, but the countries produce negligible amounts of renewable energy. Caribbean SIDS’ energy efficiency is low and supply unreliable, natural disasters sometimes destroy electricity distribution systems; transmission and distribution lines are short and some generated energy is lost in transmission (Vynne, 2016); companies use old or outdated medium or low speed diesel or heavy fuel generators for electricity production; power grids are old, poorly maintained and contribute to transmission losses and frequent power outages; in some islands high levels of illegal grid connections contribute to commercial losses for the utility companies. Often, larger establishments- especially in the tourism sector- have solved the problem of unreliability by investing in their own off-grid power plants at substantial costs. Special challenges for SIDS include policy coherence and enforceability of policy and related difficulties in implementing coordination mechanisms between state and non-state actors; lack of sustainable donor and state funding for adaptation initiatives; climatic and socio-economic data deficits; higher per unit costs for infrastructure solutions because of the lack of economies of scale in the small territories; the small size of government departments that manage climate change related issues and a lack human, financial and technical resources; the lack of the absorptive capacity to use available climate grants and funding. In addition, there is the danger of piecemeal responses that provide urgent but short-term adaptation interventions that may exacerbate climate and environmental impacts on related ecosystems in the future. Mitigation policy in Caribbean SIDS is linked to energy efficiency and to increasing renewable energy production to decrease the fuel import bill and to lessen energy insecurity (Scobie, 2018). Adaptation in SIDS is linked to disaster risk reduction and to the protection of ecosystems, food, and water security, and to protecting livelihoods. SIDS’ climate agency is done in collaboration -when not in conflict witha wide range of actors, from development partners, regional international organizations, subnational authorities, non-state actors including community groups, the transnational and local private sectors etc. (Scobie, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d). SIDS often use climate norms, particularly climate justice as the basis for their foreign policy in climate negotiations. In the lead up to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the most recent legally binding treaty on climate change, SIDS called attention to

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their unique vulnerabilities to climate change and their very limited contribution to the climate crisis. They lobbied for increased climate funding, technology sharing and capacity building to help cope with the economic and environmental costs of climate change. They argued for stronger language on responsibly, enforceability (Viola et al., 2012) and recognition of liability for loss and damage caused by carbon emissions.

1.2 Agency and Norm Diffusion Agency is a useful lens to understand SIDS’s roles in climate change norm dynamics. The norm diffusion and agency framework frames the concepts around agency and norms in the contexts of SIDS. The framework has 3 levels, each with key conceptual elements: CONTEXTS, STRUCTURE, SCALE (Institutional scales: international, regional, national; Energy security, sustainable development; Temporal and cultural contexts); AGENCY (Actions; Actors; Structure; Receivers); NORM DIFFUSION (Emergence, Penetration; Contestation, Rejection; Modification, Translation; Disappearance). Agents are actors that have the capacity to act or make things happen (2013b; Westley et al., 2013a) and can steer or prescribe behavior (Biermann et al., 2010; Dellas et al., 2011). Scobie et. al. conceptualised agency in terms of four broad categories (Scobie et al., 2020a, 2020b). First, the agency-actor nexus, which highlights the nature of authority and forms of agency. Authority may be derived from a variety of sources. There is a formal principal-agent relationship that exists for example between states and the secretariats of international organisations (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). Authority may also be derived when other actors recognise the agent’s legitimacy (Bernstein, 2011; Hurd, 1999), economic or other clout (Cashore, 2002). Second, the agency-receiver nexus addresses the dynamic relationship between the agent and a wider set of actors. Agents have power relative to other actors and some actors may even be powerless receivers of agency in some contexts and governance architectures. Agency in this context may be acquired, increased, decreased, transferred (Partzsch & Ziegler, 2011) shared among actors (Bouteligier, 2011) or even lost (Sending & Neumann, 2006) with actors becoming receivers of agency. Third, the agency-action nexus focuses on the different forms that the agency can take. Agency is exercised by international organisations, state administrations and private organisations, national and subnational agencies, partnerships, networks (Benecke, 2011) and range of non-state actors (Macdonald & Macdonald, 2017; Rasche & Waddock, 2014) etc. Actions may also be attributed to non-human agents, such as nature, technology ((Wardekker et al., 2009) and God (DiMento, 2015; Francis, 2015). And finally, the agency-structure nexus highlights how the agency is exercised within a broader system such as within organisations and institutions, across geographic and temporal scales (Scobie et al., 2020a, 2020b) from global to local and past to future and within the context of regimes and norms.

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Norm diffusion theories sometimes neglect the role of agency in norm development and transmission (Checkel, 1999), focusing on the structural elements of norm dynamics. However, agency and agency dynamics can help to illustrate how global climate change governance norms diffuse in international and national contexts. States are influenced not only by power and material interests but also by the norms that determine appropriateness (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) even in the absence of regulation because of the inherent legitimacy that the norm holds among the respective actors (Florini, 1996). A norm may be a stand-alone concept, comprising of a problem, a value and a type of prescribed behaviour, or a concept or norm that is part of a broader “norm cluster” that comprises of distinct but interlinked values (Winston, 2017). Norms are shaped inter alia by actors in their mutual interactions and in turn influence standards of behaviour among those actors (Scobie, 2019d). Actors’ shared understandings give rise to and maintain the norms which later become embedded within national and international regulatory and legal systems. Norms are always in flux, they have different trajectories, they develop, are diffused and cascade through governance systems sometimes in ways that entrench power asymmetries across geographical scales (Tabak, 2020). Norms may become embedded within the policy and may be contested and strengthened or weakened (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018), eroded, reinterpreted, translated, modified, redefined, rejected and may disappear (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Norm entrepreneurs are actors and agents that use power (knowledge, science, finance, lobbying etc.) to shape norm trajectories (Bucher, 2014) even while interacting with and challenging other norm entrepreneurs (Krook & True, 2012). Global norms are more likely to penetrate local spaces where there is a high degree of synergy between the global norm and traditional local beliefs, practices, systems and institutions (Acharya, 2004) or where local groups lobby to implement the norm (Szent-Iványi & Timofejevs, 2020). Historical contexts and economic and environmental shocks, new scientific knowledge may also contribute to norm legitimacy, acceptance and penetration. SIDS’ place in the diffusion of climate norms is interesting, they are norm shapers and norm takers and have found ways to use both roles to influence international agendas in ways that will benefit their domestic climate goals. SIDS are agents that contribute to norm diffusion as legitimate and authoritative actors. SIDS are also norm receivers within the dynamics of global structures, contexts, and scale that in some cases limit SIDS’ influence in the global political and economic order.

1.3 Content of Norms and SIDS’ Agency This section examines the content of some climate change governance norms and SIDS’ agency in shaping these global climate norms. The next section uses the norm diffusion and agency framework to point to ways in which SIDS exercised agency as well as the institutions and structures of norm diffusion that the SIDS created or participated in.

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SIDS have not contributed to historic emissions yet accept climate duties and have emission reduction targets. This and their vulnerability to climate change impacts give SIDS moral authority to be leaders on norms related to high ambition mitigation targets, climate justice and sustainable development. The sustainable development concept was first promoted by Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863–1945), RussianUkrainian geophysicists (Kautzleben & Muller, 2014). Later, at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, developing states, many with few years of independence from former colonial powers, insisted that environmental stewardship should not ignore the development needs of poorer and more recently independent states. Developing states continued to promote this emerging norm at the 1992 Rio and the 2002 Johannesburg summits on sustainable development. They argued that it would be unjust for developed states to kick away the ladder (Chang, 2002) of industrial growth when developing states have begun their climb. SIDS, together with other developing states, contributed to the emergence and or diffusion of other sustainable development and climate justice norms. These norms are now embedded in environmental institutions and initiatives and include norms like common but differentiated responsibilities; common heritage and common concern of humankind; the duty to provide prior notification of potentially harmful situations; the duty to consult in good faith; state responsibility and the duty not to cause and to prevent environmental harm; the duty of good neighbourliness and the duty to cooperate; environmental justice including an equal right of access to justice (environmental procedural rights); the principle of inter-generational equity and intragenerational equity (Caney, 2010); the right to development and state sovereignty; the polluter and user pays principles; the precautionary principle; the principle of subsidiarity; the principle of sustainable development (Brundtland Report, WSSD) etc. The climate justice norm creates distributive and compensatory justice duties (O’Brien & Barnett, 2013; Okereke, 2006) and rights for states, companies, individuals and even in duties to nature (Scobie, 2019a) and is the basis for SIDS’ support for loss and damage climate financing (discussed above). The Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) and SIDS’ groupings like the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) continue to press the climate justice norm and many of these issues have become normalised in international climate negotiations. AOSIS argues that developed states, which bear historical responsibility for environmental degradation, should help fund developing states’ efforts to implement environmental sustainability goals, by providing, “adequate, new, additional, predictable and stable” financial resources, capacity building and technology transfer beyond traditional development aid (CARICOM, 2013). Over the years, issues that began as proposals from SIDS have become mainstreamed into negotiations. At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, SIDS lobbied for the 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels global warming target, for adaptation funding and for legally binding commitments from states (Corneloup & Mol, 2014). SIDS pushed for financing for loss and damage by the quick implementation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for the recognition of the polluter pays principle (Ashe et al., 1999); for an initial

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capitalization of the Green Climate Fund and for more efficient access and simplified approval procedures for developing states (AOSIS, 2014). Finally in 2015 in the Paris Agreement, states accepted the 1.5 aspirational target. In Art. 9-developed states committed to provide resources for adaptation and mitigation for developing states, including scaled up financial resources and more efficient access to financial resources. In Art 11 developed states committed to: “facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information”.

2 Agency—Actor Nexus Agents are actors with authority which may be derived from economic or other clout (Cashore, 2002) or from when other actors recognise the agent’s legitimacy (Bernstein, 2011; Hurd, 1999). Paradoxically, SIDS have authority and legitimacy in climate discourses largely due to their unique vulnerabilities (Rasheed, 2019). SIDS, together with developing states, are a special category of actors in global efforts towards sustainable development. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro concluded inter alia with a declaration of principles related to sustainable development and with a global recognition of the special needs of developing states (more on this below). The 2015 Sustainable Development Goals, similarly, highlight the special place of developing countries and SIDS. Goal Seven on climate change includes Targets 13. A to, “Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing countries”, and Target 13.B, to, “Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States”. SIDS are agents with authority and legitimacy in international climate governance. Climate change represents an existential threat to SIDS because of their unique geographical and geomorphological characteristics but also because of their prehistorical economic vulnerabilities in the global neo-liberal order. Further, SIDS have not contributed to climate change but are “victims” of the negligent historical and present climate actions of industrialised states. SIDS use this legitimacy as a lever to build “niche diplomacy” and coalitions to obtain the support, resources and expertise of like-minded states in climate negotiations (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012) and AOSIS, has emerged as an authoritative stakeholder, leader and “moral voice” in climate negotiations since 1990. The agency and authority of SIDS in the diffusion of norms promoted by SIDS in climate governance are linked to SIDS’ positions of weakness. As discussed below however, this agency to contribute to norm diffusion—on issues like climate justice, the polluter pays principles and high ambition mitigation goals—has not always resulted in substantial gains for SIDS.

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3 Agency-Receiver Nexus The agency-receiver element of agency addresses the relationship between the agent and the wider set of actors and the relative changes in power/powerlessness among them (Sending & Neumann, 2006). One area where SIDS are norm-receivers, is on renewable energy policy and SIDS governments are pressed by local and international actors to facilitate and even subsidise or risk-share for clean energy investments, which are more costly because of SIDS’ remoteness and lack of economies of scale (IRENA, 2016). Renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency (EE) policies are now high on the agendas of Pacific (Lucas et al., 2017) and Caribbean SIDS (Scobie, 2019b) but their renewable energy projects often depend upon external financial and technical support. The tropical islands have substantial but largely untapped renewable energy resources in geothermal, hydropower, modern biomass, solar and wind (Ochs et al., 2015; McIntyre et al., 2016) and logically energy efficiency is one of the pillars of the Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) Strategic Plan 2020–2030, the successor to the CARICOM Strategic Plan 2015–2019 (CARICOM, 2014, 3). Caribbean SIDS as early as 2015 set ambitious RE targets: 100% renewables for Dominica, 35% for St. Lucia and 20% for Grenada for example although these have not been met due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, but also because of funding and organisation delays. RE policies put part of the global mitigation burden on the shoulders of SIDS’ governments that inter alia also thereby provide markets for the developed states that export renewable technologies, when these risks of investing in renewables should not be borne by taxpayers and when SIDS governments should prioritise other pressing socio-economic issues like providing water, universal health care and education, housing etc. (Scobie, 2019b). Yet, even as norm-receivers, SIDS are not without the agency. For SIDS, RE uptake is less influenced by mitigation norms and more by their need to secure future energy security and reduce fuel import bills. SIDS use the green energy norms to lobby for international climate aid to transition to renewables (Niles & Lloyd, 2013). At the global level, there are other important areas where SIDS are not normshapers but rather passive receivers of agency from more powerful actors, even while SIDS’ activism continues to promote climate justice norms. For instance, it is very unlikely that the 1.5-degree cap on global warming, the aspirational target that AOSIS lobbied so forcefully for in Paris will be achieved (IPCC, 2022; Victor & Kennel, 2014). Furthermore, although the Paris Agreement and the SDGs reaffirmed the importance of climate financing (the minimum funding target of 100Bn USD per year for developing states), the mechanisms to access the funding are difficult and some SIDS are concerned that many of the adaptation funds will take the form of loans that increase SIDS’ future debt (Pacific Island Development Forum, 2015). SIDS also struggle with diffusing norms related to climate change loss and damage and it is unlikely that SIDS will succeed in moving loss and damage discussions towards fault and compensation, liability and climate justice (Kelman, 2014). Without a normative shift to justice and compensation, the mechanism to address loss and

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damage will be less than adequate (Boyd et al., 2017). The differing normative stances on climate losses have implications for legal liability and climate duties (Vanhala and Hestbaek, 2016). A liability framing gives greater force to SIDS’ calls for financing to face climate losses. At the Paris Climate Conference SIDS argued, based on the polluter pays principle, that adaptation finance should be separate from compensation due to SIDS. This compensation would finance the inevitable and already apparent (loss and damage) impacts of climate change (Mace & Verheyen, 2016). Most states accept that climate justice includes distributive or burden sharing duties, but powerful developed states reject the restorative, compensatory or corrective justice elements that would include the duty for historic polluters to provide compensation for loss and damage (Scobie, 2019a). Developed states refused to frame climate financing as compensation for liability incurred. Although the Paris Agreement recognized already occurring climate loss and damage impacts as a separate issue from adaptation, and despite the efforts of SIDS and others to change the normative framing, the Paris Agreement excludes the legal liability of states for loss and damage and the duty to provide compensation.

3.1 Agency—Structure, Agency-Action Nexus—Norms and SIDS’s Agency The agency-structure nexus points to the broader geographic, institutional, temporal spheres and scales within which agency is exercised. The agency-action nexus provides a lens that focuses on the types of actions, available within the structures, in this case for SIDS (Scobie et al., 2020a, 2020b). The structures of global climate and energy governance are forums for SIDS’ agency in norm building, particularly on issues of climate justice. Global energy and climate governance is illustrative of the type of actors with which SIDS must engage as well as the types of actions available to SIDS for norm creation and diffusion. Energy governance is the collective action of international actors to manage and distribute energy goods and services (Florini & Sovacool, 2009) and includes policies related to renewable energy, fossil fuel subsidy reform and carbon pricing (Zelli et al., 2020). Global energy norms are shaped inter alia by large international institutions in which SIDS participate and, in some cases, help to create and promote. Among the larger structures with which SIDS engage are the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the International Energy Association (IEA), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) as well as by summit processes under the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and related agencies (IPCC, 2014; Rosen & Guenther, 2016). One of the earliest global forums that articulated SIDS’ perspectives was the first UN Conference on SIDS that produced as its outcome the 1994 Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA). The most recent major SIDS agenda setting resulted in the 2014 SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway (Scobie, 2019c).

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SIDS use international agencies and summits to push for norms that would facilitate a global recognition of their unique circumstances, vulnerability, and therefore their special place in climate justice. For example, SIDS strategically use climate diplomacy (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014), normative suasion (Checkel, 2005, 804–805) and social learning in the context of the UNFCCC to encourage higher ambition targets, contributing inter alia, to the 1.5 degrees Celsius aspirational global warming target in the legally binding Paris Agreement (Ourbak and Magnan, 2017; Scobie, 2019a). Coalitions with more powerful states are also levers that help states or organisations to promote their interests (Sikkink, 2014). The Maldives and Tuvalu used alliances, advocacy networks and the media (Jaschik, 2014) to extend their agency. Public–private partnerships (Burch et al., 2013; Pattberg, 2010) were actively promoted by SIDS to support their adaptation and mitigation goals, and 136 of the 302 partnerships registered at the 2014 UN Conference on SIDS held in SAMOA were related to climate change. Global non-state protest movements (including youth-led ones that represent future generations (Feldman, 2021)), private corporations, the media (Jaschik, 2014), are also part of the global architectures of climate governance as orchestrators that contribute to the penetration of high ambition climate mitigation norms (Chan et al., 2021) that are of interest to SIDS. At national scales, environmental groups contribute to norm diffusion that may lead to changes in public policy and industry practices (Scobie, 2019a). Private actors are also agents of norm diffusion in developing states where governments may not have the resources or political will to enforce environmental norms (Cochrane & Doulman, 2005; Mycoo, 2006). Eco-labelling and industry environmental codes, when transparent and legitimate, influence diffusion of emission reduction norms in procurement, transport, and processing of goods. Private corporations are norm receivers when they adopt industry standards, often in response to government environmental regulations but also in response to environmentally sensitive consumers. SIDS exercise agency by promoting programs that help to entrench climate justice norms favourable to SIDS such as the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) created to forge partnerships with the private sector and with civil society to make sustainable energy for all a reality by 2030. SIDS-DOCK, an inter-governmental organisation created in 2015 by AOSIS member countries, is a collective institutional mechanism that connects the SIDS’ renewable energy sectors with global finance and sustainable energy technologies’ markets. The initiative was promoted by AOSIS together with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as partners, the Government of Denmark, the World Bank, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC). The Commonwealth of Dominica with support from SIDSDock sought to increase renewable energy generation to 100 percent by adding geothermal energy to its energy mix to become a carbon negative state and to export renewable energy to neighbouring islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Its new geothermal plant, now in construction, should be completed by 2023 (PRNewswire, 2021). The 2014 SIDS Lighthouses Initiative was also created to mobilise funding for renewable energy deployment in SIDS. It is a partnership between 38 SIDS and 31 development

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partners that include developed states, international organisations, multilateral and development agencies, the private sector, academia and several non-profit organisations (IRENA, 2021). SIDS with IRENA also launched the global Renewable Energy Islands Network (GREIN), a knowledge platform for sharing best practices and innovative solutions for accelerated uptake of clean and cost-effective renewable energy technologies. At the regional level, SIDS have also created other structures and projects that augment their individual agency on climate governance. The first major regional climate project for Caribbean SIDS was the 1997 Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change (CPACC) Project 1997–2001. It was followed by the Adapting to Climate Change in the Caribbean (ACCC) Project from 2001–2004 and the Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change (MACC) Project from 2004– 2007. These led to the establishment of the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC). In one of its three framework documents, the Liliendaal Declaration (2009), Caribbean SIDS stressed that the islands should augment the financial and technical assistance available for climate projects from development partners (Scobie, 2016). SIDS are also part of regional renewable energy agencies such as the Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE) that implements the Energy Policy of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and, the Pacific Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (PCREEE), created under the Framework for Action on Energy Security in the Pacific (FAESP). A regional approach to mitigation may lead to cost savings; allow sharing of best practices and expertise among SIDS; attract investments from volume-oriented international financial markets and produce energy where it is cheapest then distributed through regional supply chains (Scobie, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d). The Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) (now called Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility Segregated Portfolio Company (CCRIF SPC)), launched by Caribbean states in 2007, is the first multi-country risk pool insurance instrument. It provides immediate liquidity to regional governments after natural catastrophes and is one of the innovative resilience initiatives to support SIDS impacted inter alia by climate-triggered emergencies (IPCC, 2014). Up to September 2020, CCRIF disbursed 163 million US dollars to 14 of its 22 member states.

