Nietzsche's Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects 9781138221567, 9781315410050

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgments
1 Interpreting Nietzsche on Objects
2 Against Constructivism
3 For Constructivism
4 Objections to Constructivism
5 Consequences of Constructivism
6 Nihilism and Constructivism
7 Nietzsche, Constructivism, and Pragmatism
8 Nietzsche’s Constructivism and Current Debates
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Nietzsche’s Constructivism

Like Kant, the German Idealists, and many neo-Kantian philosophers before him, Nietzsche was persistently concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature of objects. His texts often address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of philosophy—not just metaphysics, but also language, epistemology, science, logic and mathematics, and even ethics. In this book, Remhof presents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics. He argues that Nietzsche embraces the controversial constructivist view that all concrete objects are socially constructed. Reading Nietzsche as a constructivist, Remhof contends, provides fresh insight into Nietzsche’s views on truth, science, naturalism, and nihilism. The book also investigates how Nietzsche’s view of objects compares with views offered by influential American pragmatists and explores the implications of Nietzsche’s constructivism for debates in contemporary material object metaphysics. Nietzsche’s Constructivism is a highly original and timely contribution to the steadily growing literature on Nietzsche’s thought. Justin Remhof is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University. He specializes in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century European Philosophy and Metaphysics. His work has appeared in journals that include European Journal of Philosophy, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, and Nietzsche-Studien.

Routledge Studies in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy For a full list of titles in this series, please visit www.routledge.com

5 Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness A Kantian Perspective Gabriele Gava 6 Mill’s A System of Logic Critical Appraisals Edited by Antis Loizides 7 Hegel on Beauty Julia Peters 8 Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy Edited by Gabriele Gava and Robert Stern 9 An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life Anthony K. Jensen 10 Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology Edited by Susanne Herrmann-Sinai and Lucia Ziglioli 11 Nietzsche and the Philosophers Edited by Mark T. Conard 12 Schopenhaur’s Fourfold Root Edited by Jonathan Head and Dennis Vanden Auweele 13 Nietzsche’s Psychology of Ressentiment Revenge and Justice in On the Genealogy of Morals Guy Elgat 14 The Kantian Foundation of Schopenhauer’s Pessimism Dennis Vanden Auweele 15 Nietzsche’s Constructivism A Metaphysics of Material Objects Justin Remhof

Nietzsche’s Constructivism A Metaphysics of Material Objects Justin Remhof

First published 2018 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Taylor & Francis The right of Justin Remhof to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Remhof, Justin, author. Title: Nietzsche’s constructivism : a metaphysics of material objects / by Justin Remhof. Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series: Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy ; 15 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017017097 | ISBN 9781138221567 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844–1900. | Constructivism (Philosophy) | Material culture. Classification: LCC B3317 .R41665 2017 | DDC 193—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017017097 ISBN: 978-1-138-22156-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-41005-0 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Acknowledgments 1 Interpreting Nietzsche on Objects

vii 1

2 Against Constructivism

17

3 For Constructivism

48

4 Objections to Constructivism

71

5 Consequences of Constructivism

88

6 Nihilism and Constructivism

113

7 Nietzsche, Constructivism, and Pragmatism

128

8 Nietzsche’s Constructivism and Current Debates

143

Bibliography Index

159 171

Acknowledgments

This book exists because certain people have believed in me and continue to believe in me. I have done my best not to let them down. I thank Bernard Gendron for opening my eyes to the world of Nietzsche, and Susan Hahn for helping me find my voice with Nietzsche. I thank Robert Schwartz for showing me the vision and depth of the American pragmatists, for introducing me to constructivism, and for mentoring my early philosophical development. I thank Arthur Melnick for sharing with me his unparalleled philosophical wisdom. I thank Richard Schacht for generously accepting me as his final advisee, for his unwavering trust in my work from the classroom to the North American Nietzsche Society, and for his ongoing insight and guidance. I thank William Schroeder for his dedication to helping me understand the importance of self-cultivation in Nietzsche’s work, for his critical and creative eye, and for showing me new ways philosophy can ignite and inspire. I thank Daniel Z. Korman for his passionate and selfless devotion to helping me grow as a philosopher, both personally and professionally. I thank Garrett Bredeson, Courtney Morris, John Timmers, James Jeffries, Joe Swenson, Erick Schaaf, Aaron Harper, Daniel Estrada, Todd Kukla, Adam Bowen, Robert Shanklin, and Erick Ramirez for their friendship, kindness, and thoughtfulness, which has advanced my reading of Nietzsche over the years. The book has benefitted from comments offered by R. Kevin Hill, Rex Welshon, William Prior, Philip Kain, Garrett Bredeson, Robert Shanklin, Colin McLear, and Daniel Z. Korman. I also thank Helga Varden and Shelley Weinberg for comments on early stages of the project. I thank my parents, Cheryl and Marc Remhof, for their loving encouragement, confidence, and respect, without which I could not have dedicated myself to the world of philosophy. I thank Octavia for her patience, inspiration, and laughter, all of which keep me going—hand to paper, foot to grass, mind to movement. All the love, Tink. Some arguments have previously been published, though most have been significantly reworked. Portions of Chapters 2 and 3 were presented in “Nietzsche on Objects,” Nietzsche-Studien 44 (2015): 291–314. Parts of

viii Acknowledgments Chapters 2, 3, and 4 appeared in “Defending Nietzsche’s Constructivism about Objects,” European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). And sections of Chapter 5 developed from ideas originally published as “Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence, or Pragmatist?,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46/2 (2015): 239–238, and “Naturalism, Causality, and Nietzsche’s Conception of Science,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46/1 (2015): 110–119. I am grateful to the editors of these journals for permission to reprint.

1 Interpreting Nietzsche on Objects

Like Kant, the German Idealists, and many neo-Kantian philosophers before him, Nietzsche was persistently concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature of objects. His texts often address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of philosophy—not just metaphysics, but also language, science, epistemology, logic and mathematics, and even ethics. When referring to an object, Nietzsche follows common German usage by employing ‘Ding’ [thing] more often than ‘Objekt’ [object], but the two are generally interchangeable. Both typically refer to concrete, macroscopic entities we experience in everyday life, such as trees and leaves, cats and dogs, and tables and chairs. The primary aim of this book is to present and defend the view that, according to Nietzsche, all such objects are socially constructed. Broadly, to say objects are socially constructed is to say objects are brought into existence by social practices. I call this view of objects—which is clearly controversial—constructivism. The view that Nietzsche endorses constructivism about objects has been suggested by Nehamas (1985, ch. 3), Anderson (1998), and Cox (1999, 152– 163).1 However, I offer much more than existing accounts, and what follows will serve as a quick-and-dirty outline of the book. I develop a new argument for reading Nietzsche as a constructivist. I explore the extent to which Nietzsche thinks even the basic particles of the world are constructed. I offer arguments against all contemporary competing interpretations of Nietzsche’s view of objects in the analytic tradition. I develop and respond to challenging objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist. I explain how reading Nietzsche as a constructivist can help resolve deep-seated interpretive issues that concern his wider philosophical program, specifically with respect to truth, science, and naturalism. I elucidate an unexpected motivation behind Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism: the advent of nihilism. I compare and contrast Nietzsche’s version of constructivism with constructivist positions developed by key thinkers in the American pragmatist movement. And, I explore the extent to which Nietzsche’s constructivism could play a game-changing role in contemporary debates about material object metaphysics. This is all uncharted territory.

2  Nietzsche on Objects There is an immediate difficulty with undertaking a study of Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics, though: his remarks on the topic are incredibly perplexing. Consider the various positions that can be culled from the corpus. In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche maintains that reality is ultimately undifferentiated, such that seemingly individuated objects of everyday experience are actually illusions (see BT 1, 2, 4, 16, 18). In the influential essay “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense” (1873), he assumes that objects exist but holds that we cannot know their basic natures. In Human, all-too-Human (1878), Nietzsche asserts that objects do not exist (see HH I: 19) but also appears to believe that we structure the world of everyday experience into objects—a process which seems to be revealed by modern science (see HH I: 16, 29). In The Gay Science (1882), he reiterates that objects do not exist (see GS 110) but then explicitly claims that we are capable of bringing them into existence (see GS 58). In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Nietzsche attacks the very idea of material reality, which presumably includes objects, and suggests that the world is nothing more than a sea of forces (see BGE 12, 17, 36). In Twilight of the Idols (1888), he indicates that belief in objects is an error because it is based on erroneous beliefs about the self (see TI “Reason” 5; “Errors” 3). The Nachlaß is chock-full of passages that crisscross all these themes and more, even adding that nihilism is partly a result of adopting an ontology traditionally assumed to contain particular kinds of objects (see KSA 13:11[99]). This dizzying array of views is enough to confuse even subtle readers. Which of these positions, if any, captures Nietzsche’s considered view? Both over time and within singular works, he appears to present views that are not only painfully inconsistent but also philosophically suspect—even outright strange. This could very well indicate that Nietzsche is not concerned with metaphysical questions concerning objects. After all, if he truly cared about such questions, why would his remarks be so persistently puzzling? Is he just incompetent to write about them?2 Either he fails at doing what he wants to do, one might argue, or he has no interest in the game. We most often see Nietzsche engaging ethical issues, for instance, not issues concerning objecthood. Perhaps, as sometimes supposed, Nietzsche even believes that the entire metaphysical enterprise is misguided—perhaps it is hopeless to make claims about the way the world is.3 Metaphysics could be just a vestige of inquiry subsumed by the life-negating ascetic ideal that needs to be over and done with. So say the detractors. Not unsurprisingly, I find a good deal of this unconvincing. Yes, Nietzsche is primarily concerned with ethics. That much cannot be doubted. But he is also very much interested in making metaphysical claims about the way the world is. For instance, he thinks the world contains no egos (BGE 17). He holds that causal forces typically embraced by the Christian tradition, such as “God,” “soul,” and “ego,” “spirit,” and “free will,” do not exist (A 15). He asserts that there are no enduring, self-identical entities (GS 110). He proclaims that mathematics and logic do not reflect reality (TI “Reason” 3).

Nietzsche on Objects  3 He thinks that the existence of human consciousness developed in conjunction with language (GS 354). He suggests that human beings are comprised of drives and affects (BGE 12). He writes that the “essence of life” is “will to power” (GM II: 12). He asserts that the desire to preserve oneself is a “limitation of the truly basic life-instinct” (GS 349). And so on. Denying any of these metaphysical commitments—and these are just a few examples— would most certainly result in failing to grasp Nietzsche’s philosophical program. There are, of course, times when Nietzsche appears to attack metaphysical philosophy. However, his attacks center on a particular approach to metaphysics, rather than the ability to make general claims about the nature of reality. For instance, he often ridicules philosophical positions divorced from the possibility of empirical confirmation.4 In Human, all-tooHuman, he disparages what he calls “metaphysical philosophy,” but only targets the metaphysical view that entities have a “miraculous source” in some fully mind-independent world (HH I: 1, cf. I: 20; BGE 2; TI “Reason” 1). Nietzsche’s own metaphysical thinking rejects appeal to mind-independent worlds. This commitment, I argue in Chapter 4, motivates him to discard metaphysical thinking subsumed by the ascetic ideal. Moreover, the fact that Nietzsche is worried about inquiry caught up with the ascetic ideal indicates that his engagement with metaphysics is part and parcel of his larger concern with ethics. In Chapter 5, I suggest that Nietzsche’s interest in the metaphysical status of objects is partly motivated by his focus on affirming life. Nietzsche is certainly a metaphysician, then, but one motivated by ethical concerns. Should we conclude that Nietzsche is not interested in material object metaphysics, or that he simply has no considered view on the matter, from the fact that his remarks are not obviously consistent? Absolutely not. Nietzsche is unquestionably attentive to questions concerning objects. The topic populates most published works and occurs frequently in the notebooks. Of course, Nietzsche’s texts are notoriously difficult to disentangle— but that is my task here. There has been no attempt to sort through his various remarks on objects, and so, predictably, commentators have proposed wide-ranging, jointly incompatible interpretations. I plan to show that Nietzsche has a consistent, considered position on objects, and I plan to defend that view from opposing interpretations.5 In doing so, I will utilize helpful distinctions from contemporary analytic metaphysics. In recent years, philosophy has seen a surge of interest in the area of material object metaphysics.6 The debate has generated a fresh look at the topic and given birth to a refined vocabulary that, with a cautious and careful hand, can be employed to help understand historical positions like Nietzsche’s. Using this vocabulary, I aim to deliver a clear understanding of Nietzsche’s commitments concerning material objects. Another worry facing my project is that those who agree that Nietzsche is concerned with material object metaphysics may nonetheless think that

4  Nietzsche on Objects constructivism treads tired ground. It could be argued that Nietzsche’s “perspectivism,” which has received overwhelming attention in the literature, already involves commitment to constructivism. So, one might think, my project is old hat. Now, there is no uniform interpretation of perspectivism, but on many readings, perspectivism and constructivism come apart. In particular, perspectivism is often taken to be a semantic or epistemological view. Truth or knowledge is thought to be perspectival, where “perspectival” suggests “merely relative to a particular framework,” whatever the details may be.7 But neither of these interpretations of perspectivism implies anything about the way the world is. Constructivism does—it is a metaphysical position. What happens if perspectivism is construed metaphysically? On this reading, Nietzsche thinks reality is comprised of forces, each of which has a particular perspective, and objects are particular bundles of forces. Nietzsche writes about “this necessary perspectivism according to which every center of force [. . .] construes the rest of the world from itself” (KSA 13:11[373]). Even on the metaphysical reading, however, constructivism and perspec­ tivism are distinct. For example, some commentators take Nietzsche to believe that objects are bundles of forces organized according to intrinsically similar perspectives.8 This would entail that constructivism is false. Constructivism holds that some extrinsic perspective, namely, the perspective of agents, organizes bundles of forces into objects. Why care about how bundles of forces become objects? The fact that there is disagreement shows that a mere defense of the metaphysical reading of perspectivism will not establish constructivism. This book, then, offers something yet unseen. Furthermore, since I do think the metaphysical reading of perspectivism is correct—though I offer no argument here9—I promise to explain why the metaphysical reading of perspectivism uniquely supports a constructivist reading of Nietzsche.10 Again, this is untouched terrain. A final worry about the book is that a constructivist reading of Nietzsche is anachronistic. Constructivism seems to be associated with later thinkers, such as Goodman and Rorty, and the word ‘constructivism’ never appears in Nietzsche’s texts. But the charge of anachronism is too quick. Constructivism is highly visible in Nietzsche’s historical context, whether official in name or not. Nietzsche was familiar with constructivism through Kant and the neo-Kantian movement of the 19th century that developed in reaction to Hegel and German idealism. Nietzsche was primarily exposed to Kant through Arthur Schopenhauer, Kuno Fischer’s commentary on Kant, and the neo-Kantian philosophers Friedrich Albert Lange, Gustav Teichmüeller, Friedrich Überweg, Otto Leibmann, Hermann von Helmholtz, Heinrich Romundt, Afrikan Spir, and Eduard von Hartmann. Kant and the neo-Kantians propose various forms of the idealist position that our cognitive apparatus is an essential condition for there being objects, and there is no way to cognize objects as they are fully independent of our particular mode of cognition. Lange, for instance, who strongly influenced Nietzsche,

Nietzsche on Objects  5 writes that “The sense-world [viz., the empirical world] is a product of our organization,” and the “sense-world” provides “only pictures of an unknown object,” such that “the transcendent basis of our organization remains therefore [. . .] unknown to us” (Lange 1873–75, 3: 219, brackets added). The nature of empirical objects depends partly on how we structure the world, while the nature of objects apart from our structuring cannot be known. It is not always clear which commitments of Kantian idealism Nietzsche accepts and which he rejects. Schopenhauer seems to have had the most direct Kantian influence on Nietzsche’s thought, and elements of Schopenhauer’s idealism can certainly be found in Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, there is reason to think that reality independent of human practices is undifferentiated, and objects come into existence by virtue of applying conceptual representations to the world in experience. Similarly, in The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer holds that what most basically exists is undifferentiated will, and objects are just ways in which that will is empirically objectified in relation to an intellect equipped with conceptual capacities— in this case, the ability to apply the principle of sufficient reason. In these respects, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s Kantian idealism find agreement. But there are substantial differences between the two views. Consider just four. First, due to the fact that there is only undifferentiated will, Schopenhauer thinks constructed, individuated objects are ultimately illusions, whereas Nietzsche sides with Kant in holding that constructed, individuated objects have genuine existence.11 Second, while Nietzsche accepts that concepts construct objects, he never describes this process in a way compatible with, or even reminiscent of, Schopenhauer’s principle of sufficient reason. There is no evidence to suggest that, according to Nietzsche, objects come into existence by virtue of such a principle. Third, Schopenhauer argues that idealism gains ground by virtue of the fact that philosophy is limited to the facts of representational consciousness, since, following Descartes, philosophy must concern itself with what is certain, and only what lies within representational consciousness is certain (see Schopenhauer 1958, 4–5). Nietzsche rejects the connection between consciousness and certainly, he denies the narrow scope Schopenhauer gives to philosophical inquiry, and he often seeks philosophical explanations in the subconscious mechanisms that cause various states of representational consciousness, rather than taking representational consciousness to be of primary philosophical importance.12 The fourth difference is that Schopenhauer appears to vacillate between thinking empirical reality is what must be actually represented by some consciousness (see Schopenhauer 1958, 4–5) and what can possibly be represented by some consciousness (see Schopenhauer 1958, 5, 9).13 If the former is true, then, for instance, it seems impossible for objects to exist before humans, which is obviously false. But, I argue in Chapter 4, it is perfectly reasonable to think objects exist before humans if reality is what we can in principle encounter in experience, and Nietzsche follows Kant in embracing such a

6  Nietzsche on Objects position.14 Although Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s versions of Kantian idealism are broadly aligned, then, there are sharp differences in the details. Nietzsche’s constructivism appears to have much stronger roots in Kant.15 This comes through clearest in Nietzsche’s description of constructivism. He writes, “A ‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept, an image” [ein ‘Ding’ ist eine Summe seiner Wirkungen, synthetisch gebunden durch einen Begriff, Bild] (KSA 13:14[98]). The wording here—“synthetically united by a concept”—is unmistakably Kantian. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that our cognitive faculties come equipped with an a priori conceptual framework which partially constitutes the structure of objects by organizing sensory information. This develops from Kant’s Copernican Revolution, which challenges the longstanding assumption that material objects are mind-independent. Kant contends that instead of thinking that our representations should conform to objects outside us, as commonly supposed, we should think that objects outside us conform to our representations, such that our cognitive capacities play an essential role in determining the structure of objects. If all cognition is supposed to conform to objects that exist constitutively independent of us, Kant argues, objects would only contingently affect subjects, and consequently we could never arrive at genuine knowledge of the world in experience. Kant proposes that something can be an object just in case it can conform to the a priori elements of our mode of cognition. Reference to our mode of cognition is built into the very definition of objecthood. The quote above clearly indicates that Nietzsche accepts Kant’s constructivist position that an object is a conceptually organized unity, and this book develops Nietzsche’s version of that view.16,17 Importantly, Nietzsche comes to reject a crucial consequence of Kant’s Copernican Revolution. According to Kant, our mode of cognition never gets beyond the boundaries of the objects of possible experience. Kant calls such objects appearances. Objects construed independently of our mode of cognition are things in themselves. Appearances exist in the transaction between the sensory data we receive and the way our cognitive apparatus processes such information, whereas things in themselves are, in principle, cognitively inaccessible. Kant writes, “our cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the thing in itself as something actual for itself, but uncognized by us” (Kant 1998, Bxx). A thing in itself is not a possible object of experience. Something in itself cannot be apprehended in space and time and conceptually represented. Since conceptual representation of what is apprehended in space and time determines the limits of cognition of the empirical world, things in themselves cannot be cognized. Kant nonetheless claims that “we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves” (1998: Bxxvi–xxvii). We must be able to think about things in themselves because they provide the condition of the existence of appearances. “For otherwise,” Kant says, “there would follow the absurd proposition that there is appearance without anything that appears” (1998: Bxxvi–xxvii).18 The absurdity is

Nietzsche on Objects  7 to think that appearance—the world comprised of cognizable objects—can exist without conditions that allow appearance. According to Kant, this justifies positing things in themselves.19 In his mature work, Nietzsche is unabashedly critical of Kantian things in themselves, despite the fact that, at least in some form or another, many thinkers who comprise the 19th-century Kantian revival, including Schopenhauer, remain committed to things in themselves. Nietzsche’s boldest criticism of things in themselves is that they simply do not exist. In the notes, he asserts, “There are no things in themselves! [. . .] Something that is of no concern to anyone is not at all” (KSA 12:2[154]). Readers might find this puzzling. Why think objects do not exist just because no one has epistemic access to them? Here is how I understand Nietzsche’s argument.20 It has been established that things in themselves are in principle inaccessible to our mode of cognition. Something in itself is therefore best understood as a concept of an object that exists independently of our mode of cognition. Something in itself is a conceptual placeholder. Nietzsche maintains that we can have either no coherent conception of an object we cannot in principle cognize, or we can only have a contradictory conception of an object we cannot in principle cognize (see GM III: 12; BGE 16; GS 54). And if something cannot be coherently conceived, or cannot be conceived without contradiction, Nietzsche suggests, it does not exist. This links something’s being conceivable to something’s existing. The implication is certainly not true across all cases. But it does seem warranted in the case of unperceivable objects like things in themselves. The inability to entertain a coherent concept of an object that can only be understood as a concept indicates that the object does not exist. Similarly, the inability to entertain a concept of an object that can only be understood as a concept without falling into contradiction indicates that the object does not exist. Hence, things in themselves do not exist. As Nietzsche remarks, the world of things in themselves is a “purely fictitious world” (KSA 13:11[99]).21 I have spent some time showing that Nietzsche was exposed to constructivism through Kant and post-Kantian thinkers. Textual evidence indicates that Nietzsche accepts the Kantian idealist position that we play an essential role in determining the nature of objects, despite the fact that he rejects things in themselves. Although constructivism is perhaps most notably associated with later 20th-century thinkers, then, constructivism certainly exists within Nietzsche’s historical context. Now to explain how the book proceeds. The first issue to address is obvious. What should we do about the fact that in the literature there is no consensus about Nietzsche’s position? The next chapter begins by surveying the relevant texts to be examined and specifying what it means to be a constructivist about objects. I then argue that all non-constructivist interpretations of Nietzsche are not supported by the texts. It will be helpful to canvas the secondary readings of Nietzsche’s treatment of objects here. The

8  Nietzsche on Objects first is commonsense realism. Nietzsche often assumes that there is nothing special about objects. For example, he casually talks about stars (GS 109), animals (GS 115; TI “Maxims” 31, 35), trees, leaves, and twigs (BGE 192), and so forth. Perhaps, then, objects are just the ordinary entities of everyday experience. Such objects are often taken to exist independently of whatever we might say, think, or theorize about them. Other passages, however, raise flags against the commonsense reading. For instance, Nietzsche claims the view “that there are things” is one of many “erroneous articles of faith” [irrthümliche Glaubenssätze] (GS 110). This suggests that Nietzsche supports the eliminativist view that no objects exist. Two versions of eliminativism about objects can be gleaned from Nietzsche’s texts. In some places, Nietzsche suggests that the dynamic nature of reality is incompatible with the existence of objects. For instance, he asserts, “Continual transition forbids us to speak of ‘individuals’ ” (KSA 11:36[23]). Nietzsche appears to pull the rug on stability, and with it, objects. The second eliminativist reading stems from Nietzsche’s view that belief in objects derives from false beliefs about the self. “And as for the I! It has become a fable, a fiction,” he says, “The thing itself, to say it again, the concept of a thing: just a reflection of the belief in the I as cause” (TI “Errors” 3, emphasis added). The belief that objects exist is based on the erroneous belief in the existence of subjects, specifically causally efficacious subjects. Since no such subjects exist, objecthood is a “lie” (TI “Reason” 2). Eliminativism can therefore be derived using one of two routes: Nietzsche’s rejection of stability, or Nietzsche’s rejection of the subject. To make things more complicated, other passages report that objects indeed exist, but not as ordinary entities. Objects are sometimes regarded as “complexes of events” [Complexe des Geschehens] (KSA 12:9[91]). The idea is that objects are identical to “will to power,” or bundles of forces. I have mentioned that it is not immediately clear what renders some bundle of forces an object. Some passages suggest that objects are intrinsically unified bundles of forces. I call this view unificationism. Nietzsche maintains that a “center of force” has “its own viewpoint,” or intrinsic nature, which enables it to form a “ ‘union’ ” with other centers of force (KSA 13:14[186]). Other passages indicate that objects are bundles of forces that human beings organize into objects. This is constructivism. “A thing,” Nietzsche explains, is “a unity under which we collect the relations that may be of some account to us” (KSA 12:2[77]). On my reading, of course, Nietzsche embraces constructivism. The bulk of the second chapter argues that, contrary to appearances, Nietzsche discards all other interpretations. In the third chapter, I present Nietzsche’s constructivism about objects. In general, Nietzsche holds that something’s being an object requires having conditions of identity, which can occur only in relation to conceptual representations. For Nietzsche, I contend, we construct concrete, macroscopic objects by developing concepts that group empirical properties. For example, when we fashion the concept to refer to entities that

Nietzsche on Objects  9 orbit our sun, remain round, and have cleared the neighborhood around their orbit, we determine that only portions of the world that have these three properties are planets. Such properties taken together constitute the identity conditions of objects that are planets. The third chapter also explores the extent to which Nietzsche might think microscopic objects of scientific study, such as bundles of forces themselves, are constructed. For Nietzsche, it appears that we construct microscopic objects by developing a conceptual apparatus that determines the identity conditions of bundles of forces denoted by mathematical formulas in scientific work. Our conceptual activities provide information about which phenomena, with which sorts of identity conditions, symbols in formulas represent. Bundles of forces, then, seem to become objects in relation to our practices. On Nietzsche’s view, I argue, all macroscopic objects are constructed, and there is some reason— though perhaps not conclusive reason—to think all microscopic objects are constructed, too. The third chapter finishes by examining the constraints on construction and how constructivism avoids the charges of being subjectivist and problematically relativist. I focus on developing Nietzsche’s view that an adequate constructivist position must embrace the conceptualist view that sense experience has conceptually structured content. Nietzsche contends that our sensory apparatus organizes incoming sensory information in accordance with our concepts. Conceptualism, I argue, provides important support for Nietzsche’s preferred conception of objectivity. In the fourth chapter, I develop and respond to five major objections to interpreting Nietzsche as a constructivist. Each objection, if sound, could severely damage my reading. The first two worries concern tensions within Nietzsche’s own philosophical program. Constructivism involves taking the world to have human features, it might be argued, and Nietzsche is often critical of such anthropomorphism. For instance, he writes, “Let us beware of attributing to [the world] heartlessness or unreason or their opposites: it is neither perfect, nor noble, nor beautiful, nor does it want to become any of these things; in no way does it strive to imitate man!” (GS 109). Comments like these suggest that Nietzsche would reject the view that we construct objects. The second objection comes in two parts. First, Nietzsche seems to think that words cannot represent reality. He writes, “[Man] really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world [. . .] A great deal later—only now—it dawns on men that in their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous error” (HH I: 11). This could undermine the constructivist view that language largely determines the nature of objects. Even if Nietzsche has a response to this objection, something worse emerges. It appears that Nietzsche thinks conceptual representations necessarily falsify. Since objects are constructed by the application of conceptual representations, it seems that Nietzsche’s constructivism requires him to reject truth. Some would be happy with this result. But I am not. On my view, Nietzsche thinks we can make true and false evaluations about the

10  Nietzsche on Objects world in experience, and, consequently, my account faces a substantial interpretive problem. The next three objections are general attacks on constructivism. First, if constructivism were true, then given the diversity of languages, some groups of people might construct objects that other groups deny exist. This could lead to contradiction. The next objection concerns unperceived objects, such as objects that we have not yet encountered or objects that existed centuries before human beings. It is perfectly reasonable to believe all such objects— from distant stars to long-gone dinosaurs—have conditions of identity apart from human practices. All such objects appear unconstructed. Since constructivism claims otherwise, constructivism appears false. The final objection concerns vicious circularity. For Nietzsche, subjects bring objects into existence. Subjects, however, seem to be proper candidates for construction. It then seems that subjects must somehow bring themselves into existence! This kind of bootstrapping is obviously unacceptable. So, constructivism should be rejected. My task in the fourth chapter is to develop Nietzsche’s response to each of these objections. In the fifth chapter, I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche’s view of objects. Understanding Nietzsche on objecthood is not only intrinsically worth pursuing, but also crucial for clarifying and settling disputes that concern interpretive issues about his philosophical program at large. I present three areas of contention that are significantly affected by Nietzsche’s view of objects: truth, science, and naturalism. Consider Nietzsche on truth. It is often debated whether Nietzsche thinks we can make true evaluations about the world, and if so, whether his remarks on truth best support the correspondence theory of truth or the pragmatist theory of truth. Importantly, material objects are typically thought to form the truth conditions of propositions about the empirical world.22 If there are no such objects, as the eliminativist claims, for instance, there could be no use in trying to make true assertions about the world of every­ day experience. And if material object exist, as others claim, then how we represent them will depend on what exactly constitutes their nature. ­Nietzsche’s understanding of objects will therefore help determine whether truth is a proper evaluative standard of inquiry and what truth might consist of. Nietzsche’s position on objects also affects his understanding of science. Commentators clash over whether he praises or condemns science. This is largely due to a disagreement over whether he thinks science delivers the facts about the world. If not, the scientific project would likely be nihilistic. That is, science would presume the world to be some way it is not. Whether science should be condemned as nihilistic partially turns on Nietzsche’s understanding of the nature of an object, since facts about the empirical world often depend on what properties concrete objects instantiate. If Nietzsche denies that objects exist, he might have good reason to think science is nihilistic, whereas if he thinks objects exist, he could be motivated to praise

Nietzsche on Objects  11 science, and his view of what an object is, exactly, will provide a baseline for his positive view of science. Whether Nietzsche praises or condemns science bears significantly on his understanding of naturalism. Nietzsche’s naturalism has recently attracted heated attention in the literature. Those who believe that Nietzsche has a negative view of science argue that Nietzsche thinks naturalistic explanations of phenomena are nihilistic. Such explanations attempt the impossible, which is to represent the world from no particular perspective—a “view from nowhere,” to use Nagel’s famous phrase. Those who believe that Nietzsche has a positive view of science argue that Nietzsche’s own philosophy is committed to the naturalist view that philosophical explanations should be closely associated with the sciences. Commentators come into conflict about how best to understand this association, but many of those who take Nietzsche to embrace naturalism regularly assume that he takes the objects of naturalistic inquiry to be mind-independent. It would be a problem for this view, then, if the objects of naturalist inquiry turn out to be mind-dependent. Moreover, if objects are thought to be mind-independent, naturalist explanations might attempt to represent the world from no particular perspective, which could mean that the positive view of Nietzsche’s naturalism is actually nihilistic! Arriving at this striking conclusion turns on Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism. In the sixth chapter, I suggest that Nietzsche’s view of objects is not merely an interesting product of his neo-Kantian historical context, but appears to develop for more substantive reasons. Nietzsche might have been motivated to embrace constructivism, I argue, because it plays a special role in overcoming nihilism.23 Here, I begin to bridge a troubling gap between secondary treatments of Nietzsche’s metaphysics and his ethics. It is common for commentators to focus on Nietzsche’s metaphysics and neglect his ethical concerns, particularly his worries about nihilism, while focusing on his ethics often leaves little place for his metaphysics.24 Yet, as Nietzsche puts it, “if one would explain how the most abstruse metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does he) aim?” (BGE 6). I attempt to demonstrate one important way in which Nietzsche’s metaphysics should be pursued in the context of his ethics: Nietzsche believes constructivism is uniquely suited to prevail over positions that lead directly to nihilism. Constructivism is motivated by ethical concerns, I argue, and has positive ethical consequences. In the seventh chapter, I examine the unlikely pairing of Nietzsche with James, Goodman, and Rorty.25 To be sure, Nietzsche’s constructivism plays no role in the development of American pragmatism. In fact, bracketing Rorty’s later work, Nietzsche’s philosophy is mostly ignored by the pragmatists. However, Nietzsche, James, Goodman, and Rorty all offer constructivist accounts of objects, and this unifying theme has been almost completely overlooked in the literature.26 The task of comparing and contrasting these accounts is long overdue.

12  Nietzsche on Objects James primarily discusses constructivism in the context of his “humanism.” Humanism holds that truth is a product of human activity because we create objects that form the truth conditions of propositions. I argue that Nietzsche also endorses this controversial position on truth. Perhaps the most interesting connection between Nietzsche and James, though, is their agreement that embracing constructivism can assist humanity in overcoming the problem that life is meaningless. Nietzsche and James both believe that a feeling of meaninglessness can follow from a frustrated attachment to a non-empirical world. Since constructivism affirms the empirical world, including our distinctly human, artistic capabilities, Nietzsche and James believe that constructivism can help overcome meaninglessness. Goodman embraces a radical version of constructivism. On Goodman’s view, there is a plurality of symbol systems, such as philosophy, art, and science, and insofar as each system is correct, each literally constitutes a world. These systems will not all be consistent, Goodman maintains, and thus, there is not just a single world, but instead, many actual worlds. Although most passages in Nietzsche do not go so far as to endorse Goodman’s pluralism about worlds, some passages suggest otherwise. One reading of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, I argue, may even imply world pluralism. Another point of interest between Goodman and Nietzsche is their treatment of objects before perceivers. Nietzsche’s view, I contend, avoids troubling difficulties with Goodman’s account. Despite such differences, however, Nietzsche and Goodman stress that understanding the methods by which objects are constructed is crucial because such methods contribute to determining the structure of reality. Nietzsche proclaims that “the methods, one must say it ten times, are what is essential” (A 59). Rorty needs no introduction. His commitment to the contentious idea that everything is socially constructed is well known. However, Nietzsche’s constructivism is very different from Rorty’s. Rorty’s philosophical program turns on a commitment to antirepresentationalism, the view that language cannot represent anything non-linguistic.27 On this account, language is a tool causally enmeshed with the world, like a hammer or toothbrush. Neither hammers nor toothbrushes are representational devices, at least in the way we typically take language to be representational. I suggest that Nietzsche accepts some version of antirepresentationalism. In Chapter 3, for instance, I show that his commitment to antirepresentationalism plays a crucial role in placing constraints on how we should understand constructivism. Whereas Rorty uses antirepresentationalism to support the position that non-linguistic reality does not constrain our descriptions of the world, though, Nietzsche thinks the world constrains what we say about it. For Rorty, the only constraint on language comes down to what purposes various groups of people want to satisfy. On his constructivist view, what we talk about, given our purposes, determines reality. Nietzsche’s constructivism, on the other hand, holds that what we talk about, given how we

Nietzsche on Objects  13 organize non-linguistic reality, determines reality. These differences render Nietzsche and Rorty’s views of constructivism significantly different. The final chapter of the book connects Nietzsche’s constructivism to current debates in material object metaphysics. In the analytic tradition, constructivism is predominantly assumed to have fatal shortcomings, and the view is roundly rejected. The exact same conclusion is gaining momentum in the continental world. But as I see it, much can be gained by embracing Nietzschean constructivism. I argue that Nietzschean constructivism can provide defensible responses to difficult puzzles in contemporary material object metaphysics, in particular the argument from vagueness, arguments from arbitrariness, the debunking argument, and arguments concerning indeterminate identity. The puzzle-solving power of Nietzschean constructivism could provide reason to adopt the view, I suggest, assuming that metaphysicians are willing to keep an open mind. To motivate my reading that Nietzsche is a constructivist, I now turn to assessing—and rejecting—all non-constructivist readings of Nietzsche. Time to get things rolling.

Notes 1 Cf. Stegmaier 2012, ch. 9. For an account of Nietzsche’s constructivism construed epistemologically in relation to Nietzsche’s discussion of history, see Jensen 2016, 91, 112. See also Jenson 2013, ch. 5; Stingelin 1993. 2 One commentator certainly seems to think so. Addis writes that, “Nietzsche was not an idealist. Or, if he was an idealist in fact, it was despite himself” (Addis 2012, 63, cf. Hollingdale 1995, 118). Addis rightly recognizes that constructivism is an idealist position, but why might Nietzsche be an idealist “despite himself”? Addis answers, “Nietzsche must and does, to be consistent with his ideal of the Übermensch and ‘overcoming’ the prejudices and values and beliefs of ordinary humans, presuppose that we do not impose whatever structure reality has, but that it is already there to be discovered” (Addis 2012, 65). This is quite far-fetched. I see no reason to think that the ideal of the Übermensch and overcoming certain values and beliefs requires a reality that is constitutively mind-independent. For instance, Nietzsche thinks that overcoming certain values and beliefs requires noticing their constructed nature (see, for example, GM I). Nonetheless, commitment to constructivism about objects neither implies, nor is implied by, commitment to the view that other entities like beliefs and values are constructed. Consistency does not require commitment across such domains. 3 The idea that Nietzsche aims to overcome metaphysics is central to many continental interpretations of his work, though some analytic commentators develop a similar position. For instance, Berry (2010) argues that Nietzsche has no systematic metaphysical commitments. Poeller suggests that Nietzsche embraces “metaphysical indifferentism,” which means in part that Nietzsche is indifferent to “standard metaphysical questions” involving “propositions which have no predictive consequences and cannot in principle be assessed by our techniques of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation,” and this includes the question of “whether there are absolute, non-perspectival objects” (Poellner 2013, 696). I think Nietzsche is very much not indifferent to this question concerning material objects, and I think his concerns are launched from a philosophical perspective grounded in empirical confirmation. Sometimes, the field of metaphysics is

14  Nietzsche on Objects understood as involving non-empirical claims about the nature of reality, rather than just making claims about the way the world is (see, for example, Rea 2014, 8–11; for a discussion of how Nietzsche stands in relation to this understanding of metaphysics, see Clark 2009). On this view, I still believe Nietzsche has metaphysical commitments (concerning, for example, the nature of concepts, mathematics, logic, and values). Yet, he is often careful not to posit views that cannot, in principle, be confirmed, disconfirmed, or altered in light of empirical investigation. 4 For one such reading, see Carnap 1966, 80. For discussion of Carnap, Nietzsche, and metaphysics, see Sachs 2011. Haar is correct to say that “the overcoming of metaphysics” involves overcoming “belief in ‘another world’, in a world that is ideal and true in itself” (Haar 1996, iv). See also Houlgate 1986, 38–44. 5 Here one might press: why does Nietzsche scatter his remarks on objects, and why do they seem so inconsistent? Answering such questions would require answering why Nietzsche writes in the unique way he does, of course, and I will not venture into this complicated territory here. Perhaps it will suffice to point out the obvious: Nietzsche engages a vast array of topics from a variety of perspectives in varying contexts, so we should not expect to find his remarks on objects (or anything, for that matter) in one particular place, or with only one set of conclusions in mind. 6 See, for example, Korman 2016b. 7 For a survey and criticism of these interpretations of perspectivism, see Gemes 2013. 8 See Hales and Welshon 2000; Doyle 2009. 9 Gemes (2013) goes some of the way toward arguing for this claim by arguing that perspectivism is a psychobiological view concerning drives, rather than a view concerning semantics or epistemology. But Gemes stops short of arguing that Nietzsche thinks reality is comprised of forces. 10 See Chapter 2.6. Nietzsche adopts the Kantian view that metaphysics is only possible by epistemological means, such that what and how we know entails, at least in part, what and how objects exist. This is not inconsistent with the claim that perspectivism is a metaphysical position, since according to Nietzsche, the fact that reality consists of perspectival forces is determined in the course of what and how we know. 11 A recent critic of constructivism writes disapprovingly that for the constructivist “[Objects] have only the shadow reality of a mental (or linguistic) projection” (Elder 2004, 11). This might target Schopenhauer’s idealism, but certainly not Nietzsche’s. 12 The constructivist position I attribute to Nietzsche, which holds that our practices bring objects into existence, is meant to include actions motivated by subconscious drives as well as reflective, conscious actions. My use of the term ‘actions’ instead of ‘practices’ in Remhof (2015a) was not sufficiently clear on this point. ‘Actions’ strongly suggests conscious, reflective behavior, and Nietzsche is not committed to the view that such behavior must exist for objects to exist. 13 Thanks to Christopher Janaway for correspondence on this point. 14 Addis, then, gets it exactly wrong when he writes that, for Nietzsche, “every object we encounter is ‘conditioned’ by the fact that someone is aware of it” (Addis 2012, 62). 15 For informative discussion about Kant’s influence on Nietzsche, see Hill 2003; Bailey 2013. 16 Allais (2015, ch. 7) argues that for Kant, objects of which we are immediately aware are not conceptually organized unities. Rather, it is only the case that thinking about objects requires conceptualization. On this view, intuition presents us with particular objects and concepts play no role in this initial

Nietzsche on Objects  15 presentation. Kant believes concepts are necessarily general and do not apply to particulars. Nietzsche seems to agree that concepts are necessarily general, but I argue that he believes that sufficiently developed descriptive representations function to individuate objects by individuating the properties of objects. For Nietzsche, then, unlike Allais’s Kant, awareness of distinct objects requires conceptualization. 17 One might wonder why I believe that Kant plays such an important role in the development of Nietzsche’s constructivism. Perhaps other thinkers, such as Mill, who aligns more with Nietzsche than Nietzsche does with Kant on grounding inquiry in the study of empirical world, would be better suited. Mill’s thought was widespread in 19th-century German philosophy, and Nietzsche seems to have been aware of Mill’s views outside ethics through the influence of Spir and Spencer (see Emden 2014, 103). But it is better to read Nietzsche as someone naturalizing Kantian metaphysical commitments about objects, contributing to the 19th-century neo-Kantian movement, rather than adopting non-Kantian metaphysical commitments of 19th-century empiricists. Simply put: the textual evidence points to Kant. Moreover, Mill holds the phenomenalist view that material objects are just clusters of sensations, or constructions from clusters of sensations, a view which finds no footing in Nietzsche’s texts (and no footing in Kant’s texts either—see Allais 2015, 37–58). For readings that attribute phenomenalism to Nietzsche, see Hussain 2004; Hill 2007. For a compelling challenge to Hussain’s phenomenalist interpretation, see Clark and Dudrick 2012, 98–112. 18 For a nice list of passages in Kant which show that things in themselves ground appearances, cause appearances, or affect us, see Allais 2015, 32–33. 19 It is difficult to state Kant’s view in uncontroversial terms, but I take this conclusion to hold over interpretations of Kant which contend that things in themselves are non-cognizable either because they are distinct objects from the objects of experience (see, for example, Stang 2015) or because they indicate properties or natures that objects of experience have which are in principle inaccessible to us (see, for example, Allais 2015). Nietzsche denies things in themselves in both senses. 20 This reconstruction is influenced by Poellner (1995, 83–85), Leiter (2002, 19–20), and aided by an anonymous referee at the European Journal of Philosophy. 21 The Marburg neo-Kantians, such as Cohen and Natorp, sometimes suggest a way out here, though it is not clear they fully attribute the view to Kant (see, for instance, Kim 2016, section 3). For a recent version of the position that follows, see Senderowicz 2005, 14. Perhaps Kant thinks conceiving something is not limited to concepts that constitute the categories of the understanding, but could also involve application of the ideas of reason. The categories play a constitutive role in relation to the objects of possible experience, while objects of the ideas of reason could never be given in any possible experience, but instead are what Kant calls “transcendent principles” that play a regulative role in unifying judgments of the understanding (Kant 1998, A296/B353). It might be argued that ideas of reason do allow us to conceive objects, at least in a non-contradictory sense, even though we cannot properly cognize them (this would satisfy what Kant calls a “problematic concept” at 1998, A254). Kant even suggests that such ideas have “objective but indeterminate validity” (Kant 1998, A663/B691). But this reading faces difficulties. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant seems to argue that the ideas of reason do not represent either determinate objects of experience or things in themselves (see Buroker 2006, 207–213, 284–290; Allais 2015, 67–68). Indeed, regulative principles merely motivate and provide guidelines for organizing empirical knowledge. Kant writes that “reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the understanding,” and “thus reason

16  Nietzsche on Objects really has as object only the understanding” (Kant 1998, A643–4/B671–2). This sense of representation fails to enable cognition of things in themselves. Moreover, as will become clear in Chapters 3 and 4, Nietzsche follows the empiricist tradition in denying that we can represent indeterminate objects, or objects with conditions of identity that could not possibly be determined. Thanks to Garrett Bredeson for pushing me to be clear about these points. 22 I use ‘propositions’ very broadly to indicate bearers of truth-values, whatever they may be. 23 I therefore offer an alternative to Poellner’s reading that for Nietzsche, metaphysical questions concerning whether “there are no non-perspectival spatial objects” have no “evident and incontestable practical dimension” (Poellner 2009, 175). 24 For the former, see Hales and Welshon 2000. For the latter, see Havas 1995. 25 Putnam (1981) advances a constructivist view of objects, though one he renounces in later works. Clearly influenced by Goodman, he writes, “ ‘Objects’ do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description” (Putnam 1981, 52). For a comparison of Nietzsche and Putnam’s views on ontology, see Anderson 1998. I will not compare Nietzsche with Putnam, since Anderson has already done a fine job. 26 A search of the secondary literature reveals little discussion about Nietzsche’s metaphysics in comparison with metaphysical views offered by the pragmatists. Instead, discussions concerning Nietzsche and pragmatism often focus on issues concerning either truth or social and political philosophy. This makes sense, in part because the pragmatists are not known for their substantive metaphysical commitments. To some extent, the exception is West 2000, 188–212. West examines various ways in which Nietzsche’s ontology prefigures views later espoused by the American pragmatists. But West is not primarily concerned with objects. He focuses on phenomena such as theory-ladenness of observations. Another commentator, Gemes, claims to argue for “the Nietzsche-Goodman thesis that philosophers are prone to mistakenly identify as absolute, mind and language independent, features of the world which are in fact only features of a particular discourse, or of the world relative to a particular discourse” (Gemes 1987, 301). But this quote occurs in the abstract, and unfortunately, Nietzsche is never discussed in the body of the paper. The best place to be introduced to some of the connections between Nietzsche and the pragmatists on constructivism occurs in the footnotes in Cox 1999, 152–162. 27 Antirepresentationalism is rooted in Berkeley’s famous view of resemblance, which holds that “an idea can be like nothing but an idea” (Berkeley 1982, §8). Berkeley, of course, uses this to challenge the intelligibility of material substance.

2 Against Constructivism

Nietzsche’s remarks on objects are so diverse that the texts appear to support a variety of jointly inconsistent secondary readings. This chapter concerns all readings that deny that Nietzsche is a social constructivist about objects.1 My plan is to present the best evidence for each non-constructivist interpretation and argue that Nietzsche rejects them all. This should clear the ground for my constructivist interpretation, which I develop in the next chapter. What is at stake in the debate between constructivism and non-constructivism? Plenty, it seems. First, of course, there is the matter of getting Nietzsche’s view right. I am certainly in this business. Moreover, Nietzsche’s remarks on objects, I have suggested, affect his stance on other philosophical issues, perhaps most importantly nihilism. The fact that Nietzsche rejects all non-constructivist views, then, will go considerable length toward understanding his philosophical program at large.

