Neither Good Nor Bad : Why Human Beings Behave How They Do [1 ed.] 9781443861915, 9781443859035

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Neither Good Nor Bad

Neither Good Nor Bad: Why Human Beings Behave How They Do

By

Gerhard Besier

Neither Good Nor Bad: Why Human Beings Behave How They Do By Gerhard Besier This book first published 2014 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2014 by Gerhard Besier All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5903-6, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5903-5

CONTENTS Contents ...................................................................................................... v List of Abbreviations ................................................................................. vi List of Figures.......................................................................................... viii Foreword ................................................................................................... ix Introduction ............................................................................................... xi Chapter One ................................................................................................ 1 Perpetrators and Victims, Bystanders and Opponents: Human Behavior in Specific Contexts Chapter Two ............................................................................................. 73 Stereotypes, Prejudice and Social Discrimination Chapter Three ......................................................................................... 156 Experience, Narration and Memory Chapter Four ........................................................................................... 246 Emotional Behavior: Cognitive Processes and Endocrinal Systems Chapter Five ........................................................................................... 329 Religion as a Social and Biological Phenomenon: From the “Supposedly Actual” to a “Pretend World” Conclusion .............................................................................................. 358 Neither Good Nor Bad: What to Consider Before Judging Others Index ....................................................................................................... 368

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACTH ADHD BdV BGH Bold CDU/CSU

adrenocorticotropic hormone attention deficit hyperactivity disorder Bund der Vertriebenen (Association of Expellees) Bundesgerichthof (Federal Court of Justice in Germany) blood oxygen level dependent Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands / ChristlichSoziale Union in Bayern (Christian Democratic Union of Germany / Christian Social Union of Bavaria, Germany) CNS central nervous system COMT catechol-O-methyltransferase CRH corticotropin-releasing hormone CS conditioned stimulus CT computed tomography DNA deoxyribonucleic acid EEG electroencephalography ERPs event-related potentials EU European Union FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung FC frontal cortex FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, Germany) fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging GABA gamma-aminobutyric acid GDR German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) Gestapo Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, Third Reich) HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus infection / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome IfZ Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contemporary History) IPN ,QVW\WXW3DPLĊFL1DURGRZHM,QVWLWXWHIRU1DWLRQDO Remembrance, Poland) IQ intelligence quotient MfS Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security, GDR) MP Member of Parliament MRI magnetic resonance imaging

Neither Good Nor Bad

MRT NATO NCO NSDAP OBE OC OECD PC PDS PEA PET PISA PNS POW PTSD REM rRNA SA SAD SD SDO SED SPD SPECT SS TC TMS UN US USA UV VIP ZBoWID

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magnetic resonance tomography North Atlantic Treaty Organization non-commissioned officer Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ Party, Third Reich) out of body experiences occipital cortex Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development parietal cortex Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism, Germany) phenylethylamine positron emission tomography Programme for International Student Assessment peripheral nervous system prisoner of war posttraumatic stress disorder rapid eye movement ribosomal ribonucleic acid Sturmabteilung (Storm Detachment, Third Reich) seasonal affective disorder Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, Third Reich) social dominance orientation Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, GDR) Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) single-photon emission computed tomography Schutzstaffel (Defense Corps, Third Reich) temporal cortex transcranial magnet stimulation United Nations unconditioned stimulus United States of America ultraviolet very important person =ZLą]HN%RMRZQLNyZR:ROQRĞüL'HPRNUDFMĊ (Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, Poland)

LIST OF FIGURES Fig. 1: The lateral view of the human brain and its functions................. 167 Fig. 2: Lateral cross section of the human brain showing the six main sections of the brain and its functions ............................................... 168 Fig. 3: Side view of the human brain showing the most important limbic centers ............................................................................................... 169 Fig. 4: A three-dimensional reconstruction of the macroscopic architecture of a human brain assembled on the basis of data generated by Magnetic Resonance Tomography .................................................................... 172 Fig. 5: The basic structure of a standardized neuron .............................. 175 Fig. 6: The homunculus in the human motor cortex ............................... 178 Fig. 7: The neural substrate of the working memory .............................. 207 Fig. 8: The preferred task allocation of the two brain halves.................. 208 Fig. 9: Activation of the amygdala and regulation of memory ............... 215 Fig. 10: Fast and slow stress reactions.................................................... 254 Fig. 11: The cortex .................................................................................. 294 Fig. 12: Stone Age cave painting ............................................................ 342 Fig. 13: The Willendorf Venus................................................................ 345

FOREWORD Gerhard Besier’s is an exciting, whilst always precise text combining the disciplines of the historical sciences, brain research and psychology into a single coherent approach. Using this combination of science and humanistic disciplines, he explains why humans are “neither good nor bad” and why “human beings behave as they do”—particularly when faced with moral dilemmas. Genetic predisposition, the specific development of the brain, prenatal and early postnatal affective-emotional experience and socializing processes all combine to affect and modulate human behavior. Our culturally-determined self-concept and norms of behavior also belong to this complex, the elements of which may be rooted in neuronal structures. In addition to these stabile factors, specific situations and circumstances also dictate certain kinds of behavior. From a sociological perspective, the actions of power elites are shown to play an essential role in shaping society. Considering these premises, we have to conclude that the degree of freedom open to humans is limited. Nevertheless, developed societies have agreed that its members are responsible for their own actions, despite awareness of the myriad constraints and determinants to which our decision-making process is subject. Many of our decisions are made below the threshold of consciousness and subjected to retrospective justification. As we do not like knowledge gaps, we construct “fill-ins” to enable a coherent sense of the self and an awareness of others. We constantly work on and refine the storyline of our life. Although conscious of this situation, we persist in our longing for true self-determination, clinging onto a belief in our autonomous control over our own thoughts, emotions, and behavior. We are forced to endure the fact that our carefully developed selfperception and autobiographical narratives are repeatedly shattered by the unpredictable nature of life. Our sense of self requires repeated correction and adjustment, repair, and improvement. The fact that we can forget our failures and reinterpret them in our own favor supports this process of selfdevelopment. Although showing a firm grasp of the relevant specialist literature from a number of fields, the text of this book is animated with examples from everyday life, making it an exciting and engaging book to read. Addressing both experts and students, this book is also indispensable for

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all those general readers interested in learning more about human behavior. Stating his arguments clearly, Besier highlights the influence on our behavior of learning functions and social phenomena such as religion. His book is a skillful combination of empirical evidence and philosophical reflection. He does not subscribe to any specific world-view, but discusses the basic questions of human behavior from a range of perspectives. I recommend this book to all readers! Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Niels Birbaumer, Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology, Eberhard-Karls-University Tübingen

INTRODUCTION “The past 30 years have witnessed considerable and intensive international research into the questions of identity, development, human thought and its function. The results of research conducted in a number of fields ranging from Consciousness Studies to Neurology and Psychology all point in the same direction: many of our decisions are made below the surface, steered by our subconscious, emotions and experience and influenced by our environment, prejudice and relationships to other people. Although we like to conceive of ourselves as rational beings, we are far from being the noble and wise creatures that we like to think.” David Brooks (2011)1

When confronted with a range of violent actions perpetrated by lone individuals—gun rampages in schools and youth camps,2 abductions, torture, brutal executions, slaughter, cannibalism, rape, imprisonment, parental child-abuse, enslavement and much more, European society exhibits a constant tendency to react in terms of helpless, even perplexed horror. Seeking explanations for the apparently inexplicable, commentators often hurry to declare the perpetrators as “evil.”3 Such an attribution is usually only a code4 serving to explain everything or indeed nothing. Moreover, reaching judgments in this way is akin to opening up a moral “bad bank,” to house those individuals who can no longer be accommodated in our socially-constructed reality. After recovering from the initial shock, society then stages a number of memorials—usually with the assistance of the church—and retreats into something approaching a prescribed and ritualized period of mourning. However, whatever the nature of the cruelty and violence, which some people both perpetrate and 1

Quoted in an interview published in Der Spiegel, no. 23, June 6, 2011, 82. See Martin Gerke and Heinz Rupp, eds., Schreiben statt Schweigen: Die Schüler der Albertville-Realschule schreiben zum Amoklauf von Winnenden (Stuttgart: VEG, 2011). 3 See the title page of Der Spiegel, no. 31, August 1, 2011: On the Trace of Evil (Die Spur des Bösen). 4 See Peter-Andre Alt, Ästhetik des Bösen (Munich: Beck, 2010). 2

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even enjoy, we are not justified in styling them as “evil” or the “demonic” counterpart to the—equally illusory—forces of “good.”5 Speaking in an interview given in the aftermath of the attacks in Oslo and Utøya of July 22, 2011, the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg claimed that “something good has emerged from the evil.”6 He contested that Norwegian society had reacted to the massacre with an even greater degree of solidarity and a strengthened acceptance of democratic values. In view of such reactions, we should ask ourselves whether it is possible or even right to derive anything meaningful from this act of patently mindless violence. The crux of the matter is the question of how. What happened to transform Anders Behring Breivik into the perpetrator of a cruel crime; what made him capable of planning and executing a detailed plan in an unfeeling manner and ostensibly in the service of a higher cause? This question is not restricted to individuals: history has repeatedly demonstrated how groups and even entire nations can embark on a criminal plan united by the conviction that they were fighting for a good and just cause. That “ordinary men” are capable of making a swift transition to pursuing crimes of extensive brutality has been demonstrated by the history of a number of dictatorships, not least the two in Germany.7 We have to ask ourselves what led them to intern, denounce, plunder, rape, and kill their fellow men. Which circumstances occasioned such actions— what was their motivation? We should not restrict our focus to the perpetrators of such crimes and the profile which they exhibit. Of equal and pressing importance is the question regarding their victims and the possibility of sketching an independent “victim profile.” We also need to address the question as to those who were both victims and perpetrators alike. Those adapting to the

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See Eugen Sorg, Die Lust am Bösen: Warum Gewalt nicht heilbar ist (Munich: Nagel & Kimche in Carl Hanser Verlag, 2011); Michael Günter, Gewalt entsteht im Kopf (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2011); Jochen Kalka, Winnenden: Ein Amoklauf und seine Folgen (Munich: DVA, 2011). 6 Aftenposten, August 20, 2011. 7 See Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, victims, bystanders: the Jewish catastrophe, 1933–1945 (New York: Aaron Asher Books, 1992); Gerhard Paul, ed., Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche? (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003); Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul, eds., Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004).

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regime8 and the few opposing it, also warrant close attention. Why did people act as they did and, in many countries in the world, still do? Which empirical or theoretical models exist to explain this phenomenon? Applying a number of historical, scientific and social-scientific approaches to this question, the study seeks to produce an integrative portrait of the various social scientific approaches to this question and advance a number of different interpretations for the genesis of such behavior. The study will draw mainly on examples from Europe. In other words, it raises the question as to whether the currently dominant European conception of man is still capable of generating meaningful explanations of human behavior in a way consistent with powerful empirical material and scientific insights. The past few years have witnessed a new variety of Kulturkampf fought on the features pages of German newspapers. Legal scholars,9 theologians, philosophers and other academics have been outspoken in their rejection of a number of conclusions presented by research projects conducted by a range of social psychologists, clinical psychologists, behavioral biologists and neurobiologists.10 Viewed from the perspective 8

See Klaus Wallbaum, Der Überläufer: Rudolf Diels (1900–1957)—Der erste Gestapo-Chef des Hitler-Regimes (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, Dissertation, 2010); Roman Grafe, ed., Die Schuld der Mitläufer (Munich: Pantheon, 2010). 9 See Lorenz Böllinger et al., eds., Gefährliche Menschenbilder: Biowissenschaften, Gesellschaft und Kriminalität (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); Thomas Stompe and Hans Schanda, eds., Der freie Wille und die Schuldfähigkeit in Recht, Psychiatrie und Neurowissenschaften (Berlin: Med. Wiss. Verl.-Ges., 2010). 10 See Manfred Seitz, “Hat Luther doch Recht? Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit,” Psychotherapie und Seelsorge 1 (2005): 26–28; Andreas Klein, Willensfreiheit auf dem Prüfstand: Ein anthropologischer Grundbegriff in Philosophie, Neurobiologie und Theologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2009); Uwe Laucken, “Wie kann man der Willensfreiheit den Garaus machen? Argumentationsrezepte für Neurowissenschaftler (und einige Preise, die das Befolgen kostet),” Gestalt Theory 28 (2006): 61–97; Alexander Kraus and Birte Kohtz, “Hirnwindungen—Quelle einer historiografischen Wende? Zur Relevanz neurowissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse für die Geschichtswissenschaft,” ZfG 55 (2007): 842–57. See also the lecture by Jürgen Habermas considering “Freedom and Determinism” given to mark the award of the Kyoto Prize and published in Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008), 151–80. See also Jürgen Habermas, “The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?” Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007): 13–50. See also the interview with Wolf Singer published in Süddeutschen Zeitung, April 24, 2006 and the correspondence between Peter Janich and Wolf Singer, published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), no. 165, July 17, 2008, 29.

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of the humanities, neurobiologists and behavioral biologists have been more than assiduous in their occupation of ever-more areas of the anthropological sciences from which they have proceeded to mount an attack on the axiom actio, reactio and the associated consequences.11 Speaking of a new “Neuro-Imperialism,” journalists with a pronounced religious background are polemicizing against the neuroscientist Gerhard Roth. As one of their number, an editor of the influential FAZ, Christian Geyer, has asked: “Who is going to stop Roth’s march through the disciplines?”12 Resistance to this approach is also widespread amongst philosophers. Accusing neuroscientists of overrating the significance of the brain in determining human action, they argue that such an approach has resulted in the resurgence of the traditional mind-body dichotomy with the brain taking the position of a materialized spirit. This new “mythology of the According to Habermas, “contemporary secularism often rests on hard naturalism is based on scientific findings.” For him, this raises the question “[…] as to whether the secularized attitude of a sizeable section of society is as equally disagreeable to the normative self-conception of a post-secular society as the fundamentalist tendencies of a mass religious movement?”. Jürgen Habermas, “Die Dialektik der Säkularisierung,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 4 (2008): 33–46; 44. The Philosopher Christine Zunke accuses the neuro-biologists of transporting implicitly ideological prejudices, working with plausible commonplaces and often overstepping the bounds of their competence. “Whereas Neurophysiology […] applies the non-reflexive methods of the natural sciences to the brain, traditional philosophy constructs its concepts from reflection on its own thinking. The unity of self-consciousness and the nature of free will, the differentiation between true and false thoughts and the key attributes of human reason are not […] determined by the nature of the material, but can only be grasped through comprehending reflexive thought.” Christine Zunke, Kritik der Hirnforschung: Neurophysiologie und Willensfreiheit (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008), 13. See also “Bericht über eine kritische Tagung des Berliner Max Planck Instituts für Wissenschaftsgeschichte,” FAZ, no. 47, February 25, 2009, no. 3; Peter Janich, Kein neues Menschenbild: Zur Sprache der Hirnforschung (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2009). Felix Hasler, Neuromythologie: Eine Streitschrift gegen die Deutungsmacht der Hirnforschung (Bielefeld: transcript, 2012). 11 See Hans J. Markowitsch, “Warum wir keinen freien Willen haben: Der sogenannte frei Wille aus Sicht der Hirnforschung,” Psychologische Rundschau 55 (2004): 163–68, 166. See also Gerhard Roth, “Hume, Willensfreiheit und Hirnforschung,” Aufklärung und Kritik 18 (2011): 167–183. See also Michael Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), esp. 205ff. 12 Christian Geyer, “Gerhard Roth, der Bindestrich-Mann,” FAZ, no. 146, June 28, 2010, 26.

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brain,”13 they argue, is nothing less than a “mereological fallacy”— according a part of a living being the brain—certain characteristics which can in fact only be claimed by the being as a whole. Within this debate, the Berlin philosopher Jan Slaby called upon his discipline to confront those engaged in this new neuro research (which accords itself the status of a new meta-discipline) with genuine questions from a philosophical and epistemological perspective. “Which assumed parameters are being incorporated in the constitution, approach and interpretation of experimental results? Which “back stories” guide such researchers in their endeavors? Which paradigmatic conception of man, life, society, and science underpins their whole endeavors? Which implicit aims guide their research and the applications which they are designed to serve?” These and other questions, as he believes, need to be addressed.14 A further criticism of this new neuroscience, advanced by Maxwell R. Bennet and Peter M. S. Hacker, focuses on a level of conceptual confusion to which they believe the new movement is subject in drawing wideranging conclusions about the nature of mankind from limited empirical data.15 Seeking to mount a defense of their discipline, Daniel Dennet and John Searle replied that Bennet’s and Hacker’s “remedial program” for the natural sciences is based on normative dogmatic structures taken from the philosophy of language. Instead of conducting an a priori investigation of grammatical logic, semantic work must necessarily be based on empirical findings. Indeed, they argued that only such a step would establish the preconditions necessary for a fruitful debate.16 Similar methodological reservations have been raised against the application of sociopsychological models in the approach to research in the historical sciences into the motivation and nature of perpetrators. It is argued that failing to address the theoretical implications of such an approach results in 13

See Maxwell R. Bennet and Peter M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2009); Francisco Ortega and Fernando Vidal, eds., Neurocultures: Glimpses into an Expanding Universe (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2011). 14 Jan Slaby, “Perspektiven einer kritischen Philosophie der Neurowissenschaften,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (2011): 375–90, 386. See also Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby, eds., Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience (Chichester, West Sussex: WileyBlackwell, 2012). 15 See Maxwell R. Bennet, Daniel Dennett, Peter M. S. Hacker, and John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 16 Ibid.

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considerable and inherent contradictions within the findings presented by such investigations.17 Adding fuel to the fire of this debate, the neurobiologist Wolf Singer has advanced a highly provocative explanation for religious experiences. Subsuming encounters with saints, the Mother of God or even the Lord himself under the label of the “Jesus syndrome,” he explains such phenomena as hallucinations resulting from sleep-deprivation or hyperventilation. Such moments of epiphany, he argues, result from the contraction of certain areas of the brain. Prayer is explained as autosuggestion and “successes” in this area are categorized as self-fulfilling prophecies.18 Such arguments infuriate not only churchmen, but also the employees of the oldest university faculties—the theologians. The extent to which biologists and psychologists advance naturalist causes for human behavior19—including religion20—raises the question as 17 See Christoph Schneider, “Täter ohne Eigenschaften? Über die Tragweite sozialpsychologischer Modelle in der Holocaust-Forschung,” Mittelweg 36 20 (2011): 3–23. 18 See, for example, the interview given by Wolf Singer in the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit, no. 44, October 23, 2008, 45. See also Wolf Singer and Matthieu Ricard, Hirnforschung und Meditation: Ein Dialog (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2008). 19 See e.g. the classical works seeking to explain religion as a natural social phenomenon, above all, Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001) and Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking, 2006). For an account from the perspective of religious anthropology, see Daniel N. Finkel, Paul Swartwout, and Richard Sosis, “The Socio-Religious Brain: A Developmental Model,” accessed February 13, 2009, http://www.anth.uconn. edu/faculty/sosis/publications/socioreligiousbrain.pdf. 20 See Andrew Newberg, Eugene d’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001); Dimitrios Kapogiannis, et al., “Cognitive and Neural Foundations of Religious Belief,” PNAS (2009), doi: 10.1073/pnas.0811717106. It is noteworthy that—in comparison to great number of theologians—a number of religious studies scholars are engaged in close inter-disciplinary exchange with biologists and other researchers investigating the origins and development of religion and the modes in which they function. See Rüdiger Vaas and Michael Blume, Gott, Gene und Gehirn: Warum Glaube nützt; Die Evolution der Religiosität (Stuttgart: Hirzel, 2009). The unlikelihood of interdisciplinary contacts between Evolutionary Biology and Theology is demonstrated (albeit unwillingly) by the volume edited by Joachim Klose and Jochen Oehler, Gott oder Darwin? Vernünftiges Reden über Schöpfung und Evolution (Berlin: Springer, 2008). Even the existence of evil, a central category of Christian anthropology, has been cast into considerable doubt

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to whether our perceptions of man and the worldmaster-narratives passed on and altered over time—are in need of fundamental revision.21 This applies not only to religiously-influenced world views, but also to those of a humanist and rationalist provenance, themselves the product of the scientific emancipation from traditional transcendental conceptions. The various critiques of these new theses usually focus on the need inherent in all psycho-physiological research for careful interpretation. Nevertheless, whatever their justification, such criticisms must acknowledge the transformation undergone by the social sciences in recent years. No longer attempting to reconstruct reality, modern research in the humanities is more concerned with the representation of perceptions of the self, the other and the enemy.22 Historical research into the nature of stereotypes has long made use of socio-psychological insights,23 theories of historical socialization24 and research into emotion.25 Contemporary “neuro-cultural by the findings of both the empirical social sciences and neurobiology and behavioral biology. These findings have, in turn, provoked a considerable number of apologetic writings. See e.g. Paul Josef Cardinal Cordes, Besiege das Böse mit dem Guten: Grenzen der Psychologie und die Kraft des Glaubens (Augsburg: Sankt-Ulrich-Verl., 2009). 21 See Gerhard Besier, “Täter und Opfer, Zuschauer und Opponenten—Über menschliches Verhalten in Grenzsituationen,” TD 4 (2007): 375–90. Written from the perspective of behavioral biology and Catholic theology, see Gerd-Heinrich Neumann, Vorgeschichte als Zukunftsherausforderung: Ein Biologe nimmt Stellung zu Genetik—Evolution—Verhaltensbiologie in ethischer und theologischer Relevanz (Berlin and Münster: Lit, 2008), esp. 157ff. 22 See e.g. Jörg Baberowski, Hartmut Kaelble, and Jürgen Schriewer, eds., Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder: Repräsentation sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel (Frankfurt/M.: Campus-Verl., 2008). In view of the failure of contemporary historians to incorporate the results of social-science led findings and results, many in this discipline see that the “role of social-scientific analysis in constituting reality needs to be incorporated in historiographical reflection. […] Reading these [analyses] as a source and not a narrative is one of the central requirements currently facing our discipline.” Rüdiger Graf and Kim Christian Priemel, “Zeitgeschichte in der Welt der Sozialwissenschaften: Legitimität und Originalität einer Disziplin,” VfZ 59 (2011): 479–508, 507. 23 See Hans Henning Hahn and Elena Mannová, eds., Nationale Wahrnehmungen und ihre Stereotypisierung: Beiträge zur Historischen Stereotypenforschung (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2007). 24 See Andreas Gestrich, Vergesellschaftungen des Menschen: Einführung in die Historische Sozialisationsforschung (Tübingen: Ed. diskord, 1999). 25 See Thomas Anz, “Emotional turn? Beobachtungen zur Gefühlsforschung,” literaturkritik.de, no. 12, last modified March 28, 2009, accessed August 27, 2012, http://www.literaturkritik.de/public/rezension.php?rez_id=10267.; Florian Weber,

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history” increasingly subjects memory—one of the constituent elements of historical writing—to considerable question. These new claims from neuro-research have wide ranging implications. At stake in this new “turn” is nothing less than the reliability of the human memory,26 man’s capacity for rational action27 and his capacity for responsible and self-willed decision-making. What causes people to act in a particular fashion and not another? Are emotions in such processes more powerful than calm consideration? The new findings have also established several qualifications to the premise, so beloved of educational theorists, that as mutable subjects, people are not merely the prisoners of their dispositions and socialization. The most serious question however concerns that central element of modern society: individual human freedom. Are people truly free in their behavior or are their actions pre“Von den klassischen Affektenlehren zur Neurowissenschaft und zurück: Wege der Emotionsforschung in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften,” Neue politische Literatur 53 (2008): 21–42; Ute Frevert, “Was haben die Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen?” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 35 (2009): 183–208; Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen, eds., Die Präsenz der Gefühle: Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne (Bielefeld: transcript, 2010); Jan Plamper, Geschiche und Gefühl Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte (Munich: Siedler, 2012) (English edition is forthcoming). 26 See Johannes Fried, “Erinnerung im Kreuzverhör: Kollektives Gedächtnis, Albert Speer und die Erkenntnis erinnerter Vergangenheit,” in Historie und Leben: Der Historiker als Wissenschaftler und Zeitgenosse; FS Lothar Gall zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Dieter Hein (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 327–57; idem., “Neurokulturelle Geschichtswissenschaft,” KZG/CCH 22 (2009): 49–65; Harald Welzer, “Das kommunikative Gedächtnis und woraus es besteht,” in Arbeit am Gedächtnis: Für Aleida Assmann (zum 60. Geburtstag), ed. Michael C. Frank and Gabriel Rippl (Munich: Fink, 2007), 47–62; Aleida Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik (Munich: Beck, 2006). See also Nina Leonhard, “Gedächtnis und Kultur—Anmerkungen zum Konzept der ‘Erinnerungskulturen’ in den Kulturwissenschaften,” Historische Sozialforschung 33 (2008): 44–357. 27 See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); Stephan Schleim and Henrik Walter, “Erst das Gefühl, dann die Moral? Hirnscans legen den Verdacht nahe, dass unsere moralischen Urteile weniger auf rationalen Denkprozessen gründen, als vielmehr in emotionalen Intuitionen,” Gehirn und Geist 1, no. 2 (2008): 44–49; Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009). Even economists are beginning to doubt the classic explanations focusing on rational people and markets. See George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

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determined, the product of biochemical processes beyond their control?28 Finally, how should we conceive of the genesis of religions? As a social phenomenon? What makes a person believe? Which is the function performed by religious convictions and world views? These and other questions represent the focus of this book. Beginning with the “perpetrator-victim complex,” the first chapter examines the evidence amassed within the scope of a number of empirical investigations together with its contemporary interpretations. Thus informed, the chapter then proceeds to examine a number of forms of human behavior displayed as a reaction to specific borderline situations. The question most often posed in such a context is that regarding man’s capacity for brutality. This question constitutes the focus of the second to the fourth chapters. The questions raised in the first chapter are addressed by an appraisal of human dispositions through an examination of three separate themes: stereotypes and prejudice; experience, learning and remembering; emotions and psycho-physiological processes. A fifth and final chapter considers the need for and presence of mechanisms of compensation, which people can employ to address their manifold short-comings and inadequacies. This focuses on the construction of transcendental worlds establishing a more satisfying reality. Merely one amongst a number of such areas of makebelieve, religions hinder the necessary inter-subjective discourse and prevent consensus.29 Indeed, our whole lives are staged in a series of highly subjective and disparate constructed and controversial realities. Never entirely accepted by their constructors, these worlds rarely satisfy powerful human yearnings which, in turn, become ever-more shrill and mutable. As such, we live in the “supposedly actual.” In writing this book, I have incurred a number of debts which it is a pleasure to acknowledge. I should like to thank Ronald Lambrecht, 0HODQLH/LVW+HQULN1LWVFKH'DQQ\6FKlIHUDQG.DWDU]\QD6WRNáRVDIRU their stimulating comments, copy-editing, the provision of literature and compilation of the bibliography. Kasia, my companion of many years deserves my thanks for her understanding, patience, constant encouragement and love. I should especially like to thank Grätel 28

See Martin Heinze, Thomas Fuchs, and Friedel M. Reischies, Willensfreiheit— Eine Illusion? (Berlin: Parodos-Verl., 2006); Michael Pauen, Illusion Freiheit? (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2004); Henrik Walter, Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 29 See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966). John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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Marksteiner, Jutta Bissinger and Laura Pelzmann for preparing the manuscript for publication and their work on the graphics and the index. I should also like to thank my translator, Andrew Smith, who proved more than competent in bridging the semantic divide from German into the Anglo-American culture. Gerhard Besier

CHAPTER ONE PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS, BYSTANDERS AND OPPONENTS: HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN SPECIFIC CONTEXTS “Given the right or wrong circumstances, every act committed by any person, however atrocious it may have been, represents a possibility for us all […]. Any attempt to understand such extraordinary actions […] requires us to begin with a situative analysis.” Philip G. Zimbardo (2008)1

The transition from individual and collective pathologization to the acceptance of perpetrator profiling Shocked by the sheer inhumanity of the atrocities committed during the Second World War, contemporary observers equated the evil nature of the crimes with the personality of their perpetrators and began a search for psychopathological abnormalities of the individuals concerned.2 Granted unrestricted access to the accused at the Nuremburg trials, the psychologist Gustave M. Gilbert was unable to reach a coherent conclusion; although able to diagnose significant indications of mental illness in Rudolf Heß3 his verdict on Hermann Göring was that of a convinced perpetrator and 1

Philip G. Zimbardo, Lucifer-Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007), 211–12. 2 For this and the following, see Jeannette Schmid, “Freiwilligkeit der Gewalt? Von der Psychologie der Täter zur Psychologie der Tat,” Analyse und Kritik 20 (1998): 27–45; Angelika Benz, “Exzesstäter, Schreibtischtäter oder Durchschnittsbürger?” Informationen: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift des Studienkreises Deutscher Widerstand 1933–1945 35 (2010) 3–6; Daniel Pick, The Pursuit of the Nazi Mind: Hitler, Hess, and the Analysts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 3 Regarding Rudolf Heß see also Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Rudolf Heß: Der Mann an Hitlers Seite (Leipzig: Militzke-Verl., 2003); Rainer F. Schmidt, Rudolf Heß: “Botengang eines Toren?” Der Flug nach Großbritannien vom 10. Mai 1941 (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1997).

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confirmed his hypothesis of a psychopathological personality.4 Later psychoanalytic evaluations of Rorschach tests carried out on the accused did not exhibit any abnormalities in contrast to the control group of “normal” test subjects.5 Despite the inability to find any evidence for the widely postulated typus of “sadistic perpetrators gleaning satisfaction from their deeds,” this assumption is still present in popular understanding of the Third Reich. Even the Harvard academic Daniel Jonah Goldhagen is convinced that far from being “ordinary men,” only convinced National Socialists and sadists could have been capable of responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism.6 It is highly unlikely that the selective ideological premises underpinning Goldhagen’s work will be supported by other empirical studies. Moreover, the findings of evolutionary biology would seem to indicate that man’s capability to murder numbers amongst one of those feats of adaptation of the human brain “which has proven itself so well during the history of his development” to the extent that modern man “is unable simply to abandon or change this fundamental condition of his existence.”7 It is not just the case—as the evolutionary psychologist David Buss has demonstrated—that the old motives for murder retain their effect in the modern world. Man’s psychic disposition to killing is a familiar concept. Who has never held murderous thoughts towards a person only to apply the old strategy of avoidance so as not to tread this path?8 The contrasting explanation of a naive and immature society, “led astray” by Hitler and his demonic clique,9 also enjoyed currency in the 4

See Gustave M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947); idem., “Hermann Goering: Amiable Psychopath,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 43 (1947): 211–29. 5 See Barry A. Ritzler, “The Nuremberg Mind Revisited: A Quantitative Approach to Nazi Rorschachs,” Journal of Personality Assessment 42 (1978): 344–53. 6 See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitlers Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). See also Michael Mann, “Were Perpetrators of Genocide ‘Ordinary Men’ or ‘Real Nazis?’ Results From Fifteen Hundred Biographies,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 14 (2000): 331– 36. See also Mary Fulbrook, A Small Town Near Auschwitz: Ordinary Nazis and the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 7 David M. Buss, The Murderer Next Door: Why the Mind is Designed to Kill (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 237. 8 In this sense, Jehuda Bauer was able to say that “the behavior of the Nazis […] was only too human” Jehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 21. 9 Amongst them Joseph Goebbels, in whom the majority of commentators diagnose a narcissistic personality structure—see Peter Gathmann and Marina Paul, Narziss

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immediate post-war period as an explanation for the history of the Third Reich.10 The majority of post-war Germans claimed not to have been aware of the crimes perpetrated in their name by the Nazi regime and were thus able to turn away from their erstwhile idols with surprising rapidity.11 Seeking an explanation for how otherwise responsible citizens exhibited such passive obedience, Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford12 made recourse to a number of analytical models, including their own F[ascism]-Scale to identify the syndrome of the “authoritarian personality,” which developed through an inflexible attachment to the conventional bourgeois middle-class values.13 With a tendency to subject themselves to idealized authority figures, such people also actively sought out those not conforming to their idealized canon of civic behavior in order to punish them. Writing later, he postulated “those needing authority identify with naked power over all content. Basically, they have a very weak ego and as a result, need to identify with a collective in order to find fulfilment.”14 Having attracted Goebbels: Eine psychohistorische Biografie (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009); Peter Longerich, Joseph Goebbels: Biographie (Munich: Siedler, 2010). Not only a member of the Nazi leadership surrounding Hitler, Goebbels also belonged to the circle of leadership around Hitler. Subject to a number of early setbacks due to his physical handicap, he used self-stylisation to acquire the favour of his “Führer” and developed a complex dependence on him. Gathmann and Paul diagnozed “chronic depression, fears, strong feelings of inadequacy, and a whole range of psychosomatic complaints” (Ibid., 10). 10 In contrast, see Karl-Günter Zelle, Hitlers zweifelnde Elite: Goebbels—Göring— Himmler—Speer (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 11 See Peter Longerich, “Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!”: Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung 1933–1945 (Munich: Siedler, 2006). See also Hannes Heer, Vom Verschwinden der Täter: Der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber keiner war dabei (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2004). Regarding the high level of popular approval for the National Socialist system, see Karl-Heinz Reuband, “Das NS-Regime zwischen Akzeptanz und Ablehnung: Eine retrospektive Analyse von Bevölkerungseinstellungen im Dritten Reich auf der Basis von Umfragedaten,” GuG 32 (2006): 315–43. 12 See Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950); Theodor W. Adorno, Der autoritäre Charakter: Studien über Autorität und Vorurteil; Mit einem Vorwort von Max Horkheimer, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: De Munter, 1968/69). 13 See Lars-Eric Petersen and Bernd Six, eds., Stereotype, Vorurteile und soziale Diskriminierung: Theorien, Befunde und Interventionen (Weinheim-Basel: Beltz, 2008), 163–71. 14 Theodor W. Adorno, Erziehung zur Mündigkeit (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 17.

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massive criticism of its methodology,15 the primarily psychoanalytical concept of an authoritarian personality has been subject to a number of subsequent attempts to save it as an analytical tool.16 Since the 1980s, the scale most often used for ascertaining an authoritarian disposition is Bob Altemeyer’s Right-Wing-Authoritarianism-Scale based on learningtheoretical concepts.17 Whatever our subsequent estimation of the findings of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanders, it is clear that they stimulated research and discussion. Writing in the 1960s, Alexander Mitscherlich and others located the source of such behavior in the authoritarian form of upbringing and education prevalent in the Kaiserreich and Weimar republic.18 Moreover, the Frankfurt psychoanalyst diagnosed “pre-democratic mindsets” in many Germans and a collective tendency towards “unconscious denial, an insistent suppression of memory and most importantly, the exclusion of all feelings pertaining to crucial events of the past now denied […].”19 Mitscherlich identified two alternatives: “a prescription without mourning. The perpetrators die out. Or: working out the details of those events which although themselves not inhuman, created the atmosphere in which the Final Solution became a possibility.”20 Addressing a Berlin conference in January 1983, the Zurich-based German philosopher Hermann Lübbe scandalized the West-German intelligentsia with a contrary thesis: the successful integration of the majority of both high and low-ranking Nazis was due not to an overly scrupulous scrutiny of their behavior, but the “communicative concealment” of their past in the immediate post-war years. Thus according to Lübbe, silence about their role between 1933 and 1945 served

15 See the comprehensive criticism provided by Detlef Oesterreich, Flucht in die Sicherheit: Zur Theorie des Autoritarismus und der Autoritären Reaktion (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1996). 16 See e.g., Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). 17 See Bob Altemeyer, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1981); see also idem., Enemies of Freedom: Understanding RightWing Authoritarianism (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988); idem., The Authoritarian Specter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 18 See Alexander Mitscherlich, Society Without a Father: A Contribution to Social Psychology (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969). 19 Alexander Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior (New York: Grove Press, 1975), XXIV–XXV. 20 Mitscherlich, Inability, XXVI.

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an important integrative function.21 In view of the wide historical “travail de mémoire and the current insecurities in dealing with the past, extending into the ritual forms of political auto-promotion of our society,” the “suppression thesis” was plain wrong.22 Whatever the merits of this assertion, the “phase of silence” can only have been oppressive for those emigrants returning from their Nazi-induced exile,23 involving a degree of pressure released only by the move to “confront the past,” which closely followed the Adenauer era. Nevertheless, the question remains as to how it was possible to alter the dominant canon of civilized Western values to the extent that it was superseded by a Nazi morality which sanctioned the ensuing atrocities. If post-1945 claims to a wide-scale ignorance of the Nazi crimes did not merely represent an attempt to adapt to new political realities, then this unwillingness to believe the rumors of barbarity circulating after 1945 could also be interpreted as an attempt to return to the moral values of the pre-Nazi era. The specific system of morality inculcated and disseminated by the Nazi system involved what Raphael Gross identified as a fluid “transition in the demarcation of […] perpetrators and their victims.”24 Those responsible for implementing the criminal instructions of Hitler’s regime were able to claim—with some justification—to have “committed their crimes in the name of all others. The ‘others’ to whom they referred and who they saw as prepared to support their conception of morality were the ‘Germans.’”25 The validity of such a conclusion is indicted by the widespread level of social acceptance in German society immediately after the war of the strategies of justification employed by the former Nazi perpetrators, and the ability of the young West German society to integrate a range of far-right prejudices.26 Indeed, neither the employers nor the immediate circle of friends of such individuals found anything objectionable in their dealings with people with such a past. The judges hearing the cases of the former members of Einsatzgruppen, concentration camp personnel and other groups found it very difficult to view the 21

See Hermann Lübbe, Vom Parteigenossen zum Bundesbürger: Über beschwiegene und historisierte Vergangenheiten (Munich: Fink, 2007), 9. 22 Ibid., 23, 26. 23 See Olivier Guez, Heimkehr der Unerwünschten: Eine Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland nach 1945 (Munich: Piper, 2011), esp. 129–48. 24 Raphael Gross, Anständig geblieben: Nationalsozialistische Moral (Frankfurt/ M.: S. Fischer, 2010), 210. 25 Ibid., 210. 26 See Christina Ullrich, “Ich fühl’ mich nicht als Mörder!” Die Integration von NS-Tätern in die Nachkriegsgesellschaft (Darmstadt: WBG, 2011).

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arraigned as perpetrators in the usual sense; a situation compounded by the level of solidarity which they enjoyed. Such a climate facilitated the cognitive reconstruction of earlier actions in such a fashion as to prevent the development of a sense of injustice both amongst the perpetrators and German society at large. Those arraigned at the Nuremburg tribunal and its successor proceedings often made recourse to the formula of “obeying orders from a superior” which, according to military traditions, demanded a normative obedience preceding all demands of the conscience. In such a world, orders are not to be questioned for their moral value; this is the task of a higher authority.27 The results of Stanley Milgram’s series of experiments started in 1963 to investigate man’s tendency to “destructive obedience” occasioned contemporary surprise and no little consternation. Not only did the subjects demonstrate an unexpected readiness to inflict supposedly life-threatening injuries on unfamiliar test subjects;28 the “perpetrators” involved had not exhibited any prior inclination to cruelty. Despite attracting considerable and continued criticism for his methodology,29 Milgram’s findings have been confirmed by other similar tests performed simultaneously, for example those conducted by Arnold H. Buss.30 Milgram also succeeded in demonstrating that responsibility for the act of cruelty was not delegated to the superior giving the orders, but to the victim, who was ascribed negative characteristics in order to justify the 27

See Jochen von Lang, ed., Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police (London: Bodley Head, 1983); Harry Mulisch, Strafsache 40/61: Eine Reportage über den Eichmann-Prozess (Berlin: Tiamat, 1987). 28 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). See also Peter Huemer and Grete Schurz, eds., Unterwerfung: Über den destruktiven Gehorsam (Vienna: P. Zsolnay, 1990); Hans B. Lüttke, Gehorsam und Gewissen: Die moralische Handlungskompetenz des Menschen aus Sicht des Milgram-Experimentes (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2003). 29 See e.g. Nestar John Charles Russell, “Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Experiments: Origins and Early Evolution,” British Journal of Social Psychology (2010): 140–62. Ian Nicholson explains the great interest in the Milgram experiment with reference to the political (Cold War) and cultural crises (of the American conception of Male identity). See Ian Nicholson, “‘Shocking’ Masculinity: Stanley Milgram, ‘Obedience to Authority’ and the ‘Crisis of Manhood’ in Cold War America,” Isis 102 (2011): 238–68. 30 See Arnold H. Buss, The Psychology of Aggression (New York: Wiley, 1961); idem., “The Effect of Harm on Subsequent Aggression,” Journal of Experimental Research in Personality 1 (1966): 249–55; Timothy C. Brock and Arnold H. Buss, “Dissonance, Aggression, and the Evaluation of Pain,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 65 (1962): 197–202.

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torture. These findings were later confirmed in subsequent tests conducted in 12 different countries. Three interesting replication studies have been conducted in recent times. Indeed, independent projects conducted by the psychologists Jerry M. Burger31 and Dominic J. Packer 45 years after Milgram’s famous test from 196332 served only to confirm Milgram’s findings, despite a number of subsequent social and cultural changes such as the student revolts of 1968,33 female emancipation and the American civil rights movement.34 Even the new anti-authoritarian upbringing enjoyed by the participants of the test did not seem to have made much difference to their behavior in the tests. As in 1963, two thirds of the testpersons in the 2006 study were prepared to follow inhuman instructions and punish others with putative electric shocks. Burger was unable to identify any differences based on age, gender, race, religion or world view. Nevertheless, the ethics commission at the Santa Clara University in California would not permit him to replicate Milgram’s use of shocks of up to 450 Volts—the ceiling was set at 150 Volts. Contrary to Burger’s expectations, those obeying the order to administer the shock did not alter their behavior even after being confronted with the phenomenon of a participant who resisted these orders. As Dominic J. Packer from Ohio State University succeeded in demonstrating, those disobeying further orders stopped at the critical 150 Volts mark. Nevertheless, there was no correlation between disobedience and the increasing incidence of the cries of pain from those being punished. Speaking of those disobeying orders, Packer identified that “disobedient participants appeared to respond to a perceived right that stopped them from continuing without the learner’s consent. Noncompliance was reliably triggered among a subset of participants at the

31

See Jerry M. Burger, “Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?” American Psychologist 64 (2009): 1–11. 32 See Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World. The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram (New York: Basic Books, 2004), esp. 75ff. From the perspective of one of the test subjects see Gina Perry, Behind the Shock Machine – The untold Story of the Notorious Milgram Psychology (New York: New Press, 2013). 33 See Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 34 See Gerhard Besier, et al., Im Namen der Freiheit: Die amerikanische Mission (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 192ff., 204ff. Regarding the American Civil Rights movement in the USA, see Manning Marable, Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention (New York: Viking, 2011); Graeme Abernethy, The Iconography of Malcolm X (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013).

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first invocation of this right, but was not systematically related to increase in the severity with which the learner’s well-being was violated.”35 2009 saw a highly accessible repetition of the Milgram experiment made all the more shocking for its transmission as a reality television show. Supervised by the French psychologists Jean-Léon Beauvois, Laurent Bégue, Didier Courbet and Dominique Oberlé, the event addressed the question of whether a medium alone could bring people to inflict violence and suffering on others.36 They also addressed the question as to which personality characteristics would bring people to resist the arrangement. The testpersons were to subject fellow players—in reality actors—to a memory test. Incorrect answers were repaid with electric shocks. Those participants seeking to abandon the game in reaction to the cries of their victims were told “not to be perturbed, we need to continue” or “the logic of the game requires that you continue.” Three of the four variants of the game saw the testpersons inflict a shock of up to the maximum of 460 Volts, which, in reality, would have been sufficient to kill its recipient. The actors “subject” to such treatment screamed, requested the suspension of the test and then finally lapsed into silence. Seeking to establish the type of personality which caused a third of the testpersons to resist and two thirds to obey the command to inflict pain, the psychologists subjected their volunteers to the personality test developed by Paul Costa and Robert McCrea involving a five factor model, measuring personal characteristics on five dimensions— extroversion, neuroticism, openness to new experience, agreeability and conscientiousness. According to the investigations, the characteristics of good-naturedness and conscientiousness were often associated with pronounced levels of obedience. Accordingly, the higher the degree to which the candidates assessed their conscientiousness and agreeability, the greater was their potential readiness to administer torture. Such individuals were described as especially sociable personalities who did not wish to risk conflict with authority figures. The less good-natured the personality, the more easy they found it to say no. These results constituted a surprise to the leaders of the investigation, who usually associated conscientiousness and good nature with a lower level of aggression. 35 Dominic J. Packer, “Identifying Systematic Disobedience in Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: A Meta-analytic Review,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (2008): 301–4. 36 See Jean-Léon Beauvois et. al., “Une transposition du paradigme d’obéissance de Milgram à la télévision: enjeux, résultats et perspectives”, Connexions, no. 95, (2011): 71-88, doi: 10.3917/cnx.095.0071.; see also idem., “Rebellen am Schalthebel.” Gehirn & Geist 9 (2010): 54–59.

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Moreover, such people take fewer drugs, are less likely to become criminals, display a higher ability to bring up children and a higher degree of education. The psychologists also determined a higher degree of correlation between compliance and the subjective well-being of a person, and a connection between rebellious behavior and subjective dissatisfaction. Those satisfied with themselves and the world were more ready to torture their fellow humans than those dissatisfied with their general situation, who were ready to flout the “rules of the game.” Furthermore, the study was unable to establish an association between empathy and civil courage. In a further finding, which agreed with Alan Elms and others, those conducting the study led by Bégue discovered that people who according to their own estimation belong to the right of the political spectrum were more likely to accept authority than self-confessed left-wingers.37 1996 saw the publication of a treatment by Detlef Oesterreich of control-theoretical approaches to the subject.38 Focusing on the reactions of an authoritarian personality, he defined these as a situation-specific retreat to the security of authorities as a consequence of fear and uncertainty. Such behavior—seeking to protect oneself from both danger and seeking the experience of emotional attachments—belongs to the mechanisms of the child’s process of socialization. Whereas mature adults develop solutions to problems on the basis of their own experience, those submissive to authority have failed to transcend the primary mechanism of the child’s response and develop positive emotional ties to any instance offering protection. Accepting the values, standards and ideology of the authority to which they cling, such individuals usually reproduce the conservative orientation, which such figures usually exhibit. Any move by outsiders to question these values and standards is interpreted as an attack on the self-conception of the person holding them and provokes a rigid defense of the values in a desperate attempt to prevent their loss. Although making cautious recourse to Milgram’s observations and findings, Christopher Browning’s 1992 study of Police Reserve Battalion 101 emphasized the effect of peer- pressure over the need to obey. Nevertheless, in view of the “mutually reinforcing effect of authority and conformity,”39 Browning viewed his study as providing confirmation of 37

See Albert C. Elms, “Obedience Lite,” American Psychologist 64 (2009): 32–36. See Oesterreich, Flucht in die Sicherheit; Bennet, Dennett, Hacker, and Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy. 39 See Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battallion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 171ff.; idem., Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 38

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Milgram’s results. Conformist behavior and the glorification of the values of “hard manliness” also belong in this context; those unable to kill were viewed as being “weak.”40 In contrast, Browning estimated the effect of National Socialist ideology on the group of middle-aged men socialized before 1933 as being very low. Moreover, the party indoctrination programs made “absolutely no express attempt” to move the men of Police Battalion 101 to “make a personal contribution to the creation of a Europe ‘free of Jews.’”41 In interpreting exactly the same archive material, Goldhagen subjected Browning’s findings to severe criticism and expressed the view that extreme hate against the Jews was both a matter of socialization and a necessary precondition for the Holocaust.42 However, consideration of the domestic lives of the men involved serves to undermine the socialization hypothesis. At home, the murderers showed themselves to be loving husbands and fathers, whilst at the front (and the distance between the two events was not great) they were capable of the worst of crimes. After a day’s work in the execution pits, they continued to visit the theatre and concerts and continued their participation in the German cultural life, experiencing a number of “cheerful hours in Auschwitz.”43 Following on from Milgram and Browning, the social psychologist Harald Welzer presented a study of Police Reserve Battalion 45 recruited in Aussig (contemporary Ústi nad Labem). Responsible for mass murder, rape and other crimes in Poland and the Ukraine, Welzer also speaks of the battalion members as “ordinary men” and explains their action through something he calls “role distance:” the discrepancy between deeds and being.44 Historians continue to present “perpetrator profiles.”45 Using 2000). See also Alexander Kochinka and Jürgen Straub, “‘Dämonologie’ oder psychologisches Denken? Wie erklärt man, warum ganz gewöhnliche Angehörige der nationalsozialistischen Gesellschaft das Leben anderer auslöschten?” Analyse und Kritik 1 (1998): 95–122. 40 See Browning, Ordinary Men, 185–86. 41 Ibid., 179. 42 See Goldhagen, Executioners. 43 See Ernst Klee, “Heitere Stunden in Auschwitz: Wie deutsche Künstler ihre mordenden Landsleute im besetzten Polen bei Laune hielten,” Die Zeit, no. 5, January 25, 2007, 90; see idem., Das Kulturlexikon zum Dritten Reich: Wer war wer nach 1945 (Frankfurt/M: S. Fischer, 2007). 44 Harald Welzer, Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2005). The genocide in Rwanda was also committed by “normal” people. Following a broad analysis of perpetrator reports, Scott Straus reached the conclusion that “Rwanda’s perpetrators were not especially mad, sadistic, hateful, poor, uneducated, ideologically committed, or young. […] There

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psychological methods to explain the deeds of perpetrators as the result of a specific process of socialization, they seek to avoid ascribing them pathological characteristics.46 The survey by the French historian Christian Ingrao of over eighty members of the SD active in the Eastern territories during the Second World War, came to the conclusion that this middle-ranking group of the Nazi hierarchy consisted not of half-educated failures but highly-educated lawyers, economists, sociologists, geographers, and historians with a belief are exceptions, of course. […] On the whole, however, Rwanda’s killers were ordinary men—farmers, fathers, and sons—with fairly few distinctive characteristics.” Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 10. Regarding the violence in former Yugoslavia, see Gerhard Besier, “Täter und Opfer, Zuschauer und Opponenten: Über menschliches Verhalten in Grenzsituationen,” Totalitarismus und Demokratie 2 (2007): 375–89, 381. 45 Ernst Hanisch, “Opfer/Täter/Mythos: Verschlungene Erzählungen über die NSVergangenheit in Österreich,” Zeitgeschichte 33 (2006): 318–27 is correct in his assessment that far from originating as analytical categories, the concepts “perpetraor” and “victim” were coined by those working in religious and legal studies. 46 See Harvey Asher, “Ganz normale Täter: Variablen sozialpsychologischer Analysen,” Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung 3 (2001): 81–115, which discusses a number of socialpsychological explanations and their applicability to Holocaust perpetrators. See also Christopher R. Browning, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 143–69; Gerhard Paul, ed., Die Täter der Shoah; Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul, Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien (Darmstadt: WBG, 2004); Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Jochen Böhler, and Jürgen Matthäus, Einsatzgruppen in Polen: Darstellung und Dokumentation (Darmstadt: WBG, 2008) esp. 69ff.; Hans-Peter Klausch, Tätergeschichten: Die SSKommandanten der frühen Konzentrationslager im Emsland (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2005). A new case has been presented by Henning Pieper, “SSOberscharführer Walter Kehrer und die ‘Kaukasier-Kompanie’: Eine Sondereinheit und ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1942–1944,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 56 (2008): 197–221. Regarding the Einsatzkommando Tilsit, responsible for the murder of over 5,500 predominantly Jewish victims in the German-Lithuanian border area, see Sabrina Müller and Thomas Schnabel, eds., Die Mörder sind unter uns: Der Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozess 1958 (Stuttgart: Haus der Geschichte Baden-Württemberg, 2008); Gerhard Botz, ed., Schweigen und Reden einer Generation: Erinnerungsgespräche mit Opfern, Tätern und Mitläufern des Nationalsozialismus, 2nd ed. (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2007); Kathrin Kompisch, Täterinnen: Frauen im Nationalsozialismus (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008). The authort writes of the “scope for action within the Nazi dictatorship of entirely normal women […].” Ibid., 12.

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and investment in the world of educated humanism.47 Far from entering the SS out of a lack of opportunity, Ingrao established that their prime motivation arose from their concern for the future of Germany. Fearing that Germany would be crushed between the competing poles of the nonGermanic West and a semi-barbaric East, these and other highly-educated individuals saw National Socialism as the most promising instrument through which to complete a program of socio-biological national renewal. Moreover, institutions such as the SS also presented them with the opportunity to combine academic ambitions with ideological commitment. Involving a number of “anthropological paradigm shifts,” the entry and membership of the SD by this elite—the majority of aspirants joined between 1934 and 1938—must have placed its members under considerable emotional stress. Initially required to defeat the “enemy” in the East, they were then required to legitimize the machinery of destruction, of which they were now clearly a part. The mechanisms developed to cope with such a level of stress included the refunctioning of acts such as mass executions to assume the character of an initiation ritual or other such tests of character, thus killing off any degree of personal empathy for its victims. Those employing such a coping mechanism took advantage of every opportunity to avoid cruelty, so as to maintain a residual level of humanity and self-respect. A similar attempt to “normalize” perpetrators as undertaken by the scholarship outlined here can be observed in contemporary literature. One noticeable aspect of this trend is the fact that a number of these authors are lawyers, amongst them Bernhard Schlink and Ferdinand von Schirach.48 Writing of Schlink’s novel The Reader, Bettina von Jagow asserts that Hanna’s status cannot be resolved by the simple binary approach of “victim or perpetrator.” “Avoiding clear attributions, […] the novel “The Reader” presents the characteristics of a schism using the example of Hanna’s figure, whose two parts are irreconcilable: Hanna’s “Auschwitz self” and her everyday self. […] Hanna is no more a perpetrator than a victim: she represents the medium through which the perpetrator—victim discourse becomes transparent.”49 47

See Christian Ingrao, Croire et dètruire: Les intellectuels dans la machine de guerre SS (Paris: Fayard, 2010). 48 See Bettina von Jagow, “Bernhard Schlink ‘Der Vorleser’: Differenzen der Wahrnehmung von Täter- und Opferbewusstsein,” in Differenzerfahrung und Selbst: Bewusstsein und Wahrnehmung in Literatur und Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Bettina von Jagow and Florian Steger (Heidelberg: Winter, 2003), 245–66. 49 Ibid., 257.

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Ferdinand von Schirach’s stories draw on his experience as a barrister.50 All highly sympathetic characters, his subjects differentiate themselves from the non-perpetrators only by their being overcome by often-humorous coincidence. The “misfortune” befalling Schirach’s figures often appears not only unavoidable, but also to involve scenarios in which the reader can easily locate himself. A common refrain is “he had no other choice”51 as he killed his wife’s lover. In presenting situations and actions in which the apparently clear-cut becomes contingent, ambivalent and ambiguous, both Schlink52 and Schirach fascinate the critical reader and outrage the honest middle-class citizen by undermining all values, standards and dogmas otherwise proclaimed to be of universal validity. Complementing this perspective is the memoir of the Bremen detective Axel Petermann focusing on the “evil,” which he failed to find during his 40-year career as a police officer.53 Far from the dark, diabolical shadow men of popular imagination, the cases which he outlines all involve violations of the penal code by entirely normal people. Contemporary literature has apparently abandoned the focus on guilt and moral transgression in favor of an approach concentrating on random constellations or tragically fatal, yet unavoidable developments. Set against the backdrop of the Third Reich, Joachim Geil’s novel Home Leave introduces the protagonist Dieter Thomas, a young Wehrmacht officer on leave from the front in the summer of 1944. Traumatized, he attempts to bridge the human fault line between the endearing civilian who went to war and the Nazi barbarian who returned through embarking on inner dialogues, fantasies of violence and a love affair.54 Such literature clearly seeks to warn its readers against an oftencountered form of historical moralizing, involving a “denunciatory culture” seeking to discredit previous generations.55 Reviewing the recent multi-author volume centring on the history of the Auswärtiges Amt during the period of the Nazi dictatorship, The Office and the Past (Das Amt und

50 See Ferdinand von Schirach, Crime: stories (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011); idem., Guilt: Stories (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). 51 Schirach, Guilt, 71. 52 See also Bernhard Schlink, Summer lies (New York: Pantheon books, 2012). 53 See Axel Petermann, Auf der Spur des Bösen: Ein Profiler berichtet (Berlin: Ullstein, 2010). See also the publication of Criminal Psychiatrist Hans-Ludwig Kröber: Mord—Geschichten aus der Wirklichkeit (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2012). 54 See Joachim Geil, Heimaturlaub (Göttingen: Steidl, 2010). 55 See Bernhard Schlink, “Die Kultur des Denunziatorischen,” Merkur 745 (2011): 473–86.

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die Vergangenheit),56 Bernhard Schlink identifies a willingness to offer “moral judgment […], made from the heights of contemporary morality.”57 In his assessment, the concomitant of this culture of denunciation is its “positivism of the contemporary.”58

Opposition to “perpetrator normality” and an inflationary use of the trauma discourse Vehement protest against the widely-accepted concept of “perpetrator normality” has been voiced by Hellmuth and Harald J. Freyberger.59 They accuse both Schlink und Schirach of completely disregarding psychological and psychodynamic process descriptions.60 Perpetrator descriptions, they argue, show that the men constituted clearly identifiable clinical cases, classifiable according to the “diagnostic concept of a narcissistic dysfunction with a focus on pathological and malign narcissism.”61 With reference to Otto Kernberg,62 they describe the perpetrators as “people whose social relations are characterized by exaggerated self-reference and whose grandiosity and arrogance are 56 See Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Blessing, 2010). A critique is provided by Johannes Hürter, “Das Auswärtige Amt, die NS-Diktatur und der Holocaust: Kritische Bemerkungen zu einem Kommissionsbericht,” VZG 59 (2011): 167–92; Heinz Schneppen, “Vom Jagdtrieb historischer Ermittler: Der Bericht der ‘Unabhängigen Historikerkommission’ zur Vergangenheit des Auswärtigen Amts,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 59 (2011): 593–620. 57 Schlink, Kultur des Denunziatorischen, 479. 58 Ibid., 484. 59 Regarding the question of the psychoanalytical paradigm used in the following section, see Meinrad Perrez, Ist die Psychoanalyse eine Wissenschaft? (Berne: H. Huber, 1972). An example for more recent criticisms is that by Todd Dufresne, Against Freud: Critics Talk Back (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007); Catherine Meyer and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, eds., Le livre noir de la psychoanalyse: Vivre, penser et aller mieux sans Freud (Paris: Arènes, 2005). 60 See Hellmuth Freyberger and Harald J. Freyberger, “Ganz normale Männer und ganz normale Familien? Ein Beitrag zur Nazitäter-Psychologie unter Einschluss von zwei Buchrezensionen,” Psychosozial 30 (2007): 85–99. 61 Ibid., 93. 62 Otto Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (New York: Jason Aronson, 1975); idem., Affekt, Objekt und Übertragung: Aktuelle Entwicklungen der psychoanalytischen Therapie und Technik (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2002).

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accompanied by a sense of inferiority. […] If accompanied by pronounced suspicion and paranoia, this combination of self-centeredness, ruthlessness and excessive ambition in the sense of pathological narcissism can culminate in the syndrome of malign narcissism. […] Their cold grandiosity correlates with strongly sadistic urges in the sense of the ideology of destructive-aggressive self-activation, which itself is based on a deficient impulse control and the lack of a controlling feeling of guilt. Overwhelming sadistic urges and the lack of a conscience result in a complete disregard of social conventions and rules. […] The perpetrator experiences this massive operation as a great personal triumph. At the same time, the perpetrator is largely able to rationalize the pronounced destructive side of his behaviour through the SS ideology of ‘decency.’”63 Freyberger and Freyberger also diagnosed Heinrich Himmler with an “exceptionally serious malign narcissistic dysfunction.”64 In no way was he the product of an “ordinary family,” as Katrin Himmler claimed.65 In contrast, Peter Longerich’s study of Himmler emphasized not just the more bizarre characteristics of his ideology.66 He portrays a man originating from a “sheltered, catholic-conservative household;” and examination of his early life gave no indication of a personality “with obviously abnormal characteristics,”67 whose “inner inhibitions”68 would lead him to yearn for rules and controls was in no way to be reconciled with the accompanying and contradictory drive to cast off this psychological corset and be entirely “indecent.” He suffered with a deep “commitment problem” and was long afflicted by suppressed sexual desire which he vented in voyeurism and fantasies of violence.69 Long having

63

Freyberger and Freyberger, “Männer,” 93. The quotation is taken from Himmler’s infamous Posen speech to senior SS leaders on October 4, 1943. He said: “To have stuck it out [the extermination of the Jews] and […] to have remained decent, that is what has made us tough.” Quoted from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919–1945: a documentary reader: volume III: foreign policy, war and racial extermination. (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 1199. 64 Freyberger and Freyberger, “Männer,” 96. 65 Katrin Himmler, Die Brüder Himmler: Eine deutsche Familiengeschichte (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2005), 29ff. 66 See Gerhard Besier, “Neuheidnische Religiosität und Protestantismus im NSStaat: Der Dom zu Quedlinburg als Kult- und Weihestätte der SS,” Religion-StaatGesellschaft 1 (2000): 145–88; Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 285–86. 67 Longerich, Himmler, 737. 68 Ibid., 742. 69 Ibid., 39; 46ff.

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wrestled with an “insatiable longing for affection and care,”70 he later sought to compensate for this through hardness and self-control.71 He was conscious of “distinct feelings of inferiority”72 and reacted with insecurity, experiencing constant frustration in his dealings with other people. In opposition to his true inclinations, he stylized himself as a cool, unbending, idealistic fighter for the perfect “Führerstaat” and cultivated a burning racist hatred. In their consideration of Adolf Eichmann, long before demythologized as “banal” and a mindless careerist by Hannah Arendt,73 Freyberger and Freyberger argued that his abduction, imprisonment and trial in Jerusalem had induced a posttraumatic disorder.74 During his one and a half year 70

Ibid., 39. Ibid., 738. 72 Ibid., 55. 73 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report of the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963). See also David Cesarani, Adolf Eichmann: His Life and Crimes (London: W. Heinemann, 2004), esp. 237ff.; 357ff. Cesarani writes: “He (Eichmann—G.B.) had a normal childhood, notwithstanding the premature loss of his mother and the move from Germany to Austria. After all, many children experience bereavement and upheaval without turning into callous atrocity-mongers.” (Ibid., 361.) Moreover, he sees “no signs of abnormal behaviour” in his youth. (Ibid., 361): The Canadian missionary Reverend Hull, who visited Eichmann in prison 12 times in 1962 after he had been sentenced to death, wrote of him: “The mysterious thing about Adolf Eichmann is that he is a very usual, normal man. How could such a normal person knowingly commit such crimes?” William L. Hull, The Struggle for a Soul (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 40. See also Peter Krause, Der Eichmann-Prozess in der deutschen Presse (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2002), esp. 166ff., 190ff. Bettina Stangneth interprets Eichmann’s role in Eichmann vor Jerusalem: Das unbehelligte Leben eines Massenmörders (Zurich: Arche, 2011), in the destruction of the European Jewry not as that of a dumb “desk murderer,” but a creative progenitor of the National Socialist genocide. He had used the four months of his court appearance to minimize his role to that of a small cog in what was a much larger machinery of destruction. For the discussion of Arendt’s estimation of Eichmann, see Hannah Arendt, Joachim C Fest, Ursula Ludz, and Thomas Wild, Eichmann war von empörender Dummheit; Gespräche und Briefe (Munich: Piper, 2011), exp. 36–60; 65; 76–77; 86. The correspondence reveals that Fest agreed with Arendt in her estimation of Eichmann. This treatment portrays Eichmann as a fanatical National Socialist who constantly sought to emphasize his importance, and who found it very difficult to bear his loss of importance after the Second World War. 74 For its clincial symptoms and possible therapeutical intervention, see Anke Ehlers, Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung (Göttingen: Hogrefe, Verlag für Psychologie, 1999); Andreas Maercker, ed., Belastungsstörungen (Berlin: 71

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captivity, he suffered nightmares, impulsive instability, inner lethargy, dissociative amnesia (autobiographical memory loss), depression and mortal fear.75 “The dissociative mode of experience which Eichmann most probably displayed in Jerusalem, and which obviously contributed to his psychopathology included derealization, secondary alexithymia, amnesia and Ganser’s syndrome.”76 The Freyberger diagnosis was based on Arendt’s description of Eichmann’s behavior displayed during his trial.77 Moreover, they advance this state of mind—his posttraumatic stress disorder—as the explanation for Eichmann’s amnesia regarding the deportation and murder of Europe’s Jews. Furthermore, his precise evasion of the questions is also interpreted in the context of Ganser’s syndrome. Nevertheless, they refused to rule out that Eichmann also simulated his memory lapses, thus presenting an “artificially induced dissociative dysfunction.”78 These considerations were designed to provide an explanation for Hannah Arendt’s mistaken identification of Eichmann as an “average, normal person” without any apparent reason for his “insane antiSemitism.”79 Freyberger and Freyberger claim that in presenting the symptoms of malign narcissism, both Eichmann and the members of the police battalions suffered from a psychological disorder “characterized by an intensive anti-Semitic fanaticism.”80 However this interpretation is tacked, it would seem to render the “perpetrator-victim paradigm” obsolete, as the “perpetrators” should actually be hospitalized. Moreover, they assume a double role, which cannotbe solely conceived of in chronological order. Regardless of the psychological dysfunction which led Eichmann to become a “desk murderer,” he also suffered from posttraumatic stress induced by his flight,81 abduction, trial, and death Springer, 2003); Peter Fiedler, Dissoziative Störungen und Konversion: Trauma und Traumabehandlung (Weinheim: Beltz PVU, 2001). 75 Regarding the phenemonen of disassociation, see Norbert F. Gurris and Mechthild Wenk-Ansohn, “Folteropfer und Opfer politischer Gewalt,” in Maercker, Therapie der posttraumatischen Belastungsstörungen, 222–46; 225. See also Birgit Möller, “Die Zerstörung der psychischen Struktur durch die Folter,” Report Psychologie 24 (1999): 185–87. 76 Thus the assessment of Freyberger and Freyberger, “Männer,” 87. 77 Regarding Eichmann’s statements see Lang, Eichmann interrogated. 78 See Freyberger and Freyberger, “Männer,” 88. 79 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 22–23. 80 Freyberger and Freyberger, “Männer,” 88. 81 Regarding the often dramatic escape of Nazi war criminals, see Gerald Steinacher, Nazis auf der Flucht: Wie Kriegsverbrecher über Italien nach Übersee entkamen (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2008).

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sentence—a further albeit passive dysfunction. Speaking in 1965, Dutch Waffen-SS volunteers told of nightmares which had pursued them for twenty years, but claimed to regret nothing, and if presented with the same choice, said they would not hesitate to act in the same way.82 Having waded in blood, they said of themselves (in the third person) “those were entirely normal men. […] No, they were not butchers.”83 This assessment is supported by reference to the origin of many members of the SS hierarchy, the greatest proportion of whom were drawn from the center of German society. Indeed, the majority of such men were “upwardly mobile, ambitious graduates usually drawn from intact families. In contradiction to previously long-held assumptions, they were not members of a disturbed minority or members of a marginalized criminal milieu […].”84 East German psychotherapist’s waiting rooms are currently filled with “victims” and “perpetrators” sitting side by side—entirely justifiably as the nature of their treatment is almost identical.85 Nevertheless, despite the clear demonstration of such a phenomenon manifested by the presence in the same Stasi file of reports both from and about a person this “victimperpetrator ambivalence” has had little impact on the many programs dedicated to “coming to terms with the GDR past.”86 Instead, analysis of the perpetrator and victim remain subject to strict separation; literature regarding the consequences of the “political trauma” of those involved has been produced only for those in the latter category.87 Set against the context of the often extremely difficult experiences of many in the GDR, including the perceived threat from constant 82

See Armando Salvatore and Hans Sleutelaar, “Die SSer: Niederländische Freiwillige im Zweiten Weltkrieg erzählen,” Neueste Hefte 70 (2008): 118–41. 83 Ibid., 124. Elsewhere, he is quoted as saying “The Difference Between Myself and Eichmann Was That He Was Older, Austrian and Much More Capable Than I,” Ibid., 140. 84 Thus Robert Gerwarth, Hitler’s Hangman: The Life of Heydrich (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), XVI. 85 See FAZ, no. 70 of March 24, 2009, 8. 86 See, for example the case of Klaus Biedermann in Hedwig Richter’s treatment Pietismus im Sozialismus: Die Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine in der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 322. 87 See Joachim Maaz, Der Gefühlsstau: Ein Psychogramm der DDR (Berlin: Argon, 1990); Stephan Trobisch-Lütges, Das späte Gift: Folgen politischer Traumatisierung in der DDR und ihre Behandlung (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2004); Annette Simon, “Bleiben will ich, wo ich nie gewesen bin”: Versuch über ostdeutsche Identitäten (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2009); Christoph Seidler and Michael J. Froese, eds., Traumatisierungen in (Ost-)Deutschland (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2009).

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surveillance by the MfS, a number of commentators—the majority of them with a psychoanalytic background—maintain that many of those affected succeeded in forgetting, blocking out or even establishing a taboo around their traumatic memories. Convinced that mental wounds cannot be healed by such an approach, the therapists call for the need to focus on the need to examine and speak about forgotten trauma. Their oft-repeated plea for a stronger role to be played by psychohistory in mainstream historiography could even result in a further breakdown in the divide between victims and perpetrators. Indeed, such an approach would provoke considerable opposition. The approximation of perpetrators and victims within an individualpsychological trauma discourse is just one of the reasons leading Harald Welzer to subject this paradigm to sharp criticism, regarding it as nothing more than a fashionable term designed to recast the German culture of memory88 by creating a situation which also emphasizes German suffering.89 “If everybody is traumatized […] then nobody is traumatized. Amidst all this, who could still be a perpetrator, if we are all victims?”90 Reacting to the eternal mantra of the “necessity to remember” chanted by 88

See Bill Niven, ed., Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Helmut Schmitz, ed., A Nation of Victims? Representations of German Wartime Suffering From 1945 to the Present (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007). 89 See Harald Welzer, “Die Nachhaltigkeit historischer Erfahrungen: Eine sozialpsychologische Perspektive,” in Transgenerationale Weitergabe kriegsbelasteter Kindheiten: Interdisziplinäre Studien zur Nachhaltigkeit historischer Erfahrungen über vier Generationen, ed. Hartmut Radebold, Werner Bohleber, and Jürgen Zinnecker (Weinheim and Munich: Juventa-Verl., 2008), 75– 93, esp. 81–82. 90 Ibid., 82. Regarding the transformation of perpetrators into victims in family memory, see Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, “Opa war kein Nazi”: Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer Taschenbuch, 2002). Writing in “Heroismus und Viktimismus: Überlegungen zum deutschen Opferdiskurs in historischer Perspektive,” Potsdamer Bulletin für zeithistorische Studien 43/44 (2008): 7–21, 19; Martin Sabrow sees Stalingrad as the beginning of the development of the German view of history as a story of victimhood. He sees the interpretation of this lost battle as a “phenomenon of transformation” which re-interpreted the hero discourse of the first half of the twentieth century into a victim discourse in the second half.” (Ibid., 20). Whereas Germany has no more heroes, but only perpetrators, the discourse in other nations, such as those of the former Soviet Union are dominated by views of Red Army and partisan heroes. See Olga Kurilo and Gerd-Ulrich Herrmann, eds., Täter, Opfer, Helden: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in der weißrussischen und deutschen Erinnerung (Berlin: Metropol, 2008).

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all those staffing official memorials, Welzer counters that “the inflationary use of the word “trauma” to the point of its omnipresence has rendered it increasingly meaningless. Only recently, train passengers whose journey was marred by the breakdown of the air-conditioning unit in their carriage were referred to a psychologist. Are we going to start treating influenza victims in the same way?”91 The sociologist Michael Heinlein has also investigated what he views as the “obsessive” boom in “remembrance” and questioned the over-use of the concept of trauma as a method of giving credence to the narrative of the victims. Commenting on the memories of those expelled from their homelands after the end of the Second World War, he even asserts that such outpourings have contributed to a “publicly-staged lust for suffering.”92 According to the social psychologist Angela Kühner, the most pertinent response to the current inflationary nature of the trauma discourse is that of differentiation. “People [only] suffer from traumatic memories once these memories begin to exercise a negative, restrictive, or damaging influence on the course of their life.”93 Nevertheless, she also points to the existence of a collective tendency to play down the suffering of the victims out of a concern to avoid questions of responsibility. In this analysis, it is not just the perpetrators but also the bystanders who seek to minimize the level of suffering to which such victims are subject—as part of a defence against allegations of a failure of empathy and civil courage on their part.94 We should not allow the inflationary use to which the diagnosis of a trauma is put to allow belittlement of the struggle by Holocaust survivors and other victims for the recognition of their

91 Quoted according to the review by Harald Welzers of Christian Meier, Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns: Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit (Munich: Siedler, 2010), Die Welt, July 31, 2010, 29. 92 Michael Heinlein, Die Erfindung der Erinnerung: Deutsche Kriegskindheiten im Gedächtnis der Gegenwart (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010), 14; 30. 93 Angela Kühner, “Das Plädoyer für Vergessen als Kritik einer ‘obsessiven’ Erinnerungspolitik? Sozialpsychologische Überlegungen zum Umgang mit beunruhigenden Vergangenheiten,” in Soziologie des Vergessens: Theoretische Zugänge und empirische Forschungsfelder, ed. Oliver Dimbath and Peter Wehling (Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 211–27; 216. 94 See ibid., 217; see also Jan Philipp Reemtsma, “Trauma—Aspekte der ambivalenten Karriere eines Konzepts,” Persönlichkeitsstörungen, Theorie und Therapie (PTT) 4 (1999): 207–14.

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suffering.95 Such efforts reflect attempts to establish the Holocaust as the true paradigm of a traumatic experience.96

The “licence to kill” as a mental strain: Soldiers as perpetrators and victims Discussion of the perpetrator-victim discourse would benefit from a brief consideration of one group fitted by a number of commentators into both categories: soldiers. Equipped to a certain extent with a “license to kill,”97 many in this group often require resocialization as victims of their experiences.98 As Philip G. Zimbardo noted, “we can learn a great deal about the nature of violence and the transformation of good to evil after study of the techniques applied by a government to turn peace-loving young men into merciless soldiers.”99 To a certain extent, this transformation process also applies to “normal” men and women subject to the experiences of war, expulsion, rape, persecution and hunger.100 A study 95 See Axel Honneth, Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 96 See the special edition “Holocaust und Trauma” from the Telaviv Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 39 (2011). 97 Regarding the psychological collapse of people in combat (“war tremors,” “simulation,” etc.) see Klaus Blaßneck, Militärpsychiatrie im Nationalsozialismus: Kriegsneurotiker im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Würzburg: Dt. Wiss.-Verl., 2000); Peter Riedesser and Axel Verderber, Maschinengewehre hinter der Front: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Militärpsychiatrie (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 1996); Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany 1890–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Susann Michl and Jan Plamper, “Soldatische Angst im Ersten Weltkrieg: Die Karriere eines Gefühls in der Kriegspsychiatrie Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Russlands,” GuG 35 (2009): 209–48; Babette Quinkert, Philipp Rauh, and Ulrike Winkler, eds., Krieg und Psychiatrie 1914–1950 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010); Stefanie Neuner, Politik und Psychiatrie: Die staatliche Versorgung psychisch Kriegsbeschädigter in Deutschland 1920–1939 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Maria Hermes, Krankheit: Krieg; Psychiatrische Deutungen des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen: Klartext, 2012). 98 Klaus Wothe and Klaus Siepmann, “Soldaten nach militärischen Einsätzen,” in Maercker, Belastungsstörungen, 247–66. 99 Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Psychology of Evil: A Situationist Perspective on Recruiting Good People to Engage in Anti-social Acts,” in Schwerpunktthema Persönlichkeit und Verhalten, ed. Kurt Pawlik (Göttingen: Verlag für Psychologie, 1995), 186–204; 190. 100 See Astrid von Friesen, Der lange Abschied: Psychische Spätfolgen für die 2. Generation deutscher Vertriebener (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2000); idem and

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by Andreas Maercker, Elmar Brähler et al. focusing on posttraumatic stress in Germany found “a prevalence of PTSD amongst the over-60 age group 2-3 times higher than that exhibited by the younger age groups.”101 The authors estimate that more than 60 years after the end of the Second World War, elderly people in Germany still suffer from war-related traumas, resulting either from direct experiences of the war, imprisonment or loss of a home through being bombed-out or expelled.102 Wendelin Szalai, eds., Heimat verlieren—Heimat finden: Geschichten von Krieg, Flucht und Vertreibung aus einer Erzählwerkstatt (Dresden: DDP Goldenbogen, 2002); Andreas Kossert, Kalte Heimat: Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 (Munich: Siedler, 2008), 43ff.; Jan M. Piskorski, Die Verjagten: Flucht und Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Siedler, 2013). Regarding the post traumatic stress syndrome of those suffering repression during childhoods in the Eastern bloc, see “Bleibende Wunden—Psychische Folgen des Kommunismus,” Ost-West: Europäische Perspektiven 2 (Ostfildern: MatthiasGrünewald-Verlag, 2011); Otto Dov Kulka, Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death: Reflections on Memory and Imagination (London: Allen Lane, 2013). 101 Andreas Maercker, Simon Forstmeier, Birgit Wagner, Heide Glaesmer, and Elmar Brähler, “Posttraumatische Belastungsstörungen in Deutschland: Ergebnisse einer gesamtdeutschen epidemiologischen Untersuchung,” Der Nervenarzt 79 (2008): 577–86; 585. The Munich-based Pschologist Michael Ermann is currently conducting a research project concentrating on “War childhood” (see http://www.kriegskindheit.de). See also Michael Ermann, “Kriegskinder im Forschungsinterview: Motive und Folgen,” Zeitschrift für Individualpsychologie 32 (2007): 304–11; idem.,“Erinnerungsdiskurse—Forschungsinterviews in Deutschland,” in Kriegskinder in Ostdeutschland und Polen, ed. Jürgen Reulecke, Reinhard Schmook, and Jacek Jeremicz (Berlin: Verl. für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2008), 51–60; idem., et al., “Posttraumatische Belastungssymptome als Spätfolge von Kindheiten im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Psychotherapeut 3 (2007): 212–17; idem., et al., “Psychische Beschwerden, interpersonale Probleme, Lebensqualität und Kohärenzgefühl bei ehemaligen deutschen Kriegskindern,” Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik, Medizinische Psychologie 58 (2008): 257–63. 102 Regarding the influences to which those born between 1930 and 1945 were subject, see Margarete Dörr, “Der Krieg hat uns geprägt”: Wie Kinder den Zweiten Weltkrieg erlebten, 2 vols. (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2007). Regarding the late effects of childhood experiences of strafing and the need to provide assistance in emergency situations, see ibid., vol. 1, 171ff. Regarding the consequences of experiences of loss and growing up without a father, see ibid, vol. 2, 108ff. Regarding the effect of childhood wartime experiences and post-war experiences after 60 years, see ibid., vol. 2, 397ff. See also Ludwig Janus, ed., Geboren im Krieg: Kindheitserfahrungen im 2. Weltkrieg und ihre Auswirkungen (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2006). Lu Seegers and Jürgen Reulecke, eds., Die “Generation der Kriegskinder”: Historische Hintergründe und Deutungen (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2009); Matthias Grundmann, Dieter Hoffmeister,

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Circumstantial evidence advanced by the authors in support of this hypothesis was gathered in Portugal and Switzerland. Higher rates of PTSD amongst the Portuguese cohorts who experienced the colonial wars and civil war of the 1960s and 1970s contrast to a much lower incidence of such suffering amongst their Swiss contemporaries, with no experience of war. In contrast to the figures for Germany and Portugal, older people in Canada, Australia and Mexico display much lower PTSD rates than those from younger generations. When inquiring as to the probable causes of their symptoms—sleeping problems, attention deficit disorders, or a constant state of over-excitement—the elderly Germans almost all referred to their war experiences. Those affected recounted panic attacks triggered by hearing a fire engine siren due to their childhood experience of air raids. Some survivors of traumatic experiences even recount exaggerated and embellished memories of their experiences. A number of survivors from the aerial attack on Dresden continue to maintain that they had been strafed by low flying aircraft whilst retreating to the countryside surrounding the city.103 Refuted by geological surveys which failed to find any evidence of such ammunition, such stories are best understood as episodes of “False Memory Syndrome.”104 Maercker, Brähler et al. recorded incidences of individuals re-experiencing the loss of siblings or and Sebastian Knoth, eds., Kriegskinder in Deutschland zwischen Trauma und Normalität: Botschaften einer beschädigten Generation (Berlin: Lit, 2009). See also the therapeutic project led by the psychologists Philipp Kuwert and Christine Knaevelsrud, last modified July 11, 2007, accessed August 7, 2012, http://www.lebenstagebuch.de. 103 See Rolf-Dieter Müller, Nicole Schönherr, and Thomas Widera, eds., Die Zerstörung Dresdens 13. bis 15. Februar 1945 (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2010), esp. 75ff.; Gunnar Schubert, Die kollektive Unschuld: Wie der Dresden-Schwindel zum nationalen Opfermythos wurde (Hamburg: KVV Konkret, 2009), esp. 97–98. Johannes Fried provides a good description of our personal relationship to our own memory: “we are only too happy to enhance the value of our experiences and establish them as immutably etched on our consciousness. My memory—that is me myself.” Johannes Fried, “Gehirn macht Geschichte,” Gehirn & Geist 5 (2005): 52–57; 53. He refers to the example of Hitler’s last secretary Traudl Junge—“Until the final hour: Hitler’s last secretary” (New York, 2004), to point to the various “marks of deformity” in the process of memory. 104 See Sina Kühnel and Hans J. Markowitsch, Falsche Erinnerungen: Die Sünden des Gedächtnisses (Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2009); Karl C. Mayer, “Glossar Psychiatrie/ Psychosomatik/ Psychotherapie/ Neurologie/ Neuropsychologie: False Memory“, accessed July 15, 2012, http://www.neuro24.de/show_glossar.php?id=559. See also Harald Welzer, “Die Medialität menschlichen Gedächtnisses,” BIOS 21 (2008): 15–27.

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school friends; such memories also lead to a sense of guilt, something which is often misdiagnosed as depression. With the establishment of a taboo surrounding such experiences in the immediate aftermath of their incidence, these memories often return upon retirement, when people begin to reflect on their lives. A further study presented by the sociologist of science Gerhard Sonnert and the science historian Gerald Holton also pointed to the existence of such “enduring traumas.” Their study traces the lives of the some 28,000 children and teenagers of Jewish descent who emigrated from Germany and Austria to the USA between 1933 and 1945. Demonstrating an exceptionally high level of success in integrating into their new environments, the study identified “an inexorable will to be the best in everything. In a number of cases, this was motivated by the need to deal with an underlying feeling of insecurity triggered by the experience of immigration and flight.”105 Differentiating between war-related and civil traumas, the authors established experiences of the latter category as including serious accidents, life-threatening illnesses and the experience of rape or abuse as a child. The study also demonstrated that the effects of the war-related trauma were not restricted to the generation experiencing them.106 Further studies conducted with a cultural sciences approach demonstrated that traumatic experiences are often passed on to the following generation in the form of trans-generational experiences of violence which can also affect the children of their victims.107

105

Gerald Holton and Gerhard Sonnert, What Happened to the Children Who Fled Nazi Persecution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 182. See also Barbara Bauer and Waltraut Strickhausen, eds., “Für ein Kind war das anders”: Traumatische Erfahrungen jüdischer Kinder und Jugendlicher im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (Berlin: Metropol, 1999); United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Center for Advanced Studies, eds., Children and the Holocaust: Symposium Presentations (Washington DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2004). 106 Regarding the approach to this question by theologians, see Björn Krondorfer, Katharina von Kellenbach, and Norbert Reck, Mit Blick auf die Täter: Fragen an die deutsche Theologie nach 1945 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlag-Haus, 2006). 107 See Michael Ermann, “Wir Kriegskinder,” Forum Psychoanalyse 20 (2004): 226–39; Hartmut Radebold, Werner Bohleber, and Jürgen Zinnecker, eds., Transgenerationale Weitergabe kriegsbelasteter Kindheiten: Interdisziplinäre Studien zur Nachhaltigkeit historischer Erfahrungen über vier Generationen (Weinheim: Juventa, 2008). Regarding the concept of generations, see Stephen Lovell, ed., Generations in the Twentieth-Century Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Ohad Parnes, Ulrike Vedder, and Stefan Willer, Das Konzept

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Applying such insights to post-war Germany, it is only with considerable trepidation that Ulrike Jureit speaks of the self-perception of the generation of the 1968ers as victims. Rejecting fascism and the “generation of the perpetrators,” they stylized themselves as potential victims of the Third Reich. Moreover, in establishing a “culture of remembrance identifying with the victims,”108 this generation-specific culture sacralized the remembrance of the crimes of the National Socialist regime, thus investing commemoration with a moral connotation, hoping for “salvation through remembrance.” This construct acted as the source of the moral certainties displayed by this generation. Working on the victim perspective of the 1968 generation, the sociologist Christian Schneider examined the influence on this cohort of the Frankfurt School. The pupils of the Jewish intellectuals who had succeeded in escaping National Socialist persecution, and themselves children of the “perpetrators,” appropriated the legitimate perspective and intellectual stance of their teachers. Reserving his particular criticism for the influence of a study from Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, which examined the inability to grieve, Schneider saw that the “real damage inflicted by this diagnosis centers around the use of the term ‘grief,’ which is in fact a category inapplicable to the problem at hand. In doing so, this not only transforms grief into a metaphor, but results in its inflationary application. […] These murderous actions can no more be grieved over than they can be ‘mastered.’”109 Responding to his discovery of the SS membership of his teacher, the well-known Romanist Hans Robert Jauss, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (born in 1948) insists on the right of his generation to an “intractable sense of outrage” regarding the silence of their parents’ generation over their contribution to the Third Reich. “We inherited […] from our fathers such as Jauss the burden of a terrible past for which they hold themselves unaccountable and for which we carry no responsibility. Some of our generation are weakened to the extent of eternal immaturity.”110

der Generation: Eine Wissenschafts- und Kulturgeschichte (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2008). 108 See Ulrike Jureit and Christian Schneider, Gefühlte Opfer: Illusionen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2010). 109 Ibid., 137. 110 Hans Ulrich Gambrecht, “Mein Lehrer, der Mann von der SS,” Die Zeit, no. 15 of April 7, 2011, 62.

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Svenja Goltermann has succeeded in reconstructing the widespread nature of PTSD amongst the some 11 million former German prisoners of war, themselves responsible for all number of “crimes.”111 Whilst the public discourse largely ignored the horrors of the Second World War, the individual experience of mass murder remained a vital and disruptive part of the personal memories of a number of former Wehrmacht soldiers. Nevertheless, picking up where their military counterparts had left off in 1945, the overwhelming majority of post-war civilian psychologists maintained the view that the war itself was not a cause of mental illness, the episodes of which they viewed as potential benefit fraud. Official fears of a financially ruinous wave of claims for work incapacity benefit failed to materialize, even after the passage in 1950 of legislation guaranteeing state support for victims of war. Preventing such a development was the firm rejection of such claims by the German psychological profession whose practitioners participated in the wider social consensus determined not to permit war-related mental illness to sap the will to rebuild the young, yet war-torn Federal Republic. Only the passage of further legislation in 1956 ushered in a more open manner of dealing with the victims of National Socialist persecution. Subject to considerable pressure from both the USA and a wide alliance of Jewish victims’ associations, German psychologists gradually, albeit unwillingly, began to recognize the incidence of a number of mental conditions amongst victims of the Third Reich as the long-term consequences of the impact of National Socialist terror. However, in a stance underpinned to a great extent by financial considerations, no thought was given to applying the new mind-set to former Wehrmacht soldiers, despite protest from exservicemen’s associations. Since the Korean War, the USA has been confronted by a number of soldiers requiring resocialization.112 Whilst some 30 per cent of all Vietnam veterans are estimated to suffer from a number of psychological PTSD problems,113 the rate of PTSD suffering following the Somalia 111 See Svenja Goltermann, Die Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Gewalterfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: DVA, 2009). 112 See Michael D. Matthews and Janice H. Laurence, eds., Military psychology, 4 vols., (London: Sage, 2011). We receive reports from almost every land in our cultural circle, not just the USA, outlining cases in which soldiers suffer from their experiences years after the event. See FASZ, no. 7 of February 17, 2008, 10. 113 See William E. Schlenger, Richard A. Kulka, John A. Fairbank B. Kathleen Jordan, Richard L. Hough, Charles R. Marmar, et al., “The Prevalence of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Vietnam Generation: A Multi-method, Multisource

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campaign of 1993 was reduced to eight per cent;114 Corresponding figures for the First Gulf War registered a proportion of eight to 16 per cent.115 The figures for those serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom were 11 per cent and between 15 and 17 per cent respectively.116 Founded in 1967, the Vietnam Veterans against the War now acts as a grouping for all former GIs affected by the wars in which they suffered and now reject. Despite the increase in the number of such conflicts, the reference point for PTSD campaigners remains the Vietnam War. The some 60,000 ex-servicemen traumatized by this conflict and who took their own lives marginally exceeds the number those dying in the course of the conflict itself. A further 300,000 former soldiers were found to be in gaol in 1972 after their failure to return to their former lives. Figures produced in 2008 by the U.S. Department ofVeteran Affairs estimated that some 61,600 Vietnam veterans were homeless. In addition to the traditional military and psychological drill to which soldiers have always been subject in order to motivate and train them for combat, modern recruits are also prepared for their future roles with the state-of-the-art computer software Battlemind. Preparing its users for death, wounds and long periods of separation from home, the program also involves an element seeking to introduce the specific challenges of

Assessment of Psychiatric Disorder,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 5 (1992): 333– 63. 114 See Brett T. Litz, Susan M. Orsillo, Matthew Friedman, Peter Ehlich, and Alfonso Batres, “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Associated with Peacekeeping Duty in Somalia for U.S. Military Personnel,” American Journal of Psychiatry 154 (1997): 178–94. 115 Jessica Wolfe, Darin J. Erickson, Erica J. Sharkanski, Daniel W. King, and Lynda A. King, “Course and Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Gulf War Veterans: A Prospective Analysis,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 67 (1999): 520–28. 116 See Charles W. Hoge, Carl A. Castro, Stephen C. Messer, Dennis McGurk, Dave I. Cotting, and Robert L. Koffman, “Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care,” New England Journal of Medicine 351 (2004): 13–22. Charles W. Hoge, Jennifer L. Auchterlonie, and Charles S. Milliken, “Mental Health Problems, Use of Mental Health Services, and Attrition From Military Service After Returning From Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan,” Journal of the American Medical Association 295 (2006): 1023–32. The case of an Iraq veteran who disappeared in March 2008 after suffering a flashback only later to be found dead shook the United States. See New York Times, no. 54, March 31, 2008.

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reintegration into “normal life” in the USA.117 Also involving the participation of the family of a returning serviceman, extra attention is accorded to those soldiers exhibiting any special degree of difficulty. The true innovation of this development is the reform of an Army culture involving the enforcement of strict non-communication regarding common experiences made in a combat situation. Replacing this outmoded approach to post-combat routine, official doctrine now focuses on the duty of each GI to assume responsibility for the mental health of his immediate comrades. Follow-up studies focusing on soldiers having recently completed these training programs in 2005 and 2006 revealed that they displayed considerably lower levels of PTSD symptoms than those who had just begun such a course. Nevertheless, this reintegration program has not prevented the constantly increasing rate of suicide amongst Army members. 2007 saw almost 1000 GIs attempt to take their lives; 115 died in the process.118 Military psychologists advance stress as the main cause of attempted suicide.119 Such suicides are not merely the consequence of longer and more frequent combat operations, but a radical change in situation—two fifths of those committing suicide did so upon returning home from operations. Alarmed by statistics indicating that some 80 per cent of the soldiers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq complain of insomnia and serious sleep disorders,120 Coady B. Lapierre, Andria F. Schwegler, and Bill J. LaBauve from Tarleton State University in Killeen, Texas responded with a new study. A survey of the totality of servicemen and women returning from service in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed that 44 per cent of those participating in a government reintegration program contracted significant forms of clinical depression and symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress.121 This was matched by the even higher levels of PTSD presented by between 84 and 87 per cent of those declining to participate in such a reintegration program. The study also demonstrated an interesting level of 117

See Christopher Munsey, “Armor for the Mind: A New Tool Is Helping Soldiers ‘Normalize’ Their Reactions to Combat and Deployment Stress,” Monitor on Psychology A Publication of the American Psychological Association 38 (2007): 44–46. 118 See Die Welt of May 31, 2008, 6. 119 See the next section considering emotional behavior and endocrine systems (hormones). 120 See Munsey, “Armor for the Mind,” 45. 121 See Coady Lapierre, Andria Schwegler, and Bill LaBauve, “Posttraumatic Stress and Depression Symptoms in Soldiers Returning From Combat Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 20 (2007): 933–43.

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differentiation. Iraq veterans were more likely to suffer from serious mental health problems than those serving in Afghanistan; separated and divorced soldiers were more likely to be affected than married and single servicemen; and young soldiers displayed greater levels of mental illness than their more experienced comrades and officers. Moreover, women exhibited greater levels of difficulty than men; African-Americans and those from the Pacific Islands were less affected than their white counterparts. The move on the part of the German troops stationed in Afghanistan from concentration on exclusively humanitarian duties to the assumption of combat operations has triggered an increase in the number of traumatized soldiers returning from tours of duty in the Hindu Kush.122 According to official figures from the German Ministry of Defence, the number of soldiers receiving in-patient treatment for PTSD in German military hospitals rose from 226 in 2008123 to 655 in November 2010 and 729 at the end of the year. This represents a rise of more than 10 times in comparison to 2006, when only 55 Bundeswehr soldiers were being treated for mental disturbances.124 Despite this constant increase, comparison to Germany’s allies is more favourable: whilst only one per cent of German servicemen were diagnosed with PTSD in 2009, the figures for other NATO armies averaged at five per cent. The explosion in the incidence of PTSD in the German armed forces resulted in a significant government response. A dedicated research and treatment center for PTSD was established in Berlin in 2009;125 it was expanded and established on an independent institutional footing in June 2010.126 The Minister of Defence even appointed a general to head the official response to the spread in PTSD in the German armed forces.127 122

See Matthias Stolz and Albrecht Fuchs, “Die Narben des Krieges: Die Versehrten aus Afghanistan tauchen in der Öffentlichkeit nicht auf; Hier zeigen sich einige von ihnen und erzählen ihre Geschichte,” Zeit Magazin, no. 6 of February 3, 2011, 26–32. 123 See Die Welt of February 4, 2009, 1. 124 See Die Welt of April 7, 2011, 6. 125 See Die Welt of February 13, 2009, 2; FAZ no. 37 of February 13, 2009, 4. See also www.angriff-auf-die-seele.de and Robin Hauffa, Elmar Brähler, Karl-Heinz Biesold, and Sefik Tagay, “Psychische Belastungen nach Auslandseinsätzen: Erste Ergebnisse einer Befragung von Soldaten des Einsatzkontingentes ISAF VII,” Psychother Psych Med 57 (2007), 373–78. 126 See Die Welt of December 17, 2010, 8. 127 See the interview conducted with Munzlinger in Die Welt of March 7, 2011, 6. Regarding Munzlinger’s first annual report complaining of excess bureaucracy, including the attestation of invalidity status, see Die Welt of December 3, 2011, 4.

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Not confined to trauma, mental illness in the Bundeswehr include a further 333 soldiers currently being treated for other complaints such as depression or addiction. Treated at the Institute for Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy at the TU Dresden, soldiers can participate in a research project under the leadership of Hans-Ulrich Wittchen and Sabine Schönfeld. They are currently conducting a research project focusing on “Mental Health for Bundeswehr Personnel in Connection with Overseas Service.” The study is designed in two parts. The initial findings from part one (a cross-sectional study) show that some two per cent of German soldiers posted to Afghanistan return in a traumatized state. The results of the second part (a longitudinal study) confirm the results of the first study. Of 476 cases surveyed after returning from a deployment of 12 months, 1.8 per cent were affected by PTBS—a significantly lower proportion than that exhibited by United States servicemen and women.128 These exceptionally high figures are explained by reference to the longer periods of service and the more frequent incidence of combat to which members of the American armed forces are subject. Moreover, the much lower number of German soldiers affected would seem to indicate that German military planners not only implement much more stringent selection criteria for its personnel, but also devise and run more effective programs of preparation for those of its soldiers posted to a war zone.129 Nevertheless, as the survey has concluded, only 50 per cent of the estimated 300 total sufferers actually consult a doctor in about their mental problems. The risk of contracting PTSD and other conditions to German soldiers posted overseas remains between six and ten times higher than those soldiers who are not.

128

See the first part of the report presented on April 6, 2011 in Sächsische Zeitung of April 7, 2011, 6. See also Hans-Ulrich Wittchen, Sabine Schönfeld, and Clemens Kirschbaum et al., “Traumatische Ereignisse und posttraumatische Belastungsstörungen bei im Ausland eingesetzten Soldaten: Wie hoch ist die Dunkelziffer?,” Dtsch Artzebl Int 2012, 109 (35-36): 559-68; See the results of the second part presented on November 26, 2013 by the medical service of the Bundeswehr: http://www.sanitaetsdienst-bundeswehr.de/portal/a/sanitaetsdienst/ !ut/p/c4/NYrBCsJADAX_aLMVwerNdi9eRdB6S9tQAm22pFkF8ePdPfgG5jIPnp ARfPGExlFwhgd0A5_6t_tsKC5RT5pkg3s5juSGKGTFRmKcPSlaVLdGtbmUpJq L4xE6X4XG1_6_6nsMt7bd14dduDRXWJfl_AN3Dmga/. 129 Those following the conclusions presented by Achim Wohlgethan in Schwarzbuch Bundeswehr (Munich, 2011) maintain that it cannot have resulted from the level of training and equipment standard to the Bundeswehr.

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Transforming perpetrators, fellow travelers and observers into victims The failure in Germany to reflect on the fate of 12 to 14 million Germans expelled from their homelands after 1945 has drawn increasing criticism that in ignoring this suffering, the German landscape of memory has contributed to their “second expulsion.”130 Not Perpetrators but Victims was the judgement of the eponymous book from Alfred M. de Zayas.131 Such attempts to commemorate the fate of Germany’s former Eastern territories is usually associated with a relativization or even extenuation of the actions of many—such as Hans Globke, Theodor Oberländer and others—who were able to continue their careers in the new Federal Republic. Historians such as Manfred Kittel complain that “hundreds of thousands of crimes committed during the expulsions” have remained unpunished and that this “bad state of affairs has not engendered any appropriate level of debate within the Federal Republic.”132 Kittel claims that the changes of 1989/90 and the eastward enlargement of the EU have presented a new situation in terms of the topics of “expulsion” and “the German East.” These locations of memory have become overburdened with a “political function” which could not have developed during the period of détente.133 He holds the portrayal of the loss of the Eastern territories by German historians as “exclusively the consequence of Hitler’s war” as unconvincing.134 He recommends freeing this topic from its historical context, i.e. the causal relationship of war and expulsion and in so doing, exonerate the German civil population as far as possible from any responsibility for the events of the post-war years. He concedes 130

Thus Manfred Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? Der historische deutsche Oten in der Erinnerungskultur der Bundesrepublik (1961–1982) (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 183. Regarding this subject and the following, see Kurt Nelhiebel, “Die Entkopplung von Krieg und Vertreibung: Zu Manfred Kittels Deutung der jüngeren europäischen Geschichte,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 58 (2009): 53–69. 131 See Alfred M. de Zayas, Die deutschen Vertriebenen: Keine Täter—Sondern Opfer; Hintergründe, Tatsachen, Folgen (Graz: Ares, 2005). This account contrasts with a more balanced and detailled study from Mathias Beer, Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen: Voraussetzungen, Verlauf, Folgen (Munich: Beck, 2011), esp. 13ff.; 135ff. See also R. M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans After Second World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 132 Kittel, Vertreibung, 180. 133 Ibid., 183. 134 Ibid., 136.

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that “the program of expulsion would never have taken place without the preceding National Socialist terror […] but this factor alone does not suffice as the sole explanation of the historically complex phenomenon of deportation and expulsion.”135 A full understanding of the deportations requires investigation of the various “national-political, power-political, ideological and mass-psychological motivations behind the event.”136 One possible interpretation which he advances sees the Polish state and others as using the lost war as a welcome opportunity to launch “a policy of repression against Germans and other minorities founded on an equally nationalistic and revanchist desire” to create an ethnically homogenous nation state.137 Such arguments are used to achieve what the historian Peter Haslinger interprets as an impossible undertaking—to establish a link between a victim discourse as conducted by the expellees associations as a primary source of identity and a research-based contextual analysis of flight and expulsion.138 Viewed against this background, it is clear that even after the end of the affair centring around Erika Steinbach’s Centre Against Expulsion,139 news of Kittel’s appointment to the foundation Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung (flight, deportation, reconciliation) has resulted in considerable concerns at the direction taken by the foundation, something which prompted the only Polish and Czech historians involved in the project, Tomasz Szarota and Kristina Kaiserová to withdraw from the academic advisory board after only a few months. Rumours circulate that one of the reasons for Szarota’s resignation was Kittel’s month-long refusal to discuss the concept for the proposed permanent exhibition with him. Another version runs that a number of MPs from the CDU/CSU requested information from the German foreign minister regarding the “personal background and curriculum vitae” of Tomasz Szarota.140 Kaiserová complained of the increasing political influence to which the scholarly work in the foundation was subject; she is now convinced that 135

Ibid., 169. Manfred Kittel and Horst Möller, “Die Beneš-Dekrete und die Vertreibung der deutschen im europäischen Vergleich,” VfZ 54 (2006): 541–81, 574. 137 Ibid., 548. 138 See Peter Haslinger, “Opferkonkurrenzen und Opferkonjunkturen: Das Beispiel von Flucht und Vertreibung in Deutschland seit 1990,” GWU 62 (2011): 176–90. 139 Cf. Stefan Troebst, “Trying to Institutionalise the Memory of Forced Migration: German, Central European and Pan-European Initiatives,” in Europa und sein Osten: Geschichtskulturelle Herausforderungen, ed. :áRG]LPLHU] %RURG]LHM DQG Joachim von Puttkamer (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 47–59. 140 Thus Der Spiegel, no. 8 of February 22, 2010, 40–41; FAZ, no. 58 of March 10, 2010, 4. 136

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the foundation is no longer interested at achieving reconciliation between Germany and her neighbors but “with herself; a reconciliation of expellees with other Germans.”141 Shortly afterwards, the German historian Helga Hirsch left the advisory board, citing an “instrumentalization of the debate for party-political ends.”142 The increased number of members of the expellees associations represented on the board of trustees also gives grounds to fears over an increase in the influence of the Association of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen BdV)—which, according to a survey by the Allensbach Institute conducted in the 1980s, speaks for only one per cent of expellees.143 The autumn of 2010 saw the recruitment to the academic advisory board of the Polish academics Krzysztof Ruchniewicz and Piotr Madajczyk, the Hungarian Kristián Ungváry, and others.144 A study carried out by Der Spiegel in 2006 revealed that around one third of the approximately 200 top-level functionaries from the expellees associations were former members of either the NSDAP or the SS.145 Reacting to this news, Erika Steinbach, BdV President, commissioned the Institute for Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte IfZ) to research the history of her organization.The Interior Ministry provided 100,000 Euros of funding for the project. The IfZ named Manfred Kittel as project coordinator, who recommended the historian Matthias Lempart to develop a project sketch. The 113-page internal pre-report entitled “A feasibility study for a prosopographic study of the lives of BdV council members” and presented in early 2008, has been withheld from publication by the IfZ.146 Raimund Paleczek, a former functionary and board member of the Union der Vertriebenen (Union of Expellees) from the CSU also worked on the report. Lempart sought to discredit the Spiegel study as unsystematic and unscholarly, yet glossed over the documented complicity of several BdV functionaries with the National Socialist system, preferring instead to highlight the worthy post-war careers of BdV functionaries as government ministers and members of parliament. His approach gave the impression that the glittering post-war 141

Quoted in FAZ, no. 57 of March 9, 2010, 5, and Franziska Augstein, “Vertriebenen-Stiftung: Steinbach ist weg, die Probleme beginnen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung of February 19, 2010. 142 Quoted in FAZ, no. 58 of March 10, 2010, 4. 143 See Die Zeit, no. 5 of January 25, 1985, 12. 144 See FAZ, no. 273, November 23, 2010, 2. 145 See Der Spiegel, no. 33, August 14, 2006, 46. The GDR viewed the Expellees’ Associations as an “enemy organization.” See Heike Amos, “Vertriebenenverbände im Fadenkreuz: Aktivitäten der DDR-Staatssicherheit 1949 bis 1989,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, special edition (Munich, 2011). 146 See FAZ, no. 43, February 20, 2010, 4.

