NATO Reconsidered: Is the Atlantic Alliance Still in America's Interest? (Praeger Security International) 2020027338, 2020027339, 9781440871382, 9781440871399, 1440871388

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Contents
Maps and Tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War
2. NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan
3. Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century
4. Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia
5. NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present
6. Growing Threat to the United States from China: Impacts on U.S. NATO Policy
7. NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order
Appendix I: The North Atlantic Treaty
Appendix II: Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (2018)
Appendix III: Twelve Effective Veteran Charities
Notes
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

NATO Reconsidered

NATO Reconsidered Is the Atlantic Alliance Still in America’s Interest? WESLEY B. TRUITT

Praeger Security International

Copyright © 2020 by Wesley B. Truitt All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Truitt, Wesley B., 1939- author. Title: NATO reconsidered : is the Atlantic Alliance still in America’s interest? / Wesley B. Truitt. Other titles: Is the Atlantic Alliance still in America’s interest? Description: Santa Barbara, California : ABC-CLIO, [2020] | Series: Praeger security international | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020027338 (print) | LCCN 2020027339 (ebook) | ISBN 9781440871382 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781440871399 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: North Atlantic Treaty Organization—History. | United States—Military relations. | Diplomacy—History—20th century. | United States—Foreign relations. | Security, International. Classification: LCC UA646.3 .T78 2020 (print) | LCC UA646.3 (ebook) | DDC 355/.031091821—dc23 LC record available at ­https://​­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2020027338 LC ebook record available at ­https://​­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2020027339 ISBN: 978-1-4408-7138-2 (print) 978-1-4408-7139-9 (ebook) 24 23 22 21 20 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available as an eBook. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 147 Castilian Drive Santa Barbara, California 93117 ­www​.­abc​-­clio​.­com This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Maps and Tables

vii

Preface ix Acknowledgments xi 1. From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War

1

2. NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan 25 3. Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century

47

4. Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia

65

5. NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present

81

6. Growing Threat to the United States from China: Impacts on U.S. NATO Policy

105

7. NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order

135

Appendix I: The North Atlantic Treaty

163

Appendix II: Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (2018)

167

Appendix III: Twelve Effective Veteran Charities

169

Notes

171

Index

199

Maps and Tables

Maps 1.1 Original NATO Members 2.1 Expanded NATO Membership 6.1 Road and Belt

3 30 117

Tables 2.1 Sovereignty Declarations by Soviet Republics

27

2.2 Members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)

34

3.1 Material Base of Geopolitical Power

50

5.1 Largest Contributors of Forces in Afghanistan, February 2019

86

5.2 Ten Largest Contributors to NATO by GDP Percent, 2018–2019

92

6.1 Balance of Payments and International Investment, Net Deficit

113

6.2 Balance of Payments and International Investment, Net Surplus 113 6.3 Alphabetical List of Countries Attending Beijing Forum, 2019

121

6.4 Top Five Countries’ Military Spending, 2017

124

Preface

April 4, 2019 marked the seventieth anniversary of the Treaty of Washington that was the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance formed between the United States and Canada in North America and ten countries from Western Europe. By signing the treaty, the Truman Administration made a stunning commitment in peacetime to come to another country’s aid in the event it was attacked. Other than the 1778 Revolutionary War-era treaty with France that was terminated in 1800, the United States never had an alliance with any country in peacetime or during a war. President Truman broke this precedent by boldly equating American security and American national interests with certain countries in Europe. The Atlantic Alliance effectively established an American protectorate over war-torn Western Europe, which faced a possible attack by the Soviet Union. Every country that signed the treaty—and today there are thirty of them—pledged to come to the aid of any other member country if it is subjected to an “armed attack.” An attack against one is an attack against all. This is a classic defensive military alliance; it is not an offensive alliance. At the onset of the Cold War, Truman rightly concluded that Western Europe’s security—and consequently America’s security—depended on American military power to contain the Soviet Union and prevent it from conquering Western Europe. Now, more than seventy years after NATO’s establishment and expansion, after its successful deterrence of an armed attack in Europe, and well after its victory in the Cold War, it is time to reconsider America’s role—and its very membership—in the Atlantic Alliance.

xPreface

How NATO expanded to thirty member states; why the alliance intervened in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya (not members of NATO); and why Russia’s request to join the alliance was turned down by the United States on three occasions are actions that established precedents and thus deserve a fresh look from today’s perspective, given today’s changed global realities. This book asks a fundamental question that is rarely raised in Washington today: Is the Atlantic Alliance still in America’s best interest? That is the theme and purpose of the book—to reexamine America’s role in NATO based on that single criterion. If it is in America’s national interest to underwrite the security, at heavy cost and risk, of the fledgling small states of Eastern Europe and the wealthy nations of Central and Western Europe, then U.S. participation in NATO should continue. Alternatively, if America’s own interests are better served by freeing itself from NATO’s wide-open commitment to come to the aid of any member nation subjected to an “armed attack,” then the United States should promote alternative security arrangements for its European partners, especially those on Russia’s doorstep, and carefully discontinue its membership in the alliance. This is a realistic consideration given Russia’s relative decline and China’s rise in power, threatening America’s status as the global hegemon. Germany’s chancellor has stated that America’s nuclear protectorate of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe as a deterrent against a Russian attack is increasingly implausible. So, too, is the Russian attack it is intended to deter. America’s heavy, open-ended commitment to Europe’s security through NATO dilutes America’s military power and distracts its focus away from its major challenger in the twenty-first century—China, not Russia. NATO is like a gigantic anchor being dragged at sea behind the American ship of state as it sails on its vital mission to contain China.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to people who have provided intellectual guidance and encouragement over the years. The late Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania led my senior year honors seminar and provided encouragement to pursue the study of international relations. We remained friends long after I left Penn. The late Professor William T. R. Fox of Columbia University further stimulated my interest in this field of study and suggested the topic for my doctoral dissertation, “The Troops to Europe Decision,” which is the updated basis for Chapter One of this book. Special thanks to the late Columbia Professor Richard N. Gardner who, as assistant secretary of state, appointed me to an internship at the State Department. Most importantly, I want to acknowledge the support and encouragement of my wife, Marianne, who edited, proofread, and made numerous suggestions to improve this work, as she has for all my books. May 1, 2020

CHAPTER 1

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War

“The policy of the great powers is in their geography.”

Napoleon1

In 1947, two years after the surrender of Germany and Japan in World War II, the United States realized it was at war again. This time it was at war with the Soviet Union, its former “ally.” It was not a shooting war. It was a Cold War. This began a dark, dangerous era in world politics that stimulated a powerful response by the United States to this Soviet challenge to achieve dominance throughout all of Europe. America’s responses began in March of that year when Congress passed the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, which provided economic and material assistance to those and other governments that were being threatened by Communist subversion. By signing that bill, President Truman signaled the establishment of the Truman Doctrine in which the United States pledged to aid countries in Europe and elsewhere that were threatened by Communist subversion. It was intended to prevent the Soviet Union from taking over more countries in this new Cold War. This was the core of Truman’s containment policy. In June 1948, the Soviet Union closed the land bridge from the Western Zones of Germany to West Berlin, thus beginning the Berlin Blockade. The three great powers had agreed at the Yalta Conference in early 1945 that the city of Berlin, like all of Germany, would be divided into four zones of occupation. Yet, guaranteed access to their zones in Berlin by the Western Powers was left unstated. Berlin lay deep inside the Soviet zone of occupation, and so rail, highway, and canal travel to that city by U.S., British, and French personnel as well as supplies was easily closed by the Soviet Union.

2

NATO Reconsidered

Shortly after the blockade was established, the famous Berlin Airlift was undertaken by the United States, resulting in 272,000 flights to West Berlin by American cargo airplanes to supply West Berlin’s people with food and fuel. The airlift ended eleven months later when the Soviets reopened the border. The Berlin Blockade, more than any other event, convinced President Truman that the Soviet Union, our former tacit ally, was bent on dominating all of Central and Eastern Europe.2 Also, in 1948, the Marshall Plan was announced. Billions of American dollars were sent to help rebuild war-shattered Europe.3 All European countries were invited to receive American aid, but Moscow rejected this most generous offer, forcing its Communist satellites to follow suit. But sixteen West European states accepted the offer of American aid to restore their economies. Prime Minister Winston Churchill reportedly praised the Marshall Plan as “the most unsorted act in history.”4 The European Recovery Program, the formal name of the Marshall Plan, ended in 1952.5 FOUNDING THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE The next year, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in a great ceremony in Washington. With this act, the United States committed itself to the defense of Western Europe.6 This formal military alliance codified America’s continuing involvement in world affairs a decade after isolationism had prompted Congress to pass the Neutrality Acts.7 Beginning in 1949, the Treaty of Washington, as it was known at the time, became the political framework within which U.S. policy toward Europe and the Soviet Union was to be organized throughout the Cold War—and to this day. The twelve original signers were the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark (see map 1.1). “[T]he establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, the third leg, after the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, of the revolutionary tripod now form[ed] the basis of U.S. foreign policy. Since 1778, the United States had never offered an advance commitment to assist another nation in a future war.”8 Signing this treaty of alliance was Truman’s pivotal moment in U.S. history and secured his place in the top ranks of America’s presidents. The commitment undertaken in 1949 was as revolutionary an act of statecraft as any in the country’s history—pledging the United States to guarantee for an open-ended period the security of states on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, treating an armed attack against any of them as an attack against America itself. This was no idle commitment, having been taken in the face of the Red Army poised at the Fulda Gap in central Germany and with large Communist Party electoral minorities in a number of democracies in Western and Southern Europe.

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War3

Map 1.1  Original NATO Members (plus the United States and Canada) (­https://​ ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_52044​.­htm)

The treaty was the basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was formed in December 1949 to administer this alliance of two nations in North America and ten in Western Europe that committed themselves to come to the aid of any member nation subjected to an “armed attack.” The treaty also established a political framework to coordinate allied policies and activities—the North Atlantic Council. NATO’s purpose was to keep the peace throughout the North Atlantic region by deterring aggression by the Soviet Union, which in the closing days of World War II had occupied most of Eastern Europe and the eastern portion of Germany. The war-torn nations of Western Europe were incapable of defending themselves against the mighty Red Army, poised in the very heart of Central Europe. The atomic weapon monopoly held by the United States was the only shield against a Soviet “armed attack.” Soviet-inspired coups had already established Communist puppet states throughout Eastern Europe, and Russian armed forces in large

4

NATO Reconsidered

numbers were positioned in East Germany. Soviet pressure was being applied against Greece and Turkey. Britain, economically powerless to counter these challenges in its traditional sphere of interest, asked the United States to intervene. The Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was the initial U.S. response to the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean. Quickly realizing that economic aid was inadequate to meet the challenge as Soviet pressure intensified on Western Europe, President Truman decided an alliance with those countries was needed to signal U.S. willingness to defend them. In 1949, the alliance had no armed forces of its own. There were no troops, planes, or ships under any central command, and those forces that were available under national command were inadequate for the defense of Western Europe. Importantly, there was no obligation to provide forces to a central command in advance of an “armed attack.” Moreover, the United States did not increase its defense spending to rebuild its own armed forces following their dismantling at the end of World War II. Despite the new NATO obligations, in fiscal year 1950, President Truman held to a ceiling on new Defense Department appropriations of $14.4 billion. Actual military spending in that year was $11.9 billion.9 America’s security guarantee of Europe was entirely based on the U.S. atomic weapon monopoly. It was the “keystone of the arch” in America’s foreign and military policy in 1949. Within a year after signing the North Atlantic Treaty, the keystone would crumble, and within eighteen months the policy would be in ruins.10 The Soviet atomic test in August 194911 began to crumble the arch, and with the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, it collapsed. “The outbreak of the Korean War,” observed Robert Osgood, “completed the transformation of NATO from a multilateral guaranty pact into a semi-integrated military organization designed to redress the military imbalance on the Continent.”12 IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR: CHANGING WESTERN STRATEGY On June 25, 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea, which at the time was under the protection of the United States as part of the post–World War II peace agreements in the Pacific. This attack ushered in an entirely new period in American foreign policy. The analogy of the attack by the Communist half of a divided state on the other half was not lost on Western statesmen. It was widely feared in the West that Communist East Germany, occupied by the Red Army, might attack West Germany, which was under the protection of the United States, Britain, and France. Western military forces in West Germany were far from adequate to thwart such an attack.

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War5

In December 1949, according to NATO’s first Secretary General, Britain’s Lord Ismay, NATO’s member states had twelve divisions in Western Europe, all under national command, four hundred aircraft, and some number of naval vessels. By April 1951, the situation had improved only marginally: now there were fifteen NATO divisions under central command and less than one thousand aircraft.13 At the time of the North Korean attack, U.S. forces in the American zone in Germany included the First Infantry Division and the Constabulary, which had the firepower of a reinforced armored division and two jet fighter-bomber wings. These forces were based in Bavaria.14 Compared to the West’s weakness in Europe, the Soviet Union had approximately twenty-five divisions stationed in Europe outside the Soviet Union, supported by six thousand aircraft. This force was under central command. Behind these “forward” Russian units was the massive bulk of the Red Army and air force stationed inside the Soviet Union.15 The total size of the Soviet Army in 1950 was estimated to be 175 divisions on active duty. These were backed by a large number of additional divisions in the satellite countries.16 This enormous disparity in the size of the armed forces between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, both in terms of total forces and of those deployed in Europe, was cause for deep concern. Field Marshal Montgomery stated in June 1950, “As things stand today and in the foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if ever we were attacked by the Russians.”17 The North Korean attack convinced Western policy-makers that Soviet intentions had changed and were taking a new and more dangerous turn. Two days after the outbreak of the war, President Truman expressed his concern: “The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”18 To face this new reality of Soviet war by proxy, Western powers needed to rearm. The Korean attack was the spark that launched that effort. In the year before the North Korean attack, European NATO countries’ defense expenditures totaled $4.5 billion, representing 5 percent of their gross national products (GNPs). (The term gross domestic product [GDP] came into use years later.) For the first full fiscal year following the Korean outbreak, their defense expenditures doubled to $9 billion, averaging 8 percent of these countries’ GNPs. For the United States, the spending target was 15 percent.19 In dollar terms, the increase quadrupled from $12.5 billion to more than $50 billion. Before Korea, U.S. armed forces strength was under 1.5 million men; by January 1952, it had more than doubled to 3.5 million men under arms.20 What was the effect of the Korean War on West Germany, the country on the front line in the event of an East German/Soviet attack in Europe?

6

NATO Reconsidered

The Western Zones of Germany were disarmed by the allies at the end of World War II, but the Korean attack quickly changed the situation. The allies needed German manpower and, just as important, they needed West Germany to rearm. Though it was not a signatory to the NATO Treaty until later, West Germany was recognized by the Occupying Powers as a nation-state that had the right to defend itself. That “right” quickly became a “need.” John J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, stated: “The realization that the Soviet was prepared to unleash armed forces to extend its power aroused Europe and particularly Western Germany whose situation presented a parallel unpleasant to contemplate.”21 The legal adviser to the U.S. high commissioner felt that any sense of adequacy of the U.S. atomic deterrent vanished after the Korean attack because there were too few bombs, they were too small, and there were not enough planes to deliver them.22 West Germany’s chancellor Konrad Adenauer observed a “really panicked condition” in his country. He said there was a feeling of defenselessness in the face of the massive Soviet capabilities poised in Eastern Europe.23 The Occupying Powers, in his view, urgently needed to show “firm resolve to defend the Federal Republic including Berlin. There had to be a visible sign of this readiness.”24 Anthony Eden, Britain’s past and future foreign secretary, explained Korea’s impact on Europe: “Infinitely grave as is the outlook in the Far East, it is still in Europe that the mortal danger lies. The European situation is both anxious and confused, and this description applies even to the relations between the free nations of the West.”25 The Korean War ended in 1953 not with a victory but with an armistice, similar to Germany in World War I, leaving North Korea intact and thus permitting the Korean problem to intrude into world politics to this day. STRATEGIC REEVALUATION Against this strategic and psychological backdrop, the Truman Administration made the bold, precedent-shattering decision to send U.S. troops to Europe in peacetime and to put them under a NATO commander. This decision was foreshadowed by a comprehensive review of U.S. strategic policy in January 1950—six months before the Korean attack. This preliminary defense plan called for a fundamental alteration in U.S. NATO policy by providing for a “forward strategy” of holding the enemy as far to the east in Europe as possible, for the defense of all member states, and for a “defense” rather than a “liberation” policy, which had been American policy in Europe in World War II. The emphasis was more on defense, less on deterrence. This new concept, then, greatly expanded the political and financial costs of American membership in NATO.26 Almost immediately after the “forward strategy” was approved, an even more comprehensive strategic review of American policy was ordered by the

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War7

president. This was the famous document named NSC-68, which was a fundamental rethink of America’s global strategy. It questioned the adequacy of the strategy just approved.27 This document was an urgent call to arms of all NATO members, especially the United States, to meet head on the enormous and growing Soviet threat, which had upset the East-West balance of power. Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote in an anonymous article that “the document [NSC-68] charted the long-term project of restoring the threatened equilibrium” with the Soviet Union. While the study was being conducted, other projects were underway: the decision to build the H-bomb, authorizing the expansion of U.S. and allied ground forces, expanding the U.S. early-warning radar network, and the decision to move NATO “towards the idea of a unified armed force under a single command.”28 NSC-68 was a blueprint for American rearmament and for deeper involvement in Europe’s defense, yet it was written before but not implemented until after the North Korean attack. Korea forced the president into defense mobilization, and at the same time, it politically enabled him to mobilize. In this sense, Korea was like Pearl Harbor—or like Fort Sumter. ESTABLISHING A SUPREME COMMAND IN EUROPE Prior to North Korea’s attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950, the NATO allies had discussed the possibility of establishing a central command for NATO members’ armed forces stationed on the European Continent. However, the idea to do so was rejected as late as May 1950.29 Even in the immediate aftermath of the Korean attack the next month, the NATO allies did not approve the idea. For some time, it had been assumed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if such a command were established, it would be headed by an American.30 No decision was made until December 1950 at the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council. By then, the Chinese Communists had joined the North Koreans in throwing back United Nation (UN) forces in Korea. The shock of the Chinese intervention in the war gave new urgency to defense mobilization in the West. On December 19 at the Brussels meeting, the twelve NATO members unanimously approved the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe. General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe. On the same day President Truman gave Eisenhower “operational command” of all U.S. ground and air forces in Europe and of all U.S. naval forces in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea.31 Prior to taking up these duties, Eisenhower accepted an extended leave of absence as president of Columbia University to return to active duty at President Truman’s request.

8

NATO Reconsidered

On April 2, 1951, two years to the month following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, Eisenhower declared Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) operational.32 At last, nine months after the North Korean attack, NATO had a general and an army. The North Atlantic Treaty had been transformed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—the “O” had been put in NATO. The following year Eisenhower resigned from his command to run for the presidency. All subsequent Supreme Commanders have been Americans. “Although Eisenhower stayed with his command little more than a year, he was indispensable in bringing it to being. [He] saw to it that SHAPE became an organization with a life and interest and will of its own.”33 Also, on April 2, 1951, the Western Union Command Organization transferred to Eisenhower’s command its military responsibilities, functions, staff, and its headquarters at Fontainebleau. The Western Union Commanders-in-Chief Committee ceased to function. The Western Union military alliance had been established in 1948 as a result of the Brussels Treaty among Britain, France, and the Benelux countries to provide for the security of its member states.34 In 1951, NATO subsumed all of its duties and then some. The significance today of the Western Union’s existence, having preceded NATO’s founding, is that countries in Western Europe had previously joined together to coordinate their defense against Russia. This precedent might be useful in the future. With the Western Union treaty, Britain and France did not break precedent—they had signed a military alliance with each other in 1939 to guarantee Poland against a German attack. Hitler believed the alliance’s guarantee was impotent and attacked Poland, initiating World War II. Britain and France took no military action against Germany for a year, until Germany attacked them. In 1904, before World War I, Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale, not a formal military alliance but an agreement to work together to thwart Imperial Germany’s intention to conquer Europe. During World War I, a formal Anglo-French alliance was signed. When the United States entered the war in 1917, the three countries were termed “the Allied and Associated Powers” because President Woodrow Wilson would not sign the formal treaty believing it was an “entangling alliance.”35 Neither of these prewar Anglo-French arrangements deterred a later world war. THE GERMAN REARMAMENT QUESTION As early as 1948 there was serious thinking in the West on the issue of rearming West Germany. It was generally believed this would come about in a matter of time.36 President Truman’s position was that as any

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War9

defense arrangements were made, they should be flexible enough to allow West Germany to be added later.37 Before Korea, President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson were on record as opposed to German rearmament for domestic reasons as well as for diplomatic reasons involving European—especially French—objections.38 Two years before Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Western Europe could only be defended against a Soviet attack if West Germany were rearmed and participated in its own defense. As late as June 6, 1950, General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: “From a strictly military point of view, I do believe the defense of Western Europe would be strengthened by the inclusion of Germany.”39 Yet, political leaders continued to oppose this move. Then, out of a clear June sky, the North Koreans did for the Western military what they had been unable to do for themselves for two years. After the Korean War began, American political leaders at last became receptive to the idea of rearming Germany, and three months later they became wedded to it. Korea had “called the bluff” on the Western defense system.40 Before Korea, the U.S. military—for strategic reasons—wanted Germany rearmed, but the politicians—for political reasons—did not. After Korea, only some of the politicians wanted it rearmed for strategic as well as for political reasons. After the Korean War began, the issue became far more complicated: the question of German rearmament became involved with the issues of establishing a NATO supreme command and of sending American troops to Europe.41 THE TROOPS TO EUROPE DECISION During the summer of 1950, the U.S. government was preoccupied with the military and diplomatic issues associated with leading the UN forces against those of North Korea and with the preparation of major initiatives in America’s European and Atlantic Alliance policies. Central among these initiatives was the decision to send a large contingent of U.S. combat forces to Europe—to supplement the occupation force already in West Germany—in the belief that American security would be served by such a move.42 “Acheson was now. . . pushing for the decision to send new divisions to Europe, the first nonoccupation U.S. forces ever sent abroad in ‘peacetime.’”43 The Atlantic Alliance facilitated making the decision because it provided an existing political framework within which the United States could assist its allies and itself by taking this action.44 Article III of the treaty required the parties “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,” to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed

10

NATO Reconsidered

attack.” Sending an American army to the continent was permitted by this “self-help and mutual aid” provision.45 But neither that nor any other treaty article required the United States to take this action.46 Indeed, at the 1949 Senate ratification hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, the administration vigorously asserted that the treaty did not include the need for more U.S. troops in Europe.47 Article V of the treaty states that in the event of “an armed attack” against one or more of the Parties, each of the other Parties would assist the attacked Party by taking “such action as it deems necessary.” Article V was carefully drafted with an eye to the Congressional power, granted by the Constitution, to declare war. The Truman Administration wanted to ensure Senate confirmation of the treaty by appearing not to have intruded on Congress’ war power, even though the spirit of the treaty seemed to do just that.48 Sending troops to Europe, however, was thought by some to have further eroded that Congressional power by committing a large number of American forces to a battle zone prior to attack.49 This was the first time in its history the United States had decided it was in its own interest to place armed forces on the continent in peacetime to safeguard the security of countries in Western Europe.50 The treaty did not require this, nor did it stipulate the number of troops. The decision was exclusively an American one, determined solely by the United States to be in its own interest.51 A critical part of that determination was the diminishing deterrent value of the United States’ atomic weapon capability. As the Soviet Union developed its own atomic power, it was believed its fear of America’s atomic retaliatory power would diminish—creating a stand-off situation. At some point in the future, it was feared that Moscow would conclude that the United States would not use its atomic weapons because the Soviet Union would retaliate in kind—thus undermining the atomic deterrent value.52 Therefore, the conclusion was reached that a conventional ground force in Europe was needed as part of the Western strategic deterrent to lend credibility to America’s atomic deterrent by serving as a “trip wire” in the event of a Communist attack on West Germany to trigger a U.S. retaliatory strike on Russia. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it: “The best use we can make of our present advantage in retaliatory air power is to move ahead under this protective shield to build the balanced collective forces in Western Europe that will continue to deter aggression after our atomic advantage has been diminished.”53 Once ground troops were sent, they would have to be supported by tactical air power and by naval power. Thus, the decision to send troops immediately mushroomed into a decision to send with them air and sea power in appropriate proportions. These were the “balanced collective forces” Acheson referred to.54

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War11

In 1950, the United States abandoned the “massive retaliation” doctrine alive in NATO’s infancy in favor of a doctrine of “graduated response,” as represented by the “balanced” force strategy. Both doctrines were later resurrected full-blown—the former during the Eisenhower Administration and the latter beginning with the Kennedy Administration.55 The point is that neither of these doctrines was new when they later became fashionable. The Truman Administration had used both. In addition to the strategic reasons the U.S. military had for sending troops to Europe, a political one was favored by the State Department. U.S. troops stationed in West Germany, State believed, would diminish French fears of a rearmed Germany. For a long time, stretching back to the 1919 Versailles Treaty and even further back to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871, France had sought guarantees against Germany. The State Department believed a permanent American army in West Germany would diminish those French fears.56 How large a force would be needed to achieve these objectives? The United States already had the equivalent of two divisions in West Germany on occupation duty. The Constabulary was composed of twenty- to twenty-five thousand men facing the eastern zone frontier from Kassel to Salzburg. It was equipped with medium and heavy tanks, but it mostly relied on armored cars. The U.S. First Infantry Division was the only U.S. combat force in the American zone.57 How many more divisions should be sent to Europe? Some wanted a large force. For example, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge suggested a total of twenty divisions should be sent.58 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, decided that only four more army divisions would be sent for a total of six.59 On September 9, 1950, the White House released a statement by the president that “substantial” reinforcements of American troops would be sent to Europe.60 The specific number was not disclosed until February 15, 1951.61 Why was the announcement delayed? The U.S. military was carefully weighing its future needs in Europe against its current operational needs on the Korean Peninsula. The September press release was issued one week before General MacArthur launched his crucial Inchon invasion gamble in Korea. No one knew at the time how that would turn out. The Inchon gamble paid off, and MacArthur’s forces cut off the North Korean army in the south and drove north into North Korea, defying Truman’s orders to stop at the thirty-eighth parallel. On October 16, 1950, Lin Piao’s Fourth Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army of China crossed the Yalu River in force into North Korea, thus beginning the exponential expansion of the war in Korea.62 Once again, as was the case in World War II, the United States was faced with the prospect of a two-front war—one ongoing in Asia and one likely to start in Europe with a Soviet attack.

12

NATO Reconsidered

On May 27, 1951, the first of the four U.S. Army divisions arrived in Europe. The deployment was completed on December 8, 1951.63 All six American divisions were placed under the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower. The unit was named the U.S. Seventh Army. By the end of 1951, total NATO strength in Europe was thirty-five divisions in varying states of readiness, approximately three thousand aircraft, and seven hundred naval vessels.64 Eisenhower stated in his first report as Supreme Allied Commander this critical principle: “The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing—the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation.” America is making the major contribution, he wrote, because “it believes that America’s enlightened self-interest is served thereby. Most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course.”65 Establishing the integrated command in Europe was not all the United States did in the spring and summer of 1951 to strengthen the West’s defense vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.66 In April, the United States signed an agreement with Denmark concerning the defense of Greenland. In May, the United States landed forces in Iceland for the defense of that country and its vital airfields. In June, the United States, with Britain and France, announced that substantial economic aid would be sent to Yugoslavia, and that month the United States signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia for a strategic air base in that country. In July, an agreement was signed between the United States and France for the construction of five American strategic air bases in Morocco, and negotiations with Spain were begun for U.S. air and naval bases in that country. Finally, in September 1951, the United States made an agreement with Portugal for an American air base on the Azores in the mid-Atlantic. All the while the United States was fighting the war in Korea. This intense, robust period of American statecraft is unmatched. In 1967, the Seventh Army numbered 225,000 men—the highpoint of the U.S. deployment in Europe. That year the Johnson Administration announced the redeployment of 35,000 U.S. troops from West Germany back to the United States.67 This was the first reduction in American troop strength since the initial buildup in 1951. The public reason given was the strain on the U.S. balance of payments. The underlying reason for this redeployment was in response to domestic criticism for having such a large force in Europe and the growing need for American troops to fight in Vietnam. “THE GREAT DEBATE” The decision in 1950 to send troops to Europe sparked the first major foreign policy debate in the United States in the post–World War II period. It was known as “The Great Debate.” The underlying issue in the debate

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War13

was fundamental: Who is authorized to send American troops abroad? More specifically, is the president alone empowered to expose the United States to the risks of having an army in Europe in peacetime? For the first time since 1945, the only serious debate on foreign policy was begun when the Republican opposition was aroused by Truman’s decision to deploy U.S. armed forces to Europe without securing advance Congressional approval.68 Congressional Republicans opposed this foreign policy decision, eroding bipartisanship that had sustained the Roosevelt and Truman administrations during World War II and in the immediate postwar period. No longer were European policies developed by the Democratic administration left unchallenged by Republicans, making “The Great Debate” a watershed moment in American foreign policy. The debate was opened by former president Herbert Hoover in a nationwide radio address on December 20, 1950.69 Hoover warned that the United States would be “inviting another Korea” if it sent more troops or money to Europe before the Europeans themselves constructed a “sure dam against the Red flood.”70 Powerful anti-administration conservative Republicans in the Senate soon took over the leadership of the opposition to Truman’s policy. With the opening of the eighty-second Congress in January 1951, conservative Republican senators began their campaign against the troops to Europe decision. On January 8, the Republican floor leader, Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, introduced a “sense of the Senate” resolution stating that “no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress.”71 This resolution was a direct challenge to the president’s authority to deploy U.S. armed forces and provided the basis for the debate in the Senate that lasted for months. Other conservative Republicans joined Wherry including Senator Robert Taft (Ohio) who delivered a ten-thousand-word speech on January 5 that vigorously attacked the administration’s foreign policy.72 Later in the debate, Taft amped-up his rhetoric against the president’s policy, stating that the United States was facing a “constitutional crisis” unless Congress reasserted its right to pass on fundamental principles in foreign policy. Taft asserted, “Unless we are prepared to set up a ‘dictatorship’ in the United States,” Congress should pass on the president’s authority to send troops to Europe.73 In his typical terse style President Truman reacted to Hoover and to the ongoing Congressional Republican opposition at a press conference on January 4 where this exchange with a reporter occurred: Q. “Mr. President, do you believe that you need the approval of Congress to send additional troops to Europe?” A. The President. “No, I do not.”74

14

NATO Reconsidered

Two critical events occurred in November-December 1950 that gave the Republican opposition support. In the midterm elections in November, the Republicans gained seats in the U.S. Senate, though still not a majority. Also, in November, the Chinese Communist army attacked U.S./UN forces that had fought their way deep into North Korea near the Chinese border on the Yalu River. The Chinese, with overwhelming numbers, routed the UN forces and drove them back into South Korea. “The disaster in Korea lent cogent support to the argument that the United States should avoid ground wars with the Communist powers on the Eurasian continent.”75 The mood of the country began to favor the challenge to the president’s authority to make additional military commitments. A Gallup Poll in February 1951 indicated, “American opinion favored 2 to 1 having the President secure the consent of Congress before sending additional troops overseas.”76 The Truman Administration counterattacked the conservative Republicans with their allies in control of the Senate, especially Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Connally arranged for the Wherry resolution to be sent to the combined Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees that jointly held hearings on the matter for a month. Administration witnesses included Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower. All of them testified in support of the troops to Europe decision.77 A number of prominent Republicans announced their support for the decision: John Foster Dulles, Thomas E. Dewey, Harold Stassen, and Senators Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and William Knowland. Opponents of the decision included conservative Democrat Walter George and liberal Democrat Paul Douglas. Prominent public figures in addition to Herbert Hoover also opposed the decision including former ambassador to Britain Joseph P. Kennedy.78 On March 14, the joint committee made its recommendation to reject the Wherry resolution by adopting a substitute resolution that endorsed the president’s policy. The issue then moved to the Senate floor for more debate. On April 4, the final Senate floor vote was taken on the Connally-Russell resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 69–21.79 With this vote, the Great Debate came to an end with the Senate overwhelmingly supporting the president’s policy. Thus, for three months, the foreign policy debate occupied the time and attention of the U.S. Senate as well as the administration while the Korean War was raging. In the end, the Wherry resolution’s challenge to the president’s power was defeated, and the troops were sent to Europe. “The postwar sea change in world affairs had persuaded those Americans who

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War15

paid attention that it was dangerous to allow Europe to fall uncontested to powerful enemies.”80 This fundamental discussion of U.S. foreign policy in 1951 centered on the issue of who is in charge of the American military and how and where it should be used. The president’s power as well as his policy to deploy U.S. armed forces to Europe was reaffirmed in the 1951 “Great Debate” and has not been seriously challenged ever since. NATO ADDS MEMBERS As the Cold War continued during the 1950s through the 1980s, additional countries joined the North Atlantic Alliance, supplementing the twelve founding members. Greece and Turkey were admitted through protocols to the treaty; accession agreements were signed in October 1951. Using the same procedure, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in May 1955. Later the same month, in a retaliatory move, Moscow initiated the Warsaw Pact. The pact was formed by the Soviet Union and seven Communist-dominated countries in Eastern Europe—thus defining the lineup of the Cold War protagonists between Eastern and Western Europe. After Franco died and the fascist pall was lifted from Spain, the country was admitted to NATO in December 1981. Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, fifteen more nations joined the alliance as of 2020 for a total of thirty members, doubling the number of member states.81 All armed forces of the members that were stationed in Europe were under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.82 STRAINS WITHIN NATO Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance was not without stresses and strains among its members.83 Particularly bitter disputes arose between the United States and France resulting from America’s opposition to France’s colonial policy in Asia and Africa. The United States, after all, was the original anticolonial country, having rebelled against its European master in 1776. In its wars to keep its colonial possessions in Indo-China and Africa, France risked everything—including its historically good relations with the United States. The Indo-China war culminated in the infamous defeat of France in the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in which the regular French Army was defeated by Vietnamese guerrillas and North Vietnam’s regular armed forces. France was forced to surrender.84 When France lost all of Indo-China, France’s dysfunctional Fourth Republic collapsed. A deeper, more bitter source of stress was France’s desperate attempt to hold on to its territory in Algeria in what became a savage civil war

16

NATO Reconsidered

beginning in 1954—right on the heels of France’s humiliating defeat in Indo-China. France fought to retain this last vestige of its colonial empire in the face of a nationalist uprising and a forceful U.S. policy of supporting national self-determination. After years of bloodshed, the war ended in 1968 with Algerian independence, marking the end of France’s colonial empire. The single most divisive event within NATO during the Cold War was the Suez Crisis of 1956, during which Britain and France invaded Egypt in defiance of President Eisenhower’s warning not to do so.85 Egypt, with Soviet backing, nationalized the Suez Canal Company to use the revenue from its tolls to pay for the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. This was the highpoint of Soviet influence in Egypt, which traditionally had been a British protectorate. In a coordinated attack with Britain and France, Israel invaded the Egyptian-held Sinai Peninsula, thus beginning the Six-Day War. This was a preemptive strike by Israel, which anticipated an Egyptian attack against it. To protect the canal during these hostilities, Anglo-French forces then attacked and seized the Suez Canal and Port Said at the Mediterranean end of this all-important waterway through which flowed the vast majority of oil needed by Western Europe. Britain and France feared Egypt, under Soviet influence, would disrupt the flow of oil through the canal. In a heated UN Security Council session at the height of the Suez Crisis, the U.S. delegate voted with the Soviet delegate against America’s two most important NATO partners to cease fire and withdraw their forces from Egypt. Applying more pressure, the U.S. froze British and French assets, and Russia threatened to send rockets against France and Britain. Meanwhile, Israel had captured the Sinai Peninsula, had crossed the Suez Canal, and was on its way to Cairo.86 Anglo-French forces were forced to withdraw from Egypt in the face of U.S. pressure. Bitter feelings remained for years among these three allies who shared so much for so long. As President Eisenhower later understatedly characterized the crisis, “That was a beaut!”87 France was humbled. It had been humiliated by its defeat and occupation at the hands of Germany in 1940 after only six weeks of fighting. Hitler was able to do in that short time what the Kaiser had failed to do in four years. The three additional blows to French pride in the 1950s deepened France’s shame—the losses of Indo-China and Algeria and the Suez debacle. With the establishment of the French Fifth Republic in 1958 and the election of Charles de Gaulle as France’s president, NATO faced new stresses. De Gaulle doubted the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent to protect France, suggesting that the Americans would not risk New York City for Paris. And so in 1961 he ordered the development of France’s own nuclear deterrent, known as the Force de Frappe.88

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War17

Still furious at the United States for its opposition to France in Indo-China, Algeria, and the Suez Crisis, de Gaulle ordered NATO’s headquarters out of France. It was moved to Belgium, where it remains to this day. In March 1966, he withdrew France’s armed forces from under NATO’s Supreme Command and expelled all U.S. military from France.89 This was de Gaulle’s feeble attempt to restore France’s national pride—its grandeur—by asserting its independence of action.90 In 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy reintegrated French armed forces into NATO.91 SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATIONS IN THE 1950S AND 1960S The Cold War included scientific competition between the two superpowers as well as military and economic competition. To the profound surprise of the United States, the Soviet Union launched the first man-made satellite into space in 1957—Sputnik. The truly frightening aspect of this Russian success was their ability to lift the satellite into Earth’s orbit. This was achieved by a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the R-7. Sputnik and the R-7 heralded Russia’s ability to strike North America with nuclear weapons. The “space race” was on. Soon, America launched its own satellite into orbit, boosted by an ICBM designed by Werner von Braun.92 On August 13, 1961, the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev ratcheted up Cold War tension by initiating construction of the Berlin Wall. The wall, a physical barrier between the Eastern and Western zones of Berlin, was intended to keep the East German population from emigrating into the Western zone—and hence to freedom. The United States made no overt response to this challenge. Khrushchev concluded President Kennedy was weak.93 That same year, the United States sponsored the Bay of Pigs invasion of Communist Cuba, resulting in a crushing defeat of the invaders and another blow to American prestige.94 The most dramatic and dangerous confrontation occurred the following year, 1962, when Khrushchev recklessly attempted a strategic end-run against the United States by deploying tactical medium-range, nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba. This began the Cuban Missile Crisis.95 At that time Khrushchev had a serious disadvantage against the United States. His ICBMs did not work properly: the launchers were unreliable, their aim was off, and their fuel was so volatile they had to be stored empty thereby requiring them to be fueled just before being launched in an attack. Russia’s short- and medium-range missiles were reliable and effective, but they lacked the range to reach the United States from Russia. Thus, Khrushchev conceived the Cuba gambit to secretly base his

18

NATO Reconsidered

shorter-range missiles close enough to reach U.S. targets. This move was intended to alter the U.S./USSR strategic balance.96 President Kennedy countered this attempt to destabilize the balance of power by ordering the U.S. Navy to “quarantine” the island to prevent Soviet ships from delivering additional missiles to Cuba, and he threatened nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland if the United States were attacked from Cuba. This was “brinkmanship” of the highest order. Never in the forty-four years of the Cold War had the two superpowers come so close to nuclear Armageddon.97 The crisis ended with a negotiated agreement in which Russia withdrew its missiles from Cuba, and the United States pledged never to invade that country. In a separate, secret deal, the United States pledged to withdraw its old intermediate-range Jupiter missiles from Turkey after six months.98 PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN THE 1970S AND 1980S During those two decades, new Communist leaders less reckless than Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Kremlin. Their objective was no longer the expansion of the Soviet Union or of Communism into Europe or elsewhere, but rather the preservation of its existence in the face of the growing economic and military power of NATO. “Peaceful coexistence” was the watchword of the new, conservative leadership under Brezhnev and Kosygin. This policy signaled their unwillingness to challenge NATO and simply to hold on to power in the Kremlin, that is, preserve the status quo. Throughout their long tenure, the Soviet economy stagnated under the continuation of state-controlled central economic planning and collectivized agriculture. Being a socialist state, Russia had no economic private sector. Vast resources were devoted to developing and producing military equipment at the expense of consumer goods, which during the 1970s and 1980s were in short supply throughout the Soviet Union. Food shortages were common, frequently resulting in bread lines in urban areas. Citizens did not have access to basic necessities, such as clothing and shoes. Meanwhile, Politburo members grew wealthy, producing a stark contrast with average citizens and deep public resentment.99 In 1979, the Red Army invaded Afghanistan to aid the Afghan Communist Party’s struggle against local anti-Communist Muslim forces and to ensure the security of the Soviet Union’s southern border in Central Asia. This was a dismal, costly failure because the Afghan mujahidin, an indigenous insurgency group funded and supported clandestinely by the Central Intelligence Agency, inflicted such a high level of casualties on the Red Army that the invaders were forced to withdraw in 1989. This was the Soviet Union’s Vietnam—the first, humbling defeat of the Red Army.100

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War19

Afghanistan’s blow to Moscow’s prestige was soon augmented by the resistance of Lithuania, a small Baltic province of the Soviet Union. To bring Lithuania’s growing independence movement to heel, the Kremlin placed units of the Red Army inside its capital city to intimidate its leaders into submission, and it even attempted a coup of a newly formed pro-independence government. The Lithuanians resisted, and the Kremlin had to back off. This opened the way for Lithuania’s independence in 1991—the largest of the three Baltic states inside the Soviet Union. Moscow was reeling from this double blow to its once-vaunted invincibility. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had become General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. He reemphasized glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (openness) and attempted economic, social, and political reforms. It was too late. Russia was so deeply mired in the Communist model it could not recover—especially while continuing the arms race against the growing, overwhelming power of the United States. Gorbachev inadvertently created his own nemesis—Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev appointed him “mayor” of Moscow, and from that position Yeltsin criticized Gorbachev’s go-slow approach to economic reform. Yeltsin was a forceful leader bent on rapid economic change. His criticisms of Gorbachev escalated to a point where Gorbachev had him fired. Now in open opposition and free of any restrictions, Yeltsin became the recognized opposition to the Kremlin’s leader. Gorbachev lacked the will to silence him, as Stalin would. When the Soviet state fell apart in 1991, Yeltsin was elected president of Russia—the first direct election of a leader in the history of Russia. During the late 1980s, political unrest was surfacing in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. These were spontaneous peaceful demonstrations against the abusive, stagnant Communist system. Only in Poland was the Communist opposition organized—led by the labor movement and the Catholic Church. Most troubling for the East German regime, young East Germans, along with Hungarians, were escaping to the West through the gap in the barrier the Hungarian government opened on its border with Austria—a gateway to freedom in the West. This population outflow was crippling East Germany’s economy. Throughout 1989, the pressure for reform grew so strong inside Eastern Europe that the ruling Communist Parties’ grip spun out of control. In June, Gorbachev announced that the Kremlin would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of the East European countries. This was the nullification of the Brezhnev Doctrine, invoked in 1968 when Soviet tanks invaded Czechoslovakia and crushed its anti-Communist rebellion. The Brezhnev Doctrine had stated the Soviet Union would not permit East European Communist regimes to be overthrown and would intervene to prevent that.101

20

NATO Reconsidered

That same month Poland voted the Communist regime out of office. In October, Hungary and Czechoslovakia did the same. Open civil war was raging in Romania against its brutal Communist dictator. In August, a coup was mounted against Gorbachev by reactionary, old guard Communists and Red Army leaders. When it failed, Communism in Russia itself was finished. The people of the USSR wanted the same independence the Kremlin was allowing East Europeans to have. Some of the most dramatic demonstrations for independence against Communism occurred in East Germany. Demonstrations there grew so open and widespread that the East German government hesitantly opened portions of the Berlin Wall—which was what the populace demanded. Floods of East Germans rushed to those openings. On November 9, 1989, the government announced it would no longer hold people back. This date marks the Fall of the Berlin Wall.102 On October 3, 1990, East and West Germany were unified, and Berlin became the capital of Germany. The whole Communist empire throughout Eastern Europe was collapsing. In July 1991, the Warsaw Pact was formally dissolved. On Christmas Day 1991, Gorbachev resigned, and the next day the Soviet Union exploded into fifteen separate, independent republics. On New Year’s Eve 1991, the USSR formally ceased to exist, and the Russian Federation was born. The Cold War was over, ending the threat from the Soviet Union. NATO had won. WHY DID THE USSR IMPLODE? Answers to this vital question are as many as there are analyses and commentators. One authority on the subject is Vladimir Putin. In a January 25, 2016, speech, the President of the Russian Federation blamed V. I. Lenin, the founder of Communist Russia, for the Soviet Union’s breakup! Lenin had advocated the right of individual republics to political secession. This, said Putin, was a “delay-action bomb” that finally exploded in 1989–1991.103 Putin aside, the factors that produced this tectonic shift in world politics can be grouped into three categories: internal rot, lack of political will, and powerful external forces. Internal Rot The Soviet economic and political systems themselves were a causal factor producing the demise of the Soviet Union. The country was founded in 1917 on two false premises: the Marxist economic theory of labor and the promise of a Communist utopia. Marx and Engels wrote that the true value of an economy is based on the output of its labor. For seventy years, the labor theory of values was tested in the Soviet Union, and it failed.

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War21

Marx and the Soviet leaders downplayed or ignored the importance of other factors in economic development, especially capital and entrepreneurship—both based on private property ownership. Communist collectivist orthodoxy prohibited private ownership of property. Western capitalist nations prospered while the Soviet Union struggled economically because capitalism is a system that far outperforms socialism every time, everywhere. By the late 1980s, Russia was, economically speaking, a less developed country hamstrung by key socialist dogmas—central economic planning, state ownership of the means of production, and collectivized agriculture. The utopian promise of the end-game of a Communist society—“to each according to his needs, from each according to his ability”—the ideal of a “classless society” was never achieved but always held out as a carrot at the end of the oligarchs’ stick. That the state would “wither away” when the Communist utopia arrived was never intended by the Kremlin’s leaders.104 In the 1920s, Stalin stated this point explicitly in his struggle with Trotsky’s Left Opposition for leadership in Russia following Lenin’s death. Stalin’s slogan was Socialism in One Country (i.e., Russia).105 Trotsky, however, pushed for proletarian revolutions throughout Europe with Russia’s active assistance, even if this risked the future of the revolution in Russia. After Stalin won the struggle to be Lenin’s heir, the new master of the Kremlin never risked his power base in Russia by attempting to foment Communist revolutions elsewhere. Lack of Political Will Political will is vital to sustaining leadership in any nation-state. Months after the 1917 Revolution, Lenin demonstrated iron will. “At all costs, the Leninist leadership of the Party was determined to hold on to power, and it encountered no difficulty in identifying its own ascendancy with the fulfillment of the sacred mission of realizing socialism.” “[I]t was prepared to destroy ruthlessly all who stood in its way.”106 Throughout his long tenure, Stalin pitilessly demonstrated his will to crush any opposition, to retain power, and to reshape Soviet society.107 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Kremlin exercised its political will to maintain its empire in Eastern Europe. Soviet tanks crushed the freedom demonstrations in East Berlin in June 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Martial law was imposed in Poland as late as 1980. During these decades, Red Army troops were stationed in the satellite countries as a warning to their populations and as a means to crush any opposition if necessary.108 A decade after Stalin’s death in 1953, the Politburo, the top decision-making body in the Communist Party, “retired” Khrushchev

22

NATO Reconsidered

in 1964. The Kremlin continued its main purpose—not the expansion of Communism throughout the world but rather the maintenance of the Communist Party’s power over its own country. Following Khrushchev’s disastrous Cuban Missile gambit, the Kremlin’s new leaders accepted the fact that they could not directly challenge the United States or any NATO member protected by the United States. They lacked the will and the power to do so. Moreover, they lacked the will to risk undertaking the major changes in the Soviet economy and Soviet society that were needed to modernize and grow the underpinnings of state power. Their Communist dogma prohibited it. From the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s, the Kremlin’s principal focus—apart from the Afghanistan gamble—was internal, holding on to power. It let the Soviet economy stagnate. The reactionary Brezhnev-Kosygin era ended in 1982 with Brezhnev’s death. The Politburo appointed the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, to succeed Brezhnev, but he was incapacitated two years later. He was followed by Konstantin Chernenko, who was terminally ill and died the next year. To end confusion in its top leadership, the Politburo selected a younger, moderate Communist, Mikhail Gorbachev, and appointed him General Secretary in 1985. Little was done to improve the Soviet economy and the lives of ordinary citizens while the Communist oligarchy lived well. Stephen Kotkin labeled this the “uncivil society.”109 During the 1980s, by contrast, in the West and especially the United States, political will was abundant to contain the Soviet Union and to pressure it by fostering domestic economic progress and growing GDPs. President Reagan cut taxes to stimulate economic growth, hugely increased defense spending, and initiated advancements in strategic missile defense. His successor, George H. W. Bush, led the liberation of Kuwait from its occupation by Iraq, demonstrating the will to undertake bold international action. The contrast with the Soviet Union was stark. In one chaotic year, 1989, the Kremlin repeatedly exhibited a lack of political will. The Politburo decided not to continue the Red Army’s bloodletting in Afghanistan and withdraw their forces. It demonstrated unwillingness to put down independence movements in Lithuania and Poland. It kept hands-off peaceful demonstrations against Communist control in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. And it was unwilling to crush the violent anti-Communist revolution in Romania. Gorbachev even tolerated the open, often savage, criticism of Boris Yeltsin. Moscow’s East European and Central Asian empire spun off from the Soviet Union in 1989–1990, and its own regime collapsed in 1991. In a single year, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lost half its population and almost all the territory annexed to Russia over the previous three hundred years by Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, V. I. Lenin, and Joseph Stalin. In the satellite empire, every country declared itself a free republic.

From NATO’s Founding through the End of the Cold War23

Powerful External Forces Organized and led by the United States through NATO, powerful forces relentlessly pressured the economically weak Soviet state to keep up scientifically, economically, and militarily with the increasingly powerful Western democracies. It was a race Russia could not hope to win, given the straitjacket of its Communist economic and political systems. More than any other Western statesman, President Ronald Reagan understood that the Soviet Union was no match for the United States, much less for all of NATO. Reagan imposed financial restrictions on Soviet currency and isolated the Soviet economy, including dramatic decreases in the price of oil and natural gas, the mainstays of Russia’s exports, thus helping to cripple the Soviet economy.110 Reagan directly challenged the Kremlin with a massive buildup of U.S. armed forces, including the development of the long-range B-1 bomber and the stealthy B-2 bomber. He refused to accept Gorbachev’s proposal to limit U.S. development of its Strategic Defense Initiative only to laboratory testing by walking out of the Reykjavik Summit (which led to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty a year later). And he frequently challenged the Kremlin’s leader with forceful rhetoric, such as his famous June 1987 speech at the Brandenburg Gate next to the Berlin Wall: “Mr. ­Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”111 These were powerful forces that caused the Soviet Union to lose the Cold War and cease to exist. A remarkable fact is that it ended without a shooting war or a violent revolution producing regime change.112 Fortunately for the world, Russia in 1989 did not repeat Russia in 1917 or France in 1789.113 CONCLUSION All defensive alliances have two purposes: to deter aggression by an enemy, or, if deterrence fails, to defeat the enemy. During the forty-two years of the existence of the Atlantic Alliance throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred aggression by the Soviet Union in Europe. This success qualifies the North Atlantic Treaty as probably the most successful military alliance in recorded history. Beginning in 1949 with the signing of the Treaty of Washington and in 1951 with the deployment of a U.S. army and supreme commander to Europe, the United States and NATO deterred the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe for the remaining decades of the USSR’s existence. Throughout these decades, the United States was Western Europe’s leader114 and its protector in the face of the constant and looming threat of Soviet invasion, hyped by Soviet propaganda.

24

NATO Reconsidered

It was not just the presence of the small U.S. Seventh Army stationed in West Germany that deterred a Communist attack, but more to the point it was the threat of assured nuclear devastation that the United States could rain down on Russia if its NATO commitment was invoked. America’s nuclear guarantee underwrote peace in Europe for a longer period than any previous time in the twentieth century. From 1949 to 1999, when NATO entered the Serbia/Kosovo conflict, NATO never fired a shot in anger. The American protectorate of Western Europe secured the peace, and the president’s power to make American foreign policy and to deploy its military abroad was reaffirmed in “The Great Debate.”