2.1  The Texts Where should we look to find Nietzsche’s view of objects? I primarily examine Human, all-too-Human (1878) onward, including, with qualifications, Nachlaß material from 1878 onward. On my view, Nietzsche’s mature thoughts on metaphysics begin to unfold in Human, all-too-Human. A good deal of his major metaphysical commitments before that work, most prominently views offered in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense” (1873) and The Birth of Tragedy (1872), are either rejected or largely reworked in later material. Consider an early view of objects that Nietzsche comes to reject. In “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Nietzsche embraces the Kantian view that the basic nature of objects is ultimately unknowable. He writes, “The ‘thing in itself’ (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the least worth striving for” (TL 1). Beginning with Human, all-too-Human, though, Nietzsche is increasingly skeptical of the Kantian view, until it eventually becomes clear that he believes objects are perfectly knowable. An early view

18  Against Constructivism of objects that Nietzsche reworks after Human, all-too-Human occurs in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche argues that Dionysian experience of “true being and primal unity [Ur-Eine]” shows that Apollonian experience of individuated reality is mere “appearance [or illusion: Schein],” or “true non-being” (BT 18, 4). While the Dionysian and Apollonian experiences present a two-tiered ontology abandoned after The Birth of Tragedy, the idea that basic reality is undifferentiated, which seems to entail that objects ultimately do not exist, resurfaces after Human, all-too-Human—most noticeably when Nietzsche begins to develop the will to power ontology. Concentrating on Human, all-too-Human forward, then, when Nietzsche begins to purge his commitment to earlier metaphysical views about objects and redevelop others, should provide the best understanding of Nietzsche’s considered view of objecthood.2 It is also important to utilize relevant material from Nietzsche’s notebooks. Of course, a reading that relies too heavily on such material could very well misunderstand Nietzsche’s mature views.3 This moves some commentators to disregard the Nachlaß.4 Yet interpreters will easily recognize that Nietzsche’s unpublished writings contain some of his most interesting thoughts on metaphysics. Indeed, the most influential books on Nietzsche’s metaphysics strongly rely on the notebooks.5 I follow suit. Perhaps this is for the best: at least with respect to Nietzsche’s constructivism, unpublished material is not only largely consistent with published material, but unpublished writings also expound on published work in great detail.6 Why does Nietzsche shy away from publishing such details? I cannot help quoting Nietzsche’s letter to Franz Overbeck, dated July 2, 1885. “My philosophy,” he writes, “is no longer communicable, at least not in print [. . .] I often feel ashamed that I have said so much in public already, that should have never been put in front on an ‘audience’, even in more worthy and deeper times.” It could be the case that some of what exists for the public eye is not actually Nietzsche’s considered view. While I find it worthwhile to engage the Nachlaß, however, responsibility is paramount. I will therefore give priority to official work should there be a conflict between Nietzsche’s published and unpublished thoughts. This should ensure respectable scholarship while making the most out of the texts for the topic.

2.2  Constructivism and Objectivism Before turning to an examination of the non-constructivist readings of Nietzsche’s corpus, it will be helpful to elaborate on the nature of constructivism. This will provide a map for terrain to come. Constructivism about objects is a form of social constructivism. Ordinarily, it appears that something is constructed if its existence depends on intentional activity, and something is socially constructed if it is constructed by a group of intentional agents.7 Many objects are literally constructed, such as tables and chairs. Such objects are physically assembled from material parts, such as

Against Constructivism  19 legs and slabs. By arranging legs and slabs a certain way, agents bring tables into existence. In this manner, objects such as tables and chairs are causally dependent on our practices. Physical assembly involves causal dependence between agents and the material world. No one should deny that objects such as tables and chairs are socially constructed. But nearly everyone denies that objects like stars, which rest deep in the heavens, far out of reach, are socially constructed. This holds from the folk to philosophers alike. And constructivism holds that all objects are constructed. How can this be the case? Clearly, objects like stars are not physically assembled from material parts. We do not amass parts of stars, cobble them together, and literally place them into the firmament. Stars do not causally depend on agents for their existence. Rather, objects such as stars, according to the constructivist, constitutively depend on agents for their existence. The existence of stars essentially depends on determining what constitutes something’s being a star. In this sense, the constructivist claims, stars and other apparently natural objects are socially constructed.8 Let me be more specific. Object constructivism holds that all objects we can in principle encounter are socially constructed, and to say objects are socially constructed is to say that the existence conditions of objects are essentially, by which I mean constitutively, dependent on the intentional activities of human agents.9 The existence conditions of objects are essentially dependent on our activities because the identity conditions of objects are essentially dependent on our activities. To say some object exists requires saying what that object is, which is accomplished by providing some identifying information. No mere “that exists” or “something exists” will do. The intentional activities of human agents that provide identifying information are often certain kinds of descriptive representations, such as those found in the sciences.10 Object constructivism is therefore the view that the existence conditions of all objects we can in principle encounter are essentially dependent on certain kinds of descriptive representations. To illustrate, consider Scrabble jokers, the blank tiles that can be used to represent any letter of the alphabet in the game of Scrabble. For the constructivist, if a tile a is a Scrabble joker while b is not, it is because the concept fixes the conditions of identity of being a Scrabble joker such that the concept correctly applies to a but not b—perhaps, for instance, because b is not a blank tile, but has the marking “Z10.”11 Importantly, constructivism does not imply the Berkeleyan idealist view that objects have existence conditions solely by virtue of being actually represented. If existence conditions depend on actual representation, we saw in the first chapter, then it seems that if there had been no people there would have been no objects such as dinosaurs. This cannot be right. Constructivists like Kant and Nietzsche hold that objects gain conditions of existence by virtue of the possibility of being represented.12 They only deny that objects have existence conditions regardless of the possibility of being represented. Thus, it makes sense to talk about objects we have not encountered. If there

20  Against Constructivism had been no people, there would still have been the things that would be constructed by humans were they around.13 I will develop Nietzsche’s version of this view in Chapter 4. Object objectivism is the opposing view that not all objects are socially constructed. Some objects exist essentially independent of our intentional activities, typically because their identity conditions exist essentially independent of our activities.14 For the objectivist, the identity conditions of objects exist at least constitutively and perhaps, but not typically, both constitutively and conditionally independent of our activities. If conditions of identity are merely conditionally dependent on our activities, then although we must understand what that object is from some standpoint or other, which is determined by our practices, the object’s identity is not constituted by those practices.15 Grasping what objects are stars, for instance, might require us to be in some cognitive relation to the heavens, but objectivists hold that such a relation does not constitute what objects are stars. Stars exist and have certain conditions of identity regardless of how we represent them. Our descriptions should then aim to represent the object as it is. Objectivists who maintain that the identity conditions of objects exist both constitutively and conditionally independent of our practices embrace the existence of what I call noumenal objects. Noumenal objects are objects in principle inaccessible to human beings, such as Kantian things in themselves.16 We have seen that Nietzsche rejects the existence of such objects. Whether objectivists believe the identity conditions of objects exist only constitutively independent of our practices, or both constitutively and conditionally independent of our practices, objectivism holds that objects have some identifying features that in no way depend on our practices, while constructivism denies that objects have such features. This is the fundamental difference between the two positions. Roughly, objectivists separate metaphysics from epistemology by claiming that the existence of objects does not depend on how we cognize them. Constructivists reject the separation by claiming that the existence of objects does depend on how we cognize them. I now consider the first non-constructivist reading of Nietzsche’s texts, which, it will emerge, firmly embraces objectivism.

2.3  Commonsense Realism Nietzsche often writes about objects in a way that assumes that they are nothing out of the ordinary.17 Ordinary objects are roughly objects belonging to kinds whose instances we recognize in everyday experience, such as tree, dog, and star, and which are commonly thought to have a nature whatever we may believe or say about them. This provides grounds for thinking that Nietzsche supports the commonsense realist view that objects are ordinary entities that exist independently of our representations of them. Commonsense realism could be motivated simply by the fact that Nietzsche does not really care about questions concerning the nature of objects. The passages that reference

Against Constructivism  21 ordinary objects usually target some issue outside material object metaphysics, such as the selective nature of human perception, the kinds of presuppositions our mode of cognition forces us to make, or the ways in which our preferences or values are shaped by the way in which we see things. Such passages appear to assume the existence of ordinary objects. Here are two examples: Just as little do we see a tree exactly and completely with reference to leaves, twigs, color, and form; it is so very much easier for us simply to improvise some approximation of a tree. (BGE 192) He, for instance, who did not know how to find “identity” often enough, both with regard to nourishment and to hostile animals—[. . .] had a slighter probability of survival than he who in all cases of similarity immediately guessed that they were identical. (GS 111) Commonsense realism could also be motivated more systematically. Clark (1990) provides one such defense, and Clark’s view is generally backed by Leiter (1994), (2002). Clark’s reading follows from her developmental interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of truth. She argues that between the publication of Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On The Genealogy of Morality (1887) Nietzsche rejects his early commitment to the falsification thesis that all our beliefs are false—a thesis that depends on the position that we cannot know anything about the objects that give rise to perceptual states, but only the perceptual states themselves—and comes to hold that we can have true beliefs about the objects of experience. The later Nietzsche accepts a “minimal correspondence theory” of truth according to which true beliefs correspond to objects of experience that exist “independently of our representations of [them]” (Clark 1990, 40). This ontological commitment concerning independence lies at the heart of commonsense realism. Clark’s argument can be reconstructed as follows: (CR1) Truth exists. (CR2) Truth is a correspondence relation between our beliefs and objects of experience that exist independently of our representations of them. (CR3) If so, objects of experience exist independently of our representations of them. (CR4) So, objects of experience exist independently of our representations of them. Clark establishes CR1 by showing that Nietzsche comes to reject the falsification thesis. CR2 appears justified because Nietzsche endorses a “series of truisms” associated with the minimal correspondence theory of truth:

22  Against Constructivism The conception of truth I attribute to Nietzsche certainly does not count as a “theory” in a very strong sense. It consists merely in a number of connected assertions about truth which I find implicit in Nietzsche’s later works as well as in our ordinary beliefs about truth. In Austin’s words, this common sense “theory of truth” is a series of truisms. (Clark 1990, 40) This provides reason to uphold CR3. If the minimal correspondence theory is based on truisms, it should not be denied that objects exist independently of our representations of them. If CR1–CR3 are true, commonsense realism follows. As I see it, Nietzsche rejects commonsense realism by way of rejecting CR2. CR2 implies object objectivism. Indeed, Clark writes that, on Nietzsche’s account, “the world exists independently of our representations of it” (Clark 1990, 40), such that objects exist “ontologically [. . .] distinct from knowers and their representations” (Clark 1990, 45). For Nietzsche, Clark claims, an object has “existence in itself” but not an “essence in itself” (Clark 1990, 136). An object with an “essence in itself” has “an essence or nature that is independent of what it can appear to be [viz., a thing in itself],” whereas an object with “existence in itself” is just an “independently existing thing” (Clark 1990, 136–7, brackets added). For Clark, Nietzsche’s assertion that “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’ ” (GM III: 12) in part means that making claims about independently existing objects depends on our perspectival practices. In my terminology, the commonsense realist reading unfolds as follows. Nietzsche rejects the constructivist view that the identity conditions of objects are constitutively dependent on our representations of them. He also denies the objectivist position that the identity conditions of objects exist both conditionally and constitutively independent of our mode of cognition. Instead, Nietzsche accepts the objectivist view that the identity conditions of objects are conditionally dependent on our intentional activities. For the commonsense realist, Nietzsche’s view of truth assumes this version of objectivism. Clark’s argument for commonsense realism can be reformulated to show this specification: (CR1′) Truth exists. (CR2′) Truth is a correspondence relation between our beliefs and objects of experience that exist constitutively independent of our representations of them. (CR3′) If so, objects of experience exist constitutively independent of our representations of them. (CR4′) So, objects of experience exist constitutively independent of our representations of them. My anticipated response should be clear: I will argue that Nietzsche is a constructivist, so he rejects CR2′. On my view, Nietzsche is no objectivist about ordinary objects.

Against Constructivism  23 Leiter also embraces the commonsense realist reading. He advances the view in language I prefer: [H]uman interests are conditions of anything being true and knowable (whereas the metaphysical realist [viz., the Kantian] would have truth transcend all human interests). And crude idealism is avoided because: interests are only conditions of our knowledge of objects; hence particular interests are not constitutive of objects . . . In that sense, [the object] remains an independent object. Yet it is not—and this is the key point—a transcendent object, a thing-in-itself. For the thing-in-itself is the thing that would transcend all possible perspectives on it. (Leiter 1994, 350, brackets added) For Leiter, Nietzsche rejects constructivism and Kantian objectivism in favor of a mild objectivism. Now, one might argue that Leiter later abandons this view. In his seminal book on Nietzsche, he says, “What is necessary is that the affects also play a constitutive role in knowledge” (Leiter 2002, 273), where affects are interest-relative. This seems to be in tension with the view that objects exist constitutively independent of our interests. But Leiter continues: So just as seeing an object from a certain angle plays a constitutive role in what is seen (you see the front of the door, but not the back, because you are standing outside), so too interests or affects play a constitutive role in knowledge: you come to know about the aspects of the phenomena in question that answer to your particular interests and desires. (Leiter 2002, 273) Our interests do not determine the conditions of identity of objects. Rather, our interests constitute which features of objects with determinate identity conditions we come to know. Leiter asserts that an object “has a determinate character that transcends any particular perspective we adopt on it” (Leiter 2002, 20, cf. 1994, 334). This version of the argument for commonsense realism can be reconstructed as follows: (CR1′′) Knowledge exists. (CR2′′) Knowledge claims name objects of experience that exist constitutively independent of our representations of them. (CR3′′) If so, objects of experience exist constitutively independent of our representations of them. (CR4′′) So, objects of experience exist constitutively independent of our representations of them.

24  Against Constructivism Leiter supports CR1′′ by appeal to Clark’s work and, among other passages, GM III: 12 (see Leiter 2002: 13–21). CR2′′ is motivated by considerations just described. CR3′′ seems uncontroversial if we accept CR2′′. If CR1′′– CR3′′ are true, commonsense realism follows. The plausibility that Nietzsche is a commonsense realist turns on whether he is a non-Kantian objectivist about material objects—whether he rejects noumenal objects and accepts that the objects of experience are conditionally dependent on us. In the following chapter, I argue that he is not sympathetic to such a view. The texts do not show that truth claims and knowledge claims about the world in experience concern objects that exist constitutively independent of us. If the argument I propose is sound, then both CR2′ and CR2′′ are false. If Nietzsche denies that the objects of experience are constitutively independent of our representations of them, while remaining committed to the existence of truth and knowledge, he must reject that truth is a correspondence relation between our beliefs and constitutively mind-independent objects, and he must reject that knowledge claims name such objects.18 The burden is squarely on my account, then, to show that Nietzsche is a committed constructivist about the objects of experience. And, at least at first glance, this is not too difficult a burden to bear. I find no passage in Nietzsche which claims that objects exist ontologically independent of our practices—notice that even readers who sustain the commonsense realist interpretation never point to any such passages—whereas there are numerous passages that support ontological commitments central to constructivism. I bring these passages together in the next chapter. The last commentator to examine who appears sympathetic with commonsense realism is Poellner (1995, 79–111). Unfortunately, his reading is ambiguous. A chief contention made by Poellner is that for Nietzsche “ ‘­values’ (interests, concerns) are a condition of the possibility of objective reality” (Poellner 1995, 102, see also 108, 92 note 24). This claim could be sustained from either a constructivist or commonsense realist standpoint. Perhaps, as the constructivist argues, Nietzsche believes that values, interests, and concerns are a condition of the possibility of objective reality because we play an essential role in constituting reality. Or perhaps, as the commonsense realist argues, Nietzsche holds that values, interests, and concerns are a condition of the possibility of objective reality because objective reality requires being cognized as such. Either reading would warrant Poellner’s claim. This ambiguity makes it difficult to pin down Poellner’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics. Poellner sometimes thinks Nietzsche believes that objects are constitutively dependent on something about us. He writes, “In Nietzsche’s writings, there are many passages in which he suggests that the very notion of a subject-independent entity having properties or ‘structure’ in itself is incoherent” (Poellner 1995, 80). This lends support to the constructivist view that the identifying properties of objects depend essentially on subjects. But the passage occurs early in the chapter, and when summarizing his discussion later Poellner weakens the relation between

Against Constructivism  25 subjects and properties in such a way that supports commonsense realism. He claims to be explicating “the general Nietzschean (and idealist) claim that all conceivable objects have subject-implying properties and that, therefore, it is ‘absurd’ to suggest that there might be objects which are not objects for some subject” (Poellner 1995, 85). The view that objects have subjectimplying properties is perfectly consistent with the commonsense realist position that objects are merely conditionally dependent on us. Moreover, the fact that objects have such properties does not entail the constructivist view that subjects constitute which properties objects have. As a result, I am unsure how to categorize Poellner’s interpretation. Fortunately, this does not matter: if he takes Nietzsche to be a commonsense realist, my criticisms apply. And if he regards Nietzsche as a constructivist, so much the better!19 Here are some important final remarks. The commonsense realist reading secures what many readers want Nietzsche to believe: ordinary objects exist. Does the constructivist reject this commitment? Not at all. Since constructivism holds that we bring objects into existence, ordinary objects, which we commonly take to exist, most definitely exist. The constructivist just denies that ordinary objects have conditions of identity separate from our practical engagements with the world. Since Nietzsche is a constructivist, he cannot be a commonsense realist—but he can accept with open arms the existence of objects that answer to kinds of things we ordinarily take to exist.

2.4  Object Eliminativism Although many passages in Nietzsche’s texts assume objects are ordinary entities, others deny the existence of objects altogether. Consider the following: Continual transition forbids us to speak of “individuals.” (KSA 11:36[23]) No things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta. (KSA 13:14[79]) Such erroneous articles of faith [. . .] are for example [. . .] that there are things. (GS 110) These passages suggest that Nietzsche embraces eliminativism, the position that no objects exist—no trees, tables, dogs, and so on. Two distinct eliminativist views of objects can be found in Nietzsche’s corpus. The first, which I call object eliminativism, holds that there are no objects because there are only bundles of forces. On this view, bundles of forces cannot be objects. Nola (1999, 93, cf. 1987, 552–567) formulates Nietzsche’s argument for

26  Against Constructivism object eliminativism as follows (note that a “nexus of force-power” is just a bundle of forces): (OE1) All objects are substances, or are bits of substantive matter, with identity conditions. (OE2) Anything which is a nexus of force-power (NFP) has no identity conditions. (OE3) So, an NFP cannot be a substance, or substantive matter. (OE4). The only thing which exists is the total set of NFPs. (OE5) So, there are no substances or bits of substantive matter with identity conditions. (OE6) So, there are no objects. Many commentators find some form of this argument compelling.20 The relevant premises to examine are OE1, OE2, and OE4. Nola justifies OE4 by accepting Nietzsche’s will to power ontology—the view that the world is “ ‘will to power’ and nothing else” (BGE 36), which means that the world is comprised of bundles of forces. I will grant this for now and set it aside. Nola does not explain why Nietzsche accepts OE1. Nonetheless, it can be surmised that, assuming Nola’s claim that objects are “substances” means that objects are “bits of substantive matter,” OE1 aligns with Nietzsche’s nominalist tendency to think all objects are concrete entities. Nola argues that Nietzsche embraces OE2 because if the world is will to power, then it consists of “nexuses of force-power (NFPs),” or bundles of forces, which implies that “nothing has any continuing identity” (Nola 1999, 93). This challenges diachronic identity. But the wording of OE2 challenges any conditions of identity. It then seems best to interpret Nola as saying that since there is no definite structure to the world, not only do objects not have a particular identity over time, objects have no conditions of identity at all. Nola cites Nietzsche in support of OE2: “Continual transition forbids us to speak of ‘individuals’ etc.: the ‘number’ of beings is itself in flux” (KSA 11:36[23]). Presumably, ‘individuals’ and ‘number’ are scare-quoted because Nietzsche denies that objects exist. If OE1-OE5 are true, object eliminativism follows. My response is that the passage Nola cites on his behalf does not, in fact, support object eliminativism. For starters, Nietzsche’s claim that “the ‘number’ of beings is itself in flux” appears to assume that “beings,” which are objects, exist in a world of bundles of forces, though their relation to ‘number’ is up for grabs—Nietzsche scare-quotes ‘number’, not ‘beings’.21 To assess Nietzsche’s claim about “individuals,” consider more of the passage: The principle of identity has as its background the “appearance” that things are the same. A world of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be “grasped” or “known”; only to the extent that the “grasping” and “knowing” intellect encounters a coarse, already created world [. . .] is there anything like “knowledge.” (KSA 11:36[23])22

Against Constructivism  27 A “world in a state of becoming,” or what Nola regards as a world of bundles of forces, cannot be “known” if knowledge requires a world that is not “already created.” A “created” world is one where the way things are depends on us. It is then reasonable to suppose that “continual transition” only “forbids us to speak of ‘individuals’ ” that exist apart from our activities. Nietzsche also suggests that we can apply “the principle of identity” that “things are the same” if that principle refers to entities within an “already created world.” Hence, it appears that “individuals” can indeed have identity conditions within a world of bundles of forces if such conditions depend on our activities. In the following chapter, I explain Nietzsche’s argument for this view. Regardless, the passage does not support OE2, the claim that bundles of forces have no identity conditions—and, to my knowledge, no other passage does. As a result, Nietzsche is not committed to the object eliminativist conclusion in OE6. What about other passages in Nietzsche’s corpus that appear to advance object eliminativism? Nietzsche says, for instance, “no things [Dinge] remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta,” and this is “the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge” (KSA 13:14[79]). Arguably, Nietzsche denies the existence of objects in favor of interacting bundles of forces. But there is good reason to resist this conclusion. Nietzsche gives a telling title to the passage: “Quanta of Power: Critique of Mechanistic Theory.” This sets the context for the quote that seems to support object eliminativism. He writes, The mechanistic world is imagined the only way that eye and fingertips can imagine a world (as “being moved”) in such a way that it can be calculated—that unities are invented, in such a way that causal unities are invented, “things” (atoms) whose effect remains constant (—the false concept of subject is transferred to the concept of the atom) [. . .] If we eliminate these ingredients, no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta. (brackets added) It is clear that Nietzsche does not deny objects altogether. Rather, he thinks the existence of force supplants the existence of atoms, or hard, extended pieces of matter thought to comprise the fundamental nature of reality. This supports a different reading of Nietzsche’s view of objects, one in which Nietzsche does not reject objects by virtue of thinking only bundles of forces exist, but reconceives objects as particular kinds of bundles of forces. Hence, the passage does not justify object eliminativism. Two further passages could be used to support the eliminativist conclusion that no objects exist, though neither explicitly depends on the truth of the will to power ontology. The first occurs in The Gay Science. Nietzsche writes: Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors; some of them turned out to be useful and species-preserving [. . .]

28  Against Constructivism Such erroneous articles of faith, which were passed on by inheritance further and further, and finally almost became part of the basic endowment of the species, are for example: that there are enduring things, that there are identical things; that there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be. (GS 110, italics added) This is perhaps the best showing of eliminativism in the published corpus. Nietzsche says the view “that there are things” is an error. Unfortunately, Nietzsche provides no immediate justification for his claim that objects do not exist, and thus, he leaves it to readers to puzzle it out. The passages just before and after GS 110 suggest that Nietzsche denies the existence of objects because he believes there is no definite structure to the world. In GS 109, he remarks, “The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos [. . .] in the sense of [. . .] a lack of order” (italics added). GS 111 reports, “the beings who did not see things exactly had a head start over those who saw everything ‘in a flux’ ” (italics added). And in GS 112, Nietzsche writes, “We have uncovered a diverse succession where the naïve man and investigator of older cultures saw only two different things, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, as they said; we have perfected the picture of becoming” (italics added). It certainly seems like there must be some definite structure to the world for objects to exist. According to the eliminativist, though, Nietzsche denies that the world has any such structure. The world is said to be “chaos,” “flux,” or “becoming,” terms used more or less interchangeably. Lack of structure can be attributed to the nature of bundles of forces. For Nietzsche, forces are always in tension, and wholesale tension seems to render impossible the formation of any definite structure. On the eliminativist reading, then, Nietzsche’s ontology is incompatible with the existence of objects. Objects are merely “erroneous articles of faith.” I think the eliminativist reading of GS 110 should be discarded. First, in The Gay Science Nietzsche claims that the nature and existence of objects depends on our constructive activities. This is introduced in GS 57: [Y]ou call yourself realists and insinuate that the world really is the way it appears to you: before you alone reality stands unveiled [. . .] You still carry around the valuations of things that originate in the passions and loves of former centuries! [. . .] Your love of “reality,” for example—oh, that is an old, ancient “love”! In every experience, in every sense impression there is a piece of this old love; and some fantasy, some prejudice, some irrationality, some ignorance, some fear, and whatever else, has worked on and contributed to it. That mountain there! That cloud over there! What is “real” about that? Subtract just once the phantasm and the whole human contribution from it, you sober ones! Yes, if you could do that! If you could forget your background, your past, your nursery school—all of your humanity and animality! There is no “reality” for us—and not for you either, you sober ones—.

Against Constructivism  29 The “realists” who believe they have access to a fully mind-independent world—a world in which “reality stands unveiled”—are mistaken. We “carry around the valuations of things [. . .] of former centuries” in “every experience,” Nietzsche proclaims, such that one cannot “subtract” the “human contribution” without denying reality altogether. The nature of reality is therefore conditioned by the ways our predecessors interpreted and valued the world, which we have inherited. Nietzsche follows GS 57 by endorsing constructivism. Here is the passage: Only as creators!—This has caused me the greatest trouble and still does always cause me the greatest trouble: to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing—originally almost always something mistaken and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and quite foreign to their nature and even to their skin—has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its essence. What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as “real,” so-called “reality”! Only as creators can we destroy!—But let us also not forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new “things.” (GS 58) This may strike readers as rejecting constructivism, not endorsing it. Nietzsche indicates that “what things are called” is distinct from “what they are.” Names are “thrown over things like a dress” and therefore “quite foreign” to an object’s “nature” and “skin.” Nietzsche seems to think objects have a nature prior to, and thus independent of, our representational activities. This reading, however, cannot be correct. Nietzsche proclaims: “What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as ‘real’, so-called ‘reality’!” It is foolish to attempt to point to the world prior to human engagement in order to “destroy” the world that humans have created. Why? Our engagements construct reality. The world humans have created is the real world. Hence, “Only as creators can we destroy!” There is no destroying the constructed world by appeal to some non-constructed world. We can only destroy the constructed world by constructing another world.23 The proclamation that destruction requires creation makes sense only if existents are constitutively dependent on us. Bringing objects into existence cannot bring other objects out of existence, for example, if objects have a nature constitutively independent of us.

30  Against Constructivism The real world is therefore not only conditioned by our interpretations and valuations, as Nietzsche explains in GS 57, but also constructed by our interpretations and valuations, as Nietzsche concludes in GS 58. From “generation to generation,” our interpretations and valuations, which determine the “reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing,” have “[grown] onto and into” objects to become their very “essence.” It is even “enough to create new names and valuations,” Nietzsche announces, to “create new ‘things’. ”24 Human practices can constitute reality, specifically the nature and existence of objects. This point is reinforced later in The Gay Science. Nietzsche writes: It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make something that is not yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. This poem that we have invented is constantly internalized, drilled, translated into flesh and reality [. . .] by the so-called practical human beings (our actors). (GS 301, last emphasis added) The takeaway is that our practical activities clearly contribute to constituting reality. This provides even more evidence for the view that Nietzsche endorses constructivism in The Gay Science. Return to the issue at hand, namely, whether we should accept an eliminativist reading of GS 110. It is imperative to keep in mind GS 57, 58, and 301 when interpreting GS 110. In GS 110, Nietzsche explains that “since time immemorial” our intellect “passed on by inheritance” advantageous interpretive judgments that turned out to be “errors.” We are considering the error “that there are things.” Given the information provided in GS 57, 58, and 301, this does not seem to be the error that we interpret objects to exist, but in reality no objects exist. For Nietzsche, human interpretation is not just a necessary condition for revealing reality, but the very nature and existence of objects actually depends on our interpretive activities. It seems that Nietzsche must have in mind some other error. What could it be? The errors Nietzsche lists are these: “that there are enduring things; that there are identical things; that there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be.” The first claim (“that there are enduring things”) names a kind of object. The second (“that there are identical things”) names another kind of object. And the third (“that there are things, kinds of material, bodies”), I submit, names a further kind of object: an object thought to be fundamentally material. It is not a coincidence that Nietzsche links objecthood, materiality, and body. After he reports that it is an error to believe “that there are things, kinds of material, bodies,” he adds that it is an error to believe “that a thing is what it appears to be” (GS 110). On my reading, Nietzsche holds that it is a mistake to assume that the appearance that objects are fundamentally material implies that objects are

Against Constructivism  31 this way. In the passage immediately preceding GS 110, Nietzsche asserts that “matter is as much of an error as the god of the Eleatics” (GS 109). The “god of the Eleatics,” most famously Parmenides, is constituted by whatever is existentially fundamental. Consequently, the idea that “matter is as much of an error as the god of the Eleatics” indicates that it is a mistake to think objects are fundamentally material. Nietzsche arrives at this conclusion concerning material reality for naturalist reasons. In GS 109, he asks, “When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” Nietzsche takes modern science to show that, at the fundamental level, reality consists in forces, not material bodies. This shows the influence of mathematician and physicist Roger Boscovich. In a letter written to Peter Gast on March 20, 1882, when Nietzsche was preparing The Gay Science to be published later that year, he claims, “With effect from [Boscovich] there is no ‘matter’ any more—except as a source of popular relief. [Boscovich] has thought the atomistic doctrine through to the end.” Boscovich, who anticipates developments in modern point particle physics, contends that non-extended physical force-points are the ultimate constituents of matter. The relative positions and velocities of force-points, Boscovich claims, together with a complex law of force, can account for all properties of matter. He remarks, “it will be found that everything depends on the composition of the forces with which these particles of matter act upon one another: and from these forces, as a matter of fact, all phenomena of Nature take their origin” (Boscovich 1922, 6). Boscovich contends that within Newtonian physics, contact between two extended spheres moving at different velocities is impossible without violating the law of continuity, which holds that changes in velocity happen continuously. To avoid interpenetration, contact between the spheres would require velocities to change both instantaneously and discontinuously, which is impossible. Boscovich hypothesizes that changes in velocity between spheres are due to repulsive forces acting at small distances between the spheres. This requires force-points to be fundamental. Trust in Boscovich provides Nietzsche with a naturalist motivation to reject fundamentally material objects.25 Boscovich provides Nietzsche with a “newly discovered, newly redeemed nature” (GS 109), and Boscovich helps explain why Nietzsche asserts that the world is “chaos,” “flux,” or “becoming.” Given this evidence, the error “that there are things, kinds of material, bodies” is not that the error that we fail to understand that objects do not exist. The error is that, despite appearances, we fail to understand what modern science delivers, which is that no fundamentally material objects exist. Moreover, despite the fact that we think the world is comprised of fundamentally material objects, we cannot bring such objects into existence. Boscovich has shown this to be impossible. Naturalism provides constraints on what can be constructed. An eliminativist reading of GS 110 is then implausible: Nietzsche denies

32  Against Constructivism the existence of a certain kind of object, but not objects altogether. For Nietzsche, the world exists in a state of “chaos,” “flux,” or “becoming,” and objects are constructed within such a world. In Twilight of the Idols, we find one last route to object eliminativism. This route does not hold that objects do not exist because there are only bundles of forces. But it does hold that objects do not exist. Nietzsche says: [The senses] do not lie at all. What we make of their evidence is what gives rise to the lie, for example the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood [Dinglichkeit26], of substance, of duration. “Reason” is what causes us to falsify the evidence of the senses. (TI “Reason” 2, translation modified) precisely insofar as the prejudice called “reason” compels us to establish unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, thinghood [Dinglichkeit], Being—we see ourselves to a certain extent tangled up in error, forced into error. (TI “Reason” 5, translation modified) In both passages, Nietzsche says “ ‘reason’ ” causes “the lie of thinghood,” or the error that objects exist. “Reason” is contrasted with evidence from the “senses.” Nietzsche identifies “reason” with “the metaphysics of language”: Language is assigned by its emergence to the time of the most rudimentary form of psychology: we become involved in a crude fetishism when we make ourselves conscious of the basic premises of the metaphysics of language, in plain words, of reason. (TI “Reason” 5) For Nietzsche, the “most rudimentary form of psychology” embedded in the “metaphysics of language” is that the subject-predicate structure of language leads us to think that the world is comprised of fundamentally unchanging objects (subjects) that persist through different phases (predicates) (see also GM I: 13). “The senses,” Nietzsche writes, show “becoming, passing away, change,” and “the senses do not lie” (TI “Reason” 2). Sense evidence substantiates the view that there are no unchanging, permanent objects, whereas the structure of our language conditions us otherwise. Nietzsche scare-quotes ‘reason’ when he claims that reason leads to thinghood, then, because in light of information provided by the senses, it is unreasonable to think the subject-predicate structure of our language tracks the way the world is. Thus, Nietzsche does not reject objects altogether, but only a certain kind of object, namely, objects thought to have fundamentally unchanging natures. Twilight of the Idols, then, does not contain evidence for object eliminativism.27

Against Constructivism  33

2.5  Subject Eliminativism The other form of eliminativism that appears in Nietzsche’s texts is subject eliminativism. This view holds that there are no objects because there are no subjects. On this account, subjects must exist for objects to exist. Consider the following passages, which I letter for bookkeeping purposes: (A) Let us [. . .] contemplate the problem of error [. . .] This is what sees doer and deed everywhere: it believes [. . .] in the I as substance, and projects the belief in the I-substance onto all things—only then does it create the concept “thing” (TI “Reason” 5). (B) When one has grasped that the “subject” is not something that creates effects, but only a fiction, much follows. It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensation. If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then belief also disappears in effective things, in reciprocation, cause and effect between those phenomena that we call things (KSA 12:9[91]). (C) And as for the I! It has become a fable, a fiction [. . .] The thing itself, to say it again, the concept of a thing: just a reflection of the belief in the I as cause (TI “Errors” 3, emphasis added). A prominent theme seems to be that subjects do not exist and, consequently, objects do not exist. The basic argument for subject eliminativism can be reconstructed as follows: (SE1) Subjects do not exist. (SE2) If so, objects do not exist. (SE3) So, objects do not exist. This argument can take different forms depending on Nietzsche’s understanding of the subject. In what follows, I consider how each of the passages above (A–C) might justify the premises of the argument for subject eliminativism. It will emerge that no passage warrants the subject eliminativist conclusion. In (A), Nietzsche maintains that it is an error to understand the subject as a substance. In an earlier work, he describes substance as something that is “in its own essence something identical with itself, thus self-existent and at bottom always the same and unchanging” (HH I: 18). A substance is that which is ontologically distinct from other things and identified by a substrate of permanent properties. Nietzsche claims that substances do not exist because reality is wholly dynamic: “there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; the ‘doer’ is merely a fiction

34  Against Constructivism added to the deed—the deed is everything” (GM I: 13). Accordingly, SE1 might be read as the claim that subjects conceived as substances do not exist, which is justified by the existence of a dynamic ontology. Nietzsche explains that our naïve trust in folk psychology draws us into believing otherwise, however, and this mistakenly leads us to posit the existence of objects. “Belief in the I-substance” is projected “onto all things,” and “only then” do we “create the concept ‘thing’ ” (TI “Reason” 5, first emphasis added). So, it appears that if subjects do not exist, neither do objects. This justifies SE2. And if SE1–SE2 are true, subject eliminativism follows. But it would be too hasty to conclude that objects do not exist, simpliciter. On the current reading of SE1–SE2, the kind of object projected to exist would most likely be an object conceived as a substance. On Nietzsche’s view, substances do not exist. It is an error to believe “there are enduring things” and “there are identical things,” both of which refer to objects conceived as substances (GS 110). Moreover, as we have seen, it appears that numerous passages in Nietzsche’s texts assume objects exist in a nonsubstantial manner. Therefore, justifying SE1–SE2 on the interpretation of the subject as substance, which is Nietzsche’s target in (A), will not guarantee that no objects exist. In (B) and (C), Nietzsche appears to reject objects by way of rejecting the subject conceived as a causally efficacious entity.28 In (B) he writes, “If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then belief also disappears in effective things” (KSA 12:9[91]); and in (C) he says, “The thing itself, to say it again, the concept of a thing: just a reflection of the belief in the I as cause” (TI “Errors” 3). This suggests that we read SE1 as the claim that subjects conceived as causally efficacious entities do not exist. It is not immediately clear why Nietzsche thinks this is justified. The answer emerges once we examine the kind of object Nietzsche believes is projected onto the world as a consequence of our belief in the subject as a causally efficacious entity. Passage (B) continues: [If we no longer believe in the effective subject] There also disappears, of course, the world of effective atoms: the assumption of which always depended on the supposition that one needed subjects. At last, the “thing-in-itself” also disappears, because this is fundamentally the conception of a “subject-in-itself.” (KSA 12:9[91]) When we reject the subject conceived as a causally efficacious entity, not only do we reject objects, but also atoms and things in themselves. Belief in the subject as cause then leads to belief in objects, atoms, and things in themselves. Nietzsche reiterates this point in (C): [T]he things [man] believed most firmly—the will, the mind, the I— were projected out of himself: he derived the concept of Being from the

Against Constructivism  35 concept of the I, and posited the existence of “things” after his own image, after his concept of the I as cause [. . .] The thing itself, to say it again, the concept of a thing: just a reflection of the belief in the I as cause. . . and even your atom, my dear mechanicians and physicists, how much error, how much rudimentary psychology still remains in your atom! Not to speak of the “thing in itself,” the horrendum pudendum of the metaphysicians! The error of confusing the mind as cause with reality! (TI “Errors” 3) Again, belief in the subject as a causal entity leads to belief in objects, atoms, and things in themselves. Thus, Nietzsche must think all three entities have something in common. What they have in common, I submit, is that they are all conceived on the model of a substance. Here is the evidence. In (C), Nietzsche suggests that belief in the subject as a causal entity leads to belief in Being, and belief in Being is inherently intertwined with belief in objects, atoms, and things in themselves. A few sections earlier, Nietzsche equates Being and substance. He proclaims, “This is what sees doer and deed everywhere: [. . .] it believes in the ‘I’, in the I as Being, in the I as substance, and projects the belief in the I-substance onto all things [. . .] Being is thought in, foisted in everywhere as cause” (TI “­Reason” 5). Nietzsche uses “I as Being” and “I-substance” interchangeably, presumably because both refer to a permanent realm ontologically independent of other phenomena. Belief in objects, atoms, and things in themselves is then based on belief in substance. And in (B), after Nietzsche reports that belief in the subject leads to belief in objects, atoms, and things in themselves, he writes: If we give up the effective subject, we also give up the object upon which effects are produced. Duration, identity with itself, being, are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called object: they are complexes of events which appear to have duration in relation to other complexes. (KSA 12:9[91]) Failure to exhibit “duration, identity with itself, [and] being” means that both subjects and objects fail to be substances. Indeed, Nietzsche goes on to announce that “If we give up the concept ‘subject’ and ‘object’, then [we also give up] the concept ‘substance’ ” (KSA 12:9[91]). So, in (B) and (C), Nietzsche conjoins the idea of a subject conceived as a causally efficacious entity with the idea of a subject understood as a substance. On this reading, SE1, the premise that subjects do not exist, would hold that subjects ontologically independent of their effective thoughts and actions do not exist.29 Nietzsche believes this reading of SE1 is warranted because he rejects substance. But on this account there is no reason to think

36  Against Constructivism no objects exist—only that no objects conceived as substances exist. Hence, this reading will not establish the intended subject eliminativist conclusion that objects do not exist. There is one final path to subject eliminativism. One could maintain that Nietzsche accepts Kant’s view that the existence of objects depends on the existence of unified subjects but that Nietzsche denies the existence of such subjects. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that all objects we can encounter in experience are by their very nature something represented, and coherently representing objects requires a threefold synthesis. Briefly, we must apprehend sensory impressions in time, reproduce past impressions with current impressions, and apply concepts to those impressions to represent objects.30 This synthesis requires a unified self. If no such self existed, then we would not be able to represent the diverse array of apprehended and remembered sensations as comprising an object. One might then argue that Nietzsche, influenced by themes in Kant, holds that if objects exist, then unified subjects exist. This is one (logically equivalent) way to interpret SE2, the premise which holds that if no subjects exist, then no objects exist. SE1 would then claim that Nietzsche, rejecting a key premise of Kant’s view, denies that unified subjects exist. This would entail that no objects exist.31 Does Nietzsche accept this reading of SE1? That is, does he deny the existence of unified subjects? He certainly appears to. Nietzsche regards human beings as a multiplicity, specifically a “social structure of the drives and affects” (BGE 12). Drives and affects produce inclinations and aversions that determine thought and behavior.32 Nietzsche asks, “Is it necessary to posit the interpreter behind the interpretation?” and answers, “Even that is a fiction, hypothesis” (KSA 12:7[60]). It seems that there is no subject among the inclinations and aversions. But this conclusion is not cut and dried. At times, Nietzsche lets on that subjects have control over drives and affects in such a manner that assumes the existence of a subject distinct from them. For instance, he explains that being “noble” is in part the ability to have and not to have one’s affects, one’s pro and con; to condescend to them, for a few hours; to seat oneself on them as on a horse, often as on an ass—for one must know how to make use of their stupidity as much as of their fire. (BGE 284)33 The idea that one can “condescend” to one’s “affects,” or “seat oneself on them,” suggests that Nietzsche does not consistently reject the unified subject. If so, what does Nietzsche reject when he offers his conception of the self as a multiplicity? His chief complaint is that there is no unified subject underlying drives and affects. That is, there is no subject conceived as a substance. He notes:

Against Constructivism  37 The subject: this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality [. . .] the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum. (KSA 12:20[19], emphasis added)34 Nietzsche rejects the idea that drives and affects have a substantial ground. Those who believe that the subject is a substance often hold that, “ ‘I’ is the condition, ‘think’ is the predicate and conditioned—thinking is an activity to which thought must supply a subject as cause” (BGE 54). The idea that “ ‘there is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks’, ” Nietzsche says, “means positing as ‘true a priori’ our belief in the concept of ­substance—” (KSA 12:10[158]). Nietzsche’s claim that the subject is a multiplicity is meant to be incompatible with the claim that the subject is a substance. Nietzsche rejects the Kantian idea that it is an a priori truth that the subject is a unified entity. This does not mean that Nietzsche rejects the existence of unified subjects altogether. In fact, he offers an alternative view of a unified self. Against a tradition that has adopted the substantial view of the subject, Nietzsche comments “One tried with admirable perseverance and cunning to get out of this net—and asked whether the opposite might not be the case: ‘think’ the condition, ‘I’ the conditioned; ‘I’ in that case only a synthesis which is made by thinking” (BGE 54). The position that the “I” is a “synthesis which is made by thinking” begins to reveal Nietzsche’s positive conception of the subject. The notes are nice and direct: “What separates me most deeply from the metaphysicians is: I don’t concede that the ‘I’ is what thinks. Instead, I take the I itself to be a construction of thinking” (KSA 11:35[35]). While metaphysicians are committed to the subject as substance, Nietzsche thinks the subject is a “construction” of thought. A unified subject is constructed. A unified self—what might be called a genuine self—is a human being that (at least) constructs a functionally coordinated hierarchy of drives and affects.35 Nietzsche thinks most human beings are nothing more than a diversity of competing tendencies and affective orientations, and as a result most only exist as parts of selves: “When my eyes flee from the now to the past they always find the same: fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents—but no men” (Z II: “Redemption,” see also KSA 12:10[59]). To be a subject, our natural tendencies and affective orientations, which often compel thought and behavior in conflicting manners, must form a coherent organization. Human beings must “create and carry together into One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident” (Z II: “Redemption”). So, although Nietzsche believes we are not justified in saying that is it true a priori that the self is a unified entity, we are justified in saying that it is true a posteriori that some human beings have gained genuine selves. Hence, he denies the general claim made in SE1 that no unified subjects exist.

38  Against Constructivism Nietzsche also rejects the Kantian interpretation of SE2, which holds that if objects exist, then unified subjects exist. On Nietzsche’s account, this reading would imply that objects do not exist if not represented by unified subjects. On my reading, however, Nietzsche thinks the human being itself, conceived as a multiplicity, is perfectly capable of coherently representing objects. For Nietzsche, objects come into existence by virtue of the application of descriptive representations. This process only requires that human beings are conscious, and Nietzsche thinks the mark of consciousness is a conceptual vocabulary. He proclaims, “the development of language and the development of consciousness go hand in hand” (GS 354). Objects exist because human beings can represent experience conceptually, regardless of whether human beings are unified entities.36 Let me summarize. I have contended that there is no way to justify the premises of the subject eliminativist argument in a manner that is both consistent with Nietzsche’s texts and entails the conclusion that no objects exist. This puts the final nail in the coffin of the eliminativist interpretation. How, then, should we understand Nietzsche’s view of objects? For Nietzsche, ­reality seems to consist in dynamic forces, and we might use this to reinterpret how we understand objects, rather than eliminate objects altogether. I turn to this strategy next.

2.6 Unificationism Some readers take Nietzsche to believe that objects are identical to bundles of forces. I call this the revisionary reading. It rests on retaining objects but reconceiving their nature. As Richardson writes, Nietzsche provides a “redescription of the ‘object’ as also will to power” (Richardson 1996, 223). Indeed, Nietzsche claims that objects are “complexes of events which appear to have duration in relation to other complexes” (KSA 12:9[91]), where “complexes of events” are particular bundles of interacting forces. Here is the argument for the revisionary reading: (RV1) Only bundles of forces exist. (RV2) If so, then: if objects exist, they are identical to unified bundles of forces. (RV3) Objects exist. (RV4) So, objects are identical to unified bundles of forces. RV1 is supported by Nietzsche’s fundamental ontology of forces. I have more to say about this in the next chapter. RV3 is justified by taking seriously the many passages in Nietzsche’s texts that assume objects exist. RV2 finds warrant, first, because if objects indeed exist, but were not identical to bundles of forces, then it would not be the case that only bundles of forces exist. The thought that objects are unified bundles of forces captures the idea that objects such as rocks, trees, and planets are particular organizations of

Against Constructivism  39 forces that are somehow bound together. Bundles of forces that form objects have different existence and identity conditions than mere bundles of forces, it will emerge, and the difference turns on unification. Finally, given the plausible assumption that concrete objects are composite, or composed of at least two forces, rather than mereologically simple, it follows that forces considered by themselves, or apart from unification with other forces, are not proper candidates for the ultimate constituents of objects. Forces considered in unified bundles ultimately compose objects. The identity conditions of objects are a result of however a bundle is unified. Whereas the object eliminativist holds that bundles of forces have no identity conditions because bundles in continuous flux cannot become unified, the revisionist holds that there are indeed ways that bundles become unified, and therefore objects exist. If RV1–RV3 are true, it follows that objects are identical to unified bundles of forces. There are two versions of the revisionary reading. The versions agree that RV4 is true, but disagree about the nature by which a bundle of forces become unified. Constructivism is one version of the revisionary reading. The other is a non-constructivist view I call unificationism. Unificationist commentators Hales and Welshon (2000) and Doyle (2009) claim that, according to Nietzsche, objects are intrinsically unified bundles of forces.37 Objects are collections of forces with internally unified structures. This position seems perfectly commonsensical: we intuitively take objects like rocks, trees, and planets to have some internally organized structure. Unificationism fits well with commonsense realism, then, despite the fact that those who defend commonsense realism deny Nietzsche’s will to power ontology.38 Indeed, unificationism and commonsense realism are objectivist positions. For the objectivist, objects have a nature that does not depend on our practices. Does Nietzsche embrace unificationism? Consider this notebook passage:39 My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (—its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (“union”) with those of them that are significantly related to it: thus they conspire together for power. And the process goes on. (KSA 13:14[186]) Assuming by “body” [Körper] Nietzsche means “bundle of forces,” the passage reports that bundles are “specific,” or have a unique nature, and can form an “arrangement (‘union’)” with other “significantly related” bundles. Shared intrinsic natures allow bundles to “conspire together” for power. We can understand intrinsic unity as follows. Let any bundle of forces a be unified intrinsically if and only if a is unified ontologically independent of the existence, and of the non-existence, of any contingent bundle of forces b, such that a is wholly distinct from b. In the passage above, Nietzsche seems

40  Against Constructivism to be saying that bundles of forces have an internally organized nature independent of the nature of other bundles (see also KSA 11:36[22]). This intrinsic nature determines the identity conditions of a bundle. The argument for unificationism can be construed as follows: (UV1) Objects are identical to unified bundles of forces. (UV2) Bundles of forces are unified intrinsically. (UV3) So, objects are identical to intrinsically unified bundles of forces. UV1 is just a restatement of RV4, which follows from RV1–RV3. The previous discussion appears to justify UV2. If RV1–RV3 and UV1–UV2 are true, unificationism must also be true. The battle over whether unificationism or constructivism provides the best reading of Nietzsche is waged over the second premise: UV2. Constructivists argue that UV2 is false because objects are bundles of forces unified by virtue of human practices. But perhaps constructivists are mistaken. Unificationist readers often cite the following passage against constructivism:40 Where a certain unity obtains in the grouping of things, one has always posited spirit as the cause of this coordination: for which notion there is no ground whatever [. . .] there is no ground whatever for ascribing to spirit the properties of organization and systematization. (KSA 13:14[144]) Unificationists read this passage as claiming that our intentional activity, what Nietzsche calls “spirit,” cannot organize bundles of forces into objects. There appears to be no justification for thinking “spirit” can “cause” “unity,” “organization,” or “systematization,” and so Nietzsche is no constructivist. The quotation, however, omits something necessary for understanding Nietzsche’s position. The passage is taken from The Will to Power 526, which is only the first half of a single notebook entry, KSA 13:14[144]. The passage continues with The Will to Power 523. Here is The Will to Power 526: Where a certain unity obtains in the grouping of things, one has always posited spirit as the cause of this coordination: for which notion there is no ground whatever [. . .] We shall be on our guard against explaining purposiveness in terms of spirit: there is no ground whatever for ascribing to spirit the properties of organization and systematization. The nervous system has a much more extensive domain; the world of consciousness is added to it. Consciousness plays no role in the total process of adaptation and systematization.

