Naturalism and deontology: An Essay on the Problems of Ethics [Reprint ed.] 9027932336, 9789027932334

Table of contents :
Errata
Dedication
Preface
Contents
I Introductory
II Protreptic Logic
III How to Prove the Principle of Utility
IV The Searlian Challenge
V Postlogue
Bibliography
Index of Names

Citation preview

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY XXVII

NATURALISM AND DEONTOLOGY An Essay on the Problems of Ethics by D. A. R O H A T Y N

Roosevelt University Chicago, Illinois

1975 MOUTON THF. H A G U E • P A R I S

©Copyright 1975 in The Netherlands Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 73-92240

ISBN: 90 279 3233 6

Rohatyn: Naturalism and Deontology:

ERRATA

p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p. p.

32, 51, 86, 98, 98, 99, 102, 102, 103, 119,

1. 19, delete extreme left-hand bracket from the logical formula fn. 120, read 'prepositions' as 'prop.ositions' 1. 14, change last word on line from 'to' to 'now' fn. 81, 5th line, read'Searly'as'Searle' fn. 81,1. 10, read 'Promising' as 'promising' 1. 5, delete the word 'a' fn. 94, 3rd line, read 'dagmatists' as 'dogmatists' fn. 94,4th line, delete second occurrence of '1' in 'Evil' 1. 26, change 'of to 'on' entry under Baker, change '229' to '299' in pagination

For Stevie, who knows all about meta-meta stuff

PREFACE

The critics will have no trouble dissecting this work. They will find hyperbole, vagueness, lack of sound argument and sometimes of argument itself, sloppiness, discontinuity, and even misinterpretation. Since enemies are always more numerous than friends, one must suspect, indeed expect, the worst. Dire prognostications about the nonfuture of this book are probably correct, but at the same time they are of very little interest. The main, and perhaps the only redeeming feature of the present volume is that it raises issues which philosophy has, to its own embarrassment, neglected. As long as the neglect does not continue, there will be no reason for further shame. If some of the ideas (for which no originality is claimed, by the way) presented here receive a more thorough trial, the effort made will be rewarded. If not, then it will be up to future generations to see to it that the effort was not wasted, if they dare. Without John Donnelly, not one page here would have been written. His patience in reading, and painstakingly criticizing, every draft and early version of each chapter made it possible for it to be done, let alone possess any conceivable merit. The responsibility for mistakes and defects is of course entirely our own; but without his help, they would have been far more numerous, and infinitely graver in consequence. Only his assistance enabled numerous personal obstacles and limitations to be overcome. Without the patient support, encouragement and above all, deep and continued friendship of the person to w h o m this little treatise is dedicated, life would not be worthwhile. D.A.R. Chicago January, 1973

CONTENTS

Preface I II

VII

Introductory

1

Protreptic Logic

9

III

How to Prove the Principle of Utility

22

IV

The Searlian Challenge

66

V

Postlogue

107

Bibliography

116

Index

126

I INTRODUCTORY

Is there a permanent, logical gulf separating statements of fact ('is') from propositions expressing value ('ought')? A corresponding question has explicitly concerned philosophers ever since Hume's famous remark proposing the very distinction. 1 Today this is considered in some quarters the fundamental problem of ethics, in that the construction of a valid theory of obligation within a cognitivist framework seems dependent upon supplying a successful counter-instance to the 'is-ought' disjunction, before it can be begun or certified as rational. One may wonder why the concept of obligation should be boosted so prominently. Undoubtedly, the work of Kant and Kant's effect on ethics are reasons why obligation looms so greatly in contemporary ethical discussion. From one angle, moreover, moral philosophy 'reduces' to a theory of obligation. Suppose that the ethical standard to which one subscribes is the Good. Is it then not incumbent to pursue the Good? Therefore, would it not be odd for a person (let alone a philosopher) to say "x is good, but do not pursue (bring about, realize, obtain, enjoy) x"? Would this not contradict the plausible maxim that bonum faciendum ('the good is to be done')? Regardless whether one identifies the good with pleasure, or happiness, or something else, it would be startling simultaneously to admit that an JC is worth having, in some sense, and yet not go on to recommend that x, to oneself as well as to (many or all) other moral agents. It would be exceedingly strange to make such a judgment, regardless of any other logical concerns external to the issue under consideration. This point is not

i D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 8 8 8 ) , 4 6 9 - 4 7 0 . We shall briefly discuss Hume's own contribution to the 'is-ought' dispute in Chapter III, 36-37, 4 3 .

