New Public Management : Its impact on public servants' identity 9781846631375, 9781846631368

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12/10/2006

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ISSN 0951-3558

Volume 19 Number 6 2006

International Journal of

Public Sector Management New public management: its impact on public servant’s identity Guest Editor: Sylvia Horton

www.emeraldinsight.com

International Journal of

ISSN 0951-3558

Public Sector Management

Volume 19 Number 6 2006

New public management: its impact on public servant’s identity Guest Editor Sylvia Horton

Access this journal online __________________________ 531 Editorial advisory board ___________________________ 532 New public management: its impact on public servant’s identity: an introduction to this symposium Sylvia Horton __________________________________________________

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Civil servant identity at the crossroads: new challenges for public administrations Daniel J. Caron and David Giauque_________________________________

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Transforming public services – transforming the public servant? Anne Marie Berg _______________________________________________

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Modernizing public administration: the impact on organisational identities Giseline Rondeaux_______________________________________________

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Identifying identities: performance-driven, but professional public managers Jeroen van Bockel and Mirko Noordegraaf ___________________________

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS continued

Diffusing values or adjusting practices? A review of research on French public utilities Gilles Jeannot___________________________________________________

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New pay in European civil services: is the psychological contract changing? Ingrid Willems, Ria Janvier and Erik Henderick _______________________

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Dr Jamal Daoud Abu-Doleh Business Administration Department, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan

Dr P.I. Gomes Caribbean Centre for Development Administration, St Michael, Barbados

Dr Stephen Ackroyd The Management School, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

Dr Chira Hongladarom Human Resources Institute, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand

Professor Refat Al-faouri Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan

Professor Owen Hughes Department of Management, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

Dr Michael Barzelay Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, London School of Economics, London, UK Professor Mathias Beck Division of Risk, Caledonian Business School, Glasgow, UK

John Hutton Henley Management College, Henley-on-Thames, UK Professor Richard Kerley Faculty of Business and Arts, Queen Margaret University College, Edinburgh, UK

Professor Jonathan Boston School of Government, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand

Dr Douglas McCready School of Business and Finance, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada

Dr Richard Boyle Institute of Public Administration, Clonkskeagh, Ireland

Penny McKeown Senior Lecturer, Queen’s University, Belfast

Dr Anthony B.L. Cheung Department of Public and Social Administration, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong John G. Corcoran Economist, School of the Built Environment, Limerick Institute of Technology, Limerick, Eire Joan Corkery European Centre for Development, Maastricht, The Netherlands J. Ignacio Criado Department of Political Science and Public Administration II, Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain Dr Carolyn Currie School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Broadway, Sydney, Australia Dr Andrew L.S. Goh School of Business, University of South Australia, Adelaide, Australia

International Journal of Public Sector Management Vol. 19 No. 6, 2006 p. 532 # Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0951-3558

Geoff Merchant Civil Service College, Ascot, Berkshire, UK Peter Noordhoek Northedge Ltd, Gouda, The Netherlands Dr James Nti Management Development Institute, Serrekunda, The Gambia Dr Vinod Shanbhag All India Management Association, New Delhi, India David Shand Financial Management Board, OPCFM, The World Bank, Washington DC, USA Kuppusamy Singaravelloo Department of Administrative Studies and Politics, University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

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New public management: its impact on public servant’s identity An introduction to this symposium

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Sylvia Horton University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Hants, UK Abstract Purpose – This paper introduces the symposium on public management reform and its impact on public servant’s identity. It provides both a descriptive and theoretical context within which the other contributions to the symposium can be located. Design/methodology/approach – It is based on a literature review and a summary of the articles in the symposium Findings – The paper describes the changes associated with new public management (NPM) and its variants and their impact on systems of public administration and public officials. It also highlights the contribution that cultural and social theories, drawn from anthropology and organisational psychology, make to an understanding of the processes by which public servants’ identity are formed and changed. It complements this with an examination of different models of bureaucracy, which reflect the transition from classical public administration to NPM. These concepts and ideas are developed further in other articles in the journal. Originality/value – It provides an introduction for readers unfamiliar with the core concepts and ideas associated with individual, group and organisational identity and highlights for readers what is central to the research papers in the symposium. Keywords Public sector organizations, Social theories, Bureaucracy Paper type Viewpoint

New public management (NPM) and its variants of entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and the new steering model (Klages and Loeffler, 1996) have been with us now for more than 20 years. Although the speed and extent with which countries and governments have adopted NPM varies (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Farnham et al., 2005) there is an international trend reflected in changes in the size, role and functions of the state. The state’s boundaries with civil society and, in particular, the private market and non-profit sectors of the economy, are being redrawn and Governance is replacing government (Pierre and Peters, 2000). There are also internal changes in the cultures and identities of public services as traditional administrative and professional bureaucracies are being transformed into managerial bureaucracies based upon business principles and practices imported from the private sector. Large, highly structured state monopolies, regulated by rules and procedures and coordinated through hierarchies, are being replaced with often competitive smaller, matrix structures, partnerships and networks coordinated by contracts and performance agreements involving complex relationships between public, private and voluntary bodies. This fundamental restructuring has been described as an identity project (Du Gay, 1996), in which the vocational orientation of public service and the

International Journal of Public Sector Management Vol. 19 No. 6, 2006 pp. 533-542 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0951-3558 DOI 10.1108/09513550610685970

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public service ethic are being replaced by public management logic with a corresponding identity and ethical framework for public servants. These changes are impacting on public officials as their roles and the work they do, the ways in which they are managed, their relationships with the public and the criteria by which they are assessed, both internally and externally, are continually evolving. As the public service is losing its specificity and its unique role and mode of operation, being a civil servant or public official no longer has such a distinct identity. Individual civil servants are adjusting their perceptions of the collective identity, the public’s perception of that identity and their own self-identity. This symposium examines the concept of public service identity and explores some of the effects of the changes associated with NPM reforms on the culture of public organisations and their value and belief systems. It also considers whether at the micro level a new “identity” of civil servants or public officials is emerging and it explores the implications of this for public service motivation and public service ethics. Public service identity Relevant theories Much of the traditional literature on identity emanates from sociology and anthropology (Benedict, 1934; Durkheim, 1947; Hall, 1959; Kluckhohn and Strodbeck, 1934) but more recently from organisational psychology and organisational theory. Durkheim distinguished society and individuals arguing society was more than the sum of its parts. Individuals were the proper concern of psychology but sociology was interested in the interrelationships between society and the individual. Individuals are regulated within society by social control mechanisms, both mental and physical. These controls help to create collective representations and solidarity and in turn shape the personalities, identities and behaviours of individuals in society. This idea was transposed to organisations by sociologists who view organisations as mini-societies in which individuals are socialised or enculturated into an identity and a corresponding set of behaviours. Organisational psychologists, focusing on the micro level, have developed social identity theory to explain the psychological basis of inter-group discrimination and group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Social identity is defined as the individual’s self-concept derived from perceived membership of a social group (Hogg and Vaughan, 2002). This is in contrast to self or personal identity that refers to self-knowledge and derives from an individual’s unique attributes. Individuals can have multiple identities linked to association with different groups such as family, organisations, profession and nation. In addition to self and social identities there is also a role identity, seeing oneself as holding a role such as a doctor, a teacher or a civil servant. Social identity theory claims that group membership creates in-groups and out-groups and individuals derive positive self-esteem and status from being a member of the in-group. In fact people’s sense of who they are is defined by reference to “we” rather than “I”. However, if identity with the in-group no longer confers status, or there is a change in the goals, values and principles on which the individual perceives the group to be based, then individuals will disassociate and transfer to another group where personal identity once more confers status. Organisational and management theorists have become particularly interested in organisational culture in recent years. The perception of organisational culture as a

determinant of organisational identity and a source of individual members’ norms, values and behaviours, was triggered by the writings of some management gurus in the 1980s (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 1983). Earlier cultural theorists, such as the anthropologist Douglas (1978), achieved renewed popularity through the writings of Deal and Kennedy (1982) and Handy (1987), whilst new cultural theorists entered the debate (Hofstede, 1991; Hamden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). One of the most significant themes in the discourse of organisational culture is its importance in the process of change. It has become, therefore, a central focus in examining the transition from traditional public administration to NPM (Metcalfe and Richards, 1987; Hood, 1998). Hood, in particular, has used and adapted the ideas of Douglas in his study of administrative systems. Douglas studied traditional cultures and the forms of social organisations that support them. She constructed a typology based upon the assumption that an individual’s perceptions, beliefs, values and behaviour are shaped, regulated and controlled by two types of social constraints, which she labels “group” and “grid”. Group constraints represent the extent to which people are driven by or restricted in thought and action by their commitment to a social entity greater than themselves as individuals. The strength of the “group” influence and individual identity with the group will be reflected in the time and importance attached to interacting with the group. The frequency of the interaction, the degree of mutuality, the scope of the interaction and the tightness of the group will all affect the strength of personal identity with the group and commitment to its goals and values. Identity and group strength will be low when individuals are neither constrained by nor dependent upon a single group of others or no longer identify with it. Grid, according to Douglas, stands for the “cross hatch of rules to which individuals are subject in the course of their interaction” (Douglas, 1978, p. 8) or the extent to which people’s behaviour is constrained by normative role differentiation. Grid is strong where roles are clearly defined and filled by applying ascriptive criteria within clearly defined hierarchies and is weak when rules and regulations are removed, the criteria for selection are compromised and hierarchies are weakened. Douglas (1979) developed a four-fold grid/group typology as a tool for analysis and she described the four types as fatalism, hierarchy, individualism and egalitarianism. The exact nature of the two dimensions of sociality-“group” and “grid” – has been at the centre of debate in cultural theory for some 20 years. There is widespread agreement that Douglas’s four-fold typology is effectively a polythetic scale and that her four types are best seen as extremes with most group and organisational cultures consisting of various combinations of patterns of social relations and patterns of cultural biases. Other writers in the cultural theory school have elaborated on and explained Douglas’s cultural typology (Thompson et al., 1990; Ellis and Thompson, 1997; Hood, 1998; Considine and Lewis, 1999). The main claim of grid-group or cultural theory is that culture matters and that preferences and justifications shape the world of social relations. Identity is based upon normative and cultural cognitive elements around which meanings are constructed (Albert and Whetton, 1985), but what happens when cultures change, how does this affect personal and group identities? There are a number of possibilities but there will be an initial situation of conflict and probably some element of resistance as personal identities are under threat. If the group identity and the cultural bias become

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incompatible then cognitive dissonance is likely to occur. The individual is then faced with a number of choices. The individual may leave the group; remain within the group but continue to hold traditional values and beliefs and feel isolated or alienated; accept the new values and norms and realign membership of the group because membership continues to confer status; or individuals may adjust their “self-identity” to become congruent with the revised wider social entity. It is likely that within the original “in-group” several sub groups, with corresponding cultures, may co-exist and their response to the changed situation will produce magnified variations. Traditional bureaucratic models It is generally accepted that those working in the civil service are bound by and in most instances subscribe to a public service ethos or Beamtenethos with which they identify and are identified. Although there is no universally accepted definition of public service ethos, it is “a portmanteau phrase” that connotes not only a sense of pride in serving the public and the public interest, i.e. public service motivation but also a range of personal behaviours and institutional features. These constitute a culture and an ethical and political framework within which civil servants are expected to operate. The behavioural characteristics generally include honesty, integrity, probity, dispassionateness, freedom from corruption and above all service to the public interest, whilst the institutional practices consist of open, competitive, merit-based recruitment and promotion, expertise and accountability to the public through politicians, regulatory bodies and the law. Civil servants are expected, in western democracies, to be politically neutral and to implement the law and carry out the policies of the government of the day with efficiency and probity. However, in some political systems like Germany and the USA, political appointments that change with governments fill the top level of the service. In contrast, in the UK all top civil servants have traditionally been both politically neutral and permanent while acting as major advisors on policy to the government of the day. They have been expected to offer frank, and if need be, unwelcome advice without regard to the personal consequences. The cultural framework and the group identity associated with civil services vary according to political context and are path dependent. Nevertheless, systems tend to approximate to a model or type described as bureaucracy, which bears a close resemblance to the hierarchical group/grid model identified by Douglas. It is a social structure characterised by strong group boundaries, exclusion and binding prescriptions. The prescriptions are justified by the importance of the whole over the parts, the collective over the individual. Division of labour, differentiation of roles, hierarchical social relations are central to these groups. Fairness consists of equality before the law but there is also a blame culture and deviants are those who do not conform. There is great trust placed in authority and expertise, tradition and loyalty. New models The movement, which bears the name of NPM, and which has been sweeping across the world and transforming state and bureaucratic systems since the 1980s (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) offers a new model. The managerial ideology that underpins NPM is challenging the bureaucratic ideology on which modern western administrative systems have been traditionally based. Classic procedural bureaucracies are now only one type of governance and Considine and Lewis (1999) have constructed a new

typology in which they differentiate between procedural bureaucracy (classic Weberian), corporate bureaucracy, market bureaucracy and network bureaucracy. All these types or models can be found in contemporary state systems. Public organisational cultures do not appear to have been entirely replaced but rather infiltrated with values and norms and institutional frameworks, which are in many instances in conflict with the traditional normative and ethical frameworks of traditional public administration systems. Many writers have identified and explored the effects of these changes and argue that there are now different identities to which public officials can relate (Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Norman, 2003; Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2006). These identities reflect the values and beliefs associated with perceptions of what the role of the public or civil servant is, the objectives to be achieved and the criteria by which success and outputs should be measured. An institution’s title is a key to its identity and the words used to define it are a key to its position. Therefore, a change of title from civil servants or public administrators to public managers or chief executives signifies a different identity both to in-groups and out-groups. The process of public management reform has been incremental even in those countries where it appeared to be most radical, e.g. New Zealand and the UK. Institutional variables including the type of political executive, party system, interest mediation, administrative system, public sector industrial relations and legal system all combine to fashion the type of public management reform and the speed with which it has been introduced (Farnham et al., 2005). Contextual factors including the state of the economy, the influence of political elites and the openness of the system to international managerial ideas disseminated through institutions such as the OECD, IMF, World Bank and WTO have also been reflected in different ways across states (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). What appears to be the case is that in spite of all the changes much of the traditional public administration cultures remain. In order to assess the degree of change in the cultures and the associated identities of civil servants, ideal types of classical bureaucracy and NPM have been used as heuristic devices. Writers have been addressing the effect of the changed cultures on the identities of civil servants and other public officials and the impact on their behaviour, the ethical standards to which they relate, public service motivation and commitment (Vandenabeele et al., 2006). Milward (1996) argues that NPM has led to a deconstruction of public organisations leaving public employees searching for their organisational identity. He asks if this is destroying social attributes of public agencies and weakening the personal sense of attachment by officials. If so, are they losing their identity with their notion of self and organisational community – are these being lost in the noise of the change? Fountain (2001) asks whether the changes have led to a fundamental weakening of the role of public servants as the increasing customer satisfaction metaphor ignores and weakens the critical roles of representation and stewardship intrinsic to both public officials and the public. Have the organisational changes removed the grid constraints and bureaucratic barriers to release entrepreneurial spirit leaving individuals to establish their own normative rules to control their actions more powerfully and completely than the former system? To fully understand the implications of NPM more attention needs to be given to its effects on civil servants and public officials. We need wide-ranging research to allow us

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to understand and evaluate the impact of NPM, reinvention and modernization on civil servants. This symposium aims to contribute to the work already done by others (Millward, 1996; Considine and Lewis, 1999; Balfour and Grubb, 2000; Fountain, 2001; Vandenabeele et al., 2006). The contributions to this special edition This set of articles contributes some answers to the questions what is public service identity? Have the identities of civil servants/public officials changed? How and why have they changed? What are some of the implications of the changes for professional competencies, individual and collective ethical behaviour and work practices? Caron’s and Giaque’s article “Civil servant identity at the crossroads” examines the effect of the new managerial logic, which underpins the shift from traditional public administration to NPM, on the ethical behaviour of civil servants in two very different political systems. They compare the changes that have been introduced in Switzerland and Canada and the professional values that are emerging, following the introduction of NPM principles and tools. In both countries, the new values of productivity, efficiency, risk taking, independence and accountability are often in conflict with traditional Weberian values of procedural correctness, equality of treatment, risk avoidance and strict adherence to rules and regulations. This, the authors argue, is leading to paradoxes that are calling into question the professional identity of public officials and creating ethical dilemmas. The results-oriented ethics of NPM may be leading to civil servants making self-interested decisions, which are in complete opposition to classical public administration values and public servant’s identity, especially in the eyes of the public. If public servants are to continue to be seen as “the transfer agents for the public interest” the authors argue there must be a clearer ethical framework established and a balance between independent action and upholding the public interest. The results logic, especially where it is linked to performance related pay, is encouraging self-interested rather than public interest behaviour. At the moment, there is a lack of regulation of civil service behaviour. There is a need for clearer guidelines, rules and regulations combined with an investment in training to create an optimum situation of behaviour regulation in an ethical public service. Berg’s article develops the concept of identity and explores the diversity of identities that can exist within a common corporate culture. She argues that shared meaning does not necessarily mean shared values and there can be opposing corporate and social identities within a single organisation. In other words, there will be subcultures within an overall corporate culture. Her research question is how are different groups within public organisations reacting to the public management reforms that have been introduced? She develops three typologies to assist her analysis. The first, based on Douglas’s work, identifies four types of individual based upon their cultural predispositions to actions. The second typology builds on the first and links individual cultural alternatives of action to groups or what she calls communities of meaning. Her third typology, based upon the work of Considine and Lewis, identifies five types of bureaucracy or governance types underpinned by different logic and cultural forms. Using a study of three Norwegian public services, she then explores the interdependence of organisational forms and the identities of managers and front line workers.

The research findings support the assumption that not only individuals but also groups react to changes in different ways. She demonstrates that there has been a change from a classical procedural bureaucracy to a more market-based bureaucracy in all three public services. However, each is based on different professional groups and has different hierarchies. The result is a kaleidoscopic set of responses ranging from opposition, cynicism and exit to compliance, qualified acceptance and positive support. There were clear differences between top management and front line workers but more mixed reactions from middle and lower levels of management. The evidence points to the emergence of a new type of hybrid identity and form of bureaucracy, which may be a temporary, transitional situation or a more permanent one. It requires more research to explore that question further. Rondeaux’s article also explores the impact of NPM on organisational identities based on a case study of the introduction of the Copernicus reforms in the Belgian federal government. After discussing the approaches to studying identity that can be found in the literature, she opts for a combination of interpretive and interactionist approaches in her case study of a key department in the Federal Government. Based on interviews and content and speech analysis, she identifies a clear distinction between what she calls public service and public managerialism logics. She constructs two models of these logics derived from the responses of the interviewees. These models are not dissimilar to those used by other researchers but add to the knowledge we have of perceptions and reactions of public officials to the NPM movement. She recognises that these models are archetypes and that individuals will have positive and negative orientations towards them. Their positioning, therefore, depends not only on their identity with the fundamental principles of the two models but also on their perception of the changes that are taking place and their evaluation of these changes. In measuring the latter she uses the concepts of fidelity and realism. She constructs a set of positioning of identity profiles that produces six types of combination. The paper advances the theory of identity supporting the view that identity is a complicated concept and that organisational and group identities are complex, composite and continually evolving. It also depends on perception that is more individual than collective. The snap shot of the case study needs to be reproduced in other settings as well as developed using a longitudinal study before the causal processes involved in identity positioning can be explained. Van Bockel and Noordegraff’s article starts from the observation that public service identity is not a fixed phenomenon but dynamic and changes in response to environmental circumstances. They construct a three-fold classification of traditional, modern, and post-modern forms of bureaucracy with their corresponding public service identities. They argue there is no “ideal” public service identity as there is no ideal public service but that it is possible to differentiate particular identities and perceptions of professionalism, linked to developments in the role of the state, which they describe as fuzzy (pre-Weberian), formalistic (Weberian) and flexible (post-Weberian). In the first era, public service was identified with service to the king but was also based on self-interest. With the end of absolute monarchy and the emergence of republics or constitutional monarchies public service was to the res publica. In the third model, public servants are still perceived to be serving the public but the public are now seen as a complex set of stakeholders with multiple interests. The public servants, in turn, are expected to demonstrate multiple skills and

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competencies including being entrepreneurial, customer oriented and results driven. The latter determines rewards, and therefore, encourages self-interest. Identities of professional public officials and civil servants are, therefore, multiple ones, depending on their perception of the role of public service and their attachment to historical institutional legacies. How can we judge specific identities? The authors argue only on the basis of the normative principles on which they are based and the consequences of their application. Using their three models of bureaucracy and an historical institutionalist approach, they conclude that the present institutional logic is flawed and inconsistent. In particular, it reduces the res publica to a market of consumers; public organisations to businesses; and public officials to performance driven, self-interested employees. This, they conclude, is an impoverished view of all three. Jeannot’s article broadens the range of public organisations covered in this symposium and offers a different approach to discovering how NPM has affected identity and behaviour of public officials. Based on a series of studies of four public utilities in France it describes how agents (officials) have reacted in practical terms to the customer-focused reforms. These vary according to the type of function agents are involved in and their proximity to the user/consumer of the service. The article assumes that the reader is familiar with the reforms that have taken place in the major public utilities in France, which are essentially the adoption of NPM ideas and practices including performance management, customer orientation and human resources management. These changes reflect a different model and contrast with the traditional model of public service based on the principles of egalitarianism in service provision, security of employment, solidarity and high union membership, and standard payments for employees. The NPM model, in contrast, has fragmented both the employment structures and reward system and changed the expectations of the new “consumers”. Jeannot’s research demonstrates that changes in the public utilities in France have introduced many tensions and dilemmas for public employees who vary in their commitment to the new ideas and values. The original contribution of the article is in illustrating how individuals actually behave in dealing with these dilemmas. Those still committed to the principles of egalitarianism and public service, behave differently from those who have embraced the new model of public management. The latter are more likely to move to sales or marketing where the new values and practices are highlighted. If agents are front line workers they may choose to act out traditional principles ignoring rules and targets based upon new ones. The evidence suggests that there has been a change in values and practices but that a hybrid model is probably the most descriptive of the current situation in the French public utilities. The last article by Willems, Janvier and Henderickx focuses on one of the major changes in management practice that is accompanying NPM: the individualisation and decentralisation of human resources management and, more specifically, reward management systems. These changes, often referred to as New Pay, are designed to increase productivity and motivate staff. They are also intended to communicate new values and priorities and to be a means of gaining the commitment of staff to those values. New Pay is designed to link rewards to organisational strategy and objectives and to move away from standardisation to flexibility, from centralisation to decentralisation, and pay related to grade to performance related pay. The movement

to New Pay is seen as an indicator of the changes that are occurring in one important aspect of the traditional public sector system. An examination of six European countries reveals that there are wide variations in the extent to which New Pay has taken root and there is evidence that central governments have not yet moved far towards private pay practices. Only in Sweden is there evidence of individual based reward systems and flexibility. In the other cases, there is performance related pay and some decentralisation but still a high degree of attachment to a collectivistic and equal treatment culture. The authors ascribe this to the continuation of the traditional psychological contract in which loyalty and commitment to public service are linked to security and fair treatment. The “new pay” system has not been fully embraced. This indicates that there is still not a true performance culture at least in the six countries that were reviewed. The identity of civil servants still embraces traditional collectivist and equity values on rewards. References Albert, S. and Whetton, D. (1985), “Organizational identity theory and the organization”, Organizational Behaviour, Vol. 7, pp. 263-95. Balfour, D. and Grubb, J. (2000), “Character, corrosion and the civil servant: the human consequences of globalization and the new public management”, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 22, p. 3. Benedict, R. (1934), Patterns of Culture, Sentry, New York, NY. Considine, M.J. (1999), “Governance at the ground level: the front-line bureaucrat in the age of markets and networks”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 59 No. 6, pp. 467-80. Deal, T. and Kennedy, A. (1982), Corporate Culture, Addison-Wesley, Boston, MA. Douglas, M. (1978), Cultural Bias, Occasional Paper No. 35, Royal Anthropological Society, London, p. 35. Douglas, M. (1982), “Passive voices: theories in religious sociology”, In the Active Voice, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Du Gay, P. (1996), Consumption and Identity at Work, Sage, London. Durkheim, E. (1947), The Division of Labour in Society, The Free Press, New York, NY. Ellis, J. and Thompson, M. (Eds) (1997), Culture Matters: Essays in Honour of Aaron Wildavsky, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Exworthy, M. and Halford, S. (Eds) (1999), Professionals and the New Managerialism, Open University Press, Buckingham. Farnham, D., Hondeghem, A. and Horton, S. (2005), Staff Participation in Public Management Reform: Some International Comparisons, Palgrave, Basingstoke. Fountain, J. (2001), “Paradoxes of public sector customer services”, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 55-73. Hall, E.T. (1959), The Silent Language, Anchor Books, New York, NY. Handy, C. (1987), Understanding Organisations, Penguin, Harmondsworth. Hamden-Turner, F. and Trompenaars, F. (1993), The Seven Cultures of Capitalism, Piatkus, London. Hofstede, G. (1991), Cultures and Organizations, McGraw Hill, London. Hogg, M.A. and Vaughan, G. (2002), Social Psychology, Prentice Hall, London.