Against Constructivism  41 The Will to Power 523, the second half of the notebook entry, contextualizes The Will to Power 526: Nothing is more erroneous than to make of psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two revelations of one and the same substance. Nothing is explained thereby: the concept “substance” is perfectly useless as an explanation [. . .] We lack any sensitive organs for this inner world [i.e. consciousness], so we sense a thousandfold complexity as a unity; so we introduce causation where any reason for motion and change remains invisible to us—the sequence of thoughts and feelings is only their becoming-visible in consciousness. That this sequence has anything to do with a causal chain is completely unbelievable: consciousness has never furnished us with an example of cause and effect. (brackets added) Although the beginning of The Will to Power 526 appears to attack constructivism, it is obvious that the notebook passage as a whole is not aimed at discussing the conditions under which objects come into existence. Nietzsche is instead concerned with the insignificant role played by the ­Kantian categories substance and causation when it comes to unifying multiplicities in consciousness. The text clearly does not warrant a rejection of constructivism. In the Nachlaß, Nietzsche also presents an argument against UV2, the claim that bundles of forces are unified intrinsically. He writes that the position “That things possess qualities in themselves, irrespective of interpretation and subjectivity, is a perfectly idle hypothesis: it would presuppose that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential” [Dass die Dinge eine Beschaffenheit an sich hätten, ganz abgesehen von der Interpretation und Subjektivität, ist eine ganz müssige Hypothese: es würde voraussetzen, dass das Interpretieren und Subjektsein nicht wesentlich] (KSA 12:9[40]). An object with “qualities in itself” is an object with intrinsic properties, like a Kantian thing in itself. Unificationism holds that objects have intrinsic properties, though unlike Kantian intrinsic properties, the intrinsic properties possessed by bundles of forces are perfectly knowable. Against unificationism, Nietzsche claims that our interpretations are “­essential” for the “qualities” objects “possess.” The properties of an ­object that determine its identity are essentially dependent on our interpretations. It is not the case that objects are merely conditionally dependent on our practices. If this were the case, the passage above might provide no way to distinguish between constructivism and objectivism. But Nietzsche’s ­remarks are clear: our interpretations are “essential” for the properties objects have. Because this is the case, the properties an object has (if any) essentially independent of our interpretive activities fail to constitute its conditions of identity. It follows that intrinsic properties (if any) fail to constitute

42  Against Constructivism an object’s conditions of identity, which explains why Nietzsche says that positing intrinsic features is an “idle hypothesis.” The passage shows that Nietzsche prefers constructivism to unificationism. The second problem with unificationism turns on the fact that bundles of forces are constituted by their contextual relations with all other bundles. Call this Contextual Constitution. Those who accept Nietzsche’s fundamental ontology must accept this position. Nietzsche remarks, for example, “[a bundle’s] essence lies in [its] relation to all other [bundles]” (KSA 13:14[79], cf. 13:14[153], 13:14[154]).41 Every bundle depends on, and is depended on by, every other bundle. Yet, every bundle depends on, and is depended on by, some bundles more than others. “An atom of force,” Nietzsche says, is more “concerned” with relations to other forces in its own “neighborhood” than its distant relations (KSA 11:36[20]). Given these considerations, Contextual Constitution is incompatible with UV2, which claims that objects are intrinsically unified bundles of forces. Unificationist readers overlook the importance of our being in local relations with bundles. For Nietzsche, empirical properties are the result of interacting bundles of forces,42 and “A thing = its qualities; but these equal everything which matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we collect the relations that may be of some account to us” [Ein Ding = seine Eigenschaften = diese aber gleich allem, was uns an diesem Dinge angeht: eine Einheit, unter der wir die für uns in Betracht kommenden Relationen zusammenfassen] (KSA 12:2[77]). The message is that objecthood is defined in terms of a unified group of properties determined by us. Contextual Constitution entails that subjects are responsible for the existence of objects. Hence, UV2 is false. This conclusion establishes something I mentioned in the first chapter. I claimed that the metaphysical reading of perspectivism uniquely supports the constructivist reading of Nietzsche. The metaphysical reading of perspectivism is the view that reality is most basically comprised of forces, each of which has a particular perspective. Nietzsche describes a perspective as a “mode of action” (KSA 13:14[184], cf. 13:14[186]). A perspective refers to some nature expressed dynamically. If Contextual Constitution, the view that bundles of forces are constituted by their contextual relations with all other bundles, is true, then it must be because all perspectives are constituted by their contextual relations with all other perspectives. The dynamic nature of forces puts them into contact with other forces, such that the nature of forces ontologically depends on other forces. And if Contextual Constitution implies that the nature and existence of objects ontologically depends on the nature and existence of subjects, it must be the case that the metaphysical reading of perspectivism supports constructivism over unificationism (and, of course, commonsense realism and eliminativism, too). Objects are particular bundles of forces with perspectives that are ontologically dependent on subjects. I have argued that unificationism does not capture Nietzsche’s considered position. Yet, it is not incorrect to say that, according to Nietzsche, when

Against Constructivism  43 we set out to construct objects, we confront various structures ultimately due to bundles of forces having formed relatively stable internally unified arrangements independently of our practices.43 It is certainly likely that many objects are constructed from bundles of forces that exhibit some degree of internal unification—though, of course, not always, since some objects, like solar systems, are scattered objects. There should be no denying that intrinsic organization can play a role in objecthood.44 As a result, such organization can, and often does, limit the conditions under which we interpret some collection of forces to be an object. Nietzsche simply denies that the internal unification of a bundle of forces constitutes objecthood—that requires construction. The difference between something’s merely having some degree of internal unification and something’s being an actual object, I argue in chapters to come, makes a significant difference. Carving the world into objects puts some groups of forces, rather than others, into our ontology concerning the macroscopic world.45 Carving the world into objects creates determinate truth conditions for propositions to correspond.46 Carving the world into objects creates facts about the world.47 Carving the world into objects plays a role in determining what scientific regularities and patterns generalize over, explain, and predict.48 Carving the world into objects contributes to overcoming positions essentially associated with nihilism.49 And so forth. For Nietzsche, internal unification, taken on its own, has none of these benefits, and thus, it is crucial to recognize that objects are created, not found.

2.7 Summary I have mounted challenges to prominent non-constructivist readings of Nietzsche’s view of objects. Here is the rundown. Commonsense realism falls short because Nietzsche prefers constructivism to objectivism. Constructivism is also easily compatible with the existence of commonsense entities. Object eliminativism fails because Nietzsche’s fundamental ontology is consistent with the existence of constructed objects. Subject eliminativism should be rejected because Nietzsche does not deny the existence of subjects and objects, but only the existence of subjects and objects conceived as substances. Nietzsche also denies the Kantian requirement that unified subjects must exist in order for objects to exist. Unificationism is problematic, first, because Nietzsche holds that intrinsic properties do not constitute objecthood, and second, because Nietzsche’s relational ontology renders constructing subjects necessary for objects to exist. The road to constructivism should now be clear.

Notes 1 A non-constructivist reading I am not concerned with is the phenomenalist view that objects are identical to our sensations, perceptual states, or ideas, such that

44  Against Constructivism objects exist only in the mind. One notebook entry seems to support this view (KSA 10:24[13]), but there is no strong evidence that Nietzsche is a phenomenalist, despite the fact that various versions of phenomenalism, offered by thinkers such as Berkeley, Mach, Mill, Spir, and Lange, are present in Nietzsche’s historical context. BGE 15 is sometimes read as committing Nietzsche to phenomenalism, but such a reading has been thoroughly challenged (see Clark and Dudrick 2012, 98–112). For Nietzsche, objects are not “just in the head.” 2 Redding professes to discuss Nietzsche’s “idealism,” where idealism is the postKantian idea that “everything into which traditional metaphysics inquired and which it took to be ultimately real was, in some sense, mind-dependent, and did not have per se existence” (Redding 2009, 2). But Redding fails to identify key idealist views in Nietzsche’s thought after Human, all-too-Human. Surprisingly, Redding’s examination into Nietzsche’s idealism after The Birth of Tragedy focuses almost entirely on the eternal recurrence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and pays no attention to aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy that are conspicuously idealist, such as his understanding of objects and will to power (see Redding 2009, 165–174). For commentators who identify Nietzsche’s idealism with will to power, see Guyer and Horstmann 2015; Hill 2003. 3 See Magnus 1986, 82–83. 4 See Clark 1990. 5 See Schacht 1983; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Hales and Welshon 2000; Doyle 2009. 6 See KSA 13:14[98], 12:9[40], 13:14[184], 12:9[106], 12:2[152], 12:9[91], 12:9 [106], 13:14[79]. 7 See Boghossian 2006, 16. 8 The idea that constructivists embrace causal dependence is a widespread error, and it is often taken to be sufficient reason to reject constructivism. Thus, Addis attacks Nietzsche’s constructivist leanings by arguing that “the fundamental premise of idealism is false” because “the intentional connection is not causally efficacious, that is, to think of something is not to have an effect on it” (Addis 2012, 63). 9 See, for example, Goodman 1978; Schwartz 1986; 2000. 10 See Boghossian 2006, 27–28. 11 This example is treated at length in Schwartz 1986. 12 See chapter 4.4. 13 Berkeley suggests a counterfactual view of unperceived objects when he writes, “The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,” but he adds: “or that some other spirit actually does perceive it” (Berkeley 1982, §3, emphasis added). Berkeley’s considered position is that the existence of an object depends upon it being actually perceived by us or “some other spirit” (namely, God). 14 I will not be addressing forms of objectivism that divorce existence conditions and identity conditions, such as bare particular views. Not only does Nietzsche give no indication that he accepts such positions, his well-known criticisms of substance may indicate that he actually moves to reject them. 15 Devitt says, “An object has objective existence, in some sense, if it exists and has its nature whatever we believe, think, or can discover: it is independent of the cognitive activities of the mind [. . .] It is not constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic values, by our capacity to refer to it, by our imposition of concepts, theories, or languages” (Devitt 1997, 15–16). Haslanger writes, “It may well be that our point of view on the world is always socially conditioned; but there is no reason to conclude that the world we have a point of view on is likewise socially

Against Constructivism  45 conditioned” (Haslanger 2012, 112), since, in part, “there are things in the world that satisfy our descriptions of them, without our having to ‘constitute’ them in any sense through our cognitive efforts” (Haslanger 2012, 97). Thomasson’s Carnapian deflationism could also be considered a version of objectivism. Thomasson takes Carnap to hold that “existence questions can only be answered internal to a particular framework, that is (if our earlier interpretation was correct), using a linguistic framework which provides rules of use for the terms and thus for answer such questions” (Thomasson 2015, 57), such that “We can answer direct questions about whether this or that sort of thing exists—not just about whether they exist according to this or that theory or framework” (Thomasson 2015, 39). 16 Kant himself appears to distinguish noumena from things in themselves (see Allais 2015, ch. 3). I overlook this distinction because both satisfy the definition of noumenal objects provided here. 17 See, for example, HH I: 4; GS 109, 111, 115, 224; BGE 192; TI “Maxims” 31, 35. 18 For further discussion about difficulties with commonsense realism, see Cox 1999, 147–152. 19 Other passages are ambiguous in the way I describe. For example, Poellner examines Nietzsche’s “repeated pronouncements to the effect that what an object is, its ‘whatness’ or essence, is something that can only be established, indeed only contentfully conceived, from some determinate perspective or point of view” (Poellner 1995, 83–84). The idea that subjects determine an object’s “essence” is constructivist. But this might not be what Poellner means. The idea that an object’s essence “can only be established, indeed only contentfully conceived, from some determinate perspective or point of view” could be justified using commonsense realism. “Establish” need not mean “constitutively determine.” It could mean merely “conditionally reveal.” Indeed, having a “contentful” conception of something certainly does not imply that the conception works to “determine its nature.” I should add that in later works, most importantly Poellner 2013, which at least partly treats Nietzsche on objects, Poellner gives no indication that he favors a constructivist reading. He instead seems to support what I describe below as unificationism. 20 See Danto 1965; Young 1992; Conard 2001; Stack 2005; Braver 2007, ch. 4; Addis 2012, 47–48. Meyer (2011; 2014, ch. 5; forthcoming) presents an alternative eliminativist view, according to which objects exist but merely as fictions projected onto an otherwise undifferentiated world of forces. Constructivists believe objects are “projections” in the sense that they are constitutively dependent on human subjects, but deny that objects are fictions. Barring quantifier restriction, eliminativist accounts render statements about the macroscopic world, such as “The cat is on the mat,” strictly false (see, for example, Meyer 2011). Constructivists hold that such statements can be true. 21 Perhaps Nietzsche rejects the connection between objects and countable beings elsewhere. He writes, “The invention of the laws of numbers was made on the basis of the error, dominant even from the earliest times, that there are identical things (but in fact nothing is identical with anything else); at least that there are things (but there is no “thing”) [aber es giebt kein “Ding”] (HH I: 19). In Chapter 3.2, I explain why mathematics and logic seem to require constructed objects. 22 I have omitted what is inessential for my argument, but one might contend that Nietzsche criticizes constructivism in those omissions. Specifically, Nietzsche writes that the “already-created world” is “cobbled together out of deceptions.” This suggests that knowledge of a constructed world necessarily involves falsification. But this is not a problem. Nietzsche thinks construction requires simplifying the world, and although simplifications are literally falsifications, they can also be accurate, or true. See Chapter 4.2.

46  Against Constructivism 3 Langer (2010, 78) recognizes this important point of the passage. 2 24 Note two things. First, Nietzsche employs ‘name’ [Name] interchangeably with ‘word’ [Wort] and, unlike contemporary philosophers, he does not attempt to make any sharp distinction between names and concepts. Names are said to be “signs for concepts” (BGE 268), that is, they signify or express concepts, and “concepts are possible only when there are words” (KSA 11:25[168]). There can be no words without concepts, and vice versa. This is indebted to Katsafanas 2005; see also 2016, 23–27. For a challenge to Katsafanas’s reading, see Leiter 2016. Leiter holds that for Nietzsche concepts are merely mental representations, like Humean ideas, which do not necessarily depend on words. Leiter presents an interesting reading, but I find no place in the texts where Nietzsche distinguishes linguistically articulated content from conceptually articulated content. Moreover, what Nietzsche says in the notes (see, for example, KSA 11:25[168]), presents evidence against Leiter’s interpretation. 25 The influence of Boscovich on Nietzsche is well documented in the literature. See, for example, Stack 1981; Whitlock 1999; Poellner 1995, 48–57; AnsellPearson 2000; Tones and Mandalios 2015. Nietzsche explicitly endorses Boscovich’s view of basic reality in later works (see, for example, BGE 12, cf. 36). 26 Large translates ‘Dinglichkeit’ as “materiality,” but it literally translates as “thing-hood-ness,” which says nothing about being material. 27 For a different reading of the passages concerning objects in Twilight of the Idols, though one that reaches the same conclusion, see Clark 1990, 105–109. 28 For a subject eliminativist reading that claims that Nietzsche’s rejection of a subject conceived as a causally efficacious entity implies a rejection of objects, see Hollingdale 1995, 117. 29 See, for example, BGE 17, 54; GM I: 13. 30 See Kant 1998, A92-A110. 31 See Kain (2009, 34): “What follows from the Kantian notion of a unified self, for Nietzsche, is that if all connection, unity, and organization are dependent upon and constituted by a unified ego, then, if it turns out that the unity of this ego exists only as illusion, all organized objects would too only be illusions. Objects might appear unified, experience might appear organized, but really there would be total absence of connection, unity, and organization in things—all would really be chaos. This is Nietzsche’s view—and I want to work toward showing that it is.” 32 For a recent, well-developed account of Nietzsche’s understanding of drives and affects, see Katsafanas 2016, ch. 4. 33 See also HH I: P 6; GM III: 12. 34 See also BGE 16, 17; TI “Errors” 3; KSA 11:38[3], 12:10[158], 12:10[19]. 35 Here I follow Gemes 2011 (for a recent account, which makes qualifications to this earlier article, see Gemes and Le Patourel 2015); see also Welshon 2014, ch. 6. For an alternative conception of unity, specifically one that turns on someone reorienting themselves toward certain values, see Katsafanas 2016, ch. 8. For surveys of various interpretations of Nietzsche’s conception of the self, see Gemes and May 2011; Constâncio, Branco, and Ryan 2015; see also Anderson 2013. 36 It is worth noting that Nietzsche’s view seems to find support in contemporary models of the mind. According to modular accounts favored in cognitive science, the mind is not a single, unified entity, as Kant appears to have thought, but an assemblage of programs, or “modules,” each of which is itself composed of further programs that can operate, and even work to represent concrete objects, independently of one another. The modular model of the mind suggests the subject is an organization of functions, which could be considered, in Nietzsche’s language, a “social structure of drives and affects” (BGE 12). This provides broad support for Nietzsche’s rejection of what Kant believes must be the case for objects to exist.

Against Constructivism  47 37 Richardson (1996) also seems to embrace unificationism. He writes that on Nietzsche’s view “reality [. . .] consists in these wills [viz, bundles of forces]. Only by and in them does the chaos and indeterminacy of mere existence rise to ‘being’, to a real becoming. Only with and in their structures and meanings does the world get structure and meaning; they give it its ‘joints’ and so ‘units’, temporally and otherwise” (Richardson 1996, 108, brackets added). The “joints” of the world are bundles of forces that appear to be organized independently of human intervention. Yet Richardson also holds that for Nietzsche, human subjects consist in bundles of forces, so there is room for a constructivist reading here. Indeed, he says that Nietzsche supplies a “redescription of the ‘object’ as also will to power, hence as becoming and as lacking clear boundaries either in or through time, denies that it ‘is’ any way ‘in itself’ for that attitude to grasp” (Richardson 1996, 223). Later, though, he develops this view in a non-constructivist manner: “We must organize our experience as being of objects that last and that fall into various types—that is, objects that are equal through time and to one another. To attempt persistently to view one’s surroundings as an unstructured chaos of becoming, which it actually is, would be suicidal. We’re able to act and set a course for ourselves in the world only by structuring it some way, but this is always a distortion of reality, which is inherently structureless” (Richardson 1996, 234, cf. 250, 231). The fact that structure in the world, due partly to identical objects, is a “distortion” of something “inherently structureless” calls to mind object eliminativism, not constructivism. 38 See Clark 1990; Leiter 2002. 39 See Hales and Welshon 2000, 72; Doyle 2009, 177. 40 See Hales and Welshon 2000, 77; Doyle 2009, 177. 41 Following unificationist interpreters, I substitute ‘bundle’ for ‘quanta’ [Quanta]. 42 See KSA 12:2[85], 13:14[184], 13:14[93], 13:14[79]. 43 This could provide initial evidence for Nietzsche’s claim that “the results of science stand up” despite “the eternal change of human laws and concepts” (GS 46). It should be noted, however, that Nietzsche believes “it is a deep and fundamental stroke of luck that science discovers things that stand up under examination” (GS 46). 44 It will emerge in the next chapter, however, that it is strictly nonsensical to talk about the conditions of identity of such structures. 45 See Chapter 3.1. 46 See Chapter 5.1. 47 See Chapter 5.2. 48 With respect to causal explanations, for example, see Chapter 5.3. 49 See Chapter 6.

3 For Constructivism

The last chapter should have made it clear that Nietzsche is a constructivist of some kind. It is “we who created [geschaffen] the ‘thing’ ” [‘Ding’] (KSA 12:9[144]), he exclaims, and “it is enough to create new names and valuations [. . .] in order to create new ‘things’ ” [es genügt, neue Namen [. . .] um auf die Länge hin neue ‘Dinge’ zu schaffen]1 (GS 58). But what exactly is Nietzsche’s constructivist view? I begin this chapter by providing a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s argument for constructivism. I first examine Nietzsche’s understanding of objects at the macroscopic level of reality, namely, objects composed of bundles of forces. I then examine whether Nietzsche endorses a constructivist position about bundles of forces themselves, which exist at the microscopic level. Finally, I discuss Nietzsche’s understanding of what constrains the creation of objects. Is construction subjective? Are all ways of constructing equally legitimate? Answering these questions will require examining Nietzsche’s view of sensory information and sensory experience.

3.1  Macroscopic Objects Nietzsche’s view that all concrete, macroscopic objects are socially constructed means that we bring all such objects into existence. Here is how I understand his position: (CV1) Only bundles of forces exist. (CV2) If so, then: if objects exist, they are identical to unified bundles of forces. (CV3) Objects exist. (CV4) So, objects are identical to unified bundles of forces. (CV5) Bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices. (CV6) So, objects are identical to bundles of forces unified by virtue of human practices. (CV7) If so, human practices bring all objects into existence. (CV8) So, human practices bring all objects into existence.

For Constructivism  49 The argument moves from Nietzsche’s fundamental ontology to constructivism about objects. The first four premises, CV1–CV4, are just a restatement of the argument for Nietzsche’s revisionary conception of objects provided in the previous chapter (RV1–RV4). The revisionary view holds that Nietzsche reconfigures objects as bundles of forces. Both unificationism and constructivism accept CV1–CV4. The readings diverge at CV5. The unificationist holds that bundles of forces are unified intrinsically, whereas the constructivist holds that unification occurs by virtue of our descriptive activities. Let us take a look at CV1 before turning to CV5. CV1 holds that only bundles of forces exist. This is Nietzsche’s fundamental ontology, which he describes as “will to power.” Readers familiar with Nietzsche scholarship will immediately recognize that CV1 is not uncontroversial.2 For those who are doubtful, I soon suggest how Nietzsche can remain a committed constructivist while bracketing commitment to the will to power ontology. Nonetheless, we have seen that eliminativist, unificationist, and constructivist readers all accept Nietzsche’s ontology. In fact, nearly all commentators on Nietzsche’s metaphysics believe that he endorses the will to power as a metaphysical view about the nature of reality.3 Consider some representative passages from the published texts. ­Nietzsche remarks that “the world viewed from inside [. . .] would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else” (BGE 36). He claims that “ ‘nature’ ” could be read as operating according to “ ‘will to power’, ” the idea that “every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment” (BGE 22). He states that we live in “a world whose essence [Essenz] is will to power” (BGE 186). He says that “in all events a power-will is operating” (GM II: 12). And he appeals to the will to power to explain natural processes in a wide range of contexts in both published and unpublished writings.4 For these reasons, I will proceed on the assumption that Nietzsche accepts CV1. Even those who deny the premise recognize that they are treading against a “now-standard view” (Clark and Dudrick 2012, 233). On Nietzsche’s account, reality consists in bundles of forces. Now turn to CV5, where constructivism enters the picture. CV4 holds that objects are identical to unified bundles of forces, and CV5 adds that bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices.5 Nietzsche accepts CV5 when he writes, “A ‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept, an image” (KSA 13:14[98]). On Nietzsche’s account, the empirical properties of objects appear to be the sensible, macroscopic effects of the interactions of bundles of forces that comprise fundamental reality.6 Bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices because we employ concepts that organize empirical properties revealed in sensory experience. Nietzsche holds that concepts are “more or less definite imagesigns for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations” (BGE 268).7 If one is not convinced that Nietzsche embraces a fundamental ontology of bundles of forces, one need only grant the harmless view that Nietzsche believes sensible properties exist, no matter their origin. As

50  For Constructivism we have seen, the position that we employ concepts that group empirical properties contacted through sensory experience is very similar to Kant’s position that objects are unities derived from conceptually synthesizing the sensory manifold. Whereas Kant argues that objects are structured by an a priori, necessary conceptual framework, however, Nietzsche seems to think that all concepts are a posteriori and contingent because they are formed exclusively in accordance with our needs, interests, and values. The particular groupings of properties that we organize through conceptual ­application in accordance with our needs, interests, and values form particular objects. Recall that Nietzsche explains that “A thing = its qualities; but these equal everything which matters to us about that thing; a unity under which we collect the relations that may be of some account to us” (KSA 12:2[77]). By conceptually unifying sensible properties, bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices. This warrants CV5. If CV1–CV5 are true, CV6 follows. Objects are identical to bundles of forces unified by virtue of human practices.8 The practices that bring objects into existence are social practices. What is the import of saying that Nietzsche takes objects to be socially constructed? One might wonder, for instance, whether lone individuals can create objects. This does not appear to be the case. Object construction requires the application of language, specifically conceptual representation, and language is a social phenomenon—there are no solipsistic concept users. For Nietzsche, language is a social phenomenon because representational consciousness itself is a social phenomenon. Representational consciousness arises with the “ability” and “need” to “communicate,” such that “consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as an individual but rather to the community- and herd-aspects of his nature” (GS 354).9 Language and consciousness have a social rather than individual existence. Additionally, object construction is a phenomenon unique to human existence. Many animals are social, but Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in thinking that only human beings can represent the world conceptually.10 Animals have minds, but they are not conscious, which means they cannot conceptually organize experience. Nietzsche takes construction to be practiced by groups of concept users.11 Concept users employ language to arrange the world in accordance with their interests. For example, in On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche declares that The lordly right of giving names extends so far that one should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the rulers: they say “this is this and this,” they seal every thing [Ding] and event with a sound and, as it were, take possession of it. (GM I: 2)

For Constructivism  51 Those in positions of power obviously have greater influence in structuring the world in accordance with their desires. Nietzsche often reports that new philosophers should establish new ways of organizing because we have outlived much of the usefulness of the concepts our ancestors used to describe reality. He notes: Philosophers [. . .] have not stopped to consider that concepts and words are our inheritance from ages in which thinking was very modest and unclear. What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. (KSA 11:34[195], cf. BGE 211) New concepts bring into existence new structures that better fit contemporary interests. Constructing objects is just one example. How do concepts bring all objects into existence? Here we turn to CV7. The premise holds that if objects are identical to bundles of forces unified by virtue of human practices, then human practices bring all objects into existence. The justification for this claim turns on Nietzsche’s view that the existence conditions of objects are determined by the identity conditions of objects.12 To say some object exists is to identify what kind of object it is. To exist is to have some condition of identity. There is no bare existence. When Nietzsche writes, “A thing = its qualities,” he equates the existence of an object with identifying properties.13 Unfortunately, he does not always make this perfectly clear. For instance, the phrase that an object is “the sum of its effects [viz., empirical properties]” (KSA 13:14[98], emphasis added), suggests there is something more, namely, something other than empirical properties that provides a ground for such properties. The “its,” however, is misleading—a snare of grammar, Nietzsche would say. Unlike Kant, who believes there is a way things are in themselves that grounds the way things are manifest in experience, Nietzsche holds that there is nothing that provides a ground for sensible properties. There is only existence as some kind of thing or other. Objects are identical to identity conditions supplied by groups of empirical properties, and groups of empirical properties are fixed by the application conditions of our concepts. Application conditions are conditions that apply to concepts, which predicate properties, and identity conditions govern the objects (if any) those concepts refer to.14 On Nietzsche’s position, application conditions fix the conditions of identity for anything that meets them. Here we get a nice fist approximation of Nietzsche’s object constructivism. An object is a unity of properties created through the application of concepts. Objects come into existence when we form concepts that collect properties under a general designation. The set of properties over which our concepts generalize determine the identity conditions of objects.

52  For Constructivism Nietzsche sometimes adds that we bring properties themselves into being. “The very concept of ‘thing’ as well as all qualities,” he notes, has its “genesis” in “the work of imaginers, thinkers, willers, [and] inventors” (KSA 12:2[152]). We construct objects by forming and applying concepts, but we also construct properties, presumably because properties can be entities predicated by concepts. With this in mind, we can specify the current account in the following way. Nietzsche’s constructivism holds that the collection of properties a concept C groups together determines the application conditions of C, which also determines when the property predicated by C is instantiated. The identity conditions of objects are determined by which collection of properties constitutes the application conditions of C, or when the property predicated by C is instantiated. For Nietzsche, there is no ontologically significant difference between concrete objects that are graspable in experience. His view that “new names” are “enough” to create new ‘things’ ” (GS 58); that “a ‘thing’ ” is something “united” by the application of a “concept” (KSA 13:14[98]); and that a “thing” is identical to “qualities” that “may be of some account to us” (KSA 12:2[77]), are all perfectly general statements regarding objects. We then arrive at the conclusion stated in CV8: human practices bring all objects into existence. In a nutshell, that is Nietzsche’s object constructivism. And now a clarificatory point needs to be made that concerns Nietzsche’s understanding of the relation between construction and consciousness. On my reading, Nietzsche thinks objects depend on certain acts of consciousness, specifically the application of concepts. But can this application get off the ground? There could be reason to be worried. Nietzsche seems to think consciousness is epiphenomenal. He claims: Error of a False Causality—People throughout the ages have believed they knew what a cause is, but where did we get our knowledge, more precisely our belief that we know? From the realm of the celebrated “inner facts,” not one of which has so far turned out to be real [. . .] Of these three “inner facts,” by which causality seemed to be authenticated, the first and most convincing one is that of the will as cause; the conception of a consciousness (“mind”) as cause and, later still, of the “I” (the ‘subject’) as cause came only afterwards [. . .] There are no mental causes at all! (TI “Errors” 3) Nietzsche contends, among other things, that the “conception of a consciousness (‘mind’) as cause” is false. Despite our everyday intuitions to the contrary, there are no conscious mental causes. This is one way to construe epiphenomenalism. If Nietzsche embraces this position, then it is hard to believe that conscious mental acts bring objects into existence. The objection is important, I think, but unpersuasive. The difficulty can be defused by marking the distinction between causal dependence and

For Constructivism  53 constitutive dependence, which I addressed in the previous chapter.15 For Nietzsche, the existence of objects is constitutively, not causally, dependent on consciousness. To say objects causally depend on consciousness for their existence is to say objects are an effective outcome of consciousness as cause. Objects are literally effects of certain conscious acts. Nietzsche rejects this view, and for good reason: it is obviously false! To say objects constitutively depend on consciousness for their existence, on the other hand, is to say objects are the outcome of certain conceptual stipulations. According to Nietzsche, an object is a collection of conceptually stipulated identity conditions. Planets come into existence, for example, when we determine that the concept of a planet refers to just those portions of our solar system that have certain features, together, of course, with the fact that those portions of the solar system exist. Constructing objects does not require consciousness to have causal power, such as the power literally to place planets in the solar system. Object construction simply requires consciousness to have constitutive power. And much of Nietzsche’s philosophy, from the creation of values to the creation of objects, provides good reason to suppose that Nietzsche believes consciousness has constitutive power. “This world has gradually become so marvelously variegated,” he says, “it has acquired color” and “we have been the painters” (HH I: 16). It is therefore perfectly consistent for Nietzsche to embrace epiphenomenalism in conjunction with constructivism. To witness Nietzsche’s constructivism in action, consider objects such as planets. Here a little set theory will help. Let α, β, γ . . . be all the astronomical objects in the universe. Astronomical objects are physical entities, associations, or structures that the astronomical sciences take to exist celestially, such as planets, moons, stars, or even entire galaxies. Let Ap be the set comprised of all the planets and A1 to An be all simple combinatorial sets of astronomical objects (for example, A6 might contain α, γ; A14 only β). Only one combinatorial set of astronomical objects (for example, A18) is identical to Ap. Each member of a set instantiates a property that is unique to members of that set, and that property has those members as its extension. Suppose we want to know whether α is a planet. Only knowing which astronomical objects (α, β, γ. . .) are members of which sets (A1 to An) will not answer the question. To answer the question, we must know which set includes only instances of the property of being a planet. According to the International Astronomical Union (IAU), α is an instance of the property of being a planet just in case α (i) orbits our Sun, (ii) exhibits hydrostatic equilibrium, or has a nearly round shape, and (iii) does not have any bodies of comparable size other than its own satellites under its gravitational influence. The IAU established (iii) after discovering an object larger than Pluto that they did not want to induct into Ap, primarily because doing so required adopting a definition of based sheerly on size, which, for various reasons, was thought to be inadequate. Accepting the third condition, however, required reclassifying Pluto from planet to dwarf planet.

54  For Constructivism Pluto shares a good portion of its gravitational orbit with large Kuiper belt objects, and so it does not satisfy (iii). Hence, Pluto is not a planet. Nietzsche would interpret Pluto’s reclassification to be the result of a specification in theoretical commitments about what constitutes the relevant interpretation of the conditions under which something counts as a planet. The relevant interpretation is crucial because an object is identical to a group of empirical properties organized by our actions. The set of conditions that constitute what objects are planets are in part the conditions that are relevant to us about what objects are planets. Those conditions form the application conditions of the concept of being a planet. In doing so, they provide a framework for saying whether the term ‘planet’ applies to particular portions of the world or whether the property of being a planet is instantiated. On Nietzsche’s account, α is an instance of the property of being a planet just in case astronomers decide that the concept refers to something that satisfies (i)–(iii), only something that satisfies (i)–(iii) is the referent of , and α satisfies (i)–(iii). Fixing the boundary conditions of determines what is a member of Ap, or, for example, that A14 but not A2 will be identical to Ap. It is not the case that α is (or is not) a member of the set of all planets absent some criteria for what satisfies the membership conditions of that set. Nietzsche writes: “ ‘This is considered to be’ is the real ‘This is’ ” (KSA 12:2[150]). There is no set of objects that are instances of the property of being a planet without a set of conditions to distinguish the application conditions for the concept of being a planet. The identities of objects such as planets are constitutively dependent on our practices because our representations determine the application conditions of the concept of being a planet. Since Nietzsche finds no ontological difference between planets and other objects of experience, a similar argument can presumably be employed for explaining how we construct any object of experience. Of course, I cannot develop this extension here. Nonetheless, one might argue that Nietzsche thinks some objects are unconstructed. With respect to planets, for example, it has so far been granted that astronomical objects (α, β, γ . . .) exist apart from our descriptions. One could reply that while Nietzsche might think that we play an essential role in deciding that the property of being a planet applies to α but not β, the objects to which we ascribe that property are mind-independent.16 The voice of opposition shouts: “That heavenly body up there is not constructed, whether or not we call it a planet!” It seems that CV5, which holds that bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices, is false. Astronomical objects, one might argue, are bundles of forces unified apart from our practices. On Nietzsche’s view, though, the explanation of why something is a planet also extends to why something is an astronomical object. We construct astronomical objects, Nietzsche would say, by organizing certain features of the world. Take star clusters, for instance. Star clusters are scattered

For Constructivism  55 astronomical objects—they are composed of dozens to millions of stars. Determining whether some aggregate of stars is indeed a cluster requires determining what stars, of what kind, distributed over what spatial and temporal intervals, constitutes a cluster. Nietzsche would say that we contribute to determining those boundaries just as we do planets. A similar argument can be made about something’s being a star. We decide what particular material falls within the boundary conditions of being a star and what does not—what might instead be something else, like a comet, or what might be nothing of interest, such as the mere eminence of light. What counts as a star emerges as interpretations about stars emerge. The same holds for the heavenly bodies we call planets. Whether considering gaseous entities composed mostly of hydrogen and helium, such as Jupiter and Saturn, or rocky entities with rough, irregular surfaces, such as Mercury and Earth, there is an indefinite number of features one must choose to include, omit, or approximate when delineating various boundaries. It is required that we make decisions about which material, and how much, to incorporate when specifying conditions of identity.17 For Nietzsche, planets, stars, star clusters, and so forth are ontologically on par with all other objects of experience, and so if the objects of the heavens are constructed, so are all other objects. In fact, whatever sort of object one assumes for the sake of argument against the constructivist must have already been constructed to be of that sort. Our organization of empirical properties determines the identities of things as determinate kinds of objects, which means that no object of experience is constitutively mindindependent. As Nietzsche remarks, “The question ‘what is that?’ is an establishment of meaning from some other viewpoint. The ‘essence’, the ‘essential nature’ is something perspectival” (KSA 12:2[149]).

3.2  Microscopic Objects Critics often reject constructivism because they take the view to imply that microscopic objects—for example, electrons and quarks—are constructed right along with macroscopic objects. Call universal constructivism the view that all objects of possible experience are constructed, microscopic and macroscopic alike. The idea that microscopic objects are possible objects of experience does not mean that they can be experienced with the unaided eye, of course, but rather that in some way or another, usually by scientific means, we are capable of grasping their nature. It has been argued that universal constructivism is false because there has to be some objects upon which construction occurs which are themselves not constructed.18 Microscopic objects appear to provide the raw material for macroscopic objects to be constructed. For Nietzsche, it appears that bundles of forces are unconstructed. To be sure, my project concerns macroscopic objects, so the objection will not stick. Yet, there might be reason to think that, on Nietzsche’s account, all

56  For Constructivism objects are constructed—even bundles of forces. There might not be sufficient evidence for such a reading. But there is some evidence. The intuitive motivation is this: if existence conditions depend on identity conditions, and identity conditions depend on descriptive representations, then the view that some objects are unconstructed seems to require there to be objects fully apart from the possibility of descriptive representation. Such objects can only be noumenal objects, or things in themselves, which Nietzsche discards. Hence, all objects, including both macroscopic and microscopic objects, are constructed. But does Nietzsche actually think that the identity and existence conditions of bundles of forces depend on our descriptive representations? In this section, I present the best textual evidence for reading Nietzsche as a universal constructivist by examining his treatment of microscopic objects. How does Nietzsche think bundles of forces are represented? To answer, it is best to begin with Newton. Nineteenth-century conceptions of force take their lead from classical mechanics, and Nietzsche was familiar with Newton’s position (see, for example, BGE 12, 17; GM I: 13). Nietzsche does not accept all features of classical mechanics. In particular, we have seen that he denies Newton’s view that rigid, extended pieces of matter comprise the ultimate units of reality. He instead adopts Boscovich’s position that materially ungrounded forces are basic. Nonetheless, classical mechanics provides a helpful background for assessing Nietzsche’s position on representing force. Newton articulates force in mathematical terms. He understands force as mass times acceleration: F = ma = m d2 x/dt2. The force acting on a body is equal to its mass times the second derivative of its position with respect to time. Giere, whose work I utilize here, has pointed out that the chief importance of Newton’s principles is their application to empirical targets (Giere 1988, 66; cf. 2006, 61). Such application requires looking at various formulations of force functions. With respect to linear restoring force, for example, the force on a particle is proportional to the negative displacement of the particle from its rest position. The second law for this is (where k is the constant of proportionality): F = ma = m d2 x/dt2 = –kx. This enables the representation of harmonic motion. For current purposes, it is not essential to go over the details of different force functions, but simply note that two things must be accounted for when applying force functions to target phenomena. Mathematical symbols must be interpreted to instantiate some concept, such as position, momentum, or mass, and mathematical symbols must be identified with some feature of a specific object, such as the mass of the earth. Giere calls the former the requirement interpretation and the latter identification (Giere 1988, 74–76; 2006, 62; see also Kuhn 1970, 188–191). He examines F = –kx to illustrate his point. Here, x could be interpreted as the displacement of a particle from its rest position, and in applying the formula to a particular mass on a spring, x could be identified as the displacement of a particular

For Constructivism  57 mass from its equilibrium position. Giere (1988, 75–76; 2006, 62) notes that the requirements of interpretation and identification are not unique to mathematical representation in Newtonian physics, but occur whenever we attempt to use language to represent the world. Nietzsche appreciates that these requirements—whatever they are called— must be met to represent empirical phenomena.19 Meeting such requirements, importantly, reveals that mathematical and logical discourse are “a means and measure for us to create reality” (KSA 12:9[97], cf. HH I: 11, 19; GS 111, 121; BGE 4, 21).20 For the symbols of mathematics and logic to mean anything, or be applicable, there must be domains of objects to which they refer. These ­domains, or universes of discourse, are constructed with a conceptual apparatus. The meaningfulness and applicability of symbols, then, requires constructing objects, whether concrete or abstract. Nietzsche refers to mathematical and logical objects as “fabricated beings” (HH I: 19). Conceptual frameworks provide us with the means to interpret and identify relevant symbols. We construct domains that tell us which kinds of things symbols represent. For example, within domain D = {1, 2, 3, . . .}, say F: {2, 4, 6, . . .} and H: {/ x, y ∈ D and x > y}. We decide which particular things symbols represent. In D, say a: 1 and b: 2. Interpreting and identifying symbols then allows us to apply them. In D, we can now determine the truth-values of Haa (false) and Fb & Hba (true). For Nietzsche, when we apply conceptual frameworks to interpret and identify mathematical and logical syntax, we effectively “create reality.” In an instructive passage from the Nachlaß, Nietzsche suggests that the type of construction required to apply mathematical and logical formulas to target phenomena is also required to apply formulas of force to target phenomena. He first comments that “The mathematical physicists have no use for lump atoms in their science; consequently they construct for themselves a world of force-points which can be reckoned with” [Die mathematischen Physiker können die Klümpchen-Atome nicht für ihre Wissenschaft brauchen: folglich construiren sie sich eine Kraft-Punkte-Welt, mit der man rechnen kann] (KSA 11:40[36]). Mathematical physicists “construct for themselves a world of force-points,” or an ontology of bundles of forces, to avoid problems in material atomistic systems, such as Newtonian physics. What do they construct, exactly? Other passages in Nietzsche suggest that physicists aim to construct a scientific model that attempts to understand all worldly phenomena as different manifestations of interacting bundles of forces. To see this point, consider Beyond Good and Evil 36. The aim of this passage is a matter of significant interpretive disagreement.21 But I will not enter into those debates. I follow those who read the passage as presenting an argument for Nietzsche’s preferred ontology. Nietzsche begins by conjecturing, “Suppose nothing else were ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other ‘reality’ besides the reality of our drives” (BGE 36). This “primitive form of the world” comprised of “drives” suggests a project: “[I]s it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the

58  For Constructivism question whether this ‘given’ would not be sufficient to render the so-called mechanistic (and thus material) world comprehensible as well?” (BGE 36, translation modified). And this experiment is not optional: “not only is it permitted to make the experiment; conscience of method demands it” (BGE 36). Nietzsche then expands on the connection between effective drives and efficient causality: The question is in the end whether we really recognize the will as efficient, whether we believe in the causality of the will: if we do [. . .] then we have to make the experiment of positing the causality of the will hypothetically as the only one [. . .] In short one has to risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever “effects” are recognized— and whether all mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of the will. (BGE 36) He concludes with a statement about will to power as the only efficient causal force: Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power [. . .] then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to power” and nothing else. (BGE 36) The initial hypothesis—that “we could not get down, or up, to any other ‘reality’ besides the reality of our drives”—is a psychological claim. Psychology posits the reality of “willed” drives. Drives “will” in the sense that they are psychological forces capable of motivating behavior. The passage proposes that if a willed drive event can be understood as an instance of an efficient causal event conceived as will to power, then, after generalizing into other domains, from the organic to the inorganic, all efficient causal events might be justifiably modeled as will to power. Welshon (2004, 172–176) has pointed out that a willed drive event might be taken as an instance of a causal event conceived as will to power because these events enjoy isomorphic structures. A willed drive event, or more generally, an intentional psychological event, consists of a subject, an intentional object, and an affective attitude relating subject to object.22 For instance, if S enjoys hiking, then S is the subject, hiking is the intentional object, and enjoying is the affective attitude. The structure of such an event can be modeled as . It is an affective directed transfer of energy from subject to intentional object. A non-psychic event modeled as

For Constructivism  59 will to power has the form , where α and β are particular bundles of forces, and є is a directed energy transfer between relata α and β due to the influence of α onto β (see Welshon 2004, 174). A will to power event consists in force transferring from one bundle to another. The triadic structure of a causal event conceived as will to power is isomorphic to the structure of an intentional psychological event. The isomorphism between these events provides reason to think that the latter is an instance of the former. If this instantiation extends to events beyond the domain of psychology, Nietzsche suggests, then eventually, we should be permitted to conclude that all efficient causal events are most basically due to the operation of interacting bundles of forces. He requests that we experiment with this generalization. The will to power model should help explain all empirical phenomena. In the Nachlaß passage cited above, Nietzsche indicates that the will to power model is determinate only in relation to our contributions: “The mathematical physicists [. . .] construct for themselves a world of forcepoints which can be reckoned with [. . .] [T]hey have arranged, thought, devised the world to fit, until they could make use of it” (KSA 11:40[36]). By “constructing” a “world of force-points” physicists have “arranged” and “devised the world to fit.” The world as will to power itself is apparently “arranged,” “devised,” or “constructed.” This enables physicists to “reckon with” and “make use” of the world. The suggestion here is that the world must rendered determinate in order to be understood. Rendering the will to power model determinate seems to be a consequence of the requirements of having to interpret and identify mathematical syntax when applying force formulas to various targets. In the passage at issue, for instance, Nietzsche is concerned with “mathematical physicists.” Elsewhere he says, “our knowledge has become scientific to the degree that it can apply number and measure” (KSA 13:14[105]). He qualifies this in The Gay Science: “Let us introduce the subtlety and rigor of mathematics into all science to the extent to which that is at all possible; not in the belief that we will come to know things this way, but in order to ascertain our human relation to things” (GS 246). Insofar as possible, the sciences should be informed by mathematics. Yet, because applying mathematics to target phenomena requires some human contribution, we should not think that our sciences reveal the way the world is apart from all human influence.23 Thus, if Nietzsche holds that solving the problems of interpretation and identification contributes to “creating reality,” then it would be reasonable to think that physicists render the will to power model determinate by interpreting and identifying the symbols within that model (). The worry with this interpretation is that Nietzsche never formulates his conception of force quantitatively. He does not provide a mathematical formula for the application of the will to power model to target phenomena. Newton’s formulation is unavailable to him because it defines force in terms of material substance. And, although he accepts Boscovich’s idea

60  For Constructivism that forces are materially ungrounded, he does not endorse Boscovich’s particular law of force. Boscovich treats forces as qualitatively identical, or homogenous, whereas Nietzsche considers forces to be perspectival. Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s recognition that the requirements of interpretation and identification must be satisfied to represent the world meaningfully can help illuminate why he believes that scientists render the will to power model determinate without having to invoke a particular mathematical formula. The application of the will to power model to various observational targets first requires interpreting α and β as pertaining to some kind of event. A conceptual apparatus must provide an interpretation of α and β such that these symbols have meaningful content. They must be interpreted as some kinds of bundles of forces. This guides us from symbols to objects in a domain by providing information about which targets, with which sorts of identity conditions, symbols represent. Interpreting symbols helps us identify which specific events out of a plurality we identify as α and β. Our conceptual apparatus, then, helps us identify which bundle of forces within a domain our kind terms denote. Applying an interpretation of α and β to a target requires identifying α and β with specific sets of forces. Only by interpreting and identifying α and β can we understand some event as an event of will to power. Nietzsche’s suggestion that physicists render the will to power model determinate seems to mean that our judgments delimit the relevant kind and particular domains of α and β. This implies that the identity conditions of particular bundles of forces are essentially dependent on our practices. Nietzsche states, “There is no event in itself. What happens is a group of phenomena selected and unified by an interpreting being” (KSA 13:1[115]). There are no events in themselves, or fully apart from our mode of cognition, because the identity conditions of events depend on our organizing activities. One may be tempted to say that, on Nietzsche’s account, forces have the features they do divorced from our practices. But this might be wrong. For Nietzsche, the fundamental feature of force is directedness: a force is actively oriented from some perspective towards some target. His view that forces “will” means they are actively oriented (KSA 13:14[79], 1888, 13:14[79]). A force’s activity is to influence whatever it encounters, which becomes its target (KSA 13:14[186]). Nietzsche often discusses a force’s influence as “growth” (BGE 230, see also 259), specifically “the growth of power” (KSA 12:2[108]). Growth occurs from a particular “mode of action,” or perspective (KSA 13:14[184], see also 13:14[186]). Nietzsche’s position that a force “wills” “power,” then, means that a force is actively oriented from a perspective towards some target to increase influence. Forces are constructed, one might say, because the property of directedness is constructed. Neither the kind of perspective from which forces are oriented, nor the particular extent of their influence, can be delimited prior to interpretation and identification, which fix the nature of forces. Nietzsche notes, “an artificial distinction is made with respect to events between that which acts and

For Constructivism  61 that toward which the act is directed” (KSA 12:9[144]). The conditions delimited are “artificial” in the sense that they do not exist apart from our interventions. All kind concepts introduce conditions of identity. We establish the boundaries of the concepts that define directedness (, ), and those boundaries form the application conditions of the concept of directedness. The identity conditions of forces, then, seem to depend essentially on our activities. If the arguments in these last two sections are sound, then Nietzsche embraces universal constructivism, the view that both macroscopic and microscopic objects are constructed. Now return to the objection posed above, which contends that some unconstructed objects must exist for objects to be constructed, and so not all objects are constructed. Does Nietzsche fall into this trap? I do not think so. We are not justified in positing the existence of unconstructed objects that supposedly form the basis of constructed objects. With respect to such “bedrock” unconstructed objects, one can say, at most, “something has the features it does apart from our descriptions,” or offer the demonstrative “that has the features it does independently of our activities.” But these statements fail to say anything about what objects there are.24 There is no good reason to suppose that ‘something’ or ‘that’ succeed in referring to objects. What objects, with what conditions of identity, could they refer to? Consequently, there is no good reason to think that unconstructed objects exist—something exists, maybe, but objects, no. And even ‘something’ appears to have no reference—it certainly does not refer to some non-empty domain that exists independently of our mode of cognition. Nietzsche has shown such a position to be unintelligible. Nonetheless, all Nietzsche needs to respond to the objection from unconstructed objects is this: the view that constructing objects is only possible provided that something enables construction does not imply the further view that what enables construction are objects. As a result, Nietzsche can embrace the universal constructivist thesis that all objects are constructed without succumbing to the objection that such a position is inherently inconsistent. I do not expect everyone to accept that Nietzsche is a universal constructivist. It is clear that his constructivist remarks mostly target macroscopic objects. I have simply tried to present the best possible case for Nietzsche’s universal constructivism. If there is reason to doubt that Nietzsche thinks we construct microscopic objects, then readers can rest easy with the fact that he only endorses constructivism about macroscopic objects. Nothing in this book stands or falls with Nietzsche’s commitment to universal constructivism. To proceed with everyone on board, the remainder of the book returns to Nietzsche on middle-size dry goods.

