Nation-building and historiography in modern Turkey: Anatolia, the Balkan and geographical emphasis [1 ed.] 9789087595753

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Armand Sag (1984, Utrecht - the Netherlands) earned his undergraduate and graduate degrees at Utrecht University and is currently the chairman of Institute for Turkish Studies where he also works as a senior researcher. In addition to his work on nation-building and historiography in Turkey, his research also covers the history of Central Asia and its linguistic heritage. He is the author of History and More: Reflections of a Historian (2011) and Learning Grammar of Turkey-Turkish: Answers (2013), as well as the co-author of Revolutions in the Middle East: Perception and Consequences (2012), among many other titles.

Nation-building and historiography in modern Turkey:

Anatolia, the Balkan and geographical emphasis By Armand Sag

Copyright © Armand Sag, 2015. Utrecht, The Netherlands. All rights reserved.

Front cover image: The photograph is of the battlefield of Edirne during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) with the statue of Şükrü Paşa prominently on the right side. This picture was taken on July 10th, 2010.

Published in 2015 by ITS Series in Turkish Studies ITS Series in Turkish Studies (or ‘Institute for Turkish Studies Series in Turkish Studies’) is a trademark of Institute for Turkish Studies, as well as a joint venture of Institute for Turkish Studies (responsible for reviewing, editing, graphic designing, etcetera of the publications) and U2pi Publishing House (tasked with printing, promoting, etcetera). Prepared for publication by Institute for Turkish Studies Laan van Chartroise 174 3552 EZ Utrecht The Netherlands Tel.: +31 30 8200540 Fax.: +31 30 8200541 [email protected] www.turksestudies.org Printed by U2pi Publishing House Carolina van Nassaustraat 161 2595 SX Den Haag / The Hague The Netherlands Tel.: +31 70 3872770 [email protected] www.jouwboek.nl Graphic design: Raymond J. Reints & Mikail Pehlivan Cover photo: Armand Sag Graphic & editorial revisions: Armand Sag ISBN 978 90 8759 575 3 Copyright © Armand Sag, 2013-2015. Utrecht, the Netherlands.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part therof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronics, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

International Praise

1

(In alphabetical order by surname:)

“This book is a very serious study, written from a unique perspective by a talented, young and promising scholar. (Bu kitap, gelecek vadeden, genç ve yetenekli bir akademisyen tarafından özgün bir bakış açısıyla yapılmış ciddi bir çalışmadır.)” - Prof. Dr. Birsen Karaca, Professor at Ankara University

“A thorough look into the historiography of modern Turkey in search of the historical Balkans, a very innovative research that was due for far too long.” - Dr. László Marácz, Professor at University of Amsterdam

“The actuality of the research title, scientific novelty, practical and theoretical importance of the research work, all have a high scientific level. The findings and conclusions are scientific innovations of a scholar from whom we can expect a lot in the future.” - Dr. Guldana Sarbassova, Professor at L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan

“A

groundbreaking

history

in

the

and

Balkans

extremely and

its

well

stunning

researched neglect

in

- Michael van der Galiën, Managing Editor of The Daily Standard

1  Also see the back cover.

work

Turkish

on

Turkish

historiography.”

Table of Contents Table of Contents.…………………....................................................................................…….7 List of Tables.………………………………………………….....................................................……….…10 List of Graphs……………………………………………………………….................................………………..11 List of Maps………………………………………………………………..........................................…………12 List of Images………………………………………………..................................................……………..13 Timeline………………………………………………………………...............................................………...14 Foreword….………….……………………….……………………………................................………………….19 Chapter 1: The process of nation-building, historiography and nation-building in modern Turkey……………………………………....................................................................................…23 1.1.Introduction 1.1.1 Construction of the past 1.1.2 Neglect and emphasize 1.2 Nation-building and historiography 1.3 Nation-building in Turkey 1.3.1 The case of Turkey 1.3.2 Features of the nation 1.3.3 Context of Turkey 1.4 Overview of the chapters 1.5 Works cited in chapter one Chapter 2: All eyes on Anatolia, looking for geographical emphases in Turkish historiography…………………………………………………………………………..............................………49 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Geography in Turkish historiography 2.3 Review of literature 2.4 The relevance of geography 2.5 History in the educational system 2.5.1 Primary Education 2.5.2 Secondary Education 2.5.3 University admission exams 2.6 Geography and the Image of the Nation 2.7 Summary and conclusion 2.8 Works cited in chapter two Chapter 3: The Balkans in Turkish history………………………...................................…….……87 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Review of literature 3.2.1 Osmanlı history of the Balkans 3.2.2 The Balkans in Turkish historiography 3.3 Migrating to Europe and settling in the Balkans 3.4.1 Creating lasting empires 3.4.2 The Turco-Mongol hordes

3.4.3 The Osmanlı Balkans 3.5 Summary and conclusion 3.6 Works cited in chapter three Chapter 4: 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9

A response to losing the Balkans…………………………………………....................…129 Introduction Contemporary literature on the Young Turks Background of the Young Turk movement The Rise of the Young Turks The Young Turk Revolution Faced with ensuing wars Coup or not? Summary and conclusion Works cited in chapter four

Chapter 5: Historiographical neglect and its impact, a case study surrounding the Armenian issue in Turkish history ………………………………………………………………..…..………..157 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Review of literature 5.3 Absence in Turkish historiography 5.4 Debates and disputes among historians 5.4.1 Victims of both sides 5.4.2 Authentic proof 5.4.3 Number of casualties 5.5 The transnational aspect 5.6 A short overview of 1885-1916 5.6.1 A list of important events 5.6.2 Sasus (1894) 5.6.3 Zeytun (1895) 5.6.4 The Osmanlı Bank (1896) 5.6.5 Khanasor (1897) 5.6.6 Sasun (1904) 5.6.7 The Yıldız Assassination (1905) 5.6.8 Adana (1909) 5.6.9 Tehcir (1915-1916) 5.7 The relocation (1915) 5.8 Primary sources 5.8.1 Osmanlı archives 5.8.2 German archives 5.8.3 American archives 5.9 Aftermath 5.10 Summary and conclusion 5.11 Works cited in chapter five Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..................................191 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Military glorification as the criterion 6.3 Concluding remarks 6.4 Additional thoughts 6.5 Works cited in chapter six

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..............……………………….…..205 Appendices………………………..…………………………………………………………...................…………...227 Appendix 1: Turkish history textbooks Appendix 2: Details and copyrights Appendix 3: The literature about the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Index………..………………………..…………………………………......................................……………….235

List of Tables Table 1: The table of content of a standardized Turkish history textbook….…….........…….57 Table 2: Turkish University Admission Exams between 1985 and 2010……......................71 Table 3: The second stage of Turkish University Admission Exams which was only implemented in the years between 1985 and 1998………………………………………………….…74-75 Table 4: Waves of migrating Turkish tribes to the Balkans……………….......................……116 Table 5: Grand viziers of the Osmanlı Empire during the Young Turk era.…..................145

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List of Graphs Graph 1: The most frequently asked chapters in Turkish University Admission Exams in the years 1985 and 2010………………………………...………………………………………………………………76

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List of Maps Map 1: The depiction of Central Asia as a paradise and the migration routes of the Central Asian Turks…………...................................................................................…………58 Map 2: The migration and empire of the Selçuklu Turks………………………………….........…….61 Map 3: The decline of the Osmanlı Empire and its lost provinces………………................….62 Map 4: The migration and empire of the Scythians, Sarmatians and Alans………........90-91 Map 5: The migration and empire of the Huns…………………………................................94-95 Map 6: The migration and empire of the Bulgars………………………………………............100-101 Map 7: The migration and empire of the Avars and Macars………………....................104-105 Map 8: The migration and empire of the Peçeneks and Selçuklu’s……………….........108-109 Map 9: The migration and empire of the Kıpçaks………………………….........................112-113 Map 10: The early Osmanlı advance in the Balkans ………………………………......................119 Map 11: The Osmanlı Empire (1830-1922) with the cities Manastır, Edirne, Selanik and İstanbul………………….……………………………………..........................................................134-135

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List of Images Image 1: The class of 1928-1929 of an Armenian Primary School in İstanbul….............140 Image 2: A celebration card of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 from 1911...…..........141 Image 3: A pamphlet of the Osmanlı provinces from 1911…….......................................143

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Timeline 11.000 B.C.

Settlement of Çatalhöyük in Anatolia (sometimes written as

‘Çatalcahöyük’) 1400 B.C.

Hittites establish an Anatolian civilization

1296-1280 B.C.

Battle of Kadeş

1280 B.C.

Treaty of Kadeş

1st Millennium

Turkish tribes invade the Balkans

1000-800 B.C.

Scythians migrate to the Balkans

800 B.C.

First Wave of Turkish migration to the Balkans

700-300 B.C.

Peaceful co-existence Sarmatians and Scythians

220 B.C.

Great Hunnic Empire

0

Anno Domini (A.D.)

300

Second Wave of Turkish migration to the Balkans

4th Century

Huns migrate to Europe (Great Migration)

6th Century

Hunno-Bulgars enter the Balkans

516

Sibir Turks enter Anatolia

7th Century

Crimean Volga-Bulgars emerge

681

Turkic Bulgars defeat the Byzantine Empire

8th Century

Second Wave of Turkish migration

9th Century

Peçeneks take refuge in Pannonia

11th Century

Founding of the Selçuklu Empire

11th Century

Great Plague in the Balkans

1015

Çağrı Bey explores Anatolia

1074

el-Kâşgarî finishes his book

1071

Battle of Manzikert

1091

Peçenek siege of Constantinople

1155

Battle of Andria

1200

Third Wave of Turkish migration to the Balkans



13th Century

Fall of the Selçuklu Empire

1241

Mongol invasion of Hungary

1260

Selçuklu’s flee to Moldavia

1299

Founding of the Osmanlı Empire

14th Century

Osmanlı conquest of the Balkans

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1353

İskan strategy in Rumeli by Orhan Gazi

1363-1453

Edirne becomes the Osmanlı capital

1402

Battle of Ankara

1444

Battle of Varna

1453

Osmanlı conquest of Constantinople

1789

The French Revolution

1804-1813

First Serbian Uprising

1815-1817

Second Serbian Uprising

1821-1832

Greek Rebellion

1867

Osmanlı forces retreat from Serbia

1870-1871

Franco-Prussian War

1876 Bulgarian Rebellion 1876

Reign of Abdülhamit the Second

1876

First Osmanlı Constitution

1877 Romanian Revolt 1877-1878

Turko-Russian War

1878

Suspension of the Osmanlı Constitution

1878

Treaty of Berlin

1881

Establishment of the Kingdom of Romania

1882

Establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia

1885

Bulgarian annexation of the Osmanlı province of Rumeli

1889

Founding of İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti

1895

Renaming İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti as İttihat ve Terakki

Cemiyeti 1896

Armenian assault on the National Osmanlı Bank

1897

Greek Uprising on Crete

1908

Meşrutiyet: the Young Turks take control of the Osmanlı

Empire 1909

31 Mart Vakası

1910 Albanian Revolt 1910

Establishment of the Kingdom of Montenegro

1911 Trablusgarp War 1911

Continuing Albanian Revolt

1911-1912

Genç Kalemler journal was published

1912

Another Albanian Revolt

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1912

First Balkan War

1912

Selanik (Thessaloniki) was lost

1913

Bab-ı Ali Assault

1913

Edirne fell in Bulgarian hands

1913

Second Balkan War

1913

Edirne was recaptured by Osmanlı troops

1914-1918

First World War

1915

Battle of Gallipoli

1915

Armenian Rebellion in Anatolia

1919-1922

Turkish War of Independence

1922

Fall of the Osmanlı Empire

1923

Founding of the Republic of Turkey

1938

Death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

1939-1945

Second World War

1960

First Turkish coup d’état

1971

Second Turkish coup d’état

1980

Third Turkish coup d’état

1994

Russian Ossetians adopt ‘Alania’

2012

Turkey implements the new ‘4+4+4’-school model

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Foreword Writing this book was a long and tiresome journey in which I received support and help from many different people over the past couple of years. Some of the advice I received dates back to my years as a Bachelor and Master student at Utrecht University, others were given to me during my years as a Ph.D.student. Additionally, I have received advice, encouragement and support from colleagues, old and new friends, advisors and many people whom I met in the course of my research in Turkey and the Netherlands. Without their help, this book would have been impossible to write. I am especially grateful to Institute for Turkish Studies in Utrecht, the Netherlands where I was given the opportunity to combine my position as a Ph.D.-fellow with that of chairman of, and senior researcher at, Institute for Turkish Studies. Fellow-graduate students and colleagues at Institute for Turkish Studies; Saskia Hollander, Marloes Cornelissen, Erol Tonyukuk Ersoy, Sinan Çankaya and Dirk van der Linde deserve a special mention as they became more than mere colleagues in the last few years. Some of them are even people that I regard as my (best) friends. For funding that supported my research, I am greatly indebted to Institute for Turkish Studies and many other international organizations for providing me with grants and scholarships. Beyond this funding support, I would like to thank the various academic journals that provided me with the opportunities to present my research. They were kind enough to peer-review and approve my submitted articles for publication. In this context it is only fair to single out Kerim Rasheed of the International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) for acting as my language editor and proofreading the early editions of my work. Prof. Dr. Duco Hellema (Utrecht University), Dr. Joes Segal (Utrecht University), Dr. David Onnekink (Utrecht University), Prof. Dr. Remieg Aerts (Radboud University Nijmegen), Prof. Dr. Evert van der Zweerde (Radboud University Nijmegen) and Dr. Wim van Meurs (Radboud University Nijmegen) are just a few of the scholars that helped me in the early stages of this book while Prof. Dr. Birsen Karaca (Ankara University), Prof. Dr. Ruben Gowricharn (Tilburg University) and Dr. László Marácz (University of Amsterdam) were supportive throughout my research. Towards the end of my research I received a great deal of support from Christopher Gunn (Florida State University), Maxime Gauin (International Strategic Research Organisation), Aslan Yavuz Şir (Center for Eurasian Studies) and the retired but still very wise Nuri Yıldırım. A special thank goes out to all those around me that grew up in Turkey and

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were willing to share their high school memories and/or high school history textbooks with me. It very much made the Turkish educational system much more apparent in my research. So thank you very much: Hüsniye, Birsen, İlayda, Behin and all those others that I forgot to mention in this section. The book cover and graphic alterations are the work of various graphic designers; whom I would like to thank for their efforts in creating a graphic design that suited all of my wishes. I would also like to thank Michael van der Galiën of The Daily Standard (or ‘De Dagelijkse Standaard’ in its original Dutch format) for proofreading the manuscript in this phase. Finally, I need to thank my mother and my sister, who have always been there for me throughout my research and during my many trips to Turkey, Spain, United Kingdom and elsewhere. All of this would have been much more difficult, if not for their love and trust in me and my ability to succeed in this endeavor. In addition, I would like to thank all of my friends that succeeded in helping me relax and laugh after a long day of researching and writing in the last several months. Among those are my childhood friends, university classmates and/or neighbors; of which Kevin, Stephan, Thijs, Mustafa, Carlo and Daan deserve special mention. Most importantly, I am grateful to have shared this experience with the love of my life Özde, who has been with me through every step of this process. Her love, encouragement, support, friendship and faith in me helped me get to this point.

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Chapter 1: The process of nation-building

Historiography and nation-building in modern Turkey “Türk nereye gitse asıl yurdunu unutmazdı. Çünkü, atalarının mezarı oradaydı.” Ziya Gökalp (Ankara, 1923: 133)

Introduction Since the emergence of the phenomenon of ‘nation’, entire states have adopted an understanding of people living within a geographical region as belonging to one common origin. In realizing this unifying concept of ‘nation’, historiography plays an important factor in finding a common history for people within a given geography. Sometimes, historiography is used to emphasize or neglect parts of the national history in order to establish a new ‘nation’. In the nineteenth century, the smaller German states formed one nation, or ‘Kulturnation’ to speak in the terms of Frederich Meinecke (1922), without actually being one unified state (Iordachi, 2006). In the nineteenth century, it was widely believed that the concept of ‘nation’ was interchangeable with that of ‘race’ because it was widely accepted that ‘nation’ was carved out by descent (Hewitson, 2006). In order to forge new ‘nations’, it became important to invent myths, traditions, suitable history, cultural trademarks and linguistic commonality (Smith, 2009; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). After the nineteenth century, most notably the 1920s and 1930s, the concept of ‘nation’ became intermingled with other phrases. Some scholars of that specific time period, such as Carlton Hayes (1931) and Louis Snyder (1954), were emphasizing the concept of ‘nation’ with a modern, secular content and its close relationship to rationalism and liberalism (Smith, 2009). This was a radical change with De Gobineau (1999), who was against modern ideologies like republicanism within a ‘nation’ but was advocating for ‘race’. In both De Gobineau and Hayes’ theory of ‘nation’, historiography played an important role; for example, by linking the British ‘nation’ to the myth of a ‘honest and righteous King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table’ (Higham, 2002; Thorpe, 1966; Loomis, 1956).

Construction of the past While individual nations might come and go, a ‘nation’ as a historical community was eternal; the historiography to back this was accordingly formulated (Smith, 2009). De Gobineau (1855) stated that there were only ten great civilizations in world history and all of them were derived from the Aryan race, and in doing so, place an emphasis on certain historical events while completely neglecting others (De Gobineau, 1855; Cassirer, 2009; Collins & Gobineau, 2010).

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According to Smith (2009), it is typical for a state to formulate the grand narratives of national history and select its heroes and saints. This construction of history was meant to put an emphasis on chosen myths, traditions, suitable history, cultural trademarks and linguistics (Dixon, 2011). Therefore, historiography became an important aspect of the newly established nation state, either as an emphasizing or neglecting factor. The states focused on earlier times in order to depict an ancient ‘golden age’. During this process an exemplary of a golden age was defined. In this defining process historiography plays an undoubted role, as it is the main factor used to select or neglect parts of the national history, in order to create a ‘nation’ in which people felt united and part of the same community. The construction of the past is directed and maintained by the political elite of a country. By using political socialization, as well as popular socialization, the task of ensuring a common public, within one nation of a mass (homogeneous) culture can be done by government agencies (Smith, 1991; Almond & Pye, 1965). The best example of this is most notably the public system of education and the publication of history books that are used during this education (Dixon, 2011). These history books are to be seen as the official historiography of a nation, where regimes are under the influence of nationalist ideals of cultural authenticity and unity (Smith, 1991; Gellner, 1983). Through these books, the educational system is used to create a mass culture of homogeneous elements in which every citizen is regarded as part of the nation state (Gellner, 1983; Baycroft & Hewitson, 2006; Weber, 1976; Soboul, 1973; Mathiez, 1939). A well-maintained and effective centralized educational system is the key instrument in forming common cultural traits upon a society (Gellner, 1983). The range will be much wider than art or novels, or in later times, even movies. Other notable examples are not nearly as efficient, as the educational system and the historiography used within it. Mass nationalist education started with the French Revolution in 1789 in which every peasant was regarded a ‘national citizen’ and, therefore, received the exact same education as the son of a notable (Weber, 1976; Smith, 1991). Prior to this, children of notables did not receive the same education as a peasant, but rather a far more intensive education. The peasant did not receive that kind of education, if any.

Neglect and emphasis When one looks at different countries, we can see the aspect of neglect clearly in their educational system. For instance, after the Second World War the Allies deported some twelve million Germans from their homes in Eastern Europe (Clark, 2006). The Allies did this in order to provide Russia with the room to expand, since the Russians had aided the Western Allies against Nazi Germany. The same Germans had negotiated with their Italian and Russian allies during 1939-1941 a possible population exchange themselves. This

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aspect of national history is accordingly neglected in all the above-mentioned countries and their education systems. This aspect of neglect is not confined to the European or Asian continent; even the United States of America has its unmentioned versions of history in its education systems. The most notable example is that of the Indians, the native inhabitants of the American continents, who today are reduced to a very insignificant part of the American population (Heart & DeBruyn, 1998). In America, the aspect of the Indians is not only downplayed in the educational system but emphasis is placed on the various explorers that came to America. The explorations and navigating skills of explorers like Columbus are emphasized in such a strong way that it puts everything in a different perspective. According to Heart & DeBruyn (1998), the Indians see these explorers as the perpetrators of massacres, but this is entirely neglected in the current American education system. Keyder (2005) emphasizes that there are silences in every nation’s history that belie an active effort to forget. To give another example of the implementation of neglect and emphasis, one can look at Eugen Weber’s publication ‘Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914’ (1976). In France, after 1870, the schoolbooks of the Third Republic taught: one people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland; there was in fact no such thing. It was only in the 1840s, a mere 30 years before, that a citizen from Paris mused that one did not need “to go to America to see savages” referring to the peasants of the Burgundian countryside (Weber, 1976). But the schoolbooks of the educational system put an emphasis on the unity of the people, and subsequently neglected the poorly educated peasants of the countryside, portraying all the people of France as one and highly-educated. But France is not alone in this; other parts of Europe also became struck with the ethnic nationalist preoccupation of creating a national identity through the process of education in the early nineteenth century. Notably, in regions that had a very diverse population and a locally bound loyalty, such as Germany and Italy in the second half of the nineteenth century, the idea that “each people had its unique voice and style, its original culture and individuality [...] struck a powerful chord among the small coteries of intellectuals and middle classes of the different ethnic communities and networks in these areas” (Smith, 2009). These intellectual leaders then tried to create greater unity by using their ideas in the educational system. This resulted in the unification of the smaller Italian and German states into the Italian and German nation states we see today. Nation-building and historiography The unification of states like Germany and Italy are the outcome of nationbuilding. Historiography is argued to have played a major role in the process of nation-building. For instance, historiography in France tried to depict a picture in which France was a spiritual unity of people. That is why French history

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textbooks from 1870 onwards taught that France was “one people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland” (Weber, 1976). In teaching French spirituality through historiography, the emphasis of French nation-building created unity and equality among its citizens. In French historiography the French Revolution of 1789 was hailed as the decisive event in French history. The spiritual unity of France was that all people of France were one and highly-educated. However, Weber (1976) shows that well into the nineteenth century there was in fact no unity in France. Poorly educated peasants in the countryside were neglected in favour of the highly educated elite in the cities. In this context, historiography was used to create a spiritual unity with people that were one. In this ‘unity-creating’ pre-text, the people did not need to live in the same country or even within the same boundaries. The boundaries of France were extremely elastic. For instance, although France emphasized “one people, one country, one government, one nation, one fatherland”, it did bend the rules in order to expand to other regions. The expansion of Germany to the east in the thirteenth (and again in the twentieth) century is justified as ‘return’ and not ‘conquest’ (Geary, 2003: 35). Still, it is hard to understand. The expansion of Russia into eastern Asia is also hard to understand. Both France, as well as Germany and Russia justified their conquests by pointing to historical and cultural references in order to strengthen their claims on those lands. According to Anderson (1983), it shows how elastic and infinite the boundaries of a geographical nation were perceived by many. However, the point that Anderson tries to make is that a limited concept of nation does not aim to ‘convert’ the whole planet, but simply to distinguish oneself from the herd. On the other hand, when a geographical gain is at stake, the concepts of ‘nations’ prove extremely elastic. Historiography is used as a tool to explain why these boundaries should be in this or that way. This type of historiography focuses on a spiritual entity. Historiography that promotes the moral and intellectual entity of a nation throughout history was the case in conservative Prussia, where philosophers and historians focused on a dynamic world, in which the German moral of freedom and equality was seen as the core of the German nation. The unity it created was focused on a German culture with universal values (Breisach, 1983). Germany had become the principal agent of freedom, a role that is now taken on by the United States of America. These basic elements became the core of those nations and this is very much emphasized in the history books of those countries. It is no coincidence that German historiography focuses so heavily on German morals and values through important philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein. These names are still the core fundamentals in German historiography, as is seen in German nation-building, in which there was almost no room for colonialism due to moral objections (among other reasons). This form of historiography carves out a concept of nation where there is seemingly no focus on the geographical context of a nation or its people.

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The emphasis on spiritual unity in the case of France, however, has become intensified due to military glorification in its historiography (Luckham, 1982). Together, this military glorification and spiritual unity are seen as the core of France, mainly because of French historiography which portrayed the French nation as being a spiritual unity while emphasizing military glory. In this case, historiography was used to form a spiritual unity without geographical features of the nation. The critique on this correlation between historiography and nation-building is that it was shaped by a small elite of French people that were highly-educated and, therefore, portrayed the ‘French nation’ with a certain spiritual entity that entitled them to include the French peasants into the process of nation-building. Resisting minorities, like Huguenots, were accordingly expelled, but this focus on a spiritual unity did transcend ethnic and racial trademarks. There is, however, no reason to assume that this ‘top-down’ approach of the elite was used to force certain views concerning the nation upon the people. Perhaps those sentiments were already present among the common folk? Next to France, this kind of historiography is especially present in Western Europe and in the Western hemisphere. Another theory about the historiography of a nation is that of a selective ethno-history emerging from pre-existing myths, symbols and traditions to be found in the historical record, and in the living memories of ‘the people’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). In this context the “return to an ‘ethnic past’ (or pasts) is a corollary of the nationalist quest for ‘authenticity’. Only that which can be shown to be ‘genuine’ and ‘ours’ can form the basis for a national identity, and that in turn requires a cultivation of indigenous history and vernacular languages and cultures, and the vernacular mobilization of ‘the people’ in and through their own history and culture. The result is a type of nation founded on ‘ethnic’ conceptions, and fuelled by a genealogical nationalism; although even here, the nation, as in Germany or Greece, is simultaneously defined in territorial and political terms” (Smith, 1998: 194). In this process historiography is used to emphasize certain pre-existing myths, symbols and other historical records while simultaneously maintaining a territorial criterion. In this theory of an ethnic nation, the nation is transformed by the intelligentsia and professionals, rediscovering and implementing a selective ethno-history, like the above-mentioned pre-existing myths, symbols and traditions. These above-mentioned types of historiographies, which focus on a spiritual entity, military glorification and/or pre-existing myths, can be complementary to each other, and one does not need to exclude the other. The main critical approach to historiography in its many forms is that it stems from the desire of certain people to live together, the need to own a common possession of a rich heritage of memories, and the will to exploit the inheritance one has received in joint tenancy (Weber, 1976). Historiography is in fact formed by the intelligentsia and professionals, who emphasize or choose to neglect certain events in history, in order to form cohesion among a group of people

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(Smith, 1998). Subsequently, Smith also states that it is “difficult indeed to see how and why anyone should have wanted to turn the pre-modern Finnish or Czech, Kurdish or Ewe ‘low’ cultures into modern, literate ‘high’ cultures, rather than adopting the nearest high culture of the dominant ethnic population in the state” (Smith, 1998: 38). In other words, historiography fuels the imagining of a (national) community (Anderson, 1983). These critics are countered by the new term ‘Psycho-History’, in which the history that becomes reality in the psychology of people is seen as the only genuine history of that specific nation (Ersaydı, 2011). This ‘Psycho-History’ replaces history through invented, even artificial, elements of a supposed high culture of modernity, manufactured by intelligentsias and purveyed to thousands of schoolchildren through historiography in standardized textbooks and courses. Gellner (1983) frequently underlines that we identify with the public taught culture in modern society, not with our culture of origin or family. Toynbee (1939; Toynbee, 1952: 1) takes this a step further by stating that, “no European nation or national state, however, can point back to a history which would be explicable”. However, ‘Psycho-History’ may seem artificial but for ‘the nation’ and ‘its people’, it is very much real and it is how it carves out its own identity. The main focus of this discussion should be the various forms in which historiography has played a role in the process of nation-building. History can be depicted in various ways through historiography, but foremost is that of standardized history textbooks for school children. In this form, historiography is reflected on a mythical image of the past, which is no longer present, but is still depicted as an ultimate goal to fulfil the hope of uniting the spiritual unity of a people, sometimes through a geographical unity or embedded moral values. Historiography that shows a strong emphasis on military glorification is mostly used to create a spiritual unity against an outside foe. In the Balkans and the Caucasus it is common to use historiography that concentrates on military humiliation and elastic boundaries. Just two examples are Serbia and Armenia, where their respective historiography focuses on the glorification of major military defeats during the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and the Armenian Relocation (1915) (Krieger, 2001; Feigl, 2006). But when military success is the main criteria for either glorification of an entire region, or (in case of military humiliation) downplaying and neglecting other regions, it becomes one very unique approach to the correlation between historiography and nation-building. This correlation between military glorification, with geographical emphasis on one region while neglecting other areas in historiography, has not yet been covered in scientific debates. The case of Turkey is based upon key elements of military glorification and geographical emphasis, instead of focusing on pre-existing myths and elastic boundaries. Nation-building in Turkey As with other areas of Europe and across the world, Turkey has tried to

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implement a model of nation and nation-building on its inhabitants by means of education and historiography through schoolbooks. Promoting the dominant Turkish culture in Anatolia, whether intentionally or not, minimized various other cultures that were (and still are) present in the region. In particular, the different Kurdish cultures of Kırmancı and Goranî, to name two of the Kurdish tribal cultures in Anatolia, have been seriously neglected as distinctive cultures, and subsequently included as parts of the dominant entity (Türközü, 1985). Although the characteristics of Turkish historiography are such that there is much common ground with other countries, one exception is that Turkey started its process of nation-building fairly late, at the beginning of the twentieth century. Consequently, centuries before, minorities within the Turkish region were able to carve out their own concept of nationalism. Other processes of nation-building were started decades, or even centuries earlier, for instance in Great Britain and France (Geary, 2003). According to Weber (1976) the French started their process of nation-building in the early nineteenth century, while the British even started in the Middle Ages (Smith, 1991). For the Turks, this process was different, as the ideas of nationalism first made their appearance in the Osmanlı Empire through minorities (Hanioğlu, 2008: 51; McCarthy, 1997: 204). This in turn caused friction between the cosmopolitan Osmanlı Empire, which had no nationalist notion at that time and aimed at uniting the multicultural Osmanlı citizens under one rule, and rebellious minorities that felt they had a right to a homogenous nation of their own outside the Osmanlı Empire (Glenny, 1999).

The case of Turkey The Greek mercantile colonies abroad made some Greek Osmanlı’s far more aware of European ways and thoughts than most Osmanlı’s. This stimulated the rise of intellectuals and political leaders who spread these ideas of nationalism, revolution and independence as early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Palmer, 1992: 82; Shaw & Shaw, 2005; Ortaylı, 2007: 96). The same could be said of the Serbs who were the first Osmanlı citizens that organized a nationalist uprising in 1804 (Hanioğlu, 2008). In the Osmanlı Empire, most bankers or traders were non-Muslims, since loan bankers and mercantile colonies were the only ties Osmanlı citizens could have with the rest of Europe (FORUM, Instituut voor Multiculturele Vraagstukken, 2012). Consequently, these Osmanlı merchants who came into contact with European habits and ideologies (like nationalism) were in fact non-Muslims like Jews, Greeks, Armenians and so on (Quataert, 2006: 132; İnalcık, 2002: 3; Shaw, 1991). In the end, even the headquarters of the Osmanlı state bank was relocated to Paris and London (Zürcher, 2004). It was not until the early twentieth century that Osmanlı Turks turned

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to nationalism, some two to three centuries after the Osmanlı minorities had turned to nationalism (Shaw & Shaw, 2005; Kinross, 2002: 585). At the formation of Turkish nation-building, the fact that the Osmanlı minorities were already under the influence of nationalism played a big role. It caused a clash between various communities. On one side, there were communities already under the influence of their own nationalism, on the other there was a nationalism that was trying to be imposed by the ruling class in the early twentieth century. Legend has it that Atatürk, the founding father of modern Turkey, used the sentence “Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!” during a parliamentary session when he asked the newly appointed members of parliament to introduce themselves. One after the other began their introduction by saying that he or she was “Circassian”, “Muslim”, “Alawite”, “Armenian”, “Greek” etc., eventually one politician called himself a “Turk”. It was at this point that Atatürk was said to have jumped out of his seat and called upon this man to stand up and take a bow. He was than stated to have excitedly said, “How glad for the one that says ‘I am a Turk’!” (‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!’) (İnce, 2012). In later years, Atatürk was to recite this on a more official note during his speech delivered for the 10th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1933. It eventually became a key element of Turkish education when in 1972 the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Turkey, introduced it into the Student Pledge (Turkish: Öğrenci Andı). Today, all students in Turkey repeat this pledge in the morning before beginning their regular classes. But this sentence is especially important in defining the situation of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s (İnce, 2012). In the disarray of the First World War (1914-1918) and the following Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), the Osmanlı Empire collapsed and its citizens were engaged in a war with the Allied occupants of the former Osmanlı provinces. The former Osmanlı army officer Mustafa Kemal (who had not yet been given the surname ‘Atatürk’) became the new leader of the former Osmanlı citizens, and was keen on creating a new cultural identity, where an orientation towards Western Europe was central in achieving technological advances. But this was certainly not an easy task. After the collapse of the Osmanlı Empire, the victorious Allied forces of the First World War occupied most of the former lands. Unhappy with this situation, the Turks started the War of Independence. Their leader, Mustafa Kemal, succeeded in driving most of the French, British, Italian, Greek, Russian, Armenian and Kurdish armies out of Anatolia. Although during the Turkish War of Independence Kemal aimed to free lands in the Balkans, Northern Iraq and Cyprus among others, he eventually decided to stop after liberating Anatolia and Istanbul from the Allied forces. This was mainly due to the exhaustion of his army, which had been fighting non-stop ever since the Italians invaded the Osmanlı Empire in 1911, some eleven years prior. At this point, Kemal showed a pragmatic view and was content with what he had achieved so far, by at least

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freeing the region of Anatolia and Istanbul from the occupying Allied forces. He victoriously claimed these recaptured lands to be a part of the new Republic of Turkey, which he proclaimed in 1923. The most important struggle began at this point, with the difficult process of uniting the various peoples of the Osmanlı Empire, which remained in Anatolia, into one homogeneous nation state. This process of creating a homogenous culture in Anatolia resulted in the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, in which the dominant culture was called ‘Turkish’ but in fact was a mixture of elements as in any other state. The above quote of Atatürk illustrates this process, where people tried to fall back on their alternative identity after the fall of the Osmanlı Empire. Some fell back on their religious identity, as a Muslim, Orthodox-Greek Christian, Jew etc., while others allied themselves with their tribes. Yet others, for instance refugees from the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, focused on their cultural background of Circassia etc. In this chaos there was a search for key elements to forge a new nation, where there was room for all ethnic groups, but united under one umbrella of homogeny. This became apparent during the transition of the Osmanlı Empire to the Republic of Turkey, when the main focus was to create unity by nationbuilding. It was mostly accomplished by a concept of nation that was historical and geographical, as well as cultural. The concept, which was later to be called the ‘Turkish nation’, derives from a historical-geographical concept (Baykara, 2000). In this respect the history of Turkey was not restricted to the modern Republic of Turkey (1923 to present), nor to its predecessor the Osmanlı Empire (1299-1922), and not even to its predecessor the Selçuklu Empire (11 th-13 th century). All of these three states were more or less in the same geographical area of Anatolia (Jackson, 2005); but Turkish history was placed further in the past, and by doing this, the role of historiography as part of the process that aimed at nation-building became imminent. The historiography focused on Selçuklu tribes, migrants from Central Asia to Anatolia, and Turkish history followed this path back to Central Asia. The history of the various tribes of Central Asia, who lived as clans but with a similar culture and language, was then to become the main focus within the historiography of the new Republic of Turkey. Accordingly, the Turks were the direct and uncontaminated descendants of the tribes who inhabited a territory in these distant lands of Central Asia (Keyder, 2005). By doing so, the historiography of the Turks not only focussed on Anatolia, but also on the Central Asian tribes. However, geographically, the Central Asian tribes (the direct ancestors of the Turks) were forced to leave, due to major ecological transformations that caused their lands of origin (being Central Asia) to be irreclaimable (Keyder, 2005). Anatolia filled the geographical gap that the ecologically altered Central Asia left behind, and centres the attention of Turkish historiography not on (Central) Asia, but on Europe instead (Duran, 2005). This led to the Balkans, the first region of Europe inhabited by Turkish tribes, being subsequently neglected and/

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or ignored in Turkish historiography. This geographical aspect of Anatolia in Turkish historiography was heavily emphasized in Turkey from 1923 onwards, and in a way is still the representation of the Turkish process of nation-building. Militarization became the connecting aspect of both Anatolia and the Balkans. Military defeat in the Balkans prompted neglect of that region in Turkish geography, while military victory in Anatolia promoted that region to the core of Turkish historiography. The geographical focus on Anatolia was integrated into schoolbooks for generations of young Turkish students. These history schoolbooks are what we can call ‘Turkish historiography’, along with scholars that support them. This qualification is in no way a judgment about the accuracy of this form of historiography; that is up for discussion. The wealthiest class of citizens in the Osmanlı world were of nonMuslim and non-Turkish descent. This was mostly due to the privileges for nonMuslim minorities in the banking and trade sectors. Profiting from their wealth, and their ties with foreign states, these minorities eventually came into contact with nationalism. Due to their ties with foreign states, the minorities were able to come in direct contact with notions of nationalism, however, Muslims or Turks within the Osmanlı Empire were not in this position. Therefore, when the Turks eventually came in contact with the concept of nationalism, the common history was reinvented, but because of the lack of financial wealth the number of highly educated intellectuals was low.

Features of the nation To overcome the lack of historiography among Turks, the first political nationalists primarily used non-Turkish sources to create Turkish historiography. The philosopher Ziya Gökalp1, from Diyarbakır, is seen as the ‘father of Turkish nationalism’ (Gökalp, 1923; Gökalp & Berkes, 1959; Ünlü & Çotuksöken, 2001), while the Armenian linguist Agop Martayan Dilaçar was the first SecretaryGeneral of the Turkish Language Society in Turkey (Dilaçar, 1936; Dilaçar, 1961; Türkay, 1982). Even the theory that the Turkish language was the language from which all other languages are descended, also known as ‘Güneş Dil’ or ‘Sun Language Theory’, was proposed by the Austrian linguist Dr. Hermann F. Kvergić (Lewis, 1999; Kvergić, 1935). His theory claimed that the Turkish language, through the Sumerian language, was the language from which all civilized languages derived, and was soon given official backing and material support by the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

1  Although Gökalp wrote in his essay that “he has researched his own background and that he has no Kurdish bloodline”, adding that even if he had Kurdish blood this was of no importance because he “felt Turkish by his upbringing”; see Türkçülüğün Esasları (1923; reprint 2001).

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The lack of Turkish scholars led to foreign scholars being used to form a Turkish identity and this is also clear in Turkish historiography. The Danish scholar Vilhelm Ludwig Peter Thomsen (1896) along with the German-Russian scholar Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff (1894/1899) are regarded as founders of Turkology, a scientific study of Turkish peoples (Akdeniz, 1998; Temir, 1991). They also deciphered the Turkish Orkhon inscriptions in Central Asia, concluding that the Anatolian Turks of their day were descendants of (or at least connected to) the ancient tribes of Central Asia (Peter, 1896; Radloff, 1894/1899). The research of both Thomsen and Radloff, that there were ancient Turkish-speaking peoples from Central Asia, was incorporated in Turkish historiography (Tekin, 2010). The findings of Thomsen and Radloff led to the current Turkish historiography that states Anatolia and the various tribes in Central Asia were all ‘Turkish’. This caused some historians in Turkey to redefine the Central Asian tribes as ‘Turkish (or Turkic) tribes’ and the ancient Anatolian civilizations of Sumerians and Hittites were promoted to ‘Proto-Turks’ (Kurt, 1995). Consequently, this was adopted in the process of Turkish nation-building and these aspects were introduced in schoolbooks celebrating the victories of the Selçuklu’s; for example, the Battle of Manzikert on the 26th of August 1071, between the armies of the Byzantines and Selçuklu’s, the latter emerging as the victors subsequently conquering Anatolia, (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). Turkish history taught through the textbooks of the era, right after the founding of the Turkish Republic, represents Turkish historiography. This is still quite consistent with contemporary schoolbooks, and can offer insight into how history put forward by the process of nationbuilding in Turkey (İnce, 2012). Turkish nation-building points to the historical-geographical dimension of Anatolia as being the ‘homeland’ of the Turkish nation, and one historicalcultural tie with the Central Asian tribes (Yıldız, 2006). Between these two regions of Anatolia and Central Asia, the former became increasingly more important as summarized by Karaömerlioğlu (2010): “While the Turanist and Pan-Turkish varieties were often preoccupied with external Turks living in external territories, Anatolianism never mentioned them at all. Indeed, when they were mentioned, it was to show why it was impractical, irrelevant and impossible for any Turkish nationalist project to include Turks living outside Anatolia.” Other regions in-between, such as the Middle East, or at the frontier, like the Caucasus and the Balkans, were accordingly neglected, as they mostly still are. Anatolia became the undisputed new ‘homeland’ of the Turks, which was odd seeing that “[t]he political and intellectual elites of the Osmanlı Empire looked down on central and eastern Anatolia, the least developed part of the country

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– an attitude that would radically alter after the loss of the Balkans” (Üngör & Polatel, 2011). Nevertheless, Turkish historiography has proclaimed Anatolia as its ‘homeland’ and its few flaws have been accordingly neglected. Central Asia was consequently seen as a region ecologically transformed in such a way that the lands of origin (Central Asia) were altered to be irreclaimable. Although the theory proclaimed that the Turks were the direct and uncontaminated descendants of the tribes who inhabited a territory in the distant lands of Central Asia (Keyder, 2005), this was brought back to a strictly historical-cultural tie. By doing so, the geographical aspect of Turkish historiography only focuses on Anatolia. The portrayal of Anatolia was as an undivided region with one common culture, but much ethnic diversity. Turks, Armenians, Arabs, Greeks, Jews, Laz, Kırmancı (and other Kurdish tribes), Zaza and many more ethnic groups were all supposed to derive from one Anatolian culture. Seeing that many of these groups had already formed their own concept of nation-building some two centuries ago, many were reluctant to agree that ‘their’ culture was part of a ‘common Anatolian’ culture. As these ethnic minorities had come into direct contact with nationalism prior to the creation of Turkish nation-building, they had their own views on nationalism. Some felt more connected with their own nationalism, than with the newly created Turkish nation. For example, an ethnic Greek in Anatolia could have felt more connected with the Greek nation and subsequently dismissed Turkish views on nation-building. Turkey has one important feature within its own image of the Turkish nation. Turkey is seen as a militaristic state (İnalcık, 1964; Gökçen, 1996; Yücel, 1998). From the beginning of the twentieth century, the new Republic of Turkey was portrayed to its citizens as a “military-nation” (Altınay, 2004; Özel, 1999; Su & Bülkat, 1961). But this is not the most surprising aspect. In 1999 (some 76 years later), the following was stated by a Turkish Minister of Culture: “Turks have been known as a military-nation throughout history. The Turkish military is synonymous with Turkish national identity. Our military has won great victories, glory and honor for our nation” (Talay, 1999; “495 sayfada Türk Ordusu”, 1999). And of course the lost battles of this ‘glorious Turkish military’ cannot be fitted into this general picture. Therefore, neglect within Turkish historiography was the only option for the implementation of nation-building in Turkey. According to Altınay, the core of Turkey today is still that it is a nation with a glorious, especially military, past. The main focus lies on military victories in Anatolia, which enabled Turks to glorify their past, while the Balkans were to be neglected due to major military defeats in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Countries like Japan, Germany and France, for example, also have

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(or had) a militaristic self-image. Japan’s controversial history textbooks still reinforce the absence of both war guilt and responsibility in Japan’s nationbuilding (Dixon, 2011). Scholar Daniel Nagashima (2006) points out that Japan is still reluctant to acknowledge its role as aggressor, because it sees this as something ‘normal’. Roger Chickering (2008) describes Germany as a country in which the military is “the nation’s highest source of pride”. The fact that the German Empire was born on the battlefields of France in 1870–71 was of importance. The Franco-Prussian War credited the army as the symbol of Germany’s national destiny, and it ensured that soldiers would have an elite position within German society (Retallack, 2008). In France, the role of the French Foreign Legion, and men that served in it, played an important role. Serving in the French Foreign Legion meant that every man could become a French citizen, regardless of his ethnic origin, ability to speak French, or the country where he was born. Scholar Robin Luckham (1982) singles out France’s militarism in the French colonies of Africa, where the French intervened and used force more often than any other outside power. When this militaristic aspect is examined in Turkey, it does in fact become a unique feature due to the importance of geography. According to Altınay (2004), Turkey has a ‘military culture’ and constitutes as a ‘military nation’, although this is a product of history as well as artefacts of a century of practices and discourses. Even after 1982, Turkish history textbooks, of both primary and secondary education, taught values such as nationalism, the unity and indivisibility of the nation, respect for authority and militarism (Kerslake, Öktem & Robins, 2010). Dutch scholar Zürcher (2010a) emphasizes that Turkey focused mainly on state-centred Turkish nationalism and militarism during their process of nation-building. But no literature focuses on the aspect of military humiliation and glorification based on geography in Turkey. Most countries had problems with defining their geographical focus (Veer, 2004: 255). Turkey defined its geography through militarization. Although the Balkans were the richest provinces of the Turks, after the Turkish defeat in the Balkan Wars during 1912-1913, and the subsequent military victories of the Turks in Anatolia, all of the geographical focus was on Anatolia. Subsequently, the military humiliation of the Balkans was neglected in favour of the military glorification in Anatolia. The geographical focus in Turkish nation-building, fixated on Anatolia, became imminent.