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Hood, C. (1998), “The Art of the State”, Culture, Rhetoric and Public Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kanter, R. (1983), The Change Masters, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY. Klages, H. and Loeffler, E. (1996), “Public sector modernisation in Germany: recent trends and emerging strategy”, in Flynn, N. and Strehl, F. (Eds), Public Sector Management in Europe, Prentice-Hall, London, pp. 132-45. Kluckhohn, F. and Strodbeck, F. (1934), Variations in Value Orientation, Row Peterson, Evanston, IL. Metcalfe, L. and Richards, S. (1987), Improving Public Management, EIPA, Maastricht. Meyer, R. and Hammerschmid, G. (2006), “Public management reform: an identity project”, Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 99-115. Milward, H.B. (1996), “Symposium on the hollow state: capacity, context and performance in inter-organizational settings”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 193-313. Norman, R. (2003), Obedient Servants? Management Freedoms and Accountabilities in the New Zealand Public Sector, Victoria University Press, Wellington. Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992), Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. Peters, T. and Waterman, T. (1982), In Search of Excellence, Harper and Row, New York, NY. Pierre, J. and Peters, G. (2000), Governance, Politics and the State, Macmillan, Basingstoke. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004), Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A. (1990), Cultural Theory, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1986), “The social identity theory of inter-organisational behaviour”, in Worchel, S. and Austin, L. (Eds), Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, Nelson-Hall, Chicago, IL. Vandenabeelen, W., Scheepers, S. and Hondeghem, A. (2006), “Public service motivation in an international perspective: The UK and Germany”, Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 13-31. Further reading Altman, Y. and Beruch, Y. (1998), “Cultural theory and organizations: analytical method and cases”, Organization Studies, Vol. 19 No. 5, pp. 769-85. Alvesson, M. (2002), Understanding Organizational Culture, Sage, London. Sennett, R. (1998), Corrosion of Character; the Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism, W.W. Norton, New York, NY. Corresponding author Sylvia Horton can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Civil servant identity at the crossroads: new challenges for public administrations Daniel J. Caron

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E´cole Nationale d’Administration Publique, Quebec, Canada, and

David Giauque

Public Management Unit, Haute E´cole Valaisanne, Sierre, Switzerland Abstract Purpose – To compare and contrast the changes introduced in Canada and Switzerland as a result of public management reforms and explore the ethical challenges they entail. Design/methodology/approach – This is a case study of two countries based in part on secondary sources but also on observations made by the authors. Findings – The strategies used in each country are different reflecting their distinct political institutions. But there is a commonality, namely the emergence of new ethical problems related to the changes under way. Each country has tackled these new ethical challenges in similar ways. Individual and group behaviour of both Canadian and Swiss civil servants is regulated through “external controls” (codes of ethics, rules of conduct), but also by means of the socialization of new professional values (quality of customer service, flexibility, innovation, creativity, efficiency and effectiveness). These external controls and new values are insufficient, however, to allow civil servants to develop their own capacity for ethical deliberation, an essential condition for enhancing ethical behaviour in modern public administrations. Research limitations/implications – The findings are not based on a systematic comparative study and can only therefore be interpreted as indicative. Originality/value – The writers offer an interesting model relating to methods of behaviour regulation in an ethical public service and the need to ensure that the public good and the public interest remain at the core of public servants identity. Keywords Work identity, Ethics, Civil service, Canada, Switzerland, Public sector organizations Paper type Case study

Introduction Public sector employees are currently confronted with new professional challenges arising from the introduction of new principles and tools inspired by the shift to new public management (NPM). Even though the NPM dynamic includes several different models, many principles are shared by the various countries that have undertaken administrative reforms, particularly among the member states of the OECD. The guiding philosophy of these managerial changes is largely inspired by economic considerations. In fact, a market logic is gradually being introduced into the operation and regulation of administrative services or units (de Visscher and Varone, 2004). Designed in response to criticism about the alleged and sometimes proven ineffectiveness and inefficiency of public organizations, the principles and tools of NPM attempt to breathe a new “business-mindset” into the field of public administration, based in part on economic theories of organization. New values that have arisen in the wake of the shift constitute the criteria by which today’s civil

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servants are assessed: productivity, efficiency, risk-taking and initiative, ability to work to objectives, independence and accountability. This new orientation means civil servants are confronted with conflicting values that may lead to paradoxes calling into question the professional identity of public employees and even their capacity for ethical and critical deliberation. In the long run, the focus on individual and group performance and the related new professional values that make up the new “results-oriented ethics” may lead civil servants to make decisions and act in a self-interested and opportunistic way, in complete opposition to traditional Weberian public ethics values. But more importantly, these values may lead to decisions that gradually erode the fundamental purpose of public action in the eyes of the public – that is, defence of the public interest. To reduce what may be considered a possible perverse effect of NPM, two minimum conditions for implementation appear to be in order. First, the existence and key importance of “invisible authorities” – including conventions and moral standards – must be recognized as an essential condition for organizational effectiveness (Arrow, 1974). Second, the optimum balance between regulation and self-regulation must be sought. In this we are limited by the interdependencies of responsibility and authority and the possibilities of substituting one for the other (Arrow, 1974). In our comparison of Switzerland and Canada, our first focus is the way the two countries implemented administrative reforms in order to achieve greater organizational efficiency and effectiveness. Next, we examine the new professional values that emerged following the introduction of NPM principles and tools. We identify a few new ethical problems that Swiss and Canadian civil servants have encountered and look at ways in which the two countries have tried to respond to these new problems, pointing out shortcomings as the occasion arises. Finally, we suggest a number of possible solutions for reconciling “results-oriented ethics” with traditional public ethics to help today’s public employees find their way out of their current impasse. Our goal is to assert the need to re-establish the behavioural identity of civil servants on the basis of values that allow them to critically and ethically deliberate on their actions and decisions in order to ensure they are upholding the general interests of the public good. Canadian and Swiss reforms and their main features The reforms in Canada The Canadian civil service joined the modernization movement of western public administrations by implementing several NPM measures. The main initiatives embraced in Canada involve reviewing programmes and budgetary restrictions, setting up alternative ways to deliver services and changing values and administrative systems. These initiatives met with varied success (Giauque and Caron, 2004a, b). First, the rise of modern leadership in the federal administration provides our first insight into situations where efforts made by management were driven by the pursuit of results rather than a strict adherence to rules. There was increasing pressure on managers to put their knowledge of the sector and their analytical capacity to work in making decisions to achieve desired results. Initiatives such as Public Service 2000 and La Rele`ve are good examples of this objective. Second, alternative delivery mechanisms led to a number of large and

small reforms, in some cases as significant as the creation of agencies with a different legal status from that of the Ministries (Zussman, 2002). These reforms were called variously the single-window approach, e-channel services, co-location, special services agencies, statutory service organizations, and ministerial and partnership service organizations (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2005). Third, modern management is a management reform initiative that aims to strengthen the capacity of the administrators so that they can make better decisions. A citizens’ service logic began to emerge: better internal practices should lead to better decisions, better services, the achievement of results and, in the long run, a better response to the needs of Canadians. Fourth, the Public Service Modernization Act (PSMA) was implemented with a panoply of major changes embracing every aspect of the administrative operations and a marked emphasis on human resources (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2005). The immediate consequence of these reforms was more daring decision making on the part of some managers. Gathering, sharing and celebrating best practices helped establish new decision-making criteria. This new focus on the more innovative aspects of the management task went hand in hand with a significant decline in the attention paid to more traditional matters such as financial rectitude and respect for policies and regulations. These same policies and regulations were also subject to extensive changes and had their content pared down to provide a general rather than prescriptive referral framework. One of the most important aspects of these reforms was increased flexibility in terms of human resources management (Zussman, 2002). As regulations and procedures became more flexible, there was a need to redefine the operational contours and ascertain the political and administrative agents’ understanding of those limits. The PSMA does lighten administrative operations but it requires an unprecedented self-regulation of behaviour, the success of which relies on the capacity to train and socialize managers to respect and uphold traditional values in this new independent reality. In any case, these initiatives increase the decision-making power of the administrators, and therein lies the importance of reviewing the criteria and the ethics and value management system. Because the ethics management framework was, until now, firmly anchored in the country’s constitutional conventions, decisions were made in this spirit and the decision-making roots were relatively clear. The reforms in Switzerland The reforms undertaken by the Swiss federal administration were mainly in the form of a “management” orientation to increase the efficiency of the administrative services. In addition to these management reforms, steps were taken to change the rules concerning the status of federal bureaucrats. It is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the multiple reasons for undertaking administrative changes. Nevertheless, these reasons are usually classified as follows: changes in public tasks (complexification), state financial crises, new information technologies, the rebirth of the ideas and axioms of economic liberalism, citizens’ changing expectations of public services, and so forth. In 1985, the Council of States’ Finance Commission proposed the introduction of new measures called “augmentation de l’efficacite´ dans l’administration fe´de´rale” (EFFI) (increased effectiveness of the federal administration). In 1986,

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the federal Council launched a second project geared to achieve solutions for rationalizing interdepartmental activities – “identifier des measures de rationalisation des activite´s interde´partementales” (EFFI-QM-BV) – with the main objective of identifying rationalization measures affecting activities and work carried out in several departments. The project soon ran into difficulty, however, especially due to its interdepartmental nature and the lack of political will to keep it alive. The failure of EFFI-QM-BV pushed parliamentarians to ask for greater administrative reform efforts from the federal Council. In 1993, Parliament decided to replace the 1978 Administrative Organization Act (LOA) with the Government and Administrative Organization Act (LOGA), which aimed to create the necessary legal basis for implementing the first phase of the reform – that is, reform of government and the administration (RGA). After the LOGA was rejected by popular referendum, the federal Council reviewed it and submitted a revised version to Parliament, which adopted the new law on March 12, 1997. The four main objectives of LOGA are to increase effectiveness, aim for profitability, achieve savings and optimize management and structures. Management under performance mandate and global budget (“gestion par mandat de prestations et envelope budge´taire” or GMEB) was rolled out as soon as LOGA came into effect on October 1, 1997. The ensuing reforms sought to achieve the following objectives: increased staff flexibility, accountability, new business culture, control of administrative service operating costs and greater decentralization (Giauque and Caron, 2004a, b). Some consequences Based on recently observed behaviours (Caron and Giauque, 2006) we found, first, that the frontiers that traditionally separated the world of political decision making from administrative decisions have been breached in both directions. In other words, some administrators are making political decisions and some politicians are making administrative decisions. Second, the rules for respecting anonymity and neutrality in the provision of advice between administrators and politicians have been broken repeatedly, with both groups accusing each other in the public arena. Third, control mechanisms have failed or been insufficient. Fourth, there seems to be a gap in the understanding of values and ethics on both the administrative and political levels. Fifth, the conflict of values is becoming increasingly prevalent and difficulties in interpretation are on the increase (Gomery, 2005). In Switzerland, our observations have been of a more micro-sociological nature. We have four main findings. First, there is an increased politicization of service chiefs and an increased involvement with operational matters by some politicians. Second, institutional egoism is on the rise and the capacity to coordinate state activities is on the decline. Third, we have witnessed a reduction in the meaning of evaluation. By quantifying and measuring, the various players in the politico-administrative system are losing sight of the meaning of assessments and evaluations. Fourth, the “every man for himself” attitude appears to be spreading within the federal administration. A culture of fear and withdrawal is developing that penalizes proper administrative operations and endangers the ethics of the common good.

Summary We draw three conclusions concerning these reforms. First, we can place them in a schema that reflects three types of objectives: (1) improvement (maximization) of effectiveness of public intervention; (2) improvement (maximization) of efficiency (including “user satisfaction”); and (3) reduction (optimization) of the state’s role in the direct provision of services. These three objectives are different, but they are all targeted by several Canadian and Swiss initiatives. The discourse and efforts involving effectiveness are not new and, for that reason, this goal is the least controversial and the least hotly contested. What has changed here in relation to earlier efforts, however, is the method of increasing effectiveness. The key to success has become the civil servant’s initiative, flexibility and willingness to take risks to create or apply new ways of increasing effectiveness. Improving efficiency raises more questions because it relates directly to staffing and work processes. The idea of customer (user) satisfaction puts civil servants at the heart of a new logic where values can be in conflict: for example, citizen satisfaction, fairness and public interest. Finally, optimization of the state’s role in the direct provision of services to citizens attempts to rebalance a role often considered to have expanded too much in light of the desire to reduce the public sector. In terms of approaches used and often inaccurately called “privatization,” we can sum up our observations in both countries using five major characteristics: (1) initiatives generally involve the deconstruction of the traditional bureaucratic model in favour of reconstruction based on criteria similar to those promoted by NPM; (2) initiatives are often based on computer potential (automatic regulation) as a new “agent” for ensuring fair treatment (changing from written regulation to automated regulation); (3) work logic initiatives draw on new values; (4) there are real strategic and organizational gaps/weaknesses in the planning and implementation of initiatives; and (5) there is insufficient ongoing investment in preparing and training the human resources. Finally, less overt but nevertheless present is the fact that these objectives and approaches must defend the continuance of democratic society by promoting social cohesion and the citizens’ respect and interest in public institutions. Although this aspect is often concealed, the identity of civil servants is, in fact, at the very heart of the debate. It is primarily this aspect that gives cause for concern. There seems to be an implicit expectation that civil servants will pursue a common goal – defending the public interest – all of their own accord while the results logic coupled with performance pay encourages them to be more interested in personal, more egoist objectives. Under these conditions, the essential question that must be asked is how to maintain the identity of civil servants, both now and in the future?

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New values, identity and results-oriented ethics First of all, we must remember that effectiveness, in the Weberian model, is measured in terms of the successful application of shared values and fair treatment of citizens and the promotion and defence of the public good is what counts. Second, in this dynamic, the individual is the transfer agent of the ethics of public interest. The individual’s behaviours and decisions are the production process for the public good and they lead to results. The fact that these processes are framed by regulation – codification – usually means that results can be foreseen and suitability can be determined in advance. Third, NPM seems to suggest that we must re-orient this agent to ensure better results. The new required values, which will lead to a renewal of the public sector, tend to constitute, often informally and implicitly, a new public ethics that we could call “results-oriented ethics.” In other words, these so-called “professional” values play an important role today in judging the suitability of civil servants’ behaviour. The results, however, are rarely defined in terms of public interest as a common goal. Civil servants are called upon to judge the suitability of their actions based on new work standards, especially since the principles and tools of NPM favour the development of a greater allegiance of civil servants to the organizations they belong to. Since, civil servants are evaluated increasingly on individual performance and they are likely to be rewarded or penalized by their organization, their dependency on their unit or administrative service is considerably increased. But can we really speak of results-oriented ethics without stating what these expected results are? The unspoken truth is that everyone knows that state intervention is required under certain conditions and that these conditions dictate a unique behavioural ethic. While it is not necessarily wrong to believe certain activities undertaken by the public sector could be turned over to the private sector, it is more dangerous to assume that the values of the private sector can be wholly transposed to the public sector, since each sector has a different concept of effectiveness. Since, ethics is wholly rooted in the conscience and in critical dialogue, the traditional ethical values of the Weberian administrative model are less and less able to support and regulate individual and group behaviours because the defining feature of the traditional “public ethic” is its procedural and regulatory nature. The goal of this ethic is to provide rules and standards that are able to regulate administrative work and provide a certain fairness of treatment, an impartiality in the management of files, etc. In the “results-oriented ethics” that is characteristic of the shift toward NPM, results take precedence over the administrative standards that defend the public interest. It is a matter of seeking to preserve the role of the public employee as an agent of the defence and perpetuation of democracy and the public interest. Through their work and identity, the public sector worker has a specific and different role from the private sector worker. We do not believe that the public employee is more or less this or that than the private sector employee: both are first and foremost human beings. They will first both pursue their personal interest. But the role of the public employee requires a specific identity to properly accomplish its duty that is related to the public interest. And this raises a crucial question: in the upheaval that is leading inexorably to a “management” culture, how can we maintain our progress and ensure the longevity of the state through its principal agent? Without determining

the extent of the issues related to NPM as a method of operation, we want to raise a series of questions concerning the possibility of handing citizens the role of protecting the common interest through the identity of state employees. This leads us back to the fundamental question of the regulation/self-regulation balance. Regulation and self-regulation: required investments and desirable balances In light of our research, public administrations do not seem to have paid enough attention to several outcomes of their transformations. The ethics solutions proposed by the Swiss Confederation relate mainly to establishing externally imposed codes of behaviour. The HRM guidelines and code of behaviour set out an “un-accountability” vision, with bureaucrats relieved of the ethical deliberation that should be part of their respective administrative actions. The goal is to standardize behaviour, rather than help the players develop their capacity for ethical deliberation. In other words, while the reforms are oriented toward individual accountability, flexibility, performance, organizational effectiveness and efficiency, the ethics process appears to have remained the same, rather than evolving with the reforms and the emerging ethical problems. Furthermore, Confederation employees seem to be faced with a difficult and perhaps insurmountable dilemma: meeting the external ethical demands while developing the managerial values expected of them by their administrative unit – performance, personal initiative, flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency. The managerial values espoused by the administrative units can by no means be confused with moral values. On the Canadian side, it is not clear whether the values and ethics as defined in the tools developed to date are anchored in a legitimate framework that can serve to structure and interpret the behaviour of civil servants. Actually, the legitimacy seems to come from a hybrid source – constitutional conventions, shared governance principles and NPM. This state of affairs creates structural difficulties for behaviours and their interpretation. Values cannot be easily relayed if the public agents are not able to determine where they come from and subsequently adapt to them. There does not seem to have been sufficient effort to promote the transmission of values and, more specifically, to socialize the idea of the public good. Civil servants and politicians come from an increasingly diverse pool. In a more flexible and individualist management framework, this means extensive training and socialization mechanisms are required. Furthermore, since the roots of the ethics management framework are not very clear and since their sources of legitimacy are somewhat hazy, it is all the more important to establish a permanent dialogue on the meaning and interpretation of behaviour. Finally, the sheer number of values promoted creates tension and conflicts of interpretation. It seems to us that this could detract attention that should be focused on the idea of the public good (Caron and Giauque, 2006). Two questions must be asked at this juncture. First, how much de-codification is feasible and desirable, and second, what are the minimum conditions for ensuring ethical public service? NPM calls for initiative, entrepreneurship and similar personal values to promote greater productivity and improved results. To succeed, it is proposed that we rethink the administrative codification with the goal of eliminating it or at least “lightening” it. We know that the Weberian model calls for complex codification in order to guarantee a given level of ethical behaviour. Establishing, maintaining, developing and applying

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this codification, however, is generally an expensive undertaking. These costs are known as book costs or rigidities – “red tape.” But these codifications have, through the human agent, allowed shared values to be preserved and to a certain extent guaranteed the promotion of the public interest such as the fair treatment of citizens. On the other hand, NPM promotes minimal or no codification whenever possible. At the same time, NPM is rooted in the achievement of results that are not necessarily presented in terms of the public good but in terms of individual performance, except in the case of the measurement of satisfaction of users or quality of services rendered. The question raised by the transition from a complex codification model to a simple codification model is shown in Figure 1. For an effective given level of application of shared values and ethical behaviour: the simpler the codification, the greater the investment required in training to ensure self-regulation on the part of civil servants and the lower the costs related to codification (see curve A). The more complex the codification, the greater the investment required to ensure the development, maintenance and application of the codes and the lower the costs of training (see curve B). What, therefore, is the optimal level of administrative codification that would minimize required investments while ensuring sufficient maintenance of the civil servant identity to preserve the effectiveness of the system, that is defend the public interest? Figure 1 shows that the optimum combination for an effective given level of shared values and ethical behaviour occurs at point N. At this point costs are minimized and there is a balance between codification and self-regulation. The model suggests three consequences. First, if we agree that the effectiveness of a public system can be measured in part on the basis of the promotion of and respect for the public good, ethical behaviour and shared values are necessities and the only possible transfer agent is the human being in the person of the civil servant. Second, the importance of moral values and “invisible authorities” in the organization and its operations are a condition for effectiveness that requires socialization efforts and therefore investment in the training of individuals. Third, promoters of NPM must base their transformations on a balance between a minimum of codification and a minimum of training. As we saw earlier, these issues, and especially training, are almost entirely absent from the reforms under examination. Conclusion Contrary to popular belief, it seems that public administrations cannot content themselves with simple deregulation or over-deregulation. The model presented clearly shows that a balance must be defined to ensure an effective level of shared values and ethical behaviour. It is the responsibility of public administrations to create conditions conducive to the establishment of reforms that will respect the responsibilities invested in them in the public interest. As Durand (free translation) points out: [. . .] The future of humanity [. . .] depends on ethics, that is, on humans’ capacity to act responsibly in order to contribute to the promotion of people and the construction of a community [. . .].

We must recognize the role of the civil servant as the transfer agent for the public interest in government decisions and acknowledge the need to invest heavily in training in light of the progressive elimination of administrative codification. This is needed to replace the role previously played by codes, rules and all internal regulations

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prescribing the conduct of public servants in most situation and guaranteeing equity of treatment for citizens. We suggest that these training investments should be made in the framework of a tripartite approach: civil servants, organizational mandate and community/society. Public administrations must work to clarify the organizational missions and values that collectively support them. They must introduce the professional values – in the sense of identity – embraced by civil servants as well as the fundamental values of the community or society – to create agreement on what the general public interest really is. If public administrations are to support governments in ensuring social cohesion through delivery of relevant public policies, public servants must be mindful of the public good and the public interest as defined in the objectives of their respective government. The function of tight regulation in ensuring consistent behaviour of public servants is key to this role and must be present either through traditional internal regulation – bureaucracy – or more investments in training to socialize public servants to expected non bureaucratically regulated behaviours. References Arrow, K.A. (1974), The Limits of Organization, Norton, New York, NY. Caron, D.J. and Giauque, D. (2006), “Ethique, agents publics et nouvelle gestion publique: de nouveaux outils pour de nouveaux de´fis ? Une comparaison Canada-Suisse”, Politiques et Management Public, Vol. 23 No. 4, Printemps. de Visscher, C. and Varone, F. (2004), “La Nouvelle Gestion Publique ‘en action’”, Revue internationale de politique compare´e, Vol. 11 No. 2. Giauque, D. and Caron, D.J. (2004a), “Strate´gies des re´formes administratives et impacts sur la gestion des ressources humaines: une comparaison Suisse-Canada”, Politiques et Management Public, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 63-80. Giauque, D. and Caron, D.J. (2004b), “Re´formes administratives et gestion des ressources humaines: Comparaison de la Suisse et du Canada”, Revue Internationale de Politique Compare´e, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 225-40. Gomery, J.H. (2005), “Commission d’enqueˆte sur le programme de commandites et les activite´s publicitaires”, available at: www.gomery.ca/fr/index.asp Government of Canada, Public Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada (2005), “Human resources management modernization”, available at: www.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/ index_e.asp, www.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/hrmm-mgrh/index_e.asp Treasury Board Secretariat (2005), “Putting it all together: leading practices and testimonials of modern comptrollership”, available at: www.tbs-sct.gc.ca, www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cmo_mfc /resources2/ testimonials/pt00_e.asp. Zussman, D. (2002), “Alternative service delivery”, in Dunn, C. (Ed.), The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Further reading Aucoin, P. (2002), “Beyond the ‘New’ in public management reform in Canada: catching the next wave?”, in Dunn, C. (Ed.), The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, Oxford University Press, Don Mills. Bodiguel, J-L. (2002), “Pourquoi a-t-on tant besoin d’e´thique ?”, Ethique Publique, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 7-19.

