NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism : Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism 9780313015533, 9780275976637

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NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Recent Titles in Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations

The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000 Charles G. Cogan Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War Thomas M. Nichols NATO for a New Century: Atlanticism and European Security Carl C Hodge, editor

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism

Edited by Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens

HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CathalJ. Nolan, Series Editor Executive Director, International History Institute, Boston University

PRAEGER

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data NATO and European security : alliance politics from the end of the Cold War to the age of terrorism / edited by Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens. p. cm. — (Humanistic perspectives on international relations, ISSN 1535-0363) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-97663-7 (alk. paper) 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2. National security—Europe. 3. Statesponsored terrorism—Europe. 4. Security, International. 5. Post-communism. 6. Europe—Defenses. I. Moens, Alexander, 1959- II. Cohen, Lenard J. III. Sens, Allen Gregory, 1964- IV. Series. JZ5930A44 2003 355'.031'091821—dc21 2002022435 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2003 by Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2002022435 ISBN: 0-275-97663-7 ISSN: 1535-0363 First published in 2003 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). P Copyright Acknowledgment Portions of chapter 3 in this volume originally appeared in Jolyon Howorth, "European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?" Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 4 (November 2001): 765-789. Reprinted with permission. In order to keep this title in print and available to the academic community, this edition was produced using digital reprint technology in a relatively short print run. This would not have been attainable using traditional methods. Although the cover has been changed from its original appearance, the text remains the same and all materials and methods used still conform to the highest book-making standards.

Advisory Board Martin S. Alexander University ofSalford Juan Carlos M. Beltramino Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales Klaus von Beyme Ruprecht-Karls Universitdt Heidelberg Luigi Bonanate Universita di Torino David P. Forsythe University of Nebraska Kalevi Holsti University of British Columbia Robert H. Jackson Boston University Ethan B. Kapstein University of Minnesota Andre Kaspi Universite de Paris, Sorbonne James Mayall Cambridge University Linda B. Miller Wellesley College and Brown University Joel H. Rosenthal Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs Shmuel Sandier Bar-Ilan University Michael J. Smith University of Virginia Maurice Vaisse Universite de Reims

In memory of the American, Canadian, and other victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Contents

Series Foreword Cathal J. Nolan Acknowledgments

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

ix xiii

Acronyms

xv

Introduction: NATO in Transition Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens

xix

"Community of Fate" or Marriage of Convenience? ESDP and the Future of Transatlantic Identity David G. Haglund

/

The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the "New" NATO, and Canada Allen G. Sens

19

Ideas and Discourse in the Construction of a European Security and Defense Policy for the Twenty-first Century Jolyon Howorth

37

European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-first Century Pascal Boniface

55

Thinking Outside the Box: NATO-ESDP Cooperation at Twenty-Three Alexander Moens

67

European Security and Defense Policy: What's in It for Canada? John Bryson

83

viii 7

Contents Is Canada a European Country? Julian Lindley-French

109

8. Blue Helmets, Green Helmets, Red Tunics: Canada's Adaptation to the Security Crisis in Southeastern Europe Lenard J. Cohen

125

9. NATO's Nuclear Future: A Rationale for NATO'ss Deterrence Capabilities Karl-Heinz Kamp

755

10 The Coupling Paradox: Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defense, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship James Fergusson

153

Selected Bibliography

173

Index

777

List of Contributors

185

Series Foreword

International relations is a thoroughly humanistic subject. All its actors are human beings, or they are institutions and organizations built and controlled by human intention and maintained by daily decision-making. Individual states, which emerged as the most powerful and decisive actors on the world stage over the past 350 years, are not reified constructs with an independent will or social reality beyond human ken or volition. Properly regarded, they are wholly human constructs. All states are designed for, and are bent to, the realization of goals and aspirations of human communities. That is true whether those ambitions are good or evil, spiritual or material, personal or dynastic, or represent ethnic, national, or emerging cosmopolitan identities. So, too, is the international society of states a human construct, replete with its tangled labyrinth of international organizations, an expansive system of international law that creates binding obligations across frontiers, ancient norms of diplomacy and ritualized protocol, webs of economic, social and cultural interaction, and a venerable penchant for disorder, discord, and war. Immanuel Kant observed with acute accuracy: "Out of the crooked timber of Humanity, no straight thing was ever made." The endless drama of human affairs thus gives rise to motley events, decisions, and complex causal chains. At the international level, too, we encounter the foibles of human beings as individuals and in the aggregate, and come upon a mix of the rational and irrational in human motivation. All that makes formal "modeling" of international politics a virtual impossibility—a fact that is itself a source of deep frustration to idealistic reformers and social scientists alike. On the other hand, precisely because international relations is so deeply humanistic a subject, it is a rich realm for the exercise of broad political and moral judgment. It is a natural arena for serious ethical reflection by and about those who frame foreign policies and practice statecraft. It is proper for scholars and informed citizens to praise or censure leadership decisions and actions. In short, as in all realms of human endeavor, moral judgment is not only implicit in every decision or action (or inaction) taken in international relations, it is a core duty of leadership, an apt function of scholarship, and a basic requirement for any educated citizenry.

X

Series Foreword

These facts are clear, and even self-evident. At its classical best, political science understood them, and therefore drew its questions from the conversation across time of the great political thinkers as well as from current policy debates, to examine both in a rich discourse that was historically and philosophically aware, even as it was rigorous and well-grounded empirically. In contrast, much contemporary political science purports to describe and explain international relations through elaboration of objective "laws" of politics or economics, which entirely overlook its humanistic character. At its modern and "postmodern" worst, the discipline is prone to mere methodological preoccupations, striking elaborate poses about arcane topics, and impenetrable prose. For instance, positivism's search for a "rational choice" model of human conduct assumes that individuals are "rational actors" who purposively seek to maximize their interests. In seeking a universal, deductive theory (broadly modeled on academic economics, where similar methodologies are employed with little explanatory success), too many political scientists eschew historical or philosophically informed case study in favor of a crude reduction of all politics to formal models. These usually engage extreme simplifications, couched in an obscurantist terminology, which model what was already known, or is obvious, or are so generalized that they account for nothing specific. Over that thin substance is then spread a thick veneer of false rigor, packaged in mathematical formulae that are, and are intended to be, intimidating to the uninitiated. Left out is the fact that most things of lasting importance in human affairs may be explained not by "rational choices," but by ideology and ignorance, blundering and stupidity, courage and self-sacrifice, enlightened vision, fanaticism, or blind chance (what Machiavelli called fortuna). Alternately, the "critical theory" school in political science rejects any epistemology holding that reality exists separately from the academic observer, and is therefore objectively knowable to any real degree. All knowledge about international relations instead merely reflects the biases and power interests of the observer (the usual suspects are racial, class, or economic elites). Scholars are warned against the attempt to achieve objective knowledge of the reality of international relations, which traditionally was the moral and intellectual raison d'etre of their profession. Rather than seek to impartially map out, explore, and explain the international society of states and its complex subsystems and mores, a feat said to be impossible, scholars are to directly engage and change the world (even though that, too, ought to be impossible, if they are unable to understand it in the first place). Too often, this leads to polemical studies that purport to unmask elites whose pervasive and corrupt power is said to sustain and operate a fatally unjust international system. There is much intolerance and angry posturing here as well, in calls for "exposure" of "fellow-traveling" academic approaches identified as legitimizing and reinforcing irredeemably illicit power structures. In sum, in its epistemological assertion that all knowledge is radically subjective or merely political, critical theory denies the possibility of objective knowledge or the value of other scholarly traditions. This series does not support the contention that all significant political action is reducible to rational choice or that it is impossible to acquire objective knowledge

Series Foreword

XI

about world affairs. Instead, it promotes a classical, humanistic approach to international relations scholarship. It is dedicated to reviving and furthering the contribution to understanding made by classical studies—by knowledge of history, diplomacy, international law, and philosophy—but it is agnostic regarding the narrow ideology or specific policy conclusions of any given work. It supports scholarly inquiry that is grounded in the historical antecedents of contemporary controversies, and well versed in the great traditions of philosophical inquiry and discourse. The series recognizes that, at its most incisive, international relations is a field of inquiry that cannot be understood fully outside its historical context. The keenest insights into the meaning of economic, legal, cultural, and political facts and issues in contemporary world affairs are always rooted in appreciation that international society is a historical phenomenon, not a theoretical abstraction or a radical departure from prior experience. Hence, the series welcomes interdisciplinary scholarship dealing with the evolution of the governing ideas, norms, and practices of international society. It encourages a dialectic rooted in abiding intellectual, ethical, and practical interests that have concerned and engaged intelligent men and women for centuries, as they tried to reconcile the historical emergence of modern states with wider or older notions of political community. This series is especially interested in scholarly research on the varied effects of differences in power—whether economic, political, or military—on relations between nations and states. The causes of war and the supports of peace, both in general and concerning specific conflicts, remain a core interest of all serious inquiry into international relations. Similarly, there is an enduring need for studies of the core requirements of international order and security, and of international political economy, whether regionally or globally. Scholarship is also welcome that is concerned with the development of international society, both in the formal relations maintained by states and in broader demands for political, economic, social, and cultural justice on the subnational and even individual level. Finally, the series promoted scholarly investigation of the history and changing character and status of international law, into international organization, and any and all other means of decentralized governance that the states have invented to moderate their conflicts and introduce a measure of restraint and equity to the affairs of international society. Cathal J. Nolan

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Acknowledgments

The editors express their appreciation for the financial support received from the President's Office and Dean of Arts at Simon Fraser University, the Institute of International Relations, and the Institute for European Studies at the University of British Columbia. We also wish to acknowledge the financial support received from the Department of National Defense, Canada. We are grateful for the staff work provided by Suzy Hainsworth as well as the assistance from Ben Fishman and Emily Munro in the organization of the conference that led to this volume. Tim Came and Bruce Lord, both from Simon Fraser University, also provided very useful assistance in formatting and editing the manuscript.

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Acronyms

ABM

anti-ballistic missile

AMD

allied missile defense

AOI

Area of Interest (NATO)

AOR

Area of Responsibility (NATO)

ARRC

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

ATMD

anti-tactical missile defense

AWAC

airborne warning and control

BM/C2

battle management/command and control

BMDO

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

C3I

command, control, communications, and intelligence

CCC

Capabilities Commitments Conference

CDU

Christian Democratic Union

CEC

Cooperative Engagement Capability (U.S. Navy)

CESDP

Common European Security and Defense Policy

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

CIVPOL

Civilian Police (UN)

CJTF

Combined Joint Task Force

COPS

Political and Security Committee of the EU

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DCI

Defense Capabilities Initiative

DFAIT

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

DPP

Defense Planning Process (NATO)

EC

European Community

Acronyms

XVI

ECMM

European Community Monitoring Mission

EDC

European Defense Community

EEC

European Economic Community

EIAD

extended integrated air defense

ESDI

European Security and Defense Identity

ESDP

European Security and Defense Policy

ESDPS

European Security and Defense Planning System

EU

European Union

EUROFOR

European (Rapid Deployment) Force

EUROMARFOR

European Maritime Forces

FCO

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)

FEDN

Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale

FRS

Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

G-7

Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the United States)

G-8

Group of Eight (G-7 plus Russia)

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP

gross domestic product

GNP

gross national product

GPALS

global protection against limited strikes

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

ICTY

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia

IFOR

Implementation Force (Dayton Accords)

IFRI

Institut Fran^ais des Relations Internationales

IGC

intergovernmental conference

IHEDN

Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale

IISS

International Institute for Strategic Studies

INF

intermediate-range nuclear forces

IRBM

intermediate-range ballistic missile

IRC

International Red Cross

ITWAA

Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment

KFOR

Kosovo Force

LANDJUT

Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland

MACC

Mine Action Coordination Centre

MAD

mutual assured destruction

MD

missile defense

MEAD

medium extended air defense

Acronyms MLF

Multilateral Force

MOD

Ministry of Defense (UK)

MRBM

medium-range ballistic missile

MSU

Multinational Specialized Unit

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

nongovernmental organization

NMD

national missile defense

NPG

Nuclear Planning Group

NPT

Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSDD

National Security Decision Directive

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCG

Policy Coordination Group

PDD

Presidential Decision Directive

PJC

Permanent Joint Council

RCMP

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RMA

revolution in military affairs

RUSI

Royal United Services Institute

SACEUR

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SDI

Strategic Defense Initiative

SDR

Strategic Defense Review

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defense

SFOR

Stabilization Force

SHAPE

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

SIRPA

Service dTnformation et de Relations Publiques des Armees

SNF

short-range nuclear forces

SPD

Social-Democratic Party of Germany

START

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TMD

theater missile defense

UK

United Kingdom

UKNLAF

Dutch-British Amphibious Force

UN

United Nations

UNHCR

UN High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF

UN International Children's Emergency Fund

UNMACBH

UN Mine Action Center, Bosnia-Herzegovina

UNMIBH

UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

UNMIK

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

x

Tviii UNMOP

Acronyms UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

UNPREDEP

UN Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR

UN Protection Force

UNSC

UN Security Council

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEU

Western European Union

WHO

World Health Organization

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

Introduction: NATO in Transition Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, Allen G. Sens For the moment, NATO is the best—indeed the only—game in town.... NATO may need to prioritize activities if some allies become involved in major military operations. But the events of September 11 have, if anything, reinforced the logic of our pre-existing agenda.... We will indeed have to broaden and adapt this agenda. But we will not jettison the fundamentals. —Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General, October 2001 FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE "AGE OF TERRORISM": A DECADE OF TURBULENCE

For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), transition was the quintessential feature of the 1990s. Wedged between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of warfare against international terrorism, the decade from 1991 to September 11,2001, certainly constituted a period of profound adjustment and change for the alliance. For example, at the beginning of the decade, the alliance witnessed the end of the forty-year struggle between Soviet-sponsored communism and Western democracy. As the Cold War challenge receded, however, a new spate of ethnoreligious conflicts quickly erupted, particularly in Southeastern Europe and Eurasia. By the end of 1995, NATO had been called upon to directly intervene in the Balkans, and to assume a peacekeeping mission that would later be extended in a somewhat different form to Kosovo and Macedonia. At the end of the period (on September 12,2001), the alliance was again challenged, and for the first time in its history invoked its collective defense clause (Article 5), thereby associating NATO closely with a new U.S.- and British-led war against terrorism. It was not immediately clear what role the alliance would play in the new conflict

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Introduction: NATO in Transition

with international terrorism, a struggle that President George W. Bush termed the "first war of the twenty-first century." What could be said, however, is that NATO was about to undergo another period of organizational adaptation. The turbulent 1990s had presented NATO with a host of new challenges. For example, at the NATO gathering in London in the summer of 1990, the allies "extended the hand of friendship" to their former adversaries in the Warsaw Pact. The North Atlantic Alliance has successfully pursued dialogue, cooperation, and partnership with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and even offered some of these states membership in the alliance. Meanwhile, NATO has also tried to create a unique relationship with Russia, reflecting the latter's weight in European security even following the Cold War. NATO grew to nineteen members in 1997, and has currently twenty-seven partner countries. It is likely to begin negotiations on a second round of enlargement at a summit planned in the fall of 2002 in Prague. The alliance also faced the desire of West European countries to have more "say and do" in their own security and defense policies. Following the close of the Soviet era, the European Community (EC) transformed itself into a European Union (EU) with competence beyond trade in areas in foreign and security policy as well as in what we would now call "homeland defense" areas against asymmetrical threats. In the case of Europe, these threats are seen to be foremost in refugee flows, illegal migration, and drugs and arms trafficking. Subsequent accords at Maastricht (1991), Amsterdam (1997), and Helsinki (1999) propelled the European Union forward in political jurisdiction and in military capability. For decades the North Atlantic Council had been a forum for consultation and decisionmaking among the allies regarding issues "that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern."1 With the growing capacity of the Western European Union (WEU) and now the European Union to undertake security operations ranging from low-level threat search and rescue to operations of peace enforcement, the political center has shifted. NATO responded by constructing a European identity within the alliance and by streamlining its command structures and military plans. Using U.S. military doctrine, it created Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a means to allow various coalitions of European and or Partnership for Peace countries to contribute to peace support operations. Since 1998, European allies have dedicated a good deal of resources and planning to create "an autonomous capacity" to undertake crisis management operations. While afraid during the early years of the decade of undermining NATO with any European initiatives, Great Britain has now joined its continental partners, suggesting that a European reinvestment in security and defense will actually benefit NATO in the long run and keep the United States fully engaged. Given the scarcity of military resources and need for cross-Atlantic solidarity, these developments have led to a good deal of soul-searching about the long-term purpose of NATO and the role of the United States in Europe. Perhaps more decisive than all the political and military reform undertaken by the alliance to absorb Eastern partners and accommodate European Union aspira-

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tions, was NATO's involvement in four successive waves of armed conflict in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Non-Article 5 or crisis management other than collective defense dominated NATO's military agenda in this decade. The inability of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia to safeguard the Muslim population brought the United States and NATO to the front of Balkan crisis management. NATO's bombing campaign in 1995 prepared the ground for the Dayton Accords, which secured an armed peace in Bosnia. NATO peace enforcement forces are still deployed to implement these agreements. In a much more controversial operation, NATO forces bombed Serbia into a compromise settlement between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Again, NATO forces remain deployed to protect the fragile line between the remaining Serbs and the majority Albanian population. Operation Allied Force arguably reached some of its humanitarian objectives, though in a costly manner, but it failed to strengthen the tie between the NATO allies. In its aftermath, the U.S. government has urged its allies to modernize their forces, particularly the capacity to deploy rapidly and to fight in a fully interoperable manner with the United States. The so-called Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) is an ongoing forum inside NATO where member states are planning concrete steps toward modern "plug-and-play" forces. On the other side, the conflict in Kosovo convinced various European governments that they needed more capability in order to "balance" the activities of the alliance. The three popularized lessons learned in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are that the allies can be effective only if they act early, if they speak with one voice, and if they are prepared to use some amount of force to back up their position. In the most recent conflict, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), NATO has taken on an early crisis management role in a "wellcoordinated approach with the European Union—with discreet, effective backing from the George W. Bush administration."2 Washington's envoy, James Pardew, has worked with the EU envoy, Frangois Leotard, to bring together the parties to sign a framework for constitutional change and the disarmament of the National Liberation Army of the guerrilla Albanians. Unlike the case of the conflict in Kosovo, NATO did not stay in the background during the early diplomatic phase, and unlike the crisis in Croatia in 1991, NATO and the European Union were never at obvious cross-purposes. Rather, a remarkable sense of EU-NATO cooperation has evolved at the highest levels under the direction of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson. The strong bond of cooperation between the two men has helped ease, at least for the time being, some of the growing pains between the European Union's new security and defense policy and NATO's continuing role in crisis management. Initial views that the European Union should take the leading crisis management role in the Macedonian crisis of early 2001 and that the Bush administration would not be forthcoming in military participation have proven wrong. NATO has maintained its lead role in the area and the Bush administration has played an active part in averting an all-out civil war. While the United States is more reluctant to deploy ground forces, it has provided logistical and intelligence support to such allies as Britain and France.

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Introduction: NATO in Transition

Operation Essential Harvest was deployed in August 2001 after the three conditions set by the European Union's Javier Solana and NATO's Secretary-General Lord Robertson had been met. With very cautious rules of engagement, NATO troops began to disarm the guerrillas after the political accord was signed by a grand coalition government in Skopje, after an effective cease-fire was in place, and after the rebels agreed to voluntarily disarm. Remarkably, given the effort by the Europeans to construct a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and an autonomous military capacity since the Kosovo crisis, European allies were reluctant to take over NATO's task at the close of Operation Essential Harvest. When Francois Leotard proposed in early September 2001 that Europe's nascent Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) should deploy in FYROM to protect the monitors that will be sent by the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union's foreign ministers, including France "were united in dismissing the idea as premature.... They deemed America's continuing involvement, through NATO, vital."3 In late September 2001, NATO allies agreed to replace Operation Essential Harvest with Operation Amber Fox. This roughly 1,000-strong NATO operation led by the Germans and with strong French participation will provide the military backup to secure the safety of the international monitors finalizing the implementation of the peace and disarmament accord.4 BEYOND SEPTEMBER 11: NATO AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM The tragic events of September 11, 2001, opened a new phase in international relations, and once again presented the alliance with new challenges and responsibilities as a multilateral organization. Indeed, soon after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, NATO—which many pundits had prematurely dismissed as a terminally ill alliance—quickly began to reorient its role in the field of international security. As NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson put it on September 28: "NATO's bedrock—the commitment to collective defense [Article 5, remains] as valid and essential in today's new security environment as it was in 1949." Only ten days later, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Ottawa, Robertson made it clear that the "civilized world" had embarked on a new mission. "We will not allow the man of blood to dictate our agenda or our policies or our lives— This is not business as usual."5 The United States and the United Kingdom, not NATO, would bear the major responsibility for the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was harboring Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist organization. But Robertson left no doubt that NATO would play an important role in the activities of the emerging anti-terrorist coalition: The horrific events of September 11 have transformed completely the world in which we live How many of our generals or defense ministers are focusing today on the threats

Introduction: NATO in Transition

xxin

andrisksthat pre-occupied them just a month ago? How many foreign, and finance and interior ministers are able to concentrate on their traditional agendas? And how many parliamentarians can say that their concerns and those of their constituents have not been fundamentally affected by what happened in New York and in Washington and in Pennsylvania? ... NATO is at the heart of this international effort. Nobody expects the Alliance to lead the military action against bin Laden and the Taliban. But we will be central to the collective response of the international community to terrorism, both now and in the longer term.6 Ironically, one of NATO's first challenges in anti-terrorist security maintenance was how to deal with terrorist cells, originally trained by the United States, and often residing directly in the sights of alliance forces. Thus in 1992, soon after the onset of the war in Bosnia, thousands of "Afghan Arabs," that is, mujahidin fighters from various Middle Eastern states who had journeyed to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet occupation, migrated to Bosnia hoping to assist their Muslim brethren in a struggle against Serbian and, for a time, Croatian forces. As the underdog within the Bosnian ethnoreligious triangle, the Bosnian Muslims welcomed the assistance of the militarily seasoned Afghan warriors. Most of the mujahidin who arrived in Bosnia had been armed by the United States during the 1980s to fight against Soviet control of Afghanistan. A large segment of the Bosnian mujahidin were also closely associated with the most prominent Afghan Arab, the Saudi Arabian-born Osama Bin Laden, and his Al Qaeda organization. But after their defeat of Soviet forces, and the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan, many of the mujahidin felt abandoned by the United States and angry that U.S. military forces were permitted to enter Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. When U.S. and NATO troops began implementing the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia, they encountered the remnants of militarily skilled but anti-Western mujahidin forces. Many of the Bosnian-based mujahidin soon left the Balkans, but others—particularly those who had married Bosnian women—remained. The Bosnian mujahidin believed that they, not the Americans or Europeans, had defeated the enemies of Islam, both in Afghanistan and in Bosnia. In the years after Dayton, the residual mujahidin forces in Bosnia, a minority of whom were linked to extremist Middle East Islamic forces, were only loosely monitored by NATO officials governing Bosnia. No direct action was taken to obstruct or expose any terrorist-related activity on the part of the Bosnian mujahidin. Meanwhile, hundreds of Bosnian passports were provided to the mujahidin by the Muslim-controlled government in Sarajevo. NATO also failed to prevent training programs, clandestinely established in Bosnia for training a new generation of Muslim radicals whose main target was no longer Serbian power, but the "JudeoAmerican" alliance. Criminal elements in Bosnia and Kosovo who helped finance terrorism by moving drugs—mostly Afghan-produced opium later refined into heroin—from Turkey across the Balkans into Central Europe, also operated unchecked.

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Introduction: NATO in Transition

At the same time, some of Bin Laden's associates in the Balkans began associating with members of the insurgent Albanian forces in Kosovo (where some 70 percent of the Albanians are Muslims), who eventually became the de facto allies of the United States during NATO's 1999 military campaign against Serbia. Again, and ironically, the United States, which had originally supported and trained the Afghan Arabs, and then coddled their remaining forces in Bosnia, had become— because of Washington's obsession with removing Slobodan Milosevic and transforming Yugoslavia—the ally of the very radical Muslim elements who abhorred U.S. global hegemony and values, and who would eventually strike out ruthlessly against innocent civilian targets in New York. Indeed, even after Milosevic capitulated and was eventually ousted by his own countrymen in 2000, the militant fringe of the insurgent Albanian forces, and their few associates, continued to pursue an agenda that threatened to destabilize Southern Serbia and Macedonia. It was only in 2001, after NATO and EU officials realized that they were operating at cross-purposes with the Albanian insurgents, that the latter were pressured into accepting a fragile peace accord temporarily ending hostilities in Macedonia. But it was only after September 11 that Washington and NATO became fully awakened to the problems generated by the encouragement or benign political neglect of extremist and radical Muslim forces within and outside the Balkans. For example, in a rather blunt statement characteristic of the new climate, General Thorstein Skiaker, the outgoing commander of NATO troops in Kosovo (KFOR), remarked that the international community no longer saw the Albanians of the area as "an oppressed people under a tyrannical regime," as in 1999, but rather "as a people who have frittered away world support through bickering and pettiness of mind." "No longer," said Skiaker, "is anyone willing to consider extremists as people whose grievances should be understood." Thus, at the end of 2001, NATO found itself adopting various measures to flush out terrorist cells throughout Southeastern Europe. But while the new campaign against terrorism required hardheaded realism and urgent action, NATO's and Washington's record in choosing allies suggested that greater sensitivity be devoted to the dangers of fueling and expanding local wars, and making expedient alliances with unsavory political forces. Thus, while "absolutist political definitions" of friend and foe should not paralyze action against terrorism that must be adopted by the international community, the members of the alliance will need to take a careful and hard look at the long-term intentions of its newest allies (e.g., Afghanistan's Northern Alliance) in the struggle against radical Islamic violence and other forms of terrorism. OLD ALLIES, NEW INTERESTS? The chapters in this book analyze the transitions and tensions currently facing NATO. The "old" allies of the early Cold War years are facing an array of new challenges. Inevitably, some of those challenges will arouse divergent interests. Diverging interests occur not only in Europe, but between the Europeans on the one hand and the North American partners on the other. The core structures for re-

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gional security and stability in the transatlantic and European arena are undergoing major changes that have implications for international stability. The chapters that follow deal with the key policy issues. Will the European Security and Defense Policy, with its operational arm—the European Rapid Reaction Force—sideline NATO crisis management operations in Europe? Will the Europeans create their own "mini" Supreme Allied Headquarters with planning, operations, and command capability? Will the missile defense agenda as defined by the new Bush administration drive a wedge between European allies and the United States? Will the two sides in NATO continue to work together in the Balkans, or is the United States slowly withdrawing from this region? Analyzing the main themes in the transatlantic relationship between the European and North American allies, the authors of this book reach several conclusions. Though all of the chapters in this book were written before September 11, most of their findings appear to be reinforced by the aftermath of the terrorist strike against the United States. Despite rapid and substantive growth in a European Security and Defense Entity, NATO remains the most important security mechanism in Europe. At the same time, NATO is becoming a less cohesive, and less binding, security arrangement. Indeed, speculation over what the war against terrorism will mean for NATO is already under way. Charles Grant, a researcher with the EU-friendly Centre for European Reform, has concluded, for example, that it is unlikely that the United States will ever use NATO again "to manage a serious shooting war." He also predicts that NATO will transform more quickly now into a political organization that allows for closer relations with Russia: In the past, Article 5 appeared to be a barrier to Russian membership of NATO: west Europeans did notfindthe prospect of an obligation to defend Russia's Asian frontier appealing. However, now that Article 5 has been seen to involve a fairly loose political commitment to mutual defense, rather than one that is absolutely binding, that barrier is lower.7 Grant's predictions seem premature, but there is no doubt that the solidarity clause as used in the war against terrorism has redefined the political nature of collective defense. Several chapters in this book demonstrate that European and North American security and defense policy interests and perspectives are increasingly divergent. The response by the Clinton administration to the European plans for "autonomous capacity" in security and defense has been to insist on the so-called Three Ds. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for "no duplication" of military structures between NATO and the new military staff planned at the European Union. She also called for "no discrimination" of non-European Union NATO members, and finally for "no decoupling" of Europe's security from that of its North American allies.8 From the U.S. perspective, key threats to U.S. security lie mostly outside Europe. The attacks of September 11 appear to underscore this shift in security threats. As a result, a further drawback of U.S. assets and personnel from Europe

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now seems more likely. From the European perspective, a stronger partnership with Russia is needed to manage future Balkan crises and to work together in the war against terrorism. At a recent summit between Russian president Vladimir Putin and EU leaders it was agreed that the newly formed Political and Security Committee would have monthly consultations with the Russians. A week later Putin suggested that NATO should help the Russians to reform their military establishment.9 Not only do interests diverge across the Atlantic, but as always, the alliance is plagued with serious differences in the capabilities of the member states. The United States has decided to proceed in its war against terrorism with various bilateral agreements. This reflects the fact that few allies in NATO have the military wherewithal or the needed level of interoperability to be of much benefit to Operation Enduring Freedom. The emerging U.S. defense policy, particularly concerning the revolution in military affairs, missile defense, arms control, and responses to proliferation and regional conflicts, will also challenge transatlantic unity. Thus, the fact that airplanes were used as flying bombs on September 11 will not diminish the determination of the Bush administration to advance the research, development, and eventual deployment of missile defenses. Bush has made it clear that the United States will also keep up the pressure on Russia to amend or scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty even as it seeks active cooperation with Moscow on fighting global networks of terrorism. It remains to be seen whether NATO as an organizational entity engaged in antiterrorist activities will be able to find a suitable role for itself between U.S. unilateralism—which is likely to become enhanced by the direct terrorist challenge that has been presented to the United States—and the increasing assertiveness of a more self-confident European Union, which is endeavoring to enhance its own profile in the areas of foreign policy and security. For the moment, NATO SecretaryGeneral Robertson seems confident that the alliance could successfully adjust to its new role without much difficulty, since the events of September 11 "reinforced the logic" of the alliance's "preexisting agenda": NATO's 27 partner countries, ranging from Europe to Central Asia quickly joined the 19 allies in a statement condemning the events [of September 11].... [NATO] moved to operationalize the Article 5 commitment.... The Allies have agreed to provide enhanced intelligence support, air transit for military aircraft and access to ports and airfields. Elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces are to be deployed to the East Mediterranean.... Some U.S. assets in the Balkans will be replaced by European capabilities. Most significant— symbolically—is the move of NATO's AWACS airborne early warning aircrafts from their bases in Europe to replace U.S. aircraft now being transferred to Asia.10 Through such activities, Robertson asserted, and also by preventing the Balkans from becoming a "black hole" for terrorists, in the same way that Afghanistan had become a "safe haven" for violent extremists, NATO would be able to make a major contribution to the anti-terrorism coalition and to global stabilization.

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PONDERING THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP The chapters in this book do not represent single-country investigations or explorations of specific institutions. Rather, they address various challenges facing the future of the transatlantic relationship. In Chapter 1, David Haglund asserts that transatlantic conflict over security and defense "identity" courts the risk of imperiling the West's "community of fate." The primary source of this conflict is the divergence between the United States and France over competing visions of Pax Atlantica. The U.S. vision presupposes a role for "benign hegemony," whereas the French vision is predicated upon the necessity of "multipolarity." Divergent strategic cultures in the two countries lead to natural differences in their foreign policy approaches. Haglund suggests that overcoming these differences is a key to the future of the transatlantic relationship. In Chapter 2, Allen Sens argues that there is more cause for pessimism than optimism concerning the future of transatlanticism in general, and the future of NATO in particular. The "new" NATO reflects the values and interests that will continue to bind some form of transatlantic community together. However, the new NATO also poses several serious challenges to transatlantic unity, challenges that will have a corrosive effect on the current transatlantic relationship. The future is likely to be characterized by a less cohesive NATO, a less cohesive transatlantic community, and a decisionmaking environment characterized by less institutional clarity and more coalition decisionmaking. Sens is concerned about continued U.S. engagement in European security matters and Canada's position in the evolving transatlantic environment. He argues for a strategy of active engagement and contribution. In Chapter 3, Jolyon Howorth turns to the issues of an emerging European Security and Defense Policy and offers an insightful look at the difficulty Britain faces in aligning itself with continental approaches to ostensibly reform NATO, but by means of more EU autonomy. Howorth demonstrates how a slow but steady convergence of ideas and concepts has drawn the key European actors together on ESDP. However, Howorth is not as optimistic as Pascal Boniface on the future of ESDP. While Britain led the Anglo-French coalition that forms the backbone behind the ESDP initiative, Howorth argues that neither the British role nor the final outcome of this initiative can be taken for granted. Divergence on the political and military orientation and manifestation of the policy is still quite pronounced. From the outset, the Blair government has sought a Europeanist instrument to fix a credibility/capabilities problem in the North Atlantic Alliance. France, however, has viewed ESDP as a European solution to a European problem. In Chapter 4, Pascal Boniface argues that the emerging European defense capacity is truly new and will change old political and diplomatic habits, including those of the alliance. For Boniface, the transatlantic misunderstanding can be summed up as follows: the United States asks for burden sharing without power sharing, while Europe asks for more responsibility without spending more money

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on defense. Neither position is sustainable. The alliance is now entering a turbulent era in which a new strategic accommodation must be reached between the United States and Europe. Boniface is optimistic, suggesting that such an accommodation can be reached and in the long run transatlanticism will be strengthened. In Chapter 5, Alexander Moens suggests that NATO allies and EU members are making little progress in finding a working relationship between them because they have emphasized narrow, protective, and minimal organizational links. Building on the proposals brought to light in October 2000 by then secretary of defense William Cohen, Moens would have the allies "think outside the box." He proposes a combined NATO-EU governing arrangement composed of all twenty-three members for all non-Article 5 scenarios that includes shared decisionmaking, defense planning, and force generation, and the development of a large pool of common assets. While such an ideal model is not likely to be adopted by the allies, it points them in the direction of problem solving at twenty-three, which is increasingly the informal practice in NATO-ESDP consultations since the EU Nice Summit of December 2000. In Chapter 6, John Bryson reflects on the emergence of a "bipillar" alliance. Bryson argues that a EU military capacity is inevitable and will ultimately strengthen stability in Europe. Like Boniface, Bryson is optimistic about the ability of the European allies and partners to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden and the readiness of the United States to collaborate with the EU on a more equal footing. This should strengthen international security and stability and promote democratic values, trade, and the rule of law. However, Bryson observes that Canada's policymakers have been concerned about the notion of a bipillar alliance because such a double-headed structure could ignore Canada's historically deep and current interests in transatlantic and European security. Paradoxically, while Canada's broad interests would be served by a new transatlantic accommodation, its interests could also be harmed by exclusion in an increasingly bipillar relationship. In Chapter 7, Julian Lindley-French argues that Canada cannot be complacent about its place, role, or voice in the evolving environment of European security affairs. While acknowledging that for well over a hundred years Canada has "invested" in European security, sentiment counts for little in the modern world, and if Canada does not push, it will not be heard. That will require Canada's willingness to reinvest in its overall security effort so that Canada can "buy into" European defense. Failure to do so could mean that far from being a country in the European space, Canada will end up drawn closer to the United States. Europe still needs Canada and Canada still needs Europe. In Chapter 8, Lenard Cohen turns to NATO's engagement in the Balkans in general and Canada's role in particular. Cohen breaks down Canadian policy toward the Balkan region into three stages. The first stage coincides with the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, during which Canadian foreign policy underwent a conceptual adjustment to the post-Cold War environment. A second stage is marked by the outbreak and escalation of violence in the former Yugoslavia dur-

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ing the early 1990s, the growing frustration with the UNPROFOR mission, and the diminishing resources available for such defense-related missions. During the third and current stage, Canada's engagement in the Balkans (1996-2001) has focused heavily on peace development and human security concerns, as well as a shift to a "get in quick and get out fast" approach for military and peacekeeping missions. Conducted properly, and coordinated with Canada's allies, the author believes that the new emphasis on human security can realistically express Canada's comparative advantage in the area of peace development, enhance efforts by NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community at stabilization and democratic development, and also complement the development of a common European security policy. In Chapter 9, Karl-Heinz Kamp evaluates the challenges of managing nuclear weapons issues in the emerging European security environment. Kamp argues that the future of nuclear deterrence has to be reassessed, but not the question of "no first use." Kamp addresses three fundamental questions: What will be the future role of nuclear weapons in general and within NATO in particular? How will present trends in U.S. security policy (e.g., nuclear reductions, or national missile defense) affect the relationship of nuclear deterrence and defense? And finally, how should the issue of NATO's (U.S.) nuclear weapons deployed on European soil be resolved? Kamp argues that nuclear deterrence is still relevant, but that NATO governments have done a poor job explaining alliance nuclear policy to their publics, which has created confusion and a lack of political support. James Fergusson takes up the issue of national missile defense (NMD) in Chapter 10. Fergusson observes that many Europeans fear that a U.S. NMD will result in a "Fortress America" and essentially a condition of U.S. defection—better known as strategic decoupling. At the same time, the U.S. fear of entrapment has evaporated. Hence, Fergusson argues, NMD should be understood as reinforcing the U.S. political commitment to Europe. In fact, NMD enables the United States to escape from the unsettling and socially unacceptable condition of extended deterrence grounded upon a nuclear threat. In the absence of a similar missile defense capability for Europe, NMD also reinforces the importance of nuclear weapons in the alliance, as well as the political conditions for the likely creation of a "true" Euro-deterrent based upon French and British nuclear forces. Analyzing the main themes in the transatlantic relationship between the European and North American allies, the authors of this book reach the following conclusions: • NATO remains the most important security mechanism in Europe, but the alliance is becoming a less cohesive, less binding security arrangement. • Important aspects of European and North American security and defense policy interests and perspectives are divergent. A number of transatlantic stress points (including NATOESDP planning and operations, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and a shared vision of peace operations) have emerged that will determine the outcome of the new relationship between the European and North American allies in the near future. Managing these differences successfully, and developing the areas of commonality and shared interest, will

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be the most important task facing the alliance in the first decade of the twenty-first century. • The European Security and Defense Policy is more than a political identity. Although questions remain concerning decisionmaking and capabilities, Europe is making significant progress toward realizing the goal of a European defense capacity. This may compel a significant redefinition of the transatlantic relationship.

NOTES 1. Alliance New Strategic Concept, Rome, November 8, 1991, para. 21. 2. Joseph Fitchett, "Early Signs of Success in Macedonia," International Herald Tribune, July 9,2001. 3. "Wake Up," The Economist, September 13, 2001, pp. 45-46. 4. "Opening Statement by Secretary-General Lord Robertson," Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers, Brussels, September 26, 2001. 5. Federal News Service, October 9, 2001. 6. Ibid. 7. Charles Grant, "Does This War Show That NATO No Longer Has a Serious Military Role?" The Independent, October 16, 2001. 8. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "The State of the Alliance: An American Perspective," address at the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, December 15, 1999. 9. Judy Dempsey, "Moscow Asks NATO for Help in Restructuring," Financial Post, October 25, 2001. 10. M2 Presswire, October 11, 2001.

CHAPTER 1

"Community of Fate" or Marriage

of Convenience? ESDP and the Future of Transatlantic Identity David G. Haglund

INTRODUCTION: WHAT'S IN AN ACRONYM? The Germans have a word for it, Schicksalgemeinschaft, and during the Cold War it was not hard to take seriously the proposition that the Western allies were bound together in a "community of fate." Observers could and did disagree over exactly how the bonding was effected, with some believing that nuclear arrangements on the Central Front guaranteed that in the event of the war that they all wanted to prevent, none of the allies would be any safer than the Germans themselves—they would all share the same fate.1 But others took a less mechanistic (or lugubrious) view of what connected them, and placed the emphasis upon common values inherent in the world's great "democratic alliance."2 So long as the Cold War lasted, it was not that important to discern the nature of the bonding element, for whatever the geochemists might have said about the molecular makeup of the glue, the reality of bipolar, superpower rivalry rendered it easy to believe that the alliance was immune to dissolution; in the words of Glenn Snyder, writing at a time of heightened transatlantic bickering during the Reagan years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "cannot break up. Since [it] is a product of the bipolar structure of the system, it cannot collapse or change basically until that structure changes."3 Now that the Cold War and the Soviet Union are equally a decade in the past, the debate over NATO's future, and indeed that of the "West," continues to turn on whether alliances in general, and this one in particular, make sense without an adversary. The positions in this debate can be summarized according to how various theoreticians address this issue. Structural realists are nearly unanimous in agreeing that alliances without an enemy make no sense. Somewhat surprisingly, social constructivists have been prominent among those who say that alliances without a foe do make sense. And more than a few classical (or "neoclassical") realists think

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that the answer depends on whether it is in states' "interests" to keep foe-less alliances going. I find myself in this latter category, and in this chapter I will argue that how "interest" is interpreted will have much to do with the "identity" of the interpreting agents. In this respect, it is unfortunate that among transatlantic defense analysts, ESDP has become the acronym of choice, and even of geopolitical correctness, for what is thought to be taking place in Europe, namely that most of the members of the European Union (EU) are forging a European Security and Defense Policy (sometimes prefaced with the adjective Common, hence CESDP). For reasons not completely known to me, the earlier acronym attached to this phenomenon, ESDI, has fallen out of favor, at least on the European side of the Atlantic, possibly because it conjured up too close a link with NATO in some minds. This lexical demotion of ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity) is unfortunate, however, for in eliminating "identity" from the equation, we do run the risk of impeding rather than enhancing our understanding of the sources and consequences of Europe's bid to forge a more "autonomous" defense capability. Ironically, those who would take out "identity" in a bid to minimize NATO's centrality end up minimizing something else, the more important construct known as the "West," very much an imagined community, yet one that has served as a means of generating the kind of empathy associated with "collective identity."4 To attempt to reduce the alliance without at the same time reducing the West is to square the circle: it cannot be done. This is because there is a fundamental, if unspoken, contradiction at the heart of the European thrust for "autonomy" for its own sake. It inheres in the reality that the referent for European autonomy is and must be the United States. You do not have to be an anti-American to point out that for those who would build "Europe," the autonomy impulse is a response to the United States, just as it was during the Cold War.5 From this it follows that there will always exist potential for mishap in development of the project, as Europe and the United States will inevitably be struggling over a set of positional goods, the most important of which being "influence." And while it cannot be demonstrated that ESDP/ESDI must be divisive for the allies, the risk that it will be should not be minimized by wishful appeals to the "burden-sharing" benefits attending a more coherent European defense. What Samuel Huntington worrisomely terms an "antihegemonic coalition" with decidedly anti-American overtones could yet come to pass, and this even if no one at the moment really desires such an outcome.6 Accordingly, this paper will pursue the simple thought that conflict over security and defense "identity" courts the risk of imperiling the West's community of fate. If this happens, it will be in no small measure the result of divergences between the United States and France over competing visions of Pax Atlantica. The U.S. vision presupposes a role for "benign hegemony," whereas the French vision is predicated upon the necessity of "multipolarity." Neither country can be said to have virtue exclusively on its side, though each does have some arguments in its favor. We are not talking here about heroes and villains, but rather the working out

'Community of Fate" or Marriage of Convenience?

3

of natural differences in foreign policy postulates, derived in large measure from divergent strategic cultures. To repeat: it is not inevitable that we in the West should lose the habit of identifying strongly with each other on a transatlantic basis, and few overtly proclaim this to be their objective. But it could happen, and to understand why this is so we need to begin our inquiry with some reference to theory.

THE WEST (IN THEORY) As noted above, since the end of the Cold War it has become hard for some analysts to imagine that the Atlantic alliance, and even more to the point, the West, can continue intact without its former Warsaw Pact "Other," which many see as having given it the substance of its own identity. On this argument, the "political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its existence. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy."7 It has been fear, not common values, that has constituted the basis of the Schicksalgemeinschaft, and now that the former has diminished, the latter will become exposed as hollow. Christopher Coker relates that the allies no longer think in terms of destiny. We are living in a phase of history that can be defined by the prefix "post"—postmodern, post-Marxist, post-ideological.... No new tasks challenge the Western world's imagination. For a brief period in their history the Atlantic states did indeed share a common experience.... The attempt to create an Atlantic community was a courageous challenge to the reality that Europe and America had been divided for two centuries, and that they were continuing to grow apart. It was symbolic of the need of the moment. It could not be sustained beyond it. The moment has passed.8 Though the above claim was not made by a thinker who could be fitted into the category of "structural realist," it is easy to see how this kind of realist could warm to such a Spenglerian assessment of Atlanticism. For some time, the structural realists have been telling all who would listen that in the absence of the Cold War, NATO was going to have a rather short future. One such, Kenneth Waltz, even managed to reach the conclusion that NATO had disappeared!9 Other structural realists may be less insistent that it has vanished, but they sense nonetheless that there is something illusory about its existence. In Stephen Walt's imagery, NATO looks healthy only in the way that Oscar Wilde's roue, Dorian Gray, did: what really tells is the hideous state of the portrait up in the attic.10 The structural realists do not have the debate all to themselves. Powerful counterarguments, equally based in theory, have come from social constructivists who adhere to the "democratic peace."11 The most important of this theory's axioms is that democracies do not fight other democracies (though they can and do flex their military muscles against nondemocracies). From this it is assumed that the scourge of war, itself a by-product of the age-old "security dilemma," can be exorcised by

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the spread of democracy. But there is more to it: the theory is argued to have meaning not only for security communities but also for those more ambitious arrangements known as alliances. Democratic alliances, such as NATO, can thus be argued, pace the structural realists, to be held together not by fear but by a collective (liberal-democratic) identity. Therefore there is nothing surprising about NATO's remaining so centrally involved in European security a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union. Thomas Risse tell us why this should be so: [T]he transatlantic relationship has survived the end of the Cold War quite well [T]his is hard to reconcile with a traditional view of international relations as nothing but balanceof-power politics. Rather, recent events appear to confirm that the Western alliance represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies The end of the Cold War then not only does not terminate the Western community of values, but extends it into Eastern Europe and, potentially, even to the successor states of the Soviet Union creating a "pacific federation" of liberal democracies from Vladivostok to Berlin, San Francisco, and Tokyo.12 Somewhere between these theoretical poles can be found the classical realists. They have always been a more modest scholarly bunch than their structural cousins, and have tended to minimalist, or at least prudential, prophesying when they must prophesy at all, notwithstanding a general expectation that a sense of tragedy pervades the human condition, which James Kurth takes to be one of their earmarks.13 That said, the classical realists can certainly generate "NATO-friendly" predictions, on the basis of another of their earmarks: the notion that raison d'etat drives policymaking, which leads also to the thought that policymakers can steer their ships of state in any number of directions, as long as the "national interest" seems to require this. Thus it need be no mystery why NATO can appear so vigorous without its quondam adversary: various state interests have converged on the perception that the alliance remains necessary, or at least useful. The point is that this way of approaching the matter may not be wrong, but neither is it particularly profound. Moreover, classical realism has a not so "NATOfriendly" side, and can lead to less benign expectations regarding the alliance, on an identical logic, namely that should they reinterpret their respective interests in keeping it going, the allies could well let NATO lapse, because they wish it. There are also some less superficial, and for the alliance equally if not more problematical expectations that can be derived from classical realism. These, too, stem from classical realism's emphasis upon raison d'etre. To say again: "interest" in some nonnegligible manner must be dependent upon "identity," which is another way of noting that national ("state," really) interest cannot simply be deduced from assumptions about anarchy: this is the lesson the constructivists have taught the classical realists. If this is so, then there is reason to believe that a European security and defense "identity" might have worrisome implications for the West, if identity-building is going to require a competitive pos-

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5

ture toward the referent object of the enterprise. The pattern is a familiar one in respect of the formation of states, and there is no reason to believe it might not also apply to the creation of other forms of political organization, especially if these might be characterized, as Tony Blair has called the EU, as a "superpower not a superstate."14 Randall Schweller elaborates on the problem, and in doing so draws our attention to classical realism's roots. It may well be that security is one objective of states, and that security might even be a "positive-sum" value, such that many can enjoy it without others necessarily being deprived of it. But it hardly follows that all, or even most, objectives states pursue can be placed into similar public-goods baskets. In fact, they cannot, for the objects of states' desire—prestige, status, political influence, leadership, market share—are all "positional goods," available as are other such goods only in limited supply, thereby engendering among states a "constant positional competition."15 Evidence of such competition in the transatlantic context is not hard to come by, and even though there may be little reason to assume their commercial wrangling must drive a political and military wedge among the allies (as Marxists have so often believed), the same expectation may not apply to interaction that is more constitutive of identity in the security and defence domain. In particular, two kinds of interaction are worth examining. They are related: the first consists in the rivalry between France and the United States over the positional goods of "influence" and "leadership" within the alliance; and the second involves the ostensibly ethereal but eminently political discussion about the transformative prospects of the international system (transformed, that is, from today's "unipolarity" into a postulated "multipolarity"). I take these in turn in the following two sections. A FRENCH CONNECTION? In a recent analysis of the impact upon the United States of European efforts to forge ESDP, Stanley Sloan reminds us that there is a legacy of mistrust that exists upon the part of U.S. policymakers toward a France they widely suspect as being at the source of much if not all that goes wrong in transatlantic relations, chiefly though not only in the security realm.16 This legacy of distrust is hardly new, and tension in this particular bilateral relationship can easily be traced back two centuries, even if one accepts that there have also existed interludes of relative good feeling between the United States and the first country that it embraced, and later spurned, as an ally.17 The reason that it is easy to speculate upon a French connection in respect of transatlanticism is because the norms of the latter are thought to entail the need for "leadership," but that this in turn is critically dependent upon the presence of a reciprocal quality, "followership."18 And in this respect, not much has really changed since NATO's founding: the United States has problems trying to "lead" France, just as the latter has difficulty following the United States.

