Noema and Thinkability: An Essay on Husserl's Theory of Intentionality 9783110325546, 3868380224, 9783868380958, 9783110324983

Table of contents :
ABBREVIATIONS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Chapter I
Foundations of phenomenology
1. The theory of parts and wholes in Logical Investigations
2. Sensuous and categorial forms of unity
3. The concept of experience
3.1. Sensuous data
3.2. The functional moments of real phenomenological content
3.3. Matter and quality
4. The relation between matter, quality and the functional moments of consciousness and its interpretation via Ideas I
5. The intentional content as the intentional object
6. Intentional matter and intentional objects
Final notes
Chapter II
Noema and noetic-noematic correlation in Ideas I
1. The structure of noema and noesis
2. The noetic-noematic correlation
2.1. Preparatory remarks
2.2. The one-to-one relation between noesis and noema
2.3. The “many noeses to one noema” relation
2.4. The noetic-noematic correlation examined on the basis of the one example
3. The issue of transcendence in the sphere of an act’s components
4. The noetic-noematic correlation as a dependent variation
4.1. The examination of noema under nine postulates for supervenient entities
4.2. The question of reducing noema to noesis
4.3. The one and two way covariation between noesis and noema
Final notes
Chapter III
Interpretations and extensions of Husserl’s concept of noema
1. Noema as the Gestalt: Aron Gurwitsch’s theory of noema
1.1. The structure of the Gestalt is the structure of noema
1.2. Noema and object: Against Gurwitsch
2. The idea of identity in manifold analysis: John Drummond’s reading of noema
2.1. Object as identity in the manifold of appearances
2.2. The relation between judgmental noema and the object judged
2.3. Ontological identity of noema and object and their noncoincidence
3. Noematic Sinn as an intensional entity: Dagfin Føllesdal’s interpretation of noema
4. Smith and McIntyre’s concept of noema
4.1. Noema as the sense of definite description
4.2. Noema as the sense of ‘demonstratives’
4.3. Noematic Sinn as a mediator
4.4. The abstract nature of noema
5. Roman Ingarden’s theory of the purely intentional object
5.1. The concept of experience
5.2. Ingarden’s vs. Husserl’s concept of experience
5.3. The structure of the purely intentional object
5.4. The purely intentional object in relation to experience
5.5. Noema in comparison to the purely intentional object
6. Two subjects in noematic structure: Jacek Paśniczek’s theory of noema
6.1. Two- and three-aspect theories of intentionality
6.2. Noema as the purely intentional object
Final notes
Chapter IV
The noema as possibly thinkable content
1. Noema in the light of contradiction, conflict and nonsense
1.1. Logical investigations vis-à-vis Ideas I
1.2. Noema as the sense of self contradictory formulas
1.3. Noema in the sphere of conflict
1.4. Noema in the sphere of nonsense
1.5. Final remarks
2. The object as the substrate and as the correlate of predicative judgment
2.1. Different levels in objectifying operations
2.2. Intellect and sensibility
3. The idea of “thinkable content” in the context of various interpretations of noema
3.1. The discussion with Føllesdal
3.1.1. An argument that follows the explanation of intentional conflict
3.1.2. An argument that follows the explanation of constitution of categorial objects
3.1.3. An argument that follows the conception of immanent perception
3.1.4. An argument that follows the conception of abstraction
3.1.5. An argument that follows the explanation of the correlate of the sensuous perception
3.2. Discussion with Gurwitsch and Drummond
3.2.1. An argument that follows the ontological undifferentiation of noema from the intentional object
Final notes
SUMMARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
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Łukasz Kosowski Noema and Thinkability An Essay on Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

PHENOMENOLOGY & MIND Herausgegeben von / Edited by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski • Wolfgang Huemer Band 13 / Volume 13

Łukasz Kosowski

Noema and Thinkability An Essay on Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................7 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................9 CHAPTER I....................................................................................................................... 13 FOUNDATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY ............................................................................. 13 1. The theory of parts and wholes in Logical Investigations.....................................................14 2. Sensuous and categorial forms of unity.................................................................................21 3. The concept of experience.....................................................................................................25 3.1. Sensuous data ................................................................................................................27 3.2. The functional moments of real phenomenological content .........................................31 3.3. Matter and quality .........................................................................................................34 4. The relation between matter, quality and the functional moments of consciousness and its interpretation via Ideas I............................................................................................................38 5. The intentional content as the intentional object ...................................................................43 6. Intentional matter and intentional objects .............................................................................45 Final notes .................................................................................................................................48

CHAPTER II ............................................................................................................................................ 49 NOEMA AND NOETIC-NOEMATIC CORRELATION IN IDEAS I .......................................... 49 1. The structure of noema and noesis ........................................................................................50 2. The noetic-noematic correlation............................................................................................59 2.1. Preparatory remarks ......................................................................................................59 2.2. The one-to-one relation between noesis and noema .....................................................62 2.3. The “many noeses to one noema” relation....................................................................65 2.4. The noetic-noematic correlation examined on the basis of the one example................69 3. The issue of transcendence in the sphere of an act’s components.........................................72 4. The noetic-noematic correlation as a dependent variation ....................................................77 4.1. The examination of noema under nine postulates for supervenient entities .................78 4.2. The question of reducing noema to noesis ....................................................................82 4.3. The one and two way covariation between noesis and noema......................................84 Final notes .................................................................................................................................85

CHAPTER III.................................................................................................................... 87 INTERPRETATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF HUSSERL’S CONCEPT OF NOEMA .................. 87 1. Noema as the Gestalt: Aron Gurwitsch’s theory of noema ...................................................88 1.1. The structure of the Gestalt is the structure of noema...................................................92 1.2. Noema and object: Against Gurwitsch..........................................................................93 2. The idea of identity in manifold analysis: John Drummond’s reading of noema..................96 2.1. Object as identity in the manifold of appearances ......................................................100 2.2. The relation between judgmental noema and the object judged .................................104 2.3. Ontological identity of noema and object and their non-coincidence.........................106 3. Noematic Sinn as an intensional entity: Dagfin Føllesdal’s interpretation of noema .........110 4. Smith and McIntyre’s concept of noema.............................................................................116 4.1. Noema as the sense of definite description .................................................................117 4.2. Noema as the sense of ‘demonstratives’ .....................................................................119 4.3. Noematic Sinn as a mediator.......................................................................................122

4.4. The abstract nature of noema ..................................................................................... 123 5. Roman Ingarden’s theory of the purely intentional object ................................................. 123 5.1. The concept of experience.......................................................................................... 124 5.2. Ingarden’s vs. Husserl’s concept of experience ......................................................... 126 5.3. The structure of the purely intentional object............................................................. 127 5.4. The purely intentional object in relation to experience .............................................. 130 5.5. Noema in comparison to the purely intentional object............................................... 132 6. Two subjects in noematic structure: Jacek Paśniczek’s theory of noema .......................... 133 6.1. Two- and three-aspect theories of intentionality ........................................................ 135 6.2. Noema as the purely intentional object ...................................................................... 141 Final notes .............................................................................................................................. 143

CHAPTER IV................................................................................................................... 145 THE NOEMA AS POSSIBLY THINKABLE CONTENT .......................................................... 145 1. Noema in the light of contradiction, conflict and nonsense ............................................... 148 1.1. Logical investigations vis-à-vis Ideas I...................................................................... 148 1.2. Noema as the sense of self contradictory formulas .................................................... 150 1.3. Noema in the sphere of conflict ................................................................................. 153 1.4. Noema in the sphere of nonsense ............................................................................... 158 1.5. Final remarks.............................................................................................................. 161 2. The object as the substrate and as the correlate of predicative judgment........................... 162 2.1. Different levels in objectifying operations ................................................................. 163 2.2. Intellect and sensibility............................................................................................... 168 3. The idea of “thinkable content” in the context of various interpretations of noema .......... 172 3.1. The discussion with Føllesdal .................................................................................... 173 3.1.1. An argument that follows the explanation of intentional conflict....................... 173 3.1.2. An argument that follows the explanation of constitution of categorial objects. 174 3.1.3. An argument that follows the conception of immanent perception .................... 176 3.1.4. An argument that follows the conception of abstraction .................................... 176 3.1.5. An argument that follows the explanation of the correlate of the sensuous perception...................................................................................................................... 177 3.2. Discussion with Gurwitsch and Drummond............................................................... 180 3.2.1. An argument that follows the ontological undifferentiation of noema from the intentional object........................................................................................................... 180 Final notes .............................................................................................................................. 182

SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................... 183 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................. 191 INDEX ............................................................................................................................... 199

ABBREVIATIONS

The text employs the following abbreviations of Husserl’s works.

Hua III

Hua IV

Hua X

Husserliana vol. III Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Ed. Karl Schuhmann. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. [Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (B. Gibson, Trans.). London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1958.][Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (F. Kersten, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.] Husserliana vol. IV Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Ed. Marly Biemel. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution (R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1989.] Husserliana vol. X Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (18931917). Ed. Rudolf Boehm. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. [On the Phenomenology of the

Hua XVII

Hua XIX/1

Hua XIX/2

Hua XXIII

Hua XXXI

Ideas I

Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) (J. B. Brough, Trans.). Dordrecht, The Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.] Husserliana vol. XVII Formale und transzendentale Logik. Ed. Paul Janssen. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. [Formal and Transcendental Logic (D. Cairns, Trans,). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.] Husserliana vol. XIX/1 Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Zweiter Band. Ed. Ursula Panzer. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984. [Logical Investigations (2nd ed., Vol. I) (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). Suffolk: St Edmundsbury Press. Ltd, Bury St Edmunds, 2001.] Husserliana vol. XIX/2 Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. Zweiter Band. Ed. Ursula Panzer. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984. [Logical Investigations (2nd ed., Vol. II) (J. N. Findlay, Trans.). Padstow, Cornwall: TJI Digital, 2001.] Husserliana vol. XXIII Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925). Ed. Eduard Marbach. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. [Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory (1898-1925) (J. B. Brough, Trans.). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005.] Husserliana vol. XXXI Aktive Synthesen: Aus Der Vorlesung “Transzendentale Logik” 1920/21. Ergänzungsband zu “Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis” Ed. Roland Breeur. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. [Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic (A. Steinbock, Trans.). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.] Hua III

To Aleksandra

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book was created based on my doctoral dissertation, entitled Conceptions of Noema: The Idea of Noema as Possibly Thinkable Content. Its main purpose is to indicate new ways of reading Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Throughout the stages of its development, I received significant support, for which I would now like to express my gratitude. My special thanks go to Professor Jacek Paśniczek for his critical comments and encouragement which were both essential to the creation of this book. I would also like to show my appreciation to Professor Robert Piłat and Professor Urszula Żegleń for their valuable reviews, which motivated many improvements to the substance of the work, and to Professor Arkadiusz Chrudzimski whose notes and advice I could count on until the very latest stages in the development of this book. My kind regards go out to Miss Małgorzata Gortych for her helpful remarks concerning the elaborateness of the English language, and to my anonymous reviewer. Finally, I wish to show my deep appreciation for my fiancée, Aleksandra Gwoździowska, who designed and created the graphics used in this book, and who showed infinite patience and support. Part of this book is drawn from my previously published material. Section 1 of Chapter Four is based on: Noema in the light of contradiction, conflict, and nonsense: The noema as possibly thinkable content, Husserl Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3: 243– 259, 2008.

INTRODUCTION

Difficulties arise when the fundamental notions of a theory are ambiguous. In phenomenology, such difficulties should not occur because its method accepts only conceptions which are grounded in the total clarity of the immanent perception. One might be all the more surprised by the fact that the notion of noema, which is fundamental to the entire phenomenology, is interpreted in several ways. Of course, not only noema but also plenty of other notions introduced by Husserl suffer from similar imperfections. However, the present study is devoted to only one of them, namely the conception of noema. One can attempt to explain the lack of agreement with respect to the interpretation of noema by questioning the certainty of the results of immanent insight. On the other hand, there is also reason to mention that philosophers need time to realize exactly what they are dealing with. Even if we agree that the evidence of immanent perception is unquestionable, there is still a risk that the active ego will not be able to discern all of the characteristics of the noema necessary to understand it in an unambiguous manner. Nevertheless, regardless of the reasons for the variety of competing interpretations of noema, there is no doubt that this variety exists. And this fact circumscribes the subject of the present study. The author believes that despite the diversity of interpretations of noema, no one has successfully provided an explanation of all of its aspects. To confirm this conviction, the difficulties of each separate interpretation will be exposed and analysed. Since a theory capable of describing noema unambiguously seems to be unattainable at the present time, the purpose of this study is not so ambitious. In place of such a theory, the author will make a proposal which can be regarded as the fundament of a new conception. In harmony with this goal, noema will be interpreted as the thinkable content. Undoubtedly, all the solutions that will be suggested there require further analysis. The present study therefore reopens discussion on noema rather than merely summarizes it.

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Noema is the key point in Husserl’s idea of intentionality. As is well known, Husserl (the founder of phenomenology) was inspired by his teacher Frantz Brentano. Brentano was a proponent of the views held by scholastic philosophers who considered intentionality to be the fundamental characteristic of consciousness. However, Husserl is not the only student of Brentano who adopted this view. Here it is worth mentioning Meinong and Twardowski, who were inspired by their teacher to develop their conceptions of intentionality. In the contemporary literature, one can find numerous examples of analyses devoted to the identification of similarities and differences between their views. More than once, such elaborations have helped to clarify problems that could not have been resolved in other situations. Nevertheless, the present work will not concentrate on their views. Moreover, it will not consider (except in particular cases), any connections between Brentano and the conceptions of his students. Hence, the interpretations of noema presented here do not arise from an alternative reading of Husserl originating from the views of Brentano’s students. On the contrary, this work will attempt to consider (with one exception to be mentioned later) only those readings of noema that directly refer to analyses from Ideas I (e.g. Gurwitsch’s and Føllesdal’s work). The methodology adopted here combines a phenomenological description with theoretical reasoning. Such an approach is required as a result of the character of the present work, which gives significant attention to phenomenological and metaphysical matters. This study is composed of four chapters that are arranged to provide concise explanations of the various interpretations of noema as well as the conception of thinkable content. The first chapter is devoted to the fundaments of phenomenology. Those in turn can be found in Logical Investigations. In the first chapter, notions specified by Husserl in the theory of parts and wholes are considered; these notions are of the highest importance with respect to the present enterprise. The author believes that without consideration of this part of Husserl’s work, the remainder of his analyses concerning noema and noetic-noematic structure cannot be properly understood. Chapter one presents also the conceptions of experience that can be

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found in Logical Investigations and explains the key notions relevant to the present study, including the subjects of intentional matter and quality. All efforts are aimed at revealing the strong connection of these notions with the concept of noema and noetic-noematic structure. The second chapter is devoted entirely to the conception of noema found in Ideas I. It also contains detailed analyses of noetic-noematic correlation that are later compared to the concept of supervenience. Of course, the chapter does not say that noema supervenes on noesis; however, if there is a similarity between them, an analysis of this similarity would enrich both notions and be of use in further specification of noema. Therefore, this chapter does not present a type of phenomenological supervenience, or even attempt to find one. Instead, it suggests a possible method of interpreting the noetic-noematic correlation in order to specify a notion of noema. The third chapter presents various conceptions of noema that in the author’s opinion are the most influential and prominent. These include readings from Gurwitsch, Føllesdal, Smith and McIntyre, Drummond and Paśniczek. Roman Ingarden’s conception of the purely intentional object will also be discussed in this chapter. A controversy exists because it is difficult to unequivocally establish whether Ingarden’s idea is an interpretation of noema or a separate theory that was strongly inspired by Husserl. Regardless of the answer, there is no doubt that Ingarden’s conception is very close to that of Husserl and this is the reason why the present study considers it. The second reason is that Paśniczek’s conception makes use of Ingarden’s solutions, and, therefore, the explanation of the former requires the explanation of the latter. The fourth and final chapter is devoted to the idea according to which noema is interpreted as the thinkable content. This conception is supported there by two different methods. Firstly, it is shown that the idea of noema as thinkable content is implied by Husserl’s analyses. The author will argue that certain cases of great importance for entire phenomenology can be understood only in the context of the conception of noema as thinkable content. The first method employed in this chapter will therefore infer the proposed interpretation from Husserl’s original. Instead, the second method considers specific phenomenological

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evidence. This is accomplished in the form of a discussion comparing the interpretation of noema presented in the last chapter with interpretations presented previously. Hence, the conception of noema as thinkable content is shown as being implied by the writings of Husserl and confirmed by the phenomenological intuition. The author believes that in the present study new characteristics of noema are revealed as a result of a fresh reading of classical questions.

Chapter I Foundations of phenomenology

Logical Investigations are the most influential part of Husserl’s philosophical output. This work was undertaken with the principal objective of overcoming problems generated by the view that only psychology and psychologically-oriented research is capable of yielding ultimate answers to the fundamental questions pertaining to truth and the essence of logical forms (see Hua XIX/1; 2001b).1 The result, Logical Investigations, divided philosophers into at least two different groups. Some of them accept Husserl’s argumentation against psychologism; however, they refuse all his latter works since, as they hold, once Husserl had overcome psychologism, he immediately fell into another form of this same approach. These philosophers usually agree with the first four investigations and refuse the fifth and sixth ones. In contrast, those who accept all of the investigations also accept the phenomenological part of Husserl work. For them, Logical Investigations is the beginning of radical phenomenology, meaning that, whether Husserl was aware of this or not, through systematically developed reflection, he finally entered a field of transcendentally reduced consciousness. This group, according to historical testimony, developed one of the most influential trends in philosophy of the twentieth century. The mature form of any science becomes hermetic because of its language. Phenomenology, like physics, mathematics or information technology, has its own conceptual apparatus and, in the same manner as other disciplines, is relatively inaccessible without the relevant 1

See also: (Dougherty 1979; Meiland 1976; Hanna 1993; Hill 1991, Part One: Logic, realism and the foundations of arithmetic; Huemer 2004; Metcalfe 1988; Mohanty 1997 and Picardi 1997).

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knowledge. What is more, not only philosophical laics but also philosophy experts can become confused if they have not previously had experience with phenomenology. This situation is mainly conditioned by the fact that Husserl redefined most of the traditional terms; some of them, he totally refused. Moreover, he also introduced new phrases. Most of this work Husserl accomplished in Logical Investigations. Hence, studies of this work should precede any consideration of advanced phenomenological matters and especially the issue of noema. This chapter comprises three sections and introduces notions fundamental to phenomenology. The first section is devoted to the theory of parts and wholes. It contains, among others, explanations of such important notions as the foundation and dependency relation, the conception of the abstract and the concrete part etc. The second section presents Husserl’s account for the sensuous and the intellectual forms of unity (i.e., for the figural moments and the categorial forms). Finally, the third section is devoted to the concept of experience. It concerns such crucial notions as intentional matter and quality, sensuous data and functional moments of consciousness. The last section therefore considers phenomenological fundaments of noema and noetic-noematic structure.

1. The theory of parts and wholes in Logical Investigations None of the phenomenological problems can be adequately explained without appealing to notions introduced by Husserl in the theory of parts and wholes. Therefore, let us briefly present the notions which are most important for the present purposes. Husserl begins inquiry into the whole-part theme with a very general distinction, namely that between simple objects and complex objects (Hua XIX/1, pp. 229-30: 2001c/4-5):2 1) the simple object is an object that has no parts, 2) the complex object is an object that has at least two parts. 2

The theory of parts and wholes was also developed by Husserl in Experience and Judgment (1948, pp 160-71: 1973/140-8).

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As it is easy to notice, these definitions are formulated in terms of “having parts” and “not having parts”. However, Husserl claims that there is another and more natural sense of “complexity” as the plurality of disjoined parts (Hua XIX/1, p. 229: 2001c/4). This notion determines the following definitions: 1) the simple object is an object that cannot be divided into at least two parts, 2) the complex object is an object that can be divided into at least two parts. Moreover, the term “disjoin” has more than one interpretation. The colour and shape of a thing are disjoined in a different manner than the bough and the trunk of a tree (Hua XIX/1, p. 229: 2001c/4). This difference is explained in terms of dependency and independency. Whilst the colour and the spatial shape are dependent on each other, the bough does not depend on the trunk. According to Husserl: 1) the part is independent only if it can exist without the supplementary content, 2) the part is non-independent only if it cannot exist without the supplementary content (Hua XIX/1, pp. 229-54: 2001c/4-18). Gilbert Null, contemporary interpreter of Husserl, distinguishes between strong and weak supplementation In his opinion, strong supplementation is specified as follows: “ ( x )( y){¬( x ≤ y) → (∃z) [(z < x ) & ¬Ozy]} ”, i.e., “If one object is not part of a second then it has some proper part which does not overlap the second” (2007, p. 37).3 He defines the proper part relation “ < ”as asymmetric, transitive and irreflexive. Next he explains that the overlapping “O” obtains between x and y when they share the same parts, which can be, but do not have to be, identical to them (p. 37).4 Finally, the symbol “ ≤ ” stands for the relation of being a part and it means that “…x is a proper part of or identical to y: ( x < y) or ( x = y) (p. 37). On the other hand, Null 3

Null’s (2007, p. 33) desideratum is to: “ … use Edmund Husserl’s dependency ontology to formulate a non-Diodorean and non-Kantian temporal semantics for two-valued, first-order predicate modal languages suitable for expressing ontologies of experience (like physics and cognitive science)”. 4 Null (2007, p. 37: “Oxy [Read: x Overlaps y] means x and y share some part: (∃z)[(z ≤ x ) & ( z ≤ y)] ”.

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explains weak supplementation as follows: “ ( x )( y){( x < y) → (∃z) [(z < y) & ¬Ozx ]} ” (p. 37). Next, in Logical Investigations, the theory of dependency is strictly connected with the concept of foundation. As Husserl explains, if any A cannot exist without supplementation by B, than an A requires foundation in B. This means that A is founded on B (Hua XIX/1, pp. 267-69: 2001c/25-7). The foundation can be: 1) reciprocal, 2) one-sided, 3) immediate, 4) mediate (Hua XIX/1, pp. 270-2: 2001c/27-8).5 Ad.1) The foundation is reciprocal or, as Husserl also says, mutual when the parts are non-independent of each other. He says: “Colour and extension accordingly are mutually founded in unified intuition, since no colour is thinkable without a certain extension, and no extension without a certain colour” (Hua XIX/1, p. 270: 2001c/27).6 Instead of reciprocity, Null is talking about irregular foundation: “IFxy [read: x Irregularly Founds y] means x and y are distinct objects which found each other: (Fxy & Fyx) & ( x ≠ y) ” (2007, p. 49). The irregular founding relation is irreflexive, symmetric and non-transitive.7 Ad.2) The foundation is one-sided when the dependency of the founded part is determined by the independency of the foundational part. Husserl: “The character of being of a judgment is, on the other hand, one-sidedly founded on underlying presentations, since these letter need not function as foundations of judgments”(Hua XIX/, pp. 270-1: 2001c/27-8).8 This same relation is considered by Null as unilateral foundation. Null: “Unilateral Foundation. UFxy [read: x Unilaterally Founds y] means x founds y and y does not found x: Fxy & ¬Fyx ”. The unilateral founding relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive (2007, p. 48). 5

Null considers unilateral, regular and irregular types of foundation (2007, p. 48). Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 270): “So fundieren sich Farbe und Ausdehnung in einer einheitlichen Anschauung gegenseitig, da keine Farbe ohne eine gewisse Ausdehnung, keine Ausdehnung ohne eine gewisse Farbe denkbar ist”. 7 He (Null 2007, p. 49) also considers regular foundation: “RFxy [read: x Regularly Founds y] means x is either y or unilaterally founds y: [ UFxy or ( x = y)] ”. 8 Husserl (Hua XIX/1, pp. 270-1): “Dagegen ist ein Urteilscharakter einseitig fundiert in den zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen, da diese nicht als Urteilsfundamente fungieren müssen”. 6

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Ad.3) Next, part A is mediately founded on C only if an A is founded on C and there is some other B, which is foundational for A and founded on C (Hua XIX/1, pp. 270-2: 2001c/27-8).9 Ad.4) Finally, part A is immediately founded on C only if an A is founded on C and there is not any B, which is foundational for A and founded on C (Hua XIX/1, pp. 270-2: 2001c/27-8). 10 Hence, expressions like “something requires supplementation” or “something is founded on” mean the same as the expression “something is non-independent”. On the other hand, “something does not require supplementation” or “something is not founded on” means the same as “something is independent” (Hua XIX/1, p. 268: 2001c/25). If there is no need for some content to be supplemented, then this content is independent. Inspired by Husserl’s analyses, Null specifies the notion of “Foundational Dependency”. Firstly, he defines the founding relation as reflexive: ( x ) Fxx and transitive: ( x )( y)(z)[(Fxy & Fyz) → Fxz] . Next, he gives the notion of relative dependency: “Dxy [read: x is Dependent relative to y] means some discrete part of y founds x: (∃z){[(z ≤ y) & ¬Ozx ] & Fzx} ” (2007, p. 38). According to him, the relative dependency relation is irreflexive (p. 38). Finally, he defines foundational dependency: “FDxy [read: x is Foundationally Dependent relative to y] means y founds but is not part of x: [Fyx & ¬( y ≤ x )] ” (p. 38). On account of the foregoing definitions the pivot for the logic of the parts and wholes distinction between 1) moments and 2) pieces can

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This is how Robert Sokolowski (1968, p. 539) describes the foundation relation: “Husserl articulates a network of definitions and laws governing the many relationships that follow upon the distinction of moments and pieces. He distinguishes between founded parts, those that require the presence of other parts (part A is founded on part B if A cannot be had without B), and founding ones, those that serve as the condition for dependent parts without themselves necessarily being dependent (part K founds part L if L cannot be had without K; it is left undecided whether K needs L. If it does, then the founding relationship is reciprocal; if not, it is unilateral”. 10 As regards the notion of dependency, see also: (Casari 2005; Poli 1993 and Simons 1992).

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be specified. This distinction conditions further division of the domain of objects into 3) abstract and 4) concrete entities. Ad.1.) The moment is the part that is non-independent with respect to the other parts and to the whole (Hua XIX/1, pp. 272-3: 2001c/29). For example, colour is the moment since it is non-independent with respect to the part “extension” and the whole “colour surface”. This is what Sokolowski writes on this subject: Moments are parts that permeate each other. They are inseparable from one another and from their wholes. I may consider a material object as a whole, composed of the parts called ‘extension,’ ‘surface,’ ‘color,’ and ‘brightness.’ These parts permeate one another in such a way that one cannot be given unless the others are also present. I cannot disengage brightness from color, I cannot consider color without locating it within a certain surface, and I cannot consider surface without seeing it as a moment of an extended thing (1968, pp. 538-9).

Null, in turn, considers the following definition of moment: “ Mxy [read: x is a Moment of y] means x is part of and dependent relative to y: ( x ≤ y) & Dxy ” (2007, p. 39). The moment relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive whereas moments of an object are proper part of it (p. 40). Ad. 2) The piece is the part of a whole, which is independent of both the other parts and the whole (Hua XIX/1, pp. 272-3: 2001c/29). Thus, as the definition states, it must be possible to consider pieces separately from any whole they help to constitute. A suitable example for this is the case of the brick in the wall. Any particular brick is independent part of the wall. It depends neither on other bricks nor on the wall. Sokolowski writes that: Pieces are parts that do not permeate one another and hence are separable from their wholes. I can consider a tree as a whole made up of branches, trunk, leaves, roots, bark, etc. All these are parts that can be separated from the whole; I can consider a branch as an entity in itself. I can disengage it at least in imagination from its whole in a way in which I cannot disengage brightness from colour or color from surface (1968, p. 539).

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The precise definition of the piece however comes from Null: “Pxy [read: x is a Piece of y]: means x is a proper part of and not dependent relative to y: ( x < y) & ¬Dxy ” (2007, p. 40). This relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive (p. 40). Moreover, Husserl regards that pieces can be exclusive or isolated. 2.1) Pieces are exclusive (disjoined) only if there is no other piece identically in common, which stays in their possession (Hua XIX/1, p. 273: 2001c/29). 2.2) Pieces are isolated only if there is neither another piece nor a moment identically in common which stays in their possession (Hua XIX/1, p. 273: 2001c/29). Ad.3.) The abstract (Abstractum) is an object that belongs to the superordinate whole as its non-independent part. Husserl: “… each part that is non-independent relatively to W we call a Moment (an abstract part) of this same whole W” (Hua XIX/1, p. 272: 2001c/29). He adds: “Abstract parts can in their turn accordingly have pieces, and pieces in their turn abstract parts” (Hua XIX/1, p. 272: 2001c/29).11 Ad.4.) The concrete (Concretum) is an object in relation to all of its parts. 4.1) The Concrete (Concretum) is relative only if it comprises exclusively non-independent parts, i.e., moments (Hua XIX/1, p.274: 2001c/29). 4.2) The Concrete (Concretum) is absolute only if it comprises exclusively independent parts, i.e., pieces (Hua XIX/1, p. 274: 2001c/29). Finally, the crucial notions of the part-whole theory, i.e., the concept of the whole and the concept of the part, Husserl specifies in the following manner.

11

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 272): “J e d e n r e l a t i v z u e i n e m G a n z e n G selbständigen T e i l n e n n e n w i r e i n S t ü c k , j e d e n r e l a t i v z u ihm unselbständigen T e i l e i n M o m e n t (einen abstrakten Teil) dieses selben G a n z e n G . Es ist hierbei gleichgültig, ob das Ganze selbst, absolut oder relativ zu einem höheren Ganzen betrachtet, selbständig ist oder nicht. A b s t r a k t e Teile können danach | wieder Stücke haben und Stücke w i e d e r a b s t r a k t e T e i l e ”.

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1.) The whole is the collection of all those parts that are unified by the founding relation. Husserl: “By a Whole we understand a range of contents which are all covered by a single foundation without the help of further content” (Hua XIX/1, p. 282: 2001c/34).12 1.1) The whole is extended when it permits a peculiar kind of “piecing” by virtue of which all subordinate pieces must belong to the same “lowest Genus” that is determined by undivided whole. Husserl: “Here belongs, e.g., the division of an extent into extents, in particular of a spatial stretch into spatial stretches, of a temporal stretch into temporal stretches etc” (Hua XIX/1, pp. 273-4: 2001c/29).13 2.) The part is a content that participates in constitution of the whole (Hua XIX/1, pp. 272-83: 2001c/28-35).14 2.1) The part is absolutely mediate only if it enters into another part of the whole (Hua XIX/1, pp. 274-5: 2001c/30). Null distinguishes between absolutely mediate pieces and moments. Null: “Mediate Pieces. MPxy [read: x is a Mediate Piece of y] means x is a piece of y which is a piece of some moment of y: Pxy & (∃z)(Mzy & Pxz ) ” (2007, p. 43). The mediate piece relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive: “… and since mediate pieces are pieces and objects do not found their pieces, no object founds any of its mediate pieces. Hence (mediate or immediate) pieces of an object unilaterally found it” (p. 43). Next, he specifies the concept of the mediate moment: “MMxy [read: x is a Mediate Moment of y] means x 12

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 282): “Unter einem [Ganzen] [v e r s t e h e n ] wir einen Inbegriff von Inhalten, welche d u r c h e i n e e i n h e i t l i c h e F u n d i e r u n g , und zwar ohne Sukkurs weiterer Inhalte umspannt werden. Die Inhalte || eines solchen Inbegriffs nennen wir Teile”. 13 Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 273-4): “Hierher gehört beispielsweise die Teilung einer Ausdehnung in Ausdehnungen, spezieller einer Raumstrecke in Raumstrecken, einer Zeitstrecke in Zeitstrecken u. dgl”. 14 Husserl (1948, pp. 161-2: 1973/141): “… by ‘whole’ is understood every unitary object which admits of partial apprehensions, that is, a penetrative, explicative contemplation, and by ‘part’ every explicate which results therefrom. In this sense the relation of a sheet of paper and the white color of the paper can also be viewed as a whole-part relation; if I pass from the color, which caught my eye and which I have first made my object, to the paper, the latter is still a ‘whole’ relative to the white”. See also: (Null 2007, p. 37).

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is a moment of y which is a moment of some piece of y: Mxy & (∃z)(Pzy & Mxz) ”. Like the mediate piece relation, the mediate moment relation is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive (p. 44). 2.2) The part is absolutely immediate only if it does not enter into another part of the whole (Hua XIX/1, pp. 274-5: 2001c/30). According to Null, the immediate parts relation obtains for pieces as well as for moments. Null: “Immediate Pieces. IPxy [read: x is an Immediate Piece of y] means x is a piece of y which is not a mediate piece of y: Pxy & ¬MPxy ”. The immediate piece relation is irreflexive and asymmetric but not transitive (2007, p. 44). Next, he defines immediate moments as follows: “IMxy [read: x is an Immediate Moment of y] means x is a moment of y which is not a moment of any piece of y: Mxy & ¬(∃z)(Pzy & Mxz) ” (p. 43). The immediate moments relation is irreflexive and asymmetric but not transitive (pp. 43-4). 2.3) The part is extended when it belongs to the extended whole as its piece (Hua XIX/1, pp. 273-4: 2001c/29). Of course, most of the notions explained here require further specification. This task is accomplished in great part by Null’s work, which has been cited here a number of times. However, for the purpose of the present study, such specifications are not necessary. Instead, let us now concentrate on the sensuous and categorial forms of unity.

2. Sensuous and categorial forms of unity

The foregoing section stated that the extended whole contains only pieces. Those pieces are independent of each other; however, all of them help to found the superordinate unity of which they are parts. On this point, one can question how it is possible that the conglomerate of essentially not connected parts can constitute the whole. According to Husserl, pieces, despite being independent, can help to found a new moment, which comprehends their total content and forms them into a superordinate sensuous unity (Hua XIX/1, pp. 283-8: 2001c/35-8). For example, if one focuses on a melody or some particular musical composition, then one can easily distinguish a series of different

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sounds, i.e., pieces. Practically, every melody can be divided into its sounds. These sounds are independent of each other. This means that there is no difference for the internal integrity of any particular sound x in terms of whether a previous or subsequent sound is characterized as such and such. Moreover, x remains indifferently the same even when taken as separate, i.e., without any connection to the rest of the melody. On the other hand, when the musical composition is perceived as a whole, the ego no longer hears separate sounds. Instead, the ego is focused on the melody, which is the new quality that emerges from the set of separate sounds. Since tones are regarded to be sensuous objects and the melody unifies them into a new sensuous shape, the melody is called the sensuous moments of unity.15 John Drummond considers a different example. He writes: The perception of the aggregate, according to Husserl, is not an act of collection which is based upon a manifold of perceptions, each of an individual goose. Nor is the flock judged to be a collection; it is simply seen to be a flock or collection. The flock, in other words, is perceptually given precisely as a flock. It is important to note, however, that the plurality is not perceived as mere sum but as an organized one. Each goose is given as a member of the flock and the flock is given as an organized collection of geese. The qualitative features of the plurality as an organized plurality Husserl calls ‘figural factors’ (1990, p. 65).

For more examples of sensuous moments of unity see also the picture below. 15

The Philosophy of Arithmetic (Husserl 2003, p. 216) contains the following statement: “One speaks, for example, of a file of soldiers, of a heap of apples, of a row of trees, of a covey of hens, of a flight of birds, of a gaggle of geese, and so on. In each of these examples we speak of a sensible group of objects like each other, which are also named in terms of their kind. But not this alone is expressed – for the plural of the name of the kind would by itself suffice for that. Rather there is expressed a certain characteristic property of the unitary total intuition of the group, which can be grasped at one glance and which in its well-distinguished forms constitutes the most essential part of the signification of those expressions introducing the plural: ‘file’, ‘heap’, ‘row’, ‘covey’, ‘flight’, ‘gaggle’, etc.”. See also: (Husserl 2003, pp. 216-22; Hua XIX/1, pp. 283-8: 2001/35-8).

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Figure 1

Every moment of this kind has a sensuous character and is founded upon the plurality of sensuous and independent parts. In Logical Investigations, such a moment is called the sensuous form of unity (Hua XIX/1, p. 283: 2001c/ 35) and the moment of unity (Hua XIX/1, 287: 2001c/38). In Philosophy of Arithmetic, in turn, Husserl calls it “the figural moment” (2003, p. 215) and “quasi qualitative” moment (p. 216).16 Next, Husserl emphasises that the sensuous form of unity should be carefully distinguished from the categorial form of unity. The cardinal difference between these forms consists in the nature of the parts they unify. Sensuous form unifies sensuous material whereas categorial form unifies thoughts. According to Husserl, consciousness can apprehend the plurality of objects in many different manners, e.g., connecting, dividing, separating, adding or excluding them. These manners are forms in which consciousness is related to its correlates and this is also why categorial forms are called “forms of thoughts”. In other words, categorial forms of unity are structural properties of thoughts that determine the manner in which consciousness apprehends its correlates (Hua XIX/1, 288-91: 2001c/38-9). However, for clarity, one should also carefully distinguish categorial form and its objective correlate. For example, the manner of thinking about trees in the valley should be kept separate from the constituted objective multiplicity of trees. The manner of thinking as the form of thoughts belongs to the transcendental sphere and can only be considered in the phenomenological attitude, whereas the objective correlate of categorial form belongs to the sphere of natural attitude. So, 16

Figural moments are the main theme of Gestalt psychology. See: (Ehrenfels 1890).

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to the transcendental component of experience which is a categorial form of adding there corresponds the transcendent categorial object “sum”, to categorial form of dividing there corresponds “quotient”, etc. Husserl: We mean by categorial form, on the one hand, the characters of founded acts, which give form to acts of straightforward or of already founded intuition, and transform them into new presentations of object. These latter presentations, as opposed to the acts on which they are founded, set up for us a peculiarly modified objectivity: the original objects are now seen in certain interpretative and connective forms which are our categorial forms in the second, objective sense (Hua XIX/2, p. 714: 2001c/307).17

One may also easily notice that the kind of melody as well as, e.g., the flavour of the dish, strictly depends on components that make up the melody and flavour. More precisely, any change of melodic components entails change in the melody. A melody that contains the tone “c” is different from a melody that contains the tone “g” in the place of “c”. The same holds true for the flavour. The flavour of the dish depends on the flavours of its components. In general, it can be said that the sensuous form of unity strictly depends on the qualitative determinations of its parts. In contrast, for the categorial form, it makes no difference whether the formed parts are materially qualified in this or in that manner. The form of adding is the same when one counts apples and when one counts kilometres (Hua XIX/1, pp. 288-91: 2001c/38-9).

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Husserl (Hua XIX/2, p. 714): “D i e R e d e v o n d e r k a t e g o r i a l e n F o r m verwenden wir, wie in der letzten Reihe von Betrachtungen sichtlich ist, in einem natürlichen und bei unserer konsequenten Unterscheidung zwischen Akt und Gegenstand unschädlichen D o p p e l s i n n . E i n e r s e i t s verstehen wir darunter die fundierten A k t c h a r a k t e r e , welche den Akten schlichter oder selbst schon fundierter Anschauung Form geben und sie in neue Objektivationen umwandeln. Diese letzteren konstituieren eine im Vergleich mit den fundierenden Akten in eigentümlicher Weise modifizierte Gegenständlichkeit; die ursprünglichen Gegenstände stellen sich nun in gewissen, sie in neuer Weise fassenden und verknüpfenden F o r m e n dar, und dies sind die k a t e g o r i a l e n F o r m e n i m z w e i t e n , i m g e g e n s t ä n d l i c h e n S i n n ”.

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Moreover, the sensuous form of unity is the founded content. Instead, components of the categorial unity do not contribute to the constitution of any new content, especially not a categorical type. Husserl: “The objects themselves, being only held together in thought, do not succeed in founding a new content, whether taken as a group or together; no material form of association develops among them through this unity of intuition, they are possibly ‘quite disconnected and intrinsically unrelated’ ” (Hua XIX/1, p. 289: 2001c/38). Finally, sensuous and categorial forms differ as regards the kind of unity they confer. Unity constituted by sensuous form is sensible and has a nature of quality. In contrast, unity constituted by categorial form is intellectual and cannot be sensuously presented. Moreover, components of categorial unity are unified as far as they play the role determined by the categorial form. For example, the form “object” unifies two elements only if one element plays the role of subject and the second element plays the role of determinant (Hua XIX/1, pp. 288-91: 2001c/38-9).18 The last two sections have introduced notions that can be used to characterize the formal-ontological structure of the experience and to identify intellectual and sensuous forms of unity. In this way, the upcoming explanation of the concept of experience has been theoretically supported. The next section will be devoted to the results of Husserl’s analyses on acts of consciousness.

3. The concept of experience

In Logical Investigations, the concept of the experience is preliminarily considered in the context of consciousness. There, Husserl distinguishes three notions of consciousness: 1. Consciousness as the entire, real (reelle) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness. 18

See also: (Husserl 1948, Part II and III; Hua XVII, Chapter 1 and 4; 2001a, Part 3, Chapter 3 and 4).

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2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences. 3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’, of all sort (Hua XIX/1, p. 356: 2001c/81).19

The concept of mental experience that appears in 3 comes from psychology. Since psychology is an empirical science, it regards all mental states as facts of nature. In such an approach, the term “experience” refers to the totality of events that occur in the heads of individual existences. Hence,: “… percepts, imaginative and pictorial presentations, acts of conceptual thinking, surmises and doubts, joys and griefs, hopes and fears, wishes and acts of will etc., are, just as they flourish in our consciousness, ‘experiences’ or ‘contents’ of consciousness” (Hua XIX/1, p. 357: 2001c/82). As Husserl holds, this psychological notion of experience can be transformed into a phenomenological one, but the ego must first reduce from the psychological sense all references to real individual existence. This means that the ego should stop treating itself as a real subject that inspects the real processes inside its subjectivity. Moreover, no matter what kind of object is intended in an act, the apprehensions that posit its existence also must be suspended. As is apparent, then, extracting phenomenological sense from the psychological one relies on “reducing” or “suspending” the moments of experience responsible for the constitution of existence. In practice, however, it is impossible to reduce them in a strict sense. Instead, an ego can stop living through them and make them separate objects of reflection. This switch in attitude from living through these moments to seeing them as objects of immanent reflection is the very meaning of the terms “reduction” and “suspension”, and it provides a method for obtaining the 19

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 356): 1. Bewußtsein als der gesamte reelle phänomenologische Bestand des empirischen Ich, als Verwebung der psychischen Erlebnisse in der Einheit des Erlebnisstroms. 2. Bewußtsein als inneres Gewahrwerden von eigenen psychischen Erlebnissen. 3. Bewußtsein als zusammenfassende Bezeichnung für jederlei ‘psychische Akte’ oder ‘intentionale Erlebnisse’.