Context of Turkey The historical context in which nationalism emerged in Turkey is tied directly to the declining Osmanlı Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It led to disintegration and dissatisfaction, but also an orientation to the Western model of a nation. The lost wars paved the way for areas and regions to be lost, especially the provinces of the Osmanlı Empire that were considered the epicentre. For instance, many intellectuals and the elite of the Osmanlı Empire

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lived in the Balkan provinces, and considered it the core of the Osmanlı Empire when it was lost during the “catastrophic” Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 (Bozdoğan, 2001). The cultural and intellectual importance of the Balkans becomes clear when we give the example of the literary-cultural journal ‘Genç Kalemler’, which was published in the Osmanlı city of Selanik (present-day Thessaloniki in Greece) from April 1911 to October 1912. It was in fact this journal that opted for the idea of a purer Turkish language, without Arabic and Persian elements, instead of the Arabic-Persian-Turkish-mixed Osmanlı language (Belge, 2010). This idea of ‘a purer Turkish language’ became one of the main pillars of the political elite after Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey. The Osmanlı language, comprised of Turkish words written in the Arabic alphabet and with Persian grammar, was soon transformed into the ‘Turkish language’ as we know it today. This is just one minor example why the Balkans would have been so significant to the new regime, and subsequently, the political leaders of the Republic of Turkey. According Zürcher (2010b), the insurrection in the Balkans of 1912-1913 is one of the main reasons why the old Osmanlı regime fell. Within the Osmanlı Empire this was also a highly debated issue: “On the edges of the empire, the Ottomans lost control of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Crete, Cyprus, and parts of Caucasia. None of these areas were seriously contested by them as none were critical to the continued survival of the empire itself. In the Balkans, however, parts of which had been under Turkish domination for over five hundred years, the Ottomans fiercely contested the loss of power and control of the area” (Erickson, 2003). As a response, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (or Young Turk Movement) emerged as an innovative new political movement in the last days of the Osmanlı Empire. Despite a Western orientation these reformers were no exponents of a wealthy middle class, but ethnically diverse military officers and army soldiers. It was not a colonial situation in which they were operating; the Young Turks, made up primarily of Osmanlı army officers and government officials, were desperately trying to prevent the decline of the Osmanlı Empire, which had became imminent by the nineteenth century when the important province of Greece was lost by the Osmanlı’s. Thereafter, Greece played a decisive role in the shaping of ‘a Turkish national citizenship’ (Iordachi, 2010). General feelings of despair and hopelessness were channelled in ideologies that were aimed at saving the Osmanlı Empire from disintegrating and falling in the hands of foreign occupiers. By 1908 the Young Turks, having their base in the Balkan region, had seized power in the Osmanlı Empire in an attempt to save it from disintegration. Although the Young Turks tightened their grip on the Osmanlı Empire

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in a desperate attempt to forge unity between the Osmanlı citizens, they could not avoid being sucked into the First Balkan War of 1912. In this war, the Balkan subjects of the Osmanlı Empire secretly forged an alliance and simultaneously revolted that subsequently led to their independence. By pure perseverance the Young Turks were able to recapture some parts of the Balkans, such as the former Osmanlı capital of Edirne, during the Second Balkan War of 1913 (Ahmad, 1993). However, in general, the Balkan Wars proved disastrous for the Young Turks and the Osmanlı Empire. For example, after the army of the Greek rebels occupied the former Osmanlı lands, some 200,000 Turks fled from Greece alone, as (political) refugees from the lost provinces to the Anatolian mainland prior to 1912, in fear of torture and ethnic cleansing (Halaçoğlu, 1995). During the Balkan Wars, an additional number of at least 410,000 refugees was added to these waves of migration (McCarthy, 1995). The Turkish minorities that remain in the Balkans are the descendants of the Balkan refugees that were subjected to ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation. Despite this fact, Bulgaria (to name just one Balkan country as a example) still has a population of approximately 7 million inhabitants, comprising of approximately from 10% to 15%, to at least 20%, Turks (Turan, 1998). Consequently, the disastrous Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 enabled the Osmanlı minorities to create their own independent states. The Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs were the main examples. But the Osmanlı Empire also encountered a wave of political refugees that poured into Anatolia. These refugees, mostly of Muslim and Turkish descent, brought with them their own ideas of nationalism, after seeing how the minority nationalism caused them to be driven out of their own lands. Consequently, this trauma made it possible for these refugees to view other upcoming forms of nationalism among minorities in Anatolia as life threatening. One such case is the Armenian Rebellion in Anatolia during the First World War (1914-1918). In reaction to both the minority nationalism that had begun centuries before, and had now evolved into a rebellion against the Osmanlı Empire, and the refugees that fell victim to these rebellions, a process of nation-building was concocted in which militarism and geography were both combined. To summarize, the military aspect was used to neglect and/or abandon the Balkans (as it was the scene of military defeat), while on the other hand, hail and/or eulogize Anatolia as it was the scene of staggering military victories from 1915 onwards. Overview of the chapters Within the process of nation-building in Turkey, the characteristic of geography became a key element in the Turkish image of a military nation. In order to accomplish this, the aspect of neglect and emphasis within historiography was put to work. Anatolia was emphasized as the undisputed ‘homeland’ of the

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Turks. This emphasis in Turkish historiography (more specifically the history schoolbooks used in Turkish education) has been further examined in chapter two. For Turkey, geography is much different than for the peoples of Europe. Being the offspring of nomads, it is difficult for Turks to pinpoint which regions are their homeland. Therefore, the creation of a homeland is something that must be forged prior, or at the same time, to efforts to unite the people by one dominant culture. As Europeans settled into their geographical regions almost two millennia ago, their geographical ties are much stronger than the Turks. Even with the Selçuklu’s or Osmanlı’s, the Turks never really settled, but were always on the go to secure more territory by victories and the conquest of other lands. This is also why around 1255 that travellers mention “Christians in Seljük Anatolia outnumber the Muslims who rule over them, by ten to one” (Jackson, 2005: 348). In the case of Turkey, the region of Anatolia was chosen as the undividable core of the Turkish nation ever since the Selçuklu tribes entered the stage in the eleventh century. Although the Selçuklu’s dominated the entire Middle East (from Arabia to the borders of India), they also subsequently took Anatolia from the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 (Freely, 2008). This single battle is hailed in Turkish schoolbooks as the decisive moment the Turks entered Anatolia, never to leave this region again (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). Turkish historiography has been examined in search of geographical emphases. If one region is downplayed or neglected in Turkish historiography, there must be a reason for this. This will be the main core of the third chapter. After looking at which regions are emphasized as geographically important within Turkish historiography (chapter two), one must look further into historiography, not only Turkish historiography but historiography in general. This will be put forth in chapter three. In this process one can see that what is excluded from Turkish historiography: in the (at least three) millennia prior to the Selçuklu’s, the Central Asian tribes took other routes to Europe in their process of migrating west. In doing so, these Central Asian (or Turkic) tribes could have passed through other regions rather than Anatolia, and may have even settled there. This chapter aims to look further into historiography to research just that. Some aspects were left out of Turkish historiography; for instance, the event in which the Selçuklu’s were defeated by the Mongol hordes in the thirteenth century, and their subsequent flight to western Anatolia and the Balkans. This caused the epicentre of the Osmanlı Empire (the successor of the Selçuklu’s) to be in those regions as well, and their focus to be on those provinces (Kiel, 1993). Subsequently, in the fourteenth century the Osmanlı’s penetrated deeper into the Balkans than any other region (Freely, 2008). These “[r]aids deep into the Balkans were clearly not spontaneous but formed part of a broad strategic plan and were followed up by further operations designed

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to seize territory weakened by raiding” (Nicolle, 2007: 113). The conclusions from the first chapters give credence to the idea that the region of the Balkans was neglected, left out, or simply downplayed in Turkish historiography. This third chapter will be an effort to fill all these gaps in Turkish historiography, by seeing what aspects of the Balkans are neglected in Turkish historiography, and what role the Balkans played in Turkish history from ancient times up to the Middle Ages. After chapter three, it also becomes clear that there is a period of time during which the Balkans are the political core of the Osmanlı Empire. This chapter will differ from the first chapters, which were historiographical of nature, in the sense that it is a chapter focusing on history and not historiography. After the Balkans was lost due to rising nationalism, a distinctive political movement emerged as a response. The military defeat of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) resulted in a completely new geographical focus within Turkish nation-building. If we look at the period of the modern Republic of Turkey one can see that it was founded in 1923, but the political ideologies came from movements in earlier years, and especially from those political movements that originated in the Balkans right after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Nonetheless, this is either downplayed or is left out of contemporary Turkish nation-building. If we keep in mind that in the eighty-eight years since those wars, no critical analysis has ever been conducted that examines the specific reasons for the Osmanlı defeat, let alone other aspects, we can clearly see this neglect in contemporary historiography (Erickson, 2003). The aspect of ‘victimized Turks’ does not fit the picture of the ‘glorious Turkish militarynation’ that was depicted right after 1923 during the process of Turkish nationbuilding, and accordingly neglected. Therefore, chapter three is devoted to the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (or Young Turk Movement), which emerges as an innovative new political movement in the last days of the Osmanlı Empire as a political response to the major defeat in the Balkans. The Young Turks, made up primarily by Osmanlı army officers and governmental officials, were desperately trying to prevent the decline of the Osmanlı Empire. In the fourth and final empirical chapter, a case study concerning the impact of neglect and emphasis in historiography in the process of nationbuilding is discussed. One consequence of neglect in the process of Turkish nation-building, is that it has caused great debate about certain events in Turkish history about which the modern Republic of Turkey does not wish to discuss. The Armenian issue is one such question that has been neglected for decades, and was accompanied with deafening silence for many years on the part of Turkey. Until approximately the 1980s, the Armenian issue was very much kept quiet in Turkey. This caused many scholars to make assumptions regarding this neglected topic. The Armenian issue is seen by some scholars as a byproduct of the anguish that the Balkan refugees brought with them after they

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were subjected to ethnic cleansing and suffering; the Young Turks became bitter “after their expulsion from their ancestral lands in the Balkans, their emotions included humiliation, helplessness, anger, loss of dignity, lack of selfconfidence, anxiety, embarrassment, shame (sic)” (Üngör & Polatel, 2011: 25). To which account is this an accurate portrayal? Almost no historical event is as controversial as the Armenian issue of 1915; it is highly debated if the Armenian relocation of 1915 was indeed a systematic act of genocide by the Young Turk regime within the Osmanlı Empire. Since scholars like Üngör and Polatel take into account the aspect of the Balkan Wars to explain what happened during 1915, it is important to take this as a case study to see what happens when a historical case is neglected. It should be noted that this chapter is no way written to take a stance on this highly disputed subject. The closing chapter will deal with the concluding remarks of Turkish nationalism and the focus on geography. In doing so the main outcome will give weight to the conclusion that Turkish historiography is centred on geography. While Anatolia is considered the epicentre of Turkey, other important regions in Turkish history are either neglected or downplayed. This chapter will give a brief summary of the neglect that occurs in Turkish historiography. It will also give a reason why the lost regions of the Balkans were perceived as such a humiliation.

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Chapter 2: All eyes on Anatolia Looking for geographical emphases in Turkish historiography

“Vatan yahut Silistre” Namık Kemal (İstanbul, 1873) Introduction It was on April 1 st, 1873 that the first theatre play of Namık Kemal was performed by the Armenian-Osmanlı Güllü Agop (Bek, 2004). Kemal was an Osmanlı writer who poetically described the Battle of Silistre that took place in 1854 during the Crimean War (1853-1856). The name of his play was ‘Vatan’ (or ‘The Motherland’), which emphasized how the Osmanlı provinces in the Balkans were perceived: both as the motherland itself as well as the core of the Osmanlı Empire (B. Karaca, personal remark, November 2 nd, 2012; T. Ersoy, personal remark, November 6 th, 2012). The Battle of Silistre was one of the rare last stands of the Osmanlı’s in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that proved successful (Özükan, 2003: 58-61; Uyar & Erickson, 2009: 164; Shaw & Shaw, 1977: 139). Some 12,000 Osmanlı soldiers managed to repel 50,000 advancing Russian soldiers (Aksan, 2007: 454). The refusal of the Osmanlı troops to retreat against these overwhelming numbers of enemy soldiers, is a sign that the Balkan provinces were seen as too important to give up without a fight. Just eight days after the first re-enactment of his play, Namık Kemal was exiled to Cyprus (then still part of the Osmanlı Empire) on April 9 th, 1876 when riots broke out right after the first re-enactment (Bahar, 2003). After seeing this play, it sparked a rise of nationalism among the audience and demands for the recapture of the Osmanlı Balkans. Other people joined the riots in a desperate attempt to motivate the Osmanlı government to regain the Balkans. Along with the exile of Namık Kemal, his play was also banned and changed from ‘Vatan’ to ‘Silistre’. The Osmanlı motivation for both exiling Namık Kemal and changing the name of his play was the suspicion that Namık was too nationalist and liberal. When Namık received a general pardon on June 3 rd, 1876, after 38 months of exile, the name of his play was still upheld as ‘Silistre’ instead of ‘Vatan’ (Bek, 2004). When the region of Silistre, on the Bulgarian-Romanian border in the far north of Bulgaria, was lost in 1878 following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, the name of the play was changed yet again. It became ‘Vatan yahut Silistre!’ (or ‘The Motherland or Silistre’), which can be interpreted as either a literal meaning or a symbolic one. When looking at it from a literal point of view, it just means that the play is known as either ‘Vatan’ or ‘Silistre’; hence the name ‘The Motherland or Silistre’ (Akşin, 2007: 34).

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The symbolic explanation, however, is that the Osmanlı regime wanted to give their citizens the subliminal message that the loss of Silistre was necessary, since it was either ‘Silistre or the entire motherland’. With this subliminal message, the Osmanlı regime could defend their decision in taking no action to retake Silistre after 1878; a choice that was hard to defend, as Silistre was a large Osmanlı port city in present-day north eastern Bulgaria, lying on the southern bank of the lower Danube at the country’s border with Romania. Silistre was also the administrative centre of the Silistra district (or ‘sancak’ ) during early Osmanlı rule, while being part of the Province of Rumelia (current-day Bulgaria) ever since the Osmanlı’s conquered it in 1396. The sancak of Silistre was later even upgraded to become a new province that stretched over most of the western Black Sea littoral, controlling most of the sea trade routes in that region (Glenny, 1999: 95). This loss of Silistre quickly worsened when it became part of the newly established Kingdom of Bulgaria in 1908. Ethnic cleansing of Osmanlı Turks from the city became the main focus of Bulgarian nationalists, sweeping from the city much of their Turkish inhabitants. Only a few small groups survived, who in 2001 still form a large Turkish minority of almost 35% in Silistre (NSI, 2001). The fact that the Province of Silistre (including the port city of Silistre) became part of the new Bulgarian state meant incredible wealth for the Bulgarians, which they used to arm themselves against the declining Osmanlı’s. Eventually, it led to the First Balkan War (1912), in which the Bulgarians were superior to the Osmanlı’s in practically every way (Erickson, 2003). The loss of the Balkan provinces of the Osmanlı Empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has, therefore, been portrayed as being necessary to save at least some parts of the Osmanlı Empire. The symbolic change of Silistre from being ‘Vatan’ to just plain ‘Silistre’, is illustrative for this process and way of thinking. However, the loss of the Balkans only accelerated the decline and demise of the Osmanlı Empire and showed the importance of geography. Geography in Turkish historiography Turkish historiography is focused mainly on geography, more specifically the geographical area of Anatolia (Gökalp, 1923; Ronart, 1938; Ünlü & Çotuksöken, 2001). Although this geographical focus on Anatolia is widely accepted to be true, there has not been a thorough statistical research into the presence of the geographical area of Anatolia in Turkish historiography. For our main thesis concerning the use of Turkish historiography, it is important to determine if, and by how much, Anatolia is really emphasized within Turkish historiography. This chapter is shaped and designed to demonstrate just that. During this chapter Turkish historiography will be examined for the sole purpose of concluding whether the geographical region of Anatolia is in fact the centre of Turkish historiography. It is important to look at the region currently regarded as the undisputed

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‘homeland’ of the Turks that is Anatolia. Historically speaking, Turks were nomadic warriors who were always on the move (Stone, 2010). Therefore, an undisputed homeland was absent. Nonetheless, during the process of Turkish nation-building, history was used to create just that: a historic homeland. This process was aided by Turkish historiography, a process that still continues today in contemporary Turkey. But what is Turkish historiography in this context? According to Altınay (2004: 6-7), “the Turkish History Thesis is an official account of Turkish history that defined statebuilding [...]”. Although she argues that this ‘official Turkish history’ is the foundation of the process of Turkish nation-building, she unfortunately neglects to explain what ‘official’ is and who made it so. Altınay indirectly argues that historiography in Turkey is shaped by history books that are dictated by the Turkish government in order to strengthen the official account of Turkish history. She gives examples of some events in Turkish history that were altered “through official historiography, which was set to work soon after the Republic was founded in October 1923” (Altınay, 2004: 19). But there seems to be a great debate in Turkey about the terms ‘official’ history or historiography. Questions about the existence of any kind of ‘official’ history through official historiography are frequently asked (Çiçek, 2010). Members of the Turkish Historical Society deny that there is an official Turkish history dictated by the Turkish government. They convincingly show various history professors at various state universities in Turkey, who can freely announce their own theories. Some of those theories are taught during classes and are the opposite of what one might expect. This is especially the case surrounding sensitive topics like the Armenian controversy of 1915 and the Kurdish minority in Anatolia. In that regard the Turkish Historical Society has a point; there is in fact no ‘official history’ in Turkey, though that it is open to debate. 2 However, this is not to say that there is no general history at all in Turkey. In high school, called ‘Lise’ in Turkish after the French ‘Lycée’, the students use Lycée schoolbooks in which Turkish history is explained. After Lise the graduates take an exam in order to enrol in a university. During this exam, questions are asked about topics regarded as the most important parts of Turkish history. This is somewhat comparable to the schoolbooks of any other country, including the Netherlands 3. One of the pillars in the process of Turkish nation-building was the

2  In a private conversation with the author (Sag, 2011), two members of the Turkish Historical Society on different occasions and during two separate conversations said there was no ‘official history’ in Turkey. 3  The Canon of Dutch History (‘Canon van Nederland’ in Dutch) is a list of fifty subjects, subdivided into ten periods of time that are taught in high schools throughout the Netherlands.

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attempt to create a new historiography (Altınay, 2004; Akşin, 2007). In this process we can discern two kinds of historiography: one that was used in the process of Turkish nation-building and one that was not used in this process. During this research the former will be referred to as ‘Turkish historiography’ and the latter as historiography. In Turkish schoolbooks we can, of course, see Turkish historiography as approved by Turkey. This is visibly seen through the sentence ‘Approved by the Ministry of Education’ on the first pages of these schoolbooks (Su & Bülkat, 1961). Therefore, if one is to look into these schoolbooks, and the exam questions mentioned before, it should be possible to see where the geographical focus lies in Turkish historiography. This chapter will examine the geography in Turkish historiography as put forward in the above-mentioned schoolbooks and exams (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). However, it is equally important to define a time period for these schoolbooks. This research focuses on a historically recent development within schoolbooks from approximately 1960 onwards. According to Keyder (2005), the early years of the Republic of Turkey (1923) were filled with a desire to start over in an abstract space devoid of history and symbolic weight. Thus, Kevder (2005: 9) sees the proclamation of Ankara as the new capital city instead of İstanbul as the ultimate example. “The very move of the capital city to a place without significations, to a city where there is no there , in order to start the whole history anew, testifies to the desire to locate the new project in an abstract space devoid of history and symbolic weight.” After these early years, the 1930s were used to construct an unbroken ethnic history reaching back to a mythical past in an alien geography (Keyder, 2005: 7). “In its extreme versions in the 1930s, the thesis also included a corollary claiming an ur status for the Turkish language.” It was also presented in a way that “[t]he deserving and victorious Turkish population were distinct from the previous inhabitants of Anatolia; no fusion or mixing could be admitted” (Keyder, 2005: 8). After the death of the founder and first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in 1938, other historiographies were discovered. Soon, the 1940s and 1950s were experimenting with different historiographies, one with a focus on either anatolism or Islamism, as well as other forms such as Pan-Turanism. Turkey had trouble publishing and distributing history schoolbooks in the 1920s and 1930s, however, after the Second World War a growing economy helped in the publication and distribution of schoolbooks on a massive scale. In the years after World War II, further developments included the implementation of a multi-party period in Turkey. This encouraged an acceleration of democratic developments, after which, the Democratic Party won the elections of 1950. When the 1960 coup d’état brought the fall of the Democratic Party, and Prime

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Minister Menderes was executed along with 2 ministers, measures were taken to ensure the national unity of Turkey. In October 1961, the military junta returned power to civilians. In its aftermath, the influence of the Greeks, Armenians and Jews, who still dominated trade and industry in Istanbul, at least until the 1950s, was diminished, and coastal towns, which were left relatively empty when the Greeks departed from Anatolia in the 1920s, were filled by post-1960s urbanization (Keyder, 2005). Most importantly, history schoolbooks in Turkey were put to work more intensively. It is against this background that the time period for this study is established from 1960 onwards. For contemporary reasons the end date is set at 2010. Now that we have established the terminology of what Turkish historiography is, or at least what we will use as ‘Turkish historiography’ during this research, it is also important to define the terminology ‘Turkish’ before looking at the role of geography in the process of Turkish nation-building. In Turkish historiography, the word ‘Turkish’ is translated as ‘Türk’ and is used to refer to both the Turkish people of Central Asia during ancient times, and the citizens of present-day Turkey (Hotham, 1972; Apuhan, 2008; Bayrak, 2002; Meram, 2006; Özkan, 2010). Therefore, the definition of ‘Turk’ must be defined in order to avoid any political discussion. Some languages, like English, have made this very easy by carving out different words to represent the main categories of nomadic warriors throughout history, which are most commonly known as ‘Turkic’ in other languages. However, some languages like Dutch and Turkish do not have this distinction (Eren, 1974; Çağbayır, 2007). This makes the matter of distinction between modern Turks and the Turks from ancient times more difficult, at least in these countries. Arguably, the most important country where this distinction is not made is, of course, Turkey. In Turkey, according to the Turkish Language Association (Akalın, 2011: 2401), the word ‘Türk’ is used both for “a citizen from Turkey (including Turkish citizens of Greek, Armenian, Arab, Kurdish etc. descent)” and “people around the world who speak a Turkish dialect and origin from a Turkish race”. Although the word ‘Türk’ is shown to have two meanings in the original context of the Turkish language, it has only one Turkish historiography. By using the word in that manner, it is possible to create a history in which, for example, both the Huns and the Osmanlı’s can be regarded as one and the same people (Rásonyi, 1971; Öztuna, 1983). To avoid any political usage of the word, this research will make use of the word ‘Türk’ in accordance with the usage of the word in Turkish historiography. Therefore, the words ‘Turk’, ‘Turkic’, ‘Turkish’ will be used as the direct translation of ‘Türk’ and regarded as if they are three interchangeable words within Turkish history. This research no way means to link those ancient terms to present day terms, as the contemporary terms are heavily politicized.

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Review of literature Although there is much literature on education, the list quickly shortens when one wishes to look at literature that examines the content of textbooks used in Turkey’s educational system. The earliest account is that of the Turkish Language Society (‘Türk Dil Kurumu’) in 1976, with the book ‘ Ismarlama Ders Kitapları Üzerine Rapor ’ (A Report on Ordered Schoolbooks). It was quickly followed by ‘Siyasal Toplumsallaşma’ (Political Socialization), which was written by Alkan (1979). These studies aimed at finding out what political views were impressed on Turkish students during the 1950s and 1960s. These years were a period of transition, from a one-political-party system to the multi-party system that still exists today in Turkey. It was followed by a publication by Özdil and Tapan (1991) entitled ‘ Türkiye’nin Ders Kitapları: Ortaöğretim Ders Kitaplarına Eleştirsel Bir Yaklaşım ’ (Turkey’s Schoolbooks: A Criticizing Approach to Secondary Educational Schoolbooks). In 1997, the Ph.D. thesis of French historian Étienne Copeaux was published as ‘ Espace et temps de la nation turque: Analyse d’une historiographie nationaliste, 1934–1993 ’ and translated to Turkish in 1998 as ‘ Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine ’ (From the Turkish History Thesis to the Turkish Islam Thesis in History Textbooks (19311993)). Copeaux examined how the official historiography in Turkey seemed to have changed from a thesis surrounding Turkish history into one that focused more on Turkish-Islamic history. In 1998, an additional book was published on Turkish textbooks when Özbaran (1998) wrote his publication ‘ Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları ’ (History Education and Schoolbooks). Özbaran dealt with how history was taught in Turkey and which subliminal messages were present in schoolbooks. In 1999, Kaplan published his findings as ‘ Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi ’ (The National Education Ideology in Turkey), while Güven (2000) wrote ‘Türkiye’de Eğitim ve İdeoloji’ (Ideology and Education in Turkey). These works deal with the subliminal message that was in incorporated in education. According to Güven this message, prior to 1950, was a western orientated Kemalist ideology, while after 1950 this changed in a conservative-nationalist and conservative-liberal view. But none of the literature looked at the aspect of geography within these textbooks. Another publication came from historian İsmet Parlak (2005), who wrote his Ph.D. thesis on the influence of Kemalism on history textbooks of the early Republican era. His work was later published by Turhan Kitabevi in Ankara (2006). Parlak touches on history textbooks, but focuses on the ideology of Mustafa Kemal and the subliminal messages that he tried to give to the schoolchildren by promoting his own ideals of laïcité. Publications that use history textbooks are marginal enough as it is, but studies that focus on geography in history textbooks are even scarcer. Keyder (2005) briefly describes the aspect of geography in Turkish nationalism but does not solely focus on history textbooks in his sixteen-page-long article. Almost

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no other extensive study has been conducted by examining Turkish history textbooks, let alone the aspect of geography in Turkish historiography. The relevance of geography In the preface of nation-building, the processes of territorialization began with the growth of centralized states built around dominant ethnic societies. Geography became an ideal of a compact, unified and territorially distinct nation as an international norm by the late eighteenth century (Smith, 2009). It was in this context that almost all nations began to see the relevance of geography in their process of nation-building. For example, in 1892 the Minister of Education in Thailand, Prince Damrong Rajanuphab, inaugurated a modern-style school system for the country in which geography became mandatory (Anderson, 1991). From the late eighteenth century onwards it was believed that nations were firstly defined by a definite social space where its members must live and work. This social space was defined by an historic territory that locates a community in time and space, and creates ‘sacred centers’, in which objects of spiritual and historical pilgrimage were to reveal the uniqueness of their nation’s geography (Smith, 1991). The relevance of geography, through boundaries, was also used as a way to create cultural boundaries to distinguish a nation from its neighbours (Gellner, 1983). Geography, along with history, ethnic descent, language and religion, determined much of the character and situation of the nation (Smith, 1998). However, soon the geographical boundaries became the most important aspect to define a nation and not its culture (Eriksen, 1993; Barth, 1969). Weber (1976) even concludes that there is no better instrument of indoctrination and patriotic conditioning than history and geography, citing France as an example. Yet another example could be the Italian national identity that was rooted not on the purity of blood or race, but on geography, which lay at the root of its national identity, along with history, religion, language and culture (Baycroft & Hewitson, 2006). Therefore, it is safe to say that the geography of national identity took shape from the late eighteenth century onwards (Smith, 2009); and Turkey is no exception, its geography of national identity took shape in the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, almost no significant study has been conducted on the importance of geography in Turkish history textbooks, or Turkish history textbooks in general. History in the educational system With the definitions of Turkish historiography and ‘Turk’, we can begin to look at the schoolbooks and exams mentioned earlier. But before we do this, the Turkish educational system needs some explanation. Although the Turkish educational system was drastically changed in March 2012, earning the name: ‘4+4+4 model’, this research will focus on the pre-2012 situation. All descriptions that are made of the Turkish educational system during this study are made in reference to the pre-2012 situation.

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Education in Turkey is strictly realized and supervised by the state (Duymaz, 1999). Pre-school education for three to five year olds is not mandatory but optional. From six years old, primary education is mandatory, along with secondary education. While primary education lasts eight years, students are required to stay there at least from their sixth to fourteenth birthday (Duymaz, 1999; İrem, 2009). The students that gain a right to go to secondary school will receive another three years of education, after which they will be eligible to enrol in a university exam, but not everybody goes on after primary education (White, 2002). According to article 42 of the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, everyone has the right to receive education (İrem, 2009).

Primary Education As stated before, primary education in Turkey consists of eight-year schools with an uninterrupted education (Özdemir, 2010). In Turkey, primary education is compulsory for all male and female citizens and is free of charge; all of this is guaranteed in the Constitution, Basic Law for National Education and the Law for Primary Education and Training (Duymaz, 1999; İrem, 2009). Just like all other student textbooks, history textbooks are also free of charge (Arar, 2010). According to the state the “objective of primary education is to provide children with the required basic knowledge, ability, behavior and habits for them to become good citizens and to prepare them for life and further education according to their interests and abilities” (Duymaz, 1999: 361). During primary education, the Turkish Ministry of Education assigns history books that are to be used within all history classes. These books are easily recognizable as the sentence ‘Approved by the Ministry of Education’ is shown visibly (Su & Bülkat, 1961). These books are made up of 31 chapters, each dealing with a different subject matter. If we look deeper into the textbooks in search for the geographical region of Anatolia, and the importance given to it, we can see that the statistical mode is Kâmil Su & Galip Bülkat’s İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası (‘History Atlas with Pictures for Elementary and Middle Schools’; Ankara 1961). As a statistical mode, the content of this history textbook occurs most frequently in a probability distribution within a research of various Turkish primary education history schoolbooks conducted by this author in early 2012 (see appendix 1). Therefore, Su and Bülkat are the main focus point within this chapter, although the aspect of a geographical focus on Anatolia is seen in all history textbooks throughout the years. For convenience, I have maintained the chronological order of the chapters and organized them into eras without changing the chronology within the chapters.

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Table 1: The table of content of a standardized Turkish history textbook

Parts

Chapters

Remarks

Part I: Prehistory /

Chapter 1: Stone Age / Iron Age

The chapter about the

Ancient Times

Chapter 2: Unknown era

Anatolian Hittites makes

Chapter 3: Anatolian Hittites

up for exactly 40% of Part

Chapter 4: Ancient Egyptians

I.

Part II: Early Middle

Chapter 5: Huns

The chapter about the

Ages

Chapter 6: European Huns

Islamic Empire makes up

Chapter 7: Göktürks

for exactly 40% of Part

Chapter 8: Islamic Empire

II.

Chapter 9: Kutluk Devleti

The chapter about the

Chapter 10: Selçuklu

Anatolian Selçuklu

Chapter 11: Crusades

Empire makes up for

Part III: Middle Ages

exactly 50% of Part III. Part IV: Osmanlı Era

Chapter 12: Early Osmanlı

The main focus is

Chapter 13: Exploration era

Anatolia.

Chapter 14: Middle Osmanlı Chapter 15: Late Osmanlı Part V: Modern Turkey

Chapter 16: War of Independence

The main focus is

Chapter 17: Reforms in Turkey

Anatolia.

Chapter 18: Atatürk Chapter 19: WW II Part VI: Appendix

Chapter 20: A list of important Only the battles in battles

Anatolia have a precise date (day, month, year); the rest only a year.

Source: Kâmil Su & Galip Bülkat, İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası (‘History Atlas with Pictures for Elementary and Middle Schools’; Ankara, 1961).

The first four chapters together form the first part of the schoolbooks. This first part focuses on prehistoric and ancient times. The schoolbooks start by depicting a general history of prehistoric and primitive mankind during the Stone and Iron Ages. No mention of the word ‘Turk’ is to be found in this chapter. This changes in the second chapter of the book, when Central Asia is depicted as the “motherland of the Turks” in ancient times (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 5). It goes on to say that “Central Asia was a paradise in those days but due to dryness the Turks were forced to migrate, bringing civilization to wherever they went” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 5). Three examples are mentioned in which the Turks are said to have introduced civilization to India, China and Europe. Europe is marked with an extra comment stating that “Europe was in the cavemen era before the migrations” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 5). Two important aspects can be seen so far:

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1. The official schoolbooks state that Central Asia was a paradise in ancient times, but that this is no longer the case due to major ecological changes that caused Turks to leave their original homelands. In other words, the land of origin could only be imagined; it was irreclaimable not only because it was distant, but also because it was irreversibly altered (Birtek & Dragonas, 2005). 2. Because of mass migrations, the Turks are responsible for all of the world’s ancient civilizations (Chinese, Indian, European etc.) and therefore, practically everyone on earth is civilized due to the Turks.

Map 1: The depiction of Central Asia as a paradise and the migration routes of the Central Asian Turks

Source: Kâmil Su & Galip Bülkat, İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası (‘History Atlas with Pictures for Elementary and Middle Schools’; Ankara, 1961), p. 5.

Although the importance of geography is downplayed in the first chapters, the third chapter focuses on the ancient Hittites; an advanced civilization that existed in Anatolia around 1400 B.C., and was the ancient Egyptians’ main competitor. This is the first chapter in which years are mentioned; in the first chapter only eras were given and no specific years. In the second chapter, no mention of an era or year was made. Another thing that

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catches one’s eye is that the part dealing with the Anatolian Hittites is equal to that of the first two chapters put together. However, no mention of Turks is made in this part of Turkish historiography. The Turks who migrated just one chapter prior have seemingly disappeared in this chapter. This chapter also mentions the Assyrians, Babylonians, ancient Egyptians and Sumerians, but sees them merely as neighbours of the Hittites. The focus is put on the Hittites and not the ancient Egyptians, who are portrayed as the main archenemies of the Hittites. Its explanation appears to be in this sentence: “The first large empire of Anatolia was the Hittite Empire” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 7). It is also emphasized that the Hittites ruled almost all of Anatolia, and had their capital of Hatuşaş near the current capital Ankara (Su & Bülkat, 1961). In the last chapter of this part, students focus on the ancient Greeks and their settlements in Western Anatolia. Again, no mention of ‘Turk’ is made in this chapter, which is similar to the chapter about Hittites. What is mentioned several times in these two chapters is the region of Anatolia, especially Western Anatolia. One thing that is important to mention, is that everything north of Greece, Western Anatolia and the Aegean Sea is not portrayed on the map of the region (Su & Bülkat, 1961). When looking at chapters five through eight, we can see that they all deal with a broad region, which is, respectively, Central Asia (Huns), Europe (European Huns), Central Asia (the Göktürk Empire) and the entire Middle East (Islamic Empire). This part seems to be a general overview of the various tribes that originated from Central Asia and are now called ‘Turk’. So far in this part, no strong focus on any geographical region except Central Asia is mentioned. In the case of Central Asia (both in the chapter of the Huns and the Göktürks), pictures and maps still portray a paradise-like land that emphasizes two aspects: 1. Central Asia was a paradise, but this is no longer the case, and the Turks had to leave it behind and migrate. 2. The Huns and Göktürks have migrated west. This is mentioned several times, and is even shown on maps with arrows of migrations pointing west to Europe. The other two chapters that deal with Europe depict Anatolia as a region in which the eastern part of the Roman Empire revolved around the city of Bizans, “which was İstanbul during the time of the Byzantines” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 10). The other chapter has a strong focus on the Islamic Empire, but also mentions Anatolia as the region where “the Byzantine Empire declined due to the Islamic army” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 12-13). On the same pages, several Central Asian tribes such as Macars (also written as ‘Magyars’), Bulgars, Avars and Hazars are mentioned; tribes that settled mainly in the region of the Balkans and are considered to be Turkic by scholars (Rásonyi, 1971; Bayrak, 2002; Lang, 1976;

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Brook, 2010). However, this aspect of ‘a Turkic heritage’ is not mentioned in this chapter. It even seems as if the Macars, Bulgars, Avars and Hazars were just like other medieval peoples, like Serbians and Franks, since they are summed up in a similar way. Therefore, the emphasis on Central Asia and Turkic tribes seems to diminish in this part, whereas small references are still being made to Anatolia, although these are not so strong as in the first part. Religion (as in the Islamic Empire) is also emphasized. In the third part we can see three distinct chapters that form a bridge from Central Asia to Anatolia. While the first chapter is dedicated to the revival of the Göktürks in the seventh and eighth centuries A.D., the word ‘Göktürks’ is not mentioned. Instead, the tribal names of Uygurs and Kutluk are used, probably to show that the ‘Turks’ migrated west. This chapter is accompanied by a map, and although one arrow visibly points to the region of the Balkans, no further information is given about it; the other migration arrows focus on the Selçuklu’s. The arrow that is used to depict waves of tribes that migrate to the region of the Balkans is the largest of all five migration arrows. The arrows seem to represent major migration routes throughout history, but it remains unknown what happened at the end of the migration route when the migrants arrived at their destinations. The following chapter concentrates on the Selçuklu Empire. In this part the focus on Anatolia is more evident, as the Battle of Manzikert (or Malazgırt) in 1071 is accompanied by the sentence: “The Byzantines suffered a great defeat against Alparslan in 1071” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 15). ‘Malazgırt’ being Manzikert in Turkish while Alparslan was the leader of the Selçuklu tribes. There is also a strong emphasis on the origins of the Selçuklu’s, which are described as “Turks from the Selçuklu tribe of the Oğuz branch of the Turks” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 15). Seeing the ratio, the Selçuklu’s have the main focus here; just like the Anatolian Hittites. One page even describes Selçuklu culture, but gives only one example of Selçuklu architecture in Anatolia, while in fact this region was only approximately 10 percent of the Selçuklu Empire (Su & Bülkat, 1961). In the last chapter of this third part, the Crusades are mentioned, with again an emphasis on certain regions. Apart from Jerusalem, attention is given to Anatolia, especially when the textbooks authors write: “The Crusader armies suffered a major defeat at the hands of Kılıç Arslan the First, Sultan of the Anatolian Selçuklu’s, between 1092 and 1107” (Su & Bülkat, 1961: 17).

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Map 2: The migration and empire of the Selçuklu Turks

Source: Kâmil Su & Galip Bülkat, İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası (‘History Atlas with Pictures for Elementary and Middle Schools’; Ankara, 1961), p. 15.

From the Selçuklu’s onwards Anatolia is more or less the main focus; this change takes place in these chapters. In chapter twelve the early Osmanlı Empire (the 13 th and 14 th centuries) is described and it focuses mainly, or even solely, on Anatolia. This region even plays a significant role in the maps depicted: two of them are about Anatolia, while information about other regions is scarce and extremely vague. Here, the geographical importance of Anatolia stands out, while this was not the case in the first few chapters. This chapter also deals with the Osmanlı Empire in the Late Middle Ages. Remarkably, and even though the Osmanlı’s had, by then, conquered much of the Balkans and only parts of Anatolia, Anatolia is once again its main focus. The second map of Anatolia is more detailed in comparison to the first, since the first map depicts (relatively at least) no details about the Balkans region. The second chapter is a surprising one; it focuses on the exploration era of Christopher Columbus, Vasco da Gama and Magellan. All three explorers have a significant part of information dedicated to them in this chapter. This

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chapter is also very large compared to others by ratio and is accompanied by a world map in which some regions are defined. ‘Osmanlı Empire’, ‘Anatolia’, ‘Arab peninsula’ as well as ‘Algeria’, ‘Spain’, ‘Portugal’ and ‘Egypt’ are among the regions named. However, the Balkans is not even mentioned. In the third chapter, Anatolia is, once again, the main focus of Turkish historiography. It is noteworthy that the map depicting the Osmanlı Empire from 1299-1699 excludes lands of the Osmanlı’s in North Africa, in the PolandUkraine-Russian steppe and the Arab Peninsula. Similar to the chapter about the Selçuklu’s, the chapter dealing with the Middle Osmanlı Era has one page dedicated to Anatolia. The Late Osmanlı Era is between 1699 and 1918, and there is no mention of the major defeats of the Osmanlı’s in those years. The absence of the Balkan Wars and the First World War in this chapter is surprising. Even in the map depicted in this chapter, the strong emphasis on Anatolia becomes clear as it is covered with a red colour and the Turkish flag. Again, the only geographical emphasis seems to lie on Anatolia in this part of Turkish history schoolbooks.

Map 3: The decline of the Osmanlı Empire and its lost provinces

Source: Kâmil Su & Galip Bülkat, İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası (‘History Atlas with Pictures for Elementary and Middle Schools’; Ankara, 1961), p. 15.