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From its very beginning in 1949, the alliance has wrestled with the problem of optimizing security and defense assets; it continues today to puzzle over the most rational application of defense means to security ends, even though the old threat has disappeared. From that same beginning, France was regarded by U.S. (and some other) policymakers as being of the utmost importance for the preservation of Western security. In the words of Sumner Welles, a former high-ranking official in the State Department during the Franklin Roosevelt years, France "has long been and is today [1951] more than ever the keystone in the arch of West European security." Without the cooperation of France, it would have simply been impossible for the new "Atlantic Defense Pact" to count for much of a safeguard against Soviet expansionism.19 Although in many ways Germany would assume the place of the keystone after its inclusion in the alliance in 1955, and by the closing years of the Cold War would emerge for some Americans as a prime partner with which to share leadership of the alliance,20 France continued to matter greatly to U.S. policymakers, and by extension to NATO. Now, with the ending of bipolarity, France has apparently regained importance for the future of an alliance from which it withdrew militarily in 1966, and to which it still refuses to "reintegrate."21 The sempiternal issue of "burden sharing" within NATO has in the past several years become one element in the debate over ESDI/ESDP, and while it would be wrong to imagine that a more capable "Europe of defense" is regarded as an unqualified blessing from Washington's point of view, solace can be had from the prospect that if the Europeans really do invest more efficiently in defense, greater balance might be brought to transatlantic security cooperation, with all that that implies for the ostensibly beleaguered U.S. taxpayer, to say nothing of a U.S. military increasingly held to be "overstretched."22 As Philip Gordon notes, France is one of the few West European states that takes defense seriously enough to be willing to invest in it. Surely, according to this line of reasoning, a France that, through the mechanism of ESDI/ESDP, was more fully enmeshed with its NATO partners would be a France more able to contribute effectively to the common defense, as well as to get its European Union neighbors so to contribute—with the result being a greater rationalization of Western defense and security cooperation.23 According, then, to thisfirstway of contextualizing the French connection, NATO will be strengthened materially pari passu with the elimination of bilateral frictions, because their removal will provide the opening that French leaders need to rejoin alliance military structures. The second way in which it could be argued that those frictions matter extends geographically far beyond the alliance's sphere of activity, and goes to the very question of the conditions of international order in this new century. A group of theorists whom I have so far left out of the discussion need to make an appearance here: they perceive U.S. hegemony to be a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) guarantor of world order. In this respect, for hegemony to function it requires not only that the United States have the capability and desire to lead, but also that it be able to find partners willing to cooperate with it.24

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7

To find the partners willing to accept its dominance requires that it exercise what one author has called "strategic restraint."25 It must do this so as to provide a level of comfort on the part of its weaker allies, in whom it instils the conviction that it will refrain from taking advantage of the power differential in its favor. Indeed, the United States must work within an institutional setting so to reduce the returns to (its own) power that it enhances its long-term ability to exercise leadership. "Taken together," argues G. John Ikenberry, the Western postwar order involves a bargain: the leading state gets a predictable and durable order based on agreed-upon rules and institutions—it secures the acquiescence in this order of the weaker states, which in turn allows it to conserve its power. In return, the leading state agrees to limit its own actions—to operate according to the same rules and institutions as lesser states—and to open itself up to a political process in which the weaker states can actively press their interests upon the more powerful state.26 It is in the context of strategic restraint that the second invocation of a French connection arises. Only this time, the implication is not nearly so positive for U.S. interests as in the first instantiation, relating to the enhancement of NATO's overall defense capability. In this second invocation, what is unmistakable is that the French do not believe that the United States is exercising strategic restraint. To the contrary, they think it is attempting to throw its weight around to attain maximum advantage for itself. How else can we account for the frequency and vigor with which the current French government, and its foreign minister, inveigh against the perils of U.S. "hyperpuissance" (as that minister, Hubert Vedrine, likes to put it)?27 France, not necessarily because it is the greatest power among the U.S. network of European allies (it may not be; Britain and Germany might each make a claim to that status), but rather because it is the most rebarbative member of the set, takes on symbolic importance as the "hard case" for testing assumptions about the durability of U.S. hegemony. Crane Brinton understood this symbolic importance more than three decades ago, when he observed that even though France no longer ranked as a great power, its relationship with the United States still stood out for what it represented, namely an "ability to maintain a leadership largely acceptable to the rest of the world. If we cannot get on with France and the French, we shall indeed find hard going ahead."28 That assertion remains as pertinent today as it did during the late 1960s. On this logic, France's importance to global security rests on its being won over to the U.S. side. But that is not the only way France can be said to count. Some analysts are prepared to concede openly that France cannot be won over, but rather needs to be kept at bay. One such writer is Samuel Huntington. In one of the more widely debated contentions of the 1990s, Huntington introduced the prospect of the future of world politics being increasingly conditioned by a "clash of civilizations," with these latter entities held to be the "highest cultural grouping" of peoples, subsuming a variety of objective and subjective factors such as religion, language, customs, institutions, ethnicity, and so on—in other words, culture conceived of as "a whole way of life," as Raymond Williams expresses it.29 In the fu-

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ture, Huntington prophesied, conflict would look like being a case of "the West against the rest."30 More recently, this same author has appeared to cast doubt upon his own assertion that it will be the West against the rest. The future of the West itself looks to be up for grabs, as it may be from within this civilizational grouping that arises the most credible "antihegemonic coalition," one formed specifically to balance against the preponderant weight of the "lonely" U.S. superpower. Whether the United States can continue to claim to organize global security becomes a function of whether the European balance inclines in the direction of the "pro-American" British, or of the "anti-American" French. To Huntington, all depends upon which way Germany tilts: "America's relations with Germany are central to its relations with Europe. Healthy cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom."31 MULTIPOLARITY AND TRANSATLANTICISM: SELF-EVIDENT OR SELF-CONTRADICTORY? Huntington's claim is probably too stark in positing France as single-handedly leading the "anti-American" charge in Europe. This is not to deny that antiAmericanism exists, and may even be growing, in France as elsewhere in Europe.32 But the French are hardly alone in Europe these days in refusing to go along with U.S. preferences. Indeed, if what is truly significant is the difference, say, in a European ally's willingness to defer to the United States now compared to its earlier inclinations toward deference, then most remarkable has been the transformation in the German attitude, and least remarkable that in the French.33 The evidence, admittedly, is sparse and anecdotal, and might even be confuted by a recent softening in German declaratory policy toward the United States, but still it strikes some analysts (including this one) that German political figures during the Cold War would likely not have extolled the virtues of ESDI/ESDP in the same way that some of them have been doing, namely as a means of effecting Europe's "emancipation."34 The more frequently encountered word, when one listens to Europeans discuss the whys and wherefores of ESDI/ESDP, is autonomy, which can itself be an ambiguous concept.35 Compared to autonomy, the implications of a discourse of emancipation, given that word's connotation of slavery and other forms of servility, cannot be other than worrisome for those who contemplate the future of the alliance—or possibly even of Europe. In this respect, then, Huntington might have it right, with one important caveat: the Germans may not so much be blindly joining the French in an antihegemonic wrecking party as obeying the dictates of their own reconceptualized "national interest."36 And even when the process is not limned in the language of emancipation, many German analysts today cannot help but be much more critical of U.S. strategic proclivities than they were during the Cold War. That is to say, while during the bipolar struggle there certainly were many in Germany prepared to contest U.S. claims to organize the defense of Western Europe, what is noteworthy today is the

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attitudinal shift on the part of observers who tend more toward the mainstream of defense and security analysis than was the case with the earlier generation of critics, often clustered on the far left of the country's political spectrum. Whereas for the earlier mainstreamers the logic of self-binding within the framework of U.S. "double containment" made a good deal of sense,37 today's conventional critics are less enamored of following Washington's lead. Not only do Germans worry (as do other allies) about that lead becoming increasingly a unilateralist one, but they are even wondering to what extent the erstwhile U.S. commitment to multilateralism ever did reflect anything other than "instrumental multilateralism [in which] international institutions are useful as long as they help to reduce costs, lend legitimacy to foreign policy actions, and do not constrain the United States."38 Where the French do tend to stand out, on the other hand, is in the degree of insistence they place upon multipolarity as an end in itself, and as being tantamount to multilateralism. We should take care not to infer from this ostensible commitment toward a rebalancing of international power any upsurge in official French anti-Americanism. It is true that the Kosovo war did witness, among French intellectuals at least, a sharpening of rhetoric toward the United States rarely experienced since the 1960s. But it does not follow that the French government has become in any profound sense anti-American.39 To be sure, anti-Americanism among the chattering class is nothing new in France, but compared with levels earlier in the twentieth century, particularly during the interwar period and again in the de Gaulle era, today's societal mood might almost be more accurately characterized as pro-American, notwithstanding a sharp uptick in ill will associated with the war against Serbia in 1999.40 Moreover, Vedrine himself takes pains to emphasize that his policy objectives are aimed at rebalancing power, not at systemically confounding the United States. He is under no illusions that were France in America's position its power would not also generate resistance to "hegemony"—perhaps even on a greater scale than that directed toward the United States. Not only does the foreign minister consider France to be rather more pro- than anti-American these days, but he also insists that a realistic policy for France is one that, unlike during the de Gaulle era, becomes liberated from systematic opposition to U.S. leadership, and nuanced in a direction that allows Paris to say yes as well as no to Washington.41 We do well to remember, in all of this, that multipolarity is not a synonym for multilateralism. The former term applies to the relative distribution of capability of the units composing the international system, in this case of the states that continue to constitute the primary systemic actors; the latter is an institution (broadly conceived) governing principled behavior on the part of three or more actors.42 Thus were the world characterized, as it today looks to be, by one power whose capabilities were so superior to those of any likely challenger, and this across such a range of power assets as to make balancing an effective impossibility, then we could have some confidence in labeling the system "unipolar."43 Given that it is widely accepted that during the Cold War there were only two superpowers, and hence the system was "bipolar," the demise of the Soviet Union

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must have wrought a "systemic change."44 Few deny that this occurred; where there is a contest it has taken place between those who now call the system unipolar and those who regard it as multipolar. Given the number of schemes that are currently making the rounds for "re-equilibrating" global power, it would appear that even foes of U.S. preeminence are prepared to concede the system must be unipolar. Certainly this would also apply to an ally, France, else why bother to strive to make the system—not keep it—multipolar? But does it follow that multipolarity correlates positively with multilateralism, and that multipolarity must therefore be a good in itself, and good for the future of transatlanticism? Hardly, and this for at least two reasons. To take the issue of multipolarity's "goodness," and again with reference to the French example, it is apparent from the historical record that France did not derive net benefit from its centuries'-long experience with multipolarity. Indeed, as time went on during that long multipolar era stretching from the Peace of Westphalia to the World War II, France progressively staggered from one disaster to another, reaching its geopolitical nadir with the capitulation of June 1940.45 So depressing had that secular experience been that by the midpoint of the twentieth century a rational analyst could have been forgiven for drawing the conclusion that this country in particular should never again wish to be so unfortunate as to live in a multipolar world. In contrast, the four decades of bipolarity were beneficial ones for France, and whatever else might be claimed about the impact of the end of the Cold War on French status and interests, it is hard to sustain any meaningful comparison between the negative (if that it what it was) impact of unipolarity's first decade with that of multipolarity's final century.46 As for the first point, it is equally clear that unilateralism, on the part of the United States in particular, can be entirely consistent with multipolarity. This, after all, was the message of the U.S. interwar experience with unilateral policies— namely that they could flourish in, just as they were seen to be a required response to, multipolarity, in an era in which great political significance was attached to the U.S. geographical setting.47 Thus whether one chooses to regard today's system as being unipolar or multipolar, or even if one prefers to opt for the oxymoron of "unimultipolarity,"48 what should be of most concern here is not systemic structure but rather the policy behavior, or dispensation, of the United States. To phrase the matter bluntly, is there a likelihood of the United States reverting, as some think it is poised to do, to "unilateralism"? IS THE UNITED STATES BECOMING MORE UNILATERALIST? Nostalgia may not be what it used to be, but it still has a way of tugging at heartstrings, even transatlantic ones. Recall how the administration of Bill Clinton was being reimagined by the European allies during its final days, once it became clear(?) who had actually "won" the state of Florida: the administration that had presided over a country widely seen to have grown too big for its britches, the same country that had been vilified by anti-Americans throughout Europe during the war with Serbia—that country and that administration were now being recalled, in the

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closing days of the Clinton presidency, as the very model of multilateral diplomacy.49 In truth, transatlantic querulousness had been festering during that same Clinton administration that only retrospectively appears to represent the golden age of U.S. multilateralism. Nevertheless, personalities do matter, and it is useful to reflect on such evidence about the new U.S. president as may be had to provide insight into the manner in which George W. Bush might choose to approach the European allies. In particular, is there anything that the United States can do, or is likely to do, to rebalance and enhance its security relationship with the Europeans? No one can say, at the moment, what the new Bush administration will end up doing in Europe, and with what impact upon the quality of U.S. multilateralism. But the early trends point in the direction of unilateralism. To be sure, so did the early trends in the first Clinton administration, and we all witnessed the effect that the Bosnia crisis of 1992-1995 had on the (belated) U.S. recognition that NATO and the Europeans still remained a "vital" U.S. interest. Is Bush likely to turn out any differently? Those who worry that he is going to be very different have some basis for their fears. The new president is not known for being a world traveler, and what little sojourning he has done has generally not included European ports of call. He is considered by many Europeans (and nonEuropeans) to be intellectually none too subtle—certainly not subtle enough to grasp the intricacies of transatlantic security. He is regarded as being fundamentally out of touch with European political and cultural sensibilities, with his support for the emphatically "anti-European" activity of capital punishment seen as proof of this pudding. He is thought to be too attentive to Mexico, and talks as if the Western Hemisphere is going to reemerge as an area of strategic priority for the United States. Others say that it will be Asia that captures his attention, even if not his fancy.50 He surrounds himself with advisers, some of whom look to be too reluctant to countenance using U.S. power for purposes of European security. And, as if all this were not enough, he is determined to try to provide the United States with a shield against ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Not only this, but he has embarked upon a thorough review of U.S. defense policy that threatens to make the last defense reviews (those of 1993 and 1997) look like exercises in praising the status quo (which is what their critics say they were). Some of the totems of U.S. defense policy are expected to feel the axe wielded by Andrew Marshall and an exceedingly powerful group of civilian policymakers who surround the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and who seem bent on cutting down the power of the military top brass, the "CINCs," regional commanders who give the appearance of being too wedded to the status quo. Among the icons of recent defense policy expected to disappear in the new review is the assumption that the U.S. military should be able tofightand win (almost at the same time) two major theater wars. Another long-standing policy expected to get a serious reassessment is the forward deployment of U.S. forces, including in Europe, whence it is rumored a division, or might be withdrawn.

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Europe matters less to this president than it did to his father and to his immediate predecessor. For those in Europe inclined to criticize an overbearing U.S. presence (the "arrogance of power") the good news from this administration is that indifference is likely to replace domineering. And even if the Europeans do not actually invest more in their own defense, the relative weight of the United States versus Europe in the old continent's military affairs will diminish, by dint of the former's doing (and caring) less. The U.S. "identity" will not have changed; it is just that the struggle to interpret that identity will be won by those who, along with Walter McDougall, stress the more libertarian aspects of liberalism, and sing praises for the virtues of the "Old Testament" U.S. foreign policy.51 As those familiar with Promised Land, Crusader State will know, those virtues do not include multilateralism, much less do they include strategic restraint.52 What some have felt compelled to criticize in recent years, namely the "instrumentalist" cast of U.S. multilateralism, may shortly look like nothing so much as good old days of multilateralism.53 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA What does the debate over ESDP/ESDI and the future of transatlanticism imply for Canada? As this question touches on the very leitmotif of this volume, all that requires to be done in my conclusion is to relate some of this chapter's assertions to Canadian interests. If a European pillar of the alliance finally does take shape, what might it mean for Canada? At one extreme, it could be argued to mean something sinister, squeezing Canada out of its comfortable position of being part of a multilateral grouping that relies upon consensual decisionmaking. In effectively depriving Canada of voice and constraining its room for maneuver within the Atlantic alliance, ESDP/ESDI will be stripping away some of the country's soft power. Yet there is scope for a decidedly different reading of ESDI's meaning for Canada, one that stresses the contribution that a more coherent European effort can make to the common good. On this reading of events, the Europe of defense will be beneficial for Canada as it will enhance the security of all allies, and do so in way that presumably shifts more of the burden for European security onto the shoulders of the Europeans themselves, which is where Ottawa has for some time preferred to see it come to rest. Additional considerations enter into the discussion. If the argument in this chapter has any merit, and there exists the potential of ESDP/ESDI resulting in a widening of the Atlantic, even if such is not intended by anyone, then Canada presumably will be confronted with a choice it would prefer not to make—indeed, with a choice that could not meaningfully be made. This prospect cannot help evoking yet again the hoary "counterweight" argument in Canadian alliance policy.54 Can Ottawa somehow manipulate the course of events so as to maximize its security and its political autonomy (vis-a-vis the United States, presumably) in light of the impending alteration of the structure of transatlantic security? It has to be conceded that its room for maneuver is limited, even were the will present to exploit it. More

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important are the implications of a United States inclined toward unilateralism in its security policy. In this regard, it bears recalling that NATO, for Canada and other allies, has always made sense as a vehicle for providing at least some access into the shaping of the 17.5. national interest. In Lord Ismay's famous phraseology, NATO has been good not only because it kept the Russians out and the Germans down, but because it got the Americans mixed up in the security affairs of other, reasonably like-minded, states. In a word, NATO constrained America's own room for maneuver, and that was seen as being good for Canadian interests both in Europe and, more to the point, on the North American continent. Now it is possible to imagine other vehicles capable of enabling the United States to rediscover its multilateral "geopolitical soul" (if that is what it is). To date, only NATO has been the kind of institution equipped to allow transatlanticism to flourish. Assume that U.S. interest in the alliance is waning, as the structural realists insist: Is there any reason to think that Canada could somehow make a difference in restoring U.S. confidence in NATO? If not, then it would appear that for Canada as well, albeit for radically different reasons, the alliance would have lost much of its validity. It is possible, albeit difficult, to imagine that a United States in a NATOless world would be more inclined than is today's United States toward mutually beneficial defense collaboration with Canada, featuring as it must a heightened degree of genuine consultation, which would be a sine qua non for palatable continentalism from Canada's point of view. But why should the United States in a NATO-less world be more willing to consult meaningfully with Canada than today's United States has been? Canada may, in the not too distant future, find itself having to answer that question, should transatlanticism become the unintended casualty of Europe's quest for a more autonomous security and defense "identity." NOTES

1. See Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987). 2. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 3. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984): 494-495. 4. "Collective identity" is a relatively new addition to the vocabulary of international security, taken, in the words of Alexander Wendt, to refer to "positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the Self rather than as independent." Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 52. 5. See Jan Geert Siccama, "Towards a European Defense Entity?" in Europe in the Western Alliance: Towards a European Defense Entity? eds. Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt (London: Macmillan, in cooperation with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 19-21; and Fulvio Attina, "The European Union and the Global System: International

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and Internal Security," in Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda, eds. Lisbeth Aggestam and Adrian Hyde-Price (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 116-133. 6. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 35-49. 7. Owen Harries, "The Collapse of 'The West,'" Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993): 41-53, quote at p. 42. 8. Christopher Coker, Twilight of the West (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 68. 9. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security 25 (summer 2000): 5-41. "I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War's end and ultimately to disappear. In a basic sense, the expectation has been bome out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee." (p. 19). 10. Stephen M. Walt, "NATO's Fragile Future," in What NATO for Canada? ed. David G. Haglund, Martello Papers no. 23 (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2000), 81: "[T]he Atlantic alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing robust and youthful as it grows older and ever more infirm." 11. See Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 12. Thomas Risse, "Transatlantic Identity and the Future of Canada-UK Relations," in Transatlantic Identity? Canada, the United Kingdom, and International Order, ed. Robert Wolfe (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 1997), 27-35, quote at pp. 32-33. 13. James Kurth, "Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies," National Interest no. 53 (fall 1998): 40. 14. Quoted in Martin Walker, "Europe: Superstate or Superpower?" World Policy Journal 17 (winter 2000/2001): 7-16, quote at p. 1. The British prime minister made this comment in a speech at the Warsaw stock exchange in October 2000. On the need for an "Other" in identity formation, see William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 15. Randall L. Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources," in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, eds. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 28-68, quote at p. 28. 16. Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and European Defense, Chaillot Papers no. 39 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, April 2000). 17. See my "'Feuding Hillbillies' of the West? A Modest Inquiry into the Significance and Sources of Franco-American Conflict in International Security," in The France-U.S. Leadership Race: Closely Watched Allies, ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Queen's Quarterly Press, 2000), 19-41. 18. What was evident about the coalition assembled to fight the Gulf War a decade ago is no less valid today, in respect of the functioning of the Atlantic alliance: leadership requires followership. See Andrew Fenton Cooper, Richard Higgot, and Kim Richard Nossal, "Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict," Political Science Quarterly 106 (fall 1993): 391-410. 19. Sumner Welles, introduction to Donald C. McKay, The United States and France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), ix. See also David Schoenbrun, As France Goes (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957). 20. For a contemporary, and skeptical, assessment of the merits of such a "partnership," see Klaus-Dieter Mensel, "The United States and the United Germany: Partners in Leadership?" in Can America Remain Committed: U.S. Security Horizons in the 1990s, ed. David G. Haglund (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 81-109.

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21. The evolving nature of the France-NATO relationship is probed in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Change by Rapprochement? Asterix's Quarrel with the New Roman Empire," in France-U.S. Leadership Race, ed. Haglund, 63-86. 22. For an upbeat assessment of ESDP's meaning for the United States, see Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective," Survival 42 (summer 2000): 16-32. On the question of whether the U.S. military is overstretched, the experts do differ. One analyst who thinks it is overstretched is Daniel Goure, who believes that modernizing the U.S. military will require an additional $164 billion a year for the next decade; see Daniel Goure, Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States: Strategic Studies Institute Conference Report (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, December 2000), 10. 23. Philip H. Gordon, French Security Policy After the Cold War: Continuity, Change, and Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), 54-57. See also Philip H. Gordon, "The French Position," National Interest no. 61 (fall 2000), 57-65. 24. And to some, finding partners entails an obligation to consult with and at times follow the advice of those other states, especially allies (which must include France). For this argument, see Garry Wills, "Bully of the Free World," Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 50-59; and James Schlesinger, "Fragmentation and Hubris: A Shaky Basis for American Leadership," National Interest no. 49 (fall 1997): 3-9. 25. G John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American Postwar Order," International Security 23 (winter 1998/1999): 43-78. See also G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), especially chap. 7: "After the Cold War." 26. Ikenberry, "Institutions," 59. 27. Hubert Vedrine, quoted in John Vinocur, "France Has a Hard Sell to Rein in U.S. Power," International Herald Tribune, February 6-7, 1999, 2. See also Kim Richard Nossal, "Life with Uncle Revisited: The United States and the Issue of Leadership," in FranceUS. Leadership Race, Haglund, 157-179. 28. Crane Brinton, The Americans and the French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 246. 29. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), xvi. 30. The expression is Kishore Mahbubani's, and it was appropriated by Huntington to express the thought that the West (a civilizational unit comprising European and North American elements) would find itself under challenge from a range of other civilizational constructs. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72 (summer 1993): 22-49; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 31. Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," 48. 32. Peter W. Rodman, "The World's Resentment: Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon," National Interest no. 60 (summer 2000): 33^11. 33. William Pfaff, "Germany's Special Relationship with U.S. Is Ending Badly," International Herald Tribune, March 28, 2000, 8. 34.1 heard an SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) member of the Bundestag with responsibilities for foreign affairs use this term at an Atlantik-Briicke conference in Alberta in late September 2000. 35. On these ambiguities, see Francois Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity," Survival 42 (summer 2000): 5-15; and Franz-Josef Meiers, "La Politique

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allemande de securite et de defense a la croisee des chemins," Politique Etrangere 65 (spring 2000): 47-65. 36. This can be a contentious issue, as some people appear to believe that should Germany begin once more to articulate "national" interests it will be ultimately unable to restrain itself from embarking upon the geostrategic rampage connoted by the expression Sonderweg. Because of this misapprehension, they prefer to deny that German foreign policy has changed since the end of the Cold War and the country's unification, and believe instead that the country remains the quintessential "civilian power." This denial strikes me as odd. For a useful corrective, see Gunther Hellmann, "Realism + Idealism + Postivism = Pragmatism: IR Theory, United Germany, and Its Foreign Policy," paper presented to the forty-first annual convention of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 2000. The "postivism" in the title is not a misspelling; it is a melding of positivism and postpositivism. More significant is the author's claim, on p. 18: "In my interpretation of German foreign policy during the past ten years Germany has changed almost as dramatically as its environment has changed." Hellmann goes on to state that the "German self-image of a 'civilian power' was a well-intentioned yet ill-conceived myth of united Germany which never corresponded to the realities on the ground nor to the ambitions of the Germans themselves" (p. 21). But for a differing assessment, arguing against overstating the impact of the changes, compare Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" Survival 42 (summer 2000): 56-80. 37. "Double containment" refers to the Cold War institutional arrangements intended both to keep Soviet power out of Western Europe and to keep German power on a tight leash; it is a leitmotif in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 38. Peter Rudolf, "Vision Impossible? The United States as Benign Hegemon," in FranceU.S. Leadership Race, ed. Haglund, 152. See also Bernd W. Kubbig, Matthias Dembinski, and Alexander Kelle, Unilateralism as Sole Foreign-Policy Strategy? American Policy Toward the UN, NATO, and the OPCW in the Clinton Era, PRIF Reports no. 57 (Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, November 2000). The OPCW is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 39. For this distinction between the intellectuals and the governing class, see Michel Fortmann and Helene Viau, "A Model Ally? France and the U.S. During the Kosovo Crisis of 1998-99," in France-US. Leadership Race, ed. Haglund, 87-110. Far from professing antiAmerican sentiments, France's president has recently been little short of Panglossian in commenting on the future of U.S.-European relations. See Jacques Chirac, "May the European Union and America Go Forward Together," International Herald Tribune, December 19, 2000, 8: "Everything favors a renewed trans-Atlantic partnership anchored in shared values and destiny as one of the cornerstones of world stability." 40. The best general introduction to the topic, though dated, remains Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds., The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception, trans. Gerald Turner (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1990). Good insight into the anti-American upsurge of the interwar period can be found in Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York: W. W Norton, 1994). Among contemporary studies, none had a greater impact upon French attitudes than Georges Duhamel, Scenes de la vie future (Paris: Mercure de France, 1930). This book went through 150 printings in France within six months of publication, and appeared in English a year later under the apt title America the Menace: Scenes from the Life of the Future, trans. Charles Miner Thompson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1931). Though not enjoying the same

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sales, another widely commented work of anti-Americanism from this era was Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, Le Cancer americain (Paris: Editions Rieder, 1931). For the impact of the Kosovo war on anti-Americanism, see Reneo Lukic, "L'Antiamericanisme des opposants a la participation francaise a la guerre contre le Republique federale yougoslave (RFY)," Etudes Internationales 31 (March 2000): 135-164. 41. Hubert Vedrine, Les Cartes de la France: A Vheure de la mondialisation (Paris: Fayard, 2000), 72-74. More recently, the foreign minister has insisted before an American audience that France seeks as often as it can to cooperate with the United States, and that when it does diverge from the latter's preferences, it is "certainly not proof of anti-Americanism." See Hubert Vedrine, "New World Challenges: The French Vision," a speech presented to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 28, 2001 (text provided by French embassy, Ottawa). 42. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 20. 43. William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24 (Summer 1999), 9: "Unipolarity is a structure in which one state's capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced.... At the same time, capabilities are not so concentrated as to produce a global empire." But for the claim that U.S. might is so great as to constitute a global empire, see Alfredo G. A. Valladao, The Twenty-first Century Will Be American, trans. John Howe (London: Verso, 1996). This latter book, which was published initially in French by its Paris-based Brazilian author, has triggered one direct rebuttal from a French politician, Pierre Biarnes, Le XXIe siecle ne sera pas americain (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1998). By the start of the second Clinton administration it did look as if the "empire" thesis was gaining adherents. For examples of this, see Martin Walker, "The Happy Twilight of Washington," World Policy Journal 13 (winter 1996/1997): 61-65; and Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "A Second American Century," Foreign Affairs 11 (May/June 1998): 18-31. By the end of the Clinton years, however, a revaluation of the promise of empire was well under way; again, useful insight is provided by Martin Walker, "What Europeans Think of America," World Policy Journal 17 (summer 2000): 26-38. 44. For this meaning of change, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 42: "Systemic change involves a change ... within the system rather than a change of the system itself. It entails changes in the international distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige, and the rules and rights embodied in the system." 45. See Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France's Bidfor Power in Europe, 1914-1940 (London: Arnold, 1995). 46. For that matter, it is not easy even to say what the impact of unipolarity's first decade has been on France, although there is no shortage of pessimism on this score, as for instance to be found in Dominique Moi'si, "The Trouble with France," Foreign Affairs 11 (May/June 1998): 94-104. But a different perspective exists, one arguing that France actually benefited from the end of bipolarity, because Germany had lost standing relative to it in the Bonn/Berlin-Paris-Washington "strategic triangle." Compare Helga Haftendorn, "Le Triangle strategique Bonn-Paris-Washington," Politique Etrangere 61 (autumn 1996): 554. 47. On that geographical significance, see Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954); Eugene Staley, "The Myth of the Continents," Foreign Affairs 19 (April 1941): 491-492; Isaiah Bowman, "Geography vs. Geopolitics," in Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, eds. Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson (New York: Macmillan, 1944); and

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Alan K. Henrikson, "The Geographical Mental Maps of American Foreign Policy Makers," International Political Science Review 1, no. 4 (1980): 495-530. 48. As does Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," 36-37. 49. Joseph Fitchett, "Albright Urges Bush to Calm Fears on Europe and North Korea," International Herald Tribune, January 13-14, 2001, 1, 3; and Ian Black, "Defense Differences May Push Bush into an Early Transatlantic Crossing," Guardian Weekly, January 25-31,2001,6. See also "Europe Is Sad to See Clinton Go," Guardian Weekly, January 19, 2001, 3, in which outgoing president Bill Clinton is roundly eulogized by European leaders as practically one of them—in the words of France's foreign minister, as the president who has been "the most open to European ideas in 20 years." 50. Thomas E. Ricks, "Rumsfeld Signals Shift to Pacific in Overhaul of Defense Thinking," Guardian Weekly, March 19-April 4, 2001, 31; and Martin Kettle, "East Asia Now the Only Game in Town," Guardian Weekly, March 19-April 4, 2001, 6. See also Marvin C. Ott, "East Asia: Security and Complexity," Current History 100 (April 2001): 147-153. 51. For a sample, see Marc A. Thiessen, "Out with the New," Foreign Policy no. 123 (March/April 2001): 64-66. Thiessen is a majority (i.e., Republican) staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; he recommends McDougall's book (see note 52 below) as an "excellent primer" for understanding the U.S. geopolitical soul. 52. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). 53. For a similar assessment, see David A. Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 54. See Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada's German and European Policy, 1955-1995 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).

CHAPTER 2

The Widening Atlantic, Part II: Transatlanticism, the "New" NATO, and Canada Allen G. Sens Prophesying doom has always been a popular activity for academics and policy analysts who study transatlantic relations. Nostradamus would have been proud of some of the apocalyptic predictions that have attended the various crises and debates surrounding the relationship between North America and Europe. Much of this dialogue was characterized by overstatement, but the exaggerations proved a point: transatlanticism has always been under strain, beset with a variety of strategic, diplomatic, and economic disputes that provided ample evidence of a relationship in decline and in need of repair. And yet the relationship survived and even thrived. If the steady expansion of trade and travel and the maintenance of strategic solidarity (with some notable hiccups) during the Cold War were any indication, the forces of Western values, democratic tradition, economic interdependence, historical heritage, and a clear and present danger to all of the above, successfully bound the "transatlantic community" together. To this point, transatlanticism has survived even the third great geopolitical earthquake of the twentieth century: the end of the Cold War. Of course, the key part of the previous sentence is "to this point." And so in the words of the great American philosopher Yogi Berra, "it is deja vu all over again." The future of transatlanticism has returned as a subject of concern and debate, made all the more urgent (and apocalyptic) by the absence of the Soviet threat, a U.S. hegemon characterized as obsessed with national missile defense and a desire to break international treaties, an emergent European Union (EU), a world of increasing economic and social tension caused by the pressures of globalization and regionalization, the uncertain future of the war on terrorism, and a Europe and United States that once again seem to be drifting apart under the strain of "values gaps" and "strategic splits" made all the more palpable by disputes over beef, bananas, and Frankenfoods. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as it often has been, is once again at the center of this debate. There is more to transatlanticism than NATO, but quite rightly the alliance has been regarded as the keystone of the transatlantic

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relationship. NATO was the primary venue for security diplomacy during the Cold War, the vehicle for the deployment of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in Europe, and the focal point of strategic and military cooperation between the armed forces of the Western allies. It is hardly surprising that NATO has had a turbulent history. Transatlantic crises resonated in NATO, and NATO crises reverberated through the larger transatlantic relationship. And yet the keystone remained firmly in place, even as its future was frequently in question. Today NATO is once again a subject of concern and debate. Member states have put the organization through a major structural overhaul, but there continue to be doubts concerning its future in the absence of a threat. Policies such as the admission of new members and the use of military force in the Balkans have been controversial. Transatlantic tensions over missile defenses, global roles, and burden sharing complete an unflattering picture. Nevertheless, the "new" NATO remains the primary security organization in Europe. With the future of transatlanticism once again in question, and with NATO having evolved into a new organization for a new Europe, the old question of the role of the alliance in transatlanticism is as relevant as it has ever been. On balance, will the new NATO be a successful keystone for the future transatlantic relationship? To what extent will the new NATO have a positive or negative impact on the transatlantic relationship? Canada is often a forgotten country in transatlantic debates, usually remembered with an exclamation, a slap of one's forehead, and the insertion of the words "and Canada" into academic articles and (as Canadians suspect) policy documents and diplomatic statements. Canada has long been a champion of transatlanticism, for a number of reasons that include historical ties, diplomatic and security interests, and the value of Europe as a political and economic counterweight. What are the implications of the state of the transatlantic relationship for Canada? And what roles can Canada play in influencing the direction of transatlantic tectonics in the future? The analysis in this chapter is forward-looking, and finds cause for a little optimism and a lot of pessimism concerning the future of transatlanticism in general, and the role of the new NATO in particular. The paper concludes that the new NATO reflects the values and interests that will continue to bind some form of transatlantic community together. However, the new NATO also poses several serious challenges to transatlantic unity, challenges that will have a corrosive effect on the current transatlantic relationship. The management of this relationship will require even greater attention and skill to preserve and restructure in the future. That future is likely to be characterized by a less cohesive NATO, a less cohesive transatlantic community, and a decisionmaking environment characterized by less institutional clarity. Canada's interests are in the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, the maintenance of a strong NATO, and the maintenance of a voice in a less coherent decisionmaking environment. Canada can best contribute to the health of NATO and the preservation of Canada's relevance in Europe by pursuing a strategy of active engagement and contribution.

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THE WIDENING ATLANTIC: THE SEQUEL In the mid-1980s there was considerable discussion of a "widening Atlantic." As Andrew J. Pierre observed: "This concept is meant to indicate that perceptions and interests, as viewed on either side of the ocean, are pulling Europe and America apart."1 Certainly, there was evidence to support such claims. Trade disputes across the Atlantic had become increasingly frequent. Demographic shifts in the United States favored non-European-origin peoples and the Western states. A larger social divide was identified between U.S. conservatism and European social democracy. European energies were focused inwardly on the European integration process. A new generation of leadership on both sides of the Atlantic was replacing the World War II generation. All of this was viewed against the historical backdrop of transatlantic diplomatic disputes, from Suez to Kissinger's "Year of Europe" to Afghanistan. The transatlantic divide was acutely felt in the alliance, where repeated crises inspired pessimistic assessments of the limitations of community. In his book Europe Without America? John Palmer suggested: "The economic, military, and political world of the Atlantic Alliance, in which two generations of Americans and Europeans have grown to adulthood since 1945, is visibly crumbling."2 Earl Ravenal argued that NATO's crises "are not accidental or superficial... in fact, they derive from the divergent perceptions of alliance, the divergent security needs, and the divergent geopolitical situations of the United States and Europe."3 Ravenal went on to catalog an impressive array of transatlantic strategic disputes, from the European Defense Community (EDC) to the Multilateral Force MLF to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).4 Through the Cold War, alliance cohesion was buffeted by transatlantic disputes over burden sharing, conventional defense strategies, nuclear weapons, decoupling, arms control, detente and ostpolitik, and out-of-area issues. However, there was widespread recognition of the strength of the transatlantic link. Transatlanticism was based not solely on common security interests, though these were important. It was based on a shared heritage, shared liberal Western values, democratic governance, and economic interdependence. Transatlanticism was more than a realist compact: it was also a liberal community.5 And as such, there were "set limits on the extent to which the two sides of the Atlantic can drift apart."6 For its part, NATO was seen as an essential component of the wider relationship. Despite his argument that European society was increasingly differentiated from the United States, Ralf Dahrendorf observed that among Europeans, "the continued need for the Atlantic Alliance is unchallenged both in terms of values and interest."7 Calls for a new transatlantic bargain or partnership reflected both the divergence and the convergence of value and interests across the Atlantic. There is certainly no lack of evidence to support the existence of a new time of troubles for the transatlantic relationship. Some of the points of tension are new, while others are eerily familiar. Economic tensions have intensified on issues as diverse as beef, bananas, growth hormones, and cultural exemptions in trade agree-

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ments. For many in Europe, globalization equals Americanization, and the defense is regionalization. Demographic shifts in the United States and Europe are once again seen as pulling the two apart.8 A significant transatlantic divide over social issues ranging from energy policy to conservation to taxation has been identified. European perceptions of the United States are largely unflattering, informed by imagery and grisly statistics attesting to a society characterized by guns, the death penalty, poverty, race riots, and unfettered corporate capitalism. As William Wallace has noted: "The result has been a growing divergence between America's perception of its moral leadership and European perception of the United States as a flawed superpower."9 Diplomatic disputes have also proliferated, on issues as wide as "rogue states," terrorism, and Islam. Transatlantic friction has developed over a greater European Union role in foreign policy, especially in areas of concern to the United States, such as Russia, North Asia, and the Middle East.10 This mood intensified in the early days of the Bush administration, particularly on the issues of missile defense, the Kyoto Protocol, China, North Korea, and Iraq. All of this has led to a "season of America bashing" in Europe, which was partly to blame for the United States being voted off the UN Human Rights Committee.11 All of this is taking place when there is no longer a common transatlantic enemy. As Owen Harries remarked: "The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy."12 However, overstatement may once again be carrying the headlines. William Wallace argues that transatlantic relations are "embedded in a dense network of multilateral links."13 These include the Group of Seven/Eight (G-7/G-8), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), law enforcement cooperation, and of course NATO. Antony Blinken provides an impressive catalog of areas of convergence on important social, cultural, economic, and security issues. Blinken concludes that the notion of a transatlantic split is a "false crisis" largely driven by Europe's elite, not broader social attitudes.14 The transatlantic flow of goods, services, investment, and information has increased dramatically, while the contentious transatlantic trade relationship accounts for a mere 2 percent of trade and investment, which totals U.S.$36 billion a day.15 In the security realm, U.S., Canadian, and European positions have converged (sometimes painfully) on issues such as the restructuring of NATO, joint action in the Balkans, outreach to Central and Eastern Europe, and combating global terrorism. Much of the case for the divergence of Europe and the United States is in fact built on the difficulties encountered in the process of managing a remarkably high level of transatlantic cooperation and shared effort. And finally, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has noted, "Our greatest asset still lies in our values—freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law."16 Does the transatlantic climate thus amount to little more than a minor intraliberal squabble? Probably not, for dismissing the current debate risks ignoring or minimizing potential wedges that will deeply trouble the transatlantic relationship.

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The international environment confronting transatlanticism is markedly different than in the past. NATO's survival (and even revival) to this point is no guarantee of longevity. John Mearscheimer's predictions are too readily dismissed: ten years is a mere blink in the eye of any respectable realist. And NATO need not disappear to confirm such prognostications, for it may simply become an increasingly hollow shell of old promises, or restructured into a very different form of institution. Unsurprisingly, the transatlantic dialogue since the end of the Cold War has centered on redefining the relationship. Central to this redefinition is a more effective accommodation between NATO and European unity: "More equitable sharing of responsibilities signifies not only stronger ties between NATO and the EU, but also lasting vitality for the transatlantic alliance."17 As William Wallace observed: "the American preoccupation with the military dimension of international politics— and the European focus on the economic and social sides—has led to a failure on both sides to coordinate the development of NATO and the EU."18 The coherence of such U.S.-European coordination will be complicated by the tendency of the great powers to make decisions in informal concert forums such as the Contact Group, NATO's inner sanctum, or coalitions of the willing. THE NEW NATO AND TRANSATLANTICISM The transformation of the alliance has been modest in theory but dramatic in practice. NATO is still built on the principle of collective defense as defined in Article 5, activated for the first time after the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, even after September 11, NATO is now spending most of its organizational energies and much of its collective resources on "non-Article 5" missions, all in keeping with the alliance's new role as an anchor of peace and security in Europe. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the air war against Serbia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the deployment of NATO forces to Macedonia all attest to the commitment of NATO (and many non-NATO) countries to contingencies that would have been unthinkable during the widening Atlantic debates of the mid1980s. NATO is at the center of an ambitious array of institutions and forums designed to enhance cooperation between the alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. NATO has enlarged its membership, admitting three new countries in 1999. Will this new NATO be a force for transatlantic unity? To what extent will NATO-related controversies and disputes between Europe and the United States serve to poison an already strained relationship? Certainly, there is ample cause for skepticism, not because the reform process was inappropriate or because NATO has made mistakes. NATO will not be the force it once was because of the environment in which it now exists. Member states have a lower level of direct interest in NATO. With the threat gone, NATO no longer has the security relevance it once did. Member states have a lower stake in the alliance, in terms of resources invested and the risks associated with a failure to be supportive. The issues facing member states are more diffuse, making cost-benefit calculations less clear. As a

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result, there is more diversity of view and divergence of interest on the issues confronting the alliance. All of these challenges will have a transatlantic flavor. This will pose a significant challenge for NATO cohesion, and perhaps even the future of the organization itself. On the other hand, NATO's future should not be described in purely negative terms. There are still common threats that unite member states, from terrorism to a resurgent Russia to general stability and the prevention of the spillover of conflicts to the territory of member states. Although there are differences over the intensity of such threats, there is some commonality in the threat analysis conducted by member states that supports the maintenance of the alliance. On issues where the direct interests of member states are not engaged or are remote, member states will not necessarily withhold political or military support from the alliance. Member states may participate on the basis of indirect interests, whether it is to preserve their credibility as good allies, to support the larger credibility of NATO itself, or to visibly support the values they hold dear. In other words, in the absence of a direct interest, other more remote interests will become decisionmaking factors, and these can be expected to be supportive of transatlanticism, and supportive of NATO. Moreover, most NATO disputes are not purely transatlantic. They are intra-alliance disputes, in which some European countries may be in agreement or in disagreement with any given U.S. position. What are sometimes billed as transatlantic disputes are in fact disputes between so-called Atlanticist European countries and the United States, and less Atlanticist countries in the alliance. To the extent that a commitment to a "constellation" of values is identified as an interest, the values that unite Europe and North America will ensure that transatlanticism endures. In this sense, NATO as a community of values may be little different than NATO as a community of interests. Finally, many of the potentially corrosive challenges facing the alliance flow from activities that are in fact testaments to the continued strength of transatlanticism. TRANSATLANTICISM AND NON-ARTICLE 5 OPERATIONS The adoption of non-Article 5 missions began in 1992, when then NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner suggested that NATO could contribute its forces and related assets to peace missions under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the UN. NATO formally adopted a peacekeeping function at the June 1992 ministerial meeting in Oslo.19 NATO's increasing engagement in the former Yugoslavia inspired member states to confirm in December 1992 "the preparedness of our Alliance to support on a case by case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peace-keeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council."20 From these beginnings, NATO became the primary crisis response mechanism in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. Through the 1990s, NATO's force structure and readiness requirements were largely driven by non-Article 5 contingencies. NATO's force structure has been redesigned for crisis response operations, and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept is designed around the need for crisis response capacities.21

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The adoption of peacekeeping and crisis response roles by the alliance has introduced a new set of challenges to NATO cohesion in general and transatlantic cohesion in particular. The most crucial of these challenges concerns the unity of commitment among member states to non-Article 5 contingencies. Will such operations marshal the same sense of unified strategic purpose provided by the Soviet threat? During the Cold War, even countries physically distant from the USSR could reasonably expect their security interests to be threatened in a general European war. That is not the case with non-Article 5 contingencies. As Joseph Lepgold has argued, peace operations will not be "highly valued" because "they do not involve members' territorial or political integrity."22 And so, member states that once regarded collective defense efforts as necessary may regard non-Article 5 efforts as discretionary, with a correspondingly lower level of commitment. Divergent views on the urgency and appropriate response to crisis response operations have already taken on a transatlantic flavor. Most notable was the initial U.S. reaction to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which saw the Clinton administration absolve itself of obligation in favor of the hour of Europe. When the United States belatedly became engaged, the reluctance of the Clinton administration to deploy ground troops in Bosnia led to clashes of perspective over air strikes and arms embargoes. How can an alliance of states with divergent perspectives on a core mission establish an effective collective response? Consensus will be achieved through collective decisions that reflect the lowest common denominator among alliance members. This is what happened in Kosovo: the lowest common denominator was the limited air strikes option, and when this did not achieve the desired results in a short time frame, no consensus existed on a ground force option. There was a wide range of response to NATO action among member states: some were highly supportive, others less so, while some members were generally opposed.23 While the NATO air campaign eventually achieved its objectives, the decisionmaking experience left an unpleasant aftertaste, and did not inspire confidence that future decisionmaking would be any smoother. The existence of a negative feedback loop is a real possibility, with stark implications for the alliance. If NATO members' views on contingency response are increasingly diffuse due to varying perceptions of threat and urgency, not only may the ability to reach consensus decrease, but also the effectiveness of the decisions reached may be increasingly called into question, and with it, the relevance and value of the alliance itself. A second concern attending non-Article 5 operations is the fear of entangling commitments among member states. This may prevent or delay a decision to become engaged, thus damaging the capacity of the alliance to react rapidly to regional contingencies. More importantly, it raises the challenges posed by long-term mission burden sharing in an alliance with shrinking resources. Open-ended commitments can accumulate to drain monetary resources, military personnel and materiel, and political will from member countries. Disputes over division of labor, and shared burdens with respect to monetary and troop contributions, could evolve into a significant transatlantic problem, exemplified by the Bush administration's

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suggestions on contracting U.S. deployments overseas. If member states get cold feet due to Kosovo, these issues could be more of a factor as debates about endstates and burden sharing become more intense. Finally, disputes over nonArticle 5 operations may also call into question alliance cohesion on other matters of importance to member states.24 This spillover effect is another danger attending a more diffuse community of interests in a NATO without a clear threat. However, there are positive elements that suggest that the impact of the nonArticle 5 challenge may not be wholly negative on the transatlantic relationship. Intra-alliance tensions and disputes over non-Article 5 operations occur because of the very existence of a restructured NATO, the existence of a consensus on peacekeeping and crisis response operations, a high level of cooperation and engagement by member states in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and the fact that no other organization in Europe was capable of delivering the political coordination mechanisms and the physical capacities to undertake such tasks. Therefore, the mere existence of these operations, and U.S. and European cooperation on them, is a testament to the general strength of transatlanticism in general and NATO in particular. NATO is a much more operationally active alliance than it ever was during the Cold War, and operational planning and activity takes up much more of the time of alliance staff and officials. Furthermore, despite the lower level of direct threat presented by crises on the periphery of Europe, some clearly have, and will, represent a risk of spillover to the territory of member states. Others might contribute to be seen as credible allies, or because they have a general security interest in a healthy and credible alliance. Consensus is thus preserved by the political expediencies of going along with the majority, and the operational expediencies of deploying smaller capacities to the cooperative military effort. In addition, many of the cleavages between member states on non-Article 5 missions have occurred among the European members of the alliance. Disputes within the alliance on non-Article 5 operations are thus not a purely transatlantic phenomenon. TRANSATLANTICISM AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES One of the most potentially corrosive elements of the transatlantic relationship is the widening gap between the military capabilities of the United States and those of its NATO allies. Of course, such a gap has always existed and was part of the larger conventional burden-sharing debate during the Cold War, with the United States frequently admonishing its European allies to spend more on defense and contribute more to NATO's military capabilities. Today this debate is magnified by divergent transatlantic trends in defense spending, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) as RMA technologies and concepts are incorporated into the U.S. military, and the dependence of NATO on U.S. capabilities as evidenced by the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The spending gap is cavernous, and it is widening. In 2000 the United States spent $287,466 billion on defense, while the European members of NATO collec-

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tively spent U.S.$136,187 billion on defense. The second highest defense budget in NATO is that of the United Kingdom, with expenditures of U.S.$33,890 billion. Defense spending by the European members of NATO declined by 5 percent from 1998 to 1999, and defense spending continues to drop in virtually all NATO-European capitals. Military research and development funding by European countries in NATO was 25 percent of U.S. spending in 2000. Procurement funding by NATO Europe has declined 2.2 percent since 1995, while U.S. spending increased by 6.5 percent in that period.25 But the spending gap is only part of this challenge. The gap in military capabilities between the United States and its European allies is widening to an ever increasing extent. This gap in military capacities exists across the spectrum of operations from small unit force protection and tactical communications security to precision-guided bombing and night-fighting capabilities. During the air campaign against Serbia the United States supplied 80 percent of the aircraft employed in the campaign, and virtually all of the intelligence gathering and analysis assets. Seventy percent of the firepower deployed was American. Very few European allies had laser-guided munitions (six European members of NATO used laser-guided bombs in the Kosovo operation), and just 10 percent of European aircraft were capable of precision-bombing at the time of the war.26 Joseph Lepgold has argued that NATO is facing a new collective action problem, caused by increased incentives to free-ride and contribute little toward producing the good that NATO provides.27 The interoperability of U.S. forces and European forces presents a major concern for transatlantic security cooperation. In 1999, General Klaus Naumann, a former chairman of NATO's military committee, warned that the U.S. and its allies "will not even be able to fight on the same battlefield" in the near future.28 If the alliance is to be effective as an instrument of multilateral crisis response, it will have to retain the military capability, multinational interoperability, and consensus on combat strategies and doctrines that form the foundation of multilateral military operations in non-Article 5 contingencies. The persistence of this gap will create transatlantic tensions with respect to burden sharing, particularly with respect to shared risk. An uncomfortable division of labor has increasingly become the norm in NATO operations. The United States supplied the overwhelming majority of firepower and intelligence assets to collective action in the Balkans, while Europe supplied the majority of the ground troops. A widening gap in military capacities will create incentives for the United States to marginalize NATO should the costs of engaging allies outweigh the benefits. If the United States sees too many political constraints and military liabilities in future contingencies, and too few concrete military contributions, the value of engaging allies through NATO will be questioned. Largely as a result of U.S. pressure, the Washington summit in April 1999 created the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), aimed at developing the military capabilities of the alliance to ensure that it can effectively perform its present and future missions. In particular, interoperability, deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and command and control are the areas of focus.

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In a follow-up meeting, the NATO defense ministers meeting in Toronto on September 21,1999, agreed that European members needed to increase their military capacities in terms of funding, technological upgrades, deployable units, and transport capabilities. European governments were chided by U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen for spending 60 percent of what the United States spends but only getting about 10 percent of the actual military capability.29 However, his words seem to have had little effect: European military expenditures have continued to decline and the DCI has looked increasingly moribund. Will this contemporary burden-sharing debate necessarily lead to an incapacitated alliance? NATO retains a base level of interoperability at headquarters and operational levels. The allies continue to make an effort to remain interoperable at levels inconceivable for many other militaries. Restructuring European militaries toward more deployable capability would require politically difficult decisions to reduce national infrastructure and duplication of capacities, but it could be accomplished. And finally, the military value of a national deployment is often outweighed by its political value. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the alliance as an instrument of political consultation and multilateral action is likely to suffer if the gap in capacities persists and widens. GOING GLOBAL: THE RETURN OF THE 0UT-0F-AREA PROBLEM In 1993, Senator Richard Lugar warned that NATO would have to go out of area, because if it did not it would soon "go out of business."30 While the issue was largely settled in the context of the alliance's escalating engagement in the Balkans, the question of how far from Europe the alliance would stray was unresolved. While NATO's Area of Responsibility (AOR) remains the territory of member states, the challenge of defining its Area of Interest (AOI), the geographic region or space of direct concern to the alliance, has already been the source of friction between the United States and Europe. Flush with the success of the Implementation Force (IFOR), many commentators in the United States were eager for the alliance to take on a more global role, a role that would ensure its relevance into the future.31 In 1997, former U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher and former secretary of defense William Perry suggested that the alliance be an instrument of collective action anywhere in the world.32 Madeleine Albright suggested that NATO be employed from the Middle East to Central Africa.33 The suggestion that NATO might become an instrument for global intervention was not well received in European capitals, and this vision of NATO was soundly rejected. European members had little interest in an expansive role for NATO, for in their view the alliance serves to bind the United States to European security, not to bind Europe to U.S. global engagements. At best, a broad conception of the alliance's geographic scope could make NATO a vehicle for U.S. rather than U.S./ European security objectives. At worst, it could serve to drag Europe into U.S. crusades. This divergence in transatlantic interest will continue to be a management challenge because friction will develop between members who call for alliance en-

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gagement in certain contingencies while others argue it is outside the NATO AOI.34 Furthermore, any global role for NATO would require a quid pro quo for both the United States and Europe: a European commitment to a global NATO, and the ability to contribute meaningfully to such a role, and in return a level of leadership sharing in the alliance that would be unacceptable to the United States.35 Therefore it is far more likely that out-of-area engagements will be carried out by coalitions of the willing. Outreach and Enlargement

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has developed an extensive network of institutionalized relationships and consultation processes with nonmember states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. These include the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and regional cooperative arrangements in the form of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the South Eastern European Initiative. These mechanisms have been made to engage Central and Eastern Europe, extend stability to the periphery of Europe, and provide the political and operational experience required for formal cooperation on a range of issues from civil-military relations to crisis response operations. There has been little controversy concerning the stated roles and functions of these institutions. However, there was controversy about one of the unstated rationales for creating many of these outreach programs: the question of enlargement, and the need to stall for political time. When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO in March 1999, the door to further expansion was held open. Subsequently, nine countries queued up by formally applying for admission. NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington delayed a decision until another summit in 2002. There was transatlantic acrimony over the first round of enlargement, as the three countries selected were chosen largely on the basis of a U.S. ultimatum. The transatlantic tensions that have arisen in this process have been largely due to differences over how to accommodate Russia (one of the rationales for the creation of the Permanent Joint Council). However, there were divergent European perspectives as well, with various countries backing different potential candidates. Disputes over the next round of admissions could prove to be very divisive. The Bush administration is generally cautious on enlargement due to concerns over the Article 5 implications and the decisionmaking effectiveness of the alliance. The "big bang" proposal, in which all applicant countries (minus Macedonia and Albania) would be admitted into NATO, was certainly not acceptable to the United States.36 And yet, "What is clear is that Washington's attitude will be decisive: without clear and enthusiastic American support and leadership, there will be no further NATO enlargement."37 The issue of Russian reaction remains crucial, especially in the context of the Baltic states, and another effort to stall may be in the offing in the form of a "PFP-Plus" initiative.

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As yet there is little evidence that the new members of the alliance have made decisionmaking more difficult. The new members of NATO are strong advocates of transatlanticism and a traditional conception of the alliance. Future members are likely to want NATO to retain the character that made membership so attractive: an effective alliance, backed by the U.S. security guarantee. However, if enlargement continues, the question of effective decisionmaking will intensify, and with it prospects for even more informal great power coordination and the relegation of the North Atlantic Council to a ratification or legitimating mechanism. September 11 and the Future of NATO Despite the activation of Article 5, an important political sign of unity and solidarity, the war on terrorism may accelerate some of the corrosive trends identified in this chapter. Political unity on fighting terrorism will not necessarily translate into support for NATO. Member states certainly will feel different levels of threat and display varying levels of engagement. There will be reluctance from many members to become entangled in Central Asia or the Middle East. Responses will be conducted by those countries with the capabilities to respond to the unique military challenges of counter-terrorism. Future U.S. actions may serve to alienate political support in Europe (and elsewhere). The United States is likely to continue to engage in a vast program of coalition-building, performed largely outside formal institutional arrangements. NATO will not fall apart or collapse as a result of September 11, but it may receive less attention, resources, and diplomatic energy, at precisely the time it needs more of all three. CANADA, TRANSATLANTICISM, AND THE NEW NATO Canada is a traditional champion of transatlanticism, and has remained so after the Cold War. Membership in NATO secures Canada's access to the most important security arrangement in the transatlantic area. Most of Canada's key trade and security partners are members of the alliance. NATO is therefore a key diplomatic forum for Canada. Membership in NATO secures Canada's access to this forum with attendant expectations of having a voice and input in member-state deliberations. Furthermore, NATO is an institution that can be employed as a "counterweight" to the United States. As a multilateral forum, NATO offers Canada the opportunity to act in concert with other countries to constrain U.S. unilateralism and encourage U.S. multilateralism. Finally, the new NATO is consistent with Canadian interests in the maintenance of stability in Europe. A wide agenda of items, including training and interoperability exercises, the environment, promotion of democracy, democratic control of armed forces, arms control, and outreach to the east, all serve a fundamental Canadian interest in a peaceful and stable European space. However, if the largely, though not entirely, pessimistic calculus of this chapter is correct, the cohesion of the alliance will be undermined by increasingly diffuse interests among member states. When added to the transatlantic debates on eco-

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nomics, missile defense, and EU foreign and security policy, relations between the United States and Europe will be characterized by increased unease and friction. And if the European Union increasingly pursues its own foreign and security policy path, it is not clear how Canada will have any voice in the decisionmaking modalities of that forum. And if all of these challenges facing NATO and transatlanticism combine to create a more fluid, less cohesive, and less institutionalized decisionmaking environment, one dominated by concert arrangements among the great powers, Canada's capacity to exert influence will be eroded still further. As Defense Minister Art Eggleton remarked, there is some "brittleness" in the transatlantic link.38 The implications for Canada are exclusion, marginalization, and irrelevance. What can Canada do to preserve the viability of NATO, the health of the transatlantic relationship, and its voice in European security affairs? First, Canada must continue to contribute significant personnel and materiel assets to European security contingencies. Canada has made significant contributions to NATO and European security since the end of the Cold War. Canada was in the forefront of international efforts to establish UN peacekeeping forces for the former Yugoslavia, and was among the first countries to commit to the UN force in Croatia in February 1992 and to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in March of 1992. However, while Canada was supportive of the Dayton process, then foreign minister Andre Ouellette was frustrated with UNPROFOR, the dispute over air strikes in Bosnia, and Canadian exclusion from the Contact Group. On this basis, Canada was opposed to participation in IFOR. While Prime Minister Jean Chretien reversed this decision, there was little initial enthusiasm for a large Canadian contingent in IFOR. Options discussed at the time included a deployment of fifty troops or a field hospital, subsequently revised upward to a proposal for one hundred troops, considered the minimum necessary for a distinct Canadian presence. Eventually, Canada would agree to roll over its UNPROFOR commitment into IFOR, but Canada was the last country to commit to IFOR. This is not a good model for a country with an interest in alliance cohesion. In contrast, Canada was among the first to commit to KFOR when the Activation Order was issued to member states. Canada made a significant military contribution to NATO's air war against Serbia, with the eighteen Canadian CF-18s deployed under Operation Allied Force flying 10 percent of all strike sorties. Canada would also contribute ground forces to KFOR. One of the lessons of the experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo was that non-Article 5 operations require certain collective capacities, which represent a set of common operational denominators for member states. The contribution of formed ground force units and strike-capable air assets indicates a level of risk and cost acceptance (both human and material) that cannot be matched by the deployment of logistics or naval formations, or the deployment of "niche role" contributions. As Defense Minister Art Eggleton recently stated: "The proof really comes at a time when Canada is asked to provide its troops, such as we have in Kosovo. We have been able to deliver when we have been asked to deliver."39

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NATO continues to serve Canadian interests; therefore Canada has a stake in an effective, healthy alliance. In order to contribute to the cohesiveness of the alliance in the face of the cohesion challenges it faces, Canada should take steps to ensure it is capable of extending meaningful contributions of formed units to nonArticle 5 operations mounted by the alliance. The problem is that Canada's expeditionary capability for formed ground force units is dangerously thin. This is a consequence of successive cuts to the defense budget, which has declined by 23 percent (30 percent after inflation) between 1993 and 1998. The budget for fiscal year 2001/2002 was Can$ll,746 billion, or just 1.2 percent of GDP, the second lowest in NATO. This has fueled arguments that Canada cannot fulfill the obligations specified in its own defense White Paper. If Canada wishes to encourage multilateralism through NATO (or in any other security forums) it must have an improved capacity to deploy meaningful military assets. Canada can also contribute to the alliance by having a consistent voice on the issues of greatest important to the organization. Diplomatic energies should be directed at outreach roles, non-Article 5 operations, and other transatlantic stress points. Contributing to these issues in a way that reinforces transatlantic cooperation should be the focus of Canadian policy in the alliance. Second, Canada must work to ensure a voice in any European decisionmaking structure, by ensuring that any such structure remains subordinate to NATO or that Canada is a participant in any mechanisms designed to coordinate NATO and EU efforts. Canadian diplomacy has already made this point, as evidenced by a noted speech by Art Eggleton, the minister of national defense: "EU structures for crisis management operations should strengthen, not detract from, NATO's role as the primary body for addressing Euro-Atlantic security challenges. Nor should they impede the ability of the Alliance to carry out its tasks effectively. In short, Canada would have serious difficulties with anything that weakened NATO's current consultative practices and consensus-based decision-making." The minister went on to argue that Canada's exclusion from EU strategic planning would be "politically unacceptable."40 And so Canada has joined the chorus calling for joint NATO-EU defense planning, with a view to establishing a cooperative and transparent planning environment. Canada's role in this process will be to manage and encourage the process of consultation and maintenance of the transatlantic relationship. In an optimistic scenario, the development of European defense capacities could in fact serve to establish the basis for a redefined but more equitable and still cooperative transatlantic relationship. For Canada, the best option for the future would be the maintenance of a viable alliance with any European defense capacity subordinate to NATO. This would be an alliance that enlarges with caution but enhances its partnership relations with nonmembers, and an alliance in which member states are willing and capable of making expeditionary contributions to alliance operations, and an alliance that remains fully rooted in the challenges facing the North Atlantic and European space. This alliance would be characterized by more diffuse interests and less cohesion, but its right of first refusal would remain intact and its decisionmaking formalities

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would survive. The second best option would be a redesigned transatlantic relationship, in which Canada has access to a formalized system of coordination between NATO and the EU. This option is suboptimal because is implies a significant erosion of the centrality of the North Atlantic Council, but would still provide for Canadian access and the possibility of a direct Canada-EU security relationship. In a darker scenario, transatlanticism would devolve, detached from institutions and treaties and surviving only as a much smaller community of countries that see value in close defense partnership with the U.S. Transatlanticism would survive in the form of short-term coalitions and bilateral agreements. Canada's position would be reduced to its unequal status in the North Atlantic Triangle, a historically special element of the transatlantic relationship between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. With the future of NATO uncertain and in light of the challenges if faces, one cannot be positive about the role the alliance will, or can, play in the future of transatlanticism. While unifying interests remain in place, preventing any collapse of the transatlantic relationship or the disintegration of security cooperation, on balance the future will see the alliance erode. Canada may not have the capacity to make a difference in this regard, but the effort must be made to realize the best possible scenario in light of the country's continued interests in a strong transatlantic relationship and a strong NATO. NOTES 1. Andrew J. Pierre, introduction to Pierre, ed., A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 2. 2. John Palmer, Europe Without America? The Crisis in Atlantic Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 1. 3. Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent, Policy Papers in International Affairs no. 23 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985), 11. 4. Ibid., 6-8. 5. For the origins of the pluralistic security community concept, see Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); and Patrick M. Morgan, "Multilateralism and Security: Prospects in Europe," in Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, ed. John Ruggie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 327-364. 6. Pierre, introduction to Widening Atlantic? 3. 7. Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Europeanization of Europe," in Widening Atlantic? 52. 8. See Stephen M. Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," National Interest no. 54 (winter 1998/1999): 3-11. 9. William Wallace, "Europe, the Necessary Partner," Foreign Affairs 80 (May/June 2001): 28. 10. Roger Cohen, "New Analysis: Storm Clouds Over U.S.-Europe Relations," New York Times, March 26, 2001. 11. Roger Cohen, "New Analysis: To European Eyes, It's America the Ugly," New York Times, May 7, 2001.

