Nonexistent Objects 0300024045

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Nonexistent Objects Terence Parsons

Yale Unioersity Press New Haven-and London

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Parsons, Terence. Nonexistent objects. Bibliography: p . Includes index. L Nonexistent objects (Philosophy) III BD2Ig . PS7 ISBN 0-300-02404-5

10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3

2 I

79-21682

I.

Title.

TO MY PAR.ENTS without whom I might have been one

Contents

Preface

Xl

Introduction

I

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

2

2. THE CURRENT SCENE

5 9

3.

METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES

I: Initial Exposition I.

Initial Sketch of the Theory I. OBJECTS

2.

17 17

2.

~XTRANUCLEAR PREDICATES

22

3.

IDENTITY

27

Meinong and Motivation 1. MEINONO'S MOTIVATION 2. EVIDENCE FOR THE THEORY

3. 4·

RUSSELL'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEINONG INTENTION ALITY

3. A Sketch of a Theory of Fictional Objects I. LITERARY THEORY

30 30 32 38 44

49 49

2. IMMIGRANT AND NATIVE OBJECTS

51

3. 4· 5·

THE THEORY

52

SURROGATE OBJECTS

57 59

RELATIONAL PROPERTIES

vii

CONTENTS

viii

I I: Formal Development 4. The Language

63

{f}

I. THE SYMBOLISM OF (!)

64

2. RULES AND AXIOMS

70

3. 4. 5. 6.

78 84 8S 88 92

\ 7.

THE SEMANTICS OF (f) THEOREMHOOD EQ.UALS VALIDITY

fL'

AN ORTHODOX THEORY

~IODELING (J) WITHIN !fJ USES OF THE PICTURING

5.. Further Developments of the Language

(f)

98 98

I. MODALITIES 2. ABSTRACTS AND COMPLEX PROPERTIES

103

3. 4-

SINGULAR TERMS

I II

5.

FORMALIZATION

12 3

PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 108

APPENDIX: A SEMANTICS FOR A FRAGMENT OF

134

ENGLISH

I I I: Applications and Discussion 6. Summary of the Formal Development and More on Nuclear and Extranuclear I. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4

155 155

2 .. COMPARISON WITH ORTHODOX SYSTEMS

160

3. 4. 5.

161

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER

5

MORE ON NUCLEAR AND EXTRANUCLEAR MODIFYING THE DISTINCTION

7· Fictional Objects, Dream Objects, and Others I. "IN THE STORY.

w

..

»

166 17°

175 175

2. WHAT ARE THEY LIKE?

182

3· 4·

DIGRESSION CONCERNING THE AUTHOR

187 188

5-

INDISCERNIBLES: CROWDS AND SIBLINGS

6. 7

RELATIONS TO UNREAL OBJECTS

6

UNCLARITIES IN THE THEORY

19° 194

EXTRANUCLEAR PREDICATIONS; STORIES WITHIN STORIES

197

CONTENTS

8. 9-

ix

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

FANTASY, MYTH, AND LEGEND

202 206

10. OBJECTS IN DREAMS

207

I I. VISUAL OBJECTS

210

8. Traditional Issues from the Present Perspective

2 12

I. ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS; WHY SHOULD ANYONE CARE WHETHER GOD EXISTS?

212

2. EPISTEMOLOGY: MIGHT I BE A NONEXISTENT

OBJECT?

217

3. 4.

LEIBNIZ'S MONADS AND POSSIBLE WORLDS

219

ESSENTIALISM

224

5. 6.

PLATONIC FORMS AND COMPLEX PROPERTIES

227

THEORETICAL ENTITIES IN SCIENCE

228

9· Global Issues I. ARE THERE TOO MANY OBJECTS? 2. ARE THERE TOO FEW OBJECTS?

3. SOME CONCLUDING Selected Bibliography Index

REMARKS

233 233 240

245 247 255

Preface

Alexius Meinong was an Austrian philosopher and psychologist who did most of his work around the turn of the century. He believed that he had discovered a whole realm of objects which had not been studied previously by philosophers or by scientists. These are the objects that don't exist. As examples he cited the golden mountain-it doesn't exist, and it has certainly not been extensively scrutinized by serious scholars-and the round square, which not only does not exist but also has the interesting property of being impossible. I first became acquainted with Meinong's views when I was slated to teach a course on metaphysics at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle during the fall of 1966.. My intent was to impart to- the class the wisdom I had recently gained as a graduate student, and a nice vehicle for this was to be W. v. Quine's essay, "On What There Is." I feared, however, that the students would find the discussion there too abstract unless they were already familiar with the views that Quine was opposing in the first few pages of his essay: they would appreciate Quine's applications ofOccam's Razor more if they were already familiar with the engaging but obscure theory against which it was being wielded. I had been told that Quine's character "Wyman" was based on the historical Meinong, and so I selected Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" as an initial reading. Meinong's views had a profound impact on me. At first, I was convinced by the criticisms leveled against him by Russell and Quine; in fact, I first thought of these "refutations" as xi

xii

PREFACE

constituting one of the clearest examples of philosophical progress that we have. Clear progress is rare in philosophy, and I was pleased to have an example to cite. But as I thought about it more, I became increasingly dissatisfied. I found the criticisms intellectually compelling, but I kept thinking that there was something very true in Meinong's views that was being missed. And eventually I began working out a similar kind of theory, a theory that I thought preserved most of Meinong's radical and exciting ontological views-such as the belief in nonexistent objects) even in impossible objects-but a theory that is immune to the standard criticisms. That theory was developed gradually in a series of papers and talks, and the present book represents its most recent form. This is not an exposition of Meinong. Although I have gained much in inspiration and ideas from reading his work, I am not well enough acquainted with his voluminous writings to qualify as an expert on them, From time to time I will discuss gross similarities and differences between Meinong's views and those presented here, but for the most part I will simply treat Meinong as an ally who had many of the ideas first. I was most influenced in the early stages of my work by a manuscript by Richard Routley entitled "Exploring Meinong's Jungle," a work that is, I suspect, closer to Meinong's views than is my own. I have not tried to draw detailed comparisons between Routley's work and my own, and the same goes for many other contemporary writers on related topics.. Such comparisons would have required too much work and would probably have been out of date by the time this is published.. Likewise, I have not tried to catalogue the ways in which the present work coheres with or departs from my own earlier work. I intend this book to be an independent work, readable on its own. My goal has been to put forth a certain kind of theory of nonexistent objects. I realize that both the theory and its exposition are somewhat crude.. If the theory is of any value, it will doubtless be developed by others in ways that I do not at present envisage, and it seems to me time to place it in their hands. As for the exposition, I ask the reader to try to see past any poor choices of terminology and minor blunders. This

PREFACE

xiii

burden will fall heaviest on those who are not in sympathy with the idioms and presumptions of current professional "analytic" philosophy. I've tried to make the main ideas of the book accessible to a broader audience, especially in the introduction and part I. I have benefited enormously from numerous discussions with students and colleagues and with people outside academia altogether. In addition to those persons mentioned in the text, I have received special support and help from Kit Fine, Edmund Gettier, Gael janofsky, Kathryn Pyne Parsons, Barbara Partee, Robert Sleigh, David Woodruff Smith, John Vickers, and, most of all, from Karel Lambert. They helped in various ways, mostly by keeping me honest by one means or another. I am grateful for a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities which, together with a sabbatical leave from the University of Massachusetts (Amherst), gave me a year's free time in which to write this book, and I wish to thank the Philosophy Department at the University of California at Irvine for providing office facilities and hospitality during that period.

University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts December 1978

Introduction

Are there objects that don't exist? The orthodox, mainstream answer (in Anglo-American philosophy, anyway) is a resounding "No I-there's no such thing as a thing that doesn't exist. Though there may be kinds of things that are nowhere exemplified (e.g., being a winged horse) there is no particular. thing that fails to exist." Or, put in positive terms: "everything exists." This is a central tenet of contemporary philosophy. I'm inclined to call it the "Russellian rut": "Russellian" because it stems principally from Russell, and a "rut" because it's a view in which most of us are so entrenched that it's hard to see over the edges. The view is defended (though obliquely) in Russell's classic paper, "On Denoting'i j! published in 1905, this paper also contains RUSsell's most terse and unsympathetic treatment of Meinong. (It is unfortunate that most people are acquainted with Meinong only as the bad guy in this paper of Russell's, for Russell published several reviews of Meinong's work which were much more sympathetic, some even containing lavish praise).2 I. All references are to the bibliography at the end of the book. Most references will be given in the text by means of the author's last name followed by an abbreviation of the title of the work in square brackets; for example, a reference to Russell's article "On Denoting" would be given as "Russell [OD]," possibly followed by page references. The author's name will be omitted if it is clear from the con text. 2. For example, "Before entering upon details, I wish to emphasize the admirable method of Meinong's researches" ([1904 Review] P: 205) and "Meinong's present position appears to me clear and consistent and fruitful of valuable results for philosophy" ([I 905 Review] p. 538).

INTRODUCTION

2

'Rut' has an unfavorable connotation; the same point can be put more favorably, I believe that, until recently, at least, philosophy has been in a state that Kuhn ([SSR]) calls "normal science.. " We have a set of paradigm beliefs and techniques which we work with, and work with very fruitfully, but that we normally do not seriously question, One of these key beliefs is that everything exists, and one of the paradigm techniques, in metaphysics, if not in the philosophy of language so much anymore, is Russell's famous theory of descriptions (which was first presented in the paper mentioned above). In this introduction I want to discuss how such a situation arose, and then I want to examine the current scene in more detail. This should set the stage for the departure from orthodoxy envisaged in the body of the book. I.

