New international communism: the foreign and defense policies of the Latin European Communist parties 0669051462

465 118 18MB

English Pages xx, 262 p. ; [281] Year 1982

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

New international communism: the foreign and defense policies of the Latin European Communist parties
 0669051462

Citation preview

New International Communism

New International Communism The Foreign and Defense Policies of the Latin European Communist Parties

Lawrence L. Whetten University of Southern California

Lexington Books^J D.C. Heath and-Company Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto

MOHAWK VALLEY COMMUNITY cSaEGE LIBRAh ,

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Whetten, Lawrence L. New international communism. Includes index. 1. Communist parties—Europe. 2. Europe—Foreign 1945. 3. Europe—Military policy. I. Title. JN94.A979W5 324.24075 ISBN 0-669-05146-2

relations— 81-47963 AACR2

Copyright © 1982 by D.C. Heath and Company All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or trans­ mitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho­ tocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Published simultaneously in Canada

Printed in the United States of America

International Standard Book Number: 0-669-05146-2 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 81-47963

AVH 1t potential adversary and preservation of an omnidirectional military strategy (tons azimuts) in order to face any possible aggressor.45 While the Socialists expressed their willingness to discuss the four first points, they flatly refused to consider the two others. Differences also re­ mained over what had to be understood by maintenance en etat of the nuclear arsenal. Did it mean a freeze of its development at the present level, or did it ultimately permit an increase in the number of launchers and warheads? The PCF argued at that time that a modest expansion of the ballistic missile submarine force should be allowed. The new Communist doctrine was close to the still official Gaullist concept of total sanctuarization of the French homeland and of a categoric refusal to extend the deter­ rence for the benefit of France’s NATO allies, or the Mery concept of enlarged sanctuarization. The third point was evidently a reference to the necessity not to station the Pluton tactical missile system outside France, specifically on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The fourth point emphasized that, in order to operate the national force, France would have to possess its own means of early warning and reconnaissance—in other words, that the country would have to build military satellites. These PCF proposals could be construed as reflecting a basic accep­ tance of the current nuclear doctrine and the countervalue, or anti-city, deterrence posture. But the remaining proposals clearly were intended to undercut this very basis. Collegial decision making on nuclear use would in fact paralyze the whole system—and it had to be assumed that the PCF would delegate a number of its own representatives to the supreme council on nuclear defense (the ultimate national authority) possibly with a right of veto. The Socialists were prepared only to submit the question of force de frappe to a popular referendum, but this idea had to be abandoned because it proved to be incompatible with the Constitution. The biggest obstacle to an understanding, however, was the Communist demand to introduce a strategy of tous azimuts, linked to the refusal as a

The French Communist Party

89

matter of principle to recognize any country, even a Warsaw Pact state, in advance as a hostile power. The tous azimuts doctrine, which was con­ sidered by General de Gaulle before the events of May 1968 but afterwards speedily dropped in favor of the so-called Fourquet doctrine of flexible response, certainly carried an undertone of armed neutralism since a nuclear omnidirectional strategy could not be reconciled with the com­ mitments of the North Atlantic Treaty.46 Finally, there was some evidence that the PCF tried to go back on the concession made in 1977 on continued Alliance membership; the paragraph on the refusal to reintegrate NATO was expanded by a passage stating that France “would put an end to the measures of reinsertion into that military organization undertaken by the government in past periods and that France would also decline to take part in the setting up of any new integrated military organization.”47 Thus, there remained considerable differences over the updating of this section of the common program, but it cannot be said that these differences were a major cause of the rupture of September 1977. By the end of August, the subcommittee on defense and security of the liaison committee had finished its discussions on the understanding that only the four agreed points (1 through 4) should be taken into consideration. Jean Kanapa ac­ cepted this procedure for final deliberations among the left union members.48 It is therefore probably wrong to infer that these matters prevented the updating of the 1972 platform, since the PCF seemed willing to compromise.49 Yet it is true that the party leadership, in a show of demagogical tactics, published the Kanapa draft shortly before the March elections with the obvious intention of putting all the blame on the Socialists for the failure of the partnership and the further goal of max­ imizing nationalistic sentiments awakened by the party’s advocating a new and progressive nuclear deterrence posture.50 In their turn, the Socialist leaders had to demonstrate, after the rupture, that they had not conceded essential points to the Communists (as indeed they had not). Therefore, they emphasized the main points of divergence, which concerned the PCF position toward NATO.

The Arms-Control Policy of the PCF

The thesis that the issue of defense and security constituted a major stum­ bling block cannot be fully substantiated. In the March 1978 version of the common program, reference to the need to conclude an agreement on the nonfirst use of nuclear weapons was dropped, and the text generally cor­ responded to the Socialist version. In view of the upcoming special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament, the PCF proposed a new item (3): constructive participation and initiatives in favor

90

New International Communism

of universal nuclear disarmament, as well as simultaneous, balanced, and controlled limitations and reductions of forces, armaments, and military budgets. A second new passage (4) stated that France will demand to be associated with the U.S.-USSR agreement on the prevention of nuclear war (San Clemente agreement of June 1973) and will propose to extend this agreement to all nuclear powers. The new government will also take steps to ensure that France takes part in the SALT process, at the appropriate state of advancement of the negotiations. Finally, a third new passage (6) stipulated that renouncing nuclear weapons status remained the ultimate goal and that to this end a world conference or at least a conference of the five nuclear powers should be convened. While this approach of course reflected the general Soviet and Warsaw Pact line on disarmament, it was shared to a great extent by the leaders of the Socialist party.51 There was some doubt, however, on the usefulness of joining the San Clemente accord, since neither Washington nor Moscow had ever officially formulated such a demand. The most interesting aspect of this renewal of Communist thinking on arms control, however, is revealed by the additions to the earlier PCF draft. A new and lengthy passage stipulates that the new government will actively promote: (1) application of the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, including the greatest possible cooperation in the fields of human and cultural rela­ tions; (2) progressive adoption of a whole series of confidence building measures and the earliest possible inclusion in this process of measures favoring the military aspects of detente in Europe; (3) commitment to take part immediately in the Vienna conference on the reduction of forces and armaments (MBFR) in order to contribute to an accord on the effective, balanced, and controlled reduction of all forces and all armaments, initially of foreign forces, under conditions of equal security for all; (4) promotion of all other partial measures for disarmament in Europe, including the freeze or the balanced reduction of forces, armaments, and military budgets and the creation of denuclearized zones; and (5) proposals to all interested coun­ tries to conclude treaties of nonaggression, the nonuse of force, and friend­ ship and cooperation.52 This updated Communist doctrine on arms control in Europe mixed Western and Eastern ideas and terminology. An example of the Western ap­ proach that is not in conformity with the current Soviet terminology is the paragraph on MBFR. Whereas in 1972, the balanced nature of force reduc­ tions is stressed, as also are the general measures of conventional disarma­ ment, the later wording “under the conditions of equal security for all” is a Soviet term correlating the threat from all potential enemies. Likewise, the call for a freeze of forces and armaments in a wider European zone and the establishment of nuclear-free zones is also a Soviet concept, but it proved unacceptable to the Socialist partner.53 The essential area of disagreement concerned the last paragraph. The

The French Communist Party

91

PCF remained isolated all through the negotiations on the revitalization of the common program on the issues of concluding formal treaties of nonag­ gression and on the non-use of military force. The term treaties of friend­ ship and cooperation indicated the kind of agreements the USSR and its allies usually conclude with friendly countries. Finally, the demand to renew formal treaty links with the USSR (that is, to conclude a new bilateral treaty that was to parallel the one General de Gaulle signed in Moscow in 1944 and that was abrogated by the USSR in May 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO) was neither new nor acceptable to the Socialists. Since 1964 the Soviet government had frequently asked the French for such a new treaty and had been rebuffed repeatedly. The Socialists were also not prepared to accept the 1976 declaration of principles endorsed by Giscard d’Estaing and Brezhnev since it would probably have created even more doubts and confusion in the ranks of the Western Alliance as to the real intentions of a leftist government of France. But on the whole, the positive approach of the PCF arms control package outweighed, in the eyes of its partners, the disadvantages of the special, Soviet-oriented points. It should be noted that after the split with the PCF, Mitterrand published a series of articles setting out a comprehen­ sive Socialist plan for arms control in Europe that contained many of the elements (including immediate participation in MBFR) contained in the Kanapa draft.54

Current Thinking on Defense, Security, Disarmament, and Arms Control

At this juncture, attention should be paid to the development and shifts in strategic and tactical defense policy after the breakup of the union of the Left in order to define more precisely the current position of the PCF within the government. In matters of strategic doctrine and the organization of na­ tional defense, the line developed in the Kanapa report of May 1977 was generally maintained. The politburo was prepared, during the negotiations with the Socialists in spring and summer of 1977, however, to drop two essential elements of the Communist platform: (1) the tous azimuts military strategy and (2) the opposition to counter-city nuclear targeting. But after the rupture with the Socialist party, the leadership stressed again the demands that France not designate an enemy in advance and that French nuclear weapons not be directed against population centers.55 Given the limited means of France, there can be no question of adopting a counter­ force strategy and, in fact, such an idea was never discussed in the Com­ munist press. It must be assumed, therefore, that condemnation of deter­ rence based on the threat to destroy the population centers of the hypothetical aggressor was pure rhetoric. Louis Baillot and others have clearly stated, nevertheless, that a strict,

92

New International Communism

tous azimuts deterrence posture should rely entirely on the ocean-based elements of the force de frappe and that the nuclear bomber force of Mirage IV and the MRBM silos on the plateau d’Albion should be phased out. There was also opposition to the tactical nuclear missions of the dual­ purpose air force and the navy Jaguar, Mirage III, and Super Etendard combat aircraft. The tactical nuclear armaments mentioned in the 1977 PCF draft referred only to the Pluton missile system—thirty-six units based in Eastern France. (In this respect, Louis Baillot explained that the Pluton system, with its limited 110-km range, had a useful role to play—against the Federal Republic of Germany, should that country turn against a France governed by the left.56) Thus, the PCF rejected all strategic and tactical nuclear systems that could be targeted against Eastern Europe and the USSR but favored retain­ ing the submarine force, which could be directed against any potential aggressor. The pledge to maintain the deterrence force operational under these conditions'was a very limited one and there was no commitment to go beyond the level reached in 1977—a six-boat fleet. Yet the maintien en etat implied acceptance of technological improvements. On the whole, the party line remained very ambiguous on this issue. During the defense debate in the National Assembly in October 1978, the PCF members supported (as did the Socialists) the Gaullist RPR demand to build a sixth missile-carrying nuclear submarine of a new generation. In June 1980, the central commit­ tee of the PCF formally endorsed the construction of this sixth submarine, but it condemned the other measures the government had made public (the development of a mobile, land-based MRBM and of a new nuclear bomber) and it asked that France stay out of the arms race.37 The internal 1980 French controversy over the neutron bomb indicated a new trend in government thinking, and the PCF considered the eventual deployment by France of an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) as a politi­ cal ploy to bring French strategy closer in line with the NATO policy on the battlefield use of nuclear weapons and, in short, as further proof of the Atlanticist trend the president and the government were alleged to pursue. The party had taken an unequivocally negative stand on the deploy­ ment of the ERW into NATO arsenals in Europe during the Alliance debate on this issue in winter 1977 and spring 1978. As early as April 1978 L’humanite reported that the French government was developing its own system and that a neutron device had already been tested at the Mururoa underground test site in the Pacific, as indeed was acknowledged by Presi­ dent Giscard d’Estaing at a press conference in June 1980.58 But he declared that a definite decision on the deployment of a neutron weapon would be taken only in two or three years. The PCF took it for granted that approval would be given with the obvious intention of realigning France with NATO and starting a new nuclear arms race in Europe.59 Louis Baillot stated:

The French Communist Party

93

“Under the pretext of modernizing its nuclear armaments, France takes the decision of producing neutron weapons, whose significance is above all to abandon the Gaullist strategy of deterrence tous azimuts to the benefit of the strategy of ‘forward defense.’”60 Baillot still contended that the omnidirectional deterrence strategy cor­ responds to the original Gaullist doctrine, which is clearly not the case. Even contemporary Gaullists emphasize that the national deterrent is directed against the only conceivable potential agressor, the USSR. But this view of the political implications of neutron bomb deployment by France is indeed shared by the RPR and the other Gaullist groups. On this issue primarily, the seeming convergence between the extreme left and the ex­ treme right of the political spectrum in France is more than rhetorical. The PCF went beyond the Gaullist opposition, however, by urging even before the official admission of ERW development that France propose the negotiation of an international treaty banning the neutron bomb and all other new means of mass destruction—thereby taking up a Soviet proposal submitted to the United Nations in the fall of 1978 and repeated in the various declarations of the Warsaw Pact countries. For the PCF, the most preoccupying aspect of the neutron bomb controversy, nevertheless, was the open endorsement of a national French ERW by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.61 The PCF also shared the concern of many Gaullist politicians (exclud­ ing members of the government) about a revival of the idea of a European defense system, a development bound to destabilize the existing situation on the continent and to jeopardize the policies of detente and cooperation in a pan-European framework. As Jacques Denis has explained, a new Euro­ pean defense community would inevitably lead to the accession of the Federal Republic to nuclear armament. Furthermore, U.S. dominance over NATO would not be diminished; Western Europe would become to an even greater extent hostage to American strategy.62 On another important aspect of PCF-RPR interests, the Communist strategic perception differed markedly from the Gaullist. The fundamental assumption underlying the Gaullist doctrine from the very beginning, name­ ly that the European NATO allies could not and should not rely on the nuclear guarantee of the United States, is refuted in the Communist press and by party officials. “Under the pretext of a so-called progressive aban­ donment of Europe by the United States—certain newspapers pretend that the American nuclear umbrella is ‘full of holes’—a campaign in favor of a European defense has taken on ample shape. The whole PCF campaign against the modernization program of NATO underscores the point that by the presence of new and powerful U.S. nuclear weapons, the United States would increase its leverage on the allies.”63 Yet the PCF has not adopted the line that the United States is not pre­

94

New International Communism

pared to maintain its nuclear deterrence posture to the benefit of its Euro­ pean allies. The relevant criticism was directed toward the ways and means by which Washington was attempting to impose its will on the allies in order to maintain its leadership within NATO and to keep Europe in a hostage role. This is, of course, a contradiction of Gaullist defense analysis. In other words, is there a need for an independent French deterrent force if the prevention of war is based, as the PCF frequently argues, on the parity and stability achieved in nuclear and conventional systems between the two alli­ ance systems? But this question is seldom formally raised, and there are good reasons for this discretion. The PCF does not accept the national nuclear arsenal in terms of its military significance but in terms of its political value as a means of pursuing an independent line in foreign policy. In other words, it is the best way of preventing French realignment with NATO.64

The PCF Perception of Western Europe

The evolution of the European Economic Community was consequently seen in the context of general East-West relations. In the prime times of the Union of the Left, there were some indications that the PCF was willing to modify its uncompromising stand against any idea of a real Western Euro­ pean role in the East-West contest. By March 1977, the politburo had resolved to accept the principle of direct elections of the members to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. This move, hailed by the Socialist part­ ners as a major shift toward a pro-European attitude, however, was dic­ tated by circumstances. Giscard d’Estaing’s hope that the issue of direct European elections would continue to divide the Union of the Left and discredit their alleged common platform had to be thwarted. Therefore, the PCF added a passage to the relevant chapter on the EC in their 1977 revised draft, stating that the European Assembly should be able to exert effective control on all the activities of the commission.65 This demand appeared to contradict the stubborn refusal of the PCF to contemplate any strengthen­ ing of the different Community organs toward a real integrated and supranational structure.66 Indeed, the PCF’s acceptance of a stronger Assembly did not reflect a change in attitude toward integration; rather it was an attempt to constrain the commission’s activities regarding French national interests. Conversely, during the campaign preceding the elections of June 1979, the party concentrated on the persistent theme of a German and American dominated Western Europe. It attempted to demonstrate that Giscard d’Estaing had subordinated the national interests of France to West Ger­ man hegemonism and that this short-sighted policy led France under the guise of European integration to become a mere appendix of the Federal

The French Communist Party

95

Republic of Germany. A second main thrust of the party media was directed against the enlargement of the Community toward the South (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) and notably the inclusion of Iberian agriculture into the common agricultural program of the EC. In electoral terms, these tactics proved rather successful, since the party was able to make considerable inroads into the voting potential of the Socialist and cen­ trist groups in the poorer southwest regions of France, where farmers feared the consequences of competition with Spanish and Portuguese fruit growers and wine producers.67 The subsequent turnabout by the French president in May 1980, when he announced that the entry of the two Iberian countries into the Community had to be postponed, was seen by the Communist press as a triumph for their own thesis, but both sides were jockeying for national electoral votes, which Mitterrand largely won. As a matter of principle, the PCF stressed its national role within the European Parliament. It pointed out that the PCF group, contrary to the French Socialist party delegation in Strasbourg, had top-level representa­ tion, with Georges Marchais as chairman and three members of the politburo and eleven other members of the central committee out of a total number of nineteen representatives, and that this group made extensive use of the forum provided by the directly elected Parliament. More important, it launched a campaign against the so-called socialist Europe, denouncing it as a dangerous supranational collusion between the rightist parties and the Social Democrats. Party statements failed to mention that the PCF group consistently voted with the Gaullists and French Socialists on matters of defense and armaments cooperation, rejecting without exception all the relevant motions presented in Strasbourg on arms control on the grounds that these subjects were outside the competence of the Community.68 The optimistic view of Jean Elleinstein of the emergence of a political Europe as an alternative model between the superpowers was never officially accepted by the PCF. Immediately after the March 1978 elections, such a Eurocom­ munist vision was banned from the official vocabulary. Jacques Denis, in an interview with Heinz Timmermann, declared that Eurocommunism was not a criterion for defining the relations of the PCF with the other nonrul­ ing CPs and that this slogan did not imply the search for a common strategy.69 In the wake of events in Afghanistan, the PCF renewed its attacks on the cooperative concept of the European Economic Community—or, more precisely, the coordinating mechanism of the ten foreign ministries in mat­ ters of foreign policy, European political cooperation (ECP). The PCF scorned the idea that the countries of the Community could play an autonomous role between the United States and the USSR. The Rome declaration of the nine foreign ministers (February 1980) on the Afghanistan crisis and the idea of an internationally guaranteed neutrality for Afghanistan was considered inappropriate. On these points, the PCF

96

New International Communism

media closely followed the Soviet argument that, in the absence of real Western European political influence or military powers in this region, any such initiative was bound to fail and would only amount to a diversion. The moderate faction of the PCF maintains that, “in all essential mat­ ters of international politics, the alignment of the Western European coun­ tries with the United States is in no doubt. The two Venice summits in June 1980 showed clear evidence of this, even if at times there are some nuances regarding the ways the agreements reached should be put into practice.”70 Although it would seem hazardous to ignore entirely the AmericanEuropean dissensions over the issue of the relationship with the USSR, this school, in contrast to the Italian and the Spanish'parties, deliberately chose to ignore the contention that there could be no Western European autonomy, or even manifestation of common concerns and vital interests, that did not correspond to the course of confrontation adopted by Washington. An interpretation along harder lines follows the PCF politburo guideline on the alleged nonexistence of Western Europe (the EC) as a fac­ tor on the world scene. From this point of view, Eurocommunism indeed has no logical justification since the concept is based on the assumption that the Western part of the continent has an international quality of its own and provides the opportunity to develop a third way between Soviet real socialism and American capitalism. And it is precisely this issue that fun­ damentally divides the PCF from the PCI and the PCE.71

PCF Views of European Security

Perceptions and practices in the area of European security present serious dilemmas for the PCF between solidarity on policy at the regional level and lack of reciprocal support on the national scene. It is difficult to detect many original French Communist contributions on the problem of Euro­ pean security. Even the semantics follow the Soviet matrix closely, and the most perceptible changes in this field follow the new elements and proposals the USSR adds to its already rich catalogue of security plans for Europe. Thus, among the major nonruling CPs the PCF stands out as reflecting Soviet views most faithfully.72 But there have been notable deviations, as in its advocacy of strategic nuclear submarines, the proposal to freeze all ar­ maments in Europe, and balanced force reductions. There are two aspects to this assertion. First, contrary to the leadership of the other Latin nonruling CPs, the Marchais leadership maintains a Manichean approach, refusing to establish its distance from the Soviet posi­ tion and to consider the East-West relationships in Europe in other than black and white terms. The Soviet position is portrayed as the right and only justifiable one, the Western position as flawed and dictated by an overall

The French Communist Party

97

U.S. imperialist strategy. Second, the whole problem of the balance of forces on the continent is presented on the basis of Soviet analyses. There is little trace in the PCF literature of any serious discussion of the underlying factors of the strategic military equilibrium between the two alliance systems. The PCI attempts to assess the relevance of NATO in terms of Italian security needs and to conceive of NATO as an indispensable means of resisting Soviet intimidation and pressures; in contrast, the PCF takes it for granted that destabilization is the primary responsibility of the Western side. One example of these perceptions is the campaign against the NATO modernization of theater nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet argument that a rough balance of forces exists on the Continent, but that the West is attempting to change this situation in its favor, is repeated in most relevant statements of the PCF, including the communiques of bilateral meetings with other Communist leaders.73 One obvious reason for this is that the politburo feels bound by the guidelines adopted at the conclusion of Georges Marchais’s talks in Moscow. Regarding European security, the joint communique states that the decisions of NATO to produce and install new American missiles on European territory threatens the peace and the security of the continent. If the December 1979 NATO decisions are im­ plemented, they will provide American imperialism, which tries to gain military supremacy, with the possibility of turning Europe into a nuclear battlefield, and the United States would put nuclear armament at the disposal of West Germany.74 But there were other, more basic, long-term problems concerning the relevance of general themes like European security and the Soviet program for peaceful coexistence and detente for the perceptions and needs of the party members. They related primarily to the perennial duality inherent in Communist internationalism. What are the European security interests and requirements of the great powers, and how can they fit into the political aspirations of nonruling Communist parties? The problem reemerged in France when the PCF decided in 1964 to support leftists against de Gaulle. In 1969, 1974, 1978, and 1981, the Kremlin made it clear that the first priority had to be given to the stability and promotion of intergovernmental relations, which meant that a conservative regime willing to pursue a policy of detente and cooperation with the Eastern system had to be encouraged and kept in power. There exists an underlying resentment toward the USSR and its alleged tendency to advance the interests of a great power to the detriment of the achievement of the Marxist-Leninist objectives of social change.75 This conflict came into the open for the first time during the Twentysecond Congress of the PCF in spring 1976, and was fought out during the 1976 Berlin conference. Jean Kanapa then explained that the strategy of the Communist international movement should not be determined by the objec­

98

New International Communism

tives of any one member party. He complained that when any Communist party praises the foreign policy of Giscard d’Estaing, while the PCF fights his policy because it is aiming at a sellout of national independence, is reintegrating the country into the American strategy, and is systematically trying to block the process of detente, then the PCF is confronted with a failure of proletarian internationalism.76 The decision of the PCF to aban­ don this latter term in favor of internationalist solidarity implies a two-way approach and resulted from the assessment that the CPSU’s security in­ terests greatly outweigh its international fraternalism. A decline occurred in the grievances with the Moscow leadership that were aired publicly after the breakup of the Union of the Left, but the debate continued and was referred to as the refusal of the French party to adopt a definition of peaceful coexistence and of detente in Europe, imply­ ing acceptance of the social status quo. In April 1978, Jacques Denis stressed the point that “it is excluded that we envisage to subordinate our struggle to change the French society to any consideration of the interests on foreign states, to diplomacy or to the ‘balance of forces in the world.’”77 In light of such outspokenness, the Kremlin carefully formulated the word­ ing on this issue in the joint communique during the Afghanistan crisis that “the strengthening of the peaceful existence, which cannot be the social and political status quo, is of great importance.”78 But it is doubtful whether this verbal concession really satisfies the French Communist leaders, since Soviet diplomacy at the same time stressed the positive contribution of the French government to the lessening of tensions consecutive to the events in Afghanistan. Yet one PCF foreign policy expert stressed that international detente and peaceful coexistence are not abstract issues independent of the class struggle. On the contrary, the former depends upon the latter element.” This suggests a restricted interpretation of detente and reinforces the PCF’s known emphasis on the class struggle aspects of peaceful coex­ istence. In light of this dichotomy between the singularity of positions between the PCF and the USSR on European security issues and the persistent Soviet behavior in French politics as that of a great power pursuing realpolitik ob­ jectives, the question should be raised to what extent the PCF position on security matters affects either its own ideological interpretations and political interests or the aims of its traditional international solidarity. The PCF’s position on the nature of war and the assessed Soviet military threat to Western Europe reveal no such contradictions or frustrations.

The Soviet Threat The problem of identification within the Eurocommunist movement finally was compounded by the image the USSR and the Moscow-led socialist bloc

The French Communist Party

99

presented to the outside world. The PCF has consistently refused officially to identify potential military enemies before hostilities. The main threat to peace is presented by class enemies led by imperialist ambitions. This limited perspective was a major obstacle in the negotiations on the updating of the common program. Through the compromise of refusing to define in advance a potential aggressor, the PCF managed to skirt the main issue. Yet the negotiations revealed that the major disagreement between the partners concerned the assessment of the Soviet threat to Western security. The PCF never varied from its categorical denial that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact constituted, or could in the future conceivably constitute, a menace to France. The to us azimuts strategy was indeed a way of emphasizing that the French deterrent had to take account of the real threat, that of American imperialism. This strategy coincided with the PCF’s qualifications on the operational level of the force de frappe; maximized the strategic element, which alone, theoretically at least, could be directed against the United States; and opposed all the other nuclear weapons systems capable of hit­ ting Warsaw Pact territory. Such vehement denial of a Soviet threat was not a monopoly of the PCF; other leftist groups also took the position that the vision of a Soviet military menace against Europe was a Western exaggeration designed to ter­ rorize the French bourgeoisie and force France into subordination to NATO.80 But the similarities end there. The non-Communist represen­ tatives of the left admit that the military posture of the USSR must be con­ sidered a potential threat; therefore, a measure of balance has to be main­ tained. The most precise statement on this subject was made by Georges Marchais himself. During the last formal summit meeting of the party leaders of the leftist union on 22 September 1977, he told Francois Mitter­ rand: “If under an absurd hypothesis, France were attacked by the USSR, we would be in the first rank to defend the national territory. But do you make the same commitment if France were assaulted by the Americans or the Germans?’’81 It is evident that Georges Marchais, in his Moscow television interview of 11 January 1980, also intended to draw the final line by stressing that “now everybody has to choose his camp,’’ leaving no doubt whatsoever that the French Communist party had chosen the Soviet camp and that no military threat from the Warsaw Pact was conceivable under foreseeable circumstances.

Disarmament and Arms Control Communist demands for the updating of the common program reflected the latest proposals and initiatives of the USSR in the field of general dis­

100

New International Communism

armament. However, the party published in May 1978 a detailed memoran­ dum on arms control, which stressed that France could not contemplate unilateral disarmament and that all measures had to take account of the necessity of “respecting the existing balance of forces’’ and to ensure “equal security for all participants.”82 In comparison to the PCF platform of 1971, the new elements of the memorandum reflected the initiatives the USSR had in the meantime taken in specific fields. For instance, it called for the conclusion of a treaty banning the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction, the extension of measures of military detente to the Mediterranean, limitation or withdrawal of the naval forces of foreign powers (U.S. and Soviet fleets), abolition of foreign military bases, and the strengthening of the provisions of the nonproliferation treaty. The long-standing demand that France should participate in the Geneva United Nations Conference Committee on Disarmament (CCD) was modi­ fied, however, since the memorandum proposed a change in the rules of the CCD, including extension of membership and rotation of the chairmanship among the members, putting an end to the U.S.-USSR cochairmanship. In this respect, a certain measure of convergence existed between the PCF ap­ proach and the official Giscard d’Estaing plan on disarmament, since the two big powers, at that time, had not yet formally accepted a reform of the Geneva body. The Giscard d’Estaing plan was deliberately played down by the French Communist news media, and the offer by the president to include a representative of the PCF in the official French delegation to the United Nations special session on disarmament was rejected. The Socialist party ac­ cepted the invitation. Hardly any mention was made of the French memorandum submitted to the United Nations on the convening of a disar­ mament conference in Europe (CDE). The PCF spokesman emphasized that the party’s platform of May 1978 provided for a European conference on disarmament and military detente. In fact, this terminology closely resembled the Soviets’ and was already included in the PCF draft of 1977 updating the common program.83 It also reflected the Soviet view by in­ sisting that negotiations be conducted within the CSCE framework on the limitation and reduction of all weapons systems, nuclear and conventional, while the Giscard d’Estaing plan on the CDE explicitly excluded the topic of nuclear weapons from the agenda of such a forum. Within the overall context of the PCF campaign against the NATO LRTNF modernization program, the party asked the French government in December 1979 to take the initiative in convening a disarmament conference for Europe.84 The Eastern bloc preparations for the Madrid follow-up con­ ference of the CSCE, and in particular the Warsaw Pact declaration of May 1979 and the Brezhnev speech in East Berlin on 6 October 1979, were duly mentioned in the Communist media as positive contributions toward this

The French Communist Party

101

end. The fact that Moscow appeared prepared to compromise on the Giscard d’Estaing CDE approach and combine the different propositions on the security issues gave the impression that positive steps in this direction had been taken by the Eastern side and that their major objective was to forestall the deployment of American LRTNF on European soil. Continuing this line of argument, Georges Marchais again updated the traditional demand to renew the Franco-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation by proposing in an open letter to the president of the Republic the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet treaty on mutual security. This letter was presented as an important contribution to the collective security of Europe, since such a treaty would respect existing commitments, including France’s to the North Atlantic Treaty. Marchais did not specify the treaty provisions but defined the general aims as strengthening the detente process, diminish­ ing military confrontation, and opposing a “policy of force, of blocs, and of hegemony.”85 On SALT, the party maintained the positive attitude already expressed in the 1977 draft and reaffirmed in the memorandum on disarmament of May 1978. SALT III negotiations were presented as the logical outcome of this bilateral process and as a necessary extension to the European theater. A PCF authority refuted the two essential arguments given by the French government in order to justify its decision not to take part in Salt III. No valid distinction can be made between the U.S.-USSR peripheral nuclear systems and the French arsenal, considered to be a central system, since the categories cannot be separated in operational terms. Likewise, French par­ ticipation in SALT III, which is in itself desirable in order to limit the nuclear arms race, provides an important means to exert political leverage. As for the second official reason, namely that a French commitment to SALT III would imply a return of France to NATO, the spokesman stated that the argument was unfortunate. Indeed, the absence of France at the negotiating table presented the greatest danger. Since Giscard d’Estaing had already accepted, in the Ottowa Declaration of 1974, the inclusion of the force de frappe within the overall deterrent forces of NATO, France cannot prevent the Americans and the Soviets from discussing in the course of the SALT III negotiations the French nuclear armaments, although this will happen without the presence of the French representatives. The Americans are obliged, vis-a-vis the Soviets, to speak in France’s name, which is another way of reintegrating NATO. This attitude is taken by the United Kingdom, the third Atlantic power, which does not hide its presence within NATO and leaves it to the United States to speak in its name. Therefore, to protect French interests, participation is essential.86 On a different arms control issue, the politburo adopted, on 10 December 1979, a declaration urging the French government to ask all signatories of the CSCE to support negotiations on the freeze at existing

102

New International Communism

levels of the armed forces and armaments in Europe and on their pro­ gressive reduction.87 The message was undoubtedly directed against LRNTF deployments, but it also concerned the USSR, which had until then refused a freeze of all armaments in the region and had not responded to Western demands for a halt in production of SS-20 missiles. Only five months later, Moscow suggested a limited freeze plan (declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries in Warsaw, 15 May 1980) and not a comprehensive one along the PCF line. The Warsaw Pact freeze was to> apply solely to forces but not to armaments and only within the zone of the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Charter, therefore excluding the intermediate-range nuclear systems on both sides. This is the only known relevant example of an arms control initiative of the PCF exceeding the Soviet blueprint and actually responding to NATO demands. Nevertheless, by this declaration on a comprehensive freeze, the French politburo made the implicit admission that what was at stake was not solely the NATO modernization program but the maintenance of the balance of forces on the continent, including Soviet inventories. On MBFR, the party insisted on the balanced nature of the force reduc­ tions, even after the dissolution of the leftist union, which suggests that on this subject there is also a concern for a measure of equilibrium that ap­ parently varies from the otherwise undifferentiated support for the Soviet arms control strategy. The PCF repeatedly stressed the need to conclude speedily the present phase of the Vienna talks and asked for full French par­ ticipation.88 During the discussions on the updating of the common pro­ gram, the PCF suggested that French forces in Germany be considered part of the agreed reductions of troop levels. At the same time, the PCF deplored the fact that Giscard d’Estaing had withdrawn 13,000 French soldiers from garrisons in West Germany and it indicated that a new leftist government would send these soldiers back to Germany.89 Party authorities could not explain, however, how the return to the full strength of the French garrison to about 56,000 was to be reconciled with a commitment to share in troop reductions within the framework of a MBFR agreement. Should the principle of collectivity adopted by the NATO participants in Vienna be used in order to increase the French forces in Germany in relation to the NATO integrated forces? In conclusion, the PCF entered the 1981 elections in an isolated posi­ tion regarding arms control policies in Europe. The Socialist party, shortly after the March 1978 elections, abandoned its own demands for French par­ ticipation in MBFR and declared its willingness to give the Giscard d’Esta­ ing plan (CDE) the benefit of the doubt. On the SALT issue, the Socialists also changed their attitude and no longer urged French participation in SALT III. In this respect at least, the Communist claim that their ex-part­ ners had veered to the right in a convergence with the Giscard approach, was not entirely without justification.

The French Communist Party

103

The Political and Military Implications of the PCF Positions for Western Policies and Options

On balance, the overall strategy of the French Communist party is marked by a double dichotomy: (1) generally, the (nationalistic) doctrine of nonalignment and of full national sovereignty versus the unequivocal affir­ mation that the party has chosen the socialist camp and fully supports the objectives and actions of the USSR in the field of international politics; and (2) more specifically, the pledge to respect the existing Alliance com­ mitments of France versus the declared aim to weaken the Alliance systems and to work for the dissolution of the Atlantic Pact. In both cases, these apparent contradictions can be explained by the dialectic nature of Marxism-Leninism. A nonaligned, independent France as a member of a future system of collective security in Europe is a long­ term projection, whereas tactical considerations dictate following a course that, in conformity with the Soviet strategy, does not call into question the stability of existing structures. In consequence, the almost total realignment with the foreign policy of the USSR and the steadfast support for the Soviet approach on disarmament and arms control would fit such an explanation. This two-level thinking nevertheless poses a serious dilemma for the PCF leadership: on the one hand, it is difficult to explain to the rank and file that the attainment of their own ultimate goals must be subordinated to present political and military priorities. On the other hand, before it entered the coalition the PCF position was widely interpreted in France and abroad as a return to the fold of the Moscow-led Communist movement, something which seriously eroded its credibility and weakened its influence. There can be no doubt that at the time of the leftist union, the PCF audience was much greater and its impact on public opinion at large incomparably stronger than today. One essential distinction, however, will have to be made in the attempt to assess the present impact of French Communism in the areas of security and of alliance relationships, the distinction between the influence the party is able to exert on the French domestic political scene through party activity and the influence provided by its position at the government level. This does not signify that the PCF has undergone a conversion to what has been called Gaullo-Communism. The consensus with the Gaullists always was super­ ficial (both sides giving a very different, if not totally opposed meaning, for instance, to the recognition of the national force de frappe). In terms of disarmament and arms control, there never was a convergence of views, since the Gaullist RPR opposes an active French role in this field (and therefore opposes the Giscard d’Estaing approach). In ideological terms and on domestic policies, no common ground ever existed between the two parties. The PCF stand can rather be defined as Gallo-Communism, which resembles in its relations with Moscow the French Catholic Church in its

104

New International Communism

relations with the Vatican. The PCF and the French Church are called, not without reason, the eldest daughters of their respective spiritual families. For the Western community and in particular for NATO, the decisive role of the PCF in weakening—if not in destroying altogether—the concept of Eurocommunism has important implications. But as far as France is con­ cerned, the positive effects of Eurocommunism (for instance, the accep­ tance of NATO as a stabilizing factor in East-West relations) were simply unacceptable. The idea of a third way proved from the start to be an illu­ sion, as the French example of the Union of the Left demonstrated. The return to Moscow-inspired orthodoxy was a logical byproduct of the deci­ sion to terminate the strategy of union with the Socialists. This has to be set against the consideration that by advocating a stand hostile to the strengthening of NATO and an extension of its role outside the treaty area, the PCF contributed to the immobility of French foreign and defense policies. It therefore made very difficult the readjustment of the Paris posi­ tion to new requirements in the East-West conflict after the Aghanistan in­ vasion. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, the PCF insistence on nonalignment with the United States did not help to persuade the French body politic that under the present circumstances a division of labor within the Western camp was urgently required, especially since the Gaullists also advocated distance from Washington. It is a matter of semantics whether such a trend is termed neutralism or not. More important is the assumption that, for the foreseeable future, the PCF will still be playing its essential role in preventing a major shift in the admittedly ambivalent policies of France towards NATO. As for its positive contribution to the solution of the current security and arms control issues, the party’s close adherence to Warsaw Pact concepts and methods tended to be counterproductive, hindering more than encouraging the continuing debate on the part France should play in this respect. A polarization has necessarily followed in this public debate. Whatever the specific merits of the PCF stand (on SALT, MBFR, or the Madrid conference), from the point of view of a rapprochement of Eastern and Western positions, the fact that the French Communists took a positive attitude provoked negative reactions from other political parties. For practical purposes and in con­ sidering the foreseeable options for Western security, the most important implication of the PCF role and behavior is that, as long as the USSR is in­ terested in pursuing a policy of stabilization in Europe (and probably in its relations with the United States, too), the French Communist party will contribute to this objective in its own way.

Epilogue: The PCF after the Change of Power in France The French presidential elections of April and May 1981 and the subsequent National Assembly elections in June fundamentally changed the role of the

The French Communist Party

105

Communist party in French political life and the tactics, if not the strategy, of its leadership. Although it is too early to analyze all the factors that have contributed to the debacle of the party, there can be no doubt that the primary cause was the campaign Georges Marchais imposed on the party apparatus and the militants well before his official nomination as the PCF presidential candidate in January 1981. After the rupture of the Union of the Left, Marchais had no choice but to run with little chance of being elected but with the not entirely unrealistic hope of maintaining his party’s voting strength at about 20 percent of the electorate. What really damaged this prospect was the way Marchais orchestrated his plan. By attacking the Socialist party as artificial alternative to the Giscard d’Estaing regime and by stressing the convergence of the non-Communist left with the conser­ vative parties, including the alleged trend to Atlanticism of the Socialist leadership, he created the impression that his real aim was not to defeat the incumbent but to damage Mitterrand. A number of serious blunders, like the attacks on foreign workers in the Paris suburbs, provoked a row within the party machine and especially with Communist intellectuals and jour­ nalists. But far more costly, the politburo ignored the grass-roots feeling of the members and the voters who wanted above all to restore the Union of the Left and for whom the presidential election of spring 1981 was revenge for the defeat of spring 1978. It is significant in this context that Roland Leroy, the director of L’humanite and the most outspoken opponent of Marchais within the politburo, acknowledged this fundamental error of strategy in an editorial, implying that the leadership failed to recognize the sociological changes that have taken place in France during the twenty-three years of rightist rule.90 In fact, the traditional Communist mainstay, the proletariat, had been replaced by a new lower-middle class, the proletarians now being the nonvoting 4 million foreign workers in France. Marchais also failed to appreciate that this new class was not ideologically oriented but had developed a pragmatic sense of power. Given the rather bleak prospects for the French economy in the spring of 1981, and in particular the rising unemployment (1.7 million people out of work in March) blue and white collar workers alike, including an important faction of the Communistdominated CGT trade union, chose to vote usefully, for the candidate on the left who appeared to have the better chance of winning. By the time Marchais realized this basic trend, it was too late. From April on, he changed his tactics, concentrating on the failures of the Giscard d’Estaing regime and making an opening to Mitterrand by returning to the theme of a government of the left. After the first round of the election of 26 April and the disaster of a 15 percent tally compared to Mitterrand’s 26 per­ cent, he asked for the inclusion of Communists in the cabinet as the price for PCF support in the runoff, but he was not in a position to dictate terms to the Socialists. Mitterrand answered that the problem would be tackled only after the parliamentary elections and on the basis of the Communists strength in the new National Assembly.

106

New International Communism

The PCF leadership, in a radical departure from its former electoral strategy, went to the point of virtually negating its candidate’s party affilia­ tion. Marchais had to accept the traditional electoral pact with the Socialists (the better placed candidate being chosen to represent both parties in the runoff) without obtaining any pledge on the government program and its composition. The most worrisome fact for the French Communist party is that it fail­ ed to win back the voters who deserted Marchais in the presidential ballot­ ing. With 16 percent of the votes, the PCF lost half its seats (44 of 88). More important, all its leading deputies (members of the politburo), with the ex­ ception of secretary general, Marchais himself, were defeated in the first round by their Socialist rivals. The ominous trend of the presidential contest was confirmed on 14 and 21 June, notably by the losses in the traditional Communist workers’ bastions in Paris and the Paris suburbs. »

The Revised PCF Stand on Foreign and Security Affairs Foreign and defense issues played a minor part in the presidential election campaign (in the platforms not only of the PCF, but of all four major par­ ties). But it would be wrong to assume that Marchais’s image suffered from an alleged submission to the foreign policy line of the USSR. The focal point of criticism was not convergence with the Eastern camp’s preferences, but the divisive character of the PCF’s election campaign. It is an irony that the overt Soviet intervention in this campaign, and in particular articles in Pravda of mid-March 1981, and the angry L’humanite rebuttals rather damaged the standing of Giscard d’Estaing as the candidate of the Kremlin by making it only too obvious that Moscow wanted the incumbent to stay in power for another seven years. The Communist platform of 131 points, published in January 1981, took up all the previous proposals on arms control and European security, adding a paragraph on the need for constructive results at the Madrid follow-up conference of the CSCE, which had opened in Novemberl980. In a comment on this part of the platform, Jacques Denis wrote in February 1981 that the PCF was the only political party in France advocating a con­ structive line on the issue of European security; he accused Mitterrand of having openly chosen the policy of the blocs, aligning the Socialist party with the Western camp as an ally of the United States in the confrontation with the USSR.91 A month later, Maxime Gremetz denounced the idea of Soviet military superiority as a fabrication of capitalist propaganda, quoting Charles Hernu, the present minister of defense, as having acknowledged the fact of a military balance between the East and West.92 Immediately after the first round of presidential elections, these polemics were discontinued in the party press. The comments in L’humanite stressed,

The French Communist Party

107

without going into details, the converging points of view of the two leftist parties on the matters of disarmament and security, avoiding all points of disagreement.’3 The negotiations between the leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties, started in mid-May, were speedily concluded after the second run of the parliamentary elections of 21 June 1981. The agreement constitutes a formal pact of coalition and the basis of action of the govern­ ment of Pierre Mauroy (see appendix D). It should be noted, however, that this text makes no mention of the common program of the left adopted in 1972 and shelved in March 1978. The agreement is couched in rather general terms as far as the social and economic policies of the new coalition are concerned, but goes into more details in the sections devoted to foreign and security policies. The part of the text that treats external relations has been widely considered by observers in France and abroad as a total surrender of the Communist leadershp to the demands of their dominating partner. The text itself, however, offers insufficient grounds for this interpretation. The PCF underwrote a few policy objectives that manifestly contradicted previously stated party views. But it omitted some points that had been part of the par­ ty’s platform (in particular, some of the 131 points of Marchais’s election campaign). Furthermore, it is difficult to compare this new statement to the common program in its amended version of August 1977, since a number of important international developments occurred after that date. The agreement states that the two parties will support the international interests of France and respect the nation’s alliances. Both parties will pro­ mote peace and progressive disarmament with the aim of the simultaneous dissolution of the military blocs by ensuring the balance of forces in Europe and in the world (Socialist party wording) and the equal security of all coun­ tries (a Soviet term). They advocate prompt international negotiations on the reduction of armaments in Europe, particularly with respect to the presence of Soviet SS-20 missiles and the decision to deploy the American Pershing II missiles. While the general statement of intent (to stay within the Atlantic Alliance but to work for the dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact organization) is in line with the old common program, it is striking that the LRTNF issue is so specifically stressed. For the first time, the PCF had to acknowledge that the new Soviet SS-20 missile affects the military balance in Europe.’4 Yet the PCF also apparently gained endorsement for excluding any reference to the far more critical Cruise missile. This suggests that Mit­ terrand’s position strongly supporting Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the NATO December 1979 dual decision to modernize and negotiate simultan­ eously in reality outweighed the stand of the PCF and other Western Euro­ peans who want to open negotiations and decide on the development posture based on the results of the negotiations.’5 As for the other new elements of international politics, the Afghanistan

108

New International Communism

crisis and the situations in the Middle East and Poland, the PCF leadership likewise accepted wording that is not directly counter to the stand taken by the USSR itself. In the case of Afghanistan, the coalition paper asks for the withdrawal of Soviet forces (the Socialist party terms) and an end to all foreign interference and the right of self-determination for the Afghan peo­ ple (the PCF viewpoint).’6 The Camp David peace process is acknowledged as creating a new situation, which does not necessarily imply that the PCF will in the future take a more positive attitude on this issue. (Of all the major French political groups, the Socialist party was the only one to support the Camp David agreements openly from the outset). The”recognition of the right of the Palestinians to a homeland corresponds to the position taken by the EC and is not, in principle, a bone of contention between the two leftist partners. With regard to Poland, there is also no apparent change in the Commu­ nist stand. If there is any backing down, it is rather on the part of the So­ cialists; since 1980, Mitterrand has warned strongly against Soviet interven­ tion in Poland, but the possibility of such intervention receives no mention in the coalition agreement. The process of economic, social, and democratic renewal is mentioned in terms used by the Polish authorities themselves. The fight for emancipation of the people of the Third World is sup­ ported on the economic and the political level, with special reference to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Yet the situation in Africa, the ongoing Madrid talks in the CSCE and the French plan for a disarmament conference in Europe are not noted in the text. The relevant paragraph on the EC ignores the controversial question of the enlargement of the Community by the entry of Spain and Portugal. But the coalition partners fundamentally dif­ fer on this point; the Socialists advocate in principle the entry of the two Iberian countries, whereas the Communists, even after their entry into the French government, continue categorically to oppose it. Yet in the field of European politics, the prospects of a nuclear arms race and security ques­ tions clearly take precedence over all other foreign policy problems.

