New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities [1st ed.] 978-981-13-6708-3;978-981-13-6709-0

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxii
Front Matter ....Pages 1-1
New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities (Bharat Dahiya, Ashok Das)....Pages 3-36
Front Matter ....Pages 37-37
Integrating Urban-Rural Development (IURD) Through Governance Programmes in China’s Megacities: The Suzhou Model (Chenhao Fang, Chen Chen, Min Zhao, Richard LeGates)....Pages 39-64
Urban Policies in Neo-Liberal India (Debolina Kundu)....Pages 65-91
The Changing Role of Regional Organisation of Councils in Australia: Case Studies from Perth Metropolitan Region (Shahed Khan, Bhishna Bajracharya)....Pages 93-116
Issues in Urban Planning and Policy: The Case Study of Lahore, Pakistan (Nasir Javed, Sana Riaz)....Pages 117-162
Urban Governance Challenges and Reforms in Indonesia: Towards a New Urban Agenda (Wilmar Salim, Delik Hudalah)....Pages 163-181
Front Matter ....Pages 183-183
Financing Local Infrastructure and Public Services: Case of Shaxi Town in Suburban Suzhou, China (Xu Chen, Min Zhao, Richard LeGates)....Pages 185-223
Urban Governance in Australia: A Case Study of Brisbane City (Bhishna Bajracharya, Shahed Khan)....Pages 225-250
Urban Service Delivery and Access: The Special Case of Brunei Darussalam (Pushpa Thambipillai, Li Li Pang)....Pages 251-278
Comprehensive Management for Better Rural Infrastructure and Service Delivery: Lessons from the Implementation of China’s Six Point Rural Action Plan in Guizhou Province (Haiyan Zou, Feng Luan, Hui Xi, Ben Yang)....Pages 279-300
The Political Economy of Urban Governance in Asian Cities: Delivering Water, Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Services (Jamie Boex, Ammar A. Malik, Devanne Brookins, Ben Edwards, Hashim Zaidi)....Pages 301-329
From Exclusion to Inclusion: The Understanding, Capacity, and Will to Change Local Government Practices (Björn Möller)....Pages 331-350
Front Matter ....Pages 351-351
Towards Inclusive Urban Governance and Planning: Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories (Ashok Das, Bharat Dahiya)....Pages 353-384

Citation preview

Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements

Bharat Dahiya Ashok Das Editors

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities

Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements Series Editor Bharat Dahiya, College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand Editorial Board Member Andrew Kirby, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA Erhard Friedberg, Sciences Po-Paris, France Rana P. B. Singh, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India Kongjian Yu, Peking University, Beijing, China Mohamed El Sioufi, Monash University, Australia Tim Campbell, Woodrow Wilson Center, USA Yoshitsugu Hayashi, Chubu University, Kasugai, Japan Xuemei Bai, Australian National University, Australia Dagmar Haase, Humboldt University, Germany

Indexed by SCOPUS This Series focuses on the entire spectrum of human settlements—from rural to urban, in different regions of the world, with questions such as: What factors cause and guide the process of change in human settlements from rural to urban in character, from hamlets and villages to towns, cities and megacities? Is this process different across time and space, how and why? Is there a future for rural life? Is it possible or not to have industrial development in rural settlements, and how? Why does ‘urban shrinkage’ occur? Are the rural areas urbanizing or is that urban areas are undergoing ‘ruralisation’ (in form of underserviced slums)? What are the challenges faced by ‘mega urban regions’, and how they can be/are being addressed? What drives economic dynamism in human settlements? Is the urban-based economic growth paradigm the only answer to the quest for sustainable development, or is there an urgent need to balance between economic growth on one hand and ecosystem restoration and conservation on the other—for the future sustainability of human habitats? How and what new technology is helping to achieve sustainable development in human settlements? What sort of changes in the current planning, management and governance of human settlements are needed to face the changing environment including the climate and increasing disaster risks? What is the uniqueness of the new ‘socio-cultural spaces’ that emerge in human settlements, and how they change over time? As rural settlements become urban, are the new ‘urban spaces’ resulting in the loss of rural life and ‘socio-cultural spaces’? What is leading the preservation of rural ‘socio-cultural spaces’ within the urbanizing world, and how? What is the emerging nature of the rural-urban interface, and what factors influence it? What are the emerging perspectives that help understand the human-environment-culture complex through the study of human settlements and the related ecosystems, and how do they transform our understanding of cultural landscapes and ‘waterscapes’ in the 21st Century? What else is and/or likely to be new vis-à-vis human settlements—now and in the future? The Series, therefore, welcomes contributions with fresh cognitive perspectives to understand the new and emerging realities of the 21st Century human settlements. Such perspectives will include a multidisciplinary analysis, constituting of the demographic, spatio-economic, environmental, technological, and planning, management and governance lenses. If you are interested in submitting a proposal for this series, please contact the Series Editor, or the Publishing Editor: Bharat Dahiya ([email protected]) or Loyola DSilva ([email protected])

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13196

Bharat Dahiya Ashok Das •

Editors

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities

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Editors Bharat Dahiya College of Interdisciplinary Studies Thammasat University Bangkok, Thailand

Ashok Das Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa Honolulu, USA

ISSN 2198-2546 ISSN 2198-2554 (electronic) Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements ISBN 978-981-13-6708-3 ISBN 978-981-13-6709-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019931825 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To those, whose struggles make cities better for all, and From whom, we have learned a lot

Foreword

Cities in the Asia-Pacific region are facing enormous pressures to grow, innovate and transform infrastructure, attract more investment, become more sustainable, and improve the quality of life for their citizens. While some of these cities are at the forefront of pushing economic, social, political, and informational and technological changes, most are also increasingly characterized by the urbanization of poverty and inequality, enormous deficiencies in access to shelter and services, and deteriorating environmental quality. Achieving desirable sustainable development results in urban areas is a delicate balancing act that requires a multi-sectoral and cross-thematic approach. Urban programs need to be holistic and sustained over longer periods of time to markedly improve the quality of life of city dwellers. Context-based urban planning and land use, environmental sustainability and climate change adaptations, access to services for the poor, and managing peri-urbanization are key components of a holistic approach. Contemporary urban planning has to juggle interactions involving multiple actors to solve urban development issues. The intersections of informal settlements, non-contextualized urban planning with insufficient evidence, vested interests, and competing narratives for the right to the city become core challenges of urban planning and policymaking. There is a critical need for institutional alignment, particularly with regard to land use allocation and regulation, as well as capacity building for leadership in planning. These capacities would need to be fully utilized for strained urban authorities to proactively create disaster management and risk reduction orientation and climate change adaptations into planning. A significant opportunity may be the emergence of smart city principles that not only embrace technology in innovative ways to solve urban problems but also internalize continuous learning and innovation into how urban authorities approach the aforementioned challenges. Urban governance, itself, is best conceptualized, for several reasons, as simply an umbrella for responses to these unwieldy urban challenges toward promoting sustainable development. Traditional over-reliance on technocratic approaches and resource constraints has led to urban exclusion and the urbanization of poverty, which require inclusive urban policies, transparent and accountable governance, vii

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Foreword

anti-corruption strategies, and civil service capacities. A reoriented focus on economic growth and industrialization requires participatory structures and broad stakeholder engagement. The need is to achieve results in urban settings for citizens and to cope with alarming gaps between plans and their implementation through new institutional designs, enhanced local capacity, and reducing overlapping functions. To better understand the nexus between urban challenges and governance dimensions, the book focuses on two sets of challenges in the urban settings of the Asia-Pacific region: urban planning and policy, and improvements in service delivery and access toward social inclusion through innovations. This book owes its origin to the “Regional Workshop on Urban Governance for Sustainable Development in Asia: Access to Services for Social Equity”, convened by the East-West Center at the third session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom3) of the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), which was held in Surabaya, Indonesia, in July 2016. Key partners included the Government of Indonesia, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), The Asia Foundation, United Cities and Local Governments Asia-Pacific (UCLG ASPAC), and the Swedish International Center for Local Democracy (ICLD). The book chapters were prepared by representatives of the East-West Center’s network of institutions in Asia. The chapters were edited to ensure complementarity and alignment with the book’s thematic foci. We are grateful to our partners who have contributed to this collaborative research project, and to Bharat Dahiya and Ashok Das for co-editing the book. The views expressed in the book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Indonesia, UN-Habitat, The Asia Foundation, the Swedish International Center for Local Democracy, or the East-West Center. We hope the book will enhance our understanding of governance for sustainable urban development and better inform policies and approaches to promote sustainable and inclusive cities in the Asia-Pacific region. The book will also contribute to bridging the gap between theory and practice, and further ongoing dialogues and exchanges to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 to “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.” Cambridge, USA

Shabbir Cheema Senior Fellow Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation Harvard Kennedy School Harvard University

Foreword

ix Shabbir Cheema is Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School. Previously, he was the Director of Democratic Governance Division of UN Development Program (UNDP), New York and the Director of Asia-Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative of East-West Center, Hawaii. He prepared the first UNDP policy papers on Urbanization and Poverty and served as the coordinator of the UNDP/World Bank/UN-HABITAT Urban Management Program. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Hawaii. From 1980 to 1988, he was Development Administration Planner, United Nations Center for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan. He has taught at University of Science Malaysia, the University of Hawaii and New York University. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Urbanization and Environment. Dr. Cheema is the co-author of The Evolution of Development Thinking (Palgrave and Macmillan, 2016) and the author of Building Democratic Institutions: Governance Reform in Developing Countries (Kumarian Press, 2005) and Urban Shelter and Services (Praeger, 1987). He is the contributor and co-editor of Urban Services in Developing Countries (London: Macmillan Press, 1988) and the four volume Series on Trends and Innovation in Governance (United Nations University Press, 2010–13). He is also the contributor and co-editor of Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices (Brookings Institution Press 2007).

Preface

The New Urban Agenda, since its adoption in October 2016 in Quito, Ecuador, has received increasing attention among policymakers, development practitioners, academics, researchers, and media. Along with Sustainable Development Goal 11, it provides a transformative framework that could help in refining public policies that shape cities and human settlements, improving programmatic and planning interventions, enriching academic and applied research, and upgrading education and capacity development programs. This edited volume is set in this larger context of a shifting global urban policy and development agenda. It aims to make a threefold contribution to expanding urban planning and development knowledge. First, it explores significant contours of the New Urban Agenda in the Asia-Pacific region by examining innovative interventions likely to influence twenty-firstcentury urban governance in two core areas: (i) urban planning and policy; and (ii) service delivery and access for greater social inclusion. Second, its collection of focused papers intends to inform both the theoretical nuances and empirical evidence undergirding the ongoing discussions and debates, at multiple scales, for achieving Sustainable Development Goal 11 and implementing the New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific. Overall, the wide-ranging topics and contexts covered by this book present some new and rare insights to help make urban planning, policymaking, and governance realize sustainable and inclusive cities. The genesis of the idea of this book, in late 2015, came from Shabbir Cheema, then a Senior Fellow and Director of the Urban Government for Sustainable Development Program of the East-West Center (EWC), Hawai’i. EWC is a nonprofit organization that serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. Now a Senior Fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Shabbir had been long involved with the United Nations and other international institutions in researching and developing policy guidelines for decentralization and democratic governance, especially in the urban context, in developing countries.

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In September 2015, Shabbir led a “Regional Workshop on Urban Governance and Access to Services in Asian Cities”. Held in Bangkok, this regional workshop involved several authors who have contributed to this volume. On Shabbir’s request, Bharat Dahiya, then at Chulalongkorn University’s Social Research Institute (CUSRI) in Bangkok, contributed to the design and preparation of EWC’s regional collaborative research program on “Urban Governance and Access to Services in Asian Cities”. In early 2016, Shabbir invited Ashok Das of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UHM), to collaborate with him in preparing the concept note and delineating substantive areas of focus for a proposed EWC workshop, as a side event at the third session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom3) of the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), to be held in Surabaya. Before the workshop, Shabbir had invited Bharat Dahiya and Ashok Das to later co-edit a volume of selected papers. Bharat had many years of rich experience working with multilateral development organizations—in researching, publishing, and implementing urban planning initiatives across Asia. Ashok, too, had conducted extensive field research on how shelter and services for the urban poor can be improved through participatory planning in South and Southeast Asia. The two-day “Regional Workshop on Urban Governance for Sustainable Development in Asia: Access to Services for Social Equity”, held in Surabaya on July 2016, drew a packed house attended by many local and international participants of PrepCom3. It was one of those rare events that enable fruitful conversations among participants from diverse institutions—academics, practitioners, lawmakers, public officials, representatives of multilateral and bilateral aid organizations, and nonprofit organizations. The invited presenters represented multiple regions and continents—East, South, and Southeast Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America. During and after the workshop, Bharat and Ashok discussed how the book’s foci, contents, and organization would be aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda’s guiding themes, and, at the same time, how it could enrich extant perspectives and discourses on urbanization and urban planning, policymaking, and governance. They announced the call for submissions at the end of the workshop. With over a dozen submissions, the response to the call was enthusiastic. The co-editors reviewed each submission and offered feedback to the authors. Most submissions were reviewed and revised more than once. On the one hand, the authors’ diverse disciplinary backgrounds (urban planners and non-planners), professional engagements (academics and non-academics; state and non-state), and representation of distinct sociopolitical and developmental contexts (democratic and/or decentralized or centrally planned; less and more developing, and developed) made for uniquely stimulating content. On the other hand, adjusting and arranging these distinct commentaries, often with distinctive styles, into a coherent and coordinated narrative also posed an equally stimulating challenge. Therefore, as a knowledge product, this book combines scholarly inquiry with practice-based wisdom. It is replete with rich data and insights—some about contexts and cases

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hitherto barely explored in the scholarly literature—that will appeal to a heterogeneous audience curious to understand the challenges of equitable and sustainable city-making, from different perspectives across distinct locales of Asia-Pacific. Critical external reviews of the chapters by Kem Lowry, Professor Emeritus of Urban and Regional Planning at UHM, immensely sharpened the book’s substance and message. Most notably, without the sustained commitment of the authors through the multiple stages of this project, it would not have come to fruition. Special thanks go to Cameron Lowry and all other EWC staff, who invited the participants, organized the Surabaya workshop, and handled its complex logistics. We are profoundly grateful to Shabbir for entrusting us with this exciting book project. During the process of co-editing this volume, we learned so much from his mentoring, sagacity, and humility. We hope that we have upheld Shabbir’s trust. We would be amiss without mentioning the wonderful professional support we received from various individuals at Springer Nature. Loyola D’Silva, Publishing Editor of Springer book series, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, provided useful advice on various aspects of the publication process. Sanjievkumar Mathiyazhagan, Production Editor, extended continuous support through the book’s copy-editing and production process. In the pursuit of making cities in the Asia-Pacific more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable, we hope this book will make a modest yet meaningful contribution to expanding the body of work that nudges urban planning, policymaking, and governance to be transformative. We believe it will prove of interest to urban researchers, students, planners, policymakers, practitioners, aid agencies, development organizations, civil society organizations, urban activists, and private sector actors. This project would not have materialized without the support of EWC and other institutional supporters; however, the opinions expressed in this book are solely of the respective authors. We hope you, the reader, will enjoy reading the book, as much as we did in putting it together. Bangkok, Thailand Honolulu, USA

Bharat Dahiya Ashok Das

Advance praise for New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities

“In this path-setting book on the New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, the world’s most economically dynamic and culturally vibrant region, the authors critically assess vital issues related to urbanization: urban planning and policy, and innovations in service delivery and access towards social inclusion. Through country- and issue-specific case studies, the authors’ contributions are important toward reducing gaps between theory and practice, and identifying contextual factors that impede innovations. Though the selected countries are diverse, Bharat Dahiya and Ashok Das have done an outstanding job editing, and in identifying common patterns and challenges that will influence the New Urban Agenda’s effective implementation in Asia-Pacific over the next decade.” —Shabbir Cheema, Senior Fellow Harvard Kennedy School Cambridge, MA, USA

“The New Urban Agenda calls for a paradigm shift on how we plan, finance, develop, govern and manage cities. The cross cutting principles of inclusion, innovation and integration are prerequisites for its successful implementation. This book expands the body of knowledge on what national and local authorities in diverse socio-economic contexts of the Asia-Pacific region are doing to promote sustainable urbanization, in partnership with civil society and other actors. The book extracts learnings on what to do and what to avoid. In this way, it can help to accelerate the implementation of the New Urban Agenda to support the achievement of the urban dimensions of the Sustainable Development Goals.” —Raf Tuts, Director, Programme Division UN-Habitat, Nairobi, Kenya

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific examines some key recent developments pertaining to urban governance and planning for making cities in this economically dynamic and culturally complex region sustainable and inclusive. Its rich and diverse case studies look into various dimensions of governance and planning to clarify nuances that induce as well as impede effective urban policymaking, programming, planning, and their implementation. In doing

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Advance praise for New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific …

so, this book expands our understanding of contemporary governance and planning challenges, and provides ideas to concerned stakeholders for developing future pathways that may enable their cities to effectively pursue the New Urban Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals. —Hubert Jenny, Principal Infrastructure Finance Specialist People’s Republic of China Resident Mission Asian Development Bank, Beijing, China

“This volume establishes a useful and wide-ranging edge in the policy conversation about governance and sustainability in Asian cities. The broad range of case studies shows deep underlying commonalities and specific idiosyncrasies—in institutional issues, decentralization challenges, service delivery and capacity strengthening—that leaders and management are faced with in cities and regions of Asia and the Pacific. The volume makes an important contribution to appreciating the role of national level planning as well. The chapters suggest many legal and policy areas that are vital to support local authorities on the front line to achieve good governance and sustainable services. Perhaps more important are the solid institutional footings required for cities to harness their creative potentials for national development in the coming decades.” —Tim Campbell, Global Fellow Woodrow Wilson Center Washington DC, USA

“New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific is a timely contribution to understanding the future of our cities in Asia-Pacific, and one of the first steps towards realising the admirable vision of the United Nations for this region. The book’s scope is comprehensive. Bharat Dahiya and Ashok Das led the authors with intimate research and practice-derived understanding of the region’s different contexts to fill an important gap between local knowledge and global objectives of governance and service delivery for promoting sustainable and inclusive cities.” —Fulong Wu, Bartlett Professor of Planning University College London London, UK

Contents

Part I

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: An Overview

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bharat Dahiya and Ashok Das Part II

3

Urban Planning and Policy

Integrating Urban-Rural Development (IURD) Through Governance Programmes in China’s Megacities: The Suzhou Model . . . . . . . . . . . . Chenhao Fang, Chen Chen, Min Zhao and Richard LeGates Urban Policies in Neo-Liberal India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Debolina Kundu

39 65

The Changing Role of Regional Organisation of Councils in Australia: Case Studies from Perth Metropolitan Region . . . . . . . . . Shahed Khan and Bhishna Bajracharya

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Issues in Urban Planning and Policy: The Case Study of Lahore, Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nasir Javed and Sana Riaz

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Urban Governance Challenges and Reforms in Indonesia: Towards a New Urban Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wilmar Salim and Delik Hudalah

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Part III

Innovations in Service Delivery and Access for Social Inclusion

Financing Local Infrastructure and Public Services: Case of Shaxi Town in Suburban Suzhou, China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Xu Chen, Min Zhao and Richard LeGates

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Contents

Urban Governance in Australia: A Case Study of Brisbane City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bhishna Bajracharya and Shahed Khan

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Urban Service Delivery and Access: The Special Case of Brunei Darussalam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pushpa Thambipillai and Li Li Pang

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Comprehensive Management for Better Rural Infrastructure and Service Delivery: Lessons from the Implementation of China’s Six Point Rural Action Plan in Guizhou Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Haiyan Zou, Feng Luan, Hui Xi and Ben Yang

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The Political Economy of Urban Governance in Asian Cities: Delivering Water, Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jamie Boex, Ammar A. Malik, Devanne Brookins, Ben Edwards and Hashim Zaidi

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From Exclusion to Inclusion: The Understanding, Capacity, and Will to Change Local Government Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Björn Möller

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Part IV

Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories

Towards Inclusive Urban Governance and Planning: Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ashok Das and Bharat Dahiya

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Bharat Dahiya An award-winning urbanist, Dr. Bharat Dahiya combines research, policy analysis and development practice aimed at examining and tackling socio-economic, environmental and governance issues in the global urban context. Since early-1990s, Bharat’s research and professional work has focused on sustainable cities and urbanization, strategic urban planning and development, sustainable and inclusive cities, urban environment and resilience, and urban governance. Working with the World Bank, UN-Habitat, the Asian Development Bank, United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS), and UNDP, he provided policy advice and technical support to national and local governments. Moreover, working with these international agencies, he initiated, led and contributed to international projects on sustainable urban development in the Asia-Pacific region. Whilst working on operational projects on sustainable urban development, Bharat contributed to knowledge generation, especially through meta research and review of policies, programmes and projects. At the World Bank headquarters, he conducted the first-ever systematic review of the Bank’s investments for improving urban liveability, published as a co-authored book, Urban Environment and Infrastructure: Toward Livable Cities (World Bank, 2004; ISBN 978-0821357965). he conceptualized and coordinated the preparation of United

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Nations’ first-ever report on The State of Asian Cities 2010/11 (UN-Habitat and UN-ESCAP, 2010; ISBN 978-9211322743). More recently, he co-authored Partnering for Sustainable Development: Guidelines for Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Implement the 2030 Agenda in Asia and the Pacific (UNU-IAS and UN-ESCAP, 2018; ISBN 978-92-808-4585-3). Bharat serves on the editorial boards of Cities: The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning, Journal of Urban Culture Research, Jindal Journal of Public Policy, and National Geographical Journal of India. He has held academic positions in Australia, Indonesia and Thailand. Reuters, Inter Press Service, SciDev.Net, Nishi-Nippon, The Korean Economic Daily, China Daily and its Asia Weekly, The Hindu, Deccan Herald, Bangkok Post, The Nation, UB Post, The Sunday Times, and Urban Gateway have quoted his work. Bharat is based at the College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok. He holds a PhD in Urban Governance, Planning and Environment from the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Ashok Das is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa (UHM), USA. He is also an affiliate faculty of UHM’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Center for South Asian Studies. He was co-chair (21016–2018) of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning’s (ACSP) Global Planning Educators Interest Group (GPEIG). He received his Ph.D. in Urban Planning from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA); M.Arch. and M.A. in Environmental Planning & Management from Kansas State University; and B. Arch. from the School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi. Previously, he was an Assistant Professor in the San Francisco State University’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning; architecture and planning consultant in the United States and India; and the chief cartoonist for Architecture+Design, India’s leading architecture magazine. He researches institutional challenges and innovations for ameliorating urban poverty through services provision in Asia-Pacific, particularly in Indonesia and India, and affordable housing in the US. Community participation and empowerment, slum upgrading, decentralization and governance, civil

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society, community-managed integrated microfinance, disaster risk reduction, inclusionary zoning, and planning education are specific research interests. The Ford Foundation, the World Resources Institute, and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs have sought his advisory services.

Contributors Bhishna Bajracharya Urban Planning, Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia Jamie Boex Evidence for Policy Design (EPoD), John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Devanne Brookins Evidence for Policy Design (EPoD), John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Chen Chen College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China Xu Chen School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou, China; Department of Urban Planning, College of Architecture and Urban Planning (CAUP), Tongji University, Shanghai, China Bharat Dahiya College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand Ashok Das Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, Honolulu, HI, USA Ben Edwards Evidence for Policy Design (EPoD), John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Chenhao Fang College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China Delik Hudalah Regional and Rural Planning Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia Nasir Javed The Urban Unit, Punjab, Pakistan Shahed Khan Urban Planning, School of Design and the Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, Australia Debolina Kundu National Institute of Urban Affairs, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India

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Richard LeGates College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China Feng Luan College of Architecture and Urban Planning (CAUP), Tongji University, Shanghai, China Ammar A. Malik Evidence for Policy Design (EPoD), John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Björn Möller International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD), Visby, Sweden Li Li Pang UBD School of Business and Economics, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam Sana Riaz The Urban Unit, Punjab, Pakistan Wilmar Salim Regional and Rural Planning Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia Pushpa Thambipillai ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, Singapore Hui Xi Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design Institute, Research Center of Rural Planning & Construction, Shanghai, China Ben Yang Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design Institute, Research Center of Rural Planning & Construction, Shanghai, China Hashim Zaidi Oxfam Great Britain, Oxford, UK Min Zhao College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China Haiyan Zou Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design Institute, Research Center of Rural Planning & Construction, Shanghai, China

Part I

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: An Overview

New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities Bharat Dahiya and Ashok Das

Abstract The Asia-Pacific region houses over half of the world’s urban population, and is estimated to reach 50% urbanization mark in 2019. Based on their sustained economic growth, Asian-Pacific cities have played a transformative role in the region, and are on the forefront of economic, social, political, and informational and technological change. However, they are also characterized by widespread urban poverty and inequality, enormous deficiencies in access to shelter and services, and deteriorating quality of the urban environment. The New Urban Agenda (NUA) aims to address the main issues faced by cities and human settlements around the world today, and outlines key principles and commitments towards addressing them. First, this chapter contextualises the NUA vis-à-vis the key sustainable and inclusive urban development issues worldwide. Second, it systematically reviews the idea of governance, and its evolution and theoretical underpinnings since the early 1980s in relation to the changing emphases of overseas development aid. Likewise, it provides insights into the ideas and literature related to governance, decentralization and democratization, and their relevance to cities. Third, the chapter juxtaposes the NUA with the urban realities of the Asia-Pacific region, and reviews three areas of immediate concern: (i) urban governance as an umbrella to respond to urban challenges, (ii) urban planning and policy, and (iii) service delivery and access for social inclusion. In doing so, it highlights the latest tenets of the global urban agenda that are articulated in the NUA, and Sustainable Development Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Finally, by providing a brief introduction to the various chapters, it explains how they are organized in the following three sections of the book: (i) urban planning and policy, (ii) innovations in service delivery and access for social inclusion, and (iii) emerging trends and future trajectories. B. Dahiya (B) College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, 2 PraChan Road, Pra Nakorn, Bangkok 10200, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] A. Das Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa, Saunders Hall 107, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_1

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Keywords New Urban Agenda · Asia-Pacific · Urban governance · Sustainable cities · Inclusive cities · Urban planning and policy · Service delivery · Access to basic services

1 Introduction: The Context of the New Urban Agenda “We live in the times of a global urban transition” (Dahiya 2015). Around the world, cities contribute to economic, social and technological transformation by providing opportunities for economies of scale, products, income, services and social experimentation. They play a vital role in economic productivity gains through innovation, trade, globalization of capital and the growth of service industries. Mega urban regions, urban corridors and city-regions reflect the emerging links between city growth and new patterns of economic activity. These characteristics have led to the recognition of cities as ‘engines of economic growth’ (Dahiya 2012a, b; UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2010, 2015; UN-Habitat 2016b). Given their vibrant economies, cities are able to generate employment in manufacturing and service sectors and, thus, provide livelihoods to their expanding populations. Cities that manage their infrastructure and services well are able to maintain healthy living environments for their residents. In 2007, the United Nations declared that the world became ‘urban’ (UNFPA 2007). Eleven years on, in 2018, 4.2 billion people or 55.3% of world’s population resided in urban settlements (UNPD 2018; Figs. 1 and 2). Looking forward, it is estimated that by 2050, urban areas will house 6.7 billion or 68.4% of world’s population (UNPD 2018). In a recent review of global urbanization, Haase et al. (2018) raised a few pertinent questions: Where will we stand at the end of the twenty-first century regarding urbanization? At 99 percent urbanites on earth? At 10 percent global urban land cover? These scenarios may seem preposterous, but they reflect an increasing realization that urban areas play increasingly influential roles in global change processes. (p. 35)

Such an historic demographic shift to cities and towns will come with attendant challenges and opportunities. It is estimated that while cities occupy only two per cent of the total land on the planet, they account for 70% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), over 60% of global energy consumption and 70% of greenhouse gas emissions, and produce 70% of global waste (Habitat III 2017). In 2014, 881 million urban dwellers, or 29.7% of urban population of ‘developing regions’ lived in informal settlements often known as slums (UN-Habitat 2016b).1 These staggering figures not only underline the economic importance of cities today but also indicate the related urban social and environmental challenges as well as the opportunities to address them. 1 ‘Developing

regions’ include Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-eastern Asia, Western Asia, and Oceania; for details, see UN-Habitat (2016b: 203).

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Fig. 1 Urban population at mid-year (1995–2015). Source UN-Habitat (2016b: 6)

Fig. 2 Urban and rural population of the world, 1950–2050. Source UNPD (2014: 7)

The key global urban challenges, such as these, were discussed during the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) from 17 to 20 October 2016 in Quito, Ecuador. This global conference witnessed the active participation of the heads of states and governments, ministers, subnational and local governments, parliamentarians, civil society, indigenous peoples and local communities, the private sector, professionals and practitioners, the scientific and academic community, and other relevant stakeholders. Habitat III resulted in the adoption of the New Urban Agenda (NUA), which reaffirms the “global commitment to sustainable urban development as a critical step for realizing sustainable

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development in an integrated and coordinated manner at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels, with the participation of all relevant actors” (United Nations 2017: 4). Thus, by clearly mentioning the importance of ‘the participation of all relevant actors’ at the various levels, the NUA underscores the central importance of governance towards achieving sustainable and inclusive cities. Further, the NUA is intricately linked with the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations 2015), and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and targets, including Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable (United Nations 2018). This chapter next recounts the evolution of the idea of governance and the consequent emphasis on good governance, which by the 1990s became the sine qua non for improving development outcomes in poor countries. Good governance reinterpreted and reinforced the role of the state—as neither omniscient nor omnipotent, but vital for achieving desirable development outcomes. It averred that institutional arrangements that determine how state institutions interact with non-state entities and citizens are critical. The following section lays out the relevance of the NUA for the Asia-Pacific region. The final section highlights how the various chapters of this volume explore the role of governance for sustainable and inclusive cities.

1.1 Governance: The Idea’s Evolution, Theoretical Roots, and Relevance to Cities The good governance wave rose soon after puissant institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and also the US Treasury, in the early 1980s began to alter global development ideology and practice by aggressively promoting neoliberal policies and programmes. Their prescribed reforms—such as the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), financial liberalization, and enabling markets by the deregulation and divestment of state assets—drastically reduced the state’s active role in development, but yielded largely unsatisfactory outcomes (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Green 1996; Stiglitz 2002). Hindsight revealed that these zealous efforts at systemic overhaul were rushed, and failed to fathom the perils of not, first, developing the capacities of institutions of the state, market, and civil society; that, and donors’ wilful neglect or convenient elision of the same, created ineffective, contextually idiosyncratic political economies (Easterly 2005; Stiglitz 2004). Much research ink has flowed to explain how neoliberal policies espoused by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Britain and President Ronald Reagan in America helped enlarge the market’s influence by retracting the state toward making it leaner, more entrepreneurial. With similar neoliberal reforms, the donor community eyed the potential to overturn decades of underwhelming outcomes from development aid to countries buffeted by the ills of centralized planning and top-down government (e.g. a common lament was corruption). But decentralization was not solely the denouement of external pressure, but quite often the upshot of internal reformative impulses

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as a result of a global shift towards democratization (Stren 2003, p. 9). By enlarging local governments’ autonomy and responsibility, decentralization was expected to make development outcomes more efficient and effective—by, inter alia, enhancing the state’s proximity, transparency, and accountability (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983). By the turn of the last century, decentralization had impacted government and administration in much of the developing world. With little precedence, however, much of decentralization’s initial exuberance proved premature, and many of its touted benefits presumptive. Evidence from implementation experiences increasingly underscored the challenging complexities of different kinds of governments, markets, societies, and cultures (Litvack et al. 1998, pp. 4–9). It became apparent that focusing just on “government” (whether central or local) was imprudently narrow. The underlying and evolving complexities of cities proved challenging. It was realized that to succeed reform efforts had to acknowledge and include stakeholders, institutions, and processes of the state, market, and civil society—elements that are affected by and can influence what governments do, and how; as well as improve how different levels of government deal with each other. This is the multi-faceted notion of governance. Initially expected to flourish due to decentralization, governance instead came to be regarded as a prerequisite for effective decentralization and efficient and equitable urban development (Devas 2001a, b; McCarney and Stren 2003). Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) called this the shift from government decentralization to decentralized governance. Variants of the definition of governance proliferated, as did researchers and institutions pursuing the concept. For the World Bank, governance was “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (1992: 1). The UNDP (1997: 9) defined governance as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences”. Thus, donors, especially, have varied views about the specifics of governance but seem to agree on five guiding principles—accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, openness and transparency, participation, the rule of Law (Doeveren 2011). Leftwich (1995) proposed that good governance could manifest itself in three forms—systemic (political-economy structures that govern society’s productive and distributive life); political (ideally, a democratic regime that enjoys legitimacy and exercises rule-of-law-based authority); and administrative (mostly, an independent, autonomous, transparent, and accountable bureaucracy). In regard to urban governance, per se, this is reflected in the notion that, essentially, governance constitutes the relationships between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed (McCarney et al. 1995; McCarney and Stren 2003, p. 36). Moreover, to be effective, good urban local governance required the nuanced inter-sectionality of the social, cultural, environmental, economic, and political, and not simply technical and administrative (Harpham and Boateng 1997; Pugh 2000). All of this engendered a number of studies of urban governance around the world (Mathur 1999; McCarney 1996a, b).

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Until not too long ago, discussion of governance in poor countries, much of which revolved around poverty alleviation and services provision, often precluded the mention of the market. Within the last two decades though, with the growth of market institutions in poorer or formerly socialist states, market actors too have come to be recognized as effective interlocutors in governance. This is reflected in numerous references to all kinds of markets, at different scales, in the NUA (United Nations 2017). To keep institutions accountable and catalyze meaningful synergies between state, market, and civil society actors, having independent, pluralistic, and vibrant media—as watchdogs and providers of unbiased information—are vital. The United Nations too has clearly acknowledged this.2 However, even democratic states tend to curtail press and media freedoms. Research on how the media impact good governance is scarce. More surprising is the fact that the NUA does not once mention the term “media.” The ever deepening and sustained emphasis on governance reflects influences due to other vital yet mutually reinforcing changes in different spheres. These include, inter alia, the spread of democracy and civil society (with the end of the Cold War), as well as market forces and information access, worldwide. These happenings fostered the rise of participatory governance, planning, and development (Mansuri and Rao 2013). Neoliberalism’s uncanny ability to appeal to both the right (e.g. privatization and public-private partnerships or PPPs) and the left—calling for engaging nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs)—boosted good governance’s “chameleon-like” quality to attract multiple stakeholders (Corbridge et al. 2005, p. 153). This buoyed civil society participation (for instance, see Cheema and Popovski 2010), certainly in Asia (Cheema 2005, 2013; Dahiya 2005), as did the promise from emerging research on understanding and leveraging the advantages of social capital (for instance, see Mayer 2003; Rydin and Pennington 2000). Likewise, the vast body of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s work on capabilities, exclusion, justice, and social choice has shaped progressive notions of inclusive urban governance to address the multidimensionality of urban poverty and enhance urban productivity (see, for instance, Alkire et al. 2015; Fainstein 2001; Moser 1998; Storper 2014), while the logics of collective action and co-production, put forth by Elinor Ostrom and others, have afforded the understanding to improve urban service delivery (Mitlin 2008). Since the 1990s, progressive concepts in western urban planning theory that have decried neoliberal restructuring for eroding the city’s publicness and stoking exclusion—inter alia multiculturalism (Sandercock 1998), the right to the city (Harvey 2008), the just city (Fainstein 2010), spatial justice (Soja 2010)—have forced nuanced considerations of what urban governance ought to be. Also, others have called to decolonize urban theorizing by exploring distinct epistemologies to appropriately appreciate urban transformations underway in the global 2 UNESCO

(2017) ‘Media and Good Governance’, World Press Freedom Day 2005, available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/prizes-and-celebrations/celebrations/internationaldays/world-press-freedom-day/previous-celebrations/worldpressfreedomday200900000/thememedia-and-good-governance/ (accessed 20 July 2018).

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South—where urban institutions and complexities are fundamentally distinct, and where planning, therefore, must include and not preclude informality (Robinson and Roy 2015; Roy 2005). Encouragingly, the NUA and SDGs (especially, SDG 11) behoove urban policies to acknowledge and remedy the marginalization of certain groups,3 explicitly—based on income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migration status, disability, geographic location (informal settlements too) (United Nations 2017). In spite of being a big part of the urban economy, poor migrants, most of whom reside in squatter settlements, are among the most oppressed groups in urban society. Yet, most Asian cities render them invisible, deny them welfare support, and subject them to violence (Das 2017). Sophisticated research explicating the dynamics of rural-urban linkages and peri-urbanization (see Tacoli, McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2015) has disabused misconceptions about migration and migrants. This has influenced the NUA and other reports (Beard et al. 2016) to stress that treating migrants justly is imperative for sustainable and inclusive urban development. Different developments of late pose new prospects and challenges for governance, thereby kindling a renewed interest in the subject. Rapidly evolving advancements in technology—smart phones, the internet, and its offshoots like the platform economy (applications or apps, such as Uber, Airbnb, as well as homegrown technologies from the Global South like Didi in China, Ola in India, GO-JEK in Indonesia, Grab in Malaysia, etc.), social media, and autonomous vehicles—are responsible for generating excitement and concern alike about building “smart cities” that will facilitate technology-driven solutions to overcome problems of urban governance (Kitchin 2015; Vinod Kumar and Dahiya 2017). Whilst research and policies on smart cities are still in early stages of development and implementation, there is a spurt of literature on smart cities and their various facets (Mboup and Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 2019; Vinod Kumar 2015, 2017, 2019). The coming years and decades will reveal how digital technologies may benefit cities and their residents in the 21st century. In Beyond Smart Cities, Campbell (2012) shows how innovative cities network and engage in proactive, systematic, and repeated acquisition of knowledge, using distinct styles and employing learning channels, such as individuals, binary exchanges, clusters of cities, and casual grazing on websites. Likewise, growing alarm about climate change and the attendant frequency and intensification of extreme weather events and natural disasters have surged interest, both in urban research and management practice, in applying the systemic, holistic approach that the resilience concept embodies (UN-Habitat 2011). Recurrent and cascading disasters, with their multidimensional and multi-scalar causes and impacts, wreak havoc on the physical, economic, and social wellbeing of cities. The hyperdensity and hyper-mobility of cities today also allows threats of a public health nature to quickly assume disastrous proportions. For simultaneously dealing with disasters and building resilience, scholars have exhorted governments to espouse a framework 3 Although

the UN-Habitat explicitly supports its inclusion under the ‘right to the city’ principle (UN-Habitat, 2018), yet some national governments pressured the NUA from ignoring widespread sexuality-based marginalization; it excluded the mention of LGBTQ as an oppressed and marginalized group (Perry, 2016).

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of disaster governance, under the umbrella concept of urban governance (Miller and Douglass 2016). Arresting the current trend of ecologically unsound, galloping urban expansion in fast developing cities of Asia-Pacific, often at the expense of the poorest and most vulnerable, will be anything but facile. This brief overview of its evolutionary trajectory and facets suggests that good governance is the convergence of myriad factors that are historical, temporal, political, fiscal and financial, institutional, social, cultural, and increasingly demonstrating a penchant for the technological. Broadly speaking, good governance is indeed predicated heavily on democracy and civil society participation, and viewed as a prerequisite for economic growth and social progress. However, in the Asian context, the incredible 20th century success stories of “developmental states”—especially, of the four so-called ‘Asian Tigers’, i.e. Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (Vogel 1991), and, to a lesser extent, five ‘Tiger Cub’ economies, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam, which have been recently joined by China—have unfolded under different conditions. Strongly authoritarian but development minded, these states attained impressive economic and human development gains by closely guiding their industries and markets, while conceding few political freedoms. Although several have since relatively liberalized their economies, and some also their political systems, yet the ground realities are hardly what the western notion of good governance presumes as preconditions (Thompson 2004). Its enviable development indicators and quality of life make Singapore the quintessence of the successful, hybridized neoliberal-developmental state (Liow 2012; Low 2001). The rule of law, an unblemished bureaucracy, and strong top down planning have been instrumental for Singapore’s transformation. It is noteworthy that this so-called “Singapore model” is being aggressively imported by none other than China (Ortmann and Thompson 2016), and other emerging Asian economies find it appealing as well. While the merits of good governance are universally accepted, its realization across contexts is uneven; it varies with the quality of and relationships among the institutions of the state, market, and civil society. The nuances of definitions of governance also vary with the entities promoting it. UN-Habitat, for instance, considers governance to be an enabling environment of adequate legal frameworks and efficient processes (political, managerial and administrative) that allows local governments to respond to their citizens’ needs.4 Among other characteristics, being democratic and inclusive, long-term, and in step with technology are deemed essential. Whereas the role of institutions is paramount for improving governance, the equally critical role of leadership for transforming institutions and overcoming formidable odds through innovation is often overlooked (Das 2016). Beginning with Tendler’s (1997) work in poor localities in Brazil, several studies have since illustrated how, under the right conditions that enable dedicated local leadership, productive government-civil society synergies can emerge to yield unexpectedly good outcomes (Baiocchi et al. 2011; Campbell 2003; Campbell and Fuhr 2004; Freire and Stren 2001; Fung and Wright 2003). With time, more and more requirements kept continually and unreal4 See:

https://unhabitat.org/governance/.

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istically raising the bar of good governance. Therefore, to avoid setting up for failure, especially in poor countries, Grindle (2004) emphasized the need to value what she deems more realistic—“good enough governance”. In a similar vein, Andrews (2008) cautions against imposing such an idealized and normative model of good governance for it is not founded on a sound theoretical model, and risks stoking harmful “isomorphism” and undoing the good that governments might have achieved. It is more important to discern priorities correctly based on local constraints and capacities, set reasonably attainable targets, focus on strengthening the capacity of the state (as opposed to undermining it) to play a stewarding role, and learn from what was successful, and why, instead of just belabouring on what was not. Leveraging commonly underutilized local resources such as local universities, researchers, and NGOs for assessing past efforts, present conditions, and conducting evaluations is one way of enabling good enough governance (Grindle 2004, p. 542). Emphases on ideas and initiatives, such as decentralization, civil society participation, good governance, or sustainable development, per se, which the United Nations and other multilateral and bilateral development organizations have pushed for, are anything but new. Satterthwaite (2016), for instance, lists various efforts he argues have been “new urban agendas” over the last half-century: inter alia, Housing by People during the 1960s and 1970s; sites-and-services and slum upgrading from the 1970s onward; decentralization of services during the 1980s; co-production at scale, participatory budgeting, Local Agenda 21 for sustainable development (Dahiya and Pugh 2000), and bottom-up urban development, etc., during the 1990s; and resilient cities since the 2010s. Likewise, Habitat’s recognition (i.e. what emerged from Habitat I in Vancouver in 1976 and Habitat II in Istanbul) of multi-level government, multi-stakeholder governance, and multi-sectoral (integrated) development is also not novel; what lacked then was consensus on how these applied to urban development, which Habitat III appears to have overcome by presenting cities as an integrated part of the global environmental system, and by defining the system itself as essentially urban (Parnell 2016, p. 533). Parnell’s (2016) excellent, detailed analysis explains the evolution from the largely fragmented, sectoral approaches that followed Habitat I and II (which looked at cities as sites for sustainable development action, and focused mainly on the global south and the urban poor) to a global consensus—on having a universal focus on and an integrated view of cities as the drivers of global environmental change, predicated on the ‘right to the city’ idea—embodied in Habitat III’s denouement, the NUA. Ten different, thematic papers propelled the eventual crystallization of the NUA.5 The Habitat III Policy Paper 4 on urban governance, capacity, and institutional development stresses several points raised in the review above, and many others, as goals and steps for improved urban governance. Policy Paper 4 is squarely inspired by the ‘right to the city’ concept, and envisions cities to foster sustainable and equitable development, and territorial equity (UN-Habitat 2016a, p. 2). UN-Habitat 5 However, the NUA does not include everything that the policy papers recommended, or not exactly

so. To read the policy papers, visit: http://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda/documents/policypapers/.

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acknowledges that the process followed in developing the thematic policy papers, in itself, set a pioneering precedent for United Nations intergovernmental processes—to widely draw upon independent (not just in-house), expert knowledge from academia, government, civil society and other regional and international bodies (Harkness and Katz 2016). It demonstrated multi-stakeholder participation across multiple scales—something the NUA deems essential for good urban governance. Policy Paper 4’s objectives and recommendations are bold, progressive, and, arguably, its foci the most omnifarious ever to address urban governance, per se (see Table 1). Among ten key messages, the one it sees as being “above all” is that new urban governance should be democratic, inclusive, multi-scale and multi-level (UN-Habitat 2016a, p. 2). A comprehensive vision of reform for good urban governance is vital, but the approach has to be viewed with Grindle’s (2004) caveats in mind about knowing when what might be good enough. In any context, therefore, it is likely wiser for progress to be incremental. Therefore, appreciating the significance (nature, magnitude, etc.) of the increments, and the underlying priorities and trade-offs is more critical.

Table 1 Toward Good Urban Governance (as per Habitat III Policy Paper 4) New urban governance

What

Why/How

Goals

Exercise the right to the city as a strategic approach

To combat social exclusion

Promote sustainable and equitable development

Prevent the depletion of natural resources and addresses environmental challenges

To nurture tolerance and peaceful coexistence whilst guaranteeing equal access and protection of common goods, including land use

Foster a new economy that values social emancipation and achievements above profit, where work is a means to enhance human dignity and inclusion

Characteristics

Facilitate territorial equity

Link up cities and rural areas, and ensure access to services for all based on the principle of spatial equality

Democratic and inclusive

Guarantee the right to participate in the development of cities and their surroundings for all stakeholders, with special attention given to vulnerable groups Ensure access to technologies to enhance service provision and participation (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) New urban governance

What

Why/How

Long-term and integrated

Allow for long-term public policies, beyond terms of office Foster comprehensive public policies that involve the whole territory in a systemic and intelligent way

Multi-scale and multi-level

Coordination between different levels of government and sectors of society to tackle challenges efficiently

Territorial

Understood cities as a system of relationships between urban and rural areas operating as an urban ecosystem

Proficient

Institutions and individuals should have the necessary skills to implement relevant public policies in responsive and realistic ways

Conscious of the digital age

New technological developments can assist local authorities in crafting more transparent, accountable, participatory and responsive governance systems Digital era governance may equip citizens and businesses with the ability to push for bottom-up changes in society

Policy challenges

Increasing complexity of urban governance

To grasp the issue of integrating different levels of government and a wide range of participating actors—formally or informally—in policy formulation and implementation To acknowledge the challenges associated with the diversity of local conditions and new urban forms The co-existence of metropolitan areas, intermediary cities, small towns, rapidly growing cities and shrinking cities calls for a differentiated policy approach

Absent or inadequate decentralization

Implementation has been varied and complex; local governments typically have limited powers and resources and lack professional staff and revenue raising capacities Causes weak multi-level governance, inadequate planning processes, economic inefficiencies, backlogs in budget spending and higher transaction costs (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) New urban governance

What

Why/How

Ineffective legal and institutional frameworks

Very few countries have developed and implemented comprehensive and coherent national urban policies; Disconnect between legal, administrative and fiscal frames; lack of clarity in the distribution of responsibilities between different levels of government; and contradictory regulations

The metropolitan challenge

Cities have physically grown beyond their administrative boundaries, and their economies have become more globalized, attracting flows of goods, capital and migrants from near and far Lack of coordination at the metropolitan scale creates cost-ineffective solutions, especially for coping with spill-overs and externalities

Inequality and exclusion

Current urbanization processes are reinforcing inequality and exclusion—particularly for women, youth, the elderly, minorities and the urban poor Participatory processes still suffer from structural constraints; need for legislation that recognizes civil society organizations, guarantees and promotes participation, and allows access to public information and data to promote informed citizenship Lack of transparency and accountability in public institutions

Weak frameworks for service delivery partnerships

Public partnerships with other actors (private sector, NGOs, CBOs, etc.) can assist with service delivery and critical aspects of urban development

Insufficient monitoring and evaluation of urban policies

Local governments currently have no access to localized data and thus do not have the capacity to take informed decisions and better prioritize local policies National governments do not sufficiently promote the involvement of local governments and stakeholders in the definition, implementation and monitoring of urban and regional policies and plans, while civic society stakeholders lack access to independent mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of public policies and projects (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) New urban governance

Transformative actions for the NUA

What

Why/How

Rapid technological change

Technological change poses complex and interrelated urban challenges that require city institutions to adapt

Create strong multi-level governance frameworks Strengthen decentralization processes Promote integrated national urban and territorial policies Reinforce metropolitan governance Promote a new culture of participation and equity Strengthen capacity-building for urban governance Enable digital era governance

Key Actors

Local governments National governments Judiciary and legislative branches Supranational governments and intergovernmental cooperation Civil society Education and knowledge institutions Private sector Financial institutions and international development agencies

Source Authors; adapted from UN-Habitat (2016a)

2 New Urban Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region The progress towards sustainable and inclusive urbanization in the Asia-Pacific region is central to the achievement of the NUA at the global level. There are several recognizable factors behind this. First, in 2018, the Asian and Pacific cities were home to 2.29 billion urban dwellers, which accounted for 54.4% of the world’s urban population (UNPD 2018); whatever happens in this region’s cities has much wider

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implications than that within national or regional boundaries. Second, in 2019, this region is estimated to reach the 50% urbanization mark that, among others, highlights the growing influence of cities and towns in global- and regional-level policy deliberations. Third, the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, wherein cities play a salient role, exerts regional as well as global influence in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. All these factors are bound to influence the attainment of the NUA not only within the Asia-Pacific region but also at the global level. Hence, it is important to understand the key features of the Asian and Pacific urbanization process. Overwhelmingly rural not too long ago, the region has urbanized the fastest among all world regions in recent decades. “During 1990–2010, the region’s urban demographic expansion amounted to over 754 million people. Over the last two decades, the increase in Asia’s urban population equalled the combined populations of the USA and the European Union. No other continent has experienced such an increase in absolute numbers in such a short span of time.” (Dahiya 2012b, p. S46). The demographic growth of small- and medium-sized cities, which account for two-third of the region’s urban population, is particularly faster. Rapid urban growth in the region is likely to continue unabated. Over the next decade, two-thirds of the demographic expansion in the world’s cities will take place in Asia (Fig. 3). By 2030, of the 5.2 billion city dwellers in the world, 2.8 billion will be in Asia-Pacific; further projections show that urban areas in the region will account for two-third of its total population by 2050 (UNPD 2018). Nineteen out of 30 mega-cities of the world were already in Asia in 2015, including the world’s three largest cities: Tokyo (37 million), Delhi (26 million), and Shanghai (23 million) (UNPD 2018). In recent decades, this rapid urbanization in the Asia-Pacific region has borne unprecedented transformations (Dahiya 2012a, 2014). This urbanization wave has accompanied strong economic development, spurred by globalization, and effected

Fig. 3 Ever-changing skyline of the mega-city of Bangkok, Thailand (December 2018). Picture credit: Bharat Dahiya

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spectacular reductions in extreme poverty. Most countries of the region have also undergone significant political and administrative restructuring, with decentralization and/or democratization making cities the locus of planning and development. Robust growth of the private sector and civil society has made them important stakeholders in this new urban landscape of policymaking, development, and governance. Not all facets of Asian and Pacific urbanization, however, are promising. The growth, for example, in inequality—inter alia of income, wealth, and housing—has outpaced impressive economic gains. Based on data from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2013), Mathur (2014) estimated that during 1990–2008, the number of urban poor in South Asia increased from 122 to 152 million.6 Urban environmental degradation continues with poor solid waste and wastewater management, with attendant problems of pollution (Roberts and Kanaley 2006; UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2010). Natural disasters, such has typhoons, earthquakes and tsunamis, have caused extensive destruction of housing and infrastructure along with loss of life. New threats from climate change, such as sea level rise, and increasing frequency and intensity of typhoons, compound the persistent challenge of overcoming uneven, inadequate, and inequitable access to urban services. Peri-urbanization presents a unique challenge as the urban fringe gallops farther afield without adequate planning and services (Dahiya 2003a, b; Fazal 2000; Hui et al. 2018). Further, megacities, urban corridors and mega-urban regions pose unique challenges to urban governance, planning and policy making. In view of the unique features of the Asian-Pacific urbanization process, the related challenges of sustainable and inclusive urban development, the United Nations’ member states from the region, as from the other regions, committed themselves to the NUA at the 2016 Habitat III Conference in Quito, Ecuador: While the specific circumstances of cities of all sizes, towns and villages vary, we affirm that the New Urban Agenda is universal in scope, participatory and people-centred, protects the planet and has a long-term vision, setting out priorities and actions at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels that Governments and other relevant stakeholders in every country can adopt based on their needs. We will work to implement the New Urban Agenda in our own countries and at the regional and global levels, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development, and respecting national legislation and practices, as well as policies and priorities (United Nations 2017: 9).

Thus, the Asian-Pacific countries committed themselves to the implementation of the NUA towards achieving sustainable and inclusive urban development.

6A

related issue is that of the measurement of urban poverty in Asia. Samanta (2015) argues that “if we just look at the income poverty in urban Asia, we are ignoring many critical dimensions of urban poverty” (p. 79).

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2.1 Urban Governance as an Umbrella to Respond to Urban Challenges Urban governance matters in promoting sustainable and inclusive development for several reasons. Traditional over-reliance on technocratic approaches and resource constraints has led to urban exclusion and the urbanization of poverty, which requires inclusive urban policies, transparent and accountable governance, anti-corruption strategies and civil service capacities. The focus on economic growth and industrialization has created the space and inclination for much needed participatory structures and approaches, and a reorientation to engage all stakeholders. The need is to achieve results in urban settings for all citizens, and to cope with alarming gaps between plans and their implementation through new institutional designs, enhanced local capacity and reducing overlapping functions. The United Nations identified five governance challenges to effectively cope with rapid urbanization in the region (UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2010, 2015). First, the ‘business’ of government in the Asia-Pacific cities has shifted to that of the ‘process’ of governance with the engagement of civil society organizations and the private sector. This requires mechanisms for participatory and accountable urban governance with effective anti-corruption strategies. Second, urban governance has been a key feature of the urban policy agenda in the region for over two decades, which has been influenced by the Asian financial crisis (1997) and the global financial crisis (2007–2008). Third, policy statements about urban decentralization encompass comprehensive objectives, but in practice are far less so because they do not blend political devolution and power sharing with financial and administrative capacity of local governments and local administration as catalysts for urban development. Many cities are heavily dependent on tax revenue allocations, grants-in-aid and other forms of financial assistance from central and provincial/state governments. Fourth, the quality of the urban environment has been deteriorating; whilst Asian-Pacific countries often have relevant environmental legislation in place, its enforcement remains poor in general. Finally, the region is facing several peri-urban governance challenges, including those related to jurisdictions of peri-urban areas, expansive ecological footprints of cities that spill over into the peripheries, weak or absent mechanisms for citizen engagement in service delivery, and inadequate multi-agency consultation mechanisms and tools for local level accountability. Governance structures and national policies often limit reform and innovation capacity, and most urban centres in the Asia-Pacific region are financially dependent on higher tiers (central and/or state/provincial) of government, which control the bulk of tax revenues and are often reluctant to share with local authorities. These issues compound typically already strained budgets and service loads that cannot keep pace with increasing urban density. The management of urban services often suffers from lack of coordination, as functionally oriented central and sub-national (provincial/state) government departments compete with geographically truncated urban local authorities. Furthermore, formal government programmes can come into conflict with the interests of people living in informal settlements because

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administrative and legal reforms are not effectively adjusted to grassroots realities. Rampant corruption, disputes over land tenure and widespread human rights abuses, together with an increasingly well-informed populace, can lead to potentially explosive social situations, especially in fragile democracies and authoritarian regimes. Accountable urban governance with effective anti-corruption strategies can go a long way in promoting citizen trust in local government. The NUA takes cognizance of these complex issues, and terms ‘strengthening urban governance’ as one of the ‘fundamental drivers of change’: “Strengthening urban governance, with sound institutions and mechanisms that empower and include urban stakeholders, as well as appropriate checks and balances, providing predictability and coherence in urban development plans to enable social inclusion, sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and environmental protection” (United Nations 2017: 8). In other words, the NUA lays clear emphasis on urban governance to bring about change in the way in which urban issues are dealt with, the importance of institutions and mechanisms to engage the various urban stakeholders for their empowerment, and participation in sustainable and inclusive urban development process.

2.2 Urban Planning and Policy Contemporary urban planning has to deal with multiple layers of issues solving and juggling interactions with multiple actors. However, in a majority of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, urban planning remains captive of ‘modernist planning’, which ‘completely fails to accommodate the way of life of the majority of inhabitants in rapidly growing, and largely poor and informal cities, and thus directly contributes to social and spatial marginalization or exclusion’ (UN-Habitat 2009: 58). The ‘modernist approaches to planning’—such as master planning, which take a long-term, physical planning view of urban development process, often fall short of addressing the current and emergent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Private developers often find ways to circumvent urban planning rules, which results in haphazard growth of cities and towns with little regard to urban ecology, environment, disaster-prone areas, infrastructure linkages, and the like. An undesired result of such haphazard growth is urban sprawl that is common to a large number of cities in the Asia-Pacific region. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the Government’s Public Investment Programme 2017–2020 has identified urban sprawl as a priority issue facing the urban planners (UN-Habitat Sri Lanka 2018) (see Fig. 4). The actions and interests of unregulated private sector operators now need to be viewed in the context of new or emerging actors, including private sector developers, multinational corporations, CSOs and NGOs. These various actors have been introduced to the urban development scene or their significance increased over recent years due to drivers such as expanding space for urban governance (as mentioned earlier), continuing economic globalization, and expanding trade flows, to name a few. This frames the persistent and critical challenge of vested interests being

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Fig. 4 Ongoing urban densification that is much needed in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Picture credit: Bharat Dahiya

privileged in development, often at the expense of poor or lack of evidence-based urban planning. The intersection of informal settlements, non-contextualized urban planning with insufficient evidence, vested interests and essentially competing narratives for ‘right to the city’ becomes the core challenge of urban planning and land-use. Less pernicious, but no less impactful, are simply outmoded legal and policy frameworks prevalent across Asian-Pacific contexts. Whether it is overly complicated and outmoded land laws in Bangladesh, lack of land banking and land readjustment to better manage future infrastructure needs in Nepal, land conversion and privatization of land with unequal distribution of costs and benefits in China, or simply an archaic mindset that urbanization is something to be “contained” as in Pakistan, a lack of evidence-based urban planning with a social justice component is still the norm in many of the developing countries of Asia-Pacific. There is a critical need for institutional alignment particularly with regard to land use allocation and regulation. For example, in Karachi, there are around 16 land-owning organizations and only 38% of the land is owned or managed by the city government. This helps illustrate the critical need for land use planning agencies to have the capacity to implement and enforce plans that have already been drafted. Likewise, it demonstrates the need for capacity building for leadership as well as participation in urban planning. In this regard, SDG 11.3 becomes highly important: “By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries” (United Nations

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2018). Furthermore, the NUA aims at “reinvigorating long-term and integrated urban and territorial planning and design,” as a(nother) “fundamental driver of change,” “in order to optimize the spatial dimension of the urban form and deliver the positive outcomes of urbanization” (United Nations 2017: 8). These recommendations of global agendas are also reflected at the Asia-Pacific regional level where UN-Habitat and ESCAP (2015: 169) called upon “governments at all levels to foster governance and urban planning reforms to facilitate: (a) coordination mechanisms (both multistakeholder and cross-border) for better strategic planning and holistic management of city regions that are integrated across jurisdictions and sectors; (b) enhanced financial structures to upgrade the fiscal viability of city region authorities and improve mechanisms for financing infrastructure and services; (c) capacity-building across administrative and jurisdictional boundaries; and (d) greater community and private sector participation in urban decision-making.” Finally, the growing frequency of natural disasters and increasingly felt climate change impacts pose a significant challenge to urban planning and policy in the AsiaPacific region. “Disaster management is made more difficult in urban areas by the complexities in land tenure, high densities and high-rise structures, as well as the need to support floating populations due to rapid migration” (ESCAP 2017: 39). This calls for strengthening of capacities that would need to be fully utilized for strained urban authorities to be proactive in disaster management and risk-reduction orientation and climate change adaptations into planning. There are critical needs for awareness and policy and planning for urban resilience and disaster risk reduction strategies for all development activities, as highlighted by SDG 11.B (United Nations 2018): ‘By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels.’

2.3 Service Delivery and Access for Social Inclusion Rapid urban growth unmet by basic infrastructure has led to an ‘urban divide’ (UNHabitat 2010). In the Asia-Pacific region, urban economic growth has not benefited all residents equally, and the poor are left to bear most of the burdens and shortcomings particularly in terms of access to services (UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2010, 2015). While the rich live in well-serviced neighbourhoods and well-built settlements, the poor are confined to inner city and peri-urban informal settlements, often called slums. Urban poverty is mired in degraded urban environments, a constant threat of eviction, congestion, unsafe living conditions, crime and violence, exposure to pollution and other similar health issues and infectious diseases, greater risk of HIV/AIDS and a lack of familiar social and community networks. The number of slum dwellers in the Asia-Pacific region increased from 467.7 million in 1990 to 564.1 million in 2014 (UN-Habitat 2016b). A slum household suffers from several deprivations including lack of access to improved water and

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sanitation, insecure land tenure, and lack of durable housing and sufficient living areas (UN-Habitat 2003). Further, slums often suffer from unreliable power supplies and intermittent water availability, insufficient treatment of wastewater, poor drainage and flooding, and uncollected garbage. In the East Asia and Pacific region, many cities are often characterised by high spatial inequality “with major divisions in access to housing, infrastructure and services, and affordable transportation” (Baker and Gadgil 2017: xviii). For example, urban Ger areas in Ulaanbaatar feature poor service delivery compared to the well-serviced core city ‘built-up area’ (Fig. 5). Therefore, SDG 11.1 aptly states (United Nations 2018): ‘By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.’ In the same vein, the NUA includes ‘ending poverty’ as its one of three interlinked principles: Leave no one behind, by ending poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including the eradication of extreme poverty, by ensuring equal rights and opportunities, socioeconomic and cultural diversity, and integration in the urban space, by enhancing liveability, education, food security and nutrition, health and well-being, including by ending the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, by promoting safety and eliminating discrimination and all forms of violence, by ensuring public participation — providing safe and equal access for all, and by providing equal access for all to physical and social infrastructure and basic services, as well as adequate and affordable housing (United Nations 2017: 7).

Achieving results in sustainable development in urban areas requires multi-sectoral and cross-thematic approaches. For example, effective interventions to alleviate urban poverty include the capacity development of urban institutions, sus-

Fig. 5 Underserviced Ger areas in Mongolia’s capital city, Ulaanbaatar. Picture credit: Noel Sampson

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tainable livelihoods programmes, horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms among government agencies at the city and national levels, engagement of civil society, and land use planning and management systems to build and strengthen urban resilience. Ad hoc and isolated interventions in specific sectors are necessary but not sufficient to show visible results. Urban programmes need to be holistic and sustained over longer periods of time to improve the quality of life of citizens. Context-based urban planning and land use, the urban environment and climate change adaptations, managing peri-urbanization. Overall, urban Asia can be characterized by alarming deficiencies in shelter, health and other basic urban services. ADB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have measured the amounts of capital expenditure required for the Asian region as a whole to upgrade both physical and institutional infrastructures to address the challenges outlined above; it would take US$4.7 trillion over 10 years to meet urban infrastructure requirements, an additional US$1.6 trillion to replace aging infrastructure and another US$3.1 trillion to strengthen institution-building and management capacity (ADB 2008; IMF 2009). Given the various challenges of sustainable urban development in the Asia-Pacific region, the Asian Development Bank’s Strategy 2030 focuses on “making cities more livable” as one of its seven operational strategies (ADB 2018). The on-going global warming may further impact all of this. The latest IPCC report estimated that anthropogenic activities “have caused approximately 1.0 °C of global warming above pre-industrial levels… Global warming is likely to reach 1.5 °C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate” (2018, p. 6, emphasis original). Therefore, the IPCC report calls for “system transitions that can be enabled by an increase of adaptation and mitigation investments, policy instruments, [and] the acceleration of technological innovation and behaviour changes”; such efforts will be required for limiting the risks from the projected global warming in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication (p. 23).

3 Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities To optimally leverage continued dividends from the potentially beneficial urbanization process and to address the related challenges as discussed above, Asian and Pacific cities must become, as targeted by Sustainable Development Goal 11, more inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Therefore, this volume emphasizes critical roles for urban governance and planning towards achieving these ends. In doing so, it delineates the broad similarity of challenges of sustainable and inclusive urban development, yet it also illuminates how each context—given the distinctiveness of institutions, and their capacities and interrelationships—demands unique responses and emphases. Therefore, a renewed focus on the state—to ensure the effectiveness of new institutional arrangements and modes of urban governance—emerges as a central message.

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The present volume explores significant contours of the NUA in the Asia-Pacific region by examining innovative interventions that are influencing 21st century urban governance in two key areas: (i) urban planning and policy, and (ii) innovations in service delivery and access toward social inclusion. It has benefitted from contributions from academic researchers as well as development practitioners from different parts of the world, including Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America. Thus, this volume’s compilation of findings, ideas and opinions based on multifaceted experiences in the Asia-Pacific region is uniquely rich.

3.1 Structure of the Book This volume includes thirteen chapters that are organized into four sections. After the current introductory section, which provides an overview of the NUA in Asia-Pacific, follow two substantive sections. Section II includes a collection of four papers that focus on and review urban planning and policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Seven chapters in Section III explore innovations in service delivery and access toward social inclusion in the region. Section IV includes a concluding chapter that revisits the key issues discussed and messages put forth in the various papers on the NUA in Asia-Pacific. Section 2: Urban Planning and Policy In chapter “Integrating Urban-Rural Development (IURD) through Governance Programmes in China’s Megacities: The Suzhou Model,” Fang et al. (2019) deal with the challenge of how the dual development of urban and rural regions in China should be integrated into a unitary economy with the help of governance. The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the Coordinated Urban-Rural Development (CURD) and the IURD programmes of the Government of China with regard to the five stages of development: (i) traditional society, (ii) take-off, (iii) accumulation, (iv) rural urban coordinated, and (v) rural urban integrated. As local urban and rural economies evolve to move towards integration, a transition is required in terms of the application of development programmes from CURD to IURD. Suzhou is the (first) pilot city designated by the Government of China for the implementation of IURD through government programmes. Based on research conducted on the unique experience of Suzhou with IURD programme implementation, this chapter reviews its targets and measures in terms of integration of urban-rural industrial development, and integration of resource allocation in urban and rural areas. Further, it discusses the policy goals, accomplishments, institutional innovations, and issues of IURD in countylevel cities and subdivisions of Suzhou municipality. The chapter also discusses the applicability of Suzhou’s pilot IURD practice and planning strategies in other areas with similar development conditions.

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Debolina Kundu (2019) examines “Urban Policies in Neo-Liberal India”. The chapter starts with an introduction to the process of urbanization in India, highlighting key statistics of urban demographic growth and city size. It then provides an overview of the urban development programmes currently being implemented in the country: ‘Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewable Mission’, ‘Rajiv Awas Yojana and Housing for All’, ‘Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation’, and ‘Smart Cities Mission’. Focusing on the post-1991 period of economic liberalization, the chapter analyses the system of governance, including the developments and problems related to ward development committees, resident welfare associations, and parastatal bodies, such as development authorities, housing boards, slum boards, and water and sanitation Boards. The author then discusses the financing of urban local governments (called as ‘urban local bodies’ in India), including key features of municipal finance and intergovernmental transfers. The chapter concludes by suggesting a way forward for achieving inclusive urbanization. In chapter “The Changing Role of Regional Organisation of Councils in Australia: Case Studies from Perth Metropolitan Region,” Khan and Bajracharya (2019) discuss some Australian initiatives that attempt to broaden the scope of planning at the local level through collaboration across geographical boundaries of local councils in order to improve the effectiveness of institutional arrangements and modes of urban governance. The chapter begins with a discussion on the concept of regional organization of councils—groups of local councils that take up enhanced local and regional governance functions—operational in Western Australia, which seek to contribute to regional and strategic planning at the metropolitan level. It then introduces the structure of government in Australia to facilitate a basic understanding of prevalent forms of partnerships in urban governance. The authors trace the evolution of local government functions, and discuss the conditions and debates surrounding the various approaches to increase efficiency and effectiveness of local and regional governance. They describe the various mechanisms promoted over the years for local and regional cooperation in governance. The chapter reviews three cases of regional organisations of councils from Perth, Western Australia: Western Suburbs Regional Organisation of Councils, Western Metropolitan Regional Council, and Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council. This chapter becomes important as “[t]here has been no attempt to provide either a comprehensive or definitive account of initiatives undertaken by ROCs in Australia to enhance urban governance”. Chapter “Issues in Urban Planning and Policy: The Case Study of Lahore, Pakistan,” by Javed and Riaz (2019), examines spatial growth and urban policy in Lahore. The chapter begins with an overview of Lahore including its brief history, and demographic and socioeconomic profiles. This is followed by a review of spatial patterns of growth and development in order to look into the way Lahore has been laid out spatially, particularly with regard to housing settlements. The chapter then documents the relevant legislation and regulations, and the related gaps, in the field of urban policy and planning. Further, it illustrates the institutional set up mandated with urban planning and enforcing policies to guide spatial development in Lahore. The authors

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then discuss the emerging culture of corporate urban management, which provides important insights for improving institutional governance in the city. Next, the salient features of the city’s past and present master plans are discussed. The chapter concludes by exploring possible new directions in Lahore’s urban planning and policy. In chapter “Urban Governance Challenges and Reforms in Indonesia: Towards a New Urban Agenda,” Salim and Hudalah (2019) review the challenges to and reforms in urban governance in Indonesia, with particular reference to the NUA. At the outset, the authors present a brief overview of Indonesian urbanization, followed by an account of the proliferation of sub-national governments, both of which form the backdrop for the subsequent discussion on urban governance. The chapter analyses the various governance reforms, which are initiated by the Indonesian government and are implementation. In doing so, it highlights some key governance challenges with regard to improving urban planning and policy. The chapter then discusses the challenges set forth by the NUA. In conclusion, the authors share some ideas on how Indonesia’s own urban agenda may unfold vis-à-vis the NUA. Section 3: Innovations in Service Delivery and Access for Social Inclusion Chapter “Financing Local Infrastructure and Public Services: Case of Shaxi Town in Suburban Suzhou, China,” by Chen et al. (2019) discusses the financing mechanisms for local infrastructure construction and service delivery in Shaxi Town, a part of Taicang City, located in suburban Suzhou. The Shaxi case study from Jiangsu Province illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of local government finance in China, and their relevance for other developing countries. As local governments in China play a leading role in investment and financing of public goods, the authors begin by analysing the fiscal logic of China’s government hierarchy. With the help of Shaxi Town’s case study, they provide a detailed description of the various sources of investment and financing available to local governments in China, and the problems different kinds of investment and financing address. Finally, the authors suggest ways and means to improve financing, planning, construction, and service delivery for small towns—which are different stages of development—from the perspective of overall, systemic reform in China. The authors suggest these findings should be of interest to local officials and urban planners in China and other developing countries. In chapter “Urban Governance in Australia: A Case Study of Brisbane City,” Bajracharya and Khan (2019) set out to conduct a case study of urban governance in Brisbane—the third largest city in Australia with a population of 2.4 million people. The authors discuss the roles of key stakeholders, such as the state government, local government, private sector and civil society in urban governance. They review two important urban governance initiatives of Brisbane City Council: (i) the management role of the City Council in terms of the provision of urban services and facilities; and (ii) the democratic governance of Brisbane in terms of social inclusion and community engagement. The authors identify key urban governance challenges for the city, and briefly discuss a few ideas from Brisbane that may be relevant for other cities in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Chapter “Urban Service Delivery and Access: The Special Case of Brunei Darussalam,” by Thambipillai and Pang (2019), examines the sultanate’s urban governance and policy processes. The authors begin with a broad introduction to governance in Brunei Darussalam that provides an insight into the sultanate’s political and social system. Following this, they review urban governance in the country with regard to the specific planning agencies and their input to the urban development process. Given the focus of the chapter, the authors then review service delivery and the role of the municipal department therein. In the subsequent sections, the authors present selected illustrative cases on urban service delivery, including transportation, housing, health, energy resources, and enhancing disaster preparedness. Whilst acknowledging the fact that Brunei Darussalam is heavily dependent on income from its hydrocarbon resources, they discuss Government’s diversification policies that are steadily increasing the role of the business sector. The authors conclude the chapter with a review of the challenges and the prospects for improved urban governance and service delivery against the backdrop of the sultanate’s long-term development plan—Wawasan 2035 (Vision 2035), which calls for Brunei Darussalam to progress towards a developed country status (Fig. 6). In chapter “Comprehensive Management for Better Rural Infrastructure and Service Delivery: Lessons from the Implementation of China’s Six Point Rural Action Plan in Guizhou Province,” Zou et al. (2019) review an action plan aimed at improving rural infrastructure, services, and the quality of life in Guizhou, one of China’s poorest provinces. The authors begin with providing background on rural

Fig. 6 A row of shop-houses with roadside greenery in Kiulap commercial area, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam. Picture credit: Li Li Pang

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policy in China, and in Guizhou Province, the Province’s Six Point Action Plan, and the progress on achieving the plan’s goals in ten representative villages at the end of the first phase of the project in 2015. They explain how Guizhou Province—a poor, ethnically diverse, mountainous region characterized by many small remote settlements, difficult access problems, limited water resources, and infrastructure and service delivery shortcomings—prioritized its needs, and organized and administered a successful rural infrastructure and service delivery action plan. The authors discuss key features of Guizhou Province’s Six Point Action Plan, including its strategy, budget, goals, objectives and actions. Following this, they review the implementation of the Six Point Action Plan, which includes: (i) top-down project-oriented implementation, (ii) provincial meeting system and coordinating leading teams, (iii) capital investment, and (iv) policy support. The authors then discuss the impact of the action plan, and conclude with a summary of five aspects of programme planning and management: goal setting, organization, financing, project management, and performance appraisal. Chapter “The Political Economy of Urban Governance in Asian Cities: Delivering Water, Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Services,” by Boex et al. (2019) starts by underlining that there an increasingly felt need for local governments and policymakers to gain a deeper understanding of how they can improve urban services delivery. In this regard, the NUA recognizes improving the coverage and quality of urban public services as a key enabler for sustainable development. The authors contribute to this discussion by ‘problematizing the assumptions regarding the role of urban local governments.’ They specifically explore ‘whether the vertical or intergovernmental arrangements and local governance systems provide cities with the authority and autonomy to provide urban services. Or, if cities are constrained in different ways?’ By closely examining comparative indicators for the institutional arrangements of 18 cities across 6 different countries in Asia, and an additional sample of 24 cities in another 8 African countries, the chapter adds to the analytical literature on effective urban governance systems that facilitate improved urban service delivery and, ultimately, more sustainable urban growth. The authors evaluate the fiscal, political, and administrative determinants of variations in urban service delivery quality in otherwise comparable urban jurisdictions. They argue that Asian cities lack the intergovernmental institutional space to deliver effective urban services. In conclusion, the authors emphasize how countries can reform or strengthen local and intergovernmental institutions to ensure improved services to their urban residents. In chapter “From Exclusion to Inclusion: The Understanding, Capacity, and Will to Change Local Government Practices,” Möller (2019) discusses efforts by local governments worldwide to stimulate ideas for hands-on approaches for strengthening social inclusion. The author begins by explaining how this study considers the concepts of social inclusion and social exclusion. After a brief description of the methodology, the author discusses the cases (based on projects) that focus on local governments’ engagement in various forms of international decentralized cooperation, from municipal partnerships to capacity building programmes. Funded by the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy between 2010 and 2016,

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these projects illustrate how politicians and public servants approached issues of social inclusion in different ways. The author intends to identify commonalities across successful initiatives, which range from the strengthening of a gender perspective in local level planning processes, to how local governments can increase participation in public life of people with disabilities, and how negative effects of work-related migration on children can be countered by active engagement from local governments. After the discussion of findings, the author in conclusion, calls for enhancing social inclusion, and asserts the importance of: (i) local governments for attaining inclusive and sustainable development, (ii) global partnerships involving local governments for building their capacities, and (iii) robust state-civil society cooperation, locally, for politically and socially acceptable governance reforms. Section 4: Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories The final chapter, “Towards Inclusive Urban Governance and Planning: Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories,” Ashok Das and Bharat Dahiya (2019), the editors of this volume, draw attention to evolving trends of urban governance in the Asia-Pacific, their implications for inclusive and sustainable development, as well as entrenched impediments and emergent challenges. An aspirational idea, good governance today enjoys strong currency as a necessary ingredient for facilitating effective urban planning, development, and management. Focusing on the institutional aspects of development, its emphasis on increased collaboration among sectors in processes that effect urban transformation, and the participation therein of non-state stakeholders—especially various CSOs such as CBOs and NGOs—has become evermore salient. It builds on the discussion in this chapter of how the good governance concept has evolved since it emerged as a guiding principle for improving development outcomes in poor countries. Accumulated evidence from interventions on the ground has since afforded the concept credibility and much refinement. The chapter highlights the unique highlights and lessons from the various empirical cases in the book’s other chapters, and then gleans similarities and distinctions among them, clarifying how emphases, approaches, and outcomes of planning and governance endeavours vary across cities, and why. In stressing that outcomes are heavily shaped by the nature of extant institutions, which reflect the inertia and legacies of political histories and collective societal values, the chapter echoes the cliché-sounding yet critical importance of context. It then highlights the trends of deepening economic inequality, social and spatial exclusion, growing intolerance, and environmental degradation in Asian cities. Such outcomes are antithetical to the inclusivity and sustainability objectives of improved urban governance. The authors reckon, therefore, that in the heterogeneous, unequal, and complex societies of the Asia-Pacific, a region now significantly more democratic and market-oriented than before, progress towards inclusive and equitable cities will necessarily be trying, slow, and incremental. However, the authors remain ardently optimistic that, with empowered civil society and sustained political will, appropriately designed, capacitated, implemented, and cri-

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tiqued governance and planning impetuses will ultimately, albeit incrementally, yield sanguine outcomes.

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Bharat Dahiya an award-winning urbanist, combines research, policy analysis and development practice aimed at examining and tackling socio-economic, environmental and governance issues in the global urban context. Since early-1990s, Bharat’s research and professional work has focused on sustainable cities and urbanization, strategic urban planning and development, urban environment and infrastructure, and urban resilience. Working with the World Bank, UN-Habitat, the Asian Development Bank, United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS), and UNDP, he initiated, led and contributed to international projects on sustainable urban development in the Asia-Pacific region. Bharat conceptualized and coordinated the preparation of United Nations’ first-ever report on The State of Asian Cities 2010/11. At the World Bank headquarters, he conducted the first-ever systematic review of the Bank’s investments for improving urban liveability, published as a co-authored book, Urban Environment and Infrastructure: Toward Livable Cities. More recently, he co-authored Partnering for Sustainable Development: Guidelines for Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Implement the 2030 Agenda in Asia and the Pacific (UNU-IAS and ESCAP). Bharat

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B. Dahiya and A. Das is Series Editor for the SCOPUS-indexed Springer book series, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, and serves on the editorial boards of Cities: The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning, Journal of Urban Culture Research, Jindal Journal of Public Policy, and National Geographical Journal of India. He has held academic positions in Australia, Indonesia and Thailand. Reuters, Inter Press Service, SciDev.Net, NishiNippon, The Korean Economic Daily, China Daily and its Asia Weekly, The Hindu, Deccan Herald, Bangkok Post, The Nation, UB Post, The Sunday Times, and Urban Gateway have quoted Bharat’s work. He is based at the College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok. He holds a PhD in Urban Governance, Planning and Environment from the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Ashok Das is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa (UHM), USA. He is also an affiliate faculty of UHM’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Center for South Asian Studies. He was co-chair (21016-18) of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning’s (ACSP) Global Planning Educators Interest Group (GPEIG). He received his Ph.D. in Urban Planning from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA); M.Arch. and M.A. in Environmental Planning & Management from Kansas State University; and B. Arch. from the School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi. Previously, he was an assistant professor in the San Francisco State University’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning; architecture and planning consultant in the United States and India; and the chief cartoonist for Architecture + Design, India’s leading architecture magazine. Ashok researches institutional challenges and innovations for ameliorating urban poverty through services provision in Asia-Pacific, particularly in Indonesia and India, and affordable housing in the US. Community participation and empowerment, slum upgrading, decentralization and governance, civil society, community-managed integrated microfinance, disaster risk reduction, inclusionary zoning, and planning education are specific research interests. The Ford Foundation, the World Resources Institute, and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs have sought his advisory services.

Part II

Urban Planning and Policy

Integrating Urban-Rural Development (IURD) Through Governance Programmes in China’s Megacities: The Suzhou Model Chenhao Fang, Chen Chen, Min Zhao and Richard LeGates

Abstract The developed regions in China are now confronted with the issue of how urban-rural dual development should integrate into a unitary economy. This chapter describes the policy goal, accomplishments, institutional innovations, and issues of integrated urban-rural development in county-level cities and subdivisions of Suzhou municipality—China’s only pilot city designated by the central government to experiment with integrated urban-rural development through government programmes. The chapter discusses Suzhou’s efforts in this regard, its relevance to what has been proposed in The New Urban Agenda, and the applicability of its pilot integrated urban-rural development practice and planning strategies in similar areas. Keywords China · Urban planning · Integrated urban-rural development · Coordinated urban-rural development · New urban agenda

1 Introduction The coexistence of urban and rural areas, and the duality of their spatial and economic structures is commonplace in developing countries. As a developing economy transitions to a developed one, it needs to better integrate these dual structures. During the past three decades, China’s urbanization rate has increased to over 56% (PRC NSB 2016), and rapid growth continues. However, the rate at which different regions of China are urbanizing varies, leading to different stages of urbanization in cities and C. Fang · C. Chen (B) · M. Zhao · R. LeGates College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tongji University, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected] C. Fang e-mail: [email protected] M. Zhao e-mail: [email protected] R. LeGates e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_2

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Fig. 1 Differentiated urbanization rates in China. Data Source Statistical Yearbook of China 2015

towns in different regions of China (Fig. 1). These disparities have led to a widening urban–rural income gap, which peaked at 3.33:1 in 2007 (Fig. 2) (ibid). Accordingly, China’s central government aims to intervene with policies to change the dual economic structures of urban and rural areas. In the first phase that started in 2003, the central government proposed a policy of Coordinated Urban–Rural Development (hereafter, CURD) to strengthen rural development and diminish the urban–rural gaps in resident income, public services, infrastructure, and rural productivity; encourage equitable growth, and improve the flow of production factors (the labour force, capital, and goods and services) between urban and rural areas (Ye and LeGates 2013; Ye et al. 2013; Zheng and Ye 2009).

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Fig. 2 Urban–rural income gap in China. Source China Statistical Yearbook 2015

Two cities—Chongqing and Chengdu—were designated CURD pilot regions by the central government, charged with experiments to improve their own conditions and serve as models for other Chinese cities. In the second phase, since 2008, the central government has also been encouraging Integrated Urban–Rural Development (hereafter referred to as IURD) in economically advanced regions of China with an aim of eliminating, rather than narrowing, urban–rural gaps in resident income, public services, infrastructure, and rural area productivity to promote integration. The goal of IURD is to establish a new type of agro-industrial and urban–rural relationship that will mutually benefit and integrate agricultural areas and villages with industries and cities. It seeks to gradually realize the equality of basic rights between urban and rural residents, by making public services more uniform throughout the country, achieving similar income levels between city dwellers and villagers, rationally allocating urban–rural production factors, and attaining the convergence of urban–rural industrial development (Study Session of Political Bureau of Chinese Communist Party 2015). Although both CURD and IURD are concerned with the urban-rural relationship during the process of development, they are different from each other and different from many other approaches or strategies in previous studies, such as the growth-pole strategy (Parr 1999), agropolitan development (Friedmann and Douglass 1978), the developmental state (Leftwich 1995), and policies for Desakotas (McGee 1991). Growth pole and agropolitan development theory are mainly concerned with which places—cities, new communities, or the countryside—should be the engine of development. Growth-pole strategy encourages growth within a region at particular locations–usually are cities and sometimes new towns—on the assumption that growth will then spread to peripheral areas including the countryside. Agropolitan development theory is based on the assumption that rural area should play the

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most important role in development and that limited resources should be channelled primarily to them. Developmental state theory is concerned with state-led macroeconomic planning in contrast to pure free-market economies. Some theorists argue that strong developmental states can speed up development—particularly in East Asia. Desakota theory describes a phenomenon observed in Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia during the process of urbanization—areas alongside transit corridors between large cities, in which urban and agricultural forms of land use and settlement coexist and are intermingled with industry. China is a developmental state experiencing fast city centric economic development and urbanization. Therefore, the main concern of CURD and IURD is in what way a developmental state can best close the urban-rural development gap in regions with different characteristics at different development levels. The goal of CURD and IURD are similar to what’s been highlighted in article 49 of The New Urban Agenda which “commit to supporting territorial systems that integrate urban and rural functions into the national and subnational spatial frameworks and the systems of cities and human settlements, thus promoting sustainable management and use of natural resources and land, ensuring reliable supply and value chains that connect urban and rural supply and demand to foster equitable regional development across the urban-rural continuum and fill social, economic and territorial gaps.” However, it’s worth noting that even if both CURD and IURD aim to close the urban-rural development gap, they are slightly different as they respond to different stages in the urbanization continuum. CURD strategies will only work when a region has a sufficiently strong economy and high enough rate of urbanization, and IURD is appropriate for even later stages of development (Wu et al. 2017). A study by Zhao et al. (2016) suggests that the evolution of urban–rural relationships in China since 1949 can be divided into five stages, each with distinctive features and requirements for development (Fig. 3). In this full spectrum of the urban-rural development process, a region reaches the fourth stage—the CURD stage—when its urbanization rate crosses 50%, its economy is relatively well developed, and its fiscal capacity is strong. A series of pro-agricultural policies have improved conditions in the Chinese countryside, the rural labour surplus has decreased significantly, and the gaps in social security and public services provision between urban and rural areas are closing. Nevertheless, the gaps between urban and rural areas remain significant. A region reaches the fifth stage—the IURD stage—when its urbanization rate is over 70%. Some regions in China have already reached this stage and it appears likely that China will pass this threshold around 2030 (Gao and Wei 2013). In this fifth stage , a region’s economic and social development are at an advanced stage, its

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Fig. 3 Positioning Suzhou and its IURD programme in an urbanizing China. Source SDCDB and TU (2016)

economy is highly developed, a small proportion of the total labour force is engaged in farming, there are considerable subsidies to rural areas and agriculture,1 there is no hindrance for production factors to move between urban and rural area,2 and the region has adequate social security and public services provision in both urban and rural area. In this stage, the urban-rural dual economy will evolve towards a unitary one. The most developed areas in China—especially developed coastal areas and metropolitan regions—have already entered the fifth stage, the IURD stage, earlier than other regions. Taking Suzhou—one of China’s most developed megacities—as an example of a region that has already entered its fifth stage of development, this research focus on the experience and issues in the policy practices of IURD and discusses how these practices may help guide other cities in China, and cities in other developing countries as they become ripe for IURD.