2

INTRODUCTORY

affected in case good is wrongly identified with something else; indeed G. E. Moore plus a number of recent philosophers hold that 'good' is in principle mistakenly identified with anything else. From such a perspective it is easy to see why ethics seems (ordinarily) t o imply a theory of obligation, at bottom. However, this 'reduction' is mistaken, for the following reasons: (1) It would be equally odd to hold that it is someone's duty to pursue his own pleasure or happiness, even within the context of a "self-realization" ethic. Since Kant and Mill, attention has been paid to the idea of "self-regarding duties", 2 but whether any such obligations do exist, or it is fruitful to think so, 3 remains largely a muddle. Moreover, making the attainment of one's own satisfaction a matter of obligation is redundant, inasmuch as it will be pursued wholeheartedly and by virtually every individual, and at nearly all times, with no exhortation necessary, 4 provided there is an opportunity to do so. The truth to the doctrine of psychological hedonism is that people will usually seek out that which they conceive to be their own good, or in their own interest, regardless whether this happens to enjoy the benefit of a moral stamp of approval, or not. The problem is often to convince people to be willing to make what are eventually, if ever, perceived as worthwhile sacrifices (subordinations of one's own welfare), generally in the name of the rights and interests of others, of mankind, or one's community. (2) It is likewise odd to contend that it is everyone's duty to promote the well-being of others, although this is maintained by utilitarians. 5 Odd, because it tries to link together two incompatible positions: hedonism and altruism. Perhaps there is an explanation for this, 2 The terminology (self-regarding duties) occurs initially in Kant, but is used for a special purpose, and with an idiosyncratic meaning. See the "third example" in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. 3 For discussion, see Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., reissue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 7, 327-331; and Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 311-318. 4 Compare Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section I, paragraph 11. s See R . T a y l o r , Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), 8 9 - 9 0 , 9 2 , for critique.

INTRODUCTORY

3

but in the first blush it is as peculiar to opt f o r a combination

of

hedonism and altruism, as it is to a f f i r m that x is g o o d , but that x should not be f o l l o w e d or realized, at one and the same time. 6 (3)

Consider the statement S: " x is worthy o f approval, but d o not

go after x".

S seems implausible, even self-contradictory; but is

it? Only if w e accept a version o f the so-called "universalizability ( o r generalization) detectable. If

thesis".

Here

again

Kant's

philosophic

w e simply deny outright that the

impact

is

universalizability-

criterion ( o r , e.g. Hare's "prescriptivism") is the proper foundation f o r ethics, then there is nothing to carp about, f o r there are then no general rules, applying t o all men in similar situations; no paribus

ceteris

clauses, in other words. This undermines utilitarianism, t o o ,

even in its most primitive formulation, f o r there is always at least one principle o f distributive justice at w o r k , namely, 'the greatest happiness o f the greatest number'. This objection

cuts deeper

generalization-argument applies, f o r almost

any

than merely

denying, e.g. that the

always and without

conflict or exception

proponent

of

universalizability would

be

willing to concede that much; to be defended, all S requires is that w e be open

to possible alternative 'systems' o f ethics — o f which there are

examples, which neither make explicit use o f generalization-principles, nor implicitly rest on them (e.g. Nietzsche). Sometimes these theories are so distinctive as to resist classification, altogether.

(4)

" x deserves approval, but shun it as a g o a l " may even make per-

fectly g o o d sense within, e.g. the framework o f a Stoic position, according to which it would not be worth the e f f o r t and/or pain that must be endured in order to reach x. Or take a moral " s k e p t i c " , w h o is reluctant to advise either himself or others what to do, owing to his conviction that both speculative and practical certainty as to whether any x is indeed meritorious, is unattainable. (5)

Unsimilarly, an "existentialist" is usually convinced that he has

n o right

to tell other people what t o do, because that w o u l d be " b a d

f a i t h " , made worse b y actually f o l l o w i n g his counsel; he may there-