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12. Owen Harries, "The Collapse of The West,'" Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993): 41-42. See also John J. Mearscheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (summer 1990): 5-56; and Christoph Bertram, Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995). 13. Wallace, "Europe," 17. 14. Antony J. Blinken, "The False Crisis Over the Atlantic," Foreign Affairs 80 (May/June 2001): 35-48. 15. Ibid., 46. 16. Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Munich Conference on European Security Policy, February 3, 2001. 17. Charles Barry, Sean Kay, and Joshua Spero, "Completing the Transatlantic Bargain: The United States and European Security," Current History 100 (March 2001): 129. 18. Wallace, "Europe," 27. 19. "Final Communique Issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO press communique M-NAC-1 (92) 51, June 4, 1992, 2. 20. "Final Communique Issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session," NATO press communique M-NAC-2 (92) 106, December 17, 1992, 2. 21. Anthony Cragg, "The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation," NATO Review 44 (July 1996): 9. 22. Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," International Security 13, no. 1 (summer 1998): 185. 23. See Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2000). 24. See Peter W. Rodman, "The Fallout from Kosovo," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 45-51. 25. See The Military Balance, 2000-2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), 38,41. 26. Elinor Sloan, "DCI: Responding to the U.S.-led Revolution in Military Affairs," NATO Review 48 (spring/summer 2000): 4. 27. Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," 78-106. 28. Quoted in William Drozdiak, "Air War Exposed Arms Gap Within NATO," Washington Post, June 28, 1999, Al. 29. See Elizabeth Becker, "European Allies to Spend More on Weapons," New York Times, September 22, 1999, A13. 30. Richard G. Lugar, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business? A Call for U.S. Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance," remarks to the Open Forum of the U.S. Department of State, August 2, 1993, 7. 31. See Christoph Bertram, "NATO on Track for the Twenty-first Century?" Security Dialogue 26, 1 (1995): 65-71; and Ronald D. Asmus, Robert D. Blackwill, and F. Stephen Larabee, "Can NATO Survive?" The Washington Quarterly 19, 2 (Spring 1996): 79-101. 32. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, "NATO's True Mission," New York Times, October 21,1997. 33. Quoted in William Drozdiak, "European Allies Balk at Expanded Role for NATO," Washington Post, February 22, 1998. 34. See, for example, Karl-Heinz Kamp, "A Global Role for NATO?" The Washington Quarterly 22, no. 1 (winter 1999): 7-11.

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35. See Michael Ruhle and Nick Williams, "Why NATO Will Survive," Comparative Strategy 16 (1997): 109-115. 36. William Drozdiak, "Nine Nations United in Bid to Join NATO," Washington Post, May 20, 2000, A16. 37. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," Survival 43 (spring 2001): 73. 38. Speaking notes for the Honorable Art Eggleton, minister of national defense, for the Munich conference on "Transatlantic Relations and European Security and Defense Identity," February 3, 2001. 39. Quoted in Jeff Sallot and Murray Campbell, "NATO Gets First-Hand View of Canada's Defense Woes," Globe and Mail, September 22, 1999, Al. 40. Speaking notes for the Honorable Art Eggleton, for the Munich conference on "Transatlantic Relations."

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CHAPTER 3

Ideas and Discourse in the Construction of a European Security and Defense Policy for the Twenty-first Century Jolyon Howorth The end of the Cold War represented a shift in the tectonic plates of history, politics, and international relations comparable in significance to those of 1789-1795, 1917-1919, and 1945-1949. The major difference with those previous turning points was the absence of war and violence as midwife. Ideas, as well as "reality," were able to come fully into play. For the first time in two centuries, history offered international actors a relatively blank sheet of paper on which to write the outlines of a new world order. It also seemed to offer a reasonable breathing space during which to draft that blueprint. And yet, as a recent collected volume has demonstrated,1 most European governments initially responded neither rationally (as some insist they do) nor constructively (as others suggest they can). Instead, the picture was, at least until 1997, at best one of "disjointed incrementalism,"2 at worst one of dithering, drift, and perceived impotence. Michael Howard, pondering the thirty-year-long stranglehold of Cold War ideas, noted in his Alastair Buchan lecture to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)3 in March 1990: "We became indeed so accustomed to the prison that history had built for us that, like recidivists or long-term hospital patients, we became almost incapable of visualising any other kind of existence. No other world, it seemed, could exist."4 Yet this was the first major shift in the geology of international relations since the establishment of the discipline itself. Research institutes and think tanks existed in all European countries. Ideas abounded, and policy papers tumbled off the printers in a never ending stream. New thinking and new ideas eventually played a vital role in the shift toward new policy preferences and even a new policy paradigm. The role of legitimating discourse is more complex. In some countries it worked, in others it did not. This chapter will attempt to explain why. Stuart Croft has analyzed the "clash of ideas" involved in four "security narratives" that competed with one another in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.5 He has suggested a variety of largely politico-ideational reasons for the mid-1990s

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"victory" of the one narrative that, in early 1990, had seemed the least likely to prevail—the reemergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the dominant security actor in Europe. One significant feature in Croft's analysis is that the original "NATO narrative" was substantially transformed through the absorption of key ideas from the other contending narratives, thereby constituting (or constructing) a new overall idea that was not present at the outset. Ideas, though not unconnected to interests, can take on a life of their own. The aim of this chapter is to scrutinize the policymaking process in order to understand the connection between interests, ideas, and discourse in the construction of yet another security narrative emerging in 1998-1999 (Common European Security and Defense Policy, often referred to as CESDP), which many believe has posed a major challenge to the apparently triumphal NATO narrative of the mid-1990s. I shall concentrate on the role in this process of three countries (Britain, France, and Germany), not only because they are the main security players in Europe but also because they offer strikingly contrasting pictures of the metamorphosis of a policy-community, of the seminal role of ideas, and of the importance of appropriate political discourse. I shall take as a methodological framework for the development of this analysis the approach to discourse pioneered by Vivien Schmidt in a number of recent publications. Discourse thus has both an ideational dimension, with cognitive and normative functions, and an interactive dimension, with coordinative and communicative functions.6 Painfully slowly and in many cases with genuine reluctance, West European elites gradually constructed, in the second half of the 1990s, a transformative discourse of foreign and security relations, bit by bit putting flesh on the bones of mere acronyms (CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy], 1990; ESDI [European Security and Defense Identity], 1994) tossed into the ring years earlier, before they were endowed with substance or meaning. These elites produced a new transformative idea in international relations: the Common European Security and Defense Policy. That transformation is still in process. How did this happen? The study of the influence of ideas on security and defense policy is hardly even in its infancy. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane examined the impact of ideas on foreign policy, but avoided addressing security and, still less, defense issues.7 It is generally assumed that the impact of ideas— as distinct from, but not necessarily as opposed to, interests—is weakest in the field of security and defense policy. And yet it has become banal to record that almost all of the realist, interest-based analyses of the early 1990s proved to be incorrect: that the United States would abandon Europe and that NATO would collapse,8 that NATO would not enlarge eastward,9 and (though the jury may still be out on this one) that the Europeans would prove incapable of moving toward a coordinated security capacity.10 In any case, it is almost impossible, in globalized 2001, to define with any degree of accuracy, the notion of "national interests."11 How did policy elites construct a radically new discourse on European security—which facilitated a wholesale transition from the world of the Cold War to that of ESDP—essentially a new "coordinative discourse,"12 or "referential"?13

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What was the role, in that construction, of ideas,14 of epistemic communities,15 of advocacy coalitions,16 of the interplay of intersubjective norms, values, and identities?17 And how did those ideational forces interact with the perceived ongoing interests of nation-states? How much of the "debate" was international or transnational and to what extent was such rethinking as did take place rethought again and again within each national community? How did different countries shift from long-held shibboleths (British "Atlanticism," French "exceptionalism," German "pacifism" and "civilianism") toward a common acceptance of "integrated European interventionism," based not on the classical stakes of national interest but on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics, thereby introducing a new normative paradigm into international relations? How successfully did European leaders succeed, via a "communicative discourse,"18 in putting this new vision across to a public unschooled in the niceties of neorealism or of foreign policy itself? How do we explain anomalies such as Tony Blair's apparent 180-degree pirouette on European defense within eighteen months (Amsterdam, June 1997, to Saint-Malo, December 1998)? Did British interests change radically within that brief time frame, or did ideas make the difference? These are questions with immense and far reaching implications, and it is beyond the capacity or the remit of this chapter to attempt to answer more than a few of them. IMAGINING A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER: EDGING BEYOND THE COLD WAR The collapse of the Soviet empire happened very fast, but it did not happen in a vacuum. Evolving security and defense policy options and preferences preexisted the end of the Cold War in all capitals and a lively debate already raged within the policy community over something called "Europeanization." Different nations interpreted that concept in different ways, but prior to 1989 it was generally perceived as a process involving the construction of some sort of European pillar inside NATO. The reference text became the WEU "Platform of the Hague" (October 1987) in which the Europeans pledged themselves to greater collective efforts to reinforce the "obligations of solidarity" to which they were committed through the Treaty of Washington and the Modified Brussels Treaty. The key features of this new coordinative discourse—which distinguished it from that of the 1960s and 1970s—were a new willingness on the part of the Europeans to discuss their collective interests and preferences as a caucus within the alliance, and also to try to move toward greater Euro-American balance in influence and responsibilities. France had signed up to the "Platform" for its discursive assertion of Europeanness, Germany because it perfectly epitomized the subtle dialectic between Atlanticism and Europeanism to which Bonn had always aspired, and Britain because the traumas of the Reagan years had taught even a man as impervious to radicalism as UK foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe that genuine European security required greater efforts on the part of the Europeans themselves and a new balance within the alliance. This embryonic new consensus—the new referential—that

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bound together the policy communities of the leading European nations at the end of the 1980s had been painstakingly knitted together over the previous decade through shifting patterns of interests,19 revealed and exacerbated by historical traumas such as the crises of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),20 through institutional processes such as EPC21 and the "revitalization" of the Western European Union,22 and even through a growing European intersubjectivity based on cultural norms and values.23 Yet within two years, the fall of the Berlin Wall rendered this new consensus practically redundant. A complete new rethink was necessary. France was the obvious candidate to drive the rethink, but at the same time it was the country that would have to undergo, in the process, the most far reaching internal military transformation. For the new European security package that finally emerged from the Treaty of Nice in 2001 involved replacing: nuclear deterrence with conventional intervention; conscription with highly professional armed forces capable of distant power projection; military independence with force integration; exclusive national policy mechanisms with shared Brussels-based institutions; and a jealously protected staterun armaments industry with a Europe-wide consortium of weapons-systems manufacturers driven by market forces.24 This was a very tall order. However, the ideational underpinning of this Franco-European security revolution was already in place. For fifty years, France had aspired to create a European security order that would enjoy relative autonomy from the United States within a rebalanced alliance.25 Gaullist discourse, during the Cold War, had totally failed to convince France's European partners of the merits of that vision.26 The challenge for Paris in the 1990s was to elaborate a new coordinative discourse—both nationally and Europe-wide— with which to promote a new version of the same idea to European partners who had already repeatedly rejected it in its previous manifestations (European Defense Community [EDC] in the 1950s, Fouchet in the 1960s, revamped Western European Union [WEU] in the 1970s). The historical "blank sheet" was there to be written upon. Most serious commentators on the "new world order" in the immediate aftermath of 1990 assumed that NATO had become at best a subject for renegotiation, at worst a dead duck. This is where French discourse really did matter. For despite the mythology, Paris had never sought to weaken the alliance and throughout the Cold War had benefited enormously from its stabilizing effects. What France had constantly proposed was a new balance within it. 1989 appeared to offer a realistic prospect of finally achieving that goal. Accordingly, on April 19, 1990, Francois Mitterrand boarded Concorde to exchange ideas with George Bush at Key Largo, Florida. The Key Largo meeting is significant because it contained in embryo the entire package of contradictory ideas that would continue to bedevil Franco-American relations throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. It was in many ways a "dialogue of the deaf." But the key ideas promoted by France were already on the launchpad: (1) the alliance should focus its remit on Article 5 collective defense responsibilities and not attempt to transform itself into an instrument for extended U.S. political hegemony; (2) Europe, poised to debate political union through CFSP (an idea-project that, not coinci-

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dentally, Mitterrand and Kohl had floated the very same day the president flew to Key Largo), would gradually take on responsibility for collective security in Europe and its near-abroad; (3) there would be a new EU-U.S. dialogue inside the alliance about ultimate strategic and political objectives leading to a subsequent debate about military and institutional restructuring.27 France had to undergo a steep learning curve in the construction of a convincing coordinative discourse to promote these ideas. Its attempts were marked by early failure and confusion. The Gulf and Bosnian conflicts temporarily hung a huge—realist—question mark over the construction of this new security arrangement. Yet ultimately, this was in essence to be the package agreed by the EU at Nice in December 2000. How did we get from Key Largo to Nice? The French president was in a position to articulate the outlines of this ideational package on behalf of his country for two main reasons. First, because over the course of his tenure at the Elysee he had become the undisputed master of French strategic doctrine. Second, because that doctrine was underpinned by a relatively sophisticated and extensive epistemic community within France that—emanating from the Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision in the Quai d'Orsay and the Delegation aux Affaires Strategiques at the Ministry of Defense, through institutions such as the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale (IHEDN), think tanks such as the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), and the Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale/Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FEDN/FRS), and communications strategies such as those pursued by the Service dTnformation et de Relations Publiques des Armees (SIRPA/DICOD)28, and relayed by specialist defense correspondents who were themselves part of the community—cultivated and sustained a genuine consensus on defense and security policy, a coordinative discourse or referential that commanded substantial support across the entire political class.29 The fact that Mitterrand himself, from 1990 onward, progressively lost his touch and fought shy of the essential structural reforms that would eventually underpin the strategy he had outlined at Key Largo is incidental.30 The existence of that crucial epistemic community was the guarantee that whatever needed to be done to pursue and implement the overall strategy would be done. And so, over the next few years, the wide-ranging debate that took place throughout this broad-based community generated the entire range of ideas that would progressively be refined and distilled via the various Lois de programmation militaire, Budgets de la Defense, the 1994 Livre Blanc, and 1996 defense reforms (Une Defense Nouvelle 1997-2015) into a new European project.31 Ideas, in abundance, put the flesh on the bones of the Key Largo project. It is important to note that, at this stage, this coordinative discourse was being constructed at a purely national level, albeit with a very wide reach. An early attempt to transmit some of these ideas into the international arena—Jacques Delors's famous (or infamous?) speech to the IISS in March 199132—was a serious failure: of discourse, of coordination, and of communication. By contrast, British policy in this period was characterized by an almost total absence of ideas. Margaret Thatcher through conviction, and John Major through

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political caution and inhibition, attempted to cling to a security order that had essentially disappeared.33 Thatcher's policy was largely irrational and emotional, informed by an atavistic sense of British interests and identity,34 and a misguided Germanophobia that led her to try to forestall European developments already well under way. She surrounded herself with "yes-men" and ignored alternative ideas being tentatively formulated in Whitehall. Major, while pragmatically aware that the emergence of some form of European pillar or identity was becoming a historical inevitability, refused steadfastly to engage his European colleagues in discussions on such a project and worked exclusively with Washington, with NATO, and with the more Atlanticist defense ministries of Europe35 to try to ensure the preeminence of NATO in any emerging European security architecture and the preeminence of Britain within that NATO-centered framework. The Labor Party was no more imaginative, restricting its 1992 election manifesto to a one-line pledge on NATO.36 As Major progressively became a hostage of the Europhobic extremists inside his parliamentary party, such limited thinking on European defense issues as did take place in London was predicated on the perceived electoral necessity of distancing the UK from the dangerous and heretical European theories being spun in Paris. This climaxed in the quasi-hysterical tour of European capitals by Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind in spring 1997 threatening hell and high water if the "continental" project for EU-WEU merger were not dropped. Rifkind's discourse had nothing whatever to do with defense or security policy and everything to do with his bid to succeed Major as party leader after the expected Tory defeat in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, in the corridors of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the bunkers of Bosnia, and the offices of the think tanks, it was becoming obvious that current British (non)discourse on defense and security was not only unsustainable but actually counterproductive. Bosnia offered two linked lessons. First, as had in any case become abundantly clear from the burden-sharing debates on Capitol Hill, Uncle Sam's cavalry was no longer available on request to manage "minor" European security crises. Second, Franco-British cooperation on the ground in the Balkans had brought home to military planners in both countries that the shift within Europe from deterrence to intervention was forcing London and Paris into each other's arms. "National" interest, to the extent to which it could be perceived, was no longer going to be served by clinging to fraying U.S. apron strings that were visibly being untied. Those whose job it was in London to come up with new ideas were faced with a serious task. The alpha and omega of the new project was the retention and enhancement of the alliance, which was increasingly perceived to be in deep trouble. Somehow or other—paradoxically—a European instrument had to be found to solve the problem. The only significant partner in this strange project was France, whose starting point was diametrically opposite: the alpha and omega for Paris was Europe, the potential instrument Atlanticist. But this was the ray of light at the end of the tunnel. France, for largely pragmatic reasons, had begun its reentry into the NATO orbit. Both countries therefore shared a NATO-EU conundrum: Could they

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come up with an idea that would bridge the gap between their respective starting (and finishing) points? THINKING ABOUT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION: PART OF THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM? One idea that was to cause enormous confusion—and to constitute a three- to four-year distraction from the real focus—was the Western European Union. In a sense, the WEU has always been little more than an idea—and one, to boot, whose time never did come. The WEU had been the focus of the new consensus in the late 1980s ("Platform of the Hague") and was identified at Maastricht (faute de mieux?) as the key to the conundrum. A vast literature began to appear in the mid1990s geared to solving the almost impossible EU-WEU-NATO equation. The WEU became the central focus of the entire defense debate during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) discussions. It appealed to governments because it was intergovernmental; it appealed to military people because it was Europe's only quasi-military organism; it appealed to institutionalists because it posed a fascinating institutional challenge; and it appealed to experts on Europe and especially on European security because it was European. And the ideas went round and round in circles.37 But already by 1996-1997 in both Paris and London, small policymaking communities had begun to come up with another idea, which in fact proved to be the key to where we are today: abandon the WEU in favor of a straightforward direct relationship between the EU and NATO. Little by little, a coordinative discourse to this effect emerged, first among national elites and then at the bilateral level and eventually at the trans-European level. The idea that the WEU, instead of being the solution might in fact be the main problem, was first generated by a very small handful of policymakers in Paris and London—quite independently of one another.38 The strategic thinking in each case was quite different. For Paris, abandonment of the (increasingly impossible) WEU conundrum, while risky, had the advantage of leading logically to a direct EU military capacity. For London, dumping the WEU implied a division of labor between an EU political capacity (based on new institutions) and a NATO military capacity (based on ESDI with Combined Joint Task Forces [CJTFs]). The French approach was strategic (how to reach the ultimate goal), the British essentially tactical (how to stay on track). Thus, by the time the Blair government was elected in 1997, a very similar solution existed, at least at the level of ideas, in the minds of policy planners on both sides of the Channel. What was now required was a coordinative discourse that would generate elite consensus, followed by a communicative discourse that could sell the project to the public. In France this was unproblematic, since the idea fit perfectly with long-established policy preferences and cultural norms and values. In Britain it was highly problematic, since it involved justifying a significant policy shift whose rationale was no clearer to most nonspecialists than were its consequences, and that appeared to fly in the face of cherished Atlanticist norms and values.

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But we are forgetting Germany. Here, the role of ideas, norms, and values was paramount. Germany positively bristles with foreign and security policy think tanks, institutes, experts, and commentators whose links to government are close and permanent.39 A robust and deeply embedded coordinative discourse, particularly on security policy, constructed by a wide range of actors, has been a feature of German policy for most of the postwar period, with the exception of the Euromissiles episode in the early 1980s. The cardinal ideas informing the German discourse in the early to middle 1990s were relatively few and straightforward: (1) Contrary to the fears of many in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there would be no Sonderweg but a strong international, predominantly European, embeddedness. (2) "Neutralism" would not be an option. (3) German military capacity would remain tightly pegged to NATO's Article 5 commitments and German forces would not be used in out-of-area operations. (4) Conscription (as opposed to professionalism) would both underpin the sense of republican identity and norms that the Bundeswehr epitomized, and guard against any prospect of a return to the errors of the past. (5) A European security capacity would be an important—and growing—part of CFSP as a factor of integration, but it would be tightly pegged to NATO. (6) German budgetary commitment to European security would derive more from investment, development, and stabilization aid in Central and Eastern Europe than from an increased defense budget; and there was a marked preference for diplomatic, economic, and civilian instruments in pursuing foreign and security policy goals. Increasingly, under pressure of events and allied persuasion, the Bundeswehr assumed a more extended role in crisis management and peace support operations, but here again, this was the direct product of a cross-party coordinative discourse sophisticatedly stage-managed by "moral entrepreneurs"40 or "norm entrepreneurs"41 led by Volker Rtihe but also Joschka Fischer and Karsten Voigt. Although in many ways Germany felt closer to the UK in security policy preferences, it chose for reasons connected with the centrality of Europapolitik to prioritize the security partnership with France, however unsatisfactory and complex that option might be. A European defense initiative seemed a natural development for a nation that saw federal perspectives down every road. THE "BLAIR REVOLUTION" IN BRITAIN: IDEAS WITHOUT DISCOURSE The election of Tony Blair as UK prime minister in May 1997 came as an enormous relief to security policymakers not only in Britain but across the Continent. It is an open secret in Whitehall that officials in both the FCO and the MOD had by 1997 reached their wits' end in trying to feed new security ideas into a government that simply did not want to listen. Yet defense and security were not high on Labor's policy agenda and thinking within the party had not really shifted much since 1992.42 Blair's first serious foreign policy speech had to await the Lord Mayor's dinner in November 1997. It was a rather unimaginative rehearsal of standard British aspirations to act as a bridge between Europe and the United States.

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But within the FCO and the MOD and in think tanks such as the Centre for European Reform, ideas were on the move. The FCO had for most of the 1990s been exchanging officials with the Quai d'Orsay and the Auswartiges Amt and had established CFSP and European Security units with the express task of coordinating policy approaches with Paris and Bonn/Berlin. The MOD had set up a European Security unit in 1996 and senior officials up to the level of policy director were increasingly interacting with their opposite numbers in the major European capitals. Internal papers, such as the seminal Robert Cooper memorandum of 1997, were increasingly reflecting a new approach embracing the one idea that for fifty years had been taboo in Whitehall: a defense and security remit for the EU itself. These ideas coincided with those emanating from the think tanks.43 While by no means distancing themselves from Atlanticist norms or from NATO, this small handful of policy shapers became convinced by 1997 that Britain had to cross a European Rubicon. Richard Whitman (1999) has recounted in great detail the story of how these ideas were fed into the Downing Street mill with the result that, by the time of the informal summit of EU leaders in Portschach, Austria (October 24-25,1998), Blair indicated that he was prepared to cross that Rubicon.44 His crossing was assisted by two factors. The first was that, by late 1997, the new UK government was beginning to receive a very clear message from Washington. Far from a European security capacity being perceived in Washington as prejudicial to the alliance (as London had believed for fifty years), it was now being openly touted as the very salvation of the alliance: unless Europe got its act together, NATO was dead in the water. This was an idea that galvanized British security-cultural thinking.45 The second factor was the gathering of fresh cloud storms over the Balkans. When Blair was first properly briefed in mid-1998 on Europe's seriously defective capacity to react to a hypothetical crisis in Kosovo, he was appalled. Europe, he concluded, simply had to turn its attention to defense. The rest followed: Portschach, Saint-Malo, Cologne, Helsinki, and so forth. However, a key feature of the British paradigm shift was its restricted community. It is no exaggeration to say that fewer than two dozen individuals were involved in constructing the coordinative discourse that generated the UK side of the Saint-Malo paradigm shift. This handful of top officials should be differentiated from the defense epistemic community in the UK that had been involved in redefining national defense policy in 1998 through the Strategic Defense Review (SDR). The SDR involved thousands of individuals—service personnel, parliamentarians, officials, and experts—throughout Labor's first year in office. Revealingly, the review was conducted with virtually no reference to or consultation with Britain's European partners. And yet it did contain one seminal sentence referring to the "vital role of the EU" in defense policymaking, a phrase that went unnoticed at the time, but that provided the "key to Saint-Malo."46 However, the handful of UK officials responsible for Saint-Malo was becoming part of a new international epistemic community that was to take up the new paradigm and refine it. The teams of officials working on a new approach to European defense in the ministries of foreign affairs and the ministries of defense in Paris, London, and

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Bonn/Berlin were getting to know one another, to generate something of a wavelength and to speak a language that while not identical, was at least mutually comprehensible. The French seized on Blair's Portschach breakthrough and proposed that the forthcoming Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo become the opportunity for a significant statement on European defense. Blair agreed and requested a text. The first draft came from the Quai and was deemed nonnegotiable by the FCO. It contained no reference to NATO. Accordingly, when the British delegation arrived in Saint-Malo in the late afternoon of December 3, 1998, blank sheets of paper were provided and the two Ministry of Foreign Affairs political directors, with one or two assistants, jointly drafted the text that, around three o'clock the following morning, was silently pushed under the bedroom doors of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac. The Saint-Malo declaration contains one reference to the Treaty of Washington, two references to the Atlantic alliance, and four references to NATO. It also contains ten references to the European Union, three references to the European Council, and most significantly of all, the word that really let the genie out of the bottle: "autonomy."47 The political directors had struck a deal: "European autonomy" would underpin the "vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance." The first element satisfied the French; the second satisfied the British. It all sounded very nice. The French knew more or less exactly what they meant by that formula. It was not the same thing as was meant by the British.48 In addition to the restricted community behind it, another key feature of the British paradigm shift was the lack of any parallel effort to generate a wider coordinative discourse bringing other elites into the loop or, still less, a communicative discourse geared to explaining to the public what was going on. Saint-Malo was simply announced to the watching world as a Franco-British breakthrough that was supposed to help ensure that future Bosnias did not happen. Blair's real problem was that he actually needed four separate discourses: one for his European partners (assuring them of the UK's earnest in this radical shift), one for his Washington partners (assuring them that there was, in effect, no real shift at all), one for UK elites (explaining to them in cognitive terms exactly how the new EuroAtlantic balance was intended to work), and one for the British public (persuading them in more normative terms that this crossing of the European Rubicon was in line with the Atlanticist norms and values that had for so long underpinned UK defense policy). This was an impossible task—politically and linguistically. The result: no discourse at all. Or rather, a misleading and in some ways disingenuous discourse. When Madeleine Albright and the Washington defense community woke up on the morning of December 5, 1998, they were shocked by the Saint-Malo text. Albright responded with her famous "Three Ds,"49 whereupon the UK government embarked on the line it has stuck to ever since: that the important component in Saint-Malo is the "revitalized Atlantic Alliance." All that "autonomy" was supposed to mean was that the European component would only come into effect "where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged." In private most British policymakers would concede that it was extremely difficult to imagine circumstances where that would be the case, even though such a hypothesis had been a causal

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factor behind the paradigm shift itself. For the British government at any rate, SaintMalo was Atlanticist business as usual. There was, in the UK, no attempt to discuss the new approach with the broader policy community, nor to construct an internal coordinative discourse that would make sense of it. Whereas the Strategic Defense Review had involved numerous public workshops and colloquia to which politicians, journalists, academics, and other experts were invited (even if their advice was seldom retained), no such initiative accompanied the "European defense initiative." There were two main reasons for this. First, the UK did not wish to draw too much attention to the fact that the Atlantic alliance was felt to be in trouble, since this might open up an unwelcome discussion at the worst of all possible junctures—just as Kosovo was blowing apart. Second, there was no genuine "European project" behind the Blair initiative, other than a pragmatic desire to solve a real problem within the alliance—the likely absence of the necessary (U.S.) instruments for crisis management. Those many analysts who have seen in Saint-Malo a Tony Blair seeking to play a leadership role in Europe have missed the key factor. Consequently, when Blair's involvement in November 2000 at the time of the Capabilities Commitments Conference (CCC) became obvious, the UK press suddenly awoke to the emergence of a "European army," and there were precious few voices around to defend or explain the government's case. Even within the Labor Party itself, the coordinative discourse did not happen. The influential chair of the House of Commons Select Committee on Defense, Bruce George, by no means an "Old Laborite," was not consulted—and remains unconvinced. Former Labor defense heavyweights such as Denis Healey simply did not understand what was happening. The range of individuals from the center-ground of British politics (the territory Blair was supposed to have occupied) who protested vehemently at the time of the CCC in November 2000 indicates the absence of any attempt to get the message across—even to the policy elites. And there was no attempt whatsoever to construct a communicative discourse in an effort to sell the project to the public. Having launched this particular balloon, there was no alternative but to see it through. From Saint-Malo to Cologne: Bringing the Germans on Board

It is almost certain that there would have been a much bigger media-orchestrated public outcry about Saint-Malo in the UK had it not been for two factors. The first was that, only weeks after Saint-Malo, the Kosovo crisis erupted, offering a practical demonstration of how the British and the French (who cochaired Rambouillet) could now assume security policy leadership and not simply defer to the United States. Few were fooled by the Franco-British "leadership" at Rambouillet, but it did provide a distraction. Moreover, the military dimension of the Kosovo crisis actually furnished further concrete proof of the need for "Saint-Malo." The second factor was that the Saint-Malo project itself was handed over to the Germans, who assumed the presidency of the EU (and, coincidentally, that of the WEU) in

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January 1999. Germany took full advantage of this opportunity to bring its own ideas and discourse into line with the changing reality of security in Europe. First, the German presidency gently but decisively put the final nail into the coffin of the WEU. Second, largely under the impulsion of Joschka Fischer and Rudolph Scharping, Germany determined to use the Franco-British initiative to promote European political union and to create a genuine European Security and Defense Policy, which would be a much bigger project than ESDI. Third, instead of concentrating on the military capacity of ESDP (where Germany was weak), Berlin engaged in an intensive round of institutional engineering to create the EU structures within which the German voice could be heard most effectively. Fourth, while actively promoting this European project, Germany made it absolutely clear that the project would only work in close collaboration with NATO. The harmonious EU-U.S. outcome of the fiftieth-anniversary NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 at the height of the Kosovo war was in no small measure due to German inputs stressing the indivisibility of the new ESDP with NATO. Thus the Germans were able to satisfy both the French and the British interpretations of Saint-Malo. The various German position papers circulated at Amorbach (January 1999), Reinhartshausen (March 1999), and at the General Affairs Council (May 1999) constitute a brilliant example of coordinative discourse that successfully tied together the rather different aspirations of the United States, France, the UK, and the Federal Republic.50 They also paid full attention to the concerns of the neutral countries. Coming as they did during Germany's first out-of-area military engagement since 1945, these papers (which were elaborated with widespread consultation among the many German think tanks and security experts) also allowed Germany itself to edge its security culture closer to acceptance of military intervention.51 The German presidency was crucial and instrumental in taking forward a rather vague and inchoate declaration (Saint-Malo) and turning it into the embryo of an ESDP. It offers an unparalleled example of coordinative discourse in action. From Cologne to Helsinki and Feira: More British Ideas But Still no Discourse

The Kosovo crisis appeared to legitimate the Saint-Malo/ESDP project and to deflect from its European connotations a British media that is instinctively hostile to anything that smacks of integration. Therefore, during the Finnish presidency of the EU (June to December 1999), the project made great progress. While the UK was not opposed to institutional engineering (indeed the organism that became the Political and Security Committee [COPS] was initially Robin Cook's suggestion), London was aware that the German presidency had prioritized institutions for its own reasons. George Robertson, still UK defense secretary, had in March 1999 gently mocked this approach: "Institutional re-engineering alone will solve little [Y]ou can't send a wiring diagram to a crisis." What mattered to London (and Washington) was military capacity. This became the key idea promoted by Britain, which during the Finnish presidency engaged in a great deal of backseat

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driving. However, by now this idea too had taken on a life of its own and moved on beyond the original British plan to base that capacity in CJTFs. France had gambled on the abandonment of the WEU leading logically to an EU armed force. Britain had no alternative but to concur. Thus the two "great leaps forward" that characterized the Helsinki Council meeting in December 1999—the "Headline Goal" project for a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), and the arrangements for the planning and conduct of EU-led military operations—were both the result of British-generated policy papers, albeit with important French input.52 The same was true during the Portuguese presidency (January to June 2000), where the key policy paper, "Elaboration of the Headline Goal: 'Food for Thought,'" was again generated from the offices of the policy director of the MOD in Whitehall—as were the compromise proposals of April 2000 that broke the Franco-British deadlock over the involvement in the ESDP process of the six non-EU European members of NATO.53 But in all of these UK initiatives, coordinative discourse was far more international than national. The various papers I have just referred to were well thumbed at NATO headquarters in Brussels and in the strategic planning sections of the French and German ministries of defense and even the ministries of foreign affairs. But they were hardly known in the UK outside of the tiny circle of official policymakers behind the paradigm shift. Thus, while the Capabilities Commitments Conference scheduled for November 2000 was being actively prepared from February 2000 onward, the British press seemed to be unaware that such a significant development was taking place. Both the cognitive and the normative functions of discourse were lacking. Since no attempt had been made to explain to the "policy forum"—the political class and the security elites in Parliament and the media—quite what the Headline Goal was all about, why it was necessary, and how it would work, the brouhaha at the time of the CCC was hardly surprising. Even less surprising was the astonishment expressed across large swathes of British public opinion at the "discovery," late in November 2000, that the new norms for British defense policy involved a European initiative, hand in hand with the French, to create what the media simply would not refrain from calling a "European army." For several weeks, the British government devoted itself full-time to "fallout management"—which basically involved the repetition of a discourse that came perilously close to denying that there was any meaningful European dimension to the proposals for the RRF. Thus, for instance, the only reference made to the European defense initiative during the prime minister's keynote speech on "Engagement" at the Guildhall, London, the very week before the CCC, was a single sentence: "On defense, we are engaged in a debate that will ensure Europe's defense policy proceeds absolutely consistently with NATO."54 As far as the wider public was concerned, the communicative message that accompanied what few speeches were delivered on the subject had much more to do with "Third Way humanitarianism" than with Europe. Since the government could not admit in cognitive terms exactly what it was doing (creating an armed force with its EU partners—politically dodgy!—in order to shore up a declining alliance—strategically inadmissible!), it resorted to explaining why

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it was doing it, with the emphasis overwhelmingly on the normative legitimation. The best example of this is Tony Blair's speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, in which the campaign in Kosovo is justified in terms of an entirely new approach to international relations requiring democracies to intervene with tyrants in order to defend the human rights of oppressed peoples: This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions, but on values.... We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of humanrightswithin other countries if we want still to be secure. ... We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end, values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too.55 It is significant that the only (fleeting) reference to the European defense initiative in this long and landmark speech on international security comes in a sentence in which Blair recognizes the need for the Europeans to do more to help the United States assume its responsibilities as sole superpower.56 CONCLUSION: HOW TO TALK ONESELF OUT OF A HOLE? The absence of any credible coordinative discourse around the ESDP project has created a situation where the political class in the UK is both divided and disoriented. The new approach has not been explained, and is therefore easily misunderstood—and a hostile press is all too willing to help in the misunderstanding. The Daily Telegraph and The Sun wage almost daily warfare on the "Euro-army," backed regularly by The Times, Sunday Times, and Daily Mail. The government makes no attempt to explain ESDP in terms of its European component, contenting itself systematically with the rationalization that the project is intended to enhance NATO's capacity to manage crises. And yet the texts that have been agreed—including, most significantly, the Presidency Conclusion to the Nice Council—make it clear that ESDP has reached a very high degree of development in terms of procedures and structures. It is true that the key texts have been battled over by political-linguists for days, so that they can be read in different and even contradictory ways in different capital cities. For the French and for the Germans, this poses no problem, since the basic project fits comfortably into a long-term and comprehensive European vision of which ESDP is both a logical and an important component. For Britain, this is not the case. The idea-mongers and policymakers who have launched ESDP probably see more or less eye-to-eye with their European opposite numbers. But the government, for reasons that clearly have much to do with electoral calculation, has so far not seen fit to "come clean" on the project. Instead, a communicative discourse has been generated that presents ESDP as emanating from a twofold logic: strengthening NATO and making the world fit for

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democracy and human rights. For the moment, these appear to have met with the electorate's approval. Governmental approval ratings on defense policy hover around 60 percent. It is not certain that that score can be guaranteed once a debate is properly engaged on what the ESDP is really all about. And the opposition and the press will not let Tony Blair off the hook on that one. In a sense, he has already dug himself into a hole.

NOTES 1. Robin Niblett and William Wallace, eds., Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989-1997 (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 2. William Wallace, "Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom," International Affairs 67, 1 (January 1991): 65-80. 3. The Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London is a major set-piece annual event for the international strategic studies community. 4. Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," Survival 32, no. 2 (1990): 99. 5. Stuart Croft, "The EU, NATO, and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate," European Security 9, no. 3 (autumn 2000): 1-20. 6. Vivien A. Schmidt, "Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World," European Law Journal 6, no. 3 (September 2000): 277-300. 7. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 8. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); 5-49 and Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 14, no. 4 (1993): 44-79. 9. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994/1995): 5-49. 10. Philip Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). 11. A Chatham House study group on "British Foreign Policy for 2000," of which I was a member in the mid-1990s, took as its starting point the proposition that the United Kingdom has no definable "national interests." 12. Vivien A. Schmidt, "Values and Discourse in the Politics of Welfare-State Adjustment," in Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, vol. 1, From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, eds. Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 229-309. 13. Pierre Muller, "Les Politiques publiques comme construction d'un rapport au monde," in La Construction du sens dans les politiques publiques: Debats autour de la notion de referentiel, eds. Alain Faure et al. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995); and Bruno Jobert, "Representations sociales, controverses et debats dans la conduite des politiques publiques," Revue Francaise de Science Politique 42, no. 2 (1992): 219-234. 14. Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policy-Making in Britain," Comparative Politics 25 (1993): 275-296. 15. Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, 1 (Winter 1992): 1-35.

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16. Paul Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe," Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 1 (1998): 98-130. 17. Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 18. Vivien A. Schmidt, "The Politics of Economic Adjustment in France and Britain: When Does Discourse Matter?" Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 2 (2001): 247-264. 19. Throughout this period, the United States and the European Community/Union clashed increasingly over issues such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), trade with the USSR, and high-technology research within the military-industrial complex—. 20. Jolyon Howorth, "The Third Way," Foreign Policy 65, 1 (Winter 1986/1987): 114-134; and Sir Geoffrey Howe, "The European Pillar," Foreign Affairs 63, no. 2 (1984/1985): 330-343. 21. Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). 22. Western European Union, The Reactivation of WEU: Statements and Communiques, 1984-1987 (London: Western European Union, 1987). 23. Mary Kaldor, Europe from Below: An East-West Dialogue (London: Verso, 1991). 24.1 shall not attempt in this chapter to address the transformation of the European armaments industry, in which ideas, market forces, and advocacy coalitions played a much greater role than government policymakers or traditionally conceived strategic interests. On this aspect, see Burkard Schmitt, From Cooperation to Integration: Defense and Aerospace Industries in Europe, Chaillot Paper no. 40 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2000). 25. Jolyon Howorth, "France and European Security, 1944-1994: Re-reading the Gaullist 'Consensus,'" in France: From the End of the Cold War to the New World Order, eds. Brian Jenkins and Tony Chafer (London: Macmillan, 1995), 17-40; and Frederic Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 26. Gaullism as an alternative vision of European security is still fundamentally misunderstood. 27. For a discussion of the alternative set of ideas proposed by George Bush at Key Largo, and of the significance of this "dialogue of the deaf," see Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge? Chaillot Paper no. 43 (Paris: Western European Union, 2000), 16-18. 28. The Service dTnformation et de Relations Publiques des Armees (SIRPA) was replaced by the Delegation a 1'Information et a la Communication de Defense (DICOD) in 1998 with a mandate to explain defense policy to the general public. 29. Shaun Gregory, French Defense Policy into the Twenty-first Century (London: Macmillan, 2000), 22-32. 30. Structural forms included, among others, downgrading of nuclear weapons, especially short-range ones, professionalization of the armed services, European mergers in the armaments industry, and rapprochement with NATO. 31. Jolyon Howorth, "French Defense Reforms: National Tactics for a European Strategy?" in Brassey's Defense Yearbook, 1998 (London: Brassey's, 1998), 130-151. 32. Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," Survival 33, no. 2 (1991): 99-110.

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33. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, "The British Response: Denial and Confusion?" in Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989-1997, eds. Robin Niblett and William Wallace (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 124-151. 34. Wallace, "Foreign Policy." 35. In both Bonn and Rome, the defense ministries have traditionally been openly Atlanticist while the foreign ministries have been far more Euro-centered. This is also true, though to a much lesser extent and in a different way, of Paris. 36. "As the party which took Britain into NATO, Labor will base its defense policies on UK membership of the alliance." 37. Anne Deighton, ed., Western European Union, 1954-97: Defense, Security, Integration (Oxford: St. Antony's, 1997); Andre* Dumoulin and Eric Remacle, LUnion de VEurope Occidentale: Phenix de la defense europeenne (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998); and G. Wyn Rees, The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998). 38. Author interviews in Paris and London, 1995-1997. 39. There is, nevertheless, a lively debate about the degree of influence of these actors/thinkers over the details of government policy. See Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, "Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?" International Affairs 72, no. 1 (1996): 24. 40. Jeffrey Checkel, Social Construction and Integration, ARENA Working Paper no. 98/14 (Dublin ARENA, 1998). 41. Martha Finmore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 42. Author interviews with key Labor policy advisers, June 1997, revealed a determination to continue with the main lines of the Major policy approach. 43. Charles Grant, Strength in Numbers: Europe's Foreign and Defense Policy (London: CER, 1996). 44. Richard Whitman, Amsterdam's Unfinished Business? The Blair Government's Initiative and the Future of the WEU, Occasional Paper no. 7 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999). 45. Ever since the negotiation of the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947, this had been an item of significant disagreement between the British and the French. I was told in 2000 by a senior UK official that, had the UK not been convinced that the alliance was in serious trouble, "we would not have touched Saint-Malo with a barge-pole." 46. This in the opinion of the man who almost certainly drafted that key sentence, Richard Hatfield, policy director of the MOD, in a speech to the IFRI, Paris, titled "The Consequences of Saint-Malo" (April 28, 2000). Hatfield considers that the acceptance of a defense remit for the EU itself "let the genie out of the bottle." 47. In fact, although it is often asserted that the word "autonomy" makes its entry onto the European defense stage at Saint-Malo, it does not. The relevant phrase is "the capacity for autonomous action." 48. Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France, and the European Defense Initiative," Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 33-55. 49. Madeleine K. Albright, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's future," Financial Times, December 7,1998. The Three Ds (to be avoided) were: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. 50. Mathias Jopp, European Defense Policy: The Debate on the Institutional Aspects (Bonn/Berlin: Institut fur Europaische Politik, 1999).

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51. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had reached this point some years earlier. What was significant about the period of the German presidency was that it also allowed the coordinative discourse to bring the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) several steps closer to the new consensus. See Adrian Hyde-Pryce and Charlie Jeffery, "Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality," Journal of Common Market Studies 39,1 (November 2001): 689-717; and Brian Rathbun, forthcoming Ph.D. diss. on the transformation of the SPD's approach to security and defense policy, University of California at Berkeley. 52. The Headline Goal was proposed by the UK at the General Affairs Council on November 15, 1999, and refined ten days later at the Franco-British summit. The "Tool Box" paper titled "Military Bodies in the European Union and the Planning and Conduct of EULed Military Operations" was drafted in the UK MOD during the summer of 1999. 53. See Howorth, European Integration, 56-59. The role of the British ambassador to Lisbon, Sir John Holmes, in keeping the Portuguese "on message" over ESDP was also very important. 54. Tony Blair, "Britain's Choice: Engagement Not Isolation," a speech by the prime minister at Guildhall, November 13, 2000. 55. Tony Blair, speech by the prime minister to the Economic Club of Chicago, April 22, 1999, www.fco.gov. 56. "America's allies are always both relieved and gratified by its continuing readiness to shoulder burdens and responsibilities that come with its sole superpower status. We understand that this is something that we have no right to take for granted, and must match with our own efforts. That is the basis for the recent initiative I took with President Chirac of France to improve Europe's own defense capabilities." See Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-first Century Pascal Boniface For more than fifty years Europeans had been speaking of the organization and enhancement of their defense capacity. For more than fifty years Americans had been asking Europeans to increase their defense capacity and to share more fairly the burden of collective defense. The self-organization of European countries in defense matters was even a prerequisite for the U.S. green light to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A more active European participation—softly (Kennedy) or more aggressively (Mansfield amendment)—has been a constant position of the United States. Over the last two or three years, European countries have defined a realistic and quite ambitious project of a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 troops deployable within sixty days and sustainable for one year. One should have thought that such a result meets the requirements of the whole Western world, and is widely welcome. One should have believed that the only result is a strengthening and consolidation of NATO. Ironically, the more frequent question that is heard about this project, and precisely the one I have been asked, is rather surprising and consists in wondering whether the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) could damage and not strengthen the alliance. At first glance it should appear incomprehensible that the emerging European defense capacity could be viewed more as a problem than as a solution. How can such a contradiction be interpreted? How are we to understand such a paradox? In fact such issues are not difficult to understand: A European defense capacity is completely new and changes the old habits, habits that are as old as the alliance. Such a change clearly fuels apprehensions. States and governments fear change and clearly prefer stability. Subsequently, this process requires an enormous adaptation of the Atlantic alliance, even more in its spirit and method than in its architecture. I would suggest that in the beginning the alliance will enter a turbulent area regarding such change but that in the long run NATO will be strengthened.

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Transatlantic misunderstandings are at least as old as NATO. Basically they can be summed up as follows: • The Americans ask for burden sharing without any consideration of power sharing and Europeans call for more responsibilities, remaining reluctant to spend more money on defense. • Immediately following World War II, European countries had little choice. United in destruction and economic devastation, winners and losers shared the same preoccupation: to rebuild their economic capacities as soon as possible. • During the post-World War II era, defense was not afirstpriority. However, the Soviet threat soon led Europe and the United States to another common perception: the necessity to defend their territories and their values from the Stalinist version of communism. • The gap between a big threat and scarce resources led European countries to ask for protection from the only country that could give it. • The United States came out of the war stronger than ever. Truman fully understood such strength and what it implied. Even if the United States wanted less global responsibility, isolationism was no longer a possibility. • Pearl Harbor had shown that isolation was an illusion and the Soviet threat demonstrated that such a policy had been a mistake. Before breaking with isolationism and taking the lead of the free world, Washington had demanded a precondition: Europe must be organized into a defense zone. Not willing to be involved in various other European quarrels, the Americans asked Europeans to take the first step in the area of collective defense. The Atlantic alliance was created only after the Europeans had signed the Treaty of Brussels (1948), a defense pact that later became the Western European Union (WEU). We can hardly speak of common European security during this period, which would have meant a shared definition by European countries regarding their security. To the contrary, all European countries, depending on which side of the Iron Curtain they were situated, had very different perceptions of security. For Western countries, the security was threatened from inside by communism and protected from the outside by the United States: • Due to their lack of capacity, European countries gave responsibility for their security to Washington. • The situation suited everybody's concerns. It was in the U.S. interest to avoid the domination of Eurasia by a single country, whatever its ideology could be. Had Russia been a noncommunist country, the basic goal would have been the same. • For Germany, NATO was both a protection against the Soviet Union and a tool allowing its reintegration into the Western family. It was also a structure for self-defense. • Germans hadfinallyrealized that their thirst for power had led them into a catastrophic situation. NATO provided Germany with insurance against themselves and the certainty that they would avoid a renationalization of their defense. • For Italians, it was the possibility to do something constructively in the area of defense, following the difficulties of World War II.

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• For Portugal, it was a unique opportunity to enter the Western community, which would have been impossible on political ground. • For the British, who had lost an empire, NATO provided a new role and was a fantastic multiplier of power. Considering themselves in the role of Greeks during the Roman Empire, they found in NATO a way to keep great-power status, due to their special relationship with the United States. In the British view, NATO provided the muscles while the brain was in London. • For countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark, NATO was a protection not only against the Soviet Union but also against the appetite of France and the United Kingdom, not to speak of potential German revanchism. Small countries have always preferred protection from afar rather than by their neighbors. In the 1960s the economic landscape was greatly altered. The European countries had been rebuilt. Indeed, with the help of the Marshall Plan, the European economies fully recovered their competitiveness, sometimes at the expense of U.S. manufacturers. Meanwhile, this had little consequences on NATO's burden sharing. The United States was still the main contributor to European defense, with an average share of GNP dedicated to defense that was double that of the European share. France, since the 1960s, has tried to challenge U.S. domination. Charles de Gaulle developed a vision of European autonomy. But his pro-European stance was perceived by France's neighbors as premature. Thus other Europeans countries, first and foremost Germany, did not share his vision of a fading Soviet threat. They still considered U.S. protection an absolute necessity. The modest French nuclear capacities could not serve as a substitute for the U.S. umbrella. They also suspected that de Gaulle was criticizing U.S. hegemony only to replace it by French domination. If dependence on a protector was a necessity, however, a superpower was a better choice than a medium power. De Gaulle spoke for European autonomy, but the European translation was French imperialism, which they wished to avoid. Francois Mitterrand followed the same policy without much success. But France played an essential role, to show that NATO was not the only game in town, and that inside the Western bloc, U.S. views could be challenged. France was too weak to offer a substitute for U.S. protection, but was strong enough to show that alternatives were possible. France sent a strong signal: the relationship between the United States and European countries was characterized by domination, which was no longer acceptable and would soon become counterproductive. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one would have thought that the most probable outcome was the demise of NATO. Can an alliance survive for a long period without the threat that originally motivated its formation? European countries all responded yes, whether they were inside or outside NATO. Russia was the lone exception. For NATO members, the alliance is the foundation of stability in a continent in which uncertainty has replaced the threat of Soviet communism. NATO is the sole and unique forum of strategic consultation between Western democracies. After all, the nonmembers want nothing more than to become member states. NATO is still bedrock of European security.