Security Implications of the Communist Participation in the French Government The most immediate problem concerns the exact extent to which the four Communist cabinet members have access to sensitive information on mat­ ters of national defense. A communique of the U.S. State Department of 24 June stated that the tone and the content of Franco-American relations will be affected by the inclusion of Communists in the French government. This was understood in Paris as an announcement that Washington will reduce the flow of bilateral and NATO information to France. Communist, Social­

The French Communist Party

109

ist, and Gaullist circles protested this form of intervention in international French affairs, which indeed seemed to imply that the Communist cabinet members would be willing to pass defense information to the USSR. In the purely French context, this was considered an absurd charge. As a matter of fact, the two ministers most concerned, Charles Fiterman for transporta­ tion and Jacques Ralite for the health ministry (the two others are in charge of professional education and of the civil service), have kept the respon­ sibilities of their predecessors, including those concerning defense matters (in the case of the transportation minister, the activities related to maritime traffic have been transferred to the newly created ministry of the sea). Therefore, Fiterman is responsible for the organization of logistical mobili­ zation in case of war, including the NATO and bilateral Franco-German ar­ rangements. To dilute this authority for the Communist office holders would have been an admission of distrust, which was out of the question, despite American concern. On the level of decision making, the council of ministers does not, as a matter of principle, discuss the details of defense policies. The relevant deci­ sions are taken by a special Defense Council under the chairmanship of the president of the Republic and, as in the past, the departments now headed by Communist members are not represented in this council. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that the Communist cabinet members will have no say in the formulation of the policy guidelines, for this is a matter for the full Council of Ministers, where each member reports on the affairs of his department. Major decisions are jointly taken by the council, and the in­ structions given to the ministers concerned with various international prob­ lems are also decided by the full council. In practice, the largely dominant Socialist element of the executive will no doubt determine the guidelines for policy, especially since Francois Mit­ terrand appears determined to exercise fully the prerogatives of his three predecessors in external and defense affairs. The PCF in turn will probably keep a low profile and in the near term will avoid open confrontation with the Socialist partner. It will not, however, renounce the right to develop its own line in domestic as in external affairs, which Georges Marchais reaf­ firmed when signing the coalition agreement.97 The test of this coexistence of the two coalition parties will probably come by the end of 1981, when the government will have to take a position on current issues, like the French stand on the LRTNF and trade with the Eastern bloc. (It will be interesting to see, for instance, if France will sign the usual communique of the NATO council of ministers denouncing Soviet armaments as a threat to peace.) Inclusion of Communists in the government led Francois Mitterrand and his Socialist ministers to distance themselves from the USSR in order to minimize negative conclusions by the Western allies. But this tactic does not provide any clear indication of France’s general position in the foreseeable

110

New International Communism

future. The real test of solidarity will be about the social and economic policies of the Mauroy government, especially if the domestic situation in France deteriorates to a critical level. Nonetheless, if the situations in Poland, Afghanistan, and the Middle East should precipitate increased Soviet involvement, the PCF may be drawn reluctantly into a reinterpreta­ tion of its stand on the nature of the Soviet threat. Alternatively, the rising emotions of pacificism in Western Europe over the frustrations about arms control could create tensions within the two parties and the coalition. Joining the Mitterrand government was an absolute necessity for Georges Marchais, since participation in government allowed him to regain his authority. It must be noted that the coalition agreement covers not only government solidarity but also all activities on the level of regional and local government and labor relations. Projecting the image of governmental ac­ countability confers a new prestige and thus a greater credibility on the con­ temporary leaders of the PCF and helps them overcome internal opposi­ tion. For the time being, the government pact offers the only opportunity to regain the electoral strength the party lost in two repeated defeats. The Twenty-fourth Party Congress has been advanced to January 1982, and by showing that the Communists can govern (with all the tactical concessions to the Socialists this implies), Marchais clearly hopes to consolidate his leadership and to eliminate his critics on the left as well as the right.98 Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the party will undergo a fundamental change (a shift to New Internationalist strategy) on the occasion of the Party Congress, and there is at least a possibility, if not probability, that Georges Marchais will succeed in maintaining his present flexible policy. Thus participation in government apparently has reduced even further the prospects of the PCF’s intensifying its identification with any form of inter­ national Communism. Ultimately, however, the party must make hard choices about Communist identification in its role as the defender of workers’ rights and its ties with the international class struggle and socialist revolution.

Notes

1. See in particular Ronald Tiersky, “French Communism, Eurocom­ munism and Soviet Power,” in Eurocommunism and Detente, ed. Rudolf Tbkes, (New York: New York University Press, 1978), pp. 138-203. 2. Ibid. Tiersky argues that Communist participation in government would greatly accelerate the transformation of the PCF into a more open and democratically run party, p. 140. 3. Walter Schiitze, “Frankreich’s KP und der Kommunismus in den Farben Frankreich,” Jahrbuch Haus Rissen, Hamburg, 1976-1977; also

The French Communist Party

111

Helmut Richter and Gunter Trautmann, eds., Eurokommunismus: Ein dril­ ler Weg filr Europa? (Hamburg: Hoffman and Campe, 1979). 4. In interviews with Jean Kanapa and another spokesman on foreign policy of the PCF, Louis Odru, October 1977. 5. In the provincial elections of spring 1976, the Socialists gained more than 30 percent of the vote, and the PCF tally fell to 17 percent. In the municipal elections of spring 1977, the Union of the Left presented com­ mon lists in towns with more than 30,000 inhabitants. 6. Interview with Louis Odru in December 1977. 7. On the proceedings of this Berlin conference see, Heinz Timmermann, Jahrbuch Haus Rissen, 1976-1977. 8. Pierre Hassner, “Post-War Western Europe, the Cradle of Eurocommunism?” in Eurocommunism and Detente, ed. Takes, pp. 19-67. A comprehensive bibliography on the phenomenon is given in the appendix to Dieter Lutz, ed., Eurokommunismus undNA TO (Bonn: Osang Verlag, 1979). 9. A statement by the PCF politburo, L’humanite, 21 March 1978. 10. Francois Mitterrand, Ici et maintenant (Paris: Faillard 1980). 11. Annie Kriegel provides insights into the inner decision-making ap­ paratus, Les communistes fran$ais (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970). On party history and structures, see Jean Elleinstein, Le PC (Paris: Grasset, 1976). 12. Elleinstein, Le PC, p. 167. 13. Ibid., p. 16. Texts of the Twenty-second Party Congress, Cahiers du communisme (Paris), February-March 1976. 14. Texts, Cahiers du communisme, June-July 1979. 15. Annie Kriegel argues the contrary. Un autre communisme? (Paris: Hachette, 1977). 16. Jolyon Howorth, “The French Communist Party: Return to the Ghetto?” The World Today (London), April 1980:139-147. 17. Alexandre Adler, ed., L’URSS et nous, (Paris: Editions Sociales, Paris 1978). 18. Jean Elleinstein published a series of pertinent articles in Le monde, December 1977, on the PCF-USSR relationship. See also the rele­ vant chapter in his Le PC, p. 26. 19. See the journal Est & Quest, (Paris), March and April 1980. On the interparty links, see also William Griffith, “The Diplomacy of Eurocom­ munism,” in Eurocommunism and Detente, ed. Tbkes, pp. 385-436. 20. Le monde, 13-14 January 1980. The PCF-CPUSSR communique was published by L’humanite, 11 January 1980. 21. Ibid. 27 and 28 January 1980. 22. Texts and documents of the conference of the twenty-two Com­ munist parties in Paris are in L’humanite, 29 and 30 April 1980.

112

New International Communism

23. The party has nearly 10,000 such cells in the industrial sector. On the passive reactions of the militants, see Georges Mamy, “PCF des fuites dans 1’appareil,” Nouvel observateur (Paris), 12 July 1980. 24. Changer de cap: Programme pour un gouvernement democratique d’union populaire (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1971). 25. Ibid., p. 221. 26. Programme commun de gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972). 27. Ibid., p. 176. 28. Ibid., p. 175. 29. See Louis Baillot’s contributions to La securite de I’Europe dans les annees 30, Series travaux de ITnstitute Fran^ais des Relations Interna­ tionales (IFRI), (Paris, IFRI, 1980). 30. Chapter 2, “Disarmament and National Defense,” Programme commun de gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste, pp. 172-173; and James P. McGregor, “The 1976 European Communist Par­ ties’ Conference,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Winter 1978:339-360. 31. Changer de cap, p. 17. 32. Ibid., p. 222. 33. Programme commun de gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste, p. 175. 34. Ibid., pp. 172 and 175-176. 35. Ibid., p. 172. 36. The definition given by then chief of the general defense staff General Charles Ailleret, “Defense dirigee ou defense tous azimuts,” Revue de defense nationale (Paris), December 1967:1923-1932. 37. Interview with Jacques Denis, aide to the foreign affairs secretary of the PCF, Jean Kanapa, May 1973. 38. Programme commun du gouvernement du parti communiste et du parti socialiste, p. 172. 39. Guy Mery, “Une armee pourquoi faire et comment?” Defense Na­ tionale (Paris), June 1976:11-34. 40. See Giscard d’Estaing’s speech at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale, Le monde, 4 June 1976; also “Loi sur la programma­ tion des dispenses militaires et des equipements des forces armees pour la periode 1977-1982,” Journal officiel, debats parlementaires, Assemblee Nationale, (Paris), 21 and 26 May 1976; and “Les armees fran^aises de demain, programmation 1977-1982,” SIRPA, Minist&re de la Defense, Paris, Dossier d’Information 49, October 1976. 41. Le monde, 18, 19 and 24 April 1976. 42. Interviews with Charles Hernu, defense spokesman of the Socialist party, and with Jacques Huntzinger, aide to Mitterrand, who took part in the negotiations of the subcommittee.

The French Communist Party

113

43. See Dominique Gallet, Le monde, 15 September 1977. 44. The text of Jean Kanapa’s report is published in L’humanite, 12 May 1977. 45. Programme commun de gouvernement actualise, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1978), pp. 141-142. 46. Michel Fourquet, “Emploi des differents systemes de forces dans le cadre de la strategic de dissuasion,” Defense Nationale, May 1969; English text, Survival, July 1969:206-211. 47. Programme commun de gouvernement actualise, p. 141. 48. Background paper by Rodney Balcombe, “The Non-Communist Left and Security in Southern Europe: The Case of the French and Spanish Socialist Parties,” IISS meeting, Paris, Mimeo, April 1979. 49. A detailed analysis of this “reconversion” to the nuclear force is found in Christiane Burzig-Hoppe, “Die Sicherheitspolitik der Kummunistischen Partei Frankreichs,” in Eurokommunismus und NATO, ed. Lutz, pp. 65-101. 50. Interview with Louis Odru in December 1977. 51. See the position of Jean-Pierre Cot, in his contribution to Series travaux de 1’IFRI. 52. Programme commun de gouvernement actualise, pp. 142-143. 53. Ibid., p. 140. 54. Le monde, December 1977. 55. Jean Kanapa, L’humanite, 12 May 1977. 56. Louis Baillot, Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 March 1978. 57. Text of the declaration of the central committee in Armee-Nation (the defense journal of the PCF), August-September 1980. See also, in the same issue of this journal, Jean Marrane, “Armes nucleaires et modernisa­ tion.” 58. L’humanite, 19 April 1978, See also the rejection of the neutron bomb development by Jean Kanapa, L’humanite, 20 April and 29 September 1978. 59. On the background of this dispute see Jean Klein, “The Political Party Debate (France),” in Defense Policy Formation, ed. James N. Roherty, (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, Carolina Academic Press, 1980), pp. 247-270. 60. Louis Baillot in La securite de I’Europe, Series travaux de 1’IFRI. 61. Ibid. 62. Jacques Denis, Cahiers du communisme, March 1980:78. 63. Louis Baillot, in La securite de I’Europe, Series travaux de 1’IFRI. 64. Communique of the politburo of 21 May 1980, Cahiers du com­ munisme, June 1980. 65. Programme commun de gouvernement actualise, p. 146. 66. Jacques Hoffman, “Le parti communiste et I’Europe,” L’Appel, April 1979.

114

New International Communism

67. Only the Gaullist RPR party took a clearly negative stand on this issue. On the PCF tactics in Strasbourg, see Gustave Ansart, Cahiers du communisme, June 1980; and Renata Fritsch Bournazel, Die Franzosische KP und das Europa-Parlament, Konzeptionen und Aktivitaten, Berichte des Bundesinstitutes fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Nr. 29, Cologne, July 1980. 68. See the communique of the politburo of 21 May 1980, “La France doit mener une politique independante,” L’humanite, 21 May 1980; also the communique of the central committee of the PCF of 27 June 1980, Armee-Nation 25 (August-September 1980). 69. Jacques Denis, “Sur I’euro-communisme et les relations europeennes: Long interview with Heinz Timmermann” Cahiers du communisme, April 1978:94-108. 70. Louis Baillot, in La securite de I’Europe, Series travaux de 1’IFRI. 71. See the explanaton of Dieter Lutz, “Die NATO im Umbruch: Eurokommunismus als Katalysator der Systemveranderung? Riickwirkungen und Ausblick.” Eurokommunismus und NATO, ed. Lutz, p. 169. 72. Programme commun de gouvernement actualise, pp. 141 and 142. 73. Communique of the politburo of 14 January 1980 following the Marchais visit to Moscow, Cahiers du communisme, March 1980. Summary of the Gierek-Marchais meeting in Warsaw in Cahiers du communisme, February 1980; “Communique PCF-SED,” L’humanite, 28 April 1980. 74. Text in L’humanite, 11 January 1980. 75. Interview with Louis Odru, December 1977. 76. Jean Kanapa, France nouvelle, April 1977. 77. Denis, “Interview with Heinz Timmermann,” p. 105. 78. L’humanite, 11 January 1980. 79. Gerard Streiff, “Nous voulons la paix et le socialisme,” Cahiers du communisme, March 1980. 80. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, “La rose et la poing,” CERES Group Bulletin, January 1977. 81. Quoted by Denis, “Interview with Heinz Timmermann,” pp. 105-106. 82. “Memorandum du parti communiste fran^ais sur le desarmement,” L’humanite, 16 May 1978. 83. Programme commun de gouvernement actualise, p. 143. 84. L’humanite, 11 December 1979. 85. Ibid.; and Cahiers du communisme, January 1980. 86. Louis Baillot, “La France, SALT II, SALT III,” Strategic et Defense (Paris) November 1979:2. 87. Politburo communique of 10 December 1979, “Contre 1’installation en Europe de nouvelles armes nucleaires americaines.”

The French Communist Party

115

88. Communique of the PCF-SED in East Berlin on 25 April 1980, Cahiers du communisme, June 1980:116-118. 89. Interview with Jacques Huntzinger in September 1977. Jean Kanapa inferred that a strong military presence in the Federal Republic of Germany would be politically useful in that it would provide France with added leverage on the Bonn government. 90. Editorial by Roland Leroy in L’humanite, 7 July 1981. 91. Jacques Denis, Cahier du communisme, February 1981:76-88. 92. Maxime Gremetz, Cahiers du communisme, March 1981:27-32. 93. See the report by Georges Marchais to the central committee of 15 March 1981, Cahiers du communisme, June-July: 14-20. 94. Statement by Georges Marchais, “We shall leave nothing in the dark concerning the SS-20, the Pershing, and the Cruise, but each party might have its own appreciation of the problem.” Le monde, 25 June 1981. 95. Der Stern, 9 July 1981, pp. 80-84. 96. Marchais stated dramatically, “We say that on this basis, the Soviet forces must be withdrawn from Afghanistan,” Le monde, 25 June 1981. For additional comments seeLefigaro, 8 July 1981; L’humanite, 11 and 13 July 1981; and Le monde, 15 July 1981. 97. Cahiers du communisme, June-July 1981:4-12. 98. The so-called rightist, pro-Soviet faction of the leadership consists of Georges Gosnat, Gaston Plisonnier, Maxime Gremetz, Guy Hermier, and Jacques Denis. They are mainly opposed to the opportunistic and sec­ tarian line of Marchais. Fizbin still heads a leftist faction.

Foreign and Security Policies of the Spanish Communist Party

A central factor in the development of the Spanish Communist party is that during two-thirds of its sixty-year existence it was forced to operate clandestinely, and this method of operation is still reflected in the organiza­ tion, leadership, and doctrine of the party. Its dependence on the USSR during the Spanish civil war, and later in exile, has compelled the present leadership during the past fifteen years (and especially since its legalization in 1978) to assume a prominent role in establishing the tenets of national Communism. This unpleasant historical burden and the opportunities presented by Spain’s nascent democracy have led the PCE to become one of the most ardent supporters of the third way, a genuine Spanish road to socialism. Yet, the party remains trapped between its past record and its continued minority position in Spanish political life. Indeed, since 1980 there have been severe internal divisions that, compounded by the political isolation of the PCE, have caused marked disaffection among party members.1 One of the key features of the new government was the 1978 understanding between Carrillo and the premier, Adolfo Suarez, to facilitate the full integration of the PCE into the democratic process and remove any form of discrimination in return for tranquility within the Communist-controlled trade union, Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) In 1979 and 1980, however, public attention and the focus of policy issues had shifted from the minor problem of the rehabilitation of the PCE to the more critical economic issues of a 12 to 15 percent unemployment rate, 17 percent inflation, and greater confidentiality between business firms and non-Communist trade unions (which tended to isolate the CC.OO.), and the pressing problems of terrorism and the regional devolution of authority. The PCE felt cheated. It erroneously charged that the government had deliberately deflected public attention away from the main concern of con­ solidating the democratic process to the more tactical issues of political in­ terest to the dominant party, the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD). On this aspect, the peace accord was abandoned informally and a direct con­ frontation developed between the government and the PCE, with the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (PSOE) playing an ambivalent intermedi-

117

118

New International Communism

ate role. Thus, by 1980, there was repeated discussion in the media of the estrangement, isolation, and encirclement of the PCE in Spanish political life.2 But the PCE is not as isolated as its opponents imply. It remains a viable, potent political force in Spain. Unlike the PCF, which prior to 1981 was more committed to the political backwaters, the PCE’s continuing na­ tional influence is due precisely to the same reasons that isolated the PCF: its rejection of national communism and commitment to the Soviet model, albeit in French colors. The tenacious commitment of the PCE to the prin­ ciples of national Communist identity and the respectability granted it by other nonruling CPs for its support of Eurocommunism and the New Inter­ nationalism still have a convincing appeal within Spanish political circles. Furthermore, recent international developments related to national security and foreign policy questions have tended to reinforce the PCE’s image of independence from the Soviet position on most international issues. For example, the question of the Spanish relationship to Western Europe has forced the PCE foreign and security policies onto center stage in the national debates. Santiago Carrillo has repeatedly stated the party’s position that Spain is in a strategic zone of Western influence and bound to it by Madrid’s ties to the United States. However, he has also said that, out­ side the Alliance, Spain “would be able to carry out a more active and inde­ pendent role in international politics.’’3 A key party document underscored this point of opposition to Spain’s joining NATO, saying that as long as military blocs exist “it will be essential to avoid breaking the present balance, which is what would occur if Spain should join NATO.”4 NATO

Carrillo contends that a 1978 government-PCE tacit agreement extended beyond industrial relations and provided that the government would not raise the issue of NATO entry until after the 1983 general elections, when the PCE expected to consolidate its position within a leftist alliance and to par­ ticipate in a coalition regime. The government breached this understanding, contributing to the growing confrontation with the Communists. In the wake of the June 1980 Venice EC summit conference and France’s boycott of further negotiations for Iberian entry into the Community, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja, retaliated by announcing that Madrid would seek NATO membership before 1983, probably in 1981 in conjunc­ tion with the U.S. basing rights negotiations. The minister also directly assaulted the Communists’ position for their insisting that entering the Alliance would be very costly for Spain, or “that it would entail a breaking point in the military balance between the two blocs .... In my opinion, both these views are erroneous.”5 Oreja also insisted that the issue of Gibraltar would have to be resolved

The Spanish Communist Party

119

without addressing the sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom. Thus, the government attempted to tie all its outstanding European questions into a single EC-NATO-UK package, making it more difficult for its domestic and foreign opponents to defeat individual components. From the Western perspective, the advantages of Spanish entry are clear. A strong, militarily integrated Iberian defense posture in a conventional conflict would provide alternative aerial resupply bases, aircraft maintenance facilities, enhanced air defense and antisubmarine capabilities, logistics sanctuaries, and an enhanced threat to the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. Spain could also provide forces and equipment. After the abortive February 1981 storming of the Cortes by disgruntled Tightest officers and Guardia Civil, the new government of Calvo Sotelo reassessed its policies and priorities. To appease the military, it was decided to decouple the former negotiating package and accelerate the bid for NATO membership. Initial queries received positive responses from all allied partners. Technical problems existed, however. The precise missions and required weapons for Spanish armed forces were poorly defined. The notion of deploying two mechanized brigades to West Germany for in­ tegrated training did not materialize because Bonn feared that augmenta­ tion of the central front would stimulate rising domestic pacifism at a time when other issues were more crucial, especially LRTNF modernization. Finally, Madrid deferred pressing the matter until after the conclusion of bilateral negotiations with the United States, which could serve as a point of departure for addressing other questions. The initial response to the government’s decision set the tone for the subsequent confrontation over NATO membership. The PCE’s central committee characterized Oreja’s initial remarks as irresponsible, since Oreja would try to obtain Spain’s entry into NATO in 1981 with a simple majority vote in Parliament, rather than by the national referendum that the left advocated,6 which the government denied.7 But the PCE perceived it as an internal political maneuver aimed at driving a wedge between the PCE and other leftist forces.8 The government won a vote of censure on the issue by a thin margin (166 to 152). The PCE then claimed that Suarez felt alone and tried to overcome his difficulties with a flight forward by focusing on the issue of NATO membership rather than on various important domestic issues.9 But the government’s decision was more than a tactical maneuver. It represented a frontal attack on the theoretical precepts of the PCE’s secur­ ity policy: the crisis in bloc politics and the necessity to maintan stability and balance. It also hindered its strategy of achieving a common platform with the PSOE as the axis for an all-left coalition. Finally, it disrupted one of the PCE’s central electoral tactics of capitalizing in the 1983 campaign on its opposition to the Alliance. Even though the PCE was initially very cautious in avoiding words that

120

New International Communism

would entail a threat of pressure against the government on the NATO issue, it has demonstrated that it is determined to use all other possible means to achieve its aims. There is a very strong awareness of the Alliance issue within the party; constant campaigns are conducted to sensitize militants, primarily by the stands adopted in the local cells regarding real or hypothetical issues. Thus, members of the Balearic Islands oppose NATO “because it could entail for the Islands a very serious mortgage with the creation of a military base on the islands.”10 The rank and file in Cordoba affirm that the international economic crisis will not be solved by installing nuclear missiles in Europe and “forcing people to support NATO.”11 The international crisis is particularly relevant to . the Canary archipelago because of the government’s efforts to join NATO and “install a superbase in the Canary Islands;” it is necessary “that we all fight together for our neutrality.”12 The CC.OO. reaffirmed its opposition to war, bloc politics, and the cold war to which it claimed the “United States wishes to lead us.”13 In a joint January 1980 communique of the CC.OO. and the French CGT, similar international issues were also addressed including the rejec­ tion of NATO.14 The PCE’s negative declarations with respect to NATO are not unique. Other statements of opposition, perhaps not as varied but certainly as fre­ quent, have come from the PSOE and from the press, whether very close to the PCE (La calle) or supposedly independent (El pais, which maintains editorial policies against Spain’s entry into the Alliance).15 Even the former president of the government himself alluded to the tense atmosphere sur­ rounding the issue, referring to a “threatening” letter from Brezhnev.16 The May 1980 session of the PCE’s central committee made public an itemized accounting of the presumed results of Spanish membership: (1) a reduction of Spanish sovereignty in military and political affairs, (2) the creation of an insupportable situation in the Canary Islands, (3) disruption of the economy, (4) alteration of the correlation of European military forces and an increase in tension, (5) an emphasis on bloc dialectics and a hindering of peaceful coexistence, (6) violation of Spain’s tradition of political neutrality, (7) damage to the CSCE meeting in Madrid, and (8) ruin for all the positive steps taken with respect to Africa and the Third World in general.

The Theory of the Crisis of the Blocs

This eight-point critique of Spain’s participation in NATO is underpinned by two fundamental positions: the crisis of the existing bipolar blocs and the adequacy of U.S. bases in Spain to fulfill Western security requirements.

The Spanish Communist Party

121

The core tenet of the PCE’s defense policy is the condemnation of the collective security alliances as undesirable instruments perpetuating the divi­ sion of Europe and reinforcing the global status of the great powers. Car­ rillo is candid in his claims that bipolarity and the consequent military doc­ trines of the two blocs are in a state of crisis. Carrillo’s reasoning is that bloc politics always presuppose hegemony. This, he said, is a fact that “no ideology can hide.” This hegemony ends up being manifested not just in the military sphere but in all fields and becomes unbearable to other, crit­ ical nations.17 These contradictions arise not only from the “rejection of great power hegemony by the oppressed,” but by the disruption of the bipolarity of the world through thez process of multipolarization. New loci of power throughout the international system can no longer be ignored by the great powers. Although China and Japan seem to be leaning toward the United States, their independence cannot be doubted. Furthermore, the nonaligned nations, which do not yet represent a formal bloc, possess considerable political and economic weight given their control of the greater part of the world’s sources of energy and raw materials. They have been able to form various interest groupings that counteract bipolar hegemonic tendencies. Finally, as Carrillo said recently, one can sense in Europe a desire for in­ dependence—in Western Europe from the United States, and in Eastern Europe from the USSR.18 In the same manner in which it rejects bloc politics, the PCE also refutes the theory of two camps (referring to Marchais’s January statement in Moscow) to explain Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. An organ of the PCE central committee referred to the Soviet occupation and to what it termed President Carter’s hysterical reaction. The reaction in some Com­ munist circles has created a response that could be described as division into two camps; “to be against imperialism there is only one place to be—align­ ed with the USSR.”19 However, this does not reflect reality. It ignores great forces in today’s world that are not on the side of the USSR but are opposed to American imperialism. It is with the wide group of nations that are not with the USSR but are against American imperialism that Spanish national Communism is determined to form “a new group of forces,” a “new sort of alternative way in the realm of international relations.”20 Carrillo has in­ sisted that military blocs are a dead end beyond which there is only nuclear war. “We refuse to divide mankind into great military and ideological blocs.”21 The general theory of the crisis of the blocs, however, must be compati­ ble with the maintenance of equilibrium between them, so as to ensure equal security. A disturbance of this balance would have destabilizing conse­ quences. Spain’s entry into the Atlantic Alliance would break the balance; that is, it would increase the strength of one of the blocs, consequently

122

New International Communism

obliging the other to reinforce itself. This is the basic meaning of the con­ cept of the reinforcement of bloc politics. The blocs may be presently in crisis, but the general laws that regulate their balance must be universally valid before, during, and after any crisis. That is, the grounds for condemning the expansion of the Western bloc must be the same as those for condemning an enlargement of the Soviet bloc. In this respect, the Soviet or Western blocs must be understood not merely as formal alliances ratified through treaties, but as military and political forces. Conceptually, then, the PCE claims it is not legitimate to compare Spain’s hypothetical entrance in the Alliance with the Soviet oc­ cupation of Afghanistan, since both events’ would not serve to reinforce bloc politics. The redeeming logic of the theory is its inevitable connection to peaceful coexistence and detente as the rational means for progressive social forces to move further ahead in order to achieve the dissolution of blocs. Preservation of military parity is the key factor for the peaceful dissolution of the blocs and the termination of the crisis of the blocs. But the PCE is completely silent on the methodology for correlating rival force postures, and whether to include strategic or only theater forces.

U.S. Military Bases and Perceptions of Threat

For Communists, the subject of Spain’s relations with the United States is directly related to that of NATO, since the treaty of friendship and coopera­ tion between the two nations provides for U.S. military support in return for facilities on Spanish bases for the American naval and air forces. Even though Santiago Carrillo refers to these facilities as “foreign bases in Spain,’’ he ascribes to them a role in the present strategic balance. Thus, despite his opposition to all military blocs, he said the PCE does not pro­ pose eliminating foreign bases in Spain “except with the simultaneous elim­ ination of those which exist on the other side of Europe.”22 Do these arguments imply, however, that the PCE is willing to comply with the expansion or modernization of American facilities on Spanish bases? This question entails considerable ambiguity. According to Resolu­ tion 13 (on foreign policy and defense) of the April 1978 Ninth Congress of the PCE, “Our firm intention is to achieve a Spain free of foreign military bases, with no agreements limiting our national sovereignty.” However, “at this present juncture, the most feasible means to eliminate foreign bases and troops, be it in the West the American ones, or in the East the Russian ones, is to move towards the dissolution of blocs.”23 (This explicit support of the status quo corresponds, paradoxically, to the position of the PCI, which favors Italy’s presence in NATO on the grounds that Italy’s withdrawal

The Spanish Communist Party

123

would upset the strategic balance.) Implicit in this position is the PCE’s strong opposition to the extension, expansion, or use of the facilities. Modernization is a more difficult issue, because the process is difficult to define and the PCE is not knowledgeable about the details of present U.S. operations. But the question will probably surface during the 1981 bilateral basing negotiations, at which time the PCE may attempt to gain specific answers from the government. Therefore, to avoid the worst possible consequence (adherence to NATO), the PCE is ready to accept the least onerous circumstances (U.S. military presence). The central committee has recommended, on the one hand, that discussions be conducted to renegotiate bilateral agreements with the United States, but independently of the NATO issue. On the other hand, the PCE insists that it is essential to hold a refendum so that the na­ tion may voice its opinion.24 What limits on the U.S. military commitment are the Spanish Com­ munists ready to accept, other than (grudgingly) that of mutual defense? Communist literature has not specified the degree to which the leasing of Spanish bases to the United States is compatible with the interests of na­ tional sovereignty and with Spain’s international freedom of initiative. Without doubt, the governmental June 1980 NATO announcement forced the PCE to undertake a more explicit analysis of the issue. Carrillo repeated in the same year the PCE opposition to foreign bases on Spanish soil on grounds of national dignity and not because of any insistence from Moscow. But the bases were tolerable “as long as these [bases in Spain] are not used to implicate Spain” in any conflicts in which the United States is engaged around the world.25 The stress on the urgency of constraining U.S. activities so as not to im­ pinge on Spain’s policy options or independent decisions is central to the party’s revised eight-point defense plan. Basing rights can be continued only if (1) they are in total agreement with the Constitution; (2) they answer Spain’s vital interests; (3) the bases are used exclusively for defensive pur­ poses; (4) the presence of the bases does not affect Spanish foreign policy; (5) compliance with the conditions placed on the use of the bases is under parliamentary control; (6) strategic use of Spanish territory is precluded; (7) the transportation, placement, and use of nuclear arms or components are precluded; and (8) Spain is adequately compensated.26 Of all the above points, only (4) and (6) constitute obstacles to the renegotiation of the Spanish-American treaty. In fact, it seems impossible to pretend that the presence of American facilities in Spain could have no effect on Spanish foreign policy when the mere concession of facilities to the United States entails a high degree of definition of the Spanish interna­ tional stand. There is an intrinsic incompatibility between the PCE’s posi­ tion and what it claims it is ready to concede. With respect to point 6, this

124

New International Communism

statement creates more doubts than it clarifies. Naturally, it excludes the use of Spanish facilities as bases for strategic systems; but it also apparently pretends to exclude the use of the bases to support the defense of nations such as Italy and Yugoslavia, since there are no Soviet threats facing those nations. The same principle is applied with respect to the use of the facilities for defensive purposes in the Middle East, where “the general orientation of U.S. politics contributes to increasing tensions and the danger of con­ flict.”27 The concept of Western defense is rejecte4 by the PCE as a mask for U.S. hegemony in Europe, incarnate in NATO. Outside Europe, the United States would not defend in the Middle East, for example, any in­ terests besides its own—not those of Western Europe. Thus, Spanish bases cannot be used in any context other than the European one.28 It is reasonable, hence, to conclude from the PCE point of view that if military facilities in Spain are useful for European defense, they are acceptable; but, if used for military purposes outside the European area, then they are not. In this way, the problem becomes that of identifying threats to Europe. It would not be unjustified to assume that the only threat to Europe in the PCE’s terms would be outright military intervention on European ter­ ritory. Actions unfavorable to European interests (investments, the gaining of access to European sources of energy and raw materials, and so forth) ought to be resolved through negotiation. Soviet military action is always presented by the Communists in an anonymous context of confrontation among the blocs but very rarely is posited as a formulation of Soviet power politics or projection of military power. Soviet interventions in the Third World are viewed by PCE analysts as operations supporting popular struggles for liberation (the Communist press frequently reports on Soviet assistance of fighting peoples). No rigorous, informed analysis of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has been published in the Communist press. Such issues as the legitimacy of the Soviet naval presence in that sea, allegedly justifiable by the fact that the Soviet Union is a Mediterranean power, are ignored by the Communist press. This silence, nonetheless, should not be attributed to hypocrisy; it may be due simply to theoretical difficulties of engaging in analyses that reach beyond the immediate innovation and development of the doctrinal principles of Eurocommunism in the international area, which seldom require engaging in strategic assessments based on purely military factors and data. In an ambivalent statement on the nature of the threat, foreign bases, and force modernization, Resolution 13 of the PCE Ninth Congress con­ cluded, “In essence, today’s balance of power between the two major powers is not dependent upon military bases in foreign countries, but rather on the long-range nuclear weapons stationed in both the United States and

The Spanish Communist Party

125

the USSR. Regardless of the different historical factors on which they originated, the two blocs are instruments of hegemony rather than organizations designed to provide for military requirements.”29 If this is the threat analysis, then Spanish bases have little relevance to Western defense or European force postures from the PCE standpoint. The cynical response by the PCE’s opponents is that the Communists are less concerned about the U.S. physical presence than with the employment it provides for thousands of Spanish workers (over a thousand were laid off when the Polaris force was withdrawn from the Rota Naval Base in 1979) and with the remunerations Washington would pay, reportedly $1.2 billion over five years. In a parallel vein, the PCE has also firmly rejected all suggestions of modernizing any Western defenses, especially upgrading NATO’s theater of nuclear forces. The Communists denounced the NATO December 1979 decision to install over 500 Cruise and Pershing II missiles. This was regard­ ed as a deliberate American attempt to upset the regional balance. Accor­ ding to Carrillo, if the United States believes that a lack of balance exists, then it should seek other means to solve the problem, such as East-West arms-reduction talks.30 (He ignored the fact that the NATO December 1979 decision called precisely for initiating that option, a lamentable commen­ tary on the level of concern of the PCE on arms control matters, which receive virtually no discussion in party literature.)

The Effect of Events in Afghanistan on the PCE’s Bloc Theory

Because of its desire to gain and maintain democratic credibility and at the same time preserve its position within the international Communist move­ ment, the PCE found the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan particularly prob­ lematic. Events in Afghanistan have become as controversial as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which the PCE firmly condemned. The 1968 invasion was a watershed for the PCE. It stimulated serious rethinking of the party’s theoretical and conceptual premises. The case of Afghanistan, on the other hand, profoundly challenged the validity of the theory of crises of the blocs and the PCE’s justification for avoiding entry into the Western Alliance. Manuel Azcarate, secretary for international relations of the PCE and director of Nuestra bandera, was mainly responsible for enunciating the PCE’s position on Afghanistan. Azcarate has been since the 1960s the most outstanding ideologist within the party, and, since the Tenth Party Con­ gress in July 1981, he has become the leading spokesman of the liberal, reformist, oppositional faction. His themes are: (1) the persisting crisis of

126

New International Communism

capitalist society; (2) the necessity that Communist parties in advanced capitalist nations find their own road to socialism, avoiding formulae for violence or revolution; (3) the usefulness of democratic parliamentary in­ stitutions as instruments for the socialist transformation of society; (4) the dependence of socialist transformation on a broad union of Communists, Socialists, progressives, and Christians; and (5) the absence of an interna­ tional Communist central authority. Following these themes, he developed the PCE’s position on the Afghanistan invasion. There was no merit to arguments that the USSR had acted to protect a socialist government. The Soviets, rather, acted out of their own strategic need to occupy an advantageous position near the Indian Ocean and close to an important oil-producing region. The invasion opened a wider gap than ever between Moscow’s international politics and the policies of other revolutionary forces around the world, including those in Europe. The gap was greater than that created by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.31 For the second time since the legalization of the PCE in 1978, Spanish national Communism provoked severe rebuke by the Soviet press. New Times, following its vehement attacks against Santiago Carrillo’s book Eurocommunism and State in 1978, reviewed events in Afghanistan since 1978 to justify the presence of Soviet troops in that country. The USSR had only attempted to open the way for the people of Afghanistan to achieve the objectives of their revolution. “Articles such as the one appearing in Nuestra bandera do not, by any means contribute to this.’’32 Moscow’s wrath against Azcarate had been further incited by his repeated declarations on the Afghanistan issue, for instance that “it is inadmissible for a major power to impose its will by force on a neighboring nation by invoking socialist ideals.’’33 Azcarate said the invasion of Afghanistan apparently shows that Moscow is prepared to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine in areas where its influence was precluded by the Yalta agreements.34 He said later that the Soviets suffered disastrous political consequences from the invasion by producing a negative effect on nonaligned states and by “giving way to Carter’s opportunistic and election-geared reactions.’’35 In essence, Az­ carate viewed with concern the opportunity the Afghanistan occupation was providing to the enemies of Eurocommunism to discredit it.36 This argu­ ment is based on the differences of opinion among other Communist par­ ties, particularly the French, about the nature of Eurocommunism.37 Carrillo’s analysis of the events in Afghanistan give rise to broader questions of military balance, strategic factors, and considerations on the crisis of capitalism. In Carrillo’s opinion, the invasion of Afghanistan had four basic causes: the increasing influence of the military hierarchy in Kremlin politics, the USSR’s desire to respond to the installation of the Euromissiles, its interest in controlling the oil-producing area of the Persian

The Spanish Communist Party

127

Gulf, and its mistaken estimate of the West’s capacity to retaliate.38 In Car­ rillo’s report to the February 1980 session of the central committee he stated that the explanation that the Afghanistan government had called for the Soviet troops is inadmissible. To speak about efforts to save socialism in Afghanistan does not take into account that that nation did not have a socialist regime of any type. The central committee then called for the im­ mediate withdrawal of Soviet forces.39 How did the PCE perceive the consequences of Soviet actions in Afghanistan? Carrillo responded that one of the most obvious results was that American imperialism regained the leadership it had begun to lose. American imperialism tried to group together, not without a certain degree of success, a bloc technologically, economically, and demographically much more powerful than that of the USSR and its potential allies. A bloc of the United States, Japan, China, and Western Europe was by far the more powerful, from all points of view.40 Thus, the most significant effect of the Afghanistan crisis was that by increasing tensions it undermined the general theory of the crisis of the blocs and the necessity for preserving balance, the fundamental ideological scheme of PCE national Communism. Yet by similar logic, the party’s posi­ tion on Spain’s incorporation into NATO was also compromised: how could it now continue to reject the Alliance on the grounds that adherence would create a military imbalance? The answer could be explained only in general terms: the Soviet intrusion was condemned as highly contrary to working class interests. The creation of new imbalances and the resulting reinforcement of bloc politics were directly and radically opposed to the in­ terests of all progressive forces of the world. In the PCE’s perception, the case of Afghanistan had other serious theoretical consequences. One bloc’s promotion of social change by force generated a restoration of political determination in the United States and reversed or restrained the trend toward autonomy in Western Europe. Because it (along with other international events) galvanized the Western bloc, the invasion of Afghanistan was the turning point in the economic recovery of the capitalist societies, postponing the inevitable crisis in capitalism. In addition, the Kremlin had demonstrated utter disregard for the national interests of other Communist parties; neither ruling nor nonruling parties were consulted or informed of Soviet intentions—a direct violation of the treaty provisions with the Eastern Europeans. This indif­ ference, if not disdain, for the interests and responsibilities of fraternal par­ ties indicated that Moscow still regarded itself as the unquestionable center of the international Communist movement. But the rejection or disavowal of its actions by many important nonruling CPs proved the opposite. The explicit purpose of the devolution of authority was to allow local parties to cultivate national constituencies and develop national programs

128

New International Communism

for the progression to socialism. But Russian actions in Afghanistan were yet one more demonstration of the Soviets’ minimal tolerance for national Communist aspirations when confronted with compelling requirements of Soviet state interests. According to some PCE officials, the entire tradi­ tional concept of internationalism and the transnational idea of workers’ class struggles must now be reexamined and the advisability of further par­ ticipation in a movement dominated by a superpower whose policies are determined primarily by realpolitik, rather than the goals of socialist ad­ vancement, must be thoroughly analyzed. From the viewpoint of these PCE members, Eurocommunism is not dead at all; the situation in Afghanistan has given it new life. The most damning PCE argument was that the invasion of Afghanistan had reversed the trends of detente, peaceful coexistence, and the advance­ ment of socialism in the West. The PCE accepts the general Soviet argu­ ment that American decisions were responsible for the deterioration of superpower relations in 1978-1979, but the party holds that the invasion and Mongolianization, as it were, of Afghanistan had a far more lasting im­ pact on the nature of the confrontation of the competing sociopolitical systems. Even with the slight downward trend in public support for all four Latin European CPs in 1979, the long-term prospect for increases was good because of the economic recession, the sustained crisis of capitalism, and the decline of imperialist interests and commitments abroad. Events in Afghanistan precipitated a series of East-West developments that led to political mistrust and mutual recrimination, renewed arms race, a struggle for the redefinition of superpower spheres of influence, a rapid increase in tensions, and the distraction of local electorates from immediate steps for the advancement of socialism. The concluding indictment was that the Kremlin so seriously misjudged its military prowess and the strength of Afghan resistance that the nonruling CPs are saddled with growing public concern over international tensions, a shift to the electoral right, and grow­ ing popular perceptions of Soviet leadership as incompetent. Under these circumstances, Carrillo is in the unenviable position of having to try to preserve the former mutually reinforcing relationship between Eurocom­ munism and Spanish national Communism.41

Foreign-Policy Issues

The central negative aspect of the PCE’s foreign policy is its strong objec­ tion to Spanish entry into NATO; the cardinal positive issue is its support of Spanish admission into the European Economic Community. These posi­ tions place the PCE in deliberate opposition to both the Socialists and the government, both of which see a close tie between Spain’s joining NATO

The Spanish Communist Party

129

and joining the EC. The PCE maintains that Spanish membership in the EC would not imbalance the blocs within Europe, because the balance is primarily military. On the contrary, it raises resounding political and ideological arguments to support greater Spanish participation in first Western Europe and then a unified Europe. We have opted for a Europe of the peoples. Today we only know the Europe of the monopolies, and we can see its limits and its impotence in solving the essential problems in the economic, the political, and social arenas. A process oriented toward the internationalization of the produc­ tive forces, toward the creation of larger areas of economic and political coordination should be pursued by the working class and the European left to give it a progressive outlook and strengthen within it the authority of the laboring and cultural forces. Only in that way will we be able to decouple Europe from American influence and in general from bloc politics.42

Carrillo has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to Western European political concepts, institutions, and practices. “As for the political system established in Western Europe, based on representative political institu­ tions, political and philosophical pluralism, the theory of separation of powers, decentralization, human rights, this system is essentially valid, but would be more effective with a socialist, noncapitalist economic base. In any case, it is a matter of increasing the democratization of the system, of bringing the people even closer to power.”43 From the PCE’s perspective, the main problem lies not in the stability of political cultural and institutions but in economic factors. The 1978 Party Congress concluded that Spanish entry into the EC would accelerate reforms oriented toward socialism. Such a transformation would require the cooperation of other leftist forces, those groups committed to decisive confrontation with the great monopolies that now dominate Europe. A Western Europe dedicated to the rights and interests of workers and the people could then establish its own policies, independent of either super­ power. It could renounce hegemony while still maintaining positive and ac­ tive relations with both superpowers. This would provide a viable, durable basis for the reunification of Europe, a Europe with its own history and political culture and its own autonomous authority in the international system, which would not destabilize the blocs but would bypass superpower bilateralism. Thus, the democracy achieved by the Western bourgeoisie when it was a revolutionary class, coupled with the accomplishments of socialism, would add a new, truly egalitarian dimension to European democracy. A politically and economically independent Europe that was master of its own destiny could tackle the problems of detente, coexistence, and disarmament with real prospects of achieving the people’s desires for peace.44

130

New International Communism

While Carrillo emphasizes that the PCE’s primary ally in securing Spanish entry into the European Economic Community and the subsequent transformation of Europe is the socialist left, he also stresses that the achievement of enhanced importance for Europe within the international system rests partly in the growing relevance of the Third World to global stability. “In the second place, it shall be necessary to have the cooperation of the Third World, particularly with states that pursue an anti-imperialist and nationalist policy and are interested in the democratization of interna­ tional relations.”45 Since the underdevelopment of the Third World is a direct consequence of long colonial oppression and exploitive policies, the PCE insists on a rectification of the unequal exchange between the North and South. A new international economic order is indispensible to end the remnants of neocolonialism. Spain, with its diverse historical, political, and economic links to these countries and with its special relationship with the nonaligned movement, can and should play an increasingly useful role in stimulating the North-South dialogue. According to the Ninth Party Congress, the PCE views Africa with par­ ticular interest. It is a continent where changes of extraordinary importance are influencing the correlation of historic forces. The party openly supports all national liberation movements throughout the continent, especially the Polisario movement, which is labeled an unfortunate legacy of the Franco era. But support for freedom fighters does not include support for pro­ ponents of independence for the Canary Islands. The Canaries are part of Spain, and we reject any attempt from whatever origin, to put into question this obvious reality. The PCE firmly opposes the utilization of Canarian territory for foreign bases and military installa­ tion, and rejects aggression against African countries. At the same time, it will develop every type of initiative in support of the movements and pro­ gressive countries of Africa, in order to deter any potential interference in the problems of the Canaries.46

Thus, the PCE has maintained an active interest in foreign policy mat­ ters relevant to Spanish national interests, primarily in Europe and Africa. This attention, however, no doubt has been reinforced by its keen concern with neutrality on the one hand and nonalignment on the other.