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phenomenological sense from the psychological one (Hua XIX/1, pp. 357-8: 2001c/82).20 Husserl claims that the insight into experience in the phenomenological sense immediately discloses the internal structure of the act and its relation to the correlated objects. Such an insight makes clear the distinctiveness of the content of the experience from the objective content. In other words, the phenomenological conception of experience specifies the fundamental distinction between the act of consciousness and its object (Hua XIX/1, pp. 358-61, 394-401: 2001c/82-4, 102-6). Following this, any act should be distinguished from its object, e.g. the act of perception from the perceived thing, the act of intellectual insight from categorial objectivity and the act of immanent insight from the immanently perceived experience. Moreover, insight into the experience also discloses its components and its internal structure. For Husserl, any part that constitutes the internal structure of an experience belongs to the real (reelle) phenomenological content. Nevertheless, after publication of the First Edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl realised the special position of intentional content and, as a result, he changed his mind about the components of the phenomenological content. He noted this fact in the Second Edition of Logical Investigations. The change that Husserl made will be explained later in more detail, so for now let us merely emphasise that no matter if this is the First or Second Edition, the real phenomenological content is necessarily made up of two components, namely sensuous data and functional moments of consciousness. Data will be considered first. 3.1. Sensuous data

Under sensations, Husserl classifies the extra-receptive sensations corresponding to the various sense organs, the inter-receptive 20

Appealing to the conception of phenomenological reduction is inevitable at the current stage of the ongoing considerations. Nevertheless, we must note that Husserl developed this concept only after the publication of the First Edition of Logical Investigations.

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kinaesthetic sensations, the affective sensations of tickling, pleasure etc., and the sensible phase of tension, release, volitions etc.21 Sensations are impressed in consciousness. Like the sensuous form of unity, it is best to consider them on the basis of suitable examples. Then, let us analyse the perceptual act directed to the colour of the bowling ball. This colour as the property of the ball should be clearly distinguished from the set of sensuous data that belongs to the perception. On the one hand, there is a homogenously spread black colour which covers surface of the ball. On the other hand, there is the set of sensations that belongs to the real content of the experience.22 Moreover, while the colour is homogeneously the same on every part of its extension, the sensuous data differ as to their “qualities”. This however requires more detailed explanation. The perceived surface of the ball always has some glittering and shining parts. Colour is presented in the shading structure that is made up by the sequence of the gradually ordered tints. Those tints differ as to the saturation of the brightness. Extreme points in the order are occupied by the tints with the highest and the lowest saturation. All the differences between particular tints in the order are constituted by the differences among sensuous data. Despite the fact that the experience contains a multiplicity of different sensations, the colour is perceived as homogenous on every part of its extension. In other words, differences among data do not change the quality of the perceived colour. The bowling ball is presented as homogenously black although some of its parts glitter more or less intensively. In some instances, the glimmering can be so intensive that it entirely covers the quality of the colour. Nevertheless, the colour sustains its homogeneity. 21

Sensuous data are also called by Husserl “material data”, “hyletic data” or simply “materials” (2001c; Hua III). 22 Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 396: 2001c/104): “We then see it to be a fact of essence that the being of a sensational content differs from that of the perceived object presented by it, which is not a reality in consciousness”. And (Hua XIX/1, p. 396): “Wir sehen dann auch als eine generelle Wesenssachlage ein, daß Sein des empfundenen Inhalts ein ganz anderes ist als Sein des wahrgenommenen Gegenstandes, der durch den Inhalt präsentiert, aber nicht reell bewußt ist”.

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What is more, the colour can be given as exactly the same not only in singular appearance but also in its multiplicities. A particular appearance is the animated set of sensations.23As such, it is very vulnerable to changes in its sensuous content. Nevertheless, although any change in sensations entails a change of appearance, the sameness of the presented colour can persist in this variation.24 As regards the relation between data and objectivity, Husserl claims that it is resemblance. Alphonso Lingis notes that within consciousness, sensation “mirrors” characteristics of transcendent objects. He states that: “...the sensation for white (Empfindungsfarbe) differs from the sensation for black as white differs from black on the things” (1972, p. 96). What is more, he also notes that Husserl: “…goes so far as to affirm that the visual sensations have extensity which depicts (darstellt) the physical extension (Ausdehnung) of physical objects” and he concludes: “The consciousness then must be a sort of place that can contain these somehow extended sensations”(p. 96). Certainly, data 23

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, pp. 359-60: 2001c/83): “We cannot too sharply stress that equivocation which allows us to use the word ‘appearance’ both of the experience in which the object’s appearing consist (the concrete perceptual experience, in which the object itself seems present to us) and of the object which appears as such. The deceptive spell of this equivocation vanishes as soon as one takes phenomenological account as to how little of the object which appears is as such to be found in the experience of its appearing. The appearing of the thing (the experience) is not the thing which appears (that seems to stand before us in propria persona)”. 24 Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 396: 2001c/104): “I see a thing, e.g. this box, but I do not see my sensations. I always see one and the same box, however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same ‘content of consciousness’– if I care to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But each turn yields a new ‘content of consciousness’, if I call experienced contents ‘contents of consciousness’, in a much more appropriate use of words. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived”. And in Husserl’s (Hua XIX/1, p. 396) original words: „Ich sehe ein Ding, z. B. diese Schachtel, ich sehe nicht meine Empfindungen. Ich sehe immerfort diese e i n e u n d s e l b e Schachtel, wie immer sie gedreht und gewendet werden mag. Ich habe dabei immerfort d e n s e l b e n ‘Bewußtseinsinhalt’ - wenn es mir beliebt, den wahrgenommenen G e g e n s t a n d als Bewußtseinsinhalt zu bezeichnen. Ich habe mit jeder Drehung einen n e u e n Bewußtseinsinhalt, wenn ich, in viel passenderem Sinne, die e r l e b t e n I n h a l t e so bezeichne. Also sehr verschiedene Inhalte werden erlebt, und doch wird derselbe Gegenstand wahrgenommen”.

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taken in the physical sense of extension are individual, spatial objects with duration and qualities.25 These data are said to resemble objective qualities. The difficulties of such an explanation consist in the fact that the individual object that is included in consciousness resembles some extra-mental object. In simple words, the conception that sensations are spatially extended entities that resemble objective qualities leads to the variant of “theory of images”, which was criticised by Husserl. It is also noteworthy that sensuous data are passive components of real phenomenological content. In order to play any role in the act, data must be animated into the appearance of something. Otherwise, sensations are senseless since they cannot function by themselves. This characteristic of the data is also the reason why Husserl describes them as materials. In such a point of view, data are those kinds of stuff which are formed by the functional moments of the act (Hua XIX/1, pp. 396400: 2001c/104-5). Finally, data are not the primary objects for consciousness. For example, in the act that is aimed at the colour of the bowling ball, this colour is the primarily perceived object. Sensuous data, instead, are not perceived at all. To grasp them, the ego must redirect attention and in a separate act make them primary objects. In other words, the ego can grasp data any time, but in regular perception they are not registered.26 Husserl: Sensations, and the acts ‘interpreting’ them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, but they do not appear as objects: they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense. Objects on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced (Hua XIX/1, p. 399: 2001c/105).27

25

Roman Ingarden distinguishes qualities of sensuous data, see: (1995, pp. 89-98). See also: (Hua XVII, pp. 291-295). 27 Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 399): “D i e E m p f i n d u n g e n und desgleichen die sie ‘auffassenden’ oder ‘apperzipierenden’ Akte werden hierbei e r l e b t , aber sie e r s c h e i n e n n i c h t g e g e n s t ä n d l i c h ; sie werden n i c h t gesehen, gehört, mit irgendeinem ‘Sinn’ w a h r g e n o m m e n . D i e G e g e n s t ä n d e andererseits erscheinen, werden wahrgenommen, aber sie sind n i c h t e r l e b t ”. 26

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Since data are really inherent components of the experience, they belong to this content which is lived through. In other words, in regular perception, they are not perceived, but lived through.

3.2. The functional moments of real phenomenological content

The real side of the experience also contains sets of the moments that unify the multiplicity of sensuous data into the appearance of the perceived object. As previously mentioned, data, when considered for themselves, i.e., in abstraction form unifying moments of consciousness, are senseless. This means that they cannot present any object without the help of other factors. According to Husserl, in order to present something, sensations must be animated by the intrinsic moments of consciousness into the appearance of an object.28 This animation is the same as a sense-giving function. In other words, to present some object, the set of hyletic data must be apprehended in a manner that constitutes this presentation. Husserl: “And yet another relation is the objectifying relation ascribed by us to the sense-complex experienced by us when something appears to us, a relation in which the complex stands to the object which appears to us. We concede that such a complex is experienced in the act of appearing, but say that it is in certain manner ‘interpreted’ or ‘apperceived’, and hold that it is in the phenomenological character of such an animating interpretation of sensation that what we call the appearing of the object consist” (Hua XIX/1, pp 360-1: 2001c/84). The terms “animation”, “apperception”, “interpretation” and “apprehension” name the functional properties of the real phenomenological content. All of them describe an activity peculiar to consciousness, especially to its sense-giving property, which is the unique and most distinguishable characteristic of intentional acts and consciousness in general.

28

In Logical Investigations these moments are sometimes also called phenomenological character (Hua XIX/1, pp 361: 2001c/84) and immanent character (Hua XIX/1, pp. 397–1: 2001c/104) or just act-character (Hua XIX/1, p. 399: 2001c/105).

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One can find evidence of sense-giving moments by the considering the picture below.

Figure 2

As it is easy to notice, the object on the left side can be perceptually interpreted in a twofold manner. In the first instance, square a1, a2, a3, a4 can be seen as the front side of the perceived figure. In the second case, this same square a1, a2, a3, a4 can appear as the back side of the figure. The sensuous content is relatively constant for both cases; however, apprehension changes from instance to instance. At one time, data are apprehended in the manner that square a1, a2, a3, a4 constitutes the front side of the figure; at another, data are apprehended in the manner in which square a1, a2, a3, a4 appears as the back side. Nevertheless, the animating of data is not the only function of the sense-giving moments, since they also constitute linguistic meanings. Husserl considers the following situation: Let us imagine that certain arabesques or figures have affected us aesthetically, and that we then suddenly see that we are dealing with symbols or verbal signs. In what does this difference consist? Or let us take the case of an attentive man hearing some totally strange word as a soundcomplex without even dreaming it is a word, and compare this with the case of the same man afterwards hearing the word, in the course of conversation, and now acquainted with its meaning, but not illustrating it intuitively? What in general is the surplus element distinguishing the understanding of a symbolically functioning expression from the uncomprehended verbal sound? What is the difference between simply looking at a concrete object A, and treating it as a representative of ‘any A whatsoever’? ... Apperception is our surplus, which is found in experience itself, in its descriptive content as opposed to the raw existence of sense: it is the actcharacter which as it were ensouls sense, and is in essence such as to make

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us perceive this or that object, see this tree, e.g., hear this ringing, smell this scent of flowers etc. (Hua XIX/1, pp. 398-9: 2001c/105).

Then, the sense-giving moments animate data into the appearance of the perceived object. On the other hand, they also constitute linguistic meanings. Moreover, in harmony with the foregoing explanations, these moments condition changes of the act’s character too. This means that the differences between imagination, recollection, perception, linguistic acts and any kind of experiences in general are constituted by the differences of the functional components of the real phenomenological content. Above all else, these moments also determine to which object the act is directed and, as the foregoing explanation makes clear, in which of its properties this object is given (Hua XIX/1, pp. 394-401: 2001c/102-6). At the end of this section, it is also worth emphasising that although Husserl often talks about different functions of consciousness, e.g., animating, interpreting, sense-giving etc., he does not specify whether the differences between functions correspond to differences among functional components. He does not distinguish e.g., a separate group of moments exclusively responsible for animating data and a separate group which conditions changes of the act’s qualities, etc. Instead, he talks about functional moments as if they were undifferentiated with respect to the variety of functions they fulfil. Therefore one may consider these moments as kind of homogenous intentional unity which “interprets” (Hua XIX/1, p. 360: 2001c/84), “animates” (p. 361/84) and “ensouls” (p. 399/105) data. Moreover, these moments are also the “interpretative intentions” (p. 397/104) which make it possible “to take something in the same sense” (p. 397/104). And sometimes, they are simply called “intentions” (p. 397/104). Nevertheless, sensuous data and the functional moments of consciousness are not the only components of experience. In a sense that will become evident in the second chapter, they constitute only one side of the act. Except for sensations and functional moments, each act also contains intentional matter and intentional quality. Those latter components, when unified, constitute an intentional essence that is the

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parent notion of the noema. Therefore, the next section will be devoted exclusively to the intentional side of experience.

3.3. Matter and quality

According to Logical Investigations, every experience contains two intentional components, namely matter and quality. This is what Husserl writes on this subject: This is the distinction between the general act-character, which stamps an act as merely presentative, judgmental, emotional, desiderative etc., and its ‘content’ which stamps it as presenting this, as judging that etc.etc. The two assertions ‘2x2=4’ and ‘Ibsen is the principal founder of modern dramatic realism’, are both, qua assertions, of one kind; each is qualified as an assertion, and their common feature is their judgment-quality. The one, however, judges one content and the other another content. To distinguish such ‘contents’ from other notions of ‘content’ we shall speak here of the matter (material) of judgments. We shall draw similar distinctions between quality and matter in the case of all acts (Hua XIX/1, pp. 425-6: 2001c/119).

Hence, quality determines the intentional character of the experience. It specifies whether the act is judgment, perception, recollection etc. On the other hand, the matter determines the content of the act. This means that it establishes which object is intended and in which of its properties this object is apprehended. Husserl: Quality only determines whether what is already presented in definite fashion is intentionally present as wished, asked, posited in judgment etc. The matter, therefore, must be that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant. The matter – to carry clearness a little further – is that peculiar side of an act’s phenomenological content that not only determines that it grasps the object but also as what it grasps it, the properties, relations,

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categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it (Hua XIX/1, pp. 429-30: 2001c/121-2).29

The quoted passage makes clear the following issues. Firstly, the matter conditions the reference to the object. Secondly, the matter also “attributes” properties to the object. In this case, the term “attribution” should not be understood as a “creation” in the sense in which one creates e.g. a 3D model. Instead, “attribution” means that the matter gives to an act a peculiar structure through which the object is meant as the possessor of the strictly determined set of properties. The experience intends only those properties which are determined by the matter. In other words, matter determines which object is meant and in which of its properties, i.e., “as what”, it is meant. Drummond describes this component of an experience in the following manner: “…the matter of an act is, in a fundamental sense, the content of the act by means of which the act is directed in determinate manner to an objectivity” (1990, p. 33). Let us consider now characteristics of the matter and quality on the basis of an example. Suppose that two persons perceive the same object O. Person A perceives O from a different side than person B. A perceives O as O :{ a, b, c} whereas B as O :{ b, c, d}. In harmony with Husserl’s conception, both acts have the same quality since both have perceptual character. On the other hand, however, both acts differ as 29

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, pp. 429-30): “Die Qualität bestimmt nur, ob das in b e s t i m m t e r W e i s e bereits ‘vorstellig Gemachte’ als Erwünschtes, Erfragtes, urteilsmäßig Gesetztes u. dgl. intentional gegenwärtig sei. Danach muß uns die Materie a l s d a s j e n i g e i m A k t e g e l t e n , w a s i h m a l l e r e r s t d i e B e z i e h u n g a u f e i n G e g e n s t ä n d l i c h e s v e r l e i h t , und zwar diese Beziehung i n s o v o l l k o m m e n e r B e s t i m m t h e i t , daß durch die Materie n i c h t n u r d a s G e g e n s t ä n d l i c h e ü b e r h a u p t , welches der Akt meint, sondern auch die Weise, in welcher er es meint, fest b e s t i m m t i s t . Die Materie - so können wir noch weiter verdeutlichend sagen ist die im phänomenologischen Inhalt des Aktes liegende Eigenheit desselben, die es nicht nur bestimmt, daß der Akt die jeweilige Gegenständlichkeit auffaßt, sondern auch, a l s w a s er sie auffaßt, welche Merkmale, Beziehungen, kategorialen Formen | er in sich selbst ihr zumißt”.

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regards the matter they contain, since one of them apprehends O as {a, b, c} whereas the other apprehends it as {b, c, d}. Further, suppose that person A and person B judge that O is b and c. In this case, both acts share the same quality and matter. In Husserl words, they share the same semantic essence, which is explained as the unity of matter and quality in linguistic acts. In both instances the same object is judged as the possessor of the same set of properties. The situation changes when person A judges that O is b and c whereas person B judges that O is c and d. Certainly, the object which is judged is the same in both instances. Nevertheless, each time it is judged to have a different set of properties. This difference is conditioned by the difference of the matters. Simply, the object is differently described by the judgments since the judgments have different matters. Moreover, despite the different matters, the judgments refer to the same object. Then, it holds true that two different matters can determine the same object. Finally, suppose that person A perceives O as b and c and person B judges that O is b and c. According to Husserl, both acts are different as to their qualities although they remain the same as to their matters. Husserl: “There are different modes of intentional reference to one and the same object of which we are in an identical sense ‘conscious’, and this means that we have two acts similar in matter but differing in quality”(Hua XIX/1, p. 470: 2001c/144). To summarise, then, the same matter can be bound up with different qualities and vice versa. However, matter and quality are abstract parts of the act and they cannot occur separately. Husserl: “Exemplary intuition will convince us that the involvement of matters with act-qualities is an involvement of abstract ‘moments’. But matters cannot occur in isolation: they can only achieve concretion if supplemented by certain moments which fall under the supreme genus ‘act-quality’ and are subject to its limiting laws” (Hua XIX/1, p. 472: 2001c/145) and “… act-quality is undoubtedly an abstract aspect of acts, unthinkable apart from all matter … The same holds of matter. A matter that was not matter for presentation, nor for judgment, nor for … etc. etc., would be held to be unthinkable” (Hua XIX/1, p. 430: 2001c/122). The fact that matter can be bound up with any quality

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means that the same matter can occur in different acts, e.g., in perceptual acts, in judgmental acts, in acts of wishing etc. Moreover, two identical matters cannot determine different objective references but different matters can direct act to the same object (Hua XIX/1, p. 425-31: 2001c/119-22). Additionally, since the matter determines objective reference, Husserl considers it the objective sense. He states: “It is the act’s matter that makes its object count as this object and no other, it is the objective, the interpretative sense (Sinn der gegenständlichen Auffassung, Auffassungssinn) which serves as basis for the act’s quality (while indifferent to such qualitative differences)” (Hua XIX/1, p. 430: 2001c/122).30 It is noteworthy that in the quoted passage matter is also called an “interpretative sense”. Finally, matter and quality are notions which are used by Husserl to specify concepts of the intentional and semantic essences. Intentional essence is the unity of the matter and quality of any experience. This unity in linguistic acts constitutes a semantic essence, which is the same as the meaning of the meant phrase (Hua XIX/1, 431-5: 2001c/122-5). The way to present such an essence leads through the ideational abstraction performed upon the real phenomenological content.31 In other words, meaning is the ideal object abstracted from the real phenomenological components of the experience (Hua XIX/1, 431: 2001c/123). At this point we must note that Husserl’s conception of the relation between intentional and real phenomenological components changed after the publication of Logical Investigations. The next section outlines this case.

30

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 430): “An der Materie des Aktes liegt es, daß der Gegenstand dem Akte als dieser und kein anderer gilt, sie ist gewissermaßen der die Qualität fundierende (aber gegen deren Unterschiede gleichgültige) S i n n d e r g e g e n s t ä n d l i c h e n A u f f a s s u n g (oder kurzweg der Auffassungssinn)”. 31 Husserl (Hua XIX/1, 431: 2001c/123): “The ideational abstraction of this essence yields a ‘meaning’ in our ideal sense”.

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4. The relation between matter, quality and the functional moments of consciousness and its interpretation via Ideas I

The relation discussed here is an important and complex problem that cannot be sufficiently explained without introducing additional notions. Moreover, the case is also complicated by the fact that its solution changed after the publication of Logical Investigations. Husserl reconsidered the case and in Ideas I he came up with a new explanation provided with new terminology. Although the current chapter is devoted to the subject of Logical Investigations, referring to the relevant issues from Ideas I not only will guarantee a clear understanding of the current problem, but also will significantly specify some problems in upcoming chapters. Thus, as a first step, let us consider the issue of the relation between matter, quality and functional moments of consciousness in light of Logical Investigations. In the foregoing sections, it was stated that the functional moments of consciousness as well as hyletic data belong to the real content of the act. According to Husserl: “By the real phenomenological content of an act we mean the sum total of its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total of the partial experiences that really constitute it” (Hua XIX/1, p. 411: 2001c/112).32 This concept can be depicted in the following manner.

Figure 3 32

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 411): “Unter dem reellen phänomenologischen Inhalt eines Aktes verstehen wir den Gesamtinbegriff seiner gleichgültig ob konkreten oder abstrakten Teile, mit anderen Worten, den Gesamtinbegriff der ihn reell aufbauenden T e i l e r l e b n i s s e ”.

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What is more, Husserl holds that all parts of the real content should be studied by empirically oriented psychology. He claims that: To point out and describe such parts is the task of pure descriptive psychological analysis operating from an empirical, natural – scientific point of view. Such analysis is in all cases concerned to dismember what we inwardly experience as it in itself is, and as it is really (reell) given in experience, without regard either to genetic connections, or to extrinsic meaning and valid application (Hua XIX/1, pp. 411-12: 2001c/112).

This conviction entails important consequences. Since psychology is the empirical science that concerns individual being, parts of the real phenomenological content must also be individual. However, phenomenology does not concern individual objects. Instead, its ambitions are to deal with essential characteristics of consciousness. Hence, phenomenology concerns the real content of the experience as far as this content can serve as the basis for acts of ideation. In other words, in a phenomenological treatment, real content is taken as a basis on which there must be performed ideational abstraction in order to gain the essence of the experience. Husserl: Let us now shift from our natural-scientific, psychological standpoint to an ideal-scientific, phenomenological one. We must exclude all empirical interpretations and existential affirmations, we must take what is inwardly experienced or otherwise inwardly intuited (e.g. in pure fancy) as pure experiences, as our exemplary basis for acts of Ideation. We must ideate universal essences and essential connections in such experiences … We thus achieve insights in a pure phenomenology which is here oriented to real (reellen) constituents, whose descriptions are in every way ‘ideal’ and free from ‘experience’, i.e. from presupposition of real existence (Hua XIX/1, p. 412: 2001c/112-3).33 33

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 412): “Machen wir nun aber die Wendung von der psychologisch - erfahrungswissenschaftlichen Einstellung in die phänomenologisch -idealwissenschaftliche. Wir schalten alle erfahrungswissenschaftlichen

40

Therefore, the intentional essence does not belong to the real phenomenological content. Instead, it belongs to the intentional content that must be ideationally abstracted from the real content. The ideational abstraction, then, is the relation between functional moments of consciousness and the intentional essence. As opposed to the real content, which is comprised of individual and concrete existences, intentional content contains general and abstract parts. In this light, real content is the instantiation of the intentional essence. Hence, the relation between matter, quality and the functional moments of consciousness can be depicted in this way.

Figure 4

In his latter works, Husserl changed his mind about this relation. First he changed his conception of the phenomenological content. In the Second Edition of Logical Investigations he writes about this fact as follows: In the First Edition I wrote ‘real or phenomenological’ for ‘real’. The word ‘phenomenological’ like the word ‘descriptive’ was used in the First Apperzeptionen und Daseinssetzungen aus, wir nehmen das innerlich Erfahrene oder sonstwie innerlich Angeschaute (etwa der bloßen Phantasie) nach seinem reinen Erlebnisbestand und als bloßen exemplarischen Untergrund für Ideationen; wir schauen aus ihm ideativ allgemeine Wesen und Wesenszusammenhänge heraus - ideale Erlebnisspezies verschiedener Stufe der Generalität und ideal gültige Wesenserkenntnisse, die also für idealiter mögliche Erlebnisse der betreffenden Spezies a priori, in unbedingter Allgemeinheit gelten. So gewinnen wir Einsichten der | reinen (und hier den r e e l l e n Beständen zugewendeten) Phänomenologie, deren Deskription also eine durchaus idealwissenschaftliche ist und rein von aller ‘Erfahrung’, d. i. Mitsetzung von realem Dasein”.

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Edition only in connection with real (reelle) elements of experience, and in the present edition it has so far been used predominately in this sense. This corresponds to one’s natural starting with the psychological point of view. It became plainer and plainer, however, as I reviewed the completed Investigations and pondered on their themes more deeply – particularly from this point onwards – that the description of intentional objectivity as such, as we are conscious of it in the concrete act-experience, represents a distinct descriptive dimension where purely intuitive description may be adequately practised, a dimension opposed to that of real (reellen) actconstituents, but which also deserves to be called ‘phenomenological’. These methodological extensions lead to important extensions of the field of problems now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully conscious separation of descriptive levels (Hua XIX/1, p. 411: 2001c/354).

Thus, the Second Edition clearly states that the real as well as the intentional content belongs to the phenomenological content. This is depicted in the figure below.

Figure 5

Moreover, in Ideas I, Husserl claims the following: The knowledge of the essential two-sidedness of intentionality in the form of noesis and noema brings this consequence with it, that a systematic phenomenology should not direct its effort one-sidedly towards a real (reelle) analysis of experiences, and more specifically of the intentional kind. But the temptation to do this is at first very great, because the historical and natural movement from psychology to phenomenology brings it about that as a matter of course we take the immanent study of pure

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experiences, the study of their own proper essence, to be the study of their real components (Hua III, p. 296: 1958/359-60).34

In a note to the last sentence, he adds: “This is still the standpoint of the Logical Investigations. The nature of the facts themselves may to a considerable extent compel us to carry out noematical analyses, but these are still considered rather as indicators pointing to the parallel noetic structures: the essential parallelism of the two structures had not yet been clearly grasped” (Hua III, p. 296: 1958/360).35 The parallelism Husserl is talking about in the quoted passage is the relation between noema and noesis. In Ideas I noesis is described as the real (reell) part of the act whereas noema is characterised as the intentional component (Hua III, p. 202: 1958/257). Therefore, this parallelism is the relation between real and intentional components of the experience. However, one should not regard the term “parallelism” as the new name of ideational abstraction. In Ideas I, the intentional content is no longer the essence of the real content. Instead, it is said that both contents are correlated; what this means will be explained later. Here, however, it must be noted that the real part of the experience conditions the intentional one in such a manner that the first one is the sense-giving part whereas the second one is the given sense. To summarise, the previous sections have established that functional moments condition the sense of acts in a twofold manner: First, they animate data into appearances. Second, they constitute 34

In Husserl’s (Hua III, p. 296) original words: “Die Erkenntnis der wesentlichen Doppelseitigkeit der Intentionalität nach Noesis und Noema hat die Folge, daß eine systematische Phänomenologie nicht einseitig ihr Absehen auf eine reelle Analyse | der Erlebnisse und speziell der intentionalen richten darf. Die Versuchung dazu ist aber am Anfang sehr groß, weil der historische und natürliche Gang von der Psychologie zur Phänomenologie es mit sich bringt, daß man das immanente Studium der reinen Erlebnisse, das Studium ihres Eigenwesens wie selbstverständlich als ein solches ihrer reellen Komponenten versteht”. 35 Husserl (Hua III, p. 296): “Dies ist noch die Einstellung der ‘Log. Unters.’. In wie erheblichem Maße auch die Natur der Sachen daselbst eine Ausführung noematischer Analysen erzwingt, so werden diese doch mehr als Indices für die parallelen noetischen Strukturen angesehen; der wesensmäßige Parallelismus der beiden Strukturen ist dort noch nicht zur Klarheit gekommen”.

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meanings in purely significant acts, i.e., in acts that contain no hyletic stock. On the other hand, matter has been described as the objective or interpretative sense. All of the characteristics explained in Logical Investigations are sustained also by Ideas I. However, in the latter work the relation between real and intentional components has changed. If we interpret notions from Logical Investigations in light of the new rationalization introduced in Ideas I, the following schema appears as a result.

Figure 6

5. The intentional content as the intentional object

In Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguishes three concepts of intentional content: “… the intentional object of the act, its intentional material (as opposed to its intentional quality) and, lastly its intentional essence” (Hua XIX/1, p. 413: 2001c/113).36 Since the second and third notions have already been explained, this section will be devoted exclusively to the first notion. Husserl: “Our first concept of intentional content needs no elaborate preliminaries. It concerns the intentional object, e.g. a house when a house is presented” (Hua XIX/1, p. 414: 2001c/113). Elsewhere, 36

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 413): “Wir werden vorerst d r e i Begriffe von intentionalem Inhalt unterscheiden müssen: den i n t e n t i o n a l e n G e g e n s t a n d des Aktes, seine i n t e n t i o n a l e M a t e r i e (im Gegensatz zu seiner i n t e n t i o n a l e n Q u a l i t ä t ), endlich sein i n t e n t i o n a l e s W e s e n ”.

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he specifies: “It need only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation is the same as its actual object, and on occasion as its external object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between them” (Hua XIX/1, p. 439: 2001c/127).37 Husserl even considers whether term “intentional” can be substituted with term “real” in the sense of “thing-like”.38 However, he refuses this possibility for two main reasons. Firstly, things are not the only objects for consciousness.39 Secondly, speaking about the thing-like content is precluded by the method of his philosophy, i.e., by the “reduction to the real (reell) immanence”. Further, in Logical Investigations, he distinguishes between the object as it is intended and the object which is intended. He states: In each act an object is presented as determined in this or that manner, and as such it may be the target of varying intentions, judgmental, emotional, desiderative etc. Known connections, actual or possible, entirely external to the reality of the act, may be so cemented with it in intentional unity as to be held to attribute objective properties to the same presented object, properties not in the scope of the intention in question. Many new presentations may arise, all claiming, in virtue of an objective unity of knowledge, to be presenting the same object. In all of them the object which we intend is the same, but in each our intention differs, each means the object in a different way. The idea, e.g., of the German Emperor, presents its object as an Emperor, and as the Emperor of Germany. The man himself is the son of the 37

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 439): “Man braucht es nur auszusprechen, und | jedermann muß es anerkennen: d a ß d e r i n t e n t i o n a l e G e g e n s t a n d d e r V o r s t e l l u n g derselbe i s t w i e i h r w i r k l i c h e r u n d g e g e b e n e n f a l l s i h r ä u ß e r e r G e g e n s t a n d u n d d a ß e s widersinnig i s t , z w i s c h e n b e i d e n z u u n t e r s c h e i d e n ”. 38 He (Hua XIX/1, p. 413: 2001c/354) states: “Real would sounds much better alongside ‘intentional’ but it definitely keeps the notion of the thinglike transcendence which the reduction to real (reell) immanence in experience is meant to exclude. It is well to maintain a conscious association of the real with the thinglike”. And in Husserl’s (Hua XIX/1, p. 413) original words: “ ‘Real’ würde neben ‘intentional’ sehr viel besser klingen, aber es führt den Gedanken einer dinghaften Transzendenz, der gerade durch die Reduktion auf die reelle Erlebnisimmanenz ausgeschaltet werden sollte, sehr entschieden mit sich. Wir tun gut, dem Worte ‘real’ die Beziehung auf das Dinghafte vollbewußt beizumessen”. 39 Intellectual entities and objects of immanent insight certainly should not be classified as thing-like objects.

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Emperor Frederick III, the grandson of Queen Victoria, and has many other properties neither named nor presented. One can therefore quite consistently speak of the intentional and extra-intentional content of the object of some presentation… (Hua XIX/1, pp. 414-5: 2001c/113-4).

According to this explanation, the only difference between intentional and extra-intentional content resides in the fact that the former is presented in the act whereas the latter is not. For example, in the situation wherein what one thinks about an apple is that it is a sweet, red fruit, the object as it is intended is this apple as the red and sweet fruit. However, apple also contains other properties which are not actually presented; the total sum of these properties is the extraintentional content. Relying solely on the foregoing explanation, one may come to think that the object as it is intended is merely the part of the object which is intended. Nevertheless, a different interpretation also is possible.40

6. Intentional matter and intentional objects

In Logical Investigations, intentional matter is to be ideated from the real content of an act, more precisely, from real matter. This reading considers it the ideal, abstract and general essence of an experience, which constitutes a perceptual sense in perception and a meaning in

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Later on, in Ideas I, Husserl often says that an object as it is intended is the intentional sense of an objectifying act. Sense, in turn, is the abstract part of the experience and it should be clearly distinguished from the object which is intended (Hua III, §§ 90, 129-130). Thus, there can’t be a part-whole relation between the object as it is intended and which is intended because the former is the abstract part of the act, when act is understood as the whole composed of noesis and noema, and is entirely different from the intentional object, as the latter does not belong to the experience. The various interpretations of the notion of object as it is intended are one of the central points of controversy between Drummond and McIntyre (Smith and McIntyre 1982; Drummond 1990). This issue will be considered in detail later.

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linguistic acts.41 In contrast, an intentional object can be concrete – not abstract – and might have nothing in common with the experience. Let us consider briefly the perception of an apple. In this case, the apple is the intentional object whereas the act of perception is the total sum of the phenomenological content. Further, intentional matter is the essence which is to be abstractly ideated from the real content. In contrast, it is absurd to say that the apple can be achieved in the same way. More precisely, the relation between the real content and the intentional matter is the relation of the concrete object to the abstract one, the instantiation to the essence. On the other hand, the real, physical object like an apple is concrete and individual, and not the essence by any means. Furthermore, according to the previous explanation, matter entirely determines which object is intended in the act and in which of its properties this object given. However, matter is not the object toward which consciousness is directed. Certainly it is true that something is meant in the sense determined in matter; something is intended through this matter. But the intended entity and its intentional sense are not the same. Above all else and finally, intentional matter should be clearly distinguished from the intentional object, because this distinction is perhaps the only way to attempt to explain the fact of intentional reference in a case where an intended object does not exist. As it is known, Husserl holds that the consciousness can also be intentionally directed to non-existent objects. He states: If I represent God to myself, or an angel, or an intelligible thing-in-itself, or a physical thing or a round square etc., I mean the transcendent object named in each case, in other words my intentional object: it makes no difference whether this object exists or is imaginary or absurd. ‘The object is merely intentional’ does not, of course, mean that it exists, but only in an intention, of which it is a real (reelles) part, or that some shadow of it exists. It means rather that the intention, the reference to an object so qualified, exists, but not that the object does. If the intentional object exists, the intention, the reference, does not exist alone, but the thing referred to exists also (Hua XIX/1, pp. 439-40: 2001c/127). 41

Of course, the essence of an act is the unity of matter and quality.

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Hence, the “merely intentional” object does not belong to the real component of the act. Moreover, following Husserl, when an object does not exist, it makes no sense to talk about the “shadows of the object” or about its mental inexistence. Nevertheless, how can consciousness be directed to a non-existent object? Husserl says that although there is no object, the act refers to it, is “intentionally directed” to it. And this happens only because an act possesses content that is structured in a way that establishes such a reference. However, if any act necessarily contains matter and that act can be constituted even if no object corresponds to it, then intentional matter must be different from the intended object in at least an ontological respect. But this explanation causes difficulties in Husserl’s theory of intentionality. For example, if “the intention” and “the reference” mean the same as the relation between consciousness and an object, then there can be no such relation because there is no object, i.e., the second argument of relation. To circumvent the problem we can try the following reasoning. The matter is the structure of the intention. Further, the matter also determines which object and as what it is intended. Even if the intentional object does not exist, the act is intentionally directed to it. Next, since the object is determined only by the matter, one can further try to identify both notions and suggest the following interpretation. In a case where the intentional object does not exist, the act is directed to its sense, i.e., to the matter. Intentional matter, then, becomes the correlate of the objectless act. However, according to Husserl’s explanation, matter is a part of the act and as such it is not the target of objective reference. In other words, matter determines reference, but it is not the object of reference. Finally, we can try to interpret the terms “intention” and “intentional reference” not as relations but, as a quality of consciousness. In this sense, “intentionality” is the term for the general quality of acts, and the difference between fulfilled and empty intending acts is explained now by the difference in their qualities. This means that the actual existence of the intentional object has nothing in common with the structure of the experience. Empty act A that is directed to object O

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differs from fulfilled act B that is directed to the same object O because those acts have different qualities. One has a quality of presentation and other has a quality of empty intending act. Of course, this standpoint is still not free from difficulties. One may raise the question of what determines differences between act’s qualities. If the answer is “matter”, one can further ask why the matter in one instance determines presentational quality and in another instance empty-intending quality? Therefore, an unsatisfactory solution results, although there are many ways to try to find a conclusive one. The attempts sketched in the previous two paragraphs were meant merely to point out some difficulties in Husserl’s theory of intentionality and to present differences between the matter of an act and an intentional object. Consequently, the ontological and logical distinction of the former from the latter becomes evident.

Final notes

Certainly, most notions considered in this chapter can be further specified. Nevertheless, as the author believes, the analogy between the intentional essence and noema will be sufficiently clear without further consideration of subjects in Logical Investigations. It must be emphasized here that in the present study the notion of the unity of intentional matter and quality is regarded as the conceptual antecedent of noema. Evidence to support that conviction will be presented after the second chapter. For now, discussions on the subject of Logical Investigations are finished and the next step will be devoted exclusively to the conception of noema found in Ideas I.

Chapter II

Noema and noetic-noematic correlation in Ideas I

Twelve years after the publication of Logical Investigations, Max Niemeyer published Ideas I (1913). This work is regarded as the official beginning of the study of transcendental phenomenology. It was also the first time that the issue of noema and noetic-noematic correlation was addressed. Ideas I is essentially a continuation of Logical Investigations. However, Husserl repeatedly suggested differences between those works. The most important one concerns the conception of intentionality. In Ideas I intentional components, i.e., matter and quality are not the same as the essence of the act. Instead they are correlated with the functional moments and this relationship is by no means an ideational abstraction. Moreover, this conception of correlation in Ideas I is supported by the new terminology. Instead of speaking of relationships between the intentional essence and real moments, Husserl talks about the correlation between noema and noesis. However, the contribution of Ideas I is not limited to the new terminology. Included in there are a number of improvements with respect to the conception of intentionality and some of these will be explained here in detail. This chapter is devoted to the presentation of Husserl’s idea of noema and noetic-noematic correlation as found in Ideas I. In order to specify the nature of noema, Husserl’s original words will be interpreted in the light of different kinds of “transcendence” and in the context of contemporary notions of “dependent variation” and “supervenience”. The prefatory section comprises an outline of the structures of noesis and noema as well as general contextual information. The following sections are devoted to a detailed analysis of the noeticnoematic correlation. They raise a number of issues, including: 1) the type of relation, i.e., whether it is a one-to-one or many-to-one

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connection, 2) the type of transcendence between an act’s components, and 3) the type of dependency of noema on noesis. Simultaneously, attention is given to numerous difficulties caused by these conceptions, as well as to some possible solutions for the problems. The last section exposes “dependent variation” as the hard core of supervenience and the relationship between the components of the acts. The noetic-noematic correlation is examined in the light of nine postulates for supervenient stuffs.

1. The structure of noema and noesis

In Ideas I, Husserl divided phenomenological content into the real and the intentional components. The real components he calls noesis, whereas the intentional components he calls noema (Hua III, §§ 85-90). According to him, the phenomenological content is possible to be investigated only in the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenological attitude is in turn conditioned by the phenomenological reduction (Hua III, §§ 56-62). Noesis and noema are the only resulting residuum of this reduction. Therefore, any content that is different from noetic-noematic formations lies beyond the competency of phenomenology. Let us consider noesis first. Noesis is regarded as real content which is structured in a manner analogous to the real content presented in Logical Investigations. From this, noesis is the unity of two kinds of moments, i.e., functional moments and hyletic data. Duality as such, is fundamental to all sensuous acts. Husserl said: “Be that as it may, this remarkable duality and unity of sensuous ΰλη and intentive µορφή plays a dominant role in the whole phenomenological sphere” and he adds: “Sensuous Data present themselves as stuffs for intentive formings, or sense-bestowings, belonging to different levels, for simple formings and formings which are founded in peculiar manner…” (Hua III, pp. 192-3: 1983/204). Sensuous data then are intentionally formed by functional noetic moments into the unities of sense.

