Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay: The Theory of the Organizational Ideal 9780814788790

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NARCISSISTIC PROCESS AND CORPORATE DECAY

NARCISSISTIC PROCES S AN D CORPORATE DECA Y The Theory of the Organization Ideal Howard S. Schwart z

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRES S New York an d Londo n

Copyright © 199 0 b y New Yor k Universit y All right s reserve d Manufactured i n th e Unite d State s o f Americ a

Library o f Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Dat a Schwartz, Howar d S. , 1942 Narcissistic proces s an d corporat e deca y : the theor y o f th e organizatio n idea l Howard S . Schwartz . p. cm . Includes bibliographica l reference s (p . ) and index . ISBN 0-8147-7913- 1 (acid-fre e paper ) 1. Corporat e culture—Unite d States . 2. Organizationa l behavior—Unite d States . 3. Genera l Motor s Corporation—Management . 4. Unite d States . Nationa l Aeronautic s an d Spac e Administration—Management . 5. Challenge r (Spacecraft)—Accidents . I. Title . HD58.7.S34 8 199 0 302.3'5—dc2 0 90-1324 2 CIP New Yor k Universit y Pres s book s ar e printed o n acid-fre e paper , and thei r bindin g material s ar e chosen fo r strengt h an d durability .

Book design by Ken Venczio

For Robbie and Cassie. And for Rebecca.

Fool: Can you mak e no use of nothing , nuncle? Lear: Why, no, boy. Nothing ca n b e made out of nothing . Shakespeare, King Lear

Contents Acknowledgments x i PART ON E

The Theory o f th e Organizatio n Idea l Introduction 3 1 Th e Clockwork o r the Snakepit: A n Essay on the Meanin g of Teaching Organizationa l Behavio r 7 2 O n the Psychodynamics o f Organizationa l Totalitarianis m 1 6 3 Antisocia l Action s of Committe d Organizationa l Participant s 3 1 PART TW O

Organizational Deca y an d Organizational Disaste r Introduction 4 9 4 Totalitaria n Managemen t an d Organizationa l Decay : The Case of Genera l Motor s 5 3 5 Organizationa l Disaste r an d Organizationa l Decay : The Case of the National Aeronautic s an d Spac e Administration 7 3 6 O n th e Psychodynamics o f Organizationa l Disaster : Th e Case of the Space Shuttle Challenger 9 0 PART THRE E

American Cultur e and th e Challenger Disaster : A Historical Perspectiv e 7 Th e Symbol of th e Space Shuttle and th e Degeneration of the American Drea m 10 7 ix

CONTENTS

X

8 Conclusion : Addictio n an d Recover y 12 7 Notes 13 7 References 14 Index 14 7

3

Acknowledgments My student s an d friend s wh o hav e taugh t m e abou t organizationa l lif e have bee n m y mos t importan t intellectua l benefactors . Sinc e I canno t mention the m al l b y name , i t seem s t o m e wis e no t t o mentio n an y o f them b y name. The thoughts and observations o f B. A., B. D., D. S., and P. B. have been especially helpful . Larry Hirschhorn ha s become something of a n alter ego for me. There are often time s when I do not know where my mind stops and his begins. I have a n ide a tha t somethin g simila r ma y happe n t o him . A t an y rate , such a relationshi p i s no t alway s smooth , s o I am gratefu l t o hav e a n opportunity lik e thi s t o sa y publicl y ho w muc h I admire hi s work an d value his friendship. Howell Bau m an d Michae l Diamon d hav e bee n m y friends , intellec tual confederates , travelin g companions , an d th e protectors o f m y soul . Without their support, I think i t would have dried up and blown away . Harry Levinso n gav e support fo r m y wor k whe n I needed i t desper ately, an d suppor t o f th e sort tha t someon e ca n giv e only whe n hi s o r her own accomplishmen t i s beyond question . I am very grateful t o him. Chris Argyris, whom I have never met, has generously give n my work the benefi t o f hi s wisdom , hi s goo d sense , an d hi s ow n uniqu e poin t o f view. M y work ha s benefitte d greatl y fro m i t an d I , personally , hav e been honored b y it. The Internationa l Societ y fo r th e Psychoanalyti c Stud y o f Organiza tions ha s bee n a foru m i n whic h I have bee n abl e t o presen t m y wor k and lear n fro m th e wor k o f others . Democra t thoug h I am , I have t o admit tha t ther e i s something t o b e said fo r bein g a member o f a n elite. At th e leas t i t ha s give n m e a n opportunit y t o mee t regularl y wit h a number o f peopl e wh o have , eac h i n hi s o r he r ow n way , becom e ver y important t o me . I n additio n t o Michael , Howell , Larry , an d Harry , I would lik e to mentio n Le o Gruenfeld, Gille s Amado, Tom Gilmore , Jim Krantz, Michae l Hoffman , Lauren t Lapierre , Roge r Dunbar , Susa n Schneider, Larry Gould, and Donald Levine . One o f th e rea l pleasure s o f workin g o n thi s boo k ha s bee n th e XI

Xll

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

opportunity t o wor k wit h Kitt y Moore . I hav e dearl y appreciate d he r wonderful combinatio n o f goo d judgmen t an d goo d cheer . I woul d lik e t o than k Le o Goldberge r fo r believin g tha t ther e wa s a book t o be made out o f th e jumble I sent him . My forme r wife , Katherin e Bih m Schwartz , helpe d m e greatl y i n th e course o f developmen t tha t le d t o thi s book . Sh e taugh t m e tha t th e purpose o f writin g wa s t o sa y wha t I wa s thinkin g an d helpe d m e t o believe that wha t I was thinking wa s worth saying . Mary Va n Sel l has , over th e las t fe w years , come t o b e a frien d an d a person whos e judgmen t I could rel y upo n i n developin g m y work . I am grateful t o hav e had he r a s a colleague. I would als o lik e to than k Davi d Doane. Dan Braunstein , whe n h e wa s m y departmen t chair , di d a s muc h a s he could , withi n hi s constraints , t o hel p m e d o m y work . Li z Barclay , now tha t sh e i s chair , i s doin g th e same . I think that' s wort h a wor d o f thanks. Thanks als o t o Davi d Garvelin k an d Dr . Norma n Jackson , fo r doin g what the y did . My children , Robbi e an d Cassie , offere d m e thei r wis e counse l i n choosing th e colo r o f th e cove r o f thi s book . I n time , I am sur e the y will understand that , a t th e tim e o f yea r i n whic h thi s boo k wa s published , New Yor k Universit y Pres s neede d al l it s gree n an d re d fo r Christma s wrapping. My mother , Hatti e Schwartz , an d m y sister , Susa n Anzaha , hav e invariably love d me . Ofte n the y provide d fo r m e th e onl y emotiona l bedrock tha t I had. Also, I would lik e t o expres s m y deepes t appreciatio n t o th e me n an d women o f th e fellowshi p o f Alcoholic s Anonymous , wh o hav e taugh t me more tha n I thought I could know . Finally, I wish t o than k th e followin g fo r grantin g m e permissio n t o quote fro m copyrighte d material : The New Yor k Times Company fo r "Desig n an d Tests of Booster . . . , " February 12 , 1986 ; "NASA Admit s Col d Affect s Shuttl e Seal," by Phili p M. Boffey , Februar y 12 , 1986 ; "Analys t Wh o Gav e Shuttl e Warn ing .. . ," b y Phili p M . Boffey , Februar y 14 , 1986 ; "Ho w See-No Evil Doome d Challenger, " b y Davi d E . Sanger , June 29 , 1986 ; "NAS A Wasted Billion s . . . ," b y Stuar t Diamond , Apri l 23 , 1986 ; "NAS A Considered Shuttl e Booster s Immun e . . . ," b y Joh n Nobl e Wilford ,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xiii

February 3 , 1986 ; "NAS A Official s Sa y Shuttl e Progra m Ha d . . . , " b y Philip M . Boffey , Apri l 4 , 1986 ; "Inquir y Hea d Say s NAS A…," by Philip M. Boffey , Februar y 28 , 1986 ; "Communication s Channel s a t NASA . . . , " b y David E. Sanger, February 28,1986; "Rocke t Engineers Tell.. . , " b y Phili p M . Boffey , Februar y 26 , 1986 ; "Zea l an d Fea r Mingle . . . , " b y Philip M. Boffey , Marc h 17 , 1986 ; "NASA Chief Vow s to Fix . . . , " b y John Noble Wilford , June 10 , 1986 . Copyrigh t © 198 6 by The New Yor k Times Company. Reprinte d by permission. Farrar, Strau s & Girou x an d Internationa l Creativ e Management , Inc. fo r a n excerp t fro m The Right Stuff b y To m Wolfe . Copyrigh t © 1979 b y Tom Wolfe. Reprinte d by permission. William Morrow & Co . and Acton and Dystel, Inc . for excerpts fro m Rude Awakening: The Rise, Fall and Struggle for Recovery of General Motors, b y Maryann Keller. Copyright © 198 9 b y Maryann Keller. Random House, Inc. for excerpts from " J Touch the Future .. ." : The Story ofChrista McAuliffe, b y Rober t T. Hohler . Copyrigh t © 198 6 b y Robert T. Hohler . Reprinte d b y permission o f Rando m House , Inc. ; for excerpts fro m Prescription for Disaster, b y Joseph J. Trento . Reprinte d by permission of Crow n Publishers, Inc. Multimedia Produc t Development, Inc. , for excerpts from On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors: John Z. De Lorean's Look Inside the Automotive Giant, b y J . Patric k Wright . Copyrigh t © 197 9 b y J . Patrick Wright and reprinted with permission of th e author. The Organizationa l Behavio r Teachin g Societ y fo r excerpt s fro m "Th e clockwork o r the snakepit: An essay on the meaning of teachin g organizational behavior, " Organizational Behavior Teaching Review, X I (2) , 1987,19-26. MCB Universit y Pres s fo r excerpt s fro m "Th e symbo l o f th e spac e shuttle an d the degeneration o f th e American dream, " Journal of Organizational Change Management, 1 (2), 1988 , 5 - 2 0 . The Souther n Managemen t Associatio n fo r excerpt s fro m "O n th e psychodynamics o f organizationa l totalitarianism, " Journal of Management, 1 3 (1) , 1987, 4 1 - 5 4 . The Europea n Grou p fo r Organizationa l Studie s fo r excerpt s fro m "Antisocial action s o f committe d organizationa l participants : A n exis tential psychoanalyti c perspective, " Organization Studies, 8 (4) , 1987 , 327-40. ABC New s fo r excerpt s o f interview s wit h Senato r Joh n Glen n an d

XIV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Mr. Bruc e Murray , broadcas t o n This Week with David Brinkley, Jun e 8, 1986 . Elsevier Scienc e Publishers B . V., Amsterdam, fo r excerpt s fro m "Or ganizational disaste r an d organizationa l decay : The cas e of th e Nationa l Aeronautics an d Spac e Administration, " Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 3 (4), 1989 , 1-16 . The Trustee s o f Columbi a Universit y i n th e Cit y o f Ne w Yor k fo r excerpts fro m "O n th e psychodynamic s o f organizationa l disaster : Th e case o f th e spac e shuttl e Challenger, " The Columbia Journal of World Business, XXI I (1) , Spring 1987 , 59-67 . The MacNeil/Lehre r Production s fo r excerpt s o f a n intervie w wit h Dr. Richar d Feynman , broadcas t o n The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, June 9 , 1986 .

Part One THE THEORY O P THE ORGANIZATIO N IDEAL

Introduction

When I left graduat e school an d began teaching organizational behavio r courses, I wa s struc k b y th e irrelevanc e o f wha t I ha d learne d t o th e actual organizational experienc e of m y students. My students experienced an d understood organizational lif e as a kind of "vanit y fair, " i n whic h individual s wh o wer e intereste d i n "gettin g ahead" coul d d o s o b y playin g t o th e vanit y o f thei r superiors . On e needed t o d o thi s i n tw o ways : on e neede d t o flatter the superio r a s a n individual an d a s a n occupan t o f th e superio r role . Thi s latte r proces s tended to trail off int o an adulation of th e organization in general. Work eithe r fit int o thi s proces s o f adulation , i n whic h cas e i t mad e sense; or i t di d not , i n which cas e i t did no t mak e sense . Work tha t di d not make sense in this way, m y students felt , was bes t left t o the suckers who hadn't figured out yet how to get ahead and who deserved whatever torment thi s syste m le d them t o inherit . If , throug h thi s process, impor tant, vali d informatio n wa s los t t o th e syste m b y bein g withhel d o r simply unappreciated, that was not their concern. Through luck or guile, the consequences would , o r could be made to, occur on somebody else' s watch. At first glance, m y students ' attitud e looke d t o m e lik e cynicism. Bu t closer analysis suggested that, although they had a great deal of cynicis m in them , the y wer e no t bein g simpl y cynical , fo r the y believe d i n th e righteousness of what they were doing. For them, gettin g ahea d wa s a moral imperative , whic h justifie d an y means necessary fo r it s accomplishment . Bu t more tha n this , the syste m itself, whic h calle d upo n subordinate s t o idealiz e it , wa s hel d morall y sacrosanct. A person wh o refuse d t o g o alon g with th e syste m wa s see n as no t onl y stupi d an d naive , bu t a s morall y inferior . An d thi s wa s s o even i f th e individua l i n questio n wa s offerin g a point o f vie w tha t wa s essential fo r the organization t o do its work effectively an d efficiently . It thu s seeme d t o m e that , fo r m y students , th e organization' s pro cesses define d mora l value . A s defined b y its processes, th e organizatio n seemed t o exis t i n a mora l worl d o f it s own , whic h serve d t o justif y 3

4

THE THEORY OF THE ORGANIZATION IDEAL

anything don e o n it s behal f an d whic h di d no t requir e justificatio n o n any ground s outsid e o f itself . This vie w wa s inconsisten t wit h a vie w o f the organizatio n a s a n instrumen t t o d o work . Fo r my students , th e organization di d no t exis t i n orde r t o d o work ; i t di d wor k i n orde r t o exist. Yet, eve n whil e holdin g thi s poin t o f view , man y o f my student s di d not appea r t o have a deep loyalty to the organizations the y so supported . On th e contrary , fo r th e mos t par t the y wer e willin g t o chang e organi zations wit h n o regret s o r guilt . Thei r loyalty , i f tha t i s wha t i t was , seemed t o b e t o a n abstrac t ide a o f organization , a n ide a o f th e organi zation a s a vehicl e fo r th e revelatio n o f thei r ow n grandiosity . Ulti mately, therefore, thei r loyalt y appeare d t o b e to themselves . Over time , tryin g t o b e a goo d empiricist , I came t o tak e thei r storie s about organizationa l lif e increasingl y seriously . I mad e th e assumptio n that organizationa l lif e wa s jus t wha t m y students , who m I cam e t o consider m y researc h subjects , an d sometime s informants , appeare d t o be living. Relegatin g wha t I had learne d i n graduat e schoo l t o th e statu s of a fantasy , I trie d t o fashio n a theoretica l conceptio n tha t woul d explain thi s organizational reality . The theory cam e to center on th e Freudian (1955a , 1957 ; Chasseguet Smirgel 1985 , 1986 ) concept s o f narcissis m an d th e eg o ideal . I n thi s part o f th e boo k I try t o us e thes e concept s t o explai n th e experienc e o f my students . I d o thi s throug h a n interpretatio n o f th e ide a o f th e organization tha t the y hold . Th e reade r will understand , however , tha t I do no t inten d jus t t o interpre t a n idea . For , i f I a m correct , thos e wh o hold thi s ide a o f organization s d o s o i n a wa y tha t determine s thei r behavior. I t therefor e provide s a basi s fo r th e interpretatio n an d under standing o f organizationa l process , insofa r a s that proces s i s based upo n this psychological dynamic . The visio n o f organization s I hav e develope d her e i s negative . Cer tainly, th e topic s I hav e chose n t o investigate—totalitarianism , decay , antisocial actions , an d s o forth—represen t part s o f th e seam y sid e o f organizational life . I make n o apologie s fo r this . Thes e matter s concer n me, an d I offe r m y wor k a s my bes t attemp t a t tryin g t o understan d them. The determinatio n a s t o ho w muc h o f organizationa l realit y i s repre sented b y thi s visio n mus t b e lef t u p t o eac h reader . M y ow n estimate ,

INTRODUCTION

5

specifically wit h regard to American organizations in our epoch, is that a grea t dea l o f organizatio n behavio r ca n b e understoo d i n thi s way . And I offer the further hypothesis that the evident inability of American industry to compete may be due, in no small measure, to the dynamics I describe here.