CHAPTER 2

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan

Tyrannies are brutal abusers of power over their own populations. Only occasionally throughout history have they been overthrown by their subjected people because tyrants possess more coercive power than their citizens. Tyrannies usually have to be defeated by outside powers, as was the case in World War II. Often when one tyranny is overthrown, another replaces it. This happened in Russia in 1917 when the Czar was overthrown and Lenin imposed the dictatorship of the proletariat. After France’s Bourbon monarchy was overthrown in 1789, it was followed by Robespierre’s Reign of Terror and Napoleon’s dictatorship. When Fidel Castro overthrew Batista’s corrupt regime in Cuba, he established a Communist dictatorship. A rare exception to the general rules—that tyrannies are not overthrown from within and that one tyranny is typically replaced by another—occurred in the late twentieth century. The tyrants who ruled the USSR throughout its history, and the tyrants who ruled the USSR’s East European satellites after World War II, were overthrown by their own people during a remarkable three-year period, 1989–1991. Amazingly, most of these tyrannies were replaced not by another tyranny but by democracy. The elimination of most Communist dictators ruling the fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics within the USSR during 1989–1991 is a remarkable instance of internal overthrow. It was strongly aided by powerful outside pressure, without which it is doubtful the one hundred and fifty million people in the former Soviet republics would have thrown off Moscow’s yoke and established their own independent states, the largest of which in population was Ukraine.

26

NATO Reconsidered

Equally remarkably, the six satellite states in Eastern Europe, plus the former East Germany, that were nominally independent countries but in fact were Communist dictatorships treaty-bound to the USSR, also threw off their Communist rulers and became democracies. This rapid, large-scale transformation of an entire region from totalitarian dictatorship to democracy, from bondage to the East to free-will linkage to the West, is unprecedented in European history. From the Baltic in the north to the Black Sea in the south, these countries no longer faced East toward Moscow. Now they faced West toward Brussels. The end of the Cold War brought an unexpected, positive political and economic sea-change to Eastern Europe and to the world. BREAKUP OF THE USSR Before 1989, the Communist Party bosses in each of the republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics realized that Moscow would no longer try to hold them in its grip and that they could become leaders of independent countries. Between 1989 and 1990, each of these fifteen republics in the Soviet Union declared its independence from the Soviet Union, including the former Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic—the core country, Russia. Vladimir Putin cited the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”1 For the people living there, it was the greatest liberating event of their lives (see table 2.1). Russia itself was one of the major initiators of the Soviet Union’s breakup. As the secondary republics pressed for their independence from the USSR, the people of Russia realized they could have the same thing—they wanted independence for themselves. A dramatic moment occurred on Christmas Day, 1991 at 7:35 a.m. when the red Soviet hammer and sickle flag was lowered atop the Kremlin and was replaced by the Russian white, blue, and red banner. On New Year’s Eve 1991, the USSR officially ceased to exist. “And . . . it ended with one of the great anticlimaxes in history. Without a shot fired, without a revolution, without so much as a press release, the Soviet Union simply gave up and disappeared.”2 With the end of the Soviet Union, the United States became the lone global superpower. This was truly a “unipolar moment.”3 JOINING NATO Soon after the Soviet Union self-destructed and its East European satellites became free of Moscow’s domination, they began the process of applying for membership in the United Nations (1991–1992) and other powerful Western institutions—the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, both headquartered in Brussels.

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan27 Table 2.1  Sovereignty Declarations by Soviet Republics Azerbaijan declared sovereignty on September 23, 1989. Georgia declared sovereignty on March 9, 1990 and elected a nationalist government on November 11, 1990. Lithuania declared independence on March 11, 1990. On July 17, 1990, it announced it would create its own army units. Estonia declared independence on March 30, 1990. Latvia declared independence on May 4, 1990. Russia declared sovereignty on June 11, 1990. Uzbekistan declared sovereignty on June 20, 1990. Moldova (changed its name to Moldavia) declared sovereignty on June 23, 1990. Ukraine declared sovereignty on July 16, 1990, and on that day the Ukraine Supreme Soviet also declared the right for Ukraine to have its own armed forces. Belorussia (changed its name to Belarus) declared sovereignty on July 27, 1990. Turkmenistan declared sovereignty on August 22, 1990. Armenia declared independence on August 23, 1990. Tajikistan declared sovereignty on August 25, 1990. Kazakhstan declared sovereignty on October 25, 1990. Kirgizia (changed its name to Kyrgyzstan) declared sovereignty on December 12, 1990.

NATO’s military guarantee had been geographically extended three times after the Atlantic Alliance was signed in 1949 with an original membership of twelve nations. In 1951, Greece and Turkey were admitted and later the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain joined, bringing the total to sixteen nations. In 1990, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) acceded to the Federal Republic, NATO’s territorial guarantee was extended in Germany to the previous eastern border of the GDR, the Ode-Nisse Line on the German-Polish border. There was little debate at the time of these expansions of NATO’s guarantee because the security implications were well understood and the logic of the extension of the American nuclear umbrella to these countries made clear strategic and political sense. That was not the case nine years later—in 1999. There was no national debate on the momentous step that expanded the commitment of the United States through NATO to become the guarantor of nations bordering Russia itself. Nothing like “The Great Debate” in 1951 regarding the troops to Europe policy was undertaken by the foreign policy elite, much less by the responsible members of the U.S. Senate. The Clinton Administration and its successors just went ahead and blithely began the extension

28

NATO Reconsidered

of the American nuclear guarantee to countries across Eastern and Southern Europe without so much as a second thought as to the consequences on U.S.–Russia relations, much less the consequences on the U.S. public of having to defend these nations. Ahead of the Senate debate to amend the NATO treaty to permit this expansion, the author, then a consultant to RAND, argued that “the extension of the zone of American security into Eastern Europe may be the most important mistake in U.S. diplomacy made in this century.” With this “ill-conceived expansion of NATO right up to Russia’s front door,” the United States deepened its commitment in Europe in the face of a diminishing Russian threat and a growing threat from China. The argument concluded, “China is the main threat now and for the next half century.”4 Nevertheless, three of the newly freed satellite nations—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—applied for NATO membership, and with the Clinton Administration’s support, they were formally admitted into NATO in December 1999 on NATO’s fiftieth anniversary. With the admission barrier now broken, in 2003 the George W. Bush Administration supported an avalanche of seven more East European republics to join NATO—Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia. Two more Balkan states joined in 2009—Albania and Croatia—during the Obama Administration. Montenegro joined in 2017 during the Trump Administration, and North Macedonia joined NATO in March 2020. By 2020, a total of fourteen new members were added following the end of the Cold War—for a grand total of thirty NATO member nations. America’s protectorate now covers most of Europe west of Russia. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, Georgia and Ukraine applied for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), the final step before the applicant receives consideration for full NATO membership. The United States supported granting these countries MAPs, but France and Germany “were skeptical,” according to President George W. Bush, who attended the Bucharest Summit. As Bush later wrote, “They knew Georgia and Ukraine had tense relationships with Moscow, and they worried NATO could get drawn into a war with Russia.”5 This was classic diplomatic understatement. The Obama Administration also supported the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the Caucasus by granting membership to Ukraine and Georgia, a move that would have extended the American nuclear umbrella to these fragile former Soviet republics on Russia’s southern border. The American hope was that with their membership in the alliance, future incursions into their territory by Russia would be deterred. Once again, key European NATO members opposed granting membership to these highly vulnerable states, wary of their own future confrontation with Russia.

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan29

What motivated these newly freed East European, Balkan, and Caucasus countries to want to join NATO? Fearing Russian revanchism, they sought security against it by joining the Atlantic Alliance. Put more starkly, they sought protection from Russia under the wings of the American eagle, given that after the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States was the world’s sole superpower. At first, the Clinton Administration, coming into office during the USSR’s collapse, opposed granting NATO membership to the first four East European states that had requested it—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. At the 1994 NATO Summit, President Clinton expressed his opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion on the principle of democracy for all, not just these states. Clinton argued that the alliance should not “draw a new line between East and West that could create a self-fulfilling prophecy of future confrontation. I say to all those in Europe and the United States who would simply have us draw a new line in Europe further east that we should not foreclose the possibility of the best possible future for [all of] Europe.”6 A few years later, the Clinton Administration radically changed its policy and supported the admission to NATO of these countries. Next, the Bush Administration strongly supported expanding NATO membership eastward. As President George W. Bush later wrote, “I viewed NATO expansion as a powerful tool to advance the freedom agenda. Because NATO requires nations to meet high standards for economic and political openness, the possibility of membership acts as an incentive for reform.”7 American leaders were indifferent to Russian elites and Russian public opinion, which strongly opposed the eastward expansion of NATO. During the 1990s, Russian public opinion was largely in favor of Russian neutralism vis-à-vis NATO. But later, following the accession of Eastern European nations into the Atlantic Alliance, most Russians—elites and the general public—were strongly opposed to NATO’s eastward expansion.8 PROCEDURE TO JOIN NATO The procedure for a nation to join NATO was established at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit: Membership Action Plan (MAP). It is intended to assist countries aspiring to join NATO with their preparations. MAP drew on the accession experiences of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which became NATO members in 1999 during the Clinton Administration. MAP is a program of advice, assistance, and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries aspiring to join the alliance. It helps nurture countries to undertake policies and procedures to

30

NATO Reconsidered

improve their prospects for admission to the alliance. Countries must be invited to join MAP by the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s highest political body. Joining MAP is not a guarantee of future full NATO membership. MAP countries submit yearly plans for future membership that include political, economic, defense, resources, security, and legal aspects. MAP preceded the 2004 and the 2009 NATO expansions. Montenegro joined MAP in 2009 and became a member in 2017. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina is in MAP. Macedonia joined MAP in 1999, but its application was thwarted by Greece because of its objection to the name Macedonia. Turkey accepted the name. To overcome Greece’s objection, Macedonia agreed to change its name to North Macedonia.9 As of 2020, three countries are waiting to join NATO: Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ukraine.10 North Macedonia joined NATO in March 2020 (see map 2.1).

Map 2.1  Expanded NATO Membership (­https://​­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​ /­topics​_52044​.­htm)

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan31

A NEW NATO With the addition of these new members, NATO now had a new mission, a new life of its own. It was no longer a deterrent to the Soviet Union, which no longer existed. It now became a protector of the fledgling states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans against their fear of a renewal of Russian imperialism. NATO’s new raison d’etre was rooted in the history of the region as Russia’s Czars and Commissars relentlessly expanded the Grand Duchy of Moscovy far and wide over the past four centuries into its contiguous surroundings. How realistic was that threat to these new nations? With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was reduced to a shadow of its former size. Half of the population of the former Soviet Union was lost, reducing the country from nearly three hundred million people to just under one hundred and fifty million, still leaving it the largest country in Europe both in population and territory. Its population became less than half that of the United States. Russia’s land area lost to the new independent nations was more than one-third of the USSR’s former territory, and those territories were among the most important—including Ukraine with its breadbasket and coal and steel industry in the Donbass region, and the oil-rich Caucasus states, especially Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea. The GDP of the new Russia dropped 60 percent from 1990 to 1999 from $516 billion to $196 billion. The ruble was devalued in 1998 in the midst of a severe financial crisis.11 The breakup of the Soviet Union led to a deep economic crisis and a catastrophic fall in living standards throughout the post-Soviet states and in the East European states. The economic decline was worse than that of the great depression in the 1930s. Poverty and economic inequality surged. Even before the economic crisis of 1998, the countries in the former Soviet Union had a total GDP that was half of what it was in the early 1990s.12 Adding to this weakness, the regime in control of the new Russian Federation during its first decade was itself weak, indecisive, and inept. Boris Yeltsin was the first President of the Russian Federation, serving from 1992 to New Year’s Eve in 1999. His various illnesses were exacerbated by his alcohol addiction, rendering him frequently incapacitated. Not until he passed the presidency to his newly appointed prime minister, Vladimir Putin, the former head of the KGB, did the country come under the grip of a strong leader. For those first eight years of its life, the new Russian Federation was in the throes of despair, mismanagement, and internal turmoil as it responded to the realities of its new situation, adjusting from a centrally planned economy to a semi-market economy. After Russia joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1992, the IMF recommended privatizing Russian

32

NATO Reconsidered

industry to begin economic recovery. Yeltsin largely accepted this recommendation but kept the defense and energy sectors state-owned. So severely weakened was the Soviet Union just before its breakup that in November 1990 it needed to reduce the heavy burden of its conventional armed forces. Accordingly, that year it signed with NATO the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The treaty’s stated purpose was “to prevent any military conflict in Europe.” According to the terms of this treaty, the Soviet Union substantially reduced its superiority in conventional forces in Europe.13 With this reduced threat from Russia in Europe, the United States was able to deploy some of its military units from Germany to the Persian Gulf area for use against Iraq, which had invaded and occupied Kuwait during the Gulf War.14 Despite the weakness of the threat from Russia to the newly freed neighboring countries, they sought protection from the West against a renewal of imperialism from the East. NATO was pleased to offer that protection, affording it a new lease on life with a new mission after the Cold War ended. Was this in America’s national interest? The answer will become clear. NATO’S OPEN DOOR POLICY Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for the addition of new members to NATO. This is the alliance’s Open Door Policy: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” Thus, there are four tests for new members: they have to be invited, the invitation has to be unanimous, they have to be European, and they have to be able to contribute to the security of the area, that is, have armed forces of their own. The Declaration of the Brussels Summit held in July 2018 sharpened and reinforced the wording in the Treaty’s Article 10. The Declaration’s Item 10 states: “Membership [in the Alliance] is open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.”15 Thus, two new conditions for membership were added: countries must be democracies and they must be able to undertake the obligations of membership. The latter qualification implies that they must have their own armed forces and be willing to use them if called upon under Article 5—that is, respond to an “armed attack” on another member. The Brussels Summit invited two Balkan nations to join NATO: North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their formal accession would

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan33

wait until later. North Macedonia was admitted to NATO in 2020, rounding out the total membership to thirty countries. Ukraine is a special case with its eastern territories occupied by Russian paramilitary troops and having lost Crimea in 2014 in an outright grab by Russian forces. The Brussels Summit provided Ukraine a “NATO Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.” This was not a pledge to provide full membership, but it was a warning to Russia that NATO is watching the Ukraine’s security closely. Also, the Brussels Summit reaffirmed the previous invitation to Georgia to join NATO that was offered at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. The Brussels Summit included the following items in the final Declaration: Item 53: extended financial assistance to Afghanistan until 2024. Item 54: Aid to Iraq—provided training and advising instructors for professional military. Item 55: “Package on the South” was endorsed, establishing political cooperation in North Africa and the Middle East based on the Hub in Naples. A Regional Center in Kuwait was established to work with Gulf Partners. The 2018 Brussels Summit was one of the most productive and widely reported Summits in recent history. This is the Summit, attended by President Trump, in which cost-sharing was a major issue. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE To facilitate relations between NATO members and nonmembers, a program was introduced soon after the Soviet Union collapsed entitled Partnership for Peace (PfP). It was first proposed in 1991 by the George H. W. Bush Administration at a NATO defense ministers meeting to establish a mechanism for creating trust between NATO and non-NATO states in Europe—especially former Soviet republics. PfP was formally launched at the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels as a Clinton Administration initiative to build peaceful relations between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact states, as well as former Soviet republics in Europe and Central Asia. This was Clinton’s alternative to outright NATO membership for these newly independent states. PfP invited all former Soviet-dominated states to join. PfP was not a way-station to full NATO membership, as has often been stated. It was its own stand-alone organization.16 The following fourteen countries were PfP members who later joined NATO: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Some PfP members have no intention of

34

NATO Reconsidered

joining NATO—such as traditional neutrals like Sweden and Switzerland whose interest in becoming PfP members was to promote peace in Europe. As of 2020, four categories of countries were members of the PfP for a total of nineteen nations (see table 2.2). With the successful recruitment of so many nations into the PfP program, new international arrangements were needed to bridge the gap between NATO’s members and those in the PfP. A particular challenge was the fact that so many PfP members were not European but Central Asian.

Table 2.2  Members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Former Soviet Republics

Year of Accession to PfP

Armenia

1994

Azerbaijan

1994

Belarus

1995

Kazakhstan

1994

Kyrgyzstan

1994

Moldova

1994

Russia

1994

Tajikistan

2002

Turkmenistan

1994

Ukraine

1994

Uzbekistan

1994

Former Yugoslav Republics Bosnia and Herzegovina

2006

Serbia

2006

European Union Members Austria

1995

Finland

1994

Ireland

1999

Malta

2008

Sweden

1994

European Free Trade Association Switzerland Source: ­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_84336​.­htm​#

1996

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan35

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was the solution to this issue. It was established in 1997, replacing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which came into being in 1991. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provides a political framework for NATO to work with its partner countries. It is composed of the thirty NATO members and the nineteen PfP members for a total of forty-nine countries. BALKAN CRISIS Throughout its post–Cold War existence, NATO has dealt with serious, sometimes frightening issues of internal upheaval, mass murder, and terrorism. The first of these was in the Balkan Peninsula. Throughout history, the Balkan Peninsula has been a battleground of discord and turmoil. Athens fought Sparta; the Macedonians under Philip II conquered Greece; Philip’s son, Alexander the Great, conquered the known world; the Persians invaded Greece; the Ottoman Empire conquered most of the Balkans; in 1874, a new Balkan Crisis began and lasted till 1912 when Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia rebelled against the Ottoman Turks; the Austro-Hungarian Empire fought the Ottomans and acquired the western Balkans; World War I started in Sarajevo in 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria; during World War II, the Third Reich invaded and tried to pacify the Balkans then under Marshal Tito’s control; and during the Cold War, Albania was an outpost of Communism in the Soviet orbit. Few areas of the world have seen the centuries-long turbulence as the Balkans with its seething ethnic and religious hatreds. In the 1990s, a new crisis in the Balkan Peninsula began with the fighting in Yugoslavia. Ethnic members of Yugoslavia sought independence from Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia.17 This crisis began in 1991 when Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia each declared independence from Yugoslavia. In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence. As a result of these defections and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia, it became a failed state. Croatia, a country of four million people, 80 percent of which were Roman Catholic, was the first to fight for its independence from Yugoslavia.18 The dominant member of the Yugoslav federation, Serbia, with a population of seven million, 85 percent of whom were Orthodox Christian, fought Croatia to keep it in the federation. Serbia mounted a brutal campaign against Croatia, with most of the fighting actually taking place in Bosnia. NATO and the United States stood aside, not wanting to be involved in a civil war. The real problem for NATO was its internal division—France favored the Serbs, and Germany favored the Croats. After a time, the Clinton Administration reversed its position, deciding NATO should get involved. Then NATO diplomatically came to the rescue of the Croats in what was billed as a humanitarian crisis. The war ended in 1992.

36

NATO Reconsidered

Today, Yugoslavia is no longer a state, with various of its ethnic components having broken off from Serbia’s control and formed independent countries.19 Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were first to go. Montenegro, a Serbian-dominated province the size of Connecticut, declared its independence in 2006. This country of 614,000 people (fewer than Washington, DC) is 72 percent Orthodox and 19 percent Muslim. Montenegro was admitted into NATO in 2017. North Macedonia gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, and was admitted into NATO in 2020; this is a country of 2.1 million people with a land area slightly larger than Vermont. Kosovo was next to rebel against Serbia. KOSOVO In 1999, for the first time since its founding as a collective multinational military force, NATO engaged in actual combat activities. This occurred in Kosovo, the final breakaway province of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was a province of two million people, 96 percent of which were Muslim.20 They were primarily Albanians who had settled in that region over decades. For the Serbs, who nominally controlled the autonomous province of Kosovo, that province was of immense historic value, having been the seat of the Serbian Orthodox kingdom centuries earlier. Serbia was determined to crush the Kosovo independence movement. Between March 1998 and March 1999, approximately two thousand Kosovars were killed by Serbian military forces. By the summer of 1998, a quarter-million Kosovar Albanians were forced from their homes, which were destroyed along with their crops. In early 1999, evidence was discovered of a massacre of forty people in one village. By the end of May 1999, 1.5 million people (90 percent of Kosovo’s population) had been expelled from their homes. At least 125,000 Kosovo men were missing, and five thousand were known to have been executed.21 The humanitarian issue (known as “ethnic cleansing”) at stake in this civil war came to the attention of all Western nations, and, under pressure from the United States, NATO decided at an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council on April 12, 1999 to take action to aid the Kosovars in this increasingly bloody conflict. The decision was reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Washington, DC on April 23, 1999. This decision was made despite the fact that Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia, was not a NATO member, nor was Yugoslavia.22 NATO conducted a bombing campaign against Serbia that lasted for seventy-eight days, during which Serbia’s capital, Belgrade, was heavily damaged. At the end of the bombing, in June 1999, NATO established Operation Allied Force to secure and keep the peace in the Serb-Kosovo area. Command of this NATO multinational armed force was assigned to a general in the German Army.23

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan37

This was a seminal moment for Germany, being given leadership of a European multinational military force to undertake this mission. Many at the time realized that with this appointment, the Atlantic Alliance had finally and fully rehabilitated Germany a half-century after World War II. To some observers, the Kosovo NATO operation represented the end of the post–Cold War period, a decade after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, and marked the beginning of a new era in international politics.24 The role of the United States in this NATO military mission was limited to providing air power—both sea-based from aircraft carriers operating in the Adriatic Sea and from land bases primarily in Italy. For the first time the new U.S. Air Force B-2 stealth bomber was used in combat, proving its immense reach from its base in Missouri to the war zone in the Balkans. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. However, instability in the region continued. To deal with it, NATO established the Kosovo Force; in 2019, it was composed of four thousand troops from twenty-eight countries. The U.S. Army contributed to this multinational force with Battle Group East stationed at Ferizaj in Southeast Kosovo.25 With these combat activities by NATO forces intervening in what had been a civil war, NATO entered a new phase in its life. This was the beginning of a New NATO in 1999. Kosovo transformed NATO from a collective defensive alliance into an offensive alliance.26 SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES Two years after the conflict in Kosovo, terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. This was another milestone in NATO history. Given the unprovoked attack on a NATO member nation, the alliance invoked Article 5 of the Treaty to come to the aid of the United States having been subjected to an “armed attack.” This was NATO’s first use of Article 5 and surprisingly it was used to aid the alliance’s strongest member. This was the first and only time NATO’s collective defense clause in Article 5 has been invoked. The American government’s position on that milestone was summarized by then-vice president Dick Cheney, who wrote: Other nations would be with us as we responded to 9/11, but it was important, I said, that we not allow our mission to be determined by others. We had an obligation to do whatever it took to defend America, and we needed coalition partners who would sign on for that. The mission should define the coalition, not the other way around. The president made clear that he’d prefer to have allies with us, but we were at war, and if America had to stand alone, she would. Source: Dick Cheney, In My Time (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), 331.

38

NATO Reconsidered

NATO’s principal political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, agreed that, if it would be determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be regarded as an action covered by Article 5. On October 2, 2001, the Council was presented the results of the investigations into the attack’s origin and determined that the attack was an action covered by Article 5. Two days later, on October 4, NATO agreed on measures to support the United States. It launched its first antiterror operation, Eagle Assist, which lasted from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2012. Seven AWACS radar aircraft from NATO countries helped patrol the skies over the United States. In total, 830 air crews from thirteen NATO countries flew more than 360 sorties. This was the first time NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation. On October 26, 2001 NATO launched a second counterterrorism operation, Active Endeavour. Elements of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces were sent to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean to monitor shipping, including illegal trafficking. In 2004, the operation expanded to include the entire Mediterranean Sea. NATO’s response to the 9/11 attack on the United States, by launching its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area (in Afghanistan), began the alliance’s far-reaching transformation. Countering terrorism in all its forms became a NATO mission because terrorism was viewed as a direct threat to the security of citizens of all NATO countries. More broadly, it is a threat to international stability regardless of national borders, nationalities, or religion. With the adoption of this mission, the alliance significantly broadened its mandate and empowered itself to reach beyond the geographic region established in the Treaty of Washington. NATO’s work on counterterrorism centered on three areas: awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors. Those principles were applied to NATO’s actions in Afghanistan. AFGHANISTAN Knowing that the September 11 attack on the United States was planned and orchestrated in Afghanistan, the United States took the lead to deal with the source of that attack. It did so under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that permits “individual and collective self-defense.” Soon NATO mobilized to support the U.S. operation, which had been mandated by the United Nations. Within a month of the 9/11 attack, the United States mobilized and attacked Taliban and al-Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. A massive bombing campaign began in October 2001, which was followed by inserting thousands of U.S. Special Forces and regular army units into the

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan39

country. By December 2001, the al-Qaeda command headquarters in Tora Bora Mountain had been destroyed, and Taliban forces were largely forced to flee to Pakistan. This powerful demonstration of America’s ability to quickly project power to a faraway country showed the global reach and willingness of the United States to fight terrorism even in remote regions. The North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 6 defines the territories on which Article 5’s “armed attack” provision applies: “The territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” The September 11 attack on the United States clearly fell within these geographic boundaries but Afghanistan did not, being in Central Asia. Yet, given that the source and origin of the attack on the United States was in Afghanistan, America’s counterattack against that country was viewed as warranted. NATO’s Article 5 states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all [and shall take] such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” In August 2003, the UN established the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Its mission was to enable Afghan authorities to build the capacity of their national security forces to prevent their country from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorist operations. NATO took the lead in this effort. Troops from fifty NATO and Partner nations participated. By 2013, the International Security Assistance Force had eighty-seven thousand troops, of which the United States contributed sixty thousand, the UK contributed seven thousand and seven hundred, and other NATO members and partners provided the rest. At its height, the Force numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers. At NATO’s Lisbon Summit in 2010 a political partnership between NATO and Afghanistan was established under the name Enduring Partnership. The next year began the transition to Afghan leadership for their own security. The transition was completed in December 2014 when the International Security Assistance Force’s operation ended. Responsibility for Afghanistan’s security was transferred to the Afghan government. To assist the national effort, in January 2015, NATO began the Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Financial assistance was provided under this program. In 2018, the Resolute Support Mission numbered sixteen thousand troops from forty-one NATO and Partner nations. Commitments were made to continue financial support for Afghan’s forces until the end of 2020. Later, this was extended to 2024. NATO now has a standing force on active duty that contributes to collective defense efforts on a permanent basis. It was established in 2002

40

NATO Reconsidered

as the NATO Response Force, known formally as a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. It was intended as a quick response force to be used in the east and south of NATO’s territory and is composed of land, sea, and air units. A consequence of the NATO Afghanistan military engagement was that George W. Bush’s Doctrine of Preemption, to unilaterally wage war against terrorist sites before they strike, was discontinued, given that the doctrine was not followed by other NATO members. Alliance members chose to wage war collectively under NATO. This approach provided international political cover for the United States, as well as valuable material assistance for the United States in its war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists based in Afghanistan. The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan continued with no clear victory against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups over nearly two decades of fighting—America’s longest war. Over the last three centuries, Afghanistan has never been conquered and pacified despite attempts to do so by Impe­ rial Russia, by the British Empire, by the Soviet Union, and by the United States and NATO.27 Sustained victory has proven to be unattainable in this rugged, mountainous terrain where no central governmental authority has ever held sway over this most tribal of countries.28 Afghanistan is not a nation-state and never has been. Hamid Karzai was the president of Afghanistan when an insurgency against the legitimate government was underway, conducted by Taliban fighters with assistance from al-Qaeda. NATO backed Karzai, who was a member of the Pashtun tribe. The Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun. Tribal tensions were always present in Afghanistan between its largest tribes: Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. These tribes despise and distrust each other. But Pashtuns have always dominated the country’s politics.29 Victory in Afghanistan is highly problematic. Indeed, even after President Obama appointed a new field commander, General Stanley McChrystal, who altered allied strategy hoping for a positive outcome, the war continued.30 In June 2010, Obama fired McChrystal after he declined to reprimand his staff for negative comments about Vice President Joe Biden printed in Rolling Stone magazine.31 Obama objected to using the term “victory.” He stated, “I’m concerned about using the term ‘victory.’ It evokes the memory of Emperor Hirohito coming down to surrender on the battleship Missouri.”32 The NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan were both firsts and both established precedents. Kosovo was the first time since NATO’s founding that armed forces under its command actually undertook military operations. The campaign in Afghanistan was the first time NATO undertook military operations outside of Europe. With these precedents, NATO is empowered—if its members so choose—to undertake military operations anywhere.

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan41

The alliance’s reaction to the terrorism attack on the United States by launching its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area began a far-reaching transformation of NATO’s role and mission. Subsequent to the precedents set following the 9/11 attack, NATO took collective defense measures outside Europe in Libya and Syria, as well as in Ukraine. LIBYA In February 2011, Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi brutally suppressed a peaceful demonstration in Benghazi against his regime. This led to further violence and repression against civilians elsewhere in Libya. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 expressing “grave concern” for the situation and ordered an arms embargo against Libya. In March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 condemning Libya’s actions and called for individual countries to take measures to protect civilians.33 Operation Odyssey Dawn was begun as a multinational coalition led by the United States. Other participants included the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and Canada. At first, this operation was not under NATO’s control, though NATO AWACS aircraft based in Germany participated in the operation.34 Soon the North Atlantic Council voted to undertake NATO actions against Libya. The Council ordered Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to implement this policy through NATO’s Joint Forces Command Naples. That Command mobilized aircraft and ships from NATO and Partner countries to participate in the arms embargo and to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. This activity was under the heading Operation Unified Protector. Eighteen nations participated, including Partner countries Sweden, Qatar, UAE, Jordan, and Morocco. At its peak, the Operation involved eight thousand service members, twenty-one warships in the Mediterranean, and two hundred and fifty aircraft that flew twenty-six thousand sorties. Operation Unified Protector was concluded on October 31, 2011. No NATO forces ever landed on Libyan soil. His own people overthrew and murdered Gaddafi.35 UKRAINE In 2008, the United States and Ukraine signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership, which included providing Ukraine military aid as part of the defense and security cooperation provisions of this Charter.36 This was a George W. Bush Administration initiative. After Russia’s seizure of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and its subversion into eastern Ukraine, Ukraine’s economy contracted nearly 10 percent in 2015. During 2016–2017, Ukraine established free trade agreements with the European Union that redirected trade away from Russia

42

NATO Reconsidered

toward the EU, and Ukraine continues to seek membership in NATO to gain protection from Russia. Ukraine appealed to NATO’s European members and to the United States for military equipment to thwart Russian-backed invaders in the eastern part of the country. The Europeans did not send military equipment, fearing to confront Russia. The Obama Administration also declined to provide military equipment but instead provided humanitarian assistance. The Trump Administration, shortly after coming into office, reversed this policy and, consistent with the provisions in the Charter on Strategic Partnership, provided military equipment. The equipment, in particular, included shoulder-mounted Javelin antitank missiles that were needed to thwart the advancing “separatists” from penetrating deeper into Ukrainian territory. The Russian-backed advance was stopped, but sporadic fighting between Ukrainian forces and Russian mercenaries continued in eastern Ukraine despite repeated ceasefires.37 NATO’S POST–COLD WAR REORGANIZATION After the Cold War ended with the USSR’s collapse, NATO began the process of considering how to reorganize its military structure in the face of the new international reality. In 2002, two new commands replaced the Supreme Headquarters Europe in Brussels and the Supreme Headquarters Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia. They are Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation. ACO was established over Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels. The new ACO became the new military headquarters controlling all NATO ground and air forces in Europe, as well as maritime operations in the Atlantic. An American general officer or flag officer continued to lead the command. These military operations remain headquartered at Casteau, Belgium, where they have been since 1967 when they were removed from France. SHAPE is located nearby in Mons, Belgium. Also, in 2002, the NATO Response Force was established. This is a multinational force intended to provide quick reaction to a crisis situation. In 2014, it was enhanced and became the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and is composed of land, sea, and air units.38 NATO’s Standing Naval Forces were begun in 1968 as Standing Naval Forces Atlantic under SACLANT, which was decommissioned in 2003. These responsibilities were then transferred to ACO in Belgium. Now called NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, this unit is under Allied Maritime Command under ACO. There are six destroyers and frigates in this Force, each from a different NATO country. They train and operate together for six months when a new group of ships under a different national commander forms up.

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan43

NATO’s political and administrative staff is located in a new NATO Headquarters building near Brussels that was dedicated in 2017. It is a 2.7 million square foot structure that houses a staff of 3,800. It cost $1.23 billion. Supreme Headquarters Atlantic became Allied Command Transformation. This new headquarters was established in Norfolk, Virginia and was made responsible for future NATO military operations. It was commissioned in June 2003 and reformed in 2011. A French Air Force general became the first Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, which is in the same location in Norfolk as NATO’s previous Atlantic command. Allied Command Transformation’s motto is “Improving Today, Shaping Tomorrow, Bridging the Two.”39 Allied Command Transformation has three subordinate entities: one in Norway (Joint Warfare Center), one in Poland (Joint Forces Training Center), and one in Portugal (Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center). These centers report to the chief of staff of Allied Command Transformation. Over one thousand military and civilian people from allied and partner countries work for the Transformation Command in the United States and Europe. The rise of the Islamic State beginning in 2014 prompted the creation of NATO’s Strategic Direction South Hub. At the Brussels Defense Ministers meeting in February 2017, NATO established a new regional hub for the South based at NATO’s Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy. Its purpose is to meet threats from North Africa and the Middle East. This hub was announced at a press conference by NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, on February 15, 2017.40 NATO’S ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit established an Enhanced Forward Presence in Eastern Europe.41 This is NATO’s largest reinforcement of collective defense forces in Europe in a generation, an initiative supported by the Obama Administration. Multinational battle groups have been deployed to four “forward” NATO members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—all countries bordering on Russia’s western frontier. These combat-ready units make it clear that a Russian attack against one NATO ally is a Russian attack on the entire alliance. This deployment is reminiscent of the 1950s “trip wire” strategy—putting modest-size combat units in the path of a likely invasion route to trigger a massive retaliatory response by NATO. The battle group in Latvia is headquartered in Adazi, Latvia. It is led by Canadian forces and is composed of military units from Albania, the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Total troop strength is 1,393. The largest contributors are Canada, which provided

44

NATO Reconsidered

four hundred and fifty troops in a mechanized infantry battalion with armored fighting vehicles, and Spain, which provided three hundred troops in a mechanized infantry company with tanks and armored fighting vehicles. The battle group in Lithuania, headquartered in Rukia, is led by Germany, which provided 560 troops in one mechanized infantry company. Other troops were contributed by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Norway. The total troop strength is 1,345. The battle group in Poland, located in Orzysz, is led by the United States, which contributed 889 troops organized in one armored cavalry squadron. Croatia, Romania, and the United Kingdom also contributed forces totaling 1,208 troops. Finally, the battle group in Estonia, headquartered in Tapa, is led by the United Kingdom, which contributed seven hundred soldiers organized in one armored infantry battalion with armored fighting vehicles, main battle tanks, and self-propelled artillery. Denmark contributed 186 troops organized in one infantry company. The total strength is 887 troops. Iceland provided one civilian in a noncombat role. This Enhanced Forward Presence was announced publicly by NATO in 2018. Troop movements and their locations are typically classified. Presumably, NATO decided to go public with this information as a warning to Russia that not only are national forces located in its bordering countries but multinational forces are arrayed there too, demonstrating the full alliance’s commitment to these countries’ security. In addition to its troops in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, the U.S. Army also has troops on Russia’s border in Ukraine and Georgia that contribute to NATO’s mission in Eastern Europe. In Ukraine, there is a Joint Multinational Training Group located at Ukraine’s Yavoriv Combat Training Center. Units of the Tennessee Army National Guard are stationed there for six month tours of duty. This deployment is scheduled to end in 2020. In Georgia, there is a Defense Readiness Program Training Center where U.S. Army units participate in combat training with Georgian forces.42 Having units of the U.S. Army on the front line in Eastern Europe is a first since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the years when East Germany was nominally an independent country, the U.S. Army was on its western border guarding the Fulda Gap, the expected invasion route of Red Army units stationed in East Germany, if they were to invade from East Germany into West Germany. After Germany was reunified in 1990 and Red Army units were removed from East Germany, the U.S. Army remained where it was for the next twenty-five years, being far removed from the front line of a possible Russian attack. With this new forward deployment, the U.S. Army is once again on the front line of a possible Russian invasion of NATO

NATO’s Expansion and Using NATO Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan45

Europe—this time in Poland through Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave on the Baltic Sea. The Republic of Georgia has sought NATO membership for many years to provide security against Russia. It was turned down at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. At the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, Georgia was again disappointed that it was not invited to join MAP, the pathway to full membership. The Summit did lift the arms embargo on Georgia that had been in place since 2008 when Russia invaded two of its provinces.43 At the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Brussels in June 2014, the United States pushed for inviting Georgia and Ukraine to receive MAP invitations. East European members supported only Ukraine’s joining MAP. France and Germany opposed granting MAP to both Georgia and Ukraine, fearing a confrontation with Russia by expanding NATO to another of Russia’s neighbors.44 Three months earlier, Russian forces had annexed Crimea from Ukraine and subsequently invaded eastern Ukraine disguised as “separatists.” U.S. aggressiveness in Eastern Europe is further illustrated by the establishment of an American military operation in Romania. In February 2014, the United States opened a primary transit hub in that country as a base for refueling and resting U.S. soldiers exiting Afghanistan and Iraq on their way back to the United States.45 CONCLUSION: A NEW NATO With the demise of the Soviet Union and its East European empire, NATO’s purpose fundamentally changed. The alliance, originally intended to deter or defeat a Soviet attack on Western Europe, now became an incubator of nations—former puppets of the USSR which were now free and independent. These East European nations—every one of them—chose to align themselves with the West. Specifically, they joined Western institutions that bound their economies to Western Europe (European Union) and their defense through NATO to Western Europe and more importantly to the United States, the world’s lone superpower. The post–Cold War NATO extended the political and security guarantee of NATO right up to the border of the Russian Federation. This was an entirely new development in the alliance’s history, expanding exponentially the risk to the United States of future confrontations with that still formidable nuclear power. Today the American protectorate covers almost all of Europe west of Russia. The administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump undertook those risky commitments by welcoming these East European nations into NATO. After 1999, with the addition of East European members and NATO military operations inside Europe (Kosovo) and outside Europe in Central Asia (Afghanistan) and North Africa (Libya), NATO expanded the

46

NATO Reconsidered

purpose and underlying risk of alliance membership. NATO became a nurturer of nations in Europe and a force for regime change inside Europe (Yugoslavia) and outside of Europe (Libya). This is a New NATO. It was in every respect led by the United States that has been under the influence of the American globalist foreign policy elite with its hold over the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. With the advent of the Trump Administration, a new reality set in regarding these commitments and their consequent risks and costs. Looking at NATO’s seventy years of history, it becomes clear that there have been two NATOs. The first was true to the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Washington—to defend member nations in Europe subjected to an “armed attack” by the Soviet Union. This NATO lasted from 1949 to 1999—a half-century. Its great success was keeping the peace in Europe and reunifying Germany with its face toward the West. The New NATO began in 1999 and continues to this day. Its undertakings over the past two decades have established high-risk precedents for future activities. It has become a vast, expensive bureaucratic and military operation that can be used anywhere its political leaders choose—in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, anywhere—for any purpose its leaders choose, including regime change in nonmember nations. The cost of this far-flung enterprise is largely borne by the United States. Most wealthy nations in Europe, especially Germany, the country that benefited most from the first NATO, decline to support the New NATO to the level they have committed. The risks and costs to the United States of future use—or misuse—of this new powerful international instrument are profound.

CHAPTER 3

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century

“A nation that forgets its past has no future.”

Winston Churchill

Throughout its lifetime NATO has been vitally important to its European members because most of them have been unable or unwilling to provide adequately for their own defense against a Soviet attack or Russian imperialism. Through these seven decades, most of them have been content to rely on the United States to provide for their security through NATO. Surprisingly, throughout its lifetime NATO has also been vitally important to Russia, and that importance has continued into the twenty-first century. NATO has provided Russia’s oligarchs with a clear, visible threat to their security to justify their large defense expenditures—just as it provided this same justification for its Communist leaders to spend vast sums on the Soviet military. This threat, which feeds on Russia’s historic inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, rationalizes large defense expenditures the Russian Federation can ill afford, but which its new ruling class—as was the case with its previous Communist ruling class—needs to justify its autocratic power over its people. RUSSIAN SENSE OF INFERIORITY “Russia has always been behind Western civilization while admiring the culture and sophistication of the West.” This leads to “paranoia,”1 which leads to aggressive/defensive behavior by its leaders. Unlike Western Europe, Russia experienced neither the Renaissance nor the Reformation. This led to the comparative cultural retardation of Russia for hundreds of years, contributing to its sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the West.2

48

NATO Reconsidered

George Kennan, in his famous “Long Telegram” from Moscow in 1946, summarized his understanding of Russia’s insecurity: “At the bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.”3 Russia’s feelings of insecurity are fed by two major factors: its imperial ideology that drives its leaders to expand its borders, and its perennial fear of outside invasion because Russia’s geography lacks any major natural barriers.4 Kennan’s analysis was later published anonymously in a Foreign Affairs article in 1947 entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” where he urged the United States to adopt a “containment” policy toward the USSR.5 That is exactly what the Truman Administration did. Stephen Kotkin’s analysis is similar to Kennan’s: “Russia has felt perennially vulnerable and has often displayed a kind of defense aggressiveness  .  .  . Today, too, smaller countries on Russia’s borders are viewed less as potential friends than as potential beachheads for enemies.”6 The westernization of Russia was begun only in the late seventeenth century by Czar Peter the Great. Peter dressed in western clothes, taxed elders who refused to shave off their beards, visited West European countries, founded the Russian navy, built a “Window on the West” in St. Petersburg in 1703, where he founded the new Imperial Capital, and in 1721 changed the name of the country from the Grand Duchy of Moscovy to the Russian Empire.7 The only loser in this contemporary scenario—neither Europe nor Russia—is the United States. The West’s superpower largely paid the bill, and it was the nation most exposed to the consequent risks that would result from an Article 5 “armed attack” on any NATO member nation by having to defend that ally, thereby risking nuclear retaliation from Russia. THE NATURE OF POWER An examination of Russia’s power versus NATO’s power begins with an examination of the nature of state power. For nation-states, the traditional sources of power are geographic, demographic, economic, military, technological, and ideological. Since the advent of the nuclear age, possession of nuclear weapons is the single heaviest weight in the scales of power. Yet, as has been shown over the past seventy-five years since an atomic bomb was first used in warfare, other states having the same type of power deter its use. Mutual assured deterrence negates the use of these weapons, making the traditional bases of national power highly relevant again in today’s world politics. The U.S.–USSR standoff throughout the Cold War is proof of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.8 The same is true

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century49

in the tense, sometime openly hostile, relations between India and Pakistan, where both have nuclear weapons but none have been used—thus attesting to their deterrent value. As of the third decade of the twenty-first century, nations that have declared they possess nuclear weapons are the following: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. An undeclared possessor of nuclear weapons is Israel. Having traditional power is, however, not enough. A nation must also have the willingness—the courage—to use its power. This raises the issue of leadership. If a nation’s leader fails to use the power available, this increases adversaries’ temptations to test that unwillingness and to employ its own power against it. This phenomenon is best illustrated by Britain and France versus Germany on the eve of World War II. This is the starkest example in modern history of failure of leadership to use superior power. Despite the fact that the French Army was substantially larger than Germany’s and that Britain’s Royal Air Force was far more powerful than the Luftwaffe, the leaders of those countries repeatedly appeased Hitler in his aggressive drive to rearm Germany and to add to its territory. Hitler’s peaceful territorial acquisitions included the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Saar, the 1938 Anschluss with Austria, and the 1938 Munich Conference in which Germany was given a free hand in the Czech Sudetenland and later acquired the entire country of Czechoslovakia without firing a shot. Britain and France finally drew the line in 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland, by declaring war on Germany. Yet, they failed to attack Germany on its western border, which was largely defenseless because the German Army was then fighting in Poland. They missed an historic strategic opportunity which the following year cost them dearly when Germany, having grown even more powerful, invaded and conquered France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in six weeks and threw the British Army into the North Sea. Failure to lead, failure to use power available to a leader, can produce the same result as having no power at all. MATERIAL BASE OF POWER It is essential to begin with an understanding of the material base of power. The key components of the material base of power in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are the size of a country’s population, its GDP expressed in trillions or billions of U.S. dollars in purchasing power parity (PPP) or in exchange rate parity, and its military expenditures as a percent of GDP. These three elements—population, GDP, and military power—are the bases of a nation’s raw geopolitical power. CIA’s 2019 World Fact Book data appear in table 3.1.

50

NATO Reconsidered

Table 3.1  Material Base of Geopolitical Power Country Russia

Population millions, 2019

$ GDP ppp 2017

142

4.0 T 1.5 T exchange rate

Military % of GDP/yr 5.4 2016 4.2 2017

NATO Members United States

329.2

19.4 T

3.29 2016

Turkey

81.2

2.1 T

1.73 2016

Germany

80.4

4.1 T

1.2  2018

France

67.3

2.8 T

1.79 2017

United Kingdom

65.1

2.9 T

2.2  2017

Italy

62.2

2.3 T

1.12 2017

Spain

48.9

1.7 T

0.91 2017

Poland

38.4

1.1 T

1.99 2017

Canada

35.6

1.7 T

0.99 2016

Romania

21.5

481.5 B

1.42 2016

Netherlands

17

916.1 B

1.17 2017

Belgium

11.4

528.5 B

0.9  2017

Portugal

10.8

313.4 B

1.84 2016

Greece

10.7

298.0 B

2.4  2017

Czech Republic

10.6

375.7 B

0.98 2016

Hungary

9.8

289.0 B

1.01 2016

Bulgaria

7.1

153.0 B

1.53 2017

Denmark

5.6

286.8 B

1.15 2016

Slovakia

5.4

179.4 B

1.16 2017

Norway

5.3

380.0 B

1.62 2016

Croatia

4.2

101.0 B

1.27 2017

Albania

3.0

35.9 B

1.22 2017

Lithuania

2.8

91.2 B

2.0  2018

Latvia

1.9

53.9 B

1.7  2017

Slovenia

1.9

71.0 B

.92 2016

Estonia

1.25

41.5 B

2.17 2016

North Macedonia

1.19

31.1 B

1.19 2018

Montenegro

.642

11.0 B

1.7 2018

Luxembourg

.594

62.7 B

.54 2017

Iceland (no military)

.339

17.6 B

.1  2016

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century51 Table 3.1  continued Country

Population millions, 2019

$ GDP ppp 2017

Military % of GDP/yr

China

1.38 B

23 T 12 T exchange rate

2.0  2017

India

1.29 B

9.4 T 2.6 T exchange rate

2.47 2016

Other Great Powers

Source: ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­geos​/­rus​.­html

As these data illustrate, the balance of power between Russia and NATO is lopsidedly in favor of NATO. Even without the United States, NATO has a preponderant advantage in population, economic, and military power. With the United States, whose population is more than twice that of Russia and an economy nearly five times larger, NATO has by far the greater material base of power. But note, Russia spends a much larger proportion of its limited GDP on its military than any NATO member, and that percentage has been fairly stable. Russia is a first-class military power, even though it is a second-class economic power. Note also that Germany’s GDP is roughly the same as Russia’s, though Germany has a population a little more than half the size of Russia’s and a land area (slightly smaller than Montana) a fraction of Russia’s size. Yet, Russia spends vastly more on its military than Germany, which appears content to allow the United States to protect it through NATO. Raw numbers can be deceiving. Look at Greece and Turkey. Their military spending is largely directed against each other, not Russia, because of historic enmity, especially over Cyprus. Data from China and India are included for comparison as these nascent superpowers are the only nuclear powers that could and probably will exceed Russia’s military capability in the foreseeable future. According to these data, China’s economy is now the largest in the world in terms of PPP, and India’s is also growing rapidly now that it has abandoned socialism and embraced free market capitalism, as was the case with China beginning in the late 1970s. Economic and military data on China are probably overstated. Also for comparison, the twenty-eight members of the European Union had a total GDP in 2017 of $17.28 trillion, two trillion smaller that year than the United States. Russia’s economy is a source of vulnerability, not strength. GDP real growth in Russia in 2015 was −2.5 percent, in 2016 it was −0.2 percent, and in 2017 it had recovered from the financial crisis to only +1.5 percent.

52

NATO Reconsidered

Russia’s principal export customers in 2017 were China at 10.9 percent of total exports, The Netherlands at 10 percent, and Germany at 9.1 percent. Russia’s principal import sources in 2017 were China at 21.2 percent, Germany at 10.7 percent, and the United States at 5.6 percent.9 With its top three trading partners, Russia was in deficit—that is, it had an unfavorable balance of trade. Data on GDP spending for defense from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are similar to these CIA data with some obvious differences.10 According to SIPRI, Germany’s percent of GDP spent on defense averaged 1.2 since 2013. For the decade prior to that, it averaged between 1.3 and 1.4 percent. Russia spent on defense 4.1 percent of its GDP in 2014, 4.9 in 2015, 5.5 in 2016, and 4.3 percent in 2017. China’s defense spending averaged 1.9 percent of GDP for the ten years prior to 2017. The United States devoted 3.1 percent of its GDP to defense in 2017. WAR POWER Power rankings are not permanent or immutable. For example, in 1940, Germany and Japan were Great Powers; five years later they were not. In 1975, China was not a Great Power; by 2010, it was. Russia was a superpower in 1990; two years later it was not. Loss in war and internal developments can fundamentally and sometimes dramatically alter a country’s power status. Recognition of Great Power status traditionally followed victory in a war with another Great Power. By 1898, the United States had become one of the world’s preeminent industrial powers, but it was recognized as a Great Power only after it defeated Spain (though not a Great Power) that year in the Spanish-American War. The United States has been a Great Power ever since, attaining superpower status after World War II when it, with its allies, defeated two Great Powers.11 Japan was recognized as a Great Power following its defeat of Russia, an existing Great Power, in 1904 in the Russo-Japanese War. Today, China is regarded as a Great Power because of the size of its economy, population, and military capability. Fortunately, it has not had to prove its status in a war with another Great Power, though it won its border clashes with Russia and India in recent years. The material base of power, which underpins a nation’s ability to influence world events, is only the starting point in assessing a country’s capacity to project power and influence.12 Other nonmaterial factors are equally important—the most vital being leadership capacity and willingness to exercise power.13 The earlier discussion of Britain and France versus Germany in the late 1930s starkly illustrates that point.