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It must be also noted that in the strict sense, only the functional moments should be considered noetic (Hua III, §§ 85-6). Despite this fact, Husserl refers to noesis many times as to the unity of data and functional moments (Hua III, p. 258, §§ 85-90, § 98). In the present work, the terms “functional moments” and “pure noetic moments” will be used to refer to noesis sensu stricto. Instead, the terms “noetic moment” and “real phenomenological moment” refer to the unity of functional moments and data. The reason why Husserl does not want to call sensuous data noetic lies in his conviction that only functional moments are factors, on account of which an act can be called “conscious”. In other words, those moments condition consciousness sensu stricto. Husserl: “What forms the materials into intentional experiences and brings in the specific element of intentionality is the same as that which gives its specific meaning to our use of the term ‘consciousness’, in accordance with which consciousness points eo ipso to something of which it is the consciousness” (Hua III, p. 194: 1958/249).42 For those factors, he introduces the terms “noetic moment” and “noesis” (Hua III, p. 194: 1958/249). The new terminology makes it clear that the phenomenon of consciousness is inherent to functional moments. It is also free from the equivocation that is characteristic for traditional terms. Husserl: “Now since the terms ‘phases of consciousness’, ‘awarenesses’, and all similar constructions, and the term ‘intentional phases’ likewise have become quite unusable through manifold equivocations,…we introduce the term noetic phase, or, more briefly put, noesis. These noeses constitute the specifications of ‘Nous’ in the widest sense of the term…” (Hua III, p. 194: 1958/249).43 Finally, term “Nous” refers to “sense” (Sinn). This is a 42

Husserl (Hua III, p. 194): “Was die Stoffe zu intentionalen Erlebnissen formt und das Spezifische der Intentionalität hereinbringt, ist eben dasselbe wie das, was der Rede vom Bewußtsein seinen spezifischen Sinn gibt: wonach eben Bewußtsein eo ipso auf etwas hindeutet, wovon es Bewußtsein ist”. 43 Husserl (Hua III, p. 194): “Da nun die Rede von Bewußtseinsmomenten, Bewußtheiten und allen ähnlichen Bildungen, und desgleichen die Rede von intentionalen Momenten durch vielfältige und im weiteren deutlich hervortretende Äquivokationen ganz unbrauchbar ist, führen wir den Terminus n o e t i s c h e s

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welcome advantage since the “sense – giving” or “sense-bestowal” (Sinngebung) abilities are fundamental for real functional moments of consciousness (Hua III, p. 194: 1958/249). As was explained before, pure noetic moments are considered to be functional ones. They “animate” or “interpret” data into unities of sense. Moreover, they “give” or “bestow” sense in acts which do not contain hyletic stock. They therefore fulfil a functional role. Nevertheless, the term “function” in this sense differs from its use in mathematics. Husserl: “Yet the greatest problems of all are the functional problems, or those of the ‘constituting of the objective field of consciousness’. They concern the way in which, for instance, in respect of Nature, noeses, animating the material, and weaving themselves into unitary manifolds, into continuous syntheses, so bring into being the consciousness of something…” and further “ ‘Function’ in this sense (totally different from the mathematical) is something wholly unique, grounded in the pure essence of noeses. Consciousness is just consciousness ‘of’ something; it is its essential nature to conceal ‘meaning’ within itself, the quintessence of ‘soul’, so to speak, of ‘mind’, of ‘reason’” (Hua III, p. 196: 1958/251).44 Finally, he considers the noetic side of experience as psychical. However, he stipulates that the term “psychic” cannot be meant in a psychological sense. Husserl: “There would also be good grounds for referring to this noetic side of experiences as the psychical” and “But as M o m e n t oder, kürzer gefaßt, N o e s e ein. Diese Noesen machen das Spezifische des N u s i m w e i t e s t e n S i n n e des Wortes aus…” 44 Husserl (Hua III, p. 196): Doch die allergrößten Probleme sind die f u n k t i o n e l l e n P r o b l e m e , bzw. die der ‘K o n s t i t u t i o n d e r B e w u ß t s e i n s g e g e n s t ä n d l i c h k e i t e n ’. Sie betreffen die Art, wie z.B. hinsichtlich der Natur, Noesen, das Stoffliche beseelend und sich zu mannigfaltig-einheitlichen Kontinuen und Synthesen verflechtend, Bewußtsein von Etwas so zustande bringen, daß objektive Einheit der Gegenständlichkeit sich darin einstimmig ‘bekunden’, ‘ausweisen’ und ‘vernünftig’ bestimmen lassen kann. ‘F u n k t i o n ’ in diesem Sinn (einem total verschiedenen gegenüber dem der Mathematik) ist etwas ganz Einzigartiges, im reinen W e s e n der Noesen Gründendes. Bewußtsein ist eben Bewußtsein ‘von’ etwas, es ist sein Wesen, ‘Sinn’, sozusagen die Quintessenz von ‘Seele’, ‘Geist’, ‘Vernunft’ in sich zu bergen.

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against the use of the word ‘psychical’ as the equivalent of intentionality, there is this to urge, that it would be without any doubt unsuitable to indicate the psychical in this sense, and the psychical in the sense of psychological (of that which is the distinctive object of psychology) in the same way” (Hua III, p. 194-5: 1958/249-50).45 Each experience is also composed of intentional content (i.e., noema) that is strictly connected or, as Husserl would say, correlated with noesis. This means that any real moment is bound up with some intentional one. Husserl: “Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real (reellen) noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in really pure (wirklich reiner) intuition, and in a correlative ‘noematic content’, or briefly ‘noema’…” (Hua III, p. 203: 1958/258).46 Certainly, noema is not the object toward which consciousness is directed, as it belongs to the experience whereas the same does not hold true for intentional object.47 Therefore, the correlation that binds noesis and noema is not the same as the relation between an act and the object.48 According to Husserl, noema differs from the intentional object in that the former is the objective sense that belongs to the experience and the latter is the entity that transcends the act. He states: The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning – the meaning of this perception, something that belongs 45

Husserl (Hua III, pp. 194-5): “Es hätte auch guten Grund, diese noetische Seite der Erlebnisse als die p s y c h i s c h e zu bezeichnen … Was aber gegen den Gebrauch des Wortes als Äquivalent für Intentionalität spricht, ist der Umstand, daß es zweifellos nicht angeht, das Psychische in diesem Sinne und das Psychische im Sinne des Psychologischen (also dessen, was das eigentümliche Objekt der Psychologie ist) in gleicher Weise zu bezeichnen”. 46 Husserl (Hua III, p. 203): “Überall entspricht den mannigfaltigen Daten des reellen, noetischen Gehaltes eine Mannigfaltigkeit in wirklich reiner Intuition aufweisbarer Daten in einem korrelativen ‘n o e m a t i s c h e n G e h a l t ’, oder kurzweg im ‘N o e m a ’ - Termini, die wir von nun ab beständig gebrauchen werden”. 47 See also: (Hua III §§ 88-89). 48 This case will be explained in more detail in the next paragraph.

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necessarily to its essence – cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties (Hua III, p. 205: 1958/260-1).49

On the other hand, despite noema is regarded as the object as it is intended, it represents the intentional object in no manner. In a strict sense, noema is not a separate entity belonging to the real content of the experience. Any standpoint that classifies noema as the kind of immanent object leads to the infinite regress that is characteristic for “image theories”. Husserl: A second immanent tree, or even an ‘inner image’ of the real tree that stands out there before me, is nowise given, and to suppose such a thing by way of assumption leads only to absurdity. The copy as a real (reelles) element in psychologically–real perception would again be a reality (ein Reales) that functioned for another as image. But it could do this only through a representational form of consciousness in which for the first time something appeared- giving us a first intentionality- and this in its turn as an ‘image-object’ functioned consciously for another such object, wherewith a second intentionality based on the first would be necessary. But it is no less evident that each one of these ways of being conscious already calls for the distinction between immanent and real object, and thus contains in itself the very problem that was to have been solved through the construction (Hua III, p. 208: 1958/263).50 49

Husserl (Hua III, p. 205): “D e r B a u m s c h l e c h t h i n , das Ding in der Natur, ist nichts weniger als dieses B a u m w a h r g e n o m m e n e a l s s o l c h e s , das als Wahrnehmungssinn zur Wahrnehmung und unabtrennbar gehört. Der Baum schlechthin kann abbrennen, sich in seine chemischen Elemente auflösen usw. Der Sinn aber - Sinn d i e s e r Wahrnehmung, ein notwendig zu ihrem Wesen Gehöriges - kann nicht abbrennen, er hat keine chemischen Elemente, keine Kräfte, keine realen Eigenschaften”. 50 Husserl (Hua III, p. 208): “Ein zweiter immanenter Baum oder auch ein ‘inneres Bild’ des wirklichen, dort draußen vor mir stehenden Baumes ist doch in keiner Weise gegeben, und dergleichen hypothetisch zu supponieren, führt nur auf Widersinn. Das Abbild als reelles Stück in der psychologisch-realen Wahrnehmung wäre wieder ein Reales - ein Reales, das für ein anderes als Bild f u n g i e r t e . Das könnte es aber nur vermöge eines Abbildungsbewußtseins, in welchem erst einmal etwas erschiene - womit wir eine erste Intentionalität hätten - und dieses wieder bewußtseinsmäßig als ‘Bildobjekt’ für ein anderes fungierte - wozu eine zweite, in der ersten fundierte Intentionalität notwendig wäre. Nicht minder evident ist aber,

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Hence, noema is not an object toward which consciousness is directed, but it also cannot be regarded as some kind of immanent entity that serves as a copy of an intentional object. Instead, it is the component of an act through which (or by virtue of which) consciousness is directed to the object. In other words, noema is the objective sense that determines the objective reference of an act (Hua III, pp. 208-9, §§ 97100, 128-133). Next, noema is an abstract object.51 This means that it is part of the act and it cannot occur without any connection to the noetic moments of the experience. The same holds true for noesis, as this part of the act cannot occur without connection to the noema. Furthermore, in harmony with the previous explanations, noema is the intentional sense of any experience. As such, noema is entirely determined by the noesis since noesis is the “sense-giving” side of an act. Noetic-noematic correlation is the relationship between the side of the act that “bestows” sense and the bestowed sense. From this, it can be said that noema is dependent on noesis (Hua III, § 98).52 It is also true that different noemata can determine one object but the same noemata cannot determine different objects (Hua III, pp. 302-3, § 94, 131).53 What is more, the same noema can be constituted in daß jede einzelne dieser Bewußtseinsweisen schon die Unterscheidung zwischen immanentem und wirklichem Objekt fordert, also dasselbe Problem in sich beschließt, das durch die Konstruktion gelöst werden sollte”. 51 The conception of abstraction that is used to specify the notion of noema is exploited in Logical Investigations to establish the notion of an abstract part, i.e., a moment. In this reading noema is an abstract part of an act because it depends entirely on noesis and, as such, it can occur in no way other than as part of a noeticnoematic whole. The same holds true for noesis, which is also abstract. However, there is a significant difference concerning the manners in which these components of an act are dependent. Noema is bestowed by noesis; whereas noesis necessarily “produces” noema. 52 This case will be explained later in greater detail. 53 Of course we can raise the question of indefinite descriptions, i.e., whether the same noema which, e.g., functions in the sense of expressions such as “a black horse” can or cannot determine a reference to different individual objects. Many black horses can be meant by this noema. In particular situation, persons A and B can constitute the same noema and still establish reference to different individual horses. However, when A and B constitute noema, i.e., the exact sense of the expression “a black horse”, they do not yet refer to different individual objects, but

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individually different acts (Hua III, § 94). This suggests that noema does not have “real properties”, i.e., it has neither temporal nor spatial characteristics, and, as such, cannot be classified as belonging to the domain of individual existence. According to Ideas I, noema has a complicated structure. It can be treated similarly to the set of moments dividable into partial subsets. Metaphorically speaking, the central point of every noema is occupied by the “nucleus” of its noematic core, i.e., by “the pure X”.54 This is the unity of sense through which something is meant as the subject. Husserl said that: “...it is the central point of connection or the ‘bearer’ of the predicates, but in no way is it a unity of them in the sense in which any complex, any combination, of the predicates would be called a unity” (Hua III, p. 301: 1983/313). The content of the core, in turn, comprises the set of noematic senses of objective properties. The core and its nucleus together constitute unity which, depending on the context and within a narrow meaning, is to be called perceptual or linguistic sense (Sinn). This unity can be also regarded in some situations as the noematic object. The last subset that can be distinguished in the noematic content embraces a set of intentional, thetic characters (Hua III, §§ 99-103). Husserl claims that this volume has a lamellar structure. On several separate levels one can find characters like, e.g. doxic characters, to a general one instead, which corresponds to the description. In this very moment they refer to the same object via the same intentional sense, i.e., noema. Of course, A and B can find instantiations of “a black horse”, but when this happen their noemata change with respect to the individual endowment of each object. Nevertheless, before instantiations are found, persons A and B refer to the same general black horse. 54 Husserl (Hua III, p. 299: 1983/311): “It is not the just designated core itself but rather something else which, so to speak, makes up the necessary central point of the core and functions as ‘bearer’ for noematic peculiarities specifically belonging to the core, that is to say, the noematically modified properties of the ‘meant as meant’”. And in Husserl’s (Hua III, p. 299) original words: „Es ist nicht der eben bezeichnete Kern selbst, sondern etwas, das sozusagen den notwendigen Zentralpunkt des Kerns ausmacht und als ‘Träger’ für ihm speziell zugehörige noematische Eigenheiten fungiert, nämlich für die noematisch modifizierten Eigenschaften des ‘Vermeinten als solchen’”.

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aesthetical characters, and characters which are brought to act by different modes of presentation. Hence, the structure of noema is to be understood as a set of three subsets: the nucleus (= X), the core, and the set of intentional characters. In this fashion, noema can be depicted in following manner:

Figure 7

To constitute the simplest noematic formation, the nucleus X and the core have to contain at least one moment each.55 Moreover, the set of noematic characters must include some modification of the doxic character and the character of presentation, e.g. perceptual, judgmental, etc. These conditions are necessary and sufficient for constitution.56 Noema, as it is composed and in terms of the moments it contains, is entirely determined by noesis. Husserl calls this determination “sensebestowing” (Sinngebung) (Hua III, p. 194: 1983/213). Thus, each noematic moment, as an elementary unity of sense, is “bestowed” by a correlated noetic moment. In this light, one may distinguish in noesis the subset that determines the noematic nucleus and the subset responsible 55

Note that to Husserl, the pure X is the non-complicated moment of noema. Husserl didn’t distinguish any of its components, which, of course, doesn’t make it impossible to analyse or restrain us from interpreting it as a set. However, in Ideas I pure X appears as a simple, singular moment located in the centre of a noematic core. 56 The provided explanation doesn’t take into account the widely shared interpretation in harmony with which noema has a quasi-objective or even an objective structure (see: Paśniczek 1987, Drummond 1990, Gurwitsch 1964).

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for bestowing of the total content of the noematic core. A subset can be also discriminated that comprises noetic moments constitutional for the noematic characters.57 On the other hand, however, noesis can be also divided into a dynamic side, where pure noetic moments reside, and the passive side of hyletic data. Of course, such a division is not universal since not every act includes hyletic components. Noesis and noema fashioned as above are viewed as the two fundamental components of experience. The latter, i.e., the intentional act, is treated as the whole that contains the “reell” (Hua III, pp. 202, 225), “real” (1958, p. 257), “really inherent” (1983, p. 213) noetic component, and the “intentional” (Hua III, p. 202; 1958, p. 257), “intentive” (1983, p. 213) or “nichtreell” (Hua III, p. 225), “non-real” (1958, p. 282), “really non-inherent” (1983, p. 213) or “ideell” (Hua III, p. 233), “ideal” (1958, p. 291) “ideally inherent” (1983, p. 244) noematic one.58

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Nevertheless, the structures of noesis and noema are isomorphic by no means. Husserl (Hua III, p. 230: 1983/241): “One can project a theory of the universal and pure forms of noemata which would have as its contrasting correlate a theory of the universal and no less pure forms of concrete noetic mental processes with their hyletic and specifically noetic components. Naturally these two theories would by no means be related as, so to speak, mutual reflections; nor would the one be transformed into the other by a mere change of sign, let us say, by substituting ‘consciousness of N’ for each noema N”. And (Hua III, p. 230): “Man kann e i n e a l l g e m e i n e u n d r e i n e F o r m e n l e h r e d e r N o e m a t a entwerfen, welcher k o r r e l a t i v gegenüberstehen würde eine allgemeine und nicht minder reine F o r m e n l e h r e d e r k o n k r e t e n n o e t i s c h e n E r l e b n i s s e mit ihren h y l e t i s c h e n und s p e z i f i s c h n o e t i s c h e n Komponenten. Natürlich würden sich diese beiden Formenlehren keineswegs sozusagen wie S p i e g e l b i l d e r zueinander verhalten oder wie durch eine bloße Vorzeichenänderung ineinander übergehen; etwa so, daß wir jedem Noema N substituierten ‘Bewußtsein von N’”. 58 See also the third and the fourth chapter of Ideen I, especially paragraph 88: “Reelle und intentionale Erlebniskomponenten. Das Noema” (Hua III, p. 202).

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2. The noetic-noematic correlation 2.1. Preparatory remarks

It might seem at first sight that the concept of noetic-noematic correlation falls into a more general thesis, namely that every act of consciousness is about something. To be conscious, then, means to be directed toward some object, and it is the manner in which ego does this that is called “being conscious” here. Nevertheless, as it was previously mentioned, the noetic-noematic correlation is not the same as the relation between consciousness and its object; they are equal by no means, and for that reason they should be clearly distinguished. Husserl: In advance, however, we must impress upon ourselves that the parallelism between the unity of the object noematically ‘meant’ in such and such a way, the unity of the object in the ‘sense,’ and the constituting formations of consciousness (‘ordo et connexio rerum – ordo et connexio idearum’) must not be confused with the parallelism between noesis and noema … (Hua III, p. 232: 1983/243).59

Roughly speaking, these relations can be meant as a parallelism between an act of consciousness and some transcendent object, e.g. an object of external perception like a flower or a cigarette, and as a parallelism between two components of one act, i.e., between noesis and noema. In some measure, both relations can be explained by using one of Husserl’s well known examples. Thus, consider the following: “the victor at Jena “and “the vanquished at Waterloo”. Both utterances refer to the same object, i.e., to Napoleon. However, each of them does so in different manner, as at one time Napoleon is described as “the victor at 59

Husserl (Hua III, p. 232): “Einprägen müssen wir uns aber im voraus, daß der P a r a l l e l i s m u s zwischen der E i n h e i t d e s n o e m a t i s c h s o u n d s o ‘v e r m e i n t e n ’ G e g e n s t a n d e s , des Gegenstandes im ‘Sinne’, und der k o n s t i t u i e r e n d e n B e w u ß t s e i n s g e s t a l t u n g e n (‘ordo et connexio rerum —ordo et connexio idearum’) n i c h t v e r w e c h s e l t w e r d e n d a r f m i t d e m P a r a l l e l i s m u s v o n N o e s i s u n d N o e m a , insbesondere verstanden als Parallelismus noetischer und entsprechender noematischer Charaktere”.

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Jena” and, at another time, as “the vanquished at Waterloo”. According to Husserl, Napoleon is the object which is judged, whereas “Napoleon as victorious” and “Napoleon as vanquished” are two examples of the object as it is judged. In this context, the first parallelism is the relation between the act of judging and Napoleon taken as the object which is judged. The second parallelism, in turn, makes use of the concept of the object as it is judged. In the latter notion, what must be emphasised is the fact that it refers to the content of judgment, i.e., to the sense of the sentence that is noema, and not to the state of affairs. Husserl: …the total What which is judged – and, moreover, taken precisely in the fashion (with the characterization, in the mode of givenness) in which it is ‘intended to’ in the mental process – makes up the full noematic correlate, the ‘sense’ (in the broadest signification of the word) of the judgmental process (Hua III, pp. 216-7: 1983/228).60

Hence, noema: “…should be understood as the ‘judgment’ or proposition in the sense of the word in pure logic…” (Hua III, p. 218: 1983/229).61 This makes the second parallelism easy to explain, since it is just the relation between the act of judgment and the judgmental sense. Act is the same as noesis, whereas sense is noema. In terms of Husserl’s example, this parallelism is the relation between the experience which is directed toward Napoleon and the one of its senses, i.e., “Napoleon as victorious” or “as vanquished”. However, two important points must be stressed here.

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Husserl (Hua III, pp. 216-7): “Das aus ihnen geformte Ganze, d a s g e s a m t e geurteilte Was und zudem genau so genommen, mit der C h a r a k t e r i s i e r u n g , in der G e g e b e n h e i t s w e i s e , in der es im Erlebnis ‘Bewußtes’ ist, bildet das v o l l e n o e m a t i s c h e K o r r e l a t , den (weitest verstandenen) ‘S i n n ’ des Urteilserlebnisses. Prägnanter gesprochen, ist es der ‘Sinn im Wie seiner Gegebenheitsweise’, soweit diese an ihm als Charakter vorfindlich ist”. 61 Husserl (Hua III, p. 218): “Eben dieses wäre dann zu verstehen als das ‘Urteil’, bzw. der S a t z i m r e i n l o g i s c h e n S i n n e …”

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Firstly, the concept of act is ambiguous since, as regards the first parallelism, it indicates an experience which is comprised of noesis and noema and, in the second case, it points only to noesis. And, secondly, the foregoing explanation defines noema as the sense of linguistic acts. Nevertheless, according to Husserl, noema is also the sense of any kind of experience. Thus, in perception there is an object as it is perceived that must be distinguished from an object which is perceived; the same is true as regards immanently directed acts and acts of intellectual insight etc. Husserl: Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived. Similarly, the current case of remembering has its remembered as remembered, just as it is , precisely as it is ‘meant’, ‘intended to’ in ; again, the judging has the judged as judged, liking has the liked as liked, and so forth. In every case the noematic correlate, which is called ‘sense’ here (in a very extended signification) is to be taken precisely as it inheres ‘immanently’ in the mental process of perceiving, of judging, of liking; and so forth; that is, just as it is offered to us when we inquire purely into this mental process itself (Hua III, p. 203: 1983/214).62

Then, to summarise, all the notions that have been considered up to now can be organized in the following manner.

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Husserl (Hua III, p. 203): “Die Wahrnehmung z.B. hat ihr Noema, zu unterst ihren Wahrnehmungssinn, d.h. das W a h r g e n o m m e n e a l s s o l c h e s . Ebenso hat die jeweilige Erinnerung ihr E r i n n e r t e s a l s s o l c h e s eben als das ihre, genau wie es in ihr ‘Gemeintes’, ‘Bewußtes’ ist; wieder das Urteilen das G e u r t e i l t e a l s s o l c h e s , das Gefallen das Gefallende als solches usw. Überall ist das noematische Korrelat, das hier (in sehr erweiterter Bedeutung) ‘Sinn’ heiß, genau so zu nehmen, wie es im Erlebnis der Wahrnehmung des Urteils, des Gefallens usw. ‘immanent’ liegt, d.h. wie es, wenn w i r r e i n d i e s e s E r l e b n i s s e l b s t b e f r a g e n , uns von ihm dargeboten wird”.

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Figure 8

2.2. The one-to-one relation between noesis and noema

As regards the noetic-noematic formations, it undoubtedly must be accepted that in any possible instance the volume of the noemata and noematic parts cannot be greater than the volume of the noeses and noetic parts. More precisely, no matter how many partial acts result from dividing a stream of consciousness, and no matter how many noematic moments can be distinguished in a particular noema, it holds true without exception that the set of whole noemata cannot be greater than set of noeses and, respectively, a set of noematic moments cannot be greater than a set of noetic moments. Initially, the following reasons can be provided for this. (1) Husserl claims that noema is: “…an object, but one that is wholly dependent. Its esse consists exclusively in its ‘percipi’…” (Hua III, p. 229-30: 1958/287).63 (2) Moreover, as regards the Eidos of noema and noesis he holds that: “…the Eidos of the noema points to the Eidos of the noetic consciousness; both belong eidetically together” (Hua III, p. 230: 1958/287).64 The second point stress that the Eidos of noesis and the Eidos of noema “both belong eidetically together”. This means that both sides of 63

Husserl (Hua III, pp. 229-30): “... ein Gegenstand, aber ein durchaus u n s e l b s t ä n d i g e r . Sein e s s e besteht ausschließlich in seinem ‘p e r c i p i ’ — nur daß dieser Satz nichts weniger als im Berkeleyschen Sinne gilt, da das percipi das esse hier ja nicht als reelles Bestandstück enthält”. 64 Husserl (Hua III, p. 230): “…das Eidos des Noema weist auf das Eidos des noetischen Bewußtseins hin, beide gehören e i d e t i s c h zusammen”.

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an act are essentially interconnected, that is, lack of one of them entails lack of another. They cannot occur separately, without each other, and this impossibility is based on essential laws, i.e., the strongest phenomenological base. Hence, their existential dependency seems to be certain here. Furthermore, the first point says that noema’s “...esse consist exclusively in its ‘percipi…’”. This statement, when combined with (2), makes it clear that there cannot be a noema without a noesis specifically belonging to it (3). Hence, the set of noemata cannot be greater than the set of noeses. Next, as regards correlation between noetic and noematic moments, the following arguments can be brought out. (4) Husserl sustains that: “…there can be no noetic moment without a noematic moment specifically belonging to it” (Hua III, p. 215: 1983/226; see also: Mohanty 1972).65 And (5): “…it is also true that the essences, noema and noesis, are mutually inseparable: every lowest difference on the noematic side points eidetically back to lowest differences of the noetic. This naturally applies to all formations of genus and species” (Hua III, p. 296: 1958/359).66 These two arguments, when considered together, claim that for every noematic difference there is a corresponding noetic difference (6). Whether (6) obtains the opposite direction depends on how the term “specifically” from the fourth point is understood. If it means that any individual noetic moment n constitutes noematic part m in a way that n is the only moment that can constitute m, then it holds true that any noetic difference entails a noematic one. This conclusion seems to agree with the fact that noeses are individual beings. More precisely, for any noetic moments n1 and n2 it holds true that they are two separate, individual entities. When these moments constitute, each for itself, one and the same noematic part m, differences between them conditioned by 65

Husserl (Hua III, p. 215): “Denn k e i n n o e t i s c h e s M o m e n t o h n e e i n i h m s p e z i f i s c h z u g e h ö r i g e s n o e m a t i s c h e s M o m e n t , so lautet das sich überall bewährende Wesensgesetz”. 66 Husserl (Hua III, p. 296): “Es gilt dann aber auch, daß die Wesen Noema und Noesis voneinander unabtrennbar sind: Jede niederste Differenz auf der noematischen Seite weist eidetisch zurück auf niederste Differenzen der noetischen. Das überträgt sich natürlich auf alle Gattungs- und Artbildungen”.

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their individual natures must have resulted in the content of the correlated noema, i.e., in the content of m. One time it could be the change in the manner of how the ego intends the object, another time, the change in the objective content that is meant. Nevertheless, no matter what the part of noema is affected by the change; it seems rather obvious that individual differences between noetic moments must generate some “specific” differences in the noematic content. Those differences cannot be replayed since noeses are individual and cannot be reconstituted as exactly the same. When we agree with the foregoing, we must also agree that for every noematic difference there is a corresponding noetic difference and vice versa (6’). In more precise words: if any moment x from any set (noetic or noematic) is replaced by some moment y, then in the correlated set a moment x` which corresponds to x is replaced by y` which corresponds to y. In this light, a set of noematic moments cannot be greater than a set of noetic moments. This holds true in the opposite direction, as a set of noetic parts also cannot be greater than a set of noematic moments. Both sets then must be equal and their elements related in a one-to-one manner. On the other hand, if the term “specifically” means that any individual noetic moment n constitutes noematic part m in a way that n by the fact of its existence must constitute m but n is not the only moment that can do that, then it holds true that some noetic differences do not entail noematic ones. Basically, n can be replaced by some other noetic moment that is capable of the constitution of m. Certainly, both interpretations of the term “specifically” generate different conceptions of noetic-noematic correlation. The case is not simple, since each interpretation is consistent with different parts of Husserl’s work. What is more, they seem to be rather incompatible when considered together. But, no matter what the solution of this case is, now it is plain that every noematic difference is conditioned by the correlated noetic difference. This is consistent with both interpretations. Thus, changes of noematic moments strictly depend on noetic changes. Noema varies if noesis varies. Therefore, this relation can be also called a dependent variation since variation of noema depends on variation of noesis.

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2.3. The “many noeses to one noema” relation

The intention of the previous section was to emphasise the strict correlation between the act’s components. It was said that every noematic difference is entailed by a noetic one. On that basis, there was further disclosure of the interpretation according to which the sets of noematic and noetic moments can be regarded as equal and related in a one-to-one manner. There was also emphasis on the second reading, which states that the set of different noeses can constitute one and the same noema. This latter case will be further called the question of manyto-one relation between noeses and noema, and the current section will attempt to explain it. In Husserl’s writings there can be found at least three different interpretations of the many-to-one relation. The first two are determined by the phenomenological conception of meaning, which emphasises the possibility of summoning exactly the same sense by different egos. Such situation occurs, for example, when a class is taking an exam in mathematics. Here, for all students, when they consider the same value, they perform acts which constitute the same noema. However, every person performs an individual act that is different from the experiences of other students. Hence, one and the same notion, i.e., noema, can be constituted in many different acts (noeses) of many different people. This conclusion is also the first interpretation of the many-to-one relation between noeses and noema. Furthermore, the phenomenological conception of meaning simultaneously stresses that the same sense can be constituted by one person at different times. For example, if one knows what an Eiffel Tower is, one may refer to it in exactly the same sense at will. However, acts are individual since they have duration. This means that experiences differ among one another even when they point to the same noema. Then, anytime when one refers to the Eiffel Tower, the meaning can be the same but the acts necessarily differ in all instances. This context specifies the second interpretation of the many-to-one relation which states that many different noeses can constitute exactly the same noema in the range of the one stream of consciousness.

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Next, the third interpretation requires the intentional experience to be analysed in the light of the internal time consciousness. This makes the whole case much more complicated than previous instances, and for that reason, the next few paragraphs will be devoted exclusively to its explanation. According to Husserl, if a given object, e.g. thing O, is not grasped at one glance but careful attention is paid to it, then the perceiving process that intentionally points to O contains more than one stage, i.e., it contains some plurality of substages.67 Each particular stage is primarily constituted in the temporal “now” which is one of the forms of phenomenological time. The latter, when regarded in its totality, is the general form of the activity of consciousness (Hua X, pp. 295-97: 1991/306-8). And this, abstracted from phenomenological time “now” and fulfilled by the content that constitutes the consciousness of O, will here be called act A. A as a stage of mental process is a part of a more comprehensive whole that includes its predecessor and successor. These latter are also acts but they are different from A; however, they still point to the same object O. The predecessor of A is an act which was in the mode “now” before A. The successor of A is an act which will be in the mode “now” 67

Husserl (Hua III, p. 231: 1983/242): “Where, for example, different segments of an enduring perceiving which is constituting a physical-thing unity shows something identical, the one tree unchanging according to the sense of this perceiving – given now in this, then in that orientation, now from the front, now from the back, at first indistinctly and indeterminately, then distinctly and determinately with respect to the properties of one or another place sized upon visually - : there the object found in the noema is intended to as an identical object in the literal sense, but the consciousness of it is a non-identical, only combined, continuously united consciousness in the different segments of its immanent duration”. And in Husserl’s (Hua III, p. 231) original words: „Wo z.B. verschiedene Abschnitte eines dauernden, Dingeinheit konstituierenden Wahrnehmens ein Identisches, diesen einen, im Sinne dieses Wahrnehmens unveränderten Baum zeigen—sich jetzt in dieser Orientierung gebend, dann in jener, jetzt von der Vorderseite, dann von der Rückseite, hinsichtlich der visuell erfaßten Beschaffenheiten irgendeiner Stelle zuerst undeutlich und unbestimmt, dann deutlich und bestimmt u. dgl.—da ist der im Noema vorfindliche Gegenstand bewußt als ein identischer im wörtlichen Sinne, das Bewußtsein von ihm ist aber in den verschiedenen Abschnitten seiner immanenten Dauer ein nichtidentisches, ein nur verbundenes, kontinuierlich einiges”.

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after A. And when A’s successor is in the mode “now”, A is retentionally modified into time’s characteristic “just now”, or, from a different point of view, “before”. Next, in the period when A’s content fulfils time’s form “now”, its successor occupies the form characterised as “after”. All of these acts are intentionally interconnected; they point to the same object O and can be treated as stages of one simple mental process. The point is they are also intentionally presented in the form “now”, although that most of them are additionally modified in a retentional or protentional manner. How is this possible? Basically, A’s predecessor participates in the form “now”, as an act that has already been finished, whereas A’s successor participates as the one which is anticipated as the nearest to the “now” mode, as the one which will shortly be in A’s place, next to A (Hua X, pp. 234-6: 1991/242-4). Hence, despite the fact that A’s predecessor and successor are modified, all of them participate in the temporal “now” which is the primary form of A (Hua X, pp. 230-2: 1991/237-9). This is the main reason why experience A should also be regarded as the synthetic act that unifies the modified and unmodified content of consciousness.68 Thus, the act A gains two different interpretations. The first interpretation suggests treating A as the only content that fulfils the form “now”. This means that in this content there is no room for retentional or protentional intentions. Such an interpretation establishes the narrow concept of an act in accordance with which the form “now” can contain only intentions which, having already “slipped” from protention, are not yet retentionally modified. However, this interpretation generates difficulty that is brought by the fact that every concrete experience is also comprised of retentionally and protentionally modified experiences. This means that every act that is composed of A, is also composed of A’s predecessor and successor. Such an explanation is the second interpretation of A (Hua X, pp. 297-310: 1991/308-22).

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See: (Hua X, §§ 10, 12, 25-6, 37, pp. 116-8, 189-92, 230-2, 234-6 and 324-334).

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At the end of this consideration let us present graphically both interpretations in one picture. Simultaneously, it is important to mention here that the second reading of A is accepted for the present study.69

Figure 9.

Thus, summing up, in harmony with the second interpretation, the difference is constituted by varying forms of time. As it was mentioned, every experience is composed of subacts, which differ with regard to their forms of time, e.g. act A in a narrow sense has a different form from its predecessor and they both have different forms from A’s successor. Moreover, each particular change of time-form justifies the question of a separate act even if noema remains the same. Therefore, all of the subacts are to be treated as separate noetic unities despite the fact that they all constitute the same noema. The latter remain as such, while the form of time for particular acts is constantly changing. Thus, many acts, i.e., noeses, constitute one noema, and this is the third and last interpretation of the many-to-one relation between noeses and noema. Husserl: If we take this ‘object’ and all its objective ‘predicates’ – the noematic modifications of the predicates of the perceived physical thing, posited in normal perception simply as actual predicates – then this object and these 69

To be clear, it is well to emphasise that every retention primary belongs to the past but is intentionally sustained in the form “now”, like protentional intentions belong to the future but in the present they are intentionally anticipated.

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predicates are indeed unities in contradistinction to multiplicities of constituting mental processes of consciousness (concrete noeses) (Hua III, p. 231: 1983/243).70

2.4. The noetic-noematic correlation examined on the basis of the one example

Suppose that the act of perception is in its last stage, which means here that after the present stage, the whole act will be completed, i.e., the perceptual process will be finished. Because the act is nearly done, all its previous parts (= subacts) have already been retentionally modified. Let us call the first stage of the main act p1, i.e., part one. This partial act is on the second level of retentional modification, i.e., R(R (p1)). Moreover, it contains the hyletic section D1 :{ d1, d2} and a set of pure noetic moments N1 :{ n1, n2}. Because p1 is retentionally modified, there are no impressions among its hyletic data, but phantasms instead.71 Furthermore, act p1 constitutes noema S1: {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The second act p2 is on the first level of retentional modification i.e., R (p2). It comprises hyletic section D2 :{ D1, d3} and a set of noetic formations N2 :{ N1, n3}. There is also the following noematic set S2: {S1, s5, s6}. The third act p3 is the present consciousness; it means that it is in the unmodified form “now”. It is important to note that p3 is simultaneously the most comprehensive act. It comprises a hyletic set D3 :{ D2, d4} and inside this set there are also impressions. Moreover, it

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Husserl (Hua III, p. 231): “Nehmen wir diesen ‘Gegenstand’ und all seine gegenständlichen ‘Prädikate’ — die noematischen Modifikationen der in der normalen Wahrnehmung schlechthin als wirklich gesetzten Prädikate des wahrgenommenen Dinges — so ist er und sind diese Prädikate freilich Einheiten gegenüber Mannigfaltigkeiten konstituierender Bewußtseinserlebnisse (konkreter Noesen)”. 71 See: (Hua XXIII, pp. 92-99: 2005/99-106).

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comprises a set of pure noetic formation N3: {N2, n4}, whereas the noematic section contains S3: {S2, s7, s8}.72

Figure 10

The figure above makes it clear that each particular noetic formation corresponds to different noema. In act p1 noesis: {N1, D1} is correlated with noema S1, in p2 noesis: {N2, D2} with noema S2 and in p3 noesis: {N3, D3} with noema S3. Moreover, each noesis is related to at most one noema, and conversely, each noema is related to at most one noesis. Then, the noetic-noematic relation can be described here as the one-to-one connection and depicted as follows:

Figure 11

Next, the consideration of the individual nature of noesis from the previous section revealed the interpretation according to which also noetic and noematic moments (not only whole noeses and noemata) can be regarded as related in a one-to-one manner. And this is true not only for pure noetic parts, but also for sensuous data. Husserl writes that: 72

Undoubtedly, the model that has already been presented is a good theoretical tool to explain any process of sensuous perception. However, its explicatory ability is strictly limited, because, as is easy to notice, the empty intending acts have different structures since they do not contain sensations.

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“…any changes of the hyletic content of the perception, if it does not quite do away with perceptual consciousness, must at last result in what appears becoming objectively ‘other’, whatever in itself or in the orientation in which it is appearing, or the like” (Hua III, p. 227: 1983/238). Moreover, he claims: “…that everything hyletic belongs in the concrete mental process as a really inherent component, whereas, in contrast, what is ‘presented’, ‘adumbrated’, in it as multiplicity belongs in the noema” (Hua III, p. 227: 1983/238). Hence, any change in the hyletic set entails a change in the noematic moments. This strict correlation between noetic and noematic parts can be summarised as Figure 12 suggests.

Figure 12

On the other hand, every act also contains constant moments on both the noetic and noematic sides. As regards the noema, there is S1, and as regards the noesis, N1. What distinguishes S1 from N1, among other things, is the fact that the latter necessarily undergoes retentional modification, whereas the former does not. In other words, every noetic formation has its own duration, what cannot be said about noema since: “…an irreal object is not individuated in consequence of a temporality belonging to it originally” (Hua XVII, p. 164: 1978/156).73 Then noesis

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According to Smith and McIntyre (1982, p. 124), in an unpublished manuscript “Noema und Sinn” there are the following words of Husserl: “Sinne are nonreal objects, they are not objects that exist in time”, and “A Sinn … is related to a

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is the individual object whereas noema is not. This means that after constitution the concrete noesis is necessarily replaced by the next individually different act while noema can remain exactly the same. In this sense, many noeses are correlated with one noema; this situation is represented by the figure below.

Figure 13

3. The issue of transcendence in the sphere of an act’s components

Husserl holds that: The characterisation of the phenomenological reduction and, likewise, of the pure sphere of mental processes as ‘transcendental’ rests precisely on the fact that we discover in this reduction an absolute sphere of stuffs and noetic forms whose determinately structured combinations possess, according to immanental eidetic necessity, the marvelous consciousness of something determinate and determinable, given thus and so, which is something over against consciousness itself, something fundamentally other, non-really inherent [Irreelles], transcendent…(Hua III, p. 228: 1983/239).74

temporal interval through the act in which it occurs, but it does not itself have reality [Dasein], an individual connection with time and duration”. 74 Husserl (Hua III, p. 228): “Die Bezeichnung der phänomenologischen Reduktion und im gleichen der reinen Erlebnissphäre als ‘transzendentaler’ beruht gerade darauf, daß wir in dieser Reduktion eine absolute Sphäre von Stoffen und noetischen Formen finden, zu deren bestimmt gearteten Verflechtungen nach i m m a n e n t e r W e s e n s n o t w e n d i g k e i t dieses wunderbare Bewußthaben eines so und so gegebenen Bestimmten oder Bestimmbaren gehört, das dem Bewußtsein selbst ein Gegenüber, ein prinzipiell Anderes, Irreelles, Transzendentes ist, und daß hier die Urquelle ist für die einzig denkbare Lösung der tiefsten

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These words can be read in a twofold manner. Firstly, noema is non-really inherent component of the experience and in this sense it transcends noesis. Therefore, noema must be clearly distinguished from the “phenomenon of consciousness”, i.e., from noesis. If one is aware of something, then in the strict sense, it is not owing to noema but to noesis, because all moments of awareness are determined by noetic content. Thus, noema is not the bearer of “conscious moments”; it is not this factor in the act which can be called “conscious” in the literary sense. Instead, noema transcends every noetic formation, every intrinsically “conscious moment”, and from this position it constitutes a structure of intentional sense, through which noetic moments are directed toward the objects. Secondly, as it is easy to notice, the object to which the whole act is directed e.g. some worldly thing like a flower, doesn’t really inhere in the experience as well. Physical objects, likewise objects of any kind of acts, even acts of immanent perception, transcend not only noesis, but also noema (Hua IV, § 52: 1989/211-9). However, it must be a different kind of transcendence than the one that holds between the act’s components. It is perhaps best to explain all of these cases in the light of Roman Ingarden`s conception of transcendence. Ingarden not only uses the term transcendence with different variant meanings, but he also specified more than one subtle difference between these variants. For the present purposes, these notions are especially important, as they will make the specification of the relation between noesis and noema plausible. The first variant that can be useful here is termed weak structural transcendence (WST). The object and its consciousness are involved in a WST relation when and only when any property and any moment that belong to one of them do not belong to another one. Thus, there cannot be moment or property which is shared by the acts and their objects; there cannot be common property or common moment for them at all (Ingarden 1961, p. 59).

Erkenntnisprobleme, welche Wesen und Möglichkeit objektiv gültiger Erkenntnis von Transzendentem betreffen”.

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The second variant is a strong structural transcendence (SST) (p. 59). This option sustains everything that holds about the weak one, plus one additional condition that can be formulated in the following manner: the object is transcended in the structurally strong manner when and only when it is a separate and unconditioned whole with respect to the correlated act. According to Ingarden, object A constitutes a conditioned whole with respect to B when and only when object B contains properties or moments which condition the existence of A. Therefore, in the context that matters here, the act is an unconditioned whole with respect to the correlated object, and conversely, the object is an unconditioned whole with respect to the correlated act, only if neither the object nor the act contains moments or properties that condition the existence of one another. The third notion was termed radical transcendence (RT) (p. 60). Analogously to the previous instances, every condition that holds in the structural versions applies here also. What specifies radical transcendence is the following additional restriction: an act cannot make any change in the set of an object’s moments and properties. In other words, an object radically transcends an act only when the fact of that act’s concretization does not entail any change of the object’s very own content (p. 60). Finally, the last notion that makes some difference here is called the transcendence of existential fullness (TEF) (p. 60). This concept is built upon the set of conditions which appears in the RT variant, but not exclusively. Additionally, the object is required here to be always unknown in some aspects. More precisely, the object is related in a TEF manner to the intentional act only when the object is determined by an infinite set of properties. In this situation, no plurality of cognitive acts suffices to gain total knowledge about it. There will always be some unknown aspect of the correlated object. In Ideas I things, e.g. plants, animals, etc, fall into this mode of transcendence. Husserl called inadequate all experiences through which the cognitive processes of such objects are realized (Hua III, § 100). The foregoing exposition has been arranged to place the simplest notion of transcendence at the beginning and the most complicated one at the end. Each successive concept contains the sum of conditions that

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constitute the predecessor variant. Thus, the TEF option comprises a total sum of the conditions for all of them. It is well to begin our inquiry into the kind of transcendence among an act’s components with this latter concept, since it is the most thoroughly specified. Thus, it was said about any object that transcends an act in a TEF manner that it cannot be adequately presented for the ego. However, as Husserl claims in Ideas I, the cognitive act which points toward noeticnoematic structure always gives adequate results. In other words, every immanently directed experience presents the correlated object in its totality. There are no sides, perspectives or aspects through which the act presents itself. This means, among other things, that the noema is adequately presented, whereas the same cannot be said about an object which transcends an act in a TEF manner. Therefore, there is no transcendence of existential fullness between noesis and noema. Next, the RT variant establishes that the content of the act cannot have any impact on the content of the object. Nevertheless, a noeticnoematic relation has the character of a dependent variation. This means that noetic difference entails a difference on the noematic side. Hence, if it really does, then noesis certainly has an impact on the content of noema. Therefore, there is no radical transcendence between an act’s components, either. Only two variants are left. The strong one, i.e., variant SST seems to be most suitable; however it still depends on interpretation of the existential relation of noema to noesis. On the one hand, noema is described as: “an object, but one that is wholly dependent”. Husserl claims that “Its esse consists exclusively in its ‘percipi’”, and immediately adds that: “… the percipi does not contain the esse as real (reelles) constituent” (Hua III, p. 230: 1958/287). Then it seems that the noematic esse belongs to the noema and not to the noesis, and in this sense noema is the unconditioned whole, which makes the SST variant suitable for this case. On the other hand, however, noema is viewed as the unity which is “wholly dependent” as regards its content and also its existence. Therefore, though the esse of the noema belongs to the noema, the conditions for this esse apparently consist in the percipi. Hence, the base

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of existence of the noema is in the noesis and this situation makes the SST variant unsuitable. What is more, the latter interpretation can be enhanced by the note that noesis not only conditions the kind of noematic content, but also determines whether there is any content at all. On this theme, Husserl wrote as follows: Owing to its noetic moments, every intentive mental process is precisely noetic; it is of its essence to include in itself something such as a ‘sense’ and possibly a manifold sense on the basis of this sense-bestowal and, in unity with that, to effect further productions [Leistungen] which become ‘senseful’ precisely by ‘this sense-bestowal’ (Hua III, p. 202: 1983/2134).75

Then, if noesis is responsible for “sense-bestowing”, and noema is here the “bestowed sense”, it seems to be reasonable to accept that both the content of noema and its existence are dependent on noesis. Under this interpretation, noema does not constitute the unconditioned whole with respect to noesis, so the SST variant is inadequate. Instead, in the present context, the most suitable notion of transcendence is the variant WST. Then, to summarise, it depends on the interpretation whether the SST or WST variant is more accurate to describe the noetic-noematic relation. Of course, there are plenty of reasons for both options. The issue is complicated, as almost every argument requires a detailed explanation. For example, if one concerns the “sense-bestowing” function, it must be specified whether this is viewed as “creating” or “conditioning”. Certitude is possible only after detailed analysis, which, unfortunately, cannot be carried out here, and so the question of whether noesis conditions the existence of noema is open for this work.