3.3  Constraints and Conceptualism What constrains the creation of objects? Does Nietzsche endorse the subjectivist view that construction is dependent on the arbitrary whims of

62  For Constructivism particular subjects? Does he embrace the epistemic relativist position that any way of constructing is epistemically equal to any other? The answer to both questions is ‘no’. Nietzsche offers various constraints on the construction process. We certainly cannot construct any way we want. A typical theme in Nietzsche’s work, for instance, concerns “the fiction of a world that corresponds to our desires” (KSA 12:9[60]). Nietzsche simply denies the view that there is a particular, privileged manner in which construction should occur, guaranteed by some constitutively mind-independent reality. This leaves ample room for limiting factors. These include the experience of force and resistance, the current body of accepted beliefs, the fact that construction is a socially collective phenomenon, the epistemic values of conservatism, consistency, scope, simplicity, utility, and the mathematical and logical constraints of self-identity and equivalence.25 These constraints, taken alone, reign in arbitrariness, moving against both subjectivism and epistemic relativism. There is also sensory information, which is arguably the most important limiting factor on any plausible account of object construction. It is clear that Nietzsche believes information from the senses constrains inquiry that leads to truth (see BGE 134; TI “Reason” 3). How does sensory information constrain the creation of objects? On Nietzsche’s account, what we take to exist is what affects us: “we construe ‘what is’ as what exerts an effect on us, what proves itself by exerting its effect” [Das ‘Seiende’ wird also von uns gefasst als das auf uns Wirkende, das durch sein Wirken Sich-Beweisende] (KSA 11:5[19], see also KGW VIII.1: 5[19]).26 We are affected by sensory information. If no attention is paid to such information, objects cannot be brought into existence. Sensations contain information about empirical properties, and concrete objects are organized units of such properties. Since such unification occurs by virtue of conceptual application, failure to take sensory information into account will lead to failure of reference. For ­Nietzsche, predication need not imply reference. Information from the senses grounds reference to the external world. In effect, reality resists us. On ­Nietzsche’s view, we become acquainted with “reality” by virtue of “the feeling [or sensation, Gefühl] [. . .] of resistance,” an experience that “convinces us that there is something there that is being resisted” (KSA 12:9[91]). Importantly, such resistance taken alone does not constrain organization of sensory information in any specific manner. We arrange what affects us in relation to our purposes: “the concept ‘really, truly there’ is one we drew out of the ‘mattering-to-us’ ” [den Begriff ‘wirklich, wahrhaft vorhanden’ haben wir erst gezogen aus dem ‘uns-angehn’] (KSA 11:5[19]). The various ways in which sensory information relates to our interests influences our organization of empirical properties. Nietzsche also thinks that we must have a particular understanding the nature of sense experience to have an adequate constructivist position. Nietzsche, I submit, is a conceptualist. Broadly, conceptualism holds that sense experience has conceptually structured content. In the remainder

For Constructivism  63 of this section, I focus on developing Nietzsche’s conceptualism. My aim is to explain how conceptualism constrains constructivism and informs Nietzsche’s conception of objectivity, which helps his account avoid subjectivism and epistemic relativism. Surprisingly, there has been no discussion about Nietzsche’s conceptualism in the literature. Although Kant’s relation to conceptualism has received a good deal of attention in recent years,27 the relation between Nietzsche and conceptualism remains untouched. This is strange, I think, for at least three reasons. First, select commentators have noticed that Nietzsche’s understanding of sense experience appears similar to Kant’s.28 Second, within the neoKantian movement of Nietzsche’s time, which greatly impacted Nietzsche’s thought,29 conceptualism was almost universally embraced.30 And third, Nietzsche makes remarks that immediately call conceptualism to mind, such as, for example, “There are no experiences other than moral ones, not even in the realm of sense perception” (GS 114, cf. 57; BGE 192). These reasons taken alone lead naturally to an investigation of Nietzsche’s conceptualism. Nietzsche’s understanding of sense experience is a development and revision of themes found in Kant, so we begin there. Kant holds a two-faculty account of cognition. Sensibility is our passive capacity to intuit possible objects of experience by receiving impressions through the senses. Typically, Kant is thought to hold that intuition presents a manifold of sense data for representing objects, and objects are represented using concepts.31 Newer readings argue that intuition presents us with particular objects themselves, apart from conceptualization.32 Both interpretations agree that Kant allows for the existence of sensible content independent of conceptual application. We will see that Nietzsche rejects such a view. Kant’s other faculty of cognition is the understanding, which is the active power to cognize sensible objects through a priori concepts. This faculty takes sense data to represent objects by synthesizing, or “gathering together,” data under a concept (Kant 1998, A99). Although sensory information is not completely unorganized before conceptual organization, since Kant believes all representations generated through the sensibility are structured by space and time, cognition of determinate objects requires synthetic conceptual activity. Kant’s constructivism, then, emerges from his understanding of cognition. Our cognitive faculties come equipped with an a priori conceptual framework which functions to constitute the structure of the objects of experience by organizing incoming information. Although Nietzsche sometimes appears to adopt Kant’s two-faculty theory of cognition—for instance, he remarks that our “intellect [. . .] receives from the senses the raw material that it interprets” (KSA 11:34[35])—these passages are few.33 Instead, he focuses his attention on developing the postKantian position that the senses play an active rather than passive role in cognitive representation. He states, for example, “There could be no judgments at all if a kind of leveling had not first been carried out within the sensations” (KSA 11:40[15]). It seems that meaningful judgments require

64  For Constructivism sense impressions to be structured upon reception. This is elaborated in the following informative note: Without the transformation of the world into figures and rhythms there would be nothing “the same” for us, thus nothing recurrent, and thus no possibility of experiencing and appropriating, of feeding. In all perception, i.e. in the most original appropriation, what is essentially happening is an action, or more precisely: an imposition of shapes upon things—only the superficial talk of “impressions.” In this way man comes to know his force as a resisting and even more as a determining force—rejecting, selecting, shaping to fit, slotting into his schemata. There is something active about our taking on a stimulus in the first place and taking it on as that particular stimulus [. . .] Thus arises our world, our whole world: and no supposed “true reality,” no “inthemselves of things” corresponds to this whole world which we have created, belonging to us alone. Rather it is itself our only reality, and “knowledge” thus considered proves only to be a means of feeding. (KSA 11:38[10], cf. GS 57) Nietzsche rejects the idea that we are passively in contact with raw content—some “true reality”—due to the fact that our sensory apparatus actively arranges sensory input to generate determinate sense experience. Our “original [perceptual] appropriation,” which enables the “possibility of experiencing,” is an “action” that consists in “an imposition of shapes upon things.” It is therefore “superficial” to talk of mere “impressions,” or being passively affected. In sense experience, Nietzsche thinks, we are a “determining force,” a constructive force, one that functions by “rejecting, selecting, [and] shaping [sense data] to fit.” This explains why he claims that our sensory apparatus makes “judgments.” He contends, for instance, “In every judgment of the senses, the whole pre-history of the organism is at work—‘that is green’, for example” (KSA 11:34[167]). Sensory “judgments” are processes marked by effective discriminations, specifically the organization of incoming information. In the block quote above, Nietzsche claims that our sensory apparatus is “active” when “taking on a stimulus.” We take on a stimulus as “that particular stimulus,” he contends, meaning that we experience sensory information characterized in some determinate manner. Nietzsche believes this form of structuring is a necessary condition for our particular mode of cognition—it is, in fact, “our only reality.” Actively structuring the world in experience begins at the level of sensation. Nietzsche’s view of sense experience appears to be rooted in the neoKantian philosopher F. A. Lange, whom Nietzsche read fervently. Lange, owing influence to thinkers such as Hermann von Helmholtz and Johannes Müller, argues that constructivism should be understood naturalistically. For Lange, the natural sciences show that our sense organs actively organize

For Constructivism  65 incoming information. “The physiology of the sense organs,” he says, “developed or corrected Kantianism” (Lange 1873–1875, 2: 409). A naturalistically conceived conceptualism “develops” or “corrects” Kant by avoiding having to deduce non-empirical, a priori conditions of cognitive representation, which proved to be a project many neo-Kantians, including Nietzsche, found problematic in light of modern natural science. Lange places Kantianism wholly within the empirical study of the conditions of cognitive representation. And, like Nietzsche, Lange holds that our “physical-­psychological organization,” including the way in which our sensory apparatus is constituted, organizes the content of experience. Nietzsche endorses the conceptualist position that cognitive representation requires that sensory content contain conceptual and valuational content. He claims, “we still carry around the valuations of things that originate in the passions and loves of former centuries,” such that conceptual and valuational discriminations are present “in every experience, in every sense impression” (GS 57). There is even no “reality” if concepts and valuations are subtracted from sense experience (GS 57). For Nietzsche, our sensory apparatus actively generates determinate perceptual experience because it contains conceptual and valuational content. How do concepts and valuations structure sensory information? “In valuations,” Nietzsche writes, “conditions of preservation and growth express themselves” (KSA 12:9[38]). Preservation and growth require establishing what is, and what is not, significant for a particular valuing system. This process occurs partly at the sensory level: “All sensory perceptions are entirely suffused with value judgments” (KSA 12:2[95]), he remarks, and “whatever is some being’s ‘external world’ consists of a sum of valuations” (KSA 11:34[237]). Valuations determine relations of significance between sensed properties, and concepts systematize various collections of such properties. For this reason, Nietzsche considers concepts inherently valuational. He calls “green, blue, red, hard, [and] soft,” for example, “inherited valuations” (KSA 11:34[247]). Designations that arrange sensory information must assume some determinate relation of significance. Concepts function by inclusion and omission, which presupposes judgment about what is included or omitted. Thus, the application of concepts determines relations of significance. On Nietzsche’s account, sensory input is always organized by conceptual and valuational discriminations which structure sense experience. The idea that incoming sensory information is differentiated by concepts and valuations implies that sensory experience is representational. Sensory experiences represent non-linguistic reality structured by our sensory apparatus. Importantly, Nietzsche holds that representations, such as intentional conceptual representations, can be meaningfully compared only with other representations, such as conceptually structured sensory representations. This appears to be a consequence of Nietzsche’s claim that “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’ ” (GM III: 12). Perspectives

66  For Constructivism cannot be meaningfully compared with anything a-perspectival. Assuming perspectives can be representations, if representations can be meaningfully compared only with other representations, then we can make meaningful judgments only about what the senses transform. Meaningful judgments require conceptually articulated sensory information: “There could be no judgments at all if a kind of leveling had not first been carried out within the sensations” (KSA 11:40[15]). One crucial way in which Nietzsche thinks the nature of sense experience constrains a plausible account of object construction, then, is that constructivists about objects do well to accept that sense experience is conceptually structured. Our sensory apparatus initially organizes the data we intentionally organize into objects. This conceptualist constraint is both conceptual and substantive. A conceptual constraint concerns how to construe some view at hand, and a substantive constraint concerns particular features of the world the view involves. Conceptualism provides a conceptual constraint on constructivism by virtue of the fact that we cannot meaningfully conceive how unrepresented sensory information is intentionally organized into objects. Conceptualism provides a substantive constraint on constructivism because it implies that what is intentionally organized into objects is already structured by our sensory apparatus. “We are in our own webs, we spiders,” Nietzsche observes, “and whatever we catch in them, we can catch nothing whatever other than what admits of being caught precisely in our webs” (D 117, cf. GM III: 12). For Nietzsche, incoming information comprises “what admits of being caught,” or what can be made intelligible, which constrains what is constructed. Conceptualism also informs Nietzsche’s conception of objectivity. Nietzsche declares that “objectivity” understood as “contemplation without interest” is a “nonsensical absurdity” (GM III: 12).34 Since reality is disclosed through how we organize experience, which proceeds in accordance with our interests, we cannot make meaningful judgments about reality independently of our organizational activities. Consequently, a conception of objectivity that assumes there is a way things are with the world independently of our organization of experience is unintelligible. The “knowledgeseeker,” Nietzsche says, is “thus in no way an observer, outside, indifferent, secure, objective” (GS 351). Since organizing the world into objects begins with sensory intake, a plausible account of objectivity must take conceptualism into consideration. Nietzsche thinks that genuine objectivity emerges in the wealth of information generated by a multiplicity of representations. He proposes that “the more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that much more complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ be” (GM III: 12). The more representations we bring to bear on some matter, the better will be our understanding of that phenomenon. Nonetheless, objectivity is more than just a collection of representations. Objectivity is also “the capacity to have

For Constructivism  67 one’s pro and contra under control and to engage and disengage them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge” (GM III: 12, translation modified). To be objective and gain knowledge, we must acquire the ability to employ and shift between a variety of representations, both for and against particular matters. This enables us to do the most justice to the complexity of experience. Nietzsche’s understanding of objectivity, which holds that the ability to navigate among a rich multiplicity of representations leads to knowledge, turns on the idea that representations must be assessed relative to other representations. For this reason, objectivity requires conceptualism. Moreover, since Nietzsche thinks that object construction should proceed by objective means, conceptualism helps ensure that object construction proceeds in an appropriately constrained manner—particularly one that avoids subjectivism and epistemic relativism.

3.4 Summary In this chapter, I have developed an original argument for interpreting Nietzsche as a constructivist. Nietzsche is clearly a constructivist about macroscopic objects, and his constructivism appears to extend to microscopic objects. Macroscopic objects are constructed by unifying sensible properties by virtue of the application of concepts. Microscopic objects appear to be constructed by interpreting and identifying symbols of the will to power model of reality. The chapter also explored key aspects of Nietzsche’s view concerning what constrains object construction, most prominently the nature of sensory information and sense experience. Sensory information carries sensible properties that provide the basic elements of object construction, and the intentional organization of the world in experience into objects depends upon sense experience infused with conceptual content. The next chapter addresses what many readers may already have on their minds, which is the suspicion that my constructivist interpretation is somehow flawed, perhaps because it seems to clash with Nietzsche’s other prominent philosophical commitments, or perhaps because it appears to be a defenseless position in material object metaphysics. I will now try to dispel these worries.

Notes 1 Clark (2015, 103) takes Nietzsche’s claim that we can create new “things” to mean that we can create new values. But this is an incorrect translation: ‘Ding’ refers to an object, not a value (‘Wert’). 2 For those who deny that Nietzsche embraces the will to power ontology, see Clark 1990; Leiter 2002; Clark and Dudrick 2012. 3 See Moles 1990; Richardson 1996; Poellner 1995; Schacht 2000; Hales and Welshon 2000; Hill 2007; Doyle 2009; Addis 2012; Emden 2014; Loeb 2015; Strawson 2015; Welshon 2014; 2016.

68  For Constructivism 4 See GS 349, cf. 118; BGE 13, 19, 22, 23, 47, 51, 230, 259; GM I:13; A 6, cf. 2, 7, 17; Z II: “On Self-Overcoming”; KSA 13:14[184], 13:14[93], 11:36[31], 13:14[79], 12:7[9], 13:14[81], 13:14[82], 11:38[12]. 5 As stated, CV5 holds that bundles of forces are unified by virtue of human practices, but for reasons that I will spell out in the next chapter, it is more accurate to say bundles of forces are unifiable by virtue of human practices. This modal specification reflects Nietzsche’s view that all objects that can in principle be encountered in experience are constructed. Thanks to Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen for pushing me to be clear about this point. 6 See KSA 12:2[85], 13:14[184], 13:14[93], 12:14[79]. Nietzsche’s view of properties reflects the influence of Boscovich. For discussion, see Chapter 2.4. Since Nietzsche thinks objects are understood by virtue of their sensible, or empirical, properties, I will not be concerned with properties of space and time. Nietzsche does not seem to think space and time are constituents of objects. 7 Nietzsche links concept [Begriff] and image [Bild] elsewhere. In a note from 1884, for example, he identifies both with the “productive force that arranges given stimuli” (KSA 25[313], my translation). 8 The issue of what bundles of forces are before humans get to work on them is addressed below. 9 One might think Nietzsche’s constructivism has strange consequences for subjects who are incapable of conceptual thought. Constructivism would imply that there are no objects for such subjects. This seems hard to swallow. But Nietzsche thinks otherwise. If the mark of consciousness is a conceptual vocabulary, as Nietzsche believes, it seems perfectly reasonable to think there are no objects for subjects who are incapable of representing the world conceptually. There are no objects for those who are strictly unconscious, for example. 10 For discussion on this point, see Katsafanas 2005, 14; 2016, 27–30. 11 For an interesting discussion about Nietzsche’s view that language is a social phenomenon, in addition to worries about such a view that can be raised from within Nietzsche’s own philosophical program, see Richardson 2015. For discussion about Nietzsche’s view of concepts in general, see Katsafanas 2016, 35–36. 12 For a nice defense of this position, see Wiggins 1980. For a more recent defense from a continental perspective, see Gabriel 2015, 43–72. Generally speaking, Nietzsche seems to believe that ‘existence’ is not a material term which names a property of an object, but rather is a formal term that enables the application of a material predicate to an object. ‘Existence’ does not convey any information about what an object is like. For a good introduction to this view in material object metaphysics, see Thomasson 2015, ch. 1.4. 13 For discussion about Nietzsche’s view that objects are identical to some group of properties, including interesting discussion about how Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant also embrace this particular understanding of objecthood, see Strawson 2015, 20–25. Stawson seems to believe that Nietzsche is an objectivist, not a constructivist. Strawson writes that for Nietzsche there is a “total way [an object] concretely is, qualitywise or propertywise, uncut by discursive thought” (Strawson 2015, 21). 14 These terms are indebted to Thomasson 2007, 55–62. Thomasson holds that coapplication conditions fix conditions of identity, whereas I simplify the account by just talking about application conditions. 15 Haslanger (2012, 87) also correctly distinguishes between causal and constitutive social construction, but, unlike my reading of Nietzsche, she does not claim that something’s being constitutively dependent on our practices means that it comes into existence by virtue of our practices. The fact that we determine existence conditions, on her account, is limited to causal social construction. I see no reason for this limitation.

For Constructivism  69 16 For those who argue that planets are not constructed, Nietzsche’s account need not even be developed to this point in order to warrant an objection. For instance, Thomasson (2015, 60) writes: “The meaning of ‘planet’ similarly depends on our choice of conceptual scheme, but planets [. . .] don’t depend on there being any conceptual scheme whatsoever.” 17 Of course, one might think the boundary conditions are simply vague. For a Nietzschean constructivist response to vagueness, see Chapter 8.1. 18 See Hacking 1999, 24–25; Boghossian 2006, 35; Scheffler 2009, 61. 19 See TL; HH I: 11, 19; GS 111, 121; 354; BGE 192, 268; KSA 11:25[168], 12:2[87], 1887, 12:10[202]. 20 The following argument is indebted to Hales and Welshon 2000, 42–44. 21 For arguments that BGE 36 does not put forward Nietzsche’s view about the fundamental nature of reality, see Clark 1990, ch. 7; Clark and Dudrick 2012, ch. 8. For responses, see Anderson 1994; Hales and Welshon 2000, 102–107; Hill 2007; Loeb 2015. For arguments that Nietzsche wants us to take his fundamental ontology seriously, see Schacht 2000; Hill 2007; Poellner 2013; Loeb 2015. 22 I bracket the fact that in willed drive events subjects often recognize intentional objects. 23 One might read the passage differently. When Nietzsche says that we will not “come to know things this way” he could mean that we cannot have any knowledge of mathematically understood phenomena. However, the reason for this would be that he thinks mathematics and logic are means for us to construct realty. Mathematics and logic do not reveal the way the world is apart from us—there is no such way. 24 Cf. Devitt (2006, 13): “You do not get a realism [viz., object objectivism] worth fighting for by claiming merely that something exists objectively and independently of the mental.” 25 For experiencing force and resistance, see KSA 12:9[91]; for the current body of accepted beliefs, see GS 57, 335; BGE 12, 22; KSA 12:2[108]; for conservatism, see GS 110, 121; for consistency, see BGE 13; 12:7[4]; for scope, see BGE 36; for simplicity, see HH I: 11, 19; BGE 192; KSA 11:26[61], 13:14[152], 12:9[97], 12:9[89], 12:9[144]; for utility, see GS 110; BGE 4, 21, KSA 11:34[253]; for selfidentity and equivalence, see HH I: 11, 19; GS 111, 355; BGE 4, 21; 12:9[97], 12:7[4], 12:2[139]. 26 For an interesting discussion about how Nietzsche construes the relation between reality and how we are affected in experience, see Poellner 1995, 88ff. 27 See McDowell 1996; Hanna 2008; 2011; 2014; Allais 2009; Tolley 2011; Griffith 2012; Connolly 2014. For a nice summary of the conceptualism vs. non-conceptualism debate in Kant, see McLear 2014. McLear reads Kant as a non-conceptualist. 28 See Anderson 1999; Green 2002; Schacht 1983; Welshon 2014. Welshon comes close to identifying Nietzsche’s conceptualism when he claims that for Nietzsche “sensory perception” is “infused” with certain “categories” (Welshon 2014, 84). However, Welshon holds that Nietzsche’s view is identical to Kant’s view that the “categories” are “added after sensory transduction” (Welshon 2014, 84). I dispute this reading below. Wilcox is right to claim that, for Nietzsche, “sensations and perception are in part conceptual” (Wilcox 1974, 152). But Wilcox provides no explanation of this view. Katsafanas appears to challenge the conceptualist reading of Nietzsche when he writes that “the sense organs just by themselves generate perceptions with determinately structured content,” but “perceptual content could be determinately structured in a way that does not involve concepts” (Katsafanas 2016, 31). Kastsafanas is expressly interested in unconscious perception, however, which I am not concerned with here. When Katsafanas

70  For Constructivism talks about perception in general, he writes that “some perceptions represent their objects in a definite way, but do not represent them as instantiating concepts” (Katsafanas 2016, 32). As evidence, he cites KSA 13:14[152] and BGE 192. Yet these passages do not seem to support his reading. Consider just BGE 192, where Nietzsche says, “Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing once more an image that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is new and different,” and that we often “do not see a tree exactly and completely with reference to leaves, twigs, color, and form; it is so very much easier for us simply to improvise an approximation of a tree” (BGE 192). Nothing here implies that perceptions represent content apart from conceptual structuring. For example, the passage allows for it to be the case that the typical image produced by our eye is indeed conceptually structured, at least at some level. Such structuring could help explain why we can actually succeed in representing “leaves, twigs, color, and form,” despite the fact that such success might not occur often. 29 For a nice account of this influence, see Emden 2014, cf. Stack 1983. 30 The exception is Friedrich Beneke, who advances something like Lockean empiricism, despite identifying himself as a neo-Kantian. Thanks to Frederick Beiser for helpful correspondence. 31 For a list of those who embrace this position, see Allais 2015, ch. 7, note 7. 32 See Allais 2015, ch. 7. 33 See also KSA 12:9[106]. 34 See also A 20; BGE 80, 207; EH “Books” 5; GS P: 3.

4 Objections to Constructivism

Constructivism is contentious, no doubt about it. Whether offered by Nietzsche or considered as a metaphysical position in its own right, the idea that concrete objects depend for their existence on human practices seems wrong. Accordingly, objections to constructivism abound. This chapter responds to five objections that, unfortunately, have not been addressed by commentators defending constructivist interpretations of Nietzsche. The objections primarily concern issues that could be raised from inside Nietzsche’s philosophical program. That is, constructivism appears inconsistent with his other philosophical commitments. I also address some worries that concern constructivism in general, Nietzsche’s brand or otherwise. My aim here is to show that Nietzsche’s constructivism is compatible with his other philosophical views and that his constructivism is not a hopelessly defective philosophical position on its own terms. I do not pretend to show that Nietzsche holds the right view of material objects. I simply argue that no obvious or standard objection to his constructivism does him under, despite the fact that constructivism is far outside the ordinary. Before continuing, note an important disclaimer. Some responses to objections that I develop below, although perfectly consistent with Nietzsche’s texts, move beyond the texts. Nietzsche does not always have a final, considered view on all matters. For those who believe that Nietzsche only pledges allegiance to what can be definitively shown with the given corpus, consider some of the responses below Nietzschean—they are developed with a watchful eye to what Nietzsche would most likely say, all things considered.

4.1 Anthropomorphism The first objection to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist turns on the idea that construction involves interpreting the world to have human features. Nietzsche appears to be critical of such anthropomorphism (see GS 109; BGE 22). Of course, constructivist readers might reject this charge at the outset. Constructivism does not hold that objects literally have human qualities, but that groups of empirical properties are the result of human activities. The phenomenalist view that properties of objects are identical

72 Objections to our perceptual states seems anthropomorphic. But constructivism is not phenomenalism. Nonetheless, it might be argued that, for Nietzsche, what objects are rests on features of what subjects are. This could motivate the charge of anthropomorphism. Consider the following: Man’s three “inner facts,” the things he believed most firmly—the will, the mind, the I—were projected out of himself: he derived the concept of Being from the concept of the I, and posited the existence of “things” after his own image, after his concept of the I as cause [. . .] The thing itself, to say it again, the concept of thing: just a reflection of the belief in the I as cause. (TI “Errors” 3; see also “Reason” 5; GM I: 13; KSA 12:2[83]) The idea is that agents fashion and apply the concepts of and based on the belief that the self is an entity ontologically independent of its will. Since Nietzsche holds that belief in this conception of the self is erroneous, it seems to follow that belief in Being and objects is erroneous. Nietzsche appears to be saying that our organization of the world into objects rests on an anthropomorphic error. Consider Being before turning to objects. In general, Nietzsche understands Being as that which is distinct from change, but somehow renders change possible. According to Nietzsche, people believe the world exhibits Being because, insofar as “every event [is] an action, every action the result of a will,” people consider the subject to be ontologically distinct from its willed actions, and go on to project this belief “onto every event” (TI “Errors” 3). As a result, “Being is thought in, foisted in everywhere as cause; only following on from the conception ‘I’ is the concept ‘Being’ derived” (TI “Reason” 5). As I argued in Chapter 2, Nietzsche rejects the existence of some ontologically distinct self, or “substratum,” apart from a subject’s actions (or thoughts). He writes, “There is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (GM I: 13). Subjects are not ontologically independent of their actions (or thoughts). In a similar manner, reality is wholly dynamic. Hence, it is incorrect to believe the world exhibits Being. Now consider objects. Nietzsche holds that belief in the subject-action conception of the subject lures philosophers into thinking that objects have natures ontologically independent of changes they might undergo. This form of anthropomorphism leads to a view of objecthood that assumes intrinsic properties constitute an object’s identity. Remember that F is an intrinsic property of any object a if and only if a’s having (or not having) F is ontologically independent of the existence, and of the non-existence, of any contingent b such that a is wholly distinct from b. Importantly, Nietzsche can criticize the idea that objects have intrinsic properties while embracing constructivism. Constructivism holds that all properties of objects

Objections  73 are ontologically dependent on human practices. Thus, constructivism denies that intrinsic features constitute the conditions of identity of objects. Nietzsche’s criticism of anthropomorphism about objects is therefore consistent with his constructivism. What should we make of Nietzsche’s criticisms of anthropomorphism? Consider the most recognized passage on the topic: Let us beware.—Let us beware of thinking that the world is a living being. [. . .] After all, we know roughly what the organic is; are we then supposed to reinterpret what is inexpressibly derivative, late, rare, accidental, which we perceive only on the crust of the earth, as something essential, common, and eternal, as those people do who call the universe an organism? Let us beware even of believing that the universe is a machine [. . .] The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called [. . .] Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness or unreason or their opposites: it is neither perfect, nor noble, nor beautiful, nor does it want to become any of these things; in no way does it strive to imitate man! In no way do our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it! [. . .] Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who obeys, no one who transgresses [. . .] Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things. There are no eternally enduring substances; matter is as much of an error as the god of the Eleatics. But when will we be done with our caution and care? When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature? (GS 109) The end of the passage reveals Nietzsche’s target: “shadows of God.” As one commentator aptly remarks, Nietzsche “calls for a ‘de-deification’, rather than a de-humanization’, of nature” (Cox 1999, 102). Rather than saying that reference to our practical activities must be washed out of interpretations of worldly phenomena, Nietzsche thinks our interpretations should be naturalized. Commitment to naturalism informs Nietzsche’s conviction that the world should not be interpreted to have features often believed to have been granted by God, such as eternal form, purpose, order, beauty, laws of nature, and substance.1 This is not an objection to anthropocentric interpretation tout court, but rather to anthropomorphic interpretation inconsistent with naturalism.2

74 Objections Constructivism appears perfectly compatible with naturalism.3 On ­ ietzsche’s account, all organic phenomena are engaged in rudimentary N “constructive” activity. He notes, “As a matter of fact, the existing world, which is relevant for us, is made by us—by us, that is, by all organic beings—it is the product of the organic process” (KGW VII/2, 26[203]). Here is another helpful passage: “men and all organic creatures have done more or less the same thing: they have arranged, thought, devised the world to fit, until they could make use of it, until it could be ‘reckoned’ with” (KSA 11:40[36]). Organic beings function successfully by engaging in activities that contribute to structuring the world in accordance with their needs. The activity of constructing objects on the part of human beings is just a highly complex instance of the organizational process in which all natural beings participate.4 Nietzsche’s constructivism and his naturalism then fit nicely with one another. What about Nietzsche’s repeated attacks on the Protagorean idea that human beings are “the measure of all things”? Such criticisms seem to challenge anthropomorphism. But these criticisms, I suggest, are compatible with Nietzsche’s constructivism. Consider four representative passages. In “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Nietzsche denies that we can “treat man as the measure of all things” (TL 1). However, he justifies this claim by arguing that we cannot know the basic features of the objects of experience—a position, we have seen, that he rejects in later works. Other passages that address the Protagorean view do not target constructivism. In Human, all-too-Human, Nietzsche denies that “man” is a “sure measure of things” because we cannot draw conclusions about the nature of all humankind from the nature of contemporary humankind (HH I: 2). This holds regardless of the truth or falsity of constructivism. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche rejects the assumption that “not just man is the ‘measure of things’ ” because he rejects the view that we must appeal to some standard fully outside human experience to judge our practices (BGE 3).5 Again, constructivism is not at issue. And finally, although Nietzsche does note that the “hyperbolic naiveté of man” is “positing himself as the meaning and measure of the value of things,” he adds that this naiveté occurs because “the values by means of which we have tried to render the world estimable for ourselves and which proved inapplicable and therefore devaluated the world [. . .] have been falsely projected into the essence of things (KSA 13:11[99]). We have fashioned values that cannot be realized in the conditions of this world, but our false sense of confidence renders us unaware of this fact. Constructivism is a different matter altogether. In sum, Nietzsche’s Protagorean criticisms do not impede his approval of constructivism about objects.

4.2  Problems With Language Constructivism holds that descriptive representations partly, but essentially, constitute the nature of objects. One might argue that Nietzsche rejects

Objections  75 constructivism because he believes concepts cannot represent reality. This view is present in Nietzsche’s early works, but largely disappears in later publications. The challenge to my reading is this: Nietzsche appears to think concepts fail at capturing reality in his so-called “middle period,” which, I have suggested, contains evidence of his mature position on objects. In Human, all-too-Human, for instance, he writes: Language as putative science.—The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it. To the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates [viz., something eternally true] he has appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world. The sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge of things; language is, in fact, the first stage of the occupation with science. Here, too, it is the belief that the truth has been found out of which the mightiest sources of energy have flowed. A great deal later—only now—it dawns on men that in their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous error [. . .] Logic too depends on presuppositions with which nothing in the real world corresponds, for example on the presupposition that there are identical things, that the same thing is identical at different points of time: but this science came into existence through the opposite belief (that such conditions do obtain the real world. It is the same with mathematics, which would certainly not have come into existence if one had known from the beginning that there was in nature no exactly straight line, no real circle, no absolute magnitude. (HH I: 11, brackets added) We have fashioned a language and taken it to represent a world other than the one Nietzsche regards as the real one. Statements about this other world are believed to be eternally true. This leads people to think they have attained genuine knowledge. The problem of course is that the world in question does not exist, just as assumptions central to both logic and mathematics, including diachronic identity and perfectly straight lines, do not exist. In this sense, “belief in language” has actually “propagated a tremendous error.” It seems that language fails to represent reality—let alone construct it. However, the error Nietzsche identifies is not simply that language fails to capture reality. The error is that we have taken language to represent a world that does not exist, specifically a world that guarantees truth. Other passages in HH characterize this non-existent world as “fixed,” whereas the real world is interminably in the “course of becoming” (HH I: 16). A

76 Objections “fixed” world is one with an a priori definite structure. A world of “becoming” lacks such a structure. Our statements can be eternally true (“aeternae veritates”) only in a fixed world. On Nietzsche’s account, though, “There are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths,” because “everything has become” (HH I: 2). The world is not fixed. There are no everlasting truths. Hence, in HH, Nietzsche holds that language fails to refer to reality only if reality is fixed. Since he rejects that conception of reality, there is no reason to suppose that language fails to represent objects. So far, so good. But now a related problem crops up. Nietzsche thinks concepts necessarily falsify. Concepts falsify because they generalize over particulars. Generalization requires simplification, and simplified representations, which are inexact, are not literally true. For this reason, Nietzsche often links simplification with falsification. Consider just three passages. Nietzsche remarks, “The spirit’s power to appropriate the foreign stands revealed in its inclination to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold [. . .]—just as it involuntarily emphasizes certain features and lines in what is foreign, [. . .] retouching and falsifying the whole to suit itself (BGE 230, emphasis added). He claims that consciousness consists in “experiences [. . .] that have all been simplified, made easy to survey and grasp, thus falsified” (KSA 11:37[4], first emphasis added). And “ ‘illusoriness’, he says, “is a trimmed and simplified world” (KSA 13:14[93]).6 If conceptual representations are inexact, and inexact representations are false, then conceptual representations are false. This may cause constructivists to squirm. Constructivism now appears incompatible with truth. Specifically, it seems that there can be no true statements regarding what we construct. Yet, it will emerge in the next chapter, I follow many commentators in taking Nietzsche to believe that we can indeed make true evaluations about the world. But how can this be possible? The solution, I suggest, is that Nietzsche thinks representations are simultaneously true and false, but not inconsistent. He proclaims that “Truth” is a “kind of error” (KSA 11: 34[253], cf. GS 265), where ‘kind’ [Art] could also be translated as ‘type’ or ‘form’. True representations are a particular kind, type, or form of false representation.7 Truth, then, is a particular kind, type, or form of inexact representation. This position is workable only on the assumption that Nietzsche rejects bivalence about truth, which he does: “Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of ‘true’ and ‘false’? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance— different ‘values’, to use the language of painters?” (BGE 34). Nietzsche believes that it is best to understand truth as an approximate evaluation. A representation is approximately true to the extent that what it describes is similar to the target described. How are approximately true statements evaluated? As an analogy, consider assessing the accuracy of maps. Maps are representationally successful just in case they are accurate enough to satisfy some specified set of

Objections  77 concerns in relation to representing some target. Roadmaps, for example, are constructed to represent distances and omit information about atmospheric conditions, animal populations, etc. Our interests are crucial for determining the parameters that constitute representational success. Likewise, the application of an approximate representation will be evaluated relative to some set of concerns. Our concerns help render the truth conditions of approximate representations determinate. To assess those conditions, then, we must delineate which interests are relevant, and to what degree, relative to representing some target. A representation is similar to its target only in approximations, just as a map is similar to its target only in certain respects. Importantly, Nietzsche can consistently embrace the position that truth is approximate in conjunction with the view that conceptual representation is inexact. An inexact representation can be accurate insofar as it satisfies what we determine to be representational success. Consider the statement that some person is six feet tall. No one is six feet tall exactly. The length of our backbones fluctuates throughout the day. Of course, we could specify a particular time to measure height. But this is an idealization that requires idealizing further variables, such as posture, skin-cell surface, and so forth. Nonetheless, the inexact statement that someone is six feet tall is an accurate representation of the discrepancy between the measure of the person’s being six feet tall and any measure that includes negligible attributes falls inside the boundaries that constitute representational success. In this sense, literally false statements can be approximately true. Nietzsche can therefore be a constructivist and accept the fact that we can make true assessments about the objects of experience. His preferred “theory” of truth, if any, is examined in the following chapter. The crucial point here is that conceptual representation need not merely result in falsity, despite the fact that such representations necessarily falsify. Representations concerning constructions can be false while being approximately true.

4.3  Contradiction and Construction The next objection to my interpretation of Nietzsche can be extracted from a passage in Daybreak. Nietzsche writes: Words lie in our way!—Wherever primitive mankind set up a word, they believed they had made a discovery. How different the truth is!—they had touched on a problem, and by supposing they had solved it they had created a hindrance to its solution.—Now with every piece of knowledge one has to stumble over dead, petrified words, and one will sooner break a leg than a word. (D 47, cf. KSA 11:34[195]) Here is why the passage poses a problem for reading Nietzsche as a constructivist. The constructivist holds that by devising and applying concepts

78 Objections to the world in experience we bring objects into existence. When our ancestors devised and applied concepts to the world, then, it is reasonable to think that they brought certain objects into existence. But according to the passage above, their efforts failed to represent reality. So, the objection goes, it appears that our ancestors brought into existence objects that do not exist! Examining constructed objects at a particular time, rather than over time, could generate a similar problem. If constructivism were true, it seems that one group of people could state that some object exists, while another group could state that the same object does not exist—and both could be right. Since this possibility results in a contradiction, constructivism is false. Here is the argument: (CO1) If constructivism is true, it is possible that some object o exists and does not exist. (CO2) It is not possible that o exists and does not exist. (CO3) So, constructivism is false. In order to understand Nietzsche’s response, return to planets. The non-constructivist holds that if planets are constructed then it is possible that they both exist and do not exist. Perhaps one group of astronomers (A1) adopts our current view and maintains that planets are objects that orbit our sun, retain hydrostatic equilibrium, and have cleared the neighborhood around their orbit. Can another group of astronomers (A2) produce an inconsistent description? It is easy to imagine (A2) stating that planets exist but with different identity conditions. This would not conflict with statements made by (A1). Obviously, it is possible to state that planets both exist and do not exist if there are differently specified sets of what constitutes the application conditions of the concept of being a planet. Perhaps only one set is correct. Perhaps only one group produces their description by paying careful attention to the checks and balances that guide construction. Additionally, if it is specified that planets are objects with a particular set of identity conditions—that either (A1) or (A2) is correct—it is not possible to state correctly that planets both exist and do not exist. If there are objects with those identity conditions, planets exist, and if not, planets do not exist. So, CO1 is false. Constructivism can be true and not result in one and the same object both existing and not existing. How does Nietzsche understand the constructive practices of different groups of people, particularly our ancestors? Remember that there are constraints on the construction process. In particular, sensory information must be accounted for when organizing the world in some way rather than another. Importantly, though, sensory information does not by itself constrain organization in any unique manner. Information relevant to our purposes draws greater attention (see KSA 12:5[19]). Our ancestors constructed objects in accordance with how they were affected in accordance with their interests. Over time, the ways in which people are affected and what people find relevant change. For Nietzsche, many older ways of organizing the

Objections  79 world fail to do justice to the current ways in which we are affected and fail to satisfy current interests. Although our ancestors oftentimes “believed they had made a discovery,” they had only “touched on a problem” that modern ways of arranging reality address with much better success (D 47). We have outlived the usefulness of some concepts our ancestors applied to describe reality. Accordingly, Nietzsche often claims that we need new concepts to better reflect our experiences (see KSA 11:34[195], cf. BGE 211). Due to a difference in interests and how experience is attended to, then, currently constructed objects are either distinct in kind from formerly constructed objects or the same in kind with distinct identity conditions. It could also be the case that the objects our ancestors seemed to have constructed never existed. Their organization of reality may simply have been mistaken. Perhaps they failed to account for certain limiting factors like sensory information. The idea that people have failed to consider such constraints on inquiry, particularly constraints provided by a commitment to naturalism, informs much of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, for example, Nietzsche contends that the received view of the origin of our moral values, according to which our values are derived from utilitarian and Darwinian presuppositions, fails to reflect reality. The received view ignores reasons that suggest that our moral values actually arose in accordance with various life-negating functions. Although we have overwhelmingly accepted the received view, Nietzsche believes, we are wrong. Something similar could be the case with respect to objects. Our ancestors could have failed to account for constraints that we now know should inform our organization of the world.8

4.4  Unperceived Objects Constructivism about objects has been attacked most often because it cannot account for the nature of unperceived objects.9 Since it would seem that unperceived objects are unconstructed, and constructivism holds that all objects are constructed, constructivism appears false. There are three versions of this objection. Constructivism cannot account for: objects that currently exist but are unperceived; objects that currently exist but will never be perceived; and objects that existed before there were perceivers. This section concerns how Nietzsche might respond to these objections. The responses I develop are influenced by themes in Kant.10 It is true that Nietzsche rejects Kant’s a priori metaphysical program. But he does support Kant’s view that sensible objects depend essentially on subjects, and, I suggest, this commitment reflects Nietzsche’s sympathies with Kant’s conception of empirical reality. I argue that Nietzsche can respond to objections concerning unperceived objects by appeal to Kant’s conception of empirical reality. The first objection turns on the idea that some objects are currently unperceived. Currently unperceived objects are objects that exist in the present

80 Objections that have not been encountered, such as distant stars. The existence of such objects suggests this argument: (UA1) Some objects that currently exist are unperceived. (UA2) Currently unperceived objects are unconstructed. (UA3) If UA1 and UA2, constructivism is false. (UA4) So, constructivism is false. UA1 appears uncontroversial—one need only glance up at the heavens and let one’s mind wander. UA2 appears warranted because currently unperceived objects seem to have conditions of identity apart from our activities. UA1 and UA2 together, then, provide good reason to think that constructivism is false. R. Kevin Hill suggests that Nietzsche has a non-constructivist response to the worry (see Hill 2003, 138–140). The response reflects a Berkeleyan version of Kantian idealism. For Hill, Nietzsche denies that currently unperceived objects exist—he challenges UA1. On this account, Nietzsche embraces the panpsychist view that “there are enough finite minds in existence to guarantee that nothing we want to posit in our empirical theories goes unobserved” (Hill 2003, 138). Since reality consists in minded forces, and “force possesses rudimentary awareness of its milieu,” it seems that the “problem of unobserved items is solved” (Hill 2003, 138). This view settles the worry of currently unperceived objects without committing Nietzsche to constructivism. Hill’s reading faces a problem, however, apart from whether Nietzsche embraces panpsychism. To my knowledge, no passage in Nietzsche’s texts advance the view that reality is constituted by what minded forces “perceive.” It is therefore implausible that panpsychism provides Nietzsche’s answer to the worry about unperceived objects. Nietzsche solves the worry by appeal to a particular kind of perception, I argue, but not the “perception” of minded forces. I think Nietzsche has a Kantian constructivist solution to the problem of currently unperceived objects. In the Antinomies of the first Critique, Kant writes: That there could be inhabitants of the moon, even though no human being has ever perceived them, must of course be admitted; but this means only that in the possible progress of experience we could encounter them; for everything is actual that stands in one context with a perception in accordance with the laws of the empirical progression. Thus they are real when they stand in an empirical connection with my real consciousness, although they are not therefore real in themselves, i.e., outside this progress of experience. (Kant 1998, A493/B521) Assume that there are currently unperceived inhabitants on the moon. For Kant, we can represent these inhabitants by encountering them in

Objections  81 the advance of experience, specifically by progressing through a series of possible perceptions, a process enabled by spatial repositioning. The possible “progress of experience” links currently unperceived objects with a “real consciousness.” What is “actual,” or empirically real, is what can be encountered in the “context” of possible perception. According to Kant, if we cannot in principle perceive something, then it has no empirical reality. Nietzsche appears to endorse Kant’s view of empirical reality. He proclaims, “Thus, we construe ‘what is’ as what exerts an effect on us, what proves itself by exerting its effect.—‘Unreal’, ‘illusory’, would be that which is incapable of producing effects, yet appears to produce them” (KSA 12:5[19]). For something to be real it must, in principle, be capable of affecting us. Specifically, something must be able to “cause” some “stimulation” (KSA 12:5[19]).11 Reality is constituted by that which can causally affect us in experience.12 This Kantian conception of reality indicates that currently unperceived are constructed—that UA2 is false. Constructivism holds over all objects we can encounter in experience. If a currently unperceived object is perceivable, then its identity conditions depend upon our representational activities. It is, of course, meaningless to describe currently unperceived objects beyond expressing the empty idea that something may be currently unperceived. For Nietzsche, though, the structure of currently unperceived objects is fixed in relation to how they would be described should they be encountered. Next consider objects that will never be perceived. The existence of such objects suggests this argument against constructivism: (UB1) Some objects that currently exist will never be perceived. (UB2) Objects that will never be perceived are unconstructed. (UB3) If UB1 and UB2, constructivism is false. (UB4) So, constructivism is false. Objects that currently exist but will never be perceived can be understood in two ways. Perhaps some objects will never be perceived because, although they are perceivable, they will never be encountered. On this reading, Nietzsche will deny UB2. Like Kant, he believes perceivable objects are constructed. But perhaps some objects will never be perceived because they are strictly unperceivable. It is clear that such objects, like Kantian things in themselves, are unconstructed. If this reading were adopted, however, Nietzsche would deny UB1. As I argued in Chapter 1, Nietzsche believes unperceivable objects do not exist. Nietzsche declares, “There are no things in themselves!” (KSA 12:2[154]). We turn, finally, to objects in the past. Constructivism appears false because there were objects far before there were perceivers. Here is the argument: (UC1) Some objects exist before perceivers. (UC2) Objects that exist before perceivers are unconstructed.