3.2 SIDS’ Place in International Climate Governance This paper used concepts from norm diffusion theory and borrowed from the divisions of agency in environmental governance literature (Scobie et al., 2020a, 2020b) to create a norm diffusion and agency framework to understand the ways in which SIDS are influenced by and contribute to climate change norms in international fora and in regional and national governance. SIDS are both norm shapers and norm takers in climate change policy and governance. SIDS have historical and development contexts which determine their worldview and to how they respond to international norms. The mechanisms that give them leverage in international climate governance

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are rooted in their history, culture, economic and social conditions (Niles & Lloyd, 2013). This chapter suggests that global norm diffusion is not merely the integration of global climate norms into local spaces. In the context of climate policy, small island developing states exercise agency, are purposive actors that contribute to shaping, contesting and diffusing norms, also in global and regional governance and spaces, from their position of smallness and vulnerability. SIDS have legitimacy and moral authority also because they often lead by example with ambitious renewable energy and energy efficiency targets in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) reports to the UNFCCC. SIDS use “niche diplomacy” to shape or contribute to shaping climate justice and sustainable development norms. They use their unique environmental vulnerability and difficult development circumstances as leverage to create discourses around the polluter pays principle, the common but differentiated responsibilities principle etc. SIDS use the structures of international and regional institutions to contribute to shaping and diffusing high ambition norms into international agreements and climate projects. SIDS use mitigation norms created within structures like the UNFCCC to lobby development partners for more international financial and technical support for clean energy transitions, which will both reduce their negligible contribution to GHG emissions and will more importantly reduce energy import bills and contribute to SIDS’ economic development and energy security. SIDS choose to translate renewable energy related norms into domestic policies, aware that norm adoption is the key to unlock finance needed for their climate change policy and development needs. However, not always have SIDS been able to translate discursive power into effective outcomes (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012). As this chapter illustrated, agency is also limited by more powerful states and by the institutional and governance structures and settings, many of which militate against successful outcomes for SIDS. Thus, SIDS, and other actors, will struggle to get global action to keep to the 1.5 Degree target of the Paris 2015 Agreement and to have adequate, timely, new and additional funding for climate adaptation, part also of the SDGs goals on climate change.

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Norm Diffusion by and within Multilateral Institutions

Redefined, Repackaged and Redeployed: Diffusion of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank Šárka Kolmašová

and Arlene B. Tickner

1 Introduction Citizen security (CS) evolved as an alternative paradigm to state-centric, militarized security doctrines that were prevalent across Latin America until the 1980s. The idea has roots in broader multidimensional approaches advocated by policymakers, academics, private sector representatives, diplomats, and foreign governments in the context of post-Cold war democratization and in the specific case of Central America, efforts to build peace (Chinchilla & Vorndran, 2018; Muggah, 2017; Tickner, 2015). While initially rooted in the need to safeguard the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, to establish civilian control over the military, and to protect individuals from diverse threats to their well-being as three related components of a democratic form of security, at the onset of the twenty-first century rising levels of violence and crime led to a narrowing in which citizen security became tantamount to enhancing state capacities to combat violent and non-violent crimes against civilians (Dammert, 2007; Ungar, 2011). Over the course of its development and implementation, CS also became influenced by distinct international organizations and governments, in particular the United States, concerned with growing insecurity and instability in the region, leading to strategies that favored institutional strengthening and prevention (Goldstein, 2016). The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in partnership with varied private and non-governmental organizations, has been particularly active in such efforts. One key result of IDB involvement has been the mainstreaming of citizen security via its Š. Kolmašová (B) Department of International Relations and European Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Strašnice, Czech RepublicDubeˇcská 900/10, 100 31 e-mail: [email protected] A. B. Tickner Faculty of International, Political and Urban Studies, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_9

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insertion within dominant discourses on (neoliberal) state reform and development, and thus, its fundamental translation and redefinition. In this chapter we attempt to trace this process. The fact that citizen security has adopted a taken for granted nature in public discourse and is actively endorsed in theory and practice by numerous countries, inter-governmental organizations, think tanks and private agencies to the point that it now constitutes a widely shared standard, reflects its strong normative underpinnings. Although developed initially in Latin America it diffused northward, mainly through multilateral institutions, was repackaged, and then redeployed southward once again. Therefore, it represents an interesting case of a non-Northern concept that has been successfully diffused as a norm both within and beyond regional borders. In this sense, the chapter aims to contribute to existing studies on norm and policy diffusion from Latin America (de Oliveira et al., 2019; Gonnet, 2019; Silva Ardila, 2020; Suyama et al., 2016; Weyland, 2006), as well as to more general scholarly reflection on the role of the global South in norm transfers (de Oliveira, 2021). Although we trace citizen security’s origins firmly within the Latin American context, we also show that its diffusion has been highly political and driven by the strategic preferences of powerful extra-regional actors, most importantly the IDB (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019). As argued in the chapter, this is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the framework employed by the IDB reinforces state monopoly over the security sector by treating governments as the ultimate if not the only providers of security. While the institution’s framing documents emphasize partnership with non-state actors, in practice such groups play only a minor role in the citizen security agenda. Secondly, the developmentalist approach applied by the Bank is grounded in uniform benchmarks and indicators, leading to diffusion of standards that fail to account for the specific cultural, economic, political, and social contexts in which diverse peoples’ security needs emerge. This “one size fits all” citizen security mold is observable at various levels of IDB work, starting with the very conceptualization of the term, up to evaluations of specific loans and their outcomes. Such a technocratic lens mirrors the bureaucratic culture that prevails in other multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank or the OECD. Thirdly, the IDB channels specific types of knowledge, based on monitoring, statistical data and comparative analysis that create an image of “objective” explanations that feed into effective solutions and roadmaps to enhanced security, and in which complex social problems are presented as “manageable” as long as governments are willing to follow the Bank ‘s supposedly neutral recommendations. The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section one traces the origins of citizen security in Latin America with an eye to identifying its initial meanings, underpinnings, and transformation. In section two we analyze its diffusion and transformation. Given our interest in interrogating the Inter-American Bank as a key site for the concept’s mainstreaming, our analysis focuses primarily on IDB framing

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documents1 and interviews with key officials in this exercise.2 The chapter concludes with a brief reflection on the need to subject citizen security knowledge produced by institutions such as the IDB to critical scrutiny, given its inevitably political and biased nature.

2 Citizen Security: Emergence and Conceptualization Although the genealogy of citizen security is arguably much more complex, in this section we attempt to trace its origins, identify its meaning and normative underpinnings, and highlight how it transformed as it diffused and was appropriated by different actors. The study and practice of security in Latin America exhibit important continuities across time. Among these, concern with sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, institutional state capacities, governability, and the link between state-sponsored development and security, have figured prominently (Mares & Kacowicz, 2016; Tickner & Herz, 2012). While the Cold War and authoritarianism in Brazil and the Southern Cone played a key role in the creation and proliferation of the national security doctrine, the end of both led to considerable widening, as occurred in most other parts of the world. Specifically, civilian control over the security and defense sector, the relation between democracy, human rights and security, corruption, drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime, among multiple other issues rooted in both state and societal experiences of insecurity, entered the regional lexicon.

2.1 Democratic and Citizen Security as an Antidote to National Security Doctrine National security doctrine was adopted regionwide during the 1960s and was highly influenced by the region’s longstanding geopolitical tradition as well as U.S. strategic 1

We base our analysis on a wide range of sources, including the strategic framework documents of the IDB (2012a, 2014a, 2017), operational guidelines (2002, 2009) approach papers ( 2012b, 2013a, 2021), technical notes (2012a, 2014b, 2020a, 2020b) and especially the reports of the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (IDB, 2013a, 2014b, 2021). Furthermore, we examine documents produced by IDB with reference to specific policies, including the loans evaluations (IDB, 2005, 2010, 2013b) and its research papers (Cafferata & Scartascini, 2021; Domanick, 2016; Jaitman ed. 2015; Muggah et al., 2016). 2 Sarka Kolmasova conducted in-person interviews with seven representatives of the IDB during research consultations in Washington, DC between September 21 and 24, 2021. During these discussions, she aimed to delve further into the personal understandings of citizen security among its proponents, the background of its emergence within the IDB institutional structure, and the mechanisms through which the concept has disseminated regionally. She also inquired about the involvement of civil society and experts in IDB work, academic or social background of these individuals and how the sources of knowledge were selected.

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thought (Pion-Berlin, 1989; Cavagnari, 1994; Gill, 2004). The Cuban revolution, combined with the growth of insurgent movements and leftist parties (and governments) throughout Latin America confirmed to many political and military elites the existence of domestic level communist threats that begged to be squashed. Given the association of threat with local sources, not the Soviet Union, the idea of the “internal enemy” became a key facet of the doctrine. One of the main repercussions of the resulting friend-enemy logic was that both armed guerrillas and any other opposition group deemed to endanger state objectives were equally targeted and persecuted. In the most extreme cases, corresponding primarily to authoritarian regimes, this amorphous “enemy” was regularly deemed a “tumor” or “cancer” that needed to be extracted from the body politic (Pion-Berlin, 1989). In addition to its militarized reading of security, national security doctrine gave rise to a particular conception of the Latin American state in which the link between economic growth and development, on the one hand, and the maintenance of social order on the other, justified the adoption of repressive measures towards those sectors of society deemed problematic due to their promotion of political, economic, and social disturbances and instability (Mares, 2008). In consequence, securing the social order became an important goal of security policies derived from the doctrine. Given that individual security and freedoms were regularly considered at odds with national security, the prevailing view was that the former needed to be sacrificed in the name of the “public good”, leading to the adoption of permanent states of exception to bypass laws or rules that might impair the state’s self-defense (Loveman, 1994). Nevertheless, the end of the bipolar conflict, the transition to democracy in South America, the peaceful settlement of the civil wars in Central America and liberal economic reform all led to a re-visioning of security in the late 1980s. In the southern part of the hemisphere, the South American Peace, Security and Democracy Commission, created by a group of ex-presidents, politicians, clergy members, private sector representatives and academics, coined the term “democratic security” as an alternative to national security doctrine (Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, 1988; Somavía & Insulza, 1990). Central America picked up on this thinking through its interaction with the Contadora Support Group, created in 1985 to promote peace in the subregion, whereas foreign governments too, especially Spain, influenced regional discussions through their involvement in the transition to democracy and more directly, the Central American peace process.3 In both cases, democratic security and its sibling, “citizen security” were adopted and developed as alternatives to widely accepted concepts of national security and defense, both of which highlighted the independence, territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the state against external (or internal) threats.

3

Although Spain’s role in transmitting its own local version of post-authoritarian CS is apparent in the country’s participation in the Central American peace negotiations and more indirectly, in democratic transitions in South America, the specific mechanisms through which the idea traveled and was absorbed and adapted to regional needs and circumstances, begs to be researched more systematically.

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Democratic security, as devised in South America, was conceived as an integral, “[…] more encompassing and positive concept that prioritizes the needs of individuals to live in peace and to have access to the economic, political and environmental resources required for a dignified existence” (Somavía & Insulza, 1990, p. 7). Security was thus envisioned as an individual need rooted in the absence of economic, social, political, military, cultural, judicial, and ecological threat (Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, 1988, p. 10), while national security doctrine placed the security of the state and the nation above that of Latin American citizens, justifying systematic repression and exclusion, and the political tutelage of the armed forces. Institutional development, democracy, respect for human rights, civilian control over the military and economies geared towards the satisfaction of basic needs were therefore highlighted as the main domestic ingredients of security in democratic societies. Although democratic security was a multi-pronged concept geared towards “… assuring development with social justice at the domestic level, deepening peace, cooperation and integration at the regional level, and autonomy and independence internationally (Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, 1988, p. 33), scholars and policymakers focused largely on civil-military relations, and the differentiation between security and defense, given that subjecting the military (and police) to democratic control was deemed one of the main challenges faced by Latin American states (Diamint, 2001). The continued tendency to view security in state-centric terms, as both an actor to be protected and the main provider of security to individuals, underscores a tension that is well-illustrated by the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America. Signed in 1995, the document incorporates state-based provisions such as the separation of military and police matters, civilian control of the armed forces and the police, and free and democratic elections, and individual freedoms and social development as equivalent prerequisites of security. In Spain, where the term “citizen security” was first deployed within the context of the country’s transition to democracy in the 1970s, the essential dilemma of how to reconcile the collective good of public security with the rights of people had played out similarly and thus provided an important precursor for the region as democracy was consolidated there. In the Spanish context democratization was deemed to entail both transformation of the dictatorial state into one in which individual freedoms and rights were respected and protected, and the reigning in of the armed forces and their placement under civilian control. In addition to creating a clear demarcation between the armed forces and the police, the 1978 Constitution specifies that the latter are responsible for guaranteeing the exercise of individual rights and freedoms, and for protecting citizen security, both of which are deemed fundamental requirements of any democracy. According to Carbonell and Sanjuán (1995, p. 141), the state therefore has a double mission to provide public security and to ensure human rights and freedoms guaranteed by. In their conceptualization, “citizen security consists of the prevention, protection, guarantee and repair measures that have to be adopted so that citizens can intervene freely and with guarantees at the different levels and participatory forms that community life presents” (1995, p. 160). Interestingly, the authors anticipate situations in which the two might be in conflict and warn against

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the prioritization of public security, which might eventually work against defense of the rule of law. Political developments in Spain exercised a key influence in Latin America, where less than two decades later, especially in Central America, references to citizen security grew in tandem with debates on democracy and peacebuilding. Initially, CS was conceptualized as “freedom from fear among citizens”, based on the widespread understanding that high rates of criminal violence along with widespread corruption among governments, militaries and the police reinforced negative public perceptions and discouraged broader civil society engagement with states. According to scholars writing at the time, the main problem was a strong sense of insecurity among inhabitants of Central and Latin America more generally, that was caused by the steady increase of crime and victimization rates and repressive state policies (Chinchilla, 1992; Chinchilla & Rico, 1997; Neild, 1999). Laura Chinchilla (1992, pp. 27–28), a renowned security analyst and subsequent president of Costa Rica, argued that low citizen trust in police interventions had severe economic, social, and political consequences, including widespread anti-social behavior, including possession of weapons, distrust within neighborhoods, and acts of violence in the name of self-defense. More significantly however, she anticipated that growing perceptions of insecurity would feed popular demand for hard-handed government responses (mano dura in Spanish), that were typically short-term, highly visible but ineffective and eventually counter-productive. The key challenge faced by Latin America, as summarized by Peruvian security expert and former minister of the Interior, Carlos Basombrío (1999) was that: Equally important rights are colliding. On one side are the civil and political rights that allow citizens to be protected against abuses of the state, such as a judicial process that guarantees everyone a fair trial. On the other side, people have the right to live in a secure environment, with their lives and property protected against other people’s aggression. The problem is that a growing number of people in Latin America believe that civil and political rights can, if necessary, be sacrificed to guarantee one’s right to live in peace and in a secure environment.

In other words, Latin American analysts began to observe that the region’s security environment itself was not the only matter at stake, but increasingly, the widespread acceptability of repressive state policies, that were unproductive on the one hand, and that harkened memories of militarized national security strategies on the other.

2.2 Citizen Security as Protection from Crime and Violence Indeed, as the levels of crime and violence in the region grew between the 1990s and the inception of the twenty-first century, democratic and citizen security’s emphasis on democracy was gradually replaced by a notion of CS that highlighted the specific vulnerabilities to which Latin American inhabitants were exposed along with potential strategies to combat them (Dammert, 2007; Goldstein, 2016; Ungar, 2011). Contrary to other broader concepts of security typical of the post-Cold War period, including human security, the idea of citizen security thus attached its conceptual

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and practical lens to the protection of citizens from those forms of violent and non-violent crime (including corruption) that affect the effective exercise of democratic rights and freedoms.4 In consequence, prevalent assumptions about the link between state legitimacy and strength and effective performance shifted discussion from the safeguarding of individual liberties and well-being towards the search for preventive strategies. Although democracy was still a key facet of this framing, it fused with specific performance recommendations, including the training of professionals in crime prevention, the strengthening of research capabilities, including crime databases, and the provision of technical assistance to security institutions, among others (Chinchilla, 1992; Muggah, 2017; Neild, 1999). This more grounded and practical definition helped popularize the CS concept among governments and multilateral organizations. For example, in 1999 citizen security was embraced by the Inter-American Institute on Human Rights (IIHR) via a project entitled Citizen Security in Central America: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects, aimed at disseminating the paradigm among participating countries Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The project was based on previous IIHR experiences involving civil society organizations and educational programs in human rights for police departments and correctional personnel (IIHR, 1999, p. 9). Within its theoretical and methodological framing, the project included the following definition of the problem: Citizen insecurity bogs the police down and hinders the transformation of this body into the security force of a democratic state that would report to civilian authority, acting with a spirit of service for the protection of the citizens. Public opinion is reluctant to advocate the imposition of controls over police bodies, fearing that, when needed to combat crime, this would throw them into the action ’with their hands tied’. And, incidentally, this trap of logic is expertly exploited by ambitious politicians, sensationalistic journalists and media, and even police persons who long for the autonomy that they enjoyed during dictatorial times. (ibid., pp. 7–8)

The project report itself makes explicit references to human rights principles that should not be compromised by enhanced security measures (e.g. “we try to reconcile the legitimate rights and interests of the victims of crime, with the basic guarantees of the due process that must be afforded even the worst offenders” (ibid, p. 9). However, at the same time it acknowledges the issue of high crime and violence rates, citizen perceptions of insecurity and the pressures faced by government authorities within the countries of Latin America to respond effectively. Therefore, in terms of its normative propositions, the Inter-American Institute on Human Rights study combines democratic principles, including respect for the rule of law and citizen participation with more specific models of police action intended to be more successful in terms of public security. 4

Contrary to other parts of the world, human security has never been actively embraced at the academic or policy levels in Latin America (Tickner & Herz, 2012). However, the 2013 UNDP report on citizen security in the region describes CS as a subset of human security that focusses specifically on how the factors mentioned here negatively impact the rights and freedoms associated with (democratic) citizenship.

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During the same timeframe citizen security also started to disseminate through high-level meetings within the Organization of American States (OAS). Initially, it was framed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) within the context of structural flaws that characterized the justice systems of many member states. For example, in his presentation of the institution’s annual report, the IACHR chair Hélio Bicudo argued that CS was to be achieved by “the strengthening of the administration of justice in order to inhibit corruption or impunity” (OAS, 2000). Subsequently, in 2005, a coalition of NGOs presented a study that suggested that the OAS and especially the IACHR “can be an important agent in a regional strategy to respond to this problem, systematically incorporating citizen security in its agenda” (quoted in IACHR, 2007). The IACHR elaborated on the initiative and in 2007 presented a report on citizen security to enhance intergovernmental recognition of the concept through the OAS. The report conceptualized CS as “the right to security from crime or interpersonal or social violence” (p. 5, par 18). It primarily aimed to translate the concept into a narrow principle that could be easily operationalized and then implemented within public policies. The report resulted from a prolonged deliberative process, which granted considerable legitimacy to its final conclusions.5 In the years that followed, citizen security gained increasing traction within different multilateral fora that involved both regional and global civil society organizations. For example, in 2008 the IACHR established a cooperative arrangement with the Office for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF-TACRO) and afterward, with the Office for Latin America of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). That same year the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations (IEPRI) of the National University of Colombia hosted a large conference on CS in partnership with the IACHR, UNICEF and OHCHR, that was attended by more than 40 representatives of diverse regional NGOs. In tandem with efforts such as these, the IACHR also engaged OAS member states in the debate and requested their national position on citizen security.6 The ability of the IACHR to channel the CS concept and agenda through various stakeholders led to its formal endorsement in the 2011 OAS Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security in the Americas and its recognition in other framework documents of the organization. The Declaration itself defines citizen security “as a component of public security” that “must encourage measures for dealing with the causes of crime, violence, and insecurity” (OAS, 2011). In line with the 5

Prior to the drafting process, several workshops were organized bringing together regional groups of experts, civil society- and state representatives. In total, there were four such meetings in (a) Asunción, Paraguay, on the 20th and 21st November 2008, for Southern Cone countries with representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay; (b) in San José, Costa Rica, on March 2 and 3, 2009, with representatives of Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Mexico, in (c) Bogotá, Colombia, on March 5 and 6, 2009, with representatives from Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Bolivia. Additionally, representatives of Haiti were consulted during an IACHR visit in 2009. See IACHR 2009, section C. 6 14 countries actively participated in the process (including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Jamaica.

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2009 IACHR report, it stresses the primary role of states as security providers and the need to integrate the paradigm into concrete policies “in the area of prevention, law enforcement, rehabilitation, and reintegration into society” to enhance public security. The suggested measures ranged from strengthening education programs, and the criminal justice and prison systems, the latter of which would include rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders, to various forms of development assistance and the effective prevention and fight against the security problems themselves. This blueprint for citizen security understood as a preventive policy to combat crime and violence made the concept both relevant and politically acceptable for the Latin American governments, regional organizations, and international donors. During the 2011 General Assembly meeting in San Salvador, the OAS Executive Secretary for Integral Development, Mauricio Cortes Costa and several other representatives called for integrating citizen security into the development agenda. In 2012, the Permanent Council of OAS together with the Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CEPCIDI) agreed to build joint initiatives to implement CS through development assistance policies. And yet, although the OAS played a crucial role in facilitating a hemispheric dialogue, the Organization has had comparatively limited resources to materialize the declared policies contained within the framework in practice. As the key regional aid agency, the Inter-American Development Bank has therefore acted as a more effective platform for citizen security dissemination. Both multilateral actors should be understood as complementary rather than competing, as indicated by their interinstitutional cooperation on hemispheric security7 and participation in regional security networks, such as the Inter-American Network for the Prevention of Violence and Crime. The OAS relies on framework documents on citizen security produced by the IDB and especially on financial resources provided by the donor countries, which allow greater implementation of a citizen security-based agenda. Additionally, and although beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) too acquired an active role in promoting CS in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean. In its 2013 report, Citizen Security with a Human Face and in keeping with prevalent definitions of the concept, the strengthening of state institutions and of democratic forms of coexistence, as well the adoption of more effective preventive measures, are deemed crucial facets of the physical and material security of the region’s inhabitants.