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In this last part, we can see a couple of important aspects in the

presentation of Turkish history in the country’s official schoolbooks. For one, the chapter concerning the Turkish War of Independence is by far the largest. A ratio of four to one emphasizes this. It is also important to note that this chapter has a total of four maps; all of them are of Anatolia. None of the other chapters have so many maps. The chapters following this one are respectively, one about political reform in Turkey under the reign of Atatürk, and another one about Atatürk himself, who was the first president of the Republic of Turkey from 1923 until his death in 1938. In the chapter on the reforms in Turkey, there is yet another map of Anatolia. The political reforms teach students about the voting rights men and women received, and the implementation of secularism along with other reforms. The following chapter is dedicated to the founding president of the modern Republic of Turkey and consists of no geographical focus or even the mention of regions. The last chapter consists of a relatively large part that covers the Second World War; a war in which Turkey was neutral and did not participate in any war activities. This is particularly peculiar since the First World War, in which Turkey (or better yet: the Osmanlı Empire) did fight ferociously, was not portrayed. Geographically speaking, nothing seems to stand out. However, the last chapter depicts a list of battles that are regarded as important within Turkish history. In this final chapter there are total of sixteen battles depicted, all of them ending with a victorious Turkish (be it Selçuklu or Osmanlı) side. Of these sixteen victories, some seven take place in Anatolia; all of them are detailed with a date. The other nine battles all take place in either Europe or the Middle East; four of them take place in the Balkans region. Besides these four battles, all of which have no date, although these are known in history, four take place near the Balkans. For instance, one sea battle takes place in the Adriatic Sea just off the coast of Greece. The siege of Istanbul is also within the geographical area of the Balkans, but due to political regions is added to Anatolia. The Battle of Mohaç took place in Hungary and is just outside the region of the Balkans, just like the Battle of Prut, which took place in the border area of present day Moldavia and Romania. If we take all this into account, we can see that eight of the sixteen battles have a direct link with the Balkans and only seven are linked to Anatolia. However, the battles in Anatolia have been upgraded in importance by providing them a day and date, instead of a year. All battles outside Anatolia have been depicted with a year only. This is significant because the exact dates of all of these battles are known. In conclusion, it seems that Turkish historiography has three aspects that catches one’s eye in regard to a geographical focus: 1. Anatolia stands out, both in ancient times (with the Hittites) and in time periods.

other

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2. Central Asia’s importance is emphasized, especially in early times until approximately the tenth or eleventh centuries. However, it is emphasized that Central Asia has changed dramatically; returning there is simply impossible. Because of this, Central Asia has disappeared from Turkish historiography. 3. The Balkans are seemingly left out and downplayed, perhaps even neglected. However, before we can conclusively state that this is in fact the case, we need to take the history books used in Turkey’s secondary schools into account as well.

Secondary Education Secondary education in Turkey is based on three to four years of education, after the students are supposed to have completed their primary education of eight years, which was covered in the earlier paragraph (İrem, 2009). After completing these eight years of primary education, one gains the right to enter secondary education (Özdemir, 2010; Arar, 2010). According to Turkey “the objective of secondary education is to provide the students with a common general culture at a minimum level and prepare them to be ready for taking responsibility for the democratic society, to make them respectful of human rights and to prepare them for higher education or business life in the direction of their interests, abilities and capabilities with a consciousness for contributing to the socioeconomic and cultural development of the country” (Duymaz, 1999: 362). Secondary education is mainly used to educate students in the fields of their future occupation with “the objective of meeting the need for qualified persons essential to the country and to prevent over-application of students at the universities, besides preparing students for higher education” (Duymaz, 1999: 364). Just like primary education, schoolbooks that are used during secondary education are free of charge, including history schoolbooks (İrem, 2009). Not surprisingly, secondary education has more detailed history books. In these books, there are no less than thirty-one chapters (Yıldız, 2006). Again, just like the books used in primary schools, we can divide these chapters into chronological parts without changing the order of the chapters. Just like the paragraph dedicated to primary education in Turkey, this paragraph will use İshak Yıldız’s (Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı) ÖSS Tarih: Temel Kavramlar ve Bilgiler (‘Student Selection Exams History: Basic Terms and Knowledge’; İstanbul 2006) as the statistical mode. In secondary education we see that the first chapter is about historiography in general, explaining in detail how historiographical research is conducted and what the main purposes of history are. This chapter is a very general one. It is quickly followed by the second chapter, which immediately dives into the region of Anatolia. This chapter is called ‘Anatolia and the surrounding regions in Ancient Times’. Again, there is no mention of ‘Turk’, but

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the mere mention of the region in a different chapter indicates that the region of Anatolia is given a high-level importance in these books. The number of maps (six) in this chapter is also an indication. The following chapter is named ‘PreIslamic Turkish history’ and deals with the role of Central Asia. The mentioning of Scythians as ‘Turkish tribes’ was absent in the history books used in primary education, but is present now. However, one thing that was not absent was the sentence that Central Asia has experienced major climate change affecting the whole region; it is still emphasized in secondary education. In stating this, the importance of Central Asia is diminished further in Turkish historiography. The following two chapters deal with Islamic and Turkish-Islamic history, in which the former is concentrated on the Arabs and the latter on the period when the Turks convert to Islam. Both chapters seem to have a main focus on the Mediterranean, Middle East and Asia, but no large maps are used. The maps that are used, four in the chapter concerning Islamic history and three in the subsequent chapter, depict Anatolia some five times: three in the former chapter and two in the latter. The focus on Anatolia seems imminent, but one other aspect is that the region of the Balkans is absent up to now. The second part of the history books deal with the Early Modern Age, and subsequently begins with a chapter about the Early Modern Age in Europe. The chapter is quite general, with only one map showing Europe and the Mediterranean. The following chapter deals with the history of Turkey as a geographical meaning prior to the creation of the Osmanlı Empire in 1299. Again, sentences like the following are frequently used: “In the end, the Victory of Manzikert in 1071 cracked the gates of Anatolia wide open for the Turks. [...] The struggle of the Anatolian emirates were one of the major causes that Anatolia became Turkified” (Yıldız, 2006: 31). It shows the emphasis in these high schoolbooks on both the region of Anatolia and the conclusion that the region was rapidly Turkified. This chapter also gives room to mention the Anatolian emirates, which were the result of commanders of the Selçuklu-Turkish army who were encouraged to conquer more lands in Anatolia. Every land they conquered from the Byzantine Empire was theirs to control. The map that is added to this chapter also has a strong focus on Anatolia; in the upper corner of the map some strokes of land of the Balkan can be seen. The two peoples of Bulgars and Peçeneks are depicted but without any further information. Nonetheless, the following chapters are about the Osmanlı Empire, first the early Osmanlı’s and then the rise of the Osmanlı Empire. In both chapters the mention of the Balkan region is limited but still important: “The Osmanlı sultan Orhan Gazi crossed to Rumeli in 1353 and

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started his ‘iskan strategy’ to Turkify the region. Through ‘iskan’ nomadic Türkmen tribes were settled in this region” (Yıldız, 2006: 36). This strategy, which is up for discussion since it is not mentioned whether the settlement was forced or voluntary, and not whether it was implemented in other regions like Anatolia, seems to justify the neglect of the Balkans. In Turkish historiography, Anatolia was settled by Turkish tribes who apparently liked the region and thought it almost identical to Central Asia before it was seriously altered due to climate changes. The Balkan areas, on the other hand, were more or less unnaturally settled by the Turks due to iskan. The ninth chapter in particular, concerning the rise of the Osmanlı Empire, contains separate paragraphs describing the various relations between the Osmanlı’s and the rest of the world. It of course starts with Anatolia and then continues with the Black Sea / Aegean Sea, the West (Eastern Europe) and ends with the South (Egypt). These four paragraphs show the focus of the Osmanlı’s on the region from the perspective of these Turkish high schoolbooks. The tenth chapter is about Europe during the Early Modern Age and is called the ‘New Age’ in the Turkish high schoolbooks. The main focus is the western countries of Europe: England, France, Germany, and the southern European countries of Spain and Italy. Including Russia, the total of countries mentioned during this chapter comes to six. The subsequent chapters deal with the Osmanlı Empire and none of these chapters have any maps, although all the other chapters are accompanied by more than one map. Nonetheless, these chapters seem to focus on years, rather than on geography. A list of provinces lost is given, yet the desperate attempt to stop the decline by bringing in reforms is explained with almost no geographical focus. The fourteenth chapter starts with Europe during the Middle Ages. France receives much attention from 1789 onwards. It is depicted as one of the most important countries in Europe from 1789, probably because in the last period of the Osmanlı’s many French reforms were also implemented in the Osmanlı Empire. Therefore, the year of the French Revolution, 1789, is carved out as a major event in both European and Turkish history. The fifteenth chapter deals with the Osmanlı Reforms, and although it is not stated in the chapter that the reforms were made following the example of the French, it is implied by putting these two topics in subsequent chapters; respectively, the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. The sixteenth chapter deals with Osmanlı culture and civilization but makes no mention of a geographical area. It deals with government systems and regional administration, which has more to do with Osmanlı governance than culture. Towards the end of the chapter aspects of education, literature, social life and art are also described. The seventeenth chapter starts with the Osmanlı Empire during

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the twentieth century, but the political movement of the ‘Young Turks’ is not mentioned. Although there are four main political ideologies explained in this chapter, Osmanlı-ism, Islamism, Turkism and Westernism, the authors only make one mention of the ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’, which was the main core of the Young Turks’ ideas, but the Young Turk ideology itself is not described. It is widely accepted that the Young Turks shaped the last years of the Osmanlı Empire as well as the principles of the Modern Republic of Turkey (Zürcher, 2004). The same chapter also mentions the Trablusgarp War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. However, the mass expulsion of Osmanlı citizens from the Balkans is neglected altogether (McCarthy, 1995). Following this chapter, the prelude of the First World War is dealt with, and in particular the sentence about Admiral Bristol is emphasized:

“The Greek put forward some false accusations in order to put claim on Anatolia by stating that the Turks were massacring innocent Christians, which was entirely false. [...] The American Admiral Bristol put up a commission to investigate the allegations but his research on October 13th, 1919 showed that the Turks had not done anything wrong” (Yıldız, 2006: 68). Again, this shows that any allegations regarding Anatolia are dealt with, but that the Turks limit themselves to this region alone. In addition, the prelude to the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) is explained in a relatively short to normal chapter. Of course, by this time the leader of the Turkish resistance, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was keen on at least rescuing Anatolia from the occupying Allied armed forces, and this is reflected in the chapter. The occupation of the Osmanlı capital of Istanbul by British forces receives some extra attention towards the end of this chapter. After this chapter, the drafts and congresses organized by Mustafa Kemal to rally Turkish forces to engage the occupying Allied armed forces are of course important, due to the fact that all of Kemal’s speeches and rallies were performed in Anatolia. Overall, Kemal put his emphasis on the fact that at least regions where Turks and Muslims lived and were the majority, should be free and under their own sovereignty. If one is to look at the current situation, the outcome has not been entirely in accordance with these conclusions and congressional outcomes. The twentieth and twenty-first chapters deal with the outcomes of congresses that resulted in the creation of a new parliament. This new parliament, called the Turkish Grand National Assembly, or just Turkish Assembly in short, met from April 23th, 1920 onwards. This chapter deals with how it was formed and how the struggle against the occupying Allies (the victorious armies of the First World War) was coordinated from here. The chairman of this Turkish Assembly was chosen to be Mustafa Kemal and, again, the geographical focus

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rests on Anatolia. In chapter twenty-two, the Turkish War of Independence and its aftermath are described. First, the various battlefronts are described, all of them in Anatolia. The following paragraphs deal with the battles, treaties and meetings that occurred during the War of Independence. In particular, the Treaty of Lausanne, which was created at the end of the War of Independence and gave the Turks their independent state, receives much attention; specific articles in the treaty are highlighted and explained. The twenty-third chapter begins from the moment the Republic of Turkey was established on October 29th, 1923. Accordingly, it deals with the constitution and different laws that were implemented in a list of reforms that were put into practice by the first president of this new state: Mustafa Kemal. Uprisings against the new reforms are also described, as well as the law that was designed to remove the military from politics. Chapter twenty-four deals with the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey under the reign of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, followed by chapter twentyfive in which the principles of Atatürk are explained. In this chapter, the six pillars of Atatürk are named and explained as republicanism, patriotism, popularism, etatism, laïcité and revolutionarism. However, the twenty-sixth chapter is comprised of a list of battles that are seen as important in Turkish historiography. The first battle is that of Kadeş, sometime between 1296-1280 B.C., between the Hittites of Anatolia and the Egyptians of the Middle East. The list of battles begins with this battle, which obviously revolves around the Anatolian character of the Hittites, and the important role that Anatolia played in the region, even in those days. The list then makes a huge leap forward and depicts the second battle in 624 A.D., almost two thousand years after the first battle on the list. This second battle is between non-Muslim Arabs and Muslim Arabs near both Medina and Mecca, just like the following battles on the list; it is not until the twelfth battle that this changes. This twelfth battle is the Battle of Talas in 751, somewhere in Central Asia, while the thirteenth battle is of the Selçuklu’s, the Turkish tribe that was to settle in Anatolia. The following seven battles are all related to the (Anatolian) Selçuklu’s. The following four battles are between Europeans, for example between the French and British, while a staggering eighteen battles are of the Osmanlı Empire between 1301 and 1918. Most of these battles did not take place on Anatolian soil: four were fought in Anatolia, against seven that took place in the Balkans. Another two battles took place in Eastern Europe, just outside the Balkans in present-day Hungary and Moldavia. Only one battle of North Africa was included on the list, and three of the Middle East (present-day Iran, Egypt and Syria). Two took place in Europe, mostly against what was then the border of the Austrian Habsburg Empire and present-day Austria. The last battles of the list are all battles waged during the War of

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Independence, in which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk achieved military successes against the forces occupying Anatolia. The list begins with a battle related to Anatolia and subsequently ends with one as well. Another important aspect is that most of the battles that were seen as not relevant in Turkish historiography were left out; the most important battles of the Osmanlı Empire were noticeably fought in the Balkans. Most of the battles that are included in the list, as being important for the Osmanlı Empire, and Turkish history in general, were actually fought in the Balkans. In this regard, Anatolia is just a second aspect to the geographical regions of the Osmanlı Empire where important and decisive battles were fought. One of the four battles in Anatolia is actually a battle fought during the First World War. Along with the First World War, the Osmanlı’s also lost the battle of Ankara in 1402. Although the list of battles is the first list in the high school history book, it is not the last list. The list of battles is subsequently followed by a list of treaties. This list is not very different from the list of battles, in the sense that it also begins with Kadeş; the Treaty of Kadeş was signed in 1280 B.C. between the Anatolian Hittites and Ancient Egyptians. The second treaty on the list is one between the Arabs and Muslims of Mecca in 628 A.D., while the third is of the Osmanlı’s: the Treaty of Edirne-Segedin of 1444. From this treaty onwards, all treaties are related to the Osmanlı Empire and the subsequent modern Republic of Turkey. Chapter twenty-eight deals with constitutional developments from the Osmanlı’s up to contemporary times. In this list no geographical aspect is mentioned, and therefore no geographical focus is available. Next is chapter twenty-nine, in which basic terms of history are listed and explained. This chapter can be seen as a summary of all the other chapters, and with its large number of pages one of the biggest chapters of the book; at least the lengthiest chapters so far. However, while chapter twenty-nine was the lengthiest chapter thus far (by far), chapter thirty contains almost double the number of pages. This is mainly because chapter thirty consists of a list with chronological events numbered by year. The length of this chapter is understandable if one looks at the events that are listed. This chronological list begins with the Mesopotamian cultures and civilizations, and quickly turns its attention to Anatolia. The focus on Anatolia starts from approximately 8000 B.C. until the third century B.C., when a region other than Anatolia is listed. By this time we are well into the list, having read some thirty-three events that have all taken place in Anatolia. The first region other than Anatolia is Central Asia, when the Scythians and Huns are mentioned. The mention of “Sibir Turks entering Anatolia in 516” and “The exploration of Anatolia by Çağry Bey in 1015” comes out of the blue (Yıldız, 2006: 182 & 184). The Sibir Turks were not mentioned in the previous chapters and the Selçuklu’s (of whom Çağrı Bey was the leader) did not conquer parts of Anatolia until the eleventh century. Even then, only the

69

eastern parts of Anatolia were conquered by the Selçuklu’s after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. Nonetheless, after mentioning the Selçuklu’s in the eleventh century, the chronological list seems to focus mainly on events that happened in or around Anatolia, which would mean that most of the list consists of Anatolian events. Although the Selçuklu’s and Osmanlı’s are mentioned very frequently, none are so dominantly visible as the modern Republic of Turkey. Overall, some 96.55% of pages in this chapter, which describe the events on a chronological list, seem to have something to do with the region of Anatolia. The last chapter of the book consists of questions added to every chapter, meaning that no conclusions can be drawn from them about the role (or lack of it) geography plays. If the chapter is about Anatolian Hittites then the questions will be about the Anatolian Hittites as well, but if the chapter is about the constitutional developments of the Osmanlı’s, then the questions will be about that. Therefore, the questions cannot provide us with any new conclusions and will be left untouched. The questions part of the high schoolbooks are not seen as a chapter, therefore, the final part is not numbered as ‘chapter thirtyone’ (Yıldız, 2006). After looking at primary education, which was conducted by researching elementary school history books, we concluded that three geographical aspects were to be found: 1. Anatolia seems to stand out, both in ancient times (with the Hittites) and in other time periods. 2. Central Asia stands out, especially in early ages until approximately the tenth or eleventh centuries, but there is one sentence which is added in order to cut any ties to contemporary times by mentioning that Central Asia is altered in such a way that it has vanished from Turkish historiography. 3. The region of the Balkans are seemingly left out and downplayed, maybe even neglected. When we look at history schoolbooks in Turkish secondary education, these three conclusions still seem applicable and just. However, the aspect of a geographical focus seems more indirect and implicit when compared to the geographical focus in elementary schools. This could be explained, along with the significant lower number of maps in secondary education, by the simple fact that teenagers will be more sensitive to an indirect approach than a direct approach, as they are during their primary education. However, a test to see if our findings are accurate cannot be done by looking at higher education, but rather at the admission exams that Turkish students must pass in order to enrol themselves into a university.

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Table 2: Turkish University Admission Exams between 1985 and 2010

Source: Sevil Tuna Arıca & Arif Yaşasınoğlu, Çeyrek Asrın Soruları: Tarih çıkmış 1985-2010 soruları (‘The Questions of a quarter century: History questions between 1985-2010’; Ankara, 2010), p. 6.

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University admission exams As stated previously, the approval of history books by the Turkish Ministry of Education ends at high school. All universities in Turkey, either state or private universities, are free to create their own curriculum. Therefore, it falls outside the scope of this research. However, Turkish high school graduates have to pass a special admission exam to enrol in a university. These exams are called ‘Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı (ÖSS)’ or ‘Student Selection Exams’ (İrem, 2009). They consist of questions that are prepared according to the history books used throughout secondary education. These questions could give us a crucial insight into which topics are regarded as important in Turkey. In this, it is important to look at the questions, not merely from a superficial stance, but more from a pragmatic point of view. For example, when we look at the exam questions it will not be sufficient to look at how many times the words ‘Anatolia’, ‘Balkan’ or ‘Central Asia’ are used, but rather how many questions are related to those regions? A question about ‘Lydians’, an ancient civilization in Anatolia, is more important than just the mere mention of the geographical name ‘Anatolia’, even if the name ‘Anatolia’ is not mentioned in the question about Lydians. In the process of looking at the exam questions, we can already take into account the information we have gathered so far. Students who took these admission exams would have already completed their primary and secondary education in Turkey; therefore, they would have already been aware of the important geographical focus on Anatolia and Central Asia. Our research so far, in examining Turkish historiography in primary and secondary education, has outlined just that. It is also important to note that while looking at primary and secondary education, it was useful to define geographical importance by looking at how many times a region was named, in this particular system it would not suffice. The vast majority of the students that take the admission exams will be between seventeen and twenty-one years old, therefore, the exams will be more effective if there is a subliminal implicit message. The example given earlier concerning the Lydians is applicable here. When we look at the questions of these admission exams, we must bear in mind the several coups in Turkey in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Therefore, the period after the 1980 coup seems to be the most suitable period to begin researching these admission exam questions. The exam questions continue up to contemporary times (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). Of the seventeen history chapters, only three chapters have had questions about them each and every year between 1998 and 2010. These are, the first chapter, dealing with the ancient civilizations of Anatolia, while the remaining two both deal with the birth of the modern Republic of Turkey from 1919 until the 1930s. Also, when we look at the period from 1985 until 1997, we can see that

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questions on the chapter about the ancient civilizations of Anatolia were asked every year except two. Together with chapters on political reforms in the early Republican Era, the War of Independence, and the Era of Disintegration of the Osmanlı State, the first chapter about the ancient civilizations of Anatolia is among the most frequently asked chapters. While the latter is skipped only twice out of twenty-six years (like the chapter dealing with ancient Anatolia), the chapters on the early Republican Era and the War of Independence are only skipped once out of twenty-six years. These chapters deal with modern Turkey in present-day Anatolia. These four chapters are the least skipped chapters of the Turkish University Admission Exams in the period 1985 to 2010. However, to be accurate and complete we must take into account a brief period during which Turkey experimented by dividing the admission exams in two. During this brief period these exams were followed by a second stage, when more questions were asked; this period lasted from 1985 until 1998. An additional couple of hundred questions were asked in these years. If we take these into account as well, our conclusions still show us that Anatolia was an important geographical focus. The first chapter, which deals almost entirely with ancient civilizations of Anatolia, is still among the five chapters that receive most attention. This first chapter is not always visible by sheer numbers of questions, but it is always present. Interestingly, it seems to focus on quality and not quantity. The other four chapters, that receive the most focus, are also the chapters that have the most frequently asked questions during the admission exams. All of these chapters deal with events leading up to the founding of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923. Chapters eleven and twelve deal with the prelude to the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), focusing mainly on the preparations and political developments prior and during the War of Independence. Chapter thirteen deals with the early Republic of Turkey (1923-1930s), or more specifically, the political developments and implemented reforms during the Republican Era of Turkey. All these chapters focus heavily on the modern Republic of Turkey, which of course has a strong focus on Anatolia. In chapter eight, the disintegration of the Osmanlı Empire is dealt with, and this chapter gains special attention during the second stage of the admission exams implemented from 1985 until 1998 (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). This could have something to do with the events that took place in those years, mainly terrorism and assassination that killed around one hundred Turkish diplomats and citizens, along with many bystanders (Zürcher, 2004). It shows that neglecting some parts of history will more often than not, haunt you, and catch up with you in the end. The questions of the second Turkish admission exams are therefore very useful in this context.

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Table 3: The second stage of Turkish University Admission Exams; only implemented in the years between 1985 and 1998 Topics / Chapters

Years 1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

2

1

1

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

Islamic History

2

2

0

1

2

1

1

0

0

1

0

2

1

0

The First Muslim-

1

2

0

1

0

1

1

0

2

0

0

0

1

0

3

1

2

0

1

1

1

3

1

3

1

0

1

0

European History

1

5

1

3

1

1

2

0

3

1

4

2

0

0

The Era of Stagnation

0

0

0

2

2

1

0

3

0

0

4

3

4

1

5

4

2

3

4

5

3

2

4

5

2

5

2

2

1

1

3

1

1

1

2

0

3

1

0

1

1

1

0

2

5

1

1

0

2

3

1

0

0

3

1

0

5

1

2

4

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

4

2

4

1

3

3

3

4

3

2

5

3

3

7

2

1

3

1

2

1

4

2

5

3

1

3

1

1

2

1

1

The Atatürk Principles

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

1

0

The Foreign Policy of

2

2

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

2

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

1

2

1

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

2

2

2

Introduction to Historiography and Ancient Civilizations The Appearance of Turks in History and the First Turkish States

Turkish States and the History of Turkey The Era of Establishment and Rise of the Osmanlıs

and Decline of the Osmanlı State The Era of Disintegration of the Osmanlı State Osmanlı Culture and Civilization The Osmanlı State at the Beginning of the 20th Century The Era of Preparations for the War of Independence The Political Developments during the War of Independence The Political Developments Reforms during the Republican Era

the Republic of Turkey and the Second World War Contemporary Turkish and Global History National Security

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Source: Sevil Tuna Arıca & Arif Yaşasınoğlu, Çeyrek Asrın Soruları: Tarih çıkmış 1985-2010 soruları (‘The Questions of a quarter century: History questions between 1985-2010’; Ankara, 2010), p. 7.



With all the questions of the Turkish admission exams noted, we can look at which chapters were most consistent during these years. The chapters that were least skipped, and therefore most consistent, are mentioned above in the various tables and figures. However, it could be very useful to put them in a graph to see a summary of all the chapters asked so far during the admission exams (see graph 1). There is one important aspect that keeps coming back; in the first educational system the three regions that received most focus were Anatolia, Central Asia and the Balkans. During the final exams we see that Central Asia has been left behind along with other regions like the Middle East. Anatolia still is visible and not only because the first chapter deals with the region. This fact is not to be interpreted as anything else than a chronological order in Turkish historiography. Anatolia is dealt with in the first chapter because the ancient civilizations start in a couple of millennia B.C. and Turkish historiography strictly follows a chronological order, and no further conclusions can be drawn from this. Nonetheless, the very mention of Anatolia in the first chapter, and throughout the other chapters, is an inescapable fact. The chapters that are most asked about all deal with the modern Republic of Turkey: almost 22% of the 922 questions asked so far between 1985 and 2010. With an asked about percentage of approximately 5%, the ancient civilizations of Anatolia remain a steady factor. However, the same cannot be said of the chapter ‘The Appearance of Turks in History and the First Turkish States’ that deals with the ancient Central Asian history of the Turks. With approximately 2%, it is the second least asked about chapter in these exams. Although no chapter has a focus on the Balkan region, the two regions Anatolia and Central Asia each have at least one chapter dedicated to them. While Central Asia was ignored some 10 years out of 26, questions about Anatolia were asked more or less consistently throughout the period. The number of questions that are asked in each chapter can be seen as one, but certainly not the only, measuring tool to determine which chapters (and therefore topics) are regarded as important within Turkish historiography. In all, we see that the conclusions reached above regarding primary and secondary education in Turkey are backed by the university admission exams. The geographical region of Anatolia is the focus point of most chapters, and although some historical aspects of Anatolia do not include Turkish civilizations, these chapters are still the most asked about throughout the twenty-five years of admission exams. The Islamic Middle East plays a modest role in Turkish

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historiography, but while the three regions that most stand out are Anatolia, Central Asia and the Balkans, there are distinctive differences between the three. For one, the focus on Anatolia and Central Asia is immense. While Anatolia has half a dozen chapters devoted to its geographical focus in Turkish history, Central Asia has just one, and in that chapter Central Asia is depicted as a mythical paradise that is no longer reality. Therefore, the importance of Anatolia is yet again emphasized. With the Balkans, this is again entirely different, as the Balkans has no chapter devoted to its geographical importance. And despite the fact that the Balkans is mentioned as early as several centuries B.C. in Turkish history, they are left behind rather mysteriously. There could be an important reason for this neglect, which is why there is need to doublecheck to see if our hypothesis ‘The absence of the Balkan territories in Turkish historiography stems from the need to create nation-building in the modern Republic of Turkey’, is indeed accurate.

Graph 1: The most frequently asked chapters in Turkish University Admission Exams in the years 1985 to 2010

Source: Research of this author (Sag, 2012) in accordance with data collected from ‘Sevil Tuna Arıca & Arif Yaşasınoğlu, Çeyrek Asrın Soruları: Tarih çıkmış 1985-2010 soruları (‘The Questions of a quarter century: History questions between 1985-2010’; Ankara, 2010), p. 6-7’.



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In this, the percentages of questions with a geographical focus can show the difference between the three main regions we have seen so far in Turkish history that are depicted by Turkish historiography. Geography and the Image of the Nation The image of the nation through Turkish eyes becomes clear when one looks at the statistical data that is collected with regard to geography in Turkish education. When we look at the 922 questions (asked from 1985 until 2010 in the Turkish history admission exams), we can see a couple of important aspects. For one, many chapters do not include a direct geographical focus but an implicit one. This is, for instance, the case with chapter nine, which deals with Osmanlı culture and civilization; most of the questions relate to how the Osmanlı’s ruled and controlled their lands. One can say that since the Osmanlı’s had Anatolia among their provinces this chapter can be seen as having a geographical focus on Anatolia. However, in this research these chapters have been discarded from having a geographical focus on Anatolia (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). The chapters that we took into account did not show any big surprises. The first chapter is named after the Ancient Civilizations of Anatolia; therefore, almost 50% of the questions deal directly with Anatolia. These questions include where Çatalhöyük, a settlement from 11.000 B.C., is located and which civilizations were present in Anatolia in ancient times. In this chapter, most of the questions deal with Anatolian peoples such as the Hittites, Urartu and Ionians. This chapter includes some references made to the Babylonians and Assyrians in Mesopotamia, in present-day Iraq, but these are not included as Anatolia, although these ancient empires did conquer some parts of Anatolia. However, their empires had a strong geographical focus on Mesopotamia and are therefore not included in this research about the importance of Anatolia (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). The second chapter deals with the first Turkish states, which were all created in Central Asia, and therefore almost 70% of the questions in this chapter deal with this region. In this chapter, Turkish tribes like the Hazar are not included as ‘Central Asian’, because although the Hazar originated from Central Asia they subsequently migrated westwards. It was not until the Hazar reached the Caspian Sea that they formed their empire; they focused more on the Middle East and Arabia than on anything else. Therefore, the Hazar were not included in the section about Central Asia (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). Not surprisingly, the third chapter deals with Islamic history and, therefore, has a focus on Arabia and North Africa. Although the vast majority of the questions deal with either Arabia or North Africa, there is also an important part that deals with the Selçuklu’s and their arrival in Anatolia. In this regard the Timurids of Tamerlane and their conquest of Anatolia, as well as the Mongol hordes moving into Anatolia, are depicted.

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The fourth chapter deals with the first Muslim-Turkish states and since these were immense, dominating the entire Middle Eastern region from Central Asia to western parts of Anatolia, it is not strange that they are considered to be of such great importance. More than 50% deals with Anatolia and some 25% with Central Asia (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). From the fifth chapter onwards, the main focus seems to rest on Anatolia. Central Asia is no longer mentioned from the sixth chapter onwards. The only chapters that have a slight focus on the Balkans are also those chapters that deal with the rise of the Osmanlı Empire and its eventual downfall. This would mean that the Balkans played an important role in at least the founding, rise and end of the Osmanlı Empire (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). In chapter six, European history focuses on the western parts of Europe; this shows the most important aspect of European history from the point of Turkish historiography. In some questions the significance of Anatolia is also mixed with the geographical focus on Western Europe, for instance the Crusades (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). There is almost no geographical emphasis in chapter seven, although it deals with the era of Osmanlı stagnation. This can be explained by two reasons. For one, the preceding chapters have placed significant emphasis on Anatolia and further emphasis is not really needed at this stage. Another factor could be that this era focuses mainly on lands and regions lost by the Osmanlı’s; therefore, only regions that were not lost are mentioned to insinuate that ‘the most important regions of the Osmanlı’s, like Anatolia, were not lost’, not even in this difficult era (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). In chapter eight, again the focus rests on the fall of the Osmanlı’s. In this chapter there are many questions mentioning Russia, with whom the Osmanlı’s fought fiercely for control over the Balkans. The questions of this chapter mention that in this era many Osmanlı provinces were lost to the Russians, but the names of the provinces, or their geographical focus, is nowhere mentioned. The impact the loss of these provinces had on the rest of the Osmanlı Empire is described; the loss was seen as a major defeat. If one looks closer, one can see that almost all of the lost provinces were situated in the Balkans. Anatolia was rather important at this time, but this is not mentioned directly anywhere, only indirectly and implicitly (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). While chapter nine focuses more on the political and public administration aspects of the Turks, it seems to have no geographical focus whatsoever. However, Europe is mentioned a few times, as a sort of measuring device for politics and public administration in the Osmanlı Empire (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). In chapter ten, Central Asia is no longer mentioned (Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). The other important remark concerning this chapter is that the importance of the Balkans is now visible, as 28% of the questions of this chapter deal with that region. Anatolia is only second with 10.5%.

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It also becomes clear that since the Balkans was important in the twentieth century, as a major part of the Osmanlı Empire, they also must have played a role beforehand. It is quite unlikely that the Balkans appeared out of nowhere and suddenly played a major role in the last days of the Osmanlı Empire. Therefore, it becomes clear that the Balkans was somewhat neglected beforehand. The extent of this is still not clear, but the second chapter of this research will be devoted to this question. From chapter eleven onwards, all the questions are closely related to the modern Republic of Turkey and subsequently to Anatolia. For instance, from chapter fourteen onwards, the Balkans is not even mentioned. Towards the end, all chapters deal with modern Turkey, present-day Turkey and the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey. As we have noted that the Balkans is mentioned every now and again in the early chapters, it is necessary to point out that these are mostly chapters covering the rise and fall of the Osmanlı’s. When we verify this with the overall percentage of all the discussed chapters, the results are as follows. Of the 922 questions asked, during the university admission exams in Turkey, some 629 have a geographical focus. Of this number a staggering 45.45% deal with Anatolia, while Central Asia and the Balkans trail significantly with 3.3% and 3.6%, respectively. The rest of the questions are either not related to geography or below these three percentages. This shows that most of the questions asked during a Turkish university admission exam, which have a geographical focus, focus on Anatolia, and that Turkish nationhood again is placed squarely in Anatolia. Summary and conclusion In this chapter, we see that Turkish historiography can only be determined by historiography approved by the Republic of Turkey. In this case, we must turn to the historical theories that are approved by the Turkish Ministry of Education and subsequently taught at various schools; this applies to primary and secondary education, as well as the university admission exams in Turkey. In distinguishing Turkish historiography and Turkish history, as described in those textbooks, we can also name the other category. In this other category, that we will just call ‘historiography’, there are all the historiographies not included in the official textbooks. This category includes Turkish historiography, as well as Turkish and non-Turkish history theories of any kind. In the category ‘Turkish historiography’ only history books that are approved by the Republic of Turkey are included. Subsequently, when we look at the history as mentioned by Turkish historiography, we can draw three main conclusions. First of all, Anatolia as a geographical region in Turkish history stands out, both in ancient times (with the Hittites) and in other periods. Secondly, although the region of Central Asia is depicted as the ‘ancient homeland of the Turks’, especially in early ages until

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approximately the tenth or eleventh centuries, every tie between that region and the present-day Turkish inhabitants of the Republic of Turkey has been cut by mentioning that Central Asia is altered in such a way that it has vanished from history. Thirdly and lastly, it has become clear that the region of the Balkans is left out, subsequently downplayed, at some points and even neglected. The reason for downplaying Central Asia is given in schoolbooks, but an explanation for neglecting the Balkans is absent. While these are the outcomes of Turkish historiography, it is important to look at the aspect of the Balkans and verify the outcomes regarding this region with regard to historiography in general, and see what could be possible explanations for neglecting the Balkans. This will take place in the following chapters. This shows that Turkish historiography has a focus on geography, but not a distant and mythical geography, but a pragmatic and realistic view on geography; namely, focusing on what is available at the moment. When the Republic of Turkey was founded in the 1920s, the geography at hand was Anatolia, as the Balkans was lost. So, instead of focusing on lands outside the available region, Turkey focused on Anatolia, with no intent of ‘regaining’ other strips of land. In this statistical research concerning geography in Turkish historiography, this becomes imminent.

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Works cited in chapter two Akalın, Ş. H. (ed. 2011). Türkçe Sözlük: Onbirinci Baskı . Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu. Aksan, V. H. (2007). Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged . Harlow: Pearson Longman. Akşin, S. (2007). Turkey, From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present . New York: New York University Press. Alkan, T. (1979). Siyasal Toplumsallaşma: Siyasal Bilincin Gelişmesinde Ailenin, Okulun ve Toplumsal Sınıfların Etkisi . Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları. Altınay, A. G. (2004). The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, And Education in Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Anderson, B. (1991/1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd edition. London: Verso. Apuhan, R. Ş. (2008). Türklerin Tarihi: Göktürkler’den Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’ne 2500 Yıllık Savaş. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları. Arar, Ö. (ed. 2010). Turkey . Ankara: Ertem Basım. Arıca, S. T. & Yaşasınoğlu, A. (2010). Çeyrek Asrın Soruları: Tarih çıkmış 19852010 soruları. Ankara: Örnek Yayınevi. Barth, F. (ed. 1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries . Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Bahar, İ. (2003). Türk Klasikleri: Vatan Yahut Silistre . İstanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları. Baycroft, T. & Hewitson, M. (eds. 2006). What Is a Nation?: Europe 1789-1914 . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bayrak, M. O. (2002). Türk İmparatorlukları Tarihi . İstanbul: Bilge Karınca Yayınları. Bek, K. (2004). Nâmık Kemal: Vatan yahut Silistre . İstanbul: Bordo Siyah Klasik Yayınlar.

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Birtek, F. & Dragonas, T. (eds. 2005). Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey. New York: Routledge. Brook, K. A. (2010). The Jews of Khazaria, second edition . New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Copeaux, É. (1997). Espace et temps de la nation turque: Analyse d’une historiographie nationaliste, 1934–1993 . Paris: Éditions CNRS. Copeaux, É. (1998). Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine . İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Çağbayır, Y. (2007). Ötüken Türkçe Sözlük: Orhun Yazıtlarından Günümüze Türkiye Türkçesinin Söz Varlığı. Göktürk, Eski Uygur, Hakaniye, Oğuz, Eski Anadolu, Osmanlı ve Çağdaş Türkiye Türkçesi ile Anadolu, Rumeli, Kıbrıs, Kerkük Ağızları (volume 5/5). İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat. Çiçek, K. (2010, April 29). Ermeni Meselesinin İç Yüzü. Conference at Afyon Kocatepe University. Retrieved on June 18th, 2012: http://www.haber.aku.edu. tr/bul29nisan101.html. Duymaz, S. (ed. 1999). Facts about Turkey. İstanbul: Directorate General of Press & Information of the Prime Ministry. Eren, H. (ed. 1974). Türkçe Sözlük: Gözden Geçirilmiş Altıncı Baskı. Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi/Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları. Erickson, E. J. (2003). Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 19121913. Connecticut: Praeger. Eriksen, T. H. (1993). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. Connecticut: Pluto Press. Ersoy, E. T. (2012). Personal Remark (November 6th, 2012). Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. New York: Cornell University Press. Glenny, M. (1999). The Balkans (1804-1999): Nationalism, War and the Great Powers. London: Granta Books. Gökalp, Z. (1923/2001), Türkçülüğün Esasları. İstanbul: İnkilap.

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Güven, İ. (2000). Türkiye’de Eğitim ve İdeoloji . Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi. Hotham, D. (1972). The Turks . London: John Murray. İrem, K. (ed. 2009). Türkiye . Ankara: Fersa. Kaplan, İ. (1999). Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi . İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Karaca, B. (2012). Personal Remark (November 2nd, 2012). Kemal, N. (1873/1984). Vatan Yahut Silistre . İstanbul: Gökşin Yayınları. Keyder, Ç. (2005). A history and geography of Turkish nationalism. In F. Birtek & T. Dragonas (eds.). Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey (pp. 93-109). New York: Routledge. Lang, D. M. (1976). The Bulgarians: From Pagan Times to the Ottoman Conquest . Southampton: Camelot Press/Thames and Hudson. McCarthy, J. (1995). Death and Exile: the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 . Princeton: The Darwin Press. Meram, A. K. (2006). Göktürk İmparatorluğu Tarihi . İstanbul: Nokta Kitap. National Statistical Institute (2001). НАСЕЛЕНИЕ КЪМ 01.03.2001 Г. ПО ОБЛАСТИ И ЕТНИЧЕСКА ГРУПА . Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Retrieved on December 12th, 2012 from: http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm. NSI (2001), See: National Statistical Institute. Özbaran, S. (1998). Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları . İzmir: Dokuz Eylül University Press. Özdemir, A. K. (ed. 2010). Türkiye . Ankara: Ertem Basım. Özdil, Ş. & Tapan, N. (eds. 1991). Türkiye’nin Ders Kitapları: Ortaöğretim Ders Kitaplarına Eleştirsel Bir Yaklaşım . İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi. Özkan, M. (2010). Türk Devletleri . İstanbul: Kalipso. Öztuna, Y. (1983). Büyük Türkiye Tarihi (volume 1/14). İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi. Özükan, B. (ed. 2003). Adım Adım Osmanlı Tarihi – İmparatorluğun Son Yılları

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1789-1922 (volume 4/4). İstanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu/Dosya Yayınları. Parlak, İ. (2005). Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Ders Kitapları Üzerine bir İnceleme . Ankara: Hacettepe University (unrevised Ph.D.-thesis). Parlak, İ. (2006). Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Ders Kitapları Üzerine bir İnceleme . Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi. Rásonyi, L. (1971). Tarihte Türklük . Ankara: Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü. Ronart, S. (1936). Turkey To-Day . London: Robert Hale. Shaw, S. J. & Shaw, E. K. (1977). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, A. D. (1991). National Identity . London: Penguin Books. Smith, A. D. (1998/2003). Nationalism and Modernism . New York: Routledge. Smith, A. D. (2009). Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach . New York: Routledge. Stone, N. (2010). Turkey: A Short History . London: Thames & Hudson. Su, K. & Bülkat, G. (1961). İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası . Ankara: Birsen Yayınevi. Turkish Language Society (1976). See: Türk Dil Kurumu. Türk Dil Kurumu (1976). Ismarlama Ders Kitapları Üzerine Rapor . Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları. Uyar, M. & Erickson, E. J. (2009). A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk. California: Praeger Security International. Ünlü, M. & Çotuksöken, Y. (2001). Türkçülüğün Esasları (Günümüz Türkçesiyle) . İstanbul: İnkilap. Weber, E. (1976). Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914. California: Stanford University Press.

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White, J. B. (2002). Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Yıldız, İ. (2006). (Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı) ÖSS Tarih: Temel Kavramlar ve Bilgiler. İstanbul: Birey Yayınları. Zürcher, E. J. (2004). Turkey: A Modern History . London: I.B. Tauris.