1

The Clockwork o r th e Snakepit : An Essa y o n th e Meanin g o f Teachin g Organizational Behavio r

There i s a proble m i n teachin g introductor y organizationa l behavio r courses tha t use d t o caus e m e grea t distress . Mos t o f th e textbook s i n this are a hav e alway s seeme d t o m e t o b e essentiall y useles s fo r th e purpose o f teachin g student s abou t organizations. 1 Ye t th e student s expected an d eve n demande d tha t on e o f thes e text s b e used . Fo r m y own part , believin g tha t m y purpose wa s t o teac h student s abou t orga nizations an d tha t organizationa l realit y mor e closel y approximate s a snakepit tha n th e blan d pictur e mos t text s convey , I'v e develope d an d used a psychoanalytic framework , expresse d i n thi s book , tha t explain s much o f wha t I se e an d hav e hear d about . Th e proble m wa s tha t thi s split m y cours e int o tw o separat e courses , almos t entirel y distinc t fro m one another . One was th e course that I taught. I t focused o n organization s a s they seemed t o m e t o exis t i n reality . The othe r wa s a course , taugh t b y the text, which focuse d o n organizations tha t seemed to me to exist only in fantasy . Thi s situatio n wa s unsatisfactor y bot h t o m y student s an d to me. Trying to resolv e thi s issue, I did a n experiment i n one o f m y classes. I first asked m y student s t o for m i n thei r mind s a picture o f th e organi zation they knew best, either from their own experience or from listening to th e account s o f somebod y clos e t o them . The n I described tw o type s of organizations . On e typ e was a textbook organization . I n it, the organization i s lik e a clock : everybod y know s wha t th e organizatio n i s al l about an d i s concerne d solel y wit h carryin g ou t it s mission ; peopl e ar e basically happy a t their work; the level o f anxiet y is low; people interac t with eac h othe r i n frictionless , mutuall y supportiv e cooperation ; an d if there ar e an y manageria l problem s a t all , thes e ar e basicall y technica l problems, easily solved by someone who has the proper skills and knows the correct techniques of management . 7

8

THE THEORY OF THE ORGANIZATION IDEAL

The othe r typ e o f organization , th e "snakepit " organization , i s jus t the opposit e o f th e textboo k projection . Here , everythin g i s alway s falling apart , an d people' s mai n activit y i s t o se e tha t i t doesn' t fal l o n them; nobod y reall y know s wha t i s goin g on , thoug h everyon e care s about wha t i s going o n becaus e ther e i s danger i n no t knowing ; anxiet y and stres s ar e constan t companions ; an d peopl e tak e littl e pleasur e i n dealing wit h eac h other , doin g s o primaril y t o us e other s fo r thei r ow n purposes o r becaus e the y canno t avoi d bein g s o used themselves . Mana gerial problem s her e ar e experience d a s intractable , an d manager s fee l that the y hav e done well if they ar e able to mak e it through th e day . Having presente d thes e alternatives , I aske d m y student s t o indicat e which typ e of organizatio n mor e closely approximate d th e picture of th e organization the y kne w best . The result s wer e dramatic . Approximatel y thre e quarter s o f th e stu dents responded , and , o f those , virtuall y al l indicate d tha t th e snakepi t model fit better . Her e wa s m y answer , I thought. Th e snakepit , eac h o f them knew , wa s no t a n exceptio n t o th e rule ; i t wa s th e rule . We coul d forget abou t th e clockwork pictur e presented b y the texts. Organization s aren't lik e that . S o no w w e coul d tur n t o th e stud y o f th e snakepi t wit h a clea r conscience . W e were , afte r all , ther e t o stud y organizationa l behavior, right ? Not accordin g t o them ! For th e demonstration , impressiv e enoug h t o me, ha d n o impac t o n th e bul k o f m y students . Fact s b e damned . The y wanted t o know th e techniques fo r managin g clockworks . For the thinker wit h clinica l interests, the bizarre is the point a t whic h things begi n t o ge t interesting . Ho w wa s i t possibl e t o reconcil e th e interest o f m y student s i n th e textbook/clockwor k imag e o f th e organi zation wit h th e fac t tha t th e best evidence of thei r ow n senses , and o f th e senses of thei r peers , was tha t suc h thing s do no t exist ? Over time , I came t o believ e that th e ide a o f th e clockwor k organiza tion ha d muc h mor e tha n pragmati c significanc e fo r them . I t was rathe r an articl e o f faith . And , a s wit h al l article s o f faith , th e wa y t o under stand thi s on e is to understan d it s place i n the individual' s psychologica l configuration. W e hol d t o article s o f fait h becaus e w e nee d to . Tha t i s why the y canno t b e dislodge d b y facts . In othe r words , th e questio n becomes wha t di d th e ide a o f th e clockwor k organizatio n mea n t o thes e students? Wha t di d i t represen t t o the m tha t wa s s o important fo r the m to believ e in?

THE CLOCKWORK OR THE SNAKEPIT

9

THE CLOCKWOR K ORGANIZATIO N A S AN EG O IDEAL The ide a o f th e clockwor k organization , I propose , symbolize d a n eg o ideal fo r m y students . A s w e shal l se e mor e elaboratel y late r on , i t represented th e retur n t o narcissism—th e healin g o f th e rif t betwee n subject an d object , sel f an d other , freedo m an d necessity , that permeate s postinfant menta l life . I t represent s th e en d o f th e instability i n the sens e of identity tha t arise s from thes e (Sartr e 1953 ; Lichtenstein 1977) . Under the circumstances , i t i s not surprisin g tha t my student s wer e attache d t o it. They wante d t o kno w abou t th e clockwor k organizatio n no t becaus e it represent s a perfec t organization , bu t rathe r becaus e i t represent s th e possibility o f becomin g perfect themselves . The proble m is , o f course , tha t whil e th e clockwor k organizatio n i s an ide a tha t ha s grea t emotiona l appeal , i t doe s no t represen t anythin g that exist s i n the world , o r eve n tha t coul d possibl y exis t in the world. I t is appealing becaus e student s believ e that the y ca n redefin e themselve s i n terms o f th e organization , bu t i n fac t al l the y ca n d o i s ac t th e role . There is a qualitative differenc e here . Defining themselve s in terms of th e organization woul d mea n definin g awa y wha t i s particular an d concret e about them . Thi s i s what make s i t possibl e t o thin k o f th e organizatio n as a clockwork: i f everyone in it is defined i n terms of th e same collectiv e "person," ther e is no basi s for bruisin g competition, fo r ther e is only on e person. Bu t wha t i s particula r an d concret e abou t on e i s oneself . W e take ourselve s wit h u s wherever w e go. The clockwor k organizatio n ha s the same problem s connecte d wit h i t as an y eg o ideal . Th e eg o idea l i s formulate d a s a respons e t o anxiety , and w e ar e drive n t o pursu e i t b y anxiety . I t represent s a n en d t o th e anxiety tha t drive s u s toward it . But at its core, our anxiet y concern s ou r finitude, vulnerability , an d mortalit y (Becke r 1973) , an d thes e ar e th e biological given s of bein g a n organis m (Freu d 1955b) . We can transcen d biology onl y i n fantasy . Th e clockwor k organizatio n i s on e o f thes e fantasies. The fac t tha t w e brin g our ow n particularity , finite an d vulnerable , t o organizational lif e an d th e fac t tha t organizationa l lif e ha s n o us e fo r that particularit y combin e t o explain , perfectl y adequately , th e snakepi t character o f organizationa l life . Fo r a n organizatio n i s a dram a (Goff man 1959)— a pla y pu t o n b y actors . An d ther e i s roo m i n thi s dram a only fo r th e performance. Bu t the performance i s put o n b y a performer ,

10

THE THEOR Y O P TH E ORGANIZATIO N IDEA L

who alway s differ s fro m th e performance . Ye t th e performanc e define s us normatively , specifie s wh o w e shoul d be . Thu s th e performe r i s no t what h e or sh e is supposed t o be. This mean s that ther e must b e for eac h of us , individually an d collectively , a shameful, secre t undersid e t o orga nizational life . Wher e doe s thi s leav e th e teache r o f organizationa l be havior? Given th e premis e tha t organization s ar e snakepits , i t is obvious wh y one shoul d teac h tha t the y ar e snakepits : becaus e th e busines s o f th e college professo r i s t o teac h th e truth . Bu t give n th e premis e tha t the y are snakepits , I ca n als o thin k o f five argument s wh y on e shoul d teac h that the y ar e clockwork s nonetheless . I don' t thin k tha t an y o f thes e arguments i s adequate ; bu t eac h o f the m seem s inadequat e i n a suffi ciently interestin g way t o justify refutation .

TEACHING THE CLOCKWOR K The first tw o argument s propos e tha t on e shoul d teac h th e clockwor k theory becaus e student s deman d it . On e o f thes e ma y b e calle d th e consumer-sovereignty argument . Here , th e colleg e professo r rest s th e legitimacy o f teachin g th e clockwor k mode l o n th e basi s tha t h e o r sh e is providin g a servic e tha t student s want . Ther e i s no t muc h t o thi s argument. I t is the equivalent o f sayin g that th e physician shoul d mak e a diagnosis base d upo n wha t th e patien t want s t o hear . I t countenances , in short , a betraya l o f th e academi c profession . Whil e wha t i t describe s might b e explainable i n some instances, given the necessity of th e profes sor t o maintai n hi s or he r job , this say s nothing mor e tha n tha t universi ties can b e snakepits, too . The othe r varian t o f th e argumen t fro m studen t deman d i s mor e subtle. I cal l i t th e argumen t fro m necessar y illusion . I t recognize s th e basically defensiv e characte r o f th e belie f i n th e clockwor k organizatio n and assert s a compassionate cas e for no t shatterin g the student's psycho logical defenses. The cas e here is similar t o one I experienced i n a forme r incarnation, a s a teachin g assistan t i n a humanitie s program . There , I would lea d discussion s focusin g o n th e critiqu e o f system s o f ideas , including philosophie s an d religions . Every no w an d then , I would hav e a studen t wh o hel d th e religiou s belief s tha t wer e unde r attack . Wha t does on e d o i n a situatio n lik e this ? I f suc h belief s giv e a person solace ,

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is it always goo d t o interfere—especiall y i f one ha s no equally comfort ing alternative to offer ? On the level of religiou s beliefs , i t seems to me, this is a most disturbing question . Eve n Freu d (1961) , wh o argue d fo r th e abandonmen t o f religion, expressed clea r misgivings about his conclusion. O n the level of organizational beliefs , th e questio n i s les s formidable . Th e differenc e i s that religiou s belief s ultimatel y addres s th e meanin g o f life , whil e orga nizational belief s refe r only t o the facts of life . One can live an entire life and maintai n belie f i n religiou s ideals . Disillusionmen t wit h organiza tional belief s usuall y set s i n shortl y afte r on e get s a job (Klei n an d Ritt i 1984). Unde r th e circumstances, th e trade-off become s th e maintenanc e of a comforting illusio n durin g th e student' s colleg e lif e versu s th e con sequences o f maladaptatio n afte r graduatio n (Wanou s 1975) . Ad d t o this the opportunity costs associated with foregoing a veridical educatio n about organizations , an d i t doe s no t see m t o m e tha t th e result s o f th e calculation ca n be in doubt. At an y rate , anyon e stil l concerne d abou t th e effect s o f attackin g someone's defenses shoul d bear in mind the experience I had when I was dealing wit h th e issue i n th e sphere of religion . What I found ther e wa s that, despite my horror at what the massive power of m y intellect woul d do t o th e mind s o f m y poo r religiou s students , I ha d littl e reaso n t o worry. Defenses , i f tha t was what the y were, defend. These students di d not com e t o thei r belief s throug h reason , an d the y di d no t fee l muc h threatened whe n reaso n cam e t o attac k them . The notio n tha t the intel lect is irresistible i s perhaps a n element of ou r own narcissism , a s teachers, which we would d o well to examine on our own behalf . The thir d argumen t fo r teachin g th e clockwor k strike s m e a s bein g the mos t compelling . I t is that th e clockwor k organizatio n no t onl y i s a more appealin g pictur e o f organizationa l life , bu t represent s a bette r organization. I t is , perhaps , no t wha t organization s a s w e experienc e them ar e like , bu t i t i s wha t organization s shoul d b e like , an d there fore teachin g thi s mode l migh t brin g organization s close r t o th e idea l through th e actions o f ou r students . I refer to thi s as the argument fro m idealism. The proble m wit h th e argumen t fro m idealis m i s that i t mistake s th e qualitative difference betwee n clockwork an d snakepit organizations fo r a quantitativ e one . I f th e differenc e betwee n th e clockwor k an d th e snakepit coul d b e place d upo n som e continuum , eve n upo n a se t o f

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continua, i t would mak e sens e t o tr y t o approximat e th e clockwor k an d to wor k towar d i t incrementally . Bu t i f th e differenc e i s a differenc e i n kind, the n n o amoun t o f incrementa l chang e i s going t o matter . Thus , if one value s longevity , the n i t make s sens e t o pursu e way s t o increas e peoples' lifespans. Bu t if it is immortality tha t one values, then increasin g lifespan will b e beside the point . My contentio n i s tha t th e clockwor k organization , a s a n eg o ideal , represents a n impossibl e bridgin g o f th e ga p betwee n th e sel f an d th e other. Th e theorist s o f th e clockwor k organizatio n wan t t o bridg e thi s gap b y proposing th e organization a s a unity o f sel f an d others— a unit y created b y th e redefinitio n o f bot h selve s i n term s o f organization . Bu t this unit y fall s apar t o n th e ne w ground s o f bein g a contradictio n be tween th e abstrac t (th e ide a o f th e organizatio n a s a unity ) an d th e particular (th e individual s wh o woul d hav e t o giv e thi s abstractio n whatever realit y i t could have) . Each o f thes e individuals remain s partic ular, finite , and , hence , separat e fro m th e abstraction . Bu t th e abstrac tion i s jus t th e ide a o f th e lac k o f separation . Tha t i s wha t give s i t it s attractiveness. Thus , th e clockwor k organizatio n i s impossible— a con tradiction—and a stat e that , becaus e of it s contradictory nature , canno t even b e approximate d i n a wa y tha t woul d maintai n it s characte r a s attractive. The easies t wa y t o mis s thi s poin t i s by supposin g tha t th e organiza tion i s behavior. Analysi s o f th e ego ideal show s tha t i t is the intentiona l context o f th e behavio r tha t pose s th e problem . I hav e n o doub t tha t people ca n behav e a s i f thei r associatio n functione d lik e a clock . Bu t within the ego ideal of the clockwork organizatio n i s the idea that peopl e are actin g spontaneously . An d t o th e exten t tha t peopl e ar e actin g a s if the organizatio n wer e a clockwork , the y ar e no t expressin g themselve s spontaneously. Thei r experienc e o f thei r existenc e a s actors woul d stan d apart from , an d i n contradictio n to , th e role s the y ar e playing . Bu t thi s distinction, betwee n th e playe r an d th e role , i s jus t th e contradictio n between th e individual s an d th e abstractio n tha t w e sa w earlier—an d that we saw was a fatal fla w i n the notion o f the clockwork organization . My penultimat e argumen t i s on e tha t I thin k man y teacher s o f th e clockwork theor y woul d fin d mos t natura l t o them . Le t m e cal l i t th e argument fro m necessity . I t hold s tha t th e clockwor k theor y shoul d b e taught becaus e organization s wil l deman d i t fro m thei r employees , an d

THE CLOCKWORK OR THE SNAKEPIT

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it will be necessary for them to know if they are to get jobs, keep them, and work their way through the hierarchy. I think ther e is a good deal of trut h to this argument, but not as an argument for teaching the clockwork theory . Rather, it is an argument for teaching the snakepit theory and showing how using the language of the clockwork theory is a strategy for getting by in the snakepit. Unfortunately, thi s part of th e lesson is often onl y tacit. The teacher teaches the clockwork theory , not with an expression of belief i n it or commitment to its truth, but because "Pm supposed to teach you this stuff, so here it is." The student "learns" in a similarly detached fashion, making notes o n i t an d studyin g i t i n preparation fo r a n exam. Neither party takes it seriously, and both understand that what they are going through is a kind of charade : the charade of the wise professor who knows the truth and imparts it and of th e dutiful, conscientiou s student who sops this truth up and comes to know it and to revere the teacher who teaches it. In other words, what we have here is a perfect lesson in the way the theory of the clockwork is used in the snakepit. The pit y i s that , t o th e exten t tha t thi s lesso n remain s tacit , t o the extent that the participants pretend to tak e the clockwork theor y seriously, a great deal of pedagogical leverag e is lost. The teacher loses the opportunity t o discuss the importance of vanit y in the organization, to consider the place of meaningles s rituals that serve only to separate the powerful fro m the powerless, to address the way language can be used to avoid communication rather than create it, and to face the loneliness and isolation that must result. In short, the teacher loses the opportunity to confront with the students many of the very facts that make snakepits snakepits. There is one further argument that needs to be considered here. Not precisely an argument for the clockwork theory, it may still be seen as a variant of the clockwork theory in that it calls for the replacement of the snakepit b y a clockwork . I thin k o f thi s a s th e argumen t fro m self consciousness. Thus, authors like Argyris and Schon (1974) and Culbert and McDonoug h (1980) , wh o hav e don e brillian t wor k i n developing the theory of the snakepit, suggest that knowing about the snakepit and what causes it can lead organizational participant s to an understanding of ne w ways of organizin g tha t would avoi d the traps that lead to the snakepit. They envision new organizational forms that would permit the

