New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-U.S. Centric Evolution 2020014805, 2020014806, 9780367416034, 9781003007623

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Acronyms
A note on Japanese transliteration and names
Preface
1 Introduction
2 Explaining: decentering and recentering in security strategy
Part I Non­American directions in defense policy
3 Centered on the fight within: the inward­looking nature of the Japanese debate on constitutional reinterpretation with a diluted US focus
4 Lifting the ban on defense industrial production cooperation with non­US partners
Part II Diversifying security partners
5 Japan’s ‘special’ strategic partnership with Australia: ‘decentering’ underwrites ‘recentering’
6 Japan’s policy toward India since 2000: for the Sake of maintaining US leadership in East Asia
7 Japan’s security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam
Part III Japan’s focus on multilateral security cooperation
8 From a decentering and recentering imperative: Japan’s approach to Asian security multilateralism
9 Is Japan’s engagement in counter­piracy missions a step towards decentering of its security policy?
10 Japan’s cooperation with the EU in the nexus of development and security
11 Evolution of Japan’s non­US centric security strategy and European influences on Japan’s peace­building policy
Part IV Reflections on Japan’s non­American focused initiatives
12 The continued centrality of the United States to Japan’s security doctrine in an era of expanding security partnerships
13 Non­US direction in Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view
14 Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

New Directions in Japan’s Security

While the US-­Japan alliance has strengthened since the end of the Cold War, Japan has, almost unnoticed, been building security ties with other partners, in the process reducing the centrality of the US in Japan’s security. This book explains why this is happening. Japan pursued security isolationism during the Cold War, but the US was the exception. Japan hosted US bases and held joint military exercises even while shunning contacts with other militaries. Japan also made an exception to its weapons export ban to allow exports to the US. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s security has undergone a quiet transformation, moving away from a singular focus on the US as its sole security partner. Tokyo has begun diversifying its security ties. This book traces and explains this diversification. The country has initiated security dialogues with Asian neighbors, assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation, and begun building bilateral security ties with a range of partners, from Australia and India to the European Union. Japan has even lifted its ban on weapons exports and co-­development with non-­US partners. This edited volume explores this trend of decreasing US centrality alongside the continued, and perhaps even growing, security (inter) dependence with the US. New Directions in Japan’s Security is an essential resource for scholars focused on Japan’s national security. It will also interest on a wider basis those wishing to understand why Japan is developing non-­American directions in its security strategy. Paul Midford is Professor and Director of the Japan Program at the Norwegian University for Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim. Wilhelm Vosse is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, Japan.

Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies Series Editors: Roger Goodman

Nissan Professor of Modern Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, Fellow, St Antony’s College

J.A.A. Stockwin

Formerly Nissan Professor of Modern Japanese Studies and former Director of the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, Emeritus Fellow, St Antony’s College Japan’s World Power Assessment, Outlook and Vision Edited by Guibourg Delamotte Friendship and Work Culture of Women Managers in Japan Tokyo After Ten Swee-­Lin Ho The Dilemma of Faith in Modern Japanese Literature Metaphors of Christianity Massimiliano Tomasi Understanding Japanese Society Fifth edition Joy Hendry Japan and the New Silk Road Diplomacy, Development and Connectivity Nikolay Murashkin The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan The Realities of ‘Power’ Nakakita Kōji Japan’s New Ruralities Coping with Decline in the Periphery Edited by Wolfram Manzenreiter, Ralph Lützeler and Sebastian Polak-­Rottmann New Directions in Japan’s Security Non-­U.S. Centric Evolution Edited by Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Nissan­Institute-­Routledge-­Japanese-­Studies/book-­series/SE0022

New Directions in Japan’s Security Non-­U.S. Centric Evolution

Edited by Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-­Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Midford, Paul, editor. | Vosse, Wilhelm, editor. Title: New Directions in Japan’s Security : Non-U.S. Centric Evolution / edited by Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse. Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2021. | Series: Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese Studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020014805 (print) | LCCN 2020014806 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367416034 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003007623 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: National security—Japan. | Security, International— Japan. | Japan—Foreign relations. Classification: LCC UA845 .N43 2021 (print) | LCC UA845 (ebook) | DDC 355/.033552—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020014805 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020014806 ISBN: 978-0-367-41603-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-00762-3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

We dedicate this book to Miho and Ryoko.

Contents

List of figuresix List of tablesx List of contributorsxi Acronymsxiv A note on Japanese transliteration and namesxvii Prefacexviii  1 Introduction

1

PAUL MIDFORD AND WILHELM VOSSE

  2 Explaining: decentering and recentering in security strategy

11

PAUL MIDFORD

PART I

Non-­American directions in defense policy25   3 Centered on the fight within: the inward-­looking nature of the Japanese debate on constitutional reinterpretation with a diluted US focus

27

BRYCE WAKEFIELD

  4 Lifting the ban on defense industrial production cooperation with non-­US partners

44

CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES

PART II

Diversifying security partners

65

  5 Japan’s ‘special’ strategic partnership with Australia: ‘decentering’ underwrites ‘recentering’

67

THOMAS S. WILKINS

viii  Contents   6 Japan’s policy toward India since 2000: for the Sake of maintaining US leadership in East Asia

86

NATSUYO ISHIBASHI

  7 Japan’s security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam

107

BJØRN ELIAS MIKALSEN GRØNNING

PART III

Japan’s focus on multilateral security cooperation129   8 From a decentering and recentering imperative: Japan’s approach to Asian security multilateralism

131

TAKESHI YUZAWA

  9 Is Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy missions a step towards decentering of its security policy?

154

WILHELM VOSSE

10 Japan’s cooperation with the EU in the nexus of development and security

175

MARIE SÖDERBERG

11 Evolution of Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy and European influences on Japan’s peace-­building policy

189

YUKIKO TAKEZAWA

PART IV

Reflections on Japan’s non-­American focused initiatives213 12 The continued centrality of the United States to Japan’s security doctrine in an era of expanding security partnerships

215

ANDREW L. OROS

13 Non-­US direction in Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view

228

SUISHENG ZHAO

14 Conclusion

246

WILHELM VOSSE AND PAUL MIDFORD

Index

261

Figures

2.1 Alliance tightness versus centering 6.1 Percentage of Japanese respondents who answered ‘feel friendly’ and ‘feel somewhat friendly’ towards China 7.1 Gross domestic product (projected after 2018) of the US, Japan, and China 7.2 Defense budgets of the US, China, and Japan 8.1 The model of the decentering/recentering multilateral imperative

13 95 114 115 132

Tables

  8.1 The causal sequence of Japan’s initiatives for Asian security multilateralism149 14.1 Potential relationships between Japan’s policies and motivations 252 14.2 Actual relationships between policies and motivations (in this volume) 254 14.3 Practical security cooperation between Japan and non-­US partners to date 255

Contributors

Editors Paul Midford is Professor and Director of the Japan Program at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim. Midford received his PhD in Political Science from Columbia University in 2001 and has held visiting research positions at Chengchi, Doshisha, and Osaka Universities, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and at Pomona College. He is author of Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?; with Wilhelm Vosse, co-­editor of Japan’s new security partnerships: Beyond the Security Alliance; and author of Overcoming Isolationism: Japan’s Leadership in East Asian Security Multilateralism. Wilhelm Vosse is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, Japan, where he also served as Director of the Social Science Research Institute (SSRI). He held visiting research positions at the University of Oxford, Harvard University, and the University of Warwick. His research interests include Japanese foreign and security policy and the domestic discourse on defense and security. Current research projects deal with Japan’s new security partnerships, maritime piracy, and cybersecurity. Recent publications include Japan’s New Security Partnerships and Governing Insecurity in Japan.

Chapter contributors Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning is a senior advisor at the Norwegian Defense Staff. Grønning holds a PhD in Political Science from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) with a dissertation on Japan’s contemporary security policy. He is a former Norwegian Defense University College senior research fellow, Keio University visiting research fellow, Osaka University specially appointed researcher, and Norwegian National Security Authority senior advisor. The topics of his publications include Japan’s security and defense policy, missile defense, and maritime security. He is the author of “Operational and industrial military integration: extending the frontiers of

xii  Contributors the Japan–US alliance” in International Affairs, “The Japan-China-Russia ­Triangle and Security in North East Asia” in Bekkevold and Lo (eds.) SinoRussian Relations the 21st Century, and co-author of “Protecting the Status Quo: Japan’s Response to the Rise of China” in Ross and Tunsjø (eds.) Strategic Adjustment and The Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia. Christopher W. Hughes is Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies, and Pro-Vice-Chancellor, University of Warwick, UK. He has held visiting professorships at Harvard University, University of Tokyo and Waseda University. He is the author of Japan’s Reemergence as ‘Normal’ Military Power (2004), Japan’s Remilitarisation (2009), and Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ (2015). He is co-editor of The Pacific Review. Natsuyo Ishibashi is a visiting researcher at the Japan Program, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). She received a PhD in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington. She is the author of Alliance Security Dilemmas in the Iraq War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Andrew L. Oros is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland. Oros’ latest book, Japan’s Security Renaissance, was published in 2017. He earned his PhD in political science at Columbia University. Marie Söderberg is Professor and Director of the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics. Söderberg has a PhD from Stockholm University. A central focus of her research is Japanese foreign aid policy. She is the Chairperson of the European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN). Yukiko Takezawa is a lecturer at Osaka Jogakuin University. Takezawa received a master’s degree in political science from Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), and a PhD degree in international public policy from Osaka University. Her research area is international security, especially on Norwegian security policy after WWII. Bryce Wakefield is National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. From 2012 to 2018, he was a tenured lecturer of Japanese politics and international relations at Leiden University in the Netherlands. From 2008 to 2012 he was the associate responsible for Northeast Asian programs at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Thomas S. Wilkins is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. Wilkins specializes in Asia-­ Pacific regional security issues including alliances/alignment, Australia-­Japan relations, and middle powers. He received his doctorate from the University of Birmingham in the UK (with one year spent at Johns Hopkins University as an exchange student), and conducted post-­doctoral work at the University of

Contributors xiii San Francisco and the East-­West Center, Honolulu, for two years. He has since been a Japan Foundation and Japanese Society for the Promotion of Sciences fellowship recipient at the University of Tokyo, totaling two years, and is a visiting associate professor at the University of Hong Kong. He has published in journals such as Review of International Studies, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Pacific Review, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Asia Policy, and Asian Security. Takeshi Yuzawa is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Global and Interdisciplinary Studies (GIS) at Hosei University, Tokyo, Japan. Yuzawa received his PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His current research interests include the prospects of international rule-­making and regional order in East Asia. He is the author of Japan’s security policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The search for multilateral security in the Asia-­Pacific (Routledge, 2007). He has also published articles in peer-­reviewed journals as well as numerous book chapters in edited volumes. Suisheng Zhao is Professor and Director of the Center for China-­US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and Editor of the Journal of Contemporary China.

Acronyms

ACSA Acquisition and Cross-­Servicing Agreement ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone ADMM Plus ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus Dialogue Partners ALGS Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment AMF Asian Monetary Fund ANZUS Australia New Zealand US Security Treaty APEC Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation APT ASEAN Plus Three ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASDF Air Self-­Defense Force ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN PMC ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference ATLA Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency BMD Ballistic Missile Defense CAFTA China ASEAN Free Trade Area CBM Confidence Building Measures CDP Constitutional Democratic Party CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia CIMIC Civil-­Military Cooperation CMF Combined Maritime Forces CMI Chiang-­Mai Initiative CRF Central Readiness Reserve (SDF) CSD Collective Self-­Defense CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy (of the European Union) CTF151 Combined Task Force 151 DAC Development Assistance Committee (of OECD) DPC Defense Production Committee DPJ Democratic Party of Japan EAC East Asian Economic Community EAS East Asian Summit EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EODAS Electro-­Optical Distributed Aperture Systems

Acronyms xv EPA ESS EU EUNAVFOR FACO FMS FTA FOIP FONOPS GoJ GSDF GSOMIA HaDR IED IMO IPCL ISA ISAF ISR JCG JWG LDP MELCO METI MDGs MHI MINUSTAH MoD MoFA MSDF NATO NDPG NIDS NSC NSS ODA OECD OOS OSCE PCASP PCG PIC PKF PKO PLA

Economic Partnership Agreement European Security Strategy European Union European Union Naval Forces Final Assembly and Checkout Foreign Military Sales Free Trade Agreement Free and Open Indo-­Pacific Freedom of Navigation Operations Government of Japan Ground Self-­Defense Force General Security of Military Information Agreement (between Japan and the Republic of Korea) Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Improvised Explosive Device International Maritime Organizations International Peace Cooperation Law (Japan) Information Sharing Agreement International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Japan Coast Guard Joint Working Group Liberal Democratic Party Mitsubishi Electric Company Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry Millennium Development Goals Mitsubishi Heavy Industries UN PKO Stabilization Mission in Haiti Ministry of Defense (Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) Maritime Self-­Defense Force North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defense Program Guidelines National Institute of Defense Studies National Security Council National Security Strategy Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Development NATO Operation Ocean Shield Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel Philippine Coast Guard Pacific Island Countries Peacekeeping Force Peacekeeping Operations People’s Liberation Army (China)

xvi  Acronyms RAA RAAF ROEs SDF SDGs SHADE SOFA SLOC SPA TPP TTIP TSD UNCLOS UNDP UNMIT UNMISS UNSC VBIED VMoD WMD

Reciprocal Access Agreement Royal Australian Air Force Rules of Engagement Self-­Defense Forces Sustainable Development Goals Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Status of Forces Agreement Sea Lanes of Communication Strategic Partnership Agreement Trans-­Pacific Partnership Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (Australia, Japan, US) United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea United Nations Development Program UN Integrated Mission in East Timor UN Mission in South Sudan United Nations Security Council Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device Vietnamese Ministry of Defense Weapons of Mass Destruction

A note on Japanese transliteration and names

Regarding the transliteration of Japanese words and names, in this book we follow the Hepburn Romanization standard, and use macrons for rendering long vowels (e.g. “ō” for denoting “ou” and “ū” for denoting “uu,” etc.). However, we make exceptions when citing English-­language sources that do not use macrons or spell out long vowels. Thus, when citing the Japanese press agency Kyōdō Tsūshin from a Japanese language source we use macrons, but when citing this press agency from an English language source, such as the Japan Times, we follow the original rendering from that source (Kyodo Tsushin or Kyodo). Words commonly rendered in English without long vowels are so rendered here (e.g. Tokyo not Tōkyō). Regarding Japanese names, this book renders the family name first, and then the person’s given name: Nishihara Masashi where Masashi is the given name. However, we make an exception for Japanese who publish extensively in English. Finally, Japanese authors who transliterate their names into the Roman alphabet without the use of long vowels, or who choose their own style when so doing, have their names rendered as per their own preference (e.g. Satoh (not Satō) Yukio).

Preface

This book grew out of a research project generously funded by Osaka University. Paul Midford was invited to serve as a visiting research professor for one month annually from 2015 through 2017. During that time, together with Sugita Yoneyuki, a professor of history at Osaka University, Midford organized a project on non-­American directions in Japan’s security strategy. Midford and Sugita discussed several ways in which Japanese security strategy seemed to have become more independent of the US since the end of the Cold War, even while the Japan­US alliance continued, and even significantly strengthened. At the same time Midford was having parallel discussions with Wilhelm Vosse about Japan’s new security partnerships with various countries other than the US. Midford and Vosse realized the connections between their parallel research projects and decided to link them. Vosse held a seminar at ICU in November 2015 where various drafts of his book project were presented. Vosse and Midford went on to co-­edit a volume on Japan’s new security partnerships that was published as Japan’s New Security Partnerships: Beyond the Security Alliance (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press) in 2018. Meanwhile Midford’s project on non-­American directions in Japan’s security strategy held its first workshop at Osaka University in February 2016, and a second workshop in January 2017, where participants presented preliminary and revised chapter drafts. Christopher W. Hughes, a project contributor and co-­editor at The Pacific Review suggested making a special issue on non-­US centric developments in Japan’s security policy. Midford agreed and edited a special issue of the journal that published a subset of project papers in early 2018 under the title of “New Directions in Japan’s security: non-­US centric evolution.” The present volume includes several chapters that significantly update the articles published in this special issue, plus several more from the project that are being published here for the first time. Vosse and especially Midford would like to thank Osaka University for generously funding the project that this volume emerges from. Midford would particularly like to thank Osaka University for employing him as a cross-­appointed visiting research professor for one month a year in 2015, 2016, and 2017, and again for seven weeks in 2020. Parts of early drafts of the introduction and chapter two were written by Midford while he was working at Osaka University. We

Preface xix would like to heartily thank Professor Sugita of Osaka University for being an inspiring intellectual partner, and for extremely efficient planning and management of the two project seminars held at Osaka University in February 2016 and January 2017, for arranging funding for these seminars, and for nominating Midford for the cross-­appointment position. This project and book literally would not have been possible without Sugita sensei’s hard work and dedication. We would like to thank the editors of The Pacific Review, and Taylor and Francis for allowing us to include several updated chapters from the special issue. Bryce Wakefield would like to thank the Leiden Asia Centre, whose generosity supported much of the fieldwork for his chapter. His chapter is dedicated to the memory of Erik Herber, who was a partner in the Leiden Network for Japanese Constitutional Research, and whose discussions as a colleague and friend influenced Wakefield’s chapter. At Routledge Midford and Vosse would like to thank Georgina Bishop, Emily Pickthall, and Stephanie Rogers for ably guiding our book manuscript through the review and publication process, and John Baddeley and Umamaheswari Chelladurai for able copyediting of our book.We would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on our proposal and manuscript.

1 Introduction Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse

The puzzle Ever since Japan regained its independence in 1952 the United States has been overwhelmingly dominant in the country’s security. Even after the two countries concluded a more equal bilateral security treaty in 1960, US dominance over Japan’s security policy continued. Japan can be said to have pursued security isolationism during the Cold War (C.O.E. Oraru: Seisaku kenkyū purojekuto, 2005, p. 11), but the US was always the sole exception to this generalization. Japan hosted US military bases and the SDF held joint exercises with the US military, even while essentially shunning contacts with all other militaries. Japan largely refused even to discuss security with its neighbors, as part of a policy of regional security isolationism. Hideo Ōtake traces Japan’s security isolationism to Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s early postwar prime minister who devised the nation’s postwar foreign policy strategy (the so-­called Yoshida Doctrine). According to Ōtake, Yoshida favored “promoting economic, rather than politico-­military integration” (Ōtake, 1990, p. 139).1 Special exceptions were made for the US in otherwise sweeping security policies, such as Tokyo’s three principles on the non-­export of weapons, to allow for Japanese military exports to the US, and only to the US. At the same time, even Japan’s territorial defense was dependent on the US. Japan’s first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1976 set the modest goal of being able to hold of a large-­scale invasion until US reinforcements arrived, thereby codifying Japan’s dependence on the US (Sebata, 2010, pp. 107–139). At that same time Japan’s own security policies were reactive to and generally followed the US line. For example, Japan followed the US line of opposing regional security multilateralism (Midford, 2018). Yet, since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the turn of the century, Japan has been shifting away from relying on the US as its sole security partner. The December 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan’s first such strategy, codifies this diversification: “In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives,” it asserts that “Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries.” Although this sentence ends with identifying the Japan-­US alliance as the “cornerstone” of Japan’s

2  Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse security strategy (National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 14), the NSS’s explicit advocacy of plural partners instead of the previous centering on the US as Japan’s sole security partner represents the codification of the major and largely overlooked shift in Japanese security strategy that this book focuses on. Japan is adding more stones to the US “cornerstone” to build a larger wall that makes up its defense policy. Three dimensions of this shift represent what in the next chapter defines as decentering (which is not a synonym for weakening of Japan’s security ties with the US): diversifying security ties, removing special carve-­outs for the US in security policy, and pursuing security policies that are more self-­directed and independent of the US. Tokyo has initiated security dialogues with its Asian neighbors, starting with Russia (originally with the Soviet Union in late 1990) (Hughes, 1996; Midford, 2000, p. 377; Satoh, 2007, p. 99), and assumed a leadership role in promoting regional multilateral security cooperation as at least a supplement to its reliance on the US for security. Tokyo has also begun building bilateral security partnerships with a range of countries and actors, from Australia and India to the European Union. With the European Union and Nordic countries, Japan has pursued counter-­piracy cooperation in the Indian Ocean (see the Vosse chapter in this volume), and post-­conflict peace-­building on land that features militaries and aid agencies working together at the nexus of security and development assistance (Takezawa and Söderberg chapters in this volume; EJARN & KAS, 2012; Midford, 2012). In 2011 Japan lifted its ban on military hardware co-­development, production, and export with non-­US partners. The US, once the special exception, was no longer special. While the domestic debate on reclaiming the right to collective self-­defense had long been defined in terms of coming to the aid of the US in case it came under attack, the recent debate notably shifted toward defending any country Japan has “significant ties” with, thus decentering this debate from an exclusive US focus (see the Wakefield chapter in this volume).2 In short, in a diverse range of areas we can see Japan broadening its security strategy beyond its traditional unidirectional focus on security ties with the US, and toward new multidirectional security partnerships with some partners and actors, and looser forms of security cooperation with other actors. This is not to say that Japan is loosening its security alliance with the US, much less that it should be doing so. Indeed, US and Japanese government officials regularly proclaim a strengthening alliance, an assessment shared by many outside analysts (e.g. Hughes, 2015, pp. 61–70; Oros, 2017, pp. 123–125). Nonetheless, the sum of these changes in diverse areas suggests a coherent pattern or policy of diversifying security partners and thereby reducing the centrality of the US in Japan’s security. To be sure, the US remains Japan’s central security partner, and there is no assumption made in this book that this is about to change. Nonetheless, despite a strengthening alliance the US is now significantly less central than it was 30 years ago when Japan had no other security partners. Japan has gone from having no other security partner, to having a growing list of partners with whom it is progressively deepening ties.

Introduction 3 Because the US-­Japan alliance has been strong, and indeed strengthening since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s decentering from the US through its diversification of security partners and changes in policy that have made the US less special and dominant has received relatively little attention until recently. This is now changing, with the phenomenon even being raised by newspaper op-­ed writers. For example, Michael Macarthur Bosack, writing in The Japan Times describes joint military exercises between the SDF and Australian and Indian counterparts as “unprecedented,” which “would have seemed impossible just a decade ago for the Self-­Defense Forces” (Bosack, 2019). He observes, “certainly the Japanese government has made great strides in expanding its portfolio of security partners in recent years,” but then claims in answer to the question of “why” this has happened, that “for years scholars and analysts have repackaged the same answer to that question: Japan is hedging” (Bosack, 2019). In fact, until recently researchers have paid scant attention to Tokyo’s diversification of its security partners, while recent works have considered hedging as only one of several explanations for the new non-­US directions in Japan’s security policy, including the hypothesis that this is a means for actually strengthening its broader security cooperation with the US.3 Moreover, as discussed in the next chapter, hedging has a far broader and more nuanced meaning than simply “a country is pursuing opposite policies at the same time in case one should fail” (Bosack, 2019). Nor does the lack of a potential partner who could come close to replacing the US mean that Japan has no incentive to hedge in case of alliance failure. As this book will show, Japan can pursue policies that both hedge against possible alliance failure and at the same time work to strengthen the alliance.

From centering toward decentering During the Cold War Japan’s security policy was exclusively centered on the US as its sole partner. The SDF only interacted with the US military and scrupulously avoided contacts with non-­US militaries. During the Cold War, the SDF was essentially isolated from all other militaries except for the US military. The US Navy sponsored RIMPAC multilateral naval exercise is a striking example. Since it began participating in 1980, Japan had always been paired with participating US navy units; it avoided interaction with non-­US navy units. If a third country were assigned to the US-­Japan team, the team would be split into two groups so that Japanese military personnel did not work with military personnel from this third country. For Japan, RIMPAC was a bilateral exercise in close proximity to a multilateral one. However, in 1994 Japan began easing its policy of separating the participating Maritime Self-­Defense Force (MSDF) contingent from that of countries other than US, allowing cooperation with non-­US navies to gradually develop for the first time (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1994).4 Japan’s decision to begin participating in UN Peacekeeping operations, starting with the deployment of the Ground Self-­Defense Forces (GSDF) to Cambodia from September 1992 to participate in peacekeeping operations for the UN Transitional Authority for

4  Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse Cambodia (UNTAC), was another milestone that significantly reduced SDF isolation from interaction with non-­US militaries.5 For the first time this allowed the SDF to experience concrete unit-­level cooperation with a military other than that of the US. Thus, since 1990s SDF interaction with various non-­US militaries has begun and increased over time. One important avenue for the SDF has been through initiating Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) with foreign militaries, such as exchanges of naval vessel visits. In 1995 Japan’s Defense Agency issued a “Basic Policy” (kihon hoshin) on CBMs. While emphasizing the continued centrality of the US alliance for Japan’s security, it argued for expanding security dialogue and transparency measures to reduce misperception and build trust. It advocated several measures, including mutual observations of military exercises, exchanges of defense ministry officials, military personnel, education exchanges, ship and other unit exchange visits, joint training for peacekeeping and humanitarian and disaster relief missions (Asahi Shimbun, 1995, March 13, p. 1; Hughes, 1996, p. 234). Engaging in CBMs with potential adversaries is a means for Japan to enhance its security by reducing the threat of conflict through misperception. Japan’s security interactions with China and Russia since the end of the Cold War are the prime examples of this type of engagement. Japan has conducted a variety of confidence-­building exchanges with both countries, including track one and two security dialogues, military cadet exchanges, and exchanges between military units and non-­combat exercises. Security cooperation with South Korea has also been largely limited to a confidence-­building framework.6 With other actors, especially US allies, Japan began building deeper cooperation. From the early 2000s, bilateral military exercises began with US aligned states and actors, starting with Australia. Initially these have been non-­combat in nature, but Japan’s recent (now permanent) participation in the multilateral Malabar naval exercises sponsored by India (Gupta, 2016) have increasingly involved combat related exercises. In June 2012, the MSDF for the first time conducted a bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy in waters just off Japan (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2012). Another milestone was reached in October 2016, when a Royal Airforce combat squadron arrived from the United Kingdom for the first ever postwar combat exercise held on Japanese soil with a non-­US military (Wanklyn, 2016). This led the Asahi Shimbun to claim “Japan is moving toward forming a ‘quasi alliance’ with Britain to complement Tokyo’s security ties with Washington” (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). This exercise with the UK was quickly followed several months later by the arrival in Japan of a French naval vessel for joint exercises with Japanese, British, and US military personnel in Japanese territory and beyond (AFP-­Jiji, 2017). Trade in dual use technology, weapons, and joint development of weapons are an important dimension of security policy where we can see decentering in terms “loss of specialness.” Loss of specialness means concretely that laws and policies are changed in ways that no longer favor the US to the exclusion of all other

Introduction 5 countries. The leading examples of this loss include the modification of the Three Principles on Arms Exports in 2011 (discussed in Hughes’ chapter in this volume), and the debate on reinterpretation of the constitution to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-­defense (see the Wakefield chapter). Regarding the former, although the 1976 version of the Three Principles on Arms Exports essentially banned all weapons exports, this ban was modified in 1983 to allow for weapons exports and joint weapons development with the US,7 thereby making the US the special exception to this otherwise blanket ban. This special exception paved the way for joint development of Japan’s F-­2 combat aircraft (based on the American F-­16) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a consequence of these policies, Japanese arms manufactures became entirely inward looking, or at most socialized to working with US companies, but had no experience working with other companies.8 Already by the mid-­1990s, the Higuchi Report, a defense advisory panel established to come up with ideas for Japan’s second NDPO, which was eventually issued in 1996, called for modifying the Three Arms Export Principles to permit joint research and development of weapons “with other countries” besides the US. Even this very modest step created angst among US policy experts that such a policy change would contribute to a loosening of alliance ties.9 When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration of Noda Yoshihiko decided to modify the Three Principles on Arms Exports in late 2011, it was explicit in stating that even while Tokyo would continue seeking to strengthen the US-­Japan alliance, the US was losing its “specialness:” “In order to secure Japan’s peace and security as well as international security against the backdrop of the changes in the international community, it has become necessary for Japan to, while further strengthening the partnership with the US, enter into partnership with other countries cooperating with Japan in security area” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2011). Within months of this policy change prime minister Noda had already inked a military co-­development agreement with the UK (Ito, 2012). A final form of decentering involves adopting security policies that are independent of, and occasionally even in opposition to, US policies. A leading example of this form of decentering is Japan’s departure, beginning in 1991, from passively following US policy toward regional security multilateralism, and to forging its own policy. At times this independence has involved opposing US policy, or at least getting ahead of US policy. This is not to say that this new policy independence has not often also involved wide areas of cooperation and policy coordination with Washington. Nonetheless, Japan now formulates its policy toward regional security multilateralism far more independently of the US than it did before 1991 (Midford, 2018). Then prime minister Koizumi Junichirō’s promotion of an independent foreign policy for opening and normalizing relations with North Korea in 2002 is another example of pursuing an independent foreign and even security policy even in the face of opposition from the US (Sugita, 2017, January 16–17).

6  Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse

Core research question The core research question this volume addresses is thus: Why, as the US was Japan’s only security partner during the Cold War, has Tokyo started building security relationships with other states since the end of the Cold War, while maintaining and even strengthening its alliance with the US? Relatedly, why has the US become less special in Japan’s security policies, and why has Japan shown greater independence in its security policies? Put another way, why has the US become less central in Japan’s security policies even while the US-­Japan alliance has remained as strong, or stronger, than ever?

Structure of the book This volume consists of four parts and 14 chapters. The next chapter offers a framework for understanding centering and decentering in security policy. Specifically, this chapter explains how this concept relates to the alliance security dilemma and attention scarcity toward partners and distinguishes decentering from alliance tightness. Decentering occurs across three distinct areas of security strategy: the diversification of security partners, the ending of “specialness” for the originally central security partner in security policy, and the carving out policy independence from the central partner. Following the introduction, the first part examines non-­American directions in Japan’s defense policy. In Chapter 3 Bryce Wakefield examines the Japanese government’s move in 2014–2015 to change its constitutional interpretation and legal framework to allow for the right of collective self-­defense, and how this change is less focused on defending the US than this change would have been had it been made years earlier. In Chapter 4 Christopher W. Hughes analyzes Japan’s lifting of its arms export ban through its new Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which has opened up new strategic opportunities for Tokyo policymakers to reinforce recent, and build new, security partnerships. Part II examines Japan’s diversification of security partners beyond the sole partnership Tokyo had with the US during the Cold War. In Chapters 5 and 6 Thomas S. Wilkins and Natsuyo Ishibashi respectively examine Japan’s new security partnerships with Australia and India respectively. In Chapter 7 Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning analyzes Japan’s new burgeoning security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Part III examines Japan’s leadership and pro-­active participation in security multilateralism, thereby building security cooperation with multilateral institutions and their member states. In Chapter 8 Takeshi Yuzawa analyzes how Japan’s policy toward regional security multilateralism changed after the early 1990s, and especially how it has shifted from decentering to recentering since the early 2000s, in response to drastic changes in the regional power balance and other factors. In Chapter 9 Wilhelm Vosse considers the role of the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia in catalyzing rapid growth in bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the European Union. In Chapter 10 Marie Söderberg

Introduction 7 addresses how the Strategic Partnership Agreement concluded between EU and Japan in 2018 opened opportunities for deepening between Japan and the EU and its member states on security issues related to development. Drawing on both civilian and military assets, EU policy seems to match well with Japanese policy, and both parties put a strong emphasis on multilateral institutions, in particularly on the UN, to promote peace and sustainable development on a global basis. In Chapter 11 Yukiko Takezawa analyzes Japan’s peace-­building policy as a manifestation of decentering from the US after the Cold War, focusing on the development Japan’s peace-­building policy over 25 years through JSDF dispatches to so called “International Peace Operations” (Kokusai heiwa katsudō). Part four of this book offers reflections on the non-­American directions in Japan’s security policy by the two superpowers, the US and China. In Chapter 12 Andrew L. Oros argues that despite Japan’s building of security ties with non­US states and actors the US remains the central, irreplaceable security partner to Japan. What has driven Japan to seek out new security partners in the region is not a move away from the United States but an expansion of Japan’s security-­ provider role in the region, which comports with a strategy Washington long has pressured Japan to pursue: to deepen its contributions within the broader alliance network the United States has maintained in Asia despite the end of the Cold War. In Chapter 13 Suisheng Zhao argues that China is very sensitive toward Japan’s proactive diplomatic and strategic initiatives, including Japan’s diplomatic efforts to build security ties with regional powers and other countries besides the US because this has taken place in the context of Abe’s attempts to lift a ban on collective self-­defense and amend the Japanese constitution, while renewing and strengthening the security alliance with the US. However, many Chinese scholars have also pointed out that while Japan has cultivated new security ties, Japan’s non-­US diplomacy has faced many barriers. As a result, China’s primary concern remains the Japan-­US alliance. Finally, in Chapter 14 Midford and Vosse conclude that since the end of the Cold War, Japan has abandoned security isolationism combined with reliance on the US as its sole security partner in favor of security engagement with a wide range of countries and actors. This has involved establishing security or strategic partnerships with a range of new partners, ending special exceptions in its security policy for the US, and becoming more independent in security policy. In effect, this volume argues, this led to a less central role for the United States, or decentering, as the US was no longer as overwhelmingly as central as it used to be. Nonetheless, the US has remained very central in Japan’s security policy, its “cornerstone.” Japan has so far overwhelmingly used this decentering and diversification not to weaken its alliance with the US, but actually to strengthen it, by mostly building security partnerships with US allies and friendly countries. In this sense, Japan could be said to be decentering from an exclusive bilateral security alliance with the US toward a regional US-­centered security network. Yet, decentering has also allowed Japan to develop new options for security cooperation with partners other than the US, options that Japan can find useful for hedging against possible US abandonment and alliance failure. These options do

8  Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse not represent substitutes for the alliance, far from it, but they nonetheless represent useful options and tools in case of alliance failure.

Notes 1 Also see Pyle, 1996, p. 24; and Pyle 2007, pp. 13, 229, 301. 2 For a comprehensive overview of the enabling security legislation that allows Japan to exercise the right of collective self-­defense in some limited cases, see Akimoto, 2016. 3 Two of the first works to explicitly address this question are a special issue of The Pacific Review published in early 2018 (that grew out of the same research project as this volume). For an overview, see Midford 2018. Another example is Vosse and Midford 2018. Both consider hedging as one explanation for Japan’s decentering, but neither find that hedging is the main explanation for Japan’s new security partnerships and other forms of decentering, much less that such hedging as is taking place is designed to undermine the alliance. 4 For a discussion see Heinrich, 1997, p. 81. 5 On the learning the Japanese Ground Self-­Defense Force (GSDF) gained through cooperation with the Dutch military in post-­conflict humanitarian and reconstruction operations in the insecure environment of southern Iraq, see Aoi 2017. 6 Due to space constraints, this special issue does not analyze Japanese attempts to build security cooperation through CBMs with partners where significant mistrust or territorial or other national interest conflicts are present. Consequently, no systematic examination of the development of security cooperation since the 1990s with South Korea, China, or Russia is included. Regarding the role of Korean mistrust of Japan in inhibiting security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo, see Midford, 2010. For an overview of security cooperation and CBMs between Japan and China, see Akiyama and Zhu, 2011. 7 For the text and official interpretation of the three principles, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.d. For an analysis of the three principles on arms exports, see Söderberg, 1986; and Morimoto, 2011. 8 On the lack of experience with, and even lack of inclination to participate in, the international arms market, see Jo (2016). 9 See Cronin & Green, 1994, p. 14. Green observes elsewhere that what this special issue calls decentering was already beginning just as the Cold War was ending. He notes that British Aerospace sold the SDF fixed-­wing aircraft for search and rescue, and that this was the first purchase of fixed-­wing aircraft from a non-­US and non-­Japanese manufacturer in the history of the SDF (Green, 1995, p. 148). It is important to note that while Cronin and Green tend to equate decentering, including this loss of US specialness in Japanese security policy with a loosening of alliance ties, this volume makes no such assumption.

References AFP-­Jiji. (2017, April 29). French Warship Arrives for Joint Drills with Japan as North Korean Tensions Rise. Japan Times, p. 2. Akimoto, Daisuke. (2016). Exercising the Right to Collective Self-­defense? An Analysis of Japan’s Peace and Security Legislation. ZJapanR, 41, 137–163. Akiyama, Masahiro, and Zhu, Feng, (Eds.). (2011). Nichū anzen hoshō, bōei kōryū no rekishi, genjō, tenbō [Japan-­China Security and Defense Exchange: History, Current Situation and Outlook]. Tokyo: Ai Shobo. Aoi, Chiyuki. (2017). Conditions for Effective Intelligence and Information Sharing: Insights from Dutch-­Japanese Cooperation in Iraq, 2003–2005. In I. Goldenberg, J. Soeters, and

Introduction 9 W. H. Dean (Eds.), Information Sharing in Military Operations. New York, NY: Springer, pp. 147–163. Asahi Shimbun. (1995, March 13). Ajia to anpo taiwa sokushin, Reisengo no antei mosaku, Boeicho hoshin [Promoting Asian security dialogues, seeking Post-­Cold war stability, Defense Agency Basic Policy]. 1. Asahi Shimbun. (2016, November  3). Japan Moves to Solidify Security Relations with British Forces. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201611030061.html. Bosack, Michael M. (2019). Japan’s Not Hedging with Australia Security Ties. Japan Times, 10 October. www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/10/10/commentary/japan-­commentary/ japans-­not-­hedging-­australia-­security-­ties/#.XeLX7NVUsl0. C.O.E. Oraru: Seisaku kenkyū purojekuto. (2005). Kuriyama Takakazu (Moto Chūbei Taishi), Ōraru Hisutori: Tenkanki no Nichibei Kankei. [Kuriyama Takakazu (Former Ambassador to the US): Oral History: Japan-­US Relations at a Turning Point] Tokyo: Seisaku kenkyū daigakuin daigaku. Cronin, Patrick. M., and Green, Michael. J. (1994). Redefining the US-­Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (McNair Paper 31). Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) and the Konrad Adenuer Stiftung (KAS). (2012). A Proposal for a Way Forward on EU-­Japan Cooperation at the Nexus of Security and Development. Tokyo: Konrad Adenuer Stiftung. Green, Michael. J. (1995). Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Gupta, Sourabh. (2016, January 5). Abe and Modi Attempt to Bridge the Indo-­Pacific. East Asia Forum. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/05/abeandmodiattempttobridgethe indopacific/. Heinrich, William L. Jr. (1997). Seeking an Honored Place: The Japanese Self-­defense Forces and the Use of Armed Force Abroad. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York. Hughes, Christopher W. (1996). Japan’s Subregional Security and Defence Linkages with ASEANs, South Korea and China in the 1990s. The Pacific Review, 9(2), 229–250. Hughes, Christopher W. (2015). Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ito, Masami. (2012). Japan, U.K. Agree on Arms Development. Japan Times. https://www. japan times.co.jp/news/2012/04/11/national/japan-­u-­k-­agree-­on-­arms-­development/. Jo, Bee Yun. (2016, January). Japan Inc.’s Remilitarization? A Firm-­centric Analysis on Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Japan’s Defense Industry in the New-­TPAE Regime. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific, 16(1), 137–166. Midford, Paul. (2000). Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal and the Logic of Reassurance. The Pacific Review, 13(3), 367–397. Midford, Paul. (2010). Historical Memory Versus Democratic Reassurance: The Security Relationship Between Japan and South Korea. In Marie Söderberg (Ed.), Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Japan-­South Korea Relations. Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge, pp. 77–98. Midford, Paul. (2012). By Land and by Sea: The Potential of EU-­Japan Security Cooperation. Japan Forum, 24(3), 303–310. Midford, Paul. (2018). New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-­US Centric Evolution, Introduction to a Special Issue. The Pacific Review, 31(4), 407–423. Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2012). Japan-­India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no36/specialfeature.html.

10  Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (n.d.). Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports. Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/ disarmament/policy/. Morimoto, Masamitsu. (2011). Buki Yushutsu Sangensoku [The Three Principles on Weapons Exports]. Tokyo: Shinzansha. National Security Council of Japan. (2013). National Security Strategy, 17 December. Oros, Andrew L. (2017). Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-­First Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Ōtake, Hideo. (1990). Defense Controversies and One-­Party Dominance: The Opposition in Japan and West Germany. In. T. J. Pempel (Ed.), Uncommon Democracies: The One-­ Party Dominant Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 128–161. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (2011). Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. (December 27). https:// japan.kantei.go.jp/noda/topics/201112/20111227DANWA_e.pdf. Accessed 6 April 2020. Pyle, Kenneth B. (1996). The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Press. Pyle, Kenneth B. (2007). Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. New York: Public Affairs. Satoh, Yukio. (2007). Reflections on the Nakayama Proposal. In H. Soesastro and C. Joewono (Eds.), The Inclusive Regionalist: A Festschrift Dedicated to Jusuf Wanandi. Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 97–105. Sebata, Takao. (2010). Japan’s Defense Policy and Bureaucratic Politics, 1976–2007. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Söderberg, Marie. (1986). Japan’s Military Export Policy. Stockholm: University of Stockholm. Sugita, Yoneyuki. (2017, January 16–17). Japan’s Attempt to Build an Independent Policy toward North Korea. Paper presented at “Non-­American Directions in Japan’s Security Workshop,” sponsored by Osaka University. Vosse, Wilhelm, and Midford, Paul. (2018). Japan’s New Security Partnerships: Beyond the Security Alliance. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Wanklyn, Alastair. (2016, October 16). ASDF, Royal Air Force to Conduct First-­ever Joint Drills in Japan amid Strengthening Security Ties. Japan Times. Yomiuri Shimbun. (1994, June 1). Rimpaku 94: Kokusai josei samagawari minaoshi hitsuyo, Shudan jieiteki shikisai wa tsuyomaru (kaisetsu) [RIMPAC 94: Reconsideration of the International Situation Required, Shades of Collective Self-­defense Strengthened]. 21.

2 Explaining Decentering and recentering in security strategy Paul Midford

Introduction This chapter defines and develops the concepts of decentering and recentering in security strategy. It demonstrates how these concepts relate to the alliance security dilemma, the impact of attention scarcity on the state’s interactions with security partners and distinguishes decentering and recentering from the concepts of alliance tightness versus looseness. Decentering occurs across three distinct areas of security strategy: the diversification of security partners, the ending of “specialness” for the originally central security partner in security policy, and the carving out of policy independence from the central partner. Finally, this chapter presents a list of underlying motivations and policy-­relevant explanations for understanding decentering. The rest of this chapter consists of four sections. The next section defines centering and decentering. The following section examines underlying motivations that might be motivating decentering, and the subsequent section considers a range of policy relevant explanations for decentering. The conclusions recap the main points of this chapter.

Defining centering and decentering Centering in this book is defined as focusing on one partner to the exclusion of other partners. Decentering is defined as a process of moving away from a state of centering by building relationships with other partners. It is important to emphasize at the outset that decentering is not a synonym for weakening of the originally central relationship. Although decentering and weakening can go hand in hand, so can decentering and strengthening of the originally central relationship (as several chapters in this volume demonstrate). The original partnership can be maintained or even strengthened even while new partnerships with third parties are built, especially if those partnerships are with other states enjoying a close relationship with the hitherto entirely central partner. Nonetheless, at some point, if decentering proceeds far enough, there will begin to be trade-­offs made at the expensive of the hitherto exclusively central relationship. This can take the form of trade-­offs of scarce budgetary, equipment, and human resources that are redirected to new

12  Paul Midford partners. Attention may also be “distracted” away from the formerly central partner and toward the new partners.1 Diversifying is a synonym for decentering that is also used in this volume. Decentering in Security Policy. The state’s security policy is centered upon another when that other is its only military ally or security partner and has a special role in its security policy that no other state has. Decentering is the process of building security partnerships with third states and actors and reducing the specialness of the original security partner in the state’s security policy. The opposite of decentering is recentering, which is defined as the process of reducing ties with third states and actors and restoring the special position of the original security partner or forming a new exclusive security relationship with another partner.2 A security or strategic partnership is a form of alignment aimed at promoting security cooperation, and perhaps cooperation in other targeted fields as well. An alignment can be defined as “a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that will have each other’s support in disputes or wars with particular other states” (Snyder, 1990, p. 105). Alignments, including strategic partnerships do not extend to a formal commitment to defend the partner if it comes under attack. The presence of such a formal commitment transforms an alignment into an alliance, which is a distinct subset of alliance (Snyder, 1997, p. 8; Nadkarni, 2010; Kay, 2016; Envall, 2016; Also see Wilkin’s chapter in this volume). A strategic partnership can also be seen as an updated version of the pre-­1914 concept of an entente (Snyder, 1997, pp.  11, 346–350).3 A security partnership can focus on broader forms of security cooperation in non-­traditional security, including defending global commons, such as maritime and air space, outer space, and cyberspace. In the case of maritime space, for example, security partnerships can facilitate counter-­piracy operations (see Vosse’s chapter in this volume). Other examples include cooperation to facilitate post-­conflict reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster relief operations (HaDR), and fighting pandemics (Hornung & Midford, 2014). More concretely, building cooperation with states and actors other than the previously exclusive security partner includes establishing security and defense consultations; dialogues involving diplomats, defense bureaucrats and uniformed military personnel; capacity building and joint military exercises, including non-­combat search and rescue and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HaDR) operations; actual joint military operations, including non-­ combat operations; the conclusion of Acquisition and Cross-­ Servicing Agreements (ACSA), Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and other agreements facilitating concrete cooperation and joint operations. Even paramilitary and police cooperation with other partners in the form of dialogues, seminars, capacity building, joint training exercises and operations can be aspects of decentering. A  final form of decentering involves adopting security policies that are independent of, and occasionally even in opposition to, the policies of the primary security partner. In the context of Japan’s security policy, decentering means reducing the centrality of the US for the nation’s security and is reflected in Japan’s 2013 Security

Explaining: decentering and recentering 13 Strategy, as a policy of building security and strategic partnerships and other forms of security cooperation with non-­US actors (Cabinet Office, 2013, p. 24). It also involves reducing the “specialness” of the US in Japan’s security policy.4 Its opposite, recentering, can be defined as Japan reducing security ties with nations and actor other than the US and moving its policy and resource focus back toward the US.5 It is important to distinguish clearly decentering and recentering from alliance tightening or loosening, which respectively involve increasing or decreasing promised support to one’s ally, including the certainty of that support. In short, alliance centrality and tightness are two distinct variables that need to be distinguished. Indeed, the key puzzle this volume seeks to explain is why, since the end of the Cold War, Japan has decentered away from the US even while tightening its alliance with Washington. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the two variables of alliance tightness and centeredness. The upper left side of the matrix provides the case of an independent foreign policy or Jishu Gaikō, and lists cases where Japan has pursued decentering along with (modest) loosening of the Japan-­US alliance. Arguably the leading example is the Hatoyama administration’s pursuit of a modest loosening of the US-­Japan alliance while at the same time pursuing decentering in the form of proposing an East Asian Community that, at least initially, did not include the US. The lower left square of the matrix covers cases where decentering from the US is coupled with alliance tightening and can be categorized as hedging against possible US abandonment and/or attempting to more tightly bind with the US via American allies. Examples here include the Nakayama Proposal of 1991 to establish a regional multilateral security forum against US wishes (Midford, Centering

Tightening

Tightness

Loosening

Decentering Jishu GaikoHatoyama Administration Koizumi’s 2002 Pyongyang Summit Diplomacy; Hypothetical decision to leave the Alliance

Hedging/Binding Nakayama Proposal 2012-2014 Arms Export Liberalization 2014 CSD Reinterpretation Philippines and Vietnam Security Partnerships

Figure 2.1  Alliance tightness versus centering

Recentering Return to 1960s Japan reduces security relationships with Australia, India, EU, NATO, UN, regional security multilateralism, reduces military cooperation with US Return to 1980s/Yoshida Doctrine Japan’s NK policy following failure of 2002 Pyongyang Summit; Possible curtailment of security ties with Russia; returns resources and attention toward the US Abe Administration’s ‘PKO Zero’ since 2017

14  Paul Midford 2018), the 2011–2014 arms export liberalization (see the Hughes chapter in this volume), the 2014 reinterpretation of the Constitution to allow for the right of Collective Self-­Defense, and Japan’s promotion of security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam since 2011 (see the Grønning chapter in this volume). On the lower right side of Figure 2.1 the figure depicts the case of alliance tightening and recentering, which would mark a turn back toward the Cold War reality of a Japan entirely centered on the US for its security, hence this case is labeled a return to the 1980s. It also shows one recent example of recentering during the Abe administration, namely the decision to withdraw entirely from unit-­level boots-­on-­the-­ground SDF participation in UN PKO since May 2017. The Abe administration inherited SDF participation in three ongoing peacekeeping missions from the DPJ Noda administration in late 2012, but by May 2017 had withdrawn from the last of these, the South Sudan deployment that the Noda administration had launched in 2017, even though there are more than a dozen ongoing UN PKOs in need of military personnel. Although the Abe administration continued to maintain several officers at UN headquarters in South Sudan, and set a new precedent by dispatching several officers to a non-­UN-­sponsored PKO for the first time, namely the peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, the cessation of unit-­level boots-­on-­the-­ground SDF participation means that Japan effectively reached the state of Zero PKO essentially for the first time since the SDF began deploying to PKO missions in 1992 (see the Takezawa chapter in this volume). This withdrawal from an important aspect of engagement with actors other than the US thus represents an actual (instead of theoretical) case of recentering. Finally, the upper right square of Figure 2.1 depicts a so-­far hypothetical scenario whereby Japan reduces, if not ends, security relationships with its post-­war partners, including Australia, India, EU, NATO, regional multilateral security actors, etc., while simultaneously loosening the US alliance. Hence, this scenario would bring Japan back toward its grand strategy of the 1960s, the original Yoshida Doctrine,6 when Tokyo pursued security isolationism except vis a vis the US. Even toward the US, Japan maintained a loose alliance, and was more concerned with avoiding entrapment than abandonment, a concern that lasted from the Korean War through the Taiwan Straits Crises and until the end of the Vietnam War.

Underlying motivations for decentering Why has Japan decentered away from the US as its exclusive security partner since the end of the Cold War? This section identifies several plausible underlying causes. These underlying causes can be grouped into several categories: international structural changes, changing bilateral alliance dynamics, domestic-­level causes, including changing elite strategic culture and conceptions of security, changes in domestic political structure, including electoral reform, party structure and inter-­party competition. A final set of possible underlying causes stems from public attitudes regarding the utility of military force, views of the Self-­Defense Forces (SDF), and nationalist attitudes.

Explaining: decentering and recentering 15 International structural causes focus on the balance of power (distribution of capabilities) across states, especially perceived shifts in polarity from bipolarity during the Cold War, brief and uncertain multipolarity in the early 1990s, followed by more than a decade of unipolarity. Since 2008, perceptions of declining unipolarity have been accompanied by perceptions of emerging bipolarity between the US and China, or more generally the growth of multipolarity. While Kenneth Waltz argues that the two superpowers in a bipolar system do not depend on allies, William Wohlforth maintains that the unipole has even less need to depend on allies.(Waltz, 1979; Wohlforth, 1999) Galia Press-­Barnathan argues that the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity increases the “level of strategic uncertainty” for the unipole’ s allies, as there is greater scope for the emergence of divergent threat perceptions with the unipole (Press-­Barnathan, 2006, pp. 275–276). Thus, Japan under unipolarity might feel an increased risk of US abandonment due to a perception that the alliance is characterized by Japan’s own extreme asymmetrical dependence on the US, rather than a relationship closer to interdependence, or that the two allies’ interests are diverging, thus encouraging Japan to hedge a possible failure of US defense commitments. On the other hand, the rise of China and perceived relative decline of the US since 2008, by encouraging Japan to hedge against a perceived uncertainty of continued US resolve to honor its defense commitments and even of US ability to maintain regional military dominance, could also encourage Japan to build security cooperation with other actors, even if that cooperation does not represent a perfect or even close substitute for US security guarantees.7 In terms of bilateral alliance dynamics, changes in the institutions and norms of the US-­Japan alliance itself, notably in the direction of making the alliance less exclusive, could encourage Japan to decenter from the US, by pursuing security partnerships with other actors, starting with US allies and aligned actors.8 Beyond the US-­Japan alliance, positive experiences cooperating with non-­US militaries through participation in UN peacekeeping from 1992 until 2017, when participation (at least temporarily) ended, might encourage Japan to engage in greater security cooperation, including military to military cooperation, with these countries. At the domestic level, changes in elite strategic culture and elite perceptions, driven perhaps by generational change, as those born after World War II have assumed leadership positions, or by memories and perceptions of Japan’s 1991 Gulf War experience, and even by recognition of the very multinational nature of the coalition that ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait, could be factors driving Japan’s decentering from the US. Changes in the domestic political structure are another possible cause, most of all the growing power of the Kantei (the Prime Minister’s Office) and the Defense Ministry (promoted from being merely the Defense Agency before 2007) (Shinoda, 2007). Some argue that the 1994 reform of Japan’s Lower House electoral system has incentivized politicians and political parties to care more about security issues (Catalinac, 2016), a causal mechanism that could conceivably also encourage decentering from the US and toward other security partners. Changing domestic norms and Japan’s security identity9 might impact Japan’s decision to seek new security partners and to reduce the centrality and specialness

16  Paul Midford of the US in Japan’s security strategy. The domestic debate about “normalization,” or becoming a “normal” military power that throws off constitutional and other restrictions on the nation’s military might be driving Japan to build non-­US security partnerships (Soeya et al., 2011).10 Finally, changing attitudes among the Japanese public could also be a cause of decentering. Relevant changes might include the fading of antimilitarist attitudes (Berger, 1998; Midford, 2011), changing attitudes toward the utility of military force (Midford, 2011, chpt. 3), changing views of the SDF (Eldridge & Midford, 2017), changing views of the United States and the alliance (Midford, 2011, chpt. 3), and the possible growth of nationalist attitudes.11

Explanations for Japan’s decentering Based on these plausible causal variables, one can deduce several hypotheses explaining Japan’s motivations for decentering from an almost complete focus on the US and toward cultivating other security partnerships. These hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, the chapters in this book demonstrate that often two or more of these motivations are driving Japan to decenter from the US as its exclusive security partner. Strategic Independence. At one extreme of the spectrum is the hypothesis that a state decenters from exclusive reliance on a security partner in order to achieve strategic independence. From this perspective Japan is preparing to become strategically independent, leaving its alliance with the US, or at least greatly reducing its dependence on the US.12 Some argue that behind Tokyo’s conclusion of a security partnership with India are Japanese neo Pan-­Asianists who seek “close relations with Asia over the US alliance” (Brewster, 2010, p. 102), and are calling for “an assertive, militarily strong and independent Japan” (Panda, 2011, p. 11; also see Ishibashi’s chapter in this volume). Similarly, Aurelia George Mulgan argues that Japan’s pursuit of security partnerships with Australia and India reflects a desire to “take independent steps to shore up Japan’s security and exercise more autonomous influence over strategic developments in the Asia-­Pacific region” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 54). Moreover, “signing the security declaration with Australia was a move to shore up Japan’s security independently of the United States” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 67). A related and somewhat less extreme hypothesis is that Japan seeks to become more independent from the US as part of a larger strategy to increase Tokyo’s foreign policy independence (or Jishu Gaikō in Japanese). This follows the exhortation of noted Japanese Cold War-­era realist Nagai Yōnosuke that Japan must pursue a grand strategy of “maximizing allies” to “conserve freedom for a wide choice of action,” while “avoiding isolation and the predicament of having no choice” (Nagai, 2012, p. 431).13 Pursuing greater strategic independence as part of a more autonomous foreign policy can also be seen as an attempt to avoid political entrapment in US policies,14 carving out an independent voice for itself in East Asia distinct from the US. Specifically, Japan wants to avoid a situation described

Explaining: decentering and recentering 17 by one official in Southeast Asia: “if you want to know Japan’s policy don’t bother going to Tokyo, go to Washington instead.”15 Hedging. The state may decide to decenter from having one exclusive security partner to hedge against that partner’s potential abandonment of the state. This suggests that Japan’s decentering could reflect a hedging strategy. Hedging can be defined as “behavior in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-­uncertainties and high-­stakes” (Kuik, 2008, p. 163). Similarly, Koga Kei defines hedging as “state behavior that attempts to maintain strategic ambiguity to reduce or avoid the risks and uncertainties of negative consequences produced by balancing or bandwagoning [aligning] alone” (Koga, 2018, p. 638).16 In the context of Japan’s relationship with the US, hedging can be used to reduce the risk of Tokyo’s hitherto extreme dependence upon the US for its security and at least partially prepare for the risk of alliance failure, namely that the US suddenly withdraws from the alliance or does not honor its commitments.17 Whether this is the result of a fear of abandonment because the US, as the global military hegemon, does not depend on Japan so much for its own security, and hence can be seen as a potentially unreliable ally, or because, on the other hand, the US is seen as a declining hegemon and military power, are two mutually exclusive possibilities that could motivate a hedging strategy. All forms of decentering discussed in this book could have a hedging motivation: building security partnerships with other states and actors, reducing the specialness of the US in Japan’s security policies, and increasing independence in security policies. Cronin and Green suggested in the mid-­1990s that for Tokyo, regional “multilateralism is a hedge against waning US commitments to the alliance” (Cronin & Green, 1994, pp. 2, 9). A third possibility, according to Joshi and Pant, is that Japan is hedging against more general uncertainty, specifically to “reduce vulnerabilities in security, economic and diplomatic spheres in case the current power transition in Asia results in a highly uncertain or adverse political landscape” (Joshi & Pant, 2015, p. 315). Aurelia George Mulgan argues that Japan may hedge “against a decline in its importance to the United States relative to China” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 59).18 Alternatively, Japan might hedge its alliance commitments because of fear of entrapment in US wars not in Japan’s interest.19 Finally, Japan may desire to hedge the scope of the alliance, specifically in non-­traditional security areas (e.g. fighting piracy or pandemics) where the US may lack resolve, interest, or even capacity, and where other partners may have as much or more to offer (see the Wilkins and Vosse chapters in this book).20 Signaling Abandonment. The state might try building security ties to the central ally’s adversaries, including one’s own adversaries, or to more neutral parties, in order to signal to the other party that one’s commitment to the alliance might be open to reevaluation, thereby pressuring one’s central ally to reaffirm its commitment to the state’s security. This is essentially a type of bargaining strategy. One example might be the 1994 Higuchi report that provided advice for drafting the 1996 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). Japan hands in Washington

18  Paul Midford were alarmed that the Higuchi report mentioned regional security multilateralism before mentioning the US-­Japan alliance, and took this as a sign that Japan was downgrading the centrality of the alliance in favor of promoting regional security multilateralism (Cronin & Green, 1994, pp. 2–9). The brains behind the Higuchi report, Tokyo University Professor Watanabe Akio claims that US alarm over the Higuchi report pushed the US to reconfirm and strengthen its commitment to the alliance, and to redefine the alliance through the Nye initiative, the 1996 US-­Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the 1997 revised US-­Japan Defense Guidelines (Sebata, 2010, p. 270; and email correspondence with Watanabe Akio of May 9 and 10, 2019). Gaining Experience with New Partners. The state might build security ties with partners of the central security partner to gain greater experience in cooperating with diverse partners and their militaries. In this light Japan could be diversifying its security partners for its own sake, or in response to actual or perceived pressure from the US to do so. The US might see a Japan that has security relationships and experience with its other allies as a more valuable ally in its own right, or Japan might believe this to be the US view. For example, this might facilitate Japan’s military interoperability with allied militaries, and with shared standards for allied militaries promoted by the US. Alternatively, the US might encourage this development to prevent abandonment by Japan, or to use allies to apply group normative pressure on Tokyo to accede to US demands (Snyder, 2007, pp. 350–364). Collective Binding. Building on Joseph Grieco’s collective binding hypothesis (Grieco, 1993), and a bilateral binding hypothesis derived from Glenn Snyder’s alliance security dilemma theory (Snyder, 2007, pp. 350–364), one can hypothesize that a state might develop security relations with the central ally’s allies in order to further tie down (or bind) the central ally’s commitment to one’s security. From this perspective Japan develops security relations with US allies and US-­ friendly multilateral security institutions to ensure continued US commitment to the defense of Japan and regional security more generally. The logic is that Japan might be able to call on other allies to exert enhanced group normative pressure on Washington to honor its defense commitments to Japan and the region, and to avoid acting rashly in ways that undermine the interests of allies and even of the US itself (Cha, 2003, pp. 151–152).21 Decentering to US-­Centered Minilateralism. Greater cooperation with the primary partner’s allies can facilitate power aggregation and burden sharing. Japan’s building of strategic partnerships with other US allies can arguably facilitate burden-­sharing with the US by enhancing the efficiency of aggregating allied military power. Concretely, Michael J. Green, together with Andrew Shearer and Zack Cooper, propose that the US and its allies adopt a “federated defense” model to help maintain regional American military dominance in East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Federating capabilities involves promoting multilateral exercises, intelligence sharing, and armaments co-­development, not only between the US and its allies, but also among its allies (Green & Cooper, 2014, pp. 38–39; Green & Shearer, 2012, p. 185). Japan’s policy of building strategic partnerships

Explaining: decentering and recentering 19 and concrete defense cooperation with US allies can thus be seen as Japan’s contribution to building a “federated defense,” and as decentering away from the US alliance and toward a US-­centered regional minilateral security system. In the context of the well-­known hub-­and-­spokes metaphor for the regional bilateral alliance system linking the US with its Asian allies, Japan in effect may be working to build a multilateral “rim” linking the spokes.22 Buffering Conflict with the US. On the other hand, Japan might use multilateral ties with other US allies as a buffer against bilateral conflicts with Washington. In the mid-­1980s Japanese defense intellectual Nishihara Masashi proposed a multilateral forum of US allies in East Asia to cooperate in helping to bear the cost of continued forward deployment of US military forces in East Asia, thereby taking the issue outside of a strictly bilateral context where it often became linked to trade and other economic conflicts between Tokyo and Washington (Nishihara, 1988, pp. 274–275).23 Buffering bilateral security cooperation from bilateral conflict over other issues could thus be a motivation for Japan to start decentering from the bilateral alliance and recentering toward US-­centered regional, and even global, alliance systems. Intermediary for the US. Motivations for decentering from the bilateral alliance and toward the US regional alliance network might go beyond reducing the fear of abandonment to include helping the US shore up security cooperation with other allies, supplementing the US role. The Philippines offers a recent example: The election of President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 led to a significant deterioration in relations that threatened security cooperation between Manila and Washington. Japan, by building a good relationship with Duterte, has tried to act as an intermediary between Washington and Manila, ensuring that worsened relations do not overly damage security cooperation between the US and the Philippines. Japan has positioned itself to play a similar role between the US and the military government in erstwhile US ally Thailand (AFP-­Jiji, 2016, September 10; Jiji, 2017, June 5; AP, 2016, July 2; Yoshida, 2016, October 21; Storey, 2015).

Conclusions This chapter identified and developed the concepts of decentering and recentering in security strategy. It demonstrated how these concepts relate to the alliance security dilemma and the impact of attention scarcity on the state’s interactions with security partners, and distinguished decentering and recentering from the concepts of alliance tightness versus looseness. It argued that decentering occurs across three distinct areas of security strategy: the diversification of security partners, the ending of “specialness” for the originally central security partner in security policy, and the carving out of policy independence from the central partner. Finally, this chapter presented a list of underlying motivations and policy relevant explanations for explaining Japan’s decentering. However, these motivations have implications for other non-­Japanese cases of decentering.

20  Paul Midford

Notes 1 Although often discussed casually by foreign-­policy commentators, there has been little serious analysis of attention as a limited resource in foreign policy, and how would-­be allies or security partners might compete for it. For a rare theoretical treatment of the attention economy in foreign policy, see Wood & Peake, 1998. While analyzing what this edited volume conceptualizes as Japan’s early decentering from the US as its sole security partner in the mid-­1990s, Cronin and Green identified regional security multilateralism and participation in UN peacekeeping as reasons why officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency were becoming “increasingly distracted from alliance concerns” (Cronin and Green, 1994, p. 2). 2 There is little theoretical literature on centering, decentering, or recentering. The closest work is Snyder, 1997. See the discussion below. 3 Snyder notes that an entente can be used not only to tacitly or explicitly create expectations of cooperation in areas of mutual interest, but also to help reduce “the amount of conflict between the parties” (Snyder, 1997, p. 11). 4 Previously, as T. J. Pempel notes, Japan extended “special privileges” to the US “that they did not extend to other countries” (Pempel, 2003, p. 1). 5 Recentering could also mean forming a new exclusive security relationship with another partner that resembles Japan’s relationship with the US during the Cold War. 6 The Yoshida Doctrine, named after the most influential prime minister of the early post-­war era, Yoshida Shigeru, was conceptualized by scholars such as Kenneth Pyle as encapsulating the defining characteristics of Japan’s postwar grand strategy, including depending on the US exclusively as Japan’s sole ally (Pyle 1992, pp. 25–26; Pyle, 2007, p.  405). Pyle himself credits an unpublished manuscript of Nagai Yōnosuke from the early 1980s. In an exchange from 1984, Nagai credits both himself and Pyle (Okazaki and Nagai, 1984). Yet, Nishihara Masashi appears to have been the first to have coined the term “Yoshida Doctrine” (Nishihara, 1978). Moreover, the “Yoshida Doctrine” arguably can be best considered as a translation of Kōsaka Masataka’s earlier concept “Yoshida rosen” (Yoshida line) (Kōsaka, 1968; Soeya, 2008). 7 On 2010 as marking the effective beginning of Japanese balancing against China, see Grønning, 2014. For a more general discussion of the impact of China’s rise on Japanese foreign policy, see Smith, 2015. 8 For turn-­of-­the-­century accounts of how changes in system-­wide or structural factors were beginning to cause bilateral relations between Japan and the US to move “beyond bilateralism” and toward a less exclusive alliance, see Krauss & Pempel, 2003. 9 For the pioneering works in this field, see Katzenstein, 1996; and Oros, 2009. 10 The opposite dynamic is also plausible: decentering itself is driving Japan’s normalization. 11 Regarding nationalist trends in Japan see Winkler, 2013; and more generally Midford, 2013. 12 For an analysis of Japanese strategic thinkers who see Japan as a zakkoku, or client state of the US, see McCormick, 2007. 13 For the original Japanese version, see Nagai, 1966. 14 Galia Press-­Barnathan defines political entrapment as “a decline in one’s ability to make meaningful foreign policy decisions and to conduct meaningful foreign policy independently,” or being forced to support an ally’s political positions that are not in the state’s interests (Press-­Barnathan, 2006, pp. 280–281). 15 Interview with the author on October 5, 2010. 16 Also see Kuik, 2016 pp. 502–503. Lim and Cooper offer a more limited definition of hedging: “a class of behaviors which signal ambiguity regarding great power alignment, therefore requiring the state to make a trade-­off between the fundamental (but conflicting) interests of autonomy and alignment” (Lim and Cooper, 2015, p.  703). However, this definition is only applicable to secondary states responding to the rise

Explaining: decentering and recentering 21 of a potentially threatening great power through strategic ambiguity versus alignment with a status quo great power, and does not apply to the case of hedging against abandonment by an alliance partner. 17 Hedging against alliance failure as depicted by some op-­ed page writers has been based on underdeveloped definitions of hedging: “hedging means that a country is pursuing opposite policies at the same time in case one should fail.” This definition in turn undergirds the logical fallacy that Japan is not hedging the US alliance because “no other partner available to Japan can supplant all that the US provides as an ally” (Bosack 2019). Irrespective of how irreplaceable the US may be as an ally, when alliance failure (US abandonment) looks likely Japan has an incentive to prepare for failure by building up security cooperation with others, regardless of how inferior that cooperation may be relative to the failing alliance (also see the discussion of Cronin and Green 1994 below). Glenn Snyder argues that “when fears of abandonment dominate fears of entrapment the state will move toward its ally, increasing its general commitment . . . in order to enhance the attractiveness of the alliance to the partner,” except when the partner appears to be “irrevocably in process of defecting” in which case the state might defect itself (Snyder 1997, pp. 308, 313). Defining hedging as pursuing “opposite policies” also ignores the very real possibility (discussed extensively in this book) that Japan can build up security cooperation with other US allies, even at US behest, as a strategy for hedging against abandonment even while simultaneously using this same cooperation to strengthen the US-­centered regional security network and discourage the US from defecting in the first place. 18 Mulgan continued, “This hedging strategy [a strategic partnership with Australia] provided specific insurance against a reoccurrence of the ‘Japan passing’ phenomenon that characterized the administration of President Bill Clinton” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 59). 19 Snyder suggests that when a state fears entrapment by an ally it may attempt to loosen alliance commitments (Snyder, 2007, p. 315). Although hedging is not the same as loosening, establishing new security relationships could be seen as a way to subtly reduce dependence on an ally, or at least expand options for doing so in the future. 20 For the example of security cooperation in post-­conflict reconstruction at the nexus of security and development, see Söderberg’s chapter in this volume. 21 On the influence of norms and the “halo effect,” see Snyder, 2007, pp. 350–364. On “Gulliver” incentives for promoting multilateralism as a way to tie down an ally, in addition to Cha see Krauss, 2000, pp. 483–484. 22 Several US officials have essentially advocated this but have used slightly different metaphors. Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander-­in-­chief of the US Pacific Command, has advocated converting the hub and spokes into a web structure with interconnections among US allies as well as with the US. See Blair and Hanley, 2001. Similarly, a recently retired Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia claimed that the US “no longer needed to be the hub for the spokes,” and that what matters is the “coalition” of the US and like-­minded states. Interview of November 17, 2017. A former advisor to Barrack Obama on Asia described the US-­Japan alliance as becoming “less exclusively a bilateral alliance” and more “an open platform for bringing others in.” Interview with Frank Jannuzi, November 17, 2017. 23 Also see Midford 2018 about Japan’s break with the US over regional security multilateralism in 1991.

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24  Paul Midford Snyder, Glenn H. (1990). Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut. Journal of International Affairs, 44(1), 103–123, Spring. Snyder, Glenn H. (1997). Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Soeya, Yoshihide. (2008). Yoshida rosen to Yoshida Dokutorin. Kokusai Seiji, 151, 1–17. Soeya, Yoshihide, Welch, David A., and Tadokoro, Masayaki. (2011). Japan as a ‘Normal Country’?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World. Toronto: University of Toronto. Storey, Ian. (2015). Trends in Southeast Asia, Thailand’s Post-­Coup Relations with China and America: More Beijing, Less Washington. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Winkler, Christian G. (2013). Right Rising? Ideology and the 2012 House of Representatives Election. In Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, and Ethan Scheiner (Eds.), Japan Decides 2012. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 201–212. Wohlforth, William. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. International Security, 24(1), 5–41. Wood, B. Dan, and Peake, Jeffrey S. (1998). The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 173–184. Yoshida, Reiji. (2016). Tokyo Rushes to Analyze Duterte’s Remarks on Philippines’ ‘Separation’ from US. Japan Times, 21 October.