Historical Development

In 1900 Bertrand Russell believed in nonexistent objects, a view he says he got from G . E. Moore (Russell [POM] p. xviii). And indeed, superficially, it's quite a plausible view. If we forget or inhibit our philosophical training for the moment, we are all prepared to cite examples of nonexistent objects: Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes, unicorns, centaurs, . . . . Those are all possible objects, but we can find examples of impossible ones, too; Quine's example of the round square cupola on Berkeley College will do . It is an impossible object, and it certainly doesn't exist, so it seems to be an example of an impossible nonexistent object. With so many examples at hand, what is more natural than to conclude that there are nonexistent objects-lots of them! Well, by I9~9 at least, Russell had changed his mind. Nonexistent objects offend against our "robust sense of reality," and the main task of the metaphysician seems to be to explain away the apparent examples without committing himself to objects that don't exist ([IMP] p. 170). And the theory of descriptions, as all philosophers learn in graduate school, if not sooner, provides a means for doing that. 3 3.. The theory of descriptions is essentially a method for paraphrasing

INTRODUCTION

3

Most of Western philosophy has agreed with Russell ever since. Why? The question has a certain poignancy. For in adopting the theory of descriptions (at least as Russell originally presented it in "On Denoting"), we paid a rather high price for avoiding nonexistent entities. Formerly, we could think of a statement such as 'Pegasus is winged' as a simple predication, true if the object named is winged and false otherwise.. To use the theory of descriptions to eliminate the "apparent" reference to Pegasus, we first assume that 'Pegasus' is, logically speaking, not a name at all, but rather a kind· of code for 'the winged horse of Greek mythology' (or perhaps just 'the Pegasizer' as in Quine [OWTI]); then we say that this description, which logically underlies the apparent name, is not itself a constituent of the proposition at all, but that the entire sentence really means something like 'Some existing thing is a winged horse, and is the only existing winged horse, and is winged). This is hardly an intuitive result, and it doesn't even accord well with the apparent data. For one thing, it makes all simple sentences containing certain English locutions into the terminology of symbolic logic (or into literal English renderings of that terminology). Its most famous application involves the word 'the'. A sentence involving this word gets paraphrased, roughly, by means of the format: ", . . the A . '. .' => 'Something is such that it is an A, and nothing else is an A, and . . . it . . . '. For example, 'The king of France is bald' would be paraphrased as 'Something is such that it is a king of France, and nothing else is a king of France, and it is bald' (where ~is bald' occupies the position of the ellipses in the format). On its orthodox construal, you are to read the 'something' as 'some existing thing' and the "nothing else' as 'no other existing thing', though this construal is really independent of the paraphrase method. The main advantage of the theory is supposed to be that it allows us to replace a sentence that contains a term, 'the A,' which apparently refers to something, by a sentence which does not contain such a term, The latter sentence can then be denied without the denier having to (apparently, anyway) refer to 'the A'. Thus someone who does not believe in the king of France can comfortably avoid the apparent commitment to such a king that is suggested by 'The king of France is not bald' by saying instead: 'It is not the case that something is such that it is a king of France, and nothing else is, and it is bald'. Russell also held that English proper names are disguised definite descriptions, to which the paraphrase should be applied (see below in the text for an example); he and others hoped to extend this treatment to all sorts of other linguistic constructions (see Unnson [PA] chaps. 3,4, 10).

4

INTRODUCTION

names of nonexistents false, a matter that has been controversial ever since it was proposed. And, worse, it seems not to work at all for one of Russell's own paradigm tests: the sentence 'George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley' is said to mean 'George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverleyand Scott was that man', a result that hardly anyone finds plausible.s So why did Anglo-American philosophy follow Russell instead of Meinong? I do not believe that it was because of our "robust sense of reality." For one- thing, the issue doesn't concernreality, but rather unreality; it is not what exists that is inquestion, but rather whether there is something more, something outside the realm of existence.. And, for another, I think that our intuitions are genuinely in conflict on this matter.. We do tend to focus on what exists, if this is what a robust sense of reality comes to. But we also have a contrary tendency to believe in particular examples of nonexistent objects, such as Pegasus and Sherlock Holmes. No) I think we had much better reasons for agreeing with Russell-at least two. The first is that the contrary view-a Meinongian bloated ontology-seemed inevitably plagued with difficulties, absurdities, and outright inconsistencies. I've mentioned Russell's attacks on Meinong's theories. Well, Russell argued very effectively against Meinong. And Meinong did not provide a persuasive reply. (I believe that Meinong's reply was correct in part, but his reply was not persuasivej.f Thus we inherited the belief that, whatever its initial plausibility, an endorsement of nonexistent entities is untenable. The second reason for following RusselI was this: Russell took the view that everything exists, plus his theory of descriptions, and on this foundation he erected one of the most impressive philosophical systems ever known. He made great strides in 4. See Linsky [R] chap. V for a discussion, and chapter 5, section 4, of this book. The reading in question is the de dicta one (see chapter 2, section 4). 5. The initial objections were raised in RusseIl [1905 Review], Meinong's replies were in [USGSW] sec. 3, and Russell's final comments are in Russell (1907 Review]. A brief synopsis of the exchange is in Chisholm [REP] pp. 10-I I. The arguments will be discussed in chapter 2, section 3.

INTRODUCTION

5

the development of modern logic, he provided a kind of foundation for mathematics, and he articulated very powerful and interesting metaphysical and epistemological views. More than that, the techniques he employed-principally modem logic supplemented by the theory of descriptions-turned out to have widespread application far beyond Russell's own theories. No wonder, then, that we inherited many of his ontological views along with the rest. 2.

The Current Scene

Let me repeat my view of the current scene. Metaphysically, we are just beginning to emerge from a state of·"normal science." Normal science is characterized by the existence of certain paradigm views which are simply taken for granted-and taken for granted in such a way that it is hard to see what it would be like to deny them. I've identified the view that everything exists as one of these. Now that may sound presumptuous. After all, people have published books and articles in which they raise the question whether there might be things that don't exist. They usually conclude that the answer is no, of course; but they do raise the question. Well, that's not my point; my point is that in the normal everyday functioning of philosophy it is taken as a truism that there are no nonexistent objects. Let me illustrate this with a very simple example. In a recent article, Keith Donnellan discusses a certain principle about names, and he speaks in favor of this principle as follows: "it does not involve our theory of reference in any difficulties: . . . it has no Meinongian implications, no overpopulation with entities whose existence is being denied" ([SJV] p. 26). In other words, Donnellan takes for granted that Meinongian theories are bad, and that nonexistent objects are bad. And this is not a rhetorical error of his-quite the opposite. You can't defend everythit:lg you say, and he is aware that he's addressing an audience that agrees with him in taking those things for granted. (The literature abounds with other examples.) Here is a different illustration of the same point. It is rela-

INTRODUCTION

6

tively common to teach elementary logic in a manner that presupposes the orthodox view. In particular, when students are asked to symbolize these sentences:

(a) Tables exist. (b) There are tables. the instructor expects the same symbolization, namely:

(c) (3x) Tx. And this expectation is not presented as embodying a metaphysical view that might be wrong; instead it is treated as a matter of pure logic. But it is not pure logic. Symbolizing both (a) and (b) in the same way amounts to equating the quantifier 'there is' with the quantifier 'there exists', an equation which makes sense only if what exists exhausts what there is; and that is the metaphysical view I am now questioning. 6 This example from logic also illustrates another point: why, from the orthodox point of view, it is hard to see as sensible the question whether there are things that don't exist. If you symbolize this in the customary fashion, it comes out synonymous with 'there exist things that don't exist') and that is inconsistent on anybody's view. But, of course, such a symbolization begs the question ·at issue. The matter is actually a bit more complicated than I have indicated, for variations in word usage also enter in. In particular, I think that we sometimes use 'there are' to mean 'there exist'; when this is done, the symbolization discussed does not beg the question in any overt sense. But we also use 'there are' in a broader sense, a sense roughly equivalent to that of the word 'some', or 'at least one', and this usage cannot be appropriately symbolized in the same way as 'there exist's? For example, we are inclined to say both: 6. Quantifiers are locutions from symbolic logic. There are usually two, the universal quantifier '(x)', which means 'everything is such that . . . ' or 'for any object x, . . . ', and the existential quantifier '(3x)', which means 'something Is such that ', or 'there is at least one thing such that . . . ', ). or 'for at least one thing x, 7. The literature now contains numerous references to this distinction

INTRODUCTION

7

(d) There are winged horses-Pegasus, for example. and:

(e) There are no winged horses. When we truly utter (d), we are using 'there are' in the broad sense. When we say (e), we mean that there are no real winged horses, and (e) is appropriately symbolized using a quantifier that is read 'there- eixst'. To avoid ambiguity, I will try always to use 'there are' in the unrestricted sense, the sense of 'at least one'; when I want to assert existence, I will use 'there exist' or some similar locution. During certain periods of history (e.g., the Middle Ages) the view that everything exists would have been regarded as absolutely outrageous. But since the early 19005 it has become the received view, very firmly entrenched and almost impossible to refute" There are several reasons why it is almost immune to refutation. First, as the received view, it has authority on its side; it is endorsed or presupposed by those of our contemporaries whom we most respect. Also, as the received view, it is intuitively obvious (to many philosophers, anyway), our intuitions having been shaped by years of experience with theories that embody this view. These factors tend to throw the burden of proof on those who might want to challenge the received view. But that is almost impossible to do, for reasons that Kuhn and many others have made clear: the view in question is a high-level theoretical claim in our metaphysical scheme. And high-level theoretical claims don't confront the data directly; they can be tested against data only as interpreted by some method. And the 'orthodox view contains within it a methodology that interprets the data so as to preserve and protect the claim that everything exists. I've given between 'there is' and 'there exists' (although different terminology is sometimes used), with about half the authors pointing out the importance of the distinc... tion (e.g., Russell himself in [ElP]) and the other half saying that they can't see any difference. Some seem to resolutely see no distinction, and I have no hope of convincing them; as for others, I hope that acquaintance with the theory described in the body of the text will provide an explanatory illustra.. tion.