6 We presuppose that no clash of e.g. duties operates at the time when such an edict might or would take effect.

4

INTRODUCTORY

fore refuse to issue any guide entertaining a well worked out notion of e.g. the good, without necessarily arresting or looking askance at such edicts in general. (6) Finally, recalling Aristotle, one might remonstrate that there is a marked difference between 'the Good' and what is good for us as individuals; perhaps it is only the latter that we can ascertain with any degree of reliability. Therefore we have no universal basis f r o m which to tell people in absolute and imperative terms what they should be at, morally speaking. For all these reasons, we do not see that ethics can be glibly "reduced" to a theory of obligation, making anything left over derivative therefrom. Viewing ethics as wholly contained by deontology demands much further argument. Therefore, while the fact-value "split" in value-theory is a matter of extreme urgency and significance, the 'is-ought' question, which is logically subordinate thereto, is not nearly so crucial to ethics as is frequently suggested. For this very reason, repeated inability to resolve the riddle posed by the 'is-ought' dilemma becomes more frustrating. Such failure is all the more embarrassing in that an adequate deontology is not the sole or overwhelming criterion for a workable ethic, as we have just seen. Let us then surmount, if possible, the 'is-ought' obstacle, by focusing upon three successive attempts to deal with specific deontological questions. These are, respectively: the exhortation to philosophy known as the "protreptic argument", stemming f r o m Aristotle; the " p r o o f ' of the principle of utility in the writings of J. S. Mill; and the very recent, celebrated attempt by Searle to "derive" an 'ought' f r o m an 'is' via the example of promising, which concept is created as a "speech act". We shall expound, partly defend, and at the same time undertake extensive revision of each thesis to be examined; evaluate their intrinsic acceptability; and lastly, in the Postlogue, take up fresh challenges, and ferret out implications of the results achieved. One interesting common feature is that all three arguments selected do generate a multitude of "large questions" about philosophy, ones that demand responses, in their own right: should we study or " d o " philosophy, and if so, why? What does the denial that the first premise of an ethical theory can be put on a sound logical footing tell us about the "meaning" of life, the trust to be placed in philosophical

INTRODUCTORY

5

approaches thereto? What limitations govern moral philosophy as an inquiry, and how do these condition reflective attitudes toward "everyday" language? What are the advantages, and the drawbacks, of currently favored methods in each of these areas? And so on. All these items are of intrinsic importance, and all will receive their due. The three major topics are therefore all gratifying in their range and depth. The chapters which follow are each self-contained explorations. Yet we should be remiss not to prepare for the onslaught, with a few needed preliminary remarks. The 'is-ought' controversy is treated most sophisticatedly, as well as directly, by Searle. Searle's "derivation" at its climactic moment, amounts to a logical transition from a neutral description of agreeing to do something, to the morally decisive assessment that it ought to be done. The example chosen by Searle is a straightforward and familiar one: one's obligation to pay a debt, as contracted and expressed by a verbal promise or "speech act". This requires essentially no further explanation beyond the complete commentary provided in Chapter IV, and in the Postlogue. We consider next an assumption whose dramatic and initial "intuitive" plausibility is great: namely, the "necessity" to philosophize (a thesis originally propounded, from all available evidence, by Aristotle). If it can be demonstrated that philosophizing is a necessary occupation, pursuit, activity, life-dimension or undertaking, then it is possible to conclude that we "must" philosophize, i.e. that all men are under a sort of Socratic obligation (e.g. to themselves). This result would surely function as both a normative and a descriptive doctrine, simultaneously. Moreover, it would act as a kind of theorem, thereby enjoying all of the logical force connected with more usual apodictic pronouncements. Such a feat, if but once accomplished, would in addition successfully bridge the 'is-ought' chasm. After a detailed examination of the scope and merits of this famous but neglected argument, we show that (regrettably) it is fallacious. One can already see that the attempt to narrow the "gap" between 'is' and 'ought' is much older than the classic, initial explicit formulation in Hume. What Hume pioneered was the denial of a legitimate passage between 'is' and 'ought', which makes the effort to carry out that deduction by invoking the 'special case' of philosophy all the more intriguing. The "protreptic argument" as attributed to Aristotle might also be summarized in the following dictum: "we have no choice whether or