Part I

Non-­American directions in defense policy

3 Centered on the fight within The inward-­looking nature of the Japanese debate on constitutional reinterpretation with a diluted US focus Bryce Wakefield Introduction During the debate surrounding Japan’s decision to reinterpret its constitution to authorize the right of collective self-­defense (CSD), several of Japan’s friends and allies in the Asia-­Pacific region expressed support for the move. In talks with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in June 2014, just before the July 1 announcement of the constitutional reinterpretation, President of the Philippines Benigno Aquino, for example, noted that “nations of goodwill can benefit only if the Japanese government is empowered to assist others and is allowed to come to the aid of those in need, especially in the area of collective self-­defense.” In an editorial, a major newspaper, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (2014) suggested that in light of “increasingly aggressive posture of Beijing regarding its maritime and territorial claims to most of the South China Sea” Aquino, the president of one of Japan’s new security partners, had “all but all but encouraged Japan to amend its pacifist constitution” so as to assist the Philippines in its maritime disputes with China. In the months following the announcement, Abe met with other regional security partners, most notably with the prime ministers of Australia and India, issuing statements about the need to strengthen bilateral security and defense relations. Because of the proximity of such statements to Abe’s push for reinterpretation of the constitution, it might be tempting to view Japan’s authorization of CSD (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 2014) as indicating a bold new step in the nation’s building of security relations with regional partners, what this volume calls “decentering,” as well as with its ally, the United States. Such a view would probably be premature, however. While the Japanese government has been upbeat about its diversifying and expanding cooperation on defense and security with regional partners beyond the US, little of this cooperation will be based on the expanded authorization of self-­defense rights that were subsequently written into Japan’s security legislation of 2015. While the Abe administration’s reinterpretation of the constitution had major implications for constitutional practice in Japan, situations where Japan may use force against other states or state-­like actors will remain circumscribed. Moreover, Abe has stated his aim for outright constitutional revision and particularly revision of Article 9, the so-­called “peace

28  Bryce Wakefield clause” by 2020, and although he missed this deadline, he and perhaps his successors, will likely remain highly sensitive to public opinion for the sake of facilitating constitutional reform. The debate on collective self-­defense was highly controversial in Japan and polls show that the public, dissatisfied that the Abe administration did not engage it sufficiently in the debate, both opposed the reinterpretation and did not approve of (hyōka shinai) the security legislation at the time of passage by a ratio of about two to one (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016). However, Abe’s response to the debate on CSD and particularly his need to use appropriate language in discussing security issues abroad in order to assuage voters at home may cause confusion about the extent to which Japan is ready to exercise its newly authorized self-­defense rights. It is clear, for example, from statements by influential analysts in the United States as well as the statements from regional figures, such as Aquino cited above, that many “outside” observers of Japan’s ability to authorize CSD seemed to understand the concept as Japan simply authorizing its forces to work more closely with the militaries of the United States—or other nations. No doubt such closer cooperation will continue. Nonetheless, that in itself is not CSD. CSD is a very precise formulation inherent in international law. Put simply, the right of CSD, which is available to every nation, allows a state to use force to protect another state against an aggressive attack from a third nation. The state under initial attack does not need to be an ally of the nation that comes to its defense, and the defending state does not need to be acting out of its narrow national interests. CSD, then, is not simply an indication that Japan is willing to “do more” with alliance partners but carries very clear implications about the level to which Japan is willing to use force against other states or state-­like organizations. Nevertheless, the Abe administration has often emphasized its position that allowing the right of CSD will help Japan conduct operations with the United States. The fact that the Japanese government is willing to use the rhetoric of CSD in order to convince the United States that it is willing to take a proactive role in the alliance may be taken to demonstrate that Japan’s security concerns are still very much centered on the alliance. Also, there has been a noticeable shift in debates on constitutional issues in recent years. For much of the postwar period, the most influential opponents of constitutional change were those actors, such as the Socialist Party of Japan, that also opposed Japan’s alliance with the United States. This is, however, no longer the case. As shown below, for example, members in the current leading opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), oppose Abe’s approach to the constitution not because it brings Japan closer to the United States, but because they believe the reinterpretation serves little, if any, strategic function. In one sense, then, Japan has been increasingly “centering” on the United States for some years, given that old ideological tensions lingering since the Cold War about the legitimacy of the US-­Japan alliance and the SDF have all but disappeared. However, given the Japanese public finds military solutions to international issues problematic, and given that interpretations of the constitution by the government are still technically subject to legal challenge, the government will be

Centered on the fight within 29 extremely cautious in engaging in any action that could be interpreted as CSD. Indeed, the Abe administration emphasized that its new interpretation authorized only a “limited” form of CSD closely bound to the self-­interest and survival of the nation. As Richard Samuels (2015) pointed out almost a year after the reinterpretation “the way it came out, it is not clear if Japan didn’t simply expand its doctrine of individual self-­defense.” If Abe’s interpretation is merely a modest extension of the individual self-­defense rights that Japan claimed to exercise legitimately under an older constitutional interpretation, then much of the debate around the reinterpretation has been rhetorical. In that light, the “rhetoric” of CSD seems to enhance the rhetoric of closer relations with the United States and regional partners “in a close relationship with Japan” (see later in this chapter) without involving Japan in use of force operations that would imply that CSD—as it is understood under international law—is actually authorized. In order to analyze the debate around CSD and its effects on Japan’s general strategic development, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, in order to explain why the Abe government’s reinterpretation was so controversial, it sketches out the development of the legal limitations on the use of force by Japan as they have evolved since the constitution was promulgated in 1947. Then, it examines the language surrounding constitutional reinterpretation and CSD to demonstrate the priorities of the current prime minister before his move to reinterpret the constitution. What is notable about this language is that, despite the subsequent justification of CSD as necessary to ensure Japan’s survival in an increasingly dangerous international environment, Abe hardly emphasized strategy or traditional military motivations when initially discussing the concept. To some extent, then, the debate on CSD was one that was neither “centered” on the United States, nor on diversifying Japan’s security interests, but one that was “centered” on domestic political battles. For Abe, constitutional change, and by extension, CSD, is a personal project. As outlined in the following section, critics charge that Abe’s attempt to reinterpret the constitution is rooted either in ideological notions of Article 9 as undermining the basis, spirit, or character of the nation or in an attempt to secure a legacy as the prime minister who changed the constitution. Thus, while Abe and his supporters are happy to explore areas where Japan can deepen relations with both the United States and non-­US partners in the security realm, constitutional reinterpretation is not likely to enhance activities related to preparation for the defense of the US and regional friends and allies. Indeed, as discussed briefly in the last part of the chapter, coupled with the reinterpretation, the Abe administration’s focus on the rule of law and “proactive contributions to peace” may serve to raise expectations too highly about the extent to which Japan is willing to cooperate militarily with regional forces.

Article 9 and the use of force before Abe It is well known that the question of whether Article 9 permits the use of force in certain circumstances is controversial. Indeed, from a rhetorical point of view in the debate on CSD, it did not help their case that many left-­wing legal

30  Bryce Wakefield scholars in Japan who criticized Abe for his approach to reinterpretation stressed that government interpretations prior to 2014, which sanctioned the existence of the nation’s Self-­Defense Forces, violate the constitution. Opinion polls since the 1950s show that the public overwhelmingly accepts the presence of the SDF, so if Abe’s new interpretation is illegitimate, it is no more illegitimate than an earlier state of affairs that the Japanese people nevertheless came to accept. Abe himself enjoys reminding readers of his political writings that his most strident opponents are those ideologues who are out of touch with mainstream opinion in Japan. Nevertheless, opposition to constitutional reinterpretation was not merely a preserve of an increasingly out of touch “left,” and efforts to frame it as such fail to explain a groundswell of popular opposition to the move. Indeed, what is remarkable is that reinterpretation of the constitution gave conservative members of the bureaucracy and left-­wing legal scholars common cause in opposing Abe’s position. For example, figures such as Sakata Masahiko, former director of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) whose role was to examine new legislation for the government and determine its constitutionality, and left-­wing legal scholars such as Aoi Miho, who vehemently opposed the CLB’s position that the SDF were in line with the constitution, noted how ironic it was that they had been brought together on this issue (Aoi & Sakata, 2015, p. 75). Also, opponents of Abe’s constitutional reinterpretation who previously also rejected the legitimacy of the SDF argue persuasively that even if they accepted for argument’s sake the past interpretation sanctioning the forces, they could still mount a solid case against Abe’s reinterpretation. That is, the fact that certain left-­wing commentators opposed both the old interpretation and the new reinterpretation did not detract from the notion that the government was acting inconsistently on the narrow point of whether CSD was constitutional (Mizushima, 2014, p. 81). There is therefore a whiff of the ad hominem about government attempts to cast those that disagreed with reinterpretation as simply those that would disagree with the government whatever its position might be. Indeed, prior to the 2014 “reinterpretation” the government’s interpretation of the use of force provisions of the constitution had been consistent for decades. The first authoritative statement implying that CSD was unconstitutional emerged in 1954. In that year, following some earlier discussion on the matter, the CLB settled on the interpretation that the first paragraph of Article 9, which renounces war “and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” did not “deny the right of self-­defense . . . in the case of an immediate violation of the nation of Japan” (Diet Records, 1954a). A clear attack on Japan’s undisputed sovereign territory could not be an international dispute from Japan’s point of view. Moreover, an admittedly inventive interpretation of the language in the second paragraph connected a ban on “air, sea, and land forces and other war potential” to the language of the first. The ban did not therefore cover the acquisition of military-­style weapons for uses short of war, such as maintaining public order. Nor did it preclude these arms from being used for defense of the nation against a direct attack on its undisputed sovereign territory (Diet Records, 1952). Individual self-­defense was thus permitted under the constitution.

Centered on the fight within 31 According to the CLB, however, the constitution clearly imposed restrictions on Japan when Japan was defending itself (Diet Records, 1952). By the time it had settled on its interpretation allowing individual self-­defense, the government had refined those restrictions into three inseparable principles based on the CLB’s reading of Article 9 (Diet Records, 1954b). It is important to note, that despite the many conflicting statements that had been made in the Diet on the use of force, that this was the first explicit government interpretation of the limits of the use of force under the constitution which, as a government order, could be challenged in the courts. It was issued shortly after the promulgation of the constitution itself and shortly after Japan had gained independence as a nation state and thus had the capacity to use force. It was, therefore, the first real instance of an official formulation of principles that elucidated the relationship between the use of force by Japan as a state against other states and is not a reinterpretation of principles already clearly enunciated by the government. It is therefore somewhat specious to argue, as some do (Green & Hornung, 2014), that the government opened the door to further “reinterpretation” by interpreting the constitution in the first place. Indeed, until Abe’s reinterpretation the principles formulated in 1954 continued to form the basis of Japan’s position regarding the use of force against other nations, appearing as a comprehensive statement in Japan’s annual defense white papers. They mandate that the government can use force for self-­defense only when: (1) there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (2) there are no other means of stopping that aggression; and (3) the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level (Ministry of Defense, 2013, p. 143). While the principles taken together were sufficient to prohibit collective self-­ defense, the CLB augmented its earlier testimony in 1955. Article 13 of the constitution states that the right of the Japanese people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is the government’s highest consideration. According to the CLB, this implied an official “obligation to protect public order and freedom,” which would be impaired in a direct attack on Japan. Japan could thus defend itself, but, due to the restrictions in Article 9, only insofar as it would be protecting the Japanese people’s rights. Thus, “Article 9 considered in conjunction with Article 13, naturally recognizes . . . action necessarily limited to eliminating a direct invasion” (Diet Records, 1955, p. 21). If that was not clear enough, the CLB stated in 1960 that the right to defend a friendly foreign nation under attack “while called the right of collective self-­defense [in international law], is not recognized under the constitution” (Diet Records, 1960, p. 27). The Supreme Court, which officially holds the power to “determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act,” issued a ruling in the 1959 Sunagawa case that, while not concurring outright with the CLB interpretation, did reiterate and reinforce some of its major tenets. The central question in the case was whether US bases and forces on Japanese soil constituted the illegal maintenance by the Japanese government of “war potential.” The court ruled that they did not, because the government did not exercise command over them. Moreover, the court held that the renunciation of war and use of force in paragraph one

32  Bryce Wakefield of Article 9 did not constitute rejection of Japan’s right to self-­defense, and so foreign forces could be stationed in Japan according to that right. However, that right was to be exercised by Japan taking only “measures for necessary self-­defense in order to fulfill the existence and maintain the peace and safety of its own nation (jikoku)” (Supreme Court, 1959, p. 3225). The clear implication of this ruling was “that actions or arrangements that were not strictly for the defense of Japan, and military forces or other war potential that were under the command of the Japanese government” might violate Article 9 (Martin, 2007). More notoriously, the court also declared its reluctance to rule on treaties and laws concerning national security, because, unless their content was clearly unconstitutional, they stood as “political questions” best left to the Diet (Supreme Court, 1959, p. 3225). This was an amazing abdication of the court’s formal powers, but along with the subsequent development of narrow standing rules that made it difficult for anyone to bring a case against the government for violation of Article 9, it had the effect of increasing the importance of CLB interpretations. In the absence of Supreme Court rulings, it was the CLB that would determine how the constitution applied to security—and for that matter, most other—legislation. Indeed, the CLB confirmed its interpretation on collective self-­defense in Diet debates on the issue in 1973. The interpretation also served as the basis for an official 1981 declaration outlining the government’s view that Japan had the right of collective self-­defense under international law, but “the exercise of the right of self-­defense must stay within the minimum necessary level to defend Japan (wagakuni), and collective self-­defense exceeds this limit and is therefore impermissible under the constitution” (House of Representatives, 1981). By the early 1980s the ban on collective self-­defense was considered such an essential part of Japan’s constitutional fabric that the CLB director-­general and several ministers (including Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō, the current prime minister’s father) unequivocally testified that future governments wanting to reverse the ban “would naturally have to do so by means of constitutional revision” (Diet Records, 1983).1 Successive governments reiterated this testimony.

What is CSD for? For the current Japanese prime minister, debate on constitutional issues concerns not simply pragmatic issues related to Japan’s overall security position, but ones that strike at the very heart of Japan’s national identity. Like other revisionists with whom he has surrounded himself politically, Abe sees the constitution as a foreign imposition designed by the US Occupation Forces at the end of the Second World War specifically to deprive Japan of the sovereign rights inherent to all nations. Indeed, reinterpretation of the constitution emerged as an option only once Abe, “frustrated with the pace of legitimate constitutional amendment efforts,” had led a campaign to delegitimize and change the amendment procedure itself (Martin, 2015). CSD was also an issue that proponents of reinterpretation convinced him to take up years after he had already formed his ideological views of the status and effects of the Article 9 on national identity (Kuramae et al.,

Centered on the fight within 33 2014). For Abe at least, constitutional reinterpretation to allow CSD was not a position that was born of strategic necessity. It was therefore not necessarily an initiative that promoted a Japanese strategy “centered” on the United States or “decentered” to allow for greater regional cooperation. Rather, it was an initiative that was centered on the fight within Japan. The lack of strategic thinking Abe exhibits in relation to CSD is clear in his own writing and in discussions with proponents of collective self-­defense. As early as 2004, Abe had published a dialogue format book (taidan) with former diplomat Okazaki Hisahiko, who before his death in late 2014 would be a key advisor to Abe after the latter became the prime minister. In the book, Okazaki describes in some detail the level to which Japan might engage more heavily in regional affairs were it able exercise CSD and even stresses that “had Japan recognized the right of collective self-­defense [by 2003], it could have used the Iraq War to become one of the world’s three great powers” (Abe & Okazaki, 2004, pp. 85–86). While one might question the wisdom of Okazaki’s approach to the Iraq War, it is clear that he is thinking strategically in terms of utilizing conflicts in order to enhance Japan’s international position. In the same text, Abe, in contrast, almost ignores the strategic implications of CSD altogether. While he does vaguely mention requests from South East Asian nations such as Thailand for Japan to exercise “leadership” in the region, he spends the lion’s share of the discussion focused on what he sees as a series of mistakes in the development of the government’s interpretation of Article 9 (Abe & Okazaki, 2004, pp. 74–77, 81–83). In the book outlining his political “vision,” published when he was selected as prime minister in 2006 and republished when he entered the office again in 2012, Abe (2006, pp. 130–132) does focus on the notion of CSD as improving the US-­Japan relationship, but this is almost entirely within the context of securing the narrow security interests of Japan. While Abe did make reference to collective security organizations like NATO, there was nothing in this later discussion on CSD to indicate that he saw CSD as an instrument that would allow Japan to either to “center” on the United States or further engage in regional security or institution building. In fact, in the broader debate on reinterpretation, the Abe administration expended considerable effort to give the impression that authorizing CSD would not imply any wider regional or global strategic implications. Individual members of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with a record of strategic thinking did occasionally speak on the possible regional implications of reinterpretation. For example, LDP Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru noted that the goal of enabling the right of CSD should be to eventually allow Japan and South East Asian nations to create a NATO-­like alliance aimed at China, where, presumably, an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all (Japan Times, 2014). However, in response to later criticism that the reinterpretation would allow for government action beyond constitutional limitations, Kitaoka Shinichi, who acted as the head of the government commission tasked with establishing the case for CSD, stressed that principles governing the use of force under any new interpretation would tightly restrict Japan’s activity in areas far from Japan (Kitaoka & Yanagisawa, 2013). Kitaoka later noted that these principles would even restrict Japan

34  Bryce Wakefield from unconditionally responding to requests for armed assistance if, say, China launched an unprovoked attack on the Philippines (Asahi Shimbun, 2014a). Abe was also dismissive of plans, such as those proposed by Ishiba to have troops dispatched to UN collective security combat missions (Asahi Shimbun, 2014b). Likewise, Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori reacted quickly to refute comments by Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Takamizawa Nobushige, a former senior Defense Ministry official, who noted that the SDF might be dispatched far overseas to exercise CSD (Japan Times, 31 September 2013). Indeed, except for peacekeeping operations and the need for the SDF to be able to defend its allies in the field in that area, much of the debate about reinterpretation highlighted a pressing need to secure Japan’s own territory and airspace. The government highlighted Chinese incursions into waters surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and potential attacks by North Korea as important issues for discussion. However, as former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary in the earlier Abe administration Yanagisawa Kyōji and others pointed out, many of the threats that the administration indicated as necessitating a response involving CSD in fact could be dealt with under the existing interpretation of the constitution that allowed for individual self-­defense. In response to Abe’s centerpiece justification of reinterpretation—that SDF vessels should be able to defend ­American transport ships carrying Japanese nationals from war-­torn areas, presumably during a future Korean contingency—Yanagisawa noted the government had never demonstrated “as policy, the necessity of transporting [Japanese nationals by ship] through routes whose security cannot be assured” (Asahi Shimbun, 2014c). Indeed, other scholars showed that transport of Japanese nationals by ship in such circumstances was highly unlikely (Mizushima, 2014). Vague language about the extent of activities that Japan would undertake was also a concern. The Kitaoka commission had recommended that, pursuant to Article 13 of the constitution which holds the life, liberty, and happiness of the Japanese people ought to be paramount in the government’s consideration of its affairs, Japan could respond with the use of force in CSD to “a situation gravely affecting Japan (nihon ni taishite hijō ni jūdai na eikyō wo ataeru jitai)” (Sankei Shimbun, 2014). However, this language was criticized as too permissive, and after the administration consulted with Kōmeitō, these wording to allow for authorization of CSD was changed to “existential circumstances” (sonritsu jitai) (Asahi Shimbun, 2015a), that is, what the government of the day deems as “circumstances that threaten the existence of the nation.” One major point criticism from Abe’s political opposition was that it was unclear, precisely, what these circumstances might be. The government’s final word on reinterpretation did little to clarify the issue. In the text of the “official” government reinterpretation, Japan could use force “not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Critics have attacked this statement for its obtuseness and

Centered on the fight within 35 therefore its potential for abuse. If interpreted liberally, for example, the integrity of the US-­Japan alliance might be seen as so crucial to the security of Japan that a Japanese government could argue that a Japanese military response against any significant attack on the United States was justified. Critics also noted that the vague language of the reinterpretation might see Japan engage in the use of force in the Middle East to secure Japan’s energy supplies. So far, however, the approach to the reinterpretation has been highly circumscribed, even to the extent that it is unclear whether Japan has authorized CSD as understood under international law. As Liff (2015) notes, “the conditions under which the Japanese government can actually exercise collective self-­defense in support of even the United States are limited—analogous to those for individual self-­defense.”

Pacifism as legalism in the debate on CSD With the Abe administration avoiding language about the broader regional implications of constitutional reinterpretation, legal issues took prominence in the debate over the new security legislation. As Craig Martin and I (Wakefield  & Martin, 2014) argue, despite its relatively mild strategic implications, the 2014 reinterpretation was procedurally unique and had negative implications for constitutionalism and the rule of law in Japan. Observing the debate on the constitution in Japan, legal scholars in the United States, more comfortable with notions of constitutions as “living documents” that must change according to the times, noted that “constitutional adjustments of this nature require broad public support for their legitimacy, or at a minimum elite consensus with popular acquiescence,” which was certainly not the case in Japan (Ginsburg, 2015). Even Bruce Ackerman, perhaps the foremost proponent of the notion that constitutions can be changed without formal amendment if the security of the nation requires it, labeled the actions of the Abe government a “constitutional coup”(Ackerman & Matsudaira, 2015). Observers of foreign policy and constitutional scholars also doubted that “Japan’s external security environment is rapidly deteriorating” to an extent that might warrant constitutional reinterpretation by the executive, the very body whose actions a constitution is established to restrict (Gupta, 2015; Ginsburg, 2015). Meanwhile, informal surveys showed that 90 percent of Japanese constitutional scholars opposed the move (Ackerman & Matsudaira, 2015). As already noted, the government attempted to minimize these debates by pointing out that legal scholars had always complained about the military actions that had ultimately been accepted by the public. However, legal scholars insisted that this time it was particularly serious. True, earlier government interpretations, notably that which affirmed the constitutional status of the Self-­Defense Forces in 1954, were controversial, but they did not upend longstanding existing interpretations. True, there had earlier been some evolution in the roles of the SDF over recent decades that had received critical evaluation of scholars. Throughout the postwar, largely due to public pressure, the government established policies, such as a limited ban on the overseas dispatch of the SDF, that were seen as in line with the spirit if not

36  Bryce Wakefield the letter of the constitution. During the 1990s, many Japanese therefore saw the government’s decision to send the SDF overseas to participate in non-­combat peacekeeping missions for the first time as a loosening of the constitutional order. However, during these missions, the SDF did not engage in the use of force as it is understood in international law and thus did not technically brush up against the restrictions of Article 9, which simply does not ban the overseas dispatch of personnel. The restrictions on the use of force that Abe sought to loosen with his reinterpretation, in contrast, had been in place almost as long as the constitution itself, touched directly on the use of force provisions in Article 9 and were reinforced by decades of legislation consistent with the 1954 interpretation (Wakefield & Martin, 2014). As Daniel Sneider (2015) notes, Abe’s reinterpretation of Article 9 was “in effect amending it by administrative fiat.” While Abe’s motivations for changing the constitution might have been ideological, opposition to the move was similarly “centered” on domestic issues involving the rule of law and not alliance politics. While Abe’s overall popularity did not suffer greatly from the reinterpretation, his position on the issue remained unpopular. Public opinion polls taken in January 2016 showed that about only a third of respondents approved the new security laws that were introduced subsequent to the reinterpretation, with 52 percent opposed, figures similar to support and opposition of reinterpretation in 2014 (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). The issue has also served to restructure opposition politics, initially presenting the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had struggled to reestablish a party identity after its disastrous performance in government ended in 2012, with an opportunity to criticize the government. While some within the party argued that authorizing the use of collective self-­defense is a pragmatic step the country needs to take, the party found cause to criticize the vague language in the security legislation as “an affront to constitutionalism.” The party also criticized the hypothetical examples, such as clearing mines during a blockade of the straits of Hormuz or protecting American transport ships carrying Japanese civilians, that Abe used to try to convince the public of the need for CSD as hardly representing “a situation threatening the existence of Japan” that would require the use of force (Democratic Party of Japan, 2015). In contrast to some protestors who attempted to frame the loosening of constitutional restraints as a step “on the path to war,” the DPJ has, therefore, usually focused on the legal discrepancies inherent in Abe’s reinterpretation gambit. In 2017, when the party split and ultimately disintegrated in response to an invitation from populist Tokyo governor Yuriko Koike to join her newly formed Party of Hope, those in the DPJ who could not find a place in Koike’s new grouping rallied around constitutionalism as the backbone of their new party, the CDP. In the October 2017 Lower House elections, the CDP, despite fielding only 78 candidates, captured 55 seats and outperformed the Party of Hope, which fielded 235 and captured 50. The CDP emerged as the largest opposition party and the second largest party by seats in the Lower House, and both has an interest in opposing and is most prominently placed to criticize the Abe government’s approach to the constitution. What

Centered on the fight within 37 is significant, however, is the extent to which this party, despite its emphasis on constitutionalism and its criticism of Abe’s approach to reinterpretation, stresses the importance of the US-­Japan alliance. While the party’s policy platform clearly notes its opposition to “the present foreign and security policies that take as their premise the unconstitutional ‘security legislation framework’ ” and does emphasize that the party seeks to alter basing arrangements with the United States, the manifesto notes the CDP’s preference for the US-­Japan Alliance to serve as the axis for the Japanese government’s development of a foreign policy aimed at co-­ existence with other countries in East Asia (Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, 2018). In conversation, while party members express a certain exasperation with the administration of President Donald Trump, they note the many areas where Japan cooperated with the United States under the Obama administration. They also take what they call a fairly realistic position on the military alliance, noting that it is not simply an arrangement where the United States protects Japan, but where the placement of American forces helps the United States meet its strategic goals in Asia (Yamahana & Kamei, 2018). They do understand that there are both benefits and responsibilities to an alliance. Unlike former opposition parties, the CDP’s focus on constitutional order does not mean that it is hostile towards the US-­Japan relationship. Indeed, figures involved in planning CDP foreign policy insist that there is nothing ideological about their party’s position on the constitution and that they evaluate demands for constitutional change on the basis of practicalities. According to CDP members, Abe’s current attempts to change the constitution to mention the SDF explicitly is pointless, as it is simply an expression of an interpretation of the constitution that has existed since 1954, which the party accepts. According to Yamahana Ikuo, the head of the CDP committee on constitutional issues: “When we ask Abe why he wants to change the constitution, he says: ‘Oh, if we revise the constitution nothing will really change.’ We believe, not only in relation to the constitution, that if you are going to change rules, there should be a clear need (for that change).” According to Yamahana, the party also does not see relations with the United States or for that matter regional partners as a factor in the party’s opposition to reinterpretation. Party members are focused instead on the significant procedural issues that accompanied the reinterpretation and the creation of legislation that followed it. Meanwhile, they see Abe’s attempts to revise and reinterpret the constitution mostly as unrelated to the actual strategic needs of Japan. Japan is hardly defenseless, and as Yamahana notes, if there were a compelling strategic need to change the constitution, the LDP would be able to come up with more convincing explanations than those he has offered. Instead, party representatives see the revision as an unwelcome and illegitimate attempt by Abe to institutionalize his reinterpretation and establish his legacy. According to Diet member Kamei Akiko: “He just wants to leave his name behind as the prime minister that changed the constitution” (Yamahana & Kamei, 2018). The CDP opposes the constitutional reinterpretation mainly on procedural grounds and stresses that its opposition to constitutional change is not so much driven by fear of US-­Japan engagement.

38  Bryce Wakefield While the challenges to constitutionalism that the process of reinterpretation and the passage of the new security legislation have presented are significant, the DPJ’s and later the CDP’s decision to contest the changes mostly on procedural rather than policy grounds is nevertheless familiar territory. Legal obstructionism has been a common tactic by those opposed to the development of Japanese defense policy. Opponents of changes to government security legislation have often used the courts, even when there is little chance of winning, to highlight political cases. Since the 1960s, the highly complex relationship between legal and social norms related to defense usually led to the LDP attempting “consultation and compromise whether it was electorally strong or weak” (Keddell, 1993). Such “consensus politics” on security issues has weakened since the 1990s, in part due to strategic changes since the end of the Cold War, and in part due to internal political organization. However, in the mind of some defenders of the Japanese constitution, democratic practice—and the need for correct legal procedure which that entails—is tightly bound to norms of pacifism in Japan. As Izumikawa (2010) notes, an outright aversion to conflict is only one facet of Japanese pacifism. Liberals or “anti-­traditionalists,” such as many in the DPJ and CDP, become protective of the constitution when they believe that policymakers are “taking measures that could undermine Japan’s democracy” or when they believe that the “policymakers who seek a more active role are traditionalists” (Izumikawa, 2010, p. 131). Both characterizations surfaced as criticisms of the Abe administration during the debate on reinterpretation. First, Abe and his allies have made no secret of their “traditionalist” credentials, manifested in their view of the constitution as a foreign instrument of defeat imposed on Japan after the Second World War. As earlier noted, in articles in general interest journals and “vision” books, Abe has been forthright about constitutional change as part of a larger package of historical revisionism designed to instill a sense of pride in the Japanese nation (Hyakuta & Abe, 2013). Second, early in the debate on constitutional revision, statements by the prime minister and others in his camp led to the concern that he did not care for correct constitutional procedure. In February 2014, Abe declared during Diet debates on reinterpretation that he viewed the notion of constitutional restrictions on government action as old-­fashioned and that he alone was ultimately responsible for reinterpreting the constitution on behalf of the government. Abe’s comments attracted immediate rebuke from lawyers, the media, and opposition parties for being ignorant of the basic tenets of constitutionalism (Tokyo Shimbun, 15 February  2014). Moreover, in a significant moment in the debate, Hasebe Yasuo, a constitutional scholar the LDP called before the Diet to argue the government’s case, testified against constitutional reinterpretation, leaving the government in the awkward position of having to press on with reinterpretation even though the credibility of its legal arguments had been severely undermined by the testimony of its own expert (Asahi Shimbun, 2015b). It is this notion that the constitutional order is under attack, then, that drove much of the opposition criticism.

Centered on the fight within 39

Business as usual? Perhaps, then, more than the familiar leftist notion that the LDP is engaging in action that will “take the country down the path to war” alongside the United States, the government has been sensitive to the critique that its actions are harming constitutionalism and democracy in Japan. After Hasebe’s testimony, therefore, the government sought to create the image that the reinterpretation was, in a legal sense, simply business as usual. In fact, the government even attempted to argue, the opinion of legal scholars notwithstanding, that their reinterpretation of the constitution was not, in fact, a reinterpretation at all. Its announcement on its new approach to the use of force noted that the “changes” announced on July 1, 2014 were “within the limit of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date” (MoFA, 2014). While the scope of the legislation remains unclear, sympathetic contributors have noted that the legislation simply clarifies that missions which could arguably be defined as both individual and collective self-­defense, such as support for US missile defense operations during an attack which poses an imminent threat to Japan, are constitutional. Explanatory materials presented by diplomats at briefings on the new legislation also stressed that Japanese policy was in line with the constitution. In a broader sense, the slogan that the Abe administration chose to represent the policy shift—that Japan would engage in “proactive contribution to peace based on international contribution”—reflected pacifist norms of old coupled with the internationalist language of the constitutional preamble, an older technique that previous politicians have used in promoting more activist policies. Central to the attempt at framing the reinterpretation as legitimate was reference to Japan as a nation that follows the rule of law. The Abe administration had in its earlier incarnation in 2006–07 emphasised common respect for the rule of international law, as well as open markets and shared democratic values as the basis for regional cooperation in East Asia. Much of this rhetoric was aimed at contrasting Japan’s liberal values with those of China. However, with China stressing that its increasing economic and military presence in the region would constitute a “peaceful rise,” a message that found a sympathetic hearing if not endorsement in the United States and elsewhere at the time (Zheng, 2005), the regional reaction to Japan’s emphasis on the rule of law “ranged from lukewarm suspicion to yawning indifference” (Kingston, 2010). Within the context of Abe’s second term, however, focus on the rule of law abroad has taken on new significance. In Diet debates surrounding the security legislation, for example, Abe referenced repeatedly his respect for the rule of law as a basis for international cooperation on several occasions (Diet Records, 2015). While he referenced earlier overseas speeches, this time Abe’s rhetoric was aimed at assuring a domestic audience that his government would not use whatever military powers it had reinterpreted into existence without following correct procedure. Further legal restraints, such as prior Diet approval for any use of force that constituted collective self-­defense were also put in place.

40  Bryce Wakefield It is possible to see rhetoric about the rule of law and the announcement that Japan’s “proactivity” would “contribute to peace” as aimed to assuage the concerns of a domestic audience. Unfortunately for the Abe administration, however, reference to the importance of the rule of law and the government of Japan’s new “proactive” pacifism also implies to overseas observers that Japan is ready to play a much more active role in defending the liberal international order. This would, however, be an optimistic assessment of Japan’s position. After passing the highly controversial security legislation, the government is attempting to consolidate its support as it aims for an initial, moderate, attempt at constitutional revision and will therefore want to avoid situations where it can be criticised for dispatching the SDF in ways that would only loosely adhere to the restrictions inherent in the reinterpretation were conflict to occur. Nevertheless, the government’s rhetoric on the rule of law and international cooperation may create expectations overseas that Japan will prove reluctant to fulfil, introducing potentially contradictory messaging into Abe’s defense “doctrine” that, as Christopher Hughes (2015) notes, is already fraught with incongruities and tension. Indeed, the government’s position soon created confusion as to Japan’s willingness to diversify its security interests and partners, particularly regarding South China Sea issues. In response to Chinese activities to bolster its claim on disputed islands, in October 2015, the United States sent the USS Lassen, a US Navy destroyer to within 12 nautical miles of an island claimed by China to assert international freedom of navigation. Washington then called for a united response by allies in the area. Although individual officers of the SDF were receptive to suggestions that Japan may engage in patrols, the government, wary that such a move might provoke the ire of Beijing, but more importantly, that it may cause political problems at home, gave an extremely lukewarm reaction to such a proposal. Indeed, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide was initially reluctant to comment specifically on the decision to send the Lassen, only announcing Japan’s support for general principles of freedom of navigation (Sciutto & Starr, 2015). While Abe eventually did endorse the US action, his government did not go so far as to promise to join US efforts with maritime support (Japan Times, 2015). No doubt, Japan did show that it was more willing to engage in more joint exercises in the region. After the Lassen, Tokyo adjusted already existing missions, switching refueling stops for its monitoring aircraft returning from missions in Somalia so that they could cover more of the region, for example. Nonetheless, this will probably fall short of actions that many in Washington and elsewhere thought would result from the “proactive” changes that Japan appeared to be promising. Indeed, directly after the Abe government passed its defense legislation, commentators in the United States with an understanding of the political dynamics in Tokyo warned Washington “to manage expectations for Japan” (Tatsumi, 2015).

Conclusion The reinterpretation of the constitution to allow for CSD was a significant, and arguably irresponsible, step in the development of constitutional procedure in Japan, but, aside from clarifying Japan’s ability to cooperate, and if need be to

Centered on the fight within 41 use force, with the United States on such missions as missile defense it will likely have relatively little effect on Japan’s engagement with its region in the near future. Nevertheless, the abrupt changes to established constitutional procedure aggravated not only anti-­war sentiment on the left, but, perhaps more importantly, alarmed liberals in Japan concerned with democratic process. The rhetorical cover that the Abe administration has sought to construct during the debate on CSD, with its emphasis on protecting the rule of law, has the potential to create confusion. On the one hand, it sends a message to the public that the government will be cautious in its use of the military, while, to Japan’s friends and allies in the region, especially its new security partners, it may give the impression that Japan will be more willing to place itself in situations where it finds the use of force may be necessary in order to protect the international legal order. By raising expectations abroad while attempting to assuage the public at home, the Abe administration has potentially set the scene for a contradictory, piecemeal approach to cooperation with the US and with other regional partners looking to ensure stability and the rule of international law in the Asia-­Pacific.

Note 1 The words are the CLB director’s and were immediately endorsed, first by Abe Shintarō and then other cabinet members.

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Centered on the fight within 43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). (2014). Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People. www.mofa. go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html. Accessed 11 February 2020. Mizushima, Asaho. (2014). Ampo Hōsei-­Kon No Seikyoku-­teki Heiwashugi. Sekai, May. Philippine Daily Inquirer. (2014). Japan on Our Mind, 27 June. Samuels, Richard J. (2015). Who Defines Japan’s Past, and Future. The National Interest, 26 May. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/who-­defines-­japans-­past-­future-­12964. Accessed 7 May 2020. Sankei Shimbun. (2014). Chikyū No Ura ‘Haijo Sezu’ Shūdantekijieiken De Ishiba-­Shi, 5 April. Sciutto, Jim, and Starr, Barbara. (2015). U.S. Warship Sails Close to Chinese Artificial Island in South China Sea. CNN, 26 October. Sneider, Daniel. (2015). Shinzo Abe and the Reality of Japanese Democracy. NBE Analysis, 21 August. Supreme Court. (1959). Saikō saibansho keiji hanreishū. Tokyo: s.n. Tatsumi, Yuki. (2015). Don’t Expect Too Much of Japan’s Defense Reforms. The Diplomat, 9 October. Wakefield, Bryce, and Martin, C. (2014). Reexamining ‘Myths’ About Japan’s Collective Self-­Defense Change—What Critics (and the Japanese Public) Do Understand About Japan’s Constitutional Reinterpretation. Japan Focus, 8 September. www.japanfocus. org/events/view/227. Accessed 8 September 2014. (Subsequently republished on the same website under an incorrect date). Yamahana, Ikuo, and Kamei, Akiko (2018). [Interview by Bryce Wakefield] House of Representatives Building. Diet of Japan, 18 July. Yomiuri Shimbun. (2016). March 19. Zheng, Bijian. (2005). China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status. Foreign Affairs, 84(5).

4 Lifting the ban on defense industrial production cooperation with non-­US partners Christopher W. Hughes Introduction Japan has always maintained an interest in the strategic value for its security policy and international relations of arms production and transfers. Japanese determination from the Meiji period onwards to develop policies of ‘techno-­nationalism’ and an indigenous defense production capability as essential for the preservation of national autonomy is well documented (Samuels, 1994). This intent has continued through into the post-­war period even as Japan in its pursuit of low-­profile military stance has chosen to impose self-­constraints on the types of weaponry that it has produced for the Japan Self-­Defense Forces (SDF) to obviate the possession of ‘war potential’ (senryoku), and through the 1967 and 1976 combined restrictions on the export of arms and military technology—albeit with some slippage in dual-­use technologies and the US-­Japan cooperation—that largely deprived itself of recourse to international arms transfers as a standard tool of statecraft.1 Japanese policy-­makers, despite these constraints, have thus continued to articulate the role that extant or latent defense production capability plays in providing deterrence potential and ‘bargaining power’ internationally, essentially a code word for hedging within the US-­Japan alliance and outside it to preserve strategic autonomy (MoD, 2014). However, Japan’s progressive erosion and now full revision of its arms export ban with the initiation of the ‘Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ in April 2014 has enabled it to make more overt and to expand the range and function of international arms transfer in national security policy (MoFA, 2014a). The 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS) makes it clear that defense equipment and technology cooperation should become ‘mainstream’ in Japan’s security activities and part of the ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (National Security Council, 2013). The new Three Principles have opened up a broader range of mechanisms for international arms transfers—two-­way and one-­way—moving on from past practices of off-­the-­shelf imports and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and limited co-­development and co-­production, to now full-­ scale bilateral and multilateral co-­development and co-­production and Japan’s possible export for the first time of whole weapons systems. The Development Cooperation Charter of February 2015 (replacing the 2003 revised ODA Charter)

Lifting the ban on defense production 45 also opens up the prospect of embedding for the first time transfers of military hardware in overseas aid.2 In addition, Japan has identified a broader range of states geographically and in type for developing arms transfer cooperation—still very much centrally including the US as its ally, but also now the strategic partners or ‘quasi-­allies’ (jun-­dōmei) of Australia and India, individual Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) member states, and NATO countries such as the UK and France. Japan’s declared plans for enhanced international arms transfer activities, in turn, raise important questions about the impact on its overall strategic direction. For just as Japan in the past utilized self-­imposed constraints to highlight and practice a constrained security trajectory, so the question is whether its removal of many of these constraints is both reflective and a driver of changes of direction in security policy. More specifically, questions are posed as to whether Japan is not only casting off constraints in this area to become a more prominent security actor, but also whether the increased range of options for cooperation across different types of arms transfers and international partners might open up scope for renewed autonomy and diversification of its security strategy. In regard to the central question of this project, this paper asks on the issue of arms transfers whether Japan might now have the intent and avenues of cooperation to re-­augment hedging options, and to diversify its reliance on the US-­Japan alliance in this area of military activity and more generally in its overall security strategy. Alternatively, it is important to ask if Japan’s emerging arms transfer strategy marks more continuity than change in prioritizing and reinforcing existing US-­Japan alliance ties. The response of this paper in examining the significance of Japan’s arms transfer policies is that, whilst the removal of past constraints has indeed opened up potential new thinking and options for Japan to pursue a more autonomous or hedged security policy, in fact its policy-­makers at present in this area do not seem inclined or able to pursue any major deviation from the current security trajectory. That is to say, Japanese policy-­makers at present remain fixed on utilizing the expanding opportunities in arms transfers with new partners to ultimately complement and reinforce the US-­Japan alliance relationship and the US ‘rebalance’ in the Asia-­Pacific as the overwhelming strategic objective. Moreover, even though Japan has opened up potential new avenues to use arms transfer to broaden its security strategy, it is arguable that at the more detailed level of government and private sector implementation, Japan’s policy experience and practices and technological leverage are still limited to the point that the efficacy of the strategy is as yet highly questionable. So, in terms of intent and capability, Japan really appears to be diversifying in the area of arms transfer in order to ‘re-­center’ ultimately on the US-­Japan alliance. To make these arguments, the paper proceeds in three main sections. The first examines Japanese government and private-­ sector perceptions of the importance of arms production within national security and Japan’s particular mode of defense production. The second examines Japan’s growing strategic motivations for expanding international military technological transfers. It assesses the particular policies and patterns of cooperation that have emerged from this new

46  Christopher W. Hughes strategy for arms transfers in terms of the types of military technologies involved and the prioritization of different international partners. The third section demonstrates the continued limitations of strategy beyond the US-­Japan alliance nexus and elucidates the sheer policy-­making and logistical issues and difficulties that Japan has thus far encountered in attempting to broaden partnerships for arms transfers.

Japanese grand strategy and the role of arms production and transfers As is well known, Japan’s total defeat, subsequent economic devastation, loss of independence under the US-­dominated Allied Occupation (1945–1951), undergoing of the process of demilitarization embodied in the acceptance of Article 9 of the ‘peace constitution’ of 1946, and the emergence of the Cold War in East Asia, demonstrated its international security vulnerabilities and obliged its leaders to formulate a new ‘grand strategy’. Japan’s eventual settling on Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s pragmatic strategic line, or the so-­called ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, emphasizing the rebuilding of domestic economic strength, minimal rearmament, and alignment with the US through the 1951 US-­Japan security treaty—and the bargain of exchanging Japan’s provision to the US of bases for regional power projection in return for effective guarantees of military protection—in large part resolved Japan’s immediate security concerns. Japan’s subsequent adherence to and adaptation of the Yoshida Doctrine throughout the Cold War period, with the posture of alignment giving way to the creation of an emergent US-­Japan alliance relationship and offensive-­defensive bilateral division of labor in East Asia, continued to serve Japanese national security interests effectively.3 Japanese policy-­makers’ pursuit of the Yoshida Doctrine and strategic bargain with the US, however, did not mean that they committed unconditionally to these security arrangements or saw them as cost-­free. Japan continued to seek to maximize national autonomy as far as feasible within its domestic and international security constraints, and to hedge against the classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment, but especially entrapment, in this period. The result was Japan’s engaging in often convoluted hedging tactics involving the maintenance of the ban on the individual self-­defense to curtail risks of embroilment in collective self-­ defense operations to support the US, general obfuscation of the degree of defensive commitments to the US under bilateral alliance arrangements, and Japan’s eschewing the procurement of military capabilities that could be enlisted in the service of the US outside Japan’s immediate territorial defense. Japan thus continued to contemplate the development of a ‘dual-­hedge’ against over-­dependence on the US—hedging primarily within the US-­Japan alliance to limit its commitments and maintain autonomy and thus a degree leverage over the US; and more secondarily, given at this time its limited military capabilities and range of possible partners outside the US, hedging against the alliance by developing potential alternative options to mitigate over-­reliance on the US, or even remove itself from

Lifting the ban on defense production 47 the alliance if the costs of the relationship grew unacceptable (Heginbotham & Samuels, 2002; Midford 2015). Japan’s indigenous defense production model as form of hedging Amongst the options Japan sought to develop in order to enable hedging behavior, the maintenance of an indigenous defense production (kokusanka) capability, in spite of self-­imposed constraints, occupied an important position. Japanese policy-­ makers in framing and adapting the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’ have never lost sight of the Meiji maxim ‘rich nation, strong army’ and the belief that, even though in the post-­war period Japan would need to secure itself in large part through economic power and diplomacy, the development of an indigenous defense production capability and gradual restoration of national military power are also the markers and guarantees of national autonomy. Consequently, the main stakeholders in Japan’s security policy throughout the Cold War and into the contemporary period—the long-­governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (until the formation of the Democratic Party in 2016), Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Economy and Industry (METI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and Defense Production Committee (DPC) of the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren) as the umbrella organization for a variety of defense producer associations and individual enterprises—have consistently articulated a series of shared objectives for defense production. Japan should maintain a defense production base that provides for the SDF’s deterrent needs and particularly calibrated to providing for its ‘exclusively defense-­oriented’ posture; it should provide for a degree of self-­sufficiency in defense equipment and ability to expand procurement in a time of national emergency; it should benefit national industrial policy through developing dual-­use technologies to benefit civilian industry; and it should enable the development of defense technologies that augment Japan’s negotiating leverage in the broader international community, and especially in the context of US-­Japan alliance cooperation (Hughes, 2011). Japan’s defense planners have, therefore, strived to attain a high degree of technological autonomy even if this presents development risks and high procurement costs. Japan has attempted to nurture kokusanka in part through the government’s direct and indirect subsidization of the defense industry, but also in large part through attempts to harness together military and civilian technology within predominantly civilian corporations so as to draw technological ‘spin-­off’ from the military sector, and for the smaller military sector to derive ‘spin-­on’ from civilian industry. In turn, Japan has developed a particular industrial defense structure: armaments accounting for less than one percent of total national industrial production; arms production itself occupying, with the exception of aircraft manufacture, small proportions of key industrial sectors such as vehicles, shipping and communications; and the concentration of arms production within a limited number of large civilian corporations with a small percentage of their sales devoted to this

48  Christopher W. Hughes sector. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), most notably, has long been Japan’s largest defense contractor, securing up to 20 percent of all government contracts, but derives only around ten percent of its total sales from this activity (Defense Yearbook Publication Board, 2010, pp. 521–524). Meanwhile, outside MHI and other large contractors, a considerable number of civilian small and medium enterprises (SME) provide components and specialist technologies to the larger systems integrators and are more heavily dependent on defense work. Japan’s nurturing of an indigenous defense production base has, arguably, scored important successes. The civilian conglomerate-­led model has created a very capable defense R&D and production base whereby much of the initial cost and technological risk of weapons development is borne by the private sector; and there has been inter-­diffusion of civilian and military technologies, with semi-­ conductors developed for the civilian sector finding their way through ‘spin-­on’ into missiles and radars and composites for fighter aircraft finding ‘spin-­off’ for use in civilian airliners. Japan has shown that it is capable of building advanced armored vehicles, missiles and maritime destroyers, and succeeded in rebuilding its post-­war aircraft defense production. Japan has not achieved this defense production base, though, with total autonomy or isolation from international arms transfer. Its policy-­makers are aware that the desire for autonomy can spill into autarky and the risks of technological backwardness. Hence, while Japan was prepared to remove itself from outward transfer of armaments under the 1967 and 1976 bans, it continued inward transfers of foreign technology when deemed necessary. Japan has imported US weapons systems through FMS, such as the Aegis radar system, as they offer relatively fast and low-­risk, if not always low-­cost, solutions to SDF needs. More preferable still has been licensed production of systems such as the F-­4J and F-­15J fighters and engines, and P-­3C patrol aircraft, to enable the learning and innovation of technologies. Japan has also in the past begun to utilize co-­production with the US as in the development of the F-­2 fighter, and the first tentative steps towards the transfer of military technologies through exemptions made in the arms export for thirteen different bilateral cooperation projects with the US. Japan’s prime impulse during the Cold War period, however, was to introduce foreign technologies only when they could not be developed indigenously, and where feasible to then develop as rapidly as possible substitute indigenous technologies. Japan had thus been able to claim shares of domestic procurement at around 90 percent or above in much of the post-­war period (Bōeichō, 2006, p. 95). This indigenization policy was not without disadvantages in that it often led to the production of weapons systems that lagged behind the most advanced international standards—the F-­1 fighter, most notably, becoming near obsolete as soon as it was deployed—and were high-­cost to procure compared with off-­the-­shelf and volume-­produced foreign systems. Nevertheless, Japanese policy-­makers deemed the policy essential because, even if Japan did not manage to produce the most advanced or entire weapons platforms, it did enable via a relatively small defense production sector the preservation and mastery of key technologies to keep in some step with international competition. In addition, this model brought

Lifting the ban on defense production 49 the believed latent potential for Japan to leap ahead into producing fully independent weapons systems in the future if this became a priority for national security and resources.

Japan’s shifting grand strategy and defense production: indigenization through internationalization? Japanese policy-­makers may have felt that the arms production and arms transfer model functioned effectively for its overall grand strategy for most of the post-­war and Cold War periods, but in the post-­Cold War period this policy, and indeed, the grand strategy which it serves, have come under increasing stress, so necessitating revisions across both sets of policies. The consistent pursuit of the Yoshida Doctrine, even in modified form, has clearly become more difficult in the context of the shifting security environment in the Asia-­Pacific and beyond. Japan increasingly perceives North Korea’s nuclearization and missile programs as existential threats, and most acutely feels the implications of China’s rise in regard to territorial disputes in the East China Sea and maritime security (Hughes, 2016). Japan’s security horizon has also been expanded beyond East Asia with its dispatch of the SDF to support the US ‘war on terror’ in the Indian Ocean after 9/11 and the reconstruction of Iraq in the early 2000s, as well ongoing commitments to anti-­ piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. At the same time, Japanese awareness of broadening threats and expectations for its contribution to international security has been accompanied by increasing uncertainties over its ability to rely on the US as the backstop of its security, given the perceived waxing and waning of its ally’s power. Japanese concerns at entrapment have continued, as seen in caution over deployments of the SDF in the ‘war on terror’. But fears of abandonment have now also grown in prominence if Japan is not seen to move beyond previously minimalist commitments to the alliance and support the US in responding to North Korean provocations and China’s rise, and most recently the US ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-­Pacific. Japanese policy-­makers have responded to this new security environment and the changing terms of the US-­Japan alliance by considering the need to boost their state’s own military capabilities but most particularly by strengthening the alliance relationship with the US in terms of attempts at a closer shared strategic vision and the integration of military doctrines and capabilities in areas such as ballistic missile defense; air defense; maritime security; extended deterrence; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); critical infrastructure protection; mutual logistics support; and outer space and cyberspace. Japan has furthermore been encouraged to make common cause with other US allies and strategic partners, including Australia, South Korea, and India, in managing the regional security situation. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s recent security reforms, including in 2015 the breach on the ban on the exercise of collective self-­defense to exercise military force in support of the US and other states under certain conditions, and the revision of the US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation for ‘seamless’ security cooperation across a range of ‘Japan’, ‘regional’, and ‘global’ scenarios,

50  Christopher W. Hughes demonstrate the ambitions for Japan to shift the functional and geographical scope of its security policy (Hughes, 2015, pp. 39–54). Just how far Japan has moved to deviate from the Yoshida Doctrine remains a subject of intense debate (Hughes, 2017). However, at the very least it is apparent that any adjusted or emergent new Japanese grand strategy features efforts to generate new proactivity beyond previous legal, functional and geographical limits; a focus on strengthening the US-­Japan alliance, whilst still obviating dilemmas of entrapment but now more prominently abandonment; the broadening and deepening of areas for military cooperation; and testing the diversification of security cooperation with a new range of US allies and strategic partners. If Japan has begun to shift its overall grand strategy, then this has been matched by concomitant stresses and changes in its arms transfer policy. Japanese policy-­ makers and defense producers have increasingly concluded that the model of indigenous defense production is unsustainable in its current prevailing form. The first challenge is one of resourcing limitations, given the stagnant or declining defense budgets for much of the period since the late 1990s. Japan’s government has maintained its one percent of GDP limit on annual allocations of defense expenditure which constrains the overall budget in a period of slow economic growth, and as a proportion of annual government expenditure it has remained constant at around five percent, declining in relative importance as a government priority in comparison to the increasing proportion devoted to social security and public works (Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2016, p. 283). The proportion of the defense budget available for arms production has also fallen within the budget, as over the last 20 up to 45 percent has been directed towards personnel and provisions (with rising salary and pension costs), whereas the proportion directed to equipment acquisition has declined from around 23 percent of the budget in 1988 to around 16 percent in 2016 (Asagumo Shimbunsha, 2015, p. 285). Japanese administrations have looked to address these problems by supporting new kokusanka projects such as the P-­1 patrol aircraft, C-­1 transport aircraft (with hopes even that the C-­1 might be convertible to a version for the civilian market) and Advanced Technology Demonstration-­X (ATD-­X), or now F-­3, stealth fighter prototype. Nevertheless, Japan’s procurement of frontline platforms of main-­battle tanks, destroyers and fighter aircraft has continued to decline, and in fact from 2008 no new fighters have been built in Japan since the end of the F-­2 production run. Japan is further attempting to stretch the defense budget with more efficient systems and competitive tenders for procurement domestically and internationally, following a series of corruption scandals in the mid-­1990s, and in 2015 established an Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) (Bōei Sōbichō) in an attempt to integrate and manage procurement more efficiently (Kankōkai Henshūbu, 2016, pp.  8–43; Tamura, 2016). Defense producers have also been encouraged to consolidate in order to produce economies of scale, but this has proved difficult given that most manufacturers are civilian production-­oriented, and that the dual-­use spin-­on spin-­off model cannot easily separate civilian from military production facilities, and thus have no incentive to rationalize their business to suit defense production prerogatives. The result is that the shake-­out in

Lifting the ban on defense production 51 the Japanese defense industry has taken the form of producers simply exiting the sector and switching to concentrate on more profitable civilian products. Most recently, the Abe administration has increased defense expenditure since 2012 and restored levels to the late-­1990s, with 2016 budget request marking the largest ever budget in the post-­war period.4 But still, with rising equipment unit costs due to military technologies becoming more advanced and thus more expensive, Japan’s domestic defense procurement alone appears insufficient to sustain the defense industrial base. The proportion of defense equipment procured domestically has now fallen to 83 percent by 2014 (Kankōkai Henshūbu, 2016, p. 454). The second challenge is that Japan’s techno-­nationalist policies risk leaving its defense industry behind in the development of internationally competitive technologies. Japan’s emphasis on the indigenization of technologies has run into the obstacle of the increasing reluctance of the US and other states to provide FMS or licensed production of advanced weapons systems. Japanese industry estimates that the domestic content under licensed production of US systems has progressively decreased, from 85 percent of the F-­104, to 90 percent of the F-­4EJ, and 70 percent of the F-­15J, with a high black-­boxed content for the F-­15J, and 60 percent for the F-­2 (Chinworth, 1992, pp. 127, 137). The National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS), MoD’s academic research arm, produced a report in 2006 which questioned the degree to which the US can be relied on to allow Japan to maintain autonomous technology even in the case of co-­development and co-­production, arguing that the F-­35 project demonstrates the US’s disinclination to share technology fully with even its closest allies and partners (Bōei Kenkyūjo, 2006, p. 34). Japan was further frustrated by the US’s refusal to transfer the full or even a ‘dumbed-­down’ less capable version of the F-­22 to its ally despite intense lobbying. Japan’s highly limited international cooperation to date, especially in terms of co-­development and co-­production, due to its arms export ban, have thus raised concerns of a ‘Galapagos effect’ as Japan is isolated from the evolution of international defense production (Kiyotani, 2010, pp. 185–188). Hence, as other states forge ahead with consolidation of their defense companies domestically and internationally, and initiating new multilateral weapons platforms to share technologies and costs through economies of scale, Japan has risked being left as a bystander and surpassed technologically, or over-­dependent on its US ally (Sato, 2015, pp. 5–6). Japan’s breaching of the arms export ban: maintaining domestic production base through international collaboration Japanese policy-­makers although still intent that the maintenance of a domestic defense production base is an essential component for national autonomy have begun to accept that kokusanka alone is not a viable approach. Instead, policy-­ makers have moved to try to revitalize the defense production base through exploring enhanced international cooperation with the US and now other international partners in line with its overall broadening of security policy (MoD, 2014, pp. 7–8, 15; Nishiyama, 2008, p. 353).

52  Christopher W. Hughes The result has been Japan’s progressive weakening and then eventual overturn of the arms export ban. The Japanese government between 1991 and 2010, aside from US-­ Japan technological cooperation agreements, had enabled 12 other de facto if not formal breaches of the arms export ban, although none of these breaches were for commercial gain involving private corporations (Morimoto, 2012, pp. 121–123). Moves for formal and broader breaches and removal of the ban began in the early 2000s. The Prime Minister’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in preparing for the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004—the document which sets out Japanese defense doctrines alongside the necessary capabilities—commented that expanding technological military cooperation with states other than the US should not be seen as Japan acting as a ‘merchant of death’ (Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryokyu ni Kansuru Kondankai, 2004, p. 5). The government did in part move to breach the ban in December 2004 in order to facilitate co-­development with the US on BMD. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement stressed that BMD would not conflict with the arms export ban because the project was designed for the smooth functioning of the US-­Japan alliance and thus Japan’s own defense (Bōeishōhen, 2008, p. 388). The MoD further interpreted the statement as providing grounds for investigation with other countries into joint research and development of technologies to respond to terrorism and piracy (MoD, 2008, p. 388; Defense Yearbook Publication Board, 2006, pp. 147–148). The Prime Minister’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in August under Prime Minister Asō Tarō, in preparation for the scheduled revision of the NDPG in 2009 (delayed to late 2010 due the change of governing administrations from the LDP to DPJ), once again argued for revising the export ban at least on a case-­by-­case basis to allow Japanese participation in international joint development projects with the US and European partners, or otherwise the risks would increase of Japan being left behind in defense technology (Anzen Hoshō to Bōeiryoku in Kansuru Kondankai, 2009, pp. 64–67). The DPJ, often incorrectly accused as weak on defense issues due to initial wrangling with the US over bases issues, proved just as interested as, if not in fact bolder than, LDP administrations in seeking to revise the export ban (Hughes, 2012). The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era, a new advisory panel formed under Hatoyama Yukio and then reporting under his successor Prime Minister Kan Naoto in order to prepare for the 2010 NDPG, again reported in August 2010 in favor of a partial lifting of the arms export ban with a licensing system to facilitate international joint development and production projects (Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era, 2010, pp. 45–47). Kan’s administration, preoccupied with domestic politics in the wake of the 9/11 disaster and embroiled in National Diet budget battles requiring the assistance of other parties in the Upper House, shied away from lifting the ban, and the 2010 NDPG omitted any reference to the lifting of the ban and simply stated that in order to maintain a stable defense production base it was necessary to ‘continue to investigate policies for . . . joint development and production’ (MoD, 2010, p. 16).

Lifting the ban on defense production 53 However, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s administration did then move to dismantle the ban with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s 27 December 2011 ‘Statement on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment’. The Statement argued that Japan, in seeking a more proactive contribution to international security, to improve the performance of its defense equipment, and to strengthen the alliance with the US and with other partners with which it was engaged in security cooperation, should allow overseas transfer of defense equipment. The government set the conditions that any transfers should be subject to strict controls and the consent of Japan to ensure no use beyond the agreed purpose and no re-­export to third countries; that transfers should benefit Japan’s own security; and that they should not be used to aggravate international conflicts (Prime Minister’s Office Japan, 2011). Following this, Japan entered into an agreement with the UK under the bilateral ‘Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security’ of April 2012, ‘to identify a range of appropriate defense equipment for joint development and production, that can be carried out in accordance with Japan’s 2011 Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment which contributes to both countries’ security and presents industrial opportunities’ (MoFA, 2012). Japan and the UK then concluded in July 2013 an agreement for joint research, development and production in defense equipment, and initiated cooperation on chemical and biological defense technologies. Japan also made its first official transfer of military technology in December 2012 when it donated four Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) hydraulic shovels to Haiti following the conclusion of its participation in the UN PKO Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Prime Minister Abe upon his return to the premiership at the end of 2012 moved to decisively end the export ban. Japan’s decision under the previous DPJ administration to procure the F-­35A as the successor to the F-­4J, with some off-­the-­shelf procurement but also Final Assembly and Checkout (FACO) and development of elements of the fighter’s engine parts, radar, and electro-­optical distributed aperture systems (EODAS), meant that Japan also needed to opt into the Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment (ALGS) system (MoD, 2015a, pp.  266–267). ALGS creates under the unitary direction of the US and prime contractor Lockheed Martin a global supply chain for the mutual provision of parts amongst countries deploying the F-­35 Joint Strike Fighter platform (potentially incorporating the US itself, the UK, Italy and the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Turkey as Tier 1, 2, and 3 partners; and Singapore and Israel as Security Cooperative Partners). Participation in this system requires the ability to export to multiple countries with at the same time strict controls on the re-­export to any third countries outside the network (Morimoto, 2014, pp. 190–198). Abe’s government was thus obliged on 1 March 2013 to issue a Cabinet Secretary Statement indicating Japan’s participation in ALGS as a major exemption to the arms export ban (Prime Minister’s Office Japan, 2013). The Abe administration implemented one further breach to the export ban by agreeing in December 2013 to allow the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) deployed in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to supply South Korean

54  Christopher W. Hughes military peacekeepers with 10,000 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition to assist in their protection of refugees. Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL) governing SDF participation in UN PKO does not preclude the supply of ammunition to other military peacekeepers but previous governments had repeatedly denied in the National Diet that Japan would respond to UN requests for ammunition or weapons. The supply further transgressed the arms export ban as it was made, arguably, to a state involved in an international conflict. However, the Abe administration established this exception on the grounds that the supply was at the request of the UN, for immediate and humanitarian UN PKO purposes, and in line with the policy of a ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (although the South Korean military was later to refuse Japan’s offer of ammunition due to bilateral political tensions). The NSS and revised 2014 NDPG then both identified overturning of the export ban as a key objective in order for Japan to preserve its defense production base as it is only through new international collaborative partnerships that it will be able to access advanced technology, economies of scale given the still limited SDF procurement budget, and export opportunities. The Abe Cabinet on 1 April 2014 proceeded to formally remove the arms export ban principles, instituting instead the new Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers. The new principles in effect inverted the former principles: moving from a system of a total ban with limited exemptions, to a new potential to export all forms of weaponry overseen by the NSC with some key restrictions. Hence, the new principles somewhat return to the original 1967 original restrictions by preventing export only to states considered to impede international peace and security, such as those transgressing international treaties or under UN sanctions, but would allow export to those states contributing to international peace or Japan’s security such as the US, NATO countries, and those engaged in UN PKO, and that could prove the controls in place to prevent re-­export to third countries (Asahi Shimbun, 2014a, 2014b). Japan’s new arms transfer partners Since the introduction of the new transfer principles, the NSC has permitted an expanding number of arms transfers. In July 2014, the Abe administration announced the first formal arms transfer under the new principles in the form of the export by MHI to the US of components for PAC-­2 missiles. The PAC-­2 exports will assist US transfers of the system to Qatar, and Japanese policy-­makers admit that, even with US reassurances under the guidelines about preventing the transfer to third countries, Japanese-­made components may find their way into weapons systems exported to Israel (Asahi Shimbun, 2014d). Following up on the Japan-­UK Defense Equipment Cooperation Framework in 2013, the two sides indicated in July 2014 the intention to jointly develop the Meteor air-­to-­air missile. The UK and Japan are also thought to be keen to discuss cooperation in NBC technology, mine detection, helicopters, tanks, and artillery. Japan was also rumored to have attempted to pitch sales of the P-­1 to the UK, which could have been its first transfer of an entire military platform, although the

Lifting the ban on defense production 55 UK in 2015 chose instead to procure the Boeing P-­8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (Japan Times, 2014). Japan has been exploring similar defense and military technology cooperation with France since 2012, and there are reports of plans for cooperation on unmanned submarine technology (MoD, 2015a, p. 268). Japan has held discussions with Turkey over the development for the latter of tank engines, although progress has as yet been limited. Japan has been engaged in discussions with India as part of its ‘Strategic and Global Partnership’ for the transfer of Shin Maywa’s US-­2 search and rescue seaplane currently utilized by the MSDF. The two countries established a Joint Working Group (JWG) to explore export or licensed production of the US-­2 (MoFA, 2013a). The Japan-­India Summit in September 2014 resulted in a Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense and directed the JWG to accelerate progress on a ‘road map’ for the transfer of the aircraft and its technology (MoFA, 2014c). The December 2015 summit signed off an ‘Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ and further inched forward talks on the US-­2 (MoFA, 2015). The deal appeared to be in jeopardy in 2016 until Japan agreed a near ten percent price concession on the transfer of 12 US-­2s later in the year. Abe and Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted the importance of the deal in their bilateral summit meeting in November, but the two countries are yet to sign a final deal (MoFA, 2016b). Japan in seeking to further develop ‘strategic partnerships’ with the Philippines and Vietnam agreed in July 2013 to export ten patrol boats to the former through a yen loan and thus part of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provision, and in January 2013 to investigate providing similar maritime security support to Vietnam (MoFA, 2013b, 2013c). Japan and the Philippines signed a defense ministry-­level ‘Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges’ in January 2015, including pledging collaboration on defense equipment and technology (MoD, 2015b). Japan and the Philippines further produced in June 2015 an ‘Action Plan for Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership’ again making reference to defense equipment cooperation (MoD, 2015c). In September 2015, Abe and President Rodrigo Roa Duterte agreed on the transfer to The Philippines of MSDF TC-­90 training aircraft (MoFA, 2016a). The MoD was reported in August 2017 as looking to offer its PC-­3 patrol aircraft to the Philippines and spare parts for UH-­1 helicopters (Japan Times, 2017b). The MoD was also reported in December 2016 as attempting to sell Mitsubishi Electric Company’s (MELCO) FSP-­3 radar to Thailand in order to counter China’s increasing influence in arms sales to the country (Japan Times, 2016). Japan’s principal political and commercial efforts for the transfer of arms technology, outside the US-­Japan alliance, and representing the best opportunity for transferring an entire platform have been focused on ties with Australia. Japan and Australia as part of their ‘Strategic Partnership’ signed an Information Sharing Agreement in May 2012 and then in July 2014 signed an ‘Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ (MoFA, 2014b). The NSC in May 2015 under the new arms transfer principles provided permission for Japanese defense manufactures to enter the competition for Australia’s tender to replace its six Collins-­class submarines with up to 12 new boats by 2030

56  Christopher W. Hughes and worth up to A$50 billion. MHI and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation then sought, with strong encouragement from the Abe administration, to export their Sōryū-­class advanced air-­independent propulsion submarine technology, first hoping initially for an off-­the-­shelf export but then in November 2015 submitting a bid looking for joint development and offering build to Australian shipyards. Japan’s attempt to export submarines ended, however, in failure in April 2016, losing the contract to France’s DCNS. Japan’s failure resulted from a number of factors, including: questions over the appropriateness of the Soryu technology for Australia’s defense needs given that a longer range vessel may have been required; the evaporation of Australian domestic political support with the fall of the highly pro-­Japan Tony Abbott government in September 2015; and, crucially, the lack of experience of Japanese defense contractors in competing in international markets manifested in limited bidding skills, lack of an offset strategy, wariness to agree to licensed production, and reluctance to share advanced technologies (Gady, 2016; Mochizuki, 2016, pp. 72–94; Morimoto, 2014, pp. 108–128).

Japan’s emerging arms transfer strategy: opportunities and limitations Japan in its desire to adapt its overall grand strategy to changing circumstances and to mitigate risks of entrapment and now especially abandonment, has now moved to more actively and overtly embed its arms transfer policies within and to reinforce that strategy. It is also fair to say that Japan more than at any other time in its post-­war history has begun to articulate a strategic intent gearing its international security policy closely with arms transfers and moving beyond mercantilism or ‘techno-­nationalism’, and to develop arms transfers as a potentially credible tool of statecraft to work with a broader range of partners. Japanese policy-­makers’ efforts to initiate arms transfers with Australia, India, and ASEAN states, integrated with other measures such as ‘strategic partnership’ agreements, economic partnership agreements (EPA), and ODA provision, provide for a comprehensive package to support overall strategy. Moreover, arms transfers as part of this package appears to be gaining some traction with partner countries, with Australia continuing to gravitate closer to Japan strategically to form a ‘special relationship’, India demonstrating less standoffishness and embarking on further maritime security cooperation, and clearly the Philippines and Vietnam keen to involve Japan’s presence in the South China Sea as a counter-­balance to China’s rising influence (Wilkins, 2015). Indeed, much of recent Japanese activity in arms transfer can be seen as a means to build a coalition of like-­minded states to hedge against or even actively balance against Chinese regional influence, and particularly maritime expansion. The development of a Japanese arms transfer strategy in large part directed at responding to China’s rise draws attention back to the question of the degree to which Japan, whilst trying to add another option to its statecraft toolbox and broadening the scope of its international patterns, is deviating from or confirming its fundamental overall strategic direction of strengthening the US-­Japan alliance.