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careers of those involved should be balanced against their Nazi past. Challenged regarding the number of deficiencies, errors of judgement and distortions contained within the “feasibility study,” Kittel countered that he was responsible only for the “technical coordination” of the project; the IfZ conceded however, that in his role as project coordinator, Kittel was indeed responsible for speaking with the report’s authors about “progress made.”147 The IfZ speaks of “preliminary findings” and indeed forbade Lempart and Paleczek to make any public statements on the matter.148 After revelation of this problematic approach towards the organization of the project, the IFZ was forced to find a new author. This further study from 2012 led by the historian Michael Schwartz focussed on the first executive committee of the Association of Expellees. Its findings were damming: only two of the 13 members could be classed as “convinced non-Nazis.” The remaining 11 were shown all to have provided unflinching support to the Third Reich.149 Early 2011 saw a return to controversy with the ruling CDU/FDP coalition announcing their intention to establish August 5 (the anniversary of the proclamation of the Charter of the Expellees Association on August 5, 1950) as a day of remembrance for the expellees. The proposal met with considerable resistance and more than 60 historians from Germany and Europe responded with a critical memorandum. Labelling the Charter— which speaks of the refugees and expellees as “the victims who today experience the most suffering”—“not [as] a document of reconciliation,” the academics castigated the decision as contradicting all attempts to “establish an appropriate form of European remembrance.”150 They were joined in their criticism by the Polish foreign ministry, which issued an official announcement stating that the Charter and its recognition by the German Parliament “do not serve German-Polish relations.”151 Studying what they argue to be the troubled German forms of public remembrance, Eva and Hans Henning Hahn identify a constant repetition of “well-rehearsed phrases, stereotypes, and conceptions of history”152 as the principle malady. This, they argue, prevents anything approaching an 147

Quoted in Der Spiegel, no. 8, February 22, 2010, 41. See FAZ, no. 43, February 20, 2010, 4. 149 Cf. Michael Schwartz, Funktionäre mit Vergangenheit: Das Gründungspräsidium des Bundesverbandes der Vertriebenen und das “Dritte Reich” (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012). 150 www.tagesspiegel.de of 16.02.2011. 151 See taz, 15.02.2011; Die Zeit, no. 8 17.02.2011, 14. 152 See Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn eds., Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010), 627. 148

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effective analysis of the “diverse range of experiences made by all groups of the formerly homeless, […] it is not enough that we speak about the past—the key factor is the way in which we speak about it. Packed with former National Socialists, the group responsible for establishing the postwar myth of the expulsion used traditional Nazi modes of speech to tell stories involving Russians, Poles, the Czechs and involving Woodrow Wilson, Joseph Stalin, Edvard Beneš, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the terms which they had learnt in the Third Reich. Attacking their former national enemies, they failed to understand or even interest themselves in the true events surrounding the subject of their accusations. The failure to investigate and expose such legends would mean not only their continued function as the expression of emotional outrage, but general and continued ignorance surrounding the experiences of those Germans who had lost their homelands between 1939 and 1949.”153 The role of the post-war political situation in the Federal Republic in shaping the West-German fixation on their own victim status is reflected by the history of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, an organization articulating the views of the Germans that were expelled from the Sudetenland. Accorded a position of privilege in their dealings with the Bavarian State and thus advancing almost to a sole representation of their grouping, their view of history achieved wide-spread acceptance.154 In contrast to the Verband der Heimkehrer,155 the ex-servicemen’s association, the groupings representing the expellees conceive of themselves not as a body of individuals affected by a shared experience— which can be viewed as concluded after the end of a generation—but a cross-generational interest group with a party-political orientation. Revisionist attempts to transform “perpetrators” into “victims” is not a purely German pastime. Some even understand those efforts undertaken by elements of Italian society to portray Italy as “Hitler’s last victim”156 as part of a wider attempt to rehabilitate the (considerable) forces of fascism still present in the Italian political systen.157 Using a psychoanalytic 153

Ibid., 632. See K. Erik Franzen, Der vierte Stamm Bayerns: Die Schirmherrschaft über die Sudetendeutschen 1954–1974 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010). 155 See Birgit Schwelling, Heimkehr—Erinnerung—Integration: Der Verband der Heimkehrer, die ehemaligen Kriegsgefangenen und die westdeutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 156 See Anke Silomon, “Hitlers erstes und letztes ‘Opfer’: Vergangenheitspolitik in Österreich und Italien zwischen 1945 und 1949,” Neue Politische Literatur 54 (2009): 439–66. 157 See Aram Mattioli, “Viva Mussolini!” Die Aufwertung des Faschismus im Italien Berlusconis (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010). 154

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paradigm, and a corresponding interpretation of Catholic symbolism, Luisa Accati asserts that the Italian government campaign of historical memorialism—in particular drawing parallels between the Foibe massacres (the mass murder of Italians by communist partisans in the border area between Slovenia and Italy between 1943 and 1945) and fascist involvement in the Shoa, two crimes with no shared historical or ethnic context—aims at establishing the universality of Italian victimhood and thus obscuring the responsibility of the perpetrators.158 The entirely ahistorical, sacralized metaphors of pity used in this process enabled “Catholic satisfaction” by the guiltless, forgiver of sins, the “mother” Church, ultimately served to exonerate fascism of all guilt, enabling its successor, the post-fascist right, to return to national life as a full participant in political discourse. The role of the Roman Catholic doctrine and its papal interpretation within this process is seen to be of inestimable importance: “submission guarantees acceptance.”159 Growing out of the Western Christian tradition, the secularized rituals of national commemoration have long since developed into guidelines for a “politics of regret.”160 These rituals of political atonement and apology have led to the development of a mechanism of easy rehabilitation, bringing forgiveness in order to facilitate a return to the world political stage for those having suffered collective condemnation. The hollow nature of many of these apologies casts a shadow on the honesty of this process161 Media coverage, the almost obligatory 15 minutes of fame, would seem to be the highest attainable good in modern society.162 A very large proportion of our contemporaries dream only of “making it big”—we need look only at the popularity of the many television casting shows and ever-increasing number of internet bloggers. After the public derision of the tabloid press (for which this process is very lucrative), those having transgressed in the public eye or failed in their capacity as a “role model” lose attention and 158

Luisa Accati, “Opfer und Täter zwischen Gerechtigkeit und Straflosigkeit,” in Das Unheimliche in der Geschichte: Die Foibe; Beiträge zur Psychopathologie historischer Rezeption, ed. idem and Renate Cogoy (Berlin: Trafo, 2007), 213–39, 217. 159 Ibid., 231. See also Luisa Accati, Das Monster und die Schöne: Vater- und Mutterbilder in der katholischen Erziehung der Gefühle (Berlin: Trafo, 2006). 160 See also Hermann Lübbe, “Ich entschuldige mich“: Das neue politische Bußritual (Berlin: Berliner Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2003). 161 See Jeffrey K. Olick, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (New York: Routledge, 2007). 162 Horst Seehofer, a Bavarian politician once described how nervous politicians can become if they have not received any talk show invitations on a Monday morning. See Hamburger Abendblatt, no. 66, March 19, 2007, 2.

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see no other alternative but to perform “apology dramatics, a successful staging of public regret in the form of a credible confession cum catharsis—passing through the ‘purgatory of the public sphere’” in order to satisfy the demands of popular morality and perhaps even attain forgiveness.163 Whether this ritual is actually condusive to a change in behavior is a matter to be addressed elsewhere. Some observers even name Joseph Ratzinger, the former Bishop of Rome, amongst those seeking to establish the “victim status” of the German nation. At a speech given during a visit to Auschwitz on May 28, 2006, the former Pope Benedict XVI, said that he came as a “son of a nation once caught in the sway of a band of criminals who seduced it with lies and mendacious promises of greatness, the restoration of national honor, world-standing and prosperity and who then enslaved it by terror and intimidation. This nation was used and abused as an instrument of their destructive rage and domination.”164 Alan Posener concluded from this speech that Benedict spoke of the Germans as a “deceived, terrorized, intimidated, and misused nation as if it were they who were the true victims of National Socialism.”165 The perspective taken on events by the former Pope is not new. During his time as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger gave a speech at the war cemetery La Cambe on June 6, 2004, in which he referred to the dead— including members of the Waffen-SS panzer division “Das Reich”—as misused idealists: “it must pain us as Germans that their idealism and obedience was abused by an unjust regime. Yet, this does not dishonor these young people.”166

163

Regarding these complex procedures, see Bernhard Pörksen and Jens Bergmann, Skandal! Die Macht öffentlicher Empörung (Cologne: von Halem, 2009). The Philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has criticized what he calls the battle of opinion which he sees as raging in Germany. See Peter Sloterdijk, “Der Skandal— Von Nutzen und Nachteil der Empörung,” in Das Philosophische Quartett, ZDF, February 19, 2002. (http://www.presseportal.de). 164 Cited by Alan Posener, “Benedikt, ein Papst in deutschem Namen,” CICERO 2 (2010):65. 165 Ibid., 66. See also idem., Benedikts Kreuzzug (Berlin: Ullstein, 2009), 73–100. 166 Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger, “Was müssen wir tun? Die Verantwortung der Christen für den Frieden,” in Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs: Die Herausforderungen der Zukunft bestehen, ed. Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger (Freiburg, Basel, and Vienna: Herder, 2005), 138–46.

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Transforming victims into perpetrators: The competition for victimhood A further, complementary phenomenon, “turning victims into perpetrators” is also gaining currency. Many in Israel are coming to view Poland, once the victim of Nazi Germany, as having been complicit with its former occupier. Anti-Semitism and collaboration with Germany (a view which ignores the Polish uprising of 1944)167 provide the starting point for this point of view, which brings the advantage of monopolizing the status of victimhood for the Jewish people.168 The Warsaw sociologist ,UHQHXV].U]HPLĔVNLKDVLGHQWLILHGDSURFHVVRI³FRPSHWLWLYHYLFWLPKRRG´ between Poland and Israel relating to the period of the Second World War. An important aspect of Polish national identity is the conviction that Poland’s history amounts to a litany of injustice inflicted by foreign SRZHUV$FFRUGLQJWR.U]HPLĔVNL³WKH3ROHVIHHOWKDWWKH\KDYHabsolutely no need to examine their conscience over war-time events: 70 per cent of those questioned confirm this. […] The majority of Poles also believe that commemoration of the Holocaust has displaced an awareness of the suffering of other nations. This applies especially to Poland, who feels that it is not only accused of anti-Semitism, but whose own experience of suffering and even the aid given to many Jews by Poles has been forgotten.”169 The work of Timothy Snyder also reminds us of the dominance in Western-European memory of the genocide visited upon 5.7 million Jews, an event which has obscured the suffering and death of 14 million Ukrainians, Poles, Russians and Byelorussians before, during and after the Second World War. His aim in drawing our attention to such events is not that of devaluing the Holocaust or questioning its unique nature, but doing

167

6HH :áRG]LPLHU] %RURG]LHM The Warsaw uprising of 1944 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), esp. 126ff. 168 See Moshe Zimmermann, “Land der Täter und Verräter: Junge Israelis identifizieren Polen mit den Nazi-Verbrechen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 3, 2007, 12. Regarding anti-Polish prejudice on the part of Jews, see e.g. Uwe Neumärker, ed., Maria Blitz: Endzeit in Ostpreussen; Ein beschwiegenes Kapitel des Holocaust (Berlin: Stiftung Denkmal für die Ermordeten Juden Europas, 2010), esp. 13; 48–49. 169 6HH ,UHQHXV] .U]HPLĔVNL ³1DWLRQDOH 2SIHUNRQNXUUHQ] XQG %HKDUUOLFKNHLW GHU Tradition: Antisemitismus in Polen und der Ukraine,” in Feindbild Judentum: Antisemitismus in Europa, ed. Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2008), 347–76; 372ff.; 373–74.

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justice to those whose plight has been all but forgotten.170 Nevertheless, this important undertaking is not served when accompanied by the onesided and blinkered insistence on the victim status of the people’s of Eastern Central Europe. This “competition for victimhood” is complicated not only by the competition for material compensation, but its intractable spiritual component. Indeed, many of the individual groups involved elevate their story of suffering to something approaching a tenet of faith. Peter Novick has already pointed to the sacralization of the Holocaust in the USA;171 the paradigm of the sacrificial lamb has been used to “Christianize” an important epoch of Jewish history, which, so transformed, now competes with the Polish construction of a narrative focusing on the spilling of Polish Catholic blood in a period of national martyrdom and messianic salvation. One passage of Polish history not fitting with such clear-cut interpretations and thus ignored to the point of taboo is the anti-Semitism rife in pre-war Poland and the subsequent war-time participation by a number of Polish volunteers in the German armed forces. Such an uncomfortable fact stands at odds with the attempt to cast Poland in the role of the “Christ of the nations.”172 The young men from Upper Silesia and Pomerania who served the Third Reich not only received German citizenship, but were required to swear an oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler. Not always trusted by their German officers, who refused to deploy them in homogenous Polish units, they found the conditions of their service difficult. Nevertheless, their decision worked against the military efforts of their fellow Poles and represented the ultimate justification of a long-held prejudice that Kashubians and Upper Silesians were not real Poles after all.

170

See Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 171 See Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999); Gerhard Besier, “Amerikas Holocaust-Kultur als ‘Christianisierung’ des Massenmords an den europäischen Juden,” Menora: Jahrbuch für deutschjüdische Geschichte 14 (Berlin and Vienna: Philo, 2003), 137–61. See also Anne Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media (London: Rutgers University Press, 2011). 172 See Ryszard Kaczmarek, Polacy w Wehrmachcie [Poles in the Wehrmacht] .UDNyZ :\GDZQLFWZR /LWHUDFNLH   HVS –24; Christine Müller, “Möglichkeiten und Gefahren medialer Diskurse am Beispiel der polnischen Jedwabne-Debatte,” in Gegenwart der Vergangenheit: Die politische Aktualität historischer Erinnerungen in Mitteleuropa, ed. Julian Pänke, Gereon Schuch, Malte Brosig, et al. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 207–9.

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An article published in 2009 in the German magazine Der Spiegel reporting the involvement of Ukrainian, Belarusian,173 Baltic,174 Hungarian, Rumanian, Polish, French, and Norwegian auxiliaries (Trawniki) in the Nazi occupation of Europe175 unleashed a wave of protest in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland.176 Many feared that it represented an attempt to spread the blame for German crimes across Europe and a transformation of the “Final Solution” from a specifically German to a “pan-European project.”177 “The culture of denunciation in Poland reached such an extent that a separate term was coined for paid informants: ‘Smalcownini’”.178As Adam Daniel Rotfeld, a former Polish Foreign Minister, observed, many in Poland fear that “German opinion will soon only see two groups of victims, the Jews and the Germans.”179 The background to this outburst was provided by a Polish debate on the events surrounding the murder of the Jewish population of the small Polish town of Jedwabne by Poles in July 1941. Reflecting on this event in 2002, Leon Kieres, the President of the Warsaw Institute for National Remembrance (IPN), summarized the collective shock at the realization that “some of my own compatriots number under the category ‘perpetrator.’”180 7KH :URFáDZ KLVWRULDQ .U]\V]WRI 5XFKQLHZLF] VHHV WKH most important field of research in Polish historiography as “the problem of Polish attitudes towards the Jews during and immediately after the 173

See Leonid Rein, The Kings and the Pawns: Collaboration in Byelorussia During World War II (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011). 174 See Katrin Reichelt, Lettland unter deutscher Besatzung 1941–1944: Der lettische Anteil am Holocaust (Berlin: Metropol, 2011). 175 See Georg Bönisch, et al., “Die Komplizen: Der dunkle Kontinent,” Der Spiegel, no. 21 of May 18, 2009, 82–92. See also Paul Milata, Zwischen Hitler, Stalin und Antonescu: Rumäniendeutsche in der Waffen-SS (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), esp. 255ff. See also Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder Without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009). 176 Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Suche nach der Identität: Über Polens Umgang mit der Geschichte,” Der Spiegel, no. 23 of May 30, 2009, 92. 177 See Götz Aly, “Final Solution”: Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews (London: Arnold, 1999), 185–95. 178 Bönisch, “Komplizen,” 85. 179 Rotfeld, “Suche nach Identität.” 180 (GPXQG 'PLWUyZ 3DZHO 0DFKFHZLF], and Tomasz Szarota, Der Beginn der Vernichtung: Zum Mord an den Juden in Jedwabne und Umgebung im Sommer 1941; Neue Forschungsergebnisse polnischer Historiker (Osnabrück: fibre, 2004), 8. See also Stephanie Kowitz, Jedwabne: Kollektives Gedächtnis und tabuisierte Vergangenheit (Berlin: Be.bra wissenschaft, 2004). The debate was occasioned by the book from Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The destruction of the Jewish community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

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Second World War, including the phenomenon of Szmalcownicy—Poles who blackmailed Jews whom they had hidden—and the pogroms of 1945/46.”181 The anti-Jewish measures taken in Poland in the 1950s and 1960s are addressed much less often and can be explained as the reactivation of the stereotype of an alleged “Judeo Communism,”182 fanned by nationalist and anti-Zionist members of the United Polish Workers Party.183 Jan Tomasz Gross contends that despite having witnessed its genesis and course the Holocaust did not have a traumatic effect on Poland.184 According to his analysis, the anti-Jewish pogroms committed by Poles after the war were the product of fear and guilt. Horrified at the prospect of being confronted by some 200,000 Jews returning from the death camps—whose property they had stolen and 181

Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, “Die Jedwabne-Debatte in Polen: Das schwierigste und schmerzlichste Kapitel der polnisch-jüdischen Beziehungen,” in Verflochtene Erinnerungen: Polen und seine Nachbarn im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Martin Aust, Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, and Stefan Troebst (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), 189–98, 189. Regarding the post-war pogroms in Kíelce on July 4, 1946 and other areas in Poland, see Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An essay in historical interpretation (New York: Random House, 2006); Karol Sauerland, Polen und Juden. Jedwabne und die Folgen (Berlin and Vieanna: Philo, 2004); Klaus-Peter Friedrich, “Die polnisch-jüdischen Beziehungen unter der NS-Herrschaft von 1939 bis 1941,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 58 (2010): 489–504; Anna Wolff-3RZĊVND DQG 3LRWU Forecki, eds., Polen: Der Holocaust in der polnischen Erinnerungskultur; Geschichte, Erinnerung, Politik (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2012). 182 See Eliza Ablovatski, “The 1919 Central European Revolutions and the JudeoBolshevik Myth,” European Review of History 17 (2010): 473–489; Semion Goldin, “Jews as Cosmopolitans, Foreigners, Revolutionaries: Three Images of the Jew in Polish and Russian Nationalist Ideology at the End of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in ibid., 431–44. 183 See Sauerland, Polen und Juden; Ibid., 161ff.; Dariusz Stola, Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967–1968 [The anti-Zionist campaign in Poland 1967-1968] :DUVDZ ,QVW\WXW 6WXGLyZ 3ROLW\F]Q\FK   )HOLNV 7\FK ³Das polnische Jahr 1968,” in Die Vertreibung der Juden aus Polen 1968: Antisemitismus und politisches Kalkül, ed. Beate Kosmala (Berlin: Metropol, 2000), 65–79; Dariusz Stola, “Fighting Against the Shadows: The Anti-zionist Campaign of 1968,” in Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland, ed. Robert Blobaum (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 284–300; Dieter Pohl, “Die Historiker Volkspolens und der Judenmord: Erforschung und politische Instrumentalisierung 1956–1968,” in Umdeuten, verschweigen, erinnern: Die späte Aufarbeitung des Holocaust in Osteuropa, ed. Micha Brumlik and Karol Sauerland (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2010), 163–78. 184 See Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-semitism in Poland After Auschwitz—An Essay in Historical Interpretation (New York: Random House, 2006).

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relatives they had killed—no small number of Poles were driven to murder by an all-consuming sense of guilt. Such new discussions of Polish anti-Semitism, conducted since the 1990s, have shaken the traditional Polish self-conception of victimhood, of a 200-year national history as the plaything of more powerful and arbitrary neighbors. Working on the history of the Polish Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (ZBoWID), an amalgamation of a variety of combatants’ and victims’ groups formed in 1949, Joanna Wawrzyniak has identified three myths, dominant in Cold War Poland, which were central to the collective Polish memory of the Second World War. Consisting of the myth of innocent Polish victimhood, unified national resistance to fascism and the victorious end to this struggle,185 she shows that all three constructions served to strengthen the anti-German and pro-Soviet consensus, becoming obsolete only following the events of 1989/90 and the liberalization in the Polish historical sciences. A particular challenge to this popular, yet highly self-indulgent, discourse outlining heroic Polish victimhood was launched by the publications of the Princeton Polish-Jewish historian Jan Tomasz Gross.186 In Golden Harvest, an essay written together with his wife Irena *UXG]LĔND-Gross and translated into Polish in March 2011, he focussed on the question of Polish collaboration with the Third Reich.187 They argued that crimes committed through greed, a deep and virulent anti-Semitism and Polish complicity in the Holocaust were not limited to a very few

185

See Joanna Wawrzyniak, =%R:,' L SDPLĊü GUXJLHM ZRMQ\ ĞZLDWRZHM – 1969 [Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy and the Memory of World War Two 1949–1969] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2009); Audrey Kichelewski, “Imagining ‘the Jews’ in Stalinist Poland: Nationalists or Cosmopolites?” European Review of History 17 (2010): 505–22. 186 See also Jan T. Gross, 6WUDFK$QW\VHPLW\]PZ3ROVFHWXĪSRZRMQLH+LVWRULD PRUDOQHM ]DSDĞFL .UDNyZ Wydawn. Znak, 2008). The English edition was published before: Jan T. Gross: Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz (New York: Random House, 2006). The publication of the book moved the Polish government to add a paragraph to the Penal Code, making illegal any public accusation of the participation of the Polish nation in the organization of, or any level of responsibility for, the communist or National Socialist Crimes. Violations would be punished by a jail sentence of up to three years. The paragraph was later declared to be unconstitutional. 187 6HH -DQ 7 *URVV DQG ,UHQD *UXG]LĔND *URVV &RQWULEXWRU  Golden Harvest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

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demoralized Poles from the margins of an otherwise decent society, but represented a central feature of Polish mainstream existence.188 A recent edition of sources focusing on the Holocaust would seem to confirm this view. The documents reveal the existence of negotiations in  EHWZHHQ WKH 3ROLVK )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU -y]HI %HFN DQG WKH French government regarding a plan to settle Jews in Madagascar. These were IROORZHGE\LQE\VLPLODUWDONVEHWZHHQWKH3ROLVK$PEDVVDGRU-y]HI Lipski with Hitler. Reporting to Warsaw, Lipski wrote: “Regarding this point [the deportation of the Jews], I answered Hitler that we would erect a handsome statue to his honour in Warsaw, should he find a solution.”189 Although entirely oblivious to such an understanding, Polish Jews observed the German-Polish diplomatic manoeuvrings up to 1939, designed to improve relations between the two states, with considerable mistrust. The only reaction open to them was to boycott all German cultural events held in Polish cities.190 The occupation of Poland in 1939 and the start of a campaign which would result in the death of more than two thirds of the three-and-a-half million Polish Jews, occasioned the Catholic Church in Poland to report to the exile government in London: “despite the considerable and continuing injustice visited on the Polish nation by the Germans, it must be viewed as a peculiar fortune of divine providence that they have made a good start to addressing the Jewish question by demonstrating the possibility of freeing the Polish people from this Jewish Plague.”191 Seeking to use the phrase “natural anti-Semitism” in an essay for the American Polish-language magazine Gwiazda Polarna, the contributor was informed by the editor, Aleksander Hertz, of the inopportune nature of such a step. With a significant proportion of American Society holding all Poles to be worse anti-Semites than the Germans, he argued, the use of such a phrase would only confirm them in their beliefs.192 188

See the response to his critics by Jan T. Gross, “Das kollektive Schweigen,” Die Welt of April 6, 2011 (Lit. Welt), 1–2. 189 WacáDZ-HGU]HMHZLF]HGDiplomat in Berlin 1933–1945: Papers and Memoirs of Józef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), no. 95, 411. 190 See Karina Pryt, Befohlene Freundschaft: Die deutsch-polnischen Kulturbeziehungen 1934–1939 (Osnabrück: fibre, 2010), esp. 158. 191 Klaus-Peter Friedrich, ed., Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945, vol. 4, Polen (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011), no. 319, 693–94. 192 Aleksander Hertz to “Benedykt,” April 17, 1977, Muzeum Literatury Warszawa. 6HH DOVR 7RUVWHQ /RUHQ] DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD HGV Aleksander Hertz (Göttingen, 2014). The second deletion concerned the Pogrom in Kielce on July 4,

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Countries such as Italy193 Sweden,194 France,195 Norway,196 and Denmark,197 also maintaining a myth of a “nation in resistance” still have great difficulty in coming to terms with the positive reception given by a number of their compatriots to National Socialist racial ideology during 1946, which Benedykt wanted to blame entirely on the Germans. Hertz wrote that such a line of argument would be inappropriate as both the Polish militia and the local population had participated. Hertz did not want the American public to gain the impression that a progressive Polish publicist sought to absolve the Polish people of charges of anti-Semitism. 193 See Carlo Moos, Ausgrenzung, Internierung, Deportation: Antisemitismus und Gewalt im späten italienischen Faschismus (1938–1945) (Zürich: Chronos, 2003); Aram Mattioli, Experimentierfeld der Gewalt: Der Abessinienkrieg und seine internationale Bedeutung 1935–1941 (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 2005); Frauke Wildvang, Der Feind von nebenan: Judenverfolgung im faschistischen Italien 1936–1944 (Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2008). 194 See, for example: Stig Ekman and Klas Åmark, Sweden’s Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003); Patrick Vonderau, Schweden und das nationalsozialistische Deutschland: Eine annotierte Bibliographie der deutschsprachigen Forschungsliteratur (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2003); Daniel B. Roth, Hitlers Brückenkopf in Schweden. Die deutsche Gesellschaft in Stockholm 1933-1945 (Berlin: LIT, 2009); John Gilmour, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The Swedish Experience in the Second World War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010); Helle Bjerg, Claudia Lenz, and Erik Thorstensen, eds., Historicizing the uses oft the past: Scandinavian perspectives on history culture, historical consciousness and didactics of history related to World War II (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010); Oliver Rathkolb and Imbi Sooman, eds., Geschichtspolitik im erweiterten Ostseeraum und ihre aktuellen Symptome (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2011); Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, and Johan Östling, eds., Nordic narratives of the Second World War: national historiographies revisited (Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2011); Klas Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande til nazismen, Nazytyskland och förinteksen [Neighbour of Evil. Sweden’s relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the Holocaust] (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 2012). 195 See Henry Rousso, Frankreich und die “dunklen Jahre”: Das Regime von Vichy in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2010); Olivier Wieviorka, Divided Memory, French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 196 See Hans Fredrik Dahl, Norsk krigsleksikon 1940–1945 [Nordish War Encyclopedia 1940–1945] (Oslo: J.W. Cappelen, 2009). 197 See Steffen Werther, Dänische Freiwillige in der Waffen-SS (Berlin: wvb, 2004); Dennis Larsen, Fortrængt Grusomhed: Danske SS-Vagter 1941–45 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2010); Steffen Werther, SS-Vision und Grenzland Realität: Vom Umgang dänischer und “volksdeutscher” Nationalsozialisten in Sønderjylland mit der “großgermanischen” Ideologie der SS (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, 2012).

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the German occupation and their complicity in the deportation and murder of their nation’s Jewry.198 Confronted by such uncomfortable facts, the majority of historians respond by emphasizing the victimization of their nation and its resistance. Blending out more negative aspects of the occupation—the anti-Semitic propaganda of Vichy France was, for example, an entirely French product199—such a historiography eased the general population into a blissful ignorance of their nation’s own guilt and facilitated a comfortable appropriation and celebration of the merits of the brave few who chose the path of resistance over collaboration.

The instrumentalization and reinterpretation of the “victim-perpetrator paradigm” One trend identifiable in a number of the states of Eastern Central Europe is the inversion of the “victim-perpetrator paradigm,” or at least a blurring of the respective boundaries, and its exploitation for party political advantage. Working on contemporary conservative and far-right movements in Hungary, Magdalena Marsovszky has demonstrated both their recourse to pre-1945 anti-Semitic codes and the active use of anticommunist symbolism to delegitimize social democrats and liberals.200 A 198 6HH *HUKDUG %HVLHU DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD European Dicatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), 76ff; 247ff; 256ff. In terms of the process in Italy, the increasing racism during the war in Abyssinia (1935/36) played a central role. See Mattioli, Experimentierfeld der Gewalt; Giulia Brogini Künzi, Italien und der Abessinienkrieg 1935/36: Kolonialkrieg oder Totaler Krieg? (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006); Michael Töndl, “Mussolinis Ostafrikanisches Imperium in den Aufzeichnungen und Berichten des Deutschen Generalkonsulats in Addis Abeba (1936–1941),” Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 88 (2008): 449–488. Regarding Rumanian anti-Semitism during the Antonescu regime, see Klaus Popa, “Antisemitische Hetze im ‘Bukarester Tageblatt’ 1941–1944,” Halbjahresschrift für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik 22 (2010): 138–48. 199 See Michael Mayer, “Die französische Regierung packt die Judenfrage ohne Umschweife an. Vichy-Frankreich, deutsche Besatzungsmacht und der Beginn der ‘Judenpolitik’ im Sommer/Herbst 1940,” VZG 58 (2010): 329–62. For a general account, see Rousso, Frankreich und die “dunklen Jahre.” Cf. also Laurent Joly, “The Genesis of Vichy’s Jewish Statute of October 1940,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 27 (2013): 276–98. 200 See Magdalena Marsovszky, “Die fremde Besatzung ist weg, doch der ‘Freiheitskampf’ geht weiter: Und wo ist der Feind?” in Osteuropa—Schlachtfeld der Erinnerung, ed. Thomas Flierl and Elfriede Müller (Berlin, 2010): 71–90.

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debate conducted in Slovenia regarding “national unity” has had the effect of blurring the lines between the anti-fascist partisans and their victims (buried in mass graves) in such a way as to establish both fascists and antifascists as national heroes.201 Lithuanians paramilitaries were noted for killing both Soviet soldiers and Jewish citizens with equal gusto. Seeking a way around this nuanced problem, many right-wing historians have merely redefined the pogroms as measures directed against “base criminals.”202 The result of such taxonomic flexibility was to remove any impediment to their installation in the pantheon of Lithuanian national remembrance. Further such examples of the politically-motivated recasting of the past have been provided for Ukraine by the work of Franziska Bruder. The participation of West Ukrainian nationalists in pogroms, the massacre of Polish citizens and the wider Holocaust has, for instance, been either forgotten or reinterpreted.203 As Agnieszka Pufelska has demonstrated, the propagation of a heroic victimhood within the “hagiographic narrative’” of the Warsaw Rising Museum serves the selflegitimation of current nationalist politics.204 A further revisionist variant is the “scale of evil” approach, establishing a hierarchy of dictatorships according to cause and effect or level of

201

See Otto Lutter and Breda Luter, “Von der Ideologie zur Mythologie?” in ibid., 105–29. 202 See Roland Mischke, “Der einsame Krieg,” in ibid., 169–74. 203 See Franziska Bruder, “Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine: ‘Die unabhängige Ukraine entdeckt für sich und die ganze Welt ihre wahre Geschichte,’” in ibid., 175–89. Regarding the link between genocide and pogroms, see Wendy Lower, “Pogroms, Mob Violence and Genocide in Western Ukraine, Summer 1941: Varied Histories, Explanations and Comparisons,” Journal of Genocide Research 13 (2011): 217-46. The author argues that: “distinctions made between mob violence and genocide usually fail to account for the changing interaction of the two phenomena. The overlapping, escalating history of the two is especially evident in western Volhynia where […] the number of Jews killed in mass shootings exceeded those killed in pogroms.” (Ibid., 117). She locates these developments in the convergence of contingent phenomena and events: “[…] overlapping sociopolitical developments and behavioral responses, including clashing ideologies, a scarcity of resources, a culture of violence, the Nazi-Soviet vise, and indeed a long history of Anti-Jewish sentiment and actions.” (Ibid., 237). See also Michaela Christ, Die Dynamik des Tötens: Die Ermordung der Juden in Berditschew (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 2011). 204 See Agnieszka Pufelska, “Raub der Clio—Die polnische Geschichtspolitik und ihre Exekutoren,” in Osteuropa. Schlachtfeld der Erinnerung, eds. Thomas Flierl and Elfriede Müller (Berlin: Dietz, 2010), 33–56.

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seriousness. Following Ernst Nolte’s Europäischem Bürgerkrieg205 and Stéphane Courtois’ Black Book of Communism,206 the British historian of Poland Norman Davies207 has taken up this approach in establishing a rating for the crimes of the Second World War: the Anglo-American bombing campaign was bad, the Holocaust was worse, but Stalinism was the worst of all. His main thesis, often repeated, would appear to be that the “absolute front runner in this context was the Soviet Union.”208 Working semantically and graphically, he suggests a perspective according to which Workuta was the largest concentration camp; the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff was the most serious maritime catastrophe;209 with Katyn assuming the status of the worst massacre of prisoners of war.210 In view of such conclusions, it is not surprising that Davies is a specialist in Polish history, whose works have all been well-received in Poland. In his new work on the Second World War, he transfers the categories of interpretation found in Polish nationalist historiography to his consideration of a wider European history, thereby confirming the consensus in Poland that Russia represented a far greater threat than Germany. One consequence of this exercise in “European dictatorship ranking” is his view of German historiography—accepting only the findings from Ernst Nolte—he rails against what he sees as the German “self-flagellation.”211 His attacks on Jürgen Habermas212 imply an implicit 205

See Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus (Frankfurt/M. and Berlin: Propyläen-Verl., 1988). See also the subsequent debate between Egon Flaig and Heinrich August Winkler a quarter of a century later: FAZ, no. 160 of July 13, 2011, no 4, and Die Zeit, no. 30 of July 21, 2011, 17. 206 See Stéphane Courtois, et al., The black book of communism: crimes, terror, repression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 207 See Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland’s Present, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 208 Norman Davies, Europe at War 1939–1945: No Simple Victory (London: Pan Books, 2006), 343. 209 See Christopher Dobson, John Miller, and Ronald Payne, The Cruellest Night: Germany’s Dunkirk and the Sinking of the “Wilhelm Gustloff,” (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979). 210 See Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, “Die sowjetischen Kriegsverbrechen in Polen: .DW\Ĕ ´ LQ ³Noch ist Polen nicht verloren”: Das historische Denken der Polen, ed. Krzysztof Ruchniewicz (Berlin: Lit, 2007), 43–56; Claudia Weber, “‘Too Closely Identified with Dr. Goebbels’: Die Massenerschießungen von Katyn in der Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs und des Kalten Kriegs,” Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 8 (2011): 37–59. 211 See Davies, Europe at War, 451. 212 Ibid., 451; 469ff.

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call for revision of the “Historikerstreit”213 of the 1980s. Moreover, the only information which he provides regarding the Holocaust survivor Marcel Reich-Ranicki214 (that he worked for the Stalinist secret service)215 and his attempt to apportion part of the responsibility for anti-Jewish crimes to the Jews themselves could be interpreted as latent anti-Semitic prejudice. Further peculiarities in this vein include repeated reference to the Jewish collaboration in the Holocaust216 and his explanation of the mass death in Leningrad as being a consequence of the fierce Soviet defence.217 Continued to its logical extent, such an approach could even be used by a possible revanchist German historiography to excuse the German bombardment of Warsaw by citing Polish attempts to defend against the German invasion. The complex nature of this chapter of European history, however, does not render a more nuanced and balanced approach impossible. Eschewing both Nolte’s categories of cause and effect and Davies’ question as to the weight of evil, Timothy Snyder’s new study of Europe’s “bloodlands” of Poland, the Baltic, Ukraine and Byelorussia focuses on both the targeted and coincidental interactions of the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. In this way, he succeeds in describing and explaining the genesis, course, and monumental scale of the violence and death without making any moral 213

See Aleksandr Boroznjak, Erinnerung für morgen: Deutschlands Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit aus der Sicht eines russischen Historikers (Zurich: MusterSchmidt, 2006); Jane Caplan and Norbert Frei, “The Historikerstreit Twenty Years On,” German History 24 (2006): 587–607; Heinz-Peter Heilmann, Das Tabu der Zeitgeschichte: Der tabuisierte Weg zum Historikerstreit; Analysen—Methoden— Interessen—Gefahren (Munich: AVM, 2008); Etta Grotrian, “Kontroversen um die Deutungshoheit: Museumsdebatte, Historikerstreit und ‘neue Geschichtsbewegung’ in der Bundesrepublik der 1980er Jahre,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 61 (2009): 372–89; Lorenz Jäger, “Willkommen in der Wirklichkeit: Neue Vorstöße und alte Rückzüge im Historikerstreit,” Internationale Politik 62 (2007): 122–24; Steffen Kailitz, Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit: Der “Historikerstreit” und die deutsche Geschichtspolitik (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008); idem., Die politische Deutungskultur im Spiegel des “Historikerstreits”: What’s right? What’s left? (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2001); Volker Kronenberg, Zeitgeschichte, Wissenschaft und Politik: Der “Historikerstreit”—20 Jahre danach (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008). 214 See Marcel Reich-Ranicki, The Author of Himself: The Life of Marcel ReichRanicki (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), esp. 222ff. 215 See Davies, Europe at War, 451. 216 Ibid., 378–79. 217 Ibid., 302–3.

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judgment.218 Another possibility is that former victims assume the role of the “actor,” thus enabling them to come to terms with their tragic past.219 “Victims” or “liberators” can even take advantage of a changed political situation and cross the line from “victim” to “perpetrator.”220 Recent research has reveled that war crimes were the preserve not just of Germans and their allies221 or the Red Army; as Anthony Beevor has demonstrated, the British and Americans shot wounded Prisoners of War during and immediately after the landings at Normandy on and after D-Day in early June 1944.222 Many explain the brutalization to which the troops on both sides were subject as the effect of the extraordinarily hard nature of the fighting. US medical officers recorded 30,000 cases of war neurosis amongst their soldiers alone. The inherent weakness of the widely-accepted “perpetrator-victim paradigm” and the associated narrative of good and evil would appear to be confirmed by the investigation of more recent violations of human rights.223 One such episode, the genocide in Rwanda, shows a highly unclear line between “good” and “evil.”224 As UN reports seem to suggest, the current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame—who succeeded in stopping the genocide of the Tutsi (of whom some 800,000 had been killed)—was at least indirectly responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Hutus who fell victim to the advance of his Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994. A further UN report, this time from the High Commissioner for Human Rights focusing on the Congo, shows that both 218

See Snyder, Bloodlands. See Fritz Bauer Institut, eds., Opfer als Akteure: Interventionen ehemaliger NSVerfolgter in der Nachkriegszeit (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2008). 220 See the “Liberation trilogy” from Rick Atkinson focusing on diverse war crimes committed by the Allies in Italy. So far, only two volumes have been published: An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943 (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002) and The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2007). 221 Regarding the sexual violence perpetrated by German soldiers, see Regina Mühlhäuser, Eroberungen: Sexuelle Gewalttaten und intime Beziehungen deutscher Soldaten in der Sowjetunion 1941 bis 1945 (Hamburg. Hamburger Ed., 2010). 222 See Antony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (London: Viking, 2009). 223 For this and the following, see Andrea Böhm, “Wenn die Opfer töten,” Die Zeit, no. 36 of September 2, 2010, 10. 224 See Dominik J. Schaller, “‘Die einzig plausible Lösung ist die Eliminierung der Tutsi’: Der Völkermord in Ruanda,” in Vorurteil und Genozid: Ideologische Prämissen des Völkermords, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar: Böhlau, 2010), 217–39. 219

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wars conducted between 1996 and 2003 may have also witnessed genocide225 involving the murder of tens of thousands of Hutu refugees in the Congo by the armies of Kagame and Laurent Kabila, the rebel leader and later President of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Should the reports prove to be true, this could be highly embarrassing to the former Clinton Administration, which after declaring Kagame to be the “good guy,” gave him a free hand to conduct his “Police action.” The suppression of earlier reports commissioned by the UN High Commissioner also requires attention.226 Questioning some 1280 witnesses, investigators working on a recent UN report proposed the establishment of a Truth Commission to resolve the matter. Transforming victims into perpetrators and vice versa would thus seem a viable method of instrumentalizing past crimes for contemporary political ends. “Heroes,” “saviors” and other agents of liberation seem perfectly capable of prefacing or even following their positive acts with crimes of quite breath-taking proportions. Nevertheless, such psychohistorical controversies are in essence irresolvable. Himmler, Bormann,227 and other “desk murderers” may well have been deeply disturbed personalities seized by the fixation of destroying the “Jewish-Bolshevik Intelligentsia.”228 Eric A. Johnson extended the circle of perpetrators of the “not so ordinary men” to include the minority of the SS, Gestapo, the T4 perpetrators and a few Wehrmacht units.229 Nevertheless, examination of 225

See dpa of August 31, 2010. See the unpublished UN report from Robert Gersony from 1994: Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), esp. 15–16; 373. 227 See Volker Koop, Martin Bormann: Hitlers Vollstrecker (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: Böhlau, 2012), esp. 22ff.; 202ff. 228 The words of Himmler spoken during the meeting of SS-Gruppenführer on the Wewelsburg, June 11-15, 1941. The minutes of the meeting have not survived. This term had already been used by Hitler whilst talking about Operation Barbarossa on 3/3/1941: “The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, previously the ‘oppressor of the Volk,’ must be destroyed.” Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab) (Frankfurt/M.: Bernard & Graefe, 1965), 1:341. 229 See Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 18–19. Michael Selzer assumes that between 10 and 15 per cent of Germans possessed an abnormal character, supported National Socialism and came to dominate the “normal” majority. “Psychohistorical Approaches to the Study of Nazism,” Journal of Psychohistory 4 (1976): 215–24. Writing in 'DV 7RGHVODJHU &KHáPQR.XOPKRI 'HU %HJLQQ GHU “Endlösung” (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007), 176; Shmuel Krakowski argues that only a small 226

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the “Kommisarbefehl” question, for example, highlights the difficulties associated with this approach. Can the great majority of officers, who— against all military tradition—carried out the order from June 6, 1941, to execute civilian Soviet party functionaries and political officers without trial be viewed as “perpetrators” in the sense that to a man they all suffered from a personality disorder? Or were the two thirds of the men who carried out this order themselves traumatized victims who truly believed that the new form of “ideological warfare” was governed by a different set of rules than applied to the war in the West?230 Felix Römer focusses on “militant anti-Bolshevism” as the “mainspring in the motivation for the participation [of so many Germans] in the policy of extermination” resulting from a “demonic conception of the enemy” built up over a number of years.231 The progressive barbarization of the war in the East is interpreted by Römer as the product of the “embitterment” of the German troops over the war crimes of Soviet troops, German frustration at bitter Soviet resistance and the failure of the previously infallible Blitzkrieg—a combination of intentional and situative factors, for which the Officer Corps blamed the political commissars.232 Addressing the Third Reich in general, Joachim C. Fest wrote of an “unholy confusion of all standards.”233 The answer to this question is naturally affected by the perspective taken to it. The social psychologist Philip G. Zimbardo highlights the difficulties posed by the question: “[W]hen a power elite seeks to destroy an enemy nation, it engages propagandists to fabricate a program of hate. What is necessary to engender the requisite level of hate in your citizens so as to bring them to isolate torture and even kill? A ‘hate-filled illusion’—a psychological construction, which turns every ‘other’ into ‘the enemy.’ This fantasy is the strongest motive amongst soldiers […]”234

proportion of those responsible for the Holocaust were tried and punished. In doing so, he addresses the social-moral problem that people expect that all criminals should receive their ‘just’ punishment whatever their mental state. 230 See Felix Römer, Der Kommissarbefehl—Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), esp. 561–62. 231 Ibid., 554. 232 Ibid., 558–59. 233 Joachim C. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 119. 234 Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 9.

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Situation-based behavior What happens when the person giving orders loses influence over a test person who becomes “free to act” according to the demands of a critical situation? In a number of social-psychological studies, Philip G. Zimbardo investigated the effects of the situation on personal behavior. In doing so, he simulated a borderline situation in a prison. Based on random selection, test persons were divided into “guards” and “prisoners” and left in a mocked-up prison wing. The “guards” were given the task of maintaining order—organizing a roll call three times a day, serving meals and ensuring that the sleeping and active periods were maintained. After only a single week, observers registered the end of all human values and a radical alteration in the self-conception of the test persons: “[T]he most hateful, base pathological side of human nature showed itself. We were appalled at just how some of the boys (‘guards’) handled the other boys (‘prisoners’) as if they were animals; they clearly showed pleasure in mishandling them.”235

Soon after beginning the project, the guards redefined the rights of the “prisoners” for good behavior and a large proportion of the “guards” used their positions of power to tyrannize the “prisoners.” The “prisoners” also displayed a profound change in their behavior, “behaving like servile dehumanized automatons, hating the guards and thinking only of their own individual survival, whilst focusing on thoughts of escape.”236 The communicative behavior of the “prisoners” altered drastically; retreating into themselves, they displayed absolutely no solidarity with each other. Instead, they tended to pre-emptive obedience by disciplining those prisoners who went on hunger strike, showing clear contempt for this behaviour.”237 The “prisoners” developed behavioral problems showing similarity with “acquired helplessness” such as depression, passivity and emotional retreat.238 The project, originally planned for 14 days, was 235

Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Psychological Power and Pathology of Imprisonment,” in Behavior Disorders: Perspectives and Trends, ed. Ohmer Milton and Robert G. Wahler (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1973), 151–61, 153. 236 Ibid, 153. 237 See Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Philip G. Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,” International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1 (1973): 69–97. 238 See Lyn Y. Abramson, Martin E. P. Seligman, and John Teasdale, “Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 87 (1978): 49–74.

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eventually interrupted after only a week due to the untenable conditions in the “prison.” Neither criminal tendencies on the part of the “prisoners” nor sadistic leanings on the part of the “guards” were necessary to transform the prison into a real hell. Rather, Zimbardo was able to demonstrate the power of the situation. In 2006, working in cooperation with the BBC, S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher repeated the same experiment and registered a surprising difference.239 Although the guards exhibited similar behavior to that of their counterparts in the Stanford experiment, the “prisoners” displayed ever-fewer stress symptoms. Haslam and Richter argued that the stronger social identification of the “prisoners” with each other meant that the situation brought the group together and enabled them to deal with the situation better. From a cultural sociological perspective, Christoph Schneider has raised considerable objections to the rhetoric of “normality” which he sees as pervasive in socio-psychological perpetrator research. Reacting to Zimbardo, but also clearly with Stanley Milgram and Harald Welzer in mind, he identified a number of implicit, yet unsubstantiated anthropological assumptions in their argumentation: “[t]he anthropology of sociopsychological experiments is predicated on the implicit yet permanent assumption of the inherently good nature of people. ‘Good’ in this context is taken however to mean ‘healthy,’ itself relating to conceptions of ‘normality.’ ‘Evil,’ on the other hand is created by and through the type of social dynamic simulated by the experiment: as such, good (sic) people turn evil.”240

Apart from the fact that the anthropological assumption identified in socio-psychological work is itself a presumption, the work of Philip Zimbardo has actually assisted this development through his use of explicitly ethical-moral terms in the interpretation of socio-psychological research.241 In contrast, Stanley Milgram and Harald Welzer neither use such terms, nor do their arguments or interpretations rest in the categories of good and evil. Referring to a follow-up study focusing on Zimbardo’s Stanford

239

See S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen D. Reicher, “Stressing the Group: Social Identity and the Unfolding Dynamics of Responses to Stress,” Journal of Applied Psychology 91 (2006): 1037–52. 240 Schneider, “Täter ohne Eigenschaften?,” 5. 241 See Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect.

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Prison Experiment,242 Schneider argued that the participants were not only aware of the roles they were to play in this “prefabricated improvisation theatre,” but were willing to reproduce role stereotypes from their stock of “standardized cultural knowledge.” Advancing these two considerations as proof of a double deficit inherent to socio-psychological investigations, Schneider argued that it ignored the cultural repertoire which each person brought to the experimental situation, and which enabled them to use a number of “scripts” to facilitate dynamic interaction within the artificially created context. “The release of such group dynamics requires a mimetically- reproducible repertoire of cultural meaning.”243 A further deficit exhibited by the socio-psychological approach identified by Schneider is the concentration by its practitioners on the zone of overlap between group and individual, their failure to consider the interface between group and organization. “Previous research into perpetrators concentrated on the application of socio-psychology to analyze the interface between the individual and the group / situation. The failure of social psychologists to address the interface between group / situation and organization is entirely understandable: inclusion of the organizational level (i.e. of the experiment-leader and the experimental design) would undermine the positivistic illusion of an “objective” laboratory situation through the introduction of cybernetic effects. Nevertheless, Zimbardo’s experiment showed just how a number of processes could be initiated in the zone of overlap between the organizational and group level processes, which could truly be labelled as a level of intended radicalization.”244 After all, whilst theoretically holding to “the society-immune individual figure of the ‘normal subject,’”245 they also claim contradictory roles based on authority, peer-pressure and conformity in specific situations for these ‘normal figures.’ “If action is steered by the situative context, this consideration applies not only to situations of escalating extreme violence, but also to situations of everyday reality. This individual characteristic of ‘normality’ is carried on ad absurdum […]. Perpetrator research would be well advised to steer clear

242

See Ali Banuazizi and Siamak Movahedi, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison: A Methodological Analysis,” American Psychologist 2 (1975): 152–60. 243 Schneider, Täter ohne Eigenschaften, 8. 244 Ibid., 22. 245 Ibid., 13.

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of such concepts and consider the proposition of the possession by subjects of multiple identities.”246

Despite such moments of lucidity, Schneider’s methodological analysis has so far failed to provide proof for the existence of anything approaching a prescriptive socio-psychological anthropology claiming “normality” as the central characteristic of human behavior. The possession by human subjects of a multiple behavioral modes is as accepted as the fact that this behavior is influenced by the social-cultural environment in which they live. Psychologists, criminologists and other participants in the human social sciences pay particular attention to those situations and circumstances in which people (at least partially) abandon their cultural contexts and base their behavior on altered standards and values. In deviating, abandoning, or in effect destroying their previous sociallyaccepted behavioral repertoire—itself formed by cultural convention—and behaving in a manner entirely at variance with their previous cultural system, they are exhibiting patterns of behavior which for scientists, require explanation. The results of these two simulations were registered as reality in the former-Yugoslavia in the 1990s, in Abu Ghraib in 2003,247 in the behavior of the “Kill Teams” under Colonel Harry Tunnel248 and in Afghanistan in 2003, where Bundeswehr soldiers posed for photographs with the skulls of dead Afghans. According to one witness, an otherwise inconspicuous female American soldier said that “she enjoyed the power which she had over these humiliated men and used a dog to make them afraid.”249 The reports of many women raped in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the numbers are estimated at between 20,000 and 50,000)250 demonstrate the brutal process of “acquired helplessness.” A doctor reported that women first offered considerable resistance and were then beaten “black and blue”—later no such injuries were to be found.251 “A 19-year-old girl told me how she switched off inside, simply blocked everything out. Lying back and trying to think of something else, she was not present. This amounted to a 246

Ibid., 23. See Florian Rötzer, “Zeuge berichtet von Abu Ghraib,” Telepolis, published February 17, 2006, Heise Zeitschriften Verlag, http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/22/22062/1.html. 248 See Washington Times of April 5, 2011. 249 Rötzer, “Zeuge.” 250 See Dagmar Herzog, ed., Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 266. 251 Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape: The War Against Women in BosniaHerzegovina (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 90. 247

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psychic block.”252 Especially distressing for the women was the fact that the men who attacked them had previously been good friends and neighbors.253 Many “wore a [Serbian orthodox] crucifix and also had an earring with a crucifix.”254 A situation can trigger stimuli which bring people to adopt a particular role. In the Third Reich, Yugoslavia,255 in Rwanda256 or Sudan,257 these roles were communicated via ethnic propaganda as well as the education system and its system of values. In doing so, this propaganda created a “new reality,”258 which transformed civil society into a racist “Volksgemeinschaft,”259 making possible “ethnic cleansing,” or even genocide.260

252

Ibid., 118. Ibid., 121. 254 Ibid., 123. 255 See Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing” (Dallas: exas A & M University Press, 1995); David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (London: Vintage, 1995); David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica; Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997). For information regarding the context, see Ulrich Schiller, Deutschland und “seine” Kroaten: Vom UstašaFaschismus zu Tudjmans Nationalismus (Bremen: Donat, 2010). 256 See Helen Fein, “Genozid als Staatsverbrechen: Beispiele aus Rwanda und Bosnien,” Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung 1 (1999): 36–45. 257 See Atta El-Battahani, “Ideologische, expansionistische Bewegungen und historische indigene Rechte in der Region Darfur, Sudan,” Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung 2 (2004): 8–51; Khalid Y. Khalafalla, “Der Konflikt in Darfur,” ApuZ 4 (2005): 40–46. See also Gérard Prunier, Darfur: Der “uneindeutige” Genozid (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2007). 258 See Welzer, Täter, 254. 259 See Michael Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstermächtigung: Gewalt gegen Juden in der deutschen Provinz 1919 bis 1939 (Hamburg: Hamburger Ed., 2007); Ian Kershaw, “‘Volksgemeinschaft’ Potenzial und Grenzen eines neuen Forschungskonzepts,” VZG 59 (2011): 1–17; Michael Wildt, “‘Volksgemeinschaft’: Eine Antwort auf Ian Kershaw,” Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 8 (2011): 102–9. 260 See Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in TwentiethCentury Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Boris Barth, Genozid: Völkermord im 20. Jahrhundert; Geschichte—Theorien—Kontroversen (Munich: Beck, 2006). Michael G. Esch reflects on the motives and driving forces behind “ethnic cleansing” in a social-science-based reflection on modernity. See Michael G. Esch, “Der historische Ort von ‘ethnischer Säuberung’ und Völkermord,” GWU 62 (2011): 133–43. 253

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Sexual violence has always been an integral part of war and genocide.261 Depending on the political context, rape, forced prostitution, impregnations, and other rituals of sexual humiliation constitute a central part of ethnic and social-hierarchical conflict.262 In raping the women of their enemies, the victor demonstrates their enemies’ inability to maintain their traditional protective function. In a non-biologicist racist context, for example in Serbia, it was possible to “serbify” Bosnian women, integrating the children born from rape into the Serbian community. Working on Allied recordings of the cell conversations of German prisoners of war made between 1939 and 1945, Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer reconstructed the perception of war amongst its German participants immediately after action and before the collapse of the Third Reich.263 Their findings show that requiring only a short phase of adaptation, the “normal men” soon began to enjoy their new lives as killers. Indeed, the subsequent relaxation of discipline opened up what Günther Anders called the “opportunity for unpunished inhumanity”264 within only a very short space of time; a chance which the sociallyregimented soldiers grasped with both hands. Obviously proud of their actions, the men boasted of their deeds, seeking to entertain their listening comrades. The conditions of war had displaced moral norms and mores to such an extent that the culture of violence inherent to the assumption of superiority propagated by National Socialism had replaced previous conceptions of pre-war humanism. Outlining their enjoyment of killing, rape, and mass murder, they spared their listeners no detail. The events of the Holocaust, in which they participated, were not described as acts of barbarity; such treatment was not a matter for consideration in terms of the categories of “morality and sociality established in the People’s Community (Volksgemeinschaft).”265 The Jews were not even conceived of as “victims.” 261

For this and the following, see Herzog, Brutality and Desire. See also Buss, The Murderer Next Door, 231ff; Regina Mühlhäuser, Eroberungen; Ingo von Münch, “Frau, komm”: Die Massenvergewaltigungen deutscher Frauen und Mädchen 1944/45 (Graz: Ares, 2009). 263 See Sönke Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying: The Secret World War II Transcripts of German POWs (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2012). 264 Günther Anders, “Chance zur unbestraften Unmenschlichkeit,” in AuschwitzProzess 4 Ks 2/ 63, ed. Irmtrud Wojak (Frankfurt/M. and Cologne: Snoeck, 2004), 715–22. 265 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 22. 262

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Many soldiers even believed that Hitler was too soft and scrupulous. Transcripts of recorded conversations in a US POW camp record the opinion of a Luftwaffe NCO that Hitler should have been more ruthless in the bombardment of London.266 Analyzing similar transcripts from the secret US camp Fort Hunt, Felix Römer has drawn links between the biography, political conviction, and attitude to the war exhibited by the German POWs.267 Demonstrating the interaction of situative forces and ideological aims, he identified the key role played by ideological leaders. Labelling them “intrinsic warriors,” he sees that they had both the opportunity and capacity both to prevent and commit crimes, the incidence and nature of which were thus not the direct and sole product of explicit orders from the military hierarchy. It was such leaders who “gave the German conduct of the war a National Socialist character. Not all soldiers needed to be convinced Nazis in order to conduct the war as an ideological war of racial extermination.”268 Indeed, political indifference and the conformism which it bread enabled the unthinking acceptance of National Socialist conceptions—such as virulent anti-Soviet prejudice—which proved so instrumental in transforming the Eastern campaign into a war of racial extermination. Establishing differences in outlook between younger soldiers socialized in the Hitler Youth and their older counterparts, Römer demonstrates the greater willingness exhibited by the latter group to adapt to the rules of a war of racial extermination. His work confirms the findings of the social-psychological approach to this question. It was not ideological conviction which transformed soldiers into murders, but their actions which led them to adopt National Socialist ideology and its interpretation of the world. The need to find legitimation for their actions led them to the all-embracing tenets of the Nazi world view. The further displacement of socio-moral standards following capitulation and allied occupation also resulted in the reassessment of the events of the war by the very soldiers responsible for them. The “frame of reference” for wartime stories had changed. The altered social norms of the newly-democratic society with its civilian standards made ex266 Christian Gudehus, Harald Welzer, and Sönke Neitzel, eds., “Der Führer war wieder viel zu human, viel zu gefühlvoll”: Der Zweite Weltkrieg aus der Sicht deutscher und italienischer Soldaten (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 2011), 9. 267 See Felix Römer, Kameraden—Die Wehrmacht von innen (Munich: Piper, 2012). 268 Ibid., 479.

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servicemen more hesitant in what they said, a development also conditioned by the fear of punishment. Memories now lost definition and recollection of a number of events, such as the Holocaust (a central part of German military experience) disappeared altogether.

Biographical fractures, role changes and continued careers People are able to switch between the roles of perpetrator and victim very quickly. The reverse is also possible. Many communists persecuted by the National Socialists swapped positions suddenly in 1945. Bearing the honorary title of “former concentration camp inmate,” they colluded in the establishment of a communist dictatorship in East Germany, imprisoning people under the worst of conditions.269 A further phenomenon is that of a career continued under different regimes— convinced Nazis who kept their positions of high responsibility and served the new democracy in the West with the same measure of loyalty, or former communists in East-Central Europe, who mutated into model (not meant ironically) social democrats after 1989/90.270 After imprisonment and de-Nazification, the majority of those responsible for implementing the criminal decisions of the Third Reich from the lower and middle levels of power were quickly absorbed into the structures of a forgiving society. The majority moved into the private sector; but around one third succeeded in resuming a career in the civil service.271 Many of their number even climbed to positions of considerable seniority.272 Despite having co-authored the Nuremburg race laws, Hans Globke headed the Chancellor’s Office under Adenauer;273 Kai Schiller, 269

See Henry Leide, NS-Verbrecher und Staatssicherheit: Die geheime Vergangenheitspolitik der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2005); Frank Hirschinger, Fälschung und Instrumentalisierung antifaschistischer Biographien: Das Beispiel Halle/Saale 1945–2005 (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2007). 270 6HH WKH 3ROLVK H[DPSOH LQ *HUKDUG %HVLHU DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD European Dictatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), 433ff; 585; 589-90. 271 See Christina Ullrich, “Ich fühl’ mich nicht als Mörder.” 272 See also Malte Herwig, Die Flakhelfer: Wie aus Hitlers jüngsten Parteimitgliedern Deutschlands führende Demokraten wurden (Munich: Dt. Verl.Anst., 2013). 273 See Reinhard-M. Strecker, ed., Dr. Hans Globke: Aktenauszüge—Dokumente (Hamburg: Rütten & Loening, 1961); Klaus Gotto, ed., Der Staatssekretär Adenauers: Persönlichkeit und politisches Wirken Hans Globkes (Stuttgart: Klett-

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the former NSDAP Group Leader, became Minister of Economics in 1969;274 the former naval judge Hans Filbinger ended his career as Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg;275 and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, formerly deputy section leader in the broadcasting section of the Reich Foreign Ministry, even headed the grand coalition as Federal Chancellor.276 Those who eventually fell from grace did so not because they displayed a particularly fascist character—their behavior as democrats was exemplary—but because their attempts to hide their Nazi pasts were eventually uncovered. Indeed, once their past had caught up with them, their new lives had obscured all memory of their less savoury activities and they were unable to remember what they had done, making recourse to the excuse of the necessity of obeying the orders of superiors or such similar excuses. In reality, the freedom of action open to the Nazi judge Filbinger was much greater than he indicated and of which he made use. Even away from the incidence of “subservient jurisprudence,” many exercised rigour in their sentencing in order to curry favor with their political masters.277 Those pleading amnesia in response to media campaigns against them were usually taken to be lying. In reality, however, a clouded memory is often associated with psycho-physiological processes preventing the individual from reconstructing the past in a Cotta, 1980); Jürgen Bevers, Der Mann hinter Adenauer: Hans Globkes Aufstieg vom NS-Juristen zur Grauen Eminenz der Bonner Republik (Berlin: Links, 2009). 274 See Torben Lütjen, Karl Schiller (1911–1994)—“Superminister” Willy Brandts (Bonn: Dietz, 2007). 275 See Hans Filbinger, Die geschmähte Generation: Politische Erinnerungen (Esslingen and Munich: Bechtle, 1994), esp. 141ff.; Heinz Hürten, Wolfgang Jäger, and Hugo Ott, Hans Filbinger—Der “Fall” und die Fakten: Eine historische und politologische Analyse (Mainz: v. Hase und Koehler, 1980); Ricarda Berthold, “Filbingers Tätigkeit als Marinerichter im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Filbinger—Eine deutsche Karriere, ed. Wolfram Wette (Springe: zu Klampen, 2006), 43–64. Filbinger was not a special case. For the history of other German jurists, see Hubert Rottleuthner, “Karrieren und Kontinuitäten deutscher Justizjuristen vor und nach 1945,” Justizforschung und Rechtssoziologie 9 (Berlin, 2010). The study demonstrates that 80 per cent of the lawyers working at the Federal Supreme Court at the beginning of the 1960s were former members of the NSDAP. Eight of 16 judges at the Federal Constitutional Court also had a Nazi past. See Albrecht Kirschner, ed., Deserteure, Wehrkraftzersetzer und ihre Richter: Marburger Zwischenbilanz zur NS-Militärjustiz vor und nach 1945 (Marburg: Historische Kommission für Hessen, 2010), esp. 109ff. 276 See Philipp Gassert, Kurt Georg Kiesinger 1904–1988 (Munich: DVA, 2006). 277 See Manfred Messerschmidt, “‘Elastische’ Gesetzesanwendung durch Wehrmachtgerichte,” in Wette, Filbinger, 65–80; 72–73; 78.

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reliable fashion.278 Our ability to remember oscillates between the conscious lie and unfeigned amnesia.279 The moralizing of those attacking such amnesia, especially in connection with the Nazi past often fails to take account of this phenomenon.280 Irrespective of such considerations, the human talent to conceal, deceive, and dissimulate, let alone the tendency to pro-social extenuation (telling white lies) and self-exculpation is not a form of behavior limited to Homo sapiens; it is also, to a lesser extent, presented by primates.281 Such 278

See Hans-Joachim Markowitsch, Dem Gedächtnis auf der Spur: Vom Erinnern und Vergessen (Darmstadt: WBG, 2002); Johannes Fried, Der Schleier der Erinnerung: Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik (Munich: Beck, 2004). Seeking to relativize such claims, see Niels Birbaumer and Dieter Langewiesche, “Neuropsychologie und Historie—Versuch einer empirischen Annäherung: Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung (PTSD) und Soziopathie in Österreich nach 1945,” GuG 32 (2006): 153–75. 279 Regarding the ‘tidying’ function of forgetting in the sense of the disposal of old and irrelevant information through neuronal synchronization, see Simon Hanslmayr, et al., “Prefrontally Driven Down-Regulation of Neural Synchrony Mediates Goal-Directed Forgetting,” The Journal of Neuroscience 32 (2012): 14742-51. See also Douwe Draaisma, Das Buch des Vergessens: Warum unsere Träume so schnell verloren gehen und sich unsere Erinnerungen ständig verändern (Berlin: Galiani, 2012). 280 See the controversy surrounding the NSDAP membership of Walter Jens in 2003. His son Tilman Jens believes that his father fled into depression and dementia out of shame. See T. Jens, Demenz: Abschied von meinem Vater (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verl.-Haus, 2009), 25; 45–91. Regarding Günter Grass’ late confessions of membership of the Waffen-SS see Günter Grass, Peeling the Onion (London:Vintage, 2008), 18–19; 35; 64ff.; 78–79; 109ff. The outrage following this revelation was so great because Grass had styled himself as the “conscience of the nation”; his silence therefore made a nonsense of his professed moral standards. Whether someone “tells the truth” when questioned about a matter can be determined to a certainty of almost 90 per cent with new lie detector tests using MRI scans of the brain. See Die ZEIT, no. 28 from July 2, 2009, 29–31. Dagmar Reese argues against “the contemporary trend to dismiss statements from former members of the Hitler Youth denying that they joined the organization voluntarily as subjective, biased, exculpatory and thus implausible” arguing that “confronting them with what amounts to tendentious Nazi sources, does not do justice to a number of witnesses.” See Dagmer Reese, “Zum Stellenwert der Freiwilligkeit,” Mittelweg 36: Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung 19 (2010): 63–83, 82. 281 See Richard Byrne and Andrew Whiten, eds., Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapters 15–18; Michael Tomasello and Josep Call, Primate Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); David

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a deep-seated characteristic would seem to point to its genetic anchoring. Acting from the widest variety of motives—usually involving fear of punishment or losing face—people distort the truth on average twice per day.282 As a number of forensic psychologists have demonstrated, we humans invest heavily in the cognitive construction of truth modulation, to the extent that it is often impossible, without making recourse to lie detectors, to determine the areas of untruth in people’s utterances. Such considerations are especially true of those in senior positions. Having learnt to make successful and targeted deployment of lies to advance their career283 and coming to view such mechanisms as entirely usual and acceptable, such individuals see no legitimate impediment to the employment of lies to deal with problematic events in their past. As many a novelist would tell us, such sustained delusions are necessary for an even half-balanced life.284 Starting out as lies, many fabrications acquire such a patina over the long-term that they develop into an identity, and the liar Premack and Guy Woodruff, “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?” Behavior Brain Science 4 (1978): 515–26; Josep Call and Michael Tomasello, “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later,” Trends of Cognition Science 12 (2008): 189–92. 282 See Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities (Chichester: John Wiley, 2008); Pär Anders Granhag, The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); idem. and Aldert Vrij, “Detecting Deception,” in Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective, ed. Neil Bewer and Kipling Williams (New York: Guilford Press, 2005), 43–92; Helmut Lukesch, “Lügen und Täuschen: Eine psychologische Perspektive,” in Die Lüge: Ein Alltagsphänomen aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht, ed. Jörn Müller and Hanns-Gregor Nissing (Darmstadt: WBG, 2007), 87–99; Dan Ariely, The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty (New York: Harper, 2012). 283 See Dana R. Carney, Andy J. Yap, Brian J. Lucas, and Pranjal H. Mehta, “People with Power Are Better Liars,” working paper (Columbia Business School, 2009); Dana Carney, “Defend Your Research: Powerful People Are Better Liars,” Harvard Business Review (May 2010); Dana R. Carney and Malia F. Mason, “Moral Decisions and Testosterone: When the Ends Justify the Means,” Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 46 (2010): 668–71; Dana R. Carney, Andy J. Yap, Brian J. Lucas and Pranjal H. Mehta, “How Power Corrupts: Power Buffers the Emotional, Cognitive, and Physiological Stress of Lying” (Manuscript); Aldert Vrij, Pär Anders Granhag, and Samantha Mann, “Good Liars,” Open Access Journal of Forensic Psychology 1 (2009): E56–E67, http://www.forensic psychologyunbound.ws/; Aldert Vrij, S. Leal, Pär A. Granhag, Samantha Mann, Ronald P. Fisher, Jackie Hillman, and Kathryn Sperry, “Outsmarting the Liars: The Benefit of Asking Unanticipated Questions,” Law and Human Behavior 33 (2009): 159–66. 284 See Schlinck, Summerlies.

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comes to believe the lie with every fresh embellishment. This is confirmed by the story of Karl Bosl.285 Experiencing the end of the Second World War as a grammar school teacher in Ansbach, he witnessed the execution of one of his pupils, the 19-year-old Rober Limpert, only hours before the arrival of the Americans.286 Seeking to save himself from post-war disgrace and possible imprisonment, he fabricated a narrative of events which placed himself at the center of the resistance circle in which his pupil had participated. With increasing age, he adorned his story to such an extent that he even assumed the role played by his pupil, whom he portrayed as emulating the behavior of his role model, the teacher.287 Before branding him an outright liar, we must first consider the way in which memory of an experience reacts “with great sensitivity to the ageing of the brain.”288 The general human “bias towards positivity,” i.e. the rosy interpretation of one’s own biography also increases with advancing age.289 As people approach the end of their lives, their belief in the integrity of their memories becomes increasingly resistant to criticism. In contrast to many of his generation, Hans Globke’s ability to remember was repeatedly praised during his activity as a witness for the defence in a number of trials, testifying to the necessity to obey orders. Nevertheless, in terms of his own behavior during the Nazi period, he was increasingly seen both by contemporaries and those born later as engaging in a practice of targeted memory-loss.290 Globke seemed unable to comprehend how those of his generation, who had actually experienced the Third Reich, could reach a judgement different to his. According to his conception, it would have been entirely absurd “to have protested to a higher National Socialist agency against the killing of the Jews without 285

See Matthias Berg, “Lehrjahre eines Historikers: Karl Bosl im Nationalsozialismus,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 59 (2011): 45–63; Benjamin Z. Kedar and Peter Herde, A Bavarian Historian Reinvents Himself: Karl Bosl and the Third Reich (Jerusalem, 2011). 286 See Elke Fröhlich and Robert Limpert, “Ein junger Märtyrer,” in Bayern in der NS-Zeit: Die Herausforderung des Einzelnen; Geschichten über Widerstand und Verfolgung, ed. Elke Fröhlich and Martin Broszat (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1983), 6:228–57. 287 Quoted in Patrick Bahners, “Die Legende eines Humanisten,” FAZ, no. 154 of July 6, 2011, N 3. 288 See Christian Gudehus, Ariane Eichenberg, and Harald Welzer, eds., Gedächtnis und Erinnerung: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 2010), 56. 289 See Rüdiger Pohl, Das autobiographische Gedächtnis: Die Psychologie unserer Lebensgeschichte (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2007), 155–61. 290 See Bevers, Mann hinter Adenauer, 161–62.

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taking any account of the consequences of such behavior either for myself or my informants.”291 In his opinion, he had already taken a considerable risk by joining “the (albeit unsuccessful) resistance movement dedicated to overthrowing the National Socialist regime” and, in doing so, having attracted the attention of the Gestapo.292 He had provided the Catholic Church with information from the Ministry of the Interior and maintained contacts with those in the resistance movement. Indeed, he was forced to respond to a number of attacks both in and out of court throughout the course of his entire post-war career. The GDR even staged a show trial of Globke in his absence, finding him guilty. Nevertheless, the context of the cold war enabled him to dismiss many attacks as Bolshevik propaganda. Despite this attitude, Globke was forbidden entry to the USA as both Bonn and Washington feared mass protests. Globke’s life in the Federal Republic was in fact very trying indeed. In being forced to respond to continual attacks, Hans-Peter Schwarz sees Globke not only as a “tragic figure” but also as a “victim” of the Third Reich.293 The “antifascist” GDR also saw the rapid ascent of the career ladder by a number of former National Socialists and their assumption of a number of functions in both Party and State.294 Although the Soviet authorities arrested some 120,000 NSDAP members in the immediate post-war years and dismissed a further 200,000 from their jobs, the needs of reconstruction necessitated the social integration of those with an unfavorable political record.295 A survey of the top SED functionaries in 291

Ibid., 164. Ibid., 164. 293 Quoted according to Stephan Reinhardt, “Hans Maria Globke: Hitlers Ministerialrat und Adenauers Staatssekretär; Ein deutscher Fall,” WDR Hörfunk, broadcast on March 18, 1993. 294 See Jürgen Danyel, Olaf Groehler, and Mario Kessler, “Antifaschismus und Verdrängung: Zum Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in der DDR,” in Die DDR als Geschichte: Fragen—Hypothesen—Perspektiven, ed. Jürgen Kocka and Martin Sabrow (Berlin: Akad.-Verlag, 1994), 148–52; Jürgen Danyel, “Die SED und die kleinen Pg’s: Zur politischen Integration der ehemaligen NSDAP-Mitglieder in der SBZ-DDR,” in Helden, Täter und Verräter: Studien zum DDR-Antifaschismus, ed. Annette Leo and Peter Reif-Spirek (Berlin: Metropol, 1999), 177–96; idem., “DDR-Antifaschismus: Rückblick auf zehn Jahre Diskussion, offene Fragen und Forschungsperspektiven,” in Vielstimmiges Schweigen: Neue Studien zum DDRAntifaschismus, ed. Annette Leo and Peter Reif Spirek (Berlin: Metropol, 2001), 7–20; Jan Foitzig, ed., Sowjetische Interessenpolitik in Deutschland 1944–1954: Dokumente (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012). 295 See Marcel Boldorf, “Brüche oder Kontinuitäten? Von der Entnazifizierung zur Stalinisierung in der SBZ/DDR,” HZ 289 (2009): 287–323. 292

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the region of present-day Thuringia showed that some 13.6 per cent of those born in 1928 had been members of the NSDAP.296 Of the SED cadre occupying significant offices between 1952 and 1961, only every twelfth had participated actively in the fight against Hitler, whilst almost every second had been socialized in the NSDAP, the Hitler Youth or the SA. With the overwhelming majority of post-war decision makers concealing their Nazi past, the SED was surprisingly lax in verifying their biographical claims. In 1954, some 27 per cent of all SED members had been members of the NSDAP or its ancillary organs before 1945.297 Indeed, the SED was the first post-war party to accept former Nazis. According to the East German Interior Minister, former Nazis were to be treated as “equal citizens.” In 1954, 32.2 per cent of all public sector workers in the GDR were former members of the various organizations of the Nazi party. One prominent SED functionary, who also succeeded in concealing his career in the Third Reich, Hans Bentzien, served as Minister of Culture in 1961 before falling into disgrace in 1966 (but not for reasons connected to his past) upon which he switched to a career in the media, finishing as the last controller of GDR television. The most successful cases of such cover-ups often involved the collusion by senior SED figures, a development guaranteeing their absolute dependence and obedience. “Decisive in the process of securing absolute SED rule was the appointment of a number of compromized Party secretaries whose unquestioning loyalty could be ensured through expunging a fascist past— a process in which the Party forgave everything, but forgot nothing.”298

After 1948, those seeking to climb the greasy pole of party advancement often employed the charge of disloyality towards the SED or fascist revanchism against their rivals, in order to advance their careers. Whether such charges were in fact fabricated was of little importance.299 Nevertheless, as in West Germany, elite continuity was conditioned by the 296

Heinrich Best, et al., “Integration oder Ausgrenzung? Der Umgang der SED mit ehemaligen NSDAP-Mitgliedern,” Workshop of the SFB 580 (Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen nach dem Systembruch/Diskontinuität/Tradition/ Strukturbildung) held in Jena on December 15–16, 2009. 297 Foitzig, Sowjetische Interessenpolitik. 298 Thus Heinrich Best, quoted in Die Welt of December 30, 2009, 25. See also Sandra Meenzen, “Wie ehemalige Nazis in der DDR Karriere machten,” Sächsische Zeitung of January 21, 2010, 6. 299 See Boldorf, “Brüche oder Kontinuitäten?”

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impossibility of a more thorough-going process of renewal. The silence over such matters served not only a socially-integrative function; it could be used as a political weapon: former fascists could be accepted or denounced. The social transformation of National Socialists into model Democrats or Socialists extended across almost every sphere of society.300 The politicians, diplomats,301 artists, sportsmen,302 academics, and others were “unmasked” late in life if at all. The cases of the professor of German literature, Hans Schwerte (alias Ernst Schneider) constituted a public scandal in the 1990s.303 Following retirement, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Aachen was uncovered as the former SS officer Ernst Schneider, responsible within his capacity within the SS Organization Das Ahnenerbe for the dissemination of National Socialist ideology in the occupied Netherlands; a role which also implicated him in the Holocaust. Distracted by the events of 1989/90 and following the retirement of former Nazis from public life, Germany stepped down its hunt for National Socialist war criminals. Popular interest in such matters was occasioned less by revelations of elite continuity as those of historical interest and was fuelled by revelations contained in newly-declassified government documents. Walther Raff, the inventor of the gas-powered vehicle, and the former German diplomat Franz Rademacher, were both protected from prosecution as war criminals after 1945 by the WestGerman intelligence service, which employed these former Nazis as agents 300

See Wilfried Loth and Bernd-A. Rusinek, eds., Verwandlungspolitik: NS-Eliten in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 1998). 301 See Conze, Frei, Hayes, and Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. For a critical reception, see Hürter, “Das Auswärtige Amt.” 302 See the example of the sportsman, journalist, organizer, teacher, and scientist Carl Diem. Recent revelations of his anti-Semitism and ideological proximity to the NSDAP have not affected the fact that many sporting locations bear his name. See Frank Becker, Den Sport gestalten: Carl Diems Leben (1882–1962), vol. 3, NS-Zeit (Duisburg: Universitätsverlag Rhein-Ruhr, 2009); vol. 4, Bundesrepublik (Duisburg: Universitätsverlag Rhein-Ruhr, 2010); see also Wolfgang Benz, ed., “Erinnerungspolitik oder kritische Forschung? Der Streit um Carl Diem,” ZfG 59, no. 3 (2011). 303 See Gjalt R. Zondergeld, “Hans Ernst Schneider und seine Bedeutung für das SS-Ahnenerbe,” in Vertuschte Vergangenheit: Der Fall Schwerte und die NSVergangenheit der deutschen Hochschulen, ed. Helmut König, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, and Klaus Schwabe (Munich: Beck, 1997), 14–30; Bernd-A. Rusinek, “Von Schneider zu Schwerte: Anatomie einer Wandlung,” in Loth and Rusinek, Verwandlungspolitik, 143–79.

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in Chile and Syria respectively. Such revelations came only following the publication of their biographies.304

1989/90: Communicative silence or thoroughgoing revelation? One challenge facing post-unification Germany is dealing with those who were not only SED members, but also served the “sword and shield of the party,” the Ministry for State Security (MfS). Should post-communist society be transformed to the same extent as the Federal Republic over forty years ago? According to research by the magazine Der Spiegel, the state of Brandenburg, unlike CDU-governed Thuringia or Saxony, established “a cross-party pact of silence” amounting to “organized amnesia.”305 The main reason advanced for the stunted investigation of Brandenburg’s past was the association of Brandenburg’s first MinsterPresident, Manfred Stolpe, with the Stasi. The CDU, SPD and PDS worked together in the state parliament to prevent formal investigation of its freshly-elected members until 2010, satisfying themselves with the honorary commission led by the Potsdam General Superintendent Günter Bransch and his Catholic colleague Monsignor Karl Heinz Ducke set up in 1991. Both clergymen showed clemency and refrained from passing any judgements which would have led to the interruption of careers in public office. This policy of “leaving well-enough alone” may well have served the purposes of integration in the freshly constituted federal state, also known as the “little GDR,” but eventually resulted in scandal when, following a coalition between the SPD and Die Linke in 2009, it soon became clear that seven of the representatives from Die Linke were former MfS informants who had failed to disclose their pasts. The ensuing scandal was fuelled by the implicit philosophical / theological tradition which assumes that silence on a matter rules out any form of “inner repentance.” This understands those having adapted to the new society in this way as having undergone only a cosmetic change without experiencing any form of “political rebirth” or change in mindset as demanded by Karl Jaspers in the 304

See Jost Dülffer, “Im Einsatz für den BND,” FAZ, no. 225 September 27, 2011, 8; Axel Frohn and Klaus Wiegrefe, “Auf Pullachs Lohnliste,” Der Spiegel, no. 41 of October 10, 2011, 40–41; Heinz Schneppen, Walter Rauff: Organisator der Gaswagenmorde; Eine Biografie (Berlin: Metropol, 2011). 305 Stefan Berg and Peter Wensierski, “Das organisierte Vergessen,” Der Spiegel, no. 4 of January 25, 2010, 36–38, 36.

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1960s.306 This form of moral existentialism,307 which decries a mere recognition of democracy without inner acceptance as being morally defunct, is rooted in theological ideas. Indeed, speaking in 2002, Gesine Schwan, then president of the Viadrina European University in Frankfurt (Oder), made this the basis of her estimation of the individuals involved. According to her analysis, the transformation of East Germans into real democrats requires an inner alteration of the subject similar to the procedure of a confession: “contritio cordis, confessio oris und satisfactio operis.”308 Such an argument lacks any reference to reality as it ignores the fact that “the transformation of the followers of an ideologically formed dictatorship into citizens of a free democracy almost always occurs in silence and on an individual-practical basis. […]”309 Thus, truly effective soul-searching and confession does not take place in the market place, but in the “closet,” behind locked doors. Of course, such a process cannot be captured on the public record. Indeed, it was exactly this form of public confession which the inquisitors of real-socialism demanded from their adaptive subjects. The principal evidence for the possibility of a “conversion experience” was Günter Schabowski, a prominent SED functionary, who made a series of repeated and ever-more abject confessions of having done “everything wrong” in a system which had long lost any shred of legitimacy.310 However, the doctrine of “inner repentance,” a public confession of guilt as the prerequisite to a new start, has long been doubted by social psychologists. The learning process is better understood as an adaptation to changed circumstances, the “choice” of which is identified as being

306

See Karl Jaspers, Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? Tatsachen—Gefahren— Chancen, with an introduction from Kurt Sontheimer (Munich and Zurich: Piper, 1988), 190, 192. 307 See Hermann Lübbe, “Deutsche Zustände im Urteil eines politischen Moralisten,” in Politik nach der Aufklärung: Philosophische Aufsätze, ed. Hermann Lübbe (Munich: Fink, 2001), 101–28. 308 See Dagmar Unverhau, ed., Hatte “Janus” eine Chance? Das Ende der DDR und die Sicherung einer Zukunft der Vergangenheit: Referate der Tagung der BStU in Zusammenarbeit mit der Museumsstiftung Post und Telekommunikation sowie dem Bundesarchiv vom 27.–29.11.2002 in Berlin (Münster: Lit, 2003), 391, 393. 309 Thus Lübbe, Vom Parteigenossen, 104. 310 Günter Schabowski and Frank Sieren, Wir haben fast alles falsch gemacht: Die letzten Tage der DDR (Berlin: Econ, 2009); see also Günter Schabowski, Abschied von der Utopie: Die DDR—Das deutsche Fiasko des Marxismus (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1994).

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right only in retrospect.311 Viewed against this context, Herman Lübbe observed that “of much greater importance than what the subjects involved feel—something entirely invisible to us—is what they actually do.”312 The difficulty of drawing the correct lessons from discourses stretching over decades when subject to the opposition of a number of contrary interests is illustrated by the debate surrounding the SED and Stasi past of citizens of the former GDR. Whilst the left-leaning intellectual milieu of the old Federal Republic tends to exhibit restraint in this debate, conservative opinion seeks to discredit the now-defunct Socialist state and defame its collaborators, demanding hair shirts and confessions, before their integration in the new society can even be considered. Long having been forced to suffer the accusation of over-lenience in pursuing Nazi crimes, they now seek to conduct an unrelenting purge of the remnants of the “second German dictatorship” using untainted elites from the West. Those failing to demonstrate their new orthodoxy should, as conservative opinion holds, be subject to discrimination without limitation and made to pay for their past errors of thought and deed. “Following an ‘entirely new form of adjudication’” (BGH AZ 5 StR 747/94) they [the West German justice system] abandoned all the mechanisms developed to protect Nazi judges; the acquittal of the National Socialist legal system should in no way be followed by the exoneration of the GDR legal system. As such, the Bundestag amended the statute of limitations and the Federal Court of Justice suspended the paramount provision of the rule of law, namely the proscription of retrospective prosecution (in accordance with Article 103 of the Basic Law) in cases concerning citizens of the former GDR.”313 The new strategy of unrelenting persecution had the obvious advantage of discriminating against the newly-forming democratic Socialists through the simple expedient of insinuating a secret anti-democratic disposition, despite all the evidence of their behavior in post-unification Germany pointing to the contrary. Those accused of extremism in such a way sought (understandably) to cling on to the myth of their “birth out of antifascism,” a step for which they paid a high price of not being able to point out the clear situative and anthropological parallels between the late 1940s and 1950s on the one hand and the 1980s and 1990s on the other. Such comparisons, so they thought, achieved an unacceptable proximity between them, real-socialism and National Socialism. In choosing this line of argument, the simple explanation of “human behavior in a time of 311

See Eliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, and Robin M. Akert, Social Psychology (Boston: Pearson, 2010), 163. 312 Lübbe, Vom Parteigenossen, 85. 313 Thus Kurt Nelhiebel, Die Entkoppelung von Krieg und Vertreibung, 59.

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upheaval” was lost from sight entirely. In such a situation, the approach of integrative silence dominant after 1945 lost out to the growing enthusiasm for rooting out past injustice and thereby seeking to “come to terms with the past.” The result of this change in strategy was to slow the pace of integration to such an extent that, even after 20 years of unification, a considerable proportion of the population of East Germany seems not to have come to terms with the Federal Republic.314 Those drawing attention to this problem fall into the trap of “political correctness,” which tends to transform empirical questions into moral questions.315 Such a process is nothing less than “self-censure of public opinion, which seeks not to defeat views which it finds unsavoury, but makes short work of them, denying their proponents any shred of morality.”316 In his recent book The Need to Forget and the Irrefutability of Remembrance, the ancient historian, Christian Meier, differentiates strongly between National Socialism and the GDR. “Of course the GDR did not produce anything as outstandingly terrible as did Germany between 1933 and 1945. Its history contains nothing comparable to Auschwitz, the war, and the show trials which distinguish the period of Nazism from other dark periods of human history. The GDR remains bad enough, but in the normal course of things, this would not assume such a prominent position in public memory. Indeed, much of the history of the GDR lends itself better to the Greek amnesia ordinance of ‘letting that which occurred be.’”317

He locates the reason for the disobedience of this rule in the peaceful nature of the revolution 1989/90, which prevented a “balanced” relationship between violence and counter-violence and which ultimately prevented any guilt-burdened blood-letting on both sides. East German Bürgerrechtler (civil rights activists) initially sought to prosecute the leaders of the regime and their prominent supporters. Albeit a legitimate concern, this enterprise was doomed to failure, not only in the face of West German resistance, but also due to the unsuitability of legal mechanisms to 314

6HH *HUKDUG %HVLHU DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD HGV 15 Jahre deutsche Einheit: Was ist geworden? (Berlin: Lit, 2007). 315 See Gerhard Besier, Die Welt of September 13, 2004. See also idem., “Vergeben und Vergessen?” in Mut zur Freiheit: Ein Leben voller Projekte; FS Wolfgang Marcus zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Mike Schmeitzner and Heinrich Wiedemann (Berlin: Lit, 2007), 203–13. 316 Thus Lübbe, Vom Parteigenossen, 91–92. 317 Christian Meier, Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns (Munich: Siedler, 2010), 90.

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achieve this end. All that remained were partially successful attempts at the social exclusion of Stasi employees. In agreement with Peter Bender,318 Christian Meier has reached the view that it would have been better to restrain the energies seeking to bring everything to light in the interests of the still very difficult process of national and social integration. Those in Bonn had the “power, but not the courage to do so.” “The Bürgerrechtler had been prevented from enjoying the fruits of their victory—were we also able to deny them access to the documents?”319 In the light of such policies, it came as no little surprise that the very authority established to bring to light the illegal and unjust machinations of the Stasi—the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives—employed former members of the MfS. Deemed by the first Commissioner, Joachim Gauck, to be essential in order to guarantee the smooth working of the authority, their employment developed into a media controversy under his successor Marianne Birthler. This issue was finally resolved by her eventual replacement, Roland Jahn, who succeeded in his efforts to have every one of these 47 individuals removed after 20 years of loyal service. Protesting against this move, the Chairman of the advisory board, Richard Schröder pointed out the utter loyalty with which the former “perpetrators” had served the new authority. “Their removal from the authority against their wishes is a further example of the politics of symbolism, under which innocent people suffer, a phenomenon which we experienced in the GDR. We should take care that we do not begin to resemble our erstwhile opponents.”320 Speaking to a local newspaper from Central Germany, Schröder contested the “injustice of giving the last word to the victims. Both victims and perpetrators are biased; the role of the Federal Commissioner is to position his authority in the center of the debate.”321 Criticism of victims is entirely permissible; yet Schröder met with a considerable wave of outrage for his comments, themselves amounting only to an attempt to address a complex anthropological problem. The advent of the Internet has finally robbed technological man of the merciful possibility of forgetting. A single click suffices to confront us with the evidence of past events, effortlessly saved for posterity and without the necessity of protracted archival research. Reacting to such 318

See Peter Bender, “Erinnern und Vergessen: Deutsche Geschichte 1945 und 1989,” in Zweimal Deutschland: Eine ungeteilte Nachkriegsgeschichte 1945–1990, ed. Peter Bender (Munich: Pantheon, 2009), 285–300. 319 Meier, Das Gebot zu vergessen, 94. 320 Quoted in Der Spiegel, no. 20 of May 16, 2011, 43. 321 Mitteldeutsche Zeitung of May 9, 2011.

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developments, the political scientist Viktor Mayer-Schönberger has called for the reintroduction of amnesia in order to deny the omnipresent past unrestricted access to our present.322 Automatic best-before dates should allow “data to rust;” data preservation should be made technically impossible.323 “In the past, remembering involved considerable feats of mental exertion before memories could be made profitable for present purposes. The dawn of the digital age has reversed this relationship: today it is difficult to forget matters of considerable unimportance.”324

We need to differentiate between those items viewed as socially indispensable over the long-term; matters too “fleeting” to be remembered, and those things which we should forget for the sake of our mental health. As long as we can “google” everyone before meeting them, we burden ourselves with the punishment of eternal remembrance, acting as a barrier to forgiveness and restricting our scope for new experiences. Those incapable of forgetting are denied the experience of the new and surprising.

322

See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 323 See Viktor Mayer-Schönfelder, “Man könnte Daten rosten lassen,” Wirtschaftswoche.de of September 28, 2010. 324 Karsten Polke-Majewski, “Kein Vergeben, kein Vergessen: Das Internet hat ein gnadenloses Gedächtnis; Sein Wissen über die Menschen hält ewig,” Die Zeit, July 15, 2011, 64.

CHAPTER TWO STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE AND SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION “It is a serious error to ascribe prejudice and discrimination to any single taproot […] and anthropological literature […] suggests that while the targets of prejudice and its expression differ greatly, the underlying dynamics are much the same in all lands.” Gordon W. Allport (1954)1

From the construction of categories to stereotypes and prejudice The swimming pool in Sønderborg, South Denmark was somewhat strict in its hygiene requirements. Emerging from the changing room, would-be swimmers pass through a shower-room in which, after surrendering their clothes, they are required to shower: carefully and entirely naked. The process was subject to careful monitoring by an eagleeyed attendant. Those hoping to retain their swimming attire during the shower were informed that they would be refused entry to the pool. Foreign guests, unclear as to general practices in Danish swimming pools, could be forgiven for concluding that the Danish people are characterized not only by standards of extreme cleanliness, but exhibit a willingness to submit to the most intimate of scrutiny to ensure their enforcement. Returning to their home country, the swimmers reported their bathing experience, thus contributing to a general picture of “the Danes.” Far from having its origin in a general Danish penchant for bathing cleanliness, this regime was rooted in very specific circumstances. Having failed to invest in the modernization of the swimming facilities, the town council responded to the ensuing problems with the institution of the personnel-intensive procedure described above. In the aftermath of the much-postponed program of modernization in the autumn of 2010, the 1

Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice: 25th Anniversary Edition (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), XVIII–XIX.

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bathing attendant was relieved of his supervisory duties and his close attention is now dedicated to matters outside the showers. Whilst regular visitors to the newly-modernized swimming pool continued their traditional pre-swimming hygiene practices, new guests did not. Especially noticeable was a group of dark-skinned youths, who attracted the attention of other swimmers not only due to their habit of conversing in Arabic, but also for the exceptionally generous dimensions of their swimming trunks—which, it was noted, they retained under the shower. The Danish swimmers muttered their regret at the absence of the attendant and the decline of traditional showering practices. Understanding the youths’ failure to shower “correctly” to be part of an unclean oriental culture, the Danes felt confident in their negative judgement. It is under such or similar circumstances, that stereotypes and prejudices are formed and maintained, and from which social discrimination can result. Stereotypes are cognitive structures containing socially shared knowledge relating to the characteristic attributes of members of various social categories.2 As elementary “knowledge structures,” stereotypes should be differentiated from processes of stereotyping, i.e. the application of stereotype-based knowledge to individual members of a social category or group. A central mechanism in the development of stereotypes is the continual readiness of people to categorize others—such as members of one’s own or a foreign group.3 Social categorizing refers to a process in which groups of people involved in social interaction are viewed in a consolidated fashion. This categorization alone has a considerable impact on our perceptions and processes of judgement. Stereotypes of foreign groupings are very often more negative than those we apply to our own in-group. This is shown in our speech, in which the positive behavior of a member of our group is described in relatively abstract terms, whereas we prefer very concrete language for behavior displayed by the members of foreign groupings. The situation is reversed when it comes to bad behavior—we censure members of our in-group in clear terms, yet employ a greater degree of obfuscation for the criticism of out-groups.4 The deprecation and exclusion of marginal groupings—for instance, religious and ethnic 2

See Charles Stangor and Mark Schaller, “Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations,” in Stereotypes and Stereotyping, ed. Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor, and Miles Hewstone (New York: Guilford Press, 1996), 3–37. 3 See Ulrich Bielefeld, ed., Das Eigene und das Fremde: Neuer Rassismus in der alten Welt? (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998). 4 See the section below: The maintenance of stereotypes through linguistic distortion.

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minorities or the recipients of social security5—serves the social function of integrating the majority or “we” group and instrumentalizing the fear of social, economic or religious decline in order to prevent such a catastrophe. A whole range of historians have identified inclusion and exclusion as one of the constitutive factors in of the “People’s community” (Volksgemeinschaft) aspired in Germany between 1933 and 1945.6 Those falling into the categories of inclusion—“Aryan” Germans—enjoyed considerable privileges at the expense of those who did not. A prejudice of considerable longevity, which has long dominated Polish-German relations, is the 18th century perception of “Polish slackers,” expressed in German with the startling and offensive identification of a characteristically “Polish economy” (Polnische Wirtschaft). This stereotype functioned as the mirror image of German self-perception: “Whilst we Germans characterize ourselves as efficient, economical, and clean, with such virtues being accorded high significance, Polish behavior is interpreted as the very reverse. The ‘Polish economy’ refers to a disposition of almost total economic and political incapacity, social backwardness, disorder, waste, and obscene levels of dirt.”7 Theo Mechtenberg is correct in his estimation that this stereotype served as the instrument with which to justify the various partitions of Poland and deny Poles the right to national self-determination.8 Polish intellectuals answered this ominous stereotype, in circulation since the demise of the Rzeczpospolita at the end of the 18th century, with the assertion of a 5

See Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Deutsche Zustände: Folge 8 (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2010). 6 See Michael Wildt, Hitler’s Volksgemeinschaft and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion: Violence Against Jews in Provincial Germany, 1919–1939 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); Götz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State (New York: Metropolitan, 2007). See also Hitler und die Deutschen: Volksgemeinschaft und Verbrechen; Katalog zur Ausstellung des Deutschen Historischen Museums (Berlin: DHM-Museumspädagogik, 2010). 7 See Theo Mechtenberg, “Stereotype und Vorurteile in den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen: Aufgaben der politischen Bildung beim Zusammenwachsen Europas,” in Polen, der nahe—ferne Nachbar: Eine Würdigung für Theo Mechtenberg, ed. Johannes Hoffmann and Helmut Skowronek (Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 2002), 193–203; 195. See also Stefan Kowal, “Das Stereotyp ‘polnische Wirtschaft’ aus polnischer Sicht,” in Mythen in Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung aus polnischer und deutscher Sicht, ed. Adelheid von Saldern (Münster: Lit, 1996), 74– +XEHUW 2UáRZVNL “Polnische Wirtschaft”: Zum deutschen Polendiskurs der Neuzeit (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996). 8 See Mechtenberg, “Stereotype,” 195.

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putative Polish national character, immutable, yet dynamic in nature. Amounting to what they saw as a Polish national soul, it was depicted as subjecting itself to a continual process of renewal.9 Contrasting this to the Germanic and Russian character, they identified the Polish soul as panSlavic in nature, maintaining for it a “lack of Western attributes.”10 In addition to the dominant historical form of argumentation, the inter-war period saw an attempt to stylize the national character to an “anthropological” typology with the construction of race through psychology. The renewed interest in the “Polish soul” continued in the People’s Republic of Poland, but now analyzed with psycho-historical and mentality-led concepts. This approach to identity formation reached a pinnacle in 1985, during the Polish historical conference with the presentation of “stereotype and myth studies.”11 This highly doubtful “people’s psychological” approach to constructing national characteristics may well have historical consequences. Many authors believe that the insistence with which this interpretation was advanced eventually established it as a normative consensus given expression in a range of symbolism. This effect was enhanced by the efforts of nationalist authors to add weight to national myths and symbols with a variety of supporting narratives and ideas. The ultimate aim of this approach was to underpin the discursive construction of national communities and thus national identity-building.12 Such literary efforts tended to establish the Polish and German nation in clear and distinct opposition to each other.13 Nevertheless, an examination of German-Polish mythology displays a considerable level of 9

See Andrzej Wierzbicki, 6SRU\RSROVNąGXV]Ċ [Fighting over the Polish Soul]: Z ]DJDGQLHĔ FKDUDNWHURORJLL QDURGRZHM Z KLVWRULRJUDILL SROVNLHM ;,; L ;; ZLHNX [Characterizing the Nation in 19th and 20th Century Polish Historiography] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2010). 10 Ibid., 139. 11 See Janusz Tazbir, ed., Mity i stereotypy w dziejach Polski [Myths and Sterotypes in Contemporary Poland] (Warsaw: Wydawn. Interpress, 1991). 12 See Izabela Surynt and Marek Zybura, eds., Narrative des Nationalen: Deutsche und polnische Nationaldiskurse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2010). 13 That those reinforced prejudices produced on the micro-level and employed in nationality politics do not necessarily have to correspond with everyday reality was demonstrated by Andrzej Michalczyk in his study Heimat Kirche und Nation: Deutsche und polnische Nationalisierungsprozesse im geteilten Oberschlesien 1922–1939 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2011). The locally-dominant Roman-Catholic confession created a group identity transcending the boundaries of nationality, thus tempering conflict along national lines.

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interdependence between the two sets of national narratives and counternarratives. This is clear in one key myth: the narrative of Tannenberg/Grunwald developed between 1789 and 1914.14 Indeed, without the Polish Grunwald myth, the German counter-myth of Tannenberg would be inconceivable. The existence of mutual stereotypes of a surprising longevity was demonstrated afresh upon the emergence of WKH 6ROLGDUQRĞü PRYHPHQW WKH VSUHDG RI ZKLFK WKH *'5 OHDGHUVKLS sought to combat with the full arsenal of historically-fomented anti-Polish prejudice, despite its “reactionary” provenance.15 Stereotypes can also develop if we perceive specific, externally visible characteristics (the salience effect), such as racial, gender-role specific or party-political, national, or religious differences. Such noticeable social categories can easily lead to the development of stereotypes. Once established, the viewer soon finds a set of illusory correlations to reinforce these constructions, ascribing a social group a particular pattern of (entirely constructed and unfounded) behavior and abilities / inabilities. This form of behavior partly results from the influence exercised by stereotypes on our method of processing information. They guide processes of attention, play a role in the interpretation of information and have a clear effect on our processes of memory and reasoning. Writing in 1831, Thomas Babington Macaulay provided an example of the nationalreligious stereotyping practices of a number of his compatriots: “An English Jew looks on a Portuguese Jew as his countryman, and on an English Christian as a stranger and this want of patriotic feeling, it is said, renders a Jew unfit to exercise political functions.”16

He then continues to rebut the stereotype: “The points of difference between Christianity and Judaism have very much to do with a man’s fitness to be a bishop or a rabbi. But they have no more to do with his fitness to be a magistrate, a legislator, or a minister of finance, than with his fitness to be a cobbler. Nobody has ever thought of

14

6HH 3LRWU 3U]\E\áD 1410, “gedächtnisfrisch”: Deutsche und polnische Tannenberg-/Grunwald-Imaginationen zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis (1789–1914), in Surynt and Zybura, Narrative, 159–80. 15 See Dariusz Wojtaszyn, Der öffentliche Polen-Diskurs in der DDR während der 6ROLGDUQRĞü-Ära, in Surynt and Zybura, Narrative, 338–59. 16 Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Speech on Civil Disabilities of the Jews,” (Edingbourgh, January 1831), in Critical and Historical Essays, 2 parts, eds. Thomas Babington Macaulay and A J Grieve (London, 1933), 229.

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Stereotypes influence not only our mechanism of perception, but also its object. Adapting to expectation, he or she displays reactions which conform to the stereotype, thus confirming the original unfounded stereotyping. Viewed in this fashion, the stereotype fulfils a prophecy because the prophet acts in such a manner that forces fulfilment.18 Falling as we do into a number of social categories, our nature as individuals hampers clear classification and thus the application of stereotypes. Stereotypes are cognitive schemes permitting simplified modes of processing and judgement. Such methods of social categorization are often seen as providing a helpful framework of orientation, serving to simplify and provide structure to complex social situations. Category-based processing is, thus, often understood as an economical form of processing. The seating arrangement in a parliamentary setting thus enables perception of party allegiance by placing members of the same party in blocks. As such, the manufacture of social categories brings order to a large and otherwise unclear group of people and their complex interaction. Party allegiance is tied to stereotypical expectations concerning political belief and voting behavior. Categorization also permits conclusions to be drawn from stereotypical contents; people with whom we are unfamiliar are often evaluated and judged according to the category to which they belong. National stereotypes function in just this manner. Stereotypical knowledge structures help us—allegedly or in reality—in the interpretation of events or statements with a high potential for inclarity. They also serve to fill defects of memory by replacing or reconstructing forgotten information with a stereotypical content. The functional use of stereotypes is associated with a simplification of complex social environments. This procedure does not just involve considerable loss of information, but also carries the risk that the categories—and thus the associated stereotype contents—provide an unfounded representation of reality. This results in errors of judgement, relating to the positive or negative evaluation of categories and their representatives. We are able to speak of prejudice only after the evaluation is transferred to a member of a specific category without obtaining any further information about the person concerned. Discrimination results when a negative evaluation is given expression in the treatment of another. 17 18

Ibid., 226. Regarding the phenomenon of the self-fulfilling prophecies see below, 145.

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The impact of spontaneous social categorization was demonstrated by an experiment performed by Shelley E. Taylor and his team.19 A testperson was instructed to follow a discussion conducted by six men, three of whom were white and three of whom were black. Asked subsequently to assign statements to their originator, the testperson made a number of errors. Nevertheless, these errors displayed a certain pattern, and the testperson rarely assigned a statement made by one of the black discussion partners to one of his white counterparts. This categorization according to skin colour occurred spontaneously and almost seamlessly without the testperson being in any way aware of his pattern of behavior. The findings of this “who said what” experiment reinforced the assumption that such spontaneous social categorization remains seemingly impervious to cognitive challenges.20 Additional activities performed during listening were demonstrated to impair processes such as memory, but not those of categorization according to skin colour. Henri Tajfel also succeeded in demonstrating the effect of social categorization in categorical differentiation and accentuation. Whilst members of the same category are perceived as exhibiting a greater degree of similarity, the same testperson emphasizes a higher degree of divergence between those drawn from different categories.21 A number of factors determine the extent to which a specific category is activated and applied. One important factor is an increased accessibility, i.e. a person accords specific importance to a particular category within his perception of both himself and his world. Politicians of a “Green” persuasion have readier access to a number of categories pertinent to the news of environmental accidents. Compared to their colleagues in other parties moreover, they are also more likely to have made recent access to a body of knowledge relating to this topic. In consequence, it is probable

19 See Shelley E. Taylor, Susan T. Fiske, Nancy J. Etcoff, and Audray J. Ruderman, “Categorical and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 778–93. 20 See Karl Christoph Klauer and Ingo Wegener, “Unraveling Social Categorization in the ‘Who Said What?’ Paradigm,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75 (1998): 1155–78; Karl Christoph Klauer and Katja Ehrenberg, “Social Categorization and Fit Detection Under Cognitive Load: Efficient or Effortful?” European Journal of Social Psychology 35 (2005): 493–516. 21 See Henri Tajfel, Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (London: Academic Press, 1978). See also idem., Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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that they consider this knowledge during an immediately subsequent political debate, even if the two are entirely unrelated.22 Such implicit memory effects with a high probability of activation—so called “primings”—are common to many. This effect is supplemented by the impact of personal thoughts and goals, which play an important role in regulating the extent to which certain categories are accessible.23 Nevertheless, the choice of category is not entirely a matter of complete personal preference; these social categories must provide a certain amount of structure to the situation in question otherwise they will not fulfil their ordering and simplifying function. Every category must match the situation in hand, a “fit” which falls into two categories. The first, an intrapersonal congruence, refers to a degree of similarity between a person and a category.24 An interpersonal “fit,” on the other hand, indicates the structuring of a group in accordance with the similarities and differences of its members in terms of a specific categorization.25 Interpersonal fits are subdivided further into structural or normative fits. The former is given if a categorization corresponds with some or all of the variables of a situation. The latter relates to the conformity of the situation with the associated stereotypes.26 Of course, both types of “fit” increase the extent of categorization performed within a given situation. 22 See Mariette van Twuyver and Ad van Knippenberg, “Social Categorization as a Function of Priming,” European Journal of Social Psychology 25 (1995): 695– 701. 23 See Ad van Knippenberg, Mariette van Twuyver, and Jose Pepels, “Factors Affecting Social Categorization Processes in Memory,” British Journal of Social Psychology 33 (1994): 419–31; Karl Christoph Klauer, Katja Ehrenberg, and Ingo Wegener, “Crossed Categorization and Stereotyping: Structural Analyses, Effect Patterns, and Dissociative Effects of Context Relevance,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003): 332–54. 24 See Marilynn B. Brewer, “A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation,” in Advances in Social Cognition, ed. Thomas K. Srull and Robert S. Wyer (Hillsdale and London: Erlbaum, 1988), 1:1–36; Susan T. Fiske and Steven L. Neuberg, “A Continuum of Impression Formation, From Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 23 (1990): 1–74. 25 See Penelope J. Oakes, “The Salience of Social Categories,” in Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory, eds. John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 117–41. 26 See Ingo Wegener and Karl Christoph Klauer, “Inter-category Versus Intracategory Fit: When Social Categories Match Social Context,” European Journal of Social Psychology 34 (2004): 567–93.

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Although a precondition for the influence of stereotypes on our processes of perception and judgement, categorization does not necessarily result in stereotyping. An initial, spontaneous categorization can be diverted into an alternative category through the lack of the requisite “fit.” Indeed, a process of sub-categorization can even result in the refinement of the old category.27 Categorization does not necessarily result in the activation of stereotypical expectations.28 Even once activated, a stereotype does not always culminate in a judgement. Those appraising a specific situation are capable of suppressing stereotypes, especially those associated with social sanction or punishment.29 Socially-ostracized prejudices, such as anti-Semitism or other forms of racism, are often subject to such mechanisms.

Automatic and controlled information processing The familiar, culturally-mediated nature of much thinking about stereotypes conditions the rapid speed with which its mechanisms are activated. The introduction to a group of the member of a social minority can stimulate such reactions within a matter of milliseconds.30 Nevertheless, this automatism does not necessarily result in discriminatory actions on the part of the majority members. Not requiring immediate decisions, the nature of many such situations provide sufficient time to activate the cognitive resources required to effect the modification of automatic stereotyping through controlled mechanisms of processing. Despite such considerations, automatically activated stereotypes retain considerable influence over our modes of social perception and behavior without us being specifically aware of their existence or impact.31 27

See Brewer, “A Dual Process Model”; Fiske and Neuberg, “A Continuum of Impression Formation.” 28 See Lorella Lepore and Rupert Brown, “Category and Stereotype Activation: Is Prejudice Inevitable?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997): 275–87. 29 See Ashby Plant and Patricia G. Devine, “Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75 (1998): 811–32. 30 See Patricia G. Devine, “Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56 (1989): 5–18. 31 See Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, and Bernd Wittenbrink, “The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 1314–29; John A. Bargh, Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows, “Automaticity of Social

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Assembling an impression of one’s surroundings, a person gathers a wide range of information such as skin colour, clothing, age, gender, size etc. Although the first impression results in automatic stereotype formation, this person is also in possession of a range of supplementary, individualized information. Given the required motivation, he is thus in a position to process this information within a continuum located between the poles of category fit and individualism.32 A similar model differentiates between a categorical “top-down” processing strategy and a personalized “bottom-up” approach. Based on two different cognitive styles of processing, this “two factor model” gradually integrates individual characteristics into the category-based form of processing.33 A number of researchers even assume the existence of a number of simultaneous forms of information processing.34

Sub-stereotyping and the construction of sub-groups The process of stereotyping also generates inconsistent and, thus, disruptive information. A number of Germans living in the 1930s and 40s experienced Jewish doctors, lawyers and businessmen to be helpful, pleasant people. As such behavior did not fit into the negative views of the category “Jew,” the response was to establish a sub-stereotype, amounting to the exception to the rule. This form of “sub-typing” enabled them to engage with an inconsistent phenomenon without necessitating the abandonment of the stereotype “Jew.”35 Highly reluctant to abandon their original stereotypes, people tend to search for additional information with which they can justify their sub-typing. Such additional, pseudo-relevant information does not need to stand in any correlation with the phenomenon occasioning the original sub-stereotype. Haircut, clothing, and other characteristics can be advanced as proving that the person Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1996): 230–44. 32 See Fiske and Neuberg, “A Continuum of Impression Formation.” 33 See Marilynn B. Brewer and Amy S. Harasty Feinstein, “Dual Processes in the Cognitive Representation of Persons and Social Categories,” in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology, eds. Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), 255–70. 34 See Ziva Kunda and Paul Thagard, “Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, Traits, and Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory,” Psychological Review 103 (1996): 284–308. 35 See Kristin L. Maurer, Bernadette Park, and Myron Rotbart, “Subtyping Versus Subgrouping Processes in Stereotype Representation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69 (1995): 812–24, esp. 812.