1 According to the experiences of U.S. Japan and Korea, it is necessary to offer considerable subsidies

to the rural residents and agriculture for ensuring agricultural production when the income in agriculture is much lower than that in secondary and tertiary sectors. Although the subsides for each person is quite high, the total amount is acceptable for the government, because the total amount of rural residents is small. 2 China has a dual urban-rural dual economic structure that hinders production factors move between urban and rural sectors only when policy allows it to happen. The underlying institutions include the hukou registration system, the rural land institution, etc.

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2 Suzhou’s Integrated Urban-Rural Development (IURD) Pilot Programme Suzhou, a prefectural city3 on the west of Shanghai, is the only IURD pilot city in China at the national level.4 In 2014 there were 10.6 million people in Suzhou’s 8,488 km2 municipal area, its gross domestic product (GDP) was 1.06 trillion dollars, its per capita GDP was $19,000 U.S., its urbanization rate was 74% and had increased from 57% in 2000, and its ratio of non-agricultural productivity to agricultural productivity was 2.43:1 among the best of any municipality in China, having decreased from 4.23:1 in 2000. Since the beginning of economic reform in the early 1980s, the urban–rural relationship in Suzhou evolved in four stages. The first stage was the dual urban–rural period in the 1980s when township enterprises led industrialization progress in rural areas. In this stage, Suzhou’s rural areas experienced prosperous development of township enterprises, which led to rapid industrialization in the rural areas and strengthened the townships’ fiscal capacity. During the second stage—the 1990s—urban areas supported rural development. Urban industrial parks and development areas grew briskly and their effects radiated to rural areas. In the third stage, which started around the beginning of this century, Suzhou’s development pattern has followed the “Southern Jiangsu Province model,” in which, urban development, driven by the development of a modern international manufacturing base, nurtures agriculture and countryside development with industry and urban resources. Suzhou entered its fourth stage—IURD—after 2008. Different levels of government in Suzhou implemented programmes related to IURD. Subsequently, China’s National Development and Reform Commission designated Suzhou as China’s first Pilot Region for IURD at the national level. By early 2015 Suzhou had moved beyond the traditional city-centric development stage and entered the urban-rural equal development stage in which the urban and rural area are treated equally in many aspects, such as in the Economic and Social Development Plan, Industrial Development plan, infrastructure construction, and 3 China

has five levels of local government: the provincial, prefecture, district/county, township, and village levels. Suzhou is a prefectural city, and there are six districts and 4 counties under its jurisdiction. 4 Recognition of a city or region as a pilot or demonstration city for some purposes is important in China. It often leads, directly or indirectly, to additional funding or authority. Suzhou has been designated special by different levels of government a number of times since 2008. In September 2008, the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the provincial government designated Suzhou the only Pilot City for Comprehensive Supplementary Reform of IURD in the province. In August 2010, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) designated Suzhou a Pilot City for Comprehensive Supplementary Reform. In December 2011, the Ministry of Agriculture designated Suzhou a National Demonstration Site of Agricultural Reform with the theme of IURD reform. In August 2013 and July 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture twice entrusted a third party to conduct mid-term evaluations of the pilot work of agricultural reform in Suzhou. The expert panels’ evaluations were both very positive. In March 2014, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) designated Suzhou China’s first Pilot City of Comprehensive Reform, whose main mission is to implement the pilot IURD programme.

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public services provision, and was conducting a series of institutional experiments to achieve urban–rural integration. Unlike the bottom-up system in the United States, in China, development projects such as IURD are basically top-down. The central government initiated IURD, but deliberately let what exactly should be done remain ambiguous. Then the Suzhou municipal government determined the specific objectives of local IURD, according to its own development conditions, based on the logic of maximum political achievement; the Suzhou municipal government issued corresponding policies, provided funding, and required governments at all levels to implement the IURD programme. The IURD pilot programme in Suzhou has six targets, which corresponds exactly to the article 50 of The New Urban Agenda which aims to encourage urban-rural interactions and connectivity by strengthening sustainable transport and mobility, and technology and communications networks and infrastructure, underpinned by planning instruments, as well as to maximize the potential of these sectors for enhanced productivity, social, economic and territorial cohesion, and environmental sustainability, including connectivity between cities and their surroundings, peri-urban and rural areas, as well as greater land-sea connections. This section briefly describes the measures the local government of Suzhou has used and the achievements they have accomplished, and then concludes with a description of the governance model and operating mechanism by which the IURD programme was implemented successfully.

2.1 Targets and Measures 2.1.1

Integration of Urban-Rural Industrial Development

Prosperous primary, secondary and tertiary industries are the foundation for sustainable IURD. A strong urban economy is the foundation for Suzhou’s IURD model.5 Agriculture and rural development were promoted by strong industry and urban resources in the process of urban-rural integration. The development of secondary and tertiary industry has always been the main focus of economic development in Suzhou and has achieved considerable success, while agriculture in the rural area has often been neglected to some degree. However, in IURD the central government emphasizes agricultural modernization for ensuring China’s food security and reinforcing urbanization. Therefore, Suzhou has made the development of modern agriculture a priority in its IURD efforts. It considers this both an important way to increase rural income and a strategic measure for a better ecological environment. The standard measure of land in China is a mu, equivalent to about 1/6 of an acre. Suzhou has adopted a 4 million-mu programme to ensure that there are no less than 1 million mu each of agricultural land, woodland, water and ecological land. As a result, 4.1 million mu have been set aside for these purposes including 1.1 million mu of land cultivated for rice. 5 Suzhou’s

GDP of secondary industry ranks 2nd in China in 2017.

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Suzhou is vigorously pursuing a strategy to modernize agricultural production via agricultural parks. In this strategy agricultural parks are envisioned as the main form of modern agriculture and the principle way to transform the agricultural production pattern from small businesses to mass production. Suzhou has built twenty-nine agricultural parks with a total area of 1.059 million mu. Nearly 70% of the 1.1 million acres (817,000 mu) is prime agricultural land. With an 88.3% rate of mechanization of agriculture production and a 68% contribution rate of technological advances to agricultural productivity growth, Suzhou tops the province in terms of its agricultural modernization level.6 Suzhou has implemented agricultural support and protection systems, a subsidy system for land transfers, and a price subsidy system for large-scale grain producers. A four-tiered agro-insurance system from the national, provincial, municipal, and district levels with premiums exceeding 100 million Yuan in 2013 is in place. Suzhou has been ranked # 1 on Jiangsu Province’s comprehensive index of agricultural modernization for four years in a row. Taicang, Kunshan, and Xiangchen, as national demonstration areas for modern agriculture, rank first, third, and seventh in the country.

2.1.2

Integration of Resource Allocation in Urban and Rural Areas

The property system in China exerts a strong influence on economic efficiency and forms the foundation of the market system and other institutional arrangements. China’s land use rights system is complicated, varies from place to place, and is evolving rapidly (Tian 2014). Until recently much of rural China’s land had not been accurately surveyed and laws and written records of land ownership were ambiguous, though that is changing rapidly as China relies increasingly on marketization. Most economists and development experts consider clear property rights—particularly to land—an essential precondition for development. Hernando DeSoto, a Peruvian economist, argues that ambiguous property rights are the main reason why many capitalist developing countries have failed to develop like countries in Europe and North America where formal legal rules about ownership are clear (De Soto 2000). International organizations such as the World Bank have pushed many developing countries to clarify their property rights systems. However, Technical University of Delft professor Peter Ho notes that China has developed rapidly and land values in China have increased despite unclear property rights (Ho 2001). Ho argues that informal extra-legal development often serves useful purposes and is tolerated or encouraged. Suzhou takes the mainstream position that a clear property rights system is conducive to the orderly flow of resources and factors between rural and urban areas so that use of resources is optimized. In China, social welfare is bonded with non-agricultural/agricultural hukou status. Agricultural hukou holders have three property rights, which non-agricultural holder do not have—shared ownership and a property dividend from collective assets, 6 Data

source: documents from Suzhou government.

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the operation rights to arable land, and rural homestead rights. When agricultural hukou holders change their hukou to non-agricultural hukou, they lose the three property rights. On the other hand they become entitled to rights to education, health, and other social services of non-agricultural hukou holders. Therefore, agricultural hukou holders are usually unwilling to change their hukou status even when they are already in an urban area. This is the major barrier to integrating resource allocation across urban and rural areas. Suzhou’s basic pathway to rural property system innovation has three main features. First, property ownership of assets, including collectively owned land, is clearly defined to provide institutional guarantees that make property transfers and cooperative economic development possible. Second, a policy titled the “Three displacements policy” lets residents with rural hukou exchange their de jure rights to homestead land for a house and household plot, use rights in collectively-owned agricultural land, and other rights as rural hukou holders with their counterparts’ urban benefits as urban hukou holders. Suzhou has implemented administrative and fiscal measures to establish a set of policy mechanisms to protect farmland and to mobilize active transfer of land between farmers and agricultural enterprises and other entities so that the three concentrations can be achieved with no institutional barriers. Third, building on clarified property rights, Suzhou encourages creation of three types of cooperatives to effectively integrate and optimize the allocation of land, labour, capital, technology and other production factors. Finally, Suzhou provides supporting measures to accelerate modernized agriculture, increase farmers’ incomes, and change the status of urban and rural areas to form a new type of integrated urban–rural relationship. The measures for optimizing the resource allocation of and improving the efficiency of resource use include policies titled “Three Concentrations”, “Three Displacements”, “Three Co-operations”, and the “One Village Two Building Policy”. The purpose of the Three Concentrations policy is to reallocate land resources. They need the support of the Three Displacements policy, which enables agriculture hukou holders to exchange their agricultural hukou property rights for nonagricultural hukou rights. The purpose of the Three Co-operations is to pool sparsely spread resources of each individual and to use them more effectively. The purpose of the One Village Two Building Policy is to encourage rural collective organizations to exploit their rural real estate for more income. (1) Suzhou’s Three Concentrations Programme Suzhou, like many cities in China, is working to concentrate development in order to preserve or increase the amount of arable land and to create agglomeration economies and economies of scale for rural industry. To do this, it is pursuing a programme called the ‘Three Concentrations Programme’. First, industrial enterprises are concentrated into planned areas or industrial parks whose land is more compact than the land the enterprises previously occupied so that some previous industrial land can be converted into agricultural land, ecological land or tertiary industrial land. In order to improve the efficiency of land use, the government has implemented two measures. One is through administrative means: since many of township enterprises factory buildings are built illegally, the government can require these enterprises to relocate.

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On the other hand, the local government plans some industrial parks, builds factory buildings, and leases them to enterprises. Thus, the government implemented this concentration programme smoothly. Second, agricultural land is concentrated to form large-scale farming operations. Farmers are encouraged to transfer their use rights in arable land, which are usually small and fragmented, to promote shareholding cooperatives to engage in large-scale modern agriculture. This concentration programme is implemented with the support of three displacements, which will be introduced later. Third, farmers are concentrated in new communities in towns and cities through housing swaps. As mentioned above, agricultural hukou households have their own homesteads. These homesteads are quite scattered, with poor infrastructure. Housing on homestead land typically consists of a detached 2- or 3-floor house, which is an inefficient pattern of residential land use. Therefore, the government plans and builds some dense residential communities with good infrastructure and exchanges these new houses and apartments for rural hukou holders’ homesteads and the houses built on them. For agricultural hukou holders who already working and living in urban areas who are not willing to give up their homesteads for nothing, the three displacements programme encourage them to exchange their homesteads for some other rights in the urban area. Thereby the concentration of residence is achieved. The Three Concentrations Programme encourages more intensive utilization of land. By 2014, Suzhou had 26 modern agricultural parks with over 10 thousand mu. Eighty-one percent of Suzhou’s agro-industrial enterprises are located in agricultural parks larger than 1 thousand mu. Ninety-one percent of Suzhou’s contracted arable land is under large-scale operation, and 52% of farmers reside in concentrated communities, greatly improving Suzhou’s capacity for sustainable development. (2) The Three Displacements Programme Suzhou’s Three Displacements Programme supports the three concentrations programme (Fig. 4). It consists of three parts. First, farmers voluntarily relinquish their ownership and property dividend from collective assets in exchange for a stock share in a community cooperative. Second, they relinquish operating rights to arable land in exchange for basic social welfare rights or stock shares in urban community cooperatives to compensate them for loss of use rights in agriculture. Third, rural homestead rights may be transferred in exchange for money compensation, urban housing, a share of the proceeds of secondary and tertiary industries, or stock shares in real-estate cooperatives. The way the Three Displacements Programme supports the ‘Three Concentration Programme’ is as follows. First, the displacement of operating rights of arable land supports the concentration of arable land. As mentioned above, in China, the operating rights to arable land are owned by rural households, and each household’s arable land holdings are very small (usually no more than 5 mu per household), which made large-scale operation impossible. In addition, most of the rural households are unwilling to plant their arable land, because with the process of urbanization, most of the rural hukou holders can find non-agricultural jobs, and their salary are much higher than the income from, under 150 US dollars per year per mu. Therefore, when

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Fig. 4 Suzhou’s three displacements programme. Data Source Mapped by the authors

the government gives agricultural hukou holders’ basic social welfare rights or stock share in urban community cooperatives in exchange for their arable land, they are willing to accept it. And then the government will lease these arable lands to professional agricultural enterprises, which will implement large-scale operation. Thus, the concentration of arable land is achieved. (3) The Three Co-operations Programme Another cluster of policies is referred to by the overarching term the ‘Three CoOperations Programme’. This programme is similar to what has been agreed in article 72 of the New Urban Agenda which commits to “long-term urban and territorial planning processes and spatial development practices that incorporate integrated water resources planning and management, considering the urban-rural continuum on the local and territorial scales and including the participation of relevant stakeholders and communities.” Specifically, Three Co-operations Programme are policies and measures promoting reform of cooperatives and shareholding and development of new types of cooperative economic organizations in Suzhou to own and manage collective assets, contracted land, and productive operations in the countryside. The main results of the Three Co-operations Programme are the emergence of three types of cooperatives: community shareholding, land shareholding, and specialized farmers’ cooperatives. These cooperatives are intended to consolidate and optimize a variety of factors of production, such as putting idle resources to work, introducing new technologies, and providing funds for various services while respecting rights of farmers in contracting arable land, using homestead land, and receiving a share of the annual proceeds from the collective economy. This programme is an important innovation in the mechanism to clarify property rights and to realize sharing of assets and resources in promoting IURD in Suzhou. The Three Co-operations Programme consists of three parts. Shortly after the PRC was founded in 1949 villages collective assets, such as township enterprise and factory buildings, were owned by all villagers but each

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villager’s property rights are not delineated clearly. This leads to villagers having no incentive to supervise the operation of collective economic organizations, and, as a result, the collective economy’s organization and operations are inefficient. To cope with this issue, the community shareholding programme first clearly delineates each villager’s shares of collective assets, and then establishes an organizational form that is based on modern cooperative enterprises—establishing a cooperative governance structure with the board of directors and the board of supervisors as the core. Thus, the community shareholding cooperative can be achieved, and hence improves the effectiveness and efficiency of collective economic organizations. Second, after reform and opening up, beginning in 1977, the operation rights of arable land was shifted to households under the household responsibility system and households were permitted to retain any surplus after supplying government quotas. This was a major improvement since it stimulated the peasants’ motivation to work hard. However, in the current era, this model is no longer competitive because of the small-scale operation and low degree of specialization. Therefore, land shareholding programme gather the operation right of arable land from the rural households; let specialized farmers or enterprises operate these lands at a large scale, with a modern management model, and give dividends to the rural households. Third, the specialized farmers’ cooperatives programme also aims to address the low competitive issue in rural area. Cooperatives in rural area are initiated by agricultural technology departments, village collective economic organizations, planting experts, large brokers, etc., and are organized by different agricultural production fields, products, or one or several sections, such as production, marketing, and technology. These cooperatives enable their members to share their knowledge, exchange information, and form a professional division of labour in their operations, and hence improve the competitiveness of the rural economy. (4) The One Village Two Building Policy The Suzhou Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the Suzhou government adopted the “One Village Two Building” policy in 2013. This policy gives rural collective organizations permission to build a community service centre, business building and factory building to provide better public services and increase collective income. The core features of this programme are to encourage the collective organization to integrate underutilized and low efficiency resources, especially collective development land, and to make them more productive in order to increase rural residents’ income. As a result, there are over 30 million m2 of buildings for secondary and tertiary industry use at the village level in Suzhou—about 20,000 m2 per village on average—from which the rural collective organizations can get rent to increase their income, and asset-based income has risen to about 65% of Suzhou’s total income.

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Equalizing Infrastructure Provision in Urban and Rural Areas

The Suzhou government has made a huge investment in infrastructure construction in the countryside. As a result, rural and urban infrastructure is much more equalized now than in the past. Infrastructure, including urban and rural roads, reservoirs and other water-related infrastructure, electricity, and telecommunications are now universally available in both cities and the countryside in Suzhou. An integrated urban–rural transport network works well. Piped water is universal in the countryside, and 95% residents have access to centralized water supply. Policies for the complete coverage of sewage water treatment in key and featured village have been implemented. Fiscal transfer payments systems were established to guarantee uniformity.

2.1.4

Equalized Public Service Provision in Urban and Rural Areas

Suzhou has accelerated deployment of social and public service facilities and services such as education, health, science and technology, culture, and sports to rural areas. As a result, a new type of community service centre has been built in all villages. The budget for public services has been increased through several institutional innovations. In 2015, each village with its rural collectives’ expendable income lower than 2 million Yuan received an annual transfer payment of up to 400,000 Yuan (US$60,000) from the county for village-level public services. In this way, funding for basic public services is guaranteed even for villages with a weak collective economy. Suzhou has also actively promoted reform to separate economic operations from the entrepreneurial activities of local governments to ensure that they will spend adequately for public services rather than spending too much in entrepreneurial activities. Fifty-eight pilot administrative-economic separation reform projects in villages have been completed, and pilot programmes in another 100 villages were started in 2015.

2.1.5

Integration of Social Welfare Systems in Urban and Rural Areas

In China, there is a huge gap between urban and rural social security standards. In order to let rural residents share the dividends of regional development, and hence improve social equity, Suzhou has implemented a programme called the ‘Three Convergences Programme’, which is totally financed by local government, to integrate social welfare systems between urban and rural areas. The standard of subsistence allowances in Suzhou was unified in 2012, and pension insurance and medical insurance for residents were standardized in 2013 to put a unified level of social security across urban and rural areas in place. Currently, Suzhou provides social insurance coverage to over 99% of the working population in urban areas and townships and pension insurance and medical insurance for urban and rural residents. Medical documents of 88% of rural residents are now available in digital form. The standard

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Fig. 5 A three-star village in Suzhou. Data Source Photo by authors

subsistence allowance in urban and rural areas is 750 Yuan (about US$1,000) per year: still low, but much higher than in the past.

2.1.6

Integrating Towns and Villages with the Natural Environment

Since 2012 China’s central government has pursued a “Beautiful Countryside” programme, encouraging government at all levels to pay greater attention to the countryside.7 Suzhou is committed to a holistic concept of respecting, adapting to, and protecting nature. Suzhou’s “Beautiful Towns and Villages” programme is its main strategy to integrate the ecological and built environments in urban and rural areas. The measures under this programme are aimed at enhancing Suzhou’s ecological environment and features of local landscapes. Suzhou has completed a threeyear Beautiful Towns and Villages Action Plan involving demonstration projects in 100 villages and environmental remediation in 1,000 villages. All plan targets were completed and the city’s environment significantly improved. By 2015, Suzhou had invested 3.073 billion Yuan (US$450 million) in over 1,231 remediation projects. Eighty-five demonstration villages and 369 so-called “three-star” villages paying particular attention to the environment have been built. Sewage water treatment was an important aspect of this programme (Fig. 5). Since Suzhou lies in the Yangtze River Delta, it has many lakes, rivers, streams, and wetlands that provide valuable functions for agriculture, tourism, and ecosystem sustainability. Preserving and improving these water-related resources is a high priority. Four national wetland parks, 2 pilot wetland park projects, and over 20 municipal wetland parks have been completed. More than half (52%) of Suzhou’s natural wetlands are now protected, and rural areas’ forest coverage has been increased to 29% of all rural land.

7 The

chapter by Haiyan Zou, Feng Luan, Hui Xi, and Ben Yang in this book describes Guizhou Province’s Six Point Beautiful Countryside Action Plan (see Zou et al. 2019).

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Fig. 6 Delegation of power for development and multi-level participation in IURD in Suzhou. Source Zhao et al. (2016)

2.2 Governance Model and Operating Mechanism As documented in article 82, the effective implementation of The New Urban Agenda requires participation of international and regional organizations and bodies, including those of the United Nations system and multilateral environmental agreements, development partners, international and multilateral financial institutions, regional development banks, the private sector and other stakeholders, to enhance coordination of their urban and rural development strategies and programmes to apply an integrated approach to sustainable urbanization. The Suzhou Model presents a governance model, which operates in a way that is effective in Chinese context under current institutional framework. The Chinese government administrative system is complex and changes rapidly (Zhang et al. 2016, Chap. 3). It has five tiers: central, provincial, prefecture-level, county (district)-level, and township governments. Suzhou is a prefecture-level city with counties and townships under its jurisdiction8 (Figs. 6 and 7). It is important that all levels of government promote IURD policies and mechanisms to motivate all levels of governments to work hard to make IURD succeed. Suzhou practices a delegation of power form for development. Unlike other municipalities in China it delegates partial power of development decision making, budget, and administration to township and village bodies, so that both top-down and bottom-up motivations are combined to form a multi-tiered body of responsibility for IURD. The township level plays the most critical role in the Suzhou model. It is the level of government that directly administers IURD projects—pushing jurisdiction-based concentrated living for residents, building public service facilities and infrastructure, protecting culture and the natural environment, creating beautiful villages, and developing modern agriculture. Township governments in Suzhou have important responsibilities, including bridging the gap in public services between urban and rural 8 The

village level is not a level in the Chinese administrative system.

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Fig. 7 Administrative divisions of Suzhou Municipality. Data Source drawn by authors

areas and improving village governance. However, township and village-level governments’ finances, and authority to make administrative decisions and raise funds are limited under the current system. Suzhou municipal, district, and county-level governments creatively delegate partial power of development to towns and villages, including assigning a certain percentage of Suzhou’s quota of land which can be converted from agricultural to developed land to township government and village collective organs (Fig. 6). Delegation of power for development, together with private capital attracted to IURD, makes bottom-up operation by township and village governments possible. Figure 6 illustrates the delegation of power for development and multi-level participation in IURD in Suzhou and Fig. 7 illustrates administrative divisions of Suzhou Municipality.

3 Accomplishments and Issues in the Suzhou Model 3.1 Accomplishments Suzhou’s eight years of reform have considerably reduced the urban–rural gap in the development level between urban and rural areas. Table 1 shows that the urban–rural income ratio in Suzhou is 1.98:1, the lowest in China’s most developed megacities of Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou, and the national-level Pilot Regions for CURD, Chengdu and Chongqing. Suzhou performs well on two other measures of urbanrural integration: the ratio of per capita consumption between urban and rural areas and the Engel coefficient (a standard measure of income inequality). The per capita consumption ratio is an indicator of the gap in the standard of living between urban and rural area. An Engel coefficient measures average food consumption expenditures divided by total consumption expenditures. A region’s Engel coefficient will decrease when incomes increase; thus, it is an indicator of the standard of living.

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Table 1 Ratio of urban–rural economic development level in Suzhou and other megacities (2014) Item

Indicators

Shanghai

Beijing

Chengdu

Guangzhou

Suzhou

Income level

Urban–rural ratio of disposable income

2.30

2.57

2.31

2.43

1.98

Consumption level

Urban–rural ratio of per capita consumption

2.10

1.93

2.30

2.84

1.88

Engel’s coefficient in urban areas/Engel’s coefficient in rural areas

0.92

0.89

0.87

0.77

1.02

Per capital production value in the agricultural sector (10 thousand Yuan)

2.97

3.03

2.56

3.53

8.55

Per capital GDP between nonagricultural and agricultural sectors

6.63

6.33

4.36

5.43

2.24

Productivity

Source Compiled by authors from Statistical Yearbooks of different cities

The per capita consumption ratio between rural and urban areas in Suzhou is only 1.88, and the Engel coefficient in cities is even higher than that in villages (the ratio between the two is higher than 1.0). These indicate that Suzhou is succeeding in narrowing the urban-rural gap. In Table 1, comparing measures of income, consumption, and productivity in Suzhou and China’s other most developed megacities shows that Suzhou’s highly modernized agriculture leads to much higher agricultural output per capita than in other developed cities in China, Suzhou’s agricultural output per capita is more than two times higher than that of any other cities in Table 1, and the gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in Suzhou is the smallest of China’s most developed megacities. The gap in average per capita GDP between the non-agricultural and agricultural sectors in Suzhou is less than half of that of any other cities in the Table 1. However, the IURP programme is not perfect. While it achieved those accomplishments, it also led to some issues.

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3.2 Issues 3.2.1

Peri-urbanization

Peri-urbanization refers to the process by which an agricultural region surrounding the core built-up urban area of a city becomes integrated into the city in terms of economic, social, and spatial attributes. This process is fragmented and progressive and will lead to a transitional landform with mixed landscape on the periphery areas of megacities (Webster 2011). Areas that are undergoing peri-urbanization generally have both agricultural land and villages and industry and some high-density development. They are sites of both opportunities, where much new economic development occurs and many migrants settle, and problems, including poorly coordinated development, conflicting land uses, pollution, poor governance and social problems (Webster et al. 2014; LeGates and Hudalah 2014). Physical surveys and analysis of LandSat images from remote sensing both show a large number of peri-urban areas in Suzhou. The prosperous development of rural industry in the past, rural residents’ preferences for building new houses once they earn some money, and construction of factory buildings by different entities in rural area have all contributed to peri-urbanization in Suzhou. While Suzhou’s on-going IURD effort has had the positive impact of closing the urban-rural income gap, it has increased peri-urbanization. There is a significant gap in the ratio between Suzhou’s urbanization rate (the proportion of people who live in urban areas) and the proportion of people working in the non-agricultural sector (Fig. 8), suggesting that many rural residents are actively involved in non-agricultural jobs, but still live in rural areas. Since the IURD programme has improved living condition in rural area so much, it has diminished rural residents’ incentive to move to urban areas. In this way, the peri-urbanization has become a hindrance to the urbanization process. While reforms driven by China’s National New-style Urbanization Plan (PRC 2014) aim to facilitate rural-to-urban migration nationwide, some IURD policies in Suzhou, such as equalizing the provision of infrastructure and public service, and integration of social welfare system in Urban and Rural area, have diminished rural residents’ incentive to immigrate to cities and towns and make their informal strategy of working in rural industries while not moving to urban areas a rational choice. In Suzhou, the bottom-up motivation at the township and village levels is essential for successful IURD. However, this model makes spatial regulation difficult, because all the economic stakeholders—governments, collective organizations, developers, mid- and high-income urban residents, and villagers—are eager to get more land to develop. Suzhou still lacks effective spatial planning, regulation, and institutions and mechanism to achieve smart shrinkage9 of human settlements in the countryside and smart growth of cities. As a result, when villagers move out from villages, many con9 Smart

Shrinkage is a theory propounded by Zhao et al. (2016) which aims at dealing with the problem that the construction land in the rural area keeps increasing while the population in the rural area decreases during the urbanization in China. The Smart Shrinkage theory suggests that the allocation of land in the rural area should be optimized during urbanization, by policies such as

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Fig. 8 Comparison of the ratio between Suzhou and China’s other megacities’ urbanization rate and non-agricultural workers’ ratio. Data Source Statistical Yearbook of each city

centrated settlements for relocated villagers have not been successfully transformed into urban communities with citizen-based governance. Rural areas’ scattered spatial patterns prevail, as some villagers do not give up their rural houses and land. Some IURD policies, such as equalizing public services and integrating social welfare systems, provide dividends to villagers, which are higher than those afforded to urban dwellers because villagers have arable land and homesteads that urban residents lack. As a result, instead of migrating to urban centres, many agricultural land holders choose to retain their rural hukou- status and keep their homesteads whether they still live in villages or not. This makes the urbanization rate much lower than the proportion of non-agricultural workers, and it raises the long-term institutional costs of IURD for subsiding these rural residents.

3.2.2

Overuse of Spatial Resources

The built-up area of Suzhou grew by 2466 km2 during the 16 years to 2014, or a 4.75 times increase from the total area of Suzhou in 1998 (SDCDB and TU 2016). Between 2008 and 2016, when the three concentrations policy was in effect, developed land experienced a new round of expansion with rural factory building and village housing construction throughout rural areas (Fig. 9). Such an increase in developed land decreased arable land, forests, grassland, and wetlands, lakes and ponds, and caused unrecoverable damage to many traditional landscapes and traditional rural social spaces. demolishing redundant housing, reclaiming homestead land for arable land, and pooling scattered arable land.

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GDP per unit land area in the built-up Area(100 million yuan/km2)

Fig. 9 Expansion in the built-up area of Suzhou, 1998–2014. Source SDCDB and TU (2016)

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

7.77 5.42 4.48

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Fig. 10 GDP per unit land area in the built-up area in districts of Suzhou and county-level cities (100 million Yuan per km2 2014). Data Source GDP figure 2015 Jiangsu Provincial Statistical Yearbook; built-up area calculated by the authors from Landsat 8 images

Suzhou’s robust economy makes it rank among the top Chinese megacities in terms of GDP. However, the GDP per unit of area of developed land in Suzhou is lower than in other advanced cities in China (Wang et al. 2012). Industrialization in rural areas has narrowed the gap between Suzhou’s urban and rural areas, but it hinders the development of economies of scale and agglomeration economies in cities. Figure 10 shows GDP per unit of land area (km2 ) in the built-up areas of Suzhou as of 2014. Such extensive development creates a paradox. The lack of developable land constrains further economic development and urbanization, but at the same time considerable spatial resources are being used inefficiently. Recognizing this, Suzhou has stated its intention to change its development patterns many times. However, the

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logic of its development model and pressure to develop for all levels of government makes it difficult to alter this development pattern.

3.2.3

Local Debt Issues

Much of IURD funding consists of loans with long repayment periods for large, long-term projects with public benefits. But most projects do not generate sufficient short-term benefits to justify funding them, so government subsidies or preferential policies are needed. Fiscal support is necessary but not a panacea. Among Suzhou’s IURD projects, only the three concentrations and related projects, such as exchanging housing for rural homestead rights, can balance expenditures and revenues. Public service projects mostly deliver livelihood-related public goods, including modern agriculture, beautiful villages, sewage treatment, electricity, road, education, and medical projects. While these projects improve the quality of life, and may partially or fully pay for themselves in the very long run, they impose financial stress upon all levels of Suzhou’s governments, with especially excessive debt on governments of districts, counties, towns, and villages with significant relocation programmes. Suzhou’s funding mechanisms link short-term income and long-term return on investments. This is a more sustainable long-term economic model than relying heavily on conversion of agricultural to developable land as commonly practiced by other cities in China. But the scale of investment and accumulation of towns and village debt needs to be kept within reasonable limits.

4 Discussion and Conclusion The Suzhou model has made remarkable achievements in infrastructure construction, improving rural residents’ housing quality and welfare, and increasing productivity. These all address the New Urban Agenda as it encourages the implementation of sustainable urban and territorial planning, including city-region and metropolitan plans, to encourage synergies and interactions among urban areas of all sizes and their peri-urban and rural surroundings, including those that are cross-border, and it supports the development of sustainable regional infrastructure projects that stimulate sustainable economic productivity, promoting equitable growth of regions across the urban-rural continuum, as documented in article 96 of the New Urban Agenda. Asia is still in the process of rapid urbanization (UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2015; Dahiya 2012a, b), and many regions will face the problem of urban-rural integration. Therefore, as a pilot city for comprehensive IURD reform, Suzhou is an important example for development in eastern coastal areas in China and, in principle, in other advanced regions of China and other developing countries, despite China’s unique development mechanisms. Urban-rural gaps in income, productivity, and infrastructure, are common throughout Asia and local government in developmental states throughout the region have all adopted policies to close their urban-rural gaps to

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some extent. No matter in what area, stimulating multi-level participation and getting enough money is necessary to help close the urban-rural gap and hence ensure residents’ “right to the city”. However, many of Suzhou’s experiments will only be replicable in areas with certain comparable conditions. The first condition for the replication of the Suzhou model is a high urbanization rate. Areas with high urbanization rates by definition have a relatively small percentage of rural population, and are likely to be developed areas, where local governments are more likely to have a strong fiscal capacity. Therefore, the local governments in areas with high urbanization rate are more likely to be able to provide high standard subsidies to rural residents. Land values are more likely to be high in areas with high urbanization rates, which allows the government to adopt policies and leverage market resources for private participation in ways that are impossible with lower land values and scarce government resources. Second, rural communities should also have adequate fiscal capacity to apply Suzhou’s IURD model. One important mechanism in the Suzhou model is delegation of power for development and multi-level participation, by which the Suzhou government successfully stimulated towns and villages to undertake some programme of IURD, such as the real estate development in the Three Concentrations programme, which required a big investment. Without adequate fiscal capacity, cities would not be able to undertake such programmes. Third, the Suzhou model is more likely to succeed in areas of major in-migration. Since there are no property taxes in China, the land transfer fee is critical for revenue generation (the share of land transfer fee in the total revenue of local governments is more than 60% in 2013). Part of the funding for IURD also comes from land transfer fees, and land values are significantly affected by expectation for increased value because of migrant contributions to the economy. In developing countries with fully private land markets the value of land is still important wherever government derives revenue from property taxes or other land-related taxes. Selling land requires a prosperous real-estate market, and additional migrants generate new demand for housing, retail, and other development as well as providing much of the workforce for new industrial development. Land financing is based on future gains from a prosperous real estate market, which depends on the current state of land and property markets and projected future inflows of people. Therefore, the applicability of the Suzhou model is restricted to fast urbanizing areas with high land values and net populations inflows. However, some areas with higher level of economic development and urbanization than Suzhou may meet these conditions, but this does not necessarily mean they have to apply Suzhou’s model. Shanghai, for example, whose government has very strong fiscal capacity, implemented IURD without delegation of power for development and multi-level participation. Thus, Shanghai avoided the issue of peri-urbanization. We also have some suggestions for improving the Suzhou model, and those suggestions are very important for Asian city regions pursuing the New Urban Agenda Sustainable Development Goal 11, “By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums” (United Nations 2018). For alleviating the problem of peri-urbanization in Suzhou model, we suggest

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living condition improvement including infrastructure construction, housing condition improvement, and public services provision, should only be implemented in some appropriate villages which can attract people to live even in the ultimate scenario of IURD rather than in all the villages. Two examples of appropriate villages can be those with the potential to develop rural-characteristic industries, such as rural-tourism and leisure agriculture, and ones located in the commuter belt. For other villages that are not likely to attract people to live in the future, the government should encourage residents to migrate rather than improving living conditions to make them stay. Although improving the living conditions of all villages to a high level may accomplish equity in short term, it will lead to the loss of efficiency in the long run. As cities in China and throughout the developing world struggle to develop and implement new governance models for sustainable and inclusive cities Suzhou is an important model for cities at or nearing the mature stages of development. Suzhou has experimented with important governance reforms and many specific policies that operationalize New Urban Agenda goals. This article details Suzhou’s approaches and provides details about many different strategies they have pursued. Overall Suzhou has made remarkable progress in a short period of time. But their model has also generated problems that remain to be addressed. Other cities can learn from Suzhou’s experience. Acknowledgements This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 51608366), Key Laboratory of Ecology and Energy-saving Study of Dense Habitat, and Tongji University’s Coordinated Urban-Rural Development and Countryside Planning Laboratory. The authors thank Su Xu, Mengdi Wu, Xu Chen, Jie Zhang and other team members of a research project titled ‘Research on the Vision and Models of Integrated Urban and Rural Development in Suzhou During the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan’.

References Dahiya B (2012a) 21st century Asian cities: unique transformation, unprecedented challenges, Global Asia 7(1):96–104 Dahiya B (2012b) Cities in Asia, 2012: demographics, economics, poverty, environment and governance, cities, 29(2):S44–S61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.06.013 De Soto H (2000). The mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else. Basic books Friedmann J, Douglass M (1978) Agropolitan development: towards a new strategy for regional planning in Asia Gao CL, Wei HK (2013) Prediction study on the urbanization trends of China. Mod. Econ. Sci. 35(4):85–90 Ho P (2001) Who owns China’s land? Policies, property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity. China Q. 166:394–421 Leftwich A (1995) Bringing politics back in: towards a model of the developmental state. J. Dev. Stud. 31(3):400–427

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LeGates R, Hudalah D (2014) Peri-urban planning for developing East Asia: learning from Chengdu, China and Yogyakarta/Kartamantul, Indonesia. J. Urban Aff. 36(s1):334–353 McGee TG (1991) The emergence of Desakota regions in Asia: expanding a hypothesis. In: The extended metropolis: settlement transition in Asia, Ginsburg Parr JB (1999) Growth-pole strategies in regional economic planning: a retrospective view: part 2. Implementation and outcome. Urban Stud. 36(8):1247–1268 People’s Republic of China (2014) National new style urbanization plan, 2014. State Council, Beijing People’s Republic of China, National Statistics Bureau (PRC NSB 2016) Statistical Yearbook (2016) Suzhou Division of China Development Band, & Tongji University (SDCDB and TU). (2016). Research on the vision and models of integrated urban and rural development in Suzhou during the thirteenth five-year plan (Chinese) Tian L (2014) Land use transition driven by the industrialization and land capitalization, a case study on the land use changes in the peri-urban areas of Jiangyin and Shunde during 2001–2010. City Plann Rev 2014(9):5–21 (Chinese) UN-Habitat and ESCAP (2015) The state of Asian and Pacific cities 2015: urban transformations shifting from quantity to quality. UN-Habitat and ESCAP, Nairobi and Bangkok United Nations (2018) Sustainable development goal 11: make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11. Accessed May 1, 2018 Wang L, Li C, Ying Q, et al (2012) Mapping China’s urban sprawl using satellite image 1990–2010. Sci. China Press 2012(16):1388–1399 (Chinese) Webster D (2011) An overdue agenda, systematizing East Asian peri-urban research. Pac. Aff. 84(4):631–642 Webster D, Cai J, Muller L (2014) The new face of peri-urbanization in east Asia: modern production zones, middle-class lifestyles, and rising expectations. J. Urban Aff. 36(s1):315–333 Wu M, Chen C, Zhao M (2017) Research on East Asian economies’ evolving urban-rural development, governance strategy and its policy implications. Mod Urban Res 2017(1) (Chinese) Xi JP (2015) Promoting new mechanisms for integrated urban-rural development to benefit the people. Study Session of Political Bureau of Chinese Communist Party. http://military.people. com.cn/n/2015/0502/c172467-26936619.html. Accessed Jan 1, 2017 (Chinese) Ye Y, LeGates R (2013) Coordinating urban and rural development in China, learning from Chengdu. Edward Elgar Publishing Ye Y, LeGates R, Qin B (2013) Coordinated urban-rural development planning in China, the Chengdu model. J. Am. Plann. Assoc. 79(2):125–137 Zhang L, LeGates R, Zhao M (2016) Understanding Chinese urbanization. Edward Elgar Press, Cheltenham Zhao M, Chen C, Fang C (2016) The historical evolvement of urban-rural relationship and the policymaking in China’s developed areas, Suzhou’s practice on Integrated Urban-Rural Development. Urban Plann Forum 2016(6):22–30 (Chinese) Zhao M, You L, Chen C (2016) Smart shrinkage of rural human settlements and its planning strategies. City Planning Review. 2015(7):9–18; 24 (Chinese) Zheng G, Ye Y (2009) Research on the stages of urban-rural relationship and Coordinated Development Model in China. Journal of Renmin University of China, 2009 (6), 87–92 (Chinese) Zou H, Luan F, Xi H, Yang B (2019) Comprehensive management for better rural infrastructure and service delivery: lessons from the implementation of China’s six point rural action plan in Guizhou province. In Dahiya B, Das A (eds) New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific Governance for sustainable and inclusive cities, Springer, Singapore, pp 279–300

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Chenhao Fang is a Ph.D. student majoring in urban and rural planning in the College of Architecture and Planning at Tongji University, and a visiting student in the School of Design at University of Pennsylvania. He is a student of Professor Min Zhao and works in the Coordinated Urban-Rural Development lab at Tongji University. He is interested in the China’s urbanization, integrated/coordinated urban-rural development (IURD/CURD), and urban economic development.

Chen Chen is an Associate Professor in College of Architecture and Urban Planning at Tongji University. He specializes in urban economics, urbanization and peri-urbanization. He also serves as committee member of The Work Committee for Young Planners under Urban Planning Society of China, committee member of The New-type Urbanization and Urban-rural Research Committee in Chinese Urban Science Research Society, committee member of The Youth Group in The Chinese Urban-rural Planning Implementation Committee, Research Fellow of The Coordinated Urban-rural Development Centre of Shanghai Tongji Planning and Design Institute, and Column Editor of Urban Planning Forum.

Min Zhao is a Professor of Urban and Rural Planning in College of Architecture and Planning at Tongji University, as well as the PI of the Coordinated Urban-Rural Development lab at Tongji University. Professor Zhao was the Department Chair of the department of urban planning at Tongji University from 1999 to 2006. Professor Zhao is also a member of the Professional Committee of the Shanghai Urban Planning Commission, a Urban and Rural Planning Consultant of the People’s Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and a member of the Suzhou Urban and Rural Planning Expert Advisory Committee. Professor Zhao’ research interests span a variety of urban and rural development topics. His current and recent research focuses on the China’s urbanization, urban-rural development, and regional and urban economic development.

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C. Fang et al. Richard LeGates is a professor emeritus of Urban Studies and Planning at San Francisco State University. During 2016 and 2017 he was a Summit Professor of Urban Planning and Codirector of Tongji University (Shanghai)’s Coordinated UrbanRural Development and Countryside Planning Urban Research Laboratory. He received MCP and JD degrees from the University of California, Berkeley. He is the co-editor of The City Reader 6th edition (Routledge 2015) and The Chinese City Reader (China Architectural and Building Press 2013) and coauthor of Coordinating Urban and Rural Development in China (EE Press 2013) and Understanding Chinese Urbanization (EE Press 2015). In addition to San Francisco State and Tongji Universities, Professor LeGates has taught at U.C. Berkeley, Stanford University, Charles University (Prague), The American University of Sharjah (UAE) and had Fulbright grants in England, Scotland, Indonesia, and the UAE.

Urban Policies in Neo-Liberal India Debolina Kundu

Abstract India, like several other Asian countries, has in recent decades experienced much change in urban governance. Economic liberalisation and de-centralisation measures adopted by all tiers of government—a consequence of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992—have resulted in a gradual with-drawal of the state and increased private sector participation in capital investment and urban services. It was sought to fill the institutional vacuum left by a retracting state with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector through new forms of urban governance. The empowerment of urban local bodies (ULBs)—i.e. local government units—through funds, functions and functionaries, as envisaged in the 74th CAA still remains a distant dream. In the post-reform period, the national five-year plans adopted an inclusive agenda and launched several programmes with private sector participation as “missions”—with clearly defined objectives, scopes, timelines, milestones, as well as measurable outcomes and service levels. Most such programmes, however, demonstrated a “big-city bias” and the exclusion of the small urban centres and the poor. The much-acclaimed Smart Cities Mission, for instance, mainly focuses on retrofitting parts of cities by engaging special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which are likely to further disempower the already weak ULBs. In light of these transformations, this chapter evaluates India’s post-liberalization urbanization scenario; current urban development programmes and system of governance; as well as ULBs to suggest a way forward for inclusive urbanization. Keywords Urban policies · Urban development · Decentralisation · Urban local governance · JNNURM · Smart cities mission · AMRUT mission

D. Kundu (B) National Institute of Urban Affairs, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003, India e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_3

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1 Introduction Asia houses half of the world’s urban population and many Asian countries face multifaceted challenges of urban governance caused by decentralisation.1 The technical and political capacities of urban governments to deliver services depend on a country’s political and administrative structure. Some countries have a unitary system of government, one where the central government is clearly dominant. In countries like India and Malaysia, with a federal government structure, states or provinces are also powerful and responsible for overseeing the functions of both urban and rural local governments. Other countries such as East Timor, Nepal, and Myanmar are undergoing critical transitions—from conflict to peace, and from significant centralized control to a gradual openness and decentralization. Decentralization as well as democratization processes in Asia began around the late 1980s.2 Most Asian governments exercise strong central control even on decentralized governance structures, either by limiting functional devolution, constraining fiscal arrangements, or strong political control. Although several countries have devolved a large number of functions to urban local governments, devolution is often unclear or inadequate. National governments often also exercise strong control over local governments through the appointment of mayors or bureaucrats who remain accountable to the national or provincial administration rather than to the electorate. In other words, executive power is vested not in local elected officials but bureaucrats nominated by higher levels of government. Additionally, several metropolitan areas and city regions, like the Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory or the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, often lie outside the purview of the “regular” legislation and policies related to decentralization, and enjoy exceptional powers and/or resources. Even where hierarchical relationships are clear, the cooperation and collaboration required among different entities at local level—such as the local government and line departments or parastatal bodies—often remains challenging. Given the presence of multiple stakeholders, including non-state actors, in many contexts, institutional coordination is extremely important to ensure effective responses.3 Urban governance in India, in recent decades, has seen significant changes. India initiated ad hoc economic reforms and decentralization moves in the late 80s and early 90s. Economic liberalisation and de-centralisation measures adopted by all tiers of government—a consequence of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA), 1992—have resulted in a gradual with-drawal of the state and increased private sector participation in capital investment and urban services. New forms of urban governance have created opportunities for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 1 UN-Habitat. 2013. State of the World’s Cities 2012/13: Prosperity of Cities. Nairobi: UN-Habitat. 2 UCLG. 2008. Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World: First Global Report by United Cities and Local Governments. Barcelona: UCLG. 3 UNDP and UN-Habitat. 2014. The Impact of Decentralization and Urban Governance on Building Inclusive and Resilient Cities, Asia-Pacific Urbanization and Climate Change Issue Brief Series No.2, January 2014.

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the private sector to fill the institutional vacuum left by the retracting state. Inadequate decentralised governance in cities, envisaged by the 74th CAA, has fuelled growing middle class activism through the resident welfare associations (RWAs). In light of these transformations, this chapter evaluates India’s post-liberalization urbanization scenario; current urban development programmes and system of governance; as well as ULBs to suggest a way forward for inclusive urbanization.

2 Urbanisation in India Like in many developing nations, in India too urbanization is the key driver of the economy. The country had 377 million urban dwellers in 2011. The figure is expected to rise to 590 million by 2030.4 The urban areas today contribute to over 60%5 of the national GDP and account for more than 80%6 of incremental job creation. Although, urbanization plays a crucial role in the overall economic growth, the level of urbanization in India is among the lowest in Asia. In 2014, only 32.4% of the country’s population lived in urban areas as compared to 54.4% in China, 93% in Japan and 82.4% in Republic of Korea (WUP, The 2014 Revision). With a steady growth since independence, the level of urbanization in the country in 2011 was 31.1% (Fig. 1). In 1951, only 17.3% of India‘s population was urban and lived in 2843 Urban Agglomerations (UAs)/towns. By 2001, the share of the urban population and number of UAs/towns had increased to 27.8% and 4368, respectively; the corresponding figures in 2011 were 31.1 and 6173. Although, the number of UAs/towns increased substantially over the decades, urban growth rates do not reveal any marked increase. After a marginal increase of 3.83% (1971–81) from 3.21% (1961–71), the urban growth rate declined over successive decades. At present (2001–11), the urban growth rate is 2.76%, which increased marginally from 2.73% in the previous decade (Sivaramakrishnan et al. 2007). It may be noted that the addition of 2530 new census towns in 2011 has resulted in a spike in the level of urbanization. This has been the consequence of in situ urbanization of former rural settlements mainly due to increase in population, density, and sectoral diversification. The new towns that have emerged are mostly small census towns,7 which, though urban in definition, are rural by governance. There is clear evidence that point to growing suburbanization and peri-urbanization around big cities. These new census towns need statutory recognition by the states and proper planning. Delay in planned 4 India’s Urban Awakening: Building inclusive cities, sustaining economic growth, 2010, McKinsey

Global Institute. Term Appraisal, Eleventh Five Year Plan. 6 India Urban Report, A summary assessment, 2007, NIPFP. 7 A census town is not statutorily notified and administered as a town, but it has attained the following urban characteristics: (1) its population exceeds 5000; (2) 75% or more of its population is engaged in non-agricultural activities; and (3) its population density is 400 persons per sq. km or more (http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_files/kerala/13-concept34.pdf). 5 Mid

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Fig. 1 Urbanization levels in India, 2011. Source Census of India, 2011

intervention will result in messy urbanization that will likely become unmanageable later. There is increasing evidence towards the top-heavy structure of the distribution of urban population, wherein most of it is increasingly concentrating in the bigger urban agglomerations. In terms of the absolute additions to the population, between 2001 and 2011, the non-metropolitan class I cities/UAs8 have added 17 million to their population, whereas the metropolitan cities have added 51.4 million. Thus, out of the net addition of 91 million to the urban population in the recent decade, 75.1% 8 Metropolitan

cities have populations above 1 million, Non-metropolitan Class I cities have populations between 0.1 and 1 million; Metropolitan cities and Non-metropolitan Class I cities together constitute Class I cities; Towns constitute Class II, Class III, Class IV, Class V and Class VI towns, and have populations below 100,000.

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(68.4 million) is due to the demographic growth of the 468 class I cities alone. The 52 metropolitan cities and urban agglomerations account for 56.4% of the net addition, while the non-metropolitan class I cities account for 18.7% of it. Urbanization and economic growth are mutually reinforcing phenomena. In developed as well as developing nations, urban growth has been rapid where economic growth rates have been high, explained for by the effects of agglomeration economies. The fact that urbanization and the state income have quite high positive inter-linkage effects in India can be shown through the logarithmic regressions between urbanization and per capita gross state domestic product (PCGSDP; almost synonymously used with per capita income) run for two time periods i.e., 2001 and 2011, thus providing evidence to the hypothesis that cities are the engines of growth. The links between urbanization and per capita income have grown stronger in the Indian economy (the fitted trend lines for the level of urbanization and PCGSDP for 2001 and 2011 are upward sloping, with their R2 values, or the explanatory power, being 0.549 and 0.614, respectively), indicating that cities hold the key to economic growth (Figs. 2 and 3). Urbanization is gradually aligning itself with the economic growth processes in India but the impact of economic growth on cities is not yet strong enough, and the impact of agglomeration economies on urbanization is far from being saturated. For the Asian continent, the explanatory power R2 between these two variables amounts to 0.748 in 2011 (NIUA 2014). The next few years hold great challenges for India, but also greater opportunities—successfully exploiting and harnessing the growth potential of agglomeration and urbanization economies can set the country on a path of high growth and, thereafter, help sustain the growth momentum. India’s existing urban agglomerations can induce growth better than the small towns. Despite the strong economic that has come about with urbanization, serious deficits in the delivery of basic services still plague urban India—an outcome of weak and inefficient urban governance in the country. If the state of basic urban services are an indicator of urban governance, the necessity and urgency for improving urban governance becomes self-evident; for instance, according to official figures (Census of India, 2011), only 70.6% of urban households use municipal water supply, while many lack water metering systems and connection to sewerage networks; non-revenue water accounts for 50% of water production; 13% of urban households do not have any form of latrines; less than 20% of roads have storm water drainage; and scientific disposal of solid waste is virtually non-existent in most of the cites.

3 Urban Development Programmes in the Neo-Liberal Regime: An Overview The 1990s saw the opening up of India’s economy, although ad hoc liberalization measures were initiated in the mid 1980s. Following a balance of payments crisis, the programme of economic liberalization that was launched propagated the idea of freeing up markets, with limited state intervention. Around the same time, in 1992, the

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74th CAA was enacted which decentralized powers and essential functions related to city planning, poverty alleviation and provision of basic services to Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). It may be noted, that urban development is a “state subject” in India. As a result, post-independence in 1947, urban local bodies (ULBs) did not have the constitutional status and, therefore only limited powers and functions as institutions of local self-government. The 74th CAA gave constitutional status to ULBs, and recognized statutory towns and cities as the third tier of governance. Through the introduction of the Twelfth Schedule, the 74th CAA laid down 18 local-level functions to be fulfilled by ULBs, established ward committees in cities with populations of 300,000, mandated periodic elections of ULBs, and devolved finances t them as per the suggestions of the State Finance Commissions (Batra 2009). However, many states have not transferred all functions to ULBs, and continue to depend on higher authorities for actual transfer of funds (Vaidya and Vaidya 2010).

3.1 Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewable Mission (JNNURM) The country’s Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007–12), referred to as the Eleventh Plan, launched an inclusive agenda and emphasized the need for major changes in urban governance in order to boost investment in infrastructure development in urban areas (Kundu and Samanta 2011). Also, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), which was launched by the central government in 2005, allocated substantial additional central assistance (ACA) to cities for infrastructure, housing and capacity building. Besides, developing infrastructural facilities across 65 Mission cities,9 which were eligible for funding, JNNURM aimed at providing urban infrastructure and housing in non-mission cities through two of its components, the Urban Infrastructure and Development Schemes for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP) (Fig. 4). The mission succeeded in encouraging state and the city governments to commit themselves to structural reforms, which the central government previously had failed to achieve despite adopting several measures and incentive schemes through other programmes and legislations (Kundu et al. 2007). It was also effective in renewing focus on the urban sector across the country. Yet, the less-developed states lagged behind in programme utilization due to weak enabling capacity and inability to generate matching funds (Planning Commission 2011). Government funding under JNNURM was largely biased against the non-mission cities/towns, with UIDSSMT and IHSDP receiving only 12.8 and 8.9%, respectively, of the total allocation. The huge share of 80% funds was directed to the 65 mission cities. The big city bias of JNNURM is also reflected in the annual per capita spending by the central government between 2005 and 2009—for mission cities it was USD 3.4, and USD 1.8 for non9 These

cities are state capitals, million-plus cities, and those of touristic and historical importance.

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Fig. 4 Urban development programmes in India Source Author

mission cities (Kundu and Samanta 2011). Moreover, because the central government mandated the reforms irrespective of size of the state and ULBs, the mission was deeply criticized on the ground. There was no cost-benefit analysis whether reforms recommended for metropolitan cities were relevant to small towns as well (Planning Commission 2012).

3.2 Rajiv Awas Yojana and Housing for All During the Eleventh Plan, in pursuance of the vision to make India slum-free, the Government of India launched the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY). RAY aimed to upgrade slums by providing basic infrastructure and social amenities, and assigning titles to their residents. It also recognized rental and transit housing (Bhagat 2014), and extended financial support to the states for creating affordable housing stock through public-private partnerships (PPPs). However, not much progress was achieved under RAY as the change of government stalled it in 2014. It was replaced in 2015 by the Housing for All program, which has four main components: (i) rehabilitation of slum dwellers with participation of private developers using land as a resource; (ii) promotion of affordable housing for the economically weaker sections through credit linked subsidy scheme (CLSS); (iii) affordable housing in partnership with private and public sectors; (iv) subsidy for beneficiary-led individual house construction. Central government funding is available for each vertical for a certain amount and the rest has to be organized by the state/ULB and the private developers. The number of dwelling units financed and constructed under this project was not impressive during the early years of implementation. Between June 2015–December 2016, only 6715 houses were completed; and only 7180 households benefitted from CLSS. This

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resulted in addition of the non-poor segments of the population, i.e., the middleincome groups (MIG I and MIG II).10 This helped to improve the performance of the programme as 200,000 beneficiaries availed the CLSS by June 2018.11 However, the exact progress of the programme cannot be made since disaggregated data are not available.

3.3 Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) and Smart Cities Mission (SCM) In 2015, the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) Mission, a reform based programme akin to JNNURM, was launched to provide basic services to households and build amenities in 500 cities. Funding of USD 7.8 billion from the central government will requires matching contribution from states/UTs.12 To address urban infrastructure deficit, another initiative adopted during the Twelfth Plan (2012–17) is the Smart Cities Mission to promote cities that provide core infrastructure and a decent quality of life. With an estimated investment of USD 7.5 billion during 2015–2020, the core infrastructure elements to be provided in a smart city include adequate water supply, electricity, sanitation, solid waste management, efficient urban mobility and public transport, affordable housing for the poor, robust IT connectivity and digitalization, good governance and citizen participation, sustainable environment, safety and security of citizens, health and education. Smart Cities are selected through a ‘City Challenge Competition’ link financing with the ability of cities to achieve the mission objectives. Each state has shortlisted a certain number of smart city aspirants, as per the norms, and prepared smart city evaluation proposals for extending central government support. The selection process is competitive. Round 1 of the competition selected 20 smart cities, which are termed Lighthouse Cities. Another 13 smart cities were selected in a fast-track round. In round 2, 27 more cities were selected, and another 30 in round 3. With constraints of capacity at the ULB level and unclear devolution of functions and funds persisting even after the 74th CAA, the urban sector’s infrastructure financing challenge is huge. Given the major risks involved, the private sector has also largely stayed away, until very recently, from urban infrastructure projects. It is intended that the newly launched urban infrastructure programmes like Smart Cities Mission, AMRUT, Swachh Bharat Mission and Prime Minister’s Awas Yojana (Urban) would be able to bring in USD 1145.9 billion investment (Press Information Bureau 2016). The Twelfth Five Year Plan projects that roughly 12–23% of the investment need in the urban sector can be realized through PPP projects, which have 10 MIG I was entitled to an interest subsidy of 4% per annum for a housing loan of Rs. 900,000 (~ USD 14,000) and MIG II to 3% per annum for a housing loan of Rs. 1,200,000 (~ USD 18,500). 11 http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=180171. 12 http://amrut.gov.in/.

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the added advantage of potential efficiency gains. This would roughly translate to about 250–300 urban PPP projects each year. As per the recommendations of the Working Group on Financing Urban Infrastructure (2011), resource mobilization from instruments like PPP, borrowing and land based instruments needs to be scaled up to fund this magnitude of investment, which will require concerted efforts from all tiers of the government. The Smart Cities Mission is a Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) and the central government will fund USD 7.5 billion over five years i.e. on average, USD 15.6 million per city per year. An equal amount, on a matching basis, is contributed by the concerned state/ULB; therefore, nearly USD 1569 billion of government/ULB funds will be available for developing smart cities (Government of India 2015). The states/ULBs could also leverage other resources like taxes from property, profession and entertainment, monetisation of land/services, PPPs, municipal bonds, and borrowings from the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (Knowledge@Wharton 2016). The central government has also recommended that the Smart City Plans (SCPs) should include ways to converge funding options at the city level from other CSS efforts like AMRUT, Swachh Bharat and National Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana (HRIDAY), Digital India, Skill Development, Housing for All, etc. The mission is envisioned to be implemented through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), established as limited companies under the Companies Act, 2013, and promoted by states and ULBs jointly, with both having 50–50 equity shareholding. More autonomous and free from red tape, the SPV is supposed to plan, appraise, approve, release funds, implement, manage, operate, monitor and evaluate the smart city development projects. The private sector or financial institutions could be considered for taking equity stake in SPVs, provided the state/UT and the ULB shares are equal to each other, and the state/UT and ULB together have majority shareholding and control of the SPV. The funds given by the Central Government to the SPV will be tied grants kept in a separate grant fund. These funds are to be utilized only for the purposes as planned in the SCPs13 that were prepared by ULBs and submitted to qualify the challenge, and subject to the conditions laid down by the central government. According to a report by Deloitte, a consulting agency, over the next few years, creating these smart cities will require USD 150 billion, of which USD 120 billion is expected to come from the private sector (Balachandran 2016). Thus, the Smart City Mission focuses on being investment-friendly by leveraging central government grants and attracting private sector financing. The components of the Smart Cities Mission include an Area-based development (ABD) and a Pan-city initiative. The ABD will include either city improvement (retrofitting), city renewal (redevelopment) or city extension (greenfield development) or a mix thereof. Under the Pan-city initiative two or more smart solutions will cover larger parts of a city.

13 The SCP is a one-time exercise undertaken by cities themselves, with technical assistance from national and international agencies selected by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs of the Government of India.

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Building new smart cities and transforming the large existing ones will need huge funds—investment of USD 15.3 billion under the Smart Cities Mission will be required for the 100 smart cities to be built (Fig. 5), and AMRUT for 500 cities over the next five years (Balachandran 2016). Only about 50% of this amount is supposed to come from the central government and the rest has to be shared by the states and ULBs. ULBs in most Indian cities are not in a position to provide the entire set of requirements and are looking to raise funds from the private sector. Especially for the Smart Cities Mission, it is extremely crucial for cities to find sources of funding in order to execute the plans as per the proposals. Although all the 20 SCPs of cities have earmarked funding through convergence with other schemes, yet the majority of the funding is dependent on the Smart Cities Mission funds, PPPs and multi-lateral/bilateral assistance. As mentioned before, this mission is to be implemented through SPVs, and each is supposed to be jointly operated and owned by the state and a city, along with any private partners there might be. Each smart city’s SPV will be headed by a full-time CEO, and its board will have nominees of the central government, the state government and the concerned ULB. This may in the long run disempower ULBs, as most of the lucrative sources of funding would be tied for repayment of loans for smart city development. Also, ULBs will have no power to use the funds dedicated through escrow to the smart city projects. This may hinder financing the operations and maintenance (O&M) of the ULBs and increase intra-city disparities. A closer look into the financial proposals of the 20 Lighthouse Cities (Fig. 6), in the following section, helps to understand how much of the envisioned funding is supposed to come from sources other the government (Fig. 7). The 20 cities have proposed an investment of USD 7.9 billion over five years. Ten of these have proposed to mobilise USD 1.3 billion under the PPP model, and the others have also hinted at using this option. These cities have identified a total area of nearly 11,000 hectares for necessary infrastructure interventions (Press Information Bureau 2016). As proposed by different cities, Fig. 7 shows the various sources of funding and their percentages. As per the given template for submitting plans, each city has had to detail out the financial plan (part E of the proposal) in which the ULB evaluates its own capacities (also the SPV’s) to undertake self-funded development projects, the availability of funds from other government schemes that will converge in its SCP, and finances that can be raised from financial markets. The cities had to decide on their financial sources, lifetime costs of each project, and revenues for O&M. Since all the projects proposed by the cities as part of Area Based Development, Pan-City Development, and Greenfield Development are to be implemented through SPVs, the plans also include cash flows for each financial year (annexure 3 of all submitted proposals). Figure 8 reveals that, of the first 20 cities selected, Bhubaneswar has the highest proposed private funding (from PPPs) option at 56% (amounting to INR 2563 crores), followed by Bhopal (49%), Ahmedabad (39%) and Surat (31%). Bhubaneswar is expecting from private sources almost 2.5 times its Smart City funding than from central and state governments. Among the 20 cities, the least amount under PPP has been proposed by Ludhiana. Figure 8 shows the percentage of each city’s funding for its area based development vis-à-vis that for the pan-city proposals. The average investment across the cities for area-based development is about USD 313

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Fig. 5 Proposed smart cities in India

million, and USD 91 million for pan-city proposals. Jabalpur will devote 95% of its financial resources for area-based development, the most, followed by Kakinanda and Visakhapatnam, both with 94%, and then Indore with 92. New Delhi, Belagavi and Devanagere on the other hand have proposed to spend more on their Pan-City proposals. Table 1 shows the proposed funding structure of SCPs. Out of the total proposed budget of the 20 cities, the share of the Smart City fund from the central and state governments (in some cases ULBs also) is highest at 39%, followed by the convergence funds from various central and state sponsored schemes and programmes (18%). On average, cities would need USD 80 million in funding to implement these proposals (Fig. 9). What most proposals still lack is clarity about the following: (a) who are the intended private players; (b) how exactly the funds will be leveraged; (c) what mechanism(s) will guide PPP ventures; and (d) how much viability gap funding would still be required from the central government. The average area of the ABD

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Fig. 6 Lighthouse cities in India, 2011. Source Census of India, 2011

proposals of all the 20 cities pencils out to be 5.5 km2 , consuming an average of 75% of the SCPs’ total funding. This focused resource concentration, especially of infrastructure development in just a specific part of the city can cause serious spatial disparities in the long run. Also, this area will be particularly under SPV jurisdiction for further planning and implementing the proposals. The credibility or bankability of the cities themselves in attracting private funding for the proposed projects poses a big challenge, given the weak state of municipal finances overall. There is also scepticism among private sector actors regarding the mission itself. Since it is a CSS and cities would depend on the central government for funds, any political upheaval at the central level could possibly stall progress. Although private sector entities (both domestic and international) have expressed keen interest in the smart city projects, they are also seeking assurances about returns

D. Kundu

Convergence

Own Sources

Smart City Fund

PPP fund

Bhopal

Chennai

Ludhiana

GuwahaƟ

Udaipur

Belagavi

Kakinada

Coimbatore

New delhi MC

Indore

Solapur

Davangere

Visakhapatnam

Jabalpur

Ahmedabad

Kochi

Surat

Jaipur

Pune

120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Bhubaneswar

Percentage of Investment

78

Others

100

Area based development

Pan City proposal

Area based development

Pan City proposal

2500

80

2000

60

1500

40

1000

20

500 0

0

AVG. INVESTMENT IN RS. CRORES

PERCENTAGE OF INVESTMENT

Fig. 7 Percentage of funding options proposed by selected cities. Source Smart Cities Plans submitted by the cities to the Ministry of Urban Development, illustrated by the author

Fig. 8 Percentage of funding for the two streams of development of the smart cities mission. Source Smart Cities Plans, submitted by the cities to the Ministry of Urban Development, illustrated by the author Table 1 Sources of funding

Sl. no.

Source of funding

1

Convergence funds

2

Own sources

Percentage 18 9

3

Smart city funds

39

4

PPP funding

20

5

Other

14

Total

100

Source Smart Cities Plans submitted by the cities to the Ministry of Urban Development, prepared by the author

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3000

RS. IN CRORES

2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

PPP fund

Average

Fig. 9 Share of PPP funding. Source Smart Cities Plans submitted by the cities to the Ministry of Urban Development, 2015–16

on investment. For instance, in the terms of agreement, private investors want to be confident that government policies will not change mid-way and seek room for flexibility while a project will be in progress (Mookerji and Taneja 2014).

4 Urban Governance The first significant step, post-independence, towards addressing issues related to urban governance and strengthening decentralization was the 74th CAA of 1992, which contains an illustrative schedule (Twelfth Schedule) of appropriate functions considered for municipalities. The Twelfth Schedule envisions municipalities to perform various functions, such as planning for economic and social development, urban planning, urban poverty alleviation, urban forestry, protection of the environment, promotion of ecological aspects, and slum improvement and upgrading (GoI 2016). The 74th CAA suggests devolving functions to ULBs without making it mandatory. States can take the final call on the matter. Several Twelfth Schedule functions have not yet been devolved to ULBs, for their being underequipped or understaffed, and continued reliance on various state-level agencies.

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In India, urban development is a “State” subject,14 which results in much variation across states in the powers, tasks, and membership of ward development committees15 (WDCs). Also, the 74th CAA provisions that state governments decide the criteria and procedure for selecting WDC members, which makes their very existence a prerogative of the state government. Citizen participation in planning and implementation at the ward level is limited as these WDCs have not been constituted properly and nor has the 74th CAA clearly delineated their composition or the scope of their functions. The financial powers of WDCs also vary greatly across states. Many state governments have not acted on this issue, while some have delegated only marginal powers to WDCs. In most cities they are ineffective in representing the aspirations of the common people. Also, due to the large sizes of the constituencies of WDCs, the concept of people’s participation in local governance has not succeed. In many cities, WDCs are non-existent and even where they are present, their functioning hardly allows for any participation by citizens at large. WDCs are, thus, non-functional and structurally flawed in most of the metropolitan cities (Lama-Rewal 2007; Kundu 2011). WDCs are meant to play an important role in actively finding ways to ensure that citizens provide inputs to shape local decisions and participate fully in related decision-making processes—such as the framing, implementation and monitoring of the City Development Plan, municipal budgeting, and municipal performance management processes. However, these still remain pipe dreams visualised by the policy makers since most WDCs are yet non-functional. Residents’ Welfare Association (RWAs) are emerging in almost all big cities. RWAs are effective insofar as people in a locality or belonging to a group can see their interests being collectivized and served. Participation in RWAs, which are like local pressure groups, lets people voice their concerns. Most RWAs are found in middleclass areas, and participation in their associational activities is skewed quite heavily towards privileging those with higher levels of education and income (Harriss 2007). For instance, the Delhi Government implemented a scheme, My Delhi, I Care, where funding was routed to RWAs for meeting the expenses of upgrading local services in particular areas under each RWA; the RWAs that formed in better-off localities managed access to regular funding (Kundu 2011). In many states, ULBs are weak, ineffective, and unable to become vibrant democratic units of self-governance on account of not having regular elections, the prolonged supersession of small ULBs, and inadequate devolution of powers and functions to ULBs by state government. The Mayors/Chairpersons—who are heads of the council of ULBs—are elected either by the councillors from amongst themselves 14 The Constitution of India provides for a division of powers between the Union (Centre/central government) and states, according to 3 lists: Union List, State List and Concurrent List. The Union List describes the subjects under the control central government, the State List describes the subjects under the jurisdiction of states, and the Concurrent List has those that come under the joint jurisdiction of the Centre and state governments. The subjects, which do not fall in these lists, i.e. residuary subjects, have been given to the central government. 15 Ward Development Committees (WDCs) are institutions created by 74th CAA to promote citizen participation in urban governance for bringing urban local bodies closer to citizens and providing a platform for citizen engagement in city planning and development processes.

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or directly by the people along with the election of councillors. Depending on the city, mayoral tenure ranges from 1 to 5 years. In most ULBs, the Commissioner is an officer of the state government deputed to work in the municipal body. Indian cities do not have empowered leaders with the expertise and tenure to deliver against explicit mandates—city mayors are just constitutional/ceremonial heads, with actual powers lying in the hands of Commissioners, who are government officers (civil servants) deputed for specific periods to manage cities. Many city mayors’ tenures are short, and they rarely have the power to drive new investments, hire key personnel, fund projects, or reorganize departments, all of which are critical to revamp a city’s performance. In regard to these inadequacies, it was considered necessary that provisions relating to ULBs were incorporated into the Constitution via the 74th CAA. Consequently, in regard to ULBs, the Constitution now provides (under provision IX-A) for three types of municipalities: (i) Nagar Panchayats for areas in transition from rural to urban (population 11,000–25,000); (ii) Municipal Councils for smaller urban areas (population less than 1 million; (iii) Municipal Corporations for larger urban areas (population over 1 million). The 74th CAA mentions that the election of the chairpersons of municipalities, which connotes mayors, will be in the manner specified by State law. The lack of efficient capacity across all levels of government is the root cause of India’s urban development challenges (Twelfth Five Year Plan, 2012). Existing provisions under most states’ laws do not facilitate any effective participation of the people in urban governance because the Ward Committees are either non-existent or non-functional; in cities where these exist, their large sizes commonly render them ineffective. Proximity between citizens and their representatives is essential for securing accountability. Also, substantial skill gaps exist across all areas of urban management. Weak administration and strong political interests limit the extent to which ULBs can revise property taxes, quinquennially. The reluctance to levy user charges, raise own resources from an expanding tax base, and enforce compliance with taxes are systemic political economy challenges. The states’ finance commissions have failed to redress the issue of ULB finances (Habitat India Report 2016). State Governments have created a large number of parastatal bodies—development authorities, housing boards, slum boards, and water and sanitation Boards. The profusion of specialized parastatal bodies creates fragmentation of responsibility and leads to functional bodies working in isolation. There is lack of coordination among the parastatal bodies and ULBs, which lead to unclear lines of accountability. The existence of specialised parastatal bodies has also weakened the ULBs. As mentioned earlier, many Twelfth schedule functions have not been devolved to the ULBs. The 18 functions assigned are not being fully performed by ULBs, which still rely heavily on various state-level agencies to perform their functions (Fig. 10). An illustrative example of administrative fragmentation, on the one hand, and functional overlap, on the other, comes from the city of Agra, Uttar Pradesh. The functioning of Agra’s water supply sector is fragmented between two agencies, the Jal Nigam and the Jal Sansthan. Furthermore, when it comes to providing water to slum dwellers, two other organizations—the State Urban Development Authority

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Fig. 10 State-wise transfer of functions to urban local bodies. Source JNNURM Report, March 2014, Government of India

(SUDA) and the District Urban Development Authority (DUDA)—also get involved. However, as per the Municipal Act, this function is to be performed by the ULB, the Agra Nagar Nigam. Similarly, the Public Works Department PWD, the Agra Development Authority and the Agra Nagar Nigam are all responsible for constructing and maintaining different roads in the city.

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Lacking robust ULBs has resulted in problems of cooperation and collaboration among multiple agencies leading to the delayed execution of projects, underutilization of funds, and loss of revenues. Less than a third of all cities have master plans; even in cities with master plans, their unsatisfactory implementation has caused haphazard and unplanned development. Master plans themselves embody various shortcomings, in regard to design, conceptualization, and execution procedures. In general, attention to the provision of trunk infrastructure, environmental conservation, and financing details is inadequate. The progress with devolution has thus far been unsatisfactory; many states have not even transferred 74th CAA-warranted functions, funds, and functionaries. Crucially, the issue of rural-urban convergence is hardly addressed anywhere, despite this having to be done by district planning committees (DPCs)16 and metropolitan planning committees (MPCs).17 In fact, just a few cities have constituted MPCs, which remain largely ineffective.

5 State of Local Finance In India, urban local governments that have both constitutional and statutory bases, are essentially governed by state-level statutes. These define their functions, powers and responsibilities. The constitution provides three lists, viz. a Union list, a State list, and a Concurrent list. As provisioned by the State list, a state’s legislature endows municipalities in that state with the powers and authority it considers necessary to enable them to function as institutions of local self-government (Habitat India Report 2016). As outlined in the Seventh Schedule of the State List, state governments have the prerogative to devolve the levy of taxes and charges to ULBs. The constitution, however, requires establishing a state finance commission in every state to make recommendations on: (i) taxes, duties, tolls and fees to be shared between the state and municipalities; (ii) taxes, duties, tolls and fees that may be assigned to municipalities; (iii) grants-in-aid for municipalities; and (iv) any other measures to improve municipal finances. It entails major vertical and horizontal restructuring in state-municipal fiscal relations, providing states with the unique opportunity to redesign the existing fiscal system so that it is coherent and flexible enough to meet rapidly changing local needs and responsibilities. Of the various revenue streams, including taxes and duties, the state governments have most commonly devolved to ULBs taxes on lands and buildings, entry of goods to cities/towns (octroi), advertisements, professions, trades, and entertainment. In addition, ULBs levy a number of other charges/taxes such as, among others, on congregations (Bihar and Odisha), 16 As per Article 243 ZD of the Constitution, District Planning Committees will be constituted in every State at the district level (rural and urban) to consolidate the plans prepared by the Panchayats and the Municipalities, and prepare a holistic draft development plan for the whole district. The Chairperson of every District Planning Committee will forward the development plan, as recommended by the Committee, to the state government. 17 As per Article 243 ZE of the Constitution, there will be a Metropolitan Planning Committee in every Metropolitan area to prepare a draft development plan for the metropolitan area as a whole.

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pilgrims and tourists (Bihar), sanitation and lighting (Madhya Pradesh), and parking space deficits in non-residential buildings (Bihar and Odisha) (India Habitat Report 2016). Indian municipalities are among the weakest in the world, both in their capacity to raise resources and financial autonomy. Most have huge backlogs in basic infrastructure provision. The High Powered Expert Committee on Indian Urban Infrastructure and Services (HPEC), set up by the Government of India in 2011 for evaluating investments required for urban infrastructure services, estimated that ULBs spend only about 27–28% of what is needed for efficient services delivery and management. As an example, high commercial and physical losses in water distribution networks are compounded by the unwillingness of local/state governments to levy adequate user charges. The difference is usually taken care of by grants from the state government. Water utilities in India are typically able to recover only 30–35% of O&M costs. By contrast, in the Philippines and Cambodia, most water utilities recover O&M costs fully. Even in Bangladesh, water utilities recover about two-thirds of O&M costs (ADB 2007). Recovery ratios for sanitation and solid waste collection are, likewise, uniformly low across all Indian cities. With the abolition of octroi18 by most States, the property tax is now the most important source of revenue for local governments. The ability to finance growing local government expenditures via property taxes is severely constrained by administrative, regulatory and technical shortfalls. In particular, weak administration and strong political interests limit the extent to which local government can tap on an expanding tax base and enforce tax compliance. An increase in the tax rates may have an adverse impact on an incumbent government’s fortunes during elections. Yet, in recent years there have been substantial reforms in property tax administration. Earlier, the Annual Rental Value (ARV)19 was the basis for levying property tax. This mode of assessment had many drawbacks – the manner of assessment was opaque, with assessing officials enjoying much discretion, plus it was inelastic and non-buoyant. As a result of the Government of India’s Guidelines for Property Tax Reforms of 1998, a large number of municipal bodies have switched over from the traditional ARV based assessment to the ‘unit area’ or the ‘capital value’ methods.20 In fact, under JNNURM, this was a mandatory reform that had the compliance of most cities it covered.

18 Octroi was charged at the point of entry of goods into a local area for consumption or sale there. It was generally applicable to goods entering into urban areas, i.e. area serviced by municipalities or corporations. It was check-post-based levy collected by local tax administration and had broadly covered all goods brought into local jurisdiction for consumption or sale. 19 Annual Rental Value Basis: A rent-based rateable valuation system of property taxation where the annual rental value of the property is deemed to be the gross annual rent at which the land or buildings might, at the time of assessment, be reasonably expected to be let from year to year. 20 Capital Value Basis: The tax base comprises the assessed value of land and improvements, i.e. the value agreed upon by a willing buyer and seller in a free market. It follows that capital value is extremely elastic and the property tax will have a base that will grow with the economy.

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Although the ULBs’ own sources of revenue largely comprise of property tax and user charges, yet, in most cases, they do not enjoy the freedom to alter these rates.21 The inadequacy of own revenue sources perpetuates ULBs’ dependence on transfers from the central and state governments. In fact, in the past few years, under JNNURM, this trend has strengthened as large amounts of untied grants became available to cities for infrastructural improvement. This has slackened municipal initiatives to become credit worthy and approach the financial markets to raise funds. A study based on a survey of the 36 largest cities in India (NIPFP 2009) shows that the major factors contributing to poor realisation of property taxes are poor assessment rate (56% of the properties covered), weak collection efficiency (only 37% of property taxes raised), flawed valuation methods, losses from exemptions (11.7%), and poor enforcement. The necessity for a paradigm shift in ULBs’ financial management is further underscored by the scale of investment required for addressing just the basic urban needs. The HPEC has projected that the capital investment requirement for urban infrastructure, renewal and redevelopment (including slums), and capacity building for the 20-year period from 2012 to 2032 is around USD 482.41 billion. In addition to it, USD 202.41 billion is required for O&M. Once funds, functionaries and functions are devolved, and robust accountability mechanisms created, it is likely to bring about much needed changes to how Indian ULBs function. The central and state governments may continue to provide support in the intermediate run, particularly in view of the large-scale investment required and need for strategic intervention, but such grants must be incentivized to promote to ULBs’ own efforts. Transfers from the central and state governments have actually increased in recent years, from 44.1% in 2007–08 to 48.4% in 2012–13. Yet, the tax bases of ULBs have remained narrow, inflexible, and not buoyant; moreover, they have also not been able to levy rational user charges for the services they deliver. There are clear trends towards further increasing central and state government transfers and grants-in-aid. Given the abysmal state of municipal finances, it is unlikely that the states and municipalities alone will be able to raise and assign resources for financing the scale of on-going and impending urbanization. Successive Central Finance Commissions22 (CFCs) have recommended improving ULB finances and functioning. Recently, the Fourteenth Central Finance Commission increased grants to ULBs by 2.65 times compared to CFC grants under the Thirteenth. However, on the other hand, there are considerable delays in acting upon the recommendations

21 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Maharashtra-freezes-property-tax-for-nextfive-years-in-Mumbai/articleshow/48106582.cms; https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhinews/south-delhi-civic-body-may-hike-property-tax-aims-to-up-revenue-by-100-crore/storyxNeMIgkpywTDUi10EFDHwM.html; http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/ June2003Seminar/India.pdf. 22 Under Article 280 of the Constitution of India, the Finance Commission is constituted to enable the transfer of resources from the Centre to the States. The Finance Commission is appointed every five years or sooner.

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Table 2 State of finances of municipalities (All States, 2007–12) Structures

Year 2007–08

Year 2012–13

INR (Crore)

Percent

INR (Crore)

Percent

18,366

37.2

30,912

32

Own sources Tax revenue Non-tax revenue

9,134

18.5

19,002

19.7

27,501

55.7

49,913

51.6

Government of India

3,515

7.1

5,387

5.6

Finance commission

986

2

3,760

3.9

State devolution and assignments

9,342

18

18,537

19.2

State grant-in-aid

6,653

13.5

14,809

15.3

Others

1,355

2.7

4,232

4.4

21,851

44.1

46,727

48.4

Sub total Transfers

Sub total Own source revenue as percent of GDP

0.60

0.48

Total municipal revenue as percent of GDP

1.08

1.03

Source India Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance 2009–10, and data collected by the Fourteenth Finance Commission

of the State Finance Commissions.23 Additionally, the state governments retain the prerogative not to accept or partially accept CFC recommendations. Own revenues and transfers form the two most important components of municipal revenues in India. Besides the ULBs’ own revenues discussed earlier, transfers mostly consist of assigned monies from the state governments, devolutions and grants-inaid, finance commission dispensations,24 and grants-in-aid from central government. According to the Fourteenth CFC, in 2012–13, municipal revenues constituted just over one percent of the national GDP, while in other emerging economies such as Brazil and South Africa they amount to five to six percent, respectively—so there is much scope for India’s ULBs to raise their local revenues. The India Habitat III National Report provides insights into India’s municipal finance system based on the various studies conducted under the Fourteenth CFC. Own source municipal revenues actually declined from 55.7% in 2007–08 to 51.6% in 2012–13. Although user charges as a percentage of ULBs’ own revenues increased, the overall contribution of municipal finances to GDP remained unchanged (Table 2). The 74th CAA and JNNURM have made inter-governmental transfers the pivotal strategy for strengthening municipal governance. Transfers, which include all assigned and devolved revenues and grants-in-aid, have emerged as a crucial com23 The

State Finance Commission enables fund allocation and transfer between states and their ULBs. 24 Special grants for autonomous councils.

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ponent of municipal revenues, and an important instrument for financing municipal expenditure. On average, transfers accounted for 48% of the total municipal revenues in 2012–13 and financed nearly half of all municipal expenditure.

6 Conclusion and Way Forward Reflecting a trend seen in several Asian countries, decentralization processes began in India around the late 1980s, which included reforming the local government system as well as intensifying democratization. India, despite registering high economic growth in recent decades, has been experiencing a decline in urban demographic growth rates since the 1980s. The past decade has witnessed a slight increase in the growth rate, from 2.73–2.76%. However, this is largely attributable to the addition of 2530 new census towns, which although urban by definition, are rural in their administration and governance frameworks. Planned intervention is required for these new urban centres through statutory recognition and dedicated flow of funds. There is clear evidence of growing suburbanization and peri-urbanization around big cities. There is also growing evidence of the top-heavy structure of urban population distribution, wherein it is increasingly concentrated in big urban agglomerations. Serious deficits in the delivery of basic services continue to plague urban India—an outcome of weak and inefficient urban governance, overall. Gauging by the state of basic urban services, which is an indicator of urban governance, the necessity and urgency of improving urban governance is irrefutable. Since 2005, with the launch of JNNURM, India’s urban sector received the national government’s direct and focused attention for the first time. However, JNNURM had a strong big city bias built into it. The present government replaced JNNURM with AMRUT, with an increased coverage that included all 500 cities with populations over 100,000. However, AMRUT’s disbursements are also linked to reform measures undertaken by cities themselves, and much is left to be desired of small cities without the wherewithal to adhere to reforms and prepare the requisite detailed project reports for their projects. The small cities suffer from weak municipal finances as their collections of property tax, the most important source of revenue, are very low. In fact, data from the Fourteenth Central Finance Commission has highlighted a decline in the share of own revenues of the local governments. Additionally, cities covered under the Smart Cities Mission are likely to become more vulnerable as their most fundamental revenue streams will be tied to its financing of projects. Likewise, intra-urban disparity is likely to increase with area-based interventions of the Smart Cities Mission being limited to just 2–5% of cities garnering over 75% of all dedicated mission funds. Given the scale of investment required to support the demands placed by on-going urbanization, it is unlikely just vertical transfers alone will prove sufficient, underscoring the need for cities to mobilize their own sources. Cities should be encouraged to draw up resource mobilization plans and explore options like impact fees, transfer of development rights, land banks, and tapping the financial markets through munic-

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ipal bonds. The HPEC, a Government of India advisory committee on infrastructure investment, recommends implementing broad-based revenue sharing between states and ULBs through suitable constitutional amendments and introducing measures such as property tax, profession tax, entertainment tax, and advertisement tax, and sharing a predetermined percentage of the recent Goods and Service Tax (GST).25 However, care should be taken to ensure that adopting innovative methods of financing does not render cities more vulnerable. The ULBs, as the third tier of government, need to be made more fiscally autonomous for deciding and fixing the charges currently under the control of state governments. Unlike the reforms of central and state-level taxes undertaken in India in the mid-1990s, efforts to reform municipal taxation have been few. While studies on municipal finance enumerate close to 25 different kinds of tax instruments, many are quite irrelevant to contemporary socio-economic realities and the changing nature of cities’ economies. At the same time, taxes that are consistent with the first principle—local governments should have exclusive use of taxes with no or little inter-jurisdictional implications—have become central to recommendations by State Finance Commissions. As municipalities face higher-order responsibilities like planning for economic and social development and urban poverty alleviation, the issue of their access to central and state government tax revenues should receive serious consideration. The second Administrative Reform Commission (ARC)26 recommended a clear devolution of functions for each level of local government. Each subject matter, which has functional elements that are best attended at local levels, should be appropriately devolved by law as subordinate legislation. Each state has to develop a methodology for participatory planning based on three tiers of administration (Area, Ward, Citizen). As per ARC recommendations, a municipal ward community is supposed to manage street lighting, sanitation, water supply, drainage, and maintain roads, school buildings, local hospital/dispensaries, local markets, parks, playgrounds, and the like. Funds should be transferred en bloc to ward committees, as the basic units of budget allocation. The process of empowering ULBs would be incomplete without enhancing their capacities. Most municipal bodies do not have the capacity to be vibrant administrative bodies capable of discharging their functions in an evolving urban environment. Negligible capacity in nearly all strategic areas—urban planning, e-governance, urban transport, disaster management and mitigation, project 25 GST is one indirect tax aimed at making all of India one unified common market. It is a single tax on the supply of goods and services, right from the manufacturer to the consumer. Credits of input taxes paid at each stage will be available in the subsequent stage of value addition, which makes GST essentially a tax only on value addition at each stage. The final consumer will thus bear only the GST charged by the last dealer in the supply chain, with set-off benefits at all the previous stages (https://www.gstindia.com/about/). The intricacies of GST are still being keenly debated by various interest groups. 26 An Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) is a commission of inquiry set up by the Government of India to examine public administration in the country and recommend reform and reorganisation. The Government of India established the Second ARC in 2005 to suggest measures to achieve a proactive, responsive, accountable, sustainable and efficient administration at all levels of government.