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century53

Geography, once a hallmark of state power, has declined in importance due largely to advances in technology. In his day, Napoleon believed the foreign policy of all states was based on their geography.14 As recently as the twentieth century, proximity of one combatant to another was vitally important, as illustrated during World Wars I and II in Europe. It is less significant today. Military aircraft and missiles have intercontinental range, obviating the need for territorial propinquity. Cyberwarfare is indifferent to geographic size or distance. Geographic size can also be underrated— Brazil is geographically huge but not as powerful as Britain. Even vast natural resources, such as oil, may be a nonfactor in state power if the nation’s leadership squanders that asset, as is the case with today’s Venezuela. For a foreign policy realist, the bottom line is this: the critical test of the power of one state versus another is its warfighting power. “Where the ultimate form of conflict is war, the struggle for power becomes a struggle for war power, a preparation for war.” Improving the relative power position of one state versus another becomes the primary objective of the internal and external policy of states. “All else is secondary.”15 War has been an inherent feature of the nation-state system since its founding in 1648 in the Treaties of Westphalia, ending Europe’s Thirty Years’ War. States must be willing or appear to be willing to go to war to defend their vital interests. Look at the history of war since the founding of the nation-state system. In the seventeenth century, Europe was at war 75 percent of the time, in the eighteenth century it was at war 50 percent of the time, in the nineteenth century 25 percent, in the 20th century 12 percent of the time. The twentieth century wars in Europe included World Wars I and II, Soviet attacks on Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and NATO’s war against Serbia over Kosovo. In the first twenty years of the twenty-first century, the world has been at war 98 percent of the time—terrorist attacks, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The territorial expanse of war has declined, but its intensity and destructiveness have increased.16 With this as background, it is time to discuss specific issues NATO confronted with the Russian Federation thus far in the twenty-first century. Though it is no longer a superpower, Russia possesses a formidable nuclear weapons arsenal and nuclear weapon delivery capability. It has intervened in non-NATO neighboring nations with which it shares a border. But it also intimidates East European NATO members that were once its satellites but has not yet directly intervened in any of them. NATO AND RUSSIA: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT Immediately after the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russia and NATO appeared to be cooperating. In 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for

54

NATO Reconsidered

Peace, which led to expanded NATO-Russia cooperation. In an effort to further solidify good relations, an agreement was signed at the NATO Summit in Paris in May 1997 that was termed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. In this quasi-treaty, the parties agreed not to see each other as adversaries but to work together to achieve “a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.”17 These were Yeltsin initiatives. After Boris Yeltsin retired and Vladimir Putin came to power, the cooperation continued in 2002 when the NATO-Russia Council was established at the Rome NATO Summit that year. This new intergovernmental body met regularly during the early Putin presidency. By 2011, relations between NATO and Russia were so positive that the council authorized joint military training exercises. In May 2011, NATO-Russian submarine exercises were held, and the following month joint fighter aircraft exercises took place, code named “Vigilant Skies 2011.”18 But cooperation was mixed with conflict. In 2007, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This was followed in March 2015 by Russia’s announcement that the suspension was now “complete,” and that Russia would no longer participate in intergovernmental consulting groups.19 This appeared to be in retaliation to NATO’s harsh reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which occurred in February–March 2014. During 2014, tensions between NATO and Russia mounted with growing criticism by NATO of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. On April 1, 2014, NATO suspended cooperation with Russia. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO “strongly condemned Russia’s illegal and illegitimate self-declared ‘annexation’ of Crimea and its continued and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine in violation of international law.”20 NATO imposed financial sanctions on Russia and, together with the precipitous drop in the price of oil by 50 percent on the world market, brought about a near collapse of the Russian economy. The sanctions cut off Russia’s access to foreign capital.21 The Russian financial crisis of 2014–2015 produced immense hardship in Russia, causing the ruble to be devalued and prompting a sell-off of Russian assets.22 The fact that half of the Russian government’s revenue comes from oil and natural gas exports severely limited Putin’s leverage.23 RUSSIA TURNS EAST In the face of Western pressure against its moves in Ukraine, Russia turned East. Putin moved to strengthen Russia’s relations with China. In 2015, Russia and China signed a $2.5 billion deal for Russia to deliver twenty-four Su-35 advanced jet fighters to China in defiance of the U.S. sanctions. By April 2019, all twenty-four Su-35s had been delivered, according

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century55

to TASS News Agency, despite sanctions the Trump Administration had imposed against China in 2018 for buying the Su-35s.24 The U.S. sanctions also cited China’s receipt of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile systems and related equipment, according to the State Department.25 Russia’s China initiative came to fruition in mid-2019 when President Xi Jinping made his eighth visit to Moscow and was warmly welcomed by Vladimir Putin in a lavish ceremony. During this visit, Putin said Russia “is committed to deepening cooperation with China in the fields of economy and trade, agriculture, finance, science and technology, environmental protection, telecommunications and infrastructure construction.”26 Putin specifically announced a Russian commitment to supply China’s energy needs with oil and natural gas and to provide farm products such as soybeans. After the meeting, the two leaders signed agreements elevating their bilateral relationships into a “comprehensive strategic partnership” intended to strengthen contemporary global strategic stability.27 According to The Moscow Times, “The Russia-China relationship has reached an unprecedented high level.”28 This “strategic partnership” of the one-time Communist allies has serious implications for the West. One consequence is the elimination of the near-term possibility of developing a link between NATO and Russia to diminish the threat of Russia to Europe by having Russia join NATO. That opportunity was viewed as a long-shot option, but now it is clearly off the table for the foreseeable future. Another consequence of the Russia-China “strategic partnership” is that U.S. pressure on China and Russia in the form of financial and other types of sanctions is weakened as the two countries have now chosen to work together across a broad range of critical issues. Finally, Russia signaled it is now prepared to fully support Beijing’s “Road and Belt” strategic plan by specifically naming “infrastructure construction” as part of their new partnership, signaling Russia’s willingness to permit the construction of a high-speed railway from China to Europe through Russian territory. EUROPE MISSILE DEFENSE In the opening years of the twenty-first century, the George W. Bush Administration announced its intention to protect its European NATO allies against rocket attacks launched from Iran by establishing a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin saw this missile defense system as a threat to itself. In 2002, talks began between the United States, Poland, and the Czech Republic to establish this missile defense system in Eastern Europe to intercept long-range missiles fired from Iran toward European targets. This was an American initiative in the wake of the 9/11 attack on the United States.

56

NATO Reconsidered

Redzikowo, Poland was to be the location of the European Interceptor Site—a U.S. missile base of ten silo-based interceptors. This site would be linked to a radar tracking system in Brdy, the Czech Republic. Both sites would be under NATO command. On August 20, 2008, an agreement to establish the missile defense system was signed in Warsaw between Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state, and Poland’s foreign minister. On November 5, 2008, one day after Barack Obama won the U.S. presidential election, Russia’s president Medvedev stated his objections to “the relentless expansion of NATO” and the “creation of a missile defense system” in Eastern Europe. Medvedev announced Russia would deploy short-range missiles in Kaliningrad, Russia’s enclave on the Baltic Sea bordering Poland, to “neutralize” the NATO missile defense system.29 Reacting to this threat during his first year in office, President Obama cancelled these Bush Administration initiatives. In a speech on September 17, 2009, Obama made the termination announcement and stated that the United States would offer a smaller-scale replacement plan.30 Russia continued to express its opposition to the deployment of any missile defense system in Europe. On March 27, 2012, eight months before the next U.S. presidential election, President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev met. In a candid moment before an open microphone, President Obama commented to Medvedev on a variety of issues, specifically the European missile defense system: “[A]ll of these issues, but particularly missile defense, can be resolved,” Obama stated, “but it’s important for him [Vladimir Putin, the newly elected Russian President] to give me space.” Then Obama added, “This is my last election. After my election I’ll have more flexibility.”31 Medvedev assured Obama he would transmit this information to Vladimir Putin. The following year, after his reelection, Obama scrapped part of his smaller-scale replacement plan.32 In 2016, the Obama Administration cancelled the remaining small-scale defense system and announced a new initiative: the establishment of an Aegis antimissile system in Romania. This was named “Aegis Ashore” because the Aegis system was originally designed for ship defense. Aegis is a shipboard system for defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, not intercontinental ballistic missiles. A ribbon-cutting ceremony in Romania was filmed with Romanian officials and the NATO secretary general officiating at the opening of the new Aegis base. Even this limited defense system, which was already deployed on U.S. and many allied warships, was termed “a direct threat” by the Russian government.33 Russia’s ability to project power to back up that warning is questionable. In 2018, Russia’s projected real GDP growth was only 1.7 percent; its inflation rate was higher at 2.8 percent.34 This was an example

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century57

of Russian “sabre rattling,” a threatening statement with nothing to back it up. The Trump Administration rejected the waffling of the previous administration under threats from Russia. It boldly reversed course and signed a Patriot missile defense system agreement with Poland in March 2018—sixteen years after the talks with Poland began. The value of the Patriot deal was $4.75 billion, the largest ever military purchase by Poland.35 Patriot missiles are the latest and best U.S.-made antimissile defense system, capable of shooting down incoming ICBMs. RUSSO-GEORGIA WAR Russia’s conquest of Georgia began in 1864 under Czar Alexander II and was completed under Lenin’s Bolsheviks in 1921.36 Georgia was Joseph Stalin’s birthplace.37 Vladimir Putin, once again President of the Russian Federation, claimed a right and duty to intervene to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers wherever they live.38 This was not a new concept; in the late 1930s, Adolf Hitler used a similar rationale for annexing German-speaking territories—Austria and the Czech Sudetenland. This “Putin Doctrine” was used as the justification for Russia’s 2008 invasion of the two Georgia provinces neighboring Russian territory that have Russian minority populations. It was also used to justify Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine—the Crimea having a large Russian population and eastern Ukraine having a substantial Russian-ethnic and Russian-speaking population. The Russian invasion of the two provinces of the Republic of Georgia occurred in August 2008. Georgia, a former republic in the Soviet Union, became independent when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991. Georgia has a population of 4.9 million (2018 est.), 83 percent of which are Orthodox and 10 percent are Muslim. Eighty-seven percent of Georgia’s population is ethnic Georgian.39 Russia had massed its most seasoned military unit, the Fifty-Eighth Army, in North Ossetia, a Russian province bordering on Georgia. This army had fought in the Chechnya War and was Russia’s most experienced combat unit. The army had six hundred tanks, two thousand armored troop carriers, and one hundred and twenty combat aircraft. These forces entered the two-mile-long Roki Tunnel under the Caucasus Mountains and invaded South Ossetia, a province of Georgia, from Russia’s province in North Ossetia.40 In 1991, the two disputed Georgian provinces, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, had declared their independence from Georgia, but the Georgian authorities refused to recognize their independence. The situation festered for over a decade until Russia invaded the provinces and established

58

NATO Reconsidered

diplomatic relations with them. Russian troops remain in the provinces, supporting their independence stance. The two provinces represent 20 percent of Georgia’s territory.41 The situation remained unchanged for years. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia defeating the previous autocrat, President Eduard Shevardnadze, in what was termed the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili, a charismatic young democrat, favored the United States and, in particular, its president, George W. Bush. Saakashvili stated his desire for Georgia to join NATO. Most importantly, he ran on a platform of reunifying the two provinces with the Republic of Georgia. Dissidents in the two provinces, who were loyal to Russia, resisted unification. Russia backed the dissidents and in August 2008 sent troops and tanks into the two provinces, resulting in clashes with Georgian military.42 Putting more pressure on Georgia, Gasprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, announced it would double the price of natural gas it sends to Georgia.43 President George W. Bush condemned the violence, backing Saakashvili. While attending the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, Bush privately urged Vladimir Putin, who also attended the Games, to withdraw his troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, saying that Russia would become isolated if it did not get its troops out of Georgia. After a few weeks of intense diplomacy, Russia withdrew most of its troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but some Russian forces maintained an unlawful presence there.44 A decade later, in 2018, Russian troops continued to occupy the two provinces. Russia and the pro-Russian leaders of the provinces slowly expanded the territory under their control into Georgia. This was characterized as “creeping annexization” and gave birth to a new term: “borderization.”45 At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 Georgia was invited to join NATO. This invitation was reaffirmed at the 2018 Brussels Summit, but no date for accession was announced. European NATO members, especially Germany and France, expressed their continuing opposition to Georgia’s admission to NATO out of concern for Russia’s objection. RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR Ukraine had been a part of Imperial Russia since its annexation began under Czarina Catherine the Great in 1783. V. I. Lenin added additional Ukrainian territory to Russia in 1917, Stalin added more in 1945, and in 1954 Khrushchev ceded to Ukraine the Crimean Peninsula, thus filling out the boundaries of modern-day Ukraine. Crimea had been annexed to Russia under Catherine the Great in 1783 after Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire, which had controlled it. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, an independent Ukraine was born.

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century59

This fledgling new country of fifty million people is two-thirds Orthodox. Its ethnicity is 78 percent Ukrainian and 17 percent Russian. The Ukrainian language is the only official language, though 21 percent of the population speaks Russian in various regions of the country.46 Ukraine feared Russia would attempt to restore its authority over it partly because it was stockpiled with Soviet-era nuclear weapons. It sought security guarantees from Russia and from the United States that it would not be attacked or reabsorbed by Russia. Accordingly, a series of negotiations were undertaken to provide for Ukraine’s protection and to safeguard its nuclear arsenal. On January 14, 1994, at a meeting in Budapest, Hungary, the presidents of the United States (Bill Clinton), the Russian Federation (Boris Yeltsin), and Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement that offered security assurances for Ukraine. On the same date, the three parties signed the Budapest Memorandum, in which all three countries committed to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. They specifically pledged not to use force against Ukraine. In return for these assurances from Russia, underwritten by the United States, Ukraine gave up two thousand nuclear warheads, missiles, and bombers—essentially disarming itself based on Russia’s pledge of nonaggression. On December 5, 1994, Ukraine signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—confirming it would not have a nuclear weapon capability.47 Ukraine’s nuclear warheads were dismantled. Despite these security assurances, tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine continued. After Yeltsin retired and Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation at the end of 1999, tensions between the two nations escalated. In 2004, Ukraine had what was termed the “Orange Revolution,” which swept out of the presidency the pro-Russian leader, Viktor Yanukovych, and brought in a pro-Western reformist, Viktor Yushchenko. Yet, in 2006, Yanukovych, the pro-Russian, retook the presidency and began undermining the pro-Western reforms and restoring favoritism toward Russia. The population demonstrated against these policies, fearing Russian intervention.48 U.S.–UKRAINE POLICY The George W. Bush Administration sought to calm Ukrainian fears of Russian revanchism by signing a new agreement on December 19, 2008: United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership.49 This agreement, signed in Washington, recognized continuing threats to Ukraine’s peace and security, and the parties pledged to expand their economic and security relationships “to defeat” those threats. Thus, in its closing days, the

60

NATO Reconsidered

Bush Administration redoubled America’s security assurances to Ukraine as it faced down repeated threats from Russia. Barack Obama replaced George W. Bush in the White House in January 2009. Soon Putin, obviously believing Obama would not honor these American security pledges, disregarded these reassurances and increased pressure on Ukraine. As a result, in February 2014, violence erupted in Ukraine, which was termed the Maiden Revolution. At this time the pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, used force against his own population, resulting in many Ukrainian deaths. The situation in Ukraine rapidly deteriorated, producing a wide-scale popular uprising that forced Yanukovych to flee the country and go to Russia.50 During that same month, amid this turmoil, Russian soldiers without insignias invaded Crimea from Sevastopol where Russia had a long-term lease with Ukraine to home-port its Black Sea Fleet. These troops quickly overcame the Ukrainian defenders and closed the narrow neck of land that connects the peninsula with the rest of Ukraine. Russia announced its annexation of the entire peninsula and held a plebiscite in which people in Crimea voted to join Russia. This Russian aggression was condemned by NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. No Western country recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The following month, in March 2014, there was wholesale revolution in Ukraine. Fighting broke out in Kiev between pro-Russian and pro-Western groups. In the end a pro-Western leader was elected president, Petro Poroshenko. The new president restored the 2004 constitution, which Yanukovych had scrapped, and asked for support from the European Union and NATO.51 In early 2015, amid this turmoil, the Ukraine situation entered a new frightening phase. Russian paramilitary forces armed with tanks and other heavy equipment invaded the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine next to Russia’s border. An independence movement against the Ukrainian government in eastern Ukraine was sparked by this invasion. It included pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian insurgents. Heavy fighting ensued between Russian proxies and Ukrainian forces, resulting in thirty-four thousand Ukrainian dead or wounded. The insurgents took and held large areas in eastern Ukraine, including the Donbass region, which is the center of Ukraine’s coal and steel industry and had been a mainstay of the Russian economy for over one hundred years.52 In an attempt to calm the situation, the German chancellor and the French president flew to Moscow and met with President Putin. They were unable to reach a settlement. Russian forces remained in eastern Ukraine, and the fighting continued despite more than twenty calls for ceasefires. One ceasefire was broken within thirty minutes. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, fearing the situation in Ukraine was getting out of control, urged the parties to meet in Minsk to discuss

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century61

a settlement. The meeting took place on February 12, 2015 between President Putin, Chancellor Merkel, and the presidents of France and Ukraine. After sixteen hours of negotiation, a settlement was reached, termed the Minsk Agreement. It called for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign troops from Ukraine, removal of heavy weapons, and restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty throughout eastern Ukraine.53 This agreement was never enforced. The attitude of the United States toward the Ukraine crisis was articulated by President Obama in an interview with The Atlantic. Obama stated Ukraine is “a core interest” for Moscow in a way that it is not for the United States. He noted Ukraine is not in NATO, so it is vulnerable to Russian military domination. Regarding the United States, he said, “we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for.”54 This presidential statement appeared to provide Russia with carte blanche in Ukraine and was reinforced by the Obama Administra­ tion’s refusal, despite desperate pleas from Ukraine, to provide military equipment to repel the Russian invaders as fighting continued in eastern Ukraine. Obama sent humanitarian aid only. TRUMP REVERSES U.S.–UKRAINE POLICY After he took office in 2017, President Trump reversed Obama’s policy and provided advanced weapons to Ukraine’s government, giving it the wherewithal to resist further Russian encroachments into Ukrainian territory. This military aid included Javelin antitank missiles. Trump’s Administration also announced it might scrap a nuclear arms treaty in retaliation for Russian cheating.55 In February 2019, it did scrap the nuclear arms treaty.56 Russia soon ratcheted up the tension in Ukraine. On November 26, 2018, Russian naval vessels fired on and seized three Ukrainian warships in the Black Sea. Ukrainian sailors were injured and twenty-four were taken as prisoners. The Ukrainian government imposed martial law on the country. Russian naval vessels blocked the entrance to the Sea of Azov, denying Ukrainian ships access to its vital ports.57 The Sea of Azov, a branch of the Black Sea, had become a Russian lake. In December 2018, the Ukraine government closed its border to Russian men.58 In a gesture of solidarity with Ukraine, President Trump announced cancellation of a meeting with Vladimir Putin at the then-upcoming G-20 meeting in Argentina. Russia’s response was to deploy an additional battery of advanced S-400 surface-to-air missiles to Crimea.59 Fear of a Russian invasion of the three Baltic states grew during the crisis in Ukraine. The outgoing NATO secretary general, Anders Rasmussen, citing Russian aggression against its neighbors, stated, “There is a high probability that [Putin] will intervene in the Baltics to test NATO’s

62

NATO Reconsidered

Article 5.” This was the first time during the conflict that a high-ranking former NATO official expressed this level of concern.60 Putin did not invade the Baltic states being protected by NATO, but he continued his aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, both non-NATO states. It had become clear that Putin wanted to restore to Russia as much of its former territory as he could without risking a NATO military response. NATO’S SUCCESS RECORD IN EUROPE For seven decades, there was no war between the USSR/Russia and any NATO member nation. During this time, Europe enjoyed its longest period of peace between its Great Powers since the advent of the nation-state system in 1648. This historic achievement is a tribute to the American statesmen who originally crafted the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and to all those who followed, fulfilling the original commitment to defend its member nations. During the Cold War, the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation was the principal guarantor of peace in Europe between the superpowers. After the Cold War, the sole superpower, the United States, continued to be the principal guarantor of peace and security in NATO Europe. This is not to say there was no war or fighting in Europe during the Cold War. There was. The Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia and Hungary to put down revolts against their Communist dictators, and Soviet pressure on Poland and East Germany to quell their independence movements was also a feature of the Cold War. However, no NATO member nation was attacked by the USSR—only non-NATO states were attacked by the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, Russia under Vladimir Putin continued historic Russian aggressive policies to restore Russian control over portions of the USSR that were lost with the breakup of that country—with his focus on Georgia and Ukraine, both non-NATO states not under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella. The former portions of the USSR that became NATO members, the three Baltic states, have not been subject to a Russian armed attack. Indeed, with NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, their security has been strengthened. Putin has been in control of Russia for two decades, longer than any leader of a major country. Even when Medvedev was president, Putin was the power behind the throne. During his tenure as Russia’s chief oligarch, Putin has exercised caution toward NATO and toward the United States. His timid “sabre rattling”—such as flying his military aircraft near American territory and close to American military aircraft—has largely been for domestic consumption. Even when President Obama virtually invited him to penetrate Ukraine, saying it is a “core interest” of Russia and not of the United States, Putin was cautious and used only paramilitary forces posing as “separatists” in eastern Ukraine.

Russia and NATO in the Twenty-First Century63

Though it is his goal, Putin has achieved little over twenty years toward restoring territory to Russia it lost after 1991, having annexed only Crimea and occupying two small provinces in Georgia and part of eastern Ukraine. It appears neither NATO nor the United States has anything substantive to fear from this cautious former KGB Lt. Colonel. The first NATO, from 1949 to 1999, and the New NATO, post-1999, have both been successful in Europe in containing the Russian bear.

CHAPTER 4

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia

Germany and Russia, the two largest countries in Europe, have had a mixed record of conflict and cooperation for the past four hundred years. Together they partitioned Poland three times in the eighteenth century and once again in the twentieth century.1 Germany invaded Russia in 1914 and 1941, and Russia invaded Germany at the close of World War II. Today, Germany is a member of NATO, whose purpose is the defense of its members against a possible Russian attack. Yet, Germany and Russia share vital economic interests that recently emerged as an issue within both NATO and the EU. Moreover, in a Pew poll in 2015, only 38 percent of Germans thought Germany should use military force to defend a NATO ally being attacked by Russia.2 This begs the question: How reliable is Germany today as a NATO ally? GERMAN-RUSSIAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT German companies have substantial business interests in Russia, and they might not be willing to risk jeopardizing those interests if tensions escalate between the two countries. German investments in Russia in 2018 exceeded 3.2 billion euros, and German-Russian trade that year grew to 61.9 billion euros, an increase of 8.4 percent over the prior year.3 Russia is an attractive location for foreign investment because of the weak ruble exchange rate—benefiting exports from Russia because of their low price—and because of the market potential Russia represents, being the largest prospective market in Europe. The depth of German economic activity in Russia is illustrated by the fact that the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce is the largest foreign business association in Russia with 873 member firms.4

66

NATO Reconsidered

When the EU put sanctions on Russia after it annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Germany was the biggest EU loser from these sanctions, which cost it 40 percent of its export trade.5 In 2012, before the sanctions, German exports to Russia totaled thirty-eight billion euros; after the sanctions, they dropped to €21.5 billion in 2016.6 The EU’s sanctions on Russia targeted its financial, energy, and defense sectors, along with certain government officials, businessmen, and public figures. Yet, bilateral trade soon recovered. In 2017, the German-Russian Chamber of Commerce reported total trade between the two countries was up 23 percent to a total of $50 billion.7 That same year more than 190 German companies were operating in Russia with total sales of €29 billion and employing more than 120,000 Russians. In 2018, according to the Russian government, German-Russian trade was up another 25 percent8 to 61.9 billion euros. Also, the German Bundesbank reported that the net direct investment by German companies in Russia in 2018 totaled 3.2 billion euros—the highest level in ten years.9 Economic activity between Germany and Russia is thriving once again despite the sanctions, despite the Russian embargo on food imports, and despite other political/diplomatic differences. German companies circumvent the EU’s economic sanctions against Russia and Russia’s retaliatory embargo on food imports from the EU through foreign direct investment. In fact, the Russian government offers special incentives for new foreign investments in Russia.10 A recent example involves Mercedes-Benz, which is building new production facilities in Yesipovo, near Moscow. The company signed a special investment contract with the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, after which it announced it will invest more than €250 million in the new factory and create a thousand new jobs while producing twenty thousand SUV and E-class vehicles there each year.11 Russian authorities are so eager for foreign direct investment, offering special incentives to do so, that any foreign company that invests more than €10 million in new production facilities in Russia and commits to run the business for at least ten years receives a special investment contract such as the one Mercedes-Benz received. These contracts allow the company to bid on public tender offers and provide tax benefits available only to local companies.12 These powerful incentives have been used by many German companies, including Henkel, which opened a washing machine detergent plant in Perm in 2016, and Bionorica, a pharmaceutical company which is building a plant in Voronezh.13 Among all foreign direct investors in Russia, Germany is the leader in industrial production.14 NORD STREAM PIPELINES Though they are large and growing, these foreign direct investments pale in size and scope to the Russian-German gas pipeline project. Nord

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia67

Stream 2 is a massive business venture undertaken jointly by Russia and Germany. It is the second natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea between the two countries bringing Russian natural gas to Germany. Nord Stream 2 is being laid on the same 746-mile route under the Baltic as the first pipeline, Nord Stream 1, which became operational in 2011. In 2017, Germany was already Russia’s largest export market for natural gas, with Russia supplying 40 percent of Germany’s natural gas needs. The new pipeline was projected to be completed by the end of 2019 but was later estimated to become operational in 2020.15 It is intended to more than double the capacity of the first pipeline to bring up to fifty-five billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from Russian gas fields to the heart of Europe, thus increasing Germany’s dependence on Russian sources for its growing energy needs.16 Although energy is the lifeblood of Germany’s manufacturing economy, it produces little energy domestically, making it dependent on imports for 98 percent of its oil and 92 percent of its natural gas supply. Germany is Europe’s largest natural gas consumer, and Russia is already Germany’s largest natural gas supplier. But as former U.S. energy secretary Rick Perry once warned, “Russian gas has strings attached.”17 Gasprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG. It is in charge of managing this enormous $11.1 billion project and is financing half of the project’s cost. The other half is financed by a consortium of five Western energy companies: ENGIE, OMV, Uniper, Royal Dutch Shell, and Wintershall.18 These gigantic European companies are based, respectively, in France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Britain, and Germany. The strong German-Russian connection is further illustrated by the actions of Gerhard Schroeder, the Social Democratic Party leader who preceded Angela Merkel as chancellor of Germany. In his last days in office, after being defeated by Merkel’s conservative CDU/CSU party in 2005, Schroeder signed the first Nord Stream pipeline deal with Vladimir Putin. While still in office, Schroeder said Germany and Russia are destined to have a “special relationship,” and along those lines he developed a personal friendship with Putin, publicly describing him as a “flawless democrat.”19 His close relationship with Putin personally benefited Schroeder. Two months after leaving office, Schroeder became the head of Nord Stream AG’s shareholder committee, enabling him to oversee the project. Later, Schroeder became a board member of a number of Russian companies controlled by Gasprom, eventually becoming chairman of Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, which is controlled by the Russian government. Schroeder’s friendship with Putin clearly paid off for the former German Social Democrat leader.20 During her first years as chancellor, Merkel decided to continue Nord Stream and to pursue other pro-Russian policies promoted by Schroeder,

68

NATO Reconsidered

including a “partnership for modernization” with Russia. She opposed extending NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia, indirectly supporting Russian intervention in those countries. Her pro-Russian policy “caused particular concern in Poland and the Baltic states, where it evoked memories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact . . . Many in central and eastern Europe feared that, by increasing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, Germany was escalating its vulnerability to Russian pressure.”21 The Nord Stream project is a major source of tension between Germany and Ukraine, through which another gas pipeline travels from Russia into Europe. Ukraine fears Russia will divert its gas supplies to the Baltic Sea route, thus costing it $2.2 billion per year in vitally needed revenue from transit fees Ukraine presently charges Russia. This amount represents 10 percent of Ukraine’s GDP.22 Also, in 2014, Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine for weeks when it seized Crimea, stoking fears in Europe that Russia might interrupt supplies through Nord Stream when its diplomacy warrants that action.23 In April 2018, the European Commission refused to endorse the Nord Stream 2 project, declaring it failed to contribute to the EU goal of diversifying gas supplies.24 Concerns for European security stemming from the pipeline have been expressed not only by Ukraine but also by Poland, Denmark, Sweden, and the Baltic states.25 When Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, Germany’s foreign policy radically changed—at least for a while. Merkel was the leader of the EU in taking tough measures against Russia for the Ukraine invasions. Germany, and the entire EU, imposed economic sanctions against Russia that cost Germany dearly but were supported by the German business community.26 Tensions between Berlin and Moscow led one scholar to observe: “The Russian-German Relationship Is in Free Fall,” and European security is imperiled as a result.27 GERMAN-AMERICAN TENSIONS These German-Russian tensions were accompanied by tensions between the United States and Germany that began immediately after Donald Trump was elected president. Trump’s “America First” statements during the presidential campaign caused considerable anxiety in Berlin. After Trump came into office, the United States scrapped the Iran nuclear deal, escalating international tensions to the point where the German government openly expressed doubt that the American nuclear shield protecting Europe through NATO was still reliable. On May 10, 2018, Chancellor Merkel reprised her one-year-old theme that America is not a reliable nuclear guarantor of Germany’s or Europe’s security. She stated, “It is no longer the case that the United States will simply just protect us. Rather, Europe needs to take its fate into its own

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia69

hands. That’s the task for the future.” She made these remarks at a ceremony honoring French President Emmanuel Macron, who sat on the stage with her. Making clear what she meant, she further emphasized: Europe must “take its destiny into its own hands.”28 This bold statement was from the leader of a country that at the time had six submarines, not one of which was operational,29 and a total of four fully operational Eurofighter aircraft.30 When Merkel made these remarks, the United States had thirty-six military bases in Germany and an army of 34,800 troops stationed in that country. More than 200 U.S. bases in Europe were closed at the end of the Cold War in accordance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) signed in November 1990 between NATO and the Soviet Union. This treaty, which placed limits on all types of combat equipment in Europe, was signed “to prevent any military conflict in Europe.”31 In 2007, Putin unilaterally “suspended” Russia’s participation in the treaty in retaliation against the U.S. establishment of the missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.32 In 2015, Russia announced it “completely” halted its participation in the CFE Treaty due to NATO’s condemnation of its invasion of Ukraine.33 In comparison to the 34,800 troops stationed in Germany, the United States had 12,100 military personnel in Italy, 8,479 in the United Kingdom, and 23,468 in South Korea.34 In 2019, there were more American forces based in Germany than the United States had in Afghanistan. Yet, Chancellor Merkel asserted the United States is no longer going to protect Germany. The United States strongly opposed Nord Stream 2 on the grounds that it would make NATO Europe, especially Germany, hugely dependent on Russian energy, enabling Russia to blackmail Germany on international issues. At the NATO Brussels Summit in July 2018, President Trump openly stated his objections to the project, saying Germany will be “captive to Russia” due to its dependency on Russian sources for its energy.35 Two months later, during his address to the UN General Assembly, Trump accused Germany of becoming “totally dependent” on Russia because of its energy policy.36 Trump encouraged Germany to buy U.S.-produced natural gas, which could be supplied to Germany as liquefied natural gas (LNG), provided Germany established an LNG terminal to receive it. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, the relationship between the German chancellor and the American president was anything but warm. Germany’s energy policy was one issue, and its financial contributions to NATO was another. At a televised breakfast meeting with NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, President Trump stated, “Germany, as far as I’m concerned, is captive to Russia because it’s getting so much of its

70

NATO Reconsidered

energy from Russia. So we’re supposed to protect Germany but they’re getting their energy from Russia.”37 President Trump pressed all the European members to increase their financial contributions to NATO, singling out Germany as an especially low-level contributor at 1 percent of its GDP, though it has the largest GDP in Europe. America’s contribution was almost 4 percent of its much larger GDP. As of 2019, the United States paid 22 percent of NATO’s budget. Of the $603 billion, the United States spends on the military each year, about $31 billion goes to Europe.38 Reacting to this pressure from the United States, Chancellor Merkel altered Germany’s energy policy one month after Trump delivered his UN speech in which he accused Germany of being “totally dependent” on Russia. In October 2018, Merkel announced that Germany, the world’s largest importer of natural gas, would cofinance the construction of a $576 million LNG terminal in northern Germany and, as a concession to President Trump, would purchase LNG from the United States. She stated this is a “strategic move” that will recover its costs within ten years.39 As the press reported at the time, Trump had won.40 GERMANY AND RUSSIA FOR A HUNDRED YEARS During the last one hundred years, the United States and Germany fought each other twice. The United States and its allies won both times—in 1918 and in 1945. Germany and Russia fought each other in the same two world wars, but there were fundamental differences. Germany invaded Russia on both occasions—1914 and 1941—and Germany defeated Russia in World War I but lost in World War II. The strange dynamic between these two countries is worth a close look. At the onset of the two world wars, both countries were Great Powers, and after World War I, both temporarily lost Great Power status but quickly regained it. Following World War II, Germany lost its Great Power status permanently—indeed, it lost its independence, being partitioned and occupied by the four victorious powers. And Russia soon gained superpower status. In 1945, Russia’s victory over Germany was total—Germany ceased to exist. Today, Germany and Russia both have been diminished in size and stature—Germany having lost territory in the post–World War II peace settlements, and Russia having been torn apart by the breakup of the Soviet Union. No higher price can be paid by a country than to lose a war. World War I is a prime example. Czar Nicholas II of Russia joined Britain, France, and later Italy in August 1914 in waging war against the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, known as the Central Powers because of their location in the heart of Europe. Later, the Ottoman Empire joined Germany and Austria, thereby expanding the war into Turkish territory in the Middle East.

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia71

The complex causes of the war are best left to historians,41 but the consequences of the war are clear and immense. The Central Powers lost the war, which brought an end to four empires: German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian. The war rearranged the map of Europe and the Middle East, precipitated the Russian Revolution and the rise of Lenin’s Bolsheviks, and the closing of the European age—as the United States and Japan participated in the victory making it a world war. By February 1917, Russia was exhausted by the war. The modern, well-equipped, well-trained German and Austrian armies had invaded deep into Russia defeating its largely illiterate peasant army, sparking a revolution against the Romanov monarchy. A parliamentary government under Kerensky lasted only a few months—from February 1917 until October 1917 (Old Calendar)—when Lenin’s brutal, well-organized Bolsheviks highjacked the revolution and deposed Kerensky and the Czar.42 To preserve the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin knew he had to make peace with Germany and Austria to stop the war.43 He dispatched Trotsky to negotiate a peace treaty, which he did at Brest-Litovsk. It was signed in March 1918, thus ending the war in Eastern Europe with Russia’s defeat.44 This created a frightening prospect for the Allies—now they had no eastern front to tie down the German Army. One month following Brest-Litovsk, on April 5, Japanese troops landed at Vladivostok on Russia’s Pacific coast, and in June, British troops landed in Murmansk, and British and French forces landed in Archangel—both cities in Northern Russia. A few weeks later American forces joined them in Northern Russia, and in August, the U.S. troops joined the Japanese in eastern Siberia.45 This was a full-fledged Allied intervention in Russia in the hope of reopening the eastern front against Germany and of toppling the Bolshevik government.46 This coordinated Allied attack on Russia confirmed the Kremlin’s deep-seated paranoia of its neighbors. Fortunately for Lenin, the war in the West ended in November 1918 with an armistice, and Allied forces soon withdrew from Russia. Brest-Litovsk was probably the most punitive peace treaty signed since ancient times. It required Russia to give up to Germany and Austria-Hungary approximately 25 percent of Russia’s territory, 34 percent of its population, 32 percent of its agricultural land, and 54 percent of its industrial capacity.47 Russia was forced to renounce its claims to Finland and to give up its provinces of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and Poland—all of which were given independence under a German protectorate. This was a modern-day Carthaginian peace. Germany was now free to move its eastern army to the western front against the Anglo-French forces, which were barely holding on. Fortunately for the Allies, American troops began to arrive—and the race to the western front was on. Though America formally entered the war in April 1917, its troops did not arrive in France until the following year. By

72

NATO Reconsidered

the summer of 1918, two million trained U.S. troops were on the western front. These fresh, well-equipped soldiers were decisive. They turned the tide of battle in the Allies’ favor.48 Germany accepted an armistice in November 1918. It is important to note that Germany was not invaded, destroyed, or dismembered at the end of World War I as was the case at the end of World War II. The peace settlement the following year produced strategic consequences unforeseen by the victors. “It disarmed Germany. It took away her great navy. It dismantled her air force. It stripped her of her colonies. It levied an unfairly excessive amount of reparations, by including separation allowances and military pensions. It pared her of territory inhabited by conquered alien populations. But it did not destroy the Reich. It left a united nation. That vital fact is often ignored. The living core remained to rise again.”49 During the 1919 Peace of Paris settlements, Germany’s ruthless demands against Russia at Brest-Litovsk the previous year were right in front of the victorious Western powers—Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. The punitive Treaty of Versailles took away from Germany twenty-five thousand square miles of territory with seven million people, it restored Alsace and Lorraine to France (two provinces Germany took from France after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871), and it required Germany to relinquish the gains it made in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia, granting independence to the protectorate states. The treaty contained a “war guilt” clause that declared Germany had started the war and that its leading statesmen were “war criminals.” These included the Crown Prince and the country’s top generals—Ludendorff and Hindenburg. Germany was required to dismantle its armament industry, to demilitarize the Rhineland and Saar, to allow British and French troops to occupy those territories, and to pay a huge, punishing financial reparation to the Allies.50 But Germany remained intact. It is especially noteworthy that neither of Europe’s two pariah states were invited to the Peace of Paris negotiations. Germany and Bolshevik Russia were absent. President Woodrow Wilson, who dominated the proceedings, British prime minister Lloyd George, French president Clemenceau, and Italian prime minister Orlando were the leading participants. Their decisions were forced on Germany. This behavior was contrary to European peace settlements for centuries—where the victors and vanquished were both present. The 1815 Congress of Vienna is the classic example: Talleyrand represented defeated Napoleonic France at the bargaining table with victorious Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. At this momentous gathering, the five Great Powers established the Concert of Europe, which kept the peace in Europe for nearly a hundred years.51

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia73

The fact that Germany and Russia, the largest countries in Europe, were absent from the Paris accords and later rejected its settlements led to instabilities for the next twenty years in Europe. In 1921, Lenin, now the master of Russia, “sought to safeguard Russia from a feared coalition of capitalist powers intent upon another intervention and the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. To end Russia’s isolation therefore became a paramount concern of Bolshevik diplomacy.”52 Accordingly, Lenin sought rapprochement with outcast Germany, and Germany sought friendly relations with outsider Russia to end its isolation after the war. To begin the reconciliation process, the two governments signed a trade agreement in May 1921. This agreement opened relations between the two losers in the war, allowing additional discussions to follow. One of these was a secret military arrangement that permitted Germany to train its soldiers on Soviet territory (to circumvent the Versailles Treaty’s restrictions) and, in return, permitted German experts to come to Russia to build up its military and industrial strength. This 1921 trade agreement foreshadowed a similar arrangement in 1939 when another commercial negotiation between Germany and Russia served to veil preliminary conversations that resulted in the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of August 23, 1939.53 The two governments, having opened the door to each other in the 1921 trade agreement, sealed the deal the following year in the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922.54 This treaty achieved their principal objective—it ended their isolation. In this far-reaching treaty, Germany gave de jure recognition to Bolshevik Russia, mutual cancellation of financial claims, provided loans to Russia, and broadly expanded trade between the two countries. Clandestine military cooperation followed. Germany experimented with new weapons inside Russia (forbidden in Germany by the Versailles Treaty), built modern tank and airplane factories in Russia, and helped train Russian soldiers. Rapallo gave a measure of strength and security to both countries, which remained friendly until the rise of Hitler in 1933.55 Without Britain and France realizing it at the time, Rapallo tipped the balance of power in Europe toward the East. The Versailles Treaty’s financial reparations from Germany to the Allies bankrupted the new German republic, causing hyperinflation that wiped out its middle class. These were fertile grounds for extremist solutions to Germany’s problems. Soon Adolf Hitler emerged as the spokesman for those grievances, blaming the Treaty of Versailles for Germany’s tragic circumstances in the 1920s and early 1930s.56 To further secure their newly formed friendship, Germany and Russia signed the Treaty of Berlin in April 1926.57 A supplement to the Rapallo Treaty, the Berlin Treaty, ran for eight years providing additional security for both countries. It, along with Rapallo, remained a vital link for both nations’ national security until Hitler came to power.58

74

NATO Reconsidered

Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany in 1933. His aim was to restore Germany’s economic and military power and to regain territory lost in the Versailles Treaty. The key to his success was a neutrality agreement with Russia to allow Germany to retake lands in Poland taken away by the Versailles Treaty without fearing a Russian attack. In a striking parallel to the 1921 trade agreement, another German-Soviet trade agreement was signed in Moscow on August 19, 1939. Four days later, the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, flew to Moscow and signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact the same day with Russian Foreign Minister Molotov. This treaty guaranteed the Soviet Union against a German attack and gave Hitler Stalin’s consent to invade Poland. A secret protocol authorized the partition of Poland by the two countries and placed Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Bessarabia within the Soviet sphere. Lithuania was assigned to Germany. Unusually, the treaty entered into force as soon as it was signed.59 Twelve days later, on September 1, Hitler invaded Poland, starting World War II. REALPOLITIK TRIUMPHS For the second time in twenty years, power politics overcame ideological differences in German-Russian relations. In 1922, the German republic signed the Rapallo Treaty with Bolshevik Russia, and again in 1939, anti-Communist Nazi Germany signed a treaty with Communist Russia. Realpolitik has always trumped ideology in the statecraft between Germany and Russia. In 1939, Germany and Russia once again partitioned Poland, and, after taking half of Poland, the following year Hitler took all of continental Western Europe except for the fascist states of Italy, Spain, and Portugal. By the end of 1940, German armed forces occupied Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France. Britain had not been defeated, though its army had lost the battle in Belgium and France and had to be evacuated to safety through the port of Dunkirk. Only Great Britain remained a combatant against Hitler and Mussolini. The Royal Air Force won the air battle over the English Channel and eastern Britain, known as the Battle of Britain, thereby guaranteeing that Germany could not risk bringing its army across the English Channel. Now that Winston Churchill had become Britain’s prime minister with a policy to wage war, Hitler was stymied. In his quest to become master of all of Europe, Hitler turned east, and on June 22, 1941, he invaded Russia along a broad front in violation of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. Once again, realpolitik trumped a treaty in German statecraft. German armed forces quickly penetrated deep into the Soviet Union, surrounded Leningrad, advanced to the outskirts of Moscow, and drove

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia75

deep into Ukraine and the Volga River Valley to Stalingrad. Supporting ground operations, air attacks by the Luftwaffe were particularly devastating. For example, Sevastopol, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea, was subjected to a brutal Nazi siege in early 1942 when a quarter million Soviet soldiers were killed, and twenty thousand tons of bombs were dropped on that vital port city in just one month—June 1942—a more intense bombing than Germany subjected to London or Rotterdam.60 Yet, the Red Army held at Stalingrad and ripped the very guts out of the Wehrmacht in a prolonged battle. This turned the tide in the east, just as the Normandy invasion sealed Hitler’s fate in the west. In May 1945, Germany unconditionally surrendered to the United States, Russia, Britain, and France. In August 1945, Japan unconditionally surrendered, thus ending World War II. WORLD WAR II’S CONSEQUENCES From a human standpoint, this war was even more cataclysmic for Russia than had been World War I. Soviet military casualties totaled 8,668,000. Soviet civilian casualties were twice that number—16,900,000, an indication of the brutality of the German onslaught. Total Russian casualties in World War II were 25,568,000. Germany suffered 3,250,000 military casualties and 3,870,000 civilian casualties for a total of 7,060,000. By comparison, U.S. military casualties in World War II totaled 295,000, with no civilian casualties.61 World War II was by far the deadliest war in the entire history of warfare—seventy to eighty-five million people perished worldwide.62 The victorious Allies forced their territorial claims on Germany after the war ended, taking away from Germany all its previous gains in Eastern Europe. Germany lost 25 percent of the prewar territory it had under the Weimer Republic. These lost territories included Austria and Czechoslovakia, whose independence was restored, East Prussia, the ancestral home of the Teutonic Knights who founded the Kingdom of Prussia, West Prussia, lower Denmark, and parts of Poland. The diminished country was divided into four zones of occupation by Russia, the United States, Britain, and France.63 Why did Hitler break his nonaggression pact with Stalin and invade Russia? The answer lies in the fact that Germany had already conquered continental Western Europe, only Britain remained free in the West, and Russia had to be defeated for Germany to become the complete master of Europe. Together with his Axis Allies, Italy and Japan, Hitler intended to become master of the world. After Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, Hitler’s dream slowly faded into a nightmare as America’s military-industrial might grew to astonishing levels of power—fielding an

76

NATO Reconsidered

army of twelve million soldiers, building the largest fleet in world history, arming Russia, defeating two Great Powers in a two-front war, and building the atom bomb to boot! Tojo had truly awakened a sleeping giant at Pearl Harbor, and he and Hitler paid dearly for it. GERMAN ARMED FORCES TODAY After Germany was reunified at the end of the Cold War, the West German and East German armed forces were merged into one very capable fighting machine known as the Bundeswehr. But, perceiving no direct threat to itself from a fragmented Russia and being under the NATO umbrella, the German military was permitted to decline as a result of steep reductions in military spending. Defense budgets were slashed, the draft was abolished in 2011, and troop strength was cut from 340,000 in 1998 to 180,000 in 2018. “The main issue is that Germany doesn’t feel any military threat and that limits their interest to invest in the armed forces,” observed Claudia Major, a defense analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin.64 In his 2018 annual report to the German parliament, Hans-Peter Bartels, the parliamentary commissioner for the armed services, stated Germany’s military is “not equipped to meet the tasks before it.” He concluded that operational readiness is “dangerously low” and the ability of the military to meet NATO tasks is “in question.”65 In this damning report, Bartels cited the following deficiencies: only ninety-five of the army’s 244 Leopard II main battle tanks were operational, none of the navy’s six submarines were operational, only nine of a planned fifteen frigates were in service, none of the air force’s fourteen A400M transport planes were air worthy, and there was a serious shortage of personnel with twenty-one thousand junior officer and NCO positions unfilled. Bartels blamed the Merkel government for these shortages, saying the current defense budget of €38.5 billion is too low.66 Bartels, a Social Democratic Party leader, expressed his belief that Germany will be hard-pressed to meet the NATO defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP. In his opinion, Germany’s share will remain at 1.2 percent.67 Other observers note the same decline in German military strength due to budget cuts. For example, Germany had planned to buy 180 Eurofighters, a first-line fighter aircraft built by Germany and a consortium of other European countries, but in 2014, Germany cut the order to just 143 airplanes. In 2014, only forty-two of the 109 Eurofighters in the German air force were operational; the rest were grounded due to parts shortages. Regarding tanks, due to budget cuts at the end of the Cold War, the tank force was reduced by 90 percent.68

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia77

A particularly embarrassing incident occurred that personally impacted Chancellor Merkel. Shortly after taking off from Berlin in her government-owned Airbus-built A-340 on her way to the G-20 Summit in Argentina in November 2018, the pilot had to make an emergency landing at Cologne because the electronics systems on the twenty-year-old airplane abruptly failed. Merkel had to switch to a commercial flight.69 Even this executive airplane, the Luftwaffe’s symbol of the German state with the words Bundesrepublik emblazoned on its fuselage, failed due to poor maintenance. Reacting to these embarrassing circumstances, the Merkel government announced an increase in defense spending. In May 2019, Germany informed NATO that it will increase defense spending by more than five billion euros, bringing its defense spending to 1.35 percent of GDP. This is still far short of the 2 percent NATO target Germany previously agreed to. Germany’s defense budget for 2019 was raised to €47.32 billion ($53 billion), which is a 10 percent increase over the previous budget. At the time this was viewed as a victory for President Trump.70 Six months later, at a NATO ceremony celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall, Secretary of State Pompeo was at last told by the new German defense minister that Germany pledged to meet the 2 percent of GDP NATO target for defense spending.71 How does Germany’s defense spending compare to the world’s major military powers? The following is a list of the world’s top military spenders in 2019: U.S. $717 billion, China $177 billion, India $60.9 billion, Germany $53 billion, Saudi Arabia $51 billion, United Kingdom $49 billion, France $48 billion, Japan $47 billion, Russia $46.4 billion, and South Korea $42 billion. Thus, in 2019, Germany had the world’s fourth largest defense budget.72 GERMAN PACIFICISM In reaction to its militarist past and the devastation it inflicted on the rest of Europe during two world wars, Germany has developed a pacifist streak. As a result, it allowed its own defense capability to languish after the Cold War ended when it sought to have a “peace dividend.” A public opinion poll conducted by YouGov in 2018 reported 60 percent of Germans were opposed to increased defense spending.73 By comparison, a recent survey in the United States found that “younger generations are less concerned about some National Security Issues than Baby Boomers are.”74 Former German defense minister Volker Ruehe, who retired in 1998, stated recently, “The armed forces have been neglected for far too long. We need to do more for our defense and take on more of the burden in Europe.”75 NATO’s second largest member does need to “do more,” and the United States agrees. In August 2019, during a visit to Germany by U.S.

78

NATO Reconsidered

secretary of state Mike Pompeo, accompanied by the U.S. ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, Pompeo warned Germany to increase its defense spending or the United States might relocate its armed forces from Germany to Poland, which is meeting the NATO target of ­spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense. Grenell also slammed Germany’s refusal to participate in the U.S.-led naval mission in the Persian Gulf following Iran’s seizure of British oil tankers. He asserted American taxpayers do not understand that Germany spends its budget surpluses on domestic programs and not on defense. In 2019, Germany spent 1.36 percent of its GDP on defense, and Germany had expected to spend 1.24 percent by 2024—not the 2 percent of GDP it pledged in 2014.76 Eight NATO nations reached the 2 percent target in 2018, and fifteen more are expected to reach the target by 2024. Realistically, Germany will not be among them. By comparison, in 2019 the United States spent 3.3 percent of its GDP on defense.77 GERMANY AND RUSSIA TODAY For the past one hundred years, Germany and Russia have had a seesaw relationship—first fighting, then cooperating, then fighting again, and now cooperating. In the twenty-first century, they are de facto enemies—Germany in NATO and Russia the object of the Alliance. Yet, commercial relationships have arisen between them that are of vital economic importance to both countries. Moreover, the German government has declared openly it no longer trusts the value of NATO’s guarantee for its security. Germany has permitted its military capability to deteriorate, and it declines to fulfill its financial commitment to the Alliance. Germany had voted not to offer NATO’s protection to Ukraine and Georgia when both countries were attacked and partially occupied by Russia, thus tacitly supporting Russian imperialism. Without NATO’s protection, these Russian border states continue to be threatened by further Russian incursion and possibly outright occupation. In light of this behavior one has to ask, what is Germany’s purpose toward Russia? Is Germany a reliable NATO ally? Does it have the will and capability to defend itself and its neighbors against Russia? There is serious doubt about any of these answers in light of Germany’s history with Russia, its deepening economic ties with Russia, its growing pacificism, and its public’s unwillingness to support a strong defense establishment. Can NATO depend on Germany in the event of war with Russia or will German realpolitik once again guide German statecraft? The fact that these questions have to be raised is more than troubling for the Atlantic Alliance.

Impact on NATO of Germany’s Growing Ties with Russia79

For the first time, an American administration is facing these issues head-on and is calling out the German government to rectify its policy. President Trump has been very clear in his statements to Chancellor Merkel that Germany should meet all of its NATO obligations. Thus far, this has had little tangible effect—the Merkel government makes promises but thus far has failed to keep them.

CHAPTER 5

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present

When the Soviet Union ceased to exist on New Year’s Eve 1991, NATO’s purpose was fulfilled. The threat had passed because the source of the threat was gone. The bold, precedent-shattering diplomacy of the Truman Administration four decades earlier had been accomplished. America’s European allies had been protected throughout the Cold War from invasion and subjugation by the Communist behemoth in the east. The Atlantic Alliance had done its job. NATO had won the Cold War. This was a seminal moment, a true hinge of history—the closing of one era and the opening to the next. This extraordinary moment should have prompted a fundamental reevaluation of the need to continue NATO. Yet, that was not done. “The world had changed, but a serious reassessment of U.S. grand strategy never took place.”1 The alliance endured without a pause. The ramifications of that fact continue to unfold today—three decades later. So, the question has to be asked, why did NATO continue? WHY DID NATO CONTINUE AFTER WINNING THE COLD WAR? George H. W. Bush was president of the United States in 1991 when the Cold War ended. He had no intention of disbanding NATO or withdrawing the United States from the Atlantic Alliance. These ideas probably never occurred to him.2 Quite the contrary, he was determined to continue the alliance and use it as the means to unify East and West Germany and to bring a newly unified Germany into the Atlantic Alliance. As one of his biographers has written: NATO’s “. . . survival marked Bush’s crowning achievement, the embodiment of his entire worldview and the fruit of his most engaged diplomatic effort. . .”3

82

NATO Reconsidered

With only one term in the presidency, Bush achieved his most important foreign policy goals: “. . . he secured Germany’s reunification and with it the survival of NATO, which he considered the essential element of the post-1945 American-led peace in Europe—his single greatest diplomatic achievement. . .”4 President Bush’s own analysis of the immediate post–Cold War world is very clear. “On Germany,” he wrote, “working closely with Helmut Kohl [Germany’s Chancellor], we managed to unite the allies behind unification and persuade the Soviets to accept a united Germany in a new NATO—probably the most important moment in the transformation of Europe.”5 Bush’s overall approach to foreign policy was this: “Our nation can no longer afford to retire selfishly behind its borders as soon as international conditions seemed to recede from crisis, to be brought out again only by the onrush of the next great upheaval.” Isolationism is not an option, Bush asserted: “If the United States does not lead, there will be no leadership.”6 Answers to the question, why did NATO continue after the Soviet Union collapsed, can be grouped under four headings: (1) American determination to continue NATO (already discussed above), (2) fear of the new Russia, (3) usefulness of NATO as a mechanism for achieving new goals, and (4) bureaucratic inertia. In the end it has to be asked, was the continuation of NATO after 1991 in the best interest of the United States, the principal enforcer of NATO’s security guarantee of Europe? FEAR OF THE NEW RUSSIA Europeans have long memories. They could not forget the expansionist tendencies of the old Russian Empire, which slowly bloated like an inkblot from the Grand Duchy of Muscovy to absorb large areas of Eastern Europe. Perhaps there was little fear at first of the new Russian Federation, which during the 1990s was mired in internal chaos and economic turmoil. But the likelihood that even a diminished Russia, now stripped of half of its previous empire, would seek to recover its former territory was ever present in the minds of its European neighbors. After all, the new Russian Federation, though diminished, remained the largest country in Europe—in size of territory and in population. As early as 1994, Boris Yeltsin, the Russian Federation’s first president, at an international conference held in Budapest, tried to calm Europe’s fears of an expansionist Russia: “Europe, not having yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace,” Yeltsin warned. “Why sow the seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer enemies. We are all partners.”7 At the same conference, also attended by President Clinton, Yeltsin expressed irritation at the possible expansion of NATO eastward toward

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present83

Russia, but at the same time he recognized that renewed Russian expansionism was what East Europeans feared. To Yeltsin, the expansion of NATO, while calming the East Europeans’ fears of Russia, would result in the isolation of the new Russia. Clearly irritated at this prospect, Yeltsin added: “It is a dangerous delusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital.”8 His reference, of course, was to Washington, DC. In response, Clinton’s position was this: NATO is “the bedrock of security in Europe,” and “[a]s NATO expands, so will security for all European states . . .”9 Yeltsin did not see it that way for Russia. The most fearful of this Russian expansionist syndrome were the newly freed Russian border states, former provinces of the Soviet Union. High anxiety was latent in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Georgia—prized additions to Russia of its Czars and Commissars. These newly constituted nations sought protection from the West against a revanchist East. That protection could only be provided by NATO, backed by the world’s only superpower. The same concerns about future Russian actions were also expressed by three former Warsaw Pact members—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In the early to mid-1990s, these three pivotal countries enthusiastically campaigned for accession to NATO after Clinton came into office. In April 1993, while visiting Washington, Czech President Vaclav Havel and Polish leader Lech Walesa met with President Clinton, seeking U.S. support for their hope to join NATO. Havel told Clinton we want to join NATO “. . . because we see ourselves as Europeans who embrace European values.” Walesa was blunter: “We are all afraid of Russia.”10 By 1996, the Clinton Administration was moving toward expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. That year, “President Clinton urged Russia to accept NATO’s enlargement by former Warsaw Pact members to ‘advance the security of everyone.’”11 The three countries joined NATO in 1999 on NATO’s fiftieth anniversary. How important did they view their new status? Bronislaw Geremek, the foreign minister of Poland, said that NATO’s enlargement was “the most important event that has happened to Poland since the onset of Christianity.”12 It is not possible to see how these countries’ accession to NATO advanced the security of Russia, as Clinton had asserted. A pivotal moment in modern European history occurred in February 1990. As mentioned, the George H. W. Bush Administration’s major foreign policy objective in Europe was the unification of East and West Germany and adding the enlarged Germany to NATO. After having been invaded by Germany in two world wars, Russia’s fear of a unified Germany was palpable. American reassurance was needed to gain Gorbachev’s willingness to allow unification to happen because at that time East Germany was occupied by units of the Red Army and the Communist leadership of the country was controlled by Moscow.