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affected is somehow untypical of the social category involved. The pseudo-relevant characteristics are then used to conclude that the person is, in actual fact, untypical for the category against which they had been measured.36 If an “untypical” Jewish doctor (judged so because helpful) wears a scuffed suit, the observer is inclined to think that all Jews thus attired are helpful—they are classified to a sub-type. Since it is possible to consider information which fails to accord with any number of stereotypes as representing an exception from the rule, it would appear to be impossible to subject the stereotype to any significant degree of alteration on the basis of such inconsistent information. Nevertheless, many have observed the existence of the phenomenon of sub-grouping, i.e. the sub-division of a group into various sub-categories.37 In contrast to sub-typing, which favours the maintenance of the stereotype, sub-grouping results in the alteration of stereotypes. The tendency towards the construction of sub-groups appears to be significantly more pronounced for groups to which we belong than for foreign groups which (from our external perspective) appear to exhibit a higher degree of homogeneity.38 Should we be inclined to construct sub-groups, this disposition to group variability reduces the tendency to stereotyping and increases the probability of stereotype alteration.39 Consequently, subgrouping refers to the differentiation of a large group within which the degree of allegiance of all sub-groups to the common, higher category remains unaffected. The neurologically-reinforced40 human aspiration to maintain our expectations can serve to justify changes to the original reason for conceptions of our “self” and the “other” in accordance with the current 36

See Ziva Kunda and Kathryn C. Oleson, “Maintaining Stereotypes in the Face of Disconfirmation: Constructing Grounds for Subtyping Deviants,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68 (1995): 565–79. 37 See Maurer, Park, and Rotbart, “Subtyping Versus Subgrouping.” 38 See Bernadette Park and Charles M. Judd, “Measures and Models of Perceived Group Variability,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59 (1990): 173– 91; Bernadette Park, Carey S. Ryan, and Charles M. Judd, “Social Categorization and the Representation of Variability Information,” European Review of Social Psychology 2 (1991): 211–45. 39 See Alan J. Lambert, Keith Payne, Suzanne Ramsey, and Lara M. Shaffer, “On the Predictive Validity of Implicit Attitude Measures: The Moderating Effect of Perceived Group Variability,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005): 114–28. 40 See Arjen Alink, Caspar M. Schwiedrzik, Axel Kohler, Wolf Singer, and Lars Muckli, “Stimulus Predictability Reduces Responses in Primary Visual Cortex,” Journal of Neuroscience 30 (2010): 2960–66.

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historical-political paradigm. The mutually negative perception of Palestinians and Israelis (itself prefigured by the ideology then dominant in Europe) underwent a number of phases without subjecting the basic “we” and “they” antagonism to any significant degree of change. Initially viewed as “conspiratorial and revolutionary communists,” the Zionist settlers were then held to be suspect first on racial grounds and then finally as the “instruments of Western Imperialism.”41 This situation was exacerbated further by wider geo-political factors: the clear Israeli dependence on the West since 1949 and the Arab option of obtaining support from the Eastern bloc served to open the floodgates of anti-Semitism.42 Although official Eastern bloc policy towards Israel very seldom made use of openly anti-Semitic slurs, the deeply-rooted antiSemitism latent in the Eastern Bloc ensured that official policy enjoyed almost uniform approval, even in the GDR. In his study of GDR policy, Mario Keßler speaks of “anti-Semitic modes of thought and behavior simmering under the surface of real-socialism.”43 Nevertheless, despite such sentiment, the anti-fascist self-legitimation of the SED dictated the necessity of avoiding the revelation of hidden anti-Semitic sentiment lurking behind the “camouflage of anti-Zionism.”44 Refuting the charge of anti-Semitism, the decision-makers in Moscow, East Berlin, Prague, and Warsaw styled the Jews as “Zionists” and, as such, saw them as sharing responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism; a move which transformed all the “peoples” of the Eastern Bloc into potential victims of Zionist conspiracies. In contrast, the West German Left glorified the Israeli state, shrouding its achievements in a complex mythology, a stance which ended only on the eve of the Six Day War of 1967. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the Left soon distanced itself from the “violent implications of the Zionist project,” henceforth 41

See Werner Bergmann, “Zur Entstehung von Feindbildern im Konflikt um Palästina,” Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 12 (2003): 15–20; quote: 18. See Christina von Braun and Eva-Maria Ziegler, eds., Das “bewegliche” Vorurteil: Aspekte des internationalen Antisemitismus (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004). 42 See Leonid Luks, ed., Der Spätstalinismus und die “jüdische Frage”: Zur antisemitischen Wendung des Kommunismus (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 1998). 43 Mario Keßler, Antisemitismus, Zionismus und Sozialismus (Mainz: Decaton, 1994), 87. See idem., Die SED und die Juden—Zwischen Repression und Toleranz: Politische Entwicklungen bis 1967 (Berlin: Akad.-Verlag, 1995). 44 So Thomas Haury, Antisemitismus von links: Kommunistische Ideologie, Nationalismus und Antizionismus in der frühen DDR (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 448–49.

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transferring their support to the “anti-imperialist war of freedom” being fought by the Palestinians. Some West-German Leftist circles even developed their criticism of Israel into an “anti-Zionism of an extent which approached the ideological.”45 The “new” anti-Semitism of the 21st century contends the existence of a world-wide “Jewish lobby” pulling the strings of globalization, engineering modernization, and even new global wars.46 Although novel in character, this new anti-Semitism still makes use of old stereotypes, which, although not overtly paraded, remain latent in our cumulative cultural memory and are activated by allusions, mutable ciphers and codes. Accompanying this development is the renaissance of older stereotypes, considered by many to have been consigned to the past.47 Modern antiSemitism is characterized by an “ostensible explanation of the modern world and its complex processes”48 resting on a conspiracy theory which seeks to make a small minority responsible for the many and varied problems of modern society.49 As Monika Baár remarked, “because the Jewish population constituted a remarkably heterogeneous community, paradoxically, they could be singled out both for their reverence for ancient traditions and later, for their pivotal role in economic progress and modernization.”50

Illusory correlations Stereotypes also influence the manner in which we process information drawn from our social environment. Enabling rapid assimilation of all the information matching stereotypical explanations, this mechanism provides confirmation for the stereotype in question. This process is compounded by a complementary mechanism hindering the assimilation of information 45 Martin W. Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke: Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen Verhältnisses (Frankfurt/M.: Haag + Herchen, 1990), 152. 46 See Norman Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). See also Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Evyater Friesel, and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., Aktueller Antisemitismus—Ein Phänomen der Mitte (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2010). 47 See Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps, eds., Feindbild Judentum: Antisemitismus in Europa (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2008). 48 Ibid., 13. 49 See also Samuel Salzborn, Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2010). 50 See Monika Baár, Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 264.

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which is contradictory to our expectations.51 Stereotypes also produce different levels of memory to the extent that modes of behavior confirming our expectations are more easily remembered52 and accessed53 than those which do not. Moreover, stereotypes influence the manner in which we gain an impression of people and adapt our perceptions to conform to our expectations.54 In short, stereotypes have considerable potential to control the way in which we understand, evaluate, and react to our social environment.55 Many stereotypes even correspond to problematic social consensuses and are thus shared by a number of people within a subculture. This is also the case for national or gender-specific stereotypes. Whilst the Germans consider themselves to be industrious, they portray Poles as lazy. Other stereotypes are developed over the course of an individual lifetime through the coalescence of indirect information and direct experiences into a stereotype. Viewed from this perspective, stereotypes appear to be perceived correlations between group-identity on the one hand and a number of characteristics or mode of behavior on the other. National stereotypes— hard-working Germans vs. lazy Poles—also function in this way. Accordingly, stereotype formation would appear to work as a special form of contingency learning—the establishment of connections between variables on the basis of a random sample of observations. The only—but nonetheless fundamental—problem with such correlations is their rarity or more usually, total non-existence. It is thus possible to internalize distorted or incorrect correlations, which then act to induce stereotypical

51

See Ap Dijksterhuis and Ad van Knippenberg, “The Knife That Cuts Both Ways: Facilitated and Inhibited Access to Traits as a Result of Stereotype Activation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 32 (1996): 271–88. 52 See Jeffrey W. Sherman, Angela Y. Lee, Gayle R. Bessenhoff, and Leigh A. Frost, “Stereotype Efficiency Reconsidered: Encoding Flexibility Under Cognitive Load,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75 (1998): 589–606. 53 See Charles Stangor and David McMillan, “Memory For Expectancy-Congruent and Expectancy-Incongruent Information: A Review of the Social and Social Developmental Literatures,” Psychological Bulletin 111 (1992): 42–61. 54 See Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne, and Galen V. Bodenhausen, “Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Into the Cognitive Toolbox,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66 (1994): 37–47. 55 See Jeffrey W. Sherman, Neil Macrae, and Galen V. Bodenhausen, “Attention and Stereotyping: Cognitive Constraints on the Construction of Meaningful Social Impressions,” European Review of Social Psychology 11 (2000): 145–75.

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expectations. These, in turn, impact on processes of social perception and evaluation.56

The maintenance of stereotypes through linguistic distortion Stereotypes are maintained and reinforced through the specific structures of our everyday speech. Whilst describing the positive behavior of a member of our in-group in relatively abstract terms, we prefer very concrete language for behavior displayed by the members of out-groups.57 Internationally-mixed groups of laborers speak of the “hard work” of the guests, yet praise the “extreme efforts” of their compatriots in much more glowing terms. The situation is reversed when it comes to bad behavior— we censure members of our in-group in clear terms, yet employ a greater degree of obfuscation for the criticism of out-groups. Thus, whilst a member of the German contingent took a break for five minutes, he noticed the true extent of the sloth exhibited by his Polish colleagues. In this way, the positive characteristics identified to the in-group and the negative traits of the out-group are transformed into “characteristic” attributes. The negative behavior exhibited by the in-group and the positive behavior of the out-group, on the other hand, is explained by reference to situative factors. Such constructions are underpinned by their mode of expression. Choosing different levels of abstraction to describe the nature of each group, the phraseology employed often indicates more about the person uttering them than their object of description. Whilst descriptive and interpretative verbs of action such as “work” provide verifiable information about the situation, stative verbs and adverbs such as “industrious” or “lazy” provide a greater amount of information about the person in question and thus suggest the nature of his character.58

56

See Thorsten Meiser and Miles Hewstone, “Illusory and Spurious Correlations: Distinct Phenomena or Joint Outcomes of Exemplar-Based Category Learning?” European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (2006): 315–36. 57 See Anne Maass, Daniela Salvi, Luciano Arcuri, and Gün R. Semin “Language Use in Intergroup Contexts: The Linguistic Intergroup Bias,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989): 981–93. 58 See Gün R. Semin and Klaus Fiedler, “The Linguistic Category Model, Its Bases, Applications and Range,” European Review of Social Psychology 2 (1991): 1–50.

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One explanation for this phenomenon takes a motivational approach. Based on the theory of identity,59 it assumes individual self-conception to be based partially on group-belonging. Accordingly, a positive assessment of this in-group is taken as being vital to any feeling of positive selfesteem. Formulating the positive behavior of the in-group and the negative behavior of the out-group in abstract terms establishes these modes of behavior for each group as both characteristic and stable. Moreover, the concrete mode of description chosen for the negative behavior displayed by all or parts of the in-group and vice versa allows us to dismiss any deviations from this rule as situatively-qualified exceptions. Thus, linguistic category construction enables the development of a positive picture of the in-group and heightened self-esteem. The social-cognitive approach explains the phenomenon of the linguistic category model with differing expectations of the in and outgroups. Members of such groups clearly expect positive behavior from their fellow in-group members and preponderantly negative conduct from the representatives of out-groups which they meet. Any positive behavior encountered by the members of their in-group is taken as the norm; any negative actions encountered are located in their context.60 Having thus established “typical” and “atypical” patterns of behavior, these constructs are reinforced via linguistic convention, with the former being described in language more abstract than that used to report episodes of the latter.61 The choice of linguistic form also depends on role allocation. For example, the counsel for the defence at the Nuremberg trials described the positive and neutral behavior of the accused in relatively abstract terms so as to establish it as “typical.” The prosecution, on the other hand, keen as they

59 See Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel (Monterey: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co, 1979), 33–47. 60 See Anne Maass, Angela Milesi, Silvia Zabbini, and Dagmar Stahlberg, “The Linguistic Intergroup Bias: Differential Expectancies or Ingroup Protection?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68 (1995): 116–26; Daniel H. Wigboldus, Gün R. Semin, and Russel Spears, “How Do We Communicate Stereotypes? Linguistic Bases and Inferential Consequences,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78 (2000): 5–18. 61 See Anne Maass, Roberta Ceccarelli, and Samantha Rudin, “The Linguistic Intergroup Bias: Evidence of Ingroup-Protective Motivation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1996): 512–26.

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were to avoid assessment of the guilt of the accused as a situation-based anomaly, also formulated their charges in abstract terms.62 Such choices of formulation are also influenced by communicative relationships and the motivation of the speaker. The sender will choose a different mode of speech depending on the composition of his audience. Hoping to please when addressing his in-group, the sender necessarily adopts the corresponding mode of address. Addressing an out-group, he chooses his words primarily to convince and impress.63

Implicit personality theories, the construction of impressions and stereotypes In their perception of others, people often develop a range of psychological assumptions relating to the relationship between certain human characteristics and modes of behavior. Postulating a close relationship between numerous of potentially unrelated characteristics, the incidence of one or more such patterns trigger expectations of others. Many, for instance, believe that friendly individuals are especially talkative. Such spontaneous personality theories serve a social function, enabling us to understand our social environment, predict the behavior of those we meet and to influence our social environment.64 Such mechanisms are frequently used to assess other people in cases in which the information required to do so remains scarce.65 The initial overall impression of new acquaitances generated upon initial contact exercises a considerable influence on the perception of this person in other areas.66 62

See Jeanette Schmid and Klaus Fiedler, “Language and Implicit Attributions in the Nuremberg Trials: Analyzing Prosecutors’ and Defense Attorneys’ Closing Speeches,” Human Communications Research 22 (1996): 371–98. 63 See Karen M. Douglas and Craig McGarty, “On Computers and Elsewhere: A Model of the Effects of Internet Identifiability on Communicative Behaviour,” Group Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice 6 (2002): 17–26; Gün R. Semin, Lorena Gil de Monte, and Jose F. Valencia, “Communication Constraints on the Linguistic Intergroup Bias,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003): 142–48. 64 See David J. Schneider, “Implicit Personality Theory,” Psychological Bulletin 79 (1973): 294–309. 65 See Rainer Riemann, “Implizite Persönlichkeitstheorien,” in Handbuch der Sozialpsychologie und Kommunikationspsychologie, ed. Hans-Werner Bierhoff and Dieter Frey (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 2006), 19–26. 66 See Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Frank L. Schmidt, and Deniz S. Ones, “Is There a General Factor in Ratings of Job Performance? A Meta-analytic

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Despite considerable similarity, such implicit personality theories should not be confused with other empirically-tested models, which focus on the description of the individual differences.67 A number of different explanations have been advanced for the influence of such spontaneous forms of impression formation. Focusing on the social experiences made in a cultural context, some even posit an extrapolated reflection of experienced reality. Others argue that filtered through unreliable memories and erroneous convictions, such experiences are converted into false similarities. A third hypothesis argues that, based on overlapping categories of behavior, such trait categories are often accorded greater weighting within the process of assessment.68 Whereas the indirect approach chosen by implicit personality theories undertakes personality assessments due to a lack of information, the direct approach is far more restricted in the immediacy of its assessment. Confining itself to an intuitive assessment of two or more personality traits, these features are quickly worked in to a pre-existing holistic personality structure. The registration of positively connoted characteristics such as “warm-hearted,” “industrious,” “generous,” and “good-natured,” easily result in a positive overall assessment, whilst impressions such as “cold,” “irascible” and “avaricious” are taken as indicating a more negative personality.69 The greatest differences in initial characterization appear to be the result of an impression of “warmheartedness” or “coldness.” Indeed, it is improbable that a person taken upon first glance as being “cold” will be accorded any positive traits. Implicit personality theories enable us to differentiate between groups of persons based on the attribution of specific character traits. Although based on a similar concept as stereotypes, they differ from such mechanisms in their identification of individuals as well as groups.70 Characterized by the social interaction of its members, the group represents a relatively constant social category. In contrast to stereotyping, Framework for Disentangling Substantive and Error Influences,” Journal of Applied Psychology 90 (2005): 108–31. 67 See Bernd Six and Uwe Wolfradt, “Implizite (‘Naïve’) Persönlichkeitstheorien,” in Theorien und Anwendungsfelder der Differentiellen Psychologie, ed. Kurt Pawlik, (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 2004), 5:3–58. 68 See David J. Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotypes (New York: Guilford Press, 2004). 69 See Solomon Elliott Asch, “Forming Impressions of Personality,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 41 (1946): 258–90. 70 See Robert J. Rydell, Kurt Hugenberg, Devin Ray, and Diane M. Mackie, “Implicit Theories About Groups and Stereotyping: The Role of Group Entitativity,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33 (2007): 549–58.

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the assessment of individuals rests on a number of stable factors such as appearance and gesture, a feature with consequences for the subsequent processing of this information. The behavioral discrepancies displayed by an isolated individual can be integrated into the interpretative schema far more easily than those exhibited by a group. As a result, implicit personality theories investigate the potential change of individual characteristics. Group theories, on the other hand, assume the necessity of coordinated group effort to affect any form of transformation.71 Despite this consideration, different groups also display very different characteristics. Families and other intimate groups prove to be small, impenetrable, and long-lasting. Their members display high levels of similarity and a high degree of interaction. Such factors differentiate these groups from functional groupings (e.g. teams and committees), social groups (based on factors such as gender and ethnicity), and other, even looser associations.72 One approach, known as “lay theory,” assumes the existence of naturally occurring, well-defined groupings with immutable characteristics; these are easily labelled with tags such as “Germans,” “Jews,” or “Catholics.” Such “subjective essentialism” ignores the considerable variations exhibited by such groupings manifested across both culture and time. Catholicism, for instance, exhibits a great number of regional variations resulting from the varying influence of ideology, social difference, and sectional interest.73 Not merely a bundle of attributes characterizing a group as such (the entitative aspect), stereotypes always serve the function of maintaining the perceived stability of out-group behavior and its immutable traits (the essentialist aspect). The assessment of individuals always involves the implicit assessment of the mutability of their individual characteristics74 and represents a factor 71 See David L. Hamilton and Steven J. Sherman, “Perceiving Individuals and Groups,” Psychological Review 103 (1996): 336–55. 72 See Brian Lickel, David L. Hamilton, Grazyna Wieczorkowska, Amy Lewis, Steven J. Sherman, and Neville Uhles, “Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78 (2000): 223–46. 73 See Myrone Rothbart and Marjorie Taylor, “Category Labels and Social Reality: Do We View Social Categories as Natural Kinds?” in Language, Interaction and Social Cognition, ed. Gün R. Semin and Klaus Fiedler (London: SAGE, 1992), 11– 36; Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, Oliver Corneille, and Claudia Estrada, “The Interplay of Subjective Essentialism and Entitativity in the Formation of Stereotypes,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 5 (2001): 141–55. 74 See Carol S. Dweck, Self-Theories: Their Role in Motivation, Personality, And Development (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 1999); Sheri R. Levy and Carol S.

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of constitutive significance for a number of social cognitive processes such as social perception, attribution, and stereotype formation. Whilst the assumption of mutable personality characteristics permits a consideration of the context of judgment formation, other approaches cannot. In such a world, human behavior is the direct result of personal traits transposed unchanged into any and every setting.75 Such an understanding favours the genesis of group-based stereotyping. Those stressing the potential for individual change and development are more wary in making such sweeping statements.

Self-fulfilling prophecies A phenomenon documented in a great number of social contexts, the “self-fulfilling prophecy” is a mechanism through which expectations create reality. For instance, a teacher’s expectation of a child’s character can bring it to act in the corresponding fashion. The anticipation alone has produced the expected outcome.76 There are two types of self-fulfilling prophecies—the actual confirmation of assumptions regarding behavior on the one hand, and the assessment of information in a manner consistent with a certain set of expectations on the other. The first case—as demonstrated in the teacherpupil relationship—saw unspoken assumptions influence the behavior of the pupil. The second type involves an act of perception during which the receiver interprets information to fit a set of pre-existing assumptions. An example of this would be a teacher marking a test submitted by a pupil with a higher social status in a more favourable manner than that of a pupil from a more modest background.77 Similar phenomena have been observed in the outcomes of intelligence tests. Given indication of the high intelligence of a particular child by such a test, the pupil responded to the Dweck, “The Impact of Children’s Static Versus Dynamic Conceptions of People on Stereotype Formation,” Child Development 70 (1999): 1163–80. 75 See Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, and Mackie, Implicit Theories. 76 See Lee Jussim and Kent Harber, “Teacher Expectations and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Known and Unknown, Resolved and Unresolved Controversies,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 9 (2005): 131–55. 77 See Kari Edwards and Edward E. Smith, “A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1996): 5–24; Tobias Greitemeyer and Stefan Schulz-Hardt, “PreferenceConsistent Evaluation of Information in the Hidden Profile Paradigm: Beyond Group-Level Explanations for the Dominance of Shared Information in Group Decisions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 84 (2003): 322–39.

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teacher’s expectations with the corresponding performance (the Pygmalion effect). Those subject to the so-called “Golem effect,” on the other hand, repay low expectations with poor academic outcomes.78 Performance is clearly conditioned by expectations. Expectations are conditioned to a large degree by appearance. Those conforming to stereotypical patterns of attractiveness are often ascribed a high level of social competence.79 When approached in an open and friendly fashion, such “attractive” people could well react with higher levels of social competence than would otherwise be the case. The social behavior of individuals would thus appear to be generated not exclusively by their “nature” or “character,” but constitutes a reaction to the treatment which they experience.80

The perception of threats through stereotyping The effect of stereotyping on its subjects is demonstrated in assessment tests.81 Fearing not only assessment based on their social origin, but negative social judgements grounded in their class-specific behavior,82 those from lower social classes often react with underachievement. Already demonstrated for groupings such as African-Americans and women, past victims of social prejudice often avoid areas in which they expect to encounter such prejudice, including a number of professions. This phenomenon is exacerbated given high levels of the salience and fitting demonstrated by these groups, such as poor articulation (AfricanAmericans) and mathematical skills (women). On the other hand, situations in which the stereotype does not appear as salient or applicable, act to reduce the perception of the threat and the testpersons often 78

See Robert Rosenthal, “Covert Communication in Classrooms, Clinics, Courtrooms, and Cubicles,” American Psychologist 57 (2002): 839–49. 79 See Tobias Greitemeyer and Felix Brodbeck, “Wer schön ist, ‘wird’ auch gut: Über den Zusammenhang zwischen selbst- und fremdeingeschätzter physischer Attraktivität und selbst- und fremdeingeschätzter Persönlichkeitsmerkmale,” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 31 (2000): 73–86. 80 See Mark Snyder, Elizabeth Decker Tanke, and Ellen Berscheid, “Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling Prophecies Nature of Social Stereotypes,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (1977): 656–66. 81 See Shana Levin and Colette van Laar, eds., Stigma and Group Inequality: Social Psychological Perspectives (Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2006). 82 See Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69 (1995): 797–811.

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demonstrate a significant improvement in their test performance.83 Reduced performance is also conditioned by a number of further factors. Only if the testperson felt challenged, subject to true assessment and indeed within a field with which they identified strongly, would the existence of a stereotype influence their performance. Its impact also requires the testperson to believe—at least partially—in the existence and threatening nature of the stereotype (i.e. the degree to which the person expects the stereotype to function).84

Explicit and implicit prejudices Writing in 1954, the Nestor of the social-scientific study of prejudice, Gordon W. Allport, defined prejudice as a “deprecatory bearing towards a person of a specific group for the sole reason that he belongs to this group and consequently is taken to have or display the same deplorable characteristics which are attributed to this group as a whole.”85 Although Allport concedes the existence of positive prejudice, i.e. the development of an unfounded positive opinion of others,86 his definition, as with many

83 See Steven J. Spencer, Claude M. Steele, and Diane M. Quinn, “Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math Performance,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35 (1999): 4–28; Johannes Keller and Dirk Dauenheimer, “Stereotype Threat in the Classroom: Dejection Mediates the Disrupting Threat Effect on Women’s Math Performance,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 371–81; A. L. Alter, et al., “Rising to the Threat: Reducing Stereotype Threat By Reframing the Threat as a Challenge,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46 (2010): 166–71; R. J. Rydell and K. L. Boucher, “Capitalizing on Multiple Social Identities to Prevent Stereotype Threat: The Moderating Role of Self-Esteem,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36 (2010): 239–50. 84 See Toni Schmader, Michael Johns, and Marchelle Barquissau, “The Costs of Accepting Gender Differences: The Role of Stereotype Endorsement in Women’s Experience in the Math Domain,” Sex Roles 50 (2004): 835–50; Johannes Keller and Herbert Bless, “When Negative Expectancies Turn Into Negative Performance: The Role of Ease of Retrieval,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005): 535–41; Nai Chi Jonathan Yeung and Courtney von Hippel, “Stereotype Threat Increases the Likelihood that Female Drivers in a Simulator Run Over Jaywalkers,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 40 (2008): 667–74; Claudia C. Wolf, et al., “Sex Differences in Parking Are Affected By Biological and Social Factors,” Psychological Research 74 (2010): 429–35. 85 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature, 6. 86 See Andreas Dorschel, Rethinking Prejudice (Farnham: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2001).

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others engaged in this field,87 concentrates on the negative aspect of prejudice. According to Bernd Schlöder, a stereotype first becomes a prejudice when it is associated with an evaluation, thus producing in an emotional reaction.88 The majority of definitions assume that prejudices are variations of a specific form of attitude, (i.e. personal convictions and individual attitudes) directed towards groups or members of these groups. In this context, an attitude is defined as a set of organized and linked convictions of relative longevity which produce evaluative, cognitive and / or emotionally motivated actions towards a group, one of its members, a situation, or an issue. Fuelled by wide public interest in the source of inter-racial conflict between the white and black populations in the USA, attitude studies began to focus increasingly on the study of prejudice in the 1960s. Ethnic prejudices consist of antipathies resulting from defective generalizations ranged against a whole group or its members.89 Normative and moral factors play a specific role within this process.90 Other social problems providing the stimulus for these developments included the general Western patterns of gender-specific, age-related and disability-related prejudices91 as well as a politically-motivated interest in the origins of anti-democratic sentiment. As a result, there has been a flood of publications on racism,92 sexism,93 ageism,94 and other prejudices contributing to the development of the authoritarian personality. 87 See Andreas Zick, Vorurteile und Rassismus: Eine sozialpsychologische Analyse (Münster: Waxmann, 1997). See also James M. Jones, Prejudice and Racism (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997). 88 See Bernd Schlöder, “Vorurteile, Stereotype und die Verständigung zwischen Gruppen,” in Psychologie und multikulturelle Gesellschaft, ed. Alexander Thomas (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 1996), 109–14. See also Rüdiger Hort, Vorurteile und Stereotype: Soziale und dynamische Konstrukte (Saarbrücken: VDM, Müller, 2007), 34ff. 89 See Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, and Robin M. Akert, Social Psychology (Boston: Pearson, 2010). 90 See Werner Bergmann, “Was sind Vorurteile?” Informationen zur Politischen Bildung 271 (2001): 3–9. 91 See Mark Deal, “Aversive Disablism: Subtle Prejudice Toward Disabled People,” Disability & Society 22 (2007): 93–107. 92 See Zick, Vorurteile und Rassismus; Kevin Durrheim and John Dixon, “Attitudes in the Fiber of Everyday Life: The Discourse of Racial Evaluation and the Lived Experience of Desegregation,” American Psychologist 59 (2004): 626– 36; Lincoln Quillian, “New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination,” Annual Review of Sociology 32 (2006): 299–328; David O. Sears

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This new wave of publications brought a fresh focus. Especially in the studies concerned with racism and sexism, these approaches moved away from a study of open prejudice95 towards an analysis of the subtle, yet symbolic “modern” form of prejudice involving adverse attitudes (in terms of misogyny and racism) held behind a politically correct façade. Thanks to the progress made in methodology, attitude research was then able to uncover implicit attitudes producing “automatic” affective reactions as soon as the relevant subjects were involved. Whilst explicit prejudice is based on open, cognitively-accessible value-systems, it was demonstrated that implicit prejudice was often active without the holder of such attitudes being aware of its existence. As a result, they could only be accessed indirectly. A further question concerns the extent of interdependence between explicit and implicit prejudice and the possibility of predicting prejudice-driven actions on the basis of an investigation of implicit prejudice. Taken as a specific form of racism, the social prejudice of antiSemitism encompasses a set of negative attitudes and beliefs articulated towards Jews on the basis of religious, social, ethnic, and nationalist grounds.96 Tracing the genesis and establishment of the concept, Wolfgang and Patrick J. Henry, “Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37 (2005): 95–150. For the aesthetical aspects of racism in the United States, where to be black has been stigmatized as ugly, see Shirley Anne Tate, Black Beauty: Aesthetics, Stylization, Politics (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 93 See Peter Glick, et al., “Hostile as well as Benevolent Attitudes Toward Men Predict Gender Hierarchy: A 16 Nation Study,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86 (2004): 713–28. 94 See Randall A. Gordon and Richard D. Arvey, “Age Bias in Laboratory and Field Settings: A Meta-analytic Investigation,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 34 (2004): 468–92; Mary E. Kite, Gary D. Stockdale, Bernard E. Whitley, and Blair T. Johnson, “Attitudes Toward Younger or Older Adults: An Updated Meta-analytic Review,” Journal of Social Issues 61 (2005): 241–66; Annette Kluge and Franziska Krings, “Altersdiskriminierung—(K)ein Thema der deutschsprachigen Arbeits- und Organisationspsychologie?” Zeitschrift für Arbeitsund Organisationspsychologie 51 (2007): 180–89. 95 ,UHQHXV] .U]HPLĔVNL XVHG TXHVWLRQDLUHV WR LQYHVWLJDWH DQWL-Semitism in Poland DQG 8NUDLQH 6HH ,UHQHXV] .U]HPLĔVNL ³1DWLRQDOH 2SIHUNRQNXUUHQ] XQG Beharrlichkeit der Tradition: Antisemitismus in Polen und der Ukraine,” in Rensmann and Schoeps, Feindbild Judentum, 347–76. 96 Regarding the nationalist origins of prejudice, see e.g. Stephanie Zloch, Polnischer Nationalismus: Politik und Gesellschaft zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 2010); Hans Henning Hahn and Elena Mannová, eds., Nationale Wahrnehmungen und ihre Stereotypisierung:

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Benz and others have pointed to the influence of the German journalist and anti-Semite Wilhelm Marr, who coined the term in 1879 to refer to his “reasoned” rejection of Jews.97 Writing in 2004, the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia defined anti-Semitism as “any form of actions or attitudes based on the perception of a social object (an individual, group, institution, or state) as a ‘perfidious,’ ‘corrupt’ or ‘conspiratorial’ Jew.”98 A number of studies have traced the growth in Germany after 1945 of a new form of “secondary anti-Semitism.” Existing not despite, but “because of Auschwitz,” it is fed by every encounter with the living proof of German guilt.99 Such a form of anti-Semitism manifested itself in widespread rejection of the post-Holocaust compensation payments, based on the view that “the Jews had already received enough money” and of their shameless exploitation of the past injustices to support “excessive” demands.100 Despite its widespread diffusion, the expression of this sentiment was restricted to private or semi-public niches by the taboo surrounding it. Under such circumstances, its survival can only be accounted for by communicative latence. Articulated only through allusion and muttered Beiträge zur Historischen Stereotypen-Forschung (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2007). For a general overview of Nationalism, see Christian Jansen and Henning Borggräfe, Nation—Nationalität—Nationalismus (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2007); Erika Harris, Nationalism: Theories and Cases (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 97 See Wolfgang Benz, Was ist Antisemitismus? (Munich: Beck, 2004). See also Fritz Bauer Institut, eds., Grenzenlose Vorurteile: Antisemitismus, Nationalismus und ethnische Konflikte in verschiedenen Kulturen (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2002). 98 See European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), (Vienna: EUMC, 2004), 7. See also Brian Klug, “The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Anti-semitism,” Patterns of Prejudice 37 (2003): 117–38; 122ff.; Wolfgang Frindte, Dorit Wammetsberger, and Susan Wettig, “Antisemitische Einstellungen deutscher Jugendlicher,” in Sozialpsychologie politischer Prozesse: Beiträge des 18. Hamburger Symposiums zur Methodologie der Sozialpsychologie, ed. Erich H. Witte (Lengerich: Pabst, 2003), 34–57, esp. 37. 99 See Dan Diner and Seyla Benhabib, eds., Zivilisationsbruch: Denken nach Auschwitz (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 1988); Henryk M. Broder, Der ewige Antisemit: Über Sinn und Funktion eines beständigen Gefühls (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer Taschenbuch, 1986), 11; Werner Bergmann, Geschichte des Antisemitismus (Munich: Beck, 2002). 100 See Lars Rensmann, Kritische Theorie über den Antisemitismus: Studien zur Struktur, Erklärungspotential und Aktualität (Berlin and Hamburg: ArgumentVerlag, 1998).

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commentary, such anti-Semitic undercurrents were able to surface only if dressed in other, more socially-accepted vestments, for instance, antiZionism101 or xenophobia.102 Nevertheless, the passing of time and the blurring of memory has permitted more open expression of this longdormant prejudice.103 One effect of the post-war taboo surrounding this “oldest of hatreds” was its encasement in the positive prejudice of “philoSemitism,” in an attempt to stereotype the Jews as a group displaying a number of exceptionally positive traits. Whatever the intentions behind this, it served only to replace one erroneous assessment with another.104 An empirical study of this phenomenon presented by Susanne Gniechwitz positioned the existence of “significant differences between classical anti-Semitic attitudes and its new, more explicit yet more modern and subtle forms. […] The contrast of explicit and implicit anti-Semitic attitudes provided the first indication that explicitly anti-Semitic sentiments could be predicted from the existence of their implicit counterparts. […] It becomes clear that explicit[ly] [negative] attitudes towards Jews continue to be associated with authoritarian attitudes. As a

101

See Juliane Wetzel, “Antisemitismus als Element rechtsextremer Ideologie und Propaganda,” in Antisemitismus in Deutschland: Zur Aktualität eines Vorurteils, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: DTV, 1995), 101–20. 102 See Andreas Zick and Beate Küpper, “Transformed Anti-semitism—A Report on Anti-semitism in Germany,” Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung 7 (2005): 50–92. See also Günther B. Ginzel, ed., Antisemitismus: Erscheinungsformen der Judenfeindschaft gestern und heute (Bielefeld: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991). 103 See Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “‘Mir ist das Thema Juden irgendwie unangenehm’: Kommunikationslatenz und die Wahrnehmung des Meinungsklimas im Fall des Antisemitismus,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 43 (1991): 502–19; Bergmann, Geschichte des Antisemitismus; Ronald Freytag, “Antisemitismus im Nachkriegsdeutschland,” in Antisemitismus unter Jugendlichen: Fakten, Erklärungen, Unterrichtsbausteine, ed. Dietmar Sturzbecher and Ronald Freytag (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 2000), 49–75. 104 See Theodor W. Adorno, “Zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus heute,” in Soziologische Schriften: Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt/M., 1971), 8:105–33; Fritz Stern, “Entstehung, Bedeutung und Funktion des Philosemitismus in Westdeutschland nach 1945,” in Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur nach 1945, ed. Werner Bergmann (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), 180–96; Werner Bergmann, “Antisemitismus als Thema öffentlicher Konflikte in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik,” in Der Aufklärung zum Trotz: Antisemitismus und politische Kultur in Deutschland, ed. Doron Kiesel and Leonore Siegele-Wenschkewitz (Frankfurt/M.: Haag + Herchen, 1998), 53–79.

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result, they remain relatively resistant towards short-term attempts to influence and change.”105 Social scientists were long unable to demonstrate the existence of any real relationship between prejudice and discrimination. Nevertheless, significant evidence had been amassed pointing to a link between prejudice and an intention towards discrimination.106. More recent studies—such as that from Pettigrew and Meertens examining the difference between what they called “blatant” and “subtle” prejudice— have provided a far more differentiated treatment of prejudice as a construct.107 Associated with strongly negative feelings, blatant prejudice has been shown to produce direct discrimination on the behavioral level. This class of prejudice is based on a number of basic and constitutive assumptions made by its holders: the danger posed by out-groups for the welfare of their in-group; the inherent superiority of the in-group; the imperative of avoiding contact with out-groups; and the need to maintain the out-groups in a state of maximum weakness. Shared by radical antiSemitic ideologies (such as National Socialism and other fascisms), they resulted in open discrimination. Subtle prejudices, on the other hand, are associated with emotions of a much weaker nature. Indeed, they result in discriminatory behavior only if corresponding with their immediate environment, its values and standards (i.e. if they reach a certain level of social acceptability); or if summoned and promoted by certain authorities. Subtle prejudices are characterized by the presence of three components: the readiness to defend traditional values under attack from members of an out-group; the excessive accentuation of cultural differences between in and out-groups; and the lack of positive emotions regarding the members of out-groups. Establishing the differential significance of subtle and blatant prejudices through the use of simulated job interviews, a study by Peterson and Dietz demonstrated that those free of prejudice were much more prepared to employ foreigners than holders of subtle and blatant

105

Susan Gniechwitz, Antisemitismus im Lichte der modernen Vorurteilsforschung: Kognitive Grundlagen latenter Vorurteile gegenüber Juden in Deutschland (Berlin: wvb, 2006), 285–86. 106 See Heidi Schütz and Bernd Six, “How Strong Is the Relationship Between Prejudice and Discrimination? A Meta-analytic Answer,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 20 (1996): 441–62. 107 See Thomas F. Pettigrew and Roel W. Meertens, “Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe,” European Journal of Social Psychology 25 (1995): 41–56.

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prejudices.108 Whilst the behavior of prejudiced test subjects exhibited clear discrimination, carriers of subtle forms of prejudice registered a far greater level of fluctuation in their behavior. Unless summoned to discriminate, holders of subtle prejudices acted by and large as their unprejudiced counterparts, yet when summoned to do so, concurred with their openly-prejudiced counterparts. Demonstrating the pan-European nature of anti-Semitism, Lars Rensmann und Julius H. Schoeps109 have also established its considerable flexibility and longevity. Growing out of older, more established forms of prejudice, its survival into the modern world is based on an uncanny ability to adopt new, up-to-date forms and expressions. With memory of the Holocaust firmly established in Western Europe, anti-Semitism experienced difficulty in taking root after 1945. On the contrary, the concentration in East-Central Europe on the crimes of Stalinism has left considerable scope for the dissemination of a new and virulent form of anti-Jewish prejudice.110 Poland, for instance, conserved traditional antiSemitism in the Cold War period, adapting its popular Catholic component into the topos of the “pro-Soviet Jew.”111 Seeking to defuse anti-Semitic symbolism, Agnieska Pufelska views the task as “irrevocably twinned with the fight against nationalism. For Poland, the diametrical opposition [in nationalist circles] of the Jew and the [Polish] nation, cannot be

108

See Lars-Eric Petersen and Jörg Dietz, “Prejudice and Enforcement of Workforce Homogeneity as Explanation for Employment Discrimination,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 35 (2005): 144–59. 109 See Rensmann and Schoeps, Feindbild Judentum. 110 See Claus Leggewie, “Schlachtfeld Europa: Transnationale Erinnerung und europäische Identität,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 54 (2009): 81–93. 111 See Agnieszka Pufelska, Die “Judäo-Kommune”: Ein Feindbild in Polen: Das polnische Selbstverständnis im Schatten des Antisemitismus 1939–1948 (Paderborn: Schöningh  $OEHUW 6 .RWRZVNL ³µ3ROVND GOD 3RODNyZ¶ hEHU den Antisemitismus in Polen in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Zwischen großen Erwartungen und bösem Erwachen: Juden, Politik und Antisemitismus in Ost- und Südosteuropa 1918–1945, ed. Dittmar Dahlmann and Anke Hilbrenner (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007), 77–99; Jan T. Gross, Fear: Anti-semitism in Poland After Auschwitz: An Essay in Historical Interpretation (New York: Random House, 2007); Holger Michael, Zwischen Davidstern und roter Fahne: Juden und Polen im XX. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Homilius, 2007).

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achieved within the context of the history of Jewish-Polish relations, but is a question of Polish history itself.”112 ,Q KLV HPSLULFDO VWXG\ ,UHQHXV] .U]HPLĔVNL XQGHUOLQHV WKH FRQWLQXHG dominance of religious prejudice in the formation of Polish anti-Semitism: “[…] the percentage of [Polish] anti-Semites is higher amongst believing and practicing Catholics. […] It would even appear that the manifestation of a deep faith favours the development of anti-Semitic attitudes; a trend especially pronounced amongst the university-educated. […] In other words, it is possible to find individuals with an above-average level of education, who articulate a range of openly anti-Semitic beliefs. This is not surprising as modern anti-Semitism receives its greatest level of support amongst the educated.”113 .U]HPLĔVNL DOVR DUJXHV WKDW DQWL-Semitism is associated with “a [general] hostility towards all types of people, xenophobia, the rejection of feminism, and a predilection for an authoritarian upbringing.”114 In contrast to stereotypes, which themselves give expression to thoughts or convictions relating to a group and their members, prejudice has a clearly emotional component including a range of negative feelings such as anger, fear, disgust, unease, or even hate. Projected towards specific groups, a prejudice—such as anti-Semitism—can even develop a greater degree of specificity. As the examples on prejudices against Jews illustrate, prejudice can develop into projected preconceptions of a group invested with a high degree of hatred, serving to establish a certain outgroup as the “enemy” to be loathed, resisted, and combatted. Described as a “Feindbild” (literally, a conception of an enemy) in German, such constructions comprize negative, highly emotional, and almost implacably immutable prejudices. Although prejudice and other such constructions involve the direction of unmitigated hatred towards their object, their practitioners often seek to ensconce them in the mantle of love. Indeed, such attitudes are often defended as the expression of the highest love for the in-group, whose values, standards and way of life (they assert) they seek to protect from outside influence. As Gordon Allport has demonstrated, religions that claim an exclusive truth can

112

Pufelska, Die “Judäo-Kommune,”  6HH DOVR $OLQD &DáD ĩ\G—Wróg odwieczny? AnW\VHPLW\]PZ3ROVFHLMHJRĨUyGáD [The Jew—The eternal Enemy? Antisemitism in Poland and its sources] (Warsaw: Wydawn. Nisza, 2012). 113 .U]HPLĔVNLNationale Opferkonkurrenz, 355–56. 114 Ibid., 364.

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develop especial significance in such a context.115 “The doctrines of revelation and predestination, for example, result in the establishment of borders between ourselves and others.”116 Considering the case of inter-war Poland, the American historian Konrad Sadkowski views the anti-Semitism propagated by the Catholic Church in Poland as the most lamentable of its many actions.117 “Clerical nationalism and anti-Semitism were powerful forces in Poland before World War II. It is highly likely that an important (albeit underlying) factor contributing to the development of both was the concern, widespread amongst the priesthood over their occupational status and material well-being. […] To maintain their status in society, priests in the Lublin region, as elsewhere, endorsed the ethnic model of the nation promoted by National Democrats and began to couple Catholicism with Polishness. […] The clergy’s nationalism was directed in particular at the Jews because, more than any other ethnic or religious minority, the Jew symbolized the ‘indispensability’ of a secular and democratic order in the new Polish state.”118

The anti-Semitic component of this brand of nationalism was entirely new. Indeed, in tracing the history of division and suffering under the various partitions of their country, many nationalist historians had previously drawn parallels between their nation and that of the Jews. Within such a conception, Israel’s suffering under the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Babylonians was matched only by the long history of Polish national agony as experienced under the Russians, Prussians, and Hapsburgs. This interpretation, advanced first by the influential Polish

115

See Allport, The Nature, 444ff. See also Edward E. Sampson, Dealing With Differences: An Introduction to the Social Psychology of Prejudice (Philadelphia: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999), 103ff. 116 So James E. Dittes, Bias and the Pious: The Relationship Between Prejudice and Religion (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1973), 63. 117 6HHDOVR*HUKDUG%HVLHUDQG.DWDU]\QD6WRNáRVD³$QWLVHPLWLVPXVLP3ROHQGHU Zwischenkriegszeit,” KZG 23 (2010): 549–74. 118 Konrad Sadowski, “Clerical Nationalism and Antisemitism: Catholic Priests, Jews, and Orthodox Christians in the Lublin Region, 1918–1939,” in Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland, ed. Robert Blobaum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 171–88; quote: 187. See Brian Porter, “Antisemitism and the Search for a Catholic Identity,” in Blobaum, Antisemitism, 103–23.

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historian Joachim Lelewel in his 20 volume history of the Polish nation,119 was soon forgotten in the now-resurgent Poland.120

Stigmatization The first analysis of stigmatization in everyday interaction was presented by the American sociologist Erving Goffman.121 Differentiating between virtual and actual social identity, he identified the former as constituted by a range of stereotypical popularly associated with a specific social group. Although focusing on religious and ethnic minorities, his analysis also included professional groups such as teachers, church ministers, politicians, and business men. These preconceptions were shown to generate normative expectations which then dominated all subsequent social interaction with the representatives of these groups. This construct is contrasted by actual social identities and their attributes perceived within specific social interactions. Goffman defined a stigma as every characteristic, trait, or mode of behavior identified during social interaction and which constitutes a negative discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity. Not an inherent characteristic or mode of behavior, a stigma involves a process of social definition during which a single attribute is accorded a negative value. The stigma quality of a personality trait therefore depends on a number of variable intra- and inter-cultural evaluations. For example, whereas a job applicant would be ill-advised to indicate his religious affiliation when applying for a position in Germany, the opposite is the case for the USA. Whilst German society widely regards membership of any “non-classic” religious fellowship with mirth or even hostility, it is the profession of any form of irreligiosity which is frowned on in the United States.122 The consequences associated with the “wrong choice” of confession are the most extreme in “managed democracies,” for example in Russia, where members of groupings such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses are subject to considerable stigmatization.123 It goes without saying that 119

See Joachim Lelewel, “Odezwa komitetu narodowego do ludu Izraelskiego,” Polska: Dzieje i rzeczy jej 18, no. 2 (Posen, 1865): 147. 120 6HH%HVLHUDQG6WRNáRVD³$QWLVHPLWLVPXV´ 121 See Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963). 122 See the special editions of Religion—Staat—Gesellschaft (RSG) “On Religious Liberty in a Democratic Society,” RSG 10, no. 2 (2009). 123 See Religious Intolerance in Selected European Countries, part 2, RSG 11, no 2 (2010).

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the extent and impact of such stigmatization can both increase and decrease over time. Vying for party political advantage in post-war Germany, many conservative politicians sought to stigmatize those of their opponents who had chosen to oppose or flee Nazi persecution. Subject to accusation and insinuation, both Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner, prominent members of the post-war German Social Democrats (SPD), were accused of treason.124 Speaking in a famous pre-election speech given in February 1961, Franz Joseph Strauß, former Minister-President of Bavaria, asked rhetorically: “we deserve an answer from Mr. Brandt to a serious question: what were you doing out there for those twelve years [of his exile]? We know what we were doing here!”125 Establishing clear lines of “them and us,” Strauß hoped that branding Brandt as an outsider would render him unelectable for the majority German in-group. Those brave enough to hide Jews in their house during the Third Reich underwent a similar social experience in the immediate post-war years. Highlighting the lack of civil courage displayed by the majority of their compatriots, West German society responded with ostracism.126 In contrast to local-specific stigmatisms, evolutionary psychology has identified a number of cross-cultural stigmas. Established as cognitive patterns, they are the result of historical evolution. Performing an adaptive function, they serve to effect the exclusion of those individuals from an ingroup who exhibit traits viewed as potentially dangerous for its survival.127 Including a number of mental disorders and physical handicaps, these characteristics also include transgressors (such as criminals and 124

See Daniela Münkel, “‘Alias Frahm’: Die Diffamierungskampagne gegen Willy Brandt in der rechtsgerichteten Presse,” in Zwischen den Stühlen? Remigranten und Remigration in der deutschen Medienöffentlichkeit der Nachkriegszeit, ed. Klaus-Dieter Krohn (Hamburg: Christians, 2002), 397–418; Einhart Lorenz, Willy Brandt: Deutscher—Europäer—Weltbürger (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012), 101; 119ff.; 125. 125 Quoted in Peter Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 1913–1992: Visionär und Realist (Stuttgart: DVA, 2002), 410. 126 See Arno Lustiger, Rettungswiderstand: Über die Judenretter in Europa während der NS-Zeit (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011). 127 See Robert Kurzbahn and Mark R. Leary, “Evolutionary Origins of Stigmatization: The Functions of Social Exclusion,” Psychological Bulletin 12 (2001): 187–208; Steven Neuberg, Dylan M. Smith, and Terrilee Asher, “Why People Stigmatize: Toward a Biocultural Framework,” in The Social Psychology of Stigma, ed. Todd F. Heatherton, Robert Kleck, Michelle Hebl, and Jay G. Hull (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 31–61.

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homosexuals), the ill (e.g. the carriers of HIV), and the members of religious or ethnic minorities. Social psychological and evolutionary psychological approaches to this phenomenon differ little in the explanations which they advance as to the criteria for such exclusion. Failing to fulfil the normative expectations of their immediate social grouping and forfeiting their full status as its member, the stigmatized often suffer damage to their social identity. Unable to deal with rejection, those with little stake in society eventually accept these external judgements and react with exceedingly low self-esteem. At the other end of the spectrum, no fewer interpret their ostracism as confirmation of their—often religiously founded—convictions, and experience reassurance of their elect status.128 Some of the stigmatized succeed in overcoming their “affliction.” Addressing the causes of their social estrangement, they manage to restore their attractiveness as a partner for social exchange.129 Proactive strategies to this end, such as weight-loss or cosmetic surgery, are joined by dissimulative approaches such as public apostasy. The stigmatized can also avoid the effects of stigmatization by avoiding social contacts or other forms of social attachment carrying the potential for rejection or ostracism. A number of examples illustrate the speed with which a stigma can develop without any great change in the (albeit often unknown) facts of a situation. For instance, the prominent educationalist130 Hartmut von Hentig was soon abandoned by “friends” following a school scandal (focusing on cases of paedophilia dating back 30 years) involving his partner Gerold Becker. Moreover, the ostracism which he suffered131 followed not from the actions of Becker—who as school director was identified as one of the “principle perpetrators” in the scandal—or indeed the scandal itself, but Hentig’s defence of and refusal to distance himself from his partner.132 128

See Jennifer Crocker and Brenda Major, “Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma,” Psychological Review 96 (1989): 608–30; Brenda Major and Laurie T. O’Brien, “The Social Psychology of Stigma,” Annual Review of Psychology 56 (2005): 393–421. 129 See Brenda Major and Collette Eccleston, “Stigma and Social exclusion,” in The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion, eds. Dominic Abrams, Michael A. Hogg, and Jose Marques (New York: Psychology Press, 2005), 63–87. 130 See Winfried Böhm, Die Reformpädagogik: Montessori, Waldorf und andere Lehren (Munich: Beck, 2012). 131 See www.faz.net from April 10, 2010; FASZ, no. 14 from April 11, 2010. 132 See Hartmut von Hentig, “Was habe ich damit zu tun?” Die Zeit, no. 13 from March 29, 2010. See also the interview with Hartmut von Hentig in Spiegel Online from March 14, 2010.

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Even more extreme is the case of the conservative theologian, Klaus Berger. A member of the Lutheran faculty at the University of Heidelberg, late revelation of his Roman Catholic beliefs led to immediate repudiation by his conservative evangelical peers.133 One consequence of his actions was the immediate loss of his position as a contributor to the Conservative newspaper the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).134 Having lost none of his skill as an essayist or indeed having changed any of his views, this severance was but one expression of the measures resulting from “betrayal” of the prevailing values of his in-group. Stigmatization is a fate not restricted to individuals, but can be applied to locations and institutions. Following a school gun rampage by one of its pupils, a school in Southern Germany was long unable to attract any candidates for the post of its head teacher.135 Those threatened with social ostracism often seek to prevent a decline in self-esteem by rejecting the expectations and goals of the social area in which they are likely to suffer stigmatization.136 Pupils refuse to participate in school and adults stop working. Opting out of mainstream society, those afflicted often establish alternative relationships in the hope of finding respect and appreciation. A further common reaction in such subcultures centers on the rejection of majority views: “Black is Beautiful”137 or “Fat is Beautiful” are only two examples.138 Those stigmatized by society, for whatever reason, often perceive social rejection in their dealings with other “normal” people, even when their interlocutors act as though the stigma were irrelevant. This can lead to tension in everyday social interactions. In his study of social interaction, Goffman differentiates between the discredited (those with a clearly recognizable stigma such as skin colour, a handicap, or obesity) and the discreditable, i.e. those whose hidden handicaps—such as an HIV 133

See Gerhard Besier, “Die Kollegen wussten Bescheid: Ein Katholik als evangelischer Professor; Der “Fall” Klaus Berger stellt die theologischen Fakultäten in Frage,” Die Welt from October 31, 2005, 23. 134 See Klaus Berger, “Ich bin übergetreten,” FAZ, no. 254 from November 1, 2005, 33. 135 See Südwest Presse from June 29, 2009; Schwäbisches Tagblatt from July 29, 2009. 136 See Brenda Major and Toni Schmader, “Coping with Stigma Through Psychological Disengagement,” in Prejudice: The Target’s Perspective, ed. Janet K. Swim and Charles Stangor (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), 219–41. 137 See Tate, Black Beauty. 138 Regarding the cultural differences of the concept of beauty, see Susan Albers, “Comfort Cravings: How to Soothe Yourself Without Food—And How to Eat Healthfully and Mindfully,” Psychology Today from April 6, 2010.

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infection, homosexuality or a criminal conviction—make them a potential target of social exclusion. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, assimilated or converted Jews in Central Europe were identifiable at best by their name. The stigma associated with Judaism in this period was so great that many changed their name.139 The reaction to potential rejection is never uniform. Whilst many Sinti and Roma140 proudly assert their ethnic identity, others seek to pass themselves off as members of the majority ingroup in an attempt to escape persecution.141 The central problem for the “discreditable” is the wide access available in today’s information age, to comprehensive information concerning nearly every aspect of our lives. In consequence, those viewed as “having something to hide” live with the Damocles sword of discovery hanging over them. Unsure of who knows what, these individuals live in constant terror of discovery and rejection. Such a situation can only be addressed by social change in the longterm and the acceptance of behavior previously considered deviant. One such example is provided by the phenomenon of homosexuality in German politics. Previously a matter of considerable stigma, recent events have lead to greater social acceptance of gay politicians. Fearing the consequences of revelation or worse, blackmail, a number of prominent politicians acted in the late 1990s to reveal their sexual orientation.142 139

See Anna L. Staudacher, Jüdische Konvertiten in Wien 1782–1868 (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2001). In 1934, the German government began the task of locating and reversing such name changes on the part of Jews. Legislation from 1938 sought to make all Jews recognizable by their forename. Those not carrying a “recognizably Jewish name” were forced to carry the additional names Israel or Sara. See Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003), 111; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1933–1945 (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 135–36; Susanne Heim, eds., Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945, vol. 2, Deutsches Reich 1938–August 1939 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 269; 272. 140 See Herbert Uerlings and Iulia-Karin Patrut, eds., “Zigeuner” und Nation: Repräsentation, Inklusion, Exklusion (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2008). 141 See Martha Verdorfer, Unbekanntes Volk: Sinti und Roma; Zur Lage der Sinti und Roma in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Bozen: Frasnelli-Keitsch, 1995) (http://www.gfbv.it/3dossier/sinti-rom/de/rom-de.html); Wolfgang Wippermann, Geschichte der Sinti und Roma in Deutschland: Darstellung und Dokumente (Berlin: Pädag. Zentrum, 1993); idem., “Wie die Zigeuner”: Antisemitismus und Antiziganismus im Vergleich (Berlin: Elefanten-Press, 1997). 142 See “Der Ole, der hat sich befreit.” Interview with Achim-Helge Freiherr von Beust, in WAMS, no. 35 from August 31, 2003; See also Berliner Morgenpost, no. 236 from August 30, 2003. Following the example set by Wowereit and Ole von Beust, the former Chairman of the German Liberal Party (FDP) Guido Westerwelle

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Meeting with considerable tolerance in the political world, the high-profile nature of these examples eventually resulted in far greater acceptance of homosexuality in wider society and the end of a centuries-old stigma. The first of further number of similar acts was the most memorable. Addressing his party (and thus the wider public) during an election in Berlin, the Mayor of the city, Klaus Wowereit told his “comrades:” “I am gay, and that is a good thing!” His words have since become a popular saying.143 This strategy of openness contrasts greatly with the more usual approach to managing stigma.144 Involving secrecy and concealment, it often results in considerable psychological damage on the part of the secretive, a fate which can only be avoided through a single act of disclosure. Although successful in the long-term, the nature of prejudice dictates that such revelations require careful preparation and timing. Wowereit’s “outing” could well have spelt the end of his political career. Nevertheless, in tune with the popular mood in Germany, he sensed that changes in attitudes had advanced sufficiently to permit a break with previous practice. Those living in other contexts, such as smaller religious fellowships—where traditional attitudes of social Conservatism often find expression in organized campaigns—would experience far greater difficulty than a progressive politician in a liberal urban setting.

Social discrimination Gordon W. Allport defines social discrimination as the enactment of prejudice. According to Allport, hostile actions rooted in prejudice begin with defamation of the individual concerned and his ostracism. This is extended to encompass action: discrimination followed by violence and ending in destruction.

outed himself in July 2004. See Laura Himmelreich and Johannes Schneider, “Politiker? Männlich? Schwul? Glückwunsch!” in www.stern.de from August 25, 2009; Udo Leuschner, Geschichte der FDP (44) 15. Bundestag 2002–2005 (www.udo-leuschner.de/liberalismus/fdp44.htm). 143 See the taz from June 12, 2001, 3. 144 See John Pachankis, “The Psychological Implications of Concealing a Stigma: A Cognitive-Affective-Behavioral Model,” Psychological Bulletin 133 (2007): 328–45; Diane M. Quinn, “Concealable Versus Conspicuous Stigmatized Identities: Social Psychological Perspectives,” in Stigma and Group Inequality, ed. Shana Levin and Colette van Laar (Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 83–104.

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“Discrimination comes about only when we deny to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish. […] Here the prejudiced person makes detrimental distinctions of an actice sort. He undertakes to exclude all members of the group in question from certain types of employment, from residential housing, political rights, educational or recreational opportunities, churches, hospitals, or from some other social privileges. Segregation is an institutionalized form of discrimination, enforced legally or by common custom.”145

Kenneth L. Dion interprets discrimination as a consequence of prejudice.146 Nevertheless, not every stereotype inevitably leads to prejudice and not every prejudice results in discrimination towards the member of a specific group.147

Social dominance and discrimination Informed by an understanding of society as a system of group-based social hierarchies, the theory of social dominance, presented in 1999 by Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, locates all social discrimination in the existence of these structures.148 Differentiating between three systems of hierarchy based on age, gender role, and hegemony-building, they proceed to identify a number of power relationships. Accordingly, the middle-aged are seen to exercise proportionally more social power over children and the young; men exercise more social and political dominance over women; and qualified minorities (manifested by membership of a race, caste or ethnic, religious, political, and economic sub-groups) exercise considerably more power over the majority of society. This group-based social hierarchy is subject to two influences: that of the aggregated individual discrimination on the one hand, and the scope for behavioral manoeuvre on the other. The passage of time acts as a stabilizing factor. Groups enjoying a higher social position seek (and find) a greater level of social dominance. Legitimizing myths such as paternalistic hegemony or

145

Allport, The Nature, 51; 14–15. See Kenneth L. Dion, “Prejudice, Racism, and Discrimination,” in Handbook of Psychology 5 (New York: Wiley, 2003): 507–536; see also Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 147 See Devine, “Stereotypes and prejudice,” 5–18. 148 See Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 146

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the divine right of kings—also referred to as social ideologies—act as strategies of justification for existing injustices. Having established this human disposition, the authors proceed to identify its responsibility for the majority of cases of oppression and group conflict. The authors argue that those seeking to end such a situation should concentrate on reducing those factors contributing to the development and maintenance of hierarchies—racism, sexism, or nationalism—and strengthening the factors which reduce such an order— humanism, internationalism, and human rights. This complex, yet rather incohesive concept provides the foundations for the construction of a Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO scale) presented in a number of studies. Containing statements such as “some groups of people are simply inferior to others” or “no one group in society should dominate another,” studies have shown that the SDO scale enables reliable predictions of ethnocentricity, racism, xenophobia, conservatism, and other prejudices based on ethnicity and gender. High social status and the fact of being a man generate a socially-dominant predisposition.149 Casting doubt on a number of these assumptions, John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek pointed out that in contrast to system justification theory, Social Dominance Theory ignores the tendency exhibited by those in a non-dominant position in society, to accept and even justify existing social power structures.150 The theories of social identity advanced by Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner in 1986151 and the self-categorization theory from John C. Turner in 1987152 provide

149

See Felicia Pratto, James H. Liu, Shana Levin, Jim Sidanius, Margaret Shih, Hagit Bacharach, and Peter Hegerty, “Social Dominance Orientation and the Legitimization of Inequality Across Cultures,” Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology 31 (2000): 369–409; See also: Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius, and Shana Levin “Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,” European Review of Social Psychology 17 (2006): 271–320. 150 See John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek, “A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo,” Political Psychology 25 (2004): 881– 919. 151 See Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour,” in Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986), 7–24. 152 See John C. Turner, “The Analysis of Social Influence,” in Rediscovering the Social Group, ed. John C. Turner, Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell (Oxford and New York: B. Blackwell, 1987),

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alternative explanations. They argue that the process of prejudice is influenced not by an orientation to dominance, but processes of categorization and group identification.153

Which needs and motives result in social discrimination? According to the basal theory of social identity developed by Tajfel and Turner, it is the need for a positive self-image that moves us to look favorably on own in-group whilst deprecating all other out-groups.154 Working on this basis, further approaches focused on the significance of other needs. Presenting his theory of optimal distinctiveness, Brewer demonstrated that people tend to a particularly positive evaluation of their own in-group if such a course satisfies their need for both contact and a feeling of difference.155 Isolated individuals yearning for contact place greater value on large in-groups as they provide a greater sense of belonging than smaller associations. Finding a few hours of inclusion at mass events, such as music festivals, these individuals experience a creative group identity. Gleaning strength from the experience, participants experience a sense of control over their lives.156 Similar contexts include public marches found both in democratic and dictatorial contexts. 68–88. See also idem., “Explaining the Nature of Power: A Three-Process Theory,” European Journal of Social Psychology 35 (2005): 1–22. 153 See also Tajfel, Human groups and social categories (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 154 See Tajfel and Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” See as well the overview of Roy F. Baumeister and Kathleen D. Vohs, eds., Handbook of Self-Regulation: Research, Theory, and Applications (New York: Guilford Press, 2004) and Monique Boekhaerts, Paul R. Pintrich, and Moshe Zeidner, Handbook of Self-Regulation (San Diego: Academic Press, 2000). 155 See Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time,” in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17 (1991): 475–82. 156 A recent example is that of the 21 deaths resulting from a mass panic during the “Love Parade” held in Duisburg in 2010; see the interview with the panic researcher Dirk Helbing in FASZ, no. 30 from August 1, 2010, 41. Regarding the phenomenon of socially-conformity, see the classic study by Solomon E. Asch, “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority,” Psychological Monographs 70 (1956): 1–70, and the computer simulation of flock behavior produced by Craig Reynolds: “Flocks, Herds and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model,” in SIGGRAPH 1987: Proceedings of the 14th annual conference on Computer graphics and interactive techniques (Association for Computing Machinery), 25–34 (doi:10.1145/ 37401.37406). See also Gabriele Brandstetter, Bettina Brandl-Risi, and Kai van Eikels, eds., Schwarm(E)Motion: Bewegung zwischen Affekt und Masse (Freiburg:

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Those seeking individuality seek smaller associations, permitting a greater degree of personal singularity. This theory could even offer an explanation for the membership of smaller parties or religious fellowships. Identifying a potential for an individualized experience, some even take these as the vehicle for realizing exclusivist tendencies centering around certain forms of elect status. The need for the insecure to find reassurance157 and certainty158 can also contribute to a move towards social discrimination. Seeking an explanation of behavior based on needs and motives, all such theories include a certain degree of auto-regulation. Brendl and Higgins differentiate between needs (high identity goals), the targets derived from them and pertinent to their realization (low identity goals), and direct measures requiring immediate implementation (strategic goals).159 The first two levels denote the various motivations to which a person is subject; the latter refers to the way in which these motivations are manifested in self-regulating behavior. The self-discrepancy theory from E. Tory Higgins compares the selfevaluation of the “actual self” with that of the “ideal self” and the “ought self.”160 Consisting of all those characteristics which a person desires for themselves, the ideal self contrasts to the “ought self” and its specification of only those minimum standards to which the person feels obliged. The interesting aspect of the latter construct is the implicit belief in the binding nature of these standards not only for the person establishing them, but also for all others. Discrepancies between the “actual” and the “ideal self” result in disappointment, discontentedness and sadness. Discrepancies Rombach, 2008); Eva Horn and Lucas Marco Gisi, eds., Schwärme—Kollektive ohne Zentrum: Eine Wissensgeschichte zwischen Leben und Information (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009). 157 See Michael A. Hogg, “Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Through SelfCategorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes,” European Review of Social Psychology 11 (2000): 223–55. 158 See James Y. Shah, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Eric P. Thompson, “Membership Has Its (Epistemic) Rewards: Need for Closure Effects on In-Group Bias,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75 (1998): 383–93. 159 See C. Miquel Brendl and E. Tori Higgins, “Principles of Judging Valence: What Makes Events Positive or Negative,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 28 (1996): 95–160. Regarding the various approaches to selfregulation, see Jens Förster and Markus Denzler, “Selbstregulation,” in Bierhoff and Frey, Handbuch der Sozial- und Kommunikationspsychologie, (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 2006), 33–39. 160 See E. Tory Higgins, “Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect,” Psychological Review 94 (1987): 319–40.

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between the “actual” and the “ought self,” on the other hand, produce concern, anxiety and nervousness; the person falls short of the minimum standards which he has set for himself and others.161 Seeking not just to provide an explanation for the behavior of the personal self, the selfdiscrepancy theory also encompasses that exhibited by the social self in its group context.162 Discrepancies between the ideal conception of one’s nation and the actual duties which it imposes on its citizens can lead to active, even aggressive reactions, as emotions imply action.163 Developing his self-discrepancy theory further, Higgins extended it through the addition of the theory of regulatory focus.164 This theory establishes two motivational states—that of the regulatory promotion and the prevention focus. Whilst the promotion focus is dominated by aims, wishes and ideals, the prevention focus concentrates on duties. Developing events are evaluated in the promotion focus as bringing profit or a lack of profit (the incidence or absence of positives), whilst the prevention focus assesses them as non-occurring or occurring losses (the incidence or absence of negatives). Those operating in the various foci present differing emotional reactions to similar events. Those with a promotion focus react to success with joy and satisfaction, whilst failure brings dejection. Those with a prevention focus display calm upon success and alarm following failure. These two categories of people pursue a corresponding strategy towards social groups. Whilst those with a promotion focus remain close to their in-group165 and seek to maximize its gains, those with a prevention focus concentrate on avoiding out-groups and minimizing in-group losses.166 161

See E. Tory Higgins, Ruth Klein, and Timothy Strautmann, “Self-Concept Discrepancy Theory: A Psychological Model of Distinguishing Among Different Aspects of Depression and Anxiety,” Social Cognition 3 (1985): 51–76. 162 See Aharon Bizman, Yoel Yinon, and Shanon Krotman, “Group-Based Emotional Distress: An Extension of Self-Discrepancy Theory,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27 (2001): 1291–1300. 163 See Ira J. Roseman, Cynthia Wiest, and Tamara S. Swartz, “Phenomenology, Behaviors, and Goals Differentiate Discrete Emotions,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67 (1994): 206–21. 164 See E. Tory Higgins, “Beyond Pleasure and Pain,” American Psychologist 52 (1997): 1280–1300. 165 See James Y. Shah, Paige C. Brazy, and E. Tory Higgins, “Promotion and Prevention Forms of Ingroup Bias,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30 (2004): 433–46. 166 See Kai Sassenberg, Thomas Kessler, and Amélie Mummendey, “Less Negative = More Positive? Social Discrimination as Avoidance and Approach,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003): 48–58.

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When confronted with social discrimination, those with a prevention focus react with greater emotion, involving aggression, and resistance.167 According to Higgins’ hypothesis of regulatory fit, those with a prevention focus favor behavior satisfying their need for security such as trouble-shooting activities. Those with a promotion focus, on the other hand, prefer activities designed at producing growth and the generation of ideas.168 Powerful groups are capable of growth-oriented and self-realizing behavior; their less-powerful counterparts, on the other hand, display a security-oriented approach to life. These considerations influence individual group choice.

Social discrimination as the paradigm of the minimal group As demonstrated by Henry Tajfel and his team, the random division of a group of test subjects into two in-groups is sufficient to provoke discriminatory behavior towards the respective out-group.169 Given the absence of prior personal acquaintance and the entire lack of personal benefit arising from such actions, it would appear that this in-group bias was generated by the new group dynamic alone. Moreover, the nature of this dynamic meant that the main concern of each group was to gain more than their rivals. Given the choice of both groups receiving a large, yet equal sum and the in-group receiving less in real terms, yet more than the other, both group opted for the latter. Despite this destructive dynamic, it was impossible to determine any differences between the in and out-groups in terms of the division of negative resources. Both sought to establish similar, yet minimal constraints for both groups. Labelled by Amélie Mummendey and others as the “positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination,”170 this

167

See Kai Sassenberg and Nina Hansen, “The Impact of Regulatory Focus on Affective Responses to Social Discrimination,” European Journal of Social Psychology (2007): 421–44. 168 See E. Tory Higgins, “Making a Good Decision: Value From Fit,” American Psychologist 55 (2000): 1217–29. 169 See Henri Tajfel, Michael G. Billig, Robert P. Bundy, and Claude Flament, “Social Categorisation and Intergroup Behaviour,” European Journal of Social Psychology 1 (1971): 149–78. 170 See Amélie Mummendey and Sabine Otten, “Positiv-Negative Asymmetry in Social Discrimination,” European Review of Social Psychology 9 (1998): 107–43; Amélie Mummendey and Michael Wenzel, “Social Discrimination and Tolerance

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phenomenon has since been confirmed by numerous international studies.171 Aware of a number of potential problems in the operationalization of social discrimination in Tajfel’s experiments, these follow-up studies responded with an entirely new strategy of evaluation.172 Nevertheless, further criticism of this method centered on the obvious categorization into groups and the following group-related distribution tasks which it involved. Critics saw that these measures introduced an inherent bias towards group-formation and provoked discriminatory reactions, which the test persons otherwise would not have considered.173 This objection was countered by reference to the design of the experiment: it was argued that, whilst strengthening the tendency to display a discriminatory response, it did not engender such a reaction. Moreover, the presence in every minimal group experiment of a considerable number of people willing to pursue a fairness strategy further detracted from criticism of the methodology. A more serious objection focused on the fact that the in-group bias displayed in the experiment followed not from the random categorization used to form the groups, but from the perception of similarity with other group members in terms of preferences and self-assessment.174 The subsequent experiments performed

in Intergroup Relations: Reactions to Intergroup Difference,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 3 (1999): 158–74. 171 See. John C. Turner, Itesh Sachdev, and Michael A. Hogg, “Social Categorization, Interpersonal Attraction and Group Formation,” British Journal of Social Psychology 22 (1983): 227–39; Amélie Mummendey, Sabine Otten, and MathiasBlanz, “Social Categorization and Intergroup Discrimination: The Asymmetry in Positive Versus Negative Outcome Allocations,” Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 1 (1994): 15–30; Lars-Eric Petersen and Hartmut Blank, “Reale Gruppen im Paradigma der minimalen Gruppen: Wirkt die Gruppensituation als Korrektiv oder Katalysator sozialer Diskriminierung,” Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie 48 (2001): 302–16. 172 See Hartmut Blank, “Identifying Dominant Allocation Strategies of Individuals in the Minimal Group Paradigm,” Current Research in Social Psychology 9 (2003): 75–95. 173 See Norman H. Berkowitz, “Evidence That Subject’s Expectancies Confound Intergroup Bias in Tajfel’s Minimal Group Paradigm,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20 (1994): 184–95; Hartmut Blank, “Conversation Logic Effects in the Minimal Group Paradigm: Existent But Weak,” Current Research in Social Psychology 10 (2004): 84–103. 174 Regarding the similarity-attraction hypothesis advanced by Donn Byrne, see his book The Attraction Paradigm (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

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within the scope of the investigation do not permit conclusions to be drawn one way or the other.175 One interesting historical example demonstrating the paradigm of minimal group building is the sporting associations formed by the German SPD in the 1920s. Despite establishing something approaching a Socialist subculture (or even ghetto), in which all activities including leisure pursuits were organized, this new movement mirrored the social practices which it supposedly rejected. Moves to establish a “new form of socialist sport” without any element of competition met with considerable hostility from the socialist sporting movement, which retained bourgeois patterns of leisure. This forced the retention of what one reformist functionary called the unfortunate concentration on “aggression, rivalry, victory and triumphalism.”176

Realistic group conflicts, prejudices and social discrimination As Donald T. Campbell und Muzafer Sherif have demonstrated, it is not the individual psyche of those involved, but structural preconditions that exercise the decisive influence on inter-group relations.177 The display by entirely normal and well-balanced individuals of a range of prejudice and discriminatory behavior in the pursuit of group aims demonstrates the significance of group dynamics. Requiring the support of others in order to achieve a certain set of aims, otherwise peaceable individuals quickly reach a negative, often even hostile evaluation of other rival out-groups as soon as they perceive a threat to their goals. The incidence of “negative interdependence,” especially when confronted with cases of shortages, 175

See Rudolf Schiffmann and Robert A. Wicklund, “Eine Kritik der Social Identity Theory von Tajfel & Turner,” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 19 (1988): 159–74; Andreas Zick, Ulrich Wiesmann, and Ulrich Wagner, “Einige Anmerkungen zu Schiffmann & Wicklunds ‘Kritik der Social Identity Theory,’” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 20 (1989): 172–76; Rudolf Schiffmann and Robert A. Wicklund, “Minimale Gruppen und Psychologie—Eine Replik auf Zick, Wiesmann & Wagner,” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 20 (1989): 177–80. 176 Quoted in Franz Walter, Die SPD: Vom Proletariat zur Neuen Mitte (Berlin: Alexander Fest, 2002), 67–69. 177 See Donald T. Campbell, “Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives,” in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. David Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 13:283–301; Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

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brings a situation in which gains made by the in-group suddenly counted as double: enjoyment of the material gained and pleasure at its being denied to a rival. Found in political units and other looser associations, the nature of such power relations means intolerance of internal dissent or “treachery” and serious consequences—usually involving ejection from the in-group—upon its incidence. The warning, issued in 2008 by the former SPD minister Wolfgang Clement, against voting for his own party in a forthcoming regional election led to a number of SPD members tabling a motion for his expulsion. Preceded as it had been, by stringent criticism of a number of policy decisions, his latest intervention represented the “last straw” for many in his local branch party, which reacted to such perceived “treachery” by rescinding his membership. Although subsequently allowed to remain in the SPD, the estrangement of the former minister and his party resulted in his decision to leave his party of long-standing. Crossing the political floor to join the liberal FDP, Clement had, in effect, abandoned his in-group for a rival out-group. He later went on to compound this highest of political sins by composition of a book with Friedrich Merz, himself a member of a further out-group, the conservative CDU.178 All of this was regarded with much resentment by members of the SPD, who levelled charges of treachery. Demands for absolute loyalty within in-groups are not restricted to political parties: as the cases of the theologians Hans Küng or Gerd Lüdemann demonstrate, in-group membership places considerable boundaries on the degree of criticism and intellectual independence permitted. Deviation from pre-agreed doctrine (of all kinds) often meets with considerable sanction.179 The pursuit by different groups of identical aims and the establishment of a positive interdependence required to achieve these ends, automatically results in a reduction in mutual discrimination and the establishment of good inter-group relations.180 Translated into the political arena, such a phenomenon is often manifested in the incidence of coalitions between parties which would ordinarily never seek to establish any form of formal partnership. The grand coalition between the conservative CDU and the left-wing SPD which governed Germany from 2005 to 2009 is one example that in Great Britain between the right-wing Conservative Party 178

See Wolfgang Clement and Friedrich Merz, Was jetzt zu tun ist: Deutschland 2.0 (Freiburg: Herder, 2010). 179 See Gerhard Besier, “Intellectual Freedom and the Church: The Theologians Hans Küng and Gerd Lüdemann as a Reflection of Their Circumstances,” KZG/CCH 1 (2011): 120–28. 180 See Sherif, In Common Predicament.

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and the left-liberal Liberal Democrats is another. Within such marriages of convenience, good relations are maintained and conflict between ideological opponents is minimized only as long as both parties experience success in the pursuit of shared aims.181 A break-down in the coalition resulting from the failure of the shared project will inevitably increase levels of conflict between the former partners. Such a phenomenon is not restricted to incidences of ideological disjuncture. Although the SPD/CDU coalition of 2005–2009 was not without its conflict (especially as it became clear that the SPD suffered from its association with a strong Angela Merkel), alliances between parities of greater ideological affinity have proven to be more acrimonious still. Despite a much greater level of initial agreement, the FDP-CDU successor government proved to be as equally, if not more conflict-ridden than its partner. As soon as it became clear that the coalition agreement was unworkable in practice, the two partners fell out with considerable recrimination. In clear contrast, the liberal-conservative coalition currently governing the United Kingdom and forged between parties of considerable ideological difference, has succeeded in maintaining a partnership of what commentators have described as “harmonious and unified government.”182 The great number of different types of realistic group conflict is matched only by the variety of motives that drive them. Within such mixed-motive conflicts, group cooperation can lead to profit. However, individuals can also choose to withhold collaboration in order to maximize individual gain or, indeed, reduce losses.183 The best known of such situations is that of the “prisoner dilemma.” Accused of joint culpability of a single crime, two prisoners can choose between three options, all of which bring an entirely different outcome. Should one suspect provide a full confession whilst the other maintains silence, the first will receive a shorter sentence than the second. A confession from both parties will result in two (mild) sentences. Silence on the part of both suspects, on the other hand, means that in the case of insufficient proof, both will get off scottfree. In facing such a decision, neither prisoner can be sure as to how the 181

See Stephen Worchel, Virginia A. Andreoli, and Robert Folger, “Intergroup Cooperation and Intergroup Attraction: The Effect of Previous Interaction and Outcome of Combined Effort,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13 (1977): 131–40. 182 Robert Hazel and Ben Young, The Politics of Coalition: How the Conservative Liberal Democrat Government Works (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), 212. 183 See the possible constellations of cooperation and non cooperation in William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb (New York and London: Doubleday, 1992).

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other will react. A rational approach to such a problem would indicate cooperation as the better strategy—both sides would eventually reach the best possible result. If one suspect assessed his accomplice as irrational, he would be better advised not to maintain silence. The question of individual or group competition is complicated by further considerations, notably of prestige. The famous “chicken dilemma” involves two cars being driven head on towards a collision. The first driver to display a cooperative approach to the situation (i.e. swerving first to avoid a collision) loses prestige. Should both drivers shy away from a collision, the dual choice of the cooperative strategy means that neither side loses face. A lack of cooperation on both sides results in an accident and death. A well-known example of the chicken dilemma was that of the Cuban missile crisis of late 1962. Responding to the Soviet plan to station nuclear weapons on Cuba—the United States’ “back yard”—with the threat of invasion and a nuclear counter-strike, the US entered into a tense round of potentially-destructive diplomatic sabre rattling. With both Kennedy and Khrushchev seeking to defuse the situation, the US restricted their actions to a blockade of Cuba, whilst the Soviet Union signaled its willingness to back down in return for guarantees to Cuban independence. Indeed, Kennedy’s readiness to cooperate was so great that he even agreed to withdraw U.S. nuclear warheads from Turkey and Italy. Concerned to save face, he insisted that this agreement remain secret. Despite the appearance of an American victory, both sides sought to restrain the hawks in their respective military establishments. Retaining close political control of the situation, both leaders were prepared to make considerable concessions in order to diffuse a situation which could easily have led to wide-spread thermo-nuclear catastrophe.184 The phenomenon of group interdependence requires the individual to take steps to ensure cooperation within his own in-group, whilst providing an adequate response to the specific context. Depending on the type of conflict, various conditions of communication can also play a role in its outcome.185 Whilst some situations of conflict prevent communication between individuals, others enable only intra-group communication. Furthermore, some permit both inter- and intra-group communication. Minimizing mistrust between groups requires constant and good communication between them in order to establish and maintain 184

See Bernd Greiner, Die Kuba-Krise: Die Welt an der Schwelle zum Atomkrieg (Munich: Beck, 2010). 185 See Gary Bornstein “Intergroup Conflict: Individual, Group, and Collective Interests,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 7 (2003): 129–45.

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agreements. Communication between the groups during the incidence of a rationality-irrationality scenario could serve to strengthen the trust of each group in the rationality of the other and enable both groups to leave the situation as a winner. The chicken dilemma, on the other hand, produces only one winner and requires that one side backs down. In such a situation, communication can only produce a draw, in which both sides keep face. The perception of a collective threat during a realistic inter-group conflict can result in the generation of negative stereotypes and the growth of prejudice. Discriminatory behavior in such a context can serve to weaken the rival group and thus bring advantage within a competition for finite resources. Such a situation is clearly visible on the current European religious landscape. Concerned that new missionary movements to Europe (mostly from American evangelical churches) will reduce their already diminishing influence, the established churches have levelled a range of accusations—ranging from fundamentalism, anti-intellectualism and even criminality—against them in an attempt to maintain their position of privilege.186 This is often effected via social discrimination or exclusion from financial resources.187 Such a phenomenon has been observed in a range of studies focusing on the stereotyping of African Americans.188 Competition between social and religious groups for access to resources is typically associated with the belief in their finite nature and a fear that a gain by one group can only be made at the expense of another. Such fears often result in the application of prejudice and social discrimination to restrict the competitiveness of out-groups, thereby strengthening the position of the in-group.189 Differentiating between realistic and symbolic threats, Walter G. Stephan and C. Lausanne Renfro define the former as threats to the material prosperity of an in-group in terms of their level of political or economic power. Symbolic threats, on the other hand, endanger the value

186

In 2009, some 123,000 left the Roman Catholic Church in the Federal Republic of Germany alone. See FAZ, no. 187 from August 14, 2010, 4. 187 See Gerhard Besier, “Der Status und die Rolle von Religion in Staat und Gesellschaft,” RSG 2 (2010): 125–37. 188 See Susan T. Fiske, “Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination,” in The Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, (Boston: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2:357–411. 189 See Victoria M. Esses, Lynne M. Jackson, and Tamara L. Armstrong, “Intergroup Competition and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration: An Instrumental Model of Group Conflict,” Journal of Social Issues 54 (1998): 699– 724.

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systems and convictions of an in-group.190 Such non-material threats develop in a situation in which cultural or religious groups seek to relativize or negate the significance of their competitors. Conversions from one religious or political conviction to another pose a particularly serious threat: demonstrating the attractiveness or even veracity of rival systems of belief, apostates provide a dangerous precedent for others to follow.

Concepts of social categorization, social identity, social comparison and social distinctiveness Henri Tajfel made the assumption that individuals structure their social environment according to categories, such as class, religion, gender, ethnicity, hobbies, or party affiliation.191 Not just processes used to systemize a complex environment, such category differentiations also influence individual judgment of and behavior towards the members of these perceived categories. After their establishment, these inherently value-free social categories, such as “foreigners” or “Catholics,” are the often ascribed certain values. Thus, although nationality is entirely valuefree as a category, foreigners are often believed to be “lazy” and “impunctual” whilst natives are taken to be “hard-working” and “punctual.” After taking such an (entirely unfounded) conceptual leap, cognitive processes of accentuation then overestimate the differences between categories (foreigner-native) whilst underestimating the differences within such categories. Complimentary to this tendency is a proclivity to apply this process to oneself, thereby producing what John C. Turner called the “social identity.”192 Although often exhibiting considerable similarity to the personal identity, the two constructs remain fundamentally different. Whilst the latter is made up of the total sum of personal abilities and 190

See Walter G. Stephan and C. Lausanne Renfro, “The Role of Threat in Intergroup Relations,” in From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotion: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups, ed. Diane M. Mackie and Eliot R. Smith (New York: Psychology Press, 2002), 191–207. 191 See Tajfel, Differentiation Between Social Groups; Tajfel and Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” 192 See John C. Turner, “Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group,” in Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Relations,” in Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986), 7–24.

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character traits, the social identity is based on the social categories to which the person belongs and their associated values and characteristics. The combination of the personal and social identities forms a selfconception.193 This cognitive component is joined by a motivational aspect—the person not only conceives of himself through feeling what he feels to be, but through comparison with others. Associated with personal self-conception, a desire to increase selfesteem acts to mediate between an individual’s social environment and his social behavior.194 A number of investigations have succeeded in demonstrating an especially positive emotional and cognitive reaction to positive information.195 Social Identity Theory has identified a similar aspiration for a positive self-evaluation achievable only via social comparison. The social categories relevant to this person, such as class, religious, party, and professional affiliation, achieve significance only through comparison with other categories and their value connotations. The greater the value-related discrepancy between the in and out-groups, the more attractive is the appearance of the in-group and the higher the personal self-esteem of the person drawing the comparison. One such positive demarcation between the in and out-group—the socalled positive distinctiveness of the in-group—can be reached via a number of different strategies of comparison. Complementary to comparative social competition—such as lifestyle vetting within the confines of evangelical Christianity196—are those mechanisms of “social creativity” which enable redefinition of the dimension in which comparisons are made.197 One example of this mechanism is the competition for the political center ground fought out by German political 193

See Bernd Simon and Roman Trötschel, “Soziale Identität,” in Bierhoff and Frey, Handbuch der Sozialpsychologie und Kommunikationspsychologie, (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 2006), 684–93. 194 See Dirk Dauenheimer, Dagmar Stahlberg, Dieter Frey, and Lars-Eric Petersen, “Die Theorie des Selbstwertschutzes und der Selbstwerterhöhung,” in Theorien der Sozialpsychologie: Motivations-, Selbst- und Informationsverarbeitungstheorien, ed. Dieter Frey and Martin Irle (Bern: H. Huber, 2002), 3:159–90. 195 See Lars-Eric Petersen, Dirk Dauenheimer, and Dagmar Stahlberg, “The Integrative Self-Schema Model: A Framework for Understanding Reactions to Evaluations,” Advances in Psychology Research 8 (2002): 205–220; Dagmar Stahlberg, Lars-Eric Petersen, and Dirk Dauenheimer, “Preferences for and Evaluation of Self-Relevant Information Depending on the Elaboration of the SelfSchemata Involved,” European Journal of Social Psychology 29 (1999): 489–502. 196 Regarding the tie between confession and party political preference, see ideaSpektrum 39 (2002). 197 See Tajfel/Turner, The Social Identity Theory.

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parties at the turn of the twenty-first century. Seeking to establish themselves as the “new center” during the German general election of 1998, the left-wing SPD replaced the conservative CDU in popular perception as the “true representative” of centrist politics. Responding to this act of political redefinition, the CDU moved to reclaim the center ground in 2007, deriding the SPD as extreme and representing itself as the true provider of a centrist approach. In both cases, it was the political terrain, not the parties which had been recast. In the final analysis, the only remaining option for those seeking an improved image is to alter the comparison group. One instance of this was the German reaction to the poor assessment provided of schools by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted by the OECD in 2000. Reaching only place 16,198 the educational authorities (the responsibility of regional government) took succor in an internal ranking conducted in 2008. Whilst the Southern states reassured themselves of their elite status by topping this poll, the Northern states advanced methodological criticisms of the process or even cited the impact of specific social constellations to explain their poor position in the rankings. A considerable number of studies have pointed to the relationship between inter-group discrimination and self-esteem.199 It has become clear that holding control over the allocation of resources between members of different groups increases feelings of individual self-worth.200 As studies have shown, the greater the level of inter-group distinctiveness, the higher was the corresponding level of in-group favoritism and self-esteem.201 On 198

See Basiskompetenzen von Schülerinnen und Schülern im internationalen Vergleich: Deutsches PISA-Konsortium (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001). See also Eckhard Klieme, et al., PISA 2009: Bilanz nach einem Jahrzehnt (Münster: Waxmann, 2010). 199 See Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, “Social Motivation, Self-Esteem and Social Identity,” in Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, ed. Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 28–47; Karen Long and Russell Spears, “The Self-Esteem Hypothesis Revisited: Differentiation and the Disaffect,” in The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life, ed. Russell Spears, Penelope J. Oakes, Naomi Ellemers, and S. Alexander Haslam (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 296–317. 200 See Louise Lemyre and Philip M. Smith, “Intergroup Discrimination and SelfEsteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 (1985): 660–70. 201 See Jolanda Jetten, Russell Spears, and Antony Manstead, “Distinctiveness Threat and Prototypicality: Combined Effects on Intergroup Discrimination and Collective Self-Esteem,” European Journal of Social Psychology 27 (1997): 635– 57.

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the other hand, those with low self-esteem displayed a higher proclivity to discrimination than those with high self-esteem.202

Self-categorization as group-formation and social self-definition The Social Identity Approach to self-categorization considers the interdependence between social reality and the individual as well as the influence of the social environment on individual self-definition.203 People categorize themselves on a number of different levels of abstraction, either inclusive or exclusive, depending on their situation. The substance, truth or functionality of an action of self-categorization concerns not the reality of a self or a person, but that of their social context, upon which the act of self-categorization wholly depends. Speaking in an interview in 2009, Angela Merkel said “sometimes I am liberal, sometimes Christiandemocratic and sometimes conservative.” Far from indicating ideological confusion, she was referring to her various modes of self-categorization depending on the situation and subgroup in which she currently finds herself.204 Processes of categorization accentuate similarities within and differences between categories. As a result and depending on the situation, they influence external perceptions of similarities and differences.205 The act of social categorization emphasizes the differences to the other categories and, in doing so, hinders an alternative categorization on a higher level. For instance, the common status of a person as “politician” established on a high level of categorization does nothing to bring agreement between the various representatives of this genus in questions of controversy. On the other hand, accentuating similarities within a category prevents sub-categorization on a lower level. For instance, leftwing politicians find it very difficult to differentiate between different groupings within a right-wing party and vice versa. Acts of categorization 202 See Lars-Eric Petersen and Hartmut Blank, “Ingroup Bias in the Minimal Group Paradigm Shown by Three-Person Groups with High or Low State SelfEsteem,” European Journal of Social Psychology 33 (2003): 149–62. 203 See S. Alexander Haslam, Psychology in Organizations: The Social Identity Approach (London: Thousand oaks, 2004). 204 Quoted in www.sueddeutsche.de from March 23, 2009. 205 See Penelope J. Oakes, “The Root of All Evil in Intergroup Relations? Unearthing the Categorization Process,” in Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes, ed. Rupert Brown and Sam L. Gaertner (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 3–21.

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on different levels of abstraction are located in a negatively interdependent relationship.206 Although categorization favors stereotypical perceptions of individuals in terms of the relative similarities with their group, it also leads to acts of auto-stereotyping. Those performing such acts come to find similarities between themselves and other members of the self-category. Those conceiving of themselves as interchangeable members of a social grouping—carrying their stereotypical attributes, aims, standards, and values—repress more individualized mechanisms of self-perception. The self becomes depersonalized. A key element of all group phenomena, the mechanism of depersonalization plays a prominent, yet problematic role in mass societies, especially in dictatorial systems. Demanding the subordination of the individual to the will of society or state, dictatorships justify such acts through reference to “higher aims.” The National Socialist demand that ordinary Germans integrate themselves in the Volksgemeinschaft of the “Aryan-Germanic race” was justified by the claim of the insignificance of the individual. As they proclaimed, “you are nothing, your people are everything!”207 Such systems reject the value of the individual and human dignity. Inducing individuals to regard their group members as a part of their own self, such depersonalization promotes considerable group cohesion208 and increased intra-group attraction. Within such a system, other group members are judged by the extent to which they correspond to stereotypical group characteristics. The ideal leader of such a group is the individual deemed to embody these characteristics the best.209 The normative status of stereotypical positions and their social influence facilitates collective behavior. Despite such developments, the varying degree of conformity exhibited by every category-member still permits the formation of sub-groups. Nevertheless, their existence does not undermine the normative claims of stereotype; those conforming to expectation are viewed both as more positive and convincing.210 206

See John C. Turner, “The Self-Categorization Theory” in Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell, Rediscovering the Social Group, 42–67. 207 Wolfgang Keim, Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur (Darmstadt: WBG., 1995), 14. 208 Michael A. Hogg, “Group Cohesiveness: A Critical Review and Some New Directions,” European Review of Social Psychology 4 (1993): 85–111. 209 See John C. Turner and S. Alexander Haslam, “Social Identity, Organizations, and Leadership,” in Groups at Work: Theory and Research, ed. Marlene E. Turner (Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2001), 25–65. 210 See Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam, and John C. Turner, “The Role of Prototypicality in Group Influence and Cohesion: Contextual Variation in the

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Given the favorable stimuli, a homogenous social unit often facilitates the principle of comparative fit and a certain level of self-categorization. The effects of this mechanism are often manifested in the European-wide debate focusing on attempts to grant equal legal status to same-sex civil partnerships and heterosexual marriage.211 The repeated refusal to incorporate this demand in legislation follows from the normative fit of law to Christian values as expressed in its more conservative teaching. Normative fit plays an important role. Tying categorization to existing realities, they now reflect a clear sensitivity to context. What appears possible in one context—for instance, the rejection of gay marriage in a provincial setting—would be impossible in the more liberal setting of a large city. The readiness of observers to apply a specific category is subject to considerable variation depending on the context. Within such a theory, stereotypes appear as the immediate consequence of social categorization, the product of a normal process of semantic generation operating within a specific social context.212 Indeed, neither cognitive distortions nor irrational inflexible attitudes, stereotypes are adaptive processes facilitating identity and orientation. Indeed, they appear to vary according to the individual context and prevailing social norms. As a result, far from the result of intra-individual processes of categorization, stereotypes represent a social product generated by intra-group processes of social influence and consensus building.213 The degree of social categorization (category salience) also plays a role in in-group favoritism and the depersonalization of group members.214 Such circumstances mean that the impressions gained from category-building and stereotyping may not be subject to individual moral judgments. Graded Structure of Social Categories,” in Social Identity: International Perspectives, ed. Stephen Worchel, J. Francisco Morales, Dario Paez, and JeanClaude Deschamps (London: Thousand Oaks, 1998), 75–92. 211 For the German case, see Sächsischer Landtag, Drucksache 5/1865 “Gesetz zur Anpassung des sächsischen Landesrechts an das Lebenspartnerschaftsrecht des Bundes” and the discussion held during the 15th session of the Saxon Landtag held on May 19, 2010. 212 See Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam, and John C. Turner, Stereotyping and Social Reality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 213 See S. Alexander Haslam, John C. Turner, Penelope J. Oakes, Craig McGarty, and Katherine J. Reynolds, “The Group as a Basis for Emergent Stereotype Consensus,” European Review of Social Psychology 8 (1998): 203–39. 214 See the example of various soccer clubs investigated by Alberto Voci, “Relevance of Social Categories, Depersonalization and Group Processes: Two Field Tests of Self-Categorization Theory,” European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (2006): 73–90.

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The selective perception of similarities and differences resulting from social categorization serves to refine the very process that produced them. Not only raising self-esteem, acts of categorization also provide social identity and generate meaning. Any failure to differentiate between these social categories—and thus over-estimate the level of similarity to a relevant comparison group—can prove threatening to social identity and the distinctiveness of the in-group.215 In such a case, social discrimination can even restore a certain level of distinctiveness. This aspiration for distinctiveness is aimed primarily at a positive differentiation. Should this prove impossible however, certain circumstances can lead to the in-group becoming stereotyped with negative attributes.216

Social projection and perspective dependence Attitudes towards out-groups need not always be negative. Indeed, differences between them and the in-group can generate toleration, respect, and even admiration. The estimations by different nations of each other are subject to considerable variation. Indeed, whilst accepting or even admiring the qualities of one nation, the same group can reject those of another. The estimation of the “difference” of another nation depends to the most part on the perception generated by social groups in their relative status. Social projections depend on the perspective taken on social norms and mores.217 The theory of prototypicality assumes that the evaluation of groups takes place in a comparative context oriented around common, positivelyevaluated and superordinate categories referred to as their relative prototypicality.218 Should a politician succeed in taking the step of 215

See Nyla R. Branscombe, Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje, “The Context and Content of Social Identity Threat,” in Social Identity, ed. Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 35–58. 216 See Pawel P. Mlicki and Naomi Ellemers, “Being Different or Being Better? National Stereotypes and Identification of Polish and Dutch Students,” European Journal of Social Psychology 26 (1996): 97–114; Katherine J. Reynolds, John C. Turner, and S. Alexander Haslam, “When Are We Better Than Them and They Worse Than Us? A Closer Look at Social Discrimination in Positive and Negative Domains,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78 (2000): 64–80. 217 See Michael Wenzel, Amélie Mummendey, and Sven Waldzus, “Superordinate Identities and Intergroup Conflict: The Ingroup Projection Model,” European Review of Social Psychology 18 (2007): 331–72. 218 See Micheal Wenzel, “What Is Social About Justice? Inclusive Identity and Group Values as the Basis of the Justice Motive,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002): 205–18.

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superordinate categorization necessary to perceive the members of other parties as “politicians,” he should be able to reach a positive opinion of “his colleagues.” Nevertheless, the difference exhibited by an out-group can also generate attitudes of considerable negativity, especially if ingroup members project their traits, norms, and aims onto superordinate categories. Apparently comparable groups located within a higher category are alarming for such a group—it responds by reclaiming the prototype for itself, rejecting any rival claims to prototype status. In this example, the politicians of one party begin to characterize the others as the negation of a “good politician,” whilst reclaiming this soubriquet for themselves. According to the findings of the research group “Discrimination and Tolerance in Inter-Group Relations,” both West and East Germans respondents agreed that West Germans are the more “prototypical Germans.”219 As this study demonstrated, such a prototypical evaluation can result in the development of discriminatory consensus shared by both groups. Such a consensus does not rule out the possibility of divergence to the extent that East Germans one day reject the discrimination resulting from such judgments. A wide range of cognitive and motivational causes combine to produce in-group projections. Other in-group members are often estimated to be more prototypical than their out-group counterparts.220 Increased relative prototypicality within the in-group is associated with negative attitudes towards out-groups as far as both groups are included within the superordinate category. Relative in-group prototypicality can generate feelings of superiority, with an in-group member ranking his in-group higher than an out-group.221 Indeed, those group members exhibiting strong identification with both their in-group and the superordinate category to which they belong (dual identification), exhibit a strong

219

See Sven Waldzus, Amélie Mummendey, Michael Wenzel, and Franziska Boettcher, “Of Bikers, Teachers and Germans: Groups’ Diverging Views About Their Prototypicality,” British Journal of Social Psychology 43 (2004): 385–400. 220 See Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji, “America = White?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88 (2005): 447–66; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, and Boettcher, “Of bikers”; Michael Wenzel, Amélie Mummendey, Ulrike Weber, and Sven Waldzus, “The Ingroup as Pars Pro Toto: Projection from the Ingroup onto the Inclusive Category as a Precursor to Social Discrimination,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 461–73. 221 See Ulrike Weber, Amélie Mummendey, and Sven Waldzus, “Perceived Legitimacy of Intergroup Status Differences: Its Prediction by Relative Ingroup Prototypicality,” European Journal of Social Psychology 32 (2002): 449–70.

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tendency to in-group projections.222 In such a case, the perception of a threat posed by an out-group can result in stronger in-group projections and prejudice.223 Seeking to spread attitudes of tolerance, Mummendey and Wenzel suggest giving prototypes a vague definition and considerable variance so as to provide them with the appearance of complexity. Only such an approach, so they argue, can produce multiple prototypical dimensions in every comparative dimension.224 They also propose the definition of prototypical positions for only a small number of dimensions. Denying such an approach to the majority of dimensions, they believe, would minimize the number of in-group projections.225 These proposals assume that it is easier to influence the degree to which prototypes are defined than to identify the correlation of persons with social groups. Nevertheless, the representative quality of prototypes means that they cannot simply be set, but rather are the product of a social discourse considering the social influence of the norms and values of the relevant reference group. Investigating a number of German perceptions (of themselves, an outgroup—either Italians or British—and the relevant superordinate category of Europeans), a study by Sven Waldzus, Amélie Mummendey and Michael Wenzel226 made a number of interesting and applicable discoveries. That Germans perceive greater levels of similarity between themselves and the British is relatively unsurprising. Yet, the nature of German self-stereotyping also varied with the three comparison groups. Identifying a higher level of fit between Germans and Europeans, true Europeans were portrayed as being “un-Italian” (relating e.g. to punctuality) in terms of a comparison between Germans and Italians, yet “un-British” (relating to characteristics such as directness) during a comparison of Germans and Britons. The relative in-group projection of the “German-European” correlated negatively with attitudes towards the 222

See Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, and Waldzus, “The Ingroup as Pars Pro Toto.” 223 See Johannes Ullrich, Oliver Christ, Elmar Schlüter, “Merging On Mayday: Subgroup and Superordinate Identification as Joint Moderators of Threat Effects in the Context of European Union’s Expansion,” European Journal of Social Psychology 36 (2006): 857–76. 224 See Mummendey and Wenzel, “Social Discrimination,” 158–74; Sven Waldzus, Amélie Mummendey, and Michael Wenzel, “When ‘Different’ Means ‘Worse’: Ingroup Prototypicality in Changing Intergroup Contexts,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005): 76–83. 225 See Cláudia Meireles, Tolerance in Intergroup Relations: Cognitive Representations Reducing Ingroup Projection (Lisbon: ISCTE, 2007). 226 See Waldzus, Mummendey, and Wenzel, “When ‘Different’ Means ‘Worse.’”

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out-groups “Italy” and “Great Britain.” Any move to depict the “unitary” conception of “Europeans” with any level of complexity resulted in a reduction in both relative in-group projection and produced negative attitudes towards out-groups. The practical application of these findings within the multi-ethnic and multi-religion states produced by European migration is more than clear.227

Relative deprivation: The discrepancy between aspiration and reality Not an objective disadvantage (something covered by general indicators), relative deprivation refers to a personal consciousness of enjoying a lower level of possessions, money, experience etc. than that to which a person feels entitled.228 Such a subjective perception can trigger discontent, frustration, anger, and outrage. Membership of and identification with a group by a person in such a position can also generate certain collective forms of behavior. Davies observed that the expectations of increases in living standards generated by periods of economic expansion outstrip actual rates of economic growth. People living under such conditions perceive a discrepancy between their expectations and the actual situation. During short periods of recession, this discrepancy increases even further. A person can interpret his situation as a case of individual or—if experienced as part of a disadvantaged group—collective disadvantage. Those adapting their expectations to the situation do not necessarily feel disadvantaged. Such an attitude follows only when an individual fails to reduce his expectations during times of misfortune, or develops aspirations which his (objectively comfortable) financial position cannot support.229 Such subjective standards are often inflated by comparison with persons and groups in a more comfortable social position.230 These 227

See Klaus Bade, Migration in European History (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), WUDQVODWHG E\ $OOLVRQ %URZQ IRU +XQJDU\ VHH $JQHV 7yWK HG National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, 1920–2001 (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2005). 228 See Iain Walker and Heather J. Smith, eds., Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 229 See Heather J. Smith and Daniel J. Ortiz, “Is It Just Me? The Different Consequences of Personal and Group Relative Deprivation,” Walker and Smith, Relative Deprivation, 91–118. 230 See Faye Crosby, Relative Deprivation and Working Women (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

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standards need not be “real” in order to impact the perception of social deprivation. Indeed, they are often based on projections, memories, or processes of idealization.231 According to Robert Folger, a person experiencing such a situation follows a clearly comparative approach in evaluating his current predicament. Should he be able to conceive of a better situation he reaches a negative verdict. Aware only of worse alternatives, he is satisfied.232 Not just reviewing their current status, those experiencing such a changed situation also evaluate its causes. Any perception of injustice serves only to reinforce or indeed generate a feeling of negativity. Attitudes also depend on expectations of the future. The hope of improvement enables those experiencing misfortune to accept their current situation. Lack of hope or even fears of a deteriorating position can produce dissatisfaction. Such a tactic is often used by governments. Reassured by official evocations of an impending improvement to the economic situation, the German electorate was able to ignore the problems besetting the country in early 2007. The strategy only failed due to the banking collapse of the following summer. Considering an individual’s assessment of justified aspiration in relation to reality requires an appreciation of the different functions of the cognitive and affective components active in this process. Whilst perception of the discrepancy is a cognitive matter, a feeling of disadvantage is developed in an affective fashion.233 Nevertheless, far from constituting a simple reaction to the perception of disadvantage, the affective element of this process involves the influence and modification of cognitive mechanisms by emotion.234 An emotional disadvantage emerges from the experience of a justified and realistic, yet unfulfilled 231

See James M. Olson and Neal J. Roese, “Relative Deprivation and Counterfactual Thinking,” in Walker and Smith, Relative Deprivation, 265–86. 232 See Robert Folger, “A Referent Cognition Theory of Relative Deprivation,” in Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: The Ontario Symposium, ed. James M. Olson, C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 4:33–55; Robert Folger, “Reformulating the Preconditions of Resentment: A Referent Cognition Model,” in Social Comparison, Social Justice, and Relative Deprivation, ed. John C. Masters and William P. Smith (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1987), 183–215. 233 See Heather J. Smith and Thomas Kessler, “Groupbased Emotions and Intergroup Behavior: The Case of Relative Deprivation,” in The Social Life Of Emotions, ed. Larissa Z. Tiedens and Colin W. Leach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 292–313; Smith and Ortiz, “Is it just me?” 234 See Nico H. Frijda, “The Place of Appraisals in Emotion,” Cognition and Emotion 7 (1993): 357–87.