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same unio n o f subjec t an d objec t tha t w e sa w characteristi c o f th e clockwork organization , althoug h o n a fa r mor e sophisticate d leve l an d with muc h riche r notion s o f th e natur e o f th e individua l an d o f hi s o r her relationshi p t o th e organization . Thus, Argyri s an d Scho n (1974 ) fin d th e problem s o f organizationa l life t o b e th e result s o f participant s usin g a strateg y tha t the y cal l th e "Model I theory-in-use," which , i f I am no t oversimplifyin g t o th e poin t of distortion , consist s a t leas t partl y i n th e ide a tha t th e wa y t o ge t something i s to tr y t o get it . They wan t t o replace this wit h th e ide a tha t the way t o get what yo u want i s to pursue it collaboratively. But , clearly, this work s onl y i f thos e wit h who m yo u ar e collaboratin g wan t yo u t o have wha t yo u wan t an d ar e intereste d i n workin g fo r yo u t o hav e it . Thus, a n abstrac t unit y o f sel f an d othe r i s assumed , whic h lead s u s immediately bac k t o th e ide a o f th e organization a s ego idea l an d al l th e contradictions tha t involves . Similarly, Culber t an d McDonoug h (1980 ) propos e an organizationa l form i n whic h participant s understan d tha t everyon e ha s "alignments " —ways o f integratin g thei r ow n interest s wit h th e requirement s o f th e organization—and i n whic h others ' alignment s ar e respecte d b y every one. Thi s envision s th e contradictor y unio n o f one' s ow n identity , i n which one' s ow n alignmen t ha s unique significanc e b y virtue of it s bein g one's ow n alignment , wit h a n organizationa l identity , i n whic h one' s own alignmen t ha s n o specia l plac e bu t i s simpl y on e organizationa l alignment amon g many . Thi s organizationa l for m is , again, a n abstrac t unity o f sel f an d other—a n eg o ideal . TEACHING TH E SNAKEPI T There ar e man y argument s fo r th e clockwor k theory , eve n thoug h non e of the m i s adequate . I can thin k o f onl y tw o fo r teachin g th e snakepit , but I think the y ar e both compelling . The first argumen t i s reall y a n argumen t agains t teachin g th e clock work. I t may b e called th e argumen t fro m negativ e consequences. Le t us suppose tha t th e teache r manage d t o teac h th e clockwor k pictur e s o successfully tha t th e conceptio n survive d th e student' s disillusionmen t with hi s or he r wor k experience . What woul d b e the consequences ? A s I shall discus s mor e full y i n late r chapters , it seem s t o m e that th e studen t would mos t likel y fee l that , sinc e hi s o r he r experienc e doe s no t matc h

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up with th e ego ideal , ther e must be a deficiency o n his or her own par t or i n hi s o r he r situation . Sinc e th e eg o idea l i s th e perso n on e i s supposed t o be , a deficienc y o n one' s ow n par t wil l b e experience d a s shameful (Pier s and Singer 1953) . O n the other hand, if the belief i n the clockwork i s to b e maintained , i t must b e believed tha t ther e are other s who ar e more what the organization reall y is and who ar e the ego ideal. These woul d typicall y b e see n a s thos e highe r u p i n th e organization . Thus, th e belie f i n th e clockwor k ma y lea d t o a n experienc e o f th e delegitimation o f the individual vis-a-vi s those higher in the hierarchy. Now le t us look a t the issue b y focusing o n thos e higher up. Suppos e that they als o wer e ou r students an d they stil l believ e i n the clockwork . The differenc e betwee n the m an d thos e lowe r dow n i s tha t the y hav e power. And if the situation the y find themselves i n is not the clockwork , they ca n us e tha t powe r t o compe l th e dramatizatio n o f th e clockwor k they desir e an d expect . The y can , i n othe r words , us e thei r powe r t o enforce th e playing ou t o f thei r ow n retur n t o narcissis m b y those ove r whom the y hav e power . Thi s perspective , combine d wit h tha t o f th e individuals lowe r dow n wh o experienc e delegitimatio n a s par t o f thei r own nee d t o maintai n belie f i n th e clockwork , forms , then , a picture o f tyranny, o n th e on e hand , an d o f slavishness , passivity , loneliness , an d isolation on the other. In a word, as we shall see in the next chapter, this is totalitarianism. Of course , i t goe s withou t sayin g that , give n th e appea l o f th e eg o ideal, peopl e ca n believ e i n th e clockwor k withou t thei r professors ' having taugh t the m t o d o so . Nonetheless , I should no t leav e thi s poin t without notin g th e irony that , while al l organizations ma y be snakepits, the theory o f th e clockwor k ma y b e instrumental i n causing som e t o b e more snakepittish than others. The secon d argumen t fo r teachin g th e snakepi t i s on e t o whic h I alluded earlier . I t seem s t o m e s o straightforwar d tha t i t woul d b e egregious t o giv e i t a name . I t i s tha t organization s ar e snakepit s an d that the college professor's wor k consist s i n teaching the truth. My vie w is tha t thi s cours e o f actio n doe s no t lea d t o an y mor e despai r tha n reality holds i n store anyway . Wha t is necessary to pursue it is a certain trust an d a certai n love . The trus t i s tha t one' s student s wil l hav e th e moral substance to act responsibly, a t the margin, even though they may not believ e i t wil l ge t the m int o heaven . Th e lov e i s th e basi s fo r tha t trust.

2

On the Psychodynamic s o f Organizational Totalitarianis m Understandably, discussion s o f totalitarianis m ten d t o focu s upo n it s more dramati c manifestations . Unfortunately , thi s often lead s u s to mis s aspects o f totalitarianis m tha t pervad e ou r ow n time s an d cultur e an d that ma y be , if no t equall y destructive , a t leas t sufficientl y destructiv e t o require stud y an d criticism . A n exceptio n i s th e wor k o f Ear l Shorri s (1981) o n totalitaria n aspect s o f corporat e life . Shorris define s totalitarianism a s th e proces s o f definin g people' s happiness fo r them . The elemen t tha t make s thi s process noxiou s i s tha t the define r o f happines s i s no t th e perso n whos e happines s i s bein g defined. Thi s ha s th e effec t o f takin g th e individual' s sens e o f determin ing th e directio n o f hi s o r he r lif e awa y fro m tha t individua l an d cedin g it to another , wherea s i t is the very sens e of givin g direction t o ou r lives , even i f onl y i n thought , tha t constitute s ou r mora l autonomy . Fo r Shor ris, who i n this respect echoe s George Herbert Mead' s (1934 ) distinctio n between th e J an d th e me, th e huma n bein g stand s apar t fro m an y symbol. It is this standing-apartness tha t constitute s one' s self-conscious ness, tha t i s th e sourc e o f one' s specifi c identity . T o caus e a perso n t o collapse int o a symbo l on e ha s projecte d fo r hi m o r he r i s t o caus e th e self-consciousness t o become , no t th e essenc e o f tha t person' s identity , but somethin g alie n t o it—t o separat e th e person fro m him - or herself . This is the fundamental psychodynami c o f totalitarianism . I t alienate s people fro m themselve s an d give s the m ove r t o others . Whateve r victo ries ma y ensu e mus t b e pyrrhic . Whateve r happines s i s t o b e attaine d here i s not th e happines s o f th e individual . Indeed , i t i s not happines s a t all. I t i s th e dram a o f happines s attachin g t o a rol e tha t th e perso n performs i n a play tha t i s written an d directe d b y others . We ca n gai n insigh t int o th e underlyin g psychodynamic s o f thi s pro cess b y explorin g th e connectio n betwee n Shorris' s vie w an d th e Freud ian theor y o f narcissis m an d th e ego ideal , which w e began t o explore i n chapter 1 . 16

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7

NARCISSISM AN D TH E EGO IDEA L For Freu d (1957 ) th e infan t start s of f i n th e congenia l stat e o f bein g a t the center of a loving world. To ad d a bit t o what w e saw in the previou s chapter, i t i s thu s a perfec t combinatio n o f agenc y an d communion , subjectivity an d objectivity , activit y an d passivity , freedo m an d determi nateness, yang an d yin . Freu d refer s t o thi s happ y synthesi s a s "primar y narcissism." But th e worl d is , alas , no t a lovin g place , an d non e o f u s ar e th e center o f it . N o on e i n i t love s u s quit e a s muc h a s w e nee d t o b e loved . And if , a s lif e goe s on , other s ar e t o lov e u s a t all , we mus t lov e them i n return—and giv e up , i n a word , th e centralit y tha t th e lov e o f other s was a n instrumen t fo r preserving . Further , eve n i f I gai n th e lov e o f a few individuals , wha t goo d doe s i t d o me ? M y rea l proble m i s with th e world. An d the y canno t protec t m e fro m i t an y mor e tha n I can protec t them. Fo r th e worl d ca n d o ver y wel l withou t me . I t di d withou t m e before I wa s an d i t wil l d o withou t m e whe n I a m not . I n th e end , b y virtue of th e laws of biolog y i f nothing else, I get rubbed out . To be sure, I can mak e som e contributio n t o th e world. Perhaps , in som e sense , tha t will live after me . But what i s it that live s after me ? Obviously , whateve r it is , i t i s no t me . Th e worl d i s precisel y th e arrangemen t that , amon g other things , thi s shal l happen . Wh y shoul d I love that ? I f I don't, wha t ground i s there fo r my makin g an y contributio n t o th e world a t all ? The ide a tha t th e worl d wa s no t mad e wit h u s i n mind , tha t th e onl y place w e ca n hav e i n i t i s smal l an d temporary , underlie s wha t Melani e Klein (1975 ) calle d th e "depressiv e position. " Yo u ca n understan d why . Much o f th e psycholog y o f socia l institution s i s organize d agains t thi s position. For Klein , th e depressio n o f th e depressiv e positio n i s often defende d against b y adoptin g wha t sh e call s th e "mani c defense, " o r a regressio n to a n earlie r stag e o f developmen t calle d th e "paranoid-schizoi d posi tion." The characteristic psychology her e is determined b y what sh e calls "splitting," whic h i s a lac k o f integratio n o f th e goo d aspect s o f th e world wit h th e ba d aspect s an d a denial o f th e ultimate realit y of the ba d aspects. I n on e wa y o r another , w e attribut e th e caus e o f ou r anxiet y t o a perso n o r a plac e o r a tim e o r a grou p o r a socia l arrangemen t o r a part o f ourselve s an d direc t ou r aggressio n a t thi s "bad " stuff . W e hol d

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before u s th e imag e o f a perfec t "good " worl d tha t wil l b e our worl d when th e bad stuff i s gotten ri d of or gotten awa y from . This good worl d represent s fo r us the possibility o f a return t o narcissism, t o a worl d i n whic h annihilatio n i s no t a problem , a worl d i n which i t is perfectly al l right to do whatever w e want t o do, a world tha t has u s a s it s reaso n fo r being , a worl d fre e o f anxiety . Storie s o f th e goodness o f th e goo d worl d an d storie s o f th e root s o f ou r anxiet y constitute mytholog y an d hel p structur e culture . A mai n functio n o f culture, that i s to say, is to give content an d direction, to render sensible , our longing s t o retur n xo narcissis m an d t o avoi d th e anxiet y arisin g from ou r mortality (Becke r 1971 , 1973). In Freudia n terms , th e representatio n tha t w e mak e t o ourselve s o f the goo d worl d i s what I have bee n referrin g t o as the ego ideal. This is what w e ar e drive n towar d b y ou r anxiet y ove r ou r finitude, b y ou r rejection o f whatever i t is about ourselve s tha t i s vulnerable an d limited. Because thi s i s ou r spontaneou s self , i t i s alway s th e cas e tha t th e motivation towar d th e eg o idea l involve s th e rejectio n (i n Freudia n terms, the repression) o f our spontaneity, our "real self" (Horne y 1950) . Thus, w e experienc e th e pursuit o f th e ego ideal a s a n imperative—a s an attemp t t o be what w e ought t o be, not a natural expressio n o f wha t we are . The recognitio n tha t w e ar e no t wha t w e ar e suppose d t o be, that w e are playing a rol e rathe r tha n bein g th e role w e are playing, is the experienc e o f sham e (Goffma n 1959) . Anothe r consequence , a s we saw before , i s tha t w e neve r ge t t o b e th e eg o ideal . Th e eg o idea l represents u s a s w e believ e w e woul d b e i f w e coul d ge t ri d o f wha t causes ou r anxiety. Bu t what cause s ou r anxiety i s what i s most specifi cally ourselves. While we are alive, we can never get rid of it—it i s one's own individua l life . As Freud (1955a ) pointe d out , the ego ideal ma y be formed i n any of a numbe r o f ways. Of particular interes t in this book is the case in which an abstraction , a leadin g idea , ha s take n th e plac e o f a leader , an d in which tha t abstractio n i s the idea o f the organization itself . In this case , we ma y recognize th e committed organizationa l participan t a s a perso n whose eg o ideal i s the organization. 1 Thus , fo r the committed organiza tional participant , th e organization represent s a means fo r the return t o narcissism. To talk abou t the organization a s ego ideal is not to refer t o the actual organization bu t t o th e committe d person' s ide a o f th e organization ,

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TOTALITARIANISM 1

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which ma y have little relation t o the person's experience wit h th e actua l organization. I t is what th e committe d organizationa l participan t hold s out a s what th e organization i s supposed t o b e and would b e except fo r the effec t o f "bad " aspects o f th e world , an d what h e o r sh e accept s a s an obligatio n t o hel p brin g about . Thi s i s clearl y a n idea l organization . Indeed, I refe r t o thi s concept , tha t o f th e organization' s servin g th e function o f th e eg o ideal , a s th e organization ideal. Ho w doe s th e organization idea l serve as an ego ideal, and what are the consequences ?

THE EGO IDEAL AND THE ORGANIZATION IDEAL In th e first place , th e organizatio n idea l represent s power . Denhard t (1981) ha s note d ho w deepl y th e concep t o f contro l i s buil t int o ou r concept o f th e organization . I n psychoanalyti c terms , th e organizatio n ideal serve s a s a reactio n formatio n tha t cover s over an d represse s th e anxiety-evoking ide a of ou r finitude, vulnerability, an d mortality (Schwart z 1982, 1985 ; Diamond 1984) . Second, th e organization idea l i s a scenario o f lov e a s well an d offer s the possibility o f a return to centralit y i n a loving world. For , by takin g the organization a s ego ideal , the individual assume s th e possibility o f a boundary-dispelling relationshi p to others who have done likewise. Both love an d centralit y ar e possibl e i n thi s scenario , becaus e eac h o f th e individuals wh o hav e take n th e organizatio n a s thei r eg o idea l assume s that th e other s hav e als o redefine d themselve s a s th e organizatio n an d therefore a s essentially the same and having the same interest. Conflic t i s defined away , therefore , an d alon g wit h i t al l socia l anxiet y withi n th e organization. Indeed , wha t w e hav e here i s a perfect analo g fo r Freud' s reference t o th e tal e o f Narcissus , wh o fall s i n love wit h hi s ow n image in a pond . Here , th e othe r organizationa l participant s woul d ideall y provide a mirro r fo r th e foca l participan t an d reflec t tha t participant' s love for her- or himself . Third, a relate d poin t tie s th e intrapsychi c processe s involve d t o th e normative structur e o f th e organization . W e hav e seen that , b y definin g themselves i n term s o f th e organization , individual s pu t themselve s int o an interesting relationshi p wit h other s who hav e don e th e same : o n th e one hand, this is a relationship o f idealize d love that would no t interfer e with narcissism; on the other hand, it is a relationship of mutual responsibility becaus e i t i s u p t o eac h t o uphol d th e organizatio n idea l fo r al l

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the others . I t become s no t onl y a matte r o f th e fulfillmen t o f mutua l personal principl e bu t th e direc t objec t o f mora l sanction—th e threa t o f the los s of love—b y ideall y love d others . This give s a moral forc e t o th e maintenance o f th e definitio n o f onesel f an d one' s relation s a s th e orga nization ideal . Fourth, an d perhap s mos t comprehensively , definin g onesel f a s th e organization remove s fro m consideratio n a proble m tha t i n a wa y con tributed mos t powerfull y t o th e anxiet y th e participan t wa s tryin g t o allay. A s note d before , th e self-consciou s self , th e spontaneou s self , Mead's (1934 ) I, thoug h i t i s o n th e on e han d wha t i s mos t intimatel y myself, i s als o th e caus e o f m y greates t ontologica l trouble . Fo r i t ca n never b e fully represente d b y a symbol (Mead' s me) an d therefor e canno t become par t o f th e enacte d world , bu t alway s stand s asid e fro m m y enactments an d say s of them , "Tha t i s not me , that i s not me. " Definin g myself a s th e organizatio n idea l solve s thi s proble m fo r me . Havin g defined mysel f i n term s o f th e organization a s an ethical standard , I have a basi s upo n whic h I can rejec t my spontaneou s self-consciousnes s a s a n obstacle t o my self an d t o my obligations . I t become s a n impuls e fo r m e to negate: a source o f sham e an d guilt . What I cannot den y phenomeno logically, I ca n repudiat e morally . T o b e sure , I ca n d o tha t onl y b y rejecting tha t par t o f m e tha t i s mos t uniquel y myself . Bu t afte r all , i t was precisel y th e fac t tha t I hav e a spontaneou s sel f tha t go t m e int o trouble i n the first place . To illustrate , conside r a n intervie w tha t Stud s Terke l (1974 ) con ducted wit h a ma n name d Wheele r Stanley , wh o wa s the n th e younges t general superviso r i n a For d assembl y plant . Fro m a n impoverishe d background, Stanle y ha d come , throug h Ford , t o a positio n o f statu s i n the world an d fel t tha t h e was i n line fo r more . His ambitions la y withi n the compan y hierarchy , an d hi s consciou s concern s wer e compan y con cerns. His ego ideal wa s th e organization ideal . But listen t o the way thi s conversation evolved : I've got a great feelin g fo r For d becaus e it's bee n goo d to me. . . . My son, he's only si x year s ol d an d I'v e take n hi m throug h th e plant . . . . And that' s al l he talks about: "I' m goin g to work fo r For d too. " And I say, "Oh, n o you ain't. " And my wife will shut me up and she'll say, "Why not?" Then I think to myself, "Why not? It's been good to me." (185) Stanley her e expressed a n underlyin g resentmen t a t Ford , whic h wa s no t acceptable t o hi s mora l consciousness . H e reporte d a n occasio n whe n