84

NATO Reconsidered

Consequently, a promise was made to Gorbachev in February 1990. Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl each promised the Soviet Union that, if Germany would unify under NATO’s protection, the Atlantic Alliance would not expand “one inch to the east.”13 James Baker referred to these pledges as “iron-clad guarantees.”14 Gorbachev accepted the promise. Germany was quickly unified under NATO. It is important to note this was an American promise, backed by West Germany. It was not a NATO promise that would have been underwritten by France, Britain, Italy, and other NATO members. The promise was soon broken under pressure from former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact members also seeking NATO membership.15 This eastward expansion of NATO right up to Russia’s border—to say nothing about the betrayal of a solemn promise—poisoned America’s relations with Russia to this day. As George Kennan observed at that time, expanding NATO to the east was a “tragic mistake.”16 Over the years, Russian leaders railed against this betrayal: Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Dmitry Medvedev all protested both publicly and privately that the U.S. leaders had violated the no expansion pledge.17 Putin’s aggressive actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 “. . . were fueled in part by his ongoing resentment about what he sees as the West’s broken pact over NATO expansion.” That broken promise remains a “bitter dispute between Russia and the West.”18 Putin’s own analysis is this: “Our most serious mistake in relations with the West is that we trusted you too much. And your mistake is that you took that trust as weakness and abused it.”19 Professor Walt summed up the situation: “Relations with Russia deteriorated largely because the United States repeatedly ignored Russian warnings and threated Moscow’s vital interests.”20 As has been shown, every one of these Russian border states eventually applied for membership in NATO, but at first only the Baltic states were admitted—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Later, six former Warsaw Pact members were also admitted: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Applications for membership from Ukraine and Georgia were put on hold by the North Atlantic Council at the urging of Germany and France, both of which feared a confrontation with Russia if these former Soviet provinces were admitted to NATO. The United States supported these applications through the George W. Bush and the Obama Administrations, but, given the North Atlantic Treaty’s requirement for unanimous votes, these applications were stymied. USEFULNESS OF NATO FOR ACHIEVING OTHER GOALS The United States’ most important foreign policy goal thus far in the twenty-first century has been the destruction of the sources of terrorism.

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present85

The George W. Bush Administration launched an attack on al-Qaeda and Taliban centers in Afghanistan in the belief that they were the launching grounds for the 9/11 attack on the United States. Other NATO nations provided armed forces for that attack. Two weeks after the attack, on September 14, 2001, President Bush announced the United States would wage war on “terrorism.”21 This was an open-ended commitment that could not have an end point because terrorists are a global menace, and all of them might never be eradicated. It was a war that could not hope to be “won.”22 AFGHANISTAN NATO supported the American incursion into Afghanistan, which was far-removed from the geographic area originally intended to be protected by the Atlantic Alliance. Yet, the 9/11 attack was on the United States, a NATO member, and so a military response by NATO against Afghanistan, proven to be the source of the attack, was authorized by the North Atlantic Council. Troop levels in Afghanistan grew as the intensity of combat operations against terrorist groups increased.23 From 2002 to 2005, the NATO mission in Afghanistan grew to twenty thousand soldiers. The number continued to expand, and, by the end of the Bush presidency in 2009, forty thousand U.S. troops were deployed there. On advice of his military commanders, President Obama initially increased the U.S. armed forces strength by thirty-three thousand. Obama’s deployment peaked in 2013 at one hundred thousand troops. Then Obama announced a troop reduction by half, but more than that number returned home. When President Trump came into office in 2017, the United States had ten thousand troops deployed in Afghanistan. On the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Mattis, Trump deployed an additional four thousand troops for a total of fourteen thousand, but that number varied over the next two years. In addition to American armed forces, NATO and Partner countries contributed troops and support personnel to the Afghan campaign. Major contributions in early 2019 appear in table 5.1. A total of thirty-nine countries had 17,034 troops or support personnel in Afghanistan in February 2019, of which the United States contributed nearly half. In addition to those listed above, other contributors included Partnership for Peace members such as Australia, New Zealand, Finland, and Sweden. This number was a reduction from 2016 when the total military contribution of NATO and Partner countries was twenty-six thousand personnel.24 On December 20, 2018, President Trump surprised the world with his announcement that about half of the fourteen thousand U.S. troops then in Afghanistan would be returned home in coming months, beginning with about six thousand immediately. According to press reports, this was

86

NATO Reconsidered Table 5.1  Largest Contributors of Forces in Afghanistan, ­February 2019 Country

Number of Troops NATO Member

United States

8,475

Yes

Germany

1,300

Yes

United Kingdom

1,100

Yes

Italy

895

Yes

Georgia

890

No

Romania

733

Yes

Turkey

593

Yes

Source: NATO Press Release, “Resolute Support Mission: Key Factors and Figures,” ­February 2019.

intended to be the start of a total U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that could take months to complete.25 Despite NATO’s contributions to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Donald Trump expressed doubts about the value of NATO to the United States. When he was campaigning for the presidency, candidate Trump spoke disparagingly about NATO: “We pay so much disproportionally more for NATO. We are getting ripped off by every country in NATO, where they pay virtually nothing. . .”26 During his presidency, Trump was rumored to want the United States to withdraw from NATO. At the NATO Brussels Summit in the summer of 2018, “senior administration officials told The New York Times that several times over the course of 2018 Mr. Trump privately said he wanted to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Trump told senior national security officials during the Brussels Summit that “he did not see the point of the military alliance, which he presented as a drain on the United States.”27 Yet, at the conclusion of the Brussels Summit, Trump stated, “I believe in NATO. I think NATO is very important—probably the greatest ever done.”28 IRAQ In March 2003, the George W. Bush Administration launched a military campaign against Iraq in the belief its dictator, Saddam Hussein, had amassed weapons of mass destruction (WMD).29 Only later it was discovered that this intelligence was in error. Saddam had no WMD. Yet, Iraq was invaded, and Saddam was captured and later tried and executed.

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present87

This campaign against Iraq was led by the United States and conducted by a coalition of armed forces from a number of countries, some of which were NATO members, such as the United Kingdom, and some of which were not, such as Australia. The war was named Operation Iraqi Freedom. “NATO as an organization had no role in the decision to undertake the campaign or to conduct it.”30 Prior to the Iraq campaign, NATO took precautionary defensive measures in Turkey at its request to guard against Iraqi incursions. These measures included deploying to Turkey four AWACS surveillance aircraft from their base in Germany and three PATRIOT missile defense batteries from the Netherlands. After the military campaign was concluded, a U.S.led Multinational Stabilization Force was established in Iraq. Poland participated in this force and received NATO support with force generation, communications, and logistics.31 Thus, some individual NATO countries were active participants in the U.S.-led operation in Iraq, but NATO as an organization did not participate. The Iraq War caused deep divisions within NATO. The war was opposed by most Europeans and by many European governments. “For the first time in the postwar era, a German chancellor opposed Washington in full public view on a fundamental issue of security and even made opposition to Bush policy a part of his reelection campaign. At the United Nations, France publicly lobbied Security Council members to oppose a resolution that would authorize the United States’ use of force in Iraq.”32 Despite this opposition by America’s European NATO allies, the Bush Administration continued the war in Iraq, and after Saddam was eliminated, it undertook the occupation and pacification of the country. COST OF THE AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ WARS The cost of these two international military operations can be measured in both dollars and human life. From the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States, when 2,996 people died in the initial attack and subsequently hundreds more died of wounds and related causes, through to 2018, the U.S. government spent more than $7.6 trillion on defense and homeland security.33 Based on official Department of Defense data, the cost in lives of the major U.S. operations in the greater Middle East by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations is as follows:34 • Operation Enduring Freedom was conducted in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001 until December 31, 2014. This operation resulted in 2,216 deaths of U.S. military service members, of which 1,833 were killed in action, 383 were nonhostile casualties, and 20,057 were wounded in action. Casualties in adjacent locations during this operation were 131 total deaths and thirty-nine wounded in action. Department of Defense

88

NATO Reconsidered

civilian deaths totaled four. The grand total of deaths in this operation was 2,351, and total wounded in action was 20,096. • Operation Freedom Sentinel has been conducted in Afghanistan after December 31, 2014. Total deaths were seventy-one, of which fifty-two were killed in action; total wounded in action was 397. • Operation Inherent Resolve was conducted in the wider Middle East in association with the Afghanistan war. There were seventy-nine total military deaths and eighty-one wounded in action. • Operation Iraqi Freedom was conducted between March 19, 2003 and August 31, 2010 in Iraq and adjacent areas. Total U.S. military deaths were 4,410, and 31,957 were wounded in action. • Operation New Dawn was conducted between September 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011 in the greater Middle East in support of the Iraq campaign. Total military deaths were seventy-three and wounded in action totaled 295. The grand total of U.S. military deaths in these five operations was 6,984 while the grand total of U.S. military wounded in action was 52,826. Less than 3 percent of the total fatalities were women, who made up 16 percent of total Department of Defense forces. Men made up 84 percent of the total force and had 97 percent of the deaths in the two theaters of operation—Afghanistan and Iraq.35 In comparison, during the first Gulf War, 1990-1991, when a U.S.-led coalition liberated Kuwait, 382 U.S. service members died in-theater, of which 147 died as a result of direct combat (38 percent). During the Vietnam War, 1964–1975, there were 47,413 U.S. battle-related deaths and 10,785 additional personnel died from other causes for a total of 58,198.36 Looking at the deaths of 6,626 U.S. service members in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the question arises, where were these soldiers from? Department of Defense data records the five states the highest numbers were from: California, 642; Texas, 641; Florida, 314; New York, 272; and Ohio, 241.37 Not surprisingly, because these are the country’s five largest states by population, they contribute the most manpower to the military. What percent of the total U.S. population serves in America’s all-volunteer military? In 2015, a total of 1.4 million people served in the U.S. armed forces, which represented only 0.4 percent of the U.S. population.38 This small number of volunteers was defending a nation of 320 million people at that time. It is no wonder that the same individuals are deployed time and time again to the war zones, exposing them repeatedly to the dangers they faced there. One consequence of these Middle East wars is a high rate of suicide among veterans who served there. “More than 6,000 veterans die by suicide every year,” stated a RAND report. “It’s a public health crisis, a

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present89

broken promise to those who served, and the highest priority within the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Yet the numbers have not diminished. Tragically, more veterans still die by suicide every year than the total number of combat deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.”39 Raw numbers, while important, do not tell the whole story of the human cost of these Middle East operations. Given that more than fifty-two thousand military service members were wounded, the trauma of their recovery and rehabilitation is measurable in dollar terms, but the emotional cost to these soldiers and their families is incalculable, which has been witnessed in the high suicide rate of these veterans. In 2006, after the first five years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, more than three thousand U.S. soldiers suffered brain damage. In half of these cases, the trauma will permanently affect their capacity to think, their memory, mood, behavior, and ability to work. A joint Harvard-Columbia University study estimated the cost of lifetime care for them will be $35 billion. Many soldiers have multiple injuries, giving rise to a new medical term: “polytrauma.” The U.S. government established four new polytrauma centers to handle these most difficult cases. They are in Palo Alto, Tampa, Richmond, and Minneapolis. The trauma to these soldiers’ families is indeterminable but nevertheless real.40 In addition to government programs aimed at helping wounded service members, traditional private charitable organizations have expanded their activities and new organizations have been founded. According to the Charity Navigator blog, a nonprofit organization that evaluates the cost-effectiveness of charitable organizations, twelve of these private organizations are the most cost-effective in providing assistance to disabled veterans.41 LIBYA In 2003, Libya announced it would dismantle its infant nuclear program.42 It was presumed at the time that Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi, the long-time dictator of the country, feared a Western attack against his country, which had happened against Saddam Hussein in the belief he possessed WMD. Therefore, Gaddafi renounced his nuclear program in the hope his country would be spared Iraq’s fate and could begin to be accepted by the West, particularly after it admitted responsibility for the crash of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 killing all on board. However, five months after Libya formally renounced its nuclear program, NATO began active military support for a Libyan rebel group bent on overthrowing the Gaddafi regime in a civil war.43 A UN Security Council Resolution had authorized military action against Libya “to protect civilian life,” but not to force regime change. Russia had supported that

90

NATO Reconsidered

resolution, but NATO under U.S. pressure moved to topple Gaddafi. Robert Gates, the former defense secretary, wrote, “the Russians felt they had been played for suckers on Libya.”44 From March 19 to October 31, 2011 a total of nineteen NATO members and Partner nations participated in the Libya campaign. These included British and U.S. warships firing Tomahawk missiles into Libya, blockading Libyan ports, and enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya in support of Libya’s rebels.45 Eventually, the rebels won. Gaddafi was overthrown, found hiding in a ditch, and killed, ending his forty-two-year reign that began with his coup d’état of King Idris in 1969. The consequences of this NATO operation against Libya continue reverberating years later. It partially explains Russia’s determined support for al-Assad in Syria, Russia’s remaining client state in the Middle East. Look at North Korea. Seeing what had happed to Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi, why would another renegade dictator, like Kim Jong-un of North Korea, renounce his nuclear weapons in the face of American pressure, leaving him defenseless?46 Indeed, in early 2018, Kim rejected a “Libya-style” deal with the United States.47 Subsequent negotiations with the United States, including two summits, have yet to confirm the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Foreign policy actions taken years earlier do have consequences years later, as the Obama Administration’s policy against Libya and George W. Bush’s policy against Iraq now impact the Trump Administration’s efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA Bureaucracies tend to take on a life of their own. Once established, it is nearly impossible to reduce much less eliminate a bureaucracy. Intergovernmental bureaucracies are a special case—they are impermeable because they have a web of constituencies in their home countries that support them. These bureaucracies become deep-rooted in their domestic support base and develop qualities of intractability. NATO’s international bureaucracy is a prime example of this characteristic.48 The International Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels has about four thousand people working full-time. Of these, two thousand are members of the national delegations and supporting staff of national military representatives of member countries. Another three hundred people are from Partner countries. About one thousand people are civilian members of the International Staff, and five hundred are International Military Staff members. The new Headquarters Building in Brussels was formally dedicated in 2018 and is approximately 80 percent larger than the old Headquarters Building, reflecting the expansion of NATO to thirty member nations and their associated staffing needs.49

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present91

“The primary role of the International Staff (IS) is to provide advice, guidance and administrative support to the national delegations at NATO Headquarters. The IS helps to implement decisions taken at different committee levels and, in doing so, supports the process of consensus building and decision-making within the Alliance.”50 The International Staff is headed by NATO’s secretary general. The one thousand civilians working within the International Staff are all nationals from NATO member countries. Worldwide, approximately six thousand civilians work for NATO in different agencies and in strategic and regional commands in Europe and North America. The International Staff was created in 1951 to support the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s senior political body. It was given responsibility to prepare for meetings of the North Atlantic Council and follow-up actions taken by the Council. The International Staff’s status was defined in the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was signed in September 1951. Over the years the International Staff has expanded and been reorganized a number of times. At the Prague Summit in 2002, the International Staff was restructured to meet new security threats and to implement modern management processes. In 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, a review of International Staff’s roles and missions was begun and continues. Today, the International Staff includes the Office of the Secretary General, eight divisions, each headed by an assistant secretary general, and a number of independent offices headed by directors, such as the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of Financial Control, and the Office of Resources. The cost of NATO’s vast bureaucracy and its activities is born by the Alliance’s thirty members on a mutually agreed cost-sharing arrangement. The cost for 2019 (January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2019) was divided among the member nations as a percent of their GDP. The largest ten contributors to NATO’s civil budget and military budget are listed in table 5.2. Montenegro, a recently joined member, pays the least amount: 0.0270 percent of its GDP. NATO’s civil budget for 2018 was €245.8 million. Its military budget for 2018 was €1.325 billion.51 The combined cost of NATO was €1.571 billion. The United States funds approximately 22 percent of the NATO common funded budget, which is about $685 million out of NATO’s $2.8 billion per year budget. Common funding supports certain alliance operational costs such as Afghanistan and Kosovo, NATO AWACS, training and training exercises, joint facilities and infrastructure, common communications, NATO headquarters and staff, and NATO’s multinational integrated military command structure.52 The United States is the major contributor to certain multinational projects that achieve economies of scale by developing capabilities to support

92

NATO Reconsidered Table 5.2  Ten Largest Contributors to NATO by GDP Percent, 2018–2019 Country

Percent of NATO Budget

United States

22.13

Germany

14.76

France

10.49

United Kingdom

10.45

Italy

8.14

Canada

6.37

Spain

5.5

Turkey

4.38

Netherlands

3.19

Poland

2.76

Source: ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cpa​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_67655​.­htm

NATO operational requirements. These include the following six major activities:53 NATO Ballistic Missile Defense In 2009, the United States announced the establishment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to provide missile defense to Europe. This phased plan was designed to provide regional ballistic missile defense to protect Europe, including the forward deployed U.S. forces. The system is directed against ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region, that is, Iran. At the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, the Alliance welcomed the EPAA as the U.S.’s contribution to NATO’s ballistic missile defense. At later summits, NATO authorized additional capabilities to be deployed in the Mediterranean area and in Eastern Europe. With the construction of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems in Romania and in Poland in 2018, the system is complete. NATO Airborne Early Warning Control This system consists of sixteen E-3A AWACS aircraft based in Geilenkirchen, Germany. These aircraft have played important roles in NATO operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo, in the Mediterranean, and in eastern Turkey. Funding is provided by sixteen nations. The largest contributors are the United States with 40 percent cost share and Germany

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present93

with 27 percent. The United Kingdom makes in-kind contributions from its six E-3D AWACS aircraft based in Waddington, UK. Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) System U.S.-built Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft provide persistent high-altitude, long-endurance intelligence-gathering capability for NATO from a base in Italy. Five Global Hawk aerial vehicles, as well as ground support, were operational in 2017. Fifteen NATO nations are acquiring this system for a total of €1.3 billion. The United States pays 42 percent of the acquisition cost, plus 28 percent of the operational costs. NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) NATO nations share intelligence derived from surveillance and reconnaissance from AWACS, Global Hawk, and other means through a dedicated command and control operation that achieved initial operating capability in 2016. The United States contributes to this activity through the common funding. C-17 Strategic Airlift Command Ten NATO nations plus two Partner countries operate three Boeing C-17 strategic transport aircraft out of Papa Air Base in Hungary. These aircraft support national requirements of the participating countries, plus NATO and EU missions. The United States provided 33 percent of the acquisition cost, plus one C-17 airplane. The annual operating cost share for the United States is 31 percent of the total cost of $153 million. Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM) This is a multinational project to provide U.S.-made air-to-ground PGM to eight NATO countries. The project uses the lead-nation procurement initiative that works this way: the United States sells these munitions through foreign military sales procedures to a particular nation in a multinational group, and that nation then transfers a portion of the munitions to other participating nations in that group. This advanced technology then strengthens the defense capability of all recipient countries. Again, the United States is the major source of funds and equipment for these NATO multinational projects. Regarding overall cost-sharing of NATO’s expenses, it was agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014 that all NATO members would increase their defense spending to at least 2 percent of their GDPs by 2025. As of 2017, only the following five countries had met that commitment: the

94

NATO Reconsidered

United States, UK, Greece, Poland, and Estonia.54 As of 2017, the United States spent 3.61 percent of its GDP on defense; in dollar terms, the United States outspent the next seven NATO countries combined.55 See Appendix II for the “Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries.” WHY RUSSIA DID NOT JOIN NATO Another important question is this: why was Russia not admitted to NATO when the Soviet Union and later Russia applied for NATO membership? As the dominant member of the Atlantic Alliance, the United States determined the answer. On March 31, 1954, one year after Stalin died and one year before the Warsaw Pact was formed, Soviet foreign minister Molotov asked for the Soviet Union to join NATO. On that date, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a formal diplomatic note to the United States, Britain, and France stating that the USSR would consider participation in NATO to foster “the creation of an effective system of European collective security.  .  .” Two months later, in May 1954, the Western powers rejected the proposal as incompatible with NATO’s democratic and defensive aims.56 West Germany was admitted to NATO the following year. Perhaps this Soviet proposal was a tactical ploy by Moscow to join NATO to enable it to veto West Germany’s pending membership in the alliance. The existence of this secret diplomatic note was revealed by Vladimir Putin in June 2001. The note stated that Moscow was “holding to its intention of entering negotiations on joining” NATO. Putin then revealed the dismissive response from the Western powers: “. . . the unrealistic nature of the proposal does not warrant discussion.”57 A year earlier, in 2000, President Putin suggested that Russia should join NATO. This dramatic suggestion was rebuffed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.58 A diplomatic proposal of this fundamental importance to global security should have been considered by the North Atlantic Council before it was responded to. However, even at this date, the United States still held all the NATO cards, being the sole superpower protector of Western Europe, and obviously felt it alone could make this truly far-reaching decision. Earlier during the Clinton Administration, Russia had tried to join NATO. In 1997, Boris Yeltsin, then Russia’s president, joined the Group of Seven. This was intended by Russia as a major step toward eventually joining NATO. At the time Vladimir Putin, then head of the KGB’s successor organization, the FSB, said the Western powers deprecated Russia, and, as he famously put it, they relegated Russia to a “folding chair” at the global table. After he became president in 2000, Putin made a last attempt to improve Russia’s standing in the G8. He even offered George W. Bush assistance in

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present95

his war on terror. Once again, he floated the idea of Russia joining NATO. His offer was summarily rebuffed by the United States. After that, and for a number of other reasons, Putin turned hard left against the West.59 The debate within the Bush Administration on Putin’s offer was later discussed by the then-director of the State Department’s Policy Planning, Richard Haass. Dr. Haass, later as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, stated in a radio discussion that he had favored extending an invitation to Russia to join NATO for two reasons: Russia would not impair NATO’s functioning, and its membership would take the sting out of NATO’s forward enlargement. More broadly, it would remove the argument that the postwar order was built against Russia. The proposal was turned down by the Bush Administration in the belief that Russia as a NATO insider would impair NATO’s military effectiveness and would work against its viability.60 This was a huge missed opportunity fundamentally to alter the geopolitical landscape in Europe. It is possible Putin’s offer was motivated by his growing fear of China’s rise on Russia’s eastern border. Perhaps NATO’s first secretary general, Lord Ismay, was correct in his analysis which remained unchanged throughout NATO’s history. He said the purpose of NATO was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”61 Will Russia once again want to join NATO? One answer is offered by a Russian who is a former Soviet propaganda executive. Dima Vorobiev offered his analysis in November 2017.62 He stated that it makes no sense for Russia to join NATO while Putin is president. However, after Putin, his successor or his successor’s successor, “is very likely to join NATO.” Vorobiev offers three reasons for his prediction. First, after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia ceased being a military threat to Europe as a whole. There is no strategic or economic reason for Russia to go to war against any NATO member. If any Russian leader did that, it would be out of desperation or for personal reasons—not for reasons of state. Second, with China rising in the East and Muslim demographic pressure growing in Russia’s South with no end in sight, Russia needs a third-party ally with these characteristics: stable, predictable, with no strategic desires on anything Russia possesses. “Europe, with or without the US, fits that bill.” Third, Russia is falling behind technologically. Increasingly, Russia’s weapons consist of imported parts that cannot be produced domestically. At some point, Russia will need to make a choice: align with the West or China. With China rising and the West shrinking, “it’s much safer to go in bed with NATO.” Vorobiev personally believes Russia should join NATO. If such a proposal is made, will the response be any different from those in the

96

NATO Reconsidered

past—a flat no? Vorobiev believes Russia will eventually be permitted to join NATO. A different view from inside Russia is offered by Michael Bohm who is the opinion page editor of The Moscow Times.63 Bohm gives five reasons why Russia will never join NATO. First, the Atlantic Alliance requires members to have civilian control over their military. This democratic principle is fundamental for every member nation. It allows for parliamentary oversight over their armed forces—their budgets, their weapons programs, their performance, and their deployments. In Russia, however, civilian control over the military is contrary to the consolidation of power in the hands of the executive. There is no parliamentary oversight and therefore no transparency of the military. The Defense Ministry is accountable only to President Putin, allowing for cover-ups of inefficiencies, corruption, and poor performance. Russia’s vertical power structure highly values secrecy and prohibits civilian control. Therefore, Russia will be denied NATO membership. Second, Russia needs NATO as an “enemy,” not as an alliance partner. Deep-seated distrust of the United States persists inside the Kremlin, which views NATO as the greatest threat to Russia. Having this enemy to guard against justifies Russia’s anti-Western diplomacy and its high defense spending. For example, Russia’s military strategy document published in 2010 listed NATO as Russia’s No. 1 danger. Third, if Russia joins NATO, it will expose itself to unnecessary risks with respect to China and Iran. Russia has a long border with China, and therefore NATO’s geographic territory would be extended all across Eurasia to the Pacific Ocean. This might excite fears in China that NATO, led by the United States, is seeking to contain China, thus possibly undermining the thriving economic relations between Russia and China. Also, Russia in NATO, given the Iranian regime’s archenemy is the United States, could expose Russia to Iranian hostility. To avoid these unnecessary risks, Russia should remain outside NATO. Fourth, joining NATO would effectively end the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the collective security organization Russia founded in 2002 to compete with NATO. The CSTO was established by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, with Uzbekistan joining later. This is a multilateral military alliance of former Soviet republics intended to protect its members against outside attack. Fifth, joining NATO would be the end of Russia’s dream of restoring itself to superpower status. Within NATO, Russia would become subordinate to the United States, the leader of the alliance, and would relegate itself to being just another large European state like Germany, France, or Britain. This diminished status is unacceptable even to moderates inside

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present97

Russia, who are unwilling to relinquish the ambition of reviving Russia’s Great Power greatness. Finally, Mr. Bohm states, “The United States’ dangerous peace feelers to Russia about NATO membership was [sic] clearly more PR and provocation than anything else.” As The Economist has stated, “Russia’s relations with NATO are one of the big unsolved questions in European security.”64 One issue can be said to have been resolved. On three separate occasions, Russia sought NATO membership. In 1954, Foreign Minister Molotov asked to join NATO in a formal diplomatic note; in 1997, President Yeltsin took important steps to join the alliance; and in 2000, President Putin made a last attempt to join NATO. All three overtures were turned down by the United States. It must have become clear to Russia’s leadership that the United States wanted to maintain its protectorate over as much of Europe as it could, and that meant no formal security relationship with Russia was possible. As it turned out, for domestic political purposes, Russia needed NATO as an “enemy,” and for geopolitical purposes, the United States needed Russia as an “enemy” as well. WAS NATO’S LIFE-EXTENSION IN AMERICA’S INTEREST? If in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO had declared victory and been dissolved, would that have been in the best interest of the United States? As that did not happen, one can only speculate as to the consequences if it had happened. A senior member of the American foreign policy establishment offers his analysis that preserving NATO was essential—that at its seventieth anniversary NATO should not “retire.” Dr. Hans Bennendijk, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, offers five consequences—all negative—of life without NATO.65 First, “The most catastrophic impact of NATO’s retirement would be the risk of Russian aggression and miscalculation. Without a clear commitment to defend allied territory backed up by an American nuclear deterrent, President Vladimir Putin will certainly see opportunities to seize land he believes is Russian.” Bennendijk asserts that major wars begin when leaders miscalculate, as many historical examples illustrate. “Secondly, NATO’s retirement would also decrease American military reach, its political influence and its economic advantage.” American military bases throughout Europe provide for Europe’s protection and position American forces closer to trouble spots that threaten U.S. interests. Massive U.S. investment in Europe and trade with Europe require the degree of security provided by NATO. Third, NATO is the glue that holds European military organizations together, providing a forum to coordinate strategic issues. The EU would

98

NATO Reconsidered

be a poor substitute for NATO because it has no military structure and no superpower leadership, and without the United Kingdom after Brexit it would be weaker. He asserts an all-European approach “is likely to fail.” Fourth, the consequences of life without NATO would be global. U.S. bilateral alliances in Asia “would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense commitments there would become worthless.” America’s Asian allies would seek accommodation with China, which is determined to be dominant in Asia, Bennendijk asserts. Fifth, the impact of NATO’s retirement “would be the near collapse of what has been called the ‘liberal international order.’” This order is an edifice based on treaties, alliances, and institutions mostly created by the United States to safeguard democracies. “NATO is the principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity.” Binnendijk concludes: “Life without NATO would be more dangerous and less prosperous. Russia and China would be the big winners at America’s expense.” These justifications for NATO’s continuation after the Cold War ended are typical of the viewpoint of the American globalist foreign policy elite. However, many of these “reasons” are unprovable assertions. America’s massive financial investments in Europe would be safeguarded by the national governments where the enterprises are located because they benefit the local economy as well as American investors. America’s military has global reach, and that fact underwrites its political reach, which is independent of occupying foreign territory. Military deployment abroad is expensive and given modern technology is unnecessary. The comment that without NATO, America’s Asian security arrangements would become “worthless” is an unprovable assertion. It is likely that with a more Asia-focused foreign policy, America’s Asian allies, especially South Korea and Japan, would be more reassured as to America’s commitment to their security vis-à-vis North Korea and especially China. One impact of the dissolution of NATO might be the resuscitation of western European defense commitments by Europeans themselves. Such an arrangement would serve as a deterrent to Putin should he miscalculate his chances for aggrandizement in Eastern Europe. An all-European arrangement is not automatically “likely to fail,” as Bennendijk asserts, given that the EU already has a “military structure,” which Bennendijk denies. Keeping a large U.S. military footprint in Germany has been used to “keep Germany down,” but increasingly the conservative government of that country has demonstrated its willingness to forge powerful economic relationships with Russia on the same model as the leftist German Social Democratic Party. Germany has also demonstrated its unwillingness to

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present99

risk a confrontation with Russia over Ukraine and Georgia, thus tacitly sanctioning Russian aggression against those two former Soviet republics. Perhaps a newly invigorated all-European alliance could prevent realpolitik with Russia from once again becoming Berlin’s new norm. Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party was the top vote-getter in the May 2019 elections, giving Merkel’s party a fourth and final term. The Green Party came in second, increasing its influence in German politics and putting pressure on Merkel to move Left. Merkel defended her policy of allowing nearly one million Muslim refugees into Germany, and she acknowledged that Germany’s chronic antisemitism requires policemen to guard every temple and Jewish school throughout the country. Merkel’s term as chancellor ends in 2021.66 One has to ask, how helpful the “liberal international order” has been for the United States? It certainly has been helpful to the alliance’s European allies, who have grown wealthy under the American nuclear umbrella, most of whom have routinely failed to pay their agreed-upon fair share of the cost of their own security, as well as the cost of their neighbors’ security. For the United States, however, is keeping a large, expensive protectorate over most of Europe cost-effective? And is it in the U.S.’s national interest—given the fact that most NATO members decline to support a meaningful defense capability for their own countries and some would likely decline to honor the treaty’s key commitment? Keeping the United States in NATO certainly benefits the American foreign policy elite—underwriting their attendance at seminars and academic symposia and granting stipends to travel to international conferences in exotic locales to discuss international security issues. But it does nothing tangible or positive for the average American citizen who would bear the burden of fighting to defend a faraway country if it were subjected to an “armed attack.” PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO The American foreign policy elite has been successful in its decades-long domestic campaign to persuade the American public it needs to support NATO. In 1949, the year the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, 67 percent of Americans said the United States should ratify the treaty, according to a Gallup Poll.67 European elites have been less successful in recent years persuading their citizens to support NATO. A Pew Research Center poll in 2015 reported that at least half of the people polled in Germany, France, and Italy were unwilling to use military force to defend other NATO allies in the event of a Russian attack.68 Only 38 percent of Germans saw Russia as a “major threat.” NATO countries having a “favorable” attitude toward

100

NATO Reconsidered

NATO in 2015 were Spain, 47 percent; the United States, 49 percent; Germany, 55 percent; Canada, 56 percent; the United Kingdom, 60 percent; Italy and France, 64 percent; and Poland, 74 percent. The proportion of Americans who said they had an “unfavorable” view of NATO grew from 21 percent in 2010 to 31 percent in 2015. The same Pew poll revealed a breathtaking finding. The question was, Should or should not your country use military force to defend another NATO ally if Russia attacked it? The “should not” results are as follows: Germany, 58 percent; France, 53 percent; Italy, 51 percent; Spain, 47 percent; the United Kingdom and the United States, 37 percent; and Canada, 36 percent. This answer goes to the very heart of the Atlantic Alliance: an armed attack against one is an armed attack against all. Yet, if three of the largest European members would probably not honor that commitment (Germany, France, and Italy), and the U.S.’s willingness to honor the commitment was at best tepid given that 37 percent said “should not,” what then is the deterrent value of NATO? According to another Pew Research Center poll taken in May 2016, before the election of Donald Trump, a sizable majority of the American public viewed NATO positively—77 percent of respondents said being a member of NATO “is good for the U.S.” Yet, the poll revealed another viewpoint: “Few (15%) consider the NATO alliance to be of more importance to the U.S. than it is to other member countries.” And “. . . a sizeable minority (43%) says the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when allies strongly disagree.” There were no significant partisan differences in the public’s ratings of NATO, the poll stated.69 A Gallup Poll in 2017, however, did record partisan differences. The poll reported 97 percent of Democrats and 69 percent of Republicans thought NATO should be maintained. Overall, 80 percent of Americans supported NATO, up from 64 percent in 1995.70 It is clear that public attitudes toward NATO and its core mission vary widely on the two sides of the Atlantic. The German public’s attitude toward NATO has shifted negatively. According to a Pew poll in 2017, only 40 percent of Germans would use military force to defend another NATO ally if attacked by Russia.71 In a 2018 poll, only 15 percent of Germans supported Chancellor Merkel’s pledge to devote 2 percent of Germany’s GDP to defense, while 36 percent said Germany spends too much on the military.72 That year Germany spent 1.23 percent of its GDP on defense. At the Wales NATO Summit in 2014, Merkel pledged to meet the 2 percent target by 2024, but in August 2019, responding to public pressure, she reneged on the pledge, stating, “We said we want to achieve 1.5% by 2024.” Richard Grenell, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, responded, “It is offensive to assume that the US taxpayers will continue to pay for more than 50,000 Americans [U.S. troops] in Germany, but the Germans get to

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present101

spend their surplus on domestic programs.”73 “Germany is NATO’s biggest freeloader,” wrote James Kirchick in The Washington Post.74 President Trump sent a letter to Chancellor Merkel before the 2018 Brussels NATO Summit. He wrote, “The United States continues to devote more resources to the defense of Europe when the Continent’s economy, including Germany’s, are doing well and security challenges abound. This is no longer sustainable for us.”75 As of August 2019, only seven of NATO’s twenty-nine members met the 2 percent of GDP target: United States, UK, Poland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.76 Not surprising, four of the seven border on Russian territory. By 2019, neutrality had become the preferred foreign policy among Europeans living in the EU. That year the European Council on Foreign Relations reported the results of a survey of sixty thousand people living in fourteen EU countries.77 The key questions was: “Whose side should your country take in a conflict between the United States and Russia?” The majority of respondents in all fourteen countries replied “neither.” The breakdown favoring neutralism for selected countries is France: 65 percent favor neutralism versus 18 percent would back the United States; Italy: 65 percent neutral versus 17 percent favor the United States; Germany: 70 percent versus 12 percent; Hungary: 71 percent versus 13 percent; Romania: 65 percent versus 17 percent; and Poland: 45 percent versus 33 percent.78 With 70 percent favoring neutrality, German public support for NATO’s core mission has clearly eroded, thus explaining Merkel’s unwillingness to increase defense spending. The same EU poll asked the same question with respect to a U.S./China conflict. The responses were similar—Poland: 24 percent favored the United States, 54 percent favored neutral; the Czech Republic: 19 percent favored the United States; Romania: 17 percent favored the United States; Hungary: 13 percent favored the United States; France: 18 percent favored the United States; Italy: 20 percent favored the United States; Germany: 10 percent favored the United States while the vast majority favored “neither.” Looking at these data, a French-American journalist, Annabelle Timsit, concluded that Europeans “no longer believe that the US can serve as the guarantor of their security.” She added, “A death knell is sounding for NATO and the rest of the post-World War II transatlantic foreign policy system.”79 Given the deteriorating support for NATO among key European publics, one has to ask if it matters what those publics’ views of foreign policy issues are? Most importantly, does foreign public opinion matter to U.S. foreign policy?80 The elites in control of foreign policy decision-making have ignored public sentiment in the past, and in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member, they may do so again and honor their Article V

102

NATO Reconsidered

responsibility. Yet, the erosion of public support for NATO in these European democracies is a fundamental concern. The sons and daughters of the American foreign policy elite are not likely to be called to arms to man the battlements in Montenegro or Estonia if they were subjected to a Russian “armed attack.” These are countries many average American citizens may have never heard of or could not identify on a map but which the United States has pledged to defend. The continuing exposure of ordinary Americans to the risk of having to safeguard rich European countries against an “armed attack” is increasingly questionable, especially given that their publics would not back the United States in a war with either Russia or China. ALTERNATIVE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS Another important question is this: If in 1991 the United States had withdrawn from NATO and had encouraged its European allies to form an alternative alliance on the model of the previous Western Union, could that alliance have kept the peace in Europe by thwarting a future revanchist Russia? Without the leadership of the world’s only superpower, one can also only speculate. But if France, Germany, Italy, and Britain had the will, they would have had the means to do so. After all, two of those countries are nuclear powers. Alas, a pacifist syndrome had emerged in some of these European democracies, especially Germany, rendering those potential alliance partners largely impotent. However, America’s withdrawal from NATO might have galvanized them into the necessity for action. This approach might have been worth trying, given the fact that NATO as an organization was only marginally helpful to the United States in its subsequent struggles in Afghanistan, in Iraq (where NATO itself played no role), in Libya (where NATO produced an unmitigated disaster that is still unfolding on both sides of the globe), and in Ukraine and Georgia (where NATO assistance against Russia was thwarted by France and especially Germany). Had the United States acted alone in these instances, the end results may have been better. However, it is clear the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations had no stomach for any high-risk activities outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, despite drawing red lines (such as Obama’s in Syria) that were ignored and unenforced. One could make the case that a successor to NATO in Europe could have done no worse than what NATO did in Europe, which, except for Kosovo and partially in Afghanistan, was essentially nothing. It is true Russia did not attack any of its neighbors that were members of NATO, and therefore, the NATO deterrent can be said to have been a success. But the question has to be asked, would Russia have remained in its borders anyway if those nations were not NATO members? Given

NATO and the United States: Cold War to the Present103

that Putin had his hands full at home with a struggling economy, with the revolt in Chechnya, with Muslim pressure on Russia’s South, and with friction with China, he likely would not have risked a war with a combined all-European force. Regarding the Baltic states’ security, the Obama Administration openly declared its indifference, as it did with Ukraine. As President Obama publicly stated, those countries are not in America’s “core interest,” but they are in Russia’s “core interest.” The implication of that statement—nullifying the effect of NATO’s Article V—must have been chilling to those highly vulnerable NATO allies. Yet, Putin did not take the bait and did not invade them. One has to ask why NATO intervened in Kosovo? The Serbian suppression of the Muslim majority in that enclave represented no security threat to NATO Europe or to the United States. This was strictly a humanitarian mission—to combat “ethnic cleansing”—not a mission having any strategic value for NATO. Nevertheless, the United States beginning with President Clinton participated in the Kosovo operation and continues to participate to this day. What is most troubling is that during all this time the really important threat to the United States was relentlessly rising in Asia. NATO required the United States to focus on Europe and Russia, while on the other side of the world China was amassing wealth, power, and strategic positions to challenge the United States, which was not even paying attention to what China was doing and was seemingly unaware of its drive to become the global hegemon. In fact, the Obama Administration, like the Bush Administration before it, was aiding China’s expansion of power through its policy of benign neglect, permitting massive annual trade deficits with China. It is true the Obama Administration announced a “pivot” to Asia/Pacific, but that “rebalance” of policy was short-lived as events in Europe/Middle East once again claimed its attention.81 During the first three years of the Trump Administration, the Democratic Party and its media allies relentlessly charged the president with the accusation that he had colluded with Russia, that he was even a traitor for Russia.82 According to a Harvard study, as early as the first hundred days of the Trump Administration, media coverage of the administration was 80 percent negative and only 20 percent positive. The study included stories in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, CNN, CBS, NBC, and Fox.83 As the months went by, negative media coverage grew to 93 percent.84 Domestic political commentary and media reporting was overwhelmingly focused on Russia. Yet, in the end, the twenty-two-month long Mueller Special Counsel investigation and its final report issued to the Attorney General on March 22, 2019 concluded there was no evidence of Russian “collusion” by President Trump, as announced by Attorney General William Barr.85 Some said

104

NATO Reconsidered

at the time the accusation was a politically manufactured hoax that was used as the basis for an attempted coup d’état of the Trump Administration.86 Later, in 2019, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice released an official report of the results of a year-long investigation that concluded the FBI’s investigation of the allegation that the Trump Administration had been influenced by Russia was in fact groundless—based on false and uncorroborated sources.87 Thus, for three years beginning in 2016, America’s focus was on Russia both at home and abroad. Meanwhile, during this time, China was relentlessly emerging as the principal threat to America’s security. As a leading China expert, Michael Pillsbury, stated, this was the “most dangerous intelligence failure in American history.”88

CHAPTER 6

Growing Threat to the United States from China: Impacts on U.S. NATO Policy

“The powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.”1 Thucydides The twenty-first century has seen a tectonic shift in the center of global power. Just as the early twentieth century saw a shift away from the Europe-centered world with the rise of the United States and Japan as Great Powers, the shift continued in the current era—remarkably at an even faster pace. A hundred years later, by the first decade of the twenty-first century, China had become the world’s second most powerful state, eclipsing Russia and challenging America for global leadership. The implications of this new reality are profound and far-reaching for the United States and NATO. For the past seventy years, America has been focused on the Soviet Union/Russia and the need to protect Europe from the threat of being overwhelmed by that country. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and a now-diminished Russia facing it in the east, NATO’s core mission has been fulfilled. Yet, American foreign policy remains tied to the Europe-centered commitments undertaken in the Atlantic Alliance seven decades ago, and those commitments are expanding as new members are admitted into NATO. At the same time, the more profound threat to the United States—and to its allies in Europe—has emerged from China. This is no accident. And China’s rise is not benign. From the very beginning of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set out on a mission to achieve global hegemony by marginalizing the leading role and

106

NATO Reconsidered

importance of the United States throughout the world.2 This plan was begun in 1949 when the Communists took power in China, and its fulfillment is expected a hundred years later—in 2049. On October 1, 2019, the People’s Republic of China celebrated its seventieth anniversary, leaving it just thirty years to achieve its goal. In Chinese, this plan is known as The Hundred-Year Marathon.3 THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA It is important briefly to refresh America’s understanding of China’s rise to Great Power status and the resulting threat it poses to the West, especially to the United States. For three decades before 1972, when President Nixon visited Mao Zedong and opened direct discussions with the People’s Republic of China, relations between the United States and the Communist Chinese were hostile. During World War II, the United States supported the Nationalist Chang Kai-Shek as China’s leader, not Mao Zedong, the Communist leader, fighting against the invading Japanese Army. Beginning in late 1950, the United States fought the Chinese Army during the Korean War. The United States signed a security treaty with Taiwan to protect the island from a Chinese attack, stationed the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait as a protective shield, and sold military equipment to Taiwan. From the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Communist China and the Soviet Union were allies, with China regarding Moscow as the senior partner in that alliance. The Soviet Union, of course, was America’s principal adversary throughout the Cold War, and the United States treated China as a hostile actor, being a Soviet ally.4 The risks to the United States from China increased after China tested its first nuclear devise at Lop Nur Basin in 1964.5 A split between the two Communist behemoths was beginning to emerge in the 1960s,6 but the split was not apparent to Western countries until the rift became open in March 1969 when the two countries clashed on the Sino-Soviet border in the Far East.7 Russian and Chinese troops fought each other in an undeclared war for seven months, with each side claiming control over territory in the Ussuri River Valley. The fighting centered on Zhenbao Island.8 Eventually, China won, having a preponderance of ground forces in the area. Later, a new border agreement was reached between the two countries. Under Gorbachev in the late 1980s, Sino-Soviet relations improved, enabling Moscow to plan to reduce military spending and withdraw fifty-three Soviet divisions that were stationed on their common 3,900-mile militarized border.9 There is a history of Sino-Russian border clashes dating back at least a century earlier as Imperial Russia expanded eastward following its defeat

Growing Threat to the United States from China

107

in the Crimean War by Britain and France during 1853–1856.10 From 1858 to 1864, Russia expanded from Siberia toward the Far East reaching the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Russia and China fought for control of the Ili Valley in Sinking from 1871 to 1881. They fought again between 1898 and 1905 for control of Manchuria. And finally from 1911 to 1924, they struggled for control of Outer Mongolia, with that enormous territory finally becoming a Soviet protectorate as the People’s Republic of Mongolia, thus ending China’s historic sphere of influence in that country. Russia’s expansion to the Far East was greatly facilitated by the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was completed in 1905 between European Russia and Tashkent. Full completion of the railway all the way to the Pacific coast was accomplished in 1916.11 Mao Zedong had also initiated a border clash against India in 1962. The demarcation line of the Sino-Indian border in that lower region of Central Asia had been in dispute for decades. Mao decided to end the stalemate. According to Henry Kissinger, “China executed a sudden, devastating blow on the Indian positions [at the border] and then retreated to the previous line of control, even going so far as to return the captured Indian heavy weaponry.”12 China’s willingness and capability to defend its territorial boundaries against even major powers, such as Russia and India, is very clear. PRESIDENT NIXON’S VISIT TO CHINA Nixon’s trip to Beijing occurred against the backdrop of the Vietnam War, which was raging during the late 1960s and into the early 1970s. In 1968, the United States had 546,000 troops in Vietnam, the high point of U.S. armed forces in that country. An overwhelmingly large American force was the key to President Lyndon Johnson’s military strategy to win the war. That year Richard Nixon was elected president on a platform of “peace with honor,” and soon after his inauguration he announced the beginning of U.S. troop withdrawals. He adopted a new U.S. policy which he termed Vietnamization. Under this policy, America would train and equip South Vietnamese soldiers to bear the brunt of the fighting, enabling U.S. troop levels to decline. In subsequent years, they did decline to 475,000 in 1969, 334,000 in 1970, and 156,000 in 1971. Full withdrawal of American combat forces occurred in 1973.13 During this time, Soviet support of North Vietnam exacerbated the ongo­ ing Cold War tensions between the two superpowers. But the Sino-Soviet border clashes had exposed the rift between the two Communist nations, offering the United States an opportunity to pit China against America’s principal adversary, the Soviet Union.14 In October 1972, Nixon accepted Mao Zedong’s invitation to visit China. This remarkable break with past U.S. policy was like an earthquake in

108

NATO Reconsidered

world politics—it signaled that the Eastern Bloc no longer stood united against the West.15 It was also an earthquake in U.S. domestic politics. This initiative by a Republican president, by a man who had been a lifelong, ardent anti-Communist, was wholly unexpected. The visit to Beijing by the American president began the long road toward a rapprochement between the two nations. Nixon’s foreign policy purpose was obvious—to engage China against America’s archenemy, the Soviet Union.16 While America and China were improving relations, in 1979 tensions between China and the Soviet Union surfaced once again. North Vietnam had become a Soviet client state—much to China’s displeasure—being situated on China’s southern border. That year Chinese troops invaded North Vietnam, thus starting the Sino-Vietnam War “. . . to teach, so China said, a lesson. History, long-standing cultural differences, and more contemporary disputes about such issues as borders all contributed, as they had done in the case of China and the Soviet Union, to the triumph of national interests over Communist internationalism.”17 China’s invasion failed, and soon China had to withdraw. Then North Vietnam invaded Cambodia to overthrow the brutal Khmer Rouge Communist regime, which China had backed. China’s loss of face in Southeast Asia stimulated the need for the Beijing regime to improve its power base. DENG’S ECONOMIC REFORMS Four years after Nixon’s visit, Mao died and was eventually succeeded by Deng Xiaoping, who headed the CCP. Deng jettisoned Mao’s Soviet economic development model, which was not succeeding in China or in Russia. In 1978, Deng introduced a modified market economic model to stimulate development. Deng labeled this approach a “socialist market economy.” Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, later stated to a Communist Party conference that it does not matter what the model is called as long as it works.18 The term “socialist market economy” is such a contradiction of terms that it is laughable to Western economists. Yet, Marxism-Leninism orthodoxy occasionally necessitates a certain reconstruction of terminology and, if necessary, reality. In fact, Deng’s model for China’s private sector portion of the economy was close to pure capitalism. It allowed private ownership of property, announced the end of collectivization of agriculture (which only partially happened), gave permission to start businesses, cancelled price controls, and permitted foreign investment. A quarter century later, by 2005, the private sector accounted for 70 percent of China’s GDP.19 Regarding the public sector, Deng decided to retain numerous stateowned enterprises in key areas of the economy.20 Today these state-owned companies are major players in seven strategically important economic sectors: defense, power generation, oil and gas, coal, aviation,

Growing Threat to the United States from China

109

telecommunications, and shipping. With the Communist Party’s control of these vital sectors of the economy, “China tilts the playing field toward Chinese state-owned enterprises.”21 The economic reforms begun under Deng stimulated a staggeringly high rate of economic growth, importantly fueled by China’s aggressive export policy. China’s GDP growth averaged an astonishing 9.5 percent per year for a decade. In 1990, GDP growth shrunk to 3.9 percent largely because of sanctions put on China following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre (see below).22 How did this remarkable economic growth happen? In 1980, the Carter Administration admitted China to membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and in that year the United States granted it most-favored-nation trade status. This necessitated an annual presidential waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which restricted U.S. trade with “nonmarket” countries and those that restricted emigration, which included Communist China’s restrictions against emigration by its Muslim Uighurs in Western China. With these annual waivers, China’s economic development, powered by its exports, took off.23 In 2000, the Clinton Administration extended “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) to China, removing the need for annual waivers of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This led to China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 as a “developing nation.” This status exempted China from tough WTO requirements, and China continues to assert it is a “developing nation,”24 though by some measures it has the world’s second largest economy. WTO membership on this basis enabled China to participate widely in global trade on highly favorable terms.25 This further accelerated its economic growth because WTO membership permitted China open access to the major markets in Europe and North America with most-favored-nation treatment. China soon broke the WTO rules requiring it to open its own markets to foreign imports and thereafter defied WTO regulations for fair treatment in international commerce and protection of intellectual property. As a result, after 2001, U.S. manufacturing employment swiftly declined as Chinese imports increased and U.S. exports to China declined.26 This economic syndrome hollowed out American manufacturing and along with it the American middle class. The George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations benignly permitted this massive transfer of wealth from the United States to Communist China in the mistaken belief that an economically developed China would become democratic. Beginning in 2017, the Trump Administration, recognizing that China was not becoming democratic, initiated policies to reverse this course. As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated: “We thought that the more we interacted, the more it [China] would become like a liberal democracy,

110

NATO Reconsidered

like us here in the United States. It didn’t happen, and you all know this. Indeed, under Xi Jinping, the country is moving exactly in the opposite direction—more repression, more unfair competition, more predatory economic practices; indeed, a more aggressive military posture as well.”27 In 2018, China’s GDP growth rate slowed to 6.6 percent, the lowest since 1990,28 and in 2019, the IMF projected its economic growth rate to slow to 6.2 percent. Even though this growth rate is “moderating,” stated the IMF, it remained the highest rate of any major industrial country in the world.29 POLITICAL CONTROL Though the Communist Party modified the country’s economic model, Deng did not alter the country’s political model. The CCP remains the sole political decision-making power in the country. Many in the Western world hoped—even believed—free market economic reforms would eventually usher in prodemocracy political reforms and positive relations with the United States. As Secretary Pompeo stated, these hopes have turned out to be an illusion.30 Yet, there are commentators in the West who as recently as 2019 raised questions about China’s real intent—a peaceful rise or a threat to the West.31 Others, such as Niall Ferguson, believe the issue has already been settled. He wrote, the twentieth century saw “the descent of the West” and “a reorientation of the world” toward the East.32 The CCP’s control of its society and its hostility toward the United States was clearly articulated in an official Chinese document written in 2002 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The report read in part: “China’s leaders consistently characterize the United States as a ‘hegemon,’ connoting a powerful protagonist and overbearing bully that is China’s major competitor.” The report continued: China’s “strategic assessments and public portrayals of U.S. power are shaped by the view that U.S.-style democratic liberalism and the U.S. presence and position of power in the Asian periphery threaten the Communist Party’s monopoly on political power.”33 The Tiananmen Square massacre on June 4, 1989, a decade after Deng’s economic reforms began, is sufficient evidence of the Party’s unwillingness to democratize the country and to liberalize its political system.34 On that date as many as one million students and workers gathered in this main square in Beijing and in other cities across China to protest the lack of freedom in China and its rampant political corruption. The timing of the protest was stimulated by the death of Hu Yaobang, who had been general secretary of the Communist Party but was fired two years earlier for being too liberal.35 The CCP, then headed by Deng, faced a major decision—to permit the demonstrations to continue or to suppress them and regain control.