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Chapter 3

The Balkans in Turkish history “I have to admit that in terms of our neighborhood space I know least about the Balkans. ” Suat Kınıklıoğlu (2012: 9) Introduction

The Turkish columnist Suat Kınıklıoğlu said in his article ‘The Balkans, Turkey and Europe’ on page nine of the newspaper ‘Today’s Zaman’ that he knew almost nothing about the Balkans (Thursday, June 14, 2012). The average Turkish citizen undoubtedly recognizes himself in his column. It becomes even more interesting when the importance of geography is mentioned in Turkey, since this revolves around Anatolia. Consequently, one might wonder if any other region has been neglected and left out in order to make Anatolia Turkey’s centre in Turkish historiography. This is the case with the Balkans, which is neglected in Turkish historiography, but is frequently discussed as a part of Turkish history within historiography in general. When one looks at the position of the Balkans in Turkish history, a couple of things stand out. For one, when Turkish tribes migrated from Central Asia to Europe, the first European region they encountered was the Balkans as they took the northern route through Russia and Ukraine. This migration took place approximately 1000 B.C. Although, the first Turkish tribes used the Balkan lands to raid and pillage, eventually Turkish tribes settled in the area during the early Middle Ages. Turks set foot in Anatolia in the late eleventh century; some seven hundred years after the Turks arrived in the Balkans. Secondly, the Balkans was not simply land to the Turks, but in time it became the richest, wealthiest, and the core of elite provinces of the Turks, while Anatolia was regarded as a backward region with uneducated peasants. Kınıklıoğlu is not alone in his lack of knowledge about the Balkans, in Turkish historiography the mere mention of the Balkans is downgraded to a minimum. In this chapter I will argue that, although Turkish historiography, through Turkish history textbooks, neglects the Balkans in Turkish history, it in fact has a long history, in which Turkish tribes settled in the Balkans as early as the first millennium B.C. Consequently, I will argue that the Balkans were not discarded due to their marginal influence in Turkish history, but on the contrary, the Balkans are neglected in Turkish historiography because the region was inhabited by Turkish tribes for so long that it was regarded as the core of various Turkish empires, but were nonetheless lost relatively easily at the outbreak of war. In Turkish history, the Balkans was considered both the quantitative (longer period of time than any other region) and qualitative (being the core provinces for over five centuries) homeland of the Turkish tribes. In this chapter, the Balkans in Turkish history will be shown in correlation with

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historiography. Afterwards, one will understand why the Balkans was discarded from Turkish historiography, although the region was settled in early Turkish history by Turkish tribes. Turkish tribes settled in the Balkans centuries and millennia prior to the first Turkish settlers in Anatolia. Nonetheless, the Balkans is neglected in Turkish historiography in favour of Anatolia. This chapter will provide an answer to the question of how extensive is the Balkan history of Turkish settlement. This question is important, because one could say that the Balkans is neglected in Turkish historiography because the Balkans contains no traces of Turkish history to begin with. This chapter is designed to show that the Balkans contains just that: an extensive long history of Turkish tribes settling in the Balkans, long before any Turkish tribe migrated to and settled in Anatolia. This chapter will concentrate on the various Turkish migrations to the Balkans throughout history, in which the Balkans became the first region settled by Turkish tribes, to show that one could easily argue that the Balkans were the ‘homeland’ of the Turks long before Turkish settlers migrated to Anatolia. The paragraphs will be composed in a chronological order, from ancient times until the Osmanlı Empire. The various paragraphs will mention Turkish tribes that migrated to the Balkans, centuries and millennia prior to Turkish tribes migrating to Anatolia, as the first traces of Turkish tribes in Anatolia are mostly of the eleventh century. As I will argue, the Balkans have been the place of battle between the Turkic Scythians and ancient Greeks as far back as 1000 B.C. and has continued to harbour other Turkish tribes ever since. Therefore, the Balkans has a tradition of Turkish settlers and nomads some two thousand years prior to that of Anatolia. This chapter sheds light on this neglected part of Turkish historiography by using, primarily, non-Turkish sources. Review of literature In Turkish historiography the Balkans is greatly neglected, but there is some interest from a group of scholars in Turkey and abroad. Turkish-French scholar Yılmaz Öztuna (1983) and Vahid Çabuk (1999) both wrote extensively on the Balkans in their respective fourteen- and ten-volume encyclopedias on Turkish history. They are accompanied by the Hungarian Istvan Vasary (2010) who wrote ‘ Cumans And Tatars: Oriental Military In The Pre-Ottoman Balkans, 1185-1365 ’, published by Cambridge University Press. His book was very well received and provided much insight into the lives of the Turkish Cuman and Tatar tribes in the Balkans. The same applies to Fine (1994) and his publication ‘The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey From The Late Twelfth Century To The Ottoman Conquest’ from The University of Michigan Press. Fine, brushes and gently touches upon Turkish aspects of the Balkans by mentioning the migrating Turkish tribes, but, just like Vasary, only looks at the twelfth century onwards.

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Osmanlı history of the Balkans On the other hand, the Osmanlı history of the Balkans is well researched by Carl Brown (1997), Gerolymatos (2003) and Nicolle (2010). All three scholars concentrate on the conquest of the Balkans by the Osmanlı Turks and the legacy that was left after 500 years of Osmanlı rule. In fact, the legacy was not compromised solely of 500 years of Osmanlı-Turkish rule, but this was merely the final stage of thousands years of various Turkish tribes leaving their imprint on the Balkans, which is to be seen as a Turkish whole. The Osmanlı Turks are the most researched among the various Turkish tribes, since their empire was the most long lasting, from the thirteenth century to well into the twentieth. On the process of nation-building in the Balkans, after the retreat of the Osmanlı Turks, there is even more literature available. The editorial book of Grandits, Clayer and Pichler (2011) is the latest such example, along with the editorial book of Adanır and Faroqhi (2002) ‘ The Ottomans And The Balkans: A Discussion Of Historiography’ , published by Brill. The latter was even translated into Turkish in 2011 by İletişim Publishers as ‘ Osmanlı ve Balkanlar: Bir Tarihyazımı Tartışması’ . Other publications of recent times are Boyar’s ‘ Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered’ (2007) and Blumi’s ‘ Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities, 1800-1912 ’ (2011). These publications examine this discussion of historiography concerning the Osmanlı Empire, but do this in the context of how the various nation states of the Balkans view (or have viewed) the Osmanlı Empire and the Osmanlı-Turkish legacy in the region. The aspect of how the Osmanlı Turks perceived the Balkans, or from which perspective the loss of the Balkans was seen as traumatic from the point of Turkey, is barely touched upon. Therefore, the literature focuses on various aspects of both the Osmanlı and pre-Osmanlı Balkans, but fails to connect the dots between all these differing aspects of history in order to see the bigger picture of the traces Turkish migrations left behind in the Balkans, and therefore, the impact it had on Turkish history. Consequently, this shows why the loss of the Balkans would pose such a big threat to the image of ‘the glorious, military invincible Turk’ and why their loss was such a traumatic event for the Turks. The Balkans in Turkish historiography In 2011, Sakarya University established the Centre of Balkans Studies (SABAMER), which was one of the first academic institutes in Turkey focusing on the Balkans in Turkish history. Prior to this, the Balkans was mostly ignored in Turkish historiography. For example, when one of the biggest academic publishing houses and bookstores in Turkey was asked for a list of publications on the matter, only nineteen books were provided (see appendix 3). The years of publication vary from 1936 until 2010, but at least nine out of the nineteen books were published between 1985 and 2010. It shows that there was little attention

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Map 4: The migration and empire of the Scythians, Sarmatians and Alans

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Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment (see appendix 2).

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in Turkey for the history of the Balkans until recently. 4 However, these books, without exception, concentrated on the First Balkan War (1912) and Second Balkan War (1913). This is why one of the first projects of SABAMER was the publication of the editorial book ‘The Balkans in Turkish History’ (İskefiyeli, Çelik & Yazıcı, 2013). This book provided additional valuable information, and that the Balkans had in fact played a long and important role in Turkish history. It sparked the question, was the Balkans really so important in Turkish history? This chapter will focus on just that; the role of the Balkans in Turkish history in accordance with sources that are not used or omitted from Turkish historiography. Most of these sources describe either the migration of Central Asian tribes, or the reaction of the ancient Greek and Romans to the advancing horseback warriors of Central Asia (Haywood, 2008; Herodotus & Rawlinson, 440 B.C./1858; Griffith, 1996). Using these sources, one can see traces of Turkish tribes in the Balkans throughout history. Migrating to Europe and settling in the Balkans The first Turkish tribes that entered the Balkans were probably the Scythians. Their earliest wave of migration to the Balkans began in ancient times; more precisely around 800 B.C. according to historian John Haywood (2008), while Vrieze (1994) puts it in 1000 B.C. or some two hundred years prior. These nomadic tribes are also known as İskit and Saka. A branch of the Scythian confederation of ethnically related tribes that decided to remain in Central Asia, they were probably renamed as ‘Saka’ by outsiders like the Greeks and Persians (Seydi, 2007; Haywood, 2008). The Scythians are likely to have called themselves ‘Saka’, making no distinction between the different branches in Central Asia and Europe. However, in Turkish history textbooks used during primary education there is no mention of the Scythians at all (Su & Bülkat, 1961). The first mention of the Scythians is a rather small reference in secondary education textbooks (Yıldız, 2006). Although there is a major discussion concerning the origin of the Scythians in contemporary historiography, this is almost completely neglected in Turkish historiography. Some scholars describe the Scythians as an IndoEuropean race of Iranian nomads, while others claim that they were of Turkish descent (Haywood, 2008; Öztuna, 1983; Davis-Kimball, 1997; Roux, 2007; Herodotus, 440 B.C.; Göckenjan, 2006; Griffith, 1996; Pakendorf et al., 2003) 5. Scholar Carter Vaughn Findley (2005) thinks that at the least the culture and language were pre-dominantly (but not exclusively) Indo-European, leaving the

4  Another interesting note is the fact that eleven of the nineteen books are published by government institutions in Turkey, such as ministries and the armed forces. 5  Dates that have no abbreviation, like B.C. or A.D., refer to A.D.-periods.

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door open for discussion on various topics like ethnic origin, and the possibility that a significant minority of the Scythians were Turkish (el-Kâşgarî, 1074; Öztuna, 1983; Minns, 1913; Apuhan, 2008; Kiepert, 1881). There is no mention of this discussion in Turkish historiography (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). However, it is important to note that French-Turkish scholar Öztuna (1983: 22) states that, “it is ridiculous to defend the thesis that all Scythians were of pure Turkish origin, but it is equally ridiculous to defend that the Scythians had no Turkish tribes or branches within their confederation.”

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Map 5: The migration and empire of the Huns

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Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment.

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The migration of the Scythians to the Balkans is not mentioned in Turkish historiography, as the Hittites in Anatolia receive preference (Akşit & Oktay, 1986). The Hittites are not portrayed as ‘Turks’ in Turkish historiography, but still are favoured above the Turkish Scythians (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). The Scythians are neglected in Turkish historiography, but receive great interest outside Turkey (Vrieze, 1994; Marazov, 1984; Venedikov, 1984). After the Scythians, the Balkans came under the influence of the Sarmatians. These nomads are a fairly unknown tribe who emerged in 700 B.C. and lived in peaceful co-existence with their Scythian neighbours until 300 B.C., when, after attacking and defeating the Scythians, they took their lands. After 300 A.D. there is no longer mention of ‘Scythians’, and the Sarmatians ruled the former Scythian lands until the arrival of the invading Huns in the fourth century A.D., after which, in the fifth or sixth century A.D., they seemingly disappeared from history (Haywood, 2008). From 300 B.C. onwards, the Sarmatians dominated the area of the Black Sea but lost their initiative in the Balkans to the Romans. Subsequently, the Sarmatians lost their control around the river Danube and were forced back to the Crimea, where they held out until a new wave of tribes, most notably the Huns, arrived in the fourth century A.D. and conquered both the Roman and Sarmatian-Scythian lands in those regions. One of the few branches within the Sarmatians that was able to hold out were the Alans, whose culture was eventually and gradually transformed into an Iranian nomadic culture (Iranification). Although the Sarmatians disappeared from world history in the fifth or sixth century A.D., the Alans managed to survive until in the thirteenth century A.D., when the combined forces of Mongols and Tatars entered the stage (Shnirelman, 2006). Present-day Russian Ossetians adopted the name ‘Alania’ in 1994, after a couple of influential Ossetians tried to create a new separate nationalism for Ossetia from 1989 until 1991, during the last years of the Soviet Union, by adopting the name ‘Alania’. Again, in Turkish historiography there is no mention of Sarmatians or Alans (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). It must be said that the Scythians, along with the Sarmatians and Alans, were only able to leave an indirect trace that has lasted until the present-day. Therefore, their absence from Turkish historiography is somewhat understandable. During their frequent raids into the Balkans, well into the Thracian part of it, they never settled, which diminished their influence in the region. Following in the footsteps of the Scythians, and their relatively smaller neighbours of Sarmatians, the Turkish Huns entered the stage by migrating from the East to the West. In contrast to the Scythians, the Huns did eventually settle in large areas of the Balkans and their traces are far more evident than Turkish tribes before them (Schreiber, 1976; Berl, 1946). Just as with the

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Scythians, there is some debate on the origin of the Huns. The Turkish historian Mehmet Orhan Bayrak (2004) calls the Huns the oldest Turkish tribe, and the first Turkish tribe that united the Turks in an empire; but in doing so disqualifies the Scythians as being Turkish. Some other scholars also dispute if the Huns were in fact Turkish, but do acknowledge that they were at least Turkishspeaking nomads (Babcock, 2005). However, the argument that the Huns could be Turkified Mongols or another related tribe is not based on archaeological evidence but rather on assumptions. This is why historians vary on the origin of the Huns, although most scholars think it is most likely they were of Turkish descent (Haywood, 2008; Man, 2006). Although the Huns are mentioned in Turkish historiography, their presence in the Balkan region is not explained extensively (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). In contrast to the Scythians, the Huns did settle en masse in the Balkans. Their traces are best seen in the present-day nations of Hungary and Bulgaria. Both claim to be descendants of the Huns. It is important to note that the Huns were part of the Great Migration in the fourth century A.D., and are even considered its instigator (Haywood, 2008; Jansen, 2002) Therefore, the second wave of Turkish tribes to the Balkans (the first being the ScythianSarmatian-Alan) begins with the Huns, but certainly does not end with them. Like the first wave, the tribes of the second wave used the migration route on the north of the Black Sea through the Crimean steppe, which corresponds with maps in Turkish historiography (see map 2, chapter 2). In contrast to the tribes of the first wave, which only used the Balkans for their raids, the tribes of the second wave did eventually settle in that region. Almost all of these tribes eventually assimilated, and are therefore called the ‘Lost Turkish Tribes’ and/or ‘Assimilated Clans’ (Süslü, 2010). It was the Huns who paved the way for other Turkish tribes to enter the Balkans, and although the Huns gained a reputation as ‘fierce and brutal barbarians’, they did manage to leave a long-lasting trace in the region (Schreiber, 1976), something the Scythians and Sarmatians could not achieve. Still, this is not included in Turkish historiography. This could have something to do with the fact that the name ‘Hun’ seems to derive from the Chinese ‘Hu’ (meaning ‘barbarian’) or ‘Xiong-Nu’ (pronounced as ‘Hun-Nu’, meaning ‘bad’), which the Chinese used to refer to the people from the north (Lovell, 2006). These people from the north (or ‘barbarians’) were probably Turkish or Mongolian tribes who tried to breach the Chinese wall 6 in an attempt to raid the prosperous Chinese Empire. The background of how the Chinese perceived these Turkish Huns is

6  The Chinese wall is also called ‘The Great Wall’, although it isn’t really one great wall but several little walls that are collectively called ‘The Great Wall’. For more misunderstandings concerning the Great Wall of China, see: Julia Lovell, Achter de Chinese Muur: Geschiedenis van

China’s isolement 1000 v.C. – 2000 n.C., Utrecht, 2006.

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directly damaging for the image of the Huns in Turkish historiography. The previous chapter showed that Central Asia was depicted as a paradise, and the people as parts of a highly developed civilization. The aspect of raids, and perceptions as ‘barbarian’ and ‘bad’ by others, are not in line with the Turkish view. After all, why would rich and civilized people occupy themselves with common raids? That is why they were left out of Turkish historiography. However, what is heavily emphasized is that the Huns finally succeeded in breaching the walls and created the Great Hunnic Empire (or ‘Büyük Hun İmparatorluğu’) in 220 B.C., which stretched from the Pacific to the Caspian Sea; making it one of the largest empires of world history from a geographic point of view. However, this empire was more a nomadic confederation of united Turkish tribes, instead of builders. This empire, which harboured the mythical and legendary kings Teoman (220 B.C. – 209 B.C.) and his son Mete Oğuz Han (209 B.C. – 174 B.C.), collapsed in 216 A.D. after some six hundred years (Bayrak, 2004). With the collapse, and the advancing Chinese army, most of the tribes that made up the Hunnic Empire took their refuge by migrating to the West. These Huns ended up in the above-mentioned Balkans. The Hunnic Empire is incorporated into Turkish historiography, but without the migration to the Balkans afterwards (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). These tribes left almost no written sources; all of the information that has been revealed about them has been written down by others, in particular, the Chinese, and later, Europeans (Man, 2006). The Chinese name ‘Hun’ became a collective name for all the tribes that first inhabited the Great Hunnic Empire and subsequently migrated West after the collapse of their empire (Bayrak, 2004). The tribes that were already Turkish by origin flourished because the core of the confederation was still in hands of primarily Turkish tribes. The non-Turkish tribes soon integrated and assimilated into an overall Turkish culture. When the confederation fell apart, it was no longer possible to make a distinction between the tribes that were Turkish from origin and the ones that were Turkified over time. According to Seydi (2007: 11), the Huns had subordinated tribes “[…] including the Chinese, the Mongols and the Tunghuz […].” Having said all this, it is also likely that when the Huns migrated westwards in the fourth century A.D., many of the different tribes that encountered the Huns were forced, to either stand and fight against them, or, join them. The first option led to many tribes being either annihilated (and the survivors being forced to join the Huns regardless, or flee to the west), or to flee in sight of the advancing Huns. These tribes could be Turkish as well, but most historians agree that the tribes encountered by the Huns during their migration to the West were probably (East) Germanic. As Haywood (2008: 80) explains:

“Around 370 the Huns ran into the Ostrogoths, […] acknowledged to be the mightiest of the Germanic peoples, they prove no

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match for Balamber [the Hun leader] and the Huns. […] The defeat of the Ostrogoths spread panic among the Germanics. Some, like the Visigoths, Vandals and Burgundians, escaped into the Roman Empire but by the 430’s most of the Germanic peoples had been forced to acknowledge Hun overlordship.” These tribes rapidly assimilated into the majority of the Turkish tribes within the Huns, mostly due to the overwhelming success of the advancing Huns and the panicky retreat of their former fellow tribes of (East) Germanic origin, or at least so it seemed. The fear of these fleeing Germanic tribes caused the Romans to be overrun, before they even came into contact with the Huns (Haywood, 2008; Jansen, 2002). However, this does not mean that there were no

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Map 6: The migration and empire of the Bulgars

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Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment.

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other tribes during the Hunnic migration westwards. This is again not mentioned in Turkish historiography and the Huns are portrayed as a homogenous Turkish tribe. When, shortly after the Huns were forced to retreat, the Bulgars entered the stage, the same social development took place. Once again, the related tribes of the Central Asian steppe joined the most powerful clan of the time and went off to the Balkans. Just like the Huns, the Bulgars settled in the Balkans creating another state of Turkish origin in the region. As with the Huns, the Bulgars were a confederation of mixed tribes, most of which must have been Turkish. In a time when nationalism did not yet exist, it is likely that the Turkish tribes adopted the dominant culture and language quite rapidly. So, by the time of the Bulgars, the people that once called themselves ‘Scythians’ or ‘Sarmatians’ were no more. Some were assimilated into local tribes and others into the migrating Turkish tribes. The pace at which this occurred was so rapid that by the time the Bulgars settled in the Balkans, the name ‘Huns’ was already history. The Bulgars first appeared in world history in the fourth century A.D. according to historiography (Dimitrov, 1979), however, this is not mentioned in Turkish primary education history textbooks (Su & Bülkat, 1961). During secondary education, the Bulgars receive scant attention (Yıldız, 2006). After creating some small empires in the steppe of the Crimea, the Bulgars quickly migrated west to Europe and settled in the Balkans (Seydi, 2007; Brook, 2010; Bayrak, 2004; Lang, 1976; Dimitrov, 1979). Just like the remaining Huns in the Balkans, who ultimately succeeded in forming the Hungarian Kingdom, but eventually lost their dominant Turkish identity and assimilated into the local culture, the Bulgars lost their Turkish identity by giving up a nomadic life and began to live like farmers. The ‘Hun’ was erased from history in the early eighth century. This was followed by the disappearance of the ‘Bulgars’ in the late ninth century when “the Bulgarian khan received baptism […], taking the name of Michael after that of the Byzantine emperor who stood as his sponsor and godfather” (Lang, 1976: 58). Gradually, the usage of ‘Hungarians’ and ‘Bulgarians’ became commonplace to refer to the assimilated Christian settlers in the Balkans, instead of the name that was used for their nomadic pagan ancestors. In the ninth century, the Bulgar leader “Boris abandoned the pagan Turkish title of khan for the Slavonic ‘kynaz’ or chief prince. Mass conversion of the people, often by force, followed” by demand of the Byzantines (Lang, 1976: 58). It seems medieval Europe saw these tribes as ‘part of Europe’ after their conversion to Christianity, while the contemporary Turks discarded the same tribes in the Balkans. Although the reign of Boris was decisive in renaming the Bulgars to Bulgarians from a European perspective this is only symbolic, as the English word for ‘Bulgar’ and ‘Bulgarian’ is different; but the Turkish word remained the same (‘Bulgar’). Even in contemporary times, there is no distinction in

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Turkish between ancient Pagan Bulgars, medieval Christian Bulgarians and contemporary Slavic Bulgarians: they are all called ‘Bulgar’. The same goes for ‘Hun’ and ‘Hungarian’, which is also still one word in Turkish (‘Macar’).

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Map 7: The migration and empire of the Avars and Macars

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Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment.

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After the Huns and Bulgars assimilated, other Turkish tribes dominated the region; Oğur, Utrugur and Kutrugur were the mightiest (Dimitrov, 1979). Some renamed themselves ‘On-Ogur’, which could be another explanation for the name ‘Hungar’ (Sugar, 1994). The Oğur tribes show some resemblance with the later Oğuz, apart from the name, and it is quite likely that they were in fact both part of the Oğuz division with the difference being that the Oğur settled in the Balkans and the Oğuz centuries later in Anatolia. In this case, Oğur and Oğuz could be used to refer to a big part of the division that started to migrate west, first to join the Huns and later in the ninth century to create their own empire of the Selçuklu’s. The Utrugur and Kutrugur seem to be tribes that are unnamed until the Hunnic and Bulgaric tribes mix, and they begin to gain more influence in the confederation of the Hunno-Bulgars. The Utrugur eventually became the main tribe in the Bulgar confederation that migrated back to the Balkans from the Crimea in the 670s, defeating the Byzantine army in 681 and settling into what is today Bulgaria (Rosenwein, 2002). The Bulgar confederation that settled in the region of the Volga was dominated, in particular, by the Kutrugur. In short, one can conclude that in the West the Bulgar confederation was also called Utrugur (or Utigur), and the one in the East was named Kutrugur in the fifth or sixth century. The Bulgars that first entered the Balkans with the Huns, in the fourth century, subsequently migrated back to the Crimea and the Volga after the collapse of the Huns. In the sixth century, the Bulgars, or Hunno-Bulgars, entered the Balkans again, due to their second migration from Central Asia to the Crimea and the Volga (Dimitrov, 1979). Before the Bulgars migrated back to the Balkans, at the end of the seventh century, they created a powerful empire in the Crimean steppe alongside the river Volga called ‘Onogur-Bulgar’: the same name we saw before within the Huns as ‘On-Ogur’ (Dimitrov, 1979). In Byzantine sources this became known as ‘Old Great Bulgaria’ while the actual meaning was the ‘Ten Tribes of Bulgar’. The old Turkish ‘Ogur’, just as ‘Oğuz’ or ‘Oğur’, literally meant ten (‘on’), arrows (‘ok’, ‘og’, ‘oğ’ and the plural ‘-uz’ or ‘-ur’), while ‘Bulgar’ means ‘mixed’ (Lang, 1976). Every tribe was considered to be an arrow (in common terms ‘pillar’ of the confederation), so a loose explanation could be that ‘Ogur’ referred to the ten most powerful tribes that worked together in order to create a new Bulgar confederation of mixed Turkish clans and divisions. Because this Asian Bulgar Empire was not located in the Balkans, we will not dedicate too much of our attention to it. However, it is important to know that when the Turkish Kazars (probably a tribe of the Kıpçak clan as a prelude) invaded the Onogur-Bulgar Empire in the seventh century the Bulgars were divided into two. As mentioned before, the Eastern branch (led by the Kutrugur) migrated to the north east and founded the Bulgar Empire of the (river) Volga in the eighth century, while the Western branch of the Onogur-Bulgar Empire (led by the Utrugur) migrated back to the Balkans

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from the Crimea. This Western branch of the former Bulgar confederation subsequently joined forces with some smaller Hunno-Bulgars that remained in the region of the Balkans since their first arrival in the centuries prior the 670s, defeating the Byzantine army in 681, and settling into what is today Bulgaria, creating the Bulgar Empire of the (river) Danube (Öztuna, 1983). Prior to the Bulgars, another Turkish tribe entered the stage in the region of the Balkans: the Avars (Bayrak, 2004). The Avars rapidly settled in the Balkans in the sixth century, and stayed there until the ninth century when they lost their dominance and decided to merge with the Bulgars with whom they shared a common culture. At their highpoint the Avars created yet another Turkish empire in the Balkans, one that was able to reach an area from present day Slovakia to Bulgaria. The Avars focused mainly on the Balkan provinces of the Byzantine Empire and even besieged the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. After some major victories, constant struggle and war proved too much, and as the Byzantines tried to buy off the Avars, others attacked the Avar state. At times, the Avar acted as mercenaries for the Byzantines. They only attacked the Byzantines if they felt the Byzantine emperor did not pay enough. The Avars also joined forces with the Bulgars in the seventh century, but lost their dominance in the region just as rapidly as they had gained it. In the eighth century they suddenly disappeared from history (Bayrak, 2004); but to this day there are people in present day Hungary that claim to descend from the Avars (Bayrak, 2004). This would indicate that the Avars, like all other Turkish tribes in the region, joined other more successful and powerful Turkish tribes.

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Map 8: The migration and empire of the Peçeneks and Selçuklu’s

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Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment.

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During the eighth century, while the second wave of migrating Turkish tribes was still continuing, the Peçeneks entered the stage. Described as the nineteenth clan of the Oğuz division by el-Kâşgarî (1074), the Peçeneks were one of the few tribes that never put any effort into establishing an empire, but for centuries simply offered their warrior services to the highest bidder (Golden, 2006). In chapter 299 of Matthew’s the Chronicle, which was written in the eleventh century, the Peçeneks are sent by an Armenian prince to save and aid Christians (Dostourian, 1976). In times of relative peace, the Peçeneks organized random raids on neighbouring states (Öztuna, 1983). Although the Peçeneks lived in a geographically large area, stretching from the north coast of the Caspian Sea to the Balkans, it was primarily a region where they dwelled and lived as nomads rather that operating as a state. From the eighth century onwards, the Peçeneks went from destroyers of the Roman-Byzantine provinces in 1020-1053, to mercenaries of the Byzantines to fight off the Selçuklu tribe of the Oğuz Turks in 1071, to besiegers of Constantinople itself in 1091 (Öztuna, 1983). In the ninth century, the Peçeneks were hired by the Byzantines to fight off the Rus (ancient Russians), and by the Bulgars (or Bulgarians, hence the process of Slavification had already started at this point) to fight the Turkish Hun(garian)s. In both cases, the Peçeneks were very successful. In fighting against the Rus, they managed to attack and besiege the mighty city of Kiev (which was in hands of the Rus). During the Hun(garian) campaign, the Bulgar/ Bulgarian’s leader at that point, Simeon I, gained the greatest territorial expansion that Bulgaria ever saw; mostly due to the great Peçenek victories. Simeon I even gained the nickname ‘The Great’ and is considered a national hero of Bulgaria to this very day.

Creating lasting empires The entrance of the Oğuz Turks and a new tribe of Macars (migrating from the Crimean steppe and probably descendants of the Huns of 300 A.D.) in the ninth century, at first did not seem to worry the Peçeneks. At the Battle of Malazgırt in 1071, the Byzantines hired the Peçeneks to fight off the invading Selçuklu tribes of the Kınık clan within the Oğuz division (Apuhan, 2008). Recognizing the signs the Selçuklu’s used, the Peçeneks quickly switched sides and attacked the Byzantine forces instead, causing a major defeat for the Byzantines in which the Byzantine emperor was captured (Öztuna, 1983). Seeing that the Peçeneks were originally a clan of the Oğuz as well, this is not very surprising. It is likely that since, according to the work of el-Kâşgarî, the Peçeneks were the nineteenth clan of the same Oğuz division they felt a certain loyalty and allegiance to them. This was not the case with the Bulgars, and to a lesser degree the Hun(garian) s, who were rapidly losing their Turkish heritage and probably stopped using their nomadic animal signs and banners, consequently making themselves unrecognizable to their Turkish relatives – even though the newly migrated tribe of Macars delayed this process for the Hungarians by settling in the same region

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and quickly merging with their fellow Macars or ‘Hungarians’ (Szávai, 1999). Shortly after their victory, the Peçeneks once again accepted mercenary assignments from the Byzantines and even allied themselves with the Byzantine army. This caused the Oğuz Turks to attack the Peçeneks and drive them further westwards to the Balkans, none of this is mentioned in Turkish historiography. The Oğuz (or ‘Uz’ as they are called in Byzantine sources) weakened the Peçeneks who were also attacked by the Kievan Rus. The battles between the Oğuz and Peçeneks were so fierce that both faced annihilation in this ongoing war between the two, although the Oğuz seemed to have the upper hand (Rásonyi, 1971). After a series of serious defeats by both the Oğuz and the Rus, most of the Peçeneks were either killed or joined other Turkish tribes such as the Hungarians (Öztuna, 1983). The biggest blow came in 1091 when the Byzantines attacked the Peçeneks with the aid of the Kıpçaks. When the Kıpçaks refused to finish off all the Peçeneks, the Byzantine imperial forces carried out the slaughter (Golden, 2006). By this time, the Oğuz were decimated as well, and fell to the Byzantine and Bulgar expeditions in the eleventh century (Grousset, 2002), although it is also believed that some migrated back to the Middle East after a great plague broke out in the Balkan region in the eleventh century. The last surviving Peçeneks and Oğuz Turks were forced to join the newly invading Turkish tribes of the Kıpçak in the eleventh century.

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Map 9: The migration and empire of the Kıpçaks

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Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment.

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The Peçeneks who joined the Bulgar, Oğuz and Kıpçak assimilated into these Turkish tribes, while the groups that joined the Hungarians retained their identity well into the fifteenth century. Peçenek names are still very common among some present-day Hungarian villages, towns, regions and cities, which took that name because a large number of Peçeneks settled there (Rásonyi, 1971). It is believed that the Byzantines refer to these Hungarian Peçeneks when they refer to small groups of Peçenek mercenaries fighting for the Byzantine Empire in the twelfth century, e.g. during the Battle of Andria in Italy in 1155 (Chalandon, 1907). Over the centuries these Peçeneks assimilated, and it is believed that some of the present-day Hungarians, and to a lesser degree Bulgarians, have Peçenek ancestors, as well as the Turkish minority of Gagavuz in Moldavia and Romania (Rásonyi, 1971; Öztuna, 1983). However, there are still some small numbers of Peçeneks in the Hungarian steppe of Pannonia. According to historian Peter B. Golden (2006: 99), “[b]y the late ninth century, [the Peçeneks] had taken refuge in Pannonia, which has remained their homeland up to the present.” With the Peçenek out of the picture, the Oğuz, who were not killed by either, the Bulgar and/or Byzantine expeditions, or the outbreak of plague, gradually settled in the Balkans or returned to the Middle East. Here, they were to unite with other Oğuz around the powerful branch of the Selçuklu, and eventually form the Great Selçuklu Empire in the eleventh century (Seydi, 2007). This Turkish empire ruled almost the entire Middle East, including Anatolia, but played no significant role in the region of the Balkans. Other Oğuz were reported to join the Kıpçak, while some were hired by the declining Byzantines, unable to raise a large army of their own. With the downfall of all other Turkish tribes in the region, from Scythians to Huns and Bulgars to Peçeneks, as well as the Oğuz, a new Turkish group called the Kıpçak tribes gained a dominant role (Öztuna, 1983). Just as the Peçeneks and Oğuz before them, the Kıpçak tribes never put any effort in attempts to create an empire, something the Bulgars and Huns (or Macars) did, as well as the first wave of tribes like the Scythians and Sarmatians. Therefore, the region where the Kıpçak tribes lived was seen as a vast territory of steppe, where multiple tribes united under one name had settled. The region was never considered a state or an empire, but seen as lands inhabited by different clans and tribes, who united against their neighbours, i.e. the Rus(sians), Bulgarians, Byzantines and others in the Balkans, Armenia and Georgia. “[T]he Kypchaks dominated the area from the Caspian Sea to the southern Ukraine” (Seydi, 2007: 29). There is some controversy surrounding the Kıpçak group, European sources seem to speak of ‘Kuman’ and ‘Kıpçak’ (Golden, 2006). This has led European scholars to believe that the Kıpçak and Kuman were two major Turkish clans, thus calling the region the ‘Kıpçak-Kuman Confederation’. Some scholars

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try to explain the close relations between the two, believing they were in fact two clans of the same division. This would at least partly explain why the two clans were so close and even worked together on almost all occasions. In fact, it is more probable that although the Kıpçak were accompanied by other Turkish tribes, and even non-Turkish tribes who eventually were Turkified, ‘Kuman’ was the same name as ‘Kıpçak’. In the Turkish world, ‘Kuman’ is now used to depict the Kıpçaks who migrated to Europe. Within the Kıpçak clan, there is a tribe that is called ‘Kiman’, which could easily be altered to sound like ‘Kuman’, and this could explain why European sources speak of ‘Kuman’ (Golden, 2006; Öztuna, 1983). In the fourteenth century, the papacy decided to send missionaries to the Kıpçaks, and those that were able to learn the Kıpçak language (or the ‘Tatar tili’, the Turkish dialect used by Kıpçak tribes in the western European parts of the confederation) wrote the Codex Cumanicus (Golden, 1992; Johanson, 2006). This document has survived the ordeal of time and has given scholars great insight into the Kuman-Kıpçak culture. The Kıpçak tribes are, therefore, more prominent in European sources, since the papacy succeeded in converting some of the Kıpçak to Christianity; “[T]here were eighteen Catholic monasteries […]” in that region (Süleymanova, 2006: 223). However, the invading Mongols soon ended Kıpçak dominance in the region and erased their name from history. It must be said that although the name Kıpçak was no longer used throughout history, the Mongols eventually became Turkified by these same Kıpçaks (Seydi, 2007).



The Turco-Mongol hordes Eventually, yet new waves of Turkish tribes overran the Crimea, as well as the Balkans and Anatolia (Bayrak, 2004). This wave started around the eleventh century and was the first wave that ended in both Anatolia and the Balkans, instead of exclusively in the latter region. By then, the Balkans had been the stage of some two thousand years of Turkish migration. This wave is the first great migration that receives major attention in Turkish historiography; however, the Balkan route is accordingly left out. With the Turco-Mongol hordes of Cengiz Han (also known as ‘Ghenghis Khan’), the Turkish migration to the Anatolia is intensified (Roux, 2003).

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Table 4: Waves of migrating Turkish tribes to the Balkans

Migration First Wave

Second Wave

Period From approximately 800 B.C. onwards From

Tribes Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans

Outcome Performed frequent raids in the Balkans but assimilated eventually.

Huns

Conquered much of the

approximately 300 A.D. onwards

(Macars), Avars, Bulgars, Peçeneks, Oğuzs, Kıpçak (Kuman) Selçuklu’s, Mongols, Osmanlı’s

Balkans but subsequently merged with locals, losing their Central Asian cultural identity.

Third Wave From approximately 1200 A.D. onwards

Created empires and settled in the Balkans but did not assimilate with locals, instead they retreated to Anatolia after the Balkan Wars of 19121913.

Source: Armand Sag, Invading the Balkans and forming new nations: the first traces of Turkish tribes in Europe, in: Zeynep İskefiyeli, Mehmet Bilal Çelik & Serkan Yazıcı (eds.), The Balkans in Turkish History (forthcoming: Sakarya University Press, 2013), p. unknown at this moment.

After 1200 A.D. the third and final wave of Turkish tribes began to migrate to the Balkans. In this process, the Mongol horde (comprising mostly Turkish tribes but, contrary to common believe, not Mongol tribes) pushed the previous Turkish tribes forward. The Mongol Empire, adopting Uygur Turkish as their official language, was dominated by Turkish tribes who in time Turkified the whole empire (Roux, 2003; Seydi, 2007). Most of the Turkish tribes they encountered during their migration to the West were in fact Turkish tribes from the second wave, such as the Kıpçaks. Almost all of these second wave tribes eventually assimilated, and are known as the ‘Lost Turkish Tribes’ and/ or ‘Assimilated Clans’. This means that they do not use the name that was once used in history and are mostly assimilated. The Bulgars were Slavified

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into Bulgarians, the Huns assimilated into Hungarians with almost no Turkish elements, and the Kıpçaks joined the Mongol hordes becoming the modern day Tatars. But, it is fair to say that most of these tribes have assimilated into a nonTurkish entity, with the exception of a few groups in the Balkans and the Crimea. The Kıpçaks are an exception to this. With their arrival, the Mongols ended the reign of the Kıpçaks in the Crimea and forced them to either join the invader forces or be killed. Most Kıpçaks joined the Mongols, while one group fled to the Balkans and asked for asylum from the Hungarian king (Rásonyi, 1971). The Kıpçaks who stayed behind soon came into contact with the other Turkish tribes within the Mongol clan, the Turkish Tatars, and merged with them. The present day Crimean Tatars and Kazan Tatars are the descendants of the merging Kıpçak and Turco-Mongol tribes (also called Tatar), and still speak a Kıpçak dialect (Tekin, 2006). The Kıpçak culture strengthened the dominant Turkish aspect in the Mongol Empire, and when the Mongol state was divided the Crimean part was renamed ‘The Golden Horde’ and was entirely Turkified (Bayrak, 2004). The Kıpçak who fled to Hungary were granted asylum in return for fighting the Mongol armies, who were now invading Hungary capturing Buda (presently part of Budapest) in April 1241 (Roux, 2003). When Hungary could do nothing against the Mongols, while seeing that the vast majority of the Mongol hordes were in fact Turkish-Kıpçak horsemen, they rebelled against their own Kuman-Kıpçaks who were fighting with the Hungarians against the Mongol invaders. The Kıpçaks in Hungary were seen as spies by the local Christians and slaughtered viciously (Rásonyi, 1971). These Kıpçaks were known as Kuman in European sources and Kun in Hungarian sources. These approximately 40,000 families also vowed to convert to Christianity and were subsequently assimilated within the Hungarians well into the seventeenth century, although there are still small groups that speak the Kuman-Kıpçak dialect of Turkish and call themselves ‘Kuman’ but are Christians. They are most likely the descendants of those 40,000 families (TRT, 2007). The Mongols not only invaded the north route to the Balkans, which is the Crimean steppe, but also invaded Anatolia (or the south route to the Balkans), where the Selçuklu Turks had created an empire. Subsequently, the Selçuklu leader Sultan İzzeddin Kaykavuş was forced to flee to the Balkans with his followers in the year 1260, and his name lives on with the Turkish minority of Romania and Moldavia, who call themselves ‘Gagavuz’ after Kaykavuş (Kiel, 1993). It is believed that these Gagavuz centred around Kaykavuş and his army, in an attempt to gain protection from the invading non-Turkish people. The fact that Gagavuz Turks speak a dialect that is almost identical to that spoken by Anatolian Turks, strengthens the argument that both have common ancestors from the not so distant past. The Selçuklu’s from the thirteenth century could be the logical explanation.

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The Osmanlı Balkans The third wave of Turkish tribes entering the Balkan region begins in the thirteenth century A.D. and consists of the Selçuklu, Osmanlı and Mongol expansions in which primarily Turkish horsemen and soldiers were used. The third wave is partly distinguished by a different route. The Sedjuk and Osmanlı armies, in particular, used the Anatolian route instead of the Crimean route, which was used primarily by the first and second wave of Turkish tribes. Although the Selçuklu’s never attempted a full-scale conquest of the Balkans, their relatives did do just that. The Osmanlı Turks’ drive for new lands focused on the Balkans as early as the thirteenth century. The first lands that were conquered by the Osmanlı’s were in the Balkans. The Osmanlı’s consistently fought against the Byzantines and other East-European forces. This resulted in the conquest of most of the Balkans in the fourteenth century, long before the Osmanlı’s conquered the Anatolian lands. Nonetheless, the Anatolian part of the Osmanlı Empire is currently regarded as the core of the Turkish nation, something which is also emphasized in contemporary Turkish historiography, while the Balkans are mostly neglected (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). During the Battle of Ankara in 1402, the Turko-Tatar ruler Timur Gürkan (also known in western sources as ‘Tamerlane’) attacked the Osmanlı’s (Shaw, 1976). At that moment of time the Osmanlı Empire was regarded as an important empire but had still not conquered Anatolia, leaving important cities like Diyarbakır to other rulers. Due to defeat at the hands of Timur, many Osmanlı’s fled to the safer provinces of the Balkans. This resulted in the Balkans becoming the undisputed epicentre of the Osmanlı Empire, although the region was already seen as the richest and most fertile part of the Osmanlı Empire prior to 1402. This continued up until the seventeenth century when the Turkish possessions in Europe, being the Balkans, were the lands that were providing the main source of men and money for the Osmanlı sultan (Pennington, 1970). By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all major cities of the Osmanlı were concentrated in the Balkans. One battle needs to be singled out in Osmanlı history. The Battle of Varna in 1444 was yet another crusade against the Osmanlı’s, and is regarded as the last major battle of the Crusades. After the decisive victory of the Osmanlı’s, the strategic conquest of Constantinople became a new objective; consequently, securing the dominance of Osmanlı presence in the regions of the Balkans. The defeat of the European crusader army at Varna made the fall of Constantinople inevitable, and the Osmanlı’s subsequently conquered Constantinople in 1453. The defeat of the crusaders at Varna also meant that all of present-day Bulgaria was to remain under Osmanlı domination for over four centuries. Another important battle in that period and that region was the First Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The current Turkish flag, with the crescent and star, was also first adopted after this battle. Yet, contemporary schoolteachers in Turkey are eager to place

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this in other periods, for example, to the Battle of Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in 1915. Today, in contrast to Kosovo, Gallipoli is still part of Turkey, although officially it is part of the European continent, as is, the current city of Kosovo.

Map 10: The early Osmanlı advance in the Balkans

Source: Research of this author (Sag, 2012) in accordance with data collected from ‘Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600; London, 2000)’.