Boisot, M. (1987), Information and Organizations: The Manager as Anthropologist, Fontana, London. Boisvert, Y. (2003), “L’e´thique apre`s le code”, unpublished, Laboratoire d’e´thique publique, E´NAP, Montreal. Boisvert, Y. and Desjardins, J.P. (2004), “Les commandites: un scandale essentiellement politique”, Options Politiques, Mai, available at: www.irpp.org/po/archive/may04/boisvert. pdf Borgeat, L. and Giroux, I. (1997), “Pouvoir judiciaire et droit administrative”, in Bourgault, J. et al. (Eds), Administration Publique Canadienne et Management Public: Expe´riences Canadiennes, Les Publications du Que´bec, Quebec City. Borins, S. (2002), “Transformation of the public sector: Canada in comparative”, in Dunn, C. (Ed.), The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Bouckaert, G. (2003), “La re´forme de la gestion publique change-t-elle les syste`mes administratifs?”, Revue franc¸aise d’administration publique, No. 105-106. ENA. Brodeur, C. (2002), “Pour une e´thique contemporaine: La vie publique”, L’Agora, Vol. 51. Casanova, J-C. (2002), “L’inquie´tant retour de la de´nonciation anonyme”, Le Monde, Paris, September 26. Castonguay, A. (2005), “Une autre accusation de favoritisme: Judy Sgro de´missionne”, Le Devoir, Montreal. Saturday, January 15. Chapman, R.A. (Ed.) (2000), Ethics in Public Service for the New Millennium, Ashgate Publishing, Brookfield, VT. Charih, M. and Rouillard, L. (1997), “The new public management”, in Charih, M. and Daniels, A. (Eds), New Public Management and Public Administration in Canada, ENAP and IPAC, Toronto. Coˆte´, A. (2000), “Fondements de la le´gitimite´ de l’administration fe´de´rale canadienne: pouvoir de nomination et crite`res de recrutement des fonctionnaires entre 1763 et aujourd’hui”, unpublished PhD dissertation, Universite´ de Montre´al. Desanti, J-T. (2004), La peau des mots: Re´flexion sur la question e´thique, Seuil, Paris, p. 2. Du Gay, P. (2000), In Praise of Bureaucracy, Sage, London. Emery, Y. and Giauque, D. (2005), Paradoxes de la gestion publique, L’Harmattan, Paris. Ethique Publique (2002), Ethique Publique, Vol. 4 No. 1, Special section: Ethique de l’administration et du service public. Ford, R. and Zussman, D. (Eds) (1997), Alternative Service Delivery: Sharing Governance in Canada, KPMG and IPAC, Toronto. Giauque, D. (2003a), La bureaucratie libe´rale: Nouvelle gestion publique et re´gulation, L’Harmattan, Paris. Giauque, D. (2003b), “Nouvelle gestion publique et re´gulation organisationnelle: La bureaucratie libe´rale”, Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, Vol. 69 No. 4, pp. 663-92. Giauque, D. (2004), “Gestion des ressources humaines et modernisation des administrations publiques”, Les Politiques Sociales, Nos 1/2, pp. 47-62, (nume´ro spe´cial dirige´ par F. Varone et J-M. Bonvin sur la nouvelle gestion publique). Government of Canada, Auditor General of Canada (1995), “Ethics and fraud awareness in government”, available at: www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9501ce.html Government of Canada, Auditor General of Canada, Department of Justice (2002), “Costs of implementing the Canadian firearms program”, Chapter 10, available at: www.oag bvg.gc. ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/20021210ce.html

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Government of Canada, Auditor General of Canada, Management of Grants and Contributions at HRDC (2000b), Ottawa, available at: www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/media.nsf/html/ 00pr11_e.html Government of Canada, Auditor General of Canada (2000a), Values and Ethics in the Federal Public Sector, available at: www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/0012ce.html

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Government of Canada, Office of Public Service Values and Ethics (2005), available at: www. hrma-agrh.gc.ca/veo-bve/index_e.asp Hodgetts, J.E., McCloskey, W., Whitaker, R. and Wilson, V.S. (1972), The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967, McGill-Queen‘s University Press, Montreal. Janett, D. (2002), “L’e´thique professionnelle dans l’administration fe´de´rale suisse”, Ethique Publique, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 127-34. Kernaghan, K. (1997), “Valeurs, e´thique et fonction publique”, in Bourgault, J. et al. (Eds), Administration Publique Canadienne et Management Public: Expe´riences Canadiennes, Les Publications du Que´bec, Quebec. Kernaghan, K. (2002), “East block and Westminster: conventions, values, and public service”, in Dunn, C. (Ed.), The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Knoepfel, P. and Varone, F. (1999), “Mesurer la performance publique: me´fions-nous des terribles simplificateurs”, Politiques et Management Public, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 123-45. Lapierre, J.W. (1992), L’analyse de syste`mes: L’application aux sciences socials, Syros, Paris. Lemieux, V. (1989), La structuration du pouvoir dans les syste`mes politiques, PUL, Ste-Foy. Lindquist, E. (2002), “Government restructuring and career public service: do we need a new cosmology?”, in Dunn, C. (Ed.), The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration, Oxford University Press, Oxford. OCDE (2000), Renforcer l’e´thique dans les services publics: Les mesures de l’OCDE, OCDE, Paris. Office Fe´de´ral du Personnel (2000), de comportement de l’administration ge´ne´rale de la Confe´de´ration, OFPER, Berne. Office Fe´de´ral du Personnel (2004), Les principes directeurs en matie`re de politique du personnel au sein de l’administration fe´de´rale, OFPER, Berne. Paquet, G. (1999), Governance through Social Learning, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa. Paquet, G. (2002), “L’e´thique est une sagesse toujours en chantier: Re´flexions sur l’e´thique et la gouvernance”, Ethique Publique, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 62-76. Piron, F. (2002), “Les de´fis e´thiques de la modernisation de l’administration publique”, Ethique Publique, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 31-45. Radio-Canada (2003), “George Radwanski remet sa demission”, available at: http://radio-canada. ca/nouvelles/index/nouvelles/200306/23/006-demissionradwanski.shtml (accessed June 2003). Spanou, C. (2003), “Abandonner ou renforcer l’E´tat We´be´rien?”, Revue franc¸aise d’administration publique, No. 105-106. ENA. Tait, J. (1996), “De solides assises: Rapport du groupe de travail sur sur les valeurs et l’e´thique dans la fonction publique”, working paper, Ottawa. Weber, M. (1995), E´conomie et socie´te´: Les cate´gories de la sociologie, Plon, Paris.

About the authors Daniel J. Caron, an Economist with a PhD in social sciences, is a senior executive in the Canadian public service. He is a Professor at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration Publique (ENAP) in Gatineau. His responsibilities are related to organizational operations, including human resources, finance, information management, auditing and assessment. Daniel J. Caron is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected] David Giauque, a political scientist with a PhD in public administration, is Professor of Human Resources and Public Management in the public management unit of the Haute Ecole Valaisanne’s Institut Economie and Tourisme. E-mail: [email protected]

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Transforming public services – transforming the public servant? Anne Marie Berg The Work Research Institute, Oslo, Norway

556 Abstract

Purpose – To investigate the interdependence between organizational forms and the identities of managers and front line personnel in government services. Design/methodology/approach – A conceptual paper based upon and adding to theories and typologies developed by Douglas and Considine and Lewis. It also uses an empirical study of three Norwegian public services to support the hypothesis that distinct professional groups respond differently to new public management (NPM) reforms. Findings – The transformation of government services towards market based and private sector management models is challenging traditional cultures and identities of service providers. In general there is opposition to the reforms because of their effect on the ability of professionals to do a good job. Professional groups are responding in different ways to new management systems and organisational forms and new identities are emerging. There is evidence that a hybrid form of bureaucracy is emerging which combines some virtues of the traditional procedural bureaucracy with flexibility, user focus, participation and professional pride. Research limitations/implications – The data used in the paper was not originally collected to test models or theories. Further research, therefore, is necessary to specifically explore the link between professional and individual identities and organisational and management forms. Originality/value – It contributes to the growing literature on the impact of NPM on professional civil servants’ identity and their response to the changing cultures of the organisations in which they work. Keywords Public sector organizations, Work identity, Employees Paper type Research paper

International Journal of Public Sector Management Vol. 19 No. 6, 2006 pp. 556-568 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0951-3558 DOI 10.1108/09513550610686627

Introduction A transformation of government services towards more market-based and private sector models of management form a set of challenges to the traditional cultures and identities of public service providers. How do managers and frontline personnel receive new public management (NPM) initiatives? What type of employee is likely to be attracted to the new forms of service organization? A study of major government services in Norway (Berg et al., 2002), found that front-line personnel and top-level managers had different perceptions of organizational reforms. There were also variations between groups of employees. Through interviews with both managers and front line staff, we discovered that management schemes were perceived as threatening to or colliding with professional identities. In this paper one set of explanations is explored; we see these experiences as expressions of contradictory or adversary cultures being part of a set of identity constructing interpretations and preferences of individuals. We use the theory of cultural types presented by Douglas (1982, 1996) to describe positions and preferences of service employees. In order to relate the preferences and choices of the individual to actual organizational forms, we present a modified typology of

identities and link these to specific organizational types (Considine and Lewis, 1999). We elaborate on the link between different identities or preferences and organisational types and discuss what kind of employees is likely to be attracted to different forms of service organizations. The first part of the paper outlines the theoretical model. We present a typology of alternatives of action and community of meanings based on Douglas’ group/grid theory and draw up a model of different organizational forms of public bureaucracies. We discuss how different identities may more or less correspond to different organizational models. In the second part of the paper, we use results from a study of three major government services in Norway to illuminate the model and discuss assumptions outlined in the previous section. Changes in structure and management styles and how these changes are received and perceived by the service providers are presented. Finally, we indicate a possible, but hypothetical, alternative form of bureaucracy. Identities and culture Lack of enthusiasm or resistance to changes may be attributed to the reforms colliding with institutional norms and rules (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). It may be attributed to bureaucratic incompetence, deficiencies in bureaucratic control, conflicts of interests between policy makers and bureaucratic agents, or ambiguities in the policy making process (Baier et al., 1994). Resistance to organizational change may also be explained as ambiguities in cultures (Meyerson, 1991). Changes may also meet resistance if they threaten established identities of the members of the organization (Halford and Leonard, 1999). Literature on identity and identity formation of organizations usually addresses the question of how organizations as such, and their members, represent or even create identities common to the organization (Hatch and Schultz, 2004). Within the organizational identity literature, some authors are critical of the mono-identity assumption and discuss ambiguous and multiple identities within organizations, and also how identities are unstable and adaptive and may change over time (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Goia et al., 2000). Halford and Leonard (1999) raise the question of how individual identities may shape or determine the way work is carried out and how the changing content of work may affect employees’ identities. Gruber (1988, p. 152) defines the core identities of bureaucrats as “the way the bureaucrat thinks of himself/herself at work”, and they analyse different identities existing within the same organization – that of the administrator, the expert and the worker. The usual approach to organizational culture in the organization literature is one of a common harmonizing corporate culture with unity and shared values. Alvesson (2002, p. 188) points out that even shared meaning does not necessarily imply consensus and harmony, and a common understanding does not necessarily mean shared values. Here, we look at different groupings or collectives within work organizations. Task-groups or positions (e.g. managers, front-line staff) may constitute such collectives, but their preferences and choices may differ. In line with other theories on identity, this could be seen as opposing organizational and social identities (Dutton et al., 1994; Ka¨rreman and Alvesson, 2004).

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Communities of meaning and action Environments of action An important point in Douglas’ (1996, p. 43) culture theory is that the strategies or choices made by the individual are not just an individual matter but part of a collective frame of mind. These collective mind-sets (also called cultural biases) belong to different cultural environments of action that the individual is part of. The environments of action mediate between the system and the individual. Douglas (1982, 1996) distinguishes four main types of environments of action based on the four social forms developed through the model of group/grid typology. Group and grid are seen as the fundamental variables of social life. To what extent individuals are embedded in groups, and the degree of group cohesion (sense of group boundaries, common values and goals), constitutes the group dimension. The degree of regulations, constraints and prescriptions for the groups constitutes the grid dimension of the model. Thus, it is a question of degree of involvement in the group and the degree to which the behaviour is restricted or prescribed by rules regulating the group. The four basic social forms or types are described as fatalism, hierarchy, individualism and egalitarianism, respectively. Fatalism is high on grid, low on group; hierarchy is high on both; individualism is low on both; and egalitarianism is high on group and low on grid. Douglas’s culture theory has been applied to a variety of social phenomena (Thompson et al., 1990; Ellis and Thompson, 1997). It has also been applied to organizations (Coyle, 1997; Altman and Baruch, 1998; Hood, 1998) to describe attitudes and opinions of employees, and characteristics of organizations at different levels. In order to describe and discuss common attitudes and behaviour of members of modern public sector organizations, we have adjusted the model and apply it freely. Cultural alternatives of action Two questions that our work addresses are: what are the respective mind-sets (or biases), preferences and choices we may find among the members of work-organizations? Can these mind-sets lead to different actions and behavioural strategies? Using Douglas’ approach to reflect on different ways to adapt in modern public service organizations, we have constructed Figure 1. The figure describes the inclinations or preferences of the individual. These types of employee orientation have been extrapolated from the four social types in Douglas’ model. The isolationist represents the fatalist approach to work life, the individualist individualism, the traditionalist equates to a hierarchic approach and the team-worker and the professional player, egalitarianism. However, having studied organizations and change processes, we have added a fifth type: the innovator. This is the employee who ignores boundaries and moves across systems to form contacts, start projects and link persons and institutions. This type depends on an open mandate and few constraints. The innovator is different from the isolationist, although they sometimes resemble each other in the sense that they are often “free players” and thrive in flexible work situations and networks. An intuitive recognition of groups in work life settings gives this model its appeal. An important point is that despite the selection processes and the socializing potential of organizations, we may find all five types within market-based organizations as well as within traditional bureaucracies. The various forms of organization will, however, more or less encourage or discourage the different cultural types. Neither is this a

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Figure 1. Cultural alternatives of action

clear-cut typology. Individuals may have traits from more than one type. Some employees may, for instance, have cut out their roles as competition-oriented individuals but within a traditional hierarchical organization. In Douglas’ model there are two main types of support; the hierarchist’s support based on obedient adaptation to a set of rules and the individualist’s support on the opportunistic pursuit of self-interests while the fatalist withdraws and has no support at all. In our model, there is a third kind of support – the professional team player. This is completely different from the other two. It is a form of adaptation linked to orientation towards tasks, management of professional values and defence of the integrity of the employee. This is different from opportunism as the focal point is outside the individual (loyalty to the task, not individual utility) and different also from conformity because it emphasises both professional discretion and individual choice. Communities of meaning These five cultural biases, or preferences and attitudes, are not, as Douglas points out, individual, but contextual. They are part of a group constellation or communities of meaning. Figure 2 links the cultural alternatives of action in Figure 1 with their corresponding group strategies. The intuitive recognition of groups we know from work life settings gives this typology appeal. There are two kinds of isolated individuals. In the upper left quadrant are those who, by choice or fate, have ended up in some kind of backwater or deadlocked isolation. These may be the disgruntled and dissatisfied employees of a more fatalistic persuasion. To this category we may also add those who get together in odd or peculiar groups. In the bottom left quadrant are those who actively choose not to engage much

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Figure 2. Cultural alternatives of action and communities of meaning

in the collective, for instance, competition-oriented individualists (the individualists). Yet, market-oriented individualists will work in some kind of groups, as will the traditionalists on the upper right quadrant. These are the more or less loyal, conservative groups frequently found in large, complex organizations. In the bottom right quadrant are those who engage in the collectives out of a sense of solidarity and include groups with strong collegial norms (the team-player). In this group constellation, the innovator type of the previous model of mind-sets may or may not find like-minded colleagues, so the group strategy of these is more difficult to determine. Within these groups, communities of meaning and action may develop even in opposition to other parts of the larger organizational unit. This implies that choices made by individuals are not private choices or roles played according to personal whims. They are contextual choices – they are ways to manoeuvre in an existing structure of opportunities, and they are political choices – as the individual accepts or rejects values tied to perceptions of what a good organization and a good society are. Douglas’ perspective shows the importance and significance of what we may term collective individualism. People manage their identities in a subjective way, but within meaning-creating contexts that are structured and external to the individual. The group constellation the employee is part of not only socializes but also puts constraints on what are acceptable or encouraged preferences. In addition, the employee does not always have a choice of group. This will depend on the size and complexity of the organisation and the overall degree of grid (constraints). Bureaucratic forms and cultural alternatives of action A perspective of cultural pluralism can be linked to the concept of pluralistic governance or a mix of bureaucratic forms. We, therefore, take the cultural model to the third level: the level of the organization as a whole. Hood (1998) applies Douglas’ group/grid model to the organization of public institutions. He contends that each of the four cultural environments of her typology describes a family of approaches to organizational design. These are thoughts, models or ideologies of how to organize the public sector. Coyle (1997) chooses to see the forms as representing pressures or tendencies rather than clear-cut forms.

Hierarchists believe in orderly rules of behaviour and authority structures and have little faith in self-organizing or self-steering processes. Textbook varieties of this form are the “machine-bureaucracy” of Mintzberg (1979) or the Weberian professional bureaucracy. Doing public management the individualist way, as Hood (1998, p. 98) puts it, implies market solutions, competition, performance related pay and individualized incentive structures. Individualists tend to assume that human beings are inherently rational, calculative, opportunistic, and self-seeking. The main features of egalitarian ways of managing are an emphasis on self-management (e.g. by the citizens or users), control by mutuality and maximum face-to-face accountability. Another feature is to distrust professionalism and maximize collective citizen participation. According to Hood (1998, p. 121), an egalitarian stream is to be found in the fashionable ideas such as empowerment of front-line staff and team working. Egalitarians also normally resist the conventional managerial doctrines and seek to limit the difference between top officeholders and the rank-and-file in organizations (Hood: 124). “Fatalism” is more difficult to describe as a form of organizing and most culture theorists leave this fourth form out of their discussion of alternative organizational models (Thompson et al., 1990). Fatalism is an approach to life, and thus an approach to life in organizations. Fatalism may be seen as an anti-organizational attitude; the organizational form does not matter, the outcome is unpredictable and governed by randomness and chance. In organization theory, the work of “new institutionalists” like March and Olsen (1989) is closest to such a view. Hood (1998, p. 160) mentions multi-national corporations moving their staff around randomly or operating unpredictable inspections or audits as organizational regulatory measures as being in line with fatalist conceptions. These organizational forms describe various management models of public organizations observed over the past 25 years. However, the reality is even more differentiated and we need further categories recognizable as actual models. There is, for instance, a reform model in between hierarchy and the market, and the typology based on cultural distinctions does not easily incorporate the “fad” of the past decade, namely the network form of governance (Kickert et al., 1997). We have, therefore, constructed a typology of governance and organizational forms after a model of four bureaucratic images presented by Considine and Lewis (1999). The model implies that public bureaucracies are developing along a continuum from traditional procedural bureaucracy via a management by objectives (MBO) or corporate model to a market based model and finally a network model (Table I). The horizontal dimension represents four common elements characterizing each form of governance. These are: first the source of rationality which is the administrative logic through which each type of regime describes its way of conducting itself and defines its value. Second, is each bureaucracy’s characteristic method of control and coordination, which are the distinctive characteristic values and distinctive routines. Third, is the primary principle, or the primary virtue of the bureaucratic form in the minds of its proponents. This explains the attraction of a particular approach to bureaucratic organization. Fourth, the focus of service delivery addresses the way in which reformers define the typical method for delivery of an actual program through supervision, planning, and disciplinary intervention (Considine and Lewis, 1999, p. 469).

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Table I. Governance types

Source of rationality Procedural bureaucracy Corporate bureaucracy (MBO) Market bureaucracy Network bureaucracy

Law Management

Form of control and coordination

Primary principle

Focus of service delivery

Rules/procedures line management Plans and MBO

Reliability justice Goal driven

Universal treatment Focusing on target groups

Competition

Contracts/audits inspections Culture/dependencies Co-production agreements/trust

Cost-driven Main focus on the price Flexibility The main focus on the clients

Source: Based on Considine and Lewis (1999, p. 468)

In their study Considine and Lewis (1999) investigated the extent to which these different images and norms, concerning administrative work and orientation to ordinary work tasks, were evident in practice. They found distinctive patterns of service delivery, role of trust, norms of cooperation, supervisory styles, degree of formalization and so on. However, they did not apply these findings to a model of corresponding properties, values and identities of the civil servants. The procedural bureaucracy, we suggest, corresponds to the hierarchist way of doing public management, and the individualist to the market model. The corporate or MBO model is a hybrid form, introducing both hierarchist (neo-Taylorism) and egalitarian (team-work) principles. The network model is a form not much treated in culture theory, but may be seen as a mixture of corporate, market and egalitarian modes. If fatalism was a model, we suggest it would look like the ad-hocracy of Mintzberg (1979) or the randomness of non-regulated organizations. Neither of these is found in public sector organizations in our study. Collective identities and organizational preferences Efforts to find ways to match people and jobs have a long tradition in organizational psychology and are also found in parts of the organizational culture tradition (Pheysey, 1993). By linking collective identities to organizational preferences, we may infer which kind of organizational (public service) form will appeal to which kind of character or cultural type. A corporate bureaucracy that has not developed personal incentives tied to individual performances will, for example, be less likely to appeal to the individualist than the traditionalist. If we apply the cultural biases of Figure 1, including the fifth bias, to the governance models of Table I, we may set up the following assumptions that: . traditionalists prefer a procedural bureaucracy; . individualists prefer a market-based form; . egalitarians or team-players prefer the corporate and the network forms; . innovators prefer a network form; and . isolationists prefer any form that allows for autonomy. This is of course, not clear-cut. There will be mixes and variations. For instance, the corporate or MBO model has traits that attract the traditionalist (systems, formalism,

standards) but also the individualist (performance orientation, result-indicators). Egalitarians prefer models that allow for professional discretion and collegial control systems, but also the user involvement focus of the corporate model. It would not be out of place to argue that a majority of those who end up inhabiting professional bureaucracies are probably those who are loyal to the system and enjoy or thrive in that kind of organization. But as organizations undergo transformational change from one organizational form to another, organization members react to the changes in correspondence with their cultural preferences. We do not have data to test these assumptions. The assumptions are, however, developed through findings from a study of the implementation of reforms in public sector services. We do have indications of how managerialist reforms and initiatives are received by employees, and what kind of values and professional identities these initiatives encounter and challenge. Field of study and empirical background A study of three major public services in Norway (The National Employment Service, The National Social Security Service, and the Tax Administration (Internal Revenue)) was conducted in 1999-2002 (Berg et al., 2002). The services are similar in many respects, large, nationwide, multileveled and under the same personnel policy and governance regime. A total of 100 managers on all levels and employees on the two local levels were interviewed. Written documents of systems and operations were analyzed. A randomized survey (N ¼ 2,677 with a response rate of 66 per cent) was administered to managers and staff at the two lower levels in all three services. Comparative studies of public management reforms in western, industrialized countries have identified many variations between countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Christensen and Laegreid, 2001). For instance, Norway is considered to be a reluctant and incremental NPM reformer (Olsen and Peters, 1996). Yet, over the years, the NPM transformation has been substantial and Norway may be seen as an example of a public sector in transition, between traditional service provision and organizational forms and market or network bureaucracies. Public bureaucracies in transition The services we studied were basically procedural, but also professional bureaucracies. They had elements of independence and discretion. They had been subject to MBO and some market-based principles of organization and in the late 1980s had been inspired by the quality culture trend (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1995; Berg, 1997). To varying degrees teamwork, multi skilling and empowerment of front-line staff were introduced and a user or customer focus had been nurtured at the beginning of the 1990s. This indicates that what new management initiatives or public sector reforms challenge is not so much a classical, Weberian bureaucracy but a truly hybrid form – a modern professional organization consisting of a mixture of traditional and corporate bureaucracy combined with elements of egalitarian management principles. NPM initiatives challenge professional independence as well as traditional concepts of public service provision (Ferlie et al., 1996). Yet, Hood (1998, p. 93) may be right in his view that many of the “reinvention” schemes of late are not a break with the traditional hierarchic structure but a comeback of old ideas and variants of hierarchist doctrines like scientific management. In our Norwegian case study, the management

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schemes, MBO and also quality systems did take a form that in many respects resembled neo-Taylorism. Changes for the service providers The changes and reshaping of the public services have also produced new roles and expectations of the service providers (Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Sehested, 2002; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003) as new tasks are to be performed in new ways. This cannot be attributed solely to managerial or other reforms; it must also be attributed to changes in welfare policies, demographic and social changes and to new technology. The services studied were under pressure with workloads increasing and resources decreasing. The vast majority of officials in all three services pointed to the high workload as the main obstacle to doing a good job. An average of 75 per cent of employees in the three services agreed that their service had changed greatly and 67 per cent that in particular that work forms had been altered in important ways over the past few years (Berg et al., 2002, p. 72). Between 60 and 70 per cent, depending on the service, had experienced more responsibilities than before while the role of the users had changed too. Between 70 and 90 per cent thought that the users expected more, and were more demanding than before (Berg et al., 2002, p. 8). Between 60 and 75 per cent of respondents identified inefficient regulation (laws) of the service programs, wrong priorities by management and not enough competence and skills of staff as important obstacles to doing their job well (Berg et al., 2002, p. 130). In response to the question “what would enable you to improve the quality of the service” approximately 95 per cent identified more freedom of action, a less rule-bound service, closer cooperation with agents outside the service, better management and not surprisingly more staff. More teamwork was seen as important, but less than the previous four factors (Berg et al., 2002, p. 132). Respondents expressed loyalty towards the principal goals and tasks of the organisation. The vast majority said the most important factor in their work satisfaction was the opportunity to apply their skills and competencies to do a good, professional job for users of the service. A basic experience expressed by front line personnel was that they considered themselves as professionals, not rule operators or decision machines. This points back to the form of support (from Douglas’ model) described earlier, which is neither hierarchist nor individualist but linked to loyalty to the task and professional values and standards. Responses to NPM initiatives Based on our theory of cultural biases and organizational forms, we would expect public sector employees, according to their cultural identity, to react differently to the process of transformation. Some meet it with scepticism, frustration or active opposition; while others react with passive acceptance. Some will be positive about the changes and actively adapt to perceived opportunities in the new organization (Halford and Leonard, 1999; Newman and Clark, 1994). We would also expect a correspondence between the personal beliefs and values of top managers and their view of how the organization should be run. Implementing a system enhancing managerial control is clearly in line with their tasks of coordination and control and our research confirmed that top-managers did defend the reforms.