Growing Threat to the United States from China

111

The Politburo chose to suppress the demonstrations which had been ongoing for a month. Premier Li Peng declared martial law and dispatched three hundred thousand troops and tanks to Beijing. Many hundreds—perhaps thousands—of students and workers were killed as army units poured into Tiananmen Square ruthlessly firing automatic weapons pointblank into the unarmed sea of civilian protesters.36 A lasting image of the protests was that of a lone young man standing in front of a column of tanks defying them to run over him. People from the sidelines pulled him to safety, but not before pictures of that image flooded the world. The brutality of the suppression stunned those who believed China’s post-Maoist leadership was moving toward political liberalization. The Tiananmen Square massacre was ample proof it was not. Accordingly, Western countries imposed economic sanctions on China. From the beginning of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP has maintained political control of the country, sometimes ruthlessly as at Tiananmen Square. The protracted street demonstrations in Hong Kong throughout the summer and fall of 2019 generated fear of a Beijing crackdown similar to Tiananmen Square. “Since early June, it [Hong Kong] has been racked by civil disturbances each weekend. What began as large-scale marches against a bill that would have allowed extradition to mainland China has mutated into street battles and broader protester demands for democratic reform.”37 On September 4, 2019, after four months of demonstrations, Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s Leader, announced the withdrawal of the extradition bill, hoping to end this disruption in China’s economic crown jewel. Over fourteen hundred people had been arrested, stimulating continuing protest demonstrations.38 MAO’S RECORD Unifying China, which for centuries was a loose confederation of regional war lords and vassal states owing allegiance to the emperor in Beijing, was Mao’s great achievement. “With the tiny exception of Taiwan, Mao would unify China within a year. Decades of internal strife and disunity would come to an end.”39 Mao’s great failure was the Great Leap Forward, a bold program undertaken between 1958 and 1962 to industrialize the country using bizarre techniques, typified by having villagers install rudimentary steel-making capabilities in their rural areas. The program was eventually abandoned but not before tens of millions of people died, many from starvation, disease, or torture.40 “In short, the Great Leap was a very expensive disaster.”41 This failure marginalized Mao by his fellow Politburo members. From 1966 until his death a decade later, Mao waged the Cultural Revolution that was a purge of the remaining vestiges of Nationalist (Kuomintang) supporters, bourgeoises, anti-Communists, and reform-minded

112

NATO Reconsidered

Communists.42 More than anything it was Mao’s attempt to regain control of the party after his dismal failure during the Great Leap.43 It is estimated that up to eight million people perished and tens of millions were persecuted by marauding gangs of youthful Red Guards during this period.44 “The result,” according to Henry Kissinger, “was a spectacular human and institutional carnage, as one by one China’s organs of power and authority—including the highest ranks of the Communist Party—succumbed to the assaults of teenage ideological shock troops.”45 DENG XIAOPING’S ECONOMIC REFORMS In 1976 when Mao died, his hand-picked successor was Hua Guofeng. He continued Mao’s Soviet-style economic program that featured central planning, collectivized agriculture, and no private property ownership. Deng Xiaoping outmaneuvered Hua in the Politburo and was able to replace him as Paramount Leader in 1978. Deng enthusiastically put into place his market-based principles, and as a result China began to develop a modern economy. These economic reforms liberalized the domestic economy which began to take off. At the same time, China adopted a mercantilist international economic policy. Mercantilism, as developed and implemented by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Minister of Finances under France’s Louis XIV in the 1660s and 1670s, is an economic policy in which government stimulates the growth of domestic industries, exports its products to rival countries, erects high tariff walls and other barriers to prevent imports from those countries, and thus generates a highly favorable balance of trade for itself at the expense of its rivals. This is a form of economic warfare that China has enthusiastically waged despite WTO’s strict rules prohibiting it. “These actions have earned China the number-one spot on the Global Mercantilist Index.”46 The bottom line is this: China cheats. China’s successful use of its mercantilist policy is reflected in annual trade deficits in the U.S. current account vis-à-vis China. For example, the U.S. trade deficit with China in 2018 was $419 billion: U.S. imports were $540 billion, while U.S. exports to China were a mere $120 billion.47 This deficit with China represents the bulk of the total U.S. current account deficit in 2018 of $488.5 billion.48 It is this chronic U.S. trade deficit with China that has been enriching China at America’s expense that President Donald Trump has declared his determination to reduce or eliminate (see table 6.1). The United States has consistently had by far the largest deficits in both balance of payments and international investment flows of any major economy, and the deficit was on an upward trajectory, increasing every year of the last six except 2017. The largest contributor to these deficits is Chinese imports, accounting for nearly half of the total U.S. deficit. The

Growing Threat to the United States from China

113

Table 6.1  Balance of Payments and International Investment, Net Deficit (Top Five Deficit Countries, Millions of U.S. Dollars) 2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

United States

−5,368.6

−6,945.4

−7,461.6

−8,181.6

−7,725.0

−9,717.1

Spain

−1,334.5

−1,254.2

−1,053.1

−1,006.2

−1,172.6

−1,066.9

Euro Area

−1,983.5

−1,488.1

−1,328.1

−832.3

−952.4

−501.2

Australia

−752.2

−695.2

−674.2

−699.8

−755.6

−688.6

Brazil

−723.9

−705.9

−374.7

−566.6

−642.2

−590.1

Source: International Monetary Fund, 2019

Table 6.2  Balance of Payments and International Investment, Net Surplus (Top Five Surplus Countries, Millions of U.S. Dollars) 2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Japan

3,093.3

3,012.4

2,815.0

2,879.2

2,909.1

3,102.1

Germany

1,344.3

1,449.3

1,538.9

1,692.3

2,138.5

2,348.4

China (People’s R)

1,809.1

1,602.7

1,672.8

1,950.4

2,100.7

2,130.1

China (Hong Kong)

758.0

870.2

1,003.1

1,153.8

1,421.8

1,294.3

Norway

640.5

709.0

696.8

754.8

883.8

810.8

Source: International Monetary Fund, 2019

next five “deficit” countries are Mexico, France, Ireland, Turkey, and India (see table 6.2). Note the United States is not in a “surplus” position. Combining the People’s Republic of China with Hong Kong, the surplus total of China for 2018 was $3,424.4 million, which was more than Japan’s surplus. The next five surplus countries were Switzerland, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, and Canada. THE RISE OF XI JINPING After Deng retired in 1989, Jiang Zemin succeeded him and ruled until 2002 when Hu Jintao followed with the same market-based economic model for the next decade. In 2012, the current Paramount Leader, Xi Jinping, became the secretary general of the CCP and in 2013 became the president of the People’s Republic of China. In 2016, he was elevated to be a “core” leader of the party, a

114

NATO Reconsidered

high designation only Mao and Deng had been given. Xi also chairs the Central Military Commission (which means he is commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army), and he is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission (which gives him control over China’s foreign policy). Term limits have been abolished, granting Xi a lifetime appointment.49 This is a greater concentration of power in one man than any of his predecessors ever had, including Mao.50 Xi, dressed in a Mao jacket and not in his usual western suit and tie, personally presided over the massive seventieth anniversary celebration of China’s Communist rule in Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2019. This concentration of personal power under Xi invokes three important trends.51 “First, central authorities have accrued political power at the expense of bureaucratic ministries and local and provincial governments.” “Second, the CCP has dramatically expanded its powers, generally at the expense of the government and other organizations.” “Third, the central leadership has undertaken measures to bolster Xi’s personal authority.”52 Official propaganda relentlessly promotes Xi to the point some compare it to the “cult of personality.”53 In 2018, Forbes declared Xi to be the world’s most powerful and influential person, dethroning Vladimir Putin from the title.54 Indeed, Xi is the most powerful leader of a major nation anywhere in the world, with more power in his hands than even the American president because Xi is head of state and also controls his country’s executive, its legislature, and its judiciary through his control of the CCP, which dominates all of those institutions including the armed forces and the domestic security services.55 As a lasting result of Deng’s reforms, today China is a Great Power and has the world’s second largest economy with a GDP in 2019 of $14 trillion.56 Yet, in its five-thousand-year history, China has never had a free election of its top leader. CHINA’S THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND NATO: THE NEW SILK ROAD In September 2013, China’s Paramount Leader, Xi Jinping, personally announced the beginning of the New Silk Road. This is a massive project in which China will invest $1.4 trillion to build infrastructure linking 4.4 billion people with nine hundred developmental projects.57 The New Silk Road is projected to connect China’s economy with those of Central and South Asia, East Africa, and Europe. It is a spectacular undertaking that signals China’s new aggressiveness, a dramatic shift in policy intended to influence, not react to, the world around it. The New Silk Road is Xi Jinping’s bold strategy to dominate the Eurasian land mass, known as the “world island,” as described by Sir Halford J. Mackinder, the British geographer. Mackinder’s concept was first

Growing Threat to the United States from China

115

presented in 1904 in a Royal Society paper titled “The Geographical Pivot of History.”58 Mackinder’s theory was that he who controls the “world island” is the dominant power in the world. This concept has become popularly known as the “heartland” theory. It has never been tested because no one power has ever controlled the entire Eurasian land mass, though the Soviet Union came close with its post–World War II dominance in Eastern Europe and its alliance with China. “Silk Road” is a reference to the historic trade route between Europe and China, particularly to Marco Polo who traveled to China from Venice in the late Middle Ages and returned with silk and other valuable items. Xi labeled this bold project the “Road and Belt” initiative because there will be two Silk Roads. One “Road” will be a railroad overland from western China through Eurasia to Italy and Germany, with a branch going south through Pakistan. The other “Road” will be a maritime “Belt” extending from the South China Sea, across the Indian Ocean to East Africa, then up through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean and then to Venice (or Trieste), where the two roads would come together and extend up to the Baltic Sea. This immense project was estimated by others to cost $900 billion.59 The Road and Belt will link over sixty-five countries. The railway will cut shipping time from China to Germany from thirty-six days by container ship to thirteen days. Shipping by air is too expensive for bulk items; shipping freight by rail is 65 percent cheaper. The transcontinental railroad will eventually provide freight service from every major Chinese city to every major country in Europe, which is China’s largest trading partner. Already one-third of Chinese goods are exported throughout Europe with China-EU trade valued at more than $600 billion per year. In 2016, this was expected to rise to $1 trillion by 2020.60 The cost of this colossal infrastructure project—building high-speed railroads, bridges, tunnels, ports, pipelines, power plants, freight-handling equipment, and so forth—is estimated by Morgan Stanley to total $1.3 trillion by 2027. So far, 157 nations and international organizations have signed up for participation. The project is viewed by China’s government as so important for its foreign policy strategy that reference to it was added to the CCP’s constitution in 2017.61 Regarding the “Belt” part of the project, a string of seaport acquisitions on the major trade routes from the South China Sea, through the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean are being undertaken by China’s two largest state-owned shipping companies, COSCO Shipping Ports and China Merchants Port Holdings. In 2016, COSCO received $26.1 billion from the Chinese Development Bank to invest in seaports. In 2017 alone, Chinese firms invested $20 billion in ports outside China, doubling the amount of the previous year.

116

NATO Reconsidered

As of 2018, China’s state-owned shipping companies operated twenty-nine ports in fifteen countries, plus forty-seven terminals in thirteen more countries.62 These state-owned companies now control about 10 percent of all European port capacity.63 Chinese firms bought stakes in terminals in Zeebrugge and Antwerp in Belgium, in Piraeus Port in Greece, as well as Suez in Egypt, Colombo in Sri Lanka, and Singapore.64 FINANCING BELT AND ROAD PROJECTS Nations participating in the Road and Belt project finance their projects by accepting loans from Chinese state-owned banks, loans from China’s recently established international credit institution, or loans directly from China’s state-owned companies that are participants in joint ventures. China estimated it will ultimately lend as much as $8 trillion for infrastructure improvements in sixty-eight countries, which equals one-third of global GDP, according to McKinsey and Company.65 China is also expanding its European footprint through foreign direct investment—developing factories, ports, or other facilities in greenfield sites and outright purchasing European companies (see map 6.1). “The scale of the Belt and Road investments in key infrastructure means China’s political influence in these countries will increase,” commented Turloch Mooney of IHS Market. “That is assured.”66 There are clear geopolitical implications of China’s Belt and Road strategy. Loans from China come with strings attached. Some countries fear being burdened with heavy debt or of becoming obligated to a foreign country. One country referred to Chinese loans as “debt trap diplomacy.”67 For example, Sri Lanka was forced to relinquish a newly developed port to a Chinese firm in return for relief on some of its debt of $8 billion. This is an example of China swapping debt for equity. The Malaysian government terminated a $20 billion railroad project in 2019 and $3 billion worth of pipelines. Myanmar (Burma) cut back a port deal from $7.5 billion to $1.3 billion.68 The Myanmar Belt and Road project, named the Kyank Phyu Special Economic Zone, has immense geopolitical significance. It is China’s plan to outflank U.S. preponderant power in the Strait of Malacca by shipping Chinese-made goods from southwestern China through Myanmar to its port of Rangoon on the edge of the Indian Ocean, thus bypassing the Strait’s choke-point.69 Italy is an enthusiastic participant in the Road and Belt project. In March 2019, President Xi was hosted in Rome for three days by Italy’s Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni when the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding to launch Italy’s participation. Chinese and Italian firms inked ten deals at that time involving energy, steel, and gas pipelines. The estimated value of the deals was put at $22.6 billion.70 Italy, an

Map 6.1  Road and Belt (Courtesy of Lommes)

118

NATO Reconsidered

original member of the EU, thus became the first developed country to join the Road and Belt project. Italy is also a NATO member with a large U.S. armed forces presence in the country. Other EU/NATO countries had already joined the project—Hungary, Greece, Poland, and Portugal—but Italy has a much larger economy than any of these. Italy’s major ports of Trieste and Genoa are planning to benefit from the project. The day after the China-Italy deal was announced, the German foreign minister stated, “Countries that believe they can do clever business with the Chinese will wonder when they suddenly wake up in dependency.” EU Commissioner Gunther Oettinger urged the EU to establish a veto over future Chinese investment deals in Europe to protect the continent.71 Interestingly, Italy has Europe’s largest Chinese population—three hundred thousand people. These people have opened businesses and have been invited to join Italian companies’ boards of directors. Italy has received approximately €15 billion in Chinese investments since 2000. This investment level is smaller than those China has made in the United Kingdom and Germany but larger than those in France and the rest of the EU.72 CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE After Xi became Paramount Leader, China dramatically increased its investments in Europe. Chinese foreign direct investment in the EU increased fifty times from about $840 million in 2008 to $42 billion in 2016. This represents a paradigm shift in the China-EU relationship.73 China has many interests in penetrating Europe’s economy: gaining access to new technologies and high-tech assets, broader access to European markets and to third markets (including the United States) through corporate networks, acquiring recognizable brand names (such as Pirelli), gaining footholds in after-market supply chains, and acquiring key roles in integrated regional and global value chains. “Total Chinese investment in Europe, including mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investments, now amount to $348 billion, and China has acquired more than 350 European companies over the past 10 years.”74 While Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe is accelerating at unprecedented rates, it still remains comparatively low at a total of 2.2 percent relative to the U.S.’s market-leading position at 38 percent.75 China’s heaviest investments have traditionally been in the advanced countries of Western and Central Europe, but its main focus has now shifted to countries in Eastern Europe. In November 2014, President Xi invited sixteen East European leaders to China for a two-day summit to promote the Road and Belt project. No Western press was allowed. Xi visited Minsk, Belarus in May 2015 to launch a major joint venture project—a gigantic industrial park with factories, housing for 170,000 people, schools,

Growing Threat to the United States from China

119

hospitals, everything imaginable. In Minsk, the finest hotel is named The Beijing. Other Road and Belt projects in Eastern Europe include a high-speed rail link between Budapest and Belgrade, hydroelectric dams in Poland and Croatia, and expansion of Lithuania’s airport and China’s acquisition of Lithuania’s major port on the Baltic Sea.76 Xi visited Prague to promote a project in the Czech Republic.77 In Greece, China’s state-owned shipping giant, COSCO, acquired 67 percent of the port of Piraeus, Europe’s largest passenger port. China now considers the Greek port its “gateway into Europe,” cutting shipping time from China by one week.78 From a lower base of investments, countries in Eastern Europe have seen a dramatic percentage increase in Chinese investment in recent years. Croatia had a four-fold increase, Slovenia had a ten-fold increase, and deals in Hungary and Poland more than doubled.79 In actual numbers, China’s investment in Eastern Europe grew across the board: 162 percent increase in Poland, 185 percent increase in Hungary, 355 percent in Croatia, and by more than 1,000 percent in Slovenia.80 The EU views Eastern Europe’s pro-China economic initiatives with concern. At the EU Summit in 2019, the EU labeled China a “systemic rival.”81 Chancellor Merkel stated, “[I]t’s our own fault if we in Europe do not speak with one voice.”82 But that is not happening. In 2017, Germany surpassed the United States as China’s largest trading partner.83 The head of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, a former Italian prime minister, lauded China’s economic growth, implying Europe should participate in these projects. Prodi said China’s growth in 2018 equaled Russia’s entire GDP: “It is like saying that China grows a Russia a year.”84 “While countries welcome Beijing’s generosity, they are simultaneously wary of its largesse. China’s growing influence is a concern for nations whose political interests do not always align with Beijing’s,” stated Paul Haenle, Director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.85 Other reasons for concern for doing business with China are these: lack of protection of intellectual property rights, unequal market access, price distortions due to subsidized dumping, and discrimination against Western competitors applying for Chinese government tender offers. Most important is asymmetrical market access: only Chinese firms may bid on projects in China in key sectors such as finance, logistics, and telecom, whereas Chinese firms (that are usually state-owned) are allowed to bid on these types of projects in Europe. This lack of reciprocity is discriminatory and a clear violation of WTO regulations, which underlines the political motive of China’s trade policy.86 Yet, President Xi calls the Belt and Road project “a road for peace” that will not involve “outdated geopolitical maneuvering.”87 Other Chinese government spokesmen repeatedly deny in official state media any

120

NATO Reconsidered

charges that the Belt and Road project is a play for global dominance: it is “not and will never be neocolonialism by stealth.”88 Despite these soothing reassurances, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, is vehemently opposed to the overall project, especially the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which passes through territory claimed by India. He called the route a “colonial enterprise” that will bring “debt and broken communities in its wake.”89 ROAD AND BELT BEIJING FORUM In April 2019, Beijing hosted its second “Road and Belt Forum.”90 Heads of state and government from thirty-six nations attended the conference, which first convened in 2017. In Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, President Xi welcomed the large, distinguished gathering in a spectacular demonstration of diplomatic success for China. Looking at the list of attendees, twelve of the heads of government were from Europe, which sent the largest delegation. Other than Italy’s prime minister, the European attendees were mostly from small states. Major European countries such as Germany and France did not attend, remaining vocal in their concerns about the project, along with some of the EU executives in Brussels. Looking at other regions, Southeast Asia was represented by nine heads of government of the ten ASEAN countries, plus Indonesia which sent a vice premier. From Central Asia four of the five “Road” countries sent top leaders. Only Turkmenistan, which is opposed to the Road project, did not attend. Countries in Africa, a newer area of “Belt” penetration, sent five government leaders (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Egypt), and South America sent one (Chile). Only the United Arab Emirates (UAE) attended from the Middle East. Representing a setback for Chinese diplomacy, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea in East Asia declined to attend while only Mongolia attended from that region. In South Asia, of the eight members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, only Pakistan and Nepal attended. India, rejecting the invitation, continued its strong objections to the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor. President Trump was invited, but did not attend, not even sending an observer as he did to the 2017 Beijing Forum. For a complete list of the thirty-six non-Chinese heads of state or government attending the 2019 Forum see table 6.3. Early U.S.–China Relations Leaders of the CCP absurdly assert that the United States, whom they refer to as the “global hegemon,” has sought to dominate China since before Abraham Lincoln’s presidency. This is a false allegation that contradicts

Growing Threat to the United States from China

121

Table 6.3  Alphabetical List of Countries Attending Beijing Forum, 2019 Austria Chancellor Sebastian Kurz

Malaysia Prime Minister Mahathir

Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev

Mongolia President Khaltmaa Battulga

Belarus President Alexander Lakashenko

Mozambique President Filipe Nyusi

Brunei Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah

Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Kyi

Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen

Nepal President Bidya Devi Bhandar

Chile President Sebastian Pinera

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan

Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades

Papua New Guinea P.M. Peter O’Neill

Czech Rep. President Milos Zeman

Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte

Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guellch

Portugal President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa

Egypt President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi

Russia President Vladimir Putin

Ethiopia Prime Minister Adly Ahmed

Serbia President Aleksandar Vucic

Greece Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

Hungary Prime Minister Viktor Orban

Switzerland President Ueli Maurer

Italy Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte

Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon

Kazakhstan Former Pres. Nazarbayev

Thailand Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha

Kenya President Uhuru Kenyatta

UAE P.M. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid

Kyrgyzstan President Sooronbay Jeenbekov

Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev

Laos President Bounnhang Vorachit

Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phue

Source: The Diplomat, April 27, 2019. China’s Anti-U.S. Global Strategy

the history of U.S.–China relations for over a hundred years beginning with the settlements following the Opium War and ending with China’s attack on U.S. forces in Korea in late 1950. This assertion of near-perpetual hostility of America toward China negates America’s benign—and often positive—relationship with China throughout this hundred-year-long period. The Opium War (1839–1842) was an Anglo-Chinese War which ended with Britain’s victory over China and the subsequent signing of the unequal Treaty of Nanking (1842). The United States was not a combatant. In the treaty Britain and other Western powers received concessions from the Chinese emperor, including rights to use certain Chinese ports and

122

NATO Reconsidered

associated territorial spheres of influence for trading. The island of Hong Kong was outright ceded to Britain for one hundred and fifty years and became their chief naval base and trading center in the Far East. The adjacent New Territories were ceded to Britain later. Unlike other Occidental countries, the United States alone did not take control of any Chinese territory, though the Nanking treaty permitted it to do so. The United States signed its own treaty with China, the Treaty of Wanghia (1844), which afforded American traders the same rights and privileges given to British traders under the Treaty of Nanking.91 This marked the formal beginning of U.S.–China diplomatic relations. In 1900 the Boxer Rebellion occurred. Anti-Western Chinese formed an organization known as the Boxers. The Dowager Empress secretly encouraged the Boxers to attack westerners, pillaging and murdering hundreds of foreign private citizens and missionaries. The most dramatic attacks were against the Western powers’ legations in Peking, including those of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, as well as Japan. These attacks killed many of these legations’ military guards and caused extensive property damage and loss of civilian life in a siege that lasted fifty-five days. Nineteen thousand troops from the Western powers and Japan were landed in China (including five thousand U.S. Marines) and put down the rebellion. Reparations for damage caused by the Boxer Rebellion were demanded by the Western powers from China in the amount of $333,000,000, of which the United States demanded only $25,000,000 for loss of life and property damage. Later, in 1907, the United States returned over $10 million of its share to the Chinese government, which put this amount in a trust fund for the education of Chinese youth in China and in the United States. In 1924, the rest of the balance due ($6 million) was remitted by the United States to China.92 This was a gracious resolution by the United States of a tragic episode in China’s history. From 1941 to 1945, U.S. armed forces fought on China’s side to defeat Japanese imperialism, including the Japanese invasion of China. American supply missions in China and U.S. military advisors and combat forces worked with the Chinese Army during the war. By misrepresenting this history of positive relations between the two countries, the CCP stimulates antagonism against the United States among its people and plans to do everything possible to dominate the United States. According to Timothy Heath, a senior international defense researcher at RAND Corporation, China’s aim is to “challenge U.S. power in Asia.”93 U.S. RESPONSE The United States has encouraged doubts about China’s geopolitical motives with its Road and Belt policy. Vice President Mike Pence, speaking

Growing Threat to the United States from China

123

at a Southeast Asian conference, said the United States would not “offer a constricting belt or a one-way road.”94 In October 2018, Pence stated, “China wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies.”95 In a major address the same month, Pence stated, “But our message to China’s rulers is this: This President will not back down. The American people will not be swayed. And we will continue to stand strong for our security and our economy, even as we hope for improved relations with Beijing.”96 China expert Michael Pillsbury sounds a broader warning: “Chinese leaders view the global environment as fundamentally zero-sum, and they plan to show the same lack of mercy toward America that they believe the long line of China-hating American imperialists dating back to John Tyler have showed toward them.” China asserts the United States seeks to maintain its “. . . dominance in Europe; it has characterized the enlargement of NATO as an effort to contain and encircle China . . . China’s leaders see America as an enemy in a global struggle they plan on winning.”97 In April 2018, at his Senate confirmation hearing, the newly appointed commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Phil Davidson, stated, “The predatory nature of many of the loans and initiatives associated with the Belt and Road initiative lead me to believe that Beijing is using the Belt and Road as a mechanism to coerce states into greater access and influence for China.” This, Davidson went on to opine, may lead to China denying access to ports, transit, and logistical support for U.S. forces in the future.98 The Chinese government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic outbreak in late 2019/early 2020 is another illustration of the CCP’s control over its own people and its disregard for the health and safety of its citizens and those of its global trading partners. President Trump repeatedly blamed China for failing to contain the virus at its origin in Wuhan saying, “It could have been stopped right where it came from, China.”99 American reporters filed stories from China citing this fact and were subsequently expelled from China, having lost their licenses. Reporters for these three major U.S. newspapers were forced to leave China: The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal.100 CHINA’S ARMED FORCES To support its global policy, China is expanding and modernizing its armed forces with high levels of military spending. From 2009 to 2018, China’s military spending increased by 83 percent.101 Military spending in 2018 was $250 billion, which represented 1.9 percent of China’s GDP. For 2019, Xi’s government announced a military growth target of 7.5 percent, which amounts to $177.6 billion. For comparison, the U.S. defense budget request for fiscal year 2020 was $750 billion.102 China has

124

NATO Reconsidered

2.3 million soldiers in its armed forces.103 Males eighteen to twenty-two years of age are required to serve at least two years in the People’s Liberation Army. In addition to its conventional forces, China is developing advanced weapons intended to neutralize America’s conventional forces and especially its space-based communications—its essential military and commercial command and control systems. China has already ­developed antisatellite satellites such as those, like leeches, that attach themselves to other satellites and either disrupt them or acquire their data. In 2007, the PLA successfully tested a ground-based antisatellite missile that destroyed a spent Chinese weather satellite. This test proved the Pentagon was wrong in its previous estimate that satellites could only be destroyed by a nuclear weapon launched into space. This was a major failure of American intelligence, not to realize China’s advancements in science and space, that sent shock waves throughout the U.S. defense community.104 China’s defense spending is large enough to continue building a worldclass military, making it the second largest defense spender in the world. The Stockholm Institute (SIPRI) estimated that in 2017 China’s defense spending was 1.9 percent of its GDP compared with 3.1 percent of GDP spent on defense in the United States. Whatever the exact numbers, which China typically underreports, China spends as much money on its military as the other Asian nations combined.105 In dollar terms, Reuters confirms the estimate that China’s defense spending was at $177.49 billion in 2018.106 Projections for future military spending vary, but one forecast by the RAND Corporation estimates that by 2030 China will have in excess of $1 trillion to spend on new weapons for its navy and air force (see table 6.4).107 Table 6.4  Top Five Countries’ Military Spending, 2017 Spending in Billions (U.S. Dollars)

Country

597

United States

Percent of GDP 3.1

228

China

69.5

Saudi Arabia

1.9

59.8

India

2.5

55

Russia

4.3

10.3

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, reported in Ben Westcott, “China’s military is going from strength to strength under Xi Jinping,” CNN, March 5, 2019.

Growing Threat to the United States from China

125

CHINA’S POWER PROJECTION The “Road” part of the Road and Belt project is based on a strategy that seeks ultimately to outflank the United States’ leading position in Europe, beginning in Eastern Europe which Xi has obviously targeted as being the most cost-effective region to penetrate. It is also a strategy for China to erode Russia’s leading position in certain countries, especially Belarus (a Russian client state) and the Central Asian republics aligned with Russia. Leaders in some of these countries are rapidly gravitating into Beijing’s orbit, participating in China’s massive infrastructure projects and the loans and contractual conditions tied to them. The “Belt” part of the Road and Belt project is also based on a strategic concept that seeks to undermine American influence and power in its path. It is intended to counter the U.S. position in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and ultimately it is intended to encircle India with its projects in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and especially Pakistan.108 It is well known that China is developing power projection capabilities with its air force and especially with its navy, the part of the People’s Liberation Army that is now receiving the largest part of the budget of any of the three military branches.109 China launched its first conventionally powered aircraft carrier in 2018, and in 2019 was outfitting its second aircraft carrier,110 building more submarines and frigates, as well as amphibious assault vessels. According to Department of Defense (DOD) reports, China has the world’s third largest air force,111 and it is developing a long-range stealth bomber, a large transport airplane (similar to the C-17),112 and is building fourth- and fifth-generation jet fighters (including the stealthy J-20). The PLA is modernizing its nuclear capability with new road-mobile ICBMs and ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarines.113 These advanced armed forces are clearly not meant for coastal defense, which is the traditional Chinese defense policy. A Blue Water Navy and a long-range air force are the hallmarks of power projection, which the evidence shows is clearly China’s intent. These armed forces are key to achieving and securing China’s global reach as its national interests expand exponentially.114 China is dredging up atolls in the South China Sea, the first leg in the “Belt” project, and is establishing military fortifications on them as well as on the Spratly Islands,115 including harbors, airfields, air defense capabilities, and barracks for permanent stationing of troops. China claims these islands and their surrounding areas as its sovereign territory. China’s bases on the Spratly Islands are approximately two hundred nautical miles from the territories of the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia.116 China’s militarization of this vital international waterway is a key part of its long-term strategy to achieve global military reach.117 During a summit meeting in Washington in September 2015, President Xi and

126

NATO Reconsidered

President Obama were standing side-by-side at the White House when Xi boldly restated China’s claim to sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.118 Underlining its intent to penetrate deep into the southwest Pacific, in October 2019, China signed a seventy-five-year lease for an entire island in the Solomon Islands group. The island, Tulagi, has a highly desirable natural deep water harbor. The lease included infrastructure development, which could include harbor and airfield improvements on this island of one thousand people.119 With this long-term lease, China would have been able to project military power toward Australia and New Zealand. Fortunately, the prime minister of the Solomon Islands declared the lease was “unlawful, unenforceable and must be terminated with immediate effect.”120 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS As a counter to these aggressive Chinese initiatives, the United States under the Trump Administration is taking action. In July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined a new initiative of the administration: Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. It is significant that the official U.S. policy has shifted from the term “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” to highlight the critical role India will play. In a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, Pompeo stated this is a new economic component to America’s Asian strategy and is designed to counter China’s Road and Belt economic strategy.121 This new strategy has a military component. During the summer of 2018’s Rim of the Pacific exercise in the Western Pacific, the U.S. Army fired land-based artillery rockets and antiship cruise missiles against mock ship targets. Recently, the army held joint exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps practicing raiding and seizing small islands controlled by Japan and the Philippines. In 2020, the army will hold large-scale joint military exercises with the Philippines and Thailand armed forces in the South China Sea area. This will be a division-size army operation “. . . targeting ships to assist the U.S. Navy with sea control operations . . . [and] suggests that part of the exercises may look at neutralizing China’s fleet and its militarized island bases.”122 “As mounting pressure from Donald Trump adds to a slew of structural challenges facing China’s $14 trillion economy—including record debt levels, rampant pollution, and an aging population—the risk is that the country gets stuck in a ‘middle-income trap,’ stagnating before it reaches rich-world levels of development.”123 According to Nobel laureate Michael Spence, a professor at New York University, “Only five developing countries have made the transition to advanced-nation status while maintaining high levels of growth since 1960.”124 The United States and

Growing Threat to the United States from China

127

Singapore are two of the five. China aspires to become the sixth, but U.S. policy is actively working against its achievement. Prodemocracy demonstrations in Hong Kong raised the level of tension between the United States and Beijing during the second half of 2019. The demonstrations, sparked by the introduction of a bill in the Hong Kong government designed to strengthen the Communist Party’s hold over the former British territory, produced a level of destructiveness never before seen in Hong Kong. The demonstrations grew, forcing the Hong Kong authorities to rescind their bill. Municipal elections were held in November, resulting in a huge voter turnout with prodemocracy candidates winning more than 80 percent of the contested seats to the District Councils.125 This was Hong Kong’s most important election ever, producing an overwhelming majority favoring democracy.126 It was a sharp slap in the face to Beijing. The United States reacted to these developments by enacting two bills by Congress that were immediately signed into law by President Trump. The Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 requires an annual review by the State Department of the city’s autonomy. A second law bars the sale of munitions to Hong Kong’s police.127 These laws strengthened the prodemocracy movement in Hong Kong, where street demonstrations featured citizens waving American flags as a symbol of freedom. CHINA’S REACH China’s reach has expanded into the Indian Ocean, where it established its first overseas military base in July 2017. It is in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, which faces the Gulf of Aden and dominates the southern entrance to the Red Sea, one of the world’s most vital sea lanes.128 In addition to Djibouti, China’s economic penetration of Africa includes Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and a few others.129 To partly counter China’s “Belt” project, a group of U.S. allies and associates formed a counter organization: Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility. Members of this new international entity are Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the EU. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are also participants. This entity’s purpose is to offer an alternative to Chinese financing for development projects in the region. The United States joined the Facility in December 2018.130 Establishing this financing entity as an alternative to Chinese financing appears to be a little late. As early as 2001, China and several Central Asian countries established an organization as a potential counter to NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).131 SCO’s Business Council and Development Fund provides financing for development projects using Chinese funds—billions of dollars’ worth of credits for loans to its members.

128

NATO Reconsidered

The member countries, in addition to China, are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. Other neighboring countries are “observers.” Unlike NATO, all of whose members are democracies, this is a collection of autocracies. Like NATO, SCO has annual summits of its leaders, has a secretary general, a standing bureaucracy, a mechanism for military collaboration, and its members engage in joint military exercises. Unlike NATO, SCO members collaborate on issues of trade, finance, and legal issues. SCO created an International Bank Association and several forums dealing with common social issues, such as education, health, culture, and others. This institution ties these nations ever closer to Beijing’s expanding orbit. China has been highly creative and effective in extending its reach into those parts of the world it views as vital to its expanding national interests. The initiatives it is employing run the gamut from military expansion, to infrastructure improvements, to trade, to financing, and to diplomatic encounters with target countries. This broad-based international strategy is bearing fruit for Beijing as one after another of its target countries sign up for the Road and Belt project and thereby accept Communist China’s legitimacy as a trusted economic and diplomatic partner. Even Russia is a key participant in the Road project, now having reversed roles with China for supremacy in Central Asia. The existential threat China’s geopolitical/economic strategy poses to NATO and to the position of the United States as the dominant power in Europe is palpable. In East Asia, China is working diligently to replace America as the leading power in that vitally important region.132 China’s ultimate goal is to become the global hegemonic power. It has historically been known as the “Middle Kingdom,” meaning it is the kingdom that rules between heaven and all other countries on earth. The CCP intends to make that a reality, attested by the fact that in the CCP’s official strategy document released at the nineteenth Party Congress in 2017, the party “articulated for the first time an ambition to contend for global leadership.” They intend to achieve that by mid-twenty-first century.133 Understanding what China is doing is the first step to developing counterstrategies. For at least three decades this had not happened. Only recently are analysts and policymakers in Western countries, including the United States, beginning to appreciate the nature and extent of the Chinese threat to the United States.134 This did not begin with the Obama Administration, which did not consider China a threat, as stated by President Obama in his “pivot” to Asia speech in Australia in November 2011: “All of our nations—the United States and Australia—have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China. That’s why the United States welcomes it.”135 More recently, former vice president Joe Biden discounted the threat from China, but the Trump Administration recognizes the threat and is actively

Growing Threat to the United States from China

129

dealing with it.136 This has been, as Michael Pillsbury stated, the greatest intelligence failure in modern history. But it is not the only one. AMERICA’S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FAILURES It gives no comfort to realize there have been other enormous failures of intelligence since World War II (to say nothing of the Pearl Harbor attack) that have impacted American national security and foreign policy. In some instances, these failures produced disastrous results. On other occasions, the events stimulated a robust, positive response. The following is a short list of major international events that were not anticipated or forecast by Western intelligence services, including the Central Intelligence Agency. • Berlin Blockade: From June 1948 to May 1949, the Soviet Union blockaded all rail, road, and canal traffic from the Western Zones of Germany to the Western Zones of Berlin. The United States mounted the Berlin Airlift to supply food and fuel to the people living inside Berlin’s Western Zones. This closure was not anticipated by the OSS, the precursor to the CIA. • Korea, 1950: American intelligence did not anticipate the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, and it further discounted the likelihood that Communist China would intervene in the war if U.S. forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, threatening to become a unified country on China’s and Russia’s borders. • Sputnik, 1957: Soviet Union took the lead in space technology by launching the first man-made satellite into orbit around the Earth. This was a complete surprise. • Yuri Gagarin, 1961: Soviet Union launched the first man in space, confirming its lead in space technology. These two space events sent shock waves throughout the West, especially the United States which feared it was falling behind in technology to its archrival. This Soviet achievement prompted newly inaugurated President Kennedy to announce the goal of sending a man to the moon and returning him by the end of the decade—a policy designed to retake the lead in space. The fundamentally important point of the Gargarin mission is the fact that Russia had developed a booster rocket capable of making the launch; this rocket could also be used as an ICBM capable of hitting the United States with a nuclear weapon. • Vietnam, 1963–1973: Throughout the war in Vietnam, U.S. intelligence failed to appreciate the determination and capability of North Vietnam to annex South Vietnam and the lack of determination of the South Vietnamese to defend their own country, which quickly fell to the North after U.S. forces withdrew.

130

NATO Reconsidered

• Iran, February 1979: In a surprise and unexpected move, Iran’s pro-Western monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who owed his throne to the United States, was overthrown by an anti-Western militant Muslim uprising. The Mullahs established a government hostile to the United States in this oil-rich country on the vitally important Persian Gulf. The American embassy in Tehran was attacked, and fifty-one of its employees were detained for almost two years. A U.S. rescue mission failed. Six months before the coup, a CIA report had confidently asserted that Iran was “not in a revolutionary or even a prerevolutionary situation.”137 The Mullahs remain in charge of Iran to this day. • Soviet Union, 1991: This tectonic shift in world politics, the collapse and dismemberment of the USSR, was not predicted or anticipated by American intelligence. Only President Ronald Reagan believed it was possible for this outcome by forecasting: “We win; they lose.” • United States, 2001: On September 11, 2001, Muslim terrorists flew commercial airliners into the twin towers in Manhattan, destroying them and killing thousands of people who worked there. An airplane also flew into the Pentagon, and another plane was deliberately driven into the ground by its passengers in rural Pennsylvania before it could attack a target in Washington, DC. The resulting deaths, numbering almost three thousand people, was the single worst attack on U.S. soil in its history. • Iraq, 2002: Western intelligence was uniformly wrong that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. This intelligence error was the justification President George W. Bush used for his attack on that country, deposing Saddam, and destabilizing Iraq for nearly two decades, giving Iran the opportunity to become dominant there. • Libya, 2011: The United States and a few NATO allies supported a rebel group fighting a civil war to overthrow the four-decade long regime of Muammar Gaddafi. The new regime was expected to stabilize Libya and transform it into a pro-Western country. Gaddafi was overthrown and murdered, but Libya did not become a pro-Western state. Libya became a failed state, elements of which are anti-Western. • People’s Republic of China, 1972–2016: Western intelligence and a succession of U.S. presidents believed the economic development of Communist China would produce a positive, peaceful outcome. The expectation was that as China developed economically with Western aid and commerce, its government would become democratic and benign toward the West. This expectation proved to be dead wrong. • North Korea, 1993–2016: American intelligence believed the regime of Kim Jong-un (and his father, Kim Jong-Il) was prepared to use his nuclear weapons against the United States or its Asian allies and that talks with him would be unproductive. President Donald Trump disagreed with

Growing Threat to the United States from China

131

that analysis and met with Kim on two occasions to defuse the risks to the United States and its allies, especially South Korea. Naturally, intelligence successes are not officially reported or publicized. One famous success is a CIA operation reported in an unauthorized release of the CIA’s record of the removal in 1953 of the Iranian anti-Western leader, Premier Mohammed Mosaddeq, and the installation of the pro-Western Shah. When news of the history of this successful CIA coup d’état became known, it helped stimulate anti-American extremism in Iran.138 Another intelligence success also involved Iran. In February 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran was invaded by Iranian militants, and most of the embassy staff was captured and held hostage until President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated on January 20, 1981. However, six of the embassy’s employees managed to escape to the Canadian chancellery and were later evacuated by a covert CIA operation which was declassified in the late 1990s. An Academy Award-winning movie named “Argo” was made commemorating this highly hazardous achievement. These massive failures and the few known successes cause one to wonder about the real value of America’s massive and expensive intelligence-gathering apparatus. Just how cost-effective is it, and has it always exclusively focused on foreign operations as required by the National Security Act of 1947 which founded the agency?139 CHINESE ESPIONAGE China is a systematic, diligent, and successful gatherer of intelligence in Western countries, especially the United States. Its apparatus appears to be highly cost-effective. Through cyberattacks and human assets, they have penetrated the U.S. DOD, the CIA, the White House, the federal Office of Personnel Management, Congress, and America’s defense industry. A few high-profile examples of China’s successful intelligence operations follow: • Defense Department: DOD employee Gregg Bergersen passed classified information on U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan and military communications systems to a Chinese spy named Tai Shen Kuo in return for cash. Bergersen was sentenced to five years in prison, and Kuo was sentenced to fifteen years.140 • CIA: In January 2018, a former CIA officer named Jerry Chun Shing Lee was arrested at JFK Airport on suspicion of helping dismantle the CIA’s network of secret informants inside China. Lee was a naturalized U.S. citizen who had worked at the CIA for thirteen years. Between eighteen and twenty CIA assets in China were either imprisoned or killed.141

132

NATO Reconsidered

• White House: Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote that President Bill Clinton, while serving as president, “.  .  . made available to them [Chinese officials] significant portions of our advanced military technology.” This was done in return for a generous donation to the Clinton reelection campaign.142 Bernard Schwartz, Chairman of Loral Space and Communications, donated approximately $1.5 million to the Democratic Party and to the Clinton reelection campaign in 1996. The Clinton Administration later permitted the export to China of Loral’s sensitive missile technology.143 Hughes Electronics, headed by C. Michael Armstrong, was also permitted by the White House to export to China sensitive rocket electronic technologies without export licenses.144 • Office of Personnel Management: On July 9, 2015, it was reported that the federal government’s Office of Personnel Management had been hacked. It was estimated that twenty-two million confidential personnel records of federal government employees were stolen. It was presumed the Chinese did the hacking.145 • Congress: In August 2018, it was revealed that a Chinese spy had been employed for twenty years by U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein. He served as her driver while she was in her San Francisco office and was listed on her personnel roster as an “office director.” In his espionage capacity, he worked for the Chinese Ministry of State Security and reported his intelligence information to the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco. During part of this time, Senator Feinstein chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee and held a top secret clearance.146 • Defense industry: There are many examples of human intelligence penetration of the U.S. defense industry to obtain military secrets. One example is the arrest and conviction in February 2010 of engineer Dongfan “Greg” Chung, sentenced to fifteen years in prison for stealing trade secrets from Boeing and Rockwell International. These secrets included information on space shuttle technology, military aircraft, and the Delta IV rocket.147 Another example is the theft by PLA cyberattacks of blueprints of the stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from Lockheed Martin and the Patriot missile from Raytheon.148 America’s tolerant, open society and the trustworthiness of its people are ready-made prescriptions for China’s ruthless penetration of America’s most vital secrets. China’s agents single out Americans in sensitive positions who are susceptible to accepting bribes in return for betraying their country. These subversive tactics and China’s direct attacks on American industry and government have materially enabled a once-backward country over the last four decades to hope to achieve global domination under the leadership of its Communist Party.

Growing Threat to the United States from China

133

CONCLUSION Recognizing the growing military power of China, the U.S. National Defense Strategy Commission reported to Congress in November 2018 that “the U.S. military could suffer unacceptably high casualties” and “might struggle to win or perhaps lose a war against China or Russia.”149 Thus, it is now understood that the China threat to the United States is that real and compelling. During 2019 and 2020, the CCP leadership’s maladroit handling of the coronavirus, their failure to contain it at its source in Wuhan, their attempt to limit its devastation to their own population while allowing it to spread globally to become a pandemic, and their attempt to cover up their responsibility as the cause of this devastating plague illustrate their disregard for the norms of civilized behavior among nations. Tens of thousands of innocent victims throughout the world contracted the virus and many thousands died because the CCP allowed the disease to spread throughout the world. China expert Gordon Chang concluded their behavior was “malicious.”150 President Xi’s ruthlessness is reminiscent of Mao’s during the Cultural Revolution and of Deng’s during Tiananmen Square. As columnist Marc Thiessen reminds us, “China is a brutal totalitarian dictatorship.”151 China’s rise in power and this malevolent regime’s stated intent to unseat the United States as the premier world power necessitates a reconsideration of the fundamental tenets of America’s national security with its Europe-focused foreign policy. The implications for America’s NATO policy are profound. They are explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order

“There is no arc of history that ensures that America’s free political and economic system will automatically prevail. Success or failure depends upon our actions.”1 President Donald J. Trump The United States is the only global superpower. It has economic interests in virtually every part of the world. Its security interests mirror those economic interests. It also has the material means to safeguard those interests. No other country today has these characteristics because America is the wealthiest country on earth and the most powerful. The United States has fought aggression, liberated conquered people, secured peace, and fostered the security and prosperity of other nations for one hundred years. While so doing, it has spent its own blood and treasure, taken no territory, and seized no property of others. It has established and supported international institutions that foster peace and security, open markets, economic development, democratic values, and human rights. Among those institutions is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is an American invention intended to secure the peace and safety of democracies first in Western Europe and later throughout most of Europe. It achieved its purpose. Those democracies have grown safe and prosperous under the security of NATO, backed by the power of the United States. Given NATO’s peaceful victory over the Soviet Union in 1991, the question has been asked, why was NATO continued and not dissolved at that time?