Neutrality and Nonalignment

The PCE assumes as a general guideline for its international policy the com­ mitment to contribute to a strengthening of the worldwide anti-imperialist labor movement and to overcome the differences and divisions that today weaken the struggle of the masses and peoples against colonialism and im­

The Spanish Communist Party

131

perialism. These objectives are possible through nonalignment, which would also guarantee Spain’s sovereignty, independence, borders, and traditional neutrality.47 An ambivalence has emerged in the PCE literature about the precise nature of the preference for Spain’s international role: nonaligned, with political connections; neutral, with legal obligations; or both. The distinc­ tion is seldom made among countries without formal alliance commitments. But given the USSR’s increasing identification with the nonaligned move­ ment, the differentiation should be critical to the PCE’s quest for a third road within a Communist framework. The Seventh Party Congress in 1965 briefly held that the foreign policy of the democratic state is based on positive neutrality—Spain’s contribution to the cause of peaceful coex­ istence. The Eighth Party Congress in 1972 made no mention of either neutrality or nonalignment, but the 1978 Ninth Congress selected the term nonalignment. But in 1980 the party stated that the government’s an­ nouncement it would seek to enter NATO was a breach of Spain’s tradi­ tional political neutrality. The Ninth Party Congress endorsed neither neutrality nor identifica­ tion with the formal nonaligned movement. Maximum flexibility in foreign policy was emphasized: support for national liberation movements, recognition of an independent Saharan state to reinforce the security (and loyalty) of the Canary Islands, expansion of ties with Africa and Latin America, and a gradual curtailment of U.S.-Spanish security commitments, without impairment of Spain’s potential involvement in Europe.48 This is not a policy of commitment to explicit obligations or identification with an amorphous cause, nor is it a statement of precise responsibilities. It is a quest for maximum flexibility in foreign and defense policy with minimal constraints. The Party Congress successfully avoided consideration of the implications of the differentiation between nonalignment and neutrality, which is not surprising for a Communist party so closely identified with Eurocommunism. Regarding the definition of neutrality, the PCE’s position is rather con­ fused. Policy is often determined on the basis of other factors, such as geography and the interests of other powers. Spanish neutrality since 1823 has been due to its distance from central Europe and to French and British interests in reinforcing that posture. Only Franco, to the PCE’s embarrass­ ment, was able unilaterally to negotiate and preserve Spanish neutrality, despite his fascist obligations. The PCE is playing upon the emotions associated with its privileged historic position. More specifically, the PCE advocates the degree of nonalignment of Yugoslavia, with fewer risks, or of Algeria.49 While the party periodically mentions active neutrality within the Mediterranean context, it does not specify the legal constraints and respon­ sibilities of this neutrality. The arguments for neutrality or nonalignment,

132

New International Communism

however, are frequently used to bolster the rationale for a military doctrine directed exclusively to territorial defense. The PCE has made a considerable effort to develop a military doctrine that would embody its policy of active neutrality. One of the authors of this theoretical innovation, Fernando Zaba, a member of the defense commis­ sion of the PCE’s central committee, maintains that “the PCE is well aware of the fact that the adoption of policies geared at national independence is aimed at serving Spain’s interests, and this implies specific military policies in accordance with these postulates. The PCE promotes the establishment of a strong national defense system.”50 The idea that financing an indepen­ dent national defense system (outside NATO) would be more costly is re­ jected. Zaba said it has not been shown that, in the short term, national defense would be more expensive than an alignment with one of the blocs. In the long term, however, it would be very economical for Spain to remain nonaligned. The PCE argues that a neutral and independent defense policy for Spain would not require the allocation of more resources than at pre­ sent, simply a more efficient distribution of what is already being spent.51 Active neutrality and independence limit, according to the PCE, the possible use of Spanish armed forces outside national territory. It interprets the Constitution strictly: Spanish forces cannot be used for the defense of foreign territories. (The Constitution, however, does not preclude the deployment of the Spanish armed forces outside the national territory.) Juan Perez, a professor at Madrid University has commented that the tradition of Spanish neutrality is likely to survive and will probably be the governing factor in determining the degree of Spain’s integration into NATO, but also the preservation of the independence of the national armed forces.52 Thus, in his view, the issue that is apt to divide Spaniards over the Alliance question and possibly intensifies the PCE’s interpretation of active neutrality is not whether to maintain strict neutrality or seek full participa­ tion, but how best to secure the advantages of both options—enhanced security and independent policy choices.53 A recent survey of Spanish officers reveals other factors compounding the controversy over neutrality. Of 8,000 readers of the semi-official review Defensa, 53 percent of the civilian readers favored NATO membership, and 87 percent of the senior officers endorsed full military integration, but 58 percent of the junior grade officers and 57 percent of the noncommissioned officers opposed. This represents not only an age gap but possibly different career aspirations. There was also a higher percentage of air force and navy officers committed to membership; these are the services with the best equipment and the most exposure to joint allied training.54 Thus, the na­ tional debate is more complex than the PCE’s ambivalent quest for neutral­ ity indicates. The PCE’s vision of Spanish defense as independent and neutral is

The Spanish Communist Party

133

augmented by statements aimed at promoting the modernization of the Spanish armed forces through a process of reform (initiated by the govern­ ment and supported by the PCE). The objectives are national autonomy of the armaments industry and the democratization of military activities. The overall goals are to endow the nation with modern and efficient armed forces that are less top-heavy and are led by younger officers than at pre­ sent; are better equipped than at present, with a much higher proportion of their equipment produced nationally so as to reduce dependency on foreign nations; are capable of distributing more adequately funds in the defense budget; and are organized vertically (joint commands) and horizontally (territorial positions) as the circumstances may require—in short, armed forces that are united with the citizens, patriotically defend popular sovereignty, and, in consequence, genuinely ensure, together with all Spaniards, national defense.55

The PCE and the PSOE

To support its policies on neutrality and national defense, the PCE has sought an alliance with the Socialists. With 112 deputies in Parliament, the PSOE is the nucleus of any realistic alternative for power, and their opposi­ tion to the Atlantic Alliance is a key factor for possible success. According to the Communists, the PCE and the PSOE are in the best position to pro­ mote pacifist international politics, a European approach to nonaligned na­ tions, a dialogue among Europe and the Arab nations, and increased Western European independence from the United States. The PCE offer to the Socialists of a joint campaign against NATO membership had objectives other than to counter government domestic maneuvering. The platform also sought: (1) the development of political ac­ tion by a new majority as the basis for a new government, (2) a resolution of the impasse in the regional autonomy process, and (3) a study of interna­ tional actions that could promote a wider dialogue among the European labor organizations, especially within the framework of the CSCE.56 It must be pointed out, however, that the PCE is greatly concerned about the fact that the PSOE did not respond positively to its recommenda­ tions, making impossible the fulfillment of one of the major postulates of Spanish Eurocommunism: that it is possible to find a peaceful road to socialism through the joint action of European Communist, Socialist, pro­ gressive, and Christian forces. The proposition has been tenaciously defended on the PCE side as the central issue of the numerous encounters with French, German, and British Socialists into what Spanish Communists have recently baptized the Euroleft.57 Carrillo blamed the government for political maneuvering aimed at

134

New International Communism

splitting the left. He claimed that the government’s attempt to gain Spain’s admission to NATO was the beginning of a “political counteroffensive aimed at creating new alignments over pro- and anti-NATO membership views.”58 Carrillo was correct in being apprehensive but mistaken in his reasons. The government’s tactics were not responsible for the splintering of the left. For some time, the PSOE, the oldest and second largest (30 percent) Spanish party, had been undergoing an identity crisis. At the 2 May 1979 Twenty-eighth Party Congress, it voted two to one to oust Felipe Gonzalez as secretary general. The challenge focused on the question of whether the PSOE should remain the leading party of the leftist opposition and poten­ tial partner of the PCE or if the party should seek an alternative as a poten­ tial governing party by attracting centrist votes. Gonzalez advocated a shift to the center by dropping the party’s Marxist label. The PSOE had grown since legalization at the PCE’s expense from 8,000 to 200,000 members and lacked cohesion and a moderate base.59 When defeated on the floor, Gonzalez resigned his position, but he secured the concession that an Extraordinary Congress be convened in October to resolve the party’s future. The Congress reelected Gonzalez by 85.9 percent over his leftist rival—a stunning recovery. This represented a serious defeat for revolutionary rhetoric; it also meant the introduction of gradual reforms that left the PCE increasingly isolated on central domestic issues, such as PSOE appeals for a center-left coalition. It is too early to determine how many of the PSOE’s extreme leftists will defect to the PCE and com­ pensate for the latter’s declining popularity. This estrangement from the PSOE and declining domestic popularity partially explain Carrillo’s new regional offensive to promote acceptance of the revitalization of Eurocommunism under the name Euroleft or New Internationalism. PCE delegations have visited throughout Western Europe to stimulate endorsements of a new international conference of progressive parties and groups (see chapter 9). But top-level meetings with Mitterrand, Brandt, Berlinguer, the Yugoslavs, and the PCP have not proven entirely satisfactory. The reservations about the nuclear goals of the participants and the disarray within the left in the four Latin European countries suggest that any gathering would probably demonstrate more confusion and divi­ sion than unity and purpose.60 To date, the PCE has been unable to evaluate its security policy through a competent, empirical analysis of strategic and military factors. The insufficient information used by those within the party in charge of in­ ternational affairs and defense matters, the superficiality of their assessments, and the general delay in the elaboration of appropriate security concepts within the PCE (as frequently criticized by Azcarate) have led to an excessively ideological approach to security problems. Dogmatic reason­ ing and some inaccurate estimates, made no doubt in good faith, permeate discussions and planning of the PCE’s foreign and defense policies.

The Spanish Communist Party

135

The PCE’s position regarding Western security and its assessment of the international system have led it to the conclusion that the military blocs are in crisis. As long as it is impossible to eliminate the blocs, it is essential to maintain security through the balance of the blocs, which would be upset either if Spain joins the Atlantic Alliance or if it refuses to grant Spanish facilities to American armed forces. Yet the maintenance of balance is com­ patible with the strength against American hegemony and against capitalist societies’ imperialism. The American interests in hegemony do not coincide with those of European peoples’ preference for autonomy, except in preser­ ving the military balance. In every other aspect, they are distinctly incom­ patible. Finally, Spain’s interests, the PCE argues, will be better served through its neutrality or nonalignment. Thus, the PCE has undertaken all the doctrinal exercises necessary to make its neutrality compatible with the conservation of balance: neutrality is simply a dialectical factor of bloc politics. These contradictions are motivated by the PCE’s desire to strengthen the legitimacy and the credibility of its Eurocommunist stand. If the PCE analysis and the program of international policy and security seem contrived, it is because this contrivance reflects internal contradictions from which the party itself has not been able to escape. While there are important doctrinal dilemmas for the PCE, the inade­ quate use of neutrality as the conceptual basis for its security policy has per­ mitted serious omissions and the evasion of a comprehensive defense pro­ gram. The PCE has refused to identify the threats to Spanish vital interests and, therefore, the specific mission of the armed forces. Without designated national threats, armed forces tend to become constabulary services, with an erosion of combat readiness, defense spending, and training programs, as in the case of Mexico. Such developments would clearly satisfy the PCE’s doctrinal preferences, but they would be strongly opposed by the armed forces and Spain’s growing military-industrial complex, as well as many Spaniards. Even neutrality requires defined security objectives, as in the case of Sweden or Switzerland, and nonalignment needs definitive goals, as in the case of India and Algeria; otherwise defense policy and military spending become blurred in the public perception of self-defense. The PCE has apparently deliberately avoided resolving this axiomatic component of its security policy and, thereby, evaded serious questions about the func­ tions of the armed forces and their relationship to Spanish national in­ terests.

Notes

1. According to La calle (which is close to the PCE), 15-21 January 1980, the party had 201,000 members in 1977, 171,000 in 1978, and in Oc­ tober 1979 only 140,000. The PCE and its Catalonian counterpart together have only 23 deputies in the 350-seat national parliament. For background

136

New International Communism

see Guy Hermet, The Communists in Spain: Study of an Underground Movement, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Com­ pany, 1974). 2. The daily newspaper El pais repeatedly spoke in favor of ter­ minating the isolation of the PCE. On 20 January 1980 it stated that those who support the isolation of Communists and throw them in the ghetto of political and parliamentary life should be aware of the implications of this operation. Successful isolation and the corresponding Communist harden­ ing, with an already viable pro-Sovietism within its circles, can scarcely be considered steps forward in the consolidation of Spanish democracy. 3. Report by Santiago Carrillo before the plenary session of the PCE’s central committee, Cordoba, 19-20 May 1979. For an English language overview, see Sebastian Zapirain (central committee member, PCE, “The Congress of the Communist Party of Spain,’’ World Marxist Review, September 1979:52-61. 4. Resolution by the central committee of the PCE on international policy, Mundo obrero, 17 June 1980. 5. El pais, (Madrid), 15 June 1980. In support of the government’s ra­ tionale for joining NATO, see Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, Espana en la NA TO (Madrid: Ediciones Defensa, 1978), especially chapters 4 and 5. See also Drew Middleton’s analysis, New York Times, 24 May 1979. Still germane are Edmund A. Guillion, “U.S. Security Policy in the Western Mediterra­ nean, Spain and North Africa,’’ and Stewart Menaul, “The Political and Strategic Future of Gibralter,” both in The Western Mediterranean: Its Political, Economic and Strategic Importance, eds., Alvin J. Cottrell and James D. Theberge (New York: Praeger, 1974). 6. PCE press release, 16 June 1980. 7. Report of the IX Party Congress of the PCE: Minutes, Debates, Resolutions (Madrid: Ediciones PCE, 1978). 8. Mundo obrero, 19 June 1980. 9. Ibid. 10. El pais, 20 November 1979. 11. Ibid., 27 November 1979. 12. Diario (Madrid), 31 January 1980. 13. Mundo obrero, 31 January 1980. 14. SEIS Information Services, 14 February 1980. 15. Editorial, El pais, 15 June 1980. 16. ABC, 18 March 1980. 17. Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunismo y estado (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977). 18 Conference paper by Santiago Carrillo given at Club Siglo XXI, Mundo obrero, 29 February 1980. 19. Editorial, Nuestra bandera 102 (January-February 1980).

The Spanish Communist Party

137

20. Ibid. 21. Santiago Carrillo, speech for the 60th Anniversary of the founda­ tion of the PCE, Mundo obrero, 15-21 May 1980. 22. Mundo obrero, 29 February 1980. For details see Treaty of Friend­ ship and Cooperation with Spain, Hearings before the Subcommittee on In­ ternational Political and Military Affairs, 8 and 16 June 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). 23. IX Party Congress of the PCE. 24. PCE press release, 16 June 1980. 25. Mundo obrero, 19 June 1980. 26. Interview 4 June 1980 with Fernando Zaba, member of the defense committee of the PCE central committee. 27. Ibid. Under a strict interpretation of the bilateral accord, the Spanish government denied flight departures of U.S. KC-130 refueling air­ craft and overflight rights for airlifting cargoes to Israel during the October war. See Tad Szulc’s analysis, New York Times, 13 March 1980. 28. Ibid. Fernando Zaba has also stated that it is possible and conve­ nient for southern European nations to reach certain agreements in matters of security and cooperation. Nations in this area must struggle to establish autonomous policies in the Mediterranean zone so as to overcome effec­ tively the actual conception of being the same as NATO’s southern flank, which means that nations bordering the Mediterranean are subordinated to the interests of the blocs. 29. IX Party Congress of the PCE, p. 7. 30. Report presented by Santiago Carrillo before the session of the PCE’s central committee, press release, 10 November 1979. 31. Nuestra bandera 102 (January-February 1980). 32. Yuri Sedov, “Falsification instead of Objective Study,” New Times, May 1977:15. 33. El pais, 19 January 1980. 34. Diario 16, 4 February 1980. 35. El pais, 3 February 1980. 36. Diario 16, 9 January 1980. 37. Ibid. 38. ABC, 31 January 1980. 39. Report presented by the PCE executive committee at the plenary session of the central committee, Mundo obrero, 10-17 February 1980. 40. Ibid. 41. There were minor party divisions over the strong PCE position. In Asturias, the Canary Islands, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, local party cells approved the Soviet invasion. This represented, however, only 2 to 3 percent of local sections of the party, El pais, 4 March 1980. 42. Dolores Ibarruri, Santiago Carrillo et al., “Manifesto-programa,”

138

New International Communism

La propuesta comunista (Barcelona: Ediciones de Bolsillo Editorial Laia, 1977), pp. 40-41. 43. Carrillo, Eurocommunismo y estado, pp. 134-135. 44. Point 13 on foreign policy and defense, IX Party Congress of the PCE, p. 410. 45. Carrillo, Eurocommunismo y estado, pp. 134-135. 46. Point 13 on foreign policy and defense, IX Party Congress of the PCE, p. 415. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Carrillo acknowledges his deep sense of guilt in initially condemn­ ing Tito and his subsequent indebtedness to the Yugoslav model of worker self-management, nonalignment, and territorial self-defense, Eurocom­ munismo y estado, pp. 166, 143-144. 50. Interview with Zaba. 51. Ibid. 52. Interview with the author, 24 April 1980, S’Agaro, Spain. 53. Antonio Sanchez-Gijon skillfully enumerates the dangers that a policy of partial commitments could actually weaken rather than strengthen the Alliance by projecting false impressions to both sides—creating in PCE terms an imbalance between the blocs. See “La opcion atl&ntica,” in Espana que defensa? Las opciones de seguridad, Institute de Cuestiones Internacionales, 1981, pp. 235-237. Jose Medeiros Ferreira offers similar op­ tions, “El espacio estrategico y defensivio de la peninsula iberica,” Espana que defensa? pp. 34-36. 54. Financial Times, 12 June 1980. For a comprehensive study of the economic implications, see Angel Labo and Luis Marco, “El coste economico de la defensa,” in Espana que defensa? pp. 137-140 on neutrali­ ty, which refutes the PCE-PSOE contention that membership would be a costly disaster. 55. Interview with Zaba. 56. Report by Santiago Carrillo before the plenary session of the cen­ tral committee, Mundo obrero, 16 June 1980. 57. Diario 16, 29 April 1980. 58. Mundo obrero, 17 June 1980. 59. See “Eurocommunism at its Spanish Turning Point, A Long Con­ versation between George Urban and Manuel Azcarate,” Encounter, March 1979, pp. 20-21; and Mundo obrero, 20 May and 10 June 1980. 60. See Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, “The Spanish Self: Present Realities and Future Projects,” in The European Left: Italy, France and Spain, ed. William E. Griffith, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1979), p. 106.

Foreign and Security Policies of the Portuguese Communist Party

Although not as important a political force as in 1974-1975, when in con­ cert with radicals in the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) it appeared about to seize power and establish a Soviet protectorate in Western Europe, the PCP remains a relevant political actor today, despite its setback in the Oc­ tober 1980 National Assembly elections. The party failed in its announced objective of blocking the conservative Democratic Alliance (AD) from gain­ ing an absolute majority in Parliament and, what was worse, saw its vote drop by two percentage points over the total it had received in December 1979. At the same time, and surprising to many analysts, the Socialist party, the principal Communist challenger on the left, held its own, garnering some 27 percent of the vote. However, the Portuguese Communists still re­ tain an important presence in the labor movement and in some local govern­ ment councils, while the Socialists are beset by numerous internal problems. Portugal may, moreover, suffer from serious political and social in­ stability during the next few years as the battle between the AD and Presi­ dent Ramalho Eanes continues over the distribution of constitutional authority and the role the military should play in Portuguese politics. These conflicts, the volatility of the nascent party system, and economic condi­ tions promise to make the situation difficult for whoever governs, thus offering the PCP an opportunity to break the isolation into which the party has been cast since November 1975.1 In this context, a discussion of the foreign and security policies of the Portuguese Communists assumes particular relevance. The PCP has tried over the last few years to recast its domestic image, publicly eschewing the putschist and undemocratic one it earned during the most tumultuous phases of the Portuguese revolution and adopting a more accommodating and pluralistic tone. This has led some, particularly foreign, observers of the political scene to see a genuine change in the orientation of the PCP and to emphasize its partial Eurocommunization. As stated earlier, the Portuguese Communists and their secretary general, Alvaro Cunhal, have developed a reputation for unquestioning support of the Soviet Union. It is deserved. One interpretation of this pro­ Soviet attitude on the part of the PCP emphasizes that the PCP is an essen­ tially non-Portuguese force, national only in a very formal and narrow sense

139

140

New International Communism

and operating in close coordination with Moscow. Yet, to focus on PCP foreign and security policies from this perspective is to misinterpret not only the dynamic of the relationship between the PCP and the CPSU but also the interaction of domestic and foreign policy components in PCP activity. Most Western European parties experienced Stalinization in the 1930s and 1940s and subsequently reacted bitterly to the imposition of Soviet con­ trol. Leaders like Santiago Carrillo and Palmiro Togliatti may well have ex­ perienced a crise de conscience et confiance over their actions during that period. At that time, the PCE and PCI functioned as little more than agents of the Kremlin. Because it remained a small, relatively meaningless and isolated party, the PCP developed its views from a different perspective than the other three parties. The PCP was Stalinist and pro-Soviet not only, or even primarily, because this course had been imposed by Moscow. The party, became so because the adoption of an unswervingly pro-Soviet attitude was part of a strategy to steel the party better to resist the repression which it had to suf­ fer under the Salazar regime. Commitment to the fatherland of socialism was the foreign policy expression of the conviction, developed during four decades of clandestine activity and subsequently reinforced by the suc­ cessful, violent overthrow of the Marcello Caetano regime in April 1974, that only a cohesive, unyielding, and well-disciplined organization could lead the Portuguese working class to socialism. The PCP’s repeated references to moral strength and exhortations to moral endurance reveal the almost religious intensity with which the party believes it to be the Communists’ duty not only to be the revolutionary political vanguard of the proletariat but also its moral vanguard. Even the slightest deviation from principle, Cunhal has stressed, would have a demoralizing effect on all aspects of the party’s work and therefore be an obstacle to the fulfillment of its historical mission.2 Cunhal has spoken of proletarian internationalism as a policy and an ethic.3 Thus, Cunhal insists that, despite constant pressure to abandon party principles, the PCP does not vacilate. He claims that party militants are unanimous in their belief that the PCP will always remain faithful to the principles of proletarian in­ ternationalism.4 Observers who perceive the international ties of the PCP as an explana­ tion of the radical posture the party adopted in 1975 understand only part of the program. If anything, the international policies of the PCP reflect the radical cast of PCP domestic policies, organization, and ideology. Even the role played by the USSR in determining PCP policies during the Portuguese revolution is unclear. There is some evidence that because of the imperatives of the Security Conference at Helsinki, the USSR counseled moderation during July and August 1975, reportedly moving at one point to cut off funds from the PCP.3 Yet there are those who argue that the USSR never

The Portuguese Communist Party

141

developed a coherent policy toward Portugal.6 Events in Portugal reported­ ly sparked a lengthy and complex debate about the compatibility of encour­ aging structural change in Europe and maintaining detente with the United States, not only within the Soviet foreign policy establishment, but also be­ tween the CPSU and most Western European Communist parties. Whether one considers observable differences in Soviet commentary or analysis of the Portuguese revolution simply as “contrasts in tone and stress among an ultimately reconcilable range of emphases,”7 or goes further and sees the emergence of “distinct trends” and “dissidence”8 in the context of a major debate, these differences could only have interfered with Soviet efforts to influence the Portuguese. The international orientation of the PCP has been associated with none of the ambiguities and subtleties attending the Italian Communist stance. Unlike the PCI and even the PCF, the Portuguese Communist party has not developed an extensive or detailed range of views on foreign policy and security matters. This is because of the relative unimportance of Portugal as an actor on the international stage, the short experience of the party as a legal organization, and the improbability of the party’s becoming a partner in government. The Portuguese Communists have stubbornly backed the USSR against the Chinese since the early 1960s, and they wholeheartedly approved the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as the subsequent normalization which took place there. More recently, the PCP sided with the USSR and its allies (particularly the East Germans and the Bulgarians) against a nascent Southern European Communist axis during the lengthy procedural negotia­ tions leading to the 1976 Berlin conference. In marked contrast to Santiago Carrillo, who insisted at that conference that “Moscow was no longer the Communist Rome,” Alvaro Cunhal endorsed the idea of “a common recipe or a common obligatory road for all Western European countries” taking the road to socialism.’ It is evident that Cunhal considered a parliamentary democratic regime nonviable in Portugal, seeing the country as embarking in a relatively short time on the road to Soviet-style socialism. Cunhal has referred to the USSR as “the principal fortress of the workers and of the forces of progress and peace throughout the world.”10 Nevertheless, the period of July through November 1975 was probably a difficult one for the USSR-PCP relationship. On the one hand, the Soviets did not want to unnecessarily aggravate matters in Europe, an area where they were by and large content with the status quo. This undoubtedly reduced Moscow’s enthusiasm for a Communist revolution in Portugal. At the same time, the Soviets probably saw the Nixon resignation in August 1974, the fall of Saigon in March 1975, and the weak American response to Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola late that year as offering ample opportunities for the revolutionary movement to advance elsewhere in the

142

New International Communism

world. But a grab for power in Portugal could have undermined detente in Europe and strengthened opposition to Soviet enterprises elsewhere in the world. Whatever disappointment there may have been over Soviet actions (or inactions) during the summer of 1975, however, the pro-Soviet stance of the PCP has not changed.11 The PCP, which was not invited to and did not attend the Madrid Eurocommunist summit in March 1977, on numerous occasions has expressed its solidarity with the socialist camp, released com­ muniques against the “ideological and propagandistic offensive of im­ perialism and of reaction” in connection with Eurocommunism, and criticized dissident movement in the Eastern block countries.12 At a confer­ ence in 1978 in Sofia, Cunhal responded to a Spanish Communist move to drop the appellation Leninist from the PCE program by stating that those who reject Lenin reject Marx by the same act, and that those who are not Marxists cannot be Leninists.13 Cunhal argued further, “the PCP does not counterpose its political pro­ gram to that of real socialism”14 which emphasizes that the domestic im­ perative lies behind the international positions of the PCP. Certainly, there can be no question but that the Portuguese Communists align themselves closely with Moscow, but they do so in part because failure to uphold pro­ letarian principles would weaken the confidence of the workers in the socialist future of Portugal. The warmth of interparty relations often clouds the importance of these domestic requirements. Alvaro Cunhal has always been warmly received on visits to the USSR and Eastern Europe, and is accorded a status reserved for the most important foreign dignitaries. The CPSU delegation to the Ninth PCP Congress in June 1979 described him as a great friend, ardent patriot, and internationalist, noting that while there are people such as Alvaro Cunhal, while there are parties such as the PCP, “the cause of peace and progress and the cause of socialism will be truly invincible.”15 PCP relations have also been close with the ruling Eastern European parties, particularly those closely aligned with the USSR. The Portuguese have established a close working relationship with the East Germans on African questions; the German Democratic Republic has been the most ac­ tive Eastern European government in some African countries, and the PCP maintains good relations with the ruling parties in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. With the Czechoslovakians, the ties have been even closer. It was in Prague (not Paris or Rome, as was the case for the Spanish Communist party) that the PCP maintained its exile head­ quarters, and Czechoslovakia funneled funds and other types of assistance to the PCP. The similarity of the view on international issues of the PCP and the USSR caused an estrangement of the Portuguese party from the other ma-

The Portuguese Communist Party

143

jor Western European parties. Only the PCF maintained cordial relations, while the PCE and the PCI feared that PCP policies would jeopardize their credibility as national parties willing to abide by the rules of parliamentary democracy. The PCP cared little that the Eurocommunist strategy of reassuring the middle classes would be undermined by the radical nature of Portuguese Communist policies. Thus, Cunhal declared sarcastically that he was torn to pieces by the plight of the poor Italian Communists. Cunhal continued in a more serious vein that to the laments of Western European Communists he had one answer: “We do not await election results to change structures and to destroy the past.” More explicitly, Cunhal added, “Communists don’t accept the rules of the election game,” which have little or nothing to do with revolution. In Portugal, he said, there will be no parliament or democratic freedoms.16 The PCP found itself even more isolated in late 1975 after the failure of the November coup attempt in which it was indirectly implicated. Relations with the PCI had deteriorated significantly, but it was with the Spanish that friction was most evident. The nadir came in 1976 and 1977 as Carrillo pro­ claimed the PCE the pivotal party for the Eurocommunist movement. Such pretensions on an international scale drew bitter criticism from the USSR and also led the PCI to mark its distance from the PCE. The latter develop­ ment was significant for the PCP because it then moved to effect a rap­ prochement with the PCI. The first step in this direction was Cunhal’s visit to Rome in early 1977. Although the PCP did not attend the March 1977 Eurocommunist summit, it was evident after the meeting, when the PCE failed to elicit direct Italian and French criticism of the USSR, that the PCP was becoming less isolated. Then began a slow period of accommodation with the Italian Communists that climaxed with the visit to Lisbon of Enrico Berlinguer in October 1979. The modest rapprochement between the PCP and the PCI led to specu­ lation about a significant shift in Portuguese Communist attitudes. But, although PCP policies changed as the party tried to effect an alliance, for­ mal or not, with the Socialists in Portugal, the degree of change has not been significant. For one thing, the two parties have simply agreed to shelve public disagreements over the issues that divide them. The effort to renew and rework PCP ties with the Italians, in any case, fits well into Soviet strategy for dealing with the Eurocommunist movement. PCP relations with the Spanish Communists have also improved over the last few years, not because of a change in the orientation of the PCP, but because of the failure of Eurocommunism as a viable phenomenon. PCP leaders did not hide their satisfaction in 1977 and again in 1979 when the PCE obtained barely 10 percent of the vote. For its part, the PCE has partially moderated the anti-Soviet thrust of its foreign policy in the wake of events in Afghanis­ tan and the emergence of its own internal conflicts.17

144

New International Communism

There has been, then, an evolution in the relations of the Portuguese Communists with their Western European counterparts, particularly since the low point in late 1975. It should be emphasized that this was not because the PCP was slowly changing its foreign policy posture and moving away from the Soviet orbit. Although the PCP has tried to appear more moderate and accommodating in its search for alliance with the Socialists, its foreign and security policies have not varied. What have changed are the immediate prospects for the Eurocommunist movement, and Cunhal can take some satisfaction from his earlier comment that Eurocommunism was a passing fashion.18 Whether this assessment will stand in long term is unclear; never­ theless, the PCP can be justly pleased that it successfully weathered the phase of profound isolation after 1975. In the formulation of its foreign and security policies, the Portuguese Communist party views the world situation from the same perspective as Moscow because a real and profound agreement about the basic character­ istic of the international system and situation exists between the PCP and the CPUSSR. The Portuguese Communist analysis proceeds from the premise that the world revolutionary movement has three components: the socialist community, the working class and its parties in advanced capitalist countries, and the national liberation movements. Their unity is all the more important, according to the PCP, as imperialism heightens its interna­ tional offensive. Moreover, the Portuguese Communists insist, the socialist community and particularly the USSR must play a leading role in this battle to shift the international correlation of forces. Although the PCP is perhaps now not as euphoric about the prospects for a rapid worldwide advance of the revolutionary and anti-imperialistic struggle as it was in 1975, it never­ theless continues to emphasize that “there has been an irregular but pro­ gressive advance of the world correlation of forces.”19 Its efforts to con­ tribute to the cohesion of the international Communist movement—and specifically its move to better its relations with parties like the PCI—fit this perspective.20 On major foreign policy questions, therefore, the PCP has been quite predictable. Obviously, the United States has been a favorite target in the Portuguese Communist press, but the PCP has also shown itself, in line with Moscow, to be quite vituperative in its assessment of the Chinese. In vivid contrast with the PCE and the PCI, the PCP has attacked Chinese policy as being “in line with the actions of the most reactionary forces of capitalism.”21 Logically, the Portuguese have sided with the Vietnamese in their border conflict with China and subsequently supported Hanoi’s deci­ sion to invade Cambodia and establish a protectorate there. With respect to the Middle East, the PCP has faithfully echoed the Soviet line, condemning Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and the Israeli government for having ini­ tiated the Camp David process.22 As might be expected particularly with

The Portuguese Communist Party

145

respect to the former Portuguese colonies, the PCP has taken a keen inter­ est in developments in Africa and has supported Soviet policy initiatives and objectives. The party has clearly supported the Soviet client state Ethiopia in its intermittent war with Somalia, which the PCP says depends on imperialism.23 Portuguese Communist African policy has been most clearly articulated with respect to Mozambique and Angola, where the PCP played a key role. In the case of Mozambique, the party has been a privileged inter­ locutor, encouraging Samora Machel to shift away from the Chinese and toward closer alignment with Moscow. The PCP role in the other former African colonies was hardly visible in 1976 but has since increased consider­ ably, with the party’s, unofficial but at times necessary mediation between the various Portuguese governments and the former colonies. The most recent example of the general PCP identity with Soviet inter­ ests is connected with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which clearly cre­ ated a problem for a party as insistent on independence and self-determina­ tion as the PCP. In early 1978, Avante categorically expressed its support for “the right of peoples to choose their destiny without foreign interfer­ ence.’’24 How, then, did the PCP manage to support without reservation the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? The party justified its stance by arguing that the government of Afghanistan had requested the presence of Soviet troops and that this response had been consistent not only with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter but with the treaty of friendship signed by the two countries in December 1978. The party reiterated its position on the sit­ uation in Afghanistan repeatedly during 1980, arguing that imperialist intervention there had aimed at creating provocation on the Soviet border and thus necessitated the Soviet move.25 As to criticisms directed at it for supporting Moscow, the PCP described these as part of “a large anti-Communist and anti-Soviet campaign, a campaign of mystification and intoxica­ tion of public opinion.’’26 The dovetailing of Portuguese Communist foreign and security policy with Soviet interests has been equally obvious with respect to Europe, spe­ cifically on the questions of NATO and the European Economic Commu­ nity. Unlike Spain, Portugal was a founding member of the Alliance and, although its military contribution has been negligible, the bases it offered in the Azores have been important to NATO strategy. The Portuguese Com­ munist policy since the inception of NATO has been clear: as the statutes of the Ninth Congress insisted, it is “a military alliance at the service of imperialist policy’’ and leads to a “military presence in Portugal that limits national sovereignty over the Azores and stimulates antinationalist and sep­ aratist tendencies and activities.”27 During its clandestine phase, the PCP called for immediate Portuguese withdrawal from NATO and even approved attacks on NATO installations by its paramilitary organization.28

146

New International Communism

The party modified its policy after the April 1974 coup, retaining its opposi­ tion to the Alliance but accepting continued Portuguese participation in it for the present. Portuguese withdrawal remained an objective, but the PCP argued that it should occur in the context of more general, European discus­ sions on disarmament and mutual force reductions. This outlook bore some resemblance to the Spanish Communist perspective on the Base Treaty Agreement between the United States and Spain and to the Italian Commu­ nist argument accepting continued Italian participation in NATO, but the rationale behind the Portuguese policy was much more in line with Soviet interests. Unilateral withdrawal would encourage those who called for greater spending on armaments and for- reinforcement of the NATO defenses. This would jeopardize a fundamental Soviet objective in Europe—the maintenance and intensification of the detente process—and, ultimately, the withdrawal of American troops from the continent. More­ over, as Cunhal noted in early 1975 with the example of Chile obviously in mind, it would be particularly dangerous for the young Portuguese democ­ racy to follow a precipitous and adventurist policy with regard to NATO.29 Most recently, in the context of efforts to draw closer to the Socialists by minimizing areas of disagreement and to soften U.S. opposition to possible Communist entry into the Portuguese government, the PCP has maintained a low profile on NATO, indicating it would not push to have Portugal with­ draw from the organization nor oppose a continued U.S. presence in Lajes. The PCP has also opposed the introduction of the neutron bomb into the NATO arsenal,30 participated in the 1980 Communist peace conference in Paris, and rejected the efforts of the incumbent Democratic Alliance gov­ ernment to increase Portuguese participation in NATO. More specifically, the PCP has opposed the projected use of Portuguese bases as facilities for U.S. aircraft carriers, deployment of the Pershing II missiles, upgrading of the facilities at Porto Santo Island, and the construction of an oil pipeline (an initiative designed to ensure a European oil supply in the event of a Mid­ dle East war) from Leixoes to Sines, with a refinery in the latter.31 Given its past support for Soviet positions, there can be little question that the PCP would object to any projection of NATO military force beyond its prescribed area of responsibility, regardless of the nature of the crisis. Accordingly, the PCP would oppose any use of the Azores for uni­ lateral U.S. operations in the Middle East (as when the base there was employed for refueling during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war); but an effort to mobilize the population around a “peace campaign” in those areas where it was strong, such as Lisbon and Setubal, could certainly be expected. It is not surprising that the PCP—isolated domestically and with Portu­ gal playing only a limited strategic role—has done very little toward devel­ oping a nuclear weapons policy. When and if the party does so, it can be expected that it will approximate the Soviet position, opposing both the

The Portuguese Communist Party

147

deployment of nuclear-capable launching systems on its territory and the modernization of specific elements in the NATO theater nuclear force (TNF) arsenal. More broadly, the PCP presently opposes any move toward establishing any kind of common European policy on defense and disarma­ ment matters, particularly as this might lead to the emergence of Europe as a Third World power, an eventuality to which the PCP is firmly opposed.32 Fearful of an integrated Europe that might adopt policies directed against the USSR or intervene actively against the PCP in domestic affairs, the Communists have opposed Portuguese entry into the EC. Viewing the Common Market as little more than an instrument for the domination of the continent by United States and European monopolies, Cunhal declared at the 1974 Brussels, conference of European Communist parties that the nature and policies of the EC could not be changed from within, but “only by replacing the power of the monopolies with the power of the working class and its allies in the member countries.”33 In this, its posture resembles that of the French Communists34 but differs from that of the PCE and PCI, which support the enlargement of the Community. The Portuguese Com­ munists organized a national conference against the EC in June 1980, at which party leaders and economists warned of the disastrous economic and social consequences of admission for Portuguese agriculture and industry. Industry in particular would be vulnerable because it would no longer have the protection of tariffs and thus would be vulnerable to foreign competi­ tion. To this essentially economic argument, PCP spokesmen added a polit­ ical dimension. Integration into the EC has been perceived by the PCP as part of the Democratic Alliance government’s strategy to further Portu­ guese military and political integration into the Western Alliance. Such a policy would, in the PCP view, “create new and powerful instruments for capitalist, latifundist, and imperialist subversion in Portugal”35 and would spell the end of the nationalization of commercial enterprises and agrarian reform initiatives undertaken in 1975, which put Portugal on an economic and political course different from that of the rest of Western Europe. Moreover, enlargement would strengthen the possibility of Europe’s emer­ gence as a pole of attraction and competition to the USSR and Eastern Europe. With respect to both general and specific policies in the realm of foreign and security affairs, the Portuguese Communists have demonstrated an unconditional support for the CPSU that is unlikely to change in the imme­ diate future. Nevertheless, this foreign policy orientation should not be per­ ceived as having been dictated by the USSR. Were that the case, changes might have come more quickly. Instead, the foreign policies of the PCP reflect its domestic priorities, and its maintenance of close ties to the CPSU underscores the continued vitality of Leninist principles and political per­ ceptions within the PCP.

148

New International Communism

Notes

1. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, “The Communists and the 1980 Portuguese Election,” in Portugal at the Polls, ed. Howard Penniman, American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming. 2. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, “The PCP and the Portuguese Revolution,” Problems of Communism, January-February, 1977:21-22. 3. Alvaro Cunhal, “Proletarian Internationalism—A Policy and Out­ look,” World Marxist Review, May 1970:74. 4. Avante (Lisbon), 17 April 1980. 5. Keith Middlemas, Power and the Party: Changing Faces of Com­ munism in Western Europe (London: Andre Deutsch, 1980), p. 196; chap­ ter 4 is one of the best analyses yet of the PCP. 6. Joan Barth Urban, “Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolu­ tion in the West,” Orbis, Winter 1976:1359-1402. 7. Robert H. Legvoid, “Four Policy Perspectives: The Soviet Union and Western Europe,” Mimeo, January 1976, p. 72. 8. Urban, “Contemporary Soviet Perspectives.” 9. Avante, 8 July 1976. 10. Ibid., 20 May 1976; and Branko Lazitch, “Le parti communiste et la ‘revolution nationale-democratique’ au Portugal,” Est & Quest, 1-15 June 1974:245. 11. Conferencia internacional de los partidos comunistas y obreros, Moscu 1969 (Prague: Editorial Paz y Socialismo, 1969), p. 424; and Avante, 4 March 1976. 12. Avante, 10 February 1977. 13. Ibid., 21 December 1978. 14. Ibid., 11 May 1978. 15. Ibid., 7 June 1979. 16. For Cunhal’s notorious revolutionary statements advocating the total destruction of the past and rejection of existing bourgeois values and institutions, see his interview with Oriana Fallaci, New York Time Maga­ zine, 13 July 1975:9-50. 17. See the concluding chapters in Eusebio Mujal-Le6n, Communism and Political Change in Spain (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, forthcoming). 18. El pais, 28 September 1977. 19. Avante, 24 May 1979. 20. Ibid., 21 December 1978. 21. Ibid., 15 June 1980. 22. Ibid., 13 October 1977. 23. Ibid., 14 August 1980. 24. Ibid., 19 January 1978.

The Portuguese Communist Party

149

25. Ibid., 3 April and 26 June 1980. 26. Ibid., 24 January 1980. 27. Tesa para o IX Congresso do PCP, Lisbon, p. 13. 28. Neil Mclnnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe (Lon­ don: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 185. 29. Expresso (Lisbon), 8 February 1979. 30. Avante, 20 October 1977. 31. Ibid., 11 September 1980. 32. Ibid., March 1974. 33. Ibid. 34. L’humanite, 23 December 1978, carried a PCF-PCP communique on the subject of the EC. 35. Avante, 4 June 1980.

7

The Portuguese Revolution: A Case Study in the Contradictions among Revolution, National Security, and International Commitments

On 25 April 1974, a revolution undertaken by officers of the Armed Forces Movement ended almost five decades of dictatorship in Portugal and gave the country a radically different political orientation. The change in govern­ ment was not an entirely smooth transition and several major domestic and international concerns resulted. In terms of Lisbon’s relationship to and impact on NATO and security considerations of Alliance countries, espe­ cially the United States, the details of the revolution and resultant Portu­ guese governments in the following two years form an extremely complex and dynamic amalgam of military and political influences, relationships, and competition. This episode was unique in recent Latin European history: The role played by the military and the direct participation of the PCP in coalition government were unprecedented in the period of either the Atlan­ tic Alliance or East-West rivalry. Therefore, developments during 1974-1981 serve as the only empirical evidence of the security implications of Communists in power in a NATO member government that is applicable for assessing Mitterrand’s coalition. These events underscore the necessity for CPs to elaborate their security policy if political respectability and acceptance are expected in Western pluralistic societies. World reaction to the situation in Portugal was as inconsistent, parochial, and changing as the positions of Lisbon’s military and political leaders. The strategic location of Portugal and the perceived initiation of a Western European Communist domino effect seemed to be major factors influencing Western reaction.