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the venee r slippe d an d th e though t wa s blurte d out . Bu t the n i t wa s repudiated a s unworthy , an d th e venee r o f th e compan y man wa s pu t back i n place . "[Ford ] ha s bee n goo d t o me, " replace d an d covere d over th e apparentl y spontaneou s opposit e thought : "For d has bee n ba d to me." Fifth, the repudiation o f th e spontaneous sel f leaves open a possibility of a redefinition o f th e self that is wholly i n accordance with the organization ideal . Thi s i s a redefinitio n o f th e "wants " o f th e individual . I n terms of th e organization ideal , th e participant undertake s t o "want " to do wha t th e organization need s doing . Thus, th e polarity o f subjec t and object, activity an d passivity, is projected to be overcome. The pictur e o f th e organizatio n a s organizatio n idea l wil l b e familia r to al l teacher s o f organizationa l behavior . Thi s i s a n organizatio n i n which everyon e know s wha t h e o r sh e i s doing , i n whic h ther e i s n o conflict o r coercion , i n whic h communicatio n i s ope n an d direct , i n which peopl e want to do what needs to be done, in which every member is solel y concerne d wit h an d work s diligentl y t o promot e th e commo n good. A s I argued in chapter 1 , the picture is of a n organization tha t has never existed and never will. But somehow i t is of the utmost importanc e to students to b e able to believ e in it. Indeed, th e pictur e o f th e organizatio n a s eg o idea l i s familia r an d important no t only t o the naive observer, but to the sophisticated on e as well. The ide a of th e model organizatio n a s the integration o f individua l spontaneity an d organizationa l necessit y is , afte r all , i n on e for m o r another at the heart of many normative theories of organization, and the attainment o f th e organizatio n idea l i s a large part of th e promise mad e by practitioners of "organizationa l development. " Often, a s with Argyris (1957) , organizational developmen t efforts ar e aimed a t encouragin g wha t Maslo w (1970 ) calle d self-actualization through work . Bu t notice her e tha t a n importan t shif t take s place awa y from Maslow' s concept. 2 Instea d o f sayin g tha t self-actualization mean s "Be healthy an d then you may trust your impulses" (179), these thinkers seem t o believ e i t mean s "Wan t wha t th e organizatio n want s yo u t o want, and then you may do what you want. " To this point, we have considered the nature of th e organization idea l and it s relatio n t o th e individua l wh o adopt s i t a s hi s o r he r eg o ideal . But thoug h th e organizationa l processe s s o characterize d ma y resembl e totalitarianism, the y als o resembl e socia l processe s tha t are , arguably ,

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not onl y mor e benign , bu t ofte n eve n positive , suc h a s idealisti c move ments fo r socia l change . Indeed , thes e processe s involv e th e psychody namic underpinning s o f socia l organizatio n generally , a t leas t t o th e extent tha t peopl e pu t thei r fait h i n it . I f I hav e note d tha t i t involve s repression an d decenterin g o f th e self, I have sai d n o mor e tha n Freu d i n Civilization and Its Discontents (1961) . An d i f th e impossibilit y o f at taining th e eg o idea l lead s almos t inevitabl y t o disillusionment , i t i s a t least arguabl e tha t disillusionmen t i s a necessar y elemen t o f adul t devel opment an d growt h (Levinso n 1978) . I n orde r t o sho w ho w th e pro cesses I hav e describe d lea d t o totalitarianism , i t wil l b e necessar y t o show ho w the y ten d t o degenerat e i n th e contex t o f organizationa l power. HIERARCHY AN D ONTOLOGICA L DIFFERENTIATIO N Because th e organizatio n idea l represent s th e retur n t o narcissis m an d because th e retur n t o narcissis m ca n neve r b e achieved , ther e mus t b e some wa y o f accountin g fo r th e failur e o f th e retur n t o narcissis m whil e still remainin g tru e t o the ide a o f th e organization ideal . For th e committe d organizationa l participant , ther e ar e tw o availabl e reasons wh y narcissis m ha s no t returned—wh y I stil l fee l threatened , why everybod y doesn' t lov e me , wh y I am no t doin g wha t I want, an d so on . On e possibilit y involve s scapegoating . Here , th e anxiet y i s at tributed t o "bad " forces , externa l o r internal , tha t ar e threatenin g th e organization. Onc e th e force s ca n b e give n a n identity , i t i s possibl e t o struggle agains t them . Th e communit y o f struggler s ca n b e conceive d a s wholly good , becaus e al l th e anxiet y ca n b e attribute d t o th e enemy . Under th e circumstances , a quit e satisfyin g degre e o f localize d collectiv e narcissism ca n b e achieved . This , apparently , represent s th e dynami c o f the cohesivenes s o f man y in-group s tha t fee l themselve s arraye d agains t out-groups. W e ca n easil y se e in i t th e roo t o f th e loyalty , cohesiveness , and hig h moral e o f wor k organization s tha t ca n identif y som e externa l threat o r o f part s o f wor k organization s tha t ca n attribut e th e organiza tion's problems t o other part s o f th e same organization . Scapegoating i s certainl y a too l use d b y totalitaria n wor k organiza tions t o increas e thei r control . Thus , th e presiden t o f a majo r aut o manufacturing compan y referre d t o th e Japanese a s "th e enemy " i n a n address t o Oaklan d Universit y students . H e mad e i t manifes t tha t thi s

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climate of warfar e wa s ver y much a part of th e cultural proces s underlying hi s organization' s "qualit y o f workin g life " program . Certainl y th e feeling o f threa t fro m a n enemy increase s the level o f anxiet y an d therefore th e nee d t o believ e tha t th e organizatio n i s th e organizatio n ideal . But th e feelin g o f bein g threatene d b y a n outsid e enem y doe s not , b y itself, create the kind of internal split, the alienation, the separation fro m the self , tha t totalitarianis m represents . I n orde r t o accoun t fo r that , another dynamic must be considered. This other dynami c involve s wha t I shall cal l th e process o f ontological differentiation. Her e th e attributio n o f th e caus e o f anxiet y i s mad e to th e sel f an d experience d a s shame—sham e fo r onesel f an d fo r th e parts o f th e organizatio n wit h whic h on e i s associated . Becaus e th e organization i s understoo d a s th e organizatio n ideal , an d becaus e on e and one's associates fall shor t of thi s ideal, these have evidently no t been fully integrate d int o the organization. On e experiences sham e a s a result of contrastin g onesel f an d one' s associate s t o other s wh o are , on e be lieves, what they are supposed to be—who ar e more integrated with the organization idea l an d presumabl y d o no t hav e th e deficienc y i n thei r identity tha t on e i s ashame d of . Thi s contras t i s ontologica l differentia tion. In th e classi c bureaucrati c organization , ontologica l differentiatio n takes th e structura l for m o f vertica l differentiation , o r hierarchy . A s Arendt (1966 ) an d Shorri s (1981 ) note , wha t I a m callin g ontologica l differentiation doe s no t alway s correspon d precisel y wit h th e organiza tional pyramid . Arendt , fo r example , compare s th e totalitaria n organi zation t o a n onion , i n whic h on e goe s deepe r an d deeper , rathe r tha n higher an d higher. 3 Thus , th e Naz i party , fo r example , containe d ideo logical fanatics a t all levels of the state apparatus, trusted to wield power even ove r thei r nomina l superior s throug h thei r capacit y fo r denuncia tion. Nonetheless , a s Shorris notes , the pyrami d an d the onion intersec t at th e poin t tha t i s bot h highes t an d deepest . I n traditiona l organiza tional terms , this is the top o f th e organization. Fo r the purposes o f thi s discussion, th e dimension s o f vertica l differentiatio n an d dept h wil l b e taken to be combined i n the organization's hierarchy . In the traditional view , hierarch y serve s a variety of manageria l func tions, suc h a s coordination , control , an d th e like . Althoug h ther e i s certainly som e trut h to this view, i t cannot provid e full y fo r a phenomenology of hierarchy—for th e simple reason that hierarchy represents not

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only a differentiation o f functio n an d task , bu t a moral differentiatio n a s well (Parson s 1954) . Thus , th e organizationa l ladde r i s conceive d a s a sort o f "grea t chai n o f being. " I t represents , i n a world , a structure d adaptation t o the idea tha t organizational participatio n doe s not amoun t to a retur n t o narcissism , whil e retainin g th e ide a o f th e organizatio n a s organization ideal , an d therefor e permittin g th e ide a o f th e retur n t o narcissism a s a possibility . Thus, i t i s eas y t o suppos e tha t mor e statu s i n th e organization' s hierarchy wil l represen t a greate r degre e o f attainmen t o f th e organiza tion idea l an d therefor e progres s i n the return t o narcissism. 4 O n th e on e hand, th e organization' s action s wil l b e mor e th e resul t o f m y actions , and it s deliberation s wil l includ e my thoughts . O n th e othe r hand , b y definition, m y action s an d thought s wil l b e th e appropriat e action s an d thoughts wit h regar d t o th e organization . Th e proble m i s tha t commit ment t o th e belie f tha t progres s i n th e hierarch y wil l mea n progres s i n the attainmen t o f th e organizatio n idea l fo r me , involves commitmen t t o the belie f tha t i t represents suc h progres s fo r other s a s well. Ontological differentiatio n i s th e primar y vehicl e throug h whic h or ganizational an d specificall y corporat e lif e become s totalitarian . Fo r a t this poin t i t become s possibl e fo r som e t o us e thei r ontologica l statur e and th e powe r tha t goe s wit h i t t o narcissisticall y impos e thei r fantas y of thei r ow n perfectio n upo n other s a s th e organizatio n ideal—or , i n Shorris's definitio n o f totalitarianism , fo r som e t o defin e th e happines s of others . The poin t i s that th e to p o f th e organizatio n i s not merel y a n abstrac t position, bu t ha s a population an d a history o f action . In organizational totalitarianism the organization, as defined by its leadership's understanding of their own actions, is proclaimed to be the organization ideal; and the organization's power is used to impose this as the ego ideal for the organization's participants. Thus, locating the return t o narcissism a t the head of th e organizatio n means mor e tha n establishin g a directio n towar d th e eg o ideal . I t in volves establishing certain definit e others , with thei r ow n way of lookin g at th e worl d an d a t themselve s an d wit h thei r ow n histor y o f actions , a s already ideal . I t involves , i n othe r words , acquiescin g t o th e perfectio n of som e specifi c other s a s one' s ow n mora l obligation , collectivel y en forceable b y al l other s wh o hav e don e s o an d wit h who m on e define s oneself a s ideall y i n community . I t legitimize s th e coercio n b y th e pow -

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erful tha t cause s the les s powerful t o ac t out a drama whos e theme i s the perfection o f th e powerful . An d i t doe s s o i n suc h a wa y tha t th e powerful ca n fee l self-righteou s abou t thi s coercion—a s i f the y wer e performing a service or committin g a sacrifice . TOTALITARIANISM AN D ONTOLOGICA L DIFFERENTIATIO N The huma n consequence s o f ontologica l differentiatio n ca n b e explore d in an y o f a numbe r o f ways . On e wa y i s throug h consideratio n o f th e ways i n which people' s defense s work . I t has becom e a commonplace o f cognitive psychology tha t person s see the world i n ways that ar e system atically biased . Weine r e t al . (1971) , fo r example , not e a self-enhancin g bias that consist s of seein g oneself responsibl e fo r positiv e outcome s an d others responsibl e fo r negativ e outcomes. The self-enhancement tha t thi s bias promotes i s the attributiona l correlat e o f narcissism . Now, conside r th e vicissitude s o f thi s bia s i n th e structur e I hav e described. Here , becaus e th e hea d o f th e organizatio n serve s a s th e specification o f th e organization idea l an d henc e as the definer o f reality , we ma y expec t tha t th e realit y s o define d wil l hav e th e leader' s self enhancing bia s buil t int o it . I n term s o f maintainin g th e stabilit y o f th e organization ideal , thi s i s necessary , bu t conside r th e consequence s fo r the subordinate . Th e subordinat e ha s t o see th e worl d i n a wa y tha t enhances, not hi s or he r ow n self-image , bu t the self-image o f th e leader . The self-enhancin g bia s tha t operate s withi n th e subordinat e mus t b e abandoned an d overrule d i n favo r o f th e self-enhancin g bia s o f th e leader. Bu t whereas th e self-enhancin g bia s o f th e leade r arise s naturall y and almos t automaticall y i n th e min d o f th e leader , fo r th e subordinat e to approximat e th e leader' s self-enhancin g bia s mus t b e a tortuous , contrived, painful, an d self-destructiv e process . And yet the organizatio n ideal demand s jus t that . I t demands , i n a word , tha t i n th e nam e o f th e common good , the individual mus t no t onl y deny his or her own natura l tendencies towar d self-enhancemen t an d eve n self-protection , bu t mor ally condem n them . Moreover , informa l pressur e o n th e par t o f othe r participants an d eve n legitimize d forma l coercio n o n th e part o f author ities ma y b e use d t o enforc e thi s self-abasement . This , it seem s t o me , is the sourc e o f th e slavishnes s an d passivit y Shorris , for example , finds s o common i n totalitarianism. 5 A relate d featur e o f totalitaria n lif e i s uncertaint y regardin g th e ap -

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propriate. I f th e definitio n o f th e appropriat e i s based retrospectivel y o n the action s an d self-definition s o f th e leader , th e subordinat e mus t b e i n constant uncertaint y a s t o wha t action s will correspon d t o th e leader' s whims. I f th e rational e o f th e leader' s whim s i s no t comprehended , th e result mus t b e no t onl y uncertaint y wit h regar d t o appropriat e action , but uncertaint y ove r one' s ow n mora l worth . Thi s i s becaus e one' s ow n perceptions, instincts , and analyse s canno t b e relied upo n a s grounds fo r moral judgmen t an d becaus e action s tha t tur n ou t late r t o b e deviation s from th e leader' s positio n ar e condemnable . Thi s i s liabl e t o b e al l th e more s o t o th e exten t tha t th e subordinat e maintain s th e organizatio n ideal an d therefor e canno t blam e what h e or sh e sees as inadequacies o n the organization , bu t rathe r ha s t o accep t him - o r hersel f a s th e sourc e of th e blame . Th e resul t o f thi s mus t b e a mor e o r les s permanen t stat e of shamefulness . The alternativ e her e i s cynicism. Remembe r tha t th e leade r i s define d as th e ideal , rathe r tha n havin g tha t capacit y i n reality . Th e wisdo m o f the leader' s action s an d thought s ar e limite d i n jus t th e sam e wa y tha t the res t o f our s are . Accordingly , rationalit y canno t b e use d a s a guid e to actio n o n th e par t o f th e subordinate . Rather , th e particula r irration ality tha t th e leade r manifest s mus t b e th e criterion . Bu t a person' s specific irrationality , w e may suppose, is an outgrowt h o f tha t particula r person's personality . Althoug h i t ma y com e naturall y t o hi m o r her , i t must see m t o others , i f the y understan d i t at all , as some sor t o f system atic quirkiness. Understanding thi s quirkiness , th e subordinat e ma y wel l be abl e t o anticipat e th e leader' s judgment s an d us e this knowledg e a s a way o f "playin g th e game. " The problem i s that thi s ca n onl y b e achieve d through givin g u p idealizatio n o f th e organizatio n idea l while , a t th e same time, one's self-presentatio n conform s t o it. This i s cynicism. Another featur e o f totalitarianis m i s the isolatio n o f peopl e fro m on e another. Thi s isolatio n i s related t o a simila r dynamic . The organizatio n ideal i s held i n place not onl y b y the subordinate's ow n nee d t o d o wha t he o r sh e feel s ough t t o b e done , bu t b y sanction s issuin g fro m ideall y loved others . Thi s mean s tha t deviation s fro m the m threate n th e mean ing structure s o f other s whos e lov e i s neede d t o maintai n one' s ow n meaning structure . There is something not only unnatural bu t positively impossible abou t becoming someon e else . Bu t thi s i s obligatory . Th e resul t i s tha t th e

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person one really is not only is unacceptable to oneself, but is unacceptable in social life , whic h i s in turn composed o f person s who ar e each unacceptable in social life for the same reasons. The result is that social interaction takes place not between persons, but between performances. Roles utte r words a t othe r roles . An d i f a t an y tim e an y on e o f the m were t o say , a s eac h o f the m someho w knows , "Thi s i s a bunc h o f nonsense," that person would become a pariah because he or she would bring out in all these people the anxiety that motivated the performance in th e first place an d maintaine d i t a t al l times . Thus , eac h o f thes e persons mus t liv e i n mor e o r les s complet e isolatio n an d b e terribl y lonely. An example may be useful to illustrate some of these processes. Some colleagues were doing consulting work fo r a corporation tha t was getting ready to open a new plant in our area. A distinguished professor , call hi m D, well know n fo r his organizational developmen t work , was to give a presentation to the "design team," made up of middle managers recruited fro m th e rest of th e corporation, t o help them in designing a compensation system for the new plant. I wangled an invitation. The presentation turne d out t o b e mostly a summary of D' s widely published work , spice d wit h anecdote s abou t th e Utopia n blis s i n th e factories h e had "installed. " As the day went on, I shifted m y interest from D's presentation to the response of the design team. I eavesdropped on their informal conversation s an d watched their body language. Particularly suggestive was the way they responded when it appeared that their leader was going to as k them a question. They looked fo r al l the world like unprepared schoolchildren tryin g to make themselves inconspicuous so the teacher would not notice them. It becam e increasingl y clea r t o m e tha t thi s wa s th e first time th e members of the design team had ever been exposed to systematic thinking about compensation systems . Aside from various idiosyncratic attitudes toward certai n aspect s of wha t D was saying, none of the m had any thought s o n th e matte r a t all . Moreover , the y appeare d t o kno w that the y wer e i n ove r thei r heads . Behin d a certai n bluste r i n thei r facade, I thought I could detect shamefulness an d panic. Evidently, this state was no t a unique response t o thi s particular subject. A colleague who had been sittin g in o n th e meeting s wher e they "designed " other "behavioral systems" reported that, despite tremendous time investment,