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For instance, in 2007, the Permanent Council of OAS reviewed a report submitted by IDB on Measures and Actions Related to the Implementation of the Declaration on Security in the Americas entitled IDB Action on Violence Prevention and Promoting Citizen Security.

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3 Mainstreaming of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank While it clearly built upon the OAS conceptualization, the Inter-American Development Bank integrated citizen security into its development agenda and further enhanced its relevance on the practical policy-making level. In consequence, this section focuses on the discourse and practices of the IDB and its role in mainstreaming citizen security within the region and beyond. Although the Bank established a robust CS-based institutional system in cooperation with its member-states and dense network of think tanks, civil society groups, university centers and private organizations, we will argue that its approach suffers from fundamental legitimacy and effectiveness problems. Our case study of the IDB will first trace the process of how it disseminated the framework through its policies, including the implementation of conditionality on loans, the provision of technical assistance to governments, the facilitation of political dialogues among member states, and the promotion of knowledge transfers among stakeholders. Finally, we reflect critically on the effects of these practices and the problematic mainstreaming of a state-centric and technocratic paradigm of citizen security.

3.1 Policies of Citizen Security Diffusion The CS concept surfaced in the first loans provided by IDB in 1996 and 1998 that focused specifically on violence reduction.8 Based on these pilot projects, Preliminary Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects were adopted in 2002 in order to introduce a set of evaluation criteria to avoid fueling violence or crime in the targeted countries. These guidelines were further elaborated upon in the 2009 Operational Guidelines9 following experiences accrued over the course of 11 loans and 25 technical cooperations approved by the IDB between 1998 and 2009. In addition to such direct interventions, the Bank facilitated several debates on citizen security, which involved high-level political representatives and experts. For instance, in 1996 it sponsored a public dialogue Toward an Integrated Approach to Development: Ethics, Violence and Citizen Security in Washington D.C., and in the following years it organized a series of discussions within the Inter-American Forums on Citizen Security and Violence Prevention. Later, in 2008 the IDB organized a workshop for staff involved in the emerging citizen security agenda and

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The first one was a technical assistance project on prevention of domestic violence; in 1998, IDB approved two stand-alone citizen security loans—to Colombia “Support for Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security” (CO0213; Bogota, Cali, Medellin, and the national component) and to Uruguay “Program for Citizen Safety: Crime and Violence Prevention” (UR0118). 9 Operational Guidelines for Program Design and Execution in the Area of Civil Coexistence and Public Safety, IDB, Washington DC, 2009.

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for external regional external (including Carlos Basombrío, Lucía Dammert, Hugo Frühling and José Miguel Cruz). The 2009 Guidelines made use of these conceptual debates and the practical experiences derived from the first-generation projects to identify key lessons learned and priority areas for future projects. These included (i) public policy planning, mostly through institutional capacity-building, (ii) educational activities targeting policymakers and other stakeholders, and (iii) direct preventive activities, such as the prevention of domestic violence through awareness raising. Despite the effort to introduce a systematic framework for the citizen security agenda, the IDB’s Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) published a series of reports that criticized the first round of projects due to their “lack of evaluability” in terms of effective implementation and a fundamental knowledge gap in crime prevention strategies.10 While the 2010 OVE report was strongly critical of IDB performance, it triggered an extensive review process that only reaffirmed the Bank’s commitment to citizen security and led to major institutional reforms. The 2010 IDB Strategy for Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare identified CS as one of its priorities and recommended a consolidation of the agenda under the Citizen Security Cluster (CSC). Whereas the first round of projects was supervised by regional experts with diverse thematic specializations, within the new institutional structure a team of citizen security experts was put together within the IDB, led by Nathalie Alvarado, responsible for all relevant policies within this area. This led to the significant advancement of citizen security policies, as indicated by the growing number of approved projects, but also activities aimed to disseminate the concept within the region. In 2012, the Bank’s first framework document conceptualized citizen security as protection from crime, violence and fear of crime through effective policies strengthening democratic governance and focusing on the individual within a democratic context, rather than the coercive functions of the state (2012a, p. 6). Citizen security was thus understood as a (i) composite set of measures to prevent and/or reduce violence and a (ii) multi-sectoral government-directed approach. In practical terms, it aimed to “enhance state effectiveness and efficiency to prevent crime and violence by increasing policymaking capacities and promoting the use of empirical evidence” (2012a, p. 2). IDB policies in relation to citizen security include social interventions (addressing violent and criminal behavior among young people; substance abuse; and domestic violence), situational prevention (reducing opportunities for criminal and violent behavior stemming from environmental factors), police (detecting opportunities for crime and deterring its occurrence), the judiciary system (detecting, prosecuting, and sentencing offenders), and the penitentiary system (increasing the effectiveness of rehabilitation, in order to prevent recidivism after social integration) (IDB, 2012a, 2014a, 2017).

10

See Crime and Violence Prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from IDB’s Interventions (RE-378), IDB, Washington, DC, October 2010 or Thematic Evaluation: IDB’s Response to Key Challenges in Citizen Security, 1998–2012, IDB, Washington DC, March 2014.

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The IDB has been remarkably successful in disseminating citizen security through several key mechanisms that were implemented strategically as complementary policies designed to enhance recognition of the framework among IDB member states and the wider community of potential stakeholders. Firstly, it introduced conditionality in loans based on the identification of specific interventions that could not be approved for funding (such as military operations, anti-terrorism, intelligence, procurement of weapons or war equipment, or money laundering) and the provision of a set of control questions to ensure that projects complied with to the IDB citizen security paradigm. Secondly, the Citizen Security Cluster provided technical assistance to enhance the compatibility of state policies with the IDB framework, particularly by offering logistical, administrative, and expert knowledge to government representatives. The two policies reinforced one another. Potential loan recipients would often require technical assistance to make sure their prepared project would fit IDB standards, while each policy component disseminated citizen security through the rational calculation of material gains that would be allocated to various public security policies framed through the “more effective crime and violence prevention approach”. In addition to direct IDB interventions, including both citizen security loans and technical assistance, the Citizen Security Cluster actively promoted the concept through the transfer of knowledge among IDB member states, on the one hand and through cooperation with citizen security based “epistemic communities” on the other. There are multiple ways in which the IDB has channeled specific citizen security knowledge, including the preparation and dissemination of institutional reports and publications, organization of the Citizen Security Training Clinic, or the Course in Leaders for Citizen Security and Justice Management (2018)11 and facilitation of the Citizen Security Network. The Network primarily involves vice-ministers and high-level public officials from Latin America and the Caribbean, but the Bank also cooperates with a wide range of think tanks, university centers, and independent experts12 that produce specialized information, thereby granting even more credibility to IDB policies. Each year the Citizen Security Cluster organizes a so-called Citizen Security Week, the most extensive high-level meeting that includes all IDB member state representatives, Bank officials and a significant number of regional security experts

11

The course was facilitated through the The Multi-Donor Fund for Citizen Security. According to the IDB 2020 Report on Partnerships, it promotes knowledge sharing and the use of data and strengthens the capacity of countries to manage and evaluate public policies to enhance citizen security in the region. It is financially supported by Canada and Switzerland. 12 IDB publications on citizen security involve external experts as (co-)authors. See for instance, Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America by Robert Muggah, Ilona Szabó de Carvalho, Nathalie Alvarado, Lina Marmolejo and Ruddy Wang (igarapé Institute, IDB, and the World Economic Forum, 2016; The Evolution of Citizen Security in Colombia in Times of COVID-19 by Nathalie Alvarado, Ervyn Norza Santiago M. Perez-Vincent, Santiago Tobón, Martín Vanegas-Arias (IDB, October 2020); Restoring Paradise in the Caribbean: Combating Violence with Numbers by Heather Sutton, Lucciana Álvarez, Jan van Dijk, John van Kesteren, Inder J. Ruprah, Luisa Godinez Puig, Laura Jaitman, Iván Torre, and Camilo Pecha (IDB, 2017), among many others.

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who share their insights on crime and violence prevention.13 The agenda includes specific events with diverse formats ranging from political dialogues and conference style panels to informal field trips and cultural programs that seek to enhance interpersonal ties among the participants. Part of the Citizen Security Training Clinic (that takes place during the Week) entails the presentation of “best practices” aimed at disseminating specific knowledge among policymakers themselves, but also between the selected guest experts and political representatives. The events organized by the Citizen Security Cluster are indicative of increasing professionalization of knowledge diffusion, given not only the material resources provided by IDB but also the managerial skills of its staff. Again, one reinforces the other as the institutional reform that took place in 2009 resulted in enhanced funding of research and knowledge dissemination,14 which enabled the core members to advance their activities both on an intra-institutional level and through cooperation with external consultants and research institutions. The targeted policy of citizen security diffusion through research and knowledge allowed for the creation of a network of like-minded policymakers, practitioners, scholars but also companies. While these activities were justified by the need to strengthen the effectiveness of IDB interventions on the one hand and state capacities to prevent crime and violence on the other, we will now discuss some of the underlying problems that are observable in the IDB’s citizen security agenda.

3.2 Critical Reflection of the IDB’s Diffusion Practices From the onset, the IDB’s approach reproduced the state-centered conceptualization of citizen security by prioritizing institutional capacity building, education and transfer of knowledge targeted at regional governments. All strategic framework documents replicate the 2012 objective of enhancing “state effectiveness in preventing crime and violence”. For instance, the 2014 Sector Framework Document elaborates on this paradigm through more specific operational activities that would enhance governmental performance: (i) improve central government capabilities for sector leadership and strategic planning, management, information, monitoring, evaluation, and horizontal coordination among 13 For the detailed programme of the last Citizen Security Week in Washington, D.C. see The Future of Citizen Security and Justice Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean: What Innovations are we Offering? 11th Annual Summit, September, 2019, online: https://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ getdocument.aspx?docnum=EZSHARE-1450074229-56. 14 For instance, in 2012 IDB approved up to USD $20 million for the Special Program and Multidonor Fund for Citizen Security (Citizen Security Initiative), which aimed to enhance the effectiveness of regional public policies though “(i) generating, analyzing, and disseminating data; (ii) strengthening the capacity of state entities to manage and evaluate public policies on citizen security; and (iii) promoting more sharing of knowledge and good practices through regional dialogue and bilateral cooperation”, see GN - 2660, IDB 2012 and also its review in Thematic Evaluation IDB’s Response to Key Challenges in Citizen Security, 1998–2012, OVE, 2013.

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ministries and sectors; (ii) strengthen the institutional capacity of subnational governments for security management at the municipal level, (iii) support comprehensive CSJ programs in urban areas that promote management of the physical environment, with social and local governance interventions that involve the local authorities, police, civil society, and the private sector. (IDB, 2014a, b, p. 44)

The agenda emerged from specific loans based on principles of citizen security, which were incorporated into projects drafted by states. The broader framework documents referred to those loans and their operational guidelines or lessons learned (IDB, 2014a, b, pp. 29–36; 2021). The process of revising the strategic framework resulted from regional political dialogues among state authorities and internal evaluation procedures. Structurally, the IDB operates on an inter-governmental level and maintains a state-centric approach to the concept through its loans as well as non-lending activities. As one of the representatives of the Citizen Security Cluster mentioned, the Bank is playing the role of an honest broker and needs to act in a trustworthy and transparent manner.15 There is no doubt the team responsible for the agenda aims to improve security conditions in Latin America. Notwithstanding its good intentions, however, the IDB mandate shapes its policies, and it focuses primarily on participating states. Therefore, the agenda is to a large extent set through top-down processes based on interactions between IDB representatives of the Citizen Security Cluster and policymakers or practitioners from both donor and recipient countries. While the Bank cooperates with civil society representatives and experts,16 their role consists essentially of helping to materialize the priorities into effective types of interventions, rather than representing the actual agenda-setters or critically evaluating the IDB’s policies. The framework rests on a multi-dimensional and preventive approach to crime and violence, which arguably constituted the major shift from the frequently criticized “iron fist” security paradigm (IDB, 2018a, pp. 12–13). According to the 2021 OVE report, “[o]riginally, the impact of violence on the low-income population was the main reason for the Bank to expand its scope of action in this area” (5). In fact, policies supported by the IDB integrate preventive policies as complementary to more effective control and punitive measures. Although the IDB represents a regional alternative to global governance based on neoliberal institutionalist premises, it mirrors global development agencies, such as the World Bank Group, in its mission and structural policies. When it comes to citizen security, it was integrated into the IDB agenda based on the premise that increasing crime and violence in Latin America were caused by insufficient economic growth on 15

Interview with the Citizen Security Cluster, September 22, 2021, Washington D.C. The think tanks and research centers include the Center for Citizen Security Studies at the Institute for Public Affairs, University of Chile; the Woodrow Wilson Center through its Citizen Security Programme (US); the Central American and Caribbean Citizen Security Platform (Canada); the CitizenLab at the University of Toronto; Igarapé (with professionals in Brazil, Canada, Colombia, US and UK); the Consortium of Chilean Universities; John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York; Santa Maria Law School (Brazil); and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (US), among others.

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the one hand and lack of state-capacities to effectively respond to these problems due to limited economic resources, on the other. Therefore, the framework was co-opted into the development agenda and operationalized through IDB policies through the taken for granted assumption that institutional support of the state would inevitably lead to crime and violence reduction. Based on this logic, it was assumed that once governments had the resources to reform (rather than repress), they would implement more effective security policies. For instance, the 2018 report on Challenges and Innovation in Management and Public Policies in the Last 10 Years argued: “[a]lthough there is agreement on the part of different organizations to work with a focus on the prevention of violence, staff does not have the knowledge, techniques nor necessary tools to impact the variables of social risk associated with crime and violence.” In other words, the IDB translated citizen security problems as a lack of state capacity (rather than democratic legitimacy), which could be solved through enhanced hemispheric cooperation—an approach adopted as well by the OAS—and especially through development assistance policies implemented by multilateral organizations. While the OAS provided an adequate forum for building consensus on the meaning of citizen security, the IDB concentrated on its practical implementation. In this sense, the failures attributable to ineffective policies were assumed to be solvable through assistance in legislative and institutional reforms, sharing best practices and adopting knowledge-based solutions (IDB, 2021, pp. 7–9). In order to buttress its image as a credible and problem-solving institution, the IDB has used a variety of strategies, including the dissemination of knowledge that possesses scientific qualities, but that works to support its state-oriented institutional framework. Knowledge produced by experts, especially grounded in statistics and “hard data” legitimizes the diffusion of particular norms through scientific apolitical evidence (Hadjiisky, 2021; Pal & Spence, 2021). This leads to silencing of critical reflections beyond the identification of challenges to effective prevention or response. Across the board, IDB publications avoid critically important problems of widespread systematic human rights violations, which were not caused by a lack of institutional capacities but rather high levels of power centralization and autocratic leadership in many countries, not to mention over-empowered police institutions. The reports typically reference government representatives and practitioners in order to provide information, but this data is never cross-checked through direct field work or cooperation with specialists beyond the official pool. According to the 2010 evaluation report of OVE, “[e]thnographic studies, surveys, and focus groups commissioned by OVE in the countries clearly show that many of the prime target beneficiaries of the projects had never heard of the projects or did not know what they were about”. In more recent projects, greater emphasis has been placed on community participation and local non-governmental organizations, and yet, societal involvement is still channeled through the same state representatives who report directly to the IDB. State representatives, as well as police or military officers receiving assistance or participating in the IDB activities, such as the Citizen Security Week, regularly express their openness to reform and transformation. This is due largely to the financial motivation provided by loans, if not to the increased credibility to be gained through

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willingness to participate in the dialogues and other diplomatic or networking events. Although it is questionable at best, whether such participation leads to more effective security policies, not to mention the neglected principles of democratic legitimacy, just the fact that they are willingly engaging in specific projects is considered an indicator of improvement. By way of example, the 2018 report opens with references to the alarming homicide rates, victimization of young population and women and constant fear among citizens across Latin America. Paradoxically though, it presents an overall positive assessment: Despite lasting challenges, it is worth highlighting that, in recent years of the region’s efforts to address and prevent the phenomenon of violence, progress is being made in the field of citizen security, both at a conceptual and institutional design level as well as on the level of public policy innovation. (IDB, 2018a, b, p. 11)

All challenges identified in the 2018 report confirm the general strategic framework of IDB and stress the need for (i) specialized management system, (ii) balance between crime prevention and control, (iii) accountability mechanisms, (iv) effective allocation of human and financial resources, (v) access to knowledge, (vi) training of specialized managers in citizen security and justice, (vii) exchange of experiences. This business and management language, characteristic of most economic institutions, is apparent not only in particular projects but in more general strategic reports and evaluations: “Gradually, the regional experience in this environment and the evidence that was built demonstrated the need to systematically understand the management of problems of prevention and control of violence” (IDB, 2018b, p. 9). Frequent use of the term “manage” problematically leads to the adoption of strategies that primarily target institutional structures, coordination among sectors and offices, or the existence of actions plans, including budgeting. Such a technocratic approach buttresses the credibility of the IDB and participating countries through a results-oriented discourse that is nonetheless measured and evaluated through instrumentally designed indicators and benchmarks, such as “the existence of training” or “the presence of inter-sectoral citizen security coordinator”, that ultimately have little relation to those realities on the ground, rooted in violence and criminality, that citizen security-based strategies are allegedly concerned with. The 2010, 2013 and 2014 assessment reports of OVE all stress the lack of evaluability caused by insufficient clarity as to what counts as an indicator of practical impact. The 2010 OVE report argued: “when there is no evidence to guarantee that a project has a high likelihood of being effective, the project design should be based on well-justified hypotheses and contain monitoring and evaluation mechanisms which ensure that, upon completion, it will be possible to evaluate the program and learn what its impacts were. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this learning process has been put in place yet”. Since the 2021 OVE report has not been published yet, and previous ones conclude that it is impossible to evaluate the actual effectiveness of IDB activities in terms of improving the capacity and underlying institutional conditions for crime and violence prevention, at present and shockingly, no data are available on the outcomes of projects implemented in the past ten years. Nevertheless, the Citizen Security Cluster continues to actively promote the transfer of knowledge

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based on “best practices” in effective crime prevention strategies among countries and encourages recipients of IDB assistance to share their experience with project implementation (e.g. during the Citizen Security and Justice Clinic). The point we are trying to make is not that the IDB or those states receiving its assistance are intentionally implementing ineffective citizen security policies, a claim that is well beyond the aims of this chapter. Instead, our claim is that that IDB policies have reinforced the problematic state-centric conceptualization of citizen security at the root of Latin American approaches, including national security doctrine, and its technocratic implementation through development assistance projects. The strong state-centrism underwriting CS, in turn, undermines the role of civil society, experts critical of prevalent approaches to security, political dissidents, human rights activists and other marginalized groups across the region. The IDB disseminates a business logic by presenting citizen security-related problems as “manageable” through roadmaps and benchmarks. Again, the pervasive orientation on effectiveness leads to the technocratic operationalization of security policies limited to governmental investments in institutional reforms, training programs or education. Paradoxically, the actual effectiveness of IDB interventions as measured by improved conditions in the targeted countries has been so far neglected in favor of technocratic evaluations of project implementation.

4 Conclusion Notwithstanding its battle against militarized, state-centric security paradigms, most importantly national security doctrine, we have shown that citizen security too, as it evolved and diffused, targeted the state as its main referent object, given the identification of institutional weakness and ineffectiveness as one of the main sources of Latin American insecurity. In doing so, CS has become a powerful discourse for talking about the affairs of the state and the duties of democratic regimes towards their citizens. The first part of the chapter provided regional context to the emergence of citizen security and explained how the concept developed from a broader framework of democratic and non-coercive security into a narrow violence and crime prevention paradigm. We also attempted to demonstrate that CS was diffused by distinct Latin American countries and through the IACHR to the OAS General Assembly, which endorsed the concept in 2010. Since the process was mostly state-driven, citizen security was gradually translated into policies aimed to strengthen state capacities, an approach further popularized by the IDB. In the case-study, we discussed the process of successful citizen security mainstreaming by the IDB’s Citizen Security Cluster in cooperation with a larger network of scholars and practitioners. The IDB operationalized the concept into practical policies that were redeployed regionally through development assistance projects, including conditionality-based loans, technical assistance, and targeted knowledge dissemination. The final mechanism, as observed in reports and publications, conferences, workshops, training, and other soft strategies proved to be a particularly

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powerful source of leverage as it provided credibility to IDB policies. While our analysis provides substantial evidence of successful hemispheric circulation of the concept, we also underscore how IDB practices reinforced a state-centric understanding of citizen security implementation, thus thwarting its widening to include non-state actors. Additionally, the structural integration of the framework into the Bank’s development agenda led to a controversial technocratic understanding of what counted as effective prevention of crime and violence, which in turn undermined the added value of the initial concept. The chapter demonstrates how citizen security was successfully disseminated thanks to the policies of regional organisations, especially IDB, at the same time it shows how the core principles got appropriated in line with the popular demand for more effective security measures.