136

NATO Reconsidered

Harvard Professor Stephen Walt asks the same question, “Having won the Cold War and achieved a position of primacy unseen since the Roman Empire, why did U.S. leaders decide to maintain a military establishment that dwarfed all others and expand an already far-flung network of allies, client states, military bases, and security commitments?” Walt further asks, “Instead of greeting the defeat of its principal rival as an opportunity to reduce America’s global burdens, why did both Democrats and Republicans embark on an ill-considered campaign to spread democracy, markets, and other liberal values around the world?” Walt’s answer: “Instead of pursuing a more restrained grand strategy, U.S. leaders opted for liberal hegemony because the foreign policy community believes spreading liberal values is both essential for U.S. security and easy to do.”2 This policy has been a costly failure that produced mistake after mistake, according to Walt. MIT Professor Barry Posen asserts the following: “The United States has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions for international politics. Since the collapse of Soviet power, it has pursued a grand strategy that can be called ‘Liberal Hegemony,’ which is unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful.”3 It is past time to reconsider America’s grand strategy, beginning with the cornerstone of America’s foreign policy—its NATO commitment. This reconsideration should not be conducted by the U.S. foreign policy elite because the reevaluation’s honest conclusions may be antithetical to their personal interests and long-held beliefs. A comprehensive review should be performed by outside, nonpartisan analysts appointed by President Trump. It may result in overturning sacrosanct foreign policy positions that have produced major successes such as no general war in Europe for seventy years, but just as importantly they have produced significant foreign policy mistakes costing American lives and resources. While this review is underway, the United States should begin to withdraw from its commitment to NATO. The American foreign policy elite has fostered “globalism” since the fall of the Soviet Union. Donald Trump, during his election campaign and after becoming president, rejected this approach and announced an “America first” policy. The foreign policy elite worked to undermine his policy both outside the administration and within it. Trump’s policy is a lethal threat to the globalists’ influence over American foreign policy because it rejects their policy assumptions and positions. Globalist institutions and their occupants have relentlessly fought to emasculate the president’s new approach to put America first to prevent making future foreign policy mistakes. AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the United States bestrode the world like a colossus—the lone superpower possessing more power

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order137

and might than any other nation or even any group of nations. This was, as Charles Krauthammer put it, a “unipolar moment.”4 “American preeminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself,” wrote Krauthammer.5 This unassailable, superior position enabled American foreign policy leaders to become expansionist in their ambition to attempt to reshape the world order to suit American interests. This period began with the Clinton Administration which made a series of foreign policy mistakes during the 1990s. First, it expanded NATO’s membership right up to the border of the new Russian Federation in violation of a sacred commitment the George H. W. Bush Administration had made to Russia not to expand NATO further east than East Germany once East and West Germany were unified under NATO. This expansion produced two negative consequences: it put the United States at risk under NATO’s Article 5 to go to war with Russia to protect these fragile states in close proximity to Russia, and it poisoned U.S.–Russian relations to this day, making mutual accommodations highly improbable. The betrayal of this promise, so vital to Russian security, convinced the Russians to continue their deep distrust of the Americans. “U.S. leaders felt they could act with near impunity, however, because the Russian economy was in free fall and there was little Moscow could do, even in areas adjacent to its territory. A similar disregard for Russian concerns led President George W. Bush to withdraw from the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and announce plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe, triggering Russian fears of a possible U.S. first-strike capability.”6 The Clinton Administration, after serious misgivings, decided in its closing days to support the NATO intervention in the Serbia-Kosovo war being fought mostly in Bosnia in the Balkans. No American interests were threatened by this attempt by Serbia (a non-NATO member) to retain control over a breakaway largely Muslim province. Despite this, the United States supported the NATO military intervention with air strikes on Serbia, including the first use of stealthy B-2 bombers, one of which mistakenly dropped bombs on the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Belgrade killing three Chinese employees. This incident supercharged anti-Americanism in China, producing riots against the U.S. embassy in Beijing.7 After active fighting ended in Bosnia, the United States sent peacekeepers and military advisors into Kosovo where they remain twenty years later. This policy produced no national security benefit for the United States, but it did generate additional irritation in Russia which historically views all Serbs—especially Orthodox Serbs—as being within its sphere of

138

NATO Reconsidered

influence. It also fanned the flames of anti-Americanism in China with its collateral damage. “[T]he Clinton Administration became comfortable with the use of military force,” Posen writes. “It elected to escalate U.S. military involvement in Somalia, coerce the abdication of the government of Haiti and then occupy the country, employ air strikes coercively in Bosnia and follow with another occupation  .  .  . launch several small and medium air strikes against Iraq, and launch a major raid on an Al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. . ..”8 AFGHANISTAN After the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States, the George W. Bush Administration attacked Afghanistan where the terrorists had originated their operation. Within two months, the terrorists were defeated or driven out of Afghanistan. Very quickly after that success, this appropriate military retaliatory operation morphed into a massive nation-building enterprise. Bush concluded that attacking the al-Qaeda and Taliban forces there was not enough to ensure America’s future security. As Bush later wrote, “Afghanistan was the ultimate nation building mission. We had liberated the country from a primitive dictatorship, and we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better. We also had a strategic interest in helping the Afghan people build a free society. The terrorists took refuge in places of chaos, despair, and repression. A democratic Afghanistan would be a hopeful alternative to the vision of the extremists.”9 Despite these high hopes for a democratic, peaceful Afghanistan, the reality was far from that. “There were several reasons for the significant challenges we faced and continue to face in Afghanistan,” wrote former vice president Dick Cheney in 2011.10 Cheney lists five reasons: “First, the country’s geography, history, tribal society, and extreme poverty all combine to make it a very difficult place to govern.” Second, it is the world’s largest producer of heroin, and the poppy industry funds the warlords and encourages corruption. Third, “extreme poverty makes the task of building a sovereign, free, secure nation much more difficult.” Fourth, “our multicultural method of operating” carried weaknesses as well as strengths. Fifth, “and most important, is the problem of Pakistan,” which gave safe haven to the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.11 In addition to Cheney’s five reasons, there is another: the U.S.’s failure to effectively administer wartime reconstruction on the ground in Afghanistan. The reports of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) document the repeated failure of the U.S. military and the U.S. mission to Afghanistan to effectively employ the $136.97 billion the United States spent to reconstruct that war-shattered country.12

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order139

By 2008, when SIGAR was established, U.S. troop levels “surged” and reconstruction efforts were underway. The next IG took over in 2012. He wrote, “We had spent billions. We spent more money in Afghanistan than we did on the entire Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe—and a lot of it was being wasted.”13 The major problems he identified were “endemic corruption—from top to bottom,” and “we spent too much money, too fast, in too small a country, with too little oversight.”14 After nearly twenty years of attempting to establish a centralized governmental authority in Kabul that would be democratic, cohesive, and nonaggressive, the United States essentially gave up. In December 2018, the Trump Administration announced its intention to withdraw from the Afghanistan quagmire. Yet, Trump subsequently hedged that bet, declaring it is better to deal with the enemy on foreign soil than at home; so some U.S. military presence would continue in Afghanistan for the time being.15 Meanwhile, in early 2020, the Trump Administration announced it had conducted negotiations with representatives of the Taliban to establish a peaceful settlement to enable the withdrawal of most U.S. forces. For three hundred years, no outside power has ever succeeded in conquering or pacifying Afghanistan, this most tribal of nations. These failures include the Russian Empire, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States.16 The root feature of Afghanistan is this: it is a collection of ethnic enclaves and tribes that are loyal only to themselves and not to a national core. Afghanistan is not a nation-state, despite repeated attempts by foreign powers to make it into one. IRAQ The next American mistake occurred in Iraq. In the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had amassed WMD, the George W. Bush Administration attacked Iraq with overwhelming military force. The Iraq War caused major stresses and strains within NATO because many European governments were openly opposed to it.17 Bush later described this as an “intelligence failure on Iraq’s WMD. Almost a decade later it is hard to describe how widespread an assumption it was that Saddam had WMD. Supporters of the war believed it; opponents of the war believed it; even members of Saddam’s own regime believed it. I believed that the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD was solid.”18 “Inside the government, the debate over war was narrow and incomplete,” RAND analyst Michel Mazarr concluded, following an in-depth review of the Bush Administration’s internal discussions about the Iraq invasion. “Hundreds of meetings dealt with the minutiae of implementing a war. But senior officials never confronted the biggest questions—to what degree the war was justified, what its likely costs would be. They were carried forward by a potent, and ultimately tragic, combination of certainty,

140

NATO Reconsidered

false assumptions, messianic fervor, and in some cases a crushing sense of resignation.”19 Military advisors, knowing that promotions in rank are best advanced by actual combat experience, have a tendency to urge civilian decision-makers to fight. Saddam Hussein’s military was no match for this allied onslaught, which after a short time decimated the Iraqi army and forced Saddam to flee from Baghdad. He was eventually found hiding in a spider hole in the desert.20 He was brought to Baghdad to stand trial by a new Iraqi regime supported by the United States. He was found guilty and executed. Bush later wrote, “From the beginning of the war in Iraq, my conviction was that freedom is universal—and democracy in the Middle East would make the region more peaceful. There were times when that seemed unlikely. But I never lost faith that it was true.”21 The United States established an unstable regime in Baghdad led by Shiites and Kurds, which the previously dominant Iraqi Sunni Muslims resented. Under Saddam Hussein’s rule, Sunnis had been in control, and yet his strongman tactics had enabled him to hold the country together. “Judgments [in the Bush Administration] that in retrospect seem ludicrous, like the idea that the United States could easily turn the country over to a crowd of hand-selected Iraqi exiles, escaped careful analysis. Dissenting views were brushed aside and seldom brought to the attention of senior officials.”22 Having destabilized this important, oil-rich country in the heart of the Middle East, the United States then faced the encroachment of Iranian Shiite influence into this now Shiite-ruled country. The Iranian Mullahs began to extend their influence across the land bridge from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the shores of the Mediterranean. Rather than succeeding with its nation-building to establish a parliamentary democracy in the heart of the Middle East, the Bush Administration—by taking out Saddam—destabilized the country, enabling the Iranian mullahs to exploit the situation. “During the Bush administration, almost no public, in-depth analyses examined the potential character, costs, or risks of a U.S. invasion of Iraq.”23 WHAT ARE THE THREATS TO AMERICA TODAY? At the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century, the critical question for American policymakers is this: What are the most serious threats to the national interest and security of the United States? Are Russia, China, terrorists, or other actors a threat to America and its global interests? Identifying the threat is the first step toward developing a meaningful and appropriate counterstrategy. The Trump Administration, in its official strategy document, states: “China and Russia aspire to project power worldwide. . .”24 Let us begin with the threat Russia presents to the United States, followed by the China.

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order141

Russia’s Threat to the United States As the third decade of the twenty-first century begins, the Russian Federation remains a threat to the United States because it has a large nuclear arsenal and an intercontinental delivery capability for using those weapons. Russia announced its intention to expand and strengthen its nuclear capability in a speech by President Vladimir Putin in March 2018, and, subsequently, it has been in the process of expanding and modernizing its nuclear forces and developing new and unusual delivery systems for them. Russia has a modern nuclear triad—sea-based ICBMs, land-based (including road mobile) ICBMs, and a modern aircraft delivery capability. This upgraded triad is being developed at great expense to the Russian economy, diverting limited resources away from broad-based economic growth.25 Thus, Russia has the capability to wage modern warfare. That sums up the Russian military threat. Russia is not an economic threat. Its GDP is a fraction of that of the United States, and it does not possess resources or products vital to the American economy. This is the basis for the “capabilities” argument, which is entirely military. What about the “intent” argument? Does Russia intend to harm the United States? If it had intended that course of action, it would have done so when its power base was much more robust—that is, when the Soviet Union still existed. It did not attack the United States then and it would not attempt to do so now, given the asymmetrical power relationship of the two countries and the assured mutual destruction that would be inflicted on the Russian motherland. Putin has demonstrated he is a rational actor, and so an attack on the United States would be an irrational act on his part. As long as the American nuclear triad remains robust, well-deployed, and controlled by a leader determined to use it if attacked, Putin will be deterred from launching a nuclear attack on the United States. What, then, is Russia’s foreign policy intention based on its limited material base of power and its geographic location? Realistically, the Putin regime has a narrow range of foreign policy choices to support a limited range of national interests. A recent RAND study “identified five categories of vary broad objectives that appear to guide Russian hostile measures in Europe: 1. Pursuing security and survival of the regime 2. Developing and maintaining great-power status 3. Exerting influence within the near abroad, meaning Russia’s immediate neighborhood and desired sphere of influence 4. Increasing cooperation and trade with Western Europe 5. Undermining enlargement of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).”26

142

NATO Reconsidered

Thus, Russia’s goals are preserving the regime, maintaining its sphere of influence, and convincing other major actors that it remains a Great Power, while it seeks to contain NATO’s further enlargement and cooperates with Western Europe. Being respected as a Great Power in a multipolar world system is an important objective for Russian prestige. The Kremlin does not want Russia to be viewed as just a “big Poland,”27 nor does it want to end up as “China’s Canada.”28 The bottom line: “It has neither the resources nor the strategic interest to start a major conflict with the West.”29 Russia’s capability to exert influence in its sphere of interest is also limited. It attempts to destabilize and undermine weak nations on or near its European borders: Belarus, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through subversion, intimidation, outright aggression, or using proxies. Notably, these target countries are all non-NATO members. Putin’s only territorial takeover was Crimea from Ukraine where it used regular Russian military and eastern Ukraine where it used paramilitary units masquerading as “separatists.” Russia has not sought to take over any EU or NATO state. In the case of the Baltic states, its use of intimidation is only marginal and thus far ineffective. Putin’s regime has been reduced to occasional harassment of U.S. armed forces, such as having their warships sail close to America’s, their military aircraft fly close to American military aircraft, and having their bombers approach but not enter American air space. These are, as Kaiser William I once put it, “sabre rattling” demonstrations of bravado—empty gestures posing as serious threats largely intended to impress Putin’s domestic audience. Other than protecting the regime, “there appears to be an inverse relationship between Russia’s means of influence and its ability to achieve its interests.”30 The essential core of Russian policy today is the protection of the regime and using foreign policy actions to bolster its standing at home. There was a substantial uptick in Putin’s domestic popularity following his support of the Georgian “separatists” and his annexation of Crimea.31 “We know what Russia is—a somewhat bumptious middle power concerned with its prestige, security, and economic development,” according to professor Posen. “Its conventional forces are weak[,] and its economy cannot support anything like the legions of the Soviet Union. Russia cannot threaten the principal powers of Europe, and if Europeans small and large choose to hang together, Russia cannot do much. It certainly can make no bid for hegemony.”32 What does Russia see as the primary threats to itself? Russia’s 2016 National Security Strategy document emphasized the threat from NATO: The buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the endowment of it with global functions pursued in violation of the norms of international law, the galvanization of the bloc countries’ military

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order143 activity, the further expansion of the Alliance, and the location of its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to national security. Source: Russian Federation, National Security Strategy, Moscow, 2016, cited in Cohen and Radin, 12.

These actions by NATO, especially its addition of members close to Russia’s border and the deployment of Western combat troops into some of the NATO countries bordering on Russia, are viewed by Moscow as its primary threats. Beyond NATO, the U.S. military is engaged in training, military exercises, and material support for Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.33 And the United States still has troops in Kosovo twenty years after the Serbia-Kosovo war ended. Russia views these countries as lying within its sphere of influence, making operations in those countries by the United States thorns in Putin’s side. It is the enlargement of NATO that is the core issue addressed by Russia’s national security policy document, and the prevention of countries in its sphere of influence from joining NATO is a primary Russian objective. When Ukraine announced its decision to sign the Association Agreement leading to eventual membership in NATO, the deputy prime minister of Russia, Dmitri Rogozin, stated Russia’s objection.34 Does Russia seek the destruction of NATO? Official Russian documents and Russian analysts focus on the threat to Russia of the enlargement of NATO, not its destruction. Moreover, they contend the destruction of NATO could be “destabilizing” and threatening to Russian interests.35 This statement is a reversal of long-standing Soviet/Russian foreign policy that sought the dismemberment of NATO and has to be viewed with skepticism. How does the United States view Russia’s behavior in Europe? The official policy of the Trump Administration was stated in the National Security Strategy of the United States released in December 2018. The document states the following: Russia is using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity and weaken European institutions and governments. With its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demonstrated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region. Russia continues to intimidate its neighbors with threatening behavior, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities. Source: The White House, President Donald J. Trump, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2018, 47.

The United States, after delineating Russia’s threatening behavior in Europe and its attempts “to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe,” affirms that the United States “remains firmly committed

144

NATO Reconsidered

to our European allies and partners. The NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our competitors, and the United States remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty.”36 The strategy statement goes on to remind America’s allies that they need to pay their fair share of the costs of the alliance: “The United States fulfills our defense responsibilities and expects others to do the same. We expect our European allies to increase defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024, with 20 percent of that spending devoted to increasing military capabilities.”37 President Trump frequently restates the need for NATO members to pay their fair share of the cost of NATO, and, under his pressure, a few members have announced plans to meet the 2 percent of GDP target.38 Thus, Russia sees the further expansion of NATO as its primary national security threat. The United States sees Russia’s subversive actions to weaken the U.S. commitment to Europe and Russia’s hostile actions against its non-NATO neighbors as destabilizing. By accepting the veracity of these official foreign policy positions, if NATO expands no further into Eastern Europe, the threat to Russia will diminish and the likelihood of the need for the United States to invoke Article 5 will be moot. The conclusion can be reached that the Russian Federation is not a direct threat to the United States or to its NATO allies in Europe. China’s Threat to the United States in Europe The People’s Republic of China has increased its presence in Europe through broad-scale diplomatic and economic activity. Chinese state-owned companies have acquired or partnered with European companies and entities to expand their base of commercial operations. The Road and Belt project is the latest mechanism used by Beijing to penetrate Europe, and thus far it has been successful as one after another European countries sign on to the project. The weaker, less developed states in Eastern Europe appear to be the newest target of the Chinese commercial offensive into Europe, while the largest amounts of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) remain focused on Western Europe. The United Kingdom is the largest recipient of Chinese FDI, followed by France and Germany. This Chinese commercial offensive into Europe has clear geopolitical ramifications. It is an attempt to erode and ultimately outflank America’s dominant economic position there. Chinese state-owned companies now own or have controlling interest in large numbers of European companies and enterprise—such as airports, seaports, and supporting infrastructures, including pipelines, electricity-generating facilities, and high-speed rail lines. The United States is well aware of these activities. The official U.S. National Security Strategy document includes this statement: “China is

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order145

gaining a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies and infrastructure.”39 The United States cannot restrict China from undertaking these activities and making these investments, only the European nations can do that. But the United States can alert its European allies to the risks of doing business with China. The Trump Administration recently stated, “We will work with our partners to contest China’s unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies.”40 While undertaking the Road and Belt foreign policy initiative, China is also developing its own nuclear triad. The three components are land-based, mobile-launched ICBMs, submarine-launched ICBMs, and long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The ICBMs have multiple independently targeted warheads.41 This is a formidable delivery capability, soon to reach parity with that of Russia, according to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In June 2019, the Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning, Kiron Skinner, summarized the current Chinese threat to the United States: “In China we have an economic competitor, we have an ideological competitor, one that really does seek a kind of global reach, that many of us didn’t expect a couple of decades ago. And I think it is also striking that this is the first time that we will have a great-power competitor that is not Caucasian.”42 Oddly, Skinner did not mention the Chinese military as a competitor, which it clearly is.43 In conclusion, regarding threats to America, Russia lacks the power base to seek global preeminence, but China has the power base and is striving to do so at America’s expense. CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS Providing confirmation of this American viewpoint, in 2019 a Chinese Politburo member described the U.S.–China relationship as a “clash of civilizations.”44 In 1993, the highly respected Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?” In 2019, this Chinese Politburo member appears to have removed the question mark from Huntington’s piece, confirming the existence of a “clash.” Huntington’s analysis, expanded in a book a few years after the Foreign Affairs article, goes to the core features of societies. According to Huntington, what most distinguishes Western civilization from others is “the emergence over time of a sense of individualism and a tradition of individual rights and liberties unique among civilized societies.” Western societies have as a core feature “individualism,” whereas non-Western societies have as their dominant feature “collectivism.”45 As Huntington puts it,

146

NATO Reconsidered

individualism is responsible for a set of concepts, practices, and institutions that are more prevalent in Western society than in other civilizations. “They are also in large part the factors which enabled the West to take the lead in modernizing itself and the world.”46 The United States is the heir of European-based culture dating from ancient Greece and Rome as well as Judeo-Christian religious and ethical values. This Western heritage has a unique American overlay that Huntington terms the “creed.” “These are the principles on which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, and private property.”47 The creed is the glue that holds the people of the United States together as a society despite their different nationalities of origin and their individual viewpoints. As historian Richard Hofstader stated, “[I]t has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one.”48 The American creed has been under attack since the late twentieth century. According to Huntington this sustained onslaught against the creed has been led by “a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings.”49 During the 1990s, “the Clinton administration made the encouragement of diversity one of its major goals.”50 The contrast with the past is striking. “The Founding Fathers saw diversity as a reality and as a problem: hence the national motto, e pluribus unum [out of many one], was chosen by a committee of the Continental Congress consisting of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams.”51 The Founders saw diversity as a problem! Many of today’s leaders in government, business, and academia see it as a goal. Theodore Roosevelt warned: “The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities.”52 The Civil War was truly a “clash of civilizations,” but it apparently did not permanently resolve the core cultural divide between North and South. A century and a half later, the election in 2008 of an African-American as president apparently also failed to solve the racial problem. The “squabbling” has continued. Since at least the 1990s, according to Huntington, “the leaders of the United States have not only permitted that but assiduously promoted the diversity rather than the unity of the people they govern.” This deliberate weakening of American unity has undermined American institutions and America’s standing in its “clash” with China. “Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilization,” Huntington warned, “means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. It also means effectively the end of Western civilization.”53

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order147

The “creed” continues to be weakened, especially at the hands of leading liberal institutions and “progressive” media. For example, in its tribute to Independence Day in 2019, The New York Times editorial board published its opinion column entitled “America the Beautiful: Taking stock of the state of the Republic on Independence Day.”54 In this opinion piece, the editors of America’s leading newspaper asserted that the United States is not a great nation and never has been. It’s a country that “separates families” and “locks up children” by people who were themselves once immigrants. The assertion is that America is a deeply flawed society with stark internal divisions. America, in the eyes of this newspaper, is not “beautiful.” British professor Steven Davies takes a negative view as well. To him, “Western civilization is in a real sense defunct, continuing only as a memory of submerged force. Because the modern revolution first happened in a part of historic Western civilization, it originally had a strong inheritance from it, but as the transformation has happened in other parts of the world, this is ever less true.”55 Davies makes the case that Western civilization originated in Northwestern Europe (especially Britain, the Netherlands, northern France, Sweden, and the western part of Germany) from the mid-1700s to the mid-1800s and therefore took on characteristics of those cultures. Migrants to North America from those areas carried this culture with them to the New World. But today, with globalization of culture, Western civilization is no longer “Western.” To British-born Hoover Institution professor Niall Ferguson, “‘The West,’ then is much more than a geographical expression. It is a set of norms, behaviours and institutions with borders that are blurred in the extreme.”56 The “clash of civilizations” between China and the United States, between collectivism and individualism, is at the heart of today’s struggle for global leadership. China is single-minded in its pursuit of worldwide dominance. The Chinese Communist Party is as focused on that objective as it could possibly be, using every means it possesses for that achievement: its military, its economy, its science, its foreign policy, and its penetration of Western societies. The United States, as the leader of the Western world, has until recently provided assistance to China to expand its economy and to use Western technologies for its commercial and military benefit. The Trump Administration finally reversed this course and is confronting Beijing’s continuing effort to economically benefit from the chronic China-Western trade imbalance that has so enriched China. This is a titanic “clash” between East and West, the outcome of which at the time of this writing hangs in the balance. The Economist offered its erroneous analysis of this “clash” with typical British jargon: “The two superpowers used to seek a win-win world [never the case: each side sought victory over the other]. Today winning

148

NATO Reconsidered

seems to involve the other lot’s defeat—a collapse that permanently subordinates China to the American order; or a humbled America that retreats from the western Pacific. It is a new kind of cold war that would leave no winners at all.”57 Both Xi’s China and Trump’s America eschew that third outcome. Each country expects to win this “clash” and is working to do so. THE THUCYDIDES CHALLENGE When a dominant state’s position is threatened by a rising challenger that situation is now referred to as the Thucydides Challenge.58 This period of challenge represents the most dangerous time for both the dominant country and its challenger because the outcome of their clash is uncertain and will likely be permanent. The struggle between the two countries may result in the dominant state defeating the challenger and thus retaining its superior position, or the outcome may produce a change in status for both states, reversing roles and making the challenger the dominant. The outcome for the defeated state will be one of three things: meek acceptance, active co-option, or utter destruction. This phenomenon is based on the description of the Athens-Sparta wars by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides in his remarkable book The History of the Peloponnesian War59 in which he chronicled the three wars between Athens and Sparta between 431 and 404 BC. When the story begins, Athens was the dominant power in Greece. It had a large navy and overseas territories that generated great wealth, enabling its citizens to enjoy a level of advancement and civilization previously unknown. This was called the age of Pericles, named for the acknowledged leader of Athens who installed democracy, education, and culture in this flourishing Greek city-state. Sparta, the city-state that dominated the adjacent Peloponnesian Peninsula, was very different. It was a militarist country possessing none of the refinements of Athens, and yet it was powerful because of its large, well-trained army and its fierce commitment to martial discipline. Sparta created a spare, warlike culture that has never been matched. These characteristics have been referred to through the ages as “spartan.” These two vastly different cultures clashed for nearly three decades. Athens, the dominant power, initially won the wars, but Sparta, the challenger, won in the end—defeating Athens and ending its era of Periclean culture and democracy. Total war produced total victory for Sparta, allowing it to dominate Greece for nearly a hundred years—until it was invaded and conquered by the Macedonians under King Philip II and his son, Alexander the Great. Other examples abound throughout history of the challenger versus the dominant power. In the sixteenth century, Spain was Europe’s dominant power which sought to defeat its upstart challenger, England. In 1588,

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order149

King Philip II of Spain, in preparation for his invasion of England, sent his armada to crush the English navy, but, with the help of severe weather, the English fleet prevailed, sinking most of the Spanish galleons. Spain’s power declined thereafter, and England’s rose. The challenger defeated the dominant, which slowly lapsed into second-class status.60 The year 1898 was another watershed moment for Britain, master of the seas. The now-industrialized United States had built a navy that it used to crush Spain both in the Caribbean and in the Philippines where Spain had possessions. Victory in the Spanish-American War signaled the emergence of the United States as a Great Power. How would Britain adjust to this new reality? Would it contest America’s power or accommodate itself to that rising power in the Western Hemisphere? It wisely chose the latter course—facing as it did the rising power of Imperial Germany closer to home in Europe. Britain “acquiesced in the predominance of the United States in that part of the world, so vital to its own interests.” Soon Britain “reduced her permanent garrisons in the West Indies and withdrew her principal naval forces from that area,” relying on the U.S. Navy to protect her territories there.61 Thus began a tacit alliance between the two English-speaking Great Powers that continued until they signed the formal NATO alliance a half-century later. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the greater challenge to dominant Britain was rising in Imperial Germany. The Kaiser had the largest, most powerful army in Europe, and Britain had the largest navy. A clash between these two was not inevitable. Yet, the brash, young Kaiser, William II, was determined to be dominant in Europe in every respect. And so he began building a navy to challenge the British fleet. How did Britain react? It did not acquiesce to Germany as it had to the United States. Britain, since 1889, had a two-power naval standard—the British fleet would be equal in battleship numbers to the next two largest navies combined. At that time those were France and Russia. In 1912, responding to the growth of the German Navy, this policy was replaced with a 60 percent standard—the Royal Navy would have 60 percent more battleships than the single next largest fleet, which at that time was Germany’s. Thus, at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the line-up was this in dreadnaughts (warships comparable to battleships): Britain twenty-two, Germany fifteen, and the United States ten. In destroyers, Britain had two hundred and twenty-one, Germany ninety, and the United States fifty.62 The U.S. Navy is cited only for comparison. When World War I began, the Germany Army invaded Russia and France in a two-front war, and Germany’s surface fleet eventually sailed out to engage the Royal Navy. There was one major battle at sea between the two fleets, the Battle of Jutland, in which the British lost more ships than the Germans, but the Germans retreated to their bases never to venture out again during the rest of the war. It was a tactical defeat for Britain,

150

NATO Reconsidered

but more importantly, it was a strategic victory for Britain, enabling it to put a stranglehold on now-landlocked Germany.63 At the end of the war in 1918, Germany surrendered to the Western powers, including the United States, which had entered the war in time to ensure a British-French victory on the Western Front. Britain retained its dominant position, and the challenger lost but was left largely intact. Twenty years later, Germany under Hitler tried again to gain dominance in Europe, attacking the Western powers and later the Soviet Union. The outcome was the same as the first war—only worse for Germany. In 1945, Germany was invaded, defeated, and dismembered. During the Cold War, the dominant power in the world was the United States, the clear victor in World War II both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Two years after the end of the war, the Soviet Union began to challenge the United States by initiating the Cold War, seeking to achieve global domination. The dominant power reacted aggressively—by providing aid to countries threatened with Communist takeovers, by establishing a protectorate over Western Europe through the North Atlantic Alliance, by sending troops to defend Europe, by resisting Communist North Korea’s attempt to take over the Korean Peninsula, by establishing a network of alliances to contain the Soviet Union, and by rebuilding and modernizing its armed forces. Under this pressure, the Soviet Union, with its unproductive socialist economic system, eventually collapsed, fragmenting into its ethnic minorities and disbanding its Warsaw Pact as a counterweight to NATO. Thus, the dominant power won; the challenger was defeated and self-dismembered. TODAY’S THUCYDIDES CHALLENGE In the twenty-first century, the dominant power is still the United States. The rising challenger is China. This is now America’s Thucydides Challenge. “China’s notion of ‘harmony’ in the field of geopolitics means unipolar dominance . . . [and] the ‘Chinese dream’ is for China to be the world’s only superpower—unrivaled economically, militarily, and culturally.”64 What does history enlighten as to the terms of the engagement and the ultimate outcome of this latest Thucydides Challenge? Will the United States respond like Britain did toward the United States in 1898 and accommodate itself to the challenger by withdrawing from East Asia? Or will the United States respond to the Chinese threat like it did to the Soviet Union’s challenge during the Cold War and mount a vigorous defense of its dominant position in the world? Before the Trump Administration, the United States accommodated China’s rise. In fact, powerful Western institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and major U.S. financial companies

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order151

such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley assisted China’s economic development.65 After permitting China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 as a “developing nation,” China accumulated gigantic annual balance of payment surpluses with the United States and Western Europe, resulting from China’s exports to them and its markets being mostly closed to United States and other Western imports. This mercantilist, one-way trade relationship powered China’s expanding economy and supported its growing military establishment. Donald Trump is the first president to recognize the challenge of China and to respond vigorously to it. Among his many actions, President Trump has confronted the Chinese leader in person, has imposed tariffs on the importation of Chinese goods entering the United States, and has restricted American firms from allowing Chinese state-owned enterprises to acquire U.S. commercial secrets—their intellectual property. He has demanded that China open its markets to U.S. exports, just as U.S. markets have been open to Chinese goods for decades. No previous president undertook such measures to level the commercial playing field with China and to attempt to establish a balance in international trade between the world’s two largest economies. After the results of the initial trade negotiations between the United States and China were rejected by China in mid-2019, President Trump announced new tariffs of $300 billion on Chinese goods. “Beijing responded by halting purchases of U.S. crops and allowing the yuan to fall to the weakest level since 2008 on Aug. 5. Trump’s administration fired back within hours, formally labeling China a currency manipulator.”66 China immediately adjusted the yuan devaluation. Trade talks between the two giants resumed in October 2019, producing in December “a very large Phase One Deal with China.”67 That deal was formally signed on January 15, 2020 in a White House ceremony. The new agreement requires China to buy $250 billion in U.S. products and services over the next two years and protects U.S. intellectual rights. Some U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports will remain, pending the outcome of a Phase Two trade deal.68 This is a classic challenge and response syndrome in international relations. The “challenge and response” theory was put forward by Arnold Toynbee, the celebrated British historian/philosopher, to explain the dynamic of the rise of a challenging nation and the response to that challenge by the then dominant nation. Toynbee wrote, “Man achieves civilization . . . as a response to a challenge in a situation of special difficulty which rouses him to make a hitherto unprecedented effort.”69 Without a vigorous response to the challenger, the dominant state will be replaced—just as Sparta replaced Athens as the dominant power in ancient Greece. Trump appears determined to prevent America from becoming Athens to today’s China.

152

NATO Reconsidered

AMERICA’S BIGGEST FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES After winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union, the intellectual elite that shaped U.S. foreign policy adopted an aggressive globalist strategy to reshape the world order. “Having won the Cold War, helped liberate Eastern Europe and freed Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s clutches, U.S. leaders now set out to create a liberal world order through the active use of U.S. power. Instead of defending its own shores, maximizing prosperity and well-being at home, and promoting its ideals by force of example, Washington sought to remake other countries in its own image and incorporate them into institutions and arrangements of its own design.”70 This grandiose scheme was articulated by George W. Bush’s director of the State Department’s Policy Planning, Richard Haass, who stated the central goal of American foreign policy in the “post-post-Cold War” world was to integrate other countries “into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice.”71 This was not a benign policy but a very aggressive one—to integrate other countries into the American value system. Haass gave a foreign policy lecture in 2003 entitled “Imperial America,” the very title of which encapsulated this policy. “States that welcomed U.S. primacy were supported and defended; those that resisted it were isolated, contained, coerced, or overthrown. Terrorist and insurgent groups that opposed U.S. dominance would be tracked, targeted, and, if possible, destroyed.”72 This was the heart of U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations for twenty-four years following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Professor Walt concluded “America’s ambitious attempts to reorder world politics undermined its own position, sowed chaos in several regions, and caused considerable misery in a number of other countries.”73 The American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the first attempts. These two wars began under a Republican president and continued under a Democratic president. At home they cost American citizens dearly in lives and treasure. During President Obama’s Administration two more attempts were made to reorder world politics. Like Iraq, one involved deposing a local strongman leader, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and then an attempt was made to control another brutal dictator, Barak al-Assad in Syria. Obama made no attempt to control or confront another strongman dictator, Kim Jong-un of North Korea, leaving that problem to his successor. Libya In 2011, Obama’s secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, persuaded Obama to support rebel groups in Libya attempting to depose long-time dictator

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order153

Gaddafi.74 Secretary Clinton helped organize NATO and UN mandates to establish a “no-fly” zone over Libya and to bomb key targets in Libya, such as Gaddafi’s tanks on route to put down rebels in Benghazi. After a short war, the rebels defeated and murdered Gaddafi. Secretary Clinton’s Director of Policy Planning, Ann-Marie Slaughter, wrote a fawning congratulatory email to Clinton giving her a “bravo” for “persuading POTUS to bomb Libya.”75 Neither Obama nor the State Department gave any thought to what would happen in Libya once Gaddafi was removed from power. The lack of a plan to deal with Libya after Gaddafi, Obama later admitted, was his “worst mistake.”76 What was the mistake, he was asked: “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.” He told reporter Jeffrey Goldberg the mission in Libya “didn’t work.”77 “In retrospect, Obama’s intervention in Libya was an abject failure, judged even by its own standards. Libya has not only failed to evolve into a democracy; it has devolved into a failed state,” wrote professor Alan Kuperman in Foreign Affairs.78 Over time, differing factions vied for control of Libya, with none fully in authority in this failed state. The Libyan nonresponse to the 2012 massacre in Benghazi of U.S. civilians including the U.S. ambassador is evidence of a lack of a central governmental power in Tripoli. Indeed, by 2015, ISIS was firmly established in Libya with an operational command center there.79 The Libya war was the third time in a decade the United States waged a war but lost the peace. A lasting effect of this disastrous Libyan foreign policy is the unlikelihood that another dictator will willingly relinquish his nuclear program out of fear of an American attack after he disarms. Gaddafi had announced the renunciation of his nuclear program, and later the United States and its NATO allies attacked him and supported local rebels who overthrew him. Kim Jong-un in North Korea could not have failed to learn the lesson from Libya, a tragic legacy making it more difficult for a subsequent administration to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Syria In Syria, the Obama Administration took a softer approach in its attempt to control events in that country. This time Obama used threats, not bombs. Al-Assad had used chemical weapons on his own people, killing fifteen hundred of them.80 On August 21, 2012, President Obama made an impromptu speech in which he warned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad not to use chemical or biological weapons against his own people or rebel forces. Obama declared this is a “red line” that al-Assad must not cross.81 Obama’s own secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, later told The Atlantic he did not know this warning was coming.82

154

NATO Reconsidered

At that time, Iran threatened Obama that if he enforced the “red line” on Syria, Iran’s major ally in the region, the U.S.–Iranian nuclear deal would be off.83 So Obama backed off his threat, giving al-Assad a free hand in Syria with Russia’s help for the duration of the Obama presidency. This was another foreign policy mistake that led to catastrophic consequences—this time for the Syrian people. President Trump took a different approach to Syria. He condemned al-Assad’s continued use of chemical weapons against his own people, more than a hundred of whom were killed. On April 6, 2017, he backed up that condemnation by launching a barrage of Tomahawk missiles against the military base where the weapons were stored.84 Al-Assad discontinued the chemical attacks on his own citizens. Vietnam Looking further back in history, the United States made a massive mistake in waging the Vietnam War. For a decade beginning in the mid-1960s, American armed forces engaged both the Vietcong, Communist rebels indigenous to South Vietnam, and the North Vietnam military to prevent Communists from taking over the Republic of South Vietnam. The escalation of the war, including bombing North Vietnam and a ramp-up of U.S. ground forces to over five hundred thousand men, was triggered by the Tonkin Gulf incident, which was a fabrication of the Johnson Administration.85 In a speech to the nation on the evening of August 4, 1964, the same day as the so-called incident in which North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked a U.S. destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin, President Johnson announced the massive escalation of U.S. military action in the war in retaliation for the attack on the U.S. ship. It later became known, with the publication of the Pentagon Papers, that the Johnson Administration “systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress.”86 There was no attack by North Vietnam on U.S. Navy units in the Gulf of Tonkin—as reported at the time to the Pentagon by the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.87 Three days after the so-called attack, on August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the president to “take all necessary action” to protect U.S. armed forces in the Southeast Asia area.88 In the end, the Nixon Administration withdrew from Vietnam under the terms of a “peace” agreement with North Vietnam negotiated by Henry Kissinger in Paris.89 After U.S. forces withdrew, South Vietnam soon capitulated to North Vietnam, and the two countries were unified under the Communist government in Hanoi. So what was the result of the Vietnam War? Did it foster U.S. national security? Clearly not—all of Vietnam became Communist. Did that government represent a national security threat to the United States? Clearly

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order155

not—there was no follow-up military action by Vietnam against U.S. Asian assets. What the war did was create a deep political schism in America, undermine the public’s trust in its political leaders, cost billions of dollars, and, most importantly, cost the lives of fifty-eight thousand service members. Why did the United States wage this losing war? Lyndon Johnson later admitted he continued waging Kennedy’s war and greatly escalated it hoping to contain China (even though North Vietnam was a Soviet client state, not China’s) and to prevent the Republicans from accusing him of being soft on Communism as he entered the 1964 presidential election!90 Thus, for the United States, there was no strategic benefit and no foreign policy success resulting from waging the Vietnam War. The war was fought by the United States largely for domestic political purposes, not for geopolitical, strategic purposes. The war’s end result would have been the same without American involvement. The bottom line is this: waging the Vietnam War was a colossal, tragic mistake. NATO TODAY: ALTERNATIVE SECURITY CONCEPTS Is continuing in NATO also an American foreign policy mistake? This is a reasonable question given that public opinion in an overwhelming number of EU countries, most of which are NATO members, would not defend the United States if it were attacked by either Russia or China. They favor neutralism if America is attacked. Contemporary public opinion in these democracies undermines the core principle of the alliance. Americans have to ask themselves if Europeans would not defend the United States, why should the United States defend them? Russia is no longer a strategic/military threat to the NATO member nations in Europe, and it is no longer a strategic/military threat to the United States. The original purpose of NATO was to deter or defeat a Russian attack in Europe. It has become clear such an attack today is unlikely because “. . . Russia is, at best, a second-tier player.”91 Therefore, there is no justification for maintaining America’s membership in NATO and maintaining American armed forces on Russia’s frontier. The increasing threat to both the NATO nations in Europe and to the United States is China, not Russia. The NATO treaty’s Article 5 (to come to the aid of any member subjected to an “armed attack”) exposes the United States to risks in Europe that are both unlikely but more importantly inappropriate. Why should the United States expose itself to having to wage war to defend weak states that for the most part are unable or unwilling to tax themselves enough to enable them to defend themselves with sufficiently robust armed forces of their own? The prospect of maintaining this burden has an outcome that no American citizen should have to accept, particularly given that

156

NATO Reconsidered

European publics would not reciprocate to defend the United States if it were attacked. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires member states to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”92 Of the twenty-eight European NATO members, the only major country that complies with this requirement is Britain. Most of the other Europeans fail to meet the minimum requirements of assessing two percent of their GDP to defense. Germany, Europe’s largest NATO member, is especially delinquent in meeting this target and under its present leadership apparently has no serious intention of doing so. Alternative security arrangements for Europe are needed, and some have been offered by various experts.93 One proposal is the establishment of a new security architecture among the nonaligned states adjacent to Russia in Eastern Europe.94 This concept proposes establishing a belt of neutral states from the north to the south of Russia’s border beginning with Sweden and Finland in the north, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova in the middle, and ending with the Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the south. Cyprus and Serbia would also be included in this grouping of neutrals. Existing NATO members, such as Romania and Bulgaria, would not be included. Having a broad band of neutral states committed to joining neither NATO nor any security arrangement with Russia would, this author argues, stabilize Eastern Europe and ensure the security of these countries. Russian forces would have to be withdrawn from Ukraine and Georgia as a precondition to establishing this new zone of security. This concept harkens back in history to Woodrow Wilson’s cordon sanitaire concept after World War I, in which he backed the establishment of a belt of small, neutral states along the Soviet Union’s western border as a security buffer for the rest of Europe. Unfortunately, these new small states, carved out of the former Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires (Finland, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the three Baltic states) were insufficiently strong to maintain their own independence during the interwar period against both the Soviet Union and Germany.95 One can only speculate if this new twenty-first-century architecture would be more successful than President Wilson’s arrangement a hundred years ago to secure the peace of Europe. Another alternative security arrangement has precedent—the Western Union. After the Cold War started but before NATO was established, five nations in Western Europe formed a military alliance to promote their security against a possible Soviet attack. Britain, France, and the three Benelux countries established this alliance and a military headquarters for it at Fontainebleau, near Paris. This later became NATO’s headquarters under General Eisenhower. Today, NATO’s headquarters and its military command are located in Brussels and could serve as the headquarters of

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order157

an all-European military organization. The United States and Canada, the non-European members of NATO, would not be involved. With this new arrangement, Europe could defend itself by itself. As a practical matter, the member states in the EU have already organized themselves along these lines, and since the end of the Cold War have established institutions that could transition into a formal military alliance. Professor Posen observed, “At present the EU has only limited ability to act collectively with military force. The European Union Common Security and Defense Policy . . . was developed at the end of the Cold War, largely as an insurance policy against the possibility of a future with less U.S. engagement.” Posen concludes, “The fact that the EU members built this insurance policy demonstrates that they can look after themselves, even if they do not want the United States to believe it.”96 Since 1999, the EU has had this skeletal military command structure and an apparatus for long-range force planning. The stated purpose of these structures is to coordinate peacekeeping missions that NATO chooses not to support. These structures include a Political and Security Council composed of civilian officials of all EU member states, a Military Committee, a Military Staff, and a commanding general. All are located in Brussels. These organs enable the EU to organize and conduct large-scale operations such as piracy protection of ships off the Horn of Africa, and, since 2008, peacekeeping monitoring in Georgia, in which all twenty-eight EU member nations have participated.97 “These efforts provide a foundation for Europe to build and manage an independent defense organization. Indeed,” Posen continues, “given that the largest EU member states are also NATO members, it would be a simple matter to pass these NATO institutions to the EU as the United Sates disengaged militarily form the continent.”98 With the completion of Brexit and the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, special arrangements would have to be made to include Britain’s military in an all-EU armed force. Britain’s nuclear capability is needed in the EU force to be a credible deterrent. French President Macron proposed the establishment of a “real European Army” based on the EU saying, “We have to protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia, and even the United States of America.” He made this proposal in November 2018 at the time of the one hundredth anniversary of the end of World War I, according to Agence France-Presse.99 Posen proposes that the United States gradually withdraw from its NATO commitments and from its responsibilities as the Supreme Allied Commander. The North Atlantic Treaty should be rewritten or lapsed to reduce the risks to the United States of Article 5. A new, more limited security agreement between the United States and the EU should be

158

NATO Reconsidered

undertaken, one that is weaker than Article 5 but allowing for consultation between the parties. “This change is necessary for the disengagement effort to serve its purpose of encouraging Europeans to take up responsibility for their own security.” Posen asserts, “NATO infantilizes the Europeans, leaving them militarily dependent on the United States.” He continues, “The Europeans have little interest in providing any more resources than are required to keep the U.S. happy. And the United States has proven easy to amuse.”100 AMERICA’S NATO POLICY Under President Trump, the amusement has stopped. The forty-fifth president is the first since NATO’s founding to insist that each member state meet its defense obligations previously agreed to and ratchet up their defense spending to at least 2 percent of their respective GDPs. He is supported in this by NATO’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg. As previously shown, only one large NATO member, Britain, has met that target, along with smaller states, Poland and Lithuania. Most of the other members are content to have a free ride on American taxpayers’ backs. Germany pledges to meet the target but is making no effort to do so, responding to a strong domestic peace movement that is opposed to military spending and favors neutralism. Perhaps Posen is correct: only a dramatic reduction in the treaty’s commitment by the United States will shake the Europeans into meeting their own defense needs—whether individually or collectively. If they do not, the result would be each state standing alone.101 There is another possible way to restructure Europe’s security arrangement without the United States. If the EU were to transition itself into an all-European style NATO, it could then honor President Putin’s twenty-year-old request to allow Russia to join that arrangement. This East-West modus vivendi would at long last benefit both sides. The benefit to Russia is that it would have the Europeans as a counterweight to China. The benefit to the United States is that it would be exempt from participation in these all-European issues, would be free from the risks of participation in an Article 5 military engagement, and would be undistracted to focus on its own threat from China. The new Russia-China strategic relationship, however, may well obviate this option. Professor Walt offers his view: “In Europe, the United States should gradually draw down its military presence and turn NATO over to the Europeans. The United States entered both world wars in good part to keep Germany from controlling the continent, but there is no prospect of something similar happening today. Germany and Russia are going to

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order159

get relatively weaker over time because their populations are gradually declining and becoming considerably older, and no other potential hegemon is in sight.”102 Walt continues, “. . . there is no compelling strategic need for the United States to spend billions each year (and pledge its own citizens’ lives) to keep the peace there.”103 Another benefit to the United States from leaving NATO is that America would not be exposed to issues peripheral to European security, even though a NATO member may be involved. For example, Turkey is a member of NATO with the Alliance’s second largest military, but its primary interests are in the Middle East where the bulk of its territory lies. Under President Erdogan, Turkey is seeking to be a more independent actor on the world stage.104 Erdogan is deeply involved in the Syria-Kurd quagmire with help from Russia. President Trump separated the United States from that morass by withdrawing the bulk of U.S. military units from that perpetually volatile region. Future presidents may not have the same policy. The United States, however, will maintain a force in the oil fields in eastern Syria to prevent ISIS from retaking them.105 Withdrawing from NATO would reduce America’s exposure to these types of local issues that are not central to U.S. interests. On October 27, 2019, the White House announced that the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed during a daring U.S. Special Forces raid in northern Syria where he was hiding. The success of taking out this vicious killer proved that a large U.S. force footprint in Syria is not needed. And on January 5, 2020, Iran’s terrorist leader Major General Qassim Soleimani was killed by the United States in a drone strike in Iraq. President Trump’s stated goal during his campaign was to end these “endless wars,” and so he is reducing the terrorists’ threat and reducing America’s military presence throughout the region—including Afghanistan, where he is negotiating with the Taliban to withdraw U.S. forces from that quagmire. REFOCUS ON THE CHINA THREAT The China risk is this: if China succeeds in becoming dominant in Asia, this will give Beijing the ability to project power even into the Western Hemisphere. “[A]n emboldened China is seeking to spread its own model of domestic and international order.”106 Not only would the Western Hemisphere be a target, countries in Eurasia and Africa would also be exposed to Chinese economic and political pressure—many of which are already feeling that pressure through the Belt and Road initiative. The 2018 official U.S. national security strategy document summarizes the Trump Administration’s assessment of the threat China presents,

160

NATO Reconsidered

especially to nations in the Indo-Pacific region, “the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world”: Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence. Source: The White House, President Donald J. Trump. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2018, 46.

Actions the United States is taking in the Indo-Pacific region include welcoming “India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner.”107 “We will expand our defense and security cooperation with India, a Major Defense Partner of the United States, and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region.”108 And “[t]he Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for promoting an order based on freedom.”109 The United States views India as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region. India rejected socialism and embraced free market capitalism, and as a result its economy is taking off into sustained growth. The world’s largest democracy is also a potent nuclear power. Traditional balance-of-power diplomacy remains relevant in today’s world and is being practiced by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, “.  .  . for Chinese strategists, balance-of-power politics is inherently unbalanced. And racial pride, an overweening conviction of cultural superiority, and a long history of regional dominance all tell the Chinese that the role of hegemon properly belongs to China and its rulers.”110 As a result, the United States and China have already entered a “second Cold War.”111 CONCLUSION NATO is more than seventy years old. The conditions that brought it about no longer exist. It is time to take a fresh look at America’s membership in the alliance and think outside the box of “liberal hegemony.”

NATO’s Relevance to the United States in Today’s Changing World Order161

As columnist Henry Olson wrote on NATO’s seventieth anniversary, “Times and threats have changed, and the global alliance structure that protects the world’s democracies should change, too.” He added, “. . . it is critical to rethink the status quo. The foreign policy establishment will resist this advice.”112 It is not inappropriate for a great nation to alter its relationships as external conditions evolve. Its own interests must always be the touchstone of its foreign policy. As Lord Palmerston stated to the House of Commons in 1848: “Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”113 America’s eternal and perpetual interests have been the same for over two hundred years—the security of the nation, prevention of another Great Power from establishing a presence in the Western Hemisphere (the Monroe Doctrine114), and the peace and prosperity of its citizens. The newly independent United States established a treaty of alliance with France in 1778 that was appropriate at the time because France was fighting with Britain against whom the United States was also fighting in the Revolutionary War. When conditions under which the treaty was signed had changed—the Anglo-French War was over, and Britain and America had signed a peace treaty in 1783 in which America’s independence was recognized by the British Empire—the United States abrogated the treaty in 1800. For the next 149 years the United States had no treaties of alliance with anyone. The United States fought two world wars alongside Britain and France without having a formal alliance. Only with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty did the United States depart from this tradition. The 1778 treaty with France and 1949 treaty with the North Atlantic allies were appropriate at the time, but as conditions changed, they became inappropriate. The NATO treaty itself provides for its review after ten years,115 and it provides for the “denunciation” of the treaty by any party after twenty years.116 The twentieth year was 1969—a half-century ago. Throughout America’s history its foreign policy has always been based on the bedrock of United States national interest. Specific policies grounded on that understanding are at the discretion of the Chief Executive. Therefore, it is the prerogative of the president to determine if the Treaty of Washington remains in the best interest of the United States or if alternative policies better serve America’s interests today. Given the altered global realities of the twenty-first century, America’s national security today will be best served by carefully separating from NATO, by providing assistance to its European allies to form alternative security arrangements of their own that better match their own interests, and by adopting a laser-like focus on China as America’s principal adversary.

162

NATO Reconsidered

Critics of this view may argue that the United States, given its robust economy and its restored military under President Trump, is capable of meeting its NATO obligations and at the same time engage China in the clash for world leadership. Under present, peaceful conditions in Europe this may be true, but circumstances may change and future presidents may have a different policy. In time conditions in Europe may deteriorate, exposing the United States to NATO’s Article 5 responsibilities, thus diluting America’s focus on the threat from China. That geopolitical risk is sufficiently high that America should act to preclude it as the United States faces its twenty-first-century Thucydides Challenge from China.

Appendix I The North Atlantic Treaty Washington, DC—April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: ARTICLE 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

164

Appendix I

ARTICLE 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them. ARTICLE 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. ARTICLE 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. ARTICLE 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. ARTICLE 61 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: • on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,2 on the territory of Turkey or on the

Appendix I165

Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. ARTICLE 7 This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE 8 Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty. ARTICLE 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. ARTICLE 10 The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. ARTICLE 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provision carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The

166

Appendix I

instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.3 ARTICLE 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. ARTICLE 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. ARTICLE 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories. Source: ­https://​­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natolive​/­official​_texts​_17120​.­htm

Appendix II Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (2018)

Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (2018) (­https://​­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­news​_171356​.­htm)

Appendix III Twelve Effective Veteran Charities

Fisher House

Disabled American Veterans

Hire Heroes

Operation Homefront

Gary Sinise Foundation

Semper Fi Fund

Air Warrior Courage Foundation

Operation Second Chance

Hope for Warriors

Freedom Service Dogs of America

Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society

Special Operations Warrior Foundation

Source: Charity Navigator blog, ­www​.­charitynavigator​.­org​/­index​.­cfm​?­bay​=​­content​.­view​ &­cpid​=​­531

Notes

CHAPTER 1 1. Napoleon as quoted in Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), 11. In French: La politique de toutes las puissances est dans leur geographie. 2. For a discussion of Truman’s policy evolution, see David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 734–35. 3. Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, a Council on Foreign Relations Book, 2018). 4. In fact, Churchill said this with regard to the Lend-Lease program on November 10, 1941: “The Lend-Lease Bill Must Be Regarded Without Question as the Most Unsorted Act in the Whole of Recorded History.” w ­ ww​.­marshallfoundation​ .­org​/­blog​/­marshall​/­plan. 5. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State: ­state​.­gov 6. See Appendix I for the full text of the North Atlantic Treaty. 7. Congress passed Neutrality Acts in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939. They were all repealed in 1941. 8. Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 129. 9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 42–43. For a complete discussion, see Warner R. Schilling, “The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950,” in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, eds., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), especially chapter 11. 10. Walter Millis et al., Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959), 220–25.

172Notes 11. The Soviet atomic test occurred at least three years prior to American intelligence expectations. See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II (New York: New American Library, 1956), 350. 12. Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 74. 13. Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years (Utrecht: Bosch, 1955), 102. 14. “Some in Spain Fear Possible U.S. Loan; Rise in State-Trading Is Seen as Consequence—New Tide of Anti-Semitism Noted Spain’s Press Sees U.S. ‘Injustice’ Senator Confers with Franco,” The New York Times, August 17, 1950, 48. 15. Ismay, 29. 16. General Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, U.S. Congress, Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area. Hearings. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 168. Hereinafter cited as Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces. 17. Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery (New York: New American Library, 1958), 457. 18. Truman, 385. 19. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1951 (New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1952), 353. 20. James E. King Jr., “NATO: Genesis, Progress, Problems,” in Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challener, eds., National Security in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1960), 152–53. 21. John J. McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 29. 22. Robert R. Bowie, Interview at the Atlantic Council, May 19, 1965. 23. Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1949–53 (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), 271. 24. Ibid., 272. 25. Sir Anthony Eden, November 29, 1950. Parliamentary Papers (Hansard), Fifth Series, Vol. 481. House of Commons Official Report, 30th November–1st December 1950 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1950), cols. 1179–80. 26. M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (London: London Institute of World Affairs, Stevens, 1959), 39–41. 27. For an unclassified discussion of NSC-68, see Paul Y. Hammond, “NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament,” in Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder. 28. Anon. (Dean G. Acheson), “The Balance of Military Power,” Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 187 (June 1951), 22. 29. Laurence W. Martin, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” in Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Tuscaloosa: A Twentieth Century Fund Study, University of Alabama Press, 1963), 645. 30. As early as August 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that in the event of war there should be a Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief (West) who would be an American. See Millis, 337. 31. “Truman Gives Eisenhower Operational Command of U.S. European Forces,” The New York Times, December 20, 1950, 1. 32. “Eisenhower Declares NATO Operational,” The New York Times, April 3, 1951, 1.