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very littl e headwa y wa s eve r made . Fro m my colleague' s account , i t appeared tha t th e meeting s wer e consume d b y attempt s t o assig n blam e for thei r lac k o f progress . These tea m member s ha d apparentl y bee n recruite d int o wha t the y thought wa s a fast-track positio n i n a new directio n th e corporation wa s taking. Element s o f th e corporat e personne l an d trainin g staffs , le d b y a guru wh o wa s officiall y a "consultant, " ha d manage d t o persuad e th e corporate hierarch y t o giv e the m wide-rangin g contro l ove r th e desig n of the new plant, which woul d emplo y a new culture, based upo n a team concept. So , naturally, a team wa s recruite d t o d o th e desig n work , wit h the gur u actin g a s "facilitator. " Somethin g magica l wa s suppose d t o happen whe n a numbe r o f peopl e go t togethe r i n a room . Eac h wa s supposed t o contribut e him - o r herself , an d th e synergis m o f thei r coop eration woul d ad d u p t o a whole tha t wa s greater tha n th e parts . As it turne d out , i t was no t themselve s tha t the y wer e contributin g a t all. Wha t the y ha d t o do , instead , onc e the y wer e committed , wa s t o figure out what th e guru though t th e selves were that the y were suppose d to be , perform thos e selves , an d hop e fo r th e best . Thei r futur e wa s ou t of thei r ow n hand s an d i n th e hand s o f th e guru . Th e bes t th e grou p could d o (th e hidden agenda , really ) wa s simply t o take D's package an d adopt it . Bu t the y woul d no t b e abl e t o admi t tha t the y wer e doin g this , because the y wer e suppose d t o b e th e "desig n team " an d t o fit D' s "recommendations" int o their ow n conceptua l framework . Fo r the sam e reason, the y couldn' t eve n admi t tha t th e "facilitator " wa s i n fac t run ning the show. For the show that th e guru wa s running was one in which they were autonomous , self-determinin g agents . The poin t i s tha t i t wa s th e guru' s fantas y tha t wa s bein g enacte d here. W e ca n imagin e tha t h e sa w himsel f a s th e shepher d love d b y hi s flock, th e Lon e Range r wh o make s factorie s an d travel s on , th e Taois t sage wh o move s other s withou t movin g himself , perhap s eve n th e revo lutionary i n the pin-striped suit . There i s n o plac e i n an y o f thes e fo r th e desig n tea m member s a s th e persons tha t the y were . Thei r functio n wa s t o b e absorbe d int o th e guru's fantasy . Eve n th e promis e o f th e fas t track , b y whic h the y wer e enticed, mus t hav e bee n fel t a s shamefu l i n th e fantas y the y undertoo k to enact . N o self-servin g fantas y ca n fit int o a n organizatio n designe d around somebod y else' s narcissism . T o b e sure , on e coul d com e bac k and sa y that n o narcissistic fantas y ha s a place in an organization—eve n

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TOTALITARIANISM 2

9

the guru's . Bu t tha t woul d b e naive . Fo r wha t w e mea n whe n w e conceive o f a perfec t organizatio n i s a n organizatio n ideal ; an d a n organization idea l i s a narcissisti c fantasy . Th e onl y questio n i s wh o ultimately get s to b e the narcissist . In thi s cas e non e o f the m go t t o b e th e narcissist . No t eve n th e guru . The compan y di d no t buil d th e plant . Al l o f th e desig n tea m member s were lai d off . I don' t kno w wher e th e gur u is . He i s probably pursuin g his dream someplac e else . And h e has anothe r lin e in his resume. Finally, perhap s th e mos t poignan t los s suffered b y participant s i n organizations o f thi s sor t i s th e los s o f th e sens e o f wort h an d huma n connectedness tha t coul d otherwis e com e fro m work . Fo r organization s of thi s sor t d o no t exis t t o d o usefu l work . The y d o wor k i n orde r t o exist. An d becaus e thei r existenc e i s th e fiction o f thei r organizationa l ideal, w e ma y sa y tha t everythin g tha t goe s o n withi n the m finds it s meaning i n connection wit h maintainin g this fiction. One o f m y student s invite d m e afte r clas s on e nigh t t o hav e a drink . One drin k turne d t o many , an d I soon wa s involve d i n a ver y sa d stor y of th e mortificatio n o f a sou l tha t bor e upo n man y o f th e point s I hav e described here . He was employe d b y a large corporation i n a unit whos e function ha d almos t cease d t o exist . Ye t his superviso r spen t al l his tim e trying to expand hi s empire by hiring more people. What m y student di d all day , whe n h e di d anythin g a t all , was t o pla y u p t o th e vanit y o f hi s supervisor an d tel l him an d other s how importan t th e supervisor an d th e department were . He had t o do this because he hated i t there and wante d a transfer , whic h require d th e blessin g o f th e supervisor . Th e hear t o f the dilemm a turne d ou t t o be that th e more he was successful a t buildin g up the supervisor's image , the more the supervisor refuse d t o permit hi m to transfer, becaus e the department was , according to the drama, alread y short o n personnel . I aske d hi m wh y h e hate d thi s s o much , wha t h e would d o i f h e coul d d o whateve r h e wante d t o a t work . H e said : "I' m an engineer . All I want t o d o is build cars. " CONCLUDING REFLECTIO N This las t observation , tha t totalitarianis m ma y depriv e organizationa l participants o f th e opportunit y t o d o usefu l work , suggest s tha t ther e i s a practica l dimensio n t o thi s issue . I t appear s that , i n th e totalitaria n organization, productiv e wor k come s t o b e les s importan t tha n th e

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maintenance o f narcissisti c fantasy . Thi s cannot hel p but hav e an impac t on th e productivit y o f th e entir e enterprise . Fo r totalitarianis m repre sents a turnin g awa y fro m reality . An d organization s nee d t o dea l wit h real environments , eve n i f thi s onl y mean s tha t the y nee d t o dea l wit h narcissism project s tha t ar e no t represente d b y th e organization' s ow n organization ideal . A s I shal l sho w belo w i n par t 2 , suc h turnin g awa y from realit y mus t hav e serious consequences fo r th e organization's effec tiveness.

3

Antisocial Actions of Committe d Organizational Participant s

In th e movi e Silkwood, a manageria l employe e o f a nuclea r chemica l corporation i s observe d b y Kare n Silkwoo d a s h e retouche s th e photo graphs o f weld s i n fue l rod s intende d fo r nuclea r reactors . Th e man i s evidently a committe d organizationa l participant , concerne d abou t th e effects o n th e compan y an d its employees o f lat e delivery o n a contract. He does not appear to be a loathsome, evil creature, and yet, the activity he i s engage d i n i s no t onl y illegal ; i t i s potentiall y destructiv e i n a n order of magnitud e tha t is sickening to contemplate. The question that I wish t o addres s i n thi s chapte r i s ho w thi s ma n an d other s lik e him — loyal, moral , an d dedicate d withi n th e contex t o f thei r organizationa l lives—can, i n th e contex t o f thei r work , engag e i n action s tha t ar e morally reprehensible . The answe r I wil l propos e goe s t o th e ver y roo t o f th e connectio n between the individual and the organization, in the sense that it concerns the wa y i n whic h th e organizatio n influence s th e individual' s mora l orientation towar d th e world , an d henc e th e individual' s voluntar y so cial action . Wha t w e shal l se e i s tha t a work organizatio n ca n for m it s own mora l community , tha t it can for m tha t community o n th e basis of commitment, tha t commitmen t ca n itsel f b e explained o n th e basi s o f a function tha t participant s requir e organization s t o serve , an d tha t th e morality o f a communit y s o forme d ca n easil y stan d i n isolatio n from , and eve n oppositio n to , th e broade r communit y i n whic h i t exist s an d with which it interacts. When the individual's mora l communit y become s limited to the work organization, th e psychologica l significanc e o f wor k ca n change . Fro m an exchang e relationshi p betwee n worker s wh o produc e a produc t o r service an d consumer s wh o us e i t an d pay fo r it , wor k ca n com e t o b e experienced a s a n interna l proces s withi n th e organization—a n ex change between the organization an d its employees. Understood in terms of thi s interna l process , transaction s betwee n producer s an d consumer s 31

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can tak e o n a n indifferen t an d eve n a hostil e affectiv e coloration . Unde r these psychologica l conditions , th e relation s o f a n organizatio n wit h it s environment, includin g th e wor k tha t i t does , ca n becom e exploitative , manipulative, an d ofte n eve n aggressive . To explai n th e concep t o f organizationa l commitment , I defin e th e ontological function, b y whic h I mea n th e organization' s functio n o f providing a sens e o f identit y t o it s participants . Whil e thi s ide a i s cer tainly no t a ne w on e i n organizationa l thought , wha t I wish t o sugges t here i s why thi s functio n i s required, wha t it s psychology is , and wha t i t means. Fo r i n understandin g thes e features , w e will b e abl e t o under stand ho w th e ontologica l function , a n apparentl y beneficia l phenome non, an d th e organizationa l commitmen t tha t result s fro m it , ca n tur n sour an d malignan t an d ca n lea d t o th e most terrible consequences . WHY THE ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTION IS REQUIRE D The crucia l ste p i n th e analysi s o f th e ontologica l functio n i s t o as k th e question wh y i s it required? Th e answe r ha s t o b e that i n man y cases , as Lichtenstein (1977 ) has pointed out , people' s sense of identit y i s tenuous in the extreme . This seem s absurd . Ho w ca n a person' s sens e o f identit y b e tenuous ? Are no t peopl e wha t the y are ? I s tha t no t thei r identity ? Th e answe r i s that, fo r th e mos t part , peopl e ar e no t wha t the y are , or , wha t i s th e same thing, cannot permi t themselve s t o be what the y are . Thus, i t make s sens e to say : "H e ha s mad e somethin g o f himself, " o r "She ha s becom e somebody. " Wha t w e hav e t o notic e abou t thes e expressions i s th e implicatio n that , i f th e person s i n questio n ha d al lowed themselve s t o b e wha t the y wer e befor e the y becam e somethin g or somebody , the y woul d no t hav e bee n anythin g o r anybody . The y would not , tha t i s to say , have had a n identity . This is to sa y that havin g an identity , a t leas t i n ou r culture , i s somethin g o f a n achievement . Again, w e hav e th e notio n o f th e "ha s been, " o f somebod y wh o onc e was somebody, bu t i s no longe r anybody . Taking thes e thing s together , w e find tha t havin g a n identit y i s no t something w e ca n tak e fo r granted . O n th e contrary , i t i s something w e must achiev e i f w e ar e t o hav e i t a t all , and w e mus t continu e t o achiev e if w e ar e t o maintai n it . I n othe r words , havin g a n identit y i s a statu s that i s always i n question .

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Moreover, ther e i s clearl y a judgmenta l elemen t i n thes e assertions . Making somethin g o f onesel f i s good; no t makin g somethin g o f onesel f is bad . Bein g somebod y i s good ; bein g a "ha s been " i s bad . Thus , th e question o f identit y reflect s acceptanc e o r rejection , affirmatio n o r de nial. Finally , i t seem s a t leas t plausibl e tha t i f thes e sort s o f judgment s are commo n whe n w e judg e others , something simila r probabl y goe s o n when w e asses s and conside r ourselves . We have th e possibility no t onl y of denyin g identit y t o others , bu t o f denyin g i t t o ourselves . Indeed , th e question o f ou r ow n identit y would , lik e th e questio n o f th e identit y o f others, be continually i n question a t al l times. Never, apparently , ca n w e simply permit ourselve s to b e simply what w e are . Not allowin g ourselve s t o b e wha t w e ar e jus t becaus e tha t i s wha t we ar e mean s tha t w e canno t tak e ourselve s a s the measur e o f wha t w e are suppose d t o be . W e loo k outsid e ourselve s t o find ou t wh o w e ar e supposed t o be , if we ar e going to b e anything a t all—i f w e ar e going t o have a n identity . I submi t tha t w e fashio n socia l institution s largel y t o provide a n answe r t o thi s question . I n thi s way , socia l institutions , an d specifically wor k organizations , develo p a n ontologica l function . T o pursue thi s issue , i t i s necessar y t o conside r wh y peopl e ar e no t wha t they ar e or canno t permi t themselve s t o b e what the y are . THE EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYTI C PSYCHOLOG Y O P THE ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTIO N To understan d tha t peopl e canno t permi t themselve s t o b e what the y ar e is to recogniz e tha t a t ou r psychologica l bas e lie s self-rejection. I n orde r to understan d thi s self-rejection , w e mus t com e t o a n understandin g o f where an d whe n i t originate s a s a stabl e par t o f th e psychologica l structure. In psychoanalyti c theory , self-rejectio n i s no t a componen t o f ou r original psychologica l configuration . O n th e contrary, t o begi n with , th e infant experience s itsel f withou t an y self-critical sens e whatever . The respons e o f other s wh o ar e oriente d towar d th e chil d gives th e child a sense of importance . Moreover, th e child's lov e of thes e "mirror ing" others , it s openin g itsel f t o them , allow s i t to bas k i n thei r lov e fo r it and t o experience tha t lov e as love for itsel f (Lichtenstei n 1977) . But while love for other s permits self-love , it is also the lever by whic h self-rejection enter s int o th e child' s menta l configuration . Fo r a s tim e

34

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goes o n an d a s th e chil d come s t o ente r int o mor e comple x relation s with it s parent s an d wit h th e world , certai n spontaneou s action s o n th e part o f th e chil d becom e unacceptabl e t o th e parent s an d t o other s generally, an d th e child' s lov e fo r them , it s opennes s t o them , an d it s need fo r thei r lov e lea d t o it s experiencin g thei r rejectio n a s self-cause d rejection, an d therefor e a s self-rejection . Thus, i n th e cours e o f comin g t o liv e with others , bringin g the m int o our mind s a s th e "interna l objects " (Klei n 1975 ) wit h who m th e mean ing o f ou r live s i s transacted , w e internaliz e thei r rejectio n o f u s a s ou r rejection o f ourselves , which, i n turn , form s a stabl e par t o f ou r psycho logical configuration . In this way, a permanent woun d t o ou r narcissis m is created . Thu s w e canno t permi t ourselve s t o b e wha t w e are . Th e locus o f ou r identit y shift s fro m wh o w e ar e t o wh o other s wil l permi t us to be , and th e need fo r th e ontological functio n i s developed . The ontologica l functio n refer s t o th e projectio n o f th e eg o ideal , t o the possibility o f a retur n t o narcissism , whic h i n thi s connectio n mean s regaining a stable , self-containe d identit y withou t self-rejectio n a t it s core. I t refer s t o a specificatio n o f tha t perso n wh o wil l b e abl e t o b e exactly wh o h e o r sh e i s an d wil l no t b e required , unde r penalt y o f rejection, t o b e someon e else . We ma y no w observ e tha t th e ontologica l function o f th e organizatio n consist s i n specifyin g a n organizatio n idea l to serv e as an eg o ideal fo r organizationa l participants . Up t o thi s point , ther e i s n o problem . Al l tha t I hav e describe d i s benign. Ther e i s no wa y ye t t o understan d wh y a person woul d commi t criminal an d antisocia l act s becaus e o f concer n fo r th e corporation . I n order t o understand ho w tha t ca n happen, w e need to go more full y int o the psychology o f th e ego ideal an d organizatio n ideal . We saw befor e tha t self-rejectio n arise s from th e internalization o f th e rejection o f love d others . Bu t i f thi s wer e al l tha t i t amounte d to , the n we could imagin e that the return t o narcissism coul d be a real possibility . If one pleases th e love d others , they will lov e one in return, an d on e will again b e the center o f a loving world . There ar e tw o problem s here . Th e first, whic h w e sa w befor e i n chapter 2 , i s tha t orientin g onesel f towar d pleasin g other s i n orde r t o gain thei r lov e alread y mean s tha t on e i s no t th e cente r o f thei r world . Rather, thos e whos e lov e on e organize s one' s lif e aroun d ar e th e cente r of one' s own . B y orienting my lif e aroun d thei r lov e I am concedin g my dependence o n the m an d concedin g th e fac t tha t the y d o not , an d I