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formulation and implementation, operation and maintenance, environmental management, delivery of basic services such as water and sanitation, and urban poverty alleviation—is a serious concern that demands urgent attention. Every state should institutionalize and strengthen a dedicated municipal cadre with apposite technical and participatory skills. In addition, efforts toward having professional city managers with fixed tenure, multiplying training institutions/colleges for producing urban planners, and building the capacity of municipal personnel must be urgently initiated. It would be useful if the central government would create a comprehensive framework to lower levels of government on issues such as staffing, training, skills development, and finances. Establishing a sound, transparent, progressive, visionary and implementable revenue mobilization model, wherein citizens are brought under a municipal tax regime as per their eligibility and level of services availed, is imperative. Heavy penalties should be imposed on chronic tax defaulters, law violators, and defrauders of public resources. To overcome entrenched distrust of and hindrances faced by the state, it should utilize the resources of India’s robust civil society in extensive information, education and communication campaign to sensitize citizens about their own rights, roles, and responsibilities in building and maintaining equitable, sustainable, and liveable urban environments. Empowering and involving local communities in urban governance— including planning, implementation and performance monitoring and review—will help them identify their needs and hold municipalities accountable for service delivery. These are the yet less emphasized but no less crucial aspects for urban development in India, where recent efforts have tended to prioritize ambitious projects fuelled by large capital infusions and private sector participation. Acknowledgements The author is grateful to Ms. Pragya Sharma and Ms. Arpita Banerjee at the National Institute for Urban Affairs (NIUA), New Delhi, for their research assistance.

References Asian Development Bank (2007) Benchmarking and data book of water utilities in India. Asian Development Bank, Manila Balachandran M (2016, Feb 4) Funding Conundrum, Quartz India. Retrieved from https://qz.com/ india/606652/theres-only-one-way-india-can-pay-for-its-ambitious-smart-cities/ Batra L (2009) A review of urbanization and urban policy in post-development India. Working Paper Series. Working Paper Number CSLG/WP/12, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Bhagat RB (2014) Urban policies and programmes in India: retrospect and prospect. Yojana 58:4–8 Harriss J (2007) Antinomies of empowerment: observations on civil society, politics and urban governance in India. Econ Polit Weekly 42(26):2716–2724 Kundu et al (2007) A strategy paper on migration and urbanisation in the context of development dynamics, governmental programmes and evolving institutional structure in India. A Paper commissioned by United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Kundu D (2011) Elite capture in participatory urban governance. Econ Polit Weekly 46(10):23–25 Kundu D, Samanta D (2011) Redefining the inclusive urban agenda in India. Econ Polit Weekly 46(5):55–63

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Lama-Rewal ST (2007) Neighbourhood associations and local democracy: Delhi municipal elections 2007. Econ Polit Weekly 42(47):51–60 Mathur OP, Thakur D, Rajadhyaksha N (2009) Urban property tax potential in India. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi McKinsey Global Institute (2010) India’s urban awakening: building inclusive cities, sustaining economic growth. New Delhi Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation. Government of India (2016), India Habitat III National Report, 2016 Ministry of Urban Development (2011) High powered expert committee HPEC on Indian urban infrastructure and services, Government of India Mookerji N, Taneja M (2014) Flexible PPP Pact to Woo industry for smart city. http://www. business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/flexible-ppp-pact-to-woo-industry-for-smartcity-114091701235_1.html. Accessed 18 March 2016 National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (2007) India urban report: a summary assessment National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA) (2014) Metropolitan India: Status of Demography, Economy, Social Structures, Housing and Basic Infrastructure Planning Commission (2011) Mid term appraisal of eleventh five year plan. Oxford University Press, New Delhi Planning Commission (2011) Working group on financing urban infrastructure for twelfth five year plan. New Delhi Planning Commission (2012) Twelfth five year plan. New Delhi Sivaramakrishnan KC, Kundu A, Singh BN (2007) Handbook of urbanization in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi UN-HABITAT (2013) State of the World’s Cities 2012/13: Prosperity of Cities. Nairobi: UNHABITAT UCLG (2008) Decentralization and local democracy in the world: first global report by united cities and local governments. Barcelona United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) World Urbanization Prospects. The 2014 Revision Vaidya C, Vaidya H (2010) Market-based financing of urban infrastructure in India. In: Kochar S, Ramchandran M (eds) Building from the Bottom. Academic Foundation, UCLG

Debolina Kundu is an Associate Professor at the National Institute of Urban Affairs, India and has over 20 years of professional experience in the field of development studies. She is a doctoral fellow with the ICSSR and has a Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru University on urban governance. She has worked as consultant with, ADB, LSE, IIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCAP, KfW, GIZ, Urban Institute, Washington, East–West Centre, Honolulu etc., on issues of urbanization, migration, urban development policies, municipal finance, governance and exclusion. She is currently the HUDCO Chair and editor of journals Environment and Urbanisation, Asia (SAGE) and Urban India (NIUA). She is the Country Investigator—India, for the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) Centre for Sustainable Healthy and Learning Cities and Neighbourhoods (SHLC), which is supported by UK Research and Innovation. SHLC is an international, interdisciplinary and collaborative project, which aims to strengthen capacity in order to increase understanding of sustainable neighbourhoods and address urban, health and education challenges in fast growing cities across Africa and Asia.

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A member of the Fifth Delhi Finance Commission, she has several articles published in books and journals. Currently, she is editing books on internal migration and national urban policies.

The Changing Role of Regional Organisation of Councils in Australia: Case Studies from Perth Metropolitan Region Shahed Khan and Bhishna Bajracharya

Abstract This chapter seeks to make a case for regional integration of urban governance at the local government level in Australia. Growing complexity of planning issues and changing community values require governments to constantly look for innovative formats of governance. There is a need to promote models of governance based on collaboration rather than competition between government entities. At the level of local government, collaborative partnerships that are sustainable can be reached between adjoining councils contributing as equals and driven by common values and the need to cooperate for better outcomes. By entering into voluntary agreements in the form of regional organisations of councils, an individual local council could enable itself to rise beyond solving problems regarding provision of services to its rate payers, to additionally take an active role in tackling higher level problems relating to regional development and sustainable development. This chapter describes the role played by regional organisations of councils in Australia in general, referring to a few case studies from Western Australia. Keywords Voluntary and statutory regional organisation of councils · Integrated governance · Inter-governmental cooperation · Multi-stakeholder cooperation · Local council amalgamation · Regional development organisations

S. Khan (B) School of Design and the Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, Australia e-mail: [email protected] B. Bajracharya Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_4

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1 Introduction 1.1 A Case for Integration of Government There is an increasing realisation that government agencies need to look for different formats of cooperation. Growing complexity of the nature of planning issues arising from changing values and growing awareness of certain issues have rendered some traditional models of planning and policy implementation operating at various levels of government less than desirable. It is increasingly difficult for governments to contain and solve planning problems within defined administrative boundaries and through single-focused agencies. We are more than ever before aware of the interconnectedness of issues in dealing with environmental aspects in the pursuit of sustainable development. At the local level of government, geographical boundaries can become barriers to tackling wider issues. Working through different levels of government can be challenging, and a lack of holistic approach by governments to planning and policy implementation could result in gaps of coverage in service delivery and inefficient handling of public issues. This could not only lead to public discontent but also allow significant environmental issues to be left unattended. In recent years, a sense of urgency in promoting such cooperation can be found across many countries, with international development agencies promoting dialogue on themes related to regional inter-governmental cooperation. Various fora, which focus on identifying and assessing the potential and challenges of building win-win (or joint gain) cooperation through partnerships within various levels of government, are being organised. In the process, useful lessons drawn from documentation of good practices of governmental cooperation resulting in better outcomes in design and implementation of urban planning and development are promoted. These developments may also be explained within the broader context of neoliberal approach to planning and development and the growing influence of civil society due to a general shift in focus from government to governance. While the importance of the private sector and civil society as partners is recognised, neither the private sector nor the communities could be expected to deliver the required governance on their own. Robust and flexible governmental frameworks of cooperation that promote cooperation and collaborative partnerships among various stakeholders including all levels of government, the private sector and civil society are required. The search for effective frameworks for cooperation is driven by the need to enable and accommodate meaningful contribution by as wide a range of actors or stakeholders as optimally required. It involves the creation of organisational culture that seeks to go beyond competition towards cooperation and collaboration. To this end, there is an on-going search for institutional frameworks with inbuilt flexibility, providing institutional structures and space to accommodate various fora and platforms for discussion and action by all major stakeholders at all levels of plan making and implementation. These initiatives seek to realise synergies through collaboration between partners. For such frameworks to be sustainable, however, it is

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imperative that the resulting system of governance is democratic, based on collaboration through the operationalization of mutually beneficial partnerships between stakeholders, rather than based on competition. This approach to inter-governmental cooperation and collaboration takes various forms within the Asia-Pacific context. Niikawa (2010) notes: “European type modernization and rationalization of the local government system… tend[s] to expand decentralization and local autonomy” (p. 387). Many international agencies, such as European Union, actively promote various versions of inter-governmental cooperation, resulting in numerous initiatives aiming to facilitate inter-local governmental cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The literature reports on many cases, especially from Southeast Asian countries, where some contiguous local government units have formulated formalised groups, signing up memoranda of agreement (MOA) for joint provision of services and project implementation on a long-term basis. Most of the initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region seem to be associated with the significant move towards decentralisation of local government functions experienced across the region over the past couple of decades. Ellis and Roberts maintain that decentralisation is associated with local autonomy, pointing out “local governments need a degree of autonomy to respond to the demands of constituents, meet their functional obligations, and support the development of their territories” (Ellis and Roberts 2016, p. 87). Niikawa (2010) similarly observes, “One of the goals of decentralization is to build a local autonomy system in which powerful local governments provide better public services” (p. 396). In many Asian countries, legislative changes enabling decentralisation were followed by the introduction of laws that have enabled the grouping of inter-local government. These developments have led to a wide array of experiences related to decentralisation reported in the literature, ranging from newly formed local governments learning to deal with newly acquired local autonomy to desperate attempts to identify local resources of revenue to replace financial transfers from the centre. In some cases local government units have sought collaborative initiatives for sharing resources with neighbouring local area governments. Successful collaboration among neighbouring local governments, however, remain elusive as remote or under-resourced local government units tend to remain largely dependent on financial transfers from central government to carry out basic urban governance functions. Some cases reported from Indonesia highlight issues resulting from rapid implementation of decentralisation, leading to the creation of new independent local governments with expanded decision-making powers but limited access to financial as well as human resources. Brillantes and Flores (2012) report that in Indonesia many new local governments were created in the wake of major decentralisation of governance. In the first eight years after legislative reform in 1999, the number of local governments increased from 340 to 470 (Brodjonegoro 2009 in Brillantes and Flores 2012), an additional 130 local governments in just eight years. The newly established local governments found it difficult to work in cooperation with adjacent local governments, often failing to develop or contribute toward a coherent urban strategy. An example of such failure was seen in the difficulty the capital city Jakarta faced in finding a suitable dumpsite for its solid waste (Sarosa 2006).

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Despite initial setbacks, success stories of cooperation between local governments to address shared needs have subsequently been reported. For instance, in 2001, three local governments (Yogyakarta, Sleman and Bantul) established a joint secretariat to identify and address common urban problems associated with delivery of community services. The main areas of focus included management of garbage, waste, drainage, road, clean water, transportation and spatial layout (www.DELGOSEA). Legislative changes in the Philippines, for example, have facilitated an ‘alliance building approach’ to encourage sharing of resources between local government units for long-term development (EUDP 2010). This allows local governments units to form groups that can consolidate and coordinate their efforts for effective delivery of urban services. One such alliance, where various local government units have come together for specific cooperation without forming a new juridical entity is the PPALMA Alliance. Through PPALMA, six municipalities in rural Philippines formed a group to tackle common concerns about transport, mainly focused on maintenance of all-weather roads. With limited local revenues, these remote municipalities had been largely dependent on central government funding for road maintenance that were mostly left in a poor state of repairs. The PPALMA alliance enabled local governments to share and pool their heavy construction equipment to carry road maintenance tasks internally without requiring funds for outsourcing to contractors (FCM Newsletter July 2013). Cases from Thailand tend to blame fragmentation of urban areas for the uncoordinated delivery of urban services. With local authorities responsible for development while a central government agency looks after spatial planning, development and local spatial planning tend to be disjointed (Brillantes and Flores 2012). Despite on-going decentralisation, Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve (2006) reported that in Thailand, the central government remained involved in regulation, planning and funding of local services either through its line agencies or state enterprises. Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve (2006) noted that local government authorities in Thailand had some tax resources available to them, and legislative reform has enabled them to further expand their ability to levy taxes locally. However, they seemed to suggest that municipalities on the urban fringe still lacked the legislative support and capacity required to enter into local cooperation agreements to allow them to pool their resources to manage urban development (Vorratnchaiphan and Villeneuve 2006). In South Asia, the level of local autonomy has been described as “modest at best”, that makes it “hard for local governments to act decisively and independently..” (Ellis and Roberts 2016, p. 87). They further maintain that while local governments in South Asia “have some discretion over certain functions and resources in most countries, but they are often heavily influenced by higher tiers and particular ministries.” In their view, “the greatest autonomy may exist at the lowest tiers in some countries (communities, wards, village committees), but only over very minor functions and resources” (Ellis and Roberts 2016, p. 87).

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In Australia, where local governments tend to be quite small in terms of population and resources, local governments are forced to consider pooling resources. There has been an on-going debate over the approach to tackle the issue. One approach has been to rationalise the local government configuration through local government amalgamation into larger units. The other approach is to promote voluntary grouping of local and regional governments or councils to pool resources where required for certain specific initiatives. This has led to the formation of regional organisations of councils (ROC). ROCs have had a rather long history of presence in the form of voluntary grouping of local and regional councils, albeit with fluctuating fortunes over the decades. In this chapter, we focus on the concept of “multi-stakeholder partnerships and voluntary commitments”, listed as one of the sustainable development topics promoted under Goal 11 of UN Habitat’s New Urban Agenda (NUA) (UN 2018). We discuss some Australian initiatives that have sought to improve the effectiveness of institutional arrangements and modes of urban governance through attempts to broaden the scope of planning at the level of local government through collaboration across geographical boundaries of local councils. The discussion centres on the concept of regional organization of councils (ROC) whereby groups of local councils come together to take up enhanced local and regional governance functions. The ROC initiatives are explained as examples of local councils coming together to work in “an integrated manner by pooling financial resources, knowledge and expertise” as envisaged in the NUA (UN 2018). The chapter thus describes how “cross sectorial and innovative multi-stakeholder partnerships”, as promoted by NUA (UN 2018), are being implemented through voluntary commitments by some local governments in Australia. It presents examples of ROC operating in Western Australia that seek to contribute to regional and strategic planning at the metropolitan level. The impact and result of these initiatives in terms of success or failure are open to interpretation. There has been no attempt to provide either a comprehensive or definitive account of initiatives undertaken by ROCs in Australia to enhance urban governance. Indeed the initiatives discussed in this chapter are selective and indicative and largely on going. It is hoped, however, that the sharing of some Australian experience could provide useful reference for similar initiatives taken up for enhanced urban governance in the broader Asia-Pacific region. In the following section, an introduction to the structure of government in Australia is provided to facilitate a basic understanding of prevalent forms of partnerships in governance. The chapter then traces the evolution of local government functions in Australia and describes the conditions and debates surrounding approaches to increase efficiency and effectiveness of local and regional governance. Various mechanisms promoted over the years in Australia for local and regional cooperation in governance are described as the chapter focuses on the types of ROCs in Australia and their role and functions. Two cases from Perth, Western Australia, are then referred to as examples of voluntary cooperation between local councils.

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2 The Structure of Government in Australia Before we discuss some of the initiatives undertaken in Australia to improve the integration of governance, it is helpful to have a quick look at the government system and structures in place. For practical purposes, Australia can be seen as having three levels of government: the Federal (also referred to as National or Commonwealth); State (also including Federally administered Territory governments); and Local governments (represented through local councils). Australia has a unique history of nationhood resulting from the federation of established colonies (CoA 2010). This has resulted in a situation where the Federal government was given certain powers in matters such as those relating to national defence, foreign affairs and finance, especially income tax, while the States inherited all residual powers (https:// sielearning.tafensw.edu.au). The States have retained residual legislative powers in most matters including those concerned with housing, transport and development (https://sielearning.tafensw.edu.au). Another unique feature is that while the national constitution recognizes the existence of local government, it does not allocate it any legislative powers. Local government is also the lowest tier of the government and thus the closest to the community. This means that, potentially, it is best positioned to feel the pulse of the community in terms of their needs and aspirations and also the most accessible to the community. Local governments are, in essence, most exposed to community problems, issues and complaints. Thus, colloquially, it is said that the Federal government controls the ‘purse’ (national income tax), State government holds the ‘power’ (in most matters) and Local government inherits all ‘problems’ (Fig. 1). Most land use planning and decision-making, development control and regulation functions are generally delegated to local government by the State government. In other words, all powers that local government do exercise are those bestowed to them by their State government. Essentially, therefore, local governments are creatures of the State government. Of course, in this situation, the State government has the ultimate oversight in all such matters with the ability to dismiss elected local councils—even though it is an option most rarely contemplated. While the Federal government for the large part does not have a direct role to play in land use allocation and planning decisions, it can bear influence on some decisions by allocating

Fig. 1 Colloquial understanding of the government system in Australia. Source Khan et al. (2015)

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grants. A back door for Federal government intervention does exist in the form of international treaties that it may ratify from time to time, such as local agenda 21. We hope this rather brief introduction to the Australian system of government would suffice to provide the minimum understanding of the context required to appreciate the integration of governance initiatives undertaken in Australia discussed in this chapter.

3 Local Government in Australia 3.1 The Administrative Structure of Australian Cities Australian cities are typically low-density suburban sprawls that have defied urban consolidation attempts for decades. Administratively, most metropolitan regions are divided up into a large number of local government areas (LGA), represented by their elected councils. The LGAs of various shapes and sizes have grown around relatively higher density but usually small central business districts (CBDs). The governance frameworks of major Australian cities are seen as inefficient due to a high degree of fragmentation. No one single agency or level of government has overall responsibility for metropolitan planning and infrastructure provision. Instead, this responsibility is spread across three levels of government, a range of government agencies and departments and dozens of local councils. Gooding (2005) describes the task of planning the city in Australia as a marginal activity in terms of its status within state governments, yet the task is also usually contested between state and local governments. To date, successful state-local government partnerships in Australia to carry out planning tasks have been very rare. In the context of New South Wales, Kubler attributes the lack of such partnerships to limitations of the State governance system that does not offer an arena wherein major stakeholders can interact and negotiate in a structured way (Kubler in Gooding 2005). Kübler (2005) describes Australian cities as being among the most suburbanised as well as the most fragmented in terms of urban governance in the world, claiming they are three to ten times more fragmented than their counterparts in comparable OECD countries. The metropolitan regions comprise low-density suburban sprawl distributed across a collection of LGAs around a small CBD. It is easy to see how the primarily suburban sprawl stretching across expansive areas would worsen the fragmentation of plan implementation functions and urban governance. For many decades, the tendency to respond to planning challenges arising from increases in complexity of issues has been to make exceptions in the form of creating special organizational structures and work teams to deal with specific situation. “The general solution has been to form ad hoc authorities to deal with a particular issue as

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soon as the problem becomes too difficult for the responsible level of government to cope with, rather than examining methods of reform and updating existing representative government institutions” (Lang 1976: 7 in Gooding 2005). By now it is widely accepted that Australian cities have reached a stage of maturity and complexity that requires an overhaul of urban governance systems. From a regional planning perspective, the situation warrants finding ways to optimise coordination between the levels of government. There is a need to enable existing government structures to facilitate regional planning and the implementation of regional development projects addressing locational equity issues. In the case of Australia where the Federal Government controls the ‘purse’ strings while ‘power’ over land use rests with state governments, this requires better integration between central and local governments. Efforts to create or strengthen integration between various levels of government also need to contend with the reality that local government in Australia is the creature of State government. Effective state legislation is therefore vital to encourage issue-based collaboration between local governments across their administrative boundaries. Governance mechanisms are required to facilitate cooperation among two or more local governments, especially within metropolitan regions. They need to have the flexibility to incorporate “multi-stakeholder” cooperation and partnerships among actors at various levels, such as private developers, research institutes, universities, and civil society in general including communitybased organizations, stakeholder groups, etc. Innovations in urban governance are driven to a large extent by a change of thinking within government agencies from being responsible for service provision per se to problem solving. In the context of local councils, collaboration across administrative boundaries may enhance the ability of a local council to deal with complex social and economic issues that it is affected by. By engaging with the larger issues and joining forces, local councils could collectively be in a position to influence various government agencies to reorganise the processes and priorities that could improve outcomes for the region and ultimately their own rate payers. ROCs function best where local councils coming together for planning and governance reasons share common identity, history and heritage or aspirations with each other. Collective action across a larger geographical terrain and community can help in addressing equity issues growing out of historical disadvantage. They also encourage exploration of alternative means of service delivery due to newfound economies of scale that could render feasible the incorporation of potential input from private sector and civil society to solve longstanding issues. The adoption of integrative approaches to planning such as joined up government entail a significant change within organizational cultures of local councils. It “requires greater emphasis on particular values including collaboration, integration, innovation, risk-taking and flexibility” (IPAI 2009, p. 5). Successful adoption and operationalization of integrative governance initiatives require organisational flexibility accompanied by “the ability of staff to think and act across organisational boundaries.. [and].. political engagement and commitment” (IPAI 2009, p. 5).

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Pollitt reminds proponents of joined-up government to “regard it as a long term project, a selective project, and a cooperative project” (Pollitt 2003, p. 46). This reminder may equally apply to local councils seeking to set up an ROC. Pollitt emphasizes the long-term nature of the initiative because of the time it takes to assemble the pre-requisites, such as up skilling public servants, creating professional alignments, trust building and enabling citizen participation. In the case of ROC, this advice can assume a greater significance because local councils comprise of both elected councillors and public servants and technical experts. Also, ensuring community participation is paramount as local government works closest to the community. Pollitt (2003) considers it a selective project because it may be appropriate for solving specific and significant problems, but only where the benefits clearly justify disturbing existing structures and procedures. This suggests that the case needs to be made clearly specifying the expected added values that membership in the ROC will yield before establishing an ROC and periodically thereafter as well. Pollitt also emphasizes that it should be treated as a cooperative project because attempts to impose it from the top down are likely to fail due to “lack of interest, an absence of incentives, or sheer inertia and suspicion… [and] overt resistance” (Pollitt 2003, p. 47).

4 Partnerships at the Level of Local Government 4.1 Changing Functions of Local Councils According to the Australian Local Government Association’s website, there are around 560 local government bodies throughout Australia, represented by 6,600 elected local councillors. There is great variation in LGAs in terms of their size. The areal size of LGAs ranges from 1.5 km2 to 372,571 km2 .1 The largest local government authority by population is the Brisbane City Council with 1,052,458 residents, while the average population of LGAs in Australia is approximately 28,400 (http:// alga.asn.au). Local Government Acts in each State have created councils as statutory bodies, bestowing upon them broad powers to make laws and provide services to their constituents (Marshall et al. 2006). Prior to the 1960s, local councils primarily dealt with the provision of physical infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and sewerage in return for the ‘rates’ paid by the LGA’s constituents. After the 1970s, local councils took up additional functions of providing community facilities, such as, libraries and parks, maintenance of local roads, handling of planning and development approvals, and waste disposal. Local government functions have continued to evolve and currently, it is common for local councils to also deal with provision of childcare, tourism and urban renewal. 1 The

Shire of Peppermint Grove within Perth Metropolitan Area has an areal size of 1.5 km2 (http://www.peppermintgrove.wa.gov.au), while the Shire of East Pilbara covers an area 372,571 km2 (http://www.eastpilbara.wa.gov.au). Both these LGAs lie within the State of Western Australia..

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Many councils are increasingly inclined to consider waste disposal as part of their environmental management tasks, and some councils are considering venturing into transport service provision. This marks a gradual but significant shift from ‘services to property’ to ‘services to people’ in their approach as councils become increasingly interested in the provision of services related to public health, safety, and accessibility. In other words, up to the 1960s and 1970s in Australia, the major role and function of local councils was largely limited to property protection and improvement. During the 1990s, however, local governments acquired an increased level of sophistication in their management functions and a degree of assertiveness at the broader levels of planning and policy debates. This is explained as “a direct product of organizational, industrial, financial, legislative and regulatory reform that then swept across Australian local government (Sproats 1998; Aulich 1997; Wensig 1997)” (Kelly 2011, p. 10). During this time period, local governments tended to broaden their role, taking up policy positions and becoming proactive in areas such as environmental protection and biodiversity conservation. This was reflected in the enhanced profile of local government associations. As expectations from local governments have changed significantly over the past few decades, local governments increasingly find themselves obligated to pursue better outcomes for their communities. This has put pressure on them to engage with State and Federal governments as active partners to better coordinate the implementation of plans and policies and delivery of services. According to the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, a public service department of the Government of Australia charged with the responsibility for national policies and programmes, there has been a realisation that local government could play a greater role for in partnership with the Australian Government in fulfilling the national policy agenda. Some typical areas identified for such potential partnerships include regional development, transport and communications, environmental management and Indigenous issues (DIRD 2003). The Local Government Act 1993 has proven to be vey useful in allowing local councils to pursue partnerships, helping to remove impediments to councils providing undefined community services that existed previously. Section 24 of Local Government Act 1993 enables individual councils to “provide goods, services and facilities, and carry out activities, appropriate to the current and future needs within its local community…” (www.austlii.edu.au). It even enables each council to “provide services outside its own boundary, such as liaising with other councils in managing wildlife corridors that traverse artificial council borders” (Kelly 2011, p. 11). Local councils can also gain access to Federal grants for initiatives that could facilitate a broadening of their focus as they can opt to not narrowly focus on protecting ratepayers’ interests only.

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5 Moving Towards Regional Organisation of Councils (ROC) Local authorities tend to feel severely limited in effecting sustainable urban development because of the wider scale of issues that needs to be considered which cross across their boundaries. At times they find themselves lacking the critical mass required to justify specialised services and/or apply the scale of economy required to make the services affordable for the ratepayers. The task of identifying local community’s preferences and aspirations for urban services is also often too difficult and resource consuming. This state of affairs has prompted voluntary regional organisation of councils to come into existence to take up urban management tasks that spread beyond the boundaries of individual LGAs. With the realisation of the nature of environmental problems, local councils felt the need to combine their efforts with neighbouring councils to manage environmental issues such as water quality control along rivers and creeks, and the handling of waste management and recycling initiatives. Many local governments were also motivated to group together and pool their resources to fund joint studies and commission investigations on specific issues confronting them. There was a growing realisation of the importance of establishing community needs and aspirations. It not only helped councils to better attend to community preferences and priorities in resolving the issues, but the systematic documentation of community needs and aspirations also enabled them to lead concerted lobbying with State and Federal government agencies to seek funds for crucial projects. Over time, as the focus shifted more towards servicing broader community needs, some of the more organized and active voluntary regional councils began to take up the role of advocacy for their region.

5.1 ROCs and Regional Development Planning In Australia, voluntary regional organisations of local councils were formed to pursue mutually beneficial objectives, dating at least as far back as 1922. They are generally referred to as Regional Organisations of Councils (ROC).2 Over the decades, ROCs have evolved in terms of the complexity of the nature of functions they have undertaken as community expectations from local government have risen. It may be safe to suggest that, in the context of Australia, ROCs have survived the test of time. At the last update in 2002, there were 39 regional organization of councils included in the Australian Local Government Association’s database. However, the fortunes of ROCs have fluctuated considerably over the past couple of decades as the overall policy approach towards planning has changed with changes of government. These changes have affected the support ROC initiatives have enjoyed in certain 2 While ‘Regional Organisation of Councils’ (ROC) is the predominantly used term across Australia,

in Western Australia the statutory grouping of councils is referred to as a ‘regional council’.

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periods corresponding to the political regime, flourishing at times and floundering at other times. Growth and development of ROCs can be connected to the few rather sporadic and short-lived attempts at regional development planning that Australia has experienced. In Australia, “regional planning as has been interpreted in the statutory planning sense is more about providing a coordinated function for addressing cross boundary issues” (Gurran 2007, p. 124). In the 1970s, as the Federal government under Whitlam sought to sponsor the creation of ‘centres’ and ‘poles’ of regional development, it “saw local government as a convenient mechanism through which to pursue regional fiscal equalization policy in terms of access to public services, especially in poorer outer metropolitan areas” (Taylor and Garlick 1989 in Kelly 2011, pp. 9–10). Many ROCs came into being in the early 1970s in response to a Federal government proposal encouraging regional groups of individual councils to bid for Commonwealth grants for distribution to local governments. This programme was, however, short-lived due to the change of government. After slipping into the background in the following years, the phenomenon of ROCs received a boost again in the mid-1990s when the Federal government offered untied funding grants to local governments. The funding was funnelled through the states in the shape of Federal Assistance Grants under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia). The initiative sought to promote regional or cross local government area boundaries planning, especially in remote councils. The funding allowed a degree of discretion in terms of types of projects, allowing councils to think beyond strictly servicing the interests of their ‘ratepayers’. However, the level of funding has been criticized by some, referring to it as “drip-feed funding” that is “insufficient to meet enlarged responsibilities” (Daly 2000, p. 209 in Kelly 2011, p. 10). There is also concern raised that such limited funds were likely to be used only for carrying out elementary tasks (Kelly 2011).

5.2 REDOs and Council Amalgamation One of the threats to the survival and growth of ROCs emerged in 1994, with massive funding by the then Federal government to set up a number of Regional Development Organizations (REDOs) across Australia, focusing more directly on regional economic development (Sorensen 1994). REDOs had broader membership base than ROCs, including a variety of local groups and organizations in addition to the councils. However, the fortunes of REDOs have similarly fluctuated over the years and ROCs seem to have survived the threat. In addition to the advent of REDOs, ROCs’ survival was also threatened by the prospects of amalgamation of councils (Marshall et al. 2006). There has been a drawn out debate among policymakers as to whether consolidation or collaboration could best serve to improve efficiency and effectiveness of local governance. There has been a “long dominant perception that ‘bigger is better’ in the structural reform of Australian local government” (Marshall et al. 2006, p. 239), which, though

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diminished somewhat, still lingers on. Proponents of consolidation of LGAs push for amalgamation of local governments, claiming: …larger municipalities are more cost effective because they can deliver economies of scale and scope, and reduce duplication.. [because they help] build capacity by employing specialist expertise, provide higher quality services, ensure that resources are distributed more equitably, foster economic development, and enhance regional planning and coordination… (Marshall et al. 2006, p. 239)

There has been a history of moves for amalgamation of LGAs over the years, citing reasons such as rationalization, economies of scale, and removal of duplication of organisational structures. During the 1990s, municipal consolidation was promoted as a major feature of local government reform. Over a five-year period between 1992 and 1997, there was a massive reduction in the number of local authorities in Australia through extensive state-wide amalgamation programmes (Marshall et al. 2006). Interest in and commitment to ROCs are obviously affected by the prospect of amalgamation that could potentially alter the very existence and structure of member councils. Councils citing community concerns around historical and identity issues sometimes meet the push for amalgamation with resistance. For example, recently there was a major initiative undertaken by the State Premier of Western Australia to carry out wide scale amalgamation of LGAs in Perth metropolitan region. Many feasibility studies were carried out and demarcation of rationalized LGAs’ boundaries were discussed extensively. The push for amalgamation of local councils culminated in a 2016 referendum where the community soundly rejected it and the initiative was consequently abandoned. An alternative presented to amalgamation is collaboration. Proponents of collaboration find it to be a more desirable alternative to consolidation, claiming that collaboration could also achieve all those objectives sought by amalgamation. In addition, they avoid the potential antagonism between the councils required to merge. ROC is thus presented as an alternative solution that can serve to enhance the capabilities of local governments to perform their functions through collaboration, without risking the resentment or antagonism often likely to be generated by amalgamation.

6 Functions Provided by ROC 6.1 Capturing Advantage of Economies of Scale for Council Operations At the coalface, ROCs take up various tasks that help deliver effective day-to-day functioning of member local governments. An audit of the specific tasks undertaken by ROCs across Australia documented a wide range of formal and informal activity taking place between individual councils and groups of councils (DIRD 2003). Some of the issues the various ROCs attempted to tackle can be classified as:

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Developing regional vision for regional development Facilitating joint purchasing and resource pooling Entering into projects or forming a company Undertaking statutory review of development plans Establishing joint authority for environmental health responsibilities Establishing financial management mechanisms Asset management

6.2 Advocating the Regional Agenda In addition to managing operational tasks, successful ROCs have mainly served to provide a platform to facilitate interface between formal governance institutions. “Activities undertaken by ROCs include information exchange, coordination, resource sharing, project management, partnership building and regional advocacy” (Marshall et al. 2006). Their main utility seems to lie in facilitating actions aimed at creating equity and correcting patterns of underinvestment in infrastructure and services in historically disadvantaged areas. In this regard, ROCs undertake a wide range of activities that facilitates the promotion of regional interests shared by member councils. A national survey of ROCs undertaken by Marshall and Witherby in 2002 identified three broad priority functions of ROCs. These are: • Regional advocacy • Political lobbying • Fostering cooperation between member councils Additional goals included: • • • • •

Economic growth Resource sharing Strategic planning Community well being Protecting the environment (Marshall et al. 2006)

Initially, only progressive and ambitious ROCs sought to become strong advocates for their regions. This task in itself involved “challenging a wide range of government policies and institutions including planning…” (Gooding 2005, p. 11). In more recent years, many ROCs across Australia, widely supported by their member local councils, seem to collectively share the goal of contributing effectively to the strategic planning processes at the metropolitan regional level. Some ROCs have thus lobbied for the creation of regional or sub-regional planning frameworks and structures. There seems to be a strong desire among ROCs to facilitate metropolitan regional planning with a greater spatial dimension, enabling their member councils to effectively address perceived increasing sub-regional inequalities.

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7 Case-Studies of Regional Organisation of Councils in Western Australia Generally speaking, like the rest of Australia, local governments in Western Australia can form various types of collaboration models for delivering a range of shared systems and services on a regional basis. In addition to forming an ROC, they also have the option to enter into a partnership agreement to form an association incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1987. Within the ROC option, they may form a Voluntary Regional Organisation of Councils (VROC) or establish a statutory Regional Local Government through formal partnership agreements under the Local Government Act 1995 (DLG 2011). In the case of Western Australia, most VROCs tend to be located in non-metropolitan areas. Local councils situated within the metropolitan “are more likely to favour the statutory Regional Local Government model …” (DLG 2011, p. 7). The success of the collaborative initiative largely depends on the extent to which the structure and governance arrangements incorporate flexibility. There needs to be flexibility to allow the partnership entity to expand and contract quickly to best respond to changes in regional circumstances. This means that member councils could opt in or out of certain projects without affecting the overall regional framework of action of the ROC. Flexibility should also be reflected in the capacity to include a variety of types of partners whether they are local governments, private sector actors or non-government organisations (NGOs). The strength of regional councils, whether voluntary (VROC) or statutory regional councils, lies in their flexibility. However, flexibility “must be balanced by accountability, both to ratepayers and to the State Government” (DLG 2011, p. 2). This requires the maintenance of documentation and record keeping to ensure transparency of decision-making and compliance. Procedures need to be in place to also ensure appropriate extent of oversight by, and reporting to, participant councils (DLG 2011).

7.1 Voluntary Regional Organisations of Councils (VROCs) While all ROCs in Australia are essentially formed voluntarily by all member councils, VROCs in Western Australia are entirely voluntary collaborative groupings of neighbouring councils distinguished from statutory regional councils by their lack of any legal status on their own. VROCs are usually multi-purpose in nature and easier to form, with member councils contributing towards financing the organisation. It is common for member councils to rotate the provision of administrative support functions annually amongst themselves. A board comprising the mayors and Chief Executive Officers of constituent local governments usually governs VROCs. These are formed to serve the common purposes identified by member local governments. Common tasks include measures aimed at administrative efficiency of local

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government through resource sharing including information and staff; and creating economies of scale trough joint purchasing. They organise series of fora, information sessions and discussion groups to develop common policy positions on common issues. The object is to facilitate collaboration among member councils for delivery of identified services and projects, strengthen coordination and take up strategic planning across local council boundaries. VROCs also advocate for the region and liaise on their behalf with government departments and agencies and the private sector (DLG 2011). Because VROC partnership is entirely voluntary, it is easy for member councils to join or withdraw from particular projects that the VROC undertakes. Any member council disinclined to participate in a particular initiative has the option to pull out or dissociate itself from that specific venture. This does not affect the overall membership of the council within the ROC. This flexibility makes the partnership more versatile, ensuring flat hierarchy. It allows consensus while negating the need for assigning veto power to any member. At the same time, however, the unexpected pulling out of members may potentially undermine the viability of certain projects due to loss of advantage of economy of scales. A number of shortcomings have been identified in this voluntary model. For example, the decision-making process of VROCs can be quite time consuming. This usually occurs because of the tendency for council representatives to return to their home councils to seek confirmation before finalising response to the proposals being discussed (DLG 2011). This results from the fact that unless ratified by each council, decisions reached by the VROC have no legal weight. Another weakness relates to the organisation’s lack of a corporate status. This requires that the financial management of each of its projects have to be undertaken by one of the member councils (www. nedlands.wa.gov.au/wesroc). This could create a drain on the resources of particular councils and also lead to delays.

7.1.1

WESROC—An Example of a VROC

An example of a metropolitan VROC in Western Australia in the Perth metropolitan region is the Western Suburbs Regional Organisation of Councils (WESROC) formed in 1995. It comprises the Towns of Claremont, Cottesloe and Mosman Park, the Shire of Peppermint Grove and the Cities of Nedlands and Subiaco. The Town of Cambridge and Western Metropolitan Regional Council are also listed as participating local governments. The members work cooperatively to implement strategic initiatives across local government area boundaries in Perth’s western suburbs. (www. cottesloe.wa.gov.au). WESROC member councils work on the basis of a voluntary partnership, on a number of projects addressing cross-boundary regional issues (www.nedlands. wa.gov.au/wesroc). Its webpage is currently hosted on the websites of its member councils. The Nedlands’ website features WESROC under ‘Your Council’ section, whereas Cottlesloe’s website features its description under ‘Environment and Sustainability’ section. Nedland’s website states that WESROC has undertaken various

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projects and commissioned some important studies. Its WESROC webpage provides a single access point for reports, newsletters and WESROC projects (www.nedlands. wa.gov.au/wesroc).

7.2 Statutory Regional Local Government A statutory regional local government (referred to as regional councils) is established under section 3.61 of Western Australia’s Local Government Act 1995 and has the status of a local government. It operates on the basis of consensus of all participants and the Minister under an ‘establishment agreement’ that clearly scopes and specifies its ‘regional purpose’ (DLG 2011). As a regional council in Western Australia operates as a body corporate, it is able to manage its financial transactions independently rather than depending on any of its member councils. While its governing body comprises elected members from participant councils only, it can contract external expertise as and when required. A regional council is also able to draft local laws for regulating land, such as those related to waste disposal sites (DLG 2011). The funds at its disposal are largely sourced from contributions each member local council makes towards its expenses—as management fees and as additional funds on a project-by-project basis (Gooding 2012)—and any Federal or State government grants that it may acquire. There is also provision for ROC to generate revenue on its own, as for example, it could run a regional waste facility on a commercial basis (Gooding 2012). Although regional councils are formed under an establishment agreement, they have the flexibility to expand or vary their scope and purpose though consensus. Similar to VROC, individual members can opt out of specific initiatives without affecting their overall membership status within the ROC. Mostly these ROCs were formed to handle a single specified function at a regional scale, usually waste management. Over the years, many have “branched into activities such as safety/risk management training, environmental assessment, regional planning and development, and tourism” (DLG 2011, p. 5). More recently, some ROCs have furthered diversified their activities with some getting involved in developing integrated transport strategy for their regions. In terms of accountability and governance, ROCs are generally subject to all the constraints, responsibilities and compliance requirements applicable to a local government, but its compliance is somewhat reduced. The Local Government Act 1995 allows further reduction of compliance requirements for regional local governments. However, member councils are obliged to undertake responsibility and oversight of compliance because “Accountability rests with the council of the regional local government” (DLG 2011, p. 6).

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WMRC—A Single Purpose Statutory Regional Council

In the Perth metropolitan region, it is worth noting that Western Metropolitan Regional Council is listed as participating ‘local government’ of WESROC on Cottesloe’s website. Unlike WESROC, Western Metropolitan Regional Council (WMRC) is a statutory regional council set up in 1989 by the councils of Claremont, Cottesloe, Mosman Park, Peppermint Grove and Subiaco. It serves a region with a population of 43,983 (ABS 2016), covering an area of 21.5 km2 . WMRC’s establishment agreement empowers it to undertake waste management functions on behalf of its member Councils. The soul purpose of WMRC is to promote good waste practices in the Western Suburbs of Perth by operating a waste transfer station and also promoting waste education within the community (www.wmrc.wa.gov.au). This arrangement illustrates the point that regional councils are given the status of local councils and thereby can enter into agreements with other councils. They are financially independent and governed by accountability rules as specified in Western Australia’s Local Government Act 1995. The annual financial reviews and related documentation are accessible from its website (www.wmrc.wa.gov.au/library). Currently, WMRC is a single focus entity aiming to manage waste for its member councils. Through consensus of its members, however, WMRC has the capacity to grow in scope by taking on additional functions. In a professional network website, WMRC describes its purpose of educating the community regarding how to treat waste. It concludes with the following statement about its current aspirations: And once we have achieved this for waste management, we aspire to grow our work into ultimately delivering an inspirational natural environment for the Western Suburbs of Perth (www.linkedin.com/company/western-metropolitan-regional-council).

7.2.2

EMRC—An Example of a Dynamic Statutory Regional Council

In the Perth metropolitan region, the Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council (EMRC) is an example of an established and dynamic statutory local regional council. It comprises six local councils serving a region with a population of over 300,000 covering an area of 2,100 km2 . Originally, the main function EMRC engaged in was waste management. Over the years it has taken up projects delivering training and assessment, and has been engaged in economic development initiatives within the region. The Eastern EMRC describes itself as “a progressive and innovative regional local government working on behalf of six member Councils located in Perth’s eastern suburbs: Town of Bassendean, City of Bayswater, City of Belmont, Shire of Kalamunda, Shire of Mundaring and the City of Swan” (www.emrc.org.au). It provides services to its member councils in the areas of “waste management, environmental management, and regional development”. It presents itself as “a model of successful collaboration that has initiated projects delivering real benefits to the region” (www.emrc.org.au).

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Fig. 2 Examples of research advocacy initiatives by EMRC. Source EMRC website

EMRC undertakes advocacy for development and service provision, including research advocacy for the region by producing studies with actionable recommendations. It actively serves as a representative entity for the region by providing an organisational structure to tackle larger, shared problems. It embodies a voluntary association of member councils willing to pool and share resources, avoid duplication of service provision and create a bigger voice for the region. As such it puts in considerable effort in identifying common themes and issues across neighbouring LGAs within its region and develop a unified stance on common key issues and priorities. EMRC describes its functions as providing strategic leadership for the region. It does so by generating and sharing information on facts, perceptions and opinions prevalent in the region. It has actively commissioned research on key issues affecting the region (Fig. 2). As such it takes a proactive stance in identifying emerging issues and trends for consideration by policy makers. It then undertakes advocacy and lobbying for regional priorities through collaboration and partnerships with its member councils as well as other government agencies, private sector and community organisations. EMRC uses its legal status to maintain regular dialogue with state and federal governments and their agencies. Through its lobbying, it pushes the “region” brand to attract investment and promote business opportunities. As a successful ROC, EMRC has developed a reputation for considered policy analysis and advocacy on a wide range of issues affecting their communities. It has gone far beyond its original mandate of providing waste management services for its member councils. Its currently undertakes projects and activities in the areas of regional planning, transport, employment generation and tourism. The types of projects include those based on resource sharing to carry out required operations and other projects initiated co-operatively between member councils. These projects are either funded jointly by its members or from external sources.

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As a dynamic and progressive ROC, EMRC has also been engaged in developing a regional integrated transport strategy (Fig. 2). It commissioned studies on traffic congestion modelling and a regional bicycling network strategy. As part of its research advocacy, it has also developed partnerships with community organisations such as Curtin University to run series of community forums and workshops to identify community aspirations for public transport services in the region.

7.3 Conclusion This chapter reported on how local governments are continually maturing and adding complexity to their functions. In seeking to play a role in sustainability and regional integration, local councils have sought to work collaboratively as ROCs. ROCs have been quite effective in providing regional advocacy, political lobbying and fostering cooperation between member councils in addition to facilitation of day to day local council functions through economies of scale and pooling of resources. ROCs have successfully survived over decades of fluctuating fortunes following changes of governments and provided a useful organisational structure to deal with regional issues that need to be handled at a geographical scale larger than individual LGAs. They have come to embody the bulk of regional planning initiatives carried out in Australia through Federal government financial initiatives, where the State government holds substantial power over local government. At the local government level, ROCs have also established the feasibility of carrying out productive voluntary collaboration among local councils to take up larger level functions. This has provided credibility to proponents of collaborative form of urban governance, rather than forced top-down amalgamation of LGAs for creating economies of scale and avoidance of duplication of services. ROCs could thus have played an important role in limiting the impact of local government amalgamation efforts across Australia. The brief look at the three cases from Western Australia clearly establishes how ROCs, whether or not they have legal status, can allow local councils to join forces and venture out to take up projects of interest. ROCs are not confined to performing basic operations for their ratepayers. They often progress from waste management to other broader environmental management projects. Progressive ROCs can further broaden their functions to include regional planning and development and sustainability issues over time. Through generation of information and dissemination of research findings, they enable their members to effectively advocate for their regions. They have served to provide a platform to facilitate interface between formal governance institutions for delivery of better-integrated regional outcomes. In the process, ROCs have served to enhance the role of local government to influence regional metropolitan planning and governance.

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The success of ROCs in Australia can be largely attributed to an organisational culture developed over time within various government units that allows their staff to see beyond their traditional boundaries. ROCs have provided local governments the fora to consider, and the mechanism to carry out, experiments in inter-local government collaboration through voluntary association without giving up their autonomy or identity. The fairly long history of successful delivery of collaborative governance has allowed the ROC model to gain a fair degree of maturity and complexity. The ROC experience in the Perth metropolitan region of Western Australia could thus provide useful reference for local governments in the wider Asia Pacific region volunteering to partake in shared governance initiatives. Such initiatives in collaboration could allow planners and administrator to envision and pursue larger scale sustainability initiatives rather than compete for financial transfers from central governments to carry out day-to-day urban functions. By thinking beyond their own jurisdictions they could better contribute to inclusive planning as envisaged in the New Urban Agenda.

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DLG (Department of Local Government) (2011) Regional collaboration models for local government in Western Australia. Information Paper prepared for the Metropolitan Local Government Review, Department of Local Government, Western Australia Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council (2016). http://www.emrc.org.au. Accessed 21 Nov 2016 Ellis P, Roberts M (2016) Leveraging urbanization in South Asia: managing spatial transformation for prosperity and livability. The World Bank, Washington DC EUDP—European Union Delegation to the Philippines (2010) Critical ingredients in building and sustaining inter-local cooperation. report on activity undertaken under the aegis of the Philippines development forum and local government’s sub-working group on inter-local cooperation, Makati City FCM (2013) Federation of Canadian municipalities newsletter july/case study: inter-municipal cooperation in the Philippines https://www.fcm.ca/Documents/case-studies/International/InterMunicipal_Cooperation_in_The_Philippines_EN.pdf. Accessed 14 Aug 2017 Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2013) Case study of inter-municipal cooperation in the Philippines: poverty reduction through integrated small enterprise development. Federation of Canadian Municipalities News Letter, July 2013. http://www.fcm.ca. Accessed 14 Aug 2017 Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2013) News letter, July 2013. http://www.fcm.ca. Accessed 14 Aug 2017 Gooding A (2005) In the saddle or the burr underneath—the role of regional organisations of councils in metropolitan planning. In: Refereed Proceedings of the 2nd Bi-annual national conference on the state of Australian Cities, Brisbane, November 30–December 2 2005 Gooding A (2012) A comparative analysis of regional organisations of councils in NSW and Western Australia, Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney Gurran N (2007) Australian urban land use planning: introducing statutory planning practice in New South Wales. Sydney University Press, Sydney http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au. Accessed 20 Nov 2016 IPAI—Institute of Public Administration Ireland (2009) Joined-up government. Report prepared for efficiency unit, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Unit, Hong Kong, April 2009 Khan S, George J, Brunner J (2015) The evolving framework for planning in Australia: moving towards sustainable governance. In: Brunner J, Glasson J (eds) Contemporary issues in Australian urban and regional planning. Routledge/Taylor & Francis, New York, pp 15–33 Kübler D (2005) Problems and prospects of metropolitan governance in Sydney: towards old or new regionalism? City futures research centre. University of New South Wales, Sydney Kubler D, Randolph B (2007) Metropolitan governance in Australia: the Sydney experience. In: Hambleton R, Gross JS (eds) Governing cities in global era. Palgrave, New York, pp 139–150 Lang J (1976) The development of regional organisation in Western Sydney. Unpublished thesis, Department of Town and Country Planning, University of Sydney, Sydney Manasan R, Mercado R (1998) Metropolitan arrangements in the Philippines: passing fancy or the future megatrend?. Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Manila Marshall N, Withreby A (2002) The roles and functions of regional organisations of councils, unpublished. Paper presented to the cutting edge of change: shaping local government for the 21st Century Conference, University of New England, Armidale, 14–17 February Marshall N, Dollery B, Sorensen T (2006) Voluntary regional co-operation in Australia. Can J Reg Sci 29:239–256 New South Wales Consolidated Acts (2017) Local government act 1993—Sect 24. http://www. austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/lga1993182/s24.html. Accessed 16 Apr 2017 Niikawa T (2010) Decentralization and local politics. In: Sekiguchi M (ed.) Government and politics, vol. 1, pp. 378–397. EOLSS Publishers/UNESCO, Oxford

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Partnership for Democratic Local Governance in Southeast-Asia (DELGOSEA) (2017). http://www. delgosea.eu/cms/Best-Practices/Thematic-Area-2-Institutional-Governance/05-Cooperationbetween-Local-Governments-to-Address-Shared-Needs. Accessed 14 Aug 2017 Pollitt C (2003) Joined-up government: a survey. Polit Stud Rev 1(1):34–49 Sarosa W (2006) Indonesia (Chap 7). In: Roberts B, Kanaley T (eds) Urbanisation and sustainability in Asia: case studies of good practice. cities alliance/cities without slums, pp. 155–188. Asian Development Bank Sorensen T (1994) On the white paper: ‘working nation. Reg Policy Pract 3(1):2–4 Sproats K (1998) Australian local government reform in the 1990s, Sydney: centre for local government research and education. UTS, Sydney Taylor M, Garlick S (1989) Commonwealth government involvement in regional development in the 1980s: a local approach. In: Higgins B, Zagorski K (eds) Australian regional developments. readings in regional experiences, policies and prospects, pp. 79–103. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra Town of Cottesloe (2016). http://www.cottesloe.wa.gov.au. Accessed 20 Nov 2016 United Nations (2018). Sustainable development goal 11: make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11. Accessed 15 Apr 2018 Vorratnchaiphan C, Villeneuve D (2006) Thailand (Chap 13). In: Roberts B, Kanaley T (eds) Sustainability in Asia: case studies of good practice. Cities Alliance/Cities without Slums, Asian Development Bank, pp 341–368 Wensig E (1997) The process of local government reform: Legislative change in the states. In: Dollery B, Marshall N (eds) Australian local government: reform and renewal. Macmillan Education Australia, Melbourne, pp 89–102 Western Metropolitan Regional Council (2016). http://www.wmrc.wa.gov.au. Accessed 21 Nov 2016 Western Metropolitan Regional Council (2016). Company news. https://www.linkedin.com/ company/western-metropolitan-regional-council. Accessed 20 Nov 2016

Shahed Khan is affiliated with the urban and regional planning program at Curtin University, located in Perth, Western Australia. His research interests stretch across a broad spectrum of sustainability issues related to the built environment and its users, such as local governance and community planning, in the Australian and Asian contexts. His current teaching and research cover impacts of globalization manifest in the shaping and reshaping of global urban and regional networks and hierarchies and their implications on local governance in terms of decentralization and democratisation. As a Planner, Shahed seeks to explore the means available to pursue the objective of human development – both at the individual and community levels, and contribute towards creating just and sustainable societies.

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S. Khan and B. Bajracharya Bhishna Bajracharya has been an Associate Professor of Urban Planning at Bond University in Gold Coast, Australia since 2008. Prior to joining Bond, he taught at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Brisbane for about twelve years, and worked as a post-doctoral fellow at the Australian National University, Canberra for about two years. He has a Bachelor of Architecture degree from the School of Planning and Architecture, Delhi and Master’s degree in Urban Planning and PhD degree from the University of Hawaii. His research areas include urban governance, disaster management, masterplanned communities, transit oriented development and smart cities. He was recently invited to make a presentation on financing urban services in Nepal at a national workshop organised by the Asia Foundation and Asian Development Bank in Kathmandu. He is a founding member of the Brisbane Chapter of the East West Center Association. He is also currently the Chair of the Bond University Sustainability Committee.

Issues in Urban Planning and Policy: The Case Study of Lahore, Pakistan Nasir Javed and Sana Riaz

Abstract Since Pakistan’s independence from the British in 1947, Lahore has struggled to reconcile the two parallel cities that developed under a century of colonial rule. Old Lahore, laid out as a typical city from the medieval period, was largely contained within its defensive, fortified walls four kilometres from the bank of river Ravi. It had developed as a network of densely packed streets containing houses, bazaars and royal monuments alike. This organic city form was interrupted when the British demolished its walls and constructed their administrative apparatus on the surrounding plains. Although the new city that emerged was well planned with modern thoroughfares, canals and railway tracks, it was built on the premise of exclusion that set the course for its future development into the post-colonial era. The story of planning this multidimensional city over the subsequent seventy-odd years, which has no doubt seen some successes, is a tumultuous one. This chapter intends to explore the various efforts made to organize the chaos of a city unsettled by the aftereffects of colonization and the trauma of partition through to the present. All the while, Lahore has been a rapidly sprawling regional capital at the heart of Pakistan’s most populous province of Punjab. This chapter will include a review of the various policies, plans and legal frameworks that were introduced, along with the institutional setup intended to enforce these policies. The city’s master plans are discussed, including their soundness, the fate of their implementation and the results, if any, that were realized. Perhaps most importantly, in light of the debatable success of past planning efforts, an attempt has been made to flesh out Lahore’s current trajectory of urban planning and policy, and provide recommendations for promoting sustainable development as Lahore stands at the cusp of becoming Pakistan’s second megacity. Keywords Lahore · Urban planning · Urban policy · Institutions and governance · Urban extents · Spatial growth · Punjab Pakistan

N. Javed (B) · S. Riaz The Urban Unit, Punjab, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_5

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1 Introduction The objectives of this chapter are to introduce Lahore and its spatial growth, describe the current regulatory and institutional battlefield related to urban policy and planning, and try to guide the future for urban policy making in Lahore. In doing so, the chapter also highlights the relevance of the New Urban Agenda (NUA) and in turn Sustainable Development Goal 11 to the situation of Lahore. It is imperative to constructively examine the case of Lahore and discuss the tumultuous journey of the urban governance systems in shaping Lahore. The time is right or not too late to learn from the case of Lahore while several other cities in Punjab and Pakistan are growing at an exponential rate in terms of area and population. While Lahore has always been the forerunner in master planning and creating development authorities and other cities have followed, the gaps in the system should be acknowledged to set better examples and improve the institutional and regulatory frameworks governing the spatial growth of Lahore. The relevance of the NUA to the discussion in this chapter is key. The NUA recognizes the importance in how cities and human settlements are planned, financed, developed, governed and managed. It highlights the leading role of national and subnational governments “in the definition and implementation of inclusive and effective urban policies and legislation” for sustainable urban development. The NUA also calls to develop and “implement urban policies at the appropriate level, including in local-national and multi-stakeholder partnerships, building integrated systems of cities and human settlements and promoting cooperation among all levels of government”. It also commits to strengthen “urban governance with sound institutions and mechanisms” with “coherence in urban development plans to enable social inclusion” and growth. Finally, and most crucially, the NUA commits to support “reinvigorating long-term and integrated urban and territorial planning and design in order to optimize the spatial dimension of the urban form and deliver the positive outcomes of urbanization” (United Nations 2017, p. 5). A few previous attempts have been made to discuss the roles of institutions such as development authorities and local governments, and the urban planning challenges in Lahore, by Groote et al. (1989), The Urban Unit (2007), Hameed and Nadeem (2008) and Ahmad et al. (2013) for example. This literature review has been very helpful and used as the basis of this chapter. However, as every piece has been written at different stages of the local and provincial government systems, the information was out-dated. Some studies were too extensive and certain facts were scattered. This chapter tries to add a fresh perspective to the spatial growth of Lahore and brings together an update of the different studies in a concise and integrated manner, and in relation to the NUA for policymakers, academicians, planners and other stakeholders. It is important to note that this chapter tries to mainly address urban Lahore where the gravity of governance issues exists. The city of Lahore is a non-administrative phenomenon, a natural urban planning reality, demarcated through Lahore’s urban extents in this chapter and defined as the contiguous urbanized areas and clusters. There is no official definition of Lahore city other than the area under the metropolitan

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local government, which is the entire Lahore district. Due the limitation of data and the influence of the administrative structure, Lahore district will also be used interchangeably as a basis of discussion where necessary and required. The chapter focuses on the broad themes of spatial growth and urban policy in Lahore instead of discussing each sector in detail to cover extensive grounds. The next section provides an overview of Lahore from its brief history to its demographic and socioeconomic profile. The third section focuses on the spatial patterns of growth and development to provide an understanding of the way Lahore has been laid out. Attention has been given to housing settlements for two reasons, urban planning and developments in Lahore revolve around housing, and the scope of the chapter had to be limited. Section four describes the legislation and regulations in place or missing from the field of urban policy and planning. Section five explores the institutions set up with the mandate to plan or enforce policies guiding developments in Lahore. The budding culture of corporate urban management is discussed in section six to enrich the discussion of institutional governance, a possible scenario of implementing authorities for public service in Lahore. Section seven finally lays out the past and present masters plans. The last section concludes the chapter with possible new directions.

2 Lahore: An Overview 2.1 History, Geography, People, Culture and Economy 2.1.1

History

Lahore, with a known history of more than four thousand years, is widely known as the City of Gardens. Located in the northeast of Pakistan bordering India, it occupies a focal position in the upper Indus plain and is located along the left bank of River Ravi. Lahore was mostly confined within and around the Walled City during the regimes of Hindu, Afghan, Turk, Mughal, and Sikh Rulers who made periodic changes to the physical forms of Lahore. It remains the cultural and educational nucleus of Pakistan showcasing Mughal architecture, notably the Lahore Fort, Badshahi Mosque (Fig. 1), Shalimar Gardens, Wazir Khan Mosque and Jahangir’s tomb.

2.1.2

Geography

The river Ravi flows to the west of Lahore District. Sheikhupura district is to the northwest, and Kasur district is to the south, and Nankana Sahib district is to the west (Fig. 2). The Indian district of Amritsar is across the eastern edge of Lahore district. Lahore’s terrain is flat, sloping towards the south and southwest direction. River Ravi has caused floods in the past as the north of the city center and River

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Fig. 1 Badshahi Mosque, Lahore Fort and the surrounding settlements

Ravi have low lying lands susceptible to floods. As for the Indian border, there are restricted areas demarcated notified by the army. The physical growth of Lahore, therefore, is only bound by River Ravi and the restricted areas in the east.

2.1.3

Demography

Pakistan and particularly Lahore received a flood of migrants after independence from British India in 1947. Lahore, as one of the existing city centres closest to the border, accommodated a larger number of these migrants. Between 1941 and 1961, the population more than doubled from 672 thousand (PBS 2006) to 1.63 million (PDS 2016). As Pakistan became a nascent nation and Lahore welcomed a gush of migrants, the institutional capacity lagged. Haphazard growth was of one the results of this turbulent situation, persisting to the subsequent eras. To paint a clear picture of the Lahore we inherited, we will rewind a few years backwards to discuss the types of developments and government bodies in this chapter. This historical city is the second largest in Pakistan and the capital of Punjab province. It has been rapidly urbanizing with an estimated population of 11.13 million in 2017 growing at around 3% annually (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2017). The official population for the district of Lahore in 1998 as per the census was 6.32 million. This means Lahore has already become a megacity and is in dire need of a comprehensive sustainability plan to cater for the exponential population growth. To provide context, India’s urban population growth rate was 2.6%, and China’s was 3.8% between 2000 and 2010 (UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2015); Pakistan’s overall urban population grew at a rate of 2.7% per year between 1998 and 2017 given the

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Fig. 2 Location of Lahore and adjacent districts in the province of Punjab

legal urban definition (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2017). The gender composition was 52% male and 48% female. More than half of the population in Lahore was between the ages 15–49 in 1998. In comparison, 64% of Pakistan’s population is below the age of 30 (Najam and Bari 2017). As per the 1998 census, the average household size was approximately seven in the entire Lahore district, and interestingly also seven in urban and rural areas each, whereas the provincial average was around a six-person household. Recent surveys, however, indicate a decrease in the household size to an average of a 6person household (MICS 2014; PSLM 2015). The provisional 2017 census results also reflect a household size of 6.33 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2017). Lahore contained about 881 thousand housing units in 1998, of which 731 thousand were in urban areas. The 1981–1998 inter-census growth rate was 2.95% (PDS 2016).

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Fig. 3 Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) located in Defence Housing Authority

The 1998 census also indicated that 82.46% of Lahore’s population was already residing in urban areas. However, the spatial disparity in Lahore is intense. Today, around 90% of the urban areas are relatively lower density inhabiting 400 people per hectare on average and around 10% of urban Lahore is high density with an average of 860 people per hectare, more than double the density in just one-tenth of the land.1 Densities are as high as 1,700 persons per hectare and as low as 45 people per hectare. Some examples of high-density areas are the Walled City, Gulshan-e-Ravi, Gwalmandi and Dharam Pura.

2.1.4

Culture and Economy

Lahore has been Pakistan’s leading centre of education and a major publishing hub, historically home to popular literary poets and symposia. Some of South Asia’s leading universities are based in Lahore with higher education institutions more than any other city in the country (Figs. 3 and 4). There are about 24 universities producing a large number of science and technology professionals, creating the first flourishing high-tech industry in Pakistan. The average adult literacy rate in Lahore is 79.90% while the provincial average is 67% (MICS 2014). The average urban literacy rate is estimated to be 81% while literacy in rural areas of Lahore is 69% (PLSM 2015). Lahore remains at the forefront of music, food and literary festivities, like other vibrant metropolises of the world.

1 These

densities are based on in-house calculations at the Urban Unit from the data created by the Urban Immovable Property Tax System project and the LandScan dataset.

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Fig. 4 Government College University (GCU), Lahore

With the rise in the supply of professionals, the city has shifted from manufacturing to the services sector. Sixty percent of Lahore’s percent workforce is employed in the tertiary sector while 36% is still employed in the secondary sector (LFS 2015). However, the manufacturing industry is woven in the urban fabric of Lahore affecting the quality of life and livelihoods of its residents. The number of registered factories in Lahore was 2,233 employing 197,922 workers in 2014 (PDS 2015). Some examples of the secondary sector operations are in steel, machinery, food processing and textile. The adult unemployment rate in the district is 6.4%, while the provincial average is 6.7% (MICS 2014). The median household income in Lahore is an estimated PKR 25,000 (US$241) per month (LFS 2015). The Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (2015) reveals, that household income in Lahore ranges from less than PKR 5,000 (US$48) to more than PKR 150,000 (US$1,443) per month. It is interesting to note that 33% of the households earn PKR 15,000 (US$144) or less, 53% households earn between PKR 15,000 and 50,000 (US$481) and 13.9% of the sampled households earn greater than PKR 50,000 per month (PSLM 2015). The average of price levels between July and December 2015 has been used for the currency exchange rate published by the State Bank of Pakistan (2015) (Table 1).

3 Lahore’s Spatial-Scape and Patterns of Growth The modern history of urban planning in Lahore can be traced back to the desire of the upper and middle-income groups involving local citizens’ efforts to create a pleasant and healthy environment of living in the 1920s. Comprehensively planned

33,740

2.43

2.17

3.66

1951–1961 (%)

42,880

25,464

1,626

1961

3.90

3.61

4.32

1961–1972 (%)

65,309

37,607

2,588

1972

2.87

2.58

3.56

1972–1981 (%)

84,254

47,292

3,545

1981

Sources Punjab Development Statistics (2016), Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2006), Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017)

N/A N/A

Pakistan

1941–1951 (%)

Annual population growth rates

N/A

1,135 20,541

Punjab

Pakistan

N/A

672

1951

5.38

796,096

Punjab

1941

Population (’000)

Lahore

1,772

205,345

Lahore

Area (km2 )

Table 1 Population and population growth rates: Lahore District, Punjab, and Pakistan

2.69

2.64

3.46

1981–1998 (%)

132,352

73,621

6,319

1998

2.40

2.13

3.00

1998–2017 (%)

207,775

110,012

11,126

2017

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large-scale private and public housing schemes were developed and respectively targeted to different income groups. The urban policy and planning landscape of Lahore seems to have slightly moved the needle from a city of housing schemes towards a functioning medley of urban systems; nonetheless, there is a long way to go.

3.1 Trends of Urbanization in Lahore As its population grew, Lahore urbanized and expanded toward the south and the east. The city expanded to the east due to the military’s cantonment area, and to the south due to the canal road’s connectivity to the motorway terminal node and other inter-city highways. The advent of affordable motorized vehicles such as cars, motorbikes and rickshaws has invigorated this urban sprawl. The canal is a salient landscape and functional feature in shaping the urban footprint of Lahore. It runs from the northeast to the southwest, in line with the course of urbanization. On the other hand, the railways seemed to have played a less significant role in guiding the city’s urbanization. The Lahore railway station provides interregional connectivity to both passengers and freight with other provinces and cities such as Karachi in Sindh and Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Historically, steel, fertilizer and other allied industries have agglomerated close to the railway tracks. Some production and sales remain in the same area even though these industries have little relation to the railway today. There is serious traffic congestion between the Walled City and the railway station due to the high population density and commercial activity. The spatial growth patterns changed from a concentric structure to a starfish pattern. In the last three decades, residential, commercial and industrial development has occurred along the main arterial and inter-city roads portraying ribbon development patterns. The built-up area of Lahore has been rising rapidly. Figure 5 illustrates the temporal built up2 area in Lahore district, which increased from 234 km2 in 1996 to 337 km2 in 2008 to 484 km2 in 2016, indicating an average annual area growth rate of approximately 3.81% while the population grew at 3% per year. The total built-up area increased by around 107% during 1996–2016; or, in other words, Lahore grew more than two-fold in the last two decades. In 1996, the built-up area was 13.21% of the total area, which increased to 19.02% in 2008, and to 27.31% in 2016. The total area of administrative boundary of Lahore district is 1,772 km2 . The total built-up area of Lahore district was 484 km2 in 2016, of which the built-up within the ‘urban extent’—including the contiguous built-up area defined as urbanized areas and clusters (Angel et al. 2016)—was 359 km2 . This could be demarcated as the urban core of Lahore while the outlying sparse developments are peri-urban or rural in nature as depicted in Fig. 6. This urban extent spreads beyond Lahore district into Sheikhupura 2 All

provided built-up areas are based on in-house calculations with the help of the GIS team at the Urban Unit. The calculations vary by methodology and are only a representation of the ground realities.

Fig. 5 Spatio-temporal growth of Lahore district

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Fig. 6 The urban extents of Lahore span across the administrative boundary of Sheikhupura district

district. The estimated annual area growth rate for the ‘urban extent’ of Lahore is 4.05%. The urban footprint of Lahore grew by almost 114% in the 20 years between 1996 and 2016. This has been a common phenomenon in South American and Asian cities. Cities have been physically growing beyond their administrative boundaries, and also beyond their population rates. As urbanization has been pacing, governments have not been able to catch up. It is now crucial, more than ever, to assess cities beyond their municipal boundaries as urban agglomerations to effectively plan and provide for city inhabitants. To conclude, Lahore has been sprawling to its outskirts, largely in the southwest direction with enormous private housing schemes such as Bahria Town (Fig. 7) and Valencia Town, and in the east, predominantly owing to developments of the Defence Housing Authority. The growth pattern is evidently horizontal, with one- to twostoried buildings. Only a few commercial corridors or central areas have buildings with four to eight floors. The NUA recognizes that “urban form, infrastructure and building design are among the greatest drivers of cost and resource efficiencies, through the benefits of economies of scale and agglomeration” (United Nations 2017, p. 10), and in unison the case of Lahore should also be reassessed. The floor area ratio should at least range from 1.5 to 3, or Lahore should generally have taller residential buildings with adequate provision of transportation options to promote vertical growth for compact, walkable and efficient cities to promote sustainability. This will definitely call for a change in the local lifestyles and the social norm of single family, villa style housing.

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Fig. 7 Bahria Town Housing Scheme

Many of the problems Lahore is facing today such as high land and housing costs, inadequate trunk infrastructure for public utilities and deteriorated environmental quality are because of unplanned sprawl, which induces longer daily commutes and abnormally high use of single occupancy vehicles. These have often pushed local authorities to invest more in road construction and widening to ease traffic congestion without providing due consideration to sustainable urban plans or patterns of growth.

3.2 Eras of Urban Development The spatial growth of modern Lahore can broadly be grouped into three eras. From the 1900s to the late 1940s, the indigenous growth model prevailed with a few exceptions of odd schemes such as Model Town (1924) and the cantonment. The era between the 1950s and the 1970s was dominated by government-led housing schemes such as Samanabad (1950), Gulberg (1952), Wahdat Colony (1958), Allama Iqbal Town and Township (1970s). Since the 1980s, private sector led developments such as Bahria Town and those of the Defence Housing Authority have dominated the south-western and eastern parts of Lahore. The locations of these housing schemes and some other prominent neighbourhoods have been marked in Figs. 8 and 9. Unfortunately, in this culturally rich capital of Punjab, the indigenous nature of urban development was irregular, and not guided by planning principles; one can experience this in the signature labyrinths of old Lahore. Lahore has endured and features five main kinds of development. First is the old Walled City with narrow streets, bazaars at ground level and three to four story residential quarters above

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Fig. 8 Prominent Housing Schemes of Lahore

Fig. 9 Model Town Housing Society (May 2018)

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Fig. 10 The Walled City of Lahore (May 2018)

(Fig. 10). Second, the British laid out the Civil Lines neighbourhood outside the historic core with spacious bungalows, and the administrative centre with the town hall and the administrative secretariat. Third, the cantonment was constructed for the military with vast grounds for parades, residences, barracks, and markets for the army officers. Fourth, low cost and informal settlements, such as ‘New Indigenous Communities’ (NICs), katchi abadis (temporary settlements) and juggi clusters (slum hutments), leaped across Lahore. NIC is a term coined by Muhammad A. Qadeer in his book “Lahore: Urban Development in the Third World” (1983). Fifth, planned housing schemes are the current trend where the development is an internally planned compound regardless of the external surrounding (Qadeer 1983, 1996, 2006; Groote et al. 1989).

3.2.1

1900–1947: Pre-independence Indigenous Urban Growth Model

During the 1900s, two main urban clusters stood on the plains of Lahore, the expanded city centre and cantonment area. Subsequently, New Indigenous Communities, katchi abadis, and private and public sector-financed housing schemes, societies or ‘colonies’ shaped the form of Lahore. They filled the void space between existing traditional developments and the British, followed by sprawl consuming the fringe peri-urban and agriculture areas. NICs and katchi abadis have had to eventually cater to the lower and moderate-income classes of both refugees at independence, then rural migrants in quest for jobs in the big city. New Indigenous Communities (NICs): The NIC dwellings have had donut-shaped buildings with plots fully built to the edges and shared courtyards in the middle, with

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streets wider than those of the Walled City. The first generation NIC quarters around the early 1900s were not meant for low-income groups; they were for new native civil servants who desired to live outside the packed old City for more space and luxury. These replicated the mixed-use lifestyle of the Walled City constructed on an incremental basis with commercial corridors in the front (Groote et al. 1989; Qadeer 1983). Social and religious groups started to build their own residential quarters in the 1930s, the second generation NICs were born. For example, Krishan Nagar to the southwest of the Walled City belonged to a Hindu community. This time, space was allocated for schools, mosques, parks and temples. This could be viewed as a step forward for conscious neighbourhood planning (Groote et al. 1989). The third generation of NICs came after independence. The Hindu and Sikh left to the other side of the partition so the need for religious distinctions was eliminated. As the upper-middle classes moved to bungalows in planned schemes built nearby, the social rank of the NIC inhabitants dropped. After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, population and city growth accelerated, and the housing shortage had already begun. Bazaar merchants and lower status professionals took shelter in NICs. They gained a special image and attracted a certain class of Lahori people. By 1981, the NIC settlements spread over what was at that time the half of Lahore (Groote et al. 1989; Qadeer 1983). Squatter Settlements: The other type of housing, katchi abadis and juggi clusters have been unplanned and spontaneous (Fig. 11). Nonetheless, over time they were viewed as ‘community planned neighbourhoods’ because they were a result of planned invasions of vacant sites. In 1978, the Lahore Development Authority set up a Katchi Abadi Directorate. Government policy shifted back and forth between actions of slum clearance, slum upgrading and regularization to reduce the lag in housing supply. However, the question to whether upgrade or clear a katchi abadi was often a political one—a power play between the ties of katchi abadi residents and other stakeholders with vested interests.

3.2.2

1950s–1970s: The Pre-Lahore Development Authority (LDA) Era

Shortly after independence, the first newly developed housing scheme after partition3 was Samanabad in 1950. The only aim of this scheme was to resolve a serious housing shortage caused by the major influx of immigrants. Samanabad was meant for low and middle-income households. Major developments occurred around the late 1960s, which is also when statistics report the highest population annual growth rate of 4.32% between 1961 and 1972. The city grew along the south and southwest corridors of Ferozepur Road and Multan Road. As previously stated, urbanization towards the east and west was limited by the Indian border and the river Ravi. The government accomplished major developments in this era through the funds and endorsement from Punjab Development of Damaged Areas Act 1952 (JICA 2012). Even though expansion continued to the south and southwest direction, 3 The

partition refers to the 1947 independence of Pakistan from India and the British Raj.

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Fig. 11 Katchi Abadi in the northeast of Lahore near Mominpura

development contiguously also occurred along the northwest of Lahore into the Sheikhupura district during the 1970s. Lahore had already formed into a metropolis with population crossing two million.

3.2.3

Beyond 1975: The Era of LDA and Mega Infrastructure Projects

The year 1975 marked the creation of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), which spurred an era of private sector led and financed housing developments commonly known as ‘housing schemes’. In the Pakistani planning context, housing schemes, societies or colonies are basically land sub-divisions comprising of residential, commercial and ancillary uses. Lahore has housing schemes of varying sizes ranging from a few hectares to a couple of square kilometres. LDA is the main government agency for developing housing schemes. So far LDA has self-developed around 43 schemes with approximately 123,000 residential plots and 3,400 commercial plots (LDA 2017). A few examples of LDA’s government led developments are Gulberg, Garden Town, Faisal Town, Allama Iqbal Town, Johar Town, LDA Avenue, LDA City and Jubilee Town. Some examples of private developments are Bahria Town, Lake City, Eden Housing, WAPDA Town and Valencia Town, which are some of Lahore’s largest developments of the last three decades. LDA has approved around 241 private housing schemes and cooperatives, including 131,640 plots developed by the private sector. Lahore-Islamabad Motorway (M2): The year 1991 was when the construction of mega-development project in Pakistan, the Lahore-Islamabad Motorway or M2 (340 km in length), took place (Fig. 12). M2 was conceived, constructed and oper-

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Fig. 12 Lahore-Islamabad Motorway at Babu Sabu Interchange

ationalized during 1990–1997 as per the larger plan of the federal government of Pakistan to connect Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and other cites with Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. It was terminated in Lahore at Thokar Niaz Baig, where much of Lahore’s post 1990 urban growth took place (including Bahria Town as mentioned earlier). The motorway influenced and transformed the pattern of growth in Lahore towards the south and southwest directions for their access to M2. This corridor became an attractive investment opportunity for private sector developers, often for real estate profiteering and land speculation. Several developers capitalized on this infrastructure magnet until 2016 when LDA took notice of the undesired sprawl and depletion of arable land, which was essential for the city’s food security. Hence, LDA restricted further development in the area by amending zoning rules in the Lahore Master Plan 2021. Nonetheless, LDA too had a part in encouraging this sprawl from the 1990s to 2016 because it implemented projects such as LDA Avenue and Jubilee Town in this very area. The Ring Road and the Defence Housing Authority (DHA): The construction of the Lahore Ring Road (Fig. 13) and the Allama Iqbal Airport in 2008 also spurred housing schemes that further encouraged spatial patterns of growth to the east of Lahore. DHA and many other relatively small developments are still carrying their out-of-plan expansions in the eastern part of the city, while taking advantage of the connectivity provided by the Ring Road constructed for the new airport. This major housing development under federal supervision is imperative to note. DHA has developed and is developing an estimated total area of 150 km2 across its 11 phases to the east and southeast of Lahore (Figs. 14 and 15). DHA was formerly an extension of the Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society (LCCHS). The cantonment was regarded as an exclusive area for the military, and residents were limited to military families and veterans (JICA 2012); however, it now also houses

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Fig. 13 Lahore Ring Road and Metrobus at Niazi Chawk Interchange in the northwest of Lahore

Fig. 14 Defence Housing Authority, Phase 1, Lahore

the civilian population and private businesses. The institutional arrangement of DHA is further explained in Sect. 5. The mandate under which DHA operates is neither under provincial nor local government control; nonetheless, this federal authority is significantly shaping the urban fabric and eco-system of Lahore by building on major swaths of arable land. The area on which DHA stands today was apparently restricted for development to preserve the green lands and to protect the Indian border to the east of Lahore.

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Fig. 15 Defence Housing Authority, Phase 6, Lahore

Fig. 16 Lahore Metrobus System at Muslim Town Flyover on Ferozepur Road

Lahore Metrobus and Orange Line: Most recently, two other mega transportation projects have begun in Lahore. First, a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system by the name of Lahore Metrobus System (MBS) already runs along a dedicated track on Ferozepur Road, stretching across 28 km that connect Shahdra in the north, and across the river Ravi, to Gajjumatta in the extreme south (Figs. 16 and 17). Operationalized in 2013, the MBS, however, does not yet have any connecting feeder routes and is considered incomplete. The other project is a 43-km-long light rail transit system (LRTS) route,

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Fig. 17 Lahore MBS at Lower Mall Road crossing Nasir Bagh (Garden) near the Punjab Civil Secretariat and Punjab University Allama Iqbal Campus

the Orange line. The Orange line is still under construction with a route from the M2 terminal point in the southwest of Lahore to remote parts in the northeast. These transportation projects are ideally expected to transform the city’s morphology in a positive manner, moving away from low-density land use patterns along major road arteries toward denser and vertical living patterns. This could hopefully lead to a vibrantly compact Lahore by reducing commuting distances, unsustainable use of single occupancy vehicles (SOVs) and road occupancy, thereby positively impacting the city’s environment in the long run. Other positive externalities of agglomeration could also materialize. Rise of Private Sector Housing Schemes: This era also signifies a noticeable shift in Lahore from public sector led housing developments to private housing schemes. This may be attributed to a multitude of reasons including the rapid pace of urbanization and a liquidity crunch in the public sector for the purchase of lands. The political economy of the real estate market has also caused unprecedented land speculation by tilting development decisions that favour private-sector-led housing projects. As Lahore horizontally expands and urbanizes, the public sector has been unable to meet the rising demand for developed land for housing in addition to the construction of dwelling units. The private sector has been closing this gap by investing in the real estate and housing market. Furthermore, lenient urban land regulations without strict enforcement of growth limitations have facilitated the unauthorized conversion of land use from agricultural to residential and commercial uses. This has led to severe land speculation and fluctuation in land prices. The real estate developers conveniently plan and develop housing schemes in rural areas by purchasing cheaper land and converting land uses at manipulated timings. Changes in the law dried up LDA’s pool of finances for housing provisions. The Land Acquisition Act 1894 mandated compensations at land market values. In 1973,

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the law changed and LDA had to pay only a fixed price below market value of PKR 100,000 (US$10,101, price level 1973, SBP 2005) per hectare. However, the Land Acquisition Act 1973 was repealed in 1985, and the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was again restored. LDA had to pay market values for land acquisitions from private landowners (Hameed and Nadeem 2008; Groote 1989). To make up for the high cost of paying market values and raise finances, LDA aggressively started approving land use conversions from residential to commercial for large fees through commercialization policies. LDA has even gone to the extent of violating its own residential land use assignments by promoting unplanned and unorganized commercial land uses (Hameed and Nadeem 2008). Since 1985, the high cost of land acquisition by LDA has hindered the development of housing schemes. This has caused the private sector to take the opportunity and/or responsibility of developing land and building houses. Private developers usually build large scale housing schemes with or without housing structures, and individuals buy complete homes or buy plots in these schemes and build their own houses.

3.3 Spatial Inequities in Lahore The NUA aptly promotes “the implementation of sustainable urban development programmes with housing and people’s needs at the centre of the strategy, prioritizing well-located and well-distributed housing schemes in order to avoid peripheral and isolated mass housing developments detached from urban systems, regardless of the social and economic segment for which they are developed, and providing solutions for the housing needs of low-income groups” (United Nations 2017, p. 20). The Agenda also envisions cities for all with ‘equal use and enjoyment’ referring to cities as a ‘right’ (United Nations 2017, p. 3). This section draws attention to the reverse situation in Lahore to provide perspective. Lahore is a city of predominantly legal and illegal housing schemes, and unplanned settlements. Lately, planned schemes and major roads determine the path of urban expansion. The main pattern of urban development identified in Lahore is the selfcontained housing schemes. Housing schemes have been ‘planned’ and completed in separation from the rest of the city without taking into account the needs of areas in vicinity and adjacent surroundings. Each of these housing schemes functions as a self-contained community preventing any possible positive spill over effects to nearby neighbourhoods, failing to transfer beneficial externalities to any other part of the Lahore. When few planned schemes are developed in the south for example, land in between is occupied by the lower strata (low-income groups) or by the commercial sector. There also exist manufacturing factories in the midst of Lahore adding to the pollution and chaos. The leftover areas have poor utilities, without trunk infrastructure or in locations away from jobs or susceptible to disaster risks such as floods. The overall landscape is leapfrog development in Lahore and, as a result, the infill development is messy. LDA attempts to serve the middle class while the upper class

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Fig. 18 Residential average plot sizes in Lahore (missing data for some areas such as DHA and Cantonment)

is served by private housing schemes, which leaves the lower classes on their own to house themselves in informal settlements. Another important point to note is that for any kind of development, very seldom, if ever, are there public consultations with communities, whether rich or poor. An available and useful indicator is the average residential plot size by neighbourhood (Fig. 18). It demonstrates the variance in plot sizes of residences in Lahore. The Walled City of Lahore has the smallest house parcels while elite areas such Model Town and Gulberg have much larger parcel sizes covering larger swaths of total land. Where new development occurred in the South of Lahore, this map indicates larger house plot sizes than for the houses in the north of Lahore. To highlight the gravity of the situation and call for action, Quito’s implementation plan also commits to promote “policies and approaches that incorporate the provision of adequate, affordable, accessible, resource-efficient, safe, resilient, well-connected and well-located housing, with special attention to the proximity factor and the strengthening of the spatial relationship with the rest of the urban fabric and the surrounding functional areas” (United Nations 2017, p. 8). While the NUA recognizes cities ‘should be places of equal opportunities’ to sustain economic growth and allow ‘fulfilling lives’ as key elements of urban development (United Nations 2017, p. 7), Lahore currently does not provide enough low-income housing areas. The rental value assessment of property units across Lahore could be used as a proxy for socioeconomic groups to understand the hierarchy in the standards of living.

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Fig. 19 Spatial distribution of residential categories Fig. 20 Percentage distribution of residential categories across Lahore in 2017. Source Urban Immovable Property Tax project by the Punjab Excise and Taxation Department and The Urban Unit

Residential Property Units (%) 0.00%

0.04%

20.04%

6.68%

11.28% 15.19%

46.76%

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

Figures 19 and 20 delineate respectively the spatial and percentage distribution of property values indicating high incomes areas (category A) to low-income areas (category G). Figure 21 calculates the average monthly rent corresponding to each residential category. The rental value was determined through surveys of all localities and is basically the evaluation of total rent (for tax purposes) for each property surveyed.

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A

PKR

1,40,000

B

1,20,000

C

1,00,000 80,000

D

60,000

E

40,000

F

20,000

G

0-75

75-125

125-250

250-500

500-2000

Plot Size in Square Yards

Fig. 21 Average monthly rent in 2017 by plot sizes and residential categories in Lahore. Source Urban Immovable Property Tax project by the Punjab Excise and Taxation Department and The Urban Unit

Low-income areas of category F and G are almost non-existent. A majority of Lahore (33%) has been assigned high-income categories of A, B and C with relatively higher rental values depicted in Fig. 21. Another 47% of Lahore falls under category D where the average monthly rental values per property unit range from PKR 6,057 (US$58) to PKR 67,989 (US$649), using the conversation rate as on 30 June 2017 (SBP 2018). The remaining 20% of the residential properties are in category E, F and G. The two main reasons for building planned housing schemes in Lahore were housing shortages and the stratification of classes. Tracing back to the British colonial period, upper and middle classes preferred to live away from the lower classes. This phenomenon has carried forward to developments in subsequent decades. With the passage of time and the natural forces of land markets, the prices of land and property across housing schemes corroborate the phenomenon of stratification. Most housing schemes are built for upper and middles classes and have larger plot sizes as depicted in Fig. 18. Moreover, the housing schemes—meant for the middle classes—are usually occupied by the upper classes because of the latter’s greater ability to afford them. This phenomenon indicates the scarcity of affordable and appropriate housing options for different socioeconomic groups.