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Husserl (Hua III, p. 202): “Jedes intentionale Erlebnis ist, dank seiner noetischen Momente, eben noetisches; es ist sein Wesen, so etwas wie einen ‘Sinn’ und evtl. mehrfältigen Sinn in sich zu bergen, auf Grund dieser Sinngebungen und in eins damit weitere Leistungen zu vollziehen, die durch sie eben ‘sinnvolle’ werden”.

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Nevertheless, one thing is clear enough here, namely that noema transcends noesis in a structural manner; whether it is the strong or weak variant is not determined. Up to this point, the noetic-noematic correlation has been described in terms of “one-to-one” and “many-to-one” relations. It was also said that there is a kind of structural transcendence between an act’s components. What is more, it has been recognized that changes of noematic content strictly depend on changes of noetic content. This latter fact makes it especially clear that the phenomenological relation is close to supervenience, although other important motives have also been noted which constitute similarity in this subject. Let us consider this case in more detail, since it can help to specify some important characteristics of the noetic-noematic correlation.

4. The noetic-noematic correlation as a dependent variation

Whichever concept of supervenience is considered at a given time, there is always present a common idea which constitutes the fundamental sense of this relation. David Lewis expressed it in the following way: “The idea is simple and easy: we have supervenience when [and only when] there could be no difference of one sort without differences of another sort” (1986, p. 14). In other words, A supervenes on B when and only when there could be no difference in A without differences in B. Hence, the exact sameness of B excludes the differences in A. On the other hand, A fails to supervene on B, when and only when, A can vary non-dependently of variation in B. The relation as such is called a dependant variation and it constitutes the hard core of supervenience (Kim 1993; Johansson 2002; McLaughlin 1995). Around this core, various nonequivalent definitional formulations 76 arise. A great part of all differences between particular forms is

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In present days three options are discussed, each of them in a different variant yet. The following formulations come from Kim (1993, pp. 64-8): Let A and B be families of properties closed under Boolean operations:

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conditioned by the manifoldness of the objective domain where the relation in question was recognized to occur. Owing to the fact that supervenience was implemented on different grounds, its characteristics have been specified. It is the priority of the next task to situate supervenience inside the phenomenological provenience. This enterprise is legitimized by the fact that the relation between noesis and noema has been established to be a dependent variation, whereas the latter is also the hard core of supervenience. As it was said, the core idea establishes the correlation between two kinds of stuffs such that there can be no difference of one sort without a difference of the other. As regards the phenomenological relation, these differences are spread over noetic-noematic formations.77 Each particular noesis and noema is equal to sets of moments. Noesis is equal to a set of noetic moments, which can be shortly called set B, and, respectively, noema is equal to a set of noematic moments, which will be shortly called set A. Set B comprises subvenient moments, set A supervenient ones. The expression “difference of sort B” points to a change within a noetic set while the expression “difference of sort A” points to a change within a noematic set.

4.1. The examination of noema under nine postulates for supervenient entities

According to philosophical literature, several desiderata are usually formulated for supervenient stuffs (Johansson 2002). All of them A weakly supervenes on B if and only if necessarily for any property F in A, if an object x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and if any y has G it has F … A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each property F in A, if x has F, then there is a property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has F… A globally supervenes on B just in case worlds that are indiscernible with respect to B ("B-indiscernible," for short) are also A-indiscernible. 77 McLaughlin (1995, p. 20): “There are, of course, as many sorts of differences as there are ways of sorting anything that can be sorted”.

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are bound to specify our intuition in this theme. In the present work, supervenient stuffs are identified with noema, so every particular desideratum will be related to this part of an act. Hence: 1. Supervenient moments (properties) are determined by their base moments (properties).78 Undoubtedly this is true as regards the elements of the noematic set since, as was mentioned, they are entirely determined by noetic moments. 2. Supervenient moments (properties) are dependent on their base moments (properties). According to the previous explanation, the content and the existence of noema depend on noesis. The existential dependency means that noema could never become a part of an intentional act without noetic activity.79 The content dependency, in turn, means that noema comprises only that “stuff” which is constituted by noetic formation. 3. An act (entity) has supervenient moments (properties) by virtue of its having base moments (properties). Every act, which is regarded as consciousness that comprises noematic sense, can be treated as such only by virtue of its noetic side, which bestows the sense. In other words, noematic formation occurs in an act owing to the constitutional function of the noetic base. 4. Base moments (properties) underlie supervenient moments (properties). Undoubtedly, this postulate holds true for noetic-noematic correlation; however, the word “underlie” requires additional explanation. First, every reference to spatial characteristics should be 78

All postulates are modifications from original versions which can be found in (Johansson 2002). 79 Consider the previously noted ambiguity that concerns the manner in which noesis conditions the existence of noema. In the first sense noesis simply creates noema; whereas, in the second, noesis only conditions the manifestation of noema in an act’s structure, but doesn’t create it. This ambiguity comes from the fact that Husserl describes noema as non-self-sufficient, i.e., existentially dependent on noesis. However, he simultaneously confirms that noema inherently possesses the fundament of its own existence. This latter claim makes noema similar to the whole range of self-sufficient objects such as, e.g., worldly things (Hua III, p. 230: 1958/287).

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excluded from the meaning of “underlie”. Second, also excluded should be any suggestion that a subvenient set, as a base and foundational “ground”, is independent of a supervenient entity in the sense that the former can occur without the latter. This should be done because a noetic set is not only a necessary condition for a noematic one, but is also a sufficient one. Therefore, the constitution of any noetic formation always comes together with the constitution of a corresponding noematic formation. 5. Base moments (properties) realise supervenient moments (properties). According to the explanations from previous sections, the same unity of sense can be presented in different acts and by different egos. More precisely, if we treat consciousness of some given object as a noetic formation which is structured in manner B, then consciousness can be structured in this manner multiple times. Moreover, consciousness can be structured in manner B by any ego. Every time structure B is realized, it necessarily entails the bestowing of noema A, and in this sense noema also undergoes realization. 6. Descriptions of base moments (properties) do not entail descriptions of supervenient (moments) properties. This point requires a special treatment. In Ideas I Husserl spoke about noesis and noema: “One may therefore draw the following conclusion: A parallelism between noesis and noema is indeed the case but it is such that one must describe the formations on both sides and in their essentially mutual correspondence” (Hua III, p. 231: 1983/242).80 From Husserl we know that noesis is the sense-bestowing part of an act, whereas noema is the bestowed sense. In a particular situation, when an act intends some object O as red and round, noesis is the consciousness of roundness and redness, and noema is the sense of roundness and redness. In general, no matter in what set of properties an act apprehends an object, every moment of sense determining a particular property is bestowed by the correlating noetic moment. In this context, description 80

Husserl (Hua III, p. 231): “Somit möchte man den Schluß ziehen: Ein P a r a l l e l i s m u s zwischen Noesis und Noema ist zwar vorhanden, aber so, daß die Gestaltungen b e i d e r s e i t s und in ihrem wesensmäßigen Sich-entsprechen beschrieben werden müssen”.

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of the inherent content of consciousness, i.e., description of the content of the noetic side of experience, necessarily entails the description of the intentional content, i.e., the content of the noematic side. Hence, apparently, postulate 6 does not hold for noesis and noema. However, the ultimate answer can be given only after considering another possible level of description. Although description of noesis entails description of noema when the noetic-noematic structure is considered in terms of sense-giving function and given sense, the situation changes when different aspects of the structure are taken into account. For example, under the ontological respect, noesis is the individual, temporal and functional part of consciousness. Of course, none of this entails the characteristics of noema, which is a special kind of general object, non-temporal and static; i.e., in contrast to noesis, it doesn’t have the sense-bestowing ability (Hua III, § 97). Hence, whether postulate 6 holds for noesis and noema depends on the level of description. It holds indeed when both components of an act are described with respect to the relation of the sense-giving to the given sense. On the other hand, however, it doesn’t hold when their ontological characteristics are taken into account. The ultimate answer to the question regarding this postulate, then, depends on the kind of description noesis and noema are subjected to. And this is also the reason the present work leaves this question open. 7. Supervenient moments (properties) cannot possibly exist without being connected to base moments (properties). Undoubtedly the following are true: 1) there cannot be noematic moments without noetic ones corresponding to them, 2) every change in the noematic stock points back to changes in the noetic one, and 3) the existential base of the intentional sense consists in noema – although the condition of this existence apparently belongs to noesis. In this light, one could be tempted to conclude that noema cannot possibly exist without being connected to noesis. Nevertheless, as was mentioned above, the issue of the existential dependency of noema is complicated, and burdened by different non-equivalent interpretations. Therefore, looking for certitude in this matter, if any is possible, requires separate

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considerations devoted exclusively to it.81 Here, however, it has to be enough to mention that in harmony with essential necessities, in the act there cannot be a noematic moment without a noetic one. 8. If two acts (entities) have the same base moments (properties), then they necessarily have the same supervenient moments (property); or, base moments’ (property) indiscernibility entails supervenient moments’ (property) indiscernibility. Certainly, if two acts are indiscernible in terms of noetic contents, then simultaneously they are necessarily indiscernible in terms of noematic ones. Here necessity is eidetically grounded. 9. If two acts (entities) have different supervenient moments (properties), then necessarily they have different base moments (properties); or, supervenient moments’ (property) difference entails base moments’ (property) difference. If we suppose that noema is equal to set A :{ s1, s2, s3} and noesis to set B :{ n1, n2, n3}, then noesis which is structured in the manner B necessarily bestows noematic set A. When A has changed in one of its moments, e.g. moment s2 is replaced by moment s4, it means that in set B moment n2 has been replaced by moment n4, and this parallelism is conditioned by essential laws. In general, every change in the noematic set is entailed by the corresponding change of the noetic one. Then, if two noematic sets, e.g. {s1, s2, s3} and {s1, s4, s3}, are different, then the noetic sets necessarily must be different.

4.2. The question of reducing noema to noesis

The foregoing comparison discloses that the noetic-noematic correlation fulfils at least seven of nine desiderata. The case of postulate 7 cannot be determined as long as the existential dependency of noema on noesis is unspecified. A similar situation occurs when we consider postulate 6. Because noesis and noema can be described in different respects, it is hard to answer the question of whether description of the 81

See also: (Ingarden 1975).

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first entails description of the second. The solution given in this case has very serious consequences for phenomenology. If we agree that postulate 6 doesn’t hold for noesis and noema, because, with respect to the relation of the sense-giving part to the given sense, description of the former entails description of the latter, then we also must agree with the highly unwanted consequence as to which noematic component can be reduced to a noetic one. In the general outline, the description of A necessarily entails description of B when, at the linguistic level, every reference to B can be reduced to a reference to A. As a consequence, the dependent theory B can be inferred from the basal theory A; and this simultaneously guarantees that the former can be reduced to the latter.82 As the foregoing makes clear, this means that noema can be reduced to noesis at least at the linguistic level. When we proceed in this direction, we might notice that the noetic-noematic correlation cannot be reconciled with supervenience because this latter excludes reductionism. Nevertheless, the philosophical literature contains different notions of supervenience, in weak and strong variants. Kim argues that only the weak version is consistent with irreducibility, whereas all strong variants are not. Moreover, he emphasises that philosophical interest points almost exclusively to strong variants, because of their theoretical fruitfulness (1993, pp. 79, 161). Hence, if Kim is right, then reductionism seems to be a characteristic property of supervenience. In this light, postulate 6 is valid no more; to be supervenient, a property must fulfil eight of nine desiderata. For the noetic-noematic correlation, in turn, this means that, if we agree with this highly controversial claim that noema can be linguistically reduced to noesis, then the supervenience in the strong

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In the literature of supervenience there are several concepts of reduction. Nagel, for example, developed the derivational model of reduction, which is currently one of the most discussed. On this theme, Kim (2002, p. XXIII) writes the following: “Reduction is standardly understood as a relation between theories, where a theory is understood to consist of a distinctive theoretical vocabulary and a set of laws formulated in this vocabulary. The reduction of one theory to another is thought to be accomplished when the laws of the reduced theory are shown to be derivable from the laws of the reducer theory, with the help of ‘bridge principles’ connecting terms of the reduced theory with those of the reducer”.

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variant seems to be the closest notion adequate to name the relation between an act’s real and intentional components. On the other hand, regarding the phenomenological doctrine, it is advisable to circumvent the unwanted consequence of the reduction of noema to noesis. Here it is enough to mention that not every description of noesis entails a description of noema. Regarding ontological characteristics, an intentional component is explained in words that cannot be inferred from the words used to describe the real component. This irreducibility can be sustained if we recognise weak supervenience as more suitable than strong supervenience for describing the phenomenological relation. Such a solution not only preserves the important distinction between noesis and noema, but also satisfies the claim of supervenience to exclude the reduction.

4.3. The one and two way covariation between noesis and noema

The core idea can be further specified by considering Kim’s notion of covariance: “Supervenient properties covary with their subvenient, or base, properties. In particular, indiscernibility in respect of the base properties entails indiscernibility in respect of the supervenient properties” (2002, p. 16). McLaughlin noted that Kim uses the term “co-variation” convertibly with the expression “dependent variation”.83 According to Kim, if A supervenes on B, then A cannot

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Types of covariance which are considered by Kim (1993, p. 141): • Weak covariance I. No possible world contains things, x and y, such that x and y are indiscernible in respect of properties in B (‘B-indiscernible’) and yet discernible in respect of properties in A (‘A-discernible’). • Weak covariance II. Necessarily, if anything has property F in A, there exists a property G in B such that the thing has G, and everything that has G has F. • Strong covariance I. For any objects x and y and any worlds wi and wj, if x in wi is B-indiscernible from y in wj (that is, x has in wi precisely those Bproperties that y has in wj), then x in wi is A-indiscernible from y in wj.

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vary without variation in B, but also B cannot vary without variation in A. And, as McLaughlin stressed, this latter conclusion does not hold for supervenience. Therefore, he suggests distinguishing “one way covariation” from “two way co-variation” (McLaughlin 1995). McLaughlin claims that if A supervenes on B, then there could be some change in B without changes in A, but never conversely. Now the problem points to the question of change or difference which can occur in the base set without entailing changes or differences in the supervenient set. As regards the noetic side, such a change is conditioned by the fact that consciousness has the structure of a stream which is involved in time whereas noema is timeless. Every process, e.g. perceiving, comprises some set of subacts. Change or difference consists in the fact that one subact can be replaced by another one, and still the same noema can be meant. According to this also any noematic moment can be constituted in a multiplicity of constantly changing noetic moments, which differ with regard to their form of time. Here, one deals with the changes in a subvenient set which do not entail any change on the supervenient level. However, in some interpretations the noetic-noematic correlation can also be consistent with “two way covariation”. For that purpose we have to agree that act’s components are related in one-to-one manner. This is possible if we agree that noesis is the individual entity that cannot be re-constituted as exactly the same. In such a situation, any difference in noeses or noetic moments must entails difference in the noematic stock.

Final notes

It might seem at first sight that the case is simple; noema supervenes on noesis. However, as was mentioned, there are different kind of supervenience and different aspects of the noetic-noematic • Strong covariance II. Necessarily, if anything has property F in A, there exists a property G in B such that the thing has G, and necessarily everything with G has F.

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relation. For example, if, following the phenomenological doctrine, we tend to argue that noema cannot be reduced to noesis in any instance, then we certainly opt for the weak variant of supervenience. However, a reading is also possible when strong supervenience appears to be the suitable choice. Nevertheless, this latter option requires that noema be reducible to noesis, and this is a prize that phenomenology cannot afford. Above all else, one thing seems to be certain here, namely; no matter what concept of supervenience is considered as the most suitable in place of noetic-noematic correlation, the kind of dependency between an act’s components must be specified (i.e., postulate 7). The present chapter not only describes a concept of noema contained in Ideas I, but also suggests interpretations capable of specifying Husserl’s theory of intentionality. One of them proposes an analysis of the noetic-noematic relation in terms of Roman Ingarden’s concept of transcendence. Another interpretation attempts to specify this relationship by comparing it with supervenience. As was emphasized, this type of consideration does not tend to invent the kind of phenomenological supervenience. Instead, it only attempts to investigate whether noetic-noematic correlation cannot be specified by use of theoretical tools originated on other ground than the phenomenological. This looks possible if to consider the fact that similarity between both relations is more than accidental. In fact, as the foregoing comparison discussed, the only significant incompatibility between them concerns those characteristics of noetic-noematic correlations which are not specified by Husserl and his disciples. The current chapter presents the notion of noema as it can be found in Ideas I, but this does not mean that all philosophers would agree with it. In fact, many competitive interpretations of noema have been developed and the next chapter will be devoted to the most significant of them.

Chapter III

Interpretations and extensions of Husserl’s concept of noema

In many points, Husserl’s conception of noema is far from clear. It is not surprising, then, that philosophers have developed numerous competing interpretations. Perhaps the most famous readings of noema belong to Gurwitsch and Føllesdal. Their interpretations have gained significant support in philosophical society. Moreover, not so widely known as it deserves to be, one of the most important readings of Husserl was developed by his student, Roman Ingarden. Although there are numerous controversies concerning whether Ingarden’s conception of the purely intentional object is an interpretation of noema or a separate theory that was inspired by Husserl, one thing is certain, namely that Ingarden’s theory stays very close to the Husserl’s notion of noema. This fact was discerned by Jacek Paśniczek. He also noted that Ingarden’s concept can be used to explain both Gurwitsch’s and Føllesdal’s model of intentionality. All of this will be the subject of the upcoming considerations. The current chapter will present six different interpretations of noema in six separate sections. Aron Gurwitsch’s conception will be considered first, followed by those of John Drummond, Føllesdal and Smith and McIntyre. The last two sections will be devoted to Roman Ingarden’s theory of the purely intentional object and to the interpretation developed by Jacek Paśniczek. It also is necessary to emphasise the order in which these conceptions are presented. Drummond’s reading is considered as originated from the Gurwitschian solution. Smith and McIntyre’s in turn are regarded as following Føllesdal’s. Ingarden’s theory of the purely intentional object is treated as an alternative explanation of the intentionality inspired by Husserl. Finally, Paśniczek’s notion of noema,

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in the sense that will be explained below, unifies all of these conceptions.

1. Noema as the Gestalt: Aron Gurwitsch’s theory of noema

Gurwitsch not only commented on the works of Husserl but also developed his own conceptions. His most influential ideas will be briefly outlined in this chapter. According to Gurwitsch, Husserl’s phenomenology implicates constancy hypothesis. This can be explained in the following manner. Sense-data are “coordinated, element for element, in a strictly univocal way, to the corresponding objective stimuli” (1966b, p. 193). Elsewhere, he specifies: “... if the same neural element (for example, a circumscribed region of the retina) is repeatedly stimulated in the same manner, the same sensations will arise each time” (1966c, p. 5). In harmony with this hypothesis, constancy of external stimuli guarantees constancy of sensuous content. Thus, sensuous content can remain constant while the percipient deals with different objects. Let us consider once again a picture from the first chapter.

Figure 14

As was mentioned before, this figure can be seen in two different manners. Firstly, as a figure in which the front side is square a1, a2, a3, a4 – Gestalt 1 and, secondly, as a figure in which the front side is square b1, b2, b3, b4 – Gestalt 2. The constancy hypothesis, in Gurwitsch’s interpretation, grounds the conviction that the Gestalt can vary while its parts remain constant. Moreover, it also explains that any part of the

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Gestalt can occur separately i.e., without any connection to the rest of the parts. Gurwitsch considers all of this to be Husserl’s standpoint. He claims: The implicit assertion of von Ehrenfels’ theory is stated explicitly by both Stumpf and Husserl: sensory qualities of a higher order, qualities founded upon ordinary sense-data, are incidental and adventitious to the founding elements in that these elements are not affected by the quality they found, nor by the unity which the founded quality bestows upon them. The elements may be experienced isolatedly. Even when not experienced isolatedly, each one of the elements retains its distinct phenomenal identity (1964, p. 84).

In harmony with the explanation from Chapter One, Gestalt 1 differs from Gestalt 2 because the same sensuous content is differently apprehended by the functional moments of consciousness. In this case, sensuous data are the constant part of Gestalts while functional moments are the part that varies. Husserl’s interpretation, then, allows some content of Gestalt to remain the same while other content varies. And this is exactly the point that is rejected by Gurwitsch. He claims that any change in the Gestalt’s content entails change in the Gestalt taken as a whole. He even provides a mathematical illustration for this. As he explains, the constancy hypothesis interprets the percept as the sum of two functions P= f (xe) +f (xi), where “P” stands for the percept, “xe” stands for external conditions and “xi” stands for internal conditions. Thus, changes of Gestalt that are conditioned by the apprehension can be represented in the following manner: P = f (xe) + f (xi1). Instead of this approach, Gurwitsch proposes to interpret the percept as a two-place function, namely P = f (xe, xi). When apprehension, i.e., internal conditions, change, the function as a whole varies (pp. 95-6; Drummond 1990). John Drummond summarizes Gurwitsch’s standpoint: “... as a rejection of intentional apprehension/contents of apprehension dualism, wherein the contents are considered neutral with respect to higher forms of merely sensuous or perceptual organization” (1990, p. 67). Furthermore, Gurwitsch also specifies the notion of Gestalt in terms of whole-part theory. According to him, the Gestalt as a whole is

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prior to its parts, which are identified only on account of the functions they play in whole. He holds that: Gestalt theory replaces the traditional conception of parts and wholes in terms of elements by a functionalistic conception. Parts are defined as constituents or ‘whole-parts.’ They are conceived of as essentially determined and qualified by the functional significance which they have with respect to each other and, hence, for the whole of the Gestalt-contexture into which they are integrated. The whole is accordingly considered as the equilibrated and balanced coexistence of its functional parts in their thoroughgoing interdependence (1964, pp. 148-9).

Hence, the part is determined by the functional significance it has with respect to other parts and for the whole. This means that two different Gestalts cannot share the same part (pp. 116-7). Consider the picture below.

Figure 15

The foregoing image can be viewed as a picture of a goblet or as two faces in profile. In Husserl’s theory, both perceptions have the same sensuous stock but interpret it in a different manner. Sensuous content, then, is that part which is shared by two separate acts. Gurwitsch, on the contrary, holds that the perception of the goblet shares nothing with the perception of the two faces. However, one may raise the doubt that the line forming the nose and the mouth in the profile on the right is the same as the line forming the right side of the goblet. But Gurwitsch would disagree with such argumentation. In his opinion, this line plays different roles in different Gestalts. Moreover, for the “two faces”

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Gestalt, it has greater significance because even a small change in it can destroy the Gestalt. On the other hand, it seems that the “goblet” Gestalt can survive any small change to the edge line. Therefore, the line in question is not the same for both Gestalts since it has a different functional significance for each of them (1964, p. 118; Drummond 1990, pp. 69-70). This makes clear that the difference between parts is conditioned by the difference of their significances for the Gestalt. A part which is most determinative is called the “formative constituent” (Gurwitsch 1966b, p.190). For example, the line forming the mouth and nose is formative for the “faces” Gestalt. In the whole of the Gestalt, formative parts are interlocked with all the rest of the parts that have different weights of formative significance. Gurwitsch calls this system of mutual dependency between parts “Gestalt coherence”. In other words, Gestalt coherence is the system of relationships between parts which “... mutually condition one another by virtue of their interlocking functional significance” (Drummond 1990, p. 70). Gurwitsch: Between the parts or constituents of a Gestalt-contexture, there prevails the particular relationship of Gestalt–coherence defined as the determining and conditioning of the constituents upon each other. In thoroughgoing reciprocity, the constituents assign to, and derive from, one another the functional significance which gives to each one its qualification in a concrete case (1964, pp. 134-5).84

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And he (Gurwitsch 1964, p. 135) adds: “The existence of any constituent of a Gestalt-contexture relies upon other constituents or, to put it differently, each constituent has its existence only within a system of functional significances which all complement and fit with, one another. By virtue of its functional significance, each constituent is oriented with respect to other constituents. Such orientation is essential to a given constituent in that it gives qualification to its existence in a concrete case”.

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1.1. The structure of the Gestalt is the structure of noema

The structure of a Gestalt is analogous to the structure of perceptual noema (the sensory noema). For Gurwitsch, noema is what is seen exactly as it is seen in the act. Those moments which condition characteristic features of the face, e.g., the mouth and nose (see fig. 15), are the formative parts of noema. All the rest of the parts contribute to the constitution of the whole in harmony with their different levels of significance. Particular noematic moments participate in the constitution of the whole noema as far as they stay in the range of “Gestalt coherence” (Gurwitsch 1964, p. 229). Moreover, even in perceptual acts, momentary noema should be distinguished from sensory noema since some of the objective characteristics that are intended cannot be given sensuously, e.g., the back side of the object. Momentary noema contains both sensuously presented and emptily intended properties of the object. According to Gurwitsch, those latter characteristics belong to the inner horizon of the directly given objectivity. Thus, any momentary noema of the perceptual act is the unity of directly given intuitive content (a sensory noema) and non-directly given content of the objective horizon. In such an approach, as Gurwitsch explains, sensory noema constitutes the formative part for the whole noema that also contains the content of the horizon. This latter is entirely determined by the formative part (a sensory noema).85 Directly sensed sides or aspects of the object cohere with the content of the horizon. On account of this coherence, all sensed parts and empty intended characteristics are unified into one noematic structure (pp 2424, 274, and 278-9).

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This is what Gurwitsch (1964, p. 242) said about the content of the horizon and its structure: “Indefinite and vague as the contents to be comprised by a certain pattern or frame-work may be in every other respect, they are determined in that they must fit into the pattern and must conform to the structure and organisation of the frame-work, to the extent to which the organisational structure of the framework is delineated. In other words, the indefinite and indeterminate contents are subject to the condition of conformity with the typical and generic specification and delineation the inner horizon presents in a given case”.

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Finally, any act of perception has the structure of a process. This means that it contains not one but a set of momentary noemata. The noema of the whole perceptual act, then, is the most comprehensive unity that is constituted by retentionally and protentionally modified noemata. Nevertheless, only the “sensed noema” is “concrete” since all the others are modified in different manners, i.e., they are not present sensu stricto. This is also why they all are classified to the horizon. In such a case, “sensed noema” serve as the formative part around which all other noemata that belong to the surrounding horizon are functionally unified into the higher order noema. This latter is the noema of the whole perceptual act, in other words, the noema of the thing. Hence, the perceptual noema is a higher order unity whose noematic-constituents are the momentary noemata and the content of their horizons (1966b, p. 190).

1.2. Noema and object: Against Gurwitsch

For Gurwitsch, a perceptual noema is the unity of perceptual senses. He claims: Instead of sense-data or sensations as this term has been understood in the classical tradition of psychology and philosophy, we accordingly speak of that given in direct sense-experience and take it as one constituent of the perceptual meaning. All constituents contribute together towards the complex unity of meaning, the perceptual noema … An analysis of the structure of the perceptual noema thus assumes the form of an analysis of meaning, more specifically, of perceptual meaning. We must investigate the organizational form of perceptual meaning-constituents in their coexistence with one another, the organization of the complex perceptual meaning actualized through, and as perceptual noema corresponding to, a given act of perception (1964, p. 274).

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He also argues for the identity of the real physical thing with the unity of an infinite number of momentary noemata that present this thing. Gurwitsch: As the complete and adequate perceptual apprehension of material thing is an idea in the sense of Kant, so likewise in the material thing itself which, as real existent, is the correlate of its ‘equivalent of consciousness’. The material thing is the very idea of an infinite system or continuum of appearances all realized in actual sense- experience (1964, p. 227).

Such a statement generates difficulty for Gurwitsch’s theory. First, he holds that the perceptual noema is the unity of sense. Second, every such noema is the unified totality of momentary noemata and the contents of their horizons. Next, momentary noema presents an object exactly as it is intended in an act: “…the object just (exactly so and only so) as the perceiving subject is aware of it, as he intends it in this concrete experienced mental state” (1966a, p. 132). As mentioned above, the momentary noema is part of the full noema. This specifies the relation between the object as it is intended – momentary noema and the object which is intended – full noema. The former is related to the latter as the part to the whole. Finally, Gurwitsch claims that the infinite set of momentary noemata is equal to a physical (real) thing. In this context Paśniczek poses the question of how, in the case of perception, noema, which is an abstract object, can be part of a real, material object (1987, p. 28). Furthermore, he asks whether a material object that, in Gurwitsch’s reading, apparently contains only abstract parts, doesn’t necessarily become abstract (p.28; also see: Smith and McIntyre 1982, Drummond 1990, Dreyfus 1972, Paśniczek 1987). Paśniczek’s question also can be read in the opposite direction, namely, whether noema, which is identified with a material thing, necessarily becomes material. One of the consequences of the problem Paśniczek noted is that it allows a physical thing to be described in terms of noema. On the other hand, it also allows noema to be described in terms of particular, physical properties. Hence, one time, e.g., a red apple becomes the intentional sense and, as such, it has the property of being composed of

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an infinite set of momentary noemata. In the second instance, noema acquires physical characteristics, e.g., of being red and round. These problematic consequences are caused by identifying the sphere of sense with the sphere of intended objectivity. Nevertheless, this is not the only problem with this approach. Another issue concerns a thetic component. After Husserl, Gurwitsch holds that this moment belongs to noematic structure: “Hence within the full and concrete perceptual noema, the distinction must be made between the character of perceptivity and a central noematic nucleus” (1964, p. 179). The ontological identity of noema and a physical object makes them, in fact, the same entity. However, it is rather easy to notice that none of the physical thing’s part can be identified with, e.g., the “character of perceptivity”. This suggests that the noema must be different in some way from the perceived object. John Drummond refers to this case in the following words: “It is certainly true that Gurwitsch is not always careful about his terminology, frequently identifying the full or concrete noema, i.e., the object as meant, with the sense… ‘the perceptual noema, defined as the sense or significance of the perception’” (1990, p. 88). On the other hand, Smith and McIntyre note that, since Gurwitsch regards the noema as the perceptual sense, the momentary noema as the “object as perceived” and the “object as perceived” as a part or aspect of the material object, the act is directed to the perceptual sense instead of, as Husserl emphasises, to the material thing (1982, p. 158). Above all else, the ontological identity of noema and intentional objects means that they have exactly the same structure and manner of being. If so, then an act directed to the noema “childless mother” not only must have a contradictory structure, but also must be a non-existent object. What is more, the consequences of Gurwitsch’s theory place noema in the special role of the only object that can exist in several different ways. For example, in acts directed to ideal entities such as relations, noema must exist in the manner characteristic of ideal objects; whereas in acts pointing to some real physical entity, the noema’s mode of being must correspond to that of physical things. As we have just noted, noema can be regarded even as a non-existent object when an ego experiences some contradictory or other kind of impossible entities. Of

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course, such an interpretation leads to inconsistency in the general structure of noema, which sometimes occurs as existent and other times occurs as a non-existent object. Finally, John Drummond notes that Gurwitsch identifies the perceptual noema with an object’s appearance. Drummond: “As such, the concrete perceptual noema, the noema which is the correlate of a temporally extended act of perception, is a concrete appearance of the thing” (1990, p.67). This noema, as was explained before, is the Gestaltlike structure of a higher order that unifies the set of momentary noemata and the contents of their horizons. The momentary noema, in turn, is the side of the object or its aspect that is currently intended in the act. If, therefore, the concrete noema is concrete appearance, then the momentary noema is momentary appearance. From this, the momentary appearance is the same as a side or aspect of an object. Hence, any changes in appearance should be considered now as changes of object. For example, differences that are brought to the act by varying lighting are to be regarded as changes in the object’s endowment. However, this results in inconsistency in the structure of a perceived object, which, in particular situations, can be seen as the subject of properties that cannot be possessed simultaneously. For example, person A can see object O as blue; whereas the person B, who is wearing yellow glasses, can see it as green. If the appearance is part of the object, O must be blue and green in the same part of its spatial extension, which cannot be claimed without lacking consistency in O’s structure. This problem can be circumvented if we agree, as Husserl did, that what differs from appearance to appearance is the real content of experience, and not the object.

2. The idea of identity in manifold analysis: John Drummond’s reading of noema

John Drummond’s conception of noema is strongly inspired by Gurwitsch. However, in some points Drummond diverges from his precursor. And these points will be briefly explained below.

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According to Drummond, the relation between noema and the intentional object should satisfy the following four conditions: 1. it views the noema as the object precisely as intended in the act; 2. it understands the noema to be an abstractum, but 3. it denies that the noema is an abstract entity ontologically distinct from the intended object; and 4. it defines the relation between abstractum and concretum as other than a whole-part relationship (1990, p. 142).

Undoubtedly, 4 is a totally new move with respect to Gurwitsch’s interpretation. Before we explain this point in detail, additional remarks about noema should be provided. Drummond considers the noema to be the object as it is intended and, simultaneously, the object which is intended. He refuses Føllesdal’s interpretation that the object as it is intended is the intensional entity in virtue of which the act gains directedness. Instead, he provides his own explanation of how intention can be directed through the noema to the object (pp. 108-109 and others). In Drummond’s opinion, the object as it is intended is only the layer of the noema which directs intention to the intentional object. This latter, in turn, is another layer of the noema. One deals here with a kind of noematic intentionality since one layer of the noema intentionally refers to another layer. In this sense, the noema is that entity through which consciousness refers to its object. The intentional object is that layer of the noema to which all other layers, i.e., momentary noemata, refer. In other words, the object which is the main layer of the noema is presented in the variety of other layers of the noema, i.e., in the variety of momentary noemata. To summarise, Drummond identifies the noema with both the object as it is intended and the object which is intended, i.e., the intentional object. Moreover, he agrees that the noema is the intentional sense but he disagrees that it is ontologically different from the intentional object. Hence, the noema is the intentional sense and the

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corporeal worldly object, e.g. an apple, a tree, etc., simultaneously.86 But, how this is possible? Drummond: ...the issue I have been raising throughout this section remains open: How are we to explain Husserl’s identification of the noema with both the intended object simply as intended and the sense present in the act? The answer, I believe, is clear: the intended objectivity (just as intended) is the sense itself, although they are to be abstractly differentiated according to the manner in which we consider this objectivity (1990, p. 116).

Hence, whether the object is regarded as the noematic sense or physical entity depends on the manner of consideration. More precisely, in the natural attitude, the ego deals with apples, trees, the corporeal world and its objects etc. After phenomenological reduction, these objects become noemata. There are no apples any more. Instead, there are perceptual noemata, i.e., senses of the acts of perception. Drummond: …the Sinn (full noema) is the object intended straightforwardly in the act, but when intended in our natural experience it is not present as a sense; it is a material object in the world. Only after the performance of the reduction and the adoption of a philosophical attitude is the object intended in the act revealed as a noema or Sinn (in the broadest sense), i.e. as an object’s significance for a perceiving consciousness (1990, p. 113).

And finally, he concludes, “The object, the sense, and the noema are the same differently considered” (1990, p. 113). According to this conception, the noema is the layered entity: “We have seen repeatedly…that Husserl distinguishes layers or levels in the noema and, consequently, that the noema can be the object as meant and 86

As regards the conception that identifies noema with the worldly object see also: (Hurt 1992; Eduard Marbach 1992; Holmes 1992). According to Erazim Kohák (1978, p. 129): “The noema is not a secondary ‘intentional object’; rather, it is a real object that is present in an experience as the object of an intentional act. Similarly, the natural object is not a different entity but rather the same object, now considered abstractly, in a theoretical ‘natural’ context”.

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yet be ontologically distinct from neither the intended object nor the Sinn” (1990, p. 114).87 On the other hand, however, this is also a dyadic conception of intentionality, since it concerns only two parts, namely noesis and the noema. This latter, on account of its layering structure, is regarded as the corporeal object and as the intentional sense. But, as Husserl claims, sense is an abstract, non-spatial and timeless entity. Therefore, it cannot be identified with a concrete physical object. This conclusion holds true, according to Drummond, for a notion of abstraction that generates only timeless and non-spatial objects. But such an abstraction is not the only one that can be found in Husserl. In other words, not every abstract part is timeless and non spatial. Noematic content is composed of several mutually dependent parts. One of them is Sinn that can be investigated for itself only in abstraction from the rest of the content. This does not entail that Sinn must be timeless and non-spatial while the rest of the noema is individual. Quite the contrary, for Drummond there is no ontological difference between noema taken as the sense and noema taken as the intentional object. Drummond: “…Husserl makes no real or ontological distinctions between the object simpliciter, the object just as it is intended, the noema, and the sense; the distinctions between them are instead abstract” (1990, p. 123). Unfortunately, this is the only explanation of abstraction that Drummond provides, although the case is far from clear. Firstly, if we identify the first layer of the noema with sense and the second layer with the intentional object, then the first layer can exist without the second since sense occurs even in acts directed to non-existent objects. Secondly, the abstraction Drummond is talking about cannot be identified with ideation either. This latter experience presents essences and ideas. The noema, however, is not the idea or the essence of the act, at least not in Ideas I. In fact, Drummond appeals to a conception of 87

Drummond (1990, p. 114) argues further: “…it is incumbent upon us to explain Husserl’s way of speaking rather than to explain it away, and Husserl consistently speaks of the noema both as the objective correlate of an act – the intended object just as intended – and as a sense. This suggests clearly that the intended object as intended is, in some manner, the sense and that the two are not ontologically distinct”.

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abstraction that provides an intentional sense that is ontologically indiscernible from the physical object, and he means by this conception the phenomenological reduction. Moreover, he tends to define “... the relation between abstractum and concretum as other than a whole-part relationship” (1990, p. 142). Nevertheless, his conception of the layered structure of noema, when layers are ontologically indiscernible and existentially dependent, suggests an interpretation against which Drummond comes out in his postulate. This case will be considered in the upcoming section.

2.1. Object as identity in the manifold of appearances

Drummond disagrees with Gurwitsch that the relation between noema and object should be considered in terms of parts and wholes. He claims that the “whole-part” analysis abstracts from the temporal nature of the perception. The result of this is that such an analysis is “…essentially static…and cannot be employed in the analysis of the perceptual process as a process” (1990, p. 151). Another, rather misleading, consequence is the “horizontal transcendence” as the relation between the object and its appearances. He writes: “Gurwitsch would also claim that the thing transcends its appearance, but Gurwitsch can speak only of a horizontal transcendence, a going beyond the directly sensed appearance to other appearances, the organized totality of which constitutes the thing” (1990, pp. 151-2). Instead, Drummond proposes a different method of analyses, which he calls the “identity in manifold analysis”. He claims this conception makes it possible to specify the transcendence of the “identical object” with respect to the totality of its appearances. Drummond: “Identity-in-manifolds analysis, however, admits of another kind of transcendence; such an analysis views the identical object as irreducible to any one or any collection (including the ideal totality) of its appearances and, consequently, it views the object not as composed of appearances but as presented in

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appearances” (1990, p. 152). And this does not mean that the object exists separately from its appearance.88 Then, Drummond proposes to reveal the identity of the object in the manifold of appearances. This approach intends to disclose the relation of the object to the noema without the whole-part terminology. Following his conception, the manifold of appearances is the multicomponent structure which is involved in time. He claims that: “The recalled perceptions and judgments which ground the perceptual expectation of causal properties of objects and those protentional expectations themselves constitute the manifold of appearances in which the real causal properties, and hence the materiality of the object, are constituted” (1990, p. 168). The recalled perception is the act which has been forgotten and newly revived by the ego. It should be distinguished from the retentional phases which are past but which never have been forgotten. The “recollected perception” determines the object in respect of its perceptual properties. In contrast, recollected judgments determine the object as to its causal characteristics. The determined object, in turn, is the correlate of the original presentation, i.e., the perception of the object in intuitive fullness. Moreover, the manifold also contains protentionally and retentionally modified acts. The latter are original presentations which have just been finished. In contrast, protentional acts are expected to come. They are determined by the recollected perceptions and judgments, as well as by the content of the original presentation. All of these partial acts constitute the manifold of appearances that present identically the same object. This means that all of the partial acts, i.e., 88

Drummond (1990, pp. 152-3): “In our ordinary discourse, we speak of the transcendence of the perceptual object as its being ‘external’ to the act, ‘outside’ of the perceiver, and independent of any subject and any apparent modifications. Phenomenologically interpreted, that transcendence of the perceived is revealed in the identity-in-manifolds analysis which recognizes that the object is minimally seen as a spatially identical (i.e. enclosed) object in any single appearance (including its horizons), and the overlapping character of the appearances is such that we can identify the same spatially enclosed object in a multiplicity of appearances. This implies neither that the object exists somewhere separated from its appearances nor that there is some phenomenal similarity between all of the appearances nor that the identity is achieved by the merely formal bearer of property (the ‘X’)”.