82 Objections (UC3) If UC1 and UC2, constructivism is false. (UC4) So, constructivism is false. Objects that exist before perceivers are either perceivable or not perceivable. If they are not perceivable, Nietzsche will reject their existence. That is, he will deny UC1. And if they are perceivable, Nietzsche will say that they are constructed. But this runs into a problem. How do we perceive and construct objects that exist before we exist? Again, Nietzsche can follow Kant’s lead. In the Antinomies, Kant says: All those events which have elapsed in the immense periods that have preceded my own existence mean really nothing but the possibility of extending the chain of experience from the present perception back to the conditions which determine it in time. (Kant 1998, A495/B523, translation slightly modified) Past phenomena are identified with the possibility of extending perceptions of some object in the present back to that which determines the object as arising in the course of time. A necessary condition of perceiving that which determines an object as arising in the course of time seems to be that the object must be perceived as having some past. I perceive my dog now, for instance, one day from when I last perceived him. The present perception of my dog is the latest in the chain of ongoing possible perceptions of my dog that precede the present. If my aim is to represent “immense periods that have preceded my own existence,” however, then I must represent something that has some permanent reality, which Kant regards as substance. He writes, “That which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances [viz., objects] can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e. the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of change always remains the same” (Kant 1998, B225, brackets added). Since substantial objects endure, it is possible to represent reality before perceivers. Importantly, Kant maintains that the existence conditions of past objects depend solely upon our ability to represent those objects. The past is “nothing but the possibility of extending the chain of experience,” he claims, and “objects” are “real in past time only insofar as I represent to myself” a “regressive series of possible perceptions” that “leads to a timeseries that has elapsed as the condition of the present time” (Kant 1998, A495/B523, italics added). The existence conditions of past objects depend essentially on presenting to myself a set of possible experiences that can be traced back which determine my current perceptions in time. Nietzsche can follow Kant, but only to a certain extent. Nietzsche famously rejects conceiving objects as substances. He must then give an account of how we can represent past objects without appeal to some permanent reality. For this task, he could utilize Kant’s insight that the existence conditions of past objects depend on representing presently perceived

Objections  83 objects as having a history that can be tracked. In order to attend to present perceptions in this manner, it is not required that we represent substantial objects that abide the permanent flow of time. Rather, we could attend to present perceptions as determined by a chain of causes and effects that stretch into the past. Kant even mentions that the past exists in “the footsteps of causes and effects” (Kant 1998, A495/B523). For Nietzsche, past objects are perceivable and constructed in the following way. Objects come into existence at some time and cease to exist at another. This process is causally conditioned. Since the conditions of the present are a causal consequence of the conditions of the past, the existence conditions of past objects depend essentially on the possibility that we can track causal interactions from the present back in time. More specifically, the existence conditions of some object o depend essentially on the possibility that we can track a series of causal interactions back from some present perception to a context in which the application conditions for the category of o are met. The identity conditions of o are constructed, then, because the application conditions of our concepts involve conditions relevant to us about whether some concept correctly applies to some portion of experience. To illustrate, if something is identified as some kind of object before there were perceivers, say dinosaur d, it is because we can track a successive causal chain back from some present perception, perhaps the perception of some configuration of fossils, to a context in which the application conditions for the category d are satisfied, and we decide that some set of conditions, rather some other, correctly constitute that context. Since application conditions fix conditions of identity for whatever satisfies them, Nietzsche can say that perceivable objects before perceivers are perceivable and constructed. Of course, Nietzsche’s Kantian account has limitations. In particular, it cannot make sense of past objects that have no causal connection to what can be presently perceived. But this limitation is not unique. It is shared by any account of historical phenomena. And it is important to remember that Nietzsche’s view does not require actually tracking causal interactions back in time from present perceptions, but only the possibility of such tracking procedures. Objects actually exist, and have existed, insofar as it is possible to perceive them. I have argued that key themes in Kant’s first Critique can help Nietzsche respond to three variants of the charge that constructivism about objects cannot account for unperceived objects. Currently unperceived objects, as well as objects before perceivers, are constructed if they are perceivable, and strictly unperceivable objects do not exist. What has often been taken to be the most damaging criticism of constructivism, then, need not worry Nietzsche.

4.5  Circularity and Construction On Nietzsche’s view, as I understand it, objecthood appears to be a relational property: objects exist in relation to our practical engagements with

84 Objections the world.13 This view has been charged with being problematically circular.14 Nietzsche’s account seems to employ the notion of subjects to explain construction, but subjects could be considered objects too. This generates the following argument against constructivism: (CC1) Subjects are objects. (CC2) So, if constructivism is true, the identity conditions of subjects depend essentially on subjects’ interpretive practices. (CC3) The identity conditions of subjects do not depend essentially on subjects’ interpretive practices. (CC4) So, constructivism is false. CC1 is justified by the idea that subjects are a particular type of object, namely, living objects. CC2 is warranted by substituting ‘subject’ for ‘object’ in the constructivist thesis. The worry about circularity applied to subjects supports CC3. Assuming that existence conditions require conditions of identity, to deny CC3 would be to say that the existence of subjects is dependent on subjects interpreting themselves to exist. But surely, the existence of subjects interpreting themselves to exist is dependent on subjects existing. Thus, when constructivism is applied to subjects as objects, constructivism is false.15 In response, it is imperative to recall Nietzsche’s view that the genuine subject is constructed by (at least) hierarchically organizing drives and affects. Forming a coherent organization of drives and affects renders us more than mere human organisms. Nietzsche writes, “one should not at all assume that many humans are ‘people’ [. . .] the ‘person’ is a relatively isolated fact [. . .] it is almost something unnatural” (KSA 12:10[59]).16 A genuine self is something earned. It is an achievement. “For a genuine person to emerge,” Nietzsche notes, there need to be certain conditions in place, such as being “isolated from an early age,” being “compelled to live a life of offence and defense,” having “a greater capacity for seclusion,” and being “far less impressionable than ordinary men, whose humane qualities are contagious” (KSA 12:10[59]).17 Given this view of the subject, Nietzsche might deny CC3, which holds that the identity conditions of subjects do not depend essentially on subjects’ interpretive practices, by disambiguating two meanings of ‘subject’. Though the identity conditions of genuine subjects do not depend essentially on genuine subjects’ interpretive practices, the identity conditions of genuine subjects depend essentially on the interpretive practices of human organisms. The obvious objection, however, is that while genuine subjects might be constructed, the identity conditions of subjects conceived as human organisms do not depend essentially on the practices of human beings. The circularity objection could simply be re-stated at the level of the human organism. Nietzsche has two options here. The first option is to resist CC1. If that premise were reformulated with ‘human being’ rather than ‘subject’, CC1

Objections  85 would claim that human beings are objects. Does Nietzsche accept this reformulation? He certainly thinks human beings, along with objects such as trees and birds, are complex configurations of bundles of forces. However, he also suggests that there are ontologically significant differences between human beings and other objects. Most importantly, human beings are conscious.18 For Nietzsche, consciousness requires a conceptual vocabulary, which only human beings enjoy. Having a conceptual vocabulary can deepen self-awareness, and thus enable human beings to create genuine selves: “The sign-inventing person is also the one who becomes ever more acutely conscious of himself; for only as a social animal did man learn to become conscious of himself” (GS 354). The idea that human organisms are some unique kind of thing indicates that humans are not objects—or not merely objects. If so, CC1 is false. Subjects are not objects.19 This may not be Nietzsche’s best response. It’s plausibility requires ­Nietzsche to provide an account of why our having the unique property of consciousness is ontologically different from some object’s having some unique property, such that the former differentiates human existence from the existence of mere objects. Perhaps, then, Nietzsche might resist the reformulation of CC3, which holds that the identity conditions of human beings do not depend essentially on human beings’ interpretive practices. It could be the case that the conditions of identity of the human organism depend essentially on the practices of the human organism, specifically how we understand the human organism. Nietzsche holds that “in man creature and creator are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-giver, hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day” (BGE 225). On this reading, the existence of human organisms is not dependent on human organisms interpreting themselves to exist. Rather, having conditions of identity depends on something existing, and specific conditions are gained only when human organisms interpret themselves in some way or another. This supports Nietzsche’s position that “man has become,” by which he means that “there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths” about human beings (HH I: 2). And notice that there is no circularity here. The existence of human beings does not depend on the existence of human beings. Thus, Nietzsche can deny CC3 by claiming that the identity conditions of subjects do depend essentially on subjects’ interpretive activities.

4.6 Summary This chapter has responded to outstanding objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist. Let me review those responses. The first objection was that Nietzsche’s constructivism involves questionable anthropomorphic interpretations. I argued that Nietzsche both embraces constructivism and criticizes anthropomorphic interpretations. His criticisms turn on the idea that anthropomorphic interpretations either erroneously assume objects

86 Objections have intrinsic properties or fail to meet naturalistic constraints on inquiry. The second objection was that in his so-called “middle period” Nietzsche denies that words can represent reality. But, I argued, Nietzsche believes that words fail to capture reality only if the world is believed to have an a priori fixed structure, which he rejects. Moreover, although Nietzsche holds that all conceptual representations are false, they can also simultaneously be true. Nietzsche rejects bivalence and accepts an approximate notion of truth. The third objection was that if constructivism were true then some objects might both exist and not exist. In those seemingly contradictory cases, however, either different objects are constructed or the contradiction does not arise when an object’s identity conditions are specified. The fourth objection was that unperceived objects are unconstructed. If an unperceived object is perceivable, whether currently or in the past, Nietzsche thinks the object is constructed. And if an unperceived object is not perceivable, it does not exist. The fifth and last objection was that constructivism involves vicious circularity. Nietzsche can deny the circularity by saying either that subjects are distinct from objects or that whatever constructs objects gains conditions of identity through experience of itself and the world. These objections are, of course, not exhaustive, but I hope to have shown that Nietzsche’s constructivism is consistent with his other philosophical commitments, and that no obvious or standard objection undermines his view, despite the fact that constructivism is unorthodox. Fortunately, Nietzsche has no problem offering unorthodox views—especially ones with legs to stand on.

Notes 1 For discussion, see Cox 1999, 101–103. 2 Loeb’s (2015) interesting reading of BGE 36 assumes that Nietzsche rejects anthropomorphism tout court. As far as I can tell, however, Loeb never offers an argument for the view. Loeb (2015, note 23, cf. note 33) seems to criticize Cox (1999), who I cite here, for failing to understand that Nietzsche’s criticism of anthropomorphism extends to naturalistic interpretations. However, the notebook passage Loeb cites to support his reading (KSA 9:11[201]) only criticizes anthropomorphic interpretations that take the world to be an “organism” on faith, similar to faith in God. For Nietzsche, this is clearly not a naturalized interpretation of the world. 3 For a general defense of this claim, see Haslanger 2012, 210–214. 4 Heidegger (1979) develops this reading of Nietzsche. 5 For an illuminating discussion, see Clark and Dudrick 2012, 54–57. 6 Katsafanas holds that, on Nietzsche’s view, “simplification happens synchronically; falsification tends to happen diachronically,” such that “detecting falsification therefore requires focusing on extended stretches of mental activity” (Katsafanas 2016, 56). But the passages I have quoted here do not support such a reading. Rather, Nietzsche seems to think simplification straightforwardly implies falsification. 7 For development and criticism of two alternative readings, see Remhof 2016.

Objections  87 8 Notice that my response does not depend on quantifier variance, despite the fact that quantifier variance is often linked to constructivist views like Nietzsche’s (cf. Putnam 1987) and advanced to solve similar puzzles. I leave it open whether Nietzsche embraces quantifier variance. 9 See, for example, Boghossian 2006, 42–57; Ferraris 2015b, 15–34; Thomasson 2015, 60. 10 My reading of Kant is greatly indebted to conversations with Arthur Melnick and Todd Kukla. Melnick (2004) and Allais (2015, 137–144) have also been very helpful. 11 One might think that the notebook entry from which this is taken shows Nietzsche to embrace a falsification thesis that undermines the Kantian conception of empirical reality I attribute to him. For instance, Nietzsche starts the passage by saying “The world which matters to us is only illusory, unreal” (KSA 12:5[19). Although I think Nietzsche overstates his case by saying that we are “only” acquainted with illusions, the reason he seems to give for such a claim, which can be culled from a handful of notebook entries around the time of the entry in question (for example, KSA 12:5[16], 12:5[22]), is that the world which matters to us is only disclosed through various simplifying mechanisms, such as linguistic and logical abbreviations, which does not entail wholesale falsification. 12 Nietzsche’s naturalism lends support to his view of empirical reality as well. For Nietzsche, I argue in Chapter 5.3, there is no justification for claims that cannot be in principle confirmed in the study of the empirical world. Consequently, justified claims pertaining to what exists are limited to that which can be encountered in the empirical world. 13 At least one contemporary metaphysician, Jubien (1992), holds this view. The difference between Nietzsche and Jubien is that Jubien thinks the relata are two intrinsically individuated substances. 14 See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997, 76. See also Elder 2004, ch. 1.3. 15 Nietzsche should recognize some version of this argument by virtue of his challenge to Schopenhauer’s problematic position that, while the human brain constructs objects, the brain also appears to be a constructed object (for a discussion, see Hill 2003, 124). BGE 15 also presents an argument against the position that our sense organs are the cause of our sense organs, though here Nietzsche appears to challenge the idealist view that objects consist in ideas, rather than constructivism (see Clark and Dudrick 2012, 98–103). 16 This translation is Hill’s (2016). 17 This translation is Hill’s (2016). 18 For an influential defense of the view that consciousness differentiates humans from all other objects, see Merricks 2003. 19 Of course, this leaves open whether the identity conditions of human beings depend on human beings. But targeting CC1 renders the truth or falsity of constructivism a separate issue, since constructivism applies to objects, not human beings. Also, one might object to the idea that on Nietzsche’s account human beings are ontologically distinct from objects. For example, he thinks that viewing human beings as unique is placing humanity in a “false rank order in relation to animals and nature” (GS 115, see also GM III: 25). But the attributes Nietzsche thinks lead human beings to hold such a view are those often associated with what God presumably granted human beings, such as rationality, or even Kantian pure reason. Nietzsche can deny this view while remaining committed to the view that humans are unique because they are conscious.

5 Consequences of Constructivism

Nietzsche’s view of material objects has consequences that extend beyond metaphysics. I have already touched on how his position is intertwined with his views on language, the subject, mathematics and logic, and more. In this chapter, I expand on why it pays to read Nietzsche as a constructivist. Specifically, I explore how Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism helps resolve three areas of deep-seated interpretive dispute regarding his philosophical project at large. These areas are truth, science, and naturalism. The next chapter investigates how endorsing constructivism could help defuse the advent of nihilism.

5.1 Truth Nietzsche’s remarks on truth have generated substantial disagreement in the secondary literature.1 Does Nietzsche think our linguistic representations can be true? If so, does he prefer some particular theory of truth to others? Or are his remarks on truth merely scattershot? Nietzsche’s understanding of objects, I submit, can help answer these questions. The first issue to address is whether Nietzsche thinks we can make true evaluations about the world. I have already shown my hand here: the answer is a resounding ‘yes’. But not everyone is on board.2 There are roughly two ways Nietzsche’s texts are used to support the view that he rejects truth.3 The first, which we have seen, is that Nietzsche believes that application of concepts to the world necessarily involves falsification. This reading was addressed and discharged in the previous chapter. I argued that, according to Nietzsche, conceptual representation falsifies because such representation is inexact, but inexact representations can also be true. The position that concepts falsify is compatible with retaining truth. The second way Nietzsche is often read as denying truth turns on accepting eliminativism about concrete objects. It is common to think true evaluations that concern the macroscopic empirical world require the existence of objects. Objects are typically thought to be necessary for determining the truth conditions of propositions.4 For the sentence, “The cat is on the mat” to be true, for instance, cats and mats must exist. If there are no objects, then, as

Consequences  89 the eliminativist claims, there may be no true evaluations about the world of everyday experience. And there may be no objects if the world is in a dynamic state of tension. My response to such a reading is easily anticipated. I have argued that Nietzsche rejects eliminativism about objects. Cats and mats exist—there are not merely bundles of forces that seem to be cats and mats. Consequently, there is no reason to reject truth claims about the world of everyday experience.5 But, one might argue, a famous notebook passage undermines this conclusion. Nietzsche writes, “[The world] is ‘in flux’, as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for— there is no ‘truth’ ” (KSA 12:2[108]). Does this show that Nietzsche rejects truth about the world of everyday experience? Not that I can see, though not all agree.6 Nietzsche says that the world is a “falsehood” because it does not exist in some fixed state. To get “near the truth,” the world “in a state of becoming” would have to come to some state of rest. Nietzsche indicates that this state does not exist and will not come into existence. As a result, “there is no ‘truth’. ” This amounts to saying that statements that presume that the world exists in a fixed state or will exist in a fixed state are always false. This is fine by me. The passage says nothing about our statements that concern objects such as cats and mats. Cats and mats, I have argued, are constructed out of the “flux,” and below I contend that this constructive process enables us to make true statements about the macroscopic world. Many commentators are fully on board with the view that Nietzsche believes that true evaluations of the world are possible. Nietzsche clearly asserts that truth exists, and a tremendous amount of passages in the corpus either imply or assume the existence of truth.7 In a particularly memorable notebook passage, he remarks, “The belief that truth does not exist, the nihilists’ belief, is a great stretching of the limbs for someone who, as a warrior of knowledge, is constantly at struggle with so many ugly truths. For the truth is ugly” (KSA 13:11[108]). Nietzsche obviously casts himself as the “warrior of knowledge” battling the “nihilists’ belief” that “truth does not exist.” We must wage this war, he claims, despite the fact that “the truth is ugly.” After all, “plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, [and] immoral [. . .] truths do exist” (GM I: 1). Hence, truths about the world exist. Unless otherwise noted, the remainder of this section proceeds from this conclusion. Accepting that Nietzsche is friendly to truth is one matter, but figuring out his preferred view of truth is quite another. Commentators primarily disagree over whether Nietzsche’s remarks support the correspondence theory of truth or the pragmatist theory of truth.8 Nietzsche certainly has no fully worked out, substantive theory of truth. But what he does say about truth, I claim, is best supported by the pragmatist approach to truth. I am fully aware that reading Nietzsche as a pragmatist has fallen into severe disrepute. The reading lost significant plausibility when Danto’s (1965) pragmatist account was revealed to face major difficulties (see Nehamas 1985, 55ff; Clark 1990, 32–34). My aim is not to save Danto’s reading. My goal is to

90 Consequences show that Nietzsche’s constructivism implies a particular form of pragmatism about truth that has gone unnoticed in the literature. We first need to understand Nietzsche’s relation to the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory holds that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the way things are and false if not. This theory typically assumes that something about the world determines the representational success or failure of propositions. Some ontology of objects must be supplied. Objects are often considered determinate with respect to their properties. That is, for every possible property F, an object must either have the property (be F), or not have the property (be not-F). Objects with determinate properties form the truth conditions of propositions. On the correspondence theory, then, a proposition is true if and only if there exists an appropriate object instantiating a property to which propositions correspond and false if not. It is helpful to distinguish two versions of the correspondence theory of truth. This distinction concerns a difference in ontological commitments. The metaphysical correspondence theory of truth, often associated with Kant, holds that objects have a determinate, fully mind-independent nature.9 In short: objects are noumenal. The neo-classical theory of truth, typically associated with Moore, Russell, and many recent analytic thinkers, holds that objects have a determinate nature, but not a fully mind-independent nature. Someone sympathetic to the neo-classical theory might contend that there is no use trying to utter true statements about a fully mind-independent world. Importantly, however, this does not mean that truth depends on our minds in any significant sense. We simply need to be in some cognitive relation to trees, for instance, in order to utter true and false statements about trees. On this account, the truth conditions of propositions are not essentially dependent on our minds. The objects that render statements truth-evaluable have a determinate nature that is merely conditionally dependent on subjects. Many of Nietzsche’s remarks fit well with the correspondence theory of truth. He writes, “In Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of contact with reality” (A 15). The point seems to be that Christians’ beliefs about causality fail to correspond to features of the empirical world. But which version of the correspondence theory does he accept? At times, Nietzsche suggests that reality has a fully mind-independent nature, specifically, a dynamic state of existence completely separate from our mode of cognition, which renders it impossible to make true statements about determinately structured objects—if objects exist at all. He writes, “There are no facts, everything is fluid, incomprehensible, elusive” [Es giebt keinen Thatbestand, alles ist flüssig, unfaßbar, zurückweichend] (KSA 12:2[82], my translation). Assuming facts render propositions true, this passage could indicate that Nietzsche is sympathetic to the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth.10 Such a theory of truth pairs nicely with reading Nietzsche as an eliminativist about objects. If Nietzsche were committed to the metaphysical correspondence theory, he would most likely reject truth. Clearly, I am not convinced of this reading. I have argued that Nietzsche denies

Consequences  91 the existence of objects that cannot be encountered in experience, that he provides a revisionary account of the existence of determinately structured objects, and that he certainly appears to believe that we can make true evaluations about the everyday world of experience. He then has no good reason to think true statements correspond to objects that cannot be encountered in experience. He rejects the metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. It is not the case that there is no truth because all is “in flux.” Later, I explain why the notebook passage quoted above, KSA 12:2[82], actually supports this conclusion. Reading Nietzsche as someone who supports the neo-classical correspondence theory of truth has become common in the analytic world.11 On this view, Nietzsche believes truth requires the existence of some perspective or other, such that perspectives uncover objects that are ontologically independent of the perspectives on them. Obviously, I think we should resist such a reading. Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism is inconsistent with the ontological commitments of the neo-classical position. For Nietzsche, true propositions correspond to constructed objects. As he explains: The will to truth is a making fixed [Fest-machen], a making true and lasting [ein Wahr-, Dauerhaft-machen] [. . .] a reinterpretation into something that is [or has being: eine Umdeutung desselben ins Seiende]. Truth is thus not something there that must be found out, discovered [Wahrheit ist somit nicht etwas, das as ware und das aufzufinden, zu entdecken ware], but something that must be made and that provides the name for a process—or rather for a will to overcome, a will that left to itself has no end: inserting truth as a processus in infinitum, an active determining [actives Bestimmen] not a becoming conscious of something that is “in itself” fixed and determinate [fest und bestimmt]. (KSA 12:9[91], my translation) The activity of establishing truths brings into existence determinate satisfaction conditions for propositions to correspond. For a proposition to be determinately true or false, something must be constructed, or interpreted into “something that is [or has being].” The need to establish truth motivates this construction process. One might think that on Nietzsche’s view this merely involves constructing the meanings of terms. After all, for a proposition to be determinately true or false its terms cannot be meaningless; altering meanings affects truth conditions; and we clearly create the meanings of our terms. However, the passage above targets the objects of reference of truth-evaluable propositions. Truth, Nietzsche says, is “an active determining,” rather than “something that is in itself fixed and determinate.” Meanings are certainly not “fixed and determinate” apart from our “active determining.” But it is commonly thought that objects have a “fixed and determinate” nature apart from our activities. Truth is not “out there” waiting to be “found out” and “discovered,” Nietzsche writes, but instead “something that must be made.”

92 Consequences Why? Truth requires constructed objects. Constructing objects establishes truth because objects constitute the truth conditions of propositions. Recall that Nietzsche locates his view that we construct objects in history: The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of a thing [. . .] has, through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started as appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its essence! [. . .]—But let us also not forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new “things.” (GS 58) Elsewhere—in a passage that bears an uncanny resemblance to the line of thought introduced in GS 58—he links the process of constructing objects to truth: “Thus and thus it shall be”—that stands at the beginning: later, often after a long series of generations, it becomes a “thus it is.” Later it’s called “truth;” at first it was a will to see something thus and thus, to name it thus and thus, a saying Yes to a value-creation of one’s own. (KSA 11:34[264]) According to Nietzsche, our efforts to bring objects into being by creating concepts that organize the world in experience eventually solidify the referents that determine the truth conditions of propositions. The truth conditions of propositions are then constitutively dependent on our practices in the sense that our contributions are essential for providing the conditions that determine representational success or failure. Nietzsche’s view that we construct objects can be made consistent with the neo-classical correspondence theory if the typical ontological commitments are altered such that objects are not conceived as having determinate natures independently of our practices. Commentators who claim that Nietzsche embraces the neo-classical theory, however, believe Nietzsche sticks to the classic ontological assumptions. For instance, Nola writes that on Nietzsche’s account, “correspondence truths” are “found or discovered” (Nola 1987, 551). And, as we have seen, Clark holds that Nietzsche adopts a “common sense version of the correspondence theory of truth” according to which true propositions correspond to objects that exist “independently of our representations of [them]” (Clark 1990, 40). Nietzsche certainly thinks truths correspond to “found or discovered” objects within domains already established by representational frameworks. But correspondence first requires us to “posit and arrange a world that shall be called true by us” (KSA 12:9[97]). Constructed objects determine which propositions correspond or fail to correspond.

Consequences  93 This conclusion clears the way for my pragmatist reading of Nietzsche. The pragmatist approach to truth is most often associated with William James, so I focus on his view here. James holds that a proposition is true if and only if it is useful. What does ‘useful’ mean?12 First, it is important to notice that, in opposition to typical readings of the pragmatist view of truth, James openly accepts the commonsense view that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality and false if not. He writes, “Truth [. . .] is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their ‘agreement’, as falsity means their disagreement, with ‘reality’. Pragmatists and intellectuals both accept this definition as a matter of course” (James 1981, 91). James continues by remarking, “They begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the term ‘agreement’, and what by the term ‘reality’, when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with” (James 1981, 91). One problem James finds with ‘agreement’ is that proponents of the neoclassical position often desire a semantics that renders truth “static,” meaning that if a proposition is true, it is presumed to be true tenselessly and timelessly (James 1981, 92).13 For James, this presumption does not adequately capture the role of truth in inquiry, where we see that applicable concepts change over time, and truth conditions alter as the complexity of the world in experience unfolds. James contends that truths are such because they help us navigate such complexity. Truths “help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience” (James 1981, 30, see also 97). A proposition functions satisfactorily in experience when it can be integrated into the stock of accepted belief, confirmed, and checked. “True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify” (James 1981, 92). Truths tend not to conflict with subsequent experience—they “lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse” (James 1981, 92). Consequently, truths yield satisfactory results when acted upon. In this sense, truth is useful. Does Nietzsche agree? Perhaps not. Two passages are often thought to stand in the way. First, Nietzsche remarks, “Something might be true while being harmful and dangerous to the highest degree” (BGE 39). If a true proposition is “dangerous to the highest degree,” it appears that truth is not always useful.14 But Nietzsche continues by saying that because there are dangerous truths, “the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the ‘truth’ one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would require it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified” (BGE 39). The claim that truths are “harmful” and “dangerous” does not imply that truths fail to yield successful results in action—they do so all too well! If truths failed to help us navigate experience, they would not need to be “thinned down” for us to “endure” them. Nietzsche thinks some truths need to be “shrouded” or “sweetened” because they might negatively impact some of our longstanding beliefs. The terrifying truth that God is dead might be a good example. But the position that some truths may need to be “sweetened” in no way conflicts with James’s view that truth is useful.

94 Consequences A different passage presents a much stronger challenge to James’s pragmatist approach to truth. Nietzsche claims that “The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment [. . .] The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating” (BGE 4). Nietzsche’s view that falsehoods can generate such satisfactory results is clearly incompatible with James’s position. James holds that it is more advantageous to hold true beliefs than false ones (see James 1981, 93), and Nietzsche famously disagrees (see GS 344). For instance, Nietzsche rhetorically asks, “Is it really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived?” (GS 344). Insofar as propositions that yield satisfactory results may actually be false—and according to Nietzsche, we must “recognize untruth as a condition of life” (BGE 4)—Nietzsche seems to side against pragmatism about truth. For obvious reasons, this reading of Nietzsche is primarily responsible for sinking the pragmatist interpretation of his texts for good. I want to suggest that things are more complicated than they seem. James’s view that truth is useful, I contend, does not merely mean that truth has satisfying consequences. A new reading of the relation between truth and usefulness emerges when we focus on James’s view of reality. Recall, James holds that truth is “a property of certain of our ideas. It means their ‘agreement’, as falsity means their disagreement, with ‘reality’ ” (James 1981, 91). ‘Reality’ is scare-quoted. Why? James rejects the typical ontological commitments of the neo-classical correspondence theory of truth, and instead embraces the “humanist” view that truths are “man-made products” (James 1981, 110). Truths are “man-made” because true propositions name constructed objects. “We break the flux of sensible reality into things, then, at our will,” James says, “We create the subjects of our true as well as our false propositions” (James 1981, 114). Portions of sensory information that are selected and formed into objects constitute the truth conditions of propositions. For James, a “thing” is something we “carve out” of sensory experience “to suit our human purposes,” particularly so that we can employ true and false evaluations (James 1981, 114). He writes, “altho [sic] the stubborn facts remain that there is a sensible flux, what is true of it seems from first to last to be largely a matter of our own creation” (James 1981, 111). Sensory information, which we have no control over, provides an essential criterion of truth, while truth consists in representing selected and organized portions of sensory input. “The world stands really malleable,” James declares, “Man engenders truths upon it” (James 1981, 115). Truth is useful, then, because truth depends on objects constructed in accordance with satisfying our interests. Thus, James advances two ways in which truth is useful. These ways are sometimes advanced in tandem, but each can stand independently of the other. The first concerns truth conceived as a first-order evaluation about the representational success of propositions. The representational success of propositions, James thinks, generates satisfactory results in experience

Consequences  95 when investigating the world. The second way truth is useful concerns truth conceived as a second-order evaluation about the nature of the truth conditions of propositions. The truth conditions of propositions are inseparable from usefulness because the objects that constitute truth conditions are constructed in accordance with our interests. The ability to employ determinately true and false evaluations depends on objects constructed in accordance with what we find useful. The controversy over whether Nietzsche accepts a pragmatic account of truth focuses exclusively on the first of these two readings. Commentators have overlooked that Nietzsche accepts the second reading. And the fact that Nietzsche accepts pragmatism as a second-order evaluation concerning the truth conditions of propositions puts Nietzsche squarely in agreement with James. For Nietzsche, descriptive representations are organizational instruments that render experience manageable, and constructing objects contributes to the success of this project. Construction establishes determinate truth conditions, which helps us understand the world. For Nietzsche, “We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made” [Wir können nur eine Welt begreifen, die wir selber gemacht haben] (KSA 11:25[470]), cf. GS 301). My reading of Nietzsche’s pragmatism about truth survives the passage from Beyond Good and Evil chiefly thought to undermine pragmatism about truth. Nietzsche remarks, “The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment [. . .] The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even speciescultivating” (BGE 4). The passage challenges the usefulness of truth conceived as a first-order evaluation, but not a second-order evaluation. Unlike James, Nietzsche thinks both true and false propositions can be useful first-order evaluations. Like James, though, true and false propositions are always useful in the second-order sense. Consider what Nietzsche means by ‘false’ in the passage. He writes, “Without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live” (BGE 4). The examples indicate that useful propositions involving logic and mathematics are false. We have already seen Nietzsche’s justification for this claim: “Logic (like geometry and arithmetic) [. . .] applies only to fictitious entities that we have created” (KSA 12:9[97]). I have argued that propositions involving logic and mathematics are false if taken to refer to domains constitutively independent of our contributions, but they can be true if considered within domains of constructed objects (see Chapter 3.2). This supports James’s position that the truth conditions of propositions are inseparable from usefulness. My reading of Nietzsche’s connection to pragmatism therefore holds in spite of the passage typically thought to reject such a reading. In sum, I have argued that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth, while not constituting any wholesale theory of truth, are best situated within the pragmatist

96 Consequences theory rather than the correspondence theory. His material object metaphysics plays a crucial role in bringing out this new interpretation. Nietzsche denies that truth consists in correspondence to mind-independent objects and instead holds that our interests that inform object construction largely contribute to bringing into existence truth-evaluable propositions.

5.2 Science The next topic to consider is Nietzsche’s preferred conception of science [Wissenschaft]. Two interpretive positions are generally pitted against one another. What I call the Negative View takes Nietzsche to believe that science is nihilistic.15 Science is thought to be nihilistic either because it presumes that the world is some way that it is not, or because it functions on the erroneous assumption that truth, rather than some other mode of evaluation, such as aesthetic evaluation, is best for humanity. By contrast, what I call the Positive View takes Nietzsche to believe that science is not nihilistic.16 Science is not nihilistic either because it represents the way the world is, or because it is able to uncover important truths for humankind. The issue I want to explore concerns whether Nietzsche thinks science captures the way the world is, specifically whether the scientific enterprise succeeds at representing facts about the macroscopic empirical world. Understanding Nietzsche’s preferred conception of material objects, I submit, does much to settle this matter. The following discussion is divided into two parts. I first investigate Nietzsche’s understanding of facts. I then examine Nietzsche’s understanding of what conception of facts science aims to represent. If Nietzsche thinks facts should be understood in some way that the scientific discipline succeeds in representing, there would be good reason to favor the Positive View, and if not, there would be strong reason to favor the Negative View. Nietzsche regularly mentions facts17 but never explicitly defines facthood. Passages can be found that support three common views of what a fact is. A fact could be a truth-bearer, an obtaining state of affairs, or just an object instantiating a property. The view that facts are truth-bearers, like propositions, is suggested by Nietzsche’s mentioning of “the ascertaining of ‘true’ verses ‘untrue’, in general the ascertaining of facts” (KSA 12:9[48], cf. HH I: 2). Discerning truth and falsity, which ordinarily occurs by figuring out which propositions are true and which are false, seems to amount to discerning the facts. Depending on Nietzsche’s commitments concerning truth, the position that facts are truth-bearers could be leveled to advance either the Positive View or Negative View. The Positive View coincides with the position that Nietzsche thinks we can make true evaluations about the world, whereas the Negative View denies that such evaluations can be made. Since I have argued that Nietzsche retains the existence of truth, I side with the Positive View here. The view that facts are truth-bearers supports the Positive View.

Consequences  97 The Negative View, however, finds support in texts that pronounce that facts do not exist: “There are no facts, everything is fluid” (KSA 12:2[82], my translation, cf. KSA 12:2[175]). The lack of definite structure to the world—the view that all is “fluid”—seems to be the reason that there are no facts. Assuming that the view that the world lacks a definite structure largely means that the world lacks definitely structured objects, Nietzsche indicates that a fact is either an obtaining state of affairs or merely an object instantiating a property. A state of affairs is something that contains one or more objects and at least one property or relation. A state of affairs obtains if an object exemplifies some property or if one or more objects stand in some relation. To say that a fact is just an object instantiating a property is to say that an object exemplifies some feature of the world. The passage above suggests that there are no facts because there are either no obtaining states of affairs or no objects instantiating properties. Both could be true if there are no objects, as the eliminativist claims. And if there are no facts, science cannot represent facts. This establishes the Negative View. As I read the texts, however, this cannot be Nietzsche’s position. We have seen that eliminativism is an implausible interpretation of Nietzsche, and this implausibility extends to the Negative View on offer. Below I present a reading of the unpublished passage at issue, namely, KSA 12:2[82], that backs this position. In published passages, Nietzsche indicates that the world’s lack of definite order does not exclude the existence of facts, but rather alters how such phenomena should be understood. He remarks, “everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths. Consequently, what is needed from now on is historical philosophizing” (HH I: 2). Since the truth predicate is often thought to be tenseless and timeless, facts are thought to obtain tenselessly and timelessly. Nietzsche, however, denies this view of truth and facthood. He holds that the world lacks a tenselessly and timelessly fixed structure, but not structure altogether. We are significantly responsible for the world’s structure. Nietzsche’s position is compatible with the existence of facts insofar as facts are understood differently. On Nietzsche’s account, I submit, facts do not obtain tenselessly and timelessly because the nature of facts constitutively depends on interpretations indexed to our developing interests.18 This reading is supported by two famous Nachlaß passages regarding Nietzsche’s understanding of facts. Here they are, lettered for bookkeeping purposes: (A) Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—“There are only facts”— I would say: no, facts are just what there are not, only interpretations. We cannot determine any fact “in itself”: perhaps it is nonsensical to desire such a thing [Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehen bleibt “es giebt nur Thatsachen,” würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur Interpretationen. Wir können kein Factum “an sich” feststellen: vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen] (KSA 12:7[60], translation modified).

98 Consequences (B)  There are no “facts-in-themselves,” for a meaning must always be projected into them before they can be “facts.” The question “what is that?” is an establishment of meaning from some other viewpoint. The “essence,” the “essential nature” is something perspectival [Es giebt keinen “Thatbestand an sich,” sondern ein Sinn muß immer erst hineingelegt werden, damit es einen “Thatbestand” geben könne. Das “was ist das?” ist eine Sinn-Setzung von etwas Anderem aus gesehen. Die “Essenz,” die “Wesenheit” ist etwas Perspektivisches] (KSA 12:2[149]). Passage (A) initially appears to deny the existence of facts, which would support the Negative View. A thorough reading of (A), however, in conjunction with (B), makes it clear that Nietzsche’s target is the existence of facts in themselves, not facts in general. A fact in itself is a fact that is, in principle, inaccessible by our mode of cognition. Now, (A) holds that a fact in itself is impossible to assess, and (B) holds that facts in themselves do not exist. Nietzsche appears to uphold both claims by appealing to the nature of the relation between facts and interpretations: (A) “there are only interpretations” (KSA 12:7[60]); (B) “a meaning [Sinn]” must exist for “ ‘facts’ ” to exist (KSA 12:2[149]). So how does Nietzsche understand the relation between facts and interpretations? There are two plausible readings: epistemic and metaphysical. The epistemic reading holds that facts require interpretations to be intelligible as facts.19 On this account, the intelligibility of facts requires some interpretive system to give significance to experience—a system that cannot be eliminated without eliminating intelligible experience altogether. The epistemic reading explains why in (A) Nietzsche claims that “We cannot determine any fact ‘in itself’, ” or that such a determination appears “nonsensical.” Fair enough. But the epistemic reading has trouble explaining (B), where Nietzsche says, “a meaning must always be projected into them before they can be “facts.” Although this looks like an epistemic claim—a claim about “meaning”— the statement concludes with an assertion about the existence of facts. A “­meaning” must exist for something to “be” a fact (italics added). This is a metaphysical claim. Evidence that (B) primarily concerns metaphysics ­becomes clear as the passage continues. Nietzsche writes, “The question ‘what is that?’ is an establishment of meaning from some other viewpoint.” Again, this looks epistemic: answering the question “what is that?” by establishing some “meaning” seems to refer merely to intelligibility. But answering the question “what is that?” requires establishing conditions of identity: Nietzsche declares that the question is meant to establish something’s “essential nature.” And it should be clear by now that Nietzsche believes existence conditions are established when identity conditions are established. As a result, (B) should be read as presenting a metaphysical position, not an epistemic one. The metaphysical position Nietzsche aims to establish is that facts depend for their very existence on our interpretive practices. In this sense, facts

Consequences  99 are “perspectival.” For Nietzsche, facts are brought into existence when it is determined “what” something is—when something’s “essential nature” is determined. Put differently, facts come into existence when objects instantiating properties come into existence. When it is determined that object o instantiates property F, the fact that o is F is determined. And since, of course, we determine whether o instantiates F, the fact that o is F is constitutively dependent on our practices. Call this view fact constructivism. Fact constructivism is implied by object constructivism provided that a fact is just an object instantiating a property. If o has F by virtue of our actions, then the fact that o has F is by virtue of our actions. Importantly, Nietzsche’s commitment to fact constructivism explains why in (B) he asserts that, “There are no ‘facts-in-themselves’. ” Since facts are constructed, facts in themselves do not exist. There are no facts constitutively apart from our practices, “in themselves” or otherwise. Facts are essentially consequences of interpretively ordered experience. Does Nietzsche’s commitment to fact constructivism explain his epistemic assertion in (A)? Recall, “We cannot determine any fact ‘in itself’: perhaps it’s nonsensical to desire such a thing” (KSA 12:7[60]). We cannot “determine” facts in themselves—it even seems “nonsensical” to want to do so— because it is senseless to conceive of a fact constitutively independent of our conception of it. The very nature of a fact in itself renders the conception of such a fact impossible. Hence, Nietzsche’s commitment to fact constructivism implies that we cannot meaningfully assess facts in themselves. This could certainly explain his epistemic aims in (A). Finally, let me make good on my promise to explain Nietzsche’s notebook claim that “There are no facts, everything is fluid, incomprehensible, elusive” (KSA 12:2[82], my translation). The passage actually reads: “Interpretation (the introduction of meaning) not explanation. There are no facts, everything is fluid, incomprehensible, elusive.” Nietzsche appears to employ “interpretation,” defined as “the introduction of meaning,” to justify the view that “there are no facts.” However, given my reading of Nietzsche’s understanding of the relation between interpretation, meaning, and facthood in (A) and (B), we should read Nietzsche as saying that there are no facts constitutively apart from interpretation, not that there are no facts altogether.20 The notebook passage therefore presents no problem for my account. It fully supports the constructivist reading. Nietzsche’s view of facts is on the table. Now to the next task. Does Nietzsche think scientific work can accurately represent the facts about the world? The Positive View says ‘yes’, the Negative View ‘no’. To adjudicate, we need to examine Nietzsche’s most sustained discussion of science, which occurs in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morality.21 Nietzsche claims that science “requires justification,” or a “ ‘faith’,” so that it can acquire “a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, [and] a right to exist” (GM III: 24). Such justification provides “an ideal of value, a valuecreating power, in the service of which [science] could believe in itself” (GM

100 Consequences III: 25). Science finds this ideal of value in the ascetic ideal—science is “the latest and most noble form” of that ideal (GM III: 23). The ascetic ideal is a nihilistic ideal. It leads people to posit values that cannot be satisfied in this world.22 A person under the influence of the ascetic ideal places a particular “valuation” on life: “he juxtaposes [life] (along with what pertains to [life]: ‘nature’, ‘world’, the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness) with a quite different mode of existence which [the ascetic ideal] opposes and excludes” (GM III: 11). To value the ascetic ideal is to value some other world, or “mode of existence,” over the empirical world, such that the other world “opposes” and “excludes” the empirical world. By finding value in the ascetic ideal, science “affirms another world than that of life, nature, and history” (GS 344, quoted in GM III: 24). On my interpretation, the view that science is subsumed by the ascetic ideal primarily means that science requires a mind-independent world to warrant its practice. The reason is simple: Nietzsche thinks the world is not mind-independent, so valuing a mind-independent world “affirms another world.” Nietzsche’s analysis is meant to shock readers. After all, it seems foolish to think the world is essentially mind-dependent—to think that fact constructivism is actually true. Our representations are one thing, we often think, but what they represent is another matter altogether. The former is trivially mind-dependent, whereas the latter is obviously not. The aim of traditional scientific inquiry is to describe the mind-independent world. Consequently, a conception of science that finds value in the ascetic ideal must reject constructivism about facts.23 In this world, facts are constructed. Commentators might balk at this conclusion. A leading view in the literature is that in the third essay of GM Nietzsche mostly cares about the value of truth.24 On this reading, Nietzsche has nothing to say about whether science accurately represents facts, that is, assuming facts are truth-bearers, whether science makes good on its promise to deliver truths about the world. The disagreement between this reading and my own concerns what Nietzsche means when he says that science’s commitment to “faith in a metaphysical value, the value of truth in itself [Glaube an einen metaphysischen Werth, einen Werth an sich der Wahrheit]” (GM III: 24, translation modified) entails commitment to the ascetic ideal. Valuing “truth in itself” could mean valuing truth independent of other evaluative considerations, such that “truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized” (GM III: 25). Call this the Overestimation Reading. On this interpretation, science is ascetic because it is a truth-seeking enterprise and the value of truth has been overestimated. Science lauds truth as the ultimate evaluative ideal, but Nietzsche holds that alternative standards of evaluation, such as those guided by aesthetic values, should sometimes override truth (see GS 373). It may even be best to hold false beliefs over true ones (see BGE 4). Nietzsche maintains that we must try out depreciating the value of truth: “the value of truth must be experimentally called into question” (GM III: 24). To depreciate the value of truth is to recognize that there are times when truth should be

Consequences  101 denied an overriding role in our evaluative practices and instead played off against other values. Truth is an important criterion of evaluation, but not always the most important. What is at stake is the value of truth. I absolutely agree that Nietzsche believes truth should not always be the highest criterion for assessing the world. But I deny that this captures Nietzsche’s primary target in the third essay of GM. The Overestimation Reading does not adequately explain Nietzsche’s view of the relation between science and the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche writes that someone committed to pursuing truth under the guise of the ascetic ideal affirms another world than that of life, nature, and history; and insofar as he affirms this “other world,” does this not mean that he has to deny its antithesis, this world, our world? . . . It is still a metaphysical faith that underlies our faith in science. (GS 344, quoted in GM III: 24, cf. GM III: 11) The Overestimating Reading falls short because questioning whether truth is a desired property of our beliefs implies nothing about affirming (or valuing) some other world and rejecting (or devaluing) the empirical world. Valuing some other world and devaluing the empirical world likely turns on some commitment about the way the world is. And, of course, one might overestimate the value of truth, or even depreciate the value of truth, while simultaneously making no claims about the way the world is. The Overestimation Reading therefore cannot explain why Nietzsche thinks science’s commitment to “faith in a metaphysical value” entails commitment to the ascetic ideal. On my reading, however, the connection is straightforward. Science’s commitment to “faith in a metaphysical value” involves commitment to the value of representing a constitutively mind-independent world. Since the world is constitutively mind-dependent, the constitutively mindindependent world is some “other world.” And because the constitutively mind-dependent world is the empirical world, commitment to the ascetic ideal entails commitment to denying the empirical world. The empirical world is “this world, our world” (GS 344).25 Given this analysis, what is Nietzsche’s preferred conception of science? The Negative View holds that science is nihilistic because it fails to represent the way the world is, whereas the Positive View holds that science is not nihilistic because is succeeds in representing the way the world is. The first challenge to the Negative View should be clear: Nietzsche thinks there is indeed a way the world is. He rejects facts in themselves, not facts altogether. Facts exist, and they essentially depend on us. Moreover, nothing Nietzsche says about science suggests that the scientific enterprise fails to represent facts as we construct them. Nietzsche only thinks science fails to represent facts regarded as existing essentially independent of our practices. As a result, science does not seek to deliver what does not exist. Hence, the Negative View appears unwarranted.

102 Consequences Does this mean that we should adopt the Positive View? Although those who uphold the Positive View have done vital work to show that Nietzsche is not the anti-scientific thinker championed by those who defend the Negative View, they typically stop short of claiming that Nietzsche endorses constructivism about facts. Influential interpreters who defend the Positive View maintain that Nietzsche believes facts—whichever view of facthood Nietzsche prefers—are constitutively mind-independent.26 The consequences are significant. The conception of science attributed to Nietzsche by major defenders of the Positive View then turns out to be a conception of science that fails to represent the way the world is. Such commentators end up claiming that Nietzsche embraces a conception of science that he actually considers nihilistic. This, of course, does not provide good reason to turn around and prefer the Negative View. The Positive View triumphs, but not the Positive View received in popular analytic circles. To avoid the charge of nihilism, the conception of facts attributed to Nietzsche by the Positive View must be reconceived in light of Nietzsche’s constructivism about objects. Only a conception of science that accepts constructivism about facts can accurately represent the world. I want to close this section by addressing a possible objection to the view that Nietzsche’s preferred conception of science is suited to represent facts. One might contend that the view that we construct facts simply assumes that all scientific representations will be accurate. At best, this seems unhelpful. At worst, it appears question begging. In response, remember that Nietzsche places limits on construction (see Chapter 3.3), and accurate representations are essentially indexed to different sets of concerns (see Chapter 4.2). Nietzsche denies that there is some particular manner in which construction should proceed, but not all scientific representations will be accurate if there are different ways we should and should not organize the world, and not all representations will be accurate if different sets of concerns essentially determine standards of accuracy. As a result, it is perfectly reasonable to say that we can succeed or fail to represent constructed facts.