4 The Regulatory Context The Federal Planning Commission of Pakistan was mandated to prepare and oversee the implementation of five-year economic plans, now called Medium Term Development Frameworks (MDTF) at the federal level, while the line ministries, provincial and local governments are supposed to execute the policies. The closest to urban policies in Pakistan are the physical planning and housing policies. Five broad policy areas under the physical planning and housing sector are: (i) housing and katchi

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abadi development, (ii) public utilities and infrastructure, such as water and sanitation, (iii) institutional capacity building for urban development, (iv) government owned buildings and the development for the federal capital area, and (v) special projects. The NUA highlights the importance of urban policies and legislation by recognizing “the leading role of national governments, as appropriate, in the definition and implementation of inclusive and effective urban policies and legislation for sustainable urban development, and the equally important contributions of subnational and local governments, as well as civil society and other relevant stakeholders, in a transparent and accountable manner” (United Nations 2017, p. 5). Even though Pakistan has had a plethora of national and provincial policies, the requisite legal framework and institutional capacity building for implementation have been wanting. Pakistan has had a National Human Settlement Policy (1984), National Conservation Strategy (1988), National Housing Policy (1986), and another National Housing Policy (2001) (Qadeer 2014). In 2010, after the 18th amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, certain functions were devolved to the provinces. Subsequent to devolution, Punjab has recently developed its own draft Environment Policy under supportive legislation. The Punjab province also has a drinking water policy but no sanitation policy was promulgated. Recently, the Punjab Government has also initiated developing a Provincial Spatial Strategy, with funding from the World Bank under the Punjab Jobs and Competitiveness Program for Results (World Bank 2016). A detailed list of prevailing relevant laws, rules, and regulations in effect in Punjab and Lahore is shown in Table 2, and Table 3 lists repealed relevant acts and ordinances. These lists focusing on legislation relevant to urban planning in Lahore are shared to provide a glimpse of complexities in the regulatory arrangement of urban policy and planning. For example, the provincial land use rules for the local governments are different from those for the Lahore Development Authority even though the two institutions have overlapping jurisdiction areas. This overlap is further discussed in Sect. 5. Each institution brings its own set of rules in the same city signifying fragmentation and possibly redundancy, as opposed to a uniform regulatory framework for governance and planning. Even though fragmented legislations exist at all levels, Pakistan has no comprehensive town and country planning law at the national level. Prior to the devolution of powers to the provinces, and even post-devolution, none of the provinces has been able to draft and promulgate its own provincial town and country planning legislation. Both provincial and local governments focus on urban development projects without comprehensive regional and local development plans, mostly through direct spending. Moreover, there happens to be a complete mismatch between the shelved (obsolete or invalid) and intact (notified) master plans of Lahore and the dominant political agendas, will and wishes. The only initial legislation with a provision for local councils to prepare master plans was the Municipal Administration Ordinance (MAO) 1960. However, MAO 1960 did not specify who will sanction it and who will implement it, further it lacked any provisions for revising plans (Hameed and Nadeem 2008).

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Table 3 Repealed relevant acts and ordinances

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Acts, ordinances, rules, and regulations

Year

Lahore Development Authority Act

1975

Punjab Katchi Abadis Act

1992

Punjab Housing and Town Planning Ordinance

2002

Defence Housing Authority Lahore Order

2002

Lahore Development Authority Building and Zoning Regulations

2007

Punjab Land Use (Classification Reclassification and Redevelopment) Rules

2009

Punjab Private Housing Scheme and Land (Sub-Division) Rules

2010

Punjab Local Government Act

2013

Defence Housing Authority Act

2013

Lahore Development Authority Land Use Rules

2014

Lahore Development Authority Private Housing Scheme and Land (Sub-Division) Rules

2014

Lahore Development Authority Miscellaneous Rules

2014

Lahore Development Authority Commission Rules

2014

Lahore Development Authority Master Plan Rules

2014

Repealed relevant acts and ordinances

Year

Punjab Municipal Act

1911

Lahore Improvement Trust Act

1922

City of Lahore Corporation Act

1941

Municipal Administration Ordinance

1960

Punjab Local Government Ordinance

1979

Punjab Local Government Ordinance

2001

The Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO) of 1979 replaced MAO 1960. Yet, it carried forward the earlier provisions on master planning, almost verbatim. Under PLGO 1979 too, as in the case with MAO 1960, only urban local councils had to create master plans for their jurisdictions. However, it was not mandatory. Initially, rural local councils did not even have this requirement, but in the year 1997 rural local councils were entrusted the non-mandatory task to also make master plans; but, citing weak administrative capacity, no decision-maker ever pursued it (Hameed and Nadeem 2008). The urban and rural local councils respectively refer to the Municipal or Town Committees, and the zilla or district councils at the time. The Punjab Local Government Ordinance (PLGO) 2001 replaced PLGO 1979. PLGO 2001 was a part of the military regime’s Devolution Plan 2001 (Alam and Wajidi 2013). The new established system had three tiers of local government admin-

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istration. The provinces had been divided into districts by eliminating the former rural urban divide. Each district had a few tehsils or towns (for city districts) that were further divided into union councils. Personnel at each administrative level were restructured from existing institutions at provincial and local levels. Hence, Tehsil or Town Municipal Administrations (TMAs) replaced urban and rural local councils. The TMAs in a district are administratively linked to the district government. For provincial capitals such as Lahore, city district governments (CDGs) had been established by dividing the city into different TMAs. Lahore was divided into nine towns and the cantonment. Finally, the PLGO 2001 required TMAs to prepare master plans for their areas in collaboration with district governments and union councils. No plan was required at a district level. In Lahore, the Lahore Development Authority Act 1975 also requires LDA to prepare comprehensive development plans. Before PLGO 2001, these development authorities were working in parallel with local government institutions, which is why planning powers and jurisdictions overlapped. PLGO 2001 had brought these development authorities under district governments; nonetheless, they still operate as separate entities. Currently, the Punjab Development of Cities Act 1976, Lahore Development Authority Act 1975 and Punjab Local Government Act 2013 (PLGA 2013) advise and empower local city governments to prepare, notify (or formally inform in a public notice) and implement plans; however, if they fail to do so then the legislation does not suggest any punitive measures. At present, in Punjab province, only Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan and Faisalabad have updated and notified plans. The Punjab Local Government Act 2013 has recently been notified, and this new local government system came into effect in January 2017. The urban and rural divide of local government administrations has been reinstated in the separation between urban municipal committees/corporations and rural councils. Lahore district, with exclusively 274 urban union councils, is the only one in Punjab that is a designated metropolitan corporation without the rural-urban divide. The impacts and details of the PLGA 2013 are yet to be ascertained (and beyond the scope of this chapter). Thus, we can see there are several legislations providing urban policy making mandates to different institutions. The overlapping ambits of urban governance institutions confuse the responsibility for urban planning, and its custodianship and implementation. As the NUA acknowledges the importance to strengthen urban governance by keeping “appropriate checks and balances, providing predictability and coherence in urban development plans” (United Nations 2017, p. 5), the urban policy and regulatory framework in Pakistan, Punjab and Lahore must also be revisited.

5 Institutions for Urban Governance and Development Institutions with the mandate to perform urban policy making and master planning with in Lahore are specifically discussed below. The Lahore Improvement Trust is briefly discussed as an important institution in the history of Lahore’s spatial growth. Currently, Punjab Housing and Town Planning Agency, LDA, the Lahore Metropoli-

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tan Corporation, Cantonment Boards and DHA are all required to create spatial plans and policies to manage urban development within Lahore. These institutions operate under their respective areas of control that is often unclear or overlapping, suggesting the spatial fragmentation in Lahore visible today, as further discussed below. It is interesting to note that the main purpose of all the authorities mentioned above (except the Metropolitan Corporation) is to provide housing and the services required with it, indicating that the role of planning is considered the responsibility of institutions that provide housing. This seems to be an underlying presumption in Pakistan, even though urban planning and policy should be a cross-sectoral role performed by a multidisciplinary institution. It is important to remember and note that for effective implementation of the NUA and urban development in Lahore, NUA realizes the need for “enabling policy frameworks at the national, subnational and local levels, integrated by participatory planning and management of urban spatial development and effective means of implementation, complemented by international cooperation as well as efforts in capacity development, including the sharing of best practices, policies and programmes among governments at all levels” (United Nations 2017, p. 15). With respect to the institutional framework laid henceforth, Lahore also direly requires “strong coordination and cooperation among national, subnational and local governments, including through multilevel consultation mechanisms and by clearly defining the respective competences, tools and resources for each level of government” (United Nations 2017, p. 16). The institutions under the previous local government system (under PLGO 2001) have been discussed in detail because they were functioning for the past 15 years. As stated earlier, the new system was promulgated on the first of January 2017; therefore, it may be too soon to assess this current local government system (under PLGA 2013).

5.1 Lahore Improvement Trust Before LDA The Lahore Improvement Trust (LIT), a predecessor of LDA, was set up in 1936. Its main vision was to “prevent haphazard building operations which the municipal agency had apparently found itself unable to control” (Groote et al. 1989, Sect. 3.1). LIT’s financial and human resources were limited. It was a statutory, non-elective body, set up by the Municipal Corporation of the time. Unfortunately, like every other subsequent development authority, LIT only developed land and new housing schemes for high-income groups instead of a comprehensive system that a wellfunctioning metropolis requires. LIT’s 89% (total of 8,469 plots) plots served only 17% of Lahore’s population at the time, mostly consisting of high- and middleincome groups (Groote et al. 1989, Sect. 3.1; Rehman 2013).

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5.2 Provincial Government Institutions 5.2.1

Lahore Development Authority

As unplanned and haphazard growth continued in Lahore and other large cities, the Punjab provincial government realized its negative consequences and established development authorities (DAs) to rectify the situation. Created for big cities of Pakistan, DAs paralleled the prevailing local government system. DAs have been established in Punjab for the cities of Lahore, Faisalabad, Multan, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Bahawalpur, Fort Munro and the Capital, Islamabad. Lahore Development Authority was first established in 1975 and then the other DAs followed. When LDA was established to replace LIT in 1975, it was bigger than LIT, and had relatively more finances, judicial power and resources. LDA was and still is an autonomous body under the leadership of the Secretary of the Housing, Urban Development & Public Health Engineering Department (HUD&PHE), formerly the Housing and Physical Planning Department (HPPD). It is a provincial government department that performs localized planning and development. In addition to its metropolitan development and planning wing, LDA has two other semi-autonomous agencies under it—the Lahore Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) and Traffic Engineering & Transport Planning Agency (TEPA). In the 1980s, LDA’s area of jurisdiction was the Lahore Metropolitan Area (LMA) covering 1,760 km2 . This included 400 km2 under the Lahore Municipal Corporation and 90 km2 under the Lahore Cantonment Board. From 1988, the extents of LMA expanded to cover 2,306 km2 , encompassing most of Lahore, Ferozewala Tehsil of Sheikhupura, and parts of Kasur districts. From early 2013 to the present, LDA’s jurisdiction has spanned the entire Lahore division (Figs. 2 and 20), consisting of the four districts of Lahore, Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib and Kasur. The main purpose and functions of LDA are to (Groote et al. 1989; Ahmad et al. 2013): (i) prepare and guide the comprehensive planning of Lahore; (ii) prepare, update, and implement a metropolitan development plan and coordinate implementation with other government agencies; (iii) develop, operate and maintain water supply, sewerage and drainage systems (the reason why WASA was created); (iv) create, implement and periodically revise planning controls (such as land use and private housing scheme rules) and building regulations; and (v) prepare and enforce policies for environment conservation, housing and urban renewal, solid waste management, transportation, health and education, and historic preservation. LDA’s early activities, in effect, were developing land and controlling building regulations. In the first five years, LDA developed 55,000 plots. By February 2017, LDA had selfdeveloped around 43 housing schemes with an estimated 123,000 residential plots and 3,400 commercial plots (LDA 2017). The land development process usually begins with the identification of projects on an ad hoc basis, often under pressure from influential groups. A town planner of LDA then prepares a layout of the new scheme, following which land is acquired, and trunk infrastructure for basic services is laid out. Lack of funds and poor coordination often cause gaps and delays.

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Since the enactment of LDA private housing scheme and land use rules, private and cooperative housing schemes must gain permission from LDA to begin building. Institutions or individuals build the cooperative housing schemes with common interests, such as PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) and WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) employees, who may push the government to provide land to develop a cooperative housing society. They develop land, subdivide activities and hand it over to local urban union councils to maintain it. LDA has yet approved 241 private housing scheme including cooperatives, with a total of 131,640 plots developed by the private sector. Further, LDA acts both as the regulator of the housing sector as well as a provider. Thus, LDA competes with private sector developers, which discourages private sector investments in housing and allied infrastructure development.

5.2.2

Punjab Housing and Town Planning Agency (PHATA)

It is worth mentioning PHATA as it also operates in Lahore. PHATA is also under the provincial HUD&PHE department, and responsible for the overall spatial planning of the Punjab Province and providing housing to the low-income groups. PHATA develops land schemes across Punjab and implements the national housing policy in collaboration with the related federal, district, local government departments and agencies. Housing support is also extended by facilitating land finances and construction material through different institutions. PHATA also finds public land for social housing projects and arbitrates illegal land uses.

5.3 Local Government Institutions 5.3.1

City Administration Under PLGO 2001 (2001–2016)

The city and local government system under PLGO 2001 has been discussed here as Punjab and Lahore had functioned under this system from 2001 to the end of 2016. The city district government (CDG) was the top umbrella institution under PLGO 2001 that managed and oversaw municipal functions across an administrative district. An administrative district is a large geographic area containing a number of urban areas, cities and towns, and rural areas or settlements in between. The main functions of the CDGs related to urban planning were to authorize master plans, zoning regulations, (re)classification of land uses, and urban design projects. CDGs also review the implementation of rules and bylaws, and approve landscaping schemes along rivers. The CDG’s spatial planning office was responsible for overseeing urban planning functions in the entire district by engaging secondary tiers such as TMAs. A functional arm of CDGs under PLGO 2001, TMAs were vested with the main responsibilities of urban policymaking, planning and implementation. TMAs were responsible for preparing spatial plans for their towns, in partnership with their

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respective districts and union councils. Enforcement of land use rules, land subdivision rules and building control (including zoning) regulations was also among TMA responsibilities to ensure adherence to the framework of master plans. TMAs were also responsible for maintaining public utilities such as water supply, sewerage and sanitation. Union councils (UCs), the lowest tier of local government, were supposed to collect and maintain statistical data from socioeconomic surveys, and consolidate ward and neighbourhood development needs to prioritize them into development proposals at the UC level. In close contact with the actual residents of the area, UCs were expected to identify service delivery bottlenecks and recommend solutions to the respective TMAs.

5.3.2

City Administration Under PLGA 2013 (2017 Onwards)

Recently, urban and rural areas have been functionally and administratively divided once again just as before the enactment of PLGO 2001. For the administration of urban areas, metropolitan corporations, municipal corporations and municipal committees have been formed across Punjab, whereas rural areas and rural settlements within the district shall be governed and managed by the district councils. The officers under the new system have only recently taken charge, so it too early to assess their performance. However, dividing cities and towns into rural and urban administrative domains still begs many questions. As cities contiguously grow outward into their rural fringes, fragmented planning and development control of cities may hinder effective urban management across the province. Fortunately, the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation (LMC) is the only district declared metropolitan corporation without the urban-rural divide. Considered majorly urban, the district of Lahore only has urban union councils and does not consist of a (rural) district council. Therefore, it is hoped that Lahore will realize improved governance and urban planning, without the crippling effects of overlapping mandates and institutional frictions, which will likely continue to encumber the province’s other cities and towns. The LMC is also in charge of approving spatial plans, housing schemes, land use and zoning, building control, and urban design and renewal. The functions of LMC include to implement rules for housing schemes, land subdivision and land use, zoning, environment, roads, traffic, tax, infrastructure and public utilities. Figure 22 illustrates the morphosis in Lahore’s local government administrative boundaries superimposed on the development in grey. Gradual expansion beyond its official city limits has led to Lahore’s loosely regulated growth. The inconsistencies between its de jure administrative and de facto urban boundaries make it hard to accurately ascertain the true jurisdiction of what constitutes the city of Lahore. Due to the major influence of the district administrative system, the district boundary of Lahore containing urban and rural Lahore is usually considered the study area of any research or discussion by default. Recent studies have shown that the natural urban expanse of Lahore spreads beyond the northern end of the district into Sheikhupura district (as shown in Fig. 7), while LDA’s jurisdiction now extends over the entire

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Fig. 22 Temporal local government boundaries and urban development

Lahore division, consisting of the four districts of Lahore, Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib and Kasur (Figs. 2 and 23).

5.4 Ministry of Defence Institutions 5.4.1

Lahore Cantonment Boards

The Cantonment is under the control of the Military Lands and Cantonment Department in the Pakistan Ministry of Defence. As the Cantonment area of Lahore expanded since its inception in 1850, the area became difficult to manage and was divided into two cantonment administrations in 1998, Lahore Cantonment Board and Walton Cantonment Board. The Cantonment Boards (CBs) also prepares spatial plans in collaboration with the union councils including plans for land use and zoning policies. The Cantonment Boards Act 1924, considers the CBs as local governments. It has an elected house and manages the local government affairs in the civilian areas of the CBs. Within their area of control, the cantonment also exercises control over all kinds of the construction of buildings, land uses, land subdivisions and zoning similar to LDA and the Metropolitan Corporation.

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Fig. 23 The current administrative jurisdiction areas for the different institutions

5.4.2

Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Lahore

Defence Housing Authority was developed in 1999 under the DHA Ordinance, and its functions are governed under the DHA Order, 2002. The Authority was established to provide housing facilities for the serving and retired army personnel. DHA also has its own set of regulations and rules. Governed by a federal legislation, it is immune from any integration into the provincial or local legislation and hence not fully integrated into the city’s master plans. DHA develops an entire community with residential, infrastructure, commercial and recreational facilities within a kind of gated high-class exclusive residential area. The housing and commercial stock is nonetheless open to the general public in the real estate market. They have the rights to develop new projects by legally acquiring land with their own resources (The Urban Unit 2007).

5.5 The Institutional Overlap and Gaps Similar to NUA, Lahore also needs to systemically evolve multi-stakeholder partnerships in the process of urban development through policy and plan making, by “establishing clear and transparent policies, financial and administrative frameworks and procedures, as well as planning guidelines for multi-stakeholder partnerships”

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(United Nations 2017, p. 26). Echoing NUA, the multiple institutions, LDA, LMC, DHA etc. must determine their own clear functional territories and administrative structures to meet the actual local needs, calling to engage with the local communities (United Nations 2017, p. 16). The national legislation should support and strengthen the capacity of subnational and particularly local governments to implement “effective local and metropolitan multilevel governance, across administrative borders, and based on functional territories, ensuring the involvement of subnational and local governments in decision-making” (United Nations 2017, p. 16). In addition, the institutions must be given the “the necessary authority and resources to manage critical urban, metropolitan and territorial concerns” (United Nations 2017, p. 16). As delineated in the overview of the functions for different government agencies, both LDA and local government institutions are responsible for implementing the same urban policies and rules in overlapping areas. Both authorities enjoy similarly vested special powers to enforce strict development control in their areas of jurisdictions. In addition to their overlapping functions and territories, no horizontal lines of coordination between LDA and CDG had seemed to exist. Their vertical coordination with other local line agencies is also very weak. The attempts of LDA and CDG to implement similar functions in different styles had bred inefficiencies that are reflected in Lahore’s disorganized and fragmented spatial growth. The local government institutions and LDA have been working in silos. The overlap in functions and execution of powers in the same territory delays decisionmaking, and leads to conflicts. For instance, LDA created development control bylaws for Lahore in 1982 and exercised them thereafter. In 2001, the Punjab government drafted uniform building and development control regulations for all development authorities and past CDGs, which were implemented by both LDA and the past Lahore CDG. According to the Lahore CDG, they were never involved or consulted in the drafting process of these bylaws and, therefore, urban development in the city of Lahore had uneven ownership (Ahmad et al. 2013). Even in the current institutional system, the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation claims to have been excluded from the master planning exercise of LDA. Moreover, there remains ambiguity in the division of functions and control areas in for example, the implementation of housing scheme and land use rules, and the building bylaws. Even though both entities have their own set of housing scheme and land use rules, it has now been decided LDA will solely exercise this function across the entire Lahore division. However, the function of controlling building development is shared between the two and the territories are unclear. None of the entities have any clear demarcations of building control on a map. LDA also sometimes intervenes in the territories of the local governments for vague reasons such as the incompetency or absence of local governments. Further, neither LDA nor the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation exercises control in the areas under the Ministry of Defence, DHA and the Cantonments. As described in earlier sections, Lahore has a multitude of different departments working in urban planning, development and management, including LDA, metropolitan corporation, PHATA, Cantonment Boards, DHA and the recently incorporated companies in the public sector (further discussed in Sect. 6). There are over-

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laps in the administrative responsibilities and geographical areas of operation of all these entities (Fig. 23). All the institutions discussed are mandated for exercising spatial planning and control through a range of legal provisions. Hence, duplication in the functional and geographical ambits of each institution delays decision-making and demotivates each from owning its respective responsibilities.

6 Emerging Era of Corporate Urban Management For the past couple of years, a prevalent culture of urban corporate management has become apparent in Lahore and Punjab. The provincial government has established public sector companies to provide urban public utilities and consultancy services. It is a unique institutional structure where a parent provincial government or a publicsector department directly owns the companies; however, a company can function freely in the market as a corporate entity, governed by the Companies Act. In this hybrid model, the companies can break away from the government red tape, and raise liquidity from the open market, hire personnel with less stringent controls and perform joint ventures. The perceived impact is improved performance and efficiencies as compared to that of the conventional public sector. Usually, a professional board of directors and audit teams is responsible for decision-making in such a company. Policy level decisions, however, are approved and influenced by the government departments of Punjab and Lahore. Examples of such organizations are The Urban Unit, Lahore Waste Management Company (LWMC), Punjab Land Development Company (PLDC), Infrastructure Development Authority Punjab (IDAP), Punjab Saaf Pani Company, Lahore Transport Company and Lahore Parking Company. As the names indicate, most companies manage public utilities rather than govern or regulate urban matters. At a level for municipal services, these companies have contractual arrangements with the municipal councils, and hence can perform at an arm’s length, rather than being directly managed by the elected councillors. This arrangement brings in professional efficiency and minimises political bias. It is also worthwhile to note the support of the NUA in the innovative involvement of the private sector for providing urban public services. The NUA encourages “appropriate regulatory frameworks and support to local governments in partnering with communities, civil society and the private sector to develop and manage basic services and infrastructure, ensuring that the public interest is preserved, and concise goals, responsibilities and accountability mechanisms are clearly defined” (United Nations 2017, p. 16). While Lahore and Punjab have had private sector involvement in the form of these companies, more still needs to be done to further involve the communities and civil society in an interactive and responsible manner. Strides need to be taken in involving more private sector organizations in urban development. Just as the NUA calls “upon businesses to apply their creativity and innovation to solving sustainable development challenges in urban areas, acknowledging that private busi-

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ness activity, investment and innovation are major drivers of productivity, inclusive growth and job creation” (United Nations 2017, p. 23).

7 Master Plans: Their Making, Implementation and Fate 7.1 Brief History of Master Planning in Pakistan and the New Urban Agenda Conceptually, a master plan is a long-term policy document to guide the growth of any area in a planned manner. Master plans are normally prepared for a period of the next 20 years. Master, structure, regional, and outline development plans have been prepared time and again for cities and towns of Pakistan to achieve planned spatial growth. Historically, in the country’s second five-year plan (1960–1965), the Government of Pakistan for the first time recommended the need for master planning in 11 large cities of erstwhile West Pakistan (present day Pakistan). The nation’s first master planning activity began in 1961 for Lahore, followed by the master planning for Karachi (1970–1974), and then for the other cities (Hameed and Nadeem 2008). The creation, revision, and approval of these master plans consumed a lot of time and money. Lahore has had three master plans so far, and just the approval of two of those took circa six years, during which time the city’s boundaries had evolved and land uses had morphed. The intervals at which a plan is to be revised are still unclear and random. Ignoring such changes on the ground, during the delayed plan approval stage, leaves Pakistani cities with futile urban policies based on obsolete land use and socio-economic data. With the master plan making exercises rendered futile, the short- and long-term development plans cannot be legitimately implemented either. The making of conventional master plans for Pakistani cities has followed a traditional, simple, three-step process: survey, analyse, and plan. The problem remains that no plan is ever completely implemented, whatever the institutional set up or plan-making process may be. Hence, billions of rupees and countless hours are spent in master planning exercises only for the plans to be shelved, amounting to a colossal waste of resources. The failure to timely approve and implement has been the bane of urban plans in Pakistan, in general, and in Lahore, in particular. While the plans of Lahore are discussed below, it is imperative to keep in mind that the NUA lays a useful framework for spatial planning. The NUA aims for the “development of urban spatial frameworks including urban planning and design instruments”, that sustainably manage and use natural resources such as land, and apply “appropriate compactness and density, polycentrism and mixed uses, through infill or planned urban extension strategies” (United Nations 2017, p. 11). As mentioned earlier, compactness reduces net costs and sustains the environment by triggering economies of scales and enhancing resource efficiency (United Nations 2017, p. 11). Experiencing the current state of Lahore, instead of substantially sprawling outwards, the city should take on greater urban renewal and restoration efforts to counter the urban blight. Similarly, the NUA

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encourages spatial strategies that guide urban extension, “prioritizing urban renewal by planning for the provision of accessible and well-connected infrastructure and services”, “integrating new neighbourhoods into the urban fabric preventing urban sprawl and marginalization” (United Nations 2017, p. 11). Plans should facilitate “affordable housing with quality access to basic services and public spaces” and enhance safety and social interactions (United Nations 2017, p. 18). The Agenda also underlines the importance of preserving soft culture and cultural heritage assets through “master plans, zoning guidelines, building codes, coastal management policies and strategic development policies” (United Nations 2017, p. 22). Moreover, the balance between short-term needs and long-term goals requires introducing flexibility in the plans to adapt to the complex and fluctuating socio-economic conditions (United Nations 2017, p. 17). Plan implementation necessitates systematic evaluation through the leverage of technology. The NUA also recognizes the dire need to “improve capacity for urban planning and design by the provision of training to urban planners at the national, subnational and local levels” (United Nations 2017, p. 18). Three master plans have been prepared for Lahore: (i) Master Plan for Greater Lahore (MPGL) 1966; (ii) Lahore Urban development and Traffic Study (LUDTS) 1980; and (iii) Integrated Master Plan for Lahore (IMPL) 2021. Each plan will be briefly discussed henceforth with an overview and an account of the preparation and implementation process. An attempt has been made to provide a general understanding on the seriousness and complexities of plan making and enforcement.

7.2 Master Plan for Greater Lahore 1966 (MPGL) The master planning efforts for greater Lahore began in 1961. A Master Plan Committee with a team of professional planners, geographers, and sociologists was set up by HPPD, a provincial housing department, which felt that neither Lahore Municipal Corporation (LMC) nor Lahore Improvement Trust (LIT) could do the job. The plan took five years to create, and in 1966 it was submitted for the Punjab Government’s approval. Due to administrative and legal issues, it took another six years before the plan was sanctioned in 1972. A Governor’s working group was also set up to review the plan. It made a few changes and updates but never completed the job. With the intention to cover a time frame of up to 30 years from 1966, the plan came into force on September 1, 1972. By then the landscape of greater Lahore had changed and the bases on which the plan was proposed had become obsolete. Unplanned development continued in areas where the master plan had proposed planned development (Groote et al. 1989).

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Overview of the Master Plan for Greater Lahore

The Master Plan for Greater Lahore had two main parts: the first was the survey and analysis section with very detailed surveys, data, maps, figures and tables; and the second was the planning standards and proposals section, with segments about land use and zoning, implementation and administration, and detailed regulations of zoning and subdivisions. The plan however failed to be comprehensive enough and look at city planning as a system. It did predict future growth patterns and the existing shape of Lahore, but it was a “static pictorial plan” (Groote et al. 1989, Sect. 3.5) with a focus on land use and the physical aspects of the city. The phases of development were distinguished. However, the roles and responsibilities of the administrative authorities were vague and did not consider improvements in the administrative side of planning. The implementation and coordination of the plan was never heeded. Also, the physical plan was based on “self-contained cities and schemes” (Groote et al. 1989, Sect. 3.5), which is also seen in Lahore today as described in this chapter (see Sect. 3). There are several gated communities implying self-contained cities and housing schemes still being built in silos. There is unfortunately no concept of integrated neighbourhoods with uninterrupted development in the geographic dimension under one umbrella of Lahore.

7.2.2

Review of the Preparation Process and Implementation Framework

Highly obsolete data for settlements from circa 1940 were used to make the base maps for the land use plan. It was updated using partial land use surveys. Most members of the Master Plan Committee were bureaucrats. Only five town planners were involved in the plan-making exercise. There was no official public engagement or community participation except for the socioeconomic survey. The Municipal Administration Ordinance 1960 lacked appropriate provisions for implementing the master plans, or for sanctioning and updating the plans. The 1966 Master Plan itself asked for a solution to these problems but no necessary action was taken. The MPGL 1966 suggested creating a unitary planning authority by merging LMC and LIT to “manage and guide the development of city and act as custodian of the plan” (Hameed and Nadeem 2008, p. 1299). Soon after, LIT became LDA in 1975, and took functions that overlapped with LMC in different geographic control areas. LDA began a new master planning exercise while LMC continued to follow the Plan of 1966 in its area of jurisdiction (Hameed and Nadeem 2008; Rehman 2013). In 1980, LDA moved forward on its own to create a new plan, justifying its action by claiming that MPGL 1966 was outmoded. LMC controlled most of the built-up area but it never accepted or implemented LDA’s new plan. Hence, Lahore continued to be guided by two plans by two planning organizations of the government, with overlapping functions and territories, without any appropriate mechanism to coordinate their implementation (Hameed and Nadeem 2008).

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7.3 Lahore Urban Development and Traffic Study 1981 (LUDTS) The master planning of LUDTS began soon after LDA was established in 1975. LUDTS had a 20-year time frame from 1981 to 2000. While MPGL 1966 had been a local effort, LUDTS was initiated and led by international actors. The International Development Agency, under the World Bank, financed LUDTS (Hameed and Nadeem 2008). This plan was considered a policy document. It gave broad guidelines for the future development of Lahore, and was labelled as a ‘structure plan’ because it was supposed to serve as a guiding framework for various action plans and programmes. Local plans were to be created from these LDA guidelines. Local plans were not created; however housing schemes are considered by some to be local plans.

7.3.1

Overview of the LUDTS

The LUDTS study had five volumes. The main elements of the plan were urban development with a concrete structure plan, traffic, the expansion program in the north of Lahore, and the Walled City upgrading. It also included an immediate action and investment plan for five years. The Plan was considered flexible and had options for change with clearly defined objectives. The focus area for LUDTS was the Lahore Metropolitan Area, which at the time fit LDA’s area of jurisdiction. Urban expansion possibilities on the west side of the Ravi were explored but the only possible choice for continued growth was demarcated to the south of Lahore. At present, major urban expansion does occur towards the south. The basis for development in the LUDTS structure plan was neighbourhoods (mohallas), approximately one kilometre in diameter, with 6,000–20,000 inhabitants each. Each mohalla was to have its own facilities, such as a high school, a mosque and a prominent centre. The desired density was 300 persons per hectare. The focus on low-income groups suggested reducing plot sizes and level of services, and promoting informal and popular housing. LUDTS argued that promoting informal housing would not cause slums, but the lack of access to basic services would (Groote et al. 1989).

7.3.2

Review of the Preparation Process and Implementation Framework

Even LUDTS used incomplete land use surveys and barely any primary data. Residents and locals were again not consulted in making the plan; there was no participatory planning or community engagement. LMC was still functioning separately from LDA, the LUDTS 1980 strategies were never implemented in the areas under LMC’s jurisdiction (with some exceptions in the 5-year investment program for which funding was available). LDA wasn’t allocated enough funds for acquiring

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land to develop the plan’s proposed schemes. Already struggling to meet its own expenses, LDA went into deeper financial crisis in 1985, when the Land Acquisition Act 1973 was repealed to restore the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Once again, proper cross-sectoral and inter-departmental coordination did not occur, impeding successful implementation for most of the plan. A success of the plan is that private schemes were developed in the south of Lahore where it had proposed them. Major roads through private and public residential schemes were also successfully implemented. However, trunk infrastructure links still do not exist and development is still spread out, abetted by negligible inter-agency coordination.

7.4 Integrated Master Plan Lahore 2021 (IMPL) When the time for LUDTS was almost up, LDA realized the need to create a new plan for Lahore. Under PLGO 2001, a new CDG for Lahore was set up by dividing Lahore into nine towns, each governed by a TMA. The devolution plan initially proposed LDA to merge into CDG; however, LDA remained a separate entity but a part of CDG via LDA Ordinance 2002. The master plan was then reviewed and modified to fit the new institutional arrangement. The district government approved it for implementation in October 2004. This exercise began in 1997, revised in 2002 and approved in 2004. Again, it took six years for a plan to become operational. In 2011, LDA realized and advertised the need to create another comprehensive master plan. It, however, lacked the capacity to create a new plan and eventually decided to amend the previous version of IMPL 2021 that was prepared in 2004. The amended plan was notified and approved by LDA itself (under the LDA Master Plan Rules 2014) in July 2016, and applies to the entire division of Lahore, including the four districts.

7.4.1

Overview of the IMPL

The IMPL seems to be more comprehensive than the previous two plans. It has three volumes, an executive summary, spatial maps and a chapter dedicated to ‘environmental concerns’ for the first time. It first describes various facets of the existing situation. The plan presents analyses and policies to create a better quality of life in Lahore. It addresses different sectors and elements of urban planning such as development potentials and constraints, urban growth strategy, urban environment, socio-economic features, housing and transportation, community facilities and infrastructure development, institutional and financial framework, and zoning regulations (Hameed and Nadeem 2008, p. 1301). The last volume focuses on implementation through a phased programme of short-, medium- and long-term plans. Financial, resource and project allocations, and public private partnership options are also discussed (Hameed and Nadeem 2008; NESPAK and LDA 2004). The amended plan consists of a comprehensive map and a two-page notification (LDA 2016) detailing

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the amendments in the plan. Various land uses have been proposed in the map and certain boundaries have been demarcated. In vain efforts have been made to search for the actual amended report, which does not seem to be public at least and is plausibly not finalized. All past plans (including Outline Development Plans and Agroville plans) for the other three districts have been included in this new detailed map to holistically plan for the entire division, probably considering travel, economic and demographic patterns in the region. The LDA stance is that the growth of Lahore cannot be controlled without planning for the adjoining districts.

7.4.2

Review of the Preparation Process and Implementation Framework

Like MPGL and LUDTS, the IMPL collected minimum primary data and used existing published data. Public participation was still missing. The only form of consultations was with professionals, technocrats, administrators, builders and various government agencies. Moreover, the plan clearly defines an organizational set up for the CDG to distribute planning activities. However, no clear role in implementation is mentioned for LDA. The IMPL 2021 lays down an implementation framework for controlling land use, planning and development. Even though the plan discusses policy reforms for various sectors such as education, health, environment, transportation and infrastructure, no enforcement mechanism is specified. Hence, the CDG departments and other government agencies are neither guided nor bound to follow the sectoral policy suggestions in IMPL 2021. A Master Plan Committee to implement IMPL 2021 was proposed for coordination between the different CDG departments. Later a Plan Implementation Committee led by the Chairman Planning and Development was constituted and entrusted with the task of preparing a strategic implementation plan of the master plan for the next five years. IMPL 2021 assigned the duties of land use and strategic planning enforcement to CDG, and the preparation and implementation of local plans to TMAs. Another interesting point to note is that IMPL 2021 suggests the Board of Revenue to take permission from concerned TMAs before processing land title registration requests. This way the sale and purchase of land subdivision would be in sync with IMPL 2021. This suggestion did not materialize. Some achievements of the plan may be considered to include better traffic conditions, revision of building bylaws and new rules for private housing schemes and land use conversions (Hameed and Nadeem 2008).

8 Moving Forward: Envisaging Lahore’s Urban Planning Future For Lahore to create and sustain a brighter future, the authorities must learn from their past, and take steps to improve policy and plan making. Just as the NUA envisages

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cities and human settlements, Lahore must fulfil its social and ecological function by providing inclusive housing, safe drinking water, food security, health, education, infrastructure, mobility, energy, air quality and livelihoods (United Nations 2017, p. 4). With a population growth rate of 3% already crossing the 10 million mark, Lahore must brace itself for the urbanization pressures of basic necessities. The city must meet the opportunities of economic growth by leveraging urbanization’s structural transformations through the tools of urban policy and planning. A sense of belonging and ownership of the city with interactive public spaces for cultures expression could be harnessed through civic engagement and community participation (United Nations 2017, p. 4). Urban policy making and planning in Lahore is fragmented, echoing the larger polarization in the social, economic, environmental and spatial spheres of Pakistani cities. Lahore has tried numerous urban policies, institutions, rules and regulations, but with limited success. The system often fails to manage its spatial growth and public services in an organized and inclusive manner. As this chapter has discussed, there are too many urban development institutions at the national, subnational (provincial) and local levels with overlapping roles, responsibilities and jurisdictions. A restructuring of the urban governance institutions, their processes, roles and responsibilities is necessary to eliminate the overlap and confusion that prevails among them. The Housing, Urban Development & Public Health Engineering Department of Punjab is already attempting to bifurcate into focused departments of housing, planning, and water and sanitation, under which is the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and other development authorities of Punjab. This could be a step towards harmonizing institutions and their respective functions. A larger hurdle is the confusion in the allocation of responsibilities and control areas between LDA and the local governments of Lahore, the Metropolitan Corporation and the District Council. A clear and agreed demarcation of the control areas and functions must be laid out on a map, which will also make sense in terms of service delivery and integrated operations. In the long run, there must be a unification of institutions responsible for guiding the physical landscape of Lahore in this case. Similarly, the NUA calls for action to urge all levels of governments and stakeholders “to revitalize, strengthen and create partnerships, enhancing coordination and cooperation to effectively implement the New Urban Agenda”, “in line with national policies and legislation” (United Nations 2017, p. 6). This asks for a “collective vision and political commitments” to realize the “historic opportunity to leverage the key role of cities and human settlements as drivers of sustainable development in an increasingly urbanized world” (United Nations 2017, p. 6). Lahore needs a holistic and capable urban planning agency, backed by a comprehensive urban planning law to enforce the implementation of a multidisciplinary, sustainable, and inclusive city plan. Urban planning professionals in Punjab have begun to develop a comprehensive regional planning act and agency, under the supervision of the Punjab government. The capacity for city planning must be developed at the lowest local government level. The ability of city administrators to grasp and respond to the challenges and opportunities of urbanization will determine whether

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Lahore will be able to bridge the gap between its two parallel cities of urban blight and urban luxury. A deep disconnect exists between the implementation of master plans and actual projects on the ground. In the making of three different master plans for Lahore, the reliance for plan-making on decades’ old data and unrealistic or inaccurate forecasts, which rendered them ineffective, has remained a common handicap. Even today, primary, updated and reliable data is hardly available. A population census had not been conducted in 18 years. Delays in plan approval often let plans become obsolete. Overlapping functions and territories leave planning organizations with little sense of ownership to implement plans. Furthermore, no legal instrument at a provincial or national level has ever specified the enforcement of plans. There is a dire need for the collection and dissemination of fresh and reliable data for the socio-demographic and geographic landscape of our cities in Pakistan. The population census has now finally happened in 2017 according to the latest government bulletin, however, the complete results are still pending. Another very useful step may be to create controlled and verified open data portals so public policy analysts can easily access evidence for decision-making. Months are usually lost in just acquiring the required data and information for policy making. Likewise, the NUA precisely describes and endorses research and innovation for “robust science-policy interfaces in urban and territorial planning and policy formulation and institutionalized mechanisms for sharing and exchanging information, knowledge and expertise, including the collection, analysis, standardization and dissemination of geographically based, community-collected, high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migration status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national, subnational and local contexts” (United Nations 2017, p. 27). Analytical capacities at all level of government should also be strengthened to monitor progress and inform decision-making. The transparency of data must respect privacy and human rights of all citizens (United Nations 2017, p. 27). There also needs to be a shift in the mind-sets of the urban planners and public servant community about the notion of urban planning from traditional master plans to more strategic development planning. This should include urban policies for every sector and strategic guidelines in addition to land use zoning and infrastructure rules. Perhaps Lahore should have a plan for each functional sector such as housing, transportation, solid waste and a crosscutting sustainability plan to cover all dimensions of the city. As for the currently notified master plan of Lahore, it has gone a level higher up to the divisional level while city plans should be localized to effectively serve local needs. While a regional level plan is a good idea to assess the growth interactions and interdependencies of the Lahore divisions, there must be a system to also create more local plans at the neighbourhood level of the city matching the urban extents of Lahore illustrated in Sect. 3. Ideally, community wellbeing should be indivisible in cities. However, the private interests of politicians, commercial elites and administrative power seekers also determine the path of spatial growth and development projects in Lahore. As described in Sect. 3, majority of developments in Lahore have been for those who can afford to

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live in high end housing schemes provided by a private developer or in the Defence Housing Authority under federal control of the army. Lastly, community engagement in its true sense must be embedded in all aspects of governance in Pakistan including urban policy making and planning. The public should firstly be aware of the problems their cities encounter, and secondly be given a voice to address their concerns. The residents best know the issues they face at ground level. The connection between residents and public servants in public institutions in Pakistan, Punjab and Lahore is a useful tool for a mutually beneficial attempt in planning for the prosperous growth of our cities. In the simplest of forms, the community should be consulted and heard in city planning and policy making. The civil society could be empowered to become a part of the institution by opening government doors to civic organizations interested in working together to improve Lahore. This could operate similar to how private companies have started to a few provide public services, yet under the control and regulation of the government. Acknowledgements We would like to appreciate the guidance and support of Mr. Nadeem Khurshid in shaping this chapter. We would also like to express our deep gratitude to the team at the Urban Unit in Lahore for the motivation, logistical support and research assistance, and a special thanks to the GIS and Communications teams for their aid in cartography and photography.

References Ahmad I, Mayo S, Bajwa IU, Rahman A, Mirza AI (2013) Role of development authorities in managing spatial urban growth, a case study of Lahore development authority. Pak J Sci 65(4):546–549 Alam M, Wajidi MA (2013) Pakistan’s Devolution of Power Plan 2001: a brief dawn for local democracy? Commonwealth J Local Gov (12) Angel et al (2016) Atlas of urban expansion—2016 edition, volume 1: areas and densities. New York University, New York; UN-Habitat, Nairobi and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA Dowall D, Ellis P (2007) Urban land and housing markets in Punjab Working Paper 2007-04. Berkeley Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California Environment Protection Agency (2015) Punjab Environment Policy. Government of Punjab, Lahore Groote P, De Jonge R, Dekker J, Vries J (1989) Urban planning in Lahore: a confrontation with real development, 30th edn. (Onderzoeksverslagen; vol 30). Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Groningen, Faculteit Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen Hameed R, Nadeem O (2008) Challenges of implementing urban master plans: the Lahore experience. World Acad Sci Eng Technol Int J Soc Behav Educ Econ Bus Ind Eng 2(12):1297–1304 Housing and Physical Planning Department (1973) Masterplan for Greater Lahore. Government of the Punjab, Lahore HUD and PHED—Housing Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department (2011) Punjab Drinking Water Policy. Government of Punjab, Lahore JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency, Almec Corporation, Oriental Consultants Co. Ltd. (2012) Lahore Urban Transport Master Plan, Final Report, vols I & II, Lahore Land Policy LDA—Lahore Development Authority (2016) Notification. In: The Punjab Gazette. https://www. lda.gop.pk/page.php?p=TWpFek1BPT0=#LTR. Accessed 10 Aug 2017 LDA—Lahore Development Authority (2017) Office of Chief Metropolitan Planner, Lahore

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LDA, World Bank, IDA (1981) Lahore Urban Development and Traffic Study (LUDTS), Final Report, Lahore LFS—Labor Force Survey (2015) Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad, Pakistan MICS—Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (2014) Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab, Lahore Najam A, Bari F (2017) Pakistan national human development report. United Nations Development Programme, Pakistan. http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/library/humandevelopment-reports/PKNHDR.html. Accessed 7 May 2018 NESPAK & LDA (2004) Integrated master plan for Lahore 2021, vols I, II & III, Lahore Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017) Provisional summary results of 6th population and housing census-2017. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/provisional-summary-results-6th-populationand-housing-census-2017-0. Accessed 7 May 2018 PBS—Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2006) Pocket book, Islamabad. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/ default/files/other/pocket_book2006/2.pdf. Accessed 10 May 2018 PDS—Punjab Development Statistics (2015) Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab, Lahore PDS—Punjab Development Statistics (2016) Bureau of Statistics, Government of Punjab, Lahore PSLM—Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (2015) Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad, Pakistan Qadeer M (1983) Lahore: urban development in the third world. Vanguard Ltd, Lahore Qadeer M (1996) An assessment of Pakistan’s urban policies, 1947–1997. Pakistan Dev Rev 35(4, Part II):443—465 Qadeer M (2006) Pakistan—social and cultural transformations in a Muslim Nation. Routledge Canada & USA Qadeer M (2014) Do’s and don’ts of urban policies. In: Kugelman M (ed) Pakistan’s Runaway Urbanization. Wilson Center, Washington D.C. Rehman A (2013) Mapping Lahore: tracing historical geography of a city through maps. Habib ur Rehman Research Foundation, Al-Mezaan Publishers, Lahore SBP—State Bank of Pakistan (2005) Equilibrium real effective exchange rate and exchange rate misalignment in Pakistan.http://www.sbp.org.pk/research/conf/Session_IV_Zulfiqar_Adil. pdf. Accessed 7 Aug 2017 SBP—State Bank of Pakistan (2015) History conversion rates 2015–2016. http://www.sbp.org.pk/ ecodata/CRates/. Accessed 21 Aug 2017 SBP—State Bank of Pakistan (2018) Weighted average customer exchange rates as on 30-Jun-17. http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/rates/war/2017/Jun/30-Jun-2017.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2018 The Urban Unit (2007) Urban planning in 5 major cities of Punjab. Lahore UN-Habitat and ESCAP (2015) The State of Asian and Pacific Cities 2015: urban transformations shifting from quantity to quality, UN-Habitat and ESCAP, Nairobi and Bangkok. https://unhabitat. org/books/the-state-of-asian-and-pacific-cities-2015/. Accessed 11 May 2018 United Nations (2017) The new urban agenda, A/RES/71/256. Habitat III and United Nations United Nations (2018) Sustainable development goal 11: make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11. Accessed 2 May 2018 World Bank (2016) Pakistan Punjab jobs and competitiveness program for results. http://projects. worldbank.org/P155963?lang=en. Accessed 8 Aug 2017

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N. Javed and S. Riaz Dr. Nasir Javed is a Senior Civil Servant with more than 30 years of administrative experience in various Government departments, mostly in the urban sector. A medical doctor and Psychiatrist by education, he opted to join the Administrative Civil Service of Pakistan. Later he distinctively received his MBA from the University of Wales, Cardiff, UK, as a Chevening Scholar. He has exclusively worked in the urban sector for the last 23 years of his career. The highlight of his professional career is the conception and establishment of The Urban Unit, a state-of-the-art think tank and consultancy firm within the public sector. Dr. Javed is a member of the Cities That Work council at the IGC and has authored a number of conference papers and book chapters. His specialization is in institutional development of cities, e-governance and urban policy.

Sana Riaz is a Senior Analyst at The Urban Unit in the Government of Punjab, Pakistan. She has a Master of Urban Planning degree from New York University and a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree from Lahore University of Management Sciences. She has previous experience at the NYU Marron Institute, New York City Mayor’s Office and United Nations Development Programme. Curious about how people interact with space, her interests are in liveable cities, spatial expansion, land use planning, clean environment, urban economics and municipal finance.

Urban Governance Challenges and Reforms in Indonesia: Towards a New Urban Agenda Wilmar Salim and Delik Hudalah

Abstract In recent decades, Indonesia has experienced rapid urbanization and economic growth, and since 2012 its urban population has grown by more than half. Since 2001 it has also transformed from being a highly centralized country to a highly decentralized one. The ensuing proliferation of local governments and municipalities poses new challenges and sets the context for contemplating the future trajectory of Indonesian urban governance. This chapter analyses a set of governance reforms the Indonesian government is implementing, and highlights some governance challenges in regard to improving urban planning and policy. It then also discusses Indonesia’s challenges in implementing the New Urban Agenda (NUA). The Indonesian government aims to adopt the NUA for guiding nationwide sustainable development goals (SDGs). Guided by the NUA, Indonesia has placed spatial planning at the centre of urban governance, with a mission to build inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable cities. Only time will tell if this set of governance reforms that Indonesia has launched could overcome the persistent challenges to its urban planning practices. Keywords Urbanization · Decentralization · Regional proliferation · Urban reform · Governance reform · NUA implementation

1 Introduction The New Urban Agenda (NUA) that was adopted during the Habitat III Conference in Quito in October 2016 outlines a new commitment towards ushering in a new paradigm of urban governance and planning. The commitment’s essence is to achieve sustainable development and prosperity for all, using integrated approaches for urban and territorial development, by recognizing the role of all stakeholders, led by national governments. This will require implementing policies, strategies, W. Salim (B) · D. Hudalah Regional and Rural Planning Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_6

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capacity development and actions at all levels, based on strengthening fundamental drivers of change—urban policies at appropriate levels; urban governance; longterm and integrated planning and design; and financing frameworks and instruments (Habitat III 2016, Point 15). A key issue to address, pertaining to the first driver (urban policies), is ‘policy incoherence’ (Wild et al. 2012). In the actual practice of urban planning and development, different government departments are known to “work in silos” (UN Habitat 2009, p. 154). They often develop their own plans unlinked to one another or to the master plan. Regarding the second driver (urban governance), the literature on key urban governance challenges is relatively weak on ways to overcome them (Jones et al. 2014). An emerging literature on smart city governance mostly concentrates on technological issues, instead of enabling comprehensive multi-stakeholder collaboration using ICTs towards delivering better development outcomes and governance processes (Meijer and Bolivar 2015). In terms of the third driver, compared to other government departments responsible for infrastructure planning and development, spatial planning enjoys only a marginal institutional status (UN Habitat 2009). Could the NUA reinvigorate the practice of long-term and integrated planning? Indonesia has seen high rates of urbanization and economic growth, especially following liberalization that began in the 1980s; its urban population has grown by more than half since 2012 (Firman 2012). Indonesia has played an important role in developing the NUA. In July 2016, Surabaya, a city in East Java, hosted the Third Preparatory Committee meeting for drafting the NUA. After extensive political reforms were initiated in 1999, Indonesia dramatically transformed itself from being highly centralized to becoming highly decentralized. Decentralization has proliferated new local governments and municipalities—the 47 municipalities that existed in 1990 multiplied to 93 in 2010; likewise, the number of large and medium cities had increased from 5 in 1990 to 25 in 2010.1 This burgeoning of local governments poses new challenges and sets the context for contemplating the future trajectory of Indonesian urban governance. This next section describes the trends of Indonesian urbanization and proliferation of sub-national governments, which form the backdrop for the subsequent discussion on urban governance, in which it analyses a set of governance reforms that the Indonesian government is implementing, and highlights key governance challenges for improving urban planning and policy. The chapter then also discusses challenges set forth by the NUA. In concludes by remarking on Indonesia’s own urban governance and planning agenda vis-à-vis the NUA.

1 Using classification by Bappenas (National Planning Agency of Indonesia),

large cities have populations between 500 thousand and a million, medium cities have populations between 100 and 500 thousand, while small cities have between 50 and 100 thousand populations (UNFPA 2015).

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1.1 Urbanization and Regional Proliferation Indonesia first began experiencing rapid urbanization after independence in 1945. The inaugural post-independence population census in 1961 recorded that of its 97 million population, 14.7% was urban. Meanwhile, the last census in 2010 that its urban population had increased to almost 50% of the total (118 million out of 238 million). The rate of urban population growth of around 5% per year, between 1980 and 2000, was much swifter than the annual population growth rate of 1.7%. However, especially during the same period, Indonesia’s urbanization became characterized by high population concentrations in a few large cities, notably the Jakarta metropolitan area (Firman 2004). As Table 1 shows, between 1980 and 2000 the population of the Jakarta metropolitan area almost doubled (if Bekasi, Tangerang, and Depok are included, surrounding cities into which Jakarta sprawls, the total population rises to around 12.5 million), while the growth of Surabaya and Semarang slowed down. Yet, also notice that, for the same period, Palembang in South Sumatera recorded the fastest growth. Although much of the urban population has concentrated in Java’s large cities, especially the Jakarta metropolitan area, cities outside of Java started growing substantially as well. The cities of Bekasi, Tangerang, and Depok did not exist in 1990. They developed as suburbs of Jakarta following the late 1980 s’ liberalization of property development policies, which allowed private developers to build large-scale housing developments as well as industrial estates. On its heels came the relocation of manufacturing and services industries to the urban periphery—the trend called peri-urbanization, which is observed in many large Asian cities (Hudalah et al. 2007). Peri-urbanization involves the development of mixed land uses outside the designated city boundary. It is spurred by the rapid socioeconomic transformation of livelihoods from rural to urban, whilst maintaining a physical coexistence of both rural and urban functions—a process of forming a mega-urban region that McGee (1991) has called kotadesasi, in Indonesia. This phenomenon began in Jakarta’s suburbs before the 1990s, and by the year 2000 the former suburbs of Bekasi, Tangerang, and Depok had become autonomous cities. Another suburb, Serpong, also grew into an autonomous city called Tangerang Selatan, which in 2010 boasted a population of over a million. Similar peri-urbanizing processes are evident around other large Indonesian cities (Salim and Kombaitan 2009) too, especially the metropolitan areas of Bandung and Surabaya. After 2000, a trend of spatial and demographic expansion became evident: the populations of medium-sized cities had increased from around 100,000–500,000; and large ones had grown from 500,000 to around or over a million. This trend is, arguably, the impact of implementing Indonesia’s extensive decentralization program, which in a few years created new districts and municipalities, especially beyond the islands of Java and Bali. Thus, the number of medium and large cities increased from 43 in 2000 to 72 in 2010 (see map, Fig. 1). Prior to 1999, Indonesia had 62 urbanized areas that were classified, administratively, as municipalities. Today, there are 93 so-called autonomous cities and the Jakarta special capital region (DKI) that has five

Surabaya

Bandung

Medan

Semarang

Palembang

Makassar

Malang

Solo

Yogyakarta

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

398.7

469.9

511.8

709.0

787.2

1026.7

1379.0

1462.6

2027.9

6503.4

1990

Padang

Bandarlampung

Malang

Makassar

Palembang

Semarang

Medan

Bandung

Surabaya

Jakarta

631.5

636.7

695.1

944.7

1140.9

1249.2

1730.0

2056.9

2473.3

8222.5

2000

1342.6

Depoka

Makassar

Palembang

1091.6

1143.4

1315.9

1451.4

Semarang

1663.8

Medan

1904.3

Tangeranga

2140.0

Bekasia

2578.1

8356.5

Bandung

Surabaya

Jakarta

2010

Makassar

Palembang

Semarang

Depoka

Tangeranga

Medan

Bekasia

Bandung

Surabaya

Jakarta

9607.8

1338.7

1455.3

1556.0

1738.6

1798.6

2097.6

2334.9

2394.9

2765.5

Source Rutz (1987), Firman (2014), BPS (2010) Note a Bekasi, Tangerang and Depok are three urban centres outside of Jakarta (East, West and South respectively) that gained status of municipality in the mid 1990s and early 2000

Jakarta

1

1980

Table 1 Population of Indonesia’s ten largest cities, 1980–2010 (000)

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Fig. 1 Population sizes of Indonesian cities: 1990, 2000, and 2010

municipalities and one district. Before 1999, there were 243 districts with their own capitals; today, there are 412 such districts and their number is still growing. The decentralization agenda was to hand over some or all government responsibilities to local administrative authorities. The main challenge was to organize a clear division of governmental affairs among central, provincial, and municipal/district

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governments. This challenge, however, remains Indonesia’s big “homework” because the decentralization laws continue to be frequently revised and/or replaced. On the other hand, fast-spreading urbanization demands that this challenge be resolved quickly so that local authorities can provide their growing populations with good public service delivery.

1.2 Urban Governance Reforms It is argued that brisk urbanization in Indonesia is a strong factor that has caused the number of administrative governments (both municipalities and districts) to increase. This growing trend was rooted in the set of governance reforms, which were part of the larger reforms instituted and initiated by the central government in 1998. In this section, we discuss the implementation of these key governance reforms, which can be organized into the following areas: decentralization and spatial planning; minimum standards for urban services; capacity building for local governments; inter-regional cooperation; and environmental management.

1.2.1

Decentralization and Spatial Planning

Two of the main outcomes of the reforms of 1998 have been the decentralization of administrative functions and authority to local governments, and then fiscal ones from January 2001. The central government has retained the authority over what are called the “federal four” functions (foreign affairs, defence and security, judiciary, and monetary and finance) and religious affairs. Other than these, the central government has devolved most functions to district and municipal governments, and deconcentrated some functions to provincial governments.2 In the first year of implementation, the decentralization program, including spatial planning, drew severe criticism for being hasty and haphazard; therefore, the decentralization laws were subsequently reviewed and revised or replaced in 2004 (Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government, and Law No. 33 of 2004 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Government). The division of obligatory functions among the central, provincial and local governments under the new law (2004) is listed in Table 2. Planning and development control as well as planning, implementation and monitoring of spatial plans are among the functions decentralized to provincial and local governments. The provincial government also has the authority over regional affairs, meaning they may span 2 According

to the typology from World Bank by Rondinelli et al. (1983), there are four types of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization. In deconcentration central government sets the guidelines and thus conducts direct monitoring and supervision to the local agents Meanwhile in devolution local agents are more independent to perform the administrative authority and the central government frequently exercises the supervisory control, in an indirect way.

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Table 2 Division of obligatory functions of central, province and local governments under Law No. 32/2004, Articles 10, 13 and 14 Central

Province (deconcentration)+

Local (devolution)

• • • • • •

• Planning and development control • Planning, implementation and monitoring of spatial plan • Maintaining public order • Public service provision • Health care • Education and human resource allocation • Alleviation of regionala social issues • Regional manpower service • Facilitating cooperatives, small and medium businesses development, including regional • Environmental management • Land administration, including regional • Civil services (registration) • Administration of public affairs • Administration of investment, including regional • Basic services that local government unable to carry out • Other affairs as stipulated by this law

• Planning and development control • Planning, implementation and monitoring of spatial plan • Maintaining public order • Public service provision • Health care • Education • Alleviation of social issues • Manpower service • Facilitating cooperatives, small and medium businesses development • Environmental management • Land administration • Civil services (registration) • Administration of public affairs • Administration of investment • Other basic services and other affairs as stipulated by this law

Foreign affairs Defence Security Judicial Monetary and fiscal Religious affairs

a ‘regional’

is cross-districts/municipalities +except for Jakarta, which, as the Special Capital Region, is governed by special law

across districts or municipalities. The central government has also introduced a set of implementation regulations. One such regulation governing the division of affairs between governments, Government Regulation No. 38 of 2007, is meant to regulate the transfer of functions and authorities to regencies and municipalities. This regulation specifies 26 obligatory matters (of basic and social services) and eight optional matters (of natural resources exploitation) as local governments responsibilities. After the new Law on Regional Government came a set of regulations to guide development planning, including spatial management, with Law No. 26 of 2007 on Spatial Management replacing Law No. 24 of 1992. The new law maintained the

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hierarchical structure of the planning system, and delineated planning products/functions for each level of government as follows: • National level: The central government has the responsibility to plan, utilize, and control spatial uses at the national level. For this, the central government prepares the National Spatial Plan (RTRWN); Major Island Spatial Plan (RTRW Pulau); and the National Strategic Area Spatial Plan (RTRWN KSN). • Provincial level: The provincial governments have the responsibility to plan, utilize, and control spatial uses at the province level. The provincial governments, hence, prepare the Islands Spatial Plan (RTRW Pulau-pulau), Province Spatial Plans (RTRW Prov); and Provincial Strategic Zone Spatial Plans (RTRW KSP). • District/city level: The district/municipal governments are responsible for planning, utilizing, and controlling spatial uses at the district/city level. Therefore, the district/municipal governments prepare District/City Spatial Plan (RTRW Kabupaten/Kota; District/City Detail Spatial Plan (RDTR Kabupaten/Kota) and its zoning ordinances; and Local Strategic Zone Spatial Plan (RTRW KSD). Each plan has two main parts—a spatial structure plan; and a spatial pattern plan. The elements of spatial structure plan include settlement systems and infrastructure networks that function to shape the structure of a region or a city. The infrastructures that must be set up in each plan include transportation, energy, telecommunication, and water resource systems. Meanwhile, the spatial pattern plan designates areas into protected and development zones. Protected zones are often environmentally sensitive areas needing conservation measures, while development zones are all other areas, which support economic activities and human settlements. These zones are planned in coordination with the settlement systems and infrastructure networks of the spatial structure plan. Although a district or city has autonomy over its own structure and spatial plans (as these are functions devolved to local governments), yet each local spatial plan must also accommodate and facilitate any infrastructure or land use of national or provincial function/purpose/importance. Therefore, in order to ensure consistency between local and higher level plans, provincial and national governments must approve a local spatial plan before it comes into effect.

1.2.2

Minimum Services Standards

Indonesia’s decentralization principles mandate that central government set standards for services delivered by local governments. For instance, the Ministry of Public Works (now the Ministry of Public Works and Housing) issues the National Standard (SNI) 03-1733-2004 or Codes for Housing Design in Urban Areas, which serve as a reference, nationwide, for planning, designing, valuation, housing construction, and settlement development. The standard contains general guiding principles for developing housing (either landed/plotted or multi-story housing), public infrastructures (municipal services, schools, libraries, health centres, religious services, commercial activities, culture and recreation facilities, parks, and sports venues) and utilities (such as roads, drainage, water supply, grey water, waste, electricity, telephone, and

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transportation). As an example, housing standards prescribe minimum areas as living—9.6 m2 for an adult; for a child, 4.8 m2 . Moreover, to reduce demand for land, it is required to build flats, through the national government’s urban renewal program, on 15–30% of available land, in any urban area where population density exceeds 200 persons per hectare. This program also aims to ease difficulties in land acquisition so that public services can be delivered effectively and efficiently. Based on the statuses and sizes of urban areas, the Ministry of Home Affairs, too, issued Regulation No. 57 of 2010 on Urban Services Standards pertaining to four categories of functions: urban settlements (housing, green open spaces, and public amenities such as water, energy, waste systems, etc.); government services (government buildings, administrative offices, etc.); social services (public health facilities, schools, social service centres, recreational places, etc.); and economic activities (trading centres, service centres, and other commercial activities). Central and local governments were to provide services for all urban functions, and, gradually, within 10 years of the regulation’s coming into effect, the provision of all services were to become the responsibility of local governments (i.e. mayors); however, two years after the regulation’s implementation, only 30% of 93 municipalities had assumed this responsibility (Bappenas 2012).

1.2.3

Building Capacity of Local Governments

To support decentralization, in 2001, capacity building of local governments was set as a decentralization programme objective. Working with central government ministries and local government departments, many development partners and international donor agencies funded capacity-building programs in different sectors. The central government’s capacity-building programs related to urban planning, implemented through the Ministry of Public Works, are the Sustainable Settlement and the Green City initiatives. The Sustainable Settlement initiative aims to entirely eliminate slum areas from cities, and provide 100% water supply and sanitation coverage to all citizens. Through appropriate planning efforts in municipalities, nationwide, the Green City initiative encourages green open spaces and green communities. Besides physical planning initiatives, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), in collaboration with some urban planning schools, focuses on building the capacity of local governments by providing requisite training programs—degree and non-degree—to their planners. These encourage government officials to enrol in development and planning related graduate programs at universities in Indonesia and abroad. Under the non-degree programs, government officials take short-term courses to learn about various aspects of development, such as spatial and development planning, pro-poor planning and budgeting, disaster mitigation, public private partnership, etc., in designated university-based training centres around the country. Between 2003 and 2014, Bappenas had trained almost 33,000 government officials, and around 5000 had earned advanced degrees (Pusbindiklatren Bappenas 2015).

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Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation across jurisdictions is essential when the provision of public services involves contiguous municipalities or urban/peri-urban areas adjacent to municipalities. Firman (2014) has found that the decentralization program has led to greater exploitation of local natural resources to maximize local incomes. Moreover, many local governments have established new local regulations to boost their own revenues, build new infrastructure, and implement other plans with huge investments that have proven ineffective and inefficient. Promoting regional cooperation is, thus, seen as a way to prevent fragmented development and mutually disadvantageous competition among contiguous municipalities/districts. According to the aforementioned Law No. 26 of 2007 on Spatial Management, urban spatial management in areas comprising two or more districts/municipalities must be carried out through regional cooperation, as stipulated by pertinent national regulations. The distribution of functions across various levels of government (Table 2) reveals that regional and inter-regional cooperation for urban spatial management is the primary responsibility of the provincial government. However, for an urban area that straddles two or more provinces, the law stipulates (Article 9(2) c) that an appointed Minister, who can coordinate its administration among stakeholders across sectors and regions, will perform the urban spatial management function. Accompanying the law is a national-government-issued regulation that prescribes procedures for implementing regional cooperation (Government Regulation No. 50 of 2007), wherein a governor, a regent (district head), a mayor, and third parties may enter into cooperation for all decentralized affairs, including the provision of public services. An umbrella Cooperation Agency may be established to steer the cooperation. A follow-up to this regulation is the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri) No. 69 of 2007 on Urban Development Cooperation. It details out the features of regional cooperation for trans-boundary urban development, the bases for and underlying principles of such cooperation, and the structure of a relevant “cooperation agency,” including its funding sources and relationships with higher levels/authorities of government. Thus, the foundation for regional cooperation for managing urban development across jurisdictional boundaries is well established. The roles of the governor and the minister of Home Affairs in such arrangements are also clarified. The governor supervises and monitors the implementation of cooperation undertaken by mayors, who report to the governor. Meanwhile, the governor reports to and is advised by the minister on supervision to be provided during implementation. Although multiple metropolitan areas like Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, Makassar, and Denpasar have established such regional cooperation entities for coordinated regional development, some of these are hardly effective in practice. For instance, BKSP (Jabodetabek Cooperation Board) is rather symbolic, and mostly powerless and ineffective due to its financial and power dependence on the concerned provinces (Hudalah et al. 2014). An example of effective cooperation is the Joint Secretariat of Kartamantul in the Province of Yogyakarta. It was established as a local, bottom-up initiative to focus

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on managing the development of urban infrastructures in the region. According to Firman (2014), the Kartamantul Secretariat has contributed significantly to enabling integrated infrastructure development—key examples are the development of the Piyungan dumpsite area for solid waste management and the installation of wastewater processing installation (WWPI) in Sewon, Bantul. However, some challenges for this secretariat remain due to its constrained managerial and technical capacities. The secretariat depends upon the leadership of the heads of local governments, which makes the sustainability of the organization’s management uncertain. Despite such limitations, it serves as an exemplar of how to develop collaborative relationships between local governments in smaller metropolitan areas (p. 228).

1.2.5

Environmental Management

Law No. 32 of 2009 on Environmental Protection and Management mandates that all levels of government must ensure the following bases for policies, plans, and programs: a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and an Environmental Protection and Management Plan (EPMP). SEA is a systematic, holistic, and participatory mechanism to ensure that the principles of sustainable development are routinely integrated in all regional development policies, plans, and/or the program (KRP). SEA is required to accompany spatial plans, either general (RTRW) or detailed plan (RDTR). SEA provisions are intended to overcome the lacuna that policies, plans and/or programs in Indonesia have mostly tended to ignore sustainable development principles. Meanwhile, instruments such as the environmental impact assessment (EIA) are considered ineffective for environmental management efforts at the activity or project level, given the wide range of specific or contextual environmental issues to address. As far as EIA is concerned, it is not easy to consider the environmental impacts and alternatives earlier in the decision-making process to advance the sustainability agenda by addressing cumulative and large-scale effects and followup arrangements pertaining to individual development projects (Partidario 2000). These limitations have been somewhat resolved by SEA, which has emerged as a far more proactive process for developing sustainable approaches as an integral part of strategic planning activities (Tetlow and Hanusch 2012). In order to make Indonesia’s urban areas more sustainable, the ‘space utilization phase’ of any spatial planning effort strives to realize the structure and spatial pattern envisioned in accordance with the spatial planning regulatory framework. Law No. 26 of 2007, which mandates the provision and utilization of green open space (RTH), requires the City Spatial Plan to dedicate at least 20% area as public green spaces and 10% for private green spaces. This is implemented under Green City Development Program (P2KH). The municipal/district governments are the main actors for this program, while the provincial governments become the coordinators for the local agents and the central governments are the program facilitators. Also prescribed by Law No. 26 of 2007, P2KH is an initiative expected to deal with the urban impacts of climate change by protecting green open spaces. Overall, it pursues the ‘greening’ of eight related attributes/elements/services by effectively and efficiently utilizing water

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resources and energy; reducing waste, implementing integrated transport systems, ensuring environmental health, and synergizing the natural and built environments (Kementerian et al. 2011). Until now P2KH has been implemented in 36 districts and 24 municipalities. Most districts/cities implement P2KH through one of the programs in their Detailed Spatial Plan (RDTR), and it is also included in cities’ zoning ordinances. To make this program effective, the Ministry of Public Works (Ministry of Public Works and Housing for now) facilitates local governments to prepare a green city action plan, publish a master plan and a technical plan for developing green open space (RTH), create green folders, develop public campaigns to work with the community, and implement pilot projects in consonance with RDTR (Kirmanto et al. 2012). However, the program tends to be overly technocratic and top-down, while the participatory approach of SEA (Tetlow and Hanusch 2012) is being overlooked. An inter-sectoral or community-oriented approach towards a greener city is still conspicuously absent.

1.3 Challenges for Urban Governance and Planning Notwithstanding the set of governance reforms discussed above, Indonesia’s continuing rapid urbanization is a concern. According to World Bank (2016), Indonesia has seen the third-largest increase in urban land in East Asia, after China and Japan, of up to 1.1% each year (World Bank 2016). This presents significant challenges related to the provision of basic services, urban poverty eradication, and spatial planning and coordination (World Bank, 2012: 25). With over half the country’s population already residing in urban areas—a proportion expected to keep increasing steadily due to natural growth and in-migration—the need to provide quality urban services, which are often non-existent, and overcome their present uneven distribution is urgent. The archipelagic nature of the country exacerbates these matters (World Bank, 2012: 69). Although urban poverty rates have generally stayed lower than rural ones, studies suggest that the migration of poor people to urban areas overwhelms the pace of jobs creation. The higher volumes of migrants in Jakarta and Surabaya keep their poverty ratios slightly higher than in other cities (World Bank 2012: 13). A study by the World Bank (2012), Rise of Metropolitan Regions in Indonesia, has summarized Indonesia’s critical urban planning challenges, which undermine metropolitan-level urban planning and coordinating development across districts. Unrectified, they will impede the formation of agglomeration economies and ultimately economic prosperity. Some of these critical issues include (World Bank 2012: 80–81): (1) Out-dated plans; (2) Failure to formally adopt and make plans enforceable; (3) Chaotic policy changes driven by political turmoil addle planning responsibilities; (4) Poor regional coordination across districts and provinces;

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(5) Limited technical capacity, lack of financial resources, and the failure to link capital investment programs with necessary strategies to ensure implementation of plans and construction of infrastructure systems; 6) Inter-district conflicts over land use designations; poor quality and out-dated planning information; (7) Inconsistencies between regional, district, and local plans; and (8) Government failure in enforcing plans. Even though the national, provincial, and district spatial plans have been formulated, past experience shows that, in reality, their implementation does not lead to development as intended. The growth of metropolitan areas continues organically, without control, while planned growth falls short of expectations. The gap between the plan and its realization, in general, remains big, for some of the following main causes: 1. Weak planning analytics, due to limited data and information, and inadequate capacity of planners Plan formulation is usually not based on analytical models of the future; it is merely an extrapolation of existing trends and assumptions, given the unavailability of requisite and reliable data. For example, population projections are based on simplistic trends of overall population growth, instead of deeper cohort analysis, rendering infrastructure estimates to ineptly reflect community needs. 2. Land tenure status rarely informs land use planning A plan assumes all land parcels are ‘owned’ by the state; in reality, even government projects get entangled in long drawn out negotiations with private land owners and claimants. This practice results in major cost overruns and delays. Creating and maintain accurate cadastral databases and accurate land ownership information is essential for avoiding such impediments to spatial planning and infrastructure development. 3. Diverse groups of stakeholders with vested interests exist but are mostly ignored The planning process has tried to include stakeholders likely to be affected by a plan. However, rarely are stakeholders of the area in question with differing opinions of development or planning visions involved; they are often not even identified at the beginning of the process. They may, in fact, even be landowners who might have their own plans for developing the land. Curiously, in many cases, these happen to be government entities themselves with strong interests to sustain the current use or functions of the land. Nevertheless, an example of a collaborative development program in Solo (Widianingsih and Morrell 2017) has generated citizens’ enthusiasm, feelings of inclusion, and sense of purpose. The importance of this participatory agenda, therefore, needs to be strengthened and expanded in other regions so that it can affect to the better planning/development outcomes. 4. Linkages between the plan and other planning/policy documents, at different levels of government, are not identified in advance for coordination Indonesia’s hierarchical governance system requires that lower levels of government refer to the appropriate higher levels. Thus, it is important to review various related documents to see how other plans or policies may affect a plan proposed for a given site. This

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should also be the basis for identifying agendas for coordination among government institutions in order to share responsibility for a program or project. However, the linkages have usually been overlooked so that coordination doesn’t happen. 5. Regulations and laws are rarely enforced, although Law No. 26 of 2007 stipulates punishment for violations All the above points boil down to lax enforcement of regulations and laws, especially those that govern plan implementation. As punishment for violations, the law on spatial management stipulates fines and even imprisonment. In the past, censure for building on conservation zones, if it happened, resulted in demolition, at best, without further legal prosecution. The new law can result in even a mayor being prosecuted for violating or not enforcing the spatial plan. However, this has not yet been enforced, so violations to spatial plans still occur. In fact, rarely has the widespread flouting of spatial planning norms met with serious consequences.

1.4 Future Challenges in Implementing the NUA For the 2016 Habitat III conference, the national Ministry of Public Works and Housing prepared a report on how the country can attain the Habitat Agenda, which also discusses the challenges and thoughts pertaining to the NUA (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016). The report’s six areas of focus are urban demography; land management and urban planning; environment and urbanization; governance and legislation; urban economy; and housing and basic services. In summarizing some excerpts from this report, the following section underlines future challenges involved in implementing the NUA in Indonesia. Indonesia’s contemporary urban challenges and agenda for the future cut across the six aforementioned themes. However, given the NUA’s overall focus on sustainable urbanization, current and future challenges are framed from two perspectives that should be read concurrently (p. 107): (i) the broader, cross-cutting factors that shape the dynamics of Indonesian urbanization and urban growth; and (ii) the contemporary direct policies and institutional directives, and urban communities’ responses to immediate problems. Demographically speaking, the main challenges are the annual increase in the urban population by 3 million people, and the 30% difference between urban and rural population growth (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 109). In other words, every year Indonesia needs to build a city the size of Surabaya, its second largest, to accommodate the annual increase in the number of urban dwellers. Since this is not possible, the three million new urbanites will have to be accommodated within the densely populated, existing cities. Major cities will be packed with mostly new rural to urban migrants, who may not be fully prepared for being gainfully absorbed into the urban economy and/or adjusting to the pressures of urban life. The challenge is to ensure that this flow becomes an asset to rather than a burden on existing urban systems (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 109).

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The population census of 2010 indicates that Indonesia has attained a reasonably high level of urbanization (almost 50%). Yet, the country has only 98 municipalities or consolidated urban areas, whose governments are responsible for providing urban services (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 111). These municipalities are home to just about 22% of the population (55 million people). In other words, about 62 million urbanites are neither governed by municipalities, nor live in consolidated urban areas. Thus, the majority of urban residents are denied access to basic urban services. Indonesia’s urban challenge will require it to ensure that its planning and development efforts improve the capacity of its human resources, strengthen social and human capital, and sustainably leverage the richness of its ecological diversity. Exploiting cutting edge scientific and green technologies will help to move beyond natural resource exploitation, upon which Indonesia’s economy has stayed heavily reliant, for creating a prosperous public realm (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 111). It needs to develop infrastructure networks that support efficient and low cost production activities in rural areas and nearby small towns to create synergistic economic linkages with larger urban agglomerations. For instance, accessible financial services and favourable trade policies that promote agro- or marine-based value-added enterprises can improve the livelihoods for hitherto under-privileged groups, especially in its eastern part. Population densities in most urban areas of Indonesia have been steadily rising (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 112). Bandung and Cimahi municipalities record the highest densities at, respectively, 14,000 and 13,000 persons per km2 . This is intensifying the challenge of providing public spaces for urban residents, especially green open spaces to balance urban ecosystems (hydrology, microclimate, and other ecology systems) for improving their quality of life. The Ministry of Public Works (now Ministry of Public Works and Housing) Regulation No. 5/2008 mandates providing at least 30% of urban land as green open spaces, but the availability of such spaces is questionable. The lack of such spaces results in roads or undeveloped land serving as makeshift public spaces, such as soccer arenas in alleys (Sujatini et al. 2015). Even open parking lots end up being used as public space, although parking itself is an unmet urban need—due to grossly underprovided mass public transportation, the numbers of private vehicles in Indonesian cities are fast multiplying (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 112). With regard to the environment, a major challenge for Indonesia is to meet its commitment to achieve its voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target of 29% by the year 2030 (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 112).3 The National Action Plan to reduce greenhouse gases (RAN GRK) through Presidential Decree No. 61 of 2011 emphasizes this commitment, and is further supported by the national adaptation action plan of 2013. Each city is now required to include and 3 The

Law No. 6 of 2016 on the Ratification of the Paris Agreement stipulates the nationally determined contribution (NDC) by Indonesia to reduce emission to 29% through unilateral effort (an increase by three percent compared to the National Action Plan to reduce greenhouse gases in Presidential Decree No. 61 of 2011) and 41% (through international cooperation) in some sectors: forestry and peat land, agricultures, transportations and energies, industries, and wastes.

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execute a comprehensive and detailed implementation plan pertaining to the environmental aspects of local spatial development. The Paris COP 21 in 2015 stressed the active role of subnational governments for reducing GHGs. Mayors from various cities around the world have pledged their active contribution to reducing GHGs, and acknowledged that their significant efforts for meeting their respective national targets. This has also opened up avenues for Indonesian cities to utilize spatial planning and management for reducing GHGs. For ensuring overall societal development, another pressing challenge concerns the housing and urban basic services sector, and to address it the Indonesian government has deemed the following interventions as vital in urban areas (Ministry of Public Works and Housing 2016: 116): (1) ensure the security of food, drinking water, and energy (also considered essential for supporting national security); (2) ensure the adequate provision of basic water and sanitation infrastructure; (3) streamline and synergize the planning and development of infrastructure for drinking water provision and sanitation; (4) provide land at strategic locations for the construction of low-income housing; and (5) conduct public financial management and accounting in ways that allow for more innovative tariff mechanisms. A key future development objective is to make sustainable development principles integral to any urban development framework, and economic production and consumption. Albeit a long-standing appeal from the UN to all member countries, only a handful of small, advanced economies have integrated sustainable development principles into their urban development and governance frameworks. Indonesia’s ambition to set sustainable development goals into its official long-term development vision is welcome; unfortunately, its immediate need to achieve strong economic growth to address growing unemployment, and the pervasiveness of low cost production modes that fail to meet desired environmental standards are onerous challenges to overcome before sustainable development may be realized. Driven by the demands of urbanization and industrialization, its plentiful reserves of oil and coal are the easiest and cheapest options to satiate its growing appetite for energy. However, strong commitment for radical shifts towards a cleaner energy future is more likely to be accommodated and realized through its new urban governance framework. For Indonesian administrations to come, the challenge will be to sustain and further solidify political commitment for realizing this vision. The country’s urban economy will have to transform into a ‘green’ urban economy—infusing principles of industrial ecology into urban production is needed to wean cities off environmentally costly technologies. Indonesia’s goal of sustainable urbanization would require developing and progressively refining a comprehensive, actionable framework—from legislation and rules to governance and municipal financing—that will enable coherently and consistently applying the principles of green development across various sectors. National, provincial, and local fiscal policies will all have to reflect these goals. Despite transcending all levels (national, provincial, local), the frameworks of existing programs like P2KH involve only public agencies. The potential roles of private and nonprofit sectors have yet been overlooked or underestimated in the emerging quest for sustainable urbanization.

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1.5 Concluding Remarks Over half of all Indonesians now live in urban areas, and the urbanization rate is projected to keep climbing. Indonesia’s new decentralization policy initiated in 1999 accelerated urbanization by creating new urban centres across the country. A set of governance reforms initiated during the past decade has largely struggled to overturn undesirable urban planning practices for how pervasive and entrenched they are. The situation demands fundamental drivers of change, deemed essential for implementing the New Urban Agenda (NUA), namely to arrest policy incoherence and enlarge the role of spatial planning—which, within the government’s institutional approach for urban planning and development, currently enjoys just marginal importance. The promulgation of Law No. 26 of 2007 on spatial management marked a major shift in Indonesian urban spatial planning. Aligned with the implementation of the decentralization, this legislation emphasizes the distribution of powers and balanced coordination between different levels of government for territorial planning. It explicitly adopts sustainability as a guiding principle for spatial planning that will encourage a harmonious relationship between the natural and built environments. Upholding this principle, Indonesia’s Green City Program (P2KH) seeks to optimize the provision of green space in cities and urban regions. The principle of sustainability now needs to be included in a separate strategic environmental assessment (SEA) within every general spatial plan. To ensure consistency, the law mandates strengthening not just the making of plans but also their implementation and control, which includes enforcing zoning ordinances. The pursuit of sustainability will require good practices of urban planning and regional governance. For such practices, strong leadership, serious commitment, and communicative approaches are essential characteristics, which have made Solo’s recent collaborative development program (Widianingsih and Morrell 2017) such an exemplar of more effective and sustainable planning. The national government aims to adopt the NUA for guiding Indonesia’s sustainable development goals. Therefore, the National Report for Habitat III lays out several agenda items that emphasize the following: urban demography, social cohesion and equity; spatial development; urban ecology and environment; housing and basic services; and the urban economy. The NUA has brought spatial planning to the centre of urban governance for making cities across the world inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. Indonesia has developed an urban management agenda to reflect key NUA principles. By providing basic services and housing in newly urbanized areas in innovative ways, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing perceives implementing it as also a ‘green’ initiative (2016: 117). Fulfilling Indonesia’s new urban agenda demands greater attention to detailed plan implementation, and strong commitment to improved inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination, and regulatory enforcement.

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References Bappenas (2012) Kebijakan dan Strategi Perkotaan Nasional (KSPN): summary. Jakarta BPS (2010) Sensus Penduduk 2010. Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta Firman T (2004) Demographic and spatial patterns of Indonesia’s recent urbanisation. Population, Space and Place 10:421–434 Firman T (2012) Urbanization and urban development patterns. The Jakarta Post 12 May 2012 Firman T (2014) Inter-local-government partnership for urban management in decentralizing Indonesia: from below or above? Kartamantul (Greater Yogyakarta) and Jabodetabek (Greater Jakarta) compared. Space and Polity 18(3):215–232 Fundingsland Tetlow M, Hanusch M (2012) Strategic environmental assessment: the state of the art. Impact Asses Proj Apprais 30(1):15–24 Habitat III (2016) New Urban Agenda. United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development Hudalah D, Firman T, Woltjer J (2014) Cultural cooperation, institution building, and metropolitan governance in decentralizing Indonesia. Int J Urban Reg Res 38(6):2217–2234 Hudalah D, Winarso H, Woltjer J (2007) Peri-urbanisation in East Asia: a new challenge for planning? Int Dev Plan Rev 29(4):503–519 Jones H, Clench B, Harris D (2014) The governance of urban service delivery in developing countries: literature review. Overseas Development Institute, London Kementrian Pekerjaan Umum (2011). Program Pengembangan Kota Hijau (P2KH) Panduan Pelaksanaan 2011 Kirmanto D, Ernawi IS, Djakapermana RD (2012). Indonesia green city development program: an Urban reform. http://www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/2124.pdf. Accessed 9 June 2014 McGee TG (1991) The emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: expanding a hypothesis. In: Ginsburg N, Koppel B, McGee TG (eds) The extended metropolis: settlement transition in Asia. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI Meijer A, Bolivar MPR (2015) Governing the smart city: a review of the literature on smart urban governance. Int Rev Adm Sci 82(2):392–408 Ministry of Public Works and Housing (2016) Indonesia National Report to Habitat III. Republic of Indonesia Partidario MR (2000) Elements of an SEA framework—improving the added-value of SEA. Environ impact assess rev 20(6):647–663 Pusbindiklatren Bappenas (2015) Booklet Diklat Gelar & Non Gelar dengan Beasiswa Pusbindiklatren Bappenas. Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional Rondinelli DA, Nellis JR, Cheema GS (1983) Decentralization in developing countries: a review of recent experience. World Bank, Washington DC Rutz W (1987) Cities and Towns in Indonesia: their development, current positions and functions with regard to administration and regional economy. Gebruder Borntraeger, Berlin-Stuttgart Salim W, Kombaitan B (2009) Jakarta: the rise and challenge of a capital. City 13(1):120–128 Sujatini S, Soemardi TP, Alamsyah AT, Darmajanti L (2015) Temporary public open space as a spatial product on social life of city Kampong Community, Jakarta. Int J Eng Technol 7(2):156–158 UNFPA (2015). Urbanization in Indonesia. UNFPA Indonesia Monograph Series No. 4 UN-Habitat (2009). Global Report on Human Settlements 2009: Planning Sustainable Cities. United Nations Human Settlements Program Widianingsih I, Morrell E (2017) Participatory planning in Indonesia. Policy Stud 28(1):1–15 Wild L, Chambers V, King, M, Harris, D (2012) Common constraints and incentive problems in service delivery. Working Paper 351. Overseas Development Institute, London World Bank (2012) Indonesia, the rise of metropolitan regions: towards inclusive and sustainable regional development World Bank (2016). Indonesia’s Urban Story. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ NEWS/0„pagePK:34382~piPK:34439~theSitePK:4607,00.html. Accessed 8 Sept 2017

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Wilmar Salim is a Senior Lecturer and former Chair of Graduate Program in Regional and City Planning, the School of Architecture, Planning and Policy Development, at Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) in Indonesia. He is also affiliated with the Climate Change Center at ITB as Senior Researcher. He earned a Ph.D. in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of Hawaii at Manoa. His areas of expertise include: plan and policy implementation and evaluation; decentralization in developing countries; local and metropolitan governance; poverty reduction strategies; and mainstreaming climate change adaptation into development planning. He has given trainings on climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. He was a Visiting Associate Professor at the Graduate School of International Development and Cooperation of Hiroshima University, teaching climate change adaptation in 2016. He is a member of Indonesian Regional Science Association (IRSA) and Research Committee 21 Sociology of Urban and Regional Development of International Sociological Association (ISA). Delik Hudalah is associate professor of urban and regional planning at the School of Architecture, Planning and Policy Development (SAPPD), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Indonesia. Delik has focused his works on the transformation of urban frontiers in emerging cities, metropoles and megaurban regions in the context of Asian countries’ transition to globalization, decentralization and democracy. He is particularly interested in the interfaces, interactions and conflicts of socioeconomic and environmental changes, and global forces and local aspirations in the spatial reproduction, planning and governance on the edge of Indonesia’s regional urbanization age. He has participated in various research projects on, among other, suburban megaproject and land development, megaregion, urban deconcentration, industrial suburbanization, peri-urbanization, and metropolitan politics and governance in Indonesia and East Asia.