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recollected perceptions and judgments, retentional and protentional phases as well as the original presentation, are, in Drummond’s opinion, different appearances of the same object. This is also the point of the “identity in manifold analysis”, namely to reveal the same object in the manifold of appearances. After the foregoing explanation, one thing is evident without any doubt; namely, according to Drummond, that any appearance is also the noema or, at least, a noematic layer. Hence, if appearance is the noematic layer as well as the object presented in this appearance, and, moreover, if appearance can vary while the object remains the same, then, perhaps, the object can be identified with the noematic X and the appearance with the X taken in its determinations. Let us consider this in more detail. In Drummond’s opinion, the noematic X should not be regarded merely as the formal moment which plays the role of unifying factor among objective properties (1990, pp. 153-4). Moreover, he also disagrees with a conception that interprets X in the sense of a demonstrative pronoun. This notion, as he holds, “…is insufficient to maintain the identity of the perceived object through a series of appearances precisely because the demonstrative pronoun is occasional and, like the purely formal ‘X’, can refer to any object whatsoever” (1990, p. 153). Instead, Drummond claims that X must be a “definite continuity” which is manifested in the flux of objective determinations. Owing to this “continuity,” the ego can recognize the object as a material identity (1990, p. 153). However: “This continuity…need not be something common in all the appearances of the object” (1990, pp. 153-4). Instead, X can vary from appearance to appearance.89 Nevertheless, X can be understood as identity only against the manifold of its appearances.90 So, he concludes: “The ‘determinable X’, therefore, 89

Drummond (1990, p. 154): “The determinability of the ‘X’ should be understood as the object’s ability to come to a more precise determination in the course of a temporally extended experience” 90 Drummond (1990, p.154): “The ‘X’ as an identity can be understood, however, only against the manifold in which it manifests itself, and it must be understood therefore not merely as a purely formal identity but as a materially determinable spatial singular coming to more precise qualitative determination”.

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is a both a formal and teleological characterization of the identical object” (1990, p. 154). According to what has been stated previously, both X and its appearance, i.e., X taken in its determination, belong to the same noematic structure. They can be regarded as the content of different layers and one fact is clear enough, namely that they help to constitute one noema. Besides these moments, the noema also contains thetic characters, but they cannot establish the identity of reference and for that reason will be ignored here. Hence, X and its appearance are the only content of the noema that determine an object’s identity. Nevertheless, appearances vary as well as X. Then, how can identity be achieved in an act? The concept of “definite continuity”, which is manifested in the flux of “objective determinations”, is incomplete because no factor in the flux of noematic content can determine this continuity’s identity. Drummond finally found the basis for the object’s actual identity in its being (1990, p. 153). And this, as Paśniczek notes, is not allowed in the pure phenomenology (1987).91 Furthermore, Drummond identifies the appearance with the apprehension. For him, any partial act that participates in the constitution of a corporeal object has the character of appearance. Nevertheless, in such a constitution, some intentions have no intuitive content at all. Hence, they cannot be identified with appearances because an appearance is an experience that includes the intuitive content. From this, if the experience that constitutes corporeal objects includes moments of sense that are not fulfilled by intuitive content, and sense is ontologically indiscernible from the intentional object, then what kinds of objective properties are non-fulfilled moments of sense? In general, empty intending acts generate difficulties for Drummond’s concept. Consider the following instance. Let two acts be directed at the same object, which is a green leaf. Moreover, suppose that the first act intuitively presents the leaf’s greenness, but in the second act the greenness is only emptily intended. If we agree that the empty intention refers to exactly the same property 91

Drummond (1990, p.153): “The actual identity of the object is its being and presentation as a spatial singular whose phenomenal presentation varies in determinate patterns”.

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as the fulfilled one, and that the noema and the intentional object are exactly the same entity, then the emptily intended greenness must be identified with the fulfilled greenness. However, to consider this instance in terms of the object, we deal here with the objective property, which is colourless greenness. In one case, where the intuitive content is present, greenness has the quality of being green. In the second case, however, the lack of the intuitive content makes this property empty, i.e., colourless. Hence the question, do we really want to accept talking about the property of being green, which doesn’t exemplify greenness? Drummond also provides a very similar interpretation for the judgmental noema and the object that is judged.

2.2. The relation between judgmental noema and the object judged

According to Drummond: the “…judgmental noema…has its noematic or judgmental sense, i.e., the Satz as positum partially coincides with the Satz logically considered as the proposition” (1990, p. 186). And further, he claims: “To fully achieve that sense, we must abstract only from the thetic and doxic characteristics of this identity [identity of the state of affairs which is intended in the act - Ł. K]. The Satz as proposition, therefore, is the ideal, attributive content common to all these individuals judging which achieve the same articulation and, when we abstractively reflect on this content, we apprehend what Husserl in FTL has, as we have seen, called the ideal ‘judgmentcontent’” (1990, p.186). Hence, the judgmental content, i.e., the proposition, can be abstracted from the judgmental noema. Moreover, the judgmental noema is the same as the “object as intended”, i.e., as the “states of affairs as intended”. Drummond: “Throughout the passage under discussion, however, it is clear that the intended state of affairs just as intended, either in the individual act or the manifold of acts, is the judgmental noema” (1990, p. 186). Next, several pages before, he writes: “Every judgment, we have said, is

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intentionally directed to a state of affairs. But the state of affairs as a worldly objectivity is simply identical with neither the judgmental noema (the state of affairs as intended) nor the proposition in the logical sense; they are identical, but not perfectly coincident” (1990, p. 183). Thus, the judgmental noema, proposition and state of affairs are identical but not perfectly coincident. In summary, Drummond states: This … text, in other words, reveals the identification, albeit not the perfect coincidence, of (i) the state of affairs itself as an objectivity which transcends our knowledge and cannot be fully known but which is the correlate of the ideal of the complete judgmental experience thereof, (ii) the state of affairs as an identical objectivity intended in a manifold of judgings intending the state of affairs with varying, associated determinations, (iia) the state of affairs as an identical objectivity intended in a manifold of judgings intending the state of affairs in the same determinate manner, and (iii) the state of affairs as intended in this individual judging, but also of (iv) the proposition in the purely logical sense (1990, pp.186-7).

Moreover, he also adds that: …we can trace the coincidence of (i) the intended object, (ii) the noema (the intended object as intended), i.e. the positum or Satz, the objective Sinn in the broader, inexact use of the term ‘Sinn’, which noema is the (partial) object of a phenomenological refection, (iii) the propositional sense (Satz), the noematic Sinn in the more precise use of ‘Sinn’, which sense can become the object of a logical refection, and (iv) the sense (Sinn or, more specifically, Bedeutung) which is the meaning of an expressive statement (1990, p. 188).92

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He also notes the following (1990, p. 186): “A perfect coincidence would be achieved only in those judgments which are truly simple, i.e., those judgments containing no admixture of the results of other judgings. In such judgments, there would be no distinction between the intended state of affairs as intended in the individual judging and the intended state of affairs as an identity given in a manifold of varying judgments, precisely because the simplicity of the judgment is its isolation from other determining senses of the object and its situation”.

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We know from Drummond that coincidence is a relation that obtains between different “layers” of the same object. Phenomenological analysis of the judgmental act discloses layers such as “the intended object as intended”, “positum or Satz”, “proposition” etc. All of them are layers of the intended object, i.e., they coincide with it and with each other. However, this coincidence is not perfect, despite the fact that in the ontological sense they are all the same entity. In other words, layers are to be identified but, simultaneously, in some sense they are also separate objects. Let us consider this case with respect to both instances of noema, i.e., “the object as intended” and “the state of affairs as intended”.

2.3. Ontological identity of noema and object and their noncoincidence

As Drummond claims, the non-coincidence relation between “layers” cannot be explained in mereological terms. Hence, they cannot be regarded as parts of the object of which they are layers. Therefore, another sense must specify why layers do not coincide, despite the fact that they are the same object. From Drummond we know that the difference between noema and an intentional object consists of fact that they are considered differently. Therefore, the mode of consideration is apparently the factor that introduces non-coincidence between them. Noema occur only after reduction, whereas an object is given in a natural attitude. However, we must note that although the state of affairs as intended is achieved in the transcendental reduction, some layers also are accessible because of the abstraction conceived in the sense established by Husserl in the Second Investigation. Thus there is more than one method of achieving layers, although they all are subjected to the relation of being identical but non-coincidental. Without subsequent inquiries into the question of whether different manners of achieving layers must result in the difference of relations between these layers, let us notice that the mode of consideration is irrelevant to the ontic characteristic of an investigated object. This

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means that no matter how or from what viewpoint we conceive an object, it always preserves its ontological character. Otherwise, there would be no consistency in an object’s internal structure. If we agree with the foregoing and adopt Drummond’s perspective as the interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, then we must face the following difficulties. Husserl described noema as the unity of sense that is bestowed by the noetic side of experience. In one possible interpretation of the relation between noesis and noema, this former part of experience conditions not only the latter’s content, but also its existence. As is readily apparent, from such a perspective, Drummond’s doctrine is very similar to Barkeleyan idealism, so it can be criticised in exactly the same manner. However, there is also a less radical interpretation of the relation between noesis and noema, in which noesis only conditions noema’s manifestation in an experience, but doesn’t create it literally. This reading circumvents the dangers of idealism; nevertheless, other problems occur. Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of consciousness. Being conscious of something means the same as being intentionally directed to it. But as we know, we can be aware of different objects, which populate domains of existence and nonexistence. If we agree that an intentional object, and all layers of noema, are ontologically indistinguishable, then in acts directed to non-existent objects, noema must also be non-existent. Drummond is aware of this difficulty and attempts to explain it as follows. He considers the noema of a judgmental act that states that “Ronald Reagan is a liberal Democrat” (1990, p. 209). Because Reagan is a man of conservative convictions and Republican allegiances, the sentence is untrue and, as Drummond explains, the objectivity it articulates doesn’t exist. Nevertheless, the sentence describes a real person, who is Ronald Reagan; and in this reading the judgmental act gains direction to the real individual object. Therefore, he explains, the sentence “Ronald Reagan is a liberal Democrat” is only seemingly objectless. In fact it refers to Reagan himself but it does so indirectly through one of the many possible and, simultaneously, untruthful description of this person. What is more, Reagan as an actual person has his own genuine characteristics, which now also must be given in the

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act. This is accomplished on account of the senses that belong to the horizon of untruthful judgment. Drummond: “The horizon, then, by virtue of noematic senses it associates with the present noematic sense, contributes to the concrete sense the object has for us, but it also guarantees the act’s reference by presenting objects which serve as its referential basis in cases of apparently object-less reference” (1990, p. 213). Hence, the untruthful sense refers to an actual object owing to the senses contained in its intentional horizon.93 In this reading therefore, the intention “Reagan-as-Democrat” is not objectless, but merely indirect, which means that to gain the “proper” object, it must be specified by the associated intentional horizon’s content. Furthermore, when explaining the case of objectless acts, Drummond made an important note, namely, “The judgmental intention [intention of untruthful articulation – Ł.K.], therefore, still directs itself to the actual world and to an actual existent therein, but it supposes that object to be other than it is. It grasps, in other words, a possible articulated presentation of the actual person about whom the judgment is made; it grasps one of the manifold of possible articulations of that person and thereby grasps the object which is the identity of both this articulated presentation and other possible and actual articulated presentations” (1990, p. 209). However, if the senses of the untruthful articulation “Reagan is a liberal Democrat” and the actual articulation “Reagan is a conservative Republican” are noemata or, at least, noematic layers, and they are ontologically indistinguishable from the intentional object, i.e., from the actual Ronald Reagan, then Reagan must have both characteristics, i.e., must be both a liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican. Is this the kind of consequence we would like to contend? Let us consider the same case on the basis of an example where the intentional object’s inconsistency is vivid. If we judge Miss Smith as childless when, in fact, she has a child, then the associated content of the horizon of the sense of being Miss Smith directs the consciousness to 93

Drummond (1990, p. 211): “Thus, ‘Reagan as liberal Democrat’, the sense upon which the judgment ‘Reagan is a liberal Democrat’ is founded, has as its inner horizon other possible and actual presentations of the actually existent Reagan, and thereby reference to an actual existent is achieved”.

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the actual Miss Smith. Furthermore, the fact that Miss Smith has a child is apprehended in the genuine sense of being Miss Smith, i.e., in this sense on account of which the intention hits the actual Miss Smith. Hence, two different apprehensions of the same person arise, i.e., Miss Smith as childless and Miss Smith as mother. Because the actual Miss Smith is ontologically indistinguishable from the noemata that interprets her differently, Miss Smith must be regarded as a childless mother. Hence, the standpoint that emphasises the ontological identity of noema and the intentional object leads, in some instances, to inconsistency in an object’s internal structure. Moreover, Drummond states, “The judgmental intention [intention of untruthful articulation – Ł.K.], therefore, still directs itself to the actual world and to an actual existence therein, but it supposes that object to be other than it is” (1990, p. 209). But how did we come to know that an object is other than it is? If noema is identical to an intentional object, then in acts directed to this object we deal with exactly this object and not with any other. In other words, there is no room for an “object other than it is”, which fact is guaranteed by intended objects’ identity. An “object other than it is” would be simply another, ontologically distinct entity. Then, in the context of Drummond’s explanation, the question arises, how can objectivity be wrongly intended when the sense of intention is ontologically identical to an intended object? As is also easy to notice, Drummond’s theory shares a number of difficulties with Gurwitsch’s doctrine, because both standpoints accent the ontological identity of noema and intentional objects. The problems thus generated cannot be circumvented, because of this identity’s importance to both systems. Next, Drummond many times takes an opportunity to demonstrate that his standpoint accords well with the “general spirit of Husserl’s philosophy”. In one of those attempts, he considers the meaning of the word “Ideell”. He explains that “Ideell” means “not really inherent” but does not determine an ideal manner of existence (1990, p. 188). Next, he specifies that any object that does not belong to the real phenomenological content, i.e., to noesis, is “ideel”. Material things, for example, are not parts of noetic content and, therefore, they should be

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classified as “not really inherent” in an act. From this viewpoint, there is no difference between noema and worldly things; and this is also why Drummond argues for their ontological identity. Nevertheless, he apparently ignores the following facts. First, noema is a component of experience. It belongs to an act but is not really inherent in noesis. A worldly thing, instead, is not really inherent not only in noesis, but also in experience in general. In other words, a thing-like object is not a component of experience. Here it is enough to mention that it transcends an act in a TEF manner; whereas SST is the most “liberal” variant of the transcendence of noema. Second, Drummond must explain the ontological identity of noematic Sinn with worldly things in the context of the following words of Husserl: “Sinne are nonreal objects, they are not objects that exist in time”, and “A Sinn … is related to a temporal interval through the act in which it occurs, but it does not itself have reality [Dasein], an individual connection with time and duration” (Husserl in unpublished Noema und Sinn, pp. 109, 114 quoted by Føllesdal 1969, p. 684).

3. Noematic Sinn as an intensional entity: Dagfin Føllesdal’s interpretation of noema

Føllesdal’s conception evades difficulties which arise when the noema is identified with the intentional object. However, it generates plenty of other problems that will be considered in the present section. Føllesdal’s theory will be provided in the shape in which it appears in Husserl’s Notion of Noema (1969). In twelve theses, he briefly explains the crucial points of Husserl’s extensive analysis. Below, each thesis will be discussed and commented on. In thesis one, Føllesdal claims that: (1) “The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (Sinn, Bedeutung)” (Føllesdal 1969, p. 681; see also: 1972; 1990). For him, this thesis, despite going against the usual interpretation of Husserl, accords well with Husserl’s opinions (1969, p. 681). Føllesdal does not specify whose analysis he classifies as the “usual interpretations”.

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Nevertheless, in the phenomenological literature one can find an opinion that denies Føllesdal. Let us present the one that comes from Lenore Langsdorf: Føllesdal’s intention in juxtaposing Sinn and Bedeutung in the first thesis is unclear. He may mean to suggest certain correlations between the two terms in Husserl; or, in Husserl in relation to Frege. If he means that they are synonymous, he is violating Husserl’s practice in relation to the noema. If Føllesdal is instead simply indicating a close correlation of the two, he is still neglecting Husserl’s position as to their difference: ‘Sinn’ (hereafter: ‘sense’) is meaningfulness in general, as present in the variety of acts. ‘Bedeutung’ (hereafter: ‘meaning’) is restricted to the meaningfulness of linguistic acts (1984, p. 764).

A similar opinion is shared by John Drummond (1990). We must note that, like the Føllesdal case, this interpretation also seems to accord well with Husserl’s opinions. The second Føllesdal thesis states the following: A noema has two components: (1) one which is common to all acts that have the same object, with exactly the same properties, oriented in the same way, etc., regardless of the ‘thetic’ character of the act, i.e., whether it be perception, remembering, imagining, etc. and (2) one which is different in acts with different thetic character (1969, p. 682).

He also notes that in Logical Investigations Husserl calls the first component “Materie”, the second “Qualität” and the two together “Sinn”. In Ideas I, he further argues, Husserl uses “Sinn” for the first component whereas “Noema” is used for the two together (1969, p. 682). This interpretation clearly states that the noema is comprised of two components. Føllesdal does not mention whether Sinn has a complicated structure or not. The third thesis: (3) “The noematic Sinn is that in virtue of which consciousness relates to the object” (1969, p. 682). Next, in thesis four he states the following: (4) “The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the object toward which the act is

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directed)” (1969, p. 682).94 Føllesdal considers theses 3 and 4 to be the key points in Husserl’s phenomenology. He sees in these theses Husserl’s solution to the Brentano dilemma, which appears when one interprets the object that gives the act its directedness as the object toward which the act is directed (1969; 1982; 1990). In Føllesdal’s opinion, these theses also explain the phenomena of the objectless intentional reference. According to him, when one thinks of a centaur, there exists no object of which one thinks. However, the act of thinking has a noema in virtue of which the act has directedness, because, as Føllesdal holds: “To be directed simply is to have a noema” (1969, p. 681). In thesis five, Føllesdal holds that: (5) “To one and the same Noema, there corresponds only one object” (1969, p. 683). To ground his conviction in the literature he appeals to Husserl’s unpublished “Noema und Sinn”, where he finds the following statement: “Sameness of Sinn occurs only where the object besides being identically the same, is meant in ‘the same Sinn’ that is, from the same side, with the same properties” (1969, p. 683). This certainly explains the sameness of the sense but why it confirms Føllesdal’s thesis is unclear. The quoted passage simply states that the sameness of sense occurs when the thinglike entity, since only things “have sides”, is meant as exactly the same in exactly the same manner. But, first and foremost, Husserl does not state conditions for the sameness of sense in general, but only for a particular situation. Let us interpret the quoted passage in the following way: “Sameness of Sinn occurs (when and only when) the object (1) besides being identically the same, is meant in ‘the same Sinn’ that is, (2) from the same side, with the same properties”. According to this, the sameness of Sinn depends, among other things, on whether the presented side of the object fits to the intentions of the experience. But mathematical entities, ideas and all of the general objects have no sides since they are not spatially determined. From this, the notions of ideal 94

This is one of the main differences between Føllesdal and Gurwitsch. Føllesdal distinguishes the noema from the intentional object, whereas Gurwitsch identifies them, see: (Føllesdal 1969; Gurwitsch 1964; Drummond 1990; Smith and McIntyre 1982).

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objects do not fulfil 2. Hence, their identities cannot occur. In practise, this entails that one should not be able to distinguish the notion of π from sin α. Furthermore, a quoted passage states that the sameness of sense occurs only where the object is identically the same (1). But, according to Føllesdal, no objects correspond to names like “Pegasus”, “Zeus” or “Sherlock Holmes”. Hence, the sameness of sense of e.g. “Zeus” can never occur since there is no object of which identity can be meant. The same holds for “Pegasus”, “Sherlock Holmes” and every fictional object. The lack of the possibility to establish the identity of meaning for theses names should make “Zeus” and “Pegasus” indiscernible, but this is not true. One can easily confirm that Zeus is not the same as a winged horse because one can easy identify meanings in those cases. Therefore, the quoted passage is too narrow to define the sameness of sense in general. At the most, it can serve to specify perceptual sense only. Thesis (6): “To one and the same object there may correspond several different noemata” (1969, p. 683). This is undoubtedly true. In Husserl’s example, Napoleon is defined as being “vanquished at Waterloo” and, at another time, as the “victor at Jena”. The same object, i.e., Napoleon, is meant through two different senses and each particular sense constitutes a separate noema. Moreover, noemata can vary not only in respect of the content of their cores but also in respect of their characters. Clearly, an act that states with certitude that Napoleon was the victor at Jena has a different character than an act that questions whether “Napoleon was the victor at Jena”. In both cases, the object meant is exactly the same; however, the characters vary as in the first instance it is an assertion and, in the second, a question. In thesis (7), Føllesdal confirms that: “Each act has one and only one noema”. Hence, the most elementary act has one noema as does the complicated intentional process of comparing, doubting or any other relating (1969, p. 683; see also: Langsdorf 1984). Next, in thesis (8) Føllesdal claims that: “Noemata are abstract entities” (1969, p. 684). This holds true since, as he believes, noemata are like linguistic senses in most respects. In Føllesdal’s opinion, the object is abstract when it is timeless and free from spatial characteristics.

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In this sense, all ideal entities are abstract, while noesis is not, since it has duration (1990). Langsdorf comments on this thesis in the following way: “The significance of ‘abstract’ is the basic difficulty. One ordinary meaning is ‘not perceived through the senses’, but Føllesdal cannot mean that – for if he did, 8 and 9 would be equivalent, and he stresses that 9 is a consequence of 8” (1984, p. 771). Thesis (9) states that: “Noemata are not perceived through our senses” (Føllesdal 1969, p. 684). This is true since the noema is not a sensuously qualified object. In (10), he holds following: “Noemata are known through a special reflection, the phenomenological reflection” (1969, p. 685). Here, it is important to realize what it means that reflection is special. Certainly, it is not the name for a new kind of mental activity. Phenomenological reflection is ordinary reflection that is specially directed, namely toward noetic-noematic structures. In thesis (11) Føllesdal states that: “The phenomenological reflection can be iterated”. To ground his own conviction in the literature, he cites following statement from Husserl: “The Sinn corresponding to an object is in its turn an object … it can be made the object of a judgment. …As such it has a Sinn of the second level: the Sinn of a Sinn … hence we come to an infinite regress, insofar as the Sinn of the Sinn may in its turn be made an object and then again has a Sinn and so on” (Husserl in unpublished Noema und Sinn, pp. 107-8 quoted by Føllesdal 1969, pp. 685-6). Finally, thesis (12) concerns something that Føllesdal calls a “pattern of determinations” (1969, p. 687). This notion refers to the total noematic content through which the ego refers both to the directly given and to the empty presented sides or aspects of the object. Let us outline a brief explanation. According to Husserl, things like trees, flowers, etc., are given to consciousness in perspectives. This means, among other things, that ego cannot perceive all of the aspects of the thing simultaneously. For example, at one time the ego can perceive at most three sides of a box of matches while the rest of the sides are hidden. To grasp the unseen sides, the ego must change perspective. This, however, turns a side which is seen into the unseen. As Husserl claims, though, the act is also directed

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to the unseen aspect of the object. This explains why the ego is aware of the box of matches despite the fact that it perceives only some of its sides. The set of unseen determinations contains characteristics which are specific for the given kinds of object. For example, in the perception of a mannequin, the ego expects the object to behave in a manner that is characteristic for a mannequin. In another example, when the perceived object is a human body, the ego expects to experience determinations which are peculiar for human flesh, etc. Most of these characteristics are empty intended, which means that the ego is aware of them but no evidence in the experience is provided for them. Of course, the ego can fulfil the empty intention by changing the perspective of perception. Following Føllesdal, the totality of directly given and empty intended determinations of the object constitutes a “pattern of determinations”. In thesis (12) he states that: “This pattern of determinations, together with the ‘Gegebenheitsweise’, is the noema” (1969, p. 687). Regarding thesis twelve, it must be noted that Føllesdal considers that the noema has a dynamic structure. In his opinion, in the course of experience, the “pattern of determination” can change in some of its aspects. Føllesdal: As long as the further course of our experience fits into the more or less vaguely predelineated pattern, we continue to perceive the same object and get an ever more ‘many-sided’ experience of it, without ever exhausting the pattern, which develops with our experience of the object to include ever new, still unexperienced determinations (1969, p. 687).

In summary, it is easy to note that the most important difference between Føllesdal’s and Gurwitsch’s conceptions consists in the fact that the former philosopher accents the ontological distinction between the noema and intentional object. As the result, the noema gets the function of an intensional entity in virtue of which the act is directed to its object. 95

95

See also: (Drummond 1990).

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Føllesdal’s reading of noema inspired many philosophers to further analyses. Perhaps the most influential continuation of his interpretation belongs to Ronald McIntyre. This philosopher, together with David Smith, demonstrated an extended and original justification of Føllesdal’s theses. Some aspects of their collected work will be considered below.

4. Smith and McIntyre’s concept of noema

Smith and McIntyre propose almost the same interpretation of noema as Føllesdal does. They also situate the main point of their enterprise in demonstrating that the noema is the intensional entity, which is ontologically distinct from the intended object. However, saying that they merely repeat the argumentation of Føllesdal is far from true. Quite the contrary, they describe the issue of the noema in great detail, more than once providing original reasons for their own theses. Their most original interpretations will be outlined below. Smith and McIntyre consider noema as the unity of three components, namely: the thetic component, the noematic core and the noematic nucleus – pure X. This is the first point in which they differ from Føllesdal. According to them, Husserl discriminated X to explain, among other things, how it is possible that acts that have different senses can be directed to the same object (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 200). They claim: “Apparently … the X is a fundamental and unique kind of sense that presents an object directly, i.e., independently of any particular way of conceiving or descriptively characterizing the object” (1982, p. 201). From this, they conclude that within noematic content, two things should be distinguished: the “object simpliciter”, i.e., the pure X in abstraction from all properties, and the “object in the manner of its determinations”, i.e., pure X as determined by its properties. Following this explanation, two different concepts of noema can be pinned down. Both are based on the difference in interpreting the noematic X.

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4.1. Noema as the sense of definite description

In harmony with the first conception, noematic X “…does not prescribe anything but … its role is merely to transform the aggregate of predicate-senses into an individual sense, i.e., a Sinn prescribing an individual rather than a complex of properties” (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 204). X and the content of the core, i.e., predicate-senses, together form the structure of sense that can be brought to expression by definite description. This interpretation accords well with the other thesis of Smith and McIntyre, namely, that the noema is the intensional entity.96 They say: The term ‘intensional entity’ is also suggestive of one of Husserl’s own uses of the term ‘intentional object’. Husserl admits to using the words ‘intentional’ in two quite different senses. Sometimes he uses it so that ‘intentional object’ means the intended object, i.e., the object of an act or the referent of an expression. At other times he uses it so that ‘intentional object’ means a meaning entity, specifically the noema or the noematic Sinn of an act or the meaning of an expression … The term ‘intensional entity’ has the advantage of avoiding the ambiguity of ‘intentional object’, and its meaning seems to be just that of ‘intentional object’ as Husserl applies it to meanings and to noematic Sinne. Noematic Sinne are also ideal entities, we know, and their role in mediating intention is virtually the same as the role of linguistic meaning in reference. So it is a happy point of terminology that one of the two senses in which Husserl uses ‘intentional’ is just that of ‘intensional’ (1982, pp. 175176).

In the context of the quoted words, the noema or, more precisely, its core is identified with linguistic meanings. As such: “…noematic Sinn of any act is in principle expressible in language” (1982, p. 182). Then, whatever can be seen, recollected, imagined etc. must be expressible in language in the form of a definite description (1982, pp. 184-5). But such a consequence faces difficulties.97 96 97

See also: (Drummond 1990, pp. 130-9). See also: (McIntyre 1982a and 1982b).

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First, Smith and McIntyre notice that the noema of an intuitive act, such as sensuous perception, and the noema of a non-intuitive presentation, can have the same Sinn. Nevertheless, those noemata still will differ with respect to their total contents. The first noema has moments determined by intuitive fullness; whereas the second does not. Despite the fact that this fullness is peculiar to perceptual kinds of acts, it remains unexpressed when an act is brought to expression (1982, p. 185). Therefore, if something that is peculiar to perception does not enter the expressible sense, the whole perceptual noema must differ in this respect from the expressible sense. Secondly, they also remark that the “thetic component” of an act always remains unexpressed (1982, pp.185-6). Of course, one may express it in an indirect manner. For example, one can state that “p” and that “I judge that p”. In judgment “p” the ego expresses merely that “p”. But, in the next act, the ego also expresses the thetic character of the previous act by stating “I judge that p”. Hence, they conclude, the “thetic component” can be expressed, so to say, indirectly, that is, as the content of the sense of the next act. But, as it is easy to notice, the expression “I judge that p” is constituted in a separate experience, which, in turn, has its very own thetic component. This can be expressed in another act, and so on. Finally, according to Smith and McIntyre, additional difficulties are generated by the fact that the conception of definite description is not operative with regard to names. Through the name, one can successfully refer to an individual of whom one knows no definite or identifying description (1982, p. 206). What is more, in some instances, definite description theory yields the wrong referent for an act. They explain this case by modifying Keith Donnellan’s example in the following way: Suppose at a wine-tasting party I am introduced to Jones, who immediately impresses me as the only person I have seen there who is drinking from a martini glass. Thereafter, every time I remember Jones I fix on the description ‘the woman who was drinking a martini at the wine-tasting party’, so that the content of my noematic Sinn is essentially just the sense of this description. But now suppose further that Jones was actually not drinking a martini … (her glass contained Perrier, say), though some other woman, who spent the

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entire evening out of sight on the patio, in fact was. In that case, if the definite-description model of intention were correct, each time I thought myself to be remembering or otherwise intending Jones I would actually be intending this other person, whose presence at the party is completely unknown to me (1982, p. 207).

So, they recapitulate, this model of intention leads to absurd conclusions: “…that if most (or perhaps only one) of one’s beliefs about an individual are false then one cannot be intending that individual and, in fact, may quite unwittingly be intending some other individual whom one has never seen or even heard of” (1982, pp. 207-8). But, contrary to the definite description model, when an ego intentionally refers to Jones, the object which is intended in the act is Jones and no other individual. In this case, then, the act intends the object not via predicative content, but despite it (1982, p. 208; McIntyre 1982a). Therefore, the noematic Sinn cannot be identified with the sense of definite description.98

4.2. Noema as the sense of ‘demonstratives’

Since the previous interpretation of noema generates numerous difficulties, Smith and McIntyre propose a different reading. They suggest interpreting X as the “substrate of predicates”, i.e., an element that has no syntactic structure: “… when Husserl says a Sinn includes an X as ‘bearer’ of various predicate-senses, evidently he is thinking of an X as a substratum of predication on the semantic level” (1982, p. 202).

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On this subject, McIntyre (1982b, p. 226) writes the following: “In sum, there are at least two main reasons for rejecting the Fregean, or identifying-description, theory of reference as a model for a theory of intentionality, especially for a theory that would be adequate to Husserl’s conception of intentionality. First, an ID theory of intending fails to account for cases … in which an act’s directedness toward its object is largely independent of the particular descriptive content in the act’s noematic Sinn. And, second, the ID theory is not capable of preserving Husserl’s view that an act’s intentionality is determined by the phenomenological content of the act alone, without empirical help, while at the same time accounting for the ‘definiteness’ of intention that Husserl himself emphasizes”.

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In harmony with the previous explanation, no individual beings can be definitely determined by the expressible content. Let us consider the following example: an ego judges about a perceived leaf that it is green and has an elliptical shape. Such an expression cannot unequivocally determine the individual reference because plenty of leaves match this description. Hence, the Sinn conceived as the sense of a definite description cannot establish a reference to an individual object unambiguously. The noema, therefore, must contain another part which makes this reference possible. And, according to Smith and McIntyre, the noematic X is that part. In their opinion, X is that factor in virtue of which two different acts can be referred to the same object. For example, consider an act which apprehends a leaf as green and another act which apprehends this leaf as having elliptic shape. The sense of definite description for both experiences is different. Nevertheless, because the X determines the “codirectedness” of experiences, each act points to the same object. Smith and McIntyre: “…on Husserl’s account, different acts of consciousness are directed toward the same object if and only if their noematic Sinne include the same X” (1982, p. 202). And they conclude, “If we ignore cases in which the intended object of an act does not exist, Husserl is apparently saying that there is a one-to-one correlation between X’s and intended objects” (1982, p. 202). For these reasons, they consider whether a noematic X can be identified with the sense of occasional expressions such as “this”, “that”, etc., and with the sense of proper names such as Napoleon, Socrates, etc. They also note that perceptual intention is analogous to a demonstrative reference; so, “to perceive something” is the same as “to be demonstratively directed to it” (1982, p. 216). They say: …if we draw on the Investigations, it would seem the X in a noematic Sinn is a type of sense expressible in language by a proper name or demonstrative pronoun. In particular, the X in a perceptual Sinn would seem to be a ‘demonstrative’ sense, expressibly by ‘this’ or ‘that’, a sense through which an object would be intuitively presented as ‘this’ object ‘itself’. And the object of a perception would be determined in way analogous to that in which the object of demonstrative reference is

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determined; perceptual intention would be analogous to demonstrative reference (1982, p. 213).99

The noematic X, interpreted as demonstrative, refers to the object directly. This means, according to them, that X does not prescribe an object’s properties: “For by ‘direct’ Husserl means, in part at least, without appeal to the prescribed properties of the object” (1982, p. 215). Thus, the noematic X is that type of sense in virtue of which an object is meant in the empty set of properties. In this context, they raise the question of how intention is achieved via Sinn, via an X? In other words, how does Sinn determine which object is intended in an act? And they analyse the case in the following manner: …we might suppose the work of individuating an object be done just by the X alone, independent of the predicative content in the Sinn. But what kind of sense would the X then have to be, and how would it determine the object intended? Obviously, it would not be a sense of any description of the object, for that sort of sense would belong to the Sinn’s predicative content (1982, p.203).

Finally, they even question whether demonstratives and other pure referential expressions have a sense at all (1982, p. 204).100 As a solution, they attempt to explain the phenomenon of direct experience by appealing not only to the internal components of experience but also to its external physical factors. They note that the sense of the perception which is expressed by demonstratives is occasional. This means that it depends on the “physical situation”, the contextual relation between speaker and referent (1982, p. 217). However, such an interpretation diverges from Husserl’s theory of intentionality since it introduces the physical factors to explain the sense. So, they conclude that Husserl’s 99

See also: (McIntyre 1982a, pp. 232, 240-3). Smith and McIntyre (1982 p. 204): “This analysis raises a new line of questions. Can it plausibly be maintained that demonstratives and other such purely referential expressions express senses at all? Is there in fact any such thing as a purely referential – i.e., non-descriptive – sense, such as the X is here supposed to be? And, again, precisely how would such a sense prescribe the object intended in an act?”

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doctrine, without significant modification, is unable to explain the phenomenon of the directedness of demonstrative references (1982, pp. 217-9). As a solution, they suggest that the structure of Sinn should be explained by regarding not only intentional components but also physical factors (1982, p. 219).

4.3. Noematic Sinn as a mediator

Smith and McIntyre hold that the noema is not that object toward which the act is directed (1982, p. 122). Moreover, they also claim that the noema is this factor in virtue of which consciousness is directed to the object (1982, p. 125).101 In other words, they consider noema a mediator between noesis and the object (1982, p. 141).102 Simultaneously, they emphasise, however, that Husserl’s conception of intentionality is by no means representationalism. Noema does not stand between consciousness and its object. It does not “represent” things or “picture” them. Smith and McIntyre, then, exclude those explanations which are known for generating infinite regress and they provide the following schema of intentional relation.

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In Drummond’s (1990, p. 105) opinion: “The doctrine of the noesis-noema correlation is, for Smith and McIntyre, the result of Husserl’s continuing attempts to clarify the notion of the content of intentional experiences, and the noema, more specifically, is Husserl’s mature version of the notion of intentional or ideal content as that notion was presented in LU. Both these points are without doubt true, but the conclusion that we should consequently consider the noema of the act along the lines of the matter or intentional essence of the act, i.e., that the noema is not the object towards which the act is directed but is that through which the act intends its object, is by no means clear”. 102 In one of his articles, McIntyre (1986, p. 106) writes as follows: “Noematic Sinne constitute for Husserl a ‘medium’ in which mental processes take place; this medium is syntactically and semantically characterizable and so fundamentally language-like; mental states represent extra-mental things by virtue of how these noematic Sinne relate to the extra-mental world; and mental processes can be understood, at an ontologically neutral level of abstraction, in terms of relations among these noematic Sinne independent of the actual relations that obtain between mental states and the extra-mental world”.

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Figure 16: (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 143)

On the foregoing picture, three elements participate in the intentional relation, i.e., noesis, noema and object. Noesis is connected with the noema in a different manner than the noema with the object. The noema prescribes an object whereas noesis entertains noema.103 Intentional relation, in turn, is the assemblage of those two connections.

4.4. The abstract nature of noema

Smith and McIntyre consider noema to be an abstract entity because it has neither spatial nor temporal characteristics (1982, pp. 123–4; McIntyre 1982a). For this reason, they classify noemata as ideal objects. Simultaneously, they also note that a noema has no generic universality. For example, the essence of the colour red is general in the sense that it can be instantiated infinite times, e.g., as the particular red of vines, hair, leaves, etc. So this essence has particulars attached to it. In contrast, a noema that constitutes the sense of expression “a red colour” cannot be instantiated in the same way because no particulars are attached to it. Regarding this, they claim that a noema is the exception in a domain of ideal objects because of its lack of particularisations (1982, pp. 124-125, 141-2).

5. Roman Ingarden’s theory of the purely intentional object

Ingarden developed his own conception of intentionality. However, he insists that his ideas follow Husserl’s. What is more, 103

See also: (Drummond 1990, pp. 119-20).

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Ingarden also stresses that, on some points, he corrects his teachers (1961, p. 27). All of this and the unavoidable similarities between Husserl’s and Ingarden’s theories, make an explanation of the latter relevant to the present work.

5.1. The concept of experience

According to Ingarden, every intentional experience is comprised of three main components: a) the moment of intention (intentive moment), b) non-intuitive content and c) the moment that grasps the manner of existence (1961, p. 27). Ad. a) The moment of intention (intentive moment) is the most simple and fundamental part of every act. This means, firstly, that it cannot be further analysed into more basic elements, and, secondly, it makes the whole act intentional. Ingarden describes an intentive moment as “aiming at something” and “concerning something”) (1961, p. 27). Through this moment, consciousness is directed to an object: “Because of it [Because of the intentive moment –Ł.K.] (or in it) [in the intentive moment – Ł.K.], the act t u r n s toward something or c o n c e r n s something” (Ingarden 1961, pp. 27-8, translation mine).104 Hence, a moment of intention conditions the intentional relation because it directs an act to an object. Ingarden: “It causes the conscious subject performing a perceptual act to at least d i r e c t himself toward something different from him, something that lies beyond his boundaries” (1961, p.28, translation mine).105 Therefore, there can be no object for consciousness without an intentive moment. Strictly speaking, without the intentive moment there can be no consciousness at all. Moreover, a moment of intention (intentive moment) determines what can be called the distance between an ego and an object. Because 104

Ingarden (1961, pp. 27-8): “Dzięki niemu (lub w nim samym) akt z w r a c a się ku czemuś, d o t y c z y czegoś”. 105 Ingarden (1961, p. 28): “On to sprawia, że podmiot świadomości, spełniając akt spostrzegania, w ogóle s k i e r o w u j e się na coś od siebie różnego, leżącego poza jego obrębem”.

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of this distance, an experience is intentionally separated from its correlate and an ego can discern this fact (1961, p. 29).106 Finally, this same moment, following Ingarden, also determines an experience’s intentional structure. However, an intentive moment is not selfsufficient; it depends on other parts of an act (1961, p. 29). Ad. b) The non-intuitive content determines toward which object an act is directed and in which of its properties this object is given; Ingarden: “In an act the act’s c o n t e n t itself is what determines, in both material and formal respects, in what d i r e c t i o n (on what object) the act turns, and w h a t object it concerns” (1961, p. 29, translation mine).107 The similarity to Husserl’s ‘intentional matter’ is striking here; the non-intuitive content is the part of an experience that determines its objective reference. Different formations of this content constitute different references (1961, pp. 29, 31). Additionally, non-intuitive content is not the primary object for consciousness. Of course, it can be grasped for what it is in immanent perception (Ingarden, 1961, pp. 30-1). It is not surprising, therefore, that Ingarden regards it as the part of the experience that is responsible for the sense-giving function. In his opinion, an intentive moment establishes an objective reference (it conditions the fact that an act has any reference), while non-intuitive content determines as what an object is presented, i.e., in which set of its material properties. He says: “The 106

Ingarden (1961, p. 29, translation mine): “Wherever objective, intentive thinking occurs, whether in a sensuous, internal or imminent perception, or in a recollective or creative fantasising imagination of something, or, finally, in entirely ‘abstractive’, non-intuitive thinking, the act’s object, on account of the intentive moment, is being ‘separated’ (‘moved away’ – if it can be said that way!) from the very act in a characteristic manner and, by the same, from the subject performing this act”. And in Ingarden‘s original words: “Wszędzie, gdzie tylko występuje mniemanie intencyjne, przedmiotowe, czy to w zmysłowym spostrzeganiu, czy w spostrzeganiu wewnętrznym lub immanentnym, czy w odtwórczym lub wytwórczym fantazyjnym wyobrażaniu sobie czegoś, czy wreszcie w ‘abstrakcyjnym’, całkiem nienaocznym myśleniu – wszędzie przedmiot danego aktu zostaje dzięki momentowi intencyjnemu w charakterystyczny sposób ‘oddzielony’ (‘odsadzony’ – jeżeliby tak można powiedzieć!) od aktu samego, a tym samym od spełniającego ten akt podmiotu”. 107 Ingarden (1961, p.29): “Sama t r e ś ć aktu jest w nim tym, co o tym rozstrzyga, w jakim k i e r u n k u (na który przedmiot) akt się zwraca i j a k i e g o przedmiotu dotyczy, i to zarówno pod względem formalnym, jak i materialnym”.

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intentive moment gives the act’s non-intuitive content the reference to the object; whereas the act’s content gives the intentive moment a sense, explicit or equivocal, a qualitatively specified direction, in which the subject that lives through the act turns and, by this, determines an object’s material respects” (1961, p.31, translation mine).108 Ingarden also holds that non-intuitive content is lived through. Through this content, an ego thinks about something, perceives something or, in general, experiences something (1961, p. 30). Ad c) The last component of an act constitutes a consciousness of modes of existence. In other words, an act’s last component determines awareness of the manner in which something objective exists (1961, pp. 31–2). In what follows we will refer to this part of an act as a ‘doxic moment’.