One consistent finding in all three services, was that apart from top-management, the large majority of employees, and particularly front-line staff, were critical of the reforms. The reasons were not related to a feeling of lack of trust, because of the increased controls over them, but more with their concern about the effects of the reforms on their ability to do a good job. To a large extent middle and lower level managers shared the opinions of front-line personnel. However, they tended to have a more positive view of change and also of their own efforts and involvement as leaders. This is in line with the assumption of divergent mind-sets, cultures or values of different layers of employees. Many employees believed that their jobs were less secure than before and that they might not have jobs in the near future. Yet, in our data, there was no indication of higher turnover (exit) than before (Hirschman, 1971). This could indicate that expressions of dissatisfaction voiced both by individuals and their unions were not seriously meant. Low turnover, however, may also be explained by the fact that despite discontent with the managerial reforms, the majority of employees were quite content with the general state of affairs in the service. This can be interpreted along the lines of cultural and individual ambiguities, as described by Meyerson (1991), and that employees are caught up in multiple and competing discourses (Halford and Leonard, 1999). But an additional explanation may lie in the fact that at least for two of these services, the tax administration and social insurance, a large number of employees had little real option of exit. Exit depends on the workforce having alternative job opportunities in the labour market. These service providers had fairly low basic education, and high service-specific competencies based on in-house training and experience. Their competencies, therefore, were not easily transferable. The employment service stands out as different from the other two, as it is the service which leaves most discretion to the service workers and also the most “business like” of the three. During the 1990s the service recruited a substantial number of employees with higher education and/or with experience from private sector businesses (mainly men). This was done under the guise of a new image of a modernized and marketized public service. In this service, our survey data revealed a group of particularly dissatisfied employees; namely middle aged males who had not risen to managerial positions. They were disappointed to discover that despite the modern image, the service was still hierarchical and bureaucratic. For these employees, who were of a more individualist disposition, in Douglas’ terms, the service did not seem modern enough. The more traditional by disposition and the more senior dissatisfied employees, expressed unhappiness with the way their professional skills and competencies were being challenged. Their professional pride was hurt. What they believed were preconditions for doing a good job for the users and clients were threatened, and traditional good public service work was no longer appreciated. The more recently recruited managers, on the other hand, expressed more enthusiasm about the new possibilities and challenges of reforms and initiatives. As pointed out by Halford and Leonard (1999, p. 119), employees may portray managerialist identities whilst maintaining a quite different sense of self. An adoption of new managerialist positions does not necessarily imply a managerialist identity. An adoption of market rhetoric and compliance with market-based incentives does not necessarily mean that employees have an individualist core identity. As we pointed out above, the categories are not in any way clear cut. The (semi) professionals were not

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hierarchists in the sense described by Hood (1998, p. 74), but much more egalitarian in exercising their tasks. A fifth form? There are variations within the individual services of our study, but generally, the service providers have a basic task and “craft” orientation. They have a preference for universal policies and programs. They want more egalitarian-oriented management and better qualifications and competencies. At the same time they also see flexibility, a service less bound by rules and regulations, more freedom of action, and closer cooperation with agents outside the service as a means to perform well. They have a high work ethic and loyalty to the task, the clients as well as the universal welfare system. There is a large capacity for organizational change as long as these changes seem rational in a “quality of service delivery way”. How does this fit into the cultural model? Their attitudes and preferences are not clear-cut and they appear to express a hybrid form of public governance. Is it possible to glue this together in an alternative form of bureaucracy? This form would be one in which new roles for professionals are based on qualities from the procedural bureaucratic model combined with elements from a more collegial or egalitarian model. This seems to fit with a network-based form of bureaucracy. Referring back to the typology of Considine and Lewis (1999) in Figure 1, we may describe the elements of this form as follows: the main source of rationality is knowledge and knowledge development within a legal framework. The form of control is professional discussions/discourse, independent evaluations/audits and agencies for complaints. Coordination will be through accessible information on ICT-based systems. The primary principles are professional pride and quality orientation, but also justice and flexibility and the focus of the service delivery is a user/client focus of professionally dependable/adequate and well-founded decisions and solutions. This would involve developing a new bureaucratic structure and encouraging a new form of bureaucratic culture. Concluding comments Using the cultural theory of Douglas as a starting point, we have indicated how groups of employees within organizations are likely to react to different kinds of management systems or organizational forms. Using findings from a study of Norwegian public sector services we have illustrated our theory, although our data were not originally collected with the objective of testing models or theories. Further research is necessary to explore the link between professional and individual identities and organizational and management forms. Our research, however, confirmed that the three public services are professional bureaucracies under pressure. New roles are being shaped for the service professionals. The crucial question is whether these new roles comply with or promote good professional service quality. Our study indicates that important positive properties of the public service employee – such as professional pride, work ethic, loyalty, user and quality orientations – are being threatened. Effective service provision requires a good fit between the values and identities of the majority of the service providers and the organization. A transformation from a procedural bureaucracy to a market bureaucracy and even towards a new network-based form of organization implies a transformation of the ties

between the organization and its members (public officials). This may not be reduced to a question of “getting people to think new” or to develop a taste for new reward systems. For members of the organization new values and demands require a new mind-set. We ask what this might imply for the future constitution of the public sector workforce. We assume that the public sector will: . attract a different type of employee than before; . ward off a previously natural recruitment segment of the work force; . provoke resistance and scepticism from those who do not perceive the new forms as being satisfactory; and . start processes of re-socialization where old and potentially sceptical employees adapt to a new reality. The validity of these assumptions is not yet tested but our study opens up interesting further research in the field of personnel management in public service organisations. References Albert, S. and Whetten, D. (1985), “Organizational identity theory and the organization”, Organizational Behaviour, Vol. 7, pp. 263-95. Altman, Y. and Baruch, Y. (1998), “Cultural theory and organizations: analytical method and cases”, Organization Studies, Vol. 19 No. 5, pp. 769-85. Alvesson, M. (2002), Understanding Organizational Culture, Sage, London. Baier, V., March, J. and Sætren, H. (1994), “Implementation and ambiguity”, in McKevitt, D. and Lawton, A. (Eds), Public Sector Management, Theory, Critique and Practice, Sage, London, pp. 160-70. Berg, A.M. (1997), “Participatory strategies in quality improvement programs”, Public Productivity & Management Review, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 30-43. Berg, A.M., Heen, H. and Hovde, S. (2002), Kvalitetsbyra˚kratiet – mellom autonomi og kontroll (The Quality Bureaucracy – Between Autonomy and Control), The Work Research Institute, Oslo. Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (2001), New Public Management. The Transformation of Ideas and Practice, Ashgate, Aldershot. Considine, M. and Lewis, J. (1999), “Governance at the ground level: the front-line bureaucrat in the age of markets and networks”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 59 No. 6, pp. 467-80. Coyle, D. (1997), “A cultural theory of organizations”, in Ellis, R. and Thompson, M. (Eds), Culture Matters. Essays in Honour of Aaron Wildavsky, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, pp. 59-78. DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (Eds) (1991), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Douglas, M. (Ed.) (1982), Essays in the Sociology of Perception, Routledge, London. Douglas, M. (1996), Thought Styles: Critical Essays on Good Taste, Sage, London. Dutton, J., Dukerich, J. and Harquail, C. (1994), “Organizational images and member identification”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 39, pp. 239-63. Ellis, J. and Thompson, M. (Eds) (1997), Culture Matters. Essays in Honour of Aaron Wildavsky, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

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Exworthy, M. and Halford, S. (Eds) (1999), Professionals and the New Managerialism in the Public Sector, Open University Press, Buckingham. Ferlie, E., Ashburner, L., Fitzgerald, L. and Pettigrew, A. (1996), The New Public Management in Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Goia, D., Schultz, M. and Corley, K. (2000), “Organizational identity, image and adaptive instability”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25, pp. 63-82. Gruber, J. (1988), Controlling Bureaucracies. Dilemmas in Democratic Governance, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Halford, S. and Leonard, P. (1999), “New identities? Professionalism, managerialism and the construction of self”, in Exworthy, M. and Halford, S. (Eds), Professionals and the New Managerialism in the Public Sector, Open University Press, Buckingham. Hatch, M. and Schultz, M. (Eds) (2004), Organizational Identity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hirschman, C. (1971), Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Hood, C. (1998), The Art of the State. Culture, Rhetoric and Public Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kickert, W., Klijn, E-H. and Koppenjan, J. (Eds) (1997), Managing Complex Networks. Strategies for the Public Sector, Sage, London. Ka¨rreman, D. and Alvesson, M. (2004), “Cages in tandem: management control, social identity and identification in a knowledge-intensive firm”, Organization, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 149-75. March, J. and Olsen, J. (1989), Rediscovering Institutions, Free Press, New York, NY. Meyers, M. and Vorsanger, S. (2003), “Street-level bureaucrats and the implementation of public policy”, in Peters, G.B. and Pierre, J. (Eds), Handbook of Public Administration, Sage, London, pp. 245-55. Meyerson, D. (1991), “Acknowledging and uncovering ambiguities in cultures”, in Frost, P.J., Moore, L., Louis, M., Lundberg, C. and Martin, J. (Eds), Reframing Organizational Culture, Sage, London, pp. 254-70. Mintzberg, H. (1979), The Structuring of Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Newman, J. and Clark, J. (1994), “Going about business?”, in Clark, J., Cochrane, A. and McLoughlin, E. (Eds), Managing Social Policy, Sage, London. Olsen, J. and Peters, G. (1996), Lessons from Experience, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo. Pheysey, D. (1993), Organizational Cultures. Types and Transformations, Routledge, London. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (1995), Quality Improvement in European Public Services. Concepts, Cases and Commentary, Sage, London. Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2000), Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Sehested, K. (2002), “How new public management reforms challenge the roles of professionals”, International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 25 No. 12, pp. 1513-37. Thompson, M., Ellis, R. and Wildavsky, A. (1990), Cultural Theory, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Corresponding author Anne Marie Berg can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Modernizing public administration: the impact on organisational identities Giseline Rondeaux

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University of Liege, Liege, Belgium Abstract Purpose – To provide a case study of a Belgian ministry, within the framework of the Copernicus reform. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses both interpretative and interactionist approaches and a range of research methods including a survey, involving a questionnaire and interviews, content analysis and some elements of speech analysis. Findings – The paper confirms the hypothesis that an identities evolution is taking place following the implementation of new public management (NPM) principles in the Belgian federal service. Using two identity logics “public service,” relating to the principles and values associated with traditional public administration, and “public managerialism”, relating to the principles, values and representations linked to NPM, it distinguishes six identity profiles. These are characterised by their positioning according to two principles fidelity and reality. The conclusion is that organisational identity is complex, hybrid and composite and in constant evolution according to perceptions of reality and context Originality/value – This adds to the literature on the change process in public organisations under the banner of new public management or modernisation. It illustrates that the change process results in multiple identities with implications for human resources management. Keywords Business administration, Public sector organizations, Corporate identity, Public sector reform Paper type Research paper

Introduction The Belgian federal administration has been the subject of many reforms since the 1990s but this article focuses on the most recent Copernicus reform. It belongs to the new public management (NPM) movement or new managerialism (Farnham and Horton, 1993; Ferlie et al., 1996; Hood, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Gruening, 2001). Initiated in the name of efficiency and performance, this reform involved substantial changes in both organizational and human resource management (HRM) and a new frame of values including respect, communication, integrity, efficiency and personal development. Its implementation provides a framework with which to analyze the potential impacts of such major change on organizational identities. Our aim is to understand and describe how organizational identities evolve following the introduction of new principles and practices in the context of public administration (Fu et al., 1999). We propose to analyze the federal public service (FPS) personnel and organization (PO), as they were the source of the reform and those who pioneered its implementation. Organisational identities are usually analyzed in the literature using three approaches. The interpretative approach is the most widely used and focuses on the characterization of the identity reference frame. It aims at identifying the

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constitutive dimensions of identity, which are “stable, central and distinctive” (Albert and Whetten, 1985) and the content of representations and actors’ subjectivity. Organizational identity answers the question, who are we as an organization? Some authors (Fiol et al., 1998) consider an organization’s identity, as the aspect of culturally embedded sense making that is self-focused. Organizational identity may evolve over the long-term and be incrementally adaptive (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). As Fougere (2003) notices, the literature on organizational identity gradually switched from a focus on stable and unifying identity to the description of multiple or even contradictory identities within the organization. These multiple identities can be associated with different groups existing in separate parts of the organization (ideographic multiplicity) or, in some cases, all organizational members recognizing the existence of different identities (holographic multiplicity) (Albert and Whetten, 1985). The interactionist approach blends identity into a social categorization process (Tajfel and Turner, 1985) in terms of membership and differentiation. Identity is defined here as a collective creation of the organization, which is a context where identity becomes a subjective reality co-constructed through conversations (Schotter, 1993). Each actor takes part in this construction process (Hatch and Schultz, 1997). Hogg and Terry (2000, p. 123) describe organizations as a number of “internally structured groups that are located in complex networks of inter-group relations characterised by power, status, and prestige differentials.” This definition assumes that organizations are comprised of interrelated groups or social categories. In this perspective, identity is approached according to the concepts of in-group and out-group. Identity is thus a negotiated and reflexive concept and an interactive and discursive reality. This definition opens the possibility of multiple versions of identity within an organization since organizations are composed of multiple social categories, including work units, professional groups and departmental groups. These groups provide the basis for many nested identities within an organization (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hennessy and West, 1999). Finally, the functionalist approach regards identity as the subject of managerial action (House et al., 1995). It is therefore up to managers to deal with the production of sense (Zalesnik, 1989) in order to create and/or maintain a system of reference, which is more or less shared within the organization (Treadwell and Harrison, 1994). Leadership can also be understood as a capacity to engender active followers by promoting collective interests associated with a shared identity (Haslam and Platow, 2001) or even a way of organizing multiple organizational identities (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). This perspective focuses in particular on symbolic management or the different actions by which management portrays the ideal organization in an optimistic vision. These actions aim at erasing the divergences and the contradictions of organizational identity (Cheney, 1991) and at managing a multiple-identities organization by throwing light on particular aspects according to the context, by satisfying its different aspects or by attempting to synthesize them (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). The perspective we chose in this research is a synthesis of both interpretative and interactionist approaches. Organisational identity is defined as: . A social and discursive construction (Schotter, 1993; Hatch and Schultz, 1997; Gioia et al., 2000).

Relational and situational (Abdelal et al., 2001). Composed of what is considered to be stable, central and distinctive (Albert and Whetten, 1985). An interpretation and action scheme (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996).

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These diverse elements of definition mean we have to focus on discourse and on interviewees’ terminology. Whatever definition is adopted, identity can always be considered as a human creation constituted through language, appearing in texts, artefacts or practices (Giroux, 2001). The empirical material analysis distinguishes what includes the FPS PO’s organisational identity system of reference. Two logics emerge, in an archetypal form. One is connected to the tendencies underpinned in the literature by the term “ public service,” that is the representations, principles and values traditionally associated with public administration. The other logic is called “public managerialism”, which covers the principles, values and representations linked to NPM. Many authors describe the doctrines embedded in NPM (Pollitt, 1993; Hood, 1995; Mathiasen, 1999). NPM can be understood as a polysemous concept, inspired by different ideas and theoretical perspectives (Gruening, 2001). In the numerous reforms conceived and implemented to “modernize” public administration, the accent is put on markets with a special focus on citizens as customers. The early approaches of NPM largely focused on efficiency and the applicability and relevance of managerial techniques imported from the private sector into public organizations (Ferlie et al., 1996). More recent reforms tend to include other objectives such as quality management, transparency and a client focus. Du Gay (1996) asserts that NPM is an identity project, since it aims at redefining the workforce. Many studies of NPM also question the paradoxes and tensions within its background (Lynn, 1998; Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 2000), the difficulties of its implementation (Mathiasen, 1999) and of its assessment (Pollitt, 1993; Hodge, 1999). Some studies even reject the introduction of managerial practices in public organizations because of their specific differences, declaring them misfits and potentially de-motivating (Farnham, 2003) because they come from another logic (Chanlat, 2003). The purpose of this article is not to take a stand “for” or “against” NPM, but rather to explore two existing logics, reflecting partly these concerns and debates, which are perceptible in the FPS PO organizational identity.

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Approaching the context The Copernicus reform was initiated in 2000 by the socialist Flemish Minister Van den Bossche. Created at the same time, the FPS PO is a horizontal ministry (the Belgian federal state is conceived as a virtual matrix). It also integrates two operational agencies: Selor, which is a recruitment agency, and OFO-IFA that deals with training. PO’s mission is to define the HRM and organizational strategy and policies for the whole federal administration, to pilot their implementation and provide support to other ministries for everything within its competencies. After studying all internal and external publications dedicated to the FPS, to the Copernicus reform and its implementation, we collected data through two types of interviews.

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Context interviews were carried out with ten key actors (Table I) and the purpose was to identify the process of the Copernicus reform. Each interviewee was questioned about the FPS strategy, its work organization and HRM practices. They were also asked for details on the reform, its concrete purposes and implementation within the FPS. Identity interviews (professional story-telling) were conducted with a representative sample of 27 persons, chosen according to three structuring criteria (service, rank and functional or structural mobility of the agents), and three non-structuring criteria (gender, age and language). Table II shows the sample composition compared with the workforce composition. The identity interviews were semi-structured around the system of reference, notions of in-group and out-group, and the perceived evolution during and after the implementation of the Copernicus reform. They were framed around a half-open questionnaire that combined opinion scales, multiple-choice questions, semantic differentiators and “pseudo semantic differentiators”[1], as well as open questions. The questionnaire[2], sent before the interview, was the basis for discussion. During the interview, equal attention was paid to answers and justification of choices. The interviews took 120 min on average and were conducted at the workplace. We carried out content analysis combined with some elements of speech analysis. The content analysis was based on a thematic scanning of interview notes and

Function Table I. Context interviews sample

Table II. Identity interviews sample compared with FPS workforce

Number of interviewees

Top management N-2 management Trade union representatives

Criteria

Workforce (N ¼ 513 p.)

Service

PO: 299 (58.3 percent) Selor: 134 (26.1 percent) OFO-IFA: 80 (15.6 percent) Level A: 209 (40.7 percent) Level B: 75 (14.6 percent) Level C: 128 (25.0 percent) Level D: 101 (19.7 percent) No data available

4 4 2

Sample (N ¼ 27 p.)

PO: 13 (48.2 percent) Selor: 5 (18.5 percent) OFO-IFA: 9 (33.3 percent) Rank Level A: 11 (40.7 percent) Level B: 5 (18.5 percent) Level C: 6 (22.2 percent) Level D: 5 (18.5 percent) Mobility 14 changed situation/position 9 did not move 4 were hired after the reform Gender Women: 299 (58.3 percent) Women: 17 (63 percent) Men: 214 (41.7 percent) Men: 10 (37 percent) Age ,35: 117 (22.8 percent) ,35: 6 (22. 2 percent) 35-49: 195 (38. 0 percent) 35-49: 13 (48.1 percent) .49: 201 (39. 2 percent) .49: 8 (29. 6 percent) Language French-speaking: 253 (49.3 percent) French-speaking: 17 (63 percent) Dutch-speaking: 260 (50.7 percent) Dutch-speaking: 10 (37 percent)

developed comments inspired from the tradition of semantic analysis (Giroux, 2000). Speech analysis was made through the systematic (but not statistical) localization of the specific vocabulary used to qualify central dimensions (e.g. lexical fields of in-groups and out-groups, or notions such as citizen/client, administration, modernization, etc.). The results presented in this paper constitute an intermediate output. It requires a temporal follow-up in order to enable us to extract full richness through a longitudinal analysis. Results Our results introduce a distinction between “public service” and “public managerialism” logics. Composed of representations, opinions, perceptions and values, these logics constitute what we consider as SPF PO organizational identity frames of reference. Our research is close to several other studies on the public sector. Some authors question the potential impacts of NPM reforms on the public service ethos (Brereton and Temple, 1999; Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996) or on public service ethics and values (Allmendinger et al., 2003; Maesschalck, 2004). A number of studies on public servants’ identities question the specificity of public servants in terms of practices, ethics, motivation and values in comparison with private sector employees (Demmke, 2005) while others focus on the impact of NPM reforms on public servants’ identities (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2005). Our findings agree with many of their conclusions, which suggest there is a duality and hybridization of public organizations’ identities under the influence of NPM reforms (Van Bockel, 2005; Caron and Giauque, 2005, Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2005). We attempted to situate the discourses we collected and the representations they conveyed into positioning logics adopted by our interviewees. It appears that some of the respondents have a perception of their contextual reality that is in continuity with their identity logic, while others observe a gap between their identity principles, the logic they are adopting and their perception of reality. The latter are in a situation of dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Gu¨venc (1995) analyzes identity crisis as a result of the incompatibility between the need for fidelity (conservation of a certain representation of self) and the need for reality (adaptation to the changing social contexts). We use these terms to qualify the principles that precede the observed positioning. This approach allows us to distinguish different identity profiles inside the FPS PO, characterised by the reference to one or other archetypal identity logic, “public service” or “public managerialism” and the adopted positioning of “fidelity ” or “reality.” Finally, from an interactionist perspective, we attempt to identify which dimensions, respectively, define the different identity groups composing the FPS PO organisational identity. Doing this, we examine whether the reference to a particular group of belonging or differentiation is related to the identity profiles discovered in the analysis. The “public service” logic In this logic the specificity of the public sector is strongly asserted in contrast to the private sector. The public sector is seen as consisting of employment stability and a more loyal employer. The perception is linked in part to the uniform application of HRM policies and a guarantee of equity and honesty within the system. More

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generally, some evoke a specific humane mentality (while the private sector is perceived as inhuman, more competitive and stressful). However, several interviewees valued some private sector practices, including recognition of employee job performance. The work itself is seen as more interesting and more important, but also harder, and management is assumed to be more rigorous, stricter and ultimately better. The work organization is considered as probably more efficient, and management as empowered. Last, several people denounce the stronger differentiation between people, according to rank and status, in the public sector, which is less accentuated in the private one. Most of the interviewees agreed that being public servants was a vocation. Several people chose the public sector due to family influence, others because of the altruistic purposes of the sector. The fact that officials have had to pass examinations to qualify for entry reinforces the concept of choice. These findings echo other studies on the motivational differences between public- and private sector employees (Perry and Wise, 1990; Wright, 2003). Of the six motives identified by Perry (1996), four were cited by the interviewees: attraction to public policy making, commitment to public interest, sense of civic duty and sense of social justice. Finally, some respondents justified their professional choice not in terms of vocation (whose symbolic range appears as excessive) but for more material reasons, including a stable job and a good work-life balance. Far from being proud of being a civil servant, several interviewees admitted to feeling ashamed and suffering from the negative image that society has of the public sector. This is also reported by Demmke (2005). In some cases pride decreased or disappeared due to the Copernicus reform and the side effects of its negative experiments. This loss of pride is allotted to a loss in the significance of work or a certain ideal. Lastly, some respondents see their role as a buffer position, facing the consequences - symbolic or real - of acts carried out by other actors including politicians, political parties and some front office civil servants. Some respondents however, were proud of being a civil servant, because of the job: “(it) is a job where one can remain oneself”, “a civil servant always has a professional project, a mission, a ‘raison d’eˆtre’.” Understanding the civil servant’s mission is first expressed through the notion of general interests, defined as the satisfaction of collective needs to fulfil the common good. To serve the population with a certain sense of community and the inherent helpfulness of the sector are other key aspects conceived as the raison d’eˆtre of the administration. Some evoke their contribution to a society project and think they even have a role in structuring society. Finally, some respondents think that the mission of civil servants and the administration is to be useful and support other civil servants. This obviously reflects the specific purposes of the FPS PO. Their mission of internal service is to provide administrative support, training, clarification of complex regulations and assisting in career development Linked to the mission and purposes of public organisations, universal and “altruistic” values are deeply anchored in the identity of the civil servant. Table III summarizes the essential principles emerging from our interviews, and the correlative notions or terms used in their speech. Regulation plays an important role in the mission of the administration and has three purposes:

Principle

Associated notions or terms

Equality before the law

Respect for the law and regulations Equity, equality of treatment Impartiality, neutrality, objectivity Ethics, integrity, honesty Loyalty Justice Service to the community, with a social purpose Public interests, collective interests, general interests Helpfulness, serving the common good, the community, the citizen Serving a democratic state Social usefulness Doing a job which is useful and good Serving the social before the economic Mutual support, assistance, availability

(1) It is a protection against political influences. (2) It frames the system in an objective way; the rules are designed to ensure fair and equal treatment and avoid arbitrariness. There is no place for initiative or creativity. (3) It structures the work. The expectations towards the hierarchy are defined with regards to rules and regulations. One expects a leader or a manager to be to some extent the “guardian of the law,” independent of the political actors and protecting the administration from such influences. (S)He is also expected to frame and structure the organization, giving clear directives and established hierarchical bonds. Moreover, (s)he should show a certain organisational attachment and clearly accept and promote the goals of the organization. Finally, his(her) legitimacy is based on how well (s)he knows the administration and its complexities, and on his(her) knowledge of the regulations. We have called this legitimacy “organisational legitimacy.” Consequently, the system of fixed-term mandates for managers is highly criticized. These expectations are in contradiction with the current management scheme: the management plans realized by the managers are perceived as factors of individualization of the missions and of competition. The hierarchical flatness and project work promoted by the Copernicus reform are rejected, because they are interpreted by the respondents as fuzzy, chaotic and lacking formal structure. Lastly, the discourse of the respondents shows a critical distancing from the political actor, which is expressed in various ways and for various reasons: . Positioning as executants or as instruments of the minister and/or of his cabinet. . An assimilation of the political actor with constraints imposed on the administration and its performance. The priorities are different, as well as timescales and logics of operation. . In certain cases, the standpoint is more virulent and denounces the political influences (even intrusions) in administrative performance, giving a negative image of it.

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Table III. “Public service” logic principles

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.

Some people even express a “physical” separation of the administration and the political actors, the latter being assimilated to a different world and considered in a negative way.