6

INTRODUCTORY

not to philosophize; the only choice is whether we shall do it well or badly". 7 Presumably, one always prefers to do something well rather than badly, //one prefers to do it at all; here, there is no decision as to whether one shall be a philospher or not; so the choice, if there is one, never rests with us, anyway; what then remains is the injunction to become as good a philosopher as one can, which men may obey by some kind of natural or inborn impulse, rather than (say) under duress. While this formulation accords with much of Aristotle's thought, it does not do the protreptic argument justice, when independently formulated. For one thing, do we philosophize willy-nilly, as this version of the argument contends? There is certainly room for doubt. Secondly, the thrust of protreptic thinking is to get men to philosophize; this kind of moral exhortation would be pointless and out of place, if men already did engage in reflection. Thirdly, if men do philosophize, perhaps they ought not to; this is at once an application both of Moore's 'open-question' argument (the companion to the 'naturalistic fallacy') and numerous other statements of the supposed 'is-ought' cleavage, whose general validity is under examination here. So the J. otreptic argument invites early refutation, if not demolition. Moreover, it is not clear that men would always do something well rather than poorly. The duffer who shoots eighteen holes on the weekend has no desire to golf like a champion, although he may admire those who do, even go so far as to study their techniques. Philosophy matters more than golf; or does it? That contention is also at stake in the protreptic argument, and therefore has no business being an implicit assumption of it. It is also not necessarily a matter of choice whether we philosophize well or ill; it could be largely a matter of talent, and therefore either a 'gift' or native aptitude. Are philosophers made or born? Are athletes? We can in time make ourselves somewhat better golfers by practicing diligently out on the links, and likewise better philosophers by much hard work, but even after all that, the duffer will as likely rival Nicklaus, as we match Plato. This analogy may not hold up eternally, but it lasts long enough to indicate that philosophy is not (except for logic) a skill, any more than poetry

1 The writer is indebted to Fr. Vincent G. Potter, SJ, for extended and very fruitful discussion of this feature (among many) of the protreptic argument. (Fr. Potter is of course not responsible for any conclusions reached here, nor even for endorsement of the method of treatment we have adopted.)

INTRODUCTORY

7

(as opposed to mere versification) is. So philosophy is not something acquired by mere repetition, mastery of a technique, or the inculcation of a fixed testing-procedure. There is about as much "method in the madness" of philosophy as there is to writing sonnets. This in turn casts aspersions upon the idea that philosophy is performed, so to speak, by us, whether we will it or not. This just looks empirically false, no matter how generously we define 'philosophy', or make allowances for its sporadic appearance. We can see from even an inadequate presentation of the protreptic argument that it yields much material for close and pertinacious study. For example, it might be thought that if philosophy is somehow compulsory, then this rules out or precludes its being obligatory. But this depends upon (a) conflating logical with physical compulsion, and (b) failing to see the connection between logical and moral norms. 8 Once these concepts are elucidated (below, Chapter II, and Postlogue), and corresponding confusions dissipated, the protreptic argument is only reinforced, not quenched. For this reason alone, although we do determine it to be invalid, the protreptic argument is hard to extinguish. 9 Mill's relationship to the 'is-ought' quandary is more indirect, yet compellingly discernible. For, if the moral code known as utilitarianism can be logically grounded, then the obligation, not only to maximize utility in the world (what J. J. C. Smart calls "acting optimifically"), 1 0 but also to uphold the standard of utility (or the true morality) against all rivals or contenders in ethics, is enjoined. For Mill it would be intellectually binding upon all those whose pro8 That there is such a connection is fiercely maintained by Kant, and prominently exploited by Peirce, to give but two examples. 9 Fr. Potter has suggested (in conversation) that in this respect the protreptic argument resembles the ontological argument, or is equally precious; "you can't kill it". We agree. This expression is a way of preserving its integrity and reputation, indeed elevating them, without thereby having to subscribe to it. For an argument can be false, yet edifying; noble, yet incorrcct. The protreptic argument in our judgment, is both. Yet in our evaluation it remains nevertheless a "classic", albeit one with few champions - and no previous antagonists! 10 J. J. C. Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism", Philosophical Quarterly, 6(1956), 354; repr. in M. D. Bayles, Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1968), 115. Compare J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), 226.

8

INTRODUCTORY

fessional responsibility it is to reason meticulously a b o u t n o r m s , e.g. philosophers. If any or all of these concerted attacks achieve the desired result, then the 'is-ought' cleavage will be shown t o be an 'untenable dualism', t o b o r r o w Dewey's expression. That is the main thrust of the present w o r k , and an indication of the drift of its besetting themes: the reconciliation of ethical naturalism with d e o n t o l o g y . Searle writes at one point of desiring t o p r o d u c e an indefinite n u m b e r of counter-examples t o the thesis that one c a n n o t correctly extract an ' o u g h t ' f r o m an 'is'. 1 1 The p r o t r e p t i c argument and the ' p r o o f of utility are unique a t t e m p t s t o furnish such significant materials, although our interpretations d o not uniformly cast these in a favorable light. In the end, neither Aristotle's nor Mill's " o b l i q u e " derivations w o r k o u t ; Searle's does. These all would remain challenging enterprises, even in abject failure. In this respect t h e y resemble the standard set of proofs for G o d ' s existence. Every generation of thinkers, as Kant very perceptively observed, takes u p the task of " r e f u t a t i o n " of " t r a d i t i o n a l " or "classical" arguments a n e w . 1 2 This certainly applies t o a sympathetic reading of the arguments presented b y Aristotle and Mill; and if Searle's e f f o r t goes appropriately rewarded, it t o o will soon deserve a p e r m a n e n t place in the hierarchy, owing t o its soundness.