Part III

Innovations in Service Delivery and Access for Social Inclusion

Financing Local Infrastructure and Public Services: Case of Shaxi Town in Suburban Suzhou, China Xu Chen, Min Zhao and Richard LeGates

Abstract This chapter introduces the financing mechanisms for local infrastructure construction and service delivery in a town named Shaxi in Taicang City in suburban Suzhou. Shaxi town is located in the South of Jiangsu Province in Eastern China, near Shanghai. The chapter uses the Shaxi case study to illustrate strengths and weaknesses of local government finance in China and their relevance for other developing countries. As local governments in China play a leading role in investment and financing of public goods, this study begins by analysing the fiscal logic of China’s government hierarchy. Then, taking Shaxi Town as a case study, it provides a detailed description of the various sources of investment and financing available to local governments in China, and the problems different kinds of investment and financing address. Finally, this chapter suggests ways to improve financing, planning, construction, and service delivery for small towns in China at different stages of development from the perspective of overall, systemic reform. The findings should be of interest to local officials and planners involved with town planning in China and other developing countries. Keywords Local infrastructure and public services · Financing mode · Township · China

X. Chen School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou, China e-mail: [email protected] Department of Urban Planning, College of Architecture and Urban Planning (CAUP), Tongji University, Shanghai, China M. Zhao (B) · R. LeGates Tongji University, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected] R. LeGates e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_7

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1 Introduction Since 1982, China has been in the process of rapid urbanization and infrastructure construction. As a result of long time institutional constraints, China has a distinct urban-rural binary structure. In the provision of infrastructure and public services, small towns and rural areas in China have often lagged far behind the larger cities as in other Asian cities (Dahiya 2012a, b). In the process of urbanization in developed countries, there was no distinct urban-rural institutional divergence as is evident in China. Therefore, most policy related discussions tend to focus on the general financing mechanisms for the provision of both of urban and rural infrastructure and public services. But in China, only under the background of special institutional system will we get insight into small towns’ financing mechanism for infrastructure and public services. As in other countries, there are distinctions between cities, counties and towns in China, which are lower-level governments below central and provincial governments. Cities in China are ranked and more highly ranked cities have greater influence with the central government and more decision-making authority than lower ranked cities. Four cities—Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing—are top-ranked “provincial level cities” created by and reporting directly to the national government. Most other cities have been established by the governments of provinces in which they are located. Suzhou is a “prefectural (county)-level city” at the second rank—below provincial-level cities, but above sub-prefectural level cities. Counties are units of local government with some political and fiscal authority that report to cities. Some regions with large ethnic minority populations or other special characteristics are designated autonomous regions. Townships are a level of government located within a city or county that report to the city or county government. Based on population and area standards, they are approved by the respective provincial or autonomous regional government within whose administrative area they are located. Townships may include several towns and villages. Towns are administrative divisions, confirmed by the city or county level government. All towns in China are located within and report to a city or county. Many towns are economic and service centres for their surrounding rural areas. Towns often have one or more subordinate villages within them. Compared to townships and towns, villages are economic agglomerations with smaller rural populations. Villages are recognized administrative divisions with a village council elected by villagers, but not a level of government. Each village has a branch of the Chinese Communist party. Townships and towns are important nodes for integrating urban and rural areas. The quality of infrastructure services is an important measure of how well a town performs this role. In China’s governmental hierarchy, governments at the county and township levels are the main bodies in charge of planning and construction in small towns and responsible for supplying basic public services to them. The role of these subnational governments is an important research subject in China now. China’s National New Style Urbanization Plan (PRC 2014) proposes upgrading the planning and

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construction capacities of town governments and improving the overall public service levels of towns and villages. Contemporary research related to small town planning and infrastructure construction in China can be considered to belong to four broad areas. • Modes of infrastructure and service allocation: For example, Zhao et al. (2014) studied centralized and decentralized modes of education infrastructure and residents’ satisfaction with them in counties, towns and villages in Eastern and Central China. They proposed delivering education and other services in relation to population concentrations rather than locating facilities equally within an area. In addition, they proposed a planning strategy of “smart shrinkage” of infrastructures in rural areas experiencing outmigration and population decline. • Evaluation of infrastructure supply: Studies on this topic have evaluated the supply of public goods and regional differences among small towns, based on indices such as the Gini coefficient (Xie and Zhai 2006). • Improvement of town configurations and construction standards: For example, Shan and Zhao (2006) proposed improved standards based on regional development trends, residents’ demands, and existing construction deficiencies. • Optimization of town physical space layouts. Zhang et al. (2012) proposed establishing space standards towards equalizing urban and rural infrastructure. Other similar studies have called for understanding different dimensions of basic public services equalization. Despite a significant and growing number of studies of Chinese small towns, studies that investigate investment and financing mechanisms and government performance in the planning and construction of small towns are limited. There is a lack of deep understanding of the infrastructure challenges that small towns face, their motives for improvement, different financing models, and feasible ways of improving infrastructure construction and service supply. Deepening the understanding of these issues has important theoretical and practical significance, and can provide practical guidance to improve planning and infrastructure construction in small towns in China and other developing countries. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the fiscal logic of China’s government hierarchy. Section 3 taking Shaxi Town as a case study, it provides a detailed description of the various sources of investment and financing available to local governments in China. Section 4 concludes the problems different kinds of investment and financing address. Finally, the Sect. 5 suggests ways to improve financing, planning, construction, and service delivery for small towns in China at different stages of development from the perspective of overall, systemic reform.

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2 The Fiscal Logic of China’s Local Governments in Planning and Building Infrastructure 2.1 Division of Government’s Fiscal Power and Authority All countries rely on inter-governmental cooperation across different levels to provide infrastructure and public services. The distribution of state power in a country generally follows one of two models (Wang 2013). The first is federal (splitdecentralization) systems in which decision-making power is divided between the federal government and subnational and local governments. It is essentially a “bottom-up” system in which the power of the federal government starts with local governments and is transferred upward through different ranks of government. The United States, for instance, has a federal system in which, inter alia, the national government is responsible for defence and diplomacy; state governments for building highways; and local governments for regulating land use and providing basic public services such as police and fire protection, libraries, parks, and public primary and secondary education through independent school districts. The second model is the unitary government model with responsibility for developing and implementing programs consistent with national policy assigned to lower levels of government by the central government. The unitary government model is a “top-down” system, in which the central government and local governments forge a principal-agent relationship. China is a unitary state and achieves the division of financial revenue and supply of public services through a five-level government system. After economic reforms and opening that began in 1979, China has reformed the highly centralized political system based on the Soviet Union implemented under Mao Zedong and increased decentralization. However, the control of revenue and responsibility for service provision is not well synchronized. Local governments often lack sufficient revenue to carry out their assigned responsibilities. In 1994, the central government introduced a tax-sharing system reform that transferred a significant amount of fiscal power from local governments to the central government. The 1994 reform left local government with the same or even more responsibilities for providing infrastructure and services (see Figs. 1 and 2). The national government promised to provide transfer payments to aid local governments in meeting their responsibilities. Figure 1 shows the change in nominal central and local government fiscal and authority power from 1978 to 2005. The fiscal power of government refers to the power of government at all levels to raise and control income, authority power refers to the responsibilities for government at all levels to provide infrastructure, and services. There was a dramatic decrease in local government fiscal power between 1993 and 1994—from 78% of all fiscal power in 1993 to just 45% in 1994 and a comparable increase in central government fiscal power at the same time. Figure 1 does not reflect transfer payments, taxes that are transferred back to local government, and fixed subsidies from the central government to local governments.

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90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

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Fig. 1 Distribution of nominal central and local government fiscal and authority powers (1978−2005). Data Source China statistical yearbook (1978−2005). Note Data on real central and local government fiscal and authority power is not available before 1997 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Real authority power-Central government Real authority power-Local governments Real fiscal power-Central government Real fiscal power-Local governments

Fig. 2 Distribution of nominal and real fiscal and authority powers of the central government and local governments (1997–2012). Data Source China statistical yearbook (1997−2012)

Figure 2 shows how real—as opposed to nominal—central and local government fiscal and authority powers changed from 1997 to 2012. After transfer payments, which are taxes transferred back to local government, and fixed subsidies that contributed to real local government revenue in 1997 were about the same as in 1993, before the tax sharing reform (78% of all revenue). Over time, local governments’ local fiscal power has decreased to about 60% but their authority power has increased from 75 to 85% Figs. 1 and 2 show why local governments in China have been

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pushed by the reform to find additional revenue sources, forcing them to become more entrepreneurial and creative (discussed later in this chapter). The real authority power of governments is reflected by public expenditure data. Public expenditures refer to discretionarily disposable revenue. It includes the sum of local fiscal revenue and tax returns, transfer payments, and fixed subsidies earmarked for specific needs. The central government’s actual fiscal power equals its revenues minus these expenditures. According to China’s decentralization of public finance law, the central government is responsible for public goods of national significance such as defence and highways, high-speed rail lines and other major infrastructure construction. Local governments are responsible for most local goods, such as urban roads and municipal facilities. In contrast to some other countries, China’s central government’s share of fiscal revenue (about 46%) is not excessively high, but local governments cover 85% of the cost of local public expenditures, which is higher than most other countries (Fig. 3). The Chinese government’s expenditures on education, health care, and social security are significantly higher than most other countries (Fig. 4). In urban and rural areas, most expenditure on essential services such as education, healthcare, housing and community development is borne by local governments (Fig. 5).

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Fig. 4 International comparison of government expenditures for education, health care, and social security. Sources Chinese data are from PRC Ministry of Finance, Treasury Department, China Cities and Counties Fiscal Statistics 2000

2.2 Local Governments’ Financial Revenues and Public Expenditures At the national level, China’s decentralized system only divides financial revenues and responsibilities for provision of public services between the central and provincial governments, with no decentralization to the sub-provincial levels. The division of fiscal powers to political divisions within a province is diverse and complex. At the local government level (Fig. 6), basic level governments—including towns and counties governments, especially county-level governments—bear most service provision costs. Compared to the national government’s sharing of 18% of the total expenditure, county governments spend 35%. The gap between lower level governments’ revenue and expenditure is the result of the initial distribution prescribed by the tax-sharing system. Most of the powers, which the central government has decentralized to provincial governments, have been further transferred down by provincial governments to governments at the county and township levels (Zhou 2006). According to China’s tax-sharing system, after the first round of revenue distribution, the central government makes a secondary distribution through a transfer payment system. This is similar to payments that state governments in the United States make to equalize school finances. The transfer payments have a “convergence effect” on the revenue and expenditure gap between the general public budget and village and town government budgets. The gross gap between county and township governments’ budgetary expenditure and income is gradually widening. However, the net gap1 between county and township governments’ budgetary expenditure and (2006) measurement method: gross gap  local income—local expenditure, net shortfall  local income—local expenditure + subsidized income from higher-level governments. 1 Zhou

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Fig. 5 Proportion of major public service expenditures By China’s central and local governments (2015). Source PRC NBS, 2015

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income remains similar after the transfer payments are redistributed, that is, after subsidies from higher authorities are included (Fig. 7). Thus, transfer payments through the tax-sharing system have largely addressed the town and village government fiscal revenue gap. However, just the balance of payments of gross and general public budgets does not tell the complete story because of regional disparities and variations in public expenditures of local governments’ aggregate financial resources.

2.3 Patterns of Local Governments’ Service Provision and Regional Differences in Infrastructure Supply The direct result of China’s tax sharing and transfer payment system since the mid1990s has been to keep local governments’ public budgetary revenue and expenditures balanced. The tax-sharing system and institutional reforms of finance, corporations, and land have profoundly affected the supply of basic public services by local governments. Consequently, regional differences and regional changes in the financing structure have become more apparent.

2.3.1

Local Infrastructure Supply Incentives and Fiscal Growth

The incentives and behaviour of actors in China’s public service delivery system changed significantly after 1994s tax-sharing reform (Zhou 2006). Before the

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Fig. 7 County and township governments’ gross gap, net grants, and net gap of public budgets (1993–2005). Data Source PRC Ministry of Finance, Treasury Department, China Cities and Counties Fiscal Statistics (1993–2005)

tax sharing system, local governments pursued the “maximization of local unique income”.2 They sought to transfer as much own-source financial revenue to extrabudgetary revenue as possible in order to reduce their tax burdens and increase local revenue from local operating enterprises. Funding levels were low, and spending local financial income for infrastructure planning and construction was not a top local government development priority at that time. The 1994 the tax-sharing system, and accompanying financial and corporate reforms, changed the constraints that determined local governments’ expenditure behaviour. The possible ways for Local governments to obtain local proprietary income changed, they suddenly lost access to a large amount of extra-budgetary income from their involvement in business operations. Local governments were incentivized to attract enterprises, expand manufacturing (which would increase their tax base), and generate employment through expanding their service industries that would generate more business tax income. This strategy would only work if the local government planned and constructed sound infrastructure and provided high-quality public services. Since the new regime of institutional constraints and growth incentives was introduced in 1994, local governments have gradually phased out investment in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and have turned to investing in infrastructure to improve their business environments and attract businesses. As more attention has focused on the supply of public goods, a fundamental change in local fiscal growth models has taken place—from operation-oriented enterprises to service-oriented enterprises. 2 Tao R et al. (2009), Chen and Zhao (2016) analysed the behaviour preference of local governments

before the 1994 reform of tax sharing system.

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Local Governments’ Behavioural Patterns of Expenditure and Spatial Differences in Financing Structures

Following the tax-sharing system reform and a series of related institutional reforms, local governments now have the incentive to increase the supply of infrastructure. They now also monopolize local land markets, which play a key role in shaping infrastructure supply, and thereby economic growth, local proprietary incomes, and infrastructure reinvestment—a feedback loop. Overall, local governments’ strategies can be summarized as constituting a common pattern.3 First, local governments acquire low-cost land and construct limited infrastructure to make available affordable industrial land. Industrial development stokes economic growth and rising demand. Subsequently, commercial and residential land values appreciate and tax revenues increase. Land transfers, and land financing enable local governments to re-invest in successive rounds of infrastructure improvement suitable for expanding existing industries or attracting additional (hopefully higher-end) development. Since 1994, overall, extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures, including landleasing revenues, have increased significantly (Fig. 8). Since 2007, the central government has required local governments to include all land transfer revenue in their budgets. The main reason the central government requires local governments to include land transfer income in their budgets is to better control local governments’ land sales. This is probably the reason for a slight downward trend in local governments’ extrabudgetary revenue and expenditures after 2007. However, this increase has not been uniform and there are large regional variations. Figures 9 and 10 show regional differences in budgetary and extra-budgetary expenditures in Chinese provinces in 2010. The south-eastern coastal areas, which have unique locational advantages, can attract domestic and international investment to sustain strong economic growth and raise land values, triggering a positive feedback loop of reinvestment and renewed operation of “infrastructure supply—investment entry—economic growth.” This is harder to achieve in the less developed central and western regions—particularly in locations away from large city clusters and/or lacking well-developed transportation infrastructure. As a result, extra-budgetary expenditures in the eastern coastal provinces are significantly higher than expenditures in the central and western provinces (Fig. 10) and budgetary expenditures in the eastern coastal provinces’ budgetary expenditures are lower than in the central and western provinces (Fig. 9). This suggests that the eastern coastal provinces rely on self-financing to promote infrastructure construction to a greater extent, while the central and western provinces rely on budgetary expenditures that are controlled by the central government to a greater extent. This reflects how the self-financing of infrastructure construction in developed areas has 3 Local

governments’ behavioural strategies in China are formed in the institutional environment with no property tax. Due to the high cost of implementation of the property tax system, the Chinese government implemented the one-time land transfer system instead of the property tax system. Industrial and commercial land users and real estate developers pay entire land leasing fees for 40−70 years—a one-time land-transfer fee paid to local governments. Land transfer fees are divided and calculated as part of individual real estate purchasing expenses. So in the period of land using (40−70 years), the user pays no property taxes.

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7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Extra budgetary funds revenue:Local governments(100 million yuan) Extra budgetary funds revenue:Central governments(100 million yuan) Extra budgetary funds expenditure:Local governments(100 million yuan) Extra budgetary funds expenditure:Central governments(100 million yuan)

Fig. 8 Extra-budgetary income from central and local governments (1990–2010). Data Source PRC National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbooks (1990–2010). Note Before the fiscal budgetary system reform in 2010, a large amount of fiscal revenue was calculated in the category of extra-budgetary revenue. Land transfer income was included in the extra-budgetary income category before 2007

fostered a robust growth in infrastructure supply. The less-developed regions rely heavily on transfer payments to supplement local finance, because their capacity for self-financing and construction is weak. As a result, the pattern of regional imbalance has become more pronounced. Data on land financing and government debt show that provinces and cities with high extra-budgetary expenditures, and where public construction debts are high, rely on land revenues to a greater extent than other provinces and cities (Ye and Wu 2014). Another difference between the economically developed provinces and cities in southeast coastal region4 and less developed provinces and cities in the central and western region pertains to the level of decentralization. The authority to construct urban infrastructure tends to be much more decentralized to village and town governments in economically developed regions than in the less developed ones. There are also significant differences in government debt. The proportion of underdeveloped provincial level governments’ debt in underdeveloped provinces is relatively high, and provincial level debt in developed provinces is relatively low compared to that the level of debt in developed provinces, but the debt ratio of counties and townships in the latter set of developed provinces is relatively high. For example, the 4 According

to the yardstick of per capita GDP, China’s economically developed provinces are all located on the southeast coast region.

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Fig. 9 Regional difference in per capita public budgetary expenditures by province (2010). Data Source PRC National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2010. Note After the 2010 fiscal budgetary system reform, the China financial statistical yearbook stopped providing data on extra-budgetary expenditures

ratio of county-level debt in Zhejiang Province, a which is well developed province, is over 50% more than that in Sichuan and the provincial-level city of Chongqing, both of which are reasonably well developed (National Audit Office 2013).

3 Small Towns Investment and Financing Mechanism for Infrastructure Planning and Construction Shaxi town’s experience illuminates investment and financing mechanisms for infrastructure construction in small towns in developed areas. Shaxi is an instructive example because it is located within the prefectural-level city of Suzhou. As the chapter by Fang et al. (2019) in this book discusses, the national government designated Suzhou as China’s first and only National Comprehensive Reform Pilot City for Integration of Urban and Rural Development. In order to close—and eventually eliminate—the

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Fig. 10 Regional difference in extra-budgetary expenditures by province (2010). Data Source PRC National Bureau of statistics, China statistical yearbook 2010. Note After the 2010 fiscal budgetary system reform, the China financial statistical yearbook stopped providing data on extra-budgetary expenditures

gap between urban and rural development, Suzhou has implemented a number of institutional innovations. In particular as a result of its land transfer policy, the level of planning and construction in small towns has significantly improved. In this chapter, we use Shaxi Town to describe the balance of income and expenditures, capital circulation, and land transfers in detail. This chapter explains how town government in a quite developed region financed and built different kinds of infrastructure, and how Chinese governments promote development at the basic administrative level. It also helps explain the main constraints on development in developed regions.

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Fig. 11 Location of Shaxi town. Source Map from Google Earth

3.1 An Introduction to Shaxi Town Shaxi enjoys a favourable geographical location in the north-central region of Taicang city, close to Taicang port near the port of Shanghai (Fig. 11). Its total land area of 132.14 square kilometres is organized into 20 administrative villages, with 160,000 residents, nearly 90,000 of whom have local hukou.5 Shaxi town has developed a strong comprehensive economy and development capacity (Fig. 12). Relying on land, labour, and other advantages, Shaxi has vigorously promoted industrial park development, and succeeded in attracting industry from Shanghai and Suzhou, where substantial foreign capital and industrial capacity continue to accumulate but where land and labour costs are higher. Shaxi’s economic development level is higher than other towns in Taicang city; its per capita GDP exceeds the average levels of both Suzhou and Shanghai. Recently, Shaxi has experienced the gradual decline of its traditionally dominant industry—textiles, but also the incubation and expansion of new industries, such as new materials and biomedicine (Fig. 13).

5 Hukou is China’s system of household registration. It allows the government to control and regulate

internal migration, especially rural-to-urban migration, and control the infrastructures and services supply for a selected group of population.

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Fig. 13 Changes in the industrial structure of Shaxi 2010–2014. Data Source Shaxi town statistical yearbook (2010−2014)

Policy development in China often involves designating pilot projects, which sometimes include granting local government units more authority. A successful pilot project will usually be continued and expanded and often replicated elsewhere. If a pilot project fails it just fades away and is not replicated. To promote the reform of urban and rural integration systems and mechanisms, Jiangsu province has designated 20 economically developed towns to carry out pilot projects to reform their administrative systems. These pilot projects are intended to address towns’ problems of large responsibilities, limited power, weak functioning, and low efficiency. The pilot towns have received different degrees of county-level

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power to deal with industrial development, planning and construction, project investment, production safety, environmental protection, market supervision, social security, and livelihood. Jiangsu province also decentralized parts of its executive power, administrative oversight, and approval authority in accordance with each town’s specific situation, to simplify the administrative system and improve the town’s efficiency. The pilot project has significantly expanded Shaxi’s administrative approval authority, but has not expanded its fiscal power as much.

3.2 Income and Expenditure Structure and Infrastructure Fund Circulation for Construction and Service Provision Broadly speaking, Infrastructure can be divided into two main kinds: economic (development) infrastructure and social infrastructure (Hirschman 1958). From an economic perspective, the distinction between the two kinds of infrastructure is whether the short-term production function6 changes directly. Externalities from changing economic infrastructure will have a larger short-term effect on the economic production sector than investing in social infrastructure. But, in the long run, investment in social infrastructure may have a greater impact. Shaxi has self-financed most economic development infrastructure investment (Fig. 14). Its general public budgetary revenue covers most construction expenses, and basic social service infrastructure such building schools and paying teachers’ salaries. The construction and servicing of economic development infrastructure, with large economic externalities, has been funded primarily by the government’s financing platform. The government relies on urban investment and urban construction companies to borrow money to finance development. Credit for the financing platform has come mainly from land, including cash flow from land transfers and expected earnings from land assets. Shaxi is fortunate to have an advantageous location and strong economic development potential. It already has a solid economic base, but the government hopes to attract more investment—to promote industry and urbanization through infrastructure construction and better public services—to ensure rising land values and higher land transfer fees. Figure 14 illustrates Shaxi town’s income and expenditure structuring and main capital flows for infrastructure construction and services.

6 The

construction and growth of economic infrastructure are particularly important in the short term; successful social infrastructure improves the long-term utility function of the residents. The social infrastructure production function may not change in the short run; however, in the long run, it should lead to growth through more productive human capital and more disposable income.

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Fig. 14 Shaxi town’s income and expenditure structure and main infrastructure construction and service capital flows. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

3.2.1

Funds for Infrastructure Construction and Public Services

In 2015, Shaxi town’s comprehensive financial resources totalled approximately 485 million Yuan (over US$60 million). They came from four main sources: retained taxes, transfer payments from higher level governments, operating income from collectively-owned assets operated by town government which belong to the town, and land transfers. The Shaxi government retained taxes worth 280 million Yuan (US$40 million) in 2015, 25% of the total tax revenue (Fig. 15). According to China’s inter-governmental tax sharing rules, 28 categories of taxes are shared among different government levels. For example, a local government may retain all of the service sector business taxes collected. But local governments may keep only 25% of the value added taxes from manufacturing, which is Shaxi’s main tax source. So despite having a robust economy, Shaxi only receives a quarter of the tax revenue it generates from this source. In China, transfer payments, especially general transfer payments, are reserved for places with comparatively greater need. Higher-level governments also make fixed transfer payments for special interest projects. Since Shaxi has a strong economy it

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Fig. 15 Shaxi town’s 2015 tax structure 2015 (1.2 billion Yuan, US$0.15 billion). Source SDCCB and TU, 2016

receives only a small general transfer payment. But since it has a number of special interest projects, it often receives substantial transfer payments for special interest projects. In 2015 it received 20 million Yuan (US$2.8 million) as a general transfer payment, and 80 million Yuan (US$11.5 million) in fixed transfer payments for agricultural infrastructure and renovation of traditional villages (Fig. 16), which were of particular interest to higher levels of government for protecting basic farmland and traditional space. In 2015, Shaxi’s land transfer fee was 105 million Yuan (US$16.2 million) (Fig. 16). In addition to its four main revenue sources, Shaxi obtained a small amount of operating income from collective assets. A pie chart showing Shaxi’s general public budget expenditures (Fig. 17) shows that the main expenditures in 2015 totalled 360 million Yuan (about US$52 million). Therefore, its total fiscal power in 2015—485 million Yuan (about US$70 million)—was more than adequate to cover the general public budget outlays. Among these, basic education consumed the biggest share—40% of general public budget expenditures. More than half of the education budget was paid to retired teachers. The remaining expenditures on agriculture, forestry and water, and medical and government operations accounted for about 20% each. Some of Shaxi’s basic public expenditures are covered by transfer payments from Jiangsu province, Suzhou city, Taicang city, or combinations of two or three of these sources either as unrestricted general transfer payments or special transfer payments which must be spent for a specific purpose. Some general transfer payments

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Fig. 16 Shaxi’s retained tax, transfer payments, land funds income, and financing platform loan in 2015. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

Fig. 17 Structure of Shaxi’s basic infrastructure and public services in 2015 (0.36 billion Yuan, or US$0.054 billion). Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

come from Jiangsu province and some from Suzhou city and Taicang city. Most special transfer payments come from Jiangsu province, and a small proportion comes from Taicang city. The provincial special transfer payment was for construction of agricultural and educational infrastructure. The transfer payment from Taicang was for medical care, including endowment insurance and serious illness insurance.

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Sources of Funds for the Construction and Operation of Economic Infrastructure

Economic infrastructure spending in Shaxi in 2015 has been used for three main purposes. The first was infrastructure for construction of an industrial park. The second was for building more concentrated new settlements and relocating farmers there. The town promotes the integration of urban and rural infrastructure through three main policies7 —“three-concentrations”; “three-replacements”; and “four-matchmaking”—to facilitate the centralized reconstruction of scattered arable land, industrial land, and homestead land. The third main purpose is for urban environmental construction and protection. Most funds for these three types of infrastructure come from land development finances and government finances. Land finance refers to income from land transfers, associated tax revenue, and revenue from banks secured by land mortgages. Two main financing methods characterize Shaxi’s financing platform: (i) working capital loans secured by mortgages on land and government credit; and (ii) project financing for specific construction projects, where the government usually becomes a shareholder with funds or a mortgage. Capital is also attracted from other sources. In 2015 the income from Shaxi Town’s land transfer funds was 105 million Yuan (over US$15.1 million). New loans from Shaxi’s financing platform amounted to 600 million Yuan (approximately US$754.4 million) (Fig. 18), double the 300 million Yuan from tax and transfer payments. Shaxi’s revenue structure is different from town-level governments in China’s central and western provinces. For example, in Hubei Province’s general budget revenue and expenditures, higher-level government transfer payments are the province’s largest source of budgetary income, and non-tax land transfer revenue is significantly lower than tax revenue and transfer payments (Fig. 19). Since town governments in provinces such as Hubei, Anhui, and other provinces in central China do not have the capacity of self-financing, local government finance generally relies on the “county management of township budget” model, where counties make budgetary decisions and town governments lack financial autonomy. Although economic infrastructure investment may promote short-term economic growth, short-term construction investment in many economic infrastructure construction projects is significantly higher than the income generated in the short term, so balanced income and expenditures usually must be achieved in a multi-year development cycle. Shaxi’s response has been to establish financing platforms with differ7 “Three concentrations” means that industries are concentrated in designated planning areas, farm-

ers are concentrated in communities, and agricultural land is consolidated into larger parcels, optimizing urban, industrial, agricultural, residential, ecological, and hydrographic planning and layout. “Three-replacements” means replacing cooperative stocks of land shares with contracted land, replacing commercial houses with homestead land, and replacing shares with collective assets. This is intended to optimize allocation of urban and rural resources. “Four-matchmaking” refers to matching urban and rural infrastructure, urban and rural public services, urban and rural social security, and urban and rural social management to integrate urban and rural environments/economies. (Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University 2016.)

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Fig. 18 Shaxi’s 2015 financing platform loans and total remaining loans in 2015 Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016.

ent companies for different construction projects, but to pool revenue from multiple projects. The government coordinates financing companies in a platform for financing and ensuring loan repayment. The government-coordinated financing platforms have both advantages and drawbacks. A major advantage is that government coordination is a form of risk pooling that can effectively overcome the financial risks of individual projects, helping make infrastructure planning and construction possible. In Shaxi, some projects are risky and it may take a long time for them to return a profit. For example, renovation of an ancient town will bring little or no direct income in the short term but may be a wise project to improve a town’s overall environment in the long term. Such a long-term project may obtain financing through a financing platform that gets short-term returns from other projects, which become profitable much sooner. A drawback to multiple platforms funding multiple projects is that debt can be transferred between platforms and debt risk may be hidden. In recent years, funds raised through financing platforms in Shaxi Town have expanded rapidly. The loan balance has grown from 170 million Yuan (about US$25 million) in 2010 to 2.8 billion Yuan (US$403 million) in 2015 (Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University 2016).

3.3 Fund Operation for Specific Projects 3.3.1

Social Infrastructure

Taking education services, medical services, agriculture and forestry facilities as three important social infrastructure projects, this section introduces Shaxi Town’s detailed investment and financing mechanisms.

Fig. 19 Composition of general budgetary income and expenditures of township governments in Hubei Province (2010). Data Source Hubei Province’s Towns’ Statistical Data (2010)

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Fig. 20 Primary School in Shaxi Town. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

Education Services: As Shaxi is a traditional town which places great emphasis on education,both the quantity and quality of education infrastructure in Shaxi Town is already excellent. Shaxi’s No.1 Middle School, in particular, enjoys a high reputation in Taicang city. At present, Shaxi has six kindergartens, five public primary schools, one private primary school (Fig. 20), one primary and secondary mixed school (Fig. 21), two junior high schools, and one high school. Shaxi plans to build five new kindergartens at a total cost of 200 million Yuan during the period of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016−2020). In contrast to educational infrastructure construction jointly funded by Taicang city and Shaxi town before 2011, town-level education subsidies after 2011 are allocated to Taicang’s municipal department of finance, and town-level education and construction funds are approved by Taicang city. After being approved, the Shaxi city department of finance allocates the full amount of all education subsidies. Medical Services: Shaxi Town’s department of finance provides most of the funding for medical services. For example, the Shaxi People’s Hospital (Fig. 22) cost 280 million Yuan to construct, of which 80 million Yuan was from higher levels of government and 200 million came from Shaxi’s own resources. In addition, each village and residential community in Shaxi Town now has a medical clinic (Fig. 23). Villages themselves bear the expenses for building their medical clinics using the villages’ collective asset income, with doctors visiting from the Shaxi Town People’s Hospital.

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Fig. 21 Secondary School in Shaxi Town Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

Fig. 22 Shaxi town people’s hospital. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

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Fig. 23 Rural Medical Clinic in Shaxi Town. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

Agriculture, forestry, water facilities, and rural construction: Most funding of Shaxi Town for agriculture, forestry, water facilities and rural construction comes from transfer payments from higher-level governments. Shaxi town can apply for special funds from Suzhou’s Kangju Village (Healthy living Village) program established specifically to improve residential infrastructure and the exteriors of rural houses, and to the Jiangsu provincial government and the Suzhou city government “Beautiful Villages” programme. (China’s “Beautiful Village” programme is discussed in the chapter in this book by Zou et al. 2019.) In 2015, Shaxi built four Kangju rural projects at a total cost of 10.74 million Yuan (US$1.3 million).

3.3.2

Economic Infrastructure and Public Services

Three important economic infrastructure projects in Shaxi in 2015 included building concentrated new settlements, constructing an industrial park and urban environmental construction improvements. Relocating farmers and replacing land with social security entitlements: Shaxi’s original villages were mostly located along streams flowing into the Yangtze River. Most villages were small with scattered layouts. Relocating farmers from these villages into more concentrated settlements frees up arable land, and makes it easier and less costly to provide education, health, and other social services to the residents.

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Arable and urban land may be exchanged in the process of relocation and centralized resettlement, so that there may be a net increase in total arable land—sometimes in larger continuous plots that are better for modern agriculture. Farmers are free to choose whether to move to new concentrated settlements or not, and they are also free to choose among a different kinds of new communities. In exchange, farmers in the relocated communities must give up part or all of their homestead land, and they can choose whether to give up their use rights in farmland in exchange for cash compensation of discounted (even free) housing. With reforms that emphasize transparency and the rule of law, the town government now offers compensation in accordance with established standards. Farmers who move to new communities can retain 220 m2 of homestead land in their former village to use or rent. The Shaxi town government is responsible for building community infrastructure in the new communities. Farmers can build their own houses in the new communities, but must conform to uniform standards. Town governments pay an average of 200,000−248,000 Yuan (US$29,000 to $36,000) towards community infrastructure constructed for each household. When old houses are demolished, the town government offers households between 350,000 and 380,000 Yuan (US$50,000–$55,000) in compensation, which will usually cover most or all of the expense of a new house. In addition, the town government provides an average of 300,000 Yuan (US$43,000) per household to farmers who give up the use rights in arable land in exchange for their social insurance. When constructing residential buildings, financing platform companies provide funds, including compensation for lost land, construction of new community facilities, and social security for landless peasants. The 2016 Tongji University and China Construction Bank Shaxi Town Survey (Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University 2016) found that most farmers in Shaxi prefer to move to new communities. But the survey also found that farmers generally expect rural land and property assets to which they hold use rights to appreciate. Most believe relinquishing some or all of their existing use rights to rural land will promote appreciation of their family assets if compensation is high enough or they are able to retain some valuable use rights that they expect to appreciate as well as receiving significant compensation to use towards a new house. Given this set of conditions and expectations, to implement the relocation of peasant households, the town government must bear a large expenditure averaging about 900,000 Yuan (248,000 Yuan for infrastructure + 350,000 Yuan in compensation for the old house + 300,000 Yuan for social insurance (US$130,000) per household. Shaxi’s economic infrastructure investment is significantly higher than social infrastructure investment and cannot be balanced by short-term tax revenue growth. The coordinated financing platforms are needed to make the infrastructure projects feasible. Shaxi Town has promoted centralized living for farmers and environmental improvement in two main ways. First, relocating farmers from scattered rural houses (Fig. 24) to newly built centralized communities (Fig. 25). Of the 16,200 households in Shaxi Town, 5,000 now live in centralized communities. Of the 5,000, 4,500 are divided into 15 concentrated residential communities. The other 500 households have moved to communities in apartment buildings (Fig. 26). The remaining 11,200 households are still living in their historic villages. Some of the remaining residents

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Fig. 24 Scattered rural houses. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

will be relocated in the future if their homes are demolished; others will remain if their houses are retained and restored with the evaluation of historic villages by town and city governments. Some village residents—particularly older people or residents living in houses or villages they particularly value subjectively—have chosen not to move, and may never move, regardless of the opportunity to move into larger, more modern, better serviced housing. For town government, denser housing in communities large enough to achieve economies of scale and savings in providing water, electricity, waste disposal, and other infrastructure and education, health, job training and other social services can allow them to provide a better quality of life at lower cost. Resettlement may also free up new arable land (Figs. 27 and 28) and increase the government’s claim on limited land development quotas so they can develop more land. These are the most important reasons why the town has economic incentives to promote such projects. Industrial parks and tourist areas: Funds for building industrial parks (Fig. 29) and scenic spots for tourists in the ancient town (Fig. 30) are raised through financing platform companies and city investment companies. The government is the main body involved in the financing platform. The State Development Bank has provided many loans. Although short-term direct income from the development of scenic spots in the ancient town is modest, their development and construction is expected to improve the overall development level of Shaxi by shaping the cultural image of the town.

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Fig. 25 New concentrated communities. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

4 Contradictions Between the Planning and Construction of Infrastructure and Operation of Investment and Financing in Small Towns Shaxi is representative of towns in the developed areas of Eastern China, characterized by a high level of economic development and financial strength. Shaxi’s overall planning targets, standards, and the speed of infrastructure planning and construction have exceeded their fiscal capacity. This suggests that high development levels in China also bring steep debt, which increases pressure on the land finance system. In this sub-section, we analyse distinct contradictions between the planning, construction and investment of infrastructure.

4.1 High Debt Risk from Reliance on Land for Investment Investment funds for financing infrastructure construction in Shaxi town are generated from the financing platforms mainly by mortgaging land assets. Investment and financing mechanisms are highly dependent on land credit. Currently, the funds that

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Fig. 26 New apartment buildings. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

Fig. 27 Former village land in large scale agricultural operation. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

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Fig. 28 A large parcel of arable land after farmers were relocated. Source Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University, 2016

Fig. 29 Industrial Park in Shaxi. Source Xu Chen

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Fig. 30 Suzhou traditional architecture in tourist area in Shaxi. Source Xu Chen

Shaxi can obtain directly from land transfers to repay debts are still limited. With the rapid growth of local governments’ scale of financing liabilities at all levels, the central and provincial governments strictly constrain the quota of construction land to control risk. The right of land approval in Shaxi has been transferred from the Suzhou municipal government to the provincial government. In recent years, Shaxi has directly obtained approximately 100 million to 200 million Yuan each year from land transfers. Land transfers can repay only a small part of debt principal; most of the debt must be repaid through financing platforms, which involves raising new funds to pay off old debt. To a great extent, project funding must rely on land mortgages, which can be bought or leased by industrial and commercial land users and real estate developers. The ratio of debt to GDP in Shaxi Town was 23% in 2014 (Suzhou Division of China Development Band, and Tongji University 2016)—not excessive by the international standard of the Maastricht Treaty approved by the European Community in 1992. Shaxi’s government debt risk is low,8 but, because the town government constantly borrows money to pay off old debt with newly raised funds, Shaxi’s liquidity debt service ratio9 has exceeded the 10% standard international alert level for a long time, so debt risks cannot be ignored. If the growth rate of Shaxi Town’s financing fund is always greater than the income produced by infrastructures projects, its financing mechanism will not be sustainable in the long run. This is a problem that both Shaxi and other village governments in Suzhou city and throughout China are facing. Both land transfers and land credits are likely to decline in the future, so opportunities to raise funds will likely decrease. Therefore, 8 The

Maastricht Treaty approved in 1992 for measuring government risk, only feels an alert is necessary when total government debt reaches 60% of GDP. 9 The liquidity insolvency index is the ratio of debt service payments to fiscal revenue. The international alert level is 10%.

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government programmes to promote the transformation of industry and strengthen the real economy to expand financing sources in the public budget is a good strategy. However, the transformation of industries structure is hard to achieve in a short term.

4.2 The Township Government’s Credit Rating and Infrastructure Construction Financing In general township governments’ credit ratings in China are low, and financing matchmaking cannot be completed directly with policy-oriented financial institutions, which is leading to financing difficulties. Moreover, township governments’ financing costs are significantly higher than those of higher-level governments. This has created a situation in which what are intended to be short-term loans are in fact used for a long time. Short-term project investment is significantly higher than corresponding income. Therefore, raising infrastructure construction funds is difficult and costly. The share of non-governmental financing for infrastructure is small. Although Shaxi town raises some funds in the form of projects, the participants are mostly governments of Taicang city or Suzhou city and state-owned enterprises. In general, towns are facing more severe difficulty in investment and financing for infrastructure construction than counties and cities. Funds are more difficult to obtain, the cycle for use of funds often does not match the construction cycle, and the sources of funds are severely limited.

4.3 Structural Distortion of Transfer Payments for Infrastructure Planning and Construction and the “Flypaper Effect” In general, transfer payments are currently operated in a special transfer payment mode. That restricts the overall expenditure and allocation power of the village and town governments and leads to structural distortion of infrastructure planning and construction. Local cadres in local governments are evaluated largely in terms of short-term results. As a result, government officials have much less incentive to promote the construction of social infrastructure which will not produce measurable results in the short term than economic infrastructure where they can demonstrate success quickly. However, pressure to over-invest in projects with a measurable shortterm payback is partly offset by the so-called “flypaper effect” (Hines and Thaler, 1995). The flypaper effect is the finding that money sticks where it hits, similar to the way flies stick to flypaper. When higher level governments make transfer payments, lower level governments tend to use them for their intended purpose rather than simply substituting them for own source revenue or spending the money according to their own priorities. For example, as education funding comes from Jiangsu Province,

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township governments apply for as much education funding as possible to build more schools. Even if the level of education in a town like Shaxi is high, they still have a strong incentive to apply for the construction of new schools. Otherwise, these funds would not be distributed or would be allocated to other towns where funds are needed. This helps keep investment in economic development project with shortterm payoff and longer-term social investment in balance. In contrast, small towns lack incentives to improve medical infrastructure, because they need to bear most of the costs to construct medical facilities on their own.

5 How Infrastructure Construction Investment and Financing for Small Towns in China Can Be Improved Thus far, this chapter has described how infrastructure construction investment and financing for small towns in China works. Like cities and counties, small towns in developed regions rely primarily on self-financing to promote infrastructure. The difference is that town governments face more financing difficulties, since township governments’ credit ratings are usually lower than cities and counties while their financing costs are usually significantly higher. Also, the orientation of investment and restrictions on the use of funds are likely leading to structural distortion in the planning and development of towns’ infrastructure. This section discusses our recommendations for improvement of this situation. Problems in infrastructure planning, construction, investment, and financing reflect the high speed of development in China today. They include excessive reliance on land finance, increasing difficulty in financing, and structural distortion of infrastructure. The healthy development of small towns in China depends on reform to change the concept of planning and the mode of development.

5.1 Recommendations for Combining Incremental Expansion and Inventory Optimization for Infrastructure Planning and Supply China’s rate of GDP growth has slowed down and it appears unlikely that it will return to the very high rates that prevailed for thirty years from the early 1980s. Small towns’ planning and construction can no longer expect such rapid economic growth. The overall economic development level of Shaxi Town is already high, and its level of urbanization has reached 60%. Relaxation of restrictions in the system of land ownership and transfer have promoted industrialization and urbanization with funds obtained rapidly through land financing. At present, Shaxi Town is burdened by high debt, and market demand and operating income growth appear likely to be

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waning. Given this uncertainty, and the likelihood of resources poverty challenge (Dahiya 2012a, b), we believe small towns in developed areas of China like Shaxi should lay more emphasis on the reallocation and optimization of existing resources. In national urbanization, as regional urban agglomeration progresses, industrial parks in some small towns are inevitably shrinking. Where this is occurring, small towns should better manage their built-up space and adjust their functional layouts and infrastructure configuration. Small towns’ environment can be improved through urban renovation and ecological restoration. The improvement of a towns’ space structure could promote the development of industry and economic growth. It might switch their financial resources from the revenue of land transactions to tax revenues resulting from the local economic growth.

5.2 Recommendations for Institutional Reform to Further Rationalize the Relationship Between the Government and the Market China has a market socialist economy that relies both on government and markets to meet its needs. Another important area for reform is to adjust the relationships between government and the market. The dilemma of infrastructure investment and financing small towns face reflects flaws in existing finance and taxation systems. Constrained by the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China (1994) and other laws and regulations, China’s local governments do not have bond-financing channels adopted by developed countries to finance infrastructure construction. Funds for urbanization are provided by local financing platforms. Financing is particularly difficult for small towns because they obtain the least government financing of any level of government in China. As a result, they are dependent on the support of higher-level governments for financing authority and transfer payments. Their infrastructure supply structure is prone to distortion. These problems can only be solved as a result of a wider range of institutional changes, including rationalizing the state-market relationship so as to avoid distortions caused by excessive government influence on the market. We believe that government decentralization should be adjusted, and village and town governments’ fiscal and routine powers should be rebalanced where necessary. Matching fiscal and administrative power will help local governments to rationally allocate their fiscal revenues and avoid the structural distortion of infrastructure supply. We believe that local governments should be given more power to generate adequate own-source revenue. Based on international experience (UN-Habitat and ESCAP, 2015), a goal of fiscal reform should be to expand the tax collection power of governments at lower levels, and shift responsibility for the construction of some social infrastructure from lower-level governments to the higher-level governments. Reform of the transfer payment system should generally make lower-level governments responsibility for local decision-making. Government at every level should

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have reasonable and stable income sufficient to achieve the responsibilities assigned to it. We also believe that China’s land system should also be reformed. For both residents with hukou and migrants, education, medical care, housing, and the supply of other basic services are closely related to land transfer and capitalization. If the current land system—which requires constant land conversion as a main revenue source—does not change, funding for social services will be not sustainable. Market-oriented financing channels should be diversified. Shaxi’s experience reflects the high cost of supplying infrastructure for urbanization when financing channels are limited and interest rates high. Like many towns in China, the cost of supplying infrastructure has significantly exceeded the town’s financial capacity based on the existing tax finance system. International experience shows that private non-governmental funds can be used for infrastructure construction and it is possible to develop diversified financing channels within the market-oriented model (Pollitt 2002). For village and town governments, two critical reforms can make a large difference. First, we believe that the authorities of policy-oriented financial institutions should be redefined so that policy-oriented financial support is more widely available to village and town governments. For a long period of time, the policy-oriented financial institutions, such as China Development Bank and Agricultural Development Bank of China, have been providing financial support (loans) to fewer infrastructure development projects at the village and town level compared to higher order cities and towns. Instead, they provide a major support for the national medium- and longterm development strategy. For example, China Development Bank offers supports for the Expressway Projects and the Western Development Strategy, and Agricultural development Bank of China supports agricultural industrialization and agricultural infrastructure construction. As a result, villages and towns have limited access to the policy-oriented financial and institutional support. We believe that policy-oriented financial institutions could play a more important role in town development if they provide more opportunities for village and town level infrastructure projects. Second, local governments’ financing space should be expanded, including the establishment of a multi-level bond market so that small towns can directly raise funds. While some of the reforms discussed above apply only to Shaxi town and other reforms apply just to China, the Shaxi Town case study offers important lessons for other developing countries which face many of the same problems as China. Ameliorating living conditions in towns and villages as well as cities, equitably and inclusively, is a challenge for all developing countries, just as modernizing agriculture and developing industry are common objectives. Balancing government and market approaches, appropriate decentralization, provision of multiple funding sources, spatial equity, careful consideration of risk, and control of debt will benefit any developing country. Shaxi has had both successes and failures, which can inform policymakers and planners elsewhere. Acknowledgements This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Programme No. 51708117), the Fujian Federal of Social Science Circles (Programme No. FJ2017B021), and Fujian University of Technology (Programme No. GY-Z17006). The authors

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also thank the team members of a research project titled “Research on the Vision and Models of Integrated Urban and Rural Development in Suzhou during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan”, supported by the Suzhou Division of the China Development Bank and Tongji University (Dr. Chen Chen, Chenghao Fang, Su Xu, and others).

References Chen X, Zhao M (2016) Mechanism for economic growth and urbanization, and transformation strategies under the ‘NEW NORMAL’: theoretical analysis and empirical inference. Urban Plan Rev 40(1):9–18 [Chinese] Dahiya B (2012a) 21st century Asian cities: unique transformation, unprecedented challenges. Global Asia 7(1):96–104 Dahiya B (2012b) Cities in Asia, 2012: demographics, economics, poverty, environment and governance. Cities 29(Supplement No. 2):S44–S61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.06.013 Fang C, Chen C, Zhao M, LeGates R (2019) Integrating urban-rural development (IURD) through governance programs in China’s megacities: the Suzhou model. In: Dahiya B, Das A (eds) New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific governance for sustainable and inclusive cities. Springer, Singapore, pp 39–64 Hines JR, Thaler RH (1995) The flypaper effect. J Econ Perspect 9(4):217–226 Hirschman AO (1958) The strategy of economic development. Yale University Press, New Haven Hubei Province (2010) Towns statistical data 2010. [Chinese] Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Société Générale, Cross-Border Asset Research Data (2013) People’s Republic of China (1994) Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China. [Chinese] People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2014) National new-style urbanization plan. PRC State Council, Beijing. [Chinese] People’s Republic of China (PRC), Ministry of Finance, Treasury Department (1993–2005) China cities and counties fiscal statistics. China Statistics Press, Beijing. [Chinese] People’s Republic of China (PRC), National Bureau of Statistics (PRCNBS) (1978–2005) China statistical yearbooks. China Statistics Press, Beijing. [Chinese] People’s Republic of China National Audit Office (2013) Audit Results of Governments’ Debts. People’s Republic of China National Audit Office, Beijing. [Chinese] Pollitt MG, Smith SJ (2002) The restructuring and privatisation of British Rail: was it really that bad? Fisc Stud 23(4):463–502 Shan YM, Zhao H (2006) Research on the standard of rural public service facilities in Beijing. Beijing Plann Constr 2006(3):28–32 [Chinese] Suzhou Division of China Development Bank and Tongji University (SDCDB and TU) (2016) Research on the vision and models of integrated urban and rural development in suzhou during the thirteenth five-year plan. [Chinese] Tao R, Lu X, Su F et al (2009) China’s transition and development model under evolving regional competition patterns. Econ Res J 2009(7):21–33 [Chinese] UN-Habitat and ESCAP (2015) The State of Asian and Pacific cities 2015: urban transformations shifting from quantity to quality, UN-Habitat and ESCAP, Nairobi and Bangkok Wang W (2013) Government responsibility for public services from and international perspective. Reform 2013(6):151–157 [Chinese] World Bank (1999) World Development Report 1997. World development report volume 39(100), 1–251(251) Xie C, Zhai Y (2006) Li X (2006) Analysis of supply and demand balance of small towns’ public infrastructure in urbanization. Commer Res 21:128–130 [Chinese]

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Ye L, Wu AM (2014) Urbanization, land development, and land financing: evidence from chinese cities. J Urban Aff 36(s1):354–368 Zhang J, Ge Z, Luo Z et al (2012) Research on equalized layout of urban and rural public facilities: a case study of educational facilities in Changzhou. Urban Plan Rev 36(2):9–15 Zhao M, Sao L, Li W (2014) Comparison of basic educational facility allocation patterns and the planning strategies in rural areas: case studies of central and eastern China. City Plan Rev 38(12):28–33 [Chinese] Zhou F (2006) A decade of tax sharing: the system and its evolution. Soc Sci China 2006(6):100–115 Zou H, Luan F, Xi H Yang B (2019) Comprehensive management for better rural infrastructure and service delivery: lessons from the implementation of china’s six point rural action plan in Guizhou province. In: Dahiya B, Das A (eds) New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific governance for sustainable and inclusive cities. Springer, Singapore, pp 279–300

Xu Chen is a Lecturer at the School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou, China. During 2013-2016, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Urban Planning, College of Architecture and Urban Planning (CAUP), Tongji University, Shanghai. She holds a D.B.A. (Doctor of Business Administration), Master of Economics, and Bachelor of Engineering. Her research interests include urban and regional development and planning, urban economics, urbanization study, land institution and urban and rural development. At present, Xu CHEN is leading the National Natural Science Foundation of China funded project “Research on Dynamic Mechanism and Planning Strategy of small Town Spatial Development: From the Perspective of Land Property Right” (No. 51708117). Xu CHEN has published 18 articles in Journals of Urban Economics and Urban Planning research fields. Min Zhao is a Professor of Urban and Rural Planning in College of Architecture and Planning at Tongji University, as well as the PI of the Coordinated Urban-Rural Development lab at Tongji University. Professor Zhao was the Department Chair of the department of urban planning at Tongji University from 1999 to 2006. Professor Zhao is also a member of the Professional Committee of the Shanghai Urban Planning Commission, a Urban and Rural Planning Consultant of the People’s Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and a member of the Suzhou Urban and Rural Planning Expert Advisory Committee. Professor Zhao’ research interests span a variety of urban and rural development topics. His current and recent research focuses on the China’s urbanization, urban-rural development, and regional and urban economic development.

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Richard LeGates is a professor emeritus of Urban Studies and Planning at San Francisco State University. During 2016 and 2017 he was a Summit Professor of Urban Planning and Codirector of Tongji University (Shanghai)’s Coordinated UrbanRural Development and Countryside Planning Urban Research Laboratory. He received MCP and JD degrees from the University of California, Berkeley. He is the co-editor of The City Reader 6th edition (Routledge 2015) and The Chinese City Reader (China Architectural and Building Press 2013) and coauthor of Coordinating Urban and Rural Development in China (EE Press 2013) and Understanding Chinese Urbanization (EE Press 2015). In addition to San Francisco State and Tongji Universities, Professor LeGates has taught at U.C. Berkeley, Stanford University, Charles University (Prague), The American University of Sharjah (UAE) and had Fulbright grants in England, Scotland, Indonesia, and the UAE.

Urban Governance in Australia: A Case Study of Brisbane City Bhishna Bajracharya and Shahed Khan

Abstract Urban governance plays an important role in making cities sustainable and inclusive. This chapter provides an account of urban governance in Brisbane City Council (BCC), which is the largest city council in Australia. It focuses on two key roles of BCC: (i) its management role for the provision of urban services, and (ii) its democratic governance role for social inclusion and community engagement. BCC provides a range of services for diverse group of local communities including parks, sporting facilities, libraries, art and cultural amenities. The city has improved its services through e-governance by developing online planning tools for information on urban planning. The strategic plan of BCC aims to be holistic and inclusive with focus on sustainability and inclusiveness. In terms of democratic governance, there are challenges to community engagement partly due to the large size of the council and the top-down nature of engagement. To ensure good governance, the City of Brisbane Act 2010 requires the council to be transparent, accountable, and inclusive, and to deliver sustainable services. As this chapter will show, some of the goals of Habitat III’s New Urban Agenda (NUA) seem to already be a part of urban governance in Brisbane. Nevertheless, we argue that Brisbane still faces major governance challenges, which include the intervening role of politics in urban governance, the development of megaprojects, a growing dependence on the private sector for providing services, the increasing privatization of the public realm and the lack of well organised civil society in the city. Keywords Urban governance · Stakeholders · Service delivery · E-governance · Sustainability · Social inclusion · Community engagement · Megaprojects · Privatization · Civil society · Brisbane

B. Bajracharya (B) Urban Planning, Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia e-mail: [email protected] S. Khan Urban Planning, School of Design and the Built Environment, Curtin University, Perth, Australia © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_8

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1 Introduction The New Urban Agenda (NUA) provides an important framework to plan and manage cities in a sustainable manner (UN Habitat III 2016). NUA envisions cities that provide basic urban services and safe, accessible, green and quality public spaces. It promotes civic engagement among its people and emphasises the importance of social inclusion recognizing the needs of vulnerable population. NUA advocates for stronger coordination and cooperation between different levels of government and highlights the importance of establishing legal and policy frameworks as part of urban governance and suggests the need for appropriate fiscal, political and administrative decentralization based on principles of subsidiarity. It supports local governments to partner with civil society and private sector to develop and manage basic services ensuring strong public interest and clear accountability mechanisms. With its focus on sustainability and inclusiveness, NUA provides a useful basis to critically review and analyse the urban governance of cities. The key objective of this chapter is to conduct a case study of urban governance in Brisbane, which is the largest single local council in Australia with a population of about one million people. The chapter discusses the role of key stakeholders such as the state government, local government, private sector and civil society for managing the city. The chapter reviews two important urban governance initiatives of Brisbane City Council (BCC)—first being its management role in terms of provision of urban services and facilities. The second is the democratic governance of the city in terms of social inclusion and community engagement. It identifies key governance challenges of the city and discusses few ideas from Brisbane that may be relevant for other cities in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter will first briefly review literature on urban governance and discuss the roles of different levels of government in Australia. It will discuss the internal governance mechanisms of Brisbane and the roles of key external stakeholders in urban governance. The chapter will then examine some initiatives and challenges of urban governance. The methodology primarily involves reviewing secondary literature, including relevant books, journals and council documents, as well as the authors’ personal knowledge and lived experiences in the city.

2 Urban Governance: A Brief Review of the Literature Contemporary planning scholarship suggests the need to shift from government to governance—to see urban planning not as the government acting on the city but as governance acting through the city (Newman 1998). Urban governance has multiple players—the government, private sector, and civil society (Minnery 2007). The roles and responsibilities of different levels of government are varied. Governments have important roles in developing appropriate legislation and enhancing institutional mechanisms. In recent years, there has been a growing role of market forces in urban

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development and planning, particularly in the area of funding resources. The role of the public sector is changing from that of service provider to that of facilitator, and to identifying and maintaining standards. There is also strong acknowledgment of the important role for civil society in democratic governance, towards building community capacity, influencing political will, and contributing to building resilience of vulnerable groups (Cheema 2013; Cheema and Popovski 2010a). Thus, governance is how the three key stakeholders—government, private sector and civil society—interact and negotiate with one another to influence policy outcomes (Bovaird and Loffler 2003). Governance also requires both vertical coordination between different levels of government as well as horizontal coordination between local governments (Murphy 2012). The key principles and characteristics of good governance include transparency, accountability, engagement, social inclusion, ethical behaviour, equity, partnership, sustainability, and respect for the rule of law (Bovaird and Loffler 2003; Cheema 2013). Building trust among stakeholders is another important objective of good governance (Cheema and Popovski 2010b). A number of planning scholars in Australia have argued that neoliberalism plays an important role in urban governance of Australian cities (Gleeson et al. 2010; Tomlinson 2016; Dodson 2016; Burton 2014). Gleeson and Low (2000) are critical of the changing nature of urban governance in Australian cities—from, what they call, social democratic managerialism to corporate neoliberalism—and stress the need for more democratic planning. According to them, corporatization and commercialization of public services, and the emphasis on entrepreneurialism, competition, and an urge for megaprojects are ever increasing in Australia. Gleeson et al. (2010) also argue that there is both a planning deficit and a democratic deficit in metropolitan governance in Australia. Planning deficit relates to fragmentation and underdevelopment of mechanisms to guide urban development while democratic deficit is about lack of engagement (disenfranchisement) in the metropolitan community. Tomlinson (2016) points out that there is an increasingly limited role of government in the provision of infrastructure and services, and the private sector plays an important role in city development. Both of the two major political parties in Australia at all levels of government support public sector reform which signifies increased competition, privatisation, deregulation and outsourcing of services delivery. Civil society is only involved in areas where profits cannot be made such as involvement of nongovernmental organisations (NGO) in provision of social housing (Tomlinson 2016). This understandably has major implications for governance of local councils in Australia. Various authors have identified the challenges of urban governance of local councils. Stewart (2006), for instance, cited the dual challenge of local governance as effectively delivering public services responding to the needs of the local communities and democratic representation of their citizens. Community engagement and social inclusiveness are important dimensions of democratic local governance. Urban governance reforms need to consider both local administrative reform and well as participatory reform within a multi-level government framework (Kersting et al. 2009). While there is increasing responsibility for local government in the provision of a wide range of services and the expectation that it represents the needs and interests of local communities, the challenge is to fulfil this responsibility with lim-

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ited resources and devolution of power. With limited resources, local government is increasingly dependent on the partnership with private and community sector to achieve its objectives and responsibilities. The other challenge is that local government is working within the context of market based property development in which its income is based (Crowley 1998). With increasing role of technology, challenge is the extent to which local councils can use web technologies and social media for local governance reform in terms of provision of services and public participation (Musso et al. 2000). To deal with the challenges of urban governance, there is also growing literature on the need for collaborative planning with greater stakeholder participation in planning deliberation and decision making (Knapp 2017; Forester 1999; Healey 1998; Innes and Booher 2004). Some of the justification for collaborative planning includes improved communication and mutual understanding, creative multidisciplinary problem solving, support for local development projects, and increased capacity building of under-represented communities (Knapp 2017). Although collaborative planning is advocated strongly, in practice, many planners only organize minimum, formal participation processes as required by law (Innes and Booher 2004; Knapp 2017). The above brief review of theoretical literature provides a useful basis to understand urban governance challenges in Australia. The following section will give an overview of urban governance in Australia followed by a discussion of governance in Brisbane.

3 Urban Governance in Australia To understand urban governance in Australia, it is imperative to understand the roles of the three levels of government—federal, state, and local—as well as the role of the private and community sectors (Minnery 2014; Forster 2007; Gurran 2011). The Australian Constitution limits the role of the federal government in urban development. It is only indirectly involved in urban development through its primary responsibility for taxation, immigration, and infrastructure funding. On the other hand, state governments are primarily responsible for urban development and provision of services such as transport, health, education, recreational and cultural services, as well as the formulation of state planning legislation. Every state has its own planning system and planning legislation. The local government is involved in local land use planning controls, as guided by the state’s planning system. In the past, the local government’s role was primarily restricted to road maintenance, drainage and sewage disposal, also known as 3R (rate, road and rubbish); yet local councils today play an increasingly important role in providing community, cultural, and recreational services. The local council is responsible for developing building regulations and health by-laws. Much of the funding for a local council’s budget comes from property taxes, fines, and levies, as well as grants from the federal and state governments. Brackertz (2013) has identified key governance challenges for local governments in Australia, which include intergovernmental dependencies, financial constraints

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and weak democratic standing. Although there has been expansion of local government with the devolution of functions to a local level, it has limited power and resources, which are primarily controlled by state and federal government. Other challenges include market deregulation, privatization of public utilities, and amalgamation of local councils by state governments seeking a more efficient delivery of services. Although local governments are closest to the people with local knowledge and social networks, as it is heavily dependent on State governments for financial resources, in the fiscal sense it is not ‘as accountable to its electorate as it is to the state government’ (Hartwich 2009 cf Brackertz 2013). The above review provides a useful context for the case study of Brisbane. It would be important to see whether Brisbane has similar governance challenges to those indicated in the literature.

4 Urban Governance in Brisbane: The BCC’s Internal Governance Mechanism The Brisbane City Council (BCC) is Australia’s largest local council with an area of 1,367 square kilometers, a population of about one million, and an annual budget of about 3 billion AUD (Australian dollars). Unlike other state capitals, such as Sydney and Melbourne, which primarily cover a central business district (CBD) and inner suburbs, Brisbane City covers much of the metropolitan area of Brisbane. There is lack of strong metropolitan governance in cities such as Sydney and Melbourne as they are made of a large number of smaller councils (Tomlinson 2016; Dodson 2016). Brisbane is the only city in Australia with metropolitan governance as it is under one single council. BCC was formed by amalgamating 20 local governments of cities, towns, and shires in 1925 through the City of Brisbane Act 1924 (Minnery 2014). Figure 1 shows a skyline of Brisbane City. The city is governed by a mayor, 26 councillors (representing 26 wards) and a civic cabinet. The mayor is directly elected by the city’s residents. The civic cabinet consists of the mayor, deputy mayor, and the chairs of seven standing committees drawn from the councillors. The committees oversee areas such as community services, environment and sustainability, public transport, roads, urban planning/economic development, and water/city business. The civic cabinet is the major decision-making body of BCC with representation from elected officials. A Code of Conduct for councillors guides their roles, obligations, and acceptable behaviour to deliver transparent and accountable governance, respect for the democratic process, and compliance with legislation, local laws, policies, and procedures. In order to manage its activities, BCC is structured into five divisions: (1) Brisbane Infrastructure; (2) Brisbane Lifestyle; (3) Brisbane Transport; (4) City Planning and Sustainability; and (5) Organisational Services. Besides these five divisions, there is the Office of the Lord Mayor and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The CEO manages the city’s day-to-day operations. A division manager leads each division, and they all

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Fig. 1 A skyline of Brisbane City. Source Bhishna Bajracharya

report to the CEO. The City Planning and Sustainability Division deals primarily with strategic planning, development assessment, natural environment and sustainability, and city parklands. The Division of Organisational Services deals with corporate finance, human resources and procurement. The City of Brisbane Act 2010 provides the basis for running BCC both for longterm plans as well as its day-to-day operations. It identifies BCC’s roles and responsibilities. It requires the local government to be transparent and accountable, and to ensure good governance, democratic representation, social inclusion and community engagement, and sustainable management of its assets and delivery of services. It requires BCC to publish key documents relating to planning, finance and annual activities on its website for greater transparency and access by local community.

5 Urban Governance in Brisbane: Role of Key Stakeholders The state government, the local government, the private sector, and civil society are all important stakeholders who currently influence urban governance in Brisbane. Their specific roles and contributions are briefly discussed below to provide more detailed discussion of the urban planning and urban governance initiatives of BCC later.

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5.1 Role of the State Government Brisbane prepares its planning scheme (the strategic land use plan, the Brisbane City Plan 2014 being the latest) under the guidance and rules of the Queensland state planning legislation called the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Note: From mid2017, this was replaced with a new planning legislation, the Planning Act 2016). The planning legislation provides the framework for planning through its state planning instruments such as State Planning Policies, which BCC has to reflect in its strategic land use plan. Likewise, to manage growth, BCC has to follow the South East Queensland Regional Plan developed by the state government—a blueprint for the growth management of South East Queensland (SEQ) that includes Brisbane and six other local councils, namely Gold Coast City, Toowoomba Regional Council, Sunshine Coast Regional Council, Moreton Bay Region Council, and Redland Council. There are many positive elements in the SEQ Regional Plan. It is a statutory regional plan with stronger authority for implementation—in contrast to other states’ regional plans which are still primarily based on voluntary collaboration. It initiated the urban footprint concept to limit urban growth and focussed development around transit nodes and transit corridors. It links the regional land use plan with infrastructure plan for the better integration of land use and infrastructure.

5.2 Role of the Local Council BCC prepares the strategic plans for the city to guide its future development based on the state government’s planning guidelines and regional plan. It provides a number of important services to the people as well as engaging with the community. The Brisbane Vision 2031 provides long-term goals for the city for the next 15 years (Brisbane City Council 2013). Its goal for Brisbane is to be a safe, vibrant, green and prosperous city. The vision includes making the city: (1) accessible and connected; (2) active and healthy; (3) clean and green; (4) friendly and safe; (5) a new world city; (6) smart and prosperous; (7) vibrant and creative; and (8) well designed for its subtropical geography. These eight vision elements are well aligned to attain the sustainability goals of the NUA. Besides this long-term vision, the city prepares a five-year medium-term plan called the Corporate Plan (Brisbane City Council 2016a) that identifies the actions to be implemented as well as the monitoring of the past actions/strategies to achieve its goals. Likewise, BCC prepares an annual plan of action for the city to identify capital investments for the succeeding year (Brisbane City Council 2016b). Brisbane’s City Plan 2014 is the latest land use planning document (also called a planning scheme in Australia) which provides land use controls on how land can be used and developed in the city, taking into consideration the long-term vision for the city. The City Plan 2014 also includes the priority infrastructure plan for

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coordinating the land use and infrastructure such as roads, sewerage, parks and water facilities. Besides the City Plan for the whole city, BCC also prepares more detailed neighbourhood plans for the city in consultation with the local residents and businesses. It is important to point out that BCC uses strategic planning and planning legislation as key tools for urban management. The strategic plan is holistic, integrative, and focuses on both planning and design. Its medium-term and annual plans are used to monitor long-term progress. BCC sets up targets to achieve in the long, medium, and short terms. The city has also plans for community consultation and for social inclusion, which will be discussed in further detail later.

5.3 Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society The development industry plays an active role in planning. Some of its interests include streamlining development, reducing development costs and red tape. Civil society consists of diverse environmental and social advocacy groups and their interests include providing affordable housing and services as well as protecting the environment. While the development industry is well organized, well-resourced and makes strong representation to BCC in order to make planning friendly for development, local civil society is often not as well organized and has limited resources to make their case. The property and development industry groups, such as the Property Council of Australia (PCA) Queensland Division and the Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) have made a strong case to state government to make the recent planning legislation less regulatory, simpler, faster and requiring minimal community consultation for many development projects which follow Council’s land use plan. However, there is no well-defined citywide civil society in Brisbane that is as well organized and resourceful as PCA and UDIA. Some of the civil society groups are highly localized in its limited geographic focus, such as West End Community Association based in the inner suburb of Brisbane.

6 Urban Governance Initiatives in Brisbane This section will discuss two key roles of Brisbane City Council for its residents. The first is its role in delivery of services such as provision of parks, community facilities, and waste management. It will also discuss the recent use of technology in the delivery of services (such as online planning tools and mobile applications) as well as sustainability programmes. Secondly, the section will examine the role of BCC in democratic governance and examine its social inclusion and community engagement initiatives. The areas for discussion under social inclusion are cultural diversity, homelessness, and affordable housing.

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Fig. 2 Roma Street Parkland in Brisbane City Centre. Source Bhishna Bajracharya

6.1 Service Delivery 6.1.1

Provision and Maintenance of Parks

BCC manages more than 2000 local parks throughout Brisbane. One key service delivery is park maintenance and enhancement to ensure clean, accessible parks that are well-maintained and safe. BCC also provides fitness facilities to promote active and healthy living, improved lighting, and free Wi-Fi Internet access at the parks. Council venues host affordable recreation programs, and sports clubs can lease their sporting facilities. BCC has installed exercise equipment in many parks that are freely accessible. Figures 2 and 3 shows examples of central and suburban parks in Brisbane. BCC’s Active and Healthy Program provides discounted or free recreation opportunities (such as yoga, taichi, pilates, Zumba and other dance classes) in over 50 local parks for people of different age groups, abilities and cultural backgrounds. BCC works with the Heart Foundation to develop free walking programs for communitybased walking groups. This is an important initiative of BCC, which has resulted in attracting people of diverse social and economic backgrounds to participate in these programmes. These programs also provide opportunities for social interaction among people as well as making the parks more active and vibrant. King George Square is BCC’s primary public square in the CBD, which is available for a variety of activities, including corporate events, festivals, concerts, and exhibitions. The recent redevelopment of King George Square has seen the infusion of more cafes and restaurants into this prominent public space. While the public square had grassy lawn and trees in the past for the people to sit around, the new

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Fig. 3 Local park in suburban Brisbane. Source Bhishna Bajracharya

Fig. 4 Restaurants and cafes in King George Square, Brisbane. Source Bhishna Bajracharya

square has been completely paved making it a hard surface which require less maintenance and suitable for hosting public and private events. A large section of the park has been converted into upmarket restaurants and cafes (see Fig. 4). While these changes would help bring more revenue for BCC and less maintenance costs (hard surface versus lawns), there have been criticisms of this redevelopment by local architects for loss of shade, and greater privatization of the public realm. Here is a comment from a local architect about the redevelopment of the Square.

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Fig. 5 Community garden in Rocks Riverside Park, Brisbane. Source Bhishna Bajracharya

We need shade and cooling in our city and places to loll and take time out from the hustle and bustle of mid city life. It was wonderful when there were fountains and people could meet there and sit on the grass but there’s no space for gathering there now. (Brisbane Times 2009)

While BCC has done a good job of maintaining a large number of parks, with the provision of amenities such as barbeque, seating, gazebos, attracting diverse groups of people to use parks, there are also concerns about including a large number of private restaurants and cafes within some of these parks. There needs to be an appropriate balance between the need to keep the parks as predominantly public space while at the same time generating revenue from private and community sectors to help fund the maintenance of these public spaces. Not all parks in Brisbane have included cafes and restaurants leading to privatization of public space. Some large parks, such as Rocks Riverside Park in western outskirts of Brisbane, offer among other amenities community gardens where people set up their own little vegetable or fruit patch, which can enhance social networks within the community and greater park use (see Fig. 5). This is an example of how BCC has encouraged the use of parks for community groups not just for private groups.

6.1.2

Provision of Community Facilities

BCC manages more than 600 Council-owned community halls across Brisbane, which can be rented at discounted prices by residents and community groups. Additionally, a Council-managed network of libraries supports a range of services, including book clubs, reading programs, computer training, events (such as for sustain-

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ability awareness) and workshops. Being a large council, it also manages sports and leisure facilities such as swimming pools, sports complexes, skate parks, golf courses and tennis courts. Promoting the arts and culture is another key Brisbane initiative to make itself a vibrant and lively city. The services provided include support for events, festivals and art installations, especially through its City Arts Project. BCC provides grants to artists and creative enterprises, and invests in a number of cultural organizations. These types of community facilities and events supported by BCC provide valuable support to diverse community groups in Brisbane, strengthen social networks and help promote local businesses.

6.1.3

Waste Collection and Recycling

Another important area of service provision is the collection and recycling of domestic waste. Many of these services are now contracted out to the private sector to reduce the operating costs. In the past, the local Council staff handled much of this. Although Council makes savings by contracting out to private sector companies, this reduces the number of staff BCC employs.

6.2 E-Governance BCC has increasingly moved towards e-governance and brought planning and building tools online (Brisbane City Council 2017a). It has mapping and virtual tools to assist with data required for submitting a development application. For instance, PD Online is an online property development and application search tool for assisting with planning and development applications and enquiries. This tool facilitates ease of access to information about the property as well as for development applications to all relevant stakeholders. Another innovation to facilitate planning is Virtual Brisbane, which is an interactive, realistic computer-generated 3D model of urban development activity in Brisbane. Aside from assisting BCC’s plan for urban growth and management, it also enables visualization and analysis of development at the block level, in relation to the existing, larger urban environment. It enables shadow analysis as well as scenario modelling to analyse the impacts of new building footprints and heights on surrounding structures. BCC’s mobile application Brisbane Bin and Recycling helps the community stay up to date with bin collection days and provide feedback on improving recycling effectiveness. Likewise, a mobile application has been developed for residents to report maintenance issues in council parks and local footpaths to BCC. BCC plays an important role in disaster management through preparation of disaster management plans and preparation of GIS flood risk maps for the community to be aware of flood risk for their property and neighbourhood. Council’s online

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FloodWise Property Report shows the risk and type of flooding at a property to enable the residents to plan and build in accordance with BCC’s requirements. BCC also has SMS alert system to inform its residents about weather forecasts and likely precautions the community needs to take.

6.3 Sustainability Programmes BCC has undertaken a number of initiatives to make it a clean and green city—by making it a low carbon city, protecting and managing its open spaces and waterways, maintaining a diverse network of parks, and making it a clean city by managing waste and recycling. Brisbane has been named Australia’s Most Sustainable City and Queensland’s Most Sustainable City for 2014 and 2015, respectively, by the Keep Australia Beautiful (KAB) Foundation. KAB is a nationwide organisation for a litter-free and sustainable Australia, which honours achievements in environmental endeavours. BCC has also established an Environmental Management System (EMS) to monitor its environmental impacts and develop operational and mitigation strategies (Brisbane City Council 2015). It aims to be a carbon neutral city and has taken measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in its operations by focusing on energy efficiency improvements, renewable energy, and buying carbon offsets. BCC has established an agency called CitySmart Pty Limited to develop partnerships with local communities and business groups to initiate programs such as Brisbane’s flagship residential energy saving program to reduce energy consumption among its residents (CitySmart, Undated). BCC provided the seed funding to leverage additional funding from industry partners. BCC now provides Sustainability Grants to help NGOs reduce greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption in their facilities. The funding primarily supports energy audits and implementation of energy efficiency strategies. The applicants can apply for grants from $1,000 to $10,000 to implement energy efficiency measures such as energy efficient light fittings, ceiling fans, appliances, double-glazing, solar panels and solar hot water systems. It has initiated the Green Heart community engagement program to provide sustainability education and information services, and engage residents, businesses and community groups toward minimizing their environmental impacts. Likewise, BCC’s community partnering for conservation program promotes working with various community groups, such as Habitat Brisbane Groups, and the Wildlife Conservation Partnership program for bushland regeneration. For maintaining conserving biodiversity, it charges a Bushland Preservation Levy to residents and businesses to acquire land with significant biodiversity values. Brisbane is considered the most biodiverse city in Australia. It is important to note that BCC works closely with the community for many of its sustainability initiatives, particularly in the area of environmental management.

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Being the largest council with strong resource base (with an annual budget of $3 billion), it has been able to support many of these sustainability initiatives. Although BCC had developed many sustainability programs in Brisbane, there are still areas for improvement. For example, the city is characterized by low-density urban sprawl and heavy car dependence. There is potential for better public transport system in the city, promotion of active transport options and greater integration of land use and transport planning. BCC has proposed to build a metro system for inner Brisbane suburbs to reduce urban congestion. The next section will discuss the role of BCC in social inclusion and community engagement, which are important aspects of the democratic governance of BCC.

6.4 Social Inclusion Council has an important role to play in social inclusion. This section will focus on Brisbane City’s initiatives for social and cultural diversity, inclusion of people with disability, homelessness and affordable housing.

6.4.1

Social and Cultural Diversity

Cultural and ethnic diversity has grown over time in Brisbane. The 2011 Census shows that 295,000 (28.3% of the total population) were born overseas with the top three non-English speaking countries of birth being China, India and Vietnam. Brisbane’s Corporate Plan 2016–17 to 2020–21 has identified social inclusion as one of its key objectives that recognizes working closely with culturally and linguistically diverse communities to improve their access to services and to build community capacity. Brisbane hosts many cultural events such as Chinese New Year and the Multicultural Festival in collaboration with different cultural groups in the city to promote their diverse cultural assets (such as music, dance, sports). BCC publishes the quarterly ‘One Brisbane Many Cultures’ newsletter, in ten different languages including English, to provide a snapshot of key Council initiatives and citywide events to reach out to different cultural groups. Nonetheless, while BCC has been proactive in sharing information on Council initiatives and engaging with different cultural groups, one of the issues is to what extent these diverse cultural groups are part of decision-making group within BCC itself. BCC has established an advisory group called Brisbane Inclusive Board to get advice on emerging social inclusion issues and to explore new opportunities. However, this board is top-heavy consisting of representatives from BCC, state government departments, universities, the Multicultural Development Association, youth groups and retirement communities. There could be increased involvement of grass roots community groups in Council’s decision-making processes affecting them.

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Universal Access and Inclusion of Seniors and People with Disability

BCC estimates that it has about 210,000 residents (about four percent of the total population of the city) with a disability in 2011 (Brisbane City Council 2011). BCC introduced the Brisbane Access and Inclusion Plan 2012–2017 in 2016 focussing on universal access and inclusion of seniors and people with disability. Some of the key initiatives include auditing and access improvements for Brisbane’s public buildings and designing inclusive play experiences in Council parks. BCC has also introduced the first brail trail in the downtown shopping centre and made its bus fleet and swimming pools disabled access friendly. BCC has been at the forefront of providing services for the disabled, which could be relevant for other cities in the region with limited programs and policies in this area.

6.4.3

Initiatives for the Homeless

There is a growing incidence of homelessness in Brisbane with the last published figure of about 4,324 (about half them located in inner suburbs) in the 2011 census (Brisbane City Council 2017b). Homeless people are a diverse group of people, which include those living in streets, parks, derelict buildings, temporary emergency shelters as well cheap boarding houses. With the gentrification and urban renewal of inner suburbs in Brisbane, many of the cheaper temporary rental accommodation for the homeless—called boarding houses—were lost to make way for new apartment buildings for the higher income groups. BCC plays an important supporting role in dealing with the homeless issues. Its Public Space Liaison Officers (PSLO) act as the first point of contact between BCC and the homeless (Brisbane City Council 2017b). These Council staff works with several community organisations that support homeless people in Brisbane as well as provide information and referral services for temporary accommodation, mental health, and drug and alcohol related health services. BCC works with the Red Cross organization to run Night Cafe for homeless young people to provide free meals and access to showers, toilets, health, and legal advice. Under the program Community Housing Partnership Project, BCC also plays a limited role in provision of crisis and temporary accommodation for the homeless by letting social housing providers use properties resumed or held by BCC for homeless people on a temporary basis. Another way BCC has been helping through its annual ‘Homeless Connect’ event is by bringing together community groups and businesses to provide free services such as immunization, clothes, haircuts, health check-ups, beddings and meals. Since Council initiated this program in 2007, BCC website suggests that the project has helped more than 15,000 homeless people with participation by 600 volunteers, 350 health check-ups, and 1,700 meals. With its successes in Brisbane, other Australian cities have followed suit with the organisation of similar events in Perth, Gold Coast and Adelaide.

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Although BCC is providing links to other organizations, it does not itself play a leading role in homeless issues, rather it plays a supporting, albeit important role. There is potential for BCC to play a more active role in fund raising as well as ensuring the protection of boarding houses and cheaper short-term accommodation for homeless people in Brisbane.

6.4.4

Provision of Affordable Housing

The provision of affordable housing is the responsibility of state government rather than the local government. BCC is not directly involved in provision of affordable housing; but it does facilitate provision through the planning system by encouraging developers to provide affordable housing as part of the housing mix. There is no mandatory requirement for inclusionary housing/zoning in Brisbane at this stage. The idea of inclusionary zoning with a requirement of including a small proportion of affordable housing as part of the development has been a contested concept in Brisbane. When Council tried to introduce inclusionary zoning as part of a neighbourhood plan in an inner suburb in Brisbane about ten years ago, it was opposed by the state government of the day as well as the developers and the idea was dropped later. Currently. a draft plan is being prepared by the current state government to introduce inclusionary zoning and it is yet to be seen if it will be implemented and be successful. Additionally, BCC and the Queensland Government established a not-for-profit organisation called the Brisbane Housing Corporation (BHC) to provide affordable rental accommodation for low-income people. BHC already has over 600 units in Brisbane, and more are being developed. In recent years, with rising housing prices and lack of affordable housing, there has been a limited attempt by BCC to address this major challenge. There is potential for BCC to work collaboratively with the state government, private sector and community housing providers to develop more affordable housing options (including inclusionary zoning) in the city.

6.5 Community Engagement Citizen participation is intrinsically linked to good governance. The city has an important civic role in promoting democratic participation which could entail improving access to the decision-making processes, facilitating the establishment of interest groups, and enhancing the social networks/social capital of communities (Stewart 2006). BCC considers it important to involve the residents in its decision-making process to understand the needs of the community as well as to get feedback on important proposals from them. In its Community Engagement Policy, BCC has identified three levels of community engagement—information sharing (providing information on council activ-

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ities), community consultation (seeking community feedback) and active participation (partnership approach with community involvement in development and delivery of project). These ideas of hierarchy of community consultation seem to be partly inspired by the community engagement literature framework of the World Bank which identifies Inform, Consult and Participate as the three levels of citizen involvement. Higher levels of citizen participation such as delegated authority and citizen control suggested in the ladders of citizen participation model (Arnstein 1969) are not mentioned. BCC has a consultation program called ‘Your city your say’ which provides information updates on Council programs to its residents. By signing up, the residents can have a say via community forums, surveys online or face-to face. It also uses the Council website and social media such as Facebook, twitter and Linked-in to provide information about council projects. Under the City of Brisbane Act 2010 (Qld) there is an increased focus on community engagement under which BCC needs to be guided by five key principles to ensure good governance. The principles that apply to community engagement uphold: (1) transparent and effective processes, (2) decision-making in the public interest; (3) democratic representation, (4) social inclusion and (5) meaningful community engagement. This provides a strong basis for BCC to engage with the communities, however, the real-world practice does not necessarily follow all these principles of community engagement. To a large extent, the decision-making process is a transparent process in BCC. All the minutes of BCC meetings are available on-line and Council meetings are open to the public. However, for some large public-private partnership projects where BCC signs contracts with the private sector, there can be commercial-inconfidence clauses, which makes those projects subject to less scrutiny than other Council projects. BCC engages the community in the preparation of neighbourhood plans by establishing a community reference group with representation from businesses, residents and community groups. BCC also engages closely with many community and sports organisations particularly in the area of environmental protection such as local bush care groups. One of the challenges for BCC is due to its large geographic area and population, community engagement with the active involvement of citizens is not easy. There is a distance between the council and community simply because of the metropolitan scale of the council. For example, access to the Mayor perhaps is harder than in smaller councils. To counteract this, the Mayor and Civic Cabinet occasionally hold public civic cabinet meetings and public forums to be close to the community. It is said that busy city people are not interested in community engagement unless it affects them directly. An example is the limited response from the community to strategic plans but strong negative response to high density housing or low-income groups by well organised ‘Not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) groups. With limited greenfield sites for new development, BCC plans to increase density around transit nodes and corridors but there are many examples of established resident groups not keen on densification of their suburbs. With recent changes to planning legislation,

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there is potential for less community engagement with communities for development projects which follow the statutory City Plan 2014 and will be assessed under code assessable development rather than impact assessable development. This is justified on the basis that it provides more certainty to the project and impact assessable development requires public notification and community input, which can delay the project. The next section further elaborates on the urban governance challenges of Brisbane focussing on four key themes: urban politics, privatization of public spaces and urban services, megaprojects and lack of strong civil society.

7 Urban Governance Challenges in Brisbane 7.1 Urban Politics It is important to understand the links between urban governance and politics (Pierre 2011). Changes in the state government that cause frequent changes in planning legislation to guide the development of cities can create a lack of certainty in planning. Frequent amendments to planning legislation often reflect demands of the development industry and political changes in the state government. The Queensland planning legislation has changed four times in last 20 years from the Planning and Environment Act till 1996, Integrated Planning Act 1997, Sustainable Planning Act 2009, Planning Act 2016. By comparison, in other states in Australia, planning legislation has not changed so frequently providing continuity and certainty in planning system. For example, policies relating to climate change were removed or reinstated depending on which party was in power at the state government level. There is also need for better coordination between the state and local government for preparing plans for the city. The state and local governments coming up with two separate plans for urban transport in inner Brisbane proves another case in point. While BCC is promoting the Brisbane Metro, the State Government is promoting the Cross-River Rail to reduce the traffic congestion in the city. The Federal Government has recently committed funding for BCC’s Metro Project while making no commitment for State Government’s Cross River Rail project (incidentally, at present Local and Federal Governments are run by Liberal/Coalition Parties and State Government is run by Labour Party). This type of lack of coordination and cooperation between different levels of government can result in inefficient and inequitable service provision. Recently a State Councillor from regional Queensland questioned the high cost of the Cross River Rail (more than $5 billion estimated cost) to reduce traffic congestion in Brisbane CBD by few minutes and whether the money could be better spent in regional towns with far more shortage of infrastructure. For some large projects, the state government does not even have to involve the local council for planning approvals. Under the new Economic Development Act 2012 which was introduced by state government, the state can identify a key urban

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site as ‘Priority Development Area’ for economic development and can bypass the local government altogether for planning and assessment of the project. It fast-tracks development projects with simpler and faster approval, without requiring council development approval processes. It also requires limited engagement with the broader community. An example of this is the recent Queen’s Wharf Project, a megaproject on state owned land in Brisbane CBD, which will be discussed in further detail in the next section. Understanding the power and politics of state and local governments in Brisbane is important for effective urban governance of the city.

7.2 Megaprojects There is extensive literature on risks with megaprojects, which include cost overruns, project delays and lack of community engagement (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Priemus et al. 2008). In the last two decades, Brisbane has seen the growth of many megaprojects. A prominent example is the Trans-Apex project to develop three connected tunnel toll roads around Brisbane city. Critics argue that money could be better spent on improving public transport rather than on these toll roads (Dodson et al. 2010). With billions spent on building these toll roads, there is currently not enough patronage of these roads yet thus losing money for the investors in these megaprojects. Another megaproject, which is under construction in Brisbane CBD, is a $3 billion Queen’s Wharf Project on 7.8 hectares of public land for a major integrated resort development with hotels, casino, retail and apartment complexes. It is being developed as a joint venture between a major Australian company managing casinos with two international companies based in China. (https://queenswharfbrisbane.com. au/). It is planned to have 2000 new apartments, 1100 new hotel rooms and more than 20,000 square metres of new retail space and a casino. It is being built in a state government owned prime urban site with river front access to the Brisbane River. To make way for this project, some state government offices, one of them relatively new, have been demolished. The developer of the project promotes the project as saying this redevelopment will transform Brisbane’s CBD, with the repurposing and revitalisation of beautiful heritage buildings to make them even more accessible to the public…. This will be an asset for the state that is quintessentially Queensland, taking into account wonderful natural attractions, such as the riverfront and the weather, to create an iconic and globally appealing destination (Financial Review 2015).