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aspiration. Such a situation generates frustration, outrage, and even aggression.235 Recognition that such unfulfilled expectations are indeed unjustified, on the other hand, often results in disappointment and sometimes depression. Should the procedures, which led an individual to his current situation, be viewed as just, he is disposed to accept the current situation, not least due to the estimation that similar just circumstances could return him to a more equitable position.236 Realistic optimism reduces any feelings of deprivation, whilst memories of missed opportunities serve only to reinforce negative feelings.237 A number of indicators exist with which to assess the prospects of success. Facing an immutable situation, feelings of deprivation can often be translated into aggression, animus or even resentment.238 On the other hand, believing that the situation can be altered can act to channel aggression into action aimed at redressing the situation. Those faced with past misfortune often expend considerable energy on the search for liability. Those arriving at the conclusion that they have no-one but themselves to blame, often lapse into anger or self-pity. On the contrary, identification of an outside culprit produces outrage. Individuals showing a strong degree of group-identification exhibit the tendency to draw comparisons between their own and other groups. An unfavorable comparison can result in a feeling of disadvantage and disappointment.239 Whilst the perception of individual disadvantage often results in psychosomatic complaints such as stress and depression, when transposed to the group level, it manifests itself in some form of collective behavior. One example of this phenomenon was the rejection by the majority of inter-war German society of the Treaty of Versailles.240 235

For the well-known frustration-aggression hypothesis see John Dollard, Leonhard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, Orval H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939). 236 See Tom Tyler and Heather J. Smith, “Social Justice and Social Movements,” in Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, The Handbook of Social Psychology, 595–629. 237 See Folger, “A Referent Cognition.” 238 See Amélie Mummendey, Thomas Kessler, Andreas Klink, and Rosemarie Mielke, “Strategies To Cope With Negative Social Identity: Predictions by Social Identity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76 (1999): 229–45. 239 See Heather J. Smith, Russell Spears, and Martin Oyen, “‘People like us’: The Influence of Personal Deprivation and Group Membership Salience on Justice Evaluations,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 30 (1994): 277–99. 240 See Gerd Krumeich, “Versailles 1919: Der Krieg in den Köpfen,” in Versailles 1919: Ziele—Wirkung—Wahrnehmung, ed. Gerd Krumerich (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 53–64.

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Questioned as to their experience of personal discrimination, the members of a disadvantaged group often describe a much lower level of suffering as that which they perceive for their group as a whole. Confirmed by a number of studies,241 the phenomenon of the person-group discrepancy is often explained by reference to motivational influences. Averse to victim status, people tend to play down the extent of their own suffering partially out of a wish to prevent further discrimination.242 An alternative explanation posits a tendency to exaggerate the level of ingroup suffering so as to draw attention to existing problems and mobilize the group to act against it.243 Others argue that the disparity in perception is the result of category differences. Whilst individuals compare themselves to other persons, the point of reference for a group is a further group. Both processes of comparison are thus based on a different form of information.

The effects of social discrimination The repeated experience of social discrimination by a member stigmatized group brings psychosomatic consequences. Rooted in these symptoms exercise a considerable and negative impact on sufferers.244 Indeed, a number of studies have demonstrated

241

of a fear, their that

See Tom Postmes, Heather Young, Nyla R. Branscombe, and Russell Spears, “Personal and Group Motivational Determinants of Perceived Discrimination and Privilege Discrepancies,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76 (1999): 320–38; Donald M. Taylor, Stephen C. Wright, and Lana E. Porter, “Dimensions of Perceived Discrimination: The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy,” in The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium, ed. Mark P. Zanna, and James M. Olson, (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 7:233–55; Thomas Kessler, AmélieMummendey, and Utta-Kristin Leisse, The Personal-Group Discrepancy: Is There a Common Information Basis of Personal and Group Judgement? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79 (2000): 95–109. 242 See Cheryl R. Kaiser and Carol T. Miller, “Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27 (2001): 254–63. 243 See Taylor, Wright, and Porter, Dimensions of Perceived Discrimination, ibid. (fn. 239). 244 See Kai Sassenberg, Jennifer Fehr, Nina Hansen, Christina Matschke, and KarlAndrew Woltin, “Eine sozialpsychologische Analyse zur Reduzierung sozialer Diskriminierung von Migranten,” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 4 (2007): 239– 49; Major and O’Brian, “The Social Psychology of Stigma,” 393–421; Brenda Major, Wendy Quinton, and Shannon McCoy, “Antecedents and Consequences of

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membership of a stigmatized group increases the long-term danger of suffering from physical and mental illnesses such as depression, high blood pressure, heart complaints, and a stroke.245 The perception of social discrimination requires an appreciation on the part of its “victim” of an illegitimate situation. Moreover, they must locate the cause of their suffering in membership of a distinct group. Migrants failing to find a job cannot be sure whether they are the victim of discrimination, or have merely been competing with better-qualified applicants. This attributional ambiguity can serve a protective function— thinking that he has been rejected unfairly the applicant does not question his own prowess.246 Nevertheless, recognition of a prejudice exercises a clearly negative impact. With group membership representing an integral part of social identity,247 those suffering because of such a membership will—if they identify with this grouping—suffer considerable personal injury248 and damage to their self-esteem.249 The extent and nature of the reaction to discrimination also depends on the degree to which a person perceives its incidence—doing so provokes not depression, but anger.250 Over time, members of stigmatized groups Attributions to Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Advances,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 34 (2002): 251–330. 245 See James S. Jackson, Tony N. Brown, Myriam Torres, Sherrill L. Sellers, and Kendrick Brown, “Racism and the Physical and mental Health Status of African Americans: A Thirteen-Year National Panel Study,” Ethnicity and Disease 6 (1996): 132–47; Kevin W. Allison, “Stress and Oppressed Category Membership,” in Swim and Stangor, Prejudice, 145–70; Rodney Clark, Norman B. Anderson, Vernessa R. Clark, and David R. Williams, “Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial Model,” American Psychologist 54 (1999): 805–16. 246 See Crocker and Major, “Social Stigma and Self-Esteem,” 608–30. 247 See Michael T. Schmitt and Nyla R. Branscombe, “Will the Real Social Dominance Theory Please Stand Up?” British Journal of Social Psychology, 42 (2003): 15–219. 248 See Nyla R. Branscombe, Michael T. Schmitt, and Richard D. Harvey, “Perceiving Pervasive Discrimination Among African Americans: Implications for Group Identification and Well-Being,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77 (1999): 135–49. 249 See Major, Quinton, and McCoy, “Antecedents and Consequences of Attributions to Discrimination.” 250 See Shannon K. McCoy and Brenda Major, “Group Identification Moderates Emotional Responses to Perceived Prejudice,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 1005–17; Nina Hansen and Kai Sassenberg, “Does Social Identification Buffer or Harm? The Impact of Social Identification on Anger After Social Discrimination,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32 (2006): 983–96.

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come to expect discrimination in specific situations. Studies focusing on Afro-American students have shown that those afraid of experiencing prejudice perform worse than those of their counterparts not sharing these fears.251 A further study of HIV positive homosexual men showed that those afraid of suffering rejection on the basis of their sexuality exhibited a greater propensity both to develop full-blown AIDS and do so at a rate faster than their less fearful counterparts.252 Social discrimination is a stressful experience. Reacting with higher levels of confusion and fear, victims of such circumstances require mental strength and self-control. Highly demanding strategies as they are, the burden results in gradual exhaustion, underperformance,253 and overreaction.254

“Social infection” Attitudes, emotions, and their associated behavioral response are very often transmitted from person to person through their social network.255 Bringing added group cohesion and identification, the human tendency towards emulation makes such mechanisms self-reinforcing. In this way, stereotypes, prejudice, and hatreds are disseminated and reinforced. Shared emotions and patterns of action engender a feeling of well-being and security, especially amongst the young.256 Not merely ephemeral 251

See Rodolfa Mendoza-Denton, Geraldine Downey, Valerie J. Purdie, Angelina Davis, and Janina Pietrzak, “Sensitivity to Status Based Rejection: Implications for African American Students’ College Experience,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 896–918. 252 See Steve W. Cole, Margaret E. Kemeny, and Shelley E. Taylor, “Social Identity and Physical Health: Accelerated HIV Progression in Rejection-Sensitive Gay Men,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997): 320–35. 253 Roy F. Baumeister, Mark Muraven, and Dianne M. Tice, “Ego Depletion: A Resource Model of Volition, Self-Regulation, and Controlled Processing,” Social Cognition 18 (2000): 130–50. 254 See Michael Inzlicht, Linda McKay, and Joshua Aronson, “Stigma as Ego Depletion: How Being the Target of Prejudice Affects Self-Control,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 262–69. 255 See Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected! The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2009). 256 See Peter S. Bearman and Hannah Brückner, “Promising the Future: Virginity Pledges and the Transition to First Intercourse,” American Journal of Sociology 106 (2001): 859–912; Ilyana Kuziemko, Is Having Babies Contagious? Estimating Fertility Peer Effects Between Siblings (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2006);

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phenomena, the conventions of such social communities perform an integrative function, and establish clear lines of group demarcation. The human penchant for synchronization favors such patterns of intragroup emulation. In an on-campus experiment, the psychologist Scott S. Withermuth arranged for two groups of students to perform joint tasks. Having arranged for the one group to march around the campus in formation, the other were instructed to wander around in a loose grouping. Recording the results, he established that the first group (who went marching) was able to solve their task better than the second.257 In a further investigation, the research group led by Charles R. Seger was able to demonstrate that it was possible to align the mood of a number of individuals within a group in much the same fashion as bodily movement.258 Such similarities can also have negative consequences for both the group and its members following the incidence of personal misfortune. Should a father leave his family, those of his friends in a similar position interpret the action as undermining their own position.259 Seeking to minimize potential damage, they distance themselves from him. Those leaving a religious fellowship for another will make a similar experience. Illness sometimes also results in the social ostracism of the afflicted: smokers feel threatened in their choice of lifestyle if a friend succumbs to lung cancer. They respond with social exclusion. Suffering from social isolation (itself a health risk), the health of the cancer sufferer can deteriorate further.260 A similar phenomenon is observable in professional circles. Hearing rumors of his impending dismissal, the subordinates of the German news editor Stefan Aust, turned against him. Aust reported this to be “an extremely unpleasant experience—I realized that my colleagues, many of

James H. Fowler and Nicholas A. Christakis, “Estimating Peer Effects on Health in Social Networks,” Journal of Health Economics 27 (2008): 1400–5. 257 See Scott S. Wiltermuth and Chip Heath, “Synchrony and Cooperation,” Psychological Science 20 (2009): 1–5. 258 See Elitot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger, and Daine M. Mackie, “Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93 (2007): 431–46. 259 According to a study by Rose McDermott and her team (Brown University, Providence) divorce is “contagious.” There is a 75 per cent chance your marriage will fail if your friends split up. This could explain why friends distance themselves from a couple who have just separated (cf. Pychology Today, July 11, 2010). 260 See Gehirn & Geist 10 (2009): 48–53.

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whom had profited from my patronage, now turned against me.”261 His response to this behavior sounds like a helpless threat: “the wind will turn again. Opportunism sometimes proves itself to be highly inopportune.”262 The anxiety of those changing job or going into retirement often generates the fear of impending insignificance, especially amongst those at the top of the social hierarchy. Such a transition often proves to be a difficult experience for the former “big men.”

Social control Maintenance of a “good reputation,” often depends upon upholding group-based norms and mores; failure to do so can provoke gossipmongering. Robin Dunbar discovered that some 30 per cent of personal conversation focusses on the behavior of others.263 Usually censured, such “tittle-tattle” also serves a positive social function. Centering usually on negative behavior—infidelity, lies and worse—the fact of gossiping issues a warning to those on whom it focuses.264 Eric Anderson found that such negative stories spread about third parties often function as a social marker. Bringing the “offender” into the focus of the group, he now remains under constant scrutiny.265 Indeed, when manifested in small tightly-knit communities, such as a village, such a strategy can result in the ostracism and isolation of the social lawbreaker. These mechanisms of social control often exercise a normative impact, thus explaining the high levels of church attendance in small villages across Europe until well into the 1960s.

261

Christoph Amend and Giovanni di Lorenzo, “Ich hatte den schönsten Job der Welt.” An interview with Stefan Aust, Zeit-Magazin no. 38 from September 11, 2008, 11–19; quotation: 18. 262 Ibid. 263 See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 264 See Alex Mesoudi, Andrew Whiten, and Robin Dunbar, “A Bias for Social Information in Human Cultural Transmission,” British Journal of Psychology 97 (2006): 405–23; Helmut Lukesch, “Lügen und Täuschen: Eine psychologische Perspektive,” in Die Lüge: Ein Alltagsphänomen aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht, ed. Jörn Müller and Hanns-Gregor Nissing (Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 2007), 87-99. See also Alex Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 265 See Eric Anderson, Erika H. Siegel, Eliza Bliss-Moreau, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, “The Visual Impact of Gossip,” Science 332 (2011): 1446–48.

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Those with a high social standing have proportionally more to lose following social deviance. Although not having broken any law, the 42year-old German politician Christian Boetticher was forced to resign in August 2011 after admitting to (an entirely legal) affair with a 16-year-old girl. Despite him having ended the relationship beforehand, his party—the conservative CDU—feared a public backlash in the impending regional election and required his replacement. However, as the example of the homosexual politician Klaus Wowereit demonstrated such social mores are by no means immutable.266 Nevertheless, those seeking to alter existing realities must proceed with considerable caution, tact and impeccable timing.267

Stereotypes—history—myth Inherent to human existence, stereotypes, prejudice, ostracism, discrimination, and stigmatization are to be observed in all countries at all times. Very few seem to be aware, or even wish to know, that our knowledge of history is itself characterized by constructs and fabrications bearing little relation to reality.268 Hans Henning Hahn, one of the pioneers of research into “historical stereotyping”269 summarized the concept: “the majority of the views of the past produced by historians are indeed stereotypes. Moreover, the correlation between stereotypes and the history thus produced leads to the generation of myths, both historical and 266 See Sadie F. Dingfelder, “Learned It Through the Grapevine: Gossip May Teach People About Social Norms and the Consequences of Violating Them,” American Psychological Association 37 (2006): 60; Roy F. Baumeister, L. Zhang, and K. D. Vohs, “Gossip as Cultural Learning,” Review of General Psychology 8 (2004): 111–21; K. M. Kniffin and D. S. Wilson, “Utilities of Gossip Across Organizational Levels: Multilevel Selection, Free-Riders, and Teams,” Human Nature 16 (2004): 278–292; D. S. Wilson, C. Wilczynski, A. Wells, and L. Weiser, “Gossip and Other Aspects of Language as Group-Level Adaptations,” in The Evolution of Cognition, ed. Cecelia Heves and Ludwig Huber (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 2000), 347–65. 267 See Klaus Wowereit und Hajo Schumacher: … und das ist auch gut so: Mein Leben für die Politik (Munich: Blessing, 2007), 184ff. 268 See Hans Henning Hahn, “Stereotyp—Geschichte—Mythos: Überlegungen zur historischen Stereotypenforschung,” in Erinnerungsorte, Mythen und Stereotypen in Europa, ed. Heidi Hein-.LUFKQHU-DURVáDZ6XFKRSOHVDQG+DQV+HQQLQJ+DKQ :URFáDZ2ILF\QD:\GDZQ$787 –55, 239. 269 See Jochen Konrad, Stereotype in Dynamik: Zur kulturwissenschaftlichen Verortung eines theoretischen Konzepts (Marburg: Der Andere Verl., 2006), 90– 100.

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political in nature.”270 Surveying this situation, he warns of a common pitfall of history writing—a belief, widespread amongst historians—in the ability of stereotypes to convey information about the groups to which they refer. Stereotypes sometimes do contain partial truths. Nevertheless, those giving currency to such constructs do not or cannot subject these halftruths to any form of rigorous analysis. Indeed, stereotypes tell us more about their proponent than they do of the reality which they purport to characterize; providing an insight into their state of mind, goals, and motives. Hahn characterizes this by asking “why they need the stereotype and which mental and social functions does it satisfy?”271 The anti-Semitic or anti-Polish attitudes rife in German society in the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, tell us little of the true nature of their targets. They do, however, provide valuable information as to the special form of xenophobia and nationalism,272 which dominated modern German history. As Hahn emphasizes, it is important not to restrict the historical focus to abstract and formulated insights in this area, but to “develop questions adapted to [the peculiarity] of each separate context.”273 Only clear contextualization enables us to make meaningful statements about the effects of stereotypes and the changes which they undergo. Indeed, Hahn pleads for consideration not of individual stereotypes, but the complex world of their interaction. It is necessary, he argues, to locate the sociallygenerated stereotype consensus in an overarching discourse which itself requires close description and analysis. Only such an approach is able to incorporate both “the true multilaterality of human relations and the multidimensionality of the mental budget found in every society.”274 Returning to the example of German-Polish attitudes to each other, it is clear that the cohabitation of a number of different stereotypes subject these to considerable change over time. As Hahn observed, “viewed in the context of the totality of not only real, but also stereotypical confrontations played out in the course of the first half of the 20th century, current German-Polish stereotypes exhibit a certain degree of balance. Nevertheless, it would be illusory to believe that such negative stereotypes have simply been “deleted” from our mental reservoir. As the events of 270

Hahn, “Stereotyp—Geschichte—Mythos,” 239. Ibid., 247. 272 See Julia Schmid, Kampf um das Deutschtum, Radikaler Nationalismus in Österreich und dem Deutschen Reich 1890–1914 (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2009). 273 Hahn, “Stereotyp—Geschichte—Mythos,” 248. 274 Ibid., 249. 271

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recent years have demonstrated, many heterostereotypes have been effortlessly resuscitated on both sides as generated by fear and insecurity.”275 Political myths, as Hahn argues, are anchored deeply in our stereotype world, which provide a febrile breeding ground for myths. Requiring shared stereotypes and myths for their inner cohesion, they are crucial to group integration. Indeed, both constructs thrive on a preconception present in society’s communicative process: “[…] myths give expression to deep-rooted and abstract concepts. In such a situation, meaning is only ever generated after leaving the level of the specific for a realm of clearly theoretical. Functioning only in concrete historical contexts […] stereotypes, on the other hand, can change or lose all meaning, role, and function once transported into a new context.”276 This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the nature of stereotypes: inherently emotional constructs, they remain timeless. It is in this capacity that stereotypes interact with myths. “Political myths live from the stereotypes which they use, and their claim to ahistoricity.”277

Although seemingly established “for eternity,” all stereotypes develop in and require a specific historical context in order to function. Moreover, stereotypes are indispensable in the construction of political myths which, in turn, serve to legitimate their progenitors. Even those human actions not explicitly referenced to stereotypes take root in and are influenced by stereotypical mental contexts. Working on the basis of Henning and Hahn’s findings, Beata Dorota Lakeberg’s investigation of the minority German press in Poland underlines the significance and function of the conceptions which they developed for the formation of both hetero and auto stereotypes. Focusing on the image of a repressed minority, group identity, and cohesion are reinforced by reference to the positively-connoted “German achievement,” of “order” and “culture.”278 Heterostereotypes, such as the Polish “state for a season” or “short-term state” (Saisonstaat) characterized by “Polish 275

,ELG6HHDOVR'LHWHU%LQJHQ3HWHU2OLYHU/RHZDQG.D]LPLHU]:y\FLFNL eds., Die Destruktion des Dialogs: Zur innenpolitischen Instrumentalisierung negativer Fremdbilder und Feindbilder; Polen, Tschechien, Deutschland und die Niederlande im Vergleich 1900 bis heute (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007). 276 Hahn, “Stereotyp—Geschichte—Mythos,” 251. 277 Ibid. 278 See Beata Dorota Lakeberg, Die deutsche Minderheitenpresse in Polen 1918– 1939 und ihr Polen- und Judenbild (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2010), 144.

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slacking, nationalism and chauvinism,” are deployed to discredit the Polish state, nation, and patriotism. Nevertheless, this was accompanied by a search for the existence of commonality, in an attempt to facilitate peaceful cohabitation. Such efforts focused on the positive aspects of the Polish struggle for independence, their patriotism, shared mentalities or even reference to the “time of pro-Polish attitudes in Germany.”279 Such moments provide historical examples of the way in which prejudice and stereotypes can indeed be overcome.

Concepts for the alteration of stereotypes and prejudice Prejudices violate three ideal norms: rationality, justice, and humanity. Abjuring these three considerations, we prove ourselves to be injudicious, unjust, and intolerant. Prejudice is also economically inexpedient, producing conflict, strikes, civil unrest, and criminality. In short, the effects of prejudice conspire to make our world a less humane, less safe, and less prosperous place to live. Every balanced and fair society should take action to reduce negative labelling of its citizens and minimize discrimination in all its forms. Program dedicated to the reduction and prevention of prejudice are based on three models: that relating prejudice to personal traits; that presenting prejudice as the result of interaction between different social groups; and that identifying prejudice as the by-product of the way in which society treats its minorities.280 The first category comprises all attempts made to modify the behavior of prejudiced individuals. American schools, for instance, use history lessons as the vehicle of prejudicereduction. Pupils are encouraged to relate the lessons of history to current social problems and their own personal values.281 Such courses encourage their participants to increase their power of empathy, critical thought, and moral decision making. The “value confrontation technique” developed by Rokeach confronts participants with 10 values—such as equality and freedom—to be arranged in order of preference. Whilst American and West German participants usually rank freedom above equality, East Germans tend to 279

Quoted in Lakebarg, Minderheitenpresse, 150. See Ulrich Wagner, Oliver Christ, and Rolf van Dick, “Die empirische Evaluation von Präventionsprogrammen gegen Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung 4 (2002): 101–17. 281 See Melinda Fine, “Collaborative Innovations: Documentation of the Facing History and Ourselves Program at an Essential School,” Teachers College Record 94 (1993): 771–89. 280

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place greater value on equality.282 Participants making this choice are often questioned of their choice as they implicitly value their own freedom as higher than that of others.283 The Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes Training program is the best of such activities designed to increase empathy and reduce prejudice. Dividing its participants into two groups on the basis of their eye color, the one group is granted certain advantages whilst the other is subject to discrimination. Participants learn what it means to suffer discrimination based on meaningless exterior traits.284 Working through a demonstration of the extent of human error inherent in the processing of information, the ANCOVA-Reasoning Programme seeks to promote improvement in the cognitive faculties of its participants.285 Participants are provided with information comparing the level of educational opportunities and academic performance exhibited by members of social minorities and the majority population. A central focus is placed on establishing the relationship between ethnic origin and school performance. This category of cognitive restructuring also includes bilingual lessons. As yet, it is unclear whether the effects of this program are result from the cognitive training which it provides or the confrontation experienced by its participants with members of another culture.286 These approaches are complemented by a series of preventative programs aiming at the reduction of group-based aggression and violence—especially in schools. However, lacking any empirical foundation, their value remains, as yet, unproven.287 In contrast, the 282

See Gerhard Besier, “Das Ost-West-Verhältnis in Deutschland: Ein Volk mit unterschiedlichen Einstellungen, Verhaltensweisen und Kulturen?” in 15 Jahre deutsche Einheit: Was ist geworden? ed. *HUKDUG %HVLHU DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD (Berlin: Lit, 2007), 25–39. 283 See Bob Altmeyer, “Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians,” in Zanna and Olson, The Psychology of Prejudice, 131–48. 284 See Tracie L. Stewart, Jacqueline R. LaDuke, Charlotte Bracht, Brooke A. M. Sweet, and Kristine E. Gamarel, “Do the ‘Eyes’ Have It? A Program Evaluation of Jane Elliott’s ‘Blue-Eyes/Brown-Eyes’ Diversity Training Exercise,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 33 (2003): 1898–1921. 285 See Bob Altmeyer, “Reducing Prejudice in Right-Wing Authoritarians,” in Zanne and Olson, The Psychology of Prejudice, 131–48. 286 See Frances E. Aboud and Sheri R. Levy, “Interventions to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination in Children and Adolescents,” in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, ed. Stuart Oskamp (Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2000), 269–93. 287 See Ulrich Wagner, Rolf van Dick, and Oliver Christ, “Möglichkeiten der präventiven Einwirkung auf Fremdenfeindlichkeit/Antisemitismus und auf

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programs seeking to engender inter-group contacts can demonstrate sound empirical foundations drawn from the theories of Allport, Sherif, Tajfel, and Turner.288 Positing the beneficial nature of contact in reducing prejudice, these theories are predicated on the equal status of the participants and their cooperative nature. The programs also require the support of authority figures for any degree of success.289 Rather than seeking to provide an explanation for the development of prejudice, these programs seek to reduce the extent of hostile inter-group relations. As a number of studies have demonstrated, inter-group contact reduces the incidence and extent of prejudice.290 Increasing awareness of out-groups and redressing negative generalizations results in the modification of both behavior and attitudes. Such contacts also help to establish positive emotional relationships, reduce levels of fear and enable in-group members to consider their own norms and standards from the perspective of an out-group. This contact hypothesis remains one of the most influential perspectives amongst those involved in inter-group studies. A further series of preventative measures based on the contact hypothesis were developed primarily for use in schools.291 Divided into groups of mixed ability and ethnicity, pupils are instructed to perform tasks that can only be solved if each person makes an equal contribution. A number of studies of school teaching methods have demonstrated the greater value and effectiveness of cooperative group-based instruction over more traditional teacher-centered methods.292 Moreover, cooperative teaching was also demonstrated to make a key contribution to raising self-

fremdenfeindliche/antisemitische Gewalt,” in Empirisch gesicherte Erkenntnisse über kriminalpräventive Wirkungen, ed. Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf: Stadtarchiv, 2002), 265–332. 288 See the relevant section in this chapter. 289 See Rupert Brown and Miles Hewstone, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37 (2005): 255–343. 290 See Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, “A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90 (2006): 751–83. 291 See Walter G. Stephan, Reducing Prejudice and Stereotyping in Schools (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999). 292 See Robert E. Slavin, Cooperative Learning (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995); Robert E. Slavin, Erica A. Hurley, and Anne Chamberlain “Cooperative Learning and Achievement: Theory and Research,” in Handbook of Psychology: Educational Psychology, ed. William M. Reynolds and Gloria E. Miller (New York: Wiley, 2003), 7:177–98.

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esteem, self-reliance, empathy, increasing the pleasure of learning, and generating a more positive attitude towards school in general.293 Those prejudice-reduction programs conducted in an extra-school environment often use the contact hypothesis in exchange schemes, youth encounter programs and adult education.294 Such programs are also employed in the aftermath of wars and civil conflict.295 Contact-theory based programs can also be used to reduce prejudice concerning minorities such as homosexuals or the disabled.296 Socially-generated and transmitted conceptions regarding the members of out-groups—providing the basis for institutions such as the South African apartheid—are usually the product of a long historical development. Often articulated through political ideologies and by the media, such mechanisms serve to reinforce historically-developed situations.297 One example is provided by the current media portrayal of Muslims in Europe; influencing the perception of inter-group differences, it serves to vitalize a diffuse range of fears.298 The contribution of such feelings and threat-perceptions to the genesis and reinforcement of prejudice has been demonstrated in a number of empirical studies.299

293

See Elliot Aronson, “Building Empathy, Compassion, and Achievement in the Jigsaw Classroom,” in Improving Academic Achievement: Impact of Psychological Factors on Education, ed. Joshua Aronson (San Diego: Academic Press, 2002), 209–25. 294 See Ulrich Wagner, Bernd Baumhold, and Ursula Keuth, “Gemeinsame Familienseminare für Ausländer und Deutsche,” ISS-Informationsdienst zur Ausländerarbeit 2/3 (1983): 120–22; Deutsches Youth for Understanding Komitee, ed., Verständigung und Verständnis: Internationaler Jugendaustausch 1957–2007 (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2007). 295 See Herbert C. Kelman, “Social-Psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East,” Applied Psychology: An International Review 47 (1998): 5–28; Michael Wessels, “Wiederaufbau und Versöhnung nach Konflikten,” in Krieg und Frieden: Handbuch der Konflikt- und Friedenspsychologie, ed. Gert Sommer and Albert Fuchs (Weinheim: Beltz, 2004), 522–40. 296 See Pettigrew and Tropp, “A Meta-analytic Test,” 2006. 297 See Hans Bernd Brosius and Frank Esser, Eskalation durch Berichterstattung (Opladen: Westdt. Verl, 1995); Jens Bergmann and Bernhard Pörksen, eds., Skandal! Die Macht öffentlicher Empörung (Cologne: Halem, 2009). 298 See, for instance, Thilo Sarrazin’s book Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen (Munich: DVA, 2010) and the ensuing debate. 299 See Stephan/Renfro, “The Role of Threat in Intergroup Relations.”

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The conventional approach to combating prejudice—involving television campaigns,300 cultural programs and the obligatory VIP-led information drives—usually focus on putative commonalities between various social groups.301 A more realistic approach is that of Cultural Assimilation,302 an attempt to explain cultural differences in order to promote their acceptance. Participants in such self-learning programs are confronted with conflict situations and asked to provide explanations for their development. These programs have registered considerable success in improving interaction between those from different ethnic backgrounds.303 Although manifesting considerable short-term success, questions have been raised regarding their long-term impact. A study by Ziegler showed that participants in such cooperative learning programs demonstrated considerably improved inter-ethnic skills; 10 weeks later, however, their behavior was comparable to that of a control group.304 Long-term change requires permanent strategies of effective intervention.

Changing social categorization At root, the development of stereotypes and prejudice and the social discrimination, which they produce, all depend on social categorization. This process identifies similarities and differences resulting in division into social groups. This, in turn, provides the starting point for the fundamental decision whether to treat someone fairly or unfairly. Interventions in this process assume the borders between these categories to be determined by the social context. Category borders are also seen to influence which particular traits are associated with the act of categorization. Exercising an influence on the social context also enables us to modify the “them and us” mechanisms determining perceptions of group belonging in a prosocial fashion. Three approaches have been 300

See Sherryl B. Graves, “Television and Prejudice Reduction: When Does Television as a Vicarious Experience Make a Difference?” Journal of Social Issues 55 (1999): 707–27. 301 See Walter G. Stephan and Cookie W. Stephan, “The Role of Ignorance in Intergroup Relations,” in Groups in Contact, ed. Norman Miller and Marilynn B. Brewer (Orlando: Academic Press, 1984), 229–78. 302 See Kenneth Cushner and Richard W. Brislin, Intercultural Interactions: A Practical Guide (London: Thousand Oakes, 1996). 303 See Judy H. Katz and Allen Ivey, “White Awareness: The Frontier of Racism Awareness Training,” Personnel and Guidance Journal 55 (1977): 485–89. 304 See Suzanne Ziegler, “The Effectiveness of Cooperative Learning Teams for Increasing Cross-Ethnic Friendship: Additional Evidence,” Human Organization 40 (1981): 264–67.

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developed to this end: de-categorization, re-categorization, and the model of reciprocal differentiation. Seeking to present members of a social group as individuals and not mere members of a (potentially pejoratively) stereotyped group, methods based on the de-categorization approach attempt to establish personal contacts between the members of different groups in order to reduce the potential for conflict. Such a strategy can also promote generalization effects. For instance, the maintenance of personal contacts between a German and a member of Germany’s Turkish ethnic minority carries the potential not only to reduce the German’s level of anti-Turkish prejudice, but also leads him to question attitudes towards other ethnic minorities. The activation of a second category, incongruent to the first results in a process of cross-categorization. The previously dominant ethnic categorization is now displaced by a second, e.g. a gender-specific category. “Turks” are not only different to Germans; they also exhibit considerable differences to each other (men and women). Sensitivity to variation within a stereotype reduces the significance of social categorization and thus discrimination.305 An awareness of participation by an out-group member in multiple social categories reduces the probability with which the person will respond with hostility.306 The model of re-categorization, on the other hand, seeks to re-define category borders so as to incorporate the out-group into a common ingroup.307 Many attempts were undertaken after 1989 to incorporate both West and East Germans into the single group of “Germans.”308 Processes of re-categorization should aim not at reducing the relevance and appreciation of the in-group, but to enable former out-groups to profit from its “nest warmth.” The impossibility of ignoring a number of social categories, such as skin color or gender, means that any attempts do to so, for instance “colorblindness,” provokes mistrust amongst members of the ethnic minorities affected.309 Refusing to play down their ethnic or social identity, many 305

See Brian Mullen, Michael Migdal, and Miles Hewstone, “Crossed Categorization Vs. Simple Categorization and Intergroup Evaluations: A Metaanalysis,” European Journal of Social Psychology 31 (2001): 721–36. 306 See Sonia Roccas and Marilynn B. Brewer, “Social Identity Complexity,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 6 (2002): 88–106. 307 See Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2000). 308 Besier, “Das Ost-West-Verhältnis,” 29. 309 See Michael I. Norton, Samuel R. Sommers, and Evan P. Apfelbaum, “Colorblindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing the Political Correctness Game,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 949–53.

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such groups could be better integrated into majority society through approaches focusing on reciprocal differentiation: using the search for a positive social identity to improve inter-group relations. Uniting in the pursuit of a common aim,310 the in and out-groups are brought together into a situation of positive interdependence. The members of both groups accept distinct, yet complimentary roles. Holding each other in respect, they do not require that they abandon their need for distinctiveness. Such a situation is experienced during the construction of political coalitions. Empirical studies have shown that whilst this model can work, the nature of politics promotes mistrust between the parties.311 Thomas Pettigrew proposes the successive combination of all three forms of intervention.312 Starting with inter-group contacts in accordance with the model of de-categorization, this is to be followed by reciprocal differentiation, and then re-categorization in a “common group identity.” For example, companies with a multi-cultural workforce should encourage their shift members to retain (and not as many do, to play-down) their ethnic background in order to achieve the positive integration of their identity in their working practices. Success in this undertaking enables them to identify with their now multicultural workforce and the company as a whole.313 One problem in such strategies is the claims made by one sub-group to universal representation of the whole group in a way better than others. Working on inter-racial conflicts, Nicole Shelton and Jennifer Richeson have pointed to the possibility of perspective-divergences between members of minorities and the prevailing majority population.314 310

See Marilynn B. Brewer and Samuel L. Gaertner, “Toward Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization,” in Brown and Gaertner, Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology, 451–72. 311 See Rupert Brown, James Vivian, and Miles Hewstone, “Changing Attitudes Through Intergroup Contact: The Effects of Category Membership Salience,” European Journal of Social Psychology 29 (1999): 741–64; Rupert Brown and Karen Gardham, “Two Forms of Intergroup Discrimination with Positive and Negative Outcomes: Explaining the Positive-Negative Asymmetry Effects,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (2001): 23–34. 312 See Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” Annual Review of Psychology 49 (1998): 65–85. 313 See Kyra Luijters, Karen I. van der Zee, and Sabine Otten, “Acculturation in Organizations: When the Dual Identity Is Evaluated Most Positively,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 9 (2006): 561–75. 314 See J. Nicole Shelton and Jennifer A. Richeson, “Ethnic Minorities’ Racial Attitudes and Contact Experiences with White People,” Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 12 (2006): 149–64.

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Members of minorities experience particular difficulty in abandoning negative prejudices towards the majority and remain highly skeptical of inter-group contact. The smaller party fears a loss of influence within a larger mixed group. As a result, company based integration strategies tend to exhibit greater success in smaller rather than in larger companies.315

The significance of socialization for the construction of prejudice and stereotypes Children first learn from their family and then other, secondary agents of socialization including their school, peer groups and the media. Acquiring a whole range of opinions, symbols, and rituals constitutive to their in-group, they absorb not only social morals and standards, but also a whole range of external social identities and stereotypes regarding outgroups.316 Reconstructing the culture of their parents through verbal and non-verbal discourse, by a certain age their attitudes demonstrate considerable congruence with parental stereotypes regarding various social and national groupings. Indeed, preferences for the national in-group and other specific aspects of national identity can be demonstrated amongst six to twelve year-olds.317 Similar findings have been presented for processes of gender stereotyping.318 315

See Steffen R. Giessner, G. Tendayi Viki, Sabine Otten, Deborah Terry, and Susanne Täuber, “The Challenge of Merging: Merging Patterns, Premerger Status and Merger Support,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32 (2006): 339– 52. 316 See Joan E. Grusec and Paul D. Hastings, Handbook of Socialization: Theory and Research (New York: Guilford Press, 2007); Drew Nesdale, “Social Identity Processes and Children’s Ethnic Prejudice,” in The Development of the Social Self, eds. Mark Bennet and Fabio Sani (Hove and New York: Psychology Press, 2004), 219–45. 317 See Henri Tajfel, Charlan Nemeth, Gustav Jahoda, Jennifer D. Campbell, and Norris B. Johnson, “The Development of Children’s Preference for Their Own Country: A Cross-National Study,” International Journal of Psychology 5 (1970): 245–53; Fabio Sani and Mark Bennett, “Developmental Aspects of Social Identity,” in Bennett and Sani, The Development of the Social Self, 77–100; Martyn Barret and Teresa Farroni, “English and Italian Children’s Knowledge of European Geography,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 14 (1996): 257–73. 318 See Martyn Barrett and John Short, “Images of European People in a Group of 5-10-year-old English Schoolchildren,” British Journal of Development Psychology 10 (1992): 339–63 and the comprehensive followup study Martyn Barrett, Hannah Wilson, and Evanthia Lyons, “The Development of National InGroup Bias: English Children’s Attributions of Characteristics to English,

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According to a range of British studies, eight to ten year-olds even exhibit a range of stereotypes regarding the Germans, French, Italians, and Spanish. Believing Germans to be aggressive and industrious, the Spanish are held to be lazy, whilst the French, Spanish, and Italians are characterized as peaceable nations. Holding a high opinion of their own country, Germans landed consistently on the last place. Nevertheless, the preferences exhibited amongst children were not always combined with disparagement and dislike of out-groups.319 In-group favouritization and the disparagement of out-groups were shown to be the result of separate processes.320 Nevertheless, the children often placed great emphasis on their own in-group identity through contrast-building.

The promotion of civil courage and autonomy as a form of prosocial behavior Acts of “civil courage” are interventions by individuals motivated by the values of democracy and humanity.321 Although widely accepted as a positive value, the negative consequences inherent to this specific form of altruism322 often prevent bystanders from going to the aid of victims. One such case reported in the New York Times involved Kitty Genovese, who was stabbed to death in Queens on March 17, 1964. An everyday occurrence in the New York of the 1960s, the distinctive feature of the case was the presence of 38 bystanders, none of whom intervened or even

American and German People,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 21 (2003): 193–220. 319 See Mark Bennett, Martyn Barrett, Rauf Karakozov, Giorgi Kipiani, Evanthia Lyons, Valentyna Pavlenko, and Tatiana Riazanova, “Young Children’s Evaluations of the Ingroup and of Outgroups: A Multi-national Study,” Social Development 13 (2004): 124–41. 320 See Martyn Barrett, Evanthia Lyons, Arantza del Valle, “The Development of National Identity Processes: Do Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory Provide Useful Heuristic Frameworks for Developmental Research,” in Bennet and Sani, The Development of the Social Self, 159–88. 321 See Gerd Meyer, “Was heißt mit Zivilcourage handeln?” in Zivilcourage lernen: Analyse—Modelle—Arbeitshilfen, ed. Gerd Meyer, Ulrich Dovermann, Siegfried Frech, and Günther Gugel (Tübingen: Inst. für Friedenspädagogik, 2004), 22–41. 322 See Tobias Greitemeier, Peter Fischer, Andreas Kastenmüller, and Dieter Frey, “Civil Courage and Helping Behaviour: Differences and Similarities,” European Psychologist 11 (2006): 90–98.

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alerted the police.323 Inspired by the case to investigate human behavior in emergency situations, the social psychologists Bibb Latané and John Darley developed the classical five-step model of bystander intervention.324 Step one involves the necessity of perceiving a problem. Distracted by other activities, many passers-by simply fail to realize that something is awry. Step two requires the observer to realize that the critical situation actually constitutes an emergency. Often unclear, such situations are frequently interpreted as harmless scuffles or indeed horseplay. The presence and passivity of a large number of bystanders—referred to as pluralistic ignorance—often generates a mood of hesitancy. Step three requires the would-be intervener to take a clear decision to assume responsibility. The considerable procrastination often preceding this step is encouraged by the human proclivity to expect others to take the lead. This “diffusion of responsibility” is encouraged by the identification by ordinary members of the public of figures—such as policemen or soldiers—whom they consider to be more suited to such action. Bystander intervention requires the completion of step four of the process: the perception that they are indeed competent to do so. A slight, unfit man would stand little chance in fighting off a large man who had already demonstrated his readiness to inflict considerable violence. After clearing this last hurdle, the fifth and final step has to be taken—the decision to intervene. The corresponding resolution to this end can be prevented or at least impeded by fears of social embarrassment.325 Having overcome such considerations, the decision to intervene now depends on three further factors: a cost-benefit analysis; the salient norms of obligation; and emotions. A bystander is considerably more prepared to act should he stand to gain a reward.326 The threat of negative consequences, on the 323

See Reto V. Schneider, “Das Experiment—Warum hilft niemand?” in NZZ Folio from April 2007, accessed August 22, 2012, http://folio.nzz.ch/2007/ april/warum-hilft-niemand. 324 Cf. John A. Darley and Bibb Latané, “Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 8 (1968): 377-83. 325 See Dieter Frey, Tobias Greitemeyer, Peter Fischer, and Daniela Niesta, “Psychologische Theorien hilfreichen Verhaltens,” in Nonprofit Organisationen in Wirtschaft, Recht und Gesellschaft, ed. Klaus J. Hopt, Thomas von Hippel, and Wolfgang R. Walz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 177–96. 326 See Irving Piliavin, Jane Piliavin, and Judith Rodin, “Costs, Diffusion, and the Stigmatized Victim,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975): 429–38.

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other hand, saps such a readiness.327 Those placing great importance on values such as justice, democracy and equality—and thus feeling an obligation for others—are more likely to help.328 Investigating emotional involvement, C. Daniel Batson and his team found that those empathizing with the victims of such attacks were more ready to help.329 Anger and outrage have also been shown to play an important role in such decisions.330 Seeking to ease the path through the stages towards civil courage, a number of training programs, have been designed to enable ordinary people to make a considered response to violence.331 Such training schemes are also viewed as an instrument through which to spread democratic values. Usually aimed at the training of multipliers, these programs enable teachers or other authority figures to lead their charges through Latané and Darley’s five-stage process.332 The majority of traditional measures of prosocial behavior are based on altruism. The statements included in the altruism scale developed by Rushton, Chrisjohn, and Fekken do not incorporate a perpetrator, rather focus on situations such as: “I once helped a stranger to free his car from 327

See Bibb Latané and Steve Nida, “The Effects of Group Size on Helping Behaviour,” in Altruism and helping behavior, ed. J. Phillipe Rushton (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1981), 287–313. 328 See C. Daniel Batson, “Altruism and Prosocial Behaviour,” in Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology, 282–316. 329 See C. Daniel Batson, “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related But Distinct Phenomena,” in The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, ed. Jean Decety and William Ickes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), 3–15; C. Daniel Batson, “Two Forms of Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another Feels and Imagining How You Would Feel,” in Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation, ed. Keith D. Markman, William M. P. Klein, and Julie A. Suhr (New York: Psychology Press, 2009), 267–79. 330 See Manfred Schmitt, Mario Gollwitzer, Jürgen Maes, and Dima Arbach, “Justice Sensitivity: Assessment and Location in the Personality Space,” European Journal of Psychological Assessment 21 (2005): 202–11. 331 See an overview of Kai J. Jonas, Margarete Boos, and Veronika Brandstätter, Zivilcourage trainieren! Theorie und Praxis (Göttingen: Hogrefe, 2007). 332 See Dieter Frey, Martin Winkler, Peter Fischer, Norbert Bruckmeier, Patrizia Glöckner, Walter König, Dieter Mutz, and Robert Spies, “Zammgerauft: Ein Training von Antigewalt bis Zivilcourage für Kinder und Jugendliche,” in Jonas, Boos, and Brandstätter, Zivilcourage trainieren!, 137–204; Anne Frey-Gaska, Dieter Frey, Andreas Kastenmüller, Peter Fischer, Robert Spies, and Angelika Manzenrieder, “‘Aufgschaut’: Ein Projekt zur Förderung von Selbstbehauptung und Zivilcourage,” in Jonas, Boos, and Branstätter, Zivilcourage trainieren!, 107– 37.

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snow” or “I once helped a friend to move house.” As such, they did not involve any negative social consequences. Responding to this situation, the “Munich measure of civil courage” developed by Peter Fischer and Dieter Frey seeks to measure civil courage.333 Divided into three subscales—verbal civil courage, civil courage in the work place, and civil courage during episodes of physical violence—it consists of a number of statements. Examples from each of the three sub scales include: “you are traveling in a train. A group of youths crack racist jokes;” “a group of colleagues try to isolate one of your other workmates;” and “a young woman in the underground is being picked on by two aggressive neoNazis, who are apparently ready to use violence.” Correlating with each other, the three sub-scales combine to create an overall civil courage scale. A study from Harald Welzer, Michael Plauen, and Christoph Herrmann conducted between 2009 and 2012 investigated the general human proclivity to eschew independent thought and action in favor of various forms of herd behavior.334 Seeking the reasons for this phenomenon, the authors of the study saw that this tendency to “go with the flow” was often rooted in our genetic makeup. Pronounced individualism, especially when exhibited in extraordinary situations, places the group in danger and threatens its survival. In times of stress, we rely on the judgment of our peers and doubt that our judgment should be any better than that of the others. Indeed, Welzer, Plauen, and Herrmann were unable to find any specific character traits, situations, or even socializing influences which enabled certain individuals to resist extreme group pressures such as those to which ordinary Germans were subjected during the time of the Third Reich. It would appear that those individuals—all drawn from a diverse range of backgrounds—prepared to oppose or at least not comply with the demands of the Nazi regime were able to do so through their ability to perceive alternatives to the general trend, even when subject to considerable stress. When considering the motivation of such people— often termed as heroes—the authors of the study identified a range of incentives ranging from high idealism to base self-interest. Others were moved by a combination of the two. In other further cases, the study remained unable to advance an explanation for their acts of courage and

333

See Andreas Kastenmüller, Tobias Greitemeyer, Peter Fischer, and Dieter Frey, “Das Münchner Zivilcourage-Instrument (MüZI): Entwicklung und Validierung,” Diagnostica 53 (2007): 205–17. 334 See Autonomie: Handlungsspielräume des Selbst www.kulturwissenschaften. de/home/projekt-44.html (accessed on February 28, 2013).

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altruism.335 Indeed, many acted without much prior consideration of the matter. Suddenly finding themselves in their new and often unaccustomed role, they were unable to explain how they got there. Once in the invidious position of extreme illegality, these individuals soon sought—and found— allies in a similar position and together developed an ideology of resistance and moral discrimination. The networks which they built were striking in their social heterogeneity. It was this level of cooperation between this diverse group of “socially-adaptive and independentlyminded, materialists and idealists which enabled [them] to complete these complex tasks.”336 .

Solidarity with the out-group and the reduction of prejudice through empathy Those individuals failing to reach their goals by themselves have the option of forming an alliance with like-minded individuals. Solidarity within such groups—expressed through altruism, support and cooperation337—is seen as vital to common success. Although usually viewing other out-groups as rivals, many recognize that their aims can better be realized338 through cooperation with their competitors. 335

See Marten Düring, Illegal Support Networks for Persecuted Jews During the “Third Reich”—Data Gathering and the Visual Representation of Activities, Relational Patterns and Network Structures (Diss. Phil.: Mainz, 2012); Idem. and Susanne Beer, “Hilfe für verfolgte Juden im Nationalsozialismus: Biographische und sozialstrukturelle Zugänge am Beispiel der Berliner Helferin Ruth AndreasFriedrich,” Medaon 5 (2011): 1–17; Marten Düring, “Das Dilemma zwischen Effizienz und Sicherheit: Über die Beziehungen zwischen Verfolgten des Nationalsozialismus und ihren Helfern,” Informationen: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift des Studienkreises Deutscher Widerstand 1933–1945, no. 73 (2011): 19–24; idem., “Hilfe für Verfolgte während des Nationalsozialismus: Ein systematischer Vergleich von Egonetzwerken,” in Vom Papier zum Laptop? Perspektiven elektronischer Tools zur partizipativen Visualisierung und Analyse sozialer Netzwerke, ed. Michael Schönhuth, et al. (Bielefeld, forthcoming). 336 Natalie Knapp, “Der Stoff, aus dem Helden sind,” Die Zeit no. 10 February 28, 2013, 40. Cf. idem., Kompass neues Denken: Wie wir uns in einer unübersichtlichen Welt orientieren können (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2013). 337 See Helmut Thome, “Solidarity: Theoretical Perspectives for Empirical Research,” in Solidarity, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 101–31; 102. 338 See Waldemar Lilly and Manuela Luber, “Solidarität aus sozialpsychologischer Sicht,” in Solidarität: Konflikt, Umwelt und Dritte Welt, ed. Hans-Werner Bierhoff and Detlef Fetchenhauer (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2001), 272–91.

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Observers generally differentiate between two forms of solidarity— group-immanent and cross-group solidarity.339 The first form refers to the existence of common interests shared by a number of individuals who have joined together in order to pursue their aims. Such organizations include labor unions and political parties. Charitable organizations such as Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières practice such cross-group solidarity by providing aid and assistance to out-groups. According to the value cycle theory put forward by S.H. Schwartz, certain values (such as prosperity, social power, or respect) are subsumed under the pole of selfelevation, whereas others (including responsibility, social justice, and peace work) are viewed from the perspective of self-discipline. Whereas group-immanent solidarity has an egotistical motivation, cross-group solidarity is taken as an expression of self-restraint. Here, personal interest assumes a lower priority compared to the fulfilment of moral duty. Aiming at reaching a balance between give and take, group-immanent solidarity aims to establish a situation of equilibrium from which the in-group profits. Cross-group solidarity, on the other hand, takes its cue from humanitarian values emphasizing the demands of responsibility.340 Based on such considerations, the empathy-altruism hypothesis can be used to differentiate between prosocial behavior originating in egoism on the one hand and altruism on the other.341 Whilst the former aims at improving the well-being of the helper, those moved to act on altruistic considerations do so to improve the situation of the person they are helping. One example of cross-group solidarity is the spontaneous charitable donations made by members of the public in response to a range of humanitarian catastrophes. Empathy is highly important in such cases— the European appeals for the victims of the tsunami in East Asia in December 2004 gathered considerable funds, not least due to the presence of many European tourists in the region.342 Raising sensibilities during social situations, empathy makes its practitioners more aware of the feelings of others. Whilst egotistical people tend to avoid emergency situations, altruists respond with help. 339

See Hans Werner Bierhoff, Prosocial Behavior (New York: Psychology Press, 2002). 340 See Robert A. Hinde, “Responsibility: A Biological Perspective,” in Responsibility—The Many Faces of a Social Phenomenon, eds. Hans-Werner Bierhoff and Ann Elisabeth Auhage (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 22–33. 341 See Hans-Werner Bierhoff, “Empathie-Altruismus-Hypothese,” in Bierhoff and Frey, Handbuch der Sozialpsychologie und Kommunikationspsychologie, 150–57. 342 See Batson, “These Things Called Empathy.”

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Nevertheless, the provision of assistance often follows from a mixed motivation. Whilst many undertake charity work for the social recognition that it brings, they also harbor some feeling for the suffering of victims. True motivations are often revealed over time through the continued presence of the helper in an emergency situation; instead of fleeing, they stay and help. Altruistic responses are conditioned less by their context than the empathy of their practitioners. Indeed, empathy is not reduced upon their leaving a precarious situation but only upon the elimination of suffering. Empathy is often triggered by the awareness of similarities between the victim and the observer. Other factors include feelings of guilt and the perception of social injustice. The empathy-prejudice reaction model assumes that, if felt towards a member of a stigmatized group, empathy can result in a reduction of prejudice towards the group as a whole.343 Nevertheless, such a development requires a particularly high degree of personal identification with the victim, their considerable suffering and the transfer of this concern to the wider group as a whole. Should all these conditions be given, the long-term change in attitudes towards and solidarity with the group as a whole can be considerable.344 “The translation of empathy into solidarity seems to be effected via the reduction of prejudice.”345 Outrage at injustice and feelings of guilt at individual privilege can trigger cross-group solidarity amongst empathetic people. This serves to reduce the level of prejudice articulated towards the underprivileged.

343

See C. Daniel Batson, Marina P. Polycarpou, Eddi Hormon-Jones, Heidi J. Imhoff, Erin C. Mitchener, Lori L. Bednar, Tricia R. Klein, and Lori Highberger, “Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997): 105–18. 344 See Hans-Werner Bierhoff, Solidarity as Ingroup and Outgroup Phenomena: 14th General Meeting of the Association of Experimental Social Psychology (Würzburg, 2005). 345 Quoted in Lars-Eric Petersen and Bernd Six, Stereotype, Vorurteile und soziale Diskriminierung (Weinheim: Beltz, 2008), 345.

CHAPTER THREE EXPERIENCE, NARRATION AND MEMORY “With Copernicus and Galileo, man ceased to be the species located at the center […] of the universe […]. With Darwin, he ceased to be the species created and specially endowed by God with soul and reason. With Freud, he ceased to be the species whose behavior was—potentially—governable by rational mind. As we begin to produce mechanisms that think and learn, he has ceased to be the species, uniquely capable of complex, intelligent manipulation of his environment.” Herbert A. Simon (1977)1 “How do you give a memory to the animal, man? How do you impress something upon this partly dull, partly idiotic, inattentive mind, this personification of forgetfulness, so that it will stick? […] A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the memory: only something that continues to hurt stays in the memory […].” Friedrich Nietzsche (1887)2

Nature vs. nurture? The Western debate over learning and memory has fluctuated between empiricism and nativism since its inception.3 Aristotle (384–322 BC), 1

Herbert A. Simon, “What Computers Mean for Man and Society,” Science 195 (1977): 1186–1191; quotation: 1190. 2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality [1887], ed. by Keith AnsellPearson, transl. by Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 38. 3 See Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1999), 170ff.; 194ff.; 379ff.; 395ff.; 545ff.; David Hothersall, History of Psychology (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004); Eric Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind (New York: Norton, 2006); Monika Pritzel, Matthias Brand, and Hans J. Markowitsch, Gehirn und Verhalten: Ein Grundkurs der physiologischen Psychologie (Heidelberg: Spektrum, 2009); Mark A. Gluck, Eduardo Mercado, and Catherine E. Myers, Learning and Memory: From Brain to Behavior (New York: Worth Publishers, 2014), 3ff.;

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polymath and observer of nature was the first empiricist to develop a theory of memory based on the laws of association. The establishment of links between feelings or thoughts—associations—are the product of experience, events, or merely things experienced simultaneously in time or space. Involving an experience of either temporal or spatial contiguity, once observed, such constellations are interpreted as belonging together. Upon hearing the word “fork,” the average person immediately thinks of a “knife.” The frequency with which we perceive the two instruments simultaneously determines the strength of their mental association. The third principle of association is that of similarity: usually made of the same material, both used to eat a meal, located next to each other in the kitchen, and usually placed next to a plate. A number of factors combine to establish a high degree of similarity between what remain entirely different objects. Whilst regarding knowledge as the product of thoughts and experience, Aristotle’s teacher Plato (427–347 BC) believed it to be in-born. Housed in and transmitted by our immortal soul, he saw that the innate differences in the level of knowledge, which each individual possessed, established a natural hierarchy of ability and talent. After disappearing from medieval Western thought, both theories enjoyed a revival upon the birth of modern science in the 15th century. Positing a clear body-mind dualism, René Descartes (1596–1650) followed Plato in his acceptance of a nativist conception of knowledge.4 The empiricism of John Locke (1632–1704) followed the Aristotelian conception of knowledge as the product of experience.5 For Locke, even complex ideas and thoughts originated in a process of simple associations, which combined elementary ideas gathered via our senses. He suggested that an individual’s ability owed nothing to his social class or any other form of innate nature; rather he saw it as the product of a process of lifelong learning. This egalitarian approach eventually found expression in the Declaration of American Independence. Influenced by Locke’s philosophy,

Christian Gudehus, Ariane Eichenberg, and Harald Welzer, eds., Gedächtnis und Erinnerung: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 2010). 4 See Rene Descartes, Von der Methode des richtigen Vernunftgebrauchs und der wissenschaftlichen Forschung [1637] (critical edition, Hamburg: Meiner, 1997). 5 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690] (critical edition, Hassocks, 1978); idem., Some Thoughts Concerning Education (London, 1693).

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Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826)6 ensured that its text was guided by an anthropology in which men were “created equal” and endowed with the “unalienable rights […] to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”7 As an ideology, democracy was based on an empiricism postulating universal human equality: differences were explained by reference to people’s very different life experiences. Meanwhile in continental Europe, philosophers and mathematicians, such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), objected that human talents were the result of a combination of inheritance and learning.8 Modern science has reached a similar conclusion: providing a number of predispositions, the talents that our genetic material endows us can be modified throughout the course of our lives through learning and experience. The first psychologist William James (1842–1904) also numbers amongst the empiricists. Analyzing methods of learning and the development of habits in his two-volume consideration of the Principles of Psychology9, he established both mechanisms as the combination of associations themselves developed in a process of experience.

Evolution and natural selection A further field in which the nativist / empiricist debate was conducted concerned the question of the unique nature of man. Whilst the disciples of Plato, Descartes, and the Church all believed that man was matchless in his existence, others, following Aristotle, drew a number of parallels between the Homo sapiens and other species. The discovery, by Charles Darwin’s grandfather Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), that adaptations made within one generation of a species were transmitted to the next, implied the possibility of the development of a new species.10 Sharing his grandfather’s conviction that all beings are subject to constant change,

6

See Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch, eds., Die amerikanischen Präsidenten (Munich: Beck, 1995), 73-86. 7 For the text of the American Declaration of Independence, see John J. Patrick, The Bill of Rights: A History in Documents (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), esp. 47–49. 8 See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand [1704] (critical edition, Berlin: Adamant Media Corporation, 2003). 9 See William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York and London, 1890); William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (New York, 1892). 10 See Erasmus Darwin, Zoönomia, or the Organic Laws of Life, vol. I, [1794] (critical edition, New York: AMS Press, 1974).

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Charles Darwin (1809–1882) developed the theory of natural selection.11 According to this theory, species develop under a number of given conditions. After becoming hereditary, a new characteristic must be present in a number of forms and provide an “adaptive benefit,” conferring an increased chance of survival and reproduction on its holder. Darwin’s writings, especially The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex,12 met with criticism from a number of quarters. Although essentially a work of biology, his findings carried wide-ranging implications for a number of disciplines, ranging from theology and philosophy to the political and social sciences.13 His new thinking represented a forceful challenge to the teachings of the Church, especially the doctrine of a creator God, the relation of mankind to nature and the relationship between body and soul. Viewing mankind as but one of a number of evolutionary products and not the apex of creation contradicted not only theological orthodoxy, but a number of accepted philosophical traditions.14 Sigmund Freud dubbed the theory of evolution as one of the three affronts to mankind’s self-infatuation.15 According to Darwin, human behavior could be subject to the influence not only of individual experience, but the process of natural selection.16 The human ability to learn and remember conferred an adaptive advantage far in excess of that enjoyed by other life forms. Nevertheless, for Darwin, acquired knowledge was not inheritable. However, a number of subsequent investigations would seem to suggest

11

See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London, 1859), with a forward by Edward J. Larson (New York: Signet Classics, 2009). See also Franz Wuketits, Darwin und der Darwinismus (Munich: Beck, 2005); Eve-Marie Engels, Charles Darwin (Munich: Beck, 2007). 12 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex [1883] (critical edition, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009). 13 See Engels, Darwin, 208. See also Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design (New York: Norton, 1986). 14 See Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution and Inheritance (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003), 438. 15 Sigmund Freud, “Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse,” in Gesammelte Werke 12 (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 1999), 6–8; Sigmund Freud, “Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse,” in Gesammelte Werke 11 (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer., 1998), 294–95. 16 See Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals [1872] (critical edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

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that changes to behavior first acquired and then subject to long practice can become embedded in the genetic code of a species.17 Working with the theory of natural selection, another of Erasmus Darwin’s grandchildren, Francis Galton (1822–1911), rejected the conception of the equality of mankind at birth developed by Locke and others. He was convinced “that a man’s natural abilities are derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as are the form and physical features of the whole organic world.”18 Employing a range of experimental and statistical methods to substantiate his theory, he became an advocate of programmatic selection to improve the human stock. As such, he can be viewed as the father of eugenics.19

Experimental learning psychology and the psychology of memory The discipline of memory research was pioneered by the psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909).20 Using himself as an experimental subject, he sought to remember a list of twenty made-up words in order to examine the way in which information is not only saved but forgotten. In doing so, he discovered the four main phases of learning: learning, resting, examination, and repetition. He also investigated the speed with which such information is then forgotten (the forgetting curve) and the time required to re-learn (the saving method). Using his “memory curve,” he demonstrated that forgetting is strong in the short-term and reduces with the passage of time. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) discovered the principle of animal learning. Observing the behavior of dogs about to be fed, he saw that they were capable of association—they began to salivate even before receiving their food. Indeed, the mechanism was triggered by 17

See James Mark Baldwin, “A New Factor in Evolution,” American Naturalist 30 (1896): 441–51; 536–53; James Fisher and Robert Hinde, “The Opening of Milk Bottles by Birds,” British Birds 42 (1949): 347–57; James Fisher and Robert Hinde, “Further Observations on the Opening of Milk Bottles by Birds,” British Birds 44 (1951): 392–96; Bruce Weber and David Depew, Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). 18 Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences (London, 1869), 1. 19 See Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (London: Macmillan and co, 1883). 20 See Hermann Ebbinghaus, Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology (New York, 1885).

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the mere sight of their food bowl, or by hearing the footsteps of the person bringing their food. Working with this insight, he was able to condition the dogs to associate the sounding of a bell with the arrival of a meal. Such a stimulus-reaction sequence is now referred to as classical conditioning.21 Pavlov also demonstrated the adaptability of such reactions, which declined as soon as food failed to follow the sounding of the bell. This he termed extinction. A further variation on this mechanism was that of stimulus generalization—a new stimulus, similar to its predecessor, provoked a similar reaction, in this case saliva flow, which declined to the same extent that it deviated from the old stimulus. New knowledge was transferred to new events and problems. Working at the same time, the American Edward Thorndike (1874– 1949) demonstrated how animals learn connections between stimuli, reactions, and behavior. This learning process, in which animals behave in a specific fashion in order to provoke (or avoid) a specific set of consequences, is known as instrumental conditioning. Thorndike succeeded in demonstrating that this specific behavior was adapted to the results which it generated. Should it effect the desired consequence (e.g. access to food), the probability of its future repetition increased. The incidence of negative consequences for the animal resulted in decreased incidence of the behavior. Thorndike was convinced that learning psychologists should search for rules to describe how, when, and the extent to which the connection between stimulus and reaction was moderated by experience.22

Between behaviorism, cognitive learning and mathematical models Continuing the empirical approach to this topic, by which psychologists restricted themselves to observable events at the expense of “inner” mental processes, the American psychologist John Watson (1878– 1958) established the psychological school of behaviorism. Placing animals in a labyrinth, he rewarded those that managed to find the way out in less than 10 seconds. Having taken operative steps to rule out other possible sources of orientation, Watson concluded that the animals were in possession of a number of automatic motor habits acquired independently 21 See Ivan P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1927). 22 See Edward L. Thorndike, The Fundamentals of Learning (New York: Columbia University, 1932); Selected Writings from a Connectionist’s Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949).

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of their reaction to sensory stimuli, which enabled them locate the exit of the labyrinth.23 In conducting his experiments, Watson aimed at establishing learning psychology as an experimental science in its own right, designed to predict and control certain forms of behavior.24 As a strict empiricist, he was convinced that people could be conditioned by their environment in a manner entirely independent of their talents, inclinations, skills, or disposition.25 After losing his position at the Johns Hopkins University as the result of an extra-marital affair, he was forced to begin a second career as a marketing researcher and made ground-breaking insights in advertising psychology.26 A further step in the development of learning psychology as an exact science was taken by Clark Hull (1884–1952). Seeking to present the motor behavioral traits of the animals in the labyrinth as the product of stimulus-response learning, he sought to express his observations as a mathematical equation. In this way, he hoped to take into account the number of learning attempts and the interval between them, the incidence of mechanisms of reinforcement, the intensity of stimulus signals and the maximum efficiency of the reward.27 Nevertheless, he failed to consider all the variables involved in what amounted to a complex learning process, and was unable to express them all in a mathematical equation. The most well-known and perhaps the most dazzling behaviorist, Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904–1990),28 developed his “Skinner Box,” a fully-automatic teaching apparatus for the investigation of animal instruction.29 Using a recording device known as a cumulative recorder, Skinner recorded every noise issued by the animals involved in his experiments. Continuing where Thorndike had left off, he set himself apart 23

See John B. Watson, “Kinaesthetic and Organic Sensations: Their Role in the Reactions of the White Rat to the Maze,” Psychological Review 4 (1907): 211–12. 24 See John B. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Sees It,” Psychological Review 23 (1913): 158–77. 25 See John B. Watson, Behaviorism (New York, 1924), esp. 84. 26 See John B. Watson, “What Cigarettes Are You Smoking and Why?” The J. Walter Thompson News Bulletin 88 (1922): 1–7, See Chapter 4, How Emotions Control Our Consumption Behavior. 27 See Clark L. Hull, Principles of Behavior (New York and London: AppletonCentury company, 1943); Clark L. Hull, A Behavior System: An Introduction to Behavior Theory Concerning the Individual Organism (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952). 28 See Burrhus F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York: Vintage Books, 1976). 29 See Burrhus F. Skinner, “A Case History in Scientific Method,” American Psychologist 11 (1956): 221–33.

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from Pavlov through his coining of the phrase operant conditioning—a concept that places the stress within a sequence of movements on the consequence (e.g. the provision of food). His real discovery was that the animals learnt just as well—and sometimes even better—when not rewarded immediately after providing the desired reaction, but after its second or even third manifestation. Working with this concept of intermitting reinforcement, he launched a further, even more complex research program to investigate how the reliability with which a desired reaction was followed by a positive consequence influenced the course of learning.30 Skinner also interpreted language acquisition as a form of behavior as subject to the same laws as that of all other forms of learning.31 Skinner’s fame also rests on his writing of a number of influential novels infused with his behaviorist ideas. In Walden Two,32 he described a utopian society organized around principles of socially-desired behavior which were reinforced by the special programs, which he had developed in his animal experiments. A further novel, Beyond Freedom and Dignity from 1971,33 presented human consciousness and free will as pure illusions. According to Skinner, human behavior was nothing more than an acquired repertoire of reactions to environmental stimuli.34 Despite attracting considerable attention, Skinner was forced to witness the decline in influence of behaviorism and the move in scientific interest to the very internal mental processes of learning, which he held to be irrelevant. Working in the 1930s and 1940s, Edward Tolman (1886–1959) sought to demonstrate the intrinsic motivation of the animals placed in a labyrinth to learn its structure, a motivation that enabled them to produce a cognitive map of the maze structure.35 For Tolman, this inner plan represented the key to uncovering the mechanism behind an animal’s ability to transfer 30 See Burrhus F. Skinner, The Behavior of Organism: An Experimental Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century company, 1938). 31 See Burrhus F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957). The reductionism presented here was subject to strong criticism from Noam Chomsky, “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior,” Language 35 (1959): 26–58; see also: “A Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior,” in Readings in the Psychology of Language, ed. Leon A. Jakobovits and Murray S. Miron (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1967), 142–43. 32 See Burrhus F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: Macmillan, 1948). 33 See Burrhus F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 1971). 34 See Burrhus F. Skinner, The Shaping of a Behaviorist: Part Two of an Autobiography (New York: Knopf, 1979). 35 See Edward C. Tolman, “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men,” Psychological Review 55 (1948): 189–208.

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newly-acquired skills and insights to new situations. Blocking off the animals’ favored exit from the labyrinth or relocating the entrance did not phase the animals as they soon adapted to the changes. Such latent learning enabled animals who had become familiar with the maze to beat competitors (who had not been conferred such an advantage) in a competition for the food placed at its center. None of this can be explained by recourse to a simple stimulus-reaction schema. Positing the existence of multiple learning procedures, Tolman concluded that a number of these mechanisms were inexplicable in terms of function and focus, which could only be inferred. Behaviorism was even more limited in terms of the higher cognitive processes, such as language and perception,36 logical thought and memory. William K. Estes (1919–2011) developed a new conditioning process, which he named conditioned emotional reactions. Using it to investigate acquired reactions of fear, he demonstrated how hungry animals learned not to operate a lever supplying food (and, indeed, to interrupt all behavior) upon hearing a signal warning of an impending electric shock.37 Later, he expressed mental processes in mathematical models modifying the stimulus-reaction relationship to the extent that only one element of the stimulus was associated with the reaction. Referring to this approach as stimulus sampling theory, he showed its greater explanatory power over other theories in terms of the random aspects of learning processes. He demonstrated that the activation during an experiment of a number of elements, previously not associated with the reaction, first needed to be learnt by the participating animals unless similarities enabled a certain element of generalization.38 Also making recourse to mathematical models, Gordon Bower (born in 1932) concentrated on developing an explanation for learning through insight.39 Different testpersons complete various tasks at varying speeds. Having found the solution, speedy repetition of the same task is a matter of course. Averaging the first search phase over a number of people produces a continually increasing learning curve. Individual learning performance 36

See E. Bruce Goldstein, Sensation and Perception (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), esp. 21ff. 37 See William K. Estes and Burrhus E. Skinner, “Some Quantitative Properties of Anxiety,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (1941): 390–400. 38 See William K. Estes, “Towards a Statistical Theory of Learning,” Psychological Review 57 (1950): 94–107. 39 See Gordon H. Bower, “Application of a Model to Paired-Associate Learning,” Psychometrika 26 (1961): 255–80; Gordon H. Bower and Tom Trabasso, Attention in Learning: Theory and Research (New York: Wiley, 1968).

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can deviate from this curve considerably depending on the length of time each individual required to solve the problem for the first time. Applying the information theory to learning psychological processes, George Miller (1920–2012) sought to demonstrate the degree to which the effectiveness of communicated knowledge depends on the level of previous knowledge on the part of the recipient. His work also highlighted which signals were decoded in which manner and the level of differentiation exhibited in the judgments subsequently reached. Focusing on the latter, he demonstrated that humans assess matters across a sevenstage rating scale. This explains why the majority of opinion polls ask respondents to reply on a scale of one to seven. Investigating the human short-term memory, his experiments established that the majority of people were able to learn and repeat a five to nine digit sequence (seven plus or minus two) without error, yet encountered considerable difficulties with sequences of greater length. He concluded that the number seven had a specific significance.40 Focusing on decision-making process, Herbert Simon (1916–2001) sought an explanation for the human propensity to settle for second best. Illustrating human intelligence and memory by reference to its computer equivalent, he demonstrated how both processed, saved, and retrieved information in a similar fashion.41 He sought to demonstrate that cognitive processes were not based on associations; rather they were mental manipulations of symbols representing concepts, thoughts, and objects all drawn from the outside world.42 Continuing this approach, David Rumelhart (1942–2011) explained human cognition not as the manipulation of symbols, but in terms of networks of unitary and non-signifying connections between simple process units—nodes.43 Within this connectionist model, the outside world was represented not by symbols, but patterns of activation made up of 40

George A. Miller, “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on our Capacity for Processing Information,” Psychological Review 63 (1956): 81–97. 41 See Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert Simon, “Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving,” Psychological Review 65 (1958): 151–66. 42 See Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, “Computer Science as Empirical Enquiry: Symbols and Search,” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery 19 (1976): 113–26. 43 See David Rumelhart and James McClelland, “On Learning the Past Tenses of English Verbs,” in Parallel Distributed Processing: Exploration in the Microstructure of Cognition, vol. 2, Psychological and Biological Models, ed. James McClelland and David Rumelhart (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 216–71.

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node populations. Thinking now in terms of brain structure and function, psychologists were able to work closely together with the neurosciences.

From behavior to the brain function and back Neuroscience rests on the assumption that the brain is the location of all learning and memory.44 During learning, brain activity controls the changes in behavior produced by all forms of insight. Although familiar with the central role of the brain, the pioneers of learning science, such as Pavlov, lacked the technology to investigate its structure and, thus, were restricted to a focus on behavior. The technology required to address this shortcoming has been developed only over the last 20 years. At the center of the human nervous system, the brain is a tissue of neurons or nerve cells, specializing in the processing of information.45 Receiving, processing, and answering sensory information—visual, audio, taste, smell, and tactile in nature—the neurons permit bodily responses and their coordination. The nervous system is divided into two parts, the central nervous system (CNS) and the peripheral nervous system (PNS); the latter consists of nerve fibers, which transmit information from sensory receptors to the CNS. Once processed, the PNS then relays decisions in the form of orders from the CNS to the muscles and organs. With the exception of a very few receptors, such as the eyes, which relay information directly to the brain, the majority of these connections are transmitted via the spinal cord. The upper and lateral parts of the brain are covered by a tissue referred to as the cerebral cortex. The largest single structure in the human brain, the cerebral cortex, fits in our skull only through being folded several times.

44 See Niels Birbaumer and Robert F. Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie (Heidelberg: Springer, 2006); Larry R. Squire, Darwin Berg, Floyd E. Bloom, Sascha du Lac, Anirvan Ghosh, and Nicholas C. Spitzer, Fundamental Neuroscience (Amsterdam, Boston, and Heidelberg: Academic Press, 2008); Stephen Goldberg, Clinical Neuroanatomy (Miami: MedMaster, 2010). 45 See Gerhard Roth, Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten: Warum es schwierig ist, sich und andere zu ändern (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 33–64.

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Fig. 1: The lateral view of the human brain and its functions showing the cerebral cortex with its coils (gyrus/gyri) and furrows (sulcus/sulci), and the stronglyfurrowed cerebellum. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

The brain is made up of two near-identical halves, the left and right hemispheres. These are further subdivided into the frontal lobes, the parietal lobes, the temporal lobes and the occipital lobes. The diversity of perceptions and cognitive faculties open to a human are spread across the cortex. With the frontal lobes responsible for the planning and execution of actions, the occipital lobes enable us to consider and recognize the world. The parietal lobes permit differentiation between surfaces; whilst the temporal lobes enable hearing and memory of our actions. Located somewhat below and beneath the cortex, the cerebellum is responsible for the coordination of movement and, above all, learning processes involving motor reactions. The brainstem is located at the base of the brain on the transition to the spinal cord, itself involved in the control of automatic functions, such as breathing and the regulation of body temperature. Situated close, the center of the brain is the thalamus, a structure which receives sensory information—ranging from pictures,

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sounds or tactile information—from the peripheral nervous system and which forwards these into the brain. Close to the thalamus are the basal ganglia, node-like structures associated with the planning and execution of acquired movements. Both temporal lobes house a hippocampus that is involved in the learning of facts and autobiographical memory. Located at the tip of the hippocampus are the amygdalae, these supplement our memories with an emotional component.

Fig. 2: Lateral cross section of the human brain showing the six main sections of the brain and its functions (plus the spinal cord). The brainstem consists of the afterbrain, the pons, and midbrain, and controls functions vital to life such as heartbeat and respiration. The interbrain is viewed as the information filter and regulates the day-sleep rhythm and the hormonal regime. The two brain halves are joined by the corpus callosum. The cerebellum regulates movement and is central to the control of balance. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

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Fig. 3: Side view of the human brain showing the most important limbic centers. These centers are the location of the development of affects, positive (nucleus accumbens, ventrales tegmentales areal) and negative feelings (amygdala), the organization of memory (hippocampus), the control of concentration and consciousness (locus coeruleus, thalamus) and the control of vegetative functions (hypothalamus). Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

Even the early phrenologists suspected that neurological functions were assigned to certain specific areas in the brain.46 Nevertheless, subsequent research found that the actual level of specialization was not as far-ranging as originally assumed.47 Today, we know that the engrams, localized memory traces, are not situated not in the cortex, but sub-cortical 46

See Franz Joseph Gall and Johann Spurzheim, Anatomie et physiologie du système nerveux en général, et du cerveau en particulier, avec des observations sur lapossibilité de reconnaitre plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de l’homme et des animeaux, par la configuration de leur têtes (Paris, 1810). 47 See Karl Lashley, “Studies of the Cerebral Function in Learning: V. The Retention of Motor Habits After Destruction of the So-Called Motor Areas in Primates,” Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 12 (1924): 249–76.

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structures, such as the cerebellum.48 The combined results of multiple research projects established that the brain consists of a number of highlyspecialized systems responsible for the acceptance, processing, and saving of information. The various specialisms of the brain are not clearly divided by region with each action accorded to a specific location. Rather, a far more complicated situation involves a single action being controlled across multiple brain areas. The existence of two parallel nervous systems was an insight from the 19th century. Comprising a sensory and motor system, each leading to and from the brain via the spinal cord, it was found that spinal reflexes could trigger actions without the involvement of the brain. A sensory input channeled into the spinal cord activates motor nerves emerging from the spinal cord, which trigger an involuntary reaction. For example, touching a source of heat effects the immediate and entirely automatic removal of the hand. The majority of sensory information is transmitted to the thalamus from where it is relayed to the primary sensory cortex region. Each area in this region is specialized in the processing of specific sensory stimuli. For instance, whilst sound is processed in the primary auditory cortex situated in the temporal lobe, touch stimuli are processed in the primary somatosensory cortex in the parietal lobe, and light stimuli by the primary visual cortex in the occipital lobe. Following initial processing, sense data is transmitted to the sensory cortices, the output of which is then sent to the surrounding cortical areas for further processing. Just as the sensory cortices are responsible for sensory stimuli, other areas of the brain are adapted to the control of movement. Activation of the primary motor cortex (situated in the frontal lobes), for example, produces coordinated movement. Immediately following the reception and processing of important information pertaining to the planning of actions and motor actions (both sent by the basal ganglia and cerebellum), the primary motor cortex emits signals to the brainstem, which, in turn, sends signals through the spinal cord to motor nerves. These activate muscles in a fashion designed to control specific actions. Further areas of the brain concerned with motor action—the cerebellum, basal ganglia, the frontal cortex, and the brainstem—transmit their own outputs. Bundled in the spinal cord and transmitted to the muscles, they are also vital to the subsequent actions. The immense effort of coordination required in such processes is soon made clear through the manifestations of illness and 48 See Richard F. Thompson, “The Search of Memory Traces,” Annual Review of Psychology 56 (2005): 1–23.

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infirmity. Declining nervous performance results in manifestations—stumbling, breakages, and spilled drinks.

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Imaging procedures for the recognition of the structure and function of the brain Powerful imaging procedures developed in the last 15 years provide an insight into the general structure of the brain and any damage which it has suffered. Computed Tomography (CT) assembles a number of x-ray images from various angles into a three-dimensional picture. These images are processed further to produce cross-sections of the brain’s various structures, providing a much more precise depiction of the growth of a tumor than a simple x-ray picture. Based on the principle of nuclear magnetic resonance, Magnetic Resonance Tomography (MRT)—often referred to as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)—works with electromagnetism using alternating magnetic fields in the radio frequency. Lying in the tube of a MRT scanner, a patient is surrounded by rings of magnets. Generating the alternating magnetic field with radio frequencies, these magnets stimulate specific atomic nuclei to resonate, which induce an electrical signal in a receiver circuit.49 The recordings are collated to generate a 3-D image of the brain in sections. When scanning the brain using this method, it is subdivided into 130,000 cubes of three mm² called voxels. A voxel contains up to 27 billion contact positions (synapses). The blood oxygen level dependent (Bold) is measured for each voxel. These structural imaging procedures are supplemented by functional imaging enabling exact observation of brain functions. Upon activation, a brain structure requires more oxygen and the blood flow increases correspondingly; the reverse is the case once the activity has ended. Registration of the blood flow in the local brain region enables observers to determine which sectors are currently active and which are not.

49 See Olaf Dössel, Bildgebende Verfahren in der Medizin: Von der Technik zur medizinischen Anwendung (Berlin: Springer, 2000); Wolfgang R. Nitz, Val M. Runge, Stuart H. Schmeets, William H. Faulkner, and Nilesh K. Desai, Praxiskurs MRT: Anleitung zur MRT-Physik über klinische Bildbeispiele (Stuttgart: Thieme, 2007); Timo Krings, “Grundlagen der funktionellen Magnetresonanztherapie,” in Neurobiologie der Psychotherapie, ed. Günther Schiepek (Stuttgart: Schattauer, 2004), 104–11.

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Fig. 4: A three-dimensional reconstruction of the macroscopic architecture of a human brain assembled on the basis of data generated by Magnetic Resonance Tomography. The two diagrams on the left-hand side show the lateral exterior view of the left and right halves of the brain. The two diagrams on the right-hand side show a cross-section of the brain center. The white, curved structure in the two right-hand diagrams represents the corpus callosum. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

One procedure of functional imaging, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) works with the injection of radio markers into the blood stream. These markers emit positrons (anti-electrons) through radioactive decay and can be tracked to give a measure of brain activity. The positron emitting marker concentrates on areas of high oxygen concentration. Locating the position of the positrons with a gamma spectroscope enables observers to compile a detailed spatial map of the brain. The blood flow can be determined from the concentration of the gamma rays. The changes in the blood flow are registered through comparison of brain activity at rest and during task-completion. During tasks, many brain areas display increased activity, others reduced activity. The changes in activity produce a differential picture expressing alteration in state through color coding. A further method for measuring brain activity is that of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). In a fashion similar to the structural

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MRT, the fMRI pictures of a brain produced at rest (baseline) and during activity are different, here due to the different levels of oxidization of the blood during the two states. The different activity patterns (BOLD signals) provided by the two pictures from each area of the brain indicate the brain engaged whilst performing different tasks. Both procedures tend to register similar results. However, the minimal differences involved still exercise researchers.50 A clear advantage of fMRI over PET is the requirement of the latter for the use of radioactive material. Both methods provide only an indirect measure of brain activity through tracking the blood flow and oxygen supply to the brain. Moreover, both are too slow to provide a real-time picture. Indeed, the two methods also carry the danger of over-interpretation. Many critics argue that overstating the benefits of these scans has led to them being misused to draw poorly justified conclusions.51 This applies especially to those brain functions involved in completing complex tasks and in the processing of emotions. Addressing the application of these methods in the social neurosciences, Edward Vul has even spoken of “voodoo correlations.”52 Electroencephalography (EEG) is a method of measuring electrical brain activity. A number of electrodes applied to the scalp register the alterations in the electrical activity of the brain. The record of tiny electrical discharges of neuron groups is called an electroencephalogram. The electrical changes involved upon receiving a sensual stimulus—such as hearing a tone—is determined through repeating the issue hundreds of times and then averaging the EEGs so as to establish specific activity patterns. Activity variations in other brain areas are averaged out by this procedure. These averaged EEGs are termed event-related potentials (ERPs). The changes in brain patterns involved in the completion of learning and memory activities can be followed through the changes in 50

See Joseph Devlin, Richard Russell, Matthew Davis, Cathy Price, Helen Moss, M. Jalal Fadili, and Lorraine Tyler, “Is There an Anatomical Basis for CategorySpecificity? Semantic Memory Studies in PET and fMRI,” Neuropsychologia 40 (2002): 54–75. 51 See Craig M. Bennett, Abigail A. Baird, Michael B. Miller, and George L. Wolford, “Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument for Proper Multiple Comparisons Correction,” Journal of Serendipitous and Unexpected Results 1 (2011): 1–5; Nikolaus Kriegeskorte, Martin Lindquist, Thomas Nichols, Russel Poldrack, and Edward Vul, “Everything You Never Wanted to Know About Circular Analysis—But Were Afraid to Ask,” Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow & Metabolism 30 (2010): 1551– 57. 52 See Edward Vul, “Voodoo Correlations: Have the Results of Some Brain Scanning Experiments Been Overstated?,” Scientific American, January 29, 2009.

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EEGs. This method enables a greater level of temporal precision than that provided by PET and fMRI. On the other hand, it provides a lower level of spatial precision. Researchers are currently attempting to combine the advantages of the EEG (monitoring change) with those of the fMRT (establishing location).

Neurons, synaptic plasticity, long-term potentiation and learning Some 100 million nerve cells or neurons combine to form the average human nervous system. In addition to sensory receptors located in the eyes, ears, and on the tongue, this also includes motor nerve strands, which relay orders from the spinal cord to the muscles. Neurons are adaptable, able to extend their function and mode of information processing. These changes constitute the basis of the neurological learning process. A standardized neuron consists of three main elements: 1. Dendrites on the input side receive signals from other neurons 2. The cell body, the soma, receives signals from the dendrites 3. Long nerve fibers or axons relay the information to other neurons The considerable degree of variation exhibited by neuron typologies in terms of size, function, and the number of axons necessitates reference to a standardized form. They are supplemented by almost double the number of glial, auxiliary, and nutritional cells. Glia cells fulfil a number of important functions. One is to surround the axons with myelin, a fatty isolation substance that facilitates the rapid and efficient transmission of electrical signals. Communicating neurons tend not to come into contact; they are separated by a minute gap termed a synapse or synaptic cleft. Information exchange between neurons is effected by chemical signals from neurotransmitter molecules crossing this cleft. The majority of synapses are located between an axon of a transmitting (presynaptic) neuron and the dendrite of a receiver (post-synaptic) neuron. Signal transmission begins via neurotransmitters located in small pouches or vesicles on the presynaptic axon terminals. Transmitting neurons communicate signals to the post-synaptic receptor neurons using chemical neurotransmitters. Signal transmission—referred to as firing—involves the vesicles discharging their neurotransmitter molecules into the synaptic cleft. Of the some 100 chemical substances functioning as neurotransmitters, researchers concentrate on nine: acetylcholine,

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dopamine, noradrenaline, adrenaline, serotonin, histamine, glutamate, glycine, and Ȗ-Aminobutyric acid (GABA).

Fig. 5: The basic structure of a standardized neuron. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

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Chemical messages in the form of special molecules are absorbed by receptors located on the surface of the postsynaptic neurons. The sent transmitter molecules fit together exactly with the receptors, triggering a precise reaction. Electrical changes take place on both sides of the cell membrane; these are subsequently integrated by the cell bodies. A concentrated electrical charge results in a specific barrier being overstepped. This, in turn, leads to the firing of a neuron, which guides the electrical charge to its axon. The arrival of a charge at the axon terminal triggers the discharge of neurotransmitter molecules, which relays the signal to the next neuron. Even if a neuron releases only one form of transmitter, it is still able to accept and process signals from a range of presynaptic neurons issuing other neurotransmitters. The firing of the neuron is followed by a “rest phase;” an interval referred to as a refractory period. Unable to fire during this period—even after receiving a number of inputs—the neuron takes the opportunity to “dispose” of neurotransmitter molecules from the synapse. They either decompose or are recycled for further use by the presynaptic neuron. A number of areas in the brainstem also contain neurons, the axons of which spread through the entire extent of the human brain. These influence the level of synaptic transmission between the neurons. The neuromodulators, a type of neurotransmitter, such as acetylocholine, released during this process cause a temporary change in the number of receptors. These effect a temporary variation in the number of receptors. The speed that fires the post-synaptic neurons increases with the number of receptors that are activated. Measuring only the activity of the larger regions of the brain, imaging methods, such as EEG, must be supplemented by individual cell derivation in order to determine the functional significance of an individual neuron. This is conducted on animals by inserting microelectrodes in the brain. Whilst ethical considerations rule out the employment of such techniques on humans, the possible therapeutic benefits of this procedure are actively and passionately debated.53 By placing a single neuron in a nutrient solution, such individual cell derivations have demonstrated the relationship between neuronal activity and behavior.

53

See Oliver Müller, Jens Clausen, and Giovanni Maio, eds., Das technisierte Gehirn: Neurotechnologie als Herausforderung für Ethik und Anthropologie (Paderborn: Mentis, 2009).

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As Apostolos P. Georgopoulus and others have demonstrated, neuronal activity exhibits a strong correlation with particular fore-leg movements.54 Indeed, the implanted electrodes are able not only to measure, but generate neuronal activity through electric stimuli. Tests of the effect of selective stimuli of the motor cortex have also succeeded in constructing a functional map of its surface, indicating the respective body part controlled by each of its areas. As the physical size of the body part bears no relation to the functional map of the cortex, this is illustrated in the functional visualization of a motor homunculus. Those of the body parts requiring fine motor skills—such as the fingers, lips, and tongue—are portrayed as over-sized as they are controlled by very large surfaces in the cortical functional landscape. The new technique of Transcranial Magnet Stimulation (TMS) enables the stimulation of particular areas of the brain in humans without the necessity of a surgical intervention. A magnet coil placed on a skull permits activation of whole brain areas albeit not individual neurons. Neuron function can also be altered using pharmacological agents, either increasing or decreasing the production and release of neurotransmitters in presynaptic neurons. Substances have also been developed which modulate the reaction of post-synaptic receptors to arriving signals. It is also possible to change the mechanisms through which neurotransmitters are removed from the synapses. A number of antidepressants succeed in reducing the speed with which serotonin—“the messengers of happiness”—are removed from the synapses. Medicines affecting any significant degree of increase in attention or memory in healthy people are not freely available.55 Dietary supplements promising

54

See Apostolos P. Georgopoulos, Masato Taira, and Alexander Lukashin, “Cognitive Neurophysiology of the Motor Cortex,” Science 260 (1993): 47–52. See also Apostolos P. Georgopoulos, Hugo Merchant, Thomas Naselaris, and Bagrat Amirikian, “Mapping of the Preferred Direction in the Motor Cortex,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 104 (2007): 11068–72. 55 See Anne Whitehead, Carlos Perdomo, Raymond D. Pratt, Jaqueline Birks, Gordon K. Wilcock, and John G. Evans, “Donepezil for the Symptomatic Treatment of Patients With Mild to Moderate Alzheimer’s Disease: A Metaanalysis of Individual Patient Data from Randomised Controlled Trials,” International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 19 (2004): 624–33; Mitul A. Mehta, Adrian M. Owen, Barbara J. Sahakian, Nahal Mavaddat, John D. Pickard, and Trevor W. Robbins, “Methylphenidate Enhances Working Memory by Modulating Discrete Frontal and Parietal Lobe Regions in the Human Brain,” Journal of Neuroscience 20 (2000): RC65; Danielle C. Turner, Trevor W. Robbins, Luke Clark, Aron R. Aron, Jonathan Dowson, and Barbara J. Sahakian, “Relative Lack

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such improvements have yet to offer any proof of their effectiveness.56 Nevertheless, this did not prevent an estimated 1.6 million American citizens from prescribing themselves such “neuro-enhancers” in 2007.57

Fig. 6: The homunculus in the human motor cortex. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger. of Cognitive Effects of Methylphenidate in Elderly Male Volunteers,” Psychopharmacology 168 (2003): 455–64. 56 See Paul E. Gold, Larry Cahill, and Gary L. Wenk, “The Lowdown on Ginkgo Biloba,” Scientific American 288 (2003): 86–91; Brenda L. Jorissen, Fred Brouns, Martin P. Van Boxtel, Rudolf W. Ponds/Frans R. Verhey, Jelle Jolles, and Wim J. Riedel, “The Influence of Soy-Derived Phosphatidylserine on Cognition in AgeAssociated Memory Impairment,” Nutritional Neuroscience 4 (2001): 121–34. 57 See Gary Stix, “Doping für das Denken,” Spektrum der Wissenschaft, Dossier 2 (2011): 74–81.

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The act of learning can produce physical alterations in a neuron, affecting the form and size of the cells. These changes also occur in support structures such as the glial cells. The elasticity of synapses are changed by experience; connections between neurons can also be altered by learning. The simultaneous activity and discharge of two separate neurons strengthens the synaptic connection between them. Working at the end of the 1960s, Terje Lømo discovered that the repeated high-frequency stimulation of neuron A sharing a synapse with neuron B would not only bring a reaction in neuron B corresponding to the strength of the original stimulation, but a change in neuron B. Subsequently, even a weak stimulation of neuron A was sufficient to provoke a strong reaction in neuron B.58 The increase in effectiveness in synaptic transmission of a recent activity is referred to as long-term potentiation. Neurons are thus able to alter their activity as a result of experience; these changes can stretch over hours and days. Long-term potentiation can also result from the simultaneous activity of a presynaptic and a postsynaptic neuron.59 Researchers generally assume that a neuron undergoes the following changes during long-term potentiation: 1. The postsynaptic receptors are subject to such far-reaching changes that they react more strongly to subsequent inputs. 2. The presynaptic neurons are also possibly subject to change. One possibility is that a retrograde messenger substance issued by the postsynaptic neuron returns to the presynaptic neuron and stimulates it to increase the amount of neurotransmitter discharged from the presynaptic neuron. 3. The changes follow within a few minutes, last hours and can even produce life-long structural changes in the post-synaptic neuron.

58

See Terje Lømo, “Frequency Potentiation of Excitatory Synaptic Activity in the Dentate Area of the Hippocampal Formation,” Acta Physiologica Scandinavica 68 (1966): 128; Tim V. Bliss and Terje Lømo, “Long-Lasting Potentiation of Synaptic Transmission in the Dentate Area of the Anaesthetized Rabbit Following Stimulation of the Perforant Path,” Journal of Physiology 232 (1973): 331–56; Tim V. Bliss and Tony A. Gardner-Medwin, “Long-Lasting Potentiation of Synaptic Transmission in the Dentate Area of the Unanaesthetized Rabbit Following Stimulation of the Perforant Path,” Journal of Physiology 232 (1973): 357–71. 59 See Bruce L. McNaughton, Robert M. Douglas, and Graham Goddard, “Synaptic Enhancement in Fascia Dentate: Cooperativity Among Coactive Afferents,” Brain Research 157 (1978): 277–93.

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Many hold long-term potentiation to be a factor in memory processes. Pharmaceutical products restricting long-term potentiation have also been found to restrict learning capabilities. In turn, increasing long-term potentiation has been shown to improve learning behavior. The opposite of long-term potentiation is that of long-term depression,60 involving a reduction in the efficiency of synaptic signal transmission during a specific activity. Repeated activation of the presynaptic neurons without a corresponding activation of the postsynaptic neuron results in the detachment of the neurons from each other. Firing ineffectually, the presynaptic neuron becomes ever less-effective in its quest to stimulate a reaction in the neighboring neuron. This situation is reflected in an incidence of long-term depression. The mechanisms responsible for these changes are the exact opposite of long-term potentiation: an impaired responsiveness of the post-synaptic receptors is matched by a reduction of transmitter discharge. This results in long-term structural changes in the neurons and synapses.

Episodic and semantic memory Containing precise recollections of the time and place of autobiographical episodes, what Endel Tulving called the episodic memory,61 is contrasted to the process of semantic memories, i.e. the plain facts making up our knowledge. Although usually acquired without any reference to the location of learning,62 the mechanisms of such knowledge also exhibit similarities to its episodic counterpart. Able to communicate both forms of knowledge in a flexible fashion, we are not constrained to reproduce it in exactly the same way as it was acquired. Indeed, we are capable of depicting experiences from multiple perspectives, described in a variety of words and reproduced in a number of forms. Methods of recollection also vary, ranging from immediate knowledgeaccess (required in situations such as an academic examination), or recall following an outside stimulus. Able to recognize learnt knowledge and distinguish it from false claims, such as in a multiple choice test, we exhibit a great deal of flexibility in this area. The remarkable nature of this 60 See Thomas Dunwiddie, Gary Lynch, “Long-Term Potentiation and Depression of Synaptic Responses in the Rat Hippocampus: Localization and Frequency Dependency,” Journal of Physiology 276 (1978): 353–67. 61 See Endel Tulving, “Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain,” Annual Review of Psychology 53 (2002): 1–25. 62 See Endel Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness,” Canadian Psychology 26 (1985): 1–12.

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capacity becomes clear when comparing the nature of this skill with the way in which other forms of memory, such as our skill memory, function. Performing a range of complex tasks on a daily basis, we experience great difficulty in explaining such activities without any preparation. Tying a shoelace or a tie are activities, which, although performed daily, resist easy description. Episodic or semantic memories, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to recount. Moreover, we all know what we know. Present in our consciousness, even when unable in the short-term to access specific memories, we know that we will remember them. It is this range of similarities that has prompted a number of scientists to subsume episodic and semantic memory under the generic names declarative or explicit memory.63 A further form of unconscious memory, which resists easy verbalization, is termed non-declarative or implicit memory.64 Differentiating between episodic and autobiographical memory, a number of researchers view the former as autobiographical if it presents clear self-references. Indeed, they also class those parts of the semantic memory as autobiographical memory, which contain autobiographical facts.65 Depending on our socialization, we tend to subdivide our autobiographical memory according to various life stages. In the West, this is ordered around relationships, such as marriage, family, and professional training etc.66 Abstractions of episodic experience produces procedural scripts (stereotypical behavioral processes) and semantic schemes (personal views and preferences). The total sum of individual experiences, motives, aims, and subjective attributions combine to produce a selfconcept, the feeling of a unique identity. Usually molded to form a coherent life story between the ages of 15 and 30, this period itself usually provides a remarkable collection of memories. In addition to this 63

See Larry R. Squire, Barbara Knowlton, and Gail Musen, “The Structure and Organization of Memory,” Annual Review of Psychology 44 (1993): 453–96; Daniel L. Schacter, “Implicit Memory: History and Current Status,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 13 (1987): 501–18. 64 See Larry R. Squire and Barbara J. Knowlton, “Memory, Hippocampus, and Brain Systems,” in The Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. Michael Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 825–37. 65 See Gudehus, Eichenberg, and Welzer, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, 75. 66 See Rüdiger Pohl, Das autobiographische Gedächtnis: Die Psychologie unserer Lebensgeschichte (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2007). See also Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past (New York: BasicBooks, 1996); idem., The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002); Hans J. Markowitsch and Harald Welzer, The Development of Autobiographical Memory (Hove: Psychology Press, 2010).

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constructive function, the autobiographical memory also performs a social-communicative role, enabling individuals to communicate with others; such memory sharing serves to reinforce relationships. The recollection of personal experiences, attitudes, views, values, and morals also provide reference markers acting as sources of counsel in the problem-solving and decision-making process. Any attempt to differentiate between the episodic and semantic memory should reflect the inherently auto-biographical nature of the former. Related to a specific event experienced in a specific situation, the repetition of such an episodic memory in a similar situation weakens our memory of it. For example, if we park our car in a large car park every day, we often forget where it has been parked. Christopher Browning’s “Ordinary Men” on the Eastern front (see Chapter 1) present a much more serious example of this phenomenon. Remembering vividly their first experience of murder, its subsequent episodes became blurred over the course of time. Thus, whilst repetition serves only to strengthen the semantic memory, its episodic counterpart is weakened by the very same mechanism.67 Portraying semantic information as a precondition for episodic memory, Endel Tulving and others argue that the episodic memory develops from the semantic memory.68 A rival hypothesis assumes that learning always begins as an episodic experience; its continual repetition then obscures the situation of its acquisition, transforming it into a semantic process. Memory acquisition, whatever its nature, requires first the encoding and then the subsequent storage of information. A third step requires its accessibility. Memory researchers have long been aware that effective information retention requires its association with existing knowledge. Learners should begin by establishing an overview of the subject to be covered before entering into any level of detail. Simple repetition of the information is not sufficient to ensure learning; the information must be encoded. The depth of information processing69 required by the act of 67 See Marigold Linton, “Transformations of memory in everyday life,” in Ulric Neisser (ed.), Memory observed: remembering in natural contexts (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982), 77–91. 68 See Endel Tulving, “Episodic memory: from mind to brain,” in Annual Review of Psychology 53 (2002): 1–25. 69 See Fergus I. M. Craik and Robert Lockhart, “Levels of Processing: A Framework for Memory Research,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 11 (1972): 671–84; Fergus I. M. Craik and Endel Tulving, “Depth of Processing and the Retention of Words in Episodic Memory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 104 (1975): 268–94.

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learning requires the learner first to understand the words being used in the process of learning in order to form a mental image of the concepts to be acquired. The extent to which various techniques of learning enable information to be processed can be illuminated by an fMRI scan. Two groups were assigned different tasks—mentally pronouncing a word backwards and picturing a word. The subsequent fMRI scan showed far greater brain activity amongst the second group as the first.70 These physiological measurements appear to confirm the psychological concepts of the depth of processing. Forgetting newly-learnt concepts and information within a number of days or even hours, the memory-retention process incorporates a consolidation phase during which “unprotected” memories (both semantic and episodic) are often “deleted.”71 This is confirmed by experiments. Animals subject to electric convulsions72 lose short-term memories, yet retain long-term memories which have been consolidated. A similar phenomenon can be observed amongst depression patients subject to electroconvulsive shock treatment,73 whose long-term memory was much more reliable than their recall of very recent events. These eventually returned a short time after treatment. Short-term memory loss is observable in all cultures in relation to personal names.74 Although allegedly located “on the tip of my tongue,”75 we are often unable to “put a name to a face.” The probability of being able to access memories is greater when the act is performed in the same context in which they were encoded. Indeed, out memories function best when the format of the information—words or images—in which they 70

Lila Davachi, Jason Mitchell, and Anthony D. Wagner, “Multiple Routes to Memory: Distinct Medial Temporal Lobe Processes Build Item and Source Memories,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 100 (2003): 2157–62. 71 See James McGaugh, “Memory—A Century of Consolidation,” Science 287 (2000): 248–51. 72 See Carl Duncan, “The Retroactive Effect of Electroshock on Learning,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 42 (1949): 32–44. 73 See Richard Glass, “Electroconvulsive Therapy: Time to Bring It Out of the Shadows,” Journal of the American Medical Association 285 (2001): 1346–48. 74 See Tim Brennen, Anne Vikan, and Ragnhild Dybdahl, “Are Tip-Of-The-Tongue States Universal? Evidence from the Speakers of an Unwritten Language,” Memory 15 (2007): 167–76. 75 See Bennett L. Schwartz, “Sparkling at the End of the Tongue: The Etiology of Tip-Of-The-Tongue Phenomenology,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 6 (1999): 379–93.

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were encoded matches the form in which they are accessed.76 Indeed, this transfer-suitable processing applies not only to the format, but the context as a whole. This situation explains our failure to recognize people when we meet them in a new context and is a consideration that also applies to the physical position in which we find ourselves when memorizing and remembering. Information learnt sitting down is best reproduced in the same fashion—learners will experience difficulty if required to recount information when standing.77 Students revising for examinations are often advised to do so in an atmosphere resembling test conditions.

False memories Although the majority of people rely on their memory as a reliable source of guidance, it is not only liable to omit important details, but also to suggest alternative pasts, which, although corresponding with reality, originate from sources other than immediate experience.78 Indeed, memories “adapted to earlier experiences and reinforced by the passage of time, eventually becomes reinforced.”79 Working in the early 1930s, Sir Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969) read a Native American legend to his students, later asking them to recount it in their own words. Although the constituent parts of the story remained, not only were their accounts colored by their own world-view, but omitted unfamiliar aspects. Bartlett concluded that experience, preconception, and ideology all exercise a strong influence on our memories; these changes then became accepted as reliable.80 Memory exhibits a pronounced disposition to filter out 76

See Stefan Köhler, Morris Moscovitch, Gordon Winocur, and Anthony McIntosh, “Episodic Encoding and Recognition of Pictures and Words: Role of the Human Medial Temporal Lobes,” Acta Psychologica 105 (2000): 159–79. 77 See Duncan R. Godden and Alan D. Baddeley, “Context-Dependent Memory in Two Natural Environments: On Land and Under Water,” British Journal of Psychology 66 (1975): 325–31; Steven M. Smith, “Background Music and Context-Dependent Memory,” American Journal of Psychology 98 (1985): 591– 603. 78 See Sina Kühnel and Hans J. Markowitsch, Falsche Erinnerungen: Die Sünden des Gedächtnisses (Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verl., 2009), 73–156; Elizabeth Lofthus, “Our Changeable Memories: Legal and Practical Implications,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (2003): 231-34; Daniel Schacter, Aussetzer: Wie wir vergessen und uns erinnern (Bergisch Gladbach: Lübbe, 2005). 79 Kühnel and Markowitsch, Falsche Erinnerungen, 77–78. 80 See Frederick C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: The University Press, 1932).

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displeasing aspects of reports—we hear only what we want to hear. These partial accounts are then combined with a pre-existing stock of knowledge and attitudes to reinforce prejudged conclusions. Further factors also influence the processes of forgetting and remembering. The decay hypothesis, for example, posits a process of gradual memory decline, prevented only by periodic repetition of the information stored in the brain. However, far from being a regrettable fact of human existence, the process of forgetting is vital to continued mental health.81 Those suffering from memory persistence often become depressed by their inability to forget.82 A further factor in the process of forgetting is the process of aging inherent to human existence and the gradual decline in brain size with age. A study by Amy F. T. Arnsten and her team at the University of Yale revealed “a physiological basis for age-related working memory decline in the primate brain, with a reduction of memory-relating firing beginning in middle age and worsening with advancing age. […] Many of the cognitive deficits of normal ageing (forgetfulness, distractibility, inflexibility, and impaired executive functions) involve prefrontal cortex dysfunction.”83 The team is currently investigating the effectiveness of Guanfacine—a cell regenerator conventionally prescribed to combat attention deficit disorder—as an instrument against weakened brain cells. The process of interference sees the superimposition of two or more memories resulting in the weakening or even destruction of one or both. An experiment gave its participants a list of words consisting of a number of word pairs. Required to learn the contents of the list, they were then given a second list consisting of words from the first list paired in a new sequence.84 Where list one paired the words “horse” and “house,” list two 81

See as well Oliver Dimbath and Peter Wehling, eds., Soziologie des Vergessens: Theoretische Zugänge und empirische Forschungsfelder (Constance: UVK, 2011). 82 See Alexander R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Elizabeth S. Parker, Larry Cahill, and James L. McGaugh, “A Case of Unusual Autobiographical Remembering,” Neurocase 12 (2006): 35–49; Jill Price, The Woman Who Can’t Forget: The Extraordinary Story of Living With the Most Remarkable Memory Known to Science (New York: Free Press, 2008); Jorge L. Borges, Fiktionen: Erzählungen 1939 - 1944 (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 1992). 83 Min Wang, Nao J. Gamo, Yang Yang, et al., “Neuronal Basis of Age-Related Working Memory Decline,” Nature 476 (2011): 210–14. 84 See Alan D. Baddeley and Graham J. Hitch, “Recency Re-examined,” in Attention and Performance, ed. Stanislav 'RUQLþ (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1977), 647–67; John R. Anderson, “Interference: The Relationship Between Response Latency and Response Accuracy,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 7 (1981): 311–25.