Notes173 33. Huntington, 325. 34. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Atlantic Alliance: NATO’s Role in the Free World (London: Chatham House Study Group Report, 1953), 55. 35. For a discussion of Wilson’s internationalist philosophy, see Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 47–55. 36. Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, Arms and Stability in Europe (New York: Praeger, for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963), 31. 37. Truman, 282–283. 38. Millis, 336. 39. Cited in Martin, 451. 40. Stebbins, 132. 41. For a discussion of the German rearmament issue, see Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971). 42. Secretary of State Dean Acheson repeatedly stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1951 that the interests of the United States were served by sending troops to Europe. Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, see especially 125. 43. Beisner, 362. 44. For a comprehensive discussion of the troops to Europe decision, see Wesley Byron Truitt, The Troops to Europe Decision: The Process, Politics, and Diplomacy of a Strategic Commitment (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1968). 45. Ismay, 133. 46. Statement by Secretary Acheson, Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, 105, 112–14. 47. See statements by General Bradley, Secretary of Defense Johnson, and Undersecretary of State Lovett in U.S. Congress, Senate, North Atlantic Treaty. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 81st Congress, 1st Session. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949), 104–105, 265, 307–12. 48. Truman, 286–87. 49. For a discussion of the president’s power to send troops abroad, see Acheson’s colloquy with Senator George, Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, 96–99. 50. Ibid., 98–99. 51. For a discussion of his view of Europe’s security relationship with the United States, see Secretary of State Dean Acheson, “Europe: Decision or Drift,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No 2 (January 1966), 190–99. 52. A similar conclusion was reached a decade later by France’s President Charles de Gaulle. He feared that the United States would not risk New York City if the Soviet Union attacked Paris. Hence, in 1961, he built his own nuclear deterrent: the Force de Frappe. See Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). 53. Statement of Secretary Acheson, Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, 79. 54. Ibid., 159. 55. For a discussion of the Eisenhower policy, see Huntington, 73–85. For the Kennedy policy, see William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 47–101. 56. Walt W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper, 1960), 220.

174Notes 57. “U.S. Forces in Europe No Match for Soviets,” The New York Times, August 7, 1950, 3. 58. “Sen. Lodge Wants Large U.S. Force Sent to Europe,” The Washington Post, September 9, 1950. 59. Statement by General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, 225. 60. For the text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, September 18, 1950, 468. 61. Statement by Secretary of Defense George Marshall, Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, 40. 62. Robert Lockie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War (New York: Avon Books, 1962), 145. 63. “Discrimination Is Costly,” The New York Times, May 28, 1951, 1. 64. Ismay, 102. 65. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual Report to the Standing Group (Paris: SHAPE, April 2, 1952), 7. 66. The following data are from William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblens, Unites States Foreign Policy, 1945–1955 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1956), 391. 67. “U.S. Returns 35,000 Troops from Europe,” The Washington Post, May 3, 1967, 1. 68. Lindsay Rogers, “Who Determines Our Foreign Policy?” in Stephen D. Kartesz, ed., American Diplomacy in a New Era (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), 349. 69. Writers who asserted that Hoover opened the debate include McGeorge Bundy, ed., The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 83 and Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 323. 70. For the text of Hoover’s speech, see The New York Times, December 21, 1950, 12. 71. Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces, 38. 72. For the text of Taft’s speech, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st session, Vol. 97, part I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 54ff. 73. Taft’s statement is quoted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1951, 223. 74. Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1951 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952), 4. 75. Huntington, 323. 76. Thomas A. Bailey, The Diplomatic History of the American People, 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), 894. 77. Senate, Assignment of Ground Forces. 78. Beisner, 449. 79. “Senate Passes Troops to Europe Resolution,” The New York Times, April 5, 1951, 1. For an excellent sketch review of the main events of The Great Debate, see the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1951 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly publications, 1952), 220–32. 80. Beisner, 452. 81. See Chapter 2 for a list of NATO member states.

Notes175 82. British and French forces stationed outside of Europe were not under NATO command. 83. William I. Hitchcock, “The Ghost of Crises Past: The Troubled Alliance in Historical Perspective,” in Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 84. For a full account, see Barnard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1966). 85. See Kissinger’s account of the Suez Crisis in Kissinger, 522–49. 86. Derek Varble, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (London: Ospry, 2003). 87. The author’s personal conversation with the former president held at the U.S. Mission to the UN, 1963. 88. Kohl. 89. For the text of the French announcement, see “Diamond—Leibel,” The New York Times, March 13, 1966, 14. 90. For a review of U.S. reactions to French withdrawals and activities, see William T. R. Fox and Annette B. Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 140. 91. Frederic Bozo, “Explaining France’s NATO ‘Normalization’ under Nicholas Sarkozy (2007–2012),” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 2014 (2014), 370–91. 92. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State: w ­ ww​.­state​.­gov 93. James Reston, “Kennedy Talked, Khrushchev Triumphed,” The New York Times, May 22, 2008. 94. For an insider’s account of this period, see Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 504–505. 95. For a discussion, see Allison Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown), 1971. 96. Recorded remarks by Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, in Schlesinger, 504–505. 97. Warren Kozak, “The Missiles of October,” The Wall Street Journal, October 31–November 1, 2009, A19. 98. Graham, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2012. 99. ­www​.­history​.­com​/­topics​/­russia​/­history​-­of​-­the​-­soviet​-­union​#­section​_8 100. Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Aid, Armies, and Empires (London: I. B. Tauris), 2009. 101. ­www​.­globalsecurity​.­org​/­military​/­world​/­russia​/­soviet​-­collapse​.­htm 102. Stephen Kotkin and Jan Gross, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009). 103. Putin: “Lenin’s Ideas Destroyed USSR by Backing Republics [sic.] Right to Secession,” ­Sputniknews​.­com, January 25, 2016. 104. These terms are stated in the Communist Manifesto written by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 1848. Published in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955). 105. Merle Fainsod, How RUSSIA Is Ruled, Rev. Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 112. 106. Ibid., 90. 107. Ibid., see especially 161.

176Notes 108. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: ­history​.­state​.­gov​/­milestones​ /­1989​-­1992​/­fall​-­of​-­communism 109. Kotkin and Gross. 110. ­www​.­history​.­com​/­topics​/­russia​/­history​-­of​-­the​-­soviet​-­union​#­section​_8 111. Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004). 112. Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 113. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 114. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 143.

CHAPTER 2 1. Vladimir Putin, “Address to the Federal Assembly,” April 25, 2005, cited in ­www​.­globalsecurity​.­org​/­military​/­world​/­russia​/­soviet​-­collapse, 4. 2. Charles Krauthammer, Things That Matter (New York: Crown Forum, 2013), 333. 3. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.1 (1990), 23–33. 4. Wesley B. Truitt, “Why Expand NATO?” memorandum to Charles Wolf, Jr., Dean, RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, CA, May 16, 1997. 5. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), 430–32. 6. Remarks by President Bill Clinton to the Multinational Audience of Future Leaders of Europe, Hotel de Ville, Brussels, Belgium, January 9, 1994 (Brussels, Belgium, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, press release, January 9, 1994), 5 quoted in Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 824.  7. Bush, 430. 8. William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993–2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 9. NATO website. 10. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_49212htm 11. “Russia Devalues Ruble,” Focus Economics, November 27, 2018. 12. “Who Lost Russia?” The New York Times, October 8, 2000. 13. ­www​.­state​.­gov​/+​/­avc​/­trty​/­108155 14. ­www​.­globalsecurity​.­org​/­military​/­world​/­russia​/­soviet​-­collapse, 4 15. Item 62 of the text of the Brussels Summit Declaration: w ­ ww​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​ /­natohg​/­publications 16. Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 824. 17. Dana H. Allin, NATO’s Balkan Interventions (London: Oxford University Press, 2002). 18. ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook 19. “The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990–1992,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: ­history​.­state​.­gov​/­milestones​/­1989​-­1992​/­breakup​-­yugoslavia 20. ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook

Notes177 21. ­Jfcnaples​.­nato​.­int​/­kfor​/­about​/­facts​-­figures 22. Alexei Arbatov, The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post-Cold War Era (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 2004). 23. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natolive​/­topics​_48818​.­htm 24. Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley, eds., Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 25. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natolive​/­topics​_48818​.­htm 26. Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO: Dangerous Dinosaur (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2019), Introduction. 27. Seth G. Jones, “Going Local: The Key to Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8–9, 2009, W3. 28. Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009). 29. Rajan Menon, “Nobody Wins in the Afghan Runoff Election,” Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2009, A27. 30. “McChrystal Seeks Shift in Afghan Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2009, A1. 31. Business Insider, December 26, 2018. 32. Remarks to ABC News, July 23, 2009. Note: Emperor Hirohito was not present at the Japanese surrender ceremony on the USS Missouri in 1945. 33. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­ie​/­natohq​/­topics​_71652​.­htm 34. The Guardian, “NATO Operations in Libya,” May 22, 2011. 35. Rob Weighill and Florence Gaub, The Cauldron: NATO’s Campaign in Libya (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2018). 36. Department of State Archives, United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in Washington, DC on December 19, 2008. 37. “Three Ukrainian Soldiers Wounded Amid Six Enemy Attacks on November 21,” Union Information Agency, November 22, 2019. 38. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natolive​/­topics​_49755​.­htm 39. ­www​.­act​.­nato​.­int​/ 40. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­ntohq​/­news 41. Following discussion is from “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” ­www​ .­nato​.­int​/­factsheets, December 2018. 42. ­www​.­eur​.­army​.­mil​/­units​/ 43. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_38988​.­htm 44. Adrian Croft, “France, Germany Oppose Ukraine, Georgia Entering NATO,” Croft 2014, Reuters, June 24, 2014. 45. “U.S. Opens Transit Base in Romania,” Matt Millham, Stars and Stripes, June 24, 2014.

CHAPTER 3 1. Dr. A. Mansouri, “Putin and the Inferiority Complex of Russia,” e­ uromaidanpress​ .­com​/­2015​/­03​/­12 2. Ibid. 3. George F. Kennan, “Long Telegram” (Moscow to Washington), National Security Archive, February 22, 1946, quoted in Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew

178Notes Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Report, 2019), 6, ­www​.­rand​.­org​/­content​/­dam​/­rand​/­pubs​ /­research​-­reports​/­RR1700​/­RR1793​/­RAND​-­RR1793​.­pdf 4. Cohen and Radin, 5. 5. Mr. X (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947. 6. Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to Historical Patterns,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016. 7. Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great: His Life and World (New York: Knopf, 1980). See especially Part One: Old Moscovy. 8. “The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear forces is deterrence,” as stated in “NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces,” May 17, 2018, w ­ ww​.­nato​.­int​ /­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_50068​.­htm 9. Cohen and Radin, 6. 10. ­sipri​.­org​/­databases​/­milex 11. The term “superpower” was coined by Professor William T. R. Fox. See his The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). 12. For a more complete discussion of the elements of national power, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1960), see especially Chapter 9. 13. For a discussion, see Wesley B. Truitt, Power and Policy (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 54–55. 14. Napoleon stated, “La Politique de toutes les puissances est dans leur geographie.” Quoted in Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), 11. Translation by the author. 15. Spykman, 18. 16. Data for all but the twenty-first century are from ibid., 26. 17. NATO official text. 18. “NATO-Russia Hold Joint Military Exercises,” T ­ elegraph​.­co​.­uk, June 1, 2014. 19. Hans Kundnani, “Germany Is Rekindling its Bromance with Russia,” Foreign Policy Magazine, ­www​.­foreignpolicy​.­com​/­2016​/­07​/­07​/­ger​-­germany​-­is​-­rekindling​ -­its​-­bromance​-­with​-­russia​/ 20. Thomas Grove, “Russia Says Halts in Activity in European Security Treaty Group,” UK: Reuters, March 10, 2015. 21. Chiara Albanese and Ben Edwards, “Russian Companies Clamor for Dollars to Repay Debt,” Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2014. 22. Natalie Kitoeff and Joe Weisenthal, “Here’s Why the Russian Ruble Is Collapsing,” Bloomberg: Businessweek, December 16, 2014. 23. Frank Chung, “The Cold War is Back—and Colder.” ­News​.­au, December 18, 2014. 24. “Russia Completes Delivery of Su-35 Fighter Jets to China for $2.5 Bln,” The Moscow Times, April 17, 2019. 25. Reuters, “U.S. Sanctions China for Buying Russian Fighter Jets, Missiles,” The Moscow Times, September 21, 2018. 26. Reuters, “China, Russia Say They Will Upgrade Relations for New Era,” The Moscow Times, June 5, 2019.

Notes179 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Steve Gutterman and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia to Deploy Missiles Near Poland,” Associated Press, San Francisco Chronicle, September 19, 2014. 30. Peter Barker, “White House Scraps Bush’s Approach to Missile Shield,” The New York Times, September 17, 2009. 31. J. David Goodman, “Microphone Catches a Candid Obama,” The New York Times, March 26, 2012. 32. David M. Herzenhorn and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Cancels Part of Missile Defense that Russia Opposed,” The New York Times, March 16, 2013. 33. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Calls New U.S. Missile Defense System a ‘Direct Threat’,” The New York Times, May 12, 2016. 34. “Russia’s Economy Stalls,” Focus Economics, November 27, 2018. 35. “Trump Targets China’s Push to Make Its Economy High-Tech,” Bloomberg News, March 28, 2018. 36. Josef Joffe, “The Putin Doctrine,” Hoover Digest, The Hoover Institution, January 22, 2009. 37. Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1976). 38. Steven Pifer and John Herbst, “The Obama Doctrine and Ukraine,” The Brookings Institution, ­www​.­brookings​.­odn​/­blog​/­order​-­from​-­chaos​/­2016​/­03​/­18​ /­the​-­obama​-­doctrine​-­and​-­ukraine​/ 39. ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­geos​/­gg​.­html 40. Joffe. 41. For a discussion of the Russo-Georgian War, see Adrian Croft, “NATO Will Not Offer Georgia Membership Step, Avoiding Russia Clash,” Reuters, June 25, 2014. 42. Foregoing Georgia discussion is based on The New York Times, August 8, 2008, 1ff. 43. Peter Finn, “Russia’s State-Controlled Gas Firm Announces Plan to Double Price for Georgia,” The Washington Post, November 3, 2007. 44. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 435. 45. Luke Coffey, “10 Years after Putin’s Invasion, Russia Still Occupies Parts of Georgia,” The Daily Signal, March 1, 2018. 46. ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­geos​/­up​.­html 47. U.S. Department of State: Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, December 19, 2008, ­www​.­state​.­gov​/­p​/­eur​/­rls​/­or​/­142231​.­htm 48. ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­geos​/­up​.­html 49. U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, ­www​.­state​.­gov​/­r​/­pa​/­prs​ /­2008​/­dec​/­113367​.­htm 50. Damien McElroy, “Ukraine Revolution: Live—Ukraine’s President Has Disappeared as World Awakens to the Aftermath of a Revolution,” The Daily Telegraph, February 23, 2014. 51. The foregoing narrative is based on ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​ /­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­geos​/­up​.­html 52. ­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­publications​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­gg​.­html 53. “Russian GDP Contracted 3.7% in 2015,” Financial Times, February 12, 2015, ­www​.­ft​.­com​/­content​/­81bob4f​-­e1d2​-­35cf​-­8b52​-­02d6e245daf5

180Notes 54. Quoted in Pifer and Herbst. 55. Peter Baker, “U.S. Policy on Russia? Trump and His Team Might Give Different Answers,” The New York Times, January 20, 2019. 56. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Suspends Nuclear Arms Control Treaty with Russia,” The New York Times, February 1, 2019. 57. Paul D. Shinkman, “Putin Raises Likelihood of War, Ukrainian Navy Chief Says,” U.S. News & World Report, December 12, 2018. 58. Ian Bateson, “Ukraine Closes Its Border to Russian Men Amid Tensions,” Los Angeles Times, December 2, 2018, A4. 59. Bill Chappell, “Trump Is Expected to Extend U.S. Troops’ Deployment to Mexico Border into January,” NPR, November 28, 2018. 60. Lincoln Mitchell, “Is NATO Still Relevant?” February 10, 2015, ­Observer​.­com​ /­2015​/­02​/­natos​-­relevance​-­the​-­view​-­from​-­georgia

CHAPTER 4 1. For the partition of Poland, see Robert Ergang, Europe from Renaissance to Waterloo (Boston: D. C. heath, 1954), especially p. 543 for a map of the three partitions. Austria-Hungary took parts of Poland in 1772 and 1795; Prussia took parts of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795; and Russia took the largest parts of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. The partition of Poland was largely an initiative of Frederick the Great of Prussia to round out Prussia’s borders and connect them with East Prussia. He easily persuaded Catherine the Great of Russia to participate in the theft of Polish territory, and then added Empress Maria Theresa of Austria to prevent her from objecting. These are early examples of the Prussians and Russians engaging in mutual territorial expansion at another’s expense. Poland was restored after World Wars I and II. 2. Hans Kundnani, “Germany Is Rekindling Its Bromance with Russia,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2016. 3. ­www​.­uawire​.­org​/­germany​-­s​-­dirct​-­investments​-­in​-­Russia​-­exceed​-­3​-­billion​-­euros, April 16, 2019. 4. ­www​.­rt​.­com​/­business​/­446432​-­german​-­investment​-­in​-­Russia​/, December 14, 2018. 5. ­On​.­rt​.­com​/­8upx 6. Grigoriy Sisoev, “Russia-German Trade Sees Robust Growth Despite Sanctions,” ­www​.­rt​.­com​/­business​/­387230 7. “German-Russian Trade Picking Up Sharply,” ­www​.­dw​.­com​/­en​/­a​-­42564278 8. ­www​.­rt​.­com​/­business​/­446432 9. Tom Winter, “German-Russian Chamber of Commerce Opens New 4.5 Million Euro Moscow Headquarters,” June 3, 2019, ­www​.­fort​-­russ​.­com​/­2019​-­german​ -­russian​-­chamber​-­of​-­commerce​-­opens​-­new​-­4​.­5​-­million​-­euro​-­moscow​-­headquarters 10. Andrzej Godlewski, “German Companies Are Increasingly Investing in Russia,” Financial ­Observer​.­eu, November 7, 2017. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.

Notes181 15. Jordan Stevens, “Nord Stream 2 Explained: What It Is and Why Its’s Proving Controversial,” CNBC, May 21, 2019. 16. “Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline—What Is the Controversy About?” July 14, 2018, ­www​.­dw​.­con​/­en​/­nord​-­stream​-­2​-­gas​-­pipeline 17. Stevens. 18. “Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline.” 19. Kundnani. 20. Rick Noack, “The Russian Pipeline to Germany That Trump Is So Mad About, Explained,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2018. 21. All quotations in this paragraph are from Hans Kundnani. 22. Maria Shagina, “EU Divisions and US Sanctions to Delay Nord Stream 2,” ­GlobalRiskInsights​.­com​/­2017​/­31​/­nord​-­stream​-­2​-­delayed​/ 23. “Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline.” 24. Ibid. 25. Shagina. 26. Kundnani. 27. Lyle J. Goldstein, “The Russian-German Relationship Is in Free Fall,” The National Interest, ­nationalinterest​.­org​/­feature​/­the​-­russian​-­german​-­relationship​-­is​ -­in​-­free​-­fall​-­25837 28. Arne Delfs and Gregory Viscusi, “Merkle: Can’t Count on U.S. Military Umbrella Anymore,” Bloomberg, May 10, 2018. 29. Sabastian Sprenger, “Germany’s Armed Forces Are in Bad Shape, Report Finds,” Defense News, ­www​.­defensenews​.­com​/­smr​/­munich​-­security​-­forum​/­2018​/­02​/­21​/ 30. Tyler Durden, “Merkle: Europe Can No Longer Rely on US to Protect It,” ZeroHedge, May 10, 2018. 31. ­www​.­state​.­gov​/+​/­avc​/­trty​/­108155. 32. A. Kramer, “Russia Steps Back from Key Arms Treaty,” The New York Times, July 14, 2007. See also Y. Zarakhovich, “Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty,” Time, July 14, 2007. 33. ­www​.­globalsecurity​.­org​/­military​/­world​/­russia​/­cfe​-­treaty​.­htm 34. ­www​.­visualcapitalist​.­com 35. ­www​.­dw​.­com​/­en​/ 36. Rick Noack, “Germany’s Surging Far-right Party Is Trying to Attract an Unlikely Group of Voters: Jews,” The Washington Post, September 25, 2018. 37. Palko Karasz, “Germany Imports Gas from Russia. But Is It a ‘Captive’?” The New York Times, July 11, 2018. 38. Steven Erlanger, Julie A. Davis, and Katie Rogers, “NATO Survives Trump, but the Turmoil Is Leaving Scars,” The New York Times, July 12, 2018. 39. Bojan Pancevski, “In Win for Trump, Merkel Changes Course on U.S. Gas Imports,” The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2018. 40. Ibid. 41. For example, Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Random House, 1962) and A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918, rev. ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1980), especially chapters 22–23. 42. For a highly readable account of the Bolshevik Revolution, see Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1976).

182Notes 43. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956). 44. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk, March 1918 (New York, Morrow, 1939). 45. William S. Graves, America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920 (New York: Peter Smith, 1921). 46. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958). 47. Merle Fainsod, How RUSSIA Is Ruled, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 464. 48. No less an authority than Winston Churchill wrote that without these American troops, Germany would have won the war. Winston Churchill, World Crisis, Vol. III. Quoted in Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963), 614. 49. Bemis, 640. 50. Edward H. Carr, International Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 1955), chapter 1. 51. For a definitive account of the Congress of Vienna, see Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). 52. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1960), 75. 53. Ibid., 77. 54. For the text of the Treaty of Rapallo, see ibid., 89–90. 55. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1954), 130. 56. For a discussion of the Weimer Republic’s economic descent and the rise of National Socialism, see William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), chapter 3. 57. Gerald Freund, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1957). 58. Rubinstein, 78. 59. Full text of the Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 23, 1939 including the secret protocol is in ibid., 143–45. 60. Goldstein. 61. ­www​.­guidetorussia​.­com​/­ww2​-­casualties​.­asp 62. ­www​.­nationalww2mueum​.­org 63. ­www​.­quora​.­com​/­what​-­territories​-­were​-­lost​-­by​-­Germany​-­after​-­world​-­war​-­2 64. Quoted in Erik Kirschbaum, “Germany Faces an Awkward Struggle to Build and Maintain Its Armed Forces,” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2019. 65. Justin Huggler, “German Armed Forces ‘Not Equipped’ to Do the Job, Rules Watchdog,” The Telegraph, February 20, 2018. ­www​.­telegraph​.­co​.­uk​/­news​/­2018​ /­02​/­20​/­german​-­ground​-­forces​-­not​-­equipped​-­to​-­do​-­the​-­job​-­rules​-­watchdog​/ 66. Ibid. 67. Sprenger.

Notes183 68. Kyle Mizokami, “Is Germany’s Military Dying?” The National Interest, ­nationalinterest​.­org​/­feature​/­Germany’s-military-dying-13748. See also Murray Hammick, “Are Germany’s Armed Forces in Terminal Decline?” The Military Times, October 19, 2018. 69. Kirschbaum. 70. Justin Huggler, “Germany Announces Biggest Defense Spending Rise Since End of Cold War,” The Telegraph, May 17, 2019. 71. Adam Taylor, “Germany Finally Pledges to Increase Military Spending to NATO Levels, but Trump Still Won’t Be Happy,” The Washington Post, November 8, 2019. 72. Army Technologies, “The World’s Biggest Defense Budgets in 2019,” June 13, 2019, ­www​.­army​-­technology​.­com​/­features​/­biggest​-­defense​-­budgets​-­world​/ 73. Kirschbaum. 74. Mark N. Posard and Jennifer Kavnaugh, “Millennial Perceptions of Security: Results from a National Survey of Americans,” RAND Study: Security 2040, #Security2040. 75. Kirschbaum. 76. Ibid., “U.S. Envoy Warns Germany: Pay More or Risk Losing Protection,” Los Angeles Times, August 9, 2019. 77. “Broken Fighter Jets, Grounded Helicopters and Idled Tanks: Germany’s Military Is Ailing,” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2018.

CHAPTER 5 1. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), 22. 2. “... the foreign policy establishment never considered this possibility for more than a moment.” Ibid. 3. Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 481. 4. Ibid., 8. 5. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 565. 6. Ibid., 566. 7. Daniel Williams, “Yeltsin, Clinton Clash over NATO’s Role,” The Washington Post, December 6, 1994. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. E. M. Sarotte, “The Convincing Call from Central Europe: Let Us into NATO,” Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2019. 11. Alison Mitchell, “Clinton Urges NATO Expansion in 1999,” The New York Times, October 23, 1996. 12. Sarotte. 13. Engel, 481. 14. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Russia’s Got a Point: The U.S. Broke a NATO Promise,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2016.

184Notes 15. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal?: The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), 7–44. 16. Quoted in Thomas Friedman, “Now a Word from X,” The New York Times, May 2, 1998. 17. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Russia’s Got a Point: The U.S. Broke a NATO Promise,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2016. 18. Mary Sarotte, “A Broken Promise?: What the West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), 96. For a different view, see Mark Kramer, Washington Quarterly, fall 2009. 19. Vladimir Putin, quoted in Stephen F. Cohen, War with Russia? From Putin and Ukraine to Trump and Russiagate, Kindle ed. (New York: Hot Books, 2019). 20. Walt, 32. 21. “President Bush’s Remarks at Prayer Service,” The Washington Post, September 14, 2001. 22. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 217. 23. Following troop data is from Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, “U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, December 20, 2018. 24. “War in Afghanistan,” The Economist, June 11, 2016. 25. Gordon Lubold and Jessica Donati, “Trump Orders Big Troop Reduction in Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2018. 26. Trump quoted in The Washington Post, March 30, 2016. 27. Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns over Russia,” The New York Times, January 14, 2019. 28. Steven Erlanger, Julie H. Davis, and Katie Rogers, “NATO Survives Trump, but the Turmoil Is Leaving Scars,” The New York Times, July 12, 2018. 29. Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007). 30. NATO website: “NATO and the 2003 Campaign against Iraq (Archived),” updated September 1, 2015. 31. Ibid. 32. G. John Ikenberry, “Explaining Crises and Change in Atlantic Relations: An Introduction,” in Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1. 33. Stew Smith, “The Cost of War Since September 11, 2001,” The Washington Post, November 1, 2018. 34. U.S. Department of Defense, “Casualty Status as of 10 a.m. EDT May 31, 2019,” ­dod​.­defense​.­gov​/­news​/­casualty​-­status​/ 35. Smith. 36. “Faces of the Fallen, 1996–2018,” The Washington Post. 37. Defense Manpower Data Center reported in Mona Chalabi, “What Percentage of Americans Have Served in the Military?” ABC News, March 19, 2015. 38. Jorg Blech, “Severity of Injuries Requires New Forms of Rehabilitation,” Spiegel online, October 23, 2006.

Notes185 39. Doug Irving, “Saving Veterans’ Lives,” Rand Review, November–December 2019, 11. 40. Charity Navigator blog, ­www​.­charitynavigator​.­org​/­index​.­cfm​?­bay​=​­content​ .­view​&­cpid​=​­531 41. See Appendix III for a list of 12 private charitable organizations. 42. Flynt L. Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,” Brookings, January 23, 2004. 43. That regime change in Libya was the Obama Administration’s objective, see David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown, 2012), 345–55. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta wrote, “... our goal in Libya was regime change.” Quoted in Walt, 297. 44. Quoted in Walt, 33. 45. Reza Saniti, “A Troubling Lesson from Libya: Don’t Give Up Nucs,” Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 2011. 46. Mark McDonald, “North Korea Suggests Libya Should Have Kept Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, March 24, 2011. 47. Daniel Larson, “North Korea Rejects a ‘Libya-Style’ Deal,” The American Conservative, January 15, 2018. 48. Following data is from ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natolive​/­topics​_49284​.­htm 49. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­factsheets 50. Ibid. 51. ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­topics​_67655​.­htm 52. ­Nato​.­usmission​.­gov​/­fact​-­sheet​-­u​-­s​-­contributions​-­to​-­nato​-­capabilities​/ 53. Ibid. 54. NATO, “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries” (2012–2019) Press release, June 25, 2019, ­www​.­nato​.­int​/­cps​/­en​/­natohq​/­news​_167080​.­htm 55. Ian Bremmer, “The Only 5 Countries That Met NATO’s Defense Spending Requirements,” Time, February 24, 2017. 56. Geoffrey Roberts, “Molotov’s Proposal that the USSR Join NATO,” Wilson Center, November 21, 2017. 57. Ian Traynor, “Soviets Tried to Join NATO in 1954,” The Guardian, June 16, 2001. 58. Ibid. 59. All references in this paragraph are from Dima Vorobiev, “Russia: Why Has Russia Never Joined NATO?” Quora, January 20, 2018. 60. John V. Walsh, “Why NATO Has Not Permitted Russia to Join,” Counterpunch, May 19, 2014. 61. Lord Ismay’s quotation appears in Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 127. 62. Following is from Dima Vorobiev, “Should Russia Join NATO?” Quora, November 20, 2017. 63. The following analysis is from Michael Bohm, “5 Reasons Why Russia Will Never Join NATO,” The Moscow Times, November 18, 2010. 64. “Could Russia Join NATO?” The Economist, London, July 11, 2010. 65. Hans Binnendijk, “5 Consequences of a Life Without NATO,” Defense News, March 19, 2019, ­www​.­defensenews​.­com​/­opinion​/­commentary​/. All following quotations are from this piece.

186Notes 66. Luke McGee, “Angela Merkel Warns Against Dark Forces on the Rise in Europe,” CNN, May 28, 2019. 67. Karlyn Bowman, “NATO at 70: How Strong Is Public Support,” Forbes, April 1, 2019. 68. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “NATO Public Opinion: Wary of Russia, Leery of Action on Ukraine,” Pew Research Center, June 10, 2016. 69. Pew Research Center, “NATO, U.S. Allies, the EU and UN,” May 5, 2016, ­www​.­people​-­press​.­org​/­2016​/­05​/­6​-­nato​-­4​-­5​-­allies​-­the​-­eu​-­and​-­un​/ 70. Michael Smith, “Most Americans Support NATO Alliance,” Gallup Poll, February 17, 2017, ­https://​­news​.­gallup​.­com​/­poll​/­204071​/­americans​-­support​ -­nato​-­alliance​.­aspx 71. Cited in Henry Olsen, “It’s Time to Rethink the NATO Alliance,” The Washing­ ton Post, April 4, 2019. 72. Jon Stone, “Germans Want Donald Trump to Pull US Troops Out of Germany, Poll Finds,” Independent, July 11, 2018, ­www​.­independent​.­co​.­uk​/­news​/­world​ /­e urope​/­u s​-­t roops​-­g ermany​-­p ublic​-­o pinion​-­p ull​-­o ut​-­n ato​-­s ummit​-­m erkel​ -­a8442021​.­html 73. Benjamin Weinthal, “Germany’s Merkel Reneges on NATO Defense Pledge, Causing Friction with U.S.,” The Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2019, ­www​.­jpost​.­com​ /­international​/­germany’s-merkel-reneges-on-nato-defense-pledge-causing-fricti on-with-us-598646 74. James Kirchick, “Germany Is NATO’s Biggest Freeloader,” The Washington Post, April 3, 2019. 75. Quoted in Stone. 76. Weinthal. 77. Ted Galen Carpenter, “What’s Really Undermining NATO? Europe’s Yearning for Neutrality,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2019. 78. EU Council/report:­www​.­ecfr​.­eu​/­page​/-/­popular​_demand​_for​_strong​_european​_foreign​_policy​_what​_people​_want​.­pdf 79. Quoted in Carpenter. 80. Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusako Horiuchi, “Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for U.S. Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 64, No. 3 (July 2012), 555–85. 81. In President Obama’s address to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011, he announced the “pivot” of U.S. foreign policy to the Asia/Pacific region, ­Obamawhitehouse​.­archives​.­gov​/­the​-­press​-­office​/­2011​/­11​/­17​/­remarks​-­president​ -­obama​-a­ustralian​-­parliament. For a discussion of why the “pivot” was short lived, see Victor Cha, “The Unfinished Legacy of Obama’s Pivot to Asia,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2016. 82. For example, see statements by Representative Adam Schiff (D., CA), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, on March 28, 2019 on CNN. In an unprecedented move on that date all the Republican members on the committee demanded Schiff’s resignation as chairman because of his unsupported accusations of collusion with Russia by the president, ­www​.­cnn​.­com​/­2019​/­03​/­28​ /­politics​/­adam​-­schiff​-­call​-­resign​-­republicans​-­house 83. Joseph Curl, “How Much Does CNN Hate Trump? 93% of Coverage Is Negative,” The Washington Times, May 23, 2017. 84. Ibid.

Notes187 85. The New York Times, March 23, 2019, 1, ­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­interactive​/­2019​ /­03​/­24​/­us​/­politics​/­barr​-­letter​-­mueller​-­read​-­attorney​-­general​-­william​-­barr’s-su mmary-of-mueller-report 86. For a discussion of the attempted coup d’état by high level Justice Department and FBI officials charging Mr. Trump with Russian collusion, see Gregg Jarrett, The Russia Hoax: The Illicit Scheme to Clear Hillary Clinton and Frame Donald Trump (New York: HarperCollins, 2018). 87. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation”—Full Report/Press Release, December 9, 2019, ­oig​.­justice​.­gov​/­reports​/­all​ .­htm 88. Michael Pillsbury, The One Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016), 16.

CHAPTER 6 1. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910). 2. Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000). 3. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016). 4. In February 1950, Stalin and Mao signed in Moscow the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. See Austin Jersald, The Sino-Soviet Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). 5. Robert Farley, “How the Soviet Union and China Almost Started World War III,” The National Interest, February 9, 2016. 6. Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 7. Michael S. Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” Center for Naval Analysis, November 2010, ­www​.­cna​.­org​/­cna​_files​/­pdf​/­D0022974​.­A2 8. Farley 9. Philip Taubman, “In Soviet East, New Rapport with Chinese,” The New York Times, September 25, 1987. 10. The following discussion is based on S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (New York: Routledge, 2015), 2–3. 11. Ibid., 5. 12. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), 2. 13. ­www​.­americanwarlibrary​.­com​/­vietnam​/­vwatl​.­htm 14. History, “Soviet Union and Chinese Armed Forces Clash,” March 2, 1969. 15. Margaret Macmillan, Nixon and Mao (New York: Random House, 2007), xvii. 16. For a discussion of Nixon’s China visit, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 713–32. For an excellent secondary source see Macmillan. 17. Macmillan, 272. 18. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 682.

188Notes 19. Peter Engardio, “China Is a Private Sector Economy,” Bloomberg Businessweek, August 21, 2005. 20. Ibid. 21. Pillsbury, 189. 22. Lily Kuo, “China Warns of ‘Tough Struggle’ as It Cuts Growth Target to Lowest since 1990,” The Guardian, March 4, 2019. 23. Reihan Salam, “Normalizing Trade Relations with China Was a Mistake,” The Atlantic, June 8, 2018. Mr. Salam is President of the Manhattan Institute. 24. ­w ww​.­c nbc​.­c om​/­2 018​/­0 4​/­2 5​/­w hat​-­t rump​-­g ets​-­r ight​-­a bout​-­C hina​-­a nd​ -­t rade.html 25. Roger W. Robinson Jr. and C. Richard D’Amato, eds., China & the WTO: Compliance and Monitoring: Hearings before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Co., 2009). 26. Justin R. Pierce and Peter K. Schott, “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment,” American Economic Review, Vol. 106, No. 7 (July 2016), 1632–62. 27. Pompeo’s quotation in Joseph Bosco, “Trump’s ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Backward’ Strategy with China,” The Hill, February 13, 2020. 28. Kuo. 29. International Monetary Fund, “China’s Economic Outlook in Six Charts,” August 9, 2019. 30. Pillsbury, 65. 31. Ming Xia, “’China Threat’ or a ‘Peaceful Rise of China,’” The New York Times, March 31, 2019. 32. Niall Ferguson is quoted in G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008. 33. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Annual Report, 2002, release date: July 15, 2002, quoted in Pillsbury, 110–11. 34. This discussion of the Tiananmen Square massacre is largely based on Jan Wang, Red China Blues (New York: Random House, 1997), especially 278. 35. Andrew J. Nathan, “The New Tiananmen Papers: Inside the Secret Meeting that Changed China,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 4 (July/August 2019), h ­ ttps://​ ­www​.­questia​.­com​/­magazine​/­1P4​-­2253186239​/­the​-­new​-­tiananmen​-­papers​-­inside​ -­the​-­secret​-­meeting 36. James Miles, “Tiananmen Killings: Were the Media Right?” BBC News, 2009. For a more detailed discussion of the Tiananmen Square massacre, see Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 37. Lucy Craymer and Frances Yoon, “Unrest Alters Life in Hong Kong,” The Wall Street Journal, August 17–18, 2019, A8. 38. Reuters, September 17, 2019, ­www​.­news18​.­com 39. Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001), 6. 40. Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62 (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), xxii. 41. Dwight H. Perkins, “China’s Economic Policy and Performance,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15

Notes189 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Chap. 6, 483–86. For a detailed history of China’s development see Dwight H. Perkins, The Economic Transformation of China (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2015). 42. Frank Dikotter, The Cultural Revolution (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2017). 43. Paul Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 44. Austin Ramzy, “China’s Cultural Revolution, Explained,” The New York Times, May 14, 2016. 45. Kissinger, On China, 193. 46. Pillsbury, 241. 47. Kimberly Amadeo, “US Trade Deficit with China and Why It’s So High,” The Balance, March 27, 2019, ­www​.­thebalance​.­com​/­u​-­s​-­china​-­trade​-­deficit​-­causes​ -­effects​-­and​-­solutions​-­33061277 48. International Monetary Fund. 49. Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 50. Forbes, ­www​.­forbes​.­con​/­profile​/­xijinping 51. This discussion is based on Timothy R. Heath, The RAND Corporation, in testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 7, 2019 entitled “The Consolidation of Political Power in China under Xi Jinping,” ­www​.­rand​.­org​/­pubs​/­testimonies​/­CT503z1 52. Ibid., 1–2. 53. Philip Wen and Christian Shepherd, “China Cranks Propaganda, Xi Jinping’s Cult of Personality into Overdrive Ahead of Party Congress,” Business Insider, October 12, 2017, quoted in Ibid., 2. 54. David Bosikovski and Igor Ewalt, “The World’s Most Powerful People, 2018,” Forbes, May 21, 2018. 55. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, DIA-02-1706-085, January 2019, p. 16. Cited in Heath, 4. 56. Bloomberg News, “Trump Is Making Xi’s Superpower 2050 Plan Tougher by the Day,” August 10, 2019, ­www​.­usn​.­com​/­en​-­us​/­money​/­markets​/­trump​-­is​ -­making​-­xi’s-superpower-2050-plan- tougher-by-the-day 57. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 23. 58. Halford J. Mackinder, The Geographic Pivot of History (1904) and Mackinder, Demographic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable, 1919). Mackinder’s “heartland” theory was a response to the “rimland” theory put forward a decade earlier by U.S. Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan in his The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890). 59. Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat, May 9, 2014, ­www​.­weforum​.­org​/­agenda​ /­2017​/­06​/­china​-­new​-­silk​-­road​-­explainer​/ 60. David Tweed, “China’s New Silk Road,” Bloomberg, April 5, 2019, w ­ ww​ .­bloomberg​.­com​/­quicktake​/­china​-­a​-­silk​-­road 61. David Tweed, “China’s New Silk Road,” Bloomberg, March 25, 2019, w ­ ww​ .­bloomberg​.­com​/­quicktake​/­china​-­a​-­silk​-­road 62. Wade Sheppard, “China’s Seaport Shopping Spree: What China Is Winning by Buying up the World’s Ports,” Forbes, September 6, 2017.

190Notes 63. Keith Johnson, “Why Is China Buying up Europe’s Ports?” Foreign Policy, February 2, 2018. 64. “The New Masters and Commanders,” The Economist, June 8, 2013. 65. Anna Bruce-Lockhart, “China’s $900 Billion New Silk Road. What You Need to Know,” World Economic Forum, June 26, 2017. 66. Quoted in Johnson. 67. Shannon Tiezzi, “Who Is (and Who Isn’t) Attending China’s 2nd Belt and Road Forum,” The Diplomat, April 27. 2019. 68. Ibid. 69. Sheppard. 70. ­www​.­dw​.­com​/­en​/­italy​-­china​-­sign​-­new​-­silk​-­road​-­pact​/­a​-­48037267 71. “Chinese Investments in Europe: German EU commissioner Floats EU Veto Right,” DW, March 24, 2019, ­www​.­dw​.­con​/­en​/­chinese​-­investments​-­in​-­europe​ -­german​-­eu​-­commissioner​-­floats​-­eu​-­veto​-­right​/­a​-­48045932 72. Mads Frese, “Italy Takes China’s New Belt and Road to the Heart of Europe,” EU Observer, April 8, 2019. 73. This section is based on Valbona Zeneli, “Mapping China’s Investments in Europe,” The Diplomat, March 14, 2019. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Sheppard. 77. Erich Follath, “Beijing’s New Silk Road to Europe,” Spiegel, August 31, 2016, ­www​.­spiegel​.­de​/­international​/­world​/­china​-­a1110148 78. Zeneli. 79. “Chinese Investment in North America and Europe Slumped in 2018,” Bloomberg News, January 14, 2019, ­www​.­bloomberg​.­com​/­news​/­articles​ /­2019​-­01​-­14​/­chinese​-­investments​-­in​-­north​-­america​-­and​-­europe​-­slumped​-­in​-­2018 80. “Chinese FDI into North America and Europe in 2018 Falls 73% to Six-Year Low of $30 Billion,” Baker McKenzie, January 14, 2019, ­www​.­bakermckinsey​.­com​/­en​ /­newsroom​/­2019​/­01​/­chinese​-­fdi​-­into​-­north​-­america​-­and​-­europe​-­in​-­2018​-­falls 81. ­www​.­dw​.­com​/­en​/­italy​-­china​-­sign​-­new​-­silk​-­road​-­pact​/­a​-­48037267 82. Follath. 83. “Angela Merkel Sets Off for China to Forge New Economic Ties,” Harold Globe, July 14, 2017. 84. Quoted in Frese. 85. Quoted in Bruce-Lockhart. 86. Zeneli. 87. Quoted in Tweed. 88. Quoted in Bruce-Lockhart. 89. Ibid. 90. This discussion is based on Tiezzi. 91. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955), 344–46. 92. Ibid., 486–88. 93. Quoted in Kelly Olson, “China’s Defense Spending Is Growing More Slowly. But That Doesn’t Mean Military Tensions Are Easing,” CNBC, March 5, 2019, ­www​ .­cnbc​.­com​/­2019​/­3​/­05​/­China​-­defense​-­spending​-­is​-­growing​-­more​-­slowly​-­html

Notes191 94. Quoted in Tweed. 95. David Tweed, “China Defense Spending Set to Rise 7.5% as Xi Builds Up Military,” Bloomberg, March 4, 2019. 96. The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China,” The Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, October 4, 2018. 97. Pillsbury, 111. 98. Adm. Davidson quoted in Bruno Macaes, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 126. 99. Dan Mangan, “Trump Blames China for Coronavirus Pandemic: ‘The World Is Paying a Very Big Price for What They Did,’” CNBC, March 19, 2020, ­www​.­cnbc​ .­com​/­2020​/­3​/­19​/­coronavius​-­outbreak​-­trump​-­blames​-­china​-­for​-­virus​-­again​.­html 100. CNBC, “China Expels Journalists from New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal,” March 16, 2020. 101. Michael B. Sauter, “Countries Spending the Most on War,” ­www​.­msn​.­com​ /­en​-­us​/­money​/­markets​/­4​-­30​-­19 102. Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s Rapid Military Buildup Is Slowing Down,” Asia Times, March 13, 2019. 103. Pillsbury, 136. 104. Ibid., 151–52. 105. Tweed, “China Defense Spending...” 106. “China Boosts Defense Spending, Rattling Its Neighbors’ Nerves,” Reuters, March 3, 2018. 107. Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005). Cited in Pillsbury, 141, 277. 108. Macaes, Chapter 2. 109. Nick Childs and Tom Waldwyn, “China’s Naval Shipbuilding: Delivering on Its Ambition in a Big Way,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1, 2018, ­www​.­iiss​.­org​/­blogs​/­military​-­balance​/­2018​/­05​/­china​-­naval​-­shipbuilding 110. Ben Westcott, “China’s Military Is Going from Strength to Strength under Xi Jinping,” CNN, March 5, 2019. 111. Ibid. 112. Childs and Waldwyn. 113. Bitzinger. 114. Simon Denyer, “Chinese Military Sets Course to Expand Global Reach as ‘National Interests’ Grow,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2015. 115. Ian Storey, “China’s Terraforming in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in South China Sea?—Analysis,” Eurasia Review, June 26, 2015. 116. Steven Stashwick, “Major US Army Exercise to Focus on South China Sea,” The Diplomat, April 16, 2019. 117. Pillsbury, 237–38. 118. Ibid., 243. 119. Damien Cave, “China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked,” The New York Times, October 17, 2019. 120. “Solomons Vetoes Chinese ‘Lease’ on Pacific Island,” AFP, October 25, 2019. 121. Prashanth Parameswaran, “Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Confronting the Economic Challenges,” The Diplomat, July 31, 2018.

192Notes 122. Stashwick. 123. Bloomberg News, “Trump Is Making Xi’s Superpower 2050 Plan Tougher by the Day,” August 10, 2019. 124. Ibid. 125. Ishaan Tharoor, “Hong Kong’s Stunning Vote Deepens China’s Conundrum,” The Washington Post, November 25, 2019. 126. Benny Tai Yin-ting, “This Was Hong Kong’s Most Important Election Ever,” The New York Times, November 25, 2019. 127. Yen Nee Lee, “US Law Backing Hong Kong Protests Could End Up Hurting Everyone—The US, China and Hong Kong,” CNBC, November 28, 2019. 128. Bitzinger. 129. Arthur N. Waldron, ed., China in Africa (The Jamestown Foundation, 2009). 130. “U.S. Joins Pacific Infrastructure Development Group,” RNZ, December 12, 2018, ­www​.­radionz​.­co​.­nz​/­international​/­pacific​-­news​/­378090 131. The SCO discussion is based on Pillsbury, 191. 132. Fred Feltz, et al., Warning Order: China Prepares for Conflict and Why We Must Do the Same (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 2016). 133. Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Endgame: The Path towards Global Leadership,” The RAND Blog, January 5, 2018, ­www​.­rand​.­org​/­blog​/­2018​/­01​/­china’­s​ -­endgame​-­the​-­path​-­towards​-­global​-­leadershp​.­html 134. For two studies that examine China’s threat to American leadership, see Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011) and Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America, Hint; as Hostile, Aggressive, and Determined to Block Beijing’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 5 (September/October 2012), 32–47. 135. President Barack Obama’s address to the Australian parliament, November 17, 2011, ­Obamawhitehouse​.­archives​.­gov​/­the​-­press​-­office​/­2011​/­11​/­17​/­remarks​ -­president​-­obama​-­australian​-­parliament. See also Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot, Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 6 (November/December 2012), 70–82. 136. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo commenting on former Vice President Joe Biden’s remarks on China, Laura Ingraham’s television show on Fox News Channel, May 2, 2019. 137. “The Iranian Revolution at 40,” The Pennsylvania Gazette, May–June 2019, 26–28. 138. Statement by Roham Alvandi reported in ibid., 28. 139. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “National Security Act of 1947,” ­history​.­state​.­gov​/­milestones​/­1945​-­1952​/­national​-­security​-­act 140. Alex Newman, “Chinese Spying in the United States,” New American, April 27, 2010. 141. Adam Goldman, “Ex-CIA Officer Suspected of Compromising Chinese Informants Is Arrested,” The New York Times, January 16, 2018. 142. Newman. 143. Jonah Bennett, “Flashback: Bill Clinton Collected Donations, Then Missile Technology Shipped to China,” The Daily Caller, September 2, 2016. See also John M. Broder, “Clinton Approves Technology Transfer to China,” The New York Times, May 11, 1999.

Notes193 144. Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999). 145. Mike Levine and Jack Date, “22 Million Affected by OPM Hack, Officials Say,” ABC News, July 9, 2015. 146. Marc A. Thiessen, “Explain the Chinese Spy, Sen. Feinstein,” The Washington Post, August 9, 2018 147. Newman. 148. Alexander Abad-Santos, “China Is Winning the Cyber War Because They Hacked U.S. Plans for Real War,” The Atlantic, February 2018. 149. Brad Lendon, “China Could Overwhelm US in Military First Strike, Australian Report Says,” CNN, August 20, 2019. 150. Gordon Chang stated, “So, when you look at China’s actions and [the] WHO’s actions: it’s malicious.” Julia Musto, “Gordon Chang: China and the WHO Acted Maliciously, Tried to Deceive the World,” Fox News, April 18, 2020, ­w ww​.­f oxnews,com/media/gordon-chang-china-world-health-organizationcoronavirus-deceived-the-world 151. Thiessen, “This Virus Should Be Forever Linked to the Regime That Facilitated Its Spread,” The Washington Post, March 17, 2020.

CHAPTER 7 1. The White House, President Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2018, 38. 2. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), xi. 3. Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), xi. 4. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990), 23–33. 5. Charles Krauthammer, Things That Matter (New York: Crown Forum, 2013), 323. 6. Walt, 32. 7. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016), 92–96. 8. Posen, 9–10. See also Ryan C. Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002). 9. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 205. 10. Dick Cheney, In My Time (New York: Threshold Editions, 2011), 499. 11. Ibid., 499–500. 12. ­www​.­sigar​.­mil​/­lessonslearned 13. John Sopko, “Not-So-Secret History,” The Pennsylvania Gazette, March–April 2020, 73. 14. Ibid., 74. 15. Statement by President Donald Trump to Tucker Carlson on Fox News show, “Tucker Carlson Tonight,” aired on July 1, 2019 from Japan following the G-20 Summit.

194Notes 16. Wesley B. Truitt, Power and Policy (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 70. See also Seth Jones, “Going Local: The Key to Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 8–9, 2009, W3. 17. G. John Ikenberry, “Explaining Crisis and Change in Atlantic Relations: An Introduction,” in Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1. See also Charles A Kupchan, “The End of the West,” Atlantic Monthly, November 2002, 42–44. 18. Bush, 268–69. 19. Michael J. Mazarr, “Changing the Way America Goes to War,” The RAND Blog, June 25, 2019. 20. Cheney, 411. 21. Bush, 393. 22. Mazarr. 23. Ibid. 24. The White House, 30. 25. Statement by Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, broadcast on C-SPAN, May 30, 2019. 26. Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 18. 27. Fyodor Lukyanov, “The Lost Twenty-Five Years,” Russia in Global Affairs, February 28, 2016, cited in ibid. 28. Steven W. Mosher, Bully of Asia: Why China’s Dream Is the New Threat to World Order (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2017), 5. 29. Andrew Radin, “The Future of Russia’s Military,” RAND Corporation Annual Report, 2019, 44. 30. Mosher, 1. 31. Sam Greene and Graeme Robertson, “Explaining Putin’s Popularity: Rallying Round the Russian Flag,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2014, cited in ibid., 6. 32. Posen, 87. 33. Cohen and Radin, 147–48. 34. Ibid., 12. 35. Andrew Radin, “How NATO Could Accidentally Trigger a War with Russia,” The National Interest, November 11, 2017. Cited in Cohen and Radin, 13. 36. The White House, 48. 37. Ibid. 38. Statement by President Donald Trump to Laura Ingram during an interview in Normandy, France on June 6, 2019, aired on Fox News Channel on that date. 39. The White House, 47. 40. Ibid., 48. 41. Lt. Gen. Ashley. 42. Quoted in Don Lee, “For the U.S. and China, It’s Not a Trade War Anymore—It’s Something Worse,” Los Angeles Times, June 2, 2019. 43. Andrew Jeong, “Chinese, Russian Jets Test U.S. Allies in Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, August 17–18, 2019, A1. 44. Lee.