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There has been more progress with the building of European defense during the past two or three years (1999-2001) than during the last fifty years. This has been accomplished despite the fact that most of the experts and think tanks had depicted such progress as impossible and, for some of them, unwelcome. Since the late 1940s, efforts to develop a European defense have had a poor record of success, from the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) to the sleeping beauty of the WEU. Other failures include the Gaullist attempt to reform NATO in 1959, the emasculation of the Franco-German Treaty in 1963, and the hope of overcoming the division of Europe through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the beginning of the 1990s, in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, Yugoslavia erupted into war. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) had just been implemented. Jacques Poos, then the acting president of European Council, declared the "time for Europe has come." It is, however, an understatement to say that European performance in the Bosnian war has been poor. European defense, common security, and foreign policy might be viewed as a Sysiphian rock. Every time it appears to go forward, it falls back. Why is it that the situation is now different? There are several arguments explaining this. The first one is that change is just a matter of time. Time is logically needed to achieve results. CSFP is not something that could be accomplished with a snap of the fingers, on the flick of a switch. After all, CFSP was only a project when Yugoslavia erupted into war, and a project needs time to be implemented. After the launch of the Euro, defense became the last big goal for Europeans. It was highly illogical to be powerful in the economic, technological, commercial, cultural, and monetary fields while maintaining a second-rate status in the strategic field. At the same time, three European powers changed their attitude. Fifty years after the creation of the Federal Republic, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and some months after the arrival to power of a new generation of leaders, who had not known World War II, Germany has changed dramatically. German leaders no longer fear to be assertive and to think and even more to refer to national interest. Germany wants to be a normal player and, due to its size, its weight in European affairs is immense. It would have been inconsistent to claim a permanent seat on the Security Council without being able to participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. It should be perceived as ironical that a red-green coalition whose leaders came to politics on pacifist grounds was so eager to participate in the Kosovo war. But such German behavior was in fact deeply logical. If you want to promote some values, you need to be able to use force if necessary. The British, for their part, have understood that defense is one of the few European subjects in which they could play a leading role. Their position has changed in conformity to their interests. If they do not want to set aside Europe, and yet do not want to be a member of the European zone, and are reluctant to be involved in fiscal or social issues, defense is a good choice, in fact the best one. NATO is no longer the unique power multiplier for Great Britain. Europe is now perceived as a second one. The British government has understood that European progress is

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unavoidable, and the only choice consists of trying to have a leading role or being left standing on the platform as the train pulls out. France has also changed its views. A more pragmatic generation of leaders has come to power. NATO-France relationships are no longer seen with ideological glasses. The failures of NATO's attempt to reintegrate France in 1995 clarified the situation. The French government understands that a powerful Europe cannot be summed up as an enlarged France with a weak Germany and Great Britain kept outside the fold. For France, the rediscovery of German national interest is acceptable as long as it reinforces Europe. The position of the United Kingdom leads to the same conclusion: being less arrogant, France is in a better position to push through its project because it is no longer perceived as a French national project under a European cloak. The French-UK Saint-Malo summit in December 1998 was the first important step of the new European project. A joint declaration between two major European states, whose visions were traditionally opposed, had important political effects. An agreement to reassert the role of the European Union (EU) in international politics, to make progress toward European defense, to have autonomous capacity and credible military forces, and to be able to use adapted military capacities inside and outside NATO was quite a surprising result. Saint-Malo has shown a new trust between Paris and London. France ceased to see the United Kingdom only as a U.S. Trojan horse inside Europe, and the United Kingdom realized that the ultimate goal of French diplomacy is not to expel the United States, its troops, and its influence from Europe. Immediately, however, questions were raised: Was the joint declaration purely symbolic? Were Paris and London again playing the same song, claiming progress while in fact remaining immobile? Did it make sense to speak of increasing autonomous European capacity, while Slobodan Milosevic continued his ethnic cleansing policy in Kosovo? To avoid a clash between words and reality, Paris and London tried to put an end to the conflict. The Rambouillet summit was a Dayton-like European effort to bring peace to Kosovo. Immediately following Saint-Malo and with the continuing battles and atrocities in Kosovo, it would have been impossible for London and Paris to stay inactive unless they wanted to lose all credibility. But once everybody arrived at Rambouillet, they faced a new challenge. Having threatened Milosevic with military retaliation if he continued to refuse an agreement, another line had been crossed. That is why the Kosovo war has been mounted largely to defend the credibility of the alliance. The moral arguments were made, but Kosovo was not the issue Americans wanted to go to war over in order to show that NATO was still the cornerstone of European security. NATO's credibility was at stake on its fiftieth birthday. And, for their part, Europeans wanted to show that for once they were seriously speaking of a common defense. Some opponents of the war in Europe have criticized the Kosovo conflict of 1999 as an "American war." That interpretation is a total mistake. Of course, the

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military capacities used in the war were mainly American, but the military predominance had little impact on the political direction of the war. The decision to launch the war was largely a joint one, with Europeans and Americans acting together. It is unthinkable not to have unanimity in NATO on this subject. And in accordance with that, day-to-day direction was largely a five-way major-power agreement with a daily telephone conference between the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and France. But if Europeans shared the lead during the war, they also realized how dependent they are on the United States for military capacities. It was in fact a good fortune that Washington accepted—even under strict conditions—to be involved in the war. It should not be taken for granted that Europe could have acted alone. That is why Europe has decided to be consistent and acquire some capacities for itself. At the Cologne summit of June 1999 in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo, the goal of European defense was set: in order to be able to fulfill the so-called "Petersberg missions" (humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement), it had been decided that Europe urgently needed the military capacity to engage in crisis management. The EU should be able to act, depending on the situation, within NATO or without NATO's capacities. At the Helsinski summit another step was taken to make European defense ambitions a reality. It was decided that EU should be able to deploy between 50,000 and 60,000 soldiers abroad by 2003. These forces should be self-sufficient and endowed with the required command control and intelligence. EU members should be able to deploy such capacities on short alert (sixty days) and to have in this framework a leaner Rapid Reaction Force. The force must be strong enough to sustain a deployment of 60,000 soldiers for a year, requiring a force of 200,000 to achieve this goal. The goal is not to create a new and permanent European army, but to be able to create a viable force. In November 2000 a capabilities commitment declaration was adopted. This declaration not only forecast the size of national contributions to the rapid reaction of EU members force, but also identified the areas in which European countries must achieve some progress (e.g., intelligence, air transport). Some scenarios have been planned, ranging from light rescue operations to heavier, Kosovo-like operations. The fifteen members of the European Union must be able to sustain simultaneously a light and a heavy operation. In Nice (December 2000) it was decided that new coordinating bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (COPS), the Military Committee, and an EU chief of staff, would be operational in 2001. So we could assume that for once Europeans had become serious on defense, and would fulfill their pledges. The creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, with the necessary structures for decisionmaking, management, and cooperation with NATO and other partners, is a first and a substantive expression of that determination. Two things are to be clear: (1) The goal is not to create a European army. Every country will keep open the option to participate or not to participate, and be able to determine its level of involvement. (2) The decisionmaking process will be intergovernmental and not supranational. The goal is not to compete with NATO

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but to have an autonomous capacity to launch military operations for intervention in crises where NATO as a whole is not engaged. In the post-Cold War international environment, the United States will not want to intervene in every regional crisis on the European continent. Europe certainly does not deserve to be blamed for this situation. After all, American public opinion may not be willing to intervene in a new Balkan crisis or in Africa. As a result, it would be better to have a real European capacity to do the job. Had a crisis broken out in Macedonia or in Sierra Leone, a European military capacity would have been useful for everybody if the United States were unwilling to send troops. While acknowledging in principle the existence of a European defense identity, the U.S. administration remains reticent and cautious in its approach. Washington has established three criteria that are intended to evaluate the validity of this European step: the nondecoupling of Europe from NATO, nonduplication of forces, and nondiscrimination against NATO countries that are not members of the European Union. There is a considerable contradiction among these criteria. Can there be an equal relationship if one party alone determines the nonnegotiable points of compatibility and noncompatibility of the steps? Does the European pillar of defense have meaning if its perimeter is strictly defined by Washington? In practice, the United States has a natural tendency to consider the relationship between NATO and the European defense identity as a zero-sum game. The fear in Washington is that the European defense identity reinforces itself to the detriment of the cohesion of the alliance. What is unspoken, by the United States, is that cohesion means only one center of decision. Such a mindset explains the constant refusal of the United States to consider a European caucus. The Europeans must convince the Americans that the emergence of a European identity of defense and security is not contrary to U.S. interests and can prove useful. The United States can play a major and/or leading role in taking into account the will of its partners. This is how the war in Kosovo was conducted. The U.S. acceptance of joint management of the conflict was not a military necessity, but a political one. A unilateral U.S. attitude would have damaged the cohesion of the alliance. So unilateralism is not the only policy that the United States is capable of conducting. On the contrary, it has succeeded better in reaching its goal by actually playing the game of coalitions and compromise. A large portion of U.S. and indeed Western opinion believes that the French are anti-American by nature or by fate, and that the first and foremost concern for the majority of French leaders every morning is to find something to do that irks the United States. Everyone does not seem to notice that General de Gaulle, dead for more than thirty years, is no longer in power. Indeed, myths die hard and the one created by General de Gaulle of a "Maverick France" that stands up to the United States for mere spectacle, is profoundly anchored in the collective imagination. The French, as well as other Europeans, share the same essential values as American society. They can only be admiring of its dynamism, diversity, ease of integration, and mobility. On the other hand, Europeans are much more reticent when

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faced with certain aspects of American society: free sale of firearms, the death penalty, the importance of money in the operation of democracy, social inequalities that are not only growing but also accepted, the situation of the black community, the excessive commercialization of culture, and so forth. On the international level, the Europeans deplore what the United States sometimes does with its supremacy, as well as its increasing tendency to want to conduct unilaterally defined politics without being preoccupied with the interests and points of view of other nations. Assuming that it is the spear carrier of universal values, the United States increasingly confuses its national interest with a global interest. If one could say that what is good for General Motors is good for the United States, Washington has the tendency to think that what is good for the United States is good for the world. It is no longer U.S. isolationism that must be feared, it is U.S. unilateralism. This drives the United States to deviate more and more from the rules of multilaterally defined law, to develop a certain disaffection for international organizations, and to favor unilateral and coercive practices. In short, the United States is in danger of dismissing international rules as unjustified constraints weighing on the liberty of U.S. decisionmaking. Unipolarity produces unilateral politics, which would lead to the development of a distance between Europeans and Americans. Moreover, the United States would be wrong in thinking this type of reproach is typically French. It is, in fact, widely accepted by other European countries, even in Great Britain, be it by political leaders or by the whole of the population. In the long term, the most evident risk is that unilateralism will be the source of a rise in anti-Americanism, which is already happening among the younger generation, and in an even more accented fashion for university students (which does not prevent them from attending American universities). Among the examples of unilateral U.S. policies that particularly offend Europeans, the most notable are • the rejection of rules governing biological weapons; • the national missile defense system, which is seen in Europe more as a risk for a new arms race than a chance for a stronger defense; • the rejection of the treaty banning antipersonnel mines; • the refusal to sign the treaty completely banning nuclear tests (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); • the refusal to adhere to the regulations defined in Tokyo and the Hague concerning global warming; • the bombing of Iraq, and the maintenance of policy toward this country where the biggest victim is not Saddam Hussein but the Iraqi population in general; • the reticence in taking into account the problems concerning the north/south disparities; • the strong hesitation in accepting the multilateral organizations, notably the UN, as legitimate and effective; • a very accentuated tendency to follow Israel to the point to where, according to European public opinion, Israel appears more and more as the aggressor and Palestine the victim;

European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-first Century 63 • the absolute preference given to defense, which is defined nationally, compared to prevention of violence, which is defined in a multilateral fashion; • in matters of security, the U.S. tendency to favor a coercive approach; • and in its relations with Europe, the habit of confusing briefings with consultations after which any European disagreement is taken for a lack of solidarity. Europeans and Americans must now reshape a new partnership. This is not an easy task because neither of these two protagonists are used to balanced relationships. Europeans, familiar with dependence on the United States, are in a permanent position between provocation and submission. Americans are not used to having egalitarian strategic relations with the outside world. Their history is made of relations with Indians, Mexicans, a declining Spanish empire, and isolationism. The only period of balance of forces was with the Soviet Union from the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s. The Franco-German relationship has been a model for reconciliation. The United States should accept a new balance of forces with Europeans, as France has accepted a new relationship with Germany. During the Cold War, the FrenchGerman relationship would have been presented as a balance of unbalances. Basically, the French had the bomb and the Germans the Mark. In more sophisticated terms, France had a strategic advantage over Germany (permanent seat on the Security Council, strategic autonomy with the United States and the USSR, nuclear capacity, worldwide interest) that was compensated by German economic supremacy (strong currency, commercial surplus, a vibrant industrial sector). It has been barely noticed how easily France has accepted the new balance of forces with Germany. Except for a few nostalgic old guards, everybody in France has accepted the "Berlin Republic," a more powerful Germany, more assertive and more self-confident. The reason why is crystal clear. This new, stronger Germany would help Europe to become stronger. And a stronger Europe is in France's best interest. As a result, France needs and welcomes the new Germany. The United States must follow this example and welcome a new Europe. A stronger Europe would, from time to time, be a less convenient, more demanding partner for the United States. However, it will strengthen NATO in a broader perspective. In an uncertain, unstable world, two democratic, and strong, pillars of power must be welcome. NATO and the European defense identity are not a zero-sum game. Americans would be wrong to think that the European reinforcement would be a break in transatlantic solidarity. Solidarity does not mean hegemony, and the United States should accept that it will be counterbalanced within NATO. We are at a crossroads. Depending on the American attitude (which concerns both the administration and Congress), NATO will either be strengthened or weakened. The global strength of Western democracies needs to be improved. If Americans refuse a new definition of power between the United States and Europe, and if they believe that a stronger Europe would mean a weaker alliance, we will be in trouble because Europe would no longer accept a minor status within NATO, and logically would want to be able to act alone—if necessary—on strategic matters.

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The United States should be mindful enough to realize that a more autonomous Europe would mean more help to stabilize the world and promote democratic values. When faced with plans for a European defense identity, Americans must resist seeing a future flaw in Western society with the emergence of a more autonomous Europe. Current global disorder must be treated in a global fashion with a world vision that only the United States has at its disposal. The European Union can, at best, play a secondary role, in the service of U.S. leadership. The European Union is useful in this role of assistant with the condition of being loyal and following the large-scale orientations defined in Washington. From this perspective, the most important step is to strengthen the solidarity of the alliance. The plan for autonomy of European defense would threaten this solidarity. One could draw a parallel with the arrival of the French nuclear strength. Initially, the Americans were extremely opposed to the idea that French would have at their disposal an autonomous nuclear capacity. The same arguments reflect the current situation. There was, so to speak, the risk of duplication (a limited amount of French nuclear weapons were only able to marginally augment the overall nuclear capacity of the Atlantic alliance). But after the French force became a reality, the Americans were obliged to accept it, then realizing that this was useful for the Western defense and European security (see the Ottawa declaration of 1974). Europe possesses every measure of power: economic, technological, cultural, and so forth. The only aspect missing is strategic autonomy: it may be within reach in a few years. "L'Europe puissance," an old French project that was negatively perceived by its European partners, is now shared by the majority and could become a reality. This "L'Europe puissance" is more the affirmation of a willingness of independence than a project for hegemony. Europe, built on consensus, compromise, and concessions, is no longer eager to impose its opinions on other countries. Should Europe become a great power, it would not be a threat for others. European union political culture is now based on respect of international law, negotiated solutions, refusal of unilateralism, support of international institutions, and multilateral bodies. Europe is naturally dedicated to a multilateral approach because it is itself the product of multilateralism. The emergence of Europe as a strategic power will only help the creation of a multipolar world, which is in the interest of all the peoples in the world. This new progress in European defense has fueled some fears among the nonEU NATO members. These countries fear to be set aside by thise new evolution. Four of the non-EU NATO members, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Turkey, are EU applicants. It would be a total mistake for them to try to block the process. It would not be perceived by EU members as a clear commitment to the future of Europe. Norway, not being an EU applicant, is in a specific position. Canada's position is also quite specific. Canada may feel trapped. Not being European, Canada could naturally not be directly concerned by the process of European integration. But having European roots, and historical and strategic links with Europe, Canada should not want to be excluded and left alone in a bilateral relationship with its North American neighbor. European countries, first and foremost

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France, must then develop strategic links with Canada both on multilateral (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], UN, NATO) and on bilateral bases. For example, we need to develop a Franco-Canadian and European Canadian strategic partnership, because we share history but we also share a vision of the future (collective security, disarmament, human security, and the multilateral approach). The Canada-EU joint statement on defense and security issues concluded during the Canada-EU summit in Ottawa in December 2000 is a step in the right direction. It stipulated that Canada and the EU agree to deepen their dialogue on questions related to European Security and Defense Policy and has created a consultation mechanism on these issues. ESDP would be not only a historical task for European countries, and a new opportunity for Canada, but also a general enhancement of Western capacities, a positive and additional contribution to global stability.

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CHAPTER 5

Thinking Outside the Box: NATO-ESDP Cooperation at Twenty-Three Alexander Moens While NATO is changing to meet new threats, the purpose of NATO remains permanent. We will cooperate in the work of peace. We will consult early and candidly with our NATO allies. We will expect them to return the same. In diplomacy, in technology, in missile defense, infightingwars and, above all, in preventing wars, we must work as one. Transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest, and our unity is essential for peace in the world. Nothing must ever divide us. —President George W. Bush1 While obviously committed to the values of transatlantic cooperation, it was not clear in early 2001 whether newly elected president George W. Bush would take a stronger position than his predecessor in the ongoing discussions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the European Union on consultation and military planning. It was also not clear whether he would follow up on the "promise" during the election campaign to get the United States out of the business of nation-building and thus reduce U.S. participation in peace operations conducted by NATO in the Balkans, or indeed whether the administration would train its sights entirely on missile defense plans, leaving the other policy areas for future consideration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told delegates at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich that he was "a little worried" by proposals for a 60,000-strong European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to be developed by 2003. He said: "Actions that could reduce NATO's effectiveness by confusing duplication or perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive." However, Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are understood to be more relaxed than Secretary Rumsfeld or Vice President Richard Cheney about the plans.2 At the close of the Bush-Blair Camp David summit in February 2001, President Bush appeared to accept Prime Minister Tony Blair's assurances about the new European military force even though the British position was increasingly ambivalent between its traditional NATO connection and its desire to be the leader

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in the development of a European force.3 A few days later in Brussels, Secretary Colin Powell stated: "The United States supports and welcomes the creation of a European defense facility, and believes that as long as it avoids duplication measures and has some kind of joint planning arrangements with NATO that it will actually enhance and strengthen the alliance's capabilities."4 The Bush administration soon proved that it was determined about missile defense. It moved away from the halfhearted approach of the Clinton administration and committed itself to a robust research and development program on a wide range of missile defense options. By the summer of 2001, several allies including Britain were seriously considering cooperation with the United States while trying still to persuade Washington to proceed in the framework of a bilateral accord with Russia on modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as well as supporting an international framework that would curb proliferation. Initial views that the European Union (EU) should take the leading crisis management role in the Macedonian crisis of early 2001 and that the Bush administration would not be forthcoming in military participation have proven wrong. NATO has maintained its lead role in the area and the Bush administration has played an active part in averting an all-out civil war. Washington's envoy, James Pardew, has worked with EU envoy Francois Leotard to bring together the parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to sign a framework for constitutional change and the disarmament of the National Liberation Army of the guerrilla Albanians. EU-NATO management of the Macedonian crisis has successfully proceeded and built on "lessons learned" from the various crises in the former Yugoslavia. While the United States is more reluctant to deploy troops as a result of Washington's desire to avoid casualties, it has provided logistical and intelligence support to such allies as Britain and France, which are willing to put troops on the ground but do not want to repeat the scenario of early Bosnia where European peacekeepers were on the ground as U.S. forces started to take to the skies. Operation Essential Harvest was deployed in August 2001 after the three conditions set by EU's Javier Solana, and NATO's Secretary-General Lord Robertson had been met. With very cautious rules of engagement, NATO troops began to help disarm the guerrillas after the political accord was signed by a grand coalition government in Skopje, an effective cease-fire was in place, and the rebels agreed to voluntarily disarm. The three main lessons learned in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are that the international community can be effective only if it acts early, if it speaks with one voice, and if it is prepared to use credible force to back up its position. It appears that in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, NATO has found an early crisis management role in a "well-coordinated approach with the European Union—with discreet, effective backing from the Bush administration."5 Unlike in the case of Kosovo, NATO did not stay in the background during the early diplomatic phase. NATO has shown that it can play an early and critical crisis management function. Unlike the crisis in Croatia in 1991, NATO and the European Union

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were never at obvious cross-purposes. Rather, a remarkable sense of EU-NATO cooperation has evolved at the highest levels under the direction of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson. The strong bond of cooperation between the two men has helped ease, at least for the time being, some of the NATO-ESDP growing pains. Overall, NATO-EU cooperation and Washington's active commitment have overcome some of the earlier apprehensions of European leaders about the new Bush administration. Remarkably, given the effort by the Europeans to construct a European Security and Defense Policy and an autonomous military capacity since the Kosovo crisis, European allies were reluctant to take over NATO's task at the close of Operation Essential Harvest. When Francois Leotard proposed in early September 2001 that Europe's nascent Rapid Reaction Force should deploy in FYROM to continue collecting arms from the Albanian rebels, the EU's foreign ministers, including France "were united in dismissing the idea as premature They deemed 6 America's continuing involvement, through NATO, vital." In late September, NATO allies agreed to replace Operation Essential Harvest with Operation Amber Fox. This roughly 1,000-strong NATO operation led by the Germans would provide the military backup to secure the safety of the international monitors finalizing the implementation of the peace and disarmament accord.7 Given that European apprehensions about the new Bush administration's approach to NATO have eased so quickly and that President Bush has kept the United States engaged in the Balkans, it seems that the final obstacle to the NATO-ESDP relationship may now be overcome. This chapter proceeds by outlining the roots of ESDP, followed by a discussion of the current impasse on decisionmaking and military planning between NATO and the EU, and concludes with a set of specific proposals to create a joint mechanism. EUROPE'S NEW FORCE

The 1999 war against Serbia brought a sea change to European Security and Defense Policy. Frustrated by the European Union's shortfalls and the weak leadership and single-minded approach of the United States in dealing with the crisis, Prime Minister Blair resolved that Europe should become more active and capable on its own in security and defense matters. London reversed its previous, lukewarm attitude to a common European foreign and defense policy to embrace plans for a European Security and Defense Policy. For over fifty years the British had argued that if the European allies developed a serious military capacity themselves, the United States would abandon the alliance. Now, "arch-Atlanticist" Britain agreed with "arch-Europeanist" France that an ESDP backed up by real military capabilities would "rebalance" European and U.S. influence in the alliance, which would thus be strengthened.8 The 1993 Maastricht Treaty on European Union spelled out the ambitious goal to establish a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) by envisioning "the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to common

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defense."9 But the obstacles were formidable throughout the 1990s. Crisis management outside NATO's boundaries in the Balkan area swamped this early attempt to adopt a common European security policy. While the United States always welcomed a strong European contribution to defense, it wanted Europe to follow its leadership. The United States believed that there should be a single center of decisionmaking in the West through NATO. European efforts should contribute to this unified Atlantic approach, including its integrated military structure under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) who is traditionally an American. European efforts should not duplicate NATO's military command and defense planning system. They should not discriminate against NATO members who are not in the European Union. They should not "decouple" the North American defense effort from the European quest for more voice and participation in their own security. Thus, the European Security and Defense Identity was always seen as a military plan for resolving structural and political problems within the alliance.10 The 1994 NATO summit adopted the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a bridge between NATO's new command structure and the European Security and Defense Identity in NATO. At the 1996 meeting of the alliance in Berlin, the United States agreed to assist European military operations in which it did not wish to participate, provided that in reinforcing their military capabilities the Europeans would not try to duplicate NATO's military resources and planning facilities. In this way, it was hoped that the old jealousies among advocates of competing views on European security structures could be overcome. Combined Joint Task Forces would be the generalized force model to enable NATO to address a wide spectrum of challenges. They could range from full-scale, high-intensity interstate conflicts, as foreseen in Article 5, to peacekeeping tasks involving low-intensity intrastate conflict, or so-called non-Article 5 operations. The term "separable forces" implied that European forces could borrow NATO and U.S.-backed assets. They would provide the West Europeans with capabilities that members of the Western European Union (WEU) and European Union could not easily ensure on their own, while keeping decisionmaking and political control over European security and defense activities inside NATO. Following the 1994-1996 plans on "ESDI-in-NATO," there was a great deal of difficulty in reaching consensus over NATO's new streamlined command and defense planning system. Paris expected flexibility from the alliance in return for a much closer French role in its military structures. France wanted a radically new "dualist" NATO, split between Article 5 and non-Article 5 tasks. The U.S. military leadership did not agree with France's proposal to create dual structures. In Washington's view, the new force arrangements should be commanded and controlled in a streamlined NATO where a single system of Combined Joint Task Forces for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations would be established.11 Constructing a European defense inside NATO appeared logical and efficient. But it turned out to be a false assumption. To assume that such an entity could develop inside NATO's command structure was to assume that either U.S. influence

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could be reduced without losing U.S. involvement, or that France would agree to "institutionalize" its military participation in a system that functioned day-to-day under U.S. direction.12 While the European Union added stronger provisions for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1997, including the mandate to undertake tasks devised by the Western European Union, the "breakthrough" in European defense came in December 1998. Britain agreed with France on a proposal for the European Union to acquire the means for conducting military actions on their own in situations where the United States and other allies might not want to become involved. The Saint-Malo summit concluded that the European Union should have: "The capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces as well as the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so."13 In a speech at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) conference, "NATO at Fifty," in March 1999, George Robertson outlined London's initiative on Euro-defense in more detail: "Our ultimate aim is not so much a European Security and Defense Identity but something altogether more ambitious—namely a European Defense Capability to strengthen the ability of the European Union to pursue foreign policy objectives. To give the European Union a place in international affairs worthy of its size, experience and economic strength."14 At the December 1999 European Union Helsinki summit, member states agreed to form by 2003 a multinational army corps of up to 60,000 troops. With a sixtyday readiness, it would be backed by air power and warships. It would have its own planning staff and satellite reconnaissance system and the decisionmaking and operational capacity to deploy forces and sustain them in a NATO context or autonomously. The plans did not amount to a standing, integrated European army. In Blair's words: "Final decision on whether to involve troops will remain firmly with national governments."15 However, the demand by the U.S. Congress that NATO would have "a right of first refusal" in leading operations that the European Union deemed necessary was not adopted. After briefly considering a convergence policy for military budgets and forces akin to the convergence criteria that led the way to the "Euro" agreement, European Union members settled on "voluntary contributions." In November 2000 they held their first "pledging conference," narrowing the gap between "Headline Goal" plans and actual national contributions.16 Then secretary of defense William Cohen pointed out in October 2000 that the European Union's draft "catalogue of forces" for meeting the Headline Goal included requirements that were "very similar, if not identical" to those identified in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in NATO.17 Capabilities such as strategic lift, deployable C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence), precision-guided munitions, support-jamming, suppression of enemy air defenses and chemical and biological protection that were needed for "high-end" Petersberg tasks led by the European Union, would logically be the same as those needed by the allies for demanding NATO-led crisis response operations. At his last ministerial conference in NATO, Cohen warned fellow ministers that the allies, as a priority, must carry out their promises to im-

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prove NATO's defense capabilities. Without that, "NATO could become a relic of the past."18 "Americans," in the words of a key staff person in Congress, had cause to be "aggrieved" that the Europeans after fifty years of safety in NATO now concluded that their military buildup would need to take place outside NATO in the form of a military capacity for the European Union.19 At the December 2000 European Union summit in Nice, French president Jacques Chirac called for a European military force that would be separate from NATO: "coordinated, but independent."20 The French were apparently loath to let themselves be dragged into NATO defense planning through the new door called ESDP. However, for most European states, "independent" is not the objective. So long as planning remained centralized in NATO's integrated military command, the European Union defense force would not likely develop a role outside the alliance. THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO NATO-ESDP COOPERATION Essentially two key problems still confront the European Union and NATO in achieving an overall political and military relationship. First, Turkey has blocked "assured access" by the EU to NATO assets because it does not consider its "consultative status" during ESDP operations sufficient. Second, NATO and the ESDP do not have a clear understanding on how separate or joint their crisis decisionmaking, military planning, and operational preparedness will be. After the Helsinki Agreements, the European Union negotiated with nonmember states (including Turkey) on their relationship to the new ESDP. At the EU summit in Feira, Portugal, in the summer of 2000, member states outlined the involvement of non-EU European NATO countries and candidate countries (for EU membership) as well as other "interested states" in EU crisis management. During "routine phase" (i.e., noncrisis) operations there will be regular consultations. In case of a crisis, the European Union will make a decision whether or not to launch a military or civilian operation. Once the decision is made to commit forces, an ad hoc Committee of Contributors is to be established.21 During the "operational phase" of a crisis, the non-EU members that have confirmed their wish to participate "will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day to day conduct of that operation."22 However, the newly formed Political and Security Committee "will be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation."23 In other words, the European Union wants to maintain its jurisdictional integrity over deciding to commence and terminate a crisis operation, but is willing to let other interested states be part of a consultation process during the crisis. Given its stake in Southeastern Europe, Turkey, on the other hand, wants a "decision-shaping role."24 Despite sustained diplomatic efforts to resolve this impasse, Turkey's insistence on "automatic participation" clashes with the rights of full EU members and does not leave much room for compromise.25

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Turkish opposition to granting the European Union assured access to NATO's military planning facilities and military assets remains a stumbling block today. It is one of the reasons the European Union does not want to send an autonomous EU force into Macedonia, fearing it may not get NATO backup should it become involved in serious fighting. Ankara insists on participating in European decisionmaking when NATO assets could be involved. In an ironic twist, by insisting on having a say (via NATO) on every significant European military operation, the Turks are inadvertently playing into French hands. If Turkey keeps blocking a NATO-EU accord, France would have even more reason to insist on an "independent" European military capacity. Clearly, then, the dilemma of the Turkish veto affects the second problem: the extent of jointness in EU-NATO decisionmaking and military planning and operations. If this overall problem can be resolved, the cause of the Turkish veto may also be removed. A consensus is growing in Europe that when the Europeans use NATO assets, they should rely on the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) for planning; but when they do not use NATO assets, planning could be assured by the headquarters of European countries. NATO's SecretaryGeneral Lord Robertson intimated that if it were a question of small-scale military operations, the European Union might use French or British planning mechanisms without going so far as to re-create a "new SHAPE." However, given all the preparations in ESDP military-planning and decisionmaking bodies, it seems highly plausible that European countries would eventually develop a "mini" SHAPE. The existence of a European SHAPE plus a Turkish veto would drive NATO and the ESDP further apart. The European Union intends to call its intervention force capability "operational" after the EU summit planned in Laeken, Belgium, by the end of 2001. The answer to the question "Operational for what?" will have to wait. Some veterans of NATO and European security policy such as former U.S. ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter foresee that the ESDP's role will primarily lie outside Europe.26 Hunter envisions the Europeans may use it in Africa first. Certainly the mandate of ESDP in terms of the Petersberg tasks remains very open-ended.27 The convenience of such flexibility, or in the words of Francois Heisbourg, a "fudge factor," is obvious.28 However, the experience in the former Yugoslavia has made it clear to everyone that so-called non-Article 5 contingencies can in fact be more expensive and demanding in terms of personnel, materiel, and command and control than the static, low-threat defense common during the Cold War. The aftermath of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 has been clearly competitive between NATO and ESDP in terms of modernizing the entire range of capabilities of the allies. The Defense Capabilities Initiative was launched at the Washington summit in 1991 to bring allies "up to speed" so that they could be more interoperational with U.S. forces in the future. At the same time, of course, the Europeans were frantically developing their ESDP and planning real capabilities for their planned Rapid Reaction Force. As both organizations were essentially working

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on the same capabilities, "turf-protecting" aspects ensued inevitably. The debate is not only about who makes the decisions, but also about who will do the military planning and operational preparations for such potential interventions. Who can participate if the action is undertaken solely by the European Union? Should NATO have a right of first refusal on such actions? If NATO agrees to "autonomous" EU actions, by what procedure can the latter "borrow" NATO assets such as airborne warning and control (AWAC) aircraft or command and control facilities? The ESDP organs dropped their interim status shortly after the Nice summit in December 2000.29 The European Military Staff, composed of roughly 130 officers and headed by a German director-general, will "assist the European Council structures to exercise the political control and strategic direction of Petersberg-type operations."30 The new Political Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council have agreed to regular consultations. While the Political Security Committee (known by its French acronym COPS) is not the final decisionmaking body for ESDP, it will act as the forum where such proposals are prepared for the General Affairs Council of the European Union to make the final decisions. It is therefore between the COPS and the NATO North Atlantic Council that the allies can ensure greatest transparency of policy and action. At the Nice summit, most EU members had pledged an array of forces to the new European force capacity. Nearly 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 ships were on the list. While impressive in number, this tally does not mean that these forces actually constituted an operational force. Most importantly, the Europeans are still working on command and control capacity as well as on strategic airlift and better battlefield intelligence.31 The Policy Coordination Group in NATO has been meeting on the ESDP relationship for over a year, discussing among other things proposals for "jointness in planning." However, little progress was made during the French and Swedish presidencies. After the Nice summit, the North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee have agreed to meet at least six times per year in ambassadorial joint sessions. There is also more regular interaction among the military staffs and several countries have their NATO and EU military representatives "double-hatted." Also, most countries agree that it is practical to have the planning cycles of NATO and ESDP run in parallel time frames. The September 11,2001, attacks on the United States have made a smooth joint planning and coordination process even more urgent. While NATO invoked for the first time in its history its collective defense clause, it seems likely that the United States will coordinate its planned attacks on terrorist targets outside the European theater with individual allies rather than through the North Atlantic Council. As a result of the attacks, Washington will be reluctant to add more resources to Balkan peace management, at least in the short term. If Europe is to take care of more crisis management and peacekeeping functions on its own perimeter, it will need access to NATO military planning and assets. It may even be that Europe cannot afford to duplicate NATO structures and assets, given its current defense budgets. Therefore, a solution to the ESDP-NATO military planning relationship needs to be found urgently.

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After the initial anxiety that ESDP caused in Washington and the defensive mode taken by the French government in reaction to the U.S. stance, emotions have settled. The Bush administration has not tried to roll back ESDP developments. It is quite likely that it sees a reduced role for itself in Europe, especially given the "war on terrorism," and therefore wants to stress the positive elements of ESDP. The most obvious advantage is that ESDP may create actual capability. As long as Washington realizes that the same capability it has tried to create in the Defense Capabilities Initiative is actually being created in ESDP, and that this capacity is not a form of duplication or direct competition with NATO, it may be satisfied. From the European vantage point, the British, in particular, have argued since their "breakthrough" meeting with the French at Saint-Malo in 1998 that the European reinvestment in real defense capability was absolutely necessary to make it worthwhile for the United States to stay engaged in NATO.32 Though the NATO allies and the EU members have agreed in various declarations that EU autonomous actions will become an option "when NATO as a whole is not concerned,"33 we must not assume a hierarchical relationship between the two with NATO at the top. EU members insist that their decisionmaking process be autonomous. Therefore, a better sense of the political and decisionmaking interface is necessary. At the same time, as long as Turkey and the EU are in an impasse, EU access to NATO assets is effectively blocked. If this is prolonged, the EU may consider building "duplicative" command and control structures as well as common assets. Hence the two U.S. concerns about ESDP—"Avoiding duplication" and the need for "joint planning"—as stated by Secretary Colin Powell in February 2001, are exactly the central issues about which little if any progress has been made. France is not at all opposed to joint military operations but does not want NATO's Supreme Headquarters and military structures to subsume ESDP military planning. The Bush administration has not made these two issues conditions for NATO's cooperation with ESDP, most likely to avoid negative linkage between ESDP and the U.S. plans for allied participation in missile defense. However, sooner or later NATO and the EU have to resolve who makes the decisions, who plans the military operations, and who runs them. LIFE AT TWENTY-THREE: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX

NATO-EU negotiations have centered on adapting the "Berlin Plus" model. This model, as reached at NATO's Washington summit in 1999, includes: EU assured access to NATO planning capacities, EU presumed access to NATO common assets, and the proposal to develop European command structures under the coordination of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. In a very ambitious stroke, then secretary of defense William Cohen proposed an entirely new paradigm on October 10, 2000, in Birmingham when he called for a new "flexibility" and made the proposal for a "European Security and Defense Planning System."34 It includes joint NATO-EU organizational meetings when it comes to "decision shaping on implementing operations." Secretary Cohen proposed that ESDP should be able to

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count on NATO operational and defense planning capabilities at all times, whether NATO is involved or not.35 In addition, he called for one "collaborative, unitary" defense planning system for all scenarios other than the defense of NATO territory (also called non-Article 5 scenarios) and with the participation of all twenty-three countries (all EU and NATO members combined). Finally, he advocated that the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander be the "strategic coordinator and force generator" and thus the linchpin in this new NATO-ESDP arrangement. "The European Security and Defense Planning System" offers a blueprint for a different and more intensely integrated type of relationship between the EU and NATO. While the Economist thought that Cohen's ideas were "worth exploring," the member states have not taken them as a new political departure point.36 Current discussion in NATO's Policy Coordination Group often deals with meetings and procedures that involve all twenty-three members, but there is no movement afoot that would create a seamless organizational interface at twenty-three. I have argued that Cohen's ideas are worthy of a new NATO-EU governance model.37 The reason is that the Berlin Plus arrangements are simply too protective and set the two organizations in a direction of institutional defensiveness. During a real crisis, allies cannot afford to get into a lengthy dispute about which organization has a right of first refusal or whether one's decision encroaches upon the other. The mantra that the EU will step in "where NATO as a whole is not engaged" may be sufficient for the short to medium term, but may not be valid when the EU consolidates serious military capability. Even if the decisionmaking process on whether to engage and by what means does not pose a problem, a political dispute about assured and presumed access to command or common assets could hamstring the operations. The frequent response to the formulation of the problem in these terms is that, in times of crisis, member states will take a pragmatic approach and lines of communication will be from national capital to national capital and, therefore, we need not worry about the exact structural set up between NATO and the European Union. But NATO history does not bear this out. Discrepancies that may now look a little trifling may actually show up as big problems in a future crisis.38 Given the complexity of interests and procedures between the EU and NATO, the members do well to have their procedural house in order. Of course the fiasco experienced during the Bosnian crisis should remind us of the importance of mandates. The NATO-UN "dual-key" arrangement was a product of a poor pragmatic compromise. Each mission had a different mandate, the UN on the ground and NATO in the air. Therefore, it was felt that a dual key would safeguard both interests. In the end, it satisfied neither interest. If the previous crises have taught us anything, it is that Europe and North America should work together in as seamless a manner as possible. Given that the democratic values and principles of the twenty-three members are highly alike, the issue is whether nationally defined interests will allow relatively integrated and common procedures. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, there was some speculation and concern about whether member states would be reverting to more na-

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tionally defined interests (renationalization of foreign and defense policy) or whether they would stay the "multilateral course." Clearly, the states reinvigorated their multilateral approach. Germany was successfully united and remained embedded in both the EU and NATO. The United States resisted isolationist tendencies and remained engaged in NATO. The point I make here is that in some ways member states are still too "parochial" in their orientation. Too many favor either NATO or the EU to the exclusion of the other. NATO-EU governance at twentythree would seek to reduce such remaining preferences. The term "interblocking" rather than "interlocking" institutions was coined to describe such institutional preferences, even rivalry.39 For example, both NATO and the Western European Union created "outreach" and membership programs for Central and East European countries in the early 1990s resulting in overlapping activities. In another case, during the Bosnia crisis, the Western European Union naval boycott of the former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic essentially overlapped NATO's similar boycott. Eventually, the Western European Union simply folded its operation into the NATO mission. "Life at twenty-three" is essentially about creating an interconnected crisis management capacity around a specific membership (EU and NATO) for all crises in the European area other than conventional defense.40 Not only does it seek to avoid duplication and political competition, but it also addresses the concerns of some of the smaller members. One of their fears is exclusion from a preferred arrangement. Turkey is an example of this concern. For other states such as Poland, which are in NATO but not yet in the EU, a single forum may relieve some of the tension they have experienced between the two. In the case of Finland and Sweden, working in and contributing to a NATO-ESDP interface is likely to create more substantive involvement in European crisis management and may actually ease their entrance into NATO's collective defense function. Other states fear the formation of a duopoly in transatlantic relations. Canada, for example, would have little input left if NATO decisions, planning, and operations were to become a matter of U.S.EU bilateral negotiations. "Pillarization" would create for Canada costly questions of full alignment or realignment with either bloc, as Canadian Minister of Defense Art Eggleton put it recently: "A polarization between the North American Allies and the European Allies, or between the United States and the EU on security and defense issues, would leave Canada caught between U.S. unilateralism and EU consensus positions."41 The details of a crisis management capacity at twenty-three must concentrate on the decisionmaking process, the preparation, planning, and management of operations, and finally the allocation and sharing of resources. Decisions to launch operations should be taken in a forum in which all members of the North Atlantic Council and all members of the new Political Security Committee are present. Currently both NATO and the European Union are afraid that the other institution will curtail its decisionmaking power. NATO is concerned about a "right of first refusal." It wants to be the primary instrument for crisis management in Europe. Therefore, NATO members have insisted that the ESDP should only come into

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play "when NATO as a whole is not involved."42 At the same time, the European Union is worried that such insistence by NATO relegates it to second pickings. As a result, the European Union has stated that it seeks from NATO "full respect" of its autonomy in decisionmaking.43 Whether these disputes arise "behind the scenes" in various bilateral discussions or whether they actually show up in NATO or EU meetings, any two-step arrangement is vulnerable to such conflict. In a two-step process the actions of the other organization can easily resemble an incursion on the other's mandate or sovereignty. Timing and prestige can become distracting issues. In a single, combined decision council, these problems can be overcome. As is the practice in both the North Atlantic Council and the Political Security Committee, the decision must be based on consensus. A NATO consensus more often than not is actually obtained by one or more members not actively opposing the majority sentiment, as Greece did during some of the NATO decisions on actions in Kosovo in 1999. However, the joint council can make use of a recent EU invention to make reaching consensus even more practicable. The provision of "constructive abstention" as formulated by the EU members in the revisions to the treaties agreed to in Amsterdam in 1997 allows a member state to go along with a decision, knowing they will not have an obligation to actually participate in the implementation of the decision. Constructive abstention can easily be adopted by the combined meeting. NATO already functions on a similar principle in all non-Article 5 cases, called "coalitions of the willing." It should be clear that this right would extend to all members and would include the United States. Even though not all twenty-three states would choose to participate in every operation, at least the decision to launch an operation would include all member states. The meetings could be cochaired by NATO's Secretary-General and the EU Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and would not require much extra staff.44 Currently, NATO and the EU are planning six joint meetings in a year, showing that in practice they may come to approximate the dynamics of consultation at twenty-three. Regular combined meetings will allow allies to compare notes on emerging threats and make them familiar on how the other organization is proposing to respond to the conflict. Arguably, planning and operations during normal times may be less controversial than joint decisionmaking. Ideally, the twenty-three nations would do all their defense planning, force generation, and operational planning for all non-Article 5 and Petersberg tasks in one transparent process. This does not mean always physically meeting at twenty-three in the same location. Nor does this mean that the two organizations can no longer maintain separate political mandates or separate strategic-level planning. But it does mean that if the decision to launch an operation is considered by both organizations, then the concept of "operation" should be prepared together by NATO's military planning authorities and the new European Military Staff in conjunction with both military committees. It helps that several countries have double-hatted their military representatives. It is not politically realistic for NATO first to decide not to be engaged and then to prepare the con-

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cept for a EU operation. It is not optimal for EU military planners to remain outside the NATO planning process until a decision is reached at twenty-three. Far better that both be involved in all the planning even if at the end of the day it may end up being only a NATO operation. When the NATO and EU members work together on the concept of operation, it becomes easier to develop the operational plan and the rules of engagement together. Obviously agreement has to be found on how to square participation (including the commitment of resources) at the planning level when the state chooses to exercise the proviso of constructive abstention at decision time. ESDP capabilities have now become sufficiently concrete for ministerial guidance and force planning also to be done in combined forum with all twenty-three members participating. For the time being, member states are trying to build a variety of "crosswalks" where each organization can see what the other is doing in terms of force planning in order to build up transparency. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of a new Euro-Atlantic security and defense regime is building common resources. NATO does not actually have a large amount of common assets and capabilities. Many of the existing ones depend on direct U.S. support for their operation. There is nothing wrong with that per se, but the larger pool of members with possibly varying formations of "coalitions of the willing" would have a stronger bond if they had more resources in common. Potentially, these assets include many of the "hot" items listed in the Headline Goal and in the Defense Capabilities Initiative. These include assets of deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, command, control and information, precision warfare, and finally, the survivability of forces and infrastructure. An ideal start may be for NATO and EU states to build a common pool of heavy lift aircraft composed of both Boeing and Airbus products. Building a larger pool of common assets also helps European states to bring their procurement strategies closer together and enhances interoperability. It could even have a positive effect on defense industry convergence in Europe as well as defense industry cooperation between Europe and the United States. CONCLUSION For most of the 1990s, NATO planners and commentators have concentrated on non-Article 5 contingencies. These were the threats in the succession wars of the former Yugoslavia. However, as we were so suddenly reminded on September 11, 2001, the future of NATO is not going to be all about non-Article 5. Whether the means by which the "war on terrorism" will be fought make any distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 planning and operations remains to be seen. Also, whether this new war will draw EU and NATO planning and decisions closer together is also not clear at this point. What is clear is that NATO as a collective defense organization still has different tasks from the EU, which has not (yet) assumed Article 5 of the Treaty of Brussels. Therefore, while the integration of NATO-EU crisis management should proceed as far as the "ideal model" described

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above suggests, none of this implies that a NATO-ESDP governing arrangement should eventually result in a new institution. The interim chief of the newly formed EU Military Staff commented in January 2001: In the early years we'll be looking at things below the NATO threshold, things NATO doesn't do, like disaster relief and evacuation of citizens. In due course, once our collective capabilities are developed and we have strategic transport, the EU should be in a position to go higher. At that point, there will have to be a critical conversation between the European Union and NATO over who takes on what.45 It is this "critical conversation" that this chapter has tried to address. The "life at twenty-three" model provides a useful beacon for future discussion. We cannot presume that NATO and the EU will leap into a new governing model. In normal conditions, large organizations tend to change slowly. Could the September 11 attacks on the United States help spurn rapid change? It greatly depends on what NATO eventually ends up contributing to the conflict. Instead of expecting too much too quickly, it looks far more feasible that NATO and ESDP move pragmatically and slowly toward greater "jointness." Regular joint North Atlantic Council-Political Security Committee sessions, increased interaction among the military staff, doublehatted military representatives, and parallel planning cycles are all leading the way. Perhaps no progress can be made until the EU-Turkey impasse is resolved. Perhaps even the United States cannot really solve this conundrum. The Policy Coordination Group has been "spinning its wheels" considering various joint planning proposals. Essentially, it is waiting for a clear U.S. proposal, which may now be seriously delayed by the war on terrorism. If and when the United States weighs in on the idea of greater jointness at twenty-three, it will find both the British and the Canadians keen to advance such proposals, moving the EU-NATO debate away from "autonomy" and "duplication" to a "culture of cooperation."46 The French government may never agree in principle to joint EU-NATO planning, but may go along with it in practice while continuing to press for greater EU autonomy at the political level. What is unavoidable and unambiguous is that the allies must choose whether to emphasize where NATO and the ESDP remain separate and distinct, or where they can coalesce without dissolving. In the words of former S ACEUR Wesley Clark: The fundamental questions on which the Alliance's future depends are these: Will the European Union truly make NATO its institution offirstchoice for meeting European security needs? Will the United States pledge, and follow through, always to participate when there is a security challenge to Allied interests? If the answer to either of these questions is, No, then further problems for the Alliance are inevitable.47 Both NATO and the European Union have to accommodate a common politicomilitary arrangement that goes beyond NATO as we have known it and beyond a narrow European Security and Defense Identity. When considering the challenge

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of what processes and rules governments should follow when making use of two organizations in the pursuit of a common interest (crisis management in Europe), the answer should be to err on the side of togetherness.

NOTES 1. Remarks by President George W. Bush, Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, VA, February 13, 2001. 2. Toby Harden and Toby Helm, "Warning Shot on EU Army by White House," The Telegraph, February 6, 2001. 3. Ed Vulliamy, "Blair Wins Bush Deal on Defense," The Observer, February 25, 2001. 4. Andrew Osborn, "U.S. Has No Problem with European Force, Says Powell," The Guardian, February 28, 2001. 5. Joseph Fitchett, "Early Signs of Success in Macedonia," International Herald Tribune, July 9,2001. 6. "Wake Up Europe," The Economist, September 13, 2001. 7. "Opening Statement by Secretary-General Lord Robertson," Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers, Brussels, September 26, 2001. 8. Gert de Nooy, "NATO's Structural Reform and the ESDI: A Good Idea Wasted," in CJTF: A Lifeline for a European Defense Policy, eds. Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson (London: RUSI, 1997). 9. Treaty on European Union, art. J.4. 10. Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, and Mark Webber, "NATO's Triple Challenge," International Affairs 76, 3 (July 2000): 501. 11. Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival 38, no. 1 (spring 1996): 88. 12. Alexander Moens, "NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defense Identity," Security Dialogue 29, no. 4 (December 1998): 463-476. 13. Craig Whitney, "France and Britain Agree on Need for Independent European Defense," New York Times, December 5, 1998. 14. The Guardian, March 11, 1999. 15. Statement by Prime Minister Tony Blair, House of Commons, London, December 13, 1999, www.fco.gov.uk/newstext. 16. Richard Norton-Taylor and Ian Black, "Europe Sets Up Rapid Reaction Corps," The Guardian, November 20, 2000. 17. "The Central Role of Capabilities," remarks as prepared for delivery by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers, Birmingham, October 10, 2000. 18. Douglas Hamilton and Charles Aldinger, "EU Force Could Spell NATO's End, Cohen Says," Reuters, December 6, 2000. 19. Author interview with Congressional staff member, April 5, 2001. 20. Keith B. Richburg, "European Military Force to Cooperate with NATO," Washington Post, December 9, 2000. 21. European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," Feira, Portugal, June 19-20,2000, app. 2, paras. 13 and 20 respectively. 22. Ibid., app. 1, para. 20. 23. Ibid., para. 21.

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24. Confidential author interview with U.S. defense official, March 8, 2001. 25. Judy Dempsey, 'Turkey Warns on EU-NATO Relations," Financial Times, June 8,2001. 26. Robert Hunter, speaking notes, "Why NATO?" McCormick Tribune Foundation Conference, Chicago, March 8, 2001. 27. The Petersberg tasks adopted by the WEU in 1992 and incorporated into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives in the Treaty of Amsterdam are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Treaty on European Union, art. 17.1. 28. Francois Heisbourg, European Defense: Making It Work, Chaillot Paper no. 42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, September 2000), 12. 29. Nice European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," December 7-9, 2000, art. 14, chap. 4. 30. Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting, "The European Union's Nascent Military Staff," RUSI Journal (December 2000): 23. 31. Toby Harnden and Toby Helm, "Warning Shot on EU Army by White House," Daily Telegraph, February 5, 2001. 32. Both points are frequently underlined in European strategy. See, for example, address by Alain Richard, minister of defense of France to the Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, February 3, 2001; and Karsten D. Voigt, "The Future of Europe from a German Perspective," speech delivered at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, October 2, 2000. 33. See Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, "Final Communique," Brussels, December 15, 1999, para. 20. 34. Remarks at the Informal Meeting of Defense Ministers, Birmingham, October 10,2000. 35. "Washington Summit Communique," Washington, DC, April 23-24,1999, para. 10. 36. "The EU's Marching Orders," The Economist, November 18, 2000. 37. Alexander Moens, "European Defense: The Case for New Governance," International Journal 56, no. 2 (spring 2001): 261-278. 38. Peter Rodman, "U.S. Leadership and the Reform of Western Security Institutions: NATO Enlargement and ESDP," Conference of the German Foreign Policy Association, Berlin, December 11, 2000. 39. See Alexander Moens, "The Formative Years of the New NATO: Diplomacy from London to Rome," in Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture, eds. Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994), 24-47. 40. The European Union thus far has no mandate in the territorial defense of its members as it has not incorporated that aspect of the Western European Union. 41. Speech to the Western European Union Parliamentary Assembly and the Interim European Union Security and Defense Assembly, Paris, December 7, 2000. 42. See Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, "Final e," Brussels, December 15,1999, para. 20. 43. European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," app. 2. 44. There is in fact a precedent for decisionmaking at twenty-three. During the Kosovo crisis, a joint EU-NATO meeting was convened and was cochaired by the EU and NATO to discuss the sudden inflow of Kosovar refugees into Macedonia. Confidential author interview with a Canadian defense official, November 19, 2000. 45. Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting, in The Telegraph, January 31, 2001. 46. Confidential author interview with Canadian defense official, June 6, 2001. 47. Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 27,2001.

CHAPTER 6

European Security and Defense Policy: What's in It for Canada? John Bryson What is diplomacy but foreseeing the inevitable and expediting its occurrence in a manner beneficial to oneself. —Charles-Maurice de Tallyrand-Perigord European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has spawned a large and growing body of literature. Until recently, this was largely of academic interest to Canadian policymakers—academic in the sense of not being immediately relevant to the pressing issues of the day. The fact that the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, which brought the European Union (EU) into being, had designated the Western European Union (WEU) as its "defense component" was a notable development, but it had little impact on the gathering conflict in Bosnia and pending dissolution of the Soviet Union, matters that then preoccupied Canadian foreign and defense officials. By the time of the January 1994 Brussels summit, at which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) confirmed its support for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), Canada had succumbed, in the words of David Haglund, to one of its "periods of relative ... detachment from the central security agenda of its Allies."1 For Ottawa, the looming enemy was the deficit, and budget cutting the order of the day. Welcoming ESDI as an expression of allies' intention "to take greater responsibility for their own defense needs" provided a means (not always effective) of deflecting attention from Canadian cutbacks in support for the alliance, and what seemed to some allies like a waning interest in European security matters. The concept of a bipillar alliance that ESDI spawned—a strengthened European pillar balancing an overly powerful United States—did not sit comfortably with Canadian policymakers since it obscured, not to say ignored, Canada's position and role in the alliance. However, the WEU, with its twenty-eight states and four categories of membership, seemed most unlikely to mount an effective military operation and this served to assuage concerns.2 Furthermore, Atlanticist sentiment, led by the UK, remained strong within the alliance.

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Despite warning signals,3 the December 1998 Anglo-French Saint-Malo declaration, which proposed a defense policymaking role for the European Union, came as a surprise and somewhat of a shock. One did not know quite what to make of it—had Prime Minister Tony Blair really reversed a UK policy position of over fifty years' standing? Or was this no more than another rhetorical flourish, of which the preceding decade had seen many? The answers to these questions were by no means clear. From a Canadian perspective there was a feeling that, if ESDI had made us uncomfortable, ESDP could give us heartburn. Ottawa's instinctive response was to stress the preeminence of NATO and to seek assurances that Canada would not be read out of any EU crisis management script a priori. Both of those objectives were reflected in the April 1999 Washington summit communique, but disappointingly both were missing from EU's Cologne summit declaration issued six weeks later. Following Cologne, the initiative passed to the EU, and the non-EU allies found themselves clamoring for a glimpse of what was happening in the office towers that overlook Place Schuman.4 They were not permitted to see much, and doubts began to grow about the depth of the EU's commitment to dialogue and "transparency." Considerable progress was registered under France's presidency of the EU, which ran from July to December 2000, the results of which are set out in the December 8 Nice summit Presidency Report. A few days later, at the December 19 Canada-EU summit in Ottawa, a joint statement on defense and security was issued providing for regular expert-level consultations. This paper attempts to place those events in a historical context, to offer a European perspective on ESDP, to examine the implications for the NATO alliance and the "transatlantic link," and finally to address the question "What's in it for Canada?" I will argue that however ungainly, however prolonged, and however dispute-prone the development of an EU military capability proves to be, it is an inevitable and indeed welcome step forward in the evolution of the European project. By wedding defense cooperation to economic and political cooperation, it will extend and strengthen stability in Europe, and could provide a new instrument for dealing with crisis situations both in Europe and in the world at large. In giving the EU a modest "stick" to complement its considerable economic "carrot," it will give European allies a much needed preventive diplomacy tool as well as a stronger and more coherent capacity for dealing with the aftermath of crises. Such a capacity should complement rather than compete with the U.S. power in meeting U.S. global commitments and responsibilities. It may also encourage Washington to refine its own approach to crisis management, reducing its apparent reliance on rapid escalation and the premature use of overwhelming force. The ability of European allies and partners to shoulder a greater share of the defense and security burden, and the readiness of the United States to collaborate with the EU on a more equal footing would strengthen international security and stability and promote democratic values, trade, and the rule of law, all key Canadian foreign policy objectives.

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At the same time, ESDP could have a negative effect on NATO, which would be bad news for Canada. By promoting a bipolar alliance, it could well lead to Canada being marginalized. The NATO alliance is Canada's anchor to Europe and we must strive to ensure that ESDP does what its proponents claim it will do— strengthen the alliance and the transatlantic link. Close and mutually beneficial relations can, in the short run, be achieved through the effective implementation of the guiding principles of transparency, nondupiication, and inclusiveness, and in the longer run through the development of common assessments of strategic risks and challenges. Canada's strategic objective in this exercise should be the promotion of "a culture of cooperation" between the two organizations. Canadian influence can be brought to bear, but only if allies are persuaded that our interest is strong and our commitment firm and durable. WHAT IS ESDP? Conceived at the Anglo-French Saint-Malo summit in December 1998, ESDP underwent a relatively brief gestation period before being delivered in the form of the Helsinki "Headline Goal" at the December 1999 meeting of the European Council.5 The aim, according to the Saint-Malo declaration, was to endow the European Council with a common defense policy so as to permit it "to play its full role on the international stage." To this end, the EU would need to develop "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises." This in turn would serve to strengthen solidarity between member states. Thus, from the outset ESDP was cast as a political project building on defense, rather than simply a vehicle for strengthening European military capabilities. Saint-Malo noted that the EU would also require new institutional structures for policy formulation and implementation, including analytical capability, intelligence gathering, and strategic planning. The "military means" would come from existing forces, both those assigned to NATO and other formations. There would also be a need to rationalize weapons procurement and promote the development of a strong and competitive European armaments industry. The EU summit in Vienna, which immediately followed Saint-Malo, welcomed the initiative, but it was not until the Cologne summit the following June that a formal, all-member blessing was bestowed on the concept.6 The Cologne declaration reiterated the objectives set out at Saint-Malo, with the added precision that the EU would assume responsibility for "the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty of the European Union, the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks,' hitherto the responsibility of the Western European Union."7 The German Presidency Report, issued at the same time, provided further guidance on two aspects of ESDP—decisionmaking and implementation. Effective, "autonomous" decisionmaking would require a Political and Security Committee (along the lines of the North Atlantic Council), a Military Committee, and a military staff

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with access to a "Situation Center," to provide analytical and planning support. Regarding implementation, the report stated that the military capabilities sought should be characterized by their "deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility."8 The report also introduced a new element, the possibility of the EU mounting operations "without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities." Finally, appropriate arrangements would be required to ensure effective cooperation with NATO and to provide for the possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led operations. These broad objectives, presented at Cologne as "a new step in the construction of the European Union," were spelled out in detail at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. Helsinki set out the force or Headline Goal—the ability to deploy, by the year 2003, a corps-sized unit of 50,000-60,000 people within sixty days and sustainable for one year—and called for the early establishment of "new political and military structures" within the EU along with "a non-military crisis management mechanism ... to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the union and Member states." This was important because it showed that the EU was not intent simply on grafting a military capability onto its common foreign policy, but rather on developing a comprehensive approach to crisis management. Helsinki represented the conclusion of what might be called the "definition phase" of ESDP. With the Portuguese presidency (January-June 2000), efforts shifted to implementation, the first step in which was the establishment in March 2000 of three interim bodies: a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, and the nucleus of what would become a military support staff. The first task of the interim bodies was a work plan, which was presented to the Feira summit in June. It called, inter alia, for the preparation of a detailed catalog of the forces needed to meet the Headline Goal, and for the convening of a Capabilities Commitment Conference at which participating countries, both EU members and other European states, would be invited to signal the forces they would be willing to provide. Feira also proposed the establishment of joint EU-NATO ad hoc working groups to address four areas of cooperation: exchange of classified information, coordination of defense planning for the implementation of the Headline Goal, EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and permanent consultative arrangements. Furthermore, the EU undertook to develop modalities for consultations with and the participation of non-EU states in EU-led missions. Considerable progress was registered during the six-month French presidency, which concluded on December 31,2000. The catalog of "capability requirements," prepared by a joint NATO-EU working group, was issued on September 22 at an informal meeting of EU defense ministers in Ecouen outside Paris. This provided the necessary reference document for the November 20 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. The December Nice summit bestowed permanent status on the interim bodies and set out detailed proposals for permanent consultative/cooperative arrangements with NATO, as well as with non-EU European countries.