ANTISOCIAL ACTIONS OP COMMITTED PARTICIPANTS

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cannot mak e them , lov e m e fo r mysel f alone . Rather , i f the y ar e t o lov e me, the y wil l lov e m e ou t o f motive s arisin g fro m withi n themselves . Accepting tha t on e canno t hav e ontologica l hegemon y ove r th e world , that i n orde r t o hav e th e lov e o f other s on e mus t limi t one' s claim s an d one's sens e of self-importance , amount s t o self-rejection . Thus, i f the organization idea l i s to succee d i n avoidin g self-rejection , it mus t b e base d upo n a redefinitio n o f th e sel f an d o f other s i n a wa y that denies the differences amon g us—that define s u s as being essentially the sam e an d havin g th e sam e motive s an d th e sam e center . Thi s denie s organizational participant s th e statu s o f bein g separat e individuals , in dependent others . Thus, the denia l o f th e possibility o f bein g rejected b y others i s based upo n th e fantastica l denia l tha t othe r individual s exist . The secon d proble m i s that, eve n i f I give up centralit y i n a n attemp t to gai n love , th e outcom e mus t ultimatel y b e disillusioning . Fo r ulti mately, i t i s th e fact s o f biolog y tha t determin e tha t th e worl d i s no t a loving place, and th e lov e of love d others, early in life, served t o concea l this fact . Th e poin t i s tha t th e threa t o f los s o f lov e o n th e par t o f th e apparently omnipoten t parent s i s experience d s o powerfull y partl y be cause i t reveal s t o th e infan t ho w vulnerable , finite, and , ultimately , mortal i t is ; an d vulnerability , finitude, an d mortalit y remai n facts . I n other words , the loss of lov e establishes fo r th e infant tha t it s narcissis m was a n illusion . Thi s revelatio n ma y b e repressed , bu t i t ca n neve r b e eliminated a s a basi c elemen t o f th e psychologica l configuration . I thin k we can see from thi s where another par t o f our internalize d self-rejectio n comes from . I t consists i n the rejection o f th e vulnerability, finitude, an d mortality tha t g o alon g wit h one' s organi c identity . Thus , th e eg o idea l and th e organizatio n idea l ultimatel y symboliz e immortality . Agai n w e can se e wh y th e eg o ideal , an d th e organizatio n idea l alon g wit h it , ca n never b e achieved . ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT S OP THE ONTOLOGICA L FUNCTION The phras e organizational commitment ca n no w b e define d i n a wa y that i s consistent wit h it s usage i n traditiona l organizationa l psycholog y (e.g., Schein 1983 ; Mowday, Porter , an d Steer s 1982 ) a s the situation i n which a person' s identit y i s specifie d b y th e organization' s ontologica l function. I t describe s a person , i n othe r words , whos e eg o idea l i s th e

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THE THEORY OF THE ORGANIZATION IDEAL

organization ideal . Th e questio n the n becomes , how , i n th e contex t o f organizational activity , i s i t possibl e t o explai n morall y reprehensibl e actions o n th e part o f organizationall y committe d individuals ? Three feature s o f th e ontologica l functio n interac t t o permi t thi s explanation. The y are : (a ) th e conten t o f th e organizatio n ideal , (b ) th e relationship o f th e individua l t o th e organizatio n ideal , an d (c ) defens e of th e identity throug h defens e o f th e organization ideal . Content o f th e Organizatio n Idea l In th e cas e o f th e wor k organization , th e conten t o f th e organizatio n ideal mus t first b e social—tha t i s t o say , i t mus t b e a n imag e o f socia l interaction amon g individua l eg o ideals , relatin g t o eac h othe r i n fric tionless, mutuall y supportive , job-specifi c interaction . Thi s amount s t o the requirement, mentione d earlier , that the members of the organizatio n have redefine d themselve s i n term s o f th e organizatio n an d therefor e a s essentially identical . Second , th e idea l mus t b e powerful—i n th e sens e that th e individuals , a s organized , ar e rational , kno w wha t the y ar e doing, an d ar e competen t t o d o wha t the y ar e doin g an d i n contro l o f the situation . Thi s woul d b e a presuppositio n o f th e possibilit y o f th e organization bein g immorta l an d therefor e providin g immortalit y fo r those individual s redefine d i n term s o f it . An d third , i t mus t b e fre e o f anxiety a t th e leve l o f identity . Tha t i s t o say , th e individual s involve d would hav e to b e conceived a s performing thei r organizational roles , no t out o f a feelin g o f obligatio n o r compulsion , s o a s t o avoi d interna l o r external rejection , bu t ou t o f desir e o r self-expression—no t ou t o f lack , but ou t o f plenitude . This woul d b e the equivalen t o f specifyin g tha t th e two mentione d cause s o f anxiety , th e existenc e o f separat e other s an d mortality, hav e bee n overcome . Relationship o f th e Individua l t o the Organizatio n Idea l As we saw before , human s neve r reach th e ego ideal. This is also true fo r the organizatio n ideal . Organizations neve r reac h th e organization ideal . That woul d impl y frictionles s interactio n amon g totall y competent , per fectly rationa l individual s actin g purel y ou t o f desire . A s w e hav e see n above, this i s not a real possibility. The organizatio n idea l would als o b e an organizatio n no t onl y livin g i n perfec t coexistenc e wit h it s environ -

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ment, bu t assure d o f th e permanen t continuit y o f thi s coexistence.Thi s would imply that the organization would be able to perfectly predict and perfectly contro l th e futur e an d b e i n tota l permanen t contro l o f it s environment. Bu t a godlik e organizatio n o f thi s sor t canno t b e pu t together wit h huma n stuff . Thes e possibilitie s ar e no t i n keepin g wit h reality. They deny human limitation. We can believe them to b e possible only becaus e we need to believe it. Thus, th e ontologica l functio n essentiall y require s th e creatio n o f illusion. Obviously , thi s illusion, i f i t is going t o serv e it s purpose, mus t be take n a s a fact . Accordingly , th e ontologica l functio n o f th e organi zation mus t als o involv e th e shieldin g o f th e illusio n fro m reality , th e maintenance o f th e illusio n a s an apparent fac t i n the face o f it s illusory character. I t is thi s dua l process—th e creatio n o f illusio n an d th e preservation o f th e apparen t facticit y o f th e illusion—tha t lead s t o th e malignant consequences I wish to explain. Committed organizationa l participants , wh o requir e tha t th e organi zation specif y a n identit y fo r them , ar e precisel y thos e wh o hav e th e need t o tak e thes e illusion s a s fac t an d t o shiel d the m fro m reality . I n order t o maintai n th e sens e o f th e organizatio n a s organizatio n ideal , they ar e thu s likel y t o fee l tha t deviation s fro m th e organizatio n idea l are th e resul t o f thei r failur e t o fulfil l th e condition s o f thei r identity . Ironically, maintaining their fantasy o f becoming their "idealized" selves means despisin g thei r "actual " selve s (Horne y 1950) . Th e affec t tha t goes alon g with thi s is shame. Baum (1987) ha s pointed out the pervasiveness of the feeling of sham e among organizationa l participants . H e ha s observe d tha t superior s ca n invoke sham e amon g thei r subordinate s simpl y b y doin g thei r job . Another poin t regardin g th e relationshi p o f individual s t o the organizatio n ideal concern s th e necessity o f defendin g th e illusion o f th e organizatio n ideal from bein g revealed as an illusion in order to maintain the ontological function . Thi s implie s tha t whil e committe d organizationa l partici pants believ e tha t thei r laps e fro m th e organizatio n idea l i s a failure o n their own part, they may believe that others fulfill th e organization ideal. An importan t featur e o f organizationa l phenomenolog y i n thi s con nection is the experience of hierarchy. As we have seen in chapter 2 (als o see Schwartz 1987) , it is possible to reconcile individual failure, and even the failur e o f one' s associates , t o measur e u p t o th e organizatio n idea l through th e belie f that , a t highe r level s o f th e organization , peopl e d o

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THE THEORY OF THE ORGANIZATION IDEAL

approach th e organizatio n ideal . Indeed , a larg e par t o f organizationa l dramaturgy i s devote d t o th e enactmen t o f th e presume d competenc e and goodnes s o f organizationa l superior s (Klei n an d Ritt i 1984) . Defense o f Identit y throug h Defens e o f th e Organizatio n Idea l It is clear enough that , t o the extent tha t th e individual i s committed an d derives hi s o r he r identit y fro m th e ontologica l process , tha t identit y i s put into question b y threats to the organization's existence . Thus, threat s to th e organizatio n ar e experience d a s threats t o th e individual . Defens e of th e organizatio n become s self-defense . Mor e interestin g i s that , sinc e the organizatio n idea l i s a n ideal , threat s t o th e organizatio n ar e per ceived a s havin g a hostil e coloration , a s aggression , a s bad . Defens e o f the organizatio n ma y b e experienced a s a righteou s an d virtuou s action , therefore, regardles s o f th e light in which suc h actio n ma y be seen by th e organization's environment—whic h i s seen , afte r all , a s th e sourc e o f the aggression . Indeed , recallin g tha t th e organizatio n i s see n a s th e organization ideal , w e ma y not e tha t i t i s no t onl y rea l threat s t o th e organization tha t ar e seen a s acts of aggression . Eve n mere threats to th e image of th e organization a s perfect ca n b e seen a s reprehensible . EXPLAINING ANTISOCIA L ACTIONS OP COMMITTED PARTICIPANTS Taken together , th e content o f th e organization ideal , the relationship o f the individua l t o th e organizatio n ideal , an d th e defens e o f identit y through defens e o f th e organizatio n idea l giv e a n adequat e theoretica l base fo r understandin g ho w committe d organizationa l participant s ca n engage i n illega l an d antisocia l acts . First, and mos t obvious , the interaction o f belie f i n the ideal characte r of th e organizatio n wit h feeling s o f sham e ove r one' s ow n failur e t o fulfill th e organizatio n idea l ca n lea d t o th e sor t o f malignan t obedienc e to authorit y investigate d b y Milgra m (1963) . Feeling s o f sham e ove r failing t o mee t th e eg o idea l lea d t o a mora l delegitimatio n o f th e sel f and it s natura l responses . On e is , afte r all , not wha t on e i s supposed t o be, an d therefor e one' s spontaneou s response s shoul d no t b e take n a s the determinant s o f one' s action . O n to p o f that , highe r authorit y i s what i t i s supposed t o be , an d therefor e it s directive s ar e experience d a s

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morally enhanced and more credible as moral directives than the individual's own mora l feelings . But while thi s proces s surel y explain s som e antisocia l activit y o n th e part of committe d participants , i t does no t explai n al l o f it . Specifically , it doe s no t explai n th e action s o f thos e wh o gav e th e orders , and , generally, i t doe s no t explai n self-directe d antisocia l action , suc h a s the retouching of photographs b y the employee in Silkwood. The ke y t o understandin g self-directe d antisocia l action s lie s i n th e phenomenology o f th e individua l wh o experience s threa t t o th e organi zation a s threat to his or her own identity . Sinc e individuals neve r reach the eg o ideal , identit y i s alway s i n question ; an d since th e organizatio n itself fall s shor t o f th e organizatio n ideal , i n th e sens e o f bein g les s i n control of it s circumstances than its own mythology requires , the precarious conditions that all organizations continually face may be interpreted as the result of unfair , hostile, an d aggressive act s on the part of outsid e forces—which mus t be playing unfairly, afte r all , since the organizatio n is the organizatio n idea l an d i s therefore doin g everythin g properly an d correctly. Unde r th e circumstances , th e committe d individua l ma y fee l that the moral response is one of hostility an d aggression (Alfor d 1990) . In orde r t o ge t a mor e rounde d perspectiv e o n wha t thi s antisocia l action amounts to, it may be useful t o consider the relationship betwee n the organizatio n an d it s environment . Th e organizatio n serves , throug h the committed individual' s belie f i n the organization ideal , a n immortality function fo r the individual (Schwart z 1985) . It is, in effect, a n instrument fo r th e denia l o f th e individual' s finitude. And , i n orde r t o fulfil l this function , i t mus t itsel f b e considere d t o b e immortal . A s w e hav e seen, the individual denie s his or her mortality by defining him- or herself as part o f a n organization tha t i s conceive d t o b e in perfect, permanen t control o f it s environment . Bu t organization s ar e subjec t t o th e sam e question o f identit y a s individual s are . The y ar e neve r perfectl y i n con trol of their environments. Nor, it is important to note, should they be. The poin t i s tha t fro m a syste m perspective , th e environmen t ca n claim a legitimat e righ t t o mak e demand s upo n th e organization . Th e environment is , afte r all , where everyon e wh o i s not a committed orga nizational participan t exist s an d ha s suc h identit y a s h e o r sh e ca n manage to have. From the point of vie w of th e environment, the organization i s a sourc e o f good s and/o r services . I t i s i n exchang e fo r th e supply o f thes e good s and/o r service s tha t th e environmen t provide s

40

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resources tha t permi t th e organizatio n t o continue . Whe n th e organiza tion fail s t o provid e suc h good s and/o r service s a s th e environmen t deems sufficien t t o balanc e it s investmen t o f resources , th e environmen t responds b y withholdin g resource s an d thereb y threaten s th e surviva l o f the organization. What' s wron g with that ? When wor k i s viewed a s one side of a n exchange relationship betwee n producer an d consumer , i t alway s make s sense , in evaluating a n organi zation, t o as k wha t i s it good for ? Wha t doe s th e organization d o fo r it s environment tha t make s i t worthwhile fo r th e environment t o kee p i t i n existence a t a cost t o itsel f ? But this questio n i s not aske d b y committe d organizational participants . Fo r them , th e criterio n o f wort h i s define d not b y the environmen t bu t b y th e organization . Indeed , th e criterio n o f worth i s the organization ideal . Thus, wha t appea r fro m a n extraorganizationa l perspectiv e t o b e legitimate demand s tha t th e environmen t place s o n th e organization , appear fro m th e standpoin t o f th e committe d participan t t o b e illegiti mate, hostile , an d aggressiv e challenge s t o th e organization' s an d th e individual's existence . When I referred befor e t o the need of th e commit ted participan t t o believ e tha t th e organization control s it s environment , I was putting th e matte r to o mildly . In fact , committed participants cannot tolerate the organization's having an independent environment at all. Fro m thi s individual' s stand point, th e environmen t i s ontologicall y linke d t o th e organization , i n that it s meanin g i s a functio n o f th e organization' s need s an d agenda . Thus, rathe r tha n th e organization existin g an d justifyin g itsel f b y fulfill ing need s o f th e environment , th e environmen t i s though t t o exis t i n order t o admir e an d atten d t o the organization . Earlier, we saw that th e ego ideal symbolize s th e return t o narcissism . Now w e ca n se e ho w th e organizatio n idea l doe s s o a s well . Just a s th e narcissistic chil d expect s th e worl d t o revolv e aroun d it , s o th e organi zationally committe d individua l expect s th e world t o revolv e around th e organization, conceive d a s th e organizationa l ideal . Moreover , jus t a s the infan t respond s wit h rag e whe n th e worl d doe s no t respon d t o it s whims, s o th e committe d participan t ma y respon d wit h self-righteous , hostile, aggressive , an d eve n crimina l activit y whe n th e worl d doe s no t respond t o the whims o f th e organization . From th e standpoin t o f th e broader socia l world , therefore , antisocia l actions ar e b y n o mean s t o b e regarde d a s a n aberratio n fro m norma l

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organizational activit y o n th e part o f organizationall y committe d partic ipants. O n th e contrary , the y appea r t o b e a natura l concommitan t o f organizational commitmen t itself . "Evil, " Hobbe s said , "i s a robus t child" (cite d i n Becker 1975) . I might add , an d fo r th e very same reason , that i t can als o be a robust organization . ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMEN T AND ANTISOCIA L SOCIALIZATION That antisocia l organizationa l behavio r i s a concommitan t o f organiza tional commitment , whic h itsel f woul d see m t o b e relate d t o organiza tional effectivenes s an d perhap s socia l usefulness , raise s th e questio n o f the circumstance s unde r whic h suc h behavio r migh t tak e place . Whil e this i s properly a questio n fo r furthe r research , i t doe s see m possibl e t o use previou s wor k o n organizationa l commitmen t an d socializatio n t o provide a basi s fo r informe d speculatio n an d fo r establishin g possibl e directions fo r research . For presen t purpose s I shall restric t mysel f t o a previously mentione d work b y Schei n (1983) , whic h I thin k provide s som e ver y interestin g clues. Schein says : One mechanism [fo r buildin g commitment] is to invest much effort an d time in the new member an d thereb y buil d u p expectations o f bein g repaid b y loyalty, hard work, and rapid learning. Another mechanism is to get the new member to make a serie s of smal l behaviora l commitment s whic h ca n onl y b e justified b y him throug h th e acceptanc e an d incorporatio n o f compan y values . H e the n becomes the agent of his own socialization. Both mechanisms involve the subtle manipulation of guilt. (195) Going beyon d th e cas e o f th e ne w recrui t t o th e genera l cas e o f th e organization participan t wh o ha s been selecte d for specia l treatment an d putting thi s matte r i n term s o f th e eg o ideal , i t seems t o m e thi s passag e is suggestin g tha t selecte d participant s wil l mos t strongl y tak e th e orga nization idea l a s thei r eg o idea l whe n (1 ) th e organizatio n succeed s i n presenting itsel f a s a n organizatio n ideal , (2 ) progres s towar d thi s orga nization idea l seem s probabl e fo r th e individua l i n question , an d (3 ) other possibilitie s fo r th e eg o idea l hav e bee n eliminated . I t furthe r suggests tha t guil t i s involved bot h i n th e attractio n towar d th e organi zation idea l an d i n th e eliminatio n o f alternatives . The influenc e o f guil t (or shame, as we shall see) may provide a key to th e whole process .