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Montero, S. (2017). Worlding Bogotá’s Ciclovía: From Urban experiment to international “best practice.” Latin American Perspectives, 44(2), 111–131. Muggah, R. (2017). The rise of citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean. International Development Policy | Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement, 9, 291–322. Muggah, R., De Carvalho, I. S., Alvarado, N., Marmolejo, L., & Wang, R. (2016). Making cities safer: Citizen security innovations from Latin America. IDB. Neild, R. (1999). From national security to citizen security (p. 54). International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development. OAS. (2000). Statement made by the Chair of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Hélio Bicudo, at the Presentation of the 1999 Annual Report of the IACHR before the OAS General Assembly. Organization of American States. OAS. (2008). Commitment to Public Security in the Americas, Approved by First Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas, Mexico City, Mexico. Organization of American States. OAS. (2011). Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security in the Americas. Palma, H. (1990). Medidas de confianza recíproca. In J. Somavía & J. M. Insulza (Comps.), Seguridad democrática regional. Una concepción alternativa, pp. 283–319. Comisión Sudamericana de Paz-Nueva Sociedad. Payne, R. A. (2001). Persuasion, frames and norm construction. European Journal of International Relations, 7(1), 37–61. Pion-Berlin, D. (1989). Latin American national security doctrines: Hard and softline themes. Armed Forces & Society, 15(3), 411–429. Price, R. (1998). Reversing the gun sights: Transnational civil society targets land mines. International Organization, 52(3), 613–644. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550671 Rico, J. M. (1999). Citizen security in Central America: Theoretical and methodological aspects. Inter-American Institute on Human Rights. Rico, J. M., & Chinchilla, L. (2002). Seguridad ciudadana en América Latina: Hacia una política integral. Siglo XXI. Silva Ardila, D. (2020). Global policies for moving cities: The role of think tanks in the proliferation of Bus Rapid Transit systems in Latin America and worldwide. Policy and Society, 39(1), 70–90. Somavía, J., & Insulza, J. M. (Comps.). (1990). Seguridad democrática regional. Una concepción alternative. Comisión Sudamericana de Paz-Nueva Sociedad. Spade, D., & Willse, C. (2015). Norms and normalization (L. Disch & M. Hawkesworth, Eds., Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. Suyama, B., Waisbich, L. T., & Leite, I. C. (2016). Brazil as a development partner under Lula and Rousseff: Shifts and continuities. In J. Gu, A. Shankland, & A. Chenoy (Eds.), The BRICS in international development (pp. 25–62). Palgrave Macmillan UK. Tickner, A. B. (2015). Securitization and the limits of democratic security. Routledge. Tickner, A. B., & Herz, M. (2012). No place for theory? Security studies in Latin America. In A. B. Tickner & D. L. Blaney (Eds.), Thinking international relations differently (pp. 92–114). Routledge. UNDP. (2013). Citizen security with a human face. United Nations Development Program. Ungar, M. (2011). Policing democracy: Overcoming obstacles to citizen security in Latin America. Johns Hopkins University Press. Weyland, K. (2006). Bounded rationality and policy diffusion: Social sector reform in Latin America. Princeton University Press. Zimmermann, L. (2016). Same same or different? Norm Diffusion between resistance, compliance, and localization in post-conflict states1. International Studies Perspectives, 17(1), 98–115.

ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges Guangyu Qiao-Franco

and Randy W. Nandyatama

1 Introduction The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a persistent security challenge facing the international community. From the second half of the twentieth century, a global legal regime on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament gradually took shape, represented by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This nonproliferation regime has been further strengthened by various nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) established at the regional level. In Southeast Asia, a NWFZ was founded in December 1995 under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) after the adoption of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANFWZ).1 SEANFWZ constitutes the norms ASEAN states have championed in the nonproliferation area. It serves as an essential component of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) that ASEAN countries have strived to build and maintain since 1971. SEANFWZ treaty established the obligation of member states to not manufacture, acquire, test or possess nuclear weapons. It also bans the dumping of nuclear waste in waters around ASEAN countries and lays out guidelines for 1

Note that when SEANFWZ was signed in 1995, ASEAN comprised only 7 member states— Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia were not yet ASEAN members then but signed on the SEANFWZ. G. Qiao-Franco (B) Department of Political Science, Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark R. W. Nandyatama Department of International Relations, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_10

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monitoring nuclear power safety (ASEAN, 1995). The ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007 further buttresses SEANFWZ’s remit in preserving Southeast Asia as a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, ASEAN states have also made the profile of the SEANFWZ universally known in significant forums of multilateral diplomacy at both the regional and international levels. In particular, ASEAN is actively negotiating with the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to advance the prospect of their accession to the Protocol of the SEANWFZ Treaty.2 While none of the NWS has signed the SEANWFZ Protocol, we observe indications of greater political will on the part of these major powers to commit to peaceful intentions, confidence building and non-interference. These changes align well with the norms that SEANWFZ stands for and thus imply the status of ASEAN as a norm entrepreneur in nuclear non-proliferation. However, as Kolmasova argued in the introductory chapter of this book, existing norm diffusion literature has not adequately captured the dynamics of norm creation and advocation by smaller states in the Global South. The development and spread of SEANFWZ thus raises a question which cannot be answered by the current norm diffusion literature—how does ASEAN, a group of lesser states, spread norms? To address this question, we develop an analytical framework that unpacks the bases, pathways, and challenges for ASEAN to act as a norm entrepreneur, building on the ASEAN centrality literature (Ba, 2009; Caballero-Anthony, 2014; Tan, 2017). This literature has properly acknowledged the agency of ASEAN states in socialising external powers in a set of pan-Asian multilateral initiates, going beyond norm localisation theories which concentrate on ASEAN states’ ability to reject or adapt external norms (Acharya, 2004; Rüland & Bechle, 2014). Nevertheless, ASEAN centrality studies stop short of providing detailed explanations of the processes and mechanisms of norm diffusion driven by ASEAN, and especially, there is a lack of examination of norm diffusion processes outside ASEAN-led multilateral institutions (Qiao-Franco, 2022). This chapter thus seeks to expand this scholarship to explain how ASEAN has become a norm entrepreneur by investigating the mechanisms and pathways this regional grouping leverages to promote SEANWFZ among the NWS. We argue that ASEAN’s norm diffusion occurs through consensus-based interstate relationship development and confidence building following the “ASEAN Way”. We follow Amitav Acharya’s definition of the ASEAN Way as patterns of institutional operation that feature “a high degree of discreetness, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus building, and nonconfrontational bargaining styles” (Acharya, 1997, p. 329). Beyond the practice of the ASEAN Way, we argue that the viability of ASEAN as the driving force in norm development is underpinned by its ability: to construct frames that advance the legitimacy of their regional claims as a group of non-nuclear countries; extract strategic leverage by linking SEANWFZ

2

The subject of the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty are five nuclear countries recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely, China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US. It is for this reason that this chapter focuses on investigating the diffusion of SEANWFZ to these five countries.

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with the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and counter-terrorism efforts; and competently perform neutrality and balancing act between major powers. To proceed to develop our propositions, this chapter unfolds the following sections. First, we situate our research on ASEAN’s role as a norm entrepreneur in relevant scholarship on norm diffusion and ASEAN centrality, using those literatures to propose a norm diffusion model driven by smaller states. Second, we offer a brief summary of the development of SEANFWZ, highlighting how it is distinct from other NFWZs. Third, we examine the process and mechanisms of norm diffusion driven by ASEAN in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. In the conclusion, we offer some general propositions on what will be required for ASEAN to shape norm-building in the global security architecture.

2 ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur and Its Mechanisms for Norm Diffusion The concept of norm diffusion has expanded considerably since it was popularised in IR studies in the 1990s (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999). Norm diffusion is now understood to exist in multilateral contexts marked by multidirectionality and polycentricity, meaning that norms travel in various directions (not only top-down or from the core to the periphery) and arise from multiple sources (van der Vleuten et al., 2021, pp. 128–129). As the framework of norm diffusion evolves to include analyses of more categories of actors as agents of change, a small but important body of work that recognises the norm entrepreneurship of smaller states has begun to emerge. This body of research focuses on how small states spread norms from “below” via rhetoric action, issue prioritisation, coalition building, and performance of vulnerability (e.g., Corbett et al., 2019; Towns, 2012). Despite nascent recognition of the agency of structurally weaker states in norm diffusion, in the scholarship on ASEAN that is most relevant to this article, little attention has been directed to the role of ASEAN as a norm entrepreneur. The ASEAN literature on norm diffusion tends to focus on regional countries’ selective responses to international norms as they filter through local contexts, resulting in adoption, rejection or localisation of external norms (Acharya, 2004; Rüland & Bechle, 2014). There is, however, a limited understanding of an alternative pattern of norm diffusion whereby ASEAN reaches out to extra-regional actors. This lacuna is regrettable given ASEAN’s remarkable proactivity in embedding major powers into a cluster of networks, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, among others (e.g., Haacke, 2003; Johnston, 2001; Leifer, 1999). These ASEAN-led cooperative initiatives have largely been examined under the rubric of “ASEAN centrality”, and scholars in this field provide various conceptual propositions to explain the process

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in which ASEAN has attained and maintained the driver’s seat in pan-Asian multilateral initiates. Realists attribute ASEAN centrality to the nonthreatening stance of ASEAN as a group of lesser powers (Amador, 2010; Kraft, 2017); constructivists, on the contrary, tend to assume ASEAN centrality as rooted in the strategic position of the grouping within the regional social network (Caballero-Anthony, 2014; Tan, 2017) or the incremental relationship-building process that follows the ASEAN Way (Ba, 2012). Taken together, this literature is important in assigning a more proactive role to ASEAN in norm development. That said, however, ASEAN centrality research mostly fails to assess the specific mechanisms and means that ASEAN deploys to bring about norm adoption. In response to this omission in this literature, we offer a more refined elaboration of the range of devices available to ASEAN to change the positions of extra-regional countries, especially when it encounters blockages to spreading local norms. Before proceeding to introduce our analytical framework, it is necessary to briefly point out that ASEAN countries, as with other smaller states, suffer from a welldocumented capacity deficit to change major powers through coercion or conditionality (Jones & Smith, 2007; Tow, 2012). Therefore, we focus on ASEAN’s tactics to overcome structural weakness through persuasion. Persuasion can be understood as the active communication of new normative understandings that involves “changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion” (Johnston, 2001, p. 496). In this article, we refine the strategies of persuasion in extant norm studies to fit the smaller states’ contexts. The conceptualisation of these strategies is through a process that combines familiarising ourselves with both the theoretical analysis and empirical material, and then going back and forth between the scholarly literature and empirical material to revise/redefine relevant concepts in the contexts under investigation. Accordingly, we conclude that ASEAN-driven norm diffusion occurs through the following mechanisms: a. Practicing the ASEAN Way of engagement. Persuasion research often points to the importance of the recursive, interactive social process where revised preferences are elicited, and new collective meanings are agreed (Checkel, 2005; Johnston, 2001; Krebs & Jackson, 2007). The inherent constraints on resources imply that ASEAN states face a bigger challenge to sustain interaction with other states as they have limited capabilities to be proactive in setting agendas and initiatives. We argue that the ASEAN Way of consensus building, nonconfrontational negotiations, and minimum institutionalisation (Jetschke & Rüland, 2009) facilitate the involvement of powerful actors in relationship-building processes that potentially lead to norm diffusion. This argument echoes findings in the ASEAN centrality literature. However, we want to emphasise that ASEAN’s efforts to establish an amicable environment for the free exchange of views between states should not be taken for granted given the mistrust between states in tense negotiations in the non-proliferation area and the high stakes involved (Qiao-Franco, 2023). Despite criticism for its tendency towards avoiding rather than confronting contentious

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issues, the ASEAN Way is a practical option for regional states to keep deliberations alive, which may eventually lead to awareness of and sympathy for ASEAN positions. b. Framing for legitimacy-building. Frames offer “a singular interpretation of a particular situation and then indicate appropriate behaviour for that context” (Payne, 2001, p. 39). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) see framing as a key mission of norm entrepreneurs in the first stage of the norm life cycle. Norm entrepreneurs, such as transnational advocacy networks, were found to give considerable attention to constructing frames that coincide with widely accepted ideas and practices to persuade targeted states to embrace the normative idea they support (Price, 1997; Risse et al., 2013). For smaller states, creating suitable frames that resonate with broader public understanding is of particular significance. Promoting frames based on pre-existing normative structures and collective understandings gives legitimacy to the norms they support and lends these states additional credibility and authority in their discussions with targeted audiences. In this sense, framing is a strategy of borrowing power. This strategy also has an impact of discrediting or disempowering alternative frames, especially those perpetuated by major powers. c. Issue linkage. Issue linkage has been assigned great weight in the literature on bargaining in international organisations (Davis, 2004; Haas, 1980). It involves linking the issue of concern to another issue “to change the balance of interests in favour of a negotiated agreement” (Davis, 2004, p. 153). We see issue linkage as another strategy for norm entrepreneurs of smaller states to extract strategic leverage for their claims. When encountering blockage of the desired normative claims, small states can strategically broaden the application of their norms to issues that are pushed by more powerful institutions or governments to apply pressure. Apart from obtaining bargaining leverage to counteract obstacles to normative claims, this mechanism is likely to entice norm adoption by making one’s behaviour in an issue area conditional on reciprocal behaviour in a separate issue area (Jinnah & Lindsay, 2016). d. Counter-dominance via performing neutrality and soft balancing. While all norm diffusions may well be highly contested, the asymmetric interdependency between states implies that smaller states are particularly susceptible to manipulation by domineering advocates that intend to forward competing norms. Like other smaller states, ASEAN members need to constantly guard against competing norms that deviate from sought-after normative commitments. We argue that successful norm diffusion by smaller states would transpire in balance of power systems. This involves efforts of soft balancing that are undertaken to undermine, frustrate, and increase the costs of unilateral action for the stronger state (He, 2008; McDougall, 2012). Soft balancing in the context of norm diffusion aims to create social and discursive situations that minimise the influence of major powers. This means ASEAN countries need to refrain from taking sides and maintain the balance of powerful interests to survive discursive challenges and the distortion of communicative processes that favour claims by strong states.

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These mechanisms delineated above point to the agency of smaller states in garnering understanding and support for their normative claims while counterbalancing competing norms espoused by major states. In the next section, we look for empirical evidence to further illustrate these mechanisms.

3 Review of the Creation of SEANWFZ The genesis of the SEANWFZ is closely related to the history of ASEAN as a regional organisation in Southeast Asia. The region was regarded as unstable, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. Along with the establishment of regional organisation as the venue for nurturing cooperative behaviours and reducing animosity among Southeast Asian countries, the notion of creating a neutral region from nuclear weapons was one of the first shared norms among ASEAN member states. With the exception of Thailand, Southeast Asian countries achieved their independence from Japanese and European colonial rule after the end of World War II and faced enormous challenges of exerting authority and defending their sovereignty. Most Southeast Asian countries were suspicious of each other over territorial conflicts, such as the conflict between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah. Coupled with the Cold War tension between the Western bloc led by the US and the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia was increasingly faced with greater risk of open conflict. The establishment of ASEAN, thus, marked the new commitment from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore to create a neutral region and allow each member state to maintain their autonomy. Nevertheless, ASEAN was initially created as a rather loose regional organisation with no clear mechanism and governing structure (Hernandez, 2007; Nandyatama, 2021). The Association started gaining political momentum along with the increasingly complex Cold War politics in the region. In 1968, Soviet-backed Vietcong and the North Vietnamese People’s Army of Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive which attacked South Vietnam through Cambodia. Despite ending in a tactical failure, the action brought the Vietnam war into a new height, increasing the risk for greater US-Soviet military intervention in Indochina. At the same time, Britain announced a total withdrawal of its troops that were “East of Suez”, including Malaysia and Singapore, by the end of 1971, creating a sense of anxiety regarding the potential for increasing conflict with a power vacuum opening in the region (Strait Times, 1968). This situation pushed ASEAN member states to take the risk of sending a distinct signal to international audiences. Malaysian Foreign Minister Tun Abdul Rahman, for instance, underlined the importance of the neutralisation of Southeast Asia and the need for major powers’ support for such a plan at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) (Abad, 2005). Interestingly, it was around the early establishment of ASEAN, the UN also debated and opened for signature the Irish-sponsored NPT. This idea apparently resonated with many Southeast Asian countries’ concerns. ASEAN member states eventually declared their intention to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and

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Neutrality (ZOPFAN) on 27 November 1971. The Declaration acknowledges the “trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones ... for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tension” and specifically urges ASEAN member states to “lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs” (ASEAN, 1971). Indeed, it is important to see ZOPFAN not as a fixed rule and mechanism but a mere political signalling which does not have any strict legal obligations for its signatories. At the same time, ZOPFAN is also a politically negotiated text that tried to accommodate different perceptions among ASEAN member states, such as in vaguely defining the temporary status of the existing foreign military bases in Southeast Asia. ZOPFAN is thus better understood as a declaration of intent from ASEAN for securing recognition as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality from other great powers in the wider region, conveying a sovereign choice over their own national and regional security (Haron, 1991). ASEAN’s subsequent action after the ZOPFAN Declaration was establishing the Working Group on ZOPFAN and pushing the idea of Southeast Asia as a neutral area, including from nuclear weapons. In 1975, ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN-SOM) mandated the Working Group to discuss and formulate the definition and steps to substantiate the Zone. The Working Group eventually recommended the blueprint for ZOPFAN in the form of “Conceptual Framework and Proposals Concerning Steps for the Creation of ZOPFAN”; and this was adopted by the first ASEAN Summit in 1976 (Alagappa, 1991). In May 1977, the ASEAN-SOM also decided to endorse the denuclearisation aspect of the Conceptual Framework, including in forums beyond ASEAN. As a result, ASEAN member states have also supported many resolutions in the UNGA, calling for all members to consider and approve the establishment of such a zone in the region. Soon after 1978, however, ASEAN became preoccupied with Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Only after 1982, ASEAN-SOM mandated the creation of the ASEAN Task Force for reviewing existing regional cooperation which included the issue of reviving the proposed denuclearisation of Southeast Asia. The Task Force eventually recommended several actions, such as intensifying collective actions on ZOPFAN, expanding consultations with other countries particularly those in Southeast Asia, and establishing a NWFZ in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, internal problems stalled the process of concluding the establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia. Some member states were still reluctant to accept that a NWFZ treaty would make a significant contribution to regional stability and whether it is necessary to include all Southeast Asian states beyond ASEAN members (Tarmidzi, 1996). Nevertheless, after informally negotiating and avoiding westernstyle multilateral negotiations, ASEAN member states managed to finalise the draft treaty particularly under the chairmanship of Indonesia. The final draft was eventually adopted during the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in December 1995. The ASEAN Summit of 1995 was a historic milestone when the ten leaders of Southeast Asian countries signed the SEANWFZ even before all became members of ASEAN. The treaty stipulates that the SEANWFZ will cover an area comprising the territories of all states in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,

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Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The SEANWFZ embodies two distinct elements that go beyond the other NWFZs. First, it includes a negative security assurance that requires the grantee of NWS to not use nuclear weapons against any contracting state or protocol party within the zone of application; and second, the zone of application also includes the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the contracting parties (NTI, 2021).