The “public managerialism” logic Many respondents highlighted the strong similarity they perceive between public and private sectors, and minimize their differences. Workload, stress and pressure are described as similar in both sectors. “We work a lot, sometimes even more than in the private sector.” “It is managed as though we were a small SME,” are examples supporting this view. The constraint of regulations, non-for-profit and public-targets, are examples of specific differences of public organisations. A minority of respondents thought the public sector had to catch up: “the public sector is behind times”; “the mentality is sometimes a little old-fashioned.” The concept of vocation is absent in the discourse of these interviewees. Being a civil servant is just like any other job and is not seen as a vocation. Some express an interest in their work or function: “one does not work for the ministry, one is at the ministry. It is simply a context.” Being a civil servant is not a voluntary choice, but rather an opportunity that arose. In certain cases, it was a choice by default, to escape unemployment. Most interviewees feel no pride in being civil servants but in the job, or its achievements and results. Some “discovered” a vocation later. The main mission identified by the respondents correlates with the Copernicus reform and the creation of the FPS PO: to be pioneers, innovators and the engine for change. Most interviewees perceived their mission to carry out the reform and support its implementation. The purpose is “to make the administration effective.” The concepts of innovation, audacity, or creativity are strongly valued. In contrast, “the old routines,” “traditionalism” or the defence of the “old privileges,” including the statute, are rejected. In this identity logic, values oriented to individual performance and customer-orientation is highlighted. Table IV summarizes the central principles that underpin the public managerialism logic, and the terms or notions the respondents associate with it. The notion of regulation has a distinct status in the “public managerialism” logic. It is defined by the following elements: . It causes dysfunctions and has perverse effects. . It is an obstacle to action. For the interviewees, their opposition to regulation is part of their rejection of administrative heaviness and bureaucracy. . It is avoidable. Paradoxically, regulations are seen as flexible: “we focus firstly on the concepts, then we have to put them into a regulatory framework. We learn to be creative with regulations.” When one evokes the expectations towards the hierarchy, the evolution of the administration towards a less pyramidal structure is viewed as a positive feature of the Copernicus reform. The interviewees also value the empowerment of civil servants, in particular through project teams. Their expectations are translated into terms of autonomy, confidence, dialogue and a short hierarchical distance. They also expect

Principle

Associated notions or terms

Individual performance

Professional consciousness, professionalism Satisfaction of a job well-done, on-time Competencies, expertise, sharing knowledge Missions, challenges Performance, efficiency, quality, profitability Involvement, motivation Respect for people, not treating them as numbers but as individual clients Service “a la carte,” quality Listening to the users Customer service, satisfaction Orientation results Transparency, opening

Customer-orientation

managers to lead change and their legitimacy is based on knowledge, experience and private sector practice. Lastly, the relations with the political actor are translated into collaboration, adaptation, and more or less forced and harmonious cohabitation. Emphasis is put on complementarities of the administration and the political sphere, and is sometimes translated into terms of negotiation. There is a demand for autonomy for the administration in line with the Copernicus reform, which preaches the empowerment of the administration. Table V synthesizes the principal characteristics of the two logics identified through our interviews. Positioning of identity profiles As we have already said, these two identity logics are simply archetypes. Reality is not that simple or binary. Within each one of these logics two types of positioning can be identified, which accentuates either the principle of fidelity or reality (Gu¨venc, 1995) as shown in Figure 1. The importance given to the fidelity principle or the reality principle emerges from the presence or absence of the perception of a gap between the interviewees’ personal logic and their perception of the contextual situation. The Copernicus reform and its implementation are assimilated to a factor of change. The importance of this factor will then vary depending on one’s adherence to the “public service” logic or the “public managerialism” logic. The perception of the outcome of this reform, i.e. its actual completion and its integration in the current practices of the administration, will serve as the basis for determining the positioning. Reality principle When bearers of the “public service” logic are aware that the administration is going through a change, then their positioning corresponds to the reality principle. This change is negatively connoted as it is experienced as a disruption or even a deterioration of “public service” principles and values in favour of those brought by the reform. Conversely, among bearers of the “public managerialism” logic, the positioning corresponding to the reality principle perceives a partial implementation of the Copernicus reform within the administration. However, the expected evolution of the

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Table IV. Public managerialism logic principles

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“Public service”

“Public managerialism”

Specificity of the public sector Vocation of civil servant

Asserted

Minimized

Family tradition Affinities with the altruistic and non-lucrative purposes Logic of employment No pride, sometimes shame Disappearance of pride following the Copernicus reform Satisfaction of collective interests to fulfil the common good Role of the State towards society Support other civil servants Regulation Equality before the law Service to the community, with a social purpose

Absence/rejection of vocation Job centred interests Chance or opportunity Late vocation No particular pride, except the one linked to achievements

578 Pride of being civil servant Mission of civil servant

Values

Regulation

Relation to the hierarchy Table V. Principal characteristics of “public service” and “public managerialism” logics

Relation to the political actor

Being engine for change Translating political guidelines into organization and HRM concepts Customer-orientation

No specific values No differentiation public/private sectors Individual performance Customer-orientation Protection against political influences Causes dysfunctions and perverse effects Frames the system in an objective Is an obstacle to action way Is avoidable Frames the work Hierarchical flatness/decentralization Guardian of the law Empowerment, autonomy Independence Technical legitimacy Organisational legitimacy Framing and structuring Collaboration, adaptation Positioning as executants Complementary relationship between Assimilation with constraints on administration and political actor action Desiderata towards autonomy Denunciation of influences Physical separation, different world

administration did not occur. They therefore perceive the implementation of the reform as moving further away from the initial principles or even that it has failed. In both cases, dissonance is expressed through pessimism and disillusion, especially with top management (both political and administrative), revealing a clear rejection of the situation by the interviewees. Fidelity principle In contrast, the positioning corresponding to the fidelity principle appears when the interviewees see a certain consistency between the identity logic they belong to and the context in which it is evolving. Thus, this positioning is characterized by a representation of self as an organization consistent with the identity mind-set one claims to belong to. We now examine the identity profiles that arise from the conjunction of these two dimensions (identity logic vs positioning). We name each of the six profiles according to the concept that characterizes it the most. Figure 1 shows the position of these profiles according to the identity logic they come from and the positioning they reveal.

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Figure 1. Positioning of the identity profiles

The description of these six profiles also reveals differences regarding their perception of change and their expectations about the future. Invariants This profile derives from the “public service” logic, and the importance of the fidelity principle. It is characterized by a perception of no-change. For these persons, the Copernicus reform and its principles, have either by-passed them or has been temporary and their perception of the situation is a return to normal, or administration is homeostasis. Nostalgics Also deriving from the “public service” logic, this profile relies mainly on the reality principle. The result is a dissonant situation characterized by nostalgia for a former situation perceived as a “golden age.” These persons notice a gap between their current perception of the administration and the principles and values they believe in. They express deep doubts concerning the evolution of the situation and perceive the Copernicus reform as destroying the administration. Their priority consists in stopping the change process and going back to the former situation. Unlike the other identity profiles, the “nostalgics” continue to identify with their former service, and not any group within the new structure of FPS PO. They also identify with “the old generation” and “carrying the traditions.” As one interviewee said: “dinosaurs are all singing the same requiem.”

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Professionals Professionals identify with the “public managerialism” logic and the fidelity principle. They are fully committed to the Copernicus reform and its principles. They reject the specificity of the public sector and the content of the job or the function is more significant than the context. They perceive the Copernicus reform is operational, gradually being institutionalised and their aim is to fully achieve the reforms. This profile also displays higher levels of education and a strong commitment to meritocracy. They also perceive themselves as “young in age and/or in mentality,” rejecting the “old routines” and other “dusty” habits. Disillusioned This group also belongs to the “public managerialism” logic and relies on the reality principle. A situation of dissonance results from the gap they feel between their logic and the way it is actualized. “Copernicus is dead,” they say. They believe in the reform, but feel it has not kept its promise and has led them to a crisis of trust. They fear “going back to the old ways.” The “professionals” and the “nostalgics” both consider the reform as constituting a radical change but this is not the case for the “invariants” (Copernicus was useless and/or changed nothing), or the “disillusioned” (Copernicus constituted a useful change but was not effectively introduced). The “invariants” and the “nostalgics,” (both public service logic) see the Copernicus reform as the cause of change. In contrast, “professionals” and “disillusioned” (public managerialism logic), associate change with forces external to the Copernicus reform itself. The last two profiles do not belong to either identity logic stated above. They differ however according to the principle in which they are positioned. Pragmatists positioned in the fidelity principle, show an a` la carte operating model, taking from the “public managerialism” logic those dimension it perceives as positive in terms of values or performance, but does not disavow all characteristics of the “public service” logic. They are quite positive about the future. Disaffected, the last profile, is positioned in the reality principle. There is generalised dissonance as the “public service” logic does not meet their expectations, but they do not feel comfortable in the “public managerialism” logic either. Dissatisfied in every case, their credo is a state of dysfunction of the administration, whether the management principles are being set up or not. Their vision of the future is consequently deeply pessimistic. Evaluation From an interactionist viewpoint, we tried to identify the possible belonging or differentiation dimensions used by the identity profiles revealed in our analysis. The distinctions that exist at group level identities represent simultaneous versions of organizational identity of the FPS PO, as well as many components of this identity. We assume a potential correlation between these profiles and the importance they give to category distinctions such as age, unit/department, or profession. In particular, one of the main distinctions made by the interviewees relies on the entities (and not on the FPS PO as a whole), except for the “nostalgics.” Clear differences in philosophy, values, climate, purposes, image, culture and performance underpin the perception of a specific identity, particularly at the level of operational agencies, whose missions are more

clearly defined. The physical/spatial separation potentially contributes to part of this distinction. In the PO entity, a distinction is made at the level of subdivisions composing the entity, and is attributed to the managers’ personalities, who imprint their mark on the divisions’ identities. We assume that this identification to a service or a division, personified by its manager, proceeds on the one hand from the haziness surrounding the FPS PO (as a whole) missions and on the other hand from the individualisation of these missions, materialized into a management plan conceived by these managers with a view to reaching objectives. Conclusion On the basis of our case study of the Belgian federal administration, our hypothesis of an identities evolution following the implementation of NPM principles seems to be confirmed. We have constructed two identity logics, “public service” and “public managerialism,” reflecting representations and values linked with two specific conceptions of what defines public administration. Within these logics, we also distinguish six identity profiles, characterised by their positioning according to the fidelity principle (conservation of a certain organizational self representation) or the reality principle (confrontation of this representation with the evolution of the organizational context). These profiles show different perceptions of change and expectations about the future. It is evident that the organizational identity of the FPS PO is complex, hybrid and composite. It is also in constant evolution, according to the perceptions of reality and context, which the actors in the organization have. It is our intention to pursue this analysis in a longitudinal, study and to elaborate the results of this research by introducing a temporal dimension. Our purpose is to expose the identity dynamics constructed in time, by identifying the casual processes of the positioning changes (relying on reality or on fidelity), in parallel with the context evolution itself. These different action proposals, as well as several hypotheses proposed in this paper, could be the subject of numerous other researches. Our results have to be considered as impressionistic rather than conclusive evidence at this stage. They need to be validated on a larger scale since our empirical data stem from interviews of a small sample of people within a single organization. They could certainly be confirmed or challenged, enriched, adjusted or completed by the analysis of other organizational contexts or other projects of change or reforms within the administration. Notes 1. These terms mean differentiators whose terms are not antagonist and can be simultaneously chosen. 2. The questionnaire can be obtained by emailing the author. References Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y.M., Johnston, A.I. and Martin, T. (2001), “Treating identity as a variable: measuring the content, intensity, and contestation of identity”, draft paper, APSA, San Francisco, CA. Albert, S. and Whetten, D. (1985), “Organizational identity”, in Cummings, L. and Shaw, B. (Eds), Research in Organizational Behaviour, Vol. 7, pp. 263-95.

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Allmendinger, P., Tewdwr-Jones, M. and Morphet, J. (2003), “Public scrutiny, standards and the planning system: assessing professional values within a modernised government”, Public Administration, Vol. 81 No. 4, pp. 761-80. Ashforth, B.E. and Mael, F. (1989), “Social identity theory and the organization”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, pp. 10-39. Aucoin, P. (1990), “Administrative reform in public management: paradigms, principles, paradoxes and pendulums”, Governance, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 115-37. Brereton, M. and Temple, M. (1999), “The new public service ethos: an ethical environment for governance”, Public Administration, Vol. 77 No. 3, pp. 455-74. Caron, D.J. and Giauque, D. (2005), “L’identite´ des agents publics a` la croise´e des chemins: de nouveaux de´fis pour les administrations publiques”, paper presented at the EGPA Conference, Berne, September. Chanlat, J-F. (2003), “Le manage´rialisme et l’e´thique du bien commun: la question de la motivation au travail dans les services publics”, in Duvillier, T., Genard, J-L. and Piraux, A. (Eds), La Motivation au Travail dans les Services Publics, L’Harmattan, Paris. Cheney, G. (1991), Rhetoric in an Organizational Society: Managing Multiple Identities, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia. Demmke, C. (2005), Les Fonctionnaires sont-ils Diffe´rents parce que Fonctionnaires?, EIPA, Maastricht. Du Gay, P. (1996), Consumption and Identity at Work, Sage, London. Dutton, J.E. and Dukerich, J.M. (1991), “Keeping an eye on the mirror: image and identity in organizational adaptation”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 517-54. Farnham, D. (2003), “New public management, human resources management and job satisfaction in the UK public sector”, in Duvillier, T., Genard, J-L. and Piraux, A. (Eds), La Motivation au Travail dans les Services Publics, L’Harmattan, Paris. Farnham, D. and Horton, S. (1993), “Public service managerialism”, in Farnham, D. and Horton, S. (Eds), Managing the New Public Services, Macmillan, London. Ferlie, E., Pettigrew, A., Ashburner, L. and Fitzgerald, L. (1996), The New Public Management in Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Festinger, L. (1957), A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. Fiol, C.M., Hatch, M.J. and Golden-Biddle, K. (1998), “Organizational culture and identity: what’s the difference anyway?”, in Whetten, D.A. and Godfrey, P.C. (Eds), Identity in Organizations: Building Theory through Conversations, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Fougere, M. (2003), “Sensemaking in the third space. Insideness, outsideness and hybridity in the narratives of four young French expatriates in Finland”, NFF Conference Proceedings, Reykjavik. Fu, H-Y., Lee, S-l., Chiu, C-Y. and Hong, Y-Y. (1999), “Setting the frame of mind for social identity”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 23 No. 2, pp. 199-214. Gioia, D. and Thomas, J.B. (1996), “Identity, image and issue interpretation: sense-making during strategic change in academia”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 41, pp. 370-403. Gioia, D., Schultz, M. and Corley, K. (2000), “Organizational identity, image and adaptive instability”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25, pp. 63-81. Giroux, N. (2000), “L’analyse narrative de la strate´gie”, IXe conference de l’AIMS, Montpellier. Giroux, N. (2001), “La gestion discursive des paradoxes de l’identite´”, Xe confe´rence de l’AIMS, Que´bec.

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Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. (1985), “An integrative theory of inter-group conflict”, in Austin, W.G. and Worchel, S. (Eds), The Social Psychology of Inter-group Relations, 2nd ed., Brooks/Cole, California, CA, pp. 33-47. Treadwell, D.F. and Harrison, T.M. (1994), “Conceptualizing and assessing organizational image: model images, commitment, and communication”, Communication Monographs, Vol. 61, pp. 63-85. Van Bockel, J. (2005), “Identities of public servants: performance-driven, but professional public managers”, paper presented at the EGPA Conference, Berne, September. Wright, B.E. (2003), “Toward understanding task, mission and public service motivation: a conceptual and empirical synthesis of goal theory and public service motivation”, paper presented at the 7th National Public Management Research Conference, Georgetown., USA. Zalesnik, A. (1989), Managerial Mystique, Harper Row, New York, NY. Corresponding author Giseline Rondeaux can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Identifying identities: performance-driven, but professional public managers Jeroen van Bockel and Mirko Noordegraaf

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University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands Abstract Purpose – This paper examines the effects of performance driven public services on managerial behaviour and the values that influence individual actions. Design/methodology/approach – The approach is historical/institutional within a constructed theoretical framework Findings – Fuelled by the “new public management” movement, public managers are forced to act in performance-driven ways and instruments like “performance contracts” and “performance-related pay” are being used to improve managerial behaviour and the professionalism of public officials. Consequently, public managers have acquired personal stakes in public organizations because when they meet organizational targets, they reap financial rewards. More efficiency, lower costs, and less waste, more responsiveness to customers, and increased flexibility are perceived to be good for society. These changes, however, are more than instrumental. They are about changing identities and changing the meaning of acting as a public official. Traditional Weberian ideas about how such organizing furthers the public good have been replaced by a performance-driven conception of public management, which is strong on organizing, but weak on the public good. The paper concludes that professional public managers must be judged within the context of the “res publica”. Originality/value – The paper contributes to the debate about professionalism within the context of NPM and whether this is compatible with a view of public service as serving the public interest Keywords Managers, Work identity, Professionals, Public sector organizations Paper type Conceptual paper

Introduction “We do not only swing into action in order to score” (NRC Handelsblad, 2004). With this statement Dutch police commissioner Eringa of the Flevoland police force emphasized that his performance contract will not bias decision making about which cases will be investigated and which will not. The question, however, is what happens in daily practice, not least because there are many examples of performance contracts that do bias decision making in rather dubious ways. For example, two police officers in Paris refused to investigate a robbery, because it would raise the crime rate of their district and thus jeopardize their chances of receiving a bonus at the end of the year (Dalrymple, 2004, pp. 171-2). In many respects, these two examples have much in common. In both cases, public servants’ behaviour is improved or “professionalized” by the use of “performance contracts” and related instruments like “performance related pay” instruments that have become popular throughout western public sectors since the rise of “new public management” (NPM) (Hood, 1991). However, at the same time, both examples appear to be different, especially when it comes to the use of performance-driven instruments. The first example might be about a responsible commissioner who is aware of his

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public duty and obligations. In the second example, police officers seem to have lost such awareness – their personal stakes have won out, and the res publica is harmed. However, it is not that simple, not so much because the first example is about rhetorical acts, instead of “real” deeds whilst the second suggests that performance contracts and performance related pay introduce incentives that bias decision making by responsible administrators, but because the meaning of res publica or “public good” has become ambiguous. At least theoretically, the public good might be served by sticking to targets and by “scoring” well, as targets might prioritize public action. Well-chosen targets might be used to represent political agreements, and to allocate scarce capacities for public organizing. As the public good is about collective action with limited means, not all individual cases can be treated. The above line of reasoning might be fruitful in characterizing and judging cases like the ones described but the question is not, “to what extent is decision-making biased?” The research question is: RQ1. In what ways do instruments that introduce personal stakes in public domains “professionalize” collective action, aimed at improving the public good? In this paper, we will answer this question by arguing first, that performance-driven, NPM instruments are not merely about instrumental change, but about changes in identities that surround public organizations. Second, that NPM not only affects instruments, but also affects the meaning of public organizing – and it does so in a biased way. Third, that the NPM era is a next step in a long-term process of a professionalization of public management, preceded by what we describe as “pre-Weberian” and “Weberian” eras. Fourth, we will show that “post-Weberian” organizations individualize public organizing and institutionalize personal stakes, without strengthening a renewed sense of the res publica. Professionalizing public service In eras before Weber formalized “legal-rational” ways of organizing collective action and underscored the relevance of acting impersonally within strict “bureaucratic” frameworks, one can observe the intermingling of public and private interests, as well as political and administrative rationales, in the lives of “public” officials. The popularization of Weber’s (1991, p. 196 onward) ideal typical model of bureaucracy, since the beginning of the twentieth century, can be seen as a reply to a perceived deterioration of public service, with public officials serving their private interests more than the res publica. Weber’s emphasis on the de-coupling of bureaucratic or “procedural” and “substantive” rationality was supported by Wilson’s (1887) earlier plea for separating impersonal “administration” from “politics” (Goodnow, 1967). In more theoretical terms, this can be considered to be a matter of a growing professionalization of public service (Kearny and Sinha, 1988). The combined introduction of behavioural guidelines, such as acting sine ira et studio (Weber, 1991), merit principles and fixed salaries, introduced a modernized logic of control, aimed at optimizing the public good. Bureaucratic control would secure reliability, legality and uniformity. Recent attempts to reform and reinvent public service along the lines of the so-called NPM can be seen as a further step in public service professionalization. New behavioural guidelines, such as “be responsive” and “act flexibly” increased mobility,

and more flexible pay mechanisms have transformed bureaucratic control into “post bureaucratic control” (Barzelay, 1992; Hood, 1991, 1998; Farnham et al., 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Christensen et al., 2004; Hood and Peters, 2004). Just like the rise of Weberian bureaucratic control, this can be seen as a reply to changing circumstances, which called for a renewed interweaving of substantive and institutional control (Noordegraaf, 2007). New concepts of citizens as “customer” of a globalized market economy, and of technological breakthroughs evoked a discourse of cost-control, responsiveness and flexibility, which put pressure on strict separations between public and private, as well as between politics and administration. Professionalism The historical evolution of ways in which government and public service are organized (Finer, 1997) can be viewed as increased professionalization as several crucial ingredients of professionalism are at stake (Wilensky, 1964; Freidson, 1986, 2001; Greenwood, 1966; Raadschelders, 2003; Noordegraaf, 2004). First, members of the profession have a certain degree of knowledge that enables them to treat cases and clients. They not only acquire such knowledge through training and education but also acquire insight and in-depth knowledge through experience. Second, members of a profession have followed a training program required for occupational action. This provides them with knowledge, but also guarantees socialization. Third, professions are distinctive, as professional jobs are fully paid jobs. Wilensky (1964) argues that a profession can only be a full-time job whilst according to Freidson jobs do not need to be full time although it is necessary that one can make a living. For reasons of professional independence it is important not to have several jobs at the same time. Fourth, professions have codes of ethics that prescribe professional values and service ideals and professional associations maintain this code by sanctioning offences. Fifth, professions protect job titles and are exclusionary. Professional associations grant titles to its members, so not everybody can enter occupational practices. Sixth, there is delegation of power over the profession to the association, by the state. There is a demand for professional autonomy, because of the formal knowledge professionals possess. (Freidson, 1986, pp. 46-7) Instruments and identities Members of a profession have a distinctive intellectual make-up (knowledge and training), they have an occupational identity, their professional practices are regulated (codes of ethics, job titles), and professional autonomies are protected (delegation of power). Over time, the public service – or, more precisely, public administration – has shown increased signs of such professionalism. Separate ingredients can be found throughout administrative history (Finer, 1997), and in the writings of influential thinkers. Plato, for instance, underscored the importance of education and knowledge for governing a country (Plato, 2005). With the rise of Weberian bureaucratic control and the institutionalization of the distinction between politics and administration, these separate ingredients began to form a more coherent whole. Education, expertise and merit were combined with fully paid and protected appointments. It became more difficult to enter occupational administrative practice, and a sense of occupational autonomy began to grow. Although NPM has been criticized for its lack of “publicness” (Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), the rise of managerial

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principles must be seen as a further step towards a distinctive, closed administrative/managerial sphere. The number of training programmes has risen sharply, semi-professional associations, such as senior public services (SPS) (EIPA, 1999; Page and Wright, 1999) and codes of ethics, have appeared everywhere. Within administrative spheres, moreover, separate occupational groups have come to the fore, such as public executives and public managers. As Hood (1991, p. 6) states: This movement helped to generate a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the ideas of “professional management” expertise as portable, paramount over technical expertise, requiring high discretionary power to achieve results (“free to manage”) and central and indispensable to better organisational performance, through the development of appropriate cultures and the active measurement and adjustment of organisational outputs.

This, in itself, makes clear that the NPM movement is more than an instrumental matter. Professionalization does not equal the professional use of tools and instruments – professionalization is also about social closure, paradigms, values, ethics, in short, about identities, about what it means to be a member of a profession. The question is: what administrative/managerial identities are created over time, and what does this mean for the evolution of public service and the protection of the res publica? Or more specifically: how does NPM conceive the res publica or public good, and how does it conceive the role of politics in guarding the public good? Publicness The notion of public interest can be approached in two ways: formally, by emphasizing the process of defining the public interest, and substantively, by focusing on the content of public interest. When the process of defining the public interest is used as a starting point for analyzing public management, three methods can be distinguished (Held, 1970): preponderance procedure, common interest approach, and unitary conceptions. According to the first of these methods, the preponderance procedure, the public interest is defined by majority rule. This might have rationalist or realist twists (Schubert, 1962). Rationalists emphasize majoritarianism; realists acknowledge the role of parties or interest groups, before majorities decide. In both cases, however, power is central: majorities must be formed in order to serve the public interest. For both rationalists and realists it has proven to be attractive to portray formalized political arenas, such as Parliaments, as “the arena in which a range of private preferences is reformulated into one public preference” (Pesch, 2003, p. 41). The administration’s task then is to execute that will (Goodnow, 1967). According to the second method, the common interest approach, aggregated individual interests equal the public interest (Held, 1970). The public interest arises out of Rousseau’s “Will of All” conception, that is, individual interests are aggregated (Rousseau, 2000, pp.448-9; Bodenheimer, 1962). This “adding of interests” is complicated. Pennock (1962, pp. 180-1) argues that the public interest is not equal to the sum of all individual interests: First, the public interest is not confined to interests that are recognized by those whose interest they are. [. . .] Second, the public interest includes the interests of persons who are not yet born. Third, private interests must be conceived as including the individual enjoyments, satisfactions, fulfilments, and so on that come only in and through society. [. . .] Finally [. . .]

I would say that anything that is part of the public interest must be capable of recognition by individuals as an interest they share in the sense that they wish to see it furthered or think it ought to be furthered.