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The torch has since been passed to the current holder of the EU presidency, Sweden, which is overseeing the development of the new permanent bodies (expected to be fully operational by the summer of 2001), preparing for negotiations with NATO on permanent arrangements, and leading consultations with non-EU European allies (and Canada). In institutional terms, the implementation of ESDP is well on track. WHY IS THE EU INVOLVING ITSELF IN DEFENSE MATTERS, AND WHAT HAPPENED TO ESDI? The European Union's venture into defense policy has been propelled by two forces that are intimately linked. It is first of all a new and remarkably bold step forward in the lengthy process of European integration begun with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Second, as asserted at Saint-Malo, it is intended to give the EU the military means to back up its common foreign and security policy (the so-called second pillar of European integration). Developments over the past fifteen years have, it is argued, transformed the EU into an economic "superpower" with global interests, while harmonization of foreign policy has increased its political clout.9 It is only logical, therefore, that the EU should acquire the military means to enforce political decisions, thereby allowing it "to play its full role on the international stage."10 "The story of European integration began with defense."11 Well before the Common Coal and Steel Market came in to being in 1953, the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947) and Brussels (1948) envisaged collective arrangements that would provide signatories with defense guarantees against outside threats, while removing conflict as a means of settling disputes among themselves. Given the emergence and magnitude of the Soviet threat, however, this initiative was almost immediately overtaken by a broader North Atlantic project that led to the creation of the NATO alliance in 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not, it seems, meet all the aspirations of its European members, and the short-lived European Defense Community (EDC) can be seen as an early attempt to develop a European "pillar" within NATO. The EDC foundered for a number of reasons, foremost among them French opposition to German rearmament. One product of this failed attempt at integration was the Western European Union (1954), although it would be another thirty years before the WEU would assume a significant role in the European security and defense. With NATO providing the defense guarantee and the European Economic Community (EEC) preoccupied with other aspects of integration, there was, with the exception of France, little inclination on the part of European allies to pursue the matter. (Indeed, the Treaty of Rome explicitly forbids the EEC from dabbling in defense policy). A number of factors lead to a revival of interest in European defense during the 1980s. Among them was the success of the European project itself, an

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achievement that fostered confidence and inspired even more ambitious plans for integration. A second was mounting U.S. pressure for greater burden sharing, and allies' susceptibility to unexpected shifts in U.S. security and defense policy.12 The WEU experienced a "revival" in 1984 when President Francois Mitterrand proposed it as a forum for consultations among European foreign and defense ministers on security issues. Of particular note was the Platform on European Security Interests issued by WEU foreign and defense ministers at a meeting in the Hague on October 27, 1987, that called for the "revitalization of the WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification." The declaration signaled European allies' intention to develop "a more cohesive European defense identity" that would serve "to strengthen the European pillar of the NATO Alliance and "ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic." Thus were established the guiding principles that would, in a little over a decade, lead to ESDP. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the European Community into the European Union, also gave birth to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which would address "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." The treaty identified the WEU as the defense component of the European Union and issued instructions that arrangements be made to enable it to "implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications." For their part, WEU foreign ministers, at their meeting the following June, identified the "Petersberg tasks" as a guide for force development and planning. With ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, action shifted to NATO, which at its January 1994 Brussels summit signaled a readiness to make collective assets available for WEU operations "undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy," through the development of "separable but not separate capabilities." This took the form of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), mobile headquarters units that could be deployed on short notice to regions of crisis or conflict. Foreign ministers provided greater precision at their 1996 meeting in Berlin. The goal was now the development of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO drawing on CJTFs and alliance command structures. The North Atlantic Council in permanent session was instructed to develop the required modalities. Work on ESDI began in September 1996 in the newly created Policy Coordination Group (PCG), a political-military body intended to provide the close "interface" between foreign policy and defense expertise that post-Cold War challenges demanded. Quarterly joint NATO-WEU council meetings were also instituted with regular exchanges between the staffs of the two organizations. Considerable progress was made in elaborating modalities on the release, transfer, monitoring, and return of NATO assets and capabilities, and in the participation of non-EU European allies (Iceland, Norway, Turkey) in those missions.13 However, within a year or so interest began to flag; the steam seemed to have gone out of the process.

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The principal reason was the stalemate in the French rapprochement with the alliance initiated at the December 1995 meeting of foreign ministers, which was expected to lead to greater French participation in NATO military activities.14 This shift in French policy had been posited on the understanding that NATO would undergo a transformation that would see the emergence of an operationally effective "European pillar," leading thereby to greater transatlantic balance within the alliance. Central to this process, at least for France, was the appointment of a European—preferably a French officer—as commander in chief of the southern region (CINCSOUTH). Such an outcome might have been achievable over time (new command arrangements would have had to be found for the U.S. Sixth Fleet), but President Jacques Chirac needed a public commitment, something Washington was not prepared to give. In the midst of a growing public dispute over the issue, legislative elections brought a socialist government to power in France and with it a halt to France's reintegration with NATO. It seemed that ESDI as a vehicle for realizing European aspirations was, if not "dead in the water," at least floundering without a life preserver.15 In the meantime, the EU was taking albeit modest steps toward a common foreign and security policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam (June 1997) introduced a slight recasting of the Maastricht Treaty language, calling for the "progressive framing of a common defense policy ... which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide." Of greater note, however, was the suggestion that the WEU might, in time, be folded into the EU itself.16 However, as no timetable was proposed nor were practical goals set, Amsterdam, like Maastricht before it, was "widely seen as being of peripheral importance in the realm of defense."17 The change of government in Paris, which had slowed the development of ESDI, was matched by a similar change in London. Much has been made of Prime Minister Blair's desire to cut a figure on the EU stage as the motive behind his reversal of UK policy on European defense, and no doubt there is some truth in that claim. More persuasive, however, was the effect on all European leaders, not just Blair, of yet another looming conflict in the Balkans, first in Albania, then in Kosovo, and the prospect that the European powers would once again be obliged to defer to U.S. leadership in order to quench the flames of violence in their own backyard. European leaders were also well aware of rising calls in the U.S. Congress for greater transatlantic burden sharing.18 The 1990s had been replete with calls for military reform to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world, but little had been achieved and defense budgets continued to decline. Dramatic action was required, not only to equip Europe with the institutional and power projection tools, but also to save the Atlantic alliance—or so the Blair government would argue.19 However, in reversing long-standing UK policy, Blair unleashed his own "revolution in military affairs."20 ESDP is much more than just a strengthening of the European pillar within NATO. Rather it represents the emergence of a new and potentially powerful player on the European and international security scene. ESDP has not replaced ESDI but rather reduced

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it to a component of the EU's more ambitious political goal of "play[ing] its full role on the international security stage." ESDP AND THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK21 U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen made headlines on the eve of the semiannual meeting of NATO defense ministers in December 2000 when he charged that ESDP risked turning the North Atlantic Alliance into "a relic of the past." This remarkably forthright language was all the more notable given Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's statement following the EU's Capabilities Commitment Conference less than two weeks before that the EU force "offers a valuable complement to the efforts and capabilities of NATO,"22 and Cohen's earlier assertion at the informal meeting of defense ministers at Birmingham in October that the United States welcomed the development of an EU military capability "with wholehearted conviction."23 The Clinton administration's response to ESDP—and ESDI before it—had been at best mixed, but never before had this ambiguity been so starkly evident.24 In short, while welcoming the European allies' commitment to improved military capabilities, Washington has long been leery of any project that could weaken NATO or challenge U.S. leadership in Europe. From the U.S. perspective the development of a parallel, "autonomous" security apparatus risks drawing European allies' attention away from the alliance and gradually draining it of its purpose.25 This concern is shared by Canadian authorities and accounts for their repeated insistence that NATO remain the primary forum for addressing Euro-Atlantic defense and security matters.26 For their part, EU member states are by no means of one mind on how ESDP should be implemented, nor on relations between the EU and NATO. Most remain firmly attached to the alliance and to a strong U.S. presence in Europe.27 However, many are no longer prepared to defer as a matter of course to U.S. leadership. This is one of the numerous lessons of the Kosovo air campaign, conducted as it was according to U.S. military doctrine with European allies called on to pick up (and pay for) the pieces, all the while being subjected to a barrage of congressional criticism for not pulling their weight.28 From a European perspective, the United States has become an unpredictable ally, prone to rapid, unexpected shifts in policy and with little tolerance for criticism.29 The U.S. record in the Balkans and unilateral initiatives such as national missile defense (NMD) are but two prominent examples. U.S. leadership that finally brought hostilities in Bosnia to an end in 1995 was welcome. However, U.S. involvement had been preceded by four years of criticism and carping from the sidelines, a stance that, from a European (and Canadian) perspective, appeared hypocritical given Washington's unwillingness to support the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with ground troops. Furthermore, it was only with reluctance that, despite having led the bombing campaign and brokered the Dayton Peace Accord, Washington agreed to field ground forces for the Implementation Force (IFOR)

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while insisting, underpressure from Congress, on an unrealistically short, one-year mandate. As for Kosovo, Washington ruled out ab initio a ground force operation— at least one in which its forces would be involved—while pursuing an air campaign that, until well into the conflict, did little to stem mistreatment and expulsion of the Kosovars, the principal justification for Operation Allied Force. No one in authority has suggested how the EU, had it had the wherewithal, would have dealt with Slobodan Milosevic's aggression against his own countrymen,30 but the assumption is that it would have done it differently, giving greater scope for preventive diplomacy and resisting the temptation to go for an early military solution.31 Such an approach would have greatly reduced the significance of the so-called capabilities gap.32 European allies accept that the burden of military reform falls to them if they are to participate effectively in (let alone lead) multinational crisis management missions. They are puzzled, however, by the relentless U.S. push for ever more exotic, hi-tech military solutions to security challenges (which has increased under the Bush administration)33 and the increases in defense spending that these entail. Indeed, from a European perspective, U.S. defense and security policy seems to be driven less by objective assessments of current and future threats, and more by domestic political and defense industrial pressures. On the one hand there exists an overriding preoccupation with reducing or eliminating combat casualties (in order ensure sustained public support for overseas missions). On the other hand is the so-called Iron Triangle—an informal, alliance including the Pentagon, armaments manufacturers, and Congress—whose purpose, it seems, is to promote increased defense spending for its own sake as much as for the security of the country.34 The Iron Triangle has been in retreat since the end of the Cold War but is looking to make a comeback under the Bush administration. If the transatlantic "capabilities gap" grows wider in the coming years, it will not be due solely to European defense development and procurement policies. The preponderant influence of the Department of Defense in the formulation of U.S. security policy—despite that policy being considerably more "political" than during the Cold War—poses a potentially serious problem, that of a fundamental transatlantic split on assessments of threat and of what to do about them. As one observer has put it, "Europeans and Americans see the same problems, draw different conclusions and then make contrasting choices over foreign and security policy with the result that they often look at each other and ask, 'are you being serious'?"35 Nowhere has this been so evident as on the question of ballistic missile defense, where Washington appears to exaggerate the threats posed by North Korea and Iran while downplaying diplomatic and political measures that could contain and possibly eliminate the threat. There is also concern that the Pentagon's drive to escape the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty may reflect a broad skepticism, not to say rejection, of the value of multilateral arms control by the Bush administration. For example, both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are on record as opposing U.S. ratification of

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the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).36 This could have a negative effect on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the European allies (and Canada) see as the cornerstone of international nonproliferation efforts. Coupled with the perceived incoherence of U.S. foreign and security policy, plus the evangelical zeal with which the United States promotes its right to global leadership, one can discern ample scope for mutual incomprehension and resentment, not to say endless debates on burden sharing. Such an outcome would put the transatlantic consensus at risk, thereby weakening the NATO alliance. WHERE IS ESDP HEADED? Francois Heisbourg titled a recent study prepared for the Paris-based Institute for Strategic Studies European Defense: Making It Work. As the title implies, it is a prescriptive work. One might well undertake a second study titled European Defense: Will It Work? Will the EU indeed acquire an effective military power projection capability? If so, what effect will it have on NATO? And what will be the implications for Canada? While detailed and persuasive answers cannot yet be given to these questions, there seems to be consensus among observers, both enthusiasts and skeptics alike, that as far as the EU is concerned, a page has been turned in the evolution of European institutions, a new Rubicon crossed. And there is no going back.37 For policymakers, a prudent lot, it is probably best to take them at their word. The task at hand, therefore, is to discern what lies ahead for the EU, for NATO, and for Canada. Much has been made of the breadth and depth of the consensus underlying ESDP as reflected in the speed with which it has been implemented to date.38 In the short two years since the Saint-Malo declaration, new decisionmaking bodies have been put in place and a military support staff is being assembled with the aim of being able to mount an EU-led operation by the end of the current year, earlier if possible. This, however, begs the question: To do what? To go where? And how will they get their forces there? The Helsinki Headline Goal does not answer any of these questions—further evidence that ESDP is first and foremost a political undertaking. In some respects the Headline Goal is not particularly ambitious. Indeed, it was oversubscribed at the November 20,2000, Capabilities Commitment Conference.39 This suggests that the targets were set deliberately low so as to ensure early success and generate momentum, while at the same time avoiding the sensitive question of increased defense spending. However, such a force would clearly be insufficient to perform "the most demanding" Petersberg tasks—that is, peace enforcement in a "nonpermissive environment"—and there is some doubt it could fulfill even traditional peacekeeping functions such those currently being carried out in Bosnia. And even if it could, an all European Stabilization Force (SFOR) would still be dependent on the United States for logistics support and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), plus backup in the event the security situation deteriorated.

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A second element of the Headline Goal is intended to address that dependence.40 While the United States welcomes European acquisition of strategic lift, in-flight refueling, improved communications, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), and other capabilities required for force projection, there is less enthusiasm in Washington for EU plans to develop an autonomous intelligence capability, which is seen as an unnecessary duplication of NATO (that is U.S.) capability. However, given the experience of the Gulf War and the Kosovo air campaign, in which U.S. provision of intelligence to allied units was both slow and selective,41 this is likely to remain a priority for the EU.42 That is not to say that such an intelligence capability will become part of the EU inventory anytime soon. Indeed, General Klaus Naumann (Ret.), former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, has expressed doubts that this element of the Headline Goal could be implemented before the end of the decade.43 Budget and force capability constraints are addressed in the third element of the Headline Goal, which proposes, albeit in a most general and cursory way, greater cooperation in defense production. Indeed, consolidation within European defense industries is already under way and national procurement restrictions are having to adjust to a more open market.44 Even France, for whom national armaments procurement and production is a pillar of the Gaullist legacy, now appears prepared to pursue competitive deals regardless of source.45 It will be some time before the situation settles and the nature, extent, and benefits of consolidation become apparent. There is no doubt, however, that with the required funding and markets, European defense manufacturers could produce the required modern weapons systems needed for the full range of Petersberg tasks and more. Should collaboration evolve toward a restrictive "buy Europe" policy, it would become yet another source of transatlantic friction. A fourth and very important element of ESDP is the strengthening of the EU's "postconflict" civilian reconstruction capabilities. The June 2000 Feira summit called for the ability to deploy up to 5,000 civilian police officers, 1,000 within thirty days, as well as the provision of judicial officers and personnel to train local administrators. This element has so far received little attention and is an area that the United States has deliberately shied away from. Furthermore, there is no NATO equivalent, those functions being performed in the Balkans largely under UN auspices. It is, however, essential to the establishment of a lasting peace in strife-torn countries, and European participants in SFOR and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) are gaining extensive experience that will be put to good use as this element of ESDP is elaborated. Is the EU goal of developing an autonomous force projection and crisis management capability overly ambitious? This would certainly seem to be the case in the short term. But there is nothing particularly crucial about the year 2003—which seems to have been chosen somewhat arbitrarily as an objective (it is, after all a Headline Goal rather than a deadline). It is already having the desired effect on the defense and procurement policies of a number of EU member states. Across the board European governments are reducing the size of armed forces structures, until recently oriented largely to territorial defense, closing redundant military bases,

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and eliminating or cutting back on conscript personnel, in order to free up funds for the acquisition of the equipment and capabilities need for multinational expeditionary missions.46 In most EU countries, large numbers of heavy weapons systems are slated for replacement by lighter, wheeled vehicles, C3I systems are being modernized in the interest of interoperability, and plans are in place to acquire amphibious capabilities and strategic lift. For most countries, however, the process of conversion from territorial defense to mobile, rapidly deployable forces has only just begun and will take many years to complete. This will obviously constrain the EU's ability to mount operations in the foreseeable future, but need not be seen as a serious setback. A few years' delay in acquiring the desired range of military capabilities to fully implement ESDP will not void the project. In the meantime, military cooperation among European states continues to expand. While only the UK, France, and to a certain extent Italy were involved in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, more than half the European allies participated in combat missions in the Kosovo campaign while others provided combat support. In the earlier IFOR operation, it was the Allied Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC), an almost entirely European contingent under a British commander, that provided the alliance's ground component command. ARRC headquarters was deployed again to Macedonia in 1999 to prepare for the extraction from Kosovo of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) personnel, and was kept on to plan and coordinate KFOR operations following the cease-fire. Such a European-led force did not exist at the beginning of the 1990s. Among the other purely European units the best known is the Eurocorps, which was created in 1992. It is currently composed of forces from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain and assumed responsibility for KFOR headquarters under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) in April 2000. Operation ALBA, the 6,550-strong multinational relief operation to Albania, mounted by Italy in 1997, included forces from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. European multinational units have shown they can adapt to new challenges in the field, a notable example being creation of a Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in Bosnia in August 1998 perform riot control duties. That unit was able to draw on capabilities of national police and semimilitary forces such as the Italian Caribinieri, the French Gendarmerie, and the German Bundesgrenzschutz, forces that the United States and Canada do not possess.47 Furthermore, a myriad and growing number of binational and multinational cooperative arrangements have sprung up over the past decade. Aside from the Eurocorps, there exists the Army Joint Rapid Reaction Force (EUROFOR) and European Maritime Forces (EUROMARFOR) initiated in 1995 by France, Italy, and Spain. The same year saw the inauguration of the Netherlands-German corps totaling 40,000 troops. The Danish-German LANDJUT (Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland) unit, which dates from 1962, was integrated with the tri-nation Multinational North East Corps following Polish accession to NATO. The Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation agreement of 1996 provides for common operations and command of the two countries' navies, while the Deployable Air

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Task Force arrangement established the same year with Luxembourg proved highly effective in the Kosovo campaign, such that Portugal, another F-16 country, has asked to join. There is also a Euro-Air Group, an Anglo-French-Italian planning and coordination cell, a Spanish-Italian amphibious force, and a growing collection of multinational units dedicated to peacekeeping. Add to this the long-standing Dutch-British Amphibious Force (UKNLAF) and one has an impressive catalog indeed.48 The intensified collaboration that these units reflect helps to fosters interoperability both in terms of field planning, command, and control and in the development of new systems such as communications and tactical intelligence. ESDP AND NATO: IS THERE ROOM FOR BOTH? Will ESDP render the alliance a "relic of the past"? Despite U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen's calculated hyperbole, such concerns are not groundless. For one, the EU's pursuit of a common foreign and security policy will inevitably lead to a de facto EU caucus within NATO, positions being thrashed out beforehand, with little leeway left for the expression of national views should they go against agreed EU policy. Indeed this has already been apparent in discussions within the alliance on NATO-EU relations.49 The quality of debate within the alliance would suffer and could well be reduced to a dialogue between a monolithic EU and the United States. Second, as European military capabilities improve, the EU will likely become European allies' institution of choice for conducting crisis management operations, leaving NATO increasingly in the shadows. One senses from the statements of the more enthusiastic proponents of ESDP that, once ESDP becomes operational at the end of this year, the EU will be eagerly casting about for a crisis to manage. A NATO alliance relegated solely to an Article 5 role would gradually lose its relevance and vitality. This, however, need not be the ultimate outcome. EU documents repeatedly stress that, by strengthening European military capabilities, ESDP will reinforce NATO as well. There certainly exists a considerable overlap between the Headline Goal and objectives of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). And if, as many EU leaders claim, it proves easier to secure funds for projects with a European as opposed to a NATO cachet, tant mieux. NATO has offered the EU assured access to its capabilities and assets, including its force and operational planning capabilities. With the exception of France (the only EU state not engaged in some form of force planning within NATO), most EU members see a close working relationship with the alliance as both desirable and, in a time of budget constraints, essential. Furthermore, the "double-hatting" of military representatives of EU member countries will foster cooperation. There is thus ample scope for a mutually fruitful relationship. Transatlantic apprehensions over ESDP have been generated in large part by the speed with which it has evolved and uncertainties as to its true nature, scope, and ends. The pace will inevitably slow, however, as the EU strives to "fill in the blanks," resolve ambiguities,50 and match capabilities to rhetoric. This will give non-EU allies, and particularly North American allies, a welcome breathing space

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to assess in a more measured way than has yet been where ESDP is headed, and what it means for them and for the alliance. And indeed, where it is headed is probably not altogether clear even to EU states.51 Meanwhile, the EU itself is at a crossroads as it strives both to extend its membership and to deepen its cooperation. Of the twelve candidates for membership, nine are former satellites of the Soviet Union whose views on European security are decidedly Atlanticist.52 They can be expected to support a strong NATO alliance and prominent U.S. presence in Europe. It is therefore far too early to begin drafting NATO's obituary. ESDP: WHAT'S IN IT FOR CANADA? Canada has, since World War II, been strongly drawn to multinational institutions—provided we can join.53 This reflects, in the first instance, our interest in international stability and rules-based economic and trade relations. Multilateralism also serves as a "force multiplier" in promoting Canadian policies and interests. Of particular importance, however, it helps to deflect or contain the preponderant influence of the United States in Canadian foreign and security policy.54 These are interests that European countries share to varying degrees, and that can be invoked in support of at least one element of Lord Ismay's famous triad of NATO functions, that of keeping the United States involved in European defense. For its part, Canada has never been particularly enthusiastic about the "European project," seeing it initially as a hindrance to free trade, a threat to our special relationship with Great Britain, a barrier to an effective economic and diplomatic counterbalance to the United States,55 and now, a threat to the NATO alliance. As Canada will never be a member of the EU, there would appear little to be gained and much to be lost in backing ESDP. Canadian policymakers clearly face a dilemma. According to both the United States and European allies, the status quo is unsustainable. Continued European dependence on U.S. military might to manage conflicts in its own backyard spells the eventual demise of the North Atlantic Alliance. Canada has therefore joined the United States in urging European allies to bring their forces up to scratch, particularly as regards transatlantic "interoperability." European allies agree but insist that this be matched by a more balanced transatlantic partnership, one in which enhanced military capabilities are accompanied by increased political clout. ESDP is presented as the most promising vehicle for meeting those two objectives. But it is clout focused in and exercised through the European Union, not NATO. In other words, eighty-seven years after the Canadian armed forces' first appearance on the European scene, Canada finds itself an "outsider" in a project that could drastically alter the face of European security and defense. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? First of all, whatever our reservations about ESDP, we should (in the words of former secretary of defense Cohen) embrace it, "not grudgingly, not with resigna-

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tion, but with wholehearted conviction." This may be asking a lot. But grudging acquiescence, masked by routine protestations of support for ESDP, will do little to position us to "expedite] its occurrence in a manner beneficial to [ourselves]." How can Canada influence the development of something that, whether it succeeds or fails, threatens Canadian interests? Canadian attention has focused almost exclusively on the possible negative effects ESDP will have on NATO and on Canada's role in Europe. Little consideration has been given to its positive aspects, particularly EU concepts of crisis management that call for the employment of a broad range of political, economic, and military tools starting with preventive diplomacy, the graduated use of force, and follow-up civilian reconstruction measures. This contrasts with the U.S. approach adopted by NATO in the Balkans, which involved the employment of overwhelming force at the early stage of a conflict (granted, Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia was not early stage), with a view to securing a cease-fire or surrender, but with little thought of the consequences of such a strategy for a lasting peace. It has been noted that Canada flew a disproportionately large number of missions in the Kosovo campaign, and that Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy was highly supportive of the air campaign. That, however, was due largely to the interoperability of our aircraft with those of the United States and the minister's strong views regarding the limits of national sovereignty where state-sponsored human rights violations are concerned. That said, Kosovo did not reflect traditional Canadian concepts of crisis management, which are clearly more attuned to those of the EU than to those of the United States. One would therefore expect that Canada would feel reasonably comfortable participating in EU-led missions of this type. This is not an assumption that will be put to the test anytime soon. As indicated above, the EU will, for some considerable time, be dependent on NATO support in mounting "autonomous" operations. This should provide ample opportunity for the NATO alliance to arrive at satisfactory working arrangements with the EU, and for Canada to arrive at a clearer assessment of where its interests lie in this increasingly complex network of transatlantic relationships. The growth of EU political influence that would accompany enhanced military capabilities could encourage NATO and the United States to adopt a more restrained, comprehensive, and coherent approach to crisis management than has been evident to date. It has been suggested that the apprehensions generated by ESDP among Canadian policymakers have led unwittingly to the adoption of a position virtually indistinguishable from that of the United States, the implication being that this is a bad thing. Neil MacFarlane has proposed, as a "useful supplement to more traditional strategies of balance through NATO," the pursuit of "a robust mechanism for EU-Canada dialogue on security issues."56 Such a mechanism is provided for in the December 2000 Canada-EU Joint Declaration, and to date two exchanges have taken place with the Swedish presidency. Given the EU's many preoccupations (not the least its own internal arrangements for foreign and defense policy formulation), and the fact that ESDP is still in its formative stages, this forum may provide a venue for gaining insights into EU plans and thinking and for getting

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Canadian ideas into circulation. It is fairly clear, however, that bilateral security relations with Canada is not an EU priority. Consequently, it will likely be some time before a robust dialogue, which addresses specific Canadian interests and concerns, begins. But even when a Canada-EU dialogue is up and running, it cannot be seen as a substitute for the pursuit of Canadian interests through NATO. The alliance will remain our anchor in Europe and its continued vitality central to our security and defense policy, including relations with the United States.57 Our objective should be to ensure that ESDP is not merely NATO compatible but NATO friendly, and that, while responding to EU aspirations "to play its full role on the international stage," it also promotes a genuine transatlantic partnership in crisis management and peace support. How can this be done? Early in the discussion of ESDP, the alliance identified NATO-EU transparency as the means of promoting predictability and confidence, of avoiding duplication and inconsistencies in planning and procedures, and of making the most efficient use of limited forces. At the annual informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Birmingham in October 2000, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen proposed the establishment of a new body, the European Security and Defense Planning System (ESDPS) composed of all twenty-three NATO and EU states, which would oversee joint defense planning and review in those areas where NATO and EU objectives overlap. However, such a high-profile body was seen by many to be incompatible with EU autonomy.58 The Nice summit Presidency Report put forward as an alternative an ad hoc NATO-EU capabilities group (para. 9, appendix to Annex 1). That proposal, while welcome, was short on details as to the mandate and operation of such a body. A minimalist interpretation could see it functioning as little more than a data comparison group. In a speech to the Munich Security Conference on February 3, 2001, the minister of national defense, Art Eggleton, advanced a more generic approach to joint defense planning, one that could well see the EU proposal providing a basis for the elaboration of a multilevel politico-military consultative arrangement.59 There are some within the EU who fear that even a parallel arrangement would lead to excessive "NATO-ization" of ESDP. This however, is both inevitable and indeed desirable, at least in terms of procedures, given that both organizations will be drawing their forces from the same limited pool. The overriding objective should be promotion of a profound and enduring "culture of cooperation," one that fosters transparency, predictability, and confidence. Such an outcome would go a long way in meeting Canadian concerns regarding the transfer of NATO assets and capabilities to EU control and would greatly facilitate Canadian government decisions on participation in EU-led missions.60 As to the effects of ESDP will have on NATO, there is probably no way to avoid completely the emergence of an EU caucus within the alliance, at least on major issues. While such a development could have the effect of reducing alliance consultations to a dialogue between Washington and Brussels (with Canada and the few remaining non-EU allies relegated to the role of spectator), this need not be

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the outcome. Foreign and security policy is a constantly evolving thing, and the effects on Canada of a common EU approach could be muted by a vigorous, ongoing dialogue in EU capitals (although this would require strengthening the NATO section in foreign affairs, which currently consists of two and a half officers). Canada has many friends among EU member states and our views can expect a sympathetic hearing. A concerted approach would permit Canadian influence to be brought on EU policy as it is developed (in the so-called decision-shaping stage). It is sometimes said, not altogether in jest, that Canada's role in the world is to have a role. The fall of the Berlin Wall had an effect on Canada's foreign and security policy similar to the effect one might imagine the sudden disappearance of magnetic north having on a compass, causing it to fluctuate wildly. Events of the past few years, the conflicts in the Balkans, NATO adaptation to post-Cold War challenges, and the emergence of ESDP have refocused attention on Europe and given the transatlantic link a new dimension, one that points potentially at least beyond Europe. To reach its full dimension, this new "transatlanticism" will require careful tending. As David Haglund has reminded us, Canada can take some credit as an architect of the transatlantic link that led to the creation of NATO.61 That bridge is getting rather rusty and may be suffering from structural defects. It is clearly in need of some restorative work if it is not to become vulnerable to frequent North Atlantic gales. As a number of the studies cited in this chapter point out, the underlying threat to the alliance is diverging perceptions between the United States and European allies on the state of the world and the means of dealing with future threats to peace and security. One obvious response, but one that has yet to secure much prominence within the alliance, is development of common assessment.62 The aim would be not so much to secure agreement on all issues—a futile and potentially damaging pursuit—but rather to foster a better understanding of respective views and ways of pursuing common interests. Is there not a role for Canada in promoting such a project? Of course there is. Are we up to it? We certainly possess the intellectual and diplomatic resources. Do we have the will to see it through? Good question—but one that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Much will depend on where the needle of our foreign and security policy compass comes to rest. We would also have to deal with lingering skepticism among allies about long term Canadian commitment to the alliance. As with the European Union, our political clout will grow with the capabilities of our armed forces. NOTES 1. David G. Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance: An Introduction and Overview," in What NATO for Canada? ed. David G. Haglund (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2000), 1. 2. The WEU comprises ten full members, six associate members, seven partners, and five observer states. Gilles Andreani suggests that the UK had only agreed to the link between

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the EU and the WEU in the Maastricht Treaty on the understanding that it would not work. Thus, "It was not only doomed by intricate institutional arrangements; there was also a distinct lack of interest and loyalty from member states." Gilles Andreani, "Why Institutions Matter," Survival 42, no. 2 (summer 2000): 82. That the WEU was not taken seriously by its members was evident from Operation ALBA, the humanitarian relief mission to Albania in 1998 lead by Italy and supported by Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. "The WEU ... proved completely ineffective in responding to the Albanian crisis [even though it] was well within the rubric of the Petersberg Tasks." John G. McGinn and Timothy Liston, "Beyond the Rhetoric and Acronyms: The Reality of European Military Capabilities," National Security Studies Quarterly 1, no. 1 (winter 2001): 83. 3. The first signal, an all but imperceptible one, was buried in the UK's 1998 Strategic Defense Review which, for the first time, spoke glowingly if briefly, of the EU's common foreign and security policy. More notable was Prime Minister Blair's acknowledgment at the October informal summit in Portlach, Austria, that the EU might well develop its own defense policy were certain conditions met (i.e., that it be militarily effective, answerable to national governments—not a European army—and NATO compatible). 4. Place Schuman is the Brussels headquarters of the European Commission. It later became apparent that, until March 2000 when the EU's interim political and military bodies were set up, nothing much was going on at Place Schuman, work on ESDP being conducted largely in capitals, and by the Finnish and Portuguese presidencies. Resistance to dialogue with NATO was led by France, which argued that premature contacts would lead to the otanisation (NATOization) of ESDP, thereby compromising the EU's autonomy and even squashing this "new and fragile flower." See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, Europe's Military Revolution (London: Centre for European Reform, March 2001). See also Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge? Chaillot Paper no. 43 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2000), 56: "The fear in Paris, shared to some extent by other capitals, was that the monolithic strength of NATO would steamroller the infant ESDP into adopting structures, procedures and policies which would be unduly influenced by Washington and would therefore simply replicate NATO practices." U.S. influence aside, for Canada this would be a welcome outcome. 5. "Consensus among the Fifteen on ... the [Helsinki] 'Headline Goal' ... ha[s] unquestionably moved the question of European defense out of the realm of rhetoric and into that of practical achievement." Nicole Gnesotto, preface to Francois Heisbourg, European Defense: Making It Work, Chaillot Paper no. 42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, September 2000), v. 6. Paradoxically, the first official blessing of this project was provided by NATO. See paras. 9-10 of the NATO Washington Summit Communique, April 24, 1999. 7. Named after the suburb of Bonn that hosted the meeting of WEU foreign ministers that approved this undertaking in June 1992. The Petersberg tasks are humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including forcible separation of parties in conflict. 8. This mirrored NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative unveiled at the Washington summit six weeks earlier. 9. Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 81. 10. It is not the intent to elevate the EU to the status of a military superpower and rival to the United States. The implementation of the Helsinki Headline Goal would scarcely en-

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able the EU to mount a Bosnia- or Kosovo-type operation, let alone more ambitious missions. That said, ESDP could over time evolve into something more than is currently envisaged. Indeed, there are those who see Helsinki as but the first step on the road to a purely European collective defense arrangement. See Emile Blanc and Michel Fennebresque, "La Defense europeenne apres le conseil europeen de Nice," Defense Nationale (February 2001). 11. Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 1. 12. The most notable was the Carter administration's unilateral abandonment of the neutron bomb in 1978 (after having strong-armed the government of Helmut Schmidt into accepting what critics in the ruling SPD government had characterized as a "capitalist weapon" since it destroyed people but not property). The Reagan administration had ridden to office on a platform of "dump detente," an approach to East-West relations that had underlain alliance policy since the 1967 Harmel Report. Furthermore, the early rounds of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) left the impression that Washington was not seriously committed to arms control and disarmament. 13. Initially there was little sympathy or understanding that Canada might wish to participate in WEU-led operations. Despite the fact that Canada had been involved in Balkans peacekeeping efforts from the outset, first as a participant in the EC's monitoring mission and later in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), it proved difficult to persuade European allies that "the North American allies" would not necessarily take identical decisions on participation in particular crisis management operations. This view may well have been colored by the concern that permitting a non-European ally to participate would somehow cloud the distinctive European character of the project. All resistance ceased, however, when Canada was invited by France, the UK, and the United States to lead what proved to be an abortive UN mission to the Great Lakes district of Zaire in November 1996. (Consideration had been given to having the WEU mount the operation, but this failed because of the inability to secure consensus among its membership.) An exchange of letters between Canada and the WEU presidencies (Belgium and France) confirmed WEU acknowledgment of Canada's position, which was subsequently reflected in both WEU and NATO communiques. 14. As Isabelle Francois has pointed out, there was never any question of a reintegration of French forces with NATO. Paris saw rapprochement as a means of promoting NATO reform to the benefit of ESDI. Isabelle Francois, La France et L'Otan, Note de Recherche no. 96/02 (Direction de 1'Analyse Strategique, Groupe de la Politique et des Communications, Ministere de la Defense Nationale du Canada, April 1996). 15. ESDI was initially seen in NATO circles largely as a technical fix. It thus lives on in the form of what are called Berlin plus measures (assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities, presumption of availability to the EU of preidentified NATO assets and capabilities, etc.) set out in para. 10 of the Washington Summit Communique. As such, ESDI has neither been replaced nor superseded by ESDP. Rather, it has become its handmaiden. See Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 26-27. 16. Art. 17-1, para. 2. Prime Minister Blair had, in line with traditional UK policy, vetoed a proposal for a phased merger of the WEU with the EU. Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 25. 17. Heisbourg, European Defense, 5. 18. European leaders' sense of pending humiliation was no doubt exacerbated by recollections of Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques Poos' assertion, on launching the ill-fated

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European Community mission to mediate in the Balkans in 1991, that "[t]his is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans." 19. Howorth argues that the possibility of a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe has been persistent theme throughout the life of Alliance. Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 10. Certainly the U.S. Congress was extremely reluctant in 1948 to provide European states a peacetime security guarantee (see Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance," 3), and there have been persistent demands over the past twenty-five years that Europe shoulder a greater share of the burden of their own defense. But scenarios posited by ESDP enthusiasts that envisage a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe if European allies do not pull up their socks seem farfetched and to a certain degree self-serving. For one, as President Bush's February 13, 2001, Norfolk speech attests, the new administration is keen to maintain allied support for its foreign policy. Furthermore, U.S. bases in Western Europe provide important staging points for operations in the Middle East. Indeed, the head of U.S. European Command, General Joe Ralston (who also occupies the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe [SACEUR]), is reported to be looking to shift some U.S. forces from Germany to Italy to meet more far-flung missions in the Balkans, Middle East, and Africa. Defense News, April 2, 2001, 2. 20. Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 26. 21. "Transatlantic link" is, for most commentators, shorthand for the role of the United States in European defense and security matters. Scarcely anywhere, outside of NATO communiques (and articles by Canadian authors) it seems, is Canada's position acknowledged let alone addressed. 22. Daily Telegraph, November 22, 2000. 23. See www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2000/s20001010-secdef.html. 24. Andreani et al. ascribe Cohen's remarks to an offhand comment by French defense minister Alain Richard to the effect that the EU would, at some unspecified future date, need to acquire its own operational planning staff. As this was "a long way from French policy," Richard's comment was "not of immediate relevance," the implication being that Cohen overreacted Andreani, Bertram, and Grant, Europe's Military Revolution, 27. This is at best a misreading of the situation. While the Nice Presidency Report, issued December 7, does indeed foresee the EU drawing on NATO operational planning capabilities, its issuance was preceded by two days of intense negotiations due to UK foreign minister Robin Cook's rejection of an initial French draft on the grounds that it contained elements that went well beyond what had been agreed. It has never been made clear what the UK found objectionable, although judging from press reports it concerned a proposal on "enhanced cooperation" in defense among self-selected EU states, and ambiguities on NATO-EU relations. Given President Chirac's reference on December 7 to EU planning taking place "independently" from NATO (which Andreani et al. pass off as merely a slip of the tongue; ibid., 28), which followed by a few days a call by European Commission president Romano Prodi for a European army, one may assume that the rejected French draft carried the concept of EU "autonomy" much further than earlier documents had envisaged. This, coupled with the perception that the UK's growing enthusiasm for the European dimension of ESDP, and the growing "impenetrability" of the EU (see excerpts of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright's interview with the International Herald Tribune, January 13 and 15, 2001), raised legitimate concerns among non-EU allies, not just the United States, that the alliance risked being elbowed aside. The misleading assertion by Andreani et al. that "Americans approved the EU documents on NATO-EU relations when NATO defense ministers met on December 15" reinforces the impression that the authors are misinformed. First of all, it was NATO foreign ministers who welcomed the

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EU proposals on December 15 (the meeting of defense ministers having taken place ten days earlier). In their communique, the foreign ministers described the EU proposals as a basis for agreement, not an agreement itself. Despite continued French insistence that the matter was settled at Nice, that agreement remains to be negotiated. 25. See former deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's October 1999 speech to the Royal United Services Institute in London: "We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but could eventually compete with NATO." This and other relevant documents and speeches can be found in "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defense: Core Documents," Compiled by Maartje Rutten, Chaillot Paper no. 47 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, May 2001). 26. See Foreign Minister John Manley's address to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, December 14, and his predecessor Lloyd Axworthy's address to the North Atlantic Council, Florence, May 24,2000, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca. See also Minister of National Defense Art Eggleton's addresses to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 3, 2001, and to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, Paris, December 7, 2000, www.dnd.ca. 27. See German chancellor Gerhard Schroder's Partners for the New Millennium: The United States, Europe, and Germany, http://eng.bundesregierung, issued January 19,2001, on the eve of President Bush's inauguration. At a high-level conference that same weekend, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said: "We need a strong U.S. role [in Europe]. The United States helps balance the internal contradictions within European interests. I'm convinced the United States plays a very important role for us." International Herald Tribune, January 22, 2001. More recently, Karsten Voigt, German Foreign Ministry coordinator for German-American cooperation, stated in an April 5, 2001, speech in Boston that the United States has to remain a European power in order to provide a safeguard against the resurgence of rivalries (see http://bundesregierung.de/frameset/index.jsp). Jolyon Howorth has pointed out that the smaller EU member states such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal are reluctant to trade U.S. leadership on security and defense for British, French, or German leadership. The number of states sharing that sentiment can be expected to grow as the EU expands eastward. Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 47. 28. European forces have proven to be more effective peacekeepers than their U.S. counterparts, whose preoccupation with self-protection has severely limited their ability to mount countryside patrols. The consequence of this was evident in the recent flare-up in Macedonia due to the infiltration by Albanian insurgents who were able to move almost at will through the U.S. sector in Kosovo that borders Macedonia. 29. This is due in large part to congressional influence on foreign policy, which has been on the rise since the 1970s. As former Canadian ambassador to Washington Allan Gotlieb has pointed out a propos a quite different issue, the U.S. Congress is "the world's most powerful, unpredictable and undisciplined legislative body." National Post, April 8, 2001. 30. David Yost cites unidentified French and British observers as suggesting that, on their own, Europeans would have mounted a traditional campaign, air-to-air combat missions, low-level air-to-ground strike operations, and possibly a ground force intervention to create a safe-haven enclave for fleeing refugees. The operation would probably been prolonged and losses would have been incurred both in aircraft and in personnel, but this would have been politically acceptable. David Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," Survival 42, no. 4 (winter 2000/2001): 109. 31. See Julian Lindley-French, Leading Alone or Acting Together? The Transatlantic Security Agenda for the Next U.S. Presidency, Occasional Paper no. 20 (Paris: Institute for

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Security Studies, Western European Union, September 2000), 3. The author suggests that this is largely the result of domestic pressures and interests, particularly from the U.S. Congress. French chief of defense General Jean-Pierre Kelche, while avoiding direct comment on U.S. conduct of the Kosovo campaign, has in a recent article dismissed crisis management strategies that promote early escalation to violent countermeasures. "Vers une force europeenne de reaction rapide," Defense Nationale (February 2001): 8. James P. Thomas, a senior U.S. Department of Defense official, has noted that "since the 1970s the U.S. officer corps has rejected graduated military campaigns in favour of the early and overwhelming use of force. Emerging concepts are also placing greater weight on minimizing U.S. casualties by attacking at stand-off range, suppressing enemy air defenses, and defending against chemical and biological weapons, missiles and mines." James P. Thomas, The Military Challenge of Transatlantic Coalitions, Adelphi Paper no. 333 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000), 49. 32. "The capabilities-gap concept too often reflects an unexamined American assumption that U.S. forces and concepts of operations represent the sole standard of excellence." Yost, "NATO Capabilities," 108-109. Yost cites an unnamed British expert as observing that the capability gap is "irrelevant if the Europeans can deal on a reasonable basis with the threats at hand and conduct any necessary interventions." In other words, interoperability challenges posed by increasing U.S. reliance on hi-tech solutions could lead to even greater EU "autonomy." 33. See President Bush's remarks to the troops and personnel of the Norfolk Naval Air Station, February 13, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news. 34. As Andreani et al. put it, the debate in the United States pits those who want to spend more on defense against those who want to spend a lot more on defense. Andreani, Bertram, and Grant, Europe's Military Revolution, 55. 35. Lindley-French, Leading Alone or Acting Together? 3. 36. See Senate Confirmation Hearings: Rumsfeld, January 11, 2001, and Powell, January 17,2001. 37. Alexander Moens has captured the attitude of both enthusiasts and skeptics in two brief sentences: "the uncertainty of European's current efforts is matched by the likelihood of its long-term success, not because all the pieces fit logically, but because it is driven by a deep stream of European identity and political manifest destiny. In the best European tradition, they will go on, making haste slowly." Alexander Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force: The Politics of Sequencing, Autonomy and Ready Access," International Journal 55, no. 2 (spring 2000): 246-269. 38. It has been a remarkable achievement indeed, especially when one notes that among the fifteen EU member states are four formerly staunch neutrals, Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden. While the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, with its strong collective defense provision, was not transferred from the WEU to the EU, the complex intermingling of institutional obligations will have the effect of extending security guarantees to all EU member states including, following enlargement, to such countries as Estonia. 39. Yost, "NATO Capabilities Gap," 117. On the other hand, Andreani et al. claim that the Headline Goal is ambitious. Andreani, Bertram, and Grant, Europe's Military Revolution, 23. The divergence of view seems to depend on whether one factors in the two qualifying phrases "deploy within 60 days" and "sustain for one year," the two Helsinki objectives the EU will clearly not meet by 2003. 40. "Member states have ... decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport." Presidency Progress

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Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense, Annexes 1-4. The report also welcomes decisions announced by member states to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means, reinforce rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces, establish a European transport command, and enhance strategic lift capacity. 41. See Thomas, Military Challenge, 36, 52. 42. See Lionel Jospin, "La Politique de defense de la France," Defense Nationale (November 2000): 16. On April 5, 2001, EU ministers gave approval to the Galileo global positioning satellite navigation system, which has both civilian and military applications. Commission president Romano Prodi is reported to have said that "Galileo allows Europe to achieve self-sufficiency in the field of navigation, whatever the use: civilian, military, or scientific." Daily Telegraph, April 6, 2001. 43. See McGinn and Liston, "Beyond the Rhetoric and Acronyms," 84. The EU is looking to the Airbus A400M to provide strategic lift, a key component of any Rapid Reaction Force. Seven EU countries (plus Turkey) have indicated their intention of acquiring a total of 225 aircraft. Production is scheduled to begin by the end of 2001, with first deliveries being made in 2008. Given the history of the A400M project, which has experienced many delays, plus the fact that cash-strapped Germany, which plans to purchase 73 aircraft, has not yet budgeted for them, there seems every likelihood that deliveries will be delayed to the end of the decade or beyond. As for C3I, David Yost believes a distinct EU capability will prove simply too costly and potentially divisive. Yost, "NATO Capabilities Gap," 114. 44. As Heisbourg et al. point out, European companies and governments countries have a long way to go before they (1) will be in a position to "compete and cooperate with the American defense industry in both the U.S. and European market places," and (2) are able to extract from their own defense industries "the best value for money in terms of military equipment overall." Heisbourg, European Defense, 102. While greater cooperation and collaboration raises the specter of "Fortress Europe" in defense procurement, Christophe Cornu makes clear that the first challenge will be overcoming highly inefficient national "citadels." See Gordon Adams, Christophe Cornu, and Andrew D. James, Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defense Market, Chaillot Paper no. 44 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, January 2001), chap. 2. Nevertheless, small steps are being taken to rationalize and bolster the European defense research and technology base, the most recent being a memorandum of understanding signed in mid-May to facilitate cross-border funding, which would make it easier for defense industries to pool resources for specific projects. 45. See Defense News, February 19, 2001. That said, the context in which the head of the Delegation Generate pour' 1'Armament, Jean-Yves Helmer, gave assurance was a contract for a satellite communications system that went to the French company Alcatel Space over the Anglo-German company Astrium. There is also the suggestion that French openness may not extend beyond the shores of Europe. 46. Most U.S. commentators are skeptical that force reductions and streamlining will free up the required funds for modernization. David Yost points to a particularly serious challenge to defense budgets after 2005, when an aging European population will place increasing demands on national health services, thereby aggravating competition for government funds. Yost, "NATO Capabilities Gap," 120-121. Francois Heisbourg agrees that "the current state of input makes it impossible to reach the headline target in a meaningful way." He proposes that the EU establish a set of "convergence criteria" such as were used in the past to achieve harmonization of national trade and monetary policies, specifi-

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cally, defense spending as a percentage of GDP and research and development, acquisition, and operations and maintenance as a percentage of overall defense expenditures. He notes that currently, EU countries' outlays for the latter are 37 percent of the total defense expenditures of member states compared with 72 percent for the United States. Heisbourg, European Defense, 93. 47. McGinn and Liston, "Beyond the Rhetoric and Acronyms," 79. 48. See Heisbourg, European Defense, 74-77. Similar joint units have been formed with partner countries, for example the Polish-Ukrainian battalion, the Polish-Lithuanian battalion, the Hungarian/Slovenian/Italian battalion, and the Romanian-Hungarian battalion. The Baltic states have combined to form a joint land and naval forces, BALTBAT and BALTRON respectively. 49. Cohen cautioned, at a press conference following the December 5, 2000, meeting of NATO defense ministers, against abuse of the consensus rule: "we have to be careful that we don't have a situation where NATO members who are not EU members are precluded from participating in some decisions because the EU has not made a decision. Then the EU makes a decision, and NATO members are told that they cannot reverse an EU decision." Department of Defense news briefing, www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi. 50. See Francois Heisbourg, "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity," Survival 42, no. 2 (summer 2000): 5-15. As John Vinocur has recently pointed out, each of the three leading European powers, Britain, France, and Germany, have their own motivations in moving ahead on ESDP, which carry with them the potential for contradiction. International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2001. 51. As Andreani et al. observe, "It is an enormous challenge to graft a defense culture and a military decisionmaking structure onto the existing European Union." Andreani, Bertram, and Grant, Europe's Military Revolution, 39. They go on to describe an administrative setup that Byzantium would find impressive. At the heart of the problem is the split within the EU between the CFSP, which is intergovernmental—that is, requiring the concurrence of all fifteen member states—and the foreign policy aspects of normal communitaire EU business such as trade, aid, humanitarian assistance, technical cooperation, and borders. The result is incoherence, inconsistency, and a decisionmaking process that is one of the most confused in the entire EU system. See also Anne Deighton, Militarising the European Union (Montreal: Centre d'Etudes de Politiques Etrangeres et de Securite, Universite du Quebec a Montreal, September, 2000). 52. They are the Baltic republics, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The tenth, Slovenia, has every incentive to see the influence of the European powers balanced by that of the United States. The other two candidates are Cyprus and Malta. 53. It has frequently been observed, only partly in jest, that Canada never encountered an international organization that it did not want to join. As John Holmes noted in the context of postwar reconstruction: "Whenever there was talk of an international organization, Canadians were determined to get their rightful place on it." This was due in part to ensure protection of Canada's interests but also as a means of escaping "the dilemmas of excessive bilateralism," which, in the case of postwar relations with Great Britain and the United States, risked "forc[ing] Canada into closer integration with one country at the expense of our relations with the other states." John Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 28, 30. 54. Neil MacFarlane argues that increasing U.S. unilateralism in continental defense makes the transatlantic connection even more important to Canada. Neil MacFarlane, "Canada and the 'European Pillar' of Defense," in What NATO for Canada? ed. Haglund, 53.

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55. "In economics, as well as in security and diplomacy, multilateralism was seen {by Canadian authorities} as a counterweight to bilateralism." Holmes, Shaping of Peace, vol. 1, 180. 56. See MacFarlane, "Canada and the 'European Pillar,'" 65-66. 57. Joel Sokolsky argues that NATO's assumption of a collective security mission in Europe provides the Canadian Forces with "a politically compelling case for the retention of an overseas combat expeditionary capability" without which it would not be possible to go anywhere "with Uncle Sam." See Joel Sokolsky, "Over There with Uncle Sam," in What NATO for Canada? ed. Haglund, 26. 58. Andreani et al. argue that the optics of autonomy are as important as the military capabilities—that indeed achieving the latter will depend on the former. Andreani, Bertram, and Grant, Europe's Military Revolution, 11. 59. Transatlantic Relations and European Security and Defense Identity, www.dnd.ca/eng/min/speeches/index.htm. 60. A close working relationship would also obviate the need for a formal NATO "right of first refusal" by allowing a consensus on an EU-led operation to "emerge" from the consultative process. Alexander Moens has correctly noted that a sequencing process, whereby an EU decision to mount an operation could only be taken following a NATO decision not to take the lead, would be unacceptable to the EU as it would imply a "vertical relationship" with NATO at the top. Moens, "Developing a European Intervention Force," 268-269. His subsequent proposal that the decisions of the two organization be "synchronized" moves the issue in the right direction. Alexander Moens, "NATO and ESDP: The Need for a Political Agreement," Canadian Military Journal Vol 1., No. 4 (winter 2000/2001): 59-68. However, the suggestion that an "explicit NATO decision [would be required] even when NATO as a whole does not want to be involved" does not really get around the problem. On the other hand, the frequent and close consultative arrangement promoted by Canada would allow for a simultaneous announcement by the EU that it was mounting an autonomous operation and NATO agreement in principle to provide required support. 61. Haglund, "Canada and the Atlantic Alliance," 3. See also David G. Haglund, The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End, Contemporary Affairs no. 4 (Toronto: CIIA/Irwin, 2000), 56-58. It was not just a matter of behindthe-scenes diplomacy. As James Reston noted in the New York Times, Canada's presence in NATO turned the whole affair from an "aid to Europe" scheme into an Atlantic Community. Robert Spencer, Canada in World Affairs, 1946-1949 (Toronto: Oxford University Press Publisher, 1959), 263. 62. Movement in that direction was reflected in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Initiative proposed by the United States and introduced at the Washington summit (Washington Summit Communique, April 24, 1999, para. 31) that called for the establishment of a WMD Center within NATO. The initiative was intended to "ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them." The initiative has so far failed to live up to its promise, largely, one suspects, because it was seen by many, as an attempt to secure allied support for U.S. policies on "rogue-state" threats.

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CHAPTER 7

Is Canada a European Country? Julian Lindley-French In many ways, Canada's world outlook is far closer to that of a European country than its large neighbor to the south. Canada has certainly earned the right to be seen as a good European. The now peaceful battlefields of Western Europe are graced by the sacrifice of Canadians of two generations who gave their lives in the struggle against tyranny and criminal totalitarianism. The One Hundred Days, Ypres, Vimy Ridge, Paschendael, Dieppe, Monte Cassino, and the Normandy beaches read like a lexicon of honor that few countries could match. Even today, Europe, and indeed the world, is adorned by a forest of maple leaves that represent an enduring Canadian security presence committed to the search for peace and security that binds us all as allies. Sadly, time moves on and as those great Canadians who came and fought alongside their European comrades in arms enjoy the fruits of their retirements and remember those of their friends who did not return, Europe is stirring again. However, this is a very different Europe. This is a new Europe that has picked itself up from the ashes of its own destruction to construct the largest economy on the face of the planet. This is a new Europe that those great Canadians would not have dreamed possible fifty-six short years ago. Now, safe in its economic prosperity, the expression of that reconstruction, the European Union (EU), is looking to conquer new ground. Through the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), Europe is enshrining the vital roles of peacekeeping and peacemaking that not only anchor Canadian defense policy, but also that highlight a profound difference with a United States that finds such engagement both painful and complex. So often, Europeans and Canadians are lectured by the United States about "their" responsibilities. So often, they are reminded by the United States that it spends so much more on its armed forces than either Europeans or Canadians and that tens of thousands of more dollars are invested in each American soldier compared with their Canadian and European partners. And yet it is Canadians and Europeans who patrol the streets of Sierra Leone and Cyprus. It is Canadians and Europeans who engage the peoples of Kosovo or Bosnia while their American counterparts hunker down in their fortified barracks and while thousands of their comrades patrol the streets of Fort Leavenworth. When it comes to sharing burdens, Canada has always put itself in the front line.