11 See below, page 100. 12 KcirV A639, 640, 641/B667, 668, 669. See also A135/B174; A850-851 /B878-879; A462-464/B490-492; and esp. A341/B399; A797/B825.

II PROTREPTIC LOGIC

Is philosophy indispensable? Is philosophy inescapable? Is it a " m u s t " ? Is it a necessity? These are all equally ambiguous questions. Indispensable? To whom? When? And what for? Inescapable? By whom? And for how long? A " m u s t " ? In the same sense as "you must go to see XYZ playing Hamlet"? Not quite. A "necessity"? Of what? Of life? Of individual existence? For the survival of the species? For the flourishing of a culture? For the aspirations of a civilization? If the answer to any or all of these questions is negative, that does not mean that we should cease being interested in philosophy. But if any or all can be defended, that is, given a positive reply, then it may be asserted that we have an obligation to do, or to continue doing, philosophy. A simple yes or no answer is premature, for the questions each admit of a variety of interpretations. Moreover, it is unclear to whom they each address themselves. Just who are " w e " who have an obligation to philosophize? Moreover, a positive answer to any member of the original set of questions posed above in no way sheds any light on what kind of philosopher anyone is supposed to be or to become, or remain. Nothing is implied about what one is to hold; only that philosophy is worthwhile as an activity, and presumably, is so in itself, or for its own sake. This means that any conclusions regarding the imperative to do philosophy will be contentless, or adirectional, with regard to specific positions. The overall question, namely whether philosophy is a justifiable undertaking, is metaphilosophical, i.e. it is logically prior to "doing" philosophy itself. If the original group of questions is collectively ambiguous, the overriding issue as just formulated suffers from similar defects, as well. Justifiable? To whom? When? For what purpose? And so on. If an

10

PROTREPT1C LOGIC

answer is forthcoming to these successive challenges, to be both fulfilling and thorough it must deal effectively with the vexed concept of justifiability. For present purposes this issue will be restricted to whether there is any compelling reason for all individuals to pursue philosophy. One ambiguity we shall dispose of immediately. We distinguish 'reason' from 'urge' or 'need'. A man's personal reason for practicing philosophic inquiry may stem from some biological or psychological drive; this may well be what Aristotle meant when he declared that "all men by nature desire to know". 1 But that does not prove by itself that they should. If knowledge is desirable, then it is so on 'independent' grounds. 2 On the other hand, if one cannot prove the 'value' of philosophy to any given individual, this does not automatically license the inference that philosophy is intellectually dispensable. There are no logical implications whatsoever in the failure to demonstrate that philosophy ought to have some place in the lives of individual persons, although there may be numerous (and grave) cultural ramifications thereof. To show whether philosophy is indeed a necessity, let us center on one strong piece of reasoning in particular, that known as the "protreptic argument". The invention of this argument is credited to Aristotle, on the strength of a lost dialogue of which only fragments have been left behind. 3 We are not concerned with whether Aristotle enunciated the protreptic argument, nor with whether he was the first

1 Metaphysics I, L, 9 8 0 a 2 1 . 2 Mill's ' p r o o f attempts to counter-example just this restatement of the 'is-ought' dichotomy (see below, Ch. III). 3 For details, see I. Duering, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Goeteborg (-Studia Graeca et Latina 12, 1961), and W. G. Rabinowitz, Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of its Reconstruction (Berkeley and Los Angeles) (= Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology 16, 1957). The "protreptic argument" appears to have occurred for the first time in one of the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle (who was, to be sure, attempting a meticulous textual reconstruction). But modern scholarship concludes that the closest that Aristotle himself came to recommending such a hortatory approach was in a fragment which in pertinent part reads: "for, we ought not to avoid (or shun) philosophy". See A. H. Chroust, Aristotle-. Protrepticus, A Reconstruction (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1964), 23, 38.