Goodin (1996) introduced the “least common denominator” approach to public interest, in which “the public interest is equated, literally, with the common good, with that which is common among my good and yours”. Goodin’s alternative does not emphasize interests we happen to have in common, but interests we must have in common: “the public interest is necessarily and not merely contingently, public”. Goodin formulates three conditions: (1) it is an interest people necessarily share; (2) by virtue of their role as a member of the public; and (3) which can best or only be promoted by concerted public action. According to the third method, the unitary conceptions approach, public interest is described as conceptions on a higher moral level (Held, 1970). This means it is important for all humankind. A clash with morality means a clash with the public interest. Schubert’s third category, the idealists, fits into this approach, for they proclaim that the public interest reposes in “natural law” (Schubert, 1962). The “symbol approach” of Goodsell (1990, p. 102) includes the idea that public interest is “felt emotionally, rather than known in a precise cognitive way”. Historical evolution When we use these three methods to characterize what has happened over time, the following pattern can be traced. In pre-Weberian eras, unitary conceptions were slowly replaced by “preponderance procedures”. When Kings and Emperors reigned, according to God’s will, the public interest was seen as a divine order, which was represented by earthly reign. The sovereign was perceived as a mediator between God and the people (Stoffers, 1994, pp. 286-7; Finer, 1997, p. 1336). Serving God implied obedience to the sovereign. During the seventeenth century this obedience was getting weaker. The Glorious Revolution in England (1688) is a good example of how a sovereign (i.e. the King) was pressured to shed his absolute reign, and to share power with parliament. About 100 later the French Revolution shows more or less the same development. After a process of creating more distance between sovereign and people, during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, eventually the “people” grabbed power (Schama, 1989; Finer, 1997). In the eighteenth century, when the USA was established, comparable people-based powers were established. The founding fathers created a republican constitution, which represented the spirit of the time (Constitution of the United States, 1788) and this was the start of a separation of politics and administration. Representative bodies acquired a stronger position, and public organizing became more deliberative. In the Weberian era, the preponderance procedure was institutionalized. In line with authors like Wilson and Goodnow, Weber formulated a clear distinction between the function of politics and administration (Wilson, 1887; Goodnow, 1967; Weber, 1991). Weber described the “honour” of the politician as an “exclusively personal responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he must not and cannot reject or transfer”. The honour of the civil servant, on the other hand, is impersonal. It is “vested

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in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction” (Weber, 1991, p. 95). The “administrator” executes his task in Weber’s approach “without scorn and bias” sine ira et studio (Weber, 1991, p. 95). Weber adds to this the notion that the civil servant even executes the order if it appears “wrong” for instance, in conflict with moral rules. This approach to the relation between politics and administration implies a certain hierarchy whereby administration is subordinated to politics, and whereby certain normative standards are upheld: . Reliability. Uniformity, predictability. . Legality. Procedures, rule of law. . Justice. Protection, equity, solidarity. This structure steadily gained momentum in the first half of the twentieth century. Administrative bodies started to grow and became well-oiled machines in the service of politics. World War II forms a dramatic example of how well oiled these machines were in some European countries (Arendt, 1994). In post-Weberian eras, methods for realizing the public interest have become ambiguous. In many respects, a common interest approach seems to dominate as the neo-liberal ideas and market-paradigm have affected public organizations. What is good for individual citizens – as customers – seems to be good for society. Publicness is equated with the dominance of the individual. This is institutionalized by “demand-based” and “supply-oriented” models of management and stimulated by the instruments that are applied. In neo-liberal systems, when public officials lean heavily on market-based instruments and businesslike tools, public service is conceived as a to-be-individualized matter. “Better service delivery” “less bureaucracy” and the like, have become prime objectives in programs for “different” or “better” government, with better service, less regulation, better organizing and new relations with local government (Noordegraaf and van der Meulen, 2005). In this way, “substance” is created, or more precisely, assumed. Substantive ideals that have a lot to do with the instruments that are applied stand out: . Cost-control. No waste, macro-budgetary control, efficiency. . Responsiveness. Client wishes, demands, customer satisfaction. . Adaptiveness. Flexibility, innovation. Interestingly, however, new methods (common interest) and new ideals (cost-control, responsiveness, adaptiveness) are applied within traditional institutional frameworks. Publicness is re-interpreted, but classical roles of politics vis-a`-vis administration are intensified. Politics The death of royal absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the rise of ideals of representation meant “power to the people”, i.e. Parliaments. (Ebenstein and Ebenstein, 2000, p. 380). According to Goodnow (1967), the expression of the “state’s will” can be seen as the main function of parliaments as carriers of “politics”. Administrations execute that will. Influenced by such ideas (Wilson, 1887), western democracies increasingly introduced strictly separated functions, between politics and

administration, and tried to abolish hybrid overlaps, such as the “spoils systems”. The spoils system is derived from the adage “to the victor belong the spoils”. This system gives elected officials the opportunity to “build” their own administrations. As a result, appointed civil servants have the same political background as elected officials. Often they share a history within a political party or election campaign. The mediaeval “no cooperation, no job, no income” applies here as well. According to Weber (1999, pp. 78-83), the spoils system contributes to non-ideological parties with job seekers as their members. Weber also mentions powerful “bosses” who gain power by using political entrepreneurial skills. Such insights started to influence the restructuring of politics, even in countries like the USA, whose pre-Weberian nineteenth century’s spoils system was very strong. “The grand administration scandals, the efforts of civil service reformers, president Garfield’s assassination by a disappointed office-seeker, and the huge Republican losses in the 1882 elections” (Theriault, 2003) are seen as causes of the abolition of the classical spoils system, which is marked by the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883. This act had two important consequences. First, it prohibited mandatory campaign contribution, second, it implemented entrance examinations for would-be bureaucrats and therefore it is the start of the merit system in American public administration (Theriault, 2003). Entrance examinations reflect a step forward in the intellectual professionalization of public functions. In ways like these the “de-politicization” of bureaucracy took hold. Politics became the domain of ideology and administration of expertise. Following the American Pendleton Act, a Civil Service Commission was set up to administer a system based on merit rather than political connections. Four years after the passage of the Act, 86.000 jobs were classified as unavailable for political appointments. Other countries, with less obvious hybrid systems, but comparable politicized administrative orders, went through different, but comparable transformations. In England, for instance, the Northcote Trevelyan Report (1853) introduced a civil service merit system. Two problems were recognised in this report: the public service lacked both internal efficiency and public trust. One of the causes of these problems was patronage and incompetent, risk-avoiding, job-seekers was another. The introduction of examinations for new employees changed this (Northcote-Trevelyan, 1853). After the Pendleton Act, several American scholars focussed on what came to be known as the politics-administration dichotomy. In 1887, Woodrow Wilson wrote his famous article “The study of administration” in which he argues that public administration has everything to do with the “detailed and systematic execution of public law. [. . .] The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative” (Wilson, 1887 p. 209). Administration is a field “removed from the hurry and strife of politics”. With arguments like these Wilson clearly distinguished administration from politics. Goodnow, distinguishes the “expression” of the will, which is the function of politics, from the “execution” of that will which is the administrative function (Goodnow, 1967, p. 18), although “There is always a meeting and mingling of two functions, and the organs of government to which the discharge of these functions is entrusted cannot be clearly defined” (Waldo, 1948, p. 107). Nowadays, in post-Weberian eras, the politics-administration dichotomy is used flexibly. On the one hand, traditional frameworks for separating politics and administration are maintained. On the other hand, the meaning of politics and

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administration is changing and politicians and administrators move together. Fuelled by managerial and “governance” reform, politics has come to be focussed on “demands” – citizen or “customer” wishes, preferences, desires, and the like – either by generic input, or by the use of specific instruments. Generic opinion polls, ratings and rankings influence political decision making; while specific instruments for detecting desires, such as focus groups and demand-based methods, structure political work. Politics has become the reign of setting priorities and establishing frameworks (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Noordegraaf, 2004). Administrators support this and they enable reform. They no longer serve political ideology but priorities and frameworks. Public service identities The foregoing explorations enable us to circumscribe public service identities. If we stick to the rough distinction between pre-Weberian, Weberian and post-Weberian eras, three identities can be recognised, based on changing conceptions of public interests and politics. This is accompanied by distinctive images of what it means to be a “professional” civil servant. These public service identities are described in Table I. Pre-Weberian: fuzzy In the pre-Weberian model, public service identity can be considered to be fuzzy. People working for governments have no clear, institutionalized sense of what it means to work for government. Public and private interests are mingled, and instruments that can be applied to separate them, are weakly developed. Following the dethroning of kings and emperors and the fall of absolutism, the contours of the res publica have become ambiguous. Civil servants are not really “professionals” although they belong to collectivities, albeit fragmented collectivities. In “spoils systems” belonging to the right networks and camps might be profitable; but then again, motives are fuzzy – the powerful might have political deals, but also personal stakes. Consequently, two problems occurred related to public functions. First, nepotism was very common. A small group of aristocrats decided on the appointment of public officials. In most cases, the most important functions were sold to the highest bidder. The second problem was the “privateness” of public functions. In early modern times public functions were very attractive for other reasons than just social status. Some functions (like tax farmer or public prosecutor) were paid following the profit in office mechanism. Therefore, the official earned as much as he collected (tax farmer) or as much as the fines he imposed (public prosecutor). This private incentive resulted in misconduct, which had nothing to do with serving public interests. Weberian: formalistic In the Weberian era, public service identity can be seen as formalistic. Public service – serving the public good – means: working for politics, within well-organized bureaucratic regimes that serve public interests. Procedures are standardised and jobs

Table I. Public service identities

Public interest Politics Professionalism

Pre-Weberian: fuzzy

Weberian: formalistic

Post-Weberian: flexible

Unitary Spoils Fragmented

Preponderance Ideological Service ethic

Common interest Demand based HRM

have been turned into impersonal functions. This guarantees reliability and equity: comparable cases are dealt with in predictable and uniform ways. Weber emphasized the importance of separating public and private property. Civil servants serve the public interest, instead of personal (private) interests. Consequently, civil servants are paid fixed salaries (Weber, 1991; Van Braam, 1988). Weber (1991, p. 214) states that properly paid work is more precise. Hegel argued that “a comfortable level of payment would free the officials from worldly cares and make them act in the altruistic pursuit of the collective interests of the state” (Hood and Jackson, 1991, p. 55). Hood and Jackson call this disinterested service. Civil servants joined government because “they felt that it would be rewarding and would enable them to do something of value for the community”. “Motivation amongst civil servants [. . .] is primarily altruistic rather than financial” (Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996, p. 642). Professional civil servants in the Weberian state are taught to serve the res publica in impersonal and disinterested ways. Their expertise enables them to make proper use of discretionary spaces, in the light of institutionalized political will (expressed by “politicians”). They use instruments that fit bureaucratic standardization, enabling them to make the most of institutionalized political will. They are selected on the basis of merit and formal training, and they go through post-entry training and socialization. Depending on the country they work in, this service ethic might be accompanied by strong associational logic. In countries like France and Germany, high-ranking civil servants have to follow strictly defined career paths that strengthen collective consciousness. Belonging to a “grand corps” or “Juristen monopol” becomes obligatory (Page and Wright, 1999). In that way strong service ethics are created, often without the use of words like professionalism. Post-Weberian In post-Weberian, neo-liberal eras, with NPM, public service identity can be considered to be flexible. Public service means: acting “entrepreneurially” for “stakeholders”. In order to fuel the “entrepreneurial spirit” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), new incentives are created. Public officials use business instruments, such as “planning and control” and “quality measurement” and their work is regulated by business instruments, such as “performance related pay” “payment-per-action” and “profit-in-office” (Raadschelders, 1998, p. 158). Instead of disinterested public administration, public administration is personalized and “privatized”; public officials become persons with personal stakes, and personal stakes become money-driven (Maesschalck, 2004). At the same time, however, public officials are still assumed to act in accordance with public service ideals, as they must act flexibly in accordance with agreed-upon goals and objectives. Interestingly, the role of institutionalized politics is not played out. Politics set objectives, and flexible administrators make sure these objectives are reached. Politicians are there to set the goals but then get out of the way (Stoker, 2006). These objectives, however, do not flow from party politics, ideological struggle and preponderance procedures – they flow from new methods for measuring and monitoring customer wishes and market demands. In order to improve the use of these instruments, Human Resource Management (HRM) procedures are used to train, select and professionalize civil servants. Professional civil servants have university degrees, MBA and MPA awards, and they become part of newly formed associations, such as SPS, “high potential programs” or

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“communities of practice”. Professional administrators are taught how to deal with stakeholders and multiple customers. From their point of view, politicians themselves have become “stakeholders” or “customers”. This, as argued above, influences their perception of the res publica. Satisfying multiple customers equals public interest. .

Conclusion Public service is not a fixed phenomenon, as conceptions of public and private interests, and of politics change with changing circumstances. Consequently, there is no “ideal” of public service and no ideal public service identity. This does not mean that we are unable to judge and criticize identities that come into existence. The advantages of Weberian conceptions, for example, do not imply that Weber’s view of public service is sacred and should be protected at any price. It does mean that we should seek appropriate points of reference for judging empirical developments. The line of reasoning that was presented in the first part of this paper offers some points of reference. First, empirical developments do not come out of the blue – they grow out of earlier historical developments and choices people make. Historical evolution and contingencies can be explored, but most importantly, the choices people make can be judged. Second, empirical developments contain normative conceptions, especially when it comes to ways in which publicness and politics are conceptualized when public organizations are structured and when collective action takes place. These normative conceptualizations can be analyzed. Third, empirical developments, including normative ideas, occur in social contexts, when people interact and instruments are applied. The day-to-day use of instruments can be studied. When we apply these points of reference, we are able to judge present-day developments. Post-Weberian NPM, with flexible public service identities, must be judged as problematic. On the one hand, NPM draws from the past: it uses a pre-Weberian instrument (flexible pay) within a Weberian order (politics versus administration). On the other hand, it is post-Weberian, in reinterpreting the role of politics (demands) and reforming administration (enabler of reform). This leads to severe contradictions, which are overlooked by NPM proponents. Often, simple solutions are taken; instruments for post-Weberian organizing, including performance-related pay, are used in either superficial or empty ways. The fact that these instruments can be used in different ways, and that they do not automatically carry appropriate identities and behavioural guidelines, is often ignored. Private business instruments can be used, but businesslike imagery and identities will be insufficient in dealing with the res publica. Indeed, it will simplify the res publica in ways that will be insufficient to deal with collective issues that require more than the adding-up of so-called demands. Or, in terms of the RQ1 (paragraph 1), instruments that introduce personal stakes in public domains do not automatically “professionalize” collective action. This is what history teaches us. Instead of simplifying the res publica, more complex solutions for professionalizing collective action, aimed at improving the public good, are required. Public officials might use new instruments, but they will also need to be able to deal with complex trade-offs and ambiguous demands and constraints. Instead of taking “demands” as a starting point, public officials must be aware of the fact that knowing and meeting demands is not so simple. When it comes to public organizations, like the police and public officials who are representatives of “the state” – the necessity of looking for

complex solutions becomes obvious. Businesslike instruments can be used, but identities must come from somewhere else. At the moment the res publica is (still) represented by traditional ideas about politics, but new conceptions of politics and the res publica are needed, although they cannot be circumscribed precisely. The latter awareness contains the best argument, not only for a professional public service, but also for a distinctive form of professionalism. Professional public officials are aware of the fact that instruments do not equal identities, that the res publica requires distinctive identities, and that the res publica is not served by circumscribing the res publica. Professional public officials, then, need identities that enable them to deal with those multiple requirements. References Arendt, H. (1994), Eichmann in Jerusalem, a Report on the Banality of Evil, Penguin Books, New York, NY. Barzelay, M. (1992), Breaking through Bureaucracy, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Bodenheimer, E. (1962), “Prolegomena to a theory of the public interest”, in Friedrich, C.J. (Ed.), The Public Interest, Atherton Press, New York, NY, pp. 205-17. Christensen, T., Laegreid, P. and Stigen, I. (2004), “Performance management and public sector reform: the Norwegian hospital reform”, paper presented at EGPA Conference Lubljana. Constitution of the United States (1788), available at: www.law.emory.edu/FEDERAL/usconst. html (accessed April 2006). Dalrymple, Th. (2004), Leven aan de Onderkant (Life at the Bottom, 2001), Spectrum, Utrecht. Ebenstein, W. and Ebenstein, J. (2000), Great Political Thinkers, Harcourt Inc., Orlando, FL. EIPA (1998), The Senior Civil Service, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht. Farnham, D., Horton, S., Barlow, J. and Hondeghem, A. (1996), New Public Managers in Europe, Public Servants in Transition, Macmillan, London. Finer, S.E. (1997), The History of Government from the Earliest Times, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Freidson, E. (1986), Professional Powers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Freidson, E. (2001), Professionalism, Blackwell, Oxford. Goodin, R.E. (1996), “Institutionalizing the public interest: the defense of deadlock and beyond”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 No. 2, pp. 331-43. Goodnow, F.J. (1967), Politics and Administration, Russell and Russell, New York, NY. Goodsell, Ch.T. (1990), “Public administration and the public interest”, in Walmsley, G.L. and Wolf, J. (Eds), Refounding Public Administration, Sage, Newbury Park, CA, pp. 96-114. Greenwood, E. (1966), “Attributes of a profession”, in Vollmer, H. and Mills, D. (Eds), Professionalisation, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, pp. 10-9. Held, V. (1970), The Public Interest and Individual Interest, Basic Books, London. Hood, C. (1991), “A public administration for all seasons?”, Public Administration, Vol. 69 No. 1, pp. 3-19. Hood, C. (1998), “Individualized contracts for top public servants: copying business, path dependent political re-engineering – or Trobriand cricket?”, Governance, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 443-62. Hood, C. and Jackson, M. (1991), Administrative Argument, Aldershot, Dartmouth.

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Van Braam, A. (1988), Leerboek Bestuurskunde Tekstboek A, Coutinho, Muiderberg. Waldo, D. (1948), The Administrative State, The Ronald Press Company, New York, NY. Weber, M. (1991) in Gerth, H. and Wright Mills, C. (Eds), From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, Routledge, London. Weber, M. (1999), Politiek als Beroep, Agora, Baarn, transl. by J.M.M. de Valk. Wilensky, H.L. (1964), “The professionalisation of everyone?”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70 No. 2, pp. 137-58. Wilson, W. (1887), “The study of administration”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 197-222. Further reading Boomgaard, J. (1992), Misdaad en Straf in Amsterdam 1490-1552, Waanders Uitgevers, Zwolle. Haarman, J.W. (1933), Geschiedenis en Inrichting der Politie in Nederland, N. Samsom N.V., Alphen a.d Rijn. Jacobs, B.C.M. (1986), Justitie en Politie in ’s-Hertogenbosch Voor 1629, diss., Van Gorcum, Assen. Corresponding author Jeroen van Bockel can be contacted at: [email protected]

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Gilles Jeannot Laboratoire Techniques Territoires et Socie´te´s, Ecole Nationale des ponts et Chausse´es, Paris, France Abstract Purpose – This article reviews a set of studies depicting how public officials (agents) in French public utilities have reacted, in practical terms, to customer-focused reforms. Design/methodology/approach – The article is based on data drawn from labour studies commissioned by French public utilities to evaluate the effects of reforms. Qualitative research using direct observation or semi-structured interviews testing the assumption that the real locus of change in behaviour, values and identity stem from changes in work practices not principles. Findings – There is evidence of a progressive diffusion of new public management values but this varies between different groups and their changes in behaviour are triggered more by the adjustment of workers’ practices to new management rules and technical innovations than the imposition of new principles or cultural values. The responses of agents are also often inconsistent. This suggests that the generalised findings of research based on surveys and questionnaires may not capture the reality of change, which is more complex, varied, inconsistent and contingent. Originality/value – It offers a challenging critique of the use of surveys and top down approaches in the study of the impact of new public management on public officials and suggests a bottom up approach throws more light on how and why changes in behaviour, values and identity occur. Keywords Work identity, Sociology of work, Public sector organizations Paper type Case study

International Journal of Public Sector Management Vol. 19 No. 6, 2006 pp. 598-608 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0951-3558 DOI 10.1108/09513550610686005

Introduction The reintroduction of academic interest in such issues as motivation, norms and values and the identity of public agents in the context of new public management (NPM) must be understood in contrast to the model of public choice that underlies the trend since the 1980s of public management reform. NPM emerged in part from the criticisms of the dysfunctions of bureaucracies, which were based on a utilitarian representation of administration (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Stretton and Orchard, 1994). Many reform mechanisms proposed basing public action reform on the same hypothesis of homo economicus, for example, by changing reward policies and introducing performance related pay. We argue that the reintroduction of dimensions of individual motivation, other than self-interest, has advantages for both knowledge and action. As regards knowledge, it allows many situations to be taken into account in which individuals’ personal orientations (Perry, 1996), the institutions in which they participate (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) or the type of psychological relations established with the organisation (Rousseau, 1996) all play a part. As regards action, reforms based on a strict hypothesis of actors pursuing their own self interests, such as result-based salaries, do not always produce the expected effect of mobilizing

individuals and may prove to be counterproductive by destroying neglected longstanding factors of motivation. A range of research methods can be used in studying the effects and responses of public officials to the management reforms. Questionnaires offer one of the most immediate empirical ways to find out what drives individuals who work in public organisations in the new managerial context. Respondents are asked for their opinion on a number of general statements that attest to differentiated representations of their role or of the functioning of the administration. The questionnaire is designed to test the opposition to new and old models of administration. It is then possible to draw a graph of the supporters of one approach or the other at a given point in time. Opinion surveys can also be used to collect individuals’ opinions on predefined questions thus serving to assess the respective weights of the old and the new set of principles and values among the employees of public organisations. The questionnaire-based study allows for explanations of agents’ orientations based on correlations established with independent variables. However, the scope of these explanations seems to be limited. The first reason for this limitation is the necessity to have independent variables which can be measured fairly easily but which do not enable us to fully grasp trends that will be discussed further. The second reason is the choice of variables and especially the preference given to variables related to elements outside the organisation. For instance, the work of Perry (1997) on public service motivation assumes that motivation is related to external socialization (family, religion, professional networks, etc.). In the absence of data other than the opinions gathered and correlations with factors of external socialization, many studies support an implicit cultural hypothesis of progressive diffusion of new values via individuals’ conversion. This type of hypothesis is not devoid of practical consequences. It corresponds to a logic of reform that emphasizes the production of new ethics and identities, for instance, via awareness campaigns, training, or the promotion of recruitment based on adherence to certain values. This paper introduces another form of data: detailed descriptions of employees’ reactions to new situations at work. The underlying sociological hypothesis is pragmatic (Joas, 1992, 1993): it assumes that the real locus of change is in the agents’ professional practice, and that it is when new conditions of production disrupt old habits that individuals change their practices and sometimes even their values and feelings of belonging to a group. In this perspective, change happens not through gradual adhesion to new principles but through the actual imposition of new working conditions. The new rules of the game imposed are first reinterpreted (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1996); that reinterpretation then triggers practical reactions and possibly a redefinition of identity. As strong as the imposition of a new managerial model may be, it leaves room for workers to adjust (Du Gay, 1996). Changes in representations, values or feelings of belonging to a collective are an outcome of the experience (Dubet, 1994) and of various (practical and cognitive) differences between old representations and new practices. The data introduced here is drawn from a corpus of sociology of labour studies commissioned by French public utilities to evaluate the effects of reforms. A non-exhaustive thematic review was then presented. The qualitative research was undertaken by different teams, which did not necessarily share the same theoretical

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frame of reference. They did, nevertheless, offer the same attention to descriptions of the ways in which the agents have reacted to the new rules imposed by their managements. The method is based on direct observation by the researchers who accompanied workers, or on semi-structured interviews in which the workers were asked to describe their day-to-day work or the problems they encountered. The data collected thus comprised a number of accounts of the ways in which the new rules imposed on employees have been reinterpreted and the ensuing changes in practices. The choice of public utilities rather than public administrations is justified for three reasons. The first is the large numbers of in-depth studies, which have been carried out on the transformation of work in these organisations and which, in some cases, offer an evolving picture over two decades. The second reason is the extent of the reforms that have been carried out and which make these public companies more comparable to public administrations in other European countries marked by NPM, than to French administrations which have, until recently, been less affected by this doctrine. Thirdly, the reason for the choice of public utilities is the existence of a longstanding model (Wieviorka and Trinh, 1989), which is strong and coherent and offers a sharp contrast to the changes observed. This model is linked to the historical nature of the networks (electricity, railways, post and telecommunications (PTT)) which involved technical integration at national level; universal access to the network with a standardized service provided; and a protected status for the officials/agents to guarantee a good functioning of the service. The advantages of technical-economic rationality, public service and protection of the agents of these organisations were mutually reinforcing and further strengthened by a framework of socialization and social support, which covered agents in their professional and private lives (family recruitment, sports clubs, trade union activities, etc.). This crystallized in a very strong feeling of belonging and personal identity with both the organisation and the group among all employees. Until recently the general population also recognised this identifying factor. The reforms introduced over recent years have disrupted this coherent framework. Evidence suggests that the extent of their impact differs amongst employees depending on their functional position in the production cycle of the service. Differences in the impact of the reforms, appears to be especially linked to the organisation’s level of engagement in competition. France Telecom has had the highest level of change in this respect and the National Railway Company the lowest, with Post and Electricity Companies in-between. However, in all cases customers are the priority in the reform process. In the following sections, we examine the response of back-office agents, sales agents, and agents in contact with customers for service delivery, to the changes. The withdrawal of public officials (agents) working on infrastructure Agents in infrastructure maintenance (installing and repairing electrical or telephone lines or repairing railways) or those operating at the first level of production (sorting post, driving trains) were valorised the most during the period of reform and the setting-up of the new systems. They were also the most unionized and consequently, because of the power of the unions, the least directly affected by reforms. However, this stability was actually an illusion, because everything was changing around them, and this impacted on their own positions.