5.3 Naturalism The last issue to consider is Nietzsche’s naturalism—a topic that has recently attracted overwhelming attention. Those with even a cursory familiarity with the secondary literature know that commentators hold strongly opposing views of Nietzsche’s naturalism. Understanding Nietzsche’s naturalism is intertwined with understanding his preferred conception of science. Naturalistic explanations are typically thought to be explanations closely associated with the sciences. Thus, we can approach disagreements about Nietzsche’s naturalism by examining how the Negative View and Positive View understand his naturalism. Interestingly, central supporters of both views can appeal to Nietzsche’s view of naturalism to defend their approach. In what

Consequences  103 follows, I first lay out these positions. Afterward, I show how Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism entails that only a particular conception of naturalism—a conception that has not enjoyed the prominence it deserves in the secondary literature—adequately capture’s Nietzsche’s position. How might the Negative View understand Nietzsche’s naturalism? Consider Deleuze’s (1983) reading. Deleuze writes that, according to Nietzsche, “science is part of the nihilism of modern thought” because its ultimate goal is to seek the “undifferentiated” (Deleuze 1983, 45). Deleuze’s interpretation is motivated by a passage from the third essay of GM: Since Copernicus, man seems to have got himself on an inclined plane— now he is slipping faster and faster away from the center into—what? into nothingness? into a “penetrating sense of his nothingness”? Very well! hasn’t this been the straightest route to—the old ideal? [. . .] All science [. . .] has at present the object of dissuading man from his former respect for himself. (GM III: 25) Copernicus replaced the Ptolemaic geocentric or Earth-centered system with the heliocentric or sun-centered system. This change in scientific understanding demoted human beings from a position of centrality in the cosmos. Nietzsche associates science “since Copernicus” with a dangerous “old ideal,” the ascetic ideal. The ascetic ideal is nihilistic, remember, because it leads people to embrace values that cannot be realized in the conditions of this world. Why does Nietzsche think science after Copernicus is nihilistic? For Nietzsche, there is something critical about our understanding of human existence that is being increasingly lost in the transformation to the new scientific perspective. Science is attempting to provide an understanding of human reality in a way that results in human beings “slipping [. . .] into nothingness.” Explaining “the nihilistic consequence of contemporary natural science” in the Nachlaß, Nietzsche remarks, “since Copernicus man has been rolling from the center toward ‘X’” (KSA 12:2[127]). The “X” appears to signal the advance of a naturalist perspective that endeavors to explain human reality as nothing more than the goings on of complex physiological systems in a physical universe. Deleuze seems to have this conception of naturalism in mind when he writes that Nietzsche is worried about science seeking the “undifferentiated.”27 The ultimate goal of this naturalistic project is to achieve a wholly nonpersonal perspective on the world.28 A wholly non-personal perspective is one that fully removes the first-person perspective from inquiry in favor of some third-person perspective. Nietzsche indicates that retaining the first-person perspective is required for maintaining a non-nihilistic understanding of human existence. The “nothingness” is “dissuading man from

104 Consequences his former respect for himself” (GM III: 25).29 The naturalistic perspective gaining traction after Copernicus is therefore increasingly nihilistic. Advocates of the Negative View could use this conclusion to claim that naturalism gives Nietzsche leverage to think the scientific discipline is nihilistic.30 How might the Positive View understand Nietzsche’s naturalism? The first point to make is that Nietzsche certainly seems to endorse naturalism. He asks, “When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?” (GS 109). Nietzsche requests that we “translate man back into nature” partly by being “hardened in the discipline of science” (BGE 230). Supporters of the Positive View believe that Nietzsche embraces the naturalist position that philosophical explanations should be closely associated with the sciences. There are, of course, different ways to understand the association between philosophical and scientific explanations. It could be the case that, according to Nietzsche, philosophical explanations should be justified by the results of scientific inquiry or derived by methods that model scientific practice. Leiter (2002; 2013) focuses on methodological continuity between philosophy and science. He famously argues that Nietzsche believes philosophical explanations should attempt to understand phenomena by appeal to how science understands or might understand phenomena, which is typically by appeal to causal relations. By contrast, Clark and Dudrick (2006; 2012) argue that Nietzsche believes that while many philosophical explanations should be continuous with scientific results or methods, understanding human activity is best done within a normative rather than a scientific framework. Human activity is typically guided by reasons rather than causes. Both Leiter and Clark and Dudrick maintain that naturalistic explanations are scientific explanations and that a scientific explanation is one sanctioned by what the sciences would accept. Call this the Strong Naturalist View. Others, such as Schacht (1995, 187–205; 2012) and Acampora (2013, 77–80, 92–5), offer an alternative, milder position. On this reading, Nietzsche adopts the typical scientific guideline that philosophy should avoid justifying beliefs by appeal to anything beyond the possibility of experience.31 This includes scientific explanations, but it could also include genealogical, historical, or artful explanations. Call this the Moderate Naturalist View. The Strong Naturalist View implies the Moderate Naturalist View, but not vice versa: the accepted sciences of the day attempt to justify claims based on what can be experienced in the empirical world, but justified accounts of empirical phenomena need not be those delivered by what the sciences would accept. No matter which version of naturalism is preferred, however, advocates of the Positive View maintain that a commitment to naturalism informs Nietzsche’s view that the scientific discipline is not nihilistic. To see how Nietzsche’s constructivism about material objects figures into the debate about his naturalism, notice that many commentators

Consequences  105 take Nietzsche’s naturalism to involve causal explanations. Deleuze writes that for Nietzsche, science attempts to understand phenomena in terms of causally efficient “reactive forces” (Deluze 1983, 45). Leiter holds that naturalistic explanations have “deterministic causes” (Leiter 2002, 5). Green asserts that naturalism is the demand that “explanations of what human beings do be causal” (Green 2002, 4). Janaway holds that Nietzsche’s naturalism is driven by commitment to a “species of theorizing” that attempts to locate “causes” of phenomena (Janaway 2007, 38). And Clark and Dudrick make the contention that a “naturalistic perspective” is one that references “causes and effects” (Clark and Dudrick 2006, 160; cf. 2012, ch. 5).32 Understanding Nietzsche’s naturalism, then, requires understanding his position on causality. In what follows, I argue that Nietzsche’s constructivism about objects affects his view of naturalism because macroscopic causal events, just like macroscopic material objects, are constructed. Nietzsche’s view of causality is, to say the very least, complex. To streamline the discussion, I examine a position Nietzsche advances in one key passage and then point to other passages where the position appears to generalize. Surprisingly, the passage has escaped close attention in the literature.33 The passage is The Gay Science 112: Cause and Effect.—We call it “explanation” [Erklärung] but “description” [Beschreibung] is what distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and science. We are better at describing—we explain just as little as our predecessors. We have uncovered a diverse succession where the naïve man and investigator of older cultures saw only two different things, “cause” and “effect,” as they said; we have perfected the picture of becoming but haven’t got over, got behind the picture. The series of “causes” faces us much more completely in each case; we reason, “this and that must precede for that to follow”—but we haven’t thereby understood anything. The specifically qualitative aspect for every chemical process, still appears to be a “miracle,” as does every locomotion; no one has “explained” the push. And how could we explain! [Wie könnten wir auch erklären] We are operating only with things that do not exist—with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces. How is explanation to be at all possible when we first turn everything into a picture—our picture! It is enough to view science as an attempt to humanize things as faithfully as possible; we learn to describe ourselves more and more precisely as we describe things in their succession. [Es ist genug, die Wissenschaft als möglichst getreue Anmenschlichung der Dinge zu betrachten, wir lernen immer genauer uns selber beschreiben, indem wir die Dinge und ihr Nacheinander beschreiben] Cause and effect: there is probably never such a duality; in truth a continuum faces us, from which we isolate a few pieces, just as we always perceive a movement only as isolated points, i.e. do not really see, but infer. [. . .] An intellect that saw cause and effect as a continuum, not, as

106 Consequences we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment—that saw the stream of the event—would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all determinedness. (GS 112) Nietzsche holds that science cannot “explain” causality. He asks, rhetorically, “How is explanation to be at all possible when we first turn everything into a picture—our picture!” The project of “explanation” involves providing an account of the nature of causality essentially independent of human activities. Causality cannot be explained because causality somehow depends on our contributions—we turn everything into “our picture.” Notice that the failure of “explanation” does not undermine causality— quite the opposite. Nietzsche writes, “It is enough to view science as an attempt to humanize things as faithfully as possible.” Viewing science as “humanizing” the world is sufficient for doing good science. Nietzsche calls this positive task the project of “description.” The project of “description” embraces our role in understanding causality. It is enough for science to describe phenomena because denying our essential relation to causality would block successful scientific work. Interestingly, Nietzsche proclaims that we gain a greater understanding of ourselves as we understand how we as interpreting agents comprehend causal relations: “we learn to describe ourselves more and more precisely as we describe things in their succession.” The idea seems to be that comprehending causality involves separating out some event as being the cause of another from a “continuum,” which requires understanding how a particular event within a plurality is relevant to our interests within the domain of causal explanation. Putnam (1983) gives an example that illuminates this selective process. According to Putnam, when I say, “failure to put out the cigarette caused the house to burn down,” I do not mean that the cigarette’s remaining lit was the total or sufficient cause of the house burning down. Many other things—the cigarette’s location, the flammability of the surrounding structure, and so on—are part of the sufficient cause. We regard certain parts of the sufficient cause as background conditions, referring only to the parts of the cause that interest us as “the” cause. Suppose aliens landed on Earth and observed a house burning down. One says, “I know what caused that event—the atmosphere on this planet is saturated with oxygen.” The point is that in causal explanations one agent’s background condition is another’s cause. What one cites as a cause will in part depend on the reason for asking the question. Of course, Putnam’s example aims at capturing our ordinary talk about causality. But the context of GS 112, which concerns “stages of knowledge and science” [Stufen der Erkenntniss und Wissenschaft] indicates that Nietzsche believes scientific work involves a similar selective process. Understanding this selective process is crucial for understanding causality. Nietzsche claims that “an intellect that saw cause and effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment—that saw the

Consequences  107 stream of the event—would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all determinedness” (GS 112). A different “intellect” could identify the sufficient cause of the house burning down because it could perceive the basic continuum. The “intellect” would no longer individuate one event from another, and thus it could justifiably deny causality. It is implied that grasping causality requires reference to individuated events. Because we are the kind of beings that individuate one event from another, understanding causality requires understanding us as the kind of beings who comprehend causal relations. We determine the particular identity conditions of the cause and effect—we manufacture “division” (GS 109). As Nietzsche notes, “There is no event in itself. What happens is a group of phenomena selected and synthesized by an interpreting being” (KSA 12:1[115]). What constitutes the identity conditions of causal events is dependent on our being the types of judging beings we are. Hence, understanding causality requires understanding our practices. This is no doubt a constructivist conception of causality. Nietzsche’s commitment to such a view explains why he maintains that we learn to “describe ourselves more and more precisely as we describe things in their succession” (GS 112). In sum, Nietzsche argues that causality requires reference to our individuating activities. Causal events would not be what they are in a world constitutively apart from human concern. Causality is a phenomenon that must be understood as essentially related to our interpretive actions. GS 112 is not the only place Nietzsche presents this view. Many detailed notes from the later notes support the position. In KSA 12:9[91], for instance, Nietzsche moves from criticizing a mechanistic view of science, which adopts a mistaken conception of causality, to a discussion about how truth is an “active determining, not a becoming conscious of something that is ‘in itself’ fixed and determinate” (cf. KSA 13:14[79]). The correct understanding of causal explanations, Nietzsche appears to be saying, should make reference to causal events made determinate by us, rather than causal events as they exist fully apart from us.34 Constructivism about causality also seems to make an appearance in BGE 21, where Nietzsche explains that “one should use ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication,” adding that “it is we alone who have devised cause.” Assuming Nietzsche thinks causes and effects are not merely concepts, but are rather part and parcel of the structure of the empirical world—and published passages concerning causality provide no indication otherwise—causal events are constructed. This supports the constructivism clearly evident in GS 112. My reading has serious repercussions for understanding Nietzsche’s view of science and naturalism. On my interpretation—though a full defense must wait until the next chapter—the Negative View is absolutely right to argue that Nietzsche believes that a wholly non-personal perspective on the world is nihilistic. Nietzsche seems to deny that such a perspective is possible (GM III: 12), especially because causality should be understood in a constructivist manner. This affects how we should evaluate the Positive View. Advocates

108 Consequences of the Positive View often believe that facts, in this case, facts regarding causal events, are merely conditionally mind-dependent. Such a view of causal events is consistent with the nihilistic position that science is able to provide a wholly non-personal perspective on the world. Conditional dependence is a trivial form of mind-dependence. Hence, the Positive View appears to be perfectly compatible with the position that science is nihilistic. My reading that causal events are constitutively dependent on our practices, however, blocks the charge of nihilism. The constructivist reading directly opposes the Negative View’s position that naturalist explanations attempt to deliver a wholly non-personal perspective. Constructivism reserves plenty of room for the first-person perspective in inquiry. Constructivism even renders the attempt to understand the world in wholly non-personal terms unrealizable. Constructivism does not undermine naturalism altogether, however. It simply prompts us to reassess Nietzsche’s positive conception of naturalism. As I see it, then, Nietzsche’s constructivism reveals grave problems with the naturalism associated with both the Negative view and the received Positive View. I have nonetheless suggested that Nietzsche sides with some version of the Positive View. Which version pairs best with constructivism about causality? The Strong Naturalist View has enjoyed prominence in the literature, especially Leiter’s version. Leiter takes Nietzsche to believe that philosophical ­explanations should attempt to model scientific methods. It is possible for Leiter’s reading to support a constructivist conception of causality. For instance, scientific explanations could proceed on the methodological principle that representational elements in scientific work, such as the organization and presentation of data, in part functions to constitute the nature of target phenomena. But there are two problems. First, such an account unnecessarily limits the constructivist role in inquiry to method, while constructivism also affects the ­substantive nature of scientific results. And second, Leiter himself would not go in for this view, since he rejects the constructivist reading of ­Nietzsche. Since Leiter holds that for Nietzsche the world is only conditionally mind-dependent, Leiter supports a view that Nietzsche regards as nihilistic,35 despite the fact that, at least to some extent, Nietzsche could adopt Leiter’s version of the Strong Naturalist View. Clark and Dudrick present a radically different version of the Strong Naturalist View. They argue that Nietzsche’s naturalism responds to a tension between naturalism and normativity. Empirical phenomena like causes are ontologically distinct from reasons. The former are physical and the latter are normative. Clark and Dudrick argue that Nietzsche embraces the naturalist thesis that “If an empirical explanation of phenomenon is possible, that explanation is to be preferred to an explanation of another kind” (Clark and Dudrick 2006, 163; see also 2012). This allows Nietzsche to claim that explanations of some phenomena, namely human activities, should not be subsumed under empirical scientific explanation. Human behavior must be understood within the context of a space of reasons, whereas causal events must be understood with the empirical domain.

Consequences  109 Nietzsche’s constructivism presents a problem for this reading as well. On Nietzsche’s account, causal events can only properly be understood through the lens of a space of reasons in which agents make judgments about causal events. A proper consideration of the empirical domain does not require separation from the normative domain, but must essentially depend on the normative. Empirical explanations can only be understood in terms of our reasoning about the empirical world. For these reasons, Clark and Dudrick’s Strong Naturalist View does not best capture Nietzsche’s naturalism. Turn finally to the Moderate Naturalist View, which has received much less attention. On this account, philosophical explanations should not make reference to anything beyond the possibility of human experience, but they need not always be scientific explanations. Naturalist explanations might very well be supported by the accepted sciences, but they also might not—they might provide more imaginative accounts of natural phenomena. The strengths of this view with respect to understanding Nietzsche are three-fold. First, Nietzsche does not believe that maintaining some kind of continuity with the sciences is the only means for providing naturalistic explanations. For instance, nothing about Nietzsche’s naturalist call to “de-deify” (GS 109) nature implies that the project must proceed by scientific means.36 Second, Nietzsche’s work is sensitive to the question of what constitutes a naturalistic explanation.37 This is crucial, since what counts as a scientific explanation changes over time; scientific explanations can be naturalistic in a variety of ways; and it is always possible to question any particular scientific development as naturalistic.38 And third, the Moderate Naturalist View easily supports Nietzsche’s constructivism. The nature of the dependency relation between our practices and the world is left open. The Moderate Naturalist View is not primarily limited to constructivist ways of conceiving scientific methodology, as Leiter’s version of the Strong Naturalist View would have it. Moreover, the Moderate Naturalist View does not undermine constructivism by assuming an explanatory divide between the empirical and the normative, like Clark and Dudrick’s version of the Strong Naturalist View. Nietzsche’s constructivism therefore goes hand-in-hand with the Moderate Naturalist View.

5.4 Summary Far from being a minimal and relatively isolated metaphysical topic in Nietzsche’s philosophy, I have suggested that Nietzsche’s view of material objects helps us understand his overall philosophical program. First, his constructivist remarks on the objects of truth-apt propositions are best placed within a pragmatist approach to truth, rather than the correspondence theory of truth. Second, Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism about facts opposes both the Negative View and the received Positive View. Nietzsche thinks science can accurately represent the world, but only a constructed world, not one distinct from our practical engagements. Third, Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism about causal events shows he has a positive,

110 Consequences non-nihilistic conception of naturalism, specifically one that is most appropriately supported by the Moderate Naturalist View. It is now time to examine how Nietzsche believes constructivism affects humanity at large. We turn to the advent of nihilism.

Notes 1 For a bibliography, see Cox 1999, 28 note 16, 17, 18. See also Welshon 2009, 23–43. 2 See, for example, Babich 1994; Vattimo 2006. 3 Another way Nietzsche could be said to reject truth follows from his understanding of the relation between conscious and unconscious mental states. See Katsafanas 2016, ch. 3. Katsafanas’s account relies on linking falsification to conceptualization, which I address here. 4 There are certainly exceptions. For instance, see Ramsey 1990; Davidson 1969; Field 1972. 5 The object eliminativist could, of course, say that Nietzsche does not reject truth altogether, since “There is flux” is true. But this does not get us the world of experience, which is populated with cats and mats. 6 Some disagree. Braver writes, “Nietzsche subscribes to the ancient incompatibility of becoming and knowledge” (Braver 2007, 126). Presumably, the world’s being in flux renders knowledge impossible because it undermines truth. 7 See, for example, HH I: 3; D 45; GS 14; Z I “Metamorphoses”; BGE 134; GM P, I: 1, III: 8; A P, 9, 23; EH: BT 2, and many more. 8 The coherence theory is sometimes an option as well. For an account of Nietzsche’s relation to the coherence theory of truth, see Schacht 1983, 65–71; Remhof 2015b. 9 See Putnam 1981. 10 For those that attribute to Nietzsche a metaphysical correspondence theory, see Danto 1965, 80, 96–97; Grimm 1977, 30; Wilcox 1982, 132–133; Braver 2007, 142. 11 For those that attribute the neo-classical correspondence theory to Nietzsche, see Nola 1987, 525–544; Clark 1990; Leiter 2002; Addis 2012, ch. 2. 12 Commentators who discuss Nietzsche and the pragmatic view of truth offer little clarification. It is claimed that a useful belief “works” (Danto 1965, 72), provides “utility” (Cox 1999, 46), ensures “happiness, satisfaction, or practical benefit,” (Anderson 1998, 213 note 9), whatever is “valuable to the human species” (Nehamas 1985, 52), or whatever is “the criterion of survival and, at best, the increase of power of individuals or species” (Braver 2007, 129, cf. Nola 1987, 549). These glosses are not very helpful, especially because they occur independent of the context of any pragmatist position. 13 Nietzsche also rejects the static conception of truth. “There are no absolute truths,” or truths fully immune to revision, because “everything has become” (HH I: 2). 14 For a statement of this objection, see Braver 2007, 130. 15 See Granier 1995, 190–200; Kofman 1972; Heidegger 1979; 1982; Babich 1994; 1999; Blanchot 1995; Vattimo 2006. 16 See Schacht 1983; 1995; Clark 1990; 1998; Clark and Dudrick 2006; 2012; Leiter 1994; 2002; Anderson 1994; 1996; 1998; 1999; Ridley 1998; Green 2002; Hales and Welson 2000; Bamford 2005; Richardson 1996; Janaway 2007; Doyle 209; Addis 2012; Emden 2014. 17 See BGE P, 234, 253; GM I: 9, 11, III:11; EH “Clever” 3; A 20, 39, 59; GS 99, 355; HH I: 234, 267; TI “Errors” 3; KSA 12:2[131], 12:10[53], 12:7[1], 12:2[204], 12:2[87], 12:9[144].

Consequences  111 18 Jensen holds that in GM Nietzsche believes “there simply are no historical facts” because all purportedly factual claims are “purely expressions of drives,” which includes interpretations that express various interests (Jensen 2016, ch. 4, note 6). The conclusion that there are no facts about history could be leveled to support the Negative View. But I do not see why claims that express drives, whether about history or otherwise, are supposed to be incompatible with claims that state facts—and Jensen provides no argument. 19 See Schacht 1983, 85. 20 See my reading of The Gay Science 110 below for how we might understand Nietzsche’s view that there are no facts because such phenomena cannot be “explained.” 21 Nietzsche’s thought-provoking remarks on science and truth in this essay do not often receive the close care they deserve. For instance, the recent Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide by Cambridge (2014) contains 14 essays by many world-renowned Nietzsche scholars, none of which offer any discussion of Nietzsche’s view of science in the third essay! For an interesting read of Nietzsche’s view of science in the third essay of GM, see Poellner 1995, 111–136. 22 This understanding of nihilism is indebted to Reginster 2006. I expound on this view in Chapter 6. 23 Some commentators appear to agree with this conclusion, though none read Nietzsche as a fact constructivist. Berry thinks that for Nietzsche, science subsumed by the ascetic ideal operates with a particular purpose: “the aim of scientific inquiry, its highest goal, is to establish objective facts—that is, to produce a representation of the world that somehow bears no traces of those by whom it is represented or for whom it is a representation” (Berry 2015, 99). Welshon writes that for Nietzsche “science, every bit as much as religion, depends upon the assumption that there is an objective world beyond all interpretation (even if it is no longer a heavenly realm) that licenses absolute truths that are equally binding on everyone” (Welshon 2004, 33). And Poellner holds that Nietzsche targets “the desire to know reality as it is in itself,” or the “aspiration to attain metaphysical truth” (Poellner 1995, 113). 24 See, for example, Janaway 2007, 231; Leiter 2002, 265ff. 25 Note three things. First, my interpretation could also allow for an alternative way to understand the primary passage that lends intuitive support to the Overestimation Reading. According to Nietzsche, science and the ascetic ideal both rest on the belief that “truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized” (GM III: 25). On my reading, this makes sense because if some statement is made true by a mind-independent world, then its status as being true could not possibly be estimated or questioned. If we cannot possibly assess or challenge some statement’s truth, the statement must be made true by a mind-independent world. The second thing to note is that any full explanation of Nietzsche’s understanding of the connection between the ascetic ideal and science must make reference to Christianity, which I have bracketed here. Science expresses faith in “truth in itself,” Nietzsche thinks, because it retains a Christian-moral view of truthfulness. The Christian-moral view of truthfulness “translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience” (GS 357, cited in GM III: 27). On my reading, very roughly, the connection between modern science and the Christian-moral view of truthfulness is that both assume that there are truths about the world constitutively independent of human practices. The last thing to note is that Nietzsche’s view of interpretation in the third essay of GM supports my reading of the connection between the ascetic ideal and science. Science under the ascetic ideal operates by a “general renunciation of all interpretation” (GM III: 24). Nietzsche’s view that “active and interpreting forces” (GM III: 12) are necessary for knowledge to exist, on my reading, implies in part that we must construct objects for knowledge to

112 Consequences exist. Interpretation organizes the world in experience, and it is interpretation “through which alone seeing becomes seeing something” (GM III: 12). 26 See, for example, Clark 1990; Leiter 2002. It should be noted that commitment to the view that facts are truth-bearers also commits Nietzsche to fact constructivism. For Nietzsche, as I have argued, the objects of our true and false propositions are constructed. 27 For a similar reading of this passage, see Hatab 2008, 116. 28 For a contemporary examination of this issue independent of Nietzsche, see Baker 2013. 29 Nietzsche, of course, wants us to accept that human reality is “nothing” in the sense that it is not ultimately unique in relation to other phenomena in the “great chain of being,” such as other animals (GM III: 25). 30 For the view that GM III: 25 does not undermine Nietzsche’s commitment to naturalism, see Leiter 2002, 281–283. I address Leiter’s response in a footnote below. 31 See also Rouse 2002, 4. 32 For further discussion about naturalism and causality, see Welshon 2016, 232–234. 33 For instance, Leiter (2013) takes the time to respond carefully to his critics, particularly Gemes and Janaway (2005) and Acampora (2006), over the role causation plays in his reading of Nietzsche’s naturalism, but GS 112 is never mentioned—by Leiter or his critics! 34 In the notes, Nietzsche is sometimes much more skeptical about the entire enterprise of causal explanations. See, for example, KSA 13:14[98]. 35 Leiter would, of course, reject this charge. Leiter recognizes that GM III: 25 threatens his naturalist reading (Leiter 2002, 281–283), since, assuming a naturalist explanation is a scientific explanation, Nietzsche’s claim that science is subsumed by the ascetic ideal seems to imply that naturalist explanations are ascetic. Leiter’s solution is to deny that Nietzsche thinks naturalism is ascetic because naturalism is justified by a non-ascetic ideal, namely, freeing higher humanity from ascetic trappings. Consequently, naturalism is not nihilistic. My quick-and-dirty response is that Leiter does not grasp the implications of the challenge to naturalism offered in GM III: 25. Indeed, he offers very little by way of interpretation of the passage (see Leiter 2002, 281). Leiter’s objectivist reading of Nietzsche disallows him from claiming that for Nietzsche any view of scientific explanation that assumes there is some way the world is constitutively independent of our practices is nihilistic. On my view, naturalistic explanations are no exception, whether or not they serve as a means to realize non-nihilistic ends. Moreover, there are reasons to doubt that Nietzsche thinks naturalist explanations considered on their own can be non-nihilistic. In GM III: 25 Nietzsche asserts that art is much better for countering the ascetic ideal than science. Leiter overlooks this crucial point. And it should be obvious that naturalist explanations that take phenomena to be constructed have close ties with artistic discourse. In the next chapter, I argue that why constructivism is not nihilistic—indeed, it is life-affirming—by connecting constructivism to art. 36 By dividing the causal from the normative, Clark and Dudrick’s view seems to enjoy this strength. 37 Welshon (2016, 237ff.) notices this feature of Nietzsche’s thought. 38 Leiter’s view enjoys this strength. He holds that Nietzsche holds a “speculative” version of methods continuity, which means that naturalist explanations need not appeal to “actual causal mechanisms that have been well-confirmed by the sciences” (Leiter 2013, 577).

6 Nihilism and Constructivism

Nietzsche’s mature philosophical project centers on nihilism.1 Nihilism threatens to undermine the meaning and value of many longstanding assumptions and goals that have pervaded human existence, and Nietzsche cares about assessing and transforming the meaning and value of those assumptions and goals. In this sense, Nietzsche’s concern with nihilism can be considered practical-existential.2 In this chapter, I argue that constructivism has practical-existential consequences for understanding and overcoming nihilism. Nietzsche is attracted to constructivism, at least in part, for ethical reasons: constructivism is intertwined with the project of bringing better or worse meaning and value to our lives. Indeed, Nietzsche often appears to develop metaphysical positions in order to realize ethical ends, from criticizing traditional philosophical views to bringing superior philosophical positions to the table. On my interpretation, Nietzsche believes constructivism is distinctively suited to undermine a certain nihilistic philosophical position and help restore meaning and value in the wake of that important challenge.

6.1  Defining Nihilism Nietzsche foresees a dark future for the Western world. He writes, “For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe” (KSA 13:11[411]). The catastrophe is nihilism. “What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism” (KSA 13:11[411]).3 Nihilism is the position that life is meaningless. “The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain” (KSA 13:11[97], see also 12:5[71]). What does it mean to say life is meaningless? The most prominent values that we have used to value life, Nietzsche tells us, have somehow become devalued. “What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves” (KSA 12:9[35], see also 13:11[411]). According to Reginster (2006), whose account I draw from here, the view that our highest values have become devalued could mean two things. First, it could mean that our values have no absolute validity.4 The recognition that our values lack such validity leads to a form of nihilism Reginster calls

114 Nihilism “disorientation” (Reginster 2006, 26). Nihilistic disorientation follows the death of God, the event in which belief in God, or belief in any world apart from the empirical one, becomes discredited (see KSA 12:5[71]; GS 125, 343). God’s existence is thought to ensure the absolute validity of our values. In the aftermath of the death of God, we come to recognize that no values hold ultimate authority. A feeling of confusion arises about what to believe and how to act. As Nietzsche comments, “We are losing the center of gravity by virtue of which we have lived; we are lost for awhile” (KSA 13:11[148], see also 13:11[97]; Z III: “Tablets” 16; GS 125). The view that our highest values have become devalued could also mean that the world is inhospitable to the realization of our highest values. Nietzsche remarks, “A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist” (KSA 12:9[60], see also 13:11[61], 13:14[9]; GM II: 24; A 6, 7, 20). On this view, nihilism results from the awareness that the way the world is prevents our highest values from being manifest. Reginster calls this form of nihilism “despair” (Reginster 2006, 28). Despair refers to a state in which what is most important is recognized as unattainable. The main difference between nihilistic disorientation and nihilistic despair is that the former primarily concerns our values, whereas the latter primarily concerns the way the world is. Nietzsche is arguably more troubled by nihilistic despair.5 Nihilism is not a necessary consequence of the death of God (see, for example, GS 343). God’s death leads to nihilism only if God, or any world apart from the empirical one, is taken to be a necessary condition of the realization of our highest values. Hence, nihilism must be a result of the fact that our highest values cannot be attained in the conditions of this world. Understanding and overcoming nihilistic disorientation is certainly important, but understanding and overcoming nihilistic despair is fundamental. In what follows, I focus solely on nihilistic despair, which bears a special relation to constructivism. Call whatever contributes to nihilistic despair life-negating and whatever contributes to overcoming such despair lifeaffirming.6 Nietzsche is mostly concerned with the life-negating or lifeaffirming status of values. Life-negating values are those from the standpoint of which life is “deserving of negation” (A 7, see also KSA 12:9[107]). For instance, Nietzsche argues that pity exemplifies a “negation of life” because it aims to preserve weakness in a world preserved only by strength (A 7). Any attempt to realize life-negating values results in condemning life as it is, or effectively judging “of the world as it is that it ought not to be” (KSA 12:9[60]). Nihilistic despair takes effect with the awareness that one’s values are life-negating. My plan is to argue that recognizing that objects are constructed can expose certain life-negating values and offer a life-affirming alternative. My understanding of nihilism relies on Reginster’s groundbreaking account. But Reginster’s reading has come under fire. Gemes (2008) charges

Nihilism  115 Register’s view of nihilism with being overly cognitive. Disorientation and despair involve a cognitive awareness of our values and the world. Gemes advances two criticisms against this position. The first is that Nietzsche regards consciousness as largely epiphenomenal. In particular, conscious beliefs are mostly symptoms of interacting drives that function below our awareness and operate as the genuine causes of our thoughts (see KSA 12:1[61]). The second criticism is that nihilism is most basically an affective state, specifically the state of our drives turning against their own expression— “the will turning against life” (GM P: 5). This affective disorder arises in humankind much earlier than after the death of God (see, for example, GM III). For Gemes, any form of nihilism that arises as a consequence of conscious belief must be second in importance to nihilism that arises as a consequence of a disorderly affective state. My view is that Nietzsche holds that conscious beliefs about certain metaphysical positions can lead to nihilism and other beliefs can function to overcome nihilism. I will not launch into the debate over Nietzsche’s epiphenomenalism here—others have done fine work addressing the issue.7 Although some passages in the texts appear to embrace epiphenomenalism (see, for example, TI “Errors” 3), a substantial number indicate that consciousness is causally efficacious (see, for example, GM II: 2; TI “Germans” 6, “Morality” 2; Z II: “On Redemption”; KSA 12:9[178], 12:9[139], 11:34[96], 13:11[353]). Nietzsche repeatedly considers the ways consciousness can make a genuine difference. With respect to living the most meaningful life possible, for instance, he argues that adopting life-negating beliefs is worse for humanity than adopting life-affirming beliefs. Indeed, Gemes is careful not to claim that Nietzsche believes consciousness is in fact epiphenomenal. I will therefore proceed on the assumption that the charge of epiphenomenalism does not undermine Nietzsche’s view that conscious events can amplify or assuage nihilism. Gemes’s second criticism is that nihilism is most basically the outcome of an affective internal disorder, rather than a cognitive awareness. Gemes himself provides a nice suggestion about how this might be rendered consistent with Reginster’s account (Gemes 2008, 461–462). It could be the case that nihilism is most basically a non-cognitive problem that leads to a cognitive recognition accompanied by disorientation and despair. Accordingly, I interpret Reginster to be providing a necessary but not sufficient description of what constitutes nihilism. My primary goal is to describe important features of what is cognitively required to help overcome nihilistic despair, and what I offer beyond Register’s account is an explanation of how certain metaphysical positions associated with truth are nihilistic. In doing so, I will sometimes tie my analysis to affective states of the subject. After all, Nietzsche holds that knowledge is necessarily affective (see GM III: 12). How we feel informs our cognitive engagement with the world.8 “It is our needs which interpret the world: our drives and their for and against” (KSA 12:7[60]), Nietzsche notes, and “Who interprets?—Our affects” (KSA

116 Nihilism 12:2[190]). But we must not lose sight of the importance of the cognitive dimension of nihilism. Nietzsche claims that a particular cognitive recognition —the recognition that “all the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves” have “proved inapplicable” and “therefore devaluated the world”—provides the means by which to no longer devalue the word (KSA 13:11[99]). Some forms of cognitive awareness are life-negating, while others are not. The awareness that objects are constructed, I argue, is life-affirming.

6.2  Life-Negating Categories On the current account, overcoming nihilistic despair requires either challenging the claim that God is dead or exposing and undermining life-negating values. Nietzsche’s task is obviously the latter. The project informs what he famously calls a “revaluation” of values. In what follows, I draw out this revaluation by paying close attention to a particular Nachlaß passage that presents the advent of nihilism and outlines how to overcome that problem. Nietzsche describes the problem as follows: The feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the concept of “purpose,” the concept of “unity,” or the concept of “truth.” Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality of events is lacking: the character of existence is not “true,” is false. One simply lacks any reason for convincing oneself that there is a true world. Briefly: the categories “purpose,” “unity,” “being,” which we used to project some value into the world—we pull out again, so the world looks valueless. (KSA 13:11[99]) Nietzsche uses meaningless [sinnlos] and valueless [Werthlos] interchangeably.9 A meaningless life is one that has no value—it is not worth living. Nietzsche says the feeling that the world has no value arises with the recognition that the world is inhospitable to the realization of three “concepts,” or “categories,” which we employ to “project some value into the world.” The categories are values because they help bring meaning to reality. How are “purpose,” “unity,” and “truth” or “being” supposed to supply meaning? They are either values that many people believe are truly manifest in the world, such that their manifestation renders life worth living, or they are values that many people believe our best views of reality should embrace in order for reality to be meaningful. People begin falling into nihilistic despair when they realize that “existence may not be interpreted by means of these [categories]” (KSA 13:11[99]). We begin to overcome nihilistic despair, then, by turning a critical eye toward the categories we value highest. Nietzsche remarks, “Once we have devalued these three categories, the

Nihilism  117 demonstration that they cannot be applied to the universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the universe” (KSA 13:11[99]). It must be shown that the three categories cannot be realized in the conditions of this world. The categories must be unmasked as referring “to a purely fictitious world” (KSA 13:11[99]). The categories Nietzsche identifies are these: existence has a final purpose, pluralities of events can be unified, and there is a true world of being. I am only concerned with the third. To introduce that discussion, though, it will help to consider the first two. Nietzsche first claims that we must jettison the category that existence has a final purpose. This purpose could take the form of “the ‘fulfillment’ of some highest ethical canon in all events, the moral world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the intercourse of beings; or the gradual approximation of a state of universal happiness” (KSA 13:11[99], cf. A 26). Nietzsche seems to have in mind views associated with the Christian, Kantian, and Hegelian philosophical traditions, which have helped humanity avoid the “torment of the ‘in vain’ ” by holding that existence exhibits moral purpose or progress (KSA 13:11[99]). On Nietzsche’s view, such moralistic valuations are unrealizable because the world exists in a state of “becoming,” and such a state “aims at nothing and achieves nothing” (KSA 13:11[99], see also GM II: 12; KSA 13:11[72]). A world of becoming transpires with no moral purpose or progress. Next, Nietzsche says we must reject the idea of a “totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all events, and underneath all events” that one might “admire and revere,” that is, a “unity” that can provide “a deep feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole that is infinitely superior” (KSA 13:11[99]). One attempts to be a “mode of the deity” by comprehending the whole, which allows one to “believe in [one’s] own value” (KSA 13:11[99]). Nietzsche’s target arguably includes theistic interpretations of the universe offered by Newton and Voltaire (see GS 37), but his remarks appear to speak directly to Spinoza. In his Ethics, Spinoza argues that we are “modes” of God granted access to a unique kind of ethical life. The best kind of knowledge for Spinoza is knowledge of the essences of things as having a necessary and determinate nature. This knowledge involves understanding all things as situated in relation to God’s attributes of extension and thought. Knowledge of God’s attributes involves knowledge that all events follow from the essence of matter and thought in accordance with certain universal laws. The ethical life for Spinoza consists in knowing the necessary and determinate nature of the whole with reverent, intellectual equanimity. Nietzsche argues that this manner of valuing the world is mistaken because the world is in a state of “becoming,” and “underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself completely as in an element of supreme value” (KSA 13:11[99]). In a world of becoming, all events are contingent and indeterminate. The highest value associated with Spinoza’s philosophy therefore cannot be satisfied in the conditions of this world.

118 Nihilism The third and final category is the true world of being. Nietzsche writes: Given these two insights, that becoming has no goal and that underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself completely as in an element of supreme value, an escape remains: to condemn this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world. (KSA 13:11[99]) Recognizing the unrealizability of the first two categories leads to the nihilist’s “escape.” The escape is to condemn the world of becoming as an illusion and invent a world outside it: the true world of being (see also TI “Reason” 1, 2; “World”; EH P: 2). Consequently, the true world leads to a deeper crisis than either of the first two categories. Nietzsche’s conception of the true world loosely equates Plato (see BGE 14; TI “Ancients” 2; KSA 12:7[2]), Christianity (see BGE 11, 54; TI “Reason” 6), Kant (see HH I: 16; BGE 16; TI “Reason” 6; A 10), Schopenhauer (HH I: 26; KSA 12:10[150]), and Anaxagoras and Parmenides (PT). These positions hold in common the idea that there is a world (the “true” world), such as the Forms, Heaven, or the world of things in themselves, which exists apart from the world that we can experience (the “apparent” world). The world outside of experience appears to be the “true” one because it seems to constitute or ground the world of experience. For this reason, the true world often carries greater value. For instance, Plato holds that the Forms are necessary for the good life; Christians believe Heaven redeems our suffering; and Kant thinks the world in itself is necessary for freedom and morality. According to Nietzsche, the true world, or any world separate from the world we can experience, is essentially associated with nihilism. Here are a few colorful passages. Nietzsche writes, “Dividing the world into a ‘real’ one and an ‘apparent’ one, whether in the manner of Christianity, or of Kant (a crafty Christian, when all’s said and done), is but a suggestion of decadence—a symptom of declining life” (TI “Reason” 6, see also A 17). The “hypothesis of being is the source of all slandering of the world: ‘the better world, the true world, the world “beyond”, the thing-in-itself’ ” (KSA 13:11[72], see also EH “Destiny” 8). The “true world” is one of the “most malignant errors of all time,” a “mendaciously fabricated world” (A 10, see also EH P: 2). It is a “presupposition” of “nihilism” that “there is no absolute nature of things, no ‘thing-in-itself’ ” (KSA 12:9[35], see also 12:9[41]). And “it is of cardinal importance that one should abolish the true world. It has been the greatest [. . .] devaluator in respect of the world we are: it has been our most dangerous attempt yet to assassinate life” (KSA 13:14[103], see also TI “World” 6). Nietzsche’s position is unmistakable: commitment to the true world must be overcome for nihilism to be overcome. He even calls the abolition of the true world the “pinnacle of humanity” (TI “World”).

Nihilism  119

6.3  Overcoming the True World In the Nachlaß passage under consideration, Nietzsche describes the final manifestation of nihilism in connection with the true world as follows: But as soon as man finds out how [the true] world is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and how he has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: the nihilism which includes disbelief in a metaphysical world in itself [welche den Unglauben an eine metaphysische Welt in sich schließt], and which forbids itself belief in a true world [welche sich den Glauben an eine wahre Welt verbietet]. (KSA 13:11[99], translation modified) The “last form of nihilism” is manifest upon the recognition that the true world is merely a metaphysical prop used by philosophers to justify views thought to require a mind-independent world. These positions could include the absolute validity of values (Plato, Christianity, Schopenhauer, Kant), the existence of God (Christianity, Kant), freedom of the will (Kant), a world of enduring changelessness (Plato, Christianity, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Buddhism), or constitutively mind-independent objects (Plato, Christianity, Kant, positivists). Each view has been extremely influential when it comes to humanity’s basic picture about the way the world is. Nietzsche even regards science as finding justification in “another world.” The ascetic ideal, which deceives us into adopting life-negating values, provides science with “an ideal of value, a value-creating power, in the service of which it could believe in itself” (GM III: 25). A person under the influence of the ascetic ideal places a nihilistic “valuation” on life: “he juxtaposes [life] (along with what pertains to [life]: ‘nature’, ‘world’, the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness) with a quite different mode of existence which [the ascetic ideal] opposes and excludes” (GM III: 11). In the case of science, valuing the ascetic ideal involves valuing the true world. As I argued in the previous chapter, Nietzsche believes science has traditionally required a mind-independent world to warrant its practice. Common sense tells us that accurately representing mind-independent objects is the aim of inquiry. Such an aim drives traditional scholarly pursuits, scientific and philosophical alike. Valuing the true world then leads us to adopt a particular selfimage: we see ourselves as gaining knowledge by fulfilling the goal of grasping objects independently of how those objects are interpreted to be. Such a project is not only taken to be obvious—we expect to uncover mind-independent objects—but also highly esteemed. The traditional aim of scientific work is privileged in our contemporary world. It prevails as one of our highest values. But for Nietzsche, the vision we have of ourselves as actually achieving this aim is deceived. Here is where the life-affirming nature of constructivism begins to emerge. The truth of constructivism works to undermine the seemingly uncontroversial goal of scientific and philosophical inquiry. The

120 Nihilism empirical world is not comprised of objects that exist apart from us. Even facts about the world of everyday experience do not accurately represent a mind-independent world. The first role constructivism plays in helping to overcome the problem of nihilistic despair, then, is that commitment to constructivism helps bring about the recognition that a particular value that has dominated our traditional understanding of the world cannot, in fact, be satisfied in the conditions of the empirical world. The value of the true world is necessarily unrealizable. The true world offers a value to which we have “absolutely no right” (KSA 13:11[99]). Embracing constructivism requires revaluing our longstanding commitment to the true world. Recognizing the devaluation of our highest values is not the end of the story, however. Nietzsche considers it tremendously difficult to cope with the thought that valuing certain values actually condemns reality. The meaninglessness of traditional philosophical and scientific pursuits hits us once we become aware that a basic assumption about our self-image is undermined. The final step in overcoming nihilism then requires addressing the loss that follows the recognition that our highest values have become devalued. One way to address the loss is to show that life-negating values need not be our highest values. This is part and parcel of Nietzsche’s revaluation project (see, for example, EH “Wise” 1). And one way to show that life-negating values need not be our highest values is to show that other values can perfectly well take the place of life-negating values. Revaluation comes full circle with new values, specifically values that ease the distress of nihilism by providing realizable goals. Left with only life-negating values, we are discouraged, frustrated, and lost: Nihilism as a psychological state will have to be reached, first, when we have sought a “meaning” in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged. Nihilism, then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the “in vain,” the insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover and regain composure—being ashamed in front of oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too long [. . .] any goal at least constitutes some meaning. (KSA 13:11[99]) Nihilistic despair begins to emerge when our highest values are undermined such that we find ourselves with no meaningful goals. “What does nihilism mean? [. . .] The goal is lacking; ‘why’ finds no answer” (KSA 12:9[35]). Nietzsche regards the predominant goal of philosophical and scientific inquiry as a “waste of strength,” a project undertaken “in vain.” Historically, however, there has been “no other goal” guiding inquiry outside the ideal of accessing the true world (GM III: 23). As a result, the fact that the traditional task of philosophical and scientific work is necessarily unrealizable appears irreparably damaging. How to proceed, Nietzsche says, “finds no answer” (KSA 12:9[35]).

Nihilism  121 Constructivism offers a solution. Inquiry is not a “waste of strength” or “in vain” if we recognize that the objects of our investigations are constructed. Remember, Nietzsche contends that “we can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made” (KSA 11:25[470], cf. GS 301). Our philosophical and scientific projects can only deliver knowledge of a constructed world. And there is no reason for distress. Valuing the true world is necessarily unrealizable. Our best theories of reality should be those that accurately represent constructed objects. By valuing the constructed world, we value the way the world is. Nietzsche remarks, “A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist” (KSA 12:9[60]). Commitment to constructivism affirms reality as it is, whereas those who deny constructivism, whether or not they are aware of it, hold that the way the world is ought not to be. Embracing constructivism, then, enables people to commit to philosophical and scientific endeavors without deceiving themselves about the nature of the objects of inquiry. Such a commitment is life-affirming: it contributes to overcoming the nihilism of despair associated with the true world by rejuvenating our cognitive pursuits. Nietzsche believes that recognizing the life-affirming nature of constructivism positively affects our lives as knowers. In a passage from The Gay Science we have seen before, he writes: It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make something that is not yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colors, weights, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. This poem that we have invented is constantly internalized, drilled, translated into flesh and reality, indeed, into the commonplace, by the so-called practical human beings [. . .] we have created the world that concerns human beings! But precisely this knowledge we lack, and when we catch it for a moment we have forgotten it the next: we misjudge our best power and underestimate ourselves just a bit, we contemplative ones. We are neither as proud nor as happy as we could be. (GS 301, cf. HH I: 16) Reality is constructed, but we are largely unaware of it. We often fail to realize that we have placed high esteem in values that have lost their value. The image we have of ourselves as grasping mind-independent reality obstructs an awareness that could develop a more dignified, more affectively positive engagement with the world. Nietzsche exclaims that “we misjudge our best power and underestimate ourselves just a bit,” such that “we are neither as proud nor as happy as we could be.” Constructivism not only gets reality right, but it also unlocks new meaning for knowers—it enables a new way to understand the known and provides new meaning for the knower. Nietzsche holds that “the consequences for ourselves” that emerge upon seeing that “ ‘the old god [or true world] is dead’ ” need not be despair, but instead can

122 Nihilism supply “a new and barely describable kind of light, happiness, relief, amusement, encouragement, dawn” (GS 343, brackets added). Despair subsides when a new conception of the world illuminates our projects. This can help “mankind [. . .] guarantee its health, its future, the lofty right to its future” (EH P: 2). The life-affirming status of constructivism comes full circle.

6.4  Nihilism, Constructivism, and Art I have suggested that constructivism is life-affirming because it helps people come face-to-face with the life-negating value of the true world and confront the consequences of that recognition in a positive manner. I now argue that constructivism is life-affirming in these ways because it exemplifies an artistic engagement with the world. Nietzsche was persistently concerned with art. He was especially interested in how artistic disciplines relate to cognitive disciplines. A common theme we see in his writings is how a theoretical, cognitive orientation toward the world might combine with an artistic, non-cognitive orientation. In The Birth of Tragedy, for instance, Nietzsche asserts that “science [. . .] must transform itself into art” (BT 15, cf. UM II: 7), and he calls on us “to view science through the lens of the artist” (BT P: 2). In Human, all-too-Human, he writes that “Higher culture must give to man a double-brain [. . .] one for the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science,” such as “illusions” and “passions,” which are often identified with artistic sensibilities (HH I: 251). In The Gay Science, Nietzsche eagerly anticipates “the time when artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life join scientific thought so that a higher organic system will develop” (GS 113). And in Twilight of the Idols, he holds that the “tragic artist [. . .] says yes” to “appearance” (TI “Reason” 6), by which he means the empirical world accessible by the senses, and “we possess science nowadays precisely to the extent that we decided to accept the evidence of the senses” (TI “Reason” 3). It should be obvious that constructivism about objects melds the theoretical with the artistic. Art essentially concerns creation, and constructivism holds that our conceptual practices contribute to creating reality. The issue I want to pursue is how a connection to art enables constructivism to be life-affirming. The connection is important because Nietzsche singles out art as the primary antidote to nihilism. He regards “art as the only superior counterforce to all will to denial of life,” that which is “anti-nihilist par excellence” (KSA 13:17[3], see also 12:2[127], 12:9[35], 13:11[99]; GM II: 24; BGE 211; many passages in Z I, III). “Art,” Nietzsche proclaims, “is essentially affirmation, blessing, deification of existence” (KSA 13:14[47], cf. 12:10[194]; TI “Raids” 8, “Reason” 6). Given the significance of art in relation to nihilism, it seems reasonable to suppose that constructivism has some important association with art that grounds its life-affirming status. My suggestion is that constructivism is life-affirming because it exemplifies certain life-affirming features of art.