Lifting the ban on defense production 57 Japan’s development of stronger relations with Australia and India might in the future reach the degree to which these form hedging options for leverage against the US, hedging against dependence, or even alternatives to the US-­Japan alliance if the risks of entrapment and abandonment became too great. But clearly this is not Japan’s overall strategic intent, and neither Australia nor India share such an intent. Instead, it is apparent that Japan’s chief strategic objective, and this is matched by the embedding of arms transfers within it, is to re-­strengthen ties with the US and support the US ‘rebalance’, and Japan’s building of strategic and arms transfer relations with other partners is principally designed to complement this. Japan’s true intent and strategic direction is demonstrated by the simple fact that the majority of its arms transfers activities are firmly focused on, and even arguably increasingly locked into, the US-­Japan alliance relationship. Japan’s largest and currently realized arms transfer project in political, technological, and budgetary terms still remains BMD. The project entails not only the joint development of components of the SM-­3 BLK-­IIA interceptor missile, but in due course the likely establishment of joint production facilities. In turn, the project involves the further integration of US-­Japan ISR and space-­based surveillance early-­warning capabilities, and has already driven the moves for Japan’s revision of its ban on the exercise of collective self-­defense. Hence, this arms transfer project has been nothing short than a spearhead for the transformation and strengthening of US-­Japan alliance cooperation (Gronning, 2011). Japan’s participation in the F-­35 project only promises to further reinforce alliance bonds. For even if Japan has managed to negotiated a degree of build on the F-­35 through FACO and some elements of joint development, the majority of technology remains black-­boxed and Japan remains dependent on its alliance partner for the imparting of the most advanced technology. In addition, Japan’s necessary participation in ALGS integrates its technological capabilities into a US-­organized network of allies and strategic partners, all reinforcing broader US strategic dominance. Japan might seek to mitigate dependence on the US through development of the F-­3, but given its budgetary pressures and the lack of feasibility in going it alone in stealth fighter development, this may only represent an attempt to have some technological leverage on the US within the alliance but surely not a ready alternative. All in all, therefore, Japan’s principal efforts in arms transfer remain directed towards the US, to strengthening bilateral cooperation and integration of capabilities, and at the very most to hedge within the alliance rather than to create the option to hedge outside it. Moreover, Japan’s ability to hedge within the alliance through defense production may only become more problematic as the administration of Donald J. Trump presses its alliance partner to increases it burden-­sharing and defense expenditure. Japan may well thus devote more of its constrained defense budget to procuring additional US military equipment as a means to placate the US and be seen as a way for the US to offset the cost of its security guarantees to Japan. Japan’s decision to procure systems such as Aegis Ashore has only indicated that Japan may become further locked into greater dependency on US manufactured weapons systems

58  Christopher W. Hughes (Japan Times, 2017a; Asahi Shimbun, 2017). FMS imports from the US have meant that Japan’s level of domestic procurement by 2016 had fallen from around 90 to 77 percent, and the decision to import off-­the-­shelf a further 105 F-­35A and F-­35B fighters from the US has raised concerns that Japan’s fighter industry may be extinguished completely (Asahi Shimbun, 2019). Japan’s development of arms transfer relations with other states must surely also be seen in terms of looking to strengthen rather than mitigate or evade commitments to the US-­Japan alliance and the US ‘rebalance’. Japanese policy-­makers’ have only felt inclined to develop arms transfers with states aligned in some form with the US, and in certain cases to complement closely efforts at trilateral or quadrilateral cooperation involving these states and Japan as initiated by the US. Hence, Japan has attempted to foster arms transfer linkages with Australia, the Philippines, UK and France, all treaty partners with the US, and with India as a US strategic partner, and Vietnam as a US ‘comprehensive partner’. If Japan’s strategic intent in arms transfers marks fundamental continuity with the objective of strengthening the US-­Japan alliance, then there are also questions about the degree to which, even if Japan was seeking to eke out more strategic autonomy, that arms transfers as yet fully deliver the necessary efficacy as a policy tool. Japan’s arms transfers clearly remain small in value and number, and its strategy suffered a major setback with the failure of the Australian submarine project; and Japan has failed to get that far as yet with other partners that it maintains defense equipment agreements with, as in the attempt to sell the P-­1 to the UK. Japan’s policy-­makers and, just as importantly, defense producers also still lack much of the appropriate appetite and experience for successfully pursuing many international cooperation projects. The Keidanren and defense manufacturers, whilst in favor of enhanced international collaboration, still appear to cling to the argument that the only way to really preserve Japan’s indigenous production base is for the government to increase domestic defense spending, and are concerned that international collaboration spells simply more competition and market-­opening that could jeopardize domestic producers (Keidanren, 2015; Asahi Shimbun, 2014c). Defense producers appear keenly aware that they lack experience of international bidding processes, even basic language skills for purveying their products, and argue that the Japanese government if it wishes to encourage international transfers for strategic reasons should provide a system of FMS, offsets, and export subsidies (Keidanren, 2015, p. 3; Jo, 2016). The failure of the Australian submarine procurement bid appears to have heavily deterred many major Japan defense producers from venturing into international markets. Finally, many defense producers continue to worry about the reputational costs domestically of arms exports and are simply not that motivated to follow government international strategies, still preferring more lucrative and lower-­risk civilian markets (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). In conclusion, then, Japan’s strategic intent, although looking to increase arms transfers as an expanding and integrated option for statecraft and delivering some dividends in international cooperation, still remains focused on deepening

Lifting the ban on defense production 59 US-­Japan alliance cooperation, and to investigate cooperation with other partners only yet as far as to reinforce from another direction the US ‘rebalance’ to the region. Japan can be said to be diversifying only as far as to re-­center on the US-­ Japan alliance.

Notes 1 In 1967, Prime Minister Satō Eisaku’s administration first enunciated restrictions on arms exports to communist states, countries under UN sanctions, and parties to international disputes. In 1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s administration ordered restraint in the case of all states, and prohibited the export of weapon-­related technology. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro began to erode this principle by signing an Exchange of Technology Agreement Between Japan and the United States in November 1983. For an exhaustive account of the arms export ban principles, see Morimoto 2011. For Japan’s export of dual-­use technologies that despite the ban found their way into military usage, see Drifte 1986. 2 The Development Cooperation Charter states that: ‘Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or member of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-­military purposes such as public welfare or disaster relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-­by-­case basis in light of their substantive relevance’ (Cabinet Office Japan 2015). 3 For the Yoshida Doctrine’s origins and evolution, see Kōsaka 1968: 47–59; Pyle 1987: 246–249; Green 2001: 14–15; Samuels, 2007: 35, 43; Chai 1997: 389–412. 4 The MOD for fiscal 2015–2016 has requested a 2.2  percent increase in the defense budget, which would bring it back to the levels of the late 1990s and mark the largest defense budget in the post-­war period (Ministry of Defense of Japan 2016).

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Part II

Diversifying security partners

5 Japan’s ‘special’ strategic partnership with Australia ‘Decentering’ underwrites ‘recentering’ Thomas S. Wilkins Japan’s ‘new bilateralism’: building strategic partnerships Japanese security policy has conventionally attached supreme importance to its treaty alliance with the United States, and there is little doubt it remains ‘cornerstone’ of its national defense policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA), 2012b). As Ghee (2015, p. 2) attests, ‘Japan certainly sees its bilateral military alliance with the US as the basis of Japan’s security, and Japanese Governments tend to strengthen their security through the US, not outside it’. However, while the US remains central to Japanese security thinking, we are witnessing a remarkable shift in policy whereby Tokyo has actively sought out additional partners for bilateral security cooperation, as supplements to its heretofore exclusive reliance upon the US. In other words, a degree of ‘decentering’ or diversification in security partners is evident in contemporary strategic thinking in Japan. Accordingly, Sahashi (2013, p. 10) posits that US-­alliance is seen as necessary, but not sufficient, for Tokyo to achieve the objectives of its grand strategy. This trend may be accelerated, not only as more general apprehension about American ‘staying power’ in the Asia-­Pacific emerges in Tokyo, as well as other allied capitals, but as the Trump presidency casts doubt upon American commitment to its regional alliances. An unnamed Japanese official declares that ‘We are certainly concerned about the comments [Trump] has made to date about the alliance and the U.S. role in the Pacific, particularly Japan’ (Sieg & Park, 2016). Though Tokyo was in some ways ambivalent about the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP), President Trump’s torpedoing of that agreement has further raised misgivings about American investment in its regional commitments, and its solidarity with its local allies. Indeed, Tokyo’s championship, along with Canberra, of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-­Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018, as a substitute, or ‘place holder’ for the TPP, is indicative of the dilemma of proceeding ahead with joint interests, even in the absence of Washington, whilst conterminously hoping that the US will accede to it at a later date (Abernethy, 2019). Though Tokyo, especially in the mid-­1990s, sought to diversify away from US-­ dependence by investing in multilateral security institutions, such as ASEAN+3 and the ARF, it has recently recalibrated its efforts towards new forms of non-­US

68  Thomas S. Wilkins bilateralism (as well as ‘mini-­lateralism’) (Yuzawa, 2007). From the mid-­2000s, in tandem with reinforcing its alliance relationship with the US, Tokyo has deliberately prioritized the creation of new forms of bilateral security cooperation with key states (Wilkins, 2014). Francis Fukuyama (2008, p. 248) observes that ‘Japan has . . . been moving to implement its own version of a hub-­and-­spokes system, tying itself more closely to countries that might balance China under the rubric of a “values based” foreign policy’. Indeed, bilateral relations with Australia, South Korea, and India, get top billing in key policy documents such as the pivotal National Security Strategy (2013), alongside a range of South East Asian and European partners (Government of Japan, 2013, p. 23). Through this process, Sahashi (2013, p. 10) contends that ‘Multiplying such partnerships also helps to position Japan at the center of the Asian security network’ [Italics added]. Therefore, we can see tentative evidence that Japan may see itself as a supplemental ‘pole’ of strategic attraction in the East Asian region. Whatever Tokyo’s ultimate desires and objectives, there is increasing recognition by scholars and analysts that ‘strategic partnerships’ and their variants are now forming an integral part of the region’s ‘security architecture’, taking their place between the US-­alliances, minilaterals, and various multilateral talk shops such as ASEAN+3, the ARF, and EAS (Envall & Hall, 2016; Tow & Taylor, 2010). As the first instance of Japan undertaking bilateral security cooperation outside of the US, the Australian case emblematizes a paradigm-­shift in policy, with Kersten (2012, p. 96) noting that ‘Japan recalibrated its relationship with Australia as part of its new regional and global strategy’. The Japan-­Australia bilateral has set the benchmark for other subsequent and future strategic partnerships, and perhaps most significantly, served as an experimental ‘proving ground’ not only for this new strategy of ‘external’ mobilization (i.e. ‘decentering’ by creating new alignments), but also for many ‘internal’ strategic objectives, such as security ‘normalization’ and others, considered below (Wilkins, 2017b).

Japan-­Australia: ‘a special strategic partnership’ The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (2018a) identifies the two countries as ‘ “Special Strategic Partners” that share fundamental values and strategic interests.’ As Cook and Wilkins (2014) have pointed out, in official Japanese documentation, Australia consistently appears as the ‘first-­ranked’ of Japan’s bilateral strategic partners. It was the first such strategic partnership to be institutionalized, has progressed the most rapidly, and appears the most successful/effective of Tokyo’s desired partnerships to date. For all these reasons, Sahashi (2013, p. 12) concludes that ‘The relationship with Australia is the best example to demonstrate the Japanese strategy in security partnerships’ [Italics added]. As such, it has established the template for subsequent strategic partnerships that have followed in its wake, such as India, and others discussed in this volume. This chapter first examines some of the actuators behind the establishment of the Japan-­Australia strategic partnership from the mid-­2000s onwards, and briefly reviews the contours of its institutional structure (for comparative analysis to other

Japan’s partnership with Australia  69 case studies). The main analysis will then highlight the specific benefits yielded by the Australian connection for Japan (many of which are of course reciprocal). In other words, what makes it ‘special’ in Japanese eyes? The chapter then considers some of the problems and issues that are associated with this security dyad. Lastly, it reflects on how the influence of the US-­alliance (paradoxically) remains pervasive even in erstwhile Japanese attempts to ‘decenter’ away from absolute dependence upon its superpower protector.

Founding the first strategic partnership When Japanese Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe (in his first term) started looking beyond the US for other states with which they could potentially engage in security cooperation, Australia was at the top of the list. Indeed, the attraction of working with Canberra was facilitated by several factors, which, if aspirations were realized, would yield concrete benefits for Japan. Firstly, as liberal democracies in the Pacific with a strong sense of ‘shared interests and values,’ thus operationalizing Japanese ‘values-­based diplomacy’ (see below), Canberra was swiftly identified as a ‘natural partner.’ Unlike the thorny relations Japan suffers with some of its East Asian neighbors or Russia, Japan has enjoyed a track record of ‘long-­ standing and deep friendship’ (MoFA, 2014b) with Australia based upon strong commercial ties stretching back to the 1950s. More proactive Japan-­Australia diplomatic cooperation during the 1990s (for example: PKOs in Cambodia 1993 and East Timor, 1999) paved the way—in accord with the functionalist notion of ‘spillover’—for intensifying cooperation in the security sphere. The consequential levels of familiarity and trust built upon the economic and diplomatic planks of the bilateral relationship made Tokyo’s bold experiment in building a new bilateral security relationship both relatively frictionless and risk-­free. This allowed the partnership to progress even under weak political leadership (including the revolving premierships under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) between 2009–2012). Indeed, this bipartisan political consensus on closer security alignment with Australia has been maintained from the inception of the partnership, its momentum largely unchecked. The establishment of stronger bilateral security ties was also aided by the encouragement of their joint ally, the United States. Whilst during the Cold War Japan and Australia—as ‘northern and southern anchors’—remained in the status of ‘quasi-­allies,’ only indirectly allied as ‘spokes’ in the American ‘hub-­ and-­spoke’ system, Washington was keen to close the gap between them as part of its desire to ‘connect the spokes’ together into a more integrated alliance front (Cha, 1999). All of these factors combined lowered the ‘transaction costs’ involved in building up swift and effective cooperation as strategic partners. The political, strategic, and bureaucratic momentum behind the enhanced security relationship has led to an accretion of a well-­developed institutional structure that serves to operationalize the partnership. Since this has been detailed by the author and others elsewhere, the following only indicates some of the landmark declarations, agreements, and developments in the implementation of the partnership (Walton, 2012, pp. 13–28). Though the term ‘strategic partnership’ was

70  Thomas S. Wilkins coined in 2005 to describe the Japan-­Australia relationship, it took on tangible meaning in 2007 with the promulgation of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) (MoFA, 2007). This may be said to be the foundational document of the current strategic partnership, with an adjunct ‘Action Plan’ appended to facilitate the implementation of its stated objectives (MoFA, 2009). A ‘Common Vision and Objectives’ statement was issued in 2012, and acts as a form of ‘charter’ for the partnership (MoFA, 2012a). It is possible to assemble a more complex institutional picture of the workings of the strategic partnership, as I have done elsewhere, but its most important elements are annual leadership summits and ‘2 + 2’ (Foreign and Defense) Minsters meetings (the eighth of which met in October 2018), and a raft of ancillary agreements and memoranda of understanding (Department of Defense, 2018). The Japan-­Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA) was signed in 2014 crowning the deep economic relationship that has developed over the past fifty years, with Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop commenting that ‘The Economic Partnership Agreement between Australia and Japan is held up as a model for others’ (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 2016). What distinguishes the strategic partnership from others that follow (or seek to follow) this basic design is the addition of logistics through an Acquisition and Cross-­Servicing Agreement (ACSA), intelligence sharing through an Information Sharing Agreement (ISA), and a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement (MoFA, 2014a). Tokyo has even established a dedicated Japan-­Australia Defense Cooperation Office in 2014 to oversee proposed military transfers or joint procurement projects. By adding additional ‘depth’ to the bilateral, these mechanisms lend the partnership a ‘special’ quality not replicated so far in other less-­developed strategic partnerships.

What makes Japan-­Australia partnership so ‘special’? Unlike some of Japan’s other aspiring strategic partnerships, this one is multidimensional, with a degree of ‘breadth’ in its scope of activities that is unmatched elsewhere. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans sets the tone for the ‘special’ nature of the relationship, claiming With Japan, we have an extraordinarily fully rounded relationship, no longer just one-­dimensionally economic, but very mature, very close, and very cooperative politically: for example, we are the only country with whom Japan continues to actively and regularly engage in a formal multi-­member Ministerial council dialogue. (Evans, 1996) This section now explores several facets of the partnership through which Japan derives substantive benefits from its new security relationship with Australia. Diplomatic/security cooperation: The Japanese authorities have repeatedly remarked that Japan faces an increasingly hostile international environment, especially in its immediate neighborhood of East Asia, where relations with

Japan’s partnership with Australia 71 neighboring powers such as China, Russia, and the two Koreas are far from satisfactory. As a consequence, perhaps inspired by Meiji reformer Yukichi Fukuzawa’s well-­known exhortation to ‘leave Asia and join Europe’ (Datsu-­A nyū-­Ō), Tokyo has sought to create diplomatic space elsewhere in the Pacific region (and ‘over the horizon’ in Europe) to shore up its international position. In addition to the US, Australia, as a regional ‘middle power’ (and co-­ally of the US), has been a valuable interlocutor diplomatically across a range of issues at the heart of Japanese security concerns. Not least, Australia has been a longtime supporter of a permanent seat in the UN for Japan, and the two consulted closely during Canberra’s tenure as a non-­P5 member in 2013–14. They continued this coordination when Tokyo assumed a non-­P5 seat in 2016–17 (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 2015). Wilton (2015, p. 6) attests that ‘The strength of the Australia-­Japan relationship Shinzō is reflected in the ability of both countries to work together to achieve regional and global objectives.’ Many of these fall under the broad umbrella of regional security order, which can be identified as the organizing ‘system principle’ of the partnership (Wilkins, 2010). To elaborate: Japan as a status quo power seeks to maintain a stable and rules-­based regional order and is highly adverse to disruptions to such an order. In particular, these have taken the form of Chinese challenges to international law in the East China Sea (ECS) (where Japan is directly affected) and the South China Sea (SCS) (where it is not). Joint official statements affirm the partners’ mutual interest in ‘a stable and secure regional maritime order, including through enhanced maritime security cooperation’ (Department of Defense, 2018). For example, in the annual leadership summit of 2015, former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull issued a joint statement with Abe registering their ‘Strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the South China Sea’ (Kampmark, 2015). Australia had previously outlined its opposition to Chinese attempts to unilaterally extend an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over disputed territory, and again affirmed its opposition to the construction of artificial islands (and their militarization) in the SCS in 2016, notably during a meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister; an act that drew predictable censure from Beijing (Wen, 2016). There is, however, a limit to the support Canberra is willing to give on these contentious territorial issues. Though Japan has not received direct recognition of its claim over the disputed Senkaku Islands from Canberra, de facto such support (arguably) implicitly exists (Wilkins, 2016). Though Australia would be unlikely to render assistance to Japan unilaterally when its ANZUS obligations are considered, action alongside the US to support Japan become much more probable (see below). Japan is additionally working with Australia to assist other regional states facing coercive activities in the maritime sphere in ‘capacity-­building’ efforts, including the transfer of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and military hardware (an arrangement also extended to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), where Japan shares Australia’s wariness of expanding Chinese influence). Indeed, the partners have outlined a quite comprehensive joint Australia-­Japan Strategy for Cooperation in the Pacific, including: effective governance, economic growth

72  Thomas S. Wilkins and sustainable development, security and defense cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016). This area of cooperation has attracted greater attention in response to Chinese economic and political penetration of the PICS, and the Australia government has responded with its ‘Pacific Step-­Up’ policy to catalyze individual and joint efforts (Tidwell, 2019). This also includes trilateral (with the US) economic cooperation, with a major focus on Papua New Guinea (PNG), through the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in The Indo-­Pacific, for example (MoFA, 2018b). All this fits into a broader Japanese strategic objective of managing the rise of China by reducing its diplomatic isolation and concerting efforts to restrain Beijing’s growing geopolitical influence. Thus, Heazle and O’Neil (2011, p. 3) posit that ‘China’s rise is enhancing the importance of Australia in Japanese policy thinking.’ This mutual support regarding the above issues is a form of ‘soft balancing’ of the PRC. Satake (2016, p. 25) adds that ‘both countries have developed their cooperation in order to construct a liberal international order based on institutions, rules, norms and values, rather than simply coping with an external threat.’ One of the most salient aspects of this cooperation can be seen in their mutual championship and continued support for multilateral security institutions such as Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asian Summit (EAS). While the two have collaborated closely on these former initiatives, they failed to coordinate in simultaneous and competing efforts to build a regional security community around 2008–9 when Kevin Rudd’s ‘Asia Pacific community’ and Hatoyama Yukio’s ‘East Asian Community’ initiatives collided with one another (Wilkins, 2017a). These soft-­ balancing and community-­building efforts notwithstanding, Canberra is not oblivious to the potential military dangers posed by the rise of China or North Korea and has condemned the Pyongyang’s missile tests (and along with Japan, applied sanctions), much to Tokyo’s satisfaction. In addition, the partners are jointly extending their strategic purview toward a new arena for cooperation in the Indo-­Pacific region. This was initiated by Japan’s Free and Open Indo-­Pacific (FOIP) foreign policy strategy (or ‘vision’), which aims at ‘Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade, etc.; Pursuit of economic prosperity (improving connectivity and strengthening economic partnership including EPA/FTAs and investment treaties); and Commitment for peace and stability’ (MoFA, 2019). Though Canberra has not officially endorsed the FOIP per se (unlike the US), the eighth bilateral 2 + 2 meeting indicated that ‘Australia and Japan shared elements of their strategic visions for the Indo-­Pacific region . . . in order to maintain and promote a free, open, stable and prosperous Indo-­Pacific region founded on the rules-­based international order’ (Department of Defense, 2018). Thus, Tokyo has been broadly successful in winning Australia’s support on all fronts for its FOIP vision for the Indo-­Pacific region (Miller & Wilkins, 2019). Values-­based diplomacy. Under Prime Minister Abe in particular, Japan, as part of its efforts towards an international resurgence, has emphasized so-­ called ‘values-­based diplomacy.’ This brand of diplomacy plays up adherence to

Japan’s partnership with Australia 73 international law, good international citizenship and the practice of liberal democratic norms more generally (as emblematized in the FOIP). Once again, Australia is a perfect fit for cooperation on this score. The Defense of Japan 2016 states that ‘Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy’ (Ministry of Defense of Japan (MoD), 2016). Wilton (2015, p. 10) concurs that ‘Australia has a history of incorporating the consideration of values into foreign policymaking as a means of contributing to issues that go beyond responsibilities within borders and towards responsibilities to people and institutions outside Australia’s borders.’ Indeed, as one might anticipate, the strategic partnership serves as a vehicle for showcasing and operationalizing such values (as Fukuyama noted above), with official statements declaring: the ‘special strategic partnership between Australia and Japan, a partnership based on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade’ (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 2015). Interestingly, a similar approach has been taken with other ‘like-­minded’ partners such as India, where again the jointly held values are seen to catalyze and underpin cooperation. Behind this lies Japan’s desire to use normative means and international law to defend against challenges to the status quo. As US hegemony in the Asia-­Pacific declines, Japan has found common ground with other like-­ minded (especially ‘middle’) powers that seek to uphold a rules-­based international order, as American ability to uphold the status quo purely through military supremacy wanes. This has spurred joint cooperation across on diplomatic issues such as Freedom of Navigation/Overflight—and disruption thereof—supplemented by an enthusiasm for regional ‘public goods’ such as maritime cooperation, HaDR, and so forth that form the heart of their practical security cooperation (see below). Such collaboration leads Manuel Panagiotopoulos (2016, p.  6) to conclude that ‘The Australia-­Japan relationship is an example of “values-­based alignment” which has been supplementing realpolitik calculations.’ Normalization. Australia’s desire to have Tokyo play a more significant role in regional security has resulted in strong political endorsement of both Japan’s domestic and international policy agendas. Bisley (2014) argues that ‘The Australian government’ has made ‘a very public strategic commitment to a Japan that is in a period of significant transformation.’ In particular, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott provided a ringing endorsement of Abenomics and Japan’s ‘proactive contribution to international peace.’ Furthermore, supporting Abenomics, the Prime Minister declared ‘Japan’s economic resurgence under Prime Minister Abe will be good for Japan, good for Australia and good for the world’ (Abbott, 2014). This transnational political support provides a fillip to the Japanese Prime Minister’s domestic and international standing, with the resultant political capital assisting in achieving objectives in both spheres. To this degree, Canberra has welcomed new legislation and reinterpretations of the Japanese constitution to facilitate easier SDF deployment overseas—for example, in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO)—including the principle of ‘collective self-­defense’ (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 2015). The recent Peace and Security legislation

74  Thomas S. Wilkins approved in 2016 permits Japan to engage on a broader scope of allied operations with Australia in the future (see Akimoto, 2018). Indeed, Australian forces already count several instances of PKO co-­deployment, including southern Iraq and South Sudan. Japan has also received political support from Australia for the loosening of its rules for arms exports (and Japan hopes that Australia will be a major customer for indigenous defense technology: see below). Ghee (2015, p. 1) attests that ‘Australia’s engagement with Japan explicitly supports Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s agenda of revising Japan’s defense posture and increasing involvement in regional security issues, even at some risk of upsetting China.’ History. In the background of such security ‘normalization,’ the issue of ‘history’ looms large. This relates to Japan’s historical culpability for atrocities inflicted by imperial forces during the Great East Asia/Pacific War (Rees, 2002). Whilst Abe’s mixed messages about Japan’s role in those wars, including objectionable private views, have alienated China and South Korea, Australia has registered no such indignation. Rather, according to Wilton (2015, p. 1), ‘Australia, as a country with strong ties to Japan, has found a way to reconcile its relationship with Japan, despite its own historical grievances from the Second World War.’ Instead, particularly under (former) Prime Minister Abbott, Canberra stressed a forward-­looking relationship, and he even went as far as to praise the ‘courage’ of Japanese submariners in their daring raid on Sydney Harbor in 1942 (Szego, 2014). Moreover, while this was not accepted uncritically among the Australian public, it is clear that historical enmities on Australia’s part are largely consigned to the past and serve as no inhibitor to contemporary relations. This is a refreshing change for Japanese officials accustomed to ritualistic censure from their Chinese and Korean counterparts. It also acts as a ‘demonstration effect,’ perhaps pointing the way toward longer-­term reconciliation with countries in East Asia that may be encouraged to follow the Australian example. This was again evident in Prime Minister Abe’s historic official visit to Darwin, the port heavily bombed by Japanese air forces in the Pacific War in 2018. Hanada (2018) writes that ‘This important symbolic step, akin to Abe’s visit to Pearl Harbor in 2016, demonstrates a rejection of nationalism in Japanese foreign policy approaches in favor of historical reconciliation.’ On this basis, Medcalf (2014) surmises that that ‘Australia and Japan should make more of their exceptional record of reconciliation.’ Practical security/defense cooperation. The special strategic partnership, however, goes beyond the political/diplomatic area to encompass working-­level security/defense cooperation. As Ishihara (2014, p. 97) has pointed out, the strategic partnership with Australia is not simply a ‘talk shop,’ but an ‘action shop,’ where tangible security cooperation occurs on a range of issues. Its current remit includes: deeper and broader defense cooperation, including exercises, operations, capacity building, enhanced navy, army, and air force engagement activities and strategic visits, trilateral cooperation with the United States, and further cooperation on defense equipment, science, and technology. (Department of Defence, 2018)

Japan’s partnership with Australia 75 Indeed, as part of the strategic partnership’s modus operandi, Japan seeks to ‘learn’ through cooperation with Australia in fields ranging from intelligence, logistics, and operations. Appearing elsewhere are joint efforts in counterterrorism and non-­proliferation (where Japan has worked with Australia in the UN). Japanese forces have undergone regular joint training exercises and staff exchanges with the ADF and have gained ‘in-­field’ experience during co-­deployment in southern Iraq, East Timor, and South Sudan, building up military-­to-­military interoperability (which some have argued requires additional investment to realize its potential) (Keir, 2015). Moreover, in 2019, the two countries participated in the long-­awaited BUSHIDO GUARDIAN bilateral military exercise in Hokkaido, which involved Royal Australia Air Force (RAAF) and Japan Air Self Defense Force (SDF) combat aircraft, to evaluate and increase interoperability (Gady, 2019). Mechanisms such as the ISA and ACSA (recently upgraded in 2016) have also proved their worth, with the latter facilitating Australia’s major contribution to disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 (Operation PACIFIC ASSIST) and later cooperation on relief efforts after Philippines Typhoon Haiyan and search for the missing passenger airliner MH370 (The Japan Times, 2016). While much of the discourse has been framed in non-­traditional security (NTS) terms highlighting HaDR and PKOs, Ishihara (2015) has identified what he calls a ‘second evolution’ in security cooperation, which indicates an increasing focus on more traditional ‘hard security’ issues. Indeed, it could be argued that NTS forms a means toward CBMs/trust-­building, which will later develop into military cooperation (or arguably acts as a ‘cover’ for such actual intent). To this purpose, both Japan and Australia have developed improved amphibious capabilities in parallel that could be effectively tailored to work together in the future. Furthermore, Australia and Japan have held discussions regarding a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would ‘enable the two nations to conduct joint security exercises and disaster relief operations. Under such an accord, they will be allowed to bring troops, equipment and ammunition into each other’s country’ (The Japan Times, 2015). This had not eventuated at the time of writing, however. Instead, a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) is currently being negotiated that would simplify joint training and procedures when SDF personnel visit Australia and vice-­versa (Parliament of Australia, 2017). This expanding security collaboration is undergirded the emergence of defense technology cooperation, where Tokyo views Australia as a potential major collaborator, even setting up a dedicated Japan-­Australia Defense Cooperation Office in 2014 to manage such enterprises. Japan’s partial retraction of the ‘three principles on arms export’ allowing for this is embodied in the Standards for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment (2011) and Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Technology (METI, 2014) legislation (Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, 2011). However, this field of cooperation suffered a severe blow when its prolific bid for Australia’s SEA 1000 Future Submarine Program, was beaten by its French Rival, DCNS, leaving Japanese representatives rather aggrieved (Wroe & Johnson, 2016). The loss of the contract was a severe setback in the overall

76  Thomas S. Wilkins strategic partnership depriving it of a centerpiece defense collaboration and the potential benefits of technology/expertise transfer and improved interoperability/ joint warfighting capability. Analysts have scrambled to offer a plethora of ex post facto explanations for the controversial decision not to back the Mitsubishi/ Kawasaki bid, ranging from Japan’s inexperience in major overseas arms sales to a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the tenderers themselves (Gady, 2016). Consequently, Medcalf, among others, has suggested that ‘We need to take the initiative now to assure the Japanese that a close strategic partnership is about more than submarines’ (Wroe & Johnson, 2016). Other areas of technical cooperation, such as space and cybersecurity, are also on the table at the time of writing (Davis, 2016; MoFA, 2016). Other areas of cooperation. If joint diplomatic and security cooperation is seen as the primary impetus for the strategic partnership, other aspects of deep cooperation that reflect the maturity and ‘specialness’ of the relationship should not be ignored. As in all alliances/strategic partnerships, these reinforce ties at the top level. First, due to the Japan-­Australia EPA of 2014, Japan has made major efforts to revitalize its historically strong economic relationship with Australia. Abe expended significant political capital to drive through the early conclusion of this FTA with Australia. Though—as is the case will all Asia-­Pacific states—trade with China by volume overshadows their own bilateral exchange, Japan remains Australian second-­largest trading partner, with approximately $70bn in total bilateral exchange (based upon the slightly out-­of-­date official figures) (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014). Moreover, a more recent study conducted by Panagiotopoulos (2016) for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) argues that the Japan-­ Australia relationship amounts to a ‘new economic paradigm,’ when FDI figures, developed-­to-­developed country benefits and political risk factors are calculated, which greatly benefits both countries. Emblematic of this are major infrastructure investment projects such as the INPEX Ichthys Liquid Natural Gas facility in northern Australia, which will make a significant contribution to meeting Japan’s energy needs (Milne, 2017). Japan’s joint efforts with Australia to expand economic cooperation regionally through the CATPP and PICS-­related investments, have been noted earlier. Finally, it is worth mentioning that people-­to-­people ties also reinforce the relationship at the grass-­roots level with Australians recording 80% ‘favorable’ views toward Japan (in contrast to South Korea’s 25% and China’s 12%), according to the latest Pew polling figures (Stokes, 2015). This provides a durable base of public support in Australia for the strategic partnership.

Points of contention for Japan Political opposition. While the strategic partnership with Australia considered a significant success to date (the failed submarine deal notwithstanding), Tokyo does hold some reservations about Australian policy that may serve to slow progress or arrest it in the future. Firstly, the political leadership—most outstandingly under Abe and Abbott (where they radiated the ‘special relationship’)—has been one of

Japan’s partnership with Australia 77 the key forces behind the augmentation of bilateral relations. And while Satake (2016, p. 25) notes that ‘closer security cooperation with Australia is mostly welcomed within the Japanese security community,’ the relationship has been subjected to some negative scrutiny among strategic commentators and policy elites in Australia. There is some opposition to the continued enhancement of security ties with Japan, especially if it were to eventuate in a treaty-­alliance, prolific academic and ex-­defense official, Hugh White, chief among these (White, 2012). However, so far, the critics appear to have failed in gaining traction in government circles to date, and this should reassure Japan (Wilkins, 2016). Some disquiet was raised at the departure of Prime Minister Abbott, who had shown himself to be an unbridled supporter of the relationship, imprudently dubbing Japan and ‘ally’ and ‘closest friend in Asia.’ It is doubtful, however, that a shift in personalities or government will seriously affect the essential quality of the relationship, even if differing degrees of enthusiasm affect the pace of its development. In Australia, as well in Japan, the strategic partnership has increasingly become a fact of diplomatic life, and once such relations are formed and institutionalized, bureaucratic interests, political constituencies result in a self-­generating momentum. Indeed, despite the upset over the submarine bid, Turnbull’s December 2015 summit meeting in Tokyo emphasized the need for ‘strategic continuity’ in bilateral relations (Shanahan, 2015). By 2019, Australia’s new Prime Minister Scott Morrison had met with Abe on several occasions and seemingly established a good rapport with his Japanese counterpart (SBS News, 2019). Whaling. Perhaps the most politically delicate irritant in relations with Australia is the whaling issue (O’Connor et al., 2016). Australia has held diametrically opposed views on the harvesting of whales in the Southern Ocean (particularly in its own territorial waters, some of which are designated as whale sanctuaries). Indeed, in 2014, in response to then Prime Minister Rudd’s plea, the International Court of Justice ruled that Japan’s ‘scientific research’ activities were in breach of international law. Though the ruling went against Japan, ways to circumvent the ban are underway with some vested interests in Japan aiming to politicize the issue as an affront to Japanese national culture/sovereignty (a stance somewhat at odds with Japan’s otherwise emphatic support for international law, noted above). During the 2015 leadership summit, Turnbull did little to conceal ‘Australia’s perennial dissatisfaction with whaling, a moral tag that tends to rub Japan-­Australian relations’ (Kampmark, 2015). Indeed, Japan’s 2019 decision to resume commercial whaling—of which Australia disapproves—but confine it to its own territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—which is welcome—takes some heat out of the tensions, and more likely forecloses possibilities of some form of clash with anti-­whaling activists in Australian territorial waters. Nevertheless, as Wyeth argues: ‘Despite the firm positions that both countries hold on the issue, they have also proved adept at isolating this area of disagreement from the wider bilateral relationship’ (Wyeth, 2019). The China gap. Perhaps the most hazardous aspect of Japan’s relationship with Australia is what Satake has dubbed the ‘China gap theory.’ He argues that, ‘Unlike Japan, where there is a broad consensus on the risks of the rise of China and its

78  Thomas S. Wilkins threats to Japanese territory and sovereignty, Australia holds much more divergent views on how to assess the rise of China’ (Satake, 2016, p. 30). The voices of the critics of the relationship noted above have fueled this perception by arguing that Canberra should avoid upsetting Beijing (though implicit or explicit support for Japan) lest they receive economic punishment from the Middle Kingdom in retribution. Fears that Australia may become ‘entrapped’ into a Sino-­Japanese conflict through the strategic partnership have cast doubts in Japanese eyes over Australia’s ultimate commitment to the strategic partnership, though realistically it must be recognized that the Japanese understand that no such support is guaranteed, and do not proceed on this basis (and this misses the point of strategic partnerships which are designed to be less-­binding that conventional military alliances anyway). I have argued elsewhere that the point of Australian entrapment by Tokyo is moot anyway. Due to its (perceived) ANZUS commitments to the US, Australia will be compelled by Washington to support and participate in any regional conflict that the US is engaged in, especially in light of American guarantees of Japanese sovereign territory (Wilkins, 2016). The US-­alliance system is not as divisible as some believe, at least not in the case of the US-­Japan-­Australia who have increased their military relations with one another independently and trilaterally, making combined action all the more likely (see below). Yet, evidence of a robust diplomatic posture against Chinese assertive ambitions in the maritime sphere indicated above should reassure Japan that Australia is prepared to take a stand even in the face of Beijing’s displeasure. Paradoxically then the ‘China factor’ both unites and divides the strategic partners.

Japan’s decentering/recentering (and becoming a center itself)? By (re-­)introducing the role of the United States into the equation at this juncture, several coexisting trends can be uncovered in relation to Japan’s strategic partnership with Australia, on the face of it contradictory. First, as mentioned earlier, the new bilateral security relationship with Australia can be regarded as a definitive attempt to diversify from its absolute security dependence upon the US; in other words: ‘decenter.’ This is motivated not only by the numerous benefits enumerated above that make the partnership valuable in its own right, but as a ‘hedge’ against diminishing power and credibility on America’s part. Invoking questions over American reliability and resolve in the future, a panel of experts indicated that ‘Cuts to the US defense budget in coming years could push Australia and Japan into an even closer security cooperation relationship’ (Heazle & O’Neil, 2011, p. 4). Japan is well aware that Australia is not powerful enough to substitute the power of the US, but as a middle power has a certain range of diplomatic and military capabilities that can be contributed to Japan’s assistance across a spectrum of eventualities, mainly in the NTS sphere. Ghee (2015, p. 4) contests that, ‘Arguably, Australia and Japan have as much or more in common with respect to their national interests as they do with the US.’ The special strategic partnership connection creates valuable space for the countries to confer with one another

Japan’s partnership with Australia 79 over a ‘Plan B’ scenario in which the US disengages, partially disengages, or loses its credibility as a regional hegemon, even as the alternatives look unpromising (Heazle & O’Neil, 2017). Yet, as Envall and Hall (2016, p. 89) note—such strategic partnerships are unlikely to supersede the US-­alliance system—but ‘their development is nonetheless significant on their own terms.’ This point is accentuated by recent domestic political developments in the US with the current Trump presidency creating deep uncertainly among American allies as a result of flippant and uninformed comments relating to its bilateral alliance pacts (Sieg & Park, 2016). Though the worst fears of US disengagement under Trump have not as yet materialized, they have nonetheless unsettled both Tokyo and Canberra, both of whom have rushed to pay ritual obeisance to their superpower ally (in both cases with awkward results) (Willis, 2016). No doubt parallel to such affirmations of loyalty to the US, policy-­makers in both Tokyo and Canberra are mutually contemplating both how they might handle a more fickle US ally together (‘managing Trump’ in common parlance), and how they might further deepen their hedging strategies against American decline or withdrawal in the future. Indeed, it is no secret that ‘For years, American allies in East and Southeast Asia have been quietly preparing to rely less on the United States for regional stability and security,’ according to Soloway (2016). If early predictions from analysts that allies will have to look more to their own security individually or collectively arise under Trump and accelerate this existing trend, the strategic partnership is the ideal pre-­existing framework for such collaborative discussions. However, as noted, Australia is just the premier example of Japan’s range of strategic partnerships. When actual or potential partners such as India (especially), South Korea (possibly, but presently unlikely) and key SEA states, particularly Indonesia, are added to the equation, a stronger configuration—a ‘concert of middle powers’ emerges, in which Abe apparently aims to place Japan itself at the center (or at least sub-­center). Soeya (2013) attests that ‘To open up this new dimension of middle-­power cooperation, there is no more natural partner than Japan and Australia.’ While this occurrence is far from certain at this point, many other states also share concerns about the rise of Chinese power and the diminution of American guarantees. They have joined Japan in ‘hedging,’ and thereby at least a degree of ‘decentering’ the US-­alliance. In contradiction to this assessment, Ghee (2015, p. 2) identifies ‘it is certainly arguable that the Australian-­Japan bilateral security partnership has advanced because of, and through, the US alliance.’ Indeed, to be comprehensively understood the development of Japanese security ties with Australia needs to be put into the larger context of the American San Francisco alliance system as a whole, and the recent adoption of the American Indo-­Pacific Strategy, centered upon the FOIP (The United States Department of Defense, 2019). Americans have long been desirous of overcoming the ‘quasi-­ally’ status of key ‘spokes’ in the system by encouraging them to ‘network’ or ‘connect’ together. This is especially evident in the case of Japan and Australia, who are directly linked with one another and the US ‘hub’ through trilateral processes such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) (Wilkins, 2007). This hard-­headed assessment, according to Satake (2016,

80  Thomas S. Wilkins p. 31), rests upon the realization that ‘Even if Japan and Australia can supplement some of the USA’s activity in the region, they cannot meaningfully alter the strategic balance in the region.’ That the US still plays a fundamental guiding role in the development of Japan’s strategic partnerships, however, does not obviate the fact that real bilateral security cooperation is meaningful short of a military strategic front, but it does not preclude the formation of a middle power concert that is in many ways beneficial to over American strategic objectives (and Abe has tried to tie these together under the moniker of ‘democratic security diamond’). This dynamic can also be seen with the revived proposal to expand the TSD into a ‘Quad’ in which India and other like-­minded partners (‘Quad plus’) align more closely (Le Thu, 2019). Thus, both trajectories of decentering and recentering run in parallel, but also intersect in important ways.

Conclusions A testament to the exemplary success of Japan’s first serious attempt to build a bilateral strategic partnership beyond the US-­security alliance (if not outside its orbit) is not hard to find. Former Prime Minister Abbott (2014) effused that ‘Australia’s friendship with Japan has been one of the most mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in global history.’ Even more sober analysis from an expert panel concluded that ‘the potential for further development of the Australia-­Japan strategic relationship is strong—given the natural fit between both nations as security allies’ (Heazle & O’Neil, 2011, p. 4). Given the admirable progress made and commitment demonstrated through practical action as well as powerful rhetorical support, there is certainly something ‘special’ about this strategic partnership when compared to other less-­developed Japanese security-­dyads. Lyon (2014) points out that term ‘special relationship’ ‘suggests a much deeper form of strategic connection between Japan and Australia than some might have imagined.’ Indeed, such language is usually reserved for US-­UK or US-­Israel security relations. Yet he reflects that ‘The unfolding Australia-­Japan relationship looks likely to be atypical of what emerges. It is likely to set a benchmark in strategic cooperation that few other such relationships could achieve’ (Lyon, 2014). These positive assessments notwithstanding, Envall observes—especially in light of Japan’s failed submarine bid—that a de jure military alliance pact remains a distant prospect. He notes that Continued growth in the Australia—Japan strategic partnership is, of course, not inevitable. Importantly, neither side officially proposes a deeper strategic partnership of this kind, even though some in Japanese policy circles and politics already view the relationship as moving towards a virtual or quasi-­alliance. (Envall, 2016) However, the evidence above certainly lends credence to the argument that the Australian strategic partnership represents a ‘decentering’ away from the US to

Japan’s partnership with Australia 81 provide ballast to, or otherwise lessen its over-­dependence upon Washington. Ghee concludes that the bilateral partnership has exceeded the limits that would be seen if it were merely cooperation between two spokes in the US alliance mechanism. The burgeoning areas of bilateral cooperation indicate that the Australia-­Japan relationship provides value in its own right, [on the other hand] . . . complementing each nation’s formal alliance with the US. (Ghee, 2015, p. 1) Paradoxically, the emergence of the special strategic partnership with Australia is concomitantly a new initiative aimed at decentering the US-­alliance but occurring alongside (and interacting with) the continued centrality of the US-­alliance to Japanese security—a condition that Tokyo seems perpetually unable to break free from (Matsuoka, 2018).

Acknowledgements The author would like to extend thanks to the editors, Paul Midford and Wilhelm Vosse, and Yoneyuki Sugita of Osaka University, for the opportunity to contribute to this project and related workshops, and his research intern at the time, Ms. Jiye Kim, who helped with production of this manuscript.

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82  Thomas S. Wilkins Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2014). Australia’s Top 10 Two-­Way Trading Partners. http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-­at-­a-­glance/Pages/html/two-­way-­trading­partners.aspx. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2016). Australia-­Japan Strategy for Cooperation in the Pacific, 15 February. http://dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/Documents/australia-­japan-­ strategy-­for-­cooperation-­in-­the-­pacific.pdf. Envall, H. D. P. (2016) Strategy Under the Surface of the Australia—Japan Sub Deal. East Asia Forum, 16 April. www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/16/strategy-­under-­the-­surface-­of-­the­australia-­japan-­sub-­deal. Envall, H. D. P., and Hall, I. (2016). Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional Security Governance. Asian Politics & Policy, 8(1), 87–105. Evans, Gareth. (1996). Australia’s Asia Pacific Future: Asia Policy Lecture by the Hon. Gareth Evans to the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, University of Sydney, 28 February. www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1996/280296_australias_asiapacific_future. pdf. Fukuyama, Francis. (2008). The Security Architecture in Asia and American Foreign Policy. In K. Calder and F. Fukuyama (Eds.), East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 234–254. Gady, Franz-­Stefan. (2016). Why Japan Lost the Bid to Build Australia’s New Subs. The Diplomat, 27 April. http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-­japan-­lost-­the-­bid-­to-­build­australias-­new-­subs. Gady, Franz-­Stefan. (2019). Australia, Japan to Hold First Joint Air Combat Exercise. The Diplomat, 11 September. https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/australia-­japan-­to-­hold­first-­joint-­air-­combat-­exercise. Ghee, Lindley. (2015). The Australia-­Japan Security Relationship: Valuable Partnership or Much Ado About Nothing Much? Indo-­Pacific Strategic Papers of Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, November. www.defence.gov.au/ ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Ghee%20Indo-­Pacific_Strategic_Paper.pdf. Government of Japan. (2013). National Security Strategy, 17 December. www.kantei. go.jp/foreign/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/18/NSS.pdf. Hanada, Ryosuke. (2018). Abe’s Historic Visit to Darwin a Moment of Truth for the Rules-­ Based Order. The Strategist of Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 16 November. www. aspistrategist.org.au/abes-­historic-­visit-­to-­darwin-­a-­moment-­of-­truth-­for-­the-­rules-­ based-­order. Heazle, Michael, and Andrew O’Neil, A. (2011). Project Outcomes Paper: Overcoming Misperceptions in Australia-­Japan Relations (Project Supported by the Commonwealth Through the Australia-­Japan Foundation), August. www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/ pdf_file/0009/359712/Japan-­workshop_Outcomes-­report_Sep2011_final.pdf. Heazle, Michael, and Andrew O’Neil, A. (2017). Why Australia and Japan Need a Plan B. The Interpreter of Lowy Institute, 23 February. www.lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/ why-­australia-­and-­japan-­need-­plan-­b. Ishihara, Yusuke. (2014). Japan-­Australia Defence Cooperation in the Asia-­Pacific Region. In W. Tow and T. Yoshizaki (Eds.), Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-­Japan Security Cooperation. Tokyo: NIDS. Ishihara, Yusuke. (2015). The Case for Japan—Australia Defence Cooperation Guidelines. The Strategist of Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 6 May. www.aspistrategist.org.au/ the-­case-­for-­japan-­australia-­defence-­cooperation-­guidelines. The Japan Times. (2015). Australia’s PM to Visit Japan in Mid-­December, Security Deal Eyed: Source. The Japan Times, 6 December.

Japan’s partnership with Australia 83 The Japan Times. (2016). Japan, Australia Aim to Expand Military Logistical Support. The Japan Times, 20 November. Kampmark, Binoy. (2015). Turnbull Wades into Murky Foreign Waters with Japan Visit. ABC, 21 December. www.abc.net.au/news/2015-­12-­21/kampmark-­turnbull-­in-­japan/7044606. Keir, Richard. (2015). The Australia-­Japan Defence Relationship: Improving Interoperability at the Operational Level. Indo-­Pacific Strategic Papers of Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, November. www.defence.gov.au/ ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Keir_Indo-­Pacific_Strategic_Paper2.pdf. Kersten, Rikki. (2012). Australia and Japan: Mobilising the Bilateral Relationship. In J. Cotton and J. Ravenhill (Eds.), Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006– 2010. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, pp. 94–110. Le Thu, Huong. (2019). New Perspectives for the Revived Quad. The Strategist of Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 14 February. Lyon, Rod. (2014). Australia, Japan and the Future of Strategic Relationships in Asia. The Strategist of Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 10 July. www.aspistrategist.org.au/ australia-­japan-­and-­the-­future-­of-­strategic-­relationships-­in-­asia. Matsuoka, Misato. (2018). Hegemony and the US‒Japan Alliance. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Medcalf, Rory. (2014). PM Abe Sends a Subtle Message from Canberra. Lowy Institute Commentary, 9 July. www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/pm-­abe-­sends-­subtle-­message­canberra. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). (2014). The Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. 1 April 2014. https://www.meti.go.jp/ english/press/2014/0401_03.html. Miller, Jonathan Berkshire, and Wilkins, Thomas. (2019). The Role for Middle Powers in the Free and Open Indo-­Pacific: Looking at Opportunities for Canada and Australia. Policy Brief of Japan Institute of International Affairs, 28 June. www.jiia-­jic.jp/en/policy brief/pdf/PolicyBrief_Miller%26Wilkins_190625.pdf. Milne, Peter. (2017). Ichthys on Tight Time Line for First Gas. The West Australian, 27 January. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia. (2015). Joint Communique—Sixth Japan-­ Australia 2 + 2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, 22 November. http:// foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2015/jb_mr_151122.aspx. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia. (2016). NHK World News, Tokyo—Julie Bishop’s Interview with Takayuki Katsuki, 15 February. http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/ Pages/2016/jb_tr_160215b.aspx. Ministry of Defense of Japan (MoD). (2016). Defense of Japan 2016. Tokyo: Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA). (2007). Japan-­Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, 13 March. www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-­paci/australia/joint0703.html. MoFA. (2009). Major Elements of the Action Plan to Implement the Japan-­Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, December. www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-­ paci/australia/joint0912.html. MoFA. (2012a). Australia and Japan—Cooperating for Peace and Stability: Common Vision and Objectives, 4th Australia-­Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, 14 September. www.mofa.go.jp/files/000034392.pdf. MoFA. (2012b). U.S.-­Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future (Joint Statement Between Prime Minister Noda and President Obama, Washington), 1 May. www. mofa.go.jp/region/n-­america/us/pmv1204/pdfs/Joint_Statement_en.pdf.

84  Thomas S. Wilkins MoFA. (2014a). Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology (Signed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Australian Federal Parliament), 8 July. www.mofa.go.jp/files/000044447.pdf. MoFA. (2014b). Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century—Joint Statement Between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Abbott, Canberra, 8 July. www.mofa. go.jp/files/000044543.pdf. MoFA. (2016). The 2nd Japan-­Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue, 8 August. www.mofa. go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page4e_000484.html. MoFA. (2018a). Eighth Japan-­Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (“2 + 2”), 10 October. www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page3e_000949.html. MoFA. (2018b). Joint Statement of the Governments of Australia, Japan, and the United States of America on the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-­ Pacific, 17 November. www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000420368.pdf. MoFA. (2019). Free and Open Indo-­Pacific, 12 July. www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page25e_ 000278.html. O’Connor, Ted, Grant, Cate, and Mealey, Rachel. (2016). Japanese Whaling Program Details Prompts Calls for Australian Government to Take Stronger Action. ABC, 25 March. www.abc.net.au/news/2016-­03-­25/calls-­for-­australia-­to-­take-­action-­against-­japanese­whalers/7276788. Panagiotopoulos, M. (2016). Australia and Japan Create a New Economic Paradigm, Australia-­Japan Foundation Project 2015–16, 19 October. http://dfat.gov.au/about-­us/ publications/Documents/australia-­japan-­create-­new-­economic-­paradigm.pdf. Parliament of Australia. (2017). Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-­Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defense Force, 14 January. Rees, Laurance. (2002). Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press. Sahashi, Ryo. (2013). Security Partnerships in Japan’s Asia Strategy: Creating Order, Building Capacity and Sharing Burden. Asie.Visions, 61, The Institut français des relations internationales, February. Satake, Tomohiko. (2016). The Japan-­Australia Contribution to a Liberal and Inclusive Regional Order: Beyond the ‘China Gap’. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70(1), 24–36. SBS News. (2019). ‘ScoMo’ Receives Warm Welcome in Japan, 27 June. www.sbs.com.au/ news/scomo-­receives-­warm-­welcome-­in-­japan. Shanahan, Dennis. (2015). PM’s Tokyo Challenge: Keep the Strategic Relationship on an Even Keel. The Weekend Australian, 12 December. Sieg, Linda, and Park, Ju-­min. (2016). Trump Presidency to Create High Anxiety Among Asian Allies. Reuters, 9 November. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-­usa-­election-­asia-­idUKKBN 13424L?il=0. Soeya, Yoshihide. (2013). Prospects for Japan as a Middle Power. East Asia Forum, 29 July. www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/29/prospects-­for-­japan-­as-­a-­middle-­power. Soloway, Benjamin. (2016). Under Trump, U.S. Allies in Asia May Look to Themselves for Security. Foreign Policy, 11 November. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/11/under-­trump­u-­s-­allies-­in-­asia-­may-­look-­to-­themselves-­for-­security. Stokes, Bruce. (2015). How Asia-­Pacific Publics See Each Other and Their National Leaders. Pew Research Center, 2 September. www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/09/02/how-­asia­pacific-­publics-­see-­each-­other-­and-­their-­national-­leaders.

Japan’s partnership with Australia 85 Szego, Julie. (2014). Tony Abbott’s Praise of Japanese Submariners Delivers a Blow to Nation’s Psyche. Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July. Tidwell, Alan C. (2019). With Pacific Step Up, a Chance to Step in. The Interpreter of Lowy Institute, 30 September. www.lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/with-­pacific-­step­up-­chance-­step-­in. Tow, William, and Taylor, Brendan. (2010). What is Asian Security Architecture? Review of International Studies, 36(1), 95–116. The United States Department of Defense. (2019). Indo-­Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. Washington, DC: The United States Department of Defense. Walton, D. (2012). Australian Foreign Policy Towards Japan: Weighing the Bureaucratic Process. In W. Tow and R. Kersten (Eds.), Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-­Pacific Region. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Wen, Philip. (2016). Julie Bishop Gets Frosty Reception from China Over Australia’s Stance on South China Sea. The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February. White, Hugh. (2012). An Australia-­Japan Alliance? Centre of Gravity Paper. http://sdsc. bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-­publications/publications/1854/australian-­japan-­alliance. Wilkins, Thomas. (2007). Towards a ‘Trilateral Alliance?’ Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American—Japanese—Australian Relations. Asian Security, 3(3), 251–278. Wilkins, Thomas. (2010). Japan’s Alliance Diversification: A Comparative Analysis of the Indian and Australian Strategic Partnerships. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific, 11(1), 115–155. Wilkins, Thomas. (2014). Japan’s Grand Strategy and New Strategic Partnerships. Tokyo Foundation, 28 May. www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2014/japan-­grand-­strategy. Wilkins, Thomas. (2016). The Japan Choice: Reconsidering the Risks and Opportunities of the ‘Special Relationship’ for Australia. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific, 16(3), 477–520. Wilkins, Thomas. (2017a). Australia and Middle Power Approaches to Asia Pacific Regionalism. Australian Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 110–125. Wilkins, Thomas. (2017b). Japan’s New Grand Strategy: ‘Pro-­Active Realism’ in the Face of an ‘Increasingly Severe’ Security Environment. In H. Sakai and Y. Sato (Eds.), Re-­ Rising Japan: Its Strategic Power in International Relations. Bern: Peter Lang. Willis, Rachael. (2016). Donald Trump and the End of the Asian Security Alliance. The World Post: A Partnership of The Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute, 21 November. www.huffingtonpost.com/rachael-­willis-­/donald-­trump-­and-­the-­end-­_b_13121752. html. Wilton, Leigh. (2015). Promoting Japan’s Reconciliation: An Australian Foreign Policy Proposal. Indo-­Pacific Strategic Papers of Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, August. www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/R23177582-­6.pdf. Wroe, David, and Johnson, Chris. (2016). Submarine Deal: Australia Must Act to Mend Ties with Japan, Defence Experts Say. The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April. www.smh. com.au/federal-­politics/political-­news/submarine-­deal-­australia-­must-­act-­to-­mend-­ties-­ with-­japan-­defence-­experts-­say-­20160426-­gofkeq.html. Wyeth, Grant. (2019). Australia Unhappy About Japan’s Return to Whaling. The Diplomat, 3 July. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/australia-­unhappy-­about-­japans-­return-­to-­whaling. Yuzawa, Takeshi. (2007). Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific. London: Routledge.

6 Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 For the sake of maintaining US leadership in East Asia Natsuyo Ishibashi Introduction Japan has steadily strengthened its relations with India since Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro visited India in August 2000, after decades of distant relations. Japan’s decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is remarkable, because its security policy was deeply embedded in exclusive bilateralism centering on the US-­Japan alliance, and Japan had no military alliance arrangements with any country other than the United States throughout the Cold War period (Pempel, 2003, p. 3). During the Cold War, Japan’s foreign policy was firmly institutionalized around the so-­called Yoshida Doctrine. Japan depended on the United States for its territorial defense by hosting US military bases, shunned taking any active roles in international strategic affairs, and single-­mindedly focused on economic activities (Pyle, 1996, pp. 21–41). Although Japan’s recent policy toward India appears to be a sign of new directions in its overall security policy, since it involves building security ties with an actor other than the US, which never happened under the previous policy based on the Yoshida Doctrine, in fact, this new policy is heavily oriented toward supporting the US-­led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. Both right-­wing nationalist leaders in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and policy elites, who are responsible for Japan’s foreign policy, are strong supporters of the US-­Japan alliance. This chapter shows that Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 has evolved to become fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-­Pacific region. The critical shift in Japan’s policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to view India as an important balancer against China. Concerned about the future of Chinese foreign policy as a result of the violent anti-­Japanese demonstrations in China, Japanese political leaders and policy elites decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit (EAS), and began to incorporate India into their new values diplomacy emphasizing democracy, freedom and the rule of law. This shift in Japan’s policy toward India, along with its effort to increase interoperability between Japan’s Maritime Self-­Defense Forces (MSDF) and the Indian Navy as part of the US-­led ‘federated defense model,’ coincides with US policy to bring India into a US-­led coalition to balance against China.

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 87 In the rest of this paper, I  first discuss the people who have made Japan’s policy toward India since 2000: right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders and policy elites. I consider their political ideologies and beliefs that motivate them to pursue certain foreign policy goals. Then, I examine how Japan’s policy toward India has evolved since 2000 by considering important developments: (1) the change in Japan’s policy toward India in 2000 but the continuing hesitancy among Japanese policy elites to see India as an important element in Japan’s security policy strategy until 2004, (2) the critical turning point in spring 2005 when Japanese policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China, and the onset of Japan’s value diplomacy, and (3) Japan’s effort to assist US policy toward the Indo-­Pacific region in the area of maritime operations. In conclusion, I discuss some problems resulting from Japan’s policy shift toward India.

People who have made Japan’s policy toward India since 2000: their political ideologies, beliefs, and motivations It is important to consider political ideologies, beliefs, and motivations of the right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders (namely Mori Yoshirō, Koizumi Jun’ichiro, Abe Shinzō, and Asō Tarō) and policy elites, especially officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and leading scholars serving as members of the government’s advisory panels, in order to understand why India became an important component of Japan’s foreign policy in the 2000s, because these personal attributes of these policy-­makers influenced the making and content of Japan’s foreign policy during that time. These right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders and policy elites were strong supporters of the US-­Japan alliance, and have argued for increasing Japan’s defense budget and revising Article 9 (the renunciation of war clause) of the Constitution so that Japan can actively support US military operations. Yet, their motivations for pursuing policies in support of the US vary. By considering the influence of both right-­wing nationalist LDP politicians and policy elites, this paper will contribute to a recent debate over Abe’s foreign policy. Christopher W. Hughes, for example, argues, ‘Abe’s project of revisionism and its fundamentally radical intent should not be underestimated as it has sought to penetrate every key aspect of Japan’s foreign and security policy’ (Hughes, 2015, p. 23), whereas Adam P. Liff suggests that Abe’s foreign policy concepts (such as ‘proactive contributions to peace’) have been ‘part of elite debates about Japan’s security policy for a generation,’ and ‘assessments of Japanese defense reforms under Abe that ignore the historical, strategic, and domestic political context’ would risk ‘exaggerating the pace and scale of change underway, as well as the personal significance of Abe himself’ (Liff, 2015, p. 81). If scholars only focus on the role of right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders in Japan’s foreign policymaking, they are likely to conclude that Japan’s recent foreign policy is a radical departure from the previous defense-­oriented one by pointing out Abe’s illiberal revisionist background. On the other hand, if they focus only on policy elites, they are likely to conclude that recent changes are merely an

88  Natsuyo Ishibashi extension of normalization that policy elites started in the early 1990s. By examining both groups, this paper will be able to make a more nuanced argument about Japan’s policy toward India. Right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders The right-­wing nationalist leaders came to control the LDP in the 2000s, and moderate politicians of the former Tanaka faction (e.g. Hashimoto Ryūtarō and Nonaka Hiromu) and the Kōchikai (Katō Kōichi, Miyazawa Ki’ichi, and Kōno Yōhei), who used to control the LDP, lost their power as a result of the domestic political structural changes. These changes included the new electoral system introduced in the mid-­1990s, the prolonged economic recession since the early 1990s, and the decline of the so-­called iron triangle (bureaucracy, interest groups, and LDP policy tribes), followed by the rise of the Prime Minister’s Office in government policy-­making (Pempel, 2007, pp. 110–115). Some scholars argued that Japan’s recent attempt to establish security relations with non-­US countries is a sign of the right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders’ desire to seek an independent foreign policy from the United States. Aurelia George Mulgan, for example, argues that the reason Prime Minister Abe signed a security declaration with Australia in 2007, and made overt security approaches to India, is that he desired to ‘take independent steps to shore up Japan’s security and exercise more autonomous influence over strategic developments in the Asia-­Pacific region’ (Mulgan, 2008, p. 54). She writes, ‘Signing the security declaration with Australia was a move to shore up Japan’s security independently of the United States’ (Mulgan, 2008, p. 67). She further warns, ‘Australia risked being drawn into balance-­of-­power politics in East Asia and becoming a pawn in Japan’s strategy of containing China’ (Mulgan, 2008, p. 66). Likewise, other scholars suggest that the strong supporters in Japan for a close security partnership with India are the so-­called ‘Pan-­Asianists.’ They are right-­wing nationalists, who favor ‘close relations with Asia over US alliance’ (Brewster, 2010a, p. 102), and call for ‘an assertive, militarily strong and independent Japan and identify China as the key threat’ (Panda, 2011, p. 11). Those Pan-­Asianists are also historical revisionists. Not only do they deny Japan’s negative wartime history, but they also regard a series of democratic reforms carried out by the US occupation authority from 1945 to 1952 as humiliating and thereby seek to abolish them. Prime Minister Abe especially favors India because Indian historical figures, such as Subhash Chandra Bose and Judge Radhabinod Pal, are seen as endorsing the Japanese revisionist view that what prewar Japan had done was to liberate Asia from western colonization, and that the Tokyo Military Tribunal constituted injustice done by the winners against the losers (Hughes, 2015, pp. 9–12; Jain, 2008b, pp. 9–10).1 The right-­wing nature of Japan-­India relations has been further accentuated recently by the characteristics of their current Indian counterparts, namely the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), headed by the strong right-­wing nationalist leader Narendra Modi (Prime Minister: 2014– present) (Pant, 2014, pp. 94–97).

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 89 The right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders, however, are not anti-­American or anti-­Western Pan-­Asianist, though they are illiberal revisionists. Hughes points the contradictory nature of the right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders, in that while their ideology is characterized as illiberal and historically revisionist, they try to recover Japan’s autonomy through dependence on the United States (Hughes, 2015). In short, the LDP nationalist leaders are pro-­US, anti-­China, illiberal, and revisionist. It should also be noted that those nationalist leaders might be pro-­US for the time being, but it is uncertain whether they will remain pro-­US indefinitely since their political ideology is fundamentally different from American values. They might emphasize the importance of the US-­Japan alliance to the extent that the United States encourages Japan to take a more active military role. However, their deep-­seated aspiration—as their strong desire to roll back the liberal reforms introduced by the United States during the occupation period indicates—is to free Japan from the US dominance and bring Japan back toward the prewar period (Hasegawa, 2007, p. 75; Hook, 1998, pp. 172–174; Hughes, 2015, pp. 8–23; Soeya, 2006, pp. 44–45). Policy elites Although prime ministers are ultimately responsible for Japan’s foreign policy outcomes, it is often the case that MOFA officials and scholars serving as members of the government’s advisory panels are the ones who set the foreign policy agenda and devise strategy to realize that agenda. Those policy elites are pragmatic realists, not historical revisionists. They do not justify Japan’s colonial past or reject the liberal reforms implemented by the United States during the occupation period (Tanaka, 2007, p. 44). Nonetheless, they make common cause with right-­wing LDP leaders regarding their strong preference to maintain the US-­ Japan alliance, and share the idea that Japan should increase its defense budget and revise the Constitution so that Japan can exercise the right of collective self-­ defense, although their motivation for doing so is different. Kitaoka Shinichi (a former Tokyo University professor) and Tanaka Hitoshi (a MOFA official) are good examples of such foreign policy elites. Both of them have worked for ‘normalizing’ Japan since the early 1990s.2 Tanaka’s and Kitaoka’s ideas about Japan’s national interest and foreign policy strategy are basically the same. They argue that Japan’s national interest is to preserve the existing US-­led liberal political and economic order in East Asia (Kitaoka, 2013, p. 25; Tanaka, 2009, pp. 182–187, 2015). According to Tanaka, the US-­Japan alliance is important not only because Japan needs US nuclear protection, but also because it enables the US military presence in the region, which is indispensable for the preservation of liberal regional order (Tanaka, 2009, pp. 185, 194; Tanaka & Terashima, 2011, p. 9). Both Tanaka and Kitaoka are concerned about whether China will accept the US-­led liberal international order (Kitaoka, 2013; Tanaka, 2014).3 They are also uncertain about the US commitment to East Asian security in the future. They worry that although the US has the world’s strongest military forces, it will not act

90  Natsuyo Ishibashi as a world’s policeman any longer as a result of the prolonged wars in the Middle East and economic recession. Because military deterrence is necessary to hedge against uncertainty regarding China’s future actions, and because Japan lacks the legitimacy to become a leader in East Asia or the military capability to deter regional threats by itself, what Japan should do, according to them, is to support US leadership by assuming part of the US military role in the region. In order to do so, Japan should increase its defense budget and revise the Constitution so that it can exercise the right of collective self-­defense (Kitaoka, 2013; Tanaka, 2009, pp. 185–187, 2014, 2015). Indeed, maintenance of the US-­Japan alliance as well as US leadership in the region has been the core of Japan’s foreign policy since the Cold War. A series of Japanese attempts to promote multilateral approaches, which appears to deviate from this traditional bilateralism, was in fact for the purpose of strengthening the alliance and the US regional role in security. Japan, for example, played a major role in establishing the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the late 1980s, because it wanted to maintain the existing US-­led economic and political order in the Asia-­Pacific. Japanese policymakers were concerned about the potential decline of US influence in the region as a result of its trade and budget deficits and thought that APEC would become a useful mechanism to tie the United States to Asia (Krauss, 2000). Similarly, Japan initiated the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) not simply because Tokyo wanted to ensure a continued US presence in the region, but also because it wanted to gain other Asian countries’ acceptance of Japan assuming a greater security role in the region, thereby invigorating the US-­Japan alliance (Hook, 1998, pp. 174–179; Midford, 2000, pp. 367–370). Japanese policymakers rarely saw the multilateral frameworks (such as the ARF) as sufficient options by themselves for Japan’s security. They regarded those multilateral frameworks as ‘secondary, supplementary or subordinate to the primacy of the US-­Japan security arrangements’ (Hughes & Fukushima, 2003, p. 56). In sum, what post-­Cold War Japanese policy elites want has not changed since the Cold War: to maintain the US-­Japan alliance and US-­led liberal regional order in East Asia. What has changed since the end of the Cold War is that Japanese policy elites have come to think that Japan should be more active in supporting the alliance as well as US leadership in the region. Japanese policy elites’ effort to normalize Japan since the early 1990s is exactly for this purpose. Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 should be understood in this context. As the next section shows, Japan’s policy toward India has been part of their efforts to achieve those goals.