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associated “horse” with “door.” Required to recite list one, the answers paired “horse” with “door” instead of “house.” Referred to as proactive interference, this process involves the interference by subsequentlyacquired information with earlier memories. When required to recite list two, the testpersons often paired “horse” with “house” instead of with “door”—a case of retroactive interference. Source amnesia involves the attribution of an action or event to an incorrect source.85 We often remember a story from a film or novel without being able to identify its origin. Those suffering trauma during a historically notable event have been known to watch a film recounting an experience similar to theirs, which they subsequently incorporate in their own memory. Dreams can assume the status of memories and the testimony of others can be transformed into memory of personal experience. One particular form of source amnesia is referred to as cryptomnesia—the appropriation of the ideas of others paired with a conviction of originality.86 Writers, musicians, and scientists often suffer from such illusions. It is difficult to determine whether the thief is sincere in his assertion of innocence. Actual “false memories” in the true sense of the word refer to recollections that never actually happened. Experiments investigating this phenomenon give testpersons a fictive account of events written as if they had actually occurred in their own lives. Family members also recount these stories as if they had actually happened. At the end of the study, a quarter of its participants not only believed that these events had occurred, but even recounted extra details not included in the original accounts.87 Asking the participants to imagine the details missing from these fictions was especially effective in bringing them to accept the veracity of these implanted memories.88 “Conversations with parents, siblings, 85

See Daniel L. Schacter, “Retrieval Without Recollection: An Experimental Analysis of Source Amnesia,” Journal of Verbal Language and Verbal Behavior 23 (1984): 593–611. 86 See Serge Brédart, James M. Lampinen, and Anne-Catherine Delfeldre, “Phenomenal Characteristics of Cryptomnesia,” Memory 11 (2003): 1–11. 87 See Elisabeth Lofthus and Jacquie Pickrell, “The Formation of False Memories,” Psychiatric Annals 25 (1995): 720–25; Kimberley Wade, Maryanne Garry, J. Don Read, and Stephen Lindsay, “A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (2002): 597–603. 88 See Maryanne Garry, Charles Manning, Elizabeth Lofthus, and Steven Sherman,” Imagination Inflation: Imagining a Childhood Event Inflates Confidence It Occurred,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 3 (1996): 208–14; Lyn Goff and Henry Roediger, “Imagination Inflation for Action Events: Repeated

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acquaintances, or even friends exercise a subconscious impact on our view of events, even serving to change them.”89 False memories can be reproduced under laboratory conditions. A test subject was required to learn a list of sweet items such as honey. Called upon to recount the words on the list, the testpersons added the word “sweet” despite its absence from the original list. Encoding the semantic meaning, they were convinced of the presence on the list of the supplementary words.90 A further form of “false memory” is that of confabulation, the proclivity to recount fictitious events following a brain trauma. Originally discovered in cases of brain damage following excessive alcohol consumption (Korsakoff’s syndrome), spontaneous confabulation is also a symptom presented by those suffering from Alzheimer’s and brain damage resulting from physical trauma. A common trait in all of these cases is the onset of spontaneous confabulation without any exterior trigger. Sufferers are unable to establish an accurate chronology of events or even differentiate between actual and imaginary experiences. Not necessarily predicated by structural brain damage, such false accounts can include detailed descriptions of alien abduction.91 Others claim to have been sexual abused, even though DNA evidence rules out any such events. Cases of confabulation can also occur in connection with the incidence of sleep paralysis. Hallucinations induced by states of paralysis located between phases of sleep and consciousness are recounted as actual events. Seeking to maintain their dignity, those experiencing such episodes recount falsehood as truth in order to make sense of and interpret experiences located outside their understanding. In this way, confabulation becomes an instrument with which to provide a satisfactory explanation for experiences of abduction imagined during such episodes. “Targeted questioning, suggestion, or merely the provision of convincing explanations can even precipitate confabulations.”92 Imaginings Lead to Illusory Recollections,” Memory and Cognition 26 (1998): 20– 33. 89 Kühnel and Markowitsch, Falsche Erinnerungen, 94. 90 See Robert Cabeza, Stephen Rao, Anthony D. Wagner, Andrew Mayer, and Daniel L. Schacter, “Can Medial Temporal Lobe Regions Distinguish True from False? An Event-Related Functional MRI Study of Veridical and Illusory Recognition Memory,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 98 (2001): 4805–10. 91 See Katharine J. Holden and Christopher C. French, “Alien Abduction Experiences: Some Clues from Neuropsychology and Neuropsychiatry,” Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 7 (2002): 163–78. 92 Kühnel and Markowitsch, Falsche Erinnerungen, 101.

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A variety of studies have demonstrated the possibility of triggering confabulations within police and other interrogations through insinuation and suggestion.93 Intensive questioning within such procedures can often bring witnesses to change their statements without any awareness on the part of either the investigator or the witness of collusion in the fabrication of an incorrect statement. Unaware of his role in influencing the witness, the investigator suggested an alternative version of events, which the witness unconsciously accepts and reproduces. Indeed, such witnesses are convinced that they have told the truth. They do not realize that their confabulation—either provoked or spontaneous—is closely associated with memories and attitudes drawn from their own biography. Incorporating this fiction in their own self-perception also influences future action. In contrast to the entirely fabricated nature of confabulations, intrusions develop from the impact of experiences actually present in the individual’s experience. Trauma psychologists describe such intrusion as the re-experiencing of traumatic events. Especially violent episodes of this phenomenon are referred to as flashbacks. When triggered, such cases are experienced as a repeat of the original experience in its original form. Activated by smells, sounds or other sense data, such episodes constitute characteristic features of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).94 Those seeking to avoid the triggers of such episodes can suffer a nonspecific panic attack and general feelings of fear and helplessness. Unlike the victims of flashbacks, such sufferers are not always aware of having suffered the original trauma currently intruding into their lives.95 Indeed, a connection has been established between intrusions and dissociation. Those affected present a division between consciousness, identity, and perception to the extent that they experience the traumatic episode as though a mere observer of events rather than its direct participant.96 93

See Maria S. Zaragoza, Kristie E. Payment, Jennifer K. Ackil, Sarah B. Drivdahl, and Melissa Beck, “Interviewing Witnesses: Forced Confabulation and Confirmatory Feedback Increase False Memories,” Psychological Science 12 (2001): 473–77. 94 See Chapter 1, Section The “license to kill” as a mental strain—soldiers as perpetrators and victims. 95 See Janet E. Osterman, James Hopper, William J. Heran, Terrence M. Keane, and Bessel A. van der Kolk, “Awareness Under Anesthesia and the Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” General Hospital Psychiatry 23 (2001): 198– 204. 96 See Emily A. Holmes, Richard J. Brown, Warren Mansell, R. Pasco Fearon, Elaine C. Hunter, and Frank Frasquilho, “Are There Two Qualitatively Distinct Forms of Dissociation? A Review and Some Clinical Implications,” Clinical

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Whether such an experience develops into a PTSD depends on the nature and course of infant development; a sheltered childhood provides a certain level of protection against the development of PTSD.97 A third form of false memory supplementing confabulation and intrusion is that of false recognition—a phenomenon unifying all three. Seeking to investigate this condition, Sina Kühnel developed a film stimulus. Watching a dramatic sequence, the viewer believed that he had seen certain actions, which were not shown, merely because they would have fitted with the story played out before them. When shown episodes similar to these “missing scenes,” the test person indicated that they had already seen them.98 A team of researchers around Yadin Dudai from the Neurobiology department of the Weizmann Institute in Rehovut played a documentary film to their testpersons. After having responded correctly to a number of questions about the film, the viewers were informed that a second group had provided a different set of answers. In consequence, 70 per cent of the testpersons altered their testimony to adapt to the second group. Even after the investigator explained the deviation with reference to a computer error, only 30 per cent returned to their original report; the rest remained adamant that their second set of answers were accurate. The team observed two different types of adaptation using an fMRI scan. The first involved the superficial acceptance of the new information in an attempt to maintain group conformity. Retaining the original information in their minds, they were able to return to their initial assessment. The second group reacted to social pressure by deleting all the correct information and adopting new convictions more in tune with social realities. The members of the second group displayed significant activity in the area of the amygdala and the hippocampus, whilst those from the first group did not. Dudai ascribes a key role to the amygdala in the Psychology Review 25 (2005): 1–23; Harald Merckelbach, Theo Dekkers, Ineke Wessel, and Anne Roefs, “Dissociative Symptoms and Amnesia in Dutch Concentration Camp Survivors,” Comprehensive Psychiatry 44 (2003): 65–69; Ellert R. S. Nijenhuis, Johann Vanderlinden, and Philip Spinhoven, “Animal Defensive Reactions as a Model for Trauma-Induced Dissociative Reactions,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 11 (1998): 243–60. 97 See Alison B. W. Fries, Tony E. Ziegler, Joseph R. Kurian, Steve Jacoris, and Seth D. Pollak, “Early Experience in Humans Is Associated with Changes in Neuropeptides Critical for Regulating Social Behavior,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the USA 102 (2005): 17237–40. 98 See Sina Kühnel, False Memories—A Study of False Recognitions Caused by a Stimulus Film Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (Bielefeld: Dissertation, 2006).

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falsification process. He believes that it performs the role of a “porter,” depositing certain information in the long-term memory. Concluding that social pressure can cause the amygdala to replace existing memories, he raises the possibility that evolutionary processes favor the formation of shared group memories—for instance the location of dangers and food resources—as vital for group cohesion.99 False memories exercise a strong influence on our experience of everyday life. Indeed, set in the context of witness testimony in criminal cases, this phenomenon can have far-reaching consequences. Our performance as accurate witnesses depends to a great extent on our own experience, level of knowledge, the nature of our attitudes, our current mental and physical state, and a number of ambient variables. The nature of the questioning to which we are subject also impacts on the report we offer.100 For example, it makes a difference whether we witness an attack on television or in real life.101 Our feelings also exercise considerable influence on the precision of our accounts.102 The nature and quality of testimony also depends on the location and timing of a statement— memories are more accurate when given at the scene of a crime immediately after its event.103 Attitudes amongst witnesses participating in a line-up can also be altered by the provision of information, e.g. whether the suspect has changed his appearance subsequent to a crime; or even of the possibility that the real perpetrator is not in the line-up. The cases in which innocent people are identified by victims as a perpetrator are legion. One such example involved the psychologist 99

See Micah Edelson, Tali Sharot, Raymond J. Dolan, and Yadin Dudai, “Following the Crowd: Brain Substrates of Long-Term Memory Conformity,” Science 333 (2011): 108–11. 100 See Elizabeth Lofthus and Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memory and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996); See Elizabeth Lofthus, “Creating False Memories,” Scientific American 277 (1997): 70–75; Charles J. Brainerd and Valerie F. Reyna, “FuzzyTrace Theory: Dual-Processes in Reasoning, Memory, and Cognitive Neuroscience,” Advances in Children Development and Behavior 28 (2005): 49– 100. 101 See Cecilie Ihlebæk, Tonja Løve, Dag Erik Eilertsen, and Svein Magnussen, “Memory for a Staged Criminal Event Witnessed Live on Video,” Memory 11 (2003): 319–27. 102 See Joseph P. Forgas, Simon M. Laham, and Patrick T. Vargas, “Mood Effects on Eyewitness Memory: Affective Influences on Susceptibility to Misinformation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41 (2005): 574–88. 103 Regarding the differences between adults and children in their function as witnesses, see Kühnel and Markowitsch, Falsche Erinnerungen, 150ff.

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Donald Thomson. Only his cast-iron alibi (a live television appearance given from a far-removed location) prevented charges being pressed for rape.104 The woman had obviously seen him on television before the attack and had become confused. Many jurists are aware of the legal ramifications of false testimony in processes based on circumstantial evidence. As one judge wrote, “the human being is highly unsuited to being a witness.”105 The difficulties presented by such testimony are illustrated well in rape cases. Often with only one witnesses—the victim—their account can be colored by a thirst for revenge. Representing the high-profile weatherman Jörg Kachelmann in a rape prosecution, the barrister Johann Schwenn made some insightful remarks about the social environment of legal deliberation. “Strongly Catholic regions often produce extremely pigheaded prosecutors exhibiting a surprising readiness to work with the feminist movement.”106 A combination of prejudice and untruth can be devastating in its impact. This situation is compounded by the pressure under which judges often find themselves from the public and political system baying for the blood of those thought to have infringed popular morality and injured members of groups taken to require particular protection. As the case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn makes all too clear, rich, famous, and unsympathetic eccentrics can soon make the rapid transition from perpetrator to victim in a short space of time.107 The effects of prejudice and encoded memories also play an important part in the writing of history. The mechanisms and significance of this phenomenon will be examined later in this chapter.

The semantic memory and neuroscience Learning theorists have developed the concept of hierarchical semantic networks to describe the process by which the brain stores individual

104

See Donald Thompson, “Context and False Memory,” in Memory in Context: Context in Memory, ed. Graham Davies and Donald Thompson (Chichester and New York: Wiley, 1988), 285–304. 105 See Rolf Bender, Armin Nack, and Wolf-Dietrich Treuer, Tatsachenfeststellung vor Gericht: Glaubwürdigkeits- und Beweislehre, (Munich: Beck, 2007), 6. 106 Gisela Friedrichsen, et al., “Glaube und Wahrheit,” Der Spiegel, no. 22, May 30, 2011, 56–67; 63. See also from the perspective of Jörg Kachelmann and Miriam Kachelmann, Recht und Gerechtigkeit—Ein Märchen aus der Provinz (Munich: Heyne, 2012). 107 See Die Zeit, no. 28, July 07, 2011, 15.

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pieces of information and establishes associations between them.108 Seeking to demonstrate that concepts and terms are conceived on multiple levels as nodes, it posits the existence of links between them. Nevertheless, the model offers no explanation for the way in which information is actually encoded in the neurons. Semantic memories are saved in the cortex. The frontal cortex and a number of sub-cortical areas are responsible for the when and what of information retention. The sensory cortex is involved in processing sense data; principally the parietal lobes (somatosensory cortex), the occipital lobe (visual cortex) and the higher structures of the temporal lobes (auditory cortex). The majority of the remaining areas outside the cortex belong to the association cortex, the areas of which are involved when information is to be connected within and between the sensory systems, or if modalities are to be connected. Images and linguistic information are associated in this area; it is also responsible for the recognition of the general characteristics of concrete objects and determining the relationship between spoken language and sensory information. A damaged cortex can result in the development of specific agnosia, i.e. the inability of a sufferer to recognize or name specific objects that they see (associative visual agnosia) or the ability to hear and imitate the sound of spoken words without comprehending their meaning (auditory linguistic agnosia). The existence of such conditions has led many to assume that specific categories of semantic knowledge are saved in specific locations in the brain. Certain injuries to the cortex destroy knowledge pertaining to a specific object, but not related items. Martha Farah and Jay McClelland assume the existence of a limited number of specialized modules.109 If our semantic networks are organized according to the characteristics of specific objects—for example, visual criteria including color, structure, and size or function criteria such their application and incidence—then a cortical injury could serve to restrict one area of the network whilst leaving other forms of semantic information intact. In such a case, a sufferer could be unable to describe 108

See Allan Collins and Elizabeth Lofthus, “A Spreading Activation Theory of Semantic Processing,” Psychological Review 82 (1975): 407–28; James Tanaka and Marjorie Taylor, “Object Categories and Expertise: Is the Basic Level in the Eye of the Beholder?” Cognitive Psychology 23 (1991): 457–82; Timothy McNamara, “Priming and Constraints It Places on Theories of Memory and Retrieval,” Psychological Review 99 (1992): 650–62. 109 Martha Farah and James McClelland, “A Computational Model of Semantic Memory Impairment: Modality Specificity and Emergent Category Specifity,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 120 (1991): 339–57.

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the appearance of an object, but provide a good account of its function. A famous patient, named here as HM (initials for Henry Gustave Molaison), who died in 2008, suffered from epilepsy. Removal of brain tissue from both medial temporal lobes (some two thirds of his hippocampus, the greatest part of his amygdala and the surrounding brain areas) in 1953110 saw him live almost without any elliptic fits, but resulted in the development of anterograde amnesia, the inability to create new memories. This affected both the banal—the contents of his breakfast—to the deeply personal memories, such as the death of a relative or the appearance of new people. Otherwise, he suffered no restrictions. Neurobiologists have succeeded in using fMRI to demonstrate the presence of changes in the left medial temporal and left frontal lobes during the processes of learning and forgetting. These areas of the brain display considerably higher levels of activity when learning and then recalling words and pictures than actions involving learning and forgetting the same.111 “Increased levels of activity [in these areas] effect improvements in information saving, thus increasing the probability that this information can be accessed subsequently.”112 The only difference between words and pictures is that the latter activate the left and right medial temporal lobe, whilst the learning of words tends to affect the left medial temporal lobe only. The medial temporal lobe thus plays an important role in the encoding of words and pictures. The hippocampus would appear to play a significant role in saving information regarding the “what,” “where,” and “when” of an event in the episodic memory.113 Not only what is learnt, but the exact circumstances in which the learning action took place, including any errors involved, are 110

See Suzan Corkin, David Amaral, Gilberto Gonzales, Keith Johnson, and Bradley Hyman, “H. M.’s Medial Temporal Lobe Lesion: Findings from Magnetic Resonance Imaging,” Journal of Neuroscience 17 (1997): 3964–79, Suzanne Corkin, Permanent Present Tense—The Unforgettable Life of the Amnesia Patient H.M. (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 111 See Anthony D. Wagner, John E. Desmond, Gary H. Glover, and John D. Gabrieli, “Prefrontal Cortex and Recognition Memory: Functional-MRI Evidence for Context-Dependent Retrieval Processes,” Brain 121 (1998): 1985–2002; James B. Brewer, Zuo Zhao, John E. Desmond, Gary H. Glover, and John D. E. Gabrieli, “Making Memories: Brain Activity That Predicts Whether Visual Experiences Will Be Remembered or Forgotten,” Science 281 (1998): 1185–87. 112 Gluck, Mercado, and Myers, Lernen und Gedächtnis, 112. 113 See Lila Davachi, Jason Mitchell, and Anthony D. Wagner, “Multiple Routes to Memory: Distinct Medial Temporal Lobe Processes Build Item and Source Memories,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 100 (2003): 157–2162.

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stored as part of this process. During an incident of “false memory” relating to lists of words, the structure of the hippocampus registered an even level of activity when “remembering” both the words present on this list and the imagined words.114 In contrast to this high level of credulity, a small area in the temporal lobe situated in close proximity to the hippocampus region is resistant to false memories. The stimulus pattern which it exhibits varies considerably between listed, to which it reacts strongly, and imagined words, to which it provides almost no reaction.115 As the examination of amnesia patients has revealed, the consolidation phase for newly-acquired knowledge can last a considerable time. A continuing debate currently focuses on whether new memories ever fully emancipate themselves from the medial temporal lobes and, if they do, the time it takes for a new memory to be stored as an episodic memory. The function of both regions weakens over time until the cortex is able to access the memory without the assistance of the hippocampus.116 This hypothesis assumes that the episodic memory consists of a number of components saved across the cortex, which gradually develops connections, thus emancipating itself from its dependence on the hippocampus. Assuming the hippocampus to be more than merely a temporary holding area, the multiple trace theory of human memory ascribes this area the role of a permanent switchboard coordinating the storage of and access to all episodic memories.117 According to this alternative viewpoint, episodic and semantic memories are encoded by groups of neurons in the hippocampus and cortex. The cortical neurons never act independently from those in the hippocampus. The greater the number of neuronal 114

See Roberto Cabeza, Stephen Rao, Anthony D. Wagner, Andrew Mayer, and Daniel L. Schacter, “Can Medial Temporal Lobe Regions Distinguish True from False? An Event-Related Functional MRI Study of Veridical and Illusory Recognition Memory,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 98 (2001): 4805–10. 115 See Yoko Okado and Craig Stark, “Neural Processing Associated With True and False Memory Retrieval,” Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience 3 (2003): 323–34. 116 See Yadin Dudai, “The Neurobiology of Consolidation, or, How Stable Is the Engram?” Annual Review of Psychology 55 (2004): 51–86. 117 See Lynn Nadel and Morris Moscovitch, “Memory Consolidation, Retrograde Amnesia and the Hippocampal Complex,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 7 (1997): 217–27; “The Hippocampal Complex and Long-Term Memory Revisited,” Trends in Cognitive Science 5 (2001): 228–30; Morris Moscovitch and Lynn Nadel, “Consolidation and the Hippocampal Complex Revisited: In Defense of the Multiple-Trace Model,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 8 (1998): 297–300.

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connections and groupings generated during this process, the greater the probability with which memories are retained following damage to the hippocampus. This situation would explain why amnesia patients often retain their long-term memory whilst experiencing considerable difficulty remembering recent events. It also points to the mechanism involved in the loss of episodic memories and the concurrent retention of the associated semantic information by such patients. Episodic memories have been subject to such repeated and intense repetition that they have been transformed into semantic data.118 Much evidence would indicate that the degree of retrograde amnesia presented provides an insight into the level of brain damage suffered. Given limited damage to the hippocampus, the retrograde amnesia can last between one and two years; additional trauma to the medial temporal lobes can exert an impact lasting a number of years if not decades. Cases of amnesia are most pronounced if the cortex area is affected.119 Neurobiologists have come to suspect the involvement of the frontal cortex in the selection and suppression of memories. Undesirable memories are discarded via interruption of hippocampal activity by the prefrontal cortex. An experiment conducted by Michael Anderson involved testpersons learning pairs of words. Confronted by a single word, they were then asked either to remember or forget its pair. Subsequent tests revealed that active forgetting was indeed possible: many of the participants had a worse memory of the latter category in comparison to the former.120 Study of the fMRI data produced during this experiment indicated a higher degree of hippocampus activity during attempts to remember than that registered during attempts at memory suppression. In contrast, the activity registered in various areas of the prefrontal cortex was higher during episodes of forgetting than remembering. Anderson concluded that increased prefrontal activity prevented the hippocampus from saving information, thereby increasing the probability with which the testpersons would experience difficulty of recall.

118

See Lynn Nadel, Alexei Samsonovich, Lee Ryan, and Morris Moscovitch, “Memory Trace Theory of Human Memory: Computational, Neuroimaging and Neuropsychological Results,” Hippocampus 10 (2000): 352–68. 119 See Peter Bayley, Jeffrey Gold, Ramona Hopkins, and Larry R. Squire, “The Neuroanatomy of Remote Memory,” Neuron 46 (2005): 799–810. 120 See Michel Anderson, Kevin Ochsner, Brice Kuhl, Jeffrey Cooper, Elaine Robertson, Susanne Gabrieli, Gary Glover, and John Gabrieli, “Neural Systems Underlying the Suppression of Unwanted Memories,” Science 303 (2004): 232–35.

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Such and similar studies would indicate the role played by the frontal lobes in the saving of both new episodic and semantic memories. Their involvement in attention, decision-making and cognitive control processes as well as the association of context information with memories would suggest that the frontal lobes play a significant role in the processes of encoding and memory.121 Those having suffered damage to their frontal lobes will most likely be unable to reconstruct the time and place of certain events, a condition known as source amnesia.122 The diencephalon and the basal forebrain (both connected to the hippocampus via a c-shaped bundle of fibers known as the fornix) also play a significant part in the processing of episodic and semantic structures. Damage suffered to these areas can result in anterograde amnesia. The connection of these intermediate structures—including the core of the mediorsal thalamus and the mamillary bodies—to the cortex and medial temporal lobes has led many to advance their responsibility for effecting the interaction between the frontal cortex and hippocampus during the saving and consolidation of memory. Damage to the diencephalons could interrupt this interaction. The basal forebrain is supplied with blood and oxygen through a tiny artery, the vascular wall of which can expand like a balloon. The resulting pressure on other blood vessels can lead to a stroke or even a cerebral hemorrhage. Such damage suffered to the basal forebrain can also result in amnesia. Accessing information, the hippocampus transfers it to the cortex for long-term storage. The arrival of new and interesting information leads the basal forebrain to signal the hippocampus to interrupt this procedure and concentrate on the processing and encoding of new information. Damage to the basal forebrain means that these instructions are no longer issued, and the hippocampus works at reduced efficiency. This results in amnesia.123 Both damage to the diencephalons and the basal forebrain can result in confabulation of events in an attempt to fill the gaps of lost memories. 121

See Daniel L. Schacter and Tim Curran, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of False Memories,” Psychiatric Annals 25 (1995): 726–30. 122 See Narinder Kapur and Anthony Coughlan, “Confabulation and Frontal Lobe Dysfunction,” Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry 43 (1980): 461–63. 123 See Michael Hasselmo, “Neuromodulation: Acetylcholine and Memory Consolidation,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1999): 351–59; Catherine Myers, Brandon Ermita, Michael Hasselmo, and Mark Gluck, “Further Implications of a Computational Model of Septohippocampal Cholinergic Modulation in Eyeblink Conditioning,” Psychobiology 26 (1998): 1–20.

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Human memory is the product of a holistic brain function. The successful recall of episodic and semantic memory information requires not only that all neurological structures function properly, but that they work well together.

The skills memory In contrast to our memory of events and facts, the human skills memory saves the memory of certain skills as they develop over time. Unlike declarative feats of recall, such skills resist easy description. Our skills memory is usually subdivided into sensorimotor and cognitive skills. Whereas the former encompasses movement patterns performed as closed, (e.g. ballet), or open skills, (e.g. soccer), the latter refers to cognitive processes such as map-reading or chess. Requiring the application of strategies to a defined end, the improvement of such abilities requires constant repetition. The acquisition and recall of both forms of skill involve a greater degree of similarity than was previously believed.124 Virtuosos in a particular field are usually blessed with talent. The untalented can hope to reach a comparable or even greater level of competence through the application of intensive practice. It is unclear whether exceptional musical or sporting performance is the result of an inherited disposition or intensive practice. Twin researchers sought to determine the influence of genes on ability through the comparison of monozygotic (100 per cent genetic match) and dizygotic twins (50 per cent match). Whilst similar levels of practice saw the former master identical tasks to a similar degree, the latter exhibited differences in performance following an identical increase in the intensity of practice.125 This would imply that identical twins remain on the same level, as practice and genetic predisposition remain the same. Given the same level of application to their tasks, genetic differences mean that non-identical twins will not reach the same level of skill.

124

See David A. Rosenbaum, Richard A. Carlson, and Rick O. Gilmore, “Acquisition of Intellectual and Perceptual-Motor Skills,” Annual Review of Psychology 52 (2001): 453–70. 125 See Paul W. Fox, Scott L. Hershberger, and Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., “Genetic and Environmental Contributions to the Acquisition of a Motor Skill,” Nature 384 (1996): 356–58.

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In addition to practice, improvement requires feedback.126 Whilst regular repetition brings considerable initial progress, the rate of improvement declines over time. The principle of diminishing returns, also called the potency law of learning, refers to the restrictions to which all forms of learning and improvement are subject and the insuperable barrier to continued improvement. Whilst self-observation (sportsmen often video their performance) and direct feedback from others (such as instructors) facilitates improvement,127 the nature of the practice is also decisive in achieving maximum results. Although short-term intensive or massed practice produces greater short-term results, fewer hours of continual repetition—known as spaced practice—over the long-term is vital to enduring skill retention.128 The final subdivision of practice differentiates between constant and variable practice. The difference is manifested in the environment in which it takes place. Whereas both forms of practice involve the constant repetition of the same technique, its variable form involves periodic changes to the situation and conditions under which the operation is performed. Although not necessarily more effective, a number of studies have shown that variable practice produces better long-term results.129 Learning can also take place in an unconscious manner without the active participation of the learner. Referred to as implicit learning, this form of skill acquisition has the appearance of a discovery. A person performing a task suddenly finds that there is another, more progressive way of completing it. A further form of implicit learning is demonstrated in a keyboard-based experiment. An operator presses a certain sequence of keys on command. Over time, the test person is able to anticipate the frequency pattern, resulting in faster reactions. The unconscious nature of the process is revealed in the debriefing—afterwards, the test person is 126

See Brian D. Butki and Shirl J. Hoffman, “Effects of Reducing Frequency of Intrinsic Knowledge of Results on the Learning of a Motor Skill,” Perceptual and Motors Skills 97 (2003): 569–80. 127 See John R. Anderson, Albert T. Corbett, Kenneth R. Koedinger, and Ray Pelletier, “Cognitive Tutors: Lessons Learned,” Journal of the Learning Sciences 4 (1995): 167–207. 128 See Alan D. Baddeley and D. J. A. Longman, “The Influence of Length and Frequency of Training Session on the Rate of Learning to Type,” Ergonomics 21 (1978): 627–35. 129 See Gabriele Wulf and Richard A. Schmidt, “Variability of Practice and Implicit Motor Learning,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 23 (1997): 987–1006; Jacques H. A. van Rossum, “Schmidt’s Schema Theory: The Empirical Base of the Variability of Practice Hypothesis,” Human Movement Science 9 (1990): 387–435.

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unable to make any statement about the actual sequence.130 This form of acquiring sensorimotor skills is also open to amnesia sufferers.131 “That amnesia patients are able to acquire skills in an implicit fashion but are unable to recall recent events is often taken as proof of the separate nature of the skills memory from episodic and semantic memory.”132

Once learned, skills can easily be lost. Contrary to the popular truism, one can indeed forget how to ride a bicycle. Like any other muscle, skills will decay if not given regular exercise. Following a similar pattern as memories, such skill decay can result from the passage of time, but can also be due to the interference of newly-acquired skills. Memorizing a new set of dance steps can impede memory access to previously learnt step sequences. The person forgetting is not aware of either of the mechanisms at work. The attempt to learn two skills on one day can result in interference with the first by the second;133 such interference can also be provoked by attempts to recap the first before learning the second. Nevertheless, it would appear that more complex skills are less vulnerable to interference than simpler abilities. A number of skills can also be transferred to other body parts or into other situations. A right-handed person is able to write a partially legible sentence with their left hand, mouth, or feet. Sporting teams often practice set situations that can be implemented in a game. Thus, transfer-specific learning is possible on the basis of the generalization of previous experiences. Those seeking to stabilize memories of a skill break them down into their constituent parts. Sequences of action performed automatically or semi-automatically are referred to as motor programs. Either instinctive or acquired, such skills can also involve cognitive skills, e.g. multiplication, which, once subject to intensive practice, are transformed into motor 130

See Cornelia Exner, Janka Koschack, and Eva Irle, “The Differential Role of Premotor Frontal Cortex and Basal Ganglia in Motor Sequence Learning: Evidence from Focal Basal Ganglia Lesions,” Learning and Memory 9 (2002): 376–86. 131 See Suzanne Corkin, “What’s New with the Amnesic Patient H. M.?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3 (2002): 153–60. 132 Gluck, Mercado, and Myers, Lernen und Gedächtnis, 143. 133 See Matthew P. Walker, Tiffany Brakefield, J. Allen Hobson, and Robert Stickgold, “Dissociable Stages of Human Memory Consolidation and Reconsolidation,” Nature 425 (2003): 616–20; Matthew P. Walker, Tiffany Brakefield, Joshua Seidman, Alexandra Morgan, J. Allen Hobson, and Robert Stickgold, “Sleep and the Time Course of Motor Skill Learning,” Learning and Memory 10 (2003): 275–84.

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skills. A number of skills begin with the study of operating instructions. Required to reconstruct what we have done, we recapitulate the steps stipulated by the manual. This involves memory of action via memory of events, facts, and skills. The first, “cognitive” phase of skills-acquisition—as set out in the three-stage model presented by Paul M. Fitts—involves its encoding through observation, instructions, and experiment.134 The requirement for such methods declines with their repetition; the first phase has been superseded by that of acquisition through the stereotypical execution of the correct combinations in an associative fashion. The third, automatic phase sees the effortless execution of an acquired pattern of movement with a skill and dexterity borne of long practice. Having made the transition into a motor program, it is performed automatically.

The brain areas involved in skills acquisition Making extensive use of imaging and measurement procedures to identify the areas of the brain involved in the construction of a skills repertoire,135 researchers have established four areas involved in this process. In addition to the processing of sense data and the resulting motor control performed by the nerve connections in the spinal cord, skill acquisition is performed in three areas of the brain: the basal ganglia,136 cerebral cortex and the cerebellum. Situated in the forebrain and in close proximity to the hippocampus, the basal ganglia are subdivided into a number of cores. The majority of the cortical areas provide the basal ganglia with sense data pertaining to the physical world via sensory stimuli. Relaying these to the thalamus and brainstem, the basal ganglia modulate the interaction between the neurons in the thalamus and the motor cortex and the signals from the brainstem to the spinal cord. This influence is restricted to the initiation and 134

See Paul Fitts, “Perceptual-Motor Skill Learning,” in Categories of Human Learning, ed. Arthur Melton (New York: Academic Press, 1964), 243–85. 135 See Julien Doyon, Virgin Penhune, and Leslie G. Ungerleider, “Distinct Contribution of the Cortico-Striatal and Cortico-Cerebellar Systems to Motor Skill Learning,” Neuropsychologia 41 (2003): 252–62. 136 See Terra D. Barnes, Yasua Kubota, Dan Hu, Dezhe Z. Jin, and Ann M. Graybiel, “Activity of Striatal Neurons Reflects Dynamic Encoding and Recoding of Procedural Memories,” Nature 437 (2005): 1158–61; P. Jeffrey Conn, Giuseppe Battaglia, Michael Marino, and Ferdinando Nicoletti, “Metabotropic Glutamate Receptors in the Basal Ganglia Motor Circuit,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6 (2005): 787–98.

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maintenance of movement—its preparation, speed, direction, and amplitude.137 An interruption of the activity of the basal ganglia, as that presented by Parkinson’s sufferers, also impairs skill-acquisition. Fact recall and event memory remain unaffected—sufferers know how to walk, but remain unable to perform the necessary motor functions. Animal experiments have demonstrated the importance of the basal ganglia for sensumotor learning processes in which motor reactions are triggered by sensory information from the environment. It is widely believed that they develop an action plan for specific movements in a manner similar to Fitts’ model of skills-acquisition. Medical imaging techniques have demonstrated the involvement of the basal ganglia not only in the acquisition of sensumotor but also cognitive skills.138 Motor actions activate specific neuronal circuits in the cerebral cortex. Subject to change over time, these structures are strengthened with practice and decline when neglected. Indeed, various regions of the cerebral cortex expand when used; regions with lower significance for such procedures display little change. Imaging procedures have demonstrated how the area in the central cortex controlling hand movement is larger in professional violinists than in non-violinists.139 An increase in the volume of cortical grey substances has also been demonstrated.140 It is clear that the cerebral cortex influences the acquisition and performance of skills, but the mechanisms active in the cortical circuits during this process require further research, as does the precise nature of the interaction between the cerebral cortex and the basal ganglia. Also involved in performing sensorimotor processes and the maintenance and consolidation of memories141 is the cerebellum, which

137

See Michel Desmurget, Scott T. Grafton, Philippe Vindras, Hélène Grea, and Robert S. Turner, “Basal Ganglia Network Mediates the Control of Movement Amplitude,” Experimental Brain Research 153 (2003): 197–209. 138 See Russel A. Poldrack, Viveck Prabhakaran, Carol A. Seger, and John D. E. Gabrieli, “Striatal Activation During Acquisition of a Cognitive Skill,” Neuropsychology 13 (1999): 564–74. 139 See Thomas Elbert, Christo Pantev, Christian Wienbruch, Brigitte Rockstroh, and Edward Taub, “Increased Cortical Representation of the Fingers of the Left Hand in String Players,” Science 270 (1995): 305–7. 140 See Bogdan Draganski, Christian Gaser, Volker Busch, Gerhard Schuierer, Ulrich Bogdahn, and Arne May, “Neuroplasticity: Changes in Grey Matter Induced by Training,” Nature 427 (2004): 311–12. 141 See Jeffrey A. Kleim, Rodney A. Swain, Cheryl M. Czerlanis, Jennifer L. Kelly, Michelle A. Pipitone, and William T. Greenough, “Learning-Dependent Dendritic

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numbers amongst the oldest, most simple, and fundamental of brain structures. Any damage to the cerebellum can reduce the level of motor processes of which a person is capable, especially those requiring the kind of precise coordination involved in team sports or dancing. Activities involving focusing on or tracking targets are also difficult, indeed impossible for those having experienced some form of cerebellum trauma.142 Influenced quickly by alcohol consumption, impairment of the cerebellum activity is easy to demonstrate—walking in a straight line or touching one’s nose soon becomes difficult after imbibing sufficient quantities of alcohol. The cerebellum is not solely involved in the learning of sensorimotor skills; it is also a participant in cognitive-based learning. Scans of activity changes in the cerebellum demonstrate that testpersons learning to read mirror-writing143 present reduced and increased activity in the left and right cerebellum respectively. Neurologists have been able to demonstrate that sudden flashes of inspiration—the so-called “aha! effect”—are accompanied by characteristic, high-frequency brain-waves registered in the right temporal lobes. Further observations would indicate that the right forebrain in particular plays a central role in the creative process, whilst the left hemisphere suppresses such activities.144 Eric Kandel believes that such findings give an important indication of the future possibilities of neuro-aesthetics. The current understanding of the interaction of the cerebellum, cerebral cortex, and basal ganglia has established a clear functional division. With the cerebellum exercising the decisive influence on temporal control, the cerebral cortex controls complex actions. The basal ganglia connect sensory events and the reactions to them. All three areas demonstrate changes in the activity pattern of their neurons during activity. The neuronal structure alters with increasing practice and ensures that the resulting movements are performed with greater precision, efficiency, and a higher level of coordination. Hypertrophy of Cerebellar Stellate Cells: Plasticity of Local Circuit Neurons,” Neurobiology of Learning and Memory 67 (1997): 29–33. 142 See Robert Laforce, Jr. and Julien Doyon, “Distinct Contribution of the Striatum and Cerebellum to Motor Learning,” Brain and Cognition 45 (2001): 189–211. 143 See Russel A. Poldrack and John D. Gabrieli, “Characterizing the Neural Mechanisms of Skill Learning and Repetition Priming: Evidence from Mirror Reading,” Brain 124 (2001): 67–82. 144 See Eric Kandel, The Age of Insight: The Quest to Understand the Unconscious in Art, Mind, and Brain from Vienna 1900 to the Present (New York: Random House, 2012).

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The working memory Fleeting memories disappear only seconds after being registered. We differentiate between the sensory and short-term memory. Both represent the first phase of the memory process through which information enters our consciousness and is saved over the long-term. Sensory memories are brief impressions of sense data. Such information is stored in a sensoryvisual or auditory memory, (also known as an iconic memory) for only a fraction of a second. Encoded quickly in their “raw format,” they may be, but are not necessarily, processed and saved. The first step of processing involves active repetition of the sense data. Thus maintained, it is then applied almost immediately—such as a telephone number memorized and then dialed a few minutes later. Our short-term memory has a very small capacity. This use of our memory for the short-term intermediate storage of information is known as a working memory. Alan D. Baddeley and Graham J. Hitch have presented a model involving two independent working memories—the visuospatial sketchpad for objects and locations, and the phonological loop for spoken data. Monitored by a central executive, the information in both working memories is processed and supplemented, selected, deleted, or transferred to the long-term memory.145 Investigations into the phonological memory span conducted by Baddeley and his team have demonstrated that without the repetition of information, people are able to maintain only two seconds worth of spoken information in their memory.146 Should they wish to extend this capacity, they must use their “inner voice” to repeat it. Moreover, the number of words remembered falls with their length. Single syllable words are easier to access than longer, multi-syllable words. The visuospatial sketchpad has only a limited independent capacity. Experiments have shown that people are able to perform double functions requiring both memories.147 Nevertheless, the working memory comprises more than the short-term maintenance of phonological and/or visuospatial memories. Responsible

145

See Alan D. Baddeley and Graham Hitch, “Working Memory,” in Recent Advances in Learning and Motivation, ed. Gordon A. Bower (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 8:47–90. 146 See Alan D. Baddeley, Neil Thomson, and Mary Buchanan, “Word Length and the Structure of Short-Term Memory,” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 14 (1975): 575–89. 147 See Lee Brooks, “Spatial and Verbal Components of the Act of Recall,” Canadian Journal of Psychology 22 (1968): 349–68.

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for processing memories, it manages the short-term memory, prioritizing according to need, adding new information and deleting the less important. The transfer of information from the short-term to the working memory also implies a certain power over behavior. Updating and controlling the short-term memory involves planning, task switching, i.e. attention control, stimulus perception, and reaction suppression. Travelers from Great Britain to “the continent” are required to change lanes once arriving in France and drive on the right. A well-functioning central executive brings such travelers to look left when crossing the road instead of the more familiar rightwards glance. The same consideration applies to the motorway driver travelling from Berlin to Bern. Whereas the German Autobahn is marked blue, its Swiss counterpart is outlined in green. The working memory has to interpret the new and unfamiliar stimulus, suppressing the automatic reaction and reacting to a changed situation. Experiments investigating the function of the working memory and its central executive set a number of tasks to be completed in an independent sequence.148 Approximating the experience of everyday life, they require the test person to maintain an overview of competing demands. The complex function of a working memory processes events lying not only in the immediate past, but also those stored in the long-term semantic memory to enable the encoding of new information or the use of older information. The example of our traveler shows how his pre-existing understanding of road signs is useful in responding to a new situation. The working memory and the executive function represent a precondition for higher cognitive functions.

The activity of the prefrontal cortex in working memory tasks Studies have demonstrated the decisive role in executing working memory tasks performed by the prefrontal cortex and, in particular, its lateral regions. The far greater size of the human cerebral cortex in comparison to other mammals is widely viewed as the reason for the cognitive superiority of mankind. Those having suffered a trauma or damage to the frontal lobe present a reduced capacity for planning and organization.149 Apparently having lost the ability to think and plan in a 148

See Michael Petrides, “Frontal Lobes and Memory,” in Handbook of Neuropsychology, ed. Francois Boller and Jordan Grafman (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000), 67–84. 149 See Earl K. Miller and Jonathan D. Wallis, “The Prefrontal Cortex and Executive Brain Functions,” in Fundamental Neuroscience, ed. Larry R. Squire,

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controlled fashion, patients having had a tumor removed from their frontal lobes became prisoners of their automatic stimulus-reaction behavior. Unable to suppress impulsive reactions,150 they proceeded according to what amounted to obsolete behavioral rules.151 In addition to this dysexecutive syndrome, other patients having suffered damage to their frontal lobes display considerable impairment of their memory span152 and difficulty in the short-term retention of information pertaining to color, forms, and location.153 Experiments conducted by Joaquin Fuster using primates established that when performing working memory exercises, neuron activity in the prefrontal cortex was highest in the interval between stimulus perception and reaction, i.e. the period the working memory required for objectoriented processing.154 This pattern was confirmed by experiments registering the direction of sight during a sight reaction test. Trained to gaze at an object in the center of a screen, apes were rewarded when they continued to do so even during the temporary display of a potentiallydistracting stimulus at the edge of the screen and the disappearance of the original object. Neuron activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was highest in the time between the disappearance of the central object and remembering its former position.155 This was accompanied by continually Floyd E. Bloom, James L. Roberts, Michael J. Zigmond, Susan K. McConnell, and Nicholas C. Spitzer (Amsterdam and Boston: Academic Press, 2003), 1353–76. 150 See John Duncan, Hazel Emslie, Phyllis Williams, Roger Johnson, and Charles Freer, “Intelligence and the Frontal Lobe: The Organization of Goal-Directed Behaviour,” Cognitive Psychology 30 (1996): 25–303. 151 See Adrian M. Owen, Angela C. Roberts, John R. Hodges, Beatrice A. Summers, Charles E. Polkey, and Trevor W. Robbins, “Contrasting Mechanisms of Impaired Attentional Set-Shifting in Patients with Frontal Lobe Damage of Parkinson’s Disease,” Brain 116 (1993): 1159–79. 152 See Jerry S. Janowsky, Arthur P. Shimamura, Mark Kritchevsky, and Larry R. Squire, “Cognitive Impairment Following Frontal Lobe Damage and Its Relevance to Human Amnesia,” Behavioral Neuroscience 103 (1989): 548–60. 153 See Juliana V. Baldo and Arthur P. Shimamura, “Spatial and Color Working Memory in Patients with Lateral Prefrontal Cortex Lesions,” Psychobiology 28 (2000): 156–67. 154 See Joaquin M. Fuster and Garrett E. Alexander, “Neuron Activity Related to Short-Term Memory,” Science 173 (1971): 652–54; Joaquin M. Fuster, “Functional Neuroanatomy of Executive Process,” in Oxford Handbook of Clinical Neuropsychology, ed. Peter Halligan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 753–65. 155 See Shintaro Funahashi, Charles J. Bruce, and Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, “Mnemonic Coding of Visual Space in the Monkey’s Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex,” Journal of Neurophysiology 61 (1989): 331–49.

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high levels of neuron activity in the relevant primary and secondary sensory and motor regions of the temporal and parietal lobes. Connected to the prefrontal cortex, researchers believe this area to be responsible for the maintenance of neuronal activity during distraction.156 This assumption has been confirmed by further experiments. Maintaining stable levels of activity, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex performed its function of managing and controlling focus even during episodes of distraction. Investigations also demonstrated the differing functions of the dorsal and ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex.157 Whilst the former supports higher executive functions, maintaining responsibility for the monitoring and manipulation of memories—what Baddely named the “central executive”—the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex supports the encoding and recall of information, a function corresponding to Baddeley’s visuospatial sketchpad. The left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex performs the role of the phonological loop. The left posterior cortical speech areas maintain verbal information, whilst the right posterial cortical visual area processes information pertaining to objects and time. Further investigations using functional imaging techniques158 revealed significant activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex when forced to recall abstract pictures in a specific sequence. The left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, on the other hand, displayed pronounced activity during similar experiments involving verbal material. The right dorsolateral 156

See Earl K. Miller, “The Prefrontal Cortex and Cognitive Control,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 1 (2000): 59–65. 157 See Adrian M. Owen, Alan C. Evans, and Michael Petrides, “Evidence for a Two-Stage Model of Spatial Working Memory Processing Within the Lateral Frontal Cortex: A Positron Emission Tomography Study,” Cerebral Cortex 6 (1996): 31–38; Michael Petrides, “Frontal Lobes and Working Memory: Evidence from Investigations of the Effects on Cortical Excisions in Nonhuman Primates,” in Handbook of Neuropsychology, ed. Francois Boller and Jordan Grafman (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994), 59–82; Michael Petrides, “Specialized Systems for the Processing of Mnemonic Information Within the Primate Frontal Cortex,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: Series B 351 (1996): 1455–61. 158 See Michael Petrides, Bessie Alivisatos, Alan C. Evans, and Ernst Meyer, “Dissociation of Human Mid-Dorsolateral from Posterior Dorsolateral Frontal Cortex in Memory Processing,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 90 (1993): 873–77; Michael Petrides, Bessie Alivisatos, Alan C. Evans, and Ernst Meyer, “Functional Activation of the Human Frontal Cortex During the Performance of Verbal Working Memory Tasks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 90 (1993): 878–82.

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prefrontal cortex remained active during both activities, indicating its involvement in all monitoring processes.

Fig. 7: The neural substrate of the working memory. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

Other studies have revealed the high level of activity in the premotor cortex during memory recall of visual-spatial information;159 the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex was activated by the use of the “inner voice” in the recall of simple memories such as a telephone number.160 The rear parietal regions and the occipital area, on the other hand, are activated during the short-term maintenance of the spatial working memory. Countless investigations confirm a general division between the

159

See Edward Awh and John Jonides, “Spatial Selective Attention and Spatial Working Memory,” in The Attentive Brain, ed. Raya Parasuraman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 353–80. 160 See Edward Awh, John Jonides, Edward E. Smith, Eric H. Schumacher, Robert A. Koeppe, and Stewart Katz, “Dissociation of Storage and Rehearsal in Verbal Working Memory: Evidence from PET,” Psychological Science 7 (1996): 25–31.

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mechanism of memory in the rear brain regions and the memory processes in the fore regions, including the prefrontal cortex.161

Fig. 8: The preferred task allocation of the two brain halves (hemispheres). Not involving a clear division of labor, the distribution of tasks indicated in the diagram refers to majority ratios. Hand-orientation and sex also influence the specificity of information processing. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

Examinations of those having suffered damage to various areas of the prefrontal cortex appear to confirm the assumption that the visual-spatial and phonological-verbal working memory is spread across a number of areas in the brain. The tendency to process language in the left hemisphere means that damage to this area can result in a number of speech impediments; the visual-spatial working memory remains unaffected.162 Working with PET studies, Edward Smith and John Jonides have located 161

See Edward E. Smith and John Jonides, “Executive Control and Thought,” in Fundamental Neuroscience, ed. Larry R. Squire, et al. (Amsterdam: Academic Press, 2003), 1377–94. 162 See Tim Shallice, From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

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the spatial working memory on the right-hand side of the brain.163 Whilst the spatial working memory is located in the right hemisphere of the premotor cortex, the working memory for objects is to be found in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.164

The interaction of the working memory and the long-term memory The working memory interacts with the long-term memory, especially the declarative memory (facts and events). Both the act of recollection and the encoding of new information activate the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.165 There are a number of parallels between the role of the prefrontal cortex in the working memory and the episodic memory. The control processes and mechanisms of repetition and maintenance performed in the working memory would appear to play an important role in the encoding and accessing of episodic and semantic information stored in the long-term memory.166 Whilst the encoding of new verbal information activates the anterior prefrontal cortex, phonological information is processed in the posterior prefrontal cortex. From a clinical perspective, the most common dysfunction of the prefrontal neurons involves schizophrenia and attention deficits connected to hyperactivity (ADHD).

163

See Edward E. Smith and John Jonides, “Working Memory in Humans: Neuropsychological Evidence,” in The Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. Michael Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 1009–20. 164 See Edward E. Smith and John Jonides, “Storage and Executive Processes in the Frontal Lobes,” Science 283 (1999): 1657–61. 165 See Lars Nyberg, Roberto Cabeza, and Endel Tulving, “PET Studies of Encoding and Retrieval: The HERA Model,” Psychological Bulletin and Review 3 (1996): 135–48; Anthony D. Wagner, John E. Desmond, Gary H. Glover, and John D. E. Gabrieli, “Prefrontal Cortex and Recognition Memory: Functional-MRI Evidence for Context-Dependent Retrieval Processes,” Brain 121 (1998): 1985– 2002; Anthony D. Wagner, Wilma Koutstaal, Anat Maril, Daniel L. Schacter, Randy L. Buckner, “Task-Specific Repetition Priming in Left Inferior Prefrontal Cortex,” Cerebral Cortex 10 (2000): 1176–84. 166 See Anthony D. Wagner, “Cognitive control and Episodic Memory,” in Neuropsychology of Memory, ed. Larry R. Squire and Daniel L. Schacter (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 174–92.

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Emotional learning and memory Emotions influence our memory. The strength of fear, happiness, anger, shame and other feelings associated with particular situations etch them into our consciousness and thus explain the scope of their influence. Emotional learning situations are dominated by three very different, albeit associated levels of reaction: physiological reactions (an increased pulse, perspiration, breathing etc.), observable modes of behavior (mimic, posture, tone of voice etc.) and conscious feelings (for example, happiness or sadness). Emotions are inborn modes of behavior, although their exterior manifestations are subject to cultural regulation. Reacting automatically in a range of situations, such as impending danger, realization of the hazardous situation often follows after the event. Modern emotions theories assume that emotional stimuli provoke bodily reactions; interpreted in a specific context, they are believed to result in conscious feelings.167 As bodily reactions are open to a range of interpretation, their reception is itself contingent on the immediate situation. Horror films, for instance, provoke pronounced physiological reactions, which, if experienced in reality, would cause considerable fear. As our brains factor in the constraints of reality (we are in fact in a cinema munching popcorn), we experience a frightening scenario with pleasure.168 In short, the product of constant interaction between bodily reactions, cognitive analyses and conscious feelings, emotions represent highly complex phenomena. Emotional events make for exceptionally lasting memories due to our tendency to repeat and review them endlessly with our “inner eye.” In other circumstances, we are continually confronted by these memories or feel the need to talk about them repeatedly.169 Larry Cahill and his team conducted an experiment with two groups of testpersons. Recounting a highly emotional story to the first group, the second control group was read a less eventful narrative. Both groups were shown an identical set of pictures. Viewing this picture sequence 14 days later, both groups were asked to repeat the story. Unsurprisingly, the first provided a more detailed 167

For details see Chapter 4. See also “What attracts people to violent movies?” Science Daily, March 28, 2013; Angela Keppler, “Das Gleiche ist nicht immer gleich: Gewaltdarstellungen in Film und Fernsehen,” WestEnd. Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 8 (2011): 50-65. 169 See Friderike Heuer and Daniel Reisberg, “Emotion, Arousal, and Memory for Detail,” in The Handbook of Emotion and Memory, ed. Sven-Ake Christianson (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1992), 151–80. 168

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account than the second.170 Emotional activation thus increases memory performance—a situation that advertisers seek to exploit.171 Not only magnifying the powers of information storage, emotions assist in their recollection. Memories fitting to our current emotional state are more easily accessed than emotion mismatches; memories not matching our feelings are more difficult to access. The most advantageous situation in accessing memories involves a match between moods experienced at the time of encoding and attempted recall. Autobiographical memories also orient themselves around the current emotional situation: positive moments give rise to happy memories, whilst moments of sadness are often accompanied by negative memories.172 The tendency exhibited by patients with depression to concentrate on the negative aspects of their lives often stimulates a vicious circle of suffering and negativity. Intense moods can often trigger physiological reactions and the corresponding feelings. Perceived as context stimuli, these can also provoke positive or negative associations. The intensity and frequency of the stimulus also impact on the probability of recalling the original information. Especially strong emotions stimulated by traumatic events sometimes produce exceptionally intense “flashbulb memories.” Nature and memories of both individual, such as a car crash, and collective memory, for example a natural catastrophe, are not always clear cut. Ostensibly imprinted on our consciousness, they can often be subject to misrepresentation or embellishment.173 A good example is that of Traudl Junge. Having worked 170

See Larry Cahill, Ralf Babinski, Hans Markowitsch, and James McGaugh, “The Amygdala and Emotional Memory,” Nature 377 (1995): 295–96. 171 Regarding the use of emotions in advertising, see Chapter 4, Section: How emotions control our consumption behaviour. 172 See Eric Eich, Dawn Macaulay, and Lee Ryan, “Mood Dependent Memory for Events of the Personal Past,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 123 (1994): 201–15. 173 See Ulric Neisser and Nicole Harsch, “Phantom Flashbulbs: False Recollections of Hearing the News About Challenger,” in Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of “Flashbulb” Memories, eds. Eugine Winograd and Ulric Neisser (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 9–31; Heike Schmolck, Elizabeth Buffalo, and Larry R. Squire, “Memory Distortions Develop Over Time: Recollections of the O. J. Simpson Trial Verdict After 15 and 32 Months,” Psychological Science 11 (2000): 39–45; Jennifer Talarico and David Rubin, “Confidence, Not Consistency, Characterizes Flashbulb Memoriesin Psychological Science 14 (2003): 455–61; Daniel L. Greenberg, “President Bush’s False ‘Flashbulb’ Memory of 9/11/01,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 18 (2004): 363– 70.

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as Hitler’s last secretary, she remained convinced that the fatal bullet, which brought about his death, had been audible through the entire bunker.174 This was impossible.175 Emotional learning occurs quickly and effectively. Conferring its holders with an innate advantage, fear often ensures survival. The combination of a situative variables with the unpleasant stimulus produces a conditioned emotional reaction—a raised pulse, the release of stress hormones, and even a fight-or-flight reaction. If an organism learns to interpret the signals preceding the incidence of danger, it will seek to avoid the corresponding situation. Such avoidance learning is a form of instrumental conditioning, which represents an integral part of human experience. Indeed, seeking to avoid negative experiences, humans establish a taboo around them. Pair relationships often avoid controversial topics, locations associated with bad memories, even other people with whom they shared a negative experience. Conversely, positive experiences move people to seek out the locations of those experiences—the bar in which they had their first kiss, for example. The first experience of an inescapably negative situation leads animals and men to react to such circumstances with learned helplessness.176 Expecting all avoidance strategies to fail, they see no incentive to try any of them and abandon themselves to their fate. One of the first to tie this phenomenon to depression was Martin E.P. Seligman.177 Those subject to repeated experiences of actual or perceived helplessness can fall into apathy. Such helplessness includes repeated private or professional failure, disability, as well as the experience of bereavement, imprisonment, war, homelessness, or even long-term in-patient care. Feelings of incapacity and loss of control move people to abandon themselves entirely to their fate. Required to become active in addressing the causes of their troubles, 174 See Traudl Junge, Until the Last Hour: Hitler’s Last Secretary (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), 186–187; Johannes Fried, “Neurokulturelle Geschichtswissenschaft,” KZG/CCH 22 (2009): 49–65; 55. 175 On the subject of the memory of sounds, see Robert Maier, ed., Akustisches Gedächtnis und Zweiter Weltkrieg (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2011). 176 See Martin E. P. Seligman, Helplessness: On Depression, Development and Death (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1975). 177 Martin E. P. Seligman, Helplessness; Lyn Y. Abramson, Martin E. P. Seligman, and John D. Teasdale, “Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 87 (1978): 49–74; Heinz Scheurer, “Zur Psychotherapie der erlernten Hilflosigkeit: Ein Erkenntnis- und Behandlungsansatz der Verzweiflung,” in Verzweiflung als kreative Herausforderung, ed. Hermes Andreas Kick und Günter Dietz (Münster, 2008), 41–57.

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such people need to relearn the mechanisms of active life. Those raising and teaching children need to confront them with realistic challenges so they learn to solve problems. Subject to excessive demands, young people should identify the tasks which they can solve successfully in order to avoid a spiral of failure and disillusionment.

The areas of the brain involved in emotional learning Emotional learning takes place principally in the limbic system, itself consisting of the thalamus, hypothalamus, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and the amygdala. The processing of emotions—context interpretation and monitoring of emotional expression—also involves the frontal cortex.178 Despite this level of specialization, emotions appear to affect the entire brain. The amygdala, a small almond-shaped structure at the front of the hippocampus, has proven to be a central location of emotion processing. Consisting of a number of nuclei, all of which perform a specific inputoutput function, the lateral nucleus receives stimuli either directly from the thalamus or via the cortex. The direct route is quicker (circa 12 milliseconds) but not as precise as the slower route over the cortex (circa 19 milliseconds). Requiring fast action, life-and-death situations are processed over the shorter route to achieve quicker action. The lateral nucleus probably also performs a learning function; experiments on animals have shown that the lateral amygdala neurons fired quicker following conditioned stimuli than uncoupled stimuli.179 Indeed, it would appear that organisms are able to differentiate between stimuli heralding danger and more neutral information. After arriving in the lateral nucleus, information is relayed to the central and basolateral nucleus. Transmitting information to the autonomic nervous system, the central nucleus triggers the release of stress hormones. In addition to its other tasks, in transmitting to the motor area, the central nucleus provokes the physiological and behavioral components of an emotional reaction, such as shock and immobility. The basolateral nucleus transmits to memory areas, such as the cortex, the basal ganglia and the hippocampus, where emotional information regulates

178

See K. Luan Phan, Thor Wagner, Stephan Taylor, and Israel Liberzon, “Functional Neuroanatomy of Emotion: A Meta-analysis of Emotion Activation Studies in PET and fMRI,” NeuroImage 16 (2002): 331–48. 179 See J. Amiel Rosenkranz and Anthony Grace, “Dopamin-mediated Modulation of Odour-Evoked Amygdale Potentials During Pavlovian Conditioning,” Nature 417 (2002): 282–87.

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the mechanisms of memory recall.180 Reacting to this chain of events, the amygdala plays a decisive role in the emotional regulation of memory generation and its recall. One of the possible methods through which an emotional activation of the amygdala regulates memory storage involves following the path from the central nucleus to the autonomic nervous system. This causes the adrenal glands to secrete stress hormones. Although the blood-brain barrier prevents adrenaline from exercising a direct influence on the brain, it is able to activate the brainstem nucleus, which triggers the production of noradrenaline, a chemically related neurotransmitter, which is directed to the basolateral core of the amygdala. Connections range from the basolateral amygdala core to memory areas, such as the cortex, the basal ganglia, and the hippocampus region. The firing of the neurons in the basolateral core of the amygdala in rhythmical waves181 exerts an influence on the memory areas, resulting in a similar rhythmic pattern of activation. Stimulating long-term potentiation, the learning process of the memory is aided by the basolateral core of the amygdala. Learning and encoding is possible without the participation of the basolateral core of the amygdala, but the learning process is strengthened by the activation of the basolateral amygdala.182 A damaged amygdala results in difficulty in the learning and expression of new emotional reactions. Deficits in the learning of fearinducing stimuli can be read via the measurement of electrical skin conductivity, known as the psychogalvanic reflex. Corresponding investigations showed that patients with bilateral damage to the amygdala were unable to learn any conditioned emotional reactions.183 Warning signals to which healthy individuals reacted with increased skin conductivity (in anticipation of the impending stimulus) did not have any effect on these patients. Even when subject to a disagreeable stimulus, 180

See Joseph LeDoux, “Emotion Circuits in the Brain,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 23 (2000): 155–84; Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 179–225; James Mc Gaugh, “Memory Consolidation and the Amygdale: A Systems Perspective in Trends,” Neurosciences 25 (2002): 456–61. 181 See Denis Paré, “Role of the Basolateral Amygdale in Memory Consolidation in Progress,” Neurobiology 70 (2003): 409–20. 182 See James McGaugh, “Memory Consolidation”; idem, Memory and Emotion: The Making of Lasting Memories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 183 See Antoine Bechara, Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio, Ralph Adolphs, Charles Rockland, and Antonio Damasio, “Double Dissociation of Conditioning and Declarative Knowledge Relative To Die Amygdale and Hippocampus in Humans,” Science 269 (1995): 1115–18.

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such patients are unable to learn to avoid it. They even remain unaffected by emotional, touching stories.

Fig. 9: Activation of the amygdala and regulation of memory. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

Disruption of the basolateral amygdala results in an impaired emotional memory. Test persons taking the beta blocker propranolol (which prevents the secretion of noradrenaline) did not exhibit any improved memories of highly-emotional pictorial stories in comparison to more emotionally neutral stories.184 In contrast, an increase in stress hormones in the blood (following an injection of adrenaline, noradrenaline, or glucocorticoids) can improve the recall level of emotional memories.185 Indeed, the basolateral amygdala plays an 184 See Larry Cahill, Bruce Prins, Michael Weber, and James McGaugh, “Betaadrenergic Activation and Memory for Emotional Events,” Nature 371 (1994): 702–4. 185 See Tony W. Buchanan, and William Lavallo, “Enhanced Memory for Emotional Material Following Stress-Level Cortisol Treatment in Humans,”

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important role in the consolidation phase of forming memories. Actions are not always followed by immediate consequences. Should the consequences of certain behavior follow at a later point, the secretion of stress hormones enables the modification and indeed supplementation of memories in such a way as to ascribe the subsequent consequences to the earlier action, thereby modifying current action.186 Whilst the amygdala is responsible for emotional activation and reinforcement of memory building in the hippocampus (through the secretion of stress hormones), the responsibility of the hippocampus region is not restricted to the development of episodic memory. It performs an important role in learning via new contexts, and damage to this area prevents the acquisition of further episodic memories. Any such damage also impinges upon the context of learning, but does not affect the product of simple classic conditioning. Damage to the amygdala does not affect context learning, but does affect fear conditioning. Moreover, although emotional learning is still possible, the sufferer finds it impossible to react in an emotional way. The pathway of interaction between the amygdala and the hippocampus region (via a connection from the basolateral nucleus to the hippocampus regions and back again) explains why information about the context of learning (itself a product of the hippocampus) is included in the amygdala. This also explains why emotional memories can be activated simply by returning to the location in which they were made. The simple presence of our pair of lovers in the bar in which they shared their first kiss is sufficient to trigger the original romantic feelings. The amygdala also interacts with the frontal lobes of the cortex, the location of our executive functions of planning, decision-making, and the processing of social behavior and emotional expression. Damage to the frontal lobes can result in weak emotional expression and intelligence.187 Suffering from mood swings and unable to express them, people with damaged frontal lobes often react with social reticence and reclusive

Psychoneuroendocinology 26 (2001): 307–17; Larry Cahill and M. Alkire, “Epinephrine Enhancement of Human Memory Consolidation: Interaction With Arousal at Encoding,” Neurobiology of Learning and Memory 79 (2003): 194–98. 186 See James McGaugh, Memory and Emotion. 187 See Bryan Kolb and Laughlin Taylor, “Affective Behavior in Patients With Localized Corticol Excisions: Role of Lesion Site and Side,” Science 214 (1981): 89–91; “Facial Expression, Emotion, and Hemispheric Organization,” in Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion, eds. Richard Lane and Lynn Nadel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 62–83.

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behavior. Others react with apparently unfounded and intense expressions of anger and aggression, vulgar expressions, and public masturbation. Both extremes underline the significance of the frontal lobes in maintaining an emotional balance. The prefrontal cortex also contributes to the recognition of the feelings of others. Subject to psychogalvanic188 and fMRI monitoring, normal testpersons were confronted with pictures of various facial expressions. Reactions to expressions of fear stimulated not only a psychogalvanic reaction, but higher levels of activity in the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex. The results confirm the significance of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of emotional expression. Also responsible for the context-appropriate processing of emotional stimuli,189 the medial prefrontal cortex appears to control and regulate emotional reactions. The stimuli routed from the slow, yet precise route to the amygdala via the cortex is first analyzed for its quality in the medial prefrontal cortex. Context perception, such as our example of watching a horror film, allows the information to be “tagged” with the instruction that the amygdala issue a weakened reaction, as the danger is not real.190 Patients with lesions to the medial prefrontal cortex exhibit difficulties with such contextualization. Unable to suppress previously-acquired reaction, they are also not capable of strengthening reactions. This failure to delete patterns of emotional reaction is termed perseveration.

Phobias and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Negative emotions exert a powerful influence on our health and wellbeing. Causing physiological problems, such as excess blood pressure and a weakened immune system,191 stress can also trigger psychological 188

See Leanne Williams, Marry Phillips Michael Brammer, David Skerrit, Jim Lagopoulos, Chris Rennie, Homayoun Bahramali, Gloria Olivieri, Anthony David, Anthony Peduto, and Evian Gordon, “Arousal Dissociates Amygdale and Hippocampal Fear Responses: Evidence From Simultaneous fMRI and Skin Conductance Recording,” NeuroImage 14 (2001): 1070–79. 189 See Joseph Hornak, Joe Bramham, Edmund Rolls, Robin Morris, John O’Doherty, Paul Bullock, and Charles Polkey, “Changes in Emotion After Circumscribed Surgical Lesions of the Orbitofrontal and Cingulated Cortices,” Brain 126 (2003): 1691–1712. 190 See Gregory Quirk, Ekaterina Likhtik, Joe Pelletier, and Denis Pare, “Stimulation of Medial Prefrontal Cortex Decreases the Responsiveness of Central Amygdale Output Neurons,” Journal of Neuroscience 23 (2003): 8800–7. 191 See Robert Sapolsky, Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers (New York: Times Books, 2004).

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problems, for instance anxiety disorders. Phobias—the exaggerated and irrational fear of a place, object, or situation—are a wide-spread social phenomenon. Those locked in an elevator for any measure of time could easily develop a generalized claustrophobia. Nevertheless, not every frightening situation produces a long-term phobia. Indeed, one widely accepted theory locates their development in classical conditioning. Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, each fear stimulus confers its holder with a clear advantage—those afraid of snakes are less likely to be bitten. The fear of specific objects and creatures could well be the result of biological predisposition. On the other hand, some people display a horror of certain objects and situations without a root in either human development or personal experience, for example those afraid of flying despite never having set foot in an airplane. Such fears appear to have developed through social transmission, e.g. having watched a film about an air disaster. Such phobias are treatable with conditioned stimulus (CS). The approach of systematic desensitization gradually exposes its participants to object of the phobia, whilst maintaining calm through the use of relaxation techniques.192 Increasingly popular in the treatment of such irrational fears is virtual reality therapy, which makes use of computer-assisted learning environments to simulate phobic environments, such as a flight simulator. Indeed, used in combination with relaxation techniques and cognitive therapies, this approach has registered some considerable success.193 Sufferers can also benefit from the use of beta blockers such as propranolol. Suppressing adrenaline secretion, it prevents, or at least reduces, bodily reactions to the phobic stimuli. This, in turn, reduces the sensation of fear. Posttraumatic stress disorder has already been discussed in the context of the victim-perpetrator paradigm.194 Suffering from flashbacks and 192

See Joseph Wolpe, Praxis der Verhaltenstherapie (Bern: Huber, 1977); Frederick H. Kanfer and Arnold P. Goldstein, Helping People Change: A Textbook of Methods (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986); Donald W. Meichenbaum, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy: A DVD (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2007); Steffen Fliegel, Wolfgang M. Groeger, Rainer Künzel, Dietmar Schulte, and Hardo Sorgatz, Verhaltenstherapeutische Standardmethoden (Munich, Vienna, and Baltimore: Urban & Schwarzenberg, 1981), esp. 152ff. 193 See Paul Emmelkamp, Merel Krijn, A. Maarten Hulsbosch, Soren de Vries, Martijn Schuemie, and Charles van der Mast, “Virtual Reality Treatment Versus Exposure In Vivo: A Comparative Evaluation in Acrophobia,” Behavior Research and Therapy 40 (2002): 509–16. 194 See above, Chapter 1, section “The ‘license to kill’ as a mental strain—soldiers as ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims.’”

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nightmares, its sufferers avoid all activities and situations which they fear could summon up painful memories of the traumatic situation.195 After experiencing a traumatic event, the majority of people exhibit “abnormal” behavior, which declines withtime. A number of sufferers are affected over the course of months and years. The strength of the fear-inducing unconditioned stimulus (US) is such that it becomes closely associated with all the other stimuli experienced at the same time. Whatever their character, these become conditioned stimuli, the memory of which suffices to trigger the US. Producing a further emotional reaction itself, the multiplicity of trigger stimuli constitutes the main difference to phobias. Whilst the non-repeating nature of the original situation usually leads sufferers to delete the fear-induced reaction, PTSDsufferers are unable to escape the original traumatic experience.196 Therapies to address this problem concentrate on confronting the patient with signals that trigger his fear, whilst maintaining him in a safe environment. Confronted with the traumatic situation using a number of virtual reality techniques, he is able to gradually activate the process of forgetting. The greater resilience of certain individuals to stress situations is rooted in their neuro-physiology. The average brain reacts to a passing danger with the production of cortisone. Itself a reaction to the arousal situation, it is the signal to the adrenal glands to cease the production of stress hormones and the body returns to normal functioning. PTSD sufferers on the other hand, maintain a high cortisone level, thus perpetuating the reaction of fear. Prescribing beta blockers can assist the body in its return to normality. Propranolol injections administered to the victims of car crashes have even succeeded in preventing the development of PTSD.197 Although not obliterating the traumatic memory, its existence does not trigger damaging emotional reactions. Such an approach could 195

See Richard McNally, Richard Bryant, and Anke Ehlers, “Does Early Psychological Intervention Promote Recovery From Post-traumatic Stress?,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 4 (2003): 45–79. 196 See Barbara Rothbaum and Michael Davis, “Applying Learning Principles to the Treatment of Post-trauma Reactions,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1008 (2003): 112–21. 197 See Roger Pitman, Kathy Sanders, Randall Zusman, Anna Healy, Farah Cheema, Natasha Lasko, Larry Cahill, and Scott Orr, “Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder With Propanolol,” Biological Psychiatry 51 (2002): 189–92; Guillaume Vaiva, Francoise Ducrocq, Karine Jezequel, Benoit Averland, Philippe Levestal, Alain Brunet, and Charles Marmar, “Immediate Treatment With Propanolol Decreases Posttraumatic Stress Two Months After Trauma,” Biological Psychiatry 54 (2003): 947–49.

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profitably be applied to soldiers about to engage in operations. An alternative would be to identify those susceptible to trauma and avoid sending them on combat missions. Medical imaging procedures, in particular MRT, have indicated the possibility of such an approach.198 A study of war veterans demonstrated that the hippocampus volume is decisive in determining the susceptibility to PTSD; those with a smaller hippocampus were more susceptible to subsequent trauma.199 This might be because trauma causes the hippocampus to shrink—it is widely accepted that stress is a damaging factor to this area of the brain.200 A further possible interpretation focuses on the reduced size of the hippocampus before the traumatic experience, thus postulating a predisposition to PTSD. Seeking to test the two theories, researchers investigated the hippocampus volume of a pair of monozygotic twins, one who had developed PTSD during service in Vietnam and the other who had lived an uneventful life. This research concluded that PTSD was the consequence, and not the cause of the hippocampus volume. Certain individuals are disposed to suffering PTSD.201

Observational learning or social learning Social learning involves the acquisition of behavior based directly upon the observation of events. One form involves learning through imitation and is presented by children copying the table manners of their parents. Working in the 1960s, Albert Bandura and his team investigated whether the observation by pre-school children of aggressive adult behavior leads to its reproduction. They worked with two groups of children. The first was shown an adult beating an inflatable clown. The 198

See Mark Gilbertson, Martha Shenton, Aleksandra Ciszewski, Kiyoto Kasai, Natasha Lasko, Scott Orr, and Roger Pitman, “Smaller Hippocampal Volume Predicts Pathologic Vulnerability to Psychological Trauma,” Nature Neurosciences 5 (2002): 1242–47. 199 See Michael Smith, “Bilateral Hippocampal Volume Reduction in Adults With Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: A Meta-analysis of Structural MRI Studies,” Hippocampus 15 (2005): 798–807. 200 See above, section “Episodic and semantic memory.” See also Avis Brennan Hains, Mai Anh T. Vu, Paul K. Maciejewski, Christopher H. van Dyck, Melissa Gottron, and Amy F. T. Arnsten, “Inhibition of Protein Kinase C Signaling Protects Prefrontal Cortex Dentritic Spines and Cognition From the Effects of Chronic Stress,” PNAS 106 (2009): 17957–62. 201 See McNally, Bryant, and Ehlers, “Does Early Psychological Intervention Promote Recovery.”

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second group experienced an adult playing peaceably with a set of toys.202 Left alone, the first group displayed greater levels of aggression than the second. Bandura and his colleagues concluded that the children had learnt their aggressive behavior through observation. Bandura’s study ignored many relevant variables, so his findings stay doubtful. Remaining in a single context during the learning and behavior phases allows no conclusions to be drawn about the transferability of the children’s behavior. Moreover, the aggression demonstrated by the children of the first group could well have been a result of their loss of an attractive toy shortly before the test. The children who had not suffered such a loss displayed lower levels of aggression. Indeed, such considerations could lead to the conclusion that the observation of aggressive behavior was more likely to curb than encourage its imitation. Those seeking to protect children by banning depictions of violence have little empirical grounds for their demands. Neither punishing nor reinforcing the behavior the children exhibited, Bandura sought to prevent a situation in which children learnt through instrumental conditioning. Proposing the term observational learning, he argued that children learn during observation and not upon imitation of what they have seen.203 A further finding indicated a gender split. Those emulating aggressive behavior were mainly boys. The girls who witnessed aggressive female role models rarely, if ever, copied the behavior they had observed. In contrast to classical forms of instrumental learning, it is very difficult to make prognoses about learning outcomes. Indeed, a great deal of observations does not result in changes to behavior. Nevertheless, it is often possible to prove that a number of specific actions performed by individual children have been copied directly from specific role models in processes of genuine imitation. The mere repetition of an outcome without the individual moves involved in reaching it is referred to as emulation. All learning through imitation should be subject to critical verification—a great proportion is better understood as the simpler form of instrumental conditioning. Even comedy impressionists achieve their results not through imitation, but instrumental conditioning. Imitation is best verified using the two-action test. Demonstrating various methods of opening a plastic container (containing a reward) to 202

See Albert Bandura, Dorothea Ross, and Sheila A. Ross, “Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Aggressive Models,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 63 (1961): 575–82. 203 See Albert Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

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children and young chimpanzees, Andy Whiten and his team established that even though there were more simple approaches to opening them, both the human and animal test subjects used the methods they had been shown.204 The children were the most reliable imitators, maintaining all the redundant steps in the opening techniques. The conclusion that children are more precise in their imitation than chimpanzees ignored the identity of their role model. The results may have been different had the chimpanzees emulated an adult of the same species. Some researchers believe that observational learning is predicated on a combination of perspective adoption, visual feedback, and high level of cognitive ability.205 Others question this assumption with reference to the activities of dolphins and chimpanzees in this field. Emulation of a result using a different approach is not possible in all activities, an example being voice imitation. This requires motor reproduction and outcome control. Although many animals are able to sing, only very few birds, such as the parrot, are able to reproduce sounds heard from others. Dolphins are the only non-human mammals with the ability to imitate sounds in a modulating fashion.206 Learning new songs as a form of communication is a feat shared by humans and the humpback whale.207 Researchers conclude that voice imitation is not a general learning mechanism, but a highly specialized capability.

The theory of social learning This theory represents a supplement to traditional behaviorism. A reinforcement mechanism experienced in a specific situation determines future responses to a similar situation. Determining personal characteristics through reinforcement, observational learning—reinforcing imitation either directly or indirectly—would appear to be a specific form 204

See Andrew Whiten, Deborah M. Custance, Juan-Carlos Gomez, Patricia Teixidor, and Kim A. Bard, “Imitative Learning of Artificial Fruit Processing in Children (Homo sapiens) and Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),” Journal of Comparative Psychology 110 (1996): 3–14. 205 See Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1986); Jean Piaget, Nachahmung, Spiel und Traum (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003). 206 See Vincent Janik and Peter Slater, “Vocal Learning in Mammals,” Advances in the Study of Behavior 26 (1997): 59–99. 207 See Michael J. Noad, Douglas H. Cato, Michael M. Bryden, Micheline N. Jenner, and K. Curt S. Jenner, “Cultural Revolution in Whale Songs,” Nature 408 (2000): 537.

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of instrumental conditioning.208 Able to judge the outcome (positive or negative) of the actions of their role model, participants in this process choose not only to emulate cases of the former, but repeat it if it brings similarly positive results. In the 1980s, the supplementation of this theory by further cognitive components moved the focus away from instrumental conditioning to the thought and estimation processes which it now involved. Now all behavior—independent of its outcome—was viewed as the result of observation;209 the expectations attached to the outcome merely affected the probability with which the behavior was displayed. According to Bandura, people learn through emulation if the role-model attracts the attention of the observer, if the memory of the observed situation can be recalled, if the observer is able to repeat the action, and if he has the corresponding motivation to do so. The status and charisma of the role model also plays an attractive role, whilst actual or alleged similarity between the role-model and the observer increases the probability of imitation. The attractiveness of the observed consequence is a further factor of importance in determining whether an action is emulated.

“Infection” as an observable unconditioned reaction or observational conditioning Instinctive modes or patterns of behavior, such as yawning or crying, are “catching.”210 The yawning of one group member often spreads to the whole group. Television comedy programs seek to make use of this phenomenon by employing canned laughter. Nevertheless, the infectious nature of this mechanism is not a part of observational learning, but rather represents an unconditioned reaction. A further form of “infection” is the cause of the development of a number of phobias. Repeated observation by a child of his parent’s fearful reaction (unconditional stimulus) to a mouse (conditioned stimulus), for example, is often sufficient to bring the child to share this fear. A special form of an emotional reaction acquired through observation, such fear 208

See Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, Social Learning and Imitation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification. 209 See Bandura, Social Foundations. 210 See Richard W. Byrne, “The Evolution of Intelligence,” in Behaviour and Evolution, eds. Peter Slater and Tim R. Halliday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 223–64; see the section “Social infection” in Chapter 2.

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conditioning is termed observational conditioning.211 The same mechanism is also effective in the reduction of phobias—we watch others mastering a situation which we fear and wish to replicate the pleasure which it brings them.

Directing attention A passing bystander watching a group of people (all with an identical facial expression) looking in the same direction could be forgiven for thinking that they were imitating each other. In reality, they are all transfixed by the same event—in this case an accident. Stimulus reinforcement can direct group attention to a specific object or event, obscuring other possible attractions. Use of a laser pointer or a camera focus achieves a similar outcome. Multiple repetitions of such stimuli reinforce latent learning—a phenomenon employed to great effect by advertisers.

Social learning through information relay All human cultures pass on knowledge in oral, written, or visual form. The complexity of social information and the methods of its transmission make it very difficult to unearth the mechanisms through which it is passed on. Studies using animal experiments have demonstrated the general tendency, widespread amongst all forms of living beings, to adopt group behavior.212 Although enabling the rapid acquisition of shared information, such social conformity is not without disadvantages. Establishing expensive traditions devoid of intrinsic worth, such mechanisms can prevent the development of more advantageous forms of social organization. For example, bringing no practical advantage, the tradition of changing fashions—long thin ties replacing their broader predecessors and so on—is intended solely as a means of “keeping in with the crowd.” Cultural differences also manifest themselves in the choice of clothing, behavior, and environment. Swedes, for example, begin a letter with 211

See Sara J. Shettleworth, Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Cecilia M. Heyes, “Social Learning in Animals: Categories and Mechanisms,” Biological Reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 69 (1994): 207–31. 212 See Shettleworth, Cognition; Culum Brown and Kevin N. Laland, “Social Learning of a Novel Avoidance Task in the Guppy: Conformity and Social Release,” Animal Behavior 64 (2002): 41–47.

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“thank you for the last time” (tack för senast)—a phrase which no other grouping would choose. Social conformity usually involves the emulation of our culture group; if questioned, we say that these customs suit us better than others. Whilst many of our modes of behavior are the result of direct and intentional information transmission, others represent by-products of other mechanisms. Although the portrayal of violence on television serves the primary purpose of entertainment, many contend that it animates young people to its real-life imitation.213 An assertion which remains to be proven, it is more likely that representations of violence—either in films or video games far from teaching violence—activate and reinforce a latent tendency to this end. Even if video nasties do not promote anti-social behavior, there exists a cultural-aesthetic case against their unchecked growth.214

“Mirror neurons” The widely-observable phenomenon of “group” or “sympathetic yawning” has been explained by recourse to the function of particular nerve cells—so-called mirror neurons—which transform observations into actions.215 A research group around Giacomo Rizzolatti working at the University of Parma at the beginning of the 1990s investigated the premotor cortex of the Macaque ape.216 They noticed that a particular area in the brain was activated not only when the ape reached for a nut, but also 213

See Craig A. Anderson, Leonard Berkowitz, Edward Donnerstein, L. Rowell Husemann, James D. Johnson, Daniel Linz, Neil M. Malamuth, and Ellen Wartella, “The Influence of Media Violence on Youth,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 4 (2003): 82–110; Craig A. Anderson, “An Update on the Effects of Playing Violent Video Games,” Journal of Adolescence 27 (2004): 113–22. 214 Television is known as a factor which arrests the psychological development of children. See The American Academy of Pediatrics Council on Communications and Media Executive Committee, eds., “Media Use by Children Younger Than 2 Years,” Pediatrics 128, no. 5 (November 2011). The problem of indirect communication on other media such as the Internet has become a focus of recent research. See Manfred Spitzer, Digitale Demenz: Wie wir uns und unsere Kinder um den Verstand bringen (Munich: Droemer, 2012). His conclusion that the use of computers, smart phones, and other methods of modern communication result in reading and attention-deficit disorders, sleep disorders, depression, obesity, and a disposition to violence, have yet to be demonstrated fully. 215 See Gluck, Mercado, and Myers, Learning and Memory, 448ff. 216 See Giacomo Rizzolatti, Lucian Fadiga, Vittoria Gallese, and Leonardo Fogassi, “Premotor Cortex and the Recognition of Motor Actions,” Cognitive Brain Research 3 (1996): 131–41.

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when it saw another ape doing so. Exploring this phenomenon with the use of highly-invasive techniques, neuroscientists have been unable to discover a similar mechanism in the human brain, but experiments with medical imaging techniques have pointed to a region in the human cortex which would appear to function in a similar fashion.217 Those cortical regions activated by an action overlap with the areas activated by observation of this action in others.218 Although the existence of such mirror neurons is the subject of a widely-shared consensus, there is little agreement regarding the way in which they function or even what their purpose may be.219 A particular area of disagreement focuses on whether the function involves the mere ability to imitate or a more complex form of understanding. Many believe that the mirror neuron system in primates provides nothing more than the ability for simple imitation,220 and, despite some claims to the contrary,221 it would appear that we really understand little of this complex process. Whilst visual and motor aspects are important for the understanding of an action, they are insufficient to explain the complex procedures taking place via “mirror neurons.” A full understanding of this process requires its location in a wider neurological context.222 217

See Antonio P. Strafella and Tomas Paus, “Modulation of Cortical Excitability During Action Observation: A Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Study,” Neuroreport 11 (2000): 2289–92; Massimo Gangitano, Felix M. Mottaghy, and Alvaro Pascual-Leone, “Phase-Specific Modulation of Cortical Motor Output During Movement Observation,” Neuroreport 12 (2001): 1489–92. 218 See Giacomo Rizzolatti and Laila Craighero, “The Mirror-Neuron System,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 27 (2004): 169–92. 219 See Greg Hickok and David Poeppel, “Towards a Functional Neuroanatomy of Speech Perception,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (2000): 131–38; Greg Hickok, “Eight Problems for the Mirror Neuron Theory of Action Understanding in Monkeys and Humans,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 7 (2009): 1229–43. 220 See Giacomo Rizzolatti, Luciano Fadiga, Massimo Matelli, Valentino Bettinardi, Eraldo Paulesu, Daniela Perani, and Ferruccio Fazio, “Localization of Grasp Representations in Humans by PET: 1. Observation Versus Execution,” Experimental Brain Research 111 (1996): 246–52; Giovanni Buccino, Fausta Lui, Nicola Canessa, Ilaria Patteri, Giovanna Lagravinese, Francesca Benuzzi, Carlo A. Porro, and Giacomo Rizzolarti, “Neural Circuits Involved in the Recognition of Actions Performed by Nonconspecifics: An FMRI Study,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (2004): 114–26. 221 See Vilayanur Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011). 222 See Patricia Churchland, Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

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Experiments conducted with non-primates would indicate that observational learning involves a number of further brain areas outside the cortex, such as the cerebellum.223 We also know that animals with a large cortex are equipped with the best imitation skills. The social transmission of feeding preferences is dependent on the hippocampus—the region responsible for the storage of episodic memories.224 The neurologist Christian Keysers views the non-functioning of mirror neurons as the reason behind the absolute lack of empathy amongst psychopaths.225

Autism and damaged frontal lobes Investigations of autism and Asperger syndrome—individuals with a normal intellectual capacity, but reduced social skills—have provided further insight into the neurological principles of observational learning. Presenting a restricted social capacity, a reduced number of behavioral patterns and delayed linguistic development226—usually within the first three years of life—children with autism often reproduce repetitive stereotypical actions including repeated words or sentences which they have just learnt (echolalia). Nevertheless, their capacity for imitation is especially limited when required to adopt an outside perspective. Although able to copy others, they lack any empathy for their role-models.227 Such children find it much easier to emulate single actions than sequences. 223

See Maria G. Leggio, Marco Molinari, Paola Neri, Allesandro Graziano, Laura Mandolesi, and Laura Petrosini, “Representations of Actions in Rats: The Role of Cerebellum in Learning Spatial Performances by Observation,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 97 (2000): 2320–25. 224 See Robert E. Clark, Nicola J. Broadbent, Stuart M. Zola, and Larry R. Squire, “Anterograde Amnesia and Temporally Graded Retrograde Amnesia for a Nonspatial Memory Task After Lesions of Hippocampus and Subiculum,” Journal of Neuroscience 22 (2002): 4663–69; Anna Vale-Martinez, Mark G. Baxter, and Howard Eichenbaum, “Selective Lesions of Basal Forebrain Cholinergic Neurons Produce Anterograde and Retrograde Deficits in a Social Transmission of Food Preference Task in Rats,” European Journal of Neuroscience 16 (2002): 983–98. 225 See Christian Keysers, Jon H. Kaas, and Valeria Gazzola, “Somatosensation in Social Perception,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11 (2010): 417–28. Cf. also Christian Keysers, Unser empathisches Gehirn: Warum wir verstehen, was andere fühlen (Munich: Bertelsmann, 2013). 226 See Lynn Waterhouse, Deborah Fein, and Charlotte Modahl, “Neurofunctional Mechanisms in Autism,” Psychological Review 103 (1996): 457–89. 227 See Julie D. Beadle-Brown and Andrew Whiten, “Elicited Imitation in Children and Adults With Autism: Is There a Deficit?,” Journal of Intellectual & Development Disability 292 (2004): 147–63.

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Seeking an anatomic explanation for this situation, researchers have found that people with autism present anomalies in the size of the cerebellum, the temporal lobes (including the hippocampus), the amygdale, and the corpus callosum. Moreover, their brain functions— measured during imitations of facial expressions—present a slower pattern of cortical activation. The activity of the circuitry within and in proximity to the mirror neurons also presents systematic differences to the norm.228 As those with autism experience difficulties in the imitation of specific actions, it is widely assumed that an explanation is to be found in the abnormal function of a section of mirror neurons. Other explanations focus on deficits in the mechanisms of stimulus reinforcement, emulation, general reinforcement mechanisms, emotional processes, or the generalization of antecedent actions. Patients having suffered damage to their frontal lobes often experience similar difficulties in imitating other people. Presenting all the symptoms of echolalia, they also display unintended imitative reactions.229 According to the correspondence hypothesis, the observation of an action activates the same neuronal systems as required to perform this action. That people do not generally mimic every observable action would indicate the presence of an inhibitory mechanism which enables us to suppress and thus select the actions we wish to imitate. Investigations have shown that patients having suffered damage to their frontal lobe are less successful in operating this selection process and often imitate others involuntarily.230 This would indicate a location of the postulated inhibitory mechanism in the frontal region of the brain.231 This mechanism contains functions, which enable the individual to differentiate between voluntary and stimulated actions. Damage to this region would explain why such patients 228

See Nobuyuki Nishitani, Sari Avikainn, and Riitta Hari, “Abnormal ImitationRelated Cortical Activation Sequences in Asperger’s Syndrome,” Annals of Neurology 55 (2004): 558–62; Gordon D. Waiter, Justin H. Williams, Alison D. Murray, Anne Gilchrist, David I. Perret, and Andrew Whiten, “A Voxel-Based Investigation of Brain Structure in Male Adolescents With Autistic Spectrum Disorder,” NeuroImage 22 (2004): 619–25. 229 See Sara J. Archibald, Catherine A. Mateer, and Kimberly A. Kerns, “Utilization Behavior: Clinical Manifestations and Neurological Mechanisms,” Neuropsychology Review 11 (2001): 117–30. 230 See Marcel Brass, Jan Derrfuss, Gabriele Matthes-von Cramon, and D. Yves von Cramon, “Imitative Response Tendencies in Patients With Frontal Brain Lesions,” Neuropsychology 17 (2003): 265–71. 231 See Marcel Brass, Jan Derrfuss, and D. Yves von Cramon, “The Inhibition of Imitative and Overlearned Responses: A Functional Double Dissociation,” Neuropsychologia 43 (2005): 89–98.

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display the combination of restricted autonomy and difficulties in taking the perspective of others.232

Interdisciplinary memory research: The “collective memory” as cultural and social memory studies “Events tend to be forgotten unless they live on in collective memory. […] The reason for this ‘living on’ lies in the continuous relevance of these events. This relevance comes not from their historical past, but from an ever-changing present in which these events are remembered as facts of importance.”233

Although individual processes of memory tend to possess a collective character, there are also collective memories shared by a group of people, such as memories of war234 or the loss of a homeland. Indeed, “the process of memory consolidation […] is the same on individual and collective levels.”235 Some thinkers even classify entire cultures as collective memories. Working with the theory presented by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917)236 of the “collective consciousness” and “collective representation,”237 the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945)238 pioneered a social and cultural approach to memory studies. He begins with a frame of reference of memory, which an individual acquires through participation in a social group: “Every group—be it religious, political or economic, family, friends, or acquaintances, even a transient gathering in a salon, auditorium or street— 232

See Brass, et al., Imitative Response Tendencies. Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 9–10. 234 For example, the British collective memory still views the German bombing offensive of the Second World War a moment of proud endurance. See Dietmar Süß, Tod aus der Luft: Kriegsgesellschaft und Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England (Munich: Siedler, 2011). 235 So Thomas J. Anastasio, Kristen Ann Ehrenberger, Patrick Watson, and Wenyi Zhang, Individual and Collective Memory Consolidation: Analogous Processes on Different Levels (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 245. 236 See Daniel Šuber, Émile Durkheim (Constance: UVK, 2011). 237 See Émile Durkheim, “Individuelle und kollektive Vorstellungen,” in Soziologie und Philosophie, ed. Émile Durkheim (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 45–83. 238 See Dietmar J. Wetzel, Maurice Halbwachs (Constance: UVK, 2009). 233

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Working with this mental reference point—words and conceptions drawn from his milieu—the individual begins the construction of his memory. Using these words and conceptions, he reconstructs an image of the past with a social significance pertinent to the time of the actual memory. Indeed, there is no such thing as an unambiguous reconstruction of the past; all memory exists as “vague traces,”240 subject to processing and reformation against the backdrop of current problems and interests. Memory thus represents the socially-modulated construction of a version of the past which, far from a reliable reconstruction, is better conceived as a new creation. Prescribed by its social context, the frame of reference of memory—itself constructed through the concentration and generalization of individual memories—is transmitted by a whole range of social groups (family, friends, religious associations, parties, regions, nations etc.) to which an individual belongs. Within this process of identity-building, the individual memory opens a “vantage point” on the collective memory of the group: “I would readily acknowledge that each memory is a viewpoint on the collective memory that this viewpoint changes as may position changes that this position itself changes as my relationships to other milieus change.”241

Individual understanding and its collective memory is only possible from within the group to which a person currently belongs and should be understood from the position, which he assumes in his milieu. As such, although the unique position of the individual in his respective group makes him a distinctive subject of memory, the social transmission of memory locates each such memory within a clear social context. The reconstruction of an individual’s past is always subject to contextual influence. Memories, then, are constructs developed under certain social conditions; they are the “fruit of social pressure.”242 239

Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, transl. Francis J. Ditter jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (1950, repr. ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 126. 240 Maurice Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen (1925 repr. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), 132. 241 Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 48. 242 Halbwachs, Das Gedächtnis und seine sozialen Bedingungen, 159.

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As groups maintain differing memories of the same event, these multiple interpretations are forced to renegotiate a common position. Spontaneous memories and the stable framework organizing them come to shape each other. Should a social environment maintain any form of constancy, this situation enables the development of stable memory milieus. The existence of contact points between the local and national environment could result in the incorporation of individual memory in a national framework. In no way uniform, every society maintains a multiplicity of competing collective memories. Continuing Halbwachs’ theory and combining it with the findings of the German-Jewish Art historian Aby Warburg,243 the Heidelberg-based Egyptologist Jan Assmann differentiated between two “modes” or “frameworks” of collective memory. Starting with the common, informally-transmitted memory as cultural-social participation of the individual in collective memory, which he termed the communicative memory, he supplemented this with a second concept drawn from the realm of objective culture and organized communication. Calling it the “cultural memory,”244 he identifies this second construct as a “collective term for all knowledge controlled within the specific interactive framework of social action and experience, which is controlled across the generations by repeated rehearsal and instruction.”245 Not timeless, the cultural memory still outlives those individuals contributing to it. Moreover, abstract in nature, it contrasts with the tangible realities of communicative memory. Constituted by oral testimony drawn from the previous three generations, communicative memory interacts with everyday life in such a way as to remain immediate to those maintaining it. Inseparably intertwined, both forms of memory can only be described as an interaction of “present and past in a socio-cultural context.”246 243

See Jan Assmann, Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis: Zehn Studien (Munich: Beck, 2007), 201; Aby Moritz Warburg, “Der Bilderatlas Mnemosyne,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol II.1, ed. Martin Warnke with Claudia Brink (Berlin: Akad.-Verlag, 2000); Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, eds., The Collective Memory Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 104–9. 244 See Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen (1992, repr. Munich: Beck, 2007). 245 Jan Assmann, “Kollektives Gedächtnis und kulturelle Identität,” in Kultur und Gedächtnis, eds. Jan Assmann and Tonio Hölscher (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), 9–19; 9. 246 Thus Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, eds., Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook (Berlin and New York: Walter de

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Jeffrey Olick has proposed the two concepts of collective memory and collected memory.247 Collective memory consists of the social framework culture as expressed in public symbols, practices, and objects and, as such, closely resembles Assmann’s cultural memory. Encompassing the collected aggregation of individual memory, collective memory comes close to Assmann’s communicative memory: “The new insight of memory studies is thus not merely that memory is omnipresent but that it is at once situated in social frameworks (e. g., family and nation); enabled by changing media technologies (e. g., the Internet and digital recording); confronted with cultural institutions (e.g., memorials and museums); and shaped by political circumstances (e. g., wars and catastrophes).”248

Memory and recall are enabled and influenced by communication.249 The impact of this form of communicative memory formation is supplemented by the effect of silence and omission. Thus, the omission of specific sequences in a memory episode results in these incidents being remembered less clearly than if the speaker had omitted the entire episode in his original account.250 Memories can also be altered by the adaptation of their narrative to a particular listener; the matter of communication can also have a subsequent impact on memory and its representation.251 The location of, and language used in the communication also affects memory formation. Asked about an event, the communication partner not only modulates his language according to the identity of his interlocutor, but selects the information most likely to interest them. Such person-bound communication clearly serves to modulate the actual content of the information communicated. These effects on memory Gruyter, 2008), quote in Sabine Moller in Gudehus, Eichenberg, and Welzer, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, 87. 247 See Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” Sociological Theory 17 (1999): 333–48; Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, eds., The Collective Memory Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 36ff. 248 Olick, et al., The Collective Memory Reader, 37. 249 See Harald Welzer, Das kommunikative Gedächtnis: Eine Theorie der Erinnerung (2002, repr. Munich: Beck, 2008), esp. 9ff. 250 See Alexandru Cuc, Jonathan Koppel, and William Hirst, “Silence Is Not Golden: A Case for Socially-Shared Retrieval-Induced Forgetting,” Psychological Science 18 (2007): 727–37. 251 See Gerald Echterhoff, E. Tory Higgins, and John M. Levine, Shared Reality: Experiencing Communality With Other’s Inner States About the World,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 4 (2009): 496–521.

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and judgment have been demonstrated in so-called “saying-is-believing” studies.252 Required to judge a fictive person on the basis of ambivalent information, test subjects offered a more positive assessment if informed that this person held a positive opinion of him and belonged to his ingroup. The influence of communication on attitudes is part of social reality formation. People like to create a subjectively reliable and valid representation of the world in partnership with others. Overcoming their uncertainties regarding the evaluation of current or past experiences in communicative exchange with trustworthy people from their own ingroup, they work together to form a widely-accepted memory model of social reality formation.253 Individual memory is thus, above all, constructive and interactive. If a trusted individual dominates the process with his own form of “self-persuasion,” his view of events will slowly receive acceptance. Starting in the 1970s, the nascent oral history movement in West Germany adapted the findings of Halbwachs in an analysis of individual recollections made with the purpose of understanding their individual lives. Lutz Niethammer dealt with such attempts in the context of social groupings—class, family, and political milieu.254 Interviews conducted in the GDR during the 1980s highlighted the gap between the communicative and cultural memory in a dictatorship. Officially-prescribed historical memory failed to percolate the individual sphere and disappeared entirely with the system that propagated it.255 The studies of Ulrike Jureit used discourse analytical procedures256 to provide a typified analysis of the individual constructions of meaning made by the survivors of concentration camps and extermination camps, thereby highlighting their

252

See E. Tory Higgins and William S. Rholes, “Saying-Is-Believing: Effects of Message Modification on Memory and Liking for the Person Described,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 14 (1978): 363–78. 253 See Gerald Echterhoff, et.al., “How Communication Goals Determine When Audience Tuning Biases Memory,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 137 (2008): 3–21. 254 See Lutz Niethammer, Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedächtnis: Die Praxis der Oral History (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985). 255 See Lutz Niethammer, Alexander von Plato, and Dorothee Wierling, Die volkseigene Erfahrung: Eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991). 256 See Achim Landwehr, Historische Diskursanalyse (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2008), esp. 21–22.

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context-based nature.257 Whilst reflecting the individual’s own perspective, ego-documents such as private memoirs, diaries, or collections of letters provided constructions of meaning and identity, which were themselves subject to distinct mechanisms of social transmission.258 A study presented in 2002 by Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschugnall investigated the interaction of cultural and communicative memories in the context of inter-generational transmission.259 Analyzing family discussions and family memories, the authors examined “what ‘ordinary Germans’ remember about the Third Reich, how they discuss it, and what information they [the eye-witness generation] pass on to their children and grandchildren.”260 They concluded that “emotional and imagination-led dimension of this process of transmission features much more strongly than the rational component of cognitive fact.”261 According to the authors, the latter aspect remained largely ignored within the process of transmission. The difference between a cognitive knowledge of history and emotional perception of the past in the sphere of family communication is located in the communication involved. Whilst the habitually ritualized nature of public memory with its abstract symbolism provides no source of identity and security, private mechanisms are able to satisfy this deep-seated need. Taking refuge in the sanctuary of private memory, its participants are careful to avoid dissonance. Seeking to maintain family loyalties, avoid episodes of cognitive dissonance, and maintain contemporary moral standards, the agents of tradition victimized or aggrandized those involved in family anecdotes. Any element of critical reflection involving concession of personal shortcoming or moral transgression was conspicuous by its absence. A number of observations illustrate the results of psycho-physiological memory research, such as the way in which memories of family discussions change. Subject to constant update by children, grandchildren, and contemporaries, they are sometimes even subject to supplement from 257

See Ulrike Jureit, Erinnerungsmuster: Zur Methodik lebensgeschichtlicher Interviews mit Überlebenden der Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslager (Hamburg: Ergebnisse, 1999). 258 See Mary Fulbrook and Ulinka Rublack, “The ‘Social Self’ and EgoDocuments,” German History 28 (2010): 263–272; Kaspar von Greyertz, “EgoDocuments: The Last Word?” in ibid., 273–82. 259 See Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschugnall, “Opa war kein Nazi”: Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2008). 260 Ibid., 11. 261 Ibid., 200.

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films or novels. Family structures have been seen to work against public and school-based forms of education in maintaining racist and nationalist stereotypes. Within such a paradigm, accounts of expulsion and resettlement from ancestral German homelands were interpreted using images drawn from the Holocaust; the burden of National Socialist guilt was relieved through postulation of ignorance. The context in which concepts are understood exerts a decisive influence on the mode and contents of appropriation. Knowledge of any level and form can be corrupted by its communicative context.262 Extending Assmann’s differentiation between communicative and cultural memory, Harald Welzer incorporates the impact of the form of interaction and media involved in order to identify intentional and unintentional forms of transmission. Unintentional transmission of the past is ascribed to the social memory. Welzer’s interest rests not on the organized and finished testimony of the cultural memory, but rather, following the categories developed by Peter Burke,263 on those media, which “are not fabricated for the purposes of tradition formation, but act to transport and create history.”264 Factoring out those media used to constitute cultural memory, Welzer concentrates on interaction (oral transmission), documents (memoirs and diaries), as well as pictures and locations (memorial services, rituals) as the decisive level of mediation for implicit, unintentional memory. It is these non-intentional practices of memory that Welzer views as constituting the core of human historicity, and which constitute his definition of the social memory. With little overlap with the communicative memory, it has very little in common with the cultural memory. People are often influenced from specific memories without their being aware of the fact. Referred to in the neurosciences as implicit memory, this category also includes generational-typical forms of experience processing and the individual perception and processing of events. The implicit generational memory surrounds the subjective memories of a whole 262

This investigation was followed by a number of studies into the intermediate level between family memory and cultural memory and the associated attempt to control the construction of memory. See Jutta Faehndrich, Eine endliche Geschichte: Die Heimatbücher der deutschen Vertriebenen (Cologne: Böhlau, 2011). 263 See Peter Burke, “Geschichte als soziales Gedächtnis,” in Mnemosyne: Formen und Funktionen kultureller Erinnerung, ed. Aleida Assmann and Dietrich Harth (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 1999), 289–304. 264 See Harald Welzer, ed., Das soziale Gedächtnis: Geschichte, Erinnerung, Tradierung (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2001), 16.

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generation. Assessing Welzer’s theory, Jeffrey K. Olick writes that “these interaction and symbol theories […] neglect not only the unsaid, the unwished-for, and the unseen, but also the unconscious, i.e. various practices associated with the body”265 and refers to the work of Paul Connerton.266 Seeking to resolve the terminological incongruence involved in this debate, Mathias Berek defined memorial culture (Erinnerungskultur) as “the social processes […] by which the past is reproduced.” Collective memory, on the other hand, is “the entirety of represented images of the past, texts and meanings.”267 His main concern is to establish the constructive character of memory and analyze the various memorial cultures for their “motive power the subjects and collectives involved and their reception and impact.”268 He understands memory as a “necessary precondition of human self-consciousness” and a memorial culture as an “essential aspect of human association.”269 To enjoy wide-spread public acceptance, an official memorial culture requires the combination and reconciliation of both approaches to remembrance. The private form of family-based commemoration as identified by Welzer, Moller and Tschugnall must be coupled with historical knowledge from the wider cultural memory in order to make personal memory plausible to a wider community. Public memorial cultures, such as those conducted on a national level, develop as part of a discourse over the facts deemed by society as central to national history and therefore not to be forgotten. Incorporating diffuse group identities, this collective construct contributes to (national) identity formation.270 Public memorial cultures are those which have succeeded in establishing themselves amidst a competing polyphony of group articulations without actually dispersing them. As such, a public memorial culture should not be equated with a collective memory. Nevertheless, cultural memory cannot function as a tie with which to reinforce social stability and remind its members of the promises which they have made to 265

Quoted from Gudehus, Eichenberg, and Welzer, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, 113. 266 See Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 267 Mathias Berek, Kollektives Gedächtnis und die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit: Eine Theorie der Erinnerungskulturen (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 33. 268 Ibid., 200. 269 Ibid., 24. 270 See Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, esp. 59.

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the existing political order. National locations of memory (lieu de mémoire)—days of remembrance,271 museums, and memorials—function as the instruments of an official strategy of memory politics.272 Constructed by an elite, such programs of memory should ideally be supported by a wide public consensus.273 Far from the product of accretion, state policies of memory—even in a pluralist democracy—are always subject to central planning and control and are the result of official acts of remembrance and forgetting.274 These policy decisions about memory are, in part, ethical in nature and require justification.275 The specific functions of such interventions in the sphere of memory politics can be described on a number of levels.276 Seeking to legitimize and stabilize a political order, its agents convey a narrative focusing on a selection of events taken to have particular national significance. At the same time, memory politics seeks to de-emphasize negatively-connoted 271

See Vera Caroline Simon, Gefeierte Nation: Erinnerungskultur und Nationalfeiertag in Deutschland und Frankreich seit 1990 (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2010). 272 See Etienne François and Pierre Nora, Erinnerungsorte Frankreichs (Munich: Beck, 2005); Etienne François and Hagen Schulze, ed., Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, 3 vols. (Munich: Beck, 2008); Etienne François, “Geteilte Erinnerungsorte, europäische Erinnerungsorte,” in Visuelle Erinnerungskulturen und Geschichtskonstruktionen in Deutschland und Polen 1800 bis 1939, eds. Robert Born, Adam S. Labuda, and Beate Störtkuhl (Warsaw: Instytut Sztuki PAN, 2006), 17–32; Martin Sabrow, Erinnerungsorte der DDR (Munich: Beck, 2009); Madelon de Keizer ad Marije Plomp, eds., Een open zenuw: Hoe wij ons de Tweede Wereldoorlog herinneren [An open wound: How we remember the Second World War] (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2000); Matthias Weber, Burkhard Olschowsky, Ivan 3HWUDQVNê $WWLOD 3yN DQG $QGU]HM 3U]HZRĨQLN Erinnerungsorte in Ostmitteleuropa: Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit und Pespektiven (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011). For key examples of German memorial culture since 1945, see Bill Niven and Chloe Paver, eds., Memorialization in Germany since 1945 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 273 For a discussion of the flexibility of the German ‘Volkstrauertag’ ritual, and the ways in which it has been reinterpreted, see Alexandra Kaiser, Von Helden und Opfern: Eine Geschichte des Volkstrauertags (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2010). 274 See Helmut König, Politik und Gedächtnis (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2008). 275 See Christoph Kühberger and Clemens Sedmark, “Bausteine einer Ethik der Erinnerung,” ZfG 53 (2005): 981–99. 276 Michael Kohlstuck, “Erinnerungspolitik: Kollektive Identität, Neue Ordnung, Diskurshegemonie,” in Politikwissenschaft als Kulturwissenschaft: Theorien, Methoden, Problemstellungen, ed. Birgit Schwelling (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 173–93.