The Nature of the PCP Threat to NATO

What actually transpired during the so-called difficult period of 1974-1975 that might have compromised or allegedly did compromise Alliance security documents and communications? Was the threat to vital Alliance informa-

151

152

New International Communism

tion as dangerous as then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Gen­ eral Alexander Haig, then commander of SHAPE, alleged? There is no open, accurate, empirical account of the SHAPE or U.S. assessments of damage that could have been inflicted by the PCP’s access to the cabinet and sensitive military positions. Extensive interviews with NATO, Ameri­ can, and Portuguese officials reveal an incomplete picture. Some argue it was the most disastrous infraction of security in the Alliance’s history, requiring exhaustive administration alterations and planning innovations. But measuring the extent of potential or actual security compromises is extremely difficult, largely because intelligence leaks can come from such a wide range of sources, not the least significant being the highly effective Soviet and East German infiltration of key Western military and govern­ mental positions. War strategy and contingency operations cannot be replanned with the defection of each private secretary; the constraints and options available are well known to both sides. In terms of sensitivity of information, SHAPE and NATO have been reduced to the lowest possible denominator, based upon a general formula of the suspected leakage of any member and the need-to-know information provided by any member in order to meet the minimum requirements of effective planning and manage­ ment. Thus only a patchwork reconstruction of the impact of the PCP on NATO and U.S. classified information can be attempted. After the March 1975 coup attempt, the PCP apparently tried to strengthen its accessibility to and authority within the government and the armed forces below the cabinet and AFM levels. There is no evidence of a KGB or Soviet link to these efforts, although this cannot be ruled out, and the ultimate PCP goals remain obscure. But the PCP’s moves had the immediate consequence of polarizing the armed forces. Under Salazar, security provisions for classified information were rela­ tively loose; the assumption was that senior officers and authorities were thoroughly reliable. Leftist military officers used parallel premises after the revolution to argue for the release of sensitive information to lower eche­ lons. Such demands prompted strong reservations among other groups of officers. Anecdotes abound; for instance, one deputy commander author­ ized the release to subordinate commands of sensitive information during the absence of his commander and was promptly dismissed upon his super­ ior’s return. Even before the anti-leftist developments of November 1975, individual commanders and key political authorities were making unilateral decisions to restrict access to selected classified material on the grounds that they were irrelevant to the prosecution of the revolution. After November, the deci­ sion was made to centralize all documentation control within the intelli­ gence division of the general staff. The data included national internal and external security, bilateral U.S.-Portuguese information, and NATO mate­

The Portuguese Revolution

153

rials. It is not known even by Portuguese authorities which of these cate­ gories was the highest priority consideration for senior leftist officers. After the November 1975 coup attempt, tight controls were introduced for NATO cosmic top secret information (nuclear targeting data), and access was severely restricted on a need-to-know basis. Officers were escorted into the vaults of the general staff and subsignatory agencies, where documents were read but neither reproduced nor removed. The strictness of these procedures did not pertain so much to NATO documents as to U.S.-Portuguese naval and especially antisubmarine war­ fare intelligence. For nearly a decade the navy had been the breeding ground of radicalism; by far the most sensitive information in Portugal, therefore, was not NATO plans or technological papers but rather information on the extent of U.S. subsurface surveillance capabilities. It is not known how much information and cooperation in surveillance were routinely exchanged, but amounts were sufficient for the United States to impose an immediate embargo on the most sensitive data soon after the revolution and to halt rapidly all other intelligence contributions. SHAPE authorities pub­ licly insisted later that there was no suspension of information, because any member of the Alliance has an unrestricted right to NATO materials. Pri­ vately they acknowledge frequent circumventions, such as not inviting Por­ tuguese officers to sensitive meetings and briefings. Several suppositions can be made about the Portuguese handling of sensitive materials during the difficult period. (1) Service and personal rivalry flared during these uncertain times. (2) Even among the revolution­ ary leadership it must have been apparent that U.S. intelligence was more important to Portuguese national interests than was NATO information. (3) Even the most radical officers insisted that Portugal’s future was tied to the West, not the East; therefore, the retention of political legitimacy and credibility with the United States and NATO outweighed arguments for open access to sensitive information. Clearly, these suppositions do not pre­ clude the possibility that sensitive information might ultimately be received by the Soviets. But the apparent quality of available information and the demonstrable Portuguese concern about retaining its European credibility strongly suggest that any possible compromises would have been of limited importance. The most plausible explanation for the pressure for devolution of sensi­ tive information is offered by senior Portuguese authorities themselves. It stemmed from a genuine conviction among the militants that the exposure of NATO and U.S. classified documents to company and field-grade offi­ cers would reinforce their contention that the United States had imperial­ istic intentions counter to Portuguese national interests, especially in the Azores. Interviewees reported that there was apparently sufficient evidence to convince these officers of U.S. interests in supporting separatist move­

154

New International Communism

ments among the Islanders and to demonstrate Washington’s tendency to take Portugal for granted—for instance, by paying less for the lease of Por­ tuguese basing facilities than for the allegedly less strategically valuable Spanish bases.1 For these officers, the vital necessity for accelerating the immediate impetus of the revolution at the level of the captains of the armed forces outweighed longer-term implications of their actions. These explanations are partially supported by subsequent develop­ ments. By 1976, Lisbon began to announce informally that its highest for­ eign policy priority was to reestablish its credentials with the United States and then NATO. This decision was rewarded. Under existing bilateral bas­ ing agreements, both national authorities have the legal right to inspect each other’s security regulations and procedures for storing and controlling clas­ sified materials. In April 1980, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) conducted its first security inspection of Portuguese facilities since the revo­ lution (the last was in 1967). The report was satisfactory and the former degree of confidentiality has been restored, including the U.S. provision of antisubmarine warfare information, technology, and equipment, and data on naval movements. Although the United States began providing Portugal with classified information in 1979 on an incremental basis, pending the results of the NSA inspection, a serious problem persisted. NATO COSMIC Top Secret and U.S. final Top Secret personal security clearances require extensive individ­ ual investigations. Such inquiries are regarded as violations of personal pri­ vacy and are prohibited under the present Portuguese Constitution. Thus some top secret materials could be provided to Portugal, but only those officials who previously held such clearances could have access to them. Under the present law no new high-level clearances can be granted, and this fact partially restricts the utility of the information. The United States would undoubtedly be more comfortable if all clearances were reexamined. These restrictions can be removed only by a constitutional amendment introduced by the government. There are, however, other problems. It was estimated that as many as 20 percent of the naval officers and possibly as many as 10 percent of the army and air force officers were still leftist sympathizers in 1980. Those identified as potentially dangerous have been neutralized by either early retirement or assignment to nonauthoritative posts. There persists a radical fringe in the AFM Revolutionary Council, the body that in 1981 still exer­ cises veto authority over government decisions. These leftists presumably could provide some protection for like-minded officers whenever possible. But because the political situation has stabilized and their appeal has rapidly declined, these individuals have been increasingly frustrated by growing political impotence. The extent of their strength was revealed in March 1980 when these officers began talking about conducting a putsch within the

The Portuguese Revolution

155

Council and restoring a radical orientation to the government. There is no evidence that the plan ever progressed beyond a mere exchange of views. No definite plan was ever revealed. There were simply no military units with troops that could be relied upon to overthrow a democratically elected gov­ ernment and Constitution. These radical elements, however, can be expected to show their determination to preserve at least some of the privi­ leges of the Council after the October national elections and the December 1980 presidential elections, as demonstrated in the jurisdictional struggle that developed in July 1980. The Portuguese authorities’ second priority after November 1975 has been to secure Lisbon’s rehabilitation into NATO. American endorsement was important to gain modest financial investments, but more important for its influence within NATO and also indirectly in the EC. Portugal has accepted NATO security regulations as gospel and has strictly adhered to them. NATO inspection teams have been satisfied with the stringency of controls. There is a subtle motive in this level of enforcement. Overcompli­ ance with NATO regulations ensures American accreditation, but it also forces NATO to consider reciprocal gestures, such as Portugal’s admission to the Nuclear Planning Group, which has been expanded since the revolu­ tion from seven countries to the full membership of the Alliance except Ice­ land and Portugal. Participation in the Nuclear Planning Group would be regarded in Portugal as symbolic acknowledgment of its political maturity and reliability. That participation may be granted in view of the October 1980 elections and the proposed changes in the Constitution. In the 5 October 1980 national election, the coalition government of Francisco Sa Carneiro received 47.3 percent of votes and captured a 10-seat majority in the 250-seat Parliament and a four-year mandate. The second largest party, the moderate Socialists, led by Mario Soares, gained only 28 percent. Most surprising was the PCP showing. The party lost ground in virtually every district, including seven industrial and southern ones, retain­ ing only 40 of the 250 seats in Parliament. This was a severe setback for the Communists because Sa Carneiro campaigned on the platform of eliminat­ ing Marxist provisions of the 1974 Constitution, including the provision for the Revolutionary Council. Together with the Socialists, Sa Carneiro’s Democratic Alliance has the necessary two-thirds majority to amend or revise the Constitution. Both parties have agreed that the Council must be dissolved. But in July 1981 the Council exercised its existing rights and vetoed government legislation, demonstrating its authority in the constitu­ tional amendment process and forcing the resignation of the Social Demo­ cratic premier, Francisco Pinto Balsemao. After an internal Social Demo­ cratic party struggle, he formed a new government, but at the time of writ­ ing, the jurisdictional dispute between the government and the Council had not been resolved.

New International Communism

156 Portugal and NATO

One indication of Portugal’s attitude toward NATO after the revolution was its financial contributions to the Alliance. As table 7-1 reveals, there was a 20 percent drop during the first two years, and then a steady rise until 1979. The reasons for the initial cutback were the urgent domestic demands of resettling refugees from the former colonies, revitalizing the economy, and creating thousands of new jobs. Increased defense spending or even maintaining the previous level of contributions to NATO would have been highly unpopular in war-weary Portugal. But the military officers who dominated the Revolutionary Council did not consider their commitments to NATO weakened, even during the difficult period. Indeed, most con­ cluded that their position within the Alliance had been greatly strengthened with the advent of a democratic Constitution and government. They raised NATO contributions as soon as domestic factors allowed. As these attitudes and trends became apparent, the United States began reequipping the Portuguese armed forces, partly through West Germany and the United Kingdom, in an effort to rebuild Portuguese self-confidence and gradually to demonstrate American reassurance.2 The first priority was the army’s First Mechanized Brigade, earmarked for NATO, headquartered at Santa Margarida. The modernization of the Brigade and the various army schools was completed by the end of 1981. Upgrading the air force was the next step, then the navy. The sequence was thus established because of the air force’s greater vulnerability to obsolescence of equipment and the navy’s better indigenous support infrastructure. Moreover, it was consid-

Table 7-1 Member Contributions to NATO, 1974-1979 (millions of local currency) Country

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979*

Belgium

57,393

69,936

81,055

89,480

99,726

108,467

Denmark

4,439

5,281

5,680

6,343

7,250

8,000

Germany

35,644

37,589

38,922

40,184

43,019

45,414

Netherlands

6,423

7,246

7,817

9,260

9,317

10,001

Norway

3,938

4,771

5,333

5,934

6,854

7,394

4,207

5,165

6,162

6,822

7,620

9,085

United States

85,906

90,948

91,008

100,928

108,357

122,261

Portugal

25,108

19,898

18,845

22,082

27,354

37,733

United Kingdom

Source: Eugene Zozicharon, “NATO Emphasizing Political Cohesion,” Aviation Week and Space Tech­ nology, 3 March 1980:57. Projected.

The Portuguese Revolution

157

ered necessary to concentrate on bolstering army morale to counter residual radical factions within the navy. Another reason was the deliberate attempt to cultivate a political climate necessary for the restoration of friendly, con­ fidential relations and the preservation of existing bilateral treaties and agreements. Portugal is now participating more frequently in (and in a wider range of) Western training exercises than ever before, including the annual naval exercises around Gibralter and maneuvers in Italy. The British have access to the Santa Margarida training grounds, and the West Germans continue to maintain the support facilities for flight training at Beja Air Base. While these appear to be modest levels of participation, they are significant demonstrations of both the quantity and quality of Portugal’s rapidly increasing involvement in NATO training compared to earlier gestures. An additional coincidence of interests has developed between the United States and Portugal, namely the extension of additional basing facil­ ities and access rights. Recent crises in the Middle East and Southwest Asia illustrate the growing importance of Iberian bases. During the October war, Spanish-based KC-130 tankers were denied refueling missions by Spanish authorities and landing rights at Lajes were delayed four days. Alterna­ tively, the United States was able to use its carriers as refueling bases for tactical aircraft sent to Israel. Thus the United States delivered twice as much airlifted tonnage to Israel than the Soviets did to the Arabs and nearly ninety replacement aircraft.3 With Indian Ocean contingencies, however, U.S. carriers are no longer reliably available for refueling operations for tactical aircraft overseas deployments. Spanish authorities also denied use of Spanish-based KC-130 tankers for aerial refueling for deployments of U.S. F-15 fighters to Saudia Arabia and Egypt on the grounds that such operations were not exercises but U.S. shows of force that could be dangerous to Madrid’s interests. The aircraft refueled at the Portuguese bases on Lajes and Montigo. Furthermore, the U.S. Naval Air Station at Siginalla in Sicily has never been used for refuel­ ing during Middle Eastern crises. The reasons are political, since the facili­ ties are adequate. Thus, despite the aerial refueling capability now installed on the C-141 and C-5 fleet, maximum payloads require periodic landing or aerial refueling by tankers launched from overseas bases. The Portuguese have been attempting to capitalize on their new credibility and Spanish intransigence on the basing question to establish wider base privileges for the United States.4 With both sides in apparent agreement that expanded use of their respective assets was in their mutual interests, formal talks were opened in 1980. In principle, the United States was interested in the possible expansion of facilities or assured accessibility to several Portuguese bases, including the Alfeite Naval Base on the Rio Tejo estuary, which has repair facilities

158

New International Communism

and is home port for a six-vessel NATO flotilla; Montigo Air Base, which has assigned C-130 aircraft and facilities for operations and maintenance; Trafarla, with important fuel and ammunition storage areas; Ponta Delgada in the Azores, also with major fuel storage areas; Ovar Air Base, with facilities for aircraft operations and maintenance; Lajes in the Azores, a major air facility; and Alvera Air Base, which has repair facilities for U.S. navy and air force aircraft.5 The trade-offs the United States will finally accept are difficult to predict. For its part, Portugal has repeatedly stressed the importance of the stra­ tegic Portugal-Azores-Madeira naval triangle for monitoring maritime traf­ fic, especially if Spain remains outside NATO. The demands are likely to be high both for economic and political reasons and to appease the PCP. Portugal has other specific interests. It is seeking the forward mainte­ nance for the AWACS aircraft committed to the United States, NATO, and Middle Eastern countries, which would also include regional air defense operations. It is also seeking major contracts for maintenance and overhaul of U.S. and NATO tactical aircraft at Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico (OGMA) at Alverca. As a result of the African wars, OGMA recruited a labor force of 4,300 and thereby became the largest aircraft maintenance facility in Western Europe. Heavy new investments are planned to modern­ ize the facility so that it can handle most military and civilian aircraft equipped with engines up to 35,000 pounds thrust, with afterburners, and with avionics (including inertial navigation).6 A key factor in OGMA’s past success and a strong future selling point are its relatively low average labor costs, approximately $12 per man-hour (compared to about $27 per man­ hour in the United States).7 Increasing fuel and personnel costs make lower labor costs tempting. Finally, Lisbon reportedly would like to gain greater utilization of Beja Air Base, originally constructed and presently operated as a training base by West Germany. With the new gunnery and bombing ranges operated in Sardinia, however, this is a less attractive training site for central front air forces. The negotiations are likely to be protracted, with the Portuguese maintaining a high price in economic and military assis­ tance, while the United States continues to weigh its options elsewhere. A key question for both sides will be a possible change in the PCP posi­ tion.8 Several factors suggest that Cunhal may adopt a hard anti-basing position during the protracted negotiations. These factors are (1) the new tough Soviet stance against the autonomy-minded nonruling CPs; (2) the relative success of the 1980 Paris conference in establishing a majority understanding against autonomy, political pluralism, and imperialism; and (3) the poor PCP showing and the right-wing shift in the 1980 elections. Being isolated within the left, Cunhal may seize upon the extension of bas­ ing privileges to create an ultranationalistic, anti-NATO campaign. Given present trends and the strong residual pro-American sentiment in Portugal, such a decision could lead to the further isolation of the PCP.

The Portuguese Revolution

159

Conclusions

Several observations can be made about the consequences of the Portuguese revolution for the Alliance and Western Europe. First, the initial radicalism had a profound tranquilizing effect on political developments in Spain. The psychological transition from Franco to a constitutional monarchy was strongly influenced by the graphic example Portugal set for its Iberian neighbor concerning the potential implications of radicalism in nascent democracies. Trends in Portugal between 1974 and 1981 have had positive effects on both countries in their cultivation of moderate political develop­ ment and identification with Western Europe and the Alliance. Second, the withholding of information and equipment by the United States and NATO during the difficult period did not seriously affect the war readiness of the Portuguese armed forces. A decline in troop discipline, leadership infighting, and political polarization were far more debilitating. U.S. and NATO policies, plans, and activities were largely external to the Portuguese military situation, which had become preoccupied with internal matters rather than affairs in Africa or elsewhere in Europe. Furthermore, unilateral American intelligence collection was sufficient to compensate for the lack of Portuguese services, although U.S. efforts would have been less effective if access to the Azores and Madeira Islands had been denied. Thus, one conclusion is that Portuguese participation in NATO is important but not vital to Western security interests. If Portugal intends to remain identi­ fied with Europe and ultimately integrated into the European Economic Community, Lisbon needs the West more than NATO needs Portugal. Third, there was apparently no concerted effort to resolve the dilemma of whether (or how) to discriminate against an Alliance member in the event of possible security compromises resulting from the accession of Commu­ nists to political power. No attempts were made to amend the Treaty to accommodate such a situation. Interviews with SHAPE and NATO offi­ cials indicate that no contingency plan exists that would alter war plans, or administrative procedures, other than the suspension of communications codes, if Communists gained power elsewhere in the Alliance. Thus, there appears to have been no remedial or corrective action taken or planned to preclude further possible compromises, such as the introduction of singleuse-only communications codes. Several reasons can be suggested for this: (1) the relative decline of the threat of Communism in power within NATO; (2) the greater cost effective­ ness of new military systems and equipment; (3) the lack of political consen­ sus among allies about the severity of such a potential threat; (4) the limited administrative and technical options available to the Alliance in such cir­ cumstances; (5) the greater reliance placed by hostile espionage agencies on the services of skilled operatives, such as Chancellor Brandt’s confidante Guillaume or Secretary Luns’s personal secretary, than on less known and

160

New International Communism

temporarily political militants; and (6) the repugnance, to the public and the bureaucracy, of the downward classification of all materials to reduce the damage of exposure and related administrative problems. The presence of the Portuguese Communist party in government, in the final analysis, was a genuine, but only marginal, threat to Western interests and Alliance security. Western, primarily American, assessments were based on mistaken and inconsistent assumptions. The declared policy of the PCP and its actions in nationalizing selected business establishments and collectivizing agriculture by district were clear manifestations of Stalinist contempt for political pluralization. Thus, there was apparently a minimal immediate threat to NATO secu­ rity interests.9 A far graver danger to the Western Alliance fabric was the American political compulsion to damn and expel an ally and friendly nation. American policy statements regarding Communist parties’ partici­ pation in Western European governments demonstrate that the conservative Alliance framework tends to divorce strategic policy from the realities of the Western European domestic scene.10 In spite of the counterproductive Western blunders in Portugal in 1975, developments there suggest that Communist rule may not be irreversible [even] under military protection, let alone in election trials. But while Com­ munist participation may occur, the Alliance [should] be capable of devel­ oping pragmatic ways to maintain arrangements for military cooperation."

The revolution of 1974-1975 and subsequent developments leave many questions unanswered. The Alliance has not yet defined what level and kind of Communist participation are tolerable in a member nation’s govern­ ment. How does the Alliance assess the strength of a Communist party’s nationalism as opposed to an ideological and political commitment to the USSR? How does the Alliance appraise the strength of a member nation’s Communist party against other political elements vying for power? When and how should contending political elements be supported? Should the Atlantic Alliance permit itself a Western Brezhnev doctrine in cases like that of Portugal if the mandate of the people had been surpressed by a forceful Communist takeover? Tendencies toward Western European autonomy, the rise of West German national self-consciousness and of European paci­ fism, plus inclusion of the PCF in government, reinforce the basic proposi­ tion that the Alliance must address and resolve these questions more system­ atically than it has in the past.

Notes 1. Interviews in April 1980 in Portugal. 2. The West Germans donated Fiat G-91 aircraft, eighteen M-48

The Portuguese Revolution

161

tanks, eighteen 105 mm howitzers, and 500 other vehicles. The United States provided additional mechanized equipment, plus $25 million for A-7 aircraft, TOW launchers, and antitank missiles, as well as other support; see Eugene Zozicharon, “Portugal Keys Defense Plans to NATO,” Avia­ tion Week and Space Technology, 16 October 1978:55. 3. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, To Authorize Supplemental Military Assistance to Portugal for Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 43-44. 4. Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 378-379; and Le monde, 17 January 1979, on landing rights. 5. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 10-12. 6. “Portugal Seeks New Maintenance Work” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16 October, 1978:65. 7. Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico Prospectus (no publisher or date), p. 26. 8. See Alvaro Cunhal’s statement, Kommunist, November 1974. 9. The then Portuguese foreign minister, Jose Mederios Ferreira, reaffirmed Lisbon’s position, stating that no responsible Portuguese leader has ever cast doubt on Portugal’s remaining in NATO. “Time and again Portugal’s legitimate representatives have proclaimed their desire for the fullest participation in the Atlantic Alliance,” “Portugal and NATO,” Sur­ vival, September-October 1976:230. 10. Uwe Nerlich, “Continuity and Change,” in Beyond Nuclear Deter­ rence: New Aims, New Arms, ed. Johann J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich (New York: Crane and Russak, 1977), p. 23. 11. Ibid., p. 36.

t

Comparative Analyses of the Foreign and Defense Policies of the Latin Communist Parties There remains the complex task of comparing the asymmetrical policy posi­ tions of the four parties and of identifying the degree of common interpre­ tation of central theoretical concepts relevant to foreign and security policy. The foreign and security policies of any country or political party are closely interconnected, regardless of the level of social change advocated. For many years, the two have been conventionally referred to collectively as high policy. For the purpose of this study, the respective positions of the four parties on only the most germane aspects of foreign and security policy will be compared: relations between the CPs and their governments, the relevance of Europe and regional institutions, Third World priorities, the existence and nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, great-power rivalry within the context of detente, specific aspects of national defense, and the implications of events in Afghanistan and Poland for the foreign and security policies of the Latin CPs. Comparisons of the respective par­ ties’ positions on these international issues may provide insight into the nature of New Internationalism or more likely the state of transition from Eurocommunism and ambivalence or indifference toward preservation of some form of international Communist identification.

General Relations between the CPs and their Governments

The position of the PCI after the dramatic policy reversal and full endorse­ ment of the Atlantic Alliance in 1975 was parallel to the stance of the Chris­ tian Democrats; for the first time since the post-World War II era, there was a consensus among the Communists and the centrist parties on defense and foreign policies. There were differences in detail but not in substance. The center parties accepted the Alliance from the outset as a means of repu­ diating Italy’s fascist past and gaining primarily American endorsement for its rehabilitation into Europe. Integration into Europe was to serve a similar purpose: demonstrating Italian responsibility and accountabilty to its neigh­ bors. For its part, the PCI’s belated acceptance of the Alliance was intended as a positive move away from the cold war and for the advancement of

163

164

New International Communism

socialism. Solidarity with NATO was viewed as a means of stabilizing the blocs and thus reinforcing military parity and political detente. The sincer­ ity of this rationale was demonstrated when the PCI did not change its posi­ tion on NATO after it shifted in 1979 away from the government and into opposition. Today the consensus in Italian politics between the government and opposition on military and foreign affairs remains broader than in most European countries, even the United Kingdom. The differences that exist concern minor questions of priority rather, than major issues. Thus, the PCI is in a unique position among nonruling CPs in. the degree of its support for governmental high policy. (As of mid-1981, the compatibility of the PCF position with that of Mitterrand remains to be tested.) A fundamental dilemma persists, however, namely the nature of war and the Soviet threat, which should serve as the theoretical basis for the rationalization of foreign and security policies. Here the PCI shares a strong coincidence of views with the other three Latin parties, which inevit­ ably weakens the persuasiveness of its commitment to the consensus. It has avoided having to resolve this contradiction by focusing public attention on its position on immediate principles (arms control, for instance) and issues (Euromissiles and TNF modernization). Immediate issues tend to be more compelling than abstract concepts. The PCF paradoxically was close to the government of Giscard d’Estaing on some principles and issues because of its nationalistic senti­ ments rather than the logic of its policies. It often combined latent anti­ German emotions with standard anti-American animosity in statements that were usually more vitriolic than periodic Soviet and Eastern European denunciations of U.S. and Western hegemonistic and monopolistic machi­ nations. It rejected NATO from the outset; the government did so only in 1966. The PCF endorsed the EC belatedly, but for its own reasons and not to bolster the French position. The Communists have endorsed only par­ tially the French military doctrine of omnidirectional defense, but they have totally rejected other policies, such as the maintenance of the French For­ eign Legion, which they regard as an instrument of colonial rule. The proximity of the PCF stance on some foreign and security matters evidenced the limited support it extended the government on certain issues. Endorsement of the Soviet position in broad areas, however, should not be regarded either as subservience to the Kremlin or as acceptance of Gaullist nationalism. Rather, it is the coincidence of issues with the traditional PCF Leninist interpretation of events, with strong nationalist overtones. This parochial attitude underscored the general interpretation that the PCF cen­ tral strategy was to immobilize French foreign and defense policies when­ ever they were contrary to PCF views. But a.s the Communists became pro­ gressively more isolated in national decision making, they could block key legislation only through support by the Gaullists, with whom they have little in common.

Comparative Analyses

165

Thus, the PCF rejected the unified third way approach of the Eurocom­ munists and thereby paralyzed the movement, while reverting to a fourth, purely French, way. This reversion to nationalistic preferences contributed little to the harmonization of French policy in general or to the advance­ ment of socialism at home or abroad. It assured, however, the PCF’s return to political isolation, as demonstrated by the 1981 election results. The course of the PCE is more difficult to plot. While it has been the standard-bearer for the Eurocommunist movement, it has not yet made the hard choices necessary to enter a leftist coalition or to become the workers’ party of Spain. It has been more influential abroad than at home. The course of the Portuguese revolution strongly influenced the PCE, causing it to argue for moderation and caution domestically and for independence from Moscow and interdependence among like-minded parties. The PCE’s identification with the interdependence of the third way gave it political stature disproportionate to its domestic strength. Interdependence as a means of gaining political responsibility, however, soon began to wane within the Spanish electorate. Thus by the 1980s the signs of domestic isola­ tion were magnified by indications of party factionalism, hardening antigovernmental stances on an increasing range of issues, declining popular support, and the diminution in the public’s estimation of the value of inter­ nationalism as a surrogate for domestic authority. Despite these unfavorable trends, the PCE has persisted in its opposi­ tion to the government on most aspects of high policy. Only on its attitude toward the United States did the PCE’s policy roughly parallel that of the government. As the government approaches difficult negotiations in rela­ tion to U.S. bases, NATO, EC membership, and the disposition of Gibral­ tar, the present leadership of the PCE will probably distance itself even fur­ ther from the government. Present policies suggest that the PCE will find little common ground with the Socialists and little opportunity to assert itself as a viable alternative to the Socialists in the opposition. The Spanish Communists returned after the dictatorship with a widely accepted image of moderate nationalists with international prestige. The government decided to accommodate many PCE demands or at least chose to avoid a confrontation. It now appears that the era of conciliation is over, primarily because the PCE has become so weakened that it can no longer seriously constrain government decisions in foreign and defense affairs. Thus, an indefinite period of difficult choices awaits the PCE and it is unclear whether the leadership will adopt a more adamant oppositional position, which could be widely interpreted as increasingly pro-Soviet, or whether it will continue to stress internationalism as a source of respectabil­ ity in order to further postpone unpleasant decisions. What is also increas­ ingly apparent, however, is that the PCE remains responsive to significant segments of the Spanish public on defense matters, segments that nonethe­ less vote non-Communist for other reasons. The challenge for the PCE will

166

New International Communism

be to capitalize on this proximity to public influence on high policy matters and to translate it into political profit on domestic issues. The PCP has experienced the most varied political fortunes of any of the four parties. Before and during the revolution it was a dedicated Lenin­ ist revolutionary party. Paradoxically, until November 1975 its commit­ ment to Leninism earned it greater influence over foreign and security policy than the other three parties enjoyed as a result of their respective strategies. There is no evidence yet that the PCP used this influence to alter the basic course of Portuguese high policy. Nevertheless, the Party learned from the Chilean episode the importance of capturing the loyalty of the military to the consolidation of a social revolution. While avoiding national defense policy as such, the PCP successfully used its standing within the rul­ ing military elite to advance the class struggle and promote a socialist revo­ lution. The enterprise failed, and the PCP has since toned down the belli­ cose tenor of its revolutionary rhetoric. Yet the domestication, not interna­ tionalization, of the attempted socialist revolution stirred genuine appre­ hensions among non-Communist Western Europeans. It was not only the prospect of a total Communist takeover that raised concerns; the proposed and enacted revolutionary changes and the ability of the PCP to influence government decisions awakened strong fears. The depths of these anxieties among non-Communists, in turn, generated both respect and apprehension in other Communists. Despite its failure to consolidate its power within the government, the PCP commands concealed admiration among many Western European militants for being the only European nonruling CP to use the ruling military elite and that elite’s own security policies to promote a socialist revolution. Again, despite the decisive reactions against Commu­ nist inroads by subsequent governments, Cunhal’s participation in a coali­ tion government, based on his commitment to a socialist revolution, distin­ guished him as more experienced than, if not equal to, other Communist leaders. It has also reaffirmed among the PCP leadership and party mili­ tants the correctness of the Leninist revolutionary tradition and the limited utility of the New Internationalism. The PCF’s participation in government has not altered this PCP perception. Because of the PCP’s overriding concern with internal revolution, for­ eign and security policies have held low priority. Indeed, the PCP often avoided issues and decisions in these areas because they were seen as being potentially counterproductive. Its positions on NATO, arms control, U.S. bases, and TNF modernization were designed first to preclude domestic dis­ traction and controversy and only then to correspond to broader Soviet bloc interests. This deliberate avoidance of issues created a policy vacuum for the PCP in foreign and defense matters. It showed little interest in formu­ lating a comprehensive defense program that could permit it greater influ­ ence in security debates, either by borrowing planks from other Latin CPs

Comparative Analyses

167

and arguments from socialist countries or by amplifying its own limited positions. After its unsuccessful, if not disastrous, attempts to use the mili­ tary and governmental establishments to advance its form of revolution, the PCP was content to concentrate on domestic reforms and consolidation of local electoral gains. After a decade of protracted debate among Western and Eastern CPs and the emergence and eclipse of Eurocommunism, the four Latin Euro­ pean CPs entered the 1980s in disarray in their respective relationships with the ruling governments and in their specific foreign and security policies. Differences on many substantive issues were as great as they were on the general governmental relationships and also warrant comparative analysis. f

The Relevance of Europe and Regional Institutions

Of the four parties, the PCI has clearly been the pioneer in testing the rationale and ideological compatibility of Communist participation in Western integration. It was initially and still remains more enthusiastic about association with economic than military institutions. At the Tenth Party Congress in 1962, the PCI program accepted European integration through the EC as an irreversible reality that had contributed to Italy’s remarkable economic recovery. This was not an immediate reversal and contained strong anti-American overtones and attacks of EC policies relat­ ing to Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (with which newly established PCI economic cooperatives in Italy were opening a brisk trade). Despite this evenhandedness, the changing policies of the Italian Communists come under increasing pressure from the PCF and the USSR. Nonetheless, the PCI launched a systematic campaign to enter regional institutions and participate responsibly in decision making processes at vari­ ous levels. The Communist-Socialist labor federation in 1963 opened offices in Brussels to conduct liaison with the EC bureaucracy, the non-Communist International Labor Organization, and the economic and social committees of the EC Commission. In 1969, the PCI finally gained admission to the European Parliament and has since sent distinguished delegations to Stras­ bourg, first under Giorgio Amendola and then under Enrico Berlinguer. By 1976 it has also joined the Italian delegation to the Western European Union. By most accounts, the PCI has played a conscientious and useful role during deliberations of these various bodies. Indeed, its delegation has been one of the most active in the European Parliament and was one of the first to support strongly the proposal for direct elections to the Parliament. Its early lead in accepting regional integration contributed to the creation of the above-mentioned party-sponsored think tanks to provide the required supporting documentation for the various delegations.

168

New International Communism

Elaborating on the PCI’s policy on European integration, Giorgio Amendola stated in 1972 that it was necessary “to participate in the Com­ munity to make it an open Community, organized democratically . . . not dominated by the bureaucrats and the ‘Eurocrats’ . . . nor dominated by the national executives of the governments . . . [but] with a Parliament elected by universal sufferage.”1 The final objective of the PCI’s policy of integra­ tion, according to Amendola, was to be the historic long-term aim of creat­ ing a socialist Europe, truly united from the Atlantic to the Urals. Such a goal would require profound transformations: greater socialism in the West and more democracy in the East. Such early pronouncements suggest that the PCI has a vague outline of the reason for participation in regional insti­ tutions that has guided its activist integration policy since then. For the PCI participation in the European economic and political insti­ tutions proved an opportunity to demonstrate its public accountability in a new and assertive phase of European politics. PCI association with regional bodies allowed it to exhibit its solidarity with regional leftist parties by occa­ sionally consulting and voting with Social Democrats on controversial issues, such as the situation in Afghanistan. Thus, despite Soviet recrimina­ tions, the activism of the Italian Communists added a new dimension to their interpretation of the nature of the New Internationalism phenomenon. The French Communists have been reluctant participants in all Euro­ pean political and economic organizations. They have adopted a restrictive policy toward the EC and support occasional governmental protectionist actions. While the PCI has strongly endorsed the candidacies of Greece, Spain, and Portugal for EC membership, the PCF is equally adamant in its opposition. It only belatedly accepted universal suffrage for the European Parliament and has refrained from enthusiastic participation since then. Its consultations with other Communist parties are irregular and ineffectual. PCF voting patterns demonstrate its defense of French national interests rather than concern with internationalism. The PCE asserts that there is no alternative to Spanish integration into Europe. While the PCF argues that association with any international orga­ nization is an encroachment on French sovereignty, the PCE applies this rationale only to association with NATO. (Officials suggest privately that the primary PCF concern is not the principle involved. Rather, it is the threat of competition from Spanish agricultural products, selected indus­ trial goods, and cheaper labor that prejudices the PCF’s thinking on inte­ gration.) Even stronger PCF reactions may emerge as Spain asserts its can­ didacy for membership, forcing an even wider breach between the two par­ ties on European questions. The bulk of the Portuguese electorate favors European integration. Colloquially, economic prosperity is equated with closer ties with Europe. Furthermore, there is widespread public belief that Portugal’s entry into the

Comparative Analyses

169

Community is somehow automatically linked to Spain’s membership. Therefore, the firm rejection by the PCP of association with European organizations is unique among the Portuguese political parties and other Latin Communist parties. Unlike the PCF’s, the PCP’s abhorrence of inte­ gration is based on economic and ideological factors, the threat of the expansion of capitalist encroachments in Portugal, and extension of mono­ polistic hegemony into Europe. The PCP’s stand on Europe alone is a graphic manifestation of the degree of its relative indifference toward for­ eign policy issues, its isolation within the Portuguese polity on security affairs, the incompatibility of its position with the positions of the PCI and the PCE (and to a lesser extent the PCF), and its general disregard of the challenges of New Internationalism. Indeed, as Europe becomes an increas­ ingly critical issue for both the Spanish and Portuguese electorates, the PCP’s position may prove even less tenable. While Europe is of primary importance for the PCI and the PCE, all four CPs have differing degrees of interest in Arab and Third World states and movements. In some cases, their policies appear to be afterthoughts to events or responses to Soviet admonitions. All four strongly support the African national liberation movements and the socialist participation in the various struggles. Indeed, the PCI, the PCF, and the PCE have demon­ strated backing of the Polisarios’ war with Morocco by sending delegations to the group’s headquarters. The USSR is repeatedly praised, especially in the PCP press, for its involvement in peoples’ struggles. The PCE and the PCP also enthusiastically endorse the concept of Euro-Africanization, or the intensification of relations between former colonial states and the metropolitan powers. The PCP is particularly sensitive about strengthening ties with the former Portuguese colonies, as is the PCE to a lesser extent. The PCE maintains only limited contacts with some Latin American par­ ties, but they remain largely clandestine, with the exception of those with Cuba. The PCE is highly critical of Havana’s role in the nonaligned move­ ment and its attempts in the September 1979 conference to gain adoption of a resolution identifying nonalignment with real socialism. From the PCE’s point of view, such adulteration of the principles of the movement would be a destabilizing factor in the present balance of power between the blocs. The PCF appears to be fundamentally revising its African policy, in part to take domestic political advantage of growing popular resentment over the 4 million foreign workers in France. On Christmas Eve 1980, a Communist-led group bulldozed and ransacked a dormitory for black Afri­ can workers in the Paris suburb of Vitry-sur-Seine. Instead of disavowing the racial violence, Marchais condemned the excessive concentration of immigrants in Communist communities. Repressive measures followed in other PCF strongholds, such as Rennes and Amiens. While these moves may have been popular among French workers, especially during the con­

170

New International Communism

tinuing recession, the price has been the resignation from the party of a number of dissident intellectuals. But Marchais’s position may not repre­ sent as great a policy reversal as first appeared. Rather it seems to be merely an exploitation of circumstance for immediate political gain that will periodically be repeated in the future for local benefit. The PCI has developed the most consistent policy toward the Third World and has shaped it primarily within the context of the North-South dialogue. It endorses the efforts of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Brandt Committee, and other interna­ tional organizations. This wide-ranging support is based on the conviction that the industrialized nations have a genuine responsibility to assist and accelerate the development of the Third World countries. Rather than fol­ low the erratic PCF policy on the issue, the PCI maintains that all northern nations have humanitarian obligations to eliminate misery and ‘discrimina­ tion throughout the world. Indeed, criticism is occasionally made of the USSR for not contributing more to the overall cause of development and modernization. In relations with the Arab world, all four parties demonstrate unusual consensus. They firmly support the Arabs against Israel. There remain emo­ tional commitments to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the PCI endorsed the government’s decision to open new relations with the PLO. Sadat, Camp David, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have been repeated targets of criticism. While they have each aligned themselves with the pro-confrontation Arab states, none of the four parties is likely to be radicalized by this rather distant association. The PCI uses stronger terms for denouncing international terrorism than for condemning the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Recurring evidence of clandestine support for the Italian Red Brigade by factions of the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, qualifies the PCI’s commitment to the Palestinian cause. While Third World concerns have been important in varying ways for the four parties, they have generally been tertiary to their interests in the USSR and Western Europe, where policy innovations have been more frequent.

The Soviet Threat

The nature of the Soviet threat poses intellectual problems for all nonruling CPs: some try to rationalize the issue, others ignore it, and most claim it does not exist. Western Communists’ analyses of the Soviet threat stem fr,om assumptions about the nature of international war. All four Latin CPs share the assumption that conflict is a result of the ongoing class struggle. War is no longer inevitable; but in its various forms, the struggle is. They

Comparative Analyses

171

also accept the contention that in Western Europe the USSR would not and could not use force to achieve political aims. Some assert that there would be no logical need to employ force in Western Europe. (U.S. Admiral Harry Train, commander-in-chief, NATO Atlantic Command, reported to the December 1980 semiannual ministerial meeting that in 1977 Brezhnev told a Warsaw Pact summit that, “by 1985, we shall have attained most of our objectives in Western Europe” and the reversal of forces will then be so decisive that we shall be in a position to impose our will each time this is necessary.2 In other words, the Soviets expect to induce self-Finlandization if possible, or impose it if necessary, not by the use of threats but by the Western Europeans’ mere perception and awareness of the existence of Moscow’s overwhelming military power.) Other CP members insist naively that military parity has been established in both the conventional and nuclear aspects of theater armaments, which must be preserved as the basis for political equality and detente, ignoring the imbalance in the Soviets’ favor. But the central issue is whether a consensus exists on the Soviet defini­ tion of detente, namely, cooperation in substantive areas where advantages are possible, but active competition in ideologies and values, and complete rejection of interdependency and the prospects of political convergence. Western acceptance of these rules of engagement, plus acknowledgment that military parity is the essential requirement for mutual recognition of political equality are the indispensible components of the Soviet detente formula. Thus, the Soviet military buildup in both conventional and nuclear systems can be conveniently dismissed: under Moscow’s terms, Soviet military power at least must equal that of the total aggregation of potentially hostile forces—American, European, Chinese, and Japanese. For the Soviets to compromise at less than that level could jeopardize Soviet and socialist state and ideological interests. From the Communist perspec­ tive, the West must accept existing geostrategic asymmetries, because the USSR is encircled but the United States faces only a unidirectional threat. But at this point the split occurs. From the PCF and PCP perspective, the USSR is excused for its buildup of preponderant military strength in Eastern Europe because that buildup is purely defensive and because the USSR is accredited as the master designer and principal perpetrator of the detente process. Increased international tensions, systemic instability, and the possibility of superpower confrontation (which is contrary to Soviet interests and to the Soviet political investment in detente) are blamed on the United States. From the PCI and PCE standpoint, events in Afghanistan and Poland have raised questions about the theoretical constraints on the Soviets’ use of force. The Italian and Spanish parties also question the rela­ tionship between Soviet behavior and the cooling of detente and the interna­ tional climate (at least there are no American military activities in Africa).3

172

New International Communism

Besides the similarities in ideological interpretations of the causes of war, there are several pragmatic reasons for the tandem positions of the four parties in threat perceptions. First, all enjoy secondary or tertiary eche­ loned locations behind buffer states in central Europe. This favorable geo­ strategic situation reduces the urgency for their developing a comprehensive defense policy and allows laxity in their strategic thinking. Second, these geostrategic factors permit all four to endorse their governments’ emphases on territorial defense. This stance generally corresponds with the main­ stream of public sentiment and the constraints and priorities in defense spending. Third, the emphasis on territorial defense necessarily precludes the deployment of national forces abroad, though not joint training exer­ cises on national territory. In some cases this corresponds with government policy. The main exception is France, with its remaining colonies and sub­ stantial military forces permanently stationed at Djibouti in Africa, at May­ otte in the Indian Ocean, in Guyana, and in Tahiti. Despite the PCF’s com­ plaints, these forces are not likely to be reduced, and indeed they were increased during the 1980-1981 Persian Gulf crisis. (The PCF quietly accepts the garrisoning of the French Second Corps, with three armored divisions, in Germany as an appropriate means of ensuring political influ­ ence in Bonn. It expects that French troops will never be called upon to fight for Germany and, if called, probably would refuse.) In contrast, the PCI endorses the government’s allocation of units for NATO’s Allied Com­ mand Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, which can be deployed throughout the NATO area of responsibility, and for NATO’s Mediterranean naval opera­ tions as obligations inherent in Alliance membership. But it strongly sup­ ports the government’s stand against the deployment of Italian forces out­ side NATO and the use of Italian military facilities for non-NATO mis­ sions. A fourth pragmatic reason for the parallelism in threat perception anal­ yses is the emphasis placed for ideological reasons on the political intentions of adversaries, rather than on military capabilities. This is an intellectual weakness shared by most Communist parties. Focus on the intentional aspect of threat analyses and strategic thinking has minimized the require­ ment for technical expertise necessary for the development of comprehen­ sive defense programs. Without this technical expertise, the parties reject out-of-hand most Western threat analyses, are unable to formulate their own, and thus tend to accept Soviet rationalizations by default. Except pos­ sibly in the PCI, the lack of indigenous party expertise has denied the par­ ties independent, professional analyses, seriously limiting party participa­ tion in national security debates and the credibility of party support for national defense policies. Finally, there are minor differences based on specific nuances stemming

Comparative Analyses

173

from national and party priorities. The PCI shares the general Italian per­ ception that the Soviet navy poses virtually no threat to Italian interests. It is targeted against the U.S. Sixth Fleet and, in the event of hostilities, sur­ viving vessels could not be readily reinforced and probably would seek sanc­ tuary in neutral ports. At any rate, only surviving submarines would be able to threaten surface shipping. While the PCI rejects the government’s esti­ mate that the main ground threat is in the northeast (Soviet thrusts via Yugoslavia and Austria), it actively supports Yugoslavian nonalignment and Austrian neutrality to preclude Soviet abuse of power as in Czechoslo­ vakia and Afghanistan. In the French case, even during negotiations with the Socialist party on the Union of the Left, the PCF never conceded that the Warsaw Pact posed a menace to France. Adoption of the government’s tous azimuts strategy by the PCF was only a thinly veiled assertion that the U.S. presence in and around Europe, reinforced by the growing strength of the Bundeswehr, was the principle destabilizing factor for European security. But the PCF’s opposition to the modernization or upgrading of any nuclear system that could strike Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union is a dramatic demonstra­ tion of the ambivalent PCF position on the Soviet threat. There is no threat in central Europe; therefore, there is no need for regional deterrence sys­ tems, except for the defense of France. The endorsement of the Sixth Fleet’s ballistic submarine is confidentially justified on the grounds that the addi­ tion ensures France’s role as the primary Western European nuclear power by demonstrating to Washington that Paris has an independent strategic nuclear force that must be considered in any confrontation with the USSR. The PCE is more ambiguous in its threat perceptions than the PCF. NATO admission has only belatedly surfaced and then closely tied by most Spaniards to entry in the EC. Such pragmatic political linkages are not related to the imminence of aggression. But should an attack occur by the USSR (the only Warsaw Pact country capable of striking Spain), most Spaniards expect that only facilities used by the United States will be the retaliatory targets. The PCE interprets such a scenario as a breakdown in the balance of power, but does not conceive of potential Soviet reprisals against Spanish cities—countervalue deterrence. Since such a rupture of systemic stability obviously would be the result of misjudgments, the com­ plicity of the USSR is dismissed, as are Communist obligations to think the unthinkable. The PCP’s threat perceptions are both more parochial and more Lenin­ ist than those of the other three, including the PCF. Besides the general fac­ tors mentioned above, the PCP’s primary concern with instigating a social­ ist revolution shapes its embryonic foreign and defense policies. The PCP’s main anxiety about external threats is focused on international capitalism.

174

New International Communism

The intensification of Western European integration and the consolidation of the monopolistic power of U.S. multinational corporations are the major threats to investment-starved Portugal. Thus the PCP’s threat perception is the most narrow and constrained of all four. But as the Portuguese political situation stabilizes and if the PCP’s fortunes continue to decline, the party may have to address more directly the nature of international threats at roughly the same time the government seeks greater NATO rehabilitation. The ambivalence in Communist threat perceptions, for whatever rea­ sons, is the weakest component of their individual and collective concep­ tualization of security policy. The shallowness of Communist thinking on security matters is indicated by the heavy" reliance on Soviet political rhe­ toric on detente and complete avoidance of the vast Russian literature on Soviet military doctrine. Mention is seldom made of Admiral Gorshkov’s contention that the expansion of the Soviet navy was necessary to protect Soviet state interests abroad. Nor is reference made to former Marshal Grechko’s assertion that the basis of Soviet military doctrine is that Mos­ cow has no intention of fighting on Russian soil, and that war must be car­ ried to the enemy—even if preemption is necessary. Citations of Soviet sources on military doctrine in the literature of the four parties are rare—a commentary on the state of their security studies. But difficulty in accepting the reality of a Soviet threat and the benign use of Soviet rhetoric on detente do not necessarily imply loyalty to Mos­ cow. They follow, rather, from the ideological premises for war (from which the USSR as the socialist fatherland and a superpower is apparently immune). The denial or rejection of these ideological tenets would pose severe political consequences for any nonruling CP. Doctrines on the causes of war and the class struggle are keystones that cannot be reshaped without shaking the entire ideological edifice. Nevertheless, the lack of a precise threat estimate makes any defense policy incoherent and less than credible. The lack of focus and the presumed intention of self-defense against any and all potential enemies in a tous azimuts strategy would require far greater military resources than are presently available in any of the coun­ tries. Thus the complete avoidance of the Soviet debates and appreciation of the relationships between military force, political power, and diplomatic activity has resulted in a restricted understanding of the dynamic factors in foreign and security policies. The consequences have been the parties’ con­ tentment with narrowly defined self-defense security policies that verge on the traditional leftist preferrence for neutrality and pacifism and raise ques­ tions about the credibility of the parties’ partial support for their respective governments’ national defense programs.