4 ASEAN’s Norm Diffusion in Action While the SEANWFZ Treaty shortly entered into force two years after its adoption, ASEAN cannot fully realise its goal of becoming free from all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction until the NWS give assurances not to use them in this region. Since the signing of the SEANWFZ Treaty, ASEAN states have pursued consultations with the five NWS—China, France, Russia, the UK and the US—to secure their recognition of the SEANWFZ through their signing of the Protocol to the Treaty. So far, none of the NWS has signed or ratified the SEANWFZ. However, legal endorsement of this concept should not be the sole indicator of successful norm diffusion. Rather, we included behavioural and discursive indicators in evaluating norm diffusion, namely, to examine whether and to what extent NWS’ discourses and practices in the region on nuclear weapons show recognition of SEANWFZ and the norms it stands for. Accordingly, we have observed important changes on the part of NWS throughout the ups and downs of ASEAN’s painstaking negotiations with the NWS that attest to the occurrence of norm diffusion (see Table 1). Apart from the increased willingness to engage in regional conversations on non-proliferation and participate in ASEAN non-proliferation initiatives, the most important indicator of the diffusion of SEANWFZ is the repeatedly stated commitment of NWS to not use nuclear weapons against any regional states in various ASEAN-led forums since 2011. We will briefly review these changes below as a background for understanding mechanisms that ASEAN deployed to prompt and shape these changes. In 1995, the draft text of SEANWFZ treaty was endorsed by the ASEAN ministers despite US and Chinese reservations about its content (T. Johnson, 1995). According to the Thai Foreign Ministry’s press release in 1995, “most of the five nations have agreed in principle to accede to the protocol which will be attached to the treaty if the detailed wording in the treaty is acceptable to them” (Kyodo News, 1995). Despite this endorsement “in principle” by NWS, the negotiation process over their accession to the SEANWFZ treaty have largely been stalemated until 2010. As analysed above, the SEANWFZ is different from the other NWFZs in adding a negative security assurance and extending its zone of application to include continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the contracting parties. These new non-proliferation norms promulgated by ASEAN to shield the region from nuclear

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Table 1 Timeline of ASEAN’s norm diffusion in nuclear non-proliferation Year

Norm diffusion process and outcome

1995

NWS endorsed “in principle” of the establishment of SEANWFZ

1996–1998

All NWS opposed signing the SEANWFZ protocol

1999–2000

China indicated its readiness to sign the protocol, but the other four NWS cited the geographical scope of the Treaty and the required negative security assurance as obstacles

2001–2006

ASEAN decided to undertake further consultations with the remaining four NWS in order to address their concerns as a package

2007–2009

Consultations with the NWS remained deadlocked; NWS was involved in cooperation on the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the SEANWFZ (2007–2012)

2010

The US announced its willingness to consult with ASEAN in order to reach an agreement regarding the treaty protocol

2011

Consultations with five NWS resumed

2012

NWS indicated readiness to sign the protocol, but the signing ceremony was postponed with the US, UK, Russia and France citing reservations about the protocol

2013–2018

Continued stalemate between ASEAN and NWS over the SEANFWZ treaty’s protocol despite the latter’s involvement in enforcing the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the SEANWFZ (2013–2017; 2018–2022)

2019–2022

NWS resumed consultations with ASEAN on the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty

threats, however, also became a stumbling block that led to a drag on member states’ deliberations with NWS. The US, for instance, expressed concerns over the passing of nuclear-capable vessels and aircraft through Southeast Asian waters and air space, and that they would have to declare their cargo. It also objected to a sentence in the protocol saying signatories are “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons” within the declared zone against any other party to it. China, which is involved in territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, opposed wording in the draft treaty referring to its application to “continental shelves and exclusive economic zones” (Bangkok Post, 1995). From then on, ASEAN countries were in constant efforts to pursue recognition of SEANWFZ by NWS for an early realisation of the goal of a nuclear-free Southeast Asia. Notably, in 1997, the mandate of the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting Working Group on ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ was extended to include pursuance of consultations with NWS pertaining to the protocol to the treaty. In 1999, China expressed its willingness to sign the protocol on the condition of resolving the differences with ASEAN countries regarding the implication of the SEANWFZ treaty on the question of sovereignty in the South China Sea (Abad, 2005). Out of concerns about breaking the balance of power on security matters,

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ASEAN countries rejected China’s offer to join the NWFZ and decided to continue further negotiations with the other four NWS to achieve a package signing. Until 2010, after a long impasse, direct consultations between ASEAN and the NWS resumed. In 2010 at the Eighth NPT Review Conference, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US is prepared to consult with SEANWFZ Parties in order to reach an agreement regarding the treaty protocol (Adamrah, 2011). Afterwards, the deliberations were warmed up with the establishment of the ASEAN New York Committee under the SEANWFZ Commission and the issuance of a declaration on the protocol to the treaty in 2011 during the ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia (Kea, 2012). At the Summit, ASEAN for the first time sought clarification from the NWS on the negative security assurance that they do not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the entire territory of any state party to the treaty including land, inland waters, territorial waters and the airspace above them (Kea, 2012). However, in July 2012, the scheduled signing of the protocol at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting was postponed pending the review by the SEANWFZ Commission of the text and positions of the reservations of four NWS (France, Russia, the UK and the US) (Xinhua News, 2012). France voiced its reservations on the rights of self-defence, the UK on new security threats and Russia on the rights of foreign ships and aircraft to pass into the nuclear-free zone; while the US did not submit any written text of reservation (The Jakarta Globe, 2012). Since then, negotiations over the signing of the SEANFWZ protocol continued to move slowly despite the gap between the views of ASEAN and NWS on the problem narrowing. Throughout the process, ASEAN has continued to promote greater mutual understanding and transparency in the region and to imbue its participants with the spirit of common commitment to regional peace and stability. Specifically, the NWS as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international bodies were involved in implementing the three Plans of Action (2007–2012; 2013– 2017; 2018–2022) of the treaty. Under these Plans of Action, ASEAN made progress in forging an array of cooperative networks in improving nuclear safety, the early notification of accidents, and emergency preparedness and response plans to such accidents. These networks through constantly engaging the NWS helped develop the right attitude and mentality on the safe use of nuclear power.

4.1 Practicing the ASEAN Way The constant engagement with powerful actors that held various reservations concerning the SEANWFZ was, first of all, achieved through the ASEAN Way of endorsing consensus and building trust. Following the ASEAN Way, the Association underlined that ASEAN mechanisms will “continue to develop at a pace that is comfortable to all participants” and maintain the importance “of confidence building to the success of [its forums] and the further development of confidence

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building measures” in preventing conflict and building shared norms among all relevant parties (ASEAN, 1999). As an example, the President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, in an opening speech to the ASEAN Summit in 1995 stated the importance of addressing the “legitimate concerns and interests” of the NWS in consultations, to “encourage them to remain faithful to the spirit of the [SEANWFZ] treaty” (Reuters, 1995). ASEAN’s interaction with NWS leaders through various ASEAN-led platforms, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings Plus, Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEAN Plus, demonstrated the consistent ASEAN Way of diplomacy. Moreover, ASEAN created opportunities to persuade the NWS by deliberately holding internal SEANWFZ Treaty meetings in conjunction with regional meetings where these major powers were present. For instance, the first meeting of the Commission of the SEANWFZ Treaty organised by ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 1999 was held in conjunction with the ARF meeting in Singapore. This leverages ARF’s function as an amicable and inclusive medium for the free exchange of views between ASEAN and its dialogue partners on important strategic and security issues in the wider region. Through consultations with the NWS, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other ASEAN dialogue partners, the 1999 ARF passed the Chairman’s statement that claims “support for the continuing consultations between the state parties of the SEANWFZ Treaty and the NWS regarding the latter’s accession to the Protocol of the Treaty” (ASEAN, 1999). Akin to the ARF in 1999, ASEAN also discussed the nuclear non-proliferation issue in 2001, particularly through the ARF and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The Chairman’s statement of the eighth meeting of the ARF appreciated “the progress made at the recent direct dialogue between the State Parties and the NWS” in Hanoi on 19 May 2001 and welcomed the P-5 Joint Statement “concerning security assurances for Mongolia and support for the Nuclear Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia” (ASEAN, 2001). In setting up an informal atmosphere and avoiding confrontational criticism among all parties, ASEAN tries to create a comfortable venue for socialising external actors into norm adoption. The ASEAN Way of keeping relevant parties engaged in conversations about sensitive issues gives all an opportunity to learn about the perspectives of others, which in turn has helped in building understanding and trust regarding ASEAN positions.

4.2 Framing for Legitimacy-Building The widespread ratification of nuclear arms control treaties by ASEAN countries also allows them to bolster the credibility of SEANWFZ. Notably, all ASEAN countries have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 2018. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was ratified by six ASEAN states, including Thailand in 2017, Vietnam in 2018, Lao in 2019, Malaysia in 2020, and Cambodia and the Philippines in 2021. The demonstrated consistency of Southeast Asian policy support

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for global efforts in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was instrumental for ASEAN states to exert greater political pressure on NWS to accord recognition to Southeast Asia’s anti-nuclear positions. More importantly, SEANWFZ was meticulously framed as building trust, enhancing preventive diplomacy and addressing humanitarian concerns to appeal to the international community. For instance, at the signing ceremony of SEANWFZ, Vietnam Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet called countries outside the region, especially the nuclear powers to “respect Southeast Asia’s aspiration and commitment” to address the “menace that has always threatened mankind’s existence … over the past 50 years since the dropping of the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (C. Johnson, 1995). This statement suggests that SEANWFZ embodies principles and perspectives on nuclear issues that deem to be morally right, exemplifying ASEAN’s efforts to persuade extra-regional countries of the normative legitimacy of its positions. When encountering obstruction by NWS, ASEAN has strived to relieve situations of political disempowerment by seeking out normative credibility and authority. At multilateral forums, ASEAN countries repeatedly emphasised the resonance of the concept of SEANWFZ with the UN Charter, NPT and other nuclear disarmament initiatives. Through joint resolutions presented at the UNGA and meetings within the framework of the NPT, ASEAN called for all UN members to consider and approve the establishment of such a zone in the region. It was not surprising to see that in the 1997 UNGA Resolution on the Nuclear Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas, ASEAN members and other developing countries justifiably demanded the inclusion of “all concerned States to facilitate adherence to the protocols to such [NWFZ] treaties by all relevant States that have not done so” (UNGA, 1997). ASEAN also constructs SEANWFZ as coinciding with non-proliferation initiatives populated by the Non-Aligned Movement and other developing countries. At the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia in 2010, ASEAN countries and other NWFZ countries jointly lobbied for the recognition of ASEAN’s efforts in promoting and strengthening the implementation of the SEANWFZ as the region’s contribution to achieving a nuclear weapon-free world. These joint efforts played a key role in promoting recognition among the NWS, especially the US, of the nuclear-free zones and negative security assurance around 2011. These framing efforts that give ASEAN’s agenda an appearance of global support further provided momentum for the resumption of SEANWFZ deliberations in the same year (Khalik, 2011).

4.3 Issue Linkage Beyond socialising ideas through maintaining inclusive and amicable venues for multilateral discussions, ASEAN promoted norms via issue linkage in asserting the region’s relevance. As a norm entrepreneur constituted of small-middle power states,

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issue linkage was instrumental for ASEAN to enhance the strategic leverage of its normative claims. One of the examples of ASEAN’s efforts in using issue linkage is the action of associating SEANWFZ with the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and regional stability. Since the 1990s, Southeast Asian countries have been actively involved in initiatives towards stability building within the wider region, especially in the Asia–Pacific. With the growth of regional forums like the ARF and the Associations’ commitment for nuclear non-proliferation, ASEAN often endorsed the issue of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula on the agenda of ARF. The Philippines as the chair of ASEAN in 2007, for instance, urged “that representatives from nations participating in denuclearisation talks with North Korea—China, Japan, the US, South Korea and Russia—would meet on the sidelines of the ARF meeting” to discuss more concrete steps to sustain the talks to denuclearise and maintain regional stability (Agnote, 2007). In a similar spirit, ASEAN strived to advance the SEANWFZ in conjunction with the denuclearisation of North Korea at the UN Security Council (UNSC) since 2009. The Joint Communiqué of the 42nd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting condemned “the recent underground nuclear test and missile launches undertaken by the DPRK, which constitute clear violations of the Six-Party Agreement and relevant UNSC resolutions” and “urged the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations and relevant UNSC resolutions” (ASEAN, 2009). The Communiqué also highlighted “that the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes ASEAN and all participants of the SixParty Talks, can play a positive and proactive role in promoting peace and stability” in the region (ASEAN, 2009). Moreover, the same Communiqué “reaffirmed the importance of SEANWFZ” in ensuring regional security and stability (ASEAN, 2009). These examples highlighted ASEAN’s longstanding interest in preserving Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapon-free zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the North Korea nuclear issue, ASEAN has been stressing the value of SEANWFZ in minimising other relevant nuclear conflicts (e.g., between India and Pakistan), which all have fostered stronger strategic leverage for ASEAN to further its own conception of nuclear non-proliferation.

4.4 Counter-Dominance and Soft Balancing Strategy Despite being characterised as an amicable actor in the region, ASEAN also demonstrated a distinct diplomatic strategy in the face of great power tensions and the risk of losing its legitimacy. As a relatively small power, ASEAN felt the need to be sensitive to asymmetric power relations in the wider region. While being open might make other great powers comfortable, ASEAN realises that it can be susceptible to manipulation by domineering powers and therefore needs to constantly guard against competing actions, especially in the form of soft balancing all major powers that may deviate regional discussion from sought-after normative commitment.

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One of the efforts in diffusing nuclear non-proliferation norms exists within ASEAN’s maintenance of the balance of power in the region. Since the 1990s, for instance, ASEAN has been expanding its regional forums not only as a medium for drawing and maintaining US involvement but also engaging China (Lee, 2007). When China claimed readiness to sign on to the SEANWFZ “at an unspecified early date” in 2006, ASEAN suggested that Beijing and all nuclear powers should join at the same time (Weatherbee, 2008, p. 329). Consistently in the following years, ASEAN has politely turned down all Chinese proposals to sign the SEANWFZ protocol first for fear of being outmanoeuvred by China on nuclear issues without the participation of other powers (Lee, 2007). Similarly, ASEAN has rejected to join the tripartite agreement among Australia, the UK and US on building nuclear powered submarines, namely AUKUS, in part to appease Chinese concerns (Rakhmat, 2021). Moreover, while the Chairman’s statement of the 24th ARF in 2017 clearly expressed grave concerns over DPRK’s intercontinental ballistic missile tests, ASEAN did not comply with the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s suggestions for Southeast Asian foreign ministers “to do more to help cut funding streams for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and to minimise diplomatic relations with Pyongyang” (Brunnstrom, 2017). This signifies two important issues. First, the importance of maintaining diplomatic engagement as opposed to isolating Pyongyang. Second, the primacy of soft balancing in the context of maintaining a distance from risky US policies and strengthening ASEAN legitimacy as the supporter for peaceful denuclearisation of Korean peninsula. ASEAN strategic leverage is not static. Despite ASEAN’s strong aspiration for playing a direct role in supporting the denuclearization of Korean peninsula through ASEAN-led forums, non-ASEAN ARF members, especially Japan, South Korea and the US, “strongly opposed the idea” (Bangkok Post, 2018). This pushed ASEAN to keep its relevance by convincing Pyongyang to join the ARF and sign the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation as well as refraining from taking sides with great powers, especially the US and China. Soft balancing strategy, particularly in the context of maintaining strategic autonomy from great powers, creates social and discursive situations that allow ASEAN to maintain its legitimacy as a credible actor in the norm diffusion process (He, 2008; McDougall, 2012).

5 Conclusion By unpacking ASEAN’s approach to exporting norms to NWS, we hope to provide insights for understanding the processes of norm diffusion from structurally weaker members of the multilateral system. Overall, ASEAN’s continued efforts to resolve outstanding issues and engage NWS have successfully secured their commitment to multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, especially their openness to offering negative security assurances to regional countries. The Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races issued on 3 January 2022 is the most recent affirmance of the

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commitment of NWS to not use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes. Moreover, this statement emphasised the importance of preserving and complying with bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments, including the SEANWFZ. Despite the recognition of ASEAN as a key agent of change, we admit its norm diffusion faces several uncertainties, particularly from increasingly tense US-China competition and the growing division of ASEAN into pro-China and pro-US camps. China’s increased militarisation in the South China Sea has long stirred tensions with several ASEAN member states that reject its sweeping claims over this globally important sea trade route (Nandyatama, 2019). However, some ASEAN member states have apparently also signalled their affinity to China and echoed Beijing’s narratives in the region as their countries have no viable alternative partner for development aid (Song et al., 2021). China’s growing influence in the region has also incited greater US presence in the region. With claims such as “pivot to Asia” and promoting the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the US has been solidifying defence pacts with some ASEAN countries, such as Singapore and the Philippines. Recently, the US also announced a historic security pact with the UK and Australia in 2021 in an apparent “effort to counter China” (BBC, 2021). This creates further complex reactions from ASEAN, particularly as some member states show welcoming gestures and some others signalled concerns. ASEAN’s success in norm diffusion may lie in its capability to maintain internal unity to survive great power competition. Against the backdrop of US-China tensions and growing internal fractures in Southeast Asia, ASEAN will face greater challenges in employing its norm diffusion strategies of practicing the “ASEAN Way”, constructing frames, conducting issue linkage, and performing neutrality and a balancing act between major powers. These strategies have always been based on the strong and solid normative position shared by ASEAN members as anti-nuclear weapon states. As such, in order to maintain its viability as the driving force in norm development in the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in the Asia–Pacific, ASEAN should keep the strict observance of provisions of the SEANFWZ Treaty by all member states and carefully craft a common position to manage its relations with NWS. Moreover, it is also important for ASEAN to consider joining forces with other countries beyond the Asia–Pacific and expanding its cooperation with nonstate actors, such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). These efforts have the potential of opening new windows of opportunity for ASEAN to achieve wider adoption of its favoured nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament ideas.

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The EU Presidencies of Central Eastern European Members: A Framework for Mutual Socialisation and Normative Influence on the EU’s Agenda? Elsa Tulmets

1 Introduction The literature on the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to the East has tended to see the phenomenon of Europeanisation as moving from the EU or its member states to the candidate countries. While some of them have tried to show that, despite the asymmetry that characterised accession, there were real interactions between EU and Central and Eastern European actors (cf. Tulmets, 2005; Neumayer & Dakowska, 2008), post-accession work has tended to focus on the limits of Europeanisation, both in terms of resistance to the acquis and of non-implementation of the acquis (Coman & Tulmets, 2020; Epstein & Sedelmeier, 2008). There are, however, areas, such as foreign policy, where there is not much acquis as such and where Europeanisation has taken place later, in a concomitant movement of involvement in the European sphere by candidate actors. One can therefore observe both a Europeanisation of the foreign policy structures of the member states, which acceded the EU from 2004 on and a cognitive influence of these states on the EU’s external policies, sometimes even before formal accession. In order to show the role played by the EU on the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), as well as by the CEECs on the EU, I will focus on a case that is little covered in the literature and even less in a comparative perspective, that of the

This chapter is a reworked and actualised version of a book chapter, already published in Tulmets (2014, Chapter 5). I thank Palgrave for the authorization to published a reworked version of this chapter. It was also presented as a paper in French in 2015 at the AFSP congress in Aix-en-Provence. I thank Prof. Carolina Ban for her excellent comments on this older previous version of the article. I thank the coordinators of the GACR project Šárka Kolmašová and Ricardo Reboredo, as well as the participants of the online meetings for their excellent comments on this actualized version. E. Tulmets (B) Europa-University Viadrina, Frankfurt, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_11

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EU Council presidencies (Gosty´nska, 2011; Havelka, 2021; Kajnˇc, 2009; Kucharczyk & Łada, 2012; Rupel, 2007; Romsics, 2011; Sus, 2015; Tulmets, 2014). The rotating presidencies of the EU have indeed required a large process of institutional learning, norms and practices on the part of the “newer” member states, which can be identified as resulting from a Europeanisation phenomenon. However, in practice, each state has adopted its own style of managing the presidencies, whether they were managed before or after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the agenda of the presidencies are generally imposed by Brussels, the area of foreign policy has remained an area where the Council presidency can still exert a real cognitive influence, therefore leaving an imprint on EU’s agenda. I will show that EU presidencies represent specific context for (mutual) socialisation around social norms or values like solidarity and responsibility, which are enshrined into EU’s treaties. Empirically, I will present the impact of CEECs on the European foreign policy agenda during their respective EU presidencies. I will show that the priorities in this field were shaped according to the new foreign policy priorities defined by these states. In particular, policies towards potential candidates and former communist countries—the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries—are particular cases to study. Interestingly, these priorities have been kept over time, despite the fact that some countries have experienced a populist turn, like in Hungary, Poland and, to some extend in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia (Cadier & Szulecki, 2020; Havelka, 2021). The study first presents the EU presidency priorities of CEECs which acceded the EU since 2004. It then compares the EU presidencies held by Slovenia (2007, 2021) and the Czech Republic (2007b, 2022) in a diachronic and deeper approach in comparing two periods, with information gathered from 2010 to 2012 on the presidencies of 2007 and 2009, and information recently gathered for the years 2021–22. Original material was collected on the preparation and conduct of the presidencies through semi-structured interviews with diplomats, officials and staff in office. The analysis was complemented by a systematic study of primary documents and political speeches. The diachronic approach used by historians, complemented with discourse/content analysis allows for a check of continuities and discontinuities in the definition of EU priorities. This approach checking the impact of the CEE countries on the EU after enlargement assumes that this impact is possible as long as the priorities set are in line with the political and historical aspects of the foreign policy identity of the EU presiding countries. The political identity can be defined as the foreign policy outlines, norms and values of the organisations that the CEE countries joined in the 1990s and 2000s, i.e. the EU and NATO (but also the Council of Europe, OSCE…). Historical identity allows for inflections within these policy priorities according to interpretations of the historical relationship between the CEE countries and the recipient countries of the foreign policies studied. It is there that the political party in power plays a role in the inflections given to the priorities. This analytical approach shows that the influence of the CEECs on the EU’s foreign policy started before the formal enlargement and continued in those areas where these states found a field of specialization, lee-ways and were able to define

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their own means of action. Building on the results of previous work (Tulmets, 2014, Chapter 5), this chapter intends to shed a sociological light on the networks of actors and their interactions with European structures and ‘older’ member states during the preparation of the presidencies and the definition of the European foreign policy agenda.