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events, which could serve to undermine the legitimacy of the current political settlement. A combination of both strategies serves to reinforce current claims to political hegemony. In addition to this political function, memorial cultures generate identity and orientation during times of uncertainty and are propagated in order to remind citizens of their bonds to the common polity, thus, reinforcing mechanisms of loyalty and consent.277 Such ends are furthered through campaigns of political education carried out in schools, museums, and public organizations. Despite propagating a clear historical interpretation, they do not achieve anything approaching a collective memory. The flexibility of everyday convictions differs considerably to the coagulated manifestation of cultural memory. Any change they impose is effected through the topicality of new communicative associations.278 “Transforming history into narrative, cultural memory shifts attention from empirical history to a remembered history, generated through ritual practice and forms of representation.”279

Traditionally embedded within the framework of the nation-state, these narratives are associated with the concept of cultural memory. With a pronounced disposition exhibited in the 19th and 20th centuries towards a belief in shared faiths, the nations established within this period gradually reified into closed “communities of memory.”280 Within this process, a heavily nationalized historiography produced not only a national memory, but closed “soul-scapes:” narratives were constructed in such a way as to present the mental, political, and cultural dimensions recently established as entirely identical.281 Requiring ultimate loyalty, nations now demanded 277

The growing significance of the heritage industry, its “hands-on approach to history” and its market-approach to memorial culture tends to owe more to market demand than the constraints of political necessity. See Sybille Frank, Der Mauer um die Wette gedenken: Die Formation einer Heritage-Industrie am Berliner Checkpoint Charlie (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2009). 278 See Barry Schwartz and Howard Schumann, “History, Commemoration, and Belief: Abraham Lincoln in American Memory 1945–2001,” American Sociological Review 70 (2005): 183–203. 279 “Daniel Levy,” in Gudehus, Eichenberg, and Welzer, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, 96. 280 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (1922, 5th. rev. ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1985), 515. 281 See Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz, eds., Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010);

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that their members dedicate themselves to the collective. Not only was identity-formation and in-group construction transformed into an entirely nationalized process, all those excluded from its confines—cosmopolitans, particularists, and minorities—were henceforth subject to extensive programs of re-education and assimilation. Increasingly radical in its exclusivity, this dynamic was eventually to culminate in the ultimate act of homogenization—murder and ethnic cleansing. The “political construction of a holistic identity” saw the contraction and harmonization of all “the individual constituent identities under a single roof. On this level, I am a German and nothing else.”282 The provisions of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919 marked the rejection of the principle of oblivio et amnestia, until then the prevailing approach to European peace-making after international upheavals.283 The international ostracism of the German Empire and the punitive settlement imposed on the Central Powers after 1919 was accompanied by the prosecution of “war criminals.” Retaining this new perspective after its foundation in 1919, the League of Nations neither prevented the Second World War nor sought to return to a more traditional perspective. This moralizing approach was continued after 1945 with the Statue of London (August 1945)—outlining the corpus delicti of war crimes and crimes against humanity; the precedent established at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg;284 the foundation of the United Nations;285 and the

Izabela Surynt and Marek Zybura, eds., Narrative des Nationalen: Deutsche und polnische Nationaldiskurse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2010). 282 Dariuš Zifonun, “Vergessendes Erinnern: Eine Wissenssoziologie des Erinnerns und Vergessens,” in Soziologie des Vergessens: Theoretische Zugänge und empirische Forschungsfelder, eds. Oliver Dimbath and Peter Wehling (Constance: UVK, 2011), 189–209; 197. 283 See Christian Meier, Das Gebot zu vergessen und die Unabweisbarkeit des Erinnerns: Vom öffentlichen Umgang mit schlimmer Vergangenheit (Munich: Siedler, 2010). For the pre-history of the Hague Peace Conference, see Jost Dülffer, Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haager Friedenskonferenzen 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik (Frankfurt/M.: Ullstein, 1981). 284 See Anette Weinke, Die Nürnberger Prozesse (Munich: Beck, 2006). 285 See Hans von Mangoldt, Volker Rittberger, and Franz Knipping, eds., Das System der Vereinten Nationen und seine Vorläufer, 3 vols. (Bern and Munich: Stämpfli and Beck, 1995); Klaus Dieter Wolf, Die UNO—Geschichte, Aufgaben, Perspektiven (Munich: Beck, 2005); Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006).

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International Court of Justice at the Hague286—this new approach to international affairs was supplemented by mechanisms of compensation, remembrance, investigation, and punishment. This form of memory politics seeks to use reflection on past crimes as a means to prevent future atrocities. Seeking to drive on European integration, in 1946, Winston Churchill called for a return to the old practice of “forgiving and forgetting.” Quoting Gladstone, he spoke of the “blessed act of oblivion.” Continuing, he maintained that: “If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past.”287 Seeking to come to terms with the Nazi past, many Germans called for “a line to be drawn” under the 1945 in an attempt to free themselves from its burden. Interpreted by many as an attempt to evade responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich and replace them with counter-claims of German suffering or positive achievement,288 critics of this trend were gripped by an obsessive fear of forgetting. Assessing the development of such a “reflexive approach to the past,” Angela Kühner warned against the danger of “elements of selfdeception and self-reassurance, especially when the fear of a (real or imaginary) [form of] forgetting culminates in ritualized forms of memory which forget their own contextuality and selectivity.”289 The second half of the 20th century saw the gradual transition to a post-national regime of memorialism. Replacing the hero-narratives of national glorification with a balanced perspective on achievements and failings, parochial cultures of remembrance have also begun to merge in a common arena of memory.290 This does not and indeed should not herald the end of regional and national narratives, the immediacy of which serves 286

See Andreas Zimmermann, et al., eds., The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 287 Winston Churchill, “European Unity: ‘Something That Will Astonish You,’” in Blood, Toil, Tears And Sweat: Winston Churchill’s Famous Speeches, ed. David Cannadine (London: Cassell, 1989), 309–19; 312. 288 See Zifonun, “Vergessendes Erinnern,” 101–2. 289 See Angela Kühner, “Das Plädoyer für Vergessen als Kritik einer ‘obsessiven’ Erinnerungspolitik? Sozialpsychologische Überlegungen zum Umgang mit beunruhigenden Vergangenheiten” in Dimbath and Wehling, Soziologie des Vergessens, 211–27; 224. 290 See Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, eds., Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Kerstin von Lingen, “Erfahrung und Erinnerung. Gründungsmythos und Selbstverständnis von Gesellschaften in Europa nach 1945,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 49 (2009): 149–84.

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to prevent over-abstraction and the descent into empty ritual. Rather, a meaningful and effective culture of remembrance requires the integration of a diversity of cultural memories which take into account the multifaceted nature of contemporary identity. An Alsatian is neither German nor French, yet lives within a clearly-defined national culture within a wider European, indeed cosmopolitan framework. After the collapse of the state-ordered Marxist-Leninist school of history, East, East-Central, and South-East Europe saw a renaissance of nationalist interpretations of the past. Nevertheless, despite a revival of the traditional paraphernalia of nationalist myth in the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, and the former Soviet Union,291 and a national-conservative renaissance in West Europe,292 the days of nationalist historical posturing are increasingly numbered.293 They are being supplanted by a number of individualized and privatized forms of remembrance; and their pluralizing, fragmenting effect carries the potential to end the hegemonic status of a homogenous cultural memory. Following Stathis Kalyvas, Claus Leggewie differentiates between four European memory regimes since 1945.294 Whilst exclusion subjects specific victim groups to systematic group proscription in an attempt to force the pace of reconciliation, inclusion proclaims a non-existent consensus. Whilst the policy of contestation seeks to maintain old controversies, Leggewie labels the phase of suppression as experienced in post-war Germany or post-Franco Spain as an anti-memorial regime which transforms the right to remember into the duty to forget. Seeking to establish a shared European culture of remembrance, Claus Leggewie has called for joint commemoration of both Stalinism and the Third Reich. He advocates the establishment of a common European view of history, divided into seven spheres of remembrance. His proposal foresees framing the master narrative with two concentric spheres focusing on the Holocaust (the core of remembrance) framed by the stages of European integration. Sandwiched between these two well-researched and 291

6HH *HUKDUG %HVLHU DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD European Dicatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), 364ff. See also Oliver Rathkolb and Günther Ogris, eds., Authoritarianism, History and Democratic Dispositions in Austria, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Innsbruck: Studien Verlag, 2010). 292 See Irene Götz, Deutsche Identitäten: Die Wiederentdeckung des Nationalen nach 1989 (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau, 2011). 293 See William W. Hagen, German History in Modern Times: Four Lives of the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 294 See Claus Leggewie, Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung: Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt (Munich: Beck, 2011), 9–10.

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high-profile subjects are five less-familiar themes: the Gulag, ethnic cleansing, wars and crises, the crimes of colonialism, and the history of migration. The Holocaust and the other conflicts converge with what Paul Connerton describes as the history of suppressed or marginalized populations—the “stories from the spirit of mourning” and as such, a corrective to the legitimizing regime of official remembrance.295 Despite the transnational commemoration of the Shoah across Europe and North America,296 a good many reasons militate against Leggewie’s proposal to establish the Holocaust as a negative founding myth for Europe297: “The astounding variety of memory, its often contradictory and antagonistic nature and the contemporary power which it very often exerts would be negated and neglected by the single large and pathos-ridden gestures involved in the attempt to memorialize the Holocaust as a universal symbol of European-wide suffering. This would produce only moralizing, and the mythologization of the exterminatory terror unleashed by the Germans. Such an approach would reduce the Shoah to merely one aspect of the eternal struggle between good and evil. Such a postulation belongs to the sphere of the religious, not the political. Any such step would transform memory of the Shoah into a ‘religion of remembrance’”298

Historical memory research as “neuro-cultural history” The influence of the various memory-construction processes on our recall of past events and the effect of the present on the stored past has led the medievalist Johannes Fried to establish a theory of historical memoric. He explains the primary goal of this new instrument to be “the criticism, 295

See Paul Connerton, The Spirit of Mourning: History, Memory and the Body (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), IX; see also the second chapter of Connerton’s Seven types of forgetting, 33ff. These involve: the prescribed suppression of past conflicts in the interest of contemporary peace; forgetting in order to create new collective identities; forgetting through the destruction of objects, the planned “repressive” forgetting of political enemies; a “structural amnesia”; forgetting to serve the ends of continual consumption; and forgetting out of collective shame. See also Sharon Macdonald, Memorylands. Heritage and Identity in Europe Today (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), esp. 188-215. 296 Leggewie, Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung, 15ff. 297 See Aleida Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik (Munich: Beck, 2006), 255ff. 298 Thus Helmut König, in Gudehus, Eichenberg, and Welzer, Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, 124.

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control and the adjustment for the distortions of original perception and witnessed realities.”299 Locating the causes, structures and effects of such distorting mechanisms should enable historians to demystify the resulting cognitive deformations of memory and use regressive procedures to remove the various levels of memory so as to take us to the core of the real event. Only in this way can we fathom the reasons for the targeted or conscious changes to which oral and written traditions have been subject and the resulting temporal or qualitative inversions, selections, sacralizations, mythologies, and canonizations. This approach aims to supplement the existing methodologies of source criticism by “seeking to identify traces of earlier memory processes within sources in order to assess the value of these statements. Not intended as a replacement for existing methods, this approach should be viewed rather as […] providing an indispensable insight into the formation of these sources.”300 This innovatively interdisciplinary approach has enabled Fried to assemble a collection of 20 primary and secondary modulating factors which can result in unfounded memories.301 His plea for a joint effort by an alliance of neuro, cognition, social and cultural sciences to make “more precise insight into people and their culture”302 possible has met with pronounced skepticism from his colleagues. “How […] does our memory work? What preserves it? With what degree of reliability can we access our memories? Under which circumstances is this possible? How does the recall situation impact on the contents of the memories? […] An historian posing such questions meets with little favor amongst his colleagues […]. The answers generated by such questions call into question traditional textbook knowledge. The colleagues are annoyed, required as they would be by its acceptance, to rethink their approach in a neuro-cultural direction […]. All change is painful […] only first steps, individual corrections are possible at the present. […] Indeed, those daring to take these steps must brave the derision of their peers or at best their charity. Criticized for being destructive, they object: ‘we are only investigating a text.’ Why all this neurological mumbo jumbo? Thus reassured, the critics pat themselves on the back and return to their text

299

See Johannes Fried, Der Schleier der Erinnerung: Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik (Munich: Beck, 2004), 380. 300 Johannes Fried, “Neurokulturelle Geschichtswissenschaft,” KZG/CCH 22 (2009): 49–65; 50. 301 Ibid., 58–59. 302 Fried, Schleier der Erinnerung, 393.

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Chapter Three association, far removed from all considerations of memory and its criticism.”303

Providing a number of examples from the Middle Ages to recent times, Fried uncovers a range of modulating forces, both conscious and unconscious, that impinge on individual and collective memory and the majority of which are transmitted uncritically.304 The name of Benedict taken by Joseph Ratzinger upon his elevation to the papacy in 2005 was inspired by the example of Benedict of Nursia, the patron saint of Europe. This naming attracted particular attention, as the memoric approach demonstrated that the “Father of West” and leading Catholic saint was indeed nothing more than a fabrication, implanted in our collective memory.305 The only source for Benedict’s life is to be found in the dialogues of Gregory the Great. In a controversial assertion, Francis Clark argues that the dialogue in question was composed some 80 years after the death of Gregory. Although Fried doubts this claim, he points out that the style of this dialogue varies extensively from that of the others and may well have been composed after Gregory’s death. Moreover, the Benedict legend has been composed in the language of myth. With few historical references, the majority of the account consists of stylized symbols up to including the name of Benedictus and his sister Scholastica. Fried believes that the Benedict legend functions as a “spiritual alter-ego” (Adalbert de Vogüé) on the part of Gregory, and that the names of Benedict and Scholastica are designed to point to Gregory’s own qualities. This possibility is underscored by the manner in which Benedict was treated in the dialogues—in a fashion befitting a Pope. The East Gothic King Totila prostrates himself before the enthroned figure of Benedict. Having him rise, he then accords him a kiss of peace. In doing so, the figure of the Emperor and Pope are allied in a single person. The famous Regula 303

Ibid, 56. See Johannes Fried, “Erinnerung im Kreuzverhör: Kollektives Gedächtnis, Albert Speer und die Erkenntnis erinnerter Vergangenheit in Historie und Leben; Der Historiker als Wissenschaftler und Zeitgenosse,” in Festschrift für Lothar Gall zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Dieter Hein (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 327–57; “Canossa”: Entlarvung einer Legende (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012). The author makes a convincing case that the Henry IV’s walk to Canossa was not an act of penance, but rather an act of reconciliation. See from a critical perspective Stefan Weinfurter, “Canossa als Chiffre: Von den Möglichkeiten historischen Deutens,” in Canossa: Aspekte einer Wende, ed. Wolfgang Hasberg and HermannJosef Scheidgen (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2012), 344-57. 305 See Fried, Schleier der Erinnerung, 344–57. 304

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Benedicti was codified by Gregory, who invested it not only with papal authority, but that of the idealized Benedict. Designed to strengthen the position of the monks (of which the former Pope was a member), in their conflict with the secular clergy, they hoped to use it to secure access of the former to the papal throne. We can assume that the theologian Joseph Ratzinger was aware of these findings whilst choosing his papal nomenclature. The neuro-cultural historians will doubtless bear this in mind when coming to their conclusions about the life and work of this Pope. He adopted the name of a fiction symbolizing the apogee of piety and learning—a very grandiose claim indeed.

CHAPTER FOUR EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR: COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND ENDOCRINAL SYSTEMS “Our emotions must be in the right amount, proportional to the event that called them forth; they must be expressed at the right time, in a way that is appropriate to the emotional trigger and the circumstances in which it occurred; and they must be expressed in the right way, in a way that does no harm.” Paul Ekman (2003)1

The rediscovery of emotions Until the 1970s, Western science expounded a story of progress according to which modern man had demonstrated an ever-increasing ability to control his emotions.2 Seeking the reasons for the end of this story and the resurgent focus on affect-teaching and psychological theories of emotions, many have pointed to the rise to pre-eminence of the “therapeutic narrative,” which has come to determine contemporary

1

Paul Ekman, Emotions revealed: Recognizing faces and feelings to improve communication and emotional life (New York: Owl Books, 2007), 53. 2 See: William M. Reddy, “Historical Research on the Self and Emotions,” Emotion Review (2009): 302–15. Cf. also Jan Plamper, Geschichte und Gefühl: Grundlagen der Emotionsgeschichte (Munich: Siedler, 2012), 177–93; 297–313. Ref the decline of emotions in British literature see Alberto Acerbi et al., “The Expression of Emotions in 20th Century Books,” PLoS ONE, no. 20 (March 20, 2013), doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0059030; Giovanni Frazzetto, How we feel: What Neuroscience Can and Can’t tell us about Our Emotions (London: Doubleday, 2013).

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identity discourse.3 According to this narrative, only through dealing with one’s own emotionality it is possible to gain an insight into our otherwise opaque self and thereby overcome all sensations of fear, shame, and guilt. As the growing flood of self-help literature in this area shows, the preoccupation with emotions can be instrumentalized across a variety of social sub-systems for clearly functional ends. “Feminists, psychologists, mental health researchers, the state army of social workers, insurance societies and pharmaceuticals companies—all have made their own ‘translation’ of the therapeutic narrative in an attempt to extend and disseminate a discourse which defines the self as something entirely pathological.”4

This complex also included the veritable melting pot of the esoteric “New Age” with its “holistic” processes of emotionalization and somatization deployed for the ends of “self-liberation” and “selfrealization.”5 Working on the premise of the “harmonization of mind and body” and a rejection of an over-cognitive approach to life, this broad coalition of forces seeks to re-emotionalize life and give form to its most vital utterances. Such “searchers” employ a whole range of meditation techniques or bio-feedback procedures6 to heal their “self” and arrive in the fullness of psychosomatic peace, purity, and insight.

3

See Eva Illouz, Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2007), 6 ff. 4 Ibid., 61. 5 Pascal Eitler, “Körper—Kosmos—Kybernetik: Transformationen der Religion im ‘New Age,’ Westdeutschland 1970–1990,” Zeithistorische Forschungen 4 (2007): 116–36; Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer, “Emotionsgeschichte als Körpergeschichte: Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” GuG 35 (2009): 282–313; Monique Scheer, “Empfundener Glaube: Die kulturelle Praxis religiöser Emotionen im deutschen Methodismus des 19. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschrift für Volkskunde 105 (2009): 185-213; idem., “Protestantisch fühlen lernen: Überlegungen zur emotionalen Praxis der Innerlichkeit,” Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft 15 (2012): 179–93; idem., “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion,” History and Theory 51 (2012): 193-220. See also Plamper, Geschichte und Gefühl, 313–19. 6 See Winfried Rief and Niels Birbaumer, eds., Biofeedback-Therapie: Grundlagen, Indikation und praktisches Vorgehen, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Schattauer, 2011).

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Cognitive and body-oriented theories of emotion and multi-component models After a number of decades of latency following the 1960s, emotions research has returned to its position at the cutting-edge of the social sciences and humanities.7 Resting on the pre-Enlightenment doctrine of affects with its Aristotelian, Stoic, and Augustinian themes,8 this conception of emotions as a set of deep-rooted basal desires culminated in the exclusively corporeal concept of emotion as expressed in the work of Charles Darwin,9 William James, and Carl Lange.10 7

For this and the following, see Luc Ciompi, Die emotionalen Grundlagen des Denkens: Entwurf einer fraktalen Affektlogik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Emotionen in der Geschichte: Sind soziale Klassen auch emotionale Klassen?,” in Umbruch und Kontinuität, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Munich: Beck, 2000), 251–64; Helena Flam, Soziologie der Emotionen (Constance: UVK, 2002); Wulf-Ulrich Meyer, Achim Schützewohl, and Rainer Reisenzein, Einführung in die Emotionspsychologie, vol. 1 (Bern: Huber, 2002); Daniela Saxer, “Mit Gefühl handeln: Ansätze der Emotionsgeschichte,” Traverse. Zeitschrift für Geschichte 14 (2007): 15–29; Florian Weber, “Von der klassischen Affektenlehre zur Neurowissenschaft und zurück: Wege der Emotionsforschung in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften,” Neue Politische Literatur 53 (2008): 21– 42; Luc Ciompi and Elke Endert, Gefühle machen Geschichte: Die Wirkung kollektiver Emotionen—Von Hitler bis Obama (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Robert C. Solomon, ed., What is an Emotion? Classic and Contemporary Readings (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); idem, ed., Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Stephen Leighton, ed., Philosophy and the Emotions: A Reader (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003); Reddy, “Self and Emotions,” 311–12; Colleen M. Schmitz and Ladislav Kesner, eds., Images of the Mind: Bildwelten des Geistes aus Kunst und Wissenschaft. Ausstellungskatalog des Deutschen Hygiene-Museums Dresden und der Mährischen Galerie Brünn (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011); Wibke Larink, Bilder vom Gehirn: Bildwissenschaftliche Zugänge zum Gehirn als Seelenorgan (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011). 8 See Georg Gasser and Josef Quitterer, eds., Die Aktualität des Seelenbegriffs: Interdisziplinäre Zugänge (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010); Thomas Vašek, Seele: Eine unsterbliche Idee: Warum wir mehr sind als die Summe unserer Teile (Munich: Ludwig, 2010); Peter Nickl and Georgios Terizakis, eds., Die Seele: Metapher oder Wirklichkeit? Philosophische Ergründungen (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010); Mark Galliker, Emotion und Motivation: Historische Diskurse— Menschenbilder—Lebenshilfe (Stuttgart: Kröner, 2012). 9 Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animal (London, 1872). 10 See Solomon, What is an Emotion? 131–41.

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According to the James-Lange theory, feelings represent the individual perception of our own bodily state—a sensation felt following a bodily response to a variety of environmental events. Accordingly, people do not cry because they are sad, but are sad because they cry. Nevertheless, our bodies often remain in a single state whilst experiencing a range of emotions.11 Following these observations, the cognitive approach to emotions pioneered in the mid-20th century is based on Descartes’ concept of monism. Not differentiating between various mental “capacities,” he conceived of the mind as a thinking form of perception.12 In their classic—although methodologically controversial and unreplicable—study, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer sought to demonstrate the decisive role played by thoughts in the development of emotions.13 Serving their testpersons with a drink containing the stress hormone adrenaline, they informed the subjects that it was an ineffective vitamin supplement. The testpersons interpreted their sudden state of arousal as a function of the stimuli to which they were subject. Thus confronted with a person telling jokes, they explained their enzymeinduced state as happiness, whereas the same sensation was explained as aggravation when they met a person in a bad mood. In contrast, the neurobiologist Joseph LeDoux used animal experiments to demonstrate how emotions could be generated independently of thought.14 He showed how fear stimuli are processed extremely quickly in the cerebral cortex (and away from the location of consciousness), enabling an immediate reaction to danger. The one-sided nature of both classic branches of emotional theory— James and Lange’s body-oriented and Schachter and Singer’s cognitive approach—has resulted in the development of a multi-component model, which seeks to incorporate the physiological component of emotions (a racing heartbeat or sweating); idiosyncrasies, such as gesture and 11

For this and the following, see David G. Myers, Psychologie (Heidelberg: Springer, 2004), Chapter 13. 12 René Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641, repr. Göttingen, 2004); idem., Die Leidenschaften der Seele (Hamburg: Meiner, 1996); A detailled discussion is provided by Dominik Perler, Transformationen der Gefühle: Philosophische Emotionstheorien 1270–1670 (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2011), 38; 278–354. 13 See Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional States,” Psychology Review 69 (1962). 379–99; idem., “Comments on the Maslach and Marshall-Zimbardo Experiments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979): 989–95. 14 See Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 173.

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expression; the subjective experience of emotion; the associated cognitive aspects of the situation; and the object of the emotional response. This approach also factors in the level of familiarity of the event, its level of desirability, the degree to which its incidence has or can be influenced by the person experiencing it and lastly, its degree of congruence with the self-conception of the person experiencing it. This combination produces a highly-complex process model of emotions. Viewed from the perspective of developmental psychology, those in the early stage of emotional development tend to exhibit a duality of undifferentiated well-being or unease. These pre-emotions develop over time into universal, extensively culturally non-specific basic emotions, such as joy, fear, anger, and sadness.15 Still independent of conscious cognitive processes, the stimuli in the cortex trigger an instantaneous reaction. It is only during the subsequent stage that we begin to develop slower and increasingly cognitively-processed situation analyses. Initially reacting to all incidence of fear (a basis emotion) with flight, this could be and often is followed by a danger assessment conducted on the level of the primary cognitive emotions. The next-highest level of secondary cognitive emotions hosts a number of theories relating to social relations developed from considerations of culture and experience, which we use to reconsider a new situation. Viewed on this level, an unspecific sensation of threat or unease can be developed into a more specific, culturally-mediated feeling of shame or envy.16 Each of these stadia performs an important function. Basis emotions serve to facilitate escape from an immediate danger. The form in which primary cognitive emotions are expressed signal to us and others the various responses open to us. In such a situation, we either look to our partners with consternation, frustration, or disappointment (or interpret such looks from them) or smile in order to transmit our contented state. Complex emotions on the secondary cognitive level then facilitate 15 For this and the following, see Ekman, Emotions Revealed, 82ff; Alexandra Zinck and Albert Newen, “Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account,” Synthese 161 (2008): 1–25. 16 See Maria-Sibylla Lotter, Scham, Schuld, Verantwortung: Über die kulturellen Grundlagen der Moral (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012). The author demonstrates that only the long process of socialization—predominantly the scrupulous perception of the external perspective of oneself—makes the individual morally addressable. See also Micha Hilgers, Scham: Gesichter eines Affekts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); Niels van de Ven, The Bright Side of a Deadly Sin: The Psychology of Envy (PhD thesis Tilburg University, 2009); Jan Crusius and Thomas Mussweiler, “When People Want What Others Have: The Impulsive Side of Envious Desire,” Emotion 12 (2012): 142–53.

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adequate social interaction with each other. Stabilizing social relationships, they play an important role in the evaluation of situations, enabling us to adapt our behavior through regulation, modulation, or motivation as appropriate. Despite such insights into the complexity of their genesis and the multi-dimensionality of their impact, theories of emotions still prove to be useful in pointing to their origin. Developing contemporary theories of emotions, Martha Nussbaum extended the cognitive direction in which emotion theory is moving by consideration of their narrative context, thereby stressing their intentionality.17 At the other end of the spectrum, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio continued the decidedly non-cognitive approach pioneered by William James and Carl Lange,18 which presents emotions as a perception of bodily changes in response to an outside stimulus. For Damasio, emotions are “acts of movement performed for the most part in a public and visible fashion and manifested in the face, voice, and a number of specific modes of behavior.”19 These are to be held separate from “feelings,” which, located on a higher evolutionary level, function as an emotional memory experience, instrument of evaluation,20 and a representation of emotional reactions in the brain.21 Such feelings are the very emotional-affective points of reference to the world, which correspond to the cognitive direction of research into emotions, whilst non-intentional affective phenomena represent the path of evolutionary biological tradition. Damasio’s differentiation between “emotions” and “feelings” aims at overcoming the original body-mind dichotomy with an Affective Stage Model. In addition to the established, cognitivist, socio-structural, and symbolic interaction-led theories of emotion, social-scientific research in this area has also seen the rise of a post-structuralist, socio-biological approach, which seeks to account for the corporeality of emotions.22 In discussing the fruits of cognitivist research, those approaching the subject from the socio-biological neuroscience perspective point to the 17

See Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 18 See Solomon, What is an Emotion? 65–76. 19 Cf. Antonio R. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003), 27ff. 20 See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994). 21 See Martin Hartmann, Gefühle: wie die Wissenschaften sie erklären (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 2005), 129. 22 For an overview, see Jan E. Stats and Jonathan H. Turner, eds., Handbook of Sociology of Emotions (New York: Springer, 2006).

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predominantly unconscious course taken by emotional processes.23 Nevertheless, complex feelings and secondary cognitive emotions, such as shame or guilt, are only explicable when considering the cultural factors active in their generation. The unmediated transfer of neuropsychological insight into complex social phenomena would appear to be insufficient as a sole explanation. The findings of neuroscience have demonstrated the influence and impact of training, habit, and morals on human behavior. That constant repetition of behavioral patterns can change synaptic structures implies that neuronal structures are the product—if only partially—of learning and culture and posits the plasticity of our brains. As such, traditional differentiations between “thinking” and “feeling,” “nature” and “nurture,” as well as “body,” “mind,” and “society” are becoming increasingly superfluous. A product of this “reunification” is the appreciation that we are not only surrounded by “society,” but that we are more a part of it than we have— or want to—realize. Despite the various concepts of emotions, it is clear that human experience is mediated by brain-body chemicals. No thought is independent of our bodily feedback mechanism—sensory input, body chemistry, and the activity of neurons.24 The human endocrine system is one large communication system which influences actions and behavior. Whilst this system uses hormones, the nervous system requires electrochemical signals. Both systems work together to regulate psychological activity.25 The workings of such neuro-psychological processes can be illustrated with a number of examples.

Stress and burnout A neuropsychological state of acute psychic pressure, stress has been the subject of considerable research. Despite the clear understanding of its origins and the associated function of the stress hormone cortisol, we still have little understanding of the exact impact of stress in its social context.26 Thus, all we know is that the changes produced by cortisol 23

See e.g. David D. Franks, “The Neuroscience of Emotions,” in Stats and Turner, Handbook, 38–62, esp. 39. 24 See e.g. Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 144–45. 25 See Michael S. Gazzaniga, Todd F. Heatherton, and Diane Halpern, Psychological science (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), 100ff. 26 Regarding the historical dimension of the phenomenon “stress,” which led to work on the phenomenon of “burnout,” see Patrick Kury, Der überforderte

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secretion somehow reduce the scope for context-appropriate emotional regulation.27 The high suicide rate measured amongst soldiers has often been accompanied by a prior diagnosis of “stress.”28 Stress is caused by “stressors,” aversive stimuli with a negative impact that can range from objective physiological stimuli, such as torture, to subjectivepsychological stimuli, such as the exclusion from a community. Urbandwellers carry an almost 40 per cent higher risk of suffering depression, anxiety disorders, or schizophrenia than their rural counterparts. Indeed, children born and raised in towns show altered brain structures, which make them more susceptible to stress-related illnesses.29 Despite such statistics, suicide rates are higher in rural areas than towns, perhaps due to greater opportunities for social interaction and better medical provision. In an adaptive response to physical or emotional threat, the brain activates a range of neuronal and hormonal regulatory processes.30 The biological stress reaction begins in the hypothalamus, a region of the interbrain. These two areas are responsible for the control of vegetative functions. The hypothalamus activates the sympathetic nervous system, excreting corticotrophin-releasing hormone (CRH) which sets the body in a state of readiness and vasopressin that activates the adrenal medulla. Thus activated, the adrenal medulla secretes adrenaline and noradrenaline, which prepare the body for “fight or flight.” Blood pressure, heart rate, and respiration all increase, providing the body with more oxygen. The liver releases sugar—energy for the brain and muscles—and the blood flow to the skeletal muscles rises. The sweat glands are stimulated to protect the body from overheating. All functions not required for immediate survival—sex drive, tiredness, hunger, Mensch: Eine Wissensgeschichte vom Stress zum Burnout (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2012). 27 See Richard J. Davidson, Andrew Fox, and Ned H. Kalin, “Neural Bases of Emotion Regulation in Nonhuman Primates and Humans,” in Handbook of Emotion Regulation, ed. James J. Gross (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), esp. 57. 28 See Gazzaniga, Heatherton, and Halpern, Psychological Science, 476ff., and above, Chapter 1, section “The ‘license to kill’ as a mental strain—soldiers as ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims.’” 29 See Florian Lederbogen, et al., “City Living and Urban Upbringing Affect Neural Stress Processing in Humans,” Nature 474 (2011): 498–501; David P. Kennedy and Ralf Adolphs, “Social Neuroscience: Stress in the City,” Nature 474 (2011): 452–53. 30 See Niels Birbaumer and Robert F. Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie (Berlin: Springer, 2006), 117ff.; 142ff.; Larry Squire, et al., Fundamental Neuroscience (Amsterdam and Boston: Academic Press, 2008), 795ff.

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digestion, and the immune system—are suppressed. The bladder and bowel are instructed to empty themselves. The blood vessels in the body parts not required for the “fight or flight” reaction contract. Hormone secretion sharpens the senses, reduces the perception of pain, and curbs the processes of inflammation. In addition to this rapid stress reaction, the hypothalamus activates a second, more delayed hormonal activation system—the hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal axis. “Whereas this is activated within four minutes, the sympathetic nervous system and the catecholamines (dopamine, noradrenaline, and adrenaline) follow in seconds.”31 CRH reaches the pituitary gland at its location at the base of the skull, level with the nose. Having arrived, the hormone affects the release of a further messenger, the adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). Carried in the blood stream, ACTH reaches the adrenal cortex and stimulates the generation of the stress hormone cortisol.

Fig. 10: Fast and slow stress reactions. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger

A longer lasting incidence of stress results in a more long-term adaptation. Whilst the first confrontation with a negative event stimulates the pituitary and adreno-cortical and adrenal medulla and the 31

Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 150. Regarding the neurotransmitters and their function, see Gazzaniga, Heatherton, and Halpern, Psychological Science, 80ff.

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corresponding periphery-autonomous physiological processes (an increase in heart rate, skin resistance, blood pressure, and muscle activity), accustomization to and success in dealing with stress brings forward the onset of the stress reaction and decreases its intensity. The build-up of a specific concentration of cortisol in the brain prevents the further secretion of CRH and ACTH. This reduces the stress reaction to stimulus and the person relaxes. At this stage, cortisol reduces primary stress, inflammation, and immune reactions and converts nutrients into fat and glucose, thus replenishing depleted energy levels. Having “accustomed” itself to an exceptional situation, this reaction includes a feeling of well-being and increased secretion of the sexual hormone testosterone. Sufferers of depression exhibit a malfunctioning feedback mechanism resulting in a permanent imbalance of stress hormones and the absence of the natural relaxation phase. A failure to adapt to this situation can result in light organ damage and psychosomatic illnesses. These include disorders of the somatic-muscular area, the cardiovascular system, the intestinal system (peptic ulcers, asthma), and the muscle and ligament structure in those areas subject to the influence of corticosteroids.32 Blood values contain greater levels of inflammation biomarkers, lipids, and cholesterol; the sufferer also presents sleeping problems, repeated infections, gastric problems, muscle and bone conditions, and reduced fertility.33 The longer the period of disruption to the stress system, all the more difficult it is to return it to balance.34 The continuously high levels of stress hormones reduce the production of the “happiness hormone” dopamine, one of the central messengers in the body’s “reward system.”35 The 32 A full understanding of this process must also include the converse interaction between the nerve cells in the gut and the immune system as well as the influence of intestinal flora as a cause of psychological conditions. See Klaus-Dietrich Runow, Der Darm denkt mit: Wie Bakterien, Pilze und Allergien das Nervensystem beeinflussen (Munich: Südwest, 2011). 33 See Samuel Melamed, “The Joint Effect of Noise Exposure and Job Complexity on Distress and Injury Risk Among Men and Women: The Cardiovascular Occupational Risk Factors Determination in Israel Study,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 46 (2004): 1023–32; idem., “The Interactive Effect of Chronic Exposures to Noise and Job Complexity on Changes in Blood Pressure and Job Satisfaction: A Longitudinal Study of Industrial Employees,” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 6 (2001): 182–95. 34 See Michael Bauer, Anne Berghöfer, and Mazda Adli, Akute und therapieresistente Depressionen: Pharmakotherapie, Psychotherapie, Innovationen (Heidelberg: Springer, 2005). 35 In contrast, a high level of dopamine in the frontal lobes and the striatum produces optimism and “illusions of superiority.” See Makiko Yamada, Lucina Q.

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discovery by an individual of their inability to control or even cope with stressful situations generates a prolonged feeling of helplessness and the associated range of psycho-physiological symptoms. A result of the reduced secretion of noradrenaline, these symptoms also include a restricted attention and concentration span and a reduced capacity for memory and learning. Moreover, a reduced secretion of serotonin affects the ability to express feelings. Unprocessed traumas, such as the experience of war, imprisonment, torture, and expulsion—here taken as stressors—can result in memory-disturbances, even memory-loss, and the associated inability to come to terms with past terrors. The experience of a singular or repeated sensation of helplessness can result in the development of depression; a complex mixture of sorrow, revulsion, anger, rage, hostility, fear, guilt, and shame. Depression arises from the interaction of social and psychological factors with biological circumstances. Over-stimulation of the amygdala, the fear center of the brain, produces altered neuronal activity and even structural changes in the brain. This can include a contraction of the hippocampus and the medial orbitofrontal cortex—both areas involved in the processing of emotions. The biological factors conditioning the development of depression include a genetic predisposition,36 a factor especially relevant to bipolar or manic-depressive conditions. Bipolar and monopolar depressions exhibit a non-identical aetiology. An electroencephalogram (EEG) and the imaging techniques fMRI and Positron Emission Tomography (PET),37 demonstrate characteristic alterations in brain patterns following both grief and depression. This is accompanied by an increase in the metabolic Uddin, Hidehiko Takahassho, et al., “Superiority Illusion Arises from RestingState Brain Networks Modulated by Dopamine,” PNAS 110 (2013): 4363–67. 36 Working in a number of long-term studies, the American psychologist Nathan A. Fox and his Child Development Laboratory at the University of Maryland demonstrated that babies who cry the most after losing their dummy exhibit the tendency to react more sensitively to stress later in life. See Nathan A. Fox, “Temperament and Regulation of Emotion in the First Years of Life,” Pediatrics 102 (1998): 1230–35; Lela Rankin Williams, et al., “Early Temperament, Propensity for Risk-Taking and Adolescent-Related Problems: A Prospective Multi-Method Investigation,” Addictive Behaviors 35 (2010): 1148–51. Inversely, the situation of the mother and a range of social influences can also sensibilize children to permanent stress at an early age. See Michael Pluess, et al., “Maternal Trait Anxiety, Emotional Distress, and Salivary Cortisol in Pregnancy,” Biological Psychology 83 (2010): 169–75. 37 Oxygen-consumption in the brain increases with the intensity at which it works. This phenomenon is revealed during scans which focus on a specific area of the brain.

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activity of the orbitofrontal and ventral prefrontal areas in the amygdala and cortex insularis.38 The activity of the two brain hemispheres39 becomes displaced. Whilst depressions coincide with increased activity in rightfrontal brain activation ȕ activity), positive feelings produce increased EEG activity on the front left-side. Depression sufferers display an increased cortical reactivity to contingency changes. The negativity of the slow brain potential increases with increasing anhedonia following a contingency change. Indeed, the circadian temperature curve exhibits flattening and desynchronizations, days and even weeks before the onset of the problem. Patterns of sleeping and waking change, the REM sleep period40 increases and the secretion of growth hormones is reduced. Tests with depression patients have found increased levels of the stress hormone cortisol in blood and urine, the secretion of which is regulated by the CHR. During short-term episodes of stress, cortisone would appear to prevent too great an increase in stress levels. Sonia J. Lupien and her team from the University of Montreal found that the children of depressive mothers exhibited an expanded amygdala. They interpreted this as a protective function, improving their chances of survival.41 When all else fails, some physicians seek to address 38

See Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 712–13. Regarding the large hemispheres of the cerebrum, see Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 505ff. “The right hemisphere is more efficient than the left hemisphere in processing external and interoceptive stimuli, which are important in the perception of emotions. The left hemisphere, on the other hand, dominates the right in the causal explanation of sequences of events.” Ibid., 699. Jill B Taylor, herself a neuroscientist, provided a good description of her subjective experience of a stroke that damaged the left side of her brain. In addition to the pain, “my consciousness slowed to a soothing and satisfying awareness that embraced the vast and wondrous world within. […] In this void of higher cognition and details pertaining to my normal life, my consciousness soared into an allknowingness, a “being at one” with the universe, if you will. In a compelling sort of way, it felt like the good road home and I liked it. […] Like walking along the beach, or just hanging out in the beauty of nature, I shifted from the doingconsciousness of my left brain to the being-consciousness of my right brain. I morphed from feeling small and isolated to feeling enormous and expansive.” Jill B. Taylor, My Stroke Of Insight. A Brain Scientist’s Personal Journey (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2008), 43; 41; 68. Taylor compared this state to meditation. 40 See Birbaumer/Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 545 ff. The Rapid Eye Movement sleeping phase (REM) refers to a dream-sleep stage at the end of every sleep period. 41 Sonia J. Lupien et al., “Larger amygdala but no change in hippocampal volume in 10-year-old children exposed to maternal depressive symptomatology since birth,” in PNAS, 15 August 2011, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1105371108. 39

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depressions with electroconvulsive shock therapy. The aim is to reduce the hyperconnectivity between the areas of the brain, thus altering the electrical circuitry in the brain.42 Mood swings are a common occurrence in humans. Uncontrollable, they impact on behavior. We are not in control of our actions, and can only partially be held responsible for them. For example, some people react to extremes of temperature and the absence of daylight with depression.43 Unable to regulate their mood themselves, treatments focus on exposure to UV light in order to stabilize the levels of vitamin D and melatonin, thus reducing the extent of mood swings. Depression treatments usually involve a combination of anti-depressants with the training of social and motor training; the restructuring of negative processes of thinking and attribution and social-familial measures to extend the available alternatives for action. In general, it can be stated that hormones exercise an activating or organizing influence on human behavior. Hormonal imbalances restrict cognition and can result in fear, depression, and psychosis.44 Personal and professional stress in a number of everyday situations often results in or combines to produce a situation of exceptional emotional and bodily strain. The resulting feeling of being “burnt out”— referred to as burnout syndrome—can result in psychosomatic illnesses, depression, aggression, and an increased risk of addiction.45 Whilst the caring professions—doctors, teachers, pastors—are often affected disproportionately, others, such as politicians and sportsmen, are, indeed,

42

See Jennifer S. Perrin, Susanne Merz, Daniel M. Bennet, James Currie, Douglas J. Steele, Jan C. Reid, and Christian Schwarzbauer, “Electroconvulsive Therapy Reduces Frontal Cortical Connectivity in Severe Depressive Disorder,” PNAS, published online before print March 19, 2012. 43 Ivan C. Hanigan, Colin D. Butler, Philip N. Kokic, and Michael F. Hutchinson, “Suicide and Drought in New South Wales, Australia 1970–2007,” PNAS (August 13, 2012). 44 Disruptions to the function of the thyroid can also affect mood and performance. In complicated cases, this can result in serious behavior disorders (melancholic depression, dementia). Depressions are often treated with thyroid hormones. See Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 129ff. 45 See Joachim Bauer, Das Gedächtnis des Körpers—Wie Beziehungen und Lebensstile unsere Gene steuern (Munich: Piper, 2004); Matthias Burisch, Das Burnout-Syndrom: Theorie der inneren Erschöpfung (Heidelberg: Springer Medizin, 2006); Manfred Nelting, Burnout—Wenn die Maske zerbricht: Wie man Überbelastung erkennt und neue Wege geht (Munich: Random House, 2010).

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also affected.46 High levels of sickness and early retirement are taken as indicators for an exceptional level of strain. Initially expressed in hectic activity and the neglect of one’s own needs, this state of physical and emotional exhaustion then produces frustration, tiredness, an inability to concentrate, sleep disorders, and anxiety. Social retreat and a negative attitude to one’s surroundings are accompanied by a feeling of guilt, reduced self-esteem, and lessened motivation. The final stage is often expressed in existential despair; helplessness and dejection culminates in depression and can even result in suicide. Empirical studies often identify a pronounced “effort-reward imbalance” involving the perception of low and incommensurate rewards in relation to the energy invested to achieve them.

Epigenetic influences The existence of a genetic disposition to psychic and other illnesses does not condition their ineluctable development.47 Epigenetic studies have demonstrated the range of environmental impacts on human biology.48 Just as stress, drugs, and environmental pollutants leave traces in the genotype of nerve cells, environmental factors can also prevent the outbreak of an illness to which their holders remain susceptible. The lifestyle of a person exerts a powerful influence on the development of their psychic and bodily potential. The neuroscientist Michael Meaney and the pharmacologist Moshe Syzf discovered that, although (still) unchangeable, a number of cancer cell genes can be “switched off” through the addition of small chemical markers known as methyl groups.49 Until this discovery, biologists had 46

See Joachim Bauer, et al., “Working Conditions, Adverse Events and Mental Health Problems in a Sample of 949 German Teachers,” International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health 80 (2007): 442–49; Thomas Unterbrink, et al., “Parameters Influencing Health Variables in a Sample of 949 German Teachers,” International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health 82 (2008): 117–23; Joachim Bauer, et al., “Belastungserleben und Gesundheit im Pfarrberuf: Eine Untersuchung in der Evangelischen Landeskirche Baden,” Badische Pfarrvereinsblätter 9 (2009): 230–44. 47 See Peter Spork, Der zweite Code: Epigenetik—Oder wie wir unser Erbgut steuern können (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2011); Jörg Blech, Gene sind kein Schicksal (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2011). 48 For a general account, see Florian Holsboer, Biologie für die Seele, (Munich: dtv, 2011). 49 See Anne Monique Nuyt and Moshe Szyf, “Developmental Programming Through Epigenetic Changes,” Circulation Research 100 (2007): 452-55; Patrick

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assumed that methylation—chemical changes to basic cell DNA—was significant only in the earliest stages of life. Indeed, they had previously thought that having matured directly after cell development, our methylation patterns remain immutable. However, animal experiments demonstrated that traumatic experiences can chemically mark DNA. Investigating the genes of a neurological receptor responsible for reducing stress and initiating a relaxed response, Meaney and Syzf saw that animals, which had enjoyed full maternal care, had developed a wellfunctioning stress processing system. They produced fewer stress hormones than those animals with a strongly methylated and, thus, deactivated gene. These suffered extreme stress and were later found in a state of intense fear. Both groups presented a different methylation pattern in the cells of their hippocampus. Methyl groups were seen to have exercised a direct epigenetic impact on the DNA molecules. Using this O. McGowan and Moshe Szyf, “Environmental Epigenomics: Understanding the Effects of Parental Care on the Epigenome,” Essays in Biochemistry 48 (2010): 275–87; Moshe Szyf, et al., “The Social Environment and the Epigenome,” Environmental and Molecular Mutagenesis 49 (2008): 46–60; Patrick O. McGowan, Michael J. Meaney, and Moshe Szyf, “Diet and the Epigenetic (Re)programming of Phenotypic Differences in Behaviour,” Brain Research 1237 (2008): 12–24; Moshe Szyf, et. al., “Epigenetics and Behaviour,” in Development and Prevention of Behaviour Problems: From Genes to Social Policy, ed. Richard E. Tremblay, Marcel A. G. van Aken, and Willem Koops (Hove: Psychology Press, 2009), 25–59; Patrick O. McGowan, et al., A Broad Epigenetic Response Associated with Early Life Environment (Holderness: Gordon Conference on Epigenetics, 2009); Patrick O. McGowan, et al., “Epigenetic Markers of Suicidality in the Human Brain.” Program No. 570.16. Abstract Viewer/Itinerary Planner. Atlanta, GA: Society for Neuroscience, 2006 (online); Patrick O. McGowan, et al., “Broad Epigenetic Signature of Maternal Care in the Brain of Adult Rats,” PLoS One 28 (2011): 6 (2):e14739 (online); Patrick O. McGowan, et al., “Impaired Social Recognition Memory in Recombination Activating Gene 1Deficient Mice,” Brain Research 1383 (2011): 187–95; Patrick O. McGowan, Michael J. Meaney, and Moshe Szyf, “Epigenetics, Phenotype, Diet and Behaviour,” in Handbook of Behavior, Diet and Nutrition, ed. Victor R. Preedy, Colin M. Martin, and Ronald R. Watson (New York: Springer, 2011); Michael Clinchy, et al., “The Neurological Ecology of Fear: Insights Neuroscientists and Ecologists Have to Offer One Another,” Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 5 (2011): 1–6; Jordana T. Bell, et al., “DNA Methylation Patterns Associate with Genetic and Gene Expression Variation in HapMap Cell Lines,” Genome Biology (2011); Jian Feng and Eric J Nestler, “MeCP2 and Drug Addiction,” Nature Neuroscience 13 (2010): 1039–41; Shahaf Peleg, et al., “Altered Histone Acetylation Is Associated with Age-Dependent Memory Impairment in Mice,” Science 328 (2010): 753.

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insight, Courtney Miller and David Sweat injected stressed and scared animals with a substance which blocked the methylation process and, thus, changed the epigenetics of their memory.50 The animals no longer remembered the fear-inducing factors and moved through their surroundings without any trace of fear. In a series of experiments on humans, Meaney and Szyf compared tissue samples taken from the hippocampus of suicide victims who had been subject to abuse in their childhood with those from accident victims who had not suffered any form of trauma in their early childhood. They discovered that important genes of those having suffered childhood abuse had been deactivated. The same genes of the accident victims with a nontraumatic childhood remained unmethylated and thus active.51 The brains of those having suffered childhood abuse presented deactivated ribosome RNA (rRNA), an important component of ribosome, which is responsible for the production of protein in cells. These genes were deactivated in the hippocampus (a region of the brain playing an important role in learning and memory), but not in other regions of the brain and body. This finding could prove significant in forming an explanation for the underdevelopment of the hippocampus presented by abused children. Although their findings are insufficient to make a direct link between abuse, suicide, and epigenetic predisposition, the changes and abnormalities in the methylation are clear even if it is impossible to locate the precise moment of their development. The work of Meaney and Syzf demonstrates the influence of environment and behavior on genotype. Not only does the epigenetic marking of genes influence their readability; a further experiment revealed that methylation patterns are inheritable. In contrast to mutations, epigenetic markers can be changed. In an experiment conducted by the geneticists Robert Waterland and Randy Jirtle, ill mother animals with the so-called “agouti gene” were placed on a specific diet52 and they gave 50

See Courtney A. Miller and David Sweat, “Covalent Modification of DNA Regulates Memory Formation,” Neuron 53 (2007): 57–869. See also Courtney A. Miller, et al., “Cortical DNA Methylation Maintains Remote Memory,” Nature Neuroscience 13 (2010): 664–66. 51 See Patrick O. McGowan, et al., “Promoter- Wide Hypermethylation of the Ribosomal RNA Gene Promoter in the Suicide Brain,” PLoS ONE (2008), col. 3(5):e2085, (https://www.plos.org/cms/node/485). See also Patrick O. McGowan, et al., “Epigenetic Regulation of the Glucocorticoid Receptor in Human Brain Associates with Childhood Abuse,” Nature Neuroscience 12 (2009): 342–48. 52 See Robert A. Waterland and Randy L. Jirtle, “Transposable Elements: Targets of Early Nutritional Effects on Epigenetic Gene Regulation,” Molecular and Cellular Biology 23 (2003): 5293–5300.

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birth to healthy offspring which did not present any heightened risk of diabetes or cancer. Using only nutritional techniques, the researchers had succeeded in deactivating the agouti gene without changing the animals’ genetic basic makeup. In short, the disease gene had been decommissioned through hyper-methylation. It would appear that nutrition is a factor in determining the genetic makeup of an organism. This insight could be used to combat a number of conditions—asthma, diabetes, depression, and schizophrenia—through manipulating the epigenetic code with a number of substances. The work of Eric Turkheimer and his team has demonstrated that differences in intelligence are also conditioned by environmental factors.53 In a number of investigations using twins, he demonstrated that the social and economic differences separating children exert a significant influence on the development of the intelligence with which they were born. Whilst a difficult family background was shown to have suppressed genetic potential, optimal environmental conditions have been shown to have fostered it. Christiane Capron and Michel Duyme found similar results in their investigation of adoptive families.54 Those children sent from a well-off, intellectually-interested family to a poor and intellectually-uninterested adoptive family reached a lower IQ than one of their siblings dispatched to a family, which corresponded to their original parental home. In contrast, a child from a poor background placed in a more affluent setting demonstrated a far superior intellectual development than those of their siblings who remained with their parents. As demonstrated by a study conducted at the Boston Children’s Hospital, children raised in a care home present a different brain anatomy to those who have grown up with their parents. Significantly lower levels of grey matter (the nerve cell bodies) in their cerebrum indicate lower levels of intelligence. Special training enabled them to increase their levels

53

See Wendy Johnson, et al., “Beyond Heritability: Twin Studies in Behavioral Research,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 18 (2009): 217–20. 54 Christiane Capron and Michel Duyme, “Assessment of Effects of SocioEconomic Status on IQ in a Full Cross-Fostering Study,” Nature 340 (1989); 552– 54; Christiane Capron, et al., “Misconceptions of Biometrical IQists,” Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive/Current Psychology of Cognition 18 (1999): 115–60; see also David L. Kirp, “After the Bell Curve,” The New York Times from July 23, 2006.

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of substance (nerve fibres and the cell networks) to act as compensation for the deficit of grey matter.55 Environmental stimuli influence the control of specific genes. Learning and memory would appear to be associated with the epigenetic modification of nerve cell genes. Working with a number of animal experiments, the neuroscientist André Fischer and his team at the European Neuroscience Institute in Göttingen were able to demonstrate that a stimulating environment can even act to compensate for a shrunken brain.56 This compensation was associated with epigenetic changes in the nerve cells of the hippocampus and the cortex. The oncologists Jean-Pierre Issa and Hagop Kantarjian believe that the cause of malignant tumors is located in a mixture of genetic and epigenetic damage.57

Aggressive behavior, psychopathy and the absence of happiness Whilst the neuronal system regulates short-term and rapid-reaction responses, the long-term equivalent is controlled by the hormone system. Not only do hormones influence behavior; behavior influences hormones. One example is the aggressive reaction of audiences at sporting events. Triggered by aversive, painful stimuli and/or the withdrawal of positive stimuli (frustration), inborn aggressive behavior is instrumental in securing survival. The grinding or gritting of teeth in humans, for instance, represents a rudimentary aggressive response, the remnant of our primitive bite reaction.58 Essentially a survival mechanism, reactive aggression is accompanied by a response from the neurological pain center, originally

55

See Margaret A. Sheridan, Nathan A. Fox, Charles H. Zeanah, Katie A. McLaughlin, and Charles A. Nelson III, “Variation in Neural Development as a Result of Exposure to Institutionalization Early in Childhood,” PNAS 109 (July 23, 2012) (doi:10.1073/pnas.1200041109). 56 See André Fischer, et al., “Recovery of Learning and Memory Is Associated With Chromatin Remodelling,” Nature 447 (2007): 178–82. 57 See Lanlan Shen, et al., “DNA Methylation Predicts Survival and Response to Therapy in Patients With Myeloddysplastic Syndromes,” Journal of Clinical Oncology 28 (2010): 605–13. 58 It would also appear that genetics influence facial expression (the emotional facial expression for anger etc.). See David Matsumoto and Bob Willingham, “Spontaneous Facial Expression of Emotion in Congenitally and Non-congenitally Blind Individuals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (2009): 1–10.

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involved in the perception of bodily pain59 and now responsible for the reaction to social ostracism, humiliation, and unfair treatment. As Joachim Bauer argues, “social justice is the best means of preventing violence.”60 As such, aggressive behavior can be conceived of as a system designed for the identification of the social “pain threshold,” thus, ensuring a balanced level of human cohabitation.61 Predicated on the communication and perception of such feelings, this system also requires a corrective ability. The absence or failure of this mechanism can result in the build-up of latent aggression and its untargeted release. According to Joachim Bauer, important factors in the prevention of violence remain caring behavior, attentiveness, a good upbringing, and education.62 He argues that a clear imbalance in living conditions within a society, social decay, inequality, the pressure to succeed, and intense competition for scarce resources can serve to increase the potential for violence in society. Both individuals and society at large have an “aggression memory” and react with increasing intolerance to unambiguous inequality.63 “Faced with the reality of extreme affluence, the experience of blatant poverty […] generates the perception of exclusion and is answered with aggression.”64 Those researching happiness point out that modern egalitarian societies, such as the social democratic societies of Denmark, Norway, Sweden,65 and Switzerland, 59 See Naomi Eisenberger, Matthew D. Lieberman, and Kipling D. Williams, “Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion,” Science 302 (2003): 290–92. 60 Thus Joachim Bauer, Schmerzgrenze: Vom Ursprung alltäglicher und globaler Gewalt (Munich: Blessing, 2011), 198. See also Christian Gudehus, Michaela Christ (eds.), Gewalt. Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2013), 232 ff. 61 Bauer, Schmerzgrenze, 58 ff., 113 ff. 62 Ibid.; FAZ, no. 88 February 14, 2011, 34. 63 Bauer, Schmerzgrenze, ibid., 76ff. 64 Bauer, quoted from Welt Online July 27, 2011. An alternative is the lifestyle of aboriginal peoples who concentrating on the present do not worry about the future. The anthropologist David L. Everett advances this characteristic as an important factor in the higher levels of happiness in comparison to Western people shown by the Brazilian Pirahã people. See Daniel L. Everett, Don’t Sleep, There are Snakes: Life and Language in the Amazonian Jungle (New York: Pantheon Books, 2008). 65 See Mary Hilson, The Nordic Model. Scandinavia Since 1945 (London: Reaktion, 2008); Francis Sejersted, Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); see also Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, eds., Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010); -yKDQQ 3iOO ÈUQDVRQ DQG %M|UQ Wittrock, eds., Nordic Paths to Modernity (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012).

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register the highest levels of happiness and the lowest levels of envy in international comparison.66 Surveys have also shown that levels of trust in others are also highest in the prosperous lands of Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway.67 Scandinavian countries have been least affected by the rejection of the welfare state and the decline of the “social democratic narrative” so lamented by Tony Judt.68 As the neurobiologist Gerald Hüther stated “personal happiness requires the presence of both close human association on the one hand, and the satisfaction of yearnings for growth, autonomy, and freedom on the other. Humans need to fulfil their potential together with others. Those experiencing this coincidence of factors are happy.”69 The happiness researcher, and co-founder of “Positive Psychology,” Martin Seligman, has reached a similar conclusion. For Seligman, happiness rests on a number of factors. Positive feelings in everyday life, self-fulfilment, good relationships, and a performance-orientation70 are 66

See Jan Delhey, “Der Motor des Fortschritts,” in Glück: The World Book of Happiness, ed. Leo Bormans (Cologne: DuMont, 2011), 224–26; Ruut Veenhoven, “Was wir wissen,” in ibid., 338–349. Regarding the academic debate regarding the existence of a link between increasing income and contentedness, see Mathias Binswanger, “Die Suche nach dem Beweis,” Die Zeit, no. 43, October 20, 2011, 29. The lower comparative levels of corruption registered in these countries (according to the Transparency International Corruption Index) is probably no coincidence. 67 See Jan Delhey, Kenneth Newton, and Christian Welzel, “How General Is Trust in Most People? Solving the Radius of Trust,” American Sociological Review 76 (2011): 786-807. 68 See Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), esp. 10ff. 69 See Gerald Hüther, Was wir sind und was wir sein könnten (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2011), 46. 70 See Martin E. P. Seligman, Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment (New York: Free Press, 2002); idem. and Christopher Peterson, eds., Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Edward F. Diener and Martin E. P. Seligman, “Beyond Money: Toward an Economy Flourish; A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and WellBeing,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 5 (2004): 1–31; Ed Diener, et al., Well-being for Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ed Diener, et al., International Differences in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). In a surprising conclusion, Martin Seligman warns against placing too high a premium on feelings of happiness. Seeking to correct his earlier work, he now suggests a “theory of contentment,” which, in addition to happiness, includes the ability to be fulfilled by a task; the feeling of leading a meaningful life; social skills and goal realization. See Martin Seligman, Flourish: A New

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requisite to happiness. Lacking these experiences bring the danger of depressive introversion or externalized aggression. According to the German Happiness Atlas 2011 and 2012, the factors of health, sociability, money, and genes also require the correct regional setting and age to produce happiness.71 Thus, the happiest Germans live in Hamburg, despite the only modest economic performance in the region. The happiness curve peaks at the age of 30, after which it begins to decrease steeply. The low point of this process is reached in the mid-40s. Although usually explained with reference to social determinants, this phenomenon could indeed be the product of genetic causes as similar “moods” were detected in primates between the age of 28 and 35, the equivalent of human middle age.72 These studies have been supplemented by the Grant study, a long-term study of 268 Harvard graduates conducted since 1910. Seeking the ingredients for a “happy life,” the psychiatrist George E. Vaillant, head of the study since 1967, defines happiness as “not wanting everything immediately, even to the point of wanting less. I mean learning to control impulses and not acting on every drive. True happiness lies in genuine and deep connections with other people.”73 An important factor in determining work-satisfaction is the level of appreciation received. Nevertheless, some 50 per cent of happiness is seen to be inherited.74 In addition, neuroscientists view the perception of Understanding of Happiness and Well-Being—And How to Achieve Them (New York: Free Press, 2011). 71 See Renate Köcher and Bernd Raffelhüschen, eds., Glücksatlas Deutschland 2011 (Munich: Knaus, 2011); Bernd Raffelhüschen and Klaus-Petr Schöppner, eds, Deutsche Post Glücksatlas 2012 (Bonn and Munich: Knaus, 2012). 72 See Alexander Weiss, James E. King, Miho Inoue-Murayama, Tetsuro Matsuzawa, and Andrew J. Oswald, “Evidence for a Midlife Crisis in Great Apes Consistent With the U-shape in Human Well-Being,” PNAS, November 19, 2012. According to this research, well-being reduces over an individual lifespan in the form of a bell-curve. Reaching a low-point in the mid-forties, this phenomenon is observable across social and cultural borders. The study incorporated the data of 500,000 people from Europe and the USA. 73 Quoted by Michael Saur, “Der weite Weg zum Glück: Interview mit George E. Vaillant,” Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin, no. 13 from March 28, 2013, 33–38; quote 34. See also George E. Vaillant, Aging Well: Surprising Guideposts to a Happier Life from the Landmark Harvard Study of Adult Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002). 74 See David Thoreson Lykken, “The Heritability of Happiness,” in Harvard Mental Health Letter (http://www.psych.umn.edu/psylabs/happness/hapindex.htm). See also idem. and Anke Tellegen, “Happiness is a Stochastic Phenomenon,” Psychological Science 7 (1996): 186–89; David Lykken, Happiness: The Nature and Nurture of Joy and Contentment (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2000).

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inequality as an important factor in the development of socio-cultural homeostatic processes. The incapacities of biological and physical processes should be supplemented by socio-cultural counterweights.75 “The cultural devices created in response to the imbalance aimed at restoring the equilibrium of individuals and of the group. […] I call this overall process ‘sociocultural homeostasis.’”76

Studies of sleep behavior investigating hormone changes in autumn and winter have revealed how happiness is subject to yearly fluctuation.77 With increased secretion of the sleep hormone melatonin in periods of darkness, its counterpart serotonin—produced in summer and contributing to happiness—decreases. One highly controversial hypothesis has pointed to the possible existence of seasonal affective disorder (SAD). Seeking to counter what he perceives as the over-concentration on the “pursuit of happiness,” the psychologist Arnold Retzer argues that it is this obsession with autonomy and success, which produces depression and aggression. Indeed, faced with unreasonable targets, we react with the very opposite of the state, which we believed their realization would bring. Those seeking to overcome depression and aggression in the long-term should set lower goals and maintain lower expectations of both themselves and others.78 The philosopher Wilhelm Schmid has also warned of the “dictatorship of happiness” encouraging its subjects to ignore the more negative aspects of their lives. Many people break under the pervasive pressure to be happy and become unhappy.79 75

See Antonio R. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 292ff. 76 Ibid. 292. 77 See Jürgen Zulley, “Der Winterschlaf,” Das Schlafmagazin (2007): 24–25.; idem., “Sommerzeit Juche,” Das Schlafmagazin (2009): 32; J. Zulley and S. S. Campbell, “Chronobiology and Sleep,” in Sleep Medicine: A Comprehensive Guide to Its Development, Clinical Milestones and Advances in Treatment, ed. M. Billard and S. Schokroverty (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013) (in print). For a contrary view, see Vidje Hansen, I. Skre, and E. Lund, “What Is This Thing Called ‘SAD’? A Critique of the Concept of Seasonal Affective Disorder,” Epidemiol Psichiatr Soc 17 (2008): 120–27; Karl-Arne Stokkan, Bob Eric H. van Oort, N. J. C. Tyler, and Andrew S. I. Loudon, “Adaptations for Life in the Arctic: Evidence That Melatonin Rhythms in Reindeer Are Not Driven by a Circadian Oscillator But Remain Acutely Sensitive to Environmental Photoperiod,” Journal of Pineal Research 43 (2007): 289–93. 78 See Arnold Retzer, Miese Stimmung (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2012). 79 See Wilhelm Schmid, Unglücklich sein: Eine Ermutigung (Berlin: Insel Verlag, 2012).

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In contrast to reactive aggression, instrumental aggression is deployed as a mechanism of positive reinforcement. Not a homeostatic drive facilitating either biological or socio-cultural navigation, it is an acquired mechanism and its deployment is subject to an individual’s constitution and hormonal balance. Extremely aggressive men present a defective gene on their X chromosome, which codes the enzyme monoamine oxidase A. Both these pathological and other more “normal” forms of aggression are conditioned to a large degree by androgen levels, which function as a trigger mechanism. Aggressive behavior is organized in a neurological hierarchy; nevertheless, the heterogeneity of aggressive behavior is not restricted to specific localities in the brain. Indeed, it can be triggered with weak electrical stimuli to the brain. Stimulation of the amygdala (the location of negative feelings in the human brain) usually produces reactions involving fear, but can also produce aggression. There is no apparent “violence center” in the brain; violence does not manifest itself in any homogenous category or form. “The lateral-medial hypothalamus functions as the coordinating sample structure for reactive aggressive behavior. Modulated primarily by the limbic structures (the amygdala, hippocampus and ‘limbic’ anterior thalamus), it controls the sensumotoric expression of aggression in the deeper brain structures.”80 Simulation studies have shown that the lateral and caudal regions of the amygdala effect a gradual increase in aggressive behavior following stimulus via a summation mechanism. Stimulation of the rostral regions, on the other hand, causes fear. Stimulation of the hypothalamus triggers an immediate attack. Normal social interaction depends on the intact structures and connections between the amygdala, temporal pole, and the prefrontal cortex. The gryus cinguli plays a central role in this connection, generating and providing the energy required to maintain attention. Those suffering the destruction of this area no longer speak, but say (when asked) that they lack all energy and are dominated by the feeling that everything is utterly pointless. Destruction of the orbito-frontal cortex (the origin of conscious feeling) often produces psychopathy and social irresponsibility. Destruction of all these structures leads to the loss of the ability to experience context-relevant emotions. The “system of the amygdala, prefrontal and orbital front cortex and the rostral and superior temporal cortex would appear […] to provide a controlling and modulating structure

80

Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 719.

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for social behavior.”81 Sexual hormones, especially testosterone, would appear to influence and increase inter-male aggression.82 Repeatedly aggressive people, not deterred in their actions by censure or punishment, are classed as psychopaths or sociopaths.83 Although comprehending their actions and the associated consequences, they do not show regret, shame, or guilt. Conceptions of morality and pity are entirely alien to this—majority male—group. When questioned as to feelings, either their own or those of others, their answers are recited as if learnt by heart. Although entirely able to assume the position of others, they are incapable of affective empathy. This explains the ability of violent husbands to influence their victims, evoking sympathy and bringing them to rescind their complaint. This insight exploded the long-held misconception that their victims remained compliant through fear.84 Examining the inmates on death row with fMRI scans,85 the neuroscientist Kent Kiehl discovered that some 20 per cent of the psychopathic inmates presented a significantly smaller limbic system (the area of the brain responsible for processing feelings) compared to the normal population. Presented with images and words, which would have shocked the majority of “normal” people, the psychopaths exhibited a greatly-reduced reaction in comparison to their “normal” counterparts.86 Kiehl concluded that psychopaths lived with a mental handicap and were unfit for execution.87 In contrast, Robert D. Hare, the developer of a 81

Ibid, 721. See Matthias Wibral, Thomas Dohmen, Dietrich Klingmüller, Bernd Weber, and Armin Falk, “Testosterone Administration Reduces Lying in Men,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 10 (2012): e46774. Accordingly, the secretion of testosterone in men increases honesty without stimulating aggressive or anti-social behavior. Indeed, it can even promote mellow traits. Conducise to pride, it stimulates the need for a positive self-image. 83 See Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (Saint Louis: Mosby, 1975); Jessica Lee, “The Treatment of Psychopathic and Antisocial Personality Disorders: A Review,” RAMAS. Publications & Presentations (1999). 84 See Amy E. Bonomi, et al., “‘Meet Me at the Hill Where We Used to Park’: Interpersonal Processes Associated With Victim Recantation,” Social Science & Medicine 73 (2011): 1054–61. 85 See the podcast of the international weekly journal of science Nature on March 18, 2010, accessed on July 24, 2012, http://www.nature.com/nature/podcast/v464/ n7287/nature-2010-03-18.html. 86 See Sabrina Weber, et al., “Structural Brain Abnormalities in Psychopaths—A Review,” Behavioral Sciences & the Law 25 (2008): 7–28. 87 See James L. Bernat, Ethical Issues in Neurology (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2008), 500. 82

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widely-used psychopathy-scale,88 contends that psychopaths are mentally healthy from both a psychiatric and legal perspective. In possession of a full understanding of rule systems, which both permit and prescribe certain actions, he believes that although untreatable, they can and should be held accountable for their actions. There is no consensus as to whether psychopathological behavior has its root in genetics or is at least induced by environmental influences.89 Only those psychopaths, who draw attention to themselves by their actions, can come under the scrutiny of scientific research. Those successful, charming, and highly intelligent psychopaths, whose education and (exclusive) social provenance enable them to escape detection, can even manage to advance to positions of considerable social influence.90 Pascal Scherrer and Thomas Noll’s study of 28 stockbrokers is a case in point. Their investigation—of a profession, which has proven itself to be as wasteful as it is unscrupulous—concluded that their test subjects displayed an even greater risk-affine and egoistical behavior than a group of diagnosed psychopaths who took the same test.91 Similar studies of politicians and other groups would probably reach the same conclusions.

88 See Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL–R): Manual for the Revised Psychopathy Checklist (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 2003). See also Michael J. Vitacco, Craig S. Neumann, and Rebecca Jackson, “Testing a FourFactor Model of Psychopathy and Its Association With Ethnicity, Gender, Intelligence, and Violence,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 73 (2005): 466–76; Belinda Board and Katarina Fritzon, “Disordered Personalities at Work,” Psychology, Crime & Law 11 (2005): 17–32; Stephanie N. Mullins-Sweatt, Natalie G. Glover, Karen J. Derefinko, Joshua D. Miller, and Thomas A. Widiger, “The Search for the Successful Psychopath,” Journal of Research in Personality 44 (2010): 554–58. 89 See Christopher J. Patrick, ed., Handbook of Psychopathy (New York: Guilford, 2007). 90 See Scott O. Lilienfeld and Brian P. Andrews, “Development and Preliminary Validation of a Self-Report Measure of Psychopathic Personality Traits in Noncriminal Population,” Journal of Personality Assessment 66 (1996): 488–524; Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare, Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work (New York: Regan Books, 2006); Nassir Ghaemi, A First-Rate Madness: Uncovering the Links Between Leadership and Mental Illness (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Kevin Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths: Lessons in Life from Saints, Spies and Serial Killers (London: William Heinemann, 2012). 91 See Pascal Scherrer and Thomas Noll, “Professionelle Trader in einer Gefangenendilemma-Situation,” in Fraud Management in Kreditinstituten: Praktiken, Verhinderung, Aufdeckung, eds. Hans-Willi Jackmuth and Christian de Lamboy (Frankfurt: Frankfurt School Verlag, 2011). Dutton, The Wisdom of

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From these findings, it is apparent that the behavior of leading members of our society—present in the financial and economic sectors as well as politics—presents a serious threat to the common good. At the other end of the spectrum, those sociopaths lacking in education and privilege turn criminal. The members of this second group do not learn from sanctions, but only from the withdrawal of reinforcing mechanisms. Intolerant of delayed positive reinforcers, they are impulsive and bear boredom and monotony with great difficulty. Seeking sensation, they do not display any sign of irrationality or anticipatory fear. Seldom planning for the long-term, they are unreliable and irresponsible, rarely maintain close partnership or friendship relations and often display aggressive behavior when under the influence of alcohol. “Those displaying antisocial behavior often […] have a weakly developed system of fear and an amygdala which is difficult to stimulate. Alcohol and barbiturates weaken this even further.”92 Compared to “normal” persons, the resulting “cold-blooded” behavior, which they exhibit, is accompanied by significantly reduced skin resistance shortly before an aversive situation, a significant reduction in the secretion of noradrenaline, and a lower increase in heart rate when compared to “normal” persons. Only the administration of adrenaline and amphetamines produces “normal” behavior. As social adaptation to a culture or subculture is based on passive avoidance (learning not to perform specific actions), the prosocial integration of psychopaths would appear to be almost impossible as punishment rarely has any impact. Studies of violence suggest that its perpetrators often present a genetic disposition towards even slight agitation, no restrictions on the urge to act on impulses, a low tolerance to frustration, and a defiant attitude; all attributes associated with low levels of the neuromodulator serotonin.93 Such a situation induces a permanent feeling of threat. This is supplemented by cognitive-emotional deficits, such as the inability to interpret the behavior of others. Such individuals interpret all forms of

Psychopaths, places managers, lawyers, and surgeons high on his list of psychopaths. Church ministers rank on place 8 (see idem, 173). 92 Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 709. See also Gehirn & Geist, no. 7–8 (2009): 29–39; Jennifer L. Skeem, Norman Poythress, John F. Edens, Scott O. Lilienfeld, and Ellison M. Cale, “Psychopathic Personality or Personalities? Exploring Potential Variants of Psychopathy and Their Implications for Risk Assessment,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 8 (2003): 513–46. 93 See Larry S. Squire, Fundamental Neuroscience (Boston: Academic Press, 2013), 126–27. Antidepressants increase serotonin levels.

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human expression as indicating a threat.94 The Göttingen psychotherapist Borwin Bandelow ascribes male anti-social personality disruptions and female borderline symptoms to a lack of endorphins. The endogenous reward center in the brain is engaged in a permanent search for ever-more “kicks” to trigger the secretion of the endorphins which provide a “high.” Such people usually possess a high degree of empathy and know intuitively how they can manipulate others.95 Motives for violence can be extremely varied.96 The desire for prestige, fear, obedience, and delight, or even the desire to leave their mark or resist the onwards march of chaos, along with a wide variety of other motivating factors can lead to violent behavior.97 Empirical studies have shown that something approaching a panic-induced attack rooted in fear or emotionalization leads its sufferers to lose control or even lose their grip on reality. The result is violence.98 Usually channeled towards an out-group, aggression and the resulting violence is rarely directed towards the members of one’s own clan or social grouping. Studies conducted in the fields of social anthropology, social biology, and other social sciences have reached a consensus to the effect that the risk-affine behavior—and, thus, a readiness to use violence—is largely restricted to young men. This finding would appear to fit an evolutionary biological model of human behavior.99 These factors are complemented by considerations of social origin and age. The readiness of the young to forge strong group-loyalties and their openness to indoctrination is compounded by the impact of a socio-cultural model of 94

See Gerhard Roth, Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten (Stuttgart: KlettCotta, 2007), 216–17; Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 721; Georg Elwert, “Biologische und sozialanthropologische Ansätze in der Konkurrenz der Perspektiven,” in Gewalt: Entwicklungen, Strukturen, Analyseprobleme, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Hans-Georg Soeffner (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), 436–72; 457. 95 See Borwin Bandelow, Wer hat Angst vorm bösen Mann? Warum uns Täter faszinieren (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2013). 96 See Christian Gudehus, Michaela Christ, and Harald Welzer, ed., Gewalt: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart and Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2013). 97 See Eve Rosenhaft, “Links gleich rechts? Militante Straßengewalt um 1930,” in Physische Gewalt: Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, eds. Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1995), 238–75; 253–54; Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 98 See Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009). 99 See Elwert, “Biologische und sozialanthropologische Ansätze,” 450–51.

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legitimation. The study of the behavior of “soccer hooligans” demonstrates how tribalism, high emotion, and a group dynamic serve to loosen conventional patterns of accepted and acceptable behavior, sometimes resulting in violence directed to a well-defined “other.”100 Using soccer games as merely the excuse for “excitement,” the violence unleashed within its confines shows how “hooligan violence is a case where deprivation does not explain violence, but the positive attractions of violence do […].”101 Post-fact legitimation strategies include sub-cultural values, such as the restoration of “justice” following supposed transgression of sub-cultural rules by the “others,” or even a continuation of the sporting contest on the streets outside the soccer ground. These sub-group norms provide a ready legitimation for aggression and violence, but do not explain their genesis. Instead, explanation should concentrate rather on the affinity for risk and the pleasure found in violence exhibited by its practitioners. Having found or indeed created an opportunity for violence, this violence is then rationalized by reference to the group’s social-cultural values. Viewed from this context, the use of the term “politically-motivated” violence should be subject to severe restriction. Indeed, much of the violence unleashed within political protests follows similar mechanisms as those presented by soccer hooliganism and is then accorded a retrospective political justification. Detailed studies on the subject of mass violence have been unable to locate either an ideology with an inherently violent core or indeed a set of beliefs for which individuals and groups were prepared to use violence in order to realize their goals.102 Such misapprehensions are often to be found in a political science approach to genocide. Not only unproved, such explanations often disregard more obvious motives for extreme violence such as greed and envy. The sociologist Stefan Friedrich laments the decline of ethical considerations in human motivation. He bases his work on the assumption of “ideologies prefigured by the perception of reality and based on relationships between

100

See Martin King and Cass Pennant, Terrace Legends (London: John Blake, 2005); Robert Brown and Rens Vliegenthart, “The Contentious Fans: The Impact of Repression, Media Coverage, Grievances and Aggressive Play on Supporter’s Violence,” International Sociology 23 (2008): 796–818. 101 Collins, Violence, 316. 102 See Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 5ff.; 92ff.; Collins, Violence, 463.

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perpetrator and victims”103 in order to prevent violence being handled as an “extra-social meta-subject.”104 Failing to reflect this ambiguity in their definition of “politicallymotivated violence,” the German Conference of Security Politicians has adopted a far more simplistic conception of what remains a very problematic issue. “The criteria for a politically motivated act are fulfilled once the circumstances of the action, or the attitude of the perpetrator give rise to the assumption that their action was moved by consideration of the victim’s political conviction, nationality, ethnicity, nationality, race, skin color, religion, world view, origin, sexual orientation, handicap, appearance, or social status.”105

Within this definition, legitimating arguments are taken as authentic motivation. This conceptual leap is then used to argue that certain political groupings are likely to be especially violent. The majority of contemporary violence is not rooted in political ideology, but the ubiquitous social trend towards increasing physical violence. The trigger is usually nothing more than the different appearance of the victim. The constructed nature of this “political motivation” is demonstrated by the gang violence of Central London and the recent spate of apparently random and often murderous violence in Germany’s underground stations. Arson attacks on luxury cars in Berlin and the violence of rocker bands are further examples of the diffuse violence currently pervading Western society.106 In politics, the term “politicallymotivated violence” is often used to cover government helplessness.107 103

Stefan Friedrich, Soziologie des Genozids: Grenzen und Möglichkeiten einer Forschungsperspektive (Munich: Fink, 2012), 201. 104 Ibid., 260. 105 See the report of the Federal Ministry of the Interior in 2004: 38, http:// www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/nichtinListe/2005/Ver fassungsschutzbericht_2004_de.pdf. 106 See Michael Ahlsdorf, Alles über Rocker—Die Gesetze, die Geschichte, die Maschinen (Mannheim: Huber, 2004); Ulrich Detrois, Höllenritt—Ein deutscher Hells Angel packt aus (Berlin: Econ, 2010); Thomas P., Der Racheengel: Ich bin der Kronzeuge gegen die deutschen Hells Angels (Munich: Riva, 2011). 107 See Wolfgang Wippermann, Dämonisierung durch Vergleich: DDR und Drittes Reich (Berlin: Rotbuch, 2009); Michael Nattke and Stefan Schönfelder, eds., Gibt es Extremismus? Extremismusansatz und Extremismusbegriff in der Auseinandersetzung mit Neonazismus und (anti)demokratischen Einstellungen, (Dresden: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Sachsen, 2010). http://www.stura.tu-dresden.de/ webfm_send/1321.

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“Policy-makers […] are not really clear as to what they are facing when speaking about left-wing extremism. This situation is alarming, especially in view of the fact that the number of crimes attributed to this origin have been increasing for years.”108 The ritualized denunciation of violence often masks the fact that increasing social tolerance and greater level of individual control over one’s life has led to a “dramatic reduction of violence.”109 The spread of Western civilization and Enlightenment values has drastically reduced the level of violence in the modern world.110 Despite two world wars and a number of murderous dictatorships, less than one per cent of the population of Western Europe and the United States died during the 20th century. Pessimistic perceptions of increasing violence in the Western world may fulfil a certain psycho-hygienic and political function,111 but do not fit with the empirical reality.

Anxiety The premium placed by Western society on extroversion and riskaffinity provides a number of opportunities for intelligent psychopaths. More anxious individuals find situations of social exposure more difficult to master, especially when young.112 Anxiety is an ambivalent, yet powerful feeling. Generating both phobia and success in equal measure, it releases energy, which can be channeled either into aversion or the mastery of difficult, yet rewarding tasks. Long-term studies conducted at the University of Harvard113 and the University of Maryland, College Park,114 came to the conclusion that between 15–20 per cent of all children are born with a “highly reactive” disposition and will remain so for the course of their life. On the other hand, 40 per cent of all babies are wellbalanced. The rest are distributed between these two poles.

108

Thus Joachim Käppner, “Die Grenze zur Gewalt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 13, 2011. 109 See Damasio, Self Comes to Mind., 26–27. 110 See Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 111 See Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011. 112 See Manuel Borutta and Nina Verheyen, eds., Die Präsenz der Gefühle Männlichkeit und Emotion in der Moderne (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010). 113 See Jerome Kagan, The Temperamental Thread. How Genes, Culture, Time, and Luck Make Us Who We Are (New York: Dana Press, 2010). 114 See Nathan A. Fox, Temperament.

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Such differences in temperament—themselves the product of both inherent tendencies and environmental influences—are rooted in our neurological circuitry, which triggers a whole range of bodily reactions. Physiological measurements of highly reactive individuals present a higher heart rate, saliva tests register levels of the stress hormone cortisol, blood pressure increases are faster, and their pupils dilate more strongly when concentrating.115 What can result in greater physical burdens also enables greater success in a number of tasks. The arts and academia are often populated by anxious people, who are driven to high achievement by their fear of failure. Highly-reactive individuals are often very law-abiding, rarely become criminal, do not bring themselves into danger, and live longer lives as a result. Alert, contemplative and less impulsive than others, these factors also contribute to their social and evolutionary success. In his study of the amygdale, the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux, head of the Center for the Neuroscience of Fear and Anxiety at New York University in Manhattan, found that it functions as the decisive operational center for processing spontaneous fear-based reactions.116 Once sensed, the existence of a danger situation is conveyed via the thalamus to the amygdala, which sets the entire organism in a state of readiness. Blood pressure increases, the heart races, breathing rates increase, the stomach tenses, muscles contract, stress hormones are secreted, the liver releases sugar, and the body is prepared for “fight or flight” without any conscious decisions having been taken. The younger neurological circuits leading over the cortex (responsible for processing and evaluating information) react much more slowly. Despite the connection of both circuits, the cortex usually exercises little influence over the amygdala. As a result, irrational fear can usually not be assuaged by analysis. Experts assume that special chemistry of their amygdala makes highly reactive people especially easy to stimulate. Investigations with brain scans show that the amygdala of highly reactive people present a much more intense reaction to new pictures and require more time to suppress the reaction than is the case in less reactive people.117 Moreover, the region of the brain responsible for attenuating the 115

See also Johann Caspar Rüegg, Die Herz-Hirn-Connection (Stuttgart: Schattauer, 2013). 116 See Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 212ff.; idem., The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 252ff. 117 See Carl E. Schwartz et al., “Inhibited and Uninhibited Infants ‘Grown Up’: Adult Amygdala Response to Novelty,” Science 300 (2003): 1952–53.

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signals from the amygdala would seem to be much weaker in the case of highly reactive people. The question as to how highly-reactive people can be helped is the subject of the work of Jürgen Margraf. Differentiating between the evaluation of the anxiety reaction from the person’s social network and their own brain,118 he shows that if the former do not react as if the events in question are a catastrophe, the individual concerned can be helped to restructure their cognitive patterns. Katharina Domschke and her team at the University of Münster have investigated the genetics of affective illnesses. Of the between 30 and 100 genes involved in the development of the phenomenon anxiety, the team focused on the neuropeptide S receptor. Animal experiments showed that denying the test subjects this neurotransmitter increases levels of anxiety; adding neuropeptide S, on the other hand, reduced their anxiety. Her conclusion: “I need a functioning neuropeptide S system to prevent pathological anxiety.”119 Our memory of emotional experiences is also controlled by the limbic system, the region of the brain responsible for processing reactions such as fear and stress.120 The clarity with which a person can recall episodes of emotion depends on the level of activity of their amygdala during the experience. The amygdaloid nuclei producing the reaction to emotional stimuli are closely interconnected with the neighboring hippocampus—the “memory center” of the brain. The higher the arousal of the amygdala, the stronger is the activation of the hippocampus. This increases our capacity for remembering emotional events; it also has the effect of blending out unimportant events.121

118

See Jürgen Margraf and Silvia Schneider, Panik: Angstanfälle und ihre Behandlung (Berlin: Springer, 2008). 119 Quoted according to Ärzte-Zeitung online, July 3, 2011, accessed July 7, 2012, http://www.aerztezeitung.de/medizin/krankheiten/neuro-psychiatrische_krankheit en/angst/article/661655/angst-gen-entdeckt.html. 120 See Stephan B. Hamann, et al., “Amygdala Activity Related to Enhanced Memory for Pleasant and Aversive Stimuli,” Nature Neuroscience 2 (1999): 289– 93; Carla L. Harenski, Sang-Hee Kim, and Stephan Hamann, “Neuroticism and Psychopathy Predict Brain Activation During Moral and Non-moral Emotion Regulation,” Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience 9 (2009): 1–15. 121 See Lars Schwabe, et al., “Stress Modulates the Use of Spatial and StimulusResponse Learning Strategies in Humans,” Learning & Memory 14 (2007): 109– 16; Lars Schwabe and Oliver T. Wolf, “Stress Prompts Habit Behavior in Humans,” Journal of Neuroscience 29 (2009): 7191–98.

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Anxiety and fear in the focus of the historical sciences The phenomenon of anxiety as a mental disposition and a collective backdrop influencing individual and collective behavior has received increasing interest in the recent historiography of a number of periods and ages.122 From a historical perspective, it would appear interesting to investigate those situations in which both democratic and non-democratic systems played on pre-existing hopes and fears as an instrument of political mobilization. According to Russel A. Spinney, the majority of attempts to strike political currency from such emotions unleashed entirely unintended consequences.123 “In the case of the Weimar Republic, employing fears and anxieties in politics was highly competitive, deeply ambivalent, and not simply dominated by reemerging rightwing political practices of fear-mongering.”124 Working with the example of the Erfurt working class in the 1920s, he demonstrated that a number of forces attempted to convert mutual fears and antagonism between the nationalist and communist movements into civil courage. For instance, the Erfurt workers hoped to use the public demonstrations marking May Day to demonstrate the peaceful self-confidence of the workers’ movement. “In what became a pattern throughout the 1920s, thousands of local workers took off work each May Day and filled the streets with their families and auxiliary organizations of cyclists, athletes, choirs, women, and youth carrying their banners and singing joyous and militant songs along the way to their communities’ central gathering places—all in a visible public display that would rally workers together around feelings of strength, courage, pride and joy, convince any hesitant or aloof workers to join ranks instead of the Communists and force their rightwing nationalist opponents to think twice before they attempted to openly threaten workers again.”125 In contrast, other forces sough to play on fears of a communist putsch in order to mobilize and justify terror and violence. Launching a campaign in publications, such as the Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, nationalists played up the Red Menace and hoped to bring bourgeois society to demonstrate civil 122

See e. g. Peter Dinzelbacher, Angst im Mittelalter: Teufels-, Todes- und Gotteserfahrung: Mentalitätsgeschichte und Ikonographie (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1996); Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (London: Virago and Emeryville, 2005). 123 See Russell A. Spinney, “Fear, Courage and Civic Behavior in the Weimar Republic,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 61 (2011): 74–89. 124 Ibid., 77. 125 Ibid., 81.

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courage against communism. “The radicalization of rightwing emotional economies also more openly denigrated the feelings and actions of “respectable” middle class people who chose to flee the scene, stand by the side or just complain to the authorities rather than face the workers’ and veterans’ groups who made public appearances.”126 Indeed, the National Socialists and other far-right groupings succeeded in transfiguring nationalist feelings of despair into hope for a national renewal and even salvation. The vehicle of anti-Semitism gave expression to the deep middle class anxiety about communist sedition. Agitators pointed the unsettled bourgeoisie to the “Jew” behind this dark threat who had already wreaked so much havoc and indeed hoped to complete the destruction of the German nation. Not originally an inherently anti-Semitic nation, the growth in and establishment of far-right propaganda as a feature of mainstream life in the early 1930s transformed ordinary attitudes. With the Jewish community now established as a pariah group, German society gradually increased the social distance between the—previously integrated—Jews and the rest of the population. Fearing social and professional disadvantage, many people severed friendships with Jews in the period before 1933. Few Germans dared help the, thus, excluded. Spinney sees a clear turning point in the entry of the NSDAP to the Thuringian state government. Realizing their program through a mixture of persuasion, force and terror, the National Socialists succeeded in cowing the opposition and encouraging their supporters. Resistance on the part of the Agricultural League (Landbund)—themselves a coalition partner of the Nazi Minister Frick—to certain of his measures provoked violence and intimidation.127 Stirring up anti-communist sentiment, Frick drew the nationalist camp into line. A study of the Cold War edited by Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and Dierk Walter provides a case study of the dilemma facing politicians seeking to play on popular fears for political ends. Raising the specter of atomic war, they sought to canalize the resulting emotions for their own ends. The impossibility of providing full protection for the whole population,128 on the other hand, meant that the raised fears threatened to add to the momentum for a more peaceful policy. The discussion of the “German danger” presented by proposals for the nuclear armament of 126

Ibid., 82. See Günter Neliba, Wilhelm Frick: Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates; Eine politische Biographie (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1992), 57–62. 128 See Bernd Greiner, Christian T. Müller, and Dierk Walter, eds., Angst im Kalten Krieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2009). 127

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Germany not only fed Soviet fears of a resurgent Germany, but also soothed American anti-German sentiment with the welcome prospect of a nuclear holocaust on German soil. This would truly lance the boil of the “German menace” once and for all. Published in the American magazine Collier’s at the close of 1951, this scenario ended with an appeal to “trust the experts.” Greiner poses the question: “is implicit trust in elites twinned with the politics of fear?”129 His question draws attention to the antiemancipatory, anti-democratic impact of such campaigns of fear.130 That politicians continue to play on fear in order to win elections was demonstrated by the re-election of George W. Bush in 2004, who exploited fears of terrorism to secure a second term in office.131 Fear as a “factor of perception and action” in times of both war and peace is a topic addressed in a collection of essays edited by Patrick Bormann, Thomas Freiberger, and Judith Michel.132 Ranging from the eve of the First World War to the high point of the Cold War, the examples they present highlight the clear themes of American foreign policy. The studies show the impossibility of differentiating clearly between (irrational) anxiety and (rational) fear, the two of which reinforce each other.133 Whilst a specific level of fear can engender national solidarity and improved morale—as during the London Blitz—excessive and latent fear can cause the type of panic which spread in America during the 1950s.134

129

Ibid., 31. See also Peter Stearns, American Fear: The Causes and Consequences of High Anxiety (Hoboken: Routledge, 2006); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, ed., Emotions in American History: An International Assessment (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010). 131 See Helmut Norpoth, “Mission Accomplished: Die Wiederwahl von George W. Bush,” Politische Vierteljahrsschrift 46 (2005): 3–13. 132 See Patrick Bormann, Thomas Freiberger, and Judith Michel, eds., Angst in den internationalen Beziehungen (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2010). 133 See Joanna Bourke, “Fear and Anxiety: Writing About Emotion in Modern History,” Historical Workshop Journal 55 (2003): 111–33. 134 See Lothar Höbelt, “Schreckensszenarien und Autosuggestion: Die Royal Air Force und die britische Politik vor 1939,” in Bormann, Freiberger, and Michel, Angst in den internationalen Beziehungen, 167–83; Sebastian Haak, “Nuclear fear, konventionelle Kriege und die Instrumentalisierung von Angst in den USA nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in ibid., 185–204. See also Søren Fauth, Kaspar Green Kreijberg, and Jan Süselbeck, eds., Repräsentationen des Krieges: Emotionalisierungsstrategien in der Literatur und den audiovisuellen Medien vom 18. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012). 130

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Cultural conditioning and anxiety The extent to which a reaction to fear is rooted in culture was demonstrated in Japan in March 2011. An earthquake, tsunami and the resulting nuclear catastrophe in Asia caused near panic in Germany, whilst the Japanese population remained calm. Whilst those on the German ecological left reactivated latent fears of radioactive contamination (itself a modern manifestation of German Angst),135 Japanese calm was rooted in a cultural reluctance to demonstrate emotion and the Buddhist / Shintoist / Confucian belief in permanent loop of destruction and rebirth. This is a land in which both “traditional drama and [modern] pop songs celebrate the melancholy beauty of death at the height of youth.”136 This is a culture embracing rather than hiding from death.

Sexuality and love The majority of people experience love as a secondary cognitive emotion, something approaching an elemental force they are unable to control or direct.137 Nevertheless, such feelings are the result of biochemical processes and neurological circuitry, which developed late on in evolution. Sexuality began as a mechanism of genome transfer and reproduction.138 Successful sexual intercourse results in the fusion of two sets of DNA, itself the record of nearly all bodily cells responsible for the direction of the whole life process. Humans store such information on 23 chromosomes (DNA strands) of which every body cell possesses a second example, making for a total of 46 chromosomes. Gametes develop in the testicles and ovaries without this duplication. Indeed, ovules and sperm have only 23 chromosomes. A fertilized ovule contains 46 DNA strands, half of which come from the mother and father 135

See Joachim Radkau, “Mythos German Angst: Zum neuesten Aufguss einer alten Denunziation der Umweltbewegung,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 56 (2011): 73–89. 136 So Ian Buruma, “Schönheit ist nur das Gesicht des Schreckens,” FAZ, no. 66, March 19, 2011, 35. 137 See Nathaniel Branden, The Psychology of Romantic Love (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2008); Donatella Marazziti, The Nature of Love (Milan: Rizolli, 2002); Bas Kast, Die Liebe und wie sich Leidenschaft erklärt (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2004); Frank Tallis, “Crazy for You,” The Psychologist 18 (2005): 72-74; Helen Fisher, Why We Love: The Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love (New York: H. Holt, 2004). 138 For this and the following, see Wolfgang Wickler and Uta Seibt, Männlich— Weiblich: Ein Naturgesetz und seine Folgen (Munich: Piper, 1990).

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respectively. As a result, the third generation has only a quarter of the genes from their grandparents’ generation. This “genetic loss” would appear to render genealogical tables meaningless. Nevertheless, the theory of evolution asserts that every individual seeks to reproduce in order to pass on their genotype As Richard Dawkins has shown, the majority of sexual organisms, including humans, seek to multiply their own genotype in an “egoistical” manner.139 The advantage of this type of procreation lies in the mixture of our genetic inheritance and the possibility which it presents, of adapting to changed life circumstances. Genetic diversity means that developments, such as mutation, do not have the ability to destroy an entire species, for instance through an aggressive bacteria, which deactivates the immune system of a sub-species. Breeding, thus, provides improved protection against parasites and secures the survival of the best-adapted of the species. Females almost always accept a male suitor, as their supply of ovules—some 300—is restricted. Males on the other hand, have an almost limitless supply of sperm and can afford to exercise greater discrimination. Body odor plays an important role in the choice of partner, as it provides information about the composition of the person’s immune system. A symmetric body form also indicates a strong immune system, thus explaining its significance as a factor in attractiveness. Fat distribution in the female body indicates the amount of estrogen present and signals the level of fertility.140 For their part, women prefer men with broad shoulders and well-developed muscles, indicating the presence of testosterone. This physical component has gradually been supplemented by cultural aspects in partner selection. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to differentiate between inherited and acquired behavior in the partner selection process. Indeed, sexuality not only serves the ends of procreation; Bonobo apes, for instance, use the mechanism of attraction to secure protection and a regular food supply and to reduce tension in their social group.141 139

See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). See also G. Miller, The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature (London: Vintage, 2001). 140 See Manfred Milinski, Ilona Croy, Thomas Hummel, and Thomas Boehm, “Major Histocompatibility Complex Peptide Ligands as Olfactory Cues in Human Body Odour Assessment,” Proc. R. Soc (January 23, 2013), 1471–2954. 141 See Frans de Waal, “Bonobo Sex and Society: The Behavior of a Close Relative Challenges Assumptions About Male Supremacy in Human Evolution,” Scientific American (March 1995): 82–88; idem., Bonobos: The Forgotten Ape (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

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Those species not following a strategy of mass reproduction need to protect the few young which they produce. Nevertheless, many species restrict their parenting role to that of brood care. Birds and mammals, on the other hand, care for their young with such intensity that the biochemical and neurological processes involved create a personal connection between the generations. The behavioral scientist Irenäus EiblEibesfeldt and others believe that this process explains the phenomenon of “love.”142 The step from a close mother-child relationship towards a “family” structure also encompassing a “father” occurs when the female of the species requires a male to reproduce and for this she, in turn, requires a mechanism to bind the male to her on a long-term basis.143 This requirement involves the synchronization of behavior and the resolution of conflict. Only some five per cent of male mammals develop something approaching “fatherly love.” Having passed on their genes, and seeing that the mother will care for the resulting young, love has no significant function. This is compounded by the uncertainty that the resulting young animal is actually “theirs.” Evolutionary biologists believe that with the cooling of the climate some seven million years ago—a period when the retreat of the rain forest and the resulting savannah provided much less protection against predators—a number of apes learnt to walk upright so as to be able to run between cover and carry objects. In this dangerous period, child survival was higher amongst those females who managed to find and retain a male protector and provider. This was the birth of monogamy and the nuclear family.144 In return for their protection and provision during the period of child-rearing, males were rewarded with exclusive sexual availability (faithfulness) and the certainty that the offspring to which they accorded their protection did, in fact, stem from them. 142

See Irenäus Eibes-Eibelsfeldt, Human Ethology (New York: Aldine De Gruyte, 1989), 265ff.; idem., Love and Hate: The Natural History of Behavior Patterns (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), 129ff.; Thomas R. Insel and Larry J. Young, “The Neurobiology of Attachment,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2 (2001): 129– 36; Mario Miculincer and Philipp R. Shaver, “A Behavioural Systems Perspective on the Psychodynamics of Attachment and Sexuality,” in Attachment and Sexuality, ed. Diana Diamond, et al. (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), 51–71. 143 See Dierk Franck, Verhaltensbiologie: Einführung in die Ethologie (Stuttgart: Thieme, 1997), 123ff. 144 See Fisher, Why We Love, 131–32; Frans de Waal, Our Inner Ape: A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are (New York: Riverhead Books, 2005).

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This pair-bonding was facilitated by the development of a complex biochemical process. Reacting to certain stimuli,145 neuro-transmitters, such as phenylethylamine (PEA) and dopamine, are secreted via the thalamus and the amygdale.146 These neurotransmitters trigger a form of chemical high, drugging perception.147 The neuropeptide noradrenaline also plays a part in establishing this euphoric state of love.148 Overcoming tiredness and hunger and with a sharpened perception for detail, this process also results in the release of pheromones and fragrances, such as androstenol in female sweat or copuline in female vaginal hormones, which contribute to the development of sympathies and antipathies. The neuropeptide oxytocin raises the readiness for proximity and sexuality. Secreted by the brain during physical contact, kissing,149 massage, and 145

For the effects of the colour “red” as a signal for men see e.g. the study from Andrew Elliot und Daniele Nista “Romantic Red: Red Enhances Men’s Attraction to Women,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (2008): 1150–64. 146 See Bruce A. Arnow, et al., “Brain Activation and Sexual Arousal in Healthy, Heterosexual Males,” Brain 125 (2002): 1014–23; Jorge Ponseti, et al., “A Functional Endophenotype for Sexual Orientation in Humans,” NeuroImage 33 (2006): 825–33. 147 See Donatella Marazziti, Hagop S. Akiskal, Alessandra Rossi, and Giovanni Battista Cassano, “Alteration of the Platelet Serotonin Transporter in Romantic Love,” Psychological Medicine 29 (1999): 741–45; Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001); Arthur Aron, “Reward, Motivation, and Emotion Systems Associated With Early Stage Intense Romantic Love,” Journal of Neurophysiology 94 (2005): 327–37; Andreas Bartels and Semir Zeki, “The Neural Correlates of Maternal and Romantic Love,” NeuroImage 21 (2004): 1155–66; Gabriele Froböse and Rolf Froböse, Lust und Liebe—Alles nur Chemie? (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH, 2004). 148 See Helen Fisher, et al., “Defining the Brain Systems of Lust, Romantic Attraction, and Attachment,” Archives of Sexual Behaviour 31 (2002): 413–19. 149 See Susan M. Hughes, “Sex Differences in Romantic Kissing Among College Students: An Evolutionary Perspective,” Evolutionary Psychology 5 (2007): 612– 31; Chip Walter, “Affairs of the Lips,” Scientific American Mind 19 (2008): 24–29; Ingelore Ebberfeld, Küss mich: eine unterhaltsame Geschichte der wollüstigen Küsse (Königstein and Taunus: Helmer, 2001); Rafael Wlodarski and Robin I. M. Dunbar, “Attitudes Towards the Importance of Kissing in Various Romantic Partner Interactions,” Archives of Sexual Behaviour (in press). Originally, mothers pre-chewed the food of their children and then transferred it to the mouths of their offspring with a pointed mouth. The British zoologist Desmond Morriss sees this as the “First ever kiss.” See Desmond Morris, The Naked Woman: A Study of the Female Body (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004), 88–89; Andreas Bartels, “Oxytocin and the Social Brain: Beware the Complexity,” Neuropsychopharmacology 37 (2012): 1795–96.

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orgasm,150 this substance is closely related to vasopressin. Both hormones promote attachment to the sexual partner and increase the likelihood of establishing a long-term partnership.151 The increase of oxytocin reduces cortisol levels, which would indicate the effect of intimacy on stress reduction. Sexual affection activates two brain regions in the right hemisphere regulating desire and motivation— the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus caudatus.152 Large expanses of the cerebral cortex (with the exception of a section of the prefrontal cortex) of both men and women register reduced activity during orgasm.153 The level of prolactin increases following an orgasm. Reducing the appetite for sex, it introduces the phase of pleasant relaxation.154 Even in the early stages of a pair relationship, unintended physical contact in even innocuous areas, such as the arm or elbow, as part of a non-verbal communication pattern triggers the corresponding biochemical processes signaling closeness and intimacy. Provoking largesse, this mechanism is often used in sales pitches.155 Touching one’s opposite

150

See Thomas Baumgartner, et al., “Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of Trust and Trust Adaption in Humans,” Neuron 58 (2008): 639–50; C. Sue Carter, “Developmental Consequences of Oxytocin,” Physiology & Behavior 79 (2003): 383–97; Eric Hollander, et al., “Oxytocin Increases Retention of Social Cognition in Autism,” Biological Psychiatry 61 (2007): 498–503; Michael Kosfeld, et al., “Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans,” Nature 435 (2005): 673–76. 151 See Helen Fisher, Why We Love, 91–92; 195–96. 152 See Helen Fisher, et al., “Romantic Love: An fMRI Study of a Neural Mechanism for Mate Choice,” Journal of Comparative Neurology 493 (2005): 58– 62. 153 See Jari Tiihonen, et al., “Increase in Cerebral Blood Flow of Right Prefrontal Cortex in Man During Orgasm,” Neuroscience Letters 170 (1994): 241–43; Gert Holstege, et al., “Brain Activation During Human Male Ejaculation,” Journal of Neuroscience 23 (2003): 9185–93. See also Janniko R. Georgiadis, et al., “Regional Cerebral Blood Flow Changes Associated With Clitorally Induced Orgasm in Healthy Women,” European Journal of Neuroscience 24 (2006): 3305– 16; Barry R. Komisaruk, et al., The Science of Orgasm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Rolf Degen, Vom Höchsten der Gefühle: Wie der Mensch zum Orgasmus kommt (Frankfurt/M.: Eichborn, 2004). 154 See Tilman H. C. Krüger, et al., “Neuroendocrine Processes During Sexual Arousal and Orgasm,” in The Psychophysiology of Sex, ed. Erick Janssen (Bloomington, 2007), 83–102. 155 See April H. Crusco and Christopher G. Wetzel, “The Midas Touch: The Effects of Interpersonal Touch on Restaurant Tipping,” Pers Soc Pschol Bull 10 (1984): 512–17; Jacob Hornik, “Tactile Stimulation and Consumer Response,” Journal of Consumer Research 19 (1992): 449-58.