INTRODUCTION

8

one example above, the manner in which we use logic to symbolize claims so as to presuppose that everything exists. More important, we've all learned to use Russell's theory ofdescriptions to analyze away apparent reference to nonexistent objects; those beliefs that seem to require nonexistent objects for their troth we instinctively paraphrase into other beliefs that do not. And we retain our conviction that apparent reference to the unreal must be capable of being paraphrased away even when we don't see how to do it. It may now come as a surprise that I have hardly any objection to this situation whatsoever. I think the orthodox view is a fine view; it has been extremely useful. I don't object to its taking things for granted, nor to its defending some of its central claims by means of a methodology that biases the data I don't object because I think that any fruitful philosophical theory is going to do just that. But I do think it's a rut, and I'd like to look over the edge and see how things might be different.. To do this, we need to encounter an actual theory about nonexistent objects. That will be the task of the present work. The way has been paved by a recent mood in logic according to which logic ought not to rule out nonexistent objects (see Scott [AML]). But much of the motivation here has stemmed from the desire to. preserve the neutrality of logic, and this very neutrality has prescribed silence about what nonexistent objects are substantively like. The same also holds for much work in "free logic": 4

Free logic validates certain reasoning containing words suchas 'Pegasus'. But it does not follow from this fact that it is committed to a realm of entities among which is included a flying horse. To be sure, one could develop a philosophical semantics for free logic that does recognize a realm of nonactual but. possible beings. . . . But one need not develop the semantics that way. . . . In our development, talk about non-existents is just that-i-t'talk" is what is stressed. "Nonexistent" object, for us, is just a picturesque way of speaking devoid of any ontological commitment.. 8 8. Lambert and van Fraassen [D&C] pp. [EA&P] pt. X, and Marcus [Q,&O] .

199-200.

See also Leonard

INTRODUCTION

9

My intent is to describe in some detail the ontological commitment that these and other authors wish to avoid.

3. Methodological Preliminaries I have had certain goals in mind when working on this project, and it will aid the reader's understanding to be aware of them. For they have often influenced what I have said in ways that would not be apparent from my words alone. One goal I have had is to try to develop a theory that is understandable to those who, like myself, approach this topic from what I have called the orthodox tradition. My techniques will be familiar to those in that tradition, and my terminology has been kept as familiar as possible; I have made efforts to clarify the nonorthodox tenninology that I found it important to. use (principal examples are the notions of nuclear and extranuclear properties, and impossible and incomplete objects). This goal has also guided me in producing a theory that is, in certain respects, as detailed and specific as passible.. I have avoided many alternative theories and many variants of the chosen theory-not because they seemed to me to be wrong, but because I couldn't see how to develop them in sufficient detail to gr-asp clearly how they would go. I can't emphasize this point too much; although I have often taken a given path in order to avoid error that I saw elsewhere, I have much more often taken a particular approach just because it was the only one I could develop to the point where I felt comfortable with it. The reader who tries to find objections to alternatives lurking behind my choices will often be frustrated (though I do think it is often much more difficult to develop an alternative approach than it seems oat first glance, and that "objection" to alternatives is often relevant). I don't mean to suggest, ofcourse, that I have completely avoided vagueness and unclarity myself; these are matters of degree, and I have had as one of my goals to minimize them. A second goal that I have had is to produce a theory that is inconsistent with the orthodox view. One popular style in philosophy is to take a position that initially appears outrageous, and then to "interpret;" it in such a manner that it turns into something that we already believed. This is not what I am trying to do

10

INTRODUCTION

here. If I am successful in my enterprise, some people-who begin with orthodox opinions will end up agreeing with the theory presented here, but only because they have changed their minds, not because the theory is "really" one they originally held. There is a danger that the question of whether there are objects that don't exist should turn out to be a semantic quibble rather than a substantive matter of disagreement between Meinongians and the orthodoxy.. There are at least two ways in which this might happen. First, we could define 'exists' to mean something like 'has spatio-temporal location', and then defend the claim that some things don't exist by pointing to numbers, classes, ideas, or similar things. I want to avoid such a move . I am not sure how to define 'exists', but I may be able to say enough about my intended use of the word to forestall such a trivialization of the issues.. First, I want to follow Meinong in separating abstract things (e. g., numbers, properties, relations, propositions) from concrete things (tables, unicorns, people).. Meinong held that abstract things never exist (they are the wrong sort of thing to exist); instead, some of them have a kind of being called subsistence. I want to avoid this issue entirely. When discussing problems of existence and nonexistence, I'll limit myself entirely to a discussion of concrete objects. So when I say that some objects don't exist, I mean that some concrete objects don't exist-I don't have in mind propositions, or numbers, or sets.. With regard to concrete objects, Meinong held that some of them exist and some of them don't, and the onf?s that don't do not have some other kind of being-s-for example, subsistence (see Meinong [TO] .sec. 4, where he considers and rejects an argument that purports to establish a kind of being that all objects have). Russell objected that if there are objects that do not exist, they have to have some other kind of being (see [OD], [EIP]) . I have never been able to find more thana terminological issue here, If there is an issue about whether nonexistent objects have some kind of being, I intend to remain neutral on the issue.. This also goes for a view (which may be the same one) that I have often heard expressed in conversation; it is that "everything has its own special mode of existence." For example,Pegasus

INTRODUCTION

11

exists in mythology, Sherlock Holmes exists in fiction, . Some would even emphasize that these sorts of-existence can be more important than the everyday sort of existence that I share with my house and my automobile. Well perhaps, but that is not the issue that I will be discussing in this book. There is a perfectly ordinary sense of the word 'exists' in which Sherlock Holmes does not exist, and that is the sense that I intend when I call Holmes a -nonexistent object. This is also the sense in which orthodox .philosophers claim that there is nothing except what exists. (This does not commit them to the unimportance of literature; they need only hold that the importance of literature does not depend on the existence of its characters.) Even given these provisos, there is still room for disagreement concerning exactly what concrete objects exist-for example, concerning whether there exist any living beings on other planets. I am not concerned with these issues and so I will, as a matter of policy, agree (or at least not disagree) with others on these issues. Specifically, I intend to use the word 'exists' so that it encompasses exactly those objects that orthodox philosophers hold to exist. In particular, it includes all the ordinary physical objects that we normally take to exist, and it does not include unicorns, gold mountains, winged horses, round squares (round square things), Pegasus, or Sherlock Holmes. The theory given below will say that there are unicorns, there is such a thing as Pegasus, etc., but that none of these exist. For reasons of simplicity, I have avoided entirely dealing with tensed properties in the theory.. When I give examples like 'being blue', it would have been better to give examples like 'being blue at time t' or 'being blue sometime'. My 'exists' is always meant tenselessly, so I take it to be true that Socrates exists (Le.. , Socrates is not an example of a nonexistent object), even though it is perfectly correct English to say, 'Socrates once existed, but he no longer does'. For those who prefer tenses here, read my 'exists' as short for 'existed or exists or will exist'. A second way that the ontological issues might be trivialized would be if I were to reveal in the last chapter that my quantifiers are merely "substitutional,' that 'There are winged horses' is true only because the sentence 'Pegasus is a winged horse' is true,

12

INTRODUCTION

and the latter sentence is true in spite of the fact that 'Pegasus' doesn't refer at all. Don't bother skipping ahead; I won't do this. Whenever there is a choice) my quantifiers are always intended to be interpreted objectually.P A third goal of mine is that the theory described be consistent with the data. This is too vague to be of much help, but it can be formulated more precisely in terms of the relation between the proposed theory and the orthodox view. This is that the only point of disagreement between these views should be explainable in terms of what some call a "robust sense of reality," and what Meinong called the "prejudice in favor of the actual." Namely, the views should agree on any issue which concerns only existing objects. More specifically, there should be no disagree.. ment between them concerning the truth value of any sentence whose quantifiers are all restricted to existing objects and whose singular terms all name real objects. (The sentence 'some things do not exist' is not one of these.) Then the orthodox view can be seen to be a kind of special case of the more libertine one developed here; it is the libertine view with blinders on, blinders that prohibit vision of the unreal. Another way of putting this is that the more libertine view should "reduce to" the orthodox view when applied to old and familiar (i.e . , real) objects in much the same way that relativity theory and quantum physics reduce to classical physics when applied only to slow-moving middle-sized physical objects. This will be made clearer in chapter 6, section 2 .. 9.. Quantifiers can be read in different ways. The usual reading is the cbjectual reading; here a sentence of the form 'There is an A' is supposed to be true if, and only if, there is an object which is an A.. The substitutional reading treats 'There is an A J as being true if, and only i~ there is some true sentence of the form 'N is an A', where 'N7 is a name. In case every object has a name and no names fail to refer, then the objectual and substitutional readings are equivalent; otherwise, they need not be equivalent.. For example, some pro.. ponents of substitutional quantification assume that there are names which fail to refer but which nonetheless appear in true sentences of the form 'N is an A', and they then hold that some sentences of the form 'There is an A' are true even though no object is an A. For example, Leonard (in [EA&PJ pt. IX) suggests that 'For some x, x is fictitious' is true, on the grounds that 'Santa Claus is fictitious' is true, even though the name 'Santa Claus' does not refer to anything, and no object (e.g., no person) is fictitious. See also Marcus [Q&Ol

INTRODUCTIOJV

13

One last note: throughout this work I have always used 'real' and 'actual' as synonyms for 'existent', Both these words have uses in which they mean something quite different (e.g., both are sometimes used to mean 'genuine, as opposed to counterfeit'). I never intend these other meanings. The book consists of three parts. In part I I give a simple sketch of the main outlines of the theory, some discussion of motivation, and a sketch of an application of the theory-an application to fictional objects. Part 11 contains the formal development of the theory. I place a great deal of importance on this part, However, many readers will not be inclined to dwell in such detail on technical matters, and so I have tried to write part III in such a way that it can be understood, in general at least, without having read part 11 at all. Part III begins with an informal exposition of the results of part 11; I then discuss various applications of the theory in some detail. The book concludes with some general characteristics of, and difficulties with, the theory.

I

Initia1 Exposition

I

Initial Sketch of the Theory

The purpose of this chapter is. to give a very simple, crude sketch of a theory of nonexistent objects. I will confine myself here to a description of the theory, Discussion of motivation and of application will be postponed until later chapters, as will detailed developments and discussion of subtleties. I.