While the provision of public riverside access can activate the current relatively inactive riverfront in the city and potential to develop it into a more vibrant space, there have many concerns about this project by local architects and community groups. The Australian Institute of Architects, a professional body of architects, have questioned the scale of the development, the extent of public consultation, and public access in the area (ABC News 2017). Likewise, a Greens councillor in BCC criticized this project for its focus on casino development rather than affordable housing, science and innovation precinct, public spaces and lack of wider active consultation with the

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Brisbane community and concern about impact of large scale development in the city (Brisbane Times 2016). Members of a local community group ‘Right to city’ have also recently protested about this project. This project reflects the strong urban growth coalition of public and private sector interests to develop mega urban projects in Brisbane. During a time of slow economic growth after the Global Financial Crisis, these types of projects are supported by governments as city building projects that can create jobs both during and after the construction. There is indeed a greater need for community engagement in these types of projects and strong consideration of how it will benefit the larger community as well. As the Queen’s Wharf project is being built on state government owned land, BCC is not directly involved in either the planning or the assessment of the project. The state government, by identifying the area as a priority development area, has approved the development of the project. It is an irony that the single biggest urban development project in Brisbane CBD has limited input from the largest council in Australia.

7.3 Privatization of Public Spaces and Urban Services The development industry now plays an important role in shaping plans, with privatesector-driven megaprojects and the privatization of council services. With strong consideration of the Federal Government’s National Competition Policies, which requires councils to reduce barriers to competition for the provision of services, the council services such as waste management are now contracted out to the private sector. BCC is increasingly becoming a facilitator of service provision rather than the actual provider of services, which also reflects a growing trend towards publicprivate partnerships for providing services. In many local parks it manages, BCC encourages private and community groups to rent facilities for sports and recreation activities, or to include private businesses, such as restaurants and fitness centres, to raise additional revenues for park management. While this provides a revenue stream for the council, critics also argue that there is privatization of the public realm in some of these cases. Likewise, the collecting and recycling of domestic waste is a major service that is now contracted out to the private sector to reduce the operating costs. In the past, the local council staff handled much of this. Although BCC makes savings by contracting out to private sector companies, this reduces the number of staff the council employs. There is strong debate on the growing privatization of public spaces as well as public private partnerships’ role in the provision of services not only in Brisbane but in other parts of world. The current reality in Australia is a growing public private partnership and market oriented approach to the provision of services. The question is really how this can also address the needs of the community and views of the civil society. There could indeed be benefits of collaboration between the public and private sector in provision of services in terms of generation of additional resources

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in the context of limited resources of the government and the sharing of risks and responsibilities between government, private and community sectors. However, the downside is that the community can become disengaged and negatively impacted by growing and uncontrolled role of private sector. BCC tries to strike a balance between the interests of the private sector and community sector. If one looks at the ways Brisbane has managed the parks such as South Bank and Roma Street Parkland, while there has been some privatization of public spaces with the introduction of restaurants, cafes and private events, it has also helped to generate funds for maintaining these parks and making the parks more vibrant. Community access to parks has been an important part of Council’s planning for parks in spite of introduction of these private sector businesses. BCC has also integrated civic spaces such as community gardens and public amenities as part of the park development. However, in the case of large state government led Queens Wharf Development in the Brisbane CBD, there are community concerns about the privatization of public spaces.

7.4 Lack of Strong Civil Society Good urban governance requires strong civil society participation. Although BCC makes good efforts in engaging communities to plan and implement its planning initiatives, there is little resistance in the form of advocacy groups that oppose the increasing trend of developer-driven and developer-friendly planning, or provide alternate planning visions. The development industry influences political parties through organizations such as the Property Council and the Urban Development Institute. Likewise, civil society could be stronger to provide independent views of the community. The neighbourhood groups, advocacy groups such as National Shelter and Australian Council of Social Services can play only a limited role in this regard to bring strong voices of the community. Over the years the funding by federal and state government for advocacy groups has been declining making their work more challenging in advocating for issues such as affordable housing and provision of social services. There are growing concerns about the pro-development mentality in Brisbane. Recently a councillor for one the inner suburbs of Brisbane (West End/Woolloongabba), from the Green Party has soundly criticized high density and high-rise development in West End. Along with the Green Councillor, this suburb has seen recent emergence of a ‘Right to the city movement’, a grass roots activist group focussing on social and environmental justice. This group campaigned against the West Village Development in the suburb of West End and Queen’s Wharf development in Brisbane CBD. ‘Right to the city’ is a civic movement consisting of citizen groups, civic minded people and environmental advocates who have begun to challenge the growing privatization of public spaces, erosion of public services and limited community engagement in major development projects, and have come up with alternate ideas such as guerrilla gardens, pop-up libraries and temporary

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conversion of parking lots into community green spaces (Byrne and Osborne 2016). It is interesting to see that this ‘right to city movement’ is primarily located in an inner suburb in Brisbane, which is relatively more affluent, with many professionals living there. Perhaps there is a case for this type of movement to be more active in less well-off suburbs in outer areas of Brisbane with major challenges of high levels of unemployment and lack of adequate service provision. With limited resources in local and state government, they are likely to continue private sector involvement in major development projects. The key challenge is how to balance private interest with the larger public interest. It would be important for BCC to listen to these alternative views as people become more aware of other ideas and possibilities.

8 Summary and Conclusions Under Australia’s three-tiered federal government structure (commonwealth, state and local), local governments have an important role in urban land use planning, delivery of local level services and engagement with the community. The state government influences urban development through planning legislation, state planning policies and regional planning. The federal government is primarily involved in areas such as taxation, immigration, and major infrastructure funding. BCC plays an important role in the provision of services as well as democratic governance of the city. It provides a range of community services such as local parks, libraries, community halls rather than limiting itself to traditional 3Rs (rates, rubbish and roads) roles of Australia’s local government. Its urban design and placemaking projects foster active engagement with the city’s residents. It prepares disaster management plans and flood risk maps to make local communities more aware of neighbourhood-level vulnerabilities. The city has improved its services through egovernance, especially by developing online planning and urban design tools and for community-level disaster management efforts. BCC has moved toward more inclusive planning by providing services for the diverse cultural groups, the disabled, young and homeless. It has partnered with the state government to establish the Brisbane Housing Company (BHC) that provides affordable housing in the city. BCC has developed a number of events (such as cultural activities, festivals), programs (such as providing discounts to council healthy and active programs) to reach out to diverse community groups in the city. Brisbane is a unique council in Australia as the single largest council under one leadership by a Mayor directly elected by all residents of the city. This is unlike Sydney and Melbourne with more than 20 smaller councils forming part of their metropolis with challenges of coordination between councils for metropolitan planning. However, in a large council such as Brisbane, engaging with the community can be more challenging compared to smaller councils. There is more distance between BCC and its community due to the sheer size of the BCC in terms of its population and geographic area. Although BCC has developed mechanisms such as community ref-

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erence groups and neighbourhood planning as a way to engage the community at the local level, there is need for more meaningful community engagement in Brisbane. There is potential to work more closely in partnership with all stakeholder groups including the development industry, communities and emerging community action groups. Planning in Brisbane is still largely top-down and hierarchical in nature in the present context. The City of Brisbane Act 2010 provides the basis for running BCC both for long term plans as well as its day to day operations. It requires the government to be transparent, accountable, and to focus on social inclusion, community engagement, and the sustainable delivery of its services. BCC has a strong code of conduct for the councillors and other staff to control the misuse of council resources and ensure the ethical and effective dispensing of duties. The urban governance in Brisbane is well linked to the UN Habitat’s NUA vision for cities which include seeking participatory, affordable, healthy and prosperous cities while at the same time providing safe, inclusive, green and quality public spaces (United Nations Habitat III 2016). When one compares the ideas being promoted under the NUA with what is being already tried in Brisbane, it is apparent that some of these ideas are already part of the urban governance and planning of Brisbane. BCC’s vision and strategies are to make the city accessible, clean, green, sustainable, safe, secure and healthy which are similar to the NUA’s sustainable development goals. The goals being promoted as part of the agenda seems to be already integrated in the Brisbane city plan. Its strategic plans are holistic, inclusive, and especially emphasize sustainability. BCC works with the private sector and community groups to provide a range of services including parks, community facilities taking into consideration public interest. It has legal frameworks in place for metropolitan governance in terms of planning legislation and regional planning. Some of the innovative ideas that Brisbane has implemented may be relevant for other cities in the Asia-Pacific region. BCC’s approach of linking long-term planning, medium-term planning and the annual plans helps sustain continuity in urban planning endeavours. The role of planning legislation to enforce the planning scheme and land use planning is vital. Without robust supportive legislation the planning system would lack the necessary authority for implementation. Strong legislation (the City of Brisbane Act 2010) makes governance more transparent in Brisbane, even requiring all council meetings to be open to public and all meeting minutes to be placed on the BCC website for access by its residents. Brisbane’s holistic planning approach, with sustainability and inclusiveness as its core foci, may be worth emulating in other cities in the region. The provision of extensive parks and community facilities by BCC provides excellent opportunities for residents to enjoy the amenities for social interaction. Brisbane being a large council with a strong financial resource base has been able to maintain them but funding such quality of parks could be a challenge for local councils in many developing countries with limited financial resources. The challenges of governance in Brisbane, such as the intervening role of urban politics, emergence of megaprojects, privatization of urban services, increasing privatization of the public realm and lack of strong civil society could be a cautionary note to other cities as well. The increasing trend of

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public private partnerships in the provision of urban services in Brisbane needs to be examined carefully to see how it affects the wider public interest and vulnerable community groups. The attempts at streamlining development and reducing red tape which has the support of the development industry in Brisbane is a cause for concern among some groups of active civil society. The moves toward e-governance for providing services and planning tools needs to be considered in terms of equitable access to services by different groups. Lastly, one has to be cognizant of the differences in political, economic and cultural context before considering some of these ideas and initiatives from Brisbane for other cities.

References ABC News (2017) Archaeologists keep close eye on Brisbane’s heritage-listed Harris Terrace as casino construction begins, 16 Jan 2017. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-16/queen-streetcasino-heritage-buildings-being-protected/8185900. Accessed August 7, 2017 Arnstein S (1969) A ladder of citizen participation. J Am Plan Assoc 35(4):216–224 Brackertz N (2013) Political actor or policy instrument? Governance challenges in Australian Local Government. Commonw J Local Gov (12) (2013) Brisbane City Council (2011) Brisbane access and inclusion plan 2012–2017. https://www. brisbane.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/20141806_-_access_and_inclusion_plan_2012-2017_ full_document.pdf. Accessed 2 Jan 2017 Brisbane City Council (2013) Brisbane vision 2031 https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/sites/default/ files/Brisbane_Vision_2031_full_document.pdf. Accessed 2 Jan 2017 Brisbane City Council (2015) Brisbane city council corporate sustainability policy. https://www. brisbane.qld.gov.au/about-council/governance-strategy/vision-strategy/sustainability-policycase-studies. Accessed 2 Jan 2017 Brisbane City Council (2016a) Brisbane city council corporate plan 2016–17 to 2020–21. https:// www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/20160620-_corporate_plan_2016-17_to_2020-21. pdf. Accessed 2 Jan 2017 Brisbane City Council (2016b) Council annual plan and budget 2016–17. https://www.brisbane.qld. gov.au/about-council/council-information-rates/news-publications/council-annual-plan-budget2016-17. Accessed 2 Jan 2017 Brisbane City Council (2017a) Planning and building online tools. https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/ planning-building/planning-guidelines-tools/planning-building-online-tools. Accessed 15 May 2018 Brisbane City Council (2017b) Housing and homelessness. https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/ community-safety/community-support/housing-homelessness. Accessed 15 May 2018 Brisbane Times (2016) Greens councillor ignores Star’s legal threats over Queens Wharf video, 13 April 2016. http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/greens-councillor-ignores-stars-legalthreats-over-queens-wharf-video-20160413-go5hyl.html. Accessed 7 Aug 2017 Brisbane Times (2009) King george square redevelopment gets thumbs down, 11 Oct 2009. http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/king-george-square-redevelopmentgets-thumbs-down-20091010-grt3.html. Accessed 7 Aug 2017 Bovaird T, Loffler E (2003) Evaluating the quality of public governance: indicators, models and methodologies. Int Rev Admin Sci 69:313–328 Burton P (2014) From white shoes to bold future: the neoliberalisation of local government in an Australian city? Urban Stud 51(15):3233–3249 Byrne J, Osborne N (2016) Urban hacktivism: getting creative about involving citizens in city planning. The Conversation, 15 July 2016

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Cheema GS (ed) (2013) Democratic local governance: reforms and Innovations in Asia. United Nations University Press, Tokyo Cheema GS, Popovski V (eds) (2010a) Engaging civic society: emerging trends in democratic governance. United Nations University Press, Tokyo Cheema GS, Popovski V (eds) (2010b) Building trust in government: innovations in governance reform in Asia. United Nations University Press, Tokyo Crowley CM (1998) ‘Globalisation’ and ecological modernity: challenges for local environmental governance in Australia. Local Environment 3(1):91–97. ISSN 1354-9839 Dodson J, Sipe N, Baker D (2010) Transportation and the wheels of growth. In: Gleeson B, Steel W (eds) A climate for growth: planning South-East Queensland, 1st edn. University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, pp 185–202 Dodson J (2016) Ideas for Australia: City v 4.0, a new model of urban growth and governance for Australia. The Conversation, 20 April 2016 Financial Review (2015) Architects slam Queen’s Wharf casino site: warn of ‘irreparable’ damage to Brisbane. Financial Review, 5 Aug 2015. http://www.afr.com/real-estate/commercial/ architects-slam-queens-wharf-casino-site-warn-of-irreparable-damage-to-brisbane-20150805gis5l9. Accessed 7 Aug 2017 Flyvbjerg B, Bruzelius N, Rothengatter W (2003) Megaprojects and risk: an anatomy of ambition. Cambridge University Press, London Forester J (1999) The deliberative practitioner: encouraging participatory planning process. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Forster C (2007) Australian cities: continuity and change, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Melbourne Gleeson B, Low L (2000) Australian urban planning: new challenges, new agendas. Allen & Unwin, Sydney Gleeson B, Dodson J, Spiller M (2010) Metropolitan governance for the Australian city; the case for reform. Urban Research Program, Issues Paper, 12, March 2010 Gurran N (2011) Australian urban land use planning, 2nd edn. Sydney University Press, Sydney Hartwich OM (2009) Beyond symbolism: finding a place for local government in Australia’s constitution, issue analysis, no 104. Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney Healey P (1998) Collaborative planning in a stakeholder society. Town Plan Rev 69:1–21 Innes JE, Booher DE (2004) Reframing public participation: strategies for the 21st century. Plan Theory Pract 5:419–436 Kersting N, Caulfield J, Andrew R, Nickson A, Olowu D, Wollmann H (2009) Good local governance. Local government reform in global perspective. An introduction, Local Governance Reform in Global Perspective, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp 9–34 Knapp C (2017) Experimenting with anarchistic approaches to collaborative planning: the planning free school of Chattanooga. J Urban Affairs 39(5):635–657 Minnery J (2007) Stars and their supporting coast: state, market and community as actors in urban governance. Urban Policy Res 25(3):325–345 Minnery J (2014) Off the Shelf or Tailor-made? Sources of ideas for the creation of greater Brisbane in 1924. Int J Reg Local Hist 9(2):107–122 Murphy P (2012) The metropolis. In: Thompson S, Maginn PJ (eds) Planning Australia, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, pp 155–179 Musso J, Weare C, Hale M (2000) Designing web technologies for local governance reform: good management or good democracy. Polit Commun 17(1):1–19 Newman M (1998) Planning, governing, and the image of the city. J Plan Edu Res 18:61–71 Pierre J (2011) The politics of urban governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke Priemus H, Flyvbjerg B, van Wee B (2008) Decision making on mega projects: cost benefit analysis, planning and innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, Massachusetts Queens Wharf Development. https://queenswharfbrisbane.com.au/. Accessed 7 Aug 2017 Queens Wharf Brisbane. http://www.cotteeparker.com.au/project/queens-wharf/. Accessed 7 Aug 2017

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Stewart K (2006) Designing good urban governance indicators: the importance of citizen participation and its evaluation in Greater Vancouver. Cities 23(3):196–204 Tomlinson R (2016) Metropolitan governance is the missing link in Australia’s reform agenda. The Conversation, 4 April 2016 United Nations Habitat III (2016) The New Urban Agenda, The United National Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), Quito 17–20 Oct 2016. https://www2.habitat3.org/bitcache/99d99fbd0824de50214e99f864459d8081a9be00? vid=591155&disposition=inline&op=view. Accessed 2 Jan 2007

Bhishna Bajracharya has been an Associate Professor of Urban Planning at Bond University in Gold Coast, Australia since 2008. Prior to joining Bond, he taught at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Brisbane for about twelve years, and worked as a post-doctoral fellow at the Australian National University, Canberra for about two years. He has a Bachelor of Architecture degree from the School of Planning and Architecture, Delhi and Master’s degree in Urban Planning and PhD degree from the University of Hawaii. His research areas include urban governance, disaster management, masterplanned communities, transit oriented development and smart cities. He was recently invited to make a presentation on financing urban services in Nepal at a national workshop organised by the Asia Foundation and Asian Development Bank in Kathmandu. He is a founding member of the Brisbane Chapter of the East West Center Association. He is also currently the Chair of the Bond University Sustainability Committee.

Shahed Khan is affiliated with the urban and regional planning program at Curtin University, located in Perth, Western Australia. His research interests stretch across a broad spectrum of sustainability issues related to the built environment and its users, such as local governance and community planning, in the Australian and Asian contexts. His current teaching and research cover impacts of globalization manifest in the shaping and reshaping of global urban and regional networks and hierarchies and their implications on local governance in terms of decentralization and democratisation. As a Planner, Shahed seeks to explore the means available to pursue the objective of human development—both at the individual and community levels, and contribute towards creating just and sustainable societies.

Urban Service Delivery and Access: The Special Case of Brunei Darussalam Pushpa Thambipillai and Li Li Pang

Abstract Brunei Darussalam is the smallest country in Southeast Asia. Wealth derived from its hydrocarbon resources has enabled the state to provide its citizens a high quality of life. A small population also helps to lessen environmental degradation associated with competition for urban space common in fast-urbanizing parts of the Asia-Pacific region. As a hereditary monarchy with embedded Islamic values, the sultanate’s social and political processes are distinct from its neighbours; yet, in many ways, the state’s priority is similar to other governments’, i.e. to provide essential services for building a stable and developed society. Selected examples of service delivery in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam’s largest urban centre, provide clearer understanding of the related issues. Keywords Centralization · Malay islamic monarchy · Public sector dominance · Protracted decision-making · Weak citizen participation

1 Introduction This chapter focuses improves our understanding of urbanism in Asia-Pacific by 1 focusing on the special case of Brunei Darussalam (Brunei), a small, rich sultanate in Southeast Asia. In some respects, it shares with its neighbouring states common issues of urban governance and service delivery; yet, because of the sultanate’s distinct characteristics, its urban challenges in regard to service delivery and access 1 The common name, Brunei, is used interchangeably with the official name, Brunei Darussalam, which means Brunei, Abode of Peace.

P. Thambipillai ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] L. L. Pang (B) UBD School of Business and Economics, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_9

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by various sections of the population are also unique. On the one hand, unlike most other Asian countries, Brunei, due to its small population, has not experienced rapid or destabilizing urban growth and environmental degradation. On the other hand, it is inevitable that, as its population increases and the need for infrastructure rises, Brunei too has similar concerns caused by increasing urbanization. Given its unique political system and governmental processes, Brunei’s systems of urban development and services delivery are distinct. Comparing and contrasting the special case of Brunei to studies of urbanism in other contexts of Asia-Pacific will afford us a richer, more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of urbanization as well as the idiosyncrasies of planning and policy responses in the region. Brunei Darussalam’s hereditary monarchical system is strongly evident in its centralized systems of urban governance, administration, and policy implementation—uniquely characterised by its strong welfarist approach and the absence of structured and ‘open’ avenues for political participation. Rapid urbanization in many parts of Asia, often with the influx of rural migrants, has seen city populations soar, thereby increasing squatter settlements, traffic congestion, pollution, and strains on public service delivery (Dahiya 2012; UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2010). Brunei Darussalam has been fortunate to have largely evaded these urbanization-related undesirable phenomena. After gaining independence in 1984, the government has attempted planning based on adopting best practices. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has had a strong influence on member states’ development strategies, including on Brunei’s urban development. ADB’s ‘Vision of Liveable Cities’ emphasizes safe, sustainable urban centres.2 In Brunei’s neighbourhood, Singapore’s approach to urban development to overcome its urban problems of the 1960s and 70s is of exemplary relevance for Brunei. Singapore has strived for maintaining a sustainable environment and a competitive economy to deliver a quality of life that ranks atop various global indices. Besides several government agencies dedicated to urban development and governance, a Singaporean think-tank, the Center for Liveable Cities has addressed urbanization challenges and proposed reforms in ways that could be useful for other countries to follow3 Singapore claims it has progressed from a ‘Garden City’ into a ‘City in a Garden’. Brunei Darussalam, too, is keen to not just improve its urban infrastructure and services delivery, but also promote a clean and green environment. The following sections highlight the sultanate’s urban development challenges, and governance and policy processes. Urban, in this context, refers to areas covered by the capital city and townships in the four districts of Brunei Darussalam that account for the larger concentration of the population. The discussion on urban service delivery illustrates the state’s response to the growing needs of an increasingly urbanizing Brunei Darussalam, by focusing on public housing, transportation, health, energy conservation and disaster management. It is against these challenges in service delivery and urban governance that the chapter explores urban liveability.

2 For

more information, see www.adb.org/themes/urban-development/main. www.clc.gov.sg.

3 See:

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Next, a broad introduction to Governance in Brunei Darussalam offers insight into the Sultanate’s political and social systems. This is followed by a reviewing the status of urban governance in the country and relevant influencing factors. The subsequent section on the government and urban master plans is of significance to understanding the roles of specific planning agencies in shaping urban development in the country, and especially in the context of Brunei Darussalam. The following section then focuses on service delivery and the role of municipal departments. Subsequent sections offer a closer look into selected cases that explain the delivery of transportation, housing, health, and energy services, and disaster preparedness. While Brunei Darussalam is heavily dependent on income from hydrocarbon sales, the government’s diversification policies are steadily increasing the role of the business sector, which is discussed in the penultimate section on pro-business policies. The chapter concludes by reviewing the challenges and the prospects for improved urban governance and service delivery against the sultanate’s long-term development plan, Wawasan 2035 (Vision 2035), which seeks to steer Brunei Darussalam’s progresses towards attaining developed country status.4

2 Governance in Brunei Darussalam Brunei Darussalam is distinct from most other case studies on Asian urbanization that deal with larger and longer established independent state systems. Brunei provides a unique political system as the only absolute monarchy in Southeast Asia. Its demographic and socio-cultural attributes also distinguish it from its neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, it shares common concerns over developmental issues, especially sustainable development. Brunei has to cope with infrastructural and policy issues of urbanization just like its ASEAN partners; but its peculiar political, socio-cultural and physical attributes make its style of governance wholly different. A small Malay Islamic Monarchy (Melayu Islam Beraja), Brunei Darussalam is a hereditary sultanate, in which the reigning Sultan holds the dual posts of head of state and government. The ruling house traces its lineage back several centuries, and most state historical records begin with the first Muslim ruler who adopted Islam around the middle of the fourteenth century. Since then the same dynasty has ruled the Sultanate. As the 29th ruler in the royal lineage, the current head of state is Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah Ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddien Sa’adul Khairi Waddien. Islam came to Brunei in the late 13th century with visiting traders and travellers. Having continuously remained a Malay and Muslim majority state, Islamic values have strongly shaped and continue to define its social and political systems. Through its history, Brunei has had various foreign influences from Asia and beyond. A once-dominant state of northern Borneo, between the 17th and 19th centuries it lost most of its territory to neighbouring states through civil war and external 4 For

details on Brunei’s Vision 2035, see JPKE (2007).

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incursions. The increasing competition for trade and potential political instability from rival mercantilists and colonialists prompted the ruling elite to accept British protection. Brunei became a British protectorate in 1888 and remained under the British ‘advisory’ system until its independence in 1984.5 Even as a British protectorate, Brunei continued with its traditional domestic political system centred on the Sultan while the protector managed the larger administrative, security and external policy areas. In 1959 Brunei adopted its written constitution, which is the foundation of governance, overall. At independence, Brunei adopted a cabinet style system with the Sultan as the head of state and government.6 Administrative policies are guided by its constitution of 1959 and its supplements added over the years, in particular in 1984. Being a centralized, hereditary monarchy, there is no political competition. Political parties can be registered if there is interest; unfortunately, not many have survived for any length of time. Presently there is only one party, the National Development Party (NDP) that was set up to facilitate social interaction, and support rather than contest national policies. One of the problems NDP faces is in regard to membership because government employees are not allowed to join any political party. In a country where the most citizens are in employment linked to the state, it leaves little recruitment opportunity for any political organization. Given the uncertainties political organizations face, therefore, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have taken up community-related causes. NGOs commonly focus on humanitarian and environmental issues. Active environmental NGOs include Green Brunei,7 and Beach Bunch.8 The Deputy Chairman of the Society for Community Outreach and Training (SCOT), Mohammad Khairul Azmi was one of the five winners of the Commonwealth Youth Award for Excellence in Development Work 2018 on Sustainable Development Goals 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities.9 All NGOs are required to be registered with the relevant government agency and are carefully monitored, lest they transgress beyond their stated purpose. An appointed-cum-partially elected legislature meets once a year to review national policies and provide a platform to discuss the country’s annual budget. The judiciary is fashioned after the British model and is independent of the exec5 Only

a brief historical account is provided here. For further information on Brunei’s history, see the concise account in, Jamil Al-Sufri (2000) and Brown (1969). 6 At present, there are 13 ministries: the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the ministries of Communications, Defence, Development, Education, Finance and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Health, Home Affairs, Primary Resources and Tourism, Religious Affairs and Culture, Youth and Sports. The Department of Energy and Industry, which used to be under the PMO, was elevated to a Ministry on April 18th 2018 (PMO 2018). In September 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was renamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs while the Ministry of Finance was renamed Ministry of Finance and Economy. 7 Green Brunei’s founder, Ms. Khairunnisa Ashari, became the first Bruneian to be awarded the Queen’s Young Leaders Award in London in 2015, and she has also been appointed as an NGO representative to the Brunei Legislative Council for the 2017–2022 Session. 8 In 2016, Beach Bunch was approved as an Independent Award Centre (IAC) to offer the Duke of Edinburgh’s Award (for youth achievement) (Yap 2016). 9 Borneo Bulletin (2018b).

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utive. However, even since when the British administered Brunei, there has been a dual judicial system in place: the more pervasive civil system and the more specific shariah system—the latter applies only to Muslims for regulating shariah compliant social issues, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and religious obligations. In an effort to strengthen Islamic jurisprudence in the sultanate, a new enactment in 2014 laid out widespread legislation under the shariah legal system to strengthen existing Islamic laws and incorporate some civil and criminal codes, simply referred to as hudud. The hudud aspects of shariah are expected to be implemented fully over the next few years, after both civil and Islam-based legal jurisprudence will have been formally coordinated.10 General policymaking and implementation are responsibilities of the Council of Cabinet. However, the Sultan, as the Head of State and Government is the penultimate decision-maker with advice from special councils of state. Occasionally, if and when required, the Sultan has also acted as the initiator of certain policies. All policies need the Sultan’s approval, and all legislation to be enacted his consent. Public administration is handled by the various ministries, their departments, and other related agencies. The government’s nerve centre is the Prime Minister’s Office (deemed one of the country’s 13 ministries) and the departments under it.11 Governing the state according to established political norms and ensuring the required welfare and quality of life for its residents has been the main focus of the Sultan and his administration. Being small has its advantages. With less than half a million people (421,300), Brunei, Southeast Asia’s least populated country, is often compared to another small ASEAN state, Singapore; much smaller in geographical size but with a much larger population (five million), Singapore sits at the busy maritime crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Brunei is located on the northwest part of Borneo, a largely forested and mountainous island, bordered by the South China Sea to the west but away from the busy shipping lanes. Borneo is shared by two larger neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia, with Brunei occupying a small stretch of bifurcated territory surrounded by the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Nearly 70% of Brunei is estimated to be still covered in tropical forests since there has been no major demand for land for agricultural or industrial activities. Covered by swamp or peat, most of Brunei’s accessible lands are unsuitable for crop cultivation. Brunei’s wealth comes, mainly, from its offshore oil and gas operations to the south, where oil field was discovered in the 1920s. The small population of about 421,3000 supported by the hydrocarbon industry has made Brunei one of Asia’s wealthiest countries in terms of its GDP per capita at about B$45,000.12 About a quarter of the population is temporary residents comprising foreign workers who are employed in different sectors of the public and private sectors. Its citizens and residents do not pay personal income or sales taxes. Business enterprises are taxed relatively moderately in order to encourage business development and diversify the economy.

10 The

newly introduced Islamic legal system is explained in Abdul Aziz (2013). a detailed understanding of the Prime Minister’s Office see: www.pmo.gov.bn. 12 For a current political and economic overview of the Sultanate, see Roberts and Cook (2016). 11 For

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Brunei has achieved high status in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. Brunei is consistently ranked high in its Human Development Index; for example, in the 2016 Human Development Report (UN-HDR), it was placed 30th.13 One third of the working population work with the public sector and the public sector remains a popular choice for citizens although efforts to encourage them to work in the private sector have been strongly encouraged by the government.14 Brunei’s public administration has been influenced by the British model, having been under its influence for almost a hundred years. The sultanate embarked on National Development Plans even before independence, to provide the macro level strategies in developmental goals. Each National Development Plan targets a five year period for infrastructure and policy implementation; to date, there have been 10 development plans that collectively have contributed to Brunei’s socio-economic growth. The 1th National Development Plan began in 1954 and covered the period to 1958. The country just completed its 10th National Development Plan (2012–2017).

3 Urban Governance in Brunei Darussalam As a unitary state, the tasks of the government in promoting a developed society are inter-linked although each of the 13 ministries takes responsibility for a specific function, like transportation, health or education. Each ministry’s task is to undertake its designated policy formulation and implementation for all its constituents, rural or urban. In the Brunei case, in addition to the overarching structure of the Prime Minister’s Office, urban governance falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In addition to its numerous functions (that includes the departments of Immigration and National Registration, Labour, Prisons, Fire and Rescue Services and National Disaster Management Services) it also manages the Local Authority and the Municipal Authority. The District Office is a peculiar inheritance from the colonial era. Brunei is divided into four districts (Fig. 1), and each is administered by its district office under the direction of the Home Affairs Ministry. The district office is located in each district’s major town. The chief administrator or the District Officer is a senior member of the Brunei civil service and is appointed through the normal selection processes and is accountable to the Minister of Home Affairs. There are two urban municipal authorities, the Bandar Seri Begawan Municipal Board and the Kuala Belait and Seria Municipal Board (Table 1). With approval from the Sultan, the Minister from among the public sector officials appoints Board Members. A later section in this chapter shows the Municipal Board carries out specific tasks within the limits of its metropolitan area. The various national ministries in charge provide most of the services enjoyed by the urban dwellers. The urban sector is included within the Five Year National 13 Singapore 14 Othman

was the best Asian performer, taking the 6th spot. (2018a).

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Fig. 1 Map of Brunei Darussalam. Source http://www.mapsopensource.com/brunei-political-map. html Table 1 Urban centres in Brunei Darussalam (BD) 2011

District

Population

Urban centre

Population

Brunei Muara

279,842

Bandar Seri Begawan

241,349

Belait

60,609

Kuala Belait

33,067

Tutong

44,855

Tutong Town

11,137

Temburong Total

8,856 393,162

Bangar Total

2,510 288,063

Source JPKE (2012). Preliminary findings: population and housing census 2011

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Development Plans. In addition, specific urban planning and urban service delivery systems have also been incorporated into the urban system. Since independence, the Brunei government has engaged international consultants to assist in its urban development design. However, the way in which recommendations are being implemented may not be entirely in accordance with what was envisaged in the plans. Nevertheless, the majority of the population of Brunei has been able to live comfortably under administrative policies that have delivered modern, adequate and relatively accessible services. An egalitarian system is achieved through the government’s ‘welfare’ oriented policies, and subsidies to several sectors of the economy to enable a more equitable distribution of resources. Being a small country, in population and territorial size, it can be noted that there is no large discrepancy between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ as they are all within a two-hour drive of each other. This is not to deny the fact that there are still thousands of poor families in the rural as well as in urban areas.15 In 2009, the Minister of Development, (who is responsible for land matters), announced that the country had only 5% available area left (28,825 ha or 288.25 sq. km) for industrial and housing requirements. Most of the settlements are concentrated along the coastal flatlands, centred on the main towns of each of the four districts. As the country strived to achieve sustainable development, a synergy between its urban usage and forest coverage needed to be innovative to ensure that the government’s commitments for both aspects were upheld. Based on the current population estimates of 421,300, Brunei has a comfortable density of 73.1 persons per sq. km. The annual rate of increase of Brunei’s population has decreased in the past few years. In 2013, it recorded an annual growth rate of 1.6% but it had dropped to 1.5% in 2015.16 Based on Brunei’s population census the rate of increase has been steadily declining, from the high of 4.4% in 1971, dropping to 3.0% in 1991 and 1.7% by 2011.17 The rate of urbanization in the country was estimated at 75% in 2011. With slower population, growth, with lesser demands on the depletion of natural resources, there is the possibility that the government will be able to use its resources for the sustainable maintenance of the environment. Brunei is committed to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 11, whereby through careful urbanization process its urban centres will become more inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.

4 Development and Urban Master Plans Following Brunei’s independence in 1984, the government commissioned the Negara Brunei Darussalam Master Plan (NBDMP) that was completed in 1987. It was the first comprehensive 20-year structural and development plan for the whole coun15 About

20,790 people were living in poverty in 2012 (Azlan 2014; Rabiatul 2014). In 2017 there were over 8,000 citizens who received zakat (tithe) contribution from the Brunei Islamic Religious Council (MUIB) (Azlan 2017). 16 DEPD (JPKE) (2017). 17 DEPD (JPKE) (2012).

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try until 2005.18 The implementation of the plan did not proceed as expected. The National Land Use Master Plan (2006–2025) published in 2006, reported that the implementation of NBDMP was disorganized and not satisfactory despite the fact that specific government departments had been identified for the implementation process. It appeared that there was a lack of commitment from those public agencies that did not identify with the projects as their own initiative.19 A variety of players across the country are entrusted with the improvement of the liveable urban environment; these include the Department of Planning and Economic Development (Prime Minister’s Office), Department of Town and Country Planning, Land Department, Public Works Department (Ministry of Development), Municipal Department and Municipal Board (Ministry of Home Affairs). Another planning scheme resulted in the Master Plan for the capital, Bandar Seri Begawan (BSB), which is situated along the Brunei River (Sungai Brunei), some 15 km off the coast. In 2007, after the capital’s administrative area was increased tenfold, from 12.87 to 100.36 sq. km, the Ministry of Home Affairs commissioned a foreign consultant to transform the capital into a modern city.20 The completed Master Plan was published in 2011 after engaging in some public consultation and feedback. In 2011, one of the biggest projects recommended by the Plan, the Riverfront EcoCorridor, was approved by the Steering Committee of the BSB Master Plan for implementation.21 In 2014, the government approved B$40 million for the first phase of the construction of the Sungai Kedayan promenade (regeneration project) as part of the larger Riverfront project.22 The project was completed and a park next to the riverfront was officially opened by the Sultan of Brunei on October 22th 2017, as part of the Sultan’s 50th anniversary year on the throne and was named Taman Mahkota Jubli Emas23 (Fig. 2). The new Sungai Brunei Bridge, connecting Sungai Kebun in Lumapas to Jalan Residency in BSB is 750 m long and cost B$139 million.24 After surmounting hurdles in its early stages, both in planning and implementation, the bridge, which has a 157m tower topped with an 8.7 m dome (Fig. 3), was completed within a timely schedule in 2017. The Sultan officially opened the bridge with a grand celebration, including 20 min fireworks, on October 14th, 2017, and he named the bridge after his Queen, the Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Hajah Saleha Bridge. The bridge has been commissioned under the country’s 10th National Development Plan (2012–2017). According to the Plan, the north and south sections of Bandar Seri Begawan (BSB) are to be better connected, giving access to people living on both sides of the Brunei River. Driving 18 Hong

(2006). (2013). 20 The consultancy was undertaken by Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabum (HOK) International Asia Pacific. 21 Fitri (2010). 22 Fitri (2014). 23 Hayat (2017). 24 A South Korean firm, Daelin Industries, won the tender to build this structure, which is the world’s second longest 300 m 1 pylon cable-styled bridge. 19 Fitri

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Fig. 2 Taman Mahkota Jubli Emas. Source Li Li Pang

time to the city for residents living across the river would be reduced to 15 min from the 60 min previously. BSB was known for its commercial activities and was a thriving port of call (Fig. 4). Its ideal location on the banks of the river has now been given due recognition. If the liveable city projects are implemented, it will be comparable with other leading cities in terms of infrastructure and service delivery. According to a business consultancy firm, during the initial stages of the BSB Master Plan, its success was not assured—the BSB Municipal Board, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, was still identifying land that could be redeveloped under the scheme. The massive complexities of implementing such an ambitious public-private partnership (PPP) project, especially in Brunei, meant it always faced the threat of being downscaled, indefinitely delayed, or even entirely scrapped. The consultant, nevertheless, noted surmounting the inevitable bureaucratic hurdles—especially, strengthening cooperation among the several ministries and agencies involved—would yield and sustain strong residential and commercial real estate growth for years.25

25 Oxford

Business Group (2013).

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Fig. 3 View of Raja Isteri Pengiran Anak Hajah Saleha Bridge’s Dome. Source Li Li Pang

5 Service Delivery: Role of the Municipal Department Brunei has five major urban areas in Brunei—besides the capital region, the other four are the main urban centres of its four districts, Kuala Belait and Seria (Belait District), Tutong Town (Tutong District) and Bangar (Temburong District). These are administered by their Municipal Departments, except for Bangar, where the District Office is in charge. The municipal departments are responsible for the cleanliness, structural development, and general welfare of their jurisdictions. All the administrative agencies and resources for service delivery are located in these urban centres. The Bandar Seri Begawan Municipal Department manages Brunei’s largest urban centre (Figs. 5 and 6). Its origins lie in the Sanitary Act of 1920 (enforced in 1921), which focused on maintaining the cleanliness and physical appearance of Brunei Town (renamed Bandar Sri Begawan in 1970 in honour of the then ruler). Under the revamped Municipal Boards Act of 198426 (first instituted in 1951) a municipal board has, among others, authority over the following: (1) Regulation and control of buildings and building operations

26 See

Laws of Brunei, Chapter 57 Municipal Boards at www.agc.gov.bn.

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Fig. 4 View of Bandar Seri Begawan from the Bridge. Source Li Li Pang

(2) Identifying and maintaining land for recreation and other purposes; maintaining trees and waterways; traffic control and street lighting; and numbering houses and naming streets (subject to approval by the relevant minister) (3) Control and supervision of sewers, drains, sewage treatment works, and solid waste management; sale of fresh provisions, and licensing food stalls, restaurants, theatres, and hotels. The regulations also stipulate that all lands, buildings and houses within the municipal area not taxed more than 15% of their annual rental value, which is assessed and reviewed annually. Premises for religious use, public burial grounds, and buildings for charities are exempt from taxation. In April 2009, the maximum tax for nonresidential premises was reduced to 12% of the total annual rental revenue, while residential premises pay 12% of the total floor area. The buildings located within the capital are taxed at a rate that is double (B$2.20 per sq. m) than buildings outside the city. The revenue from the 12% building tax (formerly called cukai pintu or door tax) was allocated to police control posts, fire stations, city maintenance, and waste management at 1% each; while street lighting, road access, water supply, and sewage management was set at 2%. The BSB Municipal Department was unable to carry out tax enforcement, especially after August 2007 when its area was increased tenfold to 100.36 sq. km. Uncollected taxes accumulated, and by 2009 building owners owed B$11 million.

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Fig. 5 Water taxis in the Brunei River, the Golden Dome on the right corner is the Palace of the Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, Istana Nurul Iman. Source Li Li Pang

The Municipal Department threatened to take action against defaulting owners by closing down their businesses; however, no such action was reported. The Minister of Home Affairs reported that uncollected municipal revenues in 2016 amounted to over B$45 million (of which 92% was from BSB), which prompted a visit by the Sultan to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which manages the BSB municipal department, to seek clarification. The Sultan noted the partial enforcement by the municipal department: From my personal observation, many cases of building taxes payable by dignitaries and VIPs [Very Important Persons] are still outstanding but the authorities only managed to issue and collect a significant amount of revenue from ordinary people only.27

Although the country’s leader himself highlighted the need for VIPs to pay their dues, confusion prevailed on the rate of payable taxes. The Chairman of the BSB Municipal Department noted in an interview that building taxes were not fixed and differed depending on factors such as location.28 Indeed, the Municipal Department would not only have to collect the taxes more efficiently but also have to justify the correct amount of tax to be levied. In the 2018 Legislative Council session, the 27 Khairuddin 28 The

and Waquiddin (2016). Brunei Times (2016a).

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Fig. 6 View of Bandar Seri Begawan from the RIPAS Bridge. Source Li Li Pang

Minister of Home Affairs revealed that establishing its Recovery Taskforce Unit in 2016 helped in recovering B$5.7 million.29 A review established that both the government and the taxpayer have benefitted from the Taskforce, but more can yet be done to make it a more effective and efficient urban service provider.

6 Transportation Challenges Brunei’s citizens enjoy relatively high per capita income; thus, the majority of its citizens prefer to use their own means of travel. As a rich oil producer, the government has heavily subsidized fuel that makes domestic petrol and diesel prices among the cheapest anywhere. The government had introduced import taxes on private vehicles in the late 1990s, but these rates are much lower than in most ASEAN states. The rate of car ownership in Brunei, at about 2.65 vehicles per capita, is thus one of the highest in the world.30 Therefore, it is not surprising that the public transportation system is not well developed,31 with only two services in the urban areas—the inter-city bus 29 Hayat

(2018a). (2013). 31 Roslan (2018). 30 Ubaidillah

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lines that ply between BSB and the Tutong and Belait districts, and the capital’s BSB bus system. Although affordable for riders, the inter/intra-city bus systems are not as efficient nor widely used, which makes operating them unattractive enterprises.

6.1 Taxi Services Taxi services also have less demand for being relatively expensive, especially in comparison to other countries. The low patronage warrants the high service charge to enable drivers, as most claim, to make a decent living. Most citizens own their own vehicles, so taxis cater mostly to those without cars, such as foreign workers who share cabs for the cost of riding alone is high. High-priced taxis have been an issue in Brunei for decades. In response to continual complaints from the public, including tourists, the government through the Ministry of Communication (that covers transportation) announced a new metered taxi system in September 2016. The fare is considered to be 30% lower than before. It may surprise a visitor that in the entire country, there are only five taxi stands and about 50 licensed taxi operators. Those who generally use public transport, especially buses, are foreign workers. Hence while buses are popular during Sundays are off for most expatriate workers, and illegal taxis have also found a niche to cater to their needs. About 261 suspected operators were identified by the Land Transport Department (LTD) in April 2016, and over 10% of them were served notices for illegal taxi operation, an offense under the Road Safety Act.32 Offenders, if found guilty, can be jailed for up to six months and fined B$10,000. Neighbouring countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have allowed the mobile app-based global private car-hailing services, such as Grab and Uber, to operate and compete with private taxi operators, leading to better and cheaper services.33 Brunei’s car-booking application, DART introduced in May 2017, claimed to have secured 1,800 registered users within a week of its launch, although the actual number of users has not been revealed. Also, of the 24 registered drivers, only four seemed to be active in May 2017.34 In March 2018, DART finally received the provisional permit to operate peer-to-peer ride-sharing services after being suspended in August 2017. Legislators have urged the government to approve DART to prevent it from going out of business after having invested a quarter million dollars in developing the technology and business.35

32 Hong

*(2016a). (2016). 34 Abdul Hakim (2017). 35 Abu Bakar (2018). 33 Koo

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6.2 Bus Rapid Transit and Light Rail Transport Based on a 2014 study, the Land Transport Department (LTD) launched a new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system that will encourage more public usage.36 The study findings were incorporated into the Land Transport Master Plan, which recommended establishing the new BRT. It is estimated that passengers take about 228,000 trips per day,37 a number that LTD aims to double. LTD hopes to increase the number of bus stops in the country from 320 to 1500, and the ridership, by introducing an efficient bus management system, clear route maps and schedules, and CCTV in the buses. In a preliminary survey the Brunei Times conducted in 2010, the public overwhelmingly supported the development of a Light Rail Transport (LRT) system in the capital.38 Almost half the respondents were willing to let petrol subsidies be reduced, if those would fund the LRT.39 At the 11th Legislative Council meeting in 2015, the Minister of Communication dismissed the introduction of LRT or mass rapid transit (MRT) as not a viable option for addressing BSB’s traffic woes.40 Citing Brunei’s small population and the high investment costs, the minister feared that such an expensive transportation endeavour risked becoming another white elephant.41 Nevertheless, during the 2018 Legislative Session, the new Minister of Communication revealed preliminary plans, without details, to implement a B$15 million Public Transport System Projects in line with the Land Transport Master Plan.42

6.3 Water Taxis and Riverboats The water taxi system is another mode that connects settlements along the Brunei River with BSB (Fig. 7). Water taxis are also popular with tourists who wish to explore the scenic settlements along the water. In 2015, 114 boats were licensed to carry passengers, although 1194 boats were registered with the Marine Department. The new Brunei river bridge linking Sungai Kebun and Jalan Residency might adversely affect the livelihoods of water taxi drivers. Though licensed, the water taxi system does not charge standardized fares, which continue to depend on a customer’s negotiation skills. Possibly the-soon-to-be redundant water taxi operators may have to seek other job opportunities in the vicinity of the water villages and adjacent settlements. 36 The study was undertaken by the local think-tank, Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies (CSPS) together with consultants from SQW China Limited and Atkins International. 37 Nadzri (2014). 38 Quratul-Ain (2010a). 39 Quratul-Ain, (2010b). 40 Rashidah (2015). 41 “Anak Brunei” (2010). 42 Norjidi (2018).

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Fig. 7 The B$69 million women and children hospital block, opened in 2014. Source Li Li Pang

Plying between BSB and Bangar, in Temburong district, another form of interdistrict transportation is the riverboat. Temburong is separated from the rest of the sultanate by the Malaysian territory of Limbang (Sarawak). Riverboats (normally with a dozen passengers) offer regular services for moderate fares. For those who opt to drive to Temburong, the new Brunei river bridge also provides easy access from BSB to Limbang, across the border from Temburong. Whether and how riverboat operators will be affected by the operation of the bridge remains to be seen; plus, it will depend on citizens’ behaviour. In an effort to support healthy living, reduce the ‘carbon footprint’ and encourage foreign and domestic tourism to historic urban sites, the Ministry of Home Affairs introduced the BSB’s ‘car-free day’ every Sunday. The program (begun in October 2016), named ‘Bandarku Ceria’ (My Happy City) aims to make BSB a dynamic and vibrant city for recreation, and cultural and family-oriented activities, which underscores BSB’s appointment as the ASEAN City of Culture for 2016–2017.43 The car-free program has received good support from residents; during the inaugural period, the Sultan himself attended the Sunday events twice during the same month. He has also participated in subsequent events. The 2017 Lancet Commission on

43 The special status was decided at the 12th ASEAN Senior Ministers Meeting on Culture and Arts

at the Empire Hotel and Country Club in August 2016.

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Pollution and Health,44 2017 Global Health Observatory, and 2018 State of Global Air reports found Brunei to have some of the world’s cleanest air.45

7 Houses for the Masses The state owns about 95% of the land in Brunei. Therefore, the public is dependent on the government for land allocation for private housing development. Moreover, topography largely limits available suitable land for construction, including housing, to coastal lands and the government has to adhere to conservation and sustainable development guidelines. In 1954, the government introduced the National Housing Scheme that aimed to resettle residents of water villages on land. By the end of 1970s, the government had expanded the program to house government employees as well. According to the Housing Development Department of the Ministry of Development, over 27,000 houses have been provided under the national housing schemes since it began in the 1970s, and a further 26,000 people are still on the waiting list.46 The government has promised to reduce the waiting time for the applicants to fewer than five years; waits for over 10 years had not been uncommon. To speed up the construction of housing projects, the government began the first vertical public housing project in 2014, and the first phase was completed in 2017. Costing B$55 million, the 300 units, sized at 170 sq. m each, aimed to house 1800 residents. The project is also the first to use sustainable technologies and green building features, for which it received a provisional Green Mark Gold Rating certificate from Singapore’s Building and Construction Authority for its.47 The features include energy efficient elevators, thicker windowpanes to reduce indoor heat, natural ventilation as well as water-saving toilets and taps. More public buildings have incorporated energy efficient guidelines, especially since 2015 when they were made mandatory for all government buildings. The Energy Efficiency and Conservation (EEC) Building Guidelines 2015 for non-residential buildings, while mandatory for government buildings, will be voluntary for privately owned buildings. When formally adopted, the guidelines should reduce energy consumption by 50%. The government buildings’ Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) will be set at a baseline of 175 kW-h per sq. m. According to the 2011 BSB Master Plan, the city’s population in 2010 was about 100,700, which is projected to rise to about 302,800 by 2035. Additional built-up area of 8.2 million sq. m will be needed to cater to the needs of the people in the city, not only for commercial uses but also for cultural, environmental and healthy lifestyle projects. There would not be any new single houses, only high-rise buildings to maximize land usage and protect the natural environment. 44 Othman

(2017). (2018b). 46 Kon (2017). 47 Hong (2016b). 45 Othman

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8 Health Services at a Minimal Cost The government of Brunei provides free health care for its citizens. The life expectancy of its citizens, 80.5 years for males and 80.8 for females, is comparable with developed countries’. Its infant mortality rate is at about 8.1 per 1000 live births.48 Clean water access for 99.9% of the population is impressive. There are seven major hospitals in the country and 37 smaller health centres and clinics that serve people living in both urban and rural areas.49 The decentralization of basic health services has benefited all residents most if whom live within a few miles of a health centre. Citizens pay just B$1 to see a doctor their prescribed medication is free. The 2016/2017 budget estimated that the government will spend B$47.6 million on medicines.50 Surgery for citizens in local hospitals is also free. The new 11-storey Women and Children Hospital completed in 2014 (Fig. 8) was commissioned under the 9th NDP. Generally, the health services are well delivered although local media do report regular complaints from unsatisfied patients. Overall, it is estimated that Brunei has the commendable ratio of one doctor for every 637 persons.51 With more young Bruneians entering the medical profession, the dependence on a large number of foreign health personnel who currently serve the sector is expected to reduce. Cancer has overtaken heart disease as the leading cause of death in Brunei in recent years,52 with breast and colorectal cancers recording the highest incidence in the local population. The B$100 million Pantai Jerudong Specialist Centre (PJSC) that opened in 2016, houses the Brunei Cancer Centre (TBCC) and the Brunei Neuroscience Stroke and Rehabilitation Centre (BNSRC), located close to the country’s only private hospital, the Jerudong Park Medical Centre. PJSC aims to encourage medical tourism into the country,53 which is expected to also alleviate the government’s need to send advanced cancer patients for treatment to Singapore and Malaysia; in 2016–17 government spent about B$8.3 million on patients’ treatment in foreign countries. The Ministry of Health promotes regular health awareness campaigns at hospitals, clinics, and shopping centres. An interesting fact is that, with Brunei’s social media penetration being one of the highest in ASEAN, the Ministry of Health now utilizes social media for issuing health warnings about tobacco consumption, diabetes, etc., and promoting exercise and sports for health living.

48 JPKE

(2017).

49 Ibid. 50 Rabiatul

(2016). (2018b). 52 Mahmud (2018). 53 Azaraimy (2018); Bandial (2016). 51 Hayat

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Fig. 8 Gadong Mall. Source Li Li Pang

9 Being Prudent with Energy Resources As a hydrocarbon-rich country, Brunei’s own natural gas has been the main source of electric power and the lowest electricity tariffs in ASEAN, but then its energy consumption is among the highest.54 The country’s electricity coverage is estimated at 99.9%. In 2012, the government replaced the conventional post-paid system with a new prepaid one, which it claims is more equitable.55 Eligible households received prepaid meters in July 2011, and now there are over 85,000 consumers with prepaid meters. The positive outcome is that 25% of those households consumed less than 600 kWh per month, resulting in substantial savings for consumers and the state.56 The Minister of Energy and Industry reported at the 12th Legislative Council meeting in March 2016 that the government was owed about $167 million in overdue electricity bills—74% of it from private residences and 26% from industries.

54 Azman

and Huda (2014). Brunei Times (2011). 56 The system works like the pre-paid mobile phone system. The consumer purchases a certain amount for his usage. If he uses up more than his estimate for a certain period, he needs to ‘top up’. The consumer can thus monitor the rate of electricity consumed, and limit usage if it registers excess consumption. 55 The

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Besides encouraging the public to save electricity, the government has also led by example to an extent. It has claimed to have reduced electricity spending by B$26 million by adopting more efficient methods; for example, street lighting costs were reduced by $1.6 million,57 and in 2018 B$6 million in annual electricity savings were reported from government buildings.58 It is also promoting energy saving appliances through new regulations, such as the introduction of Standard and Labelling Order on energy saving applications and appliances. A feature highlighted in the National Development Plan (2012–17), the Electricity Order, passed in 2017, will allow the privatization of electricity services in the coming years. By 2019, the government intends to introduce solar energy for households in the Temburong district, for which a feasibility study has been jointly undertaken with Royal Dutch Shell. Temburong district’s population of about 8900 makes it possible to replace its diesel-generated power station with solar-powered and/or gas-powered alternatives. The completion of the new, B$1.6 billion, 30 km Temburong Bridge in 2019, which will for the first time provide a direct connection between the eastern and western parts of Brunei Darussalam, will also generate new demand for energy.59 In September 2016, Brunei ratified the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC). It highlights Brunei’s commitments to reducing primary energy consumption by 63% by 2035, increasing by 10% the share of power generation from renewable energy sources, and increasing the country’s carbon stock by expanding forest reserves from 44 to 55% of its total land area. All these efforts are part of the sultanate’s Wawasan 2035 (National Vision 2035) to ensure a clean, green, and healthy environment for its people.

10 Enhancing Disaster Preparedness Brunei is relatively free from major natural disasters. It neither is within the earthquake zone of Southeast Asia nor lies in typhoon paths. Occasionally there are flash floods, bush fires, and haze from neighbouring countries, and gusty winds from typhoons in the north of Borneo island. Until 2004, disaster response was ad hoc, undertaken by agencies like the Fire and Rescue Department, the Public Works Department, and the Armed Forces. After the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 (Brunei was not affected) and other major earthquakes and landslides in Southeast Asia, the government saw the need for creating a dedicated disaster management body. Other neighbouring countries already had national disaster management agencies, and ASEAN had also established a regional centre. Thus, in August 2006, the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) was established under the Ministry of Home Affairs for enabling more coordinated and immediate responses to disas-

57 Khai

et al. (2016). (2018c). 59 Sally (2015a, b). 58 Othman

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ters.60 Disaster preparedness and management were initially introduced on a small scale with support from various government agencies. The aim was to transform NDMC into a professional and capable outfit. In June 2013, Brunei hosted the 2th ASEAN Militaries Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Exercise to improve its capacity by learning from counterparts elsewhere about disaster preparedness and management.61 In Brunei’s urban areas, where flash floods occur during the monsoon season, problems were identified and steps have been taken to mitigate large floods. For the past five years, the government has deepened storm-water drains and ensured their proper maintenance. The 2011 BSB Master Plan took into account flooding challenges in the city. Proposals not only sought to beautify the riverside but also ensure maintaining the riverine ecosystem. Such measures are also expected to exploit the potentials for recreational and tourism-related development. Due to the aforementioned developments, local residents are now more aware of the issues and challenges related to disasters. Public knowledge about disaster preparedness has also increased because of the role of local mass media. Likewise, the public sector now uses social media extensively to convey news, weather reports, imminent disaster risks, and contact information of relevant agencies. Despite this current media attention and growing academic research on natural disasters, the risk posed from routine fire hazards, which frequently cause loss of life and property in Brunei’s urban areas, receives relatively weak attention. Neglect and carelessness are often cited as the cause of fires.

11 Pro-business Policies The role of the private sector is considered an important for the sultanate’s economy. A modern version of a public-private-partnership (PPP) was recognized decades ago when the government of Brunei and the Royal Dutch Shell Company entered into a partnership to develop the hydrocarbon sector. The venture resulted in creating the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSP). Policies continue to encourage and support business enterprises to contribute to the GDP and employ locals, who, otherwise, would be totally dependent on the public sector.62 The decline in global oil prices in 60 See Constitution of Brunei Darussalam (Order under Article 83-3), Disaster Management Order,

2006. Negara Brunei Darussalam, Supplement to Government Gazette, Part II, 2 March, 2006. Under this Order, the National Disaster Council was established to develop policy framework for disaster management. The National Disaster Management Centre would be responsible for coordinating operations before, during and after disasters. 61 Brunei was the Chair of ASEAN for 2013. The disaster related exercises were part of its yearlong ASEAN related activities. Information on HADR is available from https://admm.asean.org. 62 Unemployment in the country is a major issue. The government has instituted several measures to provide better training and other job related opportunities to make youths more employable in the private sector. The latest figures indicate that there are 11.000 registered unemployed Bruneian jobseekers. See Danial (2016).

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recent years has adversely affected Brunei’s economy, causing a slowdown in growth; in fact, Brunei was in recession during 2013–17, 2017 again a positive growth rate of 1.3%.63 As the government continues to diversify its economy, it is also striving to improve its international rankings in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EDB) assessment in order to make itself more attractive to local and foreign investors. Several national agencies were tasked to improve its EDB ranking, and in 2015 it established the special Penggerak Section of the PMO to coordinate efforts. It helped raise the country’s global EDB ranking to 84 (out of 189 economies surveyed),64 and by 2018 it had risen to 56 (among 190). Due to its small economy and limited products, the weakest links for Brunei are still ‘trading across borders,’ and in ‘registering property,’65 since, to protect citizens’ interests, properties are not easily transferable to expatriates. Nevertheless, in a recent survey done by the World Economic Forum, Brunei was the 46th most competitive of 137 economies surveyed.66 These improvements in rankings underscore the intensive efforts of several related offices in recent years. Among such significant administrative measures were those related to ‘starting a business.’ Since January 2015, low-risk businesses (such as shops selling footwear, restaurants, or tailoring outlets, for instance) need not wait to be officially inspected before a business license is issued. A business license is issued upon application, whereas the inspection of the premises happens when business commences. This is because 90% of the country’s businesses are micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs).67 Entrepreneurs have welcomed the move as it expedites business operations without wasting time and resources on rent and employment while awaiting approval to begin operating. Since 2015, which is when an online business registration system was implemented, about 908 new companies have been registered and incorporated in Brunei.68 Previously, to register a business, entrepreneurs had to visit the Business Registration Section at the Attorney General’s Office and then the Ministry of Finance. The new simplified business registration process has majorly contributed to raising Brunei’s EDB ranking, as mentioned earlier.69 Another 2016 initiative was the establishment of the Darussalam Enterprise (DARe) as a statutory body under the Ministry of Energy and Industry, which aims to nurture and support local enterprises by assisting in capacity building, facilitating funding, and helping MSMEs expand by gaining access to international markets. In 2013 and 2018, Brunei hosted the ASEAN Expo, which serves as a platform for local MSMEs to develop trade and tourism oppor-

63 Borneo

Bulletin (2018a). (2015). 65 World Bank (2018). 66 World Economic Forum (2017). 67 Azlan (2015). 68 Ministry of Finance (2016). 69 The Brunei Times (2016b). 64 Waqiuddin

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tunities.70 The Minister of Energy and Industry, as the Chair of DARe, has been engaging with potential entrepreneurs to facilitate business-friendly efforts in what has traditionally been a non-business-conducive environment.71

12 Conclusion: Urban Service Delivery Under Challenging Times The new promenade along the Brunei River in BSB is testimony to the fact that the physical nature of the capital is undergoing transformation, towards becoming a vibrant and liveable modern urban centre. As this chapter has illustrated, it has taken three decades since independence to remodel the urban infrastructure. For having a small population base and modest rate of growth, there was little urgency for reorganization until the drive for reforms was set in motion. As compared to Brunei’s, other urban centres in Southeast Asia have long experienced expansion and renewal. However, with Vision 2035 serving as a benchmark, the pace of change has picked up. It is undeniable that there have been delays and inefficiencies in planning and implementing policies. While the state system is centralized, urban governance at the operation level is now partially decentralized. In the absence of a central coordinating agency, lack of coordination may be an issue to explore. Services are implemented by various agencies: local authorities are in charge of urban services for ensuring cleanliness, providing parking, or maintaining parks and recreation sites. Other services like transportation, health, or disaster preparedness are the responsibility of central ministries. Although not a problem unique to Brunei, yet, at times, the lack of coordination burdens urban residents. The government of Brunei Darussalam plans to revitalize its capital, Bandar Seri Begawan or BSB, which, for long, and despite being the administrative centre of the sultanate, has remained unchanged and unattractive to residents and tourists alike. Through the 2011 BSB Master Plan, several million-dollar projects have lately been initiated to upgrade its infrastructure and quality of life. The process is still on-going as only parts of Master Plan have been implemented. When fully realized by 2035, it is hoped that it will transform BSB into a dynamic and liveable urban centre. Physical and administrative changes are also planned for Brunei’s other urban centres, so that their residents are not disadvantaged. While the top political leadership has approved and allocated finances for Brunei’s Vision 2035, during the implementation stages some delays will be inevitable. However, with the advantage of political will and a rich economy, it is the responsibility of the administrators to ensure the proper implementation of the many planned initiatives like urban renewal, transportation, and housing. There are now mechanisms 70 Kon

(2017). experienced local entrepreneur, Mr. Soon Loo, was appointed as the managing director and chief executive officer of the agency in March 2016. In March 2017, Soon Loo was appointed as the Chief Executive Officer of Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB). See Sarmiento (2016). 71 An

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that allow for inputs and feedback from the general public, which ought to assist the public sector towards ensuring good governance. Public participation in planning in Brunei was uncommon, and decision-making processes were rarely transparent or not even made public. This was even evident in the planning stages of the BSB Master Plan, and many in Brunei were unaware of it.72 For instance, it came to light much later that, prior to building the Sungai Kebun to Jalan Residency Bridge, the affected public had not been even briefed; in fact, 40 affected families had not been relocated even after construction had begun.73 It is hoped that more transparency and inclusion will emerge as more of the BSB Master Plan is executed. Brunei’s unique political system and welfare state has also created a less demanding public, which leaves, matters of planning and services provision to the monarch and his government. The educated young may gradually influence the political landscape in developing a more participatory, engaged, and demanding public. The government, too, recognizes the opportunities for and advantages of expanding civil society organizations in certain areas. Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been providing beneficial services, but, by and large, they tend to be agents who support the system and work within the perimeter determined by the state. NGO efforts complement the government’s initiatives for attaining a sustainable urban environment. They also provide avenues for young people to be constructively involved in national issues. In summary, Brunei’s peculiar social structure and political system, its abundant financial resources, and its small population have collectively influenced governance and urban service delivery; these same characteristics also impede efficient and speedy policymaking and implementation. The uncertainties of a future tied to economic wealth derived from hydrocarbons may decrease the government’s provision of free or subsidized goods and services for its citizens. There are already indications about greater privatization in production and the provision of services. Consequently, market factors will eventually determine the price of goods and services, and new ways of planning and governing will be needed to ensure that urban services remain efficient, effective, and equitable. The state will still need to stimulate strong economic growth and development to sustain the desired liveability of urban environments. The government appears committed to its current Master Plan and long-term vision. By the end of the implementation period of Wawasan 2035, a new generation will have to address the next round of challenges in sustainable urban development, governance and service delivery. As a well-established hereditary monarchy, political stability and continuity should ensure that the Wawasan would stay on course to provide adequate and equitable services in the short run, and sustainability in the long run.

72 Quratul-Ain 73 Jalil

(2016).

(2010c).

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Pushpa Thambipillai is an independent scholar and an Associate Fellow at the Yusuf-Ishak Institute (ISEAS), Singapore. She was formerly with the Faculty of Business, Economics and Policy Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam where she taught courses in International Relations, Comparative Politics and ASEAN Regionalism. Her research interests focus on, among other areas, Brunei Darussalam and Southeast Asia. She has published articles and book chapters on related topics. Her recent publication is, “Brunei Darussalam: The ‘FeelGood’ Year Despite Economic Woes”, in Malcolm M Cook and Daljit Singh (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2018, ISEAS Publishing (2018). She holds M.A. and Ph.D. (Political Science/International Relations) from the University of Hawai’i, and B Soc Sc and M Soc Sc (Political Science) from Universiti Sains Malaysia. Li Li Pang is a Lecturer at the Universiti Brunei Darussalam’s School of Business and Economics (UBDSBE). She was formerly at UBD’s Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) and was one of the Coordinators of the Executive Development Programme for Senior Government Officers and Middle Management Officers (EDPSGO and EDPMMO) at the Institute of Leadership, Innovation and Advancement (ILIA), Universiti Brunei Darussalam. She teaches public policy and governance issues and her current research interests focus on local governance and public sector improvements. She holds an M.Sc. in Public Policy from University of Bristol, United Kingdom and Ph.D. (Management) from Monash University, Australia.

Comprehensive Management for Better Rural Infrastructure and Service Delivery: Lessons from the Implementation of China’s Six Point Rural Action Plan in Guizhou Province Haiyan Zou, Feng Luan, Hui Xi and Ben Yang Abstract Along with the process of urbanization in China, the country has clearly put forward The National New-Style Urbanization Plan to promote the integration of urban and rural development, allow all of the people living in rural areas to participate in China’s modernization and share the achievements of development. Meanwhile, the country has launched lots of policies to promote rural stability, agricultural development and farmers’ income. In 2013, China launched the Beautiful Countryside program to strengthen rural ecology, environmental protection and comprehensive improvement, and strive to build a beautiful countryside. This policy is quite flexible and involves more than aesthetics. It can support rural infrastructure construction, industrial and economic development, improvement of living environments, social and cultural development, and protection of natural, historical, and cultural resources as well as beautification projects. In accordance with the policy requirements, all provinces in China have worked out the implementation plans. Guizhou province is located in South Central China, most of the province’s land (92.5%) consists of mountains and hills, water resources are limited. As a poor province, Guizhou has proposed many policies to promote the development of rural areas over the years, and some of them have made great impact. In 2013, the Provincial Government issued a policy document titled “Promote the Development of The Countryside and Build a Beautiful Countryside—Six Point Action Plan Program for Rural Infrastructure”, which emphasizes improving living conditions in rural areas by promoting roads, drinking water and irrigation, electricity, telecommunications, housing, and the environment. This paper will study the policy and focus on the formulation of the policy implementation and management. The research group at Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design Institute’s China Rural Planning and Construction Research Center launched an investigation of the implementation of Guizhou’s Six Point Action Plan in 2015, H. Zou · H. Xi · B. Yang Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design Institute, Research Center of Rural Planning & Construction, Shanghai, China F. Luan (B) College of Architecture and Urban Planning (CAUP), Tongji University, Shanghai, China e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_10

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they conducted an investigation of the planning and implementation process in 10 administrative villages representative of the variety of villages in Guizhou Province, and obtained a set of comprehensive data. On this basis, this paper firstly introduces the policy objectives and the key projects. Then, it introduces the governance and plan implementation in detail. In the end, the paper summarizes the experience of policy implementation, including breaking down and refining policy goals, paying attention to organization and project management, involving civil society and individuals in projects, providing multiple funding channels, promoting citizen participation and so on. Keywords Rural development · Beautiful countryside · Policy implementation · Comprehensive management · Government organization

1 Introduction This chapter analyses an action plan to improve rural infrastructure, services, and the quality of life in Guizhou, one of China’s poorest provinces. It provides background on rural policy in China, Guizhou Province, the Province’s Six Point Action Plan, and progress made on achieving the plan’s goals in ten representative villages at the end of the first phase of the project in 2015. It explains the way in which one poor ethnically diverse, mountainous region with many small remote settlements, difficult access problems, limited water, and infrastructure and service delivery shortcomings prioritized its needs, and organized and administered a successful rural infrastructure and service delivery action plan. Guizhou’s situation contrasts with more prosperous provinces in China such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang. In the following sections, some background about policies to promote rural development and build beautiful countryside will be introduced, more information about the study and Guizhou Province will be given. After that, the policy objectives and the key projects of Guizhou Province’s Six Point Action Plan will be introduced, and the governance and plan implementation will be discussed in detail. In the end, the effect of the plan is summarized. This chapter provides an illustrative case, which tells that the government and the society can really do something to make sure rural inhabitants participate in China’s modernization and share the achievements of development. By ensuring equitable access for the inhabitants in the rural area to public goods and services, protecting their right to safe and adequate housing, promoting the environment of the rural settlements, the policy tallies well with the New Urban Agenda (United Nations 2017), which focuses on goals for equity, quality of life, productivity, sustainable development and so on. Besides, promoting healthy development of rural areas is relevant to maintain the whole society’s healthy development. On one hand, rural areas play a significant role in providing food, vegetable, raw material and labour force to cities. On the other hand, protecting rural environment could effectively help control urban expansion

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and maintain regional ecological security. All of which could help make cities more inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable, as SDG 11’s aim addresses (United Nations 2018).

2 China’s New Rural Development Policies While rural development planning has been an important concern since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, it has received much more attention recently. Since 2006, China has placed greater emphasis on rural development and implemented policies to help create a “new Socialist countryside” (Harwood 2013). In 2008, China’s Ministry of Construction was renamed the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development by China’s State Council. In 2012 China’s Ministry of Education renamed the academic discipline of urban planning to urban-rural planning and elevated it from a category within architecture to a separate academic discipline at the same level as architecture. A major new national program to create a “Beautiful Countryside” was initiated in 2013. Rural planning and development figures prominently in China’s national strategy for new-style urbanization in China promulgated during Eighteenth National Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2012 and described in China’s National New-Style Urbanization Plan (2014–2020) (PRC 2014) released by China’s State Council in 2014. The National New-Style Urbanization Plan states as a major goal to allow all of the people living in rural areas to participate in China’s modernization and share the achievements of development. The new policy directions build on 60 years of experience with rural development in China. 90% of China’s population was rural in 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was created. The communist party’s base included hundreds of millions of peasant farmers. The government immediately initiated a “land to the tiller” policy: turning arable land over to farm households who farmed the land. Starting during the latter part of the 1950s rural land was collectivized. Today 45% of China’s population is classified as rural, living in administrative villages that collectively own arable land. China has made great progress in improving conditions in the countryside, but deep structural problems persist. The average agricultural plot size in China is still less than half an acre. Much farming is still done with traditional methods. There is regional imbalance between urban and rural. For example, the ratio between urban and rural incomes is over 3:1 (PRC NBS 2015). While 300 million people, 7.4% of China’s surplus labour force, migrated to urban areas between 2000 and 2010 (Chen et al. 2018), there is still a large surplus rural labour force beyond what is needed.

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3 China’s Beautiful Countryside Programme In 2013, China launched the Beautiful Countryside program to strengthen rural ecology, environmental protection and comprehensive improvement, and strive to build a beautiful countryside. The policy is quite flexible and involves more than aesthetics. It can support rural infrastructure construction, industrial and economic development, improvement of living environments, social and cultural development, and protection of natural, historical, and cultural resources as well as beautification projects. The program involves institutional reform and more inclusive decision-making. While the ideas and experience of China’s Beautiful Countryside program are of interest to planners, policy makers and elected officials in developing countries in Asia and throughout the world, the experience of Guizhou Province provides valuable lessons to countries with the high incidence of poverty and/or poor regions in countries with large income disparities. This is because Guizhou’s development level is closer to the level of less developed countries and poor regions, and it is pursuing an ambitious program to improve basic infrastructure, services, and living conditions in rural areas that face many challenges.

4 Guizhou Province Guizhou province is located in South Central China about 60 miles from the northern border of Vietnam. Most of the province’s land (92.5%) consists of mountains and hills. Water resources are limited. Road construction is difficult and until recently many settlements in Guizhou were inaccessible by car, truck, or bus. Residential settlements are small and scattered. In China formal governmental administrative divisions are in four ranks: province, prefecture, county, and ending at the township level. But China has also designated 900,000 administrative villages, each of which has a village committee and Communist Party branch. Many administrative villages contain multiple natural villages—settlements where small numbers of households often related by kinship, live. In 2014, there were about 18,000 administrative villages and 92,000 natural villages in Guizhou province. About 21.77 million people live in the countryside, and the average population of natural villages is only 200. Because of its remoteness and mountainous geography, significant numbers of Han Chinese (the ethnic group that constitutes approximately 92% of China’s population) did not settle in the area until the Western Han Dynasty (beginning in 206 B.C.). According to China’s 6th national census in 2010, Miao, Dong, and other ethnic minorities constitute 36.1% of Guizhou’s population. The province’s economy is based largely on traditional agriculture. Industrial development is limited. Guizhou’s urbanization rate in 2014 was 37.8%, second lowest to Tibet (the Xizang Autonomous Region) of all of China’s Provinces and Administrative regions. Nearly two thirds (62%) of Guizhou’s population lives in the countryside.

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Guizhou has a beautiful natural landscape with many karst limestone gorges and canyons, terraced hillsides, mountains, caves, forests and waterfalls. There are eight national nature reserves, 21 national forest parks, and six national geoparks in the province. It has a subtropical climate and an average elevation of 1,000 m, making it a pleasant travel destination year round. It is a culturally rich province because of its ethnic diversity with distinctive architecture, costumes, cuisine, music, dance and handcrafts. As a poor province, Guizhou has proposed many policies to promote the development of rural areas over the years. The Provincial Government saw the National Beautiful Countryside Program as a particular opportunity and in 2013, the same year that the national Beautiful Countryside Program was launched, issued a policy document titled “Promote the Development of The Countryside and Build a Beautiful Countryside—Six Point Action Plan Program for Rural Infrastructure” (Guizhou Province, 2013; hereinafter referred to as the Six Point Action Plan). The plan emphasizes improving living conditions in rural areas by promoting roads, drinking water and irrigation, electricity, telecommunications, housing, and the environment. The Province began implementation quickly and worked hard to develop ways to organize government to carry out their program. The attention to administration and implementation details under the Six Point Action Plan has been much more rapid than usual, and has already had a large impact on the province. Therefore, a study of Guizhou province’s Six Point Action Plan, especially the study of their government management system and the impact of their policies is a useful case study for other poor and geographically challenged areas of China and similar areas in other countries. A research group at Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning & Design Institute’s China Rural Planning and Construction Research Center launched an investigation of the implementation of Guizhou’s Six Point Action Plan in 2015. The investigation lasted 3 months, starting in July 2015 and ending in September 2015. The research group conducted an investigation of the planning and implementation process in 10 administrative villages representative of the variety of villages in Guizhou Province. The objective was to understand how the goals, policies, and contents of the Six Point Action Plan were actually implemented and the impact it had at the end of the first phase of the project in 2015. These investigations involved observation and 56 interviews with both village leaders and residents in 10 villages in 6 cities and 3 autonomous prefectures. The team supplemented this village-level field research with (i) a literature search of books, journal articles, and approximately 170 unpublished policy documents, (ii) secondary data analysis, and (iii) interviews with planners, policy makers, and government officials at the provincial, prefectural, county and township government levels, in 9 provincial government departments and 38 rural construction organizations.

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5 Village Case Study Selection The team selected 10 case study villages representative of diverse locations, stages of development, and ethnic composition that had undertaken different types of projects. The villages were drawn from a sampling frame of 249 villages based on the official government’s list of villages in the program and input from different government departments involved with different aspects of the project. A detailed description of the sampling methodology is in Sect. 5.1 and Table 1. Figure 1 shows the location of the 10 case study villages.

Table 1 Basic information about the 10 case study villages. Source Prepared by the research group Villages

Implemented policies

Region Prefecture County

Town

Economic Ethnic level groups

Lin Jiang village

Environment promotion action plan, road action plan, drinking water and irrigation action plan, modern efficient agriculture park

Zun Yi

Feng Gang

Jin Hua

Average level

Han

He Xi village

Environment promotion action plan

Tong Ren

Yin Jiang

Lang Xi

Tu Jia

Xing Wang village

Recommended by provincial administrations

He Shui village

Recommended by provincial administrations

Key counties for poverty alleviation efforts

Ka La village

Environment promotion action plan, road action plan, drinking-water and irrigation action plan, housing action plan, electricity action plan

Shi Qiao village

Recreational agriculture and rural tourism

Da Li village

Traditional village preservation and development

He Shui

Qian Dongnan

Dan Zhai

Long Quan

Nan Gao Rong Jiang

Zai Ma

Key counties for poverty alleviation efforts Key counties for poverty alleviation efforts

Tu Jia

Tu Jia

Miao

Miao Dong

(continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Villages

Implemented policies

Region Prefecture County

Town

Economic Ethnic level groups

Lou Na village

Environment promotion action plan, recreational agriculture and rural tourism

Qian Xinan

Xing Yi

Ding Xiao

Developed Bu Yi

Liu Jiawan village

Environment promotion action plan, road action plan, drinking-water and irrigation action plan, housing action plan

Liu Panshui

Pan Xian

Liu Guan

Developed Han

Shitou Zhai village

Environment promotion action plan, recreational agriculture and rural tourism, modern efficient agriculture park

An Shun

Zhen Ning

Huang Guoshu

Key counties for poverty alleviation efforts

Fig. 1 Location of the case study villages. Source Drawn by the research group

Bu Yi

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5.1 Case Study Sample Selection Methodology As there are many different types of villages in different parts of Guizhou Province, the selection of a sample of villages for case studies was crucial to ensure the research gave a valid and balanced picture. By interviewing and discussing with different government offices in-charge of rural development, the research group clarified what kind of villages should be selected and the method of doing so. The research group selected a stratified sample using a two-part methodology. First, the research group obtained information from government officials or the government websites at provincial, prefectural, county and even town level (such as http://www.gz.chinanews.com/), and short-listed a pool of 249 villages. For instance, the Guizhou Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, which offered their list of demonstration villages that had implemented the housing component of the Six Point Action Plan. Second, the research group selected potential villages to include in the sample from the short-list based on three criteria: information sources, policy implementation, and village characteristics. The research group gave priority the official village lists to make sure the authenticity and representativeness. Then the research group selected villages that had implemented the plans and projects of the policy as much as possible. Finally, the research group took into account the location, economic level, and cultural characteristics to make sure diversity of the sampled villages. Statistically, about 80% of the 249 typical villages were selected from the official provincial list. 30% were in developed counties and 58% in key counties for poverty alleviation. Han Chinese villages accounted for about 53%, Miao Chinese villages about 18%, Buyi and Dong Chinese villages each accounted for 10%, and the rest were other ethnic minority villages. One third (33%) of the 249 villages had implemented two or more features of the Action Plan. Based on all of the above considerations, the research group selected 10 villages distributed in 6 different prefectures, 7 counties and 9 townships representative of all villages in Guizhou from provincial official lists. The ratio between villages in developed counties and key counties for poverty alleviation efforts was about 2:3. They are ethnically diverse. All of them had implemented some policies.

5.2 Six Point Action Plan: Budget, Strategy, Goals, Objectives and Actions The Guizhou government allocated US$21.9 billion (151.068 billion RMB), including US$20.6 (142.247 billion RMB) to be spent by the end of 2017, to the Six Point Action Plan to build safer and cleaner rural areas, where people can use good facilities and have more income. The project is divided into in three phases over a 5–8 year period beginning in 2013.

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The first phase ended in 2015, at the end of the Chinese government’s 12th FiveYear Plan. The second phase will end in 2017, before the re-election of the government. The third phase will end in 2020, at the end of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan. The second phase is the most important one because most of the work has to be finished during this phase. The Six Point Action Plan sets the years 2015, 2017, 2020 as target dates by which various benchmarks are to be met, and includes annual plans and schedules for construction and capital investment. It focuses on goals for improving roads, water systems, housing, power, telecommunications, and village environments. It includes objectives for each action: to build a “reasonable and safe” road system; “convenient and effective” drinking water and irrigation system; “safe, economic and beautiful” housing; “a stable and green” power supply system; “widespread and efficient” telecommunications facilities, and “clean and beautiful” village environments. In contrast to plans which have either visionary—perhaps unachievable Utopian—goals and other plans which include only detailed and rigid standards, Guizhou Province’s goals were ambitious, but practical and their objectives flexible enough to allow different solutions for the widely different types of villages in the province. To further operationalize the plan includes key projects.

5.3 Key Projects The Six Point Action Plan specifies key projects of each component of plan. • Road action plan: Key projects include widening rural roads and hardening them (turning dirt roads into paved roads), safety engineering, information engineering, transport access projects, and road planting projects. • Electricity action plan: Key projects include improving the quality and management of the rural power grid, and equalizing of rural public services. • Drinking water and irrigation action plan: Key projects include the construction of small water conservancy projects and a water conservancy network. • Telecommunications action plan: Key projects are to insure that Internet service is available to every one of the province’s 17,000 administrative villages. • Environment promotion action plan: It includes villages’ environment improvements and public facilities construction. Public facilities reflect policy makers’ understanding of what is most needed for poor rural settlements in Guizhou such as repairing, replacing, or newly constructing public and private lavatories, and converting traditional stoves into modern ones. Other public facility improvements include building separate corrals, protecting centralized drinking water sources, building sewage treatment plants, garbage collection facilities, sports venues (with equipment), and road lighting. • Housing action plan: It not only includes specific housing construction and rehabilitation projects, but is also an important vehicle for coordination and guidance of related work. For example, according to the Action Plan, the provincial Urban Construction Department should complete housing construction standards and the

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prefectural government should complete housing design and construction guidelines within times specified in the plan so that housing can be constructed according to uniform and consistent constructing design guidelines and standards. The housing action plan should coordinate road and water network projects, Internet, radio and television network, and ecological and environmental protection according to the actual needs of villagers and local village plans.

5.4 Governance and Plan Implementation One of the weaknesses of many development plans in China and other developing countries is missing or poorly-thought out governance and implementation plans and policies. Guizhou devoted attention to how its program was to be carried out. Rural development projects often lack staff to oversee the projects. For the implementation of rural development, lines of authority and duties of different departments of government at different levels are often unclear. In contrast Guizhou’s plan devotes a great deal of attention to these government and management issues. This is one of the reasons for the quick start and initial success in implementing the plan in this province.

6 Organization 6.1 Top-Down Project-Oriented Implementation To co-ordinate the implementation of the Six Point Action Plan, Guizhou Province specified a top-down project-oriented management method. They strove to make clear the responsibility and specific requirements of provincial, prefectural, county, and township level government for each aspect of the Six Point Action Plan and laid out key projects accordingly. During plan implementation, the provincial government acts as the leader, the prefectural government as supervisor and coordinator, and county government as the organizer of township governments to make plans, evaluate investments, hire and oversee construction teams, and communicate directly with villagers. Higher levels of government plan some projects, such as roads and power lines, because they may cover different regions and need overall coordination of many different jurisdictions, but many kinds of projects can be decided at the village level. Not all villages prepare a formal written village plan, but all need a detailed plan to describe specific projects. For example, if the village needs a new square, the village has to demonstrate why they need the square, where the square will be located, its area, who will supply the land for building it, and how much the project will cost. The village committee submits their plans to township government. After a review and possible changes, the township government then sends it to the county

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government for approval and funding. If the county government allocates funds to the village, the county government will be responsible for quality inspections and to make sure it conforms to the plan submitted. During this process, villagers make decision themselves what they want to build, for example, a new square. The village committee submits the plan to apply for funding, and employs construction corps; sometimes, the villagers can also be employed.

6.2 The Provincial Meeting System and Coordinating Leading Teams Different levels of government in Guizhou considered two approaches to coordinating the Six Point Action Plan and making decisions. One approach was to organize regular meetings of department heads with the main government leader such as the vice governor or vice mayor. The other approach was to set up leading teams, under the direction of a specific institution or government office to administer the planning and implementation directly. The Guizhou Provincial government adopted the first approach, some prefectural governments used both approaches (Fig. 2), and most county level government chose the second approach.

6.3 Capital Investment The Six Point Action Plan has a budget of US$21.9 billion, US$20.7 billion of which will be spent by 2017. Figure 3 shows the amount of investment for each of the six areas. The central government will pay most of the programme’s cost ($18.7 of the $20.7 billion cost through 2017). Enterprises, nongovernment organizations

Fig. 2 Methods different levels of government chose to implement Guizhou Province’s Six Point Action Plan. Source drawn by the research group

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Fig. 3 Six Point Action Plan Allocation by 2017 (US$billion). Source Drawn by the research group

(NGOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs), foundations, and community and private donations will pay the rest. The program involves two different fund management methods. The national and provincial governments allocate funding for some specific purposes. For others, the county government pool funding from different sources and distribute the funds based on need. When the funding is allocated to towns and villages, these governments are supervised by higher levels of government to make sure the funds are used as planned and to prevent corruption. Some projects such as roads and village environment promotion also need support from village residents themselves. Usually, the government funds or provides construction materials and villages may provide labour. There is a large amount of vernacular construction knowledge in China’s countryside, and skilled construction workers are well equipped to build some kinds of local infrastructure that meets their needs. Figure 4 shows that villagers build a public toilet and barn by themselves. This is a traditional way to improve rural infrastructure in Guizhou Province, other parts of China, and many other developing countries. A concrete example illustrates the process. In many villages, such as Heshui village, if the village needs to build a road connecting it to outside, village residents will get together and discuss the project to decide how much land each household will have to supply and how many people from each household will have to participate in the construction work. Before construction begins, the village residents must prepare a detailed plan (as described above) to submit to the township government. Even if village residents do not donate money to build road, the land that they have supplied is a form of cost sharing. Usually, village residents are willing to supply land because in their opinion building roads responds to their needs.

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Fig. 4 Villagers building a public toilet and barn. Source Photographed by the research group

6.4 Policy Support In order to ensure the implementation of the Six Point Action Plan, besides specifying goals, objectives, key projects, an organizational structure, and funding channels, Guizhou Province developed a series of supportive policies. These included assuring construction land will be available, simplifying project approval processes, reducing project costs, project supervision, public education and involvement, and program evaluation. The first set of policies involves village construction land. In China the national Ministry of Land and Resources strictly controls conversion of agricultural land (which is owned by village collectives) to developable land (which must first be acquired by a local government). Because China has so little productive arable land per capita, the amount of agricultural land that can be converted each year is strictly limited. The national government assigns strictly limited quotas for the right to develop agricultural land to provinces, which in turn allocate them to lower levels of government. There is intense competition for these rights to develop land. Since Guizhou Province has a large proportion of its area as mountainous that is unsuitable for farming, the province strictly manages the land conversion process in order to conserve agricultural land. Very little agricultural land can be converted for construction unless net virgin arable land is created. Accordingly, the government formulated policies to insure that enough land for all the necessary village construction would be available. These included policies encouraging reuse of idle and abandoned land and policies to make more new arable land available in order to get a larger share of quotas to convert some arable land to construction land.