Empirical analysis: Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 August 2000–summer 2004: the new beginning of Japan-­India relations Japan’s relations with India were quite distant until August 2000 when Prime Minister Mori visited India and agreed to establish a global partnership with India. After World War II, India was one of the friendliest nations toward Japan, which

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 91 not only agreed to sign a peace treaty with Japan in 1952 but also did not press Japan for war reparations (Jain, 2008b, p. 4; Pant, 2010, p. 207). Nevertheless, India disappeared almost entirely from Japan’s foreign policy for about 20 years after Japan entered into the high growth period in the early 1960s. Indeed, no Japanese prime minister visited India for 23 years after Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato visited in 1961 (Sato, 2006, p. 109). Although Japan began to make foreign investments in East and Southeast Asian countries in the mid-­1980s, and these investments contributed to the East Asian miracle, India was left out from the Japanese economic sphere. Even after the Cold War ended, and India implemented a series of economic reforms in order to attract foreign investments in the 1990s, Japan remained disinterested in India, and the bulk of Japanese investments went to China (Sato, 2012, pp. 300–301). This contrasts with South Korea, which became the largest Asian investor in India between 1996 and 2001 (Brewster, 2010b, pp. 410, 412). Furthermore, Japan’s disinterest in India turned into condemnation as a result of India’s nuclear tests in 1998. After the Indian nuclear tests, Japan suspended its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to India and put on hold all political exchanges between the two countries. Japan made India’s accession to the Nuclear Non-­proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) a condition to restart its ODA. However, most Indians saw such treatment as ‘too harsh’ (Panda, 2011, pp. 2–3) and ‘hypocritical’(Pant, 2010, p. 209), because while Japan was able to enjoy US nuclear protection, no countries were willing to provide nuclear protection for India (Ganguly,1999). Japan changed its policy in 2000, because Japanese policy elites felt that they had to follow US efforts to improve relations with India. As Strobe Talbott (Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, 1994–1999) described in his book, after the Indian nuclear tests of 1998, US President Bill Clinton came to pay full attention to India, and made South Asia ‘front and center’ of his diplomacy (Talbott, 2004, pp. 78–79). Although the United States failed to convince India to sign the NPT and CTBT, despite a series of negotiations between Talbott and Jaswant Singh (India’s Foreign Minister), Clinton did not falter in his determination to improve relations, and decided to visit India in March 2000 (Garver, 2010, pp. 99–101). Japanese Ambassador to India, Hirabayashi Hiroshi (1998–2002), recalled that he followed the new US India policy through his contacts with US Ambassador to India Richard F. Celeste, and updated Tokyo. Hirabayashi, who saw that Clinton was enthusiastically received by members of the Indian Parliament in March 2000, was convinced that Japan urgently needed to improve its relations with India, and sent a message to Tokyo that the prime minister should visit India as soon as possible (Batsu, 2014, p. 269; Jain, 2008b, p. 6; Hirabayashi, 2014, pp. 48–49; Talbott, 2004, pp. 197–201). Although Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India was realized in August 2000, Japanese foreign policy elites still hesitated to bring India into their foreign policy strategy despite the fact that the new Bush administration continued the Clinton administration’s policy of improving relations with India. While Condoleezza

92  Natsuyo Ishibashi Rice, who later became National Security Advisor in the first Bush administration, stressed the importance of India for balancing against China, and decoupled India from Pakistan already in 2000 (Rice, 2000), Japanese policy elites did not see India in this way at least until 2004. Prime Minister Koizumi, for example, proposed creating an East Asian Community (EAC), and inviting Australia and New Zealand to that community in his January 2002 speech in Singapore. Koizumi, however, did not propose including India in the EAC. Tanaka Hitoshi, who actually drafted Koizumi’s speech, was concerned that not only were all the ASEAN+3 countries (except Japan) not mature democracies, but most of them were also developing countries. In such a community, he expected, it would be difficult for Japan to exercise leadership to create a liberal political and economic order in the region. By bringing democratic countries such as Australia and New Zealand into the EAC, Tanaka tried to increase Japan’s leverage over China in the EAC (Tanaka, 2009, pp. 162–163; Terada, 2010, p. 80). Tanaka, however, had never thought about bringing India into the EAC or using India as a counterweight to China at that time, even though India was a democratic country. He was uncertain about whether India could really achieve high economic growth in the future due to political instability resulting from the territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In this sense, different from Rice, Tanaka still coupled India with Pakistan (Tanaka, 2009, pp. 166–167). Moreover, Tanaka saw both India and China as the same kind of countries: Developing countries with large populations (India and China compose 40% of global population) and serious economic, energy, and environmental problems. He was concerned not only about whether these two countries could achieve constant economic growth, but also about whether they would behave according to the existing liberal international order that the advanced industrialized democracies (i.e. the G7 countries including Japan) had constructed under US leadership. Tanaka seemed proud of Japan’s G7 identity, which distinguished Japan from developing countries like India and China, and was afraid that these two countries might destroy the liberal international order under which Japan has been able to enjoy peace and prosperity since the Cold War period (Tanaka, 2009, pp. 174– 176, 180–185).4 It seems that Tanaka did not change this view until at least summer 2004. At the plenary policy meeting of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) on June 24, 2004, he was still cautious about what to do with India.5 He stated: It is extremely desirable for Japan to bring Australia and New Zealand [into the EAC] because I think that they can be good partners in encouraging a large country like China to accept democratic governance, capitalism, the basic rule of market . . . India’s recent policy has been Look East . . . but I think that it is still unclear what kind of role India should play in East Asia, and it will take considerable time (sōtō jikan ga kakaru) for India to be accepted in this region although we should keep India in our mind. (Council on East Asian Community, June 24, 2004, p. 15) [Translated by the author]

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 93 Spring 2005 onward: India as a balancer against China and the onset of Japan’s values diplomacy An important turning point for Japan’s policy toward India came on April 29, 2005, when Prime Minister Koizumi announced Japan’s decision to support India’s membership in the EAS in the joint statement with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the time of his visit to India (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 2005b). This was a critical moment when Japan clearly recognized India as an important element in its strategy to balance against China. But why did Japan suddenly decide to include India into the EAS in April 2005? According to Tanaka’s statement at the CEAC in June 2004, it would ‘take considerable time (sōtō jikan ga kakaru)’ for India to be included into the EAC, and Chinese influence in the EAC would be sufficiently dealt with by bringing Australia and New Zealand into the EAC. The shift in Japan’s policy toward India—as well as the onset of its value diplomacy—was the result of US influence and severely deteriorating relations between Japan and China, stemming from the violent anti-­Japanese demonstrations that occurred in major cities in China for weeks in April 2005. From the beginning, the United States was not comfortable with the idea of creating an EAC, because it was afraid that an envisaged EAC would exclude US influence from East Asia. As the EAS was scheduled to be held sometime in 2005, the US Department of State publicly expressed its concern at the November 2004 ASEAN summit meeting about the exclusive nature of a EAC, stressing Asian values and traditions, some of which have anti-­Western implications (Sohn, 2010, p. 314), and about the absence of universal values such as democracy and freedom (Sato, 2012, p. 311). Director of Policy Planning Staff of US Department of State Mitchell B. Reiss, for example, underlined that the new regional community should be open and inclusive in his speech at the Japan Institute of International Affairs on November 30, 2004: we need to ensure that the trends accompanying strategic change do not alter the open and inclusive nature of the international system that the United States and its partners have promoted for the last five decades. The fundamental strategic challenge of today is to forge a new international order adapted to the strategic realities of 2005, not 1945. But in doing so, we must ensure that new architectures and regimes remain as open as those of the immediate postwar era to the participation of countries whose interests and capabilities give them a stake. This is particularly true in East Asia, where resurgent pan-­Asian ideologies are, in some ways, challenging existing architectures and political structures . . . And the United States, as a traditional western Pacific power, must remain involved . . . For our part, we seek an East Asia that is open and inclusive. We want a regional architecture that allows states to build partnerships with each other, as well as partnerships with the United States. (Reiss, 2004)

94  Natsuyo Ishibashi In order to make an EAC ‘open and inclusive,’ what the United Stated tried to do was to make the universal values such as democracy, freedom, and the rule of law—not exclusive Pan-­Asian ideologies—the principle of the EAC, and bring other democratic countries into the EAC. Although there are no sources indicating that US officials demanded their Japanese counterparts do those things, it would not be difficult for Japanese officials to understand what the United States wanted, based on Reiss’s speech. Likewise, although there is no source indicating that US officials requested Japan to include India into the EAS in spring 2005, it is very likely that Japanese policy elites understood that the inclusion of India into the EAS was the US preference, judging from the Bush administration’s efforts to elevate its relationship with India (Tellis, 2006). That was well exemplified by the Bush administration’s decision to offer India fuel and technical support for its civilian nuclear program in July 2005, despite the fact that India neither acceded to the NPT nor accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards (Kapur, 2010, pp. 263– 264), as well as by US officials’ positive comments on the induction of India into the EAS in December 2005 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 13, 2005). Moreover, what became a catalyst for Japanese policy elites to see India as an important balancer against China was the violent anti-­Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005, as well as the Chinese government’s unwillingness to take any measures to stop them. To be sure, Japanese policy elites must have agreed with Reiss’s message about maintaining the existing regional order led by the United States, and the EAS should not damage or destroy it. As explained earlier, Japan’s primary foreign policy goal, according to Tanaka Hitoshi, is to maintain the liberal international political and economic order constructed by the advanced industrialized democracies led by the United States since the Cold War period. Japan wants China to accept that order and behave according to the rules and norms established by that order. Judging from Tanaka’s statement at the CEAC in June 2004, Japanese policy elites seemed to believe that the EAC would not destroy the US-­led regional order. Rather, it would play an important supplementary role in sustaining the existing US-­led liberal order because the EAC was supposed to provide a liberal regional framework, to which China could be tied—if Japan was able to successfully construct the EAC as it hoped. Japanese policy elites seemed to believe they could do so just by bringing Australia and New Zealand—but not India—into the EAC. The anti-­Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005, however, destroyed such optimism. It is true that Japan had already had some troubles with China before that incident. In November 2004, for example, a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near Okinawa. Although China apologized and explained that it was a mistake, the incident inflamed Japanese public opinion against China. China in turn became angry with Japan when the US-­Japan Security Consultative Committee announced that security in the Taiwan Strait was one of their ‘common strategic objectives’ on February 19, 2005 (MoFA, 2005a; Pempel, 2007, pp. 127–128). Despite all those skirmishes, however, Sino-­Japanese relations were relatively calm until March 2005. At the

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 95 National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2005, for instance, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao expressed his willingness to improve China’s relations with Japan by stating that Sino-­Japanese relations were the nation’s most important bilateral relations (Kokubun, 2007, pp. 137–138). The violent anti-­Japanese demonstrations as well as the Chinese government’s questionable response to them, however, not only raised serious concern about the prospect of Chinese foreign policy among Japanese policy elites but also severely damaged China’s image among the Japanese public. Chinese people organized anti-­Japanese demonstrations in order to oppose Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and to object to new Japanese history textbooks. The demonstrations first broke out in Chengdu, Zhongqing, and Shenzhen in the first weekend of April 2005, and spread throughout major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Several thousand joined the demonstrations. Angry protesters attacked the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and threw stones at the embassy building. The Japanese government protested and asked the Chinese government for an apology and compensation for damages. The Chinese government, however, refused and maintained that Japan should be blamed in the first place. In the third week of April 2005, the Chinese government finally mobilized law enforcement personnel throughout the country and suppressed the demonstrations. The fact that the Chinese authorities were capable of suppressing the demonstrations led the Japanese people to question why the Chinese government did not stop the violence earlier (Kokubun, 2007, pp. 138–142). Consequently, as Figure 6.1 shows, although around 50% of Japanese respondents had consistently friendly and somewhat friendly feelings toward China since the early 1990s, this percentage dropped to about 30% in 2005, and has not recovered to the previous level since then.

60 50

%

40 30 20 10 0

Years & Months

Figure 6.1 Percentage of Japanese respondents who answered ‘feel friendly’ and ‘feel somewhat friendly’ towards China

96  Natsuyo Ishibashi Tanaka Hitoshi, who hesitated to include India into the EAC in June 2004, stated during his lecture in April 2006 that the 2005 anti-­Japanese demonstration in China was a symbolic incident that revealed the erratic nature of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian system and thereby uncertainty about the future of Chinese foreign policy (Tanaka, 2007, pp. 32–33). As Yinan He explains, one of the reasons for rising mass anti-­Japanese nationalism in China in the 2000s was that, due to the decline of its prestige after the Cultural Revolution, the CCP tried to legitimatize its rule by introducing a patriotic, historical narrative that the CCP was responsible for liberating the nation from foreign invasions—especially from Japan—into primary and secondary education in the 1980s (He, 2007). As long as the Chinese political system remains authoritarian, it is uncertain what kind of foreign policy China will pursue in the future because the CCP might use international issues to divert popular attention from domestic political and economic grievances. Tanaka, therefore, argued that it is necessary for Japan to strengthen the US-­Japan alliance as well as Japan’s partnership with other democratic countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, and India, in order to hedge against China (Tanaka, 2007, pp. 32–33). Since the violent anti-­Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005, Japan has actively strengthened its relations with India through values diplomacy. The India-­Japan joint announcement at the time of Koizumi’s visit to India on April 28–30, 2005, already stated that Japan and India ‘will strive to develop closer dialogue and collaboration to secure peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia, promote democracy and development, and explore a new architecture for closer regional cooperation in Asia’ (MoFA, 2005c). MOFA also officially laid out universal values such as democracy as one of the principles for an EAC in November 2005, and the Japanese proposal for an ‘open, inclusive, transparent, and externally oriented’ regionalism was included in the December 2005 EAS declaration (Sohn, 2010, p. 516). In addition, Foreign Minister Asō Tarō in the Abe Cabinet introduced the concept of an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ in November 2006, that Japan would promote universal values such as ‘democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy’ in an arc of states lining the outer limits of the Eurasian Continent from Northern Europe to Northeast Asia (Hughes, 2015, p. 80; MoFA, 2006; Sohn, 2010, p. 516). Japan’s proposal for a quadrilateral forum composed of like-­minded countries— Japan, the United States, Australia, and India—to balance against China, which was encouraged by Vice President Dick Cheney during his visit to Tokyo in February 2007, promoted further strengthening of strategic relations with India. The proposal produced an informal meeting of representative from the four nations at the May 2007 ARF (Brewster, 2010a, p. 102; Terada, 2010, p. 85). Moreover, Abe introduced the concept of ‘broader Asia’ in his August 2007 speech to the Indian Parliament. He stated that Japan and India should come together to create ‘broader Asia,’ which ‘will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia,’ and this ‘open and transparent’ network ‘will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely’ (MoFA, 2007).

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 97 Those who enthusiastically supported values diplomacy in Japan were pro-­US, anti-­China, right-­wing nationalist LDP politicians and journalists (Asahi Shimbun, May 18, 2007; Nihon Keizei Shimbun, May 18, 2007). They used values diplomacy to promote their political agenda. Not only did they contrast Japan’s democratic system of governance with an authoritarian ‘uncivilized’ Chinese regime, thereby portraying China as an ‘unethical’ state that has been unjustly using the history card against Japan (Suzuki, 2011). But they also used values diplomacy to attack rivals within the LDP, namely the moderate, pro-­China group led by Katō Kōichi (Tokyo Shimbun, May 14, 2007; Sankei Shimbun, March 23, 2007). However, a well-­known independent-­minded nationalist professor, Nishibe Susumu, criticizes as totally ‘phony and foolish (inchiki-­tonchiki)’ the pro-­US right-­wing nationalists’ strategy of checking North Korea and China by shouting freedom and democracy. Their use of values diplomacy, according to Nishibe, does nothing but increase Japan’s dependence on the United States (Nishibe, 2014). As we can see, Japan’s policy toward India since spring 2005, especially under values diplomacy, has been supported by policy elites, who are concerned by the erratic nature of the authoritarian political system in China, and the pro-­US, anti-­China, right-­wing nationalist LDP politicians. Above all, Japan’s policy to strengthen its relations with India under values diplomacy was exactly what the United States wanted. The mid-­2000s onward: Japan’s maritime security cooperation with India as part of the US-­led federated defense model Japan has substantially contributed to the preservation of US leadership in East Asia by supporting the dominant presence of the US Navy (USN) in the region for decades (Ross, 1999, p. 100). Not only has the Japanese government provided the USN with facilities necessary to maintain a forward presence, but Japan’s MSDF has also played an important part of the operational structure of the US Seventh Fleet since the late 1970s. The MSDF has historically had close relations with the USN and is thereby willing to do anything possible to support USN operations. In the 1980s, for example, the MSDF assumed sea-­lane defense within the range of 1000 miles from Japan, as well as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations to contain the Soviet Navy in the Sea of Japan by blocking three straights (Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) so that the USN was able to operate around Japan without being attacked by Soviet submarines. For a recent example, right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in fall 2001, the MSDF was enthusiastic about providing support for US-­led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the Indian Ocean. The MSDF was eager to send Aegis-­equipped ships to the Indian Ocean throughout 2002, even after it had made sufficient contributions to OEF by sending fuel-­supply ships in fall 2001, and despite the fact that the majority of the Japanese public did not support the dispatch of Aegis-­equipped ships to the Indian Ocean (Ishibashi, 2016). Although Water C. Ladwig III suggests that the Indian Ocean is a ‘peripheral concern’ for the United States (Ladwig, 2012, p. 385), it has actually been

98  Natsuyo Ishibashi a strategically important ocean for the United States, because it needs to swing naval forces from the Pacific Ocean through the Indian Ocean in order to conduct military operations in Southwest Asia, as exemplified by Operation Desert Storm of 1991, Operation Enduring Freedom of 2001, and Iraqi Freedom of 2003 (Green & Shearer, 2012, p. 177). As I discussed above, the MSDF ships also conducted operations in the Indian Ocean in order to supply free fuel for not only the USN, but also for other navies participating in OEF from 2001 to 2009. In addition, 9/11 increased naval cooperation between the USN and Indian Navy. After 9/11, the Indian Navy provided escorts and protection to US ships passing through the Indian Ocean, thereby reducing the burden of the USN’s constabulary services in the region, and facilitating its operations against terrorist insurgencies in Afghanistan (Pant & Joshi, 2014, p. 54). The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean for hedging against China emerged around the mid-­2000s, when China began to expand its maritime activities not only in the South China Sea, but also in the Indian Ocean, by establishing a network of ports and partnerships with littoral states, including Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka. Indian analysts call China’s activities in the Indian Ocean the ‘string of pearls’ strategy (Ladwig, 2009, pp. 88–89). The strategic importance of India and the Indian Ocean further increased when the Obama administration shifted its initial strategy of accommodation vis-­à-­vis China (the so-­called ‘G-­2’ condominium of China and the United States to manage Asia) to that of a ‘pivot’ (an expanded military commitment to the Asia-­Pacific in order to ‘rebalance’ against China) in late 2011, as a result of growing Chinese assertiveness (Pant & Joshi, 2014, pp. 48, 50, 62; Kawamura, 2014). In her article published in November 2011, Secretary of State Hilary R. Clinton not only expressed a ‘rock solid’ US commitment to maintain its forward military presence in Northeast Asia through allied countries in the region, but also emphasized the strategic importance of India and the Indian Ocean for maintaining the security of the newly emerging Indo-­Pacific region ‘stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas’ (Clinton, 2011). In subsequent years, Michael J. Green, coauthoring with Andrew Shearer and Zack Cooper, proposed that the United States adopt a ‘federated defense’ model to maintain the security of Indo-­Pacific region (Green  & Cooper, 2014, p.  38; Green & Shearer, 2012, p. 185). In this model, the United States would ‘federate’ the capabilities of allies and friendly nations in the region (including Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, etc.) by encouraging multilateral exercises, intelligence sharing, and weapons co-­development not only between the United States and its allies, but also among its allies (Green & Cooper, 2014, pp. 38–39). Regarding the security of the Indian Ocean, Green and Shearer analyze that the immediate threat is not China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy, but Iranian activities in the Strait of Hormuz, because China does not currently have the ability to project controlling naval power to the Indian Ocean. China, however, could be a long-­term threat, because once China controlled Taiwan, its navy would be freed to direct its attentions to the Indian Ocean (Green & Shearer, 2012, pp. 179–181). In order to deal with those threats, they suggest that the United States should: (1) sustain its

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 99 maritime presence, (2) engage allied and friendly littoral states, and (3) demonstrate resolve though multilateral naval exercises (Green & Shearer, 2012, p. 182). They recommend that the United States ‘encourage and support closer alignment among the major maritime democracies in the region.’ The United States should especially encourage federated capabilities among the ‘Quad’ (the US, Japan, Australia, and India) by increasing bilateral interoperability and defense cooperation among these four countries (Green & Shearer, 2012, pp. 184–185). Indeed, the USN had already started implementing the ‘federated defense’ model before Green’s articles were published. The MSDF has carried out joint exercises not only with the USN, but also with other navies of American allies and partners in order to increase interoperability among them. In April 2007, for example, the USN, MSDF, and Indian Navy for the first time conducted a joint exercise (TRILATEX-­07) in Tokyo Bay (Panneerselvam, 2013, p. 82). In September 2007, a multilateral exercise called Malabar-­07 was held in the Bay of Bengal, in which navies from the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and Singapore participated (US Navy, 2007, September 7). In April-­May 2009, the Malabar exercise was again conducted, this time off the coast of Okinawa, with the USN, MSDF, and Indian Navy participating (US Navy, 2007). In June 2012, the MSDF for the first time conducted a bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy off Sagami Bay (Ministry of Defense (MoD), 2013). Although this bilateral exercise between the MDSF and Indian Navy was conducted without the USN, it should not be regarded as a move toward greater independence from the USN, but as part of the US-­led federated model, which encourages interoperability among the navies of American allies and partners.

Conclusion This edited book is about ‘New Directions in Japan’s Security: Non-­US Centric Evolution.’ This chapter showed that Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 is, in fact, what this book defines as ‘decentering,’ but decentering for the sake of strengthening US-­regional leadership. While having different motivations, both the right-­wing nationalist LDP leaders and policy elites are strong supporters of the US-­Japan alliance. Especially since 2005, both of them have worked to strengthen Japan’s relations with India under values diplomacy, thereby attempting to bring India into the US-­led coalition to balance against China. Additionally, consistent with the US-­led federated defense model, the MSDF has steadily increased joint exercises with the Indian Navy as well as with other navies of US allies and partners since the mid-­2000s in order to hedge against potentially destabilizing Chinese naval activities in the Indo-­Pacific region. Yet, there are some problems with Japan’s policy toward India. While US leadership might be important for stability in East Asia, it is risky for Japan to get too close to US foreign policies, because many of them eventually backfired (Johnson, 2004). For example, the 2003 US attack on Iraq not only brought about disastrous consequences for Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, but also tremendously exhausted US power and damaged its credibility as a world leader. Terashima

100  Natsuyo Ishibashi Jitsuro, for instance, expresses his concern about Japan’s overdependence on the US. Pointing to Japan’s decision to support the Iraq War in 2003, Terashima suggests that Japanese policy elites should go beyond their fixed notion that Japan has no choice but to rely on the United States in order to deal with the Chinese threat, although he does not totally reject the US-­Japan alliance (Tanaka & Terashima, 2011, pp. 14–19). South Asia (India and Pakistan) is not so distant for Japan. International relations in South Asia have important implications for Japan’s security, because materials and technologies that North Korea acquired to build nuclear weapons came from Pakistan, which in turn acquired them from China. Pakistan began to share its nuclear weapons technology with North Korea in exchange for North Korean missiles in 1997. China sponsored the transactions between Pakistan and North Korea, because it wanted to check India’s and Japan’s power tying them down in sub-­regional conflicts (Ahmed, 1999, pp.  185–188; Brewster, 2010b, pp.  406–409; Pant, 2012, pp.  85–86). The Pakistan-­North Korea-­China nexus, is more complicated, however, because the United States has provided a large amount of aid—much larger than China has provided—to Pakistan for decades (Pant, 2012, p. 86). Although beyond the scope of this paper, US policy toward Pakistan has thus suffered from deep contradictions that complicate US policy toward India, and have negatively affected Japan (Haqqani, 2005, pp. 159–260; Kapur & Ganguly, 2012). Regarding US policy toward India, it is uncertain whether its efforts to recruit India as a balancer against China will really work, because India has no intention of sacrificing its strategic autonomy to become a member of the US-­led, anti-­ China coalition (Batsu, 2014, p. 273; Brewster, 2010a, p. 108, 2011, pp. 831–835; Ganguly & Pardesi, 2010, p. 67). India seeks to make ‘as many friends as possible and make no enemies as far as practicable’ (Jain, 2008a, p. 24). Hoping to facilitate relations with India, the Bush administration offered India nuclear fuel and technology for its civilian nuclear program in 2005, even though India never signed the NPT. India, however, has no intention to align with the United States in exchange for US cooperation on nuclear matters (Kapur, 2010, p. 266). Similarly, India has no intention to make any commitments to Japan regarding Northeast Asian security (Panda, 2011, p. 8). Although it is often said that the 2008 India-­Japan Security Declaration signifies the importance of India for Japan’s security after the United States and Australia, in fact, there is little substance in the declaration. While the Australian declaration included commitments by Australia to cooperate with Japan on North Korean issues, the Indian declaration does not have any reference to Northeast Asian security issues. Despite Japanese requests, India refused to include similar commitments in its declaration, because it did not want to play any role in security issues on the Korean peninsula or Northeast Asia, or give any real political support for Japan over its immediate security concerns in the region (Brewster, 2010a, p. 100). India’s lack of interest in taking part in Northeast Asian security issues is exemplified by its withdrawal from Abe’s quadrilateral proposal of 2007 for fear of negative Chinese reactions (Brewster, 2010a, p. 106) as well as by its silent neutrality when the

Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 101 US, Japan, and South Korea protested China’s establishment of its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in November 2013 (which covered the Japanese controlled Senkaku Islands) (Horimoto, 2014, p. 38). In the end, the Indians might be much shrewder than the Americans and Japanese, because they got what they wanted without making any commitments or concessions. India succeeded in getting economic assistance from the US and its allies (including Japan), integrating into East Asian political and economic institutions (thereby realizing its Look East policy), and receiving technological support for its civilian nuclear program from the United States and Japan without signing the NPT or CTBT.6 Additionally, from the Indians’ point of view, it is better if Japan has troubles with China over territorial disputes, because as long as China is stuck to the East China Sea, it less likely to threaten India’s land border. In this sense, it could be argued that India is capitalizing on Japan’s inability to build peaceful relations with China. Japanese politicians and policy elites might not care about India’s non-­committal stance, since their policy toward India is all about the United States. Nevertheless, by supporting the US policy toward the Indo-­Pacific region, Japan risks locking itself into permanent confrontation with China, and thereby limiting its freedom of action.

Notes 1 It should be noted that this is what Japanese revisionists assert and want to believe. There is ample evidence that Pal, while very critical of the Tokyo Tribunal, did not recognize Japan as Asia’s liberator (Nakajima, 2012; Nishibe, 2008). 2 Japan’s normalization process was triggered by the First Gulf War of 1990–1991 because the United States did not appreciate a large amount of Japan’s financial contributions (total about 13 billion dollars) to the US-­led coalition forces. Instead, it criticized Japan for not sending troops to the Gulf, but grudgingly provided only financial contributions. Yet, it was unthinkable, not only for the Japanese public but also for many LDP politicians, to send the Self-­Defense Forces (SDF) overseas for security related operations at that time. In order to convince the Japanese public that Japan should change its pacifist norms and mercantilist foreign policy based on the Yoshida Doctrine, Ichiro Ozawa (then LDP Secretary General) published a book entitled Blue Print for New Japan (1993). The book argued that Japan should become a ‘normal nation’ that is willing to shoulder international responsibilities and send troops to overseas PKOs under the UN authority. Kitaoka Shinichi was in fact one of the real authors of Ozawa’s book. Since then, Kitaoka has worked for making Japan a ‘normal nation’ by serving as a member on governmental advisory panels, as well as by writing articles and giving public lectures (Saito, 2015). Indeed, the purpose of the Prime Minister’s Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capability under the Abe Cabinet, in which Kitaoka is currently serving as a Chairman, is to revise the Constitution in order to enable Japan to exercise the right of collective self-­defense (Hughes, 2015, pp. 28–78). Likewise, Tanaka Hitoshi—a MoFA official who held a series of important posts in the 1990s and 2000s—had great influence over Japan’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Tanaka worked for strengthening the US-­Japan alliance by expanding its geographical and functional scope. The US-­Japan Joint Declaration (April 1996), for example, stated that the purpose of the alliance was not only for the security of Japan, but also for that of the entire Asia-­Pacific (Tanaka, 2009, pp.  59–98). In the 2000s, he worked not only for normalizing Japan’s relations with North Korea, but also for creating an East Asian Community (EAC) under the Koizumi cabinet (Tanaka, 2009,

102  Natsuyo Ishibashi pp. 99–170). Tanaka is noteworthy not only for these important works during his career as a MoFA official, but also for his broader foreign policy strategy, which became widely publicized through his publications and lectures after he left MoFA in August 2005. 3 The same concern was expressed by Yachi Shotarō, a former MOFA vice-­minister (2005–2007), currently serving as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Abe. Yachi stated that in case China would not accept the US-­led liberal international order, Japan should choose the US-­Japan alliance and support US leadership (Yachi, 2013). 4 Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō (1996–1998) also saw both India and China as similar to each other and expressed concern that these two countries might destroy the existing international order. Hashimoto stated, ‘We do not want in the 21st century China and India to struggle for hegemony in Asia.’ Hashimoto worked for normalizing Japan’s relations with Russia because he thought that rising China should be counter-­balanced by Russia, not by India (Togo, 2007, pp. 89–92). 5 The CEAC is a half-­private, half-­public think tank funded by the government. Most policy discussions about establishing an East Asian Community in Japan took place at the CEAC (Sato, 2012, p. 309; Sohn, 2010, p. 514). 6 Japan signed a civil nuclear cooperation pact with India in November 2016 even though India has not signed the NPT (Asahi Shimbun, November 12, 2016).

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7 Japan’s security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning

Introduction Replacing the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) as the capstone document of its security policy, Japan issued its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2013. ‘In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives,’ the document notes, ‘Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries’ (National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 14). This statement codifies a recent trend in Tokyo’s foreign policy, namely a push to diversify its bilateral security ties, long the exclusive purview of the Japan-­US alliance. Japan’s increasingly comprehensive and substantial security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam are two notable examples. These are the topic of this chapter, which seeks answers to questions such as these: What are the characteristics of Japan’s maturing security relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence, and what promotes and constrains their further development? What, finally, do they suggest about Japan’s future direction as a security actor in the region and beyond? The chapter argues that Japan’s security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam has their six basic characteristics in common: the ‘strategic partnership’ diplomatic superstructure, regularization of strategic dialogues, increasing frequency of high-­level political interaction, diplomatic support in territorial disputes with China, aid-­based maritime capacity building, and increasingly substantial military cooperation. The chapter moreover argues that Japan’s substantiation of these non-­US security bilaterals is fundamentally driven by the contemporary power shift in East Asia and the strategic challenge with which China’s emerging maritime power and behavior presents Japan. Tokyo has pursued it under American auspices, albeit Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms have further invited Japan to do so. Notwithstanding these incentives to further substantiate the two security bilaterals, Japan faces considerable domestic and geo-­strategic constraints and counterincentives. For this reason, the chapter concludes that we are to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance, from the Japan’s ‘strategic partnerships’ with the Philippines and Vietnam.

108  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning

Towards substantive non-­US security bilaterals: Vietnam and the Philippines Japan’s ambitions of expanding its security cooperative relationships into South-­ East Asia is traceable to the 1991 Nakayama Proposal promoting the establishment of a multilateral regional security dialogue (Midford, 2000). Then, one of Prime Minister Hashimoto’s 1997 initiatives to strengthen Japan-­ASEAN relations advocated bilateral security cooperation, proposing that Japan ‘strengthen security dialogues and exchanges, whether they would be in multilateral contexts . . . or in bilateral contexts’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 1997). Both the Philippines and Vietnam made their official appearance on Japan’s security agenda in the early 2000s (Prime Minister Office of Japan, 2001; MoFA, 2000). It was, however, only around the turn of the decade that substantive security cooperation began to gain traction. Events since then reveal that Japan’s emerging security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively, have their six basic characteristics in common. The ‘strategic partnership’ structure Japan is developing bilateral security relations within its ‘strategic partnerships’ with the Philippines and Vietnam. This diplomatic superstructure is their first common characteristic. In 2009, a joint statement declared the establishment of a ‘strategic partnership’ between Japan and Vietnam. ‘Regarding security and defense,’ the document noted, Japan and Vietnam ‘will promote furthermore the exchange at high level and strengthen consultations at Director-­General level’ (MoFA, 2009). Two years thereafter Japan and the Philippines followed suit as their two leaders in a joint statement declared that also this relationship had evolved into a ‘strategic partnership.’ Venturing from their previous emphasis on aid and trade (Wallace, 2013, pp. 488–490), the document revealed that the two states were seeking to strengthen bilateral security relations via political and military interaction and cooperation in the field of maritime affairs (Prime Minister Office of Japan, 2011). Both partnerships have since upgraded to reflect increasing and further promote bilateral security cooperation. Japan and Vietnam declared an ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’ [emphasis added] in a 2014 joint statement stating their shared intention of further strengthening defense and maritime cooperation (MoFA, 2014b). In a 2015 joint statement, Japan and the Philippines declared a ‘Strengthened Strategic Partnership’ [emphasis added]. Recognizing the increasing significance of Japan-­Philippine relations for regional peace and stability, the document outlined a broader portfolio of bilateral security cooperation (MoFA, 2015b). Regular strategic dialogues The second characteristic common to Japan’s budding security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam is the regularization of bilateral high-­level strategic dialogues supplemented with a series of policy dialogues. In 2010, Japan instituted

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 109 a vice-­ministerial defense and foreign affairs Strategic Partnership Dialogue with Vietnam to ‘discuss comprehensively political, diplomatic, defense and security matters’ (MoFA, 2010, 2011). The parties convened for their seventh round of bilateral dialogue in June 2019 (Voice of Vietnam, 2019). In addition, the parties decided in 2011 to initiate a regular Defense Policy Dialogue (MoFA, 2011). The parties have arranged the dialogue annually since 2013, convening for the sixth time in Tokyo in July 2018 (People’s Army Newspaper, 2018; Vietnamnet, 2015). The 2011 ‘strategic partnership’ joint declaration stated Tokyo and Manila’s intentions of launching also a Japan-­Philippine Vice-­Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Prime Minister Office of Japan, 2011). The parties inaugurated the arrangement in 2012 (MoFA, 2012a), holding four dialogues by June 2018 (Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines, 2018). In addition, Japan and the Philippines have established regular Defense Ministerial (2014–) and Vice-­Ministerial (2013–) Policy Dialogues as well as a working level Dialogue on Maritime and Oceanic Affairs (2012–) with maritime security and naval cooperation on the agenda (Ministry of Defense (MoD), 2012a, p. 313, 2015b). High-­level political interaction The third common characteristic is the high frequency of non-­regular ministerial level bilateral interaction with security on the agenda. Since the establishment of the Japan-­Vietnam ‘strategic partnership’ in 2009, Japan’s prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister have met individually with their Vietnamese counterparts at least two dozen times combined. By official accounts, most of the bilateral encounters have had security on the agenda (MoFA, 2019a). A similar frequency of security infused ministerial level exchanges has taken place in Japan-­Philippines relations. State visits and sidelines summits combined, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (2012–present) met with President Aquino seven times during his first two years in office. Moreover, has hosted President Duterte in Tokyo annually since the latter’s inauguration in 2016 (Business World, 2019). Within seven months of the Abe government’s inauguration in December 2012, Manila received in succession visits from Japan’s foreign minister, defense minister, and prime minister for summit meetings with their Philippine counterparts, all stating intentions on deepening bilateral relations in terms of security cooperation (Prime Minister Office of Japan, 2013b; MoD, 2013a; MoFA, 2013). By 2019, Japan’s foreign minister and defense minister have met with their Philippine counterparts eight times combined (MoFA, 2019b). Diplomatic support Japan has also substantiated the two ‘strategic partnerships’ with diplomatic support for the Philippines and Vietnam in their territorial disputes with China. Publicly, Japan has framed this diplomatic backing in terms of opposition to maritime coercion, an oblique albeit hard to miss criticism of Chinese policies, and support for the Philippines and Vietnam’s international law-­based approach to territorial

110  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning disputes in the South China Sea. Prime Minister Abe’s 2014 Shangri-­La speech is but one notable example of Japan’s voicing of such diplomatic support. Adding that Japan supports Philippine and Vietnamese efforts to resolve the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Abe (2014) outlined and advocated in his speech three principles for the rule of law at sea. These are (1) making and clarifying claims based on international law, (2) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims, and (3) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. Expressions such as these unequivocally position Japan on the side of the Philippines and Vietnam against China in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Abe’s Shangri-­La speech reflected also a related expression of Tokyo’s territorial dispute diplomatic support to the Philippines and Vietnam, namely Japan’s continued support for the implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea. ‘I strongly hope,’ he stated, ‘that a truly effective Code of Conduct can be established in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China and that it can be achieved swiftly’ (Abe, 2014). Japan has also considered materially upping its diplomatic support by dispatching Maritime Self-­Defense Force (MSDF) vessels to the South China Sea in support of the US Navy’s declared Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenging excessive Chinese sovereignty claims in the area (Lubold  & Page, 2015; Reuters, 2016d). According to a Senior MOFA Official (personal communication, October 20, 2015), Japan’s NSC is continuously deliberating Tokyo’s appropriate response, including military options, to Chinese coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea. In October 2015, Prime Minister Abe suggested to President Obama that Japan was considering MSDF South China Sea deployments in support of such American operations, although both Defense Minister Nakatani and Foreign Minister Kishida soon expressed attitudes of reservation towards Japan’s military involvement (Agence France-­ Presse, 2015). Aid-­based maritime capacity building The fifth-­shared characteristic is Japan’s efforts to strengthen Philippine and Vietnamese maritime paramilitary capabilities through official development assistance (ODA) funded capacity-­building efforts. Japan initiated an ODA-­funded program to enhance the capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) in the early 2000s (Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 2006; MoFA, 2008). These efforts were very modest prior to the establishment of the ‘strategic partnership,’ featuring joint coast guard tabletop exercises, training of and education for PCG officials, the supply of three small patrol vessels, and a 609 million yen aid grant to fund enhance PCG communications (JICA, 2006; MoFA, 2008; Samuels, 2007, p. 103; The Philippine Star, 2007). Prime Minister Abe revealed in 2013 that Japan’s maritime capacity building for the Philippine was set to expand considerably. In a meeting with President Aquino, Abe offered, according to an official account of his office, based on a request from the Philippines to supply ten 40-­meter patrol vessels for the PCG through a yen loan (Prime Minister Office

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 111 of Japan, 2013a). In December that year, a 19-­billion-­yen soft loan agreement between Japan and the Philippines was signed to that effect. By August  2018, Japan had transferred all ten vessels to the PCG (2018). Japan further substantiated its maritime capacity building efforts towards the Philippines by committing a more modest 1.152 billion yen in March 2014 to enhance the communications capabilities of the PCG (Embassy of Japan in the Philippines, 2014; JICA, 2013). In the summer of 2016, reports emerged that Japan was in negotiations with the Philippines about the construction and transfer of another two larger patrol vessels to the PCG (Mogato, 2016). Japan ventured into modest capacity building also vis-­à-­vis Vietnam prior to ‘strategic partnership’ elevation, featuring seminars and training for Vietnamese Ministry of Defense (VMoD), Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard personnel to enhance their capacity in maritime security and safety, underwater medicine, PKOs, flight safety, and HaDR (Japan Coast Guard Academy, n.d.; MoD, 2014). Such efforts were however not mentioned in a jointly issued document until the 2014 joint declaration on the ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership,’ which expressed their shared intention to advance cooperation in capacity building (MoFA, 2014c). Japan and Vietnam accordingly signed an August 2014 agreement granting Vietnam six used maritime patrol vessels and related equipment ‘for the enhancement of maritime law-­enforcement capabilities of Viet Nam’ through a JPY 500 million ODA arrangement (MoFA, 2014d, 2014e). While modest, this development is notable in lifting Vietnam into the same category as Philippines as a recipient of hardware directed towards maritime capacity building via ODA. Abe revealed in October 2014 that Japan was considering supplying the Vietnam Coast Guard with additional newly built maritime patrol vessels, and in November 2015 that Japan had taken initial implementing steps (MoFA, 2014a, 2015c). Military cooperation The sixth and final shared fundamental characteristic is their increasingly comprehensive and substantive military cooperation. The 2011 joint declaration of the Japan-­Philippines ‘strategic partnership’ featured an agreement to ‘promote exchanges and cooperation between their defense authorities,’ including reciprocal senior naval officer exchanges and naval port calls (Prime Minister Office of Japan, 2011). The MSDF and the Philippine Navy have since implemented this new emphasis on military interaction, the most notable example of which to date is the much publicized port call by two destroyers and a submarine of the MSDF to the Philippine Subic Bay naval base in 2016 (Johnson, 2016). This particular port call is best interpreted as military diplomacy supporting the Philippines in its territorial standoff with China. MSDF officials reportedly explained the visit by referring to it as necessary ‘to deal with recent developments in nearby waters,’ surely a reference to Chinese assertive behavior in the South China Sea (Sasaki, 2016). Following the codification of military cooperation in the 2011 ‘strategic partnership’ declaration, bilateral military interaction gained further traction. In 2012, the Japan’s MOD and the Philippine Department of National Defense issued a

112  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning ‘Statement of Intent on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges,’ later upgraded to a 2015 Memorandum of Understanding (MoD, 2012b, 2015c). The document declared their intention of continuing previously outlined defense exchanges but added, most notably, participation in each other’s, and joint, military exercises to the bilateral military cooperation agenda. The MSDF and the Philippine Navy proceeded with arranging in rapid succession their first and second joint naval exercises in mid-­2015 (MoD, 2015a, p. 287; The Manila Times, 2015). In addition, the joint statement declaring the ‘Strengthened Strategic Partnership’ in 2014 gave a premonition of further substantiation of military relations. The two sides were seeking an agreement on bilateral trade in arms, it noted, and they were initiating negotiations to that effect (Prime Minister Office of Japan, 2015). Such an agreement on Japan’s supply of military equipment to the Philippines was signed in February 2016, making the Philippines the fourth non-­US partner with which Japan has such a military-­industrial exchange arrangement, but the first East Asian state, the first unequivocally junior partner (i.e. small power), and the first oriented towards capacity building (Gomez, 2016). Philippine defense officials are reportedly expressing interest on the transfer of both P-­3C patrol aircraft and retired submarines from Japan (Asahi Shimbun, 2016; Grevatt, 2015). Meanwhile, Japan has transferred five 1900 km range TC-­90 maritime patrol craft to the Philippines (Rahmat, 2018) under a deal struck in May 2016 (Agence France-­ Presse, 2016). Originally, the deal was set up as a leasing arrangement. However, under new provisions for defense equipment cooperation with developing states, introduced in 2017 (MoD, n.d.), Japan ultimately donated the five aircraft. According to former President Aquino, the Philippines bid to acquire the aircraft ‘to assist [the Philippines Navy] in patrolling [Philippine territories], particularly in the West Philippine Sea’ (Reuters, 2016c). Further yet bilateral military cooperation is in the works. Japan is strengthening its daily working level military interaction with the Philippines in 2017 by dispatching additional defense attaches to its diplomatic mission in Manila (JIJI Press, 2016b). More importantly, in 2014, President Aquino revealed that he had discussed with Prime Minister Abe granting the Japan Self-­Defense Forces (SDF) base privileges in the Philippines via a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), noting that ‘[the Philippines] will be initiating all the diplomatic requirements to come up with a visiting forces agreement’ (Japan Times, 2015). In addition, Japan is reportedly preparing a military intelligence sharing pact with the Philippines and other South-­East Asian coastal states, enabling exchange of classified information on defense equipment and foreign military movements and activities (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016). Coupled with the agreement on Japanese military hardware transfer to the Philippines, the implementation of a SOFA and an intelligence sharing agreement would unequivocally elevate Japan-­Philippine ties to a militarily substantive and significant relationship. Military cooperation has also incrementally substantiated the Japan-­Vietnam ‘strategic partnership.’ Exchanges and cooperation in defense featured in a 2007 Agenda drafted to move Japan and Vietnam relations towards a ‘strategic partnership.’ The language, however, was non-­committal, and this military contents were

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 113 notably absent from the 2009 declaration of the ‘strategic partnership’ (MoFA, 2007, 2009). Cooperation between their armed services was publicly reintroduced in an October 2011 memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges promoting, amongst other, mutual high-­ranking defense official visits and reciprocal naval port calls. In a joint statement issued alongside the memorandum, the parties expressed the shared view that such military exchanges ‘would contribute to the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust, and to the peace and stability of the region’ (MoFA, 2011). The 2014 declaration of the ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’ contained a commitment to implement the military interaction outlined in the 2011 Memorandum (MoFA, 2014b). Meanwhile, Japan took a step in that direction as Defense Minister Onodera visited Cam Ranh Bay, a strategic naval base housing Vietnam’s young submarine fleet, in September  2013. On the occasion, Onodera noted before the press his ‘expectation . . . that the cooperative relationship between Vietnam and Japan, which includes military-­related interactions beyond the boundary of Cam Ranh Bay, will strengthen’ (MoFA, 2013a). This led to the first naval port call by MSDF destroyers to a Vietnamese naval base in early 2016. Notably, however, the submarine the two destroyers had accompanied to the previously mentioned port call at the Philippine Subic Bay naval base just days earlier did not partake in the visit (Sasaki, 2016), ostensibly reflecting differences in the maturity of Japan’s security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively. However, in June 2019 bilateral defense cooperation progressed further as the Japanese naval flagship vessel, the JS Izumo flat-­top destroyer, led the MSDF in its first naval exercise with the Vietnamese Navy in waters off Cam Ranh Bay (Navy Recognition, 2019). Bilateral military cooperation between Japan and Vietnam is set to further increase. A decision has reportedly been made for the MSDF P-­3Cs maritime patrol aircraft returning from anti-­piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to start refueling at, amongst other, a Vietnamese air base (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2016). Japan has moreover strengthened its daily working level military interaction with Vietnam by deploying additional defense attaches to its diplomatic mission in Hanoi (JIJI Press, 2016b). Finally, Japan is reportedly preparing a military intelligence sharing pact with Vietnam as well, strengthening defense cooperation by enabling exchange of classified information on defense equipment and foreign military movements and activities (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016). While much of Japan’s military interaction with Vietnam has been of the symbolic sorts, the implementation of such an intelligence sharing arrangement would add a militarily substantial and potentially significant element to their bilateral cooperation under the ‘strategic partnership.’

The shifting power balance in maritime East Asia and Japan’s rising threat perception Japan’s diversification of security relationships to the Philippines and Vietnam is fundamentally informed by the shifting balance of power in East Asia. As Figure 7.1 reveals, China, in just a few decades, has eclipsed Japan and is fast catching up to the US in terms of economic strength.

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Figure 7.1  Gross domestic product (projected after 2018) of the US, Japan, and China Source: International Monetary Fund (2019). Note: Numbers in current USD billions (lines, left Y-­axis) and China’s GDP as a percent share of the US’s GDP (bars, right Y-­axis).

Japan has both contributed to and benefits from China’s developing economy via foreign direct investment, ODA, and trade (Jerdén & Hagström, 2012, pp. 230–234). It also, however, presents Japan with a tremendous strategic challenge, as China has translated economic strength into military power as crudely albeit tellingly indicated by its rapidly growing defense budget. As Figure 7.2 reveals, China as of 2018 outspends Japan in defense more than five times over, and trend lines suggest that it is catching up also to the US (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019), some projections indicating that China will overtake the US as the leading defense spender by 2030. Japan’s NSS recognizes this development, noting, ‘Since the beginning of the twenty-­first century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing on an unprecedented scale’ (National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 6). The maritime orientation of this power shift is what makes it a major strategic challenge to Japan. Japan is an island nation, a maritime nation, and one poorly endowed in natural resources at that. Its national well-­being relies heavily on external trade, virtually all of which arrives and departs the Japanese archipelago by sea (The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, 2014). Most notably, Japan has a near total reliance on crude oil imports, 93% of which seaborne (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015). This maritime nature and strategic reliance on the seas make the stability of Japan’s maritime surroundings and along

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Figure 7.2  Defense budgets of the US, China, and Japan Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2019). Note: Numbers in current USD millions (lines, left Y-­axis) and China’s defense budget as a percent share of the US’s defense budget (bars, right Y-­axis).

its sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) no less than a national security imperative (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). Linking this imperative to Japan’s defense doctrine, the 2010 NDPG notes that Japan, with its vast territorial waters, is a trading nation which heavily depends on imports for the supply of foods and resources and on foreign markets. Thus, securing maritime security and international order is essential for the country’s prosperity. (Ministry of Defense, 2010, p. 4) Since World War II Japan has ultimately vested the security and its safe use of the seas to a maritime security regime underpinned by US naval dominance supported by substantial indigenous naval capabilities in the region and along its SLOCS (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). China’s expanding maritime ambitions and naval power increasingly challenge the foundations of this maritime security regime. Geopolitical developments along its land borders have enabled China, traditionally a continental power, to redirect attention and resources from the Asian continent to the seas of East Asia as the go-­to domain in which to expand and pursue China’s strategic interests. The primary expression of China’s new maritime orientation is its investment in naval power, replacing and supplementing

116  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning antiquated assets with large quantities of modern naval platforms (Cole, 2010; Ross, 2009; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015). As two authoritative studies on the subject note, China is ‘building a modern and regionally powerful navy’ through a ‘naval modernization effort [that] encompasses a broad array of platform and weapon acquisition programs’ (O’Rourke, 2016), the result of which is that it now poses a ‘major threat’ to foreign naval operations within and possibly beyond 1,000 miles of China’s lengthy coastline (Heginbotham et al., 2015, p. 21). Chinese displays of expanding maritime ambitions and advances in naval capabilities have brought China’s tremendous rise to the forefront of Japan’s security anxieties (Grønning, 2014, pp. 10–12). China’s willingness to use its emerging maritime power to pressurize Japan over conflicting territorial claims in the East China Sea has emerged as the primary manifestation of the inherent Chinese maritime challenge to Japan’s security (MoFA, 2017c). However, Tokyo’s particular sensitivities and stakes extend also into the neighboring South China Sea, as indicated by the MOD compiling and successive updating of a report on China’s activities in the South China Sea and its implications for Japan’s security (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2019). On the level of perception, the recent blatancy of China’s territorial claims enforcement in the South China Sea has strengthened Japan’s convictions about the coercive inclination of an increasingly powerful China and the challenge it represents to the established regional order. More importantly, China has constructed military-­grade facilities and deployed military assets such as runways, air-­defense systems, and radars to land reclaimed from maritime features in these disputed waters. This significantly extends the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s peacetime ISR capacity and permanent air presence potential, and, by extension its bid for maritime influence and dominance in the South China Sea. This matters greatly to Japan, as it conducts most of its trade, including 81% of its crude oil imports—75% of its total supply—through the South China Sea (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015). In sum, Tokyo perceives China’s mode of conduct as a rapidly materializing challenge to a highly favorable status quo (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). As notes MoD (2018, p. 5) in its capstone defense policy document, ‘China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order.’ In their annual white papers, the MoD (2019b, p. 58) and the MoFA (2019c, p. 15) both make similar declarations. Japan’s once euphemistic references to the rise of China and the security implications thereof have gradually shed opacity and grown more confrontational (MoD, 2016, p. 5). Japan has coupled this rhetorical confrontation with an increasingly overt, comprehensive and sustained security policy response. Japan, in short, is responding by augmenting the aggregate power output of the Japan-­US alliance and by increasing its regional security involvement (Bowers & Grønning, 2017; Grønning, 2014). As part of the latter, Japan’s security policy is decentering from its Cold War era exclusive focus on the US as its only security partner, and toward building security partnerships with other US security partners such as the Philippines and Vietnam, and, notably, with Russia (Grønning, 2018). Like

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 117 Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam are regional maritime powers that find themselves at the receiving end of Chinese maritime coercive diplomacy, as detailed by Ministry of Defense of Japan (2019). In developing bilateral security cooperative relations with them, Japan is seeking to diplomatically oppose and tactically complicate what it perceives as Chinese maritime revisionism.

Under American auspices ‘The future of politics will be decided in Asia,’ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton posited in 2011. This recognition, broadly shared in the American foreign policy community, forms the premise of Washington’s ‘rebalancing’ to strengthen the US economically, diplomatically, and militarily in Asia (Clinton, 2011; United States Department of Defense, 2012). In support of this campaign, the US has made efforts to build stronger bilateral security and defense ties with, amongst other, the Philippines and Vietnam. With Vietnam, the US has most notably launched annual bilateral non-­combat naval exercises (2010), signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation (2011), committed 18 million USD in assistance to boost Vietnam’s maritime security capacity (in 2013), transferred a 115-­meter cutter to the Vietnamese Coast Guard (Naval Today, 2017), and, most importantly, partially lifted its embargo on the export of lethal weapons (in 2014). The US Department of Defense (2019) maintains ambitions to further elevate bilateral security relations. The US has committed maritime security assistance to the Philippines, amounting to 79 million USD in FY 2015 alone, while upgrading in 2014 the US-­ Philippine alliance by adopting the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement which, amongst other things, grants the US military rotational access to and use of military bases in the Philippines (Thayer, 2014). The US began inaugurating new defense facilities, established within the parameters of the agreement, in the Philippines in 2019 (Robson, 2019). These developments reveal that Japan’s budding security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam is following the US’s lead. Indeed, key elements of Japan’s efforts find themselves explicitly outlined in the Japan-­US alliance framework and are accordingly pursued under American auspices. First, Japan’s maritime capacity building efforts execute alliance policy priorities first outlined in an April 2012 joint statement of the Japan-­US ’2 + 2’ Security Consultative Committee. ‘The U.S. Government plans to continue to help allies and partners in the region to build their capacity with training and exercises,’ it notes, while ‘the Government of Japan . . . plans to take various measures to promote safety in the region, including strategic use of official development assistance, for example through providing coastal states with patrol boats’ (Security Consultative Committee, 2012). Second, promotion of the type of maritime security-­ oriented partnerships Japan has pursued with the Philippines and Vietnam was incorporated in the revised Japan-­US Guidelines for Defense Cooperation issued in 2015. ‘Proactive

118  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning cooperation with partners,’ the bilateral strategy document notes, ‘will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities . . . with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges’ (MoD, 2015d). Third, US expectations appear to carry weight also in Japan’s deliberations about potential military involvement in the South China Sea. To date, Washington has made no official request for Japan’s military support to its FONOPs challenging excessive Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Senior US Navy officials, however, active and retired, have publicly expressed expectations about Japan’s future military contributions (JIJI Press, 2016a; Kelly  & Kubo, 2015; Kinoshita, 2016; Werner, 2019). According to a Senior MOFA Official (personal communication, October 20, 2015), the policy position from which the foreign minister debates the South China Sea issue before the NSC is that ‘Japan has to do something [militarily] with the US in the South China Sea.’ The defense minister, he notes, argues from a more reserved position. While there is no indication that Japan will join in on US-­led FONOPs, Japan is demonstrating increasing confidence and willingness to operate conspicuously its naval forces in the South China Sea. The most notable indication is the MSDF, fronted by its previously mentioned flagship Izumo naval vessel, joining US Navy-­led naval maneuvers (Kelly & Kubo, 2017; Reuters, 2019; Johnson, 2019). What this indicates is that while Japan is developing increasingly substantial and significant security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, these cases far from represent Tokyo’s distancing from Washington. Indeed, the evidence suggests the contrary, that Japan is building these security partnerships to strengthen the alliance. Tokyo publicly projects this vision too, noting in its 2014 NSS that ‘Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-­U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone’ (MoD, 2013b, p. 5; National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 14). Rather, Japan’s push for substantial security ties with the Philippines and Vietnam appears to answer US calls for Tokyo to take greater responsibility not only in national but also regional security matters to support and complement US security efforts in the region. Japan’s efforts, in short, are an integral part of Japan-­US alliance policies.

Japanese nationalism While fundamentally informed by the international context, Japan’s push for substantial non-­US security relationships is not indifferent to domestic forces. The process has been facilitated by elite nationalism in Japan, featuring ideas about Japanese normalcy and international pre-­eminence and the promotion of the SDF as an instrument of foreign policy, not least, but far from exclusively, under Prime Minister Abe (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). Building security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam to resist China’s further expansion resonates well with these nationalist ideas.

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 119 Japanese nationalism, moreover, has on occasion exacerbated Sino-­Japanese tensions. At times, Japanese decision-­makers have invoked these tensions to legitimize reforms in security and defense. At other times, nationalist currents in Japans has strong-­armed decision-­makers into reluctantly making moves that reproduce and reinforce the very tensions which alarm Japanese strategists. Most notably, the Government of Japan (GoJ) intervened in Tokyo’s raucously nationalistic Governor Ishihara Shintarō’s planned purchase of the islands at the center of Japan’s territorial dispute with China, effectively nationalizing the islands in ‘an effort to minimize any negative impact on [Sino-­Japanese] relations’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012b). Tokyo’s official line of reasoning fell on deaf ears in Beijing. Fighting what it perceived as a strengthening of Japan’s claim, China sought to fortify its own claim by infesting the islands’ surrounding waters with para-­naval assets. These events illustrate the dynamics at play between Japanese nationalism, Sino-­Japanese tensions, and the contemporary security reform of which Japan’s push for security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam is part (Bowers & Grønning, 2017).

Constitutional, legal, and paralegal reforms By significantly broadening the scope of action of Japan’s international security cooperation, constitutional, security legislative, and paralegal reforms in Japan has facilitated the development of substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. First, adjustments to the paralegal framework regulating Tokyo’s arms exports significantly expand the scope of cooperation in the military-­ industrial domain. Japan has replaced its ‘Three Principles’ blanket ban arms exports regime with the new ‘Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ conditionally permitting Japan’s foreign exports of arms, defense equipment, and military technology (MoFA, 2014f). This paralegal adjustment legalizes Tokyo’s substantiation of the two ‘strategic partnerships’ with military-­industrial and military-­technological cooperation. This type of cooperation had thus far by exception been the exclusive purview of the US (Kazeki, 2015; MoFA, n.d.). Moreover, following the 2013 NSS’ declaration of intent on promoting ‘strategic utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance,’ Tokyo removed its ban on provision of aid to foreign militaries in a revised official Development Cooperation Charter released in February 2015 (Cabinet of Japan, 2015, p. 30; National Security Council of Japan, 2013, p. 30). The ‘Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’ coupled with the revised ‘Development Cooperation Charter’ constitutes a new Japanese arms exports regime in which Japan can extend its ODA-­based capacity building efforts into the military domain. It legally enables, in other words, Japan’s strengthening of Philippine and Vietnamese military capabilities by donation. Second, reform of Japan’s security legislative framework vastly expands the legal scope of military-­operational cooperation. In 2014, Japan removed by Cabinet decision longstanding constitutional barriers to its application of military power. Japan’s parliament passed corresponding security legislation in

120  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning September  2015 to the effect of broadening the legal parameters of the SDF’s use of armed force. Most notably, the new legal framework conditionally allows Japan to exercise its right to collective self-­defense, previously outlawed by constitutional reinterpretation, in situations in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. (Cabinet of Japan, 2014) The heated political debate surrounding the passing of the legislation saw both proponents and opponents voicing narratives focused on military action defending Japan’s treaty ally, the US. However, the somewhat ambiguous wording of the new legal framework makes it more broadly applicable at Japanese decision and policy-­makers’ discretion. Specifically, the new framework legalizes military commitments to and defensive operations on behalf of states ‘in a close relationship with Japan.’ Vice Admiral (ret.) Kōda Yūji offers a former MSDF commanders perspective on the ambiguity inherent in the new constitutional interpretation and security legislation, noting that it enables Japan to legally engage in collective self-­defense whenever and wherever it is considered required (personal communication, September 29, 2015). As the ‘strategic partnerships’ with the Philippines and Vietnam can be defined as such at Japanese decision-­makers’ discretion, the new security legislation permits a broad extension of Japan’s military-­operational cooperation with these countries.

Limitations and constraints While driven, facilitated, and enabled by both domestic and external forces, Japan’s further development of Vietnam and Philippine security relations faces significant limitations and constraints. Domestic politics and bureaucratic procedures apply constraints to Japan’s further development of security cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines. The Japanese public remains deeply skeptical about military-­natured statecraft, one indication of which is the stubborn popular opposition to constitutional revision targeting its war-­renouncing Article 9 (Kyodo, 2019). Public opinion on the new security legislation implies political cost for governments moving to exercise the right of collective self-­defense beyond what the public perceives as necessary to safeguard Japan and its citizens. In one such poll conducted shortly after its passing by the Japanese Diet, 51% opposed the new legislation while 30% supported it (Asahi Shimbun, 2015). Any commitment to militarily defending the Philippines and Vietnam against armed attack would no doubt be a tough case to sell domestically for the GoJ. A Diet approval clause inserted to satisfy and secure the support of the reluctant junior coalition partner Kōmeitō further applied procedural constraints on decisions to exercise the right to collective self-­defense (2015). This prevents an activist prime

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 121 minister from passing orders for the SDF to exercise the right to collective self-­ defense without broad political support, although, admittedly, the prime minister can do so in time-­sensitive situations pending Diet approval. As of 2018, the GDP of Vietnam and the Philippines stood at a mere 4.7% and 6.7% of Japan’s, respectively, while their military expenditure stood at 11.8% and 8.1% of Japan’s (International Monetary Fund, 2019; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019). Their navies, moreover, have very limited inventories, and hardly dent China’s significant quantitative lead over Japan in naval assets. By one account, the Chinese navy by 2016 had an inventory of 61 submarines (strategic and tactical) and 74 principal surface combatants (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates). The same account attributes the MSDF 18 and 74, the Philippine Navy zero and one, and the Vietnamese Navy six and two, respectively (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, pp. 242, 261, 286, 297). This all reveals that the power aggregation potential of Japan-­Philippine and Japan-­Vietnam relations is severely limited. Moreover, it implies that Japan’s pursuit of security via these bilateral arrangements is not so much a question of how they can materially assist Japan, as how Japan can assist them in return for net security gains. This draws attention to deficiencies in Japan’s own material capabilities. Notwithstanding recent arms buildup efforts, including growing inventories of submarines and large surface vessels, the SDF remains structured to carry out its primary missions: the protection of Japanese territory and its SLOCs out to 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo. In other words, the SDF is not dimensioned to sustain militarily significant operations in the South China Sea. As notes MSDF Vice Admiral (ret.) Kōda, naval deployment beyond these parameters is possible, but such operations remain outside of the SDFs operational and structural concept, severely limiting its capacity to undertake such missions (personal communication, September 29, 2015). In its current form, in other words, the SDF cannot readily assume significant military responsibilities in the South China Sea, whether it be regular peacetime patrols or contingency response operations, without running the risk of compromising its core missions. The risk of Chinese reciprocal naval actions aimed at tying up Japanese resources in the East China further exacerbate Japan’s abovementioned capacity constraint. China views Japan as an external party to the South China Sea disputes and has publicly aired its apprehensions about and admonitions against Japanese interference (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015; Reuters, 2016a). Vice Admiral (ret.) Kaneda Hideaki notes that China’s ability to bind Japanese resources in the East China Sea implies that ‘the SDF is tactically pressured by China’ (personal communication, November 12, 2015). In 2014, Prime Minister Abe hinted at this link between Chinese maritime maneuvers in the East China Sea and Japan’s capacity to commit resources to the South China Sea. Before the Diet, Abe noted that Japan was unable to retire Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessels intended for transfer to the Vietnamese Coast Guard as early as expected because its surveillance duties were getting heavier (Reuters, 2014).

122  Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning This dynamic is in play also in the naval domain. Japan publicly deliberated joining US Navy FONOPs that began in the South China Sea in 2015 (Hayashi & Tsuneoka, 2015; Kelly & Kubo, 2015). As the deliberations went on, China dispatched and maneuvered a large naval intelligence vessel close to the disputed East China Sea islands (JIJI Press, 2015). Former Defense Minister Morimoto Satoshi (personal communication, December 15, 2015) interprets the PLAN operation as a clear-­cut political message from Beijing telling Tokyo to stay out of the South China Sea. Media comments by a high-­ranking MSDF officer similarly notes that the MSDF has its ‘hands full dealing with the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, so it is unrealistic to talk about full-­scale patrol and monitoring operations in the South China Sea’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2016). Morimoto similarly notes that the risk of provoking China into reciprocal actions in the East China Sea restrain, but not altogether rule out, Japanese military action challenging Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea (personal communication, December 15, 2015). Another geopolitical constraint is the extent of Manila and Hanoi’s willingness to engage with Japan in matters of security and defense. Both China and Russia have geopolitical interests in Vietnam. Hanoi might find itself pressurized by the two great powers if it slips too close to Japan, the number one regional benefactor of American policies and presence openly opposed by Beijing and Moscow. As an island nation, the Philippines finds itself geographically cut-­off from the Asian mainland and, in this sense, somewhat less susceptible to such geopolitical pressure. Manila’s future receptiveness to Japan-­Philippine security cooperation has nonetheless become a topical issue following the geopolitical shift apparently announced by Philippine President Duterte during a recent visit to Beijing. ‘I announce my separation from the U.S. . . . both in military and economics also,’ Duterte stated (AP/Reuters, 2016), seemingly declaring Philippine overtures towards China at the expense of relations with the US. The implementation of such a shift would likely have implications for the Philippine interest in security cooperation with Japan. Finally, the US is well aware of the potency of Japan’s security policy stoking regional tensions, in particular between Japan and China (Bowers & Grønning, 2017). Surely, Washing-­ ton finds it in its interest to keep a leash on Japan with regards to its security relations in the South China Sea in case security policy activism in Tokyo threatens to develop these relations to an extent, at a pace, or in a direction that needlessly heighten regional tension or otherwise undermine broader US regional policy objectives. Tellingly, the US has thus far refrained from officially and publicly requesting Japan’s military support for its declared FONOPs in the South China Sea, seemingly vigilant that the geopolitical costs might outweigh its benefits.

Conclusion Japan’s security relationships with the Philippines and Vietnam, respectively, have rapidly matured with a shared set of fundamental characteristics. In just a few years, Japan has essentially developed bilateral relations from security talk

Japan with the Philippines and Vietnam 123 shops in the direction of and in some respects crossing over into militarily substantial relationships. This evolution raises questions not only about its origin, but moreover about the destination of these increasingly substantial security bilaterals in the context of Japan’s decentering from its bilateral alliance with the US as its sole security relationship: Are we, in essence, witnessing Japan’s non-­American military alliances in the making? This chapter has chronicled Japan’s security bilaterals with the Philippines and Vietnam as catalyzed by a mixture of domestic and international factors. While fundamentally informed by the contemporary regional power shift they cannot be understood without appreciation for its maritime dimension; the strategic challenge that China’s maritime rise presents Japan, given Tokyo’s inherent reliance on the seas. They have moreover been encouraged under American auspices, promoted by domestic nationalism, and enabled, at least in part, by domestic security legislative reform. Notably, these factors all continue to promote additional substantiation of Japan’s Philippine and Vietnam security cooperation. Yet, their further military development is up against considerable domestic political, geopolitical, and geo-­ strategic constraints. Most critical is the inescapable fact that the Philippines and Vietnam have virtually nothing to offer that would fundamentally enhance Japan’s national security, and Japan, indeed, has not much to offer them. The two ‘strategic partnerships,’ in other words, will continue to revolve around extending mutual security-­focused diplomatic support. Going forward, these constraints will only grow more severe given the growing disparity in the latent power at Japan and China’s disposal. From these security relationships, then, we should at most be expecting more of the same type of military cooperation that is already in place, rather than significant leaps towards military alliances. The rapid military maturation of these two Japanese non-­American security partnerships also yields important lessons about Japan as a regional security actor today and beyond. Most importantly, they reflect an emerging foreign and security policy activism on the part of Tokyo and a growing enthusiasm for first-­hand involvement in regional security affairs that both predated and will outlive Prime Minister Abe. When and where regional security and stability is on the line, we should expect Japan to show up with an ambition to shape unfolding events in accordance with its national interest. This reflects Japan’s growing enthusiasm for harder power applications and the (still non-­combat) use of its armed forces and military policies in general as tools of foreign policy. As such, they are illustrative of Japan’s steadfast return towards normalcy.

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Part III

Japan’s focus on multilateral security cooperation

8 From a decentering and recentering imperative Japan’s approach to Asian security multilateralism Takeshi Yuzawa Introduction One of the notable developments in Japan’s foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War has been its growing initiative for the promotion of regional multilateralism1 in Asia. In the post-­Cold War era, the region has witnessed the development of a variety of regional institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asian Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), and Japan has been actively involved in the evolution of these institutions. Japan made a significant contribution to the formation of the ARF in 1994, the first region-­wide security institution involving all of the regional major powers in the Asia-­Pacific (Midford, 2000; Ashizawa, 2003; Yuzawa, 2005, 2007). From the late 1990s to the mid-­2000s, Japan also placed great impetus on the promotion of “East Asian” multilateralism in the form of the APT and the EAS by playing a central role in the management of the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis and presenting an East Asian Community (EAC) concept (Terada, 2003, 2010; Hwee, 2006; Rozman, 2007; Sohn, 2010; Zhang, 2014). Regardless of the different degrees to which each institution prioritizes security, Japan has taken initiatives to promote multilateral security cooperation in each of them. Why has Japan attempted to promote regional security multilateralism for over two decades despite its open acknowledgement of the vital centrality of the US-­ Japan alliance in its overall foreign and security policy? Why has Japan’s pursuit for regional security multilateralism sometimes swayed between an inclusive “Asia-­Pacific” (with the US) and an exclusive “East Asian” format (without the US)? While the examination of the existing literature tends to place their focus on Japan’s engagements with one specific institution for a limited time period,2 the above questions would require a more extensive and historical analysis of the nature of Japan’s involvement in regional security multilateralism. This article hence seeks to add new insights to the literature by investigating Japan’s major initiatives for Asian security multilateralism, from the beginning of the 1990s onwards, through its own distinctive analytical model. Employing the decentering/recentering framework presented by this book (see the introduction and Chapter 2) and major theoretical assumptions drawing from neoclassical

132  Takeshi Yuzawa IV International pressures and opportunities

First MV The nature of perceived policy interests

Second MV Decentering/ Recentering multilateral imperatives

DV Intiatives for security multilateralism

Figure 8.1  The model of the decentering/recentering multilateral imperative

realism, this article develops the model of the “decentering/recentering multilateral imperative”. It unpacks the process by which Japanese policymakers have come to recognize regional security multilateralism as an appropriate tool for advancing their perceived policy interests, arising from international pressures and opportunities (see Figure 8.1). The “decentering” multilateral imperative is generally defined as the policy idea of promoting security multilateralism as a means of diversifying security ties and hence reducing the relative reliance on a central security partner. Contrary to this, the “recentering” multilateral imperative is equated with the idea of promoting security multilateralism for restoring or strengthening the relative reliance on the central security partner. In this model, the decentering/recentering imperative is treated as a key mediating variable (MV) that establishes a causal link, with another MV, between international pressures/ opportunities (as the independent variable: IV) and initiatives for security multilateralism (as the dependent variable: DV). The choice between the two differing imperatives (decentering or recentering) is primarily determined by the nature of perceived policy interests (First MV). The validity of this analytical model rests on two main folds. First, the nature of Japan’s involvement in regional security multilateralism cannot be discerned by looking at the simple independent/dependent variable dichotomy. Japan’s foreign and security initiatives are often provoked by external shocks (Cooney, 2007), but this does not mean that they directly precede Japan’s move towards multilateralism. Indeed, as recent work on neoclassical realism argues, policy choices that states make are not direct products of systemic circumstances, but rather they are outcomes of the screening process by which “the state perceives them and responds to them within the institutional constraints of its unique domestic circumstances” (Ripsman et  al., 2016, p.  31). Hence, the adequate accounts of foreign policy behavior require the incorporation of unit-­level mediating variables that can influence policy selection processes. As this article examines foreign policy choices in a particular issue area, it creates mediating variables in an ad hoc manner, illuminating the process by which Japanese officials develop certain policy interests through their assessment of international circumstances (First MV) and by which the idea of promoting Asian security multilateralism emerges in their polity thinking as an appropriate policy instrument for pursuing those interests (Second MV). Secondly, multilateralism often represents the strategy of smaller states to constrain larger states to retain a certain level of diplomatic leeway (decentering) or

Decentering and recentering imperative 133 to handcuff them to enlist their strategic support (Paul, 2005; Doran, 2010). This is also the case for Japan, historically seeing multilateralism as a useful policy tool for coping with the risk of either “abandonment” by the United States or “entrapment” in US policy (Green, 2001). This means that decentering or recentering use of security multilateralism is a general policy option for Japanese policymakers, and it becomes a likely policy choice especially when there is a shift in their perceived value of the US-­Japan alliance. The analysis of this chapter is divided into three phases and seeks to identify a causal sequence leading to Japan’s regional initiative in each: (1) Japan’s leading role in the formation of the ARF (1991–1994), (2) Japan’s initiatives for the establishment of the APT and the EAS (1997–2005), (3) Japan’s renewed focus on the EAS with US membership (2010-­onwards). It is argued that Japan’s initial tilt towards regional security multilateralism in the Asia-­Pacific, manifested by its active contribution to the formation of the ARF, was largely provoked by a “decentering” multilateral imperative arising from structural changes with the end of the Cold War; namely promoting security multilateralism as a tool for playing a more independent political and security role in region and of developing a new security measure appropriate for a changing strategic environment. The decentering imperative was at a high in the late 1990s due largely to its enhanced relations with Asian neighbours during the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis and the perceived risk of US abandonment by a Sino-­US rapprochement, leading to Japan’s genuine enthusiasm for more exclusive “East Asian” multilateralism in the form of the APT and the EAS—regional institutions without US membership. However, since the late 2000s, this decentering imperative has increasingly given way to a “recentering” multilateral imperative given the perceived challenges from China to the territorial and normative status-­quo in the region and US renewed commitment to Asia. Indeed, as Japan’s overall strategic thinking has become increasingly preoccupied with inventing measures to counter the rapid ascendance of China’s power and influence, Japan has moved back its focus on inclusive “Asia-­Pacific” security multilateralism, in particular the EAS with US membership, as a means of facilitating greater Japan-­US collaborations in the rule-­making initiative based on their shared values.