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Canadians and Europeans are, therefore, natural allies who should enjoy a relationship fashioned on the shared experience of the past and reinforced by a profound and shared commitment to the present. And yet the relationship is tense. Canadians feel marginalized by the great project being painstakingly and often painfully constructed under the banner of European defense. Canadians feel uneasy about the impact such endeavors will have upon the alliance that has so successfully served Canadian and European interests for so long—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canadians wonder what say they will have in the shaping of a European defense in which Canada has every right to a voice, but seemingly little influence. Concerns that are reinforced when they hear Britain call for Germany and Japan to be given permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC), which will further marginalize not only Canada but also the role and importance of the Group of Eight (G-8), which is such a strong platform for Canada and in which Canada's voice has so often been that of reason. And Canada asks why. The core theme of this chapter is that Canada's position is stronger than a cursory glance would suggest. That is the good news. The bad news is that if Canada really does want to play the role it apparently aspires to, then it will have to invest a lot more in its security effort. Moreover, Canadians and Europeans are bound by a common strategic perception and a recognition that influencing Washington is one of the most important goals of Euro-Canadian foreign and security policy. Europe's markedly superior economic and political power is offset, to a significant extent, by Canada's proximity to the United States and the unique relationship it enjoys with the world's only superpower. However, Canadian influence with both its American and European partners is fundamentally undermined by the lack of investment it makes in its armed forces and the relatively poor quality from which they suffer. THAT WAS THEN AND THIS IS NOW

Europe is moving on and that is nowhere more evident than in the development of European defense. The lessons of history have not been forgotten. Indeed, they are the foundation upon which the European process has been constructed, but that was then and this is now. In a range of complex ways, Europe is ever more like the United States. Self-obsessed, convinced of its destiny in a strange and yet fractured kind of way, and yet ever more conscious of a form of moral exceptionalism that hitherto Americans have claimed as their own defining badge of distinction. Behind that drive toward a new Europe there are also older and more recognizable forces at work that reinforce the development of European defense and that help to marginalize Canada and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Most of them beyond the control of Ottawa, but not a few that lie within its writ. It is necessary from the outset to consider European defense and what drives it. Indeed, there are four main political dynamics that drive the ESDP process and that underline the nature of contemporary transatlantic relations and highlight the divergence and diversity therein. First, the external security environment, and the

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perception of common threats that during the Cold War were so natural and compelling and yet that today seem so complex and contested. Second, the process of European integration itself, which seems so labyrinthine, Byzantine, and incomplete and yet which gives the European Union both purpose and momentum. Third, there is the United States. The world has never known a power like it, and so much effort is necessarily exercised to influence the world's hegemon. Finally, that quintessential metaphor of the transatlantic relationship, NATO is itself changing, buffeted by forces internal and external, by a world that seems to change more rapidly than it does. This, at a time when the United States seeks leadership without responsibility, while the Europeans claim responsibility without the ability to lead. A THREATENING ENVIRONMENT? Today, Americans and Europeans do not even perceive the same threats. Divergence driven by the respective positions of partners that are very different, be it in terms of power or location. Structurally, this places Canada in a difficult position. The very power of the United States makes it uniquely powerful and yet it feels uniquely vulnerable and its very vulnerability (or at least sense of it) drives it to dominate.1 Europe's very complexity makes it, by and large, indifferent to defense matters, obscured by a legacy of internal political machinations from which it is only just emerging. Canada could (and to some extent does) free-ride on U.S. power. Living so close to a superpower leaves one with little option. However, Canadians, like Europeans, also appear uneasy with an obsession with absolute security that drives the Americans toward grand solutions, such as missile defense, and that competes so aggressively with European and Canadian history. This shared history suggests that such security can only ever be achieved through systemic domination, and that is intrinsically dangerous, previous attempts having always ended in tears. The flip side of this American obsession with invulnerability and the chimera of hegemonic absolute security is reinforced by a political culture that regards security as a zero-sum game in which one either has security or one does not.2 Certainly, it is an aspect of American political culture that many Canadians and Europeans find mystifying, particularly when it is reinforced by a United States so powerful externally and yet so focused internally. The United States tends to export domestic policy, rather then construct classical foreign policy. Possibly, unilateralism is a wake-up call for Europeans of which Canadians, living as they do on the other side of the world's longest undefended border, have long been painfully aware. One thing is clear, there are few neutrals in Washington's eyes. One is either America's friend or America's enemy, and there is little room in between. The bottom line for any Western power is to be on the right side of that basic and defining divide in contemporary international relations.3 That said, the European concept, dare one say "culture," of security is slowly evolving into a markedly different form in which Canada seems closer to Europe than the United States. First, Europeans are used to living with vulnerability; it is an essential and unavoidable part of Europe's existence. While Canadians might

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not suffer from that particular neurosis, as living next to a giant who is equally neurotic on occasions has a tendency to reinforce a sense of the limits of one's power. The limits of maneuver being always defined by another. Second, the assessment of threats and risks by Europeans is less categorical and definitive because the degree to which Europe or Canada can influence outcomes is markedly inferior to that of the United States. That might change in time as Europe develops strength in its own muscle and convictions, but for now Europeans, by and large, prefer to emphasize the economic and the political, whereas the United States seems ever more willing to consider the use of force early in the crisis cycle (even if it is not American troops who find themselves doing the dirty work on the ground). The days of speaking softly with a big stick seem to have been replaced with talking loudly with a very big stick. Thus, Canadians and Europeans seem to find it much easier to accept that security management is a constant process of managing uncertainties, of dealing in shades of grey, that makes the pursuit of absolutes not only self-defeating, but dangerous. LIVING WITH MISSILE PRETENSE The United States, therefore, brings Europe and Canada together. The shared vested interest in influencing U.S. policy is nowhere more evident than over missile defense. Certainly, missile defense should not be dismissed as an overreaction by an overzealous unilateralist because Americans and Europeans are thinking in different time scales and see different worlds, and strategic uncertainty is such that the United States (or at least the Republican part of it) might turn out to be right. Certainly, nonproliferation is failing and could well progressively fail, and it seems entirely appropriate that Americans, Canadians, and Europeans should start to think about how to manage a world in which potentially no one is safe from anyone, anytime, anywhere. However, consensus is built on shared knowledge and a recognition that where one stands depends upon where one sits and Canadians and Europeans simply do not know what, as yet, they are being asked to agree to. Prime Minister Jean Chretien was undoubtedly correct when he said that until the Americans have a clearer view about precisely what it is they are trying to achieve, it is impossible to have a real debate. At the same time, there are at least some concerns that can be aired. Where many Europeans and Canadians take issue with the Americans is over the dangerously self-fulfilling nature of a program that, if not carefully managed (and "care" is not something that one associates much with U.S. foreign and security policy these days) could trigger the very scenario that it seeks to prevent—runaway proliferation. Indeed, the threat scenarios now routinely trotted out by senior figures in the George W. Bush administration to justify missile defense remain, at best, difficult to take that seriously, and at worst, downright unconvincing for a system that could cost between $6 billion to $10 billion per year over the next several years. Indeed, it is the suspicion about motives that concerns many Europeans and Canadians, because missile defense appears to be as much about money on Capitol Hill and a

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technological imperative, as it is about providing real security for Americans. Clearly, it would be useful if Canada and Europe spoke with one voice when dealing with Washington on this issue, because if any group is going to influence the Americans, it is the NATO allies speaking as one. It would be useful, therefore, if criteria could be agreed upon by Canadians and Europeans. These could include basing any final architecture on an alliance-wide threat assessment if "national missile defense" has truly become "missile defense." Indeed, if strategic uncertainty warrants such a system, then let the punishment fit the crime. There is no reason to vilify any power or powers to justify such an approach. NATO would of course provide the proper setting for extensive and meaningful consultations, and that could also encourage the United States to reinvest a significant part of its defense effort in the alliance, something that both Canadians and Europeans would welcome, and something that has been in marked decline over recent years. Another area of Canadian-European agreement could be to ensure that there be no participation without protection. This is particularly important for Canada, Denmark, and the UK, which could see their security diminished by providing basing for key components of the system that, in effect, made them "soft" targets. Canada, given the close relationship between NORAD and the Canadian armed forces, could help to drive home this point. An explicit agreement with the allies over any proposed architecture would need to be a very transparent transatlantic commitment to renovating arms control in what is now a complex multilateral environment. Again, Canadian-European solidarity could go a long way to modifying any U.S. stance that the allies feared was strategically destabilizing. There should be no weaponization of space without allied approval. Sensors yes, but no space-based lasers or other weapons without the case for them being categorically and extensively proven by the United States. That said, one must be under no illusions. Recently, the acronym AMD (allied missile defense) emerged from Washington as part of the recent charm offensive for missile defense. Many Canadians and Europeans were bemused by its meaning. Hopefully, with sufficient combined effort Canadians and Europeans can ensure that the A stands for "allied"—and not "afterthought"! SLEEPING WITH A GIANT, CONSORTING WITH ANOTHER

Missile defense is but one example, albeit an important one, of the dilemma that Canadians and Europeans face in dealing with the United States. In a vaguely Machiavellian way, Canadians and Europeans, if they shared none of the many other values that they share, would be bound by a common interest in this regard. Even the European Security and Defense Policy is, to an extent, partly a reaction to U.S. policy. The United States is making choices about its foreign and security policy based on a range of factors that, while not in themselves wrong, are markedly different from its European allies, and it will be the ability of the allies to bridge that difference that will determine the future of NATO. Canada and the UK, in particular, will be pivotal players in this regard.

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The renewed U.S. emphasis on bilateral arrangements, for example, in its dealings with Russia and the linkage of missile defense and offensive nuclear weapons reinforces the importance of a coordinated Euro-Canadian voice in dealing with the United States in matters security and defense. The sudden change in the position of the United States at the G-8 summit appeared ill coordinated with its EuroCanadian allies. Furthermore, there is a genuine difference in perception emerging in the culture of security between Europeans and Americans that is reflected in the relative power enjoyed by the foreign and defense ministries on the two sides of the Atlantic. In the United States the Pentagon (and its supporters) tend to have far more influence over foreign and security policy than the State Department. As a result, the United States has a tendency to overmilitarize foreign and security policy. Canadians and Europeans, on the other hand, suffer from a reverse problem. Foreign ministries (or rather treasuries) tend to enjoy far more influence over defense ministries. Canada and Europe, therefore, tend to overcivilianize foreign and security policy. The United States has always had a sense of its own "moral exceptionalism" and it is noticeable how, over the past ten years, this has been reinforced with a sense of "military exceptionalism," which has accelerated the pace of divergence. Canada is a North American country with a European security culture and it is this unique position that can reinforce the role and position of Canada as a transatlantic bridge and interlocutor. The nature and extent of the strategic-technical divergence currently under way between the United States and its Canadian and European allies underlines the importance of such a role. The drive toward a revolution in military affairs (RMA) style of technological solutions to U.S. doctrinal dilemmas often gives the impression that the Americans are locked in an arms race with themselves in pursuit of a critical military advantage over all-comers that runs counter to Canadian and European historical experience. This effort is being given ever more urgency by the rhetoric of the Bush administration. If the alliance becomes a tool of a U.S. bid to establish global military dominance, as opposed to a means for the expression of legitimate shared security interests and concerns, the allies will become rightfully fractious. That is not to say that RMA technologies cannot play some role in Canadian and European defense postures, but there are other assets and capabilities that are needed first. As Elinor Sloan, a defense analyst with the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at Canada's National Defense Headquarters, points out: "To date Canada and European members of NATO have made little progress towards equipping their militaries with the means of moving their armies swiftly into place by air and sea."4 It is about time they did. As indicated earlier, the scope and extent of divergence is further reinforced by the links between the U.S. military, Congress, and the defense industrial giants, which lend an unwelcome element of intrigue to the whole process that sometimes seems more redolent of first-century Rome than twenty-first-century North America.5 Defense industrial giants certainly need no encouragement to convince the Hill that their latest bit of gadgetry will not only save the lives of Americans, but

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guarantee U.S. preeminence and, by the way, ensure jobs in congressional districts. Too often the threat Americans perceive seems linked more to the size of defense contracts than the world around them, an aspect of U.S. policymaking that rightfully concerns Canadians and Europeans and that itself has been reinforced by the increased influence of these industrial giants over the Bush administration. This has been characterized by a move away from the Declaration of Principles back toward a very self-interested view of the defense market.6 Consequently, the United States seems not only to be preparing for a war that seems unlikely to happen for a very long time, but also appears by and large unconcerned about the views or interests of allies.7 And yet the United States seems unwilling to undertake the kind of missions that represent the stuff of modern security and that Canadians and Europeans find compelling—"muddy-boots" peacemaking and peacekeeping. This facet of the relationship, more than any attempt to build European defense, is an inherent threat to the cohesion of the alliance. How can there be a lead nation when it is all too often unwilling to lead when and where it matters? This inconsistency is reinforced by the absurdity of so many of the burden-sharing arguments emerging from Washington. Europeans have undertaken most of the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, including the dangerous missions designed to apprehend indicted war criminals. In recent years Europeans and Canadians have deployed in such far-flung places as East Timor and Sierra Leone, hardly "in-area" for NATO, and yet the United States, in the wake of the Somalia debacle, has been notable by its absence. In recent times, the British and French in particular have become the peacemaking "shock-troops" of peacekeeping. They go in, they stabilize the situation, and then they move on, leaving the rest of the job to other peacekeeping forces, which are rarely American. Indeed, it is widely recognized that U.S. forces are not good peacekeepers, making that glib throwaway U.S. military line about peacekeeping being a subset of warfighting ever more absurd. Canada is living proof of this, having lost ten members of the armed forces in the service of Canada and peace in the past year. Peacekeeping is a developed military task in its own right, something that binds Europeans and Canadians tightly in a common embrace of shared perception. Make no mistake, the implications of U.S. inaction will be profound because leadership of NATO by the United States is likely to be ceded progressively to the Europeans. Peacekeeping is what seems relevant to most Europeans and, by and large, it is what they can do and, more importantly, is what they can afford to do. This will become even more acute as the alliance expands. Here, Canada has a problem. While it is clear that Canada agrees with its European partners, it also needs to signal to the United States, both politically and militarily, that it sympathizes with enough of the U.S. perspective to warrant investment in at least some U.S.-type military solutions, thus stretching a very thin defense budget ever thinner. That is the dilemma of sleeping with a giant and consorting with another, an issue that will force Canada to make some tough choices.

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REFORGING AN ALLIANCE Canada's solution should be a reforged Atlantic alliance. However, these days the alliance itself seems fractured and dissolute and while such divergence might not represent a split per se, it certainly makes policy coordination increasingly complex within NATO. Gone is the defining feature that bound the transatlantic partners together in the Cold War, a clear and present danger commonly perceived that triggered a coordinated and determined response. Moreover, gone with it is any vestige of automaticity within an alliance rent, by a collective security debate that seems to champion divergence, rather than a collective defense response that emphasizes convergence. Equally, there is a mantra that is routinely trotted out in certain circles in the United States, Canada, not to mention the UK and elsewhere in Europe, that nothing must be done that can damage NATO. But what is there to preserve? The alliance remains essential for the unthinkable, but its effectiveness during Kosovo was questionable. It is essential, therefore, that a new transatlantic understanding is reached concerning the what, why, and how of NATO. Unfortunately, the accord reached at the Washington summit was not the understanding required, because it was more a "statute of limitations" on the obligations of each member country than a blueprint for an effective alliance. Certainly, NATO is not the tool that it should be for the coordination of transatlantic security policy. Force and operational planning is a white elephant unable to meet European planning needs with a Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) too dominated by U.S. officers and doctrine and with a simulation and exercise schedule that still overemphasizes Fulda Gap-type scenarios. It is the United States that insists that SHAPE remains the center of all Euro-Atlantic planning and yet ensured the planning for Kosovo took place in Washington precisely because of the problems that management of multinational coalitions create. Canada could play a strong role in persuading the United States that the NATO planning process is in need of urgent reform. If not, the Europeans will progressively "repatriate" planning within the EU, and that is not in Canada's interest. The United States cannot expect Europe to remain blindly faithful to an institution that is not working. If reform is not enacted, NATO will become simply a political metaphor. This danger is reinforced by the blocking of access to NATO assets for EU-led operations, the resolution of which Canada could again play a strong mediating role that emphasizes its position as a transatlantic bridge within the alliance. It is important to be clear that it is not just Turkey that will never give the EU-NATO members a carte blanche (and who can blame them?). Many so-called NATO assets are in fact American and unless there is a significant change of heart on the part of Congress it is difficult to see how Europe can be sanguine about assured access to key assets. Canada's backing for such a solution would be a welcome sign of Canadian moderation and leadership and reinforce Canada's own calls for a powerful say in the European defense process. Enlargement will fundamentally change the alliance. First, it will dilute Article 5. Second, it will effectively decouple the nuclear guarantee at the core of the al-

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liance from conventional capabilities. Some would say fine, but for the sake of alliance credibility it is important to face up to this changed reality. Certainly, the Baltic states are in an invidious position and must feel rather like Groucho Marx when he said that he would not wish to be a member of any club that would have him. Through no fault of their own, the NATO that these states wish to be part of will not be the NATO that they join, precisely because they are joining. Unfortunately, the enlargement debate has become progressively theological between Europeans and Americans, with EU and NATO enlargements often being used as weapons to weaken the position of the other. A calm and balanced Canadian voice committed to the preservation of balance between the two visions and that emphasizes both the limits and the possibilities of an enlarged NATO would pour welcome balm over an increasingly frenzied debate. Interoperability is becoming ever more difficult. There are four levels of military-technical capability in NATO today and two fundamental doctrinal paradigms: warfighting and peacekeeping.8 The United States, through the RMA, is vanishing off into the middle distance, the UK and France sit rather uncomfortably in the military-technical mid-Atlantic, the other continental West Europeans seem able only to act as force pools for basic peacekeeping in a permissive environment, whereas the new members can hardly do that. Canada could help to preserve that bridge by emphasizing to the United States the importance of peacekeeping/smallscale contingencies and promoting the development of technologies that can bind forces of varying capabilities, not divide them. Equally, NATO will never be a political organization in the way of the EU, something that the United States and Canada will have to accept. Europeans and Americans simply do not share the same level of intense economic and political interaction as Europeans and Europeans. Unfortunately, in the absence of a systemic challenger NATO becomes more like the EU, in which everything is negotiable and everything is conditional. In such a political environment a clear Canadian commitment to a NATO that does what it does well but is founded on political reality would not only strengthen the alliance itself, but strengthen Canada's position within the transatlantic relationship. A pragmatic Canadian blueprint for the future of NATO would exploit Canada's unique position in the transatlantic relationship and emphasize Canada's strengths rather than its weaknesses. UNDERSTANDING EUROPE Of course, underpinning all of Canada's concerns is the process of European integration that can seem to so many as a protracted exercise in self-obsessed, navel gazing that rejects the interests of old friends and allies. However slow and frustrating European integration might appear, it is a reality and it will continue. Indeed, for all its undoubted complexity the scale of the achievement is quite astounding. Europe is doing something that the United States would not even contemplate—the voluntary pooling of significant sovereignty in pursuit of a secure, stable, and prosperous

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Europe. Canada understands this because it has always had to compromise its security in pursuit of its security. It is a fact of life for a medium-sized country in Canada's position. Indeed, in many ways, sovereignty pooling is the quintessential act of burden sharing. Certainly, Canada could again provide an invaluable service through its unique relationship with the United States by helping the United States understand the nature of the process that is under way. There is a clear dichotomy between warfighting and peacemaking/peacekeeping that drives much of the ESDP process. The advantage of ESDP for many European countries is that it gives them the option of not having to achieve the kind of RMA bridging technologies implied in the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).9 They can focus their more limited resources on the more basic peacekeeping capabilities implied by the Headline Goal, that is, what they spend on EU collective security efforts will really make a contribution, whereas trying to close impossible gaps inside NATO will not. It also makes it more likely that these countries will feel more comfortable about benchmarking defense expenditure inside the EU, rather than inside NATO. But where does this leave Canada? In time, the European Union will become a major military security actor. It is already a major international civil security actor. At the same time, the EU is not NATO and ESDP is not about building military power per se. It is not, therefore, in itself a competitor to NATO. It could become so but for the time being ESDP must be seen as a complement to the overall efforts of the West to manage security and it is here that Canada can find its niche. ESDP is an alternative way of "doing" security, a form of "security subsidiarity" by which Europeans will act at the NATO level when necessary, the EU level where appropriate and the national level where possible. Coalitions will be the key.10 Political coalitions, diplomatic coalitions, and of course military coalitions, and such is the nature of modern crises that the institutional framework will matter less than what each willing and able partner brings to the table. It is in the interests of both Canada and Europe to ensure that such a necessarily flexible structure is efficient. A new NATO-EU Peace Enforcement Command would help ensure that peace support operations are backed by political and military credibility from the outset through a politically cohesive institutional framework that maximizes the opportunity for all allies to command and shape. CANADA'S ROCKY POLICY It is at this point that Canadian policy begins to unravel. Canada is under constant pressure to follow the American lead because of its proximity to the United States, and yet the way that Canada actually spends its own limited resources clearly shows as empathy with the Europeans. The Canadian dilemma is a more acute version of that of its European partners. A recent report by the Atlantic Council of the United States drew attention to the growing capabilities "gap" between the United States and Europe, a gap that has particular relevance for Canada because of the parlous state of Canadian defense expenditure. It states: "Governments

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with defense budgets under pressure are unlikely to fulfil all their obligations under the Defense Capabilities Initiative unless they perceive an imminent threat. European governments, in particular, will be tempted to concentrate on the 'lower end' capabilities required to meet the Headline Goal agreed at the Helsinki and Nice Meetings of the European Council."11 However, as indicated above, one of the reasons that Europeans have gone their own way is that DCI is implicitly linked to U.S. force structure and that, in turn, is linked to the U.S. threat perception with which neither Canadians nor Europeans agree. Europe is clearly in a far stronger position to develop an alternative set of priorities than Canada, and yet Canada wants to be a serious player. Thus Canada has a problem. Quite simply, Canadian defense policy suffers from an identity crisis—is it North American or European?12 The whole thesis of this chapter has been that Canada's approach to security and defense is similar to that of most European countries. At the same time, Canada tries to placate the United States by "talking the talk" about the need for interoperability, advanced communications, and how to make best use of RMA technologies. In his preface to the Department of National Defense 1999-2000 Report on Plans and Priorities, the Canadian minister of national defense, the Honorable Art Eggleton states: "Over the years ahead we will study the ramifications of the revolution in Military Affairs to ensure that we can keep pace with technological change. We will also ensure that we can maintain the capabilities required to deal with the emerging defense issues and asymmetric threats such as weapons of mass destruction."13 The plain fact is that Canada's defense budget and force structure suggests otherwise. Put simply, ambitions do not match resources. Indeed, a facet of Canadian defense activities is the development of a carefully honed domestic myth that Canada, through its peacekeeping, is a highly active player that punches above its weight to use that immortal phrase of a former British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd. On paper at least, Canada's efforts look impressive, with eighteen foreign missions and a presence in over forty countries. The reality is somewhat different. Canada, like most European countries, spends a lot of time worrying about how much of its very limited defense budget it can spend on the fancy stuff when most of the money goes on an ever increasing operational tempo of peace keeping operations, and worrying about retaining key personnel who are both overstretched and "over there" and seduced by an easier life beyond the colors. Thankfully, the days of the Program Review and the 23 percent cut in the Canadian defense budget are over, and with the recent modest increase of Can$175 million and the reform and restructuring programs it would appear that Canada is at least committed to stopping the rot. However, with defense expenditure around 1.2 percent of GDP it is difficult to see how Canada can play the role that this paper outlines.14 Indeed, according to the "NATO Review," of the NATO countries only Luxembourg at 0.7 percent of GDP spends a lower proportion of its national wealth on defense than Canada.15 This is simply not serious. Indeed, the degree of political influence, be it over the future of NATO, U.S. policy, or European defense, is and will be linked to a significant degree to the state of, and investment in, Canadian armed forces.

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It is worth recalling the wording of the 1999 defense report: "The most important and enduring priority for the Department [of National Defense] and the Canadian forces is ensuring the ongoing operational effectiveness of Canada's military capability."16 In effect, Canada has the same relationship with European defense as the Europeans have with U.S. defense policy. Unless Canada brings a critical mass of serious defense capabilities to the table, both the Americans and the Europeans will simply move on. There is no romance and little gratitude in this business. For Europeans, Vimy Ridge and Pachendael now belong to another century. To repeat, that was then and this is now. If Canada really wants to be a decision shaper in European defense, it will have to invest the same kind of levels that all Europeans will have to invest—a minimum of 2 percent of GDP per annum sustained for the foreseeable future because that is the nature of the security "market" in which Europeans and Canadians find themselves. If Europeans do not invest that level (as a minimum) across the full membership of the European Union, then European defense will not be taken seriously by the United States. If Canada does not invest that level (as a minimum), it will not be taken seriously by either Americans or Europeans and this will undermine all the other strategems that Canada undertakes, be they political or diplomatic. Furthermore, at Canada's level of expenditure, even if it can manage to increase its defense budget to around 2 percent of GDP, it will still have to emphasize certain priorities and drop certain others. That would, in addition to its links with the United States through NORAD, mean focusing on preparing a sizable Petersberg task force that can undertake rescue and humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and the role of combat troops in peacemaking.17 It would also mean the end of any attempt to produce a broad-based defense posture that included an Article 5 capability. Frankly, that is happening anyway with the result that Canadian attempts to give its armed forces a bit of everything but not much of anything, are doomed to failure. Thus Canadians and Europeans will have to make choices. In essence, Canada more than any other power needs the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and ESDP in the EU to work, and decision shaping within the EU to be just. Conversely, if Canadian defense expenditure goes any lower, given Canada's safe strategic position, it might as well spend the money on something else, such as education or healthcare, and gradually withdraw from an international role. That is not to say that Europeans do not need Canada. Canada's experience and expertise, its almost automatic ability to work with European forces, especially those of the UK, in coalitions of the willing and able, and the undoubted political legitimacy Canada endows upon any coalition are, to say the least, valuable assets. Canada must therefore redirect its resources in pursuit of two objectives: first, the maintenance of the link with NORAD; and second, provision of additional peacemaking and peacekeeping capabilities. There are no resources for a fullspectrum warfighting role. For example, it is a mystery why Canada needs four Upholder-class submarines, unless Canada intends to sink the U.S. Navy! Current Canadian policy is fundamentally flawed because Canada will only ever achieve a balanced force capable of full-spectrum warfighting (and all the things the Pen-

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tagon values) with a very large budget that would be well in excess of 2 percent and that Canadians will not want to spend. THE BEEF IN A EURO-ATLANTIC SANDWICH Contemporary transatlantic relations have fallen into a trap. Americans seem unwilling to "escalate" down to the level of Petersberg tasks/small-scale contingencies, but at the same time seem unwilling to admit as much. Whereas Europeans talk grandly about European defense but seem more interested in political autonomy than military efficiency, with the result that they can only escalate some way up the Petersberg task scale. Meanwhile, Canada drifts along on a national myth that it is the world's best peacekeeper and yet is unable to peacemake, peacekeep, or warfight effectively. No country can build a policy around a few "good chaps," as the British experience suggests. It is essential, therefore, that Canadians and Europeans commit themselves rapidly to an agenda for change that addresses these fundamental problems. This agenda will have five elements: • First and foremost (and to restate), a new NATO-EU Peace Enforcement Command to ensure that peace support operations are backed by political and military credibility from the outset through a politically cohesive institutional framework that maximizes the opportunity for all allies to command and shape. • A common set of criteria for the acceptance of the missile defense program. This will include an agreed methodology for assessing threats. • Commitment to a much moreflexibleplanning regime within the alliance that can cope with variable coalitions preparing for variable missions with NATO acting as an interoperability nexus.18 • Canadian help to persuade the United States that the creation of a force and operational planning capability within the EU for EU-led operations, that is compatible with a reformed NATO Defense Planning Process (DPP), would be in the interest of all the allies. • EU recognition that decision shaping should include inter alia the permanent presence of Canadian (and other, third-nation) staff officers on the EU Military Staff, particularly for planning functions. Such an agenda would not only help to refurbish the alliance but would also encourage the Europeans to generate capabilities in the areas of lift and logistics that are essential for sustaining peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, which remain at the core of Canadian and European policy. Such an approach would also reinforce Canada's unique bridging role in the transatlantic relationship and encourage Canada to reinvest in its security and defense capabilities. Indeed, as the Americans rightfully say, it is ultimately all about capabilities. What capabilities? Well, that's a question only Canadians and Europeans can resolve. Today the status quo ante is not an option and Canada must recognize that. Nostalgic calls for the preservation of an old NATO are frankly pointless. Ultimately,

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Canadians and Europeans need to be brave enough to recognize that the relationship requires fundamental renovation. A cold, hard look is needed at what works in the relationship and what does not, at both the political and military levels, safe in the knowledge that whatever is uncovered will not wreck the whole edifice. Is Canada a European country? That is for Canadians to decide, but it is a choice they had better make with some urgency.

NOTES 1. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice captured that curious mix of idealism and realism that is uniquely American in a concept on national interest that included the assurance of U.S. military might, the promotion of economic growth, and political openness, an emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, strong relationships with U.S. allies for the sharing of burdens, comprehensive relationships with China and Russia "that can and will mold the character of the international political system" (whither the EU?), and decisive treatment of rogue and hostile regimes that dabble in state-sponsored terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. For a fuller account, see Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000): 46-47. 2. This search for absolute security was given a moral angle by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: "No U.S. President can responsibly say that his defense policy is calculated and designed to leave the American people undefended against threats that are known to exist. And they are there, the threat. Let there be no doubt: a system of defense need not be perfect; but the American people must not be left completely defenseless. It is not so much a technical question as a matter of the President's constitutional responsibility. Indeed, it is, in many respects ... a moral issue." See "Rumsfeld Discusses U.S. Defense Policies," the text of a speech by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Munich Conference on European Security Policy, February 3, 2001. 3. It is worth recalling what is a very Republican definition of U.S. national interest made by William Kristol and Robert Kagan back in 1996. They wrote: "Today's international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony. The international financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve American interests. The international security structures are chiefly a collection of American-led alliances. ... [S]ince today's relatively benevolent international circumstances are the product of our hegemonic influence, any lessening of that influence will allow others to play a part in the shaping of the world to suit their needs. States such as China and Russia, if given the chance, would configure the system quite differently American hegemony, then, must be actively maintained, just as it was actively obtained." W. Pfaff, "The Question of Hegemony," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2001): 223. 4. Elinor Sloan, "Speeding Deployment," NATO Review (spring 2001): 33. 5. William Greider identifies both the influence and dilemma of the so-called Iron Triangle: "A hard, painful paradox lurks beneath all the facts ... the military-industrial complex is ... in a hole today in terms of costly, idle factories—despite the massive layoffs and the blizzard of corporate consolidations Yet, there's still too much of i t — By not facing this reality, the Pentagon is pushing the hardest questions off into the future. Eventually, this should set off explosive political arguments—whose factory must be finally closed?—and may even pit the Iron Triangle's three sides against each other." William Greider, Fortress America (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 91.

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6. In February 2000, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen and UK Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon signed a "Declaration of Principles for Defense Equipment and Industrial Cooperation." Gordon Adams writes: "The Defense Department had deliberately chosen to negotiate with the British because U.S.-UK relations most closely met what the Pentagon had laid out as 'five pillars of cooperation' which could lead to a licencefree relationship with another country—congruent and reciprocal industrial and security policies and procedures; congruent and reciprocal export control processes; excellent cooperative relationships in law enforcement; close cooperation in intelligence sharing on matters of counter-intelligence, economic espionage, and industrial security and export control violations; and willingness to enter into binding agreements establishing reciprocal access to each other's markets." Gordon Adams, "Fortress America in a Changing Transatlantic Defense Market," in Between Cooperation and Competition, ed. B. Schmitt (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2000), 40. 7. David Gompert, Richard Kugler, and Martin Libicki highlight this problem when they write: "The divergence will grow as the U.S. military begins to make technical decisions for future C4ISR networks that will allow its own forces to wage seamless joint warfare. With the need to support joint warfare already daunting, the United States is giving little attention to the challenge of facilitating European integration into these systems. Moreover, with the allies moving so slowly to create power projection forces and to utilize advanced information technology, why should the United States slow down or alter its own crucial integration efforts?" David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), 14. 8. In Strengthening Transatlantic Security, the Department of Defense framed NATO's role: "To be an effective military alliance, NATO must fulfil certain key functions. Specifically, it must understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts. This will remain a dynamic process, since the threats—and tools needed to meet them—change over time." Department of Defense, Strengthening Transatlantic Security (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), 13. 9. According to the Heads of State and Government Communique on April 24, 1999, the Defense Capabilities Initiative is designed "to improve the defense capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable future with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces.... Defense capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information systems." See The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington (Brussels: NATO, 1999), 17. 10. This is reflected in current British thinking. As a recent Whitehall Paper of the Royal United Services Institute states, "security in the twenty-first century will be characterised by a complex array of institutional and international links that engage different coalition partners for different levels and types of missions. Moreover ... the political and military legitimacy of missions will be provided by a range of institutions, such as the EU, NATO, UN, OSCE, or even more informal political groupings, such as the Commonwealth or Contact Groups and this will affect coalition formation and conduct." Coalitions and the Future of UK Security Policy, ed. Julian Lindley-French, Whitehall Paper no. 50 (London: Royal United Services Institute, September 2000), 34-35.

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11. See Permanent Alliance ? NATO's Prague Summit and Beyond (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2000), x. 12. It is worth putting Canada's attempt to bridge the full spectrum of dominance in perspective. Joint Vision 2020, the Pentagon's main conceptual planning statement, defines full spectrum dominance as "the independent application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection. Attaining that goal requires the steady infusion of new technology and modernization and replacement of equipment. However, material superiority alone is not sufficient. Of greater importance is the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education, leaders, and people that effectively take advantage of the technology." Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000), 4. 13. [Canadian] Department of National Defense 1999-2000 Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa: Canadian Ministry of National Defense), 5. 14. NATO Review (spring 2001): 34. 15. Ibid. 16. [Canadian] Department of National Defense 1999-2000 Report, 2. 17. The "Petersberg tasks" have become a shorthand for "EU-led operations" and although they have been incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam it is worth quoting the exact wording. The WEU Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 stated: "apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of the WEU member states acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." 18. It is worth pointing out that the Washington Summit Communique did commit the alliance to: "The further adaptation of NATO's defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations." See Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit, 17.

CHAPTER 8

Blue Helmets, Green Helmets, Red Tunics: Canada's Adaptation to the Security Crisis in Southeastern Europe Lenard J. Cohen

Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium, Canada endeavored to readjust its foreign and security policy to the rapidly changing environment and imperatives of the post-Cold War world. Generally speaking, Canadians did not find the distribution of power in this international environment particularly comfortable, especially the American self-conception that the United States functions basically as a "benign hegemon," the sole superpower, transforming the world in its own image and guiding a new global order coordinated in Washington. Recent Canadian views of U.S. foreign policy have typically resembled European perspectives, which have regarded Washington as the capital of a self-centered and imperitorial hegemonic power. However, it would be inaccurate to regard Canada's policies on international and security issues simply as a mirror image of the attitudes exhibited by any one European country, or by the recent Europe-wide common foreign policy advanced in Brussels. Thus Canadian policies have been shaped by Canada's own interests, its own resources, as well as its traditions and recent domestic political dynamics. This analysis will briefly survey a number of stages in the evolution of Canadian policy toward the Balkan region. To some extent, such an endeavor requires a consideration of Ottawa's broader policy regarding Canadian intervention in regional conflicts and crises. But a focused consideration of Canada's Balkan policies can also prove useful in understanding broader issues. Thus, the following analysis is premised on the belief that an examination of Canadian policy to the ongoing Balkan security crisis over the past decade is highly illustrative of the various issues that have influenced Euro-Atlantic dynamics, and also the dilemmas of alliance cohesion and development. The changing character of Canada's engagement in the Balkans can also shed light on why and how Canadian foreign policy has been redefined in recent years.

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THE BALKANS AND INITIAL ADAPTATION TO THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1990-1991)

If Canada has been instrumental, for example, in keeping an important peace in Cyprus for over 25 years, much to the tribute to all Canadians, I think we can do no less in Yugoslavia today. —Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, September 1991 It is useful to identify three stages in Canadian policy toward the Balkans after 1990. Indeed, the fact that there are three stages during a ten-year span immediately suggests that there has been a good deal of change and soul-searching regarding the best way for Canada to relate to international developments in the post-Cold War world. The first stage, really coinciding with the end of the 1980s and the very beginning of the 1990s, is one in which Canadian foreign and security policy underwent a kind of conceptual modernization. Thus, Ottawa engaged in a reevaluation of Canada's traditional emphasis on working closely with, and supporting the efforts of, the United Nations, and—as far as intervention strategy in crises is concerned—of reevaluating Canada's traditional mode of peacekeeping. Clearly, Canada's noteworthy participation in UN peace operations, and also its membership in the NATO alliance, have been, since at least the 1950s, an important method through which Canada could limit the extent of U.S. influence on Canadian national interests. Active engagement in UN activities, and peacekeeping in particular, were also traditionally ways for Canada to engage in "forward security"—that is, to head off threats to Canada's prosperity and security before they arose—as a way for Canada to achieve its national aims in the nuclearized bipolar world of democracy versus communism.1 What is most novel during the first period identified (the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s), is that Canada, under the Mulroney government, was fully aware that the world was undergoing some rather fundamental changes. For example, to mention only the most important, the atrophy and finally the disintegration of the USSR; the end of the bipolar nuclear confrontation; the proliferation of low-intensity regional crises; and ethnic conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeastern Europe. Recognizing these developments, Canada would emerge in the forefront of adjustment to the idea that state sovereignty should no longer be regarded as sacrosanct when humanitarian crises arise in regional settings, and that Canada and other countries would be required to initiate measures that might have to transcend long-established borders and sovereignties. Of course, Prime Minister Mulroney's September 29, 1991, speech at Stanford University was the clearest expression of this change in emphasis, a new emphasis that implied UN protection of human rights and the promise of providing UN security even in settings and conflict situations where the protagonists and a particular regime had not invited the United Nations to intervene, and indeed where an established regime may have actually disintegrated, leaving political anarchy in its wake. Indeed, it is fair to say that even before the series of wars associated with the disintegration of Titoist Yugoslavia, which began in 1991-1992, Canada was reevaluating its role and participation in the maintenance of international security. Cold War concep-

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Table 8.1 Canadian Participation in Balkan Peace-Keeping, 1992-2001*

Mission

Duration

Approximate

Maximum

Maximum Size

Of Mission

Canadian Contribution

UNPROFOR

1992-1996

44,870 750 civpol

2,400 45 civpol

IFOR (non-UN)

1996-1997

60,000

1,035

SFOR (non-UN)

1997-2001

35,000

1,800

UNPREDEP

1995-2001

1,110

2

UNMOP

1996-2001

27

1

UNMIBH

1996-2001

UNMACBH

1996-1997

5 2,057 civpol 72

1 30 civpol 6

KFOR (non-UN)

1999-2001

50,000

UNMIK Police

1999-2001

4,366

1,450 (withdrawn) 86 RCMP

Description

UN Protection Force, Bosnia, Croatia (UNCRO), Macedonia NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina UN Preventive Deployment Force, Macedonia, UN Skopje UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Croatia UN Mission in BosniaHerzegovina UN Mine Action Centre, Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO-led Kosovo Force UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Source: Author's compilation of government sources. *This table does not include Canadian activity through the CSCE/OSCE or other international agencies. ** Missions that are in bold font are still operative.

tions had become outdated. In the last years of the second Mulroney Conservative government, Ottawa had developed new directions for Canadian foreign policy, which were premised on greater activism or international involvement to prevent or preempt regional conflicts before they became highly militarized and chaotic. But this initial modernization of Canadian foreign policy and security policy still placed considerable reliance on strengthening the UN framework, as well as a strong emphasis on traditional peacekeeping operations.2

CONFRONTATION WITH A NEW REALITY: THE UNPROFOR DEBACLE (1992-1995) We [cannot] allow ourselves to be held hostage by factions which see no advantage in peace.... Intervening without being invited by all parties to a dispute has made the job of attaining peace riskier, both politically and militarily. —Barbara MacDougall, Minister of External Affairs, April 1993 A second stage in the recent evolution of Canadian foreign and security policy is marked by the outbreak and escalation of violence in the former Yugoslavia during

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late 1991 and the first part of 1992. This stage, which lasts until November 1995, is characterized by the well-meaning but rather regrettable Canadian experience with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operation in Croatia and Bosnia. Canadian involvement in the Economic Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), associated with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and engagement in other UN and international agencies and nongovernmental organizations (the UN High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR], the UN International Children's Emergency Fund [UNICEF], the World Health Organization [WHO], the International Red Cross [IRC], etc.), represented aspects of Ottawa's increasing emphasis on humanitarian intervention. In many respects, such engagement was the outgrowth of the post-Cold War reconceptualization process that occurred during the first stage of Canadian foreign and security policy. But serious problems arose with the UNPROFOR mandate, a more or less traditional peacekeeping operation conducted in an environment where, as the now conventional cliche goes, "there was no peace to keep."3 This situation, in which the local protagonists had little interest in ending hostilities, ultimately created widespread frustration and exasperation with the mission within Canada and other countries. Peacekeeping in Bosnia was not, as in earlier missions, a "calm" and "straightforward" affair under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. The intensity of the war in Bosnia, and also the difficulties of the "cold peace" in Croatia, and the realization that these peacekeeping operations were hardly traditional but would require both substantial military assets and also expensive humanitarian assets, drove a slow but sure reevaluation in Canadian foreign policy over the nature of what keeping the peace entails in an environment like the Balkans. Not only was a classical peacekeeping model inappropriate in a conflictual and multisided anarchic situation such as Bosnia during the early 1990s, but such an operation also placed an extremely heavy financial load on Canada's limited resources. The challenge that had arisen was not only how to run a peacekeeping operation in the midst of regime breakdown and ethnic civil war, but also how to reconcile good intentions with limited resources. Here we see the beginning of the so-called commitmentcapability gap, or the rhetoric-resources gap, a situation in which Canada expressed devotion to human rights protection around the globe, but was confronted with the reality of deep budgetary cutbacks driven by domestic political imperatives. As the Bosnian war dragged on, a number of lessons became apparent to policymakers and officials. For example, traditional peacekeepers who were not allowed to take preemptive or effective action against local protagonists, simply could not adequately protect themselves, or offer protection to others in a situation such as Bosnia during the early 1990s. By early 1994 most Canadians were no longer supportive of the risky UNPROFOR mission. Thus in a January 1994 survey of 1,500 Canadians, 57 percent of the respondents indicated that Canada should withdraw from any further contributions to the mission at the end of its mandate in the spring. This was the context in which Prime Minister Jean Chretien commented that "there is a limit to being a boy scout," referring to Canada's effort to keeping the peace in the Balkans.4

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Another lesson was that, in a complicated environment of post-Cold War conflicts, an impartial and lightly armed force may prove ineffective as a means of protecting humanitarian relief efforts. Nongovernmental organizations can carry out courageous and important work in war-torn zones, and they deserve every consideration when they request protection. But international forces that are only narrowly and/or ambiguously mandated, and that are also ill equipped to deal with dangers on the ground, can actually prolong crises rather than facilitate their resolution. Yet another lesson learned from the Bosnian case was that "coercive diplomacy"—the "marriage" of force and negotiations—cannot be utilized against protagonists in a conflict where a traditional peacekeeping operation is trying to function on the ground. Indeed, in May 1993, just before leaving office, Prime Minister Mulroney suggested that the international community, including Canada, had responded inadequately to the Bosnian situation. "Force," he said, "is sometimes inescapable. Diplomacy without the credible threat of force—or, in the case of Bosnia, counter-force—is likely to be unavailing." But with Canadian peacekeepers in a vulnerable position on the ground in Bosnia, Mulroney was forced to add that UNPROFOR troops should not be put at risk by the use of more vigorous international action. The problem of how to move from traditional peacekeeping to more vigorous measures (against the Bosnian Serb side, which had emerged as the strongest force in the three-way Bosnian struggle), was of course a major issue creating differences between U.S. policy (which by 1994-1995 was calling for more robust action in Bosnia) and the perspectives of Canada and European countries, which had troops on the ground. The Bosnian war also illustrated the overarching lesson that ambitious political objectives can only be achieved on a complicated and war-torn landscape if the requisite military and nonmilitary means are provided to fulfill those objectives. The traditional peacekeeping paradigm didn't work in the Balkans during the early 1990s. As President Chirac told Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "UNPROFOR was a sheep surrounded by wolves and there was a need for a hunter." Despite widespread public frustration with the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia as of 1993-1994, Ottawa could not unilaterally or easily withdraw from the UNPROFOR operation. But Canadian official emphasis regarding peacekeeping shifted to a focus on methods such as preventive diplomacy (e.g., the UN operation in Macedonia in the early 1990s), and a concentration on measures that might facilitate nonmilitary aspects of peacebuilding after hostilities had ceased in a region. For example, the 1994 Defense White Paper presented a more realistic view of Canadian commitment to peacekeeping, developed in the light of the difficult and generally unhappy experience with UNPROFOR, and the limitation of resources available for such missions. But the Defense White Paper, and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DEAIT) policy statements such as "Canada and World" (1995), continued to place emphasis on Canadian internationalism, the promotion of Canadian values on the global stage, and Canada's active involvement in the UN and other multilateral institutions.

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DEFERRING TO SUPERPOWER LEADERSHIP: "BALKAN RATIONALIZATION" AND REORIENTATION TO HUMAN SECURITY (1995-2001)

We have been asked [to participate in IFOR] and I'm indicating that we are willing to go there [again, to Bosnia], but it depends on what kind of role and what we are needed for They might ask for something we're not equipped to do, or we won't want to do. —Prime Minister Jean Chretien, December 1995 A third stage of Canada's post-Cold War engagement in the Balkans begins with the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs in the autumn of 1995, closely followed by the Dayton Agreement in November of that year. This stage extends through the NATO-Yugoslav war over Kosovo during 1999, and is fundamentally a phase that continued throughout 2001. The use of massive NATO military power against the Bosnian Serbs, and the orchestration of coercive diplomacy by Richard Holbrooke at Dayton, would bring the UNPROFOR missions in Croatia and Bosnia to a conclusion. Canada's UN ambassador, Robert Fowler, would put Ottawa's view of the new situation most starkly in December 1995: "The era of half-hearted, half-baked, under-resourced, and ill-defined [UN] operations should now be over." Sixty thousand heavily armed NATO combat troops arrived in Bosnia to secure the environment of an ambitious program of stabilization, peace implementation, and "nation-building." But though Canada would take part in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), and subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia over the next several years, the Canadian role was somewhat marginalized and overshadowed by the large U.S. contribution to the non-UN operations, and particularly by Washington's extensive influence over the entire process of peace implementation in Bosnia (which, of course, coincided with an increased role for NATO and a diminished role for the UN). At the same time, the decision by the Canadian government that national defense and the Canadian forces should contribute heavily to the cutbacks that would be part of the effort to control the federal deficit, considerably reduced Canada's ability to take the necessary steps to back up Ottawa's stated commitment to international intervention in order to promote human security (it was estimated, for example, that the Chretien government cut 23 percent of the defense budget between 1993 and 1998). The impact of the commitment-capability gap on Canadian involvement in the Balkans was further apparent during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Thus, from one perspective advanced at the time, particularly by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and DFAIT, Kosovo was a Slobodan Milosevic-generated humanitarian crisis that presented a major and compelling humanitarian case requiring international and Canadian involvement. Indeed, beginning in the early 1990s, Canada had already been actively involved in putting pressure on the Milosevic regime through the application of international sanctions, and in trying to promote reconciliation between ethnic Albanians and Serbs (e.g., Canada had participated

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in the 1992 CSCE observer mission, and also subsequent international missions in Kosovo). It was not surprising, therefore, that following the breakdown of the poorly managed Rambouillet peace process in March 1999, Canada would become involved in NATO air strikes against the Yugoslav regime. Although the air strikes launched by NATO without UN consent were exceedingly controversial in Canada (despite 70 percent support of those citizens polled regarding the bombing),5 the Canadian government justified its involvement in the action as an initiative to end Belgrade's "campaign of terror." Ottawa also adopted various nonmilitary measures to promote human security (through NGOs, receiving Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) assistance, etc.), and temporarily deployed 800 Canadian armed forces personnel in Macedonia as part of the NATO backup contingent in that country. In August 1999, soon after Milosevic capitulated to NATO, 1,450 Canadian troops were deployed to Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, establishing a Chapter 7 "peace enforcement operation," the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Other Canadian activities in Kosovo included support for mine removal through the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), personnel for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the reconstruction and peace implementation efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and contributions to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). But while Canada initially provided a rather substantial contribution to help end the Kosovo crisis, and stabilize the province, Ottawa quickly announced (in November 1999) that it intended to withdraw almost the entire contingent of defense personnel from KFOR, transfer a small number of troops to SFOR, and return the rest of the troops to Canada. "All countries are doing this," Defense Minister Art Eggleton pointed out. "[T]he British are drawing down in Bosnia ... everybody is happy with this" (a year later, the United States, Germany, and Russia all began a process of rethinking and "drawing down" with regard to their peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia). By March 2001, Defense Minister Eggleton had advanced the idea that in the future Canada would adopt a "get in quick, and get out fast" approach to peacekeeping policy. Peacekeepers, he said, would be sent to hot spots, but would definitely be withdrawn in about six months. About the same time, Foreign Minister John Manley remarked that Canada was unlikely to commit troops for peacekeeping in Macedonia, where a new security crisis had broken out: "I can't see how it could be done with the same number of forces as we have currently committed to the region. It's unlikely that we can commit additional forces, and so it's a little difficult to foresee. I think they're probably necessary where they are in Bosnia at the present time."6 Believing that the concentration of its forces in Bosnia would enable Canada to most effectively utilize its limited resources, the Canadian government had decided on the financial "rationalization" of its Balkan commitment, and on a stepped-up concentration on the allegedly less expensive and more selective sphere of nonmilitary support for human security. DFAIT's focus on human security, although

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grounded in altruism and Canada's longtime tradition of addressing trouble spots and crises around the world, was also substantially a method for Ottawa to reconcile pressure for budgetary retrenchment with the country's desire to remain internationally engaged. Thus, despite shrinking budgets for defense spending, Canadian opinion surveys revealed a substantial public consensus in support of the federal government's continued promotion of democracy and human security abroad. As a result of circumstances in the post-UNPROFOR period, Canadian security policy has substantially shifted from participation in the military aspects of peacekeeping, to nonmilitary deployment and activities that can enhance human security and peacebuilding. Whether this is a positive or negative development, a necessary or unnecessary shift in focus by Canada, has been and should be further debated.7 But that discussion aside, an emphasis on human security is the present reality of Canadian foreign and security policy, and one we are likely to live with for some time to come. Devotion to nonmilitary human security imperatives are, it seems to this author, likely to become the Canadian niche in the activities of the EuroAtlantic community, and the sphere in which Canada will derive its greatest influence on the alliance and future efforts at peace and stabilization in troubled regions. A good example of this new emphasis is the important recent activity of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Thus, while Canada has concentrated nearly all of its Balkan defense personnel involved in peacekeeping to Bosnia, Ottawa has substantially strengthened the RCMP's activity in Kosovo. As of mid-2001, there were, for example, no Canadian defense personnel in Kosovo, but eighty RCMP officers were serving in the province. Conversely, only eighteen RCMP officers were serving in Bosnia, although there were over 1,500 Canadian troops in that segmented and fragile country at the time. Since encouragement of the rule of law and institutions involved in the administration of justice constitutes a highly significant facet of political transition in new democracies, the RCMP is already playing an important role and can very likely do much more in this area. Moreover, as we saw in Kosovo during the last six months of 1999 and early 2000, the insertion of a robust military force that moves in for peacekeeping, cannot necessarily guarantee a safe environment for innocent civilians. Without adequate policing to go along with NATO combat elements, NATO's intervention can turn into a disaster for innocent civilians. In the case of Kosovo, what resulted was a revenge syndrome by Albanians who had been subjected to Serbian ethnic cleansing and then returned to the province, only to ethnically "cleanse" the region of innocent Serbs (see Table 8.2). Only belatedly did the UN's chief official in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, admit that he had learned that "one oppression may conceal another." Canada's endeavors in the area of human security, particularly in but not limited to the area of policing, can play a major role in the externally induced democratization and stabilization of Southeastern Europe, not to mention other areas of the world. Indeed, Canadian RCMP police peacekeeping and peacebuilding have also involved the training of local police in the Balkan countries, a program that

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Table 8.2 Selected Crimes in Kosovo, 1999 and 2000 (percent)

Ethnicity of

Victims

Total

Murders 2000 1999

2000

Population (Estimate)

Albanians 95.0 Serbs & Others 5.0

40.0

Total

100.0 100.0 (454) | (246)

Total (number)

Kidnapping 1999

100.0

60.0

59.7

40.3

57.0

43.0

67.5 32.5

100.0

100.0

(190)

(191)

Source: KFOR documents (http://www.kforonline.com)

during 2001 involved seven police forces in Southeastern Europe and had the potential to ultimately involve four more police forces in post-Milosevic Yugoslavia.8 CONCLUSION

Although many observers have criticized the commitment-capability gap in Canada's international efforts, such criticism, though certainly legitimate, does not really help reconcile Canadian policy to recent realities. Dennis Stairs, for example, provided an interesting piece in that regard, with the humorous title "Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig."9 Stairs and others observe that human security endeavors can prove just as or more expensive than military involvement and can involve the imposition of Canadian values (an "imperialism of values") on others, and that human security constitutes a soft-headed, "feel-good" approach to foreign policy. These and other legitimate concerns and criticisms are likely to persist in debates regarding Canadian foreign and security policy. But from what has been learned regarding the evolution of Canadian policy in the Balkans during the period after 1990, it seems unlikely that Canada can, or really will be inclined to, play a leading or allied role in the kind of "coercive diplomacy" or "counterforce" that requires massive military confrontation, that is, the kind of force necessary for dealing with military regimes, dictatorships, or heavily armed secessionist and paramilitary forces that are committing egregious violations of human rights. Fostering human security through nonmilitary tasks, on the other hand, is something that Canada can continue to specialize in with substantial benefit to the global community. In view of that situation, Canada should concentrate on further refining methods for the delivery and deployment of resources for human security. In areas like the Balkans this may involve issues such as developing better police administration, helping to combat the smuggling of drugs and humans, as well as a host of other projects to enhance the growth of civil society. Finally, Balkan volatility and violence will likely continue during the next decade despite noble efforts by the Stability Pact and other endeavors in collective

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security. Successful conflict management in Southeastern Europe will require the countries belonging to NATO to develop an effective division of labor. Moreover, because all the Balkan countries want to be associated with the Euro-Atlantic security structure, Canada can help facilitate their efforts through a focus on nonmilitary security deployment. Efforts such as those undertaken by the RCMP can significantly help to integrate the countries of the regime into the broader international community. This does not mean that there is a need to terminate the role of Canada in military peacekeeping and peacebuilding, nor does it imply any radical "decoupling" between Canada and the United States, or between Canada and Europe. Moreover, it is important also to emphasize that a focus on human security and police activities does not preclude Canadian involvement in more traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement projects (such as Canada's involvement in ending the Macedonian crisis during 2001), or in larger and more coercive international activities (e.g., the anti-terrorist coalition that attacked Afghanistan's Taliban regime in 2001 ).10 The Canadian emphasis on human security is simply the law of comparative advantages applied to peace development and stabilization. Conducted properly and coordinated with our allies, the Canadian focus on human security will strengthen NATO's efforts, and also complement the development of a common European security policy. NOTES

1. See Sean M. Maloney, "Helpful Fixer or Hired Gun? Why Canada Goes Overseas," Policy Options (January/February 2001): 59-65. 2. For a thoughtful and comprehensive consideration of Canadian foreign policy evolution during this period, see Nicholas Gammer, From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). 3. This section relies heavily on the analysis presented in Lenard J. Cohen and Alexander Moens, "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 2 (winter 1999): 85-103. 4. See Mitch de Savoye, "Canadian Response to the Wars of the Former Yugoslavia," Conference of Defense Associations Institute Newsletter (November 3-4, 2000). 5. Eighteen Canadian CF18 Canadian war plans conducted 678 sorties (10 percent of the initial strike missions), and dropped about 1,000 bombs. 6. Canadian Press Newswire, March 20, 2001. 7. See, for example, Louis Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales," Canadian Military Journal (summer 2000): 13-24; and "Curious Ambiguities: Canada's International Security Policy," Policy Options (January/February 2001): 36-42. 8. See Jean Bourassa, "Report on the Canadian Regional Training and Support Program in Cooperative Policing in Southeast Europe, Unpublished report (2001). 9. Dennis Stairs, "Canada in the 1990s: Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig," Policy Options (January/February 2001): 43-49. 10. A full consideration of how the terrorist events that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, will influence future Canadian security policy is outside the scope of this chapter.