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The province also developed policies to promote the comprehensive utilization of existing buildings and facilities. For example, villages that chose to have a new rural public sports facility were required to provide construction land for the facility. Another policy specifies that the village committee building should provide mail transfer service and some public activity rooms such as a library and activity rooms for seniors. The second policy was intended to simplify project approval processes as much as possible. Bureaucratic delay and complexity is a problem in China and many developing countries. Guizhou incorporated reduction of pre-conditions and shortening of approval times as plan-related policies. Third, the plan includes policies to reduce project costs. For example, it encourages reducing taxes for the construction of sections of new roads, based on laws, which make this possible. Power construction projects can get some financial relief through policies such as reduction of local pipeline construction fees. Fourth, the plan deals directly with project supervision, such as quality control, financial supervision and performance appraisal. Leading provincial departments are responsible for quality supervision. They formulate specific construction standards to ensure project quality is maintained so that no one can change designs, adjust budgets, or reduce construction standards without their approval. Lack of transparency and corruption are issues in China and many developing countries. The plan calls for careful supervision of project funds, including disclosure of the amount of funds and the allocation of money paid for each project. Policy for the evaluation of the quality of completed projects helps assure high quality, cost-effective projects. Finally, Guizhou’s plan is notable in including policy to educate and involve citizens. It proposes various kinds of public activities to improve public awareness, solicit opinions, and let government to learn from successful projects.

7 Project Impact Due to the provincial government’s thoughtful planning and coordination of governments at all levels, civil society and individuals, the Six Point Action Plan has had a notable impact on rural area development, poverty alleviation, improvement of social fairness and promotion of living standards for the whole large rural area of Guizhou Province. According to Guizhou Province Government Research Office statistics at the end of 2015, Guizhou Province allocated US$15.9 billion (109.66 billion RMB) Six Point Action Plan projects; in other words, 77.1% of the budget available through the end of the second phase in 2017. These funds provided 15,424 km of new cement roads in villages, 64 new village bus stations, clean and safe drinking water for additional 3,168,000 rural residents, 30,000 new houses built and 361,000 unsafe houses repaired, 4,749 new sewage treatment plants, and the establishment of mail service to 581 villages for the first time.

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Table 2 Six Point Action Plan implementation (as of September 2015). Source Drawn by the research group Village Roads Drinking water and Irrigation

Electricity

Telecommunications

Housing

Environment

House House in to danupdate ger

He xi

●

◯

◯

●

●

●

●

He Shui

◯

●

●

●

●

●

●

Xing wang

◯

●

◯

●

●

●

●

Shi qiao

●

●

●

◯

●

●

●

Ka la

●

●

●

◯

●

●

●

Da li

●

◯

●

●

●

◯

●

Lin jiang

●

●

◯

●

●

●

●

Shitou ● zhai

◯

●

◯

●

◯

●

Liujia wan

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Lou na

●

●

◯

●

●

◯

●

● Implemented ◯ Not implemented

As for progress in the 10 case study villages, as of September 2015, at the end of the research group’s investigation, 50% of the 10 villages had completed planned residential renovation, and 40% had built new residential settlements according to the housing action plan guidelines. 50% of the villages had formulated projects the environment promotion action plan required, and 68.5% of the projects had started implementation and 46.2% of them finished. Table 2 shows the implementation situation of Six Point Action Plan in the 10 villages. Figure 5, which illustrates conditions before and after implementation of the Six Point Action Plan in some villages, gives an idea of the impact the improvements have had on the lives of village residents. Figure 6, illustrating public activity facilities and infrastructure that were built in the case study villages as Six Point Action Plan projects, shows improved living condition of village residents active during the first phase of the project.

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Before

After

Fig. 5 Photos taken before and after the implementation of Six Point plan projects. Source Photographed by the research group

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Table tennis table and other sports facilities

Trash receptacle

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Activity room

Public toilets

Water tap

Fig. 6 Photos taken after implementation of Six Point plan projects. Source Photographed by the research group

8 Discussion and Conclusion This chapter describes Guizhou Province’s Six Point Rural Action Plan and summarizes the experience with respect to 5 aspects of program planning and management: goal setting, organization, financing, project management, and performance appraisal. Following are specific lessons learned.

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Fig. 7 How Guizhou broke down the ‘beautiful countryside’ goal into multi-level sub-goals with measurable performance indicators. Source Drawn by the research group

8.1 Breakdown and Refine Policy Goals Guizhou Province did an impressive job breaking down the broad project goal of creating a more beautiful countryside into multi-level operationalizable sub-goals with clearly specified key projects and specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate their progress. As Fig. 7 shows, the broad goal of building a ‘beautiful countryside’ was divided into sub-goals for roads, drinking water and irrigation, electricity, housing, telecommunications, and the environment. The plan specified what the sub-goals meant and operationalized indicators to monitor progress such as measures of length of cement roads from villages to towns, length of irrigation canals, and number of houses reconstructed.

8.2 Pay Attention to Project Management As the implementation of a plan’s policies mainly relies on successful completion of specific projects, it is important to pay attention to project management. Clear, efficient project management is essential. From design to organization, implementation, supervision and evaluation, Guizhou developed and implemented a complete management process.

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8.3 Emphasize Coordination of Different Departments and Levels of Government While the Guizhou’s approach was flexible and different levels of government adopted different approaches to coordinating plan activities, they paid attention to coordination of the plan among different levels of government from the outset. Leadership by the provincial government to assure cooperation of multiple departments, institutions and organizations was essential. Leading teams to coordinate different departments proved effective—particularly at the county level. As rural development policy involves many different kinds of construction and projects involving many different administrative departments, coordination between the departments at different levels, civil society institutions, and villagers are keys to ensuring successful project implementation.

8.4 Involve Civil Society and Individuals in Projects Traditionally individuals have been expected to contribute labour and sometimes provide other contributions to projects in Guizhou, other parts of China and many developing countries. As China’s market-socialist model evolves, NGOs and NPOs are becoming more important actors. Guizhou’s Six Point Action Plan reflects respect for traditional rural ways of accomplishing goals, including drawing on local knowledge about vernacular construction practices and coordinating improvements in individual household facilities such as toilets and stoves. At the same time, the plan implementation led to public infrastructure improvements so that village residents could experience a dramatic improvement in the quality of individual and collective village life that they themselves had directly contributed to.

8.5 Provide Multiple Funding Channels Even though many of the projects in this vast and governmentally fragmented province were small, the total fund allocation was very large. This is often the case in rural development. For poor communities lacking in conventional political support networks and with limited ability to raise money, external funding is essential but difficult to obtain. Governments have to adopt multiple methods to get enough funding and financial support. Besides government funding, Guizhou realized that mobilizing social capital was a way to relieve financial pressure on the government. Non-profit organizations, nongovernmental organizations, villages, and individuals all contributed to the effort by providing funding, construction labour and other necessary support.

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8.6 Promote Citizen Participation in Project Planning and Implementation Policies will only succeed if they are based on village residents’ true needs. Village residents whose families have experienced local problems and assets possess a great deal of relevant local knowledge that is crucial to successful and cost effective projects. For instance, Miao Chinese villages have their unique building technology because most of them are located in the mountain and the village buildings are made of wood, which can easily catch fire. In this case, local building technology could immensely help the smooth implementation of Housing action plan. Guizhou’s planning and implementation process involved working with villages and gaining their support during planning and project implementation. While this took time and effort, without the support of the village residents in the form of ideas, labour, and financial contributions, successful plan implementation would not have been possible. Guizhou’s Six Point Action Plan for better rural infrastructure and service delivery is a work in progress. How successful the project will prove for the entire province at the end of the project must await further investigation. But this investigation of early achievements in ten villages representative of the geographical, economic, ethnic, and other conditions in the Province show that the Guizhou’s careful planning of how to administer its program from the beginning with good goal-setting, alternative ways of coordinating projects, and flexibility to meet local conditions can have a dramatic impact even in a relatively short period of time. Acknowledgements The authors thank Richard LeGates and ZHAO Min for their assistance with this chapter.

References Chen C, LeGates R, Fang C (2018) From coordinated to integrated urban and rural development in China’s megacity regions. J Urban Affairs. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 07352166.2017.1413285 Guanbao S, Qiu L (1990) Methods of social research. Tianjing Renmin Press (Chinese) Harwood R (2013) China’s new socialist countryside: modernity arrives in the Nu river valley. University of Washington, Seattle Liu Z, Sun Z (2014) The protection of Chinese traditional villages and construction of beautiful countryside in the Wuling mountain area. Asian Agric Res 6(6):74–78, 82 Luan F, Xi H, Yang B (2016) Beautiful countryside: policies and implementation in Guizhou Province. Tongji University Press (Chinese) People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2014) National new-style urbanization plan. PRC State Council, Beijing (Chinese) People’s Republic of China National Bureau of Statistics (PRC NBS) (2015) Data on urban-rural income ratios

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United Nations (2017) The new urban agenda, A/RES/71/256, habitat III and United Nations. http:// habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda/ United Nations (2018) Sustainable development goal 11: make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11 Wang C et al (2016) Rural settlement restructuring based on analysis of the peasant household symbiotic system at village level: a case study of Fengsi village in Chongqing. China J Rural Stud 47(B):485–495 Wei L, Chen T, Xun L (2016) A new style of urbanization in China: transformation of urban rural communities. Habitat Int 55:1–9 Xiaotong F (2008) From the soil: the foundations of Chinese society. People’s Publishing House, Beijing (Chinese) Guizhou Province policy to promote the development of the countryside and build a beautiful countryside: six point action plan program for rural infrastructure. Guizhou Provincial Government, Guiyang (Chinese)

Haiyan Zou is Researcher and Chief Planner at China Rural Planning and Construction Research Center under Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning and Design Research Institute Company Limited. A devoted urban and regional planner, her main interest is in rural planning and construction. Her representative achievements include projects such as ‘Rural Construction Planning in Xuanwei City, Yunnan Province (2016-2030)’, ‘Beautiful Countryside Planning in Tianning District, Changzhou City, Jiangsu Province’, ‘Beautiful Countryside Construction Planning of Xinnan Village, Xinchang Town, Pudong New District, Shanghai City’. She completed her Master degree in Urban Planning & Design from Tongji University, Shanghai.

Feng Luan is Associate Professor, Deputy Doctoral Supervisor, and Assistant to Dean of the College of Architecture and Urban Planning at Tongji University, Shanghai. He is Executive Deputy Director of China Rural Planning and Construction Research Center under Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning and Design Research Institute Company Limited, also based in Shanghai. His latest publications include ‘Beautiful countrysiderelated policies and implementation investigation in Guizhou Province (Shanghai: Tongji University Press, 2016; ISBN9787-5608-6314-6)’. His other representative achievements include ‘Urumqi High-tech Zone (New City) District’, and ‘Research on Beautiful Rural Development’. He did both his PhD and Masters degrees in Urban Planning from Tongji University, Shanghai.

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Ben Yang is Deputy Director Planner at Shanghai Tongji Urban Planning and Design Research Institute. He is also Deputy Director Researcher at China Rural Planning andConstruction Research Center. He is a registered urban and rural planner with research expertise in rural planning and construction. His representative achievements include ‘Urumqi High-tech Zone (New City) District Research on Beautiful Rural Development’, ‘Pilot Construction Plan for Beautiful Rural Boutique Village in Zhangma Village, Qingpu District’, and ‘Characteristic Pastoral Countryside Planning for Longwangmiao Village in Changzhou’. He did his Masters degree in Human Geography from East China Normal University, Shanghai.

The Political Economy of Urban Governance in Asian Cities: Delivering Water, Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Services Jamie Boex, Ammar A. Malik, Devanne Brookins, Ben Edwards and Hashim Zaidi Abstract Cities across Asia are emerging as increasingly productive spaces driving economic growth and enabling social transformation. As their sizes and numbers grow, urban local governments’ ability to consistently deliver widely accessible and efficiently functioning public services is key to sustaining this momentum of positive change. Better understanding the institutional constraints facing cities in doing so is therefore critical. We design and apply an assessment framework to 18 cities across 6 countries in South and Southeast Asia to better understand the functional, administrative, and political dimensions determining the quality and coverage of water, sanitation, and solid waste management services. We find that urban local governments across Asia are constrained in their authority and discretion to deliver basic public services. Reforming intergovernmental institutional structures to better match responsibilities is essential for realizing cities’ full economic potential and meet targets set in the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda. Keywords Political economy · Public finance · Municipalities · Urbanization · Local public service H. Zaidi Oxfam Great Britain, John Smith Drive, Oxford OX4 2JY, UK e-mail: [email protected] A. A. Malik (B) Evidence for Policy Design (EPoD), Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. Boex Duke Center for International Development, Durham, USA e-mail: [email protected] D. Brookins Graduate School of Design, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA e-mail: [email protected] B. Edwards Center on International Development and Governance, Urban Institute, Washington, USA © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_11

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1 Introduction Cities are widely recognized as the primary drivers of economic development due to their ability to facilitate agglomeration economies that induce sustained growth (Glaeser 2011). While urban populations in the industrialized world have largely stagnated or are in decline, much of Africa and Asia is witnessing a momentous transformation toward highly urbanized societies with distinct political economies and spatial forms (Henderson et al. 2014). As rapid urbanization has become a common feature of many cities in the global south, governments are seeking to catalyse its potential into sustained economic growth, including through the smart economy framework (Vinod Kumar and Dahiya 2017). Urbanization is not without its challenges, including the increasing demands of rising populations for access to land, housing, and urban services, which often require governance reforms (Cheema 2013; Dahiya 2012a, b). Local government officials often struggle to keep pace with the rapid and often unplanned expansion of cities, while national officials attempt to harness this potential to bolster economic activity and attract foreign investment. In recent years, a range of academic and policy-oriented studies has provided detailed empirical analysis of the causes and consequences of urbanization (Sassen 2001; Glaeser 2011; Angel 2012). They conclude that urbanization has created both opportunities, such as the growth of the industrial sector, and potential challenges, including the rise of informal economic activity and settlements. Yet the role of urban local governments in improving public services toward sustainable development, including the nature of institutional arrangements and multilevel governance, remains understudied. As noted by Jones et al. (2014), despite the many studies being produced on global urbanization, there is a lack of rigorous comparative or empirical analysis of subnational service delivery efforts, particularly those focusing on rapidly growing cities in Asia and Africa. While a positive correlation between city size and productivity is widely reported (e.g., Rosenthal and Strange 2004), it inevitably assumes that cities are able to maintain adequate quality and coverage of basic public services despite rising population density. But as we discuss later, most developing countries are struggling to meet even the basic standards of urban service delivery to support human development and economic productivity (Prud’homme 2004). With a focus on cities, there is increasing emphasis on the needs of local governments and policymakers to gain a deeper understanding of how they can improve urban service delivery. Within the New Urban Agenda, improving the coverage and quality of urban public services is recognized as the key enabler for sustained development. NUA’s focus on improving the inclusiveness of cities cannot be achieved without equitable and widespread access to basic services like water and sanitation. Our study contributes to this discussion by problematizing the assumptions regarding the role of urban local governments. Specifically, we explore whether the vertical or intergovernmental arrangements and local governance systems provide cities with the authority and autonomy to provide urban services. Or are cities constrained in

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different ways? This is a critical consideration for several SDG 11 targets and the NUA’s correctly identified target of strengthening urban governance. Effective urban governance systems facilitate improved urban service delivery and, ultimately, more sustainable urban growth. Hence we offer an assessment of the fiscal, political, and administrative determinants of variations in urban service delivery quality in otherwise comparable urban jurisdictions. We attempt to provide a theoretically grounded, methodologically rigorous, and yet hands-on diagnosis of the institutions and multilevel governance systems enabling public service delivery in cities across South and Southeast Asia. We seek to draw conclusions about the ways in which countries can reform or strengthen local and intergovernmental institutions to ensure improved services to their urban residents. The following section presents a review of the relevant literature on the topic of decentralization and urban service delivery. We build on the findings and perspectives in the existing literature to motivate our methodological approach. In section three, we provide details on our empirical strategy and methodology. In order to better understand the roles, discretion, and accountability mechanisms faced by urban local governments as they seek to provide three key urban services (SWM, water supply, and sanitation services), we collected comparative indicators for the institutional arrangements of 18 cities across 6 different countries in Asia, and an additional sample of 24 cities in another 8 countries in Africa. Section four offers comparative analyses of the fiscal, political, and administrative systems supporting service delivery at the local level. We analyse the intergovernmental institutional contexts across services and geographical contexts by correlating governance structures and other factors with service delivery outcomes for Asian cities. In section five, we offer concluding thoughts, discussing both the policy implications of our analysis and future research ambitions.

2 Literature Review In this section, we further situate our study within the core decentralization literature to better understand potential effects on urban service delivery in an attempt to identify how our research might address existing gaps between theory, policy and practice.

2.1 Improved Public Sector Effectiveness Through Decentralization The first decades of the global development experiment in Africa and Asia constituted an era where centralized, top-down development efforts were the norm. However, as both state- and then market-led approaches to development resulted in

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failure to achieve stable economic development, there was increasing interest in how alternate forms of governance might contribute to growth and other developmental goals. During the late 1980s into the early 1990s, decentralization emerged as a key public sector governance reform amid attempts to relocate authority and certain responsibilities from central to local government control (World Bank 1992; Crook 2003; Prud’homme 2003; Smoke 2003). In theory, decentralization was seen as an opportunity to improve efficiency in the delivery of services and to make government more responsive to citizens by extending powers to locally elected political representatives (Crawford 2008). Basic public services are delivered locally, which supports the argument for augmenting local control. However, experiences with the actual implementation of decentralization reforms over the last two decades have been mixed, with some clear failures in improving efficiency, expanding service delivery, and inclusion. Despite an ambiguous record and limited empirical evidence demonstrating benefits, decentralization has been accepted and widely promoted as a key organizational reform (Smoke 2003). Advocates argue that decentralizing the delivery of local public goods improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector by promoting allocative efficiency, fostering productive efficiency and accountability, and facilitating cost recovery (Azfar et al. 2001). Regarding allocative efficiency, it is assumed that subnational governments are well-positioned to ensure that service provision matches the preferences and circumstances of the local population (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007). They are considered to be more responsive than national governments to variations in demand for public goods. In this view, decentralization increases the likelihood that local governments respond to the demands of their populations by promoting competition among subnational governments (Tiebout 1956). Competition allows for a variety of bundles of local public goods to be produced, and individuals reveal their preferences by moving—“voting with their feet”—or choosing alternatives (Tiebout 1956; Azfar et al. 2001). Decentralization is also argued to improve productive efficiency by fostering accountability, reducing corruption, and increasing cost-effectiveness in government (Azfar et al. 2001). New relationships of accountability are introduced through decentralization reforms between national and local government, and relationships between citizens and elected officials are altered (Ahmad et al. 2005). Decentralization can promote local welfare and development by leveraging local elections for accountability (Seabright 1996). With this, it is argued that local governments can capitalize on households’ willingness to pay taxes for improved services. Local governments may then exert greater fiscal effort and raise more revenues if they have the authority to determine how the revenues are used.

2.2 The Dangers and Pitfalls of Decentralization Based on these arguments made in the (fiscal) decentralization literature, academics and policymakers typically conclude that urban local governments are wellpositioned to respond to the needs of their constituents and should manage local

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affairs. This conclusion is often carried over from the context of cities in developed and industrialized economies to the context of developing economies. However, decentralization evokes some different issues in the context of developing and transition countries. Developing countries do not meet most of the explicit or implicit assumptions of the fiscal federalism model. First, the model assumes that the main difference between the various local or regional jurisdictions is their respective tastes or preferences. However, the reality of developing countries suggests the main differences are in income, whether household income or potential tax income (Bardhan 2002; Prud’homme 2004). In most developing countries, the problem is not the difference in preferences, but the ability to satisfy basic needs. Second, it assumes that citizens in each jurisdiction will express their preferences through voting in local elections, with locally elected officials willing and capable of satisfying the preferences once revealed. Yet, the fundamental institutions of local democracy are weak in many developing countries. The political and functional mandates of local governments are often vague, inconsistent, or both (Prud’homme 2004). In addition, local governments often struggle with low levels of technical and administrative capacity and lack adequate systems of information and accounting. Local governments often do not generate sufficient own-source revenue to finance local priorities. Finally, structures of local accountability are not in place in many developing countries, with civic groups often lacking sufficient information to hold local governments accountable for performance. Decentralization in developing countries thus presents dilemmas that detract from the potential achievement of its objectives. Two such dilemmas, both political in nature, are the reluctance to share power and the problem of elite capture (Olowu 2003). State power and resources are often seen as a zero-sum opportunity, in which local actors gain at the expense of central government (Smoke 2003). Some see decentralization reform as giving advantage to rival economic and political elites, including opposition parties, who might undermine the rule of those presently in power. Although many countries have undertaken decentralization reform, the process is often incomplete or there is an explicit attempt by central government to retain or regain authority over decisions and resources (Wunsch 2001). Thus, effective local governance is often handicapped by incomplete processes of decentralization, such as the devolution of authority without the appropriate amount of fiscal resources or without ability to generate such resources locally. Weak local capacity often results from inadequate support and training from higher levels of government, which is often used as a justification for the need to recentralize authority and resources. Eaton and Schroeder (2010) argue that due to national governments’ inherent hesitation toward decentralization due to inevitable loss of authority, they typically only decentralize in a single dimension (e.g., in the political, administrative, or fiscal realms), while preserving their centrist practices and prerogatives in the others. The consequences of this on-going power struggle are misaligned responsibilities, policy incoherence, and institutional fragmentation. A second dilemma is the problem of weak local democracies and local elite capture. Decentralization is encouraged along with democratic reforms in order to facilitate the necessary accountability structures to allow for local participation and

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accountability. However, such democratic and accountability mechanisms are not always in place, with some key local officials being appointed rather than elected, establishing upward accountability. Within decentralization reform, local elites offer resources, knowledge, influence, and networks that make decentralized governance work. At the same time, local elites have vested interests and can use their economic or social standing to capture resources under decentralization reforms and use them for personal gain or patronage (Seabright 1996). This vulnerability for elite capture is exacerbated in cases where local accountability structures are weak. Bardhan (2002) asserts that the extent of capture by local elites depends on extant social hierarchies and traditions of political participation, fairness and regularity of elections, and transparency in local decision making processes. As decentralization implies some reduction in the accountability of subnational governments to the central government, there is an attempt to replace this with some form of local accountability. Most argue that a broadly inclusive local political process is necessary for fiscal and institutional decentralization to meet its intended goals. Rather than merely considering an artificial centralization-decentralization binary, a deeper understanding is required regarding what functions of decentralized service delivery work best within what institutional conditions or local economic environments (Prud’homme 1995). Theoretical predictions of decentralization suggest that only certain forms of decentralization, or decentralization under certain institutional arrangements, will result in better service delivery outcomes for the majority. In particular, much of the decentralization literature is focused on devolution, or the transfer of functions, decision making authority, and finances to elected state and local government bodies on the assumption that the local participation, responsiveness, and accountability mechanisms associated with elected local governments are a prerequisite for attaining the benefits of decentralization.

2.3 Urbanization, Urban Local Services, and the Role of Urban Local Governments The patterns of urbanization and characteristics of urban centres hold the potential to enable effective service provision or serve as impediments to service delivery effectiveness. One such characteristic is high population density, which indicates that demand for public services is relatively spatially concentrated. High population density can enable effective local service provision by reducing transportation costs and allowing savings from scale economies (Glaeser 2011). However, too much density—as in the case of overpopulated and poorly located informal settlements—presents congestion and related service delivery challenges. Relative land scarcity is also an important dimension of urban environments that influences the available space for service infrastructure, intensifies the political and economic dimensions of land use planning, and heightens competition over land ownership. These interrelated factors can multiply the externalities associated with urban services, heighten political

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aspects of service delivery, and create intensified opportunities for rent-seeking of various kinds (Jones et al. 2014). Urban areas are complex environments with rapidly growing populations that are heterogeneous in terms of identity groups and income levels. For many African and Asian countries, urban employment is concentrated in the low-income, informal sector, resulting in fewer urban residents that could constitute a viable tax base to fund urban service provision (Resnick 2014). This often segregates the population both physically and in terms of their ability to pay for services that are considered by some to be basic needs. This leads to a diversity of providers, formal and informal, that serve the needs of varied income groups within cities. This situation can compensate for suboptimal public services by providing choice, but the presence of many different service providers creates a challenge for policy coherence as well as oversight and monitoring. With regard to the impact of local governance in urban service delivery outcomes, much of the urban literature (often implicitly) assumes that urban local governments are the key decision makers and key service delivery providers in their jurisdictions. For instance, it is often assumed that the presence of a dynamic mayor is a key ingredient in effective urban services and the wider success of an urban area (e.g., Barber 2013). In reality, little is known about the specific impact of local governance on urban service delivery outcomes. There is growing evidence suggesting that urban local governments in many developing economies are quite constrained in their ability to manage or deliver urban local services by multilevel governance arrangements (e.g., Boex and Simatupang 2015). There are also services with particular characteristics that might dictate the type of institutional arrangements, such as the water sector, which is highly monopolistic in nature partly because of the high degree of sunk costs and potential for economies of scale. Such a sector might require a higher degree of centralization for aspects such as regulating water quality, while other aspects such as transport and delivery might be more localized.

2.4 Urban Service Delivery: Enabling and Constraining Factors The focus of our study falls at the intersection of the urbanization literature and the decentralization literature summarized above. Within the broader context of decentralization in developing countries, urban jurisdictions provide the context where decentralized local governance is most likely to succeed, as cities in general benefit from more dynamic local political leadership, greater financial resources, and improved technical capacity in comparison with their rural counterparts. However, such advantages alone may not be sufficient to ensure adequate urban service delivery, as central governments may be reluctant to provide urban local government leaders with the political space, resources, and/or administrative control necessary to deliver urban services. Services seem to work when there are strong relationships

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of accountability between actors in the service delivery chain, including policymakers, providers, and citizens. As such, it is crucial to gain a deeper understanding, from the perspective of researchers, policymakers, and practitioners, of multilevel governance and the political economy context in which urban local governments are expected to operate (Boex et al. 2014; Jones et al. 2014). Overall, this brief review of the literature has highlighted gaps in our knowledge of the political economy of service provision in urban areas. This knowledge gap is becoming increasingly relevant in the global development community as Africa and Asia urbanize at a significant pace. In delivering programmatic interventions, the need for understanding the political economy and multilevel governance features of specific sectors, such as water, sanitation, and SWM, should receive more attention (Boex and Edwards 2014; Jones et al. 2014).

3 Research Methodology 3.1 Objective and Strategy The main goal of this study is to analyse the extent to which urban local governments in Asia are effectively able to facilitate improved urban service delivery and thereby promote human and economic development. The study’s specific objective is to quantify and analyse the intergovernmental institutional environment in which urban local governments operate. In addition to six Asian countries, our analysis draws on comparative analysis of eight African countries that were part of our broader research project (Boex et al. 2016). Do the vertical or intergovernmental arrangements and local governance systems provide cities with the authority and autonomy to provide urban services? Or are cities constrained in different aspects of urban service delivery? Although an empirical investigation of the relationship between urban governance institutions and urban service delivery outcomes is beyond the scope of the current study, what do the results and analysis suggest about the impact of institutions on these outcomes? In other words, are dynamic cities that operate in a more decentralized local governance system with a greater degree of autonomy able to achieve better outcomes? As discussed above, we find a dearth of empirically grounded studies undertaking comparative institutional analyses of urban service delivery systems in Asia. Most existing publications either describe successful case studies to derive best practices or offer operational manuals for practitioners. We attempt to fill this gap by building data from the bottom-up (i.e., directly from municipalities and service delivery units, or SDUs), thus focusing on the urban unit of analysis. Our analysis focuses on three services: SWM, water, and sanitation—all quintessential local government functions essential for sustained economic growth.

The Political Economy of Urban Governance in Asian Cities … Table 1 Countries and cities included in the analysis

309

Population (estimates) Bangladesh

India

Indonesia

Pakistan

Philippines

Sri Lanka

Bakerganj

313,845

Shailkupa

331,809

Khulna

663,342

Hospet

206,159

Jalandhar

873,725

Pune

3,124,458

Parepare

135,200

Palembang

1,535,900

Surabaya

2,853,661

Matta

100,000

Sukkur

750,000

Lahore

7,130,000

San Fernando

114,963

Iloilo

424,619

Quezon city

2,960,627

Galle

112,252

Colombo

555,031

Source Population data provided by city governments and local experts, based on actual census data or imputed estimates

As summarized in Table 1, our selection includes four countries South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) and two from Southeast Asia (Indonesia and the Philippines). The choice of these six countries allowed us to capture a broad range of governance systems (e.g., federations and centralized systems) and historical and administrative experiences (e.g., British Commonwealth and Dutch administrative traditions). Working with local researchers in each country, we selected three cities across the urban spectrum, typically one small, one medium, and one large city in terms of population, across three different states, provinces, or regions. Thus, we capture differences attributable to city size as another variable in the analysis, especially as some countries may treat larger cities differently from smaller urban areas legally.

3.2 The Urban Service Delivery Assessment Framework The Urban Service Delivery Assessment Framework, developed by the Urban Institute as part of the Local Public Sector Initiative, captures the institutional features of the local governance system within which cities operate using a five-part diagnostic instrument (Boex et al. 2014). The framework was designed to provide municipal

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managers the option of undertaking self-assessments and is able to rank their institutional environment and performance relative to other cities in their own countries and across the world. Applying this tool enables us to both collect useful data to help enhance our understanding of the gaps and successes in urban service delivery and provides a practical tool to guide the improvement of relevant institutional environments. The inherent appeal of international benchmarking drives this approach, which is informed by both theoretical and empirical literature on public service delivery in cities. Appendix A provides an overview of the assessment indicators, which consist of 31 questions spread across five dimensions. Each indicator seeks to assess the functioning of a key element of urban service delivery systems based on an ordinal indicator ranging from zero points to one point. In some cases, the maximum score for an indicator is half a point. For some indicators, fractions of points can be awarded. This methodology is based on five institutional dimensions of local governance systems: (a) the effectiveness of functional assignments for urban services, (b) the availability of local political space and the dynamism of local political leadership, (c) the degree of local control over administrative mechanisms, such as local human resource management and procurement, (d) the degree of local fiscal autonomy and the quality of local financial management, and (e) the strength of local participation and accountability mechanisms. Additionally, the assessment framework provides a set of basic, standard measures for the quality and access to key urban services within an urban local government. For instance, the basic measure for SWM quality is the aggregate number of tons of solid waste collected weekly. Likewise, two indicators measure access to drinking water: the level of piped water access (as a percent of the city’s total population) and the percentage of population not served. Similarly, the assessment framework seeks to collect information on the share of the population that has access to improved, sewered sanitation infrastructure as well as nonsewerage sanitation. The implicit hypothesis behind our analysis is that more effective frameworks for urban services—and, therefore, better urban services—are achieved when each of these five institutional dimensions are effective, well structured, and coordinated. As such, if one of the five dimensions of the urban service delivery system is weaker than the others, this may have ramifications for the whole system. For instance, even if all other dimensions of the urban service delivery system function well, if the local political and electoral systems fail to give local political leaders the necessary political space and incentives to identify and respond to the needs of residents and the local business community, then the system may become less effective as a mechanism for the improved delivery of localized services. Instead of focusing on cutting-edge innovation in decentralized service delivery, the set of performance indicators focuses on the basic performance of the urban service delivery systems based on existing good international practices. Guidance has been developed on what performance would meet each score for each of the indicators. The highest score (typically one) is warranted for an individual indicator if the criterion meets the relevant objective in a complete manner, whereas the lowest

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score indicates that an urban area has failed to meet the criteria. A brief synopsis of the five dimensions of an effective urban service delivery system follows. First, the effective assignment of functional responsibilities to the local level measures the extent to which the legal multilevel governance system allows local governments to plan and execute capital investments, appoint the leadership of the service delivery unit, and determine whether its de facto functional responsibility matches its legal authority. The scoring for this institutional dimension is informed by the idea that the urban local government should be responsible for providing or delivering the service in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, and that the local government’s functional responsibilities should be matched with the appropriate legal authorities, without which service quality is likely to suffer. In other words, when local governments are not allocated powers commensurate with their service delivery role, this inevitably hampers their ability to provide effective local services. The second dimension, dynamic local political leadership, captures the extent to which local government leadership is directly elected by its constituents, the quality of electoral processes, the degree of support that local political leaders receive from both the local legislature and local bureaucratic apparatus, the degree of authority that local political leadership has over key administrative appointments, and the responsiveness of political leaders toward the priorities of citizens. The scoring of this dimension seeks to capture the level of political space available to local political leadership—and the dynamism and responsiveness displayed by leaders—in responding to the needs of residents and local economic actors. We expect that if local political systems do not encourage city leaders to respond to the needs of their constituents, and instead focus on political incentives from the top, city leaders are less likely to deliver effective urban public services. The third dimension of the assessment framework, local control over administration and service delivery, quantifies whether local governments have complete power to appoint heads of urban service delivery units and whether they approve their own budgets, determine their own organizational structure, manage human resource decisions for these departments, and maintain power over procurement and capital investments. As such, this dimension considers how often local governments are allowed appropriate controls over the units responsible for delivering urban services within their jurisdiction. In cases where higher levels of government, rather than locally elected officials, directly control local service delivery units, it is expected that urban services become less responsive. Fourth, the urban service delivery assessment framework considers access to adequate financial resources and effective local public financial management as important prerequisites for effective local service delivery. The local fiscal autonomy and local financial management dimension assesses whether the local government maintains an orderly and participatory annual budget process, whether urban service delivery providers receive allocations consistent with budgets, what quality of annual financial statements are issued each year, how are subsidies (if any) administered in service delivery systems, and whether local governments have access to financial markets for raising capital. In addition, this institutional dimension considers the

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balance between own-source revenues and intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the level of effective control maintained by local governments. Fifth, appropriate local participation and accountability mechanisms are required for urban services to be delivered in an inclusive and responsive manner. As a result, the final dimension of the urban service delivery assessment framework measures the extent to which urban local governments are responsive to the needs of their electorate by looking into whether they have performance frameworks in place for each service, how they manage their monitoring, whether users participate in local planning financial allocations, and how urban service delivery units handle consumer complaints. Based on this framework, we quantify the different institutional dimensions of urban service delivery and analyse how much authority cities have over the basic urban services that allow their economies to thrive. In other words, are cities empowered functionally, politically, administratively, and fiscally? And do they have the mechanisms in place to act in a participatory and accountable manner? What trends and patterns, if any, do we see as we look at cities across different countries and different sizes? What are the main trends across public services, both in terms of structures and efficiency of delivery?

3.3 Data Collection and Quality Assurance Process To better understand the institutional and intergovernmental nature of urban service delivery in Asia, we identified and contracted reputed country experts in each country in this study (see Appendix B for a list of country experts). Each country expert was informed of the purpose of the study and trained on the study’s institutional assessment methodology through a series of videoconferences. For each assessment indicator, we provided detailed instructions and sample responses, which enabled in-country researchers to complete a profile for each city across the three urban services mentioned earlier. The instructions were designed to be universally applicable across different local governance systems and thus ensure consistency in scoring (alongside detailed comments justifying each score), enabling comparative analyses across different countries. Based on this guidance, each country expert prepared an initial assessment profile for three cities, including both scoring on indicators and detailed justifications of those scores. To ensure consistent application of the assessment tool across different cities and countries, the research team reviewed each assessment following a detailed quality assurance protocol. Written feedback was subsequently provided to each country researcher, often with requests to expand on scoring justifications, questions related to the scoring decisions, or suggested adjustments to allocated scores when it appeared the assessment scoring was not judiciously followed. In most cases, after country researchers reviewed the feedback, the research team held a videoconference with them to ensure clarity on specific points. The review process underwent several

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rounds of clarification and input from each country expert before the city profiles for each country were considered final. We faced the fundamental methodological challenge of attempting to translate the descriptive characteristics of the institutional contexts of urban local governments into quantitative indicators. The quality assurance process described above helped reduce the likelihood of creating inconsistencies through the subjective judgments of individuals. Although our research creates comparable institutional indicator scores for local governance and urban service delivery systems across the 18 selected cities, our data collection methodology for outcome data does not guarantee available data for all three services in all of the selected cities. As a result, we are not able to consistently draw causal inferences between the local governance systems within which urban local governments operate and the quality of urban services delivery outcomes. Regardless, our systematic assessment offers opportunities for enhancing our understanding of the role of urban local governments and intergovernmental institutions in improving urban services and urban economic growth.

4 Discussion The dataset resulting from our research design and data collection efforts profiles six countries for a total of 18 city profiles, each of which captures institutional information for three urban services across five institutional dimensions of service delivery. While this data can be parcelled in various ways, we begin by analysing the institutional dimension scores for all services and countries combined (Table 2). This general analysis is then supplemented by an analysis of average country scores (Fig. 1) and an analysis of average scores by type of service (Fig. 2).

Table 2 Institutional dimensions of urban service delivery, scores across all urban services Minimum

Maximum

Average

Effective assignment of functions to the local level

2.1

4.5

3.7

Dynamic local political leadership

0.8

4.7

3.1

Local control over administration and service delivery

0.4

4.7

2.5

Local fiscal autonomy and local financial management

1.4

4.0

3.0

Local participation and accountability mechanisms

0.4

3.7

3.0

Total

5.1

21.6

13.9

Source Scores assigned by local experts based on the assessment framework

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Fig. 1 Institutional dimensions of urban service delivery performance: average score by country Source Scores assigned by local experts based on the assessment framework Functional Assignment Fiscal Institutions

Political Institutions Participation & Accountability

Administrative Institutions

4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Solid Waste Management

Water

Sanitation

Average

Fig. 2 Institutional dimensions of urban service delivery performance: average score by urban service Source Scores assigned by local experts based on the assessment framework

4.1 Overview of Institutional Dimensions of Service Delivery Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the urban service delivery assessment scores across all 18 cities and for all three urban services (SWM, water, and sanitation) combined. The average assessment score of 13.9 out of 25 points, only slightly more than half the total possible points. Given that the scoring of the different indicators is based on achieving basic good practices instead of expecting cities to engage in cutting-edge practices, the data suggest that cities in our sample on average are only weakly empowered over the delivery of urban services within their jurisdictions. Since the profile scores were based almost entirely on the de facto situation (rather than on the de jure circumstances), it is obvious that regardless of whether the national constitution or the legislative framework mandates a decentralized forms of govern-

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ment or otherwise, cities in practice tend to have limited political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy. In other words, despite being widely recognized as engines of economic growth, more often than not, urban local governments are not given the necessary powers to maintain even basic standards of public service delivery essential for greater productivity. For instance, in India the executive power for delivering services is vested in Municipal Commissioners rather than controlled by locallyelected mayors. The fact that these Commissioners are appointed by the State puts them at odds with the powers of the local government and cannot be held accountable. There are other instances where if the city is unable to set appropriate tariff levels for water service provision, which is the case in most Asian cities and is a highly political decision, or if it is unable to authorize the firing of under-performing staff, the quality of urban service will almost inevitably come to depend not on the decisions made by local government leaders, but rather, by the decisions and actions (or inaction) of higher-level officials. The political dynamics between the national, state and local level plays a key role in determining the quality of urban services. The breakdown of scoring by institutional dimensions offers further insights and helps diagnose the source of weak local decision-making space. The most obvious finding is that while urban local governments have a relatively high degree of effective functional assignment of functions (average score: 3.7 out of 5), urban local governments tend to lack meaningful and effective local participation and accountability mechanisms. For instance, most cities do not have publically disclosed and formally approved performance frameworks, and those that do seldom apply them in practice. But then there are exceptions such as local governments in the Philippines that use a self-assessment tool, the Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS), to identify shortcomings in capacity and benchmarking service delivery against established standards. Having said this, more research is needed to determine the impact of using these performance frameworks in improving urban service delivery. Strong political decentralization without strong local accountability could be the result of several public sector obstacles. For instance, this phenomenon may simply be caused by enthusiasm about democratic decentralization, while reality subsequently reveals that achieving local participation and accountability is in fact difficult to accomplish in the real world (Mansuri and Rao 2013). In contrast, Eaton and Schroeder (2010) suggest that central government officials seldom have a real incentive to support decentralization as long as the proposed reforms do not undermine the direct power, discretion, and resources of one or more entities at the central level. As such, strong political decentralization without strong local political accountability (and without strong decentralization of administrative and fiscal powers) could be an attempt by the central political elite to co-opt local political elites by giving them political status at the local level without subjecting them to accountability from below. For instance in Pakistan, since 2015 provincial governments have conducted the local government elections after a gap of eight years but have been reluctant to devolve any meaningful power or resources to these locally-elected bodies. Newly elected local governments have minimal administrative control over service delivery units, which are effectively run by provincial departments.

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The scores in Table 2 also clearly indicate the existence of widespread higher-level institutional capture over administrative functions such as hiring and firing of staff, and approvals for operational decisions. The vast score difference between functional assignment and administrative autonomy seems to confirm the earlier argument that cities are being asked to provide services without necessarily enjoying commensurate levels of administrative autonomy. Similar differences are visible with the political and fiscal realms indicating the manifestation of the same, though average magnitudes are relatively smaller.

4.2 Urban Service Delivery by Country In Fig. 1, we observe interesting country level variations in the five dimensions of urban service delivery institutions, as measured across all three urban services. Some countries seem to have considerably stronger institutional arrangements around urban service delivery than others. Potential drivers of these variations seem to include the impact of bureaucratic traditions, the level of economic development, the state of democracy, and other political economy factors. Top scoring countries include Indonesia and the Philippines, both of which have undergone significant decentralization reforms, although it should be noted that these reforms were primarily driven by the need for political stabilization, rather than by an explicit desire to improve service delivery. As argued in Sect. 2, however, improved local service delivery is often an accompanying positive externality from having empowered local governments. The comparison between Indonesia (18.5) and India (16.1), the two largest and among the highest scoring countries in our sample, offers interesting insights into how administrative traditions, political forces and historical contexts impact service delivery standards. While both countries attain a high assessment score, the composition of the two countries’ scores differs significantly. The relatively low scores for India on the effectiveness of functional assignments and administrative decentralization at the local level are likely to be due in part to the unique decentralization trajectory in India, where state-to-local decentralization reforms were largely imposed in part by the central government. In addition, the limited degree of decentralization of administrative powers to urban areas shows the strength of India’s traditionally centralized bureaucratic system (with its roots in the British imperial administrative system) that has not relinquished staffing powers to local governments. However, post-independence India has remained a stable democracy since 1947, which helps explain its high score on local participation and accountability mechanisms (3.7 points). In contrast to India’s relatively gradual approach, Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization reforms since 1999 granted unprecedented powers to local governments in an effort to eliminate the corruption, collusion and nepotism associated with excessive centralization. Whereas the big bang brought about major political, administrative and fiscal reforms, the low score on local participation and accountability in

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Indonesia (1.8 points out of 5) seems to be at least in part due to its recently established democratic political process. In South Asia, Pakistan (5.1) scores poorly while the rest of the region including the likes of India (16.1), Bangladesh (14.3), and Sri Lanka (10.6) score relatively high on most indicators. All countries except India do especially poorly on local accountability and public participation, which is reflective of the closed structure and processes under which local governments have been set up. The capture of local governments by political elites and party networks across South Asia is common, which only re-enforces existing local power dynamics and limits accountability and public engagement opportunities. Understanding why Pakistan scores the lowest is illustrative. In 2015, after an absence of eight years and the first time in its history, Pakistan’s provinces conducted local government elections under a democratic federal government. The Constitution of Pakistan under Article 140(A) and provincial local government laws clearly articulates the functional assignments and services given to the local governments. However in practice, local control over administrative and fiscal institutions along with public participation and accountability remains extremely low. For instance, Karachi—one of the largest cities in Asia—has seen key powers of its local government (run by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, or MQM) taken away including solid waste management (SWM) by the provincial government (controlled by the Pakistan People’s Party, or PPP). This is in part due to the bitter political and electoral rivalry between the two parties, which in recent years has been exacerbated by rapid urbanization as the PPP’s traditionally rural support base is weakened by the MQM’s urban popularity, particularly in Karachi. In Southeast Asia, both the Philippines and Indonesia score high on different performance indicators, which is reflective of the powers and control given to local governments in cities. The fact that both countries have former mayors of secondary cities as current Heads of State reflects the political empowerment of the local government structures. There are still challenges though since local governments are not easily accessible to the public, grievance redressal mechanisms are weak and local accountability is limited.

4.3 Urban Service Delivery Institutions by Service: Solid Waste Management, Water, and Sanitation This final sub-section considers how (and ventures to answer why) institutional dimension scores vary across the three different urban services considered by this study. While SWM, water and sanitation all three are all basic urban services with a direct and positive impacts on the welfare and productivity of urban residents and economic actors, there are fundamental conceptual and practical differences between the ways in which their delivery is organized within cities.

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For instance, the clean urban environment produced by effective SWM is a public good (nonrival and nonexcludable), and its nonprovision would be clearly visible to local constituents, who would readily associate ineffective SWM with ineffective local leadership. In addition to an effective management system, SWM requires relatively low-scale capital expenditures, indicating that this urban service is not as capital intensive or as networked as pipelines providing drinking water or sewered sanitation. Thus SWM can be provided relatively efficiently by smaller urban jurisdictions without a need for the central government to decentralize major financial resources and without giving up administrative and fiscal powers. In contrast, water is essentially a private good (excludable and rival), though public provision is typically justified based on two conditions. First, the supply of piped water gives rise to a natural monopoly to the largest provider, who can deliver water at a lower cost than any competitors due to the efficiency gains from economies of scale. Second, there is often a strong push to provide drinking water below cost for equity reasons, and access to drinking water is generally considered an essential human right. Reflecting this reality, water scores the lowest across all dimensions in Fig. 2, but more so in functional assignment, and participation and accountability—both reflecting its relatively high capital requirements. The production function of piped water is quite different from SWM, as an effective piped water system requires major up-front investments and relatively minimal recurrent cost. Because most municipalities in Asia are not given adequate fiscal space to raise capital without central government involvement, water delivery units mostly see more profound involvement from higher levels of government. In fact, in many developing countries such as Pakistan, provincial or national governments wholly own water utility corporations. Further, in contrast to street lighting or roads, poorly provided water services are not immediately visible as a public provision failure, even though its adverse impact on human well-being is arguably more severe. The broader point is that the nature and scale of each service has large and direct effects on the institutional scoring presented in Fig. 2. When we compare the effectiveness of urban service delivery institutions across the three urban services being considered, we find that SWM gets significantly higher scores, followed by sanitation and water. This implies that for reasons explained earlier, cities are generally more empowered for the provision of SWM services. In terms of institutional dimensions, SWM’s high average score is largely driven by functional assignment, followed by close averages for political, fiscal and administrative institutions. This implies that SWM is widely accepted as a quintessential locally provided service, including by smaller private operators in many sampled cities, likely because of the practical reasons discussed earlier. Further, while the provision of water and sanitation services generally go hand in hand, the water sector appears to have significantly lower administrative autonomy and far less functional assignment of responsibilities than sanitation. This is likely because the responsibility for urban water provision is typically fully assigned to an urban water authority (owned or substantially controlled by the central or provincial/subnational government). Urban local governments in Asia often retain a

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somewhat greater degree of responsibility for (nonsewered) urban sanitation services, which is also reflects in the relatively higher score on participation and accountability. The magnitude of these dimension scores suggests that the institutional arrangements around service provision are likely to have a significantly limiting effect on the role of urban local governments in achieving effective service delivery. This is even true for SWM, which Fig. 2 suggests is the urban service under highest degree of local control. Although local governments typically have a reasonable degree of autonomy in managing solid waste services, national and regional officials still tend to exert a relatively high degree of control over the urban local government’s administrative and fiscal resources, thus constraining the ability to deliver better services. For SWM, the average score for local administrative control was 2.6, whereas the degree of urban local government control over urban finances was 3.0. Limited administrative control over human resources, access to financial resources and limited local public financial management capacity has very practical implications on the ability of local governments to provide services and to finance, regulate, and enforce contracts with private (and other) service providers. Many of the countries in the sample are unable to hire and fire local service delivery staff without higher-level approval, and they struggle with access to intergovernmental transfers that are often not provided in a timely manner and are typically inadequate relative to local budgetary needs. A second element that undermines urban local service delivery is the relative ineffectiveness of local participation and accountability mechanisms. The scoring of this indicator provided the lowest average (1.7). Even in the case of SWM, where this dimension score is the highest, the score (2.2) is less than half of allowable 5 points. Without necessary feedback and accountability mechanisms, it is difficult for urban residents to hold local governments accountable and for urban local government authorities to hold private sector service providers accountable for the delivery of solid waste services. This likely has significant and disproportionate effects in underserved and informal areas of cities.

5 Conclusion Despite the heightened global importance of urbanization and the recognition of cities as the engines of economic growth and social transformation, we find that Asian cities are simply not provided with the intergovernmental institutional space to deliver effective urban services. Although there are variations across countries depending on service and city type, in absolute terms, the average score on the urban service delivery institutional dimensions is extremely low. Whereas central governments are often keen to assign service delivery responsibilities to urban local governments, their simultaneous reluctance to transfer meaningful decision-making authority—particularly in the administrative realm—and the absence of effective local participation and accountability appears to negatively impact urban service delivery. It appears that political economy forces, rather than technical capacity, are a more significant determinant of whether urban local gov-

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ernments are institutionally empowered to effectively provide urban services. Our initial efforts have focused on quantifying the effectiveness of urban service delivery institutions in a comparative manner, but much more work needs to be done to understand why subnational institutions are stronger in some countries than in others. Another important policy question, one that we were unable to address in this study, deals with the relationship between urban service delivery institutions and urban service delivery outcomes. Do stronger institutions contribute to better outcomes? Our current research is limited by the lack of real service delivery outcome data, which could have enabled causal inferences. We found many urban local governments and service delivery units either unwilling to disclose or unaware of how much solid waste they collect every week and their own water and sanitation coverage maps. Given recent focus on the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and accompanying indicators at the urban level, researchers must continue designing innovative approaches to obtain useful data from the bottom up. Our analysis makes clear that national governments interested in improving services for their urban residents must look beyond the traditional arguments of weak capacity and the lack of political will at the local level. Instead, they should focus on improving the role of urban local governments in delivering urban services in the context of a multilevel governance system. Moreover, the unique contribution of this project lies in its systematic measurement of urban service delivery institutions and the quantification of the shortcomings of these institutional structures. While still not enough to infer causality via regression analyses, our purposive sampling strategy grants greater explanatory power to our dataset covering South and Southeast Asia. The data from our sample of 18 cities provide a useful picture of urban service delivery in several Asian countries that have experimented with decentralization reform with varying levels of success. This study illustrates that decentralized service delivery institutions are not necessarily uniform, and the extent of functional responsibility over urban services varies considerably and depends to some extent on the nature of the service itself. SWM appears to be the urban service most easily decentralized to the local government level if permitted by political economy forces at the national level. Water supply and sanitation services present greater potential obstacles to decentralized provision (e.g., a higher capital requirement), and our results suggest that the provision of these services tends to be more centralized than desirable. In terms of policy implications, it is useful to recognize that the greatest progress appears to have been made in areas where more attention has been given to the assignment of functional responsibilities to local governments and the introduction of democratic decentralization. Other areas of effective local governance and urban service delivery, however, seem to be lagging behind. In particular, weak local government control over human resources and other administrative aspects of urban service delivery seem to be a persistent challenge. Likewise, the data for urban service delivery dimensions further signal that limited fiscal autonomy and financial management are a key constraint to effective urban service provision. Therefore, strategic focus should be placed on increasing the local revenue space available to urban local governments. For

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instance, improving access to credit for creditworthy urban local governments would allow them to take on the capital investments required for the up-front costs of more effective provision of urban water and sanitation. Such a strategy would be fully in line with the recently adopted Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations 2015) for sustainable development finance. A final issue with bearing on policy implications is the need to improve the functioning of local participation and accountability mechanisms. Although much of the conceptual argument in support of decentralization rests on the notion that local governments are closest to the people, the transparency, participation, and accountability mechanisms with respect to urban services appear to be failing. Tiebout’s (1956) core assumptions underpinning the fiscal federalism framework, that communities can express their preferences and hold local officials accountable at the ballot box—or “vote with their feet”—simply do not hold in many developing country contexts. Without effective local participation and accountability mechanisms, citizens are not empowered to ensure that their urban local governments respond to their demands for greater service coverage or improvements in service quality. Greater efforts should be made to improve the level of engagement between citizens, communities, and urban local governments to achieve their service delivery goals. Acknowledgements This research underlying this chapter was funded by the International Growth Centre and the Urban Institute. We are also grateful to Urban Institute colleagues who have commented on earlier versions of this draft, including Charles Cadwell and Harvey Galper. Several current and former colleagues at the Urban Institute supported the development of the assessment methodology including Jennifer Joel, Brittany Lane and Naledi Modisaatsone. Jasmine Pless, Madeline Roth and Sarra Souid provided excellent research assistance and Caroline Smith and Dana Schmidt provided critical administrative support. Finally, we could not have completed this project without the diligent support of our in-country experts who completed country profiles in a highly professional manner. Their names are listed in Appendix B.

Appendix A: Urban Service Delivery Performance Indicator Set The table below provides an overview of the urban service delivery performance indicator set. Details for each of the individual performance indicators are provided by Boex and colleagues (2014).

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P.I.

Performance indicator

A

Effective assignment of functions to the local level

Max. score

A1

According to the legal framework, is the urban local government (ULG) responsible for providing the service?

1

A2

In practice, is the ULG responsible for the recurrent provision of the service?

1

A3

In practice, is the ULG responsible for planning and procuring the capital infrastructure required for providing the service?

1

A4

Does the de facto assignment of functional authority match de jure responsibility?

1

A5

What is the organizational status of the local service delivery unit (SDU)?

1

B

Dynamic local political leadership

B1

Is the ULG executive directly elected?

1

B2

Are the ULG election system and ULG elections competitive?

1

B3

Does the ULG executive have broad support from the ULG legislative council and the ULG’s administrative apparatus/staff?

1

B4

Does the ULG executive recruit, appoint, and hold human resource authority over the core local administration team?

1

B5

Is the ULG effective in achieving results in the service delivery areas that constituents care about?

1

C

Local control over administration and service delivery (continued)

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(continued) P.I.

Performance indicator

Max. score

C1

Does the ULG (executive or council) appoint the head of the SDU?

1

C2

Does the ULG approve the budget of the SDU?

1

C3

Does the ULG determine its own organizational structure and staff establishment?

1

C4

Does the ULG have control over its human resources decisions?

1

C5

Does the ULG plan and manage the procurement of capital investments/infrastructure required for the service?

1

D

Local fiscal autonomy and local financial management

D1

Does the ULG (or SDU) have an orderly and participatory annual budget process?

0.5

D2

Are the ULGs (or SDUs) expenditure out-turns (for the service at hand) consistent with the original approved budget?

0.5

D3

What are the quality and timeliness of annual financial statements?

0.5

D4

Is the ULG free to define its own local revenue instruments (e.g., specify user fees, adopt new revenue instruments, or modify existing local revenue instruments)?

0.5

D5

Does the ULG have the right to set the tax base or tax rate for all local revenue instruments?

0.5

D6

Does the ULG take into account full-cost recovery (including user cost of capital) when setting user fee rates or local tax rates?

0.5

(continued)

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(continued) P.I.

Performance indicator

Max. score

D7

Does the ULG effectively and equitably administer the property tax?

0.5

D8

Does the ULG have access to borrowing from financial institutions to fund local capital infrastructure expenses?

0.5

D9

Does the ULG receive (conditional or unconditional) grants/transfers from a higher-level government to support local administration and to provide services to the urban poor?

0.5

D10

Does the ULG receive formula-based grants/transfers from the higher-level government in a complete and timely manner, without unnecessary administrative impediments?

0.5

E

Local participation and accountability mechanisms

E1

Is a local performance framework in place and being applied for the service (e.g., service charter)?

1

E2

Who monitors the performance of the SDU?

1

E3

Are local budgets and finances (for the service at hand) managed in a participatory and transparent manner?

1

E4

Does the SDU have its own effective participatory planning/social accountability/oversight mechanisms?

0.5

(continued)

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(continued) P.I.

Performance indicator

Max. score

E5

What is the frequency of public interaction between the SDU and citizens?

0.5

E6

Does the ULG (separate from the SDU) have an effective mechanism in place to receive and resolve complaints about services?

1

Appendix B: Urban Service Delivery Performance Experts by Country

Bangladesh

Mobasser Monem

India

Sandeep Thakur

Indonesia

Renata Simatupang

Pakistan

Muhammad Zahoor

Philippines

Marilyn Tolosa-Martinez

Sri Lanka

Don Premasiri Hettiarachchi

References Ahmad J, Devarajan S, Khemani S, Shar S (2005) Decentralization and service delivery. Policy Research Working Paper 3603. World Bank Group, Washington, DC Angel S (2012) Planet of cities. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA Azfar O, Kahkonen S, Meagher P (2001) Conditions for effective decentralized governance: a synthesis of research findings. World Bank Group, Washington, DC Barber BR (2013) If mayors ruled the world: dysfunctional nations, rising cities. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT Bardhan P (2002) Decentralization of governance and development. J Econ Perspect 16(4):185–205 Boex J, Edwards B (2014) Triggering increased city-level public finance for pro-poor sanitation improvements: the role of political economy and fiscal instruments. Urban Institute, Washington, DC Boex J, Edwards B (2016) The (mis-)measurement of fiscal decentralization in developing and transition countries: accounting for devolved and nondevolved local public sector spending. Public Financ Rev 44(6) Boex J, Simatupang R (2015) A comparative overview of local governance systems in selected countries. Working paper. Local Public Sector Initiative, Washington, DC

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Boex J, Lane B, Yao G (2013) An assessment of urban public service delivery in South Asia: an analysis of institutional and fiscal constraints. Urban Institute, Washington, DC Boex J, Edwards B, Joel J, Lane B, Modisaatsone N, Malik A, Yao G (2014) Urban service delivery assessment framework. Urban Institute, Washington, DC Boex J, Malik A, Brookins D, Edwards B (2016) Dynamic cities? The role of urban local governments in improving urban service delivery performance in Africa and Asia. Urban Institute, Washington, DC Cheema GS (2013) Democratic local governance: reforms & innovations in Asia. Trends & Innovations in Governance. United Nations University Press, Tokyo. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ publications/democratic-local-governance-reforms-innovations-in-asia Cheema GS, Rondinelli DA (2007) Decentralizing governance. In: Decentralizing governance: emerging concepts and practices. Brookings Institution Press/Ash Center, Washington, D.C. https://www.brookings.edu/book/decentralizing-governance/ Crawford G (2008) Decentralization and the limits to poverty reduction: findings from Ghana. Oxf Dev Stud 36(2):235–258 Crook RC (2003) Decentralization and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local-central relations. Public Adm Dev 23(1):77–88 Dahiya B (2012a) 21st century Asian cities: unique transformation, unprecedented challenges. Global Asia 7(1):96–104 Dahiya B (2012b) Cities in Asia, 2012: demographics, economics, poverty, environment and governance. Cities 29(2):S44–S61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.06.013 Eaton K, Schroeder L (2010) Measuring decentralization. In: Connerley E, Eaton K, Smoke P (eds) Making decentralization work: democracy, development, and security. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, pp 167–190 Edwards B, Boex J (2015) Triggering increased city-level public finance for pro-poor sanitation improvements: final report. Urban Institute, Washington, DC Glaeser E (2011) Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier. Penguin, London Henderson JV, Storeygard A, Deichmann U (2014) 50 years of urbanization in Africa: examining the role of climate change. Policy Research Working Paper 6925. World Bank Group, Washington, DC Jones H, Cummings C, Nixon H (2014) Services in the city: governance and political economy in urban service delivery. Overseas Development Institute, London Mansuri G, Rao V (2013) Localizing development: does participation work?. World Bank Group, Washington, DC Moretti E (2014) Cities and growth. International Growth Centre, London Olowu D (2003) Local institutional and political structures and processes: recent experience in Africa. Public Adm Dev 23(1):41–52 Prud’homme R (1995) The dangers of decentralization. World Bank Res Obs 10(2):201–220 Prud’homme R (2003) Fiscal decentralisation in Africa: a framework for considering reform. Public Adm Dev 23(1):17–27 Prud’homme R (2004) Infrastructure and development. Urban Institute, Washington, DC Resnick D (2014) Urban governance and service delivery in African cities: the role of politics and policies. Dev Policy Rev 32(s1):s3–s17 Rosenthal SS, Strange WC (2004) Evidence on the nature and sources of agglomeration economies. In: Vernon Henderson J, François Thisse J (eds) Handbook of regional and urban economics, vol 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 2119–2171 Sassen S (2001) The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Seabright P (1996) Accountability and decentralization in government: an incomplete contracts model. Eur Econ Rev 40(1):61–89 Smoke P (2003) Decentralization in Africa: goals, dimensions, myths, and challenges. Public Adm Dev 23(1):7–16

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Tiebout C (1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. J Polit Econ 64(5):416–424 United Nations (2015) Addis ababa action agenda of the third international conference on financing for development. http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf Vinod Kumar TM, Dahiya B (2017) Smart economy in smart cities. In: Vinod Kumar TM (ed) Smart economy in smart cities–International collaborative research: Ottawa, St. Louis, Stuttgart, Bologna, Cape Town, Nairobi, Dakar, Lagos, New Delhi, Varanasi, Vijayawada, Kozhikode, Hong Kong. Springer, Singapore, pp 3–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1610-3_1 World Bank (1992) Governance and development. World Bank Group, Washington sDC Wunsch JS (2001) Decentralization, local governance and recentralization in Africa. Public Adm Dev 21(4):277–288

Jamie Boex is a Senior Fellow at the Duke Center for International Development and an economist with extensive experience in public sector finance, fiscal decentralization, intergovernmental (fiscal) relations and local governance reforms in developing and transition countries around the world. Working with organizations such as the World Bank, UNDP, USAID, and numerous bilateral development agencies and research organizations, Boex has contributed to policy reforms in over twenty countries around the world, including Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Republic of Georgia, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor-Leste and Uganda. Boex has authored and contributed to numerous books, book chapters, articles, and reports on intergovernmental finance, public expenditure management, and poverty reduction. In addition to his academic research and expertise in the management and provision of technical assistance, Boex has considerable experience in the development and delivery of academic courses and professional training programs in the areas of public sector finance, (fiscal) decentralization and local governance. For instance, Boex frequently contributes to the Duke Summer Executive Training Program on Fiscal Decentralization and Local Government Finance. As the head of the Local Public Sector Initiative, Boex studies how the localization of public services and the decentralization of the public sector can help achieve global development outcomes. As a scholarpractitioner, he frequently engages in comparative and quantitative public sector analyses in order to provide evidence-based policy recommendations. Boex holds a Ph.D. in economics from the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies (AYSPS) at Georgia State University (1999). He is a member of the American Economic Association (AEA), the National Tax Association (NTA), the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA), and the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management (ABFM).

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J. Boex et al. Ammar A. Malik is the Director of Research at Evidence for Policy Design, a research program at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He leads research-policy engagements that derive actionable policy insights from rigorous research. He oversees EPoD’s labour market and education research portfolios in the Middle East, identifying and supporting opportunities for data and economic analysis to inform local policies that empower underrepresented groups and support social and economic development. Before joining EPoD, he was Senior Research Associate at the Urban Institute in Washington DC, where he conceived, fundraised and led research programs on women’s economic empowerment and growth, the policy implications of forced displacement, and urban resilience building. He also previously worked at the World Bank, International Food Policy Research Institute, Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority and Standard Chartered Bank. Ammar’s research focuses on spatial urban forms and their economic implications, the political economy of public service delivery, and the distributional effects of urban public transport. For his work on the economic impact of sexual harassment in urban public spaces, he was awarded the World Bank Group and Sexual Violence Research Initiative’s 2017 Development Marketplace Innovation Award. Ammar has used agent-based modelling to explore the emergence of innovation clusters within cities, including how land-use regulations, sprawl, spatial segregation and limited physical mobility stifles productivity. Ammar holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Mason University, M.A. in Public Affairs from Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) Paris, M.A. in Public Policy from the National University of Singapore, and B.A. in Economics and Mathematics from the Lahore University of Management Sciences.

Devanne Brookins is a Research Coordinator at the Harvard University Graduate School of Design, supporting the Transforming Urban Transport—The Role of Political Leadership (TUT-POL) Sub-Saharan Africa project. Her research interests are centred on the intersection of urban development, governance and land in developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Her research is driven by overarching questions how urban governance and development—inclusive of service provision, infrastructure and land management—contribute to distributional outcomes that perpetuate inequality. Her dissertation research explored the process of institutional change and the role of informal actors through the lens of land reform in urban and peri-urban areas in Ghana. Prior to her doctoral studies, Devanne worked in international development research and program management with organizations such as The Urban Institute and Oxfam America. She has also consulted for the Africa Development Bank, UN Habitat in the Urban Land, Legislation and Governance Branch and the African Center for Economic Transformation. Devanne holds a PhD in International Development Planning from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP) at MIT; dual Masters’ degrees from

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Columbia University in Urban Planning (GSAPP) and International Affairs (SIPA); and a BA in Political Science and French from Wellesley College. Ben Edwards is a governance specialist and occasional researcher with a focus on multilevel public finance and service delivery. He currently serves as a Program Officer at the Millennium Challenge Corporation, where he supports design and implementation of large-scale development programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. In past lives, he has been a teacher, a neuropsychology researcher, and a kayak instructor. When he is not buried in a paper in Washington DC or collecting data abroad, you can find him rock climbing.

Hashim Zaidi is the Asia Urban Programme Manager at Oxfam. Having a background in public policy, Hashim has spent most of his professional career working on governance issues including parliamentary strengthening, rule of law, local governments, elections, and constitutional reforms. His previous assignment was managing a Federalism and Decentralization programme for United Nations Development Programme in Pakistan that focused on strengthening inter-provincial coordination, establishing local governments, and improving municipal service delivery & urban governance. Hashim has also had opportunities to work on education policy & reforms, enterprise development, and performance assessments. Hashim’s current role involves developing Oxfam’s learning and approaches to urban work across Asia along with providing strategic and programmatic advice and direction to country teams on urban programming.

From Exclusion to Inclusion: The Understanding, Capacity, and Will to Change Local Government Practices Björn Möller

Abstract Local governments should be at the frontline of combatting social exclusion. Their proximity to the citizens, and their understanding of the specific needs of the communities they govern, allow them to play a potentially central role in counteracting exclusion. Without undervaluing national and international efforts to counteract social exclusion, it is reasonable to state that local governments too can and should proactively contribute to building inclusive societies. Local governments are already implementing relevant measures, and several are cooperating with other local governments, globally, in this endeavour. What are the key lessons learned from the implementation of collaborative development projects related to social inclusion? Drawing on cases of municipal partnerships between local governments in Sweden and Africa, Asia and Europe, as well as on development projects led by participants in training programmes supported by the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD), this chapter highlights the importance of mobilizing broad support, raising awareness for reform initiatives, and strengthening local government capacity. The projects studied also highlight the value of partnerships, not only for generating new ideas and knowledge, but also for reform initiatives to gain added momentum from being part of global development agendas such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the New Urban Agenda. Keywords Social inclusion · Local government · Municipal partnership · Capacity building · State-civil society collaboration · Knowledge transfer

1 Introduction While urbanization undoubtedly creates opportunities for both people and places, it also creates challenges that local governments need to address. Cities, especially larger ones, have always been diverse with inflows of people and products that, historB. Möller (B) International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD), P.O. Box 1125, 621 57 Visby, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_12

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ically, have stimulated cities to become centres of creativity and innovation. However, in the last few decades, globalization, political, economic, and social restructuring, and the rescaling of governance have added new dimensions to urban diversity, and led to new types of social inequalities and patterns of segregation (Vranken 2011). Projections by the United Nations and the World Bank expect the number of people living in cities will double in the Asia-Pacific region over the coming 40 years. The current global urban population of over 50% is projected to reach 66.2% in 2050. The 2015 State of Asian and Pacific Cities report (UN-Habitat and ESCAP 2015) describes the potential effects of this impending surge in urban population on the role of Asian and Pacific local governments. Local governments in the region will need to show strong leadership and action in the management of public responsibilities and services to tackle attendant issues of poverty and growing inequalities. Utilizing the diversity of the urban population and providing opportunities for all will be a crucial factor in creating inclusive Asian and Pacific cities. While urbanization is a global phenomenon, the specific characteristics of the Asian context are worth describing in more detail. In his article 21st Century Asian Cities: Unique Transformation, Unprecedented Challenges, Dahiya (2012) points to two distinct characteristics of Asian urbanization: the unparalleled, rapid urban population growth; and the broad base of urbanization, with a majority of the urban population living in small and medium sized cities. Apart from these two phenomena, which significantly impact the work of local governments, Asia is also experiencing what Dahiya (2012) calls the urbanization of poverty. While Asia, in general, has seen an impressive overall decrease in poverty (the poverty rate was halved in less than two decades), the decline has been slower in cities than in rural areas. In recent years, a number of ambitious efforts at the global level have focused attention on the challenges of increasing urbanization. One of the prioritized areas in the New Urban Agenda (NUA), for instance, is social inclusion and ending poverty. The NUA, adopted by the United Nations member states at the Habitat III conference in Quito in 2016, intends to guide urban development worldwide in sustainable and transformative ways. To guide its vision, the NUA stresses three principles that can be summarized as: leave no one behind; ensure sustainable and inclusive economies; and ensure environmental sustainability. Another agenda of relevance for this chapter, which was launched in 2015, is the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Agenda 2030). It contains 17 goals for global sustainable development, and goal number 11 for sustainable cities and communities explicitly addresses inclusion in cities. The 17th goal of Agenda 2030 is a partnership goal—where the implementation of the other sustainable development goals is meant to be bolstered through global partnerships. For an organization such as the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD), which has been responsible for supporting local government partnerships since its creation in 2009, the emphasis on global partnerships is salient. The organization has supported numerous fruitful exchanges of experiences at the local government level. However, it is precarious, in general, to define globally applicable “best practices” of local government performance, especially when it comes to recommendations for policy-making for fostering greater inclusivity. Conditions for

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progress in social inclusion are highly idiosyncratic to a locale’s specific context and history, and are influenced by specific factors such as the extant economic condition and history, migration flows, demographics, and social conflicts. Still, it can be argued there may be “relevant practices,” in the form of common lessons to learn about social exclusion and inclusion from and across varied settings. The fundamental nature of exclusion, globally, is largely similar, whether it be structural barriers to women’s participation or the absence of representation in local governance, for instance, of ethnic minorities, youth, or disability perspectives. Such lack of inclusion and participation is a universal problem that hampers democratic development. This then begets the question this chapter addresses: What broad lessons do local government efforts to enhance social inclusion in different contexts offer? This chapter discusses such local efforts from different parts of the world to stimulate ideas and active approaches for strengthening social inclusion. The section following the introduction presents a conceptual framework to explain how this chapter views the concepts of social inclusion and social exclusion. This is followed by a description of the methodology. The discussion of cases comes next. These cases are about local governments’ engagement in various forms of international decentralized cooperation, from municipal partnerships to capacity building programmes. The projects were funded by the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD) between 2010 and 2016, and illustrate how politicians and public servants have approached issues of social inclusion in different ways. The intention here is to identify commonalities across successful initiatives, such as the strengthening of a gender perspective in local level planning processes, how local governments can increase participation of people with disabilities in public life, and how negative effects of work-related migration on children can be countered by active engagement from local governments. Findings from the projects are presented in the penultimate section, and the chapter ends with a discussion of the highlights and, in conclusion, calls for enhancing social inclusion by asserting the importance of: local governments in attaining inclusive and sustainable development; global partnerships involving local governments for building the capacities of local governments; and robust statecivil society cooperation, locally, for politically and socially acceptable governance reforms.

2 Social Inclusion, Social Exclusion and the Conditions for Knowledge Transfer: A Conceptual Framework Before proceeding further, a brief review of how the governance and planning literature views social inclusion and how development agencies and frameworks interpret them will be useful. Social inclusion must be understood as a multi-dimensional process, with the objective of ensuring equal opportunities for all, regardless of background, so that they can achieve their full potential. It is aimed at creating conditions that enable full and active participation of every member of society in all

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aspects of life, including participation in the decision-making processes for governance, policymaking, and planning (United Nations 2016). In the past decade, academic interest in different forms of citizen participation has sharply increased (Roberts 2015). Opinions regarding the potential benefits of citizen participation certainly vary, which reflect the wide spectrum of political ideologies and social mores. One could claim that citizen participation is a vital component of any democratic practice, and that in educating and empowering the citizens, which improves the democratic process, lies its intrinsic value (Karlsson 2013). From a different perspective, the direct participation of citizens could be less desirable. Evidence suggests that citizens who are engaged in participatory activities often belong to the so-called societal elite (Karlsson 2013). From this viewpoint then, in affording local elites greater influence over local politics, participatory democracy can also sustain segregation and exclusion. The opposite of social inclusion is social exclusion. Sen (2000, pp. 14–15) has indicated that social exclusion is distinguishable into two forms, active and passive: When, for example, immigrants or refugees are not given a usable political status, it is an active exclusion, and this applies to many of the deprivations from which minority communities suffer in Europe and Asia and elsewhere. When, however, the deprivation comes about through social processes in which there is no deliberate attempt to exclude, the exclusion can be seen as a passive kind. A good example is provided by poverty and isolation generated by a sluggish economy and a consequent accentuation of poverty. Both active and passive exclusions may be important, but they are not important in the same way.

Apart from these two types of exclusion, there are several more ways in which the concept of exclusion can be defined, including state-sanctioned exclusion and the kinds stemming from societal norms. Following the humble academic ambitions of this chapter, however, the discussion above should be sufficient in trying to define the phenomenon. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) provides arguments that social exclusion is a growing problem, both in the developed and developing nations. Around 900 million people worldwide are estimated to belong to groups that “experience discrimination or disadvantages as a result of their identity” (EuropeAid 2017). A case in point is Sweden. The country has experienced growing problems related to social exclusion in the past decades—whether the exclusion is passive or active is subject to a politicized and sensitive debate. Despite its reputed commitment to freedom and social equity, in many areas it has become obvious that the country has much to learn when it comes to innovative practices in regard to social inclusion that have emerged globally. The 2014 Social Inclusion Report, a part of the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) project, concluded that although social inclusion in some areas works well in Sweden, it is ineffective in other areas, most notably in relation to the integration of immigrants, primarily, into the labour market but also into society more generally (Schraad-Tischler and Azahaf 2014). Furthermore, a rapid increase in the Gini coefficient indicates that relative poverty levels in Sweden are increasing, which led the

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authors of the Social Inclusion Report to conclude that “…recent developments challenge the country’s historical position as a leader in the public provision of welfare through wealth redistribution and as a country with extremely low levels of poverty” (Schraad-Tischler and Azahaf 2014, p. 4). Notwithstanding this somewhat gloomy assessment, the coming sections aim to show a few examples of globally transferable ideas for enhanced citizen participation and increased social inclusion. As mentioned previously, global partnerships for development are enshrined as methodological goal number 17 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Around the world, there is precedence of various local governments partnering up to solve different problems related to local democracy, among which social exclusion has featured prominently. The success of reforms or other initiatives for increasing social inclusion, ultimately, lies in their implementation. Implementation theory suggests three conditions for successful implementation: will, capacity, and understanding (Lundqvist 1987); that means there must be determination, sufficient resources, and clear and unambiguous steering. This chapter will focus more on matters of capacity. It can be argued that focusing merely on these three aspects of implementation overlooks other vital perspectives pertaining to conditions for implementation. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981), for example, the conditions for effective implementation consist of a number of material, structural and contextual variables. The material variables are defined as technical difficulties, diversity of target group behaviour, target group as a percentage of the population, and the extent of behaviour change required. The structural variables include clear objectives, incorporation of adequate causal theory, hierarchical integration within and among implementing organizations, recruitment of implementing officials, allocation of financial resources, and formal access by outsiders. The contextual variables consist of socioeconomic conditions and technology, public support, attitudes and resources of constituency groups, support from legislators, and the commitment and leadership of implementing officials. Unclear or flawed causal theory is frequently noted as a source of implementation failure. By delving deeper into the causal theory of change and exploring underlying conditions in depth, the interventions analysed in this chapter could certainly be enriched. However, deeper investigation of this nature would require much more extensive study of the particular projects, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. This chapter describes international local government partnerships whose overarching aim is exchanging knowledge for strengthening local organizational capacity. The importance of the adequately capacitated civil servant cannot be overstated, but the capacity of individuals alone is not enough. Entire organizations need to have adequate capacity in order to achieve effective and sustainable results. Innovations or good practices need to be institutionalized and routinized through, for instance, guidelines, handbooks, and instructions for employees, and supervision. The model of how individual knowledge can become institutional knowledge has been described by scholars such as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) in what the authors calls the “SECI model”. The model describes how new knowledge is created through an interplay between tacit knowledge—characterized as subjective, context-specific, and difficult to formalize—and explicit knowledge, which is considered objective, and transmittable in formal language. Further, the model proposes that new knowledge is created

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and institutionalized through four different phases—socialization; externalization; combination; and internalization. In socialization the first phase individual practitioners improve their skills through the direct exchange of tacit knowledge and experiences from other practitioners. The learning-by-doing that takes place in physical meetings within the municipal partnerships (described later in this chapter) can be viewed as an example of this type of knowledge transfer. The knowledge generated in these meetings needs to reach the organization’s other departments or units; in other words, new knowledge needs to be externalized. In this phase, knowledge needs to be made explicit and shared through written reports or sets of recommendations. Even new ideas with broad support in an organization do not exist in a vacuum. They need to be matched with existing policies within the organization, what Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) call the combination phase in their model. The new knowledge will not come into use though unless the organization makes it accessible to individual staff members. This last step is the internalization phase. Mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that individual staff members are updated on policies when dealing with clients or implementing plans. At this stage, the challenge is transforming explicit, organizational knowledge (e.g. through updated guidelines or manuals) into tacit, individual knowledge, which then provides starting points for generating new knowledge. This will again trigger the knowledge generation spiral during the next exchange of experiences that will be the next opportunity for socialization.

3 Methodology The cases studied in the following section represent projects implemented by local governments, local government associations, or NGOs in partnership with local governments involved in the Municipal Partnership Programme (MPP) and International Training Programmes (ITPs), both arranged by the Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD). Funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), ICLD is a Swedish organization that supports international development cooperation through the capacity development of local governments in Africa, Asia, and Europe, and is connected to the Swedish Association of Local Government and Regions (SALAR). Both the aforementioned programmes exemplify, although in slightly different forms, global cooperation between local governments. The international partnerships of MPP follow a collaborative format designed to contribute to the development of local governments in ICLD’s partner countries as well as in Sweden. The aim of the programme is to contribute to developing democratic systems that increase citizens’ influence. This is to be achieved by strengthening local and regional political governments within one or more of ICLD’s core areas of concentration: equity and inclusion; citizen participation; transparency; and accountability. That such cooperation be of mutual benefit is a strict condition governing programme funding.

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The capacity building programmes, ITPs, focus on a multitude of areas related to local democracy and development. As a part of the training in most programmes, participants run a so-called project for change. Apart from the international training programmes, the ICLD also runs national capacity building programs in Russia and Zimbabwe.1 In these training programmes, around 25 participants, primarily civil servants from local governments, participate in 18-month long training stints. The programmes pursue different topics, such as sustainable urban planning, municipal finance, and rights-based approaches to local governance. Some programmes specifically target elected women politicians at the local level. The cases presented in this chapter have been selected from the ICLD database as instructive examples that have specifically targeted issues concerning social inclusion. They are not exclusively from Asia-Pacific, but, hopefully, are still relevant for similar efforts in the region. The data have been collected from reports, project presentations, interviews with MPP and ITP staff members, as well as from participatory observations. The author of this chapter is a member of ICLD, which may influence the analysis. However, to minimize any potential bias, the conclusions drawn mainly reflect opinions and experiences that project participants themselves have reported.

4 Project Descriptions and Findings This section presents seven cases of how local governments can work toward enhancing social inclusion. Most highlight experiences from Southeast Asia (China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam), but some instructive examples are from Europe (Moldova, Serbia and Turkey). Some examples are from the Municipal Partnership Programme (MPP) and the others are from the International Training Programmes (ITPs). The implementation of projects is not connected to any type of budgetary support from ICLD. The first three cases vary in their themes (local government–civil society dialogue, inclusion of people with disabilities, and inclusion of children), while the final cases specifically focus on women’s inclusion (Table 1).

4.1 The Municipality of Da Nang, Vietnam Civil society can play an important role in safeguarding the inclusion of vulnerable groups, and the dialogue between local government and civil society is of great significance. There are many ways to initiate and stimulate such communication. In a municipal partnership between the Vietnamese city of Da Nang and its Swedish counterpart city of Borås, this dialogue was a positive side-effect of working on waste management. The Da Nang city government partnered with the city of Borås to initiate a three-year development project to improve waste management. At the 1 The

full list of ICLD’s training programmes is available on its webpage, www.icld.se.

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Table 1 Cases in summary Case

Implementing agency

Programme Reasons for initiation

Main outcomes

1. Municipality of Da Nang, Vietnam

City of Da Nang (VN) and Borås Municipality (SE)

MPP

Creation of an environmentally sustainable Da Nang

Increased dialogue between local government and civil society

2. Chisinau, Moldova

Chisinau Municipality City Hall

ITP

Lack of accessibility to the city for people with disabilities

Increased social inclusion by changing public perception

3. Huangshan City, China

Huangshan Municipal Government (CN) and Vara Municipality (SE)

MPP

Lack of awareness and capacity of local authorities regarding the needs of left-behind children

Increased awareness Strengthened capacity Improved working methods

4. Tangerang Selatan Municipality, Indonesia

Regional Development Planning Agency of South Tangerang Municipality

ITP

Increase women’s participation in multistakeholder meetings in urban village level

Capacity building of facilitators Pilot projects Replication

5. Uttarakhand, India

Uttarakhand Urban Sector Development Agency, Government of Uttarakhand

ITP

Weak situation for elected women in Urban Local Bodies

Gender sensitive policy formulation Gender-sensitive and enabling environment for women Improved institutional arrangements in urban infrastructure projects

6. Izmir, Turkey

Association of Enhancement of Social Life (SYGD)

ITP

Failing integration of migrant or disadvantaged women

Increase in participants’ access to basic services Improved gender equality and awareness of legal rights Upgrading of communication skills Improved relationship between local government and civil society (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Case

Implementing agency

7. Standing SCTM and Committee Beˇcej of Towns and Municipality Municipalities (SCTM)/Beˇcej Municipality, Serbia

Programme Reasons for initiation

Main outcomes

ITP

Gender equality mainstreamed into budget processes

Gender unequal municipal budget allocation

Source Author

inception of this cooperative process, Da Nang was struggling to develop a strategy for sustainable waste management. The city was and still is expanding, both population-wise and spatially. Among all provinces and municipalities in Vietnam, it also has the highest urbanization rate. Tourism is a mainstay of the economy and environmental management was seen as critical to develop a sustainable tourism sector. Similar to other socialist economies, Vietnam followed the Soviet model of centralized planning. Its top down planning system has continued to function well after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mai 2008). Decentralization of planning processes to lower levels of government is rare, so the possibilities of listening to views and opinions of the public are limited. Participation in civil society organizations (CSOs) in Vietnam is high. But this gives a skewed view of the state of public participation, due to the lack of civil society independence and the impact of CSOs is limited (ADB 2011). At the start of the cooperation, Da Nang’s local government already had effective cooperation with a local university, but not with CSOs or the private sector. Borås, on the other hand, had a well-functioning model of stakeholder cooperation, which included all stakeholders. One of the first steps in the project was, therefore, to create in Da Nang a model for inter-stakeholder cooperation, based on the positive experiences of the triple helix concept of Borås. Da Nang has since taken many steps, such as awareness campaigns and street cleaning events, to involve the citizenry and civil society in becoming an environmentally conscious city. While the project sought to address issues related to waste management, including wastewater treatment and solid waste management, a democracy perspective was also infused into the project’s approach. An important aspect was to create behavioural changes pertaining to waste management, as was to work for greater inclusion of those who eke out a living from landfills by sorting and selling waste. A part of this work was to make households aware of the value of waste by using economic incentives at the community level to encourage collecting and sorting waste. According to other local governments that have participated in the project, the cooperation between Da Nang’s local government and the women’s associations in the districts, which have recently been granted official status by the People’s

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Committee, yielded some interesting outcomes. Since women’s lives are closely linked to and affected by waste management, especially at the household level, the women’s association turned out to play a vital part in needs assessment. It was observed in one project area, for example, that separation of waste at source was carried out entirely by women. The project therefore concluded that the inclusion of women in the planning processes and the women’s association were instrumental in creating a successful waste management system.

4.2 Huangshan, China A decent childhood is obviously indispensable toward ensuring an individual’s future productive participation in society, so the social inclusion of children ought to be an important focus for local government. Since 2006, Huangshan City in China and Vara Municipality in Sweden have been cooperating in an ICLD-supported partnership. One of the projects targeted the “left-behind children” of Quiankou village in Huangshan,2 and it focused on sensitizing local authorities about the needs of these children. The project undertook a challenge that is a creation of China’s urbanization and its policies to control rural-to-urban migration. As parents move to the big cities to work, many leave their children with their grandparents in the countryside. Parents are often separated from their children for years on end, and most barely see theirs a few times per year. The project was primarily conducted at the caring centre for stay-at-home children and teenagers in Qiankou Village. However, the methods and tools developed during the project and the results were intended to be transferable to all caring centres in Huangshan City. The effort yielded good results in three specific areas. First, unprecedented attention was placed on the left-behind children’s position in society. Second, it strengthened the capacity of both Chinese and Swedish project participants. Third, methods to understand and analyse children’s health were refined. These methods included the use of so-called “taping” (a method for improving communication though visual illustrations), “little teddy bear message cards” (a method to improve communication on emotional matters with other children), “life book” (a biographical method for keeping memories) and “question notes” (a method to encourage children to talk about their feelings). To adapt them from Swedish to Chinese conditions, the participants transformed the project’s methods; several of Huangshan’s left-behind children centres and schools now use the methods. Furthermore, pupils were given access to telephones for keeping in touch with their parents, and a temporary guardian kept track of their well-being and school performance. Management staff that worked with the children reported paying more 2 In 2013 there were 61 million so-called left-behind children in China. These children are a result of

work related migration, where parents have to leave their children in their home villages while they find work in the cities. For more information, see for example the study “They are also parents”, carried out in 2013 by the Center for Child Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility (CCR CSR) and the Facilitator, and supported by the CSR Centre of the Embassy of Sweden.

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Fig. 1 Scenes from Chisnau, Moldova. Source Chisinau Municipality City Hall

attention to their family background, which was considered less important earlier. The children were encouraged to become more physically active, and the schools provided resources such as venues for dancing and book clubs. The project owners reported greater empathy for the predicament of the left-behind children. Participants of the project felt it significantly improved social awareness towards left-behind children in Huangshan City. Due to almost one million RMB (around 150,000 USD) of yearly investment since 2010, by the end of 2014, 28 activity rooms and 193 caring centres for left-behind children had been created to secure for them decent living situations, better learning environments, and improved psychological health.