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Take th e guil t involve d i n th e presentatio n an d accessibilit y o f th e organization ideal . Th e organizatio n lavishe s resource s o n participants , indicating t o the m tha t i f the y tak e th e organizatio n a s a n organizatio n ideal, th e hierarchica l rout e t o tha t idea l i s ope n t o them . Th e partici pants, i f the y ar e t o thin k themselve s worth y o f thes e resource s an d o f the promis e o f mor e t o come , "mus t repa y th e compan y wit h loyalt y and har d work, " a s Schei n says ; th e participan t "woul d fee l guilt y i f h e did not " (195) . The crucia l questio n t o as k a t thi s poin t is , where d o thes e resource s really com e from ? Th e answe r ca n onl y b e tha t the y com e fro m th e environment. Proxima l contro l ove r the m ma y res t wit h th e organiza tion, t o b e sure . Bu t ultimately , o f course , the y mus t originat e outsid e the organization . Th e organizatio n ca n b e n o mor e tha n a stewar d fo r these resources . Accordingly , suc h a relationshi p o f guil t a s ma y exis t would hav e t o b e cause d b y a n unbalance d exchang e relationshi p be tween th e participan t an d th e environment , th e produce r an d th e con sumer. Thus , i t appear s tha t th e first ste p i n th e proces s throug h whic h organizational commitmen t come s t o develo p antisocia l potentialitie s i s through a n obscuring , o n th e par t o f th e organization , o f th e sourc e o f the resources i t employs . We ca n se e thi s obscuratio n i n Schein' s observatio n tha t th e organi zation build s u p "expectation s o f bein g repai d b y loyalty , har d work , and rapi d learning. " We ca n se e where har d wor k an d rapi d learnin g g o into balancin g th e exchang e relationshi p betwee n participan t an d envi ronment, bu t loyalt y t o th e organization ? Th e poin t t o b e note d her e i s that, i n th e mos t fundamenta l sens e wit h regar d t o th e exchang e rela tionship o f work , th e organizatio n i s not a party i n th e transaction . Th e organization, strictl y speaking , i s simpl y a patternin g o f thi s ver y com plex relationship . Thi s i s a t leas t on e meanin g tha t ca n b e give n t o Kar l Weick's (1969 ) observatio n tha t th e organizatio n doe s no t exist ; onl y the process o f organizin g does . Thus, bringin g th e organizatio n i n a s th e main part y i n the transaction i s already a n ac t of obscuration . How i s thi s obscuratio n possible ? Throug h th e sam e process , I sug gest, b y whic h th e organizatio n come s t o presen t itsel f a s a n organiza tional ideal . The organization, a s a process, once had a positive effect o n its environment ; an d th e environment , eage r t o hav e th e relationshi p continue, bestowe d upo n th e process a n attributio n o f identity , of causa l centrality, an d entruste d th e constructed entit y with th e resources i t no w

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commands. I t mad e th e organizatio n independent . Thus , th e environ ment relinquished proxima l contro l ove r these resource s ou t o f th e very admiration an d idealizatio n o f th e organizatio n tha t mak e i t attractiv e to the individual risin g in its ranks. In doing so, however, it gave up the means of control that it possessed to require the organization t o repay the environment fo r the resources it had give n over . I t trusted tha t th e organizatio n woul d accep t th e mora l responsibility t o balanc e th e exchang e relationship—tha t i t woul d un dertake a n obligation . Bu t if the organizatio n denie s the obligation, i f i t makes the narcissistic claim that the environment should revolve aroun d it, rather than accepting its own moral responsibility to the environment, the environment , b y virtu e o f havin g mad e th e organizatio n indepen dent, is left without recourse . The environment's rejectio n of th e organization comes to lack meaning . In assertin g it s contro l ove r th e participant' s guilt , th e organizatio n asserts it s righ t t o en d i t an d assert s tha t it , itself , i s fre e o f guilt . Implicitly, i t claim s i t i s fre e o f th e obligatio n towar d other s i n th e environment tha t th e phenomenology o f guil t contains . I n other words , it presents itsel f a s bein g beyond , a s transcending , guil t an d obligation . It presents itself a s a morally independent identity . By offering t o absolv e the participant of guil t in exchange for loyalty, the organizatio n create s a self-fulfillin g proposition . Fo r loyalt y i s th e acceptance o f th e organizatio n a s one' s eg o ideal . B y this ac t on e does , after all , believ e tha t on e i s gettin g awa y fro m one' s mora l dependenc e on others and over the necessity of bein g concerned about their rejection —in th e term s use d earlier , on e believe s on e i s creatin g fo r onesel f a n identity tha t wil l b e beyon d question . Thus , th e commissio n o f th e psychic ac t o f givin g th e organizationa l loyalt y that , fro m one' s ow n point o f view , provide s identity , i s th e ver y self-deception , th e obscura tion, that cuts the organization morall y loose from its environment. Now tak e th e techniqu e o f gettin g behaviora l commitments . On e example Schei n use s i s th e brainwashin g practic e o f forcin g publi c confession fro m a prisoner . Anothe r i s th e ac t o f enticin g a rebelliou s individual t o accep t a promotion. I n both cases , what we se e is a behavior that invokes shame among one's prior reference group, as a violation of it s own eg o ideal—a sham e that can only b e avoided b y rejecting th e previous referenc e grou p a s a source o f potentia l admiration , restrictin g oneself t o th e organization ideal , an d limiting the circle of one' s identifi -

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cations t o thos e wh o als o hav e take n th e organizatio n idea l a s thei r eg o ideal. Then , wha t woul d otherwis e b e see n a s shamefu l action s com e t o be viewed a s signs o f commitmen t an d highl y valued . This has the effec t of refreezin g th e participant' s identit y int o th e organization' s meanin g system and , effectively , o f isolatin g tha t meanin g syste m fro m it s envi ronment. Given tha t actions , no matte r ho w shamefu l the y loo k t o th e environ ment, ma y b e looke d upo n a s worthwhil e withi n th e organization ; an d given tha t b y presentin g itsel f a s a n organizatio n idea l th e organizatio n obscures th e mora l relationshi p tha t exist s betwee n participan t an d en vironment, i t i s clea r tha t anythin g ha s becom e possible . Repeatin g th e point mad e earlier , tha t identit y s o define d i s threatene d b y th e ver y existence o f a n independen t environment , i t appear s tha t i t i s onl y circumstances tha t preven t th e possible fro m becomin g probable .

CONCLUSION These las t consideration s sho w ho w th e potentialit y fo r antisocia l ac tions i s built righ t int o th e process o f th e socialization fo r organizationa l commitment. They als o show how precisely those organizations tha t ha d a favorabl e respons e fro m thei r environment s ar e most likely to build u p the sor t o f commitmen t tha t ma y lea d t o antisocia l action s whe n th e favor begin s t o slip . This secon d poin t ha s t o b e a caus e fo r pessimism , since i t implie s bot h tha t (1 ) nothin g i s stable abou t th e kin d o f identit y that commitmen t t o a n "excellent " (Peter s an d Waterma n 1982 ) orga nization offers , an d tha t (2 ) there i s no way o f dealin g with thi s proble m in programmatic , institutiona l fashion , sinc e an y institutio n tha t wa s successful i n dealin g wit h i t woul d itsel f b e subjec t t o thi s proces s o f degeneration. Moreover, ther e i s no caus e fo r optimis m i n th e ide a tha t th e solitar y individual ma y b e abl e t o withstan d th e organization' s blandishment s and maintai n a strong mora l sense . For, while some rar e individual s wil l do so , man y wil l not . I t is , of course , th e organizatio n tha t select s thos e individuals upo n who m i t will showe r resource s an d wh o i t will rais e t o positions o f power , expectin g commitmen t i n return . The n th e solitar y individual become s a deviant , an d ther e i s n o necessit y i n thi s wor k t o

ANTISOCIAL ACTIONS OP COMMITTED PARTICIPANTS 4

5

repeat wha t w e kno w abou t ho w group s dea l wit h deviants . Loo k a t what happened to Karen Silkwood. All in all, there is not much cause for optimism in any of the considerations adduced in this chapter. But, then, it is the demand that all of our stories have happy endings that leads to these dynamics in the first place.

Introduction

My firs t understandin g o f narcissisti c process , organizationa l totalitari anism, an d th e organizatio n idea l wa s i n mora l terms , i n term s o f th e psychological damag e don e t o th e individual s involve d an d i n term s o f the damag e tha t coul d b e wrough t outsid e o f th e organization . Bu t a s time went by , it became mor e an d more clea r to m e that the processes I was comin g t o understan d mus t hav e practica l consequence s a s well — consequences fo r th e effectiv e functioning , th e efficiency , th e profitabil ity, and the competitivenes s o f organizations . I n a word, i t did not see m to me that organizations a s I understood them could possibly b e successful eve n i n term s o f th e narrowes t economi c criteria , withou t regar d t o the mora l cost s involved. So , when American industr y seeme d incapabl e of competin g wit h foreig n enterprises , I di d no t find mysel f a t al l sur prised; and when the space shuttle Challenger ble w up, I thought I knew where t o loo k fo r a n explanation. The nex t thre e chapter s ar e attempt s to sho w som e o f th e effect s o f narcissisti c proces s an d totalitarian man agement on organizational functioning . I give th e nam e organizational decay t o th e multidimensiona l degen eration that results when the nature of the organization shifts from doing work i n th e rea l worl d t o presentin g a dramatization o f it s ow n perfec tion i n a fantasy world . Chapter s 4 an d 5 provid e illustration s o f orga nizations i n th e proces s o f decay . Chapte r 4 i s a cas e stud y o f Genera l Motors. Chapters 5 an d 6 deal with the National Aeronautic s and Space Administration an d th e Challenger disaster. Chapte r 5 shows ho w NAS A decayed throug h th e year s int o a n organizatio n tha t coul d mak e th e decision tha t le d t o th e Challenger disaster . Chapte r 6 discusse s th e specific decision-making process that launched th e Challenger. Chapter 4 make s extensive us e of th e only accoun t tha t I know o f b y a highl y positione d corporat e inside r wh o becam e alienate d fro m th e system an d reporte d o n it s processe s t o th e outside . Thi s i s a boo k b y John Z. De Lorean, cowritten b y J. Patrick Wright, and published by the latter under his own name , called On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors (1979) . 49

50 ORGANIZATIONA

L DECAY AND ORGANIZATIONAL DISASTER

There ar e tw o problem s wit h usin g D e Lorean' s testimony . On e i s that th e separatio n o f an y individua l fro m a n organizatio n render s tha t person's critica l testimon y suspect . Peopl e tend , ofte n correctly , t o se e his o r he r criticis m a s th e defensiv e reactio n o f a n individua l wh o ha s been rejecte d an d wh o "couldn' t mak e it" i n the system. De Lorean was , however, "makin g it " ver y well , with regar d t o outwar d signs , when hi s separation fro m G M occurred . A s grou p executiv e fo r th e Ca r an d Truck Grou p h e wa s responsibl e fo r th e cor e o f GM' s business , an d i t was widely believe d tha t h e would succee d t o GM' s presidency . The other problem i s more serious. It is that D e Lorean's activit y afte r leaving Genera l Motor s wa s no t suggestiv e o f a man whos e probit y a s a witness coul d b e take n withou t skepticism . Hi s operatio n o f th e aut o company h e create d appeare d wil d an d irresponsible , an d hi s involve ment i n a cocain e deal , eve n thoug h h e wa s no t convicted , di d nothin g to recommen d hi m a s a moral authority . I a m usin g hi s testimon y wit h som e reluctance , therefore , bu t I a m using it nonetheless, fo r a number o f reasons . First, I have never encoun tered anyon e who disagree d wit h th e facts o f D e Lorean's claims . On th e contrary, thes e ar e ofte n take n fo r grante d b y peopl e wh o revil e D e Lorean himself . Second , al l o f th e evidenc e I have com e t o b e awar e o f that bear s upo n D e Lorean' s story , howeve r fragmentary , ha s bee n supportive. Moreover , hi s observation s an d analyse s see m t o b e consis tent wit h a mor e recen t accoun t o f G M b y Maryan n Kelle r (1989) , a n account tha t bear s non e o f hi s taint . I wil l b e usin g he r wor k t o len d secondary suppor t t o m y case . Third , an d mos t important , i s tha t D e Lorean's accoun t help s one t o mak e sens e of GM' s curren t situation . The fac t i s that G M i s widely believe d t o b e in a state of free-fall . Fo r example, a n articl e i n th e 1 4 Decembe r 198 9 Wall Street Journal, head lined "Losing the Race: Wit h It s Marke t Shar e Sliding , G M Scramble s to Avoid a Calamity," observe s that : GM's 10-yea r slid e i n U.S . car-market shar e i s acceleratin g a t a n alarmin g an d dangerous rate . I t too k si x years , fro m 198 0 t o 1986 , for GM' s marke t shar e t o decline five percentag e points , t o 4 1 % fro m 46% . Sinc e then , i t ha s take n jus t three year s fo r GM' s shar e t o plung e anothe r si x points , t o jus t unde r 35 % s o far thi s year . And, th e articl e adds : Market shar e isn' t jus t a statisti c o n a board-roo m chart . An d th e declin e i n GM's marke t shar e i s "absolutel y horrifying, " say s John A . Casesa , automotiv e

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analyst a t Wertheim Schroede r 6 c Co. i n New York . "What' s happening no w has long term implications. GM' s share erosion is a sign that the fundamenta l problems haven't been fixed."(Ingrassia and White 1989: 1) If th e kin d o f "fundamenta l problems " thes e analyst s poin t t o wer e the processes of organizational deca y that De Lorean describes, we could easily understand not only the state GM currently finds itself in, but why it would b e so difficult fo r it to get itself out of it.

4

Totalitarian Management an d Organizationa l Decay: The Case of Genera l Motor s In th e mos t basi c sense , organizationa l totalitarianis m place s falsehoo d right a t th e cor e o f organizationa l functionin g an d therefor e canno t hel p but lea d t o a los s o f rationality . A s I hav e note d before , th e retur n t o narcissism i s impossible, short of psychosis, and therefor e organizationa l totalitarianism mean s th e superimpositio n o f a psychosi s upo n organi zational functioning . Ultimately , suc h a los s o f rationalit y lead s t o gen eralized an d systemi c organizational ineffectiveness . Moreover, I sugges t tha t thi s conditio n o f generalize d an d systemi c ineffectiveness ha s a unit y t o i t an d therefor e represent s somethin g lik e an organizational disease . I would lik e to giv e it the name organizational decay, wit h th e intention o f conveyin g the impression o f both a n interna l process o f rot , no t occasione d b y outsid e forces , an d a holisti c process , not takin g plac e i n isolate d part s o f th e organizatio n bu t typicall y an d increasingly sappin g th e vitalit y o f th e organizatio n a s a whole . Thi s decay eventuall y ma y manifes t itsel f i n an y o f a numbe r o f ways . I shall discuss a fe w o f them , relyin g o n D e Lorean' s boo k t o provid e illustra tions.

SOME CAUSES OF DECAY Commitment t o Bad Decision s Perhaps th e mos t obviou s sympto m o f organizationa l deca y i s the com mitment t o ba d decisions . Sta w (1980 ) ha s note d tha t th e tendenc y t o justify pas t action s ca n b e a powerful motivatio n behin d organizationa l behavior an d ca n ofte n ru n counte r t o rationality . A s h e observes , th e justification proces s lead s t o escalatin g commitment . Whe n mistake n actions canno t b e see n a s mistake n actions , th e principl e o n whic h the y are mad e i s no t see n a s bein g mistaken . Worse , th e feelin g tha t i t i s a valid principl e become s enhance d throug h th e nee d t o defen d th e deci sion, and thu s furthe r decision s ar e made on th e basis of it . 53

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This proces s mus t b e especiall y letha l i n th e cas e o f th e totalitaria n organization, wher e th e ide a o f th e perfectio n o f th e organizatio n pro vides the organization's ver y motivational base . Here, the assumption o f the identit y o f th e individua l decision-make r an d hi s o r he r organiza tional rol e turn s th e tendenc y t o justif y pas t actions fro m a defensiv e tendency o n th e part of individual s t o a core organizational process— a central element of th e organization's culture . It will be useful her e to differentiate betwee n totalitarian managemen t and idealisti c o r "transformational " (Burn s 1978 ) leadership. 1 Idealisti c leadership involve s belie f i n th e organizatio n a s a n organizatio n ideal , but it relies upon a vision of th e future that is honestly held and promulgated b y th e leaders . Whe n th e organizatio n catche s u p with th e conse quences o f it s action s an d finds the m importantl y a t varianc e wit h it s earlier idealistic intention s an d projections—when i t comes t o know , i n other words , tha t a decisio n wa s a ba d decision—i t ha s th e choic e o f either acknowledgin g it s failure , an d henc e it s deviatio n fro m th e ideal , or o f denyin g it s failur e an d attemptin g t o maintai n th e imag e o f itsel f as idea l throug h deceptio n an d compulsion . I n th e forme r case, i t i s possible tha t throug h imaginatio n an d creativit y a revise d idea l ca n b e formulated. Eve n i f i t i s not , th e organizatio n wil l a t least hav e learne d something. I n th e latte r case , th e organizatio n turn s towar d totali tarianism. The cas e of th e Corvai r illustrate s th e process o f commitmen t t o ba d decisions. Modeled afte r the Porsche, the Corvair was powered by a rear engine an d ha d a n independent , swing-axl e suspensio n system . Accord ing to De Lorean, any car so powered an d so suspended i s going to have serious problems—problems tha t were wel l know n an d documented b y GM's engineerin g staf f lon g befor e th e Corvai r wa s offere d fo r sale . Understanding th e significanc e o f th e followin g commentar y require s attending to the time it took t o reverse the original ba d decision. The questionabl e safet y o f th e ca r cause d a massiv e interna l fight amon g GM's engineers . . . . On on e sid e of th e argumen t wa s Chevrolet' s the n Genera l Manager, E d Cole . . . . O n th e othe r sid e wa s a wid e assortmen t o f top-fligh t engineers... . . . . On e to p corporat e enginee r tol d m e tha t h e showe d hi s tes t result s t o Cole but b y then, he said, "Cole' s min d wa s made up. " . . . Managemen t no t onl y wen t alon g wit h Cole , i t als o tol d dissenter s i n effect t o "sto p thes e objections. Ge t o n th e team , o r yo u ca n find someplac e els e to work." Th e ill fated Corvai r wa s launched i n the fall of 1959.