Objects

I am going to assume that no two existing objects have exactly the same properties.. This is not so much an assumption about the paucity of existing objects as it is an assumption about the variety of properties; in particular, I assume that for any existing object there is at least one property (and probably many) that it has and that no other existing object has.. Anyway, given this assumption, there's a natural one-one correlation between real, existing objects and certain nonempty sets of properties. For example, Madame Curie is a real object, and. correlated with her is the set of properties that she has:

X

The set of Madame Curie's properties

Curie

Now, make a list of all existing objects. Correlated with each one is a set of properties-i-the set of all the properties that it has: Portions of this chapter have appeared in various forms in Parsons [PMS], [MAFO], and [RNO]. 17

INITIAL EXPOSITION

18

Real Objects

Sets ofProperties The set of OJ.'s properties The set of ~'s properties

The set of Oa'8 properties The left-hand list now exhausts the ontology of concrete objects that people like Russell, Quine, Frege, and most of us find acceptable; the existing objects constituteall there is. But the theory now being presented says that there is a lot more, and it goes like this . .It is not clear how to continue the left-hand -list (that's our goal), but you can easily see how to continue the right-hand list; just write down any other nonempty set of properties.. For example, write down: {goldenness, mountainhood, . . .}, filling in whatever properties for the ellipses that you like. Now the theory under discussion says that for any such set in the righthand list, there is correlated with it exactly one object. So write in "0«+1" in the left-hand list: °a+l

{goldenness, mountainhood, . . .}

The object 0a+l can't be an existing object, because it has the properties goldenness and mountainhood-s-it's a gold mountain -and there aren't any real .gold mountains. But, as Meinong pointed out, that doesn't mean that there are no. unreal gold mountains; although certain narrow-minded people object to this, that's just because they're prejudiced! (He called this "the prejudice in favor of the actual" ([TO] sec" 2).) It's clear how to extend the right-hand list: just include arry set of properties that isn't already there. Corresponding to each such set is a unique object, and vice versa; that is, each object appears only once in the left-hand list . The two lists extend our original correlation, so that it is now a correlation between all objects and the sets of properties that they have.. ! 1.

This correlation is not one of identity; that is,. I am not saying that

INITIAL SKETCH OF THE THEORY

19

Actually we can dispense with talk of lists and correlations and present the theory in a more direct manner in terms of two principles. For reasons that will become apparent shortly, let me call the properties I have been discussing nuclear properties. The principles are: (I) No two objects (real or unreal) have exactly the same nuclear properties. (2) For any set of nuclear properties, some object has all the properties in that set and no other nuclear properties.

Principle (2) does most of the work; it's a sort of "comprehension" principle for objects. Notice that principle (2) does not require that objects be "logically closed"; for example, an object may have the property of being blue and the property of being square without having the property of being blue.. andsquare.. This lack of logical closure will be important in certain applications of the theory, particularly applications to fictional objects and objects in dreams. Many nonexistent objects will be incomplete.. By calling an object "complete," I mean that for any nuclear property, the object either has that property or it has its negation. This characterization presupposes that it makes sense to talk of the "nega.. tion" of a nuclear property in a somewhat unusual sense. This matter will require some discussion, most of which will be postponed until chapter 5, by which time most of the "logic" of nuclear properties will have been developed. For the time being, we can get along with the assumption that, for any nuclear property p, there is another nuclear property q which existing objects have if and only if they don't have p, and which I call the nuclear negation of p, or just 'non-p' for short.. Notice that the nuclear negation of a nuclear property p will not be a property that any object has if and only if it does not have p, for no nuclear property fits that description (by principle (2) any nuclear property~q is such that some object has both p and q). So the reader objects are the sets of properties that they have. The theory being developed is not a "bundle" theory, according to which objects are bundles of properties (though it may not be inconsistent with all such theories).

20

INITIAL EXPOSITION

should keep in mind that this is a somewhat unusual use of the word 'negation'. Given this account of nuclear property negation, all existing objects are complete.f Some nonexistent objects' are complete, too (see below); but some aren't. Consider the object whose sole nuclear properties are goldenness and mountainhood. It does not have the property of blueness, nor does it have the property of nonblueness; I will say that it is indeterminate with respect to blueness. That object will in fact be indeterminate with respect to every nuclear property except goldenness and mountainhood. (The object in question may be the one that Meinong was referring to when he used the words 'the gold mountain' ; whether this is so or not involves questions of textual interpretation that I amunsure about.) Completeness is different from logical closure.. Consider the set of properties got by taking all of my properties and replacing "hazel-eyed" by "non.. hazel-eyed." According to principle (2), there is an object which has the resulting properties and no others. This object will be complete but it will not be logically closed. For example, it has brown-hairedness and it has non2. It is possible to develop a different notion of incompleteness which does not depend on the notion of the negation of a nuclear property. Call p and q complementary if, in fact, all and only existing-objects that have p lack q. Then we ean call an object incomplete*' if it lacks both of a pair of complementary nuclear properties. All incomplete objects are incomplete*. It is not obvious that either of these leads to the best way to develop the theory. There is a widespread view to the effect that existing objects fall into categories, and that some properties that apply meaningfully to objects of one category may not apply meaningfully to objects of other categories. For example, it may be meaningful to say of me that I am complacent, but not meaningful to say this of my car. Perhaps, then, there is a notion of property negation according to which the negation of p is a property that is had by all and only the existing objects of the appropriate category which do not have p, and then a notion of completeness that is relativized to categories. I have avoided developing the theory in this way because (I) it would be considerably more complicated than the theory I have developed, and (2) it would involve me in making sense of what a category is-not an easy matter. The theory is already cornplicated and involved enough as it stands. Readers who favor the category approach should view the theory I am developing as an idealization.

INITIAL SKETCH OF THE THEORT

21

hazel-eyedness but it does not have the nuclear property of being both brown-haired-and-non-hazel-eyed.~ To get an object that is logically closed yet incomplete, add to "the gold mountain" all nuclear properties that are entailed by goldenness and mountainhood. Then it will have) for example, the nuclear property of either-being-located-in-North-Americaor-not-being-Iocated-in-North-America, but it will not have either of those disj uncts; it will be indeterminate with respect to being located in North America. It may be appropriate at this point to allude to a remark that Meinong was fond of making: perhaps no one could have a practical interest in certain of these objects, but that should not prejudice the philosopher against them. Some objects are impossible. By calling an object x possible I mean that it is possible that there exist an object which has all of x's nuclear properties (and perhaps more besides). 4 All existing objects are automatically possible objects by this definition. And some unreal ones are, too-for example, "the gold mountain." But consider the object whose sole nuclear properties are roundness and squareness (this may be Meinong's famous "round square"). This is an impossible object because there could not be an existing object that has both these properties. Still, as Meinong pointed out, that doesn't prevent there from being an impossible object that has them. The reader might find it profitable to verify the following claims. Not all of them follow with absolute certainty from what 3. I am assuming here that it makes sense to talk of "nuclear conjunc.. tions" of nuclear properties, "nuclear disjunctions," etc. This will be discussed more fully in chapter 5, section 2. 4. There is some arbitrariness in terminology here, for several other notions may have an equally good claim to be called possibility. For example: (a) x is possible. if and only if it is possible that some"object have exactly x's nuclear properties.. (b) x is possible?, if and only if it is possible that x exists. Possibility2 is very different from either of the other notions; to call an object possible, is to make a de re modal claim about it, which is not the case for either of the others. The present theory is very neutral about de re modalities; see chapter 5, section I.

INITIAL EXPOSITION

22

I have said so far (e.g., I haven't given a precise definition of logical closure, .and I haven't yet discussed what a "nuclear" property is), but the fact that they are supposed to be consequences of the theory being presented will help clarify the theory. (a) Every object that is both complete and possible is-logi_. cally closed. (b) Any object that is impossible and logically closed is complete. (There is exactly one such object: the object which has every nuclear property.) (c) Except for -(a) and (b), all possible combinations of completeness, possibility, and logical closure are ifested; that is, there are objects that are complete, closed, and possible; objects that are complete, closed, and impossible; .etc.

man-

(cl) There are objects that don't exist but that are complete, possible, and logically closed. (The reader might want to postpone this one until chapter 5, section 2.) Principle (2) requires that there be a "null" object, that is, an object that has no nuclear properties at all (and principle (1) says that it is unique) . I am not at all sure whether this is desirable. It makes for a certain amount of theoretical simplicity, and that offers some justification. But it would not make a great deal of difference to the applications of the theory that I know of ifit were omitted (by inserting 'nonempty' after 'any; in principle (2)). Principles (1) and (2) yield a theory that has an important virtue: they not only tell us that there are nonexistent objects, they also in part tell us what nonexistent objects there are, and they tell us what properties they have. What nuclear properties they have anyway, which brings us to the next section. 2.

Extranuclear Predicates

Not all predicates can stand for nuclear properties. Take 'exists'. In the theory I've sketched, if we allowed 'exists' to stand for a nuclear property, there would be trouble. For example, suppose

INITIAL SKETCH OF THE THEORT

23

that it did stand for a nuclear property, existence. Now consider this set ofproperties : {goldenness, mountainhood, existence}.

If existence were a nuclear property, there would be an object correlated with this set of properties; call it "the existing gold mountain." Then the existing gold mountain would turn out to have the property, existence; that is, the existing gold mountain would exist. But that's just false . Initially, we were troubled by there being a gold mountain; Meinong placated us by .pointing out that it's only an unreal object, it doesn't' exist. But in the case of the existing gold mountain, this option doesn't seem open. Conclusion: 'exists,' at least as it is used above, does not stand for a nuclear property.s I'll call 'exists' an extranuclear predicate, and, in general, I'll divide predicates into two categories: those which stand for nuclear pro}r erties, which I'll call nuclear predicates, and the others, which I'll call extranuclear.. Which are which? First, here are some examples: Nuclear Predicates .'is blue', 'is tall', 'kicked Socrates', 'was kicked by Socrates', 'kicked somebody', 'is golden', 'is a mountain' Extranuclear Predicates •. Ontological: 'exists', 'is mythical', 'is fictional' Modal: 'is possible', 'is impossible' Intentional: 'is thought about by Meinong', 'is worshipped by someone' Technical: 'is complete' I'd like to emphasize that this division of predicates into 5. This argument parallels one of Russell's objections to Meinong; see chapter 2, section 3. Meinong distinguished between existing (a "Sein" property) and being existent (a "Sosein" property); it is the former property that is under discussion in my argument. Strictly, the argument shows only that either goldenness or mountainhood or existence is extranuclear. To prove that the culprit is existence, suppose that existence were nuclear and consider the object which has only existence. Since this object is incomplete, it doesn't exist, contradicting the assumption that it does. (This argument was pointed out to me by Dorothy Graver.)