2 Influencing EU’s Agenda: The Specific Field of Foreign Policy Prior to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the academic literature showed that it was generally difficult for a member state to influence the agenda of EU presidencies (cf. Elgström, 2003, Tallberg, 2006). The creation of the trio presidency—combining two ‘older’ member states with a ‘newer’ member—under the Nice Treaty of 2000 was meant to prepare EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007, and thus allowed agendas to be better coordinated. One area, foreign and security policy, kept some leeway for EUs’ Member States during their EU Council presidency as it relates to inter-governmental policies. When the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the Member State holding the presidency no longer formally had the capacity to set the foreign policy agenda, as this competence falls to the High Representative for External Affairs and Security Policy. In practice, however, the presidency was further able to influence the European agenda, especially when the priorities put forward remain consistent with its own foreign policy priorities. The policies towards the Western Balkans (and Turkey), as well as the EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Policy (launched in 2003), became an important part of European policy. They are both mentioned in the EU Security Strategy of 2003 and in the programmes of the EU Council presidencies. This is one of the reasons why the following analysis focuses in particular on these policies, which play a major role in the foreign policy of the EU, but also of the CEECs. Before the enlargement to the East, the Finnish Presidency of the EU in 1999 had launched the Nordic Dimension to strengthen cooperation in the Baltic Sea, which it complemented during its presidency in 2006. The German Presidency in 2007 had to leave its Eastern “ENP plus” strategy emphasising relations with Russia in order to concentrate on the launch of the Black Sea strategy supported by Romania and Bulgaria. The EU presidencies of the southern countries, on the other hand, have tipped the balance towards the South. The French (2008) and Spanish (2010) presidencies have focused on cooperation with North African countries, notably with the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008, a project that was also intended to take a stand in the debate on Turkey’s accession to the EU. With the enlargement to the East, European policy towards the East took on a different legitimacy. The Czech (2007b), Polish (2011), Lithuanian (2013), Latvian (2015), Slovak (2016) and Estonian (2017) presidencies have thus emphasised the eastern dimension of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, while the Slovenian (2007),

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Hungarian (2010), Bulgaria (2018), Romanian (2019) and Croatian (2020) presidencies rather focused on issues related to the Western Balkan countries while having the support of the other CEECs. This commitment reflected the willingness to propose their experience of EU accession to further (possible) candidates and to reflect historical relations with these regions. The theme of a European policy towards the East (and towards Ukraine in particular) had, for example, already been strongly suggested by Poland even before its official accession to the EU, although the Council formally rejected concrete suggestions, which nevertheless inspired the Commission (see Natorski, 2008; interviews, European Commission, Brussels, 2010). In this respect, geographical priorities remain consistent with the political and historical dimensions of the foreign policy identity of the EU presiding countries, which allow for the expression of both solidarity and responsibility towards these geographical areas or countries. The political identity of foreign policy, which implies the promotion of the norms and values to which the CEECs have adhered, mainly those of the EU and NATO (but also those of the Council of Europe and the OSCE), allows the expression of political solidarity towards countries showing the will to move closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures, in particular Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Historical identity, on the other hand, allows for the expression of a moral responsibility towards countries with which some CEE countries have long-standing relations, such as Lithuania with Belarus, Poland with Ukraine or Romania with Moldova. Interpretations of the past can thus lead to important shifts in policy priorities depending on the political coalitions in power (Tulmets, 2014, p. 15). Solidarity and responsibility are understood here as social norms, which occasion (mutual) socialisation, therefore a better understanding of the foreign policy priorities of other EU Member States within the EU. The trio presidency developed with the Nice Treaty in view of EU’s enlargement largely contributed to enhance this process of common understanding of each others’ approaches. A short look at the foreign policy priorities of the CEECS under their EU presidency indicates that supporting countries of the Western Balkans on their way to the EU and NATO, as well as those of the Eastern European neighbourhood in coming closer to the EU remains a constant priority of these countries. For some of them, it represents a real foreign policy “niche” or domain of specialization (Table 1). Table 1 CEEC EU presidencies and their priorities in the field of foreign policy in and around the European Union Country

Period

Priorities

Website

Slovenia

January-June 2008

Western Balkans, ENP South

eu2008.si

Czech Republic

January-June 2009

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2009.cz

Hungary

January-June 2011

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2011.hu

Poland

July-December 2011

Western Balkans, ENP East

pl2011.eu

Lithuania

July-December 2013

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2013.lt

Latvia

January-June 2015

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2015.lv

Slovakia

July-December 2016

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2016.sk (continued)

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(continued) Country

Period

Priorities

Website

Estonia

June-December 2017

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2017.ee

Bulgaria

January-June 2018

Western Balkans, ENP East/South

eu2018bg.bg

Romania

July-December 2019

Western Balkans, ENP East/South

romania2019.eu

Croatia

January-June 2020

Western Balkans, ENP South

eu2020.hr

Slovenia

July-December 2021

Western Balkans, ENP South

si2021.eu

Czech Republic

July-December 2022

Western Balkans, ENP East

eu2022.cz

Hungary

July-December 2024

not official yet

eu2024.hu

Poland

January-June 2025

not official yet

eu2025.pl

Sources Council of the European Union, Council Decision of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the European Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the Council, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009D0908&from=EN; Council Decision (EU) 2016/1316 of 26 July 2016, Official Journal of the EU, 2.8.2016. https://eur-lex.eur opa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D1316&from=EN

However, in order for the presidencies to be conducted properly, the CEECs that had just joined the EU had to go through a process of learning how the institutional and procedural structures of the EU presidency work. Moreover, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has in the meantime led to changes in competences in the field of foreign policy and required readjustments in the management of the presidencies. In this sense, it is possible to speak of “Europeanisation” (Caporaso et al., 2001; cf. Radaelli, 2000), and above all, after Lisbon, of “socialization” (Alderson, 2001; Schimmelfennig, 2000) in the foreign policy structures of the CEECs. The literature, however, speaks of asymmetries in this process of Europeanisation and of socialisation. I argue, that even within asymmetries and socialisation processes, the governments of candidates, then EU Members were able to propose their own foreign policy priorities at the EU level, in agreement with the other member states (Tulmets, 2014). In fact, the results of fieldwork in four CEE EU presidencies even suggested that the more successful the socialisation into the European institutions was, the more persuasively and sustainably these states were able to influence the European foreign policy agenda in return. For this reason, I prefer to speak of ‘mutual socialisation’, which I define as the dynamic process by which actors in a society, community or polity internalise the paradigms, values and norms of that society, community or polity, while at the same time participating in the dissemination and redefinition of the formal and informal rules (sectoral frames of reference) that make up these paradigms, values and norms (Tulmets, 2005, p. 57). I argue that presidencies represent moments that are conducive to the development of this mutual socialisation (cf. point 2). A common feature of the EU presidencies of the CEE countries is that they had to be prepared longer in advance than those of the older EU countries in

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order to give officials and staff time to become familiar with internal EU procedures and norms and thus to socialize into the EU presidency’s rules, but also in order to define the priorities of their presidency (Tulmets, 2014, pp. 199–218). The result is both a Europeanisation of the foreign policy structures and administrations of the CEECs and an attempt by the member states to put their imprint on the European agenda (cf. 3).

3

(Mutual) socialisation into the Council presidency’s rules and foreign policy approaches

All CEECs that held the EU presidency since 2008 had to go through a process of intense preparation for the presidency, which rendered a sort of Europeanisation of foreign policy structures, sometimes several years in advance. This preparation included the training of staff and officials responsible for managing the dossiers during the six months of the presidency, at procedural, institutional and linguistic levels. The programme of each presidency was also worked on in advance and adapted shortly before each presidency to take account of international events. In a concomitant movement, it appears that foreign policy represents an area where the CEECs have tried to influence and thus mark their imprint on the European agenda. At this level, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has clearly led to a redefinition of competences which some CEECs have skillfully used to their advantage.

3.1 The Slovenian Experience The preparation for the first Slovenian presidency started rather fast after the EU presidency of the Netherlands, where it was decided that Slovenia would be the first CEEC to hold an EU presidency. Already in 2004, the Slovenian government started to work out the priorities of the presidency. Slovenia held many consultations and meetings with other member states (though mainly with the other two countries of the trio presidency) to exchange knowledge on the organisational and political management of an EU presidency (Tulmets, 2014, p. 199). Trainings were organised to prepare civil servants for their new tasks. These trainings included language trainings (mainly English and French), but also trainings in knowledge of EU institutions and the functioning of the EU and thematic and sectoral issues. Slovenia also worked closely with the other two countries of the troika, Germany and Portugal, in the framework of the consultations and trainings. As Slovenia is a small country, it was decided that the key political lines would be defined in Ljubljana, and the management of the presidency would be done in Brussels. The preparation in Brussels started already one year before the date of the start of the presidency: in the middle of 2006, it was already decided who would be in Brussels and who would

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stay in Ljubljana, and the core people at the Permanent Representation were already posted there 6–12 months in advance. The person in charge of the Political and Security Council (PSC) and COPS reported that personal contacts with the peers were important for the Slovenians to ‘learn how to [do] this or that’, especially ‘given the long legacy of the PSC on which to build’ (interview, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). Therefore, it took several months until each person came to understand the future tasks very well. Internships or temporary jobs of two weeks to one month were organised at the various EU institutions for the civil servants so that they could understand their internal functioning. Interactions with the other member states were taking place all the time during formal and less formal meetings, which were often organised at the initiative of the Slovenian representative. Two months before the presidency, bilateral meetings were organised very regularly by the members of the Slovenian Permanent Representation to Brussels so as to present the priorities of the presidency and get some feedback and support. In general, as a diplomat reports, ‘people were informed that [Slovenia had] been well prepared, [and] there was a good will to help from their side, but no patronage: this greatly helped to build confidence’ (interview, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). Another diplomat said, ‘…it was good that the presidency was so [soon] after our EU accession; it helped us to integrate [ourselves] much [more quickly] into the EU institutions’ functioning; it helped us to build self-confidence; it was awareness raising’ (interview, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). In addition to the secondment from the other EU member states, around 90–100 people have been hired to help out during the time of the six-month presidency. Only 20 of them were kept at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainly due to the change of government at the end of the presidency (interview, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). Consultations have been organised with Czech politicians, diplomats and higher civil servants immediately after the end of the Slovene presidency to present a part of this fresh experience with the EU institutions to the Czech Republic. Seminars related to the Slovenian presidency also took place in Budapest and Warsaw at the request of the Hungarian and Polish governments (interviews, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). In order to make sure that the presidency would be correctly managed, the government in power concluded an agreement with the opposition which stated that there would be cooperation during this six months exercise, which did not hinder criticism from political parties in the opposition (Tulmets, 2014, pp. 200–201).

3.2 The Czech Experience The first Czech EU presidency took place from 1 January to 30 June 2009. Compared to the Slovenian presidency, the Czech one did not start to be prepared so far in advance. At the institutional level, a specific office was created in 2006–2007 at the level of the Prime Minister to coordinate EU- related issues. The Office of the Vice-Prime Minister for European Affairs, then held by Alexandr Vondra, and the

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus started to work out the priorities only in 2007. While several of these priorities were inherited from the EU agenda, some leeway was left in the fields of energy policy and external affairs (Tulmets, 2014, p. 203). Their formulation has since evolved according to events on the international stage, mainly during the French EU presidency with the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean and the war between Georgia and Russia. While there were five priorities in 2007, the presidency ended up with three main topics, the three ‘Es’: Economy, Energy and Europe in the world. Under ‘Europe in the world’, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe represent two of the three key sub-priorities, the other geographical sub-priority being transatlantic relations (Czech Government 2007a, b). The Czech Republic benefited from the help of the two other countries of the trio presidency, France and Sweden, in the preparation of its six-month marathon. Several meetings and consultations have been organised at all political and administrative levels with these countries and also with other EU countries. This contributed, on the one hand, to better socialising the Czech part into EU-related issues and, on the other hand, to allowing for the presentation of Czech positions on specific issues. Some events that happened under the French presidency have made the Czechs aware of the necessity to think more about ways of managing crisis situations. Many trainings have been organised to prepare civil servants for their new tasks, like language trainings (mainly in English and French), but also trainings related to EU institutions and the functioning of the EU, and thematic and sectoral issues. About 2000 Czech diplomats and civil servants have followed courses on the French language and the French coordination of EU issues, with the support of the International Organisation of Francophonia (OIF) (interviews, Prague, 2009). During the EU presidency, secondment from several EU member states and the participation of Czech EU civil servants in the MFA’s activities have greatly contributed to assisting the presidency in its tasks. However, the presidency’s work was undermined by a serious political crisis which saw the fall of the government of M. Topolánek in March 2009 and its replacement by a transitory government made up of higher civil servants led by Prime Minister Jan Fischer (Tulmets, 2014, p. 204).

4 The Impact of the CEECs on the EU: Evolvement of the European Policy Towards Post-Communist Countries (Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood) The policy towards the candidate countries and the EU’s neighbours represent recurrent foreign policy topics promoted by the CEECs. It is quite clear that these countries have exerted, contrary to the classical analysis of Europeanisation, an important impact on the EU’s foreign policy agenda. They had a different legitimacy than countries like Germany to continue to define European policy towards the East and towards the post-communist countries. In order to better understand what efforts

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each country has made to shape the European agenda according to their own foreign policy priorities, I will look back at how each presidency has dealt with the two issues of enlargement and neighbourhood. Furthermore, I show in the example of the more detailed Slovene and Czech presidencies that these priorities are still present in the subsequent EU presidencies of these two countries, independently from the political parties in power.

4.1 A Strong Support to the Western Balkans 4.1.1

The Slovenian EU Presidencies

The Western Balkans were identified as one of the key priorities of both Slovenian EU presidencies in 2007 and 2021. Officially, there have been five priorities, the fifth being “bringing the countries of the Western Balkans one step closer to the EU” (Kajnˇc, 2009, p. 89). While the first three items on the agenda of 2007 had clearly been inherited from the European agenda, intercultural dialogue was considered to be of a symbolic nature and engagement with the Western Balkans was seen as Slovenia’s real priority (ibid). Slovenian commitment to managing and resolving Western Balkan issues was relatively sustained before and throughout the presidency. Slovenia started working on the issue already in mid-2005. In the face of general enlargement fatigue and the rejection of the Ahtisaari plan on Kosovo in December 2007, the aim of the presidency was to bring the region back to the top of the European agenda and to conclude the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) package for the countries of the former Yugoslavia. With regard to Kosovo, Slovenia was keen to avoid a situation it had already experienced, i.e. when the EU was unable to speak with one voice in case a European country declared independence (ibid, p. 95). However, during its EU presidency, it became clear that this goal would be difficult to achieve and the Slovenian government had to be satisfied with the Council’s conclusion of February 2008 that it was up to each member state to decide on this issue in accordance with international law (Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ljubljana, September 2010). The presidency was particularly involved in the deployment of the EULEX mission, which was launched on 16 February 2008 before Kosovo’s official declaration of independence, following the closure of the UNMIK mission. The signing of the Stability and Association Agreement with Serbia was another sensitive issue of the Slovenian presidency. The Netherlands and Belgium had voted against signing the Agreement in January 2008. The Netherlands and the UK then tried to work out a political compromise, which was rejected by the Serbs. Finally, Slovenia found a way to unite the member states on this issue and the agreement was signed in April 2008 (Fink-Hafner & Lajh, 2008, pp. 51–52). Other issues discussed during the Slovenian EU presidency were the opening of four additional chapters of negotiations for Croatia’s accession to the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s adoption of political reforms linked to the signing of the SAA, and Macedonia’s fulfilment of the

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conditions necessary for the opening of accession negotiations (Kajnˇc, 2009, p. 96; Inotai, 2008, p. 10). While the debate on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence remained open at the end of the presidency, the other goals related to the signing of the SAA, and keeping the Western Balkans high on the EU agenda were finally achieved. For its EU presidency during the second half of 2021, Slovenia has defined 4 priorities, the fourth one being “A credible and secure European Union, capable of ensuring security and stability in its neighbourhood” (Slovenian government, 2021, p. 15). This detailed text of this priority highlights the fact that the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood still represent key priorities of the Slovenian foreign policy, but they have been put in the meantime into a common denomination under EU’s “neighbourhood”. The programme states that “Slovenia will devote special attention to the Western Balkans, (…) organise the EU-Western Balkans summit in Brdo in October (… and), make every effort to ensure continuation of the enlargement process with the Western Balkan countries in accordance with the revised enlargement methodology” (ibid, p. 16). The Slovenian programme further explains that “Enlargement is one of the fundamental levers for reform processes in the Western Balkan countries” and that Slovenia “will support progress in the resolution of open security and political issues in the region, such as the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (…and) and include the region’s partner countries in the initiatives of the common security and defence policy” (ibid). In addition to that, the priorities consider the reinforcement of the Schengen area as a key priority around issues related to migration as well as the launch of the Strategic compass launched under the German presidency and finalized under the French one in the first half of 2022. However, the Covid-19 context has strongly impacted the second Slovenian EU presidency, as the strategy of the trio presidency with Germany and Portugal states: The Trio welcomes the decision to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia and reaffirms the EU-perspective of the Western Balkans and its objective to proceed with the enlargement process towards the Western Balkans based on the recent Commission communication on the enhanced enlargement methodology, where relevant, and deepen cooperation, including as agreed at the Zagreb Summit. In this context, the Trio will pay particular attention to tackling the significant socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis in the Western Balkans countries and the recovery of its economies, including creating positive perspective for the young. The Trio will support the connectivity in all its dimensions and thus narrowing the developmental gap between the EU and the region. Promoting democracy, the rule of law, and media freedom represents our joint EU narrative, which should be addressed through effective strategic communication. Emphasis should also be given to addressing outstanding issues, strengthening resilience against hybrid threats and disinformation through closer cooperation in the areas of CSFP, among others, tackling disruptive influences in the region (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 24).

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The Czech EU Presidency

The Czech Presidency focused in 2009 on three issues in the Western Balkans: EU enlargement, the Kosovo issue and an integrative approach to the region. On the first point, the Czech Republic wanted to see Croatia’s progress in accession negotiations accelerated, relations with Macedonia (FYROM) improved, and other countries in the region, such as Serbia, prepared for formal candidate status. On the second point, the Czech Republic has tried to involve Kosovo in the Stability and Association Process, but also to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo through, inter alia, their mutual participation in regional cooperation activities. With regard to the region as a whole, the Czech Presidency focused on support for civil society and people-to-people contacts, as well as on progress in meeting and assessing the criteria included in the roadmaps, with the idea of achieving a visa liberalisation regime and cooperation on terrorism and ESDP issues. In general, the Presidency failed to resolve the dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over access to maritime waters, preferring to pass the matter on to the Commissioners responsible for Enlargement and Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The main priorities were Croatia’s progress in its EU accession process, to the detriment of other negotiating points relating to the region, such as the transition of the international administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the UN to the EU, or Kosovo’s involvement in the Stability and Association Process. In the case of Serbia, the ratification of the Association Agreement has not progressed due to Dutch opposition (Tesaˇr, 2010, p. 235). However, on other, less political issues, the Presidency has made progress. It succeeded in obtaining a European agreement on Montenegro’s application to open accession negotiations, which was forwarded to the Commission for evaluation, and the Albanian application was received. It prepared the dossier for the introduction of the visa liberalisation regime with Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, and Serbia, and helped Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to do the same. Overall, the Presidency did not succeed in achieving all its objectives, but it kept the Western Balkans high on the European agenda (ibid, p. 236). The Czech EU presidency taking place in the second half of 2022 also defines the Western Balkan as a key priority. As the programme of the trio presidency states: “The trio will implement a strategic approach in relation to the Western Balkans. It will pay attention to the advancement of economic integration among the countries themselves, the recovery, as well as the continued provision of security by the EU. It will continue the accession process in accordance with the enhanced enlargement methodology by supporting deep and transformative reform in key areas such as the rule of law, democratic institutions, free media and economy. The trio will seek to reinvigorate and enhance the regular political dialogue with the region. An EUWestern Balkans summit will be held in 2022” (Council of the EU, 2021, p. 22).