Japan’s leading role in establishing the ARF (1990–1994): security multilateralism as an outlet for decentering aspirations At the meeting of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, Japan’s Foreign Minister Nakayama Tarō proposed to establish a region-­wide forum for multilateral political dialogue based on the ASEAN PMC, consisting of ASEAN states, Japan, South Korea, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the European Union. This initiative, known as the Nakayama proposal, represented Japan’s first post-­war security initiative towards the Asia-­ Pacific. There were two major policy interests influencing Japan’s new regional initiative. First, there was a growing desire among Japanese policymakers to

134  Takeshi Yuzawa launch political and security initiatives in the region. Throughout the 1980s, there was a heightened awareness in the mainstream of Japan’s foreign policy community that there was an acute need for Japan to make a more direct contribution to maintaining international security. This was because they had not only become increasingly frustrated with the lack of symmetry between their country’s status as the second largest economic power and its international political profile, but also Japan had become the target of international criticism for its passive and indirect involvement in international security during the Cold War (Inoguchi, 1993, pp. 139–146). It was the collapse of the bipolar structure with the end of the Cold War that boosted Japan’s latent ambition. Japanese policymakers saw this systemic change as a major opportunity to realize a greater international presence since the decrease of both Washington and Moscow’s influence over the region created room for Tokyo to adopt a more independent foreign and security policy outside the framework of the US-­Japan alliance. This was evident in a series of major speeches and publications delivered by Japanese leaders in 1990 (Leitch et al., 1995, pp. 34–43). In the quest for active engagement with the post-­Cold War order-­building, Japanese leaders increasingly identified the Asia-­Pacific region as the main arena where Japan should perform such a task. However, there was also recognition among Japanese officials that such a policy ambition would not be easily realized due to the existence of deep-­rooted skepticism and concern among its Asian neighbors who had suffered from Japan’s aggression during the Pacific War (Yuzawa, 2007, p. 33). Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War also added complexity to the Japanese perspective on the regional security environment. The end of Cold War hostilities made regional strategic environment more favorable to Japan than at any time in the last century. This was mainly exhibited by the rapid improvement of diplomatic relations among regional countries from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, such as the normalization of Sino-­Soviet relations, of China’s relations with several Southeast Asian countries, and the ameliorated relationship between the Soviet Union and both Japan and South Korea. For Japanese policymakers, these positive developments finally provided regional countries with opportunities to expand their political and security cooperation (Satoh, 1991, p. 35; MoFA, 1991). However, despite these positive developments, as Japan perceived it, the post-­ Cold War regional security environment was still prevailed upon by a variety of uncertainties and security risks. These included various unresolved disputes and conflicts, the persistence of deep distrust and suspicion among regional countries, and the possible shifts in the regional balance of power triggered by the decline of both US and Soviet military influence (MoFA, 1990). Faced with such a fluid regional security environment, Japanese policymakers came to recognize the need to expand their security strategy beyond the US-­Japan alliance in that the alliance, which was designed to cope with Soviet threats, alone would not be able to effectively address those new risks.

Decentering and recentering imperative 135 These two policy interests, namely the desire for a greater political and security role in the region and the need for new security measures to cope with a changing security environment, prompted Japanese officials to reconsider the nation’s regional policy, eventually leading to the rise of a “decentering” multilateral imperative in Japan’s overall policy thinking. The result of this reassessment was the advent of the concept of “a multifaceted approach” to regional stability and security. The concept, articulated by a senior MOFA official, suggests that regional countries should take the following four approaches for ensuring regional security and stability: (1) to expand economic cooperation through regional economic frameworks, such as APEC, PECC, and ASEAN-­PMC, (2) to make efforts to settle on-­going disputes and conflicts, such as Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula, through emerging frameworks at the sub-­regional level, (3) to maintain existing security arrangements, in particular the US-­Japan alliance and other US-­centered bilateral alliances, and (4) to enhance the level of mutual reassurance among regional countries. The key feature of this concept was the fourth approach, to enhance mutual reassurance, as not only was it a prerequisite of expanding security cooperation among regional countries but also no regional frameworks existed for this purpose. The new concept therefore suggested that regional countries promote a forum for multilateral dialogue on matters of mutual concern, and this became the intellectual foundation of the Nakayama proposal (Satoh, 1991, 1995; MOFA, 1991). The idea of promoting a regional security forum was attractive to Japanese policymakers as it could serve as a useful vehicle for achieving Japan’s two policy ambitions stated above. Indeed, it was expected that regional multilateral dialogue would function as a means of reassuring other Asian countries about Japan’s intent for a more independent political and security role by not only allowing them to express concerns about it openly but also providing Japan with an opportunity to respond to their concerns (Satoh, 1991; Midford, 2000). In short, the creation of a regional security forum offered a solution to the Japanese dilemma specified above. Japanese policymakers also conceived a regional security forum as an appropriate instrument for reducing perceived uncertainties and security risks as multilateral dialogue on various causes of regional concern was expected to enhance mutual understanding among regional countries, thus decreasing the likelihood of regional conflicts and generating the necessary conditions for deeper regional political and security cooperation. As is well known, the Nakayama proposal failed to attract genuine support from the United States and most ASEAN countries. However, Japan’s enthusiasm for Asia-­Pacific security multilateralism continued to grow during the early 1990s as many in Japan’s foreign policy community began to embrace it as a new pillar of Japan’s security policy. This was mainly exemplified by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s policy speeches in Washington D.C. in June 1992 and Bangkok in January 1993; these called for regional efforts to help promote multilateral security dialogue

136  Takeshi Yuzawa and cooperation for dealing with the new regional security context. Japan hence took further efforts to create a regional security forum by not only persuading the United States of the importance of promoting multilateral security dialogue in the region, thus helping change its negative stance, but also supporting Singapore’s initiative in expanding the ASEAN PMC structure to the wider Asia-­Pacific (Yuzawa, 2007, pp. 43–50). In July 1993, foreign ministers from 18 countries (all of the ASEAN PMC member states, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea) attended a special meeting held in conjunction with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore and made a landmark decision to establish a separate gathering of foreign ministers, named the ARF. Japan’s rising expectations for regional security multilateralism in the early 1990s, in spite of the failure of the Nakayama proposal, was in part driven by the emergence of new security risks, which became pronounced in the eyes of Japanese policymakers particularly after 1992. These included China’s growing military potential, the rapid growth in arms build-­ups in East Asia, and the danger of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This was because in their views these potential destabilizing factors would be better addressed by multilateral approaches than by unilateral or bilateral approaches. Indeed, the above perceived security risks induced changes in Japan’s original expectation of regional security multilateralism, generating new policy needs for more meaningful functions beyond a venue for multilateral security dialogue. More precisely, Japanese officials began to perceive a regional security institution, namely the ARF, as a potential vehicle for promoting confidence-­ building measures (CBMs) for the enhancement of military transparency, facilitating policy coordination and cooperation among regional countries on specific security problems, and engaging China, not merely a tool for reassuring Asian countries about the direction of Japan’s security policy (Yuzawa, 2007, pp. 50–59). Finally, with the rise of the decentering multilateral imperative in Japan’s policy thinking, Japanese policymakers more explicitly embraced security multilateralism as a major pillar of the nation’s security policy. In 1995, Yanai Shunji, the Director General of the Foreign Policy Bureau in MOFA at that time, stated in a MOFA-­affiliated journal that Japan’s post-­Cold War regional security policy would pursue the following three approaches: (1) enhancing Japan-­US security cooperation, (2) building sub-­regional frameworks for security cooperation among Northeast Asian countries and for addressing the South China dispute, (3) developing the ARF as a region-­wide forum for dialogue and cooperation (Yanai, 1995, p. 48). Indeed, Japan formally embarked on the multifaceted approach to regional security, aiming to simultaneously strengthen the US-­Japan alliance and regional security multilateralism in the form of the ARF, based on its long-­term expectation of creating a new regional security order in which these two distinct security arrangements would mutually reinforce each other by performing complementary functions. Overall, these features of Japan’s new security strategy demonstrate that regional security multilateralism was seen by Japanese officials as a major policy tool for diversifying Japan’s security strategy beyond the US-­ Japan alliance and cultivating security cooperation with regional countries, hence coping an emerging new security environment in the post-­Cold War era.

Decentering and recentering imperative 137

Japan’s APT and EAS initiatives (1997–2005): the surge of a decentering imperative and a tilt towards East Asian security multilateralism While Japan’s active commitment to the ARF continued throughout the 1990s and beyond, Japanese policymakers increasingly became attuned to regional movement to promote “East Asian” multilateralism, which did not include the United States. Regional debate on East Asian multilateralism began to take place when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir floated a proposal for establishing the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that only encompassed Asian countries, including ASEAN member states, Japan, China, and South Korea (so called the APT format) in 1990. Whereas the EAEC concept gradually drummed up regional support, Japan resisted the realization of the concept until the very end; this was mainly due to Japan’s concern that its participation in such an exclusive regional entity would damage its economic and security relations with the United States. Because of an emerging consensus within ASEAN over the EAEC concept and China’s greater support to ASEAN’s initiative, Japan eventually accepted ASEAN’s invitation to an “informal” APT summit held in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, albeit with obvious hesitation (Stubbs, 2002, p. 43). However, by the end of 1998, Japan’s disposition towards East Asian multilateralism had shifted markedly. In his policy speech, delivered at the side-­line event of the second informal APT summit held in Hanoi in December 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō presented Japan’s vision of Asia for the twenty-­first century and urged East Asian countries to promote cooperation in three areas: regional economic recovery, human security, and intellectual dialogue. Obuchi also proposed the strengthening of “a network of trilateral dialogue between Japan, South Korea, and China” for upholding ASEAN’s initiative for advancing East Asian multilateralism (MoFA, 1998). The subsequent years witnessed Japan’s greater commitment to the APT. At the third APT summit in December 1999, Obuchi floated several proposals for enhancing the APT functions, such as holding a foreign minister’s meeting within the APT framework. Obuchi also introduced a number of Japan’s planned initiatives for promoting East Asian cooperation, including “a comprehensive plan for enhancing human resources development and exchanges in East Asia” and the creation of a regional coastguard for promoting anti-­piracy cooperation (MoFA, 1999). In particular, Obuchi’s anti-­piracy proposal surprised other APT members, indicating his desire for Japan’s coast guard vessels to conduct joint patrols in Southeast Asia with other regional maritime forces—an expanded security role that most of regional countries had not expected (Bradford, 2004). This was followed by Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō’s proposal for three principles for facilitating East Asian cooperation at the fourth APT summit in December 2000, namely (1) building partnership; (2) open regional cooperation; and (3) comprehensive dialogue and cooperation including the field of political security. Mori also raised the five specific areas of cooperation that the APT should advance: (1) IT, (2) anti-­piracy, (3) the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), (4) culture

138  Takeshi Yuzawa and information, (5) political and security issues. With respect to the anti-­piracy initiative, Mori expressed Japan’s desire to host an “Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” to consider a comprehensive approach to the issue (MoFA, 2000). Although the APT emerged primarily through the process of regional endeavour to handle the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis, the above proposals indicate Tokyo’s keen interest in using the APT as a vehicle to develop the political and security aspects of East Asian cooperation. Indeed, the major motivation behind Obuchi’s proposal for the APT foreign minister meeting was to empower the APT to address primary sources of regional insecurity, such as the North Korea’s nuclear issue and separatist movements in Indonesia (Asahi Shimbun, 1999). Mori’s three principle proposal also put strong focus on regional political and security cooperation. At the 2000 APT summit, Mori stated that “even if the APT focuses economic cooperation for the time being, regional cooperation should be promoted in a well-­balanced manner in every field, including political-­ security field” (MOFA, 2000). Japan’s greater attachment to an exclusive form of regional security multilateralism indicates that it became more willing to expand its security ties beyond the US and to move towards deeper cooperation with its Asian neighbors than it had in the early 1990s although both Obuchi and Mori never forgot to mention about the importance of the bilateral alliance in their policy speeches. The upsurge of this “decentering” multilateral imperative in Japan’s policy thinking mainly derived from two major policy interests. The first was Japan’s renewed aspiration to assume greater regional leadership, stemming from its enhanced relations with its Asian neighbors during the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis. The financial crisis arose with the floating of Thailand’s currency in mid-­ 1997, which later brought about currency clashes with Indonesia, Malaysia, and finally South Korea. Despite its initial slow response to the crisis, Japan played a major role in organizing a $17 billion rescue package for Thailand under the IMF scheme at an emergency meeting held in Tokyo in August 1997 (Hayashi, 2006, p. 84). In the following month, Japan proposed the establishment of a $100 billion regional monetary fund for balance of payment support, dubbed an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). The AMF proposal proved to be highly premature due to stiff opposition mainly by the United States, seeing it as challenge to the US dominance in global finance (Amyx, 2004, pp. 201–205). Notwithstanding this policy failure, Japan continued its attempt to handle the situation other than merely backing up the IMF-­based solution. In October 1998, the Obuchi administration launched the New Miyazawa Initiative, pledging a total of $30 billion bilateral aid for regional countries with severe economic difficulties. With the IMF’s mishandling of the financial crisis and little America’s concern about it, the Miyazawa Initiative greatly impressed regional countries of the significance of Japan’s role in the stabilization of regional finance, hence prompting new regional call for Japan’s leadership in creating a regional financial mechanism to prevent future crisis. From 1999 through 2000, APT countries discussed the creation of a regional network of bilateral currency-­swap agreements

Decentering and recentering imperative 139 as a supplement to the IMF, and this eventually led to the development of the CMI in May 2000 (Amyx, 2004, pp. 207–212). The relative success of Japan’s managerial role in the financial crisis propelled Japanese policymakers to see the idea of East Asian multilateralism in a more positive manner. As seen above, with the end of the Cold War Japan had begun to seek the possibility of undertaking larger political and security initiatives in the region. While this policy ambition helped trigger the 1991 Nakayama proposal, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō’s proposal for the establishment of an annual Japan-­ASEAN summit to promote dialogue and cooperation in political and security fields, delivered at the Japan-­ASEAN summit in January 1997, was another major shot at decentering from traditional bilateralism and towards regional multilateralism (Sudo, 2002, p. 115). The Hashimoto proposal proved to be abortive due to ASEAN’s cautiousness about Japan’s overwhelming regional influence. However, Japan’s active endeavor for the financial crisis opened a window of opportunity for Japan to once again embark on a new policy venture towards the region. This was mainly because it generated the positive image of Japan as a responsible leader particularly among ASEAN states, and this in turn induced them to become more receptive to Japan’s greater political and security role (Maswood, 2002, p. 15). Indeed, by the end of 1997, ASEAN’s stance on Japan’s decentering ambition shifted dramatically. At the Japan-­ASEAN summit in December 1997, ASEAN states fully endorsed Hashimoto’s plan above (Asahi Shimbun, 1997). Added to this, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there was an emerging consensus among Japanese officials that the time was ripe for East Asian countries to take collective action to establish a “self-­help” mechanism for handling regional problems (Hayashi, 2006, p. 107). From the Japanese perspective, their shared experience in dealing with the crisis not only sharpened a strong sense of mutual interdependence but also fostered awareness of “the acute need for regional initiatives to secure their security and prosperity” among regional countries (MoFA, 2004, p. 10). In short, Japan’s ameliorated reputation for regional leadership, coupled with rising expectations for regional initiatives among East Asian countries, induced Japanese policymakers to develop the country’s own diplomatic enterprise for the promotion of an exclusive regional multilateralism beyond the financial realm. Japan’s pursuit for East Asian anti-­piracy cooperation under the Obuchi and Mori premiership was a manifestation of such Japan’s decentering aspiration. The surge of the decentering multilateral imperative in this period was also a reflection of Japan’s growing desire to “hedge” against its overwhelming dependence on the US-­Japan alliance. Although Japan and the United States made a significant step towards the strengthening of the bilateral alliance in the late 1990s, exemplified by the revision of the guidelines for US-­Japan defense cooperation in 1997, Tokyo was still chagrined by the potential risk of “abandonment” by Washington. Japanese policymakers felt deeply embarrassed when President Bill Clinton failed to stop in Tokyo before and after his nine-­day trip to Beijing in June 1998 (the so called “Japan passing”) and decided to upgrade the US-­China

140  Takeshi Yuzawa relations to a strategic partnership without notifying his major Asian ally, Japan. (Funabashi, 2005, p. 50). Moreover, during his visit to Beijing, Clinton condemned Japan for not taking an adequate measure to deal with the Asian financial crisis while applauding China’s decision to avoid devaluation of the Chinese yuan regardless of America’s weak commitment to the crisis (Mochizuki, 2004, p. 108). The US tendency to devalue the alliance with the aim of reinforcing its relations with China deepened Japanese understanding of the risk pertaining to its overdependence on the bilateral alliance, hence propelling them to seek measures to “hedge” against it (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004, p. 74). In this regard, Japanese policymakers saw the emerging concept of East Asian multilateralism as a timely opportunity to seek deeper political and security cooperation with Asian neighbors for this hedging purpose. In the early 2000s, Japan’s search for East Asian multilateralism entered a new stage under the Koizumi Junichirō administration inaugurated in 2001. In January 2002, during his visit to Singapore, Koizumi presented Japan’s new vision of East Asian multilateralism, proposing the creation of a “community that acts together and advances together” in East Asia—the so called EAC concept. Koizumi contented that the regional community should be developed “through expanding East Asia cooperation founded on the Japan-­ASEAN relationship” and referred the three main areas of cooperation that the two sides must advance for that purpose. These were (1) government and economic reform in each country, (2) regional stability, and (3) future cooperation in fields of education and human resources management, cultural and intellectual exchange, economic partnership, regional development, and transnational issues. Finally, while suggesting that regional countries should “make the best use of the APT” for promoting regional cooperation, Koizumi advocated the involvement of two non-­APT countries, namely Australia and New Zealand, in the community-­building process (MoFA, 2002). While the Koizumi’s EAC proposal paid special attention to functional cooperation in the economic field, Koizumi also worked towards the promotion of security cooperation. Succeeding the Obuchi and Mori initiatives, in October 2001, the Japanese government hosted the “Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” for the purpose of discussing a mid and long-­term vision regarding the establishment of a regional framework (MOFA, 2001). Moreover, at the APT summit in November 2001, Koizumi proposed the establishment of a working group of governmental experts to study the formulation of a regional agreement with respect to antipiracy measures. These initiatives eventually evolved into the emergence of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Arms Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in 2004, including Japan, China, South Korea, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the ASEAN member states except Indonesia and Malaysia (Bradford, 2004, p. 493). The formation of the ReCAAP represented Japan’s first successful initiative for promoting concrete regional security cooperation without the United States. However, although Koizumi’s vision of the EAC attracted widespread support from the region, it also created some ambiguity for East Asian countries about

Decentering and recentering imperative 141 Japan’s position on East Asian multilateralism. Koizumi’s call for the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand generated a feeling of uneasiness among some ASEAN states who regarded “Asian values” as the foundation of the EAC. Japan’s interest in the expanded membership of East Asian multilateralism mainly reflected its incipient concern about China’s growing influence in the region. China’s initiative for the China-­ASEAN FTA (CAFTA), which was signed in November 2001, aroused much alarm among Japanese policymakers because of the fact that Beijing could use the CAFTA as an instrument for eroding Tokyo’s “special relationship” with ASEAN states based on its extensive investment networks and trade ties in Southeast Asia. This emerging misgiving invited another Japanese concern that China might gain a dominant influence over the course of regional cooperation in the APT as most of its members were non-­democratic developing countries whose preferred values and norms were relatively congruent with that of China (Terada, 2010, pp. 79–80). In this regard, the inclusion of the two democratic countries in the EAC concept constituted a major part of Japan’s hedging strategy against China’s potential domination of East Asian multilateralism. Despite muted regional response to the idea of the expanded membership, Japan maintained its pursuit in the face of China’s direct challenge to its regional leadership. At the China-­ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting in June 2004, Beijing proposed to develop the APT into the EAS based on the existing APT membership and expressing its willingness to host the first EAS meeting. In response to this, Japan attempted to manipulate regional debate on the EAC by presenting “issue papers” at the APT Foreign Minister Meeting in July 2004. It was suggested that the APT should continue to “articulate the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and conformity with global systems and norms” as the basis of the EAC so that it can embrace non-­APT states, namely Australia, New Zealand, and India who were “an essential partner in various forms of regional cooperation” (MoFA, 2004). The paper, hence, rationalized Japan’s desire for the inclusion of Australian and New Zealand, plus India as another democratic country in the EAC. US open criticism against an exclusive EAC further invigorated Japan’s quest for the expanded membership. In late 2004, Washington suddenly began to put pressure its allies and other major security partners to make the EAS be an “open” and “outward-­looking” institution, regarding China’s explicit pursuit for an exclusive EAC as a manifestation of its strategy to maximize its own influence at the expense of the US. This eventually changed the course of regional debate on the composition of the EAS. Indeed, Tokyo even proposed Washington’s participation in the EAS as an observer status while Indonesia and Singapore, who shared concern about China’s possible domination, began to support the involvement of Australia, New Zealand, and India in the EAS. In the end, in May 2005, regional countries agreed to the formation of the EAS, comprised of the APT countries and the above three non-­ATP countries. Overall, whereas Japan’s approach to regional security multilateralism in the Koizumi era was swayed by his preference for a stronger bilateral alliance, its

142  Takeshi Yuzawa projection of the EAC concept and actual lead in promoting function cooperation in the security field demonstrated Japanese willingness to deepen political and security cooperation with Asian countries outside the framework of the bilateral alliance, albeit in the non-­traditional security field. In this respect, the Koizumi’s EAC proposal can be seen as the extension of Japan’s pursuit for the decentering use of security multilateralism under the Obuchi and Mori premierships. Yet, in retrospect Koizumi’s diplomacy in the process of the EAS formation also represented a watershed in Japan’s approach to regional security multilateralism, indicating a sign of mounting apprehension about the risk of pursuing an exclusive “East Asian” multilateralism among Japanese policymakers in the face of China’s rising economic and political presence in the region. Indeed, as well be illustrated below, Japan’s interest in the “decentering” use of security multilateralism begun to significantly wane as its strategic thinking was increasingly dominated by the search for measures to balance the rapid ascendance of China’s regional influence.

2010–onwards: Asia-­Pacific Security Multilateralism as a means of recentering on the US-­Japan alliance After the formation of the EAS, regardless of fierce leadership rivalry between Japan and China over East Asian multilateralism, Japan showed little interest in using the EAS as a venue for regional political and security cooperation. While Japan successfully incorporated its preferred principles of “openness”, “transparency”, and “inclusiveness” into the EAS’s anniversary declaration (labelled as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration), the following Shinzō Abe administration (2006–7) put forward a modest proposal for the EAS, such as the Asian Gateway Initiative, energy security, disaster prevention, and ASEAN integration (MoFA, 2007c). Instead, the Abe administration demonstrated greater interest in “Asia-­Pacific” multilateralism based on “universal values”, including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. For instance, in his speech at the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Abe introduced a new vision of regional multilateralism, dubbed as “broader Asia”. It was contended that “a broader Asia that broke away geographical boundaries is beginning to emerge as the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity” and that “this broader Asia will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the US and Australia” through the deepening of Japan-­India strategic partnership based on universal values (MoFA, 2007a). According to Terada (2013, p. 158), the major aim of Abe’s projection of the new geographical concept, later called as the “Indo-­Pacific” concept, was to legitimize US participation into Asian institutions, most notably the EAS. Although the Koizumi administration underlined the importance of “universal values” as a normative basis of East Asian multilateralism as early as the mid-­ 2000s, its relevance to Japan’s diplomacy became more apparent during the Abe administration. This new development was borne out of the concept of “value-­ oriented diplomacy”, which placed emphasis on the spread of universal values

Decentering and recentering imperative 143 and on the creation of “an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity consisting of democratic countries lining the outer rim of the Eurasian continent” (MoFA, 2007b). Value-­oriented diplomacy was invented by top MoFA officials, out of their concern about the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing in the mid-­2000s. By projecting values that China was unable to place emphasis on, Japan aimed to impress the US on the significance of the alliance partner sharing common values (Terada, 2013, p. 157). This diplomatic approach was deployed by both the Abe and Aso cabinets (2008–9), but it was essentially short-­lived because their terms in office persisted less than a year. Japan’s attention to the EAC concept revived, albeit for a very belief period, with the inauguration of the first Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio (2009–10) in September 2009. Hatoyama entered the office declaring that Japan would launch an autonomous “Asia-­centered diplomacy” while criticizing Japan’s adherence to the US-­Japan alliance under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regimes. At the fourth EAS meeting in October 2009, Hatoyama pledged Japan’s renewed initiatives for the realization of the EAC. However, Hatoyama’s EAC proposal received a cool response from both domestic and international audiences. It even caused serious anxieties about the course of Japan’s foreign policy under the DPJ on the part of the US and its strategic partners in the region. This was because his own diplomatic stance gave a strong impression that the proposal reflected his intention to greatly downgrade the bilateral alliance in Japan’s overall foreign policy (Hook et al., 2012). Facing the daunting reality of pursuing a truly “balanced” foreign policy, the following DPJ administrations of Kan Naoto (2010–11) and Noda Yoshihiko (2010–12) confirmed the US-­Japan alliance as the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy while completely dropping the EAC concept and supporting US membership in the EAS. This policy change was also accompanied by Japan’s substantial refocus on “Asia-­Pacific” security multilateralism with a special emphasis on the advancement of “universal values”. For instance, in his policy speech in January 2011, entitled “Opening a New Horizon in the Asia Pacific”, Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji maintained that regional countries should “develop institutional foundations embodying the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights, global commons, free trade, and investment rules” for shaping a new order in the Asia-­Pacific region. For that purpose, while welcoming US decision to join the EAS, he went on to argue that “the role of the EAS should be expanded and strengthened by bringing security issues within its scope” (MoFA, 2011a). Echoing this vision, in his policy speech in the Diet in January 2012, Prime Minister Noda demonstrated Japan’s intention to continue to play “a proactive role in the creation of order and rules in the Asia-­Pacific region by utilizing frameworks participated in by a wide-­range of countries and regions”. With regard to the areas of the rule-­making, Noda referred free trade, energy, counter-­terrorism, non-­proliferation, freedom of navigation, conflict prevention while highlighting the need to “deepen regional dialogue for the confirmation of universal values, such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2012). As a part of this initiative, at the sixth EAS meeting

144  Takeshi Yuzawa in November 2011, Noda expressed Japan’s desire to “develop the EAS into a leaders-­led forum that confirms common ideas and fundamental rules of the region through the enhancement of its political and security initiatives” and proposed, as the first step toward such institutional development, to establish a forum on maritime security issues within the EAS aimed at creating maritime rules on peaceful dispute settlement and freedom of navigation (MoFA, 2011b). In both Maehara and Noda’s policy statements, Japan’s regional role was defined as “a rule-­setter” aiming to promote international rules based on “universal values” through regional institutions. Japan’s emerging vision of Asia-­Pacific multilateralism in this way was largely stimulated by China’s perceived challenges to Japan’s strategic interests. While the view that China is a potential revisionist power had gradually grown in Japan’s foreign policy community throughout the 2000s, it was Beijing’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas since 2009 that massively reinforced this Japanese view. In the eyes of Japanese officials, not only is the Chinese hardline posture in both seas a matter of Japanese national security, but it has also posed serious threats to the “territorial” and “normative” status-­quo in East Asia—a symbol of the durability of the existing US-­centered regional order that has long benefited Japan’s national interests. Sino-­Japanese sovereignty disputes over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea has dramatically worsened since September 2010, when the Japanese authorities detained the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that had intentionally rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Islands. This resulted in a dangerous standoff between the two countries. This was followed by the Noda cabinet’s decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands in September 2012. In response, China initiated explicit measures to undermine Japan’s sovereignty claim, including a massive increase of Chinese patrol vessels in the vicinity of the Islands. The revisionist image of China was also buttressed by its greater assertiveness in the South China Sea against other claimant countries especially since 2009. Japanese officials began to worry that the expansion of China’s de facto authority in the South China Sea, exemplified by its occupation of the Scarborough Shoal located within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 2012, could not only encourage the Chinese navy and other maritime agencies to take more assertive action in the East China Sea but also disrupt Japan’s regional sea-­lines of communication (SLOC) (Storay, 2013, p. 146). Beside the concern about the disruption of the territorial status-­quo, from the Japanese perspective China’s assertive posture in both the East and South China Seas also posed significant challenges to the “normative” status-­quo, most notably the existing international legal norms pertaining to regional maritime order. For instance, Beijing attempted to legitimize its recent provocative behavior in both seas, such as the harassment of the US navy surveillance ship operating within China’s EEZ by Chinese ships in 2009, by projecting its own maritime rules that seemingly deviated from the standard definitions of the existing international law, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Moreover, the justification of China’s forceful actions in other claimants’ EEZs, such as its attempts to prevent the Philippines and Vietnam ships from accessing hydrocarbon

Decentering and recentering imperative 145 exploration within their own EEZ in 2011, exclusively rested on its “nine-­dashed lines” map that totally lacked any legal basis in the eyes of most regional states, as well as those of the international legal community (Storay, 2013, pp. 148–149). Japanese officials were concerned that the unilateral expansion of China’s de facto authority over the South China Sea would eventually justify its own provocative definitions of maritime and aviation rules, thus significantly weakening the legitimacy and validity of the existing international laws; most notably, the universal principles of freedom of navigation and of overflight rights above high sea (MoFA, 2014a, p. 4). Hence, China’s perceived provocations to the territorial and normative status-­ quo in the region generated deep uncertainty about the prospects for regional security order in the eyes of Japanese officials. For instance, while highlighting the lack of transparency in China’s military and its maritime activities as a matter of concern to the regional and international community, the 2011 Diplomatic Bluebook states that “in 2010 it became readily clear that the security environment in East Asia was harsh and the uncertainty and instability existed in the region” (MOFA, 2011c, p. 4). At the height of strategic uncertainty caused by the Chinese challenges and the perceived decline of US capability to provide public goods in the security realm, Japanese policymakers began to realize the necessity to help preserve the existing regional order through its own political and security enterprises. The consequence of this awareness was the rise of Japan’s aspiration to play a proactive role in promoting a stable regional order by constructing the networks of various regional frameworks that encompass “universal values”. This policy ambition was articulated in the new foreign policy concept presented by the Noda cabinet in 2011. The new concept, labelled as the concept of “open and multi-­ layered networks”, defined Japan’s foreign policy goal as to promote “a prosperous, stable regional order based on democratic values”. In order to achieve this objective, the concept stressed the need to “promote regional cooperation in various fields and to promote common rules in accordance with existing international law by creating a close linkage among regional institutions, such as the ARF, the EAS, APEC, and the APT, in addition to bilateral and trilateral frameworks among regional countries” (MoFA, 2012, pp. 7–8). The concept also underscored the importance of China’s participation in this institutional network. However, its emphasis on “existing international law” and “democratic values” implied Japan’s intention to counter Chinese power and influence. In short, Japan’s renewed focus on Asia-­Pacific security multilateralism stemmed from the emergence of the new diplomatic strategy aiming to build a “rule-­making” coalition through regional institutions for the purpose of reinforcing international legal norms favorable to the US and its alliance partners in the face of the perceived challenges from China to the regional status-­quo. Noda’s proposal for creating a maritime security forum within the EAS was a clear manifestation of this policy thinking. In addition, Japan’s rebalancing of Asia-­Pacific security multilateralism was partly inspired by the emergence of the US “Pivot to Asia” strategy. As already discussed, Japan’s new diplomatic strategy embraced its policy ambition to act

146  Takeshi Yuzawa as a leading rule-­setter in the region, hence containing a “decentering” multilateral imperative. However, ultimately it was a “recentering” imperative that push Japan in that direction since the primary objective of the new diplomatic strategy was to enlist a firm US commitment to the rule-­making effort through regional institutions. In other words, it was the Japanese perspective that the success of any rule-­making projects would require strong US engagements since this could be the only way of constructing international rules compatible with the existing US centered-­order given expanding material power gaps between China and other regional powers, including Japan. The possibility of Japan-­US strategic alignment for rulemaking was aroused with the inauguration of President Barrack Obama in January 2009. Contrary to the predecessor, the Obama administration showed keen interest in US greater involvement in Asian institutions as a part of the US “Pivot to Asia” strategy. During his first visit to Tokyo in November 2009, while pleading US stronger commitment to the Asia-­Pacific, Obama signaled US desire to join the EAS. Following this, in her major speech outlining US approaches to the Asia-­Pacific in January 2010, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton pledged a US leadership role in making regional institutions more “action and result-­oriented”. In July 2010, the Obama administration formally declared US participation in the EAS (Tan, 2016, pp. 118–121). Japan saw growing interest in regional institutions by the US, in particular the EAS, as a golden opportunity to bring the US into the rule-­making effort. Interestingly, at the Japan-­US vice foreign ministers’ meeting in October 2010, where representatives discussed their nations’ China strategies, the two sides agreed to make efforts to bring international rules in the agenda of the forthcoming EAS meeting (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2010). Furthermore, at the US-­Japan Security Consultative Committee held in June 2011, the two sides agreed to “promote effective cooperation through open, multilayered regional networks and rule-­ making mechanisms, including the ARF, the ADMM Plus, APEC, and the EAS” while “encouraging China’s responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, its cooperation on global issues, and its adherence to international norms of behavior” (MoFA, 2011d). Considering that both Obama’s and Clinton’s major policy speeches specified above had no emphasis on the rule-­making, a reference to “open, multilayered regional networks” and “rule-­making mechanisms” in the above joint statement clearly indicates how Japan’s new diplomatic strategy shaped US policy thinking. Indeed, these bilateral interactions instigated their collaborated efforts in the EAS, the ARF, and the ADMM Plus to organize a diplomatic coalition for checking China’s assertiveness in the maritime domain by stressing the importance of existing international legal norms especially regarding the freedom of navigation, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Just as importantly, it was also apparent how Washington’s preference for regional multilateralism shaped Tokyo’s approach to the rule-­making effort. This was evident in Japan’s choice of the EAS as a primary venue for the rule-­making in the political and security fields on one hand, and its focus on the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a principal vehicle for creating new regional rules in the

Decentering and recentering imperative 147 economic field on the other. Japanese officials expected to see deeper Japan-­US collaborations in these two regional frameworks, which the Obama administration viewed as a vital instrument of US Pivot to Asia strategy (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2011; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011). The concept of open and multi-­layered networks disappeared with the end of the Noda administration in 2012, but the current Abe administration (2012–) has basically followed the same policy line, albeit putting a further stress on universal values. For instance, in his keynote speech at the Shangri-­La Dialogue held in Singapore in 2014, while indirectly criticizing China’s behavior in both the East and South China Seas and underscoring the need to govern regional maritime affairs through the major principles of the rule of law and a dispute resolution mechanism, Abe proposed to “enhance the EAS as a premier forum for dealing with regional political and security issues” and to create “a permanent committee for preparing a roadmap for bringing renewed vitality to the EAS and enabling the Summit to function along with the ARF and the ADMM Plus in a multi-­layered fashion” (MoFA, 2014b). Abe’s obvious expectation was to use regional institutions, in particular the EAS, as a venue for consolidating maritime rules to constrain China’s behavior. In fact, since then at the EAS meetings, Abe has repeatedly stressed the need to strengthen a regional order based on the rule of the law and to include maritime cooperation as a priority agenda for the EAS (MOFA, 2016a). In addition, these initiatives eventually led to the emergence of Japan’s new diplomatic concept, named “the Free and Open Indo-­Pacific” (FOIP) strategy. The main aim of the strategy is to “maintain and strengthen a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law in the Indo-­Pacific region” through three major initiatives. These include “the promotion and establishment of the fundamental principles of international order such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade”, “the pursuit of economic prosperity through the enhancement of connectivities”, and “initiatives for peace and stability such as capacity building assistance on maritime law enforcement, disaster risk reduction, and non-­ proliferation” (MOFA, 2018). Needless to say, regional institutions are one of main arenas, through which Japan intends to build a coalition of like-­minded countries for implementing these three initiatives. Abe’s considerable emphasis on the rule of law in maritime affairs not only stemmed from the fact that Abe is himself a genuine believer of the value-­oriented diplomacy, but also China’s new assertiveness in both the East and South China Seas since 2013, further exacerbating the Japanese perception of the Chinese threat. These for instance include the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, the attempt to put its oil rig near the Paracel Islands, and large-­scale land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands. Japan’s official policy documents, such as the Diplomatic Bluebook and the Defense White Paper, have criticized these China’s behavior as “attempts to change the status-­quo by force” (MoFA, 2016b, p. 4; MoD, 2016, p. 41). Overall, Japan’s new initiatives for Asia-­Pacific security multilateralism since the beginning of the 2010s has mainly reflected the rise of the “recentering” imperative in Japan’s policy thinking; strengthening regional institutions, in particular

148  Takeshi Yuzawa the EAS, for facilitating greater Japan-­US collaborations in the rule-­making initiative with the aim of countering China’s perceived challenges to the regional status-­ quo and hence sustaining or indeed even strengthening the existing regional order.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the nature of Japan’ approach to Asian security multilateralism since the end of the Cold War. Four major findings can be drawn from this analysis. First, it reveals the changing dynamics of the ideas and motivations behind Japan’s initiatives for regional security multilateralism. Japan’s initial pursuit for regional security multilateralism in the early 1990s in the form of an inclusive “Asia-­Pacific” institution, namely the ARF was largely driven by a “decentering” multilateral imperative; promoting security multilateralism as a means of playing a more independent political and security role in the region and developing a new security measure suitable for a changing regional environment. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, while striving to keep the healthiness of the US-­Japan alliance, Japanese officials increasingly became attuned to the promotion of more exclusive “East Asian” security multilateralism through the APT and the EAS. Japan’s policy attention in an exclusive regional format in this period was motivated by the desire to assume the position of greater regional leadership and the need to hedge against its overwhelming dependence on the alliance. Despite rising expectations for the decentering use of multilateralism in the past periods, what the second decade of the twenty-­first century has witnessed is the rise of a “recentering” multilateral imperative, leading to Japan’s substantial focus on inclusive “Asia-­Pacific” security multilateralism centering on the EAS with US membership. Indeed, Japan has seen regional security multilateralism primarily as a means of promoting deeper Japan-­US collaborations in the rule-­making initiative based on “universal values” for coping with China’s perceived challenges to the territorial and normative status-­quo in the region rather than to diversify its security strategy beyond the bilateral alliance and towards regional countries—the expectations for security multilateralism held by Japanese officials in the 1990s. The above finding illuminates the complex nature of Japan’s commitment to regional security multilateralism, indicating that the rise of the decentering/recentering imperative among Japanese policymakers in each phase reflected various policy interests, such as assuming greater regional leadership, developing a new security measure, hedging against the perceived risk of US abandonment, and promoting international rules based on “universal values”. This finding opposes the existing studies, which tend to focus on a single variable based on a simple bivariate approach. Thirdly, it can be said that the underlying motivations behind Japan’s initiatives for regional security multilateralism were largely stimulated by pressures and opportunities given by systemic changes and relevant (and some non-­relevant) international events. These are the collapse of the bipolar structure with the end of the Cold War (the first phase); the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis, the Sino-­US rapprochement, and China’s rising presence in the region (the second phase); China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas and US greater commitment to Asia (the third phase). (See Table 8.1 for the causal sequence of Japan’s initiatives.)

The collapse of the bipolar structure. The emergence of new security risks.

The 1997-8 Asian financial crisis. The Sino-US rapprochement. China’s growing economic and political presence. China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. US renewed commitment to Asia (“Pivot to Asia”).

First (1991-94)

Second (1997-2005)

Third (2010onwards)

International pressures and opportunities

Phase

Foreign Minister Nakayama’s proposal. PM Miyazawa’s proposals. Target institution: ARF.

Promoting security multilateralism for enhancing mutual reassurance and for developing cooperative security measures. (Decentering) Promoting security multilateralism for strengthening security ties with Asian countries. (Decentering) Promoting security multilateralism for facilitating deeper Japan-US collaborations in the rulemaking project. (Recentering)

Playing a more independent political and security role in the region. Developing a new security measure appropriate for the new security context. Assuming greater regional leadership. Hedging against the perceived risk of US abandonment. Promoting international rules based on “universal values”

PM Noda’s proposals. PM Abe’s proposals. EAS with US membership.

PM Obuchi’s proposals. PM Mori’s proposal. PM Koizumi’s proposal. APT (and EAS)

Initiatives for Asian security multilateralism

Decentering/ Recentering multilateral imperatives

The nature of perceived policy interests

Table 8.1  The causal sequence of Japan’s initiatives for Asian security multilateralism

Decentering and recentering imperative 149

150  Takeshi Yuzawa Finally, the finding of the analysis corresponds to what See Seng Tan observes; there is a growing policy convergence between Tokyo and Washington in terms of their shared expectations of using regional security multilateralism as a means of counterbalancing China (Tan, 2016, p. 66). Such policy convergence has occurred because of not only their shared concerns about China’s perceived challenges to the regional status-­quo, but also Japan’s diplomatic endeavor to bind the US with its own rule-­making project through regional institutions, as seen above. As represented by the US withdrawal from the TPP in January 2017 and the absence of President Donald Trump at the EAS meeting for third years in row, the current US Trump administration has created great uncertainty about the future prospects of US commitment to regional multilateralism. However, the two countries’ policy convergence still remains visible at least at the bureaucratic level. Indeed, corresponding to Japan’s FOIP strategy, both the US State and Defense Departments have recently introduced the American version of the FOIP strategy, demonstrating US strong commitment to ASEAN-­led regional institutions for the maintenance of the rule-­based regional order. (US Department of Defense, 2019) While the diversification of Japan’s security ties beyond the US has become prominent increasingly in a diverse range of areas, Japan’s growing tendency for the “recentering” use of regional security multilateralism is likely to be more prevalent in coming years given the rapid relative decline of Japan’s power and influence in the region vis-­à-­vis China. Japan’s declared rule-­making initiative is partly a product of their decentering aspirations, but arguably Japan has increasingly lacked sufficient material resources (most notably economic incentives), essential for enticing the rest of Asian neighbors into its ambit. In short, Japan can no longer afford to see regional security multilateralism as an outlet for its pursuit of greater strategic autonomy beyond the US. As Japan’s strategic calculations are increasingly dominated by the search for ways of balancing China’s clout, Japan’s disposition towards regional security multilateralism is inevitably be linked to the strengthening of “Asia-­Pacific” multilateralism as a means of incorporating its superior ally into its counter-­balancing initiatives.

Notes 1 This article defines the promotion of security multilateralism as an undertaking to promote multilateral security cooperation among states through the formation of an international institution/arrangement or an existing international institution/arrangement. 2 Exceptions are Terada 2013; Tan 2016.

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Decentering and recentering imperative 153 Sohn, Y. (2010). Japan’s New Regionalism: China Shock, Values, and East Asian Community. Asian Survey, 50(3), 497–519. Stubbs, R. (2002). ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism? Asian Survey, 42(3), 440–455. Storay, I. (2013). Japan’s Maritime Security Interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea Dispute. Political Science, 65(2), 135–156. Sudo, S. (2002). The International Relations of Japan and South East Asia: Forging Anew Regionalism. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Tan, S. S. (2016). Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-­ASEAN Stakeholders. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Terada, T. (2003). Constructing an ‘East Asian’ Concept and Growing Regional Identity: From EAEC to ASEAN+3. Pacific Review, 16(2), 251–277. Terada, T. (2010). The Origins of ASEAN+6 and Japan’s Initiatives: China’s Rise and the Agent-­Structure Analysis. Pacific Review, 23(1), 71–92. Terada, T. (2013). Higashi Ajia to Ajia Taiheiyō: kyōgōsuru Chiikitōgō [East Asian and the Asia-­Pacific: Competing Regional Integration]. Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai. US Department of Defense. (2019). The Department of Defense Indo-­Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. https://media. defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-­1/-­1/1/DEPARTMENT-­OF-­DEFENSE-­INDO-­ PACIFIC-­STRATEGY-­REPORT-­2019.PDF. Yanai, S. (1995). Reisengo no Wagakuni to Anzenhoshō Seisaku: Kokusaikankyō no Henka to Sonoeikyō (Japan’s Post-­Cold War Security Policy: Change in International Environment and Its Effects). Gaiko Forum, 82, 44–50. Yomiuri Shimbun. (2011). Higashi Ajia Shunō Kaigi, Bei ga Shudō, Chugoku Houimō [East Asian Summit, US-­led Initiatives to Encircle China]. 20 November, p. 3. Yuzawa, T. (2005). Japan’s Changing Conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum: From an Optimistic Liberal to a Pessimistic Realist Perspective. Pacific Review, 18(4), 463–497. Yuzawa, T. (2007). Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for Multilateral Security in the Asia-­Pacific. London: Routledge. Zhang, Y. (2014). Multilateral Means for Bilateral Ends: Japan, Regionalism, and China-­ Japan-­US Trilateral Dynamics. Pacific Review, 27(1), 5–25.

9 Is Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy missions a step towards decentering of its security policy? Wilhelm Vosse Introduction This chapter argues that the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden includes many if not all of these components and can be seen as an important opportunity for Japan to deepen its understanding of forces and governments other than the United States (even though the United States was also a participant) through various dialogue and coordination fora, capacity building, or joint training exercises. It is not argued that this will in any way weaken US-­ Japan relations or the role of the United States as Japan’s national security guarantor, but that this operation has been used by both the Japanese government and by its increasing number of security partners as a model case of a successful joint mission, one that facilitates future cooperation on other security issues and potentially gives Japan more options regarding whether to support or not support specific foreign policy decisions by the United States. This chapter will first introduce the specific context, constraints, and opportunities of this mission, before analyzing Japan’s role not only in preventing or limiting maritime piracy, but also its broadening and deepening involvement in its governing and capacity building bodies. It will specifically highlight Japan’s involvement in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and its Task Force 151 as well as its coordinating body, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, and the significance of the SDF facility or base in Djibouti, before demonstrating opportunities for joint operations and training exercises with EUNAVFOR and NATO forces in the Gulf of Aden. Returning to the core question of this book, this chapter will analyze to what extent Japan’s participation in the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia has affected (1) the recent changes in Japan security policy and legislation, and (2) its current and future security cooperation with the European Union and NATO.

Initial international and Japanese reactions Maritime piracy has been an issue of concern for seafarers, shipping companies, and governments for a long time. In East Asia, maritime piracy had already been a problem in the 1990s. In East Africa and the Gulf of Aden, the problem became

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy 155 more serious between 2007 and 2009, when the number of maritime piracy incidences had increased from 44 to 218 (ICC-­CSS data). Most of these attacks occurred off the coast of Somalia, a country that had long suffered from civil wars and the lack of a functioning government, including the Gulf of Aden between Somalia and Yemen. As a country that is highly dependent on oil supplies from a small group of countries in the Middle East and equally dependent on the security of sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) from and to Europe and the Middle East, maritime piracy is an issue of particular concern. Japanese-­owned vessels were also attacked and hijacked. In October 2007, the Japanese-­owned chemical tanker MV Golden Nori, which was sailing under Panamanian flag, was approached by pirates and hijacked off the Somali coast. After negotiations, there were unconfirmed reports and claims by the pirates that a US $1 million ransom had been paid. In 2008, one Japanese-­owned vessel was just approached by pirates, but four vessels were hijacked. In most of these cases, the Japanese owner paid a ransom to free the crew. Because maritime piracy on the eastern coast of Africa had become a security concern for the commercial fleets of many countries, the United Nations Security Council issued a series of resolutions between June and December 2008, authorizing all naval forces to enter Somali waters (United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1816, UNSC, 2008a), suppress piracy and enforce UNCLOS (UNSC Resolution 1838, esp. Article 100 and 101, UNSC, 2008b). In order to co-­ ordinate and govern these forces, the UNSC also set up the CGPCS (UNSC Resolution 1851, UNSC, 2008d). These resolutions formed the legal justification for consolidated efforts to use military force against piracy.1 In December 2008, then Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Minister Asō Tarō was the first who suggested that Japan should join the counter-­piracy missions that had begun to take shape in the months before. A month later, on January 28, 2009, Japanese Minister of Defense Hamada Yasukazu issued an order to prepare for a mission against piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.2 He asked the MSDF to (1) prepare for the formation of the unit; (2) information gathering; (3) training for the mission; (4) the procurement, replenishment, storage, maintenance of necessary means; and (5) coordination with relevant organizations. Almost immediately, a MoD and SDF personnel field investigation team was sent to visit Yemen, Djibouti, Oman, and Bahrain in February 2009, and in March 2009, the MoD and SDF were commissioned to review possible bases for Japanese troops, aircraft, and vessels (MoD, 2009a). Only three weeks later, on March 14, 2009, the first two MSDF destroyers, the DD Sazanami and the DD Samidare, left Kure base near Hiroshima with about 400 MSDF personnel, 8 JCG officers, and two helicopters for the Gulf of Aden (MoD, 2009b, 2009c). Initially, the legal framework of this first dispatch was Article 82 of the SDF Law, which allowed the deployment of MSDF personnel without Diet approval when ‘special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea’ (SDF Law, 1954, Article 82). Given that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution had always been interpreted as not allowing the right for collective self-­defense, the SDF Law only allowed the protection of vessels

156  Wilhelm Vosse sailing under Japanese flag or with Japanese sailors or passengers on board. However, this was soon seen as a major constraint, since only very few Japanese-­ owned ships sail under Japanese flag or have Japanese sailors on board. At the same time, many of the ships owned or operated by third countries sailing in the Gulf of Aden do carry goods to and from Japan. The Japanese government reacted to this dilemma by passing the Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy, often referred to as anti-­piracy law, which came into force on June 24, 2009 after a fierce debate in the Japanese Diet (Black, 2012). Even before the first dispatch, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) opposition had expressed grave concern that the protection of non-­Japanese ships would constitute a collective defense measure, which they considered impermissible by the Japanese constitution (AP, 2009). The anti-­piracy law allowed the MSDF to protect vessels owned by countries other than Japan, which made Japan a fully functioning independent deployer. The law provides a clear definition of acts of piracy, or attempted piracy, and the penalties that these incur (Anti-­Piracy Law 2009, Articles 1 to 4). Japan considers piracy a criminal offense and, therefore, regards the anti-­piracy mission as a matter of policing and law enforcement, which is why the JCG plays a central role in enforcing the law. While the MSDF is in charge of providing the necessary support activities such as observation and transportation of JCG officers, the JCG takes ‘necessary measures pursuant to the provisions of this law’, in line with the Japan Coast Guard Law (Law No. 28 of 1953) (Anti-­Piracy Law, 2009, Article 5). In principle, only JCG officials, and not the MSDF, may use weapons, provided the ‘perpetrator or the ship disobeys other measures to deter and continues the acts of piracy and that there is probable cause to believe in the lack of any other appropriate measures to stop the navigation of that ship’ (Anti-­Piracy Law, 2009, Article 6) regulated by existing policing laws. This anti-­piracy law differs from special measures laws such as the Anti-­Terrorism Law (October 2011), or the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean (2001–2010), in that it gives the Minister of Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, the right to order units of the SDF to take ‘actions against acts of piracy at sea in the case where there is extraordinary necessity to take measures against acts of piracy’ and to ‘draw up and submit to the Prime Minister the guidelines for response operations’ (Anti-­ Piracy Law, 2009, Article 7).

Japan’s contribution to the multilateral-­force counter-­piracy mission Joining the multilateral counter-­piracy mission in 2009 meant that Japan had to join the military and political bodies that had been set up by the international community in order to govern and organize military aspects of the missions, as well as the political and legal component of the mission. The core political body is the CGPCS, and the two military bodies are the CMF with its SHADE. Japan had limited experience in cooperating in multi-­stakeholder bodies involving defense and foreign ministry officials, military personnel from a diverse group of countries,

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy 157 as well as non-­state actors such as large shipping companies and their representative bodies. The most significant experience was its central involvement in the counter-­piracy operation in Asia, centrally the financial and logistical support of the Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).3 Therefore, the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia became the first long-­term mission involving Japanese military forces and requiring Japanese diplomats and military officers to interact and eventually even take over leadership positions in some of the main governing and coordinating bodies. If decentering requires Japan to increase its security cooperation on a wider range of security issues and not only bilaterally and predominantly on the diplomatic level but often in multilateral fora and involving not just government to government but also then cooperation with foreign military forces and non-­state actors, then the successful cooperation in counter-­piracy missions off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden can provide an ideal learning experience and could form the basis for future cooperation in other multilateral defense organizations. Japan’s early contribution to information sharing Before outlining Japan’s involvement and lessons learned as an independent deployer in the counter-­piracy operations itself, it is important to take a brief look at the significance of Japan’s involvement in information sharing in the counter-­ piracy mission in Asia and the significance of its role in the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Japan was central in setting up the Information Sharing Center (ISC) for the Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in Singapore in 2006. The positive experience and central role of these ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) played an important role in drafting the ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden’, usually referred to as the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), which was adopted by all Western African and Middle Eastern countries on January 29, 2009 (ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), 2013). Although the drafting and design of the DCoC was officially initiated by the IMO, a specialized agency of the United Nations and the global standard-­setting authority for the ‘safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping’ (IMO, 2015), two Japanese played a central role in linking the ReCAAP experience and the DCoC and its information-­sharing mechanism, namely the IMO director Sekimizu Koji and Ito Yoshiaki. Ito had worked for ReCAAP and in December 2012 became the Special Advisor to the IMO Secretary-­General and Head of Task Force for the Implementation of the DCoC. The ReCAAP ISC actively participated in the April 2008 meeting to draft the DCoC Agreement, was an observer and many articles of the DCoC were based on the ReCAAP ISC Agreement of November 29, 2006, which was then credited in the DCoC preamble (IMO, 2013). The three DCoC ISCs in Sana’a, for the Northern area, in Mombasa, for the central area, and in Dar es Salaam, for the Southern area closely resemble those of

158  Wilhelm Vosse the ReCAAP ISC. ReCAAP shared its experience at the IMO Sub-­Regional Meeting to Progress Implementation of the DCoC in the Seychelles in October 2009 and a Program for DCoC Focal Points organized by ReCAAP ISC in Singapore and a ReCAAP ISC’s Capacity Building Workshop in the Philippines, both in November 2009 (IMO, 2013). The Governing Council of the ReCAAP ISC and its Japanese executive director Endo Yoshihisa (2010–2016) frequently expressed concern about the deterioration of the piracy situation in the Gulf of Aden, while stressing the reduction since about 2012 is in part also the result of the close cooperation between the ReCAAP ISC, the IMO, and the CGPCS, and its willingness to ‘share experience and expertise with the DCoC to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia’.4 Over the years, the three ISCs took part in maritime counter-­piracy exercises and acted as the trigger for operational response to reports of piracy. The expertise developed through the successful partnership between ReCAAP ISC in Asia, while the EC MARSIC Project works closely with the Sana’a ISC (ReMISC). The ReCAAP ISC and DCoC ISCs regularly share information about their tactics to intercept pirates and how to improve the information sharing process. This information is then disseminated to ReCAAP focal points and its partner organizations (IMO, 2013). The ReCAAP ISC also shared its experience at a Workshop and High-­Level Meeting in Djibouti, May 28–30, 2011, when the decision on the Djibouti Training Center (DRTC) was adopted. The central role of Japan in setting up the ReCAAP and its ISC, which has to date always been under Japanese directorship and the move of Japanese senior officials from ReCAAP to the IMO to oversee the implementation and improvement of the DCC, and its three ISCs, the weekly updates from the ReCAAP ISC and focal points to the DCoC ISC since 2009 based on standard operating procedures demonstrate that the initiatives of Japan have made some decisive difference in improving information sharing procedures under the DCoC and in the end also for the CGPCS (Hribernik, 2017; IMO, 2015). Japan’s contribution to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia or short CGPCS is a political coordination body, which began its operations in January 2009 (from here on, it will simply be called contact group). Japan joined the contact group in November 2009 and has participated in all of its plenary sessions since then. Japanese participants are usually composed of a delegation from the International Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Early on, it became clear that the military component of the counter-­piracy mission discussed in CGPCS Working Group 1 had to be supported by a financial support mechanism to facilitate the setting up of a legal framework in the countries of the region. In the Contact Group’s second plenary session on March 17, 2009, Japan supported and worked towards Working Group 2’s agreement to establish an International Trust Fund, to ‘help defray the expenses associated with the prosecution of suspected pirates’

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy 159 (CGPCS, 2009a). The trust fund was endorsed at the third plenary meeting on May 29, 2009, in New York (CGPCS, 2009b). Japan has a long history of providing financial and capacity-­building contributions to military operations from the First Gulf War (1991), disarmament assistance on the ground in Afghanistan, to support for coast guards under the ReCAAP framework in South East Asia. This was probably a central reason why Japan strongly supported the International Trust Fund and the development of better regional capabilities in the third contact group plenary meeting. Subsequently, Japan was asked to chair the fourth contact group’s plenary meeting on September 10, 2009. As a chair, Japan embraced the effective implementation of the International Maritime Organizations (IMO) Djibouti Code of Conduct, a multi-­donor trust fund, initiated by Japan. Japan considers the establishment of the IMO Djibouti Trust Fund to be one of the most important achievements of its activities in the Contact Group (Interview with Yoshihiro Katayama, July 2014). The core objective of this trust fund was the establishment of an information-­sharing center in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen, as well as the Djibouti Regional Training Center (DRTC) (CGPCS, 2009c, p. 2). While the IMO Djibouti Trust Fund was initiated by Japan, it was stressed that it was open to financial support from all participants (CGPCS, 2009c). The CGPCS International Trust Fund was set up in January 2010 by the UN Secretary-­General Ban Ki Moon, following up on the decisions made in the CGPCS. The IMO Djibouti Trust Fund established and administered by the IMO, which is a stakeholder in the CGPCS, is a simpler structure with only one fund and governing body. At the time of the tenth contact group plenary session held on November 17, 2011, contact group members saw the necessity to react to increased public anger about the large number of seafarers who had been held captive and the physical and psychological suffering that was increasingly reported in the media (although the number of crews being held hostage had actually already declined) (CGPCS, 2011). Despite the increasingly close international coordination of the military forces, these efforts were still considered insufficient. While an increase in the number of deployed maritime force vessels was considered desirable, the contact group also recognized the growing use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) and the fact that no vessel with privately contracted armed security personnel on board had been successfully pirated (CGPCS, 2011). However, it also saw the necessity to increase regulation and oversight by the IMO of privately contracted armed security personnel. The counter-­piracy operation provided valuable opportunities for cooperation, especially between independent deployers, which would have either not have happened outside of this mission, or on a much more limited scale. An example can be seen in the cooperation between Japan, China, India, Russia, and the Republic of Korea in the convoy operations in the Gulf of Aden (CGPCS, 2011). While Japan has only once been the chair of the CGPCS, its coordinating role increased somewhat again in May 2014, when Japan became co-­chair with the Seychelles and the United Arab Emirates of the CGPCS Working Group 3

160  Wilhelm Vosse (Maritime Counter Piracy and Mitigation Operations) (CGPCS, 2014). Japan continued to be a co-­chair of Working Group 3 until May 2016 (CGPCS, 2016). The CGPCS encouraged its member states to increase the cooperation of its maritime forces with the three main counter-­piracy missions, the EUNAVFOR mission ATALANTA, the CMF, and the NATO Operation Ocean Shield (OOS). In June 2013, the Japanese government decided that the MSDF’s destroyer JS Samidare would join the CTF151 beginning in December 2013, allowing it to prevent piracy attacks outside of the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) (CGPCS, 2013). Japan’s cooperation with the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) In June 2013, the MSDF provided air support by helicopter when a Turkish Coast Guard vessel was following a potential pirate ship. The Commander of the Pakistani Navy noted during a CMF meeting in August 2013 that ‘any additional support that the Japanese could provide CMF would be a significant development. The Japanese have experience operating in the CMF area of operations5 and are a proficient naval force that will be a great asset to CMF’ (CMF, 2013a). On June 25, 2013, the Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori announced, that ‘due to various demands being made of the SDF’ Japan will assign one destroyer to ‘zone defense’ operations. The MSDF’s destroyer JS Samidare was then allocated to the CTF151 in December 2013. Those demands came in part from CMF itself as well as other participating countries, but also from ship-­ owners associations. Responding to questions from the press, Onodera stressed the Japanese government position that ‘zone defense’ and joining the CTF151 coordination mechanism was not considered participation in ‘collective defense’ and therefore no issue of constitutionality, but merely an act of cooperation with a multinational force (MoD, 2013). This enabled the MSDF to extend its missions from escorting ships in the IRTC to actively participating in so-­called zone defense in the entire area off the coast of Somalia. Because Japan had been one of the most active and most involved forces in the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, it was a natural next step to extend Japan’s mission to zone defense and a closer formal integration into the CMF infrastructure. This also gave Japan more opportunities for cooperation with maritime forces from other deployers and access to more intelligence and data from the CMF headquarters in Bahrain. In December 2013, the Commander of the NATO task force, Rear Admiral Eugene Diaz del Rio (Spanish Navy) stressed that the ‘true strength of the combined counter piracy effort lies in the continuous close cooperation and information sharing between the EU, NATO and CMF task forces, as well as various independent deployers’ (CMF, 2013b), of which Japan was now one. Even before officially joining the CTF151, Japanese ships and the base in Djibouti was visited by CTF151 commanders on a regular basis. The surveillance capacities of the P3C units due to the exceptionally large number of hours in the air, had become a key factor in the success of the counter-­piracy missions, which was by 2013

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy  161 recognized by the CMF commanders, which made closer cooperation and a formal integration of Japan a natural next step. Soon after Japan had joined the CTF151, it had its first opportunity to show what it is capable of. On January 17, 2014, the Japanese destroyer Samidare was essential in capturing five pirates suspected of attacking the MV Nave Antropos in cooperation with the EUNAVFOR flagship Siroco. After the pirates had been repelled by private armed forces on board the MV Nave Antropos and had fled, the JS Samidare’s SH-­60 Seahawk helicopter quickly found the nearby dhow and alerted the FS Sirocco, which could apprehend the pirates and free the Indian crew. Shortly after this incidence, the CTF 151 Commander, Commodore Aage Buur Jensen praised the flexible approach of the MSDF, stressing that the ‘Japanese forces involved responded quickly and professionally, without which the successful disruption might have been difficult’ (CMF, 2014a), and the EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Force Commander, Rear Admiral Hervé Bléjean, praised Japan’s ‘decisive action’ and the captain of the FS Siroco even said that this was a ‘perfect example of international navies operating close-­up and an excellent way to benchmark our action processes’ (EUNAVFOR, 2014a). In February 2014, Japan expanded its counter-­piracy activities even further, when the JASF joined the CTF151 and also began to participate in ‘zone defense’ in the Gulf of Aden. Japan was already conducting about 60% of all surveillance flights with its two P-­3C patrol aircraft (2009–October 2019: 2,388 patrol flights with 17,920 flight hours (Joint Staff Office, 2019; MoD, 2014)). The MSDF cooperation with CTF151 also provided opportunities for joint exercises with troops from a wide range of countries with whom Japan would usually not have the chance to work with. For example, in late January 2014, Japanese and South Korean maritime forces conducted a one-­day counter-­piracy exercise, together with the US navy (CMF, 2014b). In July 2014, Japanese Defense Minister Onodera announced the next step in the deepening of Japanese engagement in the CTF 151, namely the plan to send a major general-­class officer who will be appointed CTF151 Commander from May 2015, for about three months. In his press conference, Onodera stressed two main reasons for this decision, namely that this was a (1) ‘good opportunity for Japan to understand the whole of the anti-­piracy operations and to improve Japan’s capability in the future operations’, and (2) the vital importance of information sharing between Japan, the EU, and the United States (MoD, 2014). Joining the CTF151 also allowed more frequent visits of EUNAFVOR commanders to the Japanese facilities in Djibouti and the two MSDF destroyers. For example, on July 24, 2014, the German frigate FGS Brandenburg visited the JS Inazuma (EUNAFVOR, 2014c), and on September 2, 2014, the Japanese Escort Task Group, Captain Okawa Tsutomu visited the EUNAVFOR flagship ITS Andrea Doria (EUNAVFOR, 2014b). In an address at a conference on UK-­Japan relations, Prime Minister Abe stressed the significance of joining the CTF151 for enhancing the partnership between the MSDF and the Royal Navy—despite the multinational character of the CTF151 (Kantei, 2013b). The pinnacle of Japan’s CTF-­151 involvement was the appointment of MSDF Rear Admiral Ito Hiroshi

162  Wilhelm Vosse as CTF-­151 Commander in May 2015. Because of the rotation system, Ito held this position only for three months, until August 2015. Nevertheless, this was symbolic because it was the first time since World War II, that a member of the Japanese armed forces had become the commander of a multi-­national military mission (MoD, 2015; CMF, 2015). Significance of the Djibouti base For the first two years of the SDF deployment from June 2009, MSDF personnel had been stationed at the US military base close to the Djibouti-­Ambouli Airport, but when it became clear that the counter-­piracy mission would have to be continued and perhaps even intensified, the Japanese government decided to set up a semi-­permanent base in Djibouti, usually referred to by the Japanese government as a facility. This first overseas Japanese base, located on the northern side of Djibouti international airport, is about 120,000 square meters in size has a headquarters building, dormitories, gymnasium, and a maintenance hangar for the P-­3C patrol planes, which opened in June 2011. The initial base construction cost was about US $42 million, but in addition, Japan had to pay an annual US $10 million for the land lease and another US $10 million for its maintenance, which is a significant share of the total budget for the SDF mission off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden of between 3.5 and 5 billion Yen (US $32–45 million) between 2013 and 2017) (Kantei, 2013a, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). Between 2018 and 2019, the respective budget increased even further from 4.6 billion Yen (2018) to 5.4 billion Yen (2019) (almost US $50 million) (Kantei, 2018, 2019). The significance of the Djibouti base was not only in facilitating the counter-­ piracy mission, but from the beginning of the planning stages, the MoD saw it as a first major outpost for other missions in the region. In an interview, a senior MoD official indicated that the base was ‘intended to be used so we can conduct our activities in the region for about 10 years’ (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 29, 2011). When Japan began to consider deploying Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) troops to the United Nations UNMISS mission in South Sudan in the autumn of 2011, the base in Djibouti was considered and after the actual deployment in January 2012 used as the first stop before flying into South Sudan (Mason, 2017). The base located in close proximity to similar bases and camps of, for example, French and US troops, and Djibouti City, allowed MSDF and later Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) and to a very limited degree, GSDF troops to engage with other troops and to a limited extent also with the local population on a more regular and informal basis. The base was also regularly visited by delegations from EUNAVFOR, NATO and the governments of other deployers, as well as their military officials. While these official visits were usually short, they nevertheless allowed these partner countries to see the Japanese engagement first-­hand and not just from official reports. It also gave them opportunities to meet with senior and rank-­and-­file MSDF personnel. Japanese government officials including the defense minister, parliamentary vice-­minister and even Prime Minister Abe visited the base in August 2013 to meet with the deployed soldiers, and in some cases, to

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy  163 meet with local officials. The visits by the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister also have symbolic value in Japan, where they led to some limited media coverage and demonstrated to the Japanese public the important role the SDF plays globally.6 The third significant advantage of the base was the proof it provided that SDF personnel can staff and maintain such a base about 10,000 km away from Japan. According to field reports and interviews with SDF officials, the specific challenges involved the often very high temperatures and the frequent sandstorms in Djibouti, which required increased maintenance and cleaning of the aircraft stationed at Djibouti International Airport.7 While most MSDF sailors and pilots were deployed for only about three to five months, being away from their families for so long is challenging. Nonetheless, these deployments have certainly contributed to the deployment readiness of the SDF and to future joint mid-­to long-­term missions with Japan’s security partners (see also: Vestergaard Madsen et al., 2014). Operational cooperation with other forces SDF personnel and Japanese public officials have gained numerous opportunities to engage in and deepen relationships with forces from India, South Korea, Australia and many others, as well as governments, coast guards, and law enforcement officials from countries like the Seychelles and many other countries in the region. The following examples are taken from Japan’s interaction with European Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR). After joining this counter-­piracy mission, there were initially only a few encounters and even fewer opportunities for joint exercise or training involving MSDF and EUNAVFOR. Between 2009 and 2013, there were only between one and two such occasions every year. However, since 2014, the number of such encounters increased to six in 2014, seven in 2015, and nine in 2016. While joint military exercises are mentioned in EU, Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) documents as one of the achievements of EU-­Japan cooperation, the actual number of these training exercises at sea initially remained relatively small. In 2014 and 2015, there was only one joint training exercise a year. The only time EUNAVFOR and MSDF units cooperated in an actual counter-­piracy mission was in January 2014, when a MSDF helicopter assisted in locating a hijacked Indian dhow, allowing the EU NAVFOR FS Siroco to go on board to arrest to five Somali suspect pirates and free the Indian crew (see CMF mission above). The declining number of maritime piracy incidences opened opportunities to conduct more joint military exercises and navigation maneuvers at sea. In 2015, while there were six official ship visits, which gave some opportunities for ship captains and EUNAVFOR commanders to visit MSDF vessels and their base in Djibouti, it led to only one communications exercise at sea involving a EUNAVFOR warship and the MSDF destroyer Harusame in the Gulf of Aden in March 2015. This number increased somewhat in 2016, with four training exercises conducted in January and July 2016, and a navigation maneuver in November 2016. In December 2016, a Spanish Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the warship

164  Wilhelm Vosse ESPS Relampago cooperated with a MSDF aircrew to rescue two men from a capsized skiff in the Gulf of Aden.8 The counter-­piracy mission also facilitated the cooperation between MSDF and NATO forces. Examples are the visit of a group of representatives from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to the Japanese base in Djibouti in November 2012,9 visits by NATO Ocean Shield Force commanders on MSDF vessels in February 2012 and August 2013.10 When visiting the NATO headquarter in May 2014, Prime Minister Abe suggested a joint counter piracy NATO OOS-­SDF exercise in the Gulf of Aden, which was conducted only four months later, in September 2014 (NATO Allied Maritime Command, 2014), and was soon followed by an exercise to test common procedures and maneuvers between a MSDF and NATO vessels in February 2015 (NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2015). In March 2015, Japan, together with Australia, Finland, Sweden, and the Ukraine, for the first time also participated in the NATO CMX15 exercise, which rehearsed strategic political-­military decision-­making processes using a scenario of a crisis between two non-­NATO states at distance from Alliance territory (NATO, 2015). While this exercise did not involve any deployed troops, it was potentially significant for Japan to better understand NATO’s decision-­making procedures and because it involved an out-­of-­area scenario. Shortly before, in December 2014, Japan had deployed the first SDF personnel for a two-­year stint at the NATO headquarter,11 which can be seen as another significant step in Japan’s maturing security ties with NATO. The counter-­piracy experience and changes in Japanese security policy The counter-­piracy missions underway since 2009 have been the first long-­term combined on-­ and offshore deployment of SDF personnel. In Japan, they were also perceived as proof that the SDF was more than a peace-­time military force that could not even protect their own forces (as was the case with the Iraq deployment) or whose ability was limited to humanitarian and reconstruction missions (UN PKO and the Iraq deployment) or rear-­area support missions (as was the case with the Indian Ocean refueling missions), but a force that could significantly contribute to multilateral-­force missions. For government ministry officials (mostly from MoFA and the MoD, but also from Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLITT) that is in charge of the Japanese Coast Guard), these missions required them to participate in multilateral and multi-­stakeholder meetings as the CGPCS, CMF, and the SHADE meetings. The additional legal requirements and lessons learned in the counter-­piracy were then used in justifying some of the changes of the security legislation and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution since 2014.12 The successful mission was at least one reason why the current Abe administration was able to further ‘normalize’ its international role and military contribution to global or regional challenges. In a press conference in February 2014, Donna Hopkins (Coordinator for Counter Piracy and Maritime Security, U.S. Department

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy  165 of State) stressed that ‘Japan changed its laws and created for the first time since World War II a counterpiracy based out of its own immediate regional sphere. . . . piracy is a great uniter because it’s a common enemy. Everybody hates pirates’ (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Therefore, Japan can be seen as an example of a country where CGPCS participation has not only helped to legitimize a now decade-­long mission 10,000 km away from home (involving the continued deployment of two destroyers and two planes and the setting up of the first overseas (military) base since 1945 in Djibouti, an additional two vessels that were on route to or from Somalia, and another two that were used for training for the Somalia missions, in total six MSDF vessels), but has also facilitated a domestic debate and a series of new laws and regulations that might facilitate public acceptance of similar missions in the future. This growth in military engagement can be seen in the establishment of a new National Security Council (December 2013), a new force doctrine with a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, a limited increase of defense spending in 2014 and 2015, and the increasingly force-­focused and assertive defense policy announced in the-­then National Defense Program Guidelines for 2014 and beyond and the five-­year defense program for 2014 through 2018, both passed in December 2013, and the July 2014 cabinet decision to re-­interpret the Japanese constitution to allow the exercise of collective self-­defense (see above). The National Security Strategy (NSS), which came into force in December 2013, lists the future principles of Japan’s security policy, and specifically mentions the importance of maritime security and the positive example of the counter-­piracy missions. It emphasizes that Japan will ‘play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas” ’, that Japan will ‘take necessary measures . . . including anti-­piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries’, that it will ‘enhance the frequency and the quality of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime security such as joint exercises . . . and in particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden’, which are ‘critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East’ (Government of Japan, 2013, p. 17). The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, which also came into force in December 2013, mentioned under ‘Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces’ that the ‘SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation’ and that ‘Japan will consider measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-­Piracy Operation in Djibouti’ (MoD, 2013a, p. 21). The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY for 2019 and beyond stress that Japan will ‘work towards stable, long-­term use of the’ SDF base in Djibouti (MoD, 2018). The base has become one cornerstone of

166  Wilhelm Vosse its policy of active promotion of international peace cooperation activities in line with the Legislation for Peace and Security (2015). The International Peace Support Bill, which was part of the security legislation package passed in 2015 and enabled support activities to ‘armed forces of foreign countries collectively addressing the situation which threatens (the) international peace and security’. It does not specifically mention the experience of the counter-­piracy mission, but the debate was strongly affected by the necessity for deeper and broader military and security cooperation of the Japanese government and the SDF with governments and military forces of partner countries like the EU, Australia and India, as well as Asian countries with claims in the South-­ China Sea. While the bill was opposed by most Japanese opposition parties and many citizens, who demonstrated in front of the Diet building for weeks in the summer of 2015, the EU Commission and some European national governments (e.g. United Kingdom and Germany) embraced and supported Japan’s so-­called ‘pro-­active contribution to peace’ policy, and the willingness of Japan to become a more prominent actor in times of crisis. Relevance for Japan’s security partnerships with the EU and NATO By about 2014, the SDF had demonstrated that it was able to cooperate and integrate with a multitude of forces on sea and accept responsibilities, such as heading the command of the CTF-­151 and co-­chairing CGPCS working groups for a number of years. The Japanese contributions were praised by other force commanders, EUNAVFOR or NATO Marcom officials, and the cooperation was frequently mentioned in bi-­lateral diplomatic consultations between Japan and, among others the EU, the United Kingdom, Australia, India as well as NATO. Eventually, this mission also became a standard-­bearer for successful security cooperation mentioned in numerous agreements between Japan and these international organizations and their member states. Prime Minister Abe had been the first Japanese Prime Minister invited to the NATO Council in 2007. In May 2014, he was invited back to the NATO headquarter in Brussels, where he met with NATO Secretary-­General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and attended the North Atlantic Council. Abe stressed that the ‘new security policies of Japan and NATO’s “comprehensive approach” were highly compatible and that NATO is a natural partner for implementing the “proactive contribution to peace” ’ (MoFA, 2014). Japan and NATO also agreed to an ‘Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program between Japan and NATO’ (May 2014), which stressed their ‘shared strategic interests in promoting global peace, stability and prosperity’ and the need to ‘cooperate in order to face global and emerging security challenges, such as counter terrorism, cyber defense and maritime security, especially counter piracy, as well as in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations’ (NATO and Government of Japan, 2014). In order to achieve these goals, Japan and NATO agreed to strengthen high-­level dialogue, defense exchanges and ‘Japan’s participation in NATO’s Partnership Cooperation Menu activities’, and its participation in NATO exercises. The partnership

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy  167 program lists ten priority areas of cooperation covering parts of maritime security and counter piracy, and a broad range from cyber defense to disarmament. Since 2009, the counter piracy mission off the coast of Somalia has not only led to closer military to military cooperation, it has also become a prime example for successful military and political cooperation between the EU and Japan. Only a few months after the start of the counter-­piracy mission, in May 2009, then Prime Minister Tarō Asō met EU High Representative Javier Solana and the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, at the 18th EU-­Japan summit in Prague. Both sides stressed they wanted to assume greater global responsibility in a broad range of non-­traditional security and policy fields, and cooperate more closely to promote peace and security, from Africa to Central and Southeast Asia, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East peace process. One of the areas emphasized was the need to ‘tackle the root causes of piracy and underlining their support for development activity in Somalia’, which is why both sides promised to ‘take appropriate steps to contribute to ensuring the safe passage of vessels in need through the Gulf of Aden, the EU through its deployment of NAVFOR ATALANTA and Japan through the dispatch of escort ships of Maritime Self-­Defense Forces’ (Council of the European Union, 2009). One year into the counter-­piracy mission, in April 2010, after the change to a DPJ-­led government in Japan, then Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio ‘reiterated the importance of continuing their efforts to address the increasing threat posed by pirates to the safety of maritime navigation off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and to stability in the region’, and praised the ‘fruitful interaction’ of the MSDF and EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA (Council of the European Union, 2010). What this indicated was that support for the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia had become cross-­party consensus. It was no longer opposed by the now governing DPJ and its otherwise US-­critical prime minister. On the contrary, given its multilateral profile, it had become a perfect example to demonstrate how the DPJ was not a pacifist but a pragmatic party. The subsequent Noda and Kan administrations continued this pragmatic policy stance (Council of the European Union, 2011). The EU-­Japan cooperation in the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia has continued to be seen as the prime example for ongoing and future security cooperation since the beginning of the Abe administration in December 2012. At the 2013 EU-­Japan summit meeting, both sides stressed that EUNAVFOR-­MSDF cooperation is ‘strengthening counter piracy capabilities in Somalia and its neighboring countries’, and the significance of EU-­Japan cooperation in setting up the DRTC (Commission of the EU, 2013, p. 10). In 2014, the EU leadership praised Japan’s newly expanded security role and its so-­called ‘proactive contribution to peace’, because in the eyes of the EU this facilitated even closer ‘cooperation in counter piracy activity off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden’ (Commission of the EU, 2014, p. 5). In 2015, the EU further stressed the ‘concrete cooperation in anti-­piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden within the relevant International Contact Group and through operational activities between the deployed units of Japan’s MSDF and the EU’s Naval Force

168  Wilhelm Vosse Somalia (EUNAVFOR)-­Operation ATALANTA’ (Commission of the EU, 2015). During the negotiations for the EU-­Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), both sides frequently mentioned counter-­piracy as an example of successful EU-­ Japan security cooperation (Commission of the European Union, 2016; European Parliament, 2014).