CHAPTER 9

NATO's Nuclear Future: A Rationale for NATO's Deterrence Capabilities Karl-Heinz Kamp Nuclear questions have almost completely disappeared from the political agenda in nearly all countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If nuclear issues have made their way back into the headlines of the tabloids, it is hardly in the framework of serious strategic reasoning but instead mostly in connection with wild speculations and bizarre interpretations on almost any kind of "nuclear" threats or problems. The most recent example of nuclear commotion has been the debate on the "Balkan Syndrome"—that is, the alleged dangers stemming from low-enriched uranium in ammunitions and protective materials used in the Kosovo war. Throughout these fervent debates particularly in Germany, terms like uranium, nuclear, and atomic have been used synonymously and have been perceived as the incarnation of all negative and menacing consequences of the use of military force. Given these trends, which could be easily confirmed by other examples of nuclear hysteria in the recent years, it is all the more understandable that throughout the decade since the end of the Soviet Union, NATO has approached the question of its nuclear future in a "don't rock the boat" approach, which means stating the relevance of nuclear weapons for the alliance's security without much attention to a cohesive and up-to-date reasoning. Hence, NATO's New Strategic Concept simply states that nuclear weapons "will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies response to military aggression."1 Nevertheless, given all the positive developments in Europe and beyond since the end of the Cold War, these kinds of assertions will not keep the critics from raising the question of whether nuclear weapons should remain an integral part of NATO's political and military strategy. To counter these critics of nuclear deterrence, one could point to the fact that there have been clear signs that the Russian military elite intends to base its future military strategy much more on nuclear forces as a compensation for diminishing conventional capabilities. According to this view, shrinking military budgets, increasing military disintegration, and the decreasing conventional fighting power

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can only be outweighed by a stronger reliance on Russia's nuclear posture.2 NATO's military operations in Kosovo might even increase this trend,3 since the evolution and the outcome of the crisis in the Balkans has, above all, revealed Russia's political and military weakness. Thus the existence of NATO's nuclear deterrence posture would be primarily justified by the well-known argument of a "reassurance policy" against potentially negative developments in Russia. However, even if these hypotheses on future developments in Russian military thinking toward nuclear forces should prove to be correct, such a simplistic actionreaction model can hardly be the sole base for NATO's nuclear capabilities, since it implicitly assumes that nuclear legitimacy is conditional and depends primarily on the existence of a potentially hostile Russia. Thus, such an argumentation might seriously undermine the ongoing efforts to strengthen the cooperative ties between Russia and NATO—which were preserved even throughout the entire Kosovo crisis.4 Furthermore, focusing on a potential Russian residual threat alone could render nuclear deterrence completely irrelevant should Russia's attempts to transform its political, economic, and social structures toward stability, democracy, and prosperity succeed. Last, such a limited view tends to ignore that there are a number of other dangers ahead that will require credible nuclear deterrence postures and concepts. But what kind of dangers ahead can be the foundation of NATO's nuclear capabilities today? What are the challenges to acceptance of nuclear deterrence? How can the legitimacy of NATO's nuclear posture be preserved in the years to come? This chapter will try to take on these questions from a German point of view and will approach the topic of "NATO's nuclear future" in three major steps. First, the chapter will focus on the erosion of the justification for nuclear weapons, which has to be taken into account. Second, the purpose of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world will be analyzed: What is the rationale for nuclear deterrence today? Third, the chapter will take on the question of how to maintain nuclear acceptance in the NATO countries. THE EROSION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE The concept of nuclear deterrence, for many decades deliberately or reluctantly accepted as the foundation of alliance security in a bipolar world, has been exposed to a number of erosive trends. There is not only the fundamental rejection of the deterrence idea, which has cumulated in the general and long-standing request for nuclear abolition and the fantasy of a nuclear-free world. There are also conceptual reproaches criticizing certain components of the nuclear deterrence strategy— like the "first use" concept—either in order to change the deterrence architecture into apparently more cohesive versions or in order to gradually erode nuclear deterrence in general.5 A third latently erosive effect for nuclear deterrence might result from actual policy developments, like the U.S. inclination to develop a missile defense system notwithstanding the fact that the concrete implications of an anti-

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ballistic missile capability on present security concepts and particularly on nuclear deterrence cannot yet be fully assessed. The Idea of Denuclearization

With the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing consensus that the value of nuclear weapons as a "currency" for political weight and influence has decreased significantly. Taking that argument to the extreme, a loosely-knit group of academics, scientists, defense analysts, and legal experts promoted the idea of denuclearization, that is, the request for total nuclear disarmament on a global scale. In summer 1996, a decision of the International Court in the Hague had put the legal legitimacy of nuclear weapons into question.6 Only a couple weeks later, the socalled Canberra Commission, a high-ranking expert group appointed by the Australian government, argued in favor of a global abolition of nuclear weapons.7 Even high-ranking U.S. generals like General Lee Butler or the retired NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), Andrew Goodpaster, expressed their support for the idea of total nuclear disarmament. While these "abolitionists" perform at least partly a valuable service by subjecting nuclear weapons to critical discussion, they tend to neglect present nuclear realities. It is a grim truth that all nuclear nonproliferation efforts—as strict as they may be—will only be able to slow down the spread of nuclear weapons, but not to stop it entirely. The world lost its nuclear innocence long ago and one cannot delete the nuclear expertise and the knowledge on how to construct these devices. And what is more, to be a nuclear power is not only a question of international status or of "grandeur." The implications of "mastering the atom" for nuclear states and nuclear have-nots are much broader. Nuclear weapons increase the political options of a country significantly, particularly in crisis situations. Offensively or even aggressively used, they extend the leverage of a country to force nonnuclear opponents to patterns frequently called "preemptive compliance." In turn, nuclear weapons reduce the options of other countries against a nuclear power—it is hardly possible to bring total defeat to a nuclear-armed country. To illustrate this point, one might imagine what would have happened in 1991 or 1999 had Iraq or the Serbian leadership possessed a small number of nuclear warheads. Most likely, neither the second Gulf War nor NATO's military intervention in Kosovo would have taken place. Such an increase in political options gained by nuclear status explains why some countries try to acquire atomic devices by all means. In turn, their pressing desire is the reason why the number of nuclear states will not remain stable in the future but will rise—perhaps slowly but significantly. We are certainly and fortunately far away from the gloom predictions of the 1960s and 1970s that the number of nuclear states will rise to twenty or more. Nevertheless, new nuclear players will emerge, either because countries become increasingly able to develop their own nuclear capacities independent from the technical support of others, or because the further erosion of the nuclear sector in the former Soviet Union and the nuclear

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smuggling issue will provide them with the necessary hardware and know-how to assemble their own bomb. Among those "soon to be" members of the nuclear club there are likely to be a number of so-called rogue states, meaning smallish rascal nations or religious zealots politically and ideologically in strong opposition to Western values or to the industrial world in general. What is more, those players in world politics might not have learned the lessons of Cold War deterrence, which led to five decades of nuclear nonuse. Any use of a nuclear explosive, even if would be only in a regional context in Northern Africa or Asia, might transform the international system more profoundly than the collapse of the Soviet empire did. It would mark the end of the present era, in which nuclear weapons have been plentiful but have never been used. One observer has called this "the second coming of the nuclear age," and this is certainly no understatement.8 In this context, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in spring 1998 had two crucial consequences. On the one hand, they have refuted simplistic models of a nuclear-free world put forward by nuclear "abolitionists," who intellectually linked total nuclear disarmament to the end of Cold War hostilities. Instead, India defined its nuclear capability not in terms of threats and responses, but as a key element for its claim on world-power status. On the other hand, these nuclear tests have at least partly brought the problem of nuclear weapons back to the attention of the world community. The imminent danger posed by the possibility of new nuclear nations with vastly oversized nuclear arsenals left as a legacy of the Cold War or by the potential spread of weapon technology from the crumbling nuclear sector in Russia, have found a greater public audience compared to previous times. The "Nuclear No First Use" Issue

In Germany, there were only a small number of experts taking part in the debate on the pros and cons of a global abolition of nuclear weapons The broader public certainly had amorphous antinuclear moods but did not reflect about these questions and therefore hardly expressed any critique or protest. This situation changed with the German federal elections in late 1998, which brought a new government of Social Democrats and Greens into power. After many years of "nuclear abstinence" the political tidal change to the left raised the option of an increased interest in security policy matters in general and nuclear questions in particular—at least within the political decisionmaking circles. Since the painful debates on the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in the early 1980s, large parts of the Social Democratic Party have traditionally held an antinuclear stand. This holds even more true for the coalition partner in the new government— the Greens. The roots of that party reach back to the environmental protection movement and to the antinuclear activist groups of the 1970s. Even if large parts of the Green electorate have significantly evolved and detached from their protest movements two decades ago, most of the relevant Green politicians and members of Parliament have received their political socialization in connection with the

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public demonstrations against nuclear power plants and U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil. Thus, it did not come as a surprise that the "coalition agreement" of the new government contained antinuclear language and particularly a commitment of RedGreen to make an effort for a "nuclear no first use" declaration by NATO. This onslaught on one of the long-standing basics of NATO's nuclear strategy was clearly aimed to delegitimize of nuclear deterrence in general—in full accordance with the antinuclear moods of its proponents. It is worth noting that some Social Democrats were fully aware of the potentially detrimental consequences of such an initiative on the cohesion of NATO and on German-U.S. relations. However, they subordinated their skepticism under the requirement of coalition discipline—particularly in the first weeks in power. They might have also counted on the pragmatic experience of past governments that not every single item in the coalition agreement does find its way into concrete political decisions. Nevertheless, already in early November 1998, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Chancellor Gerhard Schroder raised the idea of a "no first use" in their talks with representatives of the Clinton administration and with NATO's SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana.9 In these discussions, the German foreign minister argued that NATO's New Strategic Concept, which was under development, should display a new strategic approach to nuclear weapons and should clearly state that NATO's nuclear weapons would never be used first. However, not only was this idea in distinct opposition to NATO's nuclear fundamentals, but it also thwarted a tacit consensus particularly among the nuclear members of the alliance—France, Great Britain, and the United States—not to tackle nuclear questions in the deliberations on NATO's new strategy at all but to adopt the respective nuclear-relevant wording of the existing Strategic Concept of 1991. Nevertheless, Germany's idea that NATO should declare it would never use nuclear weapons first made it onto the agenda of NATO's High Level Group meetings. As soon as the topic was raised, however, Germany had to face harsh opposition from almost all NATO allies—only Canada expressed some sympathy for the German initiative. Particularly the United States conveyed their sharp rejection of any discussion on a "no first use" not only in bilateral talks with German politicians but also via diplomatic channels in the form of official demarches. Washington circles noted with some disappointment that the attempts to undermine nuclear deterrence came from a country that had benefited most from the U.S. nuclear umbrella during the decades of the Cold War. Faced with the strong resistance from almost all NATO capitals—except Ottawa—the German government began to realize not only the probable hazards for alliance cohesion but also the lack of support for any changes in the essentials of NATO's nuclear strategy. In consequence, NATO left its nuclear fundamentals untouched in its New Strategic Concept and even the German (and Canadian) desire for some assurances that the nuclear question would be discussed further in NATO was only very cryptically injected into the wording of NATO's new strategy.

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Instead, by German and Canadian request, the New Strategic Concept contained a paragraph on the relevance of nuclear arms control and included a reference to the notion that in light of the radical political changes in Europe over the last decade the actual use of nuclear weapons is regarded as an extremely remote option.10 Another compromise was that NATO agreed at the Washington summit in 1999 to further discuss nuclear questions—albeit in the much broader framework of proliferation, confidence-building, and arms control.11 The result was a NATO report on these questions, which was published in December 2000 and contained a number of policy recommendations—particularly with regard to an information exchange on nuclear issues with Russia.12 The very broad and general approach of the report has taken the attention away from the particular "no first use" question and has—according to critics—contributed to burying the issue and a return to the "don't rock the boat" approach. The Impact of Missile Defense on Nuclear Deterrence

The new U.S. administration under President George W. Bush is deeply committed to the development and deployment of a missile defense system as early as possible in order to shift the overall U.S. security concept from deterrence and "mutual assured destruction" more into the direction of defense. At the same time, the U.S. president has indicated a strong dedication for deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This readiness for nuclear disarmament does not only intend to raise the public acceptance of the missile defense plans; it also reflects a conviction within the new administration that an adaptation of the U.S. nuclear posture to post-Cold War requirements is long overdue. What is more, Bush has also shown some readiness for unilateral steps instead of lengthy arms control negotiations to scrap the oversized arsenals as quickly as possible—which proves the seriousness of the U.S. disarmament intentions. This in turn will provide Moscow with a facesaving framework to reduce its nuclear capabilities, since in the longer run Russia will be able to finance only a fraction of its present nuclear posture. In that sense, missile defense—provided that it will prove to be feasible at acceptable costs—and nuclear cuts are mutually reinforcing developments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. However, unlike President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) concept, which intended to render nuclear weapons obsolete, the present administration will doubtless stick to the concept of nuclear deterrence, but will significantly reduce its relevance for the benefit of a "mixed strategy" containing elements of deterrence and protection. It remains to be seen to what degree the present U.S. nuclear force structure—the "Triad" of land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear weapons—will be affected. Should missile defense be introduced within NATO as well—be it by individual member states or in terms of an alliance-wide approach (allied missile defense [AMD])—NATO would also have to fundamentally redefine the mix of offense and defense respective to deterrence and protection in its security strategy. However, given that missile defense

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still faces tremendous technological hurdles, there seems to be sufficient time for adapting strategic concepts to newly achieved capabilities. THE FUTURE RELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

If traditional Cold War patterns can no longer provide a cohesive reasoning for nuclear deterrence in NATO and if a number of erosive tendencies will further undermine the alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons, what will be the risks and challenges of justifying any future reliance on nuclear deterrence concepts? The subsequent section will try to identify some of these challenges and will attempt to describe a rationale for nuclear deterrence. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Dangers

The proliferation of nuclear weapons will doubtless constitute one of the most serious security challenges in the years to come. As noted earlier, these dangers are even likely to mount significantly. But potential threats stemming from nuclear weapons do not only result from the spread of fissile material or warhead technology. Instead, the danger of an increased number of nuclear players in international relations is further exacerbated by the fact that more and more countries have access to long-range missiles and other means of delivery. In the longer run, the combination of both tendencies—the spread of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of means of delivery—could lead to the situation where NATO comes within the range of nuclear threats from regions that have been neglected in the past—at least with regard to military and political risk assessments. Hence, in the medium and long term, technological progress will turn geographical distance into a factor of decreasing relevance. As a consequence, nuclear weapons may pose two kinds of threats—indirect and direct. Indirectly, because of the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of the nuclear sector in Russia, nuclear know-how and even nuclear weapons might find their way into the trouble spots of the world.13 This could imperil the stability in these regions and thus might also affect vital interests of NATO countries. Direct nuclear challenges, on the other hand, are not only imaginable as a result of an unintentional launch of Russian nuclear weapon against a NATO country due to the crumbling nuclear security structures in the former Soviet Union. Instead, there are three categories of direct nuclear challenges imaginable: • The most direct nuclear threat to the integrity of NATO member countries and to the security of their societies will be the detonation of a nuclear weapon on their territory. At present, this seems to be a very unlikely scenario, since the only country theoretically able to target the whole of Western Europe is Russia, which still has vast numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery means at its disposal. However, even in light of the deterioration of the West European-Russian relation as a consequence of the war in Kosovo, an intentional employment of Russian nuclear weapons against European countries is almost

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unimaginable. This holds true also for the much quoted "residual threat" of a resurgent and nuclear armed Russia falling back into the confrontative patterns of the past. Warnings of a possible nuclear war that had been occasionally expressed by military representatives in Moscow in the context of NATO's enlargement policy were more a sign of helpless fury and did certainly not reflect the views of the relevant decisionmaking circles in Russia. • With respect to the so-called states of concern adjacent to the European periphery and beyond,14 the situation for the time being seems to be not too alarming either. Countries that have recently proven their ability to develop nuclear weapons (Pakistan) or those that are still suspected to have clandestine nuclear weapons programs (Iraq, Iran, North Korea) are at least currently lacking strategic missile capabilities to threaten Western Europe directly, if we ignore for the sake of argument the U.S. homeland. At present, most of the rogue states have missiles with ranges from 600 to 900 kilometers—mostly based on old Soviet Scud technology or on Chinese missile developments. However, these countries will certainly be able to extend the range of their missile forces steadily, which would provide their political leaderships with a strategic military capability for targeting NATO territory.15 It is also worth noting that due to geographical realities certain European members of NATO are more exposed to those threats than others. For instance, Libya would not need to obtain an intercontinental ballistic missile capability to detonate a warhead on French or Italian territory. • Much more likely than a direct nuclear attack on European territory, however, is the second category, namely a nuclear threat to NATO's military forces engaged in humanitarian missions or peace support operations beyond NATO's territory. In light of the slow but continuous spread of nuclear weapons technology, it is certainly imaginable that members of NATO could become engaged in a crisis management operation outside Europe where the adversary—or a neighboring country engaged in the conflict—would be suspected of having nuclear weapons. Given the totalitarian political structures in most "states of concern" and given the radical views that leaders like Saddam Hussein and Muhmar Ghadaffi have expressed over nuclear weapons, it is well imaginable that they would threaten to employ such weapons under certain circumstances. This would confront NATO with a new threat, which would change its risk assessment completely. • The third dimension of immediate nuclear threats is the danger that in a military operation of NATO outside Europe a close ally in the region might be threatened by nucleararmed hostile states in order to undermine the cohesion of the alliance. Such a scenario would be comparable to Saddam Hussein's threat to use chemical weapons against Israel, which intended to split the anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf War. Still, nuclear weapons are far from being a panacea or a "silver bullet" to cope with each of these scenarios successfully. Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence might prove to be one option (among others) that could contribute to the reduction of each of these dangers. However, to assess the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War security environment adequately, one has to widen the analytical perspective to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Future challenges to international security and stability will result not only from nuclear proliferation but even more from the constant spread of other weapons of mass destruction. Chemical and particularly biological weapons pose an even more serious threat, since they are much easier to obtain and

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to maintain in their operational effectiveness.16 In particular, biological weapons offer a wide range of applications and have genuine strategic, operational, and tactical utility, which might be attractive to ruthless leaders everywhere in the world. Even countries of moderate technical capability and economic means are readily able to develop and produce such kinds of weapons. This holds all the more true since the manufacturing of chemical and biological materials can be masked by other weapons programs, as well as by dual-use technologies in legitimate pharmaceutical or pesticide fabrication and research facilities. Moreover, biotechnology is a booming branch of industry with impressive growth rates all around the world. As a result, the three types of nuclear threats to NATO can be applied to other weapons of mass destruction as well. A direct attack on NATO with biological or chemical weapons is imaginable because these kinds of agents do not require ballistic missiles to carry them. They can be quite easily dispersed by unconventional means of delivery, such as civilian aircraft.17 Even more likely, however, is the danger of biological or chemical substances employed against allied forces in crisis management operations beyond NATO's territory—or the credible threat of using these weapons to keep NATO from intervening in a crisis. Such kinds of scenarios could have become reality in NATO's Kosovo operation, where some sources had indicated that Serbian military forces would have chemical weapons at their disposal. Fortunately, this information turned out to be incorrect. Nevertheless, had that rumor become reality, the third threat dimension—the WMD threat against an allied country not directly involved in war—could have been realized had Slobodan Milosevic threatened the use of these weapons against neighboring countries to escalate the crisis or undermine NATO's resolve and cohesion. The Rationale for Nuclear Deterrence

In light of these pressing challenges, particularly with regard to biological and chemical weapons, the question arises whether nuclear deterrence can work against these kinds of threats. Unfortunately, this issue cannot be conclusively answered in advance, at least in peacetime. One might state that nuclear weapons, by their very existence, will contribute to deterrence of any kind of military aggression. However, the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence is not so exact that it can be tied definitely to specific missions and targets. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fact that the database for answering this crucial question is still comparably small, there is strong evidence that nuclear weapons are not only a deterrent against nuclear threats, but also can be successfully instrumentalized against other weapons of mass destruction as well. During the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein announced the employment of Scud missiles with chemical warheads against Israel—not in the least to erode the cohesion of the anti-Iraq coalition. This was a credible threat because Iraq not only had Scud missiles, but had also already employed chemical weapons in the war against Iran. As we know today, Iraq even had (and still seems to have) clandestine programs to develop and produce biological weapons.

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In reaction, the United States issued a clear warning to Iraq, cryptically announcing the possibility of nuclear retaliation as a response to an Iraqi use of chemical weapons.18 In a letter to Saddam Hussein, President George Bush wrote: "Let me state, too, that the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and installations The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort."19 Furthermore, the government in Tel Aviv made similar statements raising the possible recourse to nuclear weapons in case of a chemical attack on Israel.20 In the course of the war, Saddam Hussein only launched a few conventionally tipped Scud missiles against Israel, and it is very reasonable to assume that he had been deterred by the danger of nuclear devastation of his country and by the threat to his personal existence.21 One might ask whether President Bush was really prepared to authorize the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. Some members of the "inner circle" of the White House have stated that a nuclear strike against Baghdad had never been seriously considered. However, even if this had been the case, it would not have been a devaluation of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Whatever the views of key U.S. decisionmakers in these days were, Saddam Hussein could at least not exclude the danger of nuclear retaliation—particularly in light of the explicit messages he received from the U.S. side. Obviously, one of the old lessons of the Cold War deterrence concepts has been confirmed again: it is the level of ambiguity that makes nuclear deterrence work. Nonetheless, accepting that nuclear weapons will have a role in the deterrence of chemical and biological weapons does not diminish the responsibility to ensure that other instruments of deterrence are as robust as possible, and that nuclear weapons are pushed into the background as far as possible. Deterring use of biological and chemical weapons obviously is a complex challenge that requires as many effective policy tools as can be mustered—nuclear deterrence being one of them. Meanwhile, the idea of an extended role for nuclear weapons—not only against nuclear dangers but also against weapons of mass destruction in general—has made its way into the official U.S. nuclear documents and into the relevant circles of NATO. In November 1997, President Bill Clinton signed a new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on U.S. nuclear strategy, replacing the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 13) signed by President Reagan in 1981. The new PDD took account of the fundamental changes in the international environment and provides guidance for future nuclear planning procedures. According to the available information, this highly classified document acknowledged the close relationship between nuclear deterrence and the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons.22 With respect to NATO, the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nonnuclear threats has been discussed in NATO's Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation. This body was established in 1994 to shape an alliance position on the various aspects of the WMD challenge. Until 1996 this group had issued three

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classified reports on a WMD risk assessment, on NATO's military requirements to cope with the WMD problem, and on NATO's shortcomings and possible improvements in that area.23 It is worth noting that the New Strategic Concept agreed by NATO at its fiftieth-anniversary summit in May 1999 in Washington does not explicitly limit the deterrence function of NATO's nuclear weapons only to nuclear threats. Instead, broader interpretations are possible, since NATO's new strategy states very generally that nuclear weapons "will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability."24 This broader understanding of nuclear deterrence, as a means not only to discourage the use of nuclear weapons but also to deter chemically or biologically armed aggressors, provides a coherent rationale for NATO's nuclear capabilities in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, it gives a reason for keeping up the concept of threatening a "first use" of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence. The "first use" concept is no longer directed against the combat-ready conventional forces of the bygone Warsaw Pact. Instead, it can be instrumentalized against those nonnuclear countries that might intend to use their chemical or biological weapons in a crisis situation against NATO or against the territory of a close ally outside the North Atlantic Alliance. Being confronted with nuclear retaliation even if an aggressor had "only" used a biological weapon will change the risk calculus of the aggressive country significantly and will contribute to the deliberations surrounding such a decision. In turn, a strict adherence to a "no first use" concept would have deprived the U.S. president of the option to keep Saddam Hussein from using chemically tipped Scud missiles against Israel as a close U.S. ally. In that sense, a "first use" strategy is even the precondition for an extended role for nuclear deterrence. NUCLEAR ACCEPTANCE IN NATO Public support for political decisions and concepts is crucial for democratic societies. This does not always necessitate the wholehearted and explicit backing of any decision. Particularly with regard to nuclear deterrence, as a concept that at least theoretically implies the danger of nuclear retaliation and thereby of total devastation of those areas to be protected by the "deterrence umbrella," enthusiastic support can hardly be expected. As the German experience during the Cold War has shown, in dealing with the inherent dilemmas of nuclear deterrence the public tends to stifle or to block out this problem, whereas politicians are inclined to follow the "don't rock the boat" mentality. This kind of a negligence or "papering over" of existing dilemmas might be sufficient to create an amorphous sort of underlying "support," which de facto means nothing more than indifference or "nonopposition." As long as elaboration of the nuclear question is only limited to small expert's circles, "nonopposition" can be sufficient to keep a concept like "deterrence" in place. This seems to be true for the time being, since the "no first use" issue has shown that antinuclear moods in Germany or in Canada are still far from having a critical mass to become politically virulent in the entire Atlantic alliance.

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However, recalling the aggressive antinuclear movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this "nuclear apathy" might change abruptly—be it as a consequence of an incident involving nuclear weapons or in reaction to a political issue like the resumption of nuclear tests. In such a case, convincing political answers combined with cohesive military concepts have to be available to counter critical arguments and to find public support for NATO's nuclear forces. Hence it seems to be politically prudent to prepare for such a situation and to develop cohesive strategies and consistent lines of arguments. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES Such a preemptive approach, however, displays some weaknesses in NATO's present nuclear posture. According to the threat analysis presented in this chapter, a credible justification for nuclear deterrence can and should be based not only on nuclear risks but also particularly on the challenges posed by potentially hostile states armed with chemical and biological weapons. However, instrumentalizing nuclear weapons against chemical and biological threats will imply an evolution of nuclear deterrence that will have consequences for NATO's nuclear posture. If NATO's nuclear rationale of today has changed compared to the nuclear logic of the Cold war, the numbers and types of NATO's nuclear weapons deployed have to reflect these changes accordingly. This is all the more important since only a coherent nuclear structure will find the support of the public, which is necessary in an alliance of democratic countries. Should a situation occur in which the public asks for a justification for NATO's nuclear weapons, conceivable and plausible answers must be given to preserve nuclear acceptance. This holds particularly true for the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the nonnuclear allies.25 In spite of the fact that these so-called substrategic weapons have been significantly reduced since 1991, there are still some free-fall nuclear bombs of the B-61 type stationed in Europe. Eleven versions of that weapon have been developed and/or produced over the recent years. The most recent deployed type is B-61-10, which is reportedly a reconverted W-85 Pershing II warhead.26 The overall number of these weapons is classified. The data given in open literature differ significantly. Some observers mention the figure of about 150 nuclear weapons in Europe.27 Other sources state that the number of nuclear weapons lies between 480 and 700 gravity bombs presently stored in special ammunition vaults in Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.28 Traditionally, these weapons have a strategic as well as a political function and should serve at least three core purposes: • To contribute to a credible nuclear deterrence capability of NATO, and in that sense they must fulfill a military strategic role to have a political effect. • To provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American allies and to symbolize nuclear risk-sharing within NATO. • To enable the European NATO partners to participate in nuclear consultations and nuclear planning processes within NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

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However, with regard to the strategic rationale for these bombs there seems to be a widening gap between weapons deployed and roles and missions assigned. This holds true for the classical function of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against nuclear threats, but even more for the new role of nuclear deterrence against other WMD challenges. If one assumes an unlikely nuclear threat coming from China, India, Pakistan, or one of the potential future nuclear countries, it is difficult to attribute any strategic logic to the few and aging nuclear bombs deployed in Europe. Even in the extreme case of a newly antagonistic Russia falling back into the confrontational patterns of the past, the free-fall bombs would likely to be the least credible component of any Western response to a Russian military threat. The fighter bombers currently available in Europe to deliver the bombs cannot reach targets in Russia and return without difficult air-refueling arrangements. This holds even more true for the more likely threats posed by other weapons of mass destruction. Almost all possible sources of attacks with biological or chemical weapons against NATO territory or against NATO forces are geographically located beyond the European borders—in North Africa, the Gulf region, or in Asia. In case of a threat along the lines of the three potential scenarios outlined above, NATO's nuclear deterrence will hardly be bolstered by the bombs deployed in Europe. Instead, should an ally of NATO (e.g., Israel in the Gulf War) face a WMD threat, NATO's deterrence message would presumably be based upon U.S. nuclear cruise missiles or submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (some of which are still dedicated to NATO) but almost certainly not on U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe, which must be mounted under Tornado aircraft to be flown over vast distances into the crisis region. Obviously, there is an increasing "strategic disconnect" between NATO's nuclear strategy and NATO's nuclear weapons stationed in Europe in the sense that NATO's nuclear posture does hardly reflect the future necessities of nuclear deterrence and the modified rationale for nuclear weapons in general. And even the political function of NATO's nuclear weapons as a symbol of alliance cohesion and nuclear burden sharing has declined significantly since NATO is no longer threatened by Warsaw Pact forces heavily armed with conventional and nuclear weapons. Today, alliance solidarity is much more at stake in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans and in conceivable military operations on the periphery NATO—with or without WMD threats. In consequence, the more the preservation of nuclear deterrence is strategically justified with vital threats (nuclear, biological, chemical) beyond the traditional NATO boundaries, the less strategic logic can be attributed to the B-61 nuclear bombs in European NATO countries. Hence, a "blank-sheet approach" should be taken by NATO to rethink the need of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Do NATO's European allies still regard U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on their territory as a necessary ingredient of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" over Europe? Does the United States still consider nuclear gravity bombs as a symbol for European risk-sharing and thereby as an indispensable precondition for the U.S. military presence in Europe? Such a review of NATO's nuclear requirements could probably lead to the conclusion that future nuclear deterrence requirements could well be met by the

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strategic nuclear forces of NATO's nuclear member states (first and foremost by the nuclear posture of the United States) and that all U.S. substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe could and should be dismantled—even unilaterally without entering into lengthy and cumbersome formal arms control negotiations with Russia. In that case a nuclear withdrawal would not only help to bridge NATO's strategic disconnect but would also bring about four further benefits. It would be consistent with NATO's claim to maintain nuclear weapons "at the minimum level to preserve peace and stability."29 It would also be in line with the readiness of President George W. Bush for significant and if necessary unilateral cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In addition, it would contribute to upholding public acceptance of nuclear deterrence as a key ingredient of peace and security. Last, it could support nuclear arms control by being an incentive (or a face-saving measure) for Russia to significantly cut its nonstrategic forces as well. At least three significant counterarguments can be brought up against the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons. The first one is that some of NATO's allies such as Turkey—due to their geostrategic setting—still regard U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil as in their interest. These concerns could be met by a gradual withdrawal, starting in an area formerly called NATO's "Central Region" and developing to the flanks at a later stage. The second argument is that the Europeans would lose their leverage in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in the sense that without U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe the idea of nuclear consultations—a linchpin of alliance cohesion during the Cold War—would become a hollow shell. However, even this reasoning has to be reassessed under the new realities of the post-Cold War era. In fact, NATO's nuclear consultations have always implied two aspects: consultations on the actual use of nuclear weapons in war, and consultations with respect to nuclear planning procedures (weapons locations, targeting, etc.) in peacetime. With regard to consultations prior to the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in a conflict situation, it is hardly imaginable that the United States would not make every effort to consult with the European allies if it were ever obliged to consider using nuclear weapons in NATO's defense—even if no U.S. weapons were present in Europe. With regard to consultations concerning nuclear planning, targeting, and deployment, the situation has changed as well. Since the employment of NATO's nuclear weapons in the immediate neighborhood of NATO's territory (or even on German soil—which had been a possible option in the case of a Warsaw Pact attack during the peak of the Cold War) is no longer a realistic option, the immediate pressure for some NATO members, particularly for Germany, to have an influence on nuclear targeting operations has decreased significantly. In addition, influence on U.S. nuclear planning for contingencies that might affect Europe could be exerted via the European presence at the U.S. Strategic Command. The third counterargument is that the present U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is largely intended as a placeholder, designed to keep open the option of deploying modernized nuclear systems if necessary. This rationale is based on the assumption that a withdrawal of the bombs would foreclose, or at least make politically difficult, future U.S. deployment of any nuclear weapons in Europe.

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Even in a crisis, the redeployment of nuclear weapons would be largely impossible, because the public in most NATO countries would vigorously object such a step. However, the recent experience with public support for NATO's air strikes in Kosovo points in a different direction. Particularly in Germany there was enormous political support for NATO bombing Yugoslavia throughout the entire political spectrum, in spite of the lack of a mandate from the UN Security Council and despite Germany's antimilitary moods displayed frequently over the past decades. Obviously, even pacifist-oriented groupings like the Germany Greens and the left wing of the Social Democratic Party accepted the necessity of military strikes because there was an awareness of the danger of nonaction and a degree of direct threat due to the geographical proximity of the crisis. Transferred to the nuclear realm, this could mean that in a crisis the redeployment of nuclear weapons to Europe could well find the support of the public in most NATO countries, provided that the crisis is regarded as vital and the political and military logic of NATO's action presented to the public is conclusive and convincing. Realistically speaking, however, a political development—be it in Russia or elsewhere—that would require a modernized U.S. nuclear arsenal deployed in Europe is for the time being very hard to imagine. Hence, the "placeholder argument" seems increasingly to become a theoretical one. For many years, NATO had refrained from discussing nuclear questions because of the preemptive assumption that they would not find the backing of the electorate. This might have been prudent for a certain period of time. However, since the rationale for nuclear weapons has changed over the recent years, this has to be elucidated to those who have to support such a concept explicitly or implicitly. As history has shown, the nuclear rationale is not self-explanatory. This does not mean that nuclear questions have to be actively pushed in public, since there is no need to awake a "sleeping dog." However, credible lines of arguments have to be prepared preemptively to be available if the situation requires. The intention of the new U.S. administration under George W. Bush to fundamentally redefine the U.S. nuclear requirements could be an ignition to start a redefinition of NATO's nuclear future as well. NOTES

1. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Washington, DC, April 1999, § 62, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 2. See Andrew J. Pierre and Dimitri Trenin, "Developing NATO-Russia Relations," Survival 39, no. 1 (spring 1997): 5. 3. See John Thornhill, "Nuclear Doctrine Changes," Financial Times, April 30, 1999. 4. The war on the Balkans, NATO enlargement, and the Russian military onslaught in the Caucasus have reduced the level of cooperation between Moscow and NATO significantly, and one can seriously argue whether there is really a perspective for a "strategic partnership" on both sides, given their fundamentally opposite set of political and military interests. However, given the politically unstable situation in Russia, the political accommodation established after September 11, 2001, and the set of global challenges that can

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only be tackled with the support of an obliging Russia, there is hardly any alternative to the preservation of a cooperative relationship even in times of sharp disagreement. 5. Throughout the Cold War, many proponents of the idea of a nuclear test ban hoped that without permanent testing the two nuclear superpowers would progressively lose confidence in the reliability of their own nuclear arsenals and would become increasingly more eager to pursue nuclear disarmament. 6. See "Communique of the International Court of Justice," no. 96/23, July 8, 1996. 7. See Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination ofNuclear Weapons, August 1996. 8. Fred Charles Ikle, "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996): 119. 9. It is worth noting that Foreign Minister Fischer launched the "no first use" idea notwithstanding the fact that he had been alerted by most of his senior advisers of the political dangers of such an initiative. 10. "The allies consider that with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote." See The Alliance's Strategic Concept, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. 11. See Washington Summit Communique, para. 32, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/ p99-064e.htm. 12. See "Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures, Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament," NATO press communique MNAC-2 (2000) 121. 13. Meanwhile, there have been many international efforts to cope with the challenge of "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union. The United States has taken the lead in providing funds and expertise particularly with the safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the context of nuclear disarmament. See Zachary Selden, "Nunn-Lugar: New Solutions for Today's Nuclear Threats," Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Washington, DC, 1998, www.bens.org/pubs/nunnlugar.html. 14. "States of concern" replaced the popular U.S. terminology of "rogue state," which was very controversial among European analysts because the criteria characterizing a "rogue" state were not clearly defined. According to U.S. interpretations, rogue states were countries with nondemocratic leaderships that pursued their national interests by violent means, and that were generally perceived as supporters of international terrorism and violators of human rights. In addition, these countries were believed to develop weapons of mass destruction or to try to acquire the relevant technologies and know-how illegally. However, depending on which criteria were emphasized in the analysis, the group of states labeled "rogue" was composed of different members. The new "states of concern" classification does reduce some of the negative connotations of "rogue"—however, the definition is still cloudy and open to interpretation. 15. According to the so-called Rumsfeld Report published in the United States in 1998, the threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation has been vastly underestimated even by the U.S. intelligence services. See "National Security Report, Unveiling the Ballistic Missile Threat: The Ramifications of the Rumsfeld Report," House National Security Report, Washington, DC, August 1998. 16. There is an emerging debate whether chemical weapons are really a means of mass destruction. Unlike biological and nuclear weapons, chemical agents have to be dispersed

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in huge quantities to inflict large numbers of casualties. Hence, they are ill suited to cause mass killings on the battlefield or among the civilian population. With regard to their lethality, chemical weapons are much closer to modern conventional weapons than to biological or nuclear means of destruction. 17. Biological warheads on ballistic missiles require some technological know-how to protect the agents from heat and acceleration. 18. See McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons in the Gulf," Foreign Affairs 70, 4(fall 1991): 83. 19. See Victor A. Utgoff, Nuclear Weapons and the Deterrence of Biological and Chemical Warfare (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1997), 2. 20. See John Pike, "Nuclear Threats During the Gulf War" (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, February 1998), www.fas.org/irp/epring/ds-threats.htm. 21. Iraqi officials such as General Wafic Al Sammarai, former head of Iraqi military intelligence, has stated that Iraqi leaders took the U.S. warning very seriously. See Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, "The Case for Nuclear Deterrence Today," Orbis 42, 1 (winter 1998): 7-14. 22. It is worth noting, however, that from a legal perspective, the U.S. interpretation of nuclear deterrence as a means against biological and chemical threats is not uncontroversial. Such a role for nuclear weapons collides with the so-called negative security assurances the United States (and other nuclear powers) have long provided to the nonnuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such assurances promise that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against these states unless they attack the United States or its allies with the support of a nuclear state. See George Bunn, "The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States," The Nonproliferation Review 4 (spring/summer 1997): 1. 23. See Jeffrey A. Larsen, "NATO Counterproliferation Policy: A Case Study in Alliance Politics" (Colorado Springs: U.S. INSS, Air Force Academy, 1997). 24. See "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO press release NAC-S(99)65, Brussels, April 1999, art. 63. 25. In a strict sense, NATO as an organization does not possess any nuclear weapons at all. All nuclear warheads are under the strict national control of the three nuclear allies: France, Great Britain, and the United States. A small number of U.S. and British nuclear weapons are assigned to NATO. Most of these weapons are deployed in Europe under socalled dual-key arrangements, which indicates that the means of delivery (mostly nuclearcapable aircraft) are operated by those countries that host the weapons on their territory. 26. A new version called B-61-11, which is said to have an earth-penetrating capability, seems not yet deployed. 27. See William Arkin et al., Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998 (Washington, DC: Nuclear Resources Defense Council, 1998). 28. David S. Yost, The U.S. and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, Adelphi Paper no. 326 (London: IISS, 1999), 9. The difference in the numbers given in the literature partly results from the fact that all nuclear bombs are stored in vaults and that the number of vaults is about 150. However, it is unclear whether one or more bombs are stored in one vault. 29. See "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO press release NAC-S(99)65, art. 63.

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CHAPTER 10

The Coupling Paradox: Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missile Defense, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship James Fergusson Prior to 1989, no discussion of European security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the transatlantic relationship ignored the nuclear question. Every discussion either began with, concentrated upon, or was informed by the nuclear dimension. Perhaps no greater sign of the new post-1989 security environment has been the relative absence of discussions regarding the nuclear question. Certainly, nuclear issues have been raised in the context of NATO, and most recently in terms of the issue of its "first use" policy. Even then, there was really no major debate on "first use." It was readily sidestepped at the Washington summit in April 1999 and in NATO's New Strategic Concept released at the summit. Beyond "first use," issues concerning nuclear weapons have been of a different form and function when compared to the great debates of the Cold War. Concerns have been regularly expressed about a range of issues tied to the reduction of U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals and the future of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), especially in light of the alliance debate on the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program.1 Also, nuclear weapons are central to the rise to prominence of the proliferation issue on the alliance's security agenda. However, in all of the contemporary issues concerning nuclear weapons and the alliance, debates on their role in alliance security politics, and the implications of nuclear weapons on the debate concerning NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), are largely absent. Most importantly, and perhaps most telling, is the absence of any public discourse about the role and function of nuclear weapons in the alliance; concerns one could have expected in the wake of the end of the Cold War, but that did not materialize. In a way, it is as if nuclear weapons have publicly and privately disappeared in alliance politics, and in the transatlantic security relationship. Arguably, the politics of nuclear weapons in European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship can be best described as "let sleeping dogs lie." In its

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place, ballistic missile defense has emerged. Components of the alliance debate targeted on NMD certainly draw upon elements of nuclear weapons debates of the Cold War. This is especially true in references that link NMD to the decoupling of U.S. strategic forces from Europe. However, since the public emergence of the missile defense debate between Europe and the Unites States, the nuclear weapons element has largely been peripheral, and certainly the implications of missile defense for the politics of nuclear weapons in European security have not been examined. Instead, missile defense has largely been conceptually delinked from nuclear weapons, even though nuclear proliferation, horizontal and vertical, is a central component of the broader, generic debate on missile defense. This analysis seeks to wake up the sleeping dogs. In so doing, it suggests that missile defense has a range of potentially significant implications for the transatlantic security relationship, and for nuclear weapons, well beyond those enunciated in the ongoing generic debate. In order to identify these implications, this study initially examines some past lessons about the political role of nuclear weapons especially in terms of alliance solidarity. From this basis, the missile defense debate is examined in similar terms. It concludes by examining the wider political implications of missile defense for the transatlantic relationship, Russia, and ESDP. DEFECTION, ENTRAPMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Classic alliance theory draws a direct linkage between the motives that bring nations together, and the constraints on their behavior that result. States fundamentally enter into alliances to coordinate their security on the basis of a common threat perception.2 In so doing, states in alliance significantly constrain their freedom of action. This constraint is embedded in the alliance's operative clause that legally dictates when and how adherents must or should act. Moreover, the common threat or target nation also limits a nation's diplomatic flexibility. Alliance membership creates political expectations of diplomatic solidarity not only against the target nation, but also across a range of issues and actors in the international system. The linkage between common interest and behavioral constraints produces two significant, interrelated political concerns. The first is defection. Members of an alliance may decide in a crisis, or on the outbreak of war, that their interests lie in defecting from the alliance. Such was the case in August 1914, when Italy defected from the Triple Alliance. The second concern is entrapment. Here, members fear that their commitment could result in becoming entrapped in actions peripheral to their primary interest.3 This concern was central, for example, to the United States, fearing that its commitment to Western Europe in 1949 could result in it becoming entrapped in European colonial affairs. These two concerns crystallize into the politics of alliance solidarity, and create the solidarity paradox. The requirement to demonstrate political solidarity, and thus reduce fears of defection, results in increasing fears of entrapment. Behavior that

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reduces fear of entrapment serves to increase fears of defection. This paradox operates internally within an alliance such as NATO, and externally as well with regard to the alliance's target states. External perceptions of solidarity will significantly inform the actions of the target states toward the alliance, which in turn will affect calculations about the probability that alliance members will honor their formal or legal commitment. Thus, for example, widespread domestic opposition in Western Europe to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) led in part to the Soviet decision to walk away from the negotiating table at Geneva in 1983 as a means to promote the possibility of West European defection.4 In many ways, the history of NATO has been about managing the solidarity paradox. In its beginning, managing the paradox was central to the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington (1949) and found in the formal commitment in Article 5 and the so-called out-of-area clause (Article 6).5 By limiting the operative scope of the alliance, the parameters of defection and entrapment, and hence the context of solidarity, were set. Until the end of the Cold War, the parameters remained fixed. Since then, as part of the alliance reinventing itself, the out-of-area issue emerged, as symbolized by NATO involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, the parameters widened. The implications of this widening remain to be seen, not least of all because the common threat that created NATO has disappeared. There were a variety of mechanisms and processes applied to manage the solidarity paradox. One of the most important, yet unrecognized, was nuclear weapons. Overwhelmingly, studies on nuclear weapons and the alliance concentrated on the problem of the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent, especially after the United States became vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile attack in the 1960s. This vulnerability created the conditions for the debate on flexible response in the alliance.6 Moreover, the deployment of tactical and theater nuclear weapons under the dual-key arrangement, alongside the emergence of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in NATO to manage the politics of this arrangement, also brought attention to the idea of shared risk.7 This idea has been largely explained as a product of domestic political considerations. Thus, for example, the INF decision was politically predicted on several European NATO nations receiving the weapons. When the INF Treaty was signed in 1987, eliminating this class of nuclear weapons, one immediate concern was the nuclear singularization of West Germany. With only tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons in public view, West Germany quickly sought to place these weapons (short-range nuclear [SNF]) on the negotiating table. It was domestically unacceptable for West Germany alone to have nuclear weapons deployed on its soil, notwithstanding, of course, the reality of French and British weapons and airdelivered nuclear weapons possessed under dual key by several other allies.8 Underlying or linked to the credibility and shared-risk issues of nuclear weapons was the vital role they played as a means to manage defection. Within Europe, the deployment of nuclear weapons spread among most of the NATO allies served to reduce the likelihood that these nations would, or could, defect in the midst of a political crisis with the East. Ironically, it was nuclear weapons that created the

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fear of defection in making member states a direct target of a Soviet nuclear attack. The Soviet Union could potentially exploit fears of nuclear weapons to entice an alliance member to defect by promising them nuclear immunity in the case of war. By deploying nuclear weapons on the soil of key NATO members under the dual-key arrangement, these states became a direct target, regardless of their fear. Thus they likely would be unable to defect, even if they wanted to. This function of nuclear weapons also underpinned the alliance debate surrounding flexible response and ballistic missile defense in the late 1970s, and missile defense in the 1980s as occasioned by President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) enunciated in March of 1983. Both flexible response and ballistic missile defense presented the possibility of decoupling U.S. strategic forces from the alliance. In so doing, they effectively raised the specter of U.S. defection in the case of war. Defection in this sense refers to the notion that the U.S. homeland would be a sanctuary in the case of war with the Soviet Union in Europe, rather than overall U.S. defection from its Article 5 commitment. With U.S. forces deployed in West Germany and West Berlin in particular, war in Europe would almost automatically mean U.S. engagement.9 Europeans feared that flexible response with the U.S. emphasis on building up NATO's conventional forces would create conditions in which a war in Europe could be limited to Europe. Similarly, a missile defense of the continental United States also potentially implied the limitation of war to Europe. In other words, both implied that shared risk would be limited to the European members of the alliance. In addition, if the Soviet Union also deployed a strategic defense, then the two superpowers would possess a common interest in limiting any possible war to Europe, with both of their homelands becoming sanctuaries. Obviously, such a situation was politically unacceptable. Flexible response and missile defense thus served to raise concerns about U.S. defection by limiting any war to Europe. The West Europeans by virtue of deployed nuclear weapons could not defect, but the United States in a strategic military sense could. This concern underpins the French argument in particular about the importance of an independent strategic nuclear strike capability. At one level, the question was whether the United States would sacrifice Washington, New York, and Chicago for Bonn, Paris, and London. In other words, it reflected concerns about the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. At another level, the independent French ability to strike at Moscow can be understood as ensuring the strategic coupling of the United States. If in a war in Europe Moscow was destroyed, the Soviet Union would most certainly strike at the United States directly as well. In other words, French forces, as well as British and NATO's INF capability, would serve to entrap strategically the United States. In some ways, this is most evident in British investments in the Chevaline modernization program of its strategic nuclear forces to ensure that they could penetrate the Soviet missile defense system to strike Moscow. At the same time, of course, independent French and British strategic nuclear forces also created the possibility for their decoupling from the first line of defense in West Germany. While both would be engaged in the battle for West Germany,

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which would likely include the use of short-range battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons, their strategic forces offered the possibility of their homelands also becoming a sanctuary. The ability of both to threaten the Soviet Union itself held out the possibility of a tacit limitation of the war to West Germany. In other words, like the fear of flexible response and U.S. ballistic missile defense providing the possibility of U.S. strategic defection through decoupling, so French and British independent strategic forces held out the possibility of their strategic defection. It is this context that informed the importance of a NATO capability to strike at the Soviet Union, and thus the importance of the modernization of its INF capability. INF relative to the national forces of the United States, France, and Great Britain was a means to entrap all three strategically, while at the same time enhancing overall alliance credibility. Thus, the elimination of these forces with the INF Treaty not only singularized West Germany with attendant domestic political implications, but also created the conditions that would permit the three nuclear powers of NATO to defect strategically. West Germany faced three options. One was to eliminate short-range nuclear forces, and thus ostensibly denuclearize the alliance; the option of apparent choice at the time. The second was to develop their own strategic nuclear forces as a means to entrap their allies.10 The third option, also undertaken, was to obtain some form of nuclear consultation with the French with regard to their nuclear forces. This latter option implied of course that the French nuclear forces would serve as the basis of a Euro-deterrent, whose development would confront all the problems of the United States in NATO in the 1960s that led to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. Ultimately, the implications of INF for the solidarity paradox were sidestepped by the end of the Cold War. The role of nuclear weapons as an element of this paradox, and as a means to manage it, simply disappeared. Yet the issue has not truly gone away. At one level, the U.S. NMD program is seen as decoupling the U.S. strategic deterrent. In so doing, one of the outcomes is to reawaken the problem that West Germany faced, and the assorted options noted above. In other words, as missile defense proceeds, it is possible that the issue of nuclear weapons in the alliance, and the status of French and possibly British independent nuclear forces with regard to the ESDP, could readily emerge. Of course, this itself is a product of alliance politics surrounding missile defense, the relationship of the alliance to Russia on the issue of both missile defenses and strategic arms control, and questions of how far ESDP may go, with nuclear weapons arguably the last step toward a final outcome. THE MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE The politics of missile defense in the alliance appear to have taken a less oppositional character with the election of George W. Bush, not least of all because the new administration is committed to proceeding regardless of opposition. The U.S. missile defense development programs have been restructured by merging the theater and national divisions into a single, overarching global program, and the adminis-

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tration has offered to develop defenses for its allies.11 Nonetheless, the initial opposition of the European allies to the Clinton's administration's NMD program entails a range of concerns that relate to the old issue of decoupling as informed by the new threat environment. Concerns about NMD initially emerged in the wake of a series of formal briefings begun in the fall of 1999 by key members of the Clinton administration at meetings of the alliance. It was in response to these briefings that public alliance concerns and opposition appeared. On the surface, one could suggest that the Europeans were caught by surprise. However, this is unlikely, not least of all because European defense departments were well aware of the multifaceted U.S. missile defense programs, including NMD. Rather, the formal briefings likely indicated to the Europeans that NMD would move ahead. In other words, the question of whether NMD would be deployed shifted to the question of when. At one level, public opposition from Europe appears much too late to influence the decision to proceed, especially with the commitment of the George W. Bush administration not only to move forward quickly, but also to withdraw, if necessary, from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.12 At another level, this opposition may be understood as a function of concerns about future plans for the system. While there is widespread bipartisan support for missile defense in the United States, there are also significant differences about the nature and future of the actual system. Many Republicans long believed that NMD as a ground-based system was the wrong type of defense for the United States, and supported a navalbased system.13 President Bush, during the presidential campaign, argued in favor of a much larger and more sophisticated system of national missile defense. Since then, the Bush administration has undertaken a full reexamination of the missile defense programs, has merged the theater and national programs into a single effort for global purposes, and has placed emphasis on forward-deployed missile defense assets and boost-phase systems for the defense of North America. At the same time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, not least of all as a function of his role as chairman of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, has also placed space firmly on the missile defense agenda. As such, opposition by Europe, as well as by Russia and China, may be more readily understood as opposition to future developments that would follow an initial limited missile defense for North America. In other words, NMD is a forerunner to a much larger, layered national missile defense capability akin to the Strategic Defense Initiative as proposed during the Reagan administration.14 Concerns expressed by the Europeans in the councils of NATO and the public press serve to register a range of different concerns about the future. While these are directed specifically to the NMD issue, they are really about the future of the transatlantic link and its relationship with the evolving European Security and Defense Policy. Overall, the Europeans have identified six interrelated areas of concern: threat assessments, deterrence, strategic decoupling, Russia, arms control, and alliance consultation.15 Of these, two stand out in particular because they entail the underlying linkage of the dormant nuclear weapons issue for the alliance

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and Europe. The first is threat assessments and relates directly to European political concerns about the implications of accepting the U.S. perspective. The second concerns the strategic decoupling issue as informed by the differential security argument. Both lie at the heart of the transatlantic security relationship, and relate to the solidarity paradox. On the surface, there appears to be a fundamental disagreement between Europe and the United States on the threat, even in the case of Great Britain, which is closest to sharing the U.S. threat assessment. However, this is only a surface disagreement. Since the 1991 NATO Rome summit, the alliance has regularly identified proliferation in general, and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in particular, as one of the significant security challenges of the post-Cold War era. In response to this challenge, there is also agreement that the West's response should be multidimensional and multilateral under the mutually supportive umbrellas of diplomacy and defense. This led to the establishment, respectively, of the Senior Political Group (diplomacy), and Senior Defense Group on proliferation. In addition, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established a WMD Centre in the spring of 2001, which is designed to coordinate the alliance's response to proliferation. Thus, the disagreement on the threat is primarily one of timing. Whereas the United States believes that the threat to Europe and North America will become operational sooner rather than later, many of the Europeans believe the inverse. However, the earliest operational deployment of NMD, now likely in 2005,16 does not necessarily mean that it is also the likeliest date of a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to North America from one of the so-called rogue states, or the usual suspects.17 While possible, but unlikely, the NMD date may be better understood as an attempt to deploy as early as possible ahead of an operational threat. At the same time, ballistic missile threats already exist through the widespread possession of short-range (less than 500 miles) delivery systems among all of the usual suspects. In response, the United States has already deployed, as have Germany and the Netherlands, the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) point defense system for deployed military forces. Relative to potential nonArticle 5 missions, there is a consensus on the importance of such defenses for expeditionary forces. Concerns are now directed to the medium- to intermediaterange ballistic missile (M/IRBM) development programs, of which the 1998 Iranian test is recent evidence of an emerging threat to European members of NATO.18 Certainly, a single test does not make for an operational capability. Nor is it necessarily the case that Iran seeks a capability to threaten continental Europe or the United States. Its missile program may be directed only within the region itself. Moreover, current missile capabilities and programs in the Middle East as a whole indicate largely a regional capability for the time being. However, the defense-diplomacy logic of missile defense, and thus of transatlantic security cooperation, comes into play. Under any range of scenarios in which Western or U.S. forces may intervene, anti-tactical missile defense (ATMD) is necessary, but not sufficient. Regional MRBMs married to nuclear weapons (given

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legitimate Western concerns about the Iranian nuclear development program, for example) provide an adversary with the ability not only to strike at military debarkation and marshalling points for expeditionary forces, but also to threaten potential host nations. Theater missile defense (TMD) capabilities become vital for defense specifically, but also politically to reassure host nations. The problem here is judging the time frame of the Iranian and other Middle East missile development programs relative to ongoing U.S.-European ATMD and TMD. Following this logic, plugging the tactical and theater gap still leaves the long-range threat as an option to dissuade Western intervention. Thus, NMD serves to plug this gap. In so doing, a seamless missile defense web is created, similar in nature to the seamless deterrence web that informed alliance strategy during the Cold War and reinforced the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe by reducing European fears of U.S. defection. In other words, a seamless defense web, like the seamless deterrence web, works to prevent U.S. defection. However, the European problem has been the timing of missile defense deployment relative to missile proliferation. NMD is the final layer in response to the stepby-step development process of ballistic missiles (short to medium to intermediate to intercontinental). However, the final layer, NMD, was planned to precede effective TMD capabilities. Notwithstanding the ability of ATMD to deploy around cities for a limited, but not national or continental, defense, Europe will be operationally threatened before the United States from the Middle East, but the United States will be defended, and Europe will not. This in turn has domestic political ramifications for the Europeans, which manifest in European opposition to NMD. Accepting the U.S. threat assessment means accepting that the M/IRBM threat to Europe is looming in the immediate future, long before the likely deployment of TMD systems, which, depending upon type and deployment patterns, may be sufficient to defend Europe. In so doing, acceptance also holds the potential for raising fears among European publics about a direct ballistic missile/WMD threat to Europe. It is difficult to measure the extent to which the European public holds negative images of certain Middle East regimes, or whether these regimes are considered subject to deterrence logic, especially after the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11,2001. Nonetheless, the specter of a rapidly emerging threat is likely to lead to public demands for a response. In so doing, it not only raises the issue of missile defense. It also raises the dormant nuclear weapons issue surrounding the viability and credibility of nuclear forces assigned to Europe, either in the form of NATO's limited air-launched nuclear capabilities, or independent French and British forces. If the United States is defended by an operational limited missile defense shield, U.S. nuclear forces become ostensibly removed from the political order of battle. In other words, U.S. strategic forces are decoupled, in a manner similar to the Cold War situation in the 1950s. In contrast to the 1950s, however, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the U.S. president would threaten to retaliate with U.S. strategic forces against the threat of an attack on Europe. Instead, Europe would have to rely upon extant nuclear forces. The new question becomes whether the French, British, or

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NATO (U.S. weapons) will threaten to obliterate some Middle Eastern capital city in response to an attack against Berlin, Rome, Athens, or Ankara. Besides this classical case of the dilemma of extended nuclear deterrence, more dangerous politically is the possibility that this situation of North America defended and decoupled could possibly resurrect the nuclear debate itself in Europe. Moreover, such a debate would take place in the context of an alternative to nuclear weapons that exists across the Atlantic—missile defense. Finally, it is not simply the question of the credibility of a nuclear retaliatory threat in response to a threat to one of the nonnuclear members of the alliance. It is also the political ramifications for alliance solidarity in the face of such a threat. As feared during the Cold War, threatening a nonnuclear member could serve to affect alliance consensus in terms of a conventional response. This would not likely affect the ability of the United States and others to respond through an ad hoc coalition as in the Gulf War case. However, it would undermine the rationale and legitimacy of the alliance as a crisis management institution, and with it raise questions especially in the United States about the alliance's viability and utility. Accepting the U.S. threat assessment in combination with NMD deployment could readily produce public questioning as to why European governments are not working to defend their populations. In so doing, these demands could then raise pressures on these governments to dramatically alter defense investment patterns. Thus, NMD also spawns a domestic political debate in Europe, which all the governments are seeking to avoid. Avoiding such a debate, or at least delaying it until TMD systems, European and U.S., begin to come on line in the later years of this decade, underlies European concerns and opposition. Public pressure for action would also likely affect more pressing political-security goals relative to ESDP and NATO, political-military restructuring programs to promote an independent effective European military capability, and European/national procurement, modernization, and force restructuring programs. On the specific defense investment side, it could lead to demands for redirecting limited defense funds and increased defense spending. Military elites in Europe are neither interested in redirecting funds, for a variety of reasons outside the purview of this analysis, nor interested in increasing spending that could potentially undermine existing investment especially in terms of programs that are as much about ESDP as they are about an effective military capability. Using the threat disagreement between Europe and the United States, in effect, exposes the European criticism of NMD as largely directed toward domestic audiences, rather than the United States per se. The threat, proliferation, deterrence, strategic decoupling, and security differentials are, in effect, for domestic consumption. In this sense, the Europeans in reality may not be opposed to missile defense at all! Rather they may simply be opposed to the timing of NMD. Moreover, missile defense is essential for a range of European security interests in general, and for the future of the transatlantic link in particular. The strategic decoupling and security differential concerns not only reflect this domestic issue, but also relate to underlying concerns about U.S. engagement and

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isolationism—concerns that NMD is the forerunner of "Fortress America," increased U.S. unilateralism, and the possible collapse of the transatlantic relationship. However, NMD is more properly understood as ensuring a U.S. strategy of internationalism, and a missile defense for Europe is a vital component to limit the unilateralist impulse in the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, especially in terms of the collapse of the traditional raison d'etre for the transatlantic link, concerns, pronounced not least of all in the United States itself, about a U.S. withdrawal have been central to the importance of reinventing the alliance. The Clinton administration in successive documents reiterated the strategy of engagement and leadership, with a preference for multilateralism. While many are now deeply concerned about unilateralism under the new Republican administration, it is highly unlikely that the United States will become any more or less unilateralist than in the past. That is, the United States will remain engaged in defense of its interests, which includes its allies, and U.S. leadership is essential for a collective allied response against threats to common interests and values. Missile defense is an essential pillar of engagement and leadership, especially given the Cold War experience. At the most basic level, no U.S. president on political grounds alone will likely accept a situation in which U.S. and allied forces can be defended against ballistic missiles, but the American population cannot. Missile defense provides a measure of assurance that the American public will be supportive of U.S. engagement, especially with regard to conflicts not vital to U.S. national security. In this sense, the political willingness of the United States to intervene in support of friends and allies is enhanced. It is not simply a question of the presumed sensitivity of the public to casualties in faraway places, but of ensuring that the public itself does not feel threatened, even in the absence of an actual missile threat to North America. In other words, missile defense is not just about self-deterrence in which a limited, unsophisticated ICBM capability dissuades the United States from acting; it is also about supporting a decision to come to the aid of friends and allies. The United States will remain engaged regardless of missile defense in circumstances where vital national security interests are affected. The core issue for allies, especially relative to non-Article 5 operations, is whether the United States will act in concert in response to circumstances more vital to Europe than to the United States. Both share common interests per se, but these interests or situations may have distinctly different values and importance attached to them. Thus missile defense, regardless of the threat, is an important political pillar to allied cooperation. Missile defense may also be understood as a means for the United States to escape from the unsettling psychological condition produced by extended deterrence during the Cold War. Specifically, missile defense as partially understood during the Cold War was not as much about strategic and crisis stability concerns divorced from politics, but more about the political implications of the decoupling of U.S. strategic forces from Europe. Specifically, the United States for a period of time attempted to balance a national strategic doctrine of assured destruction to promote mutual assured destruction (MAD), with an alliance strategic concept of flexible

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response. Assured destruction was designed to reassure the Europeans of the U.S. commitment by strategic coupling, whereas flexible response also sought to reassure the Europeans through decoupling. In other words, flexible response raised the specter of strategic decoupling in order to ensure political coupling. Interestingly, the issue of strategic coupling did not play an important role during the 1950s, when the United States was relatively invulnerable. In fact, it was not an issue. The Europeans could rely upon the U.S. threat of massive retaliation. During this same period, Europe was vulnerable to limited Soviet nuclear capabilities, such that differential levels of security between Europe and the United States were most pronounced. Missile defense understood as restoring U.S. invulnerability against a limited threat thus replicates the 1950s. American TMD programs, relative to the idea or logic of spreading the U.S. defense umbrella to Europe, and to NATO/EU forces in out-of-area operations, can be understood as attempting to decouple U.S. strategic forces in order to ensure the continued political coupling of the overall relationship. It is driven by two key conditions. First, assessments of the so-called rogue states, relative to their acquisition of long-range ballistic missile delivery systems and WMD. As these states are recognized to pose a general threat to Western/U.S. security interests, which includes friends, allies, and clients, the very dilemma of extended deterrence (informal or tacit outside of Europe and formal via NATO in Europe during the Cold War) returns under new structural conditions. The escape for the United States resides in shifting the grounds from extended deterrence to dissuade via threats of nuclear retaliation, to extended defense to dissuade through the ability to use conventional forces and missile defenses. In so doing, the contentious problematique of the arcane debates on "crossing thresholds" and "dominating escalation chains" disappears. During the Cold War, there was no option other than retaliation to deterrence failure. Missile defense generally, and NMD in particular, provide another option, one more acceptable psychologically for Western/U.S. decisionmakers. If the defense umbrella is extended through TMD, it also provides a similar option and enables the United States to reassure allies and friends even more. In so doing, the fear of U.S. political defection is reduced, while promoting the greater likelihood of U.S. political entrapment. There are several implications for the alliance. At one level, missile defense does entail the decoupling of U.S. strategic forces from Europe. But this is only with regard to limited threats as a function of proliferators. NMD is insufficient to deal with Russian strategic forces, even if the system is expanded in the future to two ground-based sites of 100 interceptors each, along with forward-deployed air and naval missile defense forces. U.S. strategic forces thus remain coupled with regard to a Russian-based Article 5 threat, even though it is difficult to imagine the political conditions today and in the foreseeable future that would produce such a threat from Russia. With regard to proliferators, the strategic decoupling implied by NMD is designed to ensure continued political coupling. That is, it promotes the likelihood that the United States will continue its security commitment or guarantee to Europe without the dilemma created by extended deterrence.