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number increases levels of helpfulness, agreements, and further social contacts.156 Should a pair relationship come to a sudden end, the substances inducing a state of euphoria are no longer secreted. Experiencing a situation approximating to the withdrawal from an addictive drug, the person affected feels considerable pain.157 Sian Harding and other researchers refer to the levels of biochemical stress released by such a phenomenon as Broken-Heart Syndrome.158 With the previous feeling of security subsiding, the person renews his search for a new partner. This situation contrasts to a long-term relationship in which this biochemical mechanism comes to an end following the period of child-rearing. In such a case, the partners separate and seek a new dyadic relationship. This phenomenon is referred to as serial monogamy. Those pairs not separating often exchange the sensation of love for a state of calm, harmony, and security. The sexual therapist David Schnarch points out that positive emotional experiences impact on the neuroplasticity of a human pair and can increase their intimacy.159 Cultural and religious rituals and systems of rules seek to idealize and maintain such pair relationships on a long-term footing. Penalizing alternative life-choices, these rule systems seek to defend social interests by suggesting that long-term faithfulness is in the best interests of its practitioners. The progress of sexual emancipation has weakened the 156

See Nancy Henley, Body Politics: Power, Sex and Non-verbal Communication (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Nicolas Guéguen, “Touch, Awareness of Touch, and Compliance With a Request,” PubMed 95 (2002): 355– 60; Nicolas Guéguen, “Nonverbal Encouragement of Participation in a Course: The Effect of Touching,” Social Psychology of Education 7 (2004): 89–98; Robert Vincent Joule and Nicolas Guéguen, “Touch, Compliance, and Awareness of Tactile Contact,” PubMed 104 (2007): 581-88; Nicolas Guéguen, “Courtship Compliance: The Effect of Touch on Women’s Behavior,” Social Influence 2 (2007): 81–97; Nicolas Guéguen, “The Effect of a Woman’s Incidental Tactile Contact on Men’s Later Behavior,” Social Behavior and Personality 38 (2010): 257–66; Bryan Fuller, Marcia J. Simmering, Laura E. Marler, Susie S. Cox, Rebecca J. Bennet, and Robin A. Cheramie, “Exploring Touch as a Positive Workplace Behavior,” Human Relations 64 (2011): 231–56. 157 See Dietrich Klusmann, “Sexual Motivation and the Duration of Partnership,” Archives of Sexual Behavior 31 (2002): 275–87; idem., “Warum gibt es Gefühle? Eine Einführung in die Evolutionspsychologie,” http://zpm.uke.unihamburg.de/WebPdf/evopsych.pdf, 8ff. 158 Sian Harding, et al., “‘Broken Heart Syndrome’ Protects the Heart From Adrenaline Overload,” Imperial College London, News Release, June 27, 2012. 159 See David Schnarch, Intimacy and Desire: Awaken the Passion in Your Relationship (New York: Beaufort Books, 2009).

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power of this imposed consensus and social standards are subject to increasingly rapid change.160 The development of pair relationships gave rise to the phenomenon of jealousy. Without this phenomenon, promiscuity would promote the widest-possible transmission of genetic material. Such a practice would guarantee females the best offspring through mating with the strongest male whilst benefiting from the faithfulness of her regular partner. Human shame and the resulting need for privacy during sexual intercourse developed not from jealousy, but the concern for sexual competition.161 The lowest ape sought privacy so as not to be displaced by the dominant male of the group. Seeking an explanation for the human urge to cover their genitalia, the evolutionary biologist Thomas Junker argues that the growth of sophisticated civilization and its complex functionaldifferentiation brought the need for concentration. Nakedness would pose a constant distraction from the task in hand, endangering the success of the community.162 With sexual interest originally fixed on the posterior and genitalia, the British zoologist Desmond Morris argues that the development of bi-pedal motion established the female breasts as a further point of interest.163 Today, people control their sexual attraction with their choice of clothing. Whilst monks, nuns, and female Muslims seek to desexualize themselves with habits and the burka, others use particular vestments to emphasize their sexual organs or even sexualize their whole body through a complicated strategy of envelopment and display.

160

See Peter Fiedler, Sexuelle Orientierung und sexuelle Abweichung (Weinheim: Beltz, 2004); Gunter Schmidt, et al., Spätmoderne Beziehungswelten: Report über Partnerschaften und Sexualität in drei Generationen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006); Volkmar Sigusch, “Jugendsexualität— Veränderungen in den letzten Jahrzehnten,” Deutsches Ärzteblatt 95 (1998): A1240–A1243. See also Johannes Huinink, Josef Brüderl, Bernhard Nauck, Sabine Walper, Laura Castiglioni, and Michael Feldhaus, “Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics (pairfam): Conceptual Framework and Design,” Zeitschrift für Familienforschung 23 (2011): 77–101. 161 See Hans Peter Duerr, Der Mythos vom Zivilisationsprozess (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), 3:16; Stephan Marks, Scham—Die tabuisierte Emotion (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 2007); Rolf Kühn, Scham—Ein menschliches Gefühl (Opladen: Westdt. Verlag, 1997). 162 See Thomas Junker, Die Evolution des Menschen (Munich: Beck, 2006), 89–92, Katharina Kramer, “Die Erfindung der Scham,” GEOkompakt 20 (2009): 44ff. 163 See Morris, The Naked Woman, 146; see idem, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 50ff.

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Empathy The development of relationship bonds plays an important role in areas outside pair relationships and the nuclear family.164 An inborn drive, such mechanisms are not acquired. Investigations of people suffering from depression have demonstrated that the history of earlier relationships are stored in their memory and compared with their current social situation. Loss, disappointment, or separation produces a feeling of helplessness and can result in depression. As we have seen, the neuropeptide oxytocin plays a decisive role in the development and maintenance of social relationships. It also triggers lactation and uterine contraction during birth and sexual activity. Secreted by the hypothalamus, oxytocin affects the emotional center of the brain. Secreting neurotransmitters in the limbic system, its favorable impact stimulates repetition. This increases trust and promotes social contacts. In experiments with fMRI, Markus Heinrichs and his team discovered that oxytocin is active in the amygdale—the brain center active in fear—and suppresses this negative emotion. Oxytocin would also appear to exercise an influence on the dorsal striatum, a region of the brain usually involved in the consideration of complicated conflicts. Excess levels of oxytocin accelerate this weighingup process considerably. Heinrichs and his team discovered that in situations of social stress, those test patients who had previously hugged their partner secrete fewer stress hormones and more oxytocin. Taken as a nasal spray, oxytocin would also appear to help those with a social phobia master their lives. Oxytocin not only increases levels of trust but makes people more empathetic.165 Empathy refers to the ability of an individual to assume the perspective of another. Social intelligence requires the ability to differentiate between other persons, recognize their intentions, and compare them with our own. This can produce remorse or guilt. Persons with high psychopath scores 164

See Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 146–47. See Markus Heinrichs and Gregor Domes, “Neuropeptides and Social Behavior: Effects of Oxytocin and Vasopressin in Humans,” Progress in Brain Research 170 (2008): 337–50; Thomas Baumgartner, et al., “Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of Trust and Trust Adaption in Humans,” Neuron 58 (2008): 639– 50; Beate Ditzen, et al., “Intranasal Oxytocin Increases Positive Communication and Reduces Cortisol Levels During Couple Conflict,” Biological Psychiatry 65 (2009): 728–31; René Hurlemann and his team were able to demonstrate that oxytocin made men become more empathetic: René Hurlemann, et al., “Oxytocin Enhances Amygdala-Dependent, Socially Reinforced Learning and Emotional Empathy in Humans,” The Journal of Neuroscience 30 (2010): 4999–5007. 165

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and an underdeveloped consciousness of their own guilt tend not to display any activity in their medial-frontal brain. Empathy, which includes the capacity for guilt, thus requires a functioning medial prefrontal cortex.166 Gerben A. van Kleef and his team demonstrated that ambition and empathy tend to be mutually exclusive. Displaying little reaction to the trauma of others, this lack of feeling with their fellow men, make highly ambitious people feel more powerful.167 It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of hormones on emotional behavior. Unable to control the composition of our hormones to any great degree, the behavior it produces is almost beyond personal control. Certain feelings often precede the perception of a situation. “Linguistic-cognitive processes are not necessary for the development of emotions, as feelings can often develop before conscious semantic analysis and without an intact primary sense system.”168 Charles Darwin and William James held a similar view to this. Classifying feelings (such as disgust) as non-cognitive phenomena, bodily sensations, or a function of the nervous system, they viewed such sensations as an evolutionary product and as such, subject to genetic transmission.169 Since the work of John Dewey, on the other hand, scientists have continued to point out that the teleological nature of physiological phenomena becomes clear only upon their interpretation170—tears and smiles require the interpretation of the developments to which we react. Such labelling points not only to the intellectual component of this procedure, but also the social and cultural preconditions and references which it comprises. Our pronounced willingness to help individual victims of misfortune is clearly a culturally-influenced phenomenon.171 Whilst remaining 166

See Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 720. See Gerben A. van Kleef, et al., “Power, Distress and Compassion: Turning a Blind Eye to the Suffering of Others,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 1315–22. 168 Birbaumer and Schmidt, Biologische Psychologie, 696. 169 See Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. 250ff.; William James, “What is an Emotion” [1884], in What is an Emotion?, eds. Calhoun and Solomon, (New York: Oxford University Press), 127–41. 170 See John Dewey, “The Theory of Emotion [1894],” in What is an Emotion?, eds. Calhoun and Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press), 154–71; Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer, “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State [1962],” in ibid., 173–83. 171 See Deborah Small and George Loewenstein, “Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26 (2003): 5–13; Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and 167

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comparatively untouched by the sufferings of large groups, we humans tend only “to care” when confronted by suffering on an individual basis.172 Requiring identification with the victim, we are usually prepared to help only if we believe that we are able to do so.173 This explains our readiness to help save a drowning child or donate money to alleviate individual suffering, but the only muted outward reaction to the news of genocide or famine in a far-removed country. “[…] when a tragedy is faraway, large, and involves many people, we take it in from a more distant, less emotional, perspective. When we can’t see the small details, suffering is less vivid, less emotional, and we feel less compelled to act.”174 When further factors cause people to compare an incidence of individual suffering with that of a group, the precepts of rationality serve to “adjust” the previous intuitive emotional reaction. This mechanism serves to reduce the level of money donated in comparison to spontaneous incidences of assistance.175 Studies comparing the amounts of money donated for the victims of various catastrophes have shown that the amount given fell in proportion to the increasing size of the victim group.176 One possible strategy to counteract this tendency is to replace reams of statistics with pictures of individual suffering. After having their emotions stimulated by individual cases, potential donors are often Genocide,” Judgement and Decision Making 2 (2007): 79–95; Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now To End World Poverty (New York: Random House, 2009). 172 Thus Angela Kühner, “Das Plädoyer für Vergessen als Kritik einer ‘obsessiven’ Erinnerungspolitik? Sozialpsychologische Überlegungen zum Umgang mit beunruhigenden Vergangenheiten,” in Soziologie des Vergessens: Theoretische Zugänge und empirische Forschungsfelder, eds. Olvier Dimbath and Peter Wehling (Constance: UVK, 2011), 211–27; 217. 173 See Steven E. Aschheim, “Über die politische Ökonomie des Mitgefühls,” Mittelweg 36 20 (2011): 75–93. The author seeks to use this project to expand the impact of human empathy on donation habits by establishing the factors necessary to create an empathetic civilization. Jeremy Rifkin, on the other hand, assumes that in highlighting problems in far-away lands, globalization could produce a civilization of empathy. See Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race of Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). 174 Dan Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality: The Unexpected Benefits of Defying Logic at Work and at Home (New York: Harper, 2010), 245. 175 See Deborah Small, George Loewenstein, and Paul Slovic, “Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102 (2007): 143–53. 176 See Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality, 249ff.

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brought to donate more than if they had only seen large groups of disadvantaged people. Tania Singer, director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig conducted a survey with fMRI to locate the neurological processes involved in empathy. Although those displaying pity did not suffer any physical pain, the experience of seeing others suffer activated the same area of the brain involved in processing pain.177 The project led by David Rand at the University of Harvard also discovered that spontaneity engenders higher levels of cooperation and helpfulness. Those taking longer to ruminate on their decision on the other hand, are less likely to help.178

Consciousness One of the most intensely-contested and most important questions of our time is the (partially) unresolved question as to the origin of consciousness and the “biological revolution called culture.”179 Identifying fully with our consciousness we are not only unable to conceive of a life without it; it represents the “essence of our being.”180 Such a situation is entirely understandable: without consciousness, we would remain incapable of subjective experience, either positive or negative. Only humans, the “knowing self” possess the ability to “reveal the predicaments and opportunities of the human condition.”181 Seeking to optimize our prospects of survival, evolution created both conscious and unconscious actions. Interaction of the two enables us to reflect, plan and decide for the future. Experienced in a waking state, primary conscious feelings, such as fear, joy, aggression, pain, and enjoyment, make up the first stage of consciousness, something which 177

See Claus Lamm, Jean Decety, and Tania Singer, “Meta-analytic Evidence for Common and Distinct Neural Networks Associated With Directly Experienced Pain and Empathy for Pain Corresponding,” NeuroImage 54 (2011): 2492–2502; see also Nicolas Danziger, Isabelle Faillenot, and Roland Peyron, “Can We Share a Pain We Never Felt? Neural Correlates of Empathy in Patients with Congenital Insensitivity to Pain,” Neuron 61 (2009): 203–12. 178 See David G. Rand, Joshua D. Greene, and Martin A. Nowak, “Spontaneous Giving and Calculated Greed,” Nature 489 (2012): 427–30. 179 So Antonio R. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 288; see also Merlin Donald, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2001), esp. 13ff. 180 Thus Ap Dijksterhuis, Das kluge Unbewusste: Denken mit Gefühl und Intuition (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2010), 234. 181 Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 268.

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Antonio Damasio labels the “proto-self.”182 Generated not in the cerebral cortex, but the brainstem, these primary feelings are bodily processes, which, represented in the brain, facilitate the constant interaction between mind and body. Such findings stand in clear contradiction to the previous Cartesian consensus positing a duality of body and mind. The self develops in a number of steps on the foundation of the protoself. The first entity to emerge is the “core self.” Providing the organism with a provisional conception of itself, it generates images of objects, which are then coded in the brain. These two entities combine to form the “material self,” a state of consciousness vital to the survival instinct, the existence of which can be proven in a number of higher species. Developed on the highest level is the autobiographical self, the repository of personal perception, memories, and expectations. These are combined to form large-scale intricate models, which are incorporated to form an individual biography. Having developed late in the evolutionary process and “consisting of a ‘social me’ and a ‘spiritual me,’” the autobiographical self “embraces all aspects of one’s social persona.”183 The core self and the autobiographical self combine in our mind to produce a level of knowledge, which constitutes a further dimension of our individuality. Involving many regions of the brain, the functioning of this process prevents us from locating the self in any one of its areas or regions. Choosing the analogy of an orchestra to illustrate this point, Damasio reflects that “the performance of a symphonic piece does not come from the work of a single musician or even from a whole section of an orchestra.”184 However, this analogy falls somewhat short of reality. Whilst the orchestra of Damasio’s symphony is constituted and directed from the very first bar by a musical director, the self constructs itself without external direction through assembling emotions, situations, memories, and processes of learning itself. To remain in the analogy, the self creates its own maestro during the rehearsal. Indeed, there is no distinction between rehearsal and concert. This situation is described using the term “representation,” referring to an inner conception of the sums of our perceptions.185 Although not actually “real,” the self constitutes reality. “The grand symphonic piece that is consciousness encompasses the foundational contributions of the brainstem, forever hitched to the body, and the wider-than-the-sky imagery created in the cooperation of cerebral 182

See Ibid., 20ff.; 190ff.; 212ff. Ibid., 23. 184 Ibid., 23. 185 See Thomas Metzinger, The Ego-Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self (New York: Basic Books, 2009), esp. 40ff.; 75ff. 183

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cortex and subcortical structures, all harmoniously stitched together, in ceaseless forward motion, interruptible only by sleep, anesthesia, brain dysfunction, or death.”186 In view of the complex and multifaceted function of the conscious mind with all its subconscious functions, defective images, and double homeostasis (the originally biological and socio-cultural form of life control and vital to survival), neuroscientists plead for a new approach to this subject incorporating the disciplines of biology and the social sciences. They have recognized that the form of expression given to sociocultural life-control—music, dance, painting, and story-telling—all “contribute to the development of a conception of well-being” and so “equalize emotional imbalances” caused by fear anger, yearning, and mourning.187 Despite this insight, calls for an interdisciplinary approach to the problem have so far met with intense skepticism from both sides of the scientific divide. The naturalism-constructivism debate continues to rage.188 Although our self usually perceives “body” and “mind” as a unitary state of consciousness, a small number of people have reported unusual “out of body experiences” (OBE). The Philosopher Thomas Metzinger describes such an experience thus: “I am lying in bed on my back, going to sleep, deeply relaxed yet still alert. […] Suddenly I feel as though my bed is sliding into a vertical position, with the head of the bed moving toward the ceiling. I seem to leave my physical body, rising slowly into an upright position.”189

186

Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 24–25. Ibid., 310–11. See also Timothy D. Wilson and Elizabeth Dunn, “Selfknowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potential for Improvement,” Annual Review of Psychology 17 (2004): 1–17; Stanley B. Klein and Cynthia E. Gangi, “The Multiplicity of Self: Neuropsychological Evidence and Its Implications for the Self as a Construct in Psychological Research,” Annals of the New York Academy of Science 1191 (2010): 1–25; Karlene Hanko, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler, “When I and Me are Different: Assimilation and Contrast in Temporal SelfComparisons,” European Journal of Social Psychology 40 (2010): 160–68; Dirk Smeeters, et al., “When do Primes Prime? The Moderating Role of the SelfConcept in Individual’s Susceptibility to Priming Effects on Social Behaviour,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2009): 211–16. 188 See Tanja Bogusz and Estrid Sørensen, eds., “Naturalismus—Konstruktivismus: Zur Produktivität einer Dichotomie,” Berliner Blätter, Sonderheft 55 (2011). 189 Metzinger, The Ego-Tunnel, 82. 187

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Fig. 11: The cortex—the location of consciousness—consists of four large brain lobes, the frontal lobe (lobus frontalis), the arietal lobe (lobus parietalis), the occipital lobe (lobus occipitalis) and the temporal lobe (lobus temporalis). The brain function is subdivided into sensory, motoric and the associative areas. Only the activities of the associative areas (the function of which is distributed across the four lobes) are involved with consciousness. Diagram by Jutta Bissinger.

Such perceptions usually occur in a phase of deep relaxation, often in intermediate periods, such as waking or falling asleep. This sensation can also manifest itself in a near-death experience. Olaf Blanke and his team have succeeded in provoking such self-consciousness irritations190 and noting the areas of the brain activated by such OBEs.191 “The temporoparietal junction is responsible for the self-perspective and selflocalization. Located between the skull and the parietal lobe, this area brings together sensory impressions, such as sight, touch, or hearing with information regulating balance. Calculating an overall impression from the information stream, the result normally signalizes personal ownership of our body. Interruption of this integrative process by the dysfunctional

190

See Bigna Lenggenhager, et al., “Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self Consciousness,” Science 317 (2007): 1096–99. See also Lukas Heydrich, et al., “Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily SelfConsciousness,” Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010): 702–10. 191 See Silvio Ionta, et al., “Multisensory Mechanisms in Temporo-Parietal Cortex Support Self-Location and First-Person Perspective,” Neuron 70 (2011): 363–74.

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unloading of brain cells, e.g. during a migraine, an epileptic attack or injury, can result in an OBE.”192 Healthy individuals can also experience a conflict between the correct interpretation of optical sense data and their sense of balance. Both the nature of the human brain and its processing function are specific to each individual. The neuroscientist Jason Braithwaite has demonstrated how the temporal lobes of those with a proclivity to experience OBEs and hallucinations display a greater degree of instability.193 Accordingly, out of body experiences would appear to be the product of a mis-performing brain resulting in a failure of the self. The mystic connotations attached by a number of religions to this phenomenon transforms what is in essence a natural state into a spiritual experience. Advancing a neurological explanation for consciousness, Metzinger et al. view OBEs as a possible reason for the oft-posited dichotomy between mind and body. “The myth of the soul could even have been the product of the first out-of-body experience and its subsequent discussion.”194 That OBEs are accorded great importance in a number of cultures is probably the result of the discovery of mortality and the hope for a spiritual afterlife. A research program at the Max Plank Institute for Psychiatry in Munich investigating REM with MRI techniques concentrated on the moment in which dreamers become aware that they are dreaming and are able to steer their dreams. Such “lucid dreamers” are able to access memories, perform tasks, and even become conscious of their selves without waking up. Participants of such waking dreams develop a “meta view” of their own.195 192

Quoted according to Aileen Hohnstein, “Eine Frage der Perspektive,” FAZ, no. 31 from August 7, 2011, 49. 193 See Jason J. Braithwaite, et al., “Cognitive Correlates of the Spontaneous OutOf-Body Experience (OBE) in the Psychologically Normal Population: Evidence for an Increased Role of Temporal Lobe Instability, Body-Distortion Processing, and Impairments in Own-Body Transformations,” Cortex 47 (2011): 839–53; Jason J. Braithwaite and Kevin Dent, “New Perspectives on Perspective-Taking Mechanisms and Out-Of-Body Experience,” Cortex 47 (2011): 628–32. 194 Cf. Metzinger, The Ego-Tunnel, 212ff. 195 See Martin Dresler, Renate Wehrle, Victor I. Spoormaker, Florian Holsboer, Axel Steiger, Stefan P. Koch, Hellmut Obrig, Phillip G. Sämann, and Michael Czisch, “Neural Correlates of Dream Lucidity Obtained From Contrasting Lucid Versus Nonlucid REM Sleep: A Combined EEG/fMRI Case Study,” Sleep 35 (2012): 1017–20 (doi.org/10.5665/sleep.1974); Martin Dresler, “Kreativität, Schlaf und Traum—Neurobiologische Zusammenhänge,” in Neuroästhetik, ed. Karin Hermann (Kassel: Kassel Univ. Press, 2011); Martin Dresler, Stefan Koch, Renate Wehrle, Victor I. Spoormaker, Florian Holsboer, Axel Steiger, Phillip G. Sämann, Hellmut Obrig, and Michael Czisch, “Dreamed Movement Elicits Activation in the

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Comparison of the brain activity measured in a normal dream and the subsequent lucid phase enables differentiation between the characteristic activities of the latter. During lucid dreams, brain activity originates in those areas of the brain held to be responsible for self-evaluation and selfperception. “During REM sleep, neural activity in the brainstem, thalamus, amygdale, and extrastriate temporo-occipital cortices increases, while, e.g., the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the precuneus show deactivation. […] The strongest increase in activation during lucid compared to non-lucid REM sleep was observed in the precuneus, a brain region that has been implicated in self-referential processing, such as firstperson perspective and experience of agency.”196

An “emotional turn” in the historical sciences?197 According to Ute Frevert and Anne Schmidt, the resistance from professional historians to “neuro-cultural history”198 is matched only by their “fear of feelings in treatment of the past.”199 Basing their assertions on a number of examples drawn from the 1970s and 1980s, they argue that historians are missing much of explanatory power, especially that associated with the potential for representation, by ignoring this approach. They argue that this is compounded by the tendency for these very same historians to base their arguments on a “conscious play on emotion.”200 Historical exhibitions, memorials, and works of television history “seek to make a conscious appeal to emotion without becoming overpowering.”201 Sensorimotor Cortex,” Current Biology 21 (2011): 1833–37. Martin Dresler, “Sleep and Creativity: Theoretical Models and Neural Basis,” in Encyclopedia of Sleep and Dreams, eds. Deirdre Barrett and Patrick McNamara (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2012), 769–71; Martin Dresler, Victor I. Spoormaker, Renate Wehrle, Michael Czisch, “Dream Imaging,” in Dream Consciousness, eds. Owen Flanagan and Nicholas Tranquillo (Heidelberg, forthcoming). Dresler, Wehrle, Spoormaker, Holsboer, Steiger, Koch, Obrig, Sämann, and Czisch, “Neural correlates,” 1017– 20. 196 Dresler, et al., “Neural correlates,” 1019–20. 197 Regarding the following, see the AHR debate: “The historical study of emotions,” American Historical Review 117 (2012): 1487–1531. 198 See also Chapter 3, section “Historical memory research as ‘neuro-cultural history.’” 199 See Ute Frevert and Anne Schmidt, “Geschichte, Emotionen und die Macht der Bilder,” GuG 37 (2011): 5–25, 7. See also Rebekah Widdowfield, “The Place of Emotions in Academic Research,” Area 32 (2000): 199–208. 200 Frevert and Schmidt, “Geschichte,” 7. 201 Ibid., 9.

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Indeed, Frevert and Schmidt argue that since the mid-1990s exhibitions have increasingly used a range of techniques of the imagination to recapture past events, including films and other forms of dramatization, which play on the emotions and memories of its visitors.202 Despite their success in producing highly authentic and effective re-constructions of past events,203 the curators of such exhibitions maintain a highly defensive public position in anticipation of hostility from academic historians. University-based critics accuse them of replacing rationality with feelings, deriding what they see as “commercialized” and dangerous infotainment, which they contest, distort historical reality. Chafing at what they hold to be a narrow understanding of communication, Frevert and Schmidt reject out of hand the assumed and— for them—entirely false dichotomy of emotion versus cognition. This, they believe, is the continuation of old elitist and anti-democratic currents in the historical profession positing the “emotionality of the masses” and their distance from rationality. Addressing the question as to the place of feelings in history,204 Ute Frevert outlined the complex history of research into human emotions from Darwin to the advent of social neuroscience.205 Identifying a “history of feelings” developed and then forgotten by the historical sciences, she characterized the last third of the 18th century as a European “era of sensitivity,”206 and underlined the importance of feelings in Romanticism.207 Only the onset of modernity in the last third of the 19th century, she argues, brought a “rationalization of feeling” following radical social, economic, and political change.208 Following these observations, Frevert poses the question as to the existence of a time-bound set of emotions. Historians and social scientists 202

See Aleida Assmann and Juliane Brauer, “Bilder, Gefühle, Erwartungen: Über die emotionale Dimension von Gedenkstätten und den Umgang von Jugendlichen mit dem Holocaust,” GuG 37 (2011): 72–103. 203 See Eva Ulrike Pirker, et al., eds., Echte Geschichte: Authentizitätsfiktionen in populären Geschichtskulturen (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2010). 204 See Ute Frevert, “Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen,” GuG 35 (2009): 183–208. 205 See Tania Singer and Claus Lamm, “The Social Neuroscience of Empathy,” The Year in Cognitive Neuroscience: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1156 (2009): 81–96. 206 See Ute Frevert, et al., eds., Gefühlswissen: Eine lexikalische Spurensuche (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2011). 207 See Karl Heinz Bohrer, Der romantische Brief: Die Entstehung ästhetischer Subjektivität (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), esp. 226ff. 208 See Uffa Jensen and Daniel Morat, eds., Rationalisierungen des Gefühls. Zum Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Emotionen 1880–1930 (Paderborn: Fink, 2008).

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agree that feelings act as the social “motor”209 of history. Reconstructing the changes caused by the popular containment and development of human controls over feelings within the process of “civilization,”210 historians also point to the resurgence of feelings and their destructive impact during the first half of the 20th century. Indeed, the First World War and following the succession of murderous dictatorships are inconceivable without the public excess of emotions which formed and fuelled them. Norbert Elias concluded that the process of rationalization to which feelings had been subject, was not only reversible, but indeed contained the potential to explode in entirely the other direction, producing a culture excessive affect.211 Writing in 1941 at the high point of Nazi domination of Europe, Lucien Febvre called for a “collective and wide-ranging investigation of the fundamental human feelings and forms of expression.” Having himself experienced how the release of such emotions—hate, fear, and love—had the potential to “transform the world into a stinking charnel house,”212 he feared that the “glorification of primary feelings stripped from all forms of guidance and restraint would result in the triumph of hardness over love and the animal over culture.” This could break out at any time from under a thin crust of civilization. Frevert is correct in her rejection of the false dichotomy which she identified; she is also right in her belief that this does not vitiate Febvre’s fears. As she writes, the emergence of a specific set of circumstances could enable certain “collective emotions” to gain the upper hand, thus enabling certain feelings to achieve their diffuse aims.213 “Those with an interest in social history and the origin of social structures and joint action also appreciate the possibility that once formed, such associations contain the 209

Quoted accorded to Charles Le Brun, “Vorrede,” in Des weltberühmten Herrn Le Brun Königl: Franzöziß; Vornehmste Hof-Mahlers zu Paris Entwurff wie die Künstler die Affecten der Menschen exprimiren sollen (Augsburg, 1704). See also See Jakob Tanner, “Unfassbare Gefühle: Emotionen in der Geschichtswissenschaft vom Fin de siècle bis in die Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Jensen and Morat, Rationalisierungen, 35–59. 210 See e.g. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations [Über den Prozess der Zivilisation] (1939; rev. ed., Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 520. 211 See Norbert Elias, The Germans Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1:308ff. 212 Lucien Febvre, “Sensibilität und Geschichte: Zugänge zum Gefühlsleben früherer Epochen,” in Schrift und Materie der Geschichte, ed. Claudia Honegger, et al. (1941, repr. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1977), 313–34. 213 Frevert, “Gefühle,” 197.

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potential for division and dissent, and the possibility that they culminate in antagonism and conflict.” Indeed, this very insight means that we should not “disregard the existence and impact of feelings.”214 Social groups function as what Barbara Rosenwein calls “emotional communities”215 in which “common systems of feeling” are developed. Expressing themselves in characteristic rituals, traditions and value systems, they act to reinforce and renew their structures. Encouraging its members to exercise emotional self-control, every community provides a set of collective conceptions designed to promote it.216 “A ‘culture,’ if it is to cohere, must include a set of doctrines and practices dealing with emotion regulation, and provide a modicum of shared regulation styles, through formalized performances and informal gestures, through speech and example, through rewards and penalties.”217 Frevert argues that reminding ourselves of these familiar phenomena involves rejection of rational models as generated by the economic sciences, which assume the existence of that widely-posted, yet rarely met creature: Homo oeconomicus. Indeed, she stresses the decisive influence of “ideology, values, discourses, perceptions, and bodily practices” on human behavior—the emotional parameters of social collectivization which cultural historians previously “appear to have overlooked.”218 In contrast, Frevert sees that in posing the question as to the extent of the influence exerted by emotions on individual decisions, emotional intelligence, and the mechanisms of emotional regulation,219 many psychologists and neuroscientists have not attempted to take into account the cultural formation and social context of such processes of “emotionregulation.” Emotions such as outrage, fear, empathy, pride, and solidarity— manifested in collective actions like strikes and demonstrations—are dependent on social communication and are shared and impact on joint actions in such a way as to motivate, accelerate, retard, or even end common action. The exact mechanism by which the process of the 214

Ibid. See Barbara Rosenwein, “Worrying About Emotions in History,” The American Historical Review 107 (2002): 821–45; 842ff. 216 See William M. Reddy, “Neuroscience and the Fallacies of Functionalism,” History and Theory 49 (2010): 412–25. 217 Ibid., 424–25. 218 Frevert, “Gefühle,” 198. 219 See Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings. The Intelligence of the Unconscious (New York: Viking, 2007); Peter Salovey and Jack Meyer, “Emotional Itelligence,” Imagination, Cognition, and Personality 9 (1990): 185–211; James J. Gross, ed., Handbook of Emotion Regulation (New York: Guilford Press, 2007). 215

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“stimulation of the masses” and “contagion” function and the communicative influence of the bodily expression of emotions— movement, gestures, facial expression, tone of voice, posture, and psychophysiological reactions, such as sweating or rapid breathing—remain a matter of profound uncertainty.220 Indeed, such “bodily experiences” are usually not universal, but are subject to cultural transmission, even those experienced subconsciously.221 From this perspective, feelings are not only expressed, but also generated in bodily form, “materialized” in a fluid biosocial process.222 A consequence of such reciprocal influence is the tendency of happy people to develop “laughter lines.” The influence of emotions such as pride, honor,223 and shame, on human action is considerable both on the individual and the collective level. Contributing to large-scale events, such as the Franco-Prussian War and First World War,224 they also influence smaller-scale inter-personal behavior. The ritual humiliation to which female “horizontal collaborators” in German-occupied countries were subjected after 1945 also emerged from an apparently-arcane code of “tribal honor.” Stripped and with their hair shorn, these women were driven through the town. A range of insults were developed for the children of mixed parentage.225 220

See Frevert, “Gefühle,” 199–200. Eitler and Scheer, Emotionengeschichte, 282–313; 288. 222 Eitler and Scheer, Emotionengeschichte, 290–91. 223 See Winfried Speitkamp, Ohrfeige, Duell und Ehrenmord: Eine Geschichte der Ehre (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2010). 224 See Birgit Aschmann, “Ehre—Das verletzte Gefühl als Grund für den Krieg: Der Kriegsausbruch 1870,” in Gefühl und Kalkül: Der Einfluss von Emotionen auf die Politik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Birgit Aschmann (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 151–74; Ute Frevert, “Honor, Gender, and Power: The Politics of Satisfaction in Pre-war Europe,” in An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 233–55; Ute Frevert, Emotions in History—Lost and Found (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2011), esp. 40ff. 225 See Ebba D. Drolshagen, Wehrmachtskinder: Auf der Suche nach dem nie gekannten Vater (Munich: Droemer, 2005); idem., Nicht ungeschoren davonkommen: Das Schicksal der Frauen in den besetzten Ländern, die Wehrmachtssoldaten liebten; Mit einem Vorwort von Klaus Theweleit (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1998); Alain Brossat, Les tondues: Un carnaval moche (Levallois-Perret: Manya, 1992); Christine Künzel and Gaby Temme, eds., Täterinnen und/oder Opfer? Frauen in Gewaltstrukturen (Münster, Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, London, and Zurich: Lit, 2007); Jean-Paul Picaper and Ludwig Norz, Die Kinder der Schande: Das tragische Schicksal deutscher Besatzungskinder in Frankreich (Munich and Zurich: Piper, 2005); Amicale 221

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German women who entered a relationship with forced laborers or prisoners of war, on the other hand, were subject to the prescriptions of penal law, amounting to prison, concentration camp or even death. Although a constitutive part of our human makeup, the exact way in which emotions are formed and expressed varies across culture and time. Some affects, or at least their expression are acquired.226 Indeed, the expressions of all emotions in our social setting are subject to perception, interpretation, and, thus feedback. Not associated with any specific object, states of arousal remain flexible. Only their interpretation in the context of emotion and conditions of socialization gives them a set place. As such, the perception of “religious excitement” would appear to function as the cognitive attribution of emotions to an object field.227 Even simple olfactory stimuli such as the smell of incense,228 can trigger a chain of memories interpreted as “religious.” Frevert also points to the change in phobic objects over time.229 Each age has its own characteristic anxieties. Whilst the fear of apparent death—a sort of waking death—made the rounds in the 18th and 19th centuries, even to the extent of sparking social panic, today’s public anxieties focus on the evils of nuclear power and the impending calamities provoked by climate change. Such “phobic change” is matched by trends in feelings and their ritual expression. Once viewed as a weakness, the public expression of remorse has now become so regular an occurrence that its inflationary use threatens to strip it of any meaning. Ridiculing what he likened to practices of the Dickensian character Uriah Heep, the former British Prime Minister John Major summed up the trend: “should Nationale des Enfants de la Guerre, eds., Des fleurs sur les cailloux: Les enfants de la Guerre se racontent (Limerzel: Guillet, 2010); Gérard Lenorman, Je suis né à vingt an (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2007); Fabrice Virgili, La France “virile”: Des femmes tondues à la Libération (Paris: Payot, 2004); idem., Naître ennemi: Les enfants des couples franco-allemands nés pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Payot, 2009); Kare Olsen, Vater: Deutscher; Das Schicksal der norwegischen Lebensbornkinder und ihrer Mütter von 1940 bis heute (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2002). 226 See Caroll E. Izard, The Psychology of Emotions (New York: Plenum Press, 1991), esp. 43ff. 227 See Gerhard Besier, “Die Partei als Kirche—Der Fall DDR,” in Zwischen Politik und Religion: Studien zur Entstehung, Existenz und Wirkung des Totalitarismus, ed. Klaus Hildebrandt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 113–38; 120– 21. 228 See C. Giovanni Galizia, Wie kommen die Düfte ins Gehirn? Bericht aus der Werkstatt der Neurobiologie (Constance: UVK, 2010), esp. 12; 63–64. 229 Frevert, Gefühle, 203.

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we have a weekly apology spot in which [Tony] Blair apologizes […] for not having anything to apologize about that week?”230 Speaking in 2006, Hermann Lübbe listed a number of such apologies: “Willy Brandt fell to his knees at the monument to the dead of the Warsaw Ghetto. This unprecedented gesture marked the beginning of a new tradition of public rituals of apology. Bill Clinton acknowledged the sins of slavery in a visit to Africa. The Presidents of Russia and Poland met at the location of the massacre of the Polish officer corps and transformed the area into a cemetery. The Pope took the opportunity presented by the Holy Year to apologize for the sins of the Church committed during the crusades and the inquisition.”231 The case involving one of the foremost proponents of the relatively new practice of public penance highlights the effect of its over-use. Speaking on 24 April 2010, the former German Minister of Defense KarlTheodor zu Guttenberg asked the families of German soldiers who had recently died serving in Afghanistan for forgiveness. Couching his request in the strictures of political responsibility, he told them “political responsibility [demands] that, I ask for forgiveness. “Apology” would be an inappropriate word, as guilt and the ability to doubt are both a part of responsibility.”232 Responding to claims that he had plagiarized his entire doctoral thesis, he spoke on February 22, 2011: “I am a person with failings and weaknesses. Yet, I don’t hide my weaknesses. […] Speaking with the necessary humility, I would like to apologize, from the depths of my heart, to all those who I have caused hurt in terms of my doctoral thesis. […] The decision to discard my title hurts.”233

Asking for “forgiveness,” presenting a heart-rending “apology,” and generally laboring the concept of humility at regular intervals proved unsustainable for this deeply Heep-like character. In the end, the defense 230

John Major, quoted in The Independent, December 19, 97. http://www.ipf.uzh.ch/tagung2006/tagungportraits/portrLuebbe.html. See also Hermann Lübbe, Ich entschuldige mich: Das neue politische Bußritual (Berlin: Siedler, 2001). 232 Tendenzen: Politik u. Gesellschaft; Fakten—Meinungen (politinfos.org/tag/ entschuldigung). 233 Quoted according to SpiegelOnline and faz.net February 22, 2011. See also Oliver Lepsius and Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus, eds., Inszenierung als Beruf: Der Fall Guttenberg (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011). From Guttenberg’s perspective: Vorerst gescheitert: Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg im Gespräch mit Giovanni di Lorenzo (Freiburg/Br.: Herder, 2011). 231

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minister matched the fall from grace of his literary alter-ego, the scratched record of their (increasingly unctuous) self-abasement failing to obscure an altogether more ignoble record. On the other hand, the well-known inability of people to apologize demonstrates the human tendency towards self-destruction. Although apologies relieve the feeling of guilt produced by human transgression, there is a loss of control inherent in the action.234 Tyler G. Okimoto’s study into this phenomenon found that those refusing to apologize often exhibited a higher level of self-worth than their more humble counterparts and felt that they complied with prevailing norms. Indeed, their refusal to apologize often enabled them to justify their actions. Balancing the advantage of relief against confirmation of their ego, such individuals opt for the latter. A further term to suffer, though over and indeed, misuse, has been the word “solidarity.” Established as a method of bundling interest groups into communities of action, its current connotations smack of programmatic exhaustion. Frevert points to a different phenomenon, the failure of the word “trust” to emancipate itself from its paternalist, if not authoritarian undertones.235 Repeated appeals for the masses to invest their trust in various states or governments tend nowadays to be greeted with intense suspicion. “Words of feeling,”236 such as loyalty, honor, fatherland, national pride etc., can be used to describe cultures and systems of great difference as well as changes within a single culture. Comparison between the feelings associated with the military and its culture in France, Germany, and the United States illustrates this well. Whilst the post-war German Bundeswehr found it difficult to make an 234

See Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Wenzel, and Kyli Hedrick, “Refusing to Apologize Can Have Psychological Benefits (And We Issue No Mea Culpa for This Research Finding),” European Journal for Social Psychology 43 (2013): 2231. See also M. Wenzel and T. G. Okimoto, “The Varying Meaning of Forgiveness: Relationship Closeness Moderates How Forgiveness Affects Feelings of Justice,” European Journal of Social Psychology 42 (2012): 420-31. 235 Frevert, “Gefühle” 203. See idem., ed., Vertrauen: Historische Annäherungen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003); idem., “Wer um Vertrauen wirbt, weckt Misstrauen: Politische Semantik zwischen Herausforderung und Besänftigung,” Merkur 63 (2009): 21–28. 236 See Günter Debus, “Psychologie der Gefühlswörter,” in Zur historischen Semantik des deutschen Gefühlswortschatzes, ed. Ludwig Jäger (Aachen: AlanoRader, 1988), 95–138; Ludwig Jäger and Sabine Plum, “Historisches Wörterbuch des deutschen Gefühlswortschatzes: Theoretische und methodische Probleme,” in ibid., 5–55; Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversities and Universals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

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appeal to feelings of military honor, and passing out parades were held in obscure provincial barracks, the backlash amongst traditionalists and their attempt to place the German military at the center of national life met with an upsurge of anti-military sentiment. The parade held in Bremen in 1980 to mark the 25th anniversary of German membership of NATO was greeted with boos and whistles. A change in public attitudes only came at the start of the 1990s.237 By 2009, things had changed so much that new recruits were sworn-in before the Reichstag building in the heart of Berlin. As the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah remarked, a wide-scale change in social behavior usually occurs at the point at which those propagating the status quo experience a decline in social respect and a reduction in their “honor.” The changes are usually the product of factors outside morality and behavioral motivation cannot, in the majority of cases, be reduced to Kantian moral conceptions such as duty.238 Those hoping to motivate people to adopt a prosocial course of action should, therefore, not concentrate on moral precepts. A more effective approach would concentrate on establishing the contexts that bring individuals to discontinue popular, yet asocial activities under pressure of social censure. Appiah advances the decline of dueling as a case in point. Formerly an aristocratic mechanism through which to restore honor, its progenitors abandoned it following emulation by the middle classes.239 “As long as the institution was merely condemned, as mad or bad, it could flourish; only when it was condemned did it falter.”240 This reminds us that the extensive cultural influence of those “trendsetters” who determine what is “in” and “out” can prove to be weak or transitory in a pluralist society. Prosocial behavior often has a strategic component aiming at increasing personal prestige. The work of Kristin Leimgruber and her team has demonstrated the impact of this mechanism in children as young as five.241 Addressing the issue of the articulation of feelings, Frevert points to the central significance of language and other forms of expression, such as gesture, facial expression, and tone. “In order to be experienced, 237

See Junge Welt May 6, 2010 and Focus Online July 20, 2009. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code. How Moral Revolutions Happen (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2010). 239 See also Lisa F. Zwicker, Dueling Students: Conflict, Masculinity, and Politics in German Universities (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Ulrike Ludwig, Barbara Krug-Richter, and Gerd Schwerhoff, eds., Das Duell: Ehrenkämpfe vom Mittelalter bis zur Moderne (Constance: UVK, 2011). 240 Appiah, The Honor Code, 47. 241 Kristin L. Leimgruber, Alex Shaw, Laurie R. Santos, and Kristina R. Olson, “Young Children Are More Generous When Others Are Aware of Their Actions,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 10 (October 31, 2012), doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0048292. 238

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recognized and communicated, a feeling must be named as such. Words describing feelings such as love, hate, pride, shame, yearning, or disgust, define and interpret the nature of the emotion concerned.”242 Once named, a feeling generates the related behavior, manifested in culturally or socially-mediated codes. Known as “embodiment,” this mutuallyreinforcing connection of bodily and mental processes has knock-on consequences. Someone who has just smiled or experienced joy at a piece of good news is able to imagine further positive actions.243 The social and neurosciences have both reached a surprisingly high level of consensus in their analysis of such phenomena. This is explained by the culturally-mediated nature of the investigations conducted by the neurobiologists. As Frevert notes, “such interpretations are associated with standardizations and definitions based on culturally-mediated actions. Perceptions of a physiological sensation involve certain cognitive processes of information-selection, evaluation and memory, which render impossible any clear differentiation between the ‘actual’ feeling and its supposedly-simple expression.”244 The division of labor between the disciplines is thus manifested in each discipline’s chosen body of the material for interpretation, not in a greater or lesser degree of “proximity” to emotions. In the historical sciences, ego documents, such as letters, diaries, autobiographies, and artistic compositions, are taken as expressions of emotion.245 The interpretations of art and history provide the reader with an explanation for affect, passions, and mood; ready-made models, which ordinary people can use in order to express, process and categorize their own personal feelings. Instead of relying on such shared emotions, Frevert suggests that we turn our attention to institutions bearing significance for the emotional life of society: family, schools, religious communities, political parties, sports clubs, and other bodies seeking to inculcate its members with “distinctive modes of feeling.”246 242

Frevert, “Gefühle,” 204. See also Rachel Herz, That’s Disgusting: Unraveling the Mysteries of Repulsion (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2012). 243 See Arthur M. Glenberg, et al., “Gender, Emotion, and the Embodiment of Language Comprehension,” Emotion Review 1 (2009): 151–61. See also Herbert Bless, Klaus Fiedler, and Fritz Strack, How Individuals Construct Social Reality (Hove and New York: Psychology Press, 2004). 244 Frevert, “Gefühle,” 205. 245 See also Thomas Anz, “Kulturtechniken der Emotionalisierung. Beobachtungen, Reflexionen und Vorschläge zur literaturwissenschaftlichen Gefühlsforschung,” in Im Rücken der Kulturen, eds. Karl Eibl, Katja Mellmann, and Rüdiger Zymner (Paderborn: Mentis, 2007), 207–39. 246 Frevert, “Gefühle,” 207.

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The modern trend to multiple group membership produces a permanent transfer of values between each emotional milieu involving a pattern of eclectic adaptation. Whatever people do, we seem unable to exist without expressing emotion. As the communication of these feelings often causes social disruption, we need to develop a form of communication, which adapts to each individual context. Kissing everyone for whom we feel any level of sympathy, or bursting into laughter at the graveside contradicts the emotional conventions of our culture. On the other hand, emotionality in an open society should not remain convention-bound; innovation in all areas must remain a central concern of a growing and changing society.

States of arousal as emotional-semantic learning histories Watching any popular festival or parade, we soon see how the expression of a year’s pent-up happiness is unleashed in somatic expressions learnt as part of a particular culture. International visitors to Cologne’s traditional carnival will be able to relate to the laughter,247 dancing, waving, and shouting, but may well require explanation for the precise origin of some of the more outlandish behavior.248 This ritualized form of relaxation is also expressed in the general and organized masquerade: the fancy dress, role-playing, and other activities of the participants provide release from their everyday lives. Hitler’s announcement of the remilitarization of the Rhineland to the Reichstag, on March 7, 1936, was marked by scenes described by William L. Shirer: “They spring, yelling and crying, to their feet. The audience in the galleries does the same […]. Their hands are raised in slavish salute, their faces now contorted with hysteria, their mouths wide open, shouting, shouting, their eyes, burning with fanaticism, glued on the new god, the Messiah.”249

The political passions witnessed in these events demonstrate the prime motivations behind human activity.250 Political processes and events can 247

Regarding the function of smiling, see Friedemann Richert, Kleine Geistesgeschichte des Lachens (Darmstadt: WBG, 2011). 248 Hildegard Brog, Was auch passiert: D’r Zoch kütt! Die Geschichte des rheinischen Karnevals (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 2000); Florens Christian Rang, Historische Psychologie des Karnevals (Berlin: Brinckmann & Bose, 1983). 249 William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934–1941 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1942), 51. 250 See José Brunner, ed., Politische Leidenschaften: Zur Verknüpfung von Macht, Emotion und Vernunft in Deutschland (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010).

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trigger fear, trust, and belief, and can cause and legitimize actions. Such emotions can even shore up an entire political system. Political actors can also be moved by subjective feelings and emotions, such as ambition and resolve. Indeed, individual “charisma” is itself capable of rousing emotion; it can motivate crowds, mobilizing solidarity, yearning, hope, fear, envy, rage, and hate. Götz Aly argues that the campaign launched in the Weimar republic by the SPD and trade unions encouraging social mobility through redistribution was instrumental in promoting social envy against their the group who had preceded them up the social ladder, the Jews.251 Writing from a psychoanalytical perspective, Luc Ciombi and Elke Endert argue that “collective emotions correspond to psychosocial energies exerting an influence on human thought and action. […] Viewed from an affect-logical perspective, such a mass-psychological explosion [the near-universal support for the Third Reich] is possible only in a moment of maximum collective insecurity, during which people are carried away on a release of emotional energy.”252 Pointing to the special “emotional-cognitive resonance” in which the Germans found themselves after the First World War, the authors argue that it was this special situation that enabled an “affective-cognitive resonance” with Hitler in the first place.253 Plagued by national humiliation, economic crisis, and faced by a plethora of both real and imagined enemies, the German people developed a range of hatreds and fears whilst increasingly coming to think in black-and-white categories. The development of such an imbalance between positive and negative feelings produces “extreme phenomena, such as National Socialism.”254 Whilst following certain logic of affect, such an explanation, speculative in nature, would appear to provide only limited explanatory power. What converts ordinary feelings—joy, expectation, desire and hope, fear, envy and hate—into manifestly political, religious, or even politicalreligious phenomena?255 Once unleashed in the political arena, such 251

See Götz Aly, Warum die Deutschen? Warum die Juden? Gleichheit, Neid und Rassenhass 1800–1933 (Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, 2011). 252 Luc Ciombi and Elke Endert, Gefühle machen Geschichte: Die Wirkung kollektiver Emotionen—Von Hitler bis Obama (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 95. 253 Ibid., 96. 254 Ibid., 98. 255 6HH *HUKDUG %HVLHU DQG .DWDU]\QD 6WRNáRVD European Dicatorships: A Comparative History of the Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013), 591ff.

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unusually powerful mobilizing factors are often perceived as transcending the vagaries of conventional political transaction and assume an almost religious character. Entering this realm, “thanks to the specific significance attached to it,”256 the almost millennial enthusiasm accompanying such phenomena resulted in the foundation of a new discipline, that of the psychology of religion.257 Such movements even include a psychophysiological aspect. Constituting a focus of the neurological sciences for a number of years now, such states of religious enthusiasm258 go hand in hand with both an increased, yet at the same time, suppressed level of neurological activity in the cerebral cortex.259 That this pattern is presented by both Buddhists and Franciscans alike would indicate the viability, indeed profitability of including other faith groups and even forms of consumer behavior in the scope of a wider investigation focusing on the social, cultural, and cultic rituals and practices of these very different subcultures.260 Pursuing a “history of the body,” Pascal Eitler and Monique Scheer investigated reports of conversion and “rebirth” in Methodism.261 Incorporating a focus on both cognition and the expression of the physical body, they found that a number of converts had been prepared for such an experience by their socialization. Indeed, they recounted highly similar experiences in the conventional vocabulary of their subculture. Their upbringing equipped them with the knowledge and behavioral repertoire— tears, moans, prayerfulness, and fainting—requisite for a “genuine” conversion experience.262 Not restricted to individual confessions, this phenomenon has been recognized in a number of European and American religious groupings. In her investigation of such movements in the USA, Ann Taves found the 256

Hans Albert, Kritischer Rationalismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 152. Regarding the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, founded in 1907, see Christoph Ribbat, Religiöse Erregung: Protestantische Schwärmer im Kaiserreich (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus, 1996), 197ff. 258 See Andrew Newberg, Eugene d’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001). 259 Ibid., 40ff. 260 This phenomenon has been demonstrated in the context of consumer behavior. See Martin Lindstrom, Buyology: Truth and Lies About Why We Buy (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 107-27. 261 See Eitler and Scheer, Emotionengeschichte, 282–313. 262 See Ann Taves, Fits, Trances and Visions: Experiencing Religion and Explaining Experience From Wesley to James (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 103. 257

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appropriation of African dancing, prayer, and trance practices combined with the emotional conversion experience of European Protestantism.263 Emotions are rehearsed via the self-formulated interjections, extemporary prayers, and loud singing punctuating the meetings of such groupings. Contrasted to such careful preparation, the emotions, feelings, and other sensations presented as manifestations of the Holy Ghost are taken to be entirely spontaneous. Conversions “take place without the input of the converts and any form of cognitive control;”264 the attendant emotional phenomena indicate to the convert that they have actually been transformed without their active participation. In their investigations of the various movements of the “New Age,” Eitler and Scherr demonstrate the growth in both new and more established religious groupings, of new meditative and transcendental practices.

Emotional decisions—“irrational” behavior—motivation Humans very often exhibit the tendency to “put off to tomorrow, what they could do today.” Although aware of the clear disadvantages of such behavior, the phenomenon continues. As Dan Ariely writes, “of course, in a perfectly rational world, procrastination would never be a problem. We would simply compute the values of our long-term objectives, compare them to our short-term enjoyments, and understand that we have more to gain in the long term by suffering a bit in the short term.”265 In rejecting the course of deferred gratification, humans show themselves to be highly irrational in much of their behavior. Providing an explanation for much of our failure in life, behavioral economists are currently attempting to develop a remedy for this most human of weaknesses. Presenting their “Nudge Theory,” Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein recommend abandoning the (highly discouraging) concept of homo economicus and replacing the implied reproach used to control that 263

Ibid., 76–117. Bernd Ulmer, “Konversionserzählungen als rekonstruktive Gattung: Erzählerische Mittel und Strategien bei der Rekonstruktion eines Bekehrungserlebnisses,” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 17 (1988): 19–33; 29. See also the “Digitale Edition: Konversionserzählungen 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert,” Free University Berlin, accessed January 25, 2013, http://www.geschkult.fuberlin.de/e/konversionen/index.html; Newton H. Maloney and Samuel Southard, eds., Handbook of Religious Conversion (Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1992); Chana Ullman, The Transformed Self: The Psychology of Religious Conversion (New York: Plenum Press, 1989). 265 Dan Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality, 4. 264

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creature with a series of “pushes in the right direction.”266 The need for effective motivation in bringing results is illustrated by international comparison of the legal regulation of organ donation. Whilst Germans prepared to donate their organs in the event of their death must “opt in” to this practice, the situation in Austria requires its citizens to “opt out” of what otherwise represents a default practice. It comes as no surprise, that levels of donation are higher in Austria than Germany. As Joel Slemrod argues, the human tendency to react in an emotional fashion to financial disadvantage267 probably explains telephone companies’ tendency to present highly opaque invoices. Knowing that the majority of their customers are unwilling to fight through the small-print, the companies seek to avoid provoking the otherwise inevitable emotional response.268 Inspired by a famous animal experiment,269 Dan Ariely and his team conducted a number of experiments designed to locate the connection between the expectation of gain and performance in humans.270 Discovering that bonus payments for future achievement had almost no impact on current performance, they saw that for the great majority of people, the sensation of loss was felt more keenly after a bonus had been withdrawn for poor performance than was the case after failing to gain it in the first place. Threatened with the possibility of being forced to repay a bonus produced nervous tension and underachievement. Indeed, managers soon came to regard their bonuses as a legitimate part of the remuneration to which they are entitled and not as a reward for exceptional performance. The failure to receive said payments is thus felt as a loss. Discouraged, the managers perform even worse. Effective stimulation of cognitive achievement was shown to be better served by the provision of low and moderate rewards. Exorbitant bonus payments have even been demonstrated to suppress performance; the stress generated by their size serves to distract its prospective recipient 266

See Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 267 See Christopher L. Foote, Lorenz Goette, and Stephan Meier, eds., Policymaking Insights From Behavioral Economics (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2009). 268 See Joel B. Slemrod and Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen’s Guide to the Great Debate Over Tax Reform (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Joel B. Slemrod, ed., Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000). 269 See Robert Yerkes and John Dodson, “The Relation of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit-Formation,” Journal of Contemporary Neurology and Psychology 18 (1908): 459–82. 270 See Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality, 17ff.

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from the task at hand. Nevertheless, having accepted the fallacy of the rational economic actor, employers still seek to attract and motivate the best recruits through payment of ever-increasing bonuses. This thinking is shared by the managers themselves, who also believe that their effectiveness increases under stress. This fallacy has been exposed as such by a whole range of experiments.271 The relationship between performance, rewards, and the impact of emotions is familiar to us all. Many people are able to perform tasks in private, yet fail to perform when subject to intense social pressure. Our tendency to irrational behavior increases when called on to perform “important” tasks. Human industrial performance is determined to a great extent not by material reward, but the recognition which they receive for their work and the feeling of worth which it brings them. High payment is not sufficient to motivate people if they believe that what they do is entirely unimportant. People do not want to achieve the maximum output for the minimum effort. As a range of studies have shown, we work harder if we not only receive positive feedback, but have the feeling that our job is worthwhile.272 Those convinced of the futility of their task respond with reduced motivation. This explains why although bringing short-term gains in productivity, functional differentiation and specialization—such as that experienced on the production line—effects a long-term reduction in efficiency. Those required to perform tasks of this nature present premature aging and hebetude.273 The impact of emotions on our perception is demonstrated by the increase of the value which we place on an object proportional to the level of effort which we expend on it. Proud of the things we have created ourselves—this feeling even extends to flat-pack furniture—humans often prefer a poorly-constructed object to the perfect product of foreign agency. This explains recent developments in instructions of ready-bake products. Many companies have begun to encourage their customers to add their own ingredients, thus increasing satisfaction with the “home-made” product and engendering long-term customer loyalty. It has long been clear that personal investment in an organization, such as a religious fellowship or sports club, engenders as higher level of belonging. This explains the existence of—sometimes humiliating— acceptance tests and initiation rituals. People are not “persuaded” to enter 271

Ibid., 37ff. Ibid., 82ff. 273 See “Forscher untersuchen Auswirkungen eintöniger Arbeit: Fließbandarbeiter altern schneller” August 27, 2010, accessed on August 4, 2012, http://idwonline.de/de/news383917. 272

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a religious association, rather forced to complete a whole range of courses and tests before initiation.274 This level of personal investment explains the shock felt upon exclusion from the group and the difficulty experienced by many initiates in leaving such an association. What is easily acquired is usually of little value. Conducting a number of experiments, Dan Ariely and his team investigated the human tendency to overvalue our own work. Whilst neutral observers found amateur creations to be of a far lesser quality than professionally-produced products, the amateur craftsmen rated their products just as highly, if not better than the objects of comparison.275 Having “fallen in love” with the fruits of their own labor, they lose all objectivity. Indeed, given the choice between purchasing their own imperfect products and those of a craftsman, they opt for the former. Whilst the level of attachment to such objects increases with the effort expended on them, obvious failures are rejected without compunction. An obvious method of avoiding an emotional tie to objects is not to make any. Nevertheless, such an approach makes life less interesting. This mechanism also functions in our personal lives. Just as all parents are convinced to have produced the cleverest and prettiest children, the majority of people hold their own ideas to be far superior to those of their peers. The extent to which emotions influence, even determine our behavior is made clear by the reaction of humans (and primates) whose trust has been broken and who feel unjustly treated. Although rationality would dictate withdrawal from this relationship to prevent further injury, many continue with a damaging association, investing further emotional and financial resources in the hope of extracting revenge. Ernst Fehr and his team used imaging techniques to investigate those having taken revenge on their tormentors. Exhibiting increased activity in the striatum—the area of the brain responsible for experiencing reward276—it would appear that revenge is indeed sweet. As primates also exhibit the desire to inflict punishment, we can assume that the need for revenge is 274

See Gerhard Besier and Renate-Maria Besier, “Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Request for Recognition as a Corporation Under Public Law in Germany: Background, Current Status, and Empirical Aspects,” Journal of Church and State 43 (2001): 35–48. 275 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (rev. and exp. ed., New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), 127ff.; idem., The Upside of Irrationality, 89ff. 276 See Dominique de Quervain, et al., “The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment,” Science 305 (2004): 1254–58; see also Ernst Fehr and Colin F. Camerer, “Social Neuroeconomics: The Neural Circuitry of Social Preferences,” Trends in Cognitive Science 11 (2007): 419–27.

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anchored deep in our biological makeup. Conducting a range of experiments on chimpanzees, Keith Jensen, Josep Gall, and Michael Tomasello found that two animals lived together in harmony as long as an equitable division of food was maintained.277 As soon as one animal gained an unfair share, his “partner” was not only angry, but took every opportunity that presented itself to deny his rival any food at all. The chimpanzee was even prepared to forgo food itself if this satisfied his thirst for revenge. Often feeling let down by companies, consumers seek to extract revenge.278 Sometimes prepared to break the law—by actions such as malicious damage—in order to extract punishment, such individuals rarely differentiate between the company and those of its employees forced to deal with the irate customer. Nevertheless, as Dan Ariely discovered, their displeasure was usually assuaged by the payment of adequate compensation.279 The passage of time also decreased the desire for revenge. Under certain circumstances, humans display a high level of adaptability. Those left disabled by an accident often exhibit a much higher degree of acceptance and adaptation than they would originally have expected. Believing that such a fate would rob them of all happiness, many of those struck by such tragedy were surprised to find that their new life contained many and even unexpected joys.280 To a great extent, the human capacity to tolerate and deal with pain depends on the existence of an earlier phase of accustomization to the feeling; the contexts in which pain has been experienced and the meaning attached to it. If met as a temporary stage on the way to improvement, it is easier to bear than a constant and deteriorating state with an uncertain or a negative prognosis. Memories of both good and bad episodes can recede with the passing of time. Adapting to a run-of-the mill life makes us content, if not particularly happy, or sad. Considerable changes to this state—either positive or negative—exercise only an initial impact on our mood, which

277

See Keith Jensen, Josep Gall, and Michael Tomasello, “Chimpanzees Are Vengeful But Not Spiteful,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (2007): 13046–50. 278 See Ayelet Gneezy and Dan Ariely, Don’t Get Mad, Get Even: On Consumers’ Revenge (Manuscript, Duke University, 2010). 279 See Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality, 149ff. 280 See ibid., 160ff.

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reduces with time.281 As shown by the experience of dictatorship and war, the ability of people to grow accustomed and adapt to even the most negative of circumstances is not always a positive trait. One difficulty involved in this process is the inability to predict the degree to which we will adapt to changed circumstances. Assuming that we will be happy during easy and unhappy during difficult times,282 “we usually get it wrong on both accounts. In the long term, we don’t end up being as happy as we thought we’d be when good things happen to us, and we are not as sad as we expect when bad things occur.”283 In making such prognoses, we usually ignore the constant development of new events with both a positive and negative impact on our lives. This includes the collapse of pair relationships. Although anticipated as a catastrophe by both sides, after a period of mourning its actual occurrence is experienced far less drastic as supposed.284 Seeking to maintain our interest in both people and objects, we search for ever-new stimuli from which we expect eternal happiness. Unless we break through the cycle of acquisition and eventual disappointment, we will remain imprisoned on a hedonistic treadmill, in a constant pursuit for the unobtainable.285 Remaining interested in an activity can be promoted through interrupting practice of it in order to consider the pleasure involved in returning to it. The practice by many religions of fasting teaches its practitioners the value and pleasure of food. The reverse is true for unappealing activities, instead of procrastination we should get on with such tasks, holding in our minds how pleasant life will be upon their completion. This displays our understanding of the mechanisms of human adaptation, which enable us to become used to both pleasant and unpleasant circumstances. Completing onerous tasks in a single sitting is also advantageous as frequent repetition makes the task easier to perform. This mechanism can also be applied to activities bringing a feeling of happiness, the interruption of which serves to prolong the associated 281

See Philip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, “Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 917–27. 282 See Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (London: Harper Press, 2006). 283 Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality, 171. 284 See Paul Eastwick, et al., “Mispredicting Distress Following Breakup: Revealing the Time Course of the Affective Forecasting Error,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008): 800–7. 285 See Sonja Lyubomirsky, “Hedonic Adaption to Positive and Negative Experiences,” in Oxford Handbook of Stress, Health, and Coping, ed. Susan Folkman (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 200–24.

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sensation.286 This explains why many television viewers enjoy commercial breaks—the film can be enjoyed over a longer period.287 We should also modify our consumption patterns to account for the human tendency towards adaptation. Investing in short-term products and services, such as a short holiday, prevent us from becoming overaccustomed to leisure. Indeed, short-term pleasures are far more effective in bringing happiness than the long-term acquisition of consumer durables. The relief provided by a home cinema soon palls in comparison to the memories and restorative effect of a week by the sea. We tend to abjure such an approach in our professional and private lives, opting to avoid risk, innovation, and surprise. The human capacity for adaptation is closely associated with context variables. We learn more quickly to come to terms with a less favorable situation if our peers are forced to do the same. A sense of disadvantage, on the other hand, distracts us from this task. This explains why egalitarian societies generate greater levels of social harmony and general contentedness.288 Nevertheless, the natural inequality inherent to human existence results in the necessity of selection from within a social hierarchy. Handsome men tend to seek pretty women and vice versa.289 Variables are not always matched directly, and money or power can make up for poor looks. As confirmed by a range of studies, our emotions play an important role in our decision-making process.290 Positive or negative emotions rooted in specific circumstances can exert an influence on entirely different and unrelated matters. Having made a decision under the influence of an emotion provoked by one set of circumstances, we exhibit the tendency—when acting in similar or related situations—to repeat this decision, despite the fact that the original set of emotions has long receded. 286

See Leif Nelson and Tom Meyvis, “Interrupted Consumption: Adaption and the Disruption of Hedonic Experience,” Journal of Marketing Research 45 (2008): 654–64. 287 See Leif Nelson, Tom Meyvis, and Jeff Galak, “Enhancing the TelevisionViewing Experience Through Commercial Interruptions,” Journal of Consumer Research 36 (2009): 160–72. 288 See also Leo Bormans, ed., Glück, 225. Furthermore, cf. the section “Aggressive behavior, psychopathy and the absence of happiness” in this chapter. 289 See Leonard Lee, et al., “If I’m Not Hot, Are You Hot Or Not? PhysicalAttractiveness Evaluations and Dating Preferences as a Function of One’s Own Attractiveness,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 669–77. 290 See Eduardo Andrade and Dan Ariely, “The Enduring Impact of Transient Emotions on Decision Making,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 109 (2009): 1–8.

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In a fashion similar to herd behavior, we follow ourselves in a process referred to as “self-herding.”291 This involves individuals acting on the model of past behavior without realizing which factors conditioned our previous decisions. The problem with emotional behavior is therefore not just the (in)advisability of acting on affect, but the fact that such “decisions” once taken, exert a constitutive influence on our subsequent life. Often interpreting such structures as characteristic to our personality, we take a single large-scale donation made on the spur of the movement as indicative of our “generosity,” when the reality could indeed be that our good mood resulted from having made an illicit gain from which many people had suffered. Of little short-term importance, this decision could lead us to become careless with money in the long-term. The adoption of (often unconstructive) communication patterns conditioned by an emotional experience also produces a long-term impact. Arguments in pair relationships often repeat the same pattern and structure even when provoked by entirely different subjects. The couple rehearse the same basic dispute without them being aware of it. The majority of people believe in their capacity to judge a situation in accordance with rational criteria and act accordingly. Nevertheless, our behavior is often steered by a range of diffuse emotions, the impact and influence of which remain unclear to their holders. Such a situation is compounded by our tendency to rationalize our behavior ex post facto. Often unwilling or unable to let go of things, the value of which we overestimate, we cling on to unsuitable situations so as to minimize the pain incurred by their loss. This behavior is reinforced by our attachment to the status quo and our desire to avoid irreversible change. Such a feeling is often prevalent in the run-up to a wedding. It is not simply indecision that might deter the unsure party from “calling it off,” they are also constrained by other emotional barriers, such as the reaction of the wedding guests or the scandal associated with such a course of action. Even when we are capable of recognizing and dealing with the effects of our emotions, we are far from able to free ourselves from them. For instance, our general caution and good sense is often counteracted by the courage and bad judgment we display when seeking to realize our dreams. Many a customer has set out to a car dealership with the intention of buying an Opel and has returned with a sports car. Despite having bought entirely the wrong car for his needs, the purchaser is still able to rationalize his behavior. Ariely calls people “fantastic rationalizing

291

See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 23ff.

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machines.”292 We would be well-advised to distrust our intuition, take advice, and consider all our decisions carefully.

How emotions control our consumption behavior Studies performed in the USA as early as the 1960s noticed the existence of counter-productive over-investment in consumption at the expense of public services and education. Moreover, far from being rational, this bloated consumer demand was generated by advertising.293 Writing in his influential study The Hidden Persuaders from 1957,294 Vance Packard described how the advertising industry used subconscious techniques to persuade the populace of the need to buy superfluous goods. For Packard, these “persuaders” view the general public as “bundles of day-dreams, misty hidden yearnings, guilt complexes, and irrational emotional blockages. We are image lovers given the impulsive and compulsive acts.”295 Not just under threat from those trying to sell us things, our psyche is also bombarded by the messages of journalists, fundraisers, politicians, and a whole range of other “advisors” trying to manipulate us to their ends. Viewing the 1950s as the golden age of advertising,296 many marketing specialists see themselves presented with a much more difficult task for which they have developed a range of even more subtle approaches. “Much of it was simple and logical. Applying it was easy with three major television channels and roughly a dozen magazines.”297 292

Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality, 287. See Lawrence B. Glickman, ed., Consumer Society in American History: A Reader (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Roberta Sassatelli, Consumer Culture: History, Theory and Politics (London: SAGE Publications, 2007). Regarding the history of German consumeriesm, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Claudius Torp, eds., Die Konsumgesellschaft in Deutschland 1890–1990: Ein Handbuch (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2009). See also Georg Felser, Werbe- und Konsumentenpsychologie: Eine Einführung (Heidelberg: Spektrum, 1997); Shinsuke Shimojo, et al., “Gaze Bias Both Reflects and Influences Preferences,” Nature Neuroscience 6 (2003): 1317–22; Harald Homann and Verena Ott, “Das Europa der Konsumenten: Konsumkultur, Konsumentenmoral und Kulturkritik um 1900 und 2000,” Themenportal Europäische Geschichte (2013). 294 Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: McKay, 1982), 14. 295 Ibid., 8. Ref. the situation nearly six decades later cf. Martin Lindstrom, Brandwashed: Tricks Companies Use to Manipulate Our Minds and Persuade Us to Buy (New York: Crown Business, 2011), 6ff. 296 Quoted according to Paco in his foreword to Lindstrom, Buyology, X. 297 Ibid. 293

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Having abandoned Freud, advertisers try to sell their products with this new “neuro-marketing.” In doing so they are searching for “the subconscious thoughts feelings, and desires that drive the purchasing decisions.”298 Conventional marketing techniques—quantitative surveys and qualitative group discussions—no longer seem sufficient in determining consumer purchasing motivation. Indeed, eight out of ten new products launched on the American market flop within three months. The impact of emotions serves to bring respondents to give an answer at variance with their actual motivation. The large number of respondents who indicated that drastic warnings on cigarette packages deterred them from purchasing tobacco was not reflected in the sales figures. The marketing specialist Martin Lindstrom believes he has found the reasons for such behavior, using a range of imaging methods (MRI, electroencephalograph and Steady-State Topography). He believes that the warnings stimulate the nucleus accumbens or “addiction center” of the brain, encouraging people to smoke. Seeking to illustrate the success of such neuro-imaging techniques, he conducted a follow-up investigation to the legendary Pepsi Challenge Experiment from 1975. Seeking the reason for the market dominance of Coca Cola despite the preference expressed by consumers for Pepsi during blind tests, he used fMRI techniques to the monitor brain activity of those drinking a range of soft drinks. Informing them beforehand of what they were imbibing, these testpersons presented increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex—the region responsible for cognitive tasks and the processing of emotions—during the drinking of Coca Cola. This was compared to the blind tests during which imaging techniques detected increased activity in the ventral putamen—the region responsible for taste—during the consumption of Pepsi. In short, the public preference for Coca Cola rested not on taste, but an emotional attachment to the brand, its logo, marketing colors, design, smell, childhood associations, the response to the adverts, and more. Product placement in trendy television programs has an even greater impact than short advertisements. The ubiquitous presence of Coca Cola during American Idol—the jury sat in a red studio on chairs made in the shape of a Coca Cola bottle and sipped the fizzy drink regularly whilst making constant reference to their enjoyment of the chosen beverage299— obscured all memory of the short 30-second adverts for other products broadcast during the course of the show. Questioned as to the presence of other brands, the viewers forgot not only Pepsi, but also unrelated brands 298 299

Ibid., 3. Lindstrom, Buyology, 41.

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such as Ford. The study concluded that viewers differentiate between the advertisers and the show, thus remembering only the products that had infiltrated the fabric of the television program. “Through subtle and brilliant integration Coke […] has painstakingly affiliated itself with the dreams, aspirations, and starry-eyed fantasies of potential idols. […] Unless the brand in question plays a fundamental part of the storyline, we won’t remember it, period.”300

A successful marketing campaign should seek to take advantage of the human proclivity to copy their peers. Working with this insight, the practitioners of “neuro-marketing” attempt to use the function of mirror neurons to their advantage. Scanning a number of testpersons from their target audience, researchers observed the level of activity registered in the frontal cortex and upper parietal lobes upon observation of a specific form of behavior and the sight of specific accessories. Working with the knowledge that human mimicry extends across a whole range of activities—comprising both what we see people doing and what we read about them doing—and incorporating the development of desire and need-perception as a result of this process, the researchers sought to measure and evaluate the strength of the attraction exerted on the limbic system (responsible for processing emotion) by the incidence of such stimuli. For instance, shop dummies send our brains the message that we too would look just as good in the clothes that they are modelling. This impression is reinforced when entering the shop by the odors which we sense and the greeting of an attractive sales assistant. When making the decision to buy the goods—sometimes made in less than two seconds— our brains secrete dopamine, a reward hormone spreading a feeling of well-being. Possession of a Gucci bag or a Porsche can also raise or promise to raise our social status. Those lunching in exclusive restaurants in which they meet the rich and famous acquire a feeling of self-importance through association. This explains the practice by gastronomic entrepreneurs of displaying the photographs of celebrity customers. The same mechanism is at work in celebrity endorsements. Possessing the same coffee machine as George Clooney or sporting a celebrity hairstyle somehow makes its imitator feel important.

300

Ibid., 50; 52.

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Propagating a sensation of freedom, shopping has become one of modern man’s most popular hobbies.301 Whilst a consensus focusing on the manipulated and, thus, alienated consumer is gaining increasing currency in Western Europe,302 Daniel Miller points to the ambiguous nature of this guilt-ridden activity.303 Shopping in a group or buying items for others can generate social warmth as both the givers and recipients of gifts attach positive emotions to the objects. Providing their owners with orientation and consolation in difficult circumstances, a “culture of possession” can help people to “endure loss and change.”304 The sudden loss of such an object on the other hand, can cause considerable grief.305 Viewing the matter from a sociological standpoint, Dominik Schrage writes of the socially mediating power of consumption and its function as a medium of “modern object-transmitted prosociality.”306 With its new standardized form of mass consumption, he sees that, characterized by boundless expectation, modern society promotes a hedonistic subjectivization in our response to contingency. This has also been reflected by the rediscovery of the “magic of objects in the historical sciences.”307 These considerations do not balance criticism of the waste involved in marketing and over-packaging our consumer durables and their inbuilt obsolescence. A further point of criticism is the way in which ordinary objects are presented. 301

Regarding “consumer freedom” see Gerhard Besier and Gerhard Lindemann, Im Namen der Freiheit: Die amerikanische Mission (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 188–91. See also Wolfgang Ullrich, Alles nur Konsum (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2013). 302 See e. g. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Kritik der Warenästhetik (Frankfurt/ M.: Suhrkamp, 2009), 157–58. 303 See Daniel Miller, Theory of Shopping (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); idem., The Dialectics of Shopping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 304 See Daniel Miller, The Comfort of Things (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2008), 294ff. From a historical perspective of culture see also Gudrun M. König, ed., Alltagsdinge: Erkundungen der materiellen Kultur, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Tübinger Vereinigung für Volkskunde, 2005); Udo Gößwald, Die Erbschaft der Dinge: Eine Studie zur subjektiven Bedeutung von Dingen der materiellen Kultur (Graz: Nausner & Nausner, 2011). 305 See Annette Schäfer, Wir sind, was wir haben: Die tiefere Bedeutung der Dinge für unser Leben (Munich: DVA, 2012), esp. 205ff. 306 Dominik Schrage, Die Verfügbarkeit der Dinge: Eine historische Soziologie des Konsums (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2009), 18. 307 See Museumsmagazin des Hauses der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 3 (2012): Geschichtenerzähler: Objekte im Museum.

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“The most run-of-the-mill utensils of everyday life—be they shoes, dresses, or pillows—are presented in such a ceremonious fashion as if they were a monstrance in a never-ending religious procession. Altars to each product transform the room into a temple of consumption […]. The mass storage of identical objects appears to enhance their status. The illumination of the rooms transforms the presentation into a flamboyant spectacle, in which wearerless belts, swimming trunks, scarves, and dresses engage with each other in a sensuous display of spectacular elegance. The lamp department is populated not by simple providers of light, but a magnificent heaven of myriad stars. Indeed, the world of the department store mutates into heaven on earth […].”308

Transporting its customers into a world of quasi-religious experience, the act of purchase becomes an escape from the difficult world of real existence. The Philosopher Michael J. Sandel from Harvard University, on the other hand, points to the consequences inherent in the unrestrained commodification of human existence and the ever-dwindling reserves of the unpurchasable. The result is the increasing role played by money in a number of areas of human existence.309 “At a time of rising inequality, the marketization of everything means that people of affluence and people of modest means lead increasingly separate lives. We live and work and shop and play in different places. Our children go to different schools. You might call it the skyboxification of American life. It’s not good for democracy, nor is it a satisfying way to live.”310 Vance Packard’s early criticism of the advertising industry focused predominantly on the existence and manipulative impact of “subliminal” advertising, the use of which was subject to a ban issued by the National Association of Broadcasting in June 1958.311 Despite such alarm, the American Psychological Association argued that its impact had been overestimated. In their judgment, subliminal advertising was “confused, ambiguous, and not as effective as traditional advertising.”312 Nevertheless, marketing experts still believe in the existence of messages that are effective below the level of our conscious perception and which exert an influence on our behavior. Lindstrom points to the seductive

308

Haug, Kritik der Warenästhetik, 157–58. See. Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012). 310 Ibid., 203. 311 Oscar Godbout, “Subliminal Ads Blocked on Coast,” New York Times, March 7, 1958, 49. 312 Quoted according to Lindstrom, Buyology, 69. 309

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scents sprayed in casinos, hotel rooms, airplanes, and cars in an attempt to influence our purchasing behavior. The European-wide ban on smoking in pubs and restaurants has led to the perception of a proliferation of less-appetizing odors by customers. Taking advantage of the new situation, Hendrik Schifferstein and his team conducted an odor experiment. Spraying the scents of orange, peppermint, and sea water in a disco, a survey showed that the pleasant smells improved both the mood of the dancers and their overall enjoyment of the evening.313 Second-long visual or acoustic stimuli can contain coded messages. Critics allege that a party political broadcast transmitted for the Republican Party during the elections of 2006 included subliminally-racist attacks on the African-American Democrat contender Harold Ford. Playing jungle drums every time he appeared, the broadcast concluded with the message “he’s just not right,” which could so very easily be misheard as “he’s just not white.”314 Studies have demonstrated how, if shown even for microseconds, positive terms broadcast in conjunction with smiling people can have a positive effect on viewers, strengthening them in their resolve to take risks. Negative terms and unhappy-looking people, on the other hand, have the very opposite effect and hold people back from action.315 Applied to purchasing behavior, our emotions can be influenced by the associations given to objects. Displaying a brand of perfume in a Parisian or New York setting can, for instance, generate the impression of sophistication. Such subliminal messaging can appropriate a variety of dreams, fears, and needs with which the product is now associated. Indeed, brands often develop a consistent sub-plot, making smokers crave the cigarette of a particular brand when entering a bar. Associated with the glamorous worlds of Formula 1 (Marlborough) or desert adventure (Camel produces both cigarettes and outdoor wear), the adverts suggest that purchase of a requisite brand of cigarette holds the potential to bring a whole new way of life. The reverse is also true. Tobacco sponsoring in Formula 1 associates smoking cigarettes with the cold-blooded, youthful, dynamic and highspeed world316 of motor-car racing. Merely the sight of the company logo 313

See Hendrik N. J. Schifferstein, Katrin S. S. Talke, and Dirk-Jan Oudshoorn, “Can Ambient Scent Enhance the Nightlife Experience?,” Chemosensory Perception 4 (2011): 55–64. 314 See Lindstrom, Buyology, 74–75. 315 Ibid., 75–76. 316 Ibid., 87.

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on the team overalls stimulates the need for a cigarette. Studies have shown that a five minute display of the requisite images—a red Ferrari or a view of the Rockies—activates the nucleus accumbens more strongly than a five minute advertisement.317 Its association with Formula 1 makes smoking appear manly, virile, powerful, and skilful. Unfolding subconsciously, this entire procedure is impervious to any mechanism of protection. In 2012, seeking to counter the ever-expanding anti-smoking campaign, the tobacco manufacturer Philip Morris International launched a world-wide campaign beginning with the slogan “Don’t be a Maybe— Be Marlboro,” suggesting that only the timid and risk-averse avoid smoking. Many consumer associations and government authorities saw this campaign as infringing existing legislation on tobacco advertising. Reacting to such criticism, Phillip Morris suspended the direct campaign in Germany, yet retained its indirect campaign, displaying the offending text but not linking it to the product.318 Instead, the billboards continued in the easily-identifiable Marlboro font: “Maybe never fell in love,” “Maybe never feels free,” or “Maybe never wrote a song.” Addressing deep-seated irrational yearnings in the pleasure center of the brain, this campaign matches anything offered up by the anti-smoking movement, however stark its message. The cultural sociologist Andreas Reckwitz has identified a close alliance of art and economics in what he calls “late modernity.”319 Consumer durables—whether mobile telephones or SUVs—are no longer valued for their practicality alone, but are viewed as the products of creative processes seen as “lifestyle choices.” The capitalist creative aesthetic is thus seen as generating feelings and enabling an individual identity in an increasingly homogenous society. Turning the established practice of the 1960s on its head, the avant-garde no longer feeds an anticapitalist counter culture, but has made its peace with mammon. Now firmly in pursuit of profit, advertising, fashion, and design have re-branded themselves as the “creative industries” and as such, a part of standardized society. Conforming to social expectation, the consumers of these supposedly creative processes fill their lives with their vacuous products, achieving only an empty and near-universal uniformity.

317

Ibid., 83–84. See the report in the Frankfurter Rundschau from July 27, 2012. See also Eva Berendsen, “Generation Vielleichtsager,” FAZ, no 31 from February 6, 2013, N3. 319 See Andreas Reckwitz, Die Erfindung der Kreativität (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012). 318

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As had many before him, Martin Lindstrom discovered that people value rituals and superstition for the feeling of security which they impart. The former German Government Minister Theodor zu Guttenberg gained popularity because his aristocratic confidence made him look like a minister. Compared to his colleagues—many unsure of themselves and apparently out of place—he looked like a minister because he acted like a minister, and made people trust him. Daily rituals give us a feeling of control. Dressing for the occasion, holding to the precepts of superstition, adopting a mascot; all these prepare us to face any challenge. Habit is also highly reassuring and is often exploited by advertisers. Nokia, the Finnish manufacturer of mobile telephones became very unpopular in Germany after announcing its intention to relocate all its companies to Romania. Habit nevertheless, prevented the German consumer from switching to another producer. Mealtime ritual also imparts a feeling of well-being. Breakfast cereals are sold in the context of the family breakfast; rum is shown as the staple intake of young attractive people on a Caribbean island. The customer buys the setting, not the product. The seasonal availability of certain objects or the restricted availability of certain gifts (often marketed as sets to be collected) is a common trick to give brands a novelty value and increase sales. The production of certain series means that whole generations of little girls are brought up with the articles from ‘Hello Kitty.’ Another tactic is to suggest the time of day at which to enjoy a product. The time at which a certain brand of chocolate peppermint slices is to be consumed—not before eight p.m.—is even indicated by their name. Martin Lindstrom argues that “almost every leading religion has 10 common pillars underlying its foundation: a sense of belonging, a clear vision, power over enemies, sensory appeal, storytelling, grandeur, evangelism, symbols, mystery, and rituals.”320 The reach and impact of easily recognizable cult brands, such as Coca Cola, Harley-Davidson, Ferrari, and Apple are achieved by similar mechanisms, activating the same brain areas as those stimulated by religious messages. What the rosary is to a Roman Catholic, is iPod to the Apple fan. This explains the extensive borrowing by advertisers from the sphere of the religious. Confronted by an endless range of shampoos and other toiletries, our choice is usually made within a number of seconds. Far from a conscious decision, such choices involve the application of what Damasio terms

320

Lindstrom, Buyology, 111.

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somatic markers,321 the connection of a diverse range of experiences and associations which trigger an emotional reaction. Whilst childhood memories—remembering its particular form—move some to purchase Palmolive out of nostalgia,322 others are attracted to Chanel by their romantic image of Paris. Advertisers deliberately place these somatic markers in our consciousness, often combining incompatible elements so as to make them even more memorable. In view of the multiplicity of sensory information with which we are bombarded on a daily basis, our attention is often captured only by the very most shocking of developments. Martin Lindstrom writes of a bank in Eastern Europe, which seeking to gain attention, redecorated all of its branches pink and clothed its staff in the same color. Although meeting with uniform rejection on aesthetic grounds, customers associated the design with the color of a child’s piggy bank, thus engendering almost absolute trust.323 Having generated so much attention, the bank was eventually able to reduce its marketing outlay by almost a half. A number of somatic markers are based either on fear, or the promise of pain avoidance. The majority of parents would buy almost anything to help their children. In contrast to the range of awful products advertised in the 1950s, such as cod liver oil, contemporary advertising praise products promising increased vitality, a lengthened attention span, and other advantages as well as a tasty flavor. Forced to deal with a world full of stimuli, advertisers have come to rely on a combination of different sensory stimuli known as multi-sensory branding concentrating on odors and noise and the considerable impact they exert on our emotions. Smelling involves the speedy transfer of molecules from the olfactory mucosa to the limbic system, an area of the brain controlling feelings, memories, and well-being.324 The brand of Penaten creams work with a specific combination of picture and scent. Studies have shown that their characteristic vanilla scent activate the medial orbitofrontal cortex, the area of the brain stimulated by the

321

See Antonio R. Damasio, “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex,” Transactions of the Royal Society 351 (1996): 1413–20; idem, Looking for Spinoza (Orlando: Harcourt, 2003); idem., The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). 322 See Lindstrom, Brandwashed, 131ff. 323 Lindstrom, Buyology, 137–38. 324 See Regine Dee and Hanns Hatt, Das Maiglöckchen-Phänomen: Alles über das Riechen und wie es unser Leben bestimmt (Munich: Piper, 2008).

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perception of pleasant things.325 The right piriform cortex (responsible for smell) and the amygdala (emotions) are also activated. In view of this constellation, the olfactory impression probably improves our memories of the object and the associated images of our childhood or parenthood. An unpleasant odor activates the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex, a region of the brain connected to antipathy and distaste. The first reaction from visitors to institutions of the former GDR is to remark on the distinct and peculiar smell—the odor of the GDR. Far from being a figment of their imagination, the floors of all public buildings in the GDR were polished with a specific substance, which not only emitted a distinctive and penetrating smell, but which remains over decades. Exorcising the GDR would have necessitated removing the linoleum in the corridors. A similar mechanism is active in the brain of a Catholic presented with the smell of incense, triggering memories of the masses of years past and any personal events, which may have accompanied them. Sounds perform a similar function in our memories. They are often associated with specific images that can be used in advertising and play an important part in our private lives. The mechanism is also manifested in the phenomenon in which a song becomes “stuck in our head.” Restaurants and shopping departments play such music to address our emotions. Film melodies, for example, recall associated scenes. The impact of this mechanism relies on the consumer being confronted with the advertisement on a regular basis. Only the things featuring regularly in our lives become congenial. Discovering this “mere exposure effect” in 1968, the psychologist Robert B. Zajonc found that people judge things more positively as they come into contact with them more often.326 Newscasters profit from the impact of such mechanisms; their popularity increases through their regular presence in our living rooms. Our sense of feeling also exerts an influence on buying behavior. With the touching a product having been demonstrated as conducive to making a purchase, retailers have moved to placing clothes and books on small tables so as to facilitate this mechanism. When looking for technical 325

See Lindstrom, Buyology, 144–45. See Robert B. Zajonc, “Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (1968): 1–27. See also Robert F. Bornstein, “Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-analysis of Research, 1968–1987,” Psychological Bulletin 106 (1989): 265–89; Xiang Fang, Surenda Singh, and Rohini Ahluwalia, “An Examination of Different Explanations for the Mere Exposure Effect,” Journal of Consumer Research 34 (2007): 97–103; Martina Jakesch andClaus-Christian Carbon, “The Mere Exposure Effect in the Domain of Haptics,” PLoS ONE 7, no. 2 (February 8, 2012): e31215. 326

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objects, we hold them to assess their weight. Heavy objects are often taken as being robust; light hi-tech instruments as being of high quality. Manufacturers incorporate such considerations in their design strategy. Remote controls are made artificially heavier so as to increase consumer confidence.327 Our emotions are also (often subconsciously) subject to influence by color. Associating red with luxury, sensuality, and femininity, Sony launched a silver-pink laptop aimed at female customers. Indeed, color can increase market-recognition by up to 80 per cent.328 Form can also exert an influence—the shape taken by the Coca Cola or Perrier bottle suggests quality. Despite a wide-spread belief in the mantra that “sex sells”—up to a fifth of advertising presents a sexual message329—there is no evidence to suggest that goods increase in attractiveness through this strategy. Instead, a number of studies suggest that the interest generated by the advertising distracts from the product being sold.330 Whilst the increasingly explicit nature of Calvin Klein advertisements seems to have paid off, many believe that the controversy—and thus attention which they generate—has a greater impact than their actual content. Many studies have found that ordinary people have a greater advertising impact than models. Enabling a higher degree of identification and transmitting a more authentic message, an ever-increasing number of campaigns focus on placing their product in an atmosphere that resembles the viewer’s life. Whilst this strategy suits articles of everyday use, many luxury products are still easier to sell through the suggestion of the exquisite and exceptional. The dual strategy of “normal and beautiful” will probably continue. The high value placed on rarity and uniqueness leads many companies to follow the strategy of scarcity. Releasing a restricted number of goods, consumers are attracted to the cachet of exclusivity they imply. The apogee of this approach involves the creation of single objects, such as a single dress no other woman owns.331 The human equivalent of this 327

Lindstrom, Buyology, 154. Ibid., 157. 329 See Tom Reichert and Jaqueline Lambiase, eds., Sex in Advertising: Perspectives on the Erotic Appeal (Mahwah, NJ.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2003). 330 See Lindstrom, Buyology, 181–82.; see also idem, Brandwashed, 79ff. 331 Regarding the phenomenon of reactance, i.e. the attractiveness of the rare or forbidden, see Jack W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance (New York: Academic Press, 1966); idem., et al., “The Attractivness of an Eliminated Choice Alternative,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 2 (1966): 301–13; 328

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strategy is manifested in the creation of a unique and highly trendy individual. Once established, this person is then deployed as a carrier of popular aspiration and a highly-effective medium for advertising. David Beckham and Boris Becker serve such a role. Marketing every aspect of their lives, they move from sector to sector in order to sell various products.332

Matthew T. Crawford, et al., “Reactance, Compliance, and Anticipated Regret,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002), 56–63; Anca M. Miron and Jack W. Brehm, “Reactance Theory—40 Years Later,” Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie 37 (2006): 9–18; Hans-Otto Schenk, Psychologie im Handel (Munich and Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2007). 332 See Boris Becker’s homepage, accessed July 19, 2013, http://www.borisbecker.tv/lifestyle.html.

CHAPTER FIVE RELIGION AS A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON: FROM THE “SUPPOSEDLY ACTUAL” TO A “PRETEND WORLD”1 “If scholars were to pursue natural histories of religions instead of campaigns for the truth of a particular religion disguised as history, then we might well see religions take their proper and rightful place among the many human artefacts designed to tell our species’ stories.” Gary Lease (2000)2

Christian faith and the function of religion Practicing Christians explain both their own lives and the nature of reality as a whole from the perspective of the biblical message. To a certain extent, “Holy Scripture” provides them with a model of interpretation, the inter-textual insight with which to perceive, understand, and classify natural experience.3 Shaped by biblical ideas and Church practice, this sub-cultural perspective on the world appears to Christians to represent the whole of existence. Things which appear as strange, foreign, or even bizarre to the outsider are usually entirely self-evident to

1

Regarding this chapter, see Gerhard Besier, “Religiöse Phänomene und ihre Geschichte als Gegenstand anthropologischer, psychologischer und biologischer Forschung,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte 106 (2013): 115–142. 2 Gary Lease, “Follow the Genes: Religion as a Survival Strategy,” in Secular Theories on Religion: Current Perspectives, ed. Tim Jensen and Mikael Rothstein (Copenhagen, 2000): 107–116; 115. 3 See Gerhard Besier, Kirche, Politik und Gesellschaft im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 89ff.

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Christians.4 They are fully prepared to accept the virgin birth, the Trinity consisting of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the resurrection, the forgiveness of sin and other topoi of Christian doctrine. “Commitments to one’s social group need to be irrational and clearly specific to that group. Counterfactual religious beliefs accomplish this.”5 Those Christians, who see the results of the 18th century Enlightenment and the 19th and 20th century theological school of historical criticism as preventing the pursuit of affirmative religious practice, now prefer to emphasize the positive functions of religion, which find expression in their fundamental ethical-political values. From their liberal perspective, they value the high level of historical and intellectual development reached by Christianity and maintain that their religion can make an important contribution to human coexistence in our modern world. Thus, it is important, so they argue, to ensure that Christianity retains its firm place in our culture.6 “[…] Theology, interpreted as the cultural science of Christianity, is presented as a superior form of religious studies.”7 In doing so, no one questions the conditions under which religions are produced. They leave the question open as to why religion plays a part in human history. Has religion truly been the companion of the human species since the point at which it developed self-consciousness? This and other similar questions do not concern the well-researched religiohistorical perspective,8 but rather the social and biological parameters, which under certain specific circumstances, serve to transform the Homo sapiens into Homo religiosus.9 Religion as the subject of scientific research—this is the topic to which we now turn. 4

See Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 297. 5 William Irons, “Why People Believe (What Other People See as) Crazy Ideas,” in The Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, & Critiques, ed. Joseph Bulbulia, et al. (Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press, 2008), 51–57; 55. 6 See Besier, Kirche, Politik und Gesellschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, 15–16; 44–45. 7 Thus Ulrich H. J. Körtner, “Gott und Gehirn—Neurophysiologische Herausforderungen für die Theologie,” in Hirnforschung und Menschenbild, ed. Christian Ammer and Andreas Lindemann (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 115–48; 117. 8 See e.g. Peter Antes, Grundriss der Religionsgeschichte: Von der Prähistorie bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006); Hans G. Kippenberg, Jörg Rüpke, and Kocku von Stuckrad, eds., Europäische Religionsgeschichte: Ein mehrfacher Pluralismus, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009). 9 See Jay R. Feierman, The Biology of Religious Behavior: The Evolutionary Origins of Faith and Religion (Santa Barbara: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, 2009).

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Self-awareness, the awareness of death and religion Religiosity appears to be a constitutive part of our anthropological makeup. Traces of magical conceptions or—as some would say—religious expression, are to be found for example in pre-historic burial rituals.10 Death cults and funerary artefacts enable us to draw conclusions about both the way of life and belief systems of their practitioners. Their religious development went hand in hand with cultural evolution and its tradition. Religious actions also began with individual experiences that were adopted by others and handed down over generations. This cultural heritage rendered its practitioners “immortal” in a new fashion. In contrast to animals, people attain immortality through the ideas they propagate at the point at which their ideas are incorporated into a group’s collective experience and memory, its meme pool.11 The continued human desire for cultural immortality is rooted in the value of collective experience for the survival of one’s own group. As a result, cultural achievements also have significance for human survival. Simple survival and genetic-cultural reproduction does not satisfy the inherent human desire for personal survival and immortality. Passing on our genetic and cultural heritage is not enough: we seek personal immortality in the form of everlasting, healthy bodily existence. The postulate for this unquenchable yearning for life without end was the development of self-consciousness, the Ichbewusstsein, and later, consciousness of mortality. According to a widespread theory, this perception of life and death is probably the most important impetus for the development of religiosity. The consciousness of mortality was without doubt the most painful discovery that we, as a species, have made. The fact that other people die, are killed, or are dead has engaged mankind for thousands of years. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, man established rituals and religions, as the death of another had implications for oneself.12 If others die, so can

10

See Rüdiger Vaas and Michael Blume, Warum Glaube nützt: Die Evolution der Religiosität (Stuttgart: Hirzel, 2009), 17–18. Thomas Junker and Sabine Paul, Der Darwin-Code: Die Evolution erklärt unser Leben (Munich: Beck, 2009), 183. The authors do not interpret the existence of Neanderthal burial sites as evidence of religious belief; rather see them as a location of memory. 11 See Junker and Paul, Der Darwin-Code, 141. 12 See Regina von Brück, Michael von Brück, Leben in der Kraft der Rituale: Religion in Indien (Munich: Beck, 2011).

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we.13 The inevitable question—what next?—resulting from this insight could very possibly have produced the belief in transcendence. The need for comfort and a hope of life after death probably constituted the single largest impetus for the development of religious ideas. Raising the question of our origins automatically brings us to address the more pressing matter of our eventual destination and man’s place in the universe.14 This process has a further aspect: the death of a friend or close relation generates two competing feelings. The emotional yearning for closeness to the deceased and the inborn revulsion at the corpse need to be reconciled and overcome by complicated ceremonies.15 The deceased lives on in our memory as a virtual person; language effectively enables us to keep him alive as a sort of narrative virtual person. The impossibility of a real, corrective encounter with the deceased enables the memory of the person to assume potentially unbounded proportions, thus strengthening “our yearnings or our dreads.”16 Such or similar mechanisms produce systems of ancestor worship. Objecting to the monocausal nature of such arguments, the anthropologist Pascal Boyer pointed to a disparate variety of explanations for the phenomenon of religion involving complex neurological cognitive inference systems. Only subsequent consideration of this complex 13 Cf. Jesse M. Bering, Carlos Hernández Blasi, and David F. Bjorklund, “The Development of ‘Afterlife’ Beliefs in Religiously and Secularly Schooled Children,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 23 (2005): 587–607. “Although children attending Catholic school were generally more likely to state that functions continue after death than children attending secular school, the patterns of change with regard to question type did not differ between the Catholic and secular groups. The results were interpreted as reflecting the combined roles of religious instruction/exposure and universal ontogeny of cognitive abilities on the development of children’s afterlife beliefs” (ibid. 587). 14 See Antonio R. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 291–92. 15 See against that William W. McCorkle, Jr., “Memes, Genes, and Dead Machines: Evolutionary Anthropology of Death and Burial,” in Joseph Abdul Bulbulia, et al. The Evolution of Religion (Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press, 2008), 287–92. “It is possible that certain biological inferences concerning contamination from dead bodies may have been plausible from an early period of humans; however, these inferences appear to have taken other more salient forms, rather than by smell and taste. Empirical evidence suggest that humans make inferences about dead bodies being dangerous based on mental systems that handle agency and predation, rather than inferences about toxicity.” Ibid., 290. 16 See Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking, 2006), 114.

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experience brings us humans to consider them as representing the truth. As such, he does not view religion as a psychological reaction to mortality. Indeed, only after this stage has been reached it is possible to speak of the functions which religious concepts perform; the question makes no sense if posed at the beginning of the process. “Our spontaneous explanations are meant to lead us from the One (religion’s origin) to the Many (the current plurality of religious ideas). […] it seems sensible to assume that a ‘one thing led to many things’ scenario is opposite for cultural phenomena.”17 A capacity for feats of complex reasoning enables man to develop extensive concepts based on only fragmentary information. Far from random, the structure of the conclusions reached in this process are the product of a mental disposition and cognitive models through which the information fragments are filtered, ordered, and processed. Whatever the content of our perceptions, the brain organizes memories of them, and reaches conclusions based upon them in broadly similar ways. This is an important factor in explaining the propensity of people with differing experiences to reach similar conclusions. Participants in something resembling a “mental epidemic,”18 they develop similar forms of religious concepts and norms based on different patterns of information. It is this basic mental model, a template of religious concepts, that brings unconnected individuals to develop similar concepts on the basis of limited information. This process is assisted by the character of religion as a cultural phenomenon and the intensive level of communication between the adherents which it involves. People prefer conceptions of faith that engage the greatest possible number of nodes in our mental system— emotional, cognitive, social, and behavioral. This is compounded by the tendency to work with “mental recipes” combining familiar aspects with surprises that many people display. “If we understand what these recipes are, what ingredients are put together and how they are processed, we will understand why some types of concepts are found in so many religious traditions and others are not.”19 Everyday run-of-the-mill events are unsuitable as the material with which to form a religious world view. Requiring events experienced as truly extraordinary, these “raw materials of religion” need to be not only exceptional, but concrete enough to be the subject of testimony. Christianity was born at a time during which many spoke of and even claimed to have experienced resurrection; indeed, Lazarus had been dead 17

Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained, 32. Ibid., 47. 19 Ibid., 54. 18

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for four days. The resurrection of Christ is also said to have been corroborated by a number of independent witnesses. Religious concepts can be explained as the product of the processing of incomplete evidence through a cognitively incomplete system. Human mortality is a real fact of life, but we all hope or expect to live long lives with those we love.20 Flying in the face of the fact of death, such hopes maintain the concept of life. This desire to reconcile life and death requires an entirely new ontological category. Faced with this conundrum, Christianity developed the concept of a man, who although highly similar to us in his status as a person, is at the same time radically different. His potential to fulfil our deepest wishes is held in the promise of his own experience of death and resurrection. That this story has been passed on in a number of authentic reports makes this story believable. A similar mechanism is played out in the doctrine of the virgin birth. Involving the familiar categories of “woman” and “birth,” it introduces a new and transcendent element exceeding and indeed at variance with our experience. Although contradicting conventional ontological experience and despite their counter-intuitive nature, religious concepts can shed their foreign appearance to assume a semblance of familiarity. Both Christians and Muslims accept the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient companion, dispensing council, punishment, and reward. Invisible, yet directly accessible through prayer, this being can also be reached by intermediaries, such as saints or the mother of God, who are both closer to the Father and more accessible to ordinary humans. Their existence on another plane of existence makes it plausible for many to pray in front of their graven images. The method of communication with these superior beings—a dream or trance—although extraordinary, is taken as an entirely “natural” process. The decisive factor in the maintenance of religiosity is the capacity of the mind to process stimuli in such a way as to create specific perceptions. The result of these perceptions is the formation of a system of faith regarding the events of personal experience. Those involved have no difficulty in exploding accepted ontological categories in order to maintain their credulity. Mary remains a woman, but one capable of bearing a child without first conceiving in the conventional way. Our mind busies itself in the search for a plausible story with which to frame the information 20

See John Gray, The Immortalization Commission: Science and the Strange Quest to Cheat Death (London: Allen Lane, 2011). The author describes the methodologies used to overcome death in a “scientific” fashion and “invent” immortality.

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fragments that correspond to our intuitive expectations. Mary’s biological exceptionality means that her child must also be something special, yet, in some sense, still a person. Mary was exceptionally well-suited to fulfill a further role—a figure that can be identified with and appropriated across culture and time. Her suffering over and compassion for her crucified son is immediately comprehensible to all people, generating both admiration and trusting identification.21 “Successful” religions are based on a very few ontological categories and a highly-restricted catalogue of supernatural patterns.22 Thus, the category “person” can be represented with the following non-intuitive models: a specific physical characteristic (gods), special biological characteristics (gods do not die), and other special characteristics (the ability to hear, see, and know everything). Animals and objects, e.g. bleeding statues, can also have such patterns attributed to them. Studies have shown that listeners remember stories that transcend customary ontology due to their surprising nature.23 The story of Mary provides the best possible combination of cognitive markers—a woman bore a child without any prior sexual experience. Such a striking, yet simple form of ontological transgression explains our readiness to pray to her. Multiple breaches of the laws of physics would overstep the mark and place the doctrine beyond the bounds of credulity. The teachings of institutionalized religion, such as those regarding God, tend to diverge from popular conceptions. A study by Justin Barret found that when questioned, people provided a response which, although conforming to mainstream religious teaching that God was able to do many things simultaneously, contradicted their own personal expectations. When recounting two episodes in which God had provided assistance, they provided the episode with a diachronic structure—God performed the first act before attending to the second.24 Their non-dogmatic version of events streamed God into a very human pattern, making him conform to their intuitive expectations. “When the task allows for conscious monitoring,

21

See Miri Rubin, Emotion and Devotion: The Meaning of Mary in Medieval Religious Cultures (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2009) esp. 37; 98–99. 22 See against this Andrew Shtulman, “Variation in the Anthropomorphization of Supernatural Beings and Its Implications for Cognitive Theories of Religion,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 34 (2008): 1123–38. 23 See Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained, 80–81. 24 See Justin L. Barret, “Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion,” Trends in Cognitive Science 4 (2000): 29–34. See also idem, Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief (New York: Free Press, 2012).

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we get the theological version; when the task requires fast access, we get the anthropomorphic version.”25

Primates, social-moral codes of behavior and the phenomenon of altruism Is human morality and its associated ethical systems the product of religion? The biologist Marc Hauser argues for the existence of a subconscious and hereditary neurological mechanism that prescribes what is right and wrong.26 He sees that environmental factors merely influence the character of this instinct.27 Anthropoid apes are not only capable of communication through sounds, gestures, and mime,28 but follow social rules.29 Moreover, their behavior is influenced by culture30 and personality.31 Morality, as the evolutionary biologist Frans de Waal insists, arises from compassion for others and is part of a natural set of basic rules, which have developed in a sequence of small steps.32 Social hierarchies and rules impart a sense of fairness and reciprocity and have themselves developed from an 25

Boyer, Religion Explained, 89. Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (New York: Ecco, 2006). 27 Regarding the culture of pity see Rüdiger Zill, “Zivilisationsbruch mit Zuschauer: Gestalter des Mitgefühls,” Berliner Debatte Initial 17 (2006): 61–72. 28 See Anne Rousson and Kristin Andrews, “Orangutan Pantomime: Elaborating the Message,” Biology Letters 7 (2010): 627–30. 29 See Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behaviour (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986). 30 See Michael Krützen, Erik P. Willems, and Carel P. van Schaik, “Culture and Geographic Variation in Orangutan Behavior,” Current Biology 21 (2011): 1808– 12. The authors demonstrate that a quarter of behavioral patterns were not genetically determined, but the product of cultural transmission. Thus, “cultural plasticity” is a phenomenon which both man and primates share. 31 “Research into primate personality and social relationships,” Freie Universität Berlin, accessed July 28, 2012, http://www.primate-personality.net/de/index.htm. 32 Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also idem., The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Harmony Books, 2009). The author regards biology as “our greatest [ethical] hope… One can only shudder at the thought that the humaneness of our societies would depend on the whims of politics, culture, or religion. Ideologies come and go, but human nature is here to stay.” (Ibid., 45). See also Rolf Degen, Das Ende des Bösen (Munich: Piper, 2007). The author demonstrates that social behavior and moral standards are both the product of evolution. 26

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evolutionary process of social standard-formation. Humans share this “moral sense” with the anthropoid apes.33 The genotype of the orangutan is 97 per cent identical with the human.34 Indeed, biologists have been able to demonstrate that both species are able to learn reciprocity and both display rational, futureoriented behavior.35 As Christina M. Gomes and Christophe Boesch were able to demonstrate, female chimpanzees copulated more often with those males who reliably shared their kill with them. Behavioral biologists also showed that chimpanzees not only have the ability to incorporate concepts of the past and future in their pattern of thought, but that such considerations influenced their present behavior.36 Studying the treatment by chimpanzees of dead or dying members of their group, James Anderson and his team at the University of Stirling concluded that they exhibited a pronounced awareness of death and its implications.37 In the days prior to a death, the group paid great attention to a dying group member, treating her with tenderness and maintaining an atmosphere of calm. Hours before the death, they were especially tender and groomed the dying chimpanzee carefully. After death, the group members withdrew from the corpse, leaving it in the ‘care’ of its daughter, who cleaned it thoroughly. Afterwards, the group avoided the area in which the female had died. “Chimpanzees show self-awareness, empathy, and cultural variations in many behaviors,” the authors comment and pose the question: “are humans uniquely aware of mortality? We propose that chimpanzees’ awareness of death has been underestimated […].”38

33

As Katharina Hamann and her team have demonstrated, in contrast to chimpanzees, three-year-old humans have developed a sense of justice which they share with others. Hamann et al. assume that practices of fair sharing have developed in the course of evolution because in contrast to primates, humans were dependent on a cooperative approach to hunting and the sharing of its fruits. See Katharina Hamann, et al., “Collaboration Encourages Equal Sharing in Children But Not in Chimpanzees,” Nature 476 (2011): 328–31. 34 See Devin P. Locke, et al., “Comparative and Demographic Analysis of OrangUtan Genomes,” Nature 469 (2011): 529–33. 35 See Valerie Dufour, et al., “Calculated Reciprocity After All: Computation Behind Token Transfers in Orang-Utans,” Biology Letters 5 (2009): 172–75. 36 Christina M. Gomes and Christophe Boesch, “Wild Chimpanzees Exchange Meat for Sex on a Long-Term Basis,” PLoS One 4, no. 4 (2009): e5116, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0005116 (April 8, 2009). 37 See James R. Anderson, Alasdair Gillis, and Louise C. Lock, “Pan Thanatology,” Current Biology 20 (2010): R349–R351. 38 Ibid.