Conclusion The political, military, logistical, and governing cooperation in the counter-­piracy missions off the coast of Somalia on the ground, at sea, and in the air has been a very important learning experience not only for the SDF, but also for MoD and MoFA officials. For MSDF and ASDF personnel, the now 11-­year long (in 2020) counter-­piracy mission has become the longest deployment of MSDF and ASDF personnel, and currently involves about 400 MSDF and 70 ASDF personnel in an often-­challenging environment. The CGPCS, CMF, and SHADE meetings are multi-­stakeholder organizations that are purely solution oriented, non-­political, and apply informal decision-­ making processes, thereby provided a learning experience for Japanese decision-­ makers and government bureaucrats alike. The counter-­ piracy missions also provided an opportunity to cooperate with forces from over forty other countries, which frequently provided opportunities for personnel visits and some unofficial exchanges at the Japanese base in Djibouti or on ships at sea. Additional chances to discuss during and after meetings of the governing bodies have certainly been important opportunities for Japan and its partners to exchange ideas and deepen trust and understanding. Returning to the core question of this volume, whether Japan’s security and foreign policy is decentering from its previous complete centering on its US ally as its exclusive ally, this chapter reflects on the experience and lessons learned during the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. It argues that these experiences have led to a broadening and growing inclusivity in Japan’s defense cooperation, have strengthened the operational readiness-­level of the SDF, and has exposed MoFA, MoD, and other government official to environments where they can and must cooperate with a large number of actors in a multi-­stakeholder environment. These experiences have also offered numerous opportunities for out-­of-­area military training exercises and personal exchange on the staff and leadership level with military personnel from Europe, other NATO members, and countries with whom Japan has already begun to intensify its security ties, including Australia and India. In the case of EU-­Japan security ties, or security ties with EU member states such as the United Kingdom or France, the counter-­piracy mission has been a starting point that makes further cooperation in other specific policy areas more likely and easier to achieve. Although these policy areas will not include Japan’s national defense or security in East Asia or the EU’s security in Europe, they will likely include non-­traditional security areas such as cyber security, international terrorism, legal aspects of maritime security, and energy security.

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy  169 European governments have regularly praised changes in Japan’s security legislation enacted by the Abe administration, and now have a better understanding of the security challenges Japan faces, and might be more willing to support Japan’s position in international bodies or through political or economic coordination— for example in regard to North Korea, and in a more limited way, also towards China. If decentering is defined as ‘building relationships with other partners’ other than the previously exclusive security partner, and establishing security and defense consultations and dialogues involving diplomats, defense bureaucrats and uniformed military personnel, capacity building and joint exercises between the SDF and militaries other than the US (see the introductory chapter of this volume), then Japan’s active policing, military, and political participation in the counter-­piracy mission off the coast of Somalia can certainly be understood as a major step forward in allowing Japan to make more independent foreign and defense policy decisions in the future, and, at least as far as out-­of-­area security challenges are concerned, allow Japan to de-­center from the United States’ dominance in global affairs.

Notes 1 Most significant were UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (UNSC, 2008a) because it allowed all countries to ‘enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea’ to ‘ repress, within the provisions of international law, acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels irrespective of where such acts occur’. And UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (UNSC, 2008d), which allowed all countries to take ‘all necessary measures to interdict those who use Somali territory and airspace’ and to plan or conduct acts of piracy. It also welcomes ‘the launching of the EU operation Atalanta to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and to protect vulnerable ships bound for Somalia, as well as the efforts by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other States acting in a national capacity in cooperation with the TFG to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia’ (TFG=Transitional Federal Government). 2 Shortly before, US ambassador Thomas Schieffer had expressed the hope that Japan would soon join the counter-­piracy mission (AFP January 9, 2009). 3 For more details of the ReCAAP ISC, see: Midford 2015. 4 7th Governing Council Meeting of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), March 2013), but also 6th and 8th Meeting in March 2012 and March 2014 respectively, see: ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) (March 8, 2012); ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) (March 7, 2013); ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) (March 4, 2014). 5 The CMF area of operation covers the Gulf of Aden, the entire coastline of north-­ eastern Africa, and the western Indian Ocean, an area of 3.2 million square miles. 6 Examples of visits to the Djibouti base are those of prime minister Abe in August 2013, Parliamentary Vice-­Minister of Defense Sato Akira in April 2013, defense minister Onodera in May 2014, and defense minister Inada in August 2016. 7 In a note about his experience in participating in the CTF-­151 in early 2014, MSDF Captain Tajiri Hiroaki, wrote about the ‘unforgiving conditions we face so far away from Japan with temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius and humidity close to 100% on many of the days’ (MoD 2014a, p. 297). 8 For a more detailed analysis of the EU-­Japan cooperation, see: Vosse 2018.

170  Wilhelm Vosse 9 NATO Maritime Command’s Vice Admiral Christian Canova and a group of representatives from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited the Japanese base in Djibouti to support the implementation of NATO’s new strategic concept, focusing on its counter piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield (OOS). 10 In February 2012, Rear Admiral Antonio Natale visited the Commander of the Japanese Escort Group on board JS Suzunami, and in August 2013, OSS Force Commander Henning Amundsen visited the MSDF Escort Division 6, Captain Iwasawa Tsutomu, on board JS Akebono in the Gulf of Aden. 11 GSDF Lieutenant Colonel Kurita Chizu became an adviser to NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in the office of the Secretary General. The assigned appointment was for two years, from December 1, 2014 to November 2016. 12 Examples would be the reports of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2014), stressing that ‘anti-­piracy activities based on universal jurisdiction, does not constitute the “use of force”; and should be interpreted as not restricted constitutionally’.

References The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. (2014). ‘The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security’ Outline of the Report. www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/gaiyou_en.pdf. AFP. (2009). US Envoy Urges Japan to Join Somalia Anti-­Piracy Mission, 9 January by AFP (Agence France Press). Associated Press (AP). (2009). Japan Orders Ships Sent to Fight Somali Pirates, 28 January. Black, Lindsay. (2012). Debating Japan’s Intervention to Tackle Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Beyond Mainstream Paradigms. International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific, 12(2), 259–285. doi:10.1093/irap/lcs004 Black, L. (2014). Japan’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Outlaws. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2009a). CGPCS Communique of the Second Plenary Meeting, New York. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/ Communique_2nd_Plenary.pdf. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2009b). CGPCS Communique of the Third Plenary Meeting, New York. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/ Communique_3rd_Plenary.pdf. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2009c). CGPCS Communique of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, New York. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/ Communique_4th_Plenary.pdf. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2011). CGPCS Communique of the Tenth Plenary Meeting, New York. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/ Communique_10th_Plenary.pdf. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2013). CGPCS Communique of the fifteenth Plenary Meeting, New York. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/ Communique_15th_-­Plenary.pdf. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2014). CGPCS Communique of the Sixteenth Plenary Meeting, New York. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2015/03/ Communique_16th_-­Plenary.pdf. CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia). (2016). Communique: Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, 19th Plenary Session. www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2016/07/Communique-­of-­the-­19th-­Plenary-­of-­the-­CGPCS.pdf.

Japan’s engagement in counter-piracy 171 CMF (Combined Maritime Forces). (2013a). CTF 151 Meets with Japanese Escort Division 6 in Djibouti. https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2013/08/04/ctf-151-meetswith-japaneseescort-division-6-in-djibouti. CMF (Combined Maritime Forces). (2013b). Finding Common Ground at Sea: JS Samidare and NATO Task Force Meet. https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2013/12/31/ finding-commonground-at-sea-js-samidare-and-nato-task-force-meet. CMF (Combined Maritime Forces). (2014a). Pirates Apprehended After Coordinated Response by Counter Piracy Missions. https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2014/01/21/ pirates-apprehended-after-coordinated-response-by-counter-piracy-missions. CMF (Combined Maritime Forces). (2014b). CTF 151’s ROKS Choi Young in Counter Piracy Exercise with US & Japan. https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2014/01/26/ ctf-151s-roks-choi-young-incounter-piracy-exercise-with-us-japan. CMF (Combined Maritime Forces). (2015). Japan Makes History as It Takes the Lead of Combined Task Force 151. Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). https://combined maritimeforces.com/2015/06/02/japan-makes-history-as-it-takes-the-lead-ofcombined-task-force-151/. Accessed 28 January 2020. Commission of the European Union, Government of Japan. (2013). 21st Japan-EU Summit. Tokyo, 19 November, Joint Press Statement, Tokyo. www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000019937.pdf. Commission of the European Union. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. European Union. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/file/441/download?token= KVSh5tDI. Commission of the European Union, Government of Japan. (2014). 22nd EU-Japan Summit. Brussels, 7 May, Joint Press Statement, Brussels. www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2014/05/pdf/the-eu-and-japan-acting-together-for-global-peaceand-prosperityjoint-press-statement-following-the-22nd-eu-japan-summit/. Commission of the European Union, Government of Japan. (2015). 23rd Japan-EU Summit. Tokyo, 29 May, Joint Press Statement, EU Commission. www.consilium.europa.eu/ en/ press/press-releases/2015/05/29-joint-press-statement-eu-japan-summit/. Council of the European Union. (2009). 18th EU-Japan Summit. Prague. http://eeas. europa.eu/japan/docs/2009_summit_js_en.pdf. Council of the European Union. (2010). 19th EU-Japan Summit, Tokyo, 28 April. Joint Press Statement. Council of the European Union. (2011). 20th EU-Japan Summit Brussels. Brussels. www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122303.pdf. EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces). (2014a). EU Naval Force French Flagship Siroco and Japanese Warship Samidare Reinforce Successful Counter Piracy Cooperation with Meeting in Gulf of Aden. http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-french-flagship-sirocoand-japanese-warship-samidare-reinforce-successful-counter-piracy-cooperation-withmeeting-in-gulf-of-aden. EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces). (2014b). EU Force Commander Hosts Commander of Japanese Escort Task Group on Board EU Naval Force flagship ITS Andrea Doria. http://eunavfor.eu/eu-forcecommander-hosts-commander-of-japanese-escort-taskgroup-on-board-eu-naval-force-flagship-itsandrea-doria. EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces). (2014c). EU Naval Force Flagship FGS Brandenburg and Japanese Destroyer Inazuma Meet at Sea in Gulf of Aden. https://eunavfor.eu/eunaval-force-flagship-fgs-brandenburg-and-japanese-destroyer-inazuma-meet-at-sea-ingulf-of-aden/. European Parliament: Committee on Foreign Affairs. (2014). Draft Report Containing the European Parliament’s Recommendation to the Council, Commission and the European

172  Wilhelm Vosse External Action Service on the Negotiations for an EU-­Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement. 2014/2021(INI), Brussels. Government of Japan. (2013). National Security Strategy (NSS) (December 17, 2013). Tokyo: Government of Japan. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/documents/2013/__ icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf. Hribernik, Miha. (2017). Multilateral Counter-­Piracy Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Role of Japan. Insights and Issues, 17(3), 1–31. International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2013). Djibouti Code of Conduct. www.imo. org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx. International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2015). Djibouti Code of Conduct. London. www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20Newsletter%20 %282015%29.pdf. Joint Staff Office. (2019). Joint Staff Press Release, November. www.mod.go.jp/js/Press/ press2019/press_pdf/p20191108_04.pdf. Kantei. (2013a). Heisei 25-­nendo kaiyo kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget for 2013], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boei-­sho [Measures Against Piracy in Off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence)]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/h25/gaiyou_h25.pdf. Kantei. (2013b). Keynote Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, at the Conference on Rejuvenating U.K. Japan Relations for the 21st Century Jointly Organized by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/30ukjapan_e.html. Kantei. (2014). Heisei 26-­nendo kaiyo kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget for 2014], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boei-­sho [Measures Against Piracy in off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/h26/gaiyou_ h26.pdf. Kantei. (2015). Heisei 27-­nendo kaiyo kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget for 2015], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boei-­sho [Measures Against Piracy in off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/h27/gaiyou_h27.pdf. Kantei. (2016). Heisei 28-­nendo kaiyo kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget for 2016], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boei-­sho [Measures Against Piracy in Off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/h28/gaiyou_h28.pdf. Kantei. (2017). Heisei 29-­nendo kaiyo kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget Plan for 2017], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boeisho [Measures Against Piracy in off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/h29/gaiyou_h29.pdf. Kantei. (2018). Heisei 30-­nendo kaiyo kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget Plan for 2018], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boeisho [Measures Against Piracy in Off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/h30/gaiyou_h30.pdf.

Japan’s engagement in counter-­piracy 173 Kantei. (2019). Reiwa moto nendo kaiyō kanren yosan [Maritime Related Budget Plan for 2019], Tokyo. Data for: Somaria oki Aden-­wan ni okeru kaizoku taisaku (Gaimusho kokudo Kotsusho boeisho [Measures Against Piracy in Off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Defence]. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/budget/pdf/r1/gaiyou_r1.pdf. Mason, Ra. (2017). Djibouti and Beyond: Japan’s First Post-­War Overseas Base and the Recalibration of Risk in Securing Enhanced Military Capabilities. Asian Security, 1–19. Midford, Paul. (2015). Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea. Asian Survey, 55, 525–547. MoD (Japanese Ministry of Defence). (2009a). Press Releases: Field Investigation in Countries Around the Gulf of Aden. www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2009/090205.html. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2009b). Press Releases: Issuance of Order for Operation of the Self-­Defence Forces Concerning Maritime Security Operations. www.mod. go.jp/e/pressrele/2009/090313a.html. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2009c). Press Releases: Departure of the Dispatched Maritime Force for Response to Piracy. www.mod.go.jp/e/pressrele/2009/090313b. html. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2013a). Press Conference by the Defense Minister (10:18–10:31 A.M. July 9, 2013). www.mod.go.jp/e/press/conference/2013/07/09.html. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2013b). National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond. http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/ pdf/20131217_e2.pdf. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2014a). Press Conference by the Defense Minister Onodera (10:09–10:20 A.M. July  18, 2014). www.mod.go.jp/e/press/conference/2014/07/18.html. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2014b). Defense of Japan, Tokyo, p. 297. https:// www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2014.html. Accessed 23 June 2020. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2015). Press Conference by the Defense Minister Nakatani (08:38–08:47 A.M. February 3, 2015). https://web.archive.org/web/20170322111201/ www.mod.go.jp/e/press/conference/2015/02/03.html. Accessed 22 March 2017. MoD (Ministry of Defence of Japan). (2018). National Defense Program Guidelines for FY for 2019 and Beyond. Tokyo: Government of Japan. MoFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). (2014). Prime Minister Abe’s Meeting with Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, and Attendance at the North Atlantic Council. www. mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page23e_000240.html. NATO. (2015). NATO Conducts Annual Crisis Management Exercise (CMX): NATO to Exercise Decision-­Making in Crisis—CMX15 to Focus on Maritime Security. www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_117862.htm. NATO Allied Maritime Command. (2014). NATO and Japan Counter-­Piracy Forces Conduct Exercise in Gulf of Aden. www.mc.nato.int/media-­centre/news/2014/nato-­and-­ japan-­counterpir acy-­forces-­conduct-­exercise-­in-­gulf-­of-­aden.aspx. NATO Allied Maritime Command. (2015). NATO Warship TCG BUYUKADA Exercises with International Counter-­Piracy Forces. www.shape.nato.int/nato-­warship-­tcg-­buyukade­exercises-­with-­international-­counterpiracy-­foces. NATO and Government of Japan. (2014). Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme Between Japan and NATO. www.mofa.go.jp/files/000037772.pdf. NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. (2015). NATO Warship TCG BUYUKADA Exercises with International Counter-­piracy Forces. http://www.shape.nato.int/ nato-­warship-­tcg-­buyukade-­exercises-­with-­international-­counterpiracy-­foces.

174  Wilhelm Vosse ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC). (2013). ReCAAP ISC’s Contribution to the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Singapore: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ISC). United Nations Security Council. (2008a). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008). New York. https://undocs.org/S/RES/1816(2008). United Nations Security Council. (2008b). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1838 (2008). New York. https://undocs.org/S/RES/1838(2008). United Nations Security Council. (2008c). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008). New York. https://undocs.org/S/RES/1846(2008). United Nations Security Council. (2008d). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008). New York. https://undocs.org/S/RES/1851(2008). U.S. Department of State. (2014). Counter-­Piracy Update, U.S. Department of State. http:// iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/02/20140221293810.html. Vestergaard Madsen, Jens, Conor Seyle, Kellie Brandt, Ben Purser, Heather Randall, and Kellie Roy. (2014). The State of Maritime Piracy 2013. Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation. Vosse, Wilhelm. (2018). Japan-­EU Security Ties: The Case of the Counter-­Piracy Mission. In Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford (Eds.), Japan’s New Security Partnerships. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 219–235.

10 Japan’s cooperation with the EU in the nexus of development and security Marie Söderberg

Introduction Legislative changes on the security side as well as a new Development Cooperation Charter in Japan not only creates opportunities for broader cooperation with Japan’s main ally the US. It also opens opportunities for more cooperation with the EU and its member states on development and security issues. While the EU during recent decades has not had a coherent policy, with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, it now has the CSDP. The EU has a leading role in peace-­keeping operations. Drawing on both civilian and military assets, EU’s policy is a comprehensive one that seems to match well with what Japan is trying to achieve with its new “whole of government approach”. Both parties also put a strong emphasis on multilateral institutions, particularly on the UN, to promote peace and sustainable development on a global basis. The UN member states have moved from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), mainly focusing on poverty reduction to the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These are much broader in scope, and among its 17 goals, besides poverty reduction, are also to protect the environment, promote economic growth, and ensure health and prosperity for all. The 16th goal is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies. The SDGs emphasis, not only on the state but also on civil organizations, individuals as well as private businesses. A measurement system with many parameters through which all countries, including the developed ones, are being monitored is in place. With globalization, the power structure of the world is changing. This is causing uncertainty and, in some places, also unrest not only in developing but also in developed countries. With the decision of a Brexit and the large number of refugees that have poured into Europe, the liberal world order is being questioned. The Russian invasion of Ukraine led to more significant concerns regarding security. In Asia, the rise of a more assertive China is also causing security concerns. In the US, Donald Trump, as a president, puts further questions to the liberal world order. He started with ending further negotiations for the free trade agreement TPP (Trans-­Pacific Partnership agreement) as well as the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) with Europe.

176  Marie Söderberg Although both Europe and Japan have been relying on the US as their military protector, it now seems that they have realized that they will have to do more themselves. The US puts higher demands on its allies to cooperate more with each other. Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed that Japan, along with other American allies, does not pay what he calls a fair share to support American military bases and forward deployed forces. He even suggests he might withdraw troops unless Japan agrees to pay more (Rich, 2016). In Europe, Trump has continuously complained about the defense spending of European allies who committed less than the two percent to defense, particularly Germany. And he has cast doubt on US commitment to its obligations under Article 5 of NATO’s founding document, the Washington Treaty, under which an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all allies. NATO military spending has increased by $130 billion and the number of NATO members fulfilling their obligations of a two percent spending on defense has more than doubled. Still, President Trump claims he is considering abandoning NATO (Borger, 2019). In Japan, the military budget has been raised eight years in a row (Kelly, 2019), but President Trump keeps pushing for further increases. Recently he requested that Japan pay five times as much for the US troops stationed in the country (Japan Times, 2019). Thus, both Japan and the EU are facing similar pressure from the US. For the protection of the liberal world order, when US support is decreasing, the EU and Japan seem like ideal partners. Cooperation between them in the nexus of security and development is already ongoing, although it has not been spectacular and not created any significant headlines. The question is if the changing world order, as well as the institutional changes that have taken place recently, will lead to broader and deeper cooperation. In this chapter, we will trace policy development in both Japan and EU to see if recent changes open up for more cooperation between the two.

Historical background After WWII, Europe was in ruins. Worst off was Germany and the German cities where factories, as well as living areas, had been bombed to pieces. The western parts of Germany became occupied by mainly American, British, and French troops. The eastern parts were occupied by Soviet troops. The European communist parties were gaining ground, partly because of the Soviet Union’s victory over Germany on the east front but also because the economic system seemed more stable than the western market economy, which was falling apart. The US Foreign Minister, George Marshall, saw the growth of the communist parties as a threat. The Marshall Plan was initiated, and the US provided financing for the countries in Europe to rebuild their factories and get their economies going. In Japan the situation was similar, the occupation led by the American General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) in the first phase began the work of rebuilding Japan by dismantling the military, making land reforms and breaking up big business conglomerates to make Japan more

Japan’s cooperation with the EU 177 democratic. At the end of 1947 the spread of communism sparked a reconsideration of occupation policies. In the latter part of the occupation, sometimes called the “reverse course”, there was a change in occupation policy to assist Japan in strengthening its economy and build a strong country to counter a communist threat. The so-­called “peace paragraph” in the post-­war constitution forbids Japan to solve international disputes by military means,1 and in connection with the peace treaty, Japan also signed a security treaty with the US that in the beginning guaranteed both Japanese domestic and external security. Gradually from 1954, Japan also started building up its own Self-­Defense Forces (SDF). According to the so-­ called Yoshida Doctrine,2 Japan should rely on the US for its security and focus on building up its economy. This was the policy Japan came to follow during the Cold War period. In the 1960s, both Japan and especially West Germany grew strong in manufacturing and their economies were prospering again. They were part of the so-­called Western world, which was capitalist-­driven (in contrast to the communist-­led Eastern world) and were very close to the US. In the 1970s, the US economy faced a recession and its role in the world economy also appeared to be shifting. At that time, trilateral cooperation between western Europe, Japan, and the United States was promoted as a way of addressing global economic issues. The United Nations, which was split by a North-­South division, was not able to do that in an effective way. This was the background for the foundation of the Trilateral Commission in 1973. Its mission was to encourage business leaders, academics, and politicians to cooperate more closely in defining economic and security problems shared by all three regions and seeking solutions to them. The Trilateral Commission focused on the issues of trade and finance, as it received support from major corporations with an interest in such questions. At the first meeting in Japan in 1973, the members discussed monetary reform and trilateral politics. The second meeting, held in Europe in 1974, expanded the agenda to include relations with developing countries and the global energy crisis. The Commission issued a statement calling for increased aid from the industrialized countries to developing countries, for market-­oriented free trade, and also for a cooperative approach to dealing with the organization of the Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (United States Department of State, 2009). Quoting the founding declaration of the trilateral commission: Growing interdependence is a fact of life of the contemporary world. It transcends and influences national systems . . . While it is important to develop greater cooperation among all the countries of the world, Japan, Western Europe, and North America, in view of their great weight in the world economy and their massive relations with one another, bear a special responsibility for developing effective cooperation, both in their own interests and in those of the rest of the world. (Duthel, 2011, p. 42)

178  Marie Söderberg In the 1970s, both Japan and some of the European countries, although they were centering on the US for security cooperation, were also encouraged to decenter and initiate further cooperation among each other. The weak link in this triangular relation was the Japanese -­western Europe one. Relations during the postwar period had been quite restrictive but cordial in the field of politics. In economics, there were intense trade disputes, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, EU did not exist in its present form (we had the European Community (EC) with fewer member countries/less policy cooperation), and bilateral relations were more important between Japan and the big western European countries such as Germany, UK, and France. Several international economic and political events in the 1970s such as the Nixon shock with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods currency system, the US’s retreat from the Vietnam War and a reduction of troops in South Korea, all signaled American hegemony had reached its peak in Asia. The US, tired of war, started to pressure its allies in Asia to take greater responsibility for their own security. Japan was hit severely by the OPEC oil shocks and the global economic downturn, and increased exports and investment overseas meant increased vulnerability. From the end of the Second World War, national security in Japan was centered on the US and heavily reliant upon the Mutual Security Treaty. At this time, it seemed that Japan needed a national security policy of its own. In 1978 the newly elected Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi assembled a research group of policymakers and university scholars to examine Japan’s national security issues and design the essence of a new policy that came to be labeled the comprehensive security approach. This took a much broader perspective. Ōhira died while in office, but his successor Suzuki Zenko proceeded with the policy recommendations and in late 1980, created a new cabinet committee, the Ministerial Council on Comprehensive Security. In the comprehensive security concept, less emphasis was placed on the military than on economic and diplomatic means for ensuring the country’s security. This concept developed as a natural outgrowth of Japan’s successful postwar experience, in which Japan devoted itself to economic development while relying on its alliance with the United States to provide external deterrence and limit its military expenditures (Akaha, 1991). Within the alliance structure, Japan’s actual military planning in the postwar period focused primarily on the defense of their own territory (Fouse, 2012). The Japanese economy recovered quickly after the oil shocks in the 1970 and as the trade surplus with the US grew, especially during the 1980s, Japan became accused of being a “free rider” on US military defense spending, rather than bearing the cost of its defense, using its money to fund its economic development. The increase in Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending, with several plans which doubled the amount of aid from the end of the 1970s and onwards, was one way for Japan to fulfill its obligations to international society (Söderberg, 1996). The increase was partly explained in terms of “burden-­sharing” (yakuwari buntan), according to which Japan should take greater responsibility in the field of aid in order to compensate for US expenditures on the global security umbrella (See: Yasutomo, 1986; Hanabusa, 1991).

Japan’s cooperation with the EU 179 With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union that followed the Cold War came to an end. Member countries in EC had increased and there was an ambitious plan for creating a free internal market. By some this was seen as a threat of a “Fortress Europe” while others saw the potential of a large market. In 1991 the Hague Declaration was signed between the EC and Japan. This initiated consultations in the political field. Annual top-­ level meetings between leaders started. Economic issues were still dominating in the relationship and both lacked structure as well as interest to sustain political relations on a grand scale. In 2001, when the EU had been enlarged and became a large common market, a ten-­year Action Plan for EU-­Japan Cooperation was signed. This outlined broad cooperation in almost all fields and had to “promote peace and security” as one of its goals. The 9/11 incident in 2001 again changed the climate. Fighting terrorism, as well as transatlantic relations, were set in focus for both. EU was still inward-­looking and lacked a common security policy. Japan lacked the capability to sends troops in fighting positions abroad due to constitutional restraints. Foreign aid was one way for Japan to contribute to peace and stability on a global basis. An area where EU and its member countries, together providing more than 50 percent of all ODA3 on a worldwide basis, was also heavily involved. Starting with UN Secretary-­General Boutros Boutros-­Ghali’s report An Agenda for Peace (UN. Secretary-­General, 1992), in 1992 a new discourse linking security and development on a global basis was initiated. Boutros-­Ghali thought that UN agencies in the economic and social field, which so far had not been recognized as peace organizations, had an important part to play in a post-­conflict phase (Shinoda, 2007, p. 92). This report was followed by others (United Nations Development Program, 1994; Annan, 1998), who made a strong connection between peace and development. The Organization for Economic Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) formed the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, which gave guidelines to donors, and in 2004 a Security System Reform (SSR) was endorsed by ministers and agency heads. This emphasized that a “whole of government” approach was needed to promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development on both a personal and a state level.

Changes on a global level The rise of China during the 21st century has come very quickly and has meant a power shift not only in Asia but on a worldwide basis. This, of course, affects Japan, one of its closest neighbors and most significant trading partners, but also one where political relation with China has been far from stable. Europe, although located far away, is also affected by the rise of China and the fact that the center of gravity has shifted to Asia, pulling with it the US attention, as seen in President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”. The EU has remained slow in adjusting to this new reality and is currently occupied by several other closer issues, besides economic crises, Ukraine, Brexit, and the refugee crises.

180  Marie Söderberg In the EU, every country maintains their own defense forces. The military of the European Union consists of various cooperative structures that have been established between the military forces of the member countries and within the institutional framework of the union’s CSDP. The development of the CSDP is a contentious issue, in particular with regard to the current role of NATO, where some countries are members and others not. Since the beginning of the 21st century, this integration has, however, intensified, bringing about the initiation of numerous military as well as civilian CSDP operations. EU battlegroups have been established, but European military security is still weak and largely depends on the US, through bilateral alliances or NATO. In 2016, EU adopted a new Global Strategy for its foreign and security policy (European External Action Service, 2016). Its ambition is to make Europe stronger and a more influential actor on the world stage; to keep citizens safe, preserve European interests, and uphold common values. The strategy is a comprehensive one that should tackle challenges such as energy security, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare. Key steps have been taken to upgrade security and defense policy in line with an implementation plan that aims to improve the protection of the EU and its citizens, help governments jointly build military capacity, and develop a better response to crises. The European Defense Action Plan proposes financial help for member states for joint procurement and capability development, and steps to put into effect a defense buildup and more cooperation with NATO in line with a joint EU-­NATO declaration (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2016). The SDF is without combat experience abroad. Therefore, this country is heavily dependent on its alliance with the US for military security. The SDF and the US-­Japan alliance is at the center of Japan’s defense policy, but recently several other cooperation agreements have also been concluded as described elsewhere in this volume. A new institutional arrangement, as well as new legislation, opens up for a more proactive policy. Both Japan and EU take a comprehensive perspective on security and several structural and institutional as well as legal changes have been taken that create opportunities for more cooperation in a globalized world and at the nexus of security and development.

Changes in Japan The government led by Prime Minister Abe in December 2013 for the first time announced a Security Strategy (Government of Japan, 2013). According to this document, Japan should step up its activities and, in the future, make “proactive contribution to peace” stipulates a “strategic utilization of ODA”. A National Security Council which has a secretariat in charge of planning and coordinating security issues has been formed. After being reelected again in December 2014, further reforms where announced. In February 2015, Japan revised its ODA Charter, no longer talking about ODA, but instead a Development Cooperation Charter “bearing in mind the National Security Strategy”. The new Charter has a strong emphasis on Japan’s

Japan’s cooperation with the EU 181 national interests and opens up opportunities for more cooperation between security and development. Such cooperation has already been ongoing. Japan has been promoting multilateral regional security cooperation when it comes to maritime safety and antipiracy activities. It has played a vital role in the formation of RECAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery) through which information exchange is conducted regarding crimes at sea. Besides multilateral arrangements, Japan is also working bilaterally concerning maritime security with Australia and some of the ASEAN countries such as the Philippines. With ASEAN large scale ODA packages have been part of the deal. Already in 2006, Japan announced that it would provide Indonesia with three patrol boats financed through ODA. Although officials in charge of ODA are avers, aid has gradually been used more often for “non-­traditional” security issues such as anti-­ terrorism and piracy. Labeled law enforcement issues, these “grey zones” became eligible for Japanese ODA (Pajon, 2013, p. 5). Through aid money, the Japanese Coast Guard has provided education and training on antipiracy with Southeast Asian countries. For example, in 2013 the Philippine Coast Guard was promised ten patrol boats financed by Japanese ODA. In November  2014, Vietnam also received some patrol boats. In 2011 Japan acted proactively and took a leadership role in preparing for other donors to enter Myanmar again. For many years, there has been Japanese civilian cooperation in European CSDP missions. When the EU dispatched a civilian CSDP mission to provide training and advice to Niger’s security sector in August 2012 this was supplemented by a Japanese decision in 2014 to provide grant aid through the UN Development Program. When the EU decided to dispatch a civilian CSDP mission to Mali’s in 2014 Japan in March 2015 agreed to provide grant aid for the rehabilitation of Mali’s national police school, provision of information technology and other equipment, and the development of human resources. Japan’s cooperation with CSDP missions was facilitated by its experience of using the ODA budget to help rebuild infrastructure in Iraq during peace operations by the SDF. Similar coordination was seen in the peacebuilding operations in Timor Leste and disaster-­relief assistance to Haiti (Fukushima, 2015). Cooperation in fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has been ongoing since 2009 (see chapter by Vosse in this volume). Japanese Maritime Self-­Defense Force (MSDF) and the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) have been cooperating in Somalia through Operation ATALANTA, a CSDP military mission that has been in operation since December 2008. Both Europe and Japan are providing development assistance to Somalia and surrounding countries and are also helping to train local maritime security officials. In addition to development assistance to enhance local governance capabilities and economic development, further collaboration on capacity building should make a significant contribution to local empowerment. The impetus given to “strategic use” of ODA in Japan’s new national security strategy as well as the formulation in the Development Co-­operation Charter that this strategy should be beard in mind makes it likely that we will see more of this

182  Marie Söderberg kind of aid in the future. The Development Cooperation Charter has swept away the “grey zones” and made this kind of cooperation a priority issue. In the 2015 Charter, Japan also announced a “whole of government approach” implying that defense, development and diplomacy from now on should go hand in hand. In the military field, new possibilities for cooperation in CSDP missions are also emerging. A revision of the Japanese constitution, including paragraph nine, which forbids Japan to solve international disputes by military means, has been on the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) agenda for a long time and still is on the agenda. It is a cumbersome process that requires a two-­thirds majority in both houses and on top of that a national referendum. Instead Prime Minister Abe’s government managed to acquire a reinterpretation of the constitution so that Japanese Defense Forces can be mobilized overseas under the following conditions: (1) Japan is attacked, or a close ally is attacked, and the result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to people, (2) when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, (3) use of force should be restricted to a necessary minimum. In September 2015, both Houses of Parliament passed the necessary legislation to make this possible. A vital feature of the new laws is the right of collective self-­defense or defending the United States or another friendly country that comes under attack, but the revision also expands the scope for logistic support for the militaries of the United States and third countries and participation in peace keeping. New legislation was passed by the Upper House of the Japanese Diet in 2015 under the initiative of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The so-­called Permanent International Peace Support Law and the Legislation for Peace and Security facilitate the deployment of SDF logistical support units abroad and provide the legal foundation for the reinterpretation of Article Nine of Japan’s pacifist constitution. This new legislation was tried out in South Sudan, where Japan had been involved between 2012 and 2017. The Japanese peacekeepers’ updated Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and expanded duties allowed the military engineers dispatched there from December 2016 to come to the rescue of UN staff and non-­governmental organizations’ personnel under armed attack using deadly force. As this was a contentious issue in Japan the government in 2017 decided to withdraw its forces from South Sudan, easing political pressure on Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. Under their new (ROEs), Japanese peacekeepers are also now allowed to come to the rescue and support fellow UN troops of other peace-­keeping contingents and can engage in military security operations, including patrolling and vehicle inspections at checkpoints. The combat engineers practiced various scenarios involving the use of force during their pre-­deployment training in Japan. However, given that the Japanese peace-­keeping contingent consists of combat engineers and not infantry soldiers, it is unlikely that they will be dispatched to assist UN troops engaged in a firefight unless no troops from any other country are available. Furthermore, while the SDF in South Sudan could use their weapons to defend civilians and fellow peacekeepers, they were not allowed to use force against a regular military such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (Gady,

Japan’s cooperation with the EU 183 2016). The Permanent International Peace Support Law and the Legislation for Peace and Security still mean that there now is a legal framework for a certain amount of military cooperation for Japan.

Changes on the EU-­side The idea of a common defense policy for Europe dates back to 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels and the so-­called Western European Union was created. This, together with NATO, where all countries were not members remained the principal forum for consultations on security and defense issues in Europe until the late 1990s. Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent conflicts in the Balkans, it became clear that the EU needed to assume its responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. At the Cologne European Council in 1999 member states reaffirmed the Union’s willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces. In addition, the post of the “High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy” was created to allow the Union to speak with “one face and one voice” on foreign policy matters. In 2003 the EU got its first security strategy “A  Secure Europe in a Better World-­the European Security Strategy” (ESS), that analyzed for the first time the EU’s security environment and identified key security challenges (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime) and subsequent political implications for the EU. It was launched in the wake of the US reaction to the attacks of 9/11 and in it, the EU highlighted the overriding importance of the transatlantic relationship. The EU has since then launched some 30 peace missions and operations trying to contribute to stabilization and security in Europe and beyond. The implementation of the ESS was revised in 2008. The Lisbon Treaty that came into force in 2009 implied further European policy cooperation in many fields, including that of Security. It was the cornerstone in the development of the CSDP. The treaty includes both mutual assistance and a solidarity clause and allowed for the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-­President of the European Commission. The two distinct functions of the newly created post give the possibility to bring all the necessary EU assets together and to apply a “comprehensive approach” to EU crisis management. The CSDP enables the Union to take a role in peace-­keeping operations, conflict prevention, and the strengthening of international security. It is a part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. In a time of economic crises and limited resources, Europe also needs to do better with less. The idea is that EU member states, through the CSDP, shall be able to pool their resources and build stronger defense capabilities (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2018).

184  Marie Söderberg In the new 2016 EU Global Strategy, the level of ambition is put higher than before due to the unstable surrounding and existential crisis within and beyond the European Union. The Union itself is under threat. It is claimed in the strategy and the European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity, and democracy is being questioned. A key policy is to engage with others. “The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats”, it is stated in the strategy. This makes it essential to strengthen cooperation on defense and security. The E.U. will promote a rules-­based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The E.U. will promote a rules-­based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. (European External Action Service, 2016) Concerning development, the EU’s latest policy document is the “New European Consensus on Development” which constitutes a common framework for European development cooperation. For the first time, it applies in its entirety to all European Union Institutions and all Member States, which commit to work more closely together. The new Consensus reaffirms that poverty eradication remains the primary objective of European development policy. It integrates the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and aligns European development action with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which is also a cross-­cutting dimension for the EU Global Strategy. The new Consensus recognize the strong interlinkages between peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, environment, and climate. It takes a comprehensive approach to means of implementation, combining traditional development aid with other resources to engage in more innovative forms of development financing, leveraging private sector investments and mobilizing additional domestic resources for development. All in line with the 2030 agenda it aspires to create better-­tailored partnerships with a broader range of stakeholders, including civil society, and partner countries at all stages of development. With this New Consensus EU wants to become a frontrunner when it comes to sustainable development (European Commission, 2017).

Cooperation in the nexus of security and development EU and Japan would seem to be natural cooperation partners. They share the same values and are both democratic entities. They commonly have a strong belief in working through the UN system. Despite their shared norms and values, their bilateral cooperation has been rather meager. In the post-­war period, during the 20th century, the link between US and Japan was always solid, and so was the European-­US link, but the link between Japan and Europe, in everything besides trade, always remained weak. In the 21st century, with the rise of China, both Japan and EU came to pay great attention to China as well. Their security

Japan’s cooperation with the EU 185 cooperation was, however, centered on US military cooperation, especially in the case of Japan. It is not that there is no cooperation ongoing between EU and Japan; it is just the fact that this cooperation so far has been rather low key. One of the contributing factors to that has probably been the split picture of Europe in the nexus of security and development. This became obvious in the Iraq war, where some EU countries joined, and others did not. Some EU members are NATO members others are not, and some European countries are not EU members but NATO members. Even concerning development assistance and the way it has been implemented, there are significant variations between various European countries. Sometimes Japan has just preferred to deal with European countries on a bilateral level rather than through the EU. The British decision to leave is likely to increase this tendency. Examples of areas where cooperation has been ongoing are disarmament as well as nuclear disarmament. Here EU and Japan have been cooperating through the UN. Since the adoption of the European CSDP, which includes both a military and a civilian side, and often a mix of the two, Japan has cooperated with CSDP civilian engagement on several occasions. CSDP and UNDP missions—in Nigeria in 2014, Mali in 2015—Japan has been supporting. Japan sent personnel to participate in a special monitoring mission to Ukraine under the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where Japan has been a partner since 1992. Its contribution to OSCE rests on two pillars, active participation in meetings and financial support for projects. Initially in particular for post-­war reconstruction in former Yugoslavia, later increasingly related to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Japan has also recently appointed an Ambassador to NATO in Brussels, but had already been a NATO cooperation partner for many years. In 2013 a joint declaration to strengthen cooperation was signed, and since 2014 work is being taken forward through an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme. Practical cooperation is being developed in a wide range of areas, including cyber-­defense, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, non-­proliferation, defense science and technology, and women, peace and security. In August 2018 naval forces from Standing NATO Maritime Group One conducted a passing exercise with a Japan Maritime Self-­Defense Force squadron in the Baltic Sea (NATO, 2018). In the field of development, there is a yearly dialogue held between EU and Japan. They are both members of OECD DAC that set the standard for development cooperation. They both participate in various cooperative donors’ meetings. On the ground, they sometimes cooperate but very often do not.

Potential for further future cooperation in the nexus of security and development When the “Action Plan for EU-­Japan Cooperation” ended in 2011, a decision was taken not to go for a new agreement of similar type. Instead, negotiations started for a Free Trade/Economic Partnership agreement and in parallel with this, also a new Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The SPA provides a legally binding

186  Marie Söderberg framework for further cooperation in the field of politics, security, and development and other sectoral cooperation in a comprehensive manner. The EU has signed similar agreements with Canada and South Korea, but for Japan, it was the first time they signed such an agreement with another developed country. The EU and Japan has created a Joint Committee that is to supervise the implementation of the SPA. Already at its first meeting two priority areas for cooperation were announced: security and infrastructure development in third countries. With these institutional changes that have been made on both the Japanese and the EU side, there now also exists a legal framework and a new setting in which EU and Japan can cooperate in the future. In the field of infrastructure, cooperation is moving ahead. The “Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union and Japan” announced by Prime Minister Abe and President Juncker in September 2019 is a first step. This partnership cover sectors from transport to digital industries as part of an effort to revive multilateral cooperation in the face of US withdrawal from such agreements as the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate accord. While the agreement does not mention China by name, this partnership is clearly crafted with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in mind. This infrastructure drive is also part of a wider push by the EU to transform itself from “payer to player” where trade, aid and investments should be used together to achieve strategic foreign policy goals. It follows with other EU plans to deploy €60 billion to leverage investment many times that value to improve ties between Europe and Asia. The EU-­Japan agreement calls for “transparent procurement practices, the ensuring of debt sustainability and the high standards of economic, fiscal, financial, social and environmental sustainability”. The EU needs new cooperation partners to tackle the existing world order. The EU and Japan, located in different parts of this world, have many similarities, including the more comprehensive view of security. The institutional framework for cooperation now exists through the Strategic Partnership Agreement that is a legally binding agreement. Cooperation has increased, but there is still much-­ untapped potential. To both security cooperation with the US is the central and most important issue. The situation with Donald Trump as a president, and a US that is more inward-­looking, has given a push for further EU-­Japan cooperation not only in the field of trade liberalization, but also security cooperation, especially at the nexus of security and development. The “Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union and Japan” is a case in point. Here the two will work together to create sustainable development on a worldwide basis. Strengthening the weak link of the trilateral relation is an issue again and a way for both EU and Japan to support the existing liberal world order.

Notes 1 Japanese Constitution, Article 9 reads: “(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces,

Japan’s cooperation with the EU 187 as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”. 2 Named after the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. 3 That is foreign aid as defined by OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

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11 Evolution of Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy and European influences on Japan’s peace-­building policy Yukiko Takezawa Introduction In November 2016, Japan inaugurated a new stage in their peace-­building policy1 by allowing the Japanese Self-­Defense Force (JSDF) to engage in the International Peace Cooperation Activities2 with an unprecedented mission called Kaketsuke-­Keigo (use of weapons for coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) for the first time in the PKO mission in South Sudan.3 While international society faces peacebuilding duties with a complexity and variety of missions, and increasing demand for a so called “robust PKO,”4 Japan has been criticized for not contributing equally relative to other countries’ militaries and even having asked other countries’ forces to protect the SDF due to the SDF’s strict Rules of Engagement (ROEs) limiting its use of weapons (Ishizuka, 2005, pp. 67–86). While many previous contributions to the literature (Er, 2009; Ito, 2007; Midford, 2011; Mochizuki, 2007, etc.) inside and outside Japan have argued whether Japan’s peace-­building policy regarding its SDF overseas dispatch demonstrates the “normalization” of Japan’s security policy that seeks its own way, or only seeks to maintain alliance bonds with the United States between “fear of entrapment” and “fear of abandonment.” Japan has gradually increased its SDF logistical support to the US military, and its dispatch to PKO missions by expanding the target area to the Middle East and Africa to pursue its own interests in the area under the banner of international cooperation, humanitarian relief, disaster relief, and counter piracy operations since 1992. It is often argued that much of Japan’s security legislation has been influenced by the international security environment, and by a strong perceived necessity of providing the US with further logistic support and by “showing the flag.” This can be seen especially in the legislation regarding counterterrorism and the recent reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution. This chapter asks the following questions: In what context has Japan’s peace-­ building policy been decentering from the US after the Cold War? What came out of Japan’s peace-­building policy after 25 years of SDF dispatches for the so called “International Peace Activities” (Kokusai Heiwa Katsudō)? Finally, what could be the future trajectory of Japan’s peace-building policy, with the newly added mission of Kaketsuke Keigo? This chapter tries to answer these questions in two parts:

190  Yukiko Takezawa The first part provides an overview of the policies and cases of Japan’s peace building policy after 1992, and the latter part tries to explore Japan’s cooperation with Europe and European influences on Japan’s policy, which have not been especially large to date but are clearly increasing. The distinct contribution of this paper in view of the previous literature is to point out some crucial European influences and cases of cooperation related to Japan’s security policy and peace-­ building policy as one of the aspects of decentering from the US. Development of Japan’s peace-­building policy towards international peace cooperation activities Policies and legislation regarding International Peace Cooperation Activities after 1992. The 1992 overseas dispatch of Japan’s SDF to the UN PKO in Cambodia, as its first participation in UN PKO, was outside of the Japan-­US alliance framework, can be seen as one of the major cases of “decentering” from the United States. When the change of the international security environment after the end of the Cold War challenged US allies to establish a new international security order, Japan was not an exception, especially in the security order of East Asia.5 Japan was seeking enhanced diplomatic status in the UN Security Council by becoming a permanent member through UN Security Council reform6 (Yamamoto, 2012, pp. 112–114; Murakami, 2003, pp. 141–165). To achieve this goal Japan considered it essential to meet UN requests to dispatch Japanese personnel to UN PKO missions. It was not until after the diplomatic “trauma”7 of the Gulf War in 1990 that Japan finally made the decision to send the SDF abroad. The political argument began in 1992 led by scholars and economists, who then organized the Bōei Mondai Kondankai (Advisory Group of Defense Issues) in August 1993, and produced the Higuchi Report issued in 1994, made policy recommendations for revising Japan’s National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The report emphasized the necessity of Japan expanding its international cooperation to respond to the new post-­Cold War environment in the economic and security spheres and recommended that Japan send the SDF overseas outside the framework of the US-­Japan Alliance. It is said that the Higuchi Report shocked the US at the time for giving the impression that Japan was decentering away from the US-­Japan Alliance and toward multilateral security frameworks (Sugita, 2015, p. 17). The Higuchi Report also addressed Japan’s active use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as an important strategy. Regarding the distribution of aid, the core guidelines on ODA addressed the four principles regarding the environment and development in 1992 (MoFA, 2004 Kyu ODA Taikō [The Old ODA Guideline]). The International Cooperation Law (the PKO Law), passed in 1992, enabled the SDF to join the UN PKO missions overseas for the first time (Shinoda, 2007, pp. 50–62). There are three types of peace-­building laws regarding the types of missions; the PKO Law (“the International Cooperation Law”), with missions are classified into (1) UN peacekeeping operations, (2) international humanitarian relief operations, and (3) international election observation operations.8 The law

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 191 contained strict conditions called the “PKO Five Principles”9 (MoFA, 1997a), with strict rules for avoiding the “use of force” as forbidden by Article 9 of the Constitution, considering both the concerns from neighboring Asian countries about Japan becoming remilitarized by sending its troops overseas and the concern of Japanese public opinion about its nation becoming a “normal nation” (Futsū no Kuni) along with the risks of losing the lives of SDF personnel by sending them overseas. Japan’s first mission was in Cambodia (UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia)10 in 1992 (Watanabe, 2007, pp. 152–166; Murakami, 2003, pp. 130–151), started with the necessity of post-­conflict peace-building in Cambodia. The dispatch was evaluated as successful, and, as the first case of the SDF’s participation in comprehensive peace building, achieved high standards regarding personnel and operations (Er, 2009, pp. 27–40). However, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) for SDF personnel were very restrictive and their participation in so-­called Peacekeeping Force (PKF)11 missions that might involve the use of force was not included in the PKO Law (Nagata, 2001, pp. 68–85), and the first SDF mission started with the constraint that the SDF personnel could not follow the UN Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs). The SDF Cambodia dispatch was followed by the UN PKO mission in Mozambique (NUMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique in October 1992), and in El Salvador (ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador in 1994). In the same year, the first Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) dispatch for International Humanitarian Relief Operation was sent to Zaire (Congo) to work in Rwanda. The mission was conducted in response to a request from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was not within the framework of UN PKO (MoFA, 2014a). In 1996, as one of Japan’s longest contributions, the SDF was sent to the UN PKO mission in the Golan Heights (UNDOF).12 The main mission of the SDF unit there was to provide logistic support to the infantry observers, mainly by maintaining and repairing roads. Many missions focused on reconstruction and development such as building infrastructure or conducting airlifts, and the use of weapons was strictly limited to self-­defense. The Revision of the PKO Laws and the SDF Laws In the late 1990s, Japan faced several regional threats such as the North Korean missile threat and the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan Straits Crises in 1995–96 and China’s perceived threat and will to dominate in the Asia-­Pacific region spurred Japan to tighten its alliance relationship with the US by increasing their cooperation. The “National Defense Program Guidelines” of 1995 (MoFA, 1995), the so-called Bōei Taikō, recommended Japan strengthen alliance cooperation with the US (MoFA, 1996), rather than emphasizing multilateral security cooperation. The NDPG called for allowing the SDF to provide more logistic support to US bases in Japan and even surrounding areas, and was endorsed (through the revised US-­Japan Defense Guidelines) in 1997 (MoFA, 1997b).

192  Yukiko Takezawa Regarding the peace-­building policy, the Bōei Taikō mentioned that Japan would actively join various multilateral cooperation efforts under the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of contributing to international security. The growing experiences of the dispatches and the security environment surrounding Japan in the late 1990s made Japan loosen the SDF’s ROEs, which led to significant revisions of the PKO Law and the SDF Law in 1998 and in 2001. The first revisions in 1998 were about the newly added mission for International Electoral Observation Missions, sending of supplies to international organizations such as the UNHCR, and about SDF personnel’s use of weapons under orders from commanding officers13 (Yamamoto, 2012, pp. 119–120). In 2001, another major revision of the PKO Law was made. After intense arguments regarding the ending of the freezing of PKF missions (Shoji, ud., and Midford, 2011, pp. 68–81), the revisions included changes (Article 95 of the SDF Law) to enable actions from the minimum and passive use of weapons to the use of weapons for warning shots, and removal of the ban on the use of weapons to protect materials, such as ammunition, to protect the life of personnel under SDF control or protection (Yamamoto, 2012, p. 120). As one of the crucial cases, the biggest contribution after Cambodia, was the mission to East Timor that began in 1999. The dispatch started by sending three civilian police officers in 1999 (to UNTAET: United Nations Mission in East Timor), followed by the dispatch of a 680 Engineering Unit and ten Staff Officers in 2002 (to UNMISET: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor). In addition, 113 troops in Airlifting Unit were sent to Humanitarian Relief Operations for East Timorese Displaced Persons during the period. At least more than 2,200 personnel (Engineering Unit) with several Staff Officers were sent to the missions from 2002 to 2004. Also, four Civilian Police were sent to UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-­Leste) from September 2010 to September 2012. Military Observers were sent for the purpose of supporting local civilians, (MoFA, 2015b). Japan’s peace-­building policy towards East Timor consisted of a complex mixture of Japan’s previous policies towards the country and the related areas. This case included the first dispatch of Military Liaison Officers (Tanaka (Sakabe), 2012, p. 154). The dispatch was accompanied by financial support to East Timor (a $611 million Grant) and $400 million to the UN, as part of Japan’s ODA. The case is evaluated as one of the important turning points of Japan’s new direction of peace-­building policy in the way that the support and aid to East Timor in this mission consisted of reconstruction and development aid along with peace-­building, so called “Civil Military Affairs” including refugee aid, election monitoring, engineering unit, cooperation to support Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Such aid was envisioned by the government as “face-­to-­face” support (support in which Japanese faces could be seen by the local people in East Timor). For example, according to the first female liaison officer who was dispatched to UNMIT, she walked every day to the villages and heard from their leaders about what the villagers lacked to live comfortably (Interview with a female Lieutenant Colonel). Also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 193 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) opened several field offices in order to coordinate the mission both at the operational and strategical level, to coordinate with the SDF engineering unit (Tanaka (Sakabe), 2012, pp. 152–155). The mission in the end was evaluated as “most successful” according to Jose Ramos Horta, the Foreign Minister of East Timor at the time who later became the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (MoFA, 2003). The mission seemed to have made a crucial step toward a more comprehensive approach, although this cooperation system and its structure had not been developed either to a completed or sustainable level yet. 9/11 Attack and the development of international peace cooperation activities After 9/11, the War against Terrorism was launched and the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō moved to strengthen ties with the US Bush Administration to fight against terrorism. To prove this, the Koizumi Administration quickly passed laws to send the SDF to the Indian Ocean, and two years later to Iraq. (Hughes, 2004, pp. 427–455; Ito, 2007, pp. 75–96; Shinoda, 2007, pp. 86–98). The Anti-­Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed in November 2001, and the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law was passed in 2003 (Shinoda, 2007, pp.  86–132). The policies resulted in tightening the Japan-US relationship, resulting in the first SDF dispatch to Iraq, potentially to areas were combat was still ongoing. This was followed by a revision of the National Defense Policy Guidelines (Bōei Taikō) in 2004, which put more weight on ties with the US. At the same time, however, the Guidelines clearly positioned peace-building as an important policy in the rubric of “peace cooperation together with diplomacy,” which led to the elevation of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and the reform of the SDF to enable more multi-­layered responses, in part through creating the Central Readiness Force (CRF), education and training. During this period, there were debates over Japan’s way to cooperate with international peace efforts. The “International Peace Cooperation Panel Report” under the Koizumi Administration (Kokusai Heiwa Kyōryoku Kondankai) in 2002 mentioned that “Japan’s PKO is still bound by the traditional PKO” (Sado, 2008, p. 13), and stressed the necessity of Japan developing its own original approach to PKO and international peace cooperation. The report largely addressed the importance of international cooperation (kokusai kyōryoku). In 2003, the ODA Taikō clearly insisted that Japan’s “peace-building policy” be accompanied by international peace activities and international assistance cooperation “together with diplomacy,” consistent with the concept of “international public goods” (kokusai koukyō zai). The basic principle of the revised ODA Taikō was that of human security, requiring Japan to commit and deal comprehensively with the wide range of causes of conflicts in developing countries (MoFA, 2001). The document also proposed connecting Japan’s ODA policy, and its promotion of development overseas, with Japan’s security policy.

194  Yukiko Takezawa In 2004, the Araki Report mentioned the importance of Japan’s international peace activities as they are directly connected to Japan’s security. Regarding the peace-­building policy, the document was regarded as one of the turning points, because it requested the upgrading of “international cooperation and mission” to the level of a “primary mission” (Honrai Ninmu, or honmuka,「本務化」from that of “subordinate mission” (Akiyama, 2008, pp. 67–96). The report addressed the importance of active participation in coordination with Japan’s diplomacy, together with the active utilization of ODA as envisioned in Japan’s foreign policy strategy as “targeted ODA.” In the same year, the National Defense Program Guidelines (FY 2005 -­the Bōei Taikō) emphasized strong ties with the US, claiming that Japan would put weight on the importance of the US role in international peace and security as the only superpower, and cooperative relations, emphasizing that the close ties between the US and Japan based on the US-­Japan Alliance would strengthen the peace and stability of Asia (Kantei, 2004). The report also emphasized the necessity of the international cooperation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, explaining that Japan should be positively involved in international peace activities “with which international society cooperates” in order to improve the international security environment. The document was interpreted as an important turning point in Japan’s foreign and security policy focusing both on “Territorial Defense” and “Peace Cooperation” by mentioning the importance of preparing for new threats, actual phases of attack, and activities to improve the international security environment. Overall, the Araki Report stressed the importance of peace cooperation together with diplomacy. Under the laws the Koizumi administration enacted to support the US War on Terrorism, the MSDF was dispatched to the Indian Ocean to refuel the vessels participating in counter-­terrorism operations in Afghanistan, and the GSDF was dispatched to Iraq to engage in a humanitarian relief and reconstruction mission. With the “targeted ODA” policies and under the Special Measures Law, GSDF personnel were deployed to Iraq during 2003–2005, along with an ongoing deployment of 200 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) staff to Kuwait14 (MoFA, 2015b). The dispatch was linked with Japan’s ODA projects, reflecting the advice of the “International Peace Cooperation Panel Report” in 2002 to Prime Minister Koizumi. The dispatch was said to be the first case in which the SDF and the MoFA staff worked as a team and cooperated in mutual support. The targeted ODA policy was also conducted in the case of Sri Lanka mission in 2000, which was driven by Japan’s desire to play an active political role combined with an interest in obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Er, 2009, pp. 91–92). This was also seen in the measures the Koizumi Administration adopted toward Mindanao, which gave a “Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao” worth US $400 million to the Philippines from 2002 to 2006 (Er, 2009, pp. 73–87), including funding of training courses for the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) officials. These strong policies in Asia were based on the desire to promote political initiatives towards Southeast Asia, ASEAN states, and China, as part of a policy of political confidence building measures (CBMs), which are reflected in the missions of targeted SDF-­administered ODA or civilian ODA projects.

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 195 The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the New “Primary Mission” The biggest turning point in Japan’s peace-­building policy started in 2006, with the legislation for the elevation of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Following its passage, the Defense Agency (JDA) was elevated to the MoD in 2007, and Japan’s equivalent of the National Security Council (NSC) was established by the Abe Administration. Most importantly, Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Activity was elevated to a “Primary Mission” (Honmu­ka or Honrai-­Ninmu) of Japan’s foreign policy, and even in its security strategy (Ministry of Defense (MoD), 2008). The direct consequence of the elevation of peace cooperation activity to a primary mission included, in part, the establishment of the Central Reserve Force (CRF), or the Chuō Sokuō Shudan (or Butai), and the development of an education and training system. The 2010 NDPG (FY 2011 and Beyond, the Bōei Taikō) emphasized a more globalized security environment. Is also addressed the importance of continued cooperation during peacetime, and necessity of revision of “the 5 PKO Principles” document. In 2010, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) was established at the Joint Staff College under MoD (MoD, 2016b). In 2013 the first National Security Strategy (NSS) was adopted by cabinet decision, and it identified three purposes of the National Security Strategy as: (1) strengthening and extending the capabilities and roles of National Defense, (2) strengthening the US-­Japan Alliance, and (3) strengthening the cooperation in security efforts with foreign partners for the peace and stability of the international society. The document also addressed the integration of security policy with development assistance/ODA policy (Kantei, 2013). In 2010 the SDF dispatch to Haiti (MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) was the first new PKO mission for MoD and the SDF after the elevation of the Defense Agency to the MoD, and was the first dispatch as a “primary mission” (Honmu or Honrai-­Ninmu). The mission started with the dispatch of the 200 CRF personnel, who could be activated within two weeks after a request from the UN15 (Urakami, 2012, p. 197). This case is considered the first one featuring coordinated efforts between Japan’s PKO and NGOs in the mission of disaster relief. The coordinated mission was called a “program project” involving the Japanese embassy, grass-­roots grant aid, and UN PKO16 (Urakami, pp. 200–206). The case showed the possibilities of Japan’s new approach of creating a coordinated peace-­building system. Also, about this time, there were an increasing number of JSDF dispatches for HaDR missions in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and New Zealand (MoD, 2011), and in 2009, the first counter-­ piracy mission to the Gulf of Aden (see chapter 9 in this volume). The new policies and legislation for “Proactive Contribution to Peace” In July 2014, Prime Minister Abe outlined his policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.”17 The reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution regarding Collective Self-­Defense (CSD) made it possible for Japan not only to possess

196  Yukiko Takezawa CSD, as it always has as a sovereign state, but also to constitutionally and legally exercise that right, thanks to a cabinet decision in July 2014 reinterpreting the constitution, and subsequent enabling legislation. Consequently the reinterpretation and the new security legislation allow the SDF to provide logistical support to foreign militaries in combat areas, removes geographical constraints on SDF operations, and allows the SDF to render rear-­gear support not only to US forces but also to other foreign military units18 (Kantei, 2015). In September 2015, the Abe Administration pushed through the Diet legislation called the “Peace and Security Laws;” and the so-­called “Security Related Legislation” (Anzenhoshō Kanren Hōan). Some types of SDF overseas dispatch that had previously required special laws, like the Anti-­Terrorism Special Measures Act of 2001, were now covered by new permanent laws so that subsequent dispatches would not require the enactment of new special laws.19 These laws provide the legal framework for Japan to exercise CSD and use of weapons when a crisis situation (Sonritsu Kiki Jitai) erupts during an overseas deployment. Japan can exercise CSD rights when an armed attack against a foreign country poses a threat to Japan’s survival (Kantei, 2015). Specifically, it allows “measures for self-­defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan” (Kantei, 2014). One of the major differences in these laws concern the peace-­building policy and the revision of the PKO Principles to accommodate the so-­called “International Solidarity Peace Security Activities” (Kokusai Heiwa Sien Katsudō). With the newly established International Peace Assistance Law and the revised PKO laws, SDF personnel can engage in a mission called Kaketsuke-­Keigo, which means the use of weapons for coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack. This gives the SDF greater scope to save and protect Japanese citizens and other countries’ military personnel working with the SDF in PKO through the “use of force” (Kantei, 2014). The legislation also included the revision of the PKO laws and the Five PKO Principles under which the SDF can possibly engage in International Peace and Security activities with a mandate from UN General Headquarters, the UN Security Council, or the UN Economic and Social Council, and activities which are requested by international or regional organizations such as even the European Union (Kantei, 2015). Regarding ODA, a cabinet decision adopted the Development Cooperation Charter (Kaihatsu Kyōryoku Taikō) in 201520 (MoFA, 2015a), to match the 2013 Defense Guidelines along with the “proactive contribution to peace.” The latest SDF dispatch to a UN PKO, namely the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan) started in 2012 as a result of a decision by the Noda cabinet. Staff officers and more than 2,500 troops (Engineering Unit) have been sent. The mission seemed to demonstrate a shift towards a new type of SDF dispatch. Including this mission, by the beginning of 2017 the total number of SDF personnel dispatched to UN peacekeeping since such dispatches began in 1992 reached over 10,000. The mission was also planned as an “All Japan” project involving the collaboration of the

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 197 SDF, MoFA, and JICA with the ODA project, and this approach was said to be the most accomplished comprehensive peace-­building activity in Japan’s history. The main mission of the GSDF in South Sudan was the repair and maintenance of infrastructure in the capital, Juba, and providing transportation and replenishment of materials. In addition, SDF troops could visit related facilities located in surrounding countries such as Uganda and Kenya (Inoue, 2012, pp. 286–287). This mission was also integrated with Japan’s new ODA approach. and even with anti-­piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (Taylor, 2015, pp. 227–281). With the new security legislation, the new mission called Kaketsuke-­Keigo was implemented for the first time in South Sudan from December 2016. This enabled SDF personnel to defend remote personnel (draft for the revision of the Article 24 of PKO Law “Use of Weapons”), including other PKO personnel, UN staff, NGO staff, and members of the media (MoFA, 2016). The mission with revised ROEs was ordered on 15 November 2016 with the dispatch of the troops of the 10th SDF unit deployed to South Sudan (Japan Times, 15 November 2016). Arguments and questions over whether the SDF had been dispatched to a PKO in a place that was in state of (civil) war (“sentō-­chiiki”) or not were not resolved, but the Abe Administration denied the situation could be regarded as a civil war and the training of SDF troops for this new mission continued (Japan Times, 18 November 2016). After the revival of the South Sudanese turmoil in July 2016, MoFA and JICA employees were evacuated. In March 2017, the Japanese government decided to withdraw the SDF unit from South Sudan, explaining that the situation in the country was harsh, and admitting that no cease fire was in effect (Japan Times, 10 March, 2017). Only four SDF staff officers would remain in South Sudan until May 2019 at UNMISS headquarters (MoFA, 2018). This, and the ending of two other missions during the Abe administration created a state that can be called “PKO Zero,” with no-­ongoing SDF unit level participation in any peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief operations for the first time in a quarter of a century (Midford, 2019, pp. 44–45).21 After the Cold War, while Japan tried to readjust the US alliance within the international security environment with the motivations which consisted of both internal and external factors, and interests, Japan’s peace-­building policy became a crucial means and goal of the Japan’s foreign and security policy. The policy of “Active Contribution to Peace” was intended to accelerate the revision of the Constitution and movement “Toward a More Robust Alliance” (Przystup, 2015), along with continued annual 2 + 2 meetings, the new US-­Japan Guidelines of 2015, and the FY 2014 NDPG (Bōei Taikō) show the stronger ties with, and support for, the US. In terms of military normalization, since Kaketsuke-­Keigo is possible, as Taylor and Walsh warn, it could also set a precedence to justify the exercise of collective defense if a US warship comes under attack (Taylor & Walsh, 2014). Japan’s long-­term interests for SDF overseas dispatches are argued to be oil interests in the Middle East and in Africa (Taylor, 2015, Chapters 3–6), keeping a presence in Africa through the dispatch of the MSDF to the Gulf of Aden and the dispatch of SDF to South Sudan. These moves can also be seen as an effort by the Japanese government to gain support from African countries for

198  Yukiko Takezawa a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Yet, with the accumulation of SDF dispatches combined with targeted ODA, Japan’s peace-­building policy seems to have developed its International Peace Cooperation Activities by promoting it as a primary mission, enough to consider it as an important part of Japan’s foreign and security policy. However, there is one important aspect that most of the existing literature on Japan’s peacebuilding policy have overlooked, yet which deserves to be examined: the European factor. The next part examines some European cooperation efforts and influences on Japan’s security policy and peace building policy.