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4.2 The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Further Key Priority 4.2.1

A Slovenian Involvement Towards the Southern Neighbourhood

Slovenia is traditionally not very involved in Eastern Europe. Defining itself by nature as a Mediterranean country, it decided to focus on the southern part of the ENP. However, the events in Kosovo forced the Council Committee for Eastern Europe (COEST) and thus the Slovenian Presidency to consider the consequences of the Kosovo issue on the relations between the EU and Russia, but also for Georgia and Moldova due to the presence of separatist entities in these countries (Interviews, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). With regard to Eastern Europe, it seems that Slovenia’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2005 played a much more decisive role in attracting the attention of Slovenian politicians and officials towards this region (Buniˇc & Šabiˇc, 2011). To a certain extent, this presidency helped Slovenes to prepare for their EU presidency by accumulating the necessary knowledge on different issues, also in terms of managing international issues (interviews, MFA, Ljubljana, September 2010). Slovenian interest was focused on the South Caucasus and Moldova in particular (also due to the country’s inclusion in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe), although this did not mean that “Slovenia suddenly discovered a region where it could be more active” (ibid). The Slovenian Presidency’s focus in the neighbourhood, however, was clearly southward. Diplomats showed real engagement on issues related to Palestine and the role of children in armed conflict, but also on the functioning of the EU missions in Rafah and Gaza (ibid). The key project of the Slovenian Presidency in the ENP to the South was the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) in Portorož, which was inaugurated on 9 June 2008, with the aim of strengthening cooperation with other universities and the advancement of education, science and research in this geographical area (ibid). Concerning the ENP during the 2021 presidency, the programme indicates that “In addition to the Western Balkans, Slovenia will also promote a comprehensive debate on the European neighbourhood policy, with regard to both the southern and the eastern dimensions. We will promote the implementation of the EU’s new Agenda for the Mediterranean, discussion of which is planned for the December European Council, and the setting of priority objectives for cooperation with the Eastern partners, which will be the central topic of the EU-Eastern Partnership summit to be held in Brussels in October” (Slovenian Government, 2021, p. 17). While the 2007 presidency had clearly concentrated on the Southern dimension of the ENP, the 2021 presidency takes both dimensions—the Eastern and the Southern one—into consideration. The programme of the Trio presidency also shows the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on relations with the neighbours and the importance given to the notion of resilience: “Together with the High Representative and the Commission, the Trio will pursue an ambitious neighbourhood policy towards the East and the South. It especially seeks

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to help its immediate geographic partners successfully emerge from the COVID-19 crisis and to strengthen their overall resilience. Moreover, the Trio will put a strong emphasis on supporting the High Representative in contributing to addressing major conflicts in the Union’s neighbourhood and beyond, such as in Libya, the Sahel region, Syria, and Eastern Ukraine. The Trio, in cooperation with the High Representative, will also contribute to the preparation and subsequent implementation of the commitments to be undertaken at the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit. Work will also continue on the implementation of the June 2019 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on EU’s engagement to the Black Sea regional cooperation and the EU’s Black Sea Synergy initiative”. (Council of the EU, 2020, p. 25).

4.2.2

A Czech Involvement Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood

In 2007, the Czech Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs, Alexandr Vondra, indicated that one of the priorities of the Czech EU Presidency would be Eastern Europe. Czech politicians remained rather silent on this point until the Slovenian EU Presidency, after which the trio presidency was to define its agenda. The Slovenian experience highlighted the usefulness of defining an area of specialization, and this is one of the reasons why the Czech Republic chose to focus on launching the ‘Eastern Partnership’, mainly under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Czech diplomacy has been particularly active in launching this policy towards six countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. Already in 2007 they had worked on a strategy that would be acceptable to Brussels, which took the form of a non-paper entitled “Time to act” presented in April 2008 at the Eastern Committee (COEST). The Czech diplomats interviewed had previously taken care to circulate the paper among the Visegrád Group countries at the time of its presidency of the group, as well as among the Baltic States and Sweden, and thus secure their support (interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 2008–2010). The document, which was not made public but also circulated among experts, clearly mentions that one of its aims is to counterbalance the French proposal for a “Mediterranean Union” of 2007, which was accepted by the EU Council in March 2008 as the “Union for the Mediterranean”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs conceived its proposal as a way to decouple the relations between the EU and the Eastern ENP partners from those between the EU and Russia, without excluding the possibility of cooperation including all of these countries in cases where this would be necessary, such as in the framework of the Black Sea Synergy (interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, May 2008). However, the Polish-Swedish proposal for an “Eastern Partnership” was presented at a higher political level, that of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) at the end of May 2008, thus gaining visibility among European partners. The June 2008 European Council finally mandated the Commission to work on an “Eastern Partnership” proposal to be submitted by March 2009. After the crisis in Georgia in the summer of 2008, the Commission was asked to deliver its proposal earlier, which it did on 3 December 2008 (European Commission, 2008). The document proposed to create multilateral platforms, to launch a project-based approach

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with additional financial support and to move forward on visa liberalisation and the creation of a free trade area. The beginning of the Czech Presidency was marked by a major crisis in the Eastern neighbourhood, which further justified the launch of the Eastern Partnership when Russia decided to cut off its gas supply to Ukraine. This event had the effect of slowing down the negotiations on the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. However, the most discussed issue in the run-up to the summit on 7 May 2009 was undoubtedly the participation of Belarus in the summit. The Czech Republic had for several years been highly critical of the regime in Belarus, but this time it committed itself to a constructive dialogue with the country. It is possible to interpret this turnaround as the result of a Europeanisation of the political personnel in power (interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, March 2008). In general, this position was in line with the European Commission’s position at the time, which was to favour dialogue, even with non-democratic countries, rather than persisting with counterproductive sanctions. In April 2009, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg visited Minsk, the first trip by a Czech foreign minister to Belarus since the end of the Cold War. After heated debates in the country, it was decided that President Lukashenko would not be invited, but that Belarus could be represented at the summit. The Eastern Partnership Summit was held in Prague on 7 May 2009. Despite the fact that several political figures, including the French and Italian presidents, declined to attend, the event gained the support of other countries such as Germany and Sweden and was considered one of the key summits of the Czech Presidency. At the end of the six-month exercise, public attention for Eastern Europe waned considerably, despite the government’s attempts to maintain interest in the subject in political and administrative circles. A few more meetings were held after the end of the Presidency, including a Czech inter-ministerial meeting on 13 July 2009 to assess how to maintain a high level of involvement of Czech ministries in this policy, and a conference held with the Poles at the very beginning of the Spanish EU Presidency in January 2010 (interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, March 2010). During the 2022 presidency, the Eastern neighbourhood still represents a key priority of the Czech government as stated here: “The trio will renew, reinforce and further develop the strategic partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood. The trio will support implementation of the commitments taken at the Eastern Partnership Summit of 2021, and partner countries’ reform agendas, as set out in their respective agreements with the EU” (Council of the EU, 2021, p. 23). The launch of the European Political Community (EPC) during the Prague Summit on 6th October 2022, which discussed the issues of the war in Ukraine and energy, can also be seen in continuity of this agenda and as a way to give new impetus to the criticised ENP (Council of the EU, 2022).

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4.3 The Role of Social Norms: Which Impact on EU’s Agenda? To sum up, Slovenia has succeeded, through its EU presidency of 2007, in projecting its foreign policy identity and interests at the European level, and in influencing the EU agenda by shifting the positions of some member states on foreign policy issues that were not unanimously supported. On the one hand, it played the role of a central European country showing political solidarity with the EU candidate countries by promoting European norms and values in the region. On the other hand, it has expressed a moral responsibility towards the Western Balkan region. In a way, Slovenia discovered during its OSCE and EU Presidencies that it could express political solidarity with countries with which it has no historical relations, such as Moldova. However, with regard to the ENP, it has mainly emphasised its commitment to cooperation towards the South. It has nowadays also included the East as an equal priority. The Czech Presidency was marked by a certain consistency with the political and historical identity of the Czech Republic in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. Due to historical ties to the Balkans, this region received more attention from the Czechs than Eastern Europe. Several international events, such as the war in Georgia in 2008 and the energy crisis in Ukraine in January 2009, have led the country to become more involved in this region. Looking into more detail, the Eastern Partnership has been defined as a ‘default’ policy, pushing the country to express political solidarity with a region where human rights need to be defended, and as a way to reinforce the Atlanticist sentiment of the Czech governing actors in the face of an unstable and unpredictable Russia (Tulmets, 2010). It is today still the case.

5 Conclusion A summary of CEECs priorities for their EU Council Presidencies presented here shows that despite the tendency to set the European agenda in advance, Member States retain a margin of manoeuvre over the content of this agenda, particularly in the field of foreign policy, where they try to influence its content in line with their own priorities. Two points need to be highlighted. The Europeanisation of CEE foreign policy has mainly taken place in those areas where the European agenda was already partly in line with CEE political identity, i.e. the promotion of EU (and NATO) norms and values through further enlargements. However, the geographical priorities were defined more in line with those reflecting historical relations with certain countries. While Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have focused strongly on the Western Balkans, Poland, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic, have focused on strengthening relations with the Eastern Partnership countries. The fact that Hungary gave up in 2011 the organisation of the Eastern Partnership Summit in favour of Poland the same year also indicates a lack of historical reasons for the

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current government to engage further in this policy. For this reason, we can conclude that the social norms of solidarity and responsibility expressed by the individual CEE countries during their respective presidencies rather reflect their own foreign policy priorities, even if other priorities, such as the obligatory response to the Arab Spring, had to be taken into account. Regarding the more general issue of the impact of Eastern enlargement on the EU, the case of the CEEC presidencies clearly indicates that, in addition to a Europeanisation of the CEEC foreign policy structures and the socialisation of CEEC officials and staff to the EU’s internal procedures and norms, a process of “mutual socialization” around the social norms of solidarity and responsibility has taken place, leading to an active participation of the CEECs in the definition of the European foreign policy agenda. This can thus be seen as a continuation of a process of mutual adaptation that had already been engendered by the accession negotiations and the observer status of the candidates before their formal accession to the EU (Tulmets, 2005). By putting the more recent EU member states in a position of taking up responsibilities for the whole EU, the exchanges generated both by the preparation of the presidencies and by the management of this six-month exercise therefore lead to changes both within the states and within European institutions and policies. The cases presented here therefore confirm that the integration process of the EU-27 is a process of mutual socialisation which reflects the constant negotiations that take place within the EU, but also with the candidate countries, and even with neighbouring countries, in order to find compromises that are compatible with both the political and historical identity of these countries.

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Conclusion: Norms, Diffusion and Power Dynamics Beyond the West Ricardo Reboredo

Throughout this book we have explored how norms transfer in non-Western contexts. As we noted in the introduction, recent studies, although foregrounding local agency and acknowledging the multifaceted nature of norm transfer and diffusion, often problematically reproduce a certain model—that of powerful Western countries diffusing norms to non-Western norm followers. Put differently, whereas Western norm entrepreneurs are widely treated as proactive carriers of global knowledge and progress, ‘the others’ are expected to re-interpret, re-frame, and re-build what has been originally diffused as a universally accepted standard. Ultimately, this model reduces the agency of the non-Western countries and flattens the nature of the diffusion process. In response, we have sought to foreground particular cases of diffusion—both successful and unsuccessful—across the non-Western world and in this manner, challenge the existing perspective and contribute to critical norms research that diversifies the agency of norm entrepreneurs beyond processes of norm localisation. Likewise, we have sought to follow an interdisciplinary approach and therefore open the debate on norm diffusion beyond its IR core. By introducing questions on the specificities of norm diffusion and transfer to disciplines including political economy, geography, and development studies, we have attempted to broaden the discussion and integrate conceptualizations foreign to IR which can help not only bring about new contributions but also create new pathways of collaboration. In the process of editing this book, we sought to concretize this element of collaboration via a series of webinars which included the authors taking part in the project. In each webinar—3 in total— authors presented their findings and answered questions/critiques on their chapters. The dynamics introduced in this process led, in our opinion, to not only significant improvements in the chapters themselves but also to greater debate regarding the

R. Reboredo (B) Metropolitan University Prague, Dubeˇcská 900/10, 100 31 Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Š. Kolmašová and R. Reboredo (eds.), Norm Diffusion Beyond the West, Norm Research in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25009-5_12

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nature of non-Western norm diffusion. Indeed, while as a group we agreed on certain aspects, some questions remain unanswered (more on this below). We have divided the book into three main parts in order to at once expand and structure our assessment of non-Western norm diffusion. The first part explored norm diffusion by rising global powers: China, India, Brazil, and Japan. Importantly, while Japan could today be considered a ‘risen’ power, Kobayashi situates his discussion in the 1970s and 1980s, a time when Japan was ‘rising’. The second part focuses on diffusion by middle (i.e. regional) powers: South Africa, Turkey, Indonesia and also small states (e.g., small island developing states [SIDS]). Finally, the third looks at norm diffusion within multilateral structures like ASEAN, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the EU. Yet the use of such framing leads to a significant question: where exactly is the ‘non-Western’ world? It can be argued that the boundaries of the non-Western world are in a sense fuzzy; indeed, we have wrestled with the conceptualization in the process of editing this book. We have chosen non-Western out of the myriad terms available (e.g., Global South, Developing World) for a number of reasons. Firstly, we use the term not strictly as a geographical signifier, but rather as a spatial representation of relations and power geometries. As Stuart Hall (2018) once argued, the ‘West’ is a ‘historical rather than geographical construct’. Indeed, he goes on to note how the ‘West’, rather than being a space or place, is a type of society that developed within a particular context. Likewise, the ‘West’ is a concept in that it provides an image through which ‘the other’ can be defined—this is in turn a major part in the construction of discourses relating to European/Western unity. The combination of the two is what gives the term analytical purchase in our case. Indeed, all of the countries mentioned in this book have been portrayed—at some point in their history—as an ‘other’ by the core countries of ‘the West’. Therefore, non-Western implies a collective experience of distancing and differentiation, if not active marginalisation via imperialism and colonialism (processes, which are themselves constitutive to the construction of ‘Western’ society). Finally, we also use non-Western here because it allows us to delve into countries like Japan and Turkey with complex histories that do not neatly fit into terms like ‘Global South’ or ‘Developing World’ and yet are certainly not ‘Western’ by most categorizations. Both Japan and Turkey have their own histories of imperial conquest and exploitation (though we recognize that the Ottoman Empire cannot simply be collapsed into modern Turkey), which, as our case studies explore, have in turn had major effects on processes of norm promotion and diffusion. However, we are aware that authors in this collection have used other terms. The chapter “Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation” by Waisbich for instance utilises Global South as the primary descriptive term as it deals with ‘South–South’ cooperation and the ways in which major actors in this space transform norms from the West (or Global North). In organising this conclusion we have sought to avoid a simple retelling of chapter themes and arguments. Instead, we aim to answer 3 specific questions and in doing so summarise what this contribution has revealed about the nature of norm emergence and diffusion. These questions are as follows:

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. What are norms? . What is diffusion? . Are non-western modes of norm diffusion less asymmetric than west/non-west modes? What Are Norms? The first question may seem somewhat strange considering that this is a book about norms. Yet it is one that must be engaged with considering the diversity of perspectives and case studies we present. Indeed, the very definition of the term ‘norm’ remains contested. We detailed our conceptualization of norms in the introduction— systems of values that shape our understanding of what ought to be done in a particular situation—yet as we have found throughout the case studies documented in this book, norms are seen differently across disciplines and contexts. Likewise, the line between norm and policy requires further unpacking. On one hand, norms establish collective expectations related to a principled idea (Hirsch & Dixon, 2021, p. 4), and therefore can be seen as normative ideals that guide policy-making or practical action in general. On the other hand, substantive deviation from an established normative standard can trigger contestation over the validity of the norm and ultimately even drive a process of norm revision or norm regression (Iommi, 2020, p. 12). That means if practical behaviour is collectively seen as legitimate, it can triumph over established norms. In a number of Chapters (Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation, and Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond), norms are largely conceptualised in the way that they can inform policy. In a sense, these chapters treat policies as practical mechanisms that operationalize particular norms, and thus make their diffusion easier to track. Yet the norms that underlie policy can also be transformed by the actors undertaking the promotion process, for instance, the example of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in the chapter “Redefined, Repackaged and Redeployed: Diffusion of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank”. In other Chapters (Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion, and ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges), the policy element is de-linked in a certain way, as norm promotion and diffusion are viewed as successful through the act of opening up further space for dialogue and establishing preference (see below). In our discussions, we found it particularly challenging how to assess (non-) compliance if collective expectations are constantly contested and cannot be taken for granted. In other words, how to draw the line between a norm violation/noncompliance that would indicate insufficient endorsement of the norm, and an action that aims for norm reconfiguration and larger systematic change. This is a very important question when analysing norm appropriation through specific policies implemented towards regional or global actors. For instance, Qiao-Franco and Nandyatama’s chapter (ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges) on Indonesia’s

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democracy promotion towards Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Bali Democracy Forum demonstrates alternative principles associated with democracy and human rights norms, namely dialogue and inclusiveness. Are these representing new collective expectations in democratic governance or are they rather policies that practically operationalize democratic rule within regional politics? Karmazin’s chapter (China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West) on Chinese cyber sovereignty similarly shows how the norm is diffused at different fora towards SCO, BRICS, or ASEAN. At the same time, the process is mostly indicated by a combination of discursive practices and trade policies in technology, which makes it analytically difficult to separate the normative expectations from practical initiatives that implicitly lead to promotion of a Chinese vision regarding sovereignty in cyberspace. Karmazin (following Winston, 2018) conceptualises norms through three core dimensions—problem (that should be regulated), value (that should be protected) and behaviour (that should be adopted), which explains the inter-dependence of norms and policies that were traced in the case study. Also, it provides a useful framework to explain the scope of regulation (of a particular norm); however, it doesn’t really provide guidance on how to operationalize the normative status and its inter-subjective—shared—recognition. Finally, in the chapter “Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation”, Tabak explores the diffusion of ethnonational norms across diasporic spaces. In particular, Tabak shows how these areas function as locations for the (re)constitution of the homeland’s norms; that is, the making, diffusion and remaking of standards of conduct abroad. The framework proved to be useful for unpacking the specific values that were promoted by Turkey’s political leaders and how they were often instrumentally appropriated across different historical contexts. Yet, in our workshops we have discussed whether the concept of norms was heuristically more useful than referring simply to a national identity. In broader terms, does it make sense to trace diffusion and circulation processes through the category of norms? Despite the diversity of perspectives across the team we still believe it does, for several reasons. On the theoretical level, norms triggered a vibrant research tradition that challenged the prevailing rationalist and materialist paradigms in social sciences. Therefore, norms provide an alternative explanation for a wide range of actions and in particular for policy-making decisions that go beyond the calculation of material gains. There are plenty of studies that demonstrate that norms matter because they both regulate and constitute actions. At the same time, there is a tendency to associate norms with social learning and internalised assumptions of an appropriate behaviour in a particular situation, or, alternatively with consequentialist expectation of benefits. In many cases that were explored throughout the chapters, the reasoning behind norm promotion or circulation was not as straightforward. Norms can be diffused for the sake of reaching the status of norm-entrepreneur, which demonstrates the strong effect of norms related research within global and regional politics. What used to be an abstract concept to describe mostly individuals within epistemic communities and activist networks became a powerful status that is widely acknowledged by states,

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IGOs and other actors. As a result, norm diffusion and norms as such can be instrumentalized to gain credibility and respect by demonstrating political leverage over others. This was the case in China’s promotion of cyber sovereignty, South Africa striving for leadership through democratic norms, Indonesia’s appropriation of human rights and smaller states’ (including Czech Republic and Slovenia) efforts to influence EU external policies through the Eastern partnership. In short, norms matter not only because they manifestly constitute actions but also because they are considered an important means to achieve political agendas and social status. The findings of individual chapters will hopefully trigger further research on the instrumental value of norms and amalgamation of appropriateness with the expectations of political gains. The chapter “Redefined, Repackaged and Redeployed: Diffusion of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank” by Kolmašová and Tickner goes even further by showing how citizen security mainstreaming by the IADB led to problematic appropriation of the norm, while at the same time strengthening the position of the bank as a credible institution. Again, does strategic utilisation of a normative framework undermine the very relevance of the concept, which should primarily help to distinguish what is socially acceptable and what is not? We think that even critical reflections that expose how power can be channelled through the epistemic or political discourse on norms provide valuable insights that challenge more conventional understanding of the positive effects of norm diffusion. As Charlotte Epstein argued, norms represent powerful ordering mechanisms of international politics and must be examined through a critical reading to decolonize existing discourses and practice (2012, 2017). Despite the prevailing conceptual as well as analytical dilemmas, norms provide a useful approach that adds to our understanding of moral principles/values on one hand and practices/policies on the other. Unlike values that can be limited to individual beliefs and expectations, norms indicate collective expectations related to a principled idea (Hirsch & Dixon, 2021, p. 4). This means they emerge, get diffused, circulated, contested and sometimes replaced through interactions among multiple actors, who share particular normative views (what should be done or not done in a given situation). While established shared expectations can be relatively easily identified, e.g., through international conventions, treaties, agendas or discourses, the empirical tracing gets much more complicated in case of emerging norms—that aspire to create collective expectations on a (sub-)regional or even global level, yet they are still in the making. In other words, how can we draw the line between such an emerging standard and one that has already reached the status of recognition? And again, is it appropriate to talk about norms in situations when they are rather in the process? Since we have acknowledged norms as constantly contested and unstable, the authors have not searched for a predefined “tipping point” to be able to clearly pinpoint when a particular principled idea reaches the status of a norm. In contrast to the life-cycle model of Finnemore and Sikkink, we understand norms as fluid entities that may be appropriated and gain/lose robustness over time. Therefore, the benchmark is the collective endorsement of a particular normative principle on a