Comparative Analyses

175

Involvement in the Detente Process

Initially, full endorsement of detente was a hallmark of participation in the Eurocommunist movement. Detente was interpreted as a means for stabiliz­ ing the blocs, reducing bloc rivalries, and thereby advancing socialism. Indeed, many detente advocates argued at the time that detente was essen­ tial to socialist progress. The three parties (the PCP only belatedly con­ curred) endorsed the Soviet detente formula: it was to be based on Moscow’s interpretation of military parity and recognition of political equality by potential adversaries, whereby a program of cooperation on selected, beneficial issues could be sustained without impairing continuing ideological competition. But the deterioration of detente had already com­ menced and its character had been permanently altered even before Euro­ communism had become a viable phenomenon. Indeed, Eurocommunism itself was an important contributing factor in the eclipse of detente. In examining the detente process, the Soviets, and to a lesser extent proMoscow CPs, tend to ignore the action-reaction, or mirror-image, syn­ drome in their analytical methodologies. The Western understanding of state interactions is accepted by the Soviets during periods of diplomatic hyperbole, when advantages are possible, as in the 1969-1970 two-power talks on the Middle East. When relations deteriorate, the Soviets have a propensity to view the erosion as a unilateral, hostile progression against Soviet interests. Only a list of grievances by the offending power is pre­ sented, accompanied by total Soviet disavowal of any responsibility for mutual antagonism, as in the case of its duplicity in arming the Arabs for the October war, the continuing armament of North Vietnam after the 1973 ceasefire accord, and other U.S.-perceived Soviet quests for unilateral advantage. Washington interpreted Soviet moves from 1973 to 1978 as an aggregate challenge to its national interests and the detente process. But as Uri Ra’anan points out, the Soviets have not only denied the action-reaction syndrome but have pursued a policy of cautious unilateral initiative, based on their interpretation of the opportunities afforded for the advancement of socialism and interests of the socialist fatherland.4 Thus, the U.S. notion of detente predicated upon mutual restraint is a priori incompatible with Soviet doctrine. This interpretation placed the nonruling CPs in an awkward position. In response to general public interest, they were compelled to address the question no longer of who was responsible for the cold war, but who was responsible for the decline of detente. How could great power relations erode so quickly, where were the residual areas of cooperation, and what were the implications for smaller countries and the nonruling CPs?

176

New International Communism

These were unwelcome questions because there were few theoretical guidelines except the stock ideological ones. There were precedents for ana­ lyzing Soviet detente policy, such as pre-World War II Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-German relations. But these episodes were only partially relevant, and the parties preferred to ignore them. Indeed, they avoided serious dis­ cussion of the questions until Soviet actions themselves intensified the debate.

Policy Implications of the Afghanistan Crisis

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Mongolianization of the country created differing levels of intellectual furor within the four parties. Esoteric discussions about detente were set aside for more perplex­ ing debates about Soviet intentions for the use of its military power and the prospects for Soviet intervention elsewhere. Would Soviet military power be used solely for the defense of socialism, or were there scenarios when this condition could be blurred or merged with alleged requirements for the advancement of Soviet state interests? The PCI strongly condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czecho­ slovakia as unwarranted interference in an independent nation’s develop­ ment of socialism. It violated international law and was contrary to the 1956 Soviet espousal of the concept of separate roads to socialism. It also raised serious questions about the Kremlin’s pledges and treaties against the use of threats or employment of force. Finally, the Soviets’ demonstration of rela­ tively low tolerance for socialist deviations compromised the far more liberal PCI platform for responsible participation in government. The con­ tinuous references back to Czechoslovakia since then were both blatant attempts to bolster the credibility of the compromesso storico and deterrent moves against what the PCI leadership regarded as possible future addi­ tional Soviet abuses of power. The PCI made little effort to explain the unprecedented phenomenon of Communist fighting Communist in Southeast Asia. It condemned Viet­ nam’s invasion of Cambodia as inadmissible under international law for either ideological or security reasons. And, as in the case of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, it denounced as bogus the argument that a Communist gov­ ernment or party faction had the right and responsibility to invite friendly assistance by fraternal states to suppress reactionary elements threatening the revolution. Because it was seeking improved relations with Peking, the PCI was more moderate in its stance on China’s invasion of Vietnam, calling for a suspension of hostilities. But there was no such mild response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The promptness and harshness of the PCI’s denun­

Comparative Analyses

177

ciation tended to substantiate private comments by leading authorities that neither the PCI nor, probably, the Eastern European parties had any prior indication of Soviet intentions. The PCI rejected Moscow’s contention that the intervention was legal under the terms of its friendship treaty with Kabul and insisted that it was an inadmissible use of force, an abuse of power. This position then called for rethinking the causes of war and the use of force by socialist nations. After nearly two years, the PCI had not solved this contradiction by thorough argumentation and a final resolution. Equally important, the PCI linked the Afghanistan crisis and U.S. reactions to the deterioration of the detente process. The PCF broke ranks with the other leading nonruling CPs when Marchais publicly endorsed Soviet intervention as legally, morally, and politi­ cally warranted. Without decisive leadership by the USSR and support by other fraternal parties against reactionary attacks, any Communist party could be subject to various forms of pressure and the concept of a socialist commonwealth would lack credibility. Marchais’s open praise for the Soviet decision put the final nail in the coffin of Eurocommunism by fur­ ther distancing the PCF from the other parties. It also further isolated the PCF within French politics when the other French parties had reached a consensus condemning the Soviet invasion, as they had also done over Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the gradual reversion to greater support for Soviet policy was made without any significant change in Moscow’s posi­ tion regarding France. There is some evidence that the overwhelming PCF support for the Afghanistan operation was not due so much to loyalty to Moscow as to a move backward to recover ideological ground lost during the disastrous Union of the Left. It was an opportunity to reestablish the PCF’s reputation as the French workers’ party. (The party also attempted to exploit growing economic difficulties for the same purpose.) Despite PCF support for Soviet foreign policy in general and Soviet actions in Afghanistan in partic­ ular, there were muted expressions of grievance against Soviet chauvinistic behavior both in great power-small power and leading party-fraternal party relations. These complaints have been sufficiently audible to suggest that the PCF has not totally subordinated itself to the Kremlin’s interests. But the ideological regression with respect to Afghanistan allowed the PCF to avoid the contradiction in the PCI position over the causes of war and use of force. The PCF’s stand emerged ideologically intact: the class strug­ gle was preeminent, fraternal assistance was imperative against counterrev­ olutionary forces, and there was no Soviet military threat to Europe, Africa, or Asia. The PCE surpassed the PCI in its condemnation of the Soviet invasion. It denounced the move as unquestionable evidence of the Kremlin’s hege­ monistic ambitions, which must be countered morally if not physically. The

178

New International Communism

PCE argued that such deliberate aggression and interference not only vio­ lated international law and the rights of fraternal states but also seriously weakened detente. Soviet actions had strengthened U.S. political deter­ mination, reversed the trend toward autonomy in Western Europe, and cre­ ated a more sterile context for East-West relations. A new atmosphere had resulted characterized by mutual recriminations and distrust that could take years to redress, while the arms race had been accelerated. Thus, of the four parties, the PCE joined the PCI in charging that Soviet behavior had contri­ buted to the erosion of detente. While it was argued that this Soviet hegemonistic drive had intensified the crisis between the blocs and could upset the previous balance, the PCE did not reverse itself and endorse Spanish membership in NATO as a coun­ tervailing maneuver. The invasion should be condemned, but this did not in itself imply that Soviet power posed a threat to Europe, Africa, or Asia. Thus, the PCE drew the same conclusions as the PCF, but for opposite rea­ sons. The party leadership was compelled not to step backward but forward in order to retain rank and file loyalty and confidence. It had to apply unflinchingly its theory of bloc crises or imperil the credibility of its out­ spoken ideological position. Yet it could not reverse its positions on the causes of war and the use of force without considering the shattering con­ clusions that there was a Soviet threat to Europe and that Spanish adher­ ence to the Alliance would be in Spain’s vital national interests. The PCP strongly endorsed Soviet foreign policy during the respective crises. It fully backed the intervention in Czechoslovakia, Vietnam’s inva­ sion of Cambodia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (but it con­ demned China’s attack on Vietnam). The PCP’s support for Soviet behav­ ior is the most unqualified of the four parties. No connections are drawn between Soviet actions and the decline of detente. Like the USSR, the PCP charges that the responsibility is exclusively that of the United States. This position, even stauncher than the PCF’s, resulted from related causes. It was not an attempt, as with the PCF, to recover lost ideological territory. Foreign policy was one area where the Leninist traditions and policies of the PCP coincided with the state interests of the socialist fatherland. After the shift of emphasis in promoting the revaluation resulted in the moderation of domestic policies, the lightning rod of orthodoxy in the party’s general program became foreign policy. It is too early to assess, but the adoption of this dual standard, moderation on domestic issues and orthodoxy in foreign policy, may have been perceived as duplicity by some voters and contributed to the party’s serious losses in the September 1980 national elections. The PCP apparently did not make this connection, how­ ever, because it extended the strongest support of any nonruling CP for Soviet and Eastern European pressure against Poland during 1980-1981.

Comparative Analyses

179

The Impact of the Polish Events The developments in Poland in 1980-1981 were the most politically signifi­ cant in Eastern Europe since World War II and, some analysts argue, were the most perplexing for the Soviet leadership since the end of the Soviet civil war in 1921. They had profound implications for ruling and nonruling Communist parties in their assessments of the rights of fraternal interven­ tion, Soviet tolerance levels for national Communist deviations, the nature of the Soviet threat, and the future of detente. The Polish events added a new dimension to Communist discussions of high policy—the authority and legitimacy of party leadership. Unity between party and people is the principle manifestation of polit­ ical legitimacy in a single, minority party system. When public unrest stem­ ming from popular grievances against the government erupted in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980, the Polish party, often at the explicit disapproval of the CPSU and other hard-line parties, publicly acknowledged that the com­ plaints represented a breakdown in the bonds between the party and the masses and introduced corrective reforms. Before 1980, the reforms were preserved within the purview of the party and it was able to restore its authority, if not the full measure of its legitimacy. In the wake of each set of reforms, the oppressive weight of party and government inertia and the malevolence of conservative elements compromised the extent of the advo­ cated changes. Each set of reforms failed to achieve its expected goals, although there was no complete reversion to the status quo ante; some changes were actually sustained. Yet the failure triggered renewed chal­ lenges to government performance and the party’s authority. The first three recurring challenges began over economic conditions but quickly assumed political overtones that required physical repression (Posnan, Gdansk, Ursus, and Radom). In 1980, however, the workers posited political as well as economic demands from the outset of serious striking. Furthermore, they remained off the streets and within their factories in a resolute but disciplined atmosphere. On 31 August, the government agreed to the demands of the Solidarity labor movement. But the demands could not be fully honored; Poland was virtually bankrupt because of the mis­ management of earlier reforms. Former party leader Edward Gierek’s visionary program was founded on the assumption that the factories built on foreign credits would produce enough both to satisfy domestic demands and reduce imports and to pro­ vide sufficient exports to retire the debts. But the credits were allocated first for importation of consumer goods; then for financing service infrastruc­ ture, such as highways, bridges, and railways; and finally for funding mas­ sive industrial undertakings, such as the Katowice steel mill (Europe’s larg­

180

New International Communism

est), the Lublin coal mines, and other gigantic projects that would come into full production in ten to twenty years—schemes that were beyond Polish economic tolerance levels. Gierek’s rationale was that the economy in 1970 broke down because 50 percent of the total gross national product was tied up in unsold and unsalable products, a situation that could be cor­ rected only by importing foreign technology. The industrial crises, coupled with a series of bad harvests and an inef­ ficient agricultural policy, resulted in his demise. In 1980, meat production was down 25 percent, potatoes 40 percent (the smallest harvest in 20 years), sugar 25 percent, and grain 15 percent from the low 1979 levels. State subsi­ dies for agriculture in 1980 amounted to $16 billion, but they were paid largely to state farms that cultivated only 25 percent of the soil. Food rationing was introduced in December 1980 for the first time since World War IL When Gierek left office, Poland had accrued $24 billion in Western debt, had sought an additional $8 billion for 1981, and had obligated 92 percent of all export earnings to service the state indebtedness.5 By May 1981 industrial production had fallen 18 percent and most other goods and services had dropped between 21 and 28 percent from the previous year, seriously complicating economic planning throughout the Soviet bloc.6 As the protracted negotiations began to polarize the workers between the radicals and moderates, Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovakian officials and media issued grave warnings of the threat of reactionary forces and in December 1980 and April 1981 placed thirty-odd divisions on max­ imum alert, while Western governments reached a unique consensus that Soviet intervention would destroy the remnants of detente. Yet on 18 December 1980, Pravda reintroduced the-Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, which asserts the responsibility of fraternal states to intervene militarily to protect the true development of socialism in a deviant society. The stakes were high. East Germany could not accept a Polish solution to worker protests. In a reversal of the trend established in the HoneckerSchmidt exchange of views in February 1980, then at Tito’s funeral and in anticipation of the postponed August 1980 summit meeting, which had emphasized the need to preserve relations between the Germanies despite the deterioration of detente, the German Democratic Republic took pre­ emptive measures to insulate its own people against external influence from both Poland and the West. The closure of the Polish border, the fourfold increase in October of the required currency exchange for Western travelers, and the threat to abrogate the basic treaty that established rela­ tions between the two Germanies were clear signals that the East German party was prepared to risk the advances made under detente to preserve its authority. The Czechoslovakian party was also vulnerable and launched vicious

Comparative Analyses

181

attacks against Polish reformers. Its own reform movement, such as it was, had stagnated. In 1977 the liberal faction of the party presidium voted 6 to 3, with 2 abstentions, to replace Gustav Husak as party first secretary with Premier Lubomir Strougal. In the intended shake-up, the party refused to accept pro-Soviet Vasil Bilak as leader of its autonomous party, and the transfer of power failed. As a compromise, however, broad economic reforms were to be introduced 1 January 1981 that would have substituted planned output figures with profitability as the primary indicator of busi­ ness efficiency. But the Polish events allowed conservative circles to focus attention on the dangers of reactionism, and implemented reforms were substantially diluted. Thus, tense political, economic, and social factors in Czechoslovakia were precariously balanced by the outcome of develop­ ments in Poland. In Hungary, major economic reforms had already been implemented in 1968 under the new economic mechanism, which stressed agricultural investment and introduced semi-market pricing and intensification in indus­ trial investments. The result was a much sounder economy than Poland’s, despite Poland’s greater natural resources, and an authentically popular political leadership (Kadar would probably win a public election). Yet these important gains, including the trade union’s legal (but not often exercised) right to veto management decisions, could have been jeopardized by a vio­ lent eruption in Poland. This fostered caution on Hungary’s part. Rumania was in an even more sensitive position. Ceausescu was strongly against any form of intervention. He had firmly denounced the 1968 operation and gravely warned of the dire consequences of a similar use of force. Yet after Rumania’s own large-scale strikes by miners in 1977, Ceausescu was aware of the dangerous precedent that the Polish free labor movement could have for his own hard-line regime. Whistling in the dark appeared to be his primary tactic for navigating the waters of Eastern Euro­ pean politics. But Solidarity withdrew from the brink and refined its demands so that they bound party legitimacy, freedom from Soviet intervention, and detente in an even more complicated manner. Solidarity advocated greater religious tolerance, honesty in government, and discipline among the workers. By successfully shifting emphasis from the political vengeance demanded by the radicals to moral renewal, the leadership of Solidarity usurped the moral authority of the party and reinforced its alliance with the Church. The party’s leading role within society was seriously undermined by the workers’ demands for moral reforms at all levels. Receiving wide national endorsement for its assumption of the role of guardian of public morality, Solidarity increased the deterrence against Soviet intervention and the pre­ servation of detente, upon which Polish national survival depended. In other words, it would be difficult for a Soviet invasion force to counter a

182

New International Communism

workers’ moral crusade for the restoration of integrity and efficiency within party, government, and factory. Pressures from virtually every quarter of Polish society forced the most drastic political reforms ever instituted by a Marxist-Leninist party. Expo­ sure of corruption, the development of horizontal rather than vertical com­ munication among various parts of the organization, open nominations, and secret balloting resulted in purges of the leadership and the strengthen­ ing of the party renewal process. Ninety-one percent of the 1,955 delegates to the July 1981 Extraordinary Party Congress had not attended previous congresses; they, in turn, reelected only 16 members to the 200-member cen­ tral committee and only 4 to the politburo and ousted virtually every district first secretary. Extremists among the hard-liners and reformers lost heavily, while moderates rallied around party leader Stanislaw Kania. It is still too early to assess the significance of these democratization measures for the nonruling CPs. Preliminary analyses suggest that the Polish party has now established standards of democratization that will be difficult for any Marxist-Leninist party advocating democratic centralism to emulate. (For example, the PCI still opposes such open nominations as the Polish Party introduced, partially because in the Polish case the polit­ buro’s candidates were repeatedly defeated in district level pre-Congress elections and later at the Congress itself.) The presumed response by the orthodox CPs will be to strengthen ver­ tical discipline to preclude the degree of horizontalization that occurred in Poland. Yet it was this process that overcame the demoralization of the Polish party and generated the renewal movement within the rank and file. And it was this renewal effort that effectively restored the party’s leading role at Solidarity’s expense. The Polish Communist party was able to ini­ tiate and survive the cathartic self-criticism necessary for the reestablish­ ment of its claims to moral leadership of the society. In the course of events, Solidarity’s moral sway diminished, leaving it in the difficult position of having to introduce and possibly enforce the government’s inevitably harsh economic reforms. It can be speculated that this could create a genuine part­ nership between labor and government, as Solidarity has advocated. Alter­ natively, it could place the present labor leadership in an impossible posi­ tion and cause factionalism, the demise of Solidarity, and the undermining of the free trade union movement. Finally, without its former claims to moral leadership, Solidarity may become an embattled trade union in a nowin situation as economic imperatives immobilize it between the workers and the government. The outcome will depend heavily on the nature of the economic reforms that can now be predicated on the moral revitalization of the party. The radicalization of the union demonstrated during the Septem­ ber 1981 annual congress indicated the degree of frustration within the lead­ ership over the worsening crisis and the eclipse of its former authority throughout the society.

Comparative Analyses

183

The Polish events drove great wedges into the international Communist movement. The ruling parties voiced support and confidence for the Polish party and government. The nonruling CPs, however, were in a difficult position. They had to endorse the Polish free trade union movement in order to reaffirm the independence of their own party-sponsored unions. Endorsement of the reimposition of state control on the union would have seriously undermined their pledges of union freedom to both union mem­ bers and non-Communist critics. Nonetheless, a predictable cleavage opened among the Latin CPs. Gian Carlo Pajetta, head of the foreign relations committee of the PCI, issued a statement declaring: “All liberties, including trade union liberties and the right to strike, must be firmly upheld in order to guarantee the rational development of society, to permit correction of errors, and to ensure that each one obtains his proper share of work and coresponsibility.”7 The Catholic, Socialist, and Communist oriented unions then issued a joint statement supporting the strikers’ struggle to win better working and living conditions, together with wider union and political free­ dom.8 These and other commentaries indicated an initial PCI emphasis of the preservation of the concept of free unions for both domestic purposes and assurances of the third way to socialism. But, by December 1980, the crisis had escalated to the point that PCI attention was focused on the threat of intervention and the implications for detente. Vadim Zagladin, member of the Soviet central committee depart­ ment for relations with nonruling CPs, failed in talks in Rome to assuage Italian apprehensions. In public statements the PCI bluntly and strongly opposed any form of intervention in Poland because of the disastrous effects that would result for Poland and for the very idea of socialism. In messages to all Warsaw Pact members, the PCI warned that armed inter­ vention not only would fail to serve the cause of internationalism, “but would lead to the isolation of the countries and parties responsible.”9 The PCE was even more explicit. In a public statement, Manuel Azca­ rate firmly declared, “The Communist party of Spain will break off rela­ tions with the Communist party of the USSR if Soviet armed intervention in Poland takes place.”10 He supported the right to strike of the Polish workers and their effort to democratize the Polish system. But he charged that intervention would be “a severe blow to peace, European security, and the development of socialism itself.” Similarly, by invading Poland, San­ tiago Carrillo claimed, “Moscow would be committing a stupidity just as it did in Afghanistan.”11 The PCF was ambivalent. Press coverage of the strikes was more rou­ tine than analytical and was combined with attacks on domestic enemies of the party. This noncommittal position was shifted slightly after the Gdansk accords permitted free union elections. George Marchais stated that, at the present stage of Poland’s development, “more than ever, social progress,

184

New International Communism

economic efficiency, and socialist democracy are intimately linked.”12 Again, Marchais declared, “I am convinced there will be no Soviet interven­ tion in Poland .... [But] the Polish people must stop those people who would like to profit from this difficult situation.”13 He added that the PCI, by warning the Soviets of the dangers of intervention, had made the “neces­ sity for democratic and socialist resurgence more complicated and more dif­ ficult”—a rejoinder undoubtedly welcomed by the Kremlin. Even in view of the PCF compromise declaration with Mitterrand, one can only speculate about the PCF reaction to the Soviet use of force. Depending upon the near-term assessment of the coalition’s value, the PCF might seek a formula similar to that used during the 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis, when it disapproved of physical intervention but supported the nor­ malization process that eliminated revisionist reforms. Such a stance would allow it to maintain its ideological integrity and shift the blame to the United States for the general breakdown of detente. The PCP lost heavily in the October Portuguese elections and the most frequently cited cause among foreign policy issues was the party’s stands on Afghanistan and Poland. With respect to the latter, Alvaro Cunhal accepted the right to organize and strike, but not against a socialist govern­ ment—there was more appropriate machinery for grievance resolution that did not endanger the party’s legitimacy. He could endorse political plural­ ism in contemporary Portugal but not the pluralization of Poland. He agreed with the workers’ assessment of the state of the economy, especially after the government’s own acknowledgments in September, but he could not agree with the nature or extent of the envisioned economic reforms—the return to profitability was the abandonment of central planning and the endorsement of mini-capitalism. Thus the Polish events, more than any other issue since November 1975, apparently convinced a significant num­ ber of PCP sympathizers and opponents that the shift to moderation was merely a tactical, temporary maneuver and that the party’s Leninist tenets remained the compelling policy guidelines. In its view, then, the PCP could be expected to support Soviet intervention fully, regardless of the scenario, as a reavowal of the correctness of its own ideological positions. Finally, in assessing the potential implications of the Polish events for various Communist parties, it should be noted that facile comparisons between the Prague Spring and the Polish developments could overlook important dissimilarities.14 First, the Czechoslovakian experiment was led by a Communist party that was becoming a reformist body. The nature and extent of the reforms remained largely within party controls, despite Soviet charges to the contrary, but did not receive extensive worker support. The 1980 reforms in Poland were introduced from outside and in defiance of the party. Indeed, popular pressure from below sustained the reforms. In both cases, party cadres were purged, though far more extensively in 1980 than

Comparative Analyses

185

1968. A sharp decline in party morale occurred in Poland. Yet Kania was maintained in power, at least temporarily, primarily because the Soviets apparently concluded that, like Gomulka, he could eventually turn the reforms around. They had lost that confidence in Dubcek. Second, and as a corollary to the first point, the momentum behind the Polish developments was sustained not only by proletarian grievances but also by those of virtually all segments of society except the ruling elite. The 1980 events assumed the dimensions of a national crusade for the restora­ tion of public morality. The Prague experiment was the enterprise of the intellectual and nonproletarian strata of society. The Soviets could move with greater impunity against largely centralized, elitist factions, while appealing to those who would be aggrieved by the reforms, than they could against the workers, the Church, and the intellectuals with established chan­ nels for promoting their respective reforms, which coalesced around mutual interests. Third, the Polish economy was on the verge of bankruptcy, which could only be exacerbated by intervention. The introduction of food ration­ ing is commentary enough. With increasing economic demands from friends and allies, the USSR could ill afford the additional burden of Polish dependency. This was not the case in 1968. The Czechoslovakian reform movement began in the 1962-1963 economic slump. By 1968 the economy had rebounded to the point that it could sustain even the shock of a Soviet invasion. Fourth, there were also strategic differences. Poland lies between the USSR and East Germany. The logistical lines necessary to preserve vital Soviet interests in Germany are governed by the Poles and cannot be readily or efficiently replaced. (The Poles recognize these geopolitical realities; the railway workers never struck the international truck lines, only local com­ muter connections.) The main reason for the 1968 invasion was to ensure political control over a local constituency. There were, of course, the impor­ tant military advantages of positioning five additional Soviet divisions closer to Bavaria. But they do not play as critical a role for the protection of Soviet vital strategic interests in central Europe as do the two divisions gar­ risoned in Poland. Finally, there were sharp asymmetries in factors extraneous to the immediate crises. Soviet economic growth was lower and the strains more visible than twelve years earlier. China was no longer in the throes of the debilitating Cultural Revolution and since had normalized relations with the United States and Japan. Soviet overseas dependents (Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Cuba) required the expenditure of money and resources not anticipated in the 1960s. The attainment of even immediate Soviet objectives necessitated the continuation of the present level of Western technology transfer and trade,

186

New International Communism

which was linked closely to the political atmosphere. (In 1970 the EC imported only $4.8 billion in goods from the Soviet bloc and exported $4.8 billion in products. In 1979 the Community bought $20.3 billion from COMECON countries, while selling them $18.5 billion in goods. In 1980 West German exports to the USSR rose 30 percent to over $4 billion and French exports 31 percent to over $2 billion.) Last, in 1968 Moscow was just exploring the opportunities and advantages of detente, which were only temporarily impaired by the invasion. By 1980, it was seeking ways to keep remnants of detente viable which would undoubtedly be quashed by inter­ vention in Poland. (The 1956 Polish reformist movement is a closer analyt­ ical parallel because of its broader public support. Yet even 1956 does not provide accurate analogues for Soviet tolerance levels in 1980.) In 1980 it was argued more frequently by Europeans than by Americans that both Eastern and Western interests would be served by maintaining the vestiges of detente. Yet the four Latin CPs held different perceptions of detente. To the PCF, it was a vehicle for enhancing U.S. influence and con­ versely for diminishing the contraction of American commitments abroad. The PCP viewed detente as a distraction from and an impairment of the changes necessary for revolution. At best it was a temporary expediency that benefited political forces other than the PCP. While neither the PCI nor the PCE advocated the extension of U.S. influence, both concluded from the Polish events that strengthening Eastern European participation in the detente process served their own individual interests. The present level of East-West interactions identified as the detente process is indispensible for preserving the present momentum of the reformist tendencies in Eastern Europe. Without improved technologies and adequate resources, the reformist factions would likely succumb, as in the past, to hard-line rivals who advocate improvement in the conservative but tested model of centralization. The emergence of gradually liberalizing models for social development a la Hungary and possibly Poland would be a graphic demonstration of the raising of the Soviets’ tolerance thresholds for deviation and national Communism. Increased Soviet acceptance of national modeling within its own sphere of hegemony would enhance the credibility of the moderate nonruling parties. Thus, the PCI and the PCE view detente as a positive dynamic factor essential for lowering tensions and the advancement of their own political goals.

National Defense Policies of the Latin European CPs The PCI has by far the most developed security program of any of the four parties as presented in the 1974 semi-official Boldrini and D’Alessio white paper on defense and the December 1979 Senate defense debate. The PCI

Comparative Analyses

187

has failed, however, to amplify these initial efforts with a comprehensive, formal platform. Other policy priorities and persisting contradictions in some positions have delayed a definitive undertaking. The party’s military doctrine is based essentially on territorial self­ defense, with exceptions for selected NATO contingencies. To support an omnidirectional defense and partially to rationalize the doctrine, a rede­ ployment of the force structures from the heavy concentrations in the northeast to a more equitable nationwide distribution is urged. (It is argued that such a redeployment would permit the army to participate more effec­ tively in other duties such as emergency relief and civilian defense, as in the disastrous 1980 earthquake south of Naples.) The party presently fully sup­ ports NATO membership. But if an adequate reduction of tensions should ever occur (which has not been defined), the PCI might revert- to its pre-1975 stand and opt for nonalignment la Yugoslavia. It accepts U.S. bases and even nuclear weapons on Italian soil. It supports the government position that these facilities must be exclusively for NATO missions and that increased access rights or extensions and upgrading of these facilities are unwarranted. It agrees generally with the PCE that its policy should be aimed at reducing U.S. hegemony and influence but rejects the PCF’s bla­ tant anti-Americanism. Evenhandedness is required between the two blocs until both are eliminated. On weapons modernization, the PCI has been more systematic than the PCF in designating the function and extent of modernization. Moderniza­ tion is accepted on the grounds of cost reduction, economic rationalization, and local employment. Furthermore, weapons upgrading can be encour­ aged if there are adequate parliamentary controls over weapons procure­ ment and if there is progress in arms control. NATO systems standardiza­ tion programs are seen as steps toward economic rationalization. Finally, modernization is viewed as a necessary factor in maintaining bloc balances; it is not a destabilizing function, providing it is accompanied by adequate arms controls. The PCI strongly prefers the maintenance of military balance through arms control and detente, rather than either arms competition or neutral­ ity—both of which would be destabilizing. Its position on arms control, however, is tainted by its attitude toward the United States and its role in the Alliance. It has established premises but not developed arguments about the appropriate relationship with the United States, the ultimate purpose of the Alliance, and the role Italy should play in arms negotiations. It rejects U.S. hegemonistic tendencies, seeks greater autonomy within the Alliance, and tends to perceive NATO policies as U.S. directives. This is not a sound foundation for constructing a systematic arms control program. Nonethe­ less, on specific issues, it favors the continuation of the MBFR negotiations; and, in an effort to break the deadlocked talks, it has proposed membership

188

New International Communism

expansion to include Italy and Rumania. The PCI opposes the introduction of new provocative systems, such as the neutron warhead, Pershing II and Cruise missiles. Thus, it is against TNF modernization but strongly sup­ ports opening negotiations on the limitations of Euromissiles, largely on Soviet terms—the arms to be discussed would include only the present U.S. forward based systems (FBS), F-4 and F-lll aircraft, Pershing I missiles, and the next generation of Pershing II and land-based Cruise missiles. The general adoption of the Soviet position on arms control is mainly a consequence of the PCI’s lack of technical expertise. It has not thought through the implications of the FBS issue for the Alliance or Italy. Accep­ tance of Soviet terms would eliminate nuclear retaliatory capability from Italian soil, a move the party argues would be destabilizing and therefore has not advocated. It has apparently also not grasped the psychological and political consequences for NATO. Since the outset of SALT negotiations, the United States has refused to accept the Soviets’ argument that any sys­ tem capable of striking the national territory of the opponent, regardless of its launching base, must be considered strategic. The physical removal of the FBS components, however, would have a profound psychological and political impact on the European members of NATO by raising fears about the U.S. commitment to European defense. Furthermore, from a military viewpoint, withdrawal of the FBS would eliminate NATO’s ability to intro­ duce intermediary, controlled escalation. NATO’s doctrine of flexible response incorporated in regulation by the Military Committee (MC 14/3) would become inoperative, and the only recourse against battlefield defeat would be surrender or strategic holocaust. The PCI has yet to appreciate the fact that regional arms limitation negotiations are more complex politically and militarily than bilateral strategic talks and to prepare itself sufficiently to make a contribution to the national arms control debate. While the PCI has accepted the necessity of system modernization, its overriding emphases are on the functions, services, and control of the mili­ tary establishment. The military’s function is to defend the country and to assist civilian authority during national emergencies. Its members should participate in the political life of the country, like all other citizens, but they cannot be allowed to form indigenous political organizations. The PCI has traditionally sought to accelerate the democratization pro­ cess within the Italian military and paramilitary organizations. It has focused on greater military justice, an improved officer-men ratio, ratio­ nalization of command structures, better living conditions for recruits, pro­ motional opportunities for NCOs and junior officers, and more lucrative officer retirement benefits. The PCI’s service reform program is so broad that critics have charged it represents less a genuine attempt at democratiza­ tion than a deliberate effort to cultivate a political constituency within the military. Regardless of the charges, the PCI has accepted the challenge of

Comparative Analyses

189

maintaining its influence among the youth in the armed forces. Yet one accusation the PCI does not deny is that its reform program is aimed at weakening the political appeal of the right, neutralizing political terrorism, and precluding a rightest military coup, the principal threat it sees to the Republic. A further PCI check on the military establishment is its participation in the exercise of legislative control. It is fully engaged in the parliamentary foreign and defense committees. Indeed, the PCI has attained sufficient electoral strength and parliamentary expertise that it has partial veto power over military and foreign policy legislation. But because of peculiarities of the Italian political system, it has very little authority over the actual admin­ istration of adopted legislation. Consequently, while the PCI presently enjoys much greater authority in the legislation of high policy than any other nonruling CP, governmental structures limit its application and util­ ity. Since parliamentary control over governmental administration is far weaker in Italy than are analogous controls in the United States, United Kingdom, or Federal Republic of Germany, the PCI has sought alternative measures and has been the only Italian party to advocate greater civilian authority over the military. Its proposed solution is the creation of civilian­ military committees at all levels of government and military echelons. The purpose of the committees would be to resolve local problems at the imme­ diate level, rather than force them into bureaucratic channels where they are often overlooked. The Christian Democrats, of course, are opposed to such inroads into government prerogatives. But the PCI is unlikely to diminish its pressure for the establishment of more decisive civilian authority over the military, and the contest is likely to be protracted. In the PCI’s favor is the fact that it has acted responsibly in legislating matters of high policy, often more responsibly than the coalition parties. On the French scene, the PCF fully supported the Giscard d’Estaing government’s tous azimuts doctrine, as well as the redeployment of major formations from northeastern to southern districts, and the withdrawal of some heavy equipment from the Second Corp in Germany. It remains strongly anti-NATO and seeks constraints against the deployment of French forces abroad except in Germany. This is essentially a doctrine of territorial self-defense, but the endorsement of the presence of French units on German soil raises questions about the PCF motive. It is almost certainly not to defend Alliance interests. Yet the party is too Gallic to espouse neu­ trality. It must belong to and at least marginally participate in any organiza­ tion it intends to influence. A Swiss or PCE option is inconsistent with the PCF’s France-first interests. American forces were evicted from France after de Gaulle’s break with NATO, and NATO lost important operational depth as a result. Because

190

New International Communism

German and U.S. forces based in Bavaria and Hesse were almost exclusively dependent on fuel sources in Antwerp and Rotterdam, France agreed in a treaty with the United States to keep the World War II fuel pipelines in standby condition for emergency use. The pipelines were activated during the post-October war oil embargo. The Communists and the Gaullists have quietly accepted this residual connection and did not protest its operational use. The responsibility is now the jurisdiction of the Communist minister of transportation. The PCF is also ambivalent toward weapons modernization. Unlike the PCI, which accepts the stationing of foreign aircraft targeted against central Europe, the PCF has maintained imprecise definitions of tactical and strate­ gic weapons. Any system that can attack not just the USSR but also Eastern Europe is classified as strategic, and its modernization is rejected. On these grounds, the PCF opposes a new generation of mobile MRBMs, a new penetration bomber, and development of the neutron warhead as inconsis­ tent with perceived threats and as manifestations of arms racing and the Atlanticist tendencies of Giscard d’Estaing. (Even more than the Gaullists, the PCF regards itself as the guardian against Atlanticism. This was particu­ larly true with the neutron warhead, which it regarded as involving the abandonment of the Gaullist tous azimuts doctrine, since it required for­ ward deployment.) It rejects NATO standardization as hegemonistic, but it accepts col­ lateral production undertakings of benefit to France. Its objective was not too distant from that of the government of Giscard d’Estaing: self-suffi­ ciency in all aspects of military weapons, including advanced communica­ tions and reconnaissance. This is regarded as ideologically and politically essential to demonstrate French military autarchy. It is also important industrially to ensure French workers’ jobs. In contrast, PCF acceptance of the modernization of the strategic ballistic missile submarine fleet is not based on military rationale but on the logic of political influence. PCF sup­ port for the additional French submarine will probably persist despite the prospects and outcome of arms control developments. The PCF has a long record of demands for French participation in arms control negotiations. (It was originally dissatisfied with the 1978 French proposal for reentry into arms limitation discussions because it did not include reduction of nuclear weapons—a Soviet demand. When Moscow accepted the CSCE provisions for confidence-building measures as a point of departure, the PCF dropped its reservation.) The PCF has strongly opposed the creation of a European defense force as a destabilizing factor that is also incongruent with arms control. It loudly condemns NATO’s plans for modernizing theater nuclear forces and endorses the Soviet posi­ tion on Euromissile negotiations and the FBS issue. The PCF’s acceptance of the Soviet policy on FBSs underscores the log­

Comparative Analyses

191

ical difficulties of the French party’s position. PCF agreement that France’s central nuclear forces are indeed peripheral strategically would be consistent if it included the most invulnerable and efficient component—ballistic mis­ sile submarines. In an effort to square the circle, the PCF has advocated French participation in SALT III (at an appropriate time), a suggestion the Giscard d’Estaing government firmly rejected. It shares Moscow’s view that the United States and the West are responsible for the breakdown of SALT II and MBFR. But contrary to Soviet policy, the PCF has called for a freeze at actual levels of armaments and armed forces as a manifestation of inten­ tions to halt the arms race. For the same reason, the PCF advocates negotia­ tion of a Franco-Soviet mutual defense pact. The extremism of recent PCF rhetoric on arms control indicates the degree of political retrenchment it felt was required after its flirtation with the Union. But it also conceals the policy dexterity the PCF demonstrated on arms control under pressure from the Socialists. The future PCF posi­ tion on arms control under Mitterrand remains to be fully elaborated. The PCF has been much less definitive than the PCI in formulating an overall program for improvement of military operations and services. It rarely takes exception to government policy on these issues or on the prob­ lem of parliamentary control of the military that is so central to PCI secu­ rity policy. Indeed, parliamentary debates are seldom even discussions in the traditional legislative milieu. The PCF has not voted against any defense budget in the past decade, although spending has increased since 1975 at an average 3.5 percent in real terms, to $21 billion in 1980, making France the only Alliance member besides the United States to exceed consistently the NATO guideline of 3 percent annual increases. Military spending for 1981 was adopted with a 5 percent increase in real terms without a single Com­ munist exception or reservation. No inquiries were raised on specific line items, such as price overruns on procurement of new systems. The largest single increase has been in expenditures for the modernization of nuclear strategic forces—threefold in four years.15 Yet there has still been no parlia­ mentary reaction from the PCF. In another category, French weapons exports have risen sharply in ten years from $620 million in 1970 to over $5 billion, making France the world’s third largest arms salesman. Moreover, the bulk of these weapons have been sold to African dictators and Arab radicals. Apparently for the sake of French jobs and national prestige, there has been no public debate conducted by the PCF compared to that of U.S., British, and German liberals and leftists about the moral responsibilities attached to arms trans­ fers and the necessity for government restraint. There are various explanations for this legislative passivity on national security policy. One factor is that it is not a unique PCF omission; other national parties, mainly the Socialist, have also not developed the interest in

192

New International Communism

the details of technical military matters found among members of the Ger­ man Bundestag or the U.S. Congress. Moreover, since the French do not share the West Germans’ sense of immediate military threat, there is a ten­ dency to let the president assume full responsibility for defense matters.16 But Italy has a lower threat estimate and yet is the scene of far more inten­ sive parliamentary debate on defense matters. This is no doubt due to the vigorous PCI attitude toward parliamentary control of defense questions, which the Christian Democrats tacitly resist. Thus, there have been variations in the methods the French and Italian Communist parties have employed to inform the public and governments on their respective positions. Obviously, both make extensive use of party, national, and international news media, as well as a wide variety of official and semi-official documents, for propagation of information and for elec­ tioneering. The PCI, however, has developed a wider range of media resources and publication outlets. This is commensurate with its larger size, wider audience, and more moderate and diversified ideological stance. But the most significant variation in the public records of the two parties on high policy matters is in their use of the legislative process. Until 1981, the PCF’s role in national politics has not substantially changed since 1921. It has served primarily as the champion of aggrieved workers and secondarily as a revolutionary party. (Parliamentary support for the 1936 Blum government—an antecedent of the 1977 PCI association with the Christian Democratic government, formal participation in the first government of the Fourth Republic, and the flirtation with the Union of the Left were all short lived. At the end of each episode, the PCF reverted to its former isolated position.) It is not entirely clear why the PCF chose not to exploit the legislative process in the PCI’s manner to propagandize its secu­ rity policy. It has used the National Assembly for advancing its interests in domestic issues, and the French presidential system has not subordinated the legislature any more than has Italian centrist domination. Public indif­ ference toward high policy is equally prevalent. But the PCF has used the media, rather than the public record, to achieve its information goals. These variations tend to reinforce the conclusion that there are substan­ tial differences between the two parties about their perceived objectives and roles in their respective societies. The PCI emphasis on intensive participa­ tion in the legislative process reflects its social maturation and the recogni­ tion of the political advantages gained by seizing popular initiatives that can embarrass the government and thereby enhance the party’s public respect­ ability. But the PCI use of the legislative process had as its goal not only the exposure of governmental abuses and omissions but also the establishment of a consistent record of public accountability. As important as the substantive aspects of the two parties’ positions on high policy, their respective participation in the legislative process also

Comparative Analyses

193

reflects differences in policy priorities, the degree and durability of mutual estrangement, and interpretations of the limits of international identifica­ tion and obligations acceptable to both parties. On specific national defense policies, the PCE shares the general doc­ trine of territorial defense with the other Latin CPs, but with significant dif­ ferences of detail. It does not harbor the sense of continental grandeur that has prompted the PCF to endorse partially the French government’s strate­ gic concepts. The PCE strongly opposes Spanish NATO membership, the deployment of Spanish forces outside national territory, the development of an indigenous strategic capability, and the location of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil. (While Madrid’s foreign policy is increasingly African ori­ ented, the PCE is against, as are most Spaniards, the development of a cor­ responding military reach.) The military doctrine of the PCE is designed more so than that of either the PCI or the PCF to confine its homeland to the military status of a little European state. This position is likely to be refined and reinforced as the public debate over NATO membership intensi­ fies. Yet the PCE accepts U.S. basing rights as presently defined. It is unlikely, however, to tolerate either the visual upgrading or modernization of the facilities or the extension of greater accessibility to Spanish bases. Unlike the PCI, which also accepts foreign facilities and rights, the PCE perceives such concessions as far more expedient. This stems from a differ­ ent emphasis in the conceptualization of Western defense. Whereas the PCI endorses the concept of collective security as integral for Italian national defense and the defection of Italy from the present system as dangerously destabilizing, the PCE philosophy rejects collective security as the inevitable instrument of hegemonistic expansion. Alliances are an aberration from the natural condition of the nation-state. While advocating the abrogation of countervailing military structures, it is prepared to accept temporarily the status quo in national defense policy as the most feasible option for main­ taining bloc balances. This strong support for the status quo dominates not only its military doctrine but also its national defense policy, even in its rudimentary form. The military doctrine that would be most compatible with the PCE’s notion of the natural condition of the national state is something between legal neutrality under international law and political nonalignment. The PCE has propounded publicly a doctrine that is contrary to the stated posi­ tions and presumed interests of the PCI and the PCF. This strong unilateral stand is both politically and philosophically based. Many Spaniards believe that an essential aspect of the particular pathos of their country has been the one and a half centuries of neutrality and nonparticipation in two world wars, distinguishing Spain in Latin Europe. Thus, it is political for the PCE to cultivate important, if not the dominant, streams of public opinion.