But the creation of the Turkish flag is of course not the only connection between the Balkans and Turkish history (Ahmad, 1993). The Osmanlı Empire had its main base in the Balkans and probably regarded itself more as a part of the Western or European society than anything else. However, in modern day terms, the Osmanlı’s are more and more regarded as part of the non-European world, more specifically the Islamic or eastern parts of the world (Goffman, 2002). This is also seen when one looks at the later president of Turkey, Atatürk. He was born and raised in Selanik, home to one of the biggest ports of the Osmanlı’s; being second to only the Osmanlı capital of Constantinople (presentday İstanbul). Selanik, known today as Thessaloniki, was situated in a Balkan province of the Osmanlı Empire. Seeing that it contained one of the biggest

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ports, it is needless to say that it was a very important city for the Osmanlı Turks. Selanik has maintained its important strategic position as a port up to contemporary times, since Thessaloniki is now one of the most important regions of Greece. It was also in this region from where the movement of the Young Turks originated, and where it had its base of support starting in the early 1900s and ending at the downfall of the Osmanlı Empire. Chapter four will look further into this movement. All of this indicates that the “core” of the Osmanlı Empire was its provinces in the Balkans (Ahmad, 1993: 17-18). This continued for centuries until the disastrous Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, in which the Osmanlı Turks were driven out of the Balkan provinces. But the importance of the Balkans is not restricted to Osmanlı history. Prior to the Osmanlı Turks, other Turkish or Turkic tribes also migrated, invaded, raided or even conquered great parts of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This process dates back as far as ancient times when the Scythians (İskit and Saka tribes) entered the Balkans in approximately 800-1000 B.C., which is almost two thousand years before Selçuklu tribesmen of Turkish origin invaded Anatolia in 1071 (Seydi, 2007). Nonetheless, the latter is greatly celebrated in Turkey, while the former is completely neglected. Summary and conclusion This chapter is designed to show that although the history of the Balkans is not extensively mentioned in Turkish historiography, there is significant evidence of Turkish influence in that region. And while historiography in general, be it from non-Turkish or Turkish academics abroad (like Öztuna), or even Turkish academics in Turkey who are not given widespread attention, has enough information concerning the position of the Balkans in Turkish history, this is absent in Turkish historiography. The Balkans was the stage of Turkish raiding tribes in 1000 B.C. and this continued until other Turkish tribes eventually raided and settled in the Balkans. Of course, it is no coincidence that most of the migrating Turkish tribes from Central Asia chose the Crimean route instead of the Anatolian route to reach Europe. Ever since the Scythians migrated west to Europe by the northern Crimean route, almost all of the Turkish tribes followed. In bypassing Anatolia and using the northern route to reach Europe, the rich and fertile Balkans were settled by Turkish tribes centuries and even millennia before they reached Anatolia. The Balkan lands were rich and fertile, making them attractive to Scythians and other Turkish tribes. Among the settlers were Turkish tribes like the Peçeneks, Oğuz, Kumans and Tatars, and many more who followed in the footsteps of the Scythians. This encounter with the rich and fertile Balkans proved beneficial for the Turkish tribes in almost every aspect. The Balkans was suited for both raiding, plundering and settling. A third use for the Balkans came with the third wave of migrating Turkish tribes. After the first two waves of Turkish tribes,

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the third wave chose to create their empires in those lands. The first two waves continued for centuries, while the third wave of migrating Turkish tribes rapidly changed to permanent settlers. It shows the strategic importance of the Balkans for these tribes. During this period of empire building, the Balkans became the core of Turkish empires, like that of the Selçuklu’s and Osmanlı’s. Soon, the Balkans became the richest and wealthiest provinces of both empires, something that continued up until the twentieth century. This positioning of the Balkan as the core region within Turkish society became undisputable after the twelfth century. In the Osmanlı Empire the Balkans gained more political power and became the centre of the empire; the Balkans maintained this position up until the twentieth century – a period of over five hundred years. All of this shows that the Balkans do in a sense have an important place in Turkish history but are neglected in favour of Anatolia in Turkish historiography. This is seen in multiple examples, of which the legend of the current Turkish flag will speak to the imagination the most. Contemporary schoolteachers in Turkey put the origin of the current Turkish flag, with the crescent and star, to the Battle of Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in 1915, though it is actually the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 in current-day Kosovo. Although both battles took place on the tip of the European continent, being the Balkans, the former is now part of Bulgaria while the latter is still part of Turkey. Another important example is that of the Huns in Turkish history, because although the Huns are notably mentioned in Turkish historiography, their presence in the region of the Balkan remains almost entirely unmentioned. This has everything to do with the military defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, where not only the Osmanlı presence of five to six hundred years was ended, but also the pre-Osmanlı ties of Turkish tribes were severed. Consequently, the history of the Balkans needed to be completely neglected in Turkish historiography, to conceal the traumatic experience of losing a region that was so eminently present throughout Turkish history for millennia.

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Chapter 4

A response to the loss of the Balkans “Düşman hatlarımızı geçtikten sonra ölürsem, kendimi şehit kabul etmiyorum. Beni mezara koymayın. Etimi itler ve kuşlar çeke çeke yesinler. Fakat müdafaa hattımız bozulmadan şehit olursam, kefenim, lifim ve sabunum çantamdadır. Beni bu mahalde gömeceksiniz ve gelen nesiller üzerime bir âbide dikeceklerdir. ” Şükrü Paşa (Edirne, 1912) Introduction Loosely translated, the Osmanlı general Şükrü Paşa expects to die in the upcoming battle for the city of Edirne. He subsequently orders his army to bury his corpse only if he succeeds in holding the city of Edirne against the approaching Bulgarian armies during the First Balkan War of 1912. In case he dies, after the Bulgarians break through his defensive lines, Şükrü wants his men to leave his body in the streets for rabid dogs and birds to feast upon. His final order shows how important the defence of Edirne was to the highest officers of the Osmanlı army. With the outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912, and the subsequent heavy losses the Osmanlı Turks endured in the Balkans, the fear of losing the Balkans and the important city of Edirne was soon transformed into a new political movement, whose sole aim was the preservation of the Balkan provinces of the Osmanlı Empire and thus the Osmanlı Empire itself. Members of this movement believed that, if the Balkans were lost, the empire would collapse. Therefore, this relatively young political movement became pragmatic and realistic. Their pragmatic and realist approach to the matter of preserving their homelands, and thus the Osmanlı Empire, is to be seen as a response to what happened during the last years of the Osmanlı Empire. It has become clear that, although Turkish historiography focuses heavily on the geographical area of Anatolia, the Balkans were an important migration destination for Turkish tribes throughout Turkish history. Now, I will argue that the Balkans even became the political core of the Osmanlı Empire. In the previous chapter, it was explained that the Balkans has a historical importance to the Turks. Focusing on the response of the Osmanlı Turks in reaction to losing the entire region of the Balkans, during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, one question emerges. How did the Turks cope with the loss of the Balkans, which was, after all, the geographical core of their empire? This chapter will focus more on the history itself, in the delicate period of the beginning of the twentieth century, just a couple of years prior to the collapse of the Osmanlı Empire in 1922 and the subsequent establishment of modern Turkey in 1923. The historically rich and fertile provinces of the Balkans were what kept the Osmanlı Empire standing in the difficult times that the Turks encountered during the decline of their empire from the seventeenth century

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onwards. The thought of potentially losing the Balkans caused a revival of political movements, keen on holding the empire together and preserving the Balkans. Among these political movements it was not the Islamic-based or nationalist-based groups that achieved success, but the pragmatics that were open to any suggestions from every other political group and even from minorities. One of the pragmatic groups was the Young Turks. During this chapter I will argue that the Young Turk regime was the product of a response to losing the geographically important region of the Balkans. This chapter will begin by explaining the rise of the Young Turks, after which I will discuss the reforms they implemented after the revolution of 1908. The Young Turks are also dubbed ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ and translated by some as ‘The Committee of Progress and Union’; shortened as CUP (Zürcher, 1995; Üngör, 2011; Akçam, 2006). However, in this study either the original term ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ (translated more correctly as the ‘Society of Unity and Progress’) or the term ‘Young Turks’ will be used. Contemporary literature on the Young Turks There exists quite a lot of contemporary literature about the Young Turks movement. An analysis of contemporary sources regarding the Young Turks, and the years following their revolution of 1908 (or ‘Meşrutiyet’ as it is called), starts with the scarce material that is used in contemporary literature. Bernard Lewis stated in his book ‘The Emergence of Modern Turkey’ (2002: 213):

“The years 1908-18 are well documented, in both Turkish and foreign sources. From the time of the Revolution onwards, there was a flood of memoirs, reports, journalistic, diplomatic, and political accounts, &c., often containing important material. A few major and many minor Turkish figures of the time left memoirs, which have so far hardly been touched by Western scholarship.” It shows that most of the sources concerning that period of time are hardly touched upon. This has led to an incomplete picture of the Young Turks. One of these distorted images is that of the ‘dictatorial Young Turks’, as the young Dutch-Turkish Uğur Ümit Üngör (2007) called them in his book ‘Vervolging, Onteigening en Vernietiging: de deportatie van Ottomaanse Armeniërs tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog’. Üngör seems to be backed by the German-Turkish Taner Akçam (2006: 50), who accuses the Young Turks of anti-Christian sentiments:

“Hüseyin Cahit Yaçin, whose newspaper Tanin was considered the official Union organ […] continued to defend this thesis, on the assumption that the Christian communities had no aim other than to destroy the country.”

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This image of the Young Turks depicts a political movement that is keen on seizing power due to their dictatorial and racist thoughts. On the other hand, other scholars emphasize the modern and liberal aspects of the Young Turk ideology. For instance, the Turkish scholar Sina Aşkin (2007: 53) makes the following comparison:

“[…] the Second Meshrutiyet (the second period of constitutional monarchy) was the Turkish equivalent of the French Revolution, a period that catapulted the Turks into the modern age, and which greatly influenced subsequent Turkish history.” The comparison is made with regard to the Young Turks having an aim to restore civil rights for all civilians within the Osmanlı Empire, not only Turks or Muslims. These rights were restricted under the reigning sultan Abdülhamit the Second since 1878 (Zürcher, 1995). Another example could be that of the proclaimed “La Patrie, Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” by young officers of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Palmer, 1994: 201). Scholar Stanford J. Shaw (Shaw & Shaw, 2005: 273) states the following:

“[…] the politics, wars, personalities of the period have so diverted its scholars that, to the present time, almost nothing has been done to study the modernization that it brought in even the darkest days of war.” The Persian-American scholar Feroz Ahmad (1993) states that when the Young Turks were confronted with an ultimatum to give up the important Balkan city of Edirne, they launched a coup d’état. However, Feroz Ahmad (1993) afterwards concludes, that although the Young Turks intervened with a different intention than seizing power, the coup did result in them taking over. Although they had power, Zürcher (1995) states that the Young Turks did not abandon their liberal views. In doing so, they did not abuse their powers. Contemporary literature debates the question of the Young Turks being either fierce dictatorial oppressors of non-Turks, or modern liberals. It is, therefore, very unclear what the Young Turks really were: dictators or modern liberals? However, their efforts to stabilize the Osmanlı Empire, in a final attempt to save the Balkan provinces, are clear. During this chapter I will argue that far from the Young Turks being either modern liberals or dictatorial racists, they were mere pragmatic intellectuals keen on saving what they felt was theirs: the core provinces of the Osmanlı Empire. However, I will transcend this scholarly debate and argue that the Young Turks’ actions were a response to the imminent loss of the Osmanlı Balkans. Contemporary scholars have hardly researched the impact of this loss on the

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Young Turks and its consequences. Background of the Young Turk movement The Young Turks emerged in a period in which the Osmanlı Empire was in decline, and had been ever since the eighteenth century (İhsanoğlu, 2001). With the start of the reign of Abdülhamit the Second in 1876, ideas were flooding into the Osmanlı Empire; ideas like liberalism and nationalism evolved into political and social demands for reform - mostly by minorities that lived in the Balkans, which were the border areas of Western Europe and the Osmanlı Empire as well as the core of the Osmanlı elite. These political ideas were introduced from Europe, where they had first been encountered after the French Revolution of 1789. Strong pressures forced the new sultan Abdülhamit to create a constitution and a parliament, which seemed to take the pressure away from most of the political groups within the empire. Within months of his appointment as the sultan, Abdülhamit successfully reconstructed the political life of the Osmanlı Empire into a constitutional parliament (Yalçın et al., 2011). However, the first year proved disastrous for the new sultan: the Turko-Russian War of 1877-1878 (also known as ‘’93 Harbi’) resulted in the loss of some major Turkish lands and possessions in the Balkans, including regions where Turkish Muslims were a majority. The Russians advanced close to villages outside the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul, while other Russian troops gained some East-Anatolian regions such as Ardahan, Batum, Artvin and Kars. As a result, the Turkish defeat enabled Great Britain to seize Cyprus, while at the same time the Congress of Berlin enabled Austria-Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria to occupy Turkish lands as well. This great defeat caused Abdülhamit to dismiss parliament and abolish the constitution in 1878 by proclaiming martial law in order to stop further losses of Osmanlı lands (Beydilli, 2001). As these new political ideas first originated from Western Europe, or France to be precise, it was not very surprising to see that the strongest protests came from the European provinces of the Osmanlı Empire. After the defeat in the Turko-Russian War, and the subsequent dismissal of the parliament and abolition of the constitution, the European provinces again started to become uneasy (Morris, 2005). Being the regions that came in contact with the new political ideas, it was not very surprising to see the provinces being restless. This became more evident when the Turko-Russian War caused two-fifths of the entire territory of the Osmanlı Empire to be lost, and another one-fifth of its population to be lost as well. Almost half of the 5.5 million people were in fact Muslims (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). This caused some of the Balkan refugees to become further inspired by the new idea of nationalism; just as the non-Turkish and non-Muslim peoples of the Balkans were influenced by the same idea of nationalism some years prior. Subsequently, Abdülhamit tried to enforce a new idea of ‘Osmanlı-

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ism’ (or ‘Osmancılık’) that aimed at uniting the different religious and ethnic minorities around a powerful new Osmanlı state or government. Everybody should feel like an ‘Osmanlı’ first; their own cultural background should come second. Eventually, this caused both the Turks and the non-Turkish minorities within the Osmanlı Empire to unite against Abdülhamit. However, it must be said that ‘Osmanism’ was implemented some five hundred years after the various lands were added to the Osmanlı Empire. Before this process of nation building was established, referring to ‘Osmanism’, the people within the Osmanlı Empire were left culturally untouched. Therefore, the minorities within the boundaries were able to hold on to their cultural, as well as religious, identity for centuries. This is also why the minorities were still not assimilated and/or integrated within the dominant Turkish-Osmanlı culture. The minorities’ preservation of their own cultures made them more open to new ideas of nationalism. In contrast, all of the minorities on the Balkans had at least one thing in common: they were neither Muslim nor Turkish. Their Christian heritage made it appealing for them to focus on other Christian nations, i.e. Western Europe. This in turn caused enormous sympathy in Europe and support for the Christian peoples living in the Balkan regions (Pope & Pope, 2004). Another consequence was that the Turkish settlers and officers in the Balkan regions were among the most radical when it came to liberalism, patriotism and equal rights. This had everything to do with the fact that these young settlers had everything to lose, should the Osmanlı Empire collapse or lose all of its European provinces in the Balkan regions. Liberal and constitutional ideas merged with Osmanism (interpreted as patriotism) and the ideas spread rapidly, especially among the new generation of young military students and officers. These individuals quickly spread their ideas of liberty, Osmanlı patriotism, constitutionalism and freedom among other military students at different colleges and universities in the Balkan regions. Seeing that the Greek Rebellion of 1821-1832 and the Bulgarian Rebellion of 1876 resulted in an independent Greece and an independent Bulgaria, it is understandable that the Turkish people living in the Balkan regions were scared of losing more lands, and of course their lives. Justin McCarthy (1995) estimates that approximately one quarter of the Turks were either killed or driven out of Greece and Bulgaria, both Osmanlı provinces for five centuries until 1821 and 1876, respectively. These millions and millions of massacred Turks caused the remaining Turks to live in constant fear of their neighbours. Against this background, young military cadets of the Osmanlı Empire start to advocate the idea of equal rights for all Osmanlı citizens, in order to halt a further worsening in relations between the coexistence of Turks and nonTurks in the Balkans (Yavuz, 2009). The two universities of Mülkiye (for state servants) and Harbiye (for military students), in particular, became the centre of these ideas. The followers of these ideas all felt that the harsh and strict governance of Sultan Abdülhamit II was pushing minorities into a corner,

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Map 11: The Osmanlı Empire (1830-1922) with the cities Manastır, Edirne, Selanik and İstanbul

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Source: İlber Ortaylı (ed.), Tarih Atlası: İlk ve Ortaöğretim için (‘History Atlas: For Primary and Secondary Education’; İstanbul, 2004), p. 68.

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along with the Turkish majority (İhsanoğlu, 2002; Yalçın, 2010). They wanted him to bring back the constitution and end his reign of suppression; when the sultan heard about these ideas, they were subsequently forbidden. Seeing that his interpretation of Osmanism was not implemented in the way he wanted, he abandoned this ideology and ordered the arrest and exile of everybody who believed in either Osmanism and/or ideas of a liberal constitution. Although this resulted in a couple of silent years, it also led to the foundation of a secret society in 1889 by four students of the Military University of Medicine: ‘İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti’ (translated as ‘the Society of Osmanlı Unity’) (Kadıoğlu, 1999). This ‘İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti’ aimed to restore the constitution and parliament within the empire. It rapidly began to grow, and even started to organize events in the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul itself. The agents of Abdülhamit at times arrested many members and caused others to flee abroad (Kinzer, 2002). Because members of the society saw France as the country in which their ideas of equality and liberty originated, they eventually settled in France en masse. From France, these members started to publish newspapers and pamphlets in order to win the support of the local population in the Balkan provinces of the Osmanlı Empire. Eventually, Ahmet Rıza, the son of an important Osmanlı state servant, was forced to flee to France as well, and re-organized the group renaming them ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ in 1895. The Rise of the Young Turks Seeing their relatively young age, as well as their enthusiasm and modern views, the French started to call them ‘Les Jeunes Turcs’ (which meant ‘The Young Turks’ in English). Rıza and his followers adopted the name, but Turkified it to ‘Jön Türk’ or the plural ‘Jön Türkler’. In addition, some followers still used ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’. After a while, ‘Jön Türk’ and ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ became interchangeable terms. With the growing number of Young Turks in France, the İstanbul-based İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti eventually decided to merge with their counterparts abroad. Two other reasons were, it became increasingly difficult to organize activities in İstanbul, and most of the members of İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti were already abroad in France, leaving almost no members in İstanbul itself. From this point onwards, which would be the end of 1895 or the beginning of 1896, the name ‘İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti’ was no longer used and the names ‘Jön Türkler’ and ‘İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ became dominant (Zürcher, 1995). Sultan Abdülhamit, on the other hand, was enjoying some good times after he successfully defeated another Greek Uprising in 1897 and was able to restore order following an Armenian assault on the national bank of the Osmanlı Empire in 1896. This resulted in a short-lived economic boom within the Osmanlı Empire and a decrease in internal and external opposition. Abdülhamit immediately saw his opportunity and gladly offered the Young Turks a chance to come back to the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul. The ones that went back were

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appointed as diplomats at different Osmanlı ministries and embassies. The Young Turks that went to İstanbul soon became part of the governmental system and forgot about their ideals of reform. On the other hand, the Young Turks in France were weakened having lost much of their elite to the tempting offers of Abdülhamit (Beydilli, 2001). After 1902, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti had a period of relatively quiet times and used this period to grow stronger. Meanwhile, the young telegraph functionary, Mehmet Talat, who was banned from the Osmanlı city of Edirne to Selanik in 1896, started to gather other Young Turks in Selanik (Ünal, 1998). Both Edirne and Selanik were important cities within the Osmanlı Empire, as well as two of the biggest; both were situated in the Balkans. Edirne had even served as the capital from 1363 until 1453, prior to İstanbul becoming the capital in 1453, and still was regarded the second most important city of the empire. Selanik was a city with the second biggest harbour and port of the Osmanlı Empire, second only to İstanbul. Around the same time in 1906, a young army officer called Mustafa Kemal, who was born in Selanik, founded the ‘Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti’. Eventually, all of these groups merged with the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti in Paris during 1907, making the term ‘Young Turks’ once again a term specific for the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Robinson, 1963). However, the merger led to two very important developments for the Young Turks. For one, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti now had two official centres, one in Paris (for international contacts) and one in Selanik (to organize internal activities within the Osmanlı Empire). Secondly, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti now had a high number of influential members at the very core of the Osmanlı Empire; including high-ranking army officers. Most of these young army officers were stationed in the Balkans and witnessed the hostility between nationalist minorities and Osmanlı Turks at first hand. In particular, the port of Selanik rapidly became a more important centre for the Young Turks. Selanik was comparable to the nearby province of Manastır, and according to the memoirs of eyewitness Yakub Cemil (Yalçın, 2008), was inhabited by 260,000 Muslims (mostly Turks), 291,000 GreekOrthodox Christians (mainly Macedonians and/or Greeks), 188,000 BulgarianOrthodox Christians (mainly Bulgarians and/or Macedonians) and some 30,000 Serbian-Orthodox Christians (mostly Serbs and Ulah’s; a minority of Rumanian descent living in Macedonia, also known as ‘Vlachs’). Selanik was known for its almost 70,000 Jewish inhabitants, which probably comprised the majority of the population in Selanik (Mazower, 2007). In this multicultural city of Selanik, it was not surprising that the Young Turks started to put an emphasis on patriotism, liberalism, self-sufficiency, independence from foreign countries, secularism, democracy and equality for all Osmanlı citizens irrespective of race, nation and/or religion, in addition to their demands for a constitution and parliament. Another priority became the defence of the Osmanlı Empire against all of its enemies, losing more territory was not considered an option. This had

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two major explanations; most of the Young Turks were young state functionaries who were born, raised or currently resided in the European provinces. These European provinces were either the frontier or frontline areas, so the Young Turks were in danger of losing their home regions. Another reason was that most of these young state functionaries were army officers, eager to fight for their homelands and prove themselves in war. Two Young Turk army officers were especially important; Cemal was a junior officer in the army staff of the Second Army Corps, stationed in the Thracian region in the nearby the city of Edirne. The other, Enver, was a Major in the army staff of the Third Army Corps that was encamped in Manastır, just north of Selanik in present-day Macedonia. These two army officers began as military students with a strong sympathy for the Young Turks, but were now high-ranking officers with a strong influence in the two biggest armies of the Osmanlı Empire. Both Enver and Cemal recruited their soldiers into joining the Young Turks movement. This resulted in the European provinces of the Osmanlı Empire, especially the Balkans, to become bastions of Young Turks, especially among the military class. The Young Turk Revolution In 1908, the British King Edward VII and the Russian Tsar Nicolas II supported a small uprising of local Macedonians in the Osmanlı province of Macedonia (Price, 2008). The Third Army Corps of Enver was put to work and proved very efficient, crushing the Macedonian Revolt with relative ease. Although the Osmanlı’s suppressed the revolt, both the British and the Russians wanted to talk with Abdülhamit in June 1908. The two countries increased pressure on Abdülhamit and urged him to grant freedom to all non-Turkish peoples in the Balkan region, although in some areas Osmanlı Turks were a huge majority and in most areas both Turks and non-Turks comprised around half of the local population. Together with this pressure, the foreign forces also pressured Abdülhamit to act harshly against the Young Turks, which he had already done. The foreign intervention, pressure to permit non-Turkish peoples to form their own independent states, and the continuing persecution of Young Turks by Abdülhamit (which would have increased if the foreign forces had their way) prompted the Young Turks to threaten to march on İstanbul itself in July 1908. They subsequently took to the mountains and hills of Macedonia, where several local Macedonian bands joined them (Hanioğlu, 2008). Abdülhamit had lost control of his two European armies, respectively the Second and Third Army Corps, and in a desperate attempt rallied up his Anatolian troops to fight and crush them. Abdülhamit rallied his Anatolian troops with such a speed that these troops arrived in Macedonia before the Young Turks were on their way to İstanbul. However, when the Anatolian troops arrived in Macedonia, they soon defected to the Young Turks. This was probably caused by fear, most Anatolians would have noticed that they were badly equipped and not

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a match for the developed and experienced Second and Third Army Corps. The Second and Third Army Corps were known as the largest and strongest armies of the Osmanlı Empire, being stationed at the Osmanlı borders in Europe. There was relative peace in Anatolia and the Anatolian troops were not as experienced in warfare as the Young Turk soldiers of the Second and Third Army Corps. Another important reason would be that the Anatolians resented Abdülhamit for letting Osmanlı citizens fight each other, but did nothing against the foreign intervention of the British and Russians. A third important explanation could be that almost all of the Osmanlı citizens were tired of Abdülhamit and his oppressive ways. This is not to say that other factors did not play a role. Be that as it may, when Mehmet Talat saw that he had the overwhelming support of almost all of the army officers within the Osmanlı Empire, he soon sent a telegram to Abdülhamit demanding the restoration of the constitution and parliament. The demand was accompanied by Albanian demonstrations in support of the Young Turks (Hanioğlu, 2008). Seeing that he had no experienced troops left to defend him, Abdülhamit was forced to accept all of their demands. During the night of July 23th to July 24th 1908, Abdülhamit reinstalled the Osmanlı constitution and parliament. In return, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ensured Abdülhamit would maintain his title as the sultan of the Osmanlı Empire and caliph of the Muslim world. Almost immediately after the Young Turks ensured the constitution was to be reinstalled, they continued with numerous reforms in order to halt the further decay of the Osmanlı Empire (Shissler, 2003; Reisman, 2006). With most Balkan provinces lost during 1830 and 1878, reforms were seen as a way to save the remaining Balkan provinces. These reforms included abolishing censorship, which caused two leading newspapers in İstanbul to increase their approximately 12,000 and 15,000 copies, each day, to 40,000 and 60,000, respectively (Akşin, 2007; Mantran, 1989; Quataert, 2006). Young Turks also sent delegations to all major cities to explain to the people why there was a need for a constitution and parliament, along with the implementation of freedom for all: including the freedom of speech, press, to organize demonstrations and to form any association one desired (Zürcher, 1995). Consequently, women established their own movements and societies, while workers formed their own movements and subsequently organized strikes (Akşin, 2007). Most of the unions, or labour organizations, evolved in this period (Quataert, 2006). In the first free elections of 1908, the Young Turks ensured that all of the Osmanlı minorities were to take a place in the parliament. Consequently, the ethnic Turks who ran for election could only win just over half of the seats in parliament; the rest was reserved for non-Turkish and/or non-Muslim minorities (Zürcher, 1995). Even parties that were against the Young Turks, like the Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası (or the ‘Osmanlı Liberal Party’) were permitted to join the elections; the Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası even gained one seat in the Osmanlı parliament (Akşin, 2007).

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Image 1: A class in an Armenian Primary School, Istanbul, 1928 - 1929

Source: İbrahim Baştuğ (ed.), Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Eğitim: Mahalle Mektebinden İlkokula (‘Education in the Osmanlı and Republican Years: From Neighborhood School to Primary Education’; İstanbul, 2012), p. 43.

During the elections the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti “won a good number of seats, but the majority of them went to the independent deputies” (Akşin, 2007: 55). This had everything to do with the fact that the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti did not create a political party (McCarthy, 1997). According to Sina Akşin, the Young Turks “had come to a pre-election agreement with minority groups over the number of seats they were to hold, and minorities selected candidates who were then included”, in the candidate lists of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Akşin, 2007: 55). The Young Turks also took steps to ensure equal rights for Osmanlı minorities; just a few examples could be the following: Armenian newspapers were no longer censored, Armenian schools gained more freedom to teach students what they wanted, and the use of force during tax collection was restricted. These policies were continued in subsequent years, even in the Republic of Turkey well into the 1920s (see image 1). In 1909, the gendarmerie was reorganized by the French general Baumann to increase public order and safety in eastern Anatolia, while in 1912 a new law gave the people of a province the right to govern themselves (Davison, 1990). This was to ensure the support of the Osmanlı minorities to the Osmanlı Empire in response to the loss of most European and Balkan provinces.

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Image 2: A celebration card of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 from 1911

Source: Gazanfer İbar. Cumhuriyetten sonra da Meşrutiyet kutladık: Hürriyet İlanı İlk milli bayramımızdı. In: Atlas Tarih. Issue 13 (June-July 2012; İstanbul), pp. 70-71.

The Young Turk reforms seemed to be a success, “[…] mobs of Turks, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Armenians, and Europeans embraced in the streets” after the elections (Shaw & Shaw, 2005: 273). According to Zürcher (1995), Turks and Armenians commonly celebrated the constitutional revolution with banners that said ‘Freedom, Equality, Justice’ in İstanbul during July 1908. This would indicate that the Young Turks tried to prolong and save the Osmanlı Empire by giving all Osmanlı citizens equal rights, including minorities. This was also seen in the celebration cards that were printed in 1911 to celebrate the revolution of 1908; these cards were printed in five languages, notably (from right to left) Armenian, Greek, Osmanlı Turkish, French and Hebrew (see image 2). However, Osmanlı Turkish (Turkish written in Arabic alphabet with Persian grammar) and Greek were seen as the major languages. This is why the celebration cards had additional sentences in these two languages on the right and left side of the card in red letters. This depicted the Young Turks as defenders of minorities within the Osmanlı Empire. Some scholars, like Quataert (2006), agree that the Young Turks were nothing more than reformers, but argue that after 1913 a Young Turk military dictatorship took over. Therefore, the events leading up to 1913 need to be discussed, and especially what changed for the Young Turks. After the election of 1908, the Young Turks encountered a strong

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counter-revolution from Islamists in favour of Islamic law instead of a democratic constitution in 1909. Although the Young Turks were able to crush the counterrevolution within days, it brought some important changes to the way the Young Turks tried to implement their ideas. The first act after the counter-revolution of 1909, known as the ’31 Mart Vakası’, was to dethrone Abdülhamit and replace him by his younger half-brother Mehmet Reşat (also known as ‘Mehmet V’) who was 65 years old at that time. Consequently, Abdülhamit was sent into exile, ironically to the Young Turk bastion of Selanik. The new attitude of the Young Turks prompted them to confiscate Adülhamit’s huge fortune, restrict the royal budget, reduce the pay of high officials and discharge some civil servants (Akşin, 2007). Eventually, martial law was declared in İstanbul for three years. Since martial law was restricted to the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul, it can be considered as a method to restore order in the empire’s political centre (Akşin, 2007). At this point in 1909, the Young Turks became strongly secularist (Shaw & Shaw, 2005) in retaliation to the Islamist contra-revolution of 1909. This is why the communists (or socialists) of the Osmanlı Empire were permitted to found a political party without any problem. The ‘Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası’ was formed in İstanbul in 1910 and supported by the Armenian and Bulgarian minorities. The Young Turks did not perceive this as a threat to their own political ideas because they partially overlapped. The aim of both was to reform and modernize the empire in order to save the empire, no matter by whom or by what means. The Young Turks also put a lot of effort into changing the constitution after 1909. This first constitution was centred on equal rights for all Osmanlı citizens, but still with a bundle of privileges for the sultan. These were accordingly stripped, to form the new constitution of 1909 in which eighteen articles were altered; most notably, they abolished article 113 which stated that the sultan could declare a state of siege and temporarily suspend all the guarantees of the constitution whenever he considered it necessary, as well banish anyone whom he felt dangerous to himself and/or the state (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). The powers of the sultan and palace were severely reduced, effectively limiting the powers and influence of the sultan (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). The altered articles not only limited the rights of the sultan, but also gave more power to the elected parliament. For instance, article 29 was changed to make the ministers responsible to the parliament and not to the grand vizier. Article 30 was now stated that if ministers disagreed with parliament, the ministers had to resign and not the members of parliament (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). Article 80 was now changed to read that only the cabinet could determine how the revenues would be assessed and collected, rather than the sultan (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). The contra-revolution of 1909 in a way hastened the Young Turks to implement the reforms they wanted to realize, as their main motivation was to prevent any further loss of the Osmanlı Empire. The very core of the Osmanlı

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Empire, the Balkans, now lay at the border area. This would effectively mean that in case of more losses, the first lands to be lost, would be in fact the Balkans. Seeing that the Young Turks had their stronghold in the Balkans, it explains why they were so determined to retain these regions. This is also depicted in pamphlets of the early twentieth century that were printed and distributed by the Young Turks, in which the Balkans are named ‘Turquie’ (or ‘Turkey’ in French); Anatolia is simply referred to as ‘Asie Mineure’ (see image 3). It is also striking to see that the pamphlets are bilingual, both French and Osmanlı Turkish. This was not completely out of the blue, since the Young Turks had been in exile for many years in France and had adopted both the French concept of nationalism and the French language. However, the pamphlet shows that the Balkans was regarded as ‘Turkey’ (or ‘Turquie’) and Anatolia was simply seen as another province of the Osmanlı Empire.

Image 3: A pamphlet of the Osmanlı provinces from 1911

Source: Gazanfer İbar. Cumhuriyetten sonra da Meşrutiyet kutladık: Hürriyet İlanı İlk milli bayramımızdı. In: Atlas Tarih. Issue 13 (June-July 2012, İstanbul), p. 71.

A series of new articles meant that Osmanlı citizens were now free from search, seizure and/or imprisonment, so long as they did not violate the law, according to the newly adjusted article 10. Article 12 now said that all publications were to be free, without any censorship before publication. The

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altered article 119 emphasized that postal letters could not be opened or searched without the authorization of a court. Finally, the new article 120 read that while all citizens were free to organize themselves or found new societies, ones that aimed to harm the Osmanlı Empire were prohibited. Shaw puts it best when he states:

“As we have seen, the counterrevolution of April 1909 disrupted and scattered the CUP and its supporters, and it was the senior officer of the Macedonian army who restored the Parliament and deposed Abdulhamit to preserve order. This in turn inaugurated not a new period of CUP dominance but, rather, a mainly constitutional and democratic regime influenced from behind the scenes […]” (Shaw & Shaw, 2005: 282). Lord Kinross (2002: 583) states that although the ’31 Mart Vakası’ could in a way be described as a coup against the Young Turks, it would be wrong to state that the Young Turks took advantage of it, because they never abused their powers:

“The Committee of Union and Progress were now masters of the Empire, effectively backed by the authority of Shevket Pasha, the army commander. Having proclaimed a state of siege, which was to prevail, with martial law, for some two years to come, he ruled in effect as a military dictator. He exercised powers over all the armed forces, which overrode those of the Ministry and Cabinet, and in practice extended into the field of finance and economics. But he did not abuse these powers.” One could also add that since Şevket Paşa was never member of the Young Turks, his reign is not to be confused with that of the Young Turks. The Young Turks were not organized in a political party that made it impossible for them to seize power. There was no common factor between the various groups except their demand for a constitution and a parliament, which would, in their view, stop the Osmanlı Empire from disintegration and therefore save the Balkan provinces from being lost (Akşin, 2007). Faced with ensuing wars Although the Young Turks seemed to appease the minorities of the Osmanlı Empire with their reforms after 1909, the troubles nonetheless continued with a chain of revolts and wars. “The Armenian rebels united under Dashnaks launched a new wave of terrorism in eastern Anatolia and intensified their European propaganda campaign accusing the Osmanlı’s of massacre. And the Greek terrorists in Macedonia were equally active”, according to Shaw (Shaw & Shaw, 2005: 287). In 1910 the Albanian Revolt started, subsequently followed

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by the invasion of the Osmanlı province of Libya by Italian forces in 1911. The latter soon resulted in the Tripolitanian War of 1911, while the Albanian Revolt was still not suppressed by 1911. To concentrate on Libya, the government finally gave in to most of the demands by August 1911, but this did not prevent the Albanians from starting a new revolt in June 1912. The situation became more troublesome for the Osmanlı’s when the First Balkan War broke out on October 8, 1912, in which Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia united to fight against the Osmanlı. A quick peace treaty was signed with Italy on October 15, 1912, in which Libya was given to Italy, in order to concentrate the Osmanlı armies on the Balkans, which was considered much more important. The Albanian Revolt, which was sparked by the Italians, also stopped with the acceptance of the proposals put forth by the rebels by the Osmanlı government on September 4, 1912 (Shaw & Shaw, 2005).

Table 5: The Grand viziers of the Osmanlı Empire during the Young Turk era Grand viziers of the Osmanlı Empire during the Young Turk era Years

Name

Young Turk

15-01-1903 until 22-07-1908

Avlonyalı Mehmet Ferit Paşa

No

22-07-1908 until 06-08-1908

Küçük Mehmet Sait Paşa

No

05-08-1908 until 14-02-1909

Kıbrıslı Mehmet Kamil Paşa

No

14-02-1909 until 13-04-1909

Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa

Yes

13-04-1909 until 05-05-1909

Ahmet Tevfik Paşa

No

05-05-1909 until 28-12-1910

Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa

Yes

28-12-1910 until 12-01-1910

Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa in absence of the returning İbrahim Hakkı Paşa, who was underway from Rome

-

12-01-1910 until 30-09-1911

İbrahim Hakkı Paşa

No

30-09-1911 until 22-07-1912

Küçük Mehmet Sait Paşa

No

22-07-1912 until 29-10-1912

Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa

No

29-10-1912 until 23-01-1913

Kıbrıslı Mehmet Kamil Paşa

No

23-01-1913 until 11-06-1913

Mahmut Şevket Paşa

No

11-06-1913 until 03-02-1917

Sait Halim Paşa

Yes

03-02-1917 until 08-10-1918

Mehmet Talat Paşa

Yes

Source: Yılmaz Öztuna, Büyük Türkiye Tarihi (14 volumes; İstanbul, 1983).

The First Balkan War proved disastrous for the Osmanlı’s, losing almost all of their European provinces (Andonyan, 2002). When the important city of

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Edirne, which was the capital prior to İstanbul, was under siege the situation quickly worsened. Seeing that Selanik was lost on November 8, 1912, the Young Turks were afraid Edirne would soon be lost as well, but had hoped it would be regained; as when the Balkan War started, the Osmanlı army was unprepared. However, they felt the army was now ready to pursue the Bulgarian army that stretched over a large area. This opinion was not shared by the grand vizier Kamil Paşa, who was about to sign a peace treaty giving away all the European provinces of the empire, including Edirne. This city was, along with Selanik and Macedonia that were already lost, were the core of the Young Turk movement. When peace negotiations began in London on December 16, 1912, the British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey soon opted to let the Osmanlı’s retain some parts of eastern Thrace. Consequently, Edirne and all other European provinces would be lost, primarily to the Bulgarians (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). Seeing that grand vizier Kamil Paşa was inclined to accept these terms, the Young Turks made a radical decision. On January 23, 1913, the Young Turks staged a protest in front of the Osmanlı parliament building to stop Kamil Paşa and the parliament from accepting the terms. This soon resulted in an attack on parliament, which quickly sprung out of control leaving multiple dead and wounded. Among the dead were two parliamentary security guards, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti member Mustafa Necib, police commissioner Celal Bey, state secretary of the grand vizier Ohrili Nafız Bey, state secretary of the Ministry of War Kıbrıslı Tevfik Bey and the Minister of War Nazım Paşa himself (Yalçın, 2008). In addition to these seven casualties, there were nineteen wounded (Yalçın, 2008). The young army officer Yakub Cemil, also called ‘fedai’ or outlaw, shot and killed most of the victims. In particular, the death of Nazım Paşa was seen as unnecessary, for which Yakub Cemil was stripped from his military rank and dishonourably discharged from the military on February 3, 1913 (Yalçın, 2008: 144). Along with Yakub Cemil, five others were punished for their use of violence during the Bab-ı Ali Raid of January 23, 1913. This was especially due to the high-ranking Young Turk Cemal Paşa, who is stated to have said:

“From this moment on, I will not tolerate these kind of acts! We have taken the government in our hands now. We cannot go around killing men without any reason or legal order. I do not want this anymore!” Cemal Paşa’s outburst illustrates that the Young Turks wanted to focus on saving the empire rather than on anything else. Shaw (Shaw & Shaw, 2005: 295) summarized it as:

“The CUP, however, began to fear that Kâmil Paşa was going to give away the sacred city of Edirne to get peace. In January 1913,

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it organized the famous “Raid on the Sublime Porte.” Enver led an army band into the Porte building, burst into a cabinet meeting, and forced Kâmil Paşa to resign at gunpoint”. He also adds that this should certainly not be regarded as a coup. “That the CUP was acting mainly to save Edirne rather than to secure full power is indicated by its actions during the next few days”. These actions included the Young Turks offering the resignation papers of Kamil to the sultan and asking him to form a new cabinet. The Young Turks did not demand any position within this cabinet and when the sultan appointed the impartial Mahmut Şevket Paşa as grand vizier and Minister of War, none of the Young Turks protested. Their only consideration was to save the empire, and Edirne in particular. The experienced military officer Mahmut Şevket seemed a fitting person for the job; the fact that he was not a Young Turk was not seen as a major problem at this point. In the end, only three Young Turks were appointed within this cabinet (Shaw & Shaw, 2005). Other leaders of the Young Turks were ordered to stay away from politics (Zürcher, 1995). Nonetheless, some scholars accuse the Young Turks of a coup d’état and establishing a dictatorship (Üngör, 2007; Akçam, 2006). In reality, the Young Turks were pragmatists with the sole aim of saving the Balkans in general and Edirne specifically. Feroz Ahmad (1993: 38) states that, “[…] on 17 January the Turks were confronted with an ultimatum in the form of a Collective Note from the Great Powers. The Note requested the Porte to cede the town of Edirne, then under siege, to Bulgaria. In Istanbul, it was assumed that Kâmil Pasha, having lost the goodwill of his patrons in London, would surrender Edirne. This town, second capital of the Osmanlı Empire, had great historical and sentimental value for the Turks; the coup d’état of 23 January was launched to prevent that and Kâmil was forced to resign at gun point.” Afterwards the Young Turks did not abandon their liberal stance and in doing so, did not abuse their powers (Zürcher, 1995). The situation quickly worsened when Edirne fell in Bulgarian hands on April 26, 1913 and grand vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa was assassinated by unknown assailants on June 11, 1913. According to Zürcher (1995), the Young Turks responded to this major defeat by becoming vengeful and vindictive. 7 According to other scholars, the Young Turks responded to the trauma of having lost the very core of the Osmanlı Empire and their homelands by becoming even more pragmatic. The Young Turks took action where they thought it was necessary, regardless of any political movement. They cancelled all privileges of non-Turkish Muslim groups but did not hesitate to urge the sultan to appoint the Osmanlı of Egyptian-Arabic descent Sait Halim Paşa, as the succeeding

7  Zürcher (1995) mistakenly dates the assasination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa to June 15, 1913.