24

INITIAL EXPOSITION

nuclear and extranuclear is not peculiar to Meinong at all; it's an old and familiar one. People such as Frege and Russell distinguish predicates that stand for properties of individuals from those that don't. The extranuclear predicates listed above are mostly ones that Frege and Russell have been telling us all along do not stand for properties of individuals, For example, is 'exists' a predicate? Some people say flatly no. Frege tells us that it is a predicate, but not a predicate of individuals; it is a higher-order predicate, a predicate of concepts. Likewise, w~ all know that 'is possible' is either not a predicate at all, or a predicate not of individuals but of propositions or sentences. With the intentional predicates we're not sure what to say, but we are sure that there is trouble in supposing them to be properties of individuals. 6 Our historical situation yields a very rough kind of decision procedure for telling whether a predicate is nuclear or extranuclear. I t is this: if everyone agrees that the predicate stands for an ordinary property of individuals, then it is a nuclear predicate and it stands for a nuclear property. On the other hand, if everyone agrees that it doesn't stand for an ordinary property of individuals (for whatever reason), or if there is a history of controversy about whether it stands for a property of individuals, then it is an extranuclear predicate, and it does not stand for a nuclear property. Of course, this "decision procedure" is a very imperfect one. Probably its main virtue is to give us enough clear cases of nuclear and extranuclear predicates for us to develop an intuition for the distinction, so that we can readily classify new cases. I find that I have such an intuitive ability, and that other people pick it up quite readily; even those who are skeptical about the viability of the distinction seem to agree about which predicates are supposed to be which (except for comparatives, which will be discussed in chapter 6, section 4) . The theory itself will help by putting severe constraints on what can be nuclear. For example, it is a thesis of the theory that no nuclear property F satisfies the formula: There is a set X of nuclear properties, not containing F, such that every object which has every member of X has F.. 6. Ryle says that these predicates are "status" or "quasi-ontological" predicates (Ryle [ID]).

INITIAL SKETCH OF THE THEORT

25

This is because if F is nuclear and F is not a member of X, then the object which has exactly those nuclear properties in X has every member of X without having F. For similar reasons, no nuclear property F satisfies the formula: There is a set X of nuclear properties, not containing F, such that every object which has every member of X lacks F. If we make some minimal assumptions about nuclear properties, principles like these will show that lots or"properties are extranuclear. For example, suppose that we assume that being a unicorn, being round, and being square are all nuclear.. Then we can show, for example, that existence is extranuclear, by picking as X the unit set of being a unicorn. Every object that has every member of X-that is, every object that is a unicorn-lacks existence. So existence is extranuclear, by the second schema." Similarly, if we pick X to be {roundness, squareness} then the first schema shows impossibility to be extranuclear, and the second schema does the same for possibility. In the .modalized version of the theory, we will have the following principle: no nuclear property satisfies: There is a set X of nuclear properties, not containing F, such that it is possible that every object which has every member of X has (lacks) F. If we consider possible worlds in which (unlike our own) there are no myths about unicorns, no stories about unicorns, and Meinong never thought about a unicorn, then, using the unit set 7. This test for distinguishing nuclear from extranuclear properties will not work if applied from a perspective of complete skepticism. For example, you can't show that redness is extranuclear by using the second schema, be.. cause for any set X of nuclear properties we can (via the theory) produce an example of an object which has all the properties in X and which also has redness: ies the object that has exactly the properties in X plus redness. But doesn't that beg the question, by assuming that redness is nuclear (for, otherwise, the theory does not say that there is an object which has exactly the properties in X plus redness)? In a sense, yes, but the point is, rather, that making this assumption and then judging that the resulting object is red is, from the point of view of the general theory, at worst dubious, whereas making a similar assumption about existence, and judging that the resulting object exists, is (for some choices ofX) clearly wrong.

INITIAL EXPOSITION

26

of being a unicorn, this schema can be used to show that being fictional, being mythical, and being thought about by Meinong are all extranuclear. Exercise for the reader:

show that being complete is extranuclear. 8

Ultimately, the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear predicates and properties will gain viability by being incorporated into a general theory of properties and objects. This task will occupy most of the present book. I think it is not very important whether you say that extranuclear predicates stand for a special sort of property-s-extranuclear properties-or whether you say that they do not stand for any properties at alL In the theory I sketch, I will assume that there are extranuclear properties; this allows me a freedom of exposition that I would not otherwise have. But the important point is to distinguish extranuclear from nuclear predicates, and thereby to sharpen our intuitions about what nuclear properties are. For it is by means of nuclear properties, not extranuclear ones, that we individuate objects. What has been said above about properties applies also to relations. Some relations are ordinary nuclear ones: being an aunt of, kicking, being kicked by. Others are extranuclear: the relation of identity is a paradigm case. Some relations seem to be nuclear with respect to their first place and extranuclear with respect to their second place: thinking about, believing to be blue. One way in which relations are important in the present theory is that "plugging up') one place of a two ...place relation can yield a property: being kicked by Socrates, being thought 8. Here is a solution. First, pick X to be the set of nuclear properties possessed by Madame Curie: Notice that Madame Curie is complete, and so is any object which has all of her properties. So if completeness is not a member of X, the first schema classifies it as extranuclear. If completeness is a member of X (it isn't, but we haven't proved that yet), then it is a nuclear property. So now pick as a new X the result of replacing completeness by its nuclear negation in the old X. By the way in which we have obtained the new X from the old one, we know that any object that has all its members is complete and also that completeness is not a member; so now the first schema classifies completeness as extranuclear.

INITIAL SKETCH OF THE THEORT

27

about by Meinong. This plugging-up process will be discussed in chapter 3, its logic will be worked out in chapter 4, and applications will be discussed in chapter 7. .

3. Identity One of the major sources of opposition to nonexistent objects is the feeling that they are somehow "disorderly." I think that this feeling comes primarily from lack of familiarity with a clear theory about nonexistent objects. Within the present theory, the realm of the nonexistent is a reasonably orderly one. In addition to Russell's original objections to Meinong's theory, which will be discussed in chapter 2, the main charge of disorderliness is based on the claim that the concept of identity does not apply to nonexistent objects. For example, after making some aesthetic criticisms of nonexistent but possible objects, W. V. Quine says:

Take, for instance, the possible fat man in the doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another? These elements are well-nigh incorrigible. ([OWTI] p. 4)9 It is clear that the conclusion expr.essed in the last sentence is a bit hasty, but the questions leading up to it just as clearly deserve answers. I'll answer with respect to the theory developed in the present work. 9- These difficulties with nonexistent objects are foreshadowed in Russell [19°5 Review].

28

INITIAL EXPOSITION

Identity is meaningfully applicable to all objects, existent and nonexistent alike. All objects in fact obey the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: if x and y have all the ~ame properties, then x = y. But this much is trivial, since I am willing to count "being identical with x" as a property, albeit an extranuclear one. But objects also obey a much more powerful principle: the principle of the identity of nuclear indiscernibles:

1Nl: If x and y have exactly the same nuclear properties, then x =y. This is our principle (I), used above in explaining the theory.I? What, then, about those men in the doorway? Well, regarding "the possible fat man in the doorway," there is no such thing, for there are many possible fat men in the doorway. I am now assuming that being fat, being a man, and being in the doorway are all nuclear properties, but that being possible is an extranuclear one. There are many objects which have those three nuclear properties, some of them possible and some of them impossible. Similar remarks apply to "the possible bald man in the doorway." So the question of whether "they" are the same possible man or not does not make sense; this has nothing to do with "their" nonexistence, it is simply the fact that no specific objects have been singled out to ask the question about. Some possible fat men in the doorway are also possible bald. men who are in the doorway, and some are not. How many possible men are there in the doorway? At least as many as there are consistent sets of nuclear properties which contain the properties of being a man and being in the doorway. 10. In a less simplified development of the theory, I would use "ternporal" nuclear properties instead of their "eternalized" versions-for example, being blue, simpliciter, instead of being blue..at-time-t. The difference is that temporal properties are not just had or not had, but rather had at given times, or not had then, whereas the eternalized versions have the times built in, and they are simply had or not had. In a developmen t of the theory using temporal properties, objects would be correlated with functions from times to sets of properties instead of with sets of properties, and 1Nl would be replaced by:

If x and y have exactly the same nuclear properties at all times, then x =y_

INITIAL SKETCH OF THE THEORr

29

There will be at least a couritably infinite number of these. Are there more possible fat men than thin ones? Probably not; there are an infinite number of each, but parity suggests that the cardinality will be the same for each. Would their being alike make them one? If "being alike" means not differing with respect to any nuclear property, then yes.. Are no two possible things alike? No two things are alike, possible or impossible.

2

Meinong and .Motivation

I.

Meinong's Motivation

The basic insight behind Meinong's theory of objects was that every thought has an object-regardless of whether or not that object exists. Bertrand Russell transferred this principle to language, and attributed to Meinong the doctrine that every denoting phrase stands for an object (Russell [OD]) . This principle, when fleshed out in a natural way, yields a powerful and exciting ontological view.. The natural fleshing out is that every denoting phrase refers to the "right" object. For example, Meinong holds that the phrase 'the gold mountain' refers to an object which is golden and is a mountain, and that the phrase 'the round square' refers to an object which is both round and square. The general view seems to be that, in the case of definite descriptions at least, any definite description refers to an object that satisfies the description. I will call this the unrestricted satisfaction principle. In spite of the fact that Meinong specifically disavows certain applications of this principle (see the discussion in section 3, below), it was attributed to him by Russell- (with some justice) and it remains his most famous "contribution.. " I do not think that the main evidence for unreal objects comes from this principle, and I do not intend to endorse it I. This involves an interpretation of Russell's argument that goes beyond the actual text. For a slightly different interpretation see Lambert [10], RoutIey [DIO], and Lambert [ODIO].