194

New International Communism

Intellectually it is argued that neutrality affords the greatest policy flexibil­ ity and minimum constraints, thereby maximizing the political influence of Spain in Europe when it is undecided about the role it should play as Span­ ish isolation diminishes. The PCE’s emphasis on neutrality has so far been so incongruent with the doctrines of the PCI and PCF that the development of a common position has not been seriously attempted and will probably be avoided in the near future as an exercise that would merely expose fis­ sures. There is little mention in the PCE press about weapons modernization and service functions. When there is a tangential reference to arms upgrad­ ing, it is identified as escalatory, even if made incrementally and, therefore, a destabilizing manifestation of arms racing. There is little discussion of the view that modernization can be merely the perfection of existing systems, improving efficiency and personnel proficiency, better to fulfill existing security requirements. In a slight deviation, the PCE adopted a position parallel to that of the PCI and the PCF, advocating the expansion of the indigenous arms industry, not only for the sake of workers’ job security but to reduce dependency on foreign weapons procurement. This did not mean weapons modernization, but the extension of industrial capacity to maxi­ mize production of arms and equipment. Yet there are occasional murmurs about the dangers of the emerging military-industrial complex. (Spain is now a medium-level arms-producing country capable of generating its own research and development for some systems, especially naval warships.) On service functions, the PCE has followed a seemingly ambivalent course. On the one hand, it has generally adopted a hands-off attitude toward the former Franco military establishment. Professional military officers, therefore, are relatively unfettered in determining military bud­ gets, personnel services and costs, and operational policies. The PCE has not shown the same interest as the PCI in cultivating a political constituency among military personnel through seeking to resolve some of their griev­ ances. On the other hand, like the PCI, its primary domestic threat comes from a possible military coup engineered by disillusioned rightist officers, as indicated by the abortive February 1981 putsch. Instead of attempting to moderate or isolate radical tendencies by expanding professional collabora­ tion and exercising stricter legislative controls over defense policy, the PCE has confined itself largely to championing legislation guaranteeing civil liberties, curbing police abuses, countering terrorism, and accelerating the devolution of power (the main reason for terrorism). One explanation for the relatively low priority attached to military ser­ vices and legislative control of defense matters is that the long tradition of a professional and elitist armed forces and the positive political advantages derived from neutrality have reduced public concern with security matters (the civil war was an obvious exception). Another reason offered is that the

Comparative Analyses

195

PCE has the least precisely defined perception of national threat. Spain will remain relatively immune from the consequences of the battlefields in Ger­ many or even France, unless it enters NATO and becomes subject to limited air attacks. The lack of a public perception of an imminent threat has reduced the PCE’s interest in even exploring the prospects of the develop­ ment of one. Thus, by attempting to preserve the status quo in some areas and advancing neutrality in others, the PCE has failed to develop the pro­ fessional expertise necessary to grasp and explain to its constituents the dynamic relationship between foreign policy objectives and military capa­ bilities. Furthermore, the lack of interest and Spain’s distance from the main arms control forums on the causes of aggression are principle reasons for the PCE’s virtually unique indifference to arms control matters. (Fol­ lowing the Spanish government’s hosting of the 1980-1981 biennial meeting of the CSCE and endorsement, along with the Eastern bloc, of proposed negotiations on confidence-building measures for the reduction of tensions, however, the PCE took its first serious view of the implications of arms control.) The military doctrine of the PCP is a composite of the doctrines of the other three Latin European parties. Its preferred option would be the adop­ tion of complete neutrality along lines advocated by the PCE. It grudgingly accepts Portuguese participation in NATO and its withdrawal only within the context of European solutions to the balance of power. This position is rationalized with the argument that premature withdrawal would only encourage greater arms expenditures by the remaining partners, not the dis­ integration of the Alliance (neither occurred when Greece withdrew from the military organization). At the same time, it opposes extension of mem­ bership or the Alliance’s terms of reference. Thus, the PCP’s doctrine as presently articulated differs substantially from that of the PCF or the PCI. Within this framework, the PCP opposes a wide range of military mea­ sures. While it accepts the leasing of facilities to U.S. forces, it rejects their modernization or upgrading. Likewise, it is against the extension of greater access rights. On both issues, its position is close to that of the PCE. Similar to the PCF but in opposition to the PCI, it does not accept TNF moderniza­ tion of the Pershing II and Cruise missiles. Indeed, it seems to see little util­ ity in current arms control negotiations, except for general support for the Soviet position for a Europe-wide conference. As with the PCF, it is against creating a common European defense force because it would give Western Europe the attributes of another world power. Thus, the PCP’s doctrine and posture are not parallel to those of the other parties. Even during the rapprochement with the PCF after the breakup of the Union, it did not adopt the PCF policy on many security matters. Strategic doctrine and mili­ tary affairs in general are likely to remain fairly low among the PCP’s pri­ orities. The most immediate problems are the renewal of U.S. basing privi­

196

New International Communism

leges in 1981 and the Spanish NATO membership. If the United States presses for additional access rights, the PCP may exploit the opportunity to mount public protests in the hope of recovering its recent electoral losses. Likewise, if Madrid should accelerate its campaign for admission to NATO, the PCP could be expected to demand the closing of some U.S. facilities and a reduction in Portugal’s contribution to the Alliance. Even in the areas of military services and parliamentary control of the military, the PCP’s policy is meager compared to the policies of the other three Latin European parties. This is partially explained by the PCP’s real­ ization after its unsuccessful bid for power through manipulation of the armed forces that the government’s and the public’s insistence on the depo­ liticization of the military must be recognized. Otherwise, important domes­ tic reforms might be jeopardized. Since many of these reforms have been reversed or failed to advance the revolution along the desired socialist path anyway, the PCP may conclude that it is propitious to adopt the policies of the PCI and once again seek to cultivate a constituency within the military establishment. It is unlikely, however, that the PCP will attempt in the near future to radicalize its military followers as in 1974 and 1975. Those days will not easily be reenacted and the development of the elaborate position of the PCI regarding the armed forces will require patience, time, and caution. Although the PCP at one time enjoyed the highest standing among the mili­ tary of any of the four parties, its present ranking is low, and the reaction against its earlier rise in status will be difficult to overcome.

Conclusions

The above analyses indicate that the degree of divergence on foreign and security policies among the four Communist parties of Latin Europe is much greater than is conventionally understood. The single point of consen­ sus on high policy is their mutual interpretation of the nature of war and the international military threat. But on other foreign policy objectives and defense priorities, wide differences persist. In the areas of national defense strategy and military doctrine, weapons modernization, arms control, mili­ tary service functions, and parliamentary control of the military establish­ ment, disagreements are the rule. On the nature of detente, the reason for its decline, and its relationship to bloc balances, there is general accord, with the PCF placing greater emphasis on the French role within the bal­ ance. Yet in prescribing stands on the central issues in the contemporary detente, the cases of Afghanistan and Poland, the four split sharply. But in general, the PCP and the PCF tend to display greater harmony on high policy questions with each other than with the other two parties; the PCI and the PCE display a similar mutual affinity. While these axes are infor­

Comparative Analyses

197

mal and on some points tenuous, they illustrate the degree of schism that has developed among the former stalwarts of the Eurocommunist move­ ment. The grounds for these differences are: (1) the parties’ respective posi­ tions on the desired proximity to government and the function of political opposition, (2) the ideological demands of the party cadres and militants seeking rejuvenation through reorientation, (3) varying political cultures and the previous political experience of each in its drive for power and revo­ lution, (4) geostrategic factors that have affected each country’s and party’s policies on international problems, and (5) the changing nature of domestic political and economic questions over the past decade. The reasons for-the differences suggest that foreign and security issues have been as influential and decisive as domestic questions (where greater ideological homogeneity in theory and practice persists among the four) in demonstrating the distinctions in their respective forms of national Com­ munism. Paradoxically, the informal alignments that have fortuitously emerged have been the products of positions taken on high policy issues; yet the axes, especially the PCI-PCE tie, indicated the persisting viability of internationalism. This does not mean that the eclipse of Eurocommunism and retrenchment of all four during the early 1980s was due primarily to their failure to reach common positions on high policy issues. The retrench­ ment and greater identification with the image of nationalist Communism was required mainly for internal party reasons. Another benchmark in the history of the Latin European Communist movement had been reached. An enhanced national identification had to be pursued simultaneously with the development of the means of supplement­ ing the international aspects of Eurocommunism—a New Internationalism that would permit continued association with the international class strug­ gle and workers’ movement, without exacerbating existing fissures or risk­ ing charges of Titoism (the espousal of exclusive national Communism).

Notes 1. Cited by Kevin Devlin, “Eurocommunism between East and West,’’ International Security, Spring 1979:110. 2. International Herald Tribune, 13-14 December 1980. 3. Enrico Berlinguer, L’unitb, 27 January 1980. 4. Uri Ra’anan, “Soviet Decision-Making in International Relations,” Problems of Communism, November-December 1980:44. 5. Business Week, 23 December 1980. 6. For the most thorough documentation available, see, August 1980: The Strikes in Poland, Radio Free Europe Research, 1980. Subsequent

198

New International Communism

documentation can be found in the respective issues of Europa-Archiv. Of the many analyses the most useful are Seweryn Bialer, “Poland and the Soviet Imperialism,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981:522-539; Adam Bromke, “Poland—The Cliff’s Edge,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1980-1981: 154-162; Polen 1980, (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1980); Christopher Royen, Polens politisches Sys­ tem zwischen Beharrung und Erneuerung, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen FRG, no. 2295 (June 1981); and the numerous reports by the research departments of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, Munich. 7. L’unita, 21 August 1980. On 18 August the paper stated that acute difficulties were increasing, bringing to light serious difficulties in the way of the intervention and participation of those very workers “who declare their desire to live under and to live better under socialism.” See also Kevin Devlin, “Western Communist Reactions to Polish Crisis,” RAD Report 213, Radio Free Europe, 26 August 1980. 8. Devlin, “Western Communist Reactions.” 9. L’unita, 10 and 11 December 1980; and La stampa, 16 December 1980. 10. Tanjug (Yugoslav News Service), 12 December 1980. 11. Christian Science Monitor, 11 December 1980. 12. L’humanite, 2 September 1980. 13. Radio Luxembourg, 13 December 1980. 14. See Vladimir V. Kusin, “The Moscow Bloc Summit on Poland: A Look Back to 1968,” Radio Free Europe, RAD Background Report 294, 10 December 1980. 15. International Herald Tribune, 27 December 1980; and Military Balance, 1979-1980, IISS, London, p. 24. 16. Ibid.

Foreign and Security Policies and the Development of New International Communism Eurocommunism was not just another label for previously held aspirations. It was an attempt to institutionalize diversity and thereby enhance the politi­ cal strengths of the individual parties through international solidarity that was governed by new .democratic guidelines for interparty relations. What did the undertaking achieve? What have been the residual effects? Have the nonruling CPs reverted to the status quo ante? Were the original objectives too high? Which goals are still realistic? The high water mark for Eurocommunism was the March 1977 summit in Madrid attended by Enrico Berlinguer, Georges Marchais, and Santiago Carrillo. The meeting was the first of its kind, noteworthy for both its regional and its international implications. It provided the most elaborate statement and description of the Eurocommunist phenomenon. It presented the world with a new model for Communist cooperation and the construc­ tion of socialism against which subsequent developments must be mea­ sured.1 Carrillo explained that the goal was movement toward a socialism that would honor human rights, permit dissent, allow a majority of voters to change their government, and, finally, avoid alignment with any existing military bloc.2 Azcarate, however, said the Marxist tradition would not be abandoned. Eurocommunism, he said, is a “trend of revolutionary Marxist teaching’’ that responds to “objective new circumstances.” Democracy plays a key role in this process, and thus Eurocommunism may differ “politically and tactically from party to party.”3 This euphoric atmosphere led to tactical political gains, with all four parties achieving impressive elec­ toral victories in 1976 and 1977. But the failure to achieve even more through alliance politics, the reluctance to assume greater responsibility for government decisions during a protracted economic recession, and the crisis of identification among Communists led to critical examination of the Eurocommunist model. Edward Kardelj, one of the founders of Titoism, critically analyzed the model in these terms: “In fact, Eurocommunism is not at all related to the essential idea of Communism nor to any regional model of Communism, but rather to a specific road toward socialism under the particular contem-

199

200

New International Communism

porary conditions prevailing in Western Europe. Moreover, the policy of Eurocommunism is not only a matter of ideology . . . , but also a matter of the practical needs of West European Communist parties, should these par­ ties ever become realistic political factors.”4 Aleksandr Grlickov, secretary in the Yugoslav party presidium’s execu­ tive committee, observed that while the party defended the right of all par­ ties to seek their separate roads to socialism, the Eurocommunist model only offered a peaceful method of transition to socialism that reflected existing political realities but did not address the question of revolution.5 Without a monolithic structure, no unified strategy is possible, and the whole Eurocommunist model becomes fractured by individual national requirements.6 Hard-line Communists were even more critical. Vasil Bilak, a secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party’s central committee charged that the so-called Eurocommunism had become a “new fashionable slogan for anti­ Communism,” whose contents are traitorous attempts to split the interna­ tional movement.7 He later queried how Communists could develop a pro­ gram that involved the abandonment of the elementary principle of prole­ tarian internationalism. This merely provides anti-Communists arguments in their struggle against real socialism.8 Acrimonious denunciations from the conservative Eastern European and Soviet establishments continued into the early 1980s, despite the ero­ sion of the model and the French defection and partly because the PCI and the PCE continued to use the slogan as a manifestation of frustration in formulating an alternative model of internationalism. Non-Communist analysts studying this phenomenon, however, are becoming increasingly convinced that Eurocommunism is the result of the long evolution of the international Communist movement.’ The origins of Eurocommunism stem from the autonomous tendencies that existed among the Communist parties in the Comintern and popular fronts, during the Spanish civil war, and the Cominform. The most linear antecedents of the Eurocommunist model can be found in Eastern Europe in the 1940s and 1950s and were embodied by Tito’s Yugoslavia in its break with the USSR and creation of an indepen­ dent model for socialism. But with the progression beyond Togliatti’s polycentrism to the institu­ tionalization of diversity, Eurocommunism represented the re-Westernization and corresponding de-Russification of Marxism. The transfer of Marx­ ism from Western Europe to Russia involved systematic antibourgeois mea­ sures and, therefore, de-Westernization of Marxist theory and practice.10 Many of the fundamental tenets of Marxism, such as the emancipation of the rational individual and spontaneity, were deliberately neglected in this transfer. In the de-Westernization of Marxism, Lenin substituted the con­ cepts of clandestinity, the vanguard role of the party, and democratic cen­

Foreign and Security Policies

201

tralism as surrogates for conventional Western means of legitimation. The Leninist concepts were based on the traditions of Russian political culture, traditions related to the historic dictatorial primacy of the state over Rus­ sian society. The Russian political system was strongly influenced by orien­ tal practices of patronage, and the society sacrificed guarantees of civil liberties and personal justice for individual privileges and rewards. Leszek Kolakowski refers to the transplanting of Marxism in Russia as the birth of ‘ ‘ Asiato-Communism. ”11 Thus, the publication of the Eurocommunist Manifesto signified an important landmark in the long struggle between rival Eastern and Western value systems. Wolfgang Leonhard argues that Eurocommunism was the result of a protracted process of differentiation within the Communist movement that was intensified primarily by Soviet attempts to consolidate the new candidates for membership in the proletarian international during the 1940s.12 But the repeated challenge to Soviet authority through separa­ tism, social unrest, and intellectual protest intensified the differentiation process by forcing Communist elites and party loyalists to address funda­ mental questions about the applicability and desirability of the Soviet sys­ tem and its principles for socialist development. To what extent could either real socialism be freely criticized or, conversely, criticism be avoided in pro­ moting the interests of the respective parties? The dilemma remains central to the ongoing debate about the nature of internationalism. But the Soviets face their own dilemma. How much deviation is enough; what distinguishes socialist development from social democratic reformism? There is some evidence that the Kremlin would accept the less extreme positions of the Eurocommunists if they refrained from public criticism of real socialism. Boris N. Ponomarev, a secretary of the central committee of the USSR, said Soviet tolerance levels allow endorsement of a party’s seeking its own path to socialism as long as socialism was not defamed in the process. All parties engaged in the struggle for socialism under any condition will inevitably benefit from the invaluable experience accumulated by those practicing socialism in real life. It is exceptionally harmful to separate Marxism from Leninism and to confine the latter to Russia alone.13 To many non-Russians, such statements resound of ideological chau­ vinism and hegemonistic ambition. If nonruling Communist parties chose to advance socialism in their countries by methods and strategies other than those employed in the USSR and Eastern Europe, they were obviously obliged to explain their reasons to the party rank and file and to the general public. They had little choice but to analyze and critique real socialism. For many of the remaining Eurocommunists, especially the intellectuals, real socialism was simply incompatible with true Marxism and contemporary political reality. Jean Elleinstein has argued that the USSR is an imperfect

202

New International Communism

model of socialism because of the dominance of bureaucracy and the absence of democracy. Criticizing the Soviet model is thus a means of addressing the true identity of French Communism.14 Such critics are convinced that the Soviet model or de-Westernized Marxism can solve few of the socioeconomic problems of modern, postin­ dustrial societies and that Russified Marxism is alien to Western political culture. Either transformations must be accepted by the Soviets or modifi­ cations explored by the Eurocommunists. The latter argue that open discus­ sion of the uniqueness of the Soviet model and the distortion and mistakes in application would be beneficial for the worldwide development of social­ ism. Such criticisms are tempered, however, even by the PCE. All the Latin CPs have concluded that it is not in their interest to pursue such alternatives to the point of challenging the present international Communist system, even if the ruling parties would press their demands to such an extreme. In the same vein, Oriana Fallaci asked Enrico Berlinguer why, if the PCI insists on party independence, it does not break relations with the Soviet Communist party. He replied that the PCI policy was to affirm its autonomy, to say without hesitation what it thinks, and at the same time to maintain the thread of rapport—that is, an open dialogue—with all parties, including the Chinese.15 The Italian and Spanish Communist leaders are aware, however, of the strong pro-Soviet, dogmatic factions within the PCF and the PCP and the possible future impact of these factions on the course of internationalism. PCI and PCE leaders have therefore aimed their criticism of the Soviet model only at several general targets: (1) the CPUSSR’s claim to ideological monopoly and insistence on orthodox compliance, (2) the de facto excom­ munication of the Chinese Communists from the international movement and the ambiguous Soviet stand on the questions of separate roads to social­ ism for other parties, (3) the Soviet concept of democracy and the extension of hegemony, (4) the lack of latitude for personal expression, (5) the failure to ensure adequately all personal and collective liberties, and (6) the bureau­ cratization of government and inefficiency in the economy. The PCI is particularly sensitive to the performance and applicability of the Soviet economic model. The most common scenarios the Italians antici­ pate for Eastern economic development in the 1980s are: (1) muddling through—relatively constant economic pressures, little expansion, few policy changes, and no significant personnel turnover (cadre recruitment aimed only at maintaining constant numbers); (2) modest economic reforms—increased economic pressures from international markets, domes­ tic demands, and COMECON requirements; and (3) repressive mea­ sures—increased economic pressure, deterioration in detente and decline in Western credits, and reversion to hard-line economic policies.16

Foreign and Security Policies

203

The Soviet Counteroffensive The USSR and the loyalist parties were not fully prepared for such criticism from the nonruling CPs. Nor did they anticipate the determined demands for greater party autonomy they faced during the 1976 Berlin conference.17 By the latter half of the 1970s, consensus among the ruling elites of the CPUSSR and the loyalists began to emerge on the need for remedial action to offset the impact of such criticism. Mere polemics had proven inade­ quate; a sustained counteroffensive was required. By 1981 the new strategy could be roughly outlined: (1) no activities would be undertaken that could endanger the cohesion of the world Communist movement; (2) open discus­ sions of internal party matters would be strongly discouraged (no polemical diatribes of the Khrushchev-Mao sort); (3) at first, only substantive issues, not personalities, would be considered; (4) at a latter stage parties as abstract entities could be attacked, then the leadership, again in the abstract; (5) the final stage would be signaled by attacks against specific medium-ranked, then top personalities; (6) Eurocommunism was to be an open target; and (7) the campaign was to appear not as a Soviet action but as a common undertaking of the entire socialist community against the iso­ lated few. Multilateral meetings were held then and later on how to make the Soviet model more attractive to Western Communists. The net result of the new strategy was more to ignite loyalist indignation and strengthen the soli­ darity of the CPSU and friendly parties than to counteract criticism. Pri­ vately, the Soviets probably claimed that the new strategy was responsible for the demise of Eurocommunism. But that would be dangerous misper­ ception of the nonruling parties’ varying interpretations of internation­ alism. The cumulative impact of this Western criticism on the Polish events is sufficient evidence of the virulence of the dissident Western European CPs’ complaints. The public literature suggests that the CPSU reinforced the new strat­ egy with a reiteration of the principles that traditionally have governed Soviet attitudes and behavior toward nonruling parties. (1) The growth of socialism is governed by general scientific laws that have been formulated on the basis of historical events in general and the experience of the first socialist state in particular. Every Communist party must by definition accept the validity and relevance of both the laws of history and the Soviet experience. (2) Thus, the Soviet experience gained since the revolution has a universal significance and application. (3) The building of socialism is an extremely complicated process, accompanied by mistakes, relapses, and even blunders, to which even the USSR is not immune. But the incidence of error does not negate the universality of the doctrine, because the corre­

204

New International Communism

sponding corrections reaffirmed the true line or interpretation. (4) Nonrul­ ing Communist parties that dramatize the importance of their national peculiarities risk isolation from the mainstream of socialist progress and thereby violate the precepts of proletarian internationalism. (5) The interna­ tional prestige, power and influence of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have enabled the Western nonruling Communist parties to strengthen their internal and regional positions. (Thus, a debt of grati­ tude is incurred through participation in the world Communist movement.) (6) Criticism is welcomed, but it must be. principled, well-founded, and mainly constructive. Western Communists should not behave in a manner resembling that of international reactionary forces. Under no circumstances should interparty criticism take the form of public accusation.18 This reassertion of proletarian internationalism leads to charges of Cominformist inversion of internationalism from its function of socialist development in different countries in harmony with their respective political cultures and conditions into a reinforcement of the role and function of a single center and model. From its special position of exposure and survival, the Yugoslavian party has been highly critical of the abandonment of the spirit of the principles of the 1976 Berlin conference for the conduct of interparty relations and the reversion to Cominformist practice and ideas. The Yugoslavs returned to the polemics of the 1960s with allegations that the CPSU was conducting “impermissible interference in the internal affairs of people and the introduction of unprincipled methods of fractional strife into the international relations of Communist parties.”19 More recent charges of CPUSSR hegemonistic interference have come from the PCE over the outcome of the 2-5 January 1981 Congress of the Catalonian Unified Socialist party (PSUC)j the largest component and lead­ ing vanguardist element within the PCE. The Leninist faction wrested con­ trol of the Catalonian party from the Eurocommunist and pro-Soviet wings. In a surge of regional nationalism, the delegates voted 424 to 359 to drop the term Eurocommunism from the party statutes. This was a severe setback for Carrillo. He claimed that the Soviets were directly involved by distributing money, CPSU propaganda, and free invitations to visit the USSR for selected party members in a campaign to factionalize the Cata­ lonian party and had tried three times within the decade to engineer a change in PCE leadership.20 The charges were not denied, but the Leninist leadership claimed that Soviet influence was not the decisive factor at the Congress. The PSUC was suffering from internal dissatisfaction—party membership had dropped from 40,000 in 1977 to 21,000 in 1980—because Carrillo’s strategy of coop­ erating with the centrist government had not curbed inflation or unemploy­ ment or removed the bureaucracy from Francoist control. Additionally, Carrillo was criticized for sacrificing the traditional Communist identity for

Foreign and Security Policies

205

the new Eurocommunism one, which was unclear and insufficiently mili­ tant. Finally, Carrillo’s style of leadership was denounced. After the abor­ tive February coup attempt, the Catalonians returned to the Eurocommu­ nist line. At the stormy Tenth PCE Party Congress in July 1981, additional fissures opened with the emergence of the renovators—those who insisted that the internal structure be democraticized to counteract Carrillo’s rigid rule. Carrillo was able to defeat the unlikely coalition of traditionalists and reformers and retained his post, but he paid a heavy price in self-criticism for past mistakes and lost 15 percent of the central committee seats to the reformers. There are likely to be continuing challenges, which the Kremlin could exploit.21 More serious examples of Soviet interference have come to light in Italy and Poland. The unprecedented publication of an Italian edition of the Soviet weekly New Times and the repeated polemical attacks by the Soviets against the PCI leadership have been designed to appeal to the small minor­ ity of Italian Communists that remain pro-Soviet and Stalinist.22 But clearly the most blatant attempt to intervene short of using military force was the Kremlin’s June 1981 letter to the Polish leadership. PCI officials argued that this was a direct effort to rally the hard-liners and topple Kania before the Extraordinary Party Congress, and the PCI reacted strongly against Soviet violation of the principles of noninterference and independence.23 These incidents are likely to remain localized issues, but they reinforced continuing concern about the respective parties’ attitudes toward, on the one hand, proletarian internationalism as a supranational model for social progress whereby national distinctions are voluntarily ignored in an identifi­ cation of each component with the image and experience of the first social­ ist party, and, on the other hand, autonomy, legitimating the relative inde­ pendence of the national segments in their exercise of mutual cooperation and solidarity within the workers’ movement in accordance with the prin­ ciples of free expression of respective interests, genuine reciprocity, and equality of rights.

Soviet Views of Internationalism

Even the USSR has changed its conceptualization and application of inter­ nationalism. Initially, cooperation of socialist forces presupposed great similarity of values or even monolithic ideological and political unity. From the outset, however, there were recurring differences of view, as over the 1930s united front strategy, but the level of cooperation depended upon the degree of discernible identification with the single source of orthodoxy, reinforced by the concept of democratic centralism. As more actual diver­ gences in policies and interests occurred, as in the case of Yugoslavia,

206

New International Communism

Albania, and China, cooperation was suspended. The rise of polycentrism and later Eurocommunism was stimulated by the rationale that noncoop­ eration for divergence was counterproductive for the international workers’ movement. Policy divergence and continued cooperation, therefore, were the twin planks of the Eurocommunists’ platform. The first Soviet step toward accepting this formula for interparty rela­ tions emerged during preparations for the 1969 world Communist confer­ ence. Before his demise, Khrushchev had called for a gathering that would not excommunicate the Chinese but would demonstrate the unfortunate fact that the Chinese had cut themselves off from the world Communist community. The first preparatory meeting in March 1965 of twenty-six par­ ties, however, was boycotted by seven, forcing the Soviets to alter the proce­ dures, purpose, and agenda of the preliminary meetings and the conference itself. After repeated delays, the conference was finally convened in June 1969 in what appeared to be the first attempt by protesting parties to institu­ tionalize diversity and dissent. Even to reach this point, the Soviets had to make precedent-setting concessions. The rules of unanimity and secrecy were abandoned so that any party held the right to dissent with impunity and could publicize its own positions or leak them to promote its interests. Any party could participate in the numerous editorial drafting sessions of conference documents, which led to heated exchanges of views. (In the last session, 1 June, some 450 amendments were tabled, to be rejected by the loyalists because of time pressure.) Of the original eighty-one parties, sixtytwo attended (the pro-Chinese Asian bloc boycotted the proceedings), four­ teen publicly expressed opposition to the final document, and five refused to sign any portion of it—even though the Soviets had already agreed that it was not binding on any party. Furthermore, in violation of the conference ground rules established in the preliminary sessions banning any denunciation of China, Brezhnev’s diatribe against Peking had little impact except to offend autonomist par­ ties. It was a unilateral statement that could not reduce China to the role of outcast, despite the original Soviet purpose of the conference. Not only had monolithic unity proven illusory, but divergence without penalization had been institutionalized. With the right of dissent codified, the Eastern con­ cept of democratic centralism was now in question. Since then, in 1973 and 1974 the Soviets have attempted unsuccessfully and perhaps halfheartedly to convene another all-party conference that could again highlight the depths of diversity in the world Communist movement. Five years after the 1969 world conference, Moscow, with lowered expectations, sought to convene a second all-European Communist confer­ ence, following the less controversial and partially attended April 1967 Kar­ lovy Vary conference. At the far more controversial East Berlin conference of European Communist Parties opening in October 1974, followed by fif-

Foreign and Security Policies

207

teen additional drafting sessions, the CPSU made concessions to the autonomist parties’ positions, strengthening the stance they had taken in 1969. Decisions were to be made by consensus, no general political or ideo­ logical line could be imposed, the principles of autonomy, equality, and noninterference in internal party matters had to be enshrined and honored in practice, no special status would be afforded the CPSU, no criticism of any party present or absent would be admissible, and the term proletarian internationalism was replaced by the new phrase “voluntary cooperation between equal and autonomous parties.’’24 The document presented at the June 1976 East Berlin conference had been reached by the most genuine consensus yet, but no party signed it. The process of consensus building, however imperfect, was unique in the history of the CPSU, and it provided repeated opportunities for the several minority autonomous parties to identify common interests and demonstrate unified positions that could not be ignored by the majority.25 Moreover, by the end of 1975, the PCF shifted its pro-Soviet position to an alignment with the autonomists by openly criticizing the Soviet policy on human rights, dropping the term proletarian internationalism from the stat­ utes of its twenty-second Party Congress, rejecting through Marchais its invitation to the CPSU twenty-fifth Party Congress, and formally adopting the Eurocommunist label.26 The Soviets had lost important leverage because of the PCF’s defection and apparently convened the conference as early as possible on conciliatory terms in order to prevent further crystallization of the emerging Eurocommunist threat. The consensus requirement resulted in a lowest-common-denominator text that was the least offensive document yet to all participants in a major multilateral Communist conference. Both the procedures and the text for­ mally recognized the equality and autonomy of all Communist parties. There was a resounding note of optimism about the conference. Jiri Valenta claimed it “marked a new milestone in the history of Eurocommunism.”27 East German dissident intellectual Robert Haveman joined Milovan Djilas in asserting that the conference put an end to the hegemonistic efforts by one party; and this hegemony has been removed by all parties, not just those from the West.28 Georges Marchais felt constrained by the lowestcommon-denominator results and called for “new forms of collective encounters, even more lively, flexible, and effective.”29 Sergio Segre of the PCI leadership claimed that the results did not conflict with positions of his party and were faithful to the new spirit of interparty relations.30 The con­ sensus of the participating parties was that the newly acclaimed autono­ mous-revisionist parties had won major concessions from the conservative, loyalist parties that would be difficult to erase. The new label autonomous-revisionist was as inaccurate as had been the term independent as a description for those parties that rejected both Soviet

208

New International Communism

hegemony within the movement and Soviet policy leadership on specific issues, such as China or interparty relations. These parties include Rumania, which is hardly revisionist; Yugoslavia, which is the most revi­ sionist but totally independent; and some Western CPs that are still highly dependent upon Leninist traditions and principles. The alternate use of labels by the Communists themselves clearly indicates not only the diversity within the movement, but the differences among the opposition parties. This was underscored by the April 1980 Paris all-European Communist party conference. Like the 1967 Karlovy Vary European Communist party conference, it was jointly sponsored by a ruling and a nonruling party, the Polish and the French, in order to demonstrate, if only symbolically, the unity of all Euro­ pean parties. But it was the first to be held in a Western country. It was con­ vened on relatively short notice and without the customary preliminary con­ sultations; the joint sponsors merely sent all parties one month before a draft appeal to the peace-loving forces of Europe for the preservation of detente and the guarantee of peace. Most important, it was also an overt attempt by the CPSU to manipulate the Western CPs for its purposes: to demonstrate Communist unity in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis and thereby isolate the opposition parties. The conference represented a major step back from the opposition’s campaign to achieve the institutionalization of the concept of divergence plus mutual respect, equal rights, and full cooperation. Only one-third of the invited parties attended; only one-half of the Western CPs participated, and two merely sent observers.31 The absentees compiled an exhaustive list of complaints against the conference. It reversed the principle of consensus and unanimity established at the Berlin conference and thus neutralized years of work by the opposition to ensure equality in interparty affairs. By overturning the results of 1976, procedures had again become as significant as substance as manifestations of the opposition’s rights. The omission of adequate preliminary consultations on either the bilateral or multilateral levels demonstrated the loyalists’ deliberate disdain for the rights of the minority, an unmistakable attempt to restore the full centralization of inter­ nationalism by identifying the opposition. By so doing, it widened the fis­ sures in the movement and presented a false image of unity (the conference documents were signed by the participants on behalf of all European CPs). The agenda excluded such controversial issues as Afghanistan, the arms race, and bloc stability. The procedures also deviated from the agreements of 1976 by not including all progressive political forces in international dis­ cussions of detente and regional stability. Without adequate consultations and appropriate consideration of the minority’s objections, the agenda and thus the conference documents accurately reflected the Kremlin’s position on both substantive political issues and procedural matters that would likely

Foreign and Security Policies

209

serve as precedents for any future gatherings. Thus, the CPUSSR was attempting to reestablish its preeminence within the workers’ movement at the expense of the autonomous parties. Equally offensive, having rejected an agenda and documents framed largely by Warsaw Pact countries, the opposition parties were unfortunately cast in the eyes of some as favoring the NATO position on outstanding problems. Finally, the conference was ill-conceived and poorly timed and achieved little, except to halt the momentum and direction of previous Communist conferences.32 Thus, while the Paris conference produced little of substantive value, it demon­ strated the Kremlin’s triumph over Eurocommunism as a collective alterna­ tive within the workers’ movement. Some analysts dismissed the Paris conference as a relatively insignifi­ cant development in the history of the movement because of the poor atten­ dance, limited agenda, and controversial results. But it marked the failure of the collective effort by several nonruling parties to re-Westernize Marx­ ism. The Leninist principles of the preeminence of the CPSU and democra­ tic centralism were reinforced as the rules governing interparty behavior and relations. Mutual respect, equality, and full cooperation had become only rhetorical terms used to assuage the diminishing minority opposition. For all practical purposes, the majority of the Communist parties of Europe were to maintain a Russified interpretation of Marx.

Titoism: The Alternative?

To repeat Oriana Fallacci’s question, why then should the PCI not break relations with the CPSU? Why not embrace Titoism as the most appropri­ ate third alternative? Tito’s separate road to socialism represented the first, successful, forceful rejection of Soviet hegemony. From its birth, Titoism was alien to the Soviet model of socialism. It became a cornerstone for Tog­ liatti’s concept of polycentrism. Khrushchev’s reversal of Stalin’s 28 June 1948 expulsion decree in the 2 June 1955 Belgrade declaration pledged “mutual respect and noninterference in internal matters—whether of an economic, political, or ideological nature, since questions of the internal structure, differences of social systems, and differences of concrete forms of developing socialism are exclusively a matter for the peoples of different countries.”33 The 20 June 1956 Moscow declaration reiterated these principles, and the two documents, along with Khrushchev’s speech at the Twentieth CPUSSR Party Congress, were regarded by the Yugoslavs as the Magna Carta, not only for a new era in bilateral Belgrade-Moscow relations, but as “declarations concerning relations with all socialist countries and other countries as well.”34 Palmiro Togliatti responded by asserting that the

210

New International Communism

USSR was no longer the single guide; “the Soviet model is no longer obliga­ tory.”35 It was only eight years later, however, that he was able to formulate more adequately his concept of polycentrism along lines closely resembling the Yugoslav principles. He then said that because of the great differences among countries, each party must know how to act in an autonomous man­ ner. Togliatti described such autonomy as an “essential condition for devel­ opment under present conditions” and thus a valid reason to oppose any “centralized international organization.” Unity, he stated, is desirable, but it can be achieved only in the context of diversity.36 There were several reasons for the long delay between the establishment of Titoism and slow progress toward polyC'enterism. By April 1958, Khrush­ chev, under strong Chinese pressure, had been forced to renounce Yugoslav revisionism, cancel Soviet economic aid to Belgrade, and essentially refute the concept of separate roads to socialism. When this paradox gradually resolved itself several years later as China sought its own diverse course, the movement was so deeply divided that the survivors in the Soviet camp were compelled by self-interest to place higher priority on unity than autonomy. Until the 1960s the Yugoslavian Communist party (LCY) was the principal European guardian of the independent rights of both ruling and nonruling European Communist parties. Its strength in this singular role stemmed in part from its aloofness from the Sino-Soviet dispute and nonidentification with the thirty-nine Maoist splinter groups in Western Europe. The LCY’s general distance from ideological controversy permitted it to concentrate party and public attention on the devolution of governmental authority, the evolution of the political role of the party, and the expansion of workers’ management of economic enterprises. These were theoretical concepts developed in the 1950s and applied in practice without excessive external criticism in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, the LCY has created both in theory and practice a socialist society that is more liberal and functional than the model rather vaguely conceived by the PCI. Kardelj’s assertion that the PCI has neither formulated a strategy for achieving Communism nor practiced socialism but has merely devised tactics for attaining power in a unique political setting marks the differences between the two parties. Thus, there is little attraction between the two. The Yugoslav experi­ ence with socialism and with rival national and ethnic demands has little application to the PCI’s situation. Even in foreign policy the parties’ inter­ ests primarily converge only in their respective rejection of Soviet hege­ mony. Without sufficient commonality of problems and solutions to domestic questions and with such idiosyncratic foreign policy interests, there is little to entice the PCI into adopting the LCY model or even modify­ ing the lessons of the LCY’s experience to fit Italian circumstances. The main principle to which the two share and retain strong commitments is the indispensability of the separate roads to socialism for their respective devel­

Foreign and Security Policies

211

opment. Thus, despite Togliatti’s personal interest in the Yugoslav program as expressed during his January 1964 visit to Tito, the mutual coordination and formulation of long-term goals and policies were seldom attempted after the mid-1960s and was never satisfactorily achieved. Of the other parties, the PCP and the PCF have consistently opposed Yugoslav revisionism since its inception. Only during the tactical maneuver­ ing of the mid-1970s did the PCF find itself fortuitously aligned with the LCY on several issues related to the hegemony question. This seeming com­ patibility quickly collapsed after the PCF’s abandonment of Eurocommu­ nism. On its parts, the PCE demonstrated greater affinity for both LCY problems and solutions. Ethnic differences and demands for political devo­ lution in Spain more closely resembled those of Yugoslavia than in the other three countries. But the unique aspects of workers’ self-management reduced the degree of empathy the PCE shared with the Yugoslav model, especially after its difficulties with its regional parties. As with the PCI, its common interest with the LCY was in the rejection of Soviet hegemony. In the perceptions of all parties concerned, the LCY has not provided the model for socialist development for any of the Latin CPs. Even on inter­ nationalism and nonalignment, views and policies fluctuated. In foreign and security policies, the four parties did not borrow heavily from the Yugoslavs, except the doctrine of territorial defense. Thus, the most inde­ pendent and revisionist ruling party has contributed little to the conceptual development of the four parties, except to the autonomy espoused by the Italian and Spanish parties. What role has Rumania played in the development and articulation of New Internationalism? Has its exercise of autonomy in foreign and security policies, accompanied by replication of the Soviet system on domestic ques­ tions, been more useful for the remaining adherents to New Internation­ alism? Did liaisons at conferences go beyond mere marriages of conveni­ ence for the espousal of the principles of independence, equality, and non­ interference, which Rumania stresses so vehemently, to the broader dimen­ sions of internationalism? The Rumania Communist party (RCP) formally endorsed many of the foreign and security policies of the LCY in a 1964 statement adopted by the plenum of the RCP central committee.37 Since this initial demand for inde­ pendence, equality, and noninterference as the guiding principles in inter­ party relations, the RCP has focused its attention on specific international issues rather than on the domestic aspects of separate roads to socialism or the abstract questions of internationalism. After rejecting Khrushchev’s proposal for creating a supranational planning responsibility, which stale­ mated integration within COMECON, Rumania imposed itself as an unwanted mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Bucharest then challenged the 1966 Soviet leadership’s initiative calling for an all-European security

212

New International Communism

policy by extending full diplomatic recognition to the German Federal Republic. This two-Germanies policy weakened the impact of the July 1966 Warsaw Pact Bucharest declaration and generated a minor cold war with the East Germans. Likewise, Rumania broke ranks with the USSR by not severing relations with Israel in 1967, by condemning the invasion of Czech­ oslovakia, and by joining such Western organizations as General Agree­ ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and UNCTAD. For years, Rumania attempted to establish its independence from the Kremlin by refusing to participate on Warsaw Pact meetings deal­ ing with the Czechoslovak, Chinese, Afghan, German, and Arab-Israeli questions and by adopting an independent stand on other international issues, such as arms control and relations with nonaligned countries.38 The RCP adopted and continues to maintain its defiant posture in foreign and security policies partly because of the substantive nature of the individual issues and partly because of its conviction that it is necessary to demonstrate the need for, and ultimately gain, Soviet acceptance of a new formula for interparty relations based on equality and independence. Thus, on the demand for a new form of interparty behavior and on selected foreign and security issues, there is an affinity between the RCP position and the posi­ tions of the PCI and PCE (which in the latter case is reinforced by the warm personal friendship between Ceausescu and Carrillo and the Rumanian financial support provided during the Spanish exile and that continues today). But Rumania chose virtually every controversial international issue as a vehicle for challenging Soviet hegemony in order to demonstrate its right to do so and thereby its autonomous and special status within the Warsaw Pact. In using the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy questions, however, Rumania introduced some issues that were irrelevant to the non­ ruling parties, such as the United Nations and other international organiza­ tions, and others that were directly counter to their positions, such as sup­ port for Israel. Finally, the RCP not only could afford to be provocative, but, as a ruling party, was obliged to be far more definitive in its stands than were the nonruling parties, which regarded vagueness as an asset in the pur­ suit of power. Thus, while there was an affinity between RCP, PCI, and PCE attitudes on some foreign and security questions, there was not an identity of views. This divergence was subtly apparent in the differing approaches to multilateral Communist gatherings. The RCP considered these conferences as means of organizing opposition in order to constrain Soviet behavior, reduce hegemonistic tendencies, and generate pressure for a new code of conduct which respected national Communism. This institutionalization of diversity was also an important priority for the PCI and the PCE. But equally critical for these oppositional parties was the necessity to use such

Foreign and Security Policies

213

conferences to demonstrate both their autonomy on selected issues and their continued attachment to internationalism. For the nonruling opposition parties, the perpetuation of international ties, indeed the strengthening of international contacts, was more important than the prohibition of Soviet intervention. In the final analysis, however, it was the repressive nature of the RCP’s domestic regime that minimized the appeal of the Rumanian model for the PCI and the PCE. The intensive Rumanian application of the Soviet model internally was the license for defiance on external matters. The moderate nonruling parties could not expect to emulate such an ambivalent policy of nurturing neo-Stalinism at home, on the one hand, and rejecting democratic centralism at the international level, on the other. Neither the PCI nor the PCE could identify their positions with those of the RCP without seriously jeopardizing their ability to influence the policies of their governments or their prospects for gaining political power. Thus, neither revisionist, nonaligned Yugoslavia nor dogmatic and par­ tially aligned Rumania adequately complemented the individual interests of the respective four Latin parties. The controversial Eastern European experiments with socialism as a whole are essentially as diversified as are the requirements of the nonruling parties for the acquisition of power. The Yugoslav and Rumanian experiences, then, have only a limited, selective application to the development of the foreign and security policies of the Latin CPs and their search for internationalism.

The Feasibility of Greater Influence through a Restructuring of the Latin Left The dissimilarities among the four parties’ foreign and defense policies, which are only partially offset by the similarities of their views on detente and perceptions of threat, are further amplified by their diverse attitudes toward relations with social democratic parties. Despite the present degree of influence, prospects of ultimately gaining power by any of the four par­ ties lie in some form of liaison or coalition with the leftist parties in their respective countries. Indeed in the cases of the PCF, the PCE, and the PCP, coalitions with the Social Democrats offer the only near-term possibility for participating in government. Yet in Spain and Portugal the Social Demo­ crats have firmly rejected collaboration, and in France the PCF is the junior partner in a coalition of questionable lifespan. (In all four countries, the center parties have also rejected cooperation with Communists.) In Italy a significant shift in electoral sentiment would be required for a leftist alliance to have any hope of majority rule. Nonetheless, it is important to address the questions the leaders of the four parties are asking about the future ori­

214

New International Communism

entation of their parties. Is a restructuring of the left that would permit greater cooperation possible in these countries? What would be the para­ meters of a unified left search for the conceptualization of international­ ism? How would Moscow respond to the development of a fledgling Euro­ left? The electoral losses the Latin CPs suffered in the late 1970s and early 1980s generally bene fitted the Social Democratic parties (see appendix E). This has been due to a number of similar problems within each party. The persistence of international economic recession had both general and spe­ cific implications that forced the CPs to adopt policies on unemployment, inflation, or industrialization that were perceived by the disillusioned as irrelevant or inapplicable. As the recession continued, the main Western industrial power, the United States, adopting conservative economic poli­ cies, moved to the right; most Western European governments attempted to preserve their pro-social welfare images while actually gradually shifting toward the center. This renewed crisis in capitalism induced all four parties to reexamine the choice between cooperation with social democratic reformism and reversion to dogmatic Leninism. The international workers’ movement has been split since World War I, and attempts to restructure the left in Europe require more genuine commit­ ments to bridging the ideological chasm than were evident during the brief courtships in the mid-1930s and mid-1940s and the futile collaboration under Eurocommunism. Neither Moscow nor the Social Democrats claim that their ideological differences cannot be resolved. And Giorgio Napoli­ tano of the PCI secretariat, a leading spokesman of the party’s right wing, argues that all elements of the political left must, through open debate, “find and follow new paths.”39 The statutes of the 1979 Fifteenth PCI Party Congress pledge to pursue a process intended to “overcome the his­ torical divergences and to reunify the labor movement of Western Europe.”40 But the differences are fundamental and involve the basic elements of Marxism-Leninism, the ideology that the CPSU involves to legitimate its rule of the Soviet state and society and its leadership of proletarian interna­ tionalism. The persisting cleavages within the Western European left stem from an even deeper understanding than before of the differences between Marxism and Leninism, with the Social Democrats aware and proud of their parties’ contributions to the advancement of social welfare throughout Western Europe, whether or not they were in power. While the growth of social democracy has been uneven, its performance has clearly surpassed that of state capitalism in Eastern Europe, in the view of the majority of Western Europeans. Indeed, one of the highest national priorities of the last two West German governments has been to alleviate the hardships of the East Germans through a deliberate policy of Ostpolitik. Such glaring dis­

Foreign and Security Policies

215

crepancies between performance and aspirations in non-Western states have disinclined Social Democrats to compromise their Marxist-oriented goals of social democracy in favor of the Leninist model of socialist democracy. Thus, the Eurocommunists have been compelled to disavow Leninism and the Soviet experience if they expect to restructure the Western European left and, with a unified front, accelerate social change. But the attitude of Moscow was critical for any realignment of the left. The Soviets are prepared to cooperate with Social Democrats when the Soviets expect they can ultimately coopt the Social Democrats (as in Eastern Europe in 1945-1946), or where the Social Democrats might ultimately serve Soviet state interests (as in Chile). There is little evidence that the USSR is willing to- relinquish its leading position as the socialist fatherland.41 This authoritarianism is reinforced by the orthodox conviction that without constituent ideological dogma the Leninist revolutionary sys­ tem would be endangered, possibly fatally, as would the present character of the USSR as the leader of the world Communist movement and a model for the development of all mankind, which is reinforced by the Russian achievement of superpower status under socialism. But within the framework of exclusivity cum universality, the Soviet Union is not insensitive to the demands of national Communism. It rejects as nationalistic, however, those ultimate goals and aspirations which do not transcend national frontiers and subscribe to those of the socialist common­ wealth. Again, the difficulty for Communists and non-Communists alike is to determine the level of Soviet tolerance for deviation. Despite new Soviet literature discussing Western concepts of pluralism and democracy, Timmermann argues forcefully that there is considerable evidence that the USSR may be extremely wary of closing the ideological gap with the Social Democrats. They may also have grave suspicions about the consequences of revolution in the West for Soviet state interests. Acceptance of pluralism may discourage the development of the objective conditions for socialism in modern capitalist countries and thus impede the transition to socialist democracy. Because a reformist awareness is growing faster in the proletar­ iat than revolutionary consciousness, it might be dangerous to succumb to the illusion that the situation might change quickly and radically. Thus, bridging the ideological chasm would probably not facilitate revolution or advance Soviet national interests.42 There are similar doubts among the Western CPs. As Timmermann also argues, the Soviet leadership is interested in maintaining normal, dur­ able relations with Western Europe and its non-Communist governments in order to reinforce detente, manipulate the Atlantic Alliance, and ensure that a reformist Communist government with potentially destabilizing influences on Eastern Europe would not come to power. Thus, Soviet sup­ port for Western CPs’ participation in government has been constrained by

216

New International Communism

the necessity to ensure that they would not adopt policy positions alien to Soviet interests. Such doubts expressed by nonruling CPs weaken Soviet ideological attraction among Social Democrats.43 Historical evidence tends to support these contentions. In France, the USSR showed no liking for the May 1968 events. Indeed, workers withheld full endorsement of the student uprising, reportedly upon Soviet admoni­ tions. The Soviets were disdainful of the Union of Left, especially the con­ cessions made by the PCF, and were relieved by its collapse. Moscow’s wooing of de Gaulle and his successors and endorsement of center-right election candidates were clearly opportunistic, as charged, and were con­ trary to proletarian international solidarity. After the Portuguese revolution, the Soviets displayed cautious inter­ est, supplying only modest financial and moral assistance. When the Western Social Democratic parties rallied firmly behind Soares'and warned of the impact on detente of active Soviet involvement, Moscow accepted the dismissal of Communist ministers and adopted a nonpreferential position toward the PCP. The USSR has demonstrated more intense and sustained animosity toward the PCE than toward any other Latin party. This was due not only to Carrillo’s open challenge of Soviet foreign and defense policies and his pursuit of a third way but also to Carrillo’s victory in the initial leadership battle between the pro-Moscow and Western-based factions, whose rivalry still plagues the party. The Kremlin has allegedly not remained aloof from the infighting and by its polemics shows no interest in seeing Carrillo’s or the PCE’s influence grow until its own influence among the leadership is more reliable. Moscow has shown greater respect for the PCI, mainly because it is the largest and most influential Western Communist party. But policy differ­ ences over Afghanistan, Poland, and New Internationalism have caused relations to deteriorate to the point that Berlinguer refused to attend the Twenty-sixth CPSU Congress, and the PCI has formally warned the ruling parties that it will break relations with any that participate in an invasion of Poland.44 It is difficult to determine the seriousness of the rift between the PCI and CPUSSR or its likely outcome. But there is greater certainty that the Soviet leadership does not place a high priority on ideological accommoda­ tion with Social Democratic parties. Nor is it enthusiastic about radical changes within the Leninist parties or convincing in its discussions of plural­ istic participation and transitional reforms.45 Thus, the Soviets have dis­ played little interest in restructuring the Western left, which could encour­ age leftist accession to power. In a negative sense, this is reassuring for those Social Democrats and Communists who advocated a united front, since it distinguishes their plans from Moscow’s. It is also comforting to the

Foreign and Security Policies

217

PCP, which rejects unity for its own reasons. From the Social Democratic perspective, the egocentricity of the Soviet positions raises suspicions about PCI and PCE pledges of fidelity to the new order of democracy. But Azca­ rate assures the West that a number of Communist parties share the view that socialism can be achieved in western societies only through democracy.46 But the betrothed sometimes prove unfaithful, especially in politics, and without the genuine blessings of the Kremlin a durable union of the left does not appear probable.