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grand vizier in order to retrieve Edirne (Hanioğlu, 2008; Ahmad, 1993). Although Sait spoke almost no Turkish, he recaptured Edirne on July 21, 1913. The ongoing war made the Young Turks more determined on creating loyalty by “[…] the launching of an aggressive centralization campaign, and the demand that all citizens place their Osmanlı identity above any other” (Hanioğlu, 2008). As a response to the loss of all major Balkan provinces, and the imminent threat of losing both Edirne (once again) and even İstanbul itself, the Young Turks carried out a policy of unity (Tunçel, 2000). The Young Turks became more dominant after the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa and, especially, after Edirne was lost, the Young Turks became more preoccupied with taking steps that could undo the damage. This resulted in Young Turk member Sait Halim Paşa becoming grand vizier and the appointment of four other members of the movement to key cabinet positions. Although this still meant there was a strong minority of Young Turks within parliament, their influence increased rapidly. Among the rising Young Turks, was the earlier mentioned Talat Paşa, who was now one of the leaders of the Young Turks. A European observer from 1931 stated about Talat that he was “a man of swift and penetrating intelligence, forceful when necessary but never fanatical or vengeful - ‘The Danton of the Turkish Revolution’” (Lewis, 1961: 226; Østrup, 1931; Shaw & Shaw, 2005). The recapture of Edirne during the Second Balkan War in 1913 made most Osmanlı citizens accept the Young Turks, as they believed they could stop the decline of the Osmanlı Empire (Uyar & Erickson, 2009). When, just a few months later, the First World War broke out in 1914, the Young Turks acted quickly to focus on Anatolia since the Balkans seemed lost for now. When major victories were achieved in Anatolia, for instance in the Battle of the Dardanelles in 1915, it caused the Young Turks to consider Anatolia the centre of the Empire. After all, the all-important Balkans was already lost. The Battle of the Dardanelles was seen as especially surprising, as badly equipped Turks from Anatolia managed to defeat the British and French armies at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in 1915 (Erickson, 2007). During this battle, some half a million soldiers were killed, and it sparked a belief that these men died fighting for the ‘real’ homeland of the Osmanlı Empire. It was the start of a completely new military focus on Anatolia, i.e. on the basis of military glorification, which was basically the same reason why the Balkans had been neglected: military humiliation. Coup or not? So, we have now shown that the actions of the Young Turks can hardly be described as a ‘coup’. They did, however, intervene for short periods of time in politics, though this is not the legal way to get things done. The last period that is sometimes defined as giving a new beginning is when the Young Turks organized a coup after the assassination of grand vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa. After the İkinci Meşrutiyet (July 24, 1908), 31 Mart Vakası (April 13, 1909) and

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the Bab-ı Ali Baskını (January 23, 1913), the date of the assassination of Şevket (June 11, 1913) is also used by some historians as a new beginning. Zürcher claims that the Young Turks became dictatorial after the assassination of the grand vizier, which he mistakenly dates to June 15, 1913 (Zürcher, 1995: 134). It is quite strange that some historians agree on the fact that the Young Turks were nationalists and military dictators, but consequently cannot agree on the period. This is mainly because the Young Turks started out as a very liberal and modern movement, showing no signs of nationalism or military dictatorship. When more and more wars broke out, they became more pragmatic in order to save their empire. This is wrongly perceived as nationalism or military dictatorship. In each period, the Young Turks have taken decisions that have been hard to categorize; were these decisions taken because they wanted to Turkify the state, or was it a desperate attempt to preserve the nation? At one point, the Young Turks cancelled all privileges of non-Turkish Muslim groups (Hanioğlu, 2008: 166). By some, this is perceived as a nationalist decision but when looks at the situation within the Osmanlı, it is clear that the succeeding grand vizier Sait Halim Paşa is of Egypt-Arab descent and does not even speak Turkish that well (Ahmad, 1993: 38). So, can we still depict their decisions as “anti-Arab”, “anti-Christian” or “Turkish nationalism”? The answer is no. The Young Turks took action where they thought it was necessary, regardless of any political movement. When they felt non-Turkish Muslims had previously received too many privileges, and this endangered the equality of all Osmanlı citizens, they abolished them to create unity for all. When they subsequently felt that an Egyptian Arab was more qualified to take on the position of grand vizier (equivalent to prime minister) they did not hesitate, and urged the sultan to appoint him. This small but rather important example is significant because it undermines the thesis that is assessed by Akçam (2006) and Üngör (2007). Akçam, for example, states that in their nationalistic views the Young Turks wanted to get rid of all “non-Turkish elements of Anatolia” (Akçam, 2006: 87). However, this would not explain why the grand vizier was not Turkish and why he was brought to Anatolia from abroad, adding more non-Turkish elements to Anatolia. The same could be said concerning the Kurds in Anatolia, why were they never targeted? The answer lies in the fact that the Young Turks acted only against those who presented a threat to the existence of the Osmanlı, regardless that these groups were Armenian, Turkish, Kurdish and/or Muslim. Another example could be that of Üngör, who wrote in his book that the Young Turks started their process of “Turkification by changing non-Turkish geographical names into Turkish” (Üngör, 2007: 53). This can be easily countered by the writings of Şükrü Hanioğlu (2008: 166) from Princeton University: “[…] the launching of an aggressive centralization campaign, and the demand that all citizens place their Osmanlı identity above any other”. The Young Turks were carrying out a policy of unity, which they thought could be formed by creating a uniform language for all. This language was

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in no way strictly Turkish, like Üngör has portrayed; nor were non-Turkish geographical names the only target. For one, the name of the parliament building was still the Osmanlı version of the Arabic-originated word ‘Bâb-ı Âli’, and not the Turkish ‘Yüce Kapı’. Secondly, some Turkish geographical names were changed as well. This had nothing to do with the process of ‘Turkification’ or nationalism but with creating unity and uniformity through having one form of names applicable to all. For example, the Armenian village name ‘Vak’if’ is changed to ‘Vakıflı’ in order that all Osmanlı citizens could correctly pronounce it. According to the research of Harun Tuncel, other reasons were primarily: the confusion when two villages had the exact same name, as well as names that were seen as unacceptable (for instance: ‘Stupid Village’ or ‘Whore Village’). The latter two included changing Turkish names, so the example Üngör gives is not confined to non-Turkish geographical names (Tunçel, 2000). Another important point is that Üngör writes that, “all Armenian, Greek and Bulgarian names of provinces, districts, cities, towns, villages, mountains and rivers were erased from history” (Üngör, 2007: 53). This is a very strong statement, especially when we look at the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul that was officially still called ‘Konstantiniyye’ (derived from the Greek word ‘Constantinopolis’) in government documents until 1930 and/or ‘İstanbul’ (derived from the Greek word ‘Eistenpolin’, meaning ‘to the city’) among its residents (Lewis, 1992: 7). Since Üngör states that “all” names were altered, this one example is enough to refute his thesis. He is, as in most of his theses, appearing much too forceful to prove his point, and in doing so diminishes the impact of his own research results, as well as his credibility as a scholar. Summary and conclusion In the previous chapter, it has become obvious that the Balkans have a historical importance to the Turks. Nevertheless, it was lost for the Turks in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a response, a distinctive political movement emerged: the Young Turks. With this new political movement, the Young Turks desperately tried to save the Osmanlı Empire, and thus the provinces in the Balkans. As the military defeat of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) shattered their dreams, the Balkans were conquered with relative ease by the rebellious minorities of the Osmanlı Empire. An attempt to rescue at least Edirne from enemy hands proved so difficult that no other attempt to rescue other cities beyond Edirne was made. The Balkans became intermingled with disaster and major defeat. This military humiliation of the once mighty Osmanlı Empire, which could not even defend or fight off mere rebels in order to save its richest and oldest European provinces, caused the Turks to downplay the importance of the region. As a response, the Young Turks focused on a completely new geographical area. When Anatolia became the stage of a major victory during the First World War military humiliation in the Balkans could be erased, and the Young Turks could suddenly focus on the ‘glorious victory’ in Anatolia. Overnight

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this became the empire’s new centre. The Young Turks’ motivations lay, not in a fanatical Turkish nationalism like Akçam and Üngör claim, but in a desperate attempt to save the remains of the Osmanlı Empire. This is especially evident when one looks at the above mentioned Mehmet Talat Paşa, who became one of the Young Turks leaders after 1913. European observers stated that Talat was never fanatical or vengeful in his actions. This picture depicts the Young Turks for what they really were: not fanatic nationalists or military dictators but desperate pragmatics, keen on saving what they felt was theirs: their Balkan homelands that were also the core of the Osmanlı Empire. The actions of the Young Turks are so diverse that they can be seen as both dictatorial and liberal, which is a direct consequence of the fact that the Young Turks acted not upon a political thought or ideology but on pragmatic grounds to save the Balkans. When the Balkans was lost after 1913, the Young Turks responded by tightening the grip on the Osmanlı provinces that were still part of the empire. Every political decision the Young Turks took was a direct consequence of the situation in the Balkans. Prior to the Balkan Wars, they tried to unify all ethnic communities within the Osmanlı Empire. When the Balkan Wars were lost, and even Edirne was about to be occupied by Bulgarian rebel soldiers, they subsequently became more focused on regaining the city and not so much on the reforms that would unify all the minorities. During the following years, measures were taken to ensure that the approaching First World War would not destroy the Osmanlı Empire. Unification and a strong centralized government were prioritized, after which, one major victory in Anatolia gave hope to the Young Turk regime. Eventually, they built on this military victory in Anatolia and simply chose to ignore the disastrous military campaigns in the Balkans. The despair brought about by the defeat in the Balkans was exchanged for great military pride for their victory in Anatolia.

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Works cited in chapter four Ahmad, F. (1993). The Making of Modern Turkey . London: Routledge. Akbıyık, Y., see: Yalçin. Akbulut, D.A., see: Yalçin. Akçam, T. (2006). A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the question of Turkish responsibility . New York: Metropolitan. Akşin, S. (2007). Turkey, From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present . New York: New York University Press. Andonyan, A. (1913/2002). Balkan Savaşı . İstanbul: Aras. Avcı, C., see: Yalçin. Balcıoğlu, M., see: Yalçin. Baştuğ, İ. (ed. 2012). Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Eğitim: Mahalle Mektebinden İlkokula . İstanbul: Atlas Tarih. Beydilli, K. (2001). From Küçük Kaynarca to the Collapse. In E. İhsanoğlu (ed.). History of the Ottoman State, Society & Civilisation, volume 1/2 (pp. 63-131). İstanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA). Bozkurt, G., see: Yalçin. Davison, R. H. (1990). The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914. In R.H. Davison (ed.). Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West . Texas: University of Texas Press. Eraslan, C., see: Yalçin. Erickson, E. J. (2007). Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I . New York: Routledge. Hanioğlu, M. Ş. (2008). A brief history of the Late Ottoman Empire . Princeton: Prince University Press.

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İbar, G. (2012). Cumhuriyetten sonra da Meşrutiyet kutladık: Hürriyet İlanı İlk milli bayramımızdı. Atlas Tarih . Issue 13 (June-July 2012), pp. 66-73. İhsanoğlu, E. (ed. 2001). History of the Ottoman State, Society & Civilisation, volume 1/2 . İstanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA). İhsanoğlu, E. (ed. 2002). History of the Ottoman State, Society & Civilisation, volume 2/2 . İstanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA). Kadıoğlu, A. (1999). Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi . İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. Kinross, L. (2002). The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire . New York: Perennial. Kinzer, S. (2002). Crescent & Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds . New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Köstüklü, N., see: Yalçin. Lewis, B. (1961/2002). The Emergence of Modern Turkey (third edition) . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, B. (1992). İstanbul en de wereld van het Ottomaanse Rijk. Amsterdam: Bulaaq. Mantran, R. (1989). Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman . Paris: Fayard. Mazower, M. (2007). Thessaloniki: Stad van geesten 1430-1950 . Amsterdam: Olympus. McCarthy, J. (1995). Death and Exile: the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 . Princeton: The Darwin Press. McCarthy, J. (1997). The Ottoman Turks: an introductory history to 1923 . New York: Longman. Morris, C. (2005). The New Turkey: The Quit Revolution on the Edge of Europe . London: Granta Books. Ortaylı, İ. (ed. 2004). Tarih Atlası: İlk ve Ortaöğretim için . İstanbul: Atlas.

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Østrup, J. (1931). Det Nye Tyrki . Kopenhagen: Udvalget for folkeoplysnings fremme, i kommission hos G.E.C. Gad. Özkaya, Y., see: Yalçin. Öztuna, Y. (1983). Büyük Türkiye Tarihi (14 volumes). İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi. Palmer, A. (1994). The Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire . New York: Barnes & Noble. Pope, N. & Pope, H. (2004). Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey . New York: The Overlook Press. Price, C. (2008). Türkiye’nin Yeniden Doğuşu . İstanbul: İkarus. Quataert, D. (2006). The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, 2nd edition . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reisman, A. (2006). Turkey’s Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk’s Vision . Washington: New Academia Publishing. Robinson, R. D. (1963). The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development . Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Shaw, S. J. & Shaw, E. K. (2005). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey; volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (digital reprint). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shissler, A. H. (2003). Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the new Turkey . New York: I.B. Tauris. Süslü, N., see: Yalçin. Tokgöz, E., see: Yalçin. Tunçel, H. (2000). Türkiye’de İsmi Değiştirilen Köyler. Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi . Volume: 10, Issue: 2, pp. 23-34. Tural, M.A., see: Yalçin. Turan, R., see: Yalçin. Uyar, M. & Erickson, E. J. (2009). A Military History of the Ottomans: From

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Osman to Atatürk . California: Praeger Security International. Ünal, T. (1998). Türk Siyasi Tarihi . İstanbul: Kamer. Üngör, U. Ü. (2007). Vervolging, Onteigening en Vernietiging: de deportatie van Ottomaanse Armeniërs tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog . Soesterberg: Aspekt. Üngör, U. Ü. (2011). The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950 . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yalçın, D., Akbıyık, Y., Akbulut, D.A., Balcıoğlu, M., Köstüklü, N., Süslü, A., Turan, R., Eraslan, C. & Tural, M.A. (2011). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi I . Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi. Yalçın, D., Akbıyık, Y., Özkaya, Y., Bozkurt, G., Akbulut, D.A., Tokgöz, E., Turan, R., Köstüklü, N., Balcıoğlu, M., Tural, M.A., Eraslan, C. & Avcı, C. (2010). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi II . Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi. Yalçın, S. (2008). Teşkilat’ın İki Silahşoru . İstanbul: Doğan Kitap. Yavuz, M. H. (2009). Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zürcher, E. J. (1995). Geschiedenis van het moderne Turkije . Nijmegen: Sun.

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Chapter 5: Historiographical neglect and its impact A case study surrounding the Armenian issue in Turkish history “I have criticised many more Armenians than Turks in this review, mostly because the Armenians, being the more injured party, and more conscious of their injury, write a great deal more about it.” Dr. Gwynne Dyer (1976)

Introduction Defeat in the Balkan Wars led to the loss the core provinces of the Osmanlı Empire, of which the Balkans was the most rich and fertile. The Balkans was regarded as the centre of the Osmanlı Empire; even in 1906 a quarter of the total population lived in the Balkans (Morris, 2005). The loss of the most heavily populated parts of the empire resulted in a massive migration of Osmanlı citizens who were banished from the Balkans by the newly independent states, although they had lived there for over five hundred years (McCarthy, 1995). This trauma of forced exile of Osmanlı citizens was caused by a military humiliation; most of the exiles were either Muslim or Turkish or both. To cope with this military humiliation, the geographic focus was put on a region where Osmanlı forces had achieved military glory. This was Anatolia, where staggering victories at the Battle of Gallipoli during the War of the Dardanelles (or ‘Çanakkale Savaşı’ in Turkish) in 1915, were followed by victories during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922); all of them in the geographic region of Anatolia. This military glorification of geography soon became the main emphasis of Turkish nation-building, but it had an important impact on Anatolia. Besides the military victories, the region of Anatolia also had a traumatic experience for the Osmanlı’s in 1915 that was similar to the trauma in the Balkans. When Christian minorities in the Balkans sparked a massive uprising against the Osmanlı Turks, Anatolian Christians also started a rebellion. The later is now known as the ‘Armenian Rebellion’ and causes friction between Armenians and Turks today (McCarthy, Arslan, Taşkıran & Turan, 2006). In this chapter I will argue that in the face of Turkish nation-building, the traumatic experience of the Armenian rebellion was neglected in Turkish historiography due to an attempt to avoid any memories of these traumas. In a similar effect, the trauma of the Balkan Wars was also left out in the process of Turkish nation-building. At the same, this neglect has resulted in a onesided historiography in which Turkish historiography is silent, but Armenian historiography sweeps the world by storm. This effectively shows the impact of attempting to neglect certain aspects of history, as it will cause a distorted image of those traumatic historical events. Please note, this chapter is not

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written to take a stance on this highly disputed subject. Review of literature When speaking of Armenian-Turkish relations, one cannot ignore the burning question of the events in the late Osmanlı period. Along with the controversy, it also has a long background of literature that has tried to describe the events from 1895 to 1917. To understand these events one must first look at the literature, and categorize it accordingly. There are more than 26,000 publications concerning events in the First World War between Armenians and Osmanlı Turks, almost all are seen as “proArmenian” or “pro-Turkish” by critics (Aktan, 2009). Due to an initial silence by Turkey, the discussion is mainly between Armenian and western scholars. The controversy has led to a major interdisciplinary discussion by scholars with a background in History, Political Science, International Relations and Sociology etc. Many believe the question of genocide to be a pure juridical debate and agree it should be answered in the context of international law (Van Der Linde, 2011). Others choose to place themselves in the wrong arena, namely outside the academic world and inside the disturbing world of propaganda and lobbying. The literature surrounding the Armenian events of 1915 is intense, but in Turkish literature there is a gap from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 until 1950. It is in 1950 that the first Turkish publication on the Armenians is published. Author Esat Uras, being fluent in Armenian, wrote his extensive book ‘Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi’ in 1950, but this is accompanied by another silence up until the 1980s. By that time an Armenian terrorist group had begun assassinating Turkish ambassadors abroad in a desperate attempt to shed light on the long neglected history of the Armenians and Osmanlı Turks. At the same time, the absence of Turkish literature and the enormous presence of Armenian literature has built up a historiography in which there is more research conducted about the Armenian casualties and victims of 1915, than the casualties and victims of the Osmanlı-Turkish side. According to Justin McCarthy (1995), there were in fact more victims on the side of the latter. It even caused one scholar to conclude that “this is the most peculiar genocide ever, one where more perpetuators than victims perished” (Reedijk, 1986: 62). The neglect in Turkish historiography is noticed by some scholars who conclude that “[m]odern textbooks make no mention of the fact that the Armenians had a distinct national identity in parts of eastern Turkey for more than two millennia, a single script in use for fifteen centuries and a brilliant medieval religious art of carved reliefs upon stone churches” (Pope & Pope, 2004: 40). This neglect is in fact present in Turkish history textbooks and has only recently started to change (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010).

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Absence in Turkish historiography With this neglect in Turkish historiography in mind, the scholars that have occupied themselves with the Armenian-Turkish events in the late Osmanlı period (and published their research findings as books, essays and/or papers) are seen to be mostly uninformed about the Osmanlı-Turkish version of the story, as it was covered in silence for decades. With the absence of Turkish historiography, scholars have tried to find conclusive answers surrounding the Armenians and Osmanlı Turks within the sources that were available to them. It resulted in scholars whose arguments are roughly organized in a couple of major categories. The first category of scholars affirms the Armenian claims that the events in 1915-1917 were in fact genocide. The second group of scholars affirm the Turkish claims that the events in 1915-1917 were in fact a by-product of war and that both sides suffered, but add to this that there was no systematic, organized scheme by the Turkish government to annihilate the Osmanlı-Armenian population in Anatolia. With the new approach of Turkey, no longer neglecting the events, more subcategories of scholars have emerged. Some scholars are now reluctant to use the term ‘genocide’, due to the political meaning that has been added to the, from origin juridical, term. However, these scholars do believe that ethnic cleansing (which is close to the term ‘genocide’) by the Turks dominated the events. In the views of these scholars, the relocations of the Armenians were used as a cloak to ‘solve’ the problem of un-loyal Armenians in the Osmanlı Empire. Some of these scholars continue to debate to what extent Osmanlı officers (high-ranking and sub officers), were involved in the massacres that occurred. However, the new approach of Turkey has also caused some scholars to avoid using the term ‘genocide’. There are, roughly, two major reasons why these scholars are unwilling to use the term ‘genocide’. One part thinks it is not applicable to the events in the late Osmanlı period, because of the fact that the Osmanlı archives show that most middle- and high-ranking Osmanlı statesmen and/or officers were critical of the execution of the relocations. Most scholars in this category see a bigger role for the Hamidiye irregulars that were recruited from Kurdish horsemen, which adds a new trans-ethnic problem to the events. In addition, some scholars also exclude the term ‘genocide’ because the term was not in effect until the UN Genocide Convention of 1948, so it is legally not accurate to apply the term to the period prior to the Second World War. But nevertheless, according to these scholars, even if it was possible to use the term it would not be correct due the fact that there are no documents in the archives that imply it was an act of state driven, systematic, organized extermination of an ethnicity whatsoever. Without access to Turkish historiography prior to 1980, the older scholars have painted a subjective version of historiography. Later scholars, that began their research after 1980, have been critical of the former in later years; Vahakn N. Dadrian (born 1926) from the Armenian Zoryan Institute was heavily

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criticized by Mary Schaeffer Conroy of Colorado University. Conroy stated in her ‘Review of Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of TurkoArmenian Conflict’, that “while it suggests convincing theories for Turkish massacres of Armenians, it does not convincingly document these theories. It is thus unsatisfying as a whole. This book is more a work of journalism than solid history and is not recommended” (Conroy, 2000: 483). Dadrian (along with Peter Balakian, Arman J. KIraqosian and Richard G. Hovannisian) all seem to fit perfectly in the first category. All have endured some serious critique, for example, from Guenter Lewy in his renowned ‘The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide’. This book was received very positively by, among others, the Dutch historian Eelko Y. Hooijmaaijers (2007), who seems to agree with his colleague Lewy. Lewy states that the Andonian Papers have “raised enough questions about their genuineness as to make any of them in a serious scholarly work unacceptable” (Lewy, 2005: 73). The Andonian Papers were said to have been given, or sold, to the Armenian Andonian, who then took them to Europe. These papers are only used by scholars in the first category, especially Dadrian. According to these scholars, the papers are the ‘indefinite proof’ that the Osmanlı Empire was planning a systematic elimination of the Armenians. However, more data is being contested as Turkey opens up. Maybe one of the first scholars who decided to verify the Osmanlı population figures in the French archives was Stanford J. Shaw. It was in fact French diplomats who conducted the last pre-war population census within the Osmanlı Empire in 1914, and due to the dragoman 8 culture of Osmanlı Armenians, this Christian minority assisted the French. Being called the ‘Sadık Millet’, or ‘the most loyal people’, the Osmanlı Armenians also gained high positions within the Osmanlı government. This had everything to do with the Janissary history of the Osmanlı Turks. Janissaries were Christian children that were collected with the devşirme-system through an Islamic tax. The most intelligent children were then trained in battle skills (to form an elite Janissary Corps), music skills (to form the Military Mehter Bands), engineering skills (like the famous, most likely Armenian, Osmanlı architect Mimar Sinan) or an education in languages and diplomatic skills. The latter is one of the reasons why the Osmanlı Empire had 29 paşa’s (highest commander-in-chief), 22 ministers (including a minister of Foreign Affairs and a minister of Interior), 33 members of parliament, 7 ambassadors and 11 consuls (diplomats) of Armenian descent. Until recently, this was not public information in Turkey. So, it should not raise eyebrows to the fact that in 1912 the Osmanlı Minister of Interior was in fact an Osmanlı

8  Dragomans were translators and merchants. Because banking and trade were seen as something ‘anti-islamic’, most of these professions were performed by the Osmanlı Jews and Osmanlı Armenians.

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of Armenian descent called Gabriel Noradunkyan (or Noradoungian) (Öztuna, 2002). What Shaw stated after his intensive research in the French archives is still of importance today. In his two-volume book ‘History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey’, he stated that:

“The Entente propaganda mills and Armenian nationalists claimed that over a million Armenians were massacred during the war. But this was based on the assumption that the prewar Armenian population numbered about 2.5 million. The total number of Armenians in the empire before the war in fact came to at most 1,300,000 according to the Ottoman census. About half of these were resident in the affected areas, but, with the city dwellers allowed to remain, the number actually transported came to no more than 400,000, including some terrorists and agitators from the cities rounded up soon after the war began. In addition, approximately one-half million Armenians subsequently fled into the Caucasus and elsewhere during the remainder of the war. Since about 100,000 Armenians lived in the empire afterward, and about 150,000 to 200,000 immigrated to western Europe and the United States, one can assume that about 200,000 perished as a result not only of the transportation but also of the same conditions famine, disease and war action that carried away some 2 million Muslims at the same time” (Shaw & Shaw, 1977: 315-317). These figures are backed by most scholars, such as the French scholars Youssef Courbage and Robert Mantran. Mantran of the Aix-Marseille University of France explains the events in the lines of Shaw; he states the following:

“On the Eastern front, an expedition led by Enver finished as a serious defeat (December 1914); the Russian offensive which follows is supported by the local Armenian population; during the Winter and the Spring, exactions are committed against the Turkish inhabitants, and an Armenian State is even proclaimed (May 1915); because the threat of extension of the Armenian secession, the Ottoman government orders in May 1915 the evacuation of the Armenian populations from Van, Bitlis, Erzurum to Iraq, and from Cilicia and Northern Syria to central Syria. Legal guarantees are given to Armenians about the right to return to their homes, and about their goods, but these guarantees have not been respected by some military; in July 1915, the reconquest of the lost lands by Ottoman Army is accompanied by revenge violence: the evacuation and the regaining control provoked the death of several thousands

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of Armenians” (Mantran, 1952: 108-109). Just like Shaw, Mantran speaks of “several thousands of deaths”, which is contrary to the work of Dadrian. The scholars of the second category seem to have serious criticism with the scholars of the first category, and with Dadrian in particular. This is not just limited to scholars from the second category. Edward J. Erickson thinks Dadrian has made high-profile claims that Major Stange and the Special Organization were the instruments of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Documents not utilized by Dadrian, though, discount such an allegation, adding to it: “Clearly, many Armenians died during World War I. But accusations of genocide demand authentic proof of an official policy of ethnic extermination” (Erickson, 2006: 74). Debates and disputes among historians Erik Jan Zürcher of the International Institute of Social History in the Netherlands states that “we have to conclude that even if the Ottoman government [original emphasis] as such was not involved in genocide, an inner circle within the Committee of Union and Progress under the direction of Talat wanted to ‘solve’ the Eastern Question by the extermination of the Armenians and that it used the relocation as a cloak for this policy” (Zürcher, 2004: 127). Zürcher is contested by scholars, like Yunus Özger and Bernard Lewis, who think the events are not compatible to the term ‘genocide’ due to the facts that: - The Osmanlı government reacted to the Armenian Rebellion at Van in 1915; and the Armenian uprisings that took place as early as 1895 in Bayburt (Özger, 2007). - The Osmanlı Turks had no racial theory like that of the Nazis, nor did they have intent to ‘wipe out’ the Osmanlı Armenians (Lewis, 1998). - Probably more Osmanlı Turks were killed in that period, than Osmanlı Armenians (Sachar, 1969: 453). With recent Turkish historiography to back them up, some scholars add to these arguments, thus expanding the problem (and complicating the matter even more) by showing documents from the Osmanlı archives in which there are inconsistencies in the relocation of the Armenians. This shows there was no central plan, or any single policy, to which the officers should comply (Fargues & Courbage, 1998). The inconsistencies were that in some places the families were given 24 hours notice, in others, several days before the relocations began. In some places they were allowed to sell their possessions, in others, these were taken into custody by the local authorities. In some places carts and donkeys were allowed, in others, everyone had to go on foot. Most Armenians

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were free to travel by train or ship, but only if they could afford it; so the wealthy Armenians were allowed to travel south to Syria by train or ship, but for the impoverished masses, it was columns marching over the mountains in the dead of winter (Dyer, 2009). The documents also dispute that direct orders were given to these high-ranking officers. Most scholars, including Dutchmen Zürcher and Boekestijn, do not dispute these findings in the Osmanlı archives but see them as inconclusive. For example, Zürcher (2004), as well as Arend Jan Boekestijn, agrees with the argument that the Osmanlı Turks had no racial theory like the Nazis. Boekestijn (2005) even adds that the Armenian side claims the Osmanlı government, at the highest level, had the intention to kill Armenians, but so far no such proof was found in the Osmanlı archives.

Victims of both sides The other big controversy is the number of casualties on both sides; as Paul Dumont of the Marc-Bloch University in Strasbourg said in his 1989 article ‘The Death of an Empire (1908-1923)’: “However, it is important to underline that the Armenian communities are not the only ones to have been ground down by the plague of the war. In the spring of 1915, the tsarist army moved to the region of the lake of Van, dragging behind it battalions of volunteers composed of Caucasus and Turkish Armenians. […] For each of the provinces which suffered from the Russian occupation and from the Armenian militias’ acts of vengeance, an important demographic deficit appears in the statistics of the post-war years — adding up to several hundred thousands of souls” (Dumont, 1989: 624-625). The high rate of casualties on both sides is also recorded in Malcolm Yapp’s findings. According to Yapp, the “Armenians were deported en masse from the eastern provinces and many (probably between a quarter and a half million) died, either from starvation and hardship or from massacre mainly at the hands of Kurdish tribesmen. No direct documentary evidence has ever come to light to show that the Armenian massacres of 1915 were the deliberate policy of the Ottoman government […]” (Yapp, 1987: 269-270). The quarter and a half million of Armenians that are put forward by Yapp, are a lot lower than the estimated numbers of Zürcher (600,000 – 800,000) but near to what other scholars, like Veinstein, say. Veinstein (1995) also points out that “there were also very many victims among the Moslems throughout the war, because of combat but also of actions conducted against them by Armenians, in a context of ethnic and national rivalry. If there are forgotten victims, it is they, and the Turks of today have the right to denounce the partiality

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of the Western opinion in this respect. Were they forgotten about because they were only Moslems?” Scholars that conducted research in recent times have seen a glimpse of Turkish historiography where the former scholars were mostly in the dark. Yapp, Veinstein and McCarthy, and others (like Paul Henze and Jeremy Salt) try to point out the following: - So far, no proof that the government was involved in an organized system of annihilation of a particular ethnic group, be it Armenian, Assyrian or Pontic Greek, has been found. The relocations were also not designed to ‘get rid’ of the Christian minority in the Osmanlı Empire, since Catholic and Protestant Armenians were not subdued to the relocations (Lewis, 2002; Pope & Wheal, 1996). Nor were they an attempt to destroy the ethnic Armenian population, since not all Armenians were relocated. Along with Protestants and Catholics, Armenians living in Western Anatolia, were also exempted from relocation. On the other hand, Assyrians, Arabs, Kurds and even Turks (both Christian and Muslim) were relocated as well, if they caused any skirmish or stirred up trouble. The ‘Tehcir Law’ was a century-old law that was fairly common in the Osmanlı Empire; it was only put to use when internal uprisings evolved into a general rebellion. One of the first known cases was that of the Turkish (and Muslim) tribe of Karamanoğulları, who were relocated from the province of Karaman to the frontier in Western Thrace and Rumeli (present day Bulgaria and Greece) after the Battle of Ankara in 1402. The general idea was that both possible outcomes would benefit the Osmanlı Empire. Either the Karamanoğulları would be killed at the front after fighting the enemy, or they would defeat the Christians who were still constantly harassing and attacking the European Balkan provinces of the Osmanlı Empire. This is also absent in Turkish historiography (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). - In the events surrounding the Armenian relocations, more Muslim (probably ethnic Turkish and Kurdish) Osmanlı’s died. According to American demographer Justin McCarthy, this had everything to do with the fact that in 1915 (prior to the relocations) the Armenians had revolted in Van, the biggest Osmanlı city in Eastern Anatolia at that time, and located in the province of Van (McCarthy, 1995; McCarthy et al., 2006). Together with the invading Russian army, the Armenians had driven the Muslims from the city as well as the province. The Armenians in turn had been driven out after the recapture of Van by Osmanlı forces in the same year. The city of Van then changed hands rapidly between the fighting armies of the Osmanlı’s on one side and the Russian-Armenian combined army on the other, with massacres accompanying each side’s victory.

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At the end, the Osmanlı’s took Van on April 6 th 1918 (McCarthy et al., 2006: 244), causing the final exodus of fleeing Armenians as well as the return of the surviving Muslims. McCarthy: “Neither side, however, can truly be said to have won the war. More than half of Van’s Armenians had died, as had almost two-thirds of its Muslims” (McCarthy et al., 2006: 2). - The events were actually a power struggle in the region of Eastern Anatolia, between ethnic groups of Armenians (with the aid of Armenians from Iran and Russia) and Kurds (with the aid of Kurds from the Osmanlı provinces of Iraq and Syria, as well as the Kurds from the Qajar Empire of Iran). This started at the end of the nineteenth century with the formation of the Hamidiye irregulars (drafted from Kurdish horsemen), and developed to a new trans-ethnic problem when the Kurds used their Hamidiye forces to muscle the large Armenian minority out of Eastern Anatolia in order for them to establish a large minority of their own. The Hamidiye were formed to suppress Armenian aspirations for an independent homeland in Anatolia, which was being striven for by the National-Socialist movement of the Armenian Revolutionary Party of Dashnakzutyun (Katchaznouni, 1923). There are even sources (StewartSmith, 1964; Munoz, 2001) that speak of intensive interaction between the Dashnakzutyun and the Nazis of Hitler’s Germany.

Authentic proof The first point, which is the statement that – so far – there is no proof that the Osmanlı government was in any way involved in an organized system of annihilation of a particular ethnic group, is not only cited by the American scholars McCarthy (McCarthy et al., 2006) and Michael M. Gunter (1986), but also by the British historian Yapp, French historian Veinstein, Dutch historian René Bakker (1997) and Canadian military historian Gwynne Dyer. Most scholars seem to agree on this, even with Turkish historiography ignoring and neglecting it altogether. As Dyer (2009) pointed out “if genocide just means killing a lot of people, then this certainly was one. If genocide means a policy that aims to exterminate a particular ethnic or religious group, then it wasn’t.” He is backed by the Romanian-American scholar Michael S. Radu (2007), who made a good point by stating that “whether the Ottoman authorities were guilty of “genocide” in a legal sense is doubtful, since the term itself did not exist in international law until after World War II; in a moral sense, doubts could also be raised, since if “genocide” means intentional destruction of a specific group because of its nationality, religion, race, etc., the survival of the Armenian community of Istanbul, outside the conflict area, is hard to explain.” Like most international scholars, the German historian Eberhard Jäckel (2006) also points out that “an explicit order for mass murder has so far not been found. […] More importantly, in and around Constantinople Armenian

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residents were not deported, and those from the area of Aleppo were allowed to use rail transportation during the deportation. This is strong evidence against an intended comprehensive genocide.” He in turn is backed up by the Swedish scholar Bertil Dunér (2004), who sees political motives in the actions of some international organizations as well as in the actions of some scholars from category one:

“[…] what happened at the Sub-commission meeting in 1985 was not (UN) recognition of the Armenian genocide, although it is frequently portrayed that way – far from it. The special rapporteur does not seem to stick to the definition study. The special rapporteur’s study also lacks weight for a different, perhaps even more important, reason. It should be emphasized that neither was there any recommendation to the superior Commission on Human Rights to adopt a resolution.” Number of casualties Another point of discussion is the number of deaths. Scholars conclude that the number of 1,500,000 Armenian victims (according to Armenian sources) is exaggerated, and think only one third of that amount actually perished. Scottish scholar Norman Stone (2007) had this to say: “In 1916 -- and this surely tells against ‘genocide’ -- the Ottomans tried 1,300 of these men and even executed a governor. About half a million Armenians arrived in the south-east and a very great number then died of the disease and starvation that were so prevalent at the time. Muslims also died in droves. In addition, the figure given for overall losses by the Armenian representative at the Paris peace treaties was 700,000 -- not 1.5 million as has been widely claimed.” Although most capable scholars agree that the number of one and a half million Armenian deaths is indeed exaggerated, there are scholars who dispute this. The demographic research of McCarthy (McCarthy et al., 2006: 241-244) not only showed the death tolls in the city of Van that changed hands numerous times in the years 1915-1918, but also in Erzurum (which fell in Russian-Armenian hands on February 16, 1916) and Bitlis (March 3, 1916). In these areas it seems more likely that the non-Armenian population (since they were seen as ‘the enemy’ by the Russian and Armenian forces) suffered a higher mortality rate. However, this traumatic military defeat is perceived as a major humiliation in Turkish historiography and therefore accordingly neglected and silenced. Most Russian documents, like the newly discovered dairy of the Russian LieutenantColonel Tverdohlebov (Tetik, 2007), confirm the military defeat of the Osmanlı Turks, especially, when one looks at ‘The Armenian Report’ of the Russian

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General L.M. Bolhovitinov, which is dated December 11 th, 1915 (Perinçek, 2009). The period described by these Russian archives, which were only recently searched due to the strict policy within the Soviet Union that the archives should remain closed at all times, are from 1890 to 1918. The newly opened Russian documents, reporting on the Armenian activities within the Osmanlı Empire, seem to correspond with data taken from other archives; which, is something the French scholar Thierry Zarcone (2005: 42-43) did: “After the capture of Erzurum by the Russians in 1916, the Armenian militias committed massacres against the Muslim populations.” The transnational aspect The reason why the Russian archives are so rich and full of data, is explained by the trans-ethnic aspect of the problem. For example, all three major Armenian parties (Armenakan/Ramgavar, Huncakian and Dashnakzutyun) that fought for independence in the name of the Osmanlı Armenians were supported by tsarist Russia. Russia, the archenemy of the Osmanlı’s in those days, wanted access to the Mediterranean Sea and needed to find a way past the Osmanlı Empire, since it stood in the way of Russia and the Mediterranean Sea. Surprisingly, at times, this is mentioned in Turkish historiography (Su & Bülkat, 1961; Yıldız, 2006; Arıca & Yaşasınoğlu, 2010). Since the Allied forces did not want Russia to access the Mediterranean, which would effectively create a more powerful Russia, the Russians tried other methods. One of these methods was to stir up the Christian minorities within the Osmanlı Empire; due to Russia, the Osmanlı Armenians began a revolt against the Osmanlı’s from 1890 onwards. Both thinkable outcomes would benefit the Russian agenda: - The Armenians would succeed and create a independent Armenian state, which would not forget the Russian support and behave as a sort of Russian puppet state; - The Armenians would be defeated and Russia, having gained the title of ‘protector of all Christians in the Osmanlı Empire’ after the RussoTurkish Wars of 1877-1878, would have to intervene on behalf of the Armenians. Historian Paul Henze (1984), from the Smithsonian Institute in America, wrote that “[w]hen war broke out in 1914, the Russians again encouraged Armenian expectations and exploited the eastern Anatolian Armenians as a fifth column. In the end they did not intervene to protect Armenians when Osmanlı authorities, in a life-and-death wartime situation, moved to deport them, nor were the Russian able to protect their collaborators against the vengeance of local Muslims when Osmanlı authority collapsed. As had happened so often before

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during the preceding 150 years, Russia was willing to exploit Armenians for her own purposes but unprepared to make sacrifices on their behalf.” This is why the three major Armenian parties, striving for independence, were basically under the influence of Russia. With the exception of Armenakan/ Ramgavar, which was founded by an Osmanlı Armenian in France in 1885, the parties were in fact founded by Russian Armenians for ‘their suppressed Armenian brethren in the Osmanlı Empire’. This has only been emphasized within Turkish historiography in the new millennium (Özkan, 2001). Both Dashnakzutyun (Georgia, 1890) and Huncakian (Switzerland, 1887) were founded by Russian Armenians, but aimed to create a left wing Marxist, socialist-nationalist Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia. In particular, the formation of the Armenian Revolutionary Party ‘Dashnakzutyun’ in 1890, created an increase in Armenian state-undermining activities in the East Anatolian provinces of the Osmanlı Empire (Pope & Wheal, 1996). Most were in fact orchestrated by the Armenian leadership of Huncakian and Dashnakzutyun, and this prompted the founding of the Hamidiye by the Osmanlı Sultan Abdülhamit II in 1891. The Hamidiye were irregular troops, drafted from Kurdish horsemen in Eastern Anatolia in an attempt to suppress Armenian aspirations for an independent state in the region of Eastern Anatolia. For the Armenian militants, there were also a number of possible outcomes that encouraged them to rebel against the Osmanlı Empire: 1. Success, which meant the creation of a homogenous left wing nationalistic Armenian state in Anatolia where the overwhelming majority would be Gregorian-Christian Armenians. 2. Defeat against the Osmanlı Empire, but only after the Dashnakzutyun and Huncakian would commit bloody massacres against the local population. This would evoke the rage of the local Osmanlı’s and they would retaliate by massacring Armenians left and right. At this stage, or so they thought, the Europeans (or at least the Russians) would intervene and attack the Osmanlı Empire on behalf of the Armenians. William L. Langer said it best when he stated:

“Europeans in Turkey were agreed that the immediate aim of the agitators was to incite disorder, bring about inhuman reprisals, and so provoke the intervention of the powers. For that reason, it was said, they operated by preference in areas where the Armenians were in a hopeless minority, so that reprisals would be certain. One of the revolutionary told Dr. Hamlin, the founder of Robert College, that the Henchak bands would “watch their opportunity to kill Turks and Kurds, set fire to their villages, and then make their escape into the mountains. The enraged Moslems will then rise, and fall upon the defenseless Armenians and slaughter them

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with such barbarity that Russia will enter in the name of humanity and Christian civilization and take possession” (Langer, 1935: 157). With the neglect of the Armenian issue in Turkish historiography, these remarks, like those of Langer, were also not picked up on. The revolutionary Armenians soon realized they had misjudged their outcomes, but it was too late. “The Catholicos [supreme chief of Armenian church] was clearly asking for a Russian attack upon Turkey. […] Russia was not really interested in the Armenians; she was prepared to use them as a tool of her expansionist policy and no more. Blinded by the hatred of Turkey, the Armenians did not realize what a sorry part was prepared for them in the coming war” (Kazemzadeh, 1952). A short overview of 1885-1916 Of the most important events that played a major role in the Osmanlı-Armenian conflict, some are previously described in the text above, and took place in the years 1890-1915. One must, however, keep in mind that most Armenian revolutionary parties were founded in the years 1885-1890, and that their activities started in subsequent years. The Tehcir (or ‘relocation’) started in 1915 and ended in 1916. Another important aspect is that these years were known as the days of nationalism and imperialism, which would explain the readiness of the Armenian population in the Osmanlı Empire to participate in a Russian imperialism-based strategy. Both the Russians and the Armenians were heavily influenced by the two ideologies of nationalism and imperialism. In the Osmanlı Empire, the primary political ideology was Islamism (especially under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II from 1876 to 1909), but changed with the Young Turk Movement from 1909 onwards. It, meaning the primary political ideology within the Osmanlı Empire, then became nationalism or patriotism.