First, the reforms engaged, tended to isolate these agents, as the France Telecom case describes here. Isolation resulted from new salary policies and conditions in which salary scales were designed to make the positions in contact with the public and in sales more highly valued. The symbolic and financial de-valorisation of infrastructure functions triggered mobility towards service functions among those agents most receptive to the new values. Paradoxically, it also strengthened the position of those who defended the old model. Isolation was also produced by organisational choices. Reorganization and restructuring of services according to the type of market (domestic, small firms and self-employed workers, large firms, administrations) was designed in such a way that technical jobs, directly associated with contact with the public, were attached to the commercial services of that particular market and no longer to a general technical division. Agents in charge of the construction of lines were thus cut off from all contact with the public (Jeannot et al., 1999). This isolation of the technical sector was further reinforced by the development of new software that allowed agents in contact with customers to perform technical acts on their computers without requesting a technician’s intervention – for instance, activating lines that had already been installed but had been cut off when the previous subscriber had moved (Hochereau, 2004). Second, reforms generated competition between agents in the technical sector. Even though existing staff in the utilities in question obtained the status quo for themselves, they were unable to secure the same social advantages for new entrants. Private service contract agents or temporary workers were recruited to work alongside those with permanent tenures. Competition was also triggered by the possibility of sub-contracting and with the introduction of new technologies. The example of the centralized sorting services at the post office illustrates these phenomena (Aubert and De Gaulejac, 1998). There, the introduction of two forms of competition between agents played an important role. The first was the recruitment of agents on temporary contracts at lower salaries than permanent employees to deal with peak periods. The second was the offer to agents to do paid over-time work and to attain a level of productivity three times higher than normal. These agents, seen as traitors, were called “Califs” – or “Californians” – to signify their submission to the American management model. The consequences of this competition were multiple. The work collectives dissolved. Improved monitoring of the production curve eliminated slack periods, which had formerly enabled agents to interact and to bond within a collective. The high turnover of temporary workers no longer enabled them to learn from their seniors and, in general, competition intensified tensions and undermined the collective dimension of work. Also work itself was less valued, due to the role played by the “Califs” who accepted an intensified pace of work and the temporary workers (paid by the hour or upon completing a given task) who accepted lower rates. The image of postal workers with permanent jobs was increasingly negative: they were perceived either to be overpaid for what they did or not to work enough. In any case as professionals they were devalued. The possibility of machines doing their work strengthened that feeling. Finally, these conditions eroded the tradition of trade union solidarity and also general morale. Currently, agents with permanent positions have been able to preserve the same working conditions and are still able to defend their due rights, but they find

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themselves in a defensive position. Whereas in the former model their advantages were considered as a form of compensation for an essential function in the utility, today, temporary workers regard them as privileges. Moreover, the employees who enjoy such rights no longer train temporary workers. Their position leads to conflicts and the production centres are consequently at the centre of some of the major industrial disputes and strikes.

602 Turnover of sales staff A study carried out in the mid-1980s (Alter, 1989) reported how nascent sales services in telecommunications, at the PTT Administration, were still under the domination of the infrastructure services. The commercial model was hardly recognized and the majority of agents in contact with the public did not wish to be paid on the basis of their results. At the time, engagement in the commercial sector was an adventure chosen by a few “pioneers”. Since, then these functions have become the most valued ones, both symbolically and practically. Reform (for the postal and telephone sectors) has translated into new salary scales to the advantage of sales staff, and into direct commissions on sales. These new rules of the game triggered a process of selection of agents within the organisation. Those who were most receptive to commercial values took advantage of the symbolically and financially favourable conditions offered. Some technicians became advisers who dealt with customers by phone or over the counter. The most motivated counter clerks became financial advisers in the competitive banking section at the post office. In these new positions they tended to acknowledge the relevance of the organisation’s new values. They compared themselves with private contract agents, recruited with good conditions and no cultural reference to the public service. The feeling of “specificity” of the service disappeared and mobility to the private sector became both possible and realistic. From the perspective of an approach centred on the diffusion of new principles of commercial action, as opposed to former egalitarian principles, one could say that there was a gradual imposition of the new model. A study of post office managers (De la Burgade, 2004), undertaken after an earlier study (Alter, 1989) shows that after short-lived hesitation those who were offered commissions on the sale of new commercial products (decorated and pre-stamped envelopes) tended to agree to play the game. There is no certainty, however, that this acceptance of the new doctrine will result in the construction of a new identity that is as sound as the previous one. In fact this cultural change has put the agents engaged in commercial activity in an unstable position, as the example of financial advisers at the post office shows (Zarifian and De Coninck, 2001; Piotet et al., 1998). These agents are submissive and accept the stress generated by strong pressure to meet sales targets. Often they have to compete to obtain the positions in which objectives are easiest to attain. Many of them used to be counter clerks and are snubbed by their former colleagues who consider their new sales functions as a necessary evil, at best, and who judge those who choose to become financial advisers as traitors. In exchange for these sources of tension the financial compensation is limited. A clear sign of the absence of a stable identity model is the high turnover rate in these services: some agents revert to counter clerk functions while others move on to the private banking sector.

The bricolages of front-line workers The agents who have been studied most are those in charge of direct service delivery to users. They again have been affected by reforms that are both symbolic and practical. From a symbolic point of view, the term “customer” has been imposed on them, whereas they traditionally referred to those receiving the service as “users”. From a practical point of view, new management systems have allowed greater differentiation of customers, and productivity or performance indicators have been introduced. The research on front-line workers is old enough to allow some historical trends to be identified. The first studies in the late 1980s showed the inconsistencies between management systems devised in the 1970s for uniform treatment of users, and management plans under the new system to differentiate the treatment of customers. Armand Hatchuel (1991) noted that with a system of uniform treatment in Parisian metro stations, combined with egalitarian management of employees, the best way to ensure there was an agent who spoke English in every station used by tourists was to teach all employees English. That is now rejected as wasteful and unnecessary. The pioneering work of Joseph (1988), inspired by Goffman, examined the way in which agents in contact with the public tried to fit singular situations into the new normative management frameworks. The background debate was then defined in terms of reconciliation between an egalitarian reference model, embedded both in the management tool and in agents’ representations, and the expectations of adjustment to the service, which he qualified in terms – inspired by Musil – as a problem of “the quality of a service without quality” (Joseph and Jeannot, 1995; Alter, 1989). This tension between the egalitarian principle and the wish to differentiate clients has been clearly visible in the discontent of agents in charge of control functions. Drivers on public transport have to cope with numerous difficult situations daily as they are faced with users who try to justify commuting without a ticket (Dartevelle, 1992; Joseph, 1988; Yvon, 2004). Surveys show that the new commercial doctrine has put agents in a vulnerable position. Whereas their function is basically controlling, their management has asked them to find a way of not contradicting the company’s stated wish to treat the customers as sovereign. At the same time, customers themselves readily employ the company’s commercial doctrine to argue their case. Several studies on council housing, a field marginally different from public utilities, report similar cases where caretakers have to use different types of argument to ensure a minimum of order necessary for maintaining the premises (Warin, 1993; Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal, 1994). The terms of the debate are slightly different today. First, significant technological and management changes have been made so that service delivery can more effectively be adjusted to users. In most cases it is not one but several tools that are used and which do not necessarily converge, as seen in the private sector (De Coninck, 2005). Second, the growth of direct or indirect competition has led to the introduction of performance indicators that in many cases make it possible to opt for the solution with the lowest costs. Studies since 2000 highlight tensions between different ways of targeting the end-user. The problem may be a difference between the agent’s perception of what the user expects, and the perception enshrined in the management tool. It may also stem from the difference between several tools for rationalizing production. Many PhD theses, based on ethnographic observations, describe agents’ attempts to match their

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understanding of what the users expect with the prescribed behaviour found in quality guides, which have a different representation of clients/customers. Often agents find themselves in contact with customers who express an expectation greater than the one provided for in the service offer. For instance, the position of France Telecom agents whose job is to install internet connections is particularly difficult (Aznal, 2004). Customers believe that the internet service offer means being able to access the Web when they switch on their computer, whereas the service actually consists of providing access to a line that works. The installer is given the task of installing the line and checking that it works; it is then up to users, equipped with a connection kit, to configure their computers. Yet, faced with the helplessness of certain customers who are unable to log on, installers are tempted to exceed the mission entrusted to them and to help the customer. The problem is that the time allocated to them does not allow for this, and neither are they specifically trained for this type of service. Tension of this nature, between profitability objectives and users’ expectations, is at its height in all situations of contact with poor or socially excluded sections of the population. In its banking function the post office is obliged to accept all accounts and especially those of beneficiaries of the minimum income allowance. Dealing with this type of person is difficult, generates peak periods on the days that the allowance is paid, triggers numerous banking operations with an overall low financial volume (since beneficiaries draw small amounts from their accounts) and often require greater attention since these clients have difficulty in expressing themselves and/or in understanding the organisation’s rules. After timing these operations, Gadrey et al. (1997) estimated an excess cost of 10 per cent due to these specific users. In so far as these costs are not taken into account in productivity indicators, the agents are caught between users’ expectations and the attainment of productivity objectives. Researchers’ interpretations differ. Some, following the work of Lipsky (1980), highlight agents’ protective mechanisms (Jeantet, 2003); others report situations in which the agents side with such users out of compassion (Borzeix, 1995; Klinger, 1990; Jeannot, 1996). Sometimes contradictory expectations of quality enter into conflict. This can be illustrated by the work of Deroche (2004) on urban buses and tramways. The improvement of the effective speed of buses and trams is a key concern of the transport company studied, since it is both a quality factor for users and a cost reduction factor (the same bus does more trips for the same price if it travels faster). To improve speed, the regulation centre can ask a driver to accelerate his or her manoeuvres at the station or to deviate partially from the usual route. This helps improve the flow and overall quality but it can run counter to a user’s expectations. The user who is physically challenged needs more time to board or alight and cannot run for the bus; others expect buses to stop at all collection points and not to rush by. The driver has to choose between sticking to the commercially advantageous speed or adjusting to these particular expectations and situations. In these situations agents often find singular solutions by resorting to bricolage. This is on the one hand symbolic. The term “customer” which is supposed to attest to a new approach, is re-appropriated by those who have been with the firm longest: “the public service means serving the customer well”. On the other hand it is also practical. They have to make decisions in situations by finding a compromise between quality,

adjustment, and aid to the most disadvantaged on the one hand, and the productivity constraints weighing on them, on the other. A counter clerk can always take a little more time to deal with the request of an old person, but this type of trade-off is characterized by tension (taking the time for a particular person means making those in the queue wait) or difficulties of definition (is the agent making a “commercial gesture” or providing a public service?). The agents’ options are not necessarily the same and can be the subject of debate within organisations. Neither the organisations that refuse to take into account the irreducible nature of these dilemmas by denying them or simply decreeing new rules, nor the workers collectives or unions that are often too loosely structured, are enough to support the agents in question. They often face these dilemmas alone. Conclusion The research reported here is not all focused on the issue of identity. Even if global tendencies do tend to converge on the way in which problems are defined and on the first level of reaction to such changes, this body of separate studies does not allow us to infer a unified conception of the mechanisms of identity formation. Yet these observations on the practical modalities of adjustment at least enable us to comment on the questions which are raised in this special issue and which prompt us to examine certain implicit reasoning linked to opinion polls. This can lead us to critically question certain assumptions of these studies but also to complete and enhance the interpretations produced. The given examples here raise questions about the limits of opinion polls as a research tool. We can imagine what a questionnaire survey might have produced in the case of French public companies: on the one hand, signs of resistance to change by senior agents in charge of infrastructure, with unanimous adherence to traditional egalitarian principles; on the other, gradual adherence by the agents of commercial services to new market values. But would this picture reveal that the modalities of agents’ socialization in production centres are not perpetuated? Would they show that sales agents’ adherence to the new model does not actually put them in a comfortable and stable position? The interpretation is likely to be difficult in the case of agents in charge of service delivery. How would an agent, endorsing the official “customer” discourse but in practice defying the rules imposed by management in treating the needy, respond? And how should that response be interpreted? The collection of experiences also complicates the causal schema of an evolution of values and identity triggered by the imposition of a NPM ideology. The prism of practices reveals evolving interests and values and changes that are not only ideological. As Friedberg (1998) notes, the wish to react to the dominant current of public choice can sometimes lead to an over reaction and to neglect the fact that individuals also act in self-interest. The articulation between values and interests is a complex matter. Do individuals act against their immediate interest in order to comply with principles dear to them, or do they adopt values that cover the actions they pursue in their own interest? The diversity of reactions reported here shows that it is difficult to find a single explanation. Moreover, field studies undertaken without a strong hypothesis on the fundamental factor of change help to reveal factors other than those of a new managerial doctrine. The appearance of new technical-managerial software, which allows a redistribution of the division of work between the front office and the

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back office, is not in itself a consequence of a new commercial model, yet it strongly affects the evolution of practices and associated representations. In many respects these qualitative analyses of actual practices are nevertheless less contradictory than complementary. They enable us to further our understanding of the findings of quantitative surveys on representations. This applies, for instance, to the emergent issue of hybrid identities. In their study of the evolution of identities in a NPM context in Austria, Meyer and Hammershmid (2006) note a correlation of this hybrid form with the government level suggesting that the hybrid identity is more likely to be found at the local level and less likely at the state or district level. This can be related to differentiation based on position in the organisation, which emerges from the qualitative surveys presented here. And as we have seen, the position of the agents in charge of service delivery is the most likely to reveal individuals’ complex positioning. Moreover, surveys on practices also provide insight into the hybrid forms, which appear in this study and in various other contributions to this special issue. These hybrid forms are perhaps less the sign of a search for an intellectual compromise between former and new values, than the expression of practical compromises between various solutions. Boltanski (Boltanski and The´venot, 1991) has developed an original observation tool to describe how people justify their acts in day-to-day conversations. One of its essential assets is to show empirically that the same people, faced with different problems within a very short interval, are capable of arguing on the basis of either an egalitarian or a more commercial logic or, more often, of inventing mixed arguments that can apply only to singular situations. Finally, these studies prompt us to question the coherence of the ideological and practical dimensions of the NPM model. In the former administrative model the values produced were consistent with salary systems and the agents’ experiences. The model also took into consideration strong mechanisms of socialization and training of new employees, which perpetuated the system. The new model seems to intrinsically offer as many factors of tension as of federation. It is normal for a new model to generate zones of conflict with the previous model, but in many cases the tensions revealed in these field observations stem from the new model itself. First, the orientations proposed generate practical dilemmas valorising the quality of customer services but also imposing cost indicators which result in customer expectations not being met; and valorising those who have a private-sector outlook, with the risk of seeing them leave the organisation. Second, by turning competition between agents into a factor of mobilization and change, this model fails to facilitate the emergence of a group capable of “framing” individuals. The strength of the former model was that it contained, in daily working life, the means for its perpetuation by a collective framing, whereas the new model is far from proposing comparable modalities of socialization. From the point of view of the interpretation of contemporary trends, this raises the question of whether the existence of complex and hybrid forms highlighted by most of the articles in this issue is a transitory phenomenon related to the resistance of advocates of the former model, or a lasting one related to the absence of practical coherence in agents’ lived experience. From a practical point of view this encourages us to envisage the production of new collective spaces of socialization rather than new ethical codes to stabilize the situation.

References Alter, N. (1989), “Service public et action commerciale”, Le dilemme organisationnel des te´le´communications, Sociologie du travail, No. 3, pp. 363-79. Aznal, C. (2004), “Le roˆle des clients-usagers dans l’e´mergence d’un nouvel esprit de service: le cas des branchements a` l’internet”, in Deroche, L. and Jeannot, G. (Eds), L’action publique au travail, Octares, Toulouse, pp. 41-50. Aubert, N. and De Gaulejac, V. (1998), “Modernisation et re´sistance dans un grand e´tablissement de courrier, les avatars d’un syste`me ‘perdant-perdant’”, rapport effectue´ pour le compte de la mission de la recherche de La Poste; Toulouse, octobre, p. 58. Boltanski, L. and Thevenot, L. (1991), De la justification, Gallimard, Paris. Borzeix, A. (1995), “Qualite´ et bienveillance, l’e´preuve de l’e´tranger”, in Joseph, I. and Jeannot, G. (Eds), Me´tiers du public, les compe´tences de l’agent et l’espace de l’usager, CNRS e´ditions, Paris, pp. 87-123. Dartevelle, M. (1992), “Le travail du controˆleur”, Les annales de la recherche urbaine, Nos 57/58, pp. 110-3. De Coninck, F. (2005), “Crise de la rationalite´ industrielle et transformation de la prescription, une e´tude de cas”, Sociologie du travail, Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 77-87. De la Burgade, E. (2004), “Le ‘preˆt a` poster’, pointe avance´e du mode`le commercial a` La poste”, in Deroche, L. and Jeannot, G. (Eds), L’action publique au travail, Octares, Toulouse, pp. 33-40. Deroche, L. (2004), “La qualite´ de service dans le transport public de voyageurs: objectifs de performance et nouvelles formes de re´gulations des activite´s de travail”, in Deroche, L. and Jeannot, G. (Eds), L’action publique au travail, Octares, Toulouse, pp. 57-64. Du Gay, P. (1996), Consumption and Identity at Work, Sage, London. Downs, A. (1967), Inside Bureaucracy, Little Brown, Boston, MA. Dubet, F. (1994), Sociologie de l’expe´rience, Le Seuil, Paris, p. 273. Eymard-Duvernay, F. and Marchal, E. (1994), “Les re`gles en action: entre une organisation et ses usagers”, Revue franc¸aise de sociologie, Vol. XXXV, pp. 5-36. Friedberg, E. (1998), “En lisant Hall et Taylor: ne´o-institutionnalisme et ordres locaux”, Revue franc¸aise de sciences politiques, Vol. 48 Nos 3/4, pp. 507-14. Gadrey, J., Gallouj, F. and Ghillebaert, E. (1997), “Analyser les prestations de cohe´sion sociale ‘hors cadre’ des services publics et leur couˆt: le cas des relations de guichet a` La Poste”, Politiques et management public, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 119-44. Hatchuel, A. (1991), “Relation de service et appareil gestionnaire, l’exemple de la station de me´tro”, pp. 215-21, Actes du colloque a` quoi servent les usagers, RATP, tome 1. Hochereau, F. (2004), “L’e´volution de la fonction commerciale a` France Telecom (1978-1998) a` travers son informatisation”, in Deroche, L. and Jeannot, G. (Eds), L’action publique au travail, Octares, Toulouse, pp. 17-24. Jeannot, G. (1996), “When Non-social Public Services Take Care”, in Wolfgang, W. and Schulze, H-J. (Eds), Who Cares ?, Cassel, London, pp. 63-75. Jeannot, G., Valeyre, A. and Zarifian, P. (1999), “Une transformation organisationnelle a` France te´le´com”, Flux, pp. 38-45, avril septembre. Jeantet, A. (2003), “‘A’ votre service’ La relation de service comme rapport social”, Sociologie du travail, Vol. 45, pp. 191-209. Joas, H. (1992), Die Kreativita¨t des Handelns, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. Joas, H. (1993), Pragmatism and Social Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

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Joseph, I. (1988), “La relation de service, les interactions entre agents et voyageurs”, Les Annales de la recherche urbaine, No. 39, pp. 43-55. Joseph, I. and Jeannot, G. (1995), Me´tiers du public, les compe´tences de l’agent et l’espace de l’usager, CNRS e´ditions, Paris. Klinger, M. (1990), “Relation de service et sentiment de confiance”, Socie´te´, n, No. 48, pp. 151-61. Lipsky, M. (1980), Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, Sage, New York, NY. Meyer, R. and Hammerschmid, G. (2006), “Public management reform: an identity project”, Public Policy and Administration, Spring, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 99-115. Niskanen, W. (1971), Bureaucracy and representative government, Aldine Atherton, Chicago, IL. Perry, J. (1996), “Measuring public service motivation: an assessment of construct reliability and validity”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 5-22. Perry, J. (1997), “Antecedents of Public Service Motivation”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 181-97. Piotet, F. et al. (1998), Les conseillers financiers de La Poste, synthe`se des re´sultats, mission de la recherche de La Poste. Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (1991), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. Rousseau, D. (1996), Psychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements, Sage, Newbury Park, CA. Stretton, H. and Orchard, L. (1994), Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice, Theoretical Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government, St Martin’s Press, New York, NY. Thomas, W. and Znaniecki, F. (1996) in Zaretsky, E. (Ed.), The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: A Classic Work in Immigration History, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL, p. 129. Warin, P. (1993), “Les relations de service comme re´gulations”, Revue franc¸aise de sociologie, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 69-95. Wieviorka, M. and Trinh, S. (1989), Le mode`le EDF: essai de sociologie des organisations, La de´couverte, Paris. Yvon, F. (2004), “Activite´ commerciale ou travail de re´pression ? Sens et non sens du controˆle des titres de transport en RER”, in Deroche, L. and Jeannot, G. (Eds), L’action publique au travail, Octares, Toulouse, pp. 87-94. Zarifian, P. and De Coninck, F. (2001), “Les relations entre back et front office dans la production des services financiers a` La Poste”, La Poste, Collection de la mission de la recherche de la Poste, p. 267. Further reading Bertaux-Wiame, I., Jeantet, A. and Linhart, D. (1999), “Les temps modernes de La Poste. Vie prive´e, travail public et re´forme manage´riale”, Collection de la mission de la recherche de La Poste, p. 135. Weller, J-M. (1998), “La modernisation des services publics par l’usager: une revue de la litte´rature (1986-1996)”, Sociologie du travail, n, Vol. 3, pp. 365-92. To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints

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New pay in European civil services: is the psychological contract changing? Ingrid Willems, Ria Janvier and Erik Henderickx

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University of Antwerp, Antwerpen, Belgium Abstract Purpose – This research paper analyses the extent to which national systems are following “new pay” trends, or whether there are still traditional features, which reflect the specificity of employment in the public sector and the psychological contracts of public servants. Design/methodology/approach – The data used in this paper was based on an online survey of six countries and was completed by pay experts in each case. Findings – Previous comparative research on civil service pay systems has focused mostly on specific aspects of pay but this paper looks at a wide range of pay characteristics. It finds that although there have been changes in pay systems in the six countries studied, the “new pay” model has not been fully adopted and traditional reward systems are still strong, with the exception of Sweden and to a lesser extent the UK and Denmark. This is related to the importance that civil servants attach to their psychological contract in which equity and collectivism remain central values Originality/value – The paper demonstrates that cultural factors and psychological contracts are important in influencing both practices and attitudes towards change in reward systems across countries and that traditional identities of public service are still evident. Keywords Pay, Europe, Civil service, Public service organizations Paper type Research paper

Introduction New public management has long been referred to as the public sector trend to align itself with private sector management practices (Hood, 1991; Bach and Della Rocca, 1995). The reasons behind this change in organisational strategy are the increasing pressures to perform, to deliver results and the need to focus on customer friendliness and flexibility (Marsden, 1997). Human resource management (HRM), and more specifically reward management, are important factors in the attainment of these new organisational goals. As Schuster and Zingheim (1992, p. xv) remark: “Pay programs are visible and powerful communicators of organizational goals, priorities, and values. Proper alignment with what is to be accomplished is essential.” Comparative research indicates a trend in European central governments towards individualisation and decentralisation of HRM and an increasing focus on performance management (OECD, 2004). In the more specific area of reward management, there are elements pointing in the direction of a trend toward “new pay” reflecting the new organisational goals of flexibility and delivery of results. Traditionally, pay systems of civil servants in central governments were based on fixed salary scales with pay progression founded mostly on seniority (OECD, 2004; White, 2000b; Risher, 1999). Performance-based pay is, however, on the rise in European central governments (OECD, 2004; Marsden, 2003; White, 2000b). Research also indicates a decentralisation

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of public service labour relations. In the area of pay determination the importance of bilateral bargaining methods has increased (Nomden et al., 2003). These findings, however, mostly stem from comparative research that focuses on only one aspect of pay systems, for the most part on pay for performance (OECD, 2004; Marsden, 2003) or collective bargaining (Nomden et al., 2003). In order to compare pay systems, one needs to include other pay characteristics into the comparison. Up-to-date comparative empirical research on public sector pay systems as a whole, including a wide range of pay characteristics, is scarce[1]. The question thus arises whether public sector pay systems have developed, as a whole, from a traditional model into a more “modern” one that is based on private sector pay practices? Have public services held on to traditional pay features? And how is this related to the specificity of employment in the public sector and the psychological contract of public servants? This paper seeks to formulate an answer to these questions by studying the current features of civil service pay systems in several European countries, based on a theoretical division of traditional and “new pay” systems. “Traditional” vs “new” pay systems: main characteristics The literature and research on reward management describe several new developments in the area of reward management in the last two decades. The “new pay” paradigm, with Schuster and Zingheim (1992) and Lawler (1995) as its major advocates, emphasises the importance of linking pay to the organisational strategy and includes elements such as variable pay, flexibility and individualisation. In this section we briefly discuss the main characteristics of “new pay”. Firstly, the general framework for reward management, the way that pay and jobs are structured, has evolved. The traditional pay structure, based on grades, established a hierarchy of responsibility and linked this to pay. Searching for a more objective and systematic way of classifying jobs, organisations turned to the use of quantitative job evaluation methods, using a number of criteria to weigh jobs. As organisations’ structures flattened and the need for organisational flexibility grew, the rigid hierarchical job classification systems had to change with it, for a number of reasons. For one thing, it established limits on the tasks individuals are willing to perform, since they only get paid to do what is listed in their job description (Risher, 1999). Also, in flatter organisations, the hierarchical move upward is no longer an option for employees wanting to develop and learn. Employees need to be able to move horizontally, but job-based pay systems work against this as they punish individuals making horizontal moves (Lawler, 1994). Thus, classification systems are shifting away from the traditional focus on job value to the competency-based approach, where the individual employee with his or her skills and competences is the building block for a more flexible work design (Marsden, 1997; Risher, 1997; Lawler, 1994). One of the main, very concrete shifts in remuneration is the “new” emphasis on performance pay. In the private sector, this can hardly be called new. Especially, for manual work, performance bonuses have been given for decades. Public sector organisations have discovered the benefits of performance management – and especially performance-related pay – more recently. Two decades ago, nearly all civil servants were paid according to service-incremental salary scales (OECD, 2005). The previously discussed grade system had a scale of fixed increments that were awarded automatically. Moving up the scale simply depended on seniority (Freibert, 1997). The

underlying assumption was that experience and therefore performance increased with years of service. This pay system is closely linked with the system of internal promotion and the internal labour market, typical in the public sector. Influenced by the private sector values of individual accountability, public sector organisations have in recent years started adopting some form of pay for performance. Risher (1999, p. 334) describes this trend as a “symbolic break from the entitlement culture that is all too common in government”. In the past, promotion was the main reward for good performance and even then promotion sometimes became more or less automatic (Freibert, 1997). According to Druker and White (2000) “new pay” writers argue that the reward package should include pay which is “at risk” as well as pay that is guaranteed, following the logic as since organisational performance varies, so too should pay levels. Strongly linked to the trends listed above is the move toward a more decentralised HR and reward management. Typical of “new pay” collective bargaining seems to have become less important in the private sector, being replaced by systems that depend on management discretion (White, 2000a). Organisation-based structures have taken the place of industry-wide pay determination. The increasing demand for flexibility led to the demand for pay systems that were more adapted to the needs of organisations. Decisions on pay are decentralised even further, to local departments having the authority to develop their own pay strategy. Pay for performance also means a greater role for line managers in the area of pay setting. “New pay” also encompasses the trend to move away from internal equity considerations toward market-based pay strategies (Risher, 1999). In the private and the public sector, tight labour markets have increased the need for competitive pay levels. In the private sector, pay surveys that determine and analyse competitive pay levels are quite common. For public organisations, however, shifting from the traditional focus on internal pay relationships to a heightened interest in external pay levels is a significant strategical turnaround. The traditional public sector pay structures were often developed without paying a lot of attention to pay rates in other organisations (Risher, 1999). Flexibility in reward itself is a last evolution we wish to discuss. The new pay theory focuses on the value of variable rewards, suited to the needs of the individual. This is especially visible in the area of benefits. In “new pay” systems flexible, cafeteria-style benefits are offered to staff. This means employees can make an individual choice between benefits, for example, trading in wages in favour of supplementary holidays (Smith, 2000). To attract different kinds of employees, private sector organisations also offer more and more diverse remuneration packages (Marsden, 1997). Freibert (1997, p. 295) sums up nicely the main features of traditional reward management in the public sector: In the past most public service pay systems, in spite of national and regional variations, shared certain common features, including centrally determined pay structure, across-the-board increases, pay scales based on grade rather than job content, occupational category, or individual merit, and progress up the scale according to seniority rather than performance.