The New Internationalism z

To return to earlier questions, what are the parameters of this new aspect of workers’ internationalism? To what extent is there a dialectical progression between proletarian dictatorship and Eurocommunism? Has the proletariat been weakened in the process? Finally, does the New Internationalism have a viable future? Is it likely to be an even greater challenge to Western Euro­ pean democracies, merely a manifestation of the erosion of the European left, or an indication of the declining Soviet authority among the more influential Western CPs? The prime movers in the new innovation unquestionably have been the PCI and the PCE as they explored alternatives to Eurocommunism for the advancement of their respective third ways. In the past, both parties aban­ doned Leninist militancy, ignored traditional demands for immediate revo­ lutionary change in preference for social reforms, and focused their bid for power on the democratic centrist parties as well as the unity of the left. Eurocommunism was designed to strengthen bonds between Communist parties with sharply different strategies by forging endorsement of selected bourgeois values that theoretically would enhance their credibility and legitimacy. When the phenomenon failed, strong forces within each party demanded a reversion to the priorities and requirements of their respective national Communisms. Other forces, however, maintained pressure for the preservation of close identification with internationalism. The debates in the late 1970s and early 1980s were over the composition of internationalism and the degree of obligation to it for each party to maintain identification with the cases of the workers’ class struggle and thereby make the struggle beneficial for all participants. The course of the PCI meandered between governmental engagement under Eurocommunism and parliamentary opposition under New Interna­ tionalism. The PCI’s compromesso storico was questioned because it had confused the party’s role with its identity. It was perceived as a transfusion for an exhausted Christian Democratic party, and the proposed austerity economic program did not produce the desired results. The bureaucratiza­

218

New International Communism

tion of the Communist party was also criticized; the leadership had become cut off from the chief operatives—communal councils and local first secre­ taries, as well as the rank and file—the so-called Polish syndrome. Further­ more, it was alleged that the PCI was a party no longer of social transfor­ mation but of crisis management, mediating the sharing of power by rival interest groups. These open discussions and demonstrations of self-criticism indicated that the PCI had not reverted to Leninism at its harshest but was prepared to address substantive issues with realistic solutions, even at the risk of jeop­ ardizing traditional identification. The PCI went into opposition after the proposed reform programs for industrial' and agricultural modernization and the development of southern Italy had been blocked by resistance from Christian Democratic interest groups. But even in opposition, the party felt responsible for public policy; its sense of public accountability had not diminished. In devising its alternative austerity policy for Italy, the PCI demon­ strated the distance of its economic position from that of the PCF, which was demanding the continued operation of unprofitable enterprises in order to preserve jobs. For the PCF, industrial growth and the resulting social and economic gains could be assured only when the constraints on capitalism were broken through nationalization. The PCI was more objective, arguing that the crisis in capitalism had been intensified by concrete factors, such as the rise in raw material prices, barriers to quantitative growth, and a decline in capital accumulation. The crisis was both national and international, and the PCI concept of crisis management was intended to transform these problems into social development. The PCI and the Confederazione Generale Italiane del Lavoro (CGIL) trade union advocated greater employee benefits, wage restraints, and the lowering of consumption quotas in favor of greater investment quotas. They demanded, however, greater trade union participation in enterprise decision making, which they insisted would have meant that investments would have been directed toward plant modernization, industrial restructuring, improved social infrastructure, and the creation of new jobs. (For example, the PCI has demanded not nation­ alization but government subsidies for Fiat’s improvements in work condi­ tions and investments in the South.47) When these proposals failed, opposi­ tion was inevitable. The retrenchment in Italy witnessed in October 1980 the Socialists’ joining the government coalition at the PCI’s expense and severe loss of workers’ support within the trade unions (40,000 workers in Turin defied the appeals and personal presence of Berlinguer by demanding an end to the strike against Fiat). The debate over the growing distances between the party’s traditional leftist ally and its workers’ power base crystallized at the November 1980 PCI central committee meeting. Pietro Ingrao, leader of the party’s left wing, called for formal abandoning of the compromesso

Foreign and Security Policies

219

storico, formation of a united left with the Socialists, and focus on immedi­ ate Italian problems as the only means of surviving the present phase of Ital­ ian history with the left in eclipse.48 As expected, Berlinguer secured the committee’s support, but the compromise was a significant benchmark for the PCI. New party image and policies were to be developed. The attach­ ment to the compromesso storico was to be suspended, and devolution of power from the center to local party authorities was to be instituted as a means of focusing attention on worker and cadre problems and reducing the perception that the PCI was an intellectual party. Democratic centralism would be preserved, but the emphasis would be more on democracy and less on centralism. The primary domestic opponent was to remain terrorism, which was attempting to isolate the PCI as the main law-and-order party and bring down the government by creating chaos. Berlinguer’s main vic­ tory was to keep internationalism in the proper perspective. The PCI was to attempt to forge a new theory and practice of internationalism that would be not above but different from proletariat dictatorship and would be based on political pluralism both in domestic and foreign policies. Sergio Segre of the PCI central committee describes New Internationalism as pluralistic rather than proletarian and as closer to “American trilateralism than to Soviet Marxism.”49 The PCI is attempting to seek first discussions and later possibly con­ sensus on foreign and security issues based on common values and prin­ ciples with as wide a range of international participants as possible, and thus go beyond merely restructuring the European left. The ultimate objec­ tive, according to Segre, would be a contribution to the construction of an Italian foreign policy of national unity that would cut across the vertical divisions between political forces.50 The strong national Communist over­ tone of such statements calls into question the degree of commitment to internationalism for the universal class struggle, a question that has been endemic in the workers’ international movement since its inception. This is not cynicism, but the conviction that advances can be made on both fronts through broadening the appeal and base of New Internationalism. By pursuing cooperation with other parties on the international level, the PCI is attempting to establish a general appeal with the political forces representing “the most underprivileged classes and the middle classes.”51 Antonio Rubbi argues that the deep changes in the social structure of Western society require the expansion of class attraction and service beyond the proletariat to include other classes and other international forces in New Internationalism.52 As New Internationalism began to take shape, the PCI further refined the criterion for participation from that of class or member­ ship in a particular camp to “loyalty to certain principles. ... in this respect, the PCI felt closer to certain non-Communist parties and states than to certain Communist ones.”53 Thus, in the wake of Afghanistan, Berlinguer and Carrillo launched a

220

New International Communism

deliberate program of rapprochement with Western Social Democrats and accelerated their efforts for reconciliation with the Chinese Communist party (CPC). Berlinguer held meetings with Willy Brandt, Mario Soares, Felipe Gonzales, and Francois Mitterrand; sent Giorgio Napolitano for talks with the West German Social Democratic and Free Democratic parties and the British Labour Party; and sent ranking party officials to Scandinav­ ian Socialist parties.54 After endorsing the platform of the Spanish Social­ ists earlier,55 Carrillo also met with Mitterrand. The Berlinguer-Mitterrand exchange was the most fruitful. The resulting communique announced that the two had reached agreement on international issues, and in particular on initiatives that could contribute to arms control, detente, and European cooperation. It stressed the need for respecting the rights of mankind and the principles of civil liberty, as well as the special role of the democratic and popular left in Western Europe in advancing these causes.56 L’unita claimed that the meeting was an attempt to develop a strategy to bring together the great political forces of the Western European workers’ move­ ment through dialogue and the patient search for convergences that could create a more democratic Europe.57 In contrast, the PCF strongly con­ demned the meeting as inopportune (because the PCF-sponsored Paris con­ ference of European Communist parties was scheduled within several weeks) and denounced it as a futile effort to promote the “so-called Euro­ left,’’ which represented the abandonment of the class struggle.58 One year later, this opening to the international Social Democrats appears to have fallen short of the initial PCI expectations. There have been marginal practical results, such as improved communications at the Euro­ pean Parliament and a similarity of views on the outstanding international issues of Afghanistan, Poland, detente, and arms control. But the opening has failed to produce a unified platform for New Internationalism or even a comprehensive statement of views between the parties involved, parties with the most in common of all the European political forces. While Berlinguer’s and Carrillo’s approaches have not been rebuffed, neither have they met enthusiasm. The reasons for this non-Communist reticence are several. (1) Local political imperatives suggested that it would be unwise politically for Mitterrand to enter a presidential race by further alienating the PCE, from which he expected to gain votes by creating more formal relations with the PCI. (2) There were continuing suspicions about the PCI and PCE commit­ ment to democratic principles when their own electorates had not voted them into power because of such suspicions of their own. (3) The firm com­ mitment to detente, especially by the Social Democratic party and a possible Mitterrand left-of-center coalition government, reduced the incentive to adopt policies offensive to Moscow. Thus, the New Internationalists are confronted not only with defections from the Eurocommunist ranks but indirect Soviet intervention and manip­

Foreign and Security Policies

221

ulation of their party operations. The greatest constraint on their ability to break out of their increasing isolation and create a new image and model of internationalism is exercised indirectly by Moscow through its negative influence among Western European Social Democratic parties in or near power that are reluctant to endorse proposals that would benefit primarily Western CPs and jeopardize their own, higher priorities. But Berlinguer and Carrillo have displayed their own dexterity by play­ ing their China card and strengthening relations with dissident Eastern European parties, Yugoslavia and Rumania, and the Polish counterculture (Solidarity). The PCI and the PCF have long opposed the Soviet condemna­ tion of China, both in principle and as a rejection of hegemony, which endangers their own-autonomy. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PCI has gingerly sought to open relations with the CPC. But the Chi­ nese exhibited no interest in dealing with nonruling CPs outside its own Asian sphere of influence. Only when the PCI secured its impressive elec­ toral gains was the term Eurocommunism mentioned in the Chinese press. Chairman Hua Guofeng’s August 1978 visit to Rumania and Yugoslavia and his trip to Western Europe six months later revealed a new Chinese interest in European matters, upon which the PCI gradually capitalized. The invasion of Afghanistan was the primary turning point in improving relations between the two parties. In April 1980 Berlinguer visited Peking and formal party relations were established. The event was summed up by Gian Carlo Pajetta, who said that, although the two parties can understand each other, they do not neces­ sarily reach the same conclusions. He said both parties reject monolithism and respect the autonomy of other parties as they are jealous of their own.59 The PCI condemns policies of the Chinese, such as the invasion of Vietnam, and those of the USSR, as in the case of Afghanistan. This trip, which coin­ cided with the Paris conference, and the resulting new developments in Communist affairs were denounced by the PCF as strongly as the Berlinguer-Mitterrand meeting. Carrillo also trekked to China in August 1980, but with less stirring results. The opening to the Chinese is likely to have a more durable dimension for New Internationalism than the modest cooperation with the Western Social Democrats. For the same reasons as Rumania acted as a selfappointed mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the PCI played the China card to demonstrate that it had the right to exercise its autonomy and to resist hegemony.60 It is through Peking that the New Internationalists have their strongest leverage against Soviet hegemony in Europe. It is Moscow’s sensitivity to the Chinese ability to translate polemics against hegemony into practical politics, as in the case of the Chinese-Japanese peace treaty, that make normalized PCI-CPC relations a stronger defense against Soviet efforts to undermine or neutralize New Internationalism than united front

222

New International Communism

tactics. The overture to China marked the point of no return in Moscow’s polemics with the PCI. As Kevin Devlin has concluded, “The ‘New Internationalism’ may not be the wave of the future—although it seems likely to make headway among those Communist parties sufficiently aware of their own political interests to emphasize independence. But the old internationalism (Eurocom­ munism) can surely be described as the wave of the past.”61 How durable then are the various characteristics of this New Internationalism, and what are the implications for regional political developments? This is a transi­ tional period for all four parties, regarded by them as a dialectical progres­ sion necessary for the achievement of their respective parties’ goals. The inability of the four parties to devise a viable common approach to the out­ standing international problems or ideological questions underscores the persistence of the demands of national Communism in each party. At the same time all four are attempting to consolidate their power base by influ­ encing national policy on issues of immediate interest to party supporters. Since there is a much greater divergence among the four on domestic ques­ tions, convergence on internal matters is not feasible for some time. What limited similarities of view exist are in two aspects of internationalism: the reasons for Communist identity, and selected foreign and security matters. The crisis of identity was anticipated by William Griffith when he fore­ saw a reformist drift in the Latin CPs in the general direction of the German Social Democratic party.62 (In fact, this has been a persistent feature only of the PCI.) Whatever the seriousness of flirtation with the Social Democrats, it has reinforced in each case the necessity to maintain—even intensify— identification with Communist ideology and to preserve the demarcation with the Social Democrats. This has forced each Communist party to insist that their ultimate goal, whether achieved through gradual reform and col­ laboration with other political forces, is the establishment of a true socialist revolution that gives political power to the working class, even in a pluralis­ tic democracy, and ends capitalist exploitation. It is this common final objective that perpetuates the thin bonds between the four parties and with the different forms of the international workers’ movement: the Sovietsponsored version (formerly proletarian internationalism) and New Interna­ tionalism. As the Soviets rightly argue, to renounce these aims would result in the forfeiture of all ties to any form of internationalism.63 Thus, what­ ever the ultimate strength and appeal of New Internationalism, it must retain its Communist goals or the line between Communism and social democracy will dissolve. In the final analysis, recent election results demon­ strate this differentiation and that the definition of communism remains the individual party member’s choice. Within the context of Communist identification, the New Internation­ alists used both deliberate actions and declaratory policy to ensure their

Foreign and Security Policies

223

autonomy. After the failure of the Berlin conference to codify, as the oppo­ sition parties expected, new rules governing intraparty behavior, as the Paris conference demonstrated, New Internationalism was an attempt to rekindle the rule-building process which would then permit the institution­ alization of diversity among Communists without endangering the interests of any party. The advocates sought new parameters for these rules by including broader participation that would necessarily dilute the former exclusive proletarian composition. As Gian Carlo Pajette explained, “New Internationalism presents itself as a problem of new relationships among Communist parties, as a problem of a new unity between Communist and Socialist and Social Democratic parties, as a problem of new relationships between Western Communist parties and the Communist parties of the socialist countries, as a problem of relations between these parties and the Soviet Union.’’64 Thus, New Internationalism was the boldest attempt yet to establish comprehensive guidelines for party conduct. It was to “provide a relationship of full autonomy and equality of rights between all socialist forces, in which there is no place even for a minimum of national distrust, intolerance, and doubts as to the level of political consciousness and ability of others.’’65 This represented a new dimension of international Communist activi­ ties and thinking. It was not intended as the creation of a new center or rival pole for Communist thought or dogma, any more than Eurocommunism was. It was an effort to produce the opposite: guaranteeing the maturation of national Communism through the exercise of mutual constraints and noninterference, within the context of mutual Communist aspirations. The dwindling support for New Internationalism indicated by the Paris confer­ ence should not be interpreted as the re-Russification of the entire Commu­ nist movement but as the reendorsement by the PCF and the PCP of certain Leninist principles, such as the preservation of democratic centralism as the honored code of conduct. As the New Internationalists attempt to enhance their credibility through collaboration with the Social Democrats, the Chinese, and other progressive forces, international issues will be the primary points of inter­ est. The foreign and security policies of the respective parties will provide the broadest areas of concern. The details of detente, arms control, defense doctrines and postures, and challenges of Third World development will be the problems upon which there can be the greatest agreement. Thus, the apparent necessity to perpetuate and expand the appeal of New Internation­ alism in itself may prompt the PCI and the PCE to concentrate even more attention on foreign and security policies, simply to improve the saleability of their product. At the present juncture, Soviet reaction to New Internationalism is likely to resemble Moscow’s handling of the outspoken Rumanians: isolate

224

New International Communism

and ignore them on key issues and accommodate their idiosyncratic demands on minor questions. But such a reaction would ignore the power­ ful emotions embodied in national Communism among opposition parties and the growing emphasis they are likely to place on foreign and security policies as the supporting matrix for their international ties. It is precisely this shift of emphasis from ideological matters related to social revolution to international questions that is at the heart of the antagonism with the Kremlin. As both a superpower and the socialist fatherland, the USSR strongly resents interference in international affairs on the regional or global basis by either ruling or nonruling parties. Given the strength of national Communism among opposition parties, whose consciousness is increasingly focusing on foreign and defense matters, there are likely to be persistent difficulties with Moscow.

Notes 1. For related documents, see Manfred Steinkuhler, Eurokommunismus im Widerspruch, Analyse und Dokumentation, (Koln: Wissenschaft und Politik Verlag, 1977), pp. 282-283. 2. Cambio 16 (Madrid), 14-20 March 1977; see also Corriere della sera, 16 November 1977. 3. Interview, Radio Budapest, 24 January 1980. 4. Edward Kardelj, “Roads of Development of the Socialist Self Management Political System,” Kommunist (Belgrade), 1978:47. 5. Tanjug (Yugoslav Press Agency), 11 October 1977. 6. Zorica Priklmayer-Tomanovici, “Eurocommunism,” Politika, 1979:11. 7. Ceteka (Czechoslovak Press Agency), 17 June 1977. 8. Ibid., 15 December 1978. For Soviet sources see Yurii Krasin, Novoe vremya, 13 February 1981:18-20; and Boris Ponomarev, Kommu­ nist, March 1981:3-18. 9. Neil Mclnnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe (Lon­ don: Oxford University Press, 1975). See also Heinz Timmermann, “Euro­ communism: Moscow’s Reaction and the Implications for Eastern Europe,” The World Today, October 1977:11-20; R. Neal Tannahill, “Leadership as a Dominant Diversity in Western Europe Communism,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Winter 1976:349-368; Richard Loe­ wenthal, “Communism as an Historical Force,” International Journal, Winter 1976-77:1-19; George Urban, “A Conversation with Lucio Lom­ bardo Radice,” Encounter, May 1977:9-22; and Kevin Devlin, “The Chal­ lenge of Eurocommunism,” Problems of Communism, January-February 1977:1-20.

Foreign and Security Policies

225

10. Richard Loewenthal, “Can Communism Offer an Alternative World Order?” Encounter, April 1974:8-29. 11. Leszek Kolakowski, “The Eurocommunist Schism,” ibid., August 1977:15-21. 12. Wolfgang Leonhard, Eurokommunismus, Herausforderung fur Ost und West (Bertelsman, Gutersloh: 1978). This thesis is amplified in his Was ist Kommunismus? (Munich: Wilhelm Goldmann, 1979). 13. Pravda, 13 December 1978. 14. Le monde, 15 April 1978. For even more critical comments by Eastern European dissidents, see Rudolf Bahro, Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlaganstalt, 1977), pp. 440-444; and Janez Stanic, “Communism’s Cross­ roads,” serialized in the Croatian weekly Start, 24 December 1980 and 3 January 1981. 15. Washington Post, 28 July 1980. 16. For a thorough review, see Vladimir V. Kusin, “Eastern Europe in the 1970s,” Slavic Studies 25 (1980):85-125. 17. Heinz Timmermann, “Moskau und der Europaische Kommunis­ mus nach der Gipfelkonferenz von Ost-Berlin,” Osteuropa, April 1977: 282-302. 18. The reaffirmation of this hard line by the loyalists was made in interviews by the author with party officials in the USSR and Eastern and Western Europe between 1978 and 1980. 19. Mosa Pijade, “Grand Masters of Hypocrisy,” Politika, 1956:89. In the late 1970s several pro-Soviet Yugoslav party members were convicted on charges of “Cominformist activities.” 20. Heinz Timmermann, “Politisches Erdbeben im spanischen Kom­ munismus: Zur Einschatzung des V. Parteitags der ‘Vereinigten Sozialistischen Partei Kataloniens’ vom Januar 1981,” Aktuelle Analysen (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1981), p. 2; El pais, 8 and 14 January 1981; and Eusebio Mujal-Leon, “Cataluna, Carrillo and Eurocommunism,” Problems of Communism, March-April 1981:25-26. 21. Tanjug, 27 July 1981. 22. See Kevin Devlin, “The PCI and its Afghan,” Radio Free Europe Report, 23 April 1981; and “More on the PCI’s Afghan,” ibid., 14 May 1981. 23. Rinascita, 12 June 1981. Novoe vremya, the Soviet weekly, strongly counterattacked, 25 June 1981. 24. Information Bulletin, 12 (Prague: Peace and Socialism, 1976). 25. The seven included the Italian, Spanish, Yugoslav, Rumanian, Swedish, British, and San Remo CPs. 26. L’humanite, 13 December 1975 and 6 February 1976.

226

New International Communism

27. Jiri Valenta “Eurocommunism and Eastern Europe,” Problems of Communism, March-April 1978:47. 28. Der Spiegel, 5 July 1976. 29. L’humanite, 1 July 1976. 30. Rinascita, 6 February 1976, explains the reason for the delay of over one year in the conference’s convocation. See also K.S. Karol, “The Portuguese Obsession,” Le nouvelle observateur, 2 June 1977; and Kevin Devlin, “The Challenge of Eurocommunism,” Problems of Communism, January-February 1977:1-20. 31. The absentee parties were the CPs of Spain, Italy, the United King­ dom, the Netherlands, Belgium, San Marino, Sweden, Iceland, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, eleven out of twenty-nine invitees (excluding the Greek Com­ munist party [interior]). 32. The complaints are itemized in the following sources: L’unita, 18-30 March and 2, 3, 4, 8, and 16 April 1980; Rinascita, 28 March and 4-11 April 1980; Le nouvel observateur, 21 April 1980; Morning Star (Lon­ don), 3,8, and 14 April 1980; Aperpres (Bucharest), 23 April 1980; Le drapeau rouge (Brussels), 2, 5, 6, and 7 April 1980; Volksstimme (Vienna), 5 April 1980; Tanjug, 11 November 1979; Mundo obrero, 15-21 May 1980; Vjesnik, 5 April 1980; Nedeljne informative novne, 10 April 1980; and Afghi (Athens), 22 April 1980. 33. Stephen Clissold, ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973, A Documentary Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 225 and 261. 34. See the posthumously published memoirs of Eduard Kardelj for details of the negotiations, Borba, 10 February 1980. 35. Interview, Nuovi argumenti (Rome), 19 June 1956. 36. William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 380. 37. Ibid., p. 293. 38. For details, see Lawrence L. Whetten, East-West German Rela­ tions (New York: New York University Press, 1980), chapter 3; Edgar R. Rafael, “Entwicklungsland” Rum'dnien (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1977), chapters 1 and 2; and Robert R. King, “Rumania in the Sino-Soviet Dis­ pute,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Winter 1972:373-412. 39. Rinascita, 15 June 1979. 40. La politico e I’organizzazione dei comunisti italiani, (Rome: Editori Rivniti, 1979), p. 54. 41. Mikail Suslov, Kommunist 11 (1975):9; and ibid. 14 (1977). 42. Heinz Timmermann, Moskau und die Linke in Westeuropa: Aspekte und Perspektiven des Verhaltnisses zu den Eurokommunisten und demokratischen Sozialisten, Berichte des Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (BIOST), No. 12 (Cologne: BIOST, 1980), pp. 9-14.

Foreign and Security Policies

227

43. Ibid., pp. 14-16. 44. The Soviets formally attacked the PCI for its position on Poland, charging it with interfering in Polish internal affairs. The document was leaked to La republica, 14 February, 1981. 45. Heinz Timmermann, Reformkommunismus in West und OstKonzeptionen, Querverbindungen und Perspektiven, Berichte des BIOST, No. 13 (Cologne: BIOST, 1980); an English version can be found in “Democratic Socialists, Eurocommunists and the West,” in The European Left: Italy, France and Spain ed. William E. Griffith (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1979), pp. 167-202. 46. Manuel Azcarate, “What is Eurocommunism?” in Euro-Communism: Its Roots and Future in Italy and Elsewhere, ed. (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1978), p. 19. 47. Heinz Timmermann, “Was bleibt vom Eurokommunismus,” L’80 Demokratie und Sozialismus (Cologne) December 1980:104-105. 48. L’unita, 7 November 1980. It should be noted that the challenge to PCE leadership on these issues occurred only two months later in Barce­ lona. 49. Rinascita, 7 April 1978. 50. Sergio Segre, “Outlines for a History of ‘Eurocommunism,’ ” A chi fa paura TEurocommunismo? (Rimini Firenze: Guaraldi, 1977), p. 17, cited by Kevin Devlin, “The Challenge of the New Internationalism,” Mimeo, 1980, p. 31. 51. Manuel Azcarate, Interview, Le nouvel observateur, 27 March-2 April 1978. 52. Antonio Rubbi, “The New Internationalism,” World Marxist Review, January 1977:123-129. 53. Pierre Hassner, “Eurocommunism in the Aftermath of Kabul,” NATO Review, August 1980:13. The principles were those embodied in the still extant Eurocommunist Manifesto. 54. L’unita, 26 January and 26 March 1980. On Social Democratic party interests in Latin CPs, see Angela Yergin, “West Germany’s Siidpolitik: Social Democrats and Eurocommunism,” Orbis, Spring 1979:51-72. 55. Mundo obrero, 24-31 May 1979. 56. L’unita, 25 March 1980. 57. Ibid., 25 March 1980. 58. L’humanite, 26 March 1980. 59. L’unita, 20 April 1980. 60. Heinz Timmermann, “Neue Tendenzen im europaischen Kommunismus,” Europa-Archiv 14 (1980):453-454. 61. Kevin Devlin, “The Challenge of the New Internationalism,” Mimeo, p. 41. 62. Griffith, ed., The European Left: Italy, France and Spain, p. 10. 63. Pravda, 18 September 1980.

228

New International Communism

64. Gian Carlo Pajetta, La lunga marcia dell’ internazionalismo, (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1978), p. 169. 65. Radovan Radonjic, “Proletarian International,” Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade), March 1978:42.

Appendix A Lines of Inquiry into the Historic and Present Positions of Latin European CPs on Specific Security-Policy Issues 1. What is each party’s present position on NATO membership? What differences on this issue are identifiable within the party? How have the official and factional stands varied over the past ten years? 2. To what extent does the party perceive the need for an explicit state­ ment of its security policy as an essential element in enhancing the legit­ imacy and credibility of its bid to gain or influence national power? Is there any evidence that security policy is confined deliberately to ambiguous terms to aVoid political consequences inside and outside the party? 3. If the party acknowledges that NATO membership is important in broadening its national credibility, how is it selling or does it plan to sell the contradiction of membership in an aggressive military bloc to its rank and file or left wing? What rationale is used to accommodate the contradiction or offset an alleged increased future dependency on the United States? 4. How does the party assess the probability that the political threat posed by the nonruling CPs can induce stronger defense postures within the Alliance, greater cohesion within NATO, closer accord on disarma­ ment talks, and intensified bilateral ties (such as those between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany)? Or are trends in the opposite direction perceived as more likely? 5. In view of the party’s stand on full employment, what is its policy on NATO weapons standardization (which could cause an increase or decline in employment in defense industries), modernization (which would probably cause an increase in employment), and disarmament (how does the party square its moral responsibility to reduce both the quality of weaponry and intensity of international violence with its responsibility to workers in defense related industries)? 6. What is the party’s attitude toward national military service: does it favor conscription or professionalism? Does it endorse pacifism, even

229

230

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

19.

New International Communism

tacitly? Does it accept conscientious objection and alternative forms of fulfilling national service obligations? What is the party’s attitude toward military officers’ promotion or appointment to general staff and defense ministry positions, or assign­ ment to key posts in defense industries for party members? What is its stand on paramilitary organizations? What role should they perform, how should they be equipped, what legal constraints should be imposed on their activities, and .how should political neutrality be ensured? In assessing Soviet reactions, to what extent does a leftist government in France or Italy serve Soviet political and military interests? Can the Soviets rely on party support for their position on arms-control issues? In other words, what are the risks of either greater NATO cohe­ sion or Warsaw Pact factionalism resulting from leftist influence? How does the party rank the relevance of specific issues to party interests, national preferences, and Alliance concerns? Is there any evidence of movement toward a common policy on defense and disarmament matters between the nonruling CPs and individual Pact members or with Yugoslavia and Rumania or among themselves? What role does Yugoslavia play or could it be expected to play in influ­ encing a coordinated policy on defense issues among individual Eastern and Western CPs? If a NATO government adopts a unilateral arms control initiative within the MBFR framework applicable to the southern flank that would parallel the proposals tabled for the central front, how would the party react? What is the party’s position on NATO southern flank problems: the Greek-Turkish disputes, European Economic Community member­ ship, Greek reintegration into NATO and military demarcation lines, Spanish entry into NATO, and Turkish and Portuguese political insta­ bility? What would be the most likely impact on flank cohesion of military withdrawals by NATO members? What are the most likely scenarios for Soviet behavior in the event that Italy should follow France and Greece and withdraw from the NATO organization but not the Alliance, especially if all three demonstrated various degrees of withdrawal? What are the party’s reactions to Soviets’ apparent priority on expand­ ing the Warsaw Pact’s terms of reference outside Europe? What is the party’s interpretation of the reasons for the Soviet military buildup in Eastern Europe? What are the party’s perceptions of Soviet and American positions on theater arms control issues? Can Rumania play a more active role between East and West on secu­

Appendix A

20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

231

rity issues from the party’s viewpoint? If Rumania took steps to loosen its Pact commitments, how would the party respond within NATO? What are the military implications of a change in the nature of the Alli­ ance (a shift in the center of gravity to the central front) for the respec­ tive national interests of the member states and for broader East-West issues and relations? What are the party’s thoughts about the desirability and feasibility of establishing common southern European positions (from Portugal to Turkey) on security matters—threat perceptions, arms control, great power constraints, coordinated force postures, allocated mission priori­ ties, and force projection options—in light of Middle East instability and potential Arab oil warfare? What is the party’s position on possible unilateral U.S. or Western European military force projection beyond NATO’s area of responsi­ bility? The PCI has stated that it will accept NATO participation provided the mission and role remain within the letter of the treaty, yet moderniza­ tion and changes in force structures remain inevitable even within the spirit of the treaty. How will each party respond to modernization changes in basing requirements? What is the party’s minimum position on these issues? How does the party envision establishing the parliamentary structure necessary for closer supervision of defense budgeting and spending? The PCI expects to establish greater consensus among NATO members about the Alliance’s planning. How is this to be achieved, and what are the party’s minimum and maximum stands on NATO missions? The forward based systems issue is likely to become the main issue of SALT III and may result in constraints on the employment of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. How would the party respond to a reduced Sixth Fleet presence along the southern flank? To an increased presence? Is there a new dimension of interest emerging in the debates within the party over the nature of the hostilities between Asian Communist states? Will these concerns or debates impair the credibility of the party’s policies on theater security matters? There may be a weakening of the SALT process as the primary means of communication between the two superpowers, and this might effect the notion of detente and its importance to the U.S. alliances. What is the party’s interpretation of the detente process and what role does it play in its defense program? Does the party have an explicit nuclear weapons policy? What is its stand on deploying nuclear-capable launching systems on its territory, either national or nonnational? Is a change anticipated from the dual­

232

New International Communism

key system of nuclear warhead release procedures to a one-key, exclu­ sive U.S. responsibility? What is the attitude on specific suggestions for theater nuclear force modernizations, such as the development of enhanced radiation warheads, cruise missiles, extended-range F-llls, and mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles and the upgrading of British and French strategic nuclear forces? 30. What is the party’s position on various disarmament issues: conven­ tional general purpose forces, TNF#maval forces, and U.S.-USSR stra­ tegic forces? What are the utility of the MBFR talks, the implications of the failure of SALT II, and the expected agenda and achievements of SALT III? In light of arms control expectations, what is the position on modernization of national armed forces: would it impede, complement, or stimulate negotiations? Is modernization necessary before parity can be achieved and fruitful talks concluded? Does the party have any uni­ lateral arms control initiatives, such as the PCI’s proposal to increase the membership of the MBFR talks? Does the party intimate that tacit support of the Soviet negotiating position would produce results ulti­ mately beneficial to the Western Alliance? When candid, are party members optimistic, pessimistic, or reserved about the prospects of arms control negotiations in advancing the party’s objectives?

Appendix B Lines of Inquiry into the Case of Portugal, 1974-1975: Considerations of Alliance Security When a Communist Party Participates in the Government of a Member State 1. What change did the NATO allies and SHAPE perceive in the reliabil­ ity of the loyalty of the Portuguese government to the Alliance when members of the Communist party served in the national government? 2. What was Portugal’s legal position in the Alliance at that time? What were the allies’ responsibilities to Portugal and Portugal’s obligations to the Alliance? Did either change during this period? 3. To what extent did individual members take unilateral steps to protect their Alliance responsibilities or national security interests (as in the cases of German air force training privileges and U.S. basing rights in the Azores)? 4. How did the allies rank their concerns about the PCP in coalition: denial of Portuguese military assets, denial of basing rights, prospects of Soviet acquisition of these or similar facilities, compromise of sensi­ tive documents and materials, compromise of secure communications, and compromise of naval intelligence and antisubmarine warfare capa­ bilities? 5. Did the Allies regard the Portuguese episode as simply an aggravation or as a dangerous precedent for other member states? 6. What organizational changes within NATO and SHAPE were pro­ posed, and what changes were actually implemented? 7. What administrative changes within NATO and SHAPE were proposed and implemented to adapt plans, operational procedures, confidential information, and secure communications to the new situation? 8. Was the danger of compromise perceived as sufficiently grave that new policies and procedures have been proposed and introduced to thwart future threats of Communist accession to power? If so, what were they?

233

234

New International Communism

9. Conversely, was the Portuguese episode regarded as an isolated case of relatively low priority that did not necessarily create parallels for simi­ lar developments in other member states? 10. What administrative or structural changes were proposed or imple­ mented within Portugal in the cabinet, ministry of defense, ministry of foreign affairs, armed forces, and various security services to compen­ sate for the altered relationship with the Alliance? What measures were designed to reassure the allies and what steps were intended as uni­ lateral precautions necessary to protect national interests? What prior­ ity was placed on defense issues and Alliance responsibilities in relation to other foreign and domestic questions during this period? As a result of this experience, to what extent is Communist influence in the armed forces, through appointment of either CP members to command posi­ tions or Marxist officers at the field-grade level, now regarded as a potential threat to national stability?

Appendix C The March 1977 Eurocommunist Manifesto A meeting took place on 2-3 March 1977 between Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the CP of Spain; Enrico Berlinguer, general secretary of the CP of Italy; and Georges Marchais, secretary general of the CP of France. As an answer to the invitation of Carrillo, Marchais and Berlinguer wish to reaffirm their solidarity to the CP of Spain and to all the democratic forces in Spain in the striving for democracy and for the construction of a free Spain. In this spirit, the CPs of France and of Italy express their conviction that the Spanish people will achieve full establishment of democracy of which an essential criterion nowadays is that the Communist party and all democratic parties, which are indispensable for truly free elections, become legal. They express their solidarity to all those who fight in Spain for libera­ tion of political prisoners, for eliminating provocations and fascist crimes that try to block the march of democracy. The end of the Franco dictator­ ship, after that of fascism in Portugal and Greece, represents an important and positive change on the European scene.

The Participation of the Workers in Political Life The progress of democracy in Spain is of particular interest to the French and Italian people. The three countries experience presently a crisis which is at the same time economic, political, social, and moral. This crisis demands new solutions for social development. Regardless of the diversity of condi­ tions that exist in each of the three countries, the Italian, French, and Span­ ish Communists affirm the necessity of a positive alternative to the crisis, by fighting reactionary orientations and achieving the highest possible agree­ ment between those political and social forces that are ready to contribute to a policy of progress and renewal. This demands the participation of workers and their parties to mapping the direction of political life. The Communists defend the immediate interests of the workers every day, also advocate profound democratic reforms. The crisis of the capitalist system

“The Text of the Madrid Declaration by the Communist Parties of Spain, France, and Italy,” Le monde, 3 March 1977.

235

236

New International Communism

requires more urgently than ever before a development of democracy in the direction of socialism.

The Pluralism of Political Forces

The Communists of Spain, Italy and France agree to act for the construc­ tion of a new society with pluralism .of political and social forces, in the respect and guarantee of the development, of all collective and individual liberties: freedom of thought and expression of the press, association and meeting, demonstration, free moving of people within their country and abroad, freedom of trade unions, independence of trade unions and the right to strike, invulnerability of private life, respect of the common right to vote and the possibility of alternating democratic majorities, freedom of religion, culture, and the expansion of different philosophic, cultural, and artistic opinions and trends. This will achieve socialism within the frame­ work of democracy, and freedom inspires the concepts worked out indepen­ dently by each country. The three countries agree further to develop in the future international solidarity and friendship on the basis of independence of each party, of equality of rights, noninterference, and respect of free choice of ways and proper solutions for the construction of socialist societies corresponding to the conditions in each country.

Application of the Helsinki Act This meeting at Madrid is also an occasion for the Spanish, Italian and French Communists to reaffirm the importance they attribute to the new steps taken on the path of detente and peaceful coexistence, to the actual progress made in arms control, to the complete application of all points of the Helsinki Final Act by all countries, to a positive view of the Belgrade conference, to the efforts to overcome the division of Europe into hostile military blocs, to the establishment of new connections between the indus­ trial countries and the developing ones, and to a new international eco­ nomic order. The three parties also perceive the image of a peaceful, democratic, and independent Europe, without military bases or arms competition, of a Mediterranean Sea as a sea of peace and cooperation between the adjoining states. A free Spain, for which the Communists and all democratic forces in Spain fight, would be an important factor for Europe as it would for democracy, progress, and peace. To attain these goals it is necessary and

Appendix C

237

possible that regardless of all the differences in ideas and traditions the dia­ logue and efforts to reach agreement between Communists, Socialists, and Christian forces, between all democratic forces, should be pursued. In the course of the past years, the cause of freedom in Spain was the domain of Communist actions. From the capital of a Spain, which enters the path of democratic renaissance, the Communists of the three countries appeal today to all those forces that want democracy and progress.

Appendix D Text of the June 1981 Agreement between the French Socialist and Communist Parties The representatives of the Socialist party and of the Communist party of France met together the day after the parliamentary elections to congratu­ late each other on the decision the French people, confirming their vote of 10 May by adding to the presidential majority a broad majority of the National Assembly. Thus, conditions have been created that are necessary to perform the changes expected by the country. In order to reach a com­ mon course in government work, the two parties devoted the main aspects of their discussion to those points that remained unsettled from their previ­ ous meeting. Conscious of the tasks dictated by the present situation, the two parties state that they are committed to the promotion of the new policies chosen by the French people in electing Francois Mitterrand president of the Republic. They will do this within the scope of the majority just constituted; they will do so within government through steadfast solidarity; they would do so in local and regional collectives and in French enterprises. For this purpose they accept the decision made by the country and the agreements reached in their discussions, without neglecting due respect for the proper personalities and fundamental positions of institutions and parties. The policies of change that has developed from the first government measures will be continued. Existing commitments will be observed. Change will be achieved as it has commenced, along democratic lines pro­ ceeding from the intentions expressed by universal suffrage. This change will become demonstrated in particular by new measures in the fields of social justice and exploitation of natural resources, measures which have to be introduced in the next several months. The change will be performed in stages, according to a method of transformation that meets the present crisis situation, a consequence of the fact that the French econ­ omy is vulnerable to external forces and financial imbalances. In the same spirit, the two parties believe that immediately after the pre­ sent negotiations between trade unions and employers, legislation should be prepared within a minimum of time on the reduction of working hours. Le monde, 25 June 1981.

239

240

New International Communism

After the legal framework has been established, further negotiations should be entered into on government initiatives to work out details branch by branch and, if necessary, enterprise by enterprise on the manner and sched­ ule for the application of these changes. The two parties believe that the expansion of industries under state con­ trol would be a guarantee for efficiency and for the democratization of planning. They declare agreement on the necessity to bring about the expan­ sion of nationalized industries, in accordance with the proposals accepted on 10 May. Regarding the situation of the country, the two parties consider it necessary that a two-year plan of readjustment should be worked out creat­ ing the conditions for new economic growth and for an efficient fight against unemployment. They will favor a policy of reducing social inequi­ ties. They will commit themselves to the guarantee and extension of liber- ' ties, the development of the rights of the workers, and the democratization of national life. The two parties will support international actions of France—with respect to her alliances—for peace and disarmament with the perspective of simultaneous dissolution of the military blocs, assuring the balance of power in Europe and in the world and the security of all countries. In this spirit, they declare that they favor rapid international negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armament in Europe. These negotiations should deal primarily with the presence of Soviet SS-20 missiles and with the deci­ sion to deploy American Pershing II missiles. The two parties will strive for the peoples’ rights of self-determination, for the sovereignty of nations, for noninterference into their internal affairs, and for the right of each country to ensure its own security. To these principles they attribute universal value. In the name of these principles, they confirm the right of the people of Afghanistan to choose their own government and vote for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the ending of any foreign interfer­ ence. Regarding the situation created by the Camp David Accord, they reaf­ firm the right of existence and security of Israel and of all the states in that region, as well as the right of the Palestinian people to a national homeland. The two parties will actively support the participation of France in the EC, in its institutions and common policies, without neglecting its proper freedom of action and its legitimate interests. They will apply common poli­ cies on the social level for the defense of agriculture and other endangered sectors, and for the vitality of research and high technology industries. The two parties recall the development of the situation in Poland expressing their wish that that country and its people themselves might lead the process of economic, social, and democratic revival they are engaged in to a satisfactory conclusion.

Appendix D

241

With conviction, they express their solidarity on the economic and political level with the peoples of the Third World who, as in El Salvador and Nicaragua, fight for their national emancipation, their development, and their democratic and social liberation.

Appendix E Political Statistical Profiles of the Four Latin European Communist Parties Italian Elections Results (percentage CP vote) Chamber of Deputies Senate 1979

30.4

31.5

1976

34.4

33.8

1972

27.2 (alone)

27.6

(with Socialists of Proletarian Unity [PSIUP])

1968

26.9

30.0

(with PSIUP)

1963

25.3

25.41

1958

22.7

21.8

1953

22.6

20.9

Italian CP Employees

1970

Full-Time

Part-Time

At Party Headquarters in Rome

over 1,000

over 80,000

200-300

Archiv der Gegenwart, 1951; Europa Year Book 1960, 1970, 1980 (London); Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1970, 1971, 1980 (Stanford); and Europa-Archiv 32 (1977):159.

243

New International Communism

244 Portuguese Election Results (percentage CP vote)

President

Assembly

1980

16.9

1979

19

1976

14.35

1975

12.53

(with Movimento Democratico Popular [MDP/CDE], formed Aliance Povo Unido [APU])

no candidate; supported Eanes

(with MDP/CDE, formed APU)

7.58

Spanish Election Results (percentage CP vote) Cortes 1979

10.7

1977

9.22

French Election Results (percentage CP vote) National Assembly (1st & 2nd Rounds)

President, 5th Republic, 1st Round Only

1981

15.43

1978

20.55 (1), 18.62 (2)

1974

1973

no candidate; supported Mitterrand

21.54 (1), 20.61 (2)

1969

21.27

1968

20.03 (1), 20.14 (2)

1967

22.46 (1), 21.37 (2)

1965

1962

no candidate; supported Mitterrand

21.8 (1), 21.3 (2)

1958

18.9 (1), 20.7 (2)

1956

25.6 (with Progressives)

1951

25.9 (with Progressives)

13.1 (1 round only)

Appendix E

245

CP Party Membership France

Italy

Portugal

Spain

1980

702,864 (1979)

1,715,922

164,713

140,000 (est.)