A list of important events What follows is a list of events that have importance for everyone who wishes to study Turkish-Armenian relations during the First World War. All events are put in chronological order: - In 1885, Armenakan (also called ‘Ramgavar’) was founded; - The Armenian Party of Huncakian was created in 1887; - The formation of the Armenian Revolutionary Party ‘Dashnakzutyun’ in 1890; - The founding of the Hamidiye in 1891; - The First Sasun Rebellion of 1894 (in present day Batman); - In 1895, the region of Zeytun (present day Süleymanlı in Kahramanmaraş) was - the scene of a fierce battle between the Armenian Huncakian organization and - Osmanlı forces (including Hamidiye); - Dashnakzutyun attacked and occupied the Osmanlı Bank on August 26 th, 1896;

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- The Khanasor Punishment on July 25 th, 1897; - The Second Sasun Rebellion on March 30 th, 1904; - The 1905 Yıldız Mosque Assassination; - The Dashnakzutyun – Young Turks alliance of 1907; - The İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti constitution of 1908; - The countercoup on April 13 th, 1909 by Sultan Abdülhamit II; - The Adana Rebellion and subsequent massacre of 1909; - The assassination of the Osmanlı-Armenian governor of Van, Bedros Kapamacıyan, on December 10 th, 1912 by the Dashnakzutyun; - And the eventual arrest and trial of the Huncakian and Dashnakzutyun leaders in 1915.

Sasus (1894) The First Sasun Rebellion of 1894 (in present day Batman), when Osmanlı Armenians organized an uprising in an attempt to create an independent state of Armenia, was oppressed by the Hamidiye. Dashnakzutyun took part in the uprising by supplying arms to the local Armenian population in Sasun, which then started to attack non-Armenian villages in the region (ethnically, these were prominently Turkish or Kurdish Muslims). In the fighting that followed, the Dashnakzutyun was defeated by the Hamidiye. Some Hamidiye retaliated by massacring Armenians at random. Israeli scholar Yitzchak Kerem (2009) stated: “My point is, and this is what the Armenians don’t like, is that more Kurds killed Armenians than Turks”. Adding that “[…] it wasn’t an organized act by the regime. It was a by-product of hate.” Zeytun (1895) In 1895, the region of Zeytun (present day Süleymanlı in Kahramanmaraş) was the stage of a fierce battle between the Armenian Huncakian organization and Osmanlı forces (including Hamidiye). Zeytun, being a region that is more located in Central or South Anatolia (officially ‘Mediterranean Part of Anatolia’), was not among the regions where the Hamidiye was active. In fact, Zeytun was not one of the regions where the Hamidiye could have been strongly active, since there were not so many Kurds in the region to begin with. This is a big difference with Sasun, which is located in the far Eastern part of Anatolia and where the Hamidiye (or Kurdish tribes) were an overwhelming entity and a relatively big minority. This is one of the reasons why the Osmanlı regular forces were called to end the rebellion in Zeytun instead of the Hamidiye. This is not to say no Hamidiye were present; just less, and only as a small part within the much bigger Osmanlı army. This is again interesting because the Zeytun Rebellion did not end with large-scale massacres, like the Sasun Rebellion of 1894. It ended with a peace treaty in which the Armenians were given a form of semi-autonomous self-government (Gürün, 1983; Gürün, 2007).

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The Osmanlı Bank (1896) To raise awareness in Western Europe about the Armenian struggle for independence, members of the Dashnakzutyun attacked and occupied the Osmanlı Bank on August 26 th, 1896. The purpose of the raid was to dictate the Dashnakzutyun demands for reform in the Armenian populated areas of the Osmanlı Empire, and to attract European attention to their cause, as the Europeans had many assets in the bank. The operation caught European attention but at the cost of a ‘divide-and-rule’-strategy in Eastern Anatolia by Sultan Abdülhamit II. The Hamidiye-forces were given more options and weapons to suppress the Armenians. Because the Hamidiye forces were ethnically Kurdish, but resided in the same region (of Eastern Anatolia), they saw the Armenian struggle for independence as a risk to their own ‘homeland’. Both ethnic groups basically claimed the same territory as their own. This situation was used by the Osmanlı’s to gain more control in Eastern Anatolia. The Kurds were merely an instrument in this strategic plan. Khanasor (1897) What followed were fierce retaliations between the two ethnic groups of Armenians and Kurds. One of the bloodiest was the Khanasor Punishment, which was carried out by the Armenians against the Kurdish Mazrik tribe (mostly Hamidiye) on July 25, 1897. During earlier fighting, the Mazrik tribe had ambushed and massacred a squad of Armenian Dashnakzutyuns. Khanasor was the retaliation of the Dashnakzutyun, in which the Mazrik tribe was caught off guard and massacred (Kurdoghlian, 1996). Some Armenians consider this their first victory over the Osmanlı Empire and celebrate each year in its remembrance (Karentz, 2004; Mesrobian, 2000). Sasun (1904) With the annihilated Mazrik tribe, and a couple of other Kurdish tribes, Dashnakzutyun had a boost in morale while the Hamidiye were losing territory heavily. Eventually, the Dashnakzutyun felt they were strong enough to engage in another big battle, again to conquer the region of Sasun. On March 30 th, 1904, Dashnakzutyun played a major role in the Second Sasun Rebellion, in which they sent arms and militants to the region for the second time in an attempt to muscle the non-Armenian population out of the region. This was intended to create a majority of Armenians in the Osmanlı region. Afraid of a similar outcome as Zeytun (where estimates show at least 20,000 Muslim casualties; which were either civilian, Hamidiye or Osmanlı soldier), the Osmanlı governors reacted by sending even more Hamidiye irregulars (Dadrian, 1995). The last thing the Osmanlı’s wanted was another Armenian region that could act as a semi-autonomous region, which was the case with Zeytun in 1895. With the Zeytun defeat and Mazrik Massacre in mind, the Hamidiye used this pretext to

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retaliate fiercely. Without regular Osmanlı forces to control them, as was the case in Zeytun, the Hamidiye were free to retaliate by massacring at random.

The Yıldız Assassination (1905) The quick and constant shift of power between Armenian militants under the command of Dashnakzutyun and Huncakian on one side, and the Kurdish Hamidiye irregulars together with the Osmanlı forces on the other, caused irritation and hate on both sides. These feelings of hate were rapidly implemented in massacres, carried out both left and right by all parties involved. By 1905, creating European awareness once again became key in the attacks organized by Dashnaksutyun; just like the attack on the Osmanlı Bank in 1894. In 1905, members of Dashnakzutyun organized an assassination attempt on Sultan Abdülhamit II in the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul. The Yıldız Mosque Assassination, as it was called, was intended to kill the Osmanlı sultan when he was at his most vulnerable: on his way to the Mosque to pray, hence the name ‘Yıldız Mosque’, which was the name of the mosque Abdülhamit II frequently visited. The attempt failed because the timed bomb missed its target, Sultan Abdülhamit II, by a few minutes; but nonetheless killed three guards. Adana (1909) When on April 13 th, 1909 Sultan Abdülhamit II rallied his supporters, in order to organize a countercoup against the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, all hell broke loose in the Osmanlı capital of İstanbul. Some soldiers mutinied and were joined by religious leaders demanding Sharia instead of a parliamentary constitution. The Dashnakzutyun saw this as an opportunity and remembered the words of Sabahattin. In the turmoil, the Armenian Dashnakzutyun started an uprising in the city of Adana (Erickson, 2001). The relatively wealthy Armenians 9 were already the envy of the town and when it came to light that some Armenian religious leaders were in fact part of the organized uprising, all hell broke loose in Adana, just like it did in İstanbul, 939 km to the west. An official document, sent to Great Britain by the British Embassy in Anatolia, describes (again) what role the Russians played in the Adana Uprising: “Certain Armenian leaders, delegates from Constantinople, and priests (an Armenian priest is in his way an autocrat) urged their congregations to buy arms. It was done openly, indiscreetly, and, in some cases, it might be said wickedly. What can be thought of a preacher, a Russian Armenian, who in a church in this

9  Within the Osmanlı Empire professions like banking and trade were left to religious minorities like the Jews and Armenians. Muslims (mostly Turks) were either peasant or soldier, or both. This had everything to do with the fact that Islam looked down upon loan sharking, asking for interest and making large profits on trade. This was seen as ‘profiting from your fellowman’ and ‘unfit for a Muslim’.

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city where there had never been a massacre, preached revenge for the martyrs of 1895? Constitution or none, it was all the same to him. ‘Revenge’, he said, ‘murder for murder. Buy arms. A Turk for every Armenian of 1895.’ An American missionary who was present got up and left the church. Bishop Mushech, of Adana, toured his province preaching that he who had a coat should sell it and buy a gun” (Gürün, 2007). This was not the first document from the British archives that insinuates that the Russians, along with some Armenian committees, tried to provoke a massacre by the Osmanlı’s so the European powers could intervene. The following was stated in a report, that was dated July 18 th, 1895 and sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Embassy in Istanbul: “The Armenian Committees are determined to provoke another massacre and it is rumoured that they are preparing rebellions in various areas” (Gürün, 2007). The Armenian Uprising of 1909 was fierce for both sides; when the initial Armenian attacks wore off, the local population retaliated (Güçlü, 2009). During the massacres that followed, hundreds of thousands of Armenians were killed. This created even more antipathy between Armenians and Turks, and Dashnakzutyun cut all relations with the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti in 1912. The fact that the İtthat ve Terakki Cemiyeti had nothing to do with the Adana events, it was mostly local inhabitants, who even had courts where Armenian and Muslim ringleaders were held for trial, was ignored. Dashnakzutyun immediately showed the new Osmanlı government (now governed by the sultan, the parliament and some İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ministers) what they thought of the new Osmanlı leadership by assassinating the Osmanlı-Armenian governor of Van, Bedros Kapamacıyan, on December 10 th, 1912. The killing of Kapamacıyan, and the ongoing Armenian uprisings in Van, eventually caused all Huncakian and Dashnakzutyun leaders (almost all residing in İstanbul) to be tracked down, arrested and tried in 1915. Tehcir (1915-1916) What followed was a seemingly impossible plan of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti to relocate all Armenians from Eastern Anatolia so they would no longer be a problem. The fact that the First World War had just begun in 1914 and the Russians (with Armenian help) were advancing, taking the city of Van just a few days earlier on April 20 th, 1915, made Talat Paşa, Minister of Interior and member of the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, issue two important orders: 1. The first order was issued on April 24 th, 1915 and called for the arrest of several Armenians in İstanbul; all were suspected to be involved with Dashnakzutyun, Huncakian and/or Armenakan/Ramgavar, along with the closure of a few Armenian organizations that were suspected of ties with the three revolutionary parties.

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2. On May 27 th, 1915 Talat Paşa issued an order to reinstate the temporary ‘Tehcir Law’ (meaning ‘Relocation Law’) until early 1916. The order was published in the official state-newspaper of the Osmanlı Empire in June, 1915. The relocation (1915) The reason for Talat Paşa’s drastic measure has to be sought in the drastic events of the years 1914 and 1915. Salt (2008: 68-69) sees its origin “at this critical juncture, [when] between April 13 and 20, thousands of Armenians inside the walled city of Van, rose up against the governor and the small number of regular and irregular forces garrisoned in the city. The extent to which the rebellion was coordinated with the Russians remains an open question, to which the answer must lie buried somewhere in the Russian state archives, but the effect was to weaken the Osmanlı campaign in eastern Anatolia and Persia.” Salt even accurately described the extent of the Armenian activities:

“What was happening could no longer be described as disparate uprisings; it was rather a general rebellion, orchestrated principally by the Dashnaks and encouraged by Russia. The victims included not just soldiers or jandarma or officials but the Muslim and Christian villagers who were the victims of massacre and countermassacre.” According to Brian G. Williams (2008), most historians make the same mistake: “I am equally dismayed when I encounter Armenians who provide a historically context-less version of history which overlooks the fact that their people were engaged in an armed uprising which aimed to ‘cleanse’ (i.e. slaughter) the Turks of eastern Anatolia from a planned ‘Greater Armenia’.” Again, the factor of Turkish historiography altogether neglecting this aspect seems decisive in all of this. The armed uprisings also occurred in both Adana (1909) and Van (1915), which eventually led to the Tehcir. Almost all scholars are on the same page concerning the Russian-Armenian events: - “Armenian volunteer units served in the Russian army, and there was agitation for a homeland in and around the Anatolian city of Van” (Cleveland , 1994: 142). - “Moreover, throughout Eastern Anatolia the Turks were threatened by the insurrection of their embittered Armenian subjects, who disrupted communications and formed volunteer groups to help the Russians. Others joined the Russian Armenian forces” (Mansfield, 1991: 150). - “A few thousand Armenians joined the Russian army; there were

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Armenian desertions from the Ottoman army and guerrilla activity behind the Ottoman lines” (Zürcher, 2004: 125). - “The Armenians were drawn to the Russians as fellow-Christians and likely protectors. Armenians from Russian Transcaucasia fought in the Russian Army, where they were joined among their kinsmen in Turkey. There were also Armenian risings behind Ottoman lines” (Mango, 1999: 161). Which, should in no way be interpreted as an argument that Armenians did not die en masse:

“A few key facts are clear. One is that many hundreds of thousands (over a million, according to the Armenian lobby) Armenians in Eastern Anatolia died at that time, of exhaustion and famine as well as killed by Kurdish villagers and Ottoman soldiers. It is also a fact that the Armenian community and its leadership in Anatolia at the time took arms against the Ottomans, in open alliance with the latter’s traditional enemy, Russia. Invading Russian troops and Armenian irregulars, whose occupation of the city of Van was the immediate cause of the deportation of Armenians, also engaged in indiscriminate violence, albeit on a smaller scale, against the mostly Kurdish population of the area; and all that during a war in which the very fate of the Ottoman Empire was being decided” (Radu, 2007). But it also should not be used in discarding the deaths on the Osmanlı side (be it Turkish, Turkic, Kurdish or Osmanlı-loyal Armenian): “Worse yet, Armenian scholars have consistently dwelled on Turkish massacres of their compatriots in all their grisly details without so much as a word on the equally savage measures taken by the Armenians of the Transcaucasus and eastern Anatolia against local Turkic populace from 1905 to 1920. Indeed, when questioned on such episodes, they even dismiss them as Turkish propaganda. Yet the evidence for accepting this fact is overwhelming. This not to excuse the massacre of Armenians as mere quid pro quo but to point up such violence as an evil endemic to Middle Eastern society in general” (Zeidner , 2004: 44-48). The scholars stating that rebellious Armenians killed Osmanlı Muslims as well, like Radu and Zeidner, are not uncommon. The discussion is more about if the Armenian uprisings were as compromising to the Osmanlı war effort as Talat Paşa makes it seem. An interesting source is found in the British archives; where Talat Paşa is witnessed to have cried (or at least put his hands in front of his face) during an interview concerning the relocation (BBC, 2003). One can say that it at least shows that it was not premeditated

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by Talat Paşa, or that even he himself did not expect so many victims. According to Oxford professor Hew Strachan “the initial violence was not centrally orchestrated, although it was indirectly sanctioned by the panTurkish flourishes of Enver and others” (Strachan, 2004: 112-113). This is reinforced by three, national and international, decisions of the then still functioning Osmanlı government İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Şimşir, 2003): 1. In 1919, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Spain (all neutral states during the First World War) were officially asked to research the events of 1915, in order to rule out any sentence for an international crime. All four countries declined the invitation. 2. The Military Courts of 1919-1920 in İstanbul, which were called ‘Divan-i Harb-i Örfi’, were used to research the events. During these trials the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti put 1,673 Osmanlı officers on trial for ‘inhumane treatment of the Armenians during the Tehcir’, and sentenced 1,397, of whom 67 were put to death. 3. The Osmanlı leaders decided to cooperate with the Malta Tribunals (1919-1921) in which the Allied forces, united under the leadership of the British Lord Curzon, held 141 Osmanlı’s for ‘war crimes’ but eventually were forced to let them go. This had two reasons. For one, the British wanted to rescue their prisoners of war (POWs) from Turkish hands by exchanging prisoners. And two; they could not find any evidence against the 141 Osmanlı’s, as stated by Sir A. Gedes on July 13 th, 1921:

“I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being ‘detained for trial at Malta’” (FO 371/6504/E.8515). In the end, the Osmanlı officials were set free and exchanged for British POWs in Osmanlı-Turkish hands. Primary sources As mentioned before, the primary sources are diverse and present in more than one national archive. So far, we have seen the mention of Russian, British and French documents. The French archives show that the Osmanlı Armenians were probably numbered at 1.2 or 1.3 million, while the British archives show that there simply is no evidence linking either, Talat Paşa, nor the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, nor the Osmanlı government, to a centralized organization of annihilating the Armenians. The fact that even the Malta Tribunals were aborted says it all. The Russian archives, however, depict a totally different picture; namely that of Russians-Armenian relations which, under influence of imperialism and nationalism, started the Armenian aspirations for an independent homeland in Anatolia. In order for this to be

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realized, Eastern Anatolia needed to have a majority of Armenians, something Dashnakzutyun and Huncakian tried to accomplish in the years 1890-1915.

Osmanlı archives The Osmanlı archives are even clearer about it; the 1915-1916 events were not designed to ‘get rid’ of the Christian minority in the Osmanlı Empire, be it Armenian, Assyrian or Pontic Greek. Lewis is cited as saying that “Catholic and Protestant Armenians as well as Armenian railway workers and members of the armed forces were not subdued to the relocations” (Lewis, 2002: 332). While Pope and Wheal (1996: 34-35) insist that “exemptions spared Greeks and the Catholic Armenian business community in Constantinople, effectively restricting the order to Orthodox and Protestant Armenians, who were subject to a military enforcement operation until late 1916” (Pope & Wheal, 1996: 34-35). Therefore, some Armenians were in fact saved because of their participation in Osmanlı military operations. This would mean the relocations were aimed at the Gregorian-Armenian Christians (an orthodox and nationalistic form of Christianity, exclusively present among the Armenians). Because of the aggressive nature of the Armenian Revolutionary Party Dashnakzutyun, which had wide support under Gregorian Armenians, many Osmanlı-loyal Armenians were attacked, massacred and assassinated as well. One example could be Bedros Kapamacıyan. German archives One of the most well known sources concerning the Armenian events of 1915, is a document that is supposed to be in the German archives. It is supposed to be a quote, and said to belong to Adolf Hitler himself. It is in fact highly controversial. The quote is believed to have been used by Hitler when he said to his generals on the eve of sending his Death’s Heads units into Poland in 1939: “Go, kill without mercy! Who today remembers the annihilation of the Armenians!” (Michigan-Dearborn, 1996). Israeli historian Tom Segev (2007) had this to say about the quote:

“[…] the quote attributed to Hitler is of dubious provenance. […] It turned out that on that day, Hitler gave two speeches. The Americans managed to locate the official version of both; the line about the slaughter of the Armenians does not appear in either.” The dubiousness of the Hitler quote has also been the topic of publications of Leon Picon and Heath W. Lowry. Lowry stated, in his article ‘The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians’ (1985), that “there is no proof that Adolf Hitler ever made such a statement.” Picon made a similar remark in his article ‘Armenian “Hitler Quote” Proven To Be Fabrication’ (1985/6). Apart from the controversy concerning the Hitler quote, there are also

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sources in the German archives that speak of the following events, as witnessed by German army officers, who were allies of the Osmanlı’s during the First World War: - The suffering of Armenians; - The suffering of the Osmanlı Muslims, Turks and Kurds. This is the case in the book of the Belgian scholars Antoon Gailly and Luc Vervloet in which one German doctor is stated to have said: “What I saw in aspects of sorrow and misery among the Armenians on their journey through the wilderness, cannot be described. [...] Not only Europeans but many Turks and Arabs whom I spoke were angry about the atrocities against the Armenians. Cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases were endemic among the deportees. It was the fault of the incompetence of the local officials, their laziness and disinterest, their dishonesty and fanatical hatred, failing all efforts by the military head of state to improve the conditions of the Armenians” (Gailly & Vervloet, 1997: 150-151). Vervloet and Gailly also found a source in which one German medical army officer states that “[t]he Muslims were also not spared from such horrors [as the Armenians went through]. As they were refugees as well, they knew the horrors of war at first hand. I estimate that one million Muslims died as well during the typhus epidemic that broke out during the relocations of the Armenians.” These German documents at least show that: a) The military leaders of the Osmanlı Empire tried to take measures, ensuring the lives of the Armenians during the relocation, but this failed due to the incompetence of local officers; b) Not only Armenians, but also Muslim Osmanlı’s suffered before, during and after the events of 1915; possibly to a much larger extent.

American archives Just like the Osmanlı archives, much of the documents out the American archives are in fact disputed. Although most scholars from the first category relied on the book of former ambassador Morgenthau, recent research showed it to be an untrustworthy report. Morgenthau’s report was believed to be an eyewitness report, but turned out to be a report written by others and then assigned to Morgenthau. It was used “as proof of the fact that the Young Turk Government planned and carried out a ‘genocide’ against its Armenian minority” for more than 72 years until Heath Lowry, professor at Princeton University, examined it (Lowry, 1990: 69-70). Other primary sources of the American archives tell us the exact journey of some Christian Osmanlı’s; one example is the testimony of Edward Tashji (or Taşcı). Tashji was the son of an Armenian mother, Zabel Tashjian,

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residing in the Osmanlı province of Balıkesir in Western Anatolia at the start of the First World War, and a Syrian Orthodox father, Circi ‘George’ Tashji, who resided in the Eastern Anatolian city of Urfa at the start of the First World War. The education his father received (seemingly fluent in Arabic, French, Armenian, Osmanlı Turkish and English) and the fact that he remained an Osmanlı army officer during the entire First World War are interesting findings. Another conversation between Zabel and Edward is stated as the following:

Edward: “Were the fights between the Armenians and the Turks?” [sic] Zabel: “No!” Edward: “Then between whom did the confrontations take place?” Zabel: “It was always among one Armenian political group against another group. I remember conversations in our home; the Dashnak would attack the Huncaks, the Huncaks would beat up the Ramgavar, the mutual hate and fighting would never stop!” (Zabel & Edward, 2005: 20-25). According to this testimony, Zabel was “the sole survivor of a family of ten”, lived in Balıkesir until 1915 and made the journey to the Eastern Anatolian city of Kilis during the First World War. She had to make this journey of 1,134 km on foot and it took her approximately six months. Asked about the massacre of her family in Balıkesir, she replied:

Zabel: “I don’t remember the location or the date, but one day I witnessed a man on horse, attack a defenceless man on the ground.” Edward: “[…] please think carefully about the person on the horse: Was he a soldier, did he wear a uniform?” [sic] Zabel: “No, it was not a soldier.” Edward: “Do you remember words spoken in Turkish or Arabic?” Zabel: “No, I remember it was neither of these languages, nor was it either Greek or Armenian; but it was a language that I could not recognize.” Edward: “Could it have been Kurdish?” Zabel: “It could have been. I wish we had never seen those days.” Arriving in Kilis during 1915, Zabel does not mention any hardship during her long journey, and even speaks of “an Armenian family in the town of Kilis, living in their own home”. The same family took her in and she lived there for another three years. Since Kilis is nearby Zeytun, where there were brutal killings committed by various groups and serious fights between Dashnakzutyun, Huncakian, Hamidiye etc., the Tashji-testimony is important. It could imply that

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the relocations were restricted to areas where there had been fighting prior to 1915. Other events Zabel would testify, were: a) Her brother Minas went to İzmir to “fight against the Turks.” b) In 1916 she met two Osmanlı officers, Circi Tashji and Butrus Nakkash (or Nakas), riding a horse (something only high-ranking and wealthy officers were permitted or could afford to do). Eventually, she married Circi Tashji, who took her to New York in 1920 to start a new life. c) Because Turkey was reluctant to stand by and see how most Anatolians, or at least the educated officers like Circi, emigrated abroad; she, meaning Zabel, and her new husband Circi received French passports from the French forces occupying Eastern Anatolia from 1919 onwards, including Kilis and Urfa. They eventually went to America with falsified French passports, stating they were “George Nordigian and Izabel Nordigian”. All these events, as recorded in the various archives and documents, seem to reaffirm what most scholars agree upon. Namely the fierce fighting between Dashnakzutyun, Huncakian and Hamidiye in the late Osmanlı period, started in the late nineteenth century and ended only with the end of the First World War. Turkish historiography does not focus on this point whatsoever. Aftermath After the end of the Tehcir Law in 1916, and the end of the First World War shortly thereafter, the Osmanlı Empire collapsed. The Osmanlı forces were not able to withstand the Allied forces and Anatolia became occupied by foreign armies. It was subsequently divided into eight zones, of which the Greek, Italians, French and British areas were the most important. The Armistice of Mudros (October 30 th, 1918) and the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10 th, 1920) ensured that some of the eight zones in Anatolia would eventually become small states (like Armenia and Kurdistan), while others would be transferred to the Allied Powers. Although the Osmanlı sultan accepted the terms, in exchange for retaining his wealth and titles, most Turks did not. It led to the start of the Turkish War of Independence in 1919 in Anatolia, and was soon followed by multiple, decisive military victories for the Turks, which were glorified and replaced the traumatic and military humiliating events of the Armenian-Turkish struggle of 1915. Victory during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) led to the establishment of the new nation-state of the Republic of Turkey (1923). In the meantime, there was widespread migration of most Anatolian Armenians. a) Some had just now returned to Anatolia from their relocation to Syria (see image 1); b) Other Armenians decided to flee to the Caucasus, where they expected

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a Russian welcome-committee (Karpat, 2009); c) Another group decided to stay in (or return to) Syria or nearby regions like Lebanon; d) Quite a few emigrated to the United States, France or other Western countries; e) And another group of Armenians assimilated in the TurkishKurdish communities of Eastern Anatolia. For example, the Armenian Sergey Vardanyan (2009) thinks that almost “half a million Armenians assimilated”, while the Turkish-Armenian Etyen Mahçupyan (2007) thinks “there are more than one million Armenians in Turkey today, for all but 60,000 they think they are and always were Turkish and Muslim.” There are Turkish historians, who support these conclusions: like Yusuf Halaçoğlu (2002) in his book ‘Facts On The Relocation of Armenians: 1914-1918’. Summary and conclusion Against the framework of this great migration of Armenians, which is the direct cause of seven million Armenians living abroad, while only three million live in Armenia itself today, the neglect of these events in Turkish historiography has caused for a major disrupt in objective historiography. This case study effectively shows the impact of what neglect can have in historiography. The Armenian issue was a traumatic and painful experience for the Osmanlı Turks. Not only because it was an uprising in the last remaining region of the Osmanlı Empire but also because it was relatively in the favour of the Armenians in the beginning, which is illustrated by the death toll on both sides. The Osmanlı casualties are significantly higher, which makes it harder to ‘celebrate’ the quelling of the rebellion as ‘successful’. The Russian aid that accompanied the Armenian rebels also made it that entire cities in Eastern Anatolia were lost to the invading Russians. It was only with the greatest effort that important cities like Van and Erzurum were to be retaken by Osmanlı forces. But even then the cities were not saved. Van changed hands numerous times; one week it was in Russian hands while the next week the Osmanlı’s recaptured the city. Consequently, there was no reason for a feeling of military victory because defeat lay just around the corner. The same applies to the Armenian distress and the uprisings that consequently followed. The Osmanlı’s could only defeat the rebel armies with the greatest of trouble. It made the victory not so glorious and certainly not fit for glorification. The notion of the ‘mighty Osmanlı-Turkish army that could not even defeat a minor rebel army’ was seen as unfit for glorification and therefore neglected in Turkish historiography. It had some important impacts on historiography in general. For one, while Turkish historiography remained silent other historiographies did not. It caused a distorted image of the events of 1915, with more information on the

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Armenian side than the Osmanlı-Turkish side. Secondly, many aspects were hotly debated, since there was no Turkish historiography that could provide some answers as to what exactly happened surrounding 1915. This only happened after the Armenians started their campaign of terrorist attacks and assassinations on Turkish diplomats after the 1980s. Prior to the 1980s, Turkey chose to completely neglect this issue in its historiography. After the 1980s, it had no choice but to fill-in the gaps with ‘its own’ version of history, a tale that was kept in the dark for decades in order to cope with the trauma, and military humiliation, and also to start over within the new nation-state of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. This case study of the Armenian issue and its long neglect in Turkish historiography shows the consequences of neglect on this scale. It is clear that in the case study of the Armenian issue, most of the disputes are among non-Turkish scholars, debating with the limited use of Turkish historiography because of its absence. It is only in recent years that Turkey has tried to come to terms with its own historical trauma and humiliation in the face of their process of nation-building.

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Mantran, R. (1952). Histoire de la Turquie . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. McCarthy, J. (1995). Death and Exile: the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 . Princeton: The Darwin Press. McCarthy, J., Arslan, E., Taşkıran, C. & Turan, Ö. (2006). The Armenian Rebellion at Van . Utah: The University of Utah Press. Mesrobian, A. S. (2000). Like One Family: The Armenians of Syracuse . London: Gomidas Institute. Morris, C. (2005). The New Turkey: The Quit Revolution on the Edge of Europe . London: Granta Books. Munoz, A. J. (2001). The East Came West: Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist Volunteers in the German Armed Forces 1941-1945. A Study of East European Middle Eastern Collaboration with the German Armed Forces In World War II . New York: Europa Books Incorporated. Özger, Y. (2007). 1895 Bayburt Ermeni Ayaklanmaları . İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık. Özkan, Z. (2001). The Armenian Question from terror to policy . İstanbul: Erofset. Öztuna, Y. (2002). The Political Milieu of the Armenian Question. In T. Ataöv (ed.). Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period (pp. 43-64). Ankara: Turkish Historical Society. Perinçek, M. (ed. 2009). Rus Kafkas Ordusu Kurmay Başkanı Tuğgeneral L. M. Bolhovitinov – 11 Aralık 1915 Tarihli Resmi Ermeni Raporu . İstanbul: Doğan Kitap. Picon, L. (1985/6). Armenian “Hitler Quote” Proven To Be Fabrication. ATAUSA , Fall 1985/Winter 1986. Pope, N. & Pope, H. (2004). Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey . New York: The Overlook Press. Pope, S. & Wheal, E.A. (1996). Dictionary of the First World War . New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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Radu, M. S. (2007). The Dangers of the Armenian Genocide Resolution . Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Reedijk, P. (1986). Wat zoekt u daar nu? Een andere kijk op Turkije . Delft: Meinema. Sachar, H. M. (1969). The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924 . New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Salt, J. (2008). The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands . California: University of California Press. Salt, J. (2010). Forging the past: OUP and the ‘Armenian question’. Eurasia Critic (January 2010). Segev, T. (2007, October 18). Mozart and the Armenian genocide. Haaretz Daily News . Shaw, S. J. & Shaw, E. K. (1977). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shaw, S. J. (1976). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 12801808 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stewart-Smith, G. (1964). The defeat of communism . London: Ludgate. Stone, N. (2007, October 20). What has this genocide to do with Congress?. The Spectator . Strachan, H. (2004). First World War . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Su, K. & Bülkat, G. (1961). İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası. Ankara: Birsen Yayınevi. Şimşir, B. (2003). The Deportees of Malta and The Armenian Allegations . Ankara: Etki Yayıncılık. Tashji, E. (2005). Armenian Allegations: The Truth Must be Told . Inverness: Rose International Publishing House (reprint). Tetik, A. (ed. 2007). Gördüklerim Yaşadıklarım (Erzurum 1917-1918) . Ankara:

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Genelkurmay Başkanlığı. University of Michigan-Dearborn (1996). Fact sheet: Armenian Genocide . Michigan: University of Michigan-Dearborn. Uras, E. (1950). Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi . Ankara: Yeni Matbaa. Veinstein, G. (1995). Trois questions sur un massacre. L’Histoire , No. 187 (April 1995). Wiliams, B. G. (2008, January 31). Toronto District School Board . Dartmouth: TCA. Yapp, M. E. (1987). The Making of the Modern Near East: 1792–1923 . New York: Longman. Yıldız, İ. (2006). (Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı) ÖSS Tarih: Temel Kavramlar ve Bilgiler . İstanbul: Birey Yayınları. Zarcone, T. (2005). La Turquie: De l’Empire Ottoman à la République d’Atatürk . Paris: Gallimard. Zeidner, R. F. (2005). The Tricolor over the Taurus . Ankara: Turkish Historical Society. Zürcher, E. J. (2004). Turkey: A Modern History . London: I.B. Tauris.

Archive material FO 371/6504/E.8515: Craigie, British Charge d’ Afaires at Washington, to lord Curzon, No.722 of 13.7.1921

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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Geographical emphasis and historiographical neglect as tools of nation-building “The Serbs, in their bitterness, slit the throats of the Turks everywhere they found them, sparing neither the wounded, nor the women, nor the Turkish children.” Konstantin Nenadović (Beograd, 1883) Introduction The quote illustrates the situation for the average Turk who was living in the Balkans in the nineteenth century (Judah, 1997: 75). It was a time in which millions of Turks were either killed or driven out of the Balkans: a time of ethnic cleansing. Somewhere in all this violence, the Serbian army officer Konstantin Nenadović wrote his ‘Život i dela velikog Đorđa Petrovića, KARAĐORĐA, Vrhovnog Vožda, oslobodioca i Vladara Srbije, i život njegovi Vojvoda i junaka. Kao gradivo za Srbsku Istoriju, od 1804 do 1813 i na dalje, Sabro napiso i izdo Konstantin N. Nenadović, Kraljev. Srb. Artiljerije Kapetan u penziji, sa 14 litografisanih slika’, which translates itself to English as ‘The life and works of the great Djordje Petrovic, Karadjordje, the Supreme Leader, the liberator and ruler of Serbia, and the life of his hero and Duke. Srbsko as material for history, from 1804 to 1813 and beyond, written by Konstantin N. Nenadović, retired Serbian Artillery Captain in the King’s Army, with 14 lithographic pictures’ (Nenadović, 1883/1971; Nenadović , 1883/2008). It is illustrative that Konstantin Nenadović did not write about the killing of Turks as a point of criticism but rather as something the Serbs should be thankful for, especially to their ‘great leader’ Karadjordje (or ‘Kara Corç’). This fierce battle between Serbs and Turks caused an exodus of many Turks from the Balkans to Anatolia, never to return again to the lands where they had lived for 500 years under Osmanlı rule, but where Turks had lived ever since the first millennium before Christ. Focusing on the response of the Osmanlı Turks in reaction to losing the entire region of the Balkans, during and prior to the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, as well as being faced with fierce massacres during this process, one question emerges. How did the Turks cope with the loss of the Balkans, which was, after all, the geographical core of their empire? The abrupt end of Turkish presence in the Balkans has grown and cultivated into a new Turkish nationalism that is strongly focused on the geographical region of Anatolia and discards the Balkans with all of its bloody conflicts. The Balkans represented disaster and defeat. This military humiliation of the once mighty Osmanlı Empire, which could not even defend or fight off mere rebels in order to save its richest and oldest European provinces, caused the Turks to downplay the importance of the region. As a response, the Young

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Turks focused on a completely new geographical area that continued with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. When Anatolia became the stage of a major victory during the First World War, the military humiliation in the Balkans could be erased, and the Young Turks could suddenly focus on the ‘glorious victory’ in Anatolia, which overnight became the empire’s new centre. This form of nationalism is based on the principle of pragmatism: from the Young Turks until the Republican Era of Atatürk. The quote of Konstantin is strikingly interesting when compared to the quote that was used by Atatürk, who is stated to have said “How glad for the one that says ‘I am a Turk’!”. Where Konstantin uses the ‘Turk’ to create an atmosphere in which it is perfectly okay to kill ‘a Turk’, since they are inferior to other races (or in this case Serbian Christians), Atatürk tried to revive the term, but with a proud awareness among these self identified ‘Turks’. But what was the core of this new ‘Turkishness’? Somewhere between the proud mention of Turks massacred by Konstantin Nenadović in Beograd during 1883, and the sentence ‘Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene!’ (translated by this author as “How glad for the one that says ‘I am a Turk’!”) of Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s, the Turks had found something to base their national identity upon. The despair brought about by defeat in the Balkans was exchanged for great military pride for their victory in Anatolia. The road from Nenadović’s quote to Atatürk’s illustrates the struggle for national identity in Turkey. The aim to create a new nation has been a process ever since the establishment of the Republic in Turkey in 1923. In this research I have argued that the prelude to a description of a theoretical or empirical problem is just that: the struggle for national identity in Turkey during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. A description of the problem itself is the basis of national identity in Turkey, which is focused on geography through military glorification. More specifically, the neglect and emphasis in historiography was used as a tool in order to glorify a certain geographical region in the process of nation-building. I have argued that this is a problem because the elements of neglect and emphasis have made it that Anatolia is considered the ancient homeland of the Turks, while the Balkans were in fact much more important throughout Turkish history. Existing theories or solutions have neglected this aspect. The motives to neglect or emphasize certain aspects, to form a new image of the nation, are mostly absent in works on nation-building in Turkey. When formulating this into an objective, one has to bear in mind that the main objective is to show how neglect and emphasis has worked in Turkish historiography in order to create nation-building. The specification of the problem needs to be clarified. I have argued that Turkey has started a process of nation-building in which military glory determined which geographical regions should or should not become a focus. This shift of this focus was implemented due to phases of neglect or emphasis

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in Turkish historiography. By doing so, some regions were regarded as the new homeland while other regions (that were seen as the core of the nation) were now discarded. The formulation of the value (or relevance) of this study is comprehensive. The first chapter constitutes as the framework of this study by providing the proper theories concerning nation-building, historiography and the reciprocity between these two factors. By doing so, the other chapters can act as pillars to strengthen the main outcome of this research. This last chapter is the overall framework of all the other chapters by providing the conclusion. When looking at the definitions of the subject, it becomes clear that when focusing on nation-building, the understanding of both the concept of ‘nation’ and the concept of ‘nation-building’ are described accordingly. This is especially the case with the theories that are taken into account during this specific research. When focusing on Turkey, the time period is to be defined. In this case, mainly, is it modern Turkey from 1923 onwards. Lastly, the usage of historiography is defined by focusing on schoolbooks and history textbooks used in national education from 1923 onwards. Both categories are to be approved by the Ministry of Education in Turkey. With the definitions out of the way, we can look at what I expected to see in this research as a whole. The aim was to depict how Turkish historiography was used during the process of nation-building in modern Turkey, while simultaneously fuelling the expectation that, in order to put an emphasis on Anatolia as the new geographical homeland of Turks, the element of neglect was used to cut the region of the Balkans out of Turkish historiography. Therefore, a Turkish history without the Balkans was depicted. Military glorification as the criterion In this research I have argued that the basis of national identity in Turkey is focused on geography through military glorification. More specifically, I have argued that the neglect and emphasis in Turkish historiography occurred in this process of nation-building. The aspect of neglect is mostly centred on the region of the Balkans because of the military humiliation that caused massive ethnic cleansing and an exodus of Turks from the Balkans. This painful event caused the neglect of the Balkan region; on one hand, because of the military humiliation that culminated in the ethnic cleansing of Turks, and on the other hand because of the inability of the Turks to stop it. As a whole, this part of Turkish history does the opposite of militarily glorifying the Turkish nation. It, in fact, shows the incredibly devastating military defeat of the Turks in a region that was considered to be the core of the Turkish Osmanlı Empire. It quickly becomes clear that the most important criterion that was used to either emphasize or neglect a geographical region in Turkish geography, became the military successes that were either present or not. In the case of the former, the region that had the most military successes in recent history

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(with recent being the Turkish War of Independence of 1919 until 1922) was regarded as the undisputed ‘homeland’ of the Turks. With the recent military glorification in mind, successes were also sought in a distant past. In the case of Anatolia, recent victories in the Turkish War of Independence were expanded to military successes in the eleventh century (for instance with the Battle of Manzikert in 1071). In the case of the latter, where military success was absent, an active effort to forget came into force. So, in the case of the Balkans, the recent humiliations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (in which Turks were either expelled or killed) were taken as a pretext to neglect the Balkans altogether. In this version of Turkish history, the long history of Turkish Osmanlı’s living in the Balkans was neglected. The recent military humiliation was perceived as so great, that even present military successes could not revive interest in the Balkans. Eventually, when the Balkans was lost after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the Young Turks responded by tightening the grip on the Osmanlı provinces that were still part of the empire. During the following years, measures were taken to ensure that the upcoming First World War would not destroy the Osmanlı Empire. Unification and a strong centralized government were prioritized, after which, one major victory in Anatolia in 1915 gave hope to the Young Turk regime. Eventually, the Turks built on this string of military victories in Anatolia throughout 1919 until 1922, and simply chose to ignore the disastrous military campaigns in the Balkans from previous years. With military humiliation in the Balkans, the entire Balkan history of the Turks was erased from Turkish historiography from 1923 onwards. Ultimately, it would be hard to explain how a region that was inhabited by Turks for so long was lost so easily (relatively speaking) in just a couple of years. This is only explainable by military incompetence, and this harms the image of Turkey that was propagated. The image of Turkey is that of a glorious military state, and the loss of a central region does not fit this picture. In the end, the region of the Balkans was neglected in Turkish historiography. Two features are the direct outcome of linking the image of the nation to military glorification: (a) the later military victories, and relatively low number of defeats suffered by the Turks in Anatolia during the early twentieth century, have transformed the region to the core of the nation; (b) the large number of military defeats in the Balkans during recent times (from the nineteenth century to 1913), caused the Turkish geographical epicentre to shift from the Balkans to Anatolia.

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Concept 1: The Balkans and Turkish historiography

Situation

>>>

Cause

Losing the Balkans (Establishing facts)

The rise of The Rise of Nationalism the Young Turks (As a response)

>>>

Consequence

The process of Turkish Nationbuilding

Neglecting the Balkans (By using historiography)

Source: Armand Sag, Nation-building and historiography in modern Turkey (Utrecht, 2013-2014).

Concluding remarks This study was made up of several chapters in which each chapter provided a reinterpretation of Turkish history, especially the regime change from the Osmanlı Empire to the Republic of Turkey and the process of nation-building that accompanied it. The first chapter dealt with the various theories concerning nation-building and historiography. Most countries use historiography to craft an image of spiritual unity within its people. The states surrounding Turkey have added a component of military humiliation and geography to this concept of historiography and nation-building. For instance, in Serbia, the Battle of Kosovo (1389) is glorified as the ‘last stance of the Christian Serbians against the Muslim Osmanlı Turks’, despite the fact that Kosovo was a major defeat for the Serbians in a region that is now outside the borders of Serbia itself. Other states also made this approach to nation-building by adopting a version of history in which military humiliation and lost geography was elevated to the core of the nation’s nationalist historiography. In Armenia, the historiography still depicts Eastern Anatolia as ‘Western Armenia’, while the Republic of Armenia is dubbed ‘Eastern Armenia’. The focus lies on geography that is lost during an immense traumatic experience; in the case of Armenia this is the Armenian Relocation of 1915. Turkey, however, focused more on military success within a region that was still in Turkish hands after the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the First World War (1914-1918). This geographical emphasis was based on a pragmatic approach and a realistic view on the matter. In this chapter the unique approach of Turkey on focusing on historiography with a pragmatic and realistic approach is shown. In its process of historiography Turkey has not focused on a mythical land outside the available lands at the time of its independence, like Serbia or Armenia, but mainly on the lands that remained after the various wars.