The various trends in remuneration management described above are presented in Table I. It lists the main characteristics of the traditional and the “new pay” models.

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Table I. Traditional vs “new pay” systems: overview of main features

Central value Design Equity Degree of centralisation Pay structure Pay increase based on Pay determination Fringe benefits

Traditional pay

New pay

Consistency Based on general principles, values Internal equity Central HR system

Flexibility and individualisation Based on organisational needs, strategy External market compatibility Decentralised management system

Pay scales based on job classification (grade) or job evaluation (job content) Length of service (seniority) Collective

Based on labour market value and individual competences (Individual or team) performance, competence Individual

Job security is important, also other benefits

Flexible, individual choice between diverse range of benefits

Source: Largely based on Risher (1999, p. 340)

The list is not all-inclusive but meant to illustrate the major differences between the two systems that are most often referred to in reward management literature. The “new pay” trends set out in this section have been described in reward management literature for several years now. They mostly refer to private sector organisations, however. The following sections examine the occurrence of “new pay” systems in central governments in Europe We look at six national pay systems and, based on the characteristics listed above, try to situate them in the typology and determine whether these systems are traditional, new and more NPM-based or whether they contain elements of both types. Methodology: database on pay systems in European central governments The data used in this paper were collected in 2005 through an online survey. An e-mail invitation, with link and personal password to the database, was sent to pay experts within the ministries or departments responsible for HRM at central government level. The questionnaire was divided into several topics such as pay structure (fixed salary scales vs pay bands or ranges, use of job evaluation), bases for pay (seniority, age, diploma, job weight, performance of individuals, teams or organisation, competencies), source of pay decisions (laws, decrees, collective agreements between social partners and others), level of pay decisions (national/federal, regional, sectoral, department/ministry, individual level or other), form of pay decisions (strictly regulated or guidelines) and fringe benefits (list of financial and non-financial benefits). Respondents were then asked to indicate only those elements that occur in the pay system of their central government. They were also given the opportunity to report whether certain pay features only apply to a limited number or specific groups of personnel. The result of respondents’ answers is a detailed map of the pay system. Currently, the database includes the pay systems of the civil services in the UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Sweden. Results: comparison of pay system elements Pay structure The Dutch, Belgian and German central governments still rely on pay scales with fixed increments. Germany has 16 overlapping salary scales for civil servants and

ten for contractual employees. In The Netherlands, the state sector pay system comprises of 18 overlapping salary scales with 10-13 increments each. Job weight is the main basis for pay, with jobs being evaluated and placed in the scales using a points-based job evaluation system designed for the Dutch administration. Jobs are given points on 14 criteria, which together make up a total score. This score is then used to determine the position of the job in the job hierarchy, consisting of six functional groups. The groups are each comprised of several levels, which are linked to the pay scales. The Belgian federal level recently uses job evaluation for level A jobs, which are jobs requiring a university masters degree. Based on a quantitative evaluation system, jobs are placed in one of five classes. The Danish central government also uses salary scales. This is more flexible and decentralised than in the countries mentioned above, since the gradual implementation of a new reward system, which started in 1998. In the UK civil service the pay structure is made up mostly of broader pay bands (pay ranges) where pay does not progress through fixed steps. Each department is responsible for developing its own reward structure and setting pay for staff outside the Senior Civil Service, so pay structure can vary across departments and agencies. For approximately, 90 per cent of the jobs the job evaluation and grading support (JEGS) is used. This points-based job evaluation system was designed for the civil service and is based on seven factors. The Swedish system differs to a great extent, because Swedish agencies generally do not have salary scales or pay bands. Individual pay is set in individual negotiations based on relevant factors like profession, market value, performance, contribution to the organisational goals, level of responsibility etcetera. Job evaluation is therefore not used. There are, however, pay analysis programmes available to help government employers in setting pay by providing them with statistics on pay levels for specific jobs. Pay level adjustments based on cost of living are common in the Belgian, Danish, German and Dutch state sector, although only Belgium and Denmark adjust the pay levels automatically. Basis for pay increase Seniority (and age in the case of Germany) is still an important base for pay increases in the countries this paper looks at. The only exception is again the Swedish central government. In the Belgian federal administration, for instance, pay increases are still largely based on years of service although recently, competence-based bonuses are being given to individuals passing a competence test. These are then valid for a certain number of years (this varies across jobs and job levels), after which civil servants need to retake the test to receive the bonus. Promotions to a higher pay scale are also based on the results of a competence test. With the exception of the Belgian state sector, competences are less popular as a base for pay increases than performance. Besides Belgium only the UK civil service includes competences – to some extent – in the reward system. Competences are often part of the performance pay in the sense that developing competences can be a performance target in the individual performance plan, as is the case in the UK civil service. The new Danish pay system includes allowances based on qualifications, but these are measured by educational background and work experience. In Sweden competence evaluations are used in certain specific professions such as for doctors and

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judges, but they are not directly connected to pay and are only used to determine whether the individual has the right to keep a certain post. In general, performance bonuses seem to be more common. Only the Belgian federal government does not use performance-based pay for its civil servants. In Sweden performance-based bonuses exist in a small number of agencies for jobs where the labour market demands the use of bonuses (i.e. where bonuses are expected as part of the total compensation). In the UK, Denmark and The Netherlands, bonus schemes exist, though they vary across departments, since these are responsible for the development and implementation of the schemes. Irreversible, permanent performance-related pay increases – which accumulate in base pay, contrary to bonuses – also occur in Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands and the UK. In the Swedish state administration pay increases are more and more being negotiated directly between the individual employee and his or her supervisor, who is responsible for the delegated pay budget. The pay for performance system is integrated in the yearly process of setting pay increases. Dutch civil servants receive an annual increase of pay only when their performance level is satisfactory. Higher increases are available to those with more than satisfactory results. This system is developed at the central level, although performance criteria, for instance, are a ministerial responsibility. In Germany, the current reforms will replace automatic increments by pay based more on performance and job content. In some countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and Germany, team performance can also be a reason for a reward. In Sweden, pay increases linked to the performance of teams exist in a few agencies. Danish departments can choose whether they reward individual or team performance. In the UK team, pay was trialed in several departments, but was not very successful (Willems et al., 2004b). Bonuses based on the performance of the organisation are uncommon. Pay determination and degree of centralisation Pay regulations in the Belgian and German federal public service are set both in laws and decrees. In Belgium, decisions are usually made by royal or ministerial decree, except for the judiciary organisations, where pay regulations are set in laws. Non-financial benefits, such as the possibility to work from home, are usually not laid down in regulations. In Germany collective agreements between social partners regulate the pay system of contractual employees in the civil service. Civil servants pay is laid down in laws and decrees. In The Netherlands, the UK, Denmark and Sweden collective agreements regulate (some) pay elements. The main elements of the Dutch pay system are, however, regulated through a decree. The Swedish civil service again forms the exception, since – as stated above – it increasingly uses direct pay talks between manager and individual staff member. Collective agreements, more and more agreed on at agency level, stipulate the rules for these talks. In most included countries, except for Sweden, certain pay decisions are still made at the central level and apply to all departments. The departmental level does, however, play a role in decisions in all countries. Only in Germany, is the departmental decision-making power limited to the more concrete implementation decisions. In all other countries ministries or departments have the authoritative power to introduce certain pay elements. In Belgian federal government, pay

decisions are still highly centralised. Grades are set at the national (central) level for all ministries. However, ministries do have the autonomy to set pay scales for departments’ specific grades and also to set allowances and reimbursements but the approval of the minister is still required, to guarantee uniformity. Dutch pay scales are also set centrally, though the use of the job evaluation system is a decentralised matter. All except one department are obligated to use the centrally developed job evaluation system. Bonuses, allowances and the specific application of benefits are largely a ministerial responsibility. In the UK civil service, departments are free to have their own pay and grading system, to set their own pay ranges and to use their own job evaluation system. As for fringe benefits, departments and agencies are responsible for setting terms and conditions, but they must set these within the boundaries of the law, and be guided by central government policy. In the new Danish wage system pay setting is decentralised to a large degree. Some elements, such as general pay increases, are, however, still negotiated on the central level. In Sweden the guidelines for pay setting are agreed at central as well as at departmental level. Apart from this, the agencies are expected to develop pay policies that are customised and adopted to their business needs and to their specific activities and workplace. In countries where pay decisions are predominantly centralised, such as Belgium and Germany, pay elements are mostly strictly regulated. In more decentralised pay systems, such as the UK and Sweden (and to a lesser degree, The Netherlands), central guidelines make up the framework within which departments make their pay decisions. In Sweden, however, strict regulations on, for example, benefits do exist, but at local and not at central level. This is also the case in Denmark. Fringe benefits, allowances and other extras It would lead us too far to sum up the range of benefits, allowances and other extras offered to civil servants in the countries discussed. In general, we can state that all public services offer a large amount of benefits and allowances. Nearly, all countries provide social security through coverage for accidents, medical costs and some form of life insurance. Reimbursements for internet at home, travel and relocation expenses are also offered in almost every central administration in the study. Belgium and The Netherlands are the only countries providing reimbursements for commuter traffic. Additional pension schemes only exist in Sweden, Denmark and the UK. It is possible, however, that the government pensions are more favourable than those of private sector employees, which makes additional pension schemes superfluous, as is the case in Belgium. The use of allowances varies greatly between countries. Only some countries have allowances for certain job types, projects, working hours or regime and location. All countries, however, have either a holiday allowance or an end-of-year allowance and some have both. All offer a range of training options, opportunities to work part-time or flexible hours and the possibility to work from home. The wellbeing of employees thus seems to be an important issue. Employment security (for statutory civil servants or government employees with a permanent contract) is still an important benefit in most countries as well. Individual choice between (certain) benefits is possible in The Netherlands, the UK, Denmark and Sweden.

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Discussion: European central government pay systems, traditional or “new”? Concerning pay structure, both the Belgian and German system are still traditional, characterised by pay scales based on grades, with the exception of the highest job level in Belgium where job evaluation is used. The Dutch central government also employs narrow pay scales with fixed increments, although here there is an underlying quantitative job evaluation system. Denmark can be placed somewhere in between the two types, since its pay system is more flexible but still includes pay scales. The UK, with its greater use of pay ranges without fixed steps linked to a points-based job evaluation system, tends more towards a “new pay” system than the others. The only country with a true “new” pay structure is, however, Sweden, where pay is increasingly set in individual negotiations. Looking at the bases for pay increases, we noted that in Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands (and the UK and Denmark to a lesser degree) the traditional seniority or age-based increments are still an important part of pay for civil servants. Sweden is again the exception. Individual performance-related pay is on the rise though, both in the form of irreversible pay increases and through bonuses. Competence pay is not popular in the countries we looked at, with the exception of Belgium, and to some extent the UK and Denmark. So again, the only organisation that can be fully characterised as having solely “new” forms of pay increases is the Swedish central government. The Netherlands, Denmark and especially the UK we could perhaps place in between the traditional and the new model. Pay determination in Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands still takes place at the central level. Although ministries or departments have some decision-making power, they still need to follow the (strict) regulations set down centrally. In Denmark and the UK pay decisions are made more at a decentralised level with departments having the authority to set pay. Again, it is in Sweden where the pay determination is most decentralised and even individualised, although central guidelines still exist. As for fringe benefits, the government organisations still try to look after their personnel by offering them job security and a whole range of benefits, allowances, compensations, flexible working arrangements and so on. Flexibility and individual choice of benefits, characterising “new pay” exist in The Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and Sweden. Looking at all four main features of pay systems discussed in this paper, it is notable that the position the different countries take in the typology is the same for each of the features. The German Bund pay system and the Belgian federal government system are still mainly traditional pay systems, although each shows signs of developing more into “new” systems with Belgium using competence pay, and Germany planning changes toward more performance based pay. The Netherlands still has mainly traditional pay system features, such as pay scales with fixed increments, with some “new pay” characteristics, such as the use of performance-based pay and individual choice concerning benefits. The UK civil service pay system leans toward the “new pay” system, with decentralised responsibility for pay, performance-related pay and the use of pay bands as a basis for pay structure. The same goes for Denmark, with performance-based allowances and decentralised pay setting. And finally on the basis of the features discussed in the previous section, we would situate the Swedish pay system clearly into the “new” model, since it has a

highly decentralised and even individualised pay system, largely based on performance. Thus, although “new pay” has been written about for several years now, and in public sector research it is associated with new public management at least in the area of reward management central governments have not (yet) evolved along the lines of private sector practices. Of the countries included in this study, individualism and flexibility in pay are only truly adopted in Sweden. Decentralisation does occur, but in practice it is often limited to the implementation of decisions, which are restricted by central guidelines or regulations. Performance-related pay, however, is slowly on the rise in central government. But even though performance-related pay exists in central administrations in theory, one can wonder whether it is true performance pay in practice (OECD, 2004). Evidence from our own case studies in the UK and The Netherlands shows that line managers still encounter difficulties rewarding only a portion of their employees with pay based on performance (Willems et al., 2004b). They often hand out bonuses to their entire staff to avoid jealousy and conflict and therefore undermine the performance motivational facet. Marsden (1997) also indicates that evidence in the public sector shows that only a very small minority of personnel receive unfavourable performance scores. It would seem line managers in practice remain highly attached to the collectivistic, equal treatment culture. The results above can be linked to the psychological contract framework. Research literature on the psychological contract makes a distinction between an old and a new psychological contract, which is very similar and can be connected to the contrast between more traditional and new approaches to HRM and remuneration. Some psychological contract researchers indicate a shift from a relational contract, with emphasis on long-term job security, loyalty and trust, to a transactional contract, where the more monetisable aspects of the exchange relationship, such as pay and employability, are central elements (Hiltrop, 1996; Anderson and Schalk, 1998). The old contract emphasizes equality and fairness, whereas the principles of the new contract are market forces and added value. The main responsibility of the employer in the old contract is to provide fair pay, job security, training and a solid career. In the new contract pay increases based on excellent performance are seen as the key responsibility of the employer (Willems et al., 2003). The key responsibilities of employees also differ. In the old psychological contract employees are expected to deliver satisfying results and to be obedient, loyal, honest and committed. These are in contrast to the responsibilities of employees in the new contract: “making a difference” flexibility, excellent performance and employability. We found, in an analysis of three empirical studies on the psychological contract in the public sector (two in Belgium and one in the UK), of which two also include the private sector, that central government workers usually have a strong or loyal psychological contract (Willems et al., 2004a). This is one of the types in the typology of Janssens et al. (2003) and implies that civil servants have high expectations of their employer, especially where job security is concerned. They are also willing to offer a lot in return, especially loyalty. Next to long-term involvement and job security, employees in the public sector report to a large extent that they are promised fair treatment and quality of treatment (Willems et al., 2004a). These promises occur more often in the public sector, compared to the private sector. The loyal and strong psychological contract with an important emphasis on loyalty, job security and fair

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treatment can both be seen as forms of the “old” psychological contract and they thus seem to fit well with the career-based system and the more traditional pay model, where seniority (reward for loyalty) is an important base for pay, job security is still offered, pay determination occurs collectively, and individualised pay is uncommon. Schuster and Zingheim (1992) also note that offering security in return for loyalty was the primary reward for employees before “new pay”. For private sector employees in Belgium and the UK, in contrast, unattached and instrumental psychological contracts are most common (Willems et al., 2004a). The unattached contract is exactly the opposite of the loyal contract. Employees with an unattached psychological contract have low expectations of long-term involvement and are only to a small extent prepared to be loyal to their employer. An instrumental contract implies that employees have reasonably high expectations of the employer but perceive themselves as having low obligations. They expect quite a lot from their employer, but are not prepared to offer the same effort in return, especially concerning personal investment and flexibility. The “new pay” model seems to coincide with the typical private sector contract in the way that loyalty is not an important expectation, but for the other features such as individualisation, the link is not so clear. The “new pay” practices are perhaps based more on an investing psychological contract (which also coincides with the “new” contract) where employees do not have high expectations but are willing to offer personal investment and flexibility. The investing psychological contract was also found in the private sector, though not as often, and mostly in management jobs. Conclusion This study has some limitations. First, we only looked at a few European countries. To determine whether central government pay systems in Europe are still following a more traditional model or whether they have incorporated several “new pay” elements or have entirely moved on to “new pay” we need to include more countries into our study. It would be especially interesting to take a look at the Southern and Eastern European pay systems, to see whether they follow the same trends as the western and northern European countries listed in this paper. In line with the previous remark, it would also be interesting to include other public sector organisations or other government levels into the comparison. How do for instance, pay systems in the health sector or municipalities in Europe compare to central government pay systems? Have they developed more along the private sector line? Despite these limitations, we can conclude that central government pay systems in this study have far from developed into “new pay” systems, with Sweden (and the UK and Denmark to a lesser degree) being the exception. Most countries have some form of decentralised authority, and have adopted performance pay elements, but it remains a question whether the performance element has truly penetrated the organisational culture. As Risher (1999, p. 334) states, “the transition to a true performance culture takes time, an investment in training and a commitment to make it successful”. The importance that civil servants attach to fair treatment in their psychological contract and the reluctance of line managers to give negative evaluations and differentiate between staff members when giving performance bonuses, indicates that pay equity remains an important issue. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the “new pay” system is not fully embraced by the central governments in this study. The

highly individualised “new pay” systems are, after all, more prone to lead to inequities (Risher, 1999) and do not coincide with the collectivistic culture. It is a huge step for the civil service to change from collective pay grades to individual pay setting. Especially, in countries with a civil service statute the question arises whether this statute is compatible with a decentralised pay system. The statute is after all inherently made up of general regulations, which should be applied equally to all civil servants with the same employment conditions. Furthermore, a psychological contract consists of a delicate balance between employee and employer expectations. Reforms in reward systems involve changing the terms of the psychological contract (Marsden, 1997). These changes often lead to (temporary) breaches that cause demotivation and subsequently diminishing performance. Elements such as length of service increments provide an important element of stability for staff (Marsden, 1997). This security element disappears with the introduction of newer, variable reward components such as performance or competence-based pay. It is not unthinkable that the specific exchange relationship between the civil servant and the employer is so deeply rooted, that it makes radical changes difficult. The ability to change is further hindered in countries such as Belgium and Germany because of a strong legalistic culture. Strictly regulated pay systems that describe rights and obligations in great detail could promote an entitlement culture. Relinquishing former attainments is a lot harder when they are laid down in laws. It seems much easier to change systems relying less on laws and decrees, such as the Swedish model. Finally, the question remains whether “new pay” is the way to go for European public services. “New pay” in the strict sense, means adapting the pay system to the organisational strategy. If public services want to perform better and to achieve more efficiency, will they be able to better motivate their staff by offering them individualised, performance- or competence-related pay? This would not coincide with research showing that public employees are still motivated by intrinsic, rather than extrinsic rewards (Brown and Heywood, 2002). Note 1. An exception is the study of Bossaert et al. (2001), which compares several characteristics of public services in 15 European countries. The chapter on remuneration covers several subtopics such as allowances, performance-related pay and other determinants. Some of the information, however, dates back to 1997 (Bossaert et al., 2001, p. 131). References Anderson, N. and Schalk, R. (1998), “The psychological contract in retrospect and prospect”, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 19, S1, pp. 637-47. Bach, S. and Della Rocca, G. (1995), “The management strategies of public service employer in Europe”, Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 82-96. Bossaert, D., Demmke, C., Nomden, K. and Polet, R. (2001), Civil Services in the Europe of Fifteen: Trends and New Developments, EIPA, Maastricht. Brown, M. and Heywood, J. (Eds) (2002), Paying for Performance: An International Comparison, Sharpe, New York, NY.

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Druker, J. and White, G. (2000), “Introduction. The context of reward management”, in White, G. and Druker, J. (Eds), Reward Management. A Critical Text, Routledge, London, pp. 1-24. Freibert, A. (1997), “Public pay programs in OECD countries”, in Risher, H. and Fay, C. (Eds), New Strategies for Public Pay: Rethinking Government Compensation Programs, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, pp. 294-311. Hiltrop, J. (1996), “Managing the changing psychological contract”, Employee Relations, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 36-50. Hood, C. (1991), “A public management for all seasons?”, Public Administration, Vol. 69 No. 1, pp. 3-19. Janssens, M., Sels, L. and Van Den Brande, I. (2003), “Multiple types of psychological contracts. A six-cluster solution”, Human Relations, Vol. 56 No. 11, pp. 1349-78. Lawler, E. (1994), “From job-based to competency-based organisations”, Journal of Organisational Behavior, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 3-15. Lawler, E. (1995), “The new pay: a strategic approach”, Compensation & Benefits Review, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 14-22. Marsden, D. (1997), “Public service pay reforms in European countries”, Transfer, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 62-85. Marsden, D. (2003), “Perspectives on performance pay in government organisations: a short review of history, research and theory so far, and main trends in OECD member countries”, available at: www.oecd.org Nomden, K., Farnham, D. and Onnee-Abbruciati, M. (2003), “Collective bargaining in public services. Some European comparisons”, The International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 16 No. 6, pp. 412-23. OECD (2005), Performance-related Pay Policies for Government Employees, OECD, Paris. OECD HRM Working Party (2004), “Trends in human resources management policies in OECD countries. An analysis of the results of the OECD survey on strategic human resources management”, available at: www.oecd.org Risher, H. (1997), “Competency-based pay: The next model for salary management”, in Risher, H. and Fay, C. (Eds), New Strategies for Public Pay: Rethinking government Compensation Programs, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, pp. 145-58. Risher, H. (1999), “Are public employers ready for a ‘New Pay’ program?”, Public Personnel Management, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 323-43. Schuster, J. and Zingheim, P. (1992), The New Pay. Linking Employee and Organizational Performance, Impressum Lexington Books, New York, NY, p. NY. Smith, I. (2000), “Benefits”, in White, G. and Druker, J. (Eds), Reward Management. A Critical Text, Routledge, London, pp. 152-77. White, G. (2000a), “Determining pay”, in White, G. and Druker, J. (Eds), Reward Management. A Critical Text, Routledge, London, pp. 25-53. White, G. (2000b), “Pay flexibility in European public services: a comparative analysis”, in Farnham, D. and Horton, S. (Eds), Human Resources Flexibilities in the Public Services. International Perspectives, Macmillan, London, pp. 255-79. Willems, I., Janvier, R. and Henderickx, E. (2003), Copernicus tussen de regels door: de cultuur en de verwachtingen van het federale overheidspersoneel [Copernicus, Read Between the Lines: Culture and Expectations of the Federal Public Servants], Academia Press, Ghent.

Willems, I., Janvier, R. and Henderickx, E. (2004a), “The unique nature of psychological contracts in the public sector: an exploration”, paper presented at the EGPA conference, Ljubljana, September 2004, available at: http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/egpa/HRM/index.html Willems, I., Janvier, R. and Henderickx, E. (2004b), Beter beloond bij de buren? Het beloningsbeleid in de UK Civil Service en de Nederlandse Rijksoverheid doorgelicht. [Better Paid in Neighbouring Countries? Research into the Pay Policy in the UK Civil Service and the Dutch State Sector], SBOV, Leuven. Corresponding author Ingrid Willems can be contacted at: [email protected]

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