5.2. Ingarden’s vs. Husserl’s concept of experience

Ingarden claims that his theory of intentionality follows Husserl’s, but he does not use the vocabulary of noema/noesis. And this is not the only difference that can be noted here. Let us comment on the most significant ones. In the previous section, non-intuitive content was described as the act’s component that plays the role of intentional sense. Through this content, ego refers to (e.g., perceives, thinks, recollects, etc.) an object. It also determines in which of its properties this object is intended. Thus, the analogy with Husserl’s notion of intentional matter (noematic Sinn) is obvious. Nevertheless, Ingarden emphasises that thinking performed through non-intuitive content might have duration. Then, apparently, this content can exist in time. In contrast, the noematic Sinn is a timeless

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Ingarden (1961, p. 31): “Moment intencyjny nadaje treści nienaocznej aktu odnoszenie się do jej przedmiotu, natomiast treść aktu nadaje momentowi intencyjnemu ‘sens’, jedno – lub ewentualnie wieloznaczny, jakościowo sprecyzowany kierunek, w którym zwraca się podmiot akt spełniający i dokonuje przez to materialnego określenia przedmiotu”.

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entity. It seems therefore, that Sinn and non-intuitive content cannot be identified. On the other hand, non-intuitive content is not the same as noesis, either. Noesis is a temporal entity that conditions objective reference by the sense-giving activity; it differs, nevertheless, from the sense it confers. It must differ from non-intuitive content also because Ingarden regards the latter as an intentional sense. For these reasons, there is no simple answer to the question of on which side of the noetic-noematic structure non-intuitive content should be classified. This content shares characteristics with both sides.109 The same holds true for the rest of an act’s components. This means that we can interpret both an intentive moment and a moment that grasps the mode of existence as either a noetic or noematic part. Such ambiguity in Ingarden’s notions is surprising, especially when we take into account the fact that he was familiar with Husserl’s doctrine. On the other hand, however, it confirms his conceptions’ independence of Husserl’s.

5.3. The structure of the purely intentional object

Roughly speaking, a purely intentional object is a fictional entity; whereas an intentional object is a thing-like entity. When an ego thinks about Sherlock Holmes, a winged horse or any kind of fictional existence, the act of consciousness is directed to a purely intentional object. On the other hand, when an ego perceives a house or an apple, the experience is directed to an intentional object. Then, whether an object is pure or not decides its thing-like determinations, but not only them. Let us consider the example of a winged horse. In this case, the subject is conceived as the bearer of two properties, i.e., the properties of 109

This fact, of course, generates difficulties because an intentional sense that is temporal cannot be universal.

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“being a horse” and “having wings”. However, a winged horse is also a fictional object. We can state rightly that it is not a real object but merely a creation of an imaginative act. Therefore, it is not a genuine horse and it has no wings in a genuine sense, but everything it possesses is only imagined as its characteristics. As Ingarden explains, the subject of this latter description differs from the subject of the former description. In other words, the descriptions “x is a winged horse” and “a winged horse is a fictional object” have different subjects. In the first case, the subject is the horse that is winged. In the second case, the subject is the winged horse taken as a fictional object - an entity that is characterised, among other things, by the determinations specified for fictional objects in general. Next, these two subjects do not constitute separate objects. Instead, they enter the single structure of a purely intentional object. In this structure, one subject is described by the properties that belong to the imagined object. The second subject, in turn, is described by the set of properties that, as was mentioned, characterise fictional objects in general (Ingarden 1961, p. 35).110 In Ingarden’s opinion, then, a purely intentional object has two different subjects. He calls the first of these i.e., the subject of the properties “winged” and “horse” - the subject of the purely intentional object’s content. In this light, the winged horse is, so to speak, the content-object. And he calls the second subject - i.e., the subject of properties that determine fictional objects in general - “the subject of the structure of the purely intentional object”.

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Ingarden (1961, p. 35, translation mine): “… there are two different rows of judgments that can be given about o b j e c t s of our imagination: first (as in our case), judgments that concern details of the ‘ship’, ‘boat’, ‘sea’s shore’, etc.; and second, judgments that concern properties of t h e s e s a m e objects, but which [objects – Ł. K.] a r e t a k e n a s p r o d u c t s o f o u r i m a g i n a t i o n ”. And in Ingarden’s original words: “… istnieją dwa różne szeregi sądów, które można wydawać o p r z e d m i o t a c h naszej fantazji: jeden, w którym sądy (jak w naszym wypadku) dotyczą szczegółów ‘okrętu’, ‘łodzi’, ‘brzeg morskiego’ itd., drugi zaś, w którym w sądach stwierdza się własności t y c h ż e s a m y c h przedmiotów, ale w z i ę t y c h j a k o w y t w o r y n a s z e j f a n t a z j i ”.

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These subjects have different ranks. The subject of a structure is superordinated to the subject of the content (Ingarden, 1961, p. 54).111 In fact, neither the subject of the content nor the whole content is anything more than the property of an intentional structure. Hence, having such and such content characterises a purely intentional object or, more precisely, the subject of an intentional structure. Ingarden states: “…the proper subject of an intentional object’s properties functions as the subject for the w h o l e object, and thus, also for its content, because having this and no other content is the intentional object’s property, for which the proper subject is the intentional object’s very subject”(1961, p. 54, translation mine).112 According to Ingarden, a purely intentional object is an individual object. As such, it is the only individual object that has two subjects in its form. Ingarden: In the ‘i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ’ of a purely intentional object we again encounter the individual object’s basic form, which we found in selfexisting objects. Therefore, in a formal respect, a purely intentional object, as such, is an individual object. With this important difference, however, an individual object’s basic form occurs merely on one ‘side’ of the intentional object and d o e s n ’ t e x h a u s t i t s c o m p l e t e d f o r m I . Because to this form also belongs that ‘two-sidedness’ and, by this, the occurrence of the s e c o n d s u b j e c t of properties that, as in this instance, is the special moment of the content that plays the role of subject w i t h r e s p e c t t o

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Ingarden (1961, p. 54, translation mine): “Both subjects of properties that occur in an intentional object are not of equal rank. The p r o p e r subject is that which occurs in the ‘intentional structure’; that is the subject of the intentional object as such. The second one is merely a specifically important moment of the c o n t e n t …” And in original words: “Obydwa podmioty własności występujące w przedmiocie intencjonalnym nie są zresztą równowartościowe. W ł a ś c i w y m podmiotem jest ten, który występuje w ‘strukturze intencjonalnej’, a więc podmiot przedmiotu intencjonalnego jako takiego, drugi stanowi jedynie specjalnie ważny moment z a w a r t o ś c i …” 112 Ingarden (1961, p. 54) “…właściwy podmiot własności przedmiotu intencjonalnego obejmuje swoją funkcją c a ł o ś ć tego przedmiotu, a więc także i jego zawartość, ponieważ posiadanie takiej a nie innej zawartości stanowi własność przedmiotu intencjonalnego, własność, której właściwym podmiotem jest właśnie podmiot samego przedmiotu intencjonalnego”.

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a l l t h e c o n t e n t ’ s o t h e r e l e m e n t s (1961, p. 53, translation mine).113

Moreover, the manner in which a purely intentional object presents itself for an ego is also significant. According to Ingarden, an object in the content is given directly. This means that an ego, when imagining, is directed to an imagined object qua imagined. In contrast, an intentional structure cannot be given in acts of imagination. To ‘discern’ this structure, an ego must redirect its attention from the content-object (object imagined qua imagined) to the act of imagining that object (1961, p. 52).114

5.4. The purely intentional object in relation to experience

In accordance with the foregoing explanation, non-intuitive content determines objective content: the former establishes in which properties a given object is intended. For example, x as a winged horse 113

Ingarden (1961, p. 53): “W ‘s t r u k t u r z e i n t e n c j o n a l n e j ’ przedmiotu czysto intencjonalnego odnajdujemy na nowo formę podstawową przedmiotu indywidualnego, którą znaleźliśmy przy przedmiotach samoistnych. A więc i przedmiot czysto intencjonalny jako taki jest pod wzglądem formalnym przedmiotem indywidualnym, z tą istotną różnicą jednak, że forma podstawowa przedmiotu indywidualnego występuje tylko na jednej ‘stronie’ przedmiotu intencjonalnego i n i e w y c z e r p u j e j e g o p e ł n e j f o r m y I . Do formy tej bowiem należy nadto owa ‘dwustronność’, a tym samym występowanie d r u g i e g o p o d m i o t u własności, a to tym razem jako specjalnego momentu zawartości, który w j e j o b r ę b i e spełnia te funkcje wobec in n y c h e l e m e n t ó w tejże zawartości”. 114 Ingarden (1961, p. 52, translation mine): “This kind of object presents its content for us when we simply intend it in creative or reconstructive acts; whereas its intentional structure reveals itself to us when, consciously directing to it, we throw one rail of our attention at its ‘structure’, or when, reflecting on its foundational act, we pass from the act toward its intentional correlate”. And in his original words: “Zawartość swą pokazuje nam tego typu przedmiot, jeżeli po prostu domniemywamy go albo w aktach twórczych, albo w odtwórczych, natomiast struktura jego intencjonalna odsłania się przed nami, gdy domniemywając go rzucamy jeden promień uwagi naszej na jego ‘strukturę’, lub też, gdy dokonując aktu refleksji na wytwarzający go akt przechodzimy od niego samego do jego intencjonalnego odpowiednika”.

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is determined by non-intuitive content. Hence, a purely intentional object has an objective content that is determined by an act’s nonintuitive content. Moreover, a content-object is imagined as existing in some manner (Ingarden 1961, p. 45). For example, if a winged horse is imagined as existentially self-sufficient, then, in a purely intentional object’s content, a moment is produced in which that horse is a self-sufficient object; so, modes of existence also can be imagined. In this case, however, we should distinguish the imagined object’s self-sufficient existence from a purely intentional object’s non-self-sufficient existence. Finally, an intentive moment determines a purely intentional object’s structure and essence (1961, pp. 45, 52). The term ‘structure’ might suggest only a formal qualification but, in this case, it also denotes material and existential characteristics.115 Then, the intentive moment determines a purely intentional object in the strict sense, i.e., in the formal, material and existential aspects. To summarise briefly: 1) an experience’s non-intuitive content determines an imagined object, i.e., an object in a purely intentional object’s content, 2) non-intuitive content also determines an imagined object’s imagined existence; whereas an act’s doxic component determines a purely intentional object’s existence and 3) the moment of intention, i.e., the intentive moment, determines a purely intentional object’s structure.

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Ingarden (1961, p. 45, translation mine): “…an intentional object as an act’s correlate is described, first of all, by the intentiveness of intention…” and (p.52, translation mine) “The ‘three-part unity’ of form I, matter I and manner of existence can be found in the ‘content’, as well as in the ‘intentional structure’, of a purely intentional object”. And in his original words: “… przedmiot intencjonalny jako odpowiednik aktu jest określony przede wszystkim przez intencyjność intencji …”, and „Zarówno w ‘zawartości’, jak i ‘intencjonalnej strukturze’ przedmiotu czysto intencjonalnego da się wynaleźć ‘trójjednia’ formy I, materii I i sposobu istnienia”.

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5.5. Noema in comparison to the purely intentional object

Let us now compare a purely intentional object with a noema. The first important difference between them is that the object in the content of the purely intentional object is the target of intentions in the regular course of experience. In contrast, to grasp the noema, the ego must leave the natural attitude and redirect attention to the immanent sphere. Ingarden: “Anyway, noema occurs only when phenomenological reduction is performed; whereas an intentional object is created in a simple, regular attitude and is accessible for a new, so to speak, unreduced experience when being targeted, if I may say so, by perception’s secondary rail” (Ingarden in a letter to G. Küng on 12.07.1969, quoted by Paśniczek 1994, p. 55, translation mine).116 A noema, therefore, should be considered rather as the sense through which consciousness is directed to the imagined object and not as the object itself. Moreover, Ingarden claims that imagined objects are created by an ego (Ingarden in a letter to G. Küng on 12.07.1969, quoted by Paśniczek 1994, p. 55). This means, among other things, that this kind of object depends existentially on experience. In contrast, the case of noema’s existential dependency on noesis is rather ambiguous. In one possible reading, noema’s existence really depends on noesis. However, another interpretation highlights that noema depends on noesis, but only in the sense that the latter conditions the former’s manifestation in an act. Finally, in Ideas I Husserl conceives noema as the intentional sense that establishes reference to an intentional object. Ingarden, however, says that the role of sense is played by an act’s non-intuitive content. This content belongs to the immanent or, as Husserl would say, to the real side of the experience and, as such and in contrast to noema, constitutes a temporal being (Ingarden 1961, pp. 25, 30). For Ingarden, therefore, sense occupies a different position in an act’s structure, but it 116

Ingarden quoted by Paśniczek (1994, p.55): “Noemat pojawia się w każdym razie dopiero wtedy, gdy przeprowadzono redukcję fenomenologiczną, podczas gdy przedmiot intencjonalny zostaje utworzony w prostym, zwykłym nastawieniu i jest dostępny, by tak rzec, nowemu ujęciu bez redukcji, gdy się nań skieruje, by się tak wyrazić wtórny promień spojrzenia”.

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maintains its characteristic function of establishing an objective reference. In this light, a purely intentional object, in contrast to noema, occurs not as a bearer of sense but as an object toward which the sense of experience (i.e., the non-intuitive content) establishes reference. Summarising, then, noema and the purely intentional object differ because the first is a unity of sense, whereas the second is the object the sense prescribes. On the other hand, however, the structure of the purely intentional object can be grasped only in immanently directed experiences. Hence, this structure cannot be perceived in an act that is carried out in harmony with its regular course. Instead, the ego must redirect attention from the content-object to the immanent sphere. Only then can the ego grasp the intentional structure. Similar conditions are formulated for presentation of the noema. Both the noema and the structure of the purely intentional object can be considered only in immanently directed analyses. The only difference is that, in Husserl, immanent analyses have sense only after phenomenological reduction, whereas in Ingarden they can be carried out even in a natural attitude. But, if we ignore this difference, the noema and the purely intentional object become very similar in respect of the role they play in the structure of intentionality. Moreover, the similarity between them is strengthened if to interpret the purely intentional object, or at least, some of its part, not as the “object to” but as the “object through” which intention achieves directedness. This point of similarity was articulated by Jacek Paśniczek. Nevertheless, drawing an analogy between the noema and the purely intentional object was not his concern. Instead, inspired by Ingarden’s conception, Paśniczek proposed an interpretation of the noema that is simultaneously suitable for competitive theories of intentionality.

6. Two subjects in noematic structure: Jacek Paśniczek’s theory of noema

In one of his articles, Jacek Paśniczek attempts to demonstrate that Føllesdal’s theory of intentionality is consistent with Gurwitsch’s theory

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when noema is correctly interpreted. This enterprise of Paśniczek is the main subject of the present section. We consider first his general conviction about the noema. Paśniczek holds that: 1) to any act there corresponds only one noema; 2) the noema transcends the act but is also different from the intentional object; 3) the noema can refer to one object at most; however, numbers of noemata can refer to the same object, 4) noema has a complicated structure inside of which the central point is occupied by the noematic sense. These characteristics, according to Paśniczek, are non-controversial (Paśniczek 1987, p. 27-9). Moreover, he calls noema the intentional carrier. This means that the noema is the entity in virtue of which the act is directed to the object. Additionally, the noema also determines as what something is apprehended. For example, it determines whether an apple is apprehended as a green fruit or a tasty fruit. This makes the noematic structure intensional (1987, p. 21). As regards the noematic X, Paśniczek holds that Husserl introduces this part into the noematic structure to explain the identity of the object without appealing to its existence (1987, p. 29). Moreover, the noematic X also determines the identity of the reference for acts which have different contents. Like Smith and McIntyre, Paśniczek confirms that X does not contain descriptive matter. This later, in turn, belongs to the separate part of noema, namely that part which constitutes senses of the objective properties. Paśniczek: “The pure X is the element that is responsible for identifying an act’s object, but simultaneously it contains no descriptive moments. The descriptive role fulfils the set of predicatives expressing ‘how’ an object is apprehended in an act, in which of its attributes” (1987, p.29, translation mine).117 Hence, likewise in Smith and McIntyre, the noematic X is the sense of the object 117

In original words (p. 29): “Czyste x jest elementem odpowiedzialnym za identyfikację przedmiotu aktu, a zarazem nie zawiera w sobie żadnych momentów deskryptywnych. Natomiast rolę deskryptywną, opisową pełni zbiór orzeczników, wyrażających ‘jak’ przedmiot jest ujęty w akcie, w jakich przynależnych mu określeniach”. We must note that in Paśniczek’s original works, “x” that stands for pure X is sometimes written in lowercase. The consistency of the style accepted for this book, however, requires the author to use the uppercase X.

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simpliciter. In contrast, this X taken together with the senses of properties constitutes an “object in its determinations”. As mentioned previously, Paśniczek explains that the notion of X is helpful for establishing references for acts that are directed to nonexistent objects. Simply, all noematic senses have the same structure, . X is the sense of the object simpliciter, whereas “α” represents the set of its determinations. In acts that differently apprehend the same non-existent object, the noematic X is the constant moment that establishes the identity of references. Paśniczek also stresses that X is not the proper object of an act. In other words, X is not an object toward which an act is directed. Instead, in a figurative sense, X is the noematic pole (1987, p. 30). Hence, X’s function in the full noematic structure differs from other components’ functions. However, all parts constitute a complementary whole in which X establishes a reference to an object in abstraction from its properties (1987, p. 32). These latter are specified by different parts of the noema, namely by the content of the noematic core. Nevertheless, neither this content nor the noematic X should be identified with the intentional object. Most importantly, this is not only a logical difference, but also an ontological one. When the act is directed to the apple, no part of the noema is the real physical thing.

6.1. Two- and three-aspect theories of intentionality

The notion of noema, as Paśniczek holds, when properly interpreted, is consistent with both the two- and three- aspect theories of intentionality. Before his argumentation is considered in detail, let us first explain those theories in respect of the criterion of aspect. Paśniczek classifies Meinong’s and Gurwitsch’s doctrines as twoaspect theories.118 Regarding Meinong’s theory, Paśniczek presents a concise account that contains remarkable insights. He notes that according to Meinong, any given collection of properties constitutes a 118

Paśniczek also calls two-aspect theories “relational conceptions of intentionality” (1996).

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separate object. The term “property” has a broad sense and it refers to any possible determination of the object (Paśniczek 1987, p. 24).119 Moreover, the collection may contain any combination of properties. It may even contain properties which exclude themselves extensionally. In such a situation, it is said that the collection generates non-existent objects. In fact, there are no limits as to the nature and combinations of elements, except one, namely, that the collection of properties that constitutes the object must contain one element at least. Furthermore, in Meinong’s doctrine, every thing-like object is characterised by an infinite collection of properties that cannot be apprehended in an act in its totality because every experience has a finite content. In other words, we cannot present a thing in all of its determinations. Instead, we can grasp only a greater or lesser part of the totality of its objective characteristics, because an act’s content is always limited. In harmony with the foregoing explanation, however, any collection of properties generates an object, and this also holds true for the content of an experience. Therefore, on one hand, we deal here with a thing-like object that is characterised by an infinite collection of properties; and on the other hand, with an object characterised only by those determinations that currently are presented in an act. Meinong calls this latter object an auxiliary one (Hilfsgegenstand), and the former one an “ultimate object” (Zielgegenstand) (Meinong 1915, pp. 196–7). The role of the first is to establish a reference to the second. We even can say that “... the auxiliary object is what words mean, the ultimate object is what they name” (Meinong 1915, p. 741 quoted by Lindenfeld 1980, p. 163). Therefore, auxiliary objects are incomplete, i.e., they are undetermined with respect to at least one property. On the other hand, some ultimate objects, e.g., correlates of perceptual acts, are complete. To describe the relation between incomplete and complete objects, 119

We must emphasise that Meinong distinguished between konstitutorische (constitutive or, in Findlay’s translation, nuclear) and außerkonstitutorische (extraconstitutive, according to Findlay, extranuclear) properties and claimed that only nuclear ones can be used in a form x is P (Meinong 1915, pp. 176–7; Findlay 1963, p. 176; see also: Jacquette 1996a; Parsons 1978 and 1980; Paśniczek 1997; Routley 1979).

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Meinong used the term “implektiert”, which Findlay translated as “embedded” (Meinong 1915, §29; Findlay 1963).120 Hence, an incomplete object is embedded in a complete one; however, this is not a mereological relation between part and whole. 121 In term of aspects, Meinong’s doctrine concerns intentionality as the relation between an act (first aspect) and an object (second aspect). As Paśniczek claims, there is no third aspect of an “intentional carrier” that can determine a direction of the rail of intention. An auxiliary object cannot play this role because it doesn’t function as an intentional part that depends on an act and lasts unnoticed in the regular course of experience, but rather serves as the object or target of intention. Hence, despite that auxiliary objects are, in some sense, responsible for establishing an objective reference, they are also intentional objects, i.e., objects toward which acts are directed so that intentional relations arise between them and the acts in which they are intended (Paśniczek 1987, pp. 24–5). Paśniczek explains that this doctrine of Meinong is very close to Gurwitsch’s concept. Meinong’s auxiliary object can be regarded analogously to Gurwitsch’s momentary noema. The latter notion is explained as an object taken in its determinations. The totality of momentary noemata is identified with an intentional object. Hence, the only difference between a particular noema and an object is that the former contains only a part of the total characteristics of the latter. However, although Gurwitsch’s momentary noema is apparently related to the Gestalt-noema as a part to the whole, Meinong would not say that about his auxiliary object that is to be embedded in the ultimate 120

Jacquette explains that term Meinong used derives from the Latin implecto, which means “… to plait, weave or twist into, entangle in, involve, entwine or enfold” (1996b, p. 233). 121 Paśniczek notes that in some respects Meinong’s conception is similar to representationalism because it primarily directs the act of perception not to a thing itself, but to an auxiliary object. A problem arises because an ultimate object can be given only as represented by an auxiliary one, and this situation leads to infinite regress (1987, p. 24). Another weakens of Meinong’s theory, which Paśniczek noted, is that it should, but doesn’t, provide a conception of relation that establishes the ontological identity of all incomplete objects that are embedded in the same ultimate correlate (pp. 23–4).

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correlate, but not as its part. Moreover, momentary noemata depend on a conscious act; but the same doesn’t hold for auxiliary objects. Despite this difference, intentional relation in both theories has the same schema, i.e., it arises between an act and momentary noema in Gurwitsch’s theory, and between an act and an auxiliary object in Meinong’s (Paśniczek 1987, pp. 25, 30). Paśniczek provides the following very simple schema that illustrates intentional relation as conceived in both theories.

Figure 17: (Paśniczek 1987, p. 25)

In two-aspect theories the intentional relation occurs between “a” and “b”. Letter “a” stands for an act of consciousness, letter “b” for an object as intended, i.e., momentary noema or auxiliary object, and the letter “c” stands for an object that is intended, i.e., Gestalt-noema or ultimate correlate (1987, p. 25). In the phenomenological literature, some interpretations also consider intentionality as a tri-faceted structure. In Føllesdal’s concept, for example, noesis is the first aspect, noema is the second aspect and the intentional object is the third aspect. This theory interprets the noema as the factor that determines objective reference but that is not intended in an act. Noema plays the role of sense through which an experience points to an object. Noema therefore only directs an act to something that is logically and ontologically different from it.122 Consider a simple example. In the perception of an apple, the perceptual act is the first aspect. The second aspect is the noema, i.e., the objective sense by which an apple is apprehended, but that doesn’t occur for a conscious subject in the regular course of experience (i.e., in the natural attitude). Finally, the third aspect is the apple as the primary target of intention, which is different from both the act and the sense of perception, i.e.,

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This is also why Paśniczek calls three-aspect theories directional conceptions of intentionality (1996).

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noema (1987, p. 28). Paśniczek also provides an illustration of this instance, which is as follows.

Figure 18: (Paśniczek 1996, p. 377)

According to Paśniczek, both theories interpret the intentional relation differently. In harmony with two-aspect theory, the intentional relation arises between an act and the noema. In contrast, in three-aspect theory, the act is directed to an object through an intentional carrier, i.e., noema. To make this difference intuitive, Paśniczek provides the following example. He considers two acts. In the first act 1), Napoleonas-victorious-at-Jena is imagined. In the second act 2), Napoleon is imagined-as-victorious-at-Jena. The first act corresponds to the twoaspect theory, and the second corresponds to three-aspect theory. As Paśniczek holds, the difference is now clear enough. In the first case, the act is directed to Napoleon-as-victorious-at Jena, i.e., to the object as it is intended, to the noema. This latter, in Meinong doctrine, is an auxiliary object; whereas to Gurwitsch it is a momentary noema. In the second case, the act is directed through the sense of “victorious-at-Jena” to Napoleon. In other words, the act is directed to the object through the noematic sense (1987, p. 25). Paśniczek also provides a visual representation of both theories.

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Figure 19: (Paśniczek 1987, p. 30)

In this picture, the relation “ab” represents two-aspect theory, and “ac” represents three-aspect theory. Moreover, the connection “bc” is the relation of possessing a noematic pole (1987, pp. 30–1). In two-aspect theory, the act is directed to the noema, i.e., the object as it is intended, to X-as-α. Paśniczek explains that “… ‘X-as-α’ alone has a quasi objective structure, and this is why we may in turn associate and even identify it, for quite obvious reasons, with the intentional object qua intentional, i.e., with the Gurwitschian noema” (1996, p. 379). Instead, in three-aspect theory, the structure is not the target of intention, but a sense that directs intention at X. However, a question immediately arises concerning how the noema can determine reference to one of its components. Paśniczek’s answer is as follows: “The X is not identical to the object intended but it is rather, as linguists would say, a ‘purely referential’ (and at the same time, ‘completely transparent’) element directing an intentional act toward the object. As such, the X should be distinguished from the object intended. However, since X is completely transparent, the object intended is given directly in the act; also, it can be said that the object fills the place marked by X and in this sense X and the object coincide” (1996, pp. 378–9). Moreover, Paśniczek explains the intentional relation as qualitatively different for both instances. Therefore, the relation “ac” is not merely a composite of “ab” and “bc”. Otherwise, “ac” would have no immediate character and the intentional object would be represented by a noema. All of this suggests that in these two theories, noema

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functions differently. However, as Paśniczek argues, the occurring difference doesn’t have to be explained by introducing two separate notions of noema but, instead, both theories can share the same notion and, simultaneously, the characteristic differences between them can be sustained (1987, p. 31).

6.2. Noema as the purely intentional object

Paśniczek suggests that differences between noemata should not be viewed as the difference between two separate objects but as the internal difference between two separate objective formations inside one noema. In his interpretation, the noema is conceived as a structure that contains two subjects and two different sets of properties. In plain words, the noema is the unity of two different objective formations and this fact is represented in the following picture (Paśniczek 1987, pp. 31– 2).

Figure 20: (Paśniczek 1987, p. 32)

The first formation is the noema as it is considered in two aspect theory, i.e., the object taken in its determinations, “X-as-α”. The second formation, in turn, is the noema taken as the whole, i.e., . This means that the second formation is superordinated to the first one. The

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latter enters into the content of the former. Thus, the first objective formation i.e., “X-as-α” is the peculiar content of the second formation, i.e., (1987, pp. 31-2). In order to summarise his explanation, Paśniczek sketched the final picture and supplemented it with the following notes.

Figure 21: (Paśniczek 1996, p. 379)

Paśniczek: “Thus, in our approach, the Gurwitschian noema is the content of the abstract Føllesdalian noema and an act is related to the first while being directed by the second… Also, we can say that the two ‘noemata’ appear to be two sides of one and the same noema” (1996, p. 379). Interpreted as such (and according to Paśniczek), noema fits well with both theories. Simply, as he holds, the two aspect theory takes into consideration noema only in forms “X-as-α”. In contrast, in the three aspect theory, the noema is conceived as a whole, i.e., . This conception was extensively inspired by Ingarden’s notion of the purely intentional object (1987, p. 32). In fact, Paśniczek’s noema has the same structure as the purely intentional object. Hence, one can expect that both theories share the same difficulties. Let us consider this briefly. According to Ingarden, the act of imagination is directed to the object which is imagined in the experience. So, thinking about a winged horse is directed to the winged horse which is the intentional object of the act. As such, the winged horse is situated by Ingarden in the content

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of the purely intentional object. Paśniczek, in turn, situates it in the content of the noema. Hence, the situations are analogous and this fact generates the following difficulty. Husserl emphasises an epistemological difference between the noema and the intentional object. He claims that the ego cannot reach any knowledge about the noema when exclusively directed to the intentional object. Moreover, he also stresses that the noema should be distinguished in every kind of act, including acts of imagination. An imagined object is not the same as a noema of the act of imagination. When the ego focuses on the imagined object, the noema is out of consideration. Instead, in Ingarden’s conception, the imagined object is the same as the intentional object and it is also part of the purely intentional object. Hence, this latter is not the same as noema and the former is not the same as the object in the content of the noema. Nevertheless, Paśniczek’s interpretation differs from Ingarden’s. The former philosopher interprets an object in the content of the noema not as the intentional object but as the unity of sense. Hence, the objective formation “X-as-α” is not the object toward which consciousness is directed but it is part of the noematic sense (1987, pp. 31-2). In this light, “X-as-α” is logically, ontologically and epistemologically different from the intentional object. Therefore, it can be said that Paśniczek avoids difficulties that arise when the contentobject is considered as the primary target of intention.

Final notes

All the interpretations of noema that have been considered up to now have one thing in common, namely: they consider noema as equal or as “almost” equal (Drummond’s notion of noema) to the notion of the object as it is intended. Undoubtedly, this notion describes noema, and sometimes, the total content of the noematic Sinn. However, in most cases, when analyses of original experiences take place, and in any instance of the phenomenological conflict, noema as the strict correlate of noesis comprises more than one objectifying structure of sense. In

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other words, in some instances, noematic content comprises more than is determined by the notion of the object as it is intended. This conviction goes against all of the interpretations of noema that have been considered up to this moment. In the next chapter, it will be shown that Husserl’s analyses allow noema to gain such a complicated structure. In other words, it will be explained that the conception according to which the noema can comprise more than one objectifying structure of sense results directly from Husserl’s words. Otherwise, as will also be explained, the notions of noesis, intentional act and intentional correlate cannot be considered in accordance with their usual reading.

Chapter IV

The noema as possibly thinkable content

Most commentators of Husserl agree that a noema cannot determine more than one object.123The rest of the philosophers who engage in discussion about noema do not deny this opinion, but simply ignore it. This situation strengthens the position of the first group and confers to the community a conviction that the case has been analyzed and its solution is certain. The present chapter will argue against the existing standpoint by emphasising that the conception that allows noema to determine only one object does not suffice to describe the consciousness in its concreteness. The issue appears for the first time in Dagfin Føllesdal’s short article, Husserl’s notion of noema. In the fifth thesis, the author states that a noema cannot determine more than one object. How he argues this position was considered before and will not be discussed here. Nevertheless, one case is noteworthy at this point, namely, Smith and 123

Without additional comment, however, this statement can be misleading. If we consider the sense of the utterance “all crows are black”, then the noema apparently determines the reference to the multiplicity of objects, i.e., to all black crows. Despite this fact, however, noema still possess one objectifying structure that posits only one subject, i.e., the totality of crows. In other words, in the structure of noema we can find no multiplicity of objectifying structures of a sense that corresponds to the multiplicity of crows in a one-to-one manner; but only one structure that synthetically apprehends all crows into the state of affairs of being black. A similar situation occurs in cases of definite description. If someone judges in singular form that a “crow is black”, then the description doesn’t determine a reference to one particular crow, but to all crows that satisfy the description’s conditions. Nevertheless, noema possess only one objectifying structure of a sense in which a singular subject is posited. In this way noema determines objects of which instantiations can be found in a multiplicity of particular crows. The difference under consideration will become clear after the analyses in upcoming sections.

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McIntyre’s explication of Føllesdal’s thesis, where they say that “... each meaning determines exactly one referent ...” (1982, p. 178). According to this, the noema is the same as the linguistic meaning and, as such, it can determine only one referent. This implies, however, that any noematic content is equal to the singular preposition and must be expressible in one utterance or, more precisely, in one structure x is P. How, then, can one adequately express the total content that is given in the perceptual act? One may suggest an infinite conjunction, e.g. x is an apple and is hanging on a branch, and is at the left of a bird and so on. This description, unfortunately, cannot show, e.g., that the bird is red and that the branch is broken because the bird and branch are different subjects and their descriptions will generate separate objects. Nevertheless, the fact that the total intentional content of the act cannot be brought into expression in the singular form x is P, does not mean that noematic content is limited only to the content of this form. Quite the contrary, in this case adequate expression of noema must respect three different subjects, i.e., the apple, the branch and the bird. Each of them must be described separately in the form x is P. When we see an apple as posited on the left side of a bird, we also see the bird as qualified in some manner. To express this fact we can use the following formulation: there are x and y such that x is an apple and y is a bird; and x and y stand in relation R, i.e., in symbolic interpretation, xy(Fx & Gy & Rxy). In the structure of this sentence, form “x is P” occurs more than once, which indicates that more than one objectivation is brought to expression. Of course, we can argue that this sentence describes a singular object, which is the state of affairs. However, such an argument is valid only as long as the expressed act has a monothetical structure. But that is not always the case because the experience of seeing the apple and the bird also can be organised polythetically and, as such, can be directed to the objectivity in separate rays, i.e., through the separate objectifying structures of sense (Hua III p. 275:1983/285). When this happens the consciousness of two different objects is constituted in one noetic formation, i.e., in the formation that fulfils the same form “now” of the phenomenological time. The noematic content of such experience, therefore, is richer than the proposition with only one subject. In other words, the noema determines more than one object,

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and the current chapter will show how this happens in particular situations. The present chapter contains three sections. 124 The first of them is guided by the belief that Edmund Husserl’s concept of noema can be significantly enriched when considered in extreme epistemological instances. These include the phenomena of the absurd and nonsense, but also intentional conflict and cases of consciousness directed to contradictory objects. This section shows that the noema, when experienced in such a context, exhibits interesting characteristics that are rather difficult to note in other circumstances. It is disclosed that the noema, in some instances, must be able to comprise two separate structures of sense, through which two different objects are meant. In the further stages of the section, this characteristic of noema is shown to be restricted by the concept of nonsense and the laws of meaningcompounding. In this way, the idea of noema as “possibly thinkable content” is also clarified. The second section specifies the distinction between the “broader” concept of the object and the object “in the pregnant” sense. It also explains the notion of intentional content, which is determined by sensibility, in contrast to content that is determined by the intellect. Considerations that are included in this section serve to clarify intuitions about the relation between the noema and the object. Finally, section three brings the idea of possibly thinkable content into the dialogue with the most important and influential interpretations of noema, which were presented in Chapter Three.

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Parts of this chapter, including Figures 22 and 23, are drawn from my previously published material. With kind permission from Springer Science Business Media: “Noema in the light of contradiction, conflict, and nonsense: The noema as possibly thinkable content”, Husserl Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3: 243– 259, 2008, Kosowski, Ł. DOI: 10.1007/s10743-008-9040-8. License Numbers: 2383090166116 and 2385910314333.

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1. Noema in the light of contradiction, conflict and nonsense

Expressions like “round square,” “childless mother,” and any other contradiction exemplify situations for which the “intending meaning” cannot be unified with the “fulfilling act” (Hua XIX/2, p. 544: 2001c/191). However, Husserl also holds that every particular expression of this sort has its own meaning, despite the fact that none of them has an object (Hua XIX/1, p. 58: 2001b/200). Hence, expressions that refer to contradictory objects are not meaningless but only objectless.125 This lack of object is to be understood here as the a priori impossibility of performing the act capable of fulfilling the meaning that is intended in the act (Hua XIX/1, p. 61: 2001b/202). This way of explaining things appeals to conceptions from Logical Investigations. Indeed, in that text, Husserl describes the issues of absurdity and nonsense in detail as a sort of corollary to Ideas I, where he did not find a place for analysis of this matter (Hua XIX/1, p. 334: 2001c/67). Because the question of absurdity, nonsense, and contradictory objects is, for present purposes, noteworthy only insofar as it takes into account the notion of noema, the next several paragraphs will be devoted to exploring the fact that the conceptions from Logical Investigations can also be explained by using an apparatus from Ideas I. More precisely, it will be emphasised that a structure of intentional essence is analogous to the structure of noema.126

1.1. Logical investigations vis-à-vis Ideas I

In Logical Investigations, intentional matter is viewed as a component of an act that determines the object to which the act is 125

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 334: 2001c/67): “Die Verknüpfung ein rundes Viereck liefert wahrhaft eine einheitliche Bedeutung, die ihre Weise der ‘Existenz’, des Seins in der ‘Welt’ der idealen Bedeutungen hat; aber es ist eine apodiktische Evidenz, daß der existierenden Bedeutung kein existierender Gegenstand entsprechen kann”. 126 See also: (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 136).

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directed and in which of its properties this object is apprehended. Matter establishes a direction and intentional sense for any kind of act (Hua XIX/1, p. 425: 2001c/119). Moreover, every experience also involves an intentional quality, which is responsible for differences in “how” objectivity is intended, e.g. as possible, questionable, deniable, presented in this or that manner, etc. (Hua XIX/1, pp. 425, 505: 2001c/119,162). Next, as was mentioned in the first chapter, the intentional matter and quality together constitute the intentional essence. This latter, since it establishes the sense and the manner in which the object is intended, is equal to the notion of the object as it is intended. From this point of view, everything that can be said about the intentional essence points also to the noema. According to Husserl, “noema” refers to what is thought in the fashion that it is thought, as it is meant (Hua III, p. 203: 1983/214). Thus it is easy to see that this general description can be substituted by the formula object as it is intended. Moreover, in the case of linguistic acts, the noema is that component of experience that comprises intentional sense, namely meaning or judgment (Hua III, § 94). All of the relationships which have been emphasised in the present section are depicted in Figure 22.

Figure 22

Husserl claims that the noema has a complicated structure (Hua III, §§ 129-31). Treated as the object as it is intended and in the light of previous systematization, it appears as the unity of intentional matter and quality. In Ideas I Husserl prefers to talk about noematic characters rather than intentional qualities and, moreover, rather than talk about intentional matter he introduces and exploits the notion of a noematic

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core (Hua III, § 99). Thus, what he called “intentional quality” in Logical Investigations is “noematic character” in Ideas I, while intentional matter is the same as the noematic core. The core and the noematic character are the main components of noematic structure. Nevertheless, analysis of intentionality in Ideas I reaches further than that it does in Logical Investigations. As it was explained in the second chapter, a further component should be distinguished in the noematic core, namely “the nucleus” of the core, which he also calls “pure X”. Thus every noema is to be treated as the unity of the noematic character, the core, and its nucleus (Hua III, § 131). These three components together constitute that which in Logical Investigations is called “intentional” or “semantic essence” and in Ideas I is called “noema”. All of these assignations are pictured below in Figure 23.127

Figure 23

1.2. Noema as the sense of self contradictory formulas

According to Husserl, every self-contradictory formula, such as “childless mother,” is meaningful and objectless. This means that this kind of expression has meaning but it can never be used objectively because there are no objects that correspond to it (Hua XIX/1, pp. 58, 334: 2001b/200, 2001c/67). The lack of “correlates” is conditioned by an 127

A similar idea as to the relation between intentional matter, quality and noema was proposed by Smith and McIntyre (1982) in their famous Husserl and Intentionality, as well as by Józef Dębowski (1986).

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a priori law that grounds the impossibility of presenting contradictory objects. Here a further distinction will be helpful, one that helps to keep objective and objectless meanings separate. Thus, following Experience and Judgment, the term “concept” will designate those meanings for which objective correlates can be found (1948, § 82). The term “meaning” will have a broader sense, i.e., it can be considered as objective or objectless. So, the formula “childless mother” has a meaning, but there is no object that corresponds to it and, therefore, it expresses no concept. In accord with Husserl’s claim in Ideas I that in linguistic acts meanings and judgments are the same as noematic content (Hua III, § 94), the analysis of linguistic noemata is the same as the explication of the structure of meaning or judgment. Moreover, if an act is carried out, then its corresponding noema is available for analysis. There is no exception here: every noema can be analysed, even noemata that comprise the senses through which contradictory objects are intended. How is the noema structured in this latter case? To answer this question, it will be helpful to consider what exactly a self-contradictory formula refers to. Simply put, it names an object that has, for instance, the properties of being a mother and of being childless. The problem resides in the fact that the object cannot simultaneously be characterised by both of these attributes because they exclude each other when treated as the characteristics of one entity. Any x that is a mother cannot simultaneously be childless, and vice versa. Nevertheless, Husserl argues that we must understand the idea of childless mother, because otherwise we could not explain the fact that we know, concerning such an object, that there is no possible act in which it can be presented (Hua XIX/1, p. 61: 2001b/202). We understand the impossibility of unifying under the title of one object properties that exclude each other in respect of this unity. This argument leads Husserl to the conclusion that selfcontradictory formulas are meaningful but objectless (Hua XIX, pp. 58, 334; 2001b/200, 2001c/67). Here, the bearer of properties, when considered from the noematic side, occupies the place of the nucleus, while the noematic core is comprised of the intentional senses of objective properties i.e., being a mother and being childless. The core and its nucleus constitute the

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noematic structure through which the childless mother is meant. Hence there is a significant difference between the noematic and the objective structure, since the former is consistent whereas the latter is not. How is this possible? First and foremost, the noema contains only moments of sense. This means that, whereas objective unity is the subject of properties, in the noematic content there is only its sense, i.e., the noematic nucleus through which this unity is thought as the subject of properties. In other words, on account of this nucleus, something is meant as the subject. But the meaning differs from the object, as the latter is not a formation of sense but rather the target of thinking.128 Here we should also distinguish the objective aspect from the noematic one. An objective unity can be a mother, childless, green, spooky, etc., whereas the noematic nucleus cannot. The latter establishes intentional sense, on account of which properties are intended, but it is ridiculous to say that the childlessness or the greenness constitute parts of the noematic core. To continue the analysis of the differences between noematic and objective unity, we note that objective childlessness belongs to its subject but the part of the noematic core in which a sense of childlessness is constituted does not belong to the noematic nucleus. Objectively, this connection holds between subject s and property P; but in noematic content there is no relation of this type. Rather, there is only the sense through which this connection is meant. In other words, the noematic sense of P is not related to the noematic sense of s, i.e., to the pure X as property is to object. Otherwise, X would lose its purity and become a complicated object analysable in terms of its properties, which would be senses contained in the noematic core. Of course, particular moments of noematic content are connected with each other because they form a unity of sense, but this is a connection between parts rather than a relation of a property to an object. And this is also why noematic structure can be consistent even in acts that point to contradictory

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An exception is constituted by immanently directed acts, since in these the acts are (or can be) directed toward thoughts.