Nihilism  123 Before examining these features, three preliminary points must be made concerning Nietzsche’s view of art and life-affirmation. The first turns on the idea that it is possible for art to exemplify life-negating qualities, rather than life-affirming qualities. In the notebooks, he asks, “Is art a consequence of dissatisfaction with the real? Or an expression of gratitude for happiness enjoyed? In the first case Romanticism” (KSA 12:2[114], see also GS 370). Nietzsche’s questions focus on the drives that motivate the construction of works of art (see also KSA 12:7[3]). These drives can be life-negating or life-affirming, depending on facts about the artist—for instance, whether the artist engages suffering “from an impoverishment of life,” which is manifest in Romanticism, or “from a superabundance of life,” which is manifest in the Dionysian (GS 370). My first preliminary point, then, is that the lifeaffirming features of art that I discuss below are not contingent on facts about artists. Specifically, the features I am interested in are inherent to the artistic method. The fact that Nietzsche thinks the artistic method is necessarily life-affirming is the second preliminary point I want to make. Nietzsche cares little about art considered as a set of artworks or aesthetic objects (see GS 299, 370; TI “Raids” 8, 9, 24; KSA 12:10[194], 13:14[47]). The artistic method, it will emerge, motivates him to assert that, “There is no such thing as pessimistic art—Art affirms” (KSA 13:14[47]). The final preliminary point concerns Nietzsche’s understanding of the relation between life-affirmation and deception. The life-affirming features I address do not rest on Nietzsche’s early position, offered in The Birth of Tragedy, that art is life-affirming because it traffics solely in illusions necessary for dealing with the cruelties of the world.10 He goes on to abandon this view. The life-affirming features of art that concern me are those discussed after The Birth of Tragedy. In sum, then, my attention falls on the life-affirming features of art found in artistic practice which do not rely on the presumption that art is mere illusion. There are two life-affirming features of art exemplified in constructivism. The first, easily and obviously enough, is that artistic practice affirms the empirical world. This affirmation is due to embracing that which can be experienced with the senses. The nature of aesthetic objects typically depends on information from the senses. For Nietzsche, embracing a sensual engagement with the world counters the motivation to embrace the true world. The “denial of sensuality,” he remarks, leads people to value the ascetic ideal (GM III: 24), an ideal that “affirms another world” (GS 344, quoted in GM III: 24). Valuing a world “Apart, Beyond, Outside, [and] Above” the world graspable by the senses, according to Nietzsche, is certainly a sign of “illness” (GS P: 2). Such a valuation effectively disparages this world. Art expresses a “good will to appearance” (GS 107), or an affirmation of the empirical world, and “the apparent world is the only one” (TI “Reason” 2, emphasis added). In this manner, art counters forms of nihilism associated with a non-empirical realm. The second life-affirming feature of art exemplified in constructivism is that the artistic process determinately structures sensory information.

124 Nihilism Artists do not take sensory input as “given,” or as revealing anything a priori determinately structured. Art gives form to sensory information by transfiguring, shaping, and arranging it through processes like inclusion, omission, interpolation, extraction, emphasis, and de-emphasis. The artist “rejects, selects, knots together;” the artist engages in “sifting, transforming, [and] ordering” (HH I: 155). “What does all art do?” Nietzsche asks, “does it not praise? does it not glorify? does it not select? does it not highlight?” (TI “Raids” 24, see also “Raids” 9). This form-giving process is partly why he claims that art “lies”: the artistic method organizes what is not organized prior to our practices. Yet works of art are not mere falsifications, since, of course, certain ways of organizing can result in content that accurately reflects experience. Importantly, the content of an artwork is essentially determined by how sensory information is organized. The manner in which such information is structured contributes to determining how the work is experienced, which establishes relevant meanings of the work. This type of process—giving form to generate new ways to experience and provide meaning—is crucial for overcoming nihilism.11 Nietzsche’s view that people turn to the true world because “becoming has no goal” and that “underneath all becoming there is no grand unity” (KSA 13:11[99]) indicates that a primary motivation behind valuing the true world is the recognition that the world has no fixed meaning or structure. Instead of running to the true world, Nietzsche thinks we must embrace the a priori indeterminacy of reality and recognize that we largely fix meaning and structure. This recognition can help us live well, perhaps, for instance, by illuminating new ways in which we are interconnected with our environment and empowering us to cope with the anxiety of indeterminacy. Learning this from artists can help move us beyond nihilism. Constructivism also embraces that which can be experienced with the senses and holds that we create determinate form by organizing sensory information. For the constructivist, the nature of concrete objects is essentially dependent on sensory information we organize. Sensory information does not reveal a priori determinately structured objects. The nature of an object, just like the content of an artwork, is essentially determined by how information is framed. Nietzsche takes such framing to be an interpretive process. “The essence of interpreting,” he says, consists in activities such as “doing violence, pressing into orderly form, abbreviating, omitting, padding, fabricating, [and] falsifying” (GM III: 24, translation modified). Such interpretive activities are life-affirming. The “renunciation of all interpretation,” Nietzsche asserts, “expresses, broadly speaking, as much ascetic virtue as any denial of sensuality (it is at bottom only a particular mode of this denial)” (GM III: 24). The manner in which sensory information is structured in works of art contributes to determining how the work is experienced, which makes possible meaningful interactions with the artwork. Similarly, the manner in which sensory information is structured into objects contributes to determining how the world is experienced, which

Nihilism  125 makes possible meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful interactions with the world constructivism makes possible are disclosed by recognizing the devaluation of the true world. Objectivism about objects, it should be noticed, does not contribute to overcoming nihilism—in fact, quite the opposite. Objectivist views such as commonsense realism and unificationism hold that the world has a certain form fixed apart from our activities. In this sense, such positions fail to affirm the empirical world. Objectivism is compatible with the view, essentially associated with the true world, that objects have a determinate nature constitutively independent of our interactions with sensory information. It is then nihilistic to embrace commonsense realism and unificationism, no matter how intuitive those positions appear to be. By embracing constructivism, we come to see that valuing objectivism is unrealizable. Constructivism is therefore distinctly fit to undermine nihilistic values essentially associated with the true world. So there we have it: constructivism instantiates features of art that make possible the task of overcoming dominant forms of nihilistic despair. In closing, I want to consider a possible objection, which is posed by Heidegger (1979). Heidegger contends that, according to Nietzsche, overcoming nihilism has little to do with truth and mostly to do with art (see Heidegger 1979, ch. 25).12 For Heidegger, Nietzsche considers reality to be wholly dynamic, which means that no configuration of bundles of forces has a determinate, enduring nature. It is widely thought to be the case that propositions can be true, however, only insofar as objects with determinate, enduring properties form their truth conditions. Heidegger therefore believes that truth will always ultimately fail to reflect the genuine nature of reality. He writes, “Truth, i.e. true being, i.e. what is constant and fixed, because it is the petrifying of any single given perspective, is always only an apparentness that has come to prevail, which is to say, it is always error” (Heidegger 1979, 214). Heidegger takes Nietzsche to believe that faith in truth is ultimately nihilistic—we should not place value in something discordant with the world. Truth is an “immobilizing of life,” Heidegger says, “and hence [life’s] inhibition and dissolution” (Heidegger 1979, 216). This condemnation of truth appears to implicate constructivism as nihilistic. To facilitate survival, Heidegger explains on Nietzsche’s behalf, we organize the world into objects. This contributes to having determinate, enduring truth conditions for propositions. “ ‘Objects’, ” Heidegger claims, “emerge for creatures in what they encounter; things that are constant, with enduring qualities, by which the creature can get its bearings. The entire range of what is fixed and constant is, according to the ancient Platonic conception, the region of ‘Being’, the ‘true’ ” (Heidegger 1979, 214). But, as we have seen, the Platonic conception is flawed: “Being, the true, is mere appearance, error” (Heidegger 1979, 214). Constructing objects and establishing order ultimately conflicts with the way the world is. The world is transformative, not immutable. Constructing objects seems to be imperative for coping with reality, but it is life-negating.

126 Nihilism Alternatively, art consists in life-affirming activities, such as overcoming determinacy, fixity, boundary, and limit. These activities reflect the transformative nature of reality. Heidegger comments that “creation, as forming and shaping, as the aesthetic pleasures related to such shaping, are grounded in the essence of life” (Heidegger 1979, 216). To value art is to value the genuine nature of the world. When it comes to confronting nihilism, art wins out over truth: “Art, as transfiguration, is more enhancing to life than truth, as fixation of an apparition” (Heidegger 1979, 217). On my account, there is no need to be moved by Heidegger’s challenge. It should be clear that Heidegger’s interpretation only targets what Nietzsche calls “absolute truths” (HH I: 2). Absolute truths are made true by determinate, enduring structures in the world. Nietzsche’s ontology is certainly inconsistent with the existence of absolute truths, but not truth altogether. Application of the truth predicate need not require something determinate and enduring. It only requires something determinate for a finite time indexed to helping creatures like us navigate complex experience. Determinate structures are brought into existence by our activities, and there is no need to presume that they will endure. Thus, neither truth nor constructivism rests in disharmony with the dynamic world. Moreover, art overcomes determinacy and fixity by a process of restructuring. Breaking down boundaries, limits, and barriers involves new boundaries, limits, and barriers. As Nietzsche writes, “Only as creators can we destroy!” (GS 58). The transformative nature of art, like the transformative nature of the world, consists in reforming and reshaping activities. Constructivism, like art, is simply another instance of the transformative activity that governs all processes in the natural world. In this regard, constructivism reflects the way the world is. Consequently, we can remain committed to thinking that, according to Nietzsche, constructivism is life-affirming.

6.5 Summary For Nietzsche, I have argued, commitment to constructivism is vital for overcoming nihilistic despair, that is, the meaninglessness that sets in upon the recognition that our highest values cannot be satisfied in the conditions of this world. Embracing constructivism has practical-existential consequences for transforming the nature and meaning of scientific and philosophical inquiry by helping humanity avoid falling into forms of nihilism derivative of the true world. Commitment to constructivism exposes life-negating values essentially associated with the true world and provides a life-affirming alternative to inquiry after such values have become devalued. Constructivism does both tasks, I have contended, because it exemplifies two features of the method of artistic discourse: it affirms the empirical world and the fact that our activities transform the empirical world. These features bring new meaning to our lives and reality.

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Notes 1 For others who take this approach, see Heidegger 1982; Danto 1965, 22; Havas 1995; Reginster 2006. 2 This is indebted to Came 2014, 1–3. 3 In this chapter, I use Nietzsche’s notebooks more liberally than in other chapters. Nietzsche’s most sustained treatment of nihilism occurs in the notebooks, and Reginster (2006, ch. 1) has argued convincingly that Nietzsche’s considered view of nihilism is most clearly stated in the notebooks. 4 For this reading, see Schacht 1975, 65; Havas 1995, Preface, xiv; Larmore 1996, 82; Langsam 1997, 235; Owen 2007, 5, 32. 5 For a defense of the following argument, see Reginster 2006, ch. 1. 6 For additional ways of understanding Nietzsche’s conception of life-negation, see Reginster 2006, 44–49. 7 For a nicely detailed treatment of the issue, see Welshon 2014, ch. 5. See also the collected papers in Gemes and May 2009. For epiphenomenalist readings of Nietzsche, see Leiter 2002; 2007; Addis 2013. For non-epiphenomenalist readings, see Schacht 1983, 314–315; Katsafanas 2005, 2016. 8 For more discussion about this view, see Janaway 2007, ch. 12; cf. Katsafanas 2015; forthcoming. 9 See also Reginster 2006, 23. 10 For a recent collection of essays that address the issue, see Came 2014. 11 Ridley (2013, 419–420) also stresses the importance of this point in Nietzsche. 12 For a helpful introduction to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on this issue, see Hill 2007, 140–146.

7 Nietzsche, Constructivism, and Pragmatism

Nietzsche’s position on objects is not a common one, and yet it appears strikingly similar to views advanced by thinkers in the American pragmatist tradition, despite the fact that Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole seems to have little to no influence on the pragmatist movement. In this chapter, I examine prominent similarities and differences between Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics and views offered by James, Goodman, and Rorty. Such connections have gone virtually unnoticed in the literature. Sometimes the similarities are uncanny, and sometimes the differences are profound. What should emerge is a fresh and illuminating account of Nietzsche’s relation to American pragmatism.

7.1  Nietzsche and James I have already argued that James embraces constructivism about objects.1 As far as I can tell, there is no substantive difference between James and Nietzsche’s constructivism. James’s constructivism comes from his “humanist” view that truth is “man-made” (James 1981, 110). We create truth because “we create the subjects of our true as well as of our false propositions” (James 1981, 114). The “subjects” we construct are objects that render propositions truth-evaluable. James writes, “What shall we call a thing anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes” (James 1981, 114). Like Nietzsche, James believes that we “carve out” objects such as constellations by deciding that some set of stars, rather than another, constitutes a constellation. This constructive process not only applies to constellations, but all objects of possible experience—stars included. James declares that we “carve out everything” (James 1981, 114, italics added). For James, objects are constructed from information provided by “sensations” (James 1981, 111), which means sensory information constrains construction. While sensory input offers resistance on construction, however, there are no constraints that make it the case that construction must occur in some particular manner over another.2 James declares, “Now however fixed these elements of reality may be, we still have a certain freedom

Pragmatism  129 in our dealings with them. Take our sensations. That they are is undoubtedly beyond our control; but which we attend to, note, and make emphatic in our conclusions depends on our interests” (James 1981, 111). We have no control over the fact that we are affected in experience, but our concerns dictate which sensations we pay attention to, and this contributes to determining which objects come into existence. James remarks, “The that of [reality] is its own; but the what depends on the which, and the which depends on us” (James 1981, 111). Applying the demonstrative ‘that’ does not identify what there is. Identifying what there is requires attending to some portion of experience the boundaries of which are drawn using nondemonstrative representations. “Altho [sic] the stubborn facts remain that there is a sensible flux,” James says, “what is true of it seems from first to last to be largely a matter of our own creation” (James 1981, 115). True representations about the world in experience depend our organization of the sensory manifold. “We break the flux of sensible reality into things, then, at our will” (James 1981, 114). Consequently, the world is “what we make it” (James 1981, 110).3 Nietzsche and James not only come together in advancing similar metaphysical views about concrete objects. Both also believe that embracing constructivism can help humanity respond to the problem that life is meaningless. James calls the problem of meaninglessness pessimism. On his account, pessimism can be understood either temperamentally or metaphysically. Temperamental pessimism is the position that psychologically we find it very difficult to find life meaningful (James 1915, 34). Metaphysical pessimism is the view that the salvation of the world is impossible (James 1981, 128). First consider temperamental pessimism, which James regards as “a religious disease” (James 1915, 39).4 On this view, the source of meaninglessness is the frustrated desire to believe in some world outside the empirical world. James remarks, “The nightmare view of life has plenty of organic sources; but its great reflective source has at all times been the contradiction between the phenomena of nature and the craving of the heart to believe that behind nature there is a spirit whose expression nature is” (James 1915, 40). This “craving of the heart” seeks “atonement,” “reconciliation,” “acquiescence,” and “communion with the total soul of things” (James 1915, 40). James holds that such fervent desire becomes frustrated either in the face of the truth of naturalism or the problem of evil (James 1915, 41ff.). This frustration leads to a deep feeling of meaninglessness. The religious desire James describes is also a cause of meaninglessness for Nietzsche. Nietzsche writes, “Nihilism as a psychological state is reached [. . .] when one has posited a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all events, and underneath all events” that one “longs to admire and revere” (KSA 13:11[99]). “This faith,” he says, “suffices to give man a deep feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole that is infinitely superior, and see himself as the mode of a deity”

130 Pragmatism (KSA 13:11[99]). The problem is that belief in such a metaphysical world has become unbelievable, and humanity is beginning to confront this difficult fact. Nietzsche claims that “man” loses “faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him” (KSA 13:11[99]). This syncs with James’s position that “the heart” loses faith when it fails to find “behind nature [. . .] a spirit whose expression nature is” (James 1915, 40). The “religious disease” James describes, then, finds clear expression in Nietzsche. James offers two ways to overcome temperamental pessimism, one of which aligns with Nietzsche’s call to revalue the values essentially associated with God or any non-empirical world. James writes, “The longing to read the facts religiously may cease, and leave the bare facts by themselves; or, supplementary facts may be discovered or believed-in, which permit the religious reading to go on” (James 1915, 41). One can focus on rejecting religious desire by affirming the natural world, or one can remain committed to religious desire by seeking out new ways to understand the world that exceed naturalistic explanations. Both are viable options. James famously explores the second by examining the “will to believe.” Nonetheless, the first option supports Nietzsche’s revaluation project. Prevailing over temperamental meaningless could take the form of placing complete value in one’s natural environment by disregarding drives to all things otherworldly. James and Nietzsche hold that constructivism can assist with this undertaking. Embracing constructivism places special emphasis on the empirical world. “Reality, we naturally think, stands ready-made and complete, and our intellects supervene with one simple duty of describing it as it is already,” James comments, “But may not our descriptions [. . .] be themselves important additions to reality?” (James 1981, 115). Although we commonly take reality to have a fixed structure our best theories aim to represent, the application of descriptive representations “adds” to the world by creating structure. The constructive process exemplifies our artistic capabilities. James writes, “In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative. We add, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands” (James 1981, 115). We “add” to reality by fashioning representations (predicates) and using them to construct objects (subjects). The world is not “ready-made,” but “malleable,” and recognizing this fact is valuable for building a meaningful relationship with the world. James asserts, “No one can deny that [our constructivist] role would add both to our dignity and to our responsibility as thinkers” (James 1981, 115). We gain dignity by recognizing the truth of constructivism partly because the awareness overcomes longstanding misconceptions about the nature of reality, and partly because the awareness increases our responsibility as knowers. To embrace constructivism is to accept a new and important form of accountability. For these reasons, James believes constructivism “proves a most inspiring notion” (James 1981, 115). He mentions Giovanni Papini, an Italian pragmatist, as someone

Pragmatism  131 who voices this inspiration. It is a “mental stimulus,” Papini declares, to be aware of “the powers of the human soul over the universe” (Papini 1907, 357). Of course, Nietzsche undermines much hubris concerning our presumed “powers” over the universe, but he agrees with James and Papini that endorsing constructivism ushers in vital new forms of finding the world meaningful. What about metaphysical pessimism, the position that, as a matter of necessity, the world will not be saved? James explains that a non-pessimistic alternative to metaphysical pessimism is metaphysical optimism, the view that, as a matter of necessity, the world will be saved. He finds that “rationalists,” specifically those who believe that “reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity,” are responsible for positing both metaphysical pessimism and metaphysical optimism (James 1981, 115). Rationalism opposes the idea that our actions genuinely alter the structure of the world. Since rationalists stand behind both metaphysical pessimism and metaphysical optimism, metaphysical optimism is clearly not the best antidote for metaphysical pessimism. James’s preferred response to metaphysical pessimism is meliorism, the view that the world’s salvation is possible. Salvation depends on our cooperative efforts. We can bring value to the world such that it can be saved. James remarks that “[Reality] is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future” (James 1981, 115). Reality is created, and thus open-ended. It is “unfinished, growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places where thinking beings are at work” (James 1981, 116). The warrant for this view is that we “create [the world’s] truth” (James 1981, 117). It should be obvious that constructivism supports meliorism over rationalism. “We build the flux out inevitably,” James says, “The great question is: does it, with our additions, rise or fall in value?” (James 1981, 115). Constructivism facilitates a “rise” in the world’s value, whereas rationalism does not. Hence, adopting constructivism can displace the metaphysical pessimist position that the world simply cannot be saved. Nietzsche agrees that constructivism can counter what James understands as metaphysical pessimism. Metaphysical pessimism is what Nietzsche describes as nihilistic despair. Both hold that the way the world is prevents us from living meaningfully. On Nietzsche’s account, nihilistic despair must be overcome by understanding exactly which values we have adopted that cannot be realized in the conditions of this world. Nietzsche and James believe that because objects are constructed the value that our best theories should represent objects with fixed natures cannot be realized. Showing that objects are constructed helps demonstrate, in Nietzsche’s words, that there is “no longer any reason for devaluating the universe” (KSA 13:11[99]). For ­Nietzsche and James, supporting constructivism affirms the way the world is, which is a crucial source of meaningfulness. In sum, Nietzsche and James’s take on constructivism, meaningfulness, and the relation between these ideas is astoundingly alike. Nietzsche and James believe constructivism can contribute to overcoming meaninglessness,

132 Pragmatism which they both find rooted in a certain view of religion. While James, but not Nietzsche, thinks some religious perspectives can respond to the problem of meaninglessness,5 James and Nietzsche agree that a constructivist affirmation of the natural world can help reinstate lost meaning. Such an affirmation can contribute to overcoming temperamental and metaphysical pessimism by enhancing our understanding of our own value and increasing the value of reality.

7.2  Nietzsche and Goodman Goodman is arguably the most well-known constructivist in the analytic world—or at least the most outspoken. Nietzsche is not on Goodman’s radar, but Goodman does pay tribute to Kant.6 Despite the fact that Goodman and Kant agree that objects of experience ontologically depend on subjects, though, Goodman is no Kantian. In short: Goodman thinks there are literally many different constructed worlds comprised of constructed objects—a view that would have Kant jump ship. In this section, I start with outlining Goodman’s radical multi-world view. I then suggest what ways Nietzsche might be on board. Whereas Kant, Nietzsche, and James focus on how conceptual representations construct objects, Goodman extends his account to the application of representational symbols in general. In Ways of Worldmaking, the primary work in which he develops his constructivism, he describes how we “exchange the structure of concepts for the structure of several symbol systems of the sciences, the arts, perception, and everyday discourse” (Goodman 1978, x). On Goodman’s account, reality consists in representational systems, specifically those that are true, and each accurate system constitutes an actual world. Of course, not all systems are consistent. But Goodman sees no problem with this. He avoids contradiction by claiming that there are literally many worlds. Call this view world pluralism. World pluralism holds that there are equally true but conflicting representational systems that each constitutes a world. An immediate and obvious objection to world pluralism is that there is simply one world represented in many different ways. This one world, it could be argued, has a determinate structure prior to our representational activities. Thus, we can in principle appeal to this one world to settle disputes over representations that appear to conflict. However, Goodman contends that representations supply structure, or “form,” to experience, and “content vanishes without form” (Goodman 1978, 6). An unrepresented world is therefore “a world without kinds or order or motion or rest or pattern—a world not worth fighting for or against” (Goodman 1978, 20). Moreover, constructing worlds does not start from some world that exists antecedently to worlds constituted by our representational activities. Goodman writes, “Nothing is primitive or is derivationally prior to anything apart from a constructional system” (Goodman 1978,

Pragmatism  133 12). Worlds are constructed from other constructed worlds. Construction is always a reconstruction. Is Nietzsche a world pluralist? It certainly does not seem so. He notes, “It was we who created ‘thingness’ in the first place. The question is whether there might not be many other ways of creating such an apparent [scheinbare] world” (KSA 12:9[106], translation modified). Nietzsche seems to hold the commonsense view that there might be different ways of constructing objects that together comprise a single world. Yet, Nietzsche’s notes sometimes appear to support world pluralism. He asserts, for example, “[The world] is essentially a world of relationships: it could have a difference face when looked at from each different point: its being is essentially different at every point: it presses on every point, every point resists it—and these summations are in every case entirely incongruent” (KSA 13:14[93]). Despite the fact that the language here appears to assume the existence of a single world, the incompatibility of “summations” indicates that there could be multiple worlds. World pluralism might also find support in the following passage: Against the positivism which halts as phenomena—“There are only facts”—I would say: no, facts are just what there aren’t, there are only interpretations. We cannot determine any fact “in itself” [. . .] Inasmuch as the word “knowledge” has any meaning at all, the world is knowable: but it is variously interpretable; it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. “Perspectivism.” It is our needs which interpret the world: our drives and their for and against. Every drive is a kind of lust for domination, each has its perspective, which it would like to impose as a norm on all the other drives. (KSA 12:7[60]) Nietzsche says the world is “knowable” but also “variously interpretable,” since it “has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.” He calls this “perspectivism.” In this context, perspectivism does not appear to have anything to do with the nature of forces, but instead indicates that there are multiple accurate but inconsistent descriptions of the world. Nietzsche suggests that the world has many accurate meanings because the world is “knowable,” and accurate meanings are likely to be incompatible because “our needs [. . .] interpret the world.” Our needs, governed by competing drives, inform our interpretations. Assuming interpretations can be discursive, different needs could lead to inconsistent interpretations. In the previous chapter, I argued that for Nietzsche, our interpretations construct facts about the material world. Since interpretations can be inconsistent, there is no guarantee that facts obtain in a single world. And if facts derive from accurate but incompatible descriptions, there could be, in Goodman’s sense, many worlds. So there appears to be some reason to think that Nietzsche’s perspectivism implies world pluralism, though this conclusion finds little support elsewhere in Nietzsche’s corpus.7

134 Pragmatism Whether or not Nietzsche goes in for world pluralism, Goodman and Nietzsche wholeheartedly agree that all concrete macroscopic objects are constructed. Like James, Goodman famously advances his view by discussing stars. “We make a star as we make a constellation,” Goodman claims, “by putting its parts together and marking off its boundaries” (Goodman 1984, 42). Stars gain determinate conditions of identity only in relation to our practical engagements with the world. Assuming stars are not ontologically different from other objects of experience, all such objects are constructed. Someone sympathetic to Nietzsche’s constructivism, however, might point out that Goodman is not always clear about the fact that we create all objects. To illustrate why an object’s “being already there” is “very much a matter of making” (Goodman 1984, 35), Goodman offers the following example: I sit in a cluttered waiting room, unaware of any stereo system. Gradually I make out two speakers built into the bookcase, a receiver and turntable in a corner cabinet, and a remote control switch on the mantel. I find a system that was already there. But see what this finding involves: distinguishing the several components from the surroundings, categorizing them by function, and uniting them into a single whole. A good deal of making, with complex conceptual equipment, has gone into find what is already there. Another visitor, fresh from a lifetime in the deepest jungle, will not find, because he has not the means of making, any stereo system in that room. Nor will he find books there; but in the books and plants I find he may find fuel and food that I do not. Not only does he not know that the stereo set is one, he does not recognize as a thing at all that which I know to be a stereo system—that is, he does not make out or make any such object. (Goodman 1984, 35) The passage primarily concerns objects that are trivially socially constructed, such as stereo systems. Consequently, Goodman could be charged with begging the question: starting with constructed objects to show all objects are constructed is a non-starter. To avoid this objection, Goodman might say the objects that he represents in the passage above have no determinate identity conditions prior to his representational activities. But this is not how he proceeds. Although pointing out the stereo system requires “distinguishing [the component parts] from the surroundings, categorizing them by function, and uniting them into a single whole,” none of these activities constitute the identity conditions of the stereo system. In this sense, the stereo and its component parts are unconstructed objects. Although Goodman notices the presence of the stereo, while the foreign observer does not, the stereo’s features remain essentially independent of Goodman’s observations.

Pragmatism  135 Goodman would have done much better to argue that the fuel and food are constructed, since such objects seem found rather than made. However, he thinks the foreign observer’s recognition of the fuel and food does not constitute the nature of those objects—the fuel and food are unconstructed. The overall problem with the passage, then, is that Goodman endorses the trivial view that our interests determine how we represent fully determinate objects, rather than the constructivist view that objects are only fully determinate by virtue of applying representations. Hence, the passage does not help Goodman show that all objects are constructed. He does much better sticking to explaining how we manufacture objects such as stars.8 There are two more points of interest to notice between Goodman and Nietzsche. The first concerns objects before there were perceivers. According to Goodman, we construct objects before perceivers, such as stars, by constructing a “version” of the world that “puts the stars much earlier than itself in its own space-time” (Goodman 1984, 36), or “by making a space and time that contains those stars” (Goodman 1984, 42). To represent objects before perceivers we construct a temporal framework that locates stars as having existed in the past. Since temporal units are themselves constructed, the view goes, the temporal features of objects are constructed as well. There are at least two problems with this position. First, it seems to render time merely a feature of our representations, rather than a feature of the world. It is strange to say that our representations are the sole truth conditions for whether some star comes into existence at some time. On Goodman’s view, there is no time any star comes into existence if there are no perceivers. Of course, this may not be a problem were Goodman to endorse a Kantian constructivist view of time, but Goodman expresses no allegiance to Kant on this matter. The second and more pressing problem with Goodman’s treatment of objects before perceivers is that it does not follow from the fact that time is constructed that objects before perceivers are constructed. The identity conditions of concrete objects, such as stars, do not seem to depend necessarily on temporal properties, whereas they do seem to depend necessarily on empirical properties. Goodman’s account allows for objects to have determinate empirical properties within constructed time. This does not lend support to constructivism. Nietzsche’s account of objects before perceivers avoids these problems. I will pass over the first worry, since Hill (2003, ch. 4) has already a­ ddressed the issue. On Nietzsche’s view, there is no reason to believe that time is merely (if at all) a feature of our representations, rather than a f­ eature of the world. With respect to the second worry, recall that Nietzsche seems to think that the nature of objects before perceivers depends essentially on the possibility that we can follow a succession of causal interactions back from some present perception to a context in which the conditions for the category of the object in question are met. Objects before perceivers

136 Pragmatism have some set of properties, rather than another, because we determine such conditions. Whether or not time is constructed, then, the identity conditions constituted by all empirical properties of past objects depend necessarily on our descriptive practices. Insofar as identity conditions for concrete objects depend necessarily on empirical properties, Nietzsche can conclude that objects before perceivers are constructed. Finally, Goodman and Nietzsche share an appreciation for methodology. Rather than exploring the metaphysical details of constructivism in Ways of Worldmaking, Goodman chooses to examine the methods that inform constructive practices. “Let’s look at the ways we work, the instruments we use,” Goodman writes, “and the varied and fascinating results” (Goodman 1984, 43). Goodman’s book is an “examination and comparison of the ways we make what we make—call them versions or worlds as you like—and of the criteria we use in judging what we make” (Goodman 1984, 43). Similarly, Nietzsche exclaims that “the methods, one must say it ten times, are what is essential” (A 59). Putting constructivism to work requires understanding, first and foremost, the methods of construction. The “ways of worldmaking” Goodman examines include “composition and decomposition,” “weighting,” “ordering,” “deletion and supplementation,” and “deformation” (Goodman 1978, 7–16). Nietzsche mentions “doing violence, pressing into orderly form, abbreviating, omitting, padding, fabricating, [and] falsifying” (GM III: 24, translation modified). He also lists a “force that forms, simplifies, shapes, [and] invents” (KSA 11:25[505]). These structuring processes inform object construction. Nietzsche adds a cognitive virtue to methodology. He often talks about method as a critical attitude called the “intellectual conscience” (GS 2). When one embodies an intellectual conscience, one has a clear understanding of “reasons pro and con” (GS 2, see also GM III: 12; BGE 284; cf. HAH P: 6). A person with an intellectual conscience finds it “contemptible” to “stand in the midst of this rerum concordia discors [discordant harmony of things] and the whole marvelous uncertainty and ambiguity of existence without questioning, without trembling with the craving and rapture of questioning” (GS 2). Having such a reverent and critical attitude, Nietzsche writes, “advances humanity” by “reawakening the sense of comparison, of contradiction, of delight in what is new, daring, [and] unattempted,” which has, importantly, “forced men to pit opinion against opinion, ideal model against ideal model” (GS 4). Giving reasons for and against, questioning, comparing, contrasting, being innovative, bold, curious, and open-minded are all cognitive ways to go about the constructive process. Overall, understanding the various methods behind construction, whether structural or cognitive, is imperative. The application of these methods largely determines the structure of the world. For Nietzsche, like Goodman, one should even “value more than truth the force that forms, simplifies, shapes, [and] invents” (KSA 11:25[505]).

Pragmatism  137

7.3  Nietzsche and Rorty Rorty is the most controversial thinker associated with constructivism. And unlike James or Goodman, Rorty writes about Nietzsche. Beginning in the 1970’s, Rorty more or less consistently references Nietzsche as someone that he thinks represents his own viewpoints.9 Much attention has been devoted to exploring whether Rorty is justified in enlisting Nietzsche for his cause.10 I will not revisit such territory, since Rorty’s self-proclaimed agreement with Nietzsche is limited to themes outside constructivism. My goal is to explore the constructivist views of these two thinkers—a topic about which no ink has been spilled. Rorty’s philosophy stems from his rejection of representationalism. Representationalism, which is rooted in Plato and adopted by many contemporary analytic thinkers, holds that language is able to represent languageindependent entities. The word ‘cat’ can presumably represent an object that exists and has a nature apart from our representations of it. For obvious reasons, representationalism is often paired with the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory typically assumes that candidate objects of correspondence are determinate with respect to their properties independent of how they are represented. Truth is constrained by the way the world is apart from our actions. Rorty embraces the antirepresentationalist view that “no linguistic items represent any nonlinguistic items” (Rorty 1991, 2). For Rorty, we cannot draw a distinction between our statements and entities independent of our statements, since we cannot describe anything independent of our descriptions of it. Nonetheless, language is not hopelessly divorced from reality. Our representations are causally enmeshed with the world. Language is “a way of abbreviating the kinds of complicated interactions with the rest of the universe which are unique to the higher anthropoids. These interactions are marked by the use of strings of noises and marks to facilitate group activities, as tools for coordinating the activities of individuals” (Rorty 1999, 64). Language provides tools for coping with objects—it does not supply representations of objects—and tools are causally intertwined with reality. As Rorty states, “There is no way in which tools can take one out of touch with reality. No matter whether the tool is a hammer or a gun or a belief or a statement, tool-using is part of the interaction of the organism with its environment” (Rorty 1999, xxiii). Given this view of language, Rorty maintains that we should reject the distinction between appearance and reality. Instead, we should accept that there are only more or less useful statements about the world. Statements are tools that can only be assessed in terms of satisfying our purposes. Accuracy is a matter of utility rather than correspondence to reality. Accurate statements are those that help us satisfy our interests, whereas inaccurate statements are those that do not. What constrains accuracy is not the way the world is apart from our descriptions of it—there is no such way—but rather,

138 Pragmatism what conversations different social arrangements, such as democracy, allow us to have. Rorty writes, “we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature” (Rorty 1981, 171). The aim of inquiry is utility, not truth. Maximal utility is a convergence of vocabularies that satisfy shared purposes. “The purpose of inquiry is to achieve agreement among human beings about what to do, to bring about consensus on the ends to be achieved and the means to be used to achieve these ends” (Rorty 1999, xxv). Our investigative practices should attempt to fulfill humanity’s interests. Rorty’s antirepresentationalism grounds his constructivism. He denies that we can draw a distinction between what is made using language and what is found independent of language. Hence, he does not think that we contribute to determining the structure of an antecedently indeterminate reality. He comments, “Antirepresentationalists need to insist that ‘determinacy’ is not what is in question—that neither does thought determine reality nor, in the sense intended by the realist, does reality determine thought” (Rorty 1991, 5). To say something is a social construction is not to say that its identity conditions depend essentially on human practices. Rather, “to be a social construction is simply to be the intentional object of a set of sentences—sentences used in some societies and not in others. All that it takes to be an object is to be talked about in a reasonable coherent way” (Rorty 1999, 85). According to Rorty, something is a social construction if we can reasonably talk about it. Since everything in reality is what we can talk about, and our descriptions are constructed to serve our purposes, everything in reality is socially constructed. “To say that everything is a social construction,” Rorty contends, “is to say that our linguistic practices are so bound up with our other social practices that our description of nature, as well as of ourselves, will always be a function of our social needs” (Rorty 1999, 48). Thus, “human rights,” “atoms,” and “everything else” are socially constructed (Rorty 1999, 85). As I read Nietzsche, he would reject much of Rorty’s metaphysics, semantics, and understanding of the aim of inquiry. And the disagreement, I think, runs quite deep. It starts with antirepresentationalism. Nietzsche is an antirepresentationalist in some sense. Both Nietzsche and Rorty are motivated to adopt antirepresentationalism because we cannot describe anything fully independent of our descriptions of it. But they do not agree about what this position means, despite the fact that Rorty thinks Nietzsche shares his view (see Rorty 1991, 15). Rorty holds that language does not represent non-linguistic reality. Nietzsche believes that although we are not in contact with an undifferentiated sensory manifold, this does not imply that we are not in contact with non-linguistic reality. We are not in contact with an undifferentiated sensory manifold because our sensory apparatus actively organizes incoming sensory information. This organization helps make possible determinately structured sensory experiences, which represent differentiated non-linguistic reality. For Nietzsche, the view that we cannot represent anything fully independent of our representations of it,

Pragmatism  139 then, does not imply the further view that we cannot represent non-linguistic reality. He merely holds that our representations can only be compared to other representations. Nietzsche’s antirepresentationalism leads him to reject the c­ onsequences of Rorty’s antirepresentationalism. First, consider truth. On Nietzsche’s account, language is perfectly capable of representing the world—it is not merely a tool for coping with reality. Thus, Nietzsche seems to believe that it is coherent for statements to be evaluated as true or false by virtue of corresponding or not corresponding to the world. Statements are not assessed solely in terms of utility. Whereas Rorty’s antirepresentationalism is leveraged to undermine assumptions about the correspondence theory of truth, Nietzsche’s antirepresentationalism is compatible with that theory. Of course, Nietzsche’s approximate view of truth implies that assessing the accuracy of statements requires reference to our interests, and in this sense utility is crucial. But satisfying our interests is certainly not sufficient for accuracy. For Nietzsche, there are many more constraints than utility that inform the evaluation process. Next, consider the goal of inquiry. Rorty’s antirepresentationalism leads him to deny that inquiry should aim at truth, whereas Nietzsche’s antirepresentationalism is consistent with seeking truth. Of course, we have seen that Nietzsche believes that our investigations need not always seek truth. In fact, truth might not even be primary. Nietzsche asks, “Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth?” (BGE 1). It is an open question, for instance, whether it is really less harmful not to be deceived or not to deceive others (see GS 344). “The value of truth,” Nietzsche exclaims, “must for once be experimentally called into question” (GM III: 24). We have to question the value of truth relative to other standards of evaluation—truth does not always reign superior. But truth is certainly an option. For Rorty, the aim of inquiry is a convergence of descriptions for satisfying shared purposes. Again, Nietzsche disagrees—and this time vehemently. According to Rorty, embracing antirepresentationalism grounds the “hope [. . .] that the human race as a whole should gradually come together in a global community, a community which incorporates most of the thick morality of the European industrialized democracies” (Rorty 1999, xxxii). Nietzsche values the flourishing of great individuals over the development of a traditional moral community, especially European democracies. On Nietzsche’s account, traditional moral systems hinder the development of creative and strong individuals. Nietzsche would therefore reject Rorty’s focus on satisfying shared purposes. Agreement lurks in the vicinity, however. Nietzsche appears to think that the immediate purpose of contemporary inquiry is to find the resources to overcome nihilism. With this in mind, consider Rorty: There are two principle ways in which reflective human beings try, by placing their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those lives. The first is by telling the story of their contribution to a community.

140 Pragmatism This community may be the actual historical one in which they live, or another actual one, distant in time or place, or a quite imaginary one, consisting perhaps of a dozen heroes and heroines selected from history or fiction or both. The second way is to describe themselves as standing in immediate relation to a nonhuman reality. (Rorty 1991, 21) Rorty’s antirepresentationalism motivates him to argue that only the former option is viable. Likewise, Nietzsche believes that meaninglessness will follow from the problematic desire to seek meaning in some nonhuman reality, that is, some reality outside the empirical world, such as the true world. Nietzsche’s antirepresentationalism pushes him to argue that targeting a mind-independent world is nihilistic. For both Nietzsche and Rorty, then, people should find meaning by situating inquiry within a community of thinkers, though again, Nietzsche rejects Rorty’s view that this community should embrace traditional moral standards. Finally, Nietzsche and Rorty’s different versions of antirepresentationalism lead to very different forms of constructivism. For Rorty, something is socially constructed if it is an intentional object of meaningful sentences. Since sentences are formed in relation to our needs and interests, Rorty thinks objects “are what they are” by virtue of “human needs and interests” (Rorty 1999, xxvi). He explains: We describe giraffes in the way we do, as giraffes, because of our needs and interests. We speak a language which includes the word “giraffe” because it suits our purposes to do so. The same goes for words like “organ,” “cell,” “atom,” and so on—the names of the parts out of which giraffes are made, so to speak. All the descriptions we give of things are descriptions suited to our purposes. No sense can be made, we pragmatists argue, of the claim that some of these descriptions pick out “natural kinds”—that they cut nature at the joints. The line between a giraffe and the surrounding air is clear enough if you are a human being interested in hunting for meat. If you are a language-using ant or amoeba, or a space voyager observing us from far above, that line is not so clear, and it is not clear that you would need or have a word for “giraffe” in your language. More generally, it is not clear that any of the millions of ways of describing the piece of space time occupied by what we call a giraffe is any closer to the way things are in themselves than any of the others. (Rorty 1999, xxvi) Unlike Nietzsche’s constructivism, Rorty’s is not ontologically committed. The view that “all the descriptions we give of things are descriptions suited to our purposes” does not imply that objects “are what they are” by virtue of our descriptions. Rorty’s position entails nothing about the nature of the objects of experience: something can be an intentional object of our

Pragmatism  141 descriptions while having a determinate nature apart from our activities. There could be a “way things are in themselves,” for instance, described in different manners. Rorty might respond by claiming that the causal relationship between language and reality contributes to determining the nature of objects. But this reply is off limits. He writes: “if there had been no human beings there would still have been giraffes, whereas there would have been no bank accounts. But this causal independence of giraffes from humans does not mean that giraffes are what they are apart from human needs and interests” (Rorty 1999, xxvi). If it is truly the case that there would have been giraffes if there were no human beings, that is, if giraffes exist independently of being encountered by human beings, then the proposed causal relationship between language and reality does not actually affect the nature of the objects of experience, in this case giraffes. In short, Rorty has no right to claim that objects “are what they are” by virtue of “human needs and interests.” For all these reasons, Nietzsche would reject Rorty’s constructivism. Rorty’s view fails to account for the actual construction of material objects.

7.4 Summary In this chapter, I have examined how Nietzsche’s constructivism compares to versions advanced by James, Goodman, and Rorty. Nietzsche’s version of constructivism comes closest to James’s, and both believe that constructivism can bring much-needed meaning to the world, despite the fact that James believes that affirming a non-empirical world can generate meaningfulness. Nietzsche and Goodman appear to disagree about world pluralism and representing past reality, but agree that understanding the methods of construction is most important when it comes to understanding the world. Last, although Nietzsche and Rorty share commitment to a general form of antirepresentationalism, and both believe that we should place inquiry within a community of thinkers, Nietzsche’s view that non-linguistic reality constrains our descriptions of the world is inconsistent with Rorty’s dismissal of truth and Rorty’s constructivism. Rorty is therefore much further from Nietzsche than he might like to believe. Where does this leave us? Readers will notice that pragmatism has largely gone by the wayside in contemporary thought. Is Nietzschean constructivism around today? I now turn to this question.

Notes 1 My reading of James is greatly indebted to conversations with Robert Schwartz. For a helpful discussion of James’s constructivism, see Schwartz 2012, ch. 7. 2 On James’s account, like Nietzsche’s, construction occurs within a rigorous context of constraints—it is certainly not the case that anything goes. In addition to sensory information, construction is often limited by such factors as the current stock of accepted beliefs and what James calls “necessary truths,” or truths that we must regard as fixed for inquiry to proceed.

142 Pragmatism 3 Slater challenges James when he writes, “But why an object must be considered by us in order for beliefs and statements about those objects and events to be true is simply not evident” (Slater 2009, 204). James, as I read him, provides such evidence: objects need to be constructed for truth to exist. Slater also accuses James of begging the question because James “assumes that objects and events must be constructed by our minds from a sensory flux in order to bear a truthvalue” (Slater 2009, 204). But I see no problem here. James argues that truth requires there to be objects with determinate properties, and since the world in experience is a mere sensible flux out of which we construct objects with determinate properties, truth requires that we construct objects. 4 For further discussion, see Lamberth 2009, 98–99. 5 For a reading that Nietzsche does, in fact, embrace some form of religion, such that religious commitments could form an adequate response to nihilism, see Young 2006. 6 See, for example, Goodman 1978, 6. 7 Cox (1999, 155–158) attributes world pluralism to Nietzsche. Unfortunately, he is not very careful when culling this view from the texts. Cox writes that, for Nietzsche, there is “no One True World of which [perspectives] are all descriptions” (Cox 1999, 157). However, this does not follow from either passage he cites (TI “Reason” 2; KSA 13:14[184]). Cox then derives the position that, according to Nietzsche, “there are many different, coexisting worlds” (Cox 1999, 158) from the view that “each perspective fabricates a world,” together with the view that “there are many different, coexisting perspectives” (Cox 1999, 157). However, there is no textual evidence for thinking that each perspective creates an entire world. Rather, most passages in Nietzsche take there to be a single world constituted by various perspectives, specifically perspectival forces. 8 For other challenges to Goodman’s account from various objectivist positions, see McCormick 1996. 9 See, for example, Rorty 1982; 1989; 1991; 1999. 10 See, for example, Fanning and Mooney 2010; Sedgwick 2000; Magnus 1995; Shaw 1989.

8 Nietzsche’s Constructivism and Current Debates

Is Nietzschean constructivism alive and well in contemporary debates about material object metaphysics? The answer is easy: no. A few contemporary metaphysicians suggest that objects, in some non-trivial sense, are socially constructed.1 But the position is a drastic minority. It has been largely stamped out. It just seems obviously true that objects such as trees and birds are in no way brought into existence by our social practices. Most often, the truth of objectivism does not even require argument.2 Nearly all metaphysicians in the analytic tradition embrace such a position— too many, in fact, to name here. Consider, for example, the first paragraph of Sider’s influential book, Writing the Book of the World: The world has a distinguished structure, a privileged description. For a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts, so that its conceptual structure matches reality’s structure. There is an objectively correct way to “write the book of the world.” (Sider 2011, v) The point to notice is that naturally occurring objects have boundary conditions, or structure, independent of our representational practices. The metaphysician’s job is to describe this structure: Discerning “structure” means discerning patterns. It means figuring out the right categories for describing the world. It means “carving reality at its joints,” to paraphrase Plato. It means inquiring into how the world fundamentally is, as opposed to how we ordinarily speak or think of it. (Sider 2011, 1) The predominant view in metaphysics holds that (i) reality has some inherent structure, (ii) there is a clear divide between the structure of reality and our ways of describing the structure of reality, and (iii) our descriptions should aim to represent the structure of reality as it exists apart from our ways of describing it. This amounts to a staunch rejection of constructivism in the analytic world.3

144  Current Debates What about the continental world? Constructivism is widely known to have enjoyed a good deal of popularity in continental philosophy— considerably more than what we find in analytic circles.4 Harman exclaims, “Until lately, the word ‘realism’ was almost never spoken aloud in the continental tradition” (Ferraris 2015a, ix). But the sun is setting on this silence. The objectivist trends that dominate analytic philosophy are taking root in continental philosophy. Grant writes, “In the early twenty-first century, philosophy stemming from the continental tradition has become overtly realist” (Ferraris 2015b, vi). Movements known as “speculative realism” and “new realism” have emerged, both of which attempt to defend various forms of objectivism against the constructivist view that, according to Ferraris, “relatively large parts of reality are constructed by our conceptual schemes and perceptual apparatuses” (Ferraris 2015a, 24).5 As these new forms of realism gain footing, it looks like the days are numbered for Nietzschean constructivism. Nietzsche seems to have, at best, one foot in the grave—no matter which side of the ocean he stands on.6 Against current trends, I think Nietzsche’s brand of constructivism is worth taking seriously. I think it can do a lot of good. Below, I begin to make the case for my view by examining how Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics might figure into contemporary analytic philosophical debates. It may be ironic that, although analytic thinkers often take the truth of objectivism to be a matter of common sense, two prominent positions in analytic material object metaphysics are significantly counterintuitive.7 One of the prevailing views is permissivism, which holds that there are countless more macroscopic objects than we intuitively take there to be. Universalism is a popular form of permissivism. Universalism is the position that the composition of objects is unrestricted: for any objects, there is a single object composed of those objects.8 On this view, then, whenever there is a tree and a bird, there is a further object composed of that tree and that bird. There is a treebird. The other prevailing view in contemporary analytic material object metaphysics is eliminativism. Roughly, eliminativism holds that there are no macroscopic objects that we intuitively take there to be. Nihilism is a leading form of eliminativism. Nihilism holds that there are no composite objects: every object is mereologically simple.9 On this view, there may be mereological simples arranged treewise and birdwise, but no actual pluralities that compose trees or birds. Trees and birds do not exist.10 Whereas universalism multiplies objects, nihilism deletes them. Both universalism and nihilism run contrary to our everyday sensibilities concerning what objects exist. Universalism countenances extraordinary objects, such as an object composed of my nose and Jupiter, and nihilism rejects the existence of ordinary objects, like my nose and Jupiter. Yet, universalism enjoys enthusiastic support across the field, and nihilism is a serious contender. Why is this the case? Both universalism and nihilism, it will emerge below, either appear to be logical consequences of seemingly sound arguments, or offer solutions to tricky metaphysical puzzles. But the price

Current Debates  145 may be high for some: to accept universalism or nihilism is to accept that many of our ordinary judgments about the world are radically misguided— perhaps even flatly false. The merits of Nietzschean constructivism that I examine concern its ability to offer solutions to thorny problems in material object metaphysics, specifically solutions that support our intuitive judgments about what objects there are. Common sense supports conservatism, the view that ordinary objects exist, such as trees and birds, but no extraordinary objects exist, like an object with both bark and feathers.11 Conservatism is an underdog position in contemporary debates. As I see it, however, finding a persuasive conservative response to difficult metaphysical puzzles is the most desirable result. We should not accept the existence of treebirds. We should not deny the existence of trees and birds. And constructivism can supply both results. Constructivists hold that what we ordinarily take to exist definitely exists. Consequently, no treebirds exist, but trees and birds do exist. This seems exactly right. Is constructivism compatible with either permissivism or eliminativism? In principle, constructivists could be permissivists, and permissivists could be constructivists. We could take many more objects to exist than we ordinarily take to exist, and the existence of all extraordinary objects could essentially depend on our practices. Plus, in principle, constructivists could be eliminativists, and eliminativists could be constructivists. We could take no objects to exist that we currently take to exist, and the existence of objects we ordinarily take to exist could depend on a conceptual apparatus with no corresponding referents. But constructivists should be neither permissivists nor eliminativists: the concept does not satisfy our needs, interests, or values in organizing the world in experience, whereas the concepts and certainly do. Of course, there is nothing the constructivist can point to which would take completely off the table. Moreover, there is nothing that would render and the objectively correct concepts for representing portions of the world. In the way of organizing experience, if there are genuine uses for adopting , or genuine uses for junking and , things may change. But we should be hard-pressed to imagine a permissivist or eliminativist holding their respective view because of a prior commitment to constructivism. And I do not see us discarding deeply entrenched, commonsense concepts like and anytime soon. Such concepts nicely organize experience. So, for all intents and purposes, constructivism is incompatible with permissivism and eliminativism. And constructivism stands alone in supporting our intuitive beliefs about what objects exist. What follows focuses on the problem-solving power of Nietzschean constructivism. To this end, I will not be presenting an argument for the truth of constructivism. I want to explore what the view can do. Uncovering the power of Nietzsche’s position could very well provide reason to take constructivism seriously. Constructivism can do significant philosophical work, I suggest, in places we might not expect.