30

MEINONG AND MOTIVATION

31

myself. True, it does entail that there are objects (e.. g., the gold mountain) of a sort that do not exist. But it entails too much; the principle is in fact inconsistent. Russell's arguments against Meinong almost show this, though not quite; they will be discussed in section 3. But a variant of one of his arguments does the trick. We need only consider the definite description 'the object which is such that it is golden and also such that it is not the case that it is golden.' By the satisfaction principle, this refers to an object, call it 's'. which satisfies the- .description.. That is, g satis.. fies the description 'it is golden ~nd it is not the case that it is golden'. So the following is true: 's is golden and it is not the case that g is golden). But that is a contradiction. Meinong mayor may not have intended to endorse contradictions (the scholarly evidence is unclear);2 but I do not, for contradictions are not true.. Even though I am advocating a theory according to which there are impossible objects, this will not lead to contradictions (again, see section 3). There is a parallel here with the paradoxes .of set theory.. The unrestricted comprehension principle of naive set theory says that for any open formula there is a set consisting of exactly those things which satisfy the formula . Taking the formula to be 'X ~ X' then yields "the Russell set", which is a member of itself if and only if it isn't a member of itself. Some reacted to this result by giving up sets altogether, but the majority view was to search for some more modest principles of generating sets, Some fairly natural principles of set theory had to be given up, but others were preserved. Similarly the unrestricted satisfaction principle of naive object theory leads to contradiction, and must be given up.. The majority view here has been to give up all but the existing ob . . 2. The principal evidence in favor of the view that Meinong was willing to endorse contradictions comes from sec. 3 of [ USGS W] (p. 16): Naturally I cannot in any way evade this consequence: whoever once has dealings with a round square will not be able to stop when faced with a square or some other sort of object which is simultaneously round and not round. But one will also, as far as I can see, have weighty reason hereupon to take the initiative: the principle of con.. tradiction is to be applied by no one to anything other than to reality and possibility [my own translation; not to be highly trusted].

INITIAL EXPOSITION

32

jects, a rather severe reaction. Certainly some of the natural "objects" of naive object theory must be given up, but I think there is still hope that some of the nonexistents can be saved. (I'm sure that this can be done consistently; the open question is whether it can be done plausibly.) 2.

Evidence for the Theory

I will discuss Meinong's restriction of the satisfaction principle in section 3. As I have stated, I do not think that the major motivation for the endorsement of nonexistent entities should come from this principle. The motivation should come instead from a host of particular 'propositions which we believe and which seem to commit us to unreal objects. Consider, for example, the following remarks: (i) Ironically, a certain fictional detective (namely, Sherlock Holmes) is much more famous than any real detective, living or dead. (ii) Several of the Greek gods were also worshipped by the Romans, though they called them by different names. (iii) Any good modern criminologist knows more about chemical analysis than Sherlock Holmes knew.. These are claims that we believe, and they seem, prima facie, to commit us to a fictional detective (Sherlock Holmes) and to Greek gods. Anyone can deny this, of course, but to deny it is to make a claim that is primafacie implausible. The case can even be strengthened by comparing (i)-(iii) with certain parallel examples: /)

Ironically, a certain ancient philosopher (namely, Plato) is much more famous than any modern philosopher, living or dead. (ii') Several of the Qreek cities were also occupied by the Romans, though they called them by different names. (iii') Any good modern criminologist knows more about chemical analysis than Lavoisier knew. We would normally say that (i')-(iii /) commit us to a certain (i

MEIJVONG AND MOTIVATION

33

Greek philosopher (Plato), Greek cities, and Lavoisier. An op . . ponent of unreal objects must either find a difference between the logic of the former and latter cases, or else deny the commitment in the latter cases. The first move calls for a theory of logical form that has not yet been developed." the second calls for an explanation of commitment that differs from the normally accepted ones. I don't think that it is at all plausible to deny the truth of (i)-(iii), nor to attribute to (i)-(iii) relevantly different logical forms than to (i')-(iii'). But some people would deny that any of these examples contain commitment to objects of any sort; I will discuss briefly what I take to be the most popular variants of this position. Probably the most common way within the orthodox tradition to sidestep apparent commitment to objects is to hold that the linguistic forms in question create "nonextensional" contexts. No one thinks that 'It is possible that a unicorn is approaching' commits one to there being unicorns; the prefix 'It is possible that' creates a context that cancels the commitments of the sentence that follows it . Similarly, one could hold that the locutions used in (i)-(iii)-'is more famous than', 'was/were worshipped by', and 'knows more about chemical analysis than'-create such nonextensional contexts. Unfortunately, this is not only implausible, it does not even fit accepted accounts of nonextensionality, There are two generally acknowledged tests for nonextensionality: failure of substitutivity of identicals and failure of existential generalization. With regard to substitutivity ofidenticaIs, the adverb 'necessarily' is shown to create a nonextensional context by virtue of such failures of inferences as: Necessarily anyone who flies to the Evening Star flies to the Evening Star. The Evening Star is the Morning Star. 3. Actually the theory developed. in this book could be interpreted as attributing different logical forms to (i)-(iii) than to (i')-(iii t ) , since the former contain extranuclear predicates in certain places where the latter contain nuclear ones; but this theory does not provide a means for avoiding the commitment to nonexistent objects apparent in (i)-(iii).

INITIAL EXPOSITION

Therefore, necessarily anyone who flies to the Evening Star flies to the Morning Star. But this test for nonextensionality indicates that all the contexts mentioned above are extensional. For example, from: Jimmy Carter is more famous than WaIter Mondale. and:

Jimmy Carter is the present president of the U.S.. we can infer: The present president of the V.S. is more famous than WaIter Mondale.

Nor is the situation different in the case of nonexistent objects; from: Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective. and:

Sherlock Holmes is the principal character in Conan Doyle's novels. we can infer: The principal character' in Conan Doyle's novels is more famous than any real detective. The same holds for 'worships'; from: Samantha worships her queen. .and:

Samantha's queen is the evilest person in the nation. we can infer: Samantha worships the evilest person in the nation. Again the situation doesn't change where nonexistent objects are concerned; from: Francis, the talking mule, worships Pegasus.

MEINONG AND MO TIVA TION

35

and: Pegasus is the winged horse of Greek mythology. we can infer: Francis, the talking mule, worships the winged horse of Greek mythology. The other test for nonextensionaIity is failure of existentional generalization. For example, 'believes that' is shown to create a nonextensional context by the failure of the inference: Janes believes that the tallest spy is a spy_ Therefore, someone is such that Jones believes that he is a spy.

Here) too, the idioms in question seem to be extensional; from:

Jimmy Carter is more famous than WaIter Mondale. one can infer: Someone is such that he is more famous than Walter Mondale. (Note: Of course, existential existential generalization may fail in these cases; from the above premise alone we may not be able to infer 'Someone who exists is such that he is more famous than WaIter Mondale'. But this is not the inference in question.) Perhaps I have belabored the nonextensionality issue unnecessarily, for even if the idioms in question were nonextensional, (i) and (ii) would still provide evidence for nonexistent objects. For they seem to have the forms of de re statements, and these are normally thought to reintroduce the commitment canceled by the nonextensional idiom. For example, (i) has the ostensible form: (i") There is something such that it is a fictional detective and it is more famous than any real detective.

Here the quantifier comes outside the scope of 'is more famous than', and so (i") is explicitly in the "existentially" quantified form that is commonly acknowledged to form a paradigm case of commitment to objects.

36

INITIAL EXPOSITION

. Another attempt to avoid the commitment to nonexistent objects implicit in (i)-(iii) involves the appeal to substitutionaI quantification. One can accept a sentence such as (i") above, granting its explicit quantificational form, but insist that the quantifier here is to be read as merely substitutional.. 4 This raises a myriad of issues, most of which I do not have a settled opinion about, and which I hope to avoid. My main reason for not taking substitutional quantification seriously here is that it can be used just as well to avoid commitment to anything at all. If I insist that there are cows, an anticowist can grant me the truth of what I say, but hold that this does not really commit him to there being cows, since the 'there are' may be taken as merely substitutionaL Of course, if there were something peculiar about the use of quantifiers to range over nonexistent objects, as opposed to existent ones, then perhaps substitutional quantification might play a role in explaining the difference. But the question being discussed is not whether one could consistently construe the data so as to avoid commitment to nonexistent objects, but rather whether there is some reason to do so. Substitutional quantification may provide a mechanism for doing so, but it doesn't provide a reason. Probably the main orthodox reaction to sentences such as (i)-(iii) does not appeal either to nonextensionality or to substitutional quantification, but rather to the need for some sort of paraphrase of the sentences in question so as to avoid the apparent commitment to unreals. Ever since Russell showed how to do this with sentences like 'The king of France isn't bald', there has been a widespread "faith in favor of the paraphrase," which even at times tends to outrun the prejudice in favor of the actual, The extent to which faith in the existence of an appropriate paraphrase outruns the believer's ability to give such a paraphrase is often quite striking, though if my analysis of the orthodox tradition in terms of "normal science" is correct, this should not be surprising at all; it is the sort of thing that is typical of normal science. Again I have no objection, unless this faith is 4- See Marcus [Q&O] for a discussion of this view. For an explanation of the term 'substitutional quantification', see the introduction, note 9~

MEINONG AND MOTIVATION

37

directed at the plausibility or interest of the present exercise, which aims at looking outside of the current normal science. Without going into elaborate detail, I think there are two reasons that the possibility of paraphrase does not diminish the primafacie case for unreals offered by (i)-(iii). The first is that the paraphrases are not at hand, and they are much more difficult to produce than may' seem apparent at first glance. (There are paraphrases at hand, of course-for example, Quine's development of Russell's theory in [0 WTI]; but these paraphrases of (i)-(iii) make explicit, rather than removing, the commitment to nonexistent objects.) The second reason is that it is implausible to paraphrase (i)-(iii) without also paraphrasing (i')-(iii /) in a similar fashion; but the latter seem unobjectionable as they stand. 5 There are lots of examples other than (i)-(iii); I have avoided' discussing some of these because they have become so familiar that philosophers have become used to biting the bullet where they are concerned. For example, there is hardly any orthodox theory that makes (iv) true and (v) false:

(iv) Pegasus is the winged horse of Greek mythology. (v) Zeus is the winged horse of Greek mythology.. This is because terms that appear to refer to nonexistent objects are treated as if they do not refer at all, and all terms that fail to refer at all get treated on a par. The theory to be described will treat 'Pegasus' and "Zeus' as terms that refer to different (nonexistent) objects; (iv) and (v) will be treated as ordinary identity statements, the former being true and the latter false. Viewed impartially, I believe that there is nothing within the orthodox tradition to undercut the prima facie plausibility, offered by examples like (i)-(v), that there are nonexistent objects. Of course, I have not proved that there are nonexistent objects; I don't believe that anyone could do that in a nonquestion-begging way. Instead, I have tried to show that there is enough reason, primafacie, to believe in them, to make it worth5. There is a good discussion of this point and others that have been made in this section in Howell [FO :HAHA] secs. IV and V. See also Chisholm [BB&JVB] and, for a historical perspective, Urmson [PAl pp. 148-49-

INITIAL EXPOSITION

38

while to try to develop a theory about them, with a reasonable hope that it will turn out to be true.. Whether it is true or not will ultima.. . tely be decided in terms of global considerations-s-how well it accords with the data and with other theories, and how widespread and interesting its applications are. Only years of use and critical examination" can answer such questions. Henceforth, I will not argue in favor of the theory, but will concentrate entirely on its development.