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objects. However, in such an interpretation, noema loses not only objective, but also quasi-objective, construction. Hence, it must be said about noematic content that the nucleus and the core are unified insofar as every noema must have both, but their contents are independent of each other. According to this conception, the part of the noematic core that constitutes the sense of being a mother, and the one through which being childless is meant, can be easily unified with a nucleus into one noematic structure. Because contents of noematic parts are independent of each other, a noema can comprise even arbitrary moments of sense. This explains not only how it is possible that self-contradictory formulas have meaning, but it also makes clear that even expressions that ignore ontological order, such as “a trapezoid ton c,” “green sinα,” or “vanilla ∆t,” have meaning. From this viewpoint, the difference between the noema and an intentional object is vivid. It consists in the fact that no matter what kind of object consciousness is directed to at a given time, and no matter what set of properties that object has, or even whether an object is presented at all, the noema is always fully constituted and ready to be analysed. In other words, any given act of consciousness necessarily entails the possibility of knowledge about its noema, and in every instance every characteristic of the noema can be recognized. In contrast, in some cases this cannot be said about the object meant through the noema.

1.3. Noema in the sphere of conflict

The present consideration will now turn to the radical conflict between properties. This time, the context will be slightly extended in order to make the structure of the noema more intuitive and sharper. To explain the consciousness of conflict in Logical Investigations as well as in Experience and Judgment, Husserl uses the example of a “mannequin” (1948, pp. 99-104: 1973/91-6; Hua XIX/1, pp. 458-61: 2001c/136-9). According to him, one encounters a conflict when one finds oneself in the middle of a doubting process. This latter is instantiated every time the ego cannot find any intuitive motivation to

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choose between two competing apprehensions, e.g. when one cannot find a reason to decide whether the object one sees is a mannequin or a living body. This situation can be explained in more detail in following manner. Upon seeing the mannequin from far away, one may believe that what one sees is a living body. But that conviction can change, as one follows some new intuitive motives, into the perceptual belief that one sees a mannequin. This latter act can again be modified into the perception of a living body, and vice-versa. Everything depends on the weight of the intuitive motive on the basis of which the perceiving ego decides as to which apprehension should be asserted. If the given motive is not sufficient and a decision cannot be made, then during the period of uncertainty in consciousness there are constituted two apprehensions: apprehension of mannequin and of a living body. From time to time, one of these gains a privileged place in the activity if the intuitive motive is strong enough. When this happens, the second apprehension is situated on the nearest horizon, which means that it is still intentionally presented but now as background for the competing apprehension. In such a case, no matter which act occurs, its object is not asserted; in other words, it is not an object of certitude but of doubt. Here, according to Husserl, one deals with a situation in which the same intuitive core involves double and competing apprehensions (1948, pp. 100-1: 1973/92-3). If so, then in this case the noematic structure seems to be composed in an extraordinary manner, since it apparently comprises more than one objectifying unity of sense. At this point it is important to look closely at this structure, in which the intentional sense of a sensuous substrate can be found. In particular instances this sensuous substrate serves as the basis for apprehending activity. Husserl called this the “common intuitive core” (1948, p. 100: 1973/92-3). This is easy enough to grasp when one considers the hyletic content of the example in question. Here, the set of hyletic data remains relatively constant, while the object for consciousness varies in that at one time it is a mannequin and at another

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time a human body.129 The difference is determined only by the animations of hyletic data, i.e., by apprehensions. At one time, data are animated into the appearance of living tissue; at another time into the appearance of a piece of wood. Thus, the sensuous substrate constitutes the common intuitive basis for both apprehensions, whilst in the noematic core there is its sense. Moreover, one can also note that the particular apprehension determines only a part of the core. Further content is provided by the moments coming from the competing apprehension. Therefore, the noema comprises the sets of moments through which two different objects are apprehended. One part of the core is occupied by the sense of a mannequin and the other part by the sense of human flesh. Thus, in light of such an interpretation, the noema refers to two different objects. As in the case of contradictory objects, the noematic core here comprises moments of sense that cannot be unified in the same subject, because human flesh cannot simultaneously be a wooden figure. But this fact does not impact the noematic structure, since in its core the whole complex of senses bestowed by the apprehension of a mannequin is unified with the complex constituted by the apprehension of human flesh. Despite the fact that from the noetic side one deals here with a complicated situation in which differently formed apprehensions take place, there is only “one noema” regarding the consciousness of conflict.130

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Of course in practise there is always a constant flux of sensuous data, but here it is presupposed that this fact has no impact on the theoretical results. 130 Husserl (1948, p. 100: 1973/92-93): “Since the empty horizons constitute objectivity only in unity with the common intuitive core, we accordingly have, as it were, a bifurcation of the original normal perception, which in unanimity constituted only one sense, into a double perception. They are two perceptions, interpenetrating each other by virtue of the content of their common core”. And in Husserl’s (1948, p. 100) original words: “Da die Leerhorizonte nur in eins mit dem gemeinsam anschaulichen Kern Gegenständlichkeit konstituieren, so haben wir danach ein A u s e i n a n d e r g e h e n d e r u r s p r ü n g l i c h e n n o r m a l e n W a h r n e h m u n g , die nur e i n e n Sinn in Einstimmigkeit konstituierte, gewissermaßen in e i n e D o p p e l w a h r n e h m u n g . Es sind zwei sich vermöge des gemeinsamen Kerngehaltes durchdringende Wahrnehmungen”.

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Finally, in this case noematic content also comprises intentional characters such as the moment of doubting and the conflict that appears between parts of the core. In Husserl’s writings there are many other examples that justify the already discussed conviction according to which the noema can assemble more than one objectifying structure of sense. Here, one more instance will be considered in detail in order to enhance the foregoing conception and to pin down its uncertain points. The case that will be analyzed is the intentional conflict between the object as it is perceived and the object as it is expected to be perceived.131 This can be explained in following manner: When one looks at one side of a red thing, one may believe that the other side is also red. And if this belief for some reason is not confirmed, then it engenders a kind of intentional conflict. In place of the red there could be any other colour, for example yellow. Conflict arises between an intention of a “red back side” that is empty and a fulfilled intention of a “yellow back side”. After the intention of a “red back side” has been denied and superseded by a competing one, it does not “disappear” but undergoes intentional negation (1948, pp. 97-8: 1973/89-91). In the noematic core there are still moments of sense owing to which a “red back side” is intended, but this part of the noema is characterized as null, is nullified. The same noema also comprises the competing, intentionally asserted moments of sense, i.e., the ones through which a yellow side is meant.132 Undoubtedly, the noematic content must be able to assemble two apprehensions, i.e., “x has a red back side” and “x has a yellow back side,” since a conflict arises between two objects and this situation is 131

See also: (Hua XXIII, pp, 146-9: 2005/171-6). Husserl (1948, p. 417: 1973/345): “However, what is seen as unity in the conflict is not an individual but a concrete hybrid unity of individuals mutually nullifying and coexistentially exclusive: a unique consciousness with a unique content, whose correlate signifies concrete unity founded in conflict, in incompatibility”. And in Husserl’s (Husserl 1948, p. 417) original words: “Was aber als E i n h e i t i m W i d e r s t r e i t erschaut wird, ist k e i n I n d i v i d u u m , sondern eine konkrete Zwittereinheit sich wechselseitig aufhebender, sich koexistenzial ausschließender Individuen: ein eigenes Bewußtsein mit einem eigenen konkreten Inhalt, dessen Korrelat konkrete Einheit im Widerstreit, in der Unverträglichkeit heißt”. 132

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meant in one act through the one noematic core. If we deny that the noema can be structured in this manner, then the intelligibility of the whole phenomenon is hard to explain. Alternatively, one might want to hold that a conflict takes a place between two objects for which separate noemata can be found. But if that is so, one must also accept that the consciousness of conflict is constituted by the two different acts, since a particular experience involves only one noema. Further, one must hold that both acts occur in exactly the same period of time. Nevertheless, this whole conception is erroneous for two reasons. First, if we accept that in the same moment of internal time consciousness there can be constituted two different acts, this blurs the conception of experience since the criterion that helps to distinguish one act from another is its place in time. Second, two different acts that refer to two different objects do not yet constitute conflict, since their objects must be intentionally related to each other. This can be accomplished, however, only in another synthetic act. If this is the case, then the most that can be said is that the consciousness of conflict is constituted by the comprehensive experience that embraces partial acts. But phenomenological analysis discloses that the noema in this synthetic act comprise two objectifying unities of sense, since consciousness is simultaneously directed to two separate entities. All considerations in this section have emphasised that the singular noematic structure can comprise the sets of moments through which two different objects are apprehended. In other words, this conviction can be expressed as follows: the noematic stock is able to assemble formations of sense owing to which two objects are constituted upon one substrate. This ability makes the noema entirely different from the object that is meant through it. Moreover, in this fashion, the noema cannot be considered as the object as it is intended any longer, since the latter concept is conceived as a structure of sense that can objectify only one entity at a given time.

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1.4. Noema in the sphere of nonsense

As mentioned earlier, in the case of acts pointing to contradictory objects, as well as in any kind of doubting, and, more generally, in every kind of experience where intentional conflict is particularised, the set of noematic parts comprises moments that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled by any intuitive unity. In other words, there are no objects for the senses prescribed by the total content of the noema. What is more, it should be emphasised that the conception that allows the noematic core to assemble arbitrary moments of sense specifies the idea of thinkable content. The ego is generally understood to be rather free in shaping his/her thoughts. Thus, the limitations on forming noematic content are the same as the limitations on shaping thoughts. The “extension” of noematic content often reaches far beyond the sense for factual existence, since the ego may think about existent, non-existent, possible, or impossible objects in any physical or logical sense, and this does not mean that these objects have to be presented. Nonetheless, there are limits to the spontaneous arranging of noematic content. These restrictions should not be reduced to the trivial idea that what is impossible to think cannot be thought; rather, as Husserl assures us, configurations of words can be found that only seemingly have consistent meaning. In terms of the noema this means that there are moments of sense that cannot manifest themselves as parts of the same core. If so, then the conception of the noema as thinkable content should not be regarded as trivial. This situation requires more detailed explanation. In Logical Investigations Husserl recommends distinguishing nonsense, i.e., lack of sense, from the absurd.133 Examples of the latter provide meanings like “wooden iron” or “round square,” while the former concept can be explained on the basis of configurations of words like “about or King however” or “a man is and”. Husserl claims that in 133

Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 334: 2001c/67): “Man darf, wie wir in der Unters. I schon betont haben, das Sinnlose (das U n sinnige) nicht zusammenwerfen mit dem Absurden (dem W i d e r sinnigen), welches die übertreibende Rede ebenfalls als sinnlos zu bezeichnen liebt, obschon es vielmehr ein Teilgebiet des Sinnvollen ausmacht”.

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the first case, one deals with rightful but absurd meanings whereas in the second case there is no meaning at all: In the one case certain partial meanings fail to assort together in a unity of meaning as far as the objectivity or truth of the total meaning is concerned. An object (e.g. a thing, state of affairs) which unites all that the unified meaning conceives as pertaining to it by way of its ‘incompatible’ meanings, neither exists nor can exist, though the meaning itself exists. Names such as ‘wooden iron’ and ‘round square’ or sentences such as ‘All squares have five angles’ are names or sentences as genuine as any. In the other case the possibility of a unitary meaning itself excludes the possible coexistence of certain partial meanings in itself. We have then only an indirect idea, directed upon the synthesis of such partial meanings in a single meaning, and at the same time see that no object can ever correspond to such an idea, i.e. that a meaning of the intended sort cannot exist (Hua XIX/1, p. 335: 2001c/67).

In the second case mentioned in the quoted passage, the nonexistence of the object is correlated with the non-existence of meaning. In contrast, in the first case the fact that the expression is objectless does not entail lack of sense. Thus, the meaning or its lack makes a difference here. As regards the absurd, the noematic moments that constitute senses of properties are unified by the objectifying form. Owing to this fact, some object is intended and it does not matter if it exists or not. We can also say that “something” is meant in the act. In the case of nonsense, however, the noematic content is structured in such a way that it cannot establish an objective reference. On the basis of moments of sense like “a man is and,” the form of objectivation cannot be constituted (Hua XIX/1, p. 334: 2001c/67). Therefore no object, no state of affairs or any intuitive unity, is meant in the act. In other words, there is no meaning at all (Hua XIX/1, pp. 334-48; 2001c/67-75). Thus the ego deals with a sense when, and only when, an objective reference is established, i.e., when an objectifying apprehension is intentionally constituted. Consequently, the lack of the latter necessarily entails a lack of sense. To summarise: expressions like “wooden iron” or “round square” give absurd but genuine meanings. On account of these, objects are meant despite the fact that they cannot be presented.

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However, there are also nonsensical “expressions”.134 On the basis of combinations like “a man is and” or “about or King however,” it is impossible to constitute any meaning because an objectifying apprehension, which is fundamental for every experience, cannot be realized (Hua XIX/1, p. 334: 2001c/67). In the case of nonsense, noematic content does not contain an objectifying structure. But this does not mean that there is no noema at all. Quite the contrary, a solid noematic structure is constituted; however, its content differs from what could be expected here. Namely, noematic unity involves a sense through which the ego tries to apprehend particular meanings from the collection “a man is and” and unify them into one objective reference. In other words, through noematic content, the ego tries and fails to constitute an objective reference on the basis of partial meanings that correspond to elements of composition “a man is and”. Because some senses cannot be unified into one meaning, the conception of noema stands under an important limitation. The case becomes clear when considering the noema as thinkable content. Strictly speaking, the impossibility of constituting a meaning indicates a content that cannot be thought. If so, then not every noematic structure is possible. The arranging of noematic content is limited by the fact that some content is thinkable and other content is not. Thanks to this, the idea of noema as “possibly thinkable content” gains an important clarification. Moreover, in Logical Investigations Husserl discusses the laws that regulate the sphere of the possible and impossible, objective and objectless meanings (Hua XIX/1, p. 342: 2001c/71). On this theme he distinguishes two levels of formal logic.135 On the upper level one finds the laws that define material and formal kinds of absurd meanings.136 On 134

Sensu stricto they are not expressions because there is nothing that they express. Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 350: 2001c/75-6): “Nichts hat die Diskussion der Frage nach dem richtigen Verhältnis zwischen Logik und Grammatik so sehr verwirrt als die beständige Vermengung der beiden logischen Sphären, die wir als die ‫ ׀‬untere und obere scharf unterschieden und durch ihre negativen Gegenstücke - die Sphären des Unsinns und des formalen Widersinns - charakterisiert haben”. 136 As Husserl emphasises, the expression “round square” contains notions that are materially qualified, thus this kind of absurdity is called a material one. On the other 135

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the lower level one finds the most essential laws that regulate the sphere of meaning in general, i.e., the laws of meaning-compounding. This is also where nonsense, i.e., the lack of sense, is distinguished from every meaningful formation; it does not matter whether the latter is absurd or not. In this place, logical interest goes together with the interest of pure universal grammar. It is easy to see that the laws of meaning-compounding specify the concept of noema. The reason for this is that these laws, by distinguishing genuine meanings from nonsense, also distinguish thinkable from unthinkable content. Any content that is possible to be meant constitutes meaning. The latter in turn is the same as the noematic core. Hence, the laws of meaning compounding are the same as the laws of noema structuring. They make it clear which structure is possible and which is not. In other words, laws of meaning compounding describe thinkable and unthinkable content, possible and impossible structures of noem.

1.5. Final remarks

The conception of the noema which has been elaborated in this chapter expresses in large part the consequences of Husserl’s standpoint. He accepts that self-contradictory formulas have meanings. Simultaneously, his conception of intentionality establishes the noema as the structure of sense which constitutes a meaning. Thus, questions about the reasonability of self-contradictory formulas or any other absurdity in fact refer to the structure of the noema. In this chapter, it was stressed that the noematic core must be able to assemble arbitrary moments of sense, since without this ability an explanation of the absurd seems impossible.

hand, there is formal absurdity; Husserl (Hua XIX/1, p. 343: 2001c/72): “Gesetze wie der Satz vom Widerspruch, wie der von der doppelten Negation oder wie der modus ponens sind, normativ gewendet, G e s e t z e d e s z u v e r m e i d e n d e n f o r m a l e n W i d e r s i n n s ”.

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Similarly, Husserl stresses that two competing apprehensions constitute the experience of conflict. But this explanation entails the assumption that the noema can comprise two objectifying structures of sense. Thus, Husserl’s phenomenological results imply the noema’s ability to assemble more than one structure through which more than object is determined. The same holds for all the other characteristics of the noema that help here to specify the concept of thinkable content. If this is the case, then the latter notion seems to be implied by Husserl’s philosophy. Perhaps this knowledge motivated Danuta Gierulanka when she speculated as to whether the German “ideell” could be translated into the Polish language as “pomyślane,” (in Husserl 1975, p. 328) which in English means “being thought”. Nevertheless, we still might argue that the concept that allows a noema to assemble more than one objectifying structure of sense must be specified as to the notion of the object. Because this notion is ambiguous, we might want to argue that an intentional conflict is based on two different objectivations of the same substrate and that thus, in fact, consciousness is directed toward only one object, i.e., to a differently apprehended substrate. Therefore, an object as substrate must be clearly distinguished from an object as the correlate of objectifying apprehension, i.e., an object as the correlate of a predicative judgment.

2. The object as the substrate and as the correlate of predicative judgment

As was just mentioned, in Husserl’s writings one can find at least two notions of the object, namely: 1) the object as the substrate, and 2) the object as the categorial unity of subject and predicate. The first of these refers to the pre-predicative unity that is constituted on the lowest level of activity (1948, §§ 13-14, 16-17). The second notion, in turn, refers to the predicative unity that is reachable only on the highest level of activity (1948, §§ 13, 47). Lets us now explain both of these notions in order to disclose the relation between them.

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2.1. Different levels in objectifying operations

Different notions of the object correspond to different levels of objectifying operations (Husserl, 1948, § 49; Hua XXXI, pp. 66-83: 2001a/337-55). These levels can be divided into the passive and the active section. Each section, in turn, comprises several subsections. For the present consideration, however, only some of these are important. In the passive section, therefore, this discussion will pass over all of the analyses that concern the constitution of the intuitive unity in the internal time consciousness (1948, § 16, 33-46; 2001a, pp. 162-238). On the other hand, in the active section, this commentary will skip all considerations that concern the active formations of the objects of the higher levels, specifically the pure generalities and concepts (1948, §§ 86-93b; Hua XXXI, pp. 69-83: 2001a/340-55). Then, suppose that substrates are already constituted and pregiven for consciousness.137 According to Husserl: “All experience … rests at bottom on the simple pregiving protodoxa [Urdoxa] of ultimate, simply apprehensible substrates. The natural bodies pregiven in this doxa are the ultimate substrates for all subsequent determinations, cognitive determinations as well as those which are axiological or practical. All come into being from these simply apprehensible substrates” (1948, p. 60: 1973/59).138 After this, he immediately adds: “But this domain of the protodoxa, the ground of the simple doxic consciousness [Glaubensbewusstsein], is a merely passive pregiving consciousness of objects as substrates” (1948 p. 60: 1973/59). 137

Husserl (1948, p. 160: 1973/139-40): “A broader concept of absolute substrate is that of something completely indeterminate from the point of view of logic, of the individual ‘this here’, of the ultimate material substrate of all logical activity …This concept of absolute substrate, in its formal generality, leaves open what the nature of the experience of an object is, whether simple or founded, and includes in itself only the lack of all logical formation, of everything which is called forth in the substrate as determination by a logical activity of a higher level”. 138 Husserl (1948, p. 60: 1973/59): “Alle Erfahrung in diesem konkreten Sinne ruht zuunterst auf der schlichten, letzte, schlicht erfaßbare Substrate vorgebenden Urdoxa. Die in ihr vorgegebenen naturalen Körper sind letzte Substrate für alle weiteren Bestimmungen, sowohl die kognitiven wie auch die Wertbestimmungen und die praktischen Bestimmungen.”

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From the quoted passage, the following must be emphasised: “the natural bodies pregiven in this doxa are the ultimate substrates”; and the “domain of protadoxa … is a merely passive pregiving consciousness”. Moreover, Husserl also confirms that substrates are objects for consciousness. Nevertheless, he also notes the following: “…when one speaks here of an object [von einem Objekt, einem Gegenstand], the term is not being used properly. For, as we have already pointed out several times, one cannot yet speak at all of objects in the true sense in the sphere of original passivity” (1948, p. 81: 1973/77). In his opinion: “…an object is the product of an objectivating operation of the ego and, in the significant sense, of an operation of predicative judgment” (1948, p. 75: 1973/72). However, predicative judgment is the final stage of objectivation. As such, it is preceded by several other stages. Lets us analyse all of these, starting from the lowest level and ending at the form of judgment. Husserl holds that to apprehend a substrate in the form of an object, the ego must first turn toward the source of the affect. He writes: “We say, for example, of that which, in its nonsimilarity, stands out from a homogeneous background and comes to prominence that it ‘strike’ us, and this means that it displays an affective tendency toward the ego” (1948, pp. 79-80: 1973/76).139 And: “Turning our attention toward is, as it were, the bridge to activity, or the bridge is the beginning or mis en scène of activity, and it is the constant way in which consciousness is carried out for activity to progress”(Hua XXXI, p. 4: 2001a/276). 139

Husserl (1948, pp. 81-2: 1973/78): “We must, therefore, distinguish: I. The tendency which precedes the cogito, the tendency as stimulus of the intentional background-experience and its differing degrees of strength. The stronger this ‘affection’, the stronger the tendency to give way to it, to bring about the apprehension … this tendency has its two sides: a) The obtrusion on the ego, the attraction which the given exerts on the ego. b) From the side of ego, the tendency to give way, the being-attracted, the being-affected, of the ego itself. From these tendencies antecedent to the cogito can be distinguished: II. The turning-toward as compliance with the tendency, in other words, the transformation of the character of the tendency of the intentional background-experience in which the cogito becomes active”.

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Then, the turning of attention toward the substrate is the first and the lowest level of the activity (1948, pp. 79-80: 1973/76; Hua XXXI, pp. 66-69: 2001a/337-40). Attention that is paid to some intuitive unity discriminates this unity from the background of the other pregiven substrates. According to Husserl, this active apprehension immediately turns into contemplation. He states: “…the ego, oriented toward the acquisition of knowledge, tends to penetrate the object, considering it not only from all sides but also in all of its particular aspects, thus, to explicate it” (1948, p. 113: 1973/103-4). This contemplation, in turn, has two variants. The first one is: “The contemplative intuition which precedes all explication, the intuition which is directed toward the object ‘taken as a whole’. This simple apprehension and contemplation is the lowest level of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest” (1948, p. 114: 1973/104). The second variant is “true explicative contemplation” of the object. This is the “higher level” of the exercise of the perceptual interest (1948, p. 114: 1973/104).140 From this, it can be concluded that simple contemplation is the first level of objectivation, whereas the explicative contemplation is the second level. The ego cannot long remain with simple contemplation, since the tendency inherent in this experience motivates to further activity. The borderline between simple and explicative contemplation is especially clear at this point. The former act is limited to a single apprehension, whereas the latter consists of a set of apprehensions (1948, p. 124: 1973/112). Any single apprehension from this set is correlated with some internal or external determination of the object. Therefore, explicative contemplation is the complicated experience which tends to disclose the object in its determinations. Husserl: “For example, what first strikes the eye is its total surface color or its shape; then a certain part of the object becomes prominent – in the case of a house, for example, the roof; finally, the particular properties of this part – its color, shape and so on” (1948, p. 125: 1973/113). 140

In fact, Husserl (1948, pp. 114-5: 1973/104-5) distinguishes three kinds of contemplation, but one of them has been omitted since it is irrelevant for the purposes of the present work.

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Furthermore, the explicative contemplation is not the merely a series of apprehensions where the correlates are not connected with each other. Husserl: “Let us take an object, call it S, and its internal determinations α, β…; the process set going by the interest in S does not simply give the series: apprehension of S, apprehension of α, of β, etc., as if the apprehensions had nothing to do with one another … On the contrary, in the whole process of individual acts which lead from the apprehension of S to the apprehension of α, β, …we come to know S” (1948, pp. 125-6: 1973/113). Hence, on the second level of objectivation, the intuitive unity is presented as the “substrate” for explication. Explicated moments, in turn, are presented in the form of “determinations” (1948, pp. 126-7: 1973/114). Nevertheless, the contemplative explication does not determine the predicative judgment in a strict sense. The relation between the “substrate” and the “determination” is what Husserl calls the explicative coincidence, and this constitutes the “pre-predicative” form of judgment. He explains this relation in the following manner: Substrate and determination are constituted originally in the process of explication as correlative members of a kind of coincidence. When α is present to our consciousness as a determination, we are not simply conscious of it as being absolutely the same as S, nor are we conscious of it as something completely other. In every explicative determination of S, S is present in one of its particularities… (Husserl 1948, 129-30: 1973/116).141

The predicative judgment is constituted when the ego reapprehends the correlate of the contemplative explication. This can happen only on the highest level of activity. In such a situation, the substrate becomes a “subject” and determinations become “properties”. 141

Husserl (1948, pp. 129-30: 1973/116): “Substrat und Bestimmung sind im Prozeß der Explikation ursprünglich konstituiert als Korrelatglieder einer Art Deckung. Indem das α als Bestimmung bewußt ist, ist es nicht schlechthin als dasselbe bewußt wie das S, aber auch nicht als ein schlechthin anderes. In jeder das S explizierenden Bestimmung i s t das S in einer seiner Besonderheiten, und in den verschiedenen als Explikate auftretenden Bestimmungen ist es dasselbe, nur in verschiedenen Besonderheiten als seinen Eigenheiten”.

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The relation of the “explicative coincidence”, in consequence, is reformed into the “predicative determination”. Husserl: “I have S as the substrate of a determination and actively determine it. The objectsubstrate takes the form of the predicative subject; it is the subject-theme as terminus a quo, and the activity goes over to the predicate as the opposed terminus ad quem. It is only then that there is realized in a productive activity – which is not only a synthetic activity in general but, at the same time, the activity of synthesis itself – the consciousness that S receives a determination by p in the mode ‘S is p’”(1948, p. 244: 1973/207).142 This is the third and the last stage of objectivation. The result is the object in the logical sense. To summarise, then, three different levels of objectifying operations must be distinguished. The first and the lowest level is simple contemplation. The second level is explicative contemplation and the third level is active predicative judging. The acts of those levels differ as regards their structure and correlates. The experience of simple contemplation is a singular apprehension which is correlated with the pregiven substrate that is also called by Husserl the “bodily given thing”. In contrast, the act of explicative contemplation consists of more than one apprehension. This experience is correlated with a substrate explicated in its determinations. However, nothing is judged yet on this level. Finally, the experience of predicative judgment constitutes an object in the pregnant sense. This act is correlated with the substrate which is presented as the subject. Moreover, the substrate’s determinations are presented in the form of predicates. On the base of the foregoing explanation, the broader concept of the object can be clearly distinguished from the object in the “pregnant, logical sense”. Thus, the first notion refers to correlates of simple and explicative contemplation. The second notion, instead, points to the correlate of the predicative judgment. 142

Husserl (1948, p. 245: 1973/208): “… in order for the substrate of the explication to become a subject and for the explicates to become predicates, it is necessary that the regard turn back to the unity which is passively preconstituted within the receptive activity of the process of explication and is in a sense concealed. Being turned toward this unity in order to apprehend it implies repeating the process in a changed attitude, making an active synthesis from a passive one”.

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2.2. Intellect and sensibility

The explanation in the previous section makes it clear that the constitution of the object in the logical sense is strictly correlated with the active mode of consciousness. It is said that the predicative judgment is “produced” at the highest level of activity. As opposed to this, the substrate for judgment is passively pre-constituted. From the use of different levels of objectifying operations, Husserl explains how the ego raises up from the passive level that presents the substrate, through the elementary activity in the simple and explicative contemplation, to the highest level of activity in the predicative judgment. However, this is not the only use of the notions “passive” and “active” in Husserl’s philosophy. He also uses these terms to distinguish the sphere of intellect from the sphere of sensibility. This distinction clearly specifies differences between the substrate and the object in the pregnant sense. Husserl claims that: The intellect is a name for constitutive accomplishments of objects that the ego has given to itself through the activities of identification. The selfgiving is a creative self-giving. Sensibility is the contrary, for constitutive accomplishments without the participation of the active ego; the grasping of such objects is indeed an activity, but it is a mere receiving of a pre-constituted sense, and further explicating, judging already presupposes this sense (Hua XXXI, pp. 40-1: 2001a/312-3).

Clearly, the quoted passage is ambiguous in describing sensibility. Firstly, it can be understood as the sphere of passive experience, which constitutes substrates. Secondly, it can be also understood as this sphere of passivity but actively grasped in the sense of the simple contemplation. Husserl is not clear in this case; however, it can be specified by the appealing to his conception of the perception and the judgment. We consider first his notes about the perception. In Experience and Judgment, he makes the following claim: “… under the term ‘perception’, for example, we distinguish, on the one hand, the simple

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having-in-consciousness of the original appearances (those which present objects in their original embodiment), in which an entire field of perception is set before us – already in pure passivity – and, on the other hand, active perception, the active apprehension of objects which come to prominence within a field of perception which extends beyond them” (1948, pp. 83-84: 1973/79). Thus, the ambiguity of the previous explanation does not seem to be accidental. Husserl apparently holds that the perception can be both passive and active. Nevertheless, the factor that makes perception active belongs to the intellect and not to the sensibility. The latter statement can be easy confirmed when considering Husserl’s conception of judgment. He holds that the active perception in the form of contemplation constitutes logical objects in the “broad sense”. Husserl: But if we wish to define the broadest concept of the judgment as opposed to this most limited and specific concept of the predicative judgment, we can wholly disregard this and point out that, with every prepredicative, objectifying turning-toward an existent, it is already necessary to speak of an act of judgment in the broader sense. Thus, for example, a perceptive consciousness in which an object is before us as existing, intended [vermeint] by us as such, is an act of judgment in this broader sense (1948, p. 62: 1973/61).143

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Husserl (1948, p. 62: 1973/61):“ Aber um einen w e i t e s t e n Urteilsbegriff gegenüber diesem e n g s t e n u n d e i g e n t l i c h e n , dem des prädikativen Urteils abzugrenzen, können wir davon ganz absehen und stellen fest, daß a u c h s c h o n bei jeder vorprädikativen vergegenständlichenden Zuwendung zu einem Seienden im weiteren Sinne von einem Urteilen, g e s p r o c h e n w e r d e n m u ß . So ist z. B. ein Wahrnehmungsbewußtsein, in dem ein Gegenstand als seiend vor uns steht, als das von uns vermeint ist, ein Urteilen in diesem weiteren Sinne”. Let us note that these words of Husserl generate another difficulty. He does not specify whether the act of turning-toward the passively pregiven substrate should be identified with simple or explicative contemplation. The issue arises since, on the level of the simple contemplation, there is nothing explicated about the object. Hence, in this situation, there are not enough “components” even to pre-constitute judgment.

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In harmony with this explanation, every simple or explicative contemplation constitutes objects in the broader sense. Moreover, Husserl claims that every judgment is determined by two components: (1) The form as the component of the form of judgment or as the form that makes the content adaptable to a judgment, we call the syntactic form. (2) Its content, what is thematic and maintained identically in different syntactic forms, we call the syntactic matter or judicative core (Hua XXXI, p. 29: 2001/301-2).

The syntactic form is the intellectual aspect of the experience. It can be found not only in the predicative judgment, but also in explicative contemplation. Moreover, the syntactic form appears as the preconstituted component of the simple apprehension (Hua XXXI, pp. 40-1: 2001a/312-3; 1948, pp. 62-3:1973/61-2). Hence, this form can be found in acts that constitute the object in both the broader and the pregnant sense. On the other hand, sensibility brings into the experience the syntactic matter, i.e., the judicative core. In a case where the act is the perception of the worldly thing, the syntactic matter has a sensuous origin. The sensibility then can be understood in two complementary manners. Firstly, this is the passive level of the experience that constitutes substrates for the judgments, i.e.: “… the objects of pure perception – simple, sensuously apprehensible substrates, natural things, things in their fundamental stratum as natural bodies – which as such are not relative and which, through all the relativities of our environmental dealings with the pregiven, maintain themselves as objectively stable identities and, in virtue of this, can be confirmed and judged” (1948, pp. 67-8: 1973/65). Secondly, sensibility is the sphere of the syntactic matter, i.e., the judicative core. In other words, sensibility is responsible for the constitution of the syntactic matter in judgments based on perception. This matter is syntactically formed into the object on the way of intellectual activity of the ego.

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To make the foregoing distinction between the intellectual and the sensuous aspects of the experience clearer, let us appeal to the following words of Husserl: “Traditional logic always spoke of the termini of a judgment, without ever bringing it to phenomenological clarity, for example, ‘Socrates is tall’. Seen precisely, these termini are not, for instance, subjects, predicates and the like, but the syntactic cores in the subjects, in the predicates” (Hua XXXI, p. 30: 2001a/302). Termini are not “subjects” because a subject is the unity of syntactic matter and syntactic form. The same holds true for predicates. Instead, Husserl interprets termini as moments of judgment taken in abstraction from the syntactic form. In this reading, therefore, they are identified with syntactic matter. In a judgment based on a perceptual act, termini should be regarded as an objective structure’s purely perceptual content, i.e., as the substrates. The substrate then is the same as the syntactic matter that, together with the syntactic form, constitutes an object. In conclusion, the substrate does not constitute a self-sufficient unity of knowledge, i.e., an existentially autonomous unity that can be presented for itself. Instead, it enters to the object as its dependent part that cannot be presented in any other manner than as unified with the syntactic form. More precisely, the substrate, when it appears for the ego, is meant in the form of a subject from the beginning. It can appear only as the subject of properties, and there is no other way for it to enter into consciousness. Hence, it cannot be presented for itself and, therefore, it does not constitute a separate unity of knowledge. Instead, it is only the abstract part of the object that is used by Husserl to explain different levels in objectifying operations. To summarise the considerations of the current section, Husserl distinguishes between the broader and the pregnant sense of the object. The first notion refers to the correlate of the simple and explicative contemplation while the second notion refers to the correlate of the predicative judgment. Moreover, any object, whether it is taken in broader or in pregnant sense, comprises two reciprocally nonindependent parts, namely: the syntactic matter and the syntactic form. This former should be identified with the substrate for the judgment. The substrate, therefore, is not a self-sufficient unity of knowledge that can

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be presented for itself. Instead, it constitutes only a dependent part of the objective structure, more precisely, its syntactic matter and, as such, it can be presented only when is intellectually formed into the “subject”. Otherwise, it cannot enter into the consciousness. As the answer to the question from the previous section, it must be confirmed that in the intentional conflict that takes place between the “mannequin” and “human flesh”, consciousness is directed toward two different objects that are constituted on the basis of the same intuitive substrate. This makes clear that the noema of the intentional conflict comprises two objectifying structures of sense which determine two different objects. An interpretation as such goes against all of those conceptions of noema which have been explained in Chapter III. Then, let us now consider how the idea of the noema as possibly thinkable content works together with the other readings of Husserl.

3. The idea of “thinkable content” in the context of various interpretations of noema

Føllesdal, Smith, McIntyre, and Paśniczek all confirm that the noema can determine one object at most. On the other hand, Gurwitsch and Drummond do not express a similar conviction. However, their explanations make it rather clear that the noema can determine only one entity. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the interpretations of noema from Føllesdal and Smith and McIntyre, and those of Gurwitsch and Drummond. The first group of philosophers, briefly, makes an ontological distinction between the noema and the intentional object, whereas the second group does not. For this reason, parts of the argument that can be made against the second group cannot be used against the first. Therefore, this section will be divided into two subsections, which will help to separate the discussion of Føllesdal’s conception of noema and the opinions of his followers from the discussion of Gurwitsch’s and Drummond’s readings of Husserl. As regards Paśniczek’s theory, the aspect of it that is relevant here will be treated equally with Føllesdal’s theory. To be clear, we do not

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want to blur all of the important specifications that Paśniczek’s ideas bring into the concept of noema. Instead, we merely accept that his theory makes an ontological distinction between the noema and the intentional object and, also, that it does not allow the noema to determine more than one object. In those respects, Paśniczek’s theory is closer to Føllesdal’s and Smith and Macintyre’s readings than to Drummond’s.

3.1. The discussion with Føllesdal

Every single argument used against Føllesdal also holds against Smith, McIntyre and Paśniczek. In his famous Husserl’s Notion of Noema, Føllesdal writes, “To one and the same noema there corresponds only one object” (1969, p. 682). If “only one object” means the correlate of only one objectifying structure of sense, then Føllesdal’s conception does not agree with the findings of this work since the latter asserts that, among other things, in some instances the noema comprises senses that determines two different objects. Otherwise, as emphasised in the examples used, the phenomena of the intentional conflict are hard to explain.

3.1.1. An argument that follows the explanation of intentional conflict

However, one may still argue that intentional conflict is based on two different objectivations of the same substrate. Therefore, in fact, consciousness is directed toward only one object, i.e., to the differently apprehended substrate. This, in turn, as one can further claim, supports Føllesdal’s thesis. Nevertheless, the correctness of the argumentation as such is only delusive, and fades away as soon as the ambiguity of the notion of the object is explained.

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As emphasised in the previous section, the substrate does not constitute a self-sufficient unity of knowledge, i.e., the intuitive unity that can be presented for itself. The substrate is only the abstract part of the object, i.e., its syntactic matter. To appear for consciousness, it must be intellectually formed into the subject. Thus, not the substrate alone but the one apprehended as a “mannequin” or as “human flesh” should be regarded as the object. This conviction, however, confirms the conception that allows the noema to assemble more than one objectifying structure of sense against the reading of noema that comes from Føllesdal.

3.1.2. An argument that follows the explanation of constitution of categorial objects

Next, Føllesdal’s thesis fails to explain any intentional reference that is more complicated than singular objectivation. Suppose that Føllesdal’s thesis holds and only one object corresponds to one noema. Because consciousness cannot simultaneously constitute more than one noema, the ego cannot be aware of more than one entity at a time. In this light, consider a situation in which a mother asks a child which toy, out of two, he would like to have. According to Føllesdal, when the child examines toy A, there is no intentional reference to toy B. On the other hand, when the child considers toy B, he cannot be aware of A. The question then arises: How it is possible that the child will finally make a decision? The simplest explanation is that the child compares both toys and decides which one he prefers. However, comparison as a relation is founded upon the consciousness of related parts and, as such, is originally constituted in a polythetically organised act. Husserl: “… in a primal relating consciousness the relation is constituted in a two-fold positing. And likewise everywhere” (Hua III, p. 275:1983/285). Of course, the relation can be given in a monothetic act, but only after constitution in “many-rayed” experience. Husserl:

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We said that a total synthetical object is constituted in synthetical consciousness. But it is ‘objective’ therein in a quite different sense than what is constituted in a simple positing. Synthetical consciousness, or the pure Ego ‘in’ it, is directed by many rays to something objective; the positional consciousness simpliciter is by one ray. Thus synthetical collecting is a ‘plural’ consciousness; it is one and one and one taken together. Similarly, in a primal relating consciousness the relation is constituted in a two-fold positing. And likewise everywhere. To every such many-rayed (polythetical) constituting of synthetical objectivities - which, according to their essence can become intended to ‘originaliter’ only synthetically - there belongs, according to eidetic law, the possibility of converting what is intended to in many rays into what is intended to simpliciter in one ray, the possibility of ‘making objective’ in a ‘monothetical’ act in the specific sense what is constituted synthetically in the first act (Hua III, pp. 275-6: 1983/285-6).144

In the present context these words of Husserl mean that the child learns the difference between toys on the basis of experience, in which polythetical organisation corresponds to the multiplicity of objects submitted for comparison. In simple words, the child must be aware of both things simultaneously because only then he/she can discern a feature that makes one toy more attractive than another.

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In Husserl’s (Hua III, pp. 275-6) original words: “ Im synthetischen Bewußtsein, sagten wir, konstituiert sich ein synthetischer Gesamtgegenstand. Er ist aber darin in ganz anderem Sinne ‘gegenständlich’ als das Konstituierte einer schlichten These. Das synthetische Bewußtsein, bzw. das reine Ich ‘in’ ihm, richtet sich v i e l s t r a h l i g auf das Gegenständliche, das schlicht thetische Bewußtsein in e i n e m Strahl. So ist das synthetische Kolligieren ein ‘plurales’ Bewußtsein, es wird eins und eins und eins zusammengenommen. Ebenso konstituiert sich in einem primitiven beziehenden Bewußtsein die Beziehung in einem zwiefachen Setzen. Und ähnlich überall. | Zu jeder solchen vielstrahligen (polythetischen) Konstitution synthetischer Gegenständlichkeiten — die ihrem Wesen nach ‘u r s p r ü n g l i c h ’ n u r synthetisch bewußt werden können — gehört die wesensgesetzliche Möglichkeit, das v i e l s t r a h l i g B e w u ß t e i n e i n s c h l i c h t i n e i n e m S t r a h l B e w u ß t e s z u v e r w a n d e l n , das im ersteren synthetisch Konstituierte sich in einem ‘m o n o t h e t i s c h e n ’ A k t e i m s p e z i f i s c h e n S i n n e ‘g e g e n s t ä n d l i c h z u m a c h e n ’ ”.

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3.1.3. An argument that follows the conception of immanent perception

Moreover, Føllesdal’s thesis also fails to explain phenomena of immanently directed experiences. Briefly speaking, the consciousness of A can be investigated only if A is still present for the ego. Hence, the noema of an immanently directed act refers to the noetic-noematic structure and to the object that is presented through this structure. Therefore, the noema of immanent perception must contain two objectifying structures of sense, whereas Føllesdal’s thesis allows only one such structure. This is also the main difference between the conception of “thinkable content” that was introduced in this work and Føllesdal’s theory. In plain words, the idea of thinkable content allows a noema to contain more than one objectifying structure of sense, whereas Føllesdal’s notion does not.