146  Current Debates

8.1  The Argument From Vagueness Nietzschean constructivism can provide an overlooked response to the argument from vagueness. The argument, which has received volumes of attention, is this:12 (AV1) If some pluralities of objects compose something and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for composition. (AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of composition. (AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series. (AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of composition. (AV5) So, either every plurality of objects composes something, or none do. AV5 holds that either universalism or nihilism is true. To reach a universalist conclusion, the following could be added: (AV6) Some pluralities of objects compose something. (AV7) So, every plurality of objects composes something. AV5 could also support nihilism. Nihilism could be derived by adding the following: (~AV6) Not every plurality of objects composes something. (~AV7) So, no pluralities of objects compose something. It is important to notice that both universalism and nihilism are incompatible with constructivism. Universalism is an objectivist position: some compositions of objects, such as my nose and Jupiter, exist regardless of human practices. And nihilism and constructivism are opposed because constructivism, but not nihilism, countenances the existence of ordinary objects. So, it appears that if either universalism or nihilism is true, constructivism is false. How might the constructivist respond to the argument from vagueness? Consider the premises of the argument more closely. AV1 holds that if some pluralities of objects compose something and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for composition. This is perfectly reasonable. Consider assembling a hammer from a handle and a head. Suppose they do not compose anything at the beginning of the assembly process and they do compose something by the end. The series of moments leading from the beginning to the end of the assembly is a sorites series for composition. AV2 holds that such a series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of composition. The premise is uncontroversial. Any sorites series for composition must contain a transition from composition

Current Debates  147 not occurring to composition occurring, and there either will or will not be an exact point at which that transition occurs. AV3 holds that there cannot be exact cut-offs in a sorites series for composition. This is intuitively true. The handle and head certainly compose a hammer when the head gets fully screwed on. But it is strange to think there is some exact point that sharply distinguishes the moment when composition does not occur from the moment when composition does occur. It appears hopelessly arbitrary to think one tiny fraction of a turn makes all the difference. As Sider writes: there would seem to be something “metaphysically arbitrary” about a sharp cut-off in a continuous series of cases of composition. Why is the cut-off there, rather than there? Granted, everyone must admit some metaphysically “brute” facts, and it is a hard question why one brute fact seems more or less plausible than another. Nevertheless, this brute fact seems particularly hard to stomach. (Sider 2001, 124) The fact that composition occurs at some point and not another nearly identical point seems arbitrary. This justifies the idea that there cannot be sharp cut-offs. AV4 holds that there cannot be borderline cases of composition. If there were borderline cases of composition, the reasoning goes, then some numerical sentence would lack a determinate truth-value. Here is one such sentence (the sentence that there are exactly two objects): ‘∃x∃y(x ≠ y & ∀z(x = z ∨ y = z))’. It is implausible that such a numerical sentence lacks a determinate truth-value—there seems to be no vagueness in the quantifiers, the identity relation, and so on. Thus, there can be no borderline cases for composition. There is more to say about AV4, but I will grant the premise. I want to examine AV3.13 The Nietzschean constructivist could challenge AV3. Arguably, the intuition that composition is not constituted by some minute turn of the handle onto the head is motivated by assuming that objectivism is true. Indeed, those who defend AV3 are staunch objectivists.14 An objectivist would claim that each moment in the area of nearly identical cases of the assembly sorites series, where it seems indeterminate whether or not composition has occurred, is objectively as good as any other with respect to providing a boundary between when composition does and does not occur. There is no ontologically significant difference between the nearly identical steps that would justify marking an exact cut-off—pointing out an exact cut-off is hopelessly arbitrary. The primary warrant of AV3, then, seems to turn on accepting objectivism. Accordingly, one way to resist AV3 is to reject objectivism. There are, of course, ways to challenge AV3 while remaining committed to objectivism— and that is how the literature plays out.15 The Nietzschean strategy is new: examine the argument for vagueness by denying objectivism.

148  Current Debates Constructivists can deny the charge of arbitrariness motivating AV3. For the constructivist, all objects come into existence by virtue of the actions of groups of agents. To act, agents employ reasons, and reason-giving behavior fulfills certain purposes. Hammers are created to fulfill the purpose of hammering. And a tiny turn of a handle onto a head—a microscopic, even fraction of a turn—can make a macroscopic difference with respect to whether a hammer succeeds at hammering. There is certainly no significant difference between close steps in the hammer assembly series when it comes to considering when something comes into existence as a hammer if the series is considered objectively, or apart from our concerns, but there is a significant difference if considered in relation to our reasons for building a hammer. Taking into consideration what we care about when drawing certain boundaries within a sorites series for composition, the constructivist argues, can defuse the charge of arbitrariness. The constructivist response, then, proceeds as follows. We construct tools to satisfy certain purposes. The primary purpose of a hammer is to effectively strike objects, specifically drive nails through boards. When it comes to striking objects there are various degrees of effectiveness, and these degrees may be relevant to satisfying a wide variety of purposes. For example, as the assembly series progresses, some handle and head pairs could be able to drive nails through material such as cookie dough while failing to drive nails through boards. Does the constructivist need a fine-grained account of how each step in the assembly series might effectively satisfy various purposes? Not at all. The point in the assembly series that is important for distinguishing when a hammer comes into existence is the point at which the handle and head are able to drive nails through boards—the handle and head must certainly remain together, for instance! One might ask, how many nails? Or, what kind of boards? Each specification will depend on fulfilling certain purposes, and our purposes can be rendered determinate relative to accomplishing particular tasks, like hammering nails. The point at which the handle and head succeed at being a hammer—when they succeed at doing what hammers do when it comes to what, for example, carpenters need hammers to do—is the point at which the handle and head compose a hammer. And this point in the assembly series is not arbitrary. There is a distinct moment when the handle and head succeed at the task of hammering. This provides reason to reject AV3. The constructivist argues that insofar as composition results in a new object, composition occurs by virtue of our practices. In regards to a hammer, composition occurs by deciding when screwing together a handle and a head compose a hammer. This decision depends on the concept of what something must be in order to be a hammer. The concept of being a hammer conjoins properties that we find relevant to something’s being a hammer, such as the property of having a handle and a head, and the property of being able to drive nails through boards. The properties of being able to forge metal and break apart objects could also be added. For the

Current Debates  149 constructivist, we conjoin whatever properties we find relevant to being a hammer in order to determine the application conditions for the concept of being a hammer. These application conditions fix the identity conditions of what a hammer is. The identity conditions of being a hammer are constituted by the collection of properties that constitute the correct application conditions of the concept of being a hammer. Correctly applying the concept to certain portions of the world—for example, the particular point in the sorites series at which the handle and head together successfully function as a hammer—brings hammers into existence. The constructivist response to the argument from vagueness results in retaining the existence of ordinary objects. Against universalism, there is no single object when the handle and head are sitting at opposite ends of the room. Against nihilism, there are hammers. Both conclusions seem spot on. Constructivism supports our intuitive notions about what objects exist. Two objections might crop up. First, one might protest that the hammer case is unique—that the constructivist response might be plausible for objects that are obviously socially constructed, but not natural objects, like trees and planets. For the constructivist, however, there is nothing about the world considered objectively, or fully apart from our interests, that determines when composition occurs. Provided that composition results in the formation of a new object, there is no fact of the matter about composition independent of how we understand that phenomenon. The concept is a term we bring to bear on experience. According to the constructivist, then, there is no ontologically significant difference between assembling hammers and organizing other parts of experience into objects.16 Showing the soundness of this extension need not be developed in full for the constructivist response to succeed. Commentators who challenge AV3 are objectivists even about hammers. The constructivist ball gets rolling, so to speak, with hammers. The second objection is this. It seems that both a constructivist and an objectivist could argue that objects compose something just in case they together fulfill some function, such as hammering. If so, why prefer constructivism to objectivism? Why think constructivism is special? The reason is simple: we identify when a function is fulfilled. We constitute the identity conditions of fulfillment. Fulfilling a function is constitutively dependent on satisfying our purposes. The objectivist could certainly argue that the existence of fulfilling the function of a hammer constitutively depends on our purposes, but must deny that constitutive dependence extends to all objects we can grasp. The objectivist is therefore not entitled to claim that fulfilling a function, in general, brings a new object into existence. I have argued that the constructivist can respond to the argument from vagueness by resisting the premise that there are no exact cut-offs in a sorites series for composition. The response is novel. Unlike other strategies for resisting AV3, the current account does not depend on the truth of objectivism. And the response supports our intuitive notions about what

150  Current Debates objects exist. For these reasons, at least, Nietzschean constructivism looks appealing.

8.2  Arbitrariness Arguments Arguments from arbitrariness purport to show that if we accept the existence of certain ordinary objects, then, on pain of being objectionably arbitrary, we should also accept the existence of certain extraordinary objects—objects that are particularly hard to stomach.17 Arbitrariness arguments can be leveled to support either permissivism, the view that there are many more objects in existence than we ordinarily believe exist, or eliminativism, the view that ordinary objects do not exist. Here is an arbitrariness argument for permissivism:18 (AR1) There is no ontologically significant difference between islands and incars. (AR2) If so, then: if there are islands, there are incars. (AR3) There are islands. (AR4) So, there are incars. An incar is an extraordinary object. An incar is exactly like a car, except an incar cannot exist outside a garage, whereas a car can exist both inside and outside a garage. When a car is in a garage, one might argue that there are two co-located objects: the car and the incar. An incar shrinks as a car leaves the garage, and goes fully out of existence when a car fully leaves the garage. AR1 appears to be warranted because both islands and incars go out of existence when they undergo a certain kind of change, specifically a change that in no way intrinsically affects their constituent matter. For instance, incars cease to exist when their matter fully leaves the garage, and islands arguably cease to exist when their matter becomes fully submerged in water. This suggests there is no ontologically significant difference between islands and incars. AR2 finds support in the fact that it would be unreasonable to deny the existence of incars while accepting the existence of islands if there really is no ontologically significant difference between incars and islands. As Hawthorne writes, “none but the most insular metaphysician should countenance islands while repudiating incars” (Hawthorne 2006, vii). And AR3 seems undeniable: there are islands. If AR1-AR3 are true, it follows that there are incars. The eliminativist can challenge the soundness of the argument by rejecting AR3. Eliminativists say there are no islands. And the argument can then be tweaked to support eliminativism. Say we find good reason for rejecting the existence of incars. The eliminativist could capitalize on this finding and offer the following: (AR1) There is no ontologically significant difference between islands and incars.

Current Debates  151 (AR2) If so, then: if there are islands, there are incars. (~AR3) There are no incars. (~AR4) So, there are no islands. Denying the existence of incars plays nicely into the hands of the eliminativist. So, it seems that we are stuck with permissivism (AR1-AR4) or eliminativism (AR1-~AR4). Alas, conservatism is out. The constructivist, though, has a ready response: AR1 is false. According to the constructivist, there is indeed an ontologically significant difference between islands and incars: we take islands to exist, but not incars. The ontologically significant difference lies in our practical engagement with the world. We created the concept of an island to organize the world in experience, and there are unique parts of the world that satisfy the conditions of what it is to be an island. Hence, islands exist. The concept of an incar is also our creation, but its purpose is merely for metaphysical musings. The concept has no work to do in organizing the world in experience. There are no unique parts of the world that satisfy the conditions of what it is to be an incar that cannot be accounted for by using the concept of a car.19 Hence, incars do not exist. The concept of an island works to organize experience, whereas the concept of an incar does not. Islands are retained, incars are rejected. Constructivism gets us what we want. The lynchpin of arguments from arbitrariness is the declaration that there is no ontologically significant difference between objects we would typically like to keep in our ontology—such as islands, trains, watches, statues, and snowballs—and objects we would typically like to keep out of our ontology—such as incars, monewments, trogs, gollyswaggles, and snowdiscalls. If such strange kinds are unfamiliar, there is no need to worry. It is enough to notice their strangeness, together with the fact that such kinds have received serious attention by metaphysicians.20 Separating out islands from incars, trains from monewments, statues from gollyswaggles, or snowballs from snowdiscalls can lead to complex discussions of modality, persistence, material constitution, mereology, and the like—all sorts of heavy duty metaphysical machinery. There seems to be no systematic, principled manner by which to treat cases of arbitrariness that delivers a conservative result.21 And maybe such principles are undesired. Nonetheless, constructivism does provide a systematic, principled response that ensures conservatism in the face of arguments from arbitrariness: our conceptual organization of the world, tailored by various constraints, provides good guidance for distinguishing what exists. This could provide another reason to take a serious look at Nietzschean constructivism.

8.3  The Debunking Argument The debunking argument is launched to debunk longstanding beliefs about ordinary objects. It aims to show that due to biological and cultural contingencies informing what we believe, we should not think that many objects

152  Current Debates that we take to exist actually exist. Our beliefs about objects appear to be pragmatic accidents given the kind of creatures we are. So, it would be extremely unlikely were it to turn out that our beliefs somehow track the true nature of reality. We should either suspend judgment about the existence of such objects, or perhaps, as the eliminativist might suggest, reject our ordinary beliefs. Here is the debunking argument:22 (DK1) There is no explanatory connection between how we believe the world to be divided up into objects and how the world actually is divided up into objects. (DK2) If so, it would be a coincidence if our object beliefs turned out to be correct. (DK3) If it would be a coincidence if our object beliefs turned out to be correct, we should not believe there are trees. (DK4) So, we should not believe there are trees. DK1 gains warrant because contingent facts about us appear to explain our coming to have the beliefs about objects that we do. This suggests that there is no explanatory connection between the way we think the world is and the way the world actually is. DK2 is justified because, if there really is such an explanatory divide, then coming to have correct beliefs about objects could only be an extremely remarkable accident.23 As Hawthorne proclaims, “The simplest exercises of sociological imagination ought to convince us that the assumption of such a harmony [between objects we believe to exit and objects that do exist] is altogether untoward” (Hawthorne 2006, 109). And DK3 is true because we should certainly not believe there are trees if we have no good grounds for believing that the highly remarkable accident occurred. If DK1–DK3 are true, we should not believe there are trees—or mountains, clouds, rocks, and so on. The constructivist is nicely positioned to provide a response to this argument.24 Readers will have already guessed it. Since our beliefs are constitutively responsible for bringing objects into existence, there is a straightforward explanatory connection between how we believe the world to be divided up into objects and the how the world actually is divided up into objects. The way the world is actually divided up into objects is how we believe the world is divided up into objects. Thus, DK1 is false. Some would not be happy with this conclusion. As Hawthorne remarks, “Barring a kind of anti-realism that none of us should tolerate, wouldn’t it be remarkable if the lines of reality matched the lines that we have words for?” (Hawthorne 2006, 109). And here is Sider: On [conservative views] the entities that exist correspond exactly with the categories for continuants in our conceptual scheme: trees, aggregates, statues, lumps, persons, bodies, and so on. How convenient! It would be nothing short of a miracle if reality just happened to match

Current Debates  153 our conceptual scheme in this way. Or is it rather that the world contains the objects it does because of the activities of humans? This is an equally unappealing hypothesis. (Sider 2001, 156–157) For Hawthorne, constructivism is a position “none of us should tolerate.” For Sider, constructivism is “unappealing.” Why come to such conclusions? Perhaps the mind-independence of trees and birds just seems patently selfevident. Or maybe constructivism leads to the view that the divide between what objects exist and what objects do not exist is far too haphazard. But, as we have seen, Nietzschean constructivism is not baseless, and the view does not operate independent of constraints—sensory information and various epistemic virtues should guide construction. Constructivists simply stress the importance of our activities when attempting to understand the world, since nothing determines its identity conditions fully and completely all by itself—not planets, not trees, not mountains, not rocks. Determinate structure is our responsibility. So, we should take care when constructing. Nonetheless, there is no need to be worried that our beliefs about objects are hopelessly divorced from the objects that populate the world. Putting this skeptical worry to rest should make constructivism an attractive position.25

8.4  Indeterminate Identity Material constitution puzzles are abundant in the analytic metaphysics literature. One such puzzle concerns the issue of whether two things can be indeterminately identical. To see the difficulty, consider the famous example of the Ship of Theseus. Say we build a wooden ship and name it ‘Theseus’. As Theseus ages, the original planks are replaced by new planks, such that the ship eventually comes to have entirely new planks. The original planks are later gathered and built into a new ship—a ship that seems identical to Theseus. Call this new ship ‘Mended’. Here is the question: which, if either, of these two ships is identical to Theseus? Intuitively, the answer is indeterminate— there simply is no deciding fact of the matter. Arguably, though, this cannot be the case:26 (ST1) Suppose that it is indeterminate whether Theseus = Mended. (ST2) If so, Theseus has the property of being indeterminately identical to Mended. (ST3) Mended does not have the property of being indeterminately identical to Mended. (ST4) If Theseus has this property and Mended lacks this property, Theseus ≠ Mended. (ST5) If Theseus ≠ Mended, it is not indeterminate whether Theseus =  Mended. (ST6) So (by reductio), it is not indeterminate whether Theseus = Mended.

154  Current Debates Why accept the premises? ST2 is upheld because the supposition that Theseus is indeterminate to Mended seems to imply that Theseus has that particular property of indeterminacy. ST3 looks trivial. Mended is, of course, identical to Mended, in which case Mended does not have the property of indeterminacy instantiated by Theseus. ST4 is justified by Leibniz’s Law: x = y if and only if x and y share all properties.27 ST5 is uncontroversial. If Theseus and Mended are not identical, then there is a determinate answer with respect to whether Theseus and Mended are identical. If ST1–ST5 are true, it is indeed determinate whether Theseus is Mended. It should come as no surprise that most responses to the argument concerning indeterminate identity are launched from an objectivist standpoint.28 Yet there is an attractive reply in the literature that focuses on the importance of our practices when determining identity: the four-dimensionalist view that an object’s persistence through time is like its extension through space.29 On this view, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. Four-dimensionalists commonly identify objects such as ships with subregions of temporal parts known as spacetime worms.30 There is a spacetime worm that includes, for instance, all the years between my dog’s being ages two and five; all the years between my dog’s being ages four and ten; all the moments between my dog’s waking up today and heading out on a first walk; all the moments between my dog’s waking up today, heading out on a first walk, and taking his first nap, and so on. No object, like my dog, is wholly present at any particular time. There are many overlapping worms I could refer to when talking about my dog. It is a matter of convention which worm I do refer to when having such conversations. When visiting the vet, for instance, it might be prudent for me to talk about the spacetime worm that includes the beginning of my dog’s falling ill to the present moment. At other times, different worms are relevant. With respect to Theseus, the four-dimensionalist can say ST2 is false. There are many determinate worms overlapping from Theseus to Mended and it is simply a matter of convention which one we call Theseus. So, if we start by supposing that it is indeterminate what ‘Theseus’ refers to, we certainly cannot accurately determine that some ship is identical to Mended. Of course, it might simply be the case that our language is not suitably refined enough to refer to particular worms of Theseus. But this is no problem. The four-dimensionalist holds that linguistic indeterminacy does not imply indeterminacy of identity. According to the four-dimensionalist, then, there are determinate facts of the matter about Theseus’s identity regardless of our practices. Is this right? Perhaps not. It seems that the question concerning which, if any, ship is Theseus requires much stronger reference to our practical engagements with the world. We bring ships into existence to serve our purposes, just like we do hammers. It therefore seems imperative to know what we think makes something a ship and what we think makes a ship the

Current Debates  155 same ship over time. It would be strange to think that answers pertaining to whether something is a ship, or whether a ship is the same ship over time, hold regardless of our social practices involving ships.31 Enter the Nietzschean constructivist. In some sense, the constructivist can accept both the intuition that there is no fact of the matter about whether Theseus is Mended and the conclusion that there is indeed an answer with respect to whether Theseus is Mended. For the constructivist, there is no fact of the matter about whether Theseus is Mended in the sense that there is no way the world is constitutively independent of our activities that determines whether Theseus is Mended. To say we bring ships into existence in accordance with our purposes is to say the existence conditions of ships essentially depend on us, which is to say the identity conditions of ships essentially depend on us. And this means that a determinate answer to the question concerning which, if any, ship is Theseus essentially depends on our practices. Theseus is therefore indeterminately identical to Mended only if the identities of Theseus and Mended are considered apart from our practices. In this way, constructivism supports the intuition that there is no fact of the matter about whether Theseus is Mended. If Theseus is identical to Mended, then it is because we take Theseus to be identical to Mended. This conditional also allows the constructivist to accept the conclusion, stated in ST6, that there is indeed an answer with respect to whether Theseus is Mended. There is an answer with respect to whether Theseus is Mended only if the identities of Theseus and Mended are considered in relation to our activities. Constructivism therefore seems to provide a nice response to the argument concerning indeterminate identity. It explains why we feel there is no objective answer about the identity of Theseus, and it explains how we can still provide an answer to Theseus’s identity. What is the answer? It will depend on which group of people, with which particular needs, interests, and values, are taking part in organizing the world—and I will leave this discussion aside.32 The constructivist concludes by saying that the solution on offer does not merely hold for obviously socially constructed objects, like Theseus and Mended, but extends to any possible object of experience, such as amoebas splitting in two.33 Once again, constructivism helps to resolve a difficult and lasting puzzle in contemporary metaphysics.

8.5 Summary Objectivism dominates the philosophical landscape. Nietzschean constructivism is almost long forgotten. But a position’s ability to provide solutions to metaphysical problems without reverting to incredibly strange views of what objects exist is certainly a reason to begin to explore that position’s merits. I have suggested that constructivism can deliver a strong metaphysical bite. Constructivism appears to provide tenable responses to the argument from vagueness, arbitrariness arguments, the debunking argument, and the puzzle of indeterminate identity. I have only really introduced these

156  Current Debates solutions here. They have not been defended in any detail, and constructivism undoubtedly has more puzzle-solving abilities waiting to be developed. I leave these projects to future work, in hopes that metaphysicians can receive Nietzsche’s heterodox views with an open mind.34 I close this book by reiterating one last reason to care about constructivism—a reason I find personally compelling. Constructivism implies that something is at stake when doing metaphysics, something much more than solving metaphysical puzzles. Constructivist thinkers like Nietzsche tie metaphysics directly to ethics. We are responsible for the way the world is to a significantly greater extent than one would ordinarily think. And how we construct material entities can have far-reaching ethical implications— especially objects such as gendered bodies, sexed bodies, racialized bodies, native persons, native species, diseases, mental illness, and many more.35 Nietzsche recognizes that the consequences of a constructivist account of material entities could be liberating. For instance, how we construct the world could very well “spare someone shame” (GS 274), and “the seal of having become free,” Nietzsche says, is “no longer to be ashamed before oneself” (GS 275). For the constructivist, then, a metaphysics of objects is a metaphysics we should care deeply about.

Notes 1 See Varzi 1997; 2011; Jubien 1992; Einheuser 2011; 2009; 2006. For discussions of constructivism that are somewhat sympathetic to the position, though ultimately critical, see Weiland 2012; Rea 2014, ch. 7; Elder 2011. 2 There are exceptions, of course. See, for example, Tahko 2012. 3 Those sympathetic to objectivism need not be aligned with Sider, who holds that some ways of describing the world’s structure are more privileged than others. Thomasson, for instance, a leading critic of Sider, claims that the constructivist view that “there are no objects independent of conceptual schemes” is a “flatout philosophical mistake” (Thomasson 2015, 60). 4 For a nice discussion of major trends in the history of continental anti-realism from Kant to Derrida, see Braver 2007. As I have noted in this project, I find significant difficulties with Braver’s reading of Nietzsche’s metaphysics. Overall, though, the book presents a solid introduction to the roots of constructivism in continental philosophy. 5 For versions of speculative realism, see Harman 2011; 2013; Grant 2008; Brassier 2007; Meillassoux 2008; Shaviro 2014. For versions new realism, see Ferraris 2015a; 2015b; Gabriel 2015. 6 One often finds the same argument against constructivism in both the analytic and continental traditions: constructivism entails that objects do not exist before perceivers, but objects do exist before perceivers, so constructivism is false (for an analytic rendering of the argument, see Boghossian 2006, ch. 3; for a continental version of the argument, see Ferraris 2015b, 29–33). For a response to this kind of objection, see chapter 4.4. 7 The following distinctions are summarized in Korman 2016a, ch. 3. 8 For representative views, see Korman 2016b, note 7. 9 For representative views, see Korman 2016b, note 3. 10 Some nihilists think there are birds in the sense that ‘the bird’ just refers to pluralities of simples arranged birdwise. The bird is not an individual composite object, then, but rather many objects. See Contessa 2014.

Current Debates  157 11 For a recent defense of conservatism, see Korman 2016a. See also Thomasson 2007; Elder 2004. 12 This is Korman’s (2016a, 7) reconstruction of the argument. The argument from vagueness is advanced by Lewis 1986, 212–213; Heller 1990, 50–51; Sider 1997, §3.1; 2001, §4.9.1; and Van Cleve 2008, §3. These thinkers put the argument to work in defense of universalism. 13 For further justification of AV4, including an interesting argument for thinking the premise is false, see Korman (2016a, ch. 9). The Nietzschean constructivist may have a response to AV4. The sentence ‘∃x∃y(x ≠ y & ∀z(x = z ∨ y = z))’ makes no claim about any kind of object or other. And strictly logical sentences cannot be used to justify existence claims about some kind of object or other, such as hammers. AV4 might be false because our application of kind concepts to particular areas in a sorites series could determine that there are borderline cases of composition. For the strategy that quantification requires reference to some kind of object or other, see Thomasson 2007, ch. 6. 14 See Horgan 1993; Hudson 2001; Sider 2001; Barnes 2007; Korman 2016a. 15 See Markosian 1998, 237–239; Merricks 2005; 2007; Hawthorne 2006, 107– 109; Nolan 2006, 725–728; Smith 2006; Cameron 2007, 114–117. 16 Of course, according to the constructivist, composition need not result in the existence of a new object. No object comes into existence when objects are merely conjoined, and it is not necessarily the case that objects that are not conjoined do not form an object. How we organize the world will determine which instances of composition result in objects. 17 For an extensive list of arbitrariness arguments in the literature, see Korman 2016a, 124 note 1. 18 The following formulation is indebted to Korman 2016a, 6. 19 One might argue that this cuts both ways: there is nothing about unique about the concept of car that could not be captured by the concepts of incar and outcar (see, for example, Hirsh 1993). Here the constructivist options are open. If incars and outcars are always co-located with cars, the response I develop holds. There is surely nothing unique about the world in experience captured by incar and outcar. Moreover, for the constructivist there is nothing intrinsically wrong with jettisoning cars altogether and adopting incars and outcars—assuming, of course, that such concepts have good organizing work do to—perhaps other than the fact that the epistemic virtue of simplicity often plays a crucial role in motivating our organization of experience. 20 For a thorough discussion, see Korman 2016a, ch. 8. 21 Korman (2016a, 157–159) readily admits this and finds it to be no problem. Rather than attempt a principled approach to sort out cases, Korman takes each arbitrariness argument on its own terms and carefully carves out significant ontological differences. 22 This formulation is indebted to Korman 2016b. 23 See Heller 1990, 44. 24 For a non-constructivist response, see Korman 2016a, ch. 7. Korman recognizes that the conservative has a hard time responding to the argument. Although he admits that an antirealist view like constructivism provides a ready response (Korman 2016a, 94), his commitment to realism prevents him from adopting that response. Korman also points out that permissivists seem to have a nice reply: DK2 is false (Korman 2016a, 94–95). Although there might not be an explanatory connection between how we believe the world to be divided up into objects the how the world actually is divided up into objects, the permissivist contends that it is not a coincidence that our object beliefs are correct. Permissivists radically multiply the number of objects in existence, so it is no wonder that one of the ways we organize the world is correct. For a challenge to this reading, see Korman 2016a, 99ff.

158  Current Debates 25 Nietzsche often appears to embrace a debunking argument like the one examined in this section. For an examination of these texts in Nietzsche in relation to his naturalized epistemology, see Remhof 2015c. 26 I adopt this formulation from Korman 2016b. 27 ST4 actually seems to follow from the contrapositive of Leibniz’s Law, which some deny is equivalent to Leibniz’s Law (see Parsons 1987, 9–11). The details do not concern me here. 28 For objectivist responses to ST1, for example, see Chisholm 1976, ch. 3; Sider 1996, §2; Hawley 2001, ch. 4. 29 For a discussion, see Sider 2001, 141–153. 30 Four-dimensionalists need not embrace spacetime worms. See Sider 2001, ch. 5.8. 31 See also Rea 2014, 200–203. As far as I know, Rea is the only commentator to explore the merits of constructivism for responding to material constitution puzzles like indeterminate identity. 32 For some helpful considerations, see Rea 2014, 200–202. 33 This example comes from Robinson 1985. 34 Many thanks to Daniel Z. Korman for helpful comments on drafts of this chapter. 35 For a nice introduction to some of these issues, see Hacking 1999.

Bibliography

Works by Nietzsche “Antichrist,” (A), in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1976 [1895]), 565–656. Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989 [1886]). The Birth of Tragedy (BT), trans. Ronald Speirs, ed. Raymond Guess and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 [1872]). Daybreak (D), trans. R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1881]). Ecce Homo (EH), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989 [1908]). The Gay Science (GS), trans. Josefine Nauckoff, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1882]). On the Genealogy of Morals (GM), trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989 [1887]). Human, All Too Human (HH), trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1878]). “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” (TL) in Philosophy and Truth, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1979 [1873]), 79–100. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (PT), trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1998 [1873]). “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” (Z), in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1976 [1883–1892]), 121–439. Twilight of the Idols (TI), trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1889]). For Nietzsche’s unpublished notes, I primarily, but not exclusively, use translations provided in Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). I provide full references to Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA), ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988) and Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW), ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967). In some places, I reference and use translations from The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), and The Will to Power: Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s, trans. R. Kevin Hill and Michael Scarpitti, ed. R. Kevin Hill (London: Penguin Classics, 2017).

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Index

Acampora, Christa 104, 112 active 58, 60, 63 – 5, 91, 107, 111, 138 Addis, Laird 13 – 14, 44 – 5, 67, 110, 127 aesthetic 73, 96, 100, 123, 126 affects 3, 23, 36 – 7, 46, 66, 84, 115 Allais, Lucy 14 – 15, 45, 69, 70, 87 Anderson, Lanier 1, 16, 46, 69, 110 Ansell-Pearson, Keith 46 anthropomorphism 9, 71 – 4, 85 – 6 Antinomies 80, 82 anti-realism 152, 156 antirepresentationalism 12, 16, 137 – 41 appearance 18, 26, 29 – 30, 76, 92, 122 – 3, 125, 137; Kant’s view 6 – 7, 15, 82 arbitrariness, argument from 13, 150 – 1, 155 art 12, 104, 112, 122 – 6, 130, 132 ascetic ideal 2 – 3, 100 – 1, 103, 111 – 12, 119, 123 atom 27, 31, 34 – 5, 42, 57, 105, 138, 140 Babich, Babette 110 Bailey, Tom 14 Baker, Lynne Rudder 112 Bamford, Rebecca 110 Barnes, Elizabeth 157 becoming 26 – 8, 31 – 3, 47, 72, 75, 89, 100, 105, 110, 117 – 19, 124 being 18, 32 – 5, 47, 72, 112, 116 – 18, 125 Berkeley, George 16, 19, 44, 80 Berry, Jessica 13, 111 Beyond Good and Evil 2, 21, 57, 74, 95 Birth of Tragedy, The 2, 17 – 18, 44, 122 – 3 bivalence 76, 86 Blanchot, Maurice 110 Boghossian, Paul 44, 69, 87, 156 Boscovich, Roger 31, 46, 56, 59 – 60, 68

Braver, Lee 45, 110, 156 Buroker, Jill Vance 15 Came, Daniel 12 Cameron, Ross 157 Carnap, Rudolf 14, 45 causality 2, 8, 12, 19, 27, 34 – 5, 41, 44, 46 – 7, 52 – 3, 58 – 9, 68, 81, 83, 90, 104 – 9, 112, 115, 135, 137, 141 chaos 28, 31 – 2, 46 – 7, 73, 85 Chisholm, Roderick 158 Christianity 90, 111, 118 – 19 circularity 10, 83 – 6 Clark, Maudemarie 14, 21 – 2, 24, 44, 46 – 7, 67, 69, 89, 92, 110, 112; and Dudrick, David 15, 44, 49, 69, 86 – 7, 104 – 5, 108 – 10, 112 commonsense realism 8, 20 – 5, 39, 42 – 3, 45, 125 composition 31, 136, 144, 146 – 9, 157 Conard, Mark 45 conceptualism 9, 61 – 7, 69 Connolly, Kevin 69 consciousness 3, 5, 38, 40 – 1, 50, 52 – 3, 68, 76, 80 – 1, 85, 87, 115 conservatism 62, 69, 145, 151, 157 constraints on construction 9, 12, 31, 61 – 7, 78 – 9, 86, 128, 139, 141, 151, 153 Contessa, Gabriel 156 Contextual Constitution 42 contradiction 7, 129, 132, 136; construction and 10, 77 – 9, 86 Copernican revolution 6 Copernicus 103 – 4 Cox, Cristoph 1, 16, 45, 73, 86, 110, 142 Danto, Arthur 45, 89, 110, 127 Davidson, Donald 110 Daybreak 77

172 Index debunking argument 13, 151 – 3, 155, 158 Deleuze, Gilles 103, 105 Descartes, René 5, 68 despair, nihilistic 114 – 16, 120 – 1, 125 – 6, 131 Devitt, Michael 44, 69 disorientation, nihilistic 114 – 15 Doyle, Tsarnia 14, 39, 44, 47, 67, 110 drives 3, 14, 36 – 7, 46, 57 – 8, 84, 111, 115, 123, 133 Einheuser, Iris 156 Elder, Crawford 14, 87, 156 – 7 eliminativism 8, 88 – 9, 97, 144 – 5, 150 – 1; object eliminativism 25 – 32, 43, 47; subject eliminativism 33 – 8, 43 Emden, Christian 15, 67, 70, 110 empirical reality 5, 79, 81, 87 epiphenomenalism 52 – 3, 115, 127 epistemology 1, 14, 20, 158 ethics 1 – 3, 11, 15, 156 existence conditions 19, 44, 51, 56, 68, 82 – 4, 98, 155 fact 5, 10, 43, 52, 72, 76, 85, 90, 96 – 102, 108, 111, 123, 130, 133, 147, 152, 153 – 5 fact constructivism 99 – 100, 102, 109, 112, 120, 133 falsification 21, 45, 76, 86 – 8, 95, 110, 124 Fanning, Bryan and Mooney, Timothy 142 Ferraris, Maurizio 87, 144, 156 Field, Hartry 110 Fischer, Kuno 4 flux 26, 28, 31 – 2, 39, 89, 91, 94, 110, 129, 131, 142 four-dimensionalism 154, 158 Gabriel, Markus 68, 156 The Gay Science 2, 27 – 8, 30 – 1, 59, 105, 111, 121 – 2 Gemes, Ken 14, 16, 46, 112, 114 – 15, 127 On the Genealogy of Morality 21, 50, 79, 99, 111 Giere, Ronald 56 – 7 God 2, 31, 44, 73, 86 – 7, 93, 104, 114 – 17, 119, 121, 130 Goodman, Nelson 4, 11 – 12, 16, 44, 128, 132 – 7, 141 – 2 Granier, Jean 110 Grant, Ian Hamilton 156

Green, Michael Steven 69, 105, 110 Griffith, Aaron 69 Grimm, Ruediger 110 Guyer, Paul and Horstmann, Rolf-Peter 44 Haar, Michael 14 Hacking, Ian 69, 158 Hales, Steven 14, 16, 39, 44, 47, 67, 69, 110 Hanna, Robert 69 Harman, Graham 144, 156 Hartmann, Eduard 4 Haslanger, Sally 44 – 5, 68, 86 Hatab, Lawrence 112 Havas, Randall 16, 127 Hawley, Katherine 158 Hawthorne, John 150, 152 – 3, 157 Hegel, G.W.F. 4, 117 Heidegger, Martin 86, 110, 125 – 7 Heller, Mark 157 Helmholtz, Hermann 4, 64 Hill, R. Kevin 14 – 15, 44, 67, 69, 80, 87, 127, 135 Hirsh, Eli 157 history 13, 64, 83, 92, 100 – 1, 111, 113, 140 Hoffman, Joshua 87 Hollingdale, R.J. 13, 46 Horgan, Terrance 157 Hudson, Hud 157 Human, all-too-Human 2 – 3, 17 – 18, 44, 74 – 5, 122 humanism 12, 94, 128 Hussain, Nadeem 15 idealism 4 – 6, 14, 23, 44, 80 indeterminate identity, argument from 13, 153 – 5 intellectual conscience 136 James, William 11 – 12, 93 – 5, 128 – 32, 134, 137, 141 – 2 Janaway, Christopher 14, 105, 110 – 12, 127 Jenson, Anthony 13, 111 Jubien, Michael 87, 156 Kain, Philip 46 Kant, Immanuel 1, 4 – 7, 14 – 17, 19 – 20, 23 – 4, 36 – 8, 41, 43 – 6, 50 – 1, 63 – 5, 68 – 9, 79 – 83, 87, 90, 117 – 19, 132, 135, 156 Katsafanas, Paul 46, 68 – 70, 86, 110, 127

Index  173 Kim, Alan 15 knowledge 4, 6, 9, 15, 23 – 4, 26, 44 – 5, 52, 59, 64, 66 – 7, 69, 75, 77, 89, 105 – 6, 110 – 11, 115, 117, 119, 121, 133, 138 Kofman, Sarah 110 Korman, Daniel 14, 156 – 8 Kuhn, Thomas 56 Lamberth, David 142 Lange, F.A. 4 – 5, 44, 46, 64 – 5 Langer, Monika 46 Langsam, Harold 127 language 1, 3, 9 – 10, 12, 16 – 17, 32, 38, 44, 46, 50, 57, 68, 74 – 7, 88, 137 – 41, 154 Larmore, Charles 127 Leibmann, Otto 4 Leiter, Brian 15, 21, 23 – 4, 46 – 7, 67, 104 – 5, 108 – 12, 127 Lewis, David 157 life-affirming 112, 114 – 16, 119, 121 – 4, 126 life-negating 2, 79, 114 – 16, 119 – 20, 122 – 3, 125 – 6 Loeb, Paul 67, 69, 86 logic 1 – 2, 14, 45, 57, 62, 69, 75, 87 – 8, 95, 157 McCormick, Peter 142 McDowell, John 69 McLear, Colin 69 Magnus, Bernard 44, 142 Mandalios, John and Tones, Mathew 46 Markosian, Ned 157 mathematics 1 – 2, 14, 45, 57, 59, 69, 75, 88, 95 Meillassoux, Quentin 156 meliorism 131 Melnick, Arthur 87 Merricks, Trenton 87, 157 metaphysical indifferentism 13 metaphysical pessimism 129, 131 – 2 methodology 109, 136 Meyer, Mathew 45 Mill, John Stuart 15, 44 Moles, Alistair 67 morality 11, 90, 118, 139 naturalism 1, 10 – 11, 31, 73 – 4, 79, 87 – 8, 102 – 10, 112, 129 Nehamas, Alexander 1, 89, 110 neo-Kantian 1, 4, 11, 15, 63 – 5, 70 new realism 144

Newton, Isaac 31, 56 – 7, 59, 117 nihilism: and material object metaphysics 144 – 6, 149; and Nietzsche 1 – 2, 11, 17, 43, 88, 102 – 3, 108, 110 – 11, 113 – 27, 129, 139, 142 Nola, Robert 25 – 7, 92, 110 Nolan, Daniel 157 noumenal objects 20, 24, 45, 56, 90 number 26, 45, 59, 95 objectivity 9, 63, 66 – 7 object objectivism 20, 22 – 3, 41, 43 – 5, 69, 125, 143 – 4, 147, 149, 155 – 6 Owen, David 127 Overbeck, Franz 18 panpsychism 80 Papini, Giovanni 130 – 1 Parsons, Terence 158 perception 21, 63 – 5, 69 – 70, 80 – 3, 122, 132, 135 permissivism 144 – 5, 150 – 1 persistence 154 perspective 11, 22 – 3, 30, 45, 65 – 7, 91, 121, 125, 133, 142; and force 4, 42, 60 – 1, 142; and naturalism 103 – 5, 107 – 8 perspectivism 4, 12, 14, 42, 133 phenomenalism 15, 43 – 4, 71 – 2 planet 8, 38 – 9, 53 – 5, 69, 78, 149, 153 Plato 118 – 19, 125, 137, 143 Poellner, Peter 13, 15 – 16, 24 – 5, 44 – 6, 67, 69, 111 positivism 97, 133 pragmatism 11, 16, 90, 94 – 5, 128 – 42 principle of sufficient reason 5 a priori 6, 37, 50, 63, 65, 76, 79, 86, 124 properties 8 – 10, 15, 24 – 5, 31, 33, 40 – 3, 49 – 52, 54 – 5, 62, 65, 67 – 8, 71 – 2, 86, 90, 97, 99, 125, 135 – 7, 142, 148 – 9, 154 Protagoreas 74 Putnam, Hilary 16, 87, 106, 110 Ramsey, F.P. 110 Rea, Michael 14, 156, 158 reactive 105 realism 69, 144, 156 – 7; see also commonsense realism; object objectivism Redding, Paul 44 Reginster, Bernard 111, 113 – 15, 127 relativism, epistemic 62 – 3, 67

174 Index religion 90, 111, 132, 142 Remhof, Justin 14, 86, 110, 158 revaluation 116, 120, 130 Richardson, John 38, 44, 47, 67 – 8, 110 Ridley, Aaron 110, 127 Romundt, Heinrich 4 Rorty, Richard 4, 11 – 13, 128, 137 – 41, 142 Rosenkrantz, Gary 87 Rouse, Joseph 112 Sachs, Carl 14 Schacht, Richard 44, 67, 69, 104, 110 – 11, 127 Scheffler, Israel 69 Schopenhauer, Arthur 4 – 7, 14, 50, 87, 118 – 19 Schwartz, Robert 44, 141 science 1 – 2, 10 – 12, 19, 31, 46 – 7, 53, 57 – 9, 64 – 5, 75, 88, 96 – 109, 111 – 12, 119, 122, 132 Sedgwick, Peter 142 self 2 – 3, 8, 36 – 8, 46, 72, 84 – 5, 119 – 20 Senderowicz, Yaron 15 sensation 15, 33, 36, 43, 49, 62 – 4, 66, 69, 128 – 9 sense experience 9, 62 – 7 sensibility, faculty of 63 sensory information 6, 9, 48, 62 – 7, 78 – 9, 94, 123 – 5, 128, 138, 141, 153 Shaviro, Stephen 156 Shaw, Daniel 142 Ship of Theseus 153 Sider, Theodore 143 – 4, 147, 152 – 3, 156 – 8 simplification 45, 76, 86 Slater, Michael 142 Smith, Donald 157 social constructivism 18, 50, 68, 138 sorites series 146 – 9, 157 space 6, 39, 63, 68, 105, 135, 140, 154, 158 space of reasons 108 – 9 speculative realism 144, 156 Spinoza, Baruch 68, 117 Spir, Afrikan 4, 15, 44 spirit 2, 40, 44, 76, 93, 129 – 30 Stack, George 45 – 6, 70 Stang, Nicholas 15 Stegmaier, Werner 13 Stingelin, Martin 13

Strawson, Galen 67 – 8 subconscious 5, 14 substance 16, 26, 32 – 7, 41, 43 – 4, 59, 73, 82, 87 synthesis, synthesize 6, 36 – 7, 49 – 50, 63, 107 Tahko, Tuomas 156 Teichmüeller, Gustav 4 temperamental pessimism 129 – 30, 132 thing in itself 6 – 7, 17, 22 – 3, 34 – 5, 41, 118 Thomasson, Amie 45, 68 – 9, 87, 156 – 7 Thus Spoke Zarathustra 44 time 6, 26 – 7, 30, 32, 36, 47, 56, 63, 68, 75, 77 – 8, 82 – 3, 93, 97, 105, 109, 126, 135 – 6, 140, 154 – 5, 158 Tolley, Clinton 69 true world 116 – 26, 140, 142 truth 1, 4, 9 – 10, 12, 16 – 17, 21 – 4, 27, 29, 37, 43, 57, 62, 74 – 7, 86, 88 – 96, 97, 100 – 1, 105, 107, 109 – 12, 115 – 16, 119, 125 – 6, 128 – 31, 135, 137 – 9, 141 – 3, 147; absolute 76, 85, 97, 110 – 11, 126; approximate view 76 – 7, 86; correspondence theory 10, 21, 90 – 2, 109, 137; and nihilism 115 – 16, 125 – 6; pragmatist theory 10, 89, 93 – 6, 109, 128 – 31, 142; value of 100 – 1, 136 “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” 2, 17, 74 Twilight of the Idols 2, 32, 46, 122 Übermensch 13 Überweg, Friedrich 4 unconscious 68 – 9, 110 understanding, faculty of 15 – 16, 63 unificationism 8, 38 – 43, 45, 47, 49, 125 universal constructivism 55 – 6, 61 universalism 144 – 6, 149, 157 unperceived objects 10, 44, 79 – 83, 86 utility 62, 69, 110, 137 – 9 vagueness, argument from 13, 69, 146 – 50, 155, 157 values 13 – 14, 21, 24, 44, 46, 50, 53, 62, 67, 74, 76, 79, 100 – 1, 103, 113 – 16, 119 – 21, 125 – 6, 130 – 1, 139, 145, 155

Index  175 Van Cleve, James 157 Varzi, Achille 156 Vattimo, Gianni 110 Weiland, Jan Willem 156 Welshon, Rex 14, 16, 39, 44, 46 – 7, 58 – 9, 67, 69, 110 – 12, 127 West, Cornel 16

Whitlock, Greg 46 Wiggins, David 68 Wilcox, John 69, 110 will to power 3, 8, 18, 26 – 7, 38 – 41, 44, 47, 49, 58 – 60, 67 world pluralism 12, 132 – 3, 141 – 2 Young, Julian 45, 142