Notes195 45. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 71–72. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid., 305. 48. Quoted in ibid., 306. 49. Ibid., 305. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 305–6. 52. Quoted in ibid., 306. 53. Ibid., 306–7. 54. “Let’s Finish the American Revolution,” The New York Times, July 3, 2019. 55. Steven Davies, “Modernity and Its Causes,” CATO Policy Report, Vol. XLI, No. 2 (March–April 2019), 7. 56. Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 15. 57. “China v America: A New Kind of Cold War,” The Economist, May 16, 2019, cover story. 58. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 59. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910). 60. Robert Ergang, Europe from the Renaissance to Waterloo (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1954), 252. 61. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1955), 511. 62. P. G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (London: UCL Press, 1994), 7–20. 63. Robert K. Massie, Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004). 64. Pillsbury, 195. 65. Ibid., 170–72. 66. Bloomberg News, August 11, 2019, ­www​.­usn​.­com​/­en​-­us​/­money​ /­markets​/­trump​-­is​-­making​-­xi’s-superpower-2050-plan-tougher-by-the-day/ ar-AAFDOZz?RI=BBnb7Kz 67. Lingling Wei, Alex Leary, and Andrew Restuccia, “U.S., China Confirm Reaching Phase One Trade Agreement,” The Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2019. 68. Ana Swanson and Alan Rappeport, “Trump Signs China Trade Deal, Putting Economic Conflict on Pause,” The New York Times, January 15, 2020, 1. 69. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 570. 70. Walt, 23. 71. Richard N. Haass, “Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World,” Lecture at the Foreign Policy Association, April 22, 2002, quoted in Walt, 22. 72. Walt, 22. 73. Ibid., 23. 74. David N. Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard, and Eric Schmitt, “ISIS’ Grip on Libya City: Gives It Fallback Option,” The New York Times, November 28, 2015.

196Notes 75. Joshua Yasmeh, “Libya Was Hillary’s War: Here’s the Proof,” The Daily Wire, February 16, 2016. A copy of Ann-Marie Slaughter’s email is included in the piece. 76. Dominic Tierney, “The Legacy of Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake’,” The Atlantic, April 15, 2016. 77. Ibid. 78. Alan J. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle,” Foreign Affairs, March 4, 2015. 79. Kirkpatrick, et al. 80. Pamela Engel, “Obama Reportedly Declined to Enforce Red Line in Syria after Iran Threatened to Back Out of Nuclear Deal,” Business Insider, August 23, 2016. 81. James Bell, “Obama Issues Syria a ‘Red Line’ Warning on Chemical Weapons,” The Washington Post, August 20, 2012. 82. Engel. 83. Bell. 84. NBC News, “U.S. Launches Missiles at Syrian Base Over Chemical Weapons Attack,” April 6, 2017, ­awww​.­nbcnews​.­com​/­news​/­us​-­news​/­u​-­s​-­launches​ -­missiles​-­syrian​-­base​-­after​-­chemical​-­weapons​-­attack​-­n743636 85. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), 325–26. 86. R. W. Apple, “25 Years Later: Lessons from the Pentagon Papers,” The New York Times, retrieved October 28, 2013. For a more complete account of the unclassified Pentagon Papers, see John T. Correll, “The Pentagon Papers,” Air Force Magazine, retrieved November 4, 2018. 87. On August 4, 1964, the author was the Watch Officer on duty in the State Department’s Operations Center and saw the State Department’s copy of the incoming cable from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific to the Pentagon reporting there was no North Vietnam attack on the destroyer USS Maddox. Therefore responsible officials in Washington knew from the beginning the “Tonkin Gulf incident” was a fabrication. The Pentagon Papers, published later, reported the cable’s contents to the world. 88. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 658–59. 89. Ibid., 692–97. 90. McMaster, 625–26. 91. Mosher, 5. 92. See Appendix I for the text of Article 3. 93. Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO: Dangerous Dinosaur (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2019) urges new security arrangements be undertaken to separate the United States from European-only issues. 94. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2017), 8–9. 95. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 2016 edition). 96. Posen, 89. 97. European Union official website: ­eeas​.­europa​.­eu​/­topics​/­common​-­security​ -­and​-­defence​-­policy​-­esdp​_eu​? 98. Posen, 90.

Notes197 99. Quoted in Victoria Friedman, “Macron Calls for ‘Real European Army’ to Protect EU from U.S.” Breitbart News, November 6, 2018, ­www​.­breitart​.­com​ /­europe​/­2018​/­11​/­06​/­macron​-­calls​-­real​-­european​-­army​-­protect​-­eu​-­us​/ 100. Posen, 91. 101. Alina Polyakova and Benjamin Haddad, “Europe Alone: What Comes After the Transatlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2019), ­https://​­www​.­questia​.­com​/­magazine​/­1P4​-­2253186585​/­europe​-­alone​-­what​ -­comes​-­after​-­the​-­transatlantic​-­alliance 102. Walt, 269. 103. Ibid., 270. 104. Carlotta Gall, “Erdogan Goes His Own Way as Turkish Distrust with U.S. Grows,” The New York Times, July 16, 2019. 105. Statement by Secretary of Defense Mark Esper to NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Brussels, October 24, 2019. Michael Birnbaum and Missy Ryan, “U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper Says U.S. Will Leave Forces in Syria to Defend Oil Fields from Islamic State,” The Washington Post, October 25, 2019. 106. Jessica Chen Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy: China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 4 (July/August 2019), 92–102. 107. The White House, 46. 108. Ibid., 47. 109. Ibid., 46. 110. Mosher, 23. 111. Statement by professor Niall Ferguson on “Life, Liberty, and Levin,” Fox News Channel, August 4, 2019. 112. Henry Olson, “It’s Time to Rethink the NATO Alliance,” The Washington Post, April 4, 2019. 113. Quoted in Walt, 360, fn. 24. 114. Bemis, 208. 115. See Appendix I for Article 12. 116. See Appendix I for Article 13.

APPENDIX I 1. The definition of the territories of which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on October 22, 1951. 2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962. 3. The Treaty came into force on August 24, 1949 after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

Index

An italicized f following a page number indicates a figure. An italicized t indicates a table. A-340 aircraft, 77 A400M transport planes, 76 Abkhazia, 57–58 Acheson, Dean, 7, 9, 10, 14 Active Endeavour, 38 Adams, John, 146 Adenauer, Konrad, 6 advanced-nation status, 126–127 advanced weapons, Chinese, 124 Aegis antimissile system, 56 Afghanistan aid to, 33 forces in, 86t nation-building mission in, 138 NATO actions in, 38–41, 45, 85, 102 security forces, 39 Soviet invasion of, 1979, 18 Soviet withdrawal from, 22 tribal tensions in, 40 U.S.-led war in, 40, 85–86, 87–88, 89, 138–139, 152 U.S. withdrawal from, 85–86, 139, 159 wartime reconstruction in, 138–139

Africa Chinese economic penetration of, 127 countries attending Road and Belt Forum, 120 France’s colonial policy in, 15 African American president, election of, 146 aggression, deterring, 10, 23 agriculture, end to collectivization of, 108 air bases, strategic, 12 airborne early warning control, 92–93 Airbus A-340 aircraft, 77 aircraft, military, intercontinental range of, 53 aircraft carriers, Chinese, 125 air power, 10 air-to-ground Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM), 93 Albanians in Kosovo, 36 Albright, Madeleine, 94 Alexander the Great, 148 Algeria, 15–16, 17 Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, 93

200Index Allied and Associated Powers, 8 Allied Command Operations (ACO), 42, 43 Allied Command Transformation, 42 allied ground forces, 7 Allied Maritime Command, 42 all-volunteer military (U.S.), 88 al-Qaeda, 38, 39, 40, 85, 138 “America first” policy, 136 American creed, 146–147 American protectorate, expansion of, 27–28, 45 American value system, 152 Andropov, Yuri, 22 Anglo-French relations, 8 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 2002, 137 antisatellite satellites, 124 Armstrong, C. Michael, 132 Asia, 15, 98 Asia-focused foreign policy, 98 Asian Development Bank, 127 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 160 Assad, Barak al-, 152 Assad, Bashar al-, 153 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 160 Aswan High Dam, 16 Athens-Sparta wars, 148, 151 Atlantic Alliance accomplishment of goal, 81 establishment of, 62 Europe-centered commitments in, 105 expansion, concerns over, 84 Germany rehabilitated by, 37 requirements of, 96 Russian attack response and, 100 U.S. troops to Europe facilitated by, 9 atom bomb, 76 atomic power, Soviet development of, 10 atomic weapons, 3, 4, 10 Australia, 85, 87 Austria, 57, 75 autocracies, organization of, 128 AWACS aircraft, 92–93 Azerbijan, 31 Azores, American air base on, 12

B-1 bomber, 23 B-2 bomber, 23, 137 Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al-, 159 Baker, James, 84 balanced collective forces (defined), 10 balanced force strategy, 11 balance-of-power diplomacy, 160 Balkan crisis, 35–36 Balkan Peninsula, 35 ballistic missile defense, 92, 137 Baltic states, 68, 83, 84, 103 Barr, William, 103 Bartels, Hans-Peter, 76 Bay of Pigs invasion, 17 Beijing Road and Belt Forum, 120, 121t Belgium, German conquest of, 49 Belt and Road initiative. See “Road and Belt” initiative Benghazi, Libya massacre, 2012, 153 Bennendijk, Hans, 97, 98 Bergersen, Gregg, 131 Berlin, Treaty of, 1926, 73 Berlin Airlift, 2, 129 Berlin Blockade, 1–2, 129 Berlin Wall, 17, 20 Bessarabia, 74 Biden, Joe, 40, 128 Bionorica, 66 bipartisanship, erosion of, 13 Boeing C-17 aircraft, 93 Bohm, Michael, 96, 97 Bolshevik Revolution, 71 “borderization” (term), 58 Bosnia, 35, 138 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30, 32–33, 36 Boxer Rebellion, 1900, 122 Bradley, Omar, 9 Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 1918, 71, 72 Brexit, 98, 157 Brezhnev, 18, 22 Brezhnev Doctrine, 19 “brinkmanship,” 18 Britain conflict with Germany, 149–150 defense spending, 158 European security arrangements, role in, 102 nuclear capability, 157

Index201 oil tankers, Iran seizure of, 78 power use prior to World War II, 49, 52 Britain, Battle of, 74 British Empire, 139 Brussels Summit, 2018, 32–33, 58, 69, 86 Brussels Treaty, 1948, 8 Bucharest Summit, 2008, 33 Budapest Memorandum, 59 Bulgaria, 84 Bundeswehr, 76 bureaucratic inertia, 82, 90–94 Bush, George H. W. foreign policy, 22, 82 German reunification advocated by, 81–82, 83 NATO policy, 137 Partnership for Peace proposed by, 33 Russo-Georgia war, response to, 58 Bush, George W. Afghanistan operations under, 102, 138 Doctrine of Preemption discontinued by, 40 East European countries welcomed into NATO by, 45 foreign policy, 46, 152 Iraq campaign under, 86, 87, 90, 102, 139 Middle East operations under, 87–88, 140 missile defense system promoted by, 55 NATO expansion backed by, 29, 84 NATO membership extended by, 28 NATO policy, 81–82 Putin, V., dealings with, 94–95 Russian NATO membership rejected by, 95 terrorism, war on, 85 Ukraine policy, 41, 59–60 U.S.–China trade relations under, 109 businesses, starting, 108 C-17 Strategic Airlift Command, 93 Cambodia, invasion of, 108 capital, 21 capitalism, 21

Carter, Jimmy, 109 Castro, Fidel, 25 Catherine the Great, Czarina of Russia, 58 Caucasus states, 31 Central Asian countries, 34–35, 120 Central Europe, 2, 3 Central Intelligence Agency, 18, 129, 130, 131 Central Powers, 70, 71 challenge and response theory, 151 Chang, Gordon, 133 Chang Kai-Shek, 106 Chechnya War, 57, 103 Cheney, Dick, 37, 138 Chernenko, Konstantin, 22 China accommodation, potential with, 98 air force, 125 anti-Americanism in, 137, 138 armed forces, 123–124 containment of, 155 defense policy, 125 defense spending, 52, 123, 124, 124t economic challenges, 126 economic reforms, 108–110, 112–113, 130 economic warfare, 112 economy, 114, 151 emigration restricted by, 109 espionage, 131–132 European Union, relations with, 118 failed intelligence concerning, 130 foreign investment in, 108 foreign policy, 115 GDP, 114 global hegemony as goal of, 105–106, 128 as Great Power, 52, 114 investments in Europe, 118–120 island leased by, 126 loans from, 116 military power, growing, 133 nuclear device, first tested by, 106 as nuclear power, 51 nuclear triad, 145 nuclear weapons, 49, 125 as People’s Republic of China, 105, 106, 113, 130

202Index China (Continued) political control, 110–111 power base, 145 power projection, 125–126 reach, 125–126, 127–129 rise of, 95, 105, 106–107, 133, 150 as Russian export customer, 52 Russian relations with, 54–55, 96, 103, 106–107, 158 Soviet Union, relations with, 106, 107, 108 threat posed by, 28, 98, 103, 104, 105–106, 114–116, 122–123, 125–129, 131–132, 133, 140, 155, 159–160, 161–162 trade policy, 119, 144–145 unification of, 111 worldwide dominance as goal of, 147, 150 China Merchants Port Holdings, 115 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, 120 China–U.S. relations. See U.S.-China relations China-Western trade imbalance, 147 Chinese Communist Army in North Korea, 14 Chinese embassy in Belgrade, bombing of, 137 Chung, Dongfan “Greg,” 132 Churchill, Winston, 2, 74 citizens, peace and prosperity of, 161 “classless society” ideal, 21 Clinton, Bill American nuclear guarantee extended by, 27–28 at Budapest conference, 1994, 82 Chinese, military technology information passed on by, 132 East European countries welcomed into NATO by, 45 foreign policy mistakes, 137–138, 152 globalist foreign policy, 46 Kosovo operation, participation in, 103 NATO membership extension approved by, 29, 45 NATO policy, 35, 83 Partnership for Peace involvement of, 33

Russian NATO membership sought during administration of, 94 Trilateral Statement signed by, 59 U.S.–China trade relations under, 109 Clinton, Hillary, 152–153 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 112 Cold War end of, 20, 26, 77, 98, 157 forward strategy in, 6 overview of, 1 peaceful coexistence in, 18–20 Soviet defeat in, 23 superpower confrontations in, 17–18 two-front war, potential in, 11 U.S.–USSR standoff during, 48, 150 victory, 81, 136, 152 collective defense efforts, 39–40, 41 collective defense forces, 43 Collective Security Treat Organization (CSTO), 96 collectivism, 145, 147 Communism, 19, 22 Communist collectivist orthodoxy, 21 Communist empire, collapse of, 20 Communist internationalism, 108 Communist leaders, 18 Communist Party electoral minorities, 2 Communist revolutions, 21 Communist utopia, 20, 21 Concert of Europe, 72 Congress of Vienna, 1815, 72 Connally, Tom, 14 Connally-Russell resolution, 14 containment policy, 1, 48, 63, 150 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty), 1990, 32, 54, 69 cordon sanitaire, 156 coronavirus pandemic outbreak, 123, 133 COSCO Shipping Ports, 115, 119 counterterrorism operations, 38 “creed” (term), 146–147 Crimea Russian annexation of, 54, 60, 63, 66, 68, 142 Russian population, 547 Ukraine loss of, 33 Crimean Peninsula, Russia seizure of, 41 Crimean War, 106–107

Index203 Croatia, 35, 36, 119 Cuban Missile Crisis, 17–18, 22 “cult of personality,” 114 Cultural Revolution, 111–112, 133 cyberwarfare, 53 Czechoslovakia Communist regime voted out by, 20 demonstrations crushed in, 21 demonstrations in, 22 German acquisition of, 49 independence, restoration of, 75 Russia fears, 83 Soviet invasion of, 62 Czech Republic, 28, 29, 69, 84 Czech Sudetenland, German annexing of, 57 Davidson, Phil, 123 Davies, Steven, 147 Declaration of the Brussels Summit, 2018, 32–33 defense emphasis versus deterrence, 6 defense industry, U.S., espionage in, 131, 132 Defense Readiness Program Training Center, 44 defense spending, international comparisons, 77, 124t defensive alliances, 23 de Gaulle, Charles, 16, 17 democracies, 2, 25, 32, 98 Deng Xiaoping, 108–110, 112–113, 114, 133 Denmark, 68, 75 deterrence, defense emphasis versus, 6 Dewey, Thomas E., 14 Dien Bien Phu, battle of, 15 disabled veterans, aid to, 89 diversity, past versus present views of, 146 Djibouti, 127 Doctrine of Preemption, discontinuation of, 40 Douglas, Paul, 14 Dulles, John Foster, 14 E-3A AWACS aircraft, 92 E-3D AWACS aircraft, 93 Eagle Assist, 38 early-warning radar network, 7

East Berlin, demonstrations in, 21 Eastern Europe American security zone extension into, 28 China investments in, 118–119 Communist puppet states throughout, 3 NATO members in, 53 NATO mission in, 44 neutral state role in stabilizing, 156 reform, pressure for, 19 Soviet empire, maintaining, 21 Soviet Union attempt to dominate, 2 East Germany demonstrations in, 22 independence, nominal, 44 independence movement in, 62 Russian armed forces in, 3–4 West Germany, union with, 27 West Germany attack against, potential by, 4 East Prussia, 75 East-West balance of power, 7 East-West modus vivendi, 158 economic development, 21 Eden, Anthony, 6 Egypt, 16 Eisenhower, Dwight Egypt invasion opposed by, 16 presidency, bid for, 8 as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 7, 12, 156 U.S. forces in Europe supported by, 14 Enduring Partnership, 39 enemy, defeating, 23 Engels, 20 England, Spain defeated by, 148–149 Enhanced Forward Presence, 43–45, 62 Entente Cordiale, 8 entrepreneurship, 21 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 159 Estonia defense spending, 94 independence, 71 multinational battle group in, 43, 44 NATO membership, 84 in Soviet sphere, 74 ethnic cleansing, 36, 103

204Index Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 35 Eurofighter aircraft, 69, 76 Europe China investments in, 118–120 defense, 7, 47, 48, 156–157 Korean War impact on, 6 map, World War I impact on, 71 missile defense, 55–57 peace, 62, 136 Russian invasion, potential of, 44–45 security arrangements, alternative for, 102–104 European Commission, 68 European Council on Foreign Relations, 101 European Inceptor Site, 56 European military organizations, 97–98 European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), 92 European Recovery Plan, 1948, 2 European Union China, relations with, 118 Common Security and Defense Policy, 157 enlargement, Russia attempts to undermine, 141 gas supply diversification as goal of, 68 membership in, 26, 45 NATO compared to, 97–98 pro-China economic initiatives, concern over, 119 Russia, sanctions on, 66 total GDP of, 51 United States, agreement with, 157–158 external forces versus Soviet Union, 20, 23 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, 132 Federal Republic of Germany. See West Germany Feinstein, Dianne, 132 Ferguson, Niall, 110, 147 Finland, 71, 74, 85 food imports, Russian embargo on, 66 Force de Frappe, 16 foreign direct investment, 66, 116, 118, 144

Fort Sumter, 7 forward strategy, 6 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, 54 France colonial policy, U.S. opposition to, 15 European security arrangements, role in, 102 German conquest of, 49 Germany, fears concerning, 11 lands restored to, 72 NATO, attitudes concerning, 99 NATO involvement of, 17 nuclear deterrent, 16 nuclear weapons, 49 power use prior to World War II, 49, 52 tyrannies overthrown in, 25 Franco, Francisco, 15 Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1871, 11, 72 Franklin, Benjamin, 146 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, 126 free republics, 22 G8, 94 Gaddafi, Muammar al-, 41, 89–90, 130, 152–153 Gagarin, Yuri, 129 Gasprom, 58, 67 gas supplies, diversifying, 68 Gates, Robert, 84, 90 GDP defense spending as percent of, 52, 76, 77, 78, 93–94, 100, 124, 158 material base of power, component of, 49 military expenditures as percent of, 49, 51 NATO cost-sharing as percent of, 91 geography versus technology, 53 geopolitical power, material base of, 50t–51t George, Lloyd, 72 George, Walter, 14 Georgia Germany-Russia relations and, 99 independence, 57, 156

Index205 NATO membership sought by, 28–29, 33, 45, 58, 68, 84 NATO protection for, 78, 102 Putin focus on, 62 Russia fears of, 83 Russian conquest of, 57 U.S. troops in, 44 Geremek, Bronislaw, 83 German Democratic Republic (GDR). See East Germany German rearmament question, 8–9 German-Russian Chamber of Commerce, 65, 66 German-speaking territories, annexing, 57 Germany armed forces, 76–77 Britain and France versus, 52 as China trade partner, 119 Czech Sudetanland, annexing of, 57 defense, 51 defense spending, 52, 76, 77, 100 energy policy, 70 European security arrangements, role in, 102 financial reparations required from, 72, 73 GDP, 70 as Great Power, 52, 70 Kosovo mission, role in, 36–37 military ambitions of, 49 Muslim refugees in, 99 NATO, attitudes concerning, 99, 100–101 as NATO member, 65, 78 pacifism, 77–78, 102 Paris accords, absence from, 72, 73 partitioning of, 70 Poland attacked by, 8 post–World War II rehabilitation of, 37 reunification of, 20, 27, 44, 81, 82, 83–84, 137 rise of imperial, 149 as Russian export customer, 52 Russian invasion of, 65 U.S. bases and troops in, 69 World War II impact on, 75 in world wars, 70, 72, 75, 158

Germany, central, Red Army in, 2 Germany-Russia relations gas pipeline project, 66–68 German energy dependence, 67, 69–70 historic conditions, 70–74 overview of, 65, 78–79 reality of, 98–99 trade and investment, 65–66 between world wars, 73 Germany–U.S. relations, 68–70, 77, 79 glasnost (transparency), 19 global GDP, 116 Global Hawk surveillance aircraft, 93 globalism, pitfalls of, 136 globalization of culture, 147 global power shift, 105 global strategy, rethinking, 7 Goldman Sachs, 151 Gorbachev, Mikhail coup against, 20 as General Secretary, 22 German reunification, views on, 83–84 NATO expansion opposed by, 84 Reagan, R., dealings with, 23 reforms passed by, 19 resignation of, 20 Sino-Soviet relations under, 106 graduated response doctrine, 11 Great Britain in World War II, 74 “Great Debate,” 12–15, 24, 27 Great Leap Forward, 111, 112 Greece ancient, 148, 151 defense spending, 94 military spending, 51 NATO membership, 15, 27 Road and Belt project, participation in, 118 Soviet pressure against, 4 Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, 1, 4 Greenland, 12 Grenell, Richard, 78, 100–101 gross domestic product (GDP), 5 gross national products (GNPs), defense expenditures as percent of, 5

206Index Group of Seven, 94 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 154 Haass, Richard, 95, 152 Haenle, Paul, 119 Haiti, 138 Havel, Vaclav, 83 H-bomb, 7 “heartland” theory, 115 Heath, Timothy, 122 Henkel, 66 heroin production, 138 History of the Peloponnesian War, The (Thucydides), 148 Hitler, Adolf defeat of, 75, 76, 150 German-speaking territories annexed by, 57 military and political ambitions, 49, 75 rise of, 73–74 Hofstader, Richard, 146 Hong Kong, 111, 113, 122, 127 Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, 2019, 127 Hoover, Herbert, 13, 14 Hua Guofeng, 112 Hu Jintao, 113 Hundred-Year Marathon, 106 Hungary Chinese investments in, 119 Communist regime voted out by, 20 demonstrations in, 21, 22 NATO membership, 28, 29, 84 Road and Belt project, participation in, 118 Russia fears, 83 Soviet invasion of, 62 Huntington, Samuel P., 145–146 Hussein, Saddam, 86, 87, 89, 90, 130, 139, 140 Hu Yaobang, 110 Iceland, 12 Inchon invasion, 11 India, 49, 51, 120, 160 individualism, 145–146 Indo-China, 17 Indo-China war, 15–16

Indo-Pacific region, U.S. actions in, 159–160 intellectual property rights, 119, 151 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 17, 57, 129, 141, 145 intermediate-range Jupiter missiles, 18 internal rot of Soviet Union, 20–21 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 31–32, 109, 150–151 International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 39 Iran anti-American extremism in, 131 nuclear deal, 68, 154 Russian relations with, 96 U.S. hostages held in, 130, 131 Iraq aid to, 33 Kuwait occupied by, 22 unstable regime in, 140 U.S. air strikes in, 138 U.S. war against, 32, 86–87, 88–89, 90, 102, 130, 152 ISIS, 159 Islamic State, 43 Ismay, Lord, 95 isolationism, departure from, 2 Israel, 16, 49 Italy Chinese population, 118 European security arrangements, role in, 102 NATO, attitudes concerning, 99 Road and Belt project, participation in, 116, 118 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 109 Japan as Great Power, 52, 105 imperialism, U.S. and China fight against, 122 security, U.S. commitment to, 98 in World War I, 71 in World War II, 75, 76 Javelin antitank missiles, 42, 61 Jefferson, Thomas, 146 Johnson, Lyndon, 107, 154, 155 Joint Forces Command Naples, 41

Index207 Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR), 93 Joint Multinational Training Group, 44 Judeo-Christian religious and ethical values, 146 Jupiter missiles, 18 Jutland, Battle of, 149 Karzai, Hamid, 40 Kennan, George, 48, 84 Kennedy, John, 17, 18, 129, 155 Kennedy, Joseph P., 14 Khrushchev, Nikita, 17–18, 21–22, 58 Kim Jong Un, 90, 130–131, 152, 153 Kirchick, James, 101 Kissinger, Henry, 112, 154 Knowland, William, 14 Kohl, Helmut, 82, 84 Korean Peninsula, 11, 90, 153 Korean War Chinese intervention in, 7, 106, 121, 129 foreign policy debate during, 14 German rearmament support strengthened by, 9 impact of, 4–6 outbreak of, 4 Korea problem, 6 Kosovo conflict in, 36–37 independence movement, 36 NATO operations in, 40, 45, 103 U.S. involvement in, 137–138, 143 Kosovo force, 37 Kosygin, 18, 22 Kotkin, Stephen, 48 Krauthammer, Charles, 137 Kuwait, 22, 33, 88 Kyank Phyu Special Economic Zone, 116 labor theory of values, 20 Lam, Carrie, 111 Latvia, 43–44, 71, 74, 84 leadership, 49, 52 Lee, Jerry Chun Shing, 131 Lenin, V. I., 20, 21, 58, 71, 73 Leopard II tanks, 76 liberal hegemony, 136, 160

liberal institutions, 147 liberal international order, 98, 99 liberal world order, 152 Libya arms embargo against, 41 NATO campaign in, 89–90 NATO operations in, 45, 46, 102, 130 U.S. involvement in, 152–153 Li Peng, 111 liquefied natural gas (LNG), 69, 70 Lisbon Summit, 2010, 39 Lithuania defense spending, 158 independence, 19, 22, 71 multinational battle group in, 43, 44 NATO membership, 84 in World War II, 74 Lockheed Martin, 132 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 11, 14 long-range bombers, 145 Loral Space and Communications, 132 MacArthur, General, 11 Macedonia, 30, 35, 36 Mackinder, Sir Halford J., 114–115 Macron, Emmanuel, 69, 157 Maiden Revolution, 60 Major, Claudia, 76 Malaysia, 116 man in space, first, 129 Mao Zedong, 106, 107, 108, 111–112, 114, 133 market access, unequal, 119 Marshall, George, 14 Marshall Plan, 1948, 2 Marx, 20, 21 Marxist economic theory of labor, 20 massive retaliation doctrine, 11 Mazarr, Michel, 139 McChrystal, Stanley, 40 McCloy, John J., 6 Mediterranean, 4 Medvedev, Dmitri, 56, 62, 84 Membership Action Plan (MAP), 28, 29–30, 45 mercantilism, 112 mercantilist international economic policy, 112

208Index Mercedes-Benz, 66 Merkel, Angela energy policy shift announced by, 70 Europe defense, attitude concerning, 68–69 German politics, role in, 99 NATO defense spending under, 76, 77, 79, 100, 101 pro-China economic initiatives criticized by, 119 pro-Russia policy, 67–68 during Russo-Ukraine war, 60–61 United States, attitude toward, 68–69 Middle East democracy in, 140 nation-building in, 140 political cooperation in, 33 U.S. operations in, 87, 88 wars, 88–89 World War I impact on, 71 military, civilian control over, 96 military bases, Chinese, 127 military bases, U.S., 12, 69, 97 military power, 49 Minsk Agreement, 61 missile defense system, 55–57, 69 missiles, intercontinental range of, 53 Modi, Narendra, 120 Molotov, 94, 97 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 68, 74 Montenegro, 30, 36, 91 Mooney, Turloch, 116 moon flight, 129 Moorer, Thomas, 132 Morgan Stanley, 115, 151 Morocco, 12 Mosaddeq, Mohammed, 131 multiculturalism, 146 Muslims in Kosovo, 103 Muslim Uighurs, 109 mutual aid, 9–10 mutual assured destruction, 141 mutual assured deterrence, 48 Myanmar (Burma), 116 Myanmar Belt and Road project, 116 Nanking, Treaty of, 1842, 121–122 Naples, Hub in, 33

Napoleon, 53 national interests, 108 National Security Act, 1947, 131 nation-state system, 62 NATO Response Force, 39–40, 42 NATO-Russia Council, 54 NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, 42 NATO’s Strategic Direction South Hub, 43 natural gas, 58, 66–67, 69, 70 naval power, 10 Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, 1939, 73, 74, 75 Netherlands, 49, 52 Neutrality Acts, 2 neutrality as preferred foreign policy, 101, 155–156 neutral states, 33–34, 156 New Silk Road, 114–116 New Zealand, 85 Nicholas II, Czar of Russia, 70 Nixon, Richard, 106, 107–108, 154 non-NATO member nations, 46, 62, 142 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty on, 59 Nord Stream 1, 67 Nord Stream 2, 66–67, 68, 69 Nord Stream pipelines, 66–68 North Africa, 33 North Atlantic alliance, 2–4 North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 35 North Atlantic Council, 7, 30, 38, 91, 94 North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 armed attack provision in, 39 NATO member additions covered in, 32 review of, 161 rewriting, 157 Senate ratification hearings on, 10 signing and overview of, 2 signing of, 8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alternative security concepts, 155–159 armed forces, 4, 5, 12 China threat to, 127–128 in Cold War, 46, 81 collective defense efforts, contribution to, 39–40, 41

Index209 combat activities, 36–37 counter organizations, 127–128 counterterrorism operations, 38 current relevance of, 135–136, 160–162 deterrent value of, 100 eastward expansion, controversy over, 29, 82–83, 84, 137 Enhanced Forward Presence, 43–45, 62 establishment of, 3, 8 Europe success record of, 62–63, 81 extension pros and cons, 97–99, 141, 144 growing power of, 18 growth of, 27–29, 143 internal divisions of, 35 International Staff, 90–91 Iraq War impact on, 87 joining, procedure for, 29–30 Korean War impact on, 4 material base of power, 51 membership, alternatives to, 33 membership, countries seeking, 45 military operations anywhere as option for, 40 multinational projects, 91–94 open door policy, 32–33 political and administrative staff, 43 political and security guarantee, extending, 45 post-9/11 transformation of, 41 post–Cold War, 31–33, 42–43, 45–46, 81–82, 90–94 post–Cold War goals, 82, 84–90 public attitudes toward, 99–102 purpose of, 94, 95, 135, 155 Russian invasion of Ukraine condemned by, 69 Russo-Ukraine war impact on, 61–62 strains within, 15–17 successor, potential to, 102 treat from, 142–143 United States, aid to, 37–38, 102 victory of, 20, 135 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states cost-sharing arrangement among, 91–94, 92t

defense spending (general), 78, 93–94, 158 defense spending, European and American compared, 70 defense spending, German, 76, 77, 78 East Europe countries, 53 military strength of, 5 nonmembers, relations with, 33 original, 3f PfP members as, 33 post–Cold War addition of, 15, 26–30, 30f Russian attacks not made against, 102–103 Soviet attacks not made against, 62 United States, financial cost of, 6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Command, 7–8, 9 North Korea continuing problem of, 6 nuclear weapons, 49, 90, 130–131 security threat posed by, 98 South Korea attacked by, 4, 129 UN forces against, 9 North Macedonia, 30, 32–33, 36 NSC-68, 7 nuclear annihilation, mutual, threat of, 62 nuclear devastation, assured, threat of, 24 nuclear submarines, 125 nuclear weapons, 48–49 Obama, Barack Afghanistan policy, 85, 102 appointments by, 40 Baltic states, policy toward, 103 China policy, 128 East European countries welcomed into NATO by, 45 foreign policy, 46, 152–153 Iraq policy, 102 Libya policy, 90, 152–153 Middle East operations under, 87–88 missile defense system policy, 56 NATO actions supported by, 43 NATO expansion supported by, 28, 84 Syria policy, 153–154 Ukraine policy, 42, 60, 61, 62, 103

210Index Obama, Barack (Continued) U.S.–China trade relations under, 109 Xi Jinpeng, dealings with, 125–126 Oettinger, Gunther, 118 Office of Personnel Management, 132 Olson, Henry, 161 Operation Allied Force, 36 Operation Enduring Freedom, 87–88 Operation Freedom Sentinel, 88 Operation Inherent Resolve, 88 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 87, 88 Operation New Dawn, 88 Operation Odyssey Dawn, 41 Operation Unified Protector, 41 Opium War (1839–1842), 121–122 “Orange Revolution,” 59 Osgood, Robert, 4 Ottoman Empire, 35, 58, 71 Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility, 127 pacifism, 102 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 130 Pakistan, 49, 138 Palmerston, Lord, 161 Pan Am Flight 103 crash of Lockerbie, Scotland, 1988, 89 Panetta, Leon, 153 Paris Summit, 1997, 54 Partnership for Peace (PfP), 33–35, 34t, 53–54, 85 Pashtun tribe, 40 Patriot missile, 132 Patriot missile defense system, 57 peaceful coexistence, 18–20 peacekeeping missions, coordinating, 157 Peace of Paris settlements, 1919, 72 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 7, 76, 129 Pence, Mike, 122–123 People's Republic of China, 105, 106, 113, 130 perestroika (openness), 19 Pericles, age of, 148 Perry, Rick, 67 Persian Gulf, 32, 78 Peter the Great, Czar of Russia, 48 Philip II, King of Macedonia, 148

Philip II, King of Spain, 148–149 Pillsbury, Michael, 104, 123, 129 Poland Chinese investments in, 119 Communist regime voted out by, 20 defense spending, 78, 94, 158 German attack against, 8, 49, 74 German loss of parts of, 75 German-Russian ties, concern over, 68 independence, 71 independence movement in, 22, 62 martial law in, 21 missile defense system in, 69 multinational battle group in, 43, 44 NATO membership, 28, 29, 84 partitioning of, 65, 74 Patriot missile defense system signed with, 57 Road and Belt project, participation in, 118 Russia fears, 83 Russian invasion of, 74 U.S. troops in, 44–45 political and security guarantee, 45 political will, lack of, 20, 21–22 Polo, Marco, 115 “polytrauma” (term), 89 Pompeo, Mike, 77–78, 109–110, 126 population as component of material base of power, 49 Poroshenko, Petro, 60 Portugal, 118 Posen, Barry, 136, 138, 142, 157, 158 poverty in Afghanistan, 138 power material base of, 49–52, 50t–51t nature of, 48–49 willingness to exercise, 49, 52 Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM), 93 president, U.S., powers of, 24 private sector, 108 Prodi, Romano, 119 progressive media, 147 property, private ownership of, 21, 108 Putin, Vladimir aggressive actions by, 84 challenges faced by, 102–103 deterrents other than NATO, 98

Index211 gas pipeline deal with, 67 leadership of, 31 NATO-Russia relations under, 54, 62 Obama assumption of presidency, response to, 60 presidency assumed by, 59 Russia-China relations under, 55 Russian NATO membership proposed by, 94–95, 97, 158 Russians, ethnic protection cited by, 57 Russia-West relations under, 84 during Russo-Ukraine war, 60, 61–62 on Soviet Union’s collapse, 20, 26 territorial goals, 63, 97, 142 United States relations under, 56, 69 Xi Jinping compared to, 114 R-7, 17 racial problem, 146 RAND Corporation, 124, 141 Rapallo, Treaty of, 1922, 73, 74 Rasmussen, Anders, 61–61 Raytheon, 132 Reagan, Ronald, 22, 23, 130, 131 Realpolitik, 74–75, 78, 99 Red Army, 5, 18, 21 regime change, 46 Resolute Support Mission, 39 revanchism, Russian, 29, 83, 102 Ribbentrop, 68, 74 Rice, Condoleezza, 56 Rim of the Pacific exercises, 126 Road and Belt Forum, Beijing, 120, 121t “Road and Belt” initiative, 115–118, 117f, 122–123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 144, 145, 159 Rogozin, Dmitri, 143 Romania, 20, 22, 45, 84 Roosevelt, Theodore, 146 Rose Revolution, 58 ruble, devaluation of, 31, 54 Ruehe, Volker, 77 Russia CFE Treaty participation suspended by, 69 Collective Security Treat Organization (CSTO) founded by, 96 Crimean War, defeat in, 106–107

Cuba missiles withdrawn by, 18 defense expenditures as percent of GDP in, 51 defense spending, 52 diminished threat from, 28, 155, 158–159 East focus of, 54–55 European missile defense system opposed by, 56 foreign investments in, 65, 66 gas exported by, 66–68 German invasion of, 65, 70, 74–75 German reunification, concerns over, 83–84 Germany, relations with (see Germany-Russia relations) imperialism, 47 inferiority complex, 47–48 Japanese defeat of, 52 Libya policy, 89–90 military, central control over, 96 Muslim pressure in South, 95, 103 NATO expansion opposed by, 82–83, 84 NATO membership, pros and cons of, 94–97 nuclear triad, 141 nuclear weapons, 49, 53, 59 Paris accords, absence from, 72, 73 post–Cold War fear of, 82–84 post-Soviet economic conditions, 31 Road and Belt project, participation in, 128 Serbs, relations with, 137–138 Soviet Union breakup, role in, 26 as superpower, 52, 70 superpower status as goal of, 96–97, 141 Syria policy, 90 technology lag in, 95 threat posed by, 53, 140, 141–144 threats, perceived to, 142–143, 144 tyrannies overthrown in, 25 U.S. election interference, suspected by, 103–104 U.S. focus on, 105 westernization of, 48 in world wars, 75

212Index Russia-China relations, 54–55, 96, 103, 106–107, 158 Russia-NATO relations balance of power, data illustrating, 51 cooperation and conflict, 53–54 NATO as enemy, 96, 97 NATO eastward expansion, Russian opposition to, 29 NATO impact, 47 Russia-China partnership impact on, 55 Russian economy challenges, 51–52, 56–57, 102–103 financial crisis, 2014-2015, 54 Russian Empire (formerly Grand Duchy of Moscovy), 48, 82, 139 Russian Federation birth of, 20 chaos and turmoil of, 82 defense expenditures, 47 economic conditions, 31–32 NATO membership up to border of, 137 and Soviet Union compared, 31 Russian-German gas pipeline project, 66–68 Russian imperialism, 31 Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, 66 Russian revanchism, 29, 83, 102 Russian Revolution, 71 Russo-Georgia war, 57–58 Russo-Japanese War, 52 Russo-Ukraine war, 58–62 S-400 surface-to-air missile systems, 55 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 58 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 17 satellite, man-made, first, launching of, 17 satellite countries, former Soviet, 5, 21, 22, 26 Saudi Arabia, 12 Schroeder, Gerhard, 67 Schwartz, Bernard, 132 science, Chinese advances in, 124 seaport acquisitions, Chinese, 115–116 “second Cold War,” 160

self-help and mutual aid, 9–10 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. See terrorist attacks, September 11, 2001 Serbia, 35, 36 Serbia-Kosovo conflict, 24, 137 Serb-Kosovo area, keeping peace in, 36 Serbs, Russia relations with, 137–138 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 127–128 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 58 shipping companies, Chinese, 116 “Silk Road,” 115 Sinai Peninsula, Israeli invasion of, 16 Singapore, 126–127 Sino-Russian border clashes, 106–107 Sino-Soviet border clashes, 106, 107 Sino-Vietnam War, 108 Six-Day War, 16 Skinner, Kiron, 145 Slaughter, Ann-Marie, 153 Slovakia, 29, 84 Slovenia, 35, 36, 119 socialism, 21 “socialist market economy” (term), 108 Soleimani, Qassim, 159 Solomon Islands, 126 Somalia, U.S. military involvement in, 138 South Asia, 120 Southeast Asia, 108, 120 South Korea, 4, 98, 129 South Ossetia, 57–58 Soviet atomic test, 1949, 4 Soviet republics, former, 25, 26, 27t, 84 Soviet Union in Afghanistan, 18, 22, 139 armed forces, 5, 18, 21, 32 attack by, response to, 46 breakup of, 26, 31, 70 China, relations with, 106, 107, 108 collapse of, 20–23, 29, 42, 44, 45, 58, 81, 82, 95, 97, 105, 130, 136, 150 containment of, 150 defense expenditures, 47 economy, 18, 22, 23 Europe dominance sought by, 1, 2 NATO membership sought by, 94

Index213 nuclear weapons, 129 in space, 129 space developments, 17 threat, countering, 4, 23 U.S. focus on, 105 victory over, 135 space, Chinese advances in, 124 space, Soviet advances in, 129 space race, 17 Spain, 12, 15, 27, 148–149 Spanish-American War, 52, 149 Sparta, 148, 151 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 138–139 Spence, Mike, 126 Spratly Islands, 125 Sputnik, 17, 129 Sri Lanka, 116 Stalin, Joseph birthplace, 57 Communism at home as focus of, 21 death, 94 Hitler pact with, 74, 75 later leaders compared to, 19 territory acquired by, 22, 58 Ukrainian territory added to Russia by, 58 Stassen, Harold, 14 State Department, 11 state-owned enterprises, 108–109 state power, 48–49 stealth bombers, 125 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 52, 124 Stoltenberg, Jens, 43, 69, 158 Strategic Defense Initiative, 23 strategic missile defense, U.S., 22 strategic reevaluation, 6–7 Su-35 advanced jet fighters, 54–55 Suez Crisis, 1956, 16, 17 superpower confrontations, 17–18 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 8, 41, 42 Supreme Headquarters Atlantic, Norfolk, Va., 42, 43 surplus countries, trade, 113, 113t Sweden, 34, 68, 85

Switzerland, 34 Syria, 152, 153–154, 159 Taft, Robert, 13 Tai Shen Kuo, 131 Taiwan, 106 Taliban Afghanistan strongholds, attack on, 38 flight to Pakistan, 39 negotiations with, 159 U.S. war against, 40, 85, 138 tanks, German, 76 technology, geography versus, 53 Tehran, Iran, U.S. embassy attacked in, 130, 131 terrorism, war on, 84–85, 94–95 terrorist attacks, September 11, 2001 intelligence failure to anticipate, 130 NATO measures taken following, 41 overview of, 37–38 U.S. response to, 38–39, 55, 85, 87 Thiessen, Marc, 133 Thirty Years’ War, 53 Thucydides, 148 Thucydides challenge, 148–151, 162 Tiananmen Square massacre, 1989, 109, 110–111, 133 Timsit, Annabelle, 101 Tomahawk missiles, 90, 154 Tonkin Gulf incident, 154 Toynbee, Arnold, 151 trade deficits with China, 112–113, 113t transcontinental railroad, Chinese, 115 transport planes, 125 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1990, 32, 54, 69 Trotsky, 21, 71 Truman, Harry alliances established by, 2 American policy review ordered by, 6–7 containment policy adopted by, 48 Eisenhower operational command given by, 7 Korea attack, response to, 5 U.S. armed forces sent to Europe by, 13 West Germany rearmament, views on, 8–9

214Index Truman Doctrine, 1, 2 Trump, Donald Afghanistan troop withdrawal under, 85–86, 139 China handling of coronavirus pandemic criticized by, 123 China policy, 126–127, 128–129, 147, 151, 159–160 East European countries welcomed into NATO by, 45 election of, polls taken before, 100 foreign policy, 159 Germany, policy toward, 69–70, 77, 79, 101 Iran nuclear deal scrapped by, 68 Kim Jong-un, dealings with, 130–131 Korean Peninsula denuclearization challenges, 90 media coverage of, 103 missile defense system policy, 57 NATO, attitude concerning, 86 NATO policy, 46, 144 nonpartisan analysts appointed by, 136 quotes, 135 Road and Belt Forum not attended by, 120 Russia threat assessed by, 143 Syria policy, 154 Ukraine policy, 42, 61–62 U.S. threats assessed by, 140 U.S. trade deficit with China, goal of reducing, 112 Turkey military spending, 51 missiles withdrawn from, 18 NATO membership, 15, 27, 159 Soviet pressure against, 4 two-front war, World War II and Cold War compared, 11 Tyler, John, 123 tyrannies, 25 Ukraine aid to, 41–42 boundaries of, 58 disarmament by, 59 GDP, 68

Germany, tensions with, 68 Germany-Russia relations and, 99 independence, 25, 58, 71, 156 industries, 31 leadership changes, 59 NATO membership sought by, 28–29, 45, 68, 84, 143 NATO protection for, 78, 102 Putin focus on, 62 Russia fears of, 83 Russian invasion of, 2014, 54, 57, 66, 68, 69 security of, 103 security of, NATO watching, 33 U.S. troops in, 44 violence in, 60 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 120 United Kingdom, 49, 87, 94 United Nations, 26 United States advanced-nation status, 126–127 Afghanistan policy, 138–139 armed forces, 5, 13, 15, 23, 88, 98 China threat to, 103, 104, 105, 106, 122–123, 125, 128–129, 131–132, 133, 140, 144–145, 150–151, 155, 161–162 defense industry, 131, 132 defense spending, 52, 78, 87, 123, 124 European defense, role in, 7, 47, 48 foreign intelligence failures, 129–131 GDP, 51 Germany policy, 77, 79 Germany’s defense, role in, 51, 68–69, 70 globalist foreign policy elite, 46, 98, 99, 102, 136, 152 grand strategy, reconsidering, 136 as Iran archenemy, 96 Japanese attack on, 75 Kosovo crisis, role in, 37 manufacturing employment, decline in, 109 military commitments, public opinion on, 14 national security and interest, 161 NATO aid to, 37–38, 102 NATO continuation impact on, 82

Index215 NATO funding, contribution to, 91–94 NATO policy, post–Cold War, 81–82, 83, 133, 136, 158–159 NATO pros and cons for, 86, 99, 100, 162 NATO role in protecting interests of, 97 Nord Stream 2 opposed by, 69 nuclear weapons, 49, 76 political will in, 22 Road and Belt project, response to, 122–123 Russian NATO membership opposed by, 94–95, 97 Russia threat to, 140, 141–144 strategic policy, review of, 6–7 as superpower, 52, 105, 135, 136–137, 149, 150 terrorism, war on, 84–85, 94–95 terrorist attack against, September 11, 2001 (see terrorist attacks, September 11, 2001) threats to, 140–145 trade deficit with China, 112–113, 113t Ukraine policy, 59–62 as Western Europe’s leader and protector, 23 as world's sole superpower, 26, 29 World War I, participation in, 71–72, 158 World War II, participation in, 75–76, 158 United States Army, 44 United States Congress, 13–14 United States Senate, 14 U.S.–British alliance, 149 U.S.–China conflict, theoretical, 101 U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 110 U.S.–China relations accommodation versus defense, 150–151 clash of civilizations, 145–148 Hong Kong impact on, 127 Nixon trip to China, 106, 107–108 post–World War II, 106 through World War II, 120–122

trade relations, 109–110, 151 under Trump, 126–127 U.S. Civil War, 146 U.S. foreign policy in Cold War era, 2 debates on, 12–15, 24 general, 161 mistakes, 136–140, 152–155 U.S.–French relations, 16–17 U.S. ground forces, 7 U.S. National Defense Strategy Commission, 133 U.S.–Russia conflict, theoretical, 101 U.S.–Russia relations, 28, 56–57, 137 U.S. Seventh Army, 12, 24 U.S. troops, 6, 9–15 Versailles Treaty, 1919, 11, 72, 73, 74 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, 39–40, 42 veterans, suicide among, 88–89 Vietnam, American troops in, 12 Vietnamization, 107 Vietnam War (1964–1975), 18, 88, 107, 129, 154–155 von Braun, Werner, 17 Vorobiev, Dima, 95–96 Walesa, Lech, 83 Wales Summit, 2014, 45, 54 Walt, Stephen, 136, 152, 158–159 Wanghia, Treaty of, 1844, 122 war Congressional power to declare, 10 history of, 53 as nation-state system feature, 53 war power, 52–53 Warsaw Pact, 15, 20, 84, 94, 150 Warsaw Summit, 2016, 43 Washington, Treaty of, 1949, 23, 38, 46 Washington Summit, 1999, 29 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 86, 89, 130, 139 West, political will in, 22 West, Russian inferiority complex vis-`a-vis, 47

216Index Western civilization, 145–146 Western competitors, Chinese discrimination against, 119 Western Europe attack against, deterring, 23 U.S. defense of, 2, 9–11, 24 Western institutions, 45 Western powers, 5, 94 Western Union Command Organization, 8, 102, 156–157 West Germany defense of, 6 East Germany attack, potential against, 4 Korean War effect on, 5–6 NATO membership, 15, 27, 94 occupational force in, 9 rearming, 8–9 U.S. divisions in, 11, 24 Westphalia, Treaty of, 1648, 53 West Prussia, 75 Wherry, Kenneth, 13, 14 William II, Kaiser of Germany, 149 Wilson, Woodrow, 8, 72, 156 women in U.S. armed forces, 88 world affairs, 14–15 World Bank, 109, 127, 150–151 world events, nation's ability to influence, 52 “world island” (concept), 114–115 world leadership, clash for, 162 World Trade Organization (WTO), 109, 112, 119, 151 World War I, 53, 70–73, 149–150 World War II Cold War compared to, 11 consequences, 75–76

geography importance in, 53 German defeat in, 70, 150 power use prior to, 49 start of, 8, 74 U.S.–China relations during, 106, 122 Xi Jinping China reach stated by, 125–126 China regression under, 110 military growth target, 123 New Silk Road project announced by, 114, 115 rise of, 113–114 Road and Belt project promoted by, 118, 119, 120 Russia-China relations under, 55 ruthlessness of, 133 Yalta Conference, 1945, 1 Yanukovych, Viktor, 59, 60 Yeltsin, Boris criticism of, 22 as elected president, 19, 31 on expansionism, 82–83 Group of Seven joined by, 94 NATO expansion opposed by, 84 NATO membership sought by, 97 NATO-Russia relations under, 54 privatization accepted by, 32 Trilateral Statement signed by, 59 Yugoslavia breakup of, 36 economic aid to, 12 fighting in, 35 NATO influence on, 46 Yushchenko, Viktor, 59

About the Author WESLEY B. TRUITT bases his analysis in NATO Reconsidered on his academic training, experience working as an executive in the military aerospace industry, years of teaching international politics at the university level, and international business activities with the State and Defense Departments and the CIA. He earned a PhD in political science at Columbia University, where he was a President’s Fellow, an International Relations Scholar, and an International Fellow. Besides this, he completed his BA honors in international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and was also the president of his social fraternity. Further, Dr. Truitt earned a postgraduate diploma from the University of Florence, Italy, and was a National Science Foundation Scholar. He began his career as a political science professor. He was a guest lecturer for one year in national security decision making at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College. He served in the federal government for three years in various capacities, including internships at the State Department and NASA. He transitioned to the private sector and became an executive at Northrop Grumman Corporation, where he served for twenty-five years in different roles including corporate director—policy analysis, executive assistant to the CEO/chairman, and vice president—Europe and Middle East. He traveled the world on behalf of the company while working closely with the State and Defense Departments as well as with the CIA. He gave addresses at the Brookings Institution, CATO Institute, the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, the CIA, Claremont Graduate School, and the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. After leaving Northrop Grumman, he became adjunct professor at UCLA’s Anderson Graduate School of Management, Executive-inResidence at the College of Business Administration at Loyola Marymount University, and adjunct professor at Pepperdine University’s School of Public Policy. He was a consultant to RAND Corporation, the U.S. Air Force’s principal think tank, and is a member of RAND’s Policy Society. Praeger Publishers also published four of his earlier books: Business Planning, What Entrepreneurs Need to Know about Government, The Corporation, and Power and Policy. Dr. Truitt published three espionage novels based on his work in the military aerospace industry: Stealth Gambit, Spy Brothers, and Ghost Missile. Visit ­www​.­westruitt​.­com