3.1.4. An argument that follows the conception of abstraction

Next, any act of abstraction involves more than one object simultaneously presented for consciousness. Consider the case where an ego tends to separate movement from the moving thing or spatial extension from colour. In each case, abstracted moments are nonindependent. They must be supplemented by another moment, since, otherwise, they cannot even occur for consciousness. Even if we agree that the abstract moment can be presented for itself, we must add that this is possible only at the final stage of the act of abstraction. Before this stage, however, the ego must take into account not only the part that is going to be abstracted, but also the “ground” from which it will be abstracted. For example, when an ego presents movement for itself, it must present this on the basis of the moving thing. Likewise, spatial extension never occurs in any other way than as the “surface” that is fulfilled by some sensuous quality. Therefore, in the act of abstraction, the ego must be simultaneously aware of the moment that is going to be abstracted and

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the ground from which it will be abstracted. Both moments, however, have different subjects and are constituted by separate objectifying structures. In plain words, both moments are different objects for consciousness. They must be simultaneously presented in consciousness since, otherwise, abstraction is impossible.

3.1.5. An argument that follows the explanation of the correlate of the sensuous perception

Undoubtedly, the results of the present work cannot be viewed as merely the contention that noema can refer to more than one object at the time. In fact, its key point resides in a different place. This can be revealed when one realizes for what purposes the noetic-noematic correlation was inducted. Firstly, Husserl introduced it to explain the structure of the transcendentally reduced consciousness. In this context, noesis and the noema constitute the only components of any experience. Through the experience or in it, the ego deals with the world in the fullness of its richness. In the phenomenological attitude, the world appears for the ego as a complicated system of sense, i.e., as a system of noemata. Moreover, it is also said that the ego deals with objects that are presented through the noemata. In phenomenology, the object is the correlate of the apprehending function of consciousness. In some sense, therefore, it is true that to any particular apprehension that can be abstractly distinguished from the experience, there corresponds a separate object. According to this interpretation, a perceptual process directed to the physical thing A generates a set of different objects that correspond to the different apprehensions of A. Next, when analysing the stages of the perceptual act that constitute particular apprehensions, it can be discerned that the intentional side of the experience contains not only a sense of A, but also a set of other senses through which A is meant as planted in a perceptual environment. In fact, when the ego apprehends a physical thing, plenty of other objectivations take place simultaneously in consciousness. The

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ego is constantly aware of the position that A occupies in space with respect to the other bodies. This phenomena is possible only because the ego can discern the things that surround A. Any such particular thing, to be classified to the components of A’s surroundings, first must enter consciousness. This means that it must become an object for consciousness; it must be objectified. Let us consider this situation from the scope of the theory that allows the noema to be related only to one object. Consider the apprehension of the physical thing A. According to Føllesdal and his followers, in the act that apprehends A there is no other intentional objectivity except A. In a literary reading of this interpretation, the act as such does not situate A in any environment. To do so, the act must plant A into some surrounding. But this is impossible because the act does not contain a structure of sense that is suitable for this purpose. Perhaps it is obvious that, in a perceptual act, a physical thing cannot appear with no connection to surrounding things. In other words, a physical thing cannot be presented in isolation from its background. To simplify this, suppose that thing A’s environment contains only one entity, B. When an ego apprehends A in some of its respects, B is simultaneously posited as the surroundings of A. This is possible only because B has meaning for consciousness. In other words, B is a point toward which consciousness is directed, i.e., it is also an object of consciousness. If we agree that a singular objectivation is constituted in one ray of intention, then a perceptual act under consideration must be composed of at least two such rays. One ray constitutes an awareness of A, and the second an awareness of B. Such an act therefore has a polythetical structure. In fact, perceptual experiences, which we should distinguish clearly from judgmental ones, in many cases are built of a multiplicity of rays that go in different directions and bring into consciousness the visual field’s complexity. Of course, every such act can be modified into monothesis. Nevertheless, the conditions of such a modification consist of polythetic experiences, i.e., of acts that contain a plurality of objectifying structures of sense. This outcome, however, goes against Føllesdal’s thesis that the noema can determine only one object.

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Despite this, we still might argue that perceptual acts don’t concern objects in a logical sense and, furthermore, that Føllesdal’s interpretation holds, but only for judgmental acts. Certainly, perception concerns objects in a “broad” sense; but these objects are also correlates of consciousness. More precisely, they are correlates of the objectifying functions of consciousness. As such, they form distinguishable unities upon which judgment and object in a logical sense can be constituted. Moreover, Husserl made the noema of sensuous perception one of the main subjects — the investigation of which is of the highest importnacy for the revealing of the structure of consciousness. Knowing all of this would lead to a serious misinterpretation of Husserl’s position if we, defending Føllesdal’s thesis by asserting that only objects in a logical sense are correlates of consciousness, denied that a perceptual act, because it concerns only objects in a broad sense, has an object at all. Perceptual acts, judgmental ones and any other kind of experience, have objects. However, judgments constitute objects in a logical sense; whereas perceptions deal with objects in a “broad” sense. Nevertheless, no matter the kind of object, all of them are given to ego only on account of the objectifying functions of consciousness. The sense of these functions consists in noema. Without additional insight into the question of whether a sense of judgmental acts also can constitute multiplicity of objectifying structures, one fact seems to be clear enough, namely, a singular perceptual experience can bring more than one object into consciousness. This can be accomplished only thought the intentional sense that is composed of objectifying structures’ plurality. In place of Føllesdal’s interpretation, therefore, the present work suggests regarding the noema of perceptual acts as a complex that unifies some multiplicity of sense’s objectifying structures. This is the only way to account for perception’s full intentional content. In contrast, an interpretation that allows noema to be related to only one object oversimplifies the issue. Such a theory, no matter if it is true for judgments, is highly inadequate for describing perceptions’ intentional content. In other words, even if Føllesdal’s thesis can be preserved for linguistic kinds of acts, it certainly doesn’t hold for the intentional content of perceptions.

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3.2. Discussion with Gurwitsch and Drummond

As regards the point that is relevant in this work, Drummond and Gurwitsch’s theories can be criticized in exactly the same manner. Once again, it must be emphasised that we do not want to blur the distinction between these conceptions of noema. Of course, the main argument against Gurwitsch, that the noema is the part of object, cannot be used against Drummond without controversy. Nevertheless, even in this respect, both theories can be brought into agreement. Let us explain this briefly. Gurwitsch regards the momentary noema as part of the object, whereas the system of noemata is regarded as the object itself. Here, we accept the argument that the part cannot exist in a different manner than the whole. This entails that, in any case, the noema is ontologically indiscernible from the intentional object. Exactly the same standpoint is held by Drummond. Moreover, in Gurwitsch’s reading of Husserl, the system of noemata has the same subject as the intentional object. A similar conviction can be found in Drummond, who claims that the noema and the intentional object are the same entity but differently considered. In this respect, the two theories are very similar. As in the previous section, all critique will be directed toward only one philosopher, i.e., toward Drummond. Nevertheless, any particular argument can also be easily used against Gurwitsch.

3.2.1. An argument that follows the ontological undifferentiation of noema from the intentional object

Hence, as we said, the interpretation of noema that will be brought into dialogue with this study’s results belongs to John Drummond, who identifies noema with an intentional object. This is why we conclude that a noema and a perceived object must share the same subject. The latter, when considered in a natural attitude, is the perceived object’s subject.

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In contrast, after phenomenological reduction, it becomes the noema’s subject.145 In this context, consider two competitive apprehensions: the apprehension of a “green leaf” and of a “red leaf”. Suppose that the first of them is confirmed while the second one is disappointed. According to the explanation from the previous sections, the senses of both are simultaneously contained in noema (otherwise phenomenon of conflict cannot be constituted), but only one apprehension can be intuitively fulfilled at a time. Let us agree with Drummond that the fulfilled part of the noema that contains the sense of “green leaf” is ontologically indiscernible from the perceived object, but what about the rest of the noematic content, and what about the sense for “red leaf” that is not fulfilled? This example makes clear that the interpretation of noema presented in this work is different from the conception addressed by Drummond. In fact, the former requires the noema to be clearly distinguished from the individual existence in respect of the formalontological characteristics. I can intend, when I perceive, that the perceived object is different from that which I see. At that time, the act of thinking as well as the perception has the same substrate but different objects. This means that the noema comprises two objectifying structures of sense. Only then can the ego discern a respect in which one object is different from the other. Hence, the situation requires the noema to determine two different objects from which only one is intuitively given. But, in Drummond’s reading, the noema is ontologically indiscernible from the intentional object. For this reason, the noema’s mode of being must be identified with both the mode of being of the intuitively given object and the empty intended one. If the latter does not exist, the noema must be simultaneously regarded as an existent and a non-existent object. Then, Drummond’s conceptions 145

Drummond (1990, p. 113): “…the Sinn (full noema) is the object intended straightforwardly in the act, but when intended in our natural experience it is not present as a sense; it is a material object in the world. Only after the performance of the reduction and the adoption of a philosophical attitude is the object intended in the act revealed as a noema or Sinn (in the broadest sense), i.e. as an object’s significance for a perceiving consciousness”. So, he concludes: “The object, the sense, and the noema are the same differently considered”.

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cannot allow the noema to comprise two objectifying structures of sense without falling into inconsistency.

Final notes

This short discussion of the most important and influential readings of noema discloses the fact that the idea of the possible thinkable content highlights another aspect of the problem of intentionality. Once again, it opens up the question of the relation between noema and the intentional object. It also suggests answers that are different from all those that are currently considered. Therefore, if the analyses that have been carried out in this study are correct, then one must agree that a great amount of work still needs to be done in order to understand the structure of consciousness.

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SUMMARY Undoubtedly, a conception of noema in which the key point resides in the structural ability to assemble more than one objectifying unity of sense does not suffice to determine noema unambiguously. Open questions remain, such as the relation between noema and intentional objects, noema’s ontological status and relation to nonexistent objects, etc. In fact, as was mentioned previously, the present study discloses only a few noematic characteristics, the most important of which are the structural ability to assemble unities of sense that constitute contradictory objects and the ability to objectify more than one entity. The author believes that the present study accents the need to reconsider conceptions of noema in light of this new characteristic. As is easily discerned, the interpretation of noema proposed here excludes only the readings of noema that follow Gurwitsch, but can be reconciled with all of the conceptions that follow Føllesdal. The reason is quite simple; namely, any interpretation that considers the ontological identity of noema with an intentional object cannot explain how noema can comprise more than one objectifying structure of sense or how it can establish reference to contradictory objects without itself falling into inconsistency. On the other hand, the conceptions of Føllesdal and Paśniczek state that noema cannot determine more than one entity; however, they also make the ontological distinction between noema and intentional objects. Hence, the interpretation proposed in this study can be reconciled with Føllesdal’s and Paśniczek’s doctrines more easily than with the readings of Gurwitsch and Drummond. In particular, Paśniczek’s theory seems to be suitable for this purpose. He distinguishes noema as a whole from an object in noematic content. In this regard, the simplest way to reconcile both interpretations is to agree that noematic content can comprise more than one object. No matter how difficult such a compromise is to make, the fact remains that any particular unity of which we are aware is an object for consciousness. Evidence comes from acts of intentional conflict and perceptual experiences, of which particular instances can concern a multiplicity of such unities. In acts of conflict, an ego must be simultaneously aware of both conflicted objects; otherwise, conflict

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cannot be constituted. On the other hand, when someone perceives an apple but pays it no special attention, he is also aware of its surroundings. Any particular unity that is, in some manner, differentiated in this surrounding field is also a separate object for consciousness. Otherwise, it could never appear in the act. Of course, an apple and all unities that belong to its surrounding field are objectified in the broadest sense. Nevertheless, and this is the point of this argumentation, all of the objectivations belong to the same experience. In other words, one and the same act constitutes the apple and, simultaneously, constitutes a multiplicity of other objects that surround the perceived apple. This, in turn, means that noema is comprised of a multiplicity of objectifying structures of sense. One thing, however, must be emphasised here, namely, in such a polythetical act the apple is not discriminated in the same way as correlates of judgmental experiences; but rather is only, so to say, planted in the visual field in the same manner as are all other things in its surroundings. It also can be said that a polythetical act presents a multiplicity of objects in the form of distinguishable parts of the visual field constituted in the appearances of these objects. Upon phenomenon of such a field, an ego can raise the activity and pay special attention to one of the given objects by apprehending it in the form of judgment. In this way, an ego distinguishes this object from all other things in the visual field. As a result, the discriminated entity appears in the form of an object in a logical sense. Simultaneously, all the other things are still objectified, but only in a broad sense. Certainly, for logical purposes, the most important thing is the structure that constitutes an object in the logical sense. Nonetheless, this reason is not good enough to argue that such an object is the only possible correlate of consciousness. In other words, the author does not deny that noema contains linguistic sense, but disagrees with the assertion that this sense is the noematic content’s only possible component. Husserl’s doctrine uses the notion of noema to describe the structure of consciousness. The latter cannot be limited only to linguistic kinds of acts, because it also comprises acts of sensuous perceptions, acts of imminent insight, acts of ideation, etc. Therefore, we need notions of noema that respect this variability of acts. The author believes

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that noema, interpreted as thinkable content, brings us close to this purpose. The proposed concept redirects attention from singular objectivation to the rest of the intentional content. In this sense, it also contributes to distinguishing the linguistic form of sense from all the others. All linguistic forms can be limited to the objectivations performed in an ego’s total activity. Moreover, as was also mentioned, noema must be able to assemble even the unities of sense that correlates cannot constitute a consistent objective structure. For example, the correlates of the senses of being a mother and of being childless, when regarded as properties of the same object, generate inconsistency in the structure of intentional object because the latter now must be conceived as the unity of mutually excluding properties. This does not mean that particular components of noema also exclude themselves. They do not; otherwise there would be no noema. That is the difference between intentional sense and objectivity; namely, a sense can be consistent even if intended objectivity is not. The author has tried to determine how such a sense can be arranged. Nevertheless, in this case, a great amount of work still needs to be done. Here, however, we can outline how the idea of noema as thinkable content can be extended, and note some of possible directions for future analyses. With respect to the first purpose, let us first briefly specify our interpretation of noematic X. According to Husserl, this part of noema is “… the central point of connection or the ‘bearer’ of the predicates, but in no way is it a unity of them in the sense in which any complex, any combination, of the predicates would be called a unity” (Hua III, p. 301: 1983/313). Moreover, Smith and McIntyre consider whether X is the purely formal moment that unifies senses of properties, or is the sense of occasional expressions and names. On the other hand, Paśniczek interprets X as a noematic pole that, in the case of acts directed to an existing object, is perfectly transparent in determining reference and, as such, coincides with its own correlate. Finally, Drummond sees X as the definite continuity responsible for constituting an intended object’s identity. X, therefore, fulfils the crucial role of establishing reference to

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an object. Although the mentioned characteristics of X come from different interpretations of noema, they all point out something specific about X. Hence, in some sense, all of them are true about X. Unfortunately, we cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of X that retains all these characteristics. However, we can try to respect the majority of them. Hence, first let us interpret pure X as the moment of subject-positing. In this sense X is the simple, i.e., undividable, unanalysable part of noema that establishes reference to an object in abstraction from its properties. However, pure X as merely the moment of subject-positing is exactly the same in every objectifying experience. Therefore, it cannot individuate the reference. To do so it would need an additional content on account of which it could determine an intended object’s peculiarity. This content is nothing more than the senses of properties taken as purely syntactic matter, i.e., in abstraction from their function of being senses of something objective. What this means will become clear after we consider the foregoing example. Suppose that a noematic core contains a sense of being red. When analysed, this sense occurs as composed of two parts, namely, syntactic matter and a syntactic form. The sense of redness taken in abstraction from the form of “being of” is the syntactic matter. The form that modifies the sense of redness into the sense of being red is the syntactic form and we henceforth will call it the moment of determinant-positing. Hence, the part of the noematic core that is the sense of being red is composed of two moments, namely, syntactic matter, i.e., the sense of redness and syntactic form, i.e., the moment that modifies the sense of redness into the sense of being red. Moreover, syntactic matter, i.e., the sense of redness, is modified not only by the sense of determinant-positing, but also by the sense of subject-positing. Regarding this latter situation, the sense of redness enters the structure of pure X, which constitutes the red object’s sense of subject. Summarising, then, the proposed interpretation of noematic structure uses the concepts of syntactic matter and syntactic form. The sense of redness is syntactic matter; whereas the senses of the subject and determinant-positing constitute two dependent moments of the syntactic, objectifying form of sense. Next, in the concrete noematic

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whole, syntactic matter is always given in the syntactic form. This means that the moment of redness is modified by the moment of determinant-positing but, simultaneously, also by the moment of subjectpositing. The unity of redness and determinant-positing moments constitutes a sense of the objective characteristic and can be explained as the sense of being red. Such unity belongs to this part of the noematic core, where properties’ senses reside. On the other hand, the unity of redness and subject-positing moments constitutes the sense of an intentional object as the subject of determinations. This unity of sense is the pure X. Syntactic matter, therefore, is the additional content on account of which X can determine individual reference. Simultaneously, as Husserl claims, X is not merely a collection of properties’ senses because it also contains moments of subject-positing. X also can be seen as the “bearer” of the predicates because it modifies them into the sense of an objective subject. Moreover, none of the syntactic matter is property of the pure X. X therefore has no objective or even quasi-objective structure. After the foregoing, one thing is clear enough, namely, syntactic matter belongs to two different formations inside one noematic structure. When unified with the moment of determinant-positing, this matter belongs to the part of noema that is occupied by the sense of objective properties. The same matter, when unified with the moment of subjectpositing, belongs to the pure X. Of course, in the concrete noematic whole, syntactic matter is unified simultaneously with both formal moments. And it depends only on the theoretical interest if we consider it, one time, as unified with the moment of determinant-positing and another time as unified with the moment of subject-positing. Let us now consider this conception of noema with an example. Suppose that a perceptual act explicates a perceived object as both P and Q. Of course this is an oversimplification of the perceptual content, but for current purposes it will be helpful. Such a perception constitutes the object in a broad sense. If we analyse this act’s noematic structure, the following facts become readily apparent. First, the moment of subjectpositing modifies and, by this, unifies matters of P and Q into the sense of the objective subject. Second, the content of noematic predicates contains two separate formations, namely, formations of P and Q that

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are, each for itself, modified by the moment of determinant-positing. The perceptual act, as such, constitutes the object in a broad sense that is perceptually explicated as P and Q. Suppose also that an ego, on the basis of this perceptual act, judges that x is P. What kind of differences does such a situation make to the noematic structure? First, as is easy to notice, all the syntactic matter is retained. Second, formal moments also are retained, but some of them are now given in the mode of the highest activity. The noetically regulated level of activity impacts, so to say, the distance at which correlates are given to the ego. The higher the mode of activity is, the shorter the distance between the ego and the correlate. From another viewpoint, we also may say that the objective correlates of senses constituted in the mode of the highest activity gain priority in the ego’s interest and, by this, they become distinguished from correlates of senses on the lower level of activity and are posited as the exclusive target of an ego’s concerns. Analyses of the noema contained in this judgmental act reveal pure X as composed of unitary syntactic matter of P and Q that is modified by the moment of subject-positing. Moreover, the noematic core also contains syntactic matter P modified by the enhanced in activity moment of determinant-positing. Such a judgmental act determines the reference to the object, which is P and Q, but which is predicatively explicated merely as P. As a result, the judged object appears as P. After the foregoing we can note that the noetically regulated level of activity discriminates noematic content and, by this, distinguishes in it separate objectifying structures. These structures, which are constituted in the highest activity level, have an advantage over structures of lower levels in positing their own correlates in the closest distance from the ego, making them exclusive targets of the ego’s interest. In harmony with the previous explanation, every distinguishable moment of syntactic matter is modified by both subject and determinantpositing moments. If we suppose that noesis doesn’t enhance any syntactic formation by applying to it an increased level of activity, then all of an act’s intentional content is constituted on the same activity level. If we also suppose that noema contains syntactic matter P and Q, then we also must agree that both P and Q are modified by the moments

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of subject and determinant-positing. Because there is no discriminating activity from the noetic side, formations of matters P and Q are, each for themselves, modified by moments of syntactic form and, as such, they constitute two separate objectifying structures of sense. The objective correlates are P as P and Q as Q. This is also the simplified schema of noema in polythetical perceptual acts. This briefly sketched extension of the concept of noema as possibly thinkable content reveals the following facts. First, the noetic side of experience is responsible for distributing activity over the noema’s content. Further, the unity of enhanced moments constitutes objectifying formations of sense. In this light noesis is responsible for object discrimination. Second, when noesis enhances part of noematic content and, by this, forms it into the sense of judgment, the nonenhanced parts remain in consciousness. If we agree that an experience is the content of the form “now” in phenomenological time, then we also must agree that noema can possess parts that are constituted on different levels of activity. In judgment based on a perceptual act, for example, part of the noematic content that is the sense of this judgment is constituted on the highest level of activity; whereas all the rest of content that doesn’t belong to judgment, but to the underlying perceptual act, is constituted on a lower activity level. We can state that both perceptual and judgmental content belong to the same noema because they are given simultaneously in the same form “now” of phenomenological time. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is highly controversial and as long as we cannot provide reasons sufficient to accept it and its advantages over other interpretations, it remains only an indication for further analyses. On the other hand, we can interpret experience as any noeticnoematic formation distinguishable from the stream of consciousness by any particular noetic’s increasing activity. In this sense, the form “now” of phenomenological time can contain as many acts as the many of activities noesis constitutes. Nevertheless, even in this reading of experience we must explain the phenomenon of polythetically organised acts. This is accomplished by the theory of noema as possibly thinkable content. In this theory’s light, different parts of the same noematic core, when constituted on the same level of activity, form separate

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objectifying structures of sense, which determine polythetical reference in a singular act. Of course, the foregoing sketch doesn’t exhaust all possible ways in which the theory of noema developed in this work can be extended; nor does it exhaust the multiplicity of problems that this theory can be exploited to solve. Instead, it merely outlines one possible direction and some problems connected with it. Many issues remain to be faced before the proposed theory can provide us with outcomes significant for philosophical purposes. One such issue is the case of the relation between syntactic matter and syntactic form. Here we can say that form modifies matter by giving it the function of being a subject or determinant. Nevertheless, this relation is highly enigmatic. Moreover, the question is also open regarding the relation between senses of different subjects that, in light of the theory of thinkable content, now can constitute one noematic structure. Subsequent analyses must clarify whether or not these senses are of equal rank for the constitution of noema. Furthermore, noema is composed of not only senses of different subjects, but also senses of different properties. The proposed theory interprets the latter as mutually independent parts of noema, but it does not further specify this relation between them. On the other hand and finally, it is also worth investigating consequences that come from the fact that the variation of noema depends on noesis. The case is even more attractive when situated in the modern context of discussions about the relation between concrete mental processes and abstract senses. Here is the open field for analyses that can significantly enrich our knowledge of phenomenological and metaphysical problems. The author believes that the idea of noema as possibly thinkable content, when analysed in detail, will yield the specified notion of intentional matter. Such an achievement would be of the highest importance for epistemological efforts that tend toward certitude in the case of difference between an object which and as it is intended. Considerations carried forward in this matter also will bring valuable results of a phenomenological and formal-ontological nature into the modern philosophical discourse.

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INDEX

A abstraction ideational, 37, 39-40, 42, 49 theory of, 31, 55, 99, 106, 116, 122, 135, 171, 176, 186 absurdity, 44, 46, 54, 119, 147-8, 158, 15961 act, 22, 26-7, 30-8, 41-51, 53, 55, 57-61, 63, 65-75, 77, 79-82, 84-6, 92-9, 101, 103-4, 107, 110-1, 113-5, 117-22, 124-8, 130-40, 142-3, 146, 148, 151, 153-4, 157, 159, 165, 167, 169-70, 174-6, 178, 181, 184, 187-90 empty intending, 47, 70, 103 fulfilling, 148 intentional, 26, 31, 51, 58, 66, 74, 79, 98, 122, 124, 140, 144 intuitive, 118 judgmental, 37, 60, 106-7, 179, 188 linguistic, 33, 36-7, 46, 61, 111, 149, 151 monothetical, 146, 175 objectifying, 45, 165 objectless, 47, 108 perceptual, 28, 37, 92-3, 124, 136, 138, 146, 171, 177-9, 187-9 polythetical, 175, 178, 184, 189-90 protentional, 101 retentional, 101 sensuous, 50 significant, 43 synthetic, 67, 157, 167 analysis, 9, 11, 39, 41, 49, 76, 86, 93, 96, 100-2, 106, 110, 121, 148, 150-2, 157 psychological, 39 appearance, 29-31, 33, 96, 100-3, 155 apperception, 31-2 apprehension, 31-2, 89, 103, 154-5, 160, 1647, 169-70, 177-8, 181 objectifying, 159, 162 perceptual, 94 association, 25, 44 attention, 10, 30, 50, 66, 130, 132-3, 164-5, 184-5 attitude

natural, 23, 98, 106, 132-3, 138, 180 phenomenological, 23, 50, 177 B background, 154, 164-5, 178 Bedeutung, 61, 105, 110-1, 148 Brentano, F., 10, 112 C Casari, E., 17 categorial form, 14, 21, 23-5, 35 causal property, 101 complexity, 15, 178 concrete (concretum), 19 absolute, 19 relative, 19 conscious experience, 138 consciousness, 10, 13-4, 23, 25-31, 33, 3840, 44, 46-7, 51-2, 54-5, 58-9, 62, 66-7, 69, 71-3, 79-81, 85, 89, 94, 97-8, 107-8, 111, 114, 120, 122, 124-7, 132, 138, 1457, 153-7, 162-4, 166-9, 171-9, 181-4, 189 internal time, 66, 157, 163 positional, 175 stream of, 25, 62, 65, 189 synthetical, 175 constancy-hypothesis, 88-9 contemplative intuition, 165 content, 11, 17, 20-1, 25, 27-9, 31, 34-5, 3842, 44-5, 47, 50, 54, 56, 58, 60, 64, 66-7, 71, 74-6, 79, 81, 88-90, 92-3, 96, 99, 101, 103-4, 107-8, 113, 117-22, 125-33, 135-6, 142-7, 152, 154-6, 158, 160-1, 170-1, 176, 179, 183, 186-7, 189 attributive, 104 descriptive, 32, 119 extra-intentional, 45 founded, 25 intentional, 27, 40-3, 45, 53, 81, 146-7, 179, 185, 188 intuitive, 92, 103, 104, 125-7, 131, 133 judgmental, 104, 189 lived through, 31

200 noematic, 53, 56, 64, 76-7, 103, 114, 116, 144, 146, 151-3, 156, 158-60, 181, 1834, 188-9 noetic, 53, 73, 77, 82, 109 non-intuitive, 124-7, 130-2 objective, 27, 64, 130 real phenomenological, 27, 30-1, 33, 3740, 51, 109 sensuous, 28-9, 31-2, 88-9, 154 supplementary, 15 thinglike, 44, 110, 112, 127, 136 thinkable, 9-11, 145, 147, 158, 160, 162, 172, 176, 182, 185, 189-90 unthinkable, 161 covariance strong, 84-5 weak, 84 covariation, 84-5 one way, 85 two way, 85

real, 39 self-sufficient existence, 131 experience, 10, 14-5, 24-9, 31-5, 37, 39, 412, 44-5, 47, 52-5, 58, 60-1, 67-8, 73, 75, 81, 93-4, 96, 98-9, 102-3, 105, 107, 110, 112, 115, 118, 121, 124-7, 130-2, 136-8, 142, 146, 149, 151, 153, 157-8, 160, 1623, 164-5, 167-8, 170-1, 174-5, 177, 179, 181, 184, 186, 189 comprehensive, 157 inadequate, 74 intentional, 26, 51, 66, 122, 124 mental, 25-6 of conflict, 162 partial, 38 perceptual, 29, 178-9, 183 phenomenological concept of, 27 psychological concept of, 26 explicative coincidence, 166-7 expressibility thesis, 117, 120

D

F

Dębowski, J., 150 definite continuity, 102-3, 185 demonstrative reference, 120, 122 dependency, 14-7, 50, 79, 86, 91 existential, 63, 79, 81-2, 132 foundational, 17 relative, 17 theory of, 16 dependent variation, 49, 50, 64, 75, 77-8, 84 description, 41, 56, 80-4, 107, 118-21, 128, 145-6, 149 definite, 117-20, 145 phenomenological, 10 Dougherty, Ch. J., 13 doxic character, 56-7, 104, 126 Dreyfus, H., 94 Drummond, J., 11, 22, 35, 45, 57, 87, 89, 91, 94-104, 106-12, 115, 117, 122-3, 143, 172-3, 180-3, 185 E Ehrenfels, Ch. F., 23, 89 eidetic necessity, 72 embedding relation of, 137 essence, 13, 28, 32, 37, 39-40, 42, 45-6, 49, 52, 54, 63, 76, 99, 123, 131, 149, 175 existence concrete, 40 individual, 26, 39, 56, 63, 120, 181 manner of, 109, 124, 131

figural moment, 14, 22-3 Findlay, J. N., 136-7 Føllesdal, D., 10-1, 87, 97, 110-6, 133, 138, 145, 172-4, 176, 178-9, 183 form of unity categorial, 21-3, 25, 162 sensuous, 21, 23-5, 28 foundation (founding relation), 14, 16-7, 20 immediate, 17 irregular, 16 mediate, 17 regular, 16 unilateral, 16 Frege, G., 111 fulfillment fulfilling experience, 148 functional significance, 90-1 G Gestalt, 23, 88-92, 96, 137-8 structure of, 92 Gestalt-coherence, 91-2 Gurwitsch, A., 10-1, 57, 87-97, 100, 109, 112, 115, 133, 135, 137, 139, 172, 180, 183 H Hanna, R., 13 Hill, C. O., 13 Holmes, R., 98, 113, 127

201 horizon, 92-3, 108, 154 inner, 92, 108 Huemer, W., 13 Hurt, J. G., 98 Husserl, E., 9-11, 13-7, 19-54, 56-66, 68-72, 74-6, 79-80, 86-90, 95-6, 98-9, 104, 1067, 109-14, 116-7, 119-23, 125-7, 132-4, 143-5, 147-51, 153-6, 158, 160-75, 177, 179-80, 184-5, 187 hyletic data, 14, 27-33, 38, 42, 50-3, 58, 6970, 88-9, 93, 155 I identity, 89, 94-6, 100-6, 108-10, 113, 134-5, 137, 183, 185 identity-in-a-manifold, 96, 100, 102 immanent analysis, 133 indiscernibility, 82, 84 inexistence, 47 Ingarden, R., 11, 30, 73-4, 82, 86-7, 123-33, 142, 143 insight, 27, 179, 184 immanent, 9, 27, 44 intellectual, 27, 61 instantiation, 40, 46, 56, 145 intellect, 147, 168-9 intentional animation, 31-3, 52 intentional carrier, 134, 137, 139 intentional character, 34, 56, 57, 103, 111, 118, 156 intentional conflict, 147, 156, 158, 162, 1723, 183 intentional correlate, 130, 144 intentional essence, 33, 37, 40, 43, 48-9, 122, 148-9 intentional negation, 156 intentional relation, 122-4, 137-40 intentional structure, 125, 129-31, 133 intentionality, 10, 41, 47-9, 51, 53-4, 86-7, 97, 99, 107, 119, 121-3, 126, 133, 135, 137-8, 150, 161, 182 directional conception of, 138 relational conception of, 135 three aspect, theory of, 135, 138-40, 142 two aspect, theory of, 135, 138-42 internal time consciousness, 66, 157, 163 interpretative intention, 33 intuition, 16, 22, 24-5, 36, 53, 79, 165 phenomenological, 12 intuitive core, 154-5 intuitive fullness, 101, 118 intuitive unity, 158-9, 163, 165-6, 174

J Jacquette, D., 136-7 Johansson, I., 77-9 judgment, 14, 16, 34, 36, 60, 104-5, 108, 114, 118, 149, 151, 153, 162, 164, 166-71, 179, 184, 189 judicative core, 170 K Kim, J., 77, 83, 84 L Langsdorf, L., 111, 113-4 Lewis, D. K., 77 Lingis, A., 29 M Marbach, E., 98 material thing, 94-5, 109 matter, 26-7, 34-8, 40-1, 43, 45-9, 62, 64, 801, 86, 107, 122, 131, 134, 148-9, 153-4, 159, 161, 170, 171-2, 179, 183, 186-8, 190 intentional, 11, 14, 33, 45-8, 125-6, 14850, 190 syntactic, 170-1, 174, 186-8, 190 McIntyre, R., 11, 45, 71, 87, 94, 95, 112, 116-23, 134, 146, 148, 150, 172-3, 185 McLaughlin, B. P., 77-8, 84-5 meaning, 13, 26, 32, 37, 39, 45, 51-3, 56, 65, 80, 93, 105, 109-11, 113-4, 117, 146, 14853, 158-61, 178 absurd, 159-60 impossible, 160 intending, 148 linguistic, 32-3, 117, 146 objective, 151, 160 objectless, 151, 160 perceptual, 53, 93 possible, 160 meaning-compounding lows of, 147, 161 Meiland J. W., 13 Meinong, A., 135 Metcalfe J. F., 13 Mohanty, J. N., 13, 63 moment, 18-21, 23, 51-3, 55-7, 63-4, 73, 80, 82, 95, 102, 124, 126-7, 129, 131, 135, 144, 156, 157, 176, 185-8 conscious, 73 definition of, 18 functional, 14, 27, 30-1, 33, 38, 40, 42, 4951, 89

202 immediate, 21 mediate, 20 noematic, 57, 62-4, 70, 78, 81, 85, 92, 159 noetic, 50-2, 55, 57-8, 62-5, 69, 73, 76-80, 85 sense giving, 42, 83 supervenient, 79-82 unifying, 31 moment of intention (intentive moment), 124-5, 127, 131 N noema, 9-11, 14, 34, 41-2, 45, 48-50, 53-66, 68-71, 73, 75-88, 92-107, 109-20, 122-3, 126, 132-5, 137-53, 155-8, 160-2, 172-4, 176-90 concrete, 95-6, 186-7 higher order, 93 judgmental, 104 momentary, 92-7, 137, 138-9, 180 perceptual, 45, 61, 92-6, 98, 113, 118 sensory, 92 noematic core, 56-8, 116, 135, 150-3, 155-8, 161, 186-9 noematic layer, 97, 99, 102, 108 noematic nucleus, 57, 95, 116, 152 noematic structure, 11, 50, 57, 92, 95-6, 100, 103, 133-5, 145, 148, 150, 152-5, 157, 160, 186-8, 190 noematic X, 56-7, 102, 116-7, 120-1, 134-5, 150, 152, 185-8 noesis, 11, 41-2, 45, 49-53, 55, 57-65, 68-71, 73, 75-85, 99, 107, 109-10, 114, 122-3, 126-7, 132, 138, 143-4, 177, 188-9, 190 noetic-noematic formation, 50, 62, 78, 189 noetic-noematic correlation, 11, 49, 55, 59, 64, 69-70, 75-7, 79, 82-3, 85-6, 177 noetic-noematic relation many-to-one, 49, 65, 68, 77 one-to-one, 49, 62, 64-5, 70, 77, 85, 120, 145 noetic-noematic structure, 10-4, 75, 81, 114, 127, 176 nonsense, 147-8, 158-61 Null, G. T., 15-21 O object, 14-5, 18-20, 24-37, 44-7, 53-6, 59-62, 64, 66, 68, 71, 73-5, 78, 80-1, 92-106, 108-9, 111-7, 119-43, 145-49, 151-4, 1567, 159, 162-74, 176-81, 183-90 abstract, 55, 94

as it is intended, 44-5, 54, 94, 97, 99, 13940, 143, 149, 157, 190 auxiliary, 136-9 categorial, 24, 27, 174 complete, 136 complex, 14-5 concrete, 32, 46 content-object, 128, 130-1, 133, 143 contradictory, 147-8, 151, 153, 155, 158, 183 corporeal, 98-9, 103 fictional, 113, 128 general, 56 ideal, 37, 95, 113, 123 imagined, 128, 130-2, 143 immanent, 54 impossible, 158 in the broad sense, 179, 184, 187 in the logical sense, 167, 168, 184 incomplete, 137 individual, 30, 39, 55, 72, 107, 120, 129 intended, 46-7, 95, 97-9, 105-6, 109, 1167, 120, 185-6 intensional, 97, 110, 115-7 intentional, 41, 43, 45-8, 53-5, 95, 97-9, 103-4, 106-10, 112, 115, 117, 127-9, 131-5, 137-8, 140, 142-3, 153, 172-3, 178, 180-3, 185, 187 material, 18, 94-5, 98, 181 merely intentional, 46 noematic, 56 non-existent, 46-7, 95, 99, 107, 135, 136, 181, 183 nonreal, 71, 110 physical, 29, 46, 95, 99-100 possible, 158 purely intentional, 11, 87, 123, 127-33, 141-3 real, 54, 98, 128 sensuous, 22 simple, 14-5 simpliciter, 99, 116, 135 spatial, 30, 99 synthetical, 175 thing-like, 44, 110, 136 transcendent, 29, 46, 59 ultimate, 136-7 which is intended, 44-6, 53, 55, 94, 97, 104, 119, 137, 143, 178 objectifying act, 45, 165 objectifying activity, 163, 165, 167-8, 171, 179 objectivation, 146, 164-7, 174, 178, 185 form of, 159

203 occasional expression, 102, 120-1, 185 Ontology, 15 overlap relation, 15 P parallelism between noesis and noema, 59 Parsons, T., 136 part, 10, 13-22, 25, 27-8, 42, 45-7, 55, 63, 66, 69, 77, 79-81, 88-92, 94-7, 99-101, 107, 120-1, 124-6, 131, 133-7, 143, 152-3, 1556, 161, 165, 171, 174, 176, 180-1, 185-7, 189 abstract, 18-9 concrete, 18-9 definition of, 20 disjoined, 15 extended, 21 formative, 91-3 immediate, 21 independent, 15, 18-9, 23, 171, 190 mediate, 20 noematic, 62-4, 71, 127, 153, 158 non-independent, 15, 17, 99, 171-2 proper, 15, 18-9 proper part relation, 15 Paśniczek, J., 11, 57, 87, 94, 103, 132-43, 172-3, 183, 185 pattern of determinations, 114-5 perception, 22, 27-8, 30-1, 33-4, 45, 53-4, 59, 61, 68-9, 71, 90, 93-6, 98, 100-1, 111, 115, 118, 120-1, 125, 132, 137-8, 154-5, 168-70, 179, 181, 187 immanent, 9, 73, 125, 176 sensuous, 50, 70, 118, 177, 179, 184 perceptual intention, 120-1 perceptual organization, 89 perceptual sense, 45, 61, 93, 95, 113 phenomenological reduction, 27, 50, 72, 98, 100, 132-3, 181 phenomenological time, 66, 146, 189 physical thing, 46, 68, 94-5, 135, 177-8 Picardi, E., 13 piece, 18-21, 155 immediate, 21 mediate, 20 Poli, R., 17 Positum, 104-6 predicative unity, 162 pre-predicative unity, 162 presentation, 31, 36, 44-5, 48-9, 57, 101, 103, 108, 133 non-intuitive, 118

property causal, 101 perceptual, 101 Proposition, 60, 104-6, 146 Protention, 67-8, 93, 101 Psychologism, 13 Psychology, 13, 23, 26, 39, 41, 53, 93 Q quality, 11, 14, 22, 25, 28, 34-8, 40, 46-9, 89, 104, 149-50 higher order, 89 intentional, 33, 43, 149-50 objective, 30 sensuous, 176 R recollection, 33-4 reduction, 26, 44, 50, 72, 83, 84, 98, 106, 181 derivational, 83 reductionism, 83 reference, 34-7, 46-7, 55, 79, 83, 103, 108, 112, 117, 119-21, 125, 127, 132, 134-40, 145, 159-60, 174, 183-8, 190 reflection, 13, 26, 114 immanent, 26 phenomenological, 114 representationalism, 122, 137 Retention, 67-9, 71, 101-2 Routley, R., 136 S Satz, 60, 62, 104-6, 161 semantic essence, 36-7, 150 sense, 15, 20, 26, 27, 30-3, 35-7, 41-2, 44-7, 50-7, 59-61, 65-6, 68, 72-3, 75-7, 79-81, 83, 88-9, 93-5, 97-9, 102-6, 108-9, 111-4, 116-21, 123, 125, 127-8, 131-40, 145, 147, 149-53, 155-61, 164, 166-71, 173, 175-9, 181-2, 184-90 bestowed, 55, 76, 80 formations of, 157, 189 intentional, 45-6, 55-6, 73, 81, 94, 97, 99100, 126-7, 132, 149, 151-2, 154, 179, 185 interpretative, 37, 43 judgmental, 60, 104, 179, 189 linguistic, 56, 113, 184 noematic, 56, 79, 98, 108, 134-5, 139, 143, 152

204 objectifying structure of, 143-4, 146, 156, 162, 172-4, 176, 178, 181, 183-4, 18990 objectifying unity of, 154, 157, 183 objective, 24, 37, 53, 55, 138 perceptual, 45, 61, 93, 95, 113 phenomenological, 26-7 physical, 30 pre-constituted, 168 propositional, 105 psychological, 26, 52 unity of, 50, 52, 56-7, 80, 94, 107, 133, 143, 152, 183, 185, 187 sensibility, 147, 168-70 sign, 58 Simons, P., 17 simple contemplation, 165, 167-9 Sinn, 24, 30, 37, 51-2, 54, 56, 60-1, 71, 76, 98-9, 105, 110-2, 114, 117-22, 126, 155, 181 noematic, 105, 110-1, 117-20, 122, 126, 143 Smith, D. W., 11, 45, 71, 87, 94-5, 108, 112, 116-23, 134, 145, 148, 150, 172-3, 185 Sokolowski, R., 17-8 substrate, 119, 154, 157, 162-74, 181 sensuous, 154 ultimate, 163-4 supervenience, 11, 49-50, 77-8, 83-6 supplementation, 16-7 strong, 15

weak, 15 syntactic form, 170-1, 186, 188, 190 T thetic character, 56, 95, 103-4, 111, 116, 118 transcendence, 44, 49-50, 72-7, 86, 100-1, 110 horizontal, 100 of existential fullness, 74-5 radical transcendence, 74-5 strong structural, 74 weak structural, 73 Twardowski, K., 10 U unity of knowledge, 44, 171, 174 W whole, 14, 18-22, 45, 50, 55, 58, 62, 66, 6970, 73-4, 79, 89-94, 97, 100-1, 118, 124, 129, 135, 137, 141-2, 155, 157, 165-6, 180, 183, 187 conditioned, 74 definition of, 20 extended, 20 unconditioned, 74-6 wholes/parts theory of, 10, 14, 100

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