3. Russell"s Arguments against Meinong I want to return to Russell's historical arguments against Meinong, because although I think they are not decisive against the theory, they do put severe constraints on an account of nonexistent objects, and Meinong's responses contain some provocative ideas. The first objection has to do with impossible objects, such as the round square. The problem, Russell says, is that such objects "are apt to infringe the law of contradiction" ([OD]). Russell does not say explicitly how this is supposed to happen, but based on certain of his comments, we can reconstruct the following line of reasoning if

-(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)

The round square is round. The round square is square. (x) (x is square to '" (x is round)). ~ (The round square is round). The round square is round & "" (The round square is round).

Granted. Granted. ? From (2), (3), From (I), (4).

The argument, of course, is not good unless the quantifier in (3) is construed broadly enough so as to include the round square in its range. But in that case, why should (3) be accepted? 6. I am using here some terminology from symbolic logic, The sign ,~' is read 'it is not the case that', so line (4) says 'It not the case that the round square is round'. The '(x)' is the universal quantifier (see the introduction, note 6), and '::>' stands for the English complex connective 'if . . . , then . . .". So line (3) reads: 'Everything is such that if it is square, then it is not the case that it is round', or, more simply, 'Everything that is square is not round', The ampersand stands for 'and'.

is

MEINONG iJ·ND MOTIVATION·

39

-It has been suggested to me (in .conversation) that part of the meaning of 'x is square' is 'it is not the case that x is round'. If that were true, I would be inclined' to reject (J). But I don't think it is true. Even if one could define a word, 'square', so as to include 'not being round' in part of the definition, such a definition would be artificial and not in keeping with the meaning of the word as normally used. If being square implies not being round, it is because of some geometrical principles that connect the two notions, and net simply because of the definitions alone. (At least this is true of the customary definitions of' 'square' and 'circle' that usually occur in dictionaries and geometry books; 'round' is much vaguer.) A more 'plausible suggestion is that. the properties of "being round and being square are interrelated by the principles of Euclidean geometry, and that (3) is a thesis of that theory. But is that so? Historically, Euclidean geometry developed as a formalization of notions with empirical content. Eventually, the idea grew that the interrelations of these notions that had been formalized were not merely contingent, but were somehow necessary. And finally, there was a move away from these issues by the innovation of viewing Euclidean geometry (and other geometries) as an uninterpreted calculus-a pure mathematical theory in its own right, without regard for the interpretation of its primitive terms.. This most recent development is simply not relevant here. If 'round' and 'square' are uninterpreted terms from an uninterpreted formal theory, then 'there is a round square' is not even an assertion, but only a string of symbols .awaiting an interpretation, and likewise for (3). An issue only arises when 'round' and 'square' are construed as symbols with actual content, as in the earlier stages of Euclidean geometry. But it seems to me that the early stages of Euclidean geometry did not concern themselves with all objects, and so they are not relevant to the truth of (3), with its broad-ranging quantifier. The original developments of geometry, we are told, dealt with the practical considerations of land survey following periodic floodings of the Nile; here it is actual square and round areas that are in question. Philosophers then tended to broaden the scope of its principles; but even here

40

INITIAL EXPOSITION

there were limits. The most famous example is Kant, who at.. tributed the necessity of the principles of Euclidean geometry to the structure of human spatial intuition; these. principles were held to be somehow constitutive of this faculty, and therefore must govern any object of which we can have a spatial intuition. But even if he were right about this, the claim would only be that any such object is, if square, then not round. As Meinong pointed out, many objects are such that we cannot have an intuitive apprehension of them; the round square is one of these. (In a .sense, these objects are not conceivable.) Premise (3) would not apply to them. (Note: Meinong granted Kant's claim that we cannot intuitively apprehend a round square ([EP] P: 21), but I think he may have been hasty about this. It seems to me that. dreams and some drug experiences may provide examples, of spatial intuition that defy description in terms consistent with the laws of Euclidean geometry. The orthodox conclusion is that such intuitions are not of objects at all, but one might equally well conclude that they are sometimes of objects that do not obey the laws ofEuclidean geometry.7) Since there has not been a serious attempt to establish (3) in its complete generality, I suggest that the evidence for it is meager, and there is no need to accept it. Not- all square objects fail to be round; the round square provides an example of this. However, I suspect that this leaves the average reader somewhat ill at ease. There is a feeling that one cannot understand a given property (say squareness) without understanding how it excludes other properties (e.g., roundness), and trying to view squareness as not excluding roundness undercuts our understanding of what these properties are. But perhaps the following observation will help: being square does exclude being round for real objects 7. See R. L. Gregory's discussion of perceptual illusions in [E & B]. Here is a sample quote (pp. 107-08): If the after-effect from the rotating spiral is examined carefully, two curious features will be noticed. The illusory movement may be paradoxical: it may expand or shrink, and yet be seen not to get bigger or smaller, but to remain the samesize andyet to grow. This sounds impossible, and it is impossible for real objects, but we must always remember that what holds for real objects may not hold for perception once we suffer illusions .

MEINONG AND MOTIVATION

41

(indeed, for all possible objects), and it is primarily with real objects that we are normally concerned. There is a long tradition according to which reality must be coherent in certain ways, the exclusion of roundness by squareness being one of these. As for why reality should be so coherent, that's a question I don't know the answer to. In any event, since we primarily concern ourselves with real objects, we instinctively make the judgments of exclusiveness of properties (such as round and square) that are appropriate to real things. It is only natural that we should feel the force of those instincts when we attempt to discuss unreal things as well, and feel somewhat disquieted when we are tempted to abandon them (such as in the recollection and recounting of dreams). There may be an analogy here to the situation in physics when relativity theory was proposed. It was a theory which was extremely difficult to understand in terms offamiliar experiences, and it remains a theory which holds that there are physical events which are, in a limited sense, not conceivable. The difficulty with conceivability is that our "conceptions" or mental picturings tend to take temporal relations, such as simultaneity, for granted -a habit that is quite hard to break. Exercise for the reader." ( I) Form a mental picture of four events far removed in space. Event A happens before event B from the point of view of event C, but after event B from the point of view of event D. Both points of view are equally correct. Make sure that you do not include in your picturing that A happens absolutely before (or after, or simultaneous with} event B. (2) Ifyou succeeded in carrying out (I), form a mental picture of a round square; otherwise, just relax, Of course, relativity theory kept in touch with ordinary experience in .. this sense: when applied to neighboring objects moving at medium speeds, for example, relativity theory approximates to classical mechanics. In much the same way, the theory of unreal objects will agree with the orthodox view when applied to. "familiar" situations-that is, to situations involving only existing objects. The exclusiveness of roundness and squareness is a special case of this; the general argument will be made in chapters 5 and 6. Before passing to Russell's second objection, let me sum-

42

INITIAL EXPOSITION

marizethe view being taken of impossible objects, Let us call an object which does infringe the law of contradiction (i.e., which satisfies some formula of the form 'x is A & "" (x is A)') a contradictory object. Then there are no contradictory objects (for if there were, some contradiction would be true). The round square is not a contradictory object; arguments that it is appeal to some principle such as (3), which is true if its quantifier is restricted to real objects, but not if its quantifier is read with complete generality. The round square is impossible only in the sense defined in chapter I : It has properties which no real object could have. 8 Russell's second argument is this: consider the existent gold mountain; by the satisfaction principle it is golden, is a mountain, and exists. So some gold mountain exists, which is plainly false. Meinong's answer was surprising. The existent gold mountain is existent, he said, but it does not exist (Meinong [USGSW] sec. 3). The former notion (being existent) is part of the "sobeing" of an object, the latter part of an object's "being"; the existent gold mountain has being existent as part of its so-being, but it lacks existence as part of its being. (Strictly, it has no being. at all.) Russell replied that he saw no difference between being existent and existing ([lg07 Review]), and one can easily sympathize with him here. But I think something can be made of the distinction. Suppose that being existent is a nuclear property, and that existing. is an extranuclear one (the one that 'exists' stands for, and that was discussed in chapter I, section 2) . Then, according to the theory discussed in the last chapter, there will be an object which has exactly the three properties: being golden, being a mountain, and being existent; but it will not exist, any more than the gold mountain exists. 8. We might call the round square a geometrically impossible object, since it is geometrical principles that preclude the existence of anything with its properties. A question that. naturally arises here is' whether there are any logically impossible objects, objects that have properties that it is logically impossible for an existent to have. That depends on what you count as logic. An example might be the "nonsquare square," in which the prefix 'non-' signifies nuclear predicate negation as defined in chapter 5, section 2.