1970

250,000-290,000

1,615,296

2,000 (est., Year­ book on Interna­ tional Communist Affairs 1970)

5,000 (est.)

Glossary ACE AD

AFM ASEAN ASW AWACS Brandt Commission CGIL COMECON CPC CPSU CGT

CDE

CBMs CC.OO DC Euromissiles

ERW FBS FDP GATT GLCM IMF

NATO’s Allied Command Europe Democratic Alliance (Portuguese conservative coali­ tion) Armed Forces Movement Association of Southeast Asian Nations Anti-submarine Warfare Airborne Warning and Control Systems Independent Commission for International Develop­ ment Questions, chaired by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt Confederazione Generate Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labor) Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Communist Party of China Communist Party of Soviet Union Confederation General du Travail (French General Confederation of Labor of the Workers’ International) Conference sur le Desarmement en Europe (Giscardist arms-control proposal) Confidence Building Measures Comisiones Obreras (Spanish Workers’ Organizations) Democrazia Christiana (Italian Christian Democrats) Medium-range missiles that the Soviet Union has already deployed (SS-20) in the European Theater and that NATO has decided to deploy (Cruise and PershingIl) from late 1983 as a counter force unless SovietAmerican negotiations in the interim result in agreement to limit, reduce, or eliminate such weapons on both sides. Enhanced Radiation Warhead Forward Based System Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (West Ger­ man Free Democratic Party) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Ground Launched Cruise Missile International Monetary Fund

247

248 LCY LOME II

LRTNF MBFR Moncloa Pact

MRBM MRCA NCO NSA NPT PCI

PSI PSOE PSUC

PUWP RCP RPR R&D SED

SFIO

SIPRI SPD UCD

UDF UNCTAD WEU

New International Communism League of Communists of Yugoslavia A Convention signed 31 October 1979 in Lome, Republic of Togo, between the European Economic Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries concerning economic and trade relations. Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions A two-part accord reached in October 1977 by Premier Adolfo Suarez and Spanish political parties concerning economic and political reforms. Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Multiple Role Combat Aircraft Noncommissioned Officer U.S. National Security Agency Nonproliferation Treaty Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) Party) Parito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalunya (United Socialist Party of Catalonia) Polish United Workers’ Party Romanian Communist Party Rassemblement pour la Republique (Rally for the Republic) French neo-Gaullist party Research and Development Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (East German Socialist Unity Party) Section frangaise de [’Internationale ouvriere (French Branch of the Workers’ International) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (West Ger­ man Social Democratic Party) Union de Centro Democratico (Spanish Union of the Democratic Center) Union pour la democratie frangaise (Giscardist Union for French Democracy) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Western European Union

Index Accountability, public, 4, 8 AD (Conservative Democratic Alliance), 139 Afghanistan, Soviet-created crisis over, 1, 3, 7, 9, 19, 29, 31, 44, 52, 56-61, 82-83, 95, 98, 104, 107-110, 121-122, 125-128, 143, 145, 163, 168, 171, 173, 176-178, 184-185, 196, 208, 212, 216, 219-220 Africa: colonies in, 145; countries of, 53, 65, 108, 120, 130-131, 142, 159, 171, 177-178, 193; dictators in, 191; national liberation movement, 169; politics in, 43; wars in, 158 Agrarianism and agriculture: collective, 160; modernization in, 218; policies and programs, 95, 180-181; in Portugal, 147; reforms in, 147; in Spain, 168 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 54, 158 Air force personnel, 6, 54 Albania, 206 Alfeite Naval Base, 157 Algeria, 131, 135 Allende, Salvador, 17 Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, 172 Alvera Air Base, 158 Amendola, Giorgio, 166-167 Angola: colony of, 7, 142, 145, 185; intervention in, 141 Anti-: Americanism, 164, 187; Atlanticism, 39; Germanism, 164; militarism, 40; submarines, 63, 119, 153-154 Antiterrorist and Antisubversive Operations (SISDE), 50 Arab States, 53, 66, 133, 169-170, 175; and Israeli conflict, 55, 146, 212; radicalism in, 191

Armaments: industry, 133; nuclear, 83, 88-89, 97, 101 Armed forces, 102, 135, 189: Italian, 45-47, 55, 58; Portuguese, 156; Spanish, 133 Armed Forces Movement (AFM): levels of, 139, 151-152; Revolutionary Council, 11, 154-155 Arms-control limitations, 3-6, 42-44, 60-63, 66, 84, 89-102, 164, 166, 187-190, 194-196, 220, 223 Arms race, 16, 128, 194; strategic, 60-61 Asia: Southwest, 60, 157, 176-178; Soviet military actions in, 59 “Asiato-Communism,” form of, 201 Atlantic Alliance and Atlanticism, 6, 11, 39-42, 85, 92, 103, 105, 178, 188, 190, 195, 215. See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization Austria, 64; frontiers of, 58-59; neutrality of, 173 Autarchy, French military, 190 Authority and authoritarianism, 215; civilian, 189; delegation of, 49-50; devolution of, 117, 127-128; party, 8, 32; political, 12 Autonomy: Eurocommunism, 79; ideological, 82; interrelations of, 50, 135; national, 133; party, 3, 203; principles of, 20, 40, 52, 202, 207-208, 213, in Western Europe, 96, 127, 160, 178 Avan te, 145 Azcarate, Manuel, 125-126, 134, 183, 199, 217 Azores, factor of, 145-146, 153, 158-159

Baillot, Louis, 87, 91-93

249

250 Balance-of-power, factor of, 42-44, 57, 62, 169, 173, 195 Balearic Islands, 120 Balkans, The, 53, 65 Ballistic-missile submarine fleet, 190 Ballots and balloting, secret, 1, 16 Balsemao, Francisco Pinto, 155 Banks and banking policies, 79 Bases: air, 158; facilities for, 4, 157, 193; in Italy, 55; military, 55, 64, 66, 122-125, 165; naval, 157; in Spain, 120, 123, 154; supply, 119; and treaties, 146 Beja Air Base, 157-158 Belgium, 25, 156 Belgrade Declaration, 209-210 Berlin Conference of 1976, 3, 79, 82, 97, 203-204, 208, 223 Berlinguer, Enrico, 16-18, 26, 39-40, 43-45, 60-62, 134, 143, 199, 202, 216, 218-221 Bilak, Vasil, 181, 200 Bilateral: agreements, 6, 65, 123, 154; meetings, 16, 97; negotiations, 109, 119, 129, 152-153, 188, 208; treaties, 91, 157 Bloc(s): bipolar, 120-121; crises, 178; Eastern, 22, 100, 109; ideological, 121; military in Europe, 42, 86, 107, 121, 135; politics, 120-122, 127, 129, 135; rivalries, 175; Western, 122 Blum, Leon, 30, 192 Boycotts, use of, 206 Brandt, Willy, 134, 159, 170, 220 Brezhnev, Leonid, 18, 79, 82, 91, 100, 120, 171, 206; Doctrine, 52, 126, 160, 180 Brussels Conference of European Communist parties, 17-19, 147 Bucharest Declaration, 212 Budget(s): defense, 49-50, 54-55, 65, 133; military, 62, 90 Buis, Georges, 87 Bulgaria, 141 Bundeswehr, strength of, 173 Bureaucrats and bureaucracy, 52, 65,

New International Communism 160, 167-168, 189, 202, 204, 217-218 Caetano, Marcello, 140 Cambodia, 7, 144, 176, 178, 185 Camp David peace process, 108, 144, 170 Canary archipelago, 120, 130-131 Capitalists and capitalism: constraints on,-218; crisis of, 27, 126, 214; countries involved, 78, 96, 144, 215; economies, 20, 25; faith in, 17; imperialism of, 43, 58, 135; restructuring of, 32; society of, 28, 126-127, 135; state, 214 Carabinieri, factor of, 46 Carrillo, Santiago, 16, 18, 29-30, 117-118, 121-123, 125, 127-130, 133-134, 141, 143, 183, 199, 204-205, 212, 216, 219-221 Carter, James Earl, 121, 126 Catholicism and Catholic voters, 48, 104, 103183 Cells, effectiveness of, 22, 81, 83 Center-left governments, 1, 33, 134 Center-right political domination, 31 Central Europe, 84, 172-173 Centralism: democratic, 1-2, 8, 10, 22, 80, 206, 219; Soviet, 10 Centrist political forces, 28, 41, 80, 192, 204, 217 Changer de cap (Change the direction), 84-85 Chauvinism, factor of, 21, 177 Chile, events in, 17, 40, 45, 48, 146, 166, 215 China and the Chinese, 3, 19, 57, 60, 121, 127, 141, 144-145, 171, 176, 178, 185, 202, 208, 210, 212, 220-223; denunciation of, 206; imperialism of, 25; and Japanese peace treaty, 221; press relations, 221 Chirac, Jacques, 87 Christian Democrats, 17, 29, 32-33, 41-42, 46, 48-49, 53-54, 58, 64, 67, 163, 189, 192, 217-218

Index Christian forces and the Church, 17-18, 24, 133, 181 Civil: authority, 189; liberties, 194, 201, 220; military relations, 51; wars, 29, 117, 200 Class: leadership, 8; relationships, 15; struggles, 2, 10, 110, 170, 177, 197, 217; tensions, 23, 34; workers, 217, 222 Classified information. See Security Coalition(s): agreement, 108-110; centrist, 1, 33, 80, 134; governments, 22, 118, 166; partners, 4, 87; practices, 26, 151, 213; Socialist-Communist, 11; values, 184 Coexistence: peaceful, 16, 97-98, 120, 122, 128, 131; problems of, 109, 129 Cold wars, 1, 19, 39, 41, 46, 58, 77, 86, 120, 163 Collectivity and collectives: in agriculture, 160; freedoms, 16-17; pan-European security, 86, 101, 103; principle of, 84, 102, 121, 193 Colonialism and colonies: factor of, 6, 130, 145, 156; French, 65, 172; Portuguese, 65, 169 Cominform and Comintern, 200-201, 204 Commissions Obreras (CC.OO), 117, 120 Communications, channels of, 34, 47-48, 63 Competition, ideological, 151, 171 Compulsory military service, 84-85 Confederation General du Travail (CGT), 31, 105, 120 Confederazione Generate Italiane del Lavoro (CGIL), 218 Conference sur le Desarmement en Europe (CDE), 100, 102 Confrontation, factor of, 8, 23, 163, 171 Congress: Second, 2; Seventh, 131; Eighth, 131; Ninth, 131; Tenth, 125, 167, 205; Fifteenth, 214; Twentieth, 209; Twenty-second, 80,

251 97, 207; Twenty-third, 80-81; Twenty-fourth, 110; Twenty-fifth, 207; Twenty-sixth, 216; Twenty­ eighth, 134; Extraordinary, of July 1981, 1, 205 Congress of Epinay in 1971, 83 Congress of the Catalonian Unified Socialist party (PSUC), 204 Conservative Democratic Alliance (AD), 139 Control: parliamentary, 64; political, 50-51 Conventional: systems, 94, 1.19, 171; weapons, 62-63, 90 Cosmic top-secret information, 153-154 Cost-effectiveness, evaluation of, 53, 65, 159 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 167, 186, 202, 211 Counterculture: factor of, 15; in France, 24; in Poland, 221 Counterrevolutionary forces, 177 Coup attempts, military, 45, 67, 151-153, 189 Crapi, Bettino, 33 Credibility: democratic, 125; erosion of, 103; Portuguese, 153 Cruise missiles, 5 , 62 , 64, 107, 125, 188, 195 CSCE, 84, 90, 100-101, 106, 108, 133, 190, 195 Cuba, 169, 185 Cultural Revolution in China, 185, 221 Culture and cultural relations, 15, 17, 24, 90, 129, 197, 201 Cunhal, Alvaro, 11, 16, 21, 26, 29-30, 139-144, 146-147, 158, 166, 184 Cyprus conflict, 56 Czechoslovakia, Soviet interference in, 40, 43,52, 57, 59, 125-126, 141-142, 173, 176-178, 180, 184, 200, 212

Decentralization of party authority, 32, 129

252 Decisions and decision making: collegial, 88; Italian, 65; national, 164-166; process of, 51, 78, 80, 109; unilateral, 152 Defensa, 132 Defense: budgets, 49-50, 54-55, 65, 133; doctrines and pacts, 191, 223; European, 188; French, 164, 191; Italian, 51-56, 193; national, 3-6, 91-98, 132, 163, 166, 191, 193; NATO, 51-56, 146; policies, 3-6, 132, 166 DeGaulle, Charles, 79 Democracy: absence of, 202; Christian, 24; liberal, 4, 52-53; nascent, 117; parliamentary, 15, 68, 143; pluralistic, 5, 57, 68, 222; social, 27-30, 214; Western, 15, 52-53 Democratic: Alliance, 146-147, 155; centralism, 1-2, 8, 10, 22, 80, 206, 219; credibility, 125; interparty behavior, 3 Demography, factor of, 127 Denis, Jacques, 93-95, 98, 106 Denmark, 156 Denuclearized zones, 90 D’Estaing, Giscard, 31, 80, 87, 91-92, 94, 98, 100-103, 105-106, 164, 189, 191 Detente: advantages of, 186; definition of, 171; development of, 39; EastWest, 61; in Europe, 60-61, 63 , 90, 142; future of, 179; international, 40; in Italy, 42-45; military, 97-100; policy of, 8, 16, 34, 51, 53, 56, 58, 93, 208, 220, 223; political, 163-164; problems of, 3, 128-129; process of, 6, 141, 146 Devlin, Kevin, 222 Discrimination: factor of, 170; political, 47 Dictatorships: African, 191; fascist, 56; proletarian, 2, 8 Diplomacy, 7, 98 Disarmament Conference in Europe (CDE), 84, 100, 102 Disarmament: Conventional, 90;

New International Communism nuclear, 63, 90; problems of, 99-102, 107, 129, 146-147; unilateral, 100 Djilas, Milovan, 207 Domestic: isolation, 165; priorities, 1-2; reforms, 196 East Berlin conference, 17-18, 100, ' 206-207 East German Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED), 25 East Germany, 79, 141-142, 152, 180, 185, 212 Eastern Europe, 3, 7-10, 16, 25, 27, 42, 53, 77, 80, 92, 121, 142, 171, 177-179, 186, 190, 215 East-West: arms control, 31, 42, 66; detente, 61; military balance, 43-44, 57, 62; relationships, 43-44, 96, 104 Eanes, Ramalko, 139 Economy and economic relationships, 5, 15-16, 42-43, 117, 139, 167, 187, 217-218; capitalistic, 20, 25; crisis in, 65, 120; European, 168; French, 105; Hungarian, 181; international, 120, 130; Italian, 65; policies on, 107, 110; Polish, 180, 185; and recessions, 78, 128; reforms in, 181, 184; and socialism, 8 Efficiency: administrative, 65; personnel, 194 Egypt, 157, 170 El pais, 120 El Salvador, 108 Elections: assembly, 104-105, 139; factor of, 4, 77; French, 22, 105; 104general, 118; Italian, 39, 41, 66; national, 30, 66, 139, 155; parliamentary, 1, 107; presidential, 1, 78, 83, 104-106, 155; Portuguese, 184 Elleinstein, Jean, 82-83, 95, 201 Energy crisis, 78, 121, 124 Enhanced radiation weapons (ERW), 92-93 Equality and equal rights, 207-208, 223

Index

253

Espionage, factor of, 66-67. See also European political cooperation (ECP), Security 95 Ethiopia, 7, 145, 185 Eurostrategic missile systems, 62 Euro-Africanization, concept of, 169 Extraordinary Party Congress of July Eurocommunism movement, 2, 11, 1981, 1, 182, 205 15-19, 22, 28, 77, 95-96, 128, 139, 142, 144, 165, 175, 177, 197, 199, Factionalism, party, 7, 10, 165, 182 217, 222; autonomous, 79; doctrinal Fallacci, Oriana, 202, 209 principles of, 104, 124; eclipse of, 8, Far-left feminist groups, 21 167; enemies of, 126; failure of, 30; Fascists and fascism, 9, 24, 45, 56, 58, model, 200-201; revitalization of, 163 1-4, 15-19, 134; in Spain, 18-19, Federal Republic of Germany, 54, 88, 133; strategy in, 82, 143; unity of, 91-95, 189 26 Fifth column, 82 Eurocommunism and State (Carillo), Finland and Finlandization, 4, 7, 60 126 Fiterman, Charles, 109 Eurocrats, factor of, 168 Fizbin, Henry, 81 Euroleft, 3, 133-134 Force de frappe, question of, 87-88, Euromissiles, 44, 62, 64, 126, 164, 188 92, 99, 101, 103 Europe: autonomy in, 96, 127, 160, Foreign: affairs, 7, 106-108; issues, 178; Central, 84, 172-173; defense 2-4, 32; military bases, 4; Soviet, 7; of, 188; detente in, 60-61, 63, 90, technology, 180; trade, 78; workers 142; disarmament conferences, 84, in France, 105 100, 102; Eastern, 3, 7-10, 16, 25, Foreign policy, 4, 10, 12, 34, 39; 27, 42, 53, 77, 80, 92, 121, 142, French, 77; Italian, 41-42, 53, 65; 171, 177-179, 186, 190, 215; in Latin countries, 163; Portuguese, economic conditions, 168; 6, 144; Soviet, 56-57, 141; Spanish, hegemony in, 124-125; labor 128-130; Union of the Left, 83-85 organizations, 55, 133, 167; military Foundation for the Study of National blocs in, 42, 86, 107, 120-121, 135; Defense Problems, 87 NATO allies, 93; and nuclear Fourquet doctrine of flexible response, weapons, 92, 97, 126, 173; 89 pacificism in, 160; politics of, 15, France, 5, 11, 68; arms-control in, 89, 95-96, 108; security problems, 91-98; Catholicism in, 103-104; 56-57, 60-62, 84-86, 96-98, 101, colonies of, 65, 172; communism 103, 106; and social democracy, 30; in, 1, 9, 15-29, 89, 91-98; Southern, 4, 7; Soviet threat to, 163 counterculture in, 24; elections in, European Conference on Security and 96-98; and European security, Cooperation (CSCE), 5, 84, 90, 96-98; foreign policies, 77, 164; 100-101, 106, 108, 133, 190, 195 foreign workers in, 105; leftist union in, 79; military autarchy, 190; European Economic Community (EC), 17, 26, 28, 41-44, 65, 94-96, national interests, 77, 168; NATO membership, 85-86; politburo, 102; 128-130, 145, 155, 159; agricultural presidential system, 192; in Shaba programs, 95; membership, 4, 165, II, 7; Socialist Party, 21, 30, 78, 168; and NATO-U.K. package, 119; 133; society in, 30, 98 and Portugal, 147; summit Franco, Generalissimo, 21, 30, conference, 118-119

254 130-131, 159, 194, 204; and American relations, 108-109; German bilateral arrangements, 109; and Soviet treaty, 101, 191 Freedom(s): collective, 16-17; cultural, 17; of union movement, 182-183 French Foreign Legion, 164 Friendship and cooperation, treaties of, 90-91, 101, 122, 145 Front organizations, 22

New International Communism Greece, 56, 65, 95, 168, 195; and Turkey, 63 Gremetz, Maxime, 106 Griffith, William, 222 Grlickov, Aleksandr, 174, 200 Gross national product (GNP), 180 Guyana, 172

Haig, Alexander, 152 Hassner, Pierre, 7-8 Haveman, Robert, 207 Hegemony, 101, 121, 129; expansion of, 177-178, 193, 202; monopolistic, 169; question of, 211, 221; Soviet, 209, 211, 221; in United States, 124-125, 135, 187; West German, 94 Helsinki Final Act, 16, 43-44, 52, 59, 90, 102, 140 Hercules transport aircraft, 53 Hernu, Charles, 106 Hua Guofeng, Chairman, 221 Human rights, issue of, 16, 80, 90, 129, 199 Humanitarian obligations, 170 Hungary, 176, 186; economic reforms, 181; revolution, 40 Husak, Gustav, 181

Gaullist: coalition partners, 80, 87; doctrine, 93-95, 103; nationalism, 164, 190 Gaullist Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), 30, 92-93, 103 Gdansk, city of, 179, 183 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 212 Geneva United Nations Conference Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 100 Geography, factor of, 42, 63, 131 Geopolitical realities, 52, 185 Geostrategic asymmetries, 5-6, 58, 171, 197 German Democratic Republic, 142, 180, 212 Germany, 99, 172, 195; East, 79, 141-142, 152, 180, 185, 212, 214; and France, 109; hegemony of, 94; Iceland, 1, 4, 11, 155 national self-consciousness, 160; Identity and identification: socialism in, 10, 29, 133, 222-223; Communist, 2, 9, 163, 222-223; Soviet relations, 176; West, 2, 5, 49, crisis of, 222; cultural, 24; problem 65, 67, 94, 97, 102, 119, 156-158, of, 98-99; Western, 15 192, 214 Ideology and ideological territories: Gibralter, issue of, 119, 157, 165 arguments, 129; aspirations, 2; Gierek, Edvard, 179-180 autonomy, 82; blocks, 121; Giscardist Union pour la democratic competition in, 151, 171; franfaise (UDF), 30 compromises over, 79; demands, Gonzalez, Felipe, 134, 220 197; heresies in, 8; interpretations Gorshkov, Admiral, 174 of, 28, 98, 172, 178; moderation in, Gramsci, Antonio, 21 20, 39, 52-53; tenets of, 134, 174, Great Britain, 18, 25, 68; labor party 192, 224 in, 10, 220; socialism in, 29, 133. Imperialism: capitalist, 43, 58, 135; See also United Kingdom Chinese, 25; interests in, 29, 99, Grechko, Marshal, 174 127-131, 142; Leninist theory of,

Index 58, 62; and subversion, 147; and the United States, 97, 121 Independence: Italian Communist Party, 59; of trade unions, 17; in Yugoslavia, 58-59 India and Indian Ocean, 126, 135, 172 Indochina conflict, 19 Industrialization and industry: crisis in, 180; factor of, 133, 147, 214; goods, 168; military complexes, 6, 135, 194; modernization, 218; revolution in, 118 Inflation, problem of, 78, 117, 204, 214 Ingrao, Peitro, 218 Insurance sector, 79 Integration, 167-170; in Western Europe, 174 Intellectualism, levels of, 81, 105, 170, 176, 201 Intelligence: agencies, 66-67; American, 159; leaks in, 151-153; military, 45, 49-50; services, 47, 51 50International: detente, 40; economic order, 120, 130; labor organizations, 167; law, 59, 193; politics, 58, 107; reactionary forces, 204; security, 58; workers’ movement, 8, 214 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 212 Internationalism: Communist, 1, 163, 97; concept of, 4-8, 128, 165, 168; legitimation function, 8-9; proletarian, 2-3, 18, 26, 98, 140, 201, 204, 207, 214, 216, 222; Soviet views of, 205-209 Interparty struggles, 19, 208 Intervention: in Angola, 141; in Czechoslovakia, 52. See also Afghanistan, Soviet-created crisis over Interviews: results of, 10, 153, 159 Intraleft conflicts and party patriotism, 28-33 Iran, 63 Isolation, 118; domestic, 165; political,

255 32 Israel: and Arab conflicts, 55, 146, 212; Egyptian peace treaty, 170; government of, 144-145; survival of, 66 Italian Red Brigade, 170 Italy, 5, 8, 124, 188; air force of, 54; armed forces, 45-47, 54-55, 58, 64-65; and arms control, 60-63; and Atlantic Alliance, 39-42; centrist domination, 192; civil-military problems, 45-48; Communist party in, 1-2, 7, 9, 11, 15-29, 34-35, 39-42, 59-63, 143; decision making in, 65; defense system, 42, 51-56; and detente, 42-45; economy of, 65; elections in, 39, 41, 66; fascist past, 163; government of, 22-24; military bases, 53, 55; national interests, 40; and NATO, parliamentary system, 50-51; political policies, 41-42, 53, 65, 67; reform in, 49; socialist revolution in, 40, 46; security of, 41, 51, 97; and United States, 55

Japan, 18, 121, 127, 171, 185; and China, 221; and Soviet relations, 176 Jordan, crisis over, 66

Kanapa, Jean, 88-89, 91, 97 Kania, Stanislaw, 182, 185, 205 Kardelj, Edvard, 199, 210 Karlovy Vary European Communist Party Conference, 206, 208 Katowice steel mill, 179 KGB, 152 Khrushchev, Nikita, 203, 206, 209-210 Kissinger, Henry, 152 Kolakowski, Leszek, 201

Labor: cheap, 168; federations, 167; international, 167; movement, 54, 130, 179; organizations, 133; party policies, 10, 23 , 220 Lajes, landing rights in, 157-158; U.S. presence in, 146

256 Laos, 7 Latin European countries, 134; Communism in, 1-3, 10-11, 96, 128; history of, 151; leadership in, 25; national defense policies, 186-196 Law(s): international, 59, 193; scientific, 203 Leaders and leadership: class, 8; moral, 181-183; party, 25, 35, 52, 179; political, 26, 181 Leftist: forces, 2, 99, 129; governments, 63, 78-79, 91; military officers, 152-153; parties, 33, 107, 168; traditional policies, 4; unions, 102-103 Legvoid, Robert, 7 Lenin, Leninists, and Leninism, 9-10, 21-23, 32, 57, 142, 164, 166, 200-201, 215; imperialistic theory of, 58, 62; and Marxism, 52, 78-79, 81, 83, 97, 103, 214; militancy of, 217-218; objectives of, 52, 79, 97; orthodoxy, 78-79; principles of, 147, 184, 223; traditions, 178, 208 Leonhard, Wolfgang, 201 Leroy, Roland, 105 L’humanite newspaper, 82-83, 92, 106 105Liberalism, 4, 15, 52-53 Liberation movement: Africa, 169; national, 26, 130-131, 144; of Palestine, 170; Third World, 26-27 Liberty, civil, 194, 201, 220 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 9 Livorno, meeting in, 18 Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF), 5, 109; modernization program, 100-102, 119 Lublin coal mines, 180 L’unita, 220 L’URSS et nous, 81

Machel, Samora, 145 Madeira Islands, 159 Madrid Eurocommunist summit

New International Communism conference, 5, 15-19, 44, 104, 106, 108, 142, 199 Manifesto, Eurocommunist, 201 Mao and Maoist splinter groups, 203, 210 Marchais, Georges, 16, 32, 78-82, 86, 95-97, 99, 101, 105-107, 110, 121, 169-170, 177, 183-184, 199, 207 Marx, Marxists, and Marxism, 8-9, 16, 32,’ 57, 83, 142, 182, 199-201; and Leninism, 52, 78-79, 81, 83, 97, 103, 214; objectives, 97; orthodoxy of, 78-79 Marxist Research Institute, 83 Mauroy, Pierre, 107, 110' Mediterranean area, 64, 100, 131; naval operations, 119, 124, 172 M6ry, Guy, 87-88 Mexico, 135 Middle classes, 22, 105, 143 Middle East, 53, 60, 62, 64-65, 104, 108, 110, 124, 144, 146, 157-158, 175 Militancy, Leninist, 217-218 Military: autarchy, 190; bases, 4, 55, 64, 66, 122-125, 165; blocs, 42, 86, 107, 120-121, 135; budgets, 62, 90; committees, 188; coups, 45, 67, 151- 153, 189; detente, 97-100; East-West balance, 43-44, 57, 62; hierarchy, 48-51; industrial complexes, 6, 135, 194; intelligence, 45, 49-50; and NATO relations, 60, 146; personnel, 47-48, 54, 64, 152- 153, 194; power, 1, 5, 43-44, 56-57, 146, 171, 176; Soviet buildup, 1, 44, 56-57, 98-99, 124, 171; systems, 8-9, 40, 84-85, 159; technology, 53-54, 58, 63 Ministers, Council of, 109 Missiles, 62; deployment of, 55; nuclear, 120; submarine, 190; systems, 62 Mitterand, Francois, 1, 28, 31-32, 78, 80-81, 83, 91, 95, 99, 105-106, 108-110, 134, 151, 164, 184, 191, 220-221

Index Mobile MRBMS, 92, 172, 190 Modernization: agricultural, 218; industrial, 218; LRTNF program, 100-102, 119; TNF, 164, 195; weapons, 123-124, 190 Moncloa Pact, 23 Mongolianization, factor of, 176 Monopolies, factor of, 129, 169, 174 Montigo Air Base, 157-158 Moral: leadership, 181-183; revitalization, 1, 140, 182 Morale, army, 157 Morality, public, 181-182, 185, 191 Morocco, 169 Mozambique, colony of, 142, 145, 185 Multiparty systems, 18 Multipolarization, process of, 121, 208 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), 56, 85-86, 90-91, 102, 104, 191; negotiations, 61, 187 Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRVed), 62 Multiple Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), 54

Napolitano, Georgio, 214, 220 National: autonomy, 133; communism, 2-3, 8, 11, 19-22, 126-128, 186, 215, 222; decision making, 164-166; defense, 3-6, 39, 91-98, 132, 163, 166, 191, 193; elections, 30, 66, 104-105, 139, 155; liberation movements, 26, 130-131, 144, 169; priorities, 3; security, 4, 53, 59, 154, 191; self-consciousness, 160; sovereignty, 123 National interests: divergent, 4; French, 77, 168; Italian, 40; Portuguese, 153; Soviet, 57 National Security Agency (NSA), 154 Nationalization, factor of, 19, 89, 147, 160, 164, 190 Naval operations, 119, 124, 157, 172 Nazis and Naziism, 57-58. See also Germany Neocolonialism, remnants of, 130 NeoFascists, influence of, 46-47

257 NeoLeninism, factor of, 21 Netherlands, 156 Neutrality, 4, 64, 104, 130-135, 174, 194-195: Austrian, 173; armed, 89; political, 120; Spanish, 5, 131-132 New Internationalism, emerging and nature of, 2-4, 6, 8, 110, 163, 216, 219 New Times, 126, 205 News media and press, 91, 93, 95, 100 Nicaragua, 108 Nixon, Richard M., 141 Nonaggression, treaties of, 86, 90 Nonalignment, doctrine of, 103, 121, 126, 130-135, 169, 193 Nonproliferation treaty, 84 Nonruling communist parties, 1, 8, 96, 164 North Atlantic Council at Rome, 85 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Cosmic top-secret information, 153-154; and European Economic Community (EC), 119; factor of, 4, 10-1, 16-17, 29, 31, 51, 107; and France, 85-86; and Italy, 39-41, 48, 54, 58; membership in, 5-6, 48, 54, 58, 85-86, 118-120, 128-129, 178, 187, 193, 196; military capabilities of, 51- 56, 60, 86, 104, 146; nuclear arsenal, 147, 155; and Portugal, 151-158, 195; secrets of, 67-68; security regulations, 68, 155; and Spain, 118-120, 128-129, 178, 193, 196; standardization efforts, 55-56, 64, 187, 190; and the United States, 52- 53 North Vietnam, 175 Norway, 156 Nuclear: armaments, 83, 88-89, 97, 101, 123; deterrence, 87, 89, 94; disarmament, 63, 90; force, 87; missiles, 120; planning group, 155; power, 173; submarines, 5, 62, 92, 96; systems, 6, 66, 92, 171; weapons, 5, 66, 84, 90, 92-97, 120, 125, 190-191; war, 121

258 Nuestra bandera, 125-126

October Revolution, 24-26 Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico (OGMA) at Alverca, 158 Oil: boycotts, 190; regions, 126 Opinion polls, public, 77, 82, 145, 193-194 Opportunism, advantages of, 81 Oreja, Marcelino, 118-119 Orthodoxy, Marxist-Leninist, 78-79 Osima, Treaty of, 58 Ostpolitik, effects of, 214-215 Ottowa Declaration of 1974, 101 Ovar Air Base, 158 Ownership, public, 28, 83 Pacifism, 4, 83, 160, 174 Pajetta, Gian Carlo, 183, 221, 223 Palestine, 108, 170 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 170 Pan-European: collective security, 84, 86, 101, 103; communist community, 25, 28; conference, 17-18; unity, 19 Paramilitary organization, 188 Paris All-European Communist Party Conference, 3, 83, 208-209, 221, 223 Parliamentarism and parliamentary system, acceptance of, 1, 15, 20, 50-51, 64, 68, 94-95, 107, 143 Partisan brigades, 45 Party: autonomy, 3, 203; authority, 8, 32; decentralization, 32, 129; leadership, 25, 35, 52, 179; leftist inclinations, 10, 33, 107, 168, 220; patriotism, 28-34; presses, 80, 106; purges, 82-83 Pasti, Nino, 54 Peaceful coexistence, policy of, 16, 97-98, 120, 122, 128, 131 Pecchioli, Ugo, 54 Perception of Western Europe (PCF), 94-96

New International Communism Perez, Juan, 132 Pershing II missiles, 62, 64, 146, 188 Persian Gulf issues, 60, 65, 126-127, 172 Personnel efficiency and problems, 6, 51, 194 Pluralism: conversion to, 83; and democratic societies, 5, 57, 68, 151, 222; legitimation, 8; philosophy of, 80,'129, 215; political, 3, 15, 158, 160, 184 Pluton tactical missile system, 88, 92 Poland: communist party in, 25; counterculture movement, 221; economic system, 180, 185-186; events in, 3, 7, 19, 61, 108, 110, 163, 171, 179-186, 196, 203, 216, 220; pressures against, 9, 31, 52; reformist movement in, 179-182, 186 Police activities, 66, 194 Policymaking: domestic priorities, 1-2; exploitation by, 130; foreign, 6, 14; in France, 77; labor, 23; security, 6, 144 Polisario movement, 5, 130 Politburo, factor of, 22, 78-79, 81, 91, 96, 105; in France, 102 Political: authority, 12; centrist forces, 28, 41, 80, 192, 204, 217; challenges, 4; control, 50-51; cooperation, 95; cultures, 15, 197, 201; detente, 163-164; discrimination, 47; isolation, 32; leadership, 26, 181; life, 67, 118; neutrality, 5, 120, 131; parties, 169; pluralism, 3, 15, 158, 160, 184; power, 4, 15-16, 124, 174; pressures, 42-43; reforms, 182; traditions, 5, 131 Politics: African, 43; bloc, 120-122, 127, 129, 135; European, 15, 95, 108; international, 58, 107 Polycentrism, 27, 200; concept of, 17, 210; emergence of, 8, 206 Ponomarev, Boris N., 201 Popular Front, factor of, 170, 200

Index

259

Porto Santo Island, 146 Radom, city of, 179 Portugal, 1, 8, 11, 56, 95, 108, 213; Ralite, Jacques, 109 armed forces, 151, 156; agricultural Rapprochement, program of, 104, 143, industry, 147; bilateral U.S. 220 information, 152-153; colonies of, Rationing, food, 185 65, 169; communism in, 9, 16, Raw materials, importance of, 121, 124 20-25, 34, 139-145, 196; coup Reactionaries, dangers of, 181, 204 attemps in, 151-153; credibility of, Realpolitik, 128 153; elections in, 184; and EC, 147; Recessions, economic, 78, 128 foreign and security policies, 6, 144; Recruitment, factor of, 23-24 government, 66-67; investment Reform: agrarian, 147; domestic, 196; starved, 174; military situation, 159; economic, 181, 184; in Italy, 49; national interests, 153; and NATO, political, 182; in Poland, 179-182, 151-158, 195; politics in, 169, 174; 186; revisionist, 184; study of, 40; revolution in, 165; working class of, transitional, 216 140 Regional institutions, 167-170 Poseidon strategic missiles, 62 Religion: and cultural freedom, 17; Posnan, city of, 179 and tolerance, 181 Power: abuse of, 176; achievement of, Republicanism, 49 29; balance of, 42-44, 57, 62, 169, Resistance movement, 45, 51 173, 195; military, 43-44, 56-57, Revisionists and revisionism, 171, 176; political, 4, 15-16, 124, ideological, 39, 52-53, 184, 207-208 174; separation of, 129; terroristic, Revolts and revolutions: Councils, 11, 154-156; in Hungary, 40; industrial, 66 118; movement, 144; in Portugal, Pravda, 106, 180 165; social, 166; socialist, 2, 40, Presidential election systems, 1, 78, 83, 166; of workers, 2; world, 25 104-106, 155, 192 Right-wing political philosophy, 48, 67 Presidential War Powers Act, U.S., 7 Rights: of striking, 17, 183-184; of Press: bourgeois, 82; Chinese, 221; workers, 110 factor of, 120; freedom of, 17; Rinascita, 17 party, 7, 80, 106, 124, 169, 196; Rivalries, bloc, 175 Soviet, 81, 126 Rome conference, 17, 95 Privacy, inviolability of, 17 Proletarianism: and dictatorships, 2, 8; Rota Naval Base, 125 Rubbi, Antonio, 219 international solidarity, 216; and Rumania, 18, 65, 181, 188, 208, 213, internationalism, 2-3, 18, 26, 98, 221, 223; communist party of, 140, 201, 204, 207, 214, 216, 222 211-213 Public: accountability, 4, 8; morality, 181-182, 185, 191; opinion polls, 77, 82, 145, 193-194; ownership, 28, Sa Carneiro, Francisco, 155 Sabotage, acts of, 32 83 Sadat, Anwar, 144, 170 Purges, party, 82-83 Saharan state, 131 Salazar regime, 140, 152 Ra’anan, Uri, 175 Salt negotiations, 86, 104, 188; II, Racial violence, 169-170 43-44, 60-61, 191; III, 60, 101-102, Radicals and radicalism: Arab, 191; 191 implications of, 159

260 San Clemente agreement June 1973, 90 Santa Margarita training grounds, 156-157 Sardinia, 158 Saudi Arabia, 157 Scandinavian Socialist Party, 220 Schmidt, Helmut, 107, 180 Schweigler, Gebhard, 9 Scientific: laws, 203; socialism, 81 Section frangaise de I’internationale ouvriere (SFIO), 79 Security: collective alliances on, 121, 193; conferences, 5, 86; European, 56-57, 60, 84, 86, 96-98, 101, 103, 106; interests and issues, 2-4, 32, 98, 106-108, 159; international, 58, Italian, 41, 51, 97; Latin countries, 163; national, 4, 53, 59, 154, 191; NATO regulations on, 68, 155; programs, 96, 186; Soviet, 52; Spanish, 131; Union on the Left, 83-85; Western Europe, 62, 120, 135, 159 Self-: consciousness, 160; criticism, 1, 24, 182, 205, 218; defense, 174; determination, 108, 145; Finlandization, 171; sufficiency, 190 Segre, Sergio, 207, 219 Separation of powers and separatist movement, 129, 153-154 Shaba II, French forces in, 7 SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Sicily, 157 Sino-Soviet dispute, 8, 210-211, 221 Sixth Fleet, U.S., 5, 64, 173 Soares, Mario, 155, 220 Social: alliances, 23; change, 8, 97, 127, 163; democracy, 27-30, 214; forces, 17, 122, 127, 181; programs, 107, 183-184, 205; structure, 15, 41, 218; systems, 209; transformation, 218; unrest, 78-79 Social Democratic parties, 17, 27, 95, 155, 168, 213-217, 222; European, 30; German, 20, 220-223; United Kingdom, 29; Western, 220

New International Communism Socialism: advancement of, 128, 163-164, 175; building of, 203-204; economic benefits of, 8; government by, 7, 126; pattern for, 3, 20; road to, 2, 126, 140-141, 211; Scandinavian, 220; scientific, 81; society, 46, 57; solidarity, 27, 49; Soviet model of, 81-83, 141; " struggle for, 15; traditional values of, 4; transition to, 18-19, 200 Socialists and Socialist Party, 77, 81-87, 100, 105-106; and communist coalition, 11, 167; French, 21, 30, 78, 133; German, 10, 133; Italian, 29, 46; solidarity, 27, 49; Spanish, 117; in United Kingdom, 29, 133 Society: capitalist, 28, 126-127, 135; centers of, 23; French, 30, 98; sectors of, 21-22; socialist, 46, 57; stratas of, 2, 185 Socioeconomic crisis, 39 Sociopolitical systems, 15, 128 Sofia, 142 Solidarity labor movement, 27, 49, 179, 181-182, 216, 221 Somalia, 145 Sotelo, Calvo, 119 South Yemen, 7, 185 Southern Europe, 4, 7 Southwest Asia, 60, 157, 176-178 Sovereignty, national, 123 Soviet Union: centralism, 10; Communist Party, 25-26, 78, 98, 141-142, 147, 179, 202-204, 207, 209, 216; foreign policy, 7, 56-57, 98, 141; Franco treaty, 101, 191; German relations, 57, 176; hegemony, 209, 211, 221; internationalism, 205-209; Japanese relations, 176; military buildup, 1, 44, 56-57, 98-99, 124, 171; missiles, 102, 107; navy, 173; press, 81, 126; security, 52; Sino dispute, 8, 210-211; socialism model, 81-83, 141; world threat, 3, 7, 56-60, 98-99, 163, 170-174

Index Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), 5 Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED), 25 Spain, 56, 95, 108, 213; agricultural products, 168; American treaty, 123; armed forces, 133; bases in, 120, 123, 154; civil war, 29, 117, 200; communism in, 2, 9, 11, 16, 18-19, 22-27, 34-35, 117-128, 132, 147, 205, 212; Eurocommunism, 18-19, 133; foreign-policy issues, 128-130; nascent democracy, 117; and NATO, 118-120, 128-129, 178, 193, 196; neutrality of, 5, 131-132; political life, 5, 118, 131; security commitments, 131; and socialism, 117 Spanish Workers’ Organizations (CC.OO), 117, 120 Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (PSOE), 117, 120, 133-134, 165 Spheres of influence, 40, 128 Stalin, Stalinists and Stalinization, 20, 25, 31, 80-81, 140, 205, 209 Standardization in NATO, 55-56, 64, 187, 190 State: capitalism, 214; Soviet interests, 1; planning, 84 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 62 Strasbourg, European Parliament in, 94-95 Strategic: arms race, 60-61; bilateral talks, 188; nuclear submarines, 96 Strike, right to, 17, 183-184 Strougae, Lubomir, 181 Suarz, Adolfo, 117, 119 Submarines: anti-, 63, 119, 153-154; and ballistic missiles, 190; nuclear, 5, 62, 92, 96 Subversion, imperialist, 147 Superpower: bilaterialism, 129; relationships, 28, 40-41, 57, 95, 121, 128, 224; rivalry, 60-61, 163, 171; spheres of influence, 128; status, 215

261 Supersonic fighting aircraft, 62 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 5, 152-153; command, 54; interviews with, 159 Sweden, 18, 25, 135; Social Democrats in, 29 Switzerland, 135, 189

Tactical: missile system, 88, 92; nuclear systems, 92 Tahiti, 172 Tanks, 62 Technology: foreign, 180; improvements, 92; military, 53-54, 58, 61-63; papers on, 153; Western, 185-186 Tensions, class, 23, 34 Terrorists and terrorism; countering, 194; political, 189; problems of, 66, 117 Third World countries, 34, 42, 52-53, 59-62, 108, 120, 124, 130, 169-170; challenges in, 3; development of, 223; liberation movement in, 26-27; power and priorities in, 147, 163 Timmermann, Heinz, 95, 215 Titoism, 8, 11, 197, 199-200, 209-213 TNF modernization, 164, 195 Togliatti, Palmiro, 17, 27, 43, 140, 200, 209-211 Tolerance, religious and cultural, 17, 181 Totalitarianism, theory of, 15 Tous azimuts doctrine, 86-93, 99, 173-174, 189 Trade, foreign, 78 Trade unions: CGT, 31, 105, 120; communist controlled, 117; federation, 22, 31-32; independence of, 17; movement, 23, 29, 181-183, 218 Tradition, factor of, 3-5, 33, 83, 131, 178, 208 Train, Harry, 171 T 185, 221 Violence, racial, 169-170

262 War(s): African, 158; cold, 1, 19, 39, 41, 46, 58, 77, 86, 120, 163; nature of, 3; nuclear, 121 Warsaw Pact, countries and activities of, 9, 16, 40, 43, 52-53, 57, 59, 66, 68, 84, 90, 93, 99-100, 102, 104, 107, 171, 173, 176, 183, 209, 212 Warsaw Treaty, 86 Washington, Treaty of 1949, 86 Weapons: conventional, 62-63; modernization, 123-124, 190; nuclear, 5, 66, 84, 90-93, 97, 120, 125, 190-191 Weber, Max, 9 West Germany, 2, 5, 49, 65, 67, 94, 97, 102, 119, 156-160, 192, 214 Western: alliances, 6; blocs, 122; cohesion, 4; communism, 19-20; democracy, 15, 52-53; identity, 15; pluralism, 151; social democracy, 220; technology, 185-186 Western Europe: 8-9, 68, 87, 121, 124, 127; autonomy in, 96, 127, 160,

New International Communism 178; communism in, 2, 16, 26-28, 57; integration of, 174; nuclear power in, 173; politics of, 15; Soviet threat to, 163; unions in, 55, 167 Workers’: class struggles, 128; foreign, in France, 105; moral crusade, 182; movement, 8, 27, 197, 205, 214; representatives, 4; revolution, 2; rights, 110 Working class, 27-30, 78, 80, 144, 147, 217, 222; interests of, 127-129; Portuguese, 140 World War II, era of, 163

Yalta, agreement at, 126 Yugoslavia, 18, 42, 53-54, 57-59, 64-65, 124, 131, 134, 173, 187, 200, 204-211, 221 Yugoslavian Communist Party (LCY), 210-211 Zaba, Fernando, 132 Zagladin, Vadim, 183

About the Author Lawrence L. Whetten is professor of international relations at the Univer­ sity of Southern California, and is director of studies of the German Graduate Program at the University of Southern California, Munich. He was formerly senior political analyst at the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, Europe. Professor Whetten is the author of eight books, including Germany East and West: Conflicts, Collaboration and Confrontation (1980), Future of Soviet Military Power (1976), The Canal War; Four Power Conflict in the Middle East (1974), and Current Research in Com­ parative Communism