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In clear contrast, Antonio Damasio differentiates between “promoral behaviors, such as kin altruism and reciprocal altruism,” and higher ethical-moral rule-systems. Identifying the existence of the first at a time “that nature had long been exhibiting prior to the emergence of reflective selves,” the latter is interpreted as a social-cultural homeostatic answer to biological imbalances.39 Social biologists tend not to accept the existence of a society of social altruists;40 simulations—such as those of martial societies—demonstrate that inner cooperation and altruism are eminently combinable with hostility towards outsiders. An open society, in contrast, tends to pair egoistical behavior with tolerance.41 Writing in 2000, the social biologists Manfred Milinski and Claus Wedekind presented an interesting hypothesis to explain altruism in humans: bringing augmented social standing, it confers advantages at a later point.42 Such a prospect leads people to suppress their egoistic instincts and decide on a path of cooperation. The proponents of this thesis do not believe in the existence of “true altruism.”43 Hoping to glean—at least indirect—advantages from apparently selfless behavior in terms of greater group standing, such behavior is contingent on the increase in status. Once the actor feels that he would be better served by egotistical behavior, he reverts. Martin Nowak goes so far as to present a concern for self-image and the ability for cooperation which it produces as a decisive evolutionary factor on a par with mutation and selection.44 For his part, Jörg Wettlaufer assumes the existence of a hereditary fear of suffering a bad reputation. Accordingly, transgression expressed in unfairness, avarice or self-serving behavior triggers shame and the corresponding physiological reaction—

39

See Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 291. 40 See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3–4. 41 See Holly Arrow, “The Sharp End of Altruism,” Science 318 (2007): 581–82. 42 Claus Wedekind and Manfred Milinski, “Cooperation Through Image Scoring in Humans,” Science 288 (2000): 850–52. 43 But see also Adam Grant, Give and Take: A Revolutionary Approach to Success (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2013); Sonja Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness (New York: Penguin Press, 2007). 44 Referring to the effectiveness of natural selection as “The Greatest Show on Earth,” see Richard Dawkins, The Greatest Show on Earth (London: Bantam, 2009); see also RSG 2 (2006): Kreationismus vs. Evolution; see also Martin Nowak and Roger Highfield, SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed (New York: Free Press, 2011).

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blushing.45 Wettlaufer views shame as a mechanism to ensure cooperation; shameless people exhibit an evolutionary disadvantage.46 A partner to our biological makeup, the cultural setting also plays its part in this behavior through its development of open punishments for transgressors of social norms and standards. Public exposure is designed to act as a deterrent to anti-social behavior. Prosocial behavior would appear to confer evolutionary advantages. Martin Reuter and his team found that the possession of a specific variation of the COMT gene predisposes half of the world’s population to prosocial behavior.47 Discovered 15 years ago, the two types of this gene, COMT-Val and COMT-Met, contain the “construction manual” for an enzyme that activates neuro-transmitters, such as dopamine, itself involved in the control of social behavior and associated with positive emotions.48 Those possessing the COMT-Val variation display a greater effectiveness of enzyme activation at rates of up to four times the average. Those with COMT-Val variations were twice as likely to make charitable donations as those with the COMT-Met variation. Those who have suffered specific damage to the basolateral amygdala following Urbach-Wiethe disease exhibit impulsive altruism and willing cooperation. Studying this phenomenon, Christoph Eisenegger and his team concluded that egoistic behavior must first be learnt through social interaction, a cognitive act requiring the basolateral amygdala.49 Frans De Waal sees a certain irony in the use of moral principles as weapon against enemy groups. “[…] our noblest achievement— 45

See Jörg Wettlaufer, “Evolutionäre und pädagogische Aspekte des sozialen Schamgefühls: Zum sozialen Gebrauch von Emotionen im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit am Beispiel der Schand- und Ehrenstrafen,” in Neue Pädagogik und alte Gehirne? Erziehung und Bildung in evolutionstheoretischer Sicht, ed. Julia Kurig and Alfred K. Treml (Münster: Lit, 2008), 237–48. 46 Sören Krach and Frieder Paulus used imaging techniques to demonstrate that vicarious embarrassment activates the same areas of the brain as those involved in reacting to the physical pain of others. See Sören Krach and Frieder Paulus “Your Flaws Are My Pain: Linking Empathy to Vicarious Embarrassment,” PLoS ONE 6, no 4 (2011): e18675, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018675. 47 See Martin Reuter, et al., “Investigating the Genetic Basis of Altruism: The Role of the COMT Val158Met Polymorphism,” Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience (October 28, 2010): 1–7. 48 See Chapter 4, “Sexuality and love” and “How emotions control our consumption behavior”. 49 See Jack van Honk, Christoph Eisenegger, David Terburg, Dan J. Stein, and Barak Morgan, “Generous Economic Investments After Basolateral Amygdala Damage,” PNAS, January 22, 2013.

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morality—has evolutionary ties to our basest behavior—warfare. The sense of community required by the former was provided by the latter.”50 Although locating consciousness at the pinnacle of human evolution—as it enables us to assume the perspective of others51—such biologistic observations remind mankind of its natural and characteristic dispositions. Not only opening opportunities, they mark our dependencies and limits.52 When moral certainties appear to lack legitimacy, man feels the need for and develops superior moral authorities. This was the birth-hour of religious authority.53 In a series of thought experiments, Marc Hauser established the greater weight attached in our inherent moral systems to acts of commission in comparison with those of omission. As a result, we exhibit a greater reluctance to harm others through action than inaction. This explains why the majority of people are fence-sitters. Although Hauser believes in the possibility of overcoming this disposition through cultural programming,54 as the psychologist Manfred Spitzer has pointed out, much time is required to learn social skills and morality.55 The completion of the process of myeslinisation of the neuro-fibres to and from the frontal cortex in late puberty means that moral values take some time to learn.56 This produces the marked tendency to a combination of passivity and cautious experimentation.

50

Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers, 55. Regarding the stages of development of the consciousness and its functions up to the arrival of Homo sapiens, see Merlin Donald, The Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (New York and London: Norton, 2001), 149ff. See also Josef Perner, Susan R. Leekam, and Heinz Wimmer, “Three-Year-Olds’ Difficulty With False Belief: The Case for a Conceptual Deficit,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 5 (1987): 125–37. 52 See Junker and Paul, Darwin Code; Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of Evolution (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004). 53 See Boyer, Religion Explained, esp, 329ff. See also Geoffrey Miller, Spent: Sex, Evolution and Consumer Behavior (New York: Viking, 2009). The author argues that the behavior of Homo sapiens in the modern world is subject to considerable influence by early evolutionary stages. 54 See Hauser, Moral Minds. 55 Se: Manfred Spitzer, Lernen: Gehirnforschung und die Schule des Lebens (Heidelberg: Spektrum, 2002), 339ff. Regarding the role of the brain in processing the data flow during social learning, see Timothy E. J. Behrens, et al., “Associative Learning of Social Value,” Nature 456 (2008): 245–49. 56 See Larry Squire, et al., eds., Fundamental Neuroscience (Amsterdam: Academic Press, 2008), 121ff. 51

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Art and religion The development of self-awareness57 and a corresponding exterior perception went hand in hand with the beginning of art.58 The oldest evidence of Stone Age cave paintings and artefacts—predominantly portrayals of animals—are around 36,000 years old. Some works of art include symbols we are no longer able to decipher. Others function as messages we can understand. However, not all the works of art relate to the real world. Some express rich possibilities through depictions of fantasies, feelings, and worlds of desire. In doing so, they send a message to their fellow men, opening a channel of communication. This communication is successful when others recognize their own desires and feelings in the artwork and are able to accept them as a part of their extended ego. The human yearning for community is fulfilled through the generation of identical feelings, desires and aims. Thus, together with language and common rituals (feasts,59 celebrations,60 drugs, dancing, games, spectacles, and plays), art represents a means of communitybuilding. Art “co-ordinates and synchronizes the feelings and desires of individuals by according them a specific value and celebrating them.”61 Art is not just a social adhesive, but rather reinforces our feelings by forming our collective fantasies with exterior grandeur—a sign of something special and exceptional, without any practical use other than functioning as a sign of the quality of the owner. One need only consider the glorious cathedrals, the imperial edifices of emperors, kings, leaders, and presidents, or the “palaces of culture” produced by communism. “The true luxury of cult buildings is that they are designed […] to bear witness

57

See Donald, The Mind So Rare, esp. 46ff. See Damasio, Self Comes to Mind, 291ff. 59 Eating in company around a fire belongs to the fundamental components of human coexistence and explains the prominence in many religions of eating rituals. See Gunther Hirschfelder, Europäische Esskultur—Geschichte der Ernährung von der Steinzeit bis heute (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2001). Regarding the evolutionary biological advantages of the nutritional patterns of Homo sapiens, see Chris Organ, et al., “Phylogenetic Rate Shifts in Feeding Time During the Evolution of Homo,” PNAS, August 22, 2011, (doi: 10.1073/pnas.1107806108). 60 See Volker Sommer, Feste—Mythen—Rituale: Warum die Völker feiern (Hamburg: Gruner, 1992); Nathalie D. Munro, Leore Grosman, “Early Evidence (ca. 12,000 B. P.) for Feasting at a Burial Cave in Israel,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) 107 (2010): 15362–66. 61 Junker and Paul, Darwin-Code, 160. 58

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to the genuine nature of other, much cheaper signals.”62 Art is used to form and express group identity, which, in this way, becomes a superior superorganism. Through the promotion of coordination and synchronization, the psychological effect of art, thus, serves to provide the collective with adaptive group-evolutionary advantages over the competition.

Fig. 12: Stone Age cave painting from around 15000 B.C. Two ibex, wild horses and a rectangular sign. Lascaux, Montignac, Dordogne. Copyright: bpk / Egmar Ruppert.

There is no academic consensus as to the meaning of the Stone Age cave paintings of animals. They could symbolize the desire of the painter for a rich haul from the hunt, thus, amounting to a sort of hunt magic. Other interpretations point to the depiction of a strong male animal as reflecting the desire for sexual fulfilment and for large and strong offspring. It could even represent a picture of a dead person, the tribal father, expressing a belief in their unity through an animal. Antonio Beltrán summarizes the various interpretations: “the depictions were probably mediatory agents between the worlds; art connected the everyday

62

Junker and Paul, Darwin-Code, 176. See also Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi, The Handicap Principle (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

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world with the ever-present higher forces and powers.”63 Magical conceptions, the purpose of these “forces and powers” was to dominate the world through the power of thought. Although remaining a natural, collective form of wishful thinking with no direct impact on the workings of the natural world, the fantasized effects of magical rituals possessed real power. Humans exhibit the tendency to embed phenomenon such as suffering in a holistic metaphysical system, which enables them to understand, and thus engage with the world. The conception of an inner struggle between the forces of “good” and “evil” is just one of the mythical attempts to explain our experience of inner conflict.64 Stories in which these forces do battle enable us to record supposed victories over the forces of “evil.”

The social and explanatory function of art and religion The socio-biologist Edward O. Wilson argued that “the predisposition to religious belief is the most complex and powerful force in the human mind and in all probability an ineradicable part of human nature.”65 The function of religions, according to Wilson, consists in integrating the individual into a human community and subjecting them to a system of rules. Furthermore, by positing their God-given, and thus holy nature, religion confers on a system of man-made rules the status of unrestricted and universal validity. Such an imputation can, and indeed has been used to convince people to subordinate their immediate personal interests to the interests of the group.66

63

Antonio Beltrán, et al., Altamira (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1998), 173. See Terry Eagleton, On Evil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). See also Leszek Kolakowski, Gespräche mit dem Teufel: Acht Diskurse über das Böse (Munich: Piper, 1998). 65 Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1978); 169. See also David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). See also idem, “Evolution and Religion: The Transformation of the Obvious,” in Bulbulia, et al., The Evolution of Religion, 23–29. Here he states: “[…] the general conclusion is that most religions […] are clearly designed to define groups, coordinate behavior within groups, and solve the all-important problem of cheating.” Ibid. 27. 66 See E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature, 185. Cf. also Ara Norenzayan, How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 64

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The parallels between art and religion were recognized by the sociologist Émile Durkheim as early as 1912.67 Yet contrary to his assumption, art is not the product of religion, rather religion is the offspring of art. Assuming that the larger religions developed after the last ice age—the epoch in which humans made the transition to agriculture and animal husbandry and which saw the early stages of state formation and economic productivity—they would be 10,000 years old at the most. In contrast, art is at least 36,000 years old. As well as similarities—the social function of community-building and their elaborate forms of presentation—art and religion also display important differences. A fundamental component of the religious interpretation of the world is the existence of higher beings, gods, which are able to intervene in our earthly reality in a manner at variance with the physical laws of that reality. In its insistence on the possibility of such divine intervention, religion makes greater claims than art. Both seek to transport mankind to the sphere of the fantastical, yet religion works with a mixture of promises and threats to ensure acceptance of its system of values and view of the world. According to Clifford Geertz, religion is a “system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and longlasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”68 It is this “aura of factuality,” the emotional transformation of the fantastical into the genuine, which differentiates religion and art. A vital forerunner of religion is animism and its method, magic. Religions still harbor remnants of magical rituals such as the assumption found amongst many Christians, that bread and wine are actually transformed in some secret and magical fashion into flesh and blood during mass.69 Many people continue to believe in superstitious conceptions against all evidence. For instance, they assume that particular rituals are able to prevent misfortune and cause good fortune. “The memorable nymphs and fairies and goblins and demons that crowd the

67 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976, repr. from 1915), 406. 68 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 90. 69 See Thomas Wünsch, ed., Religion und Magie in Ostmitteleuropa: Spielräume theologischer Normierungsprozesse in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit (Berlin: Lit, 2006).

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mythologies of every people are the imaginative offspring of a hyperactive habit of finding agency wherever anything puzzles or frightens us.”70

Fig. 13: The Willendorf Venus. Dating from 25,000 BCE, the Willdendorf Venus and was found in Willdendorf, Lower Austria in 1908. Copyright: bpk/Lutz Braun. 70

Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 123.

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Animism and magic can be interpreted not just as part of a prereligious outlook, but also as an early natural philosophy. It was assumed that a particular magic could exercise a direct influence on reality in some fashion—for instance, rain could be caused by performing a particular ritual. Indeed, one function of the representations of animals in the ice age caves was an attempt to gain actual power over them. This first comprehensive form of mastering the world split into three competing currents following the last ice age. Firstly, art no longer seeks to bring the whole world under its spell, just mankind. Secondly, religions accord magical powers only to the gods and thirdly, science has evicted not just magical conceptions but also the gods from its view of the world.

The evolution of religion and brain activity If we differentiate between animism and god-centric belief systems,71 the religious world view is less than 10,000 years old. Thus, the question arises as to the circumstances that led to the development of religions. The evolutionary biologists Thomas Junker and Sabine Paul advance the view that the epochal transition from the age of Paleolithic hunters and gatherers to that of agriculturalism and animal husbandry 10,000 years ago, represents the actual dawn of the age of religion.72 In the relatively egalitarian age of the hunters and gatherers, decisions regarding common aims were met on the basis of group consent. The change in environmental conditions, an accompanying population explosion,73 and the transition to farming resulted in the development of towns and states, the division of labor and an enormous concentration of power. As such, the preconditions of life changed dramatically.74 Art, the voluntary aggrandizement of fantasy, was no longer able to reconcile the resulting social constraints and conflict of interest between the rulers and the ruled. Under these changed circumstances, religion as a conception of an all-encompassing divine power, replaced art as the primary strategy of community-formation. With its mechanism of promises and threats, religion was able to manifest itself in evolution amidst the changed conditions of life as a much more effective method of community-formation.

71

Dennett does the same. See Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 124. See the study of the anthropologists Frank Marlowe und Colette Berbesque, “More ‘Altruistic’ Punishment in Larger Societies,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B 275 (London, 2008): 587-90. 73 See Dennet, Breaking the Spell, 159. 74 See Junker and Paul, Darwin-Code, 178; 182–83. 72

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In their study of cultural evolution, Junker and Paul identify a close relationship between the growth of religion and the submission of society to the interests of the ruling class. They make clear that they hold the cultural evolution of religion to be a maladjustment. Not conferring any form of individual selective advantage, it brings no long-term benefit to the social group.75 They agree with Richard Dawkins’ identification of religion as a damaging cultural evolution: he argues that religion serves not its adherents, but its leaders. Writing in his controversial best-seller The God Delusion, he argues that believers have been subject to genetic manipulation by parasites. For Dawkins, religious belief is the by-product of processes of childhood processes. “Natural selection builds child brains with the tendency to believe whatever their parents and tribal elders tell them. Such trusting obedience is valuable for survival […]. But the flip side of trusting obedience is slavish gullibility. […] An automatic consequence [of trusting obedience] is that the truster has no way of distinguishing good advice from bad.”76 In his attempt to generate spiritual experiences by electromagnetic stimulation of the temporal lobe, the Canadian “neurotheologian” Michael A. Persinger has claimed to have found the “God module.”77 Comparing the transcendental experiences reported by his test subjects to those of an epileptic, he reached a similar conclusion to Dawkins. Criticizing what he refers to as the “God concept,” he condemns religions for their propensity to cause war. He also concluded that the “self-concept,” i.e. our conception of individuality, free-will etc. is entirely illusory. He believes that we should see ourselves for what we are: a biochemical system exhibiting certain patterns of behavior.78

75

See Junker and Paul, Darwin-Code, 184–85. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam Press, 2006), 205. 77 The Swedish psychologist Peer Granqvist and his team (Granqvist, et al., “Sensed Presence and Mystical Experiences Are Predicted By Suggestibility, Not By Application of Transcranial Weak Complex Magnetic Fields,” Neuroscience Letters 379 (2005): 1–6) tested Persinger’s findings as part of a double-blind replication study. He found that some of the test subjects who had not been subject to magnetic fields also reported transcendental experiences. These results could be interpreted as a classical placebo effect. Held in an isolated environment with the expectation of experiencing something, their anticipation induced the requisite experience. Regarding the entire phenomenon, see Michael Blume, Neurotheologie: Hirnforscher erkunden den Glauben (Marburg: Tectum-Verlag, 2009). 78 Cf. Michael A. Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs (New York: Praeger, 1987), 65. 76

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The neuroscientist David J. Linden argues “that our brains have become particularly adapted to creating coherent, gap-free stories and that this propensity for narrative creation is part of what predisposes humans to religious thought.”79 The left side of the brain exhibits the tendency to collate fragmentary perceptions and memories into coherent stories. “Religious ideas are […] formed by transforming everyday perceptions, by building coherent narratives that bridge otherwise disparate concepts and entities.”80 This function is performed by the left cortex. Not only does it enable these narrative creations by subconsciously forming them to become compatible with non-naturalistic conceptions, but it also produces a pattern for non-naturalistic thought figures through remembered dreams. “All of these aspects of ritual practice, by moving us away from waking consciousness, provide non-naturalistic, dreamlike experience guided by the left cortex, and thereby reinforce the religious impulse.”81 Linden argues for the existence of a strong human predisposition to believe propositions which cannot be proven. “Our brains have evolved to make us believers.”82 Nevertheless, as Catherine L. Caldwell-Harris and her team have demonstrated, our species presents a number of different dispositions towards faith. Differentiating between two cognitive styles— critical-intellectual sceptics and holistic spiritualists83—the latter claim to recognize a higher meaning in all events, which their more skeptical counterparts ascribe to the workings of chance. “Contrary to the suggestion that atheists are unhappy with their life, friends, and work […] our respondents did not differ from Christians and Buddhists on measures of sociality, joviality, emotional stability, and happiness. […] our atheist respondents did not differ from the Christians and Buddhists in their compassion or empathic concern. Atheists disagreed more strongly than did Christians and Buddhists with items expressing magical thinking […] and sacredness/spirituality […]. Our atheist respondents strongly disagreed with many statements that were endorsed by Christians and Buddhists, including all statements mentioning a ‘Higher Power’ or ‘Universal Intelligence,’”84 79

David J. Linden, The Accidental Mind: How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory, Dreams and God (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007), 225. 80 Ibid., 230. 81 Ibid., 231. 82 Ibid., 234. 83 See Catherine L. Caldwell-Harris et al., “Exploring the atheist personality: wellbeing, awe, and magical thinking in atheists, Buddhists, and Christians,” in Mental Health, Religion & Culture 2010, 1–14. 84 Ibid., 10–11.

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According to the findings of her investigation, the two personality types do not exhibit any differences in lifestyle and attitude, differing only on the question of the divine origin of life and its many events. The question is raised as to the existence of a specific region in the brain responsible for transcendental experience. Andrew Newberg, Eugene d’Aquili, and Vince Rause found that those engaged in intensive prayer or meditation display an especially high level of activity in their frontal lobes—the areas of the brain responsible for concentration. At the same time, other areas of the brain register a near-complete absence of activity. Indeed, an especial level of inactivity in the parietal lobes can produce a sensation of self-transcendence—the feeling of having left one’s own body—to the extent of feeling absent from the whole universe.85 The findings presented by a team of neuro-surgeons, philosophers, and psychologists from the University of Udine would seem to confirm such assumptions. Unlike Newberg et al, they eschewed a SPECT camera and fMRI to investigate the sensation of self-transcendence exhibited by cancer sufferers from whom large sections of their rear parietal lobes had been removed following a brain tumor. Their awareness of a transcendental environment was greater after the surgery than before.86 They reported feelings of a closer connection with their surroundings and a sensation of intimate connection with the universe as a whole. A considerable number of neurobiologists posit that the human brain has such a thing as a “God center,”87 whilst others speak of a “God gene,”88 which developed through mutation in the course of human development. This argument naturally raises the question as to why it should have come to such a selection.89 A possible answer could be that religions provided rituals, supernatural processes, and God-stories, which gave people hope and enabled them to deal better with their daily stress 85

Cf. also Ara Norenzayan, How Religion, esp. 18ff; 98ff. See Andrew Newberg, Eugene d’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001), esp. 18ff; 98ff. See also Chapter 4, Section “Consciousness”. 86 See Cosimo Urgesi, et al., “The Spiritual Brain: Selective Cortical Lesions Modulate Human Self-Transcendence,” Neuron 65 (2010): 309–19. 87 Newberg, d’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 3ff. See also Dimitrios Kapogiannis, et al., “Cognitive and Neural Foundations of Religious Belief,” PNAS 106 (2009): 4876–81. 88 Dean Hamer, The God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired Into our Genes (New York: Doubleday, 2004). 89 See Richard Dawkins, “What Use Is Religion? Part 1,” in Free Inquiry, 24, no. 4 (2004): 14.

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through reducing the number of decisions which they had to make.90 Thus, it had a “salvatory” effect. “Such belief structures could indeed be understood as the result of strategies developed for prey situations, and which have remained anchored in the human tool kit for survival […] in an evolutionary and functional sense.”91

These religious rituals were passed on from generation to generation first in oral, then written form. Publicly practiced and passed on with “religious” accuracy, they were probably also modified to fit changing contexts.92 Population increase produced an inner differentiation of the religions. The gods became more abstract and powerful and underwent a process of functional specialism, being ascribed responsibility for trade, war, fertility, or some other aspect of human existence.93 Thus emerged a form of formative experiential behavior, which inscribed itself on the human brain as a kind of cultural inheritance. A further stage, which both Junker and Paul and the philosopher and cognition researcher Dennett view as starting with the Neolithic age, saw the formalization of the culturally transmitted religious practices.94 The previously spontaneous proto-religion previously taken as a matter of course now threatened to enter a crisis resulting from the onset of reflection on the matter. In order to deal with the emerging doubts, the shamans or priests, clearly beneficiaries of the religious traditions, removed themselves from the group and shrouded their activities in an aura of secrecy.95 Indeed, in doing so, they developed into a closed caste and subjected their religion to a process of domestication and systemization. Finally, they entered an alliance with political leaders and 90

See Dennett, Breaking the spell, 132–40. “In traditional urban societies, religion sums up the whole hierarchy of expression and ideas offered by that society and provides a framework within which life is experienced. However, it is doubtful whether traditional religion as a whole could be characterized as a deliberately designed means of controlling experience. It is more often a kind of cultural attic, containing the major ideas and images that influence a people’s history.”; Donald, The Mind So Rare, 316. 91 Quoted according to Gary Lease, “Following the Genes,” 114. 92 Regarding the stages of development, of religions, see Feierman, The Biology of Religious Behaviour. 93 See Marlowe and Berbesque, “More ‘altruistic’ punishment.” 94 See Dennett, Breaking. 95 See also Pierre Bourdieu, Religion Schriften zur Kultursoziologie 5 (Constance: UVK, 2009), 11ff.; Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 3 ff.

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declared the existing system of social by uniting the group around the common worship of a single organization as God-given. Not the political leaders, but a higher power was responsible for instituting the system as it stood, and both the rulers and ruled were subject to divine authority. Thus, the priests created and reinforced social cohesion not only by reducing tensions between the rulers and the ruled, but God. “Ecclesiastical religions with professional priesthoods are not really possible until a society has developed a fairly intensive form of agriculture because large economic surpluses are needed to support specialized religious functionaries. […] Priests are religious literati who form themselves into guilds and who monopolize religious knowledge and ritual.”96

Religion as a social phenomenon Dawkins’ bestseller outraged believers across the world. The devout do not see their religion as a damaging by-product of an otherwise meaningful genetic development, but rather as the precondition for a fulfilling and meaningful life. Moreover, they are able point to studies, which describe religion as a social phenomenon and refrain from any value-judgment,97 or even to those that emphasize the high social value of religion. Others point to religion as an evolutionary development with myriad social benefits, conferring evolutionary advantages.98 Pascal Boyer, on the other hand, presents religion as a natural product of neurological activity.99 Others stress both the negative and positive aspects of religious behavior.100 This ambivalent position is probably the closest to reflecting the actual effects of religion.101 The capacity for an individual religious experience would appear to be highly dependent on cultural influence, socialization and personal learning experiences. Those possessing the corresponding disposition receive 96 Stephen K. Sanderson, “Religious Attachment Theory and Biosocial Evolution of the Major World Religions,” in Bulbulia, et al., The Evolution of Religion, 68. 97 See Boyer, Religion Explained. 98 See Rüdiger Vaas and Michael Blume, Gott, Gene und Gehirn: Warum Glaube nützt—Die Evolution der Religiosität (Stuttgart: Hirzel, 2009). Jeffrey Kluger, “The Biology of Belief,” Time February 12, 2009, 34–39; Nicholas Wade, The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved and Why It Endures (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). 99 See Boyer, Religion explained, 329–30. 100 See Gehirn & Geist, no. 4 (2009). 101 Thus Ulrich Schnabel, Die Vermessung des Glaubens (Munich: Pantheon, 2010), 506ff.

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neurological stimuli that control attention, perception, learning, memory, and the evaluation of social relations.102 A complex interaction of various brain areas produces a religious interpretation of life, coordinated in the prefrontal cortex.

The objections of the religious believers and cultural analysts Confronted by the complex explanations of both the “new atheists” and the more “moderate” socio-psychologists, neurobiologists, and anthropologists, some theologians and religious writers speak of a “relativism,” which, they argue, reduces the search for truth to a mere question of taste.103 Basing his arguments on the writings of Joseph Ratzinger,104 the Catholic journalist Alexander Kissler accuses the “new atheists” of advancing an “experimental” concept of truth, which he seeks to contrast with the “truth of faith.”105 The usual definition of truth—matching a statement to a reconstruction of reality—can be applied both to the findings of “new Atheism” and theological metaphysics. Investigating the relationship between faith and reason and echoing Robert Spaemann, Kissler maintained that neuroscientists did not accept reason, whilst the faithful were its best defenders.106 Defining reason as the facility for problem-solving, the philosopher Hans Albert argues that it is strictly a product of evolution.107 He pointed out that Darwinist epistemology does not question reason, but

102

Ibid., esp. 501ff. Regarding this and the following, see Alan Posener, Benedikts Kreuzzug (Berlin: Ullstein, 2009), 19ff.; Hans Albert, “Missverständnisse eines katholischen Aufklärers: Alexander Kisslers missglückter Versuch einer Kritik am neuen Atheismus,” Aufklärung und Kritik 15 (2008): 10–21. 104 See Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (London: Burns & Oates, 1969); Hans Albert, Ratzingers Rettung des Christentums: Beschränkungen des Vernunftgebrauchs im Dienste des Glaubens (Aschaffenburg: Alibri, 2008); Gerhard Besier, “Diktatur des Relativismus? Zur Individualisierung von :HOWDQVFKDXXQJHQ XQG UHOLJL|VHQ hEHU]HXJXQJHQ´ LQ %HVLHU DQG 6WRNáRVD 20 Jahre neue Bundesrepublik, 239-52; Stephan Rixen, “Homosexualität? Natürlich unnatürlich,” FAZ no. 279, November 30, 2011, 33. 105 See Alexander Kissler, Der aufgeklärte Gott: Wie die Religion zur Vernunft kam (Munich: Pattloch, 2008), 123. 106 Ibid., 189. 107 See Albert, “Missverständnisse,” 14. 103

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seeks to explain its nature and achievements.108 Moreover, free will is not negated; naturalists seek to incorporate the fruits of scientific research into the solution of the problem of freedom. “Those failing to do this and instead choosing to advance certain theological positions with rigid dogmatism, open themselves to the suspicion that they are not really interested in finding the truth at all.”109 Christian theologians locate ultimate meaning with a God who has revealed himself in the Bible. Referring to Dawkins’ criticism of the God of the Old Testament,110 Kissler counters that his statements are offensive and disrespectful.111 Such a response does not fit into any conventional academic category. The “Christian” West is not subject to the restrictions of speech and thought practices of Sharia law; grounded criticism of the Bible should remain a matter of free speech. The psychologist Franz Buggle finds it difficult to present a God as a role model who “orders wars of conquest, the execution of children, women and hostages; demands blood justice; desires the death of his son as an act of atonement; who requires the extermination of those of a different faith; explains mental illness through possession; who threatens eternal damnation; and who contradicts himself through demanding charity.”112 Helmut Schmidt is correct in reminding us that the “call to peace”113 was adopted by a number of religions only very late on and then only in theory. “In practice, 20th century religious leaders, ideologues, and philosophers have followed this standard in only a reduced fashion.”114 In contrast to a number of legends, he maintains that in Europe, the secular state, democracy, and the rule of law was “not the offspring of Christianity, but the product of a struggle with the powers and authority of the Christian Churches.”115 Advancing a far more incisive analysis, the historian of ideas John Gray reminds the critical rationalists that both secular humanism and the 108

See Hendrik Wortmann, Zum Desiderat einer Evolutionstheorie des Sozialen: Darwinistische Konzepte in den Sozialwissenschaften (Constance: UVK, 2010), esp. 57ff. 109 Thus Albert, “Missverständnisse,” 17. 110 See Dawkins, The God Delusion, 269ff. 111 See Kissler, Der aufgeklärte Gott, 254–55. 112 Franz Buggle, Denn sie wissen nicht, was sie glauben: Oder warum man redlicherweise nicht mehr Christ sein kann; Eine Streitschrift (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1992), 33. 113 Helmut Schmidt, Religion in der Verantwortung: Gefährdungen des Friedens im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Berlin: Propyläen, 2011), 233. 114 Ibid., 234. 115 Ibid., 247–48.

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“new Atheism” find their origin in Christian ideas.116 For Gray, “the comedy of militant unbelief is in the fact that the humanist creed it embodies is a by-product of Christianity. […] Contemporary atheism is a Christian heresy that differs from earlier heresies chiefly in its intellectual crudity.”117 Whilst describing the claims of religion as an illusion— advancing “truth” in the form of symbolic myths—Gray argues that it would be naïve to believe that revealing it as such would immediately result in its disappearance. The mistake of secular society is to claim the absence of religion. In doing so, such secularists use religion (which officially no longer exists) to describe their secular conception of the world. Religion cannot be suppressed or expunged from politics by positing a model of secularism. “Like repressed sexual desire, faith returns, often in grotesque forms, to govern the lives of those who deny it.”118

The impact of religion Viewing religion in terms of its impact, the Egyptologist Jan Assmann differentiated between monotheistic and polytheistic religions of a cosmotheistic nature, based on the effects they had (Wirkungsgeschichte).119 He argued that with the mosaic differentiation between the one true god and false gods, monotheistic religions introduced hate and sin into the world.120 Indeed, generated in an attempt to distance themselves from a primary, cosmo-theistic orientated form of religion, these belief systems are better conceived of as anti-religions and do not simply emerge from a causa essendi.121 Since then, religious formulae tend to dogmatize their own teachings and reject alternative explanations. Differentiating starkly 116

See John Gray, Black mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Penguin, 2008), 266. 117 Ibid., 266–67. 118 Ibid., 269. 119 See Jan Assmann, “Gotteszorn und Apokalypse: Über den Ernstfall totaler Religionen,” Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 67–82. 120 See George Lundskow, The Sociology of Religion (Los Angeles: Pine Forge Press, 2008), 210ff. (Exclusive Monotheism), and Rodney Stark, One true God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Religiusly-motivated violence is often highly militant. See Ron E. Hassner, War on Sacred Grounds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). See also Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, From Christian Militias to al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 121 See Jan Assmann, Die mosaische Unterscheidung oder der Preis des Monotheismus (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2003).

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between good and evil, they mobilize their followers to defend their claims. Stephen K. Sanderson explains the polytheism-to-monotheism shift with the dramatic increase in warfare between the sixth and first centuries BCE. “[…] war is a tremendously socially disruptive and psychologically [an] anxiety-producing phenomenon. It is not difficult to see how a dramatic increase in the scale of war casualties would create new needs for security and comfort.”122 The second major change undergone in this period, he argues, was urban growth. Humans “did not evolve to live in densely packed cities in which most of their social relations occurred with non-kin and strangers. The monotheistic religions of human compassion, and with an all-powerful and loving God, were an excellent prescription for people’s new sense of threat and danger.”123 In doing so, they accepted the flip-side of the coin. “An extremely powerful God must also be a demanding God. To reap the benefits that this God can provide, individuals must be willing to pay high costs.”124

From the “supposedly actual” to a religious culture of make-believe As the reader can no doubt guess, this is not the end of the story. A levelling process began within our cultural group around 500 years ago. With the Reformation, the development of historical criticism, the triumph of the scientific explanation of the world, and, finally, the process of democratization and the spread of universal human rights,125 religion assumed an increasingly marginal position in our view of the world. Both its promises and threats have lost their “actuality.” Heaven and hell do not have the same reality as this world.126 Viewed increasingly as chimeras, these constructs have lost their power as a constitutive force. This nowworldly approach was summarized by the German comedian Ingo Appelt:

122

Quoted according to Stephen K. Sanderson, Religious Attachment Theory, ibid., 70–71. 123 Ibid., 71. 124 Ibid., 72. 125 See Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., Moral für die Welt? Menschenrechtspolitik in den 1970er Jahren (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012). 126 For the clear reality of heaven and hell in the Middle Ages, see Peter Dinzelbacher, Angst im Mittelalter: Teufels-, Todes- und Gotteserfahrung: Mentalitätsgeschichte und Ikonographie (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1996).

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“earlier, people wanted to go to heaven. Now they want to be on television.”127 The possibility of social pressure has also disappeared. The religiously unbound no longer have to fear discrimination and disadvantage in society. Nevertheless, the old yearnings remain. Thus many, including theologians, have begun with the construction of paradoxes of “actually-impracticalbut-really-practical.” Such people repeatedly attempt to pin down dissenters to a particular form of behavior “as though” God existed. Usually, they point to the benefits of religious faith. The agnostic philosopher Herbert Schnädelbach pointed out that religion acts as a good therapy only when it is not reduced to its therapeutic function. The very moment at which the value of God is reduced to helping people cope with their life, we stop using our soul.128

127

Ingo Appelt in the ZDF television program “Markus Lanz” on August 23, 2011. Herbert Schnädelbach, Religion in der modernen Welt (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2009). 128

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Schnädelbach is entirely correct and his conclusions have been confirmed by a number of empirical studies.129 Yet how can the original, natural belief in God take effect, when we know how and why he evolved and when we see through the power-hungry shamans and priests who used it and given the opportunity, would use it again? With the biological discovery of how “man created God” we have not only disenchanted God, but de-realized him. Yet what happened to him also happened to us, if a little later.130 We have long had reason to cast great doubt on our own free will, rationality, and decision-making ability and with it, our responsibility. At best, we are able to agree to continue to accord ourselves responsibility for our actions because it is the type of freedom, “which is worth wanting.”131 Consequently, not only God, but we all only live in what amounts to a pretend world.

129

See Jochen Gebauer, Constantine Sedikides, and Wiebke Neberich, “Religiosity, Social Self-Esteem, and Psychological Adjustment: On the CrossCultural Specificity of the Psychological Benefits of Religiosity,” Psychological Science (2011). The authors argue that only in the societies in which religion has established itself as a social norm there is a link between religiosity and mental health. The countries in which religion plays a minority role exhibit no such link. The authors believe that the positive effects of faith are to be found entirely in social recognition. 130 See Gerhard Besier, “Passen wir zu unseren tradierten Menschenbildern und Weltanschauungen? Psychologische und biologische Erkenntnisse als Deutungshorizont für Alternativen,” KZG/CCH 22 (2009): 66–115. 131 See Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). Quoted according to Henrik Walter, “Willensfreiheit, Verantwortlichkeit und Neurowissenschaft,” Psychologische Rundschau 55 (2004): 169–77; 174; Peter Bieri, Das Handwerk der Freiheit: Über die Entdeckung des eigenen Willens (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2007), in which he interprets so-called free will as “understood will”. He sees this as a will that fits in with our self-conception and wishes.

CONCLUSION NEITHER GOOD NOR BAD: WHAT TO CONSIDER BEFORE JUDGING OTHERS “The animal that therefore I am” Jacques Derrida (1997)1

After a cordial but unenthusiastic discussion about the relationship between church and state in Germany2, I was somewhat surprised by the subsequent verbal attack from the journalist of the FAZ, Peter Schilder: “what was that all about?” Missing the presupposed level of solidarity with those from the church milieu, he proceeded to offer me a lesson in “doing the right thing,” summarized neatly in two maxims: never change political party, never change confession. Armed with these two simple precepts, the practicing Catholic is able to protect himself from what could otherwise be a disconcerting discovery. Namely, these things work in just the same way in other milieus as in one’s own. That this perception is both ambivalent and not highly sought-after was demonstrated by his colleague Ulrich Schnabel writing in Die Zeit. In an article entitled ‘No enemies, no group feeling’, he summarized what many socially-levelling social scientists and philosophers have long failed to grasp. “The more we reject rival ways of thinking, the stronger is our group solidarity. Where would the SPD be without the scare of the CDU/FDP alliance (the same applies for the CDU in terms of the SPD and the LINKE)? What has greater potential to unite a religious fellowship than the struggle against those of alternative (or indeed no) beliefs? Indeed, what better motivation is there for soldiers, soccer players or demonstrators than

1

Jacques Derrida, The animal that therefore I am (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). 2 Meeting ‘Denkwerk Links’, May 9, 2011.

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an appeal to the group feeling against those in power/the rabble/or over there’ whom it is our duty to resist.”3

A principled stance, reliability, and other secondary virtues would vanish overnight were it not for the blissful ignorance of the fact that every subculture acts, thinks, and functions in an entirely comparable fashion. What would happen should it become clear that the formation of political camps was merely the result of assiduous lobby work and not the product of honest conviction? Not only would we lose a number of muchcherished foe images, but our in-group would greatly loose in attractivity. Undermining a plethora of certainties, our conceptions of others would be called into question. It is not always impossible to deny or even ignore artificial divisions between people. For instance, when considering opinion polls with the view to drawing up their program political parties are reaching increasingly similar conclusions. Thus it should come as no surprise that these programs exhibit an increasingly greater degree of convergence, presenting the electorate with a considerable challenge when trying to differentiate between the rival groupings.4 With the decline in programmatic differences, the parties are resorting to attractive faces and personalities5 to serve as surfaces onto which a number of competing and often contradictory ideas are to be projected. In many cases, such individuals are unable to match the expectations placed upon them—we need only to remember the cases of Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg and Christian Wulff. The threat of alignment between the in-group and the out-group often leads to minority movements, such as the Aktion Linkstrend stoppen’ in the CDU to call for a return to the roots of the movement and an affirmation of the core values, which are said to have established the original differences. Nevertheless, the minority nature of this or other such movements, such as the ‘Große Konservative Kongress’6, considerably reduce their impact. Despite support drawn from a number of subcultures, 3

Ulrich Schnabel, “Fatale Nächstenliebe. Ohne Feinde gibt es auch kein Wirgefühl,” Die Zeit, No. 4, January 20, 2011, 31. 4 See Gerhard Besier, “The history of party development in Germany 1848–the present: from ideological communities to post-modern associations,” KZG/CCH 23 (2010): 520–48. 5 See Christoph Hickmann, “Schlicht schön,” Der Spiegel, No. 19, May 7, 2011, 34–38. 6 See the report in the evangelical idea spektrum, No. 19 from May 11, 2011, 10. The publication clearly sympathizes with this movement.

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the majority of CDU party strategists are apparently convinced that such a course change would be unconducive to electoral success. It is here that we see the differences between Germany and a number of other European countries whose governments have begun to pander to right-wing populists with a whole raft of measures aimed at renationalization. We only need to think of the measures initiated in May 2011 by the (now defunct) Danish minority government of restoring border controls with Sweden and Germany designed to buy the continued parliamentary tolerance of the Danish People’s Party. The move to circumvent the Schengen agreement—with the assent of a number of member states—shows the growing interest in finding national solutions to international problems, such as migration. Such examples provide a good demonstration of the human proclivity not only to differentiate themselves from others, but to construct a range of complex in-groups based on a limited behavioral repertoire, which in the end fails to differentiate between them and the others. A range of factors influence the choice of group membership, the vast majority of which lack any basis in rationality. Many such decisions are made well below our threshold of consciousness and once taken are substantiated in retrospect without any awareness of their genesis. The human aversion to gaps in our knowledge leads us to fill such cavities with explanations enabling a coherent perception of both ourselves and others. “We are permanently weaving a storyline of our own life.”7 Although unable to deny the existence of such mechanisms of self-delusion, we are also aware of an inherent longing for a level of entirely unadulterated selfdetermination, amounting to total control over all aspects of our thought, action and behavior. As Peter Bieri states, “even if my inner-being is profoundly spliced with the rest of the world, there is a significant difference between a life in which someone marshals his thoughts, feelings and desires in a way making him the author of his own life—an independent subject—and a defenseless object of events and experiences subject to the influence of a range of outside force.” Moreover, he continues, “understanding self-determination involves the act of expressing this term.”8 Nevertheless, we make the experience that “genuine” self-conception or even one’s own autobiographical narrative often breaks down in the face of a number of challenges, and requires correction and renewal. 7

Michael Gazzaniga in an interview, Der Spiegel, No. 50, December 12, 2011, 149–52, quotation: 150. 8 Peter Bieri, Wie wollen wir leben? (Salzburg, 2011), 11.

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“Scratch the surface of an altruist and watch a hypocrite bleed”9 as Michael Ghiselin, the father of evolutionary psychology, once said. Is this still true today, or are we able to follow the studies of Marc Hauser and Frans de Waal in accepting that prosocial behavior is an innate anthropological phenomenon subject to cultural transmission? If true, we are forced to address the question of the origin of anti-social behavior. In her legendary research into the nature of primates and their rationality, feelings, and social behavior, Jane Goodall was shocked when she witnessed a mother chimpanzee kill and eat the male child of a neighboring group. Taking her own young son to the rain forest, Goodall took the precaution of locking him in a cage. “Humans eat chimpanzees and vice versa” as she said in an interview, “chimpanzees are just as much primates as we are […].”10 It is this very ambivalence we have to endure without making moral judgment, as it provides us with the insight into our contradictory dispositions—the constant fluctuation between “nature” and “nurture.” Sensing an immediate threat to their existence usually unleashes an overwhelmingly strong survival instinct in people, the strength of which often breaks all nature of “civilized” norms. In 1884, the British sailing ship Mignonette came into difficulties on the high sea. After conferring, three of the four survivors resolved to kill and eat the 17-yearold cabin boy, who, they claimed, was already dying.11 After their rescue, they were convicted of murder. The court case saw the clash of Victorian morality and the reality of life on the high sea. The starvation of between three to five million people in the course of the Holodomor, the large-scale famine in Ukraine in 1933, prompted similar actions and a number of cases were recorded of God-fearing peasants surviving at the cost of the murder and cannibalism of their own children.12 The Soviet authorities 9

Michael T. Ghiselin, The economy of nature and the evolution of sex (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 247. 10 Jane Goodall, interview by Stefan Klein (Eine Affenliebe). Zeit Magazin, No. 34, August 18, 2011, 28–32, quotation: 30. 11 See Brian Simpson, Cannibalism and the common law: the story of the tragic last voyage of the Mignonette and the strange legal proceedings to which it gave rise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Brian Simpson, Cannibalism and the common law: a Victorian yachting tragedy (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2003). 12 “After all the rats, cats, animal cadavers and all nature of plants had been eaten, the canibalism began. 2.500 people were prosecuted for canibalism between 1932/33. They did not just eat the dead, but a number of children were killed and eaten.”, in: Gazeta Wyborcza, November 24, 2008, 13. See Serhy Yekelchyk, Ukraine: birth of a Modern Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 103 ff.; Tony Halpin, “Fight for justice for millions who died in Stalin’s famine

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registered hundreds of cases of cannibalism during the blockade of Leningrad. In one case, the wife of a Soviet soldier smothered her youngest daughter aged only 18 months so as “to provide for herself and her three children.”13 A further example of such breaches of civilization in extraordinary circumstance was the airplane crash of 1972 in the Chilean Andes in 1972.14 The survivors staved off starvation by eating the dead passengers. Beyond such extreme situations, the human drive to survive also engages in a range of further situations in which subject to extreme psychological pressure, people commit acts which they would otherwise have not have countenanced. The question as to whether the commitment made during a dictatorship to spy on or otherwise betray relatives and acquaintances numbers amongst such a situation remains a question of heated debate.15 In Rumania, the ruling of a Bucharest court established a precedent to take into account the specific nature of the extraordinary circumstances of the time. According to the ruling, former members of the Securitate, the former Rumanian security police, cannot be unmasked as spies; during 1945–1989, the absence of freedom and human rights and the prevailing climate of fear meant that only the dictator was able to exercise free will.16 People from different cultures do not act differently in borderline or situations of extreme coercion. Nevertheless, individual social selfconception and the preferred forms taken by social interaction vary considerably between cultures. We in the Western world exhibit a tendency towards individualism and an independent self-perception. In such cultures, self-definition as a process is borne and fed by individual

‘genocide’,” The Times, June 23, 2008, 29; Gerhard Gnauck, “Bandera und der Holodomor,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 23, 2008; Paul Robert Magocsi, A history of Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 557ff. 13 Quoted in “Die Leningrader Blockade. Der Krieg, die Stadt und der Tod,” in Osteuropa, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde, No. 61 (2011),101–12: 101. 14 See Nando Parrado, Vince Rause, and Sebastian Vogel, 72 Tage in der Hölle. Wie ich den Absturz in den Anden überlebte (Munich: Goldmann, 2007), 104–11. 15 See Ingrid Kerz-Rühling and Tomas Plänkers, Verräter oder Verführte. Eine psychoanalytische Untersuchung Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter der Stasi (Berlin: Links, 2004), 231 ff. 16 See FAZ no. 288 of December 9, 2008, 5; FAZ no. 17 of January 21, 2011, 31, which provides a portrayal of the situation of Oskar Pastior who in fearing a further spell in the prison camp switched from being a victim to a prepatrator.

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thoughts, feelings and actions, without reference to others.17 The inhabitants of such societies learn to define themselves in isolation to others and, in consequence, place particular importance on the traits of independence and uniqueness. In contrast, those socialized in Asian and other non-Western societies tend towards collectivism and an interdependent self-perception. Defining themselves on the basis of social relationships, they are aware that their own behavior is often influenced by the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. Ted Singelis developed a questionnaire to measure the extent to which people view themselves as independent or interdependent. He concluded that Asian-Americans respondents displayed a higher degree of conformity to interdependence, whilst in white Americans, this trend was reversed.18 Many interdependent cultures accord considerably greater importance to the in-group than it is the case for cultures underpinned by an 17

See Susan E. Cross, “Self-construals, coping, and stress in cross-cultural adaption,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 26 (1995): 673–97; Alan P. Fiske et al., “The cultural matrix of social psychology,” in The handbook of social psychology, eds. Daniel T. Gilbert and Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 915–81; Steven J. Heine et al., “Is there a universal need for positive self-regard?,” Psychological Review 106 (1999): 766– 94; Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel R. Markus, “Culture and the self: how cultures influence the way we view ourselves,” in People: psychology from a cultural perspective, ed. David Matsumoto (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 1994), 17–37; Shinobu Kitayama et al., “Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: self-enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in Japan,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997): 1245–67; Hazel R. Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “Culture and the self: implications forcognition, emotion, and motivation,” Psychological Review 98 (1991): 224–53; Hazel R. Markus, Shinobu Kitayama, and Rachel J. Heiman, “Culture and ‘basic’ psychological principles,” in Social psychology: handbook of basic principles, eds. Edward Tory Higgins and Arie W. Kruglanski (New York: Guilford Press, 1996), 857–913; Romin W. Tafarodi and William Bill Swann, “Individualism – collectivism and global self-esteem: evidence for a cultural trade-off,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 27 (1996): 651–72; David Trafimow, Harry C. Triandis, and Sharon G. Goto, “Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60 (1991): 649–55; Harry C. Triandis, “Cross-cultural studies of individualism and collectivism,” in Nebraska symposium on motivation, ed. John J. Berman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 41–133; ibid., Culture and social behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994); ibid., Individualism and collectivism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 18 See Ted M. Singelis, “The measurement of independent and interdependent selfconstruals,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20 (1994): 580–91.

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independent self-conception. We can infer that members of interdependent cultures probably exhibit a greater level of altruism than the representatives of individualistic cultures. Nevertheless, interdependent cultures accord greater importance to the needs of their in-group than do those of Western cultures.19 The borders between “us” and “them” are more rigid and inflexible; they are probably less helpful towards members of an out-group than it is the case for more individualistic cultures.20 Membership of a group can promote de-individuation. This involves the display of modes of behavior, which deviate from usual social norms. Group membership often brings people to commit acts of which an individual would have been entirely incapable. The history of the 20th century is littered with such examples.21 Aside from extreme examples, such as genocide, mob hooliganism at soccer matches provides a perfect example of de-individuation. Analyzing 60 cases between 1899 and 1946 in which the Ku Klux Klan pursued and lynched African Americans, Brian Mullen22 concluded that the brutality and cruelty of the methods used to kill the victims increased with the size of the mob. Robert Watson’s comparative study of warriors in 24 cultures23 showed that the level of 19

See Kwok Leung and Michael Harris Bond, “The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47 (1984): 793–804; Joan G. Miller, David M. Bersoff, and Robin L. Harwood, “Perceptions of social responsibilities in India and the United Staes: moral imperatives or personal decisions?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58 (1990): 33– 47; Fathali M. Moghaddam, Donald M. Taylor, and Stephen C. Wright, Social psychology in cross-cultural perspective (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1993). 20 Kathleen L’Armand and Albert Pepitone, “Helping to reward another person: a cross-cultural analysis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31 (1975): 189–98; Leung and Bond, The impact; Triandis, Cross- cultural studies of individualism; Jen-Chieh Ting and Jane Allyn Piliavin, “Altruism in comparative international perspective,” in Between state and market: essays on charities law and policy in Canada, eds. Jim Phillips and Bruce Chapman, and David Stevens (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press, 2000), 51–105. See also Robert V. Levine, Ara Norenzayan, and Karen Philbrick, “Cross-cultural differ- ences in helping strangers,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 32 (2001): 543–60 (an investigation of sympatía). 21 See Bernard Wasserstein, Barbarism and civilization: a history of Europe in our time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 22 See Brian Mullen, “Atrocity as a function of lynch mob composition: a selfattention perspective,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 12 (1986): 187– 97. 23 See Robert Watson, “Investigation into deindividuation using cross-cultural survey technique,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25 (1973): 342– 45.

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cruelty with which prisoners of war were treated increased in proportion to the level with which the warriors were able to conceal their identities with methods such as war paint. As Jürgen Rehm and his colleagues were able to demonstrate, the wearing of uniforms or at least uniform elements of clothing in an army or at sporting events also promotes the incidence of violence towards the opponent.24 Deindividuation induces people to feel less responsibility for their actions due to the low probability of their being singled out for punishment.25 In a meta-analysis of more than 60 studies, Tom Postmes und Russell Spears26 established the correlation between deindividuation and the increasing extent to which a group standard is pursued. The presence of the other group members moves individuals to pursue group norms. It is the specific norms and the nature of the situation which determine whether deindividuation results in positive or negative behavior.27 Human action is determined by both a genetic predisposition and the singularity of brain development.28 Both influences make up 50 per cent of our personality. A third influence is the pre-birth and early post-birth affective emotional experiences, which contribute to around 30 per cent of our personality. The processes of socialization accounts for additional 20 per cent of our personality. This complex also comprises our culturallydetermined self-conception and the prevalent norms of behavior. Elements of these are possibly also strengthened in our neuronal structures. 24 Jürgen Rehm, Michael Steinleitner, and Waldemar Lilli, “Wearing uniforms and aggression: a field experiment,” European Journal of Social Psychology 17 (1987): 357–60. 25 See Edward Diener, “Deindividuation: the absence of self-awareness and selfregulation in group members,” in Psychology of group influence, ed. Paul B. Paulus (Hillsdale NJ.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1980), 209–42; Tom Postmes and Russell Spears, “Deindividuation and anti-normative behavior: a meta-analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 123 (1998): 238–59; Philip G. Zimbardo, “The human choice: individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuation, impulse and chaos,” in Nebraska symposium on motivation, eds. William J. Arnold and David Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969): 237–307. 26 Postmes and Spears, “Deindividuation”. 27 See Kenneth J. Gergen, Mary M. Gergen, and William H. Barton, “Deviance in the dark,” Psychology Today, (July 1973): 129–30; Robert D. Johnson and Leslie L. Downing, “Deindividuation and valence of cues: effects on prosocial and antisocial behaviour,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979): 1532–38. 28 See Gerhard Roth, Persönlichkeit, Entscheidung und Verhalten. Warum es so schwierig ist, sich und andere zu ändern (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 103–5.

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These highly inter-related factors are compounded by specific situations—circumstances which causes people to undertake a particular course of action. Moreover, this situation is influenced by the behavior of the power elites. “Systems create hierarchies of dominance with influence and communication going down—rarely up—the line.”29 Open societies ascribing each individual with responsibility for their actions and which use the jargon of freedom to establish binding norms—such as universal human rights—as the foundation of their action also tend to seek to protect their citizens from the situational forces resulting in de- individuation. In doing so, they tend to achieve higher civilizatory standards than closed and interdependent societies in which the individual is absorbed by the collective. Anonymity not coupled to the assumption of responsibility tends to promote a readiness to obedience and destructive behavior.30 Such behavior is usually accompanied by fear and legitimated by dubious virtues such as “soldierly manliness.”31 With the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 1948 and endorsed after the collapse of communism in 1989/90, the ideals of the so-called “free world” appeared to have triumphed. Nevertheless, the mood of optimism prevalent in these periods later gave way to sore disappointment. Often deformed by corruption, the perversion of justice, extreme social inequality, hunger, and torture, the non-Western democracies do not accord human rights the same weight as in Europe or North America.32 A decline in democratic convictions can even be observed in East-Central Europe. A number of autocratic systems— sometimes with the consent of their populations—view Western appeals for the observation of human rights as Trojan horses designed to further their own interests and advance the cause of Western imperialism. The prosperity of authoritarian states such as China often makes them a role model for threshold countries.33 For example, authoritarian states such as Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia (the governments of which repress free speech and censor the Internet) currently boast growth rates 29 Philip G. Zimbardo, The Lucifer effect. Understanding how good people turn evil (New York: Random House, 2007), 10 f. 30 See ibid., 219. 31 See Frank Werner, “‘Hart müssen wir hier draußen sein.’ Soldatische Männlichkeit im Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1944,” GuG 34 (2008): 5–40. 32 See Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That used to be us: how America fell behind in the world it invented and how we can come back (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 33 See also Niall Ferguson, Der Westen und der Rest der Welt. Die Geschichte vom Wettstreit der Kulturen (Berlin: Propyläen, 2011).

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amounting between 7.4 and 9.7 per cent. The economic stagnation traditionally associated with military dictatorships is increasingly being replaced by efficiency and growth. Many citizens are all to glad to trade “Western freedoms” for material security,34 education, and health provision. The Western world, rocked by a series of financial and economic crises, often falls into despondency; unhappy at what it perceives as the apparent predominance accorded to economics over politics. New conflicts over resources, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the increasing curtailment of social spending all serve to compound this feeling. Such developments are sure to exert an influence on the social behavior of people and doubtless not in a positive manner. Should these developments continue, the various and attractive chimera we maintain— ranging from the existence of a benign God to the existence of universal human rights—will begin to lose their attributive reality. A gently sloping path leading us from the “supposedly actual” via the “as if” will culminate in the disappearance of our socially-constructed reality.

34 Stefan Halper, The Beijing consensus: legitimizing authoritarianism in our time (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

INDEX A adrenaline. See hormones adrenocorticotropic hormone. See hormones advertising 162, 211, 317, 321, 323, 325-28 ageism 95 aggressive behavior. See behavior agnosia 192 alexithymia 17 altruism 149, 151, 153 f., 336, 338 f., 364 amnesia 17, 60 f., 67, 70, 72 186, 193-96, 199 amygdalae. See brain anthropology xvi, 53, 55, 158, 272 anti-Bolshevism 51 anti-Fascism 69 anti-Jewish 41, 46, 48, 100 anti-Semitism 17, 38, 42-45, 66, 81, 84 f., 96 f., 100-02, 279 philo-Semitism 98 secondary anti-Semitism 97 anti-social behavior. See behavior anti-Zionism 84 f., 98 art 27, 231, 305, 323, 341-44, 346 Asperger syndrome 227 association 9, 33-35, 42, 67, 91, 111 f., 116-18, 157 f., 160, 165, 182, 192, 196, 211, 230, 236, 238, 244, 265, 298, 312, 318 f., 322 f., 325 Association of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen ) 33, 34 atheism 352, 354 authority 3, 6, 8 f., 54, 71, 143, 151, 245, 340, 351, 353 authoritarian disposition 4

authoritarian personality 3 f., 9, 95 autism 227 f. autobiographical memory. See memory autonomic nervous system. See nervous system axon (nerve fiber). See neuron B basal ganglia. See brain basis emotions. See emotions behavior ix f., xiii, xvi, xviii, xix, 1, 3 f., 7, 9 f., 17, 28, 37, 52 f., 55, 60-64, 69, 74 f., 77-79, 81 f., 84, 86-93, 99 f., 103, 107, 112-14, 116, 120-22, 125, 130, 132, 137, 141, 143, 145, 149-52, 154, 156, 159-64, 166, 176, 180, 204 f., 210, 216 f., 219-21. 223-25, 246, 251 f., 258, 261, 263 f., 267-73, 278, 282 f., 289, 299 f., 304-06, 308 f., 311 f., 316, 318 f., 321 f., 326, 336-40, 347, 350 f., 356, 360 f., 363-67, aggressive 221, 223, 264, 268, 271 anti-social 225, 269, 271, 339, 361 collective 125, 132, 278 consumer behavior 308 destructive 366 egoistical 270, 338 emotional 28, 246 289, 316 irrational 309, 311 negative 87 f., 137, 365 neutral 88 positive 74, 87 f.

Neither Good Nor Bad social 93, 122, 149, 151, 154, 216, 225, 269, 271, 304, 336, 339, 361, 367 behaviorism 161, 163 f., 222 belief xi, 11, 43, 63, 78, 96, 101, 106, 112, 120 f., 139, 238, 273, 281, 298, 307, 327, 330-32, 342 f., 346 f., 350, 354, 357, 359, body-mind dichotomy xiv, 251 Bolshevik propaganda 64 borderline situation xix, 52 blatant prejudice. See prejudice blood oxygen level dependent 171 blue eyes/brown eyes training 142 brain ix, xiv-xvi, 2, 61, 63, 166-73, 176 f., 183, 185, 187, 191-93, 195-97 200 f., 202, 208-10, 213 f., 219 f., 226-28, 251-53, 255-58, 261-63, 268 f., 277, 284 f., 288 f., 291-96, 312, 318 f., 323-326, 333, 339 f., 346-50, 352, 365 amygdala 168 f., 189 f., 193, 211, 213-17, 256 f., 268, 271, 276 f., 288, 326, 339 basal ganglia 168, 170, 200-02, 213 f. brainstem 167 f., 170, 176, 200, 214, 292, 296 cerebellum 167 f., 170, 200-02, 227 f. cerebral cortex 166 f. 200-02, 204, 249, 285, 292, 308 cerebrum 257, 262 corpus callosum 168, 172, 228 cortex 166 f., 169 f., 177 f., 185, 192-96, 200-02, 204 f., 20609, 213 f., 116 f., 225-27, 249 f., 254, 256 f., 263, 268, 276, 285, 289, 292-94, 296, 308, 318 f., 325 f., 340, 348, 352 cortex insularis 257 diencephalon 196 dorsolateral orbitofrontal cortex 205 f., 209, 296

369

forebrain 196, 200, 202 fornix 196 frontal cortex 170, 192, 195 f., 213, 319, 340 frontal lobe 167, 170, 193, 196, 204 f., 216 f., 227 f., 255, 294, 349 gyrus/gyri 167 hypothalamus 169, 213, 253 f., 268, 288 interbrain 168, 253 locus coeruleus 169 medial orbitofrontal cortex 256, 325 midbrain 168 nucleus accumbens 169, 318, 323 occipital lobe 167, 170, 192, 294 orbitofrontal cortex 256, 268, 325 f. parietal lobe 167, 170, 192, 206, 294, 319, 349 piriform cortex 326 pituitary gland 254 prefrontal cortex 185, 195, 20409, 217, 268, 285, 289, 296, 318, 352 somatic marker 325 spinal cord 166-68, 170, 174, 200 sulcus/sulci 167 thalamus 167-70, 196, 200, 213, 268, 276, 284, 296 broken-heart syndrome 286 burnout 252, 258 bystander 1 f., 20, 149 f., 224 C Cannibalism xi, 361 f. categorization 74, 78-81, 110 f., 115, 121, 124-28, 145-47 cross-categorization 146 de-categorization 146 f. self-categorization 110, 124-26 social categorization 78 f., 121, 124, 126 f., 145 f. sub-categorization 81, 124 re-categorization 146 f.

370 category salience 126 CDU. See party cell body (soma). See neuron central nervous system. See nervous system cerebellum. See brain cerebral cortex. See brain chicken dilemma 119 f. chimpanzee 222 f., 313 f., 337, 361 Christianity 77, 122, 330 f., 333 f., 353 f. civil courage 9, 20, 104, 149, 151 f., 278 classical conditioning. See conditioning Clerical Nationalism. See nationalism cognition 165, 243, 257 f., 297, 308, 350 cognitive learning. See learning Cold War. See war collective behavior. See behavior. collective memory. See memory communication 119 f., 222, 225, 231-34, 252, 264, 285, 297, 299, 306, 316, 333 f., 33, 341, 366 communicative memory. See memory communism 41, 47, 279, 341, 366 comparative fit. See fit computed tomography 171 COMT gene 339 COMT-Met 339 COMT-Val 339 concentration camp 5, 47, 59, 233, 301 conceptual confusion xv condemnation 36 collective condemnation 36 conditioning 161, 163 f. , 212, 216, 218, 221, 223 f., 256, 281 classical conditioning 161,,pp,, 218 cultural conditioning 281 instrumental conditioning 257, 221, 223, 161, 212,

Index operant conditioning 163 consciousness ix, xi, xiv, 23, 130, 163, 169, 181, 187 f., 203, 210 f., 229, 236, 465, 469-76., 525, 534 f., 249, 257, 289, 291-295, 325, 330 f., 340, 348, 360 consumption 242, 256, 315, 317 f., 320 f. consumptional behavior. See behavior contact hypothesis 143 f. contiguity 157 contingency learning. See learning cooperation 53, 118 f., 136, 153, 291 f., 338, f. cooperative learning. See learning corpus callosum. See brain cortex . See brain cortex insularis. See brain corticotrophin-releasing hormone. See hormones cortisol. See hormones cross-categorization. See categotization cryptomnesia 186 cultural memory. See memory culture xx, 13 f., 19, 25, 28, 40, 46, 57, 74, 86, 91, 106, 116, 140, 142, 148, 183, 224 f., 229, 231 f., 236-38, 240 f., 243, 250, 252, 271, 281, 291, 295, 298 f., 301, 303, 306, 308, 320, 323, 330, 335 f., 341, 355, 359, 362-64 culture of memory 19 D D-Day 49 death 16 f., 27, 38, 41, 43, 48 f., 111, 119, 149, 193, 212 f., 244, 269, 281, 293, 301, 310, 331 f., 334, 337, 353 near-death experience 294 de-categorization. See categorization de-Nazification 59 dendrite. See neuron

Neither Good Nor Bad depersonalization 125 f. depression 3, 17, 24, 28, 30, 52, 61, 132, 134, 180, 183, 211 f., 225, 253, 255-59, 262, 267, 288 long-term depression 180 deprivation xvi, 130-32, 273 relative 130 destructive behavior. See behavior Die Linke. See party diencephalon. See brain discrepancy 10, 103, 112 f., 122, 130 f., 133 discrimination 69, 73 f., 78, 99 f., 108 f., 111 f., 114-17, 120, 123 f., 127 f., 133-35, 138, 141 f., 145 f., 153, 282, 356 E Eastern Bloc 22, 84 egoistical behavior. See behavior electroencephalogram 173, 256 electroencephalography 278 emotions ix, xi-xviii, xix, 99, 113 f., 131, 135, 150, 173, 210 f., 213, 217, 246-52. 256 f., 368, 273, 277, 279, 281, 288-90, 292, 296301, 305-07, 309, 311, 312, 31519, 320, 322, 325-27, 339 basis emotions 250 pre-emotion 250 primary cognitive 250 emotional learning. See learning empiricism 156-58 enslavement xi essentialism 91 estrogen. See hormones eugenics 160 evolution 2, 104, 158 f., 281 f., 291, 331, 336 f., 340, 346 f., 352 evolutionary biology xvi, 2 evolutionary psychology 2, 104 f., 361 execution xi, 10, 12, 63, 269, 353 experience ix, xi, xvi, xix, 8 f., 13, 15-18, 21-24, 26, 28 f., 34 f., 38, 59, 63, 68, 71-73, 82, 86, 90, 93,

371

100, 102, 104 f., 108, 111 f., 130 f., 133, 135-37, 148, 156-59, 161, 179-82, 184, 186-90, 199, 204, 212, 218-20, 231, 233, 235, 250-52, 256 f., 260, 264, 266, 268, 277, 286, 291, 293-296, 300, 308 f., 312, 314, 316, 321, 325, 329, 331, 333-35, 343, 347-51, 360, 365, emotional experiences ix, 277, 286, 316, 365 out of body experiences 293, 295 personal experience 182, 186, 218, 334 near-death experience 294 religious experience xvi, 321, 351 spiritual experiences 295, 347 subjective experience 250, 257, 291 traumatic experience 21, 23 f., 219 f., 260, expulsion 21, 31 f., 35, 117, 235, 256 extenuation 31, 61 F false memory. See memory family memory. See memory fascism 25, 35 f., 42, 69, 99 FDP. See party fear 3, 9, 17, 26, 33, 41, 59, 62, 75, 101, 120, 131, 133, 135, 137, 140, 143 f., 148, 150, 164, 188, 210, 212, 214, 216-19, 224, 240, 247, 249 f., 256, 258, 260 f., 268 f., 271 f., 276-81, 288, 291, 293, 296, 298 f., 301, 307, 322, 325, 338, 356, 361 f., 366 feminism 101 First Gulf War. See war First World War. See war five factor model 8 fit 80-82, 114, 126 f., 129, comparative 126 interpersonal 80 normative 80, 126 flashback 27, 188, 218

372 Foibe massacres 36 foreign group. See group forgetfulness 156, 185 fornix (bundle of fibres). See brain freedom ix, xviii, 27, 42, 60, 85, 141 f., 265, 320, 353, 357, 362, 366 f. frontal cortex. See brain frustration-aggression hypothesis 132 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 172-74, 183, 189, 193, 195, 217, 256, 269, 288, 291, 318, 349 G Ganser’s syndrome 17 GDR 18, 64 f., 67, 69-71, 84, 233, 326 genocide 10, 16, 38, 46, 49 f., 56 f., 273, 290, 364 genocide in Rwanda 10, 49 Gestapo 50, 64 glucocorticoids. See hormones God gene 349 Golem effect 93 group xii, 2, 10 f., 21 f., 35, 39 f, 42, 53 f., 58, 74, 77 f., 80-83, 86-95, 97-99, 101, 103-05, 107, 109-11, 113-30, 132-37, 139-49, 151-55, 190 f., 223-25, 229-31, 233, 236, 239, 241, 267, 269-73, 279, 282, 287, 290 f., 299, 303, 306-08, 312, 318, 320, 330-32, 337-39, 342 f., 346 f., 350 f., 355, 358-61. 363-65 disadvantaged group 130, 133 faith groups 308 in-group 74, 87-89, 99, 101 104, 106 f., 111, 113-15, 117, 11923, 126-30, 143, 146, 148 f. 154, 233, 239, 359 f., 363 f. marginal grouping 74 out-group 74, 87-89, 91, 99, 101, 111, 113 f., 116 f., 120, 122,

Index 127-30, 144, 146-49, 153 f., 272, 359, 364 sub-group 82 f., 109, 124 f., 147, 273 Gulf War. See war gyrus. See brain H hallucinations xvi, 187, 295 happiness 158, 177, 210, 249, 255, 263-67, 306, 313-15, 348 happiness hormone 255 histamine. See hormones historical science ix, xv, 42, 278, 296 f., 305, 320 Historikerstreit 48 historiography 19, 40, 45, 47 f., 238, 278 Hitler Youth 58, 61, 65 HIV 105 f., 135 Holocaust 10 f., 20 f., 38 f., 41-43, 46-48, 57, 59, 66, 97, 100, 235, 241 f., 280 Homo sapiens 61, 158, 330, 340 f. homosexuality 107 f. hormones 249, 252-55, 257 263, 267, 276, 319, adrenaline 175, 214-15, 218, 249, 253-54, 271 adrenocorticotropic hormone 253 corticotropin-releasing hormone 253-55 cortisol 252, 254 f., 257, 276, 285 dopamine 175, 254 f., 284, 319, 339 estrogen 282 glucocorticoids 215 histamine 175 melatonin 258, 267 noradrenalin 175, 214 f., 253 f., 256, 271, 284 oxytocin 284 f., 288 phenylethylamin 284 serotonin 175, 177, 256, 267, 271 sexual hormone 255, 269 sleep hormone 267

Neither Good Nor Bad stress hormones 212-16, 219, 249, 252, 254, f., 257, 260, 276, 288 testosterone 255, 269, 282 vasopressin 253, 285 humanism 12, 57, 110, 353 pre-war humanism 57 humanities xiv, xvii, 248 Hutus 49 hypothalamus. See brain I ideal self. See Self-assessment identification 17, 53, 75, 90, 111, 128, 130, 132, 135, 150, 155, 264, 290, 327, 335, 347 identity xi, 6, 32, 38, 62, 76, 86, 88, 103, 105, 107, 110-112, 121 f., 124, 126 f., 134, 140, 146-49, 181, 188, 222, 230, 232, 234, 236, 238 f., 241, 247, 323, 342 group identity 76, 86, 111, 140, 147, 149, 342 social identity 103, 105 110 f., 121, 122, 124, 127, 134, 146 f. theory of identity 88 imitation 220-23, 225-28 implicit learning. See learning imprisonment xi, 16, 22, 59, 63, 212, 256 in-group. See group instrumental conditioning. See conditioning interbrain. See brain interpersonal fit. See fit irrational behavior. See behavior J James-Lange theory 249 Jehovah`s Witnesses 103 Jews 10, 15, 17, 38, 40 f., 43, 46, 48, 57, 63, 83, 91, 96-98, 101 f., 104, 107, 279, 307, pro-Soviet Jew 100 Judaism 77, 107

373

K Korean War. See war knowledge ix, 54, 74, 78-80, 138, 157, 159, 161, 165, 180, 182, 185, 190, 192, 194, 224, 230 f., 234-36, 243, 292, 308, 351, 360 knowledge structures 74, 78 semantic knowledge 192 standardized cultural knowledge 54 stereotype-based knowledge 74 Kulturkampf xiii L lay theory 91 long-term depression. See depression long-term memory. See memory long-term potentiation. See potentation latent learning. See learning learning x, xix, 4, 68, 86, 144 f., 156-58, 160-68, 173 f., 179 f., 182 f., 191, 193, 195, 198 f., 201 f., 210, 212-14, 216, 218, 220-24, 227, 245, 252, 256, 261, 263, 266, 271, 292, 306, 351 f. contingency learning 86 cooperative 145 emotional 210, 212 f., 216 implicit 198 latent 164, 224 social 220, 222-24, 340 liberators 49 linguistic category model 88 locus coeruleus. See brain M machinery of destruction 12 magnetic resonance tomography 171-73 marginal grouping. See group marketing campaign 319 massacre xii, 36, 46 f., 72, 302 mass execution 12 mass murder 10, 26, 36, 57

374 materialized spirit xiv melatonin. See hormones memory xviii, 4, 8, 17, 19, 23, 31, 38, 42, 60, 63, 70, 77-80, 85 f., 98, 100, 156 f. 160, 164-69, 173, 177, 180-91, 193-97, 199-201, 203-05, 207-11, 213-16, 219, 223, 229-38, 240-45, 251, 256, 261, 263 f., 277, 288, 305, 318, 331 f., 352 autobiographical 17, 168, 181 f. collective 211, 229-32, 236, 238, 244 communicative 231 f., 235 cultural 85, 231-33, 235 f., 238, 241 episodic 180, 182, 193 f., 209, 216 false 23, 187, 189,194 family memory 19, 235 implicit 80, 181, 235 long-term memory 183, 190, 195, 203, 209 semantic 180-82, 191, 197, 199, 204 short-term memory 165, 183, 203 f. skill memory 181 social 229, 235 working memory 185, 203-05, 207-09 memory politics 237, 240 memory research 160, 182, 229, 234, 242 mereological fallacy xv Milgram experiment 6, 8 mind-body dichotomy. See body-mind dichotomy monotheism. See religion moral existentialism 107 moral value 5 f., 340 motivation xii, xv, 12, 32, 51, 82, 88 f., 112 f., 122, 128, 133, 152, 154 f., 163, 223, 251, 259, 273 f., 285, 304, 306, 309-11, 318, 344, 358

Index motorical nerveous system. See nerveous system mourning xi, 4, 242, 293, 314 period of mourning xi, 314 myth 35, 42, 44, 69, 76 f., 109, 138, 140, 241, 244, 295, 354 Grunwald myth 77 mythology xiv, 76, 84 mythology of the brain xiv N narratives ix, xvii, 39, 20, 46, 49, 63, 76 f, 210, 232, 237 f., 240 f., 246 f., 251, 265, 332, 348, 360 narrative of Tannenberg 77 national narratives 77, 240 Nationalism 100, 102, 110, 139, 141 Clerical Nationalism 102 National Socialism 2, 12, 37, 50, 57, 69 f., 84, 99, 307 nativism 156 naturalism xiv, 293 natural sciences xiv Nazi crime 5, 69 Nazi morality 5 Nazi system 5 negative behavior. See behavior nerve fiber (axon). See neuron nervous system 166, 168, 170, 174, 213 f., 252-54, 289 autonomic 213 f. central 166 peripheral 166, 168 neurobiology xvii, 189, Neuro-Imperialism xiv neurology xi neuromodulator 176, 271 neuron 166, 173-77, 179 f., 192, 194, 200-02, 205 f., 209, 213 f., 225-28, 252, 319 axon 174, 176 cell bodies (soma) 174, 176, 262 dendrite 174 mirror neurons 225-28, 319 presynaptic 174, 176 f., 179 f. refractory period 176

Neither Good Nor Bad neurophysiology xiv neuroscience xv, 166, 173, 177, 191, 235, 251 f., 263, 276, 297, 305 neurotransmitter 174, 176 f., 179, 214, 277, 284, 288 neutral behavior. See behavior noradrenalin. See hormones normative fit. See fit nucleus accumbens. See brain NSDAP 33, 60 f., 64-66, 279 Nudge Theory 309 Nuremburg race laws 59 O occipital cortex. See brain occupation xiv, 40, 43, 45, 58 operant conditioning. See conditioning orbitofrontal cortex. See brain ougth self . See self-assessment out of body experience. See experience oxytocin. See hormones P parietal lobe. See brain party 10, 33, 35, 41, 45, 51, 64 f., 67, 77 f., 104, 108, 117, 121 f., 124, 128, 138, 148, 316, 322, 358, 360 Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) 32, 34, 67, 117 f., 123, 138, 358-60 Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) 32 f. Die Linke 67 Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) 34, 117 f., 358 Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) 67 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 67, 104, 116-18, 123, 307, 358 peer pressure 9, 54 perception ix, xvii, 25, 57, 74 f., 78 f., 81, 84, 86-89, 92 f., 97,

375

115, 120, 123-25, 127, 129, 13034, 144 f., 150, 155, 164, 167, 188, 204 f., 217, 234 f., 243, 24951, 254, 257, 259, 264, 266, 273, 275, 280, 284, 289, 292, 294, 296, 299, 301, 305, 311, 319, 321 f., 326, 331, 333 f., 341, 348, 352, 358, 360, 362 f. peripheral nervous system. See nervous system perpetrator xi f., xv, xix, 1 f., 4-6, 10-15, 17-21, 25, 31, 35 f., 38, 40, 45, 49-51, 53 f., 59, 71, 105, 151, 190 f., 218, 271, 274 perpetrator-victim complex xix perpetrator-victim paradigm 17, 49 personality test 8 person-group discrepancy 133 phenylethylamin. See hormones philo-Semitism. See anti-Semitism philosophy xiv f., 157, 159, 346 phobia 218, 275, 288 pituitary gland). See brain polytheism. See religion positive behavior. See behavior. positron 172, 256 Positron emission tomography (PET) 172-74, 208, 256 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 17, 22 f., 26-30, 188 f., 217, 219 f., potentiation 174, 179 f., 214 long-term potentiation 174, 179 f., 214 pre-emotions. See emotions prefrontal cortex. See brain prejudice xi, xiv, xix, 5, 38 f., 48, 58, 73-78, 81, 93-96, 98-101, 108-11, 116, 120, 129, 134 f., 138, 141-46, 148, 153, 155, 191 blatant prejudice 99 ethnic 95 explicit 96 implicit 94, 96 socially-ostracized prejudices 81

376 subtle prejudice 99 f. presynaptic neuron. See neuron pre-war humanism. See humanism prisoner dilemma 118 psychological disorder 17 psychology ix, xi, 30, 54 76, 104, 158, 160, 162, 250, 265, 308, 361 psychology of religion 308 psychopathological personality 2 Pygmalion effect 93 R racism 45, 81, 95-97, 110 rape xi f., 10, 21, 24, 55, 57, 191 reaction, xii, xix 8 f., 78, 81, 93, 95 f., 106 f., 113, 115, 122, 131, 134, 155, 161-64, 167, 170, 176 f., 179 f., 194, 198, 201 f., 204 f., 210-14, 217-19, 223, 228, 249-51, 253-55, 263 f., 268 f., 276 f., 281, 289 f., 300, 312, 316, 325 f., 333, 338, re-categorization 146 f. Red Army 19, 49 relative deprivation. See deprivation religion x, xvi, xix, 7, 101, 121, 130, 242, 274, 295, 308, 314, 324, 329-33, 335 f., 341, 343 f., 346 f., 349-51, 353-57 monotheism 355 polytheism 355 religious studies xvi, 330 REM sleep 257, 296 reproduction 159, 220, 222, 281, 283, 331 resistance 34, 42, 44 f., 51, 55, 63 f., 70, 114, 153, 255, 271, 279, 296 nation in resistance 44 Right-Wing-Authoritarianism-Scale 4 ritual xi, 5, 12, 36 f., 57, 148, 234 f., 237 f., 240 f., 244, 275, 286, 299302, 306, 311, 324, 331, 341, 343 f., 346, 348-50 Roman Catholic doctrine 36

Index S salience effect 77 sleep hormone. See hormones seasonal affective disorder 267 Second World War. See war self-assessment 115 actual self 112 ideal self 112 ought self 112 self-awareness 331, 337, 341 self-categorization 110, 124, 126 self-concept ix, xiv, 9, 42, 88, 122, 181, 250, 347, 357, 360, 362, 364 f. self-confidence 278 self-esteem 88, 105 f., 122-24, 127, 134, 259 self-fulfilling prophecy 92 self-worth 123, 303 semantic memory. See memory sensory nervous system. See nerve systems serotonin. See hormones sexism 95 f., 110 sexual hormone. See hormones sexual humiliation 57 sexual violence. See violence sexuality 107 f., 135, 281 f., 284 Shoah 36, 242 Sinti and Roma 107 Six Day War. See war social behavior. See behavior social categorization. See categorization social distinction. See distinction Social Dominance Orientation scale 110 Social Dominance Theory 109 f., 213 social learning. See learning social memory. See memory social sciences xvii, 55, 159, 248, 272, 293 socialism 68 f., 84, socialization xviii, 9-11, 148, 181, 250, 301, 308, 351, 365

Neither Good Nor Bad 6ROLGDUQRĞü soma (cell body) See neuron somatic markers. See brain SPD. See party spinal cord. See brain Stalinism 47, 100, 241 Stalinist secret service 48 Stanford Prison Experiment 53 Stasi 18, 67, 69, 71 Steady-State Topography 318 stereotypes xvii, xix, 34, 41, 54, 7378, 80-83, 85-87, 89-95, 98, 101, 109, 120, 125-27, 135, 138-41, 145 f., 148 f., 235 stereotyping 74, 77, 78, 81-83, 90, 92 f., 120, 125 f., 129, 138, 143, 148 automatic 81 f. gender 148 sub-stereotyping 82 stigma 103-08, 133 stigmatization 103-06, 138 stimulus sampling theory 164 Stone Age cave paintings 341 f. stress 12, 17, 22, 28, 53, 56, 132, 135, 152, 163, 188, 212-20, 249, 252-61, 276 f., 285 f., 288, 310 f., 349, 351m stress hormone. See hormones subconscious xi, 187, 293, 300, 317 f., 323, 327, 336, 348 sub-group. See group subtle prejudice. See prejudice sulcus/sulci. See brain T temporal cortex . See brain testosteron. See hormones thalamus. See brain Third Reich 2 f., 13, 25 f., 34 f., 39, 42, 48, 51, 56 f., 59, 63-65, 104, 152, 234, 240 f., 307 theology xvi f., 159, 330 torture xi, 7-9, 51, 253, 256, 366 transcranial magnet stimulation 177

377

trauma 13 f., 16, 18-24, 31-27-30, 41, 51, 186-88, 195, 202, 211, 219 f., 256, 260 f. 289, truth modulation 62 Tutsi 49 two factor model 82 U United Nations 239 V values xii, 3, 5 f., 9 f., 13, 23, 52, 55 f., 96, 99, 101, 103, 106, 111, 114, 120-22, 125 f., 129, 141-43, 149, 151, 154, 182, 243, 255, 273, 275, 299, 306, 309, 311 f., 314, 316, 323 f., 327, 330 f., 340 f., 344, 351, 356, 359 vasopressin. See hormones victim xii, xix, 1, 5, 7 f., 11 f., 1821, 24-26, 31 f., 34-40, 42, 45 f., 49-51, 57, 59, 64, 71, 84, 93, 133-35, 149, 151, 154 f., 188, 190 f., 218 f., 234, 241, 261, 269, 274, 289 f., 362, 364 victim-perpetrator paradigm 45, 218 victimhood 19, 36, 38 f., 42, 46, competitive victimhood 38 Polish victimhood 42 victimization 45 Vietnam War. See war Vietnam veterans 26 f. violence xi f., 8, 11, 13, 15, 21, 24, 48 f., 54, 57, 70, 108, 142, 15052, 221, 225, 264, 268, 271-75, 278 f., 365 sexual 49, 57 W war 1, 3-6, 11, 13, 17, 20-27, 30-33, 35, 37-38, 41 f., 45, 47, 49, 51, 57 f., 63-66, 70, 76, 84 f., 98, 100, 102, 104, 132, 212, 220, 229, 239, 241, 256, 279 f., 298, 300 f., 303, 307, 314, 347, 350, 355, 365

Index

378 Cold War 6, 42, 64, 100, 279 f. First World War 280, 298, 300, 307 Franco-Prussian War 300 Gulf war 27 Korean War 26 Second World War 1, 11, 16, 20, 22, 26, 38, 41 f., 47, 63, 229, 239 Six Day War 84

Vietnam war 27 Wehrmacht 13, 26, 59 Weimar Republic 4, 278, 307 working memory. See memory X xenophobia 97 f., 101, 110, 139 Z Zionism 84

Index of Persons A Accati, Luisa 36 Adenauer, Konrad 5, 59 Adorno, Theodor W. 3 f. Albert, Hans 352 f. Allport, Gordon W . 73, 94, 101, 108, 143 Altemeyer, Bob 4 Aly, Götz 307 Anders, Günther 57 Anderson, Eric 137 Anderson, James 377 Anderson, Michael 195 Appelt, Ingo 355 Appiah, Kwame Anthony 304 Arendt, Hannah 16 f. Ariely, Dan 309 f., 312 f. Aristotle 156-58 Arnsten, Amy f. T. 185 Assmann, Jan 231 f., 235, 354 Aust, Stefan 136 B Baár, Monika 85 Baddeley, Alan D. 203, 206 Banaji, Mahzarin R. 110 Bandelow, Borwin 272 Bandura, Albert 220-23 Barret, Justin 335 Bartlett, frederic 184 Batson, C. Daniel 151 Bauer, Joachim 264 Beauvois, Jean-Léon 8

Becker, Boris 328 Becker, Gerold 105 %HFN-y]HI Beckam, David 328 Beevor, Antony 49 Bégue, Laurent 8 f. Beltrán, Antonio 342 Bender, Peter 71 Benedict XVI. See Ratzinger, Joseph Benedict of Nursia 244 Beneš, Edvard 35 Bentzien, Hans 65 Benz, Wolfgang 97 Berek, Mathias 236 Berger, Klaus 106 Beust, Ole von 107 Biedermann, Klaus 18 Bieri, Peter 360 Birthler, Marianne 71 Blair, Tony 302 Blanke, Olaf 294 Boesch, Christophe 337 Boetticher, Christian 138 Bormann, Martin 50 Bormann, Patrick 280 Bosl, Karl 63 Bower, Gordon 164 Boyer, Pascal 332, 351 Brähler, Elmar 22 f. Braithwaite, Jason 295 Brandt, Willy 104, 302 Bransch, Günter 67

Neither Good Nor Bad Breivik, Anders Behring xii Brendl, Miguel 122 Brewer, Marilynn B. 155 Brooks, David xii Browning, Christopher 9 f., 182 Bruder, franziska 46 Buggle, franz 353 Burger, Jerry M. 7 f. Burke, Peter 235 Bush, George W. 280 Buss, Arnold H. 6 Buss, David 2 C Cahill, Larry 210 Caldwell-Harris, Catherine L. 348 Campbell, Donald T. 116 Capron, Christiane 262 Cesarani, David 16 Chrisjohn, Roland D. 151 Churchill, Winston 35, 240 Ciombi, Luc 307 Clark, francis 244 Clement, Wolfgang 117 Clinton, Bill 302 Connerton, Paul 236, 242 Copernicus 156 D Damasio, Antonio R. 251, 292, 324, 338 d’Aquili, Eugene 349 Darley, John 150 f. Darwin, Charles 156, 158f., 248, 289, 297, Darwin, Erasmus 158, 160 Davies, Norman 47 f., 130 Dawkins, Richard 282, 347, 351, 353 Dennet, Daniel xv, 350 Derrida, Jacques 358 Descartes, René 157 f., 249, Dewey, John 289 Diem, Carl 66 Dion, Kenneth L. 109

379

Domschke, Katharina 227 Ducke, Karl Heinz 67 Dudai, Yadin 189 Dunbar, Robin 137 Durkheim, Émile 229, 344 Duyme, Michel 262 E Ebbinghaus, Hermann 160 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus 283 Eichmann, Adolf 16 f. Eisenegger, Christoph 339 Eitler, Pascal 308 f. Ekman, Paul 246 Elias, Norbert 298 Elms, Alan 9 Endert, Elke 307 Esch, Michael G. 56 Estes, William K. 164 Everett, Daniel 264 F Farah, Martha 192 Febvre, Lucien 298 Fehr, Ernst 312 Fekken, G. S. Cynthia 151 Fest, Joachim C. 16, 51 Filbinger, Hans 60 Fischer, André 263 Fischer, Peter 152 Fitts, Paul M. 200 f. Flaig, Egon 47 Folger, Robert 131 Ford, Harold 322 Fox, Nathan A. 256 Freiberger, Thomas 280 Frenkel-Brunswik, Else 3 f. Freud, Sigmund 156, 159, 318 Frevert, Ute 296-99, 301, 303-05 Freyberger, Harald J. 14-17 Freyberger, Hellmuth 14-17 Frey, Dieter 152 Frick, Wilhelm 279 Fried, Johannes 23, 242 Friedrich, Stefan 273 Fuster, Joaquin 205

380 G Galilei, Galileo 156 Gall, franz Josep 313 Galton, francis 160 Gathmann, Peter 3 Gauck, Joachim 71 Gazzaniga, Michael 360 Geertz, Clifford 344 Geil, Joachim 13 Genovese, Kitty 149 Georgopoulos, Apostolos P. 177 Gersony, Robert 50 Geyer, Christian xiv Ghiselin, Michael 361 Gilbert, Gustave M. 1 Gladstone, William Ewart 240 Globke, Hans 31, 59, 63 f. Gniechwitz, Susanne 98 Goffman, Erving 103, 106 Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah 2, 10 Goltermann, Svenja 26 Gomes, Christina M. 337 Goodall, Jane 361 Göring, Hermann 1 Granqvist, Peer 347 Grass, Günter 61 Gray, John 353 f. Greiner, Bernd 279 f. Gross, Jan T. 40-42 Gross, Raphael 5 *UXG]LĔND-Gross, Irena 42 Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich 25 Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor zu 302, 324, 359 H Habermas, Jürgen xiv, 47 Hacker, Peter M. S xv Hahn, Eva 34 Hahn, Hans Henning 34, 138-40 Halbwachs, Maurice 229 231, 233 Hamann, Katharina 337 Harding, Sian 286 Hare, Robert D. 269

Index Haslam, S. Alexander 53 Haslinger, Peter 32 Hauser, Marc 336, 340, 361 Heinlein, Michael 20 Heinrichs, Markus 288 Helbing, Dirk 176 Henry IV. 244 Hentig, Hartmut von 105 Herrmann, Christoph 152 Hertz, Aleksander 43 f. Heß, Rudolf 1 Higgins, Tory E. 112-14 Himmler, Heinrich 15, 50 Himmler, Katrin 15 Hirsch, Helga 33 Hitch, Graham J. 203 Hitler, Adolf 2 f., 5, 23, 31, 35, 39, 43, 50, 58, 61, 212, 306 f. Holton, Gerald 24 Hull, Clark 162 Hull, William L. 16 Hurlemann, René 288 Hüther, Gerald 265 I Ingrao, Christian 11 f. Issa, Jean-Pierre 263 J Jagow, Bettina von 12 Jahn, Roland 71 James, William 158, 248 f., 251, 289 Janich, Peter xiii f. Jaspers, Karl 67 Jauss, Hans Robert 25 Jefferson, Thomas 158 Jensen, Keith 313 Jens, Tilman 61 Jens, Walter 61 Jirtle, Randy 261 Johnson, Eric A. 50 Jonides, John 208 Jost, John T. 110 Judt, Tony 265 Junge, Traudl 23, 211

Neither Good Nor Bad Junker, Thomas 287, 346 f., 350 Jureit, Ulrike 25, 233 K Kabila, Laurent 50 Kachelmann, Jörg 191 Kagame, Paul 49 f. Kaiserová, Kristina 32 Kalyvas, Stathis 241 Kandel, Eric 202 Kantarjian, Hagop 263 Kennedy, John f. 119 Kernberg, Otto 14 Keßler, Mario 84 Keysers, Christian 227 Kiehl, Kent 269 Kieres, Leon 40 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 60 Kissler, Alexander 353 f. Kittel, Manfred 31-34 Kleef, Gerben A. van 289 Knaevelsrud, Christine 23 Krach, Sören 339 Krakowski, Shmuel 50 Khrushchev, Nikita 119 .U]HPLĔVNL,UHQHXV], 96, 101 Kühnel, Sina 189 Kühner, Angela 20, 240 Küng, Hans 117 Kuwert, Philipp 23 L LaBauve, Bill J. 28 Lakeberg, Beata Dorota 140 Lange, Carl 248 f., 251 Lapierre, Coady B. 28 Latané, Bibb 150 f. Lease, Gary 329 LeDoux, Joseph 249, 276 Leggewie, Claus 241 f. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 158 Leimgruber, Kristin 304 Lelewel, Joachim 103 Lempart, Matthias 33 f. Levinson, Daniel J. 3 f.

381

Limpert, Robert 63 Linden, David J. 348 Lindstrom, Martin 318, 321, 324 f. /LSVNL-y]HI Locke, John 157, 160 Lømo, Terje 179 Longerich, Peter 15 Lotter, Maria-Sibylla 250 Lübbe, Hermann 4, 69, 302 Lüdemann, Gerd 117 Lupien, Sonia J. 257 M Macaulay, Thomas Babington 77 Madajczyk, Piotr 33 Maercker, Andreas 22 f., Major, John 301 Margraf, Jürgen 277 Marr, Wilhelm 97 Marsovszky, Magdalena 45 Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor 72 McClelland, Jay 192 McCrea, Robert 8 Meaney, Michael 259-61 Mechtenberg, Theo 75 Meertens, Roel W. 99 Meier, Christian 70 f. Merkel, Angela 118, 124 Merz, friedrich 117 Metzinger, Thomas 293, 295 Michalczyk, Andrzej 76 Michel, Judith 280 Milgram, Stanley 6-10, 53 Milinski, Manfred 338 Miller, Courtney 261 Miller, Daniel 320 Miller, Geoffrey 340 Miller, George 165 Mitscherlich, Alexander 4 Mitscherlich, Margarete 25 Molaison, Henry G. (HM) 193 Moller, Sabine 234, 236, Morris, Desmond 284, 287 Mullen, Brian 364 Müller, Christian Th. 279 Mummendey, Amélie 114, 129

382 Munzlinger, Christoph 29 N Neitzel, Sönke 57 Newberg, Andrew 349 Niethammer, Lutz 233 Nietzsche, friedrich 156 Noll, Thomas 270 Nolte, Ernst 47 f. Nosek, Brian A. 110 Novick, Peter 39 Nowak, Martin 338 Nussbaum, Martha 251 O Oberländer, Theodor 31 Oberlé, Dominique 8 Oesterreich, Detlef 9 Okimoto, Tyler G. 303 Olick, Jeffrey K. 232, 236 P Packard, Vance 317, 321 Packer, Dominic J. 7 Paleczek, Raimund 33 f. Pavlov, Iwan 160 f., 163, 166 Pope Benedict XVI. See Ratzinger, Joseph Pastior, Oskar 362 Paul, Sabine 346 Paulus, frieder 339 Persinger, Michael A. 347 Petermann, Axel 13 Pettigrew, Thomas f. 99, 147 Pieper, Henning 11 Plato 157 f., Plauen, Michael 152 Postmes, Tom 365 Pratto, felicia 109 Pufelska, Agnieszka 46, 100 R Rademacher, franz 66 Raff, Walther 66 Rand, David G. 291

Index Ratzinger, Joseph (Benedict XVI.) 37, 244 f., 352 Rause, Vince 349 Reckwitz, Andreas 323 Reese, Dagmar 61 Rehm, Jürgen 365 Reicher, Stephen 53 Reich-Ranicki, Marcel 48 Renfro, C. Lausanne 120 Rensmann, Lars 100 Retzer, Arnold 267 Reuter, Martin 339 Reynolds, Craig 111 Richeson, Jennifer 147 Rifkin, Jeremy 290 Rizzolatti, Giacomo 225 Rokeach, Milton 141 Römer, felix 51, 58 Roosevelt, franklin D. 35 Rosenwein, Barbara 299 Rotfeld, Adam Daniel 40 Roth, Gerhard xiv Ruchniewicz, Krzysztof 33, 40 Rumelhart, David 165 Rushton, J. Philipp 151 S Sabrow, Martin 19 Sadkowski, Konrad 102 Sandel, Michael J. 321 Sanderson, Stephen K. 355 Sanford, R. Nevitt 3 Schabowski, Günter 68 Schachter, Stanley 401 f. Scheer, Monique 308 Scherrer, Pascal 270 Schifferstein, Hendrik 322 Schilder, Peter 358 Schiller, Kai 59 Schirach, ferdinand von 12-14 Schlink, Bernhard 12-14 Schlöder, Bernd 95 Schmid, Wilhelm 267 Schmidt, Anne 296 Schmidt, Helmut 353 Schnabel, Ulrich 358

Neither Good Nor Bad Schnädelbach, Herbert 356 f. Schnarch, David 286 Schneider, Christian 25 f. Schneider, Christoph 53-55 Schneider, Ernst see Hans Schwerte Schoeps, Julius H. 100 Schönfeld, Sabine 30 Schrage, Dominik 320 Schröder, Richard 71 Schwan, Gesine 68 Schwartz, Michael 34 Schwartz, Shalom H. 154 Schwarz, Hans-Peter 64 Schwegler, Andria f. 28 Schwenn, Johann 191 Schwerte, Hans 66 Searle, John xv Seehofer, Horst 36 Seger, Charles R. 136 Seligman, Martin E. P. 212, 265 Selzer, Michael 50 Shelton, Nicole 147 Sherif, Muzafer 116, 143 Shirer, William L. 306 Sidanius, Jim 109 Simon, Herbert A. 156, 165 Singelis, Ted 363 Singer, Jerome 249 Singer, Tania 291 Singer, Wolf VII, x Skinner, Burrhus f. 162 f. Slaby, Jan xv Slemrod, Joel 310 Sloterdijk, Peter 37 Smith, Edward 208 Snyder, Timothy 38, 48 Sonnert, Gerhard 24 Spaemann, Robert 352 Spears, Russell 365 Spinney, Russell A. 278 f. Spitzer, Manfred 340 Stalin, Joseph 35 Stangneth, Bettina 16 Steinbach, Erika 32 f. Stephan, Walter G. 120 Stolpe, Manfred 67

383

Stoltenberg, Jens xii Straus, Scott 10 Strauß, franz Joseph 104 Strauss-Kahn, Dominique 191 Sunstein, Cass 309 Sweat, David 261 Szarota, Tomasz 32 Szyf, Moshe 261 T Tajfel, Henri 79, 110 f., 114 f., 121, 143 Taves, Ann 308 Taylor, Jill B. 257 Taylor, Shelley E. 79 Thaler, Richard 309 Thomson, Donald 191 Thorndike, Edward 161 f. Tolman, Edward 163 f. Tomasello, Michael 313 Tschugnall, Karoline 234, 236 Tulving, Endel 180, 182 Tunnel, Harry 55 Turkheimer, Eric 262 Turner, John C. 110 f. 121, 143 U Ungváry, Kristián 33 V Vaillant, George E. 266 Vogüé, Adalbert de 244 Vul, Edward 173 W Waal, frans de 336, 339, 361 Waldzus, Sven 129 Walter, Dierk 279 Warburg, Aby 231 Waterland, Robert 261 Watson, John 161 f. Watson, Robert 364 Wawrzyniak, Joanna 42 Wedekind, Claus 338 Wehner, Herbert 104

Index

384 Welzer, Harald 10, 19 f., 53, 57, 152, 234-36 Wenzel, Michael 129 Westerwelle, Guido 107 Wettlaufer, Jörg 338 f. Whiten, Andy 222 Wilson, David S. 343 Wilson, Edward O. 343 Wilson, Woodrow 35 Winkler, Heinrich August 47 Withermuth, Scott S. 136 Wittchen, Hans-Ulrich 30

Wohlgethan, Achim 30 Wowereit, Klaus 107 f., 138 Wulff, Christian 359 Z Zajonc, Robert B. 326 Zayas, Alfred M. de 31 Ziegler, Suzanne 145 Zimbardo, Philip G. 1, 21, 51-54, 249 Zunke, Christine xiv

Index of Places A Abu Ghraib. See Iraq Afghanistan 28-30, 55, 302 Africa 144, 302, 309 Congo 49 f. Ethiopia 366 Madagascar 43 Uganda 366 Rwanda 10 f., 49, 56 f., 366 South Africa 144 Sudan 56 Ansbach. See Germany Asia 154, 281, 363 Auschwitz. See Poland Aussig. See Ústi nad Labem Australia 23 Austria 16, 24, 37, 310, 345 Willendorf 345 B Baden-Württemberg. See Germany Baltic States 241 Bavaria. See Germany Belarus 40 Berlin. See Germany Bonn. See Germany Bosnia-Herzegovina 55 Boston. See United States of America Brandenburg. See Germany

Bremen. See Germany C California. See United States of America Canada 23 Central Europe 107 Chile. See South America Cologne. See Germany Congo. See Africa Cuba 119 Prague 84 Ústi nad Labem 10 D Denmark 44, 73, 264 Sønderborg 73 Dresden. See Germany E East Asia 154 East-Central Europe 59, 100, 366 East Germany 59, 70 Eastern Europe 63, 525 Erfurt. See Germany Ethiopia. See Africa Europe xi, xiii, 10, 16 f., 34 f., 3840, 45, 47 f., 59, 68, 84, 97, 100, 107, 120, 126, 129 f., 137, 144, 154, 158 239-42, 244, 263, 266,

Neither Good Nor Bad 275, 297 f., 308 f., 320, 322, 325, 353, 360, 366, F France 44 f., 204, 303 La Cambe 37 Normandy 49 Paris 239, 325, G Germany xii f., 4-6, 10 12, 18 f., 2226, 29-35, 37-40, 42 f., 45, 47-49, 51, 57- 60, 65-67, 69-71, 75-77, 84 f., 87, 97 f., 101, 103 f., 10608, 116 f., 122 f., 129, 131 f., 138-41, 146, 149, 204, 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, 239-41, 266, 274, 279-81, 301-04, 307, 310, 312, 324, 355, 385, 360 Ansbach 63 Baden-Württemberg 60 Bavaria 35, 104 Berlin xv, 4, 29, 84, 108, 204, 274, 304 Bonn 64, 71 Brandenburg 67 Bremen 13, 304 Cologne 306 Dresden 23, 30 Erfurt 278 Göttingen 263, 272 Hamburg 266 Heidelberg 106, 231 Leipzig 291 Munich 152, 295 Nuremberg 88, 239 Saxony 67 Thuringia 65, 67 279 Great Britain 117, 204 London 43, 58, 239, 274, 280 H Hamburg. See Germany Heidelberg. See Germany Hindu Kush 29 Hungary 45, 241

385

I Iraq 28 f. Abu Ghraib 55 Israel 38, 84 f., 102 Jerusalem 16 f. Italy 35 f., 44 f., 49, 119 J Japan 281 Jedwabne. See Poland Jerusalem. See Israel K Kashubia. See Poland Katyn 47 L La Cambe. See france Leipzig. See Germany Leningrad. See Russia London. See Great Britain Lublin. See Poland M Madagascar. See Africa Mexico 23 Moscow. See Russia Munich. See Germany N New York. See United States of America Netherlands 66 The Hague 239 f. North America. See United States of America Normandy. See france Norway 44, 264 f. Nuremberg. See Germany P Paris. See france Pacific Islands 29 Poland 10, 38-43, 47 f., 75 f., 96, 100, 102 f., 140, 241, 302 Auschwitz 10, 12, 37, 70, 97

386 Grunwald 77 Jedwabne 40 Kashubia 39 Lublin 102 Warsaw 38, 40, 43, 46, 48, 84, 302 Pomerania 39 Portugal 23 Prague. See Czech Republic Prussia 102, 300 Tannenberg 77 R Rwanda. See Africa Russia 35, 38, 47, 76, 102 f., 160, 302 Leningrad 48, 362 Moscow 84 Stalingrad 30 Workuta 47 S Saxony. See Germany Serbia 56 f. Silesia 39 Slovenia 36, 46 Sønderborg. See Denmark South Africa. See Africa South America South-East Europe 241 Soviet Union 19, 47 f., 119, 241 Spain 241 Stalingrad. See Russia Sudan. See Africa Sweden 44, 264 f., 360 Switzerland 23, 264 f. Chile 67, 362 Sudetenland 35 Syria 67

Index T Tannenberg. See Prussia Texas. See United States of America The Hague. See the Netherlands Thuringia. See Germany Turkey 119 U Uganda. See Africa Ukraine 10, 46, 48, 96, 361 United States of America (USA) 6 f., 24, 26, 28 f., 30 39, 44, 49, 55, 63 f., 93, 95, 102 f., 119 f., 135, 141, 157 f., 161, 178, 184, 266, 280, 308, 317 f., 321 f., 363 f. Boston 262 California 7 New York 149, 276, 322, Texas 28 Washington 64 Upper Silesia 39 Ústi nad Labem. See Czech Republic V Vietnam 26 f., 220 W Warsaw. See Poland Washington. See United States of America Western Europe 38, 100, 275, 320 West Germany 65, 233 Willendorf. See Austria Workuta. See Russia Y Yugoslavia 11, 55 f.