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national, intra-national, international or transnational level rather than recognition by a certain number of states. Unlike practices or policies, norms are not an aggregate of actions and can be sustained despite non-compliance. What matters is the prevailing collective expectation of how a particular situation should be treated. For example, a widely shared norm that torture is a prohibited practice both in times of peace and war has prevailed despite the existing world-wide evidence that people have been tortured by police officers, military personnel or other state officials. What matters is the collective perception that such actions are not acceptable and should be prosecuted and punished according to relevant legal provisions. In other words, norms do not necessarily and always correlate with the actual practices, therefore they cannot be substituted by a conceptual framework based on policies or policy-diffusion/-circulation. What Is Diffusion? We must also ask how we can best understand diffusion and how the concept is understood in the different chapters. As Qiao-Franco and Nandyatama explain in their chapter, “ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges”, ‘norm diffusion is now understood to exist in multilateral contexts marked by multidirectionality and polycentricity, meaning that norms travel in various directions (not only top-down or from the core to the periphery) and arise from multiple sources’, yet there is a limited understanding in the literature as to how diffusion is achieved and even what constitutes diffusion in the first place. In this book, the authors have generally conceptualised diffusion as the act of promoting or propagating norms rather than being ‘successful’ in transferring them via policy. Indeed, as the chapter “ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges” explains, ‘legal endorsement of [norms] should not be the sole indicator of successful norm diffusion’. Regarding diffusion by rising powers, in the chapter “Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation” Waisbich argues that the (soft) norm of donor accountability is simultaneously diffused, contested, and re-invented by the main promoters of SouthSouth development cooperation (e.g., Brazil, India, China). The author notes how processes of ‘Southernization’, ‘Co-option’ and ‘Convergence’ illustrate the ways in which mutual socialisation dynamics unfold in the field of international cooperation. The first of these relates to the ‘substantive, ideational and ontological challenge posed by the ‘rise of the South’ and SSC to the existing aid paradigm’; the second to the pressures placed on Global South donors to comply with existing northern norms; and the third to the integration of said norms into broader patterns of engagement. South-South norm diffusion is thus accomplished via reorganised paradigms that take into account broader legacies of colonial and post-colonial exploitation. These in turn both facilitate the diffusion process and produce new understandings and operationalisations of accountability. The chapter “Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond” by Kobayashi on the other hand argues that the diffusion of

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commercial development norms in the case of Japan and China occurred largely through bottom-up models based on mutual learning and cooperation in the context of historically influenced power dynamics (see below). Kobayashi incorporates the concept of policy learning—which emphasises the agency of norm ‘learners’—to better conceptualise how processes of diffusion functioned in his case study, as well as the effects that this has had on the development of China’s own overseas cooperation norms. He argues that policy learning may ‘prompt a more proactive form of norm localization in the absence of an external disciplining authority’ and thus norms diffused through the mechanism may entail greater degrees of transformation and adaptation. In China’s case, while the practices of overseas development cooperation are clearly influenced by Japanese norms including mutual benefit, self-reliance, and the primacy of state sovereignty, certain changes, including a proclivity for ‘adventurism’, or the willingness to engage with fragile states and conflict-affected settings; a framing based on ‘South-South’ cooperation; and a willingness to resist Western pressure to conform to mainstream OECD norms (both of which are also detailed in the previous chapter), are documented. The particularities of Chinese norm diffusion vis-à-vis cyber sovereignty are detailed in the chapter “China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West”. Karmazin argues that Chinese state actors have re-defined cyber security, taking concepts put forth by Western countries and altering these to foreground state sovereignty. Indeed, China’s formulation of cyber sovereignty stresses state-led governance of the internet and highlights anti-regime or anti-state threats as problems to be addressed. Since approximately 2010, China has begun to ‘mobilise support for cyber sovereignty and increase its credibility in its promotion of the norm’ in order to meet its geopolitical goals. This has been done through both multilateral fora such as the United Nations (UN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the yearly BRICS meetings, and bilateral relations. Yet importantly, Karmazin details how China’s promotion of cyber sovereignty has largely been patient and non-confrontational, which means the norm has been institutionalised only on a loose basis. Chinese actors operate with the understanding that promotion of the home-grown (or hybridised) norm must be done via cooperative and mutually beneficial negotiations—in a sense, echoing the themes touched upon in chapters “Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation” and “Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond”. The chapters “Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation”, “Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond”, and “China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West” thus paint a particular picture of norm diffusion as a multifaceted process in which adoption/conversion/transformation are affected by varied actors operating across different geographies and scales. Each of these in turn leaves its own imprints on the diffusion process. In this manner, the chapters in this section largely take from, and build on, understandings of norm diffusion as best conceptualised via the concept of circulation, which emphasises translation, mutual learning,

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and innovation in the context of complex interactions between actors with diverse identities, imperatives, and normative preferences. Diffusion is also discussed in depth in Part II, in which we explore the processes as practiced by middle powers, understood here as those that largely project power in a regional setting, and small states. The chapter by Reboredo (From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline), which discusses South Africa, analyses how the promotion of norms relating to human rights and democracy were tied to narratives relating to neoliberal ‘good governance’ and leveraged by the early post-apartheid governments to attain regional/continental power and prestige. However, a combination of factors including widespread African rejection of (further) neoliberal reform and contradictions relating to the political economy of regional state-society relations meant that the tying of neoliberal market reform to democratic norms significantly hindered the ability of the South African state to leverage its norm diffusion in a bid for regional leadership. In a sense, Pretoria’s willingness to diffuse western norms into the region backfired and led to accusations that South Africa was following a ‘Western imperialist agenda’ (Louw-Vaudran, 2016, p. 3). The interweaving between diffusion and regional processes/spaces is again foregrounded in the chapter “Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation”. Here, Tabak explores diaspora and kin spaces and how they ‘represent a context in which the non-Western peripheral actors’ capacities and efforts for developing norms and putting them into circulation globally/regionally can be unfolded’. In a manner reminiscent of Agnew’s famous territorial trap in geography, Tabak argues that physical boundaries between countries are often treated in the literature as separating territorially bounded normative orders. However, via a case study of the Turkish government’s efforts to build ethnonational norms and categories, it quickly becomes evident that diaspora and kin spaces are constructed as political projects in which said norms can facilitate groupmaking. Diffusion is therefore once more conceptualised as a multifaceted, multilateral process that eludes ‘one way’ descriptions. Indeed, as Tabak notes ‘ethnopolitical entrepreneurs within the diasporic communities tend to look up to the mainland in group-making and ethnicity building, they also independently invented the norms of the mainland without necessarily a need for direct diffusion from or involvement of the homeland.’ The theme of actors autonomously altering norms and in turn diffusing them across varied spaces is repeated in the chapter “Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion”. Here, Grzywacz argues that actors may not only acclimate to international norms, but rather may also ‘appropriate [their] normative politics to accommodate the targeted audiences’ expectations’. Via its case study of Indonesia’s promotion of norms relating to human rights and democracy, the chapter demonstrates how regional actors can promote global norms in more localised contexts, and how their transformation into said context can provide the necessary legitimization for broader adoption— or simply the space for greater discussion. In this manner, regional norm promoters like Indonesia are seen as essential for diffusion given their greater historically and geographically based credibility.

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The chapters “From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline” and “Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion” provide an interesting contrast in norm diffusion. While Indonesia has combined international norms with its own experiences, values, principles, and regional expectations, South Africa arguably undertook a far different route; instead integrating human rights and democracy promotion into broader initiatives aimed at transforming regional economies in a manner closely intertwined with Western international financial institutions (IFIs). As per the chapter “Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion”, Indonesia ‘was able to make use of political opportunities and push for the acceptance of its ideas or to establish its own platforms of cooperation by combining its heritage and values with regional appropriateness’, yet South Africa has consistently faltered in its attempts to bolster its regional legitimacy and has run into major impediments including accusations of neo-colonialism and an alignment with the Global North rather than Global South. Such differentiated pathways speak to the nature of the diffusion process and the delicate balancing act that nonWestern countries have to undertake in their promotion across regional or continental formations. Moving from middle powers to small states, in the chapter “Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS”, Scobie explores how the 52 countries that together make up the small island developing state (SIDS) grouping diffuse norms relating to climate change and broader environmental issues despite their lack of power within the global order. Scobie details how SIDS leverage and promotes climate norms, particularly climate justice but also norms relating to care for nature, mitigation and adaptation, the principle of climate compensation, and the rights of nature, as the ‘basis for their foreign policy in climate negotiations’. The chapter argues that SIDS are at once norm shapers and norm takers vis-a-vis climate policy and governance. Rather than being passive actors, SIDS actively utilise regional and international formations and organisations to shape the climate change agenda and lobby developmental partners for greater environmental support and awareness. Moving beyond the activities of states, in Part III, diffusion is discussed within multilateral structures. Considering the similarity in study area between the chapters “Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion” and “ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges” it is useful to compare the two. Both chapters aim to extend understandings of diffusion beyond simple endorsement by the recipient party. In the chapter “ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges”, Qiao-Franco and Nandyatama included behavioural and discursive indicators in evaluating norm diffusion. They make the point that as an organisation, ASEAN has been successful in engaging nuclear weapon states in terms of creating space for continued discussion vis-a-vis norm transfer despite being a weaker member of the multilateral system. This has largely been accomplished via the practice of the ASEAN way of engagement (that is, a non-interference and consensus-based process that relies on norms including consultation, informality, and inter-governmentality), using framing

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for legitimacy building, linking specific issues of concern, and performative neutrality and soft balancing. The chapter “Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion”, while likewise focusing on Southeast Asia, in this case, Indonesia rather than ASEAN as a whole, takes a slightly different view of diffusion. In this chapter, Grzywacz uses the concept of actorness—that is, the ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’—to highlight how Indonesia contributes to norm promotion not merely by localising ‘global’ (i.e. Western) norms, but by promoting them regionally by drawing from local/regional cultural dynamics. Grzywacz argues that ‘in both cases (i.e. democracy and human rights promotion), Indonesia has the capacity and capability to play a significant normative role (despite its structural weakness), and it combines international norms, its own experience, values and principles, and regional expectations.’ Similarly, the idea of cultural relevance and multidirectionality and its role in the success/failure of diffusion is also explored in the chapter “Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation”. Here the author argues ‘the success and failure of the diffusion of Turkey’s norms were also determined by the existing normative orders within the diasporic spaces’. Likewise, a temporal dimension is added as Tabak highlights how norms were both made and unmade within diasporic spaces across time—depending on the nature of the Turkish government. This temporal dimensionality again appears in the chapter “Redefined, Repackaged and Redeployed: Diffusion of Citizen Security by the Inter-American Development Bank” by Kolmašová and Tickner. This chapter traces the emergence of the norm of citizen security in Latin America in the 1970s, then its subsequent adoption and neoliberal re-imagining by the IADB. As the authors argue, ‘Although developed initially in Latin America, it diffused northward, mainly through multilateral institutions, was repackaged, and then redeployed southward once again’. Diffusion in this instance has been highly political/politicised and driven by the specific preferences of important regional actors, in particular the IADB. The western re-imagining of citizen diffusion has resulted in a vastly different norm that problematically reinforces ‘state monopoly over the security sector by treating governments as the ultimate if not the only providers of security’ and thus reproduces elements of the national security doctrine. This is in direct contrast to the original norm, which developed as a response to national security doctrine and its privileging of stability and order over individual security and freedoms. The chapter thus highlights how norms can be twisted and altered depending on the imperatives of the diffusing party. Norm alteration and transformation is also a topic in the chapter “The EU Presidencies of Central Eastern European Members: A Framework for Mutual Socialisation and Normative Influence on the EU’s Agenda?” by Tulmets. There, the author argues that EU presidencies represent an area of mutual socialisation. In essence, while the rotating presidencies of the EU have required institutional learning on behalf of the Central Eastern European countries (CEEC) undertaking the role, these countries have also been able to exert significant influence and leave an imprint on areas like foreign policy. As described, Slovenia succeeded in projecting and imprinting its foreign policy interests at the European level through its 2007 presidency. Likewise, the country was able to shift the positions of certain

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member states on issues that were not universally supported. Yet it simultaneously also sought to promote EU norms and values in its engagement with countries both inside and outside the union. Therefore, through the cases of Slovenia and Czech Republic, the author shows how CEEC countries have actively participated in the definition of the European foreign policy agenda and thus how diffusion can thus occur even in asymmetrical situations. It is this topic to which we now turn. Is Non-Western Norm Diffusion More Symmetrical? Our final question in this conclusion is whether norm diffusion between non-western countries is in some manner more symmetrical, or put differently, less coercive than what has been documented in the research on west to non-west norm transfer. Indeed, in Part I of this book, Kobayashi argues that ‘the conventional unidirectional models (explicitly or implicitly) assume an asymmetrical relationship where the agent of diffusion (“teacher”) exercises leverage over norm takers (“students”) through monitoring, evaluation, and other mechanisms of “carrot and sticks”’. The question is also worth considering in light of discourses—promoted via multilateral fora (e.g., the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation [FOCAC], the annual BRICS summits) as well as bilateral meetings—that present non-Western engagement as being at its core more equitable than West-non West relations. These understandings not only build on the historical legacies of colonialism but also on neocolonial patterns of engagement between western countries (e.g., France) and institutions (e.g., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund) and non-Western countries. The ‘win–win’ discourse—which emphasises mutual gain and respect of national sovereignty—in particular has been one of the core tools of legitimization for the diffusion of Chinese and BRICS-centred capital/expertise/diplomacy over the last two decades. Therefore, the question asked here is directly tied to extant geopolitical trends. For the most part, the answer that has emerged from the chapters in this book is that power relations and asymmetries are still visible, though perhaps the ways in which these manifest can (at times) be conceptualised as distinct from conventional models. For instance, in the case of norm diffusion from Japan to China since the late 1970s as documented in the chapter “Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond”, Kobayashi notes how ‘Tokyo had no or limited leverage over Beijing’. Rather, considering the historical context and in particular World War II, the author notes that China instead had leverage over Japan. Yet while Japan’s commercial development (CD) system was (and is) based on request, its distinct mix of norms means that the donor-recipient model is in a way subverted from the start. As the chapter argues, China integrated these norms into its own overseas development program, though with a few changes, detailed above. The notion of asymmetry is also explored in the chapter “Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation”. Here, Waisbich engages with the rhetoric of ‘win–win’ development and establishes it as part of the ‘new modes of economic development’ being created via the southernization of global development. The chapter thus documents how such narratives serve

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to further the reach of non-Western powers like China, India, and Brazil. Mutually beneficial development is also a crux of China’s promotion of its hybrid norm of cyber sovereignty, as detailed by Karmazin. Yet as has been documented by scholars like Bond (2013), and Murphy and Carmody (2019), ‘South-South’ economic processes can be severely exploitative and lead to both marginalisation and the loss of economic opportunities in countries throughout the developing world. In other case studies mentioned in this book, asymmetry is much more visible and in some ways follows the conventional west to non-west model. For instance, in the chapter “From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline”, Reboredo details how South Africa sought to project power in the region through strategic diffusion of particular norms relating to democracy and human rights. Indeed, these were integrated into the ‘good governance’ framework put forth by Western IFIs as a way to both increase South Africa’s regional/continental standing and create space for domestic capital to enter new markets. Programs like the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), while espousing norms related to human rights and democracy, were in essence designed to facilitate state restructuring, making other African countries more pliable for international capital. Indeed, in practice ‘NEPAD amounted to an agreement whereby African governments would practice neoliberal ‘good governance’ and Western elites would provide aid to narrow economic programs’.

1 Sources of Leverage/Power Having detailed how the chapters in this book conceptualise norms, diffusion, and power dynamics, we now shift toward the particular sources of leverage that are employed in the diffusion process. The chapters (Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation, Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond, China’s Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West) in this book that focus on China for the most part detail a Chinese strategy that aims to build on discourses relating to shared histories of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle, mutually beneficial outcomes, and respect for national sovereignty. By focusing on such commonalities across the developing world, and pairing this with the country’s increasing capacity to export domestic technologies (e.g., the construction of 5G information communications technology systems in Africa and Latin America), China has been able to move its agenda forward and diffuse its home-grown norms. For instance, in the chapter “Active Learning Beyond Borders? Interrogating the Diffusion of Development Cooperation Norms from Japan to China and Beyond”, Karmazin details how Chinese actors have used the SCO, BRICS, and ASEAN meetings, as well as the World Internet Conference, as platforms to promote its specific vision of cyber sovereignty. Indeed, the author notes how ‘China’s technological and normative entrepreneurism goes hand in hand, and the Chinese leadership has arguably accepted the presumption that its

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material and technological presence will help convince others to adhere to Chinese views’. While each country examined in this book utilises distinct sources of leverage for diffusion that reflect both structural and conjunctural factors, the chapter “Who Is Socialising Whom? How Southern Powers Negotiate Accountability in International Development Cooperation” by Waisbich describes how major southern powers beyond China (e.g., Brazil, India) have likewise sought to leverage the emerging ‘South-South’ discourse and more broadly, what Carmody (2017) terms the ‘South Space’ meta-regional imaginary. In essence, a space in which economic and political engagements are characterised as less exploitative than those that take place between North and South. Waisbich gives an example of how the South-South discourse is used to facilitate norm diffusion by detailing how Southern powers have sought to create and promote country-specific mechanisms for measuring the effects of southern-led development cooperation. Innovation in this area takes place largely at the epistemic level as non-Western states engage in conceptual, lexical-semantic and methodological negotiations regarding the assessment of developmental cooperation. This in turn indicates the openness of these countries to create alternative norms based on their own experiences and the commonalities they identify within the South Space. Considering their (more) limited power, the countries examined in part II largely aim to leverage cognitive mechanisms—that is, conferences, best practice approaches, and knowledge sharing—for diffusion. The chapters “Recognising Indonesia’s Actorness: Challenging and Contributing to Norm Diffusion”, “Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS”, and “ASEAN as a Norm Entrepreneur in International Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Bases, Pathways, and Challenges” for instance, all detail how both countries and institutions have premised promotion and diffusion of home-grown norms on multilateral diplomacy at regional and international levels. The ‘ASEAN way’—which aims to establish consensus and institutionalise non-interference—in particular, has become a major source of normative power for certain countries. Indeed, it is through this framework that Indonesia and ASEAN more broadly, have sought to engage with actors large and small across the region and beyond. Similarly, in the chapter “Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS”, Scobie argues that SIDS’s relative lack of power within multilateral structures can be conceptualised as a positive as their unique environmental vulnerabilities, histories of colonisation and exploitation, and current developmental circumstances, provide them opportunities to create discourses to further the promotion and diffusion of particular norms. Likewise, SIDS often lead by example via ambitious renewable energy targets in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) reports to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Through the case studies in this book we have seen how varied sources of leverage and power are mobilised toward norm promotion and diffusion. As noted above, context plays a major role in determining which sources of leverage are used, yet several overarching themes stand out. For one, almost all non-Western countries aim to leverage discourses relating to self-determination, respect for sovereignty, and

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non-interference. This shared vocabulary allows for norm diffusion and legitimation and serves to distinguish non-Western norm entrepreneurs from their Western counterparts. Likewise, it reflects how historical and developmental contexts retain significant influence in shaping both strategies and capacities for norm diffusion. In fact, as the example of South Africa ( From Norm-Maker to Norm-Taker? South Africa, the BRICS and the African National Congress’ Hegemonic Decline) shows, diffusing norms outside of this framework, or tying norms to Western-led politico-economic agendas can actually lead to backlash from recipients. The enduring popularity and concomitant spread of so-called ‘South-South’ discourses can thus be considered one of the main findings of this book. Yet we have also seen how the sources of leverage can vary depending on temporal or geographical factors, for instance as demonstrated in the chapters “Diaspora/Kin Spaces as Sites for Non-Western Norm Diffusion—Turkey’s Ethnonational Norms in Circulation” and “Climate Change, Norm Dynamics and the Agency of SIDS”. Ultimately, the great variety of sources of leverage described in this book showcases the agency of non-Western norm entrepreneurs and highlights how norm diffusion is at once deeply political and intertwined with questions of capacity, power, and identity. We finish this conclusion with a call for further research. We view this book’s primary contribution as both the extension of theoretical understandings of norms and their dynamics and the widening of the geographical scope of norms research. Through case studies that correspond to major trends in international politics, including the rise of China, enhanced regionalism, and South-South cooperation, we have examined norm diffusion across varied contexts, many of which involve significant power asymmetries between agents as well as divergent sources of leverage. Yet much work remains to be done within the field as norms shift and are diffused in the context of changing power dynamics in the contemporary international order. Future work could aim to build on themes touched on in this book, albeit in new ways and contexts. For instance, exploring how small states across the developing world aim to develop and diffuse norms in response to increasingly severe climatic events, or how regional powers position themselves and play off the normative systems put forth by the United States and China as they become embattled in new forms of competition. Likewise, research could build on the questions we have sketched out in this conclusion. In particular, how place-specific factors affect innovation, diffusion, and everything in between or further explorations of the line between norms and policy and their interface in particular contexts. In doing so, future research could continue to contribute to this rapidly growing, and increasingly important field.

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