European factor? Influences and cooperation Cooperation between Japan and Europe in security policy. The relations between Japan and European countries have traditionally been focused on economic cooperation rather than on security matters. As for security cooperation, critics have claimed that EU-­Japan cooperation to date has been mostly political and symbolic, with almost no practical achievements. Since the end of WWII, the security relations between the two were relatively limited due to the geographical distance separating them and the weight each gave to their respective relations with the US. In an interview with a former Administrative Vice Minister of MoD said that he had never thought about influences of European countries on Japanese security or peace-­building policy (Interview with a former Administrative Vice Minister of Japanese MoD, April 2017). As Gilson points out, the EU does not have the same political relevance for the Japanese policy-­making community that Washington, Beijing, or Pyongyang has, and this is due to the absence of contentious issues in relations between Japan and Europe, and to the fact that these relations have not involved substantive security-­related discussions22 (Gilson, 2000, pp. 53–54). Whether Japan-­European relations could strengthen the US-­Japan Alliance through the “hub-and-spokes” structure is debatable because relations can also be affected by trans-­Atlantic relations. As we see from optimistic views about their relationship, Japan and Europe share relatively compatible strategic cultures and interests in contributing to global peace and stability through multilateral security cooperation. Much of the literature mentions that Japan and the EU share common values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and the positive views that they have of each other create the potential that they could become “normative partners” (Hosoya, 2012, pp. 317–337). Some Europhile former Japanese diplomats emphasize the advantages of Europe as a partner, as it has “relatively stable values based on traditions and a long history,” so Japan could rely on Europe as a stable partner. By contrast, the US relatively often changes its policies along with leadership changes (Interviews with retired high-­ranking diplomats, December  2016 and March 2017). As Midford suggests, Japan and the EU “have come to play a larger security role in areas far from their shores,” and identified two areas of mutual interests and compatible capabilities that could potentially lead to military-­to-­ military (mil-­mil) centered cooperation: counter-­piracy and post-­conflict reconstruction and development assistance (Midford, 2012, pp. 289–316).

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 199 When we look at the evidence carefully, we find accumulating experiences of coordination and cooperation, which is creating more cases of cooperation and exchange in the area of peace-­building policy. Even with comparatively little or only very general cooperation in security, Japan has nonetheless made some notable contributions to OSCE-­led peace building efforts, since Japan has been an active partner of this organization. According to Gilson, the OSCE is regarded “as an important forum for promoting ‘soft power’ credentials, and Japan recognizes its value as a channel for confidence-­building measures (CBMs), which are designed to encourage dialogue and to facilitate preventive diplomacy”23 (OSCE, 2014; Gilson, 2000, pp. 108, 125). In the area of ODA, during the 1990s, for example, several meetings took place in Brussels and Tokyo with the directors of the development aid and assistance divisions from both sides, and cooperation was facilitated for certain ODA projects24 (OSCE, 2014; Gilson, 2000, pp. 108, 125). In 2014 Tokyo sponsored the OSCE-­Japan Conference, and Japan was among the top contributors to the OSCE’s Extra-­budgetary projects in 2009–2014, and its contribution was approximately €4.3 million (OSCE, 2014). Regarding the relationship with NATO, the annual NATO-­Japan Security Conferences began in 1990 and have involved sharing information and experiences on “the respective relationship with Russia, concerns over arms proliferation, and the need to strengthen and the role of the United Nations.” The dialogue on common security interests has become more regular and structured, and more practical cooperation occurs in a wide range of areas, including peace support and crisis management (NATO, 2018b). In 2003, responding to the split of between the US and Europe towards the Iraq war, a unique multilateral approach was taken by the Koizumi administration by playing a mediating role and attempting “bridge-­building.” This approach contributed to keeping the French and Germans engaged through joint efforts on ODA projects (Yasutomo, 2014, p. 82), and continued to the 2012 Tokyo Afghanistan Conference focused on the necessity of supporting the civilian phase of nation-­ building. Moreover, in April 2013, during the official visit of NATO’s Secretary General to Japan, Japan and NATO signed a joint political declaration, and Japan established a delegation to NATO in Brussels in 2018 (NATO, 2018a). Japan has already provided large financial support for the NATO-­led Inter­ national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and for reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan, including the 2012 Tokyo Conference. In total, Tokyo pledged US $5 million during the period of 2009 to 2013 (NATO, 2018b; Yasutomo, 2014, p. 63). This support is much appreciated by NATO members and inside NATO Headquarters, according to an interview (Interview with a female SDF Lieutenant Colonel, 2016). With regard to NATO, Japan has dispatched the first female SDF personnel to the NATO Headquarters. The dispatch was the part of Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) between Japan and NATO, signed by Prime Minister Abe. The program is designed to promote Japan-­NATO Cooperation in the area of women, peace, and security (MoFA, 2014c), an area where NATO recently has been actively engaged. The cooperation has expanded to include the issues of maritime security, cyber defense, nuclear

200  Yukiko Takezawa non-­proliferation, and gender mainstreaming in peace missions, an expansion linked to the establishment of Japan’s NATO mission in 2018 (NATO, May 2018). The Japan-­ Europe relationship seems to have deepened after 2014, when Prime Minister Abe addressed “diplomacy that adopts a panoramic global view” (Chikyūgi wo fukan suru Gaikō, MoFA, 2014b). During Abe’s visit to major EU countries in May–June 2015, Japan and the EU agreed to start negotiations on a “Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)”, which came into force in 2019, although not all EU countries agreed that the relationship had reached a level where an SPA was justified (MoFA, 2019a). However, there were several visits by ministers of European states, and notably joint agreements concluded with France (MoFA, 2019b) and Britain (UK Government, 2014). In addition, one of the outstanding achievements was the Memorandum on Defense Exchange concluded in late 2013 between the Japanese and Swedish Ministries of Defense (Embassy of Japan in Sweden, 2013). Regarding security cooperation between Japan and the EU itself, and with member states, as the literature recognizes, both Japan and the EU have become aware of the growing importance of this security cooperation among them, and this perception stems from the shifting balance of world power driven by the rise of Asian nations, especially China, the growing interdependence between the two regions, and overlapping interests and concerns regarding Russia and counter-­ terrorism. Especially after the EU-­Japan SPA came into effect in April 2019, there are clear incentives for both sides to cooperate. Also, finally the Japanese government realizes the importance of cooperation with non-­US actors such as European countries and the EU as well as with Asian countries. Tokyo is trying to enhance more practical multilateral security cooperation given the instability of the international security environment (KAS & EJARN, 2019).

Cooperation on a practical level: SDF dispatch and mil-­mil exchanges As for practical cooperation, since the first SDF dispatch overseas in 1992, there have been several interactions and exchanges between SDF and European military personnel. First, in 1992, 35 SDF officers were sent to the Swedish Armed Forces International Center (SWEDINT) for education and training related to the Cambodia PKO deployment, and two personnel were sent before the mission in the Golan Heights (Sangiin, 2008). Since then, several higher officers have been sent to Nordic Training Centers of NORDEFCO (Nordic Defense Cooperation), such as SWEDINT and Finish Defense Forces International Center (FINCENT), which are well-­known for providing a high-­level education and training regarding international peace cooperation activities. Almost every year, some SDF officers join the lectures at these institutions regarding the training for the PKO missions and education of the personnel back home (MoD, ud/2019). According to the interviews of a Colonel and a Lieutenant Colonel who were sent to the Japanese embassy and an international organization in European and Nordic countries, they had a chance to join the courses in SWEDINT and FINCENT regarding the education, training of military dispatch, gender perspectives in the

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 201 military, and civil military cooperation (Interview with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, September 2016). According to the interview, the establishment of Japan’s Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) was modeled on these Nordic educational institutions, as well as other educational institutions in Canada, Australia, and Germany (Uesugi, pp. 41–66), and the head of the JPC visited SWEDINT. The Swedish model is suitable as it is regarded as relatively neutral and it is certified by the UN. If the JPC could get a UN certificate recognizing it as an effective training institution, it would be a great benefit for the SDF (Interview with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to Nordic countries, February 2017). As seen in the results of the Memorandum with Sweden and the dispatches of SDF officers to these educational institutions, Japan’s SDF seems to be rapidly climbing the “learning curve” by importing more European and even Nordic approaches, as well as those from Australia and Canada, for training and education for peace-building including military capacity building. There have been several opportunities for SDF personnel to learn from European approaches during PKO missions, for example, in the Golan Heights mission (UNDOF) and in the International Humanitarian Relief Mission in Iraq. During the mission in Iraq, Japan’s SDF personnel worked closely with the Dutch CIMIC (Civil-­Military Cooperation) operation personnel and learned some methods of civil military cooperation or CIMIC regarding the way to coordinate activities with the Muthanna Governorate (provincial government) in Iraq (Sato, 2007, pp. 320–321). Opportunities for practical cooperation between Japan and Europe in international peace activities have been increasing, especially since 2014. One major example is the counter-­piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, where the MSDF held joint exercises with EU NAVFOR naval units (EUNAVFOR, EEAS, 2016). According to an interview, the SDF base in Djibouti is very central to potential multilateral security cooperation, as it is for ongoing cooperation with the Combined Task Force CTF 151 (MoD, 2017a and an interview with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, September 2016). As for mil-­mil cooperation, exchanges including joint exercises between Japan and European countries are also increasing. According to a former military officer who had been dispatched to the Nordic countries, several military exchanges have been conducted between the Japanese SDF and the European or Nordic milita­ ries. For example, the first overseas training cruise visit to Europe was held in Finland in 2013, which included official visits and invitations of high officials, and the SDF band joining a European military band concert for the first time in Europe. According to the officers, it is definitely important to have stronger ties with Europe to learn their strategic culture and the ways or methods of dispatching troops overseas (Interviews with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, September 2016, and with a female JSDF Lieutenant Colonel, December 2016). More recently, based on the agreement at the Japan-­UK Ministerial Meeting in 2016, a joint exercise was held between the ASDF and the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) in November, which included RAF fighter aircraft visiting the Misawa Air Base in Tohoku, where they engaged in air-­to air training. The possibility of concluding a visiting forces agreement (VFA) emerged as another

202  Yukiko Takezawa result (Japan News, 2017). Through these mil-­mil exchanges and cooperation, the dispatched officers learned about the cultures of European militaries. They have also learned the European and Nordic points of views on ongoing security issues, on which leadership has mostly been taken by the United States up to now. Future Trajectory: What Japan’s peace-­building policy can learn from Europe and the experiences of cooperation According to interviews of the SDF personnel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, there are several findings that could apply to the future or ongoing peace-­building missions. First, while European and Nordic states send to PKO or other military or non-­military missions relatively small numbers of personnel, they have become high-­profile dispatches that generate a wide-­range of experiences because they have included a wide range of personnel, from high level commanders to infantry soldiers. As such, more SDF personnel should be sent to education and training courses or programs at European and Nordic training centers such as SWEDINT and FINCENT. This is because, according to SDF officers interviewed by the author, to engage in missions involving Kaketsuke-­Keigo it is important to learn about the “international standard” regarding the use of force, although it is still possible for countries to set their own ROEs. (Interviews with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, September 2016, and a female JSDF Lieutenant Colonel, December 2016.) Therefore, it is important for the SDF to learn to adapt to more complex missions from European and Nordic experiences, from non-­military focused humanitarian reconstruction support to training for dealing with and diffusing improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle borne IEDs (VBIED) (Uesugi, 2008, pp. 56–57), and such subjects of learning should be reflected in the SDF and the JPC. In addition, one type of essential equipment that Japan’s GSDF has not possessed is the armored ambulance (Sōkō Kyūkyūsha), and this should be procured (Interview with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, September 2016) for treating injured personnel in a combat zone (Interview with a male JSDF Colonel dispatched to European and Nordic countries, September 2016). Moreover, even setting aside the restrictive ROEs under which SDF personnel have had to operate, there are other challenges that have to be addressed within Japan or in Japan’s peacebuilding (international peace cooperation activities) policies in order to reach to European levels and approaches. First, education and training for every level of SDF personnel to work effectively in missions abroad is still inadequate. Inadequacies include education for gaining proficiency in English or other languages, more general communication skills, and knowledge of universal values beyond those based on Western perspectives or norms, but also values of various regions and host countries. Regarding European values, the level of awareness toward human rights issues among SDF personnel needs to be developed further, along with deeper understanding towards the issues of Asian countries. Most notably, from a gender perspective, Japan and its SDF lag significantly behind the European standard, which regards the gender as a “mainstream” issue and welcomes more women into the military, including

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 203 up to universal conscription as is now happening in Nordic countries. The SDF should learn from NATO regarding the issue of gender in the military, and in terms of security to enhance operational effectiveness in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which calls for enhancing “equal participation of women at all levels ranging from conflict prevention to post-­conflict reconstruction, peace and security” (United Nations, 2000). The SDF should make more efforts to recruit more female personnel25 (Ministry of Defense, 2019) to strengthen its capabilities by achieving a better gender balance, one sufficient to meet the standards of NATO (NATO, 2019), other European and Nordic countries, as well as the new standards emerging in the US military. As sexual violence in conflict areas is reported as especially serious, trained female SDF personnel can be welcomed to play important roles where “Japanese female SDF personnel can contribute” more than their male counter-­parts (Interview with a female JSDF Lieutenant Colonel, December 2016) to peace-building missions for example in Asian countries. As mentioned previously, despite being far from the level of European nations, Japan could learn to create or develop its own “comprehensive approach” and become a bridge between the regions of Europe and Asia, by handing these methods on to Asian countries through capacity building assistance (MoD, 2016a). Moreover, through establishing its own way of peace-­building with “kokoro” (heart) (Interview with a female JSDF Lieutenant Colonel, December, 2016), meaning the characteristics of Japanese values such as hospitality, caring for others, and being a peace-­loving nation, Japan could be an example among Asian countries as it is often mentioned that the SDF’s participation PKO and other international peacebuilding and HaDR operations has received positive evaluations from host countries, and especially from host communities. As an important point realized by several personnel is that Japan’s SDF can demonstrate these characteristics. With such an approach and with the European method of dispatch, Japan can offer its own way of peace building with high quality, both materially and in terms of ideals.

Conclusions This chapter analyzed aspects of Japan’s peace-­building policy that involve decentering from the US in that Japan dispatched the SDF independently of US influence and accumulated experiences from dispatch in its peace-­building and international peace cooperation activities. These in turn have become important points in its diplomatic and security strategy, including with non-­US partners. It is still hard to interpret the real intentions of the Abe Administration’s concept of “proactive contribution to peace,” whether it is to support the US more smoothly or whether it is aimed at strengthening Japan’s diplomatic independence (Jishu Gaikō). Nonetheless, when we focus on Japan’s peace-­ building policy itself, it is decentering from, rather than recentering toward, the US in three ways. First, the initial SDF dispatch to PKO in 1992, the promotion of peace-­building (International Peace Activities) as a “primary mission” of the SDF in 2007, and the expansion of SDF missions have all been signs that Japan is seeking to make

204  Yukiko Takezawa its own contribution to international security outside the framework of the US-­ Japan Alliance. Japan’s peace-­building policy is decentering in that Japan is trying to make direct contributions to international peace cooperation, emphasizing the importance of “Peace Cooperation” and “International Peace,” and by changing the interpretation of the constitution and expanding the SDF’s ROEs to a new level, in parallel with the Abe Administration’s strong will to support the US. As seen in the 2015 security legislation, the types of missions and the cases of dispatch, Japan’s peace-­building policy has expanded its contributions and experiences even within the restrictions of the Constitution. This expansion could even be seen as reflecting preferences on the part of some Japanese hawkish politicians towards “normalization,” by which the SDF can be dispatched overseas along with or even outside the framework of the US Alliance, as seen in SDF overseas cooperation with the EU. Second, Japan’s own method of dispatch has decentered from the US since 1992. Dispatches have been decided and run by the Kantei, MoD and MOFA to send SDF along with civilian staff to International Peace Cooperation Activities. The activities were regarded as subordinated missions until 2006, but they came to be considered as primary SDF missions from 2007. Especially after that the types of missions has widened to include a broader range of HaDR missions, and missions that prioritize coordination between the SDF and civilian staff (CIMIC). These experiences have enabled Japan to achieve deployments characterized to a certain degree by a “Comprehensive Approach,” which is sometimes called the “All Japan” or “3D Approach” as it combines Diplomacy, Development, and Defense. From these perspectives, Japan’s peace-­building policy is seeking its own way and decentering from the US through SDF overseas deployments that generally do not involve the US. It can be called as decentering, or at least not recentering in that Kaketsuke-­Keigo still limits the SDF from being deployed to areas of armed conflict for “fear of entrapment” by the US, and due to constitutional or domestic constraints emphasizing the policy of “defensive defense” (senshu bōei) (Sangiin, 2015). The SDF’s PKO missions starting from Cambodia, and including deployments to the Golan Heights, East Timor, Iraq, and South Sudan, can all be seen as part of the exploration and path to Japan’s original way of contributing to peace-­ building, even though questions persist about Japan lacking full commitment compared to “normal” countries. Japan’s peace-­building policy took 25 years to reach these levels, and it may finally be called a “strategic” peace-­building policy through the form of International Peace Activities. Yet, conversely, as Japan ended unit level SDF dispatches to PKOs in 2017, and thereby reached a so-­called state of “PKO Zero,” it seems that the Japanese government is wondering where to restart SDF dispatches (not to mention the separate dilemma of whether to pursue its interest in playing the role of peace mediator with Iran, or instead comply with US demands to join a US naval coalition aimed at Iran).26 Third, Japan is decentering from the US in the way that its security cooperation with European nations and organizations, both at the political and practical levels, has increased. The development of both bilateral cooperation with European

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 205 countries, especially with Britain, France, and Sweden, and multilateral cooperation with NATO and the EU in training, education, and mil-­mil cooperation since 1992, eventually raised the Japan-­Europe relationship to the “partnership” level. It is clear that Japan’s peace-­building policy is decentering from the US in the way that Japan is looking at other partners in security strategy in addition to the US. Along with the method of dispatch, Japan’s approach to peace-­building has become closer to the European approach than the US approach, which is often more military-­centered and relatively lacking in emphasis and experience on civil-­military cooperation, There are some important cases of practical cooperation between Japan and the US in disaster relief, but there are more opportunities to cooperate with non-­US countries in peace-­building policy. Through, or along with, Kaketsuke Keigo, Japan could develop its own deployment approach by utilizing the Japanese way of “comprehensive” peace-­building or international peace cooperation activities based in part on learning from European methods, including the focus on non-­military aspects, such as HaDR, coordination with civilian organizations (CIMIC) and with ODA. Although Kaketsuke Keigo is still controversial in Japanese politics, public opinion, and the media, it is one of the inevitable missions SDF personnel should undertake in order to cooperate with other military personnel on an equal basis to implement peace-­building operations through a comprehensive approach. There have been some critics who claim that such a mission should have been added earlier because the prior restrictions were too strict, and the contributions by the SDF meant nothing since they were protected by the soldiers from other countries. In this sense, Kaketsuke Keigo by the SDF is taken by the European side as a positive step that reduces the burden on personnel from other countries, making SDF units more trusted as a credible PKO partner. However, since May 2017, Japan seems to have been practicing “passive pacifism” rather than “proactive pacifism” (Midford, 2019, p. 42). “PKO Zero” and the Abe administration’s apparent lack of interest in “proactively participating” in UN peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding certainly impacts these methods of dispatch and could undermine opportunities for more practical EU-­Japan military cooperation. The changing security environment, both globally and more narrowly in Japan’s East Asian region, could move Japan’s peace-building policy in a new direction with possibilities for more cooperation with countries other than the US in SDF dispatch. The possibilities for greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation with European nations in Japan’s peace-­building policy could enable Japan to reduce both its existing “alliance dilemma” with the US and domestic arguments over SDF overseas dispatch. Such cooperation is compatible and may even ease the existing security concerns and dilemmas on both sides. Multilateral security cooperation at the political and practical levels is an essential diplomatic card, and peace-­building policy involving SDF overseas dispatches still possesses great untapped potential to accelerate and deepen security ties between Japan and Europe. Consistent and sustainable cooperation with European nations is one trajectory that Japan’s peace-­building policy should follow.

206  Yukiko Takezawa

Notes 1 According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Japan’s peace-­ building policy consists of international peace cooperation, including peacekeeping operations and Official Development Assistance (ODA). This chapter mostly focuses on SDF dispatches to PKO missions and other peacebuilding missions mentioned in the MoFA homepage, as well as missions based on the international emergency aid law and the various special measures laws mentioned in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) homepage (Ministry of Defense (MoD). (ud). About International Peace Cooperation Activities, and MoD. (ud). Kokusai heiwa kyōryoku katsudō tō tōwa [About International Peace Cooperation Operations].). This chapter also describes how the combination of these activities has developed into the International Peace (Cooperation) Activities. 2 For detailed definitions, see MoFA (2016) and MoD. 3 In March 2017, the government made the decision to withdraw the SDF from South Sudan in May 2017. 4 This chapter does not try to follow the changes in definitions of peacebuilding, but the definitions and arguments regarding peacebuilding are mentioned in “An Agenda for Peace” of 1992 by Boutros Ghali, “Brahimi Report” of 2000, and the recent report by Jose Ramos-­Horta in 2015 that emphasizes the importance of so called “robust PKO,” which is from the more combat-­centric peacekeeping to post-­conflict state building, or an admonition for going beyond the so called “Chapter 6 1/2 of the Charter,” mentioned by Dag Hammarskjöld. 5 Before that, Japan already had a dilemma as to whether it should or could send the SDF to UN missions abroad, with interest and preferences to enact a more independent diplomacy (Jishu Gaikō). 6 In 1958, when Japan was elected as a non-­permanent member of the UNSC for the first time, Secretary General Hammarskjöld requested an SDF personnel contribution from Japan to the mission in Lebanon (UNOGIL), but Japan refused. During this period, the Kishi Administration actively tried to mediate between Asian-­African (AA) states with and western states such as France. In the 1960s, there were some arguments and considerations to contribute Japanese SDF personnel to PKOs, for example in Congo, but these arguments were eventually rejected. In 1965, Miyazawa Kiichi (who served as prime minister from 1991 to 1993) commented about the Japanese constitution and the UN, and he argued that joining PKO would not contradict the basic principles of the Japanese Constitution. After 1966, during the Sato Administration, some plans and legislation to contribute to the UN were unveiled. These plans and legislations were criticized by the opposition parties, but they gave birth to new arguments regarding the method of dispatch. 7 Even though Japan contributed US $13 billion to the support the liberation of Kuwait, that country’s government did not include Japan in the list of countries it publicly thanked. 8 “Japan’s contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations.” Available at www. mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf. 9 The five principles are: (1) a cease-­fire must be in place, (2) the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operation, (3) the activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner, (4) participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied, and (5) use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel. 10 From September 1992 to September 1993, 16 Military Observers, 75 Civilian Police, 1,200 Troops (Engineering Unit) in total, and 41 Electoral Observers were sent to engage in the UNTAC mission. The details of the SDF’s engagement in Cambodia are found in Watanabe (2007) and Murakami (2003). The mission continued even after one civilian police personnel was killed due to an armed attack by an unknown assailant,

Japan’s non-­US centric security strategy 207 but this death shocked the Japanese government and public. It was said that this “trauma” made the Japanese government reluctant to dispatch larger numbers of ­Japanese civilian police personnel. 11 PKF is an acronym only used in Japan to denote peacekeeping operations that might involve the use of force and to distinguish these operations from PKO that do not involve the use of force, except for personal or unit self-­defense. 12 This mission continued until 2013, with a continual dispatch of several Staff Officers and a large number of transport troops for 17 years, totaling over 1,500 personnel. The SDF withdrew from this mission in 2013 due to heightened risks to personnel from the spreading Syrian civil war. 13 Article 24 of the PKO Law. 14 The total number of SDF personnel dispatched overseas numbered 10,895 GSDF personnel when the SDF joined the humanitarian and reconstruction mission in Iraq. Around 500 GSDF personnel were dispatched in successive rotations, and one Transport Vessel and one Escort Vessel were sent during February to April 2004 with 150– 170 MSDF personnel. 15 During February 2012 to February 2013, over 2,000 troops (Engineering Unit) and 12 Staff Officers were dispatched to MINUSTAH for removing rubble, leveling ground for setting up disaster camps, medical support facilities, etc., under the tasking order of JOTC (Joint Operational Tasking Centre) of MINUSTAH. 16 The project contributed to building a girls’ dormitory and warehouses, for example, with the PKO Child Protection Unit. Moreover, SDF personnel cooperated with a Japanese NGO to help remove the rubble of destroyed school buildings. The SDF succeeded in coordinating its capabilities with the NGO’s needs based on an exchange of local information. 17 “The most important duty of the Japanese government is to keep our peace and security, keep existence of the country to the end, and to protect the life of the citizens” (Kantei, 2015). 18 The mission needs to be approved by the Diet without exception. 19 The purpose of the laws mentioned are (1) to “assure Japan’s peace and security,” and (2) to “contribute to the international peace.” The bills consisted of 11 pieces of legislation, including six revisions of existing laws, and one new law, namely the International Peace Support Law.” The revised laws included both the Anti-­Terrorism Special Measures Law of 2001 and the International Emergency Aid Laws of 2003 (Buryoku Kōgeki-­Sonritsu Kiki Jitai Hō with the revised Buryoku Kōgeki Jitai Hō, and Jyuyō Eikyō Jitai Hō, which was renamed and revised from the Shuhen Jitai Hō). The legislation also revised the SDF Law, the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law). One more new law was created as well, namely the International Peace Assistance Law. 20 The major focus of the charter is on the term “development cooperation.” The charter refers to “international cooperation activities,” and the term “development” is used in a broader sense than before as it “encompasses such activities as peacebuilding and governance, promotion of basic human rights and humanitarian assistance.” 21 Since 2017 a few SDF officers have been dispatched in PKO headquarters in South Sudan, Egypt, and the UN Headquarters. See www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_ heiwa/list_pko.html [Accessed: January 2, 2020]. 22 For example, Prime Ministers Hata (in 1994) and Hashimoto (1996 to 1998) tried to promote relations with the European Commission and major European countries. Although these leaders did not last long enough to permanently raise relations to a higher level, behind the scenes politicians and top officials with European experience were able to use these initiatives to lay the groundwork for further development of the relationship between Japan and Europe in subsequent years. 23 For example, Japan has provided financial assistance to the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo to monitor and set up local elections. Also, the Japanese Diet decided to provide US

208  Yukiko Takezawa $2 million to the OSCE mission in Sarajevo in 1994 to monitor and set up elections, and to Bosnia in 1996 to fund the holding of local elections there. Japan also sent an expert to the OSCE Mission in Croatia. 24 In 1998 Japan and the EU decided to promote the New Development Strategy for the (OECD’s) DAC to promote their cooperation, creating forums on Africa for tackling poverty reduction (Gilson, 2000, pp. 108, 125). 25 The percentage of female personnel in the SDF stood at around 6.1% in 2017, and around 5.8% in 2019. 26 Responding to the US attempt to recruit coalition partners to dispatch naval units to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the Abe cabinet decided to dispatch MSDF vessels and patrol planes to the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman.

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Part IV

Reflections on Japan’s non-­American focused initiatives

12 The continued centrality of the United States to Japan’s security doctrine in an era of expanding security partnerships Andrew L. Oros Introduction The United States remains the central, irreplaceable security partner to Japan. There is no question in Washington that Japan will remain a stalwart US ally and that Japan’s dependence on the United States for security will continue far into the future. There is also no question—even after the dramatic political power transition in Washington in January 2017—that the US-­Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of US Asia strategy. The two countries are as central to each other as at any time in their histories and continue a special relationship rare in its depth and longevity among states. There have been a few brief periods of US doubt in the past 40 years, but past fears of a Japan moving away from US centrality proved transitory and, if anything, served to illustrate the multiple forces pushing Japan to deepen its military alliance and broaden its global partnership with the United States. What has driven Japan to seek out new security partners in the region is not a move away from the United States but an expansion of Japan’s security-­provider role in the region under what I have elsewhere described as a “security renaissance” that Japan has experienced in the past decade (Oros, 2017). This renaissance is driven by a range of factors—both international and domestic, material and ideational—but, in part, has emerged as a response to Japan’s relative decline in a region that experienced a striking expansion in the number of security actors, dynamic economic growth, and a parallel growth in military spending and capabilities across a wide range of actors since the start of the new century. Japan’s expanded security role—both in terms of indigenous capabilities and new security partners—comports with a strategy Washington long has pressured Japan to pursue: to deepen its contributions within the broader alliance network the United States has maintained in Asia despite the end of the Cold War. Japan has emerged as a more valuable US ally as a result of its expanded security partnerships. The policies pursued by the Abe government since his December 2012 return to power have been encouraged by the United States and dovetail with the so-­called “pivot/re-­balance” strategy that the Obama administration followed over the same period (Campbell, 2016) and that the Trump administration mirrors in its Indo-­Pacific strategy (US Department of Defense, 2018, 2019).

216  Andrew L. Oros Of course, the United States and Japan are different states, with overlapping but not identical interests. Japan’s different location, geography, history, and military power resources all contribute to tensions within the US-­Japan alliance and, at times, different policies within a broadly complementary security strategy. A prominent recent example is divergence over Putin’s Russia, particularly during the Obama administration. Previously, divergence over North Korea introduced tensions in the alliance, and may again in the future. Different political leaderships in both countries also have introduced doubts at times about the resilience of the long-­standing alliance, and the complementarity of the shared alliance strategies. The transition to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rule in September 2009 is one recent example of such doubt, as discussed in numerous places within this volume. Fears were rather quickly assuaged, however, with the brief three-­year period of DPJ rule ending with historic closeness in the alliance under the last of the three DPJ prime ministers, Noda Yoshihiko. This closeness has only deepened after the return of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, and even further under the close relationship between Abe and President Donald Trump. Within Japan, public support for the US-­Japan alliance was among the highest it had ever been in January 2012 and 2015 with over 80% support, according to the Japanese Cabinet Office, and remained over 77% in the 2018 polling summary (Japan Cabinet Office, 2015, 2018, p. 16).1 Even the long-­present conservative voices for greater autonomy from the United States have grown notably silent despite a rise of conservative prominence under Abe’s tenure. Abe was the first foreign leader to meet with President-­elect Trump after the November 2016 US presidential election, and by mid-­2018 was the foreign leader who has met with Trump most often—seven times in Trump’s first 18 months in office. They met in person five times in 2019 and had conducted 34 phone calls through ­October 2019, a remarkable level of personal engagement between a US president and Japanese leader. Abe’s frequent visits with numerous Asian heads of state underscore the value to the United States of Japan’s expanded ties in the Indo-­Pacific region—information Abe is able to convey to Trump, as well as messages to those leaders from the United States. The complex legacy of the US-­Japan relationship, yet the lack of plausible alternatives Complex legacies of the past continue to challenge the US-­Japan relationship, despite the strong alliance enjoyed today.2 Memories of the Second World War continue to motivate political actors in both countries and to demand responses from political leadership. The postwar period began with a seven-­year occupation of Japan and an imposed constitution which both continue to animate political discourse in Japan, including influential voices among Prime Minister Abe’s supporters. Through much of the postwar period, one US justification for the US-­ Japan alliance was to keep a “cork in the bottle” of the resurgence of Japanese militarism (Midford, 2002).

Continued centrality of US to Japan 217 There have been times when Japan’s moves away from the United States— a potential “decentering” beyond a diversification of security partners—caused concern in Washington. Others in this volume have discussed the transition to DPJ rule in September 2009 that caused alarm in some quarters in Washington. That the first DPJ prime minister, Hatoyama Yukio, did not succeed in his quest to reorient Japan’s foreign relations to become more “equidistant” between the United States and East Asia was certainly in part due to strong US resistance and even collusion with senior Japanese bureaucrats who also opposed this agenda.3 Hatoyama resigned less than a year after assuming office, in favor of a new DPJ prime minister, Kan Naoto, who was much more outwardly supportive of the US-­ Japan alliance and of deepening alliance coordination—particularly after experiencing a major foreign policy crisis with China in August/September 2010 over the Senkaku islands and later working closely with US forces on relief efforts after the March 11, 2011 “triple disaster” of the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku, including the nuclear meltdowns at the Fukushima Dai-­ichi nuclear power plant. In the more distant past, Japan’s “technonationalist” industrial strategy in the 1980s led some to worry that Japan might defect from the US-­Japan alliance and enable the Soviets to match US military prowess using Japanese technology (Samuels, 1994).4 In the early post-­Cold War period, there was concern that a growing and independent Japanese military capability could de-­stabilize the post-­ Cold War Asian regional order. The subsequent 1996 US-­Japan Joint Declaration on Security and 1997 revised US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation set into motion the current trajectory of further enmeshing an expanded Japanese defense role within a deepened US-­Japan alliance (Green & Cronin, 1999; Funabashi, 1999). Despite these past challenges—and the legacies of the past that continue to introduce tensions in the day-­to-­day management of the US-­Japan relationship— the geostrategic situation in the Indo-­Pacific region today offers Japan few choices to continued centering of its security strategy around the United States, and no good choice beyond a broadening and deepening of the US-­Japan alliance. Leaders in both states know this and have acted accordingly. This makes the current period of US-­Japan relations different to earlier periods of tension. Bandwagoning with China is not a credible strategy in the current political climate; neither is another earlier dream of the left: unarmed neutrality. On the right, the autonomous defense capability scenarios championed by political conservatives from the 1950s through the 1990s (Mochizuki, 1995) also are not geopolitically (or budgetarily) plausible. The hybrid option between these two camps, a set of alternative alliances with regional neighbors together with a greatly expanded indigenous defense capability, also is a stretch in terms of credibly providing for Japan’s defense needs. Such an option would require substantially increased Japanese defense spending at a time of already huge budget deficits (the highest among OECD countries) and also would require massive capability enhancements among potential regional alliance partners. Despite Japan’s limited military spending to date (barely nudging past 1% of GDP recently), Japan’s military spending dwarfs

218  Andrew L. Oros that of other potential alliance partners in the region (SIPRI, 2019). Moreover, the legacies of Japan’s past complicate relations with some potential alliance partners, particularly Japan’s close neighbor and fellow US ally South Korea (Glosserman & Snyder, 2015), making an alternative set of alliances scenario even more implausible. The re-­embrace of the alliance and push to further deepening under Abe Japan’s re-­embrace of the US-­Japan alliance after the 1997 US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, and more recently the 2015 updated Guidelines, reaffirms the centrality of the US-­Japan alliance to Japan’s national security (MoFA, 2015). Both versions of these revised Guidelines set out a growing regional security role for Japan, including the establishment of new security ties with other partners. Japan’s expanded security ties with regional partners benefit broader US strategic goals in multiple ways. Japan’s enhanced military capabilities and partnerships assist the United States in balancing against China’s growing military power. New security relationships with the Philippines, Indonesia, or Vietnam, for example, could allow Japan’s Maritime Self-­Defense Forces (MSDF) or the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to jointly patrol the South China Sea more efficiently than if based solely from Japanese territory. Enhanced defense-­related cooperation with new partners already has allowed the JCG in particular to work successfully with other states in antipiracy operations, as discussed by Vosse in this volume and by others. Japan’s provision of defense-­related equipment for enhanced coastal defenses for states challenging Chinese unilateral efforts to control the South China Sea also facilitates US strategic objectives. Japanese efforts to underscore the importance of the rule of law and respect of international norms in defense-­related activities similarly advance US strategic objectives, as noted recently in the US 2019 Indo-­Pacific Strategy Report (pp. 4–6). New Japanese initiatives to train officers in the growing militaries and coast guards of the Indo-­Pacific contribute to a safer and more cooperative security environment that benefits the United States as well as other regional states (in addition to benefiting Japan). More broadly, in tandem with expanding security ties with regional partners, the SDF, Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Japanese government writ large are improving institutional efficiencies and legal mechanisms to more effectively manage Japan’s military capabilities while also boosting capabilities. All of these activities are welcomed by the United States and are seen as facilitating deeper US-­Japan cooperation, not as “decentering” Japan away from its traditional focus on the centrality of the US-­Japan alliance.

Why diversify beyond the world’s most powerful ally? It is not difficult to understand why Japan might want to develop an alternative to dependence on the United States for its security. Long-­standing Japanese concerns about abandonment at a time of need or entrapment into a conflict not of

Continued centrality of US to Japan 219 Japan’s choosing both rise to the level of plausible credibility based on examination of US government statements and actions in the past. Even today, some in Japan fear US abandonment over a Senkaku island conflict with China or an escalating confrontation with North Korea. President Trump’s penchant for unilateral and unpredictable action also contribute to these fears. Over the past 70 years of postwar Japanese security policy, there were arguably some points where Japan might plausibly have developed an alternative security strategy than one reliant on the United States—though it would have taken substantial political will on the part of Japan, and may not ultimately have generated as positive an outcome in terms of securing Japan. In the early years after the end of the Cold War, a number of influential Japanese actively called for careful study of a re-­crafting or abandonment of the US-­Japan Security Treaty— though, in fact, the alliance was historically re-­affirmed through the issuance of new Guidelines for US-­Japan Defense Cooperation for a new era in 1997. It is also possible to imagine—as some especially in the DPJ did—a different sort of relationship between Japan and China in the early 21st century that would have paired China’s economic rise with a more cooperative security relationship with Japan. At the present time, however, from the perspective of Washington’s security planners—and the vast majority of Japanese strategic thinkers as well—it is simply not plausible to advance a viable security strategy for Japan that does not involve substantial support from the United States. No combination of other security partners can take the place of the United States. Even the long-­standing conservative voices for autonomy have gone silent in recent years (Oros, 2017, pp.  143–164). Thus, Japan’s security policy is “centered” on the United States regardless of the inclusion of other actors. Why, then, has Japan put such effort into expanding its security partnerships in the past several decades? One explanation is closely linked to US long-­standing efforts to “normalize” Japan. A second explanation is rooted in Japanese and US relative decline in the region, and the concomitant rise of a multi­polar Asian security environment. Incessant US pressure on Japan to play a larger security role Japan’s moves to develop new regional security partners are the result, in part, of urging by the United States for Japan to play a larger security role in the region. The United States used a series of discussions over “guidelines” for US-­Japan defense cooperation to push Japan, step-­by-­step, to play a more active security role for its own defense and in the region (Satake, 2016, p. 30). This started, in the 1997 Guidelines, as a limited “rear area support” role in wartime only during a contingency in an “area surrounding Japan” (a concept that was said to be not geographically defined, but never fully defined otherwise). In the newer 2015 Guidelines, this role was expanded to regional security roles in peacetime, as discussed further in a following section (MoFA, 2015). Domestic political elites responded to the pressure for Japan to play a greater domestic and regional security role in varying ways over time, as noted in other

220  Andrew L. Oros chapters in this volume. The DPJ in particular saw an opportunity both to satisfy US demands and to advance a degree of “decentering” in Japan’s security policies by developing security ties with other states. The subsequent Abe government further elevated the development of new security partnerships by including this goal as a central pillar of Japan’s first national security strategy, published in December 2013 (Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2013). In both cases, though, expanded security partnerships with other states were paired with deepening US-­ Japan alliance activities, and, in addition often involved trilateral or deepened multilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the additional party/ parties (US Dept of Defense, 2019, pp. 44–49). Pressure from the United States is not the only, nor even the primary, explanation for Japan’s growing security ties beyond the United States, however. Another major factor is the dramatic change in the Indo-­Pacific regional security environment that affects both Japan and the United States. Post-­Cold War emergence of a multi­polar Asia and relative decline of Japan and the US The security environment that both Japan and the United States face in the Indo-­ Pacific is dramatically different to the one that the US-­Japan Security Treaty was designed to respond to in 1960. Moreover, it is dramatically different to the environment that was envisioned in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War, when the US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation were re-­crafted in 1997. In 1989, around the peak of Japan’s economic power, Japan’s economic size was larger than that of China, India, Russia, North and South Korea, and Taiwan combined (World Bank, 2018). Since that time, however, Japan’s economy began a period of prolonged stagnation, while other states in the region—particularly China—experienced significant economic growth. The size of the Chinese economy surpassed that of Japan in 2010 and had already grown to double the size of the Japanese economy only seven years later (World Bank, 2018). Other states in the region experienced less dramatic economic growth, but still much higher growth than Japan: the story of East Asian economic rise is not just about China, but about South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and many other states. Demographics also play a role in Japan’s relative decline in the region. Japan’s birthrate sank below the replacement level in 1975 (United Nations, 2019). As a result, Japan’s total population began to decline in the early 21st century. United Nations demographers predict a population shrinkage to 120 million in the mid-­ 2020s and down to 100 million by 2050 (United Nations, 2019). Demographic change in Japan poses a number of security challenges. In a shrinking labor force, the SDF must compete for recruits—leading to unmet recruiting quotas and higher labor costs. Paying for labor costs and for new equipment also becomes more challenging as the total tax base shrinks (Yoshihara, 2014; Glosserman & Tsunoda, 2009).

Continued centrality of US to Japan 221 Although a number of other powerful Asian economies also have experienced declining birthrates that will inflict significant economic consequences (especially South Korea and Taiwan, but also China in a delayed effect), other states in the Indo-­Pacific continue to grow their populations and are projected to surpass Japan’s population size by mid-­century: in particular, the Philippines and Vietnam. Indonesia, already twice the population size of Japan, is projected to grow to three times Japan’s population size by mid-­century (United Nations, 2019). In this context, it is not surprising that Japan is reaching out to these states to develop durable security ties. In addition to the rise—or re-­emergence—of numerous East Asian states, due to changes in the nature of security writ large as a result of new technology and increasing globalization, the conception of the “East Asian” region has expanded in the post-­Cold War period to include a larger number of actors—first under the conception of the “Asia-­Pacific” and more recently under the conception of the “Indo-­Pacific.” In particular, as noted in other chapters in this volume, Australia and India are now routinely seen as security actors in the region. Multilateral institutions also are playing an increasingly important security provider role. As a result, Japan’s security environment must now be seen as multi­polar, rather than bi­polar or unipolar or tripolar as previously imagined. The United States, while still the preeminent economic and military power in the world, also is facing relative decline globally and in the Indo-­Pacific region in particular. US defense spending dwarfs that of other states in the region— more than double all of the other states in the region combined—but US security interests are global, not just regional, and the extent of US outspending declined as the United States shrunk defense spending under the Obama administration and the spending of other states rose. According to data collected by SIPRI, US defense spending during the Obama administration (2008–16) peaked in 2010 and declined thereafter, while China’s defense spending doubled in that period (SIPRI, 2019). Prime Minister Abe has sought to address Japan’s relative decline in defense spending by increasing Japanese defense spending three of the first five years since returning to office in 2012. Japanese defense spending is now the highest it has ever been (in yen terms), but to date has only modestly exceeded spending levels from the early 21st century, when a period of gradual annual declines in defense spending began. SIPRI reports Japanese defense spending in yen terms to be almost 5,146 billion yen in 2018, an increase of almost 7.5% from 2012—but it took until 2014 for defense spending to even equal spending in yen terms in 1998. US President Trump also pledged to reverse the extended period of decline in US defense spending in the Obama administration and has succeeded in increasing US defense spending in the first years of his administration, from just over $600 billion in 2016 to nearly $649 billion in 2018 (SIPRI, 2019). Still, both states are looking to share the burden of defense spending with other partners. In the case of Japan, this has led to what this volume refers to as “decentering” of Japan’s security policies beyond just the US-­Japan alliance. This movement also parallels US policy under the Obama administration to expand security cooperation to

222  Andrew L. Oros new security partners while also deepening existing security ties, a policy widely known as “the pivot” or “re-­balance” strategy (Campbell, 2016). While President Trump went to great lengths to repudiate what he described as failed policy of the Obama administration in the Indo-­Pacific, the Trump administration’s policies on deepening the US-­Japan alliance and seeking new security partners in the Indo-­ Pacific look remarkably similar (US Department of Defense, 2018, 2019). Thus, as discussed further in the following section, while both states have expanded the number of security partners in the past decade, they have simultaneously re-­ affirmed the centrality of their alliance to each other.

Common US and Japanese strategies of looking for new security partners The Japanese and US “pivots” to the Indo-­Pacific have many common elements. First, they are both driven by a desire for greater synergies in providing security efficiently, and by a desire to maximize limited defense budgets at the time of budgetary pressure. Second, they both recognize the changing distribution of power in the region, and the relative decline of the United States and Japan within that balance of power. Given the different starting points of the two states, however, the specifics of the new outreach policies vary—but they are deeply coordinated and serve to reinforce the many shared interests between Japan and the United States, and the centrality of each to the other. The US pivot to Asia under Obama and continuity under Trump The pivot strategy of the Obama administration involved both a deepening of existing security relationships in the region and a development of new security ties. Among the existing security relationships, the US-­Japan alliance was widely seen as the most important and developed to assist the United States to manage future security challenges in the region, and also one that was in need of re-­envisioning due to changes in the region since the early post-­Cold War period. For this reason, the two states entered into talks to revise the Guidelines for US-­ Japan Defense Cooperation that had last been revised in 1997. The revised new Guidelines were announced in April 2015 and illustrate the continued centrality of the United States and Japan to each other in the provision of military security in the Indo-­Pacific region (MoFA, 2015). The US “pivot” strategy was imagined as a three-­pronged strategy that would have military, economic, and diplomatic components (Campbell, 2016). In the military sphere—the focus of this volume—the United States re-­started an array of military security interactions and agreements with the Philippines, developed new temporary personnel rotation and training agreements with Australia, and updated military planning, coordination, and basing agreements with South Korea. (Deepening relations with the other of the five US treaty allies in the Indo-­ Pacific, Thailand, were hindered by the military coup in that country and resulting US pressure on the military-­led government to return to democratic rule.)

Continued centrality of US to Japan 223 The United States also made historic outreach efforts and military-­related agreements with former adversary Vietnam, achieved a long-­standing goal of the beginnings of formal diplomatic relations and a democratic transition for long-­isolated Myanmar (which the United States officially calls Burma), and greatly enhanced its security cooperation with India. In every single one of these areas, Japanese policy followed a similar strategy, expanding and deepening ties and reinforcing an agenda sought by the United States. In some cases, the United States and Japan followed an explicitly coordinated strategy; in others, a confluence of interests led to mutually beneficial outcomes. As the United States sought out and achieved new security partners, its new partners also established and deepened ties with the core US ally in the Indo-­Pacific, Japan. While the Trump administration disavowed the “pivot” strategy of the Obama administration, and notably withdrew the United States from the founding of the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP), its national security strategy overlaps substantially in the area of outreach to new regional security partners. Indeed, one of the main sections of the 2018 US National Defense Strategy is entitled “Strengthen Alliances and Attract New Partners” (p. 8). “Expand Indo-­Pacific alliances and partnerships” also is explicitly called for in the summary document (p. 9), and further developed in the 2019 Indo-­Pacific Strategy Report published by the US Department of Defense. Arguably the Trump administration has gone even further than the Obama administration in deepening military security ties with Japan, though benefitting from the Guidelines document negotiated by the Obama administration. Increased defense spending by both Japan and the United States in the Trump years also has enabled further military cooperation, including with other partners in the region. The Japanese pivot to Asia under Abe Japan also re-­doubled its efforts to maximize positive connections in the Indo-­ Pacific region to boost its security and prosperity in recent years. As with the United States, this is not a wholly new initiative on the part of Japan. In particular, the so-­called Fukuda Doctrine of the 1970s sought to create deeper and more positive ties with numerous states in Southeast Asia (Lam, 2012). More recently, as noted in other chapters in this volume, DPJ policy platforms argued for expanded security connections to other partners in the Asian region—most notably with Australia and India—that expanded the scope for Fukuda doctrine policy that focused on economic and cultural ties. Also discussed elsewhere in this volume, the LDP governments before and after the three years of DPJ rule also pursued a strategy of expanding security ties throughout the region. After Abe’s return to power in December 2012, these efforts intensified. Japan issued its first formal national security strategy in 2013, which codified as part of Japan’s security objectives greater outreach to new security partners (Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2013, pp. 23–27). However, this objective is only one of six “strategic approaches” set out in the strategy. First on the list of approaches is to increase Japan’s own military capabilities, including by reforming the legal

224  Andrew L. Oros framework and strategic deployment limiting the use of these forces (Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2013, pp. 14–20). Second is to deepen security cooperation and planning within the existing US-­Japan alliance framework, including formal revision of the US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2013, pp. 20–23)—which was achieved in 2015, as previously noted. Thus, yet again, one sees the centrality of the United States in Japan’s security planning, despite an expansion of security ties elsewhere in addition.

Next steps in alliance deepening and broadening: complementing Japan’s new security partnerships Recent Japanese-­enhanced contributions to regional security with new security partners already have made Japan a more attractive ally to the United States and have deepened the US-­Japan alliance. Even further deepening of the US-­Japan alliance—reinforcing the centrality of the United States to Japan—is planned and expected in the coming years through the implementation of the 2015 US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the 2015 new security legislation that took effect in Japan in March  2016, and even further steps envisioned as President Trump and Prime Minister Abe forge new ties. Japan had envisaged a number of new missions under the 1997 US-­Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation to assist in “rear area support” under a specific regional contingency, as noted previously. Such activities as refugee assistance, search and rescue, noncombatant evacuation, and activities related to possible economic sanctions were envisioned as contributions in line with Japan’s constitutional interpretation of the time (Smith, 1999). Even under these previous Guidelines, the Japanese government was able to provide re-­fueling assistance to US forces for counter-­terrorism activities in Afghanistan for a decade after the September 2001 attacks on the United States (and, later, to other coalition forces) by utilizing “special measures” legislation. Under the new Guidelines, this sort of support could, in principle, be provided in a wider range of scenarios. The new Guidelines seek to bring US-­Japan security cooperation to a wholly different level from the past and compared to Japan’s other new security partners, beyond simply cooperation during a contingency in “situation in areas surrounding Japan” to regularized cooperation during peacetime and preparation for action during a so-­called “gray zone” conflict. The goal is “to ensure seamless and effective whole-­of-­government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies” (MoFA, 2015, Section III, paragraph one). Japan’s growing relationships with other security partners in the region facilitate this sort of contribution through peacetime training, advance coordination, and, in principle, facilities in those countries during such expanded peacetime or war-­ time contingencies. In contrast to an argument that Japan’s expanding security partnerships in the region are for the purpose of seeking alternatives to the United States, Satake argues rather that these new Guidelines, as well as the preceding ones, were “motivated by Japanese policymakers’ growing concern about the decline of the

Continued centrality of US to Japan 225 US military presence in Asia” (Satake, 2016, p. 29). Japan’s actions were motivated by a fear of abandonment and sought to reassert to the United States the importance of the US-­Japan alliance to Japan. Satake continues, “the [new] guidelines assign Japan greater burden-­sharing responsibilities in terms of regional and global order-­building in exchange for a more comprehensive US military commitment to Japanese security” (p. 29, my emphasis). Building on the rather limited role—though ground-­breaking for the time—of Japan playing a modest role in regional security in the event of a major contingency in an “area surrounding Japan” under the 1997 Guidelines, the 2015 Guidelines have “expanded Japan’s security role from one of simply protecting Japanese territory and sovereignty to one of contributing to regional and global security” (Satake, 2016, p. 29). The new Guidelines include many areas of enhanced cooperation between the United States and Japan, such as over missile defense, cyber and outer space, ISR, and joint patrols. In addition, the 2015 Guidelines seek to support trilateral and broader multilateral cooperation. The document states, “In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-­Pacific region and beyond” (Section V, para­ graph one). In order to achieve some of the objectives of the new Guidelines, the Abe government needed to pass a complex package of new legislation to be able to legally enact some of the new forms of security cooperation envisioned in the new Guidelines. In particular, the issue of “collective self-­defense” still faced limits and needed to be authorized by the Diet under certain circumstances, as discussed in the Wakefield chapter of this volume. This package of legislation was passed in September 2015 and put into effect in March 2016, under strong support and coordination with the United States. The Abe government was cautious in implementing some of the more controversial aspects of this new legislation in the lead-­up to the July 2016 House of Representatives election, but subsequently worked closely with its US ally on expanding further Japan’s operational contribution to regional and global security. Japan’s new security relationships with other countries in the Indo-­Pacific will facilitate this additional security role. In addition, the early years of the Trump administration have further deepened security cooperation with Japan and further drawn on Japan’s expanded security ties in the Indo-­Pacific region. The political leaderships of both the United States and Japan have expressed complementary visions for stability in the Indo-­Pacific. Both see future stability as rooted in economic and military power, assertive leadership, a wide range of partners willing to contribute, and tough talk and bargaining with adversaries to address security concerns. Japan’s expanded security partnerships in the Indo-­ Pacific complement US strategy and make Japan an even more valuable ally to the United States. Explaining the depth and nuances of these new partnerships is a valuable contribution of this volume collectively. That such new partnerships have been forged and deepened, however, in no way undermines the centrality and special nature of the security partnership between the United States and Japan. The

226  Andrew L. Oros oft-­quoted assertion by former US ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, that the US-­Japan relationship is the most important relationship in the world “bar none” is even more valid in the context of Indo-­Pacific security today than when it was the ambassador’s catch phrase in the waning years of the Cold War.

Notes 1 Defense of Japan (2014) provides longitudinal polling data reporting that over 70% of Japanese responding view the US-­Japan Security Treaty as “helpful” since the 2000 survey, rising from 63.9% in 1991 (p. 465). 2 For an extended discussion of the effect of the legacies of the past on contemporary Japanese security discourse, see Oros (2017), Japan’s Security Renaissance, chapters one and five. 3 Hughes (2013), among others, advances the argument that the United States played a substantial role in the early ending of the Hatoyama cabinet. 4 For a case study in the sorts of concerns that plagued the alliance during this tense period, see Otsuki and Honda (1991).

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Continued centrality of US to Japan 227 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). (2015). The Guidelines for Japan-­U.S. Defense Cooperation, 27 April. www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf. Oros, Andrew. (2017). Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the 21st Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Otsuki, S., and Honda, M. (1991). Nichibei FSX Senso: Nichibei Domei wo Yurugasu Gijutsu Masatsu [The Japan-­U.S. War Over the FSX: Technology Conflict That Rocks the Japan-­U.S. Alliance]. Tokyo: Ronso-­sha. Samuels, Richard. (1994). ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Satake, T. (2016). The New Guidelines for Japan-­US Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role. Asian Politics and Policy, 8(1), 27–38, January. Smith, Sheila. (1999). The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the US-­Japan Alliance. In Michael Green and Cronin Patrick (Eds.), The US-­Japan Alliance. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, pp. 69–93. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2019). Military Expenditure Database, 1949–2019. www.sipri.org/databases/milex. United Nations. (2019). World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision. https://population. un.org/wpp/. United States Department of Defense. (2018). Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://dod.defense. gov/. United States Department of Defense. (2019). Indo-­Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. https://dod.defense.gov/. World Bank. (2018). World Development Indicators. http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/WV.1. Yoshihara, T. (2014). Japanese Hard Power: Rising to the Challenge. National Security Outlook, August. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

13 Non-­US direction in Japan’s security strategy A Chinese view Suisheng Zhao

Introduction Despite a reputation as a reactive state, starting with the Noda Yoshihiko administration (2011–2012) and particularly since Abe Shinzō came to office in 2012, Japan has been proactive in its effort to expand its strategic space while complicating and frustrating China’s rise. Renewing its efforts to strengthening strategic alliance with the US, Japan has increased its number of strategic dialogues with many of its neighboring states, particularly Southeast Asian countries in tension with China, and built security ties with regional powers such as India and Australia, getting them to speak the same language in regard to maritime law and liberal values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and aiming at China. China is very sensitive toward Japan’s proactive diplomatic and strategic initiatives, including Japan’s diplomatic efforts to build security ties with regional powers and other countries because Japan’s pro-­activism translates into its renewed regional presence when the Chinese have become increasingly assertive in its territorial disputes with Japan and Southeast Asian countries. China’s relationship with Japan has always been complicated and sensitive, tainted by unsettled historical memories and geopolitical rivalries. Doing everything to discourage Japan from aspiring to take on a greater global or regional role, Chinese officials and scholars have paid special attention to the Abe government’s non-­US direction diplomacy because it has taken place in the context of Abe’s attempts to lift ban on collective self-­defense and amend the Japanese constitution while renewing and strengthening the security alliance with the US. Japan’s non-­US direction in security strategy is thus regarded as part of the Japanese efforts to contain China’s rise. However, many Chinese scholars have also pointed out that while Japan has successfully cultivated new security ties with new partners such as India and Australia and some Southeast Asian countries, Japan’s non-­US focused security diplomacy has faced many barriers, which may prevent Japan from taking a leadership role in regional and global competition with China. As a result, China’s primary concern remains the Japan-­US alliance.

China Alarmed: the causes and objectives of Japan’s Non-­US diplomacy Beijing has been alarmed by the diplomatic offense of the Japanese government or the so-­called “Japan’s pushback of China,” the title of an article published by

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 229 the Washington Quarterly, which describes Tokyo’s efforts at crafting new strategic partnerships and initiating security/strategic relationships and strengthening political ties in the regional level and globally to possibly shape other states’ China policies while enhancing its security alliance with the US. These increase Japan’s leverage to “push China” toward more acceptable behavior. The efforts to expand Japan’s strategic ties have in particular targeted countries that share concerns regarding China’s rising assertiveness in territorial disputes, primarily maritime countries of Southeast Asian countries—particularly the Philippines and Vietnam—and sea powers such as India and Australia, to coalesce around Tokyo’s interpretation of freedom of navigation as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is less restrictive than China’s interpretation. Because China prefers to handle territorial disputes bilaterally, Japan’s efforts to unify states around a common interpretation of UNCLOS complicate China’s ability to engage in divide-­and-­conquer tactics. “This is different from anything Japan has ever done” (Hornung, 2015, p. 168). Examining various causes, including Japan’s domestic dynamics and changing regional/global contexts leading to diplomatic development, the Chinese are convinced that the overarching objective of Japan’s diplomatic offense is to contain China’s rise. Seeing Japan’s strategic diplomacy represents a new foreign policy direction aiming to contain China and maintain Japan’s strategic advantage, the Chinese have blamed the Japanese government for not only bringing negative impacts on and causing tensions in Sino-­Japan relations but also deteriorating regional security environment. China must pay attention to Japan’s strategic diplomacy. Chinese scholars have identified various motivations and objectives in Japan’s diplomatic offense. Zhu Haiyan, a professor at Henan University, discovered that the Abe administration’s diplomacy has tried to achieve several strategic objectives. The first is to carry out the “overlooking the earth” (地球仪) or globe diplomacy, making friends with countries ignored in the past, such as those in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and Southeast Asian countries. The second is to build friendly relations with neighboring countries in its northern and southern peripheries. In the north, Japan has tried to improve relations with Russia. In the south, Japan has set the Southeast Asian countries as a priority in Japanese diplomacy while building strategic ties with Australia. The third is to renew and strengthen the alliance with the US (Zhu, 2015). Chen Xing at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations describes the Abe administration’s efforts as a new “strategic diplomacy” intended to strengthen relations with Asia-­Pacific countries and expand Japan’s diplomatic space globally based on the shared values. He summarizes three components of strategic diplomacy. The first is to renew Japan­US diplomacy and strengthen the Japan-­US alliance. The second is to develop periphery diplomacy and build relations with Southeast Asian countries. The third is the “overlooking the earth” (地球仪) or globe diplomacy (Chen, 2014). Wang Shan, a research fellow in the Institute of Japan Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, characterizes Abe’s diplomatic advances as to “get rid of the Post-­WWII system” (摆脱战后体制), the political, economic, and security order build under the US leadership that transformed Japan

230  Suisheng Zhao into a democracy and denounced Japanese militarism and aggressive history. The Abe administration is to achieve the objective through diplomatic advances in three fronts. First, blaming China’s maritime expansion, the Abe administration has aimed to increase Japan’s military combat capacities and amend the Defense Guidelines with the US to confront China, the largest victim of the Japanese aggression during WWII and the firm defender of the post-­WWII system. Second, the Abe administration has taken advantage of regional conflicts and disputes and roped in periphery countries by providing economic assistance. Third, Abe has carried out “values diplomacy” (价值观外交) in cooperation with offshore powers. In addition to the liberal values of democracy and human rights, the Abe administration has tried to promote the China threat and the necessity of containing China as a shared value in cooperation with its partners (Wang, 2013). Shi Yongming, a researcher in China Institute of International Studies, identified 2015 as the year that witnessed the fundamental change of Japan’s security policy from passive defense to an aggressive defense as the Abe government made substantial efforts to promote the so-­called “proactive activism” (积极的 和平主义). These efforts have two primary objectives in mind. One is to change Japan’s international status from a purely pacifist state to a “normal state,” so that it can become a great political power and play a leadership role in shaping the direction of the regional order and even the world order. The second objective is to increase Japan’s capacity for constraining China and to join the US in containing China (Shi, 2015). Chinese scholars have pointed out that the objectives of Japan’s diplomatic advances have been set in response to the changing East Asian geopolitical environment. Wang Shan made three points. First, the rise of China’s comprehensive national strength has caused chain reactions from Japan. In particular, China’s overtaking Japan as the second-­largest economy in 2010 produced a massive shock wave in Japan and forced Japan to seriously search for policy responses in order to regain its advantage over China. China’s rise, therefore, changed Japan’s post-­War peace mentality. Japan was able to work with a weaker China peacefully for many years, but has become angry and frustrated and determined to contain China’s rise as China is rising to a stronger position. Second, the US strategic rebalance toward the Asia-­Pacific has prompted the Abe administration to make foreign policy adjustments. Renewing the security alliance with the US, the Abe administration has tried to reshape the East Asian political, economic, and security environment to isolate China. Third, the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea have deteriorated China’s security environment and provided an opportunity for Japan to confront China. Claiming to defend the international law and freedom of navigation, Japan has tried to take a leadership role, building a maritime security cooperation mechanism and actively shaping regional security environment (Wang, 2013). For Chen Xin, the causes and primary objectives of Abe’s strategic diplomacy are threefold. First, Japan’s diplomatic advances are a response to the shifting global power balance: while the US has been damaged by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as global financial crisis, facing debt crisis and budget deficit,

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 231 and has to reduce its overseas strategic presence, the global power distribution has increasingly become multipolar and emerging powers represented by the BRICS have played an increasingly important role in international affairs. China’s rise has been particularly spectacular. China’s defense budget surpassed Japan for the first time in 2006. Facing an increasingly challenging security environment, Japan has adjusted its international strategy to confront China and defend its national interests. Second, Japan has continued economic stagnation while China was rapidly rising in the first decade of the 21st century. This development severely damaged Japanese national pride and created many domestic problems, giving rise to extreme nationalists and right-­wing politicians who have called to make strategic readjustment and restore public confidence in international affairs, particularly in relationship with China. Third, taking a hardline position on historical and territorial disputes, Prime Minister Abe has tried to gain support from a renewed alliance with the US and expanded relations with regional powers and other countries to seek strategic advantage over China (Chen, 2014). Zhu Haiyan found that the causes of Japan’s diplomatic advances are the conviction by the Abe government that East Asian strategic environment has become increasingly severe, Japanese diplomacy and security have developed into a crisis, mostly due to the unstable Korean Peninsula and the rise of China. Notably, China’s rapid rise has changed the relatively balanced regional political and military power configuration. Japan is concerned about being marginalized in the new round of power redistribution. Inviting other countries to join Japan and contain China, Japan has repeatedly spread the “China threat.” Based on the assessment of the regional strategic environment, the Abe administration has attempted to get rid of the post-­WWII system and build a strong Japan while seeking a leadership role as the regional order has been changing (Zhu, 2015).

Taking a note: the accomplishments of Japan’s non-­US direction China has taken note of the accomplishments of Japan’s non-­US security diplomacy in cultivating strategic ties with like-­minded countries in the region, particularly India, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries. Japan’s strategic influence has increased as it increased the number of high-­level strategic meetings and built a growing list of military exchanges, exercises, and equipment arrangements. In the meantime, Japan’s capacity-­building efforts are improving the abilities of the Philippines and Vietnam to deal with an increasingly assertive China. In both bilateral and multilateral fora, Japan’s willingness to promote UNCLOS helped a growing number of states to speak the same language in terms of the maritime legal principles and reduce China’s ability to engage in divide-­and-­conquer tactics in the South China Sea. Similarly, through Official Development Assistance (ODA), strategic dialogues, and capacity-­building efforts, Japan helped these countries bolster their capabilities and strategic planning. Japan’s promotion of the Trans-­Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been designed to prevent Asia from being pulled into the

232  Suisheng Zhao Chinese economic orbit by giving states other trade options, thereby making member states less dependent on their trade with China. In so doing, it diminishes the importance of the China-­led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Taken together, Japan’s outreach to many new partners in many different areas is to promote a regional network of security dialogues, rule of law, and trade among states challenged by China (Hornung, 2015). Chen Xiang, a professor at the School of International Relations of Beijing Foreign Studies University, wrote that Japan’s cooperation with India in political, economic, trade, military security, and social-­cultural areas have developed rapidly (发展迅猛) since the wake of the 21st century. There are many driving forces behind the development. Among them is a shared strategic interest. Both countries have aimed to be recognized as great powers. Their shared great power dreams include becoming permanent members of the UN Security Council. Joining Brazil and Germany in 2005, these two countries have been active in the so-­ called G4 to push for their UNSC permanent memberships. In addition, these two countries have shared strategic interests in each other’s regions. India has carried out its “Look East” strategy to enter the Pacific while Japan has made “Going South” strategy to enter Indian Ocean. Supporting each other’s strategic interests, they hope to increase their own strategic stocks in dealing with the third party, i.e., China. Chen Xiang believes that Japan and India want to work together to contain China (联手遏制中国) because Japan is concerned about the intensified conflicts with China over Diaoyu islands. At the same time, India is worried about the border disputes with China. In addition, Japan is unhappy to be overtaken by China economically and militarily while India, as an emerging economy, does not want to see a China rising to threaten its security interests. The China factor has, therefore, driven Japan and India together. Besides, the US has encouraged the development of the Japan-­India relationship because the US wants to use it to balance China in the region (Chen, 2015). Niu Tong, a PLA officer, has documented many details in the warming up of Japan-­India maritime security cooperation. While high-­level visits of political and military leaders have increased dramatically, maritime security dialogues are institutionalized. Niu listed many of institutionalized dialogues, including foreign and defense ministers’ strategic dialogue, 2 + 2 (foreign ministers and defense ministers) dialogue, Indian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-­Defense Force (MSDF) chiefs of staff dialogue, comprehensive security, defense policy, and military dialogues, Maritime affairs dialogue, and maritime security defense dialogues. In addition, these two countries have institutionalized maritime joint exercises, such as anti-­pirate and anti-­terrorism on the seas joint exercises. Moreover, Japan-­Indian military equipment and technology cooperation is strengthening. Japan has looked for opportunities in the Indian arms market after the relaxation of the three principles of arms exports. These two countries have also explored the possibility of sharing a military base. This PLA officer found many causes for increasing maritime security cooperation. The first is the common goal of great power aspiration. Maritime cooperation may help these two countries realize their strategic objectives. Second, they share the realist interest of containing China to

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 233 assure their maritime security. Third, the US has promoted maritime cooperation between Japan and India (Niu, 2015). China has also paid attention to Japan’s attempt to strengthen its relations with Australia. Taking note that Abe became the first Japanese Prime Minister speaking at the Parliament in Australia during his visit in July 2014, one Chinese scholar suggests that the visit pushed the relationship Japan and Australia to a new level toward the direction of an alliance (同盟化) after the Joint Japan-­Australia Security Declaration signed in 2007. Japan and Australia have expanded security and defense cooperation, including joint military exercises and training, intelligence sharing, and military technology and weaponry cooperation. These two countries have also strengthened cooperation in non-­traditional security areas, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue, cyber and space security, and UN peace-­keeping operations. In particular, the political relationship between Japan and Australia has been raised to “New Special Strategic Partnership” because they have not only enjoyed shared values but also shared strategic interests and concerns. This Chinese scholar argues that the most critical cause for the closer Japan-­ Australian relationship is the rise of China. The primary objective of the Japanese-­ Australian alliance, therefore, is to contain China. Japan sees Australia as one of the most important countries in the so-­called democratic security diamond chain to contain China’s rise. Japan alone or even Japan-­US security alliance alone may not be sufficient to deal with China’s rise. It must work with more countries around China to effectively restrain and balance the adverse effects of China’s rise to Japan. Facing the territorial disputes with China in the East China Sea, Japan regards Australia as a country geographically close enough and strategically important enough to contain China’s entering the deep ocean. In addition, strengthening the relationship with Australia may reduce Japan’s unilateral reliance on the US, win Australian support to Abe’s efforts to get rid of the WWII system, and expand Japan’s diplomatic space. The Chinese scholar also believes that the US is the major pusher to the Japanese-­Australian alliance. Starting with the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2006, the US has laid down an institutional framework for Japan-­Australian cooperation. For this purpose, the US has tried to transform US+1 alliance model to US-­Japan+1 alliance model and paid particular attention to TSD to coordinate the policies of the three countries on regional disputes involving China (Zhu, 2014). Japan’s improving relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Philippines, have also caught Chinese attention. From the Chinese perspective, “Japan has proactively strengthened (主动加强) relations with Southeast Asian countries, starting with economic assistance and political and security cooperation to collaborate with the US strategic rebalance toward the Asia Pacific and compete and contain with China’s influence in the region” (Overseas Network, 2015). Yang Guanghai, a professor at the PLA University of International Relations, finds that Japan’s involvement in the South China Sea has intensified and upgraded since the escalation of the South China Sea disputes in recent years and has shown many new dynamics and features. First, Japan has intensified the

234  Suisheng Zhao propaganda of the “China threat” and comprehensively opposed China’s territorial sovereignty and policy initiatives. Second, Japan has promoted multilateralization and internationalization of the South China Sea disputes through various channels. Third, Japan has strengthened maritime security cooperation with the ASEAN countries in the name of “supporting their capacity building.” These are in addition to Japan’s new attempt to strengthen multilateral coordination and cooperation with the US, Australia, and India, and form a coalition of the like-­ minded to contain China (Yang, 2015). For many years, Japan played a major economic role in the region but never translated its economic prowess into strategic influence. This passive stance has changed. A full-­dialogue partner since 1977, Japan underlined its priorities toward ASEAN with the appointment of a resident ambassador in 2010, the first dialogue partner to do so. The Mission of Japan to ASEAN was established in Jakarta in 2011. In the meantime, Japan significantly increased its profile to participate in joint military exercises, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, non-­combatant evacuation operations, networking, communications, and security cooperation with Southeast Asian states. Seeking to promote the strategic use of ODA to help build the defense infrastructure and security capacity of Southeast countries, Japan eased the restrictions on overseas transfers of defense equipment in cases related to contributing to peace and advancing international cooperation in December 2011. One month before this decision, the Japanese government pledged $25 billion to promote flagship projects for enhancing ASEAN connectivity at the Japan-­ASEAN Summit. At the Japan-­Mekong Summit in April 2012, Japan pledged $7.4  billion in aid over three years to help five Mekong states’ infrastructure projects. After taking office, Prime Minister Abe set-­top foreign policy priorities to nurture closer ties with Southeast Asian nations. Visiting Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand in January 2013, his first foreign tour as Prime Minister, Abe visited all ten ASEAN countries at least once in his first year. Reaching out to many potential markets in Southeast Asia, Abe encouraged the stream of Japanese investment away from China and into Southeast Asia that was already taking place largely due to China’s rising labor costs. Focusing on expanding universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights and keeping sea lanes free and open in line with international law, Abe frequently referred to a set of shared values. He proposed to promote maritime cooperation in his dialogue with Southeast Asian leaders (Trinidad, 2013). Japan’s initiatives were welcomed by many ASEAN states. Japan and ASEAN commemorated 40 years of friendship and cooperation with a Summit in Tokyo in December 2013, coinciding with Beijing’s announcement of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Their joint statement emphasized the importance of principles of international law and enhancement of cooperation to ensure the freedom of overflight and civil aviation safety in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law. Cambodia this time closed ranks with its neighbors and joined a pledge to work together to protect freedom of aviation. On the fringes of the meeting, Japan and all participants announced they

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 235 had upgraded the status of their relationship to a strategic partnership. The summit capped a successful year of diplomacy for Abe to win hearts and minds and open doors for Japanese companies with promises of billions of dollars in aid and investments in Southeast Asia. China’s assertive stance advanced Japan’s courtship, soothing backlash across Southeast Asia against Japan’s rising military profile. Emerging as one of the most nationalistic politicians of his generation, Abe spoke openly of rewriting Japan’s pacifist constitution and upgrading its armed forces and even contested the idea that Japan’s brutal wartime assault on its neighbors as an invasion. Only a few years ago, such an agenda by a Japanese leader would have sent tremors around the whole region. Nevertheless, worries about a revival of Japanese militarism among some Southeast Asian countries were trumped by the concerns about China’s power aspiration. According to a Pew Research Center survey in 2013, about half or more of the public in five of seven Asia-­Pacific nations had a favorable view of Japan. Eight-­in-­ten Malaysians, and nearly as many Indonesians (79%), Australians (78%), and Filipinos (78%) saw Japan in a positive light (Pew Research Center, 2013). Japan invaded and brutally occupied the Philippines during World War II. Nevertheless, the two countries have since grown closer due to trade and investment and China’s assertiveness. The convergence of their geostrategic and economic interests helped overcome the bitter memories of brutal Japanese occupation. Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel, the former president of the Philippine Senate, recalled that as a boy during the war, his family escaped Japanese troops by hiding in banana groves. For years, his attitude toward Japan was “one of fear and hatred. Now we see Japan’s resurgence as a balancing factor in what otherwise would be China’s dominance in this region” (Browne, 2013). Philippine officials said their nation does not share the concerns of others in Asia, notably China and South Korea, about Japan’s military past. The survivors of Japanese military sexual slavery in the Philippines urged President Benigno Aquino to bring up their demand for an official apology with Abe. However, President Aquino did not delve into the issue of comfort women during their bilateral meeting and even suggested that the Philippines had moved on from its historic conflict with Japan (Trajano, 2013). Complaining about Chinese bullying in the contested waters, the Philippines consider Japan a counterweight to China, and maritime cooperation with Japan and the US part of the Philippines’ broader strategy of intensifying defense cooperation to compensate for its limited military capability. The Japan-­Philippines strategic partnership was established in 2011 to facilitate economic exchanges and maritime security cooperation. Other than the United States, Japan is the only strategic partner of the Philippines and the only country given access to the Subic Naval Base. One month before Abe’s visit to Manila in July 2013, Japanese Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori pledged to help the Philippines defend its remote islands because they “face a very similar situation in the East China Sea of Japan” (Agence France-­Presse, 2013). During his visit, Abe affirmed Japan’s assistance towards the capacity building of the Philippine Coast Guard by providing

236  Suisheng Zhao ten patrol vessels through the ODA program. Following the visit, Japan mounted its largest ever peacetime deployment of its SDF for disaster aid after Typhoon Haiyan devastated the southern Philippines, killing more than 6,000 people, displacing 4.1 million and leaving behind a trail of destruction that overwhelmed the under-­equipped and ill-­prepared Filipino authorities in November 2013. Tokyo sent aid and SDF rescue missions and pledged $287 million to the Philippines, while Beijing was widely criticized as slow and grudging when it initially offered a modest $100,000 in government aid along with another $100,000 through the Chinese Red Cross (Xinhua Net, 2013). In June 2015, President Aquino made a state visit to Japan and signed a Joint Declaration to provide a strategic vision to the two countries’ evolving security partnership. During the visit, Aquino announced that the two countries would soon start talks on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow the Japanese Self-­Defense Force access to Philippine military bases.