PR0TRF.PT1C LOGIC

11

to do so; we are interested in the argument itself, not in the murky historical details, however fascinating. 4 We shall now examine the protreptic argument in its myriad versions and reformulations. According to the protreptic argument: either it is necessary to philosophize or it is not ; if it is, then it is; if it is not, then it is; therefore, it is necessary to philosophize. 5 Here the protreptic argument (hereafter PA) analyzes into three distinct parts: premise, pattern of sentential reasoning, and conclusion. The pattern followed, along natural deduction lines, is one of setting up for disjunction elimination (dis elim) and then carrying through. (Alternately know as a variant of the "constructive dilemma".) In order to see the various possibilities more perspicuously, we shall resort to logical notation to assist us with the entire exercise. First, let us list the four alternative construals as presented by the premise: namely, ( l ) i t is necessary to philosophize; (2) it is not necessary to philosophize (which does not mean that one should not philosophize, either); (3) it is necessary not to philosophize (this is much stronger than (2), and not entailed by it); (4) it is not necessary not to philosophize (which does not mean that one should philosophize, either). What is contested is whether anyone has an obligation to philosophize; yet the PA is usually stated, not in deontic, but in strictly modal terms. The gambit is no doubt to produce an even more cogent PA than circumstance requires. This strategy of "overproof" is also in keeping with the purely logical character of the PA; for whether there is an obligation to " d o " philosophy belongs to the domain of moral philosophy; whereas, the PA attempts to circumvent the problems that would be generated in designating the issue as an explicitly ethical one. The latter-day Nietzschean critique of the "will to truth" as a mere "philosopher's prejuduce" shows that the PA, if it is to be successful, must avoid direct encounters with such problematic areas. By retreating to logic, the PA can hope to win converts to philosophy through the force of its apodictic pronouncements, using methods and 4

See W. Jaeger, Aristotle, 2nd ed., tr. R. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), and J. D. Monan, S. J., Moral Knowledge and its Methodology in Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 5 See A. H. Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus, A Reconstruction 3, 48-49. For a Stoic version of the protreptic argument as applied to the alleged indispensability of logic. See Epictetus, Discourses, Bk II, Ch XXV.

12

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

techniques with which everyone will agree. This strategy appears more promising than a head-on approach to such a delicate subject as "why study philosophy?" (which we interpret as equivalent, at the initial or introductory stage only, to philosophizing itself). Returning t o our four alternatives, we may represent each by letting N stand for logical necessity, and the two-place predicate, pxy (unbound), for 'x philosophizes^'; the rest is self-explanatory: 6 (1) (2) (3) (4)

N -N N -.V

(x) (*) (*) (x)

(Ey) (Ey) (y) (y)

(pxy (pxy -(pxy -(pxy

We conceive philosophy, minimally speaking, to involve an intentional relationship, one between a given person and what (for lack of a better word) may be termed a subject-matter. 7 There is nothing prejudicial t o schools, systems or doctrines in construing philosophy in the manner we suggest; furthermore, the PA is grounded without making any favorable or unfavorable reference, either to philosophers or major distinguishing ideas and tenets within the field. The PA requires none of this extra-logical baggage in order to get started. Aristotle's main premise, is that "either it is necessary to philosophize or it is n o t " ; i.e. either (1) or (2). Verbally there is some lingering doubt as to whether "not necessary" might mean "superfluous", but if so, then the premise would be: either (1) or (3); which is plainly false. On the other hand, the premise as we accept it, namely, either (1) or (2), is tautologous. From this it is already clear wherefrom the PA's surface plausibility is derived! As a new approximation to the PA's main premise, we might write: (the wedge V stands for inclusive disjunction) (5)

N(x)

(Ey)

(pxy v -N (x)

(Ey)

(pxy.

While this is a logically valid formula, to represent the " e i t h e r . . . o r " component of the premise, something else must serve as the indicator 6

We omit the use of corners to highlight use-and-mention, hybrid expressions. For, philosophy is not a 'property' of anything. One does not "philosophize" in thin air; the activity always takes an object; including, sometimes, itself (denoted by i ^ z , the reflexive relation). And it is always deliberate, even when orginally acted upon inadvertently. 7

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

13

of exclusive disjunction or alternation. Since "either p or q" (but not both) is equivalent to saying that " p if and only if the negation of q", or "p = -q", (5) can be scrapped in favor of (6)

N (x)

(Ey) 0xy = -- N (x)

(Ey)0xy,

which in turn reduces to (7)

N(x)

(Ey)