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In so doing, it reinforces the importance of ensuring that NATO remains a nuclear alliance, and grants in a way greater significance to NATO as a pseudoindependent nuclear agent. At the same time, it also inherently raises the significance of French and British independent strategic forces, and could drive the logic of their becoming the foundation of a truly independent European nuclear deterrent. Despite the significant reluctance of the Europeans to confront missile defense, even though Europe will face a missile threat much sooner than the United States, they face little or no choice but to respond. But in responding, they also must confront demands from the United States for investment; the new manifestation of the old burden-sharing issue. In one way, Europe is faced with the fact that the U.S. will defend it whether it likes it or not; the well-known Canadian dilemma. In the absence of European participation, investment, and acquisition of a missile defense capability, either a national-based sharp-end integrated into an alliance-based battle management/command and control (BM/C2), or variants thereof, the doctrinal and capability end-state of U.S. TMD will determine how Europe is to be defended. This may not be problematic for Europe as effective free-riding on a U.S. TMD capability (most likely the naval programs) supports the European nuclear posture. However, it also cedes to the United States the ability to define the political-security response. Specifically, how Europe or the European pillar responds politically to events in its two core security regions will be effectively ceded to the United States. Responses to the Middle East or Russia could increasingly be structured, if not determined, by the United States. In effect, it is this specter that deeply concerns many Europeans, and especially the French, that their political-security future will be made by U.S. policy toward, for example, Iran and Moscow. Perhaps the United States will sacrifice Europe for the sake of other interests. NMD is a vital element of the U.S. commitment to Europe relative to emerging threats and cooperation in response to these threats. As a result there is political coupling. European involvement and cooperation is vital to avoid the very fear of unilateralism and a U.S. security dictat. Thus, both sides have a common interest in cooperative development of missile defenses, even though the United States by virtue of investment dollars is driving the agenda. Certainly, a security differential is likely to result. Cooperative missile defense that extends to a robust defense for all the members of the alliance against emerging threats provides a means to reduce, rather than exacerbate, the security differential in Europe. It appears that this is the very direction, in fact, that Europe and the United States are moving, toward the various programs under way, and the future central role of the alliance. MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE FUTURE OF NATO In the wake of the Cold War, the alliance sought to modernize itself in response to the collapse of its original raison d'etre: collective defense against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Through a series of political declarations, new concepts, such as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), and actions—the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization (SFOR) in the Bosnia and Kosovo war—the alliance

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adapted to take on the role of crisis management. This functional adaptation was not simply an institutional and generational response to a legitimacy crisis. It was and is also a response to concerns that one of the pillars of cooperative defense could collapse as a function of political forces on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, there was concern that after years of entanglement in Europe, the forces of isolationism would take hold, and that the United States would withdraw back into Fortress America. In Europe, this related to concerns about U.S. withdrawal and its paradoxical relationship with the European integrationist agenda.19 Certainly elements of institutional legitimacy and the presence of a generation of elites on both sides of the Atlantic who had been socialized by the alliance cannot be entirely ignored in explaining NATO's post-Cold War reinvention. Nonetheless, political interests on both sides of the Atlantic are vital. The United States had, and continues to have, little interest in an isolationist-unilateralist approach to its security, shares fundamental values and interests with the Europeans, and possesses a long-standing strategic interest in a stable Europe.20 The Europeans also seek to ensure a U.S. role in Europe as a fundamental guarantee of its security, even though the immediate threats to its security are low. In one sense, both the United States and Europe implicitly agreed that if the transatlantic relationship embodied in NATO collapsed, it might be difficult to reconstruct in the future if, or when, it was needed. The problems of the relationship are not new per se. Issues concerning consultation, and burden sharing and technology transfer, have a long history in NATO. Managing these issues has long been central to the alliance. At the same time, simple functional requirements for some degree of common military standards and interoperability remains important on both sides of the Atlantic. Notwithstanding the low likelihood that NATO would undertake military missions on its own accord or with the blessing of the United Nations outside continental Europe, commonality is vital for future missions that are ad hoc in nature. NATO may not go "outof-area," but the United States and many of its European allies may. The Gulf War demonstrated functionally the value of decades of military cooperation. In other words, it is not simply the political forces that underpin the value and importance of NATO. It is also the functional value of military cooperation. In one way the greatest threat to NATO is that the military forces of the United States and Europe will be unable to work together. The growing technological gap between the U.S. and European militaries, as most deeply illustrated by concerns surrounding the revolution in military affairs (RMA), are central to NATO's Defense Capability Initiative launched at the 1999 Washington summit.21 With the significant gap between U.S. and European defense spending in general, and research and development/procurement in particular, the need to coordinate investment and avoid duplication is paramount.22 Failure to do so would not necessarily mean that the United States and Europe would not participate together in NATO out-of-area operations, or ad hoc coalitions enhanced by NATO military cooperation. There is a political logic for participation independent from the actual military ability to be interoperable on the battlefield. In other words, simply being there may suffice.23

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However, there is also a political cost attached to simply being there. Input into the actual conduct of a military campaign is largely lost. As a result from a broader political perspective, it cedes wider political dominance to the United States, and relegates the Europeans to the second tier.24 It is this issue that in many ways underpins the ESDP initiative. There is an element of ESDP that directly relates to the wider integrationist agenda of a unified federal Europe. At the same time, it also relates to the belief that ESDP is, or will become, the European pillar of NATO in which greater political equality will result with the United States. It is not necessarily the case that obtaining a truly integrated military capability for Europe, within the concept of being separable, but not separate from NATO, is a forerunner of the replacement of NATO as the primary security institution for Europe. It is difficult to imagine the actual political conditions short of relatively benign peace support operations where both the United States and Europe would not share similar interests and values. The importance of ESDP is thus political in nature, rather than truly military. Nonetheless, one key problem concerns which of the many military requirements for ESDP should receive attention and investment. It is here that the missile defense issue is important. At one level, the Europeans are unlikely to possess the resources and will to develop an independent early warning capability vital to effective missile defense. Despite French desires to develop such a capability, the interest of the other Europeans appears low. At the same time, if Europe does proceed to develop its own space-based global positioning system, currently known as Galileo, it will likely absorb a significant amount of investment dollars. Of course, if Galileo goes ahead, its funding will not likely come out of defense, even though the system would have significant defense application. Nonetheless, it would constrain the likelihood of further space initiatives, such as the development and deployment of a European early warning capability.25 Even with more robust European missile defense development programs, European defense from missiles and air-breathing threats for the continent and deployed forces will have to rely upon access to U.S. early warning data. In so doing, the only institution available to coordinate and disseminate this vital cueing data to peripheral and fire control radars is NATO. In this light, NATO's central role as the core security institution for Europe is not only cemented, but also enhanced. As air defense required a collective response during the Cold War, so the idea of extended integrated air defense (EIAD), with its missile defense component, requires a collective response.26 This collective response with its core transatlantic component also spills over into the other aspects of crisis management and collective defense. EIAD extends beyond traditional land-based air defense to include the integration of naval forces. In so doing, it is one of the key elements of interoperability through jointness. It also supports efforts to enhance combined operations. In effect, it is a key element that will be integrated in the future into the CJTF plans in NATO. As a core requirement for out-of-area operations, NATO or an ad hoc coalition based upon NATO membership and experience, the future battlespace of an integrated common joint picture, and interoperable forces requires the centralized

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BM/C2 that is being developed in NATO. This future of 2010 and beyond also reinforces the ideas behind the DCI. The future development of early warning sharing from U.S. assets represents a foundation for avoiding the duplication of efforts. Whether it will evolve into a more formal relationship in the sense of the CanadaU.S. one in NORAD remains to be seen.27 Yet a U.S.-NATO Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITWAA) beyond the current arrangements on early warning would appear as the logical outcome. Both the United States and Europe share a common interest in such an integrated approach. Such an outcome would thus serve again to reinforce the role of NATO, and reduce underlying concerns that either or both the parties would drift apart. Similarly in terms of missile defense platforms, NATO's key role in BM/C2 also provides opportunities to avoid duplication of effort. As the European programs are concentrated for the time being in the lower tier, through the development of a common battlespace picture, the requirement for Europe, or individual nations, to develop multilayered missile defense capabilities is reduced.28 It is unlikely as U.S. TMD systems come on-line that the Europeans will entirely eschew their own TMD capabilities in upgrading their naval platforms. Nonetheless, the overall requirements will be significantly less than if Europe or the current European nations involved attempt to do it on their own. Moreover, the need for ground and naval missile defense capabilities will be significantly less as a function of the cooperation through the alliance with the United States. There is the possibility that NATO could acquire through its Security Investment Fund a missile defense capability similar to airborne warning and control (AWAC), although the likelihood is rather low. Of course, the core role of NATO in facilitating combined and joint operations implies that two key issues will be resolved. The first concerns technology transfer questions between the U.S. and European programs. In this regard, NATO's EIAD program may serve an important function facilitating the resolution of transfer issues. One positive indicator is the resolution of this issue with regard to the employment of the Patriot interceptor in the NATO-MEAD (Medium Extended Air Defense) program.29 Regardless, U.S. willingness to transfer missile defense technology will be an important indicator, and NATO's role is important in this regard. One cannot expect that Europeans to be willing, on economic grounds alone, to accept rigid constraints on the way technology is handled. If the United States is truly willing to share missile defense technology as repeatedly enunciated by successive administrations, the future of the overarching NATO EIAD project may well be a core indicator over the near term. The development of NATO's role through EIAD, alongside greater technology transfer and related industrial cooperation between European and U.S. firms, will enhance political cooperation. In fact, the NATO TMD Feasibility Study currently under way will likely serve to promote greater transatlantic industrial cooperation, and impact upon long-standing issues with regard to defense trade.30 One should not expect that NATO EIAD and TMD will be a panacea for all the problems of cooperation. But they will be an important indicator of the direction of the relationship as the Cold War fades evermore into memory.

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The second issue, and perhaps the most central, will be the politics of missile defense itself. Technology transfer has a political dimension about cooperation and commitment. It is a signal of the continuing importance of the alliance and the transatlantic relationship. It is also an element of partially overcoming the hegemonicconsultation issue that has long affected the relationship, an issue that is much more germane in the post-Cold War security environment. However, publicly, the European allies are in a somewhat difficult position relative to their expressed concerns about NMD.31 To move too quickly down the TMD path is politically problematic. It is in this sense that the immature technology of missile defense, the focus on lower-tier capabilities, and NATO's role keep the option open. There is one final issue that concerns the alliance and the relationship between the United States and Europe on missile defense: Russia. In fact, central to the missile defense debate has been Russian opposition to U.S. NMD revolving around the future of the ABM Treaty. Russia has been playing on European concerns about strategic stability, the future of arms control, and arms racing. However, Russia's position also appears to be changing. In February, Sergei Ivanov, Vladimir Putin's security adviser, spoke in favor of a cooperative missile defense for Europe. More recently, formal cooperative talks between Russia and NATO on TMD were scheduled to begin.32 Alongside these recent developments are also long-standing elements of cooperation on missile defense between Russia and the United States. Russian-U.S. cooperation dates back to President G.H.W. Bush's GPALS proposal and the Yeltsin-Bush idea of a global warning system in 1991. Since then, there has been cooperation between the United States and Russia on a variety of missile defenserelated experiments, as well as the presence of Russian officials at TMD tests in the United States. More recently, there has evolved cooperation between them on the Y2K issue (which had a nuclear dimension), and shared early warning, with the latter especially important in light of the gaps in the Russian early warning system as a function of the collapse of the Soviet Union.33 It also seems to be forgotten that one of the components of the 1997 Russia-NATO Charter was cooperation on missile defense.34 Certainly, cooperation in this regard, as well as generally, has not gone well, not least of all due to the contentious political issues surrounding NATO enlargement and the 1999 conflict in Kosovo. Moreover, it is unclear whether the lack of engagement on missile defense between Russia and the alliance has been a function of Russian, or NATO reluctance. Nonetheless, the recent Russian move forward, alongside the positive comments made by Putin during his recent visit to Brussels, should be seen as a potential harbinger of future cooperation in the area of a strategic defense for Europe against proliferation threats.35 If such cooperation does develop, NATO's role as the central European security institution will likely be further cemented, with a range of other implications for the future role and functions of the alliance. CONCLUSION Substantial NATO-Russian cooperation on the strategic European defense against proliferate threats is well off into the future. But moving in this direction

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requires both East and West to move beyond the legacy of the Cold War. Much of the current public debate on NMD remains deeply embedded in Cold War rhetoric and logic. What is clear in the foreseeable future is a security environment of deployed missile defenses, and to a very limited degree these already exist. This future is not one in which nuclear deterrence will be replaced. Rather, it is one in which deterrence will be augmented by defense in both the East and the West. Recognizing this future is essential to the possibility of using missile defense through the alliance as a mechanism for confidence-building and a cooperative security relationship among Russia, Europe, and the United States. If missile defense serves this function over the coming years, the nature of alliance solidarity and coupling will change. The politics of alliance solidarity and the role of nuclear weapons and missile defense in terms of the solidarity paradox will likely take a different form. A European strategic missile defense that includes Russia and is married to a U.S. system for North America, is likely to change the requirements politically and militarily for managing alliance solidarity, not least of all because it implies Russian membership, either formally or tacitly by default. Already, the underlying debate about the purpose of the alliance, largely framed between the pillars of Article 5 and non-Article 5 purposes, has surfaced, and of course NATO enlargement itself entails this debate. In the end, missile defense represents a solution to the political problems associated with the employment of nuclear weapons with regard to the solidarity paradox. The very weapons deployed to reduce fears of defection created the desire to avoid becoming entrapped. Missile defense does not eliminate the importance of nuclear weapons to the alliance. Rather, it serves to replicate the conditions found in the 1950s of an relatively invulnerable alliance guarantor— the United States—and a credible alliance based threat of nuclear employment to prevent aggression. Then, as in the future, once these defenses are employed, the guarantor will be able to decouple its strategic forces as a means to ensure the political coupling of its commitment. This is the new form of the solidarity or coupling paradox. In the end, however, this new form itself will likely raise a series of new issues, not least of all surrounding the limits of ESDP as independent from NATO, and the future of nuclear weapons themselves. The latter will be of particular concern following the likely restructuring of the old Cold War bilateral arms control regime. Unless Russia decides to take a different course, Russia and the United States are likely to develop a new arms control regime, in which offensive and defensive strategic forces are directly linked together, significant cuts to their offensive forces result, and more elaborate missile defenses are permitted. All these factors, in turn, may well bring the nuclear question back to the forefront for reasons mentioned above. This analysis has only touched the surface of many of the issues related to the alliance, and European security and the transatlantic relationship in the context of nuclear weapons and missile defense. Nonetheless, it appears evident that as missile defenses move from development to operational deployment on both sides of the Atlantic, the nuclear sleeping dog is likely to wake with implications that are difficult to foresee.

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NOTES 1. The national division has been dropped by the Bush administration as part of the reintegration of the U.S. missile defense programs and the ongoing restructuring of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). NMD emerged first with the passing of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act and was codified with the Clinton administration's decision to create two separate program streams—national and theater. For the purpose of this analysis, this division is employed only for purposes of clarity. For a presentation of the current program, see Lieutenant-General Ronald Kadish, "Ballistic Missile Defense Program," testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2001. 2. This is the modem rationale for formal, relatively permanent alliances that date back to the late nineteenth century, and whose origin is usually traced to the Austro-German alliance of 1879. 3. In much of the literature concerning the United States and NATO, the term employed is "entanglement." For example, see the classic study by Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). 4. The INF debate is better known as the Euromissile debate. It concerns the decision to modernize NATO's intermediate nuclear forces through the deployment of the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in the 1980s. 5. NATO, The NATO Handbook Documentation (Brussels: NATO, Office of Information and Press, 1999). 6. The best analysis of the history is Jane Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). 7. For an in-depth analysis of the Nuclear Planning Group, see Paul Buteux, The Politics ofNuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 8. See Paul Buteux, The Political and Strategic Implications of the INF Treaty for NATO, Occasional Paper no. 2 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defense and Security Studies, 1988). 9. This notion goes back to the 1950s and the idea of U.S. forces in West Berlin as a tripwire not only for war with NATO, but also for war with the United States as a function of U.S. immediate engagement. 10. An independent German nuclear force has been argued as a likely outcome in the wake of the end of the Cold War if the United States withdrew and NATO collapsed. See Patrick Garrity and Steven Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World (New York: Plenum Press, 1992). 11. With regard to changes in Europe, for example, the German chancellor in a television interview on August 8, 2001, announced that his government had retreated from its earlier opposition, and emphasized German vital economic interests in helping to develop technology for the project. 12. Several senior administration officials have emphasized a decision on ABM in the short term, and if necessary it is likely the decision to give six months' notice will occur around the planned November Bush-Putin sumrnit. For example, see Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 12, 2001. 13. See Heritage Foundation, Defending America: A Near and Long Term Plan to Deploy Missile Defenses (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1995). 14. Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) is the operational deployment plan of the former Bush administration that lapsed with the election of Clinton in 1992. It would have entailed a ground-based and space-based architecture. For a brief discussion,

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see K. Scott McMahon, Pursuit of the Shield: The U.S. Quest for Limited Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: University Press of America, 1997). 15. The following analysis is based on a wide range of confidential author interviews conducted over the past two years and funded by a NATO fellowship. For a public viewpoint, see Karl A. Lamers (Rapporteur), NMD and Implications for the Alliance (Paris: North Atlantic Assembly, Subcommittee on Transatlantic Relations, April 2000). 16. The United States is now planning to deploy an intercept test site at the former planned location of NMD in Alaska. In so doing, it amounts to an initial intercept capability. 17. The "usual suspects" are North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. It is North Korea that is the primary concern of obtaining an operational capability by 2005. Importantly, North Korea apparently deployed the No Dong MRBM after only one successful test. It is also reported that India will test shortly its first ICBM. 18. Libya, in contrast to Iran and Iraq, could directly target most of southern Europe with an MRBM. Also, Saudi Arabia possesses the Chinese DF-3IRBM, with a range of between 2,500 and 3,000 kilometers, which could potentially target southern Europe if there was a dramatic regime change that ushered in an anti-Western government. 19. The classic article is John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, 4 (summer 1990): 5-56. 20. The linkage between isolationism and unilateralism is problematic. The former historically in the case of the United States equated to a policy to avoid peacetime formal alliance or security commitments. The latter basically is the undertaking of decisions individually. While they are linked in some ways, a state can be isolationist and multilateralist, as well as committed to a formal alliance and act unilaterally. 21. The most recent analysis, which unfortunately does not discuss the EIAD missile defense element, is James P. Thomas, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions, Adelphi Paper no. 333 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). See also, Elinor Sloan "ADO: Responding to the U.S.-led Revolution in Military Affairs," NATO Review (spring/summer 2000). 22. For example, the U.S. defense budget was $272 billion in 1997, and the combined defense budgets of all of NATO Europe was $184 billion. In 1997 alone, the United States had committed roughly $14.5 billion to missile defense development projects over the next several years, an amount far beyond European ability. Even the cost of a single program, such as the PAC-3 Patriot, estimated at $6.2 billion for the deployment of 1,200 interceptors in 54 units, is problematic for any one of the single European military powers. David Mosher, "The Grand Plans," IEEE Spectrum (September 1997). 23. In the case of the Gulf War, the presence of troops from a wide range of coalition members served a political value. Militarily, they were largely assigned to the second echelon, with the first echelon consisting of U.S. and British forces. The French, due to their lack of heavy armor, were assigned to the far left flank. Only the Saudis actually fought, but were supported by U.S. forces greatly, and their military role was primarily a function of political rather than strict military considerations. 24. The most recent example of this problem is detailed in Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). 25. France has been the most supportive of an independent military satellite system for Europe formerly under the WEU to be based upon the station at Torrejon, Spain. The current system is the Franco-Italian-Spanish Helios 1A reconnaissance satellite, launched in 1995. Work on the French Alerte ballistic missile early warning system has been recognized as vital for a European missile defense capability but remains stalled due to ongoing French

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restructuring. For a relatively detailed discussion, see Shaun Gregory, France and Military Satellite Systems: Implications for European Security, Research Paper no. 33 (Athens: Research Institute for European Studies, 1997). 26. This includes the ongoing modernization of NATO's Air Command and Control System, its linkage to naval platforms, and the aforementioned early warning offer in which U.S. data are transmitted via the Joint Analysis Centre in the United Kingdom to NATO authorities. For a full discussion, see James Fergusson, Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for the Alliance, NATO Fellowship Report, 2000). 27. For a discussion of the Canadian dimension and NORAD, see James Fergusson, Deja Vu: Canada, NORAD, and Ballistic Missile Defense, Occasional Paper no. 39 (Winnipeg: Centre for Defense and Security Studies, 1999). 28. This common battlespace picture (one of the RMA elements itself) is most clearly defined in the U.S. Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). For a discussion, see Underway at Sea: Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense: U.S. Navy, 2000). 29. For current status of NATO-MEAD, see Martin Aguera and Gopla Ratnam, "MEADS Fosters Teamwork," Defense News, August 6-12, 2001. 30. There are in fact two studies under way on TMD feasibility. On June 5,2001, the host NATO agency, the NATO Command, Control, and Consultation Agency in The Hague, announced that the consortiums led by Science Applications International and Lockheed Martine were successful. The studies are due in eighteen months. See NATO, NATO's Theatre Missile Defense Program Reaches New Milestone (Brussels: NATO, Office of Information and Press, June 5, 2001). 31. For the most recent, albeit pessimistic view on the European dimension, see Richard Sokolsky, "Imaging European Missile Defense," Survival 43, no. 3 (autumn 2001): 111-128. 32. Brooks Tigner, "NATO, Russia Move Toward Missile Defense Cooperation," Defense News, September 10-16, 2001. 33. A joint Russian-U.S. statement on missile launches and early warning information sharing was signed in September 1998. An earlier agreement to share early warning on TMD launches was signed in 1995. The U.S. offered to extend and expand cooperation in October 1999 if Russia agreed to renegotiate the ABM Treaty. Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge: Institute for Defense and Disarmament, 603.B-11.1, 1999). 34. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation," Paris, May 27, 1997. 35. Vladimir Putin, Response to Lord Robertson, Secretary General (Brussels: NATO, Office of Information and Press, October 3, 2001).

Selected Bibliography

Andreani, Gilles, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant. Europe's Military Revolution. London: Centre For European Reform, March 2001. Asmus, Ronald D., Robert D. Blackwill, and F. Stephen Larabee. "Can NATO Survive?" The Washington Quarterly 19 (1996): 79-101. Barry, Charles. "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice." Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 81-97. Bertram, Christoph. "NATO on Track for the 21 st Century?" Security Dialogue 26 (1995): 65-71. Blanc, Emile, and Michel Fennebresque. "La defense europeenne apres le conseil europeen de Nice," Defense Nationale, (fevrier, 2001). Blinken, Antony J. "The False Crisis Over the Atlantic." Foreign Affairs 80 (May/June 2001): 3 5 ^ 8 . Bulmer, Simon, and William Paterson. "Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?" International Affairs 72, no. 1 (1996). Bunn, George. "The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States." The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring/Summer 1997). Buteux, Paul. The Politics ofNuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Carpenter, Ted Galen. Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars. Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1994. Cohen, Lenard J. Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. Cohen, Lenard J. and Alexander Moens. "Learning the Lessons of UNPROFOR: Canadian Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia," Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 85-103. Coker, Christopher. Twilight of the West. Boulder: Westview, 1998. Croft, Stuart. "The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate." European Security 9, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 1-20. Croft, Stuart, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff, and Mark Webber. "NATO's Triple Challenge." International Affairs (Summer 2000). de Savoye, Mitch. "Canadian Response to the Wars of the Former Yugoslavia." Conference of Defense Associations Institute (November 3-4, 2000).

174

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Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Goldgeier. "Putting Europe First." Survival 43 (Spring 2001). Delvoie, Louis. "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales." Canadian Military Journal (Summer 2000): 13-24. . "Curious Ambiguities: Canada's International Security Policy." Policy Options. (January/February 2001): 36-42. Foster, Edward, and Gordon Wilson. CFJT—a Lifeline for a European Defense Policy. London: RUSI Whitehall Paper Series, 1997. Freedman, Lawrence. Military Intervention in European Conflicts. London: Blackwell Publishers, 1994. Gammer, Nicholas. From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. Gompert, David C , Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki. Mind the Gap—Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1999. Grant, Charles. Strength in Numbers: Europe's Foreign and Defense Policy. London: CER, 1996. Greider, William. Fortress America. New York: Public Affairs, 1999. Haglund, David G, ed. What NATO for Canada? Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2000. Harries, Owen. "The Collapse of 'The West'." Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October 1993): 41-53. Heisbourg, Francois. "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity," Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000). . European Defense: Making It Work. Chaillot Paper 42. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, September 2000. Howorth, Jolyon. "Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative," Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 33-55. . European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge? Chaillot Paper 43. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2000. Hunter, Robert. "Enlargement: Part of a Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe." NATO Review (May 1995): 3-8. Huntington, Samuel P. "The Lonely Superpower." Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999): 35-49. . The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Ikle, Fred Charles. "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996). Jenkins, Brian and Tony Chafer, eds. France: From the End of the Cold War to the New World Order. London: Macmillan, 1995. Jopp, Mathias. European Defense Policy: the Debate on the Institutional Aspects. Bonn/Berlin: Institut fur Europaische Politik, 1999. Joseph, Robert G. and John F. Reichart. "The Case for Nuclear Deterrence Today." Orbis (Winter 1998): 7-14. Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997. Lepgold, Joseph. "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem." International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1998).

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Index

ABM Treaty, xv, 68, 91, 158 Afghanistan, xxi-xxiv, xxvi, 21, 134 Al Qaeda, xxiii Albright, Madeleine, Secretary of State, xxv, 18,28,46,53,90, 102 Alliance theory, 154 Allied Command European Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC) headquarters, 94 Allied Missile Defense (AMD), 122 American hegemony, 122 Amsterdam (EU Summit), xx, 39, 53, 78, 82, 89, 124 Amsterdam (EU) treaties, xx, 39, 78, 82, 89, 124 Anti-Americanism, 2, 8-10, 15-17, 61, 62 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, xxvi, 68, 91, 158, 168, 170 Anti-personnel mines, 62 Anti-tactical missile defense (ATMD), 159, 160 Article 5. See NATO Asia, xxv, xxvi, 11, 18, 22, 138, 147 Atlantic Defense Pact, 6 Atlanticism, ii, 3 AWAC, xxvi, 74, 167 Axworthy, Foreign Minister Lloyd, 97, 103, 130 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), 170

Balkans, xix, xxiii-xxvi, xxviii, xxix, 20, 22,27,28,42,45,67, 69, 89,90,93,97, 99, 101,102; Peace management, 74 Bin Laden, Osama, xxii-xxiv Biological weapons, 62, 104, 142-146 Bipolarity, 6, 17 Blair, Prime Minister Tony, xxvii, 5, 39, 43-47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 67, 69, 71, 81, 84 Bosnia, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 11, 23-26, 31, 41, 42,46, 58, 68, 76, 77, 83, 90, 92, 94, 97, 101, 109, 115, 128-132, 155, 164 Brinton, Crane, 7, 15 Britain, xx, xxi, xxvii, 7, 38, 39,42^t5, 48-54, 58, 59, 62, 68, 69, 71, 81, 96, 106,110, 139,151,157, 159 Brussels Treaty (1948), xxix, 39, 40, 56, 79, 124 Bush-Blair Camp David Summit (2001), 67 Bush, President George H. W., 40, 52, 144, 168, 170; GPALS, 168 Bush, President George W, xx, xxi, xxv, xxvi, 11, 18, 22, 25, 29, 67-69, 75, 81, 91, 103, 104, 112, 114, 115, 140, 148, 149, 157, 158, 170; Norfolk speech, 81, 102, 104; C4ISR, 123 Canada, xvii, xxvii-xxix, 12-14, 18-20, 30-33, 35, 64, 65, 77, 83-85, 87, 92, 94, 96-102, 106, 107, 109-126, 128-134, 139, 145, 167, 172;

178

Canada (continued) and Balkans, xxviii, xxix, 22, 101, 125-125-134; CanadaEU Summit (2000), 65, 84; Canadian defense budget, 32, 115, 119, 120, 130; Canadian foreign policy, xxviii, 125, 127, 128,133,134; Canadian policymakers, xxviii, 83, 96, 97 Capabilities Commitments Conference (CCC), 47, 49 Central and Eastern Europe (see also NATO: Relations with Central and Eastern Europe), xx, xxiii, xxv, 4, 22, 29,44,168 Central Asia, xxvi, 30 CESDP (Common European Security and Defense Policy). See European Union CFSP, 38,40, 44, 45, 58, 71, 88, 106 Chemical weapons, 16, 142-144, 147, 150, 151 China, 22, 122, 147, 158 Chirac, President Jacques, 16, 46, 54, 72, 89, 102, 129 Chretien, Prime Minister Jean, 31, 128, 130 Christopher, Warren, Secretary Of State, 28,34 CJTF. See Combined Joint Task Forces Clark, former SACEUR Wesley, 80, 171 Clinton, President Bill, xxv, 10, 11, 16-18, 25, 68, 90, 139, 144, 158, 162, 170; Administration, xxv, 10, 11, 16, 17, 25, 68, 90, 139, 158, 162, 170 Cohen, William S., Secretary of Defense, xxviii, 28, 71, 75, 76, 81, 90, 95, 96, 98, 102, 106, 123 Cold War, xix, xx, xxiv, xxviii, 1-4, 6, 8-10, 14, 15, 16, 19-21, 23, 25, 26, 29-31, 34, 37-40, 51, 52, 61, 63, 73, 76,88,89,91,99,111,116,125,126, 128-130, 135-142, 144-146, 148, 150, 153-155, 157, 159-171 Cologne Declaration. See European Union Cologne Summit. See European Union Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), xx, 24,43,49,70,81,88,164,166 Common European Security and Defense Policy. See European Union

Index

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 38,40,44,45, 58, 71, 88, 106 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 92 Contact Group, 23, 331 Croatia, xxi, xxiii, 31, 68,128,130 Croft, Stuart, 37, 38, 51,81 CSCE Ministerial meeting in Oslo (1992), 24,58,127,128,131 Cyprus, 106, 109, 126 Dahrendorf,Ralf,21,33 De Gaulle, Charles, 9, 52, 57, 61 Defense budget, 32, 44, 74, 89, 105, 115, 119,120,130,171 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), xxi, 27,28,34,71,95,118,119,167 Une Defense Nouvelle 1997-2015 (1996), 41 Defense Spending, 26, 27, 92, 106, 132, 161, 165; Europe (1995-2000), 27, 92, 106, 161, 165; US (1995-2000), 91, 106, 165 Delors, Jacques, 41, 52 Democratic peace, 3, 14 Denuclearization, 137 Department of National Defense, xvii, 119, 124 Deterrence, xxix, 40, 42, 135-137, 139-148, 151, 158, 160-163, 169; flexible response, 156; shared risk, 27, 155, 156; strategic de-coupling, xxix, 157-159, 161, 163 DFAIT, 103, 129-131; "Canada and World," 129 Dieppe, 109 Double containment, 9, 16 Dunkirk, Treaty of (1947), 53, 87 Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation agreement, 94 Dutch-British Amphibious Force (UKNLAF), 95 East Timor, 115 Economic community monitoring mission (ECMM), 128 EDC. See European Defence Community

Index

Eggleton, Minister of Defense Art, 31, 32, 35,77,98,103,119, 131 EPC, 40 "ESDI-in-NATO," 70 Eurasia, xix, 56 Euro-army, 50 Euro-Atlantic community, xxix, 132 Eurocorps, 94 Europapolitik, 44 European Allies, xx, xxi, xxv, xxviii, 7, 10, 11, 26, 27, 34, 69, 77, 84, 86-88, 90-92, 94-96, 99, 102, 113, 114, 147, 148, 158, 165 European Commission, 100, 102 European Community. See European Union European Defense Community (EDC), 21,40,58,87 European integration, 21, 32, 52-54, 87, 100-103, 111, 117, 123,165 European Maritime Forces (EUROMARFOR), 94 European Military Staff, 74 European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), 2, 6, 8, 12, 38,43, 48, 69, 70, 81, 83, 84, 87-90, 101, 103, 120; European Security and Defense Planning System, 75, 76, 98; European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), xv, xxiii, xxvii-xxix, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 38, 48-51, 54, 55, 65, 67, 69, 71-77, 79-90, 92-102, 106, 107, 109, 110, 118, 120, 153, 154, 157, 161, 166, 169; EU-Canada dialogue, 97; IGC, 43; Helsinki Summit, 71, 86; military staff, xxv, 74, 78, 80, 85, 121; Political and Security Committee (COPS), 48, 60, 74; and NATO-EU cooperation, 69; NATO-EU defense planning, 32; NATO-EU Peace Enforcement Command, 118, 121; Military Committee, 27, 78, 85, 93; Nice Summit, xxviii, 74, 84, 86, 98; Saint-Malo Summit, 59, 71, 85; and Turkey impasse, 72, 73, 75, 77, 80,82,116 European Security and Defense Policy. See European Union

179

European Union, xx-xxii, xxiv-xxviii, 2, 5, 6, 13, 14, 19, 22, 23, 31-33, 39-43, 45-49, 51-4, 56, 59, 64, 65, 67-107, 109,111,116-118,120-124,163; Canada-EU Joint Declaration, 97; Cologne Declaration, 85; Cologne Summit, 60, 84, 85; Common European security and defense policy (CESDP), 2, 38; constructive abstention, 78, 79; European Community, xx, 52, 88, 102 Europeanism, 39 Extended integrated air defense (EIAD), 166, 167, 171 FEDN/FRS (Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale/Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique), 41 Feira Summit, 86, 93 Fischer, Foreign Minister Joschka, 44, 48, 103, 150 "Food for Thought" (UK Paper), 49 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), xix, xxi, xxiv, xxix, 23, 29, 61, 68, 73, 81, 82, 94, 103, 129, 131, 134 France, xxi-xxii, xxvii, 2, 5-10, 14, 38-44, 48,49, 51-53, 57, 59-61, 63, 65, 68-71, 73, 75, 81, 82, 84, 87, 89, 93-95, 100, 101, 105, 106, 117, 139, 151, 157, 171, 172; nuclear capabilities, 57, 139,151 Franco-German Treaty (1963), 58 Francois, Isabelle, 101 G-8 Summit, 22, 110, 114; Group of Seven/Eight, 22, 110 Gaullist, 40, 52, 58, 93 George, Bruce, 47 Germany, 6-8,14-17, 38,29,42,44, 47-51, 53, 54, 56-60,63,69, 74,77, 82, 85, 87,94,102,103,105,106,110,131, 135,136, 138-140, 145,146, 148,149 Ghadaffi, Muhmar, 142 Ghali, Boutrous-Boutrous, 129 Global stability, 65 Global warming, 62 Globalization, 19, 22

180

Gordon, Philip, 6, 15,51 Grant, Charles, xxv, xxix, 53, 100, 102, 104, 106, 107 Great Lakes district (Zaire), 101 Greece, 78, 94, 100, 146 Gulf War, xxiii, 14, 93, 94, 137, 142, 143, 151,161,165,171 Harries, Owen, 14, 22, 34 "Headline Goal" (EU), 49, 54, 71, 79, 85, 86,92,93,95,100,104,118,119 Heisbourg, Francois, 15, 73, 82, 92, 100, 101, 105, 106 Helsinki Summit. See European Union Holbrooke, Richard, 130 Howard, Michael, 37,51 Howe, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey, 39, 52 Human security, xxix, 65, 130-134 Hunter, Ambassador to NATO Robert, 73, 82 Huntington, Samuel, 2, 7, 8, 14, 15, 18 Hurd, Douglas, 119 Hussein, Saddam, 62, 142-145 Hyperpuissance, 1 Iceland, 88 IFOR, 28, 31, 90, 94, 130, 164 IFRI (Institut Francais des Relations Internationale), 41, 53 IHEDN (Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale), 41 Ikenberry, John, 7, 15 India, 138, 147, 171 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), 159,162, 171 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), 21,40, 101, 155-157, 170; INF Treaty, 101, 155, 157, 170 Interoperability, xxvi, 27, 28, 30, 78, 86, 94,96,117,123,166 Intra-Alliance, 24, 26 Iran, 91, 142, 143, 159, 160, 164, 171 Iraq, xxiii, 22, 62, 137, 142-144, 151, 171 "Iron Triangle," 91, 122 Islam, xxiii, xxiv, 22 Israel, 62, 142-145, 147

Index

Italy, 56, 60, 94, 95, 100, 102, 106, 142, 146, 154, 171 Ivanov, Sergei, 168 Kelche, French Chief of Defense General Jean-Pierre, 104 KFOR, xxiv, 23, 31, 93, 94, 131, 133 Kohl, Chancellor Helmut, 41 Kosovo, xix, xxi-xxiv, 9, 16, 17, 23-27, 31, 34, 45,47,48, 50, 58-61, 68, 69, 73, 78, 82, 89-91, 93-95, 97, 101, 103, 104, 109, 115, 116, 130-133, 135-137, 141, 143, 149, 153, 164, 168; air campaign, 25, 27, 90, 91, 93, 97, 141 Kouchner, Bernard, 132 Kuwait, 144 Kyoto Protocol, 22 LANDJUTunit,94 Laser-guided bombs, 27 Leotard, Minister of Defense Francois, xxi, xxii, 68, 69 Lepgold, Joseph, 27, 34 "Lessons learned," xxi, 68 Libya, 142, 171 Livre Blanc (1994), 41 Lugar, Richard, 28, 34, 150 Maastricht (EU Summit and Treaty), xx, 43, 58, 69, 83, 88, 89, 100 MacDougall, Minister of External Affairs Barbara, 127 Macedonia. See Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Macedonian Crisis, xxi, 68, 134 MacFarlane, Neil, 97, 106, 107 Major, Prime Minister John, 41,42, 53 Manley, Foreign Minister John, 103, 131 Marshall, Andrew, 11 Marshall Plan, 57 McDougall, Walter, 12, 18 Mearscheimer, John J., 23, 34 Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO), 29 Medium to intermediate-range ballistic missiles (M/IRBM), 159, 160, 171 Mexico, 11

Index

Middle East, xxiii, 22, 28, 30, 102, 126, 159-161, 164 Milosevic, Slobodan, xxiv, 59, 91, 130, 131, 133, 143 Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC), 131 Missile Defense. See National Missile Defense Mitterrand, President Francois, 40,41, 57, 88 Modified Brussels Treaty, 39, 124 Monte Cassino, 109 Mujahidin, xxiii-xxiv Mulroney, Prime Minister Brian, 126, 127, 129 Multilateral Force (MLF), 21 Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), 94 Multipolarity, xxvii, 2, 5, 8, 10 Muslim, xxi, xxiii, xxiv Mutual assured destruction (MAD), 162 National Liberation Army, 68 National Missile Defense (NMD), xxix, 90, 153, 154, 157, 158, 160-164, 168, 169-171 National Missile Defense Act, 170 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), alternatives to, 52, 98, 118; Article 5, xxi, xxii, xxv, xxvi, xxviii, 23, 27, 29-32,40, 44, 70, 73, 76, 78, 79, 95, 116, 120, 124, 155, 156, 159, 162, 163, 169; AWACS airborne, xxvi; burden sharing, xxvii, 2, 6, 21, 25, 26, 28, 42, 56, 57, 89, 92, 115, 147, 165; Defense Ministers meeting, Birmingham (October 2000), 28; defense spending, 26, 27; enlargement, xx, 29, 82, 104, 116, 117, 142, 149, 168, 169; NATO alliance, 84, 85, 87, 88, 92, 95-97, 126; NATO-ESDP, xx, xxi, 69, 71-73, 75-77, 79-81; NATO-EU cooperation, xxviii, 27, 32,42, 69, 73, 75-77, 86,95,98,102, 118, 121; NATO-EU defense planning, 35, 75 NATO-EU Peace Enforcement Command, 118, 121; NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, 29

181

NATO-Russian cooperation, 29, 149, 168; New Strategic Concept, xxix, 135, 139, 140, 145, 149, 153; North Atlantic Council, xx, xxx, 30, 33, 34, 74, 77, 78, 80, 82, 85, 88, 103, 139; Nuclear Planning Group, 146, 148, 155, 157, 170; Partnership for Peace (PFP), xx, 29; PFP-Plus, 29; Policy Coordination Group (PCG), 74, 76; relations with Central and Eastern Europe, xxiv, 22, 29, 134, 168; Senior Defense Group, 159; Senior Political Group, 159; Standing Naval Forces, xxvi Naumann, General Klaus, 27, 93 Nice (EU Presidency) Report, 102 Nice (Treaty of), December 2000, 60, 72, 74, 84, 86, 98, 103, 124 Non-proliferation, 92, 130, 151 NORAD (North American Air Defense Command, now Aerospace Defense Command), 113, 120, 167, 172 Normandy, 109 North Korea, 18, 22, 91, 142, 171 North American Allies, xxv, xxix, 75, 95, 101, 146 Northern Alliance, xxiv Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization. See NATO Norway, 64, 88, 103 Nuclear deterrence, xxix, 40, 135, 136, 139-148, 151,161, 169 "Nuclear No First Use," 138, 139 Nuclear Test ban treaty, 62, 92 OECD, 22 Operation ALB A, 94, 100 Operation Allied Force, xxi Operation Amber Fox, xxii, 69 Operation Deliberate Force, 97 Operation Essential Harvest, xxii, 68, 69 Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), xxii, 13; OSCE, xxii, 65. 94, 123, 131 Ostpolitik,21 Ottawa, xxii, 12, 17, 65, 83, 124-132 Ottawa Declaration (1974), 64

182

Index

Pakistan, 138, 142, 147 Palmer, John, 21, 33 Pardew, James, xxi, 68 Partnership for Peace. See NATO Paschendael, 109 Pax Atlantica, xi, 2 Peacekeeping, xxix, 25, 26, 31, 58, 60, 68, 70, 74, 82, 92, 100, 101, 103, 109, 115, 117-121, 124, 126-129,131, 132, 134 Pentagon, 91, 114, 122-124 Perry, William, Secretary of Defense, 28, 34 Pierre, Andrew J., 21, 33, 104, 149 Poos, Jacques, 58, 101 Powell, Secretary of State Colin, 67, 68, 75, 81, 104 Prodi, Commission President Romano, 102, 105 Putin, President Vladimir, xxvi, 168, 170 172 Rambouillet, 47, 59, 131 Ravenal, Earl, 21,33 Reagan, President Ronald, 1, 39,101, 140, 144, 156,158; and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 40, 140, 156, 158 Revolution In Miliatry Affairs (RMA), 26,114,117-119,165,172 Rice, National Security Advisor Condoleezza, 67, 122 Richard, French Defense Minister Alain, 82, 102 Rifkind, Defense Secretary Malcolm, 42 Robert Cooper memorandum, 45 Robertson, NATO Security-General Lord, xix, xxi, xxii, xxvi, xxix, 48, 68, 69, 71, 73, 81, 172 'Rogue states,' 22, 107, 138, 142, 150, 159, 163 Rome, EU Treaty of (1957), 87 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 6 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 132, 134 Rune, Minister of Defense, Volker, 44 Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Donald, 11,18, 22, 34,67,91,104,122, 150,158 Russia, xx, xxv, xxvi, 13, 22, 24, 29,56, 57, 68, 114, 122, 131, 135, 136, 138,

140-142, 147-150, 153, 154, 157, 158, 163, 164, 168, 169, 172; NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, 29; NATORussian cooperation, 29, 49, 169 Saint-Malo Summit. See European Union Schicksalgemeinschaft, 3 Schmidt, Vivien, 38, 51, 52 September 11, v, xix, xxii, xxiv-xxvi, 23, 30,74,79,80,134,149,160 Serbia, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, 9, 10, 23, 27, 31, 69, 132, 137, 143 SFOR, 23, 92, 93, 130, 131,164 Sierra Leone, 61, 109, 115 Sloan, Stanley, 5, 14 SNF, 155 Social constructivists, 1, 3, 53 Solana, Javier, xxi, xxii, 68, 69, 139 Soviet Union, 1, 4, 9, 23, 56, 57, 63, 83, 96, 135, 137, 141, 150, 156, 57, 164, 168 Stability Pact, 133 Stairs, Dennis, 133, 134 "States of concern," 142, 150 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 101, 153 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 40, 140, 154, 158 Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), 70, 80, 94, 102, 137 Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), 73, 116 Sweden, 77, 104 Tactical nuclear weapons, 157 Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe, xxii Taliban, xxii, xxiii, 134 Terrorism, iii, v, xix, xx, xxii-xxvi, 19, 22, 24, 30,74, 75,79, 80, 122, 134, 150, 160; War on, xix, xx, xxii-xxiv, xxvi, xxxv, 19, 22, 30, 75, 79, 80, 134 Thatcher, Prime Minister Margaret, 41,42 Theater Missile Defense (TMD), 160, 161,163, 164,167, 168,172 Transatlanticism, xxv-xxvii, xxviii-xxx, 3-5, 8, 12, 13, 19-35, 55, 56, 63, 67, 77, 84, 85, 89-93, 95, 99, 102, 103,

Index

110,111,113,114,116,117,121,123, 161, 162, 165-169, 171; capabilities gap, 91, 103-105; Transatlantic bridge, 114; Transatlantic community, xxvii, 19, 20; Transatlantic link, 21, 67, 84, 85,90,99,161,162 Turkey, xv, 64, 72, 73, 75, 77, 80, 82, 88, 94, 100, 105, 116, 146, 148 Unipolarity, 5, 10, 17, 62 United Kingdom, xxii, 14, 27, 31, 33, 57, 59, 60, 146, 172; SDR (Strategic Defense Review) 45, 47, 100 United Nations (UN), 16, 22, 24, 31, 34, 62,65,76,90,93,101,110,123, 126-132, 149; UN Mission in government administration (UNMIK), 131; UN peace operations, 31,126,129-131 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 24, 110, 131, 149; and NATO, 131, 149; Resolution 1244, 131 United States, xxi-xxix, 2, 5-19, 21-31, 33, 34, 38,40,44,47,48, 50, 52-57, 59-64, 67-71, 74, 75, 77-80, 83, 84, 90, 92-104, 106, 109-121, 123-125, 131, 134, 139, 144, 147, 148, 150, 150, 154-172; Defense budget, 171; Department of Defense, 91, 104, 106, 123; unilateralism, 10, 11,13, 16, 30, 61, 62, 77, 106, 162, 164, 171

183

UNPROFOR mission, xxix, 90, 101, 127-130, 132, 134 Vedrine, Foreign Minister Hubert, 7, 15,17 Vimy Ridge, 109, 170 Wallace, William, 23, 33, 34, 51, 53 Walt, Stephen, 3, 14, 33 Waltz, Kenneth, 3, 14,51 Warsaw Pact, xx, 3, 145, 147, 148 Washington Summit (NATO), 27, 73, 75, 82, 84, 100, 101, 107, 116, 124, 140, 150, 165 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 107, 142-145, 147, 159, 160, 163 Wehrkunde conference, 82 Welles, Sumner, 6, 14 Western European Union (WEU), xx, 39, 40,42,43,47^9, 52,53, 56, 58, 70, 82, 83, 87-89,99-101,103,104,124,171 Williams, Raymond, 7, 15 Yost, David, 103-105, 151 Ypres, 109 Yugoslavia, xxi, xxiv, xxviii, 24, 25, 31, 58, 68, 73, 77, 79, 126, 127, 131, 133, 134, 149. See also Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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List of Contributors

PASCAL BONIFACE is the founder and Director of the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) in Paris. He has published and edited numerous books on security and foreign policy issues. He recently published "The Specter of Unilateralism," in Washington Quarterly (2001). JOHN BRYSON is a Canadian diplomat who has served as Nuclear Counsellor and Political Advisor to the Canadian Delegation to NATO, Deputy Head of Delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks and to the Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). He is currently at the Directorate of Strategic Analysis of the Department of National Defence in Ottawa. LENARD J. COHEN is a Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, British Columbia. His recent publications include Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (1995) and Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic (2002), both in their second edition. JAMES FERGUSSON is the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Manitoba. He has published widely on security issues, and especially Missile Defense, most recently in Canadian Foreign Policy and the Canadian Military Journal DAVID G. HAGLUND is a professor of political studies at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Among his recent books are The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End (2000); The France-US Leadership Race: Closely Watched Allies (2000); and Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability (2001).

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List of Contributors

JOLYON HOWORTH is Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics at the University of Bath (UK). His recent publications include "European Integration and Defence: the Ultimate Challenge?" (Chaillot Paper 43, 2000) and Defending Europe: NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, edited with John T.S. Keeler (2002). KARL-HEINZ KAMP is the Head of the International Planning Staff at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Germany. He has published extensively on security policy issues, including in Foreign Policy, Survival, and the International Defense Review. JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH is Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute for Security Studies in Paris. He deals with defense aspects of transatlantic relations and the development of the CESDP and has recently published: "Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma post September 11" (Chaillot Paper 52, 2002). ALEXANDER MOENS is an Associate Professor at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, British Columbia. He is author of Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision Making (1990) and co-editor of Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a New Security Architecture (1994). ALLEN G. SENS is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at the University of British Columbia. He specializes in international security and conflict management, with an emphasis on the UN and NATO. He is the co-author of Global Politics: Trends, Currents, Directions, an international relations textbook now in its second edition.