No over-­concern: constraints and the prospects of Japan’s non-­US diplomacy While Japan has made progress in making initiatives and forging closer strategic ties with many countries, its engagements face serious challenges. Chinese observers are well aware of the limitations. Analyzing Japan’s strategic diplomacy, Chen Xin identifies many of these challenges. First, the objective does not match reality because Japan cannot contain China or even maintain a strategic advantage over China. Containing China is not only an outdated Cold War mentality but also cannot be supported by the Japanese national economy and capacity. China’s rise cannot be stopped. China’s substantial territorial, population, and economic scale determine that it is inevitable that the Chinese economy takeover Japan. Japan has no choice but to reposition and adjust its mentality in relation to China. Second, Japan’s strategic diplomacy must rely on the success of Abe economics, which is not promising. It is still uncertain if Abe economics can reverse Japan’s economic stagnation. In fact, to a great extent, Japan’s economic recovery depends on China’s continuing economic growth. Because Abe’s strategic diplomacy aims at confronting China, Japan will lose the historical opportunity of taking a free ride of China’s rise and recover the Japanese economy. Third, Japan cannot count on US support because these two countries have many disagreements, and the US does not want to be hijacked by Japan’s confrontational position against China. Taking a hedging strategy rather than a containment strategy in relationship with China, the US has been cautious in the management of the alliance with Japan to avoid confronting China directly in the territorial disputes between Japan and China. For Americans, the US-­China relationship is more important than the US-­Japan relationship at a certain period and certain issue areas. In other words, US-­Japan relations are subject to the US-­China relationship. In addition, the US-­Japan relationship is constrained by Japan’s inability to face historical issues. Fourth, most countries in the region and the world are not enthusiastic toward Abe’s strategic diplomacy because they are not willing

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 237 to take a side between Japan and China, afraid of offending China and damaging their interests. For example, although Japan provided a large amount of economic assistance to India, India has not agreed to include any words of balancing China in the Joint Statement between Japan and India (Chen, 2014). Wang Shan also listed two barriers to Japan’s attempt to get rid of the post-­ WWII system. First, Japan cannot take a leadership role in East Asia because very few countries in the region are willing to dance with Japan. Most of the East Asian countries have benefited from China’s rise. Even the Japanese economy is depending on China to a great extent. Japan’s attempt to contain China can only lead to Japan’s isolation in the region. Second, the United States will not tolerate unlimited indulgence (无限度的姑息纵容) toward Japan. The US may want to use Japan to contain China but not to the degree of intensifying regional conflict and damaging East Asian economic prosperity and security. Alarmed by the extreme languages and actions by Prime Minister Abe, the US has urged Japan to resolve the territorial disputes with China through diplomacy. The US has not been entirely in tune with Japan and kept some strategic distance (战略错位). Because of these two barriers, Japan’s attempts to get rid of the post-­WWII system cannot be sailing smoothly (Wang, 2013). Many Chinese scholars noticed that after Abe assumed office, he intended to make his first overseas visit to Washington in January 2013. However, President Obama turned him down with the excuse of a busy schedule. When Abe finally made it to the US in February, President Obama set aside less than two hours to meet with him. Although President Obama reiterated that the US-­Japanese alliance is based on the Security Treaty and shared democratic values, he quietly asked the Japanese government to exercise restraint to prevent tensions from rising in the East China Sea. The United States also has concerns regarding Japan’s stance on historical issues and expressed disappointment over Prime Minister Abe’s December 26, 2013 visit to the Yasukuni shrine, which honors Japanese war dead, including the 14 A-­class war criminals. Using unusually blunt language, the American Embassy in Tokyo stated that “the United States is disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan’s neighbors” (US Embassy, 2013), a rare case of criticism directed at one of its closest allies. Daniel Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, compared the challenges of helping Japan to deal with the historical issues with the challenge of China’s territorial disputes and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs (Hayashi, 2014). Prime Minister Abe’s homage to Japan’s war criminals smacked of denial of his nation’s wartime aggression, not only strengthening China’s hand in disputes with Japan but also driving wedges into the coalition of the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Assessing the prospects of Abe’s diplomatic initiatives, Zhu Haiyan also found several severe constraints. First, the US would not allow Japan to get rid of the post-­WWII system completely because it was built by the US and continues to be a symbol of US leadership. Second, The Abe administration’s denials of Japanese war crimes and atrocities during the Pacific War cannot be accepted by Japan’s neighbors and prevented Japan from taking a leadership role in the region. Third,

238  Suisheng Zhao the Japanese economy has continued to stagnate and cannot support the strategy of expanding Japan’s international space and role (Zhu, 2015). China has also found many constraints, specifically in Japan’s new security ties with India, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries. Chen Xiang pointed out many barriers that have to be overcome before the Japanese-­Indian relationship can move forward further in the long run. The first barrier is the different national development strategies and diplomatic principles between the two countries. While India has long claimed to be a great power with a non-­alliance policy and independent status, Japan has followed other great powers historically, allying with the UK, Germany, and the US. India is not willing and will not become a pawn used by Japan and the US to contain China. Second, Japan and India may cooperate but more likely to have a conflict of interest in the efforts to enter the UNSC. The UN reform resolution restricts each continent can only have one representative as a permanent member of the UNSC. Japan and India, as Asian countries are doomed to become competitors in this race. Third, Japan and India have different positions on the use of nuclear power. While India is anxious to develop nuclear power, many in Japan have opposed nuclear cooperation with India because India has not joined NPT and developed nuclear weapons. Finally, these two countries have different international identities. Japan has been one of the developed Western countries, while India is an emerging developing country. Japan has identified with the Western countries on the issues of democracy and human rights while India has taken the position of developing countries. Japan and India have also taken a different position on some global issues such as trade negotiations, climate change, and non-­proliferation. Without overcoming these barriers, it is difficult for Japan and India to move their relations further ahead (Chen, 2015). In terms of the Japan-­Australia relations, Zhu Haiyan does not see a prospect for these two countries to form a traditional military alliance because of the following barriers. First, Australia holds a different position from Japan in response to China’s rise. Zhu divides China’s neighbors into three groups according to their different attitudes toward China. One is the “China friend group” (友华派), including Cambodia and Pakistan, which welcome China’s rise. The second is “pragmatic group” (用华派), represented by Australia, Singapore, and Indonesia, which hope China rises peacefully within the existing order to benefit from China’s economic development while still maintaining the existing order and regional security and prosperity. The third is “containing China group” (遏华派), including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which are hostile to the development of Chinese economic and military capacities and have tried to contain China’s rise. Because Australia belongs to the pragmatic group while Japan belongs to the containment of China group, Australia has distanced itself from Japan to make sure that it would not be dragged into Japan’s conflict with China. It will not form a military alliance with Japan against China. Second, the US has played a delicate role in promoting as well as preventing the formation of the Japan-­Australian alliance. While the US has tried to elevate Japan-­Australian relations, it has tried make sure the relationship is under its control. Because of the concern that Japan

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 239 may want to hijack the relationship to challenge the post-­WWII order, the US cannot support a military alliance between Japan and Australia. Third, the US-­ China relationship has a delicate impact on Japanese-­Australian relations. While Japan sees its security increasing when the US-­China relationship is deteriorating, Australia sees an expanding diplomatic space when the US-­China relationship is improving. Japan has tried to take a provocative position to cause a US-­China conflict and to tie the US in its anti-­China strategy. However, Australia has supported cooperation between the US and China. In conclusion, this author suggests that while the Japan-­Australian relationship has moved toward an alliance, a military alliance is still far from becoming a reality (Zhu, 2014). Japan’s engagement in Southeast Asia also faces serious challenges. Yang Guanghai indicates that ASEAN does not want to be Japan’s tool to contain China. A profoundly conservative and consensual body, ASEAN has no wish to pick a fight with Beijing. Like their attitudes toward the relationship between China and the US, Southeast Asian countries have tried to avoid taking sides. Even the most radical claimant states, the Philippines and Vietnam, have taken a policy of separating politics from economics to avoid the impression of following Tokyo to confront China (Yang, 2015). One Chinese scholar suggested that the Abe administration has failed to lure Southeast Asian countries to contain China because Abe overestimated Japan’s influence while underestimating China’s influence in the region. ASEAN states have followed a balanced strategy among great powers and will not sacrifice its long-­term development for immediate economic interests. Although some Southeast Asian countries have territorial disputes with China, they are a minority. ASEAN, as a regional organization, has its own objectives of peace, stability, and prosperity (Zhu, 2013). Moreover, Japan’s continuing painful relations with some East Asian nations over historical animosities still jangle regional nerves, lingering in Tokyo’s ties with its neighbors. Some countries that suffered Japanese occupation remained wary over the potential for a resurgence of Japanese militarism because of Japan’s inability, at least in the eyes of some of its neighbors, to accept responsibility for its wartime atrocities. In addition, Japan’s complicated relationship with its immediate neighbor South Korea has worked in China’s favor. The Tokyo-­Seoul relationship was always tight, but North Korea’s increasing aggression once prompted Japan and South Korea to resume high-­level defense exchanges through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group with the US in the 1990s. Cautiously moving toward a closer relationship, particularly after North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan ship and artillery bombardment of a South Korean island, the two countries signed a joint declaration in 2010 to emphasize the need for settling issues related to the colonial era and the importance of a future-­oriented partnership. The United States, Japan, and South Korea conducted the first joint naval exercise in the seas southwest of the Korean Peninsula in May 2012. One month later, South Korea announced that it was ready to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the first military pact between the two governments since the end of Japanese colonization of Korea in 1945, to share and protect sensitive military and other sensitive data on their common concerns. Kazuo Ogura, former

240  Suisheng Zhao Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, was very optimistic that “the two countries seemed to overcome at last the negative legacy of the past and to put their bilateral relations on a ‘future-­orientated’ course” (Ogura, 2013). However, the advancement of the relationship made a sudden downturn in 2012 as the announcement of GSOMIA aroused a flurry of anti-­Japanese sentiments and triggered a political firestorm in South Korea, highlighting deep-­ seated mistrust of the nation’s former colonizer. “It is perceived that sharing classified data on South Korea’s military capabilities could be disadvantageous to it in the event of a conflict with Japan” (Teo, 2012). The signing of GSOMIA was postponed indefinitely. To calm the domestic backlash, President Lee Myung-­bak made an unprecedented visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands contested between South Korea and Japan in August 2012. Tokyo responded by recalling its ambassador and canceling a planned visit by its finance minister to Seoul. From there on, the Japan-­South Korea relationship moved to an all-­time low since the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1965. While Korea’s classic “shrimp among whales” strategy between Asia’s major players, by which Seoul avoided openly regarding China as a rival and sought instead to cultivate a middle position, was partially responsible for the strained state of relationship, Japan’s denying of the wartime crimes is a major obstacle to forward-­looking Korea-­Japan relations as Koreans are still resentful of Japan’s colonization. Any sign of Japan’s growing military role was met with deep suspicion. The Korean media is filled with editorials warning to keep a close watch on Japan rearming and going nuclear. Shared democratic values, geographical proximity, affiliation to the US alliance network, and shared concerns about China’s great power aspiration, are insufficient to build a Japan-­ROK partnership. The fissure in Japan-­South Korea relationship helped improved China-­South Korea relations, which became strained in 2010 after North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and the shelling of a border village as China refused to denounce North Korea for escalating tensions. Many South Koreans believed that China should have adopted a sterner approach toward Pyongyang for its outrageous provocations. South Korea and China, however, embarked on a rapid rapprochement thereafter, due to the shared perception of an unabashedly aggressive Japan under Abe. President Park Geun-­Hye made her first state visit to China in June 2013 and proposed to president Xi to erect a memorial stone for Ahn Jung-­geun, a Korean national hero who assassinated Ito Hirobumi, a founding father of modern Japan, on the station platform of Harbin in China’s far north and was hanged in a Japanese prison in 1909. This was a bold suggestion as only a handful of foreign nationals were honored in such a way in China. Looking for ways to assail Abe’s government, China jumped on the idea. A full-­scale museum to Ahn opened in January 2014. A plate glass window at one end overlooks the spot on the platform where Ahn fired the fatal shots. This development underscores how complicated it is for Japan to work with South Korea to overcome historical issues and forge a geostrategic balance against China.

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 241

Conclusion: Japan-­US alliance still the central concern Because of the limitation in Japan’s non-­US diplomacy, China’s primary concern is still the Japan-­US security alliance and believes that enhanced security cooperation between Washington and Tokyo compromises China’s security interests. Although the United States has tried to persuade China that the alliance acts as a “cap on the bottle” that can prevent Japan from growing into a military power and some Chinese scholars recognize the alliance as a constraint on Japan’s remilitarization, most Chinese analysts are still concerned about the destabilizing aspect of the US-­centric alliance system. Shi Yongming even argues that in the context of the Abe government’s efforts to promote the “proactive pacifism” with the ideological basis on historical revisionism, the Japan-­US alliance has become more dangerous (Shi, 2015). One Chinese scholar wrote that the US-­Japan alliance is, in essence, an exclusive arrangement based on a zero-­sum-­game assumption and a worst-­case-­scenario calculation. The reinforcement of this alliance in the mid-­1990s as a response to the North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan Strait crisis merely strengthened the US stance in a potential crisis but did nothing to alleviate the tensions, let alone solve the problems. Instead, it exacerbated the security dilemma between China and the US-­Japan alliance and deepened China’s suspicion over Japan’s military role. Developments since the mid-­1990s convinced Beijing that the alliance had become an excuse for Japan to pursue a more active security policy. The “China factor” has played an even stronger role in US-­Japanese security cooperation in the 21st century. The concern with checking rising Chinese power has caused Washington to push for a more assertive Japanese security policy, shaping both the form and substance of US-­Japanese security cooperation. As Beijing continues to expand its material power and influence in Asia, Washington has sought to balance China’s rise through its campaign to return Japan to a “normal nation.” Contrary to past policies, the United States is now driving rather than constraining Japan’s rearmament. As a result, the US-­Japanese alliance has acted as a propellant of, rather than as a cap on, Japan’s military development (Wu, 2005–2006). China is, therefore, alarmed as Japan made efforts to renew its alliance with the US. In light of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, Japan has provided military ports, and base for the US conducted joint military exercises regularly and supported joint operations, including providing refueling assistance to coalition vessels in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean during the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) replaced the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2009, however, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama took a radical overhaul of foreign policy to have a more independent and equidistant position between the US and China. However, China’s hardline behavior in the September 2010 diplomatic showdown over the collision between a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels changed the dynamics as it demonstrated not only Japan’s vulnerability in relationship with China but also the difficulty in conducting an independent foreign policy without the US. This might force Tokyo to stand down from pursuing a more independent strategic

242  Suisheng Zhao diplomacy. China pushed many Japanese from an anti-­US position toward a more even and favorable view of the US. Prime Minister Hatoyama sought to distance Japan from the US, but his DPJ successors, especially Noda Yoshihiko, were forced to see the security treaty with the US as vital for dealing with tensions with China related to territorial disputes. After Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to office in 2012, he took bold steps to boost the alliance. Announcing Japan’s participation in TPP negotiations, Abe started a national debate on reinterpreting Japan’s peace constitution to remove restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-­defense (CSD), so that the SDF could assist the US in regional contingencies. Moving to reinterpret the constitution in a way that would recognize limited forms of collective self-­defense, Abe pressed the security bills, which will allow this reinterpretation to be implemented, to pass the lower house vote in July 2015 and the upper house of the Diet two months after, despite widespread voter opposition and mass protests. Clearing the way for a policy shift that could allow troops to fight overseas for the first time since the end of WWII, the bill allows Japan’s Self-­Defense Forces (SDF) to use military force to aid a foreign country in a close relationship with Japan if certain conditions are satisfied. Enabling legislation also expanded the scope for the SDF to provide logistical support to friendly countries and respond to “grey zone” infringements of Japanese territorial waters and airspace short of an armed attack. In addition, as a result of the review of the 1997 defense alliance guidelines with the US for the first time, Japan agreed in the new US-­Japan Defense Guidelines signed in April 2015 to operate more closely with, and possibly even fight alongside, US forces, which “injects a dose of equality into the bilateral relationship that potentially reduces Japan’s over-­dependence on the United States and charges of ‘free-­riding’ that threaten the relationship” (Newsham, 2015). Two Chinese scholars at Beijing’s Renmin University were very alarmed at indications that the new Guidelines transformed the US-­Japan alliance from “traditional security cooperation” into “all fronts (全方位) security cooperation,” from a “regional alliance” to a “global alliance,” from a “one-­sided assistance alliance” to a true “mutual assistance alliance,” and from a “primarily defensive alliance” to a “primarily offensive alliance” (Huang & Zhao, 2015). Abe’s efforts paid off. Although framing security concerns vis-­à-­vis China was always an area of divergence between Tokyo and Washington as the US tried to avoid publicly denouncing China in relations with Japan, the 2014 Joint Statement of the US-­Japan “two-­plus-­two” Security Consultative Committee meeting for the first time explicitly called China to embrace greater openness and transparency in its military capability as well as its defense spending. Barack Obama became the first sitting US president to explicitly declare that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are subject to the Japan-­US Security Treaty during his April 2014 visit to Japan. During his week-­long visit to the US in April 2015, meeting with President Obama and enjoying a state dinner, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to address a joint session of Congress. Sending a clear message that Japan is America’s willing ally, Abe was especially pleased when Obama repeated his

Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 243 statement that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fall under the ambit of the Mutual Security Treaty (Snyder, 2015). Beijing was very upset by the US reconfirmation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands covered by Article 5 of the US-­Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which authorizes the US to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack, and the US support to the Abe administration’s attempt to revise its interpretation of the Japanese constitution to exercise the “collective self-­defense” right, which would enable Japan to support US military activities when it comes to Asian security. As one Global Times editorial suggested, China has set its biggest goal of development as realizing a peaceful rise. Nevertheless, this single goal has been countered and contained by other powers, such as Japan and the U.S. The Diaoyu Islands have already become the outlet where these powers voice their hostility and resentment against China. China has managed to control this outlet, and respond with effective action. (Global Times, 2013) In this context, Japan’s continuing impertinence was perceived because the United States’ alliance with Japan gave Japanese nationalists the gumption to defy a rising China. “Consequently, when China attempts to gain control over disputed islands in the China seas, it does not only target at those claimants but also sends a signal of disapproval to the U.S.” (Pan, 2013). Regarding Japan, a rival and even enemy, as a proxy for US power, Beijing is convinced that the United States would try to benefit from territorial disputes in the East China Sea.

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Japan’s security strategy: a Chinese view 245 Zhu, Haiyan (朱海燕). (2014). Japan-­Australia Relations Moving Ward Alliance: The New Developments and Prospects (日澳关系同盟化的新发展及其前景). Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系), 8, 44–51. Zhu, Haiyan (朱海燕). (2015). An Analysis of the Abe Administration’s East Asian Strategy (日本安倍政府的东亚战略探析). Contemporary International Relations (现代国 际关系), 11, 44–51.

14 Conclusion Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford

Introduction This volume makes the argument that after decades of exclusively relying on the United States as its sole security partner, hence pursuing a policy of security isolationism toward all other nations, Japan since the end of the Cold War has abandoned security isolationism in favor of security engagement. This has involved establishing security or strategic partnerships with a range of new partners, ending special exceptions in its security policy for the US, and becoming more independent in security policy. In effect, this volume argues, this led to a less central role for the United States, or decentering in Japan’s security policy, as the US is now no longer as overwhelmingly as central as it used to be under the Yoshida Doctrine.1 Nonetheless, even though it is no longer Japan’s sole security partner, the US remains far and away Japan’s most important security partner. The core puzzle dealt with in this volume is namely: Why has Japan started building security relationships with other states since the end of the Cold War, ended special carve outs in policy for the US (e.g. arms sales), and become more independent in its security policy, even while maintaining or strengthening its alliance with the US? Moreover, how can we explain the paradox that while the US has become less central in Japan’s security policies, the Japan-US alliance has remained as strong, or stronger, than ever? The core concept of this volume is decentering which, on one end of the spectrum, can range from simply adding new security partners, without necessarily weakening, and even with the intention of even strengthening the formerly exclusive partnership, to abandonment of the formerly exclusive security partner. In addition, there are various levels in-­between where new security partners might improve the specific state’s security in domains not, or insufficiently, provided by the central security partner, broadening military experience by cooperating with other military forces, and a decline of centrality through improving one’s own security capabilities. In the case of Japan’s security policy, as Midford argues in Chapter 2, decentering means reducing the centrality of the US as outlined in Japan’s Security Strategy (2013), a policy of building security and strategic partnerships and other forms of security cooperation with non-­US actors. We identify three causal categories for explaining changes in Japan’s relations

Conclusion 247 with the United States: (1) changes in international structure, specifically changes in the distribution of capabilities (balance of power) that lead to changes in polarity, (2) changes in bilateral alliance dynamics, and (3) changes in Japan’s domestic political structure, including the electoral system, party politics, and public attitudes towards the SDF, nationalism, elite strategic culture, and security policy options. (See the section in Chapter 2 entitled Underlying motivations for decentering.)

Overview of findings In order to identify which factors are driving policy change in different areas this volume considers the phenomenon of decentering in four separate parts. First, it analyzes recent changes in Japan’s defense policy related to the loss of special carve-­outs for the US in policy. Second, this volume examines four bilateral security partnerships that have emerged since 2000, namely with Australia, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Third, it examines the way Japan’s involvement in multilateral missions and areas of policy coordination have led decentering through building security cooperation with new partners, both multilateral entities and states. The two chapters in Part IV provide American and Chinese reflections on Japan’s decentering. In Part I on Non-­American Directions in Defense Policy, the two chapters argue that Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution to permit a limited exercise of the right of collective self-­defense, and policy changes allowing for an expansion of arms transfers and co-­development with states other than the United States, represent indications of a careful attempt towards removing special exceptions for the US, while nonetheless remaining closely aligned with the United States. In Chapter 3 Wakefield comes to an ambivalent conclusion about the relevance and the message of the Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution in 2014 to allow the exercise of collective self-­defense (CSD). As far as Japan’s security ties and potential willingness for deeper involvement in US military operations are concerned, he concludes that the impact will likely be quite limited. Nonetheless, other security partners of Japan might interpret the reinterpretation as a first step toward a new willingness to engage in joint military operations with them that potentially involve the use of force. This might raise expectations in Australia, India, or among East Asian partners, that given the inward nature of Japan’s debate on CSD, Japan is not able to fulfil. However, adverse shifts in the security environment in the Asia-­Pacific and Indo-­Pacific regions might increase pressure on Japan from its security partners to become a more active military player. In the end, the reinterpretation of the constitution is a personal ideological project of Abe Shinzō that has less implications for decentering or recentering, at least for now, than meets the eye. The hypothesis that Wakefield’s conclusions come closest to supporting is the strategic independence hypothesis, although more in an ideological and inward-­looking sense than in terms of military security. In the longer run, the changes he analyses in Japan’s widening definition of CSD could offer greater potential for Japan to come to the defense of countries

248  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford other than the US, thereby lending support to the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism hypothesis, and perhaps to the hedging hypothesis. Hughes finds in Chapter 4 that Japan’s decision to remove the most onerous constraints on weapons export and co-­development are driven by a long-­standing desire to maintain and develop an indigenous defense industrial base, and to hedge both inside and outside of the US alliance. However, this goal has been pursued through co-­development with US allies and partners. At the same time, the main thrust of Japan’s arms transfer policy, at least in the short run, has been to further tighten force interoperability with the US military, a thrust that encompasses both cooperation with US allies as well as with the US itself. Both goals are currently limited by a lack of experience and capability necessary for international co-­development and weapons export. Overall, Hughes’ findings give strong support to the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism hypothesis of tightening security ties with the US through tightening security cooperation with allies, and secondarily to the hedging hypothesis for explaining Japan’s decentering from exclusive cooperation only with the US. The three chapters in Part II identity specific strategic motivations that led Japan to deepen its security ties with Australia, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Wilkin’s chapter concludes that despite Japan’s decentering from the US alliance by building an ostensibly independent security partnership with Australia, Tokyo is nonetheless still very much tied up with the regional hub and spokes structure of the US system of bilateral alliances, most notably the US-­Japan and US-­Australia alliances. By finding that Japan is essentially decentering from the US in order to re-­center on the regional US alliance system, and is attempting to build the ‘rim’ of the hub and spokes system, Wilkin’s conclusions are most consistent with the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism hypothesis, including a ‘federated defense model,’ and secondarily with the hedging hypothesis. In Chapter 6, Ishibashi finds that Japan’s decentering from an exclusive focus on the US and toward building a strategic partnership with India, is in fact based on a desire to promote India as a counter-­balance to China, a goal that is entirely consistent with, and even following, parallel US policy. Thus, Ishibashi’s findings regarding Japan’s promotion of a strategic partnership with India provide greatest support to the collective binding and the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism hypotheses, including attempts to move toward a ‘federated defense model.’ In Chapter 7 Grønning finds that Japan’s building of security cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam is driven by adverse changes in the regional balance of power and has been pursued in close cooperation with the US. Thus, Grønning’s findings are most consistent with the hedging hypothesis, specifically Japanese hedging against US relative decline, and also the collective binding hypothesis, specifically the desire to more closely bind the Philippines and Vietnam into the regional hub and spoke system of US regional alliances, or in the case of Vietnam, this system’s growing non-­alliance security partnerships. The four chapters in Part III highlight the significance of Japan’s initiatives to develop multilateral institutions in East Asia, its engagement and experience in

Conclusion 249 multilateral security missions, including counter-­piracy and peace building missions, as well as one of its core foreign policy instruments since the 1970s, development assistance. Yuzawa finds in Chapter 8 that since the early 2000s Japan’s policy toward regional security multilateralism has shifted from decentering from the Japan-­US alliance through promoting the ARF and other multilateral structures, and toward recentering on the regional US alliance system. During this latter period Tokyo came to view regional institutions primarily as a means for promoting greater US and allied collaboration for coping with China’s perceived challenges to the territorial and normative status-­quo in the region, instead of using regional security multilateralism as a means to diversify Japan’s security strategy beyond the US. Yuzawa’s chapter thus tends to support the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism hypothesis, including the federated defense sub-­hypothesis. Vosse concludes in Chapter 9 that Japan’s ongoing ten-­year-­plus deployment of its military to participate in multilateral counter-­piracy operations off the coast of Somalia has involved many, if not all, of the components of decentering processes. As one of the most active participants in these counter-­piracy operations, Japan has been able to deepen its understanding of governments and military forces other than those of the United States in various multilateral security dialogue and coordination fora, and through joint capacity building and training exercises. While it is not argued that this in itself will in any way weaken the US-­ Japan alliance, it demonstrates that Japan and the SDF can be a security partner for EU and European NATO countries. This potentially gives Japan more options regarding whether or not to support specific US security policies, and to participate in security missions that do not involve the US. Vosse’s chapter thus tends to support the gaining experience with new partners hypothesis, and secondarily the hedging hypothesis. In Chapter 10 Marie Söderberg finds that the last decade has seen a further deepening of EU-­Japan relations in a range of policy areas, many with relevance to regional and global security. Japan and the EU are both at a point in time where they want to become more influential global players. Both share a comprehensive and less military-­centric approach to security, which ranges from climate change and non-­proliferation to the challenges of hybrid warfare and a strong belief in working through the UN system. On the other hand, there are differences in threat perceptions, especially with respect to Russia and China. Therefore, their main area of cooperation has long been non-­traditional security issues such as development assistance, especially in Southeast Asia, Japan’s civilian cooperation in European CSDP missions in Mali, Niger, and Iraq, and since 2009 the MSDF-­ EUNAFVOR cooperation in the counter-­piracy mission ATALANTA in the Gulf of Aden. Söderberg argues that the 2018 EU-­Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the 2019 ‘Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union and Japan’ not only improve the legal and institutional bases for EU-­Japan security cooperation, but that they also constitute responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Overall, Japan’s cooperation with the EU has contributed significantly to Japan’s growing experience with

250  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford new partners and has improved the SDF’s military interoperability with non-­US militaries. This cooperation even provides a limited buffer against the ‘America first’ policy of the Trump administration. This chapter thus lends support to the gaining experience with new partners hypothesis, and secondarily to the hedging hypothesis. In Chapter 11 Yukiko Takezawa argues that Japan’s track record of involvement and accumulating experience in UN peacekeeping missions that were not under the control of the United States over the last decades has weakened Japan’s reliance on the United States, and led to some degree of decentering. Since its first PKO mission in Cambodia in 1992, Japan has gained operational experience in missions independent of the United States and Takezawa interprets these as signs of Japan’s eagerness for decentering and increased independence from US foreign and security policies, also Tokyo’s fear of entrapment in other US military missions. While originally considered exploratory and less important for the development of the SDF, UN PKO eventually came to be seen as having strategic importance, as they increasingly became more comprehensive, involving the integration of diplomacy, development, and defense policy. Finally, SDF PKO deployments offered opportunities to collaborate with European nations, multilateral organizations such as NATO and the EU in training, education, and military-­military cooperation. Over the years, Japan’s approach to peace building resembles more Europe’s civilian-­centered approach rather than that of the more military-­centered United States. Takezawa’s chapter thus lends support to the gaining experience with new partners hypothesis, and secondarily to the strategic independence and hedging hypotheses. The last two chapters in Part IV take a more critical view towards the decentering argument. In Chapter 12 Andrew L. Oros claims that the US pivot that began under the Obama administration is continuing under the Trump administration. One piece of evidence is the revised US-­Japan Security Guidelines of May 2015, which clearly demonstrate the continued centrality of the United States for Japan’s security. Although Trump withdrew from the TPP, he has further deepened military ties with Japan, evidenced by closer bilateral security cooperation, and by closer security cooperation with other regional partners. Abe has intensified Japan’s efforts to deepen ties with the Indo-­Pacific region, and Tokyo’s National Security Strategy (2013) aimed at further strengthening ties with the United States. Japan’s continued participation and even leadership in multilateral counter-­piracy efforts and its growing preparations for so-­called ‘gray zone’ conflicts indicate that the US-­Japan relationship is deepening. A central concern for many Japanese policy makers in recent years has been the risk of abandonment, which led to a deepening willingness for burden sharing. Oros concludes that the United States and Japan share similar visions for the Indo-­Pacific and a willingness to work together with several partners, introduced in more detail in several other chapters of this volume, and that these new partnerships do not challenge the continued centrality of the United States as Japan’s security partner. Oros’s chapter thus tends to support the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism and the collective binding hypotheses.

Conclusion 251 Finally, in Chapter 13 Suisheng Zhao observes that China has long considered the US-­Japan military alliance as a threat to China’s security, while at the same time believing that the United States is constraining Japan’s remilitarization rather than enabling it, because China has trusted Japan less than the United States. However, Abe’s ideology of historical revisionism, and his security policy of ‘proactive peace’ in combination with the deepening of security cooperation with the United States in the Indo-­Pacific region, is increasingly considered a security risk by many observers in China. Because the Koizumi and now the Abe administrations have used the China threat as a central component of their security policies and as a reason to deepen US-­Japan security ties, he concludes that rather than a constraining factor, the United States is acting as a catalyst of Japan’s militarization.2 Some Chinese scholars have even gone so far as to argue that the revised 2015 US-­Japan Security Guidelines have transformed the alliance from a regional to a global one. Zhao argues that the worsening of China-­Japan relations in recent years and the ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands increases the importance of the United States for Japan. By showing how decentering is leading Japan to cooperate more with US allies, Zhao’s chapter lends support to the decentering to US-­centered minilateralism and the collective binding hypotheses.

Synthesis The chapters in Parts 1, 2, and 3 of this volume demonstrate that since the end of the Cold War Japan has decentered or diversified its security policy away from exclusive focus on the US as Tokyo’s sole security partner. This decentering has provided Japan with new options it did not have during the Cold War: New options to support the US regional hub-­and-­spokes alliance network, including by developing its “minilateral rim,” to support US allies globally, and even new options for supporting the US directly. So far, more multifaceted support for the US, its regional alliance network, including even a federated defense model, and for US partners such as the EU, has been far and away the main result of Japan’s decentering. Nonetheless, this book also demonstrates that decentering has given Japan new options to pursue more independent security policies with its new security partners and to hedge against possible US unreliability and alliance failure. While Japan has so far not chosen to exercise these options, the fact that they exist at all is an important change and a major conclusion of this edited volume. With US global leadership currently in a period of great uncertainty, it is not inconceivable, should this uncertainty continue, that Japan will begin exercising these options to hedge US unreliability and pursue a more independent security strategy. Table 14.1 presents potential relationships between Japan’s policies and its motivations. Table 14.2 presents actual relationships between policies and motivations to date that this volume has revealed. Table 14.3 presents practical cooperation between Japan and other non-­US partners to date (2020). The codings in Tables 14.1 and 14.2 are relative to other policy options presented in these tables and this book, not relative to all possible policy options or outcomes. Thus, regarding

Arms Exports Collective Self-Defense Australia Partnership India Partnership Vietnam Partnership Philippines Partnership Asian Security Multilateralism Example 1: Maritime Piracy Example 2: Development Cooperation Example 3: Peacebuilding

Strong Strong Weak Strong Strong Weak Strong Weak N/A Weak

Strategic Independence Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak

Hedging Alliance Failure

Table 14.1  Potential relationships between Japan’s policies and motivations

Strong N/A Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong

Gaining Experience Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak

Collective Binding

Weak N/A N/A N/A N/A Weak Strong Strong Strong Weak

Buffering US-Japan Conflict

N/A N/A Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak

Intermediary for the US

252  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford

Conclusion 253 the hedging categories in Tables 14.1 and 14.2, the use of the term “strong” is relative to other options, but not in absolute terms relative to the continuation of the Japan-US alliance. As discussed earlier in this volume, Japan currently has only relatively weak and bad options in case of alliance failure. As Tables 14.1 and 14.2 reveal, the most consistently strong result of Japan’s decentering from its previous position of having the US as its exclusive security partner is gaining experience. Table 14.1 shows that Japan can gain experience with US allies and leaning states, experience, including through weapons sales and co-­development with non-­US partners. Japan can also accumulate experience through cooperating with non-­US partners in various forms of multilateralism, including East Asian regional multilateralism, and global multilateralism for combating piracy, promoting development, and engaging in UN, and recently non­UN, sponsored peacekeeping. The findings of this book, as depicted in Table 14.2 reveal that the theoretical expectations laid out in Chapter 2 have by and large been met, with the partial exception of arms sales and weapons co-­development, which have to date only given Japan moderate opportunities to accumulate experience with non-­US partners. Although Japan has launched a number of weapons co-­development programs with non-­US states, mostly US allies in Europe, Japan has to date not been very successful selling weapons overseas, in part because Japan and its companies still lack sufficient experience and know-­how to be competitive in a very competitive global arms market. However, there is reason to expect that this may change over time as Japanese companies socialize to international arms markets and gain experience. In one area Japan has recently been recentering in a way that may undermine the experiential gains that this book has identified. Specifically, the Abe administration’s complete withdrawal from SDF unit-­level deployments to UN PKO since 2017, by creating a situation that can be called Japan’s “PKO zero,” essentially for the first time since 1992 (see the discussion in Takezawa’s chapter), can be seen as a case of recentering in that it is reducing what was a major form of security interaction with non-­US partners. This has happened despite over a dozen ongoing UN PKOs in need of troops. Although Japan has continued to deploy around three officers to UNMISS headquarters in South Sudan, and more recently set a new precedent in Japan’s security policy by deploying a similarly small number of officers to the headquarters of the ongoing peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, Japan’s first deployment to a non-­UN sponsored PKO, these deployments are too small to give the SDF the kind of experience it previously had with boots-­on-­ the-­ground unit-level deployments to peacekeeping operations. Indeed, unit-­level peacekeeping participation helped the SDF, especially the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), build experience cooperating with various non-­US militaries, as well as gain experience operating in challenging (especially infrastructure deprived) and remote locations. The decision to eliminate boots-­on-­the-­ground unit-­level contributions also appears to reflect a casualty and combat risk minimizing strategy. Wakefield notes in his chapter on CSD that the debate over exercising this right and the security legislation of 2015, that was supposedly going to underwrite a pro-­active contribution to peace, was in fact very inward looking, a debate that often centered

Source: Authors’ creation

Arms Exports Collective Self-Defense Australia India Partnership Vietnam Partnership Philippines Partnership Asian Security Multilateralism Example 1: Maritime Piracy Example 2: Development Cooperation Example 3: Peacebuilding

Weak Strong Weak Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak N/A Weak

Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Moderate Weak Weak Weak

Weak Weak Moderate Moderate Weak Weak Moderate Weak Weak Weak

Medium N/A Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong

Weak Strong Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak

Weak Weak Strong Moderate Moderate Weak N/A Weak Weak Weak

Weak N/A Strong Weak Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong Weak

Weak N/A Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong

Intermediary Collective Decentering from Buffering Gaining Hedging Signaling Strategic Abandonment Experience Binding bilateral alliance Conflict with for the US Independence to US-centered the US Minilateralism

Table 14.2  Actual relationships between policies and motivations (in this volume)

254  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford

Source: Authors’ creation

Australia India Philippines Vietnam Collective Self-Defense Arms transfers Maritime piracy ops Development coop CBM Countries: China ROK Russia

Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No

No No No No N/A N/A No No

Yes No No No Yes Yes N/A Yes No Yes No

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A Yes N/A No No No

No No No

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes Yes

Joint military PKOs Confidence Building exercises (Coop with Measures (CBMs) new partners) with foreign militaries

Yes Negotiating No No N/A Yes No No

Joint military SOFA ACSA operations

No (working level dialogue) No No (working level dialogue) No Yes No

Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A

Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Consultations (2 + 2)

Table 14.3  Practical security cooperation between Japan and non-­US partners to date

Conclusion 255

256  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford more on defense of Japanese territory than possible SDF use of force overseas. Abe himself has often personified this inward-looking dynamic by focusing on his dissatisfaction with previous constitutional interpretations rather than with strategic rationales for constitutional reinterpretation, suggesting that the shift to PKO zero, and from proactive pacifism to passive pacifism, arguably reflects a partial resurgence of isolationism in Japanese security policy, at least at the global level, and at least as far as the Abe administration and Abe himself are concerned. This is certainly a case of recentering. While decentering has been most beneficial for Japan in terms of gaining experience working with non-­US militaries and partners, on the other end of the spectrum decentering has not offered major benefits for hedging failure of the US-­Japan alliance to date. Although a range of decentering policies, including diversifying arms exports and co-­development, reclaiming the right to collective self-­defense, and various bilateral partnerships have a relatively strong potential for hedging alliance failure in theory, in practice almost all of the decentering policy options have proven weak, with the possible exceptions of bilateral security partnerships with Australia and India, and Asian multilateralism. Even in the case of Australia and India, their moderate potential to help hedge abandonment is arguably still mostly potential. In the case of Asian security multilateralism this can be considered to have a moderate potential to hedge alliance failure in that it can be used to build confidence, reduce mutual threat perceptions, and perhaps aid reconciliation with opponents. The fact that the Hatoyama administration initially chose this approach (and that the Abe administration has more recently been attempting a parallel policy of limited reconciliation with China, albeit not an approach so centered on regional multilateralism), suggests that this remains a serious policy option in case of abandonment and alliance failure. As Japan’s weapons co-­development and arms sales have yet to realize much success this has also not yet proven to have much potential as a hedging strategy. As the CSD rights that the Japanese government has claimed for itself are extremely limited, it remains difficult for Japan to promise much in the way of military assistance to a would-­be ally, even if capacity were not an issue. Although all the alternatives to the alliance are far worse for Japan than alliance continuance, that is not to say that decentering has not been useful for hedging possible alliance failure, as even modest preparations for such an adverse event are more rational than none at all. In terms of the related category of using forms of decentering as a way to signal the US of a possible intent to abandon the alliance, all options to date have proven to be weak, with the partial exception of regional security multilateralism. As Takezawa discusses in her chapter, the 1994 Higuchi Report that appeared to prioritize security multilateralism over the US alliance alarmed US Japan hands in Washington (e.g. Cronin and Green), and according to some, prompted the US to therefore stop prioritizing bilateral economic disputes and begin a process of reaffirming and redefining the alliance starting with the 1995 Nye Report and the 1996 Clinton-­Hashimoto joint declaration on the alliance. (See also Sugita, 2015, p. 17; Midford, 2020, Chapter 7). Similarly, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s proposal

Conclusion 257 for an East Asian Community seemed to capture US attention and even concern, although Hatoyama proved incapable of capitalizing on this opportunity. Collective binding, which is one way to mitigate the risks of abandonment and entrapment, also appears to be somewhat stronger in theory than in practice, especially regarding arms exports and co-­development, where Japan’s success in building ties with other US allies and leaning states has remained limited. In principle Japan can build relations with US allies in order to try to put collective pressure on the US when the danger of abandonment or entrapment arises. In practice, this has only appeared to be a viable option in the case of Australia, as India and Vietnam are only US-friendly states instead of being full allies, and the Philippines is estranged from its erstwhile US ally. Regarding decentering from exclusive reliance on a closed Japan-US alliance toward US centered minilateralism or regional security network, so far only the security partnership with Australia has arguably contributed significantly to this development. That is because India and Vietnam remain US friendly but decidedly outside of US alliance and military coalition frameworks. Hence, building partnerships with these countries only moderately contributes toward building US-centered minilateralism. The Philippines under President Duterte is alienated from the US and by extension potentially from a US-centered regional security minilateralist system, hence Japan’s security cooperation with Manila currently is only a weak means for promoting regional minilateralism. Decentering has created some options for Japan to buffer itself from bilateral conflicts. Its security partnership with Australia gives it opportunities to try to work together with Canberra to restrain US unilateralism that could lead to entrapment or abandonment while avoiding bilateral confrontation (see also collective binding). Similarly, Asian multilateralism (also regional minilateralism), specifically multilateral cooperation on piracy and development assistance also provide Japan with opportunities to make meaningful security contributions in ways that do not depend on US cooperation or that might lead to issue linkage (e.g. over trade or other economic conflicts). Decentering offers strong opportunities for Japan to act as an intermediary for the US. The Philippines currently is the most obvious case of this; Thailand is another case. Japan can act as an intermediary and bridge between the US and erstwhile allies who have a bad relationship with Washington. In the case of Vietnam, the relationship is not especially bad, but the US relationship with Vietnam remains constrained by American ideologically allergic reactions to any communist regime. Similarly, Japan can use regional security multilateralism as a platform for mediating between the US and various Asian states in conflict with Washington, including China and North Korea (similar to the bilateral efforts the Abe administration have been making with respect to Iran). In combating maritime piracy, Japan can build cooperation through the multilateral frameworks it has promoted to build cooperation with countries the US has difficulty cooperating with, such as Iran, Philippines, and Russia, and to a more limited degree Malaysia and Indonesia. Given the toxicity of nation-­building policies and foreign aid in US politics (except for a few select US allies and the context of very

258  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford specific and narrow US interests), Japan can use its bilateral state-­to-­state partnerships, the EU and multilateral security frameworks to promote development and conflict resolution in places where the US does not want to become involved (e.g. Aceh or Sri Lanka), or has disqualified itself by taking sides (e.g. Mindanao). The same goes for PKO, as Japan, at least until 2017, proved itself far more willing, and in some ways more able, than the US to contribute to PKO and peacekeeping. Table 14.3 gives examples of practical security cooperation between Japan and partners other than the US to date. Foreign and Defense Minister Dialogues, or so-­called 2 + 2 ministerial meetings, that Japan once only held with the US, have spread to five other security partners: Australia, India, the Philippines and Vietnam, and even Russia, who is not a security partner aligned with the US, but rather a US competitor. These dialogues can facilitate further cooperation in other areas. For example, the launch of the Japan-­India 2 + 2 Dialogue in ­November 2019 is facilitating bilateral negotiations for an ACSA agreement. This is Japan’s fifth such dialogue with a country other than the US, and this is India’s first 2 + 2 Dialogue with a country other than the US (Jain, 2019; Rajagopalan, 2019). The 2 + 2 ministerial meetings with Australia have also coincided with the conclusion of an ACSA agreement, similar to the UK, which concluded an ACSA with Japan two years after holding their first 2 + 2 ministerial meeting (MoFA, 2017). 2 + 2 ministerial meetings also appear to correlate with, or in the case of Japan and India, perhaps grow out of, bilateral military exercises. India and Japan have established regular, if not annual military exercises between their three military services, starting with naval exercises, then expanding to air force, and finally ground force, joint exercises (Jain, 2019). In the case of out-­of-­region partner France, the emergence and rapid expansion of military exercises after 2014 has not yet catalyzed the establishment of a 2 + 2 ministerial process. On the other hand, Japan to date has not concluded a permanent SOFA with any of its security partners, although Tokyo has been negotiating a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Australia, which would offer reciprocal access to each other’s territories and bases (whereas a SOFA just offers one-­way access) (Jiji, 2020). The Japan-­Australia RAA could pave the way for future RAAs with other partners, including India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and perhaps Canada, France, and the UK. To date PKOs have not proven to be a significant dimension of cooperation with Japan’s new regional security partners, with the partial exception of Australia. However, PKO cooperation has become a significant dimension of cooperation between Japan and the EU, and with several European countries, most notably the Netherlands and Sweden (see Takezawa’s chapter). Regarding what Table 14.3 identifies as the so-­called ‘CBM countries,’ namely China, South Korea, and Russia, it is important to emphasize that military-­ confidence building between Japan and these countries also represents an important dimension of Japan’s decentering since the end of the Cold War, albeit one this book has not been able to cover in any depth. CBMs can enhance national security by reducing the chance of accidental war through misperception, a role that

Conclusion 259 is especially important in the case of China and Russia. CBMs can also be used to build mutual confidence in each other’s intentions, paving the way eventually for deeper security cooperation. For example, Japan’s CBMs and reassurance diplomacy toward Southeast Asia over several decades helped pave the way for the development of security cooperation between Japan on the one hand, and the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia on the other (regarding this cooperation see Grønning’s chapter in this volume). It is also worth noting that before the end of the Cold War Japan’s security isolationism meant that Japan did not engage in any military to military CBMs with other countries. With the exception of peacekeeping cooperation with South Korea, Japan’s military cooperation with these nations has so far not included cooperation in peacekeeping, or joint military exercises, except for confidence-­building type joint military exercises involving non-­combat focused operations such as search and rescue, and joint participation in HaDR military training through the ARF and ADMM Plus.

Conclusions During the Cold War the US was Japan’s sole security partner. This volume has demonstrated that since the end of the Cold War Japan has abandoned security isolationism combined with reliance on the US as its sole security partner in favor of security engagement with a wide range of countries and actors. This has involved establishing security or strategic partnerships with a range of new partners, ending special exceptions in its security policy for the US, and becoming more independent in security policy. This volume argues these changes led to a less central role for the United States, or decentering, as the US was no longer as overwhelmingly as central as it used to be. Nonetheless, the US has remained very central in Japan’s security policy, its ‘cornerstone.’ Yet, since the end of the Cold War Japan has added more stones to the wall that compose its security policy. This book has demonstrated that Japan has so far overwhelmingly used this decentering and diversification not to weaken its alliance with the US, but actually to strengthen it, mostly by building security partnerships with US allies and friendly countries. In this sense, Japan could be said to be decentering from an exclusively bilateral security alliance with the US toward a regional US-­centered security network where the alliance becomes more of an open platform than a closed alliance. Tokyo can also be said to be developing the multilateral rim of the hub-and-spokes structure of bilateral alliances radiating out from the US toward partners in East Asia, starting with the Japan-­US alliance. Yet, decentering has also allowed Japan to develop new options for security cooperation with partners other than the US, options that Japan can find useful for hedging against possible US abandonment and alliance failure. These options do not represent anything approaching complete substitutes for the alliance, far from it, but they nonetheless represent useful options and tools in case of alliance failure. Short of such a dire outcome, Japan’s decentering through building security partnerships with US allies and leaning states can also help Tokyo to manage, together with other states, their common US ally and partner, managing the risks

260  Wilhelm Vosse and Paul Midford of entrapment as well as abandonment. Given the highly volatile and uncertain era that US foreign policy and the Japan-­US alliance have entered since the beginning of the Trump administration, Japan may soon start focusing more on the hedging potential its security decentering offers.

Notes 1 See the introduction and Chapter 2 for more detailed overviews of this development. 2 For a similar conclusion regarding China’s reaction to the revised Japan-US defense guidelines of 1997, see Midford, 2004.

References Cronin, P. M., and Green, M. J. (1994). Redefining the US-­Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program (McNair Paper 31). Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Jain, Punendra. (2019). Shared Anxieties Drive India-­Japan Defence Ties Upgrade. East Asia Forum, 12 December. www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/12/12/shared-­anxieties-­dr. Accessed 22 February 2020. Jiji. (2020). Japan, Australia Look to Hammer Out Status of Forces Pact in June. Japan Times, 24 February. Midford, Paul. (2004). China Views the Revised US-­Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork? International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific, 4(1), 113–145. Midford, Paul. (2020). Overcoming Isolationism: Japan’s Leadership in East Asian Security Multilateralism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. MoFA. (2017). Nichi-­ei butsuhin yakumu sōgo teikyō kyōtei no hakkō [Promulgation of the Japan-­ UK Mutual Service Agreement]. www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/ press4_004920.html. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. (2019). India-­ Japan Strategic Relations: The Dialogue Has Strategic Implications Beyond the Bilateral Relationship Itself. The Diplomat, 29 November. https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/22-­dialogue-­will-­further-­ce. Accessed 22 February 2020. Sugita, Yoneyuki. (2015). U.S.-­Japan Relations in Transition. In Yoneyuki Sugita (Ed.), Toward a More Amicable Asia-­Pacific Region: Japan’s Roles. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. pp. 5–26.

Index

abandonment 7, 13 – 15, 17 – 19, 46, 49, 56, 133, 139, 148, 189, 218, 225, 246, 250, 254, 256, 259; signaling abandonment 17 Abbott, Tony 56, 73, 76, 80 Abenomics 73 Abe Shintarō 32, 41 Abe Shinzō 27, 49, 74, 109, 182, 216, 228, 247 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) 12, 70, 75, 255, 258 ACSA see Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement Action Plan for Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership 55 ADIZ see Air Defense Identification Zone ADMM Plus see ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus Aegis Radar System 48, 57, 61, 97 Afghanistan 98, 159, 167, 185, 194, 199, 224, 230, 241 Africa 154, 157, 165, 167, 189, 197, 229 Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 55 Ahn Jung-geun 240 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 71, 147 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) 162, 168, 194, 201 alignment 12, 46, 68, 73, 99, 146 alliance security dilemma 6, 11, 18 alliance tightening 13f AMF see Asian Monetary Fund ANZUS see Australia New Zealand US Security Treaty APEC see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Aquino, Benigno 27, 235 ARF see ASEAN Regional Forum

Arms Export Ban 6, 44, 51 – 54 ASDF see Air Self-Defense Force ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) 146, 259 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 131 ASEAN PMC see ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN PMC) 133, 135, 136 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 67, 72, 76, 90, 96, 131, 133, 136, 145 – 149, 180, 217, 221, 249, 259 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 138 Asia-Pacific 16, 27, 41, 45, 49, 67, 72, 76, 88, 90, 98, 131, 133 – 136, 142 – 148, 150, 191, 221, 225, 229, 235, 247 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 72, 90, 135, 145 Asō Tarō 52, 87, 96, 155 Australia 2 – 4, 6, 9, 13, 16, 27, 45, 49, 53, 55 – 58, 67 – 85, 88, 92 – 94, 96, 98 – 100, 133, 140 – 142, 163, 166, 168, 181, 201, 221 – 223, 228, 231, 233 – 235, 238, 247, 252, 254 – 258 Australia New Zealand US Security Treaty (ANZUS) 71, 78 Bahrain 155, 160 balance of power 15, 113, 134, 222, 247 balancing 17, 72, 92, 117, 145, 150, 218, 235, 237 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 49, 52, 57 bandwagoning 17, 217 Bangladesh 140 Barroso, Jose Manuel 167 bipolarity 15, 134, 148, 149 Bléjean, Hervé 161 BMD see Ballistic Missile Defense

262 Index Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 179 Brexit 175, 179 buffering conflict 19 Burma (Myanmar) 98, 223 Bush, George W. 91, 94, 100, 193 Cambodia 3, 69, 135, 190 – 192, 200, 204, 234, 238, 250 Cam Ranh Bay 113 CBM see Confidence Building Measures CDP see Constitutional Democratic Party CGPCS see Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia China 4, 6 – 8, 15, 17, 27, 33, 39, 49, 55, 68, 71, 74, 76 – 78, 86 – 101, 107, 109 – 111, 113 – 116, 118, 121 – 123, 133, 136, 139 – 150, 159, 166, 169, 175, 179, 184, 186, 191, 194, 200, 217 – 221, 228 – 243, 248, 251, 255 – 259 Clinton, Bill 91, 139 collective binding 18, 248, 250 – 252, 257 collective self-defense (CSD) 2, 5 – 8, 13, 27 – 36, 40, 49, 57, 73, 90, 120, 155, 165, 175, 180 – 183, 185, 187, 195, 225, 228, 242, 247, 249, 253, 255 Combined Maritime Forces 154, 160 Common Security and Defence Policy (of the EU) (CSDP) 175, 180 – 183, 185, 187, 249 comprehensive security 178, 232 Confidence Building Measures (CBM) 4, 8, 75, 136, 194, 199, 255, 258 Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) 28, 36 Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 154 – 156, 158 – 160, 164 – 166, 168 counter-piracy 2, 6, 12, 154 – 169, 171, 173, 198, 201, 249 CSD see collective self-defense CSDP see Common Security and Defense Policy (of the EU) CTF151 160 cyberspace 12, 49 decentering 2 – 8, 11 – 19, 21, 23, 27, 67, 78 – 81, 99, 116, 123, 131 – 133, 135 – 139, 141 – 143, 145 – 151, 153, 168, 189, 203 – 205, 217, 246 – 251, 253, 256 – 260 Defense Production Committee (DPC) 47 Defense Equipment Cooperation Framework 54

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 5, 14, 36, 38, 47, 52, 53, 69, 143, 156, 167, 216, 217, 219, 220, 223, 241, 242 Diaoyu islands see Senkaku islands Diet 30 – 32, 37 – 39, 52, 54, 120, 143, 155, 166, 182, 196, 225; Lower House 15, 36, 242; Upper House 52, 182, 242 distribution of capabilities 15, 247 Djibouti 154, 157 – 165, 168, 171, 201; Djibouti-Ambouli Airport 162 Dokdo see Takeshima Island DPJ see Democratic Party of Japan Duterte, Rodrigo 19 EAC see East Asian Community EAS see East Asian Summit East Asian Community (EAC) 13, 72, 92, 131, 257 East Asian Summit (EAS) 72, 86, 131 East China Sea 49, 71, 101, 116, 121, 144, 147, 233 – 235, 237, 243 EEZ see Exclusive Economic Zone entente 12 entrapment 14, 16, 46, 49, 56, 78, 133, 189, 204, 218, 250, 257, 260 Eugene Diaz del Rio 160 EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) 168, 200, 249 EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) 154, 160 – 163, 166 – 168, 171, 181, 201, 208 EUNAVFOR see EU Naval Forces European Union (EU) 2, 6, 133, 154, 167, 180, 183, 186, 196, 249 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 77, 94, 144, 145 federated defense 18, 86, 97 – 99, 248, 251 Finland 164, 201 FOIP see Free and Open Indo-Pacific Foreign Policy Bureau 136 France 45, 55, 58, 110, 112, 168, 178, 183, 200, 205, 235, 258 Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) 40, 110 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 72, 79, 147, 150 Fukuda Doctrine 223 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 217 gaining experience with new partners 18, 249 Germany 166, 176 – 178, 201, 232, 238 global commons 12, 143

Index  263 Great East Japan Earthquake 75, 217 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 3, 8, 53, 162, 170, 191, 194, 197, 202, 207, 253 GSDF see Ground Self-Defense Force Gulf of Aden 49, 113, 154 – 165, 167, 181, 195, 197, 201, 249 HaDR see Humanitarian and Disaster Relief hedging 3, 7 – 9, 13, 17, 44 – 47, 57, 79, 98, 140, 148, 236, 248 – 250, 252 – 254, 256, 259 Higuchi report 5, 17, 190, 256 Hirabayashi Hiroshi 91 hub and spokes 198, 248, 259 Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HaDR) 4, 12, 73, 75, 111, 195, 203 – 205, 259 Ikeda Hayato 91 India 2 – 4, 6, 13, 16, 18, 27, 45, 49, 55 – 58, 68, 73, 79, 86 – 101, 103 – 105, 140 – 142, 156, 159, 161, 163, 166, 168, 193 – 195, 220, 223, 228, 231 – 234, 237, 241, 243, 247, 252, 254 – 258 Indian Navy 4, 86, 98, 232 Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program between Japan and NATO 166 Indonesia 79, 138, 140, 141, 181, 195, 218, 220, 221, 234, 235, 238, 257, 259 Indo-Pacific 72, 79, 82, 86, 98, 101, 142, 147, 215 – 218, 220 – 223, 225, 247, 250 Information Sharing Agreement 55, 70 Iran 98, 186, 204, 257 Iraq 8, 15, 33, 49, 74, 98 – 100, 164, 181, 185, 193, 199, 201, 204, 230, 241, 249 Ishihara Shintarō 119 Ito Hiroshi 161 Japan Coast Guard (JCG) 121, 156, 218 JCG see Japan Coast Guard Jishu gaikō 13, 16, 203 JS Inazuma 161 JS Izumo 113 JS Samidare 155, 160, 171 Juba 197 Kaketsuke-Keigo 189, 196, 202, 204 Kaneda Hideaki 121 Kan Naoto 52, 143, 217 Kantei 15, 59, 127, 161, 170, 172, 194 – 196, 204, 226 Katō Kōichi 88, 97 Kitaoka Shinichi 33, 89

Kōchikai 88 Kōda Yūji 120 Koizumi Jun’ichirō 193 Kōmeitō 34, 120 Kōno Yōhei 88 Laos 136 Lee Myung-bak 240 LDP see Liberal Democratic Party Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 33, 37, 38, 39, 47, 52, 86, 87, 88, 89, 97, 99, 101, 143, 155, 182, 216, 223, 241 Maehara Seiji 143 Malaysia 137, 138, 140, 235, 257 Mali 5, 16, 40, 49, 68, 73, 88 – 90, 134, 154, 157, 160, 162 – 165, 167 – 169, 181, 185, 189, 197, 204, 219, 240, 249 Maritime Piracy 2, 6, 12, 17, 49, 52, 113, 137 – 140, 151, 154 – 171, 173, 181, 189, 195, 197, 201, 218, 249, 252 – 255, 257 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) 3, 55, 86, 97 – 99, 110 – 113, 118, 120 – 122, 155, 160 – 165, 167, 181, 185, 194, 197, 201, 218, 232, 249 MELCO see Mitsubishi Electric Company Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges 55 MHI see Mitsubishi Heavy Industry minilateralism 18, 248 – 251, 254, 257 Mitsubishi Electric Company (MELCO) 55 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (MHI) 48, 76 Miyazawa Ki’ichi 88 Modi, Narendra 55, 88 Mori Yoshirō 87, 137 Morimoto Satoshi 122 MSDF see Maritime Self-Defense Force multilateralism 1, 5, 13, 17, 131 – 133, 135 – 150, 184, 249, 252 – 254, 256 multipolarity 15, 231 Nagai Yōnosuke 16 Nakayama Tarō 133 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 52, 54, 107, 115, 165, 191, 194, 197 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) 1, 17, 190 National Security Council (NSC) 2, 44, 54, 55, 107, 110, 114, 118, 119, 165, 180, 195 National Security Strategy (NSS) 1, 44, 54, 62, 68, 82, 107, 114, 118, 165, 172, 180, 195, 220, 223, 250

264 Index nationalism 44, 56, 74, 96, 107, 118, 123, 247 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDPG see National Defense Program Guidelines NDPO see National Defense Program Outline Nigeria 185 Nishihara Masashi 19 Noda Yoshihiko 5, 53, 143, 216, 228, 242 Nonaka Hiromu 88 normalization 16, 68, 73, 88, 134, 189, 197, 204, 240 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 13, 33, 39, 45, 54, 154, 160, 162, 164, 166, 168, 171, 173, 176, 180, 183, 185, 187, 199, 203, 205, 249 NSC see National Security Council NSS see National Security Strategy Nye Initiative 18, 256 Obama, Barrack 37, 98, 110, 146, 179, 215, 221 – 223, 237, 242, 250 Obuchi Keizō 137 Ōhira Masayoshi 178 Onodera Itsunori 34, 160, 235 outer space 12, 49, 225 P3C 160 Park Geun-Hye 240 passive pacifism 205, 256 peacekeeping 3, 14, 34, 36, 182, 190, 195 – 197, 201, 205, 250, 253, 258; PKF 191, 192, 207 Philippine Coast Guard 110, 181, 235 Philippines 6, 13, 19, 27, 34, 55, 58, 75, 107 – 113, 115 – 123, 125, 127, 144, 158, 181, 194, 218, 220 – 222, 229, 231, 233, 235, 238, 247, 252, 254, 257 – 259 PKO 13, 53, 69, 73 – 75, 111, 164, 189 – 193, 195 – 197, 200 – 206, 250, 253, 255, 258; PKO zero 13, 197, 204, 253, 256 practical security cooperation 73, 185, 199 – 201, 205, 251, 255, 258 proactive contributions to peace 29, 40, 87, 205, 241, 256 public opinion 28, 36, 94, 120, 191, 205 RAA see Reciprocal Access Agreement Rasmussen, Fogh 166 RCEP 4, 15, 45, 57, 78, 113, 116, 147, 158, 200, 240, 249, 256, 258

recentering 6, 11 – 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 131 – 133, 135, 137, 139, 141 – 143, 145 – 151, 153, 203, 247, 249, 253, 256 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) 75, 258 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 232 ROEs see Rules of Engagement Rules of Engagement (ROEs) 182, 189, 191 Russia 2, 4, 8, 13, 69, 71, 116, 122, 136, 159, 175, 195, 199, 216, 220, 229, 249, 255, 257 – 259 SDF see Self-Defense Forces Sea Lanes of Communications 115, 121, 144, 155 Sea of Japan 97, 235 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 1, 3, 7, 14, 16, 28, 30, 34 – 37, 40, 44, 47 – 49, 53 – 55, 73, 75, 82, 86, 97 – 99, 110 – 113, 118, 120 – 122, 154 – 156, 160 – 169, 177, 180 – 182, 189 – 205, 209, 218, 220, 232, 236, 242, 247, 249, 253, 256 Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands 34, 71, 101, 122, 144, 217, 232, 242, 251 Shangri-La Dialogue 147 Sinai 14, 253 Singapore 53, 92, 98, 99, 136, 140, 141, 147, 157, 158, 238 SOFA see Status of Forces Agreement Solana, Javier 167 Somalia 6, 40, 154, 157, 160, 162, 165, 167 – 169, 181, 249 South China Sea 6, 27, 40, 56, 71, 98, 110, 116, 118, 121, 144, 147 – 149, 218, 230, 233 South Korea 4, 8, 49, 53, 68, 74, 76, 79, 91, 98, 101, 133, 137, 140, 161, 163, 178, 186, 218, 220 – 222, 235, 237, 239, 258 South Sudan 14, 53, 74, 162, 182, 189, 196, 204, 253 Sri Lanka 98, 140, 194, 258 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 12, 31, 75, 112, 236, 255, 258 Strait of Hormuz 36, 98, 165, 208 strategic independence 16, 247, 250 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) 7, 12, 13, 18, 21, 45, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 86, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 119, 120, 123, 140, 142, 143, 168, 185, 186, 200, 229, 233, 235, 246, 248, 249, 259

Index  265 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 175, 184 Suzuki Zenko 178 Sweden 164, 200, 205, 258 Taiwan 14, 94, 98, 191, 220, 221, 241 Takamizawa Nobushige 34 Takeshima (Dokdo) Island 240 Tanaka Hitoshi 89, 92, 94, 96 Thailand 19, 33, 55, 61, 138, 222, 234, 257 Timor Leste 181 TPP see Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 67, 76, 146, 150, 175, 223, 231, 242, 250 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue 79, 233 tripolarity 221 Trump, Donald J. 37, 57, 67, 79, 84, 150, 175, 186, 215, 219, 221 – 225, 235, 250, 260 Turnbull, Malcolm 71, 77, 83 Typhoon Haiyan 75, 236 Ukraine 164, 175, 179, 185 UNCLOS see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea unipolarity 15 United Kingdom 4, 166, 168 United Nations 144, 155, 157, 162, 177, 179, 184, 191, 195, 199, 203, 220

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 144, 155, 229, 231 United States 1, 7, 16, 27 – 29, 33, 35, 37, 39 – 41, 67, 69, 74, 78, 86, 88 – 91, 93, 96 – 101, 117, 133, 135 – 140, 154, 161, 169, 177, 182, 189, 202, 215 – 225, 235, 237, 239, 241 – 243, 246, 249 – 251, 259 UNMISS 53, 162, 196, 253 UNSC see UN Security Council UN Security Council (UNSC) 95, 190, 194, 196, 198, 203, 232 US-Japan Defense Guidelines 18, 191, 242 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation 49, 217, 220, 224 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security 18, 217 values-based diplomacy 69, 72 Vietnam 6, 14, 55, 58, 107 – 113, 115 – 123, 125, 127, 136, 144, 178, 181, 218, 220, 223, 229, 231, 234, 238, 247, 252, 254, 257 – 259 Watanabe Akio 18 Yanagisawa Kyōji 34 Yanai Shunji 136 Yoshida Doctrine 1, 13, 46, 49, 86, 177, 246 Yoshida Shigeru 1, 46