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Therefore, Turkey was to create its own myths surrounding Anatolia. This became the main focus: on military success and the glorification of the battles won in that region. To elevate Anatolia to the status of a ‘Turkish homeland’, the military victories in those lands were glorified to such an extent that it created, in fact, a new geographical focus in Turkish nation-building in which other regions were neglected. After the first chapters, the following chapter is centred on Turkish historiography itself. In this chapter, the question deals with which region has a geographical focus in Turkish historiography. In this case, Turkish historiography was defined to correspond with the history schoolbooks used in Turkey from 1961 until 2010. The textbooks of elementary schools, secondary education and university admission exams were all taken into account. In distinguishing Turkish historiography and Turkish history as described in those textbooks, we can also name the other category. In this other category, which we will just call ‘historiography’, there are all the historiographies not included in the official textbooks. This category includes Turkish historiography as well as Turkish and non-Turkish history theories of any kind. In the category ‘Turkish historiography’ only history books that are approved by the Republic of Turkey are included. After defining Turkish historiography as Turkish history schoolbooks and some thorough research, the collected data in fact shows a a number of important points. The geographical region that was most mentioned, or asked about during the university admission exams, was the region of Anatolia. Even pre-Turkish ancient civilizations in Anatolia were given more room in the various chapters than the Turkish tribes in medieval times, in regions other than Anatolia. Therefore, this question in this chapter could be answered with a firm conclusion that, there is no doubt that Anatolia is the main focus in Turkish historiography. Turkish historiography indeed has a strong focus on geography, more specifically on Anatolia. While this is the outcome of Turkish historiography, it is important to look at the Balkans, and verify the outcomes regarding this region with the historiography in general, to see what possible explanations for neglecting the Balkans could be. Although this chapter’s question was answered, it also provided a new question that was posed. If Anatolia was indeed so emphasized to ignore other regions in Turkish history, then which regions were neglected? Looking further in Turkish historiography showed that, according to the various history textbooks, Central Asia was discarded due to supposed changing ecological factors. According to these books, Central Asia was once a paradise with fertile lands but altered into a dry desert steppe region. While an explanation for downplaying Central Asia was provided in Turkish schoolbooks, the explanation for neglecting the Balkans is entirely absent. For the Balkans, there was neither an explanation for its absence in Turkish historiography, nor the mere mention of the Turkish tribes that settled in that region. The third chapter, therefore,

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focused on the importance of the Balkans in Turkish historiography. This chapter is designed to show that, although the history of the Balkans is not intensively mentioned in Turkish historiography, there are a significant amount of Turkish traces in that region. And while historiography in general (be they non-Turkish academics or Turkish academics abroad, or even Turkish academics in Turkey that are not given widespread attention) has enough information concerning the position of the Balkans in Turkish history, this is absent in Turkish historiography. Was it neglected because the region never had an impact on Turkish tribes? Looking at historiography in general, not the official Turkish historiography, shows that the Balkans did have a great number of Turkish settlers in the region. These settlers started their migration well before the first Turks settled in Anatolia and their traces are still very visible in the various states of the Balkans: from Bulgaria to Hungary. Nonetheless, Turkish traces in the Balkans are either downplayed or simply left out in contemporary Turkish nation-building. In fact, the Balkan regions became the first stage when Turkish tribes migrated from Central Asia to Europe in the first and second millennia B.C., and this continued until other Turkish tribes eventually raided and settled in the Balkans some centuries later. The migration routes these Turkish tribes choose were along the Crimea (in present-day Ukraine) and not Anatolia. This effectively shows that ever since the Scythians migrated west from Central Asia to Europe by the northern Crimean route, almost all of the other Turkish tribes followed. By using the steppes of Russia and Ukraine, instead of passing through Anatolia, the rich and fertile Balkans were the first European regions that were settled by Turkish tribes. This migration was centuries and even millennia before Turks reached Anatolia. Nonetheless, Turkish historiography focuses merely on Anatolia. After the Scythians, other Turkish tribes like Peçeneks, Oğuz, Kumans, Tatars and many more adventurous horsemen from Central Asia followed in the footsteps of the Scythians and reached the Balkans. However, in Turkish historiography not only were the Balkan regions neglected or downplayed, but all of the Turkish tribes that also migrated to those lands. In Turkish historiography the Scythians, Peçeneks and Kumans are barely mentioned. The neglect of the Balkans in Turkish historiography formed a process in which events that occurred some millennia B.C., were forced to be neglected as well. In the Balkans, there are three major migration waves that are visible. While the first wave only entered the Balkans to raid and plunder, the second wave eventually settled in the Balkans and discarded their nomadic ways. The third wave of Turkish tribes even went a step further and created their own empires in the Balkan regions. These waves of Turkish horsemen, who kept pouring into the vast Balkan regions, continued for centuries. These waves not only depict the Balkans as a vast land that was seen as the last destination for migrating Turkish tribes, but also as a strategically important region. The Turkish tribes of the third wave, like the Osmanlı’s and

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to a lesser extent the Selçuklu’s, built their empires in those regions and chose to advance through the Balkans to Europe in the early period of their empire, instead of to the east, north or south. It shows the strategic importance of the Balkans for these Turkish tribes. Especially in the early period of empire building, the Balkan regions were transformed to the core of Turkish empires like that of the Selçuklu’s, but primarily that of the Osmanlı’s. This chapter also focused on the Osmanlı presence of the Balkans in Turkish historiography. This chapter is designed to show that there are significant Turkish traces in that region that descend from pre-Osmanlı as well as Osmanlı times. The Balkans did have a great number of Turkish settlers in the region. Eventually, it became the centre of the Osmanlı Empire but also played a decisive role in its demise. Nonetheless, Turkish historiography focuses merely on Anatolia. Eventually, the Balkans became the richest and wealthiest provinces of the long-lasting Osmanlı Empire. This wealth continued well into the twentieth century, and since the twelfth century the position of the Balkans as the core region within the Osmanlı Empire became more important. The Balkans remained the core for over five hundred years. All of this shows that the Balkans do in a sense have an important place in Turkish history, but are neglected in favour of Anatolia in Turkish historiography. The loss of the Balkans, with no possible means to retain or regain it in the short term, changed the Osmanlı Turks to a pragmatic people; a pragmatism that would not disappear with the lost of the Balkans. One important example of how events of the Balkan regions are shifted to Anatolia is the legend of the current Turkish flag. Although the Turkish flag first comes to use after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which is in current-day Kosovo but was then part of the Osmanlı Empire, cotemporary schoolteachers in Turkey are eager to shift this to the Battle of Gallipoli in the Dardanelles in 1915. Although both the battles of Kosovo and Gallipoli took place on the tip of the European continent, being the Balkans, the former is now part of Kosovo while the latter is still part of Turkey. The neglect of the Balkans in favour of Anatolia is now quite clear. The following chapter, therefore, focused on the question of why the Balkans was neglected. Why was this done? Were these regions unimportant to the image of the ‘Turk’ in the process of nation-building in Turkey? Or did some traumatic experience alter the role of the Balkan regions? In this context, the disastrous Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 are decisive. Prior to these wars, we can name a number of important features of the Balkans. For one, within the Osmanlı Empire these Balkan regions were regarded as the most fertile and richest provinces of the whole empire. Consequently, a great proportion of the Osmanlı population of Turkish-Muslim descent lived in those regions. This, in turn, led the most influential and intellectual Turks to come from those regions, the Young Turk movement and the Genç Kalemler are just two examples. In particular, the Young Turks put all efforts into saving the Balkan regions from

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the rebellious minorities of the Osmanlı Empire. The Balkan Wars ended all this, and the victorious rebels immediately started an ethnic cleansing that forced most Turks out of the Balkans. The Turkish exodus was a process that started in the nineteenth century with the Serbian and Greek uprisings within the Osmanlı Empire. Defeat in the Balkans Wars not only ended Osmanlı, or Turkish, rule in the Balkan regions but also ended all Turkish presence in the Balkans with the ethnic cleansing that followed. This exodus in fact caused a massive forced movement of Turkish civilians just for being Muslim and/or Turkish. It ended Turkish presence in the Balkan regions after almost three thousand years. This is the main reason why the lost regions of the Balkans were perceived as such a humiliation in Turkish nation-building, and accordingly neglected or downplayed in Turkish historiography. In the same chapter, the response to the approaching First World War and inevitable loss of the Balkan regions are discussed. Just a few years before the Balkan Wars, a new political movement came to light in the Balkans and were called the Young Turks after their relatively young ages. The İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (or Young Turk Movement) emerges as an innovative new political movement in the last days of the Osmanlı Empire as a political response to the major defeat in the Balkans, after the Serbian, Greek, Romanian and Bulgarian Uprising ensured independence for the Serbs, Greeks, Romanian and Bulgarians. The Young Turks were made up of primarily Osmanlı army officers and governmental officials. Their pragmatic and realistic approach was a desperate attempt to save the Balkan regions from being lost to the rebellious minorities of the Osmanlı Empire. The Young Turks tried everything in their power, from favouring the Osmanlı minorities for government positions to a coup d’état in order to maintain control over the city of Edirne when the Osmanlı minister was about to surrender it. Their pragmatic approach also included equal rights for all Osmanlı citizens to ensure loyalty. Nonetheless, the Young Turks and their political concessions were not enough to stop the decline within the Osmanlı Empire. Despite all the efforts of the Young Turks, the Balkans was eventually lost for the Osmanlı Empire. The Balkan Wars ended any ideas that the Young Turks had about preserving unity when the victorious rebels immediately started an ethnic cleansing that forced most Turks out of the Balkans. The Turkish exodus was a process that started in the nineteenth century with the Serbian and Greek uprisings within the Osmanlı Empire. Defeat in the Balkans Wars not only ended Osmanlı, or Turkish, rule in the Balkan regions but it also ended all Turkish presence in the Balkans with the ethnic cleansing that followed. This exodus in fact caused a massive forced movement of Turkish civilians, just for being Muslim and/or Turkish. It ended Turkish presence in the Balkan regions after almost three thousand years. This is the main reason why the lost regions of the Balkans were perceived as such a humiliation in Turkish nation-building, and accordingly neglected or downplayed in Turkish historiography.

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In this context, the defeat of the Osmanlı Turks in the Balkan Wars was without a doubt catastrophic. The fact is that almost one hundred years since those wars, no critical analysis that examines the specific military and strategic reasons for the Osmanlı defeat in the Balkan Wars has ever been conducted; we can clearly see this neglect in contemporary Turkish historiography. Neither the military loss, nor the exodus of millions of Turks from the Balkans to Anatolia has been a focus in Turkish historiography. The aspect of “victimized Turks” does not fit in the picture of the “glorious Turkish military-nation” that was depicted in contemporary Turkish historiography during the process of Turkish nation-building, and therefore the Balkan Wars are accordingly neglected within Turkish historiography. Subsequently, we can conclude that the disastrous Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 are decisive. Prior to these wars, we can name a few important features of the Balkans. For one, within the Osmanlı Empire these Balkan regions were regarded as the most fertile and richest provinces of the whole empire. Consequently, a great proportion of the Osmanlı population of TurkishMuslim descent lived in those regions. This, in turn, caused the most influential and intellectual Turks to come from those regions. The Young Turk movement and the Genç Kalemler are just two examples. The Young Turks, in particular, put all efforts into saving the Balkan regions from the rebellious minorities of the Osmanlı Empire. The last chapter evolves around a case study, in which the historic events were also neglected by Turkish historiography for resembling similar reasons as with the Balkans. These events have been distorted by historiographers outside of Turkey; up to a point it is believed that Turkey neglected it, not to hide their own pain, but to try and hide their ‘guilt’ in those events. This case study clearly shows the worst possible outcome for actively forgetting and neglecting one’s painful history. In short, in the first chapter we can see which theory of nation-building and historiography is implacable in the case of Turkey. In the second chapter we can see which geographical region is emphasized in Turkish historiography. In the third chapter we can see that the Balkans are downplayed in Turkish historiography, while in fact they play a quite big role in Turkish history. The fourth chapter deals with what trauma caused the Balkans to be neglected in Turkish historiography and what response this trauma surrounding the Balkans triggered. The last chapter goes further, and gives an implicit explanation for the geographical emphasis and neglect in Turkish historiography in the process of nation-building. Additional thoughts The neglect of the Balkans had a major impact on Turkish historiography in which almost three thousand years of history was to be neglected or downplayed. From the neglect of the Scythians, who raided the Balkans from a thousand

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years B.C., and onwards to the innovative political movement of the Young Turks, neglect created a distorted image in historiography. The neglect of the Balkans also changes the mentality itself. The collapse of the Osmanlı Empire made way for a new pragmatic approach of the Turks. Firstly, the Young Turk Movement tried to stop the decline of the Empire. When this did not work, and the Republic of Turkey eventually rose from the ashes of the Osmanlı Empire, another pragmatic approach was to downplay the Balkans, since that area was no longer part of the Turkish Republic. This is very different to how other peoples from the Balkans and the Caucasus dealt with their own military humiliation and elastic boundaries. Just two examples are Serbia and Armenia, in which their historiography respectively focuses on the glorification of major military defeats during the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and the Armenian Relocation (1915). But when military successes are the main criteria for either glorification of an entire region, or (in case of military humiliation) downplaying and neglecting other regions, it comes down to a correlation between military glorifications with geographical emphasis on one region while neglecting other regions in historiography. But just as with the case of the innovative political movement of the Young Turks, neglect creates a distorted image in historiography. For example, the neglect of the Young Turks in Turkish historiography has caused some to claim that the Young Turks’ motivations lay in a fanatical Turkish nationalism, instead of the more precise motivation of the Young Turks to save the remains of the Osmanlı Empire. An example on a micro level could be the impact that this historiographical neglect has on contemporary Turkish intellectuals. One could look at the example of a Turkish columnist, who recently wrote a column in which he admitted that he knew almost nothing about the Balkans or anything slightly connected to that region. The average Turkish citizen undoubtedly recognizes himself in his column. Neglecting the Balkans in Turkish historiography caused not only to neglect or downplay aspects that were in the distant past of three thousand years ago, but also to neglect some vital political movements during the Osmanlı era in the twentieth century that played a role in the foundation of the later Republic of Turkey in 1923. This neglect of the Balkans narrowed Turkish history to a mythical Central Asia, and a pragmatic ‘Turkish homeland’ in Anatolia. This becomes even more interesting when the importance of geography is mentioned in Turkey, since this revolves entirely around Anatolia. All other regions seem to be deemed as unimportant in order to avoid any attempts or claims to expand the Turkish nation, as other conquerors like Napoleon did in a not too distant past. In Turkey, the historiography is designed to be pragmatic and realistic or in order words; to ensure that the Turkish population is content with the lands it currently has, without a claim on other lands. As with nations that still claim outside regions, like Serbia and Armenia, wars are eventually inevitable. Serbia recently had the Yugoslavian Wars in the 1990s while Armenia

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had the Azerbaijani War in the same decade. Consequently, with the Young Turk movement and their intellectual heritage, the newly established Republic of Turkey focused more on a pragmatic and realistic approach to historiography and the Turkish process of nationbuilding, in which the prevention of new wars prevented a focus on distant or mythical lands since the risk of an outbreak of a new war would then be present. The reluctance of Turkey to be involved in the Second World War can be viewed as an example in this context, where Turkey did not want to enter any new war, even if the outcome could have provided additional lands for the young Turkish Republic. Possibly, this attitude came from a reconciliation process in which the traumatic events of the Balkans (and other places) were to be prevented in the future. Peace was a sure step in order to prevent it. Ensuring peace would also block any feelings of retaliation, revenge or to recover what some Turks felt were ‘theirs’ by waging a new war. This step was to ensure reconciliation, compassion, forgiveness, and peace. These four components would lead to a neglect of past injustices inflicted by others on the Turks, and the traumatic experiences of the Turks during the early twentieth century. It would also lead to a new beginning of relating to ‘others’ by Turks. But without acknowledging the traumatic experiences, forgiveness, healing and restoration proved quite difficult in contemporary times. In this case, the search for social restructuring and restitution, would heal wounds, would establish equality, and would rectify the past through neglecting or downplaying traumatic events (especially in the Balkans) in historiography. This has brought respect, mutual understanding and security for Turkey and the surrounding countries, but at a cost in which injustice against Turks in the past was, and still is, entirely neglected or downplayed.

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Appendices Appendix 1 Turkish history textbooks that were analyzed for geographical emphasis on Anatolia within Turkish history: 1. Akşit, N. & Oktay, E. (1986). Tarih: Lise I. Sınıf (‘History: First Year of High school). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. 2. Akşit, N. (1986). Tarih: Lise 2 (‘History: Second Year of High school). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. 3. Arıca, S.T. & Yaşasınoğlu, A. (2010). Çeyrek Asrın S oruları: Tarih çıkmış 1985-2010 soruları (‘The Questions of a quarter century: History questions between 1985-2010’). Ankara: Örnek Yayınevi. 4. Dündar, O. (ed. 2009). Atatürk ve Cumhuriyetçilik (‘Atatürk and Republicanism’). Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi / Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları. 5. Dürder, B. & Ediskun, H. (1982). Bizim Dilbilgisi, İlkokul 5 (‘Our Language Grammer, Fifth Grade of Primary School’). İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. 6. Göğüş, B. (1982). Temeleğitim Okulları Türkçe, 3. Sınıf (‘Turkish for Primary School, Third Grade’). İstanbul: Devlet Kitapları / Oğul Matbaacılık. 7. Göğüş, B. (1982). Temeleğitim Okulları Türkçe, 4. Sınıf (‘Turkish for Primary School, Fourth Grade’). İstanbul: Devlet Kitapları / Tifdruk Matbaacılık. 8. Göğüş, B. (1982). Temeleğitim Okulları Türkçe, 5. Sınıf (‘Turkish for Primary School, Fifth Grade’). Ankara: Devlet Kitapları / Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. 9 Ortaylı, İ. (ed. 2004). Tarih Atlası (6 volumes) (‘History Atlas’). İstanbul: Atlas / Hürriyet. 10. Ortaylı, İ. (ed. 2004). Tarih Atlası: İlk ve Ortaöğretim için (‘History Atlas: For Primary and Secondary Education’). İstanbul: Atlas.

227

11. Sanır, F., Asal, T. & Akşit, N. (1981). İlkokullar İçin Sosyal Bilgiler, 4. Sınıf (‘Social Sciences for Primary School, Fourth Grade’). İstanbul: Devlet Kitapları / Milli Eğitim Basımevi. 12. Sanır, F., Asal, T. & Akşit, N. (1978). İlkokullar İçin Sosyal Bilgiler, 5. Sınıf (‘Social Sciences for Primary School, Fifth Grade’). İstanbul: Devlet Kitapları / Milli Eğitim Basımevi. 13. Su, K. & Bülkat, G. (1961). İlk ve Orta Okullar İçin Resimlerle Tarih Atlası (‘History Atlas with Pictures for Elementary and Middle Schools’). Ankara: Birsen Yayınevi. 14. Türkben, M. (ed. 2005). Dünya ve Türkiye Atlası (‘The Atlas of Turkey and the World’). İstanbul: Atlas / Milliyet. 15. Unat, F.R. (1983). Tarih Atlası, genişletilmiş basım (‘History Atlas, extended version’). İstanbul: Kanaat Yayınları. 16. Yıldız, İ. (2006). (Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı) ÖSS Tarih: Temel Kavramlar ve Bilgiler (‘Student Selection Exams History: Basic Terms and Knowledge’). İstanbul: Birey Yayınları.

228

Appendix 2 Details and copyrights of the maps in Chapter Three:

Map 4: Scythians (1000/800 B.C. - 300 B.C.), Sarmatians (300 B.C. - 400 A.D.), Alans (300 A.D. - 1300 A.D.) Including the cities and battles of: Olbia (331 B.C.) and Chersonesus (512 B.C.) “The Scythians”, Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht (2011). Creator: Armand Sag Designer: Mesut Pehlivan Copyright: Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht – the Netherlands (2011) Map 5: Huns (fifth century A.D.) “The Western Huns”, Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht (2011). Creator: Armand Sag Designer: Mesut Pehlivan Copyright: Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht – the Netherlands (2011) Map 6: Bulgars: Empire of the (river) Volga (770-1400) / Empire of the (river) Danube (584-1018) “The Bulgars”, Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht (2011). Creator: Armand Sag Designer: Mesut Pehlivan Copyright: Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht – the Netherlands (2011) Map 7: Avars (6th-8th century), Macars (9th-10th century) “The Avars & Macars”, Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht (2011). Creator: Armand Sag Designer: Mesut Pehlivan Copyright: Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht – the Netherlands (2011) Map 8: Peçeneks (8th-11th century) and Oguz (9th century) “The Peçeneks”, Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht (2011). Creator: Armand Sag Designer: Mesut Pehlivan Copyright: Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht – the Netherlands (2011)

229

Map 9: Kıpçak (Kuman) (11th-13th century) “The Kıpçaks”, Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht (2011). Creator: Armand Sag Designer: Mesut Pehlivan Copyright: Institute for Turkish Studies, Utrecht – the Netherlands (2011)

230

Appendix 3 The literature that is written in Turkey about the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) can be found in a couple of easy ways. One way, for example, is to approach the main academic publishing house / bookstore in Turkey and ask for a list of publications on the matter. After doing this with Libra Books in İstanbul, one of the most known bookstores of Turkey, the following list was provided:

Author

Title

Year

Place

Publisher

Mükekaid, Mahmud Beliğ

Bulgar Komitalarının Tarihi ve Balkan Harbinde Yaptıkları

1936

Ankara?

Askeri Matbaa

Andonyan, Aram

Balkan Harbi 19121913

1937

Ankara

Genelkurmay Başkanlığı

Çağan, Nazmi

Balkan Harbi’nde Edirne

1965

Ankara

Türk Tarih Kurumu

Tansu, Muzaffer

Konuşan Hatıralar - Balkan Harbi ve 1. Dünya Harbi

1974

İzmir

Aydın Matbaası

Andonyan, Aram

Balkan Harbi Tarihi

1975

İstanbul

Sander Yayınları

Muhtar, Mahmut

Balkan Harbi

1979

İstanbul

Tercüman Yayınları

Andonyan, Aram

Balkan Harbi Birinci Çatalca Muharebesi

1983

Ankara

Genelkurmay Başkanlığı

Öztuna, Yılmaz

93 ve Balkan Savaşları Avrupa Türkiyesi’ni Kaybımız - Rumeli’nin Elden Çıkışı

1990

İstanbul

Babıali Kültür Yayınları

Görgülü, İsmet

On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu 1912-1922 Balkan-Birinci dünya ve İstiklal Harbi

1993

Ankara

Türk Tarih Kurumu

Kurnaz, Şefika

Balkan Harbinde Kadınlarımızın Konuşmaları

1993

İstanbul

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı

231

Kurnaz, Şefika

Balkan Harbinde 87. Alay (Trabzon Gönüllüleri)

1995

Trabzon

Trabzon Belediyesi

Görgülü, İsmet (ed.)

On Yıllık Savaşın Günlüğü - Balkan, Birinci Dünya ve İstiklal Savaşları

1997

İstanbul

Yapı Kredi Yayınları

Bardakçı, İlhan

Bir İmparatorluğun Yağması (Balkan Bozgunu ve 1. Dünya Harbi)

2006

İstanbul

Türk Edebiyat Vakfı

Bardakçı, İlhan

Balkanlar Harbinde Osmanlı Donanması

?

İstanbul?

Deniz Harp Akademisi Komutanlığı

Çağan, Nazmi

Balkan Harbi’nde Yanya Savunması ve Esat Paşa

?

Ankara

Genelkurmay Başkanlığı

232

233

234

Index # 31 Mart Vakası 142, 144, 148 4+4+4 model 55 A Abdülhamit the Second 131-132 Admiral Bristol 67 Adriatic Sea 63 Aegean Sea 59, 66 Agop Martayan Dilaçar 32 Ahmet Rıza 136 Alania 96 Alans 90, 96, 116 Albanian Revolt 144-145 Albanians 145 Algeria 62 Alparslan 60 Anatolia 29-35, 37-38, 40, 49-53, 56-70, 72-73, 75,75-80, 87-88, 96, 106, 114-118, 120-121, 129, 132, 138-140, 143-144, 148-151, 157, 159, 164-165, 167-168, 171-177, 179-181, 191-198, 200-201 Anatolianism 33 Ancient Egyptians 57-59, 69 Ancient Greeks 59, 88 Ancient times 39, 53, 57-58, 63-64, 70, 77, 79, 88, 92, 120 Arab 34, 36, 38, 53, 62, 65, 68-69, 77, 141, 147, 149-150, 164, 178-179 Arabia 38, 77 Arab peninsula 62 Arabs 34, 65, 68-69, 141, 164, 178 Ardahan 132 Armenia 28, 114, 170, 180-181, 195, 201 Armenian assault 136 Armenian controversy 51 Armenian issue 39-40, 157, 169, 181-182 Armenian prince 110 Armenian Rebellion 37, 157, 162 Armenians 29, 34, 53, 141, 157-182 Artvin 132 Aryan race 23 Asian Bulgar Empire 106 Assimilated Clans 97, 116

235

Assyrians 59, 77, 164 Atatürk 30-32, 36, 57, 63, 67-68, 74, 119, 192 Austria 32, 68, 132 Austria-Hungary 132 Avars 59-60, 104, 107, 116, B Bab-ı Ali 146, 149-150 Bab-ı Ali Raid 146 Babylonians 59, 77 Balamber 98 Balkan 36-37, 39, 49-50, 65-66, 75-76, 87-88, 97, 107, 111, 115, 118-121, 131-133, 136, 138-140, 144, 148, 151, 164, 193-194, 197-200 Balkans 28, 30-40, 49-50, 59-70, 75-76, 78-80, 87-89, 92, 96-98, 106-107, 110-111, 114-121, 129-133, 137-138, 143, 145, 147-148, 150-151, 191-202 Balkan Wars 34-37, 39-40, 62, 67, 116, 120-121, 129, 150-151, 157, 194-195, 198-200 Basic Law for National Education 56 Battle of Ankara 69, 118, 164 Battle of Gallipoli 119, 121, 157, 198 Battle of Kadeş 68 Battle of Malazgırt 110 Battle of Manzikert 33, 38, 60, 194 Battle of Mohaç 63 Battle of Prut 63 Battle of Talas 68 Battle of Varna 118 Batum 132 Bizans (city of) 59 Black Sea 50, 66, 96-97 Budapest 117 Bulgaria 37, 50, 106, 110, 118, 121, 132, 164, 197 Bulgarian khan 102 Bulgarian-Orthodox Christians 146 Bulgarian Rebellion 137 Bulgarians 37, 50, 102-103, 110, 114, 117, 129, 137, 146, 199 Bulgars 59-60, 65, 100-107, 110, 114, 116, 141 Burgundian countryside 25 Burgundians 99 Byzantine Empire 59, 65, 107, 114 Byzantines 33, 38, 59-60, 102, 107, 110-111, 114, 118 Byzantine sources 106, 111

236

129, 102, 157, 191,

C Çağrı Bey 69 Caliph of the Muslim world 139 Caspian Sea 77, 98, 110, 114 Çatalhöyük 77 Caucasus 28, 31, 33, 161, 163, 175, 180, 201 Celal Bey 146 Cemal Paşa 146 Cengiz Han 115 Central Asian tribes 31, 33, 38, 59, 92 China 57, 97 Chinese 58, 97-98 Chinese wall 97 Christian Bulgarians 103 Christianity 102, 115, 117, 177 Christians 38, 67, 110, 117, 137, 157, 164, 167, 175, 177, 192 Christian settlers 102 Christopher Columbus 61 Chronicle 110 City of Kiev 110 Codex Cumanicus 115 Congress of Berlin 132 Constantinople 107, 110, 118-119, 165, 172, 177 Constitution 56, 68-70, 131-133, 136-137, 139, 141-142, 144, 170, 172-173 Construction of the past 23-24 Coups in Turkey 72 Crete 36 Crimea 49, 96, 102, 106-107, 115, 117, 197 Crusades 57, 60, 78, 118 Cyprus 30, 36, 49, 132 D Damrong Rajanuphab 55 Dardanelles 119, 121, 148, 157, 198 Dashnaks 144, 172, 174 Democracy 137 Diyarbakır 32, 118 Dutch 20, 35, 51, 53, 130, 160, 163, 165 E Early Middle Ages Early Modern Age

57, 87 65-66

237

Earth 58 East-European forces 118 Eastern Europe 24, 66, 68, 120 Ecological transformation 31 Edirne 37, 69, 129, 131, 134-135, 137-138, 146-148, 150-151, 199 Education 24-25, 29-30, 35, 38, 52, 54-56, 64-66, 70, 72, 75, 77, 79, 92, 102, 160, 179, 193, 196 Educational system 24-25, 54-55, 75 Edward Grey 146 Edward VII 138 Egypt 36, 57, 62, 66, 68, 149 el-Kâşgarî 93, 110 England 66 Enver 138, 147, 161, 176 Ethnic societies 55 Europe 24-25, 27-31, 38, 57, 59, 63, 65-66, 78, 92, 102, 120, 132-133, 161, 171, 197-198 European sympathy 133 Europeans 38, 68, 98, 141, 168, 171, 178 Expulsion of Osmanlı citizens 67 F First Balkan War 37, 50, 92, 129, 145 First World War 30, 37, 62-63, 67, 69, 148, 150-151, 158, 169, 173, 176, 178-180, 192, 194-195, 199 France 25-27, 29, 34-35, 55, 66, 132, 136-137, 143, 161, 168, 181 Franco-Prussian War 35 Franks 60 Frederich Meinecke 23 French Foreign Legion 35 French Revolution 24, 26, 66, 131-132 Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff 33 G Gagavuz 114, 117 Genç Kalemler 36, 198, 200 Geography 23, 32, 35, 37-38, 40, 50, 52-55, 58, 66, 70, 77, 79-80, 87, 157, 192-193, 195-196, 201 Geography in Turkish historiography 50, 52, 55, 80 Georgia 114 German Empire 35 Germanic 98-99 Germanic peoples 98-99

238

Germans 24 Germany 24-27, 34-35, 66, 165 Ghenghis Khan 115 Göktürk Empire 59 Göktürks 57, 59-60 Government agencies 24 Great Britain 29, 132, 172 Great Hunnic Empire 98 Great Migration 97, 115, 181 Great Selçuklu Empire 114 Greek-Orthodox Christians 137 Greek Osmanlı’s (Greek Ottomans) 29 Greek Rebellion 133 Greeks 29, 34, 37, 53, 59, 88, 92, 137, 141, 177, 199 Greek Uprising 136, 199 Güneş Dil 32 H Habsburg Empire 68 Harbiye 133 Hazar 77 Hazars 59-60 Hermann F. Kvergić 32 Heroes and saint 24 Higher education 64, 70 Historical-geographical concept 31 Historic homeland 51 Historiography 23-29, 31-34, 37-40, 49-55, 59, 62-66, 68-70, 72, 74-80, 87-89, 92-93, 96-98, 102, 111, 115, 118, 120-121, 129, 157-159, 162, 164-169, 174, 180-182, 192-202 History schoolbooks 32, 38, 52-53, 56, 62, 64, 70, 196 History textbooks 28, 35, 54-56, 87, 92, 102, 158, 193, 196 Hittites 33, 57-60, 63, 68-70, 77, 79, 96 Horseback warriors 92 Hungarian Kingdom 102 Hungarians 102, 110-111, 114, 117 Hungary 63, 68, 97, 107, 117, 132, 197 Hunnic traces 96 Hunno-Bulgars 106-107 Huns 53, 57, 59, 69, 94-99, 102, 106, 110, 114, 116-117, 121 I India

38, 57-58

239

Indians 25 Indoctrination 55 Ionians 77 Iraq 30, 77, 161, 165 Iranian nomads 92 Iranification 96 Iron age 57 İskan 65-66 İskit 92, 120 Islamic Empire 57, 59-60 Islamism 52, 67, 169 Italian 24-25, 30, 55, 145, 180 Italy 25, 66, 114, 145 İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 170, 172-173, 176, 199

136 36, 39, 67, 130-131, 136-137, 139-140, 146,

J Japan 34-35 Jerusalem 60 Jews 29, 34, 53, 141, 160, 172 Jön Türkler 136 K Kamil Paşa 145-147 Kars 132 Kıbrıslı Tevfik Bey 146 Kılıç Arslan 60 Kiman 115 King Arthur 23 Kınık clan 110 Kıpçak 106, 111-117 Kıpçak-Kuman Confederation 114 Kırmancı 29, 34 Kulturnation 23 Kuman 114-117, 120, 197 Kuman-Kıpçak culture 115 Kurdish 28-30, 32, 34, 51, 53, 149, 159, 163-165, 168, 170-172, 175, 179, 181 Kurdish minority 51 Kutluk 57, 60 Kutrugur 106 Kynaz 102

240

L Late Middle Ages 61 Law for Primary Education and Training 56 Laz 34 Liberalism 23, 132-133, 137 Libya 36, 145 Lydians 72 M Macars 104-105, 110-111, 114, 116 Macedonia 137-138, 144-146 Magellan 61 Magyars 59 Mahmut Şevket Paşa 145, 147-148 Manastır 134-135, 137-138 Massive migrations 157 Mecca 68-69 Medina 68 Mehmet Reşat 142 Mehmet Talat 137, 139, 145, 151 Mehmet V 142 Mercenaries 107, 110, 114 Mesopotamia 77 Mesopotamian cultures 69 Meşrutiyet 130, 148 Mete Oğuz Han 98 Middle Ages 29, 39, 57, 61, 66, 87 Middle East 31, 33, 38, 59, 63, 65, 68, 75, 77-78, 111, 114, 175 Militarism 35, 37 Militaristic self-image 35 Militaristic state 34 Militarization 32, 35 Military defeat 28, 32, 34, 37, 39, 121, 150, 166, 193-194, 201 Military glorification 27-28, 35, 148, 157, 192-194, 201 Military humiliation 28, 35, 148, 150, 157, 182, 191-195, 201 Military-nation 34, 39, 200 Military victory 32, 151, 181 Ministry of Education 52, 56, 72, 79, 193 Minorities 27, 29-30, 32, 34, 37, 130, 132-133, 137, 139-142, 144, 150-151, 157, 167, 172, 199-200 Moldavia 63, 68, 114, 117 Mongol Empire 116-117

241

Mongol hordes 38, 77, 115, 117 Mongols 96-98, 115-117 Mongol tribes 116-117 Montenegro 132, 145 Mülkiye 133 Muslim Arabs 68 Mustafa Kemal 30, 54, 67, 68, 137 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 32, 52, 67-68 Mustafa Necib 146 Mythical paradise 76 N Nation 24-29, 31, 34, 38, 55, 77, 89, 133, 137, 192, 194 National citizen 24, 36 National history 23-25 Nationalism 27, 29-30, 32, 34-35, 37, 39-40, 49, 54, 96, 102, 132-133, 143, 149-151, 169, 176, 191-192, 195, 201 Nazım Paşa 146 Nazi’s 24, 162-163, 165 Neglect 23-29, 31-35, 37-40, 51, 64, 66-67, 70, 73, 76, 79-80, 87-88, 92, 96, 118, 120-121, 148, 157-159, 165-166, 169, 174, 181-182, 191-202 Nomadic confederation 98 Nomadic warriors 51, 53 Non-Muslims 29 North Africa 62, 68, 77 O Official historiography 24, 51, 54 Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı (ÖSS) 72 Ogur 106 Oğuz 60, 106, 110-111, 114, 116, 120, 197 Oğuz branch 60 Ohrili Nafız Bey 146 Old Great Bulgaria 106 On-Ogur 106 Onogur-Bulgar 106 Orhan Gazi 65 Orkhon inscriptions 33 Osmancılık 133 Ossetia 96 Ostrogoths 98-99 Osmanlı citizens 29-30, 37, 67, 133, 137, 139, 141-143, 148-150, 157, 199

242

Osmanlı Empire 29-33, 35-40, 49-50, 61-63, 65-69, 73, 78-79, 88-89, 118-121, 129, 131-145, 147-148, 150-151, 157, 159-161, 164, 167-169, 171-172, 174, 177-178, 180-181, 191, 193-195, 198-201 Osmanlı-ism 67, 132-133 Osmanlı minorities 30, 37, 139-140, 199 Osmanlı Reforms 66 Osmanlı rule 50, 89, 191 Osmanlı’s 29, 36, 38, 49-50, 53, 61, 62, 65-66, 69-70, 77-79, 116, 118-119, 121, 138, 144-146, 157, 164-165, 167-168, 171, 173, 176, 178, 181, 194, 197-198 Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası 142 Osmanlı-Turkish legacy 89 P Pacific 98 Pagan Bulgars 103 Pannonia 114 Pan-Turkish 33, 176 Parliament 30, 67, 132, 136-137, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 160, 172-173 Peçenek names 114 Peçeneks 65, 108-111, 114, 116, 120, 197 Persian 36, 131, 141 Persians 92 Pillage 87 Policy of unity 148-149 Political nationalist 32 Portugal 62 Prehistory 57 Pre-Islamic Turkish history 65 Pre-Osmanlı 89, 121, 198 Pre-school education 56 Primary education 56, 64-65, 70, 92, 102, 140 Process of nation-building 23, 25, 27-29, 32-33, 35, 37, 39, 55, 89, 182, 192-193, 195, 198, 200, 202 Publication of history books 24 R Race 23, 53, 55, 92, 137, 165, 192 Rationalism 23 Reign of Boris 102 Republican Era 54, 73-74, 192 Republicanism 23, 68 Republic of Turkey 30-32, 34, 36, 39, 52, 56, 63, 67-70, 72-76, 79-80, 140, 158, 180, 182, 192, 195-196, 201-202

243

Revolution of 1908 130, 141 River Danube 96, 107 Roman Empire 59, 99 Romania 49-50, 63, 114, 117, 132, 165, 199 Romans 92, 96, 99 Rumeli 50, 65, 164 Russia 24, 26, 30, 33, 35, 49, 66, 78, 87, 96, 132, 138-139, 161, 163-169, 172-176, 181, 197 Russians 24, 78, 110, 132, 138-139, 167-169, 172-176, 181 Russian steppe 62 Russian Tsar Nicolas II 138 S SABAMER 89, 92 Sait Halim Paşa 145, 147-149 Saka 92, 120 Sakarya University 89 Sarmatians 96-97, 102, 114, 116 Sarmatian-Scythian lands 96 Schoolbooks 25, 29, 32-33, 38, 51-58, 62, 64-66, 70, 80, 193, 196 Scythian 92, 96-97 Scythians 65, 69, 88, 90-93, 96-97, 102, 114, 116, 120, 197, 200 Secondary education 35, 56, 64-65, 70, 72, 75, 79, 92, 102, 196 Second Balkan War 37, 92, 148 Second World War 24, 52, 63, 74, 159, 202 Secularism 63, 137 Selanik 36, 119-120, 134-135, 137-138, 142, 146 Selçuklu architecture 60 Selçuklu Empire 31, 57, 60, 114 Selçuklu tribes 31, 38, 60, 110, 120 Selçuklu’s 33, 38, 60-62, 68-70, 77, 106, 108-110, 116-118, 121, 198 Serbia 28, 60, 132, 137, 145, 191-192, 195, 199, 201 Serbian-Orthodox Christians 137 Serbians 60, 195 Serbs 29, 37, 137, 141, 191, 199 Sibir Turks 69 Siege of Istanbul 63 Simeon 110 Slavic Bulgarians 103 Slavification 110 Slovakia 107 Southern Ukraine 114 Soviet Union 96, 167

244

Spain 62, 66, 176 Statistical mode 56, 64 Suat Kınıklıoğlu 87 Şükrü Paşa 129 Sultan İzzeddin Kaykavuş Sumerian language 32 Sumerians 33, 59 Sun Language Theory 32

117

T Tamerlane 77, 118 Tatars 96, 117, 120, 197 Tatar tili 115 Ten Tribes of Bulgar 106 Teoman 98 Territorialization 55 Terrorism 73, 144 Thailand 55 The Golden Horde 117 The Netherlands 51, 162, 176 The Rus (ancient Russians) 110 Thessaloniki 36, 119-120 Third Republic 25 Thracian 96, 138 Timur Gürkan 118 Timurids 77 Today’s Zaman 87 Trablusgarp War of 1911 67 Traces of Turkish tribes 88, 92 Treaty of Edirne-Segedin 69 Treaty of Kadeş 69 Treaty of Lausanne 68 Tripolitanian War 145 Tunghuz 98 Tunisia 36 Turanist 33 Turco-Mongol hordes 115 Turk 173, 191 Turkey 23, 28-40, 51-57, 63-65, 67-70, 72-76, 79-80, 87-89, 92, 96, 118-121, 129-130, 140, 143, 158-161, 168-169, 175, 180-182, 192-198, 200-202 Turkic 33, 38, 53, 59-60, 88, 120, 175 Turkified 65, 97-98, 115-117, 136 Turkish academics 120, 197

245

Turkish diplomats 73, 182 Turkish flag 62, 118-119, 121, 198 Turkish geography 32, 193 Turkish Grand National Assembly 67 Turkish Historical Society 51 Turkish historiography 29, 31-34, 38-40, 49-53, 55, 59, 62-66, 68-70, 72, 75-80, 87-89, 92-93, 96-98, 102, 111, 115, 118, 120-121, 129, 157-159, 162, 164-169, 174, 180-182, 192-201 Turkish History Thesis 51, 54 Turkish horsemen 118, 197 Turkish identity 33, 102 Turkish-Islamic history 54, 65 Turkish Islam Thesis 54 Turkish Kazars 106 Turkish language 32, 36, 52-54 Turkish Language Association 53 Turkish Language Society 32, 54 Turkish migrations 88-89 Turkish military 34, 39, 200 Turkish Minister of Culture 34 Turkish Ministry of Education 56, 72, 79 Turkish nation 38 Turkish nationalism 32, 35, 40, 54, 149, 151, 191, 201 Turkish schoolbooks 38, 52, 196 Turkish settlers 88, 133, 197-198 Turkish University Admission Exams 71, 73-74, 76 Turkish War of Independence 30, 63, 67-68, 73, 157, 180, 194 Turkism 67 Türkmen tribes 66 Turkology 33 Turko-Russian War 132 Turko-Tatar 118 Turks 29-35, 37-39, 50-51, 53, 57-61, 65-68, 75, 78-79, 87-89, 96-97, 102, 129, 131, 133, 137-139, 141, 147-148, 150, 157, 159, 163-164, 168, 170, 172-174, 176, 178-180, 191-194, 197-202 Twentieth century 26, 29-30, 34, 55, 66, 79, 121, 129, 143, 194, 198, 201-202 U Ukraine 62, 87, 114, 197 Ulah’s 137 United States of America 25-26 Universities in Turkey 51, 72

246

Urartu 77 Utrugur 106 Uygurs 60 Uygur Turkish

116

V Vandals 99 Vasco da Gama 61 Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti 137 Vilhelm Ludwig Peter Thomsen 33 Visigoths 99 Volga 106 W Western Anatolia Westernism 67

38, 59, 164, 179

X Xiong-Nu 97 Y Yakub Cemil 137, 146 Young Turk Movement 36, 39, 132, 146, 169, 198-202 Young Turk regime 40, 130, 151, 194 Young Turks 36-37, 39-40, 66-67, 120, 130-132, 136-144, 146-151, 170, 192, 194-195, 198-201 Z Zaza 34 Ziya Gökalp

23, 32

247

248