4.3 Chisinau, Moldova Inclusion of people living with disabilities is a global challenge. In Chisinau, Moldova, the focus for a project in one of ICLD’s training programmes was on assuring accessibility to people in wheelchairs, adults with children in perambulators, and the elderly (Fig. 1). Most municipal infrastructure in Chisinau—mainly buildings and public spaces (including, for instance, medical facilities, cultural facilities, pharmacies, residential buildings, parks and recreation areas, and pedestrian crossings)—was inaccessible for people with disabilities or special physical needs. The methods of intervening in Chisinau included a series of workshops and group discussion with stakeholders, a citizen survey conducted through the city’s website, interviews with youth in local schools, meetings with City Hall officials, awarenessraising activities (such as flash mobs and school classes), creation of partnerships

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among public institutions to promote accessibility, and publishing and updating a new ‘accessibility map’ on the city’s website. Moldovan law requires public authorities and economic agents (for example certain commercial facilities) to ensure access for persons with disabilities to social infrastructure. Yet only about one in three (1697 out of 5137) concerned structures/facilities in Chisinau and the country, overall, is equipped with ramps. Existing ramps rarely meet construction regulations or users’ needs. The city’s officials and inhabitants alike did not view the lack of access as a problem or concern. In general, the project managers considered societal awareness about the abilities, challenges, and problems of excluded people to be alarmingly low, so the project was an important step towards providing equal accessibility opportunities. Five meetings were carried out with representatives from different departments of the administration to hear their opinions in order to visualize and articulate an action plan. The project also sought the active involvement of NGOs and other CSOs. That, in itself, has yielded a positive outcome of the project: to collaboratively approach problems and suggest measures for immediately improving the conditions of accessible paths. The project raised the sense of social responsibility, especially of public authorities and the youth, which led to access ramps becoming functional in 70% of Chisinau’s buildings. The limited mobility of certain groups prompted this project to create necessary conditions toward expanding accessibility of public structures and spaces. While the legal framework already existed to support the implementation of the project, the problem was insufficient understanding of the issue’s seriousness and urgency among citizens and public authorities. The project’s different awareness raising activities helped attain greater social inclusion by changing public perception and opinion.

4.4 Tangerang Selatan Municipality, Indonesia Inclusion of women in decision-making processes is undoubtedly a vital dimension of social inclusion. In Tangerang Selatan, the municipal government had observed that participation of women was lower than men’s in local decision-making processes and planning meetings (Musrenbang). This was suspected to partly explain why the aspirations of women were rarely spoken about, heard, or implemented. To ameliorate the situation, the Regional Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) of South Tangerang Municipality initiated a project, managed by a participant of ICLD’s capacity building programmes, to increase women’s participation in the multi-stakeholder consultation forum for development planning at the urban village (sub-city) level. Tangerang Selatan (South Tangerang) Municipality was established at the end of 2008, making it one of the youngest cities in Indonesia. Since 1999, Indonesia has practiced political decentralization. The extensively decentralized Indonesian municipalities, including South Tangerang, are responsible for providing a wide range of

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services to their citizens, such as education, health, public work, environment, trade and industry. Foreign policy, defence (including armed forces and national police), legal system, and monetary policy are the responsibilities of the central government. Even for the decentralized affairs, the central government still has the right to create laws and general policies for local governments to comply (Nasution 2016). The ICLD-supported project specifically identified the causes of poor women’s participation as weak economic, educational and technical capacity, lack of family support for women involved in public roles, male favouritism, and gender stereotypes prevalent in a patriarchal system. Efforts to increase women’s participation in multi-stakeholder meetings at the urban village level (akin to neighbourhoods) were concluded to be of key importance, as such meetings are crucial steps in development planning and, especially, a participatory budgeting process called musrenbang in Indonesia. The project’s approach was to develop deliberative planning fora and provide capacity building, which mainly consisted of strengthening meeting facilitation techniques as well as piloting the approach elsewhere for replication. To enable women’s participation and empowerment, the project leader concluded that it is essential to convince the community’s men and their groups, and community leaders to give women the chance to be involved in decision-making processes. Furthermore, the will of the urban village administration to change the conventional practice of conducting male-dominated, multi-stakeholder consultation forums was found to be a vital precondition for developing the current situation, which was equally true regarding the will of local political leaders for involving women in urban development processes. It became clear in the project that the role of the meeting facilitators was highly important in achieving optimal dynamics for discussion in the forum. Also, in every village, an additional forum (Pra Musrenbang) organized by the village administrator was introduced prior to the actual forum. Involving smaller groups, this meeting allows more detailed discussion, and it is now viewed as an effective way for women to formulate their proposals for the village forum. Good facilitation by local facilitators means that less time is now devoted to the forum’s ceremonial components, and most of it is dedicated for group discussions. Since it would be too costly to train special facilitators for the forums, villages are advised to use as facilitators community self-groups called Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat that were formed for the country’s main poverty reduction program, the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM). These facilitators are familiar with bottom-up planning and participative decision making, and during facilitation they place special emphasis on involving women. Furthermore, an “e-Musrenbang” system that was implemented makes it possible for everyone in the meeting groups to input their proposals directly to the system. The local government is planning to make it possible for all citizens to submit proposals.

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Fig. 2 Women in Uttarakhand, India. Source Uttarakhand Urban Sector Development Agency

4.5 Uttarakhand, India In this case from the Indian state of Uttarakhand, too, issues of women’s inclusion in society were in focus. India’s 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) of 1992 gave urban local bodies (ULBs), which includes municipalities, a wide range of powers and functions. However, according to the Uttarakhand Urban Sector Development Agency, the project lead, the role of elected women in ULBs is yet weak. Women who are unaware of their rights, consequently, fail to empower themselves adequately or demand appropriately sensitive service delivery. Scant exposure and awareness, and lacking technical knowhow are some key reasons for this. The Uttarakhand project was implemented in the towns of Dehradun and Nainital, and it aimed to promote citizen participation through improved institutional arrangements in urban infrastructure projects, good governance by strengthening local capacities, and better urban governance and better services by focusing strongly on the poor, the marginalized, and women (Fig. 2). The prime objective was to create a gender-sensitive and enabling environment for women in infrastructure projects, and to enhance ULBs’ capacities through various capacity development activities equally for men and women. The project’s efforts, such as capacity building and creation of networks and fora for elected women representatives, targeted institutional strengthening, involv-

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ing stakeholder institutions from planning to execution and evaluation, communityparticipation in planning basic services for the urban poor, pursuing strong genderfocused policies, and conducting capacity building activities for elected women representatives in ULBs and other institutions. Capacity building exercises included trainings, orientation workshops, seminars, and exposure tours for women officials and local citizens. These efforts resulted in significantly increasing the active participation of women leaders in meetings and workshops, creation of a women’s forum/network, and emergence of a collective voice on issues and concerns pertaining to policy reform. In turn, these have boosted active participation in decision making and municipal plan preparation, women-sensitive welfare schemes, and gender-sensitive policy formulation. Eventually, the State Cabinet’s approving a Gender Sensitive State Slum Policy exemplified the scaling-up of the project’s innovative interventions.

4.6 Izmir, Turkey The inclusion of women was also in focus in a project (2014–15) in Izmir, Turkey, where an NGO, the Association of Enhancement of Social Life (SYGD), was the project leader. The integration and empowerment of migrant women in urban life was the issue in question here. The societal integration of migrant and disadvantaged women who live in the Izmir’s Konak district and Karabaglar municipality was the project’s spatial focus. Due to lower levels of educational attainment and information access, these women experience widespread discrimination. The patriarchal nature of their societies renders the situation even more complex. Very few social services and programmes exist to enable these women to educate them about their legal rights and translate those into actionable support. The women involved in the project were recent migrants and long-time residents, but both groups had not benefited from city-provided opportunities such as access to health, educational, and vocational services. Thus, through various types of training, an ICLD capacity-building programme aimed to assist the project managers to improve disadvantaged migrant women’s larger socio-economic inclusion and their ability to address routine problems on their own. The approaches utilized in the project included capacity building for effective communication and other social activities for supporting personal development, and assisting women to learn about their rights and responsibilities, which can promote more active engagement in city life. Awareness campaigns about the trainings and other services provided by the project helped increase interest in and participation by the target groups. The migrant women’s family members were also treated as stakeholders in the project, since discrimination partly stems from within their families and communities. The project organized eight trainings at four different learning centres of the local government (Fig. 3). Each lasted two weeks and, in all, 108 women participated. The educational topics stressed effectıve communication, increasing self-confidence

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Fig. 3 Training in Izmir, Turkey. Source Association of Enhancement of Social Life (SYGD)

and motivation, stress management, child development, gender equality and sensitivity (with male and women participants), and the rights of women and children. The follow-up to the project included interviews and surveys in the target areas that found the following: 75% of the women reported improved access to basic services (health, education, vocational services etc.); 70% said their awareness about gender equality and legal rights had increased; and 80% reported upgrading of communication skills. Another vital result was improved relationships between the local governments and the lead NGO, SYGD. The training programmes developed by SYGD were shared with the participating local governments for regular implementation beyond the project duration.s

4.7 Standing Committee of Towns and Municipalities (SCTM)/Beˇcej Municipality, Serbia Working toward the inclusion of women and girls by looking at how the municipal budget is allocated was the objective of a project in Serbia led by the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities (SCTM), in cooperation with the municipality of Beˇcej. Gender inequality in public expenditures is a globally pervasive problem (OECD 2016), and it is no different in Serbia. The project managers had participated in a ICLD training programme in 2014. The project was a partnership attempt by SCTM and Beˇcej municipality to produce an exemplar of gender responsive budgeting, which could be adopted later in other Serbian municipalities.

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During 2014–2015, the Serbian budgeting system underwent an important change. There was a shift towards budgets based on programmes and goals, instead of the prevalent line-item budgeting approach, which allocated resources towards certain users. This shift opened up an opportunity to make public spending more efficient, gender equal, transparent, accountable and fair. A baseline study undertaken by the project showed, however, that only around a quarter of the 23 municipalities studied had introduced programme-based budgeting, and, even though respondents to a high degree were trained in gender budgeting, only four percent of the municipalities conducted gender analyses of their budgetary lines. More than a third of the municipalities reported not having any practice of involving the public at all in the budgetary process. The Municipality of Beˇcej moved forward toward improving its data collection and analysis, using specifically designed software that now provides gender sensitive statistics on all municipal operations and services. Using the software and the personal identification number of each citizen, the municipality can disaggregate individuals’ municipal service demands from men and women. The system provides an overview of which services are used by women and men, and how differently. SCTM has also developed a procedure for programme budgeting, with standardized gender sensitive indicators for local level administration. It is hoped that the Beˇcej experience will enable implementing similar systems in other municipalities. The project aim to standardize data collection will enable broader gender-based development analyses. Future analyses can help the continued refinement of policies to make them more equitable, and enhance people’s quality of life by improving access to public services. The long-term vision is a system to monitor gender inequality in public sector activities toward better reallocating public resources. In the project, a number of local NGOs such as the Beˇcej Youth Association and the Association of Entrepreneurs and Leader Net were also invited to participate in the training course along with participants from the local government. Improving public finances is usually a long and complex process requiring extensive contributions from different stakeholders at different levels. SCTM received a European award for its work to create a gender-integrated budget process from The Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South East Europe (NALAS), the GENiYOUTH Municipal Initiatives Award for the Inclusion of Women and Youth in Local Government Affairs in South East Europe. This project recognized the importance of national level commitment for establishing a legal framework that enables the space for such partnerships.

5 Discussion and Conclusion The discussion of the seven cases on different aspects of social inclusion and ICLD’s experience from its other projects suggest a few conclusions. The conclusions are obviously drawn from a small sample size; yet, these likely hold wider relevance and can inspire change elsewhere too.

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The three concepts from implementation theory mentioned earlier—will, capacity and understanding—can be useful when interpreting the conclusions (Lundquist 1987). Civil servants need sufficient capacity to implement social inclusion policies, both in terms of knowledge as well as material and financial resources available, but they also need to understand well the reasons behind policy decisions in order to have the motivation and will to implement them. However, in addition to the capacity, understanding, and will for successful implementation by civil servants, there must obviously also be an awareness about the challenges of social exclusion and the will to overcome them from policy makers since they play a key role in making sufficient resources available. It is salient to revisit the knowledge transfer model described at the beginning of this chapter. Why is it relevant for a chapter on social inclusion? Firstly, it describes the need for ways to transfer knowledge on the nuances of social inclusion, which can be hard to convey in written form; hence, the need to meet, in person, people working with similar challenges and observe their ways of working needs to be stressed for improving practice. All the cases involved individual staff members of local governments participating, sometimes with civil society actors, in capacity building programmes that heavily emphasized physical meetings. The training programmes typically held physical meetings over several weeks. The value of involving higher decision-making levels in the process became evident for making the externalization of transformed practices easier and effective. To stimulate this, ICLD involves members of both incumbent and opposition parties in the partnerships, especially in the steering groups of these projects, which also strengthens the sustainability of the partnerships. For the knowledge gained from such projects to be useful, it needs to inform organizations’ existing plans and modes of functioning. This highlights the importance of political will. That organizations are resistant to change in organizations is well acknowledged. It is, however, important to bear in mind that sometimes resistance is not the problem. Instead, the problem is a lack of awareness, and the most suitable solution is proper informing. The lack of awareness in local governments can be due to the inadequacies of political will as well as the capacity of civil servants. The case of Huangshan’s left-behind children, for example, demonstrated how the real issue was not the authorities’ ill intentions, but their lack of understanding. The last phase of the knowledge creation spiral, described by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), is to ensure that the individual civil servant is abreast of how the institutionalization of new knowledge translates into changed guidelines. The cases allude to this several times, and the use of updated software for gender-sensitive budgeting in Serbia underscores this. The cases indicate the benefits of putting effort into gaining broad-based support for reforms, both vertically (within and across different levels of government) and horizontally (with citizens and civil society). Pursuing change without involving citizens, CSOs, and influential groups is likely to face major hurdles, which is also true if initiatives are not firmly anchored in the groups expected to benefit from the results. The role of local governments in reaching the objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and fulfilling the ambitions of the New Urban Agenda

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cannot be stressed enough. The formation of sustainable, mutually rewarding, and results-oriented partnerships among local governments can provide momentum to achieving the SDGs and catalysing socially inclusive development at the local level. In this context, the work of UCLG ASPAC on furthering the DELGOSEA network on reform initiatives and replications by South East Asian local governments is notable. Launched in March 2010, DELGOSEA or the Partnership for Democratic Local Governance in Southeast-Asia, is a network of local government associations, local authorities, NGOs and academic institutions in the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. It focuses on the transnational exchange of sustainable good governance practices in four main areas: people’s participation in planning and decision-making; institutional governance; urban environment; and fiscal management and investment promotion strategies. The important role of renewed and strengthened global partnerships for inclusive, equitable, and sustainable development is also highlighted in a late 2017 report by the UN Secretary General (UN 2017). Scholars have long stressed the salience of state and civil society cooperation for effective governance and reform. Networking and partnerships among local governments and CSOs can push progressive governance agendas forward—locally, nationally, and globally. As this chapter demonstrated, local governments around the world often face similar challenges in enabling greater social inclusion. Many local governments are already innovating in different ways for realizing social inclusion, and global partnerships aided by organizations such as ICLD can help in disseminating and appropriately contextualizing innovative ideas and practices.

References Asian Development Bank (2011) Civil Society Briefs Vietnam. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/ files/publication/28969/csb-vie.pdf. Accessed June 2018 Dahiya B (2012) 21st century Asian cities: unique transformation, unprecedented challenges. Global Asia 7(1):96–104 European Commission (2017) Social inclusion. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/humandevelopment/social-inclusion_en. Accessed Jan 2017 Karlsson D (2013) A democracy of scale. Size and representative democracy in Swedish local government. Scand J Public Adm 17(1):7–28 Lundquist L (1987) Implementation steering. Studentlitteratur AB, Lund Mai TTV (2008) Comprehensive planning: does it work? Experiences from Vietnam. JOAAG 3(2) Nasution A (2016) Government decentralization program in Indonesia. ADBI working paper 601. Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo Nonaka I, Takeuchi H (1995) The knowledge creating company. Oxford University Press OECD (2016) J Budg 2016(3):4 Roberts NC (2015) The age of direct citizen participation. Routledge, p 496 Sabatier P, Mazmanian D (1981) The implementation of public policy: a framework of analysis. In: Mazmanian D, Sabatier P (eds) Effective policy implementation. Lexington Books, Lexington Schraad-Tischler D, Azahaf N (2014) Social inclusion report. Bertelsmann Stiftung Sen A (2000) Social exclusion: concept, application and scrutiny. Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, Social Development Papers, 2000, 1, June

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UN-Habitat and ESCAP (2015) The State of Asian and Pacific Cities 2015: urban transformations shifting from quantity to quality, UN-Habitat and ESCAP, Nairobi and Bangkok. https://unhabitat. org/books/the-state-of-asian-and-pacific-cities-2015/ United Nations (2016) Leaving no one behind: the imperative of inclusive development. Report on the world social situation 2016 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2017) Strategies for eradicating poverty to achieve sustainable development for all. Report of the secretary-general. E/CN.5/2017/3, p 18 Vranken J (2011) Social challenges of cities of tomorrow, pp. 1–2 in of cohesion, exclusion, inclusion and diversity—and of cities

Björn Möller is the Quality Assurance Manager of the Swedish International Center for Local Democracy (ICLD) in Visby, Sweden. The Centre is linked to the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) and is financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. He has worked with capacity building and research support in numerous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and Europe for nearly a decade. He has a specific interest in processes relating to knowledge management, monitoring, evaluation and learning in the context of municipal international cooperation. Besides his professional activities, Björn is also engaged as a local government auditor in the local government of Gotland, Sweden. Björn has a master’s degree in public administration from the School of Public Administration at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

Part IV

Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories

Towards Inclusive Urban Governance and Planning: Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories Ashok Das and Bharat Dahiya

Abstract In recent decades, the pace and scale of urbanization in many developing nations of Asia and the Pacific have been unprecedented. Globalization and neoliberal institutional reforms have accelerated the flow of capital and people into cities. Growing income/wealth inequality in societies across the world, both within cities and between urban and rural areas, has lately also been cause for deep concern. Whilst urbanization’s challenges are broadly common, this book signals the pressing need for seeking contextually appropriate responses founded on the premise of good governance. The enormous diversity within and across countries of the Asia-Pacific region makes urbanization related issues more complex, and attaining good governance and effective planning bedevilling. This chapter reflects upon and interprets the highlights of the book’s earlier chapters to clarify how emphases, approaches, and outcomes of planning endeavours vary across cities, and how their governance forms and reforms have been useful and/or wanting. It draws attention to some disconcerting trends as well as ingredients of success, which could prove instructive across contexts. It concludes by gleaning discernible trends and desirable trajectories for progressing urban governance—decentralization’s impacts on planning institutions and urban governance; prioritizing large infrastructure projects and spatial planning over basic services; advancing the use of technology to improve governance; and continuously enhancing the quality of participatory urban planning and governance. In stressing that outcomes are heavily shaped by the nature and capacities of extant institutions, the chapter reiterates the cliché-sounding importance of understanding and responding to context. Keywords Asia-Pacific · Urbanization · Governance · Planning · Institutions · New Urban Agenda (NUA) A. Das (B) Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa, Saunders Hall 107, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA e-mail: [email protected] B. Dahiya College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, 2 PraChan Road, Pra Nakorn, Bangkok 10200, Thailand © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Dahiya and A. Das (eds.), New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6709-0_13

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1 Introduction For three days in July 2016 the city of Surabaya in East Java, Indonesia hosted the third and final set of meetings of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom3) that led up to Habitat III—the third vicennial United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development1 —later that year in Quito, Ecuador. In Surabaya, continuing charged deliberations—among the Member States of the United Nations, civil society organizations of all stripes and sizes from around the world and, inter alia, representatives of the private sector, universities, and research and knowledge institutes, development agencies, and common citizens—lent considerable finality to several elements in the draft that was eventually adopted in Quito as the New Urban Agenda or NUA (United Nations 2017). Among PrepCom3’s many associated events was a three-day workshop organized by the East-West Center (EWC) and its partners (see Foreword), Urban Governance for Sustainable Development in Asia: Access to Services for Social Equity, which generated wide-ranging, dialogic conversations among academic researchers from three continents, national level administrators, elected local legislators, representatives of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, members of Indonesian and international civil society organizations (CSOs), and students from local universities. Some papers presented at the EWCsponsored workshop during PrepCom3 evolved into the chapters of this compendium. In recent decades, the dramatic pace and scale of urbanization in many developing nations of Asia and the Pacific have been unprecedented (Dahiya 2012a, b; UN-Habitat & ESCAP 2010, 2015). Globalization and countries’ neoliberal institutional reforms, which have accelerated the flow of capital and people into cities, have stoked much of this rapid urbanization, which economists and policymakers welcome as the harbinger of much needed economic growth. It is widely believed that urbanization is a strong proxy for development, and developing economies follow the U-shaped trajectory of the Kuznets curve. The gist of this contested curve is that inequality in a society rises during its initial phases of development (i.e. before a society becomes majority urban) but lessens in later stages. Growing income/wealth inequality in societies across the world (Seery and Arendar 2014), both within cities and between urban and rural areas, has lately been cause for deep concern. In some of the leading Asian economies, which have undergone rapid urbanization, recent evidence clearly indicates that urban poverty has soared even faster (Mathur 2014) and that urbanization is a major driving force of societal inequality (albeit to varying extents) (Kanbur and Zhuang 2013). Whilst the challenges posed by extensive and accelerated urbanization are broadly common, the book’s chapters signal the pressing need for seeking contextually appropriate responses founded on the premise of good governance. The Asia-Pacific region embodies enormous diversity—geographical, historical (including colonial histories), political, economic, social, cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and racial. Diversity pervades across and within national boundaries in the heterogeneous, multicultural societies of Asia-Pacific. 1 Habitat

I was organized in Vancouver in 1976, and Habitat II in Istanbul in 1996.

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Such intersectionality makes urbanization issues more complex, and attaining good governance and effective planning for sustainable and equitable urban development bedevilling. The next section summarizes the key features and points from the book’s previous chapters. This helps clarify how emphases, approaches, and outcomes of planning endeavours vary across cities, and how governance forms and reforms in each context are useful and/or wanting. The chapter vignettes draw attention to some disconcerting trends—intensifying economic inequality, social and spatial exclusion, intolerance, and environmental degradation. These also identify ingredients of success, the transformative potential of which, if tapped prudently, in measures large or small, could prove instructive across contexts. Based on the similarities and distinctions evidenced by the chapters, the concluding section summarizes the discussion. It gleans discernible trends, which raise concern or offer promise, and delineates desirable trajectories for progressing urban governance. These pertain to decentralization’s impacts on planning institutions and urban governance; the preponderance of trends prioritizing large infrastructure, mega-projects, and spatial planning over improving basic services; advancing the use of technology to improve governance; and continuously enhancing the quality of participatory urban planning and governance. In stressing that outcomes are heavily shaped by the nature and capacities of extant institutions, which reflect the inertia and legacies of political histories and collective societal values, the chapter reiterates the cliché-sounding importance of understanding and responding to context.

1.1 Urban Governance, Planning, and Development: Assessing Shifts, Innovations, and Impacts The chapters in this book present an array of cases representing myriad shifts in urban planning, governance, and development underway in several countries. On the whole, they represent deliberate but varied efforts—such as innovative or improved processes, incentives, and emphases—to enlarge local urban planning by bolstering the capacity of relevant local institutions. The diversity of the nature of cities, their institutional arrangements, and the unique contexts within which they are embedded preclude neatly generalizable lessons. However, in the concluding section of this chapter we do attempt to identify recent and current trends that are more similar than dissimilar across multiple contexts, and propose desirable trajectories for urban governance and planning to trace. Prior to that, in this section, we summarize the main characteristics of the cases investigated in the chapters, and highlight their key arguments to make gleaning some cross-cutting inferences meaningful. The introduction chapter by Dahiya and Das (2019), firstly, contextualized the NUA vis-à-vis the key sustainable and inclusive urban development issues at the global level. Second, it reviewed the concept of governance and its evolution since the early 1980s in relation to the changing emphases of overseas development aid and advocacy as well as various attempts at its theoretical rationalization. Thus, it

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provided insights into the ideas and literature related to governance, decentralization and democratization. In doing so, it traced the development of the international urban development agenda from Habitat I through Habitat III. As a logical denouement, it linked the review and discussion on governance with the NUA. Third, by juxtaposing the NUA with the urban realities of the Asia-Pacific region, the introduction chapter reviewed three areas of immediate concern: (i) urban governance as an umbrella strategy to respond to urban challenges; (ii) urban planning and policy; and (iii) service delivery and access for social inclusion. Finally, it introduced and explained how the other chapters are organized under two themes: urban planning and policy, and innovations in service delivery and access toward social inclusion. While the chapters do indeed adhere more to their respective section rubrics, most of the narratives straddle both categories to different extents, for valid reasons—shifts in urban planning and policy seek to effect improved services delivery, access, and social inclusion; but, conversely, the performance of and access to service delivery innovations also rely on prevalent policies and institutional structures that govern urban planning, management, and development. Therefore, in this section we logically rearrange the chapter summaries into five sub-sections, by either their contextual uniqueness or similarity, thematic sameness, and/or for proximity in their research approaches. The first sub-section presents the three chapters on China in this volume because they are related, largely, to a multi-pronged initiative in a particular metropolitan region. Also, these chapters raise the question of balancing urban and rural development more than any other. The second sub-section clubs together the chapters on India and Indonesia. This is not only because they are two of the three largest, robust democracies anywhere as well as frontrunner emerging economies, but also because their primary emphasis, albeit with different foci, is on the aftermath of decentralization. The two chapters discuss how intergovernmental relations and other factors impact local autonomy and capacity for urban planning and services provision. Civil society’s involvement in local governance, and even planning, is relatively stronger in India and Indonesia than in most other developing Asian nations. The third subsection pairs the chapters on Pakistan and Brunei Darussalam because, from a planning and governance standpoint, they are oddly similar for different reasons. None of the two Islamic nations is truly a democracy—the former has mostly been under martial law and is a fragile democracy at best, and the latter a monarchy. Consequently, urban governance and planning have historically been very top-down, and civil society participation is arguably weak. Another curious commonality is that urban planning scholarship on the two cities analysed—Lahore and Bandar Seri Begawan—is relatively scant. The organizational logic of the fourth sub-section is obvious: the Australian metropolises of Perth and Brisbane are not just representative of an advanced nation context in the Asia-Pacific region but also one that is socio-culturally western. The two chapters of the final sub-section belong there for their analyses span multiple countries, and explore the hows and whys of local governments’ effectiveness in delivering services and enabling social inclusion. Next, in summarizing the individual chapters, we begin by highlighting how each relates to the goals, characteristics, and policy challenges targeted, as per the

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framework suggested by the NUA (Table 1 in the chapter “New Urban Agenda in Asia-Pacific: Governance for Sustainable and Inclusive Cities”), and, likewise, where relevant, comment on the policy actors involved and the potential for being transformative.

1.1.1

Addressing the Urban-Rural Dichotomy and Peri-urbanization in China

The cases discussed in this volume’s chapters on China reflect the NUA’s goals of promoting sustainable and equitable development, and facilitating territorial equity (among urban, peri-urban, and rural areas), albeit within a small, pilot zone. From among the set of good urban governance characteristics that the NUA suggests, these best characterize long-term and integrated, and multi-scale and multi-level planning efforts. The intended transformations pertain to strengthening decentralization, metropolitan governance, participation and equity, and capacity building for governance. The key actors involved are local—urban and rural—and provincial governments, private sector actors, financial institutions, and also universities; civil society actors are the prominent ones missing. In the chapter “Integrating Urban-Rural Development (IURD) Through Governance Programmes in China’s Megacities: The Suzhou Model,” Fang et al. (2019) analyse the curious initiative undertaken in Suzhou municipality in China—an experiment toward synergizing urban and rural planning through comprehensive (spatial, social, and economic) and integrated development objectives. In laying out the background context, the chapter emphasizes the complexity of China’s unique and oft-changing administrative structure, which presently comprises five levels or tiers (central, provincial, prefectural, district, and township), even without a formal village level. These many levels of government in the world’s most populated nation and second largest economy make any coordinated planning endeavour, such as the Integrated Urban-Rural Development (IURD), uniquely challenging. Not only have the scale and pace of urbanization and economic development in China in recent decades been dizzying, but the fact that property taxes are near non-existent (Man 2012) makes urban planning context of Chinese cities exceptionally unique. Therefore, for long now, urban sprawl has been unyielding because local governments have tended to continuously convert agricultural land to urban uses as they depend on revenues from land sales and leases, whilst also accruing windfalls to developers and villagers alike (Fang and Pal 2016). But policymakers have realized that such development is ecologically unsound and financially unsustainable. The impetus for IURD stems from growing concerns to stem this tide of land use conversion, which has been rising since China initiated economic reforms in 1978, and outstripping rural productivity and earnings, resulting in a yawning gap between cities and villages in the quality and efficiency of their basic infrastructure and services. IURD is an ambitious attempt to attain development outcomes that are less uneven and more equitable by establishing mutually beneficial, “new” relationships between the agricultural and industrial, and urban and rural. Other associated objectives include

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protecting the cultural and natural environments, and revitalizing rural locales by creating “beautiful villages.” The three prongs of its approach are: concentrating industrial development into compact spatial configurations (for freeing up more land for agriculture); increasing agricultural productivity and raising farmers’ incomes by consolidating small land holdings into large farms through the transfer of use rights of arable land into shareholding cooperatives; and moving rural residents into urban communities with improved services through housing swaps. This approach is a significant departure from the prevailing, dominant logic of pursuing economic development by aggressively promoting rural to urban migration for speedier urbanization. Like some Chinese programs before it, IURD represents the scope for and limitations to governance innovations that tend to rejig the balance between centralized, top-down decision-making and decentralization that allows increasingly more flexibility at the local and sub-regional levels. The central government pushed the IURD idea, the Suzhou municipality (a prefectural-level city) designed and detailed the program, and delegated its implementation responsibilities with some degree of autonomy to the lowest administrative units of townships and villages. Seldom had the lowest tiers of the administrative hierarchy been entrusted with implementing such programs. The authors deem IURD successful, for the district and township level governments generated substantial acceptance and compliance from the rural residents that the program targeted. In large measure, this is because of the policy innovation that allows farmers to exchange their rights to till arable land for social welfare rights or stock shares in urban community cooperatives. Rural cooperatives are now empowered to assemble and develop idle collective lands to build community centres, business offices, and factories. After nearly a decade since its inception, IURD appears to have attained its core objective to decelerate the widening chasm between urban and rural per capita incomes; today Suzhou’s aggregate urban income is less than twice its rural counterpart—the smallest ratio among Chinese megacities and other important urban centres. However, this capital-intensive experiment has also generated unintended consequences of concern—peri-urbanization has accelerated; contrary to the objective of boosting agriculture, across the target region built-up areas have expanded disproportionately, at the expense of disappearing grasslands, forests, wetlands, and water bodies; only select components, like exchanging homestead rights for new housing are financially profitable; and the lowest tiers of government have become increasingly saddled by onerous debts. The authors sagely conclude that IURD may succeed only in cities where urban growth is brisk and land markets are hot, plus even the lowest tiers of local governments will need adequate levels of fiscal capacity and autonomy. In contexts where higher levels of government may be unable or loath to extricate small local governments mired in debt, the implications of this model failing could be devastating.

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The case study of Shaxi city in the chapter, “Financing Local Infrastructure and Public Services: Case of Shaxi Town in Suburban Suzhou, China,” by Chen et al. (2019), describes the fiscal and financial complexities and impacts of IURD’s mechanisms, and the evident incongruence of China’s decentralization model and urban development approaches with on-the-ground constraints, consequences, and challenges. County and township level governments are charged with planning and providing basic services; in such a system of multi-level governance, China’s decentralized structure clarifies the distribution of revenues and responsibilities only between the national and provincial governments, but not to the lowest tiers of government that are responsible for serving their populations. How provinces, in turn, devolve financial responsibility and fiscal authority to lower tiers varies immensely, making planning and governance at the lowest levels, across the country, quite uneven. In China, the central government’s share of revenues is over 40%, which is well over double its share of expenditures; the relationship is similar but inverse for county level governments, suggesting that responsibilities outweigh their revenues. Far-reaching tax-sharing reforms instituted in 1994 shifted local governments’ dependence on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to relying on infrastructure development for attracting manufacturing and other businesses. This fuelled a vigorously expanding mode of land conversion, sales, and leasing, as revenue generators, for rapidly increasing the supply of public infrastructure and supplies. Not surprisingly, provinces and cities along China’s already quite developed eastern seaboard benefited disproportionately; for their major locational advantage in attracting investment, local infrastructure in the coastal provinces came to be largely self-financed, as opposed to local governments in the interior regions that depend heavily on transfers from higher levels of government. Also, the economically robust coastal provinces have generally decentralized far more authority to towns and villages to plan and build their own infrastructure. Shaxi, a town of 160,000 within the prefectural-level city of Suzhou, is emblematic of such relative autonomy and flexibility. The authors describe in detail how by managing its revenues and expenditures, and investing in hard and soft infrastructures, Shaxi’s revenues in 2015 reached USD 60 million. One key feature is the government-created financing platform, which lends to companies for financing infrastructure development. The platform is supported by cash flow from land transfers and expected earnings from land assets; it enables risk-pooling but renders some investments risky. Located in a region with well-developed infrastructure and a roaring economy, Shaxi had a solid economic base to begin with; yet, by further promoting infrastructure construction and improving public services, the government hopes to keep attracting more investment for generating higher land values and capturing more land transfer fees. But this building frenzy is also creating some redundancies or avoidable investments by targeting infrastructures that already exist.

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Relocating Shaxi’s farmers to denser, concentrated, “urban” communities has largely succeeded due to generous compensation (around USD 100,000 per household). Whether economies of scale to make compensation attractive enough are feasible in smaller places is doubtful. Also, as expenditures have exceeded revenues, whether freed up arable land will indeed promote or at least preserve agriculture or fuel even more development is hardly certain, and the authors question whether Shaxi’s debt, and especially of even smaller towns, can prove sustainable. Highlighting potential weaknesses in China’s system of decentralization and governance, especially in the face of zealous urbanization policies, the authors recommend reforms that are instructive for improving local governance and planning in other swiftly urbanizing and developing contexts: increasing the fiscal autonomy and capacity of small local jurisdictions; and reducing the dependence on financing from higher levels of government by promoting market-oriented approaches such as municipal bond markets. They also sound a cautionary note against excessive decentralization that burdens small local governments, and call upon higher levels of government to continue to provide some social development infrastructure. While hailing the state’s responsibility in providing essential social services, they view its continued reliance on revenues from land conversion as unsustainable; which, as they allude, likely hinders local policies from being inclusive by providing essential services to residents and migrants alike. In the chapter, “Comprehensive Management for Better Rural Infrastructure and Service Delivery: Lessons from the Implementation of China’s Six Point Rural Action Plan in Guizhou Province,” Zou et al. (2019) discuss another program, in Guizhou Province, focused on raising rural living standards by creating or upgrading basic infrastructure, connectivity, and environmental quality. Guizhou, China’s third-poorest province, is rendered remote by its geography and terrain, almost two-thirds rural, and ethnically diverse, with well over a third of its population comprising of multiple ethnic minorities. Close on the heels of the national government launching the Beautiful Countryside program in 2013, Guizhou, on its own, instituted an eponymous provincial-level policy, “Promote the Development of The Countryside and Build a Beautiful Countryside—Six Point Action Plan Program for Rural Infrastructure,” to translate ideas enshrined in the national program. The name is somewhat of a misnomer as “beautification” or “aesthetics” is but a small component of this comprehensive program—physical, social, economic, environmental, and governance reform. Guizhou’s provincial government created the Six Point Action Plan program (SPAP) with the following half a dozen foci: roads; water and irrigation; electricity; telecommunications; housing (new); and the environment (including upgrading existing dwellings). The Guizhou provincial government created SPAP as a strongly top-down initiative, like the IURD program (chapters “Integrating Urban-Rural Development (IURD) Through Governance Programmes in China’s Megacities: The Suzhou Model” and “Financing Local Infrastructure and Public Services: Case of Shaxi Town in Suburban Suzhou, China”), and has provided close to 80% of its generous budget. Yet, at the village administration level (which could comprise multiple villages), where the interventions occur, the SPAP seeks participation from citizens and civil society groups for

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spreading awareness of the program, obtaining ideas, and smoothening implementation. The top-down aspect ensured that local governments could overcome the traditional handicaps of funding and personnel as well as gain the non-traditional advantage of community approbation and contributions in the form of donated land and/or labour. The authors’ analysis evidences the physical improvement outcomes, especially housing, which leads them to conclude that the program has been successful, especially in terms of its speed, extensiveness, transparency, and quality. The authors remind us that this is laudable because rural development projects, more so in China’s lesser-developed regions, tend to exemplify mismanagement, delays, and corruption. They feel that Guizhou’s provincial government averted SPAP from meeting a similar fate by having a detailed, well-resolved implementation plan. Aside from thoughtfully allocating adequate resources and responsibilities, designing appropriate chains of control and coordination, and setting performance targets and standards, SPAP’s unique community outreach efforts at the grassroots attained rare levels of trust and cooperation. For instance, SPAP’s allowing community participation, to let vernacular design wisdom and construction techniques guide the building of housing and public infrastructure, is an extremely rare happening, anywhere. Leveraging communities’ social capital for development ends is more common where civil society is puissant and trustworthy. Therefore, SPAP’s participatory approach to leverage social capital for development in remote corners of poor Chinese provinces such as Guizhou marks a small but significant demonstration of how inclusive planning and governance can beget celeritous execution.

1.1.2

Decentralization, Neoliberalism, and Shifts in Urban Governance and Planning

The chapter, “Urban Policies in Neo-Liberal India,” provides a macro-view of India’s decentralization, urban development, and urban governance reforms, in which Debolina Kundu (2019) illustrates how various lacunae have impeded the ability of urban local bodies (ULBs), i.e. local governments, to influence and manage urbanization, despite what is a fairly modest growth rate compared to other countries. Like the chapters on China, this chapter’s discussion also mainly alludes to NUA’s goals of sustainable and equitable development, and facilitating territorial equity, but it takes a much more critical stance. Additionally, it implicitly conveys that planning and governing with the ‘right to the city’ as a strategic approach, in effect, not yet a state priority. Somewhat cursorily, this chapter attempts a comprehensive critique of India’s pervasive urban planning and governance challenges, from a vantage point that affords a broad, systemic view. In doing so, it touches upon most elements of the NUA good urban governance agenda presented in Table 1. Kundu (2019) posits that the widely touted causal effect of urbanization on economic development is only weakly evident in India, especially in terms of improved infrastructure and basic services. In part, this is attributable to India’s federated political structure. Notwithstanding the early 1990s’ constitutional amendments that

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effected decentralization—the 73rd (for rural) and 74th (urban)—their objective of strengthening grassroots voice and participation, especially in urban governance, have largely remained on paper. Unlike in other comparable countries, say Indonesia, the state governments have remained powerful; how and how much they have executed suggested decentralization reforms determine how well cities are able to respond to their unique needs and challenges, or how responsive they are to their citizens’ demands. On the whole, barring a few large cities, across the country, urban local governments continue to demonstrate emasculated fiscal and financial capacities owing to negligible fiscal autonomy. Whereas much change has transpired in India during the last quarter century, the author asserts that urban governance is still gravely wanting. Indian ULBs are able to spend less than 30% of what they should for providing services. She points to poor institutional coordination across different levels, ad hoc measures, and policy discontinuity—a lamentable trade-off—that change of government brings in this robust democracy. The trend, therefore, is one of neoliberal development—characterized by a retraction of the state, with the attendant institutional vacuum being increasingly filled by NGOs and private sector actors. In recent times, to stimulate brisk urban development, the Government of India has launched large, nationwide, comprehensive urban development programs such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) for housing development, Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), and Smart Cities Mission (SCM). Initiated at different times by governments led by feuding political parties, these programs are concurrent and reflect overlapping missions and emphases. The creation of most programs as public-private partnerships (PPPs) represents a common financial innovation, as is their execution through the creation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) that allow cost sharing among different levels of government. A main objective of SPVs is to raise private funds by collateralizing future receivables,2 and they enjoy “complete flexibility” to ensure unencumbered implementation.3 However, given the inadequate devolution of appropriate fiscal and decision-making powers to ULBs, this growing penchant for SPVs, for infrastructural fixes, by facilitating the entrepreneurial mobilization of capital and techno-managerial approaches such as smart cities is aggrandizing the role of state-level governments over ULBs. Consequently, governance objectives such as inclusivity, transparency, and accountability suffer, as the locus of decision-making gets distanced from the grassroots, and insidiously liberates local urban development from being governed by mechanisms of citizen participation and public scrutiny. Like Kundu in this chapter, other critical observers too view these moves as enfeebling urban local government and inclusive governance, by creating plutocratic new institutions with technocratic visions that render the poor and their interests invisible (Chattopadhyay 2017; Ravindran 2015), and propagating the make-believe notion that “smart cities” will naturally be inclusive, sustainable, and just (Kaika 2017). A bigger concern Kundu points to is Indian urban policies’ lack of acknowledgment of peri-urbanization, which like in China and other fast-urbanizing 2 http://www.financialexpress.com/archive/what-is-a-special-purpose-vehicle/129610/. 3 http://smartcities.gov.in/content/innerpage/spvs.php.

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contexts of the Asia-Pacific is a compounding challenge. Moreover, this emergent trend of neoliberal urban planning using PPPs and SPVs is generating competition among cities, which is disproportionately advantaging larger urban centres and exacerbating uneven urban development. Moreover, despite hundreds being underway or on the drawing board, even optimistic forecasts see PPPs meeting not more than 13% of the country’s unmet spending needs for urban infrastructure and services. According to the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), a leading private sector think tank, India’s current rate of urbanization and its projected acceleration pose mammoth, unprecedented managerial and policy challenges (MGI, 2010), yet India’s policy response is flagging and fragmented. Emphasizing the critical need to create inclusive cities, MGI recommends urgent reform and action in four areas: funding; governance; planning; and sectoral policies (especially, affordable housing). Progress is evident in the form of increased funding, albeit yet inadequate, and new implementation mechanisms of some ambitious programmes, but substantive reform and strengthening of governance and planning capacities are wanting. Salim and Hudalah (2019) discuss in their chapter, “Urban Governance Challenges and Reforms in Indonesia: Towards a New Urban Agenda,” key urban planning challenges involved in dealing with the twin phenomena of rapid urbanization and sudden proliferation of sub-national administrative units following extensive decentralization. Like the chapters discussed yet, in terms of relating to NUA objectives, this too highlights the goals of sustainable and equitable development of cities and regions for facilitating territorial equity—especially by building capacity of local governments for improved spatial planning, land regulation, and services provision. Mostly concentrating on the national government’s efforts, it invokes the NUA’s good urban governance characteristics of multi-level and multi-scale, integrated, territorial, and proficient planning. It stresses that the Indonesian national government is not just launching ambitious programs, but also encouraging enhanced collaboration with universities and other institutions to build the human resource capacities of local governments. However, NUA’s goal of a strategic approach based on the ‘right to the city’ philosophy is absent, as is any emphasis on the need to include and support civil society actors as partners in urban development and governance. Urbanization in Indonesia has been uneven for the last few decades, with much of it concentrated in the behemoth that is the Jakarta metropolitan region. While the growth of other major Javanese cities like Surabaya and Semarang ebbed, small urban centres outside Java have expanded the fastest. The exceptional ballooning of Jakarta’s metropolitan region since the 1980s is a consequence of economic liberalization fostered by the former authoritarian developmental regime of President Suharto (the New Order), and has spurred extensive peri-urbanization. After the New Order fell in 1998, to better manage existing large conurbations and continuing urbanization with improved governance, one of the many far-reaching decentralization reforms has been to create new autonomous administrative units—the numbers of cities and districts have increased by about 50% and 70%, respectively. Following the early reform years’ focus on administrative and fiscal decentralization, more recently the Indonesian national government has attempted to guide decentralized spatial planning by framing new regulations and delineating new responsibilities for

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provincial and local governments—but in a way that sustains the existing hierarchy of government levels. Also, some of its guidance, in the form of prescribing minimum standards for housing and services across such a diverse country, seems to be too limiting and standardized. The national government has rightly identified that—for attaining decentralization’s goals of improved spatial planning, services provision, environmental management, and regional cooperation and coordination—a primary hurdle is the limited capacity of most sub-national governments. As such, it has actively supported and promoted capacity-building by letting international development agencies and foreign and domestic universities train personnel of central ministries and local governments; Bappenas, the National Development Planning Agency, partners with Indonesian and foreign universities to enable local government planning personnel to enhance their knowledge and expertise by earning development/planning degrees and/or participating in short-term training programs. Despite these moves, the authors hold that urban governance and planning, overall, are not yet satisfactory owing to: poor data and capacity of planners to utilize those; cloudy land tenure claims and conflicts between existing uses and proposed plans; negligible multi-stakeholder participation, especially of civil society actors (Antlöv et al. 2010; Das and Luthfi 2017), in local planning; confounding linkages and poor coordination across different levels of state institutions; and feeble implementation of the bevy of legislation. Indonesia has demonstrated speedy initiative in outlining half a dozen areas for policy action in alignment with the NUA’s themes and objectives. Among the areas of action the national government prescribes are accommodating the millions of new urban denizens that urbanization will bring, and creating commensurate employment by shifting the focus from extractive industries to sustainable production activities in urban centres. It is pushing for zoning-driven spatial planning by, inter alia, emphasizing attention to increasing green areas and in situ urban upgrading in cities, and investing in the country’s woeful public transportation sector. Although some specific emphases are somewhat new, the overall approach is hardly so. Like before, there is evermore talk of what ought to be done, and much less how—which is crucial for improved urban governance. Recent developments seem to be reinforcing the role of the national government in dictating how planning is to be done, nationwide, instead of promoting initiatives and innovations that are decidedly local and truly participatory. Very few of Indonesia’s nearly hundred autonomous cities today can boast substantively innovative or progressive planning efforts that decentralization and democratization should have fostered.

1.1.3

Institutional Challenges and Capacity Building for Planning in Historically Top-Down Contexts

The chapter, “Issues in Urban Planning and Policy: The Case Study of Lahore, Pakistan,” by Javed and Riaz (2019) is a rare, detailed insight into the challenges related to urban development, planning, and governance in Pakistan’s second largest city. Its focus is aligned squarely with the NUA goal of sustainable and equitable

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development, and reinforces the need for the NUA-recommended characteristics of democratic and inclusive, long-term and integrated, territorial, and proficient urban planning and governance. In terms of policy challenges, it strongly concentrates on ineffective legal and institutional frameworks—especially, the multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping institutions, weak frameworks for service delivery partnerships, and insufficient monitoring and evaluation of policies and projects. The main policy actors critiqued are local urban planning and development agencies, and, to a lesser extent, national level institutions and local level private sector developers. Despite being the world’s sixth largest country (in population) and the second largest in South Asia, compared to the region’s other countries, the published urban studies and planning literature on Pakistan is scant. Thus, Javed and Riaz’s welcome contribution illuminates the malaise that characterizes planning in Lahore, and other Pakistani urban centres, by explaining the evolution (or stagnation) of its institutions of planning in an historical perspective, beginning with the country’s colonial past. A common justification proferred for poor planning and development outcomes in developing countries is the absence of proper institutions. Institutional woes are true of Lahore’s failings too but, as is not uncommon in Pakistan’s neighbourhood, the absence of institutions is a lesser evil than the confusion and lack of coordination caused by their profusion and overlapping jurisdictions. A colonial era institution, the Lahore Improvement Trust (LIT) was responsible for most urban planning activities for almost 30 years after independence in 1947. In 1975, the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) replaced LIT to become the main planning institution and continues to be dominant today. The Lahore Metropolitan Corporation (LMC) was another planning institution that had existed beside LIT and continues to exist in its designated areas of jurisdiction. Additionally, the cantonment boards (CBs) were also pre-existing colonial institutions that managed planning in military areas; over the decades, areas under CBs’ jurisdictions expanded to include civilian areas, and as late as 1998 Lahore’s CB was divided to create two separate CBs. As a consequence of both national and provincial laws, during the 1990s and 2000s, several other institutions such as city district governments (CDGs), tehsil municipal associations (TMAs, for peri-urban towns), and union councils (UCs) were either created or revamped to partake in urban planning, development, and service delivery activities. The TMAs and UCs were products of the devolution and decentralization of 2001, undertaken by the military regime of the time. Likewise, borne by federal legislation and governed by the national Ministry of Defence, the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) is a particularly unique and powerful player in the planning and real estate development arena. While DHA began by building residential complexes for military officers in or around the cantonments, it has since expanded its imprint on metropolitan development by building residential and commercial properties, mostly on arable greenfield lands, which are freely transacted in the open market. Although a big producer of urban real estate in the metropolitan region, as a military/federal institution, DHA is free from the controls of provincial and local rules and regulations. Therefore, in Lahore, at least half a dozen organizations create disparate spatial plans and haphazardly manage urban development. Also, the institutional organization of rural and urban areas has periodically swung back and forth between

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consolidation and separation. A complicated array of laws and regulations causes overlapping responsibilities and planning redundancies. Directives and responsibilities for the potpourri of urban planning and development organizations abound, but largely without corresponding enforcement mechanisms. Other scholars attribute this chaotic scenario of urban planning and governance to the deleterious impacts of long periods of martial law in the country, with few and weak interludes of civilian rule (Haider and Badami 2010). Consequently, as authors argue, for the military’s undue influence over the urban public realm, not only are civilian institutions of democratic governance underdeveloped, but DHA and CB, for instance, tend to overstep their reasonable ambit and through their direct and extensive involvement in production, seem to distort real estate markets. Furthermore, whether civilian or military, an institution seems to enjoy planning authority for having played a major role in housing production—i.e. historically, planning has been construed just as housing development and the attendant provision of basic services. The production of housing, however, has been highly inequitable—having almost always served the rich and upper middle classes, whereas the poor have mostly depended on self-help and informal settlements, some of which the city has sporadically incorporated and formalized. The authors illustrate how master plans with 20-year horizons have been the modi operandi guiding Lahore’s long-range planning and development. All three master plans yet were marred by approval delays that rendered their implementation ineffective. Furthermore, the data on which master plans have been based have either been unreliable or delays rendered those obsolete. For other reasons, too, these master plans have never been fully implemented, which the authors condemn as a “colossal waste of resources.” Administrative challenges at the national level exacerbate the incongruence between local plans and needs. LDA approved the latest master plan (IMPL 2021) in 2016, on which it begun work in 2011; however, lacking the requisite capacity, it ended up amending the latest version that was approved in 2004, which was based on data from 1998—the year the last census was conducted (the 2017 census had not happened and the results were not expected to become available anytime soon). Besides organizational confusion and overlaps among urban planning entities, lack of coordination, and redundancies, a serious shortcoming of planning in Lahore is that public participation or even consultation with affected communities has been near non-existent. Civil society participation, in general, is feeble, and the system of planning—mechanisms, institutions, and officials—is not just exclusive but also hardly transparent or accountable. This is a remediable situation though as there are CSOs and NGOs and other societal institutions capable of being effective interlocutors for improving the culture and efficacy of planning. The Orangi Pilot Project that begun in Karachi, and spread to other places (Hasan 2006), successfully provided low-cost sanitation and other services in informal settlements. Sustainable and scalable, this impactful pro-poor innovation features among international best practices. Lahore has not yet signalled such inclusive, pro-poor, and innovative forms of urban planning and governance. Rather, the authors suggest that a culture of “urban corporate management” is emerging, with the provincial government

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creating private-sector-style utility companies that enter into contracts with municipal councils to service utilities in privileged areas. The discussion of the small but rich modern-day Malay monarchy of Brunei Darussalam, in the chapter, titled, “Urban Service Delivery and Access: The Special Case of Brunei Darussalam,” is another rare insight into the governance, planning, and development structures and mechanisms of a largely unfamiliar context. The authors, Thambipillai and Pang (2019), describe how its hitherto rigid, top-down governmental culture is showing signs of gradually allowing some privatization and engaging with the populace. This chapter, like the one on India, provides an overarching view of the planning apparatus and emerging challenges in the country. It aligns closely with the NUA goals of sustainable and equitable development and improving territorial equity. It discusses Brunei in regard to several characteristics of good urban governance (Table 1) (such as long-term, integrated, multi-level policies, territorial approaches, and proficient institutions), including the need for more participatory and inclusive urban governance, even in a monarchy. It discusses why the roles of the state and its agencies ought to transform to facilitate bigger and better roles for the private sector and civil society actors, especially toward attaining suggested NUA transformations towards strengthened capacity of urban planning and governance, and a culture of participation and equity. In a sense, Brunei is a classic developmental state, but arguably more fortunate than other ones in Asia such as, say, Singapore and South Korea. Its small size, in terms of both land mass and population, disproportionate wealth amassed from the export of abundant hydrocarbon reserves, and having a large ethno-religious majority (Malay Muslims) likely enabled its benevolent rulers to create an effective welfare state. Brunei’s GDP per capita and human development, especially health and education indicators, are comparable to those of advanced nations; yet poverty persists, more so in rural areas and smaller urban centres. Its capital and primate city, Bandar Seri Begawan, does not face urbanization pressures such as migration. Yet, the urgent need for modernizing its urban planning and governance structures for upgrading its transportation, energy, housing infrastructures, and building disaster management capacity are indicative of common urban challenges across the Asia-Pacific region. Delays and snags in implementing planning and infrastructure projects, as compared to other countries in the neighbourhood, suggest that financing is hardly ever the only shortcoming; the development of capacity—for instance, institutions and their appropriate arrangements, human resources, process innovations—is equally important, if not more. As a monarchy, formal political rights of citizens’ or a culture of criticizing the state is absent. However, it is quite likely that this Islamic monarchy’s reasonably liberal stance on development stems from the fact that its administrative bureaucracy was shaped during the protracted period of being a British protectorate. In that sense, the state’s own past efforts to allow NGOs to exist and work as partners in development, and establish new mechanisms to decentralize urban governance and foster public participation in and solicit public opinion about the government’s planning endeavours are positive steps toward improving urban planning and governance. Likewise, relaxing state control enterprises and sources of production, including

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its prized hydrocarbon reserves, and promoting public-private partnerships to raise efficiencies, which may also capacitate home-grown enterprises, is likely to augur well. More importantly, the state’s sustained initiatives to diversify the economy and speedily enhance business-friendliness—with the adoption of technology to cut redtape—to attract foreign and local investors are laudable. Despite their more complex contexts, larger countries with greater institutional capacity could look to Brunei for inspiration in certain areas. The implementation saga of Bandar Seri Begawan’s 2010 master plan, slated for completion by 2035, will further illuminate the factors that will influence urban planning and governance changes in this outlier case.

1.1.4

Improving Planning in Local Contexts with Capacity

The chapters, “The Changing Role of Regional Organisation of Councils in Australia: Case Studies from Perth Metropolitan Region” and “Urban Governance in Australia: A Case Study of Brisbane City” focus on chapters that discuss this volume’s only advanced country context, whose polities, cultures, and governance systems are closer to those of the West. Yet, this former British colony’s institutional legacies and elements of governmental form and organization do bear resemblance to other erstwhile colonies in Asia-Pacific. Its universities have rapidly emerged as a popular destination for foreign students, led by those from China and South Asia.4 More significantly, Australian universities are now a favoured training ground for urban professionals, planners, and public officials from its large archipelagic and small island neighbouring countries. Australian cities regularly feature among the world’s most liveable cities.5 With one of the highest rates of population growth of any OECD country, most of Australia’s population is concentrated in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. Such rapid expansion presents opportunities for, what Glaeser (2012) reckoned, the triumph of the city. Yet, increasing car dependence, sprawling growth, worsening housing affordability, lingering historical inequities, and among the rapidly rising income inequality also threaten to tarnish Australian cities’ vaunted liveability reputation, and frequently raise questions about urban planning’s efficacy and inclusiveness.6 For such reasons, there are lessons of mutual relevance between the Australian experiences presented here and developing Asia’s large urban centres seeking to bolster capacity through institutional reforms and technological innovations to respond to peri-urbanization, fragmented urban governance and planning, and increasingly heterogeneous populations. 4 https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/record-number-of-international-students-in-

australia-leads-to-s30b-boost-to-economy. instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks 140 cities worldwide based on its liveability index comprised of 30 factors (https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/08/dailychart-14). 6 http://theconversation.com/city-planning-suffers-growth-pains-of-australias-population-boom75930; https://www.theguardian.com/cities/series/australian-cities-week. Also, on Australia’s economic success, see the Special Report on Australia in The Economist (October 27, 2018b issue), “The wonder down under: can the boom last.” 5 For

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The chapter, “The Changing Role of Regional Organisation of Councils in Australia: Case Studies from Perth Metropolitan Region,” analyses a type of planning institution called the Regional Organisation of Council (ROC) the capital city of the state of Western Australia. Khan and Bajracharya (2019), the chapter’s authors, argue the utility of regional planning, through coalitions of multiple local governments in fragmented metropolitan regions, and describe supportive and inhibitive conditions for regional planning, and factors and facets that make ROCs efficacious. This case also emphasizes the NUA goals of sustainable and equitable development, and territorial equity (between cities and suburbs). For good urban governance, it calls for inclusive, integrated, multi-level, territorial policymaking. Dealing with increasingly complex urban governance, and improving service delivery at a regional level are the main policy challenges highlighted in this discussion of Perth. The transformative actions sought, as prescribed by the NUA, are strengthening decentralization, metropolitan governance, equity within a region, and local capacity building. The main policy actors here are local governments, and regional associations of local units. Although voluntarily formed ROCs date back to the 1920s, yet, in general, until the 1990s regional planning was not a major concern. Australia’s cities are the most sprawled and fragmented among all OECD countries, which make urban governance and planning difficult. Typically, a metropolitan region comprises of several lowdensity local government areas (LGAs) that surround a much denser central business district. They resemble American suburbanization, but, unlike their North American counterparts, Australian cities have far less autonomy and the federal government plays an active role in urban planning. Khan and Bajracharya stress that when it comes to planning, traditionally, the federal government has controlled the purse, the state governments have wielded most of the legislative power, and local governments have dealt with problems on the ground, but with little ability to alter funding or regulatory frameworks. Responsibilities were decentralized without commensurate authority. As metropolitan areas kept expanding, councils realized that an LGA working alone could not garner the economies of scale or the support and coordination necessary for addressing planning issues that transcend individual jurisdictions—especially, say, for waste, environmental, or transportation management. Different pieces of federal and state legislation passed during the 1990s catalysed the formation of new ROCs. This is noteworthy. Even in a decentralized, capacitated, and wealthy context like Western Australia’s, the proactive and intentional role of higher levels of government was what effected ROC formation at the inter-local level (even in the past, ROCs had sprouted in response to the federal government’s incentivizing). In the authors’ observation, what was more vital was the flexibility that ROCs enjoy. Flexibility exists in two ways. LGAs (mostly outside metropolitan limits) can either form a loose association called a Voluntary ROC (VROC), which is not a legal entity; or organize themselves into a statutory, law-making body called, simply, a regional council. ROCs can expand or contract quickly, i.e. member councils can opt in or out of a partnership, as a situation may demand, plus a council can selectively participate in projects. Of course, such uncertainty can also hurt shared endeavours, and other problems like protracted decision-making have also been noted. Yet, the

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authors reckon that flexibility has helped ROCs become more versatile, innovative, and inclusive in evaluating and responding to regional planning. The specific examples of VROCs and regional councils discussed indicate they have initiated or upgraded a host of initiatives, such as managing waste, transportation, economic development, tourism, and open spaces. At present, the members of ROCs are mostly local governments. The authors recommend that the notion of flexibility could be extended, effectively, if ROCs were to include, as stakeholders, other types of organizations, such universities, NGOs, other CSOs, private developers, and other market agents as well. In their chapter, “Urban Governance in Australia: A Case Study of Brisbane City,” Bajracharya and Khan (2019) next turn to providing a descriptive account of urban planning and governance in the capital of the state of Queensland. It presents an intriguing contrast to their chapter on the Perth metropolitan region. While their discussion of Perth concentrated on the significance and execution of regional planning, and, specifically, the progressively larger roles that myriad regional associations of local councils are playing. Brisbane, on the other hand, is the largest city council in Australia, which actually covers the entire metropolitan area. The NUA goals this case reflects are sustainable and equitable development, and, in a limited way, espousing the ‘right to the city’ approach for reducing social exclusion. The NUA-recommended characteristics of good urban governance that resonate in this Brisbane study are inclusive planning, territorial integration, proficient institutions, and greater utilization of digital technology for attaining the goals. The explicit policy challenges to tackle are: strengthening decentralization by improving the capacity of local government, for improving the delivery of public services, by exploring new arrangements with private sector actors and leveraging digital technologies. The transformations sought are, primarily, robust metropolitan governance and enabled digital governance. The main policy actors are the local government and the private sector, not so much educational institutions or civil society groups. This chapter illustrates how the Australian planning system perpetuates the dependency of local governments on higher levels of government (as opposed to American cities)—the federal government controls funding for infrastructure whereas the state governments create most planning legislation to be followed and also provide most essential physical, social, and cultural services. Local government responsibilities, traditionally, had been restricted to exercising land use planning controls (created by the state government), maintaining roads and drainage, and managing waste. In recent years, the Brisbane City Council (BCC) has assumed other significant roles and pursued new initiatives—such as increasing and improving parks and recreation spaces; providing more community halls for human development and socio-cultural activities; adopting a comprehensive sustainability agenda that requires active engagement with different stakeholder groups; as well as promoting technology and the internet for e-governance. The authors report that some citizens feel that the zeal to improve parks by privatizing and monetizing them is symptomatic of a larger trend of eroding the publicness of public goods. Whereas in developing countries the potential to lessen corruption with e-governance is its biggest draw, the BCC desires to further

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improve local agencies’ efficiency and information dissemination, as well as enable broader participation in visualizing future urban development scenarios. In regard to the provision of basic urban services and infrastructures—a fundamental aspect of urban planning and governance, the performance of cities of developed countries is usually not unsatisfactory in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. However, most developed cities cannot claim their efforts have been equitable and empowering. In an age of intensified globalization, inequality, and migration (on which, arguably, rests the continued economic well-being of rich societies), issues of equity, social inclusion, and social justice now are rightly drawing more attention. Brisbane too is now, admittedly, committed to better social inclusion and ensuring that planning and governance are sensitive to and reflective of the city’s rich social and cultural diversity. This social inclusion commitment, however, is uneven and more visible in some efforts—such as improving access for seniors and people with disabilities and assisting CSOs for expanding services to the homeless. Interventions with likely longer-lasting benefits, such as expanding affordable housing supply by mandating inclusionary zoning, have yet not earned the same commitment. BCC has tried to raise community engagement by enabling transparent and broad-based participation, including the active use of social media outlets, for deliberating city and neighbourhood plans that it prepares. However, still little is known of how well community engagement enables diverse voices, especially minority and marginalized ones, getting heard and influencing outcomes. Likewise, how representative are BCC and other city agencies, themselves, in terms of their senior management representing disadvantaged groups, would be a useful indicator embodying the commitment to equity and social inclusion. The authors conclude that there is still much that Brisbane can do to improve the quality of urban governance and planning—improve coordination between local and state governments to avoid duplicating efforts and wasting resources; temper the penchant for megaprojects or at least subject their planning to more vigorous community deliberations and scrutiny; ensure a balance between the need to private public open spaces and citizens’ sentiments about changing their forms and management. More essentially, given the context, the authors argue that Brisbane’s planning environment is still hierarchical and top-down, and to be more effective by being more inclusive and equitable it has to actively increase civil society participation. While the city indeed seeks inputs from ordinary citizens, especially for neighbourhood planning, organized and meaningful civil society engagement continues to be relatively weak. It needs to proactively promote the routine involvement of advocacy groups and NGOs to realize NUA’s comprehensive mission.

1.1.5

Cities, Urban Services, and Social Inclusion

The chapter, “The Political Economy of Urban Governance in Asian Cities: Delivering Water, Sanitation and Solid Waste Management Services,” by Boex et al. (2019) is an impressive effort to understand, explicate, and compare, empirically, fundamental facets of how institutional arrangements—local and intergovernmental—affect the delivery of key urban services, namely solid waste management (SWM), sanitation,

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and sewerage. These three are among the most essential services for individual and collective well-being in cities on a daily basis. The NUA rightly emphasizes, as imperative, improving the coverage and quality of such services for sustained and sustainable development. The other NUA goal that this chapter resonates loudly with is that of exercising a ‘right to the city’ approach by combating social exclusion. The characteristics of good urban governance stressed here are that service delivery efforts have to be inclusive, and it is important to have well-coordinated multi-level governance, which should allows local institutions to be proficient and autonomous. Overcoming urban inequality and exclusion, which stem from weak institutional frameworks for delivering basic services, is the main NUA policy challenge addressed here. The transformative actions this study stresses are building the capacity of local government service agencies and a culture of participation and equity in service delivery. The focus is wholly on state actors—local government agencies, and their relationships with higher levels of government. Besides their vital research focus, the authors’ creative evaluation methodology effectively illuminates multiple aspects of how decentralization has impacted local government capacities to deliver services—the understanding of which tends to be weak or patchy, at best, since relevant data are largely unavailable, inconsistent, or hardly accessible. In doing so, it problematizes facile, widely-held assumptions about decentralization’s alchemic potential. This study of 18 cities from large developing countries of South and Southeast Asia, concentrates on the fiscal, political, and administrative dimensions and features of local government and governance that bear upon the performance of urban services delivery. Specifically, it unpacks the following dimensions of local government capacity: (1) the functions assigned, and their effectiveness; (2) political autonomy and leadership; (3) control over administrative and resource management; (4) fiscal autonomy and financial management; and (5) mechanisms for local participation, transparency, and accountability. The authors find more cause for concern than celebration. A specific aspect or two of an individual case could be promising, yet, the overall status of urban services delivery is hardly flattering. Across contexts, a promising observation is that decentralization has assigned to local governments a wide range of functions—a marked departure from the top-down, centralized institutional structures of before. Decentralized institutional arrangements vary greatly, as do local government responsibilties for services, and the nature of the service also impacts its provision. Nevertheless, few local governments, despite political decentralization, enjoy the necessary fiscal autonomy and administrative powers to dispense their functional duties effectively; political decentralization does not affect local accountability, lacking which impairs the delivery of urban services. A negative impact on service delivery is that almost no city demonstrates effective local participation and accountability. Among the urban services studied, most local governments enjoy most functional autonomy with SWM (but not without fiscal and resource constraints imposed by higher government) and the least with water, which is usually managed by entities of the provincial or national government. For want of data, this study does not claim a causal link between strong institutions and better services. It does find that, when it comes to urban services, the political economy of the context is more empowering for a local government than its

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technical capacity; likewise, careful assignment of and close attention to functional responsibilities has yielded more progress than democratic decentralization itself. Finally, based on the assessment of these 18 cities, the sobering comment—that casts doubt on decentralization’s claims of bringing the state closer to the people—is that mechanisms of participation, transparency, and accountability seem to be failing. Amidst loudening voices calling for bolstering the “local” in urban governance, in the chapter, “From Exclusion to Inclusion: The Understanding, Capacity, and Will to Change Local Government Practices,” Möller (2019) redraws our attention to a relatively muted aspect in the expansive discourse on governance. This aspect is the constructive role that external agents can play in stimulating local institutions—both of the state and civil society—to enhance local capacity for reducing and eliminating social exclusion. The NUA prioritizes social inclusion as the central goal for realizing the ‘right to the city’ approach in good urban governance. Good urban governance, it asserts, ought to be democratic and inclusive. The policy challenge inherent in the cases described is the need for robust legal frameworks that facilitate extensive participation between the local government and non-state actors, including local NGOs and external institutions, for providing a variety of services to urban citizens who experience socio-economic marginalization. Möller (2019) stresses how social inclusion can come about when local governments and institutions form or join networks and associations of similar entities that are transposal and even transnational. Here, external agents/institutions imply non-local ones. These could include, inter alia, foreign or domestic, governmental or quasi-governmental organizations, NGOs, as well as private foundations and other philanthropic institutions. Möller chiefly focuses on how external agents can facilitate horizontal or peer learning among local governments through appropriate associational arrangements. As several of the chapters in this book illustrate, social exclusion be sets cities in developing and developed contexts alike. Social exclusion stems from what Amartya Sen calls capability deprivation, which can be in the form active discrimination due to “unfreedoms” (Sen 1999) that can be a political, legal, or social nature, or passive marginalization due to inequitable development. Depending on the context, exclusion disadvantages specific groups, for instance, for their age, gender, physical ability, race, ethnicity, language, immigration or migration status, sexuality, and, most commonly, socioeconomic standing and urban citizenship status (i.e. the formal/informal dichotomy). For local governments newly empowered by decentralization and similar reforms, social exclusion may not be intentional; rather, their lack of political will, capacity, and understanding of underlying factors and remedial processes hampers social inclusion. The author describes how in emerging economies such as China, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Vietnam, and transitioning ones like Moldova and Serbia, the Swedish government-backed International Centre for Local Democracy7 (ICLD) has pursued training local public officials, politicians, and CSO representatives to build the capacity to acknowledge, understand, and address various forms of social exclusion. ICLD promotes and utilizes partnerships among Swedish and foreign municipalities 7 https://icld.se/en/.

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(in lower income countries), by leveraging the potentials of different stakeholders, especially universities and NGOs, for creating and disseminating knowledge, and imparting skills necessary for strengthening democratic local governance and participatory planning. The largely simple, small scale projects have ranged from infusing gender-sensitivity and expanding citizen and CSO participation in local governance and planning to focusing on “left-behind” children in China (a consequence of its harsh measures to control internal migration) and enhancing physical mobility for those with special needs. A few notable lessons emerged from these efforts, many of which were also in oft-neglected smaller urban centres. First, although top-down pressure is important, supplementing that with purposively designed training involving face-to-face engagement, with peer groups from different places, has sustained transformative effects. Second, these efforts are affordable. Mostly implemented with existing local budgets, these overcome the common lament that lack of funding precludes innovative initiatives. Third, the partnerships of local government associations promoted by ICLD (such as DELGOSEA8 in Southeast Asia), as well as other similar actors and donors, underscores how well-endowed external agents with their wide networks can perform a catalytic role. The transnational civil society networks they foster can nudge horizontal learning about social inclusion and social justice, especially in places where these concepts’ appreciation or application is yet weak.

1.2 Summary Discussion: Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories The chapters in this volume present cases from several national and sub-national contexts in the Asia-Pacific region, such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, and some others. Most of these cases predate the deliberations that helped crystallize the NUA, and hence are not directly influenced by it. Still, in different ways and to different degrees, they represent efforts that will be essential to attaining NUA objectives in most places. Collectively, the cases suggest some broad commonalities among the slew of moves underway towards improving urban governance for addressing compounding challenges from accelerated urbanization. These include initiatives toward greater decentralization and local government action, improving the provision of basic urban services, better coordination for planning and development among government entities across and within levels (from the national to the local), coordinated spatial planning by bolstering financing and leveraging technology, and greater participation by local communities and civil society in planning. Of course, implementation of initiatives is often patchy and uneven across contexts. Therefore, individually, the cases reiterate that appreciating the uniqueness or peculiarity of context informs how good urban governance is to be viewed and pursued on the ground. How democratic is the context, how well-established and capacitated are its institutions, how empowered is local government, how conducive 8 http://www.delgosea.eu/cms/.

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are inter-governmental relationships for innovation and change, how strong are trust and understanding between the state and civil society, how overwhelming or urgent are various urbanization challenges, how deep are socioeconomic inequalities, and how proactive, responsive, and resourceful are the media and educational institutions—these are but just some vital, context-specific determinants of the quality of urban governance and planning. Nevertheless, in this section we attempt to highlight trends—both encouraging and disconcerting ones—that seem to resonate across multiple, if not most, cases. This facilitates two things. First, following the in-depth analyses of the individual chapters, a few nuanced, region-specific inferences should allow policymakers, planners, and other interested groups to reflect upon their context of interest in actionable terms. This is because the universal tenor and comprehensiveness of the NUA could yet sound distant and overwhelming. Second, it lets us propose some desirable trajectories for continued progress on the path to improved urban governance and sustainable development. As was discussed in the introductory chapter of this volume (Dahiya and Das 2019), and presented in Table 1, several considerations and aspirations are raised in the NUA, which reimagines the new paradigm of urban governance to be democratic and inclusive, long term and integrated, multiscalar and multilevel, territorial, and digitally conscious (Harkness and Katz 2016). Noticeably positive trends are evident in most countries’ efforts to decentralize urban planning and policymaking, and the push to make local governments assume bigger roles in urban development. The argument to strengthen the capacity for local decision-making, planning, and implementation is now long established. In that vein, and in acknowledging longer time horizons, integrating of multiple ends, and re-evaluating coordination across multiple scales, the new urban planning and governance moves discussed in every chapter echo key elements of the paradigm shift the NUA desires. The Chinese cases highlight how, spurred by the national government’s incentives and directives, provincial and local governments have embarked on pilot projects that integrate multiple physical, social, and organizational objectives to reduce the gaps in the levels of infrastructure, services, and incomes between cities and their rural hinterlands. These efforts also claim to have stoked more community participation at the local level. However, it is not clear how broad-based and inclusive such participatory mechanisms are. Much more apparent are the efforts to create innovative arrangements to leverage financing, including from private capital markets, and increase local stakeholders’ share in profits from land and infrastructure development. However, the authors of the China cases also point to the relatively far less attention being given to possible environmental and ecological ramifications, and how this could be a trend promoting peri-urbanization-style development while not promoting agricultural productivity (a stated goal). Moreover, it also appears that such integrated rural-urban development models will likely benefit larger urban centres more, just as villages in richer provinces and near big cities would be disproportionately advantaged. Similar concerns prevail about extant uneven development levels or imbalanced outcomes that may accrue from multiple governance and planning changes, for instance, in post-decentralization India and Indonesia. As the developing countries of the region most comparable in size and economic growth to

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China’s, their democratic milieus are quite distinct. Unpredictability and variability stemming from local autonomy are, naturally, greater challenges than under China’s authoritarian political system and developmental state environment. The chapters on India and Indonesia, and also Brunei Darussalam, offer detailed accounts of recent developments initiated at the national government level to upgrade urban infrastructure and planning systems in cities. There have been substantial institutional changes to promote locally-driven urban development: from creating novel institutions and innovative institutional arrangements (especially in India) to exploring ways to revamp and bolster financing and regulatory frameworks (particularly, in India).9 Facilitated by two decades of reforms since its extensive decentralization, and concerns over the gargantuan agglomeration that is the unwieldy Jakarta metropolitan region, Indonesia’s new NUA-aligned reforms explicitly push local governments to espouse regionally coordinated spatial planning services provision, and productively manage the ubiquitous phenomenon of peri-urbanization. The impetus on local level planning is evident across contexts. Yet, for the historically weak capacity of local governments, regulatory structures that continue to limit local autonomy, and national governments’ financing or incentivizing of large-scale spatial planning and infrastructures development (housing, transportation, etc.), local governments appear staying or even becoming, paradoxically, dependent on higher levels of government. Also, as the chapter on Lahore explicates, the presence of competing government institutions for planning and development with overlapping responsibilities or jurisdictions, and without clear mandates and adequate resources, impedes effective urban planning and management. In most contexts covered in this volume, the desirable forms of multi-scalar, multi-level governance, enabled by adequately capacitated local governments are still wanting. The authors of multiple chapters in this volume (such as on India, Brisbane, and Lahore) decry or caution against strongly emergent neoliberal tendencies that can allow insidious market forces from hijacking the public good imperative of good urban governance. Overall, efforts to strengthen spatial planning and upgrade physical infrastructures, in ways more innovative, collaborative, and participatory than before, even where institutions have been weak for different reasons (such as Lahore or Bandar Sari Begawan), are quite ubiquitous. There is now widespread realization that local urban governance and planning benefit from greater civil society and community participation. To varying degrees, all the programs and initiatives presented in this volume, including in the less democratic contexts of China, Pakistan, or Brunei, reflect this promising trend. However, the actual quality of civil society participation, on the ground, is hardly adequate yet for transformative local planning. This is true, relatively speaking, even in India or Australia where civil society is neither weak nor CSOs scarce. Why should this matter? Not only can CSOs be valuable partners by sharing roles, responsibilities, resources, and innovative practices for achieving context-sensitive and effective local planning and development, but, more importantly, by checking potential excesses of the state or market forces, they form the essential countervailing force for ensuring 9 For

a fine account of how India’s urban spatial planning is transforming, buoyed by innovative institutional arrangements and financing mechanisms, also see Vidyarthi et al. (2017).

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more just and equitable outcomes. This is of particular salience given the form, pace, and extensive scale of development, driven by neoliberal approaches, underway in most metropolitan or rapidly urbanizing contexts. The brisk conversion of agricultural lands and/or wetlands, for instance, either as peri-urbanization or formal urban expansion, not just raises ecological concerns but also causes much livelihoods distress, dispossession, and displacement of the already marginalized. This renders the poor even more vulnerable and cities less resilient, thereby undermining the goal of creating sustainable cities and communities (which closely aligns NUA to SDG 11). The potential to harness technology, inter alia, for e-governance, managing services, and developing intelligent transportation services, is fuelling the enthusiasm for building smart cities (Vinod Kumar 2015, 2017a, b, 2019). However, the palpable rush to implement highly ambitious smart city programs (e.g. India has its 100 smart cities initiative, China has over 500 smart city pilots)10 is also drawing close scrutiny, and raising valid questions about their problematic conceptualization, land acquisition, ecological ramifications, and social polarization (see, for instance, Ravindran 2015; Hoelscher 2016). In regard to the aforementioned, how CSOs can play a critical role is illuminated, for instance, by the Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN), India, an activist and research NGO, which through its National Eviction and Displacement Observatory tracks and helps check development-related excesses nationwide (HLRN 2018). Also, the logics of collective action and co-production, especially for providing and maintaining urban services, have been actualized globally. For over a quarter century now, the success of participatory budgeting in synergizing state-civil society potentials demonstrates a scaling up of those logics and improving urban governance (Cabannes and Lipietz 2018). Across developing Asian cities, innovations for improving shelter and basic services for the poor (one of the most visible forms of urban deprivation) have benefited greatly from meaningful partnerships11 between local governments and capable NGOs (Dahiya 2003, 2005, 2014; Das 2016; Das and Takahashi 2009). With globalization, albeit a significant expansion of civil society worldwide and its growing influence on governance, inexorably robust trends of monetizing and corporatizing cities in Asia-Pacific are transforming the urban landscape, civic scape, as well as the traditional public sphere (see, for instance, Castells 2008; Douglass et al. 2007), with serious implications for ecological integrity, social equity, and spatial justice. The scale and scope of the engagement of large corporate real estate players and corporate consultancies, like Deloitte, KPMG, and McKinsey, which now market urban planning visions and services to fast developing cities and nations, are quite unprecedented. These serious transformations underway in the urban development ecosystem further warrant civil society assuming bigger roles of vigilance, mediation, and inducing accountability and transparency. However, for this 10 https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-outnumbers-other-countries-in-smart-city-

pilots-report. 11 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasizes the importance of partnerships as one of the five critical dimensions of sustainable development, which include: people, planet, prosperity and peace (United Nations 2015).

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to happen, in contexts where civil society has been historically weak or is presently under threat, national and local governments alike have to actively promote CSOs’ capacity building and involvement as stakeholders in city building.12 The altruistic strength of civil society also matters in light of another disquieting trend about the role of the media. Like civil society, free and vibrant media are indispensable for healthy, transparent, and accountable governance. Due to either the state itself overstepping (e.g. in Southeast Asia and China) or enabling excessive corporatization (e.g. in India), free and/or objective media are under threat in much of Asia (Wake 2018).13 In recent years, as societal intolerance, and populist and jingoist politics have been on the rise worldwide, and social media has proved as pernicious (especially, in spreading falsehoods as news) as it can be beneficial (The Economist 2018a), it is imperative to promote and empower good civil society as a tempering force. A trend that is yet weak but can significantly raise the status of state-civil society cooperation, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is the role of universities in research and imparting education that stresses the importance of governance. For the same reason, we reckon, most cases in this volume indicate that the ‘right to the city’ approach is only weakly, if at all, evident as a guiding principle in the myriad efforts towards improving urban governance and planning underway at different scales in the Asia-Pacific region. An effective way for cities to build collaborative partnerships for local planning initiatives and governance is through local university departments, such as those of planning and architecture, which are prevalent in many places, but also public administration, and public health, geography, sociology, and business management, among others. Universities are usually an under-utilized resource, and cities’ use of it is mutually beneficial. On one hand, academic units tend to produce the most contemporary and cutting-edge research, and often departments and their researchers and teachers have established relationships with local communities and CSOs. On the other hand, many marginalized communities often have little trust in government, but usually more in CSOs and universities familiar to them. So, by working with universities and CSOs, local governments can help reorient research foci onto local issues and leverage sophisticated resources for generating awareness about, and implementing and evaluating local initiatives. The chapters on China in this volume exemplify such cooperation, and even the chapter on Perth stresses the abundance of this underexploited potential. Indeed, across Asia-Pacific some of the most successful pro-poor local initiatives have thrived because of such stateuniversity-civil society partnerships (Das 2016). Again, in contexts where such partnerships have little precedence, universities can provide relevant short- to long-term training to public officials to improve the human resource quality and sensibilities of local governments. The chapter on Indonesia mentions how the national government is actively encouraging public officials to upgrade their skills through supplementary university training. However, what is also critical is the nature of planning and public 12 Among studies from other regions, detailed ethnographic research from Brazil is instructive in this regard; see, for instance, Abers (2000); Tendler (1997); Baiocchi et al. (2011). 13 Also see, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/attacks-record-state-global-pressfreedom-2017-2018.

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affairs education. Likewise, in his chapter on how local governments can become more inclusive, Möller too stresses the positive contribution of universities. Planning education in developing Asia-Pacific continues to encourage problem solving from heavily positivist, scientific, and technocratic perspectives. Effecting good urban local governance, however, requires knowing not just the technical, but more so the nuanced intersectionality of the social, cultural, environmental, economic, and political (Harpham and Boateng 1997; Pugh 2000). Negligible emphasis in planning curricula on theories of equity, justice, inclusivity, and civil society, and the overall neglect of social sciences knowledge, in general, produce planners and bureaucrats who either see little value in embracing participatory and inclusive approaches, or feel challenged when it comes to acting in non-routine ways. Thus, like in many countries now, although Indonesia has admirably revamped its institutional framework and created new sub-national institutions for disaster risk reduction and resilience building, their efficacy remains questionable (Das and Luthfi 2017). Encouragingly, recent works indicate planning scholars in Asia are cognizant of the urgent need for critically examining planning education, and for it to be founded on bold, progressive theoretical pillars (see, for instance, Bhan et al. 2018; Kumar et al. 2016). The discussion above brings into relief trends that are useful, or not, for what the NUA champions as good urban governance. The expectations good governance embodies are lofty, but progress in the realms of urban governance, planning, and development across countries and cities in the Asia-Pacific makes us optimistic about their attainment. Urbanization’s challenges for cities are daunting because they are simultaneously about the economy, housing, basic services, transportation, the environment, social inequity, uneven spatial development, and so forth. So far, for improving how cities perform, government impetuses have heavily concentrated on strengthening spatial and physical planning, financing, big infrastructure, and technological fixes. Bolstering the institutional arrangements and capacities for local governance has received relatively less attention or seen less concerted action. Pressures from higher levels of government, or global trends threatening democratic and progressive local agendas impact goings-on in cities. Notwithstanding such influences, cities can and should demonstrate how good governance, through meaningful state action and state-civil society synergy, can promote development that is equitable and sustainable. For this desirable end to occur, national governments should continue the trajectory of implementing decentralization and enhancing local autonomy, and provide local governments, especially of small and medium sized cities, the necessary guidance and support to develop their own capacities to govern and plan. Urban local governments, in turn, need to be more flexible in their ways, and promote collaboration among public, private, and civil society institutions. This will help leverage valuable resources and generate new ideas, facilitate alternative perspectives on tackling development challenges, and deepen trust and confidence among different stakeholders. Current trends of urbanization, peri-urbanization, and neoliberal urban development appear to be compromising ecologically sound, socially equitable, and spatially just outcomes. Therefore, expanding and improving the space for engaging citizens and civil society in local planning and development processes

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is critical. Given how quickly urban inequality has been expanding, and continuously contracting access to decent housing, employment, and health for the poor, cities have a solemn duty to uphold the public good by ensuring the fruits of urban development do not benefit just the privileged few. Universities ought to play a bigger role in setting trajectories of socially sensitive, context-appropriate planning and development, bringing state and civil society actors closer, and producing capable stewards of good urban governance. Reforming universities’ planning and public affairs curricula is therefore a vital and urgent first step in most contexts. Obviously, several other factors, including contextually peculiar ones, will affect how closely individual cities stay the desired course to realize the NUA’s aspirational ends.

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Ashok Das is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Hawai‘i at M¯anoa (UHM), USA. He is also an affiliate faculty of UHM’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and Center for South Asian Studies. He was co-chair (2016–18) of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning’s (ACSP) Global Planning Educators Interest Group (GPEIG). He received his Ph.D. in Urban Planning from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA); M.Arch. and M.A. in Environmental Planning & Management from Kansas State University; and B. Arch. from the School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi. Previously, he was an assistant professor in the San Francisco State University’s Department of Urban Studies and Planning; an architecture and planning consultant in the United States and India; and the chief cartoonist for Architecture+Design, India’s leading architecture magazine. Ashok researches institutional challenges and innovations for ameliorating urban poverty through services provision in Asia-Pacific, particularly in Indonesia and India, and affordable housing in the US. Community participation and empowerment, slum upgrading, decentralization and governance, civil society, community-managed integrated microfinance, disaster risk reduction, inclusionary zoning, and planning education are specific research interests. The Ford Foundation, the World Resources Institute, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs have sought his advisory services.

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A. Das and B. Dahiya Bharat Dahiya is an award-winning urbanist, combines research, policy analysis and development practice aimed at examining and tackling socio-economic, environmental and governance issues in the global urban context. Since early1990s, Bharat’s research and professional work has focused on sustainable cities and urbanization, strategic urban planning and development, urban environment and infrastructure, and urban resilience. Working with the World Bank, UN-Habitat, the Asian Development Bank, United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS), and UNDP, he initiated, led and contributed to international projects on sustainable urban development in the Asia-Pacific region. Bharat conceptualized and coordinated the preparation of United Nations’ first-ever report on The State of Asian Cities 2010/11. At the World Bank headquarters, he conducted the first-ever systematic review of the Bank’s investments for improving urban liveability, published as a co-authored book, Urban Environment and Infrastructure: Toward Livable Cities. More recently, he co-authored Partnering for Sustainable Development: Guidelines for Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Implement the 2030 Agenda in Asia and the Pacific (UNU-IAS and ESCAP). Bharat is Series Editor for the SCOPUS-indexed Springer book series, Advances in 21st Century Human Settlements, and serves on the editorial boards of Cities: The International Journal of Urban Policy and Planning, Journal of Urban Culture Research, Jindal Journal of Public Policy, and National Geographical Journal of India. He has held academic positions in Australia, Indonesia and Thailand. Reuters, Inter Press Service, SciDev.Net, Nishi-Nippon, The Korean Economic Daily, China Daily and its Asia Weekly, The Hindu, Deccan Herald, Bangkok Post, The Nation, UB Post, The Sunday Times, and Urban Gateway have quoted Bharat’s work. He is based at the College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok. He holds a Ph.D. in Urban Governance, Planning and Environment from the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.