ME/NONG AND MOTIVATION

43

This raises other questions: is there a nuclear property, being existent? And if so, how is it related, if at all, to the extranuclear property of existing? And further, couldn't the point of Russell's objection be preserved by a simple reformulation of the example; instead of 'the existent gold mountain', just consider 'the gold mountain which exists'? Let me quickly answer the last question with respect to the theory being developed in the present work. On that theory, the phrase 'the gold mountain which exists} does not refer to any object at all; for ifit did, it would refer toa gold mountain which exists, and there are none of those. (Strictly, the question has partly to do with the nonontological, linguistic question of how to interpret definite descriptions; this will be discussed in chapter 5.) But what about the other questions? For example, is beingexistent a nuclear property? I'm not at all sure, but the following answer seems natural, First, there is a nuclear property (probably many) which belongs to all real objects. This is a consequence ofa general assumption that I will make about nuclear propertiesroughly, that any class of existing objects is the extension of some nuclear property. In defense of this general assumption, I can say only that some such assumptions are needed, on pain of not having a theory at all. And if we recall that, from the orthodox point of view, nuclear properties are just ordinary properties of individuals, and existing objects are all there is, the assumption is just the "translation)' of the orthodox assumption that every class is the extension of some property. Of course, many philosophers reject properties altogether, but those who acknowledge them typically adopt this assumption. Given that there. are nuclear properties true of all existing objects, are any of them denoted by 'being existent'? I think this is mainly a linguistic question, and one that I have no definite intuitioris about. But since the controversy over whether existence is a property uses the word 'existence', and since both sides of the dispute seem to have some claim to plausibility, it seems reasonable to hold that the reason the dispute goes onis that both sides are in some sense right. And this would be explained if 'exists' or its cognates were ambiguous, standing for both a nuclear and an extranuclear property, neither of which alone exhausts the way

INITIAL EXPOSITION

44

in which we use the word. Ifso, it seems convenient to use 'being existent' and 'existing' to mark the distinction, and I'll do this for the remainder of this section (though later I'll just use 'is existent' as a synonym for 'exists'). So according to the theory being developed, Meinong was right in his reply to Russell: there is such an object as the existent gold mountain, and it is existent (and golden, and a mountain), but it does not exist. But what is the relation between being existent and .existing? Meinong attempts to answer this question in ObeT Miiglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, where he calls the nuclear property a "watered-down" version of the extranuclear one (see Findlay [MTO V] chap. IV). Existing is not the only extranuclear property which has a watered-down version; being possible also has one. This tempts one to wonder if all extranuclear properties have nuclear watered-down versions. That will depend, of course, on what 'watered..d own' means. In Meinong's theory it is not clear (at least to me). He speaks of the watered-down version of a property as got by removing the "modal moment" from "full-strength factuality." I am not sure what this means. We know at least this much about the relation between a property and its watered-down version: if p is a watered-down version of P, then (1) P is extranuclear, (2) p is nuclear, and (3) it's hard to tell the difference between p and P. We can be more explicit about (3), by suggesting: (4) necessarily, any real"object has p if and only if it has P. In the theory given below, for every extranuclear property P, there will be at least one nuclear property p which is related to P as in (4). Such nuclear properties will be important in applications of the theory-for example, in applications to fictional objects. 4- Intentionality

So-called "intentional" idioms have been much discussed in the recent philosophical literature (see Chisholm [P]). In this section I will review those points on which there is the most agreement, and say how such idioms will be used in the theory being developed Intentional idioms fall into at least two categories, First, 4

MEINOJYG AND MOTIVATION

45

there are those which take "prepositional" objects: believe: want: think:

Everyone believes that snow is white. Smith wants people to be nice. No one thinks Jones is a spy.

Second, there are those which take "ordinary" direct objects: lookfor: dream about: conceive of:

Many people are looking for the cure for cancer. Smith is dreaming about a unicorn with purple stripes. No one can conceive of a roundsquare.

Meinong devoted some effort to getting people to acknowledge that in the first sort of case-cases involving belief, desire, etc.there are things that are the objects of the mental attitudes in question. In the case of belief, he called these objects "objectives." Objectives are somewhat similar to what we now call propositions or states of affairs. Since Frege and Russell believed in similar entities, and since they were much more influential than Meinong, this view is not often thought of as one of Meinong's con.. tributions. There is at least one difference between Meinong's objectives and modern propositions: both true and false propositions are supposed to exist, but only true objectives are supposed to exist;9 false objectives furnish another example of nonexistent objects. At one time, Russell and Moore worried a great deal about how something false could be said to exist, but this does not often worry people nowadays. The main evidence that there are propositions is that they seem to be required for the truth ofsuch claims as : Mary believes only some of the things she was taught as a child. 9. I am using 'exist' here in a broader sense than Meinong; for comparison with his theory read this use of 'exist' as 'exist or subsist'. For Meinong, objectives never exist, but some of them subsist-the true ones (see [TO]). Also, he would not use the word 'true' in connection with objectives, but rather the word 'factual'.

46

INITIAL EXPOSITION

In the present work, I will suppose that there are propositions (and that they are objects of belief). I t will not be necessary for me to take sides on the issue of whether they all exist, or only the true ones, or perhaps whether they all constitute examples of nonexistent objects. I'm not sure whether this. is a substantive question at all, and I don't want to divert attention from my. major task. Intentional idioms of this sort manifest a de re/de dicto ambiguiry.I? The sentence 'Agatha believes the round square is round' has a de dicta reading in which it "is asserted that Agatha stands in a certain relation to the proposition that the round square is round, This reading does not require for its truth that there be a round square. The de re reading can be paraphrased as 'The round square is such that Agatha believes it is round'. This attributes to the round square a certain extranuclear property: the property of "being believed by Agatha to be round. It requires for its truth that there be a round square (though not that there exist a round square); at least, this is how it will be treated in the present theory. The details of this treatment will be given in chapter 5. The second category of intentional idioms is less well understood, despite the fact that these idioms figure centrally in the 10& The terms 'de re' and 'de dicto' translate roughly as 'of the thing' and 'ofwhat is said'} and they are used to mark certain aspects of meanings of certain English sentences. For example, on its most natural construal, the sentence 'Agatha believes that everyone will be late' says that Agatha stands in a certain relation (the belief relation) to a certain proposition (a certain "thing that is said")-namely, the proposition that everyone will be late. The whole sentence is called a de ditto beliefsentence. An example ofa dere beliefsentence is 'Agatha believes ofJolm that he is unfaithful', in which Agatha is said to be related by belief to John himself (to a H thing"). The utili ty of the terms is that they provide a brief way of resolving certain ambiguities. For example, the sentence 'Agatha believes that a man I know will help me out' is said to have two readings: the de dicto reading, which may be paraphrased as 'Agarha believes that the following proposition is true: some man whom I know will help me out' (this reading does not require that Agatha have any idea at all regarding which man will help me out); and the de re reading, which may be paraphrased as 'with regard to a certain man whom I know, Agatha believes that he will help me out'. Other examples ofde re/de dictaambiguities will be discussed off and on in the text.

MElNONG AND MOTIYATION

47

articulation of many famous philosophical issues. For example, 'conceiving' is used in the questions 'Is there-such a thing as that than which no greater can be conceived?', 'Can one conceive of an unconceived-of thing ?~. Sentences involving intentional idioms of the second category are typically-ambiguous, and many of the traditional philosophical issues involving them seem to trade on this ambiguity. Let me use 'looks for' as a philosophically neutral example, and consider:

Samantha is looking for a cow. The ambiguity is between the sense in which Samantha is looking for some particular cow, perhaps the one she has just lost, andthe sense in which she is just out cow hunting, perhaps because she wishes to augment her herd andjust hasn't found a cow yet that is suitable. I'll call the first reading the de reading, and the second the de dicta reading (this may be a controversial use of these terms). There is a tendency to call the first reading the "definite" reading (since there is a definite cow Samantha is looking for) and the latter the "indefinite"; but these terms get confusing when the direct object of the verb is itself a definite description, as in:

re

Samantha is looking for the best milk cow in the county. The same ambiguity appears here as above. On the de re reading, there is a specific cow that is being searched for, say Esmerelda, who has already won five blue ribbons; whereas, on the latter reading, she has no specific. cow in mind: she merely wants to end up with the best, whichever it is. Notice that, given the de re construal, the singular term is in an extensional context, whereas, on the de dicta construal, it is not. If the best milk cow in the county is Bossie, Samantha's own cow, then, on the de re reading, it follows that Samantha is looking for Bossie, while, on the de dicta reading, this does not follow. I am not at all sure how to treat the de dicta readings of these idioms. I suppose that, as with other nonextensional contexts, we should say that the words in these contexts refer to their customary senses, or something like this) but the logic ofsuch contexts is not at all easy

48

INITIAL EXPOSITION

to work out. The best treatment I know ofis due to Montague in his paper "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English," but this treatment involves complications that I would like to avoid here (see also Montague [PIL] p. 124). So I will simply ignore the de dicto readings of these idioms. I will have (extranuclear) relation words which represent the de re readings ofsuch verbs. One reason for fussing so much about these idioms is that certain of them, particularly 'thinks about', 'dreams about", and 'writes about' stand for notions that get discussed under the title of 'directedness toward an object'. Brentano is famous for the view that mental acts can be "directed toward" objects even when such objects don't exist. Although Brentano eventually altered his views about the nature of this relation, Meinong took over the doctrine wholeheartedly, with only an occasional qualm. But the "doctrine" is subject to various interpretations. Meinong is usually, I think, credited with the view that in any true sentence of the form 'x is thinking about the and if; are wffs, then so are (ifJ & cjJ), ( c/J), and (if> == is a wff and if a is any variable, then (a)ifJ and (3a)

constant singular terms of (f) behave like English proper names. This oversimplification will be rectified in chapter 5, section 4.

FORMAL DEVELOPMENT

70

p2h1g, which may be abbreviated by:

[hp2]g.

Quantification is relatively straightforward; we symbolize 'Everything that has the property of seeing Gladstone is clever' as:

(x)(p2g2x

::> plx),

and we symbolize 'Every real thing that has the property of be_ing seen by Gladstone is clever' as:

(x)(E!x &

p2g1x

::>

plx).

The last two sentences may be abbreviated as: (x)(x[p2g ]

::l

plx)

and: (x)(E!x & [gp2]x

::::l

pIx).

Last, we symbolize 'Anything which has all and only Holmes's nuclear properties is Holmes' as: (x) (q) (qh == qx)

::>

x

=

h),

in which superscripts "and subscripts have been suppressed. 2.

Rules and Axioms

One way to state a large portion of the theory of objects is to specify some rules and axioms; the "theorems" which follow from them are all intended t