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The results were disastrous…. It wa s onl y a coupl e o f year s o r s o befor e GM' s lega l departmen t wa s inundated with lawsuits over the c a r . . . . When [Bunkie] Knudsen took over the reins of Chevrolet in 1961, he insisted that h e b e give n corporat e authorizatio n [t o fix the proble m wit h a stabilize r bar, whic h woul d hav e cos t $1 5 a car] . But hi s reques t wa s refuse d b y [to p management] as "too expensive." [Ultimately, unde r threa t o f hi s resignation , the y relented. ] Bunki e pu t a stabilizer bar on the Corvair in the 1964 models. ... To date , million s o f dollar s hav e bee n spen t i n lega l expense s an d out-of court settlement s i n compensatio n fo r thos e kille d o r maime d i n th e Corvair . The corporatio n steadfastl y defend s th e car' s safety , despit e th e interna l engi neering record s whic h indicate d i t wa s no t safe , an d th e ghastl y tol l i n death s and injury it recorded. (65-67, emphasis added) Advancement o f Participant s Wh o Detach Themselve s fro m Reality an d Discouragemen t o f Reality-Oriente d Participant s Who Ar e Committe d t o Their Wor k When cor e organizationa l proces s become s th e dramatizatio n o f th e organization an d it s hig h official s a s ideal , th e evaluatio n o f individual s for promotio n an d eve n fo r continue d inclusio n come s t o b e mad e o n the basis of ho w muc h the y contribute t o this dramatization. Thi s mean s that increasingl y promotio n criteri a shif t fro m achievemen t an d compe tence to ideology an d politics. 2 De Lorean describe s the process thi s way : As I grew in General Motors it became apparent that objective criteria were not always used to evaluate an executive's performance. Many times the work record of a ma n wh o wa s promoted wa s fa r inferio r t o th e record s o f other s aroun d him who were not promoted. It was quite obvious that something different tha n job performance was being used to rate these men. That somethin g different wa s a very subjective criterio n which encompasse d style, appearance , personalit y and , mos t importantly , persona l loyalt y t o th e man (o r men) who was the promoter, an d t o the system which brought this all about. There were rules of this fraternity o f management at GM. Those pledges willing t o obe y th e rule s wer e promoted . I n th e vernacular , the y wer e th e company's "tea m players. " Those wh o didn' t fit int o th e mol d o f a manager , who didn' t adher e t o th e rule s becaus e the y though t the y wer e silly , generall y weren't promoted. "He' s not a team player," was the frequent, an d many times only, objectio n t o a n executiv e i n lin e fo r promotion . I t didn' t mea n h e wa s doing a poor job. It meant he didn't fit neatly into a stereotype of style, appearance and manner. He didn't display blind loyalty to the system of management ,

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to the man or men doing the promoting. He rocked the boat. He took unpopular stands o n product s o r polic y whic h contradicte d th e prevailing attitud e o f to p management. (40) Keller (1989 ) adumbrate s thi s point : Elitism withi n th e system wa s inevitable. Ove r th e years it has become easy for executive s t o bu y staf f loyalty ; everyon e know s that' s ho w yo u ge t o n th e fast-track—in G M ling o that' s calle d bein g a HI-POT , a high-potentia l em ployee. At General Motors, the road to the corporate dining room is paved with occasions o f lookin g th e othe r way , o f sayin g yes , of supportin g th e team , of keeping one' s opinion s t o oneself . Those chose n few—abou t fou r thousan d i n number—who hav e achieve d bonus-eligibl e statu s continu e t o b e yes-sayers , their huge bonus earnings buying their loyalty. (33) She notes thi s abou t curren t chairma n Roge r Smith : For thirty-one years, Smith moved up through th e ranks of GM as the consummate corporat e player—th e G M cultur e course d i n hi s veins . Admiratio n fo r and loyalt y t o th e organizatio n wa s a t th e cor e o f hi s being . He was on e of a new bree d o f corporat e politician s whos e succes s depende d o n thei r eas e i n wearing th e corporat e mantle . Translated , tha t meant , "Abov e all , be loyal t o your superior's agenda." (66) One resul t o f thi s kin d o f collusio n i s tha t individual s wh o ar e re tained an d promote d ar e thos e wh o kno w ver y wel l ho w thing s ar e supposed to look, accordin g t o th e ideolog y o f th e dominan t coalition , but wh o kno w les s an d les s abou t realit y insofa r a s i t conflict s wit h o r simply i s independen t o f thi s ideology . Th e proble m is , o f course , tha t since n o organizatio n is , o r ca n be , th e organizatio n ideal , individual s who ar e retaine d an d promote d ar e thos e wh o ca n cu t themselve s loos e from discrepan t reality . Another resul t o f thi s sor t o f selectio n mus t b e tha t realisti c an d concerned person s mus t los e th e belie f tha t th e organization' s rea l pur pose i s productive wor k an d com e t o the conclusion tha t it s real purpos e is self-promotion. The y the n ar e likely to see their wor k a s being alien t o the purposes o f th e organizatio n an d mus t fin d doin g wor k increasingl y depressing an d useless . De Lorean put s i t this way : In an y syste m wher e inexperienc e an d eve n incompetenc e exist s i n th e uppe r reaches of management , lower-echelon executive s become demoralized an d dissatisfied. The y see a system whic h impede s rather tha n enhance s decision mak ing. Thei r ow n job s becom e frustrating . Divisiona l manager s reportin g t o a

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group executive who is uneducated in their businesses must literally try to teach the busines s t o hi m befor e gettin g decision s fro m hi m on thei r proposals. We often waltzed our bosses on the Fourteenth Floor through a step-by-step explanation of eac h program proposal—what i t meant, how it related to the rest of the busines s an d wha t i t woul d d o fo r th e company . Eve n afte r this , thei r judgement most often was based on what GM had done before. (255) And h e give s thi s exampl e o f th e clas h betwee n th e incompeten t wh o have been promoted an d their competent but discouraged subordinates : Increasingly, grou p and upper managers seemed to loo k upo n their jobs in such narrow terms that it was impossible to competently direct broad corporate policy. Ofte n misplaced , unprepare d o r simply undertalented , thes e executives filled thei r days and our committee meeting s with minutiae. After on e particularly frustrating meeting of the Administrative Committee, John Beltz and I were picking up our notes when he looked down at the far end of the conference table at the corporate management and said to me, "I wouldn't let one of those guys run a ga s statio n fo r me. " I t wa s a bitte r an d sa d indictmen t o f ou r to p management b y on e o f th e the n young , trul y brigh t lights o f Genera l Motor s management. (256) A thir d effect , obviou s b y thi s point , i s tha t highe r managemen t i s effectively isolate d from criticism, or even serious discussion, of it s thought and actions. 3 De Lorean gives this account: This system quickly shut top management off fro m the real world because it surrounded itsel f i n man y case s wit h "yes " men. Ther e soo n becam e n o real vehicle fo r adequat e outsid e input . Lowe r executives, eage r to pleas e the boss and rise up the corporate ladder, worked hard to learn what he wanted or how he thought on a particular subject. They then either fed the boss exactly what he wanted to know, or they modified their own proposals to suit his preferences. Original idea s wer e ofte n sacrifice d i n deferenc e t o wha t th e bos s wanted. Committee meetings no longer were forums for open discourse, but rather either soliloquies b y the top man , or conversations betwee n a few to p men with the rest of th e meeting looking on. In Fourteenth Floor meetings, often onl y three people, Cole, Gerstenberg, and Murphy would have anything substantial to say, even though there were 14 or 15 executives present. The rest of the team would remain silent, speaking only when spoken to. When they did offer a comment, in many cases it was just to paraphrase what had already been said by one of the top guys. (47) Indeed, a s organizationa l promotio n an d retentio n criteri a shif t towar d the dramatizatio n o f th e perfectio n o f th e organization , thi s shape s th e

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very job of the subordinate int o what Janis (1982 ) calls "mindguarding, " the suppressio n o f criticism. 4 Keller als o comment s o n th e conflic t betwee n wha t on e need s t o d o to get promoted an d th e quality o f one' s work : One retired executive rails against a system that create s vertical thinkers and cautious leaders . "Th e whol e syste m stink s onc e you'r e i n it . Yo u continu e t o want t o mak e vertica l decisions : 'Wha t i s i t tha t I shoul d decid e tha t wil l b e good fo r me . Never mak e a horizontal decisio n base d o n what i s good fo r th e company. I want to get promoted.' So yo u ge t promote d becaus e you'r e sponsore d b y someone ; yo u ge t pro moted before they catch up with you. I can go through a litany of those clowns. They go from thi s plant t o tha t comple x an d then , all of a sudden, they've got plaques al l ove r th e wall s tha t sa y ho w grea t they'v e done—bu t th e plant' s falling apart and the division's falling apart." (34)

The Creatio n o f th e Organizationa l Jungl e The mor e successfu l th e organizatio n i s a t projectin g th e imag e o f itsel f as th e organizatio n ideal , th e mor e deepl y mus t committe d participant s experience anxiety . Fo r th e imag e projected , th e imag e o f th e individua l as perfectly a part o f th e perfect organization , i s only a n image ; and th e more perfec t i t is , th e mor e acut e th e discrepanc y betwee n th e role an d the role-player. Give n th e importanc e o f th e organizatio n idea l i n th e individual's self-concept , th e individua l mus t find som e way t o reconcil e the discrepanc y betwee n th e centralit y i n a lovin g worl d h e o r sh e i s supposed t o b e experiencing an d th e wretchedness h e or she in fact feels . As we hav e seen , th e typica l wa y i s t o attemp t t o deepe n th e identit y o f self an d organizatio n b y risin g i n th e organization' s hierarch y an d b y fighting of f wha t ar e perceive d a s threat s t o th e organizationa l identit y one ha s attained—perceive d threat s tha t ar e ofte n projection s o f one' s own self-doubts . The resul t i s tha t individual s becom e obsesse d wit h organizationa l rank. The y becom e compelle d t o bea t dow n anyon e who m the y se e a s threatening o r competin g wit h the m i n thei r pursui t o f highe r ran k o r threatening th e rank the y have already acquired . Thus, ironically, behin d the displa y o f th e organizatio n ideal , o f everyon e workin g togethe r t o realize shared values, the real motivational proces s becomes a Hobbesia n battle o f on e narcissis m projec t agains t anothe r narcissis m project. 5 Th e

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consequences o f thi s fo r coordination , cooperation , an d motivatio n ar e clear enough. D e Lorean says : Not only is the system perpetuating itself, but in the act of perpetuating itself the system has fostered severa l destructive practices which are harmful t o executive morale . The y develope d fro m th e psychologica l need , a s I se e it , o f les s competent manager s t o affir m i n their ow n mind s a logical right t o thei r positions, even though the basis for thei r promotions wa s illogical by any businessperformance standard . Onc e in a position o f power , a manager wh o was promoted b y th e syste m i s insecure because , consciousl y o r not , h e know s tha t i t was somethin g othe r tha n hi s abilit y t o manag e an d hi s knowledg e o f th e business that put him in his position.... H e thus looks for methods and defense mechanisms to ward off threats to his power. (49) Isolation o f Managemen t an d Ruptur e o f Communication s A relate d proble m i s tha t th e greate r th e succes s o f th e totalitaria n manager, th e mor e the manager i s isolated fro m hi s or he r subordinates . The worl d th e subordinate s liv e in i s the world o f th e organization idea l as create d b y th e totalitaria n manager . Th e worl d tha t th e totalitaria n manager live s i n i s th e worl d o f th e construction of the image o f th e organization ideal . Thes e tw o world s ar e incommensurable , an d com munication an d trus t canno t hel p bu t brea k dow n betwee n them . Fo r communication an d trus t mea n tw o differen t thing s t o thes e groups . Indeed, fo r totalitaria n management , communicatio n t o subordinate s i s not communicatio n a t all—i t i s deception. 6 The practic e o f totalitaria n managemen t indicate s contemp t o n th e part o f th e manager towar d th e managed. Suc h manager s d o no t believ e that th e manage d hav e th e capacity, fo r whateve r reason , to com e to th e correct vie w o n th e basi s o f th e simpl e presentatio n o f facts . Thus , th e fact tha t th e presentatio n i s a presentatio n an d th e contemp t tha t i t implies mus t b e covered-up. And the n th e cover-u p mus t b e covered up , and s o on, in the manner tha t Argyri s (1985 ) ha s described . In thi s fashion , th e organizatio n come s t o b e stratifie d i n a n insider / outsider dimension , whic h i n chapte r 2 I likene d t o th e structur e o f a n onion an d whic h serve s th e sam e functio n a s part y membershi p i n th e totalitarian state . Thi s mus t mak e a mocker y o f al l attempt s t o brea k down statu s barriers that stan d i n the way of effectiv e communication — as appear s t o b e th e ide a behin d variou s "qualit y o f workin g life " efforts.

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Development o f Hostil e Orientatio n Towar d th e Environmen t If th e totalitaria n manage r i s successful, organizationa l participant s tak e the organizatio n a s a n organizatio n ideal . I t mus t follow , i n thei r think ing, tha t suc h a n organizatio n wil l b e successfu l i n it s dealing s wit h th e world. A s w e sa w i n chapte r 3 , thi s pose s a difficult y o f interpretatio n for th e necessaril y problemati c relationship s betwee n th e organizatio n and it s environment . Thus, a s w e know , th e environmen t place s constan t demand s o n th e organization. Failur e to meet them will result in the organization's death . But fro m th e standpoin t o f th e totalitaria n manage r committe d t o por traying th e organizatio n a s th e organizatio n ideal , thi s sor t o f reasonin g cannot b e acknowledged . Fro m thi s poin t o f vie w i t i s th e organizatio n that i s the criterio n o f worth . Th e environmen t i s not conceive d t o exis t as a n independen t environmen t a t all ; i t exist s onl y i n orde r t o suppor t the organization . Fro m thi s standpoin t th e demand s o f th e environmen t must b e presente d a s hostil e action s b y ba d externa l forces—hostil e actions to which a legitimate response is equally hostile action . The Genera l Motor s Corporation , i n respons e t o Ralph' s Nader' s book abou t th e Corvair , Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) , hire d privat e detectives t o find way s t o discredi t him . A s De Lorea n remarks , "Whe n Nader's boo k threatene d th e Corvair' s sale s an d profits , h e becam e a n enemy o f th e system . Instea d o f tryin g t o attac k hi s credential s o r th e factual basi s o f hi s arguments , th e compan y sough t t o attac k hi m per sonally" (64) . Sending privat e detective s t o find ou t th e detail s o f hi s privat e lif e suggests somethin g abou t th e compan y managers ' attitud e towar d him . It suggest s tha t the y expecte d t o find somethin g t o sho w tha t h e wa s a bad person . H e had t o b e a bad person : h e had attacke d GM , hadn't he ? Thus, note s D e Lorean , "Criticis m fro m th e outsid e i s generally viewe d as ill-informed . Genera l Motor s managemen t think s wha t i t i s doin g i s right, becaus e i t i s G M tha t i s doin g i t an d th e outsid e worl d i s wrong . It is always 'they ' versu s 'us'. " (257) . Another inciden t D e Lorean describe s confirm s th e point : When a reputabl e Harvar d managemen t professor , Pete r Drucker , i n 194 6 wrote The Concept of a Corporation, which dissecte d an d analyze d Genera l Motors, th e publi c regarde d th e wor k a s decidedl y pro-busines s an d pro-GM .

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But the corporation didn't . . . . H e was resoundingly criticize d withi n th e company for daring to criticize the organization of the corporation. (258) Thus, the picture o f th e organization a s organization idea l leads to a n orientation towar d th e worl d tha t ca n bes t b e describe d a s paranoid . I t is clea r enoug h tha t suc h a conceptio n mus t degrad e th e relationship s with th e environment tha t th e organization require s fo r it s survival . The Transposition o f Wor k an d Ritua l When work , th e productiv e process , become s display , it s meanin g be comes lost. Its performance a s part o f th e organizational dram a become s the onl y meanin g i t has . Accordingly , th e part s i t plays i n th e organiza tion's transaction s wit h th e worl d becom e irrelevant . Whe n thi s hap pens, work lose s its adaptive functio n an d become s mer e ritual. At th e sam e time , th e ritual s tha t serv e t o expres s th e individual' s identification wit h th e organizatio n ideal , especiall y thos e connecte d with rank , com e t o b e infuse d wit h significanc e fo r th e individual . The y become sacred . Thus , realit y an d appearanc e trad e places . Th e energ y that onc e wen t int o th e productio n o f good s an d service s o f valu e t o others i s channele d int o th e dramatizatio n o f a narcissisti c fantas y i n which th e organization's environmen t i s merely a stage setting . Consider ho w thi s show s u p i n th e matte r o f dress . On e ca n easil y make a cas e tha t pattern s o f dres s amon g organizationa l participant s often hav e som e functionality . Bu t whe n th e issu e come s t o b e investe d with grea t meaning , on e mus t suspec t tha t ritua l ha s supplante d func tion. De Lorean give s some examples : At Genera l Motors , goo d appearanc e mean t conservativ e dress . I n m y firs t meeting as a GM employee in 195 6 at Pontiac, half the session was taken up in discussion abou t som e vice-president downtow n a t headquarters wh o was sent home tha t mornin g fo r wearin g a brow n suit . Onl y blu e o r blac k suit s wer e tolerated then. I remember thinkin g that was silly. But in those days I followed the rules closely. (40-41) Later on , whe n h e wa s les s incline d t o follo w th e rule s jus t becaus e they were the rules , De Lorean foun d ou t wha t violatio n o f the m meant : I made a habit of widening my circle of friend s an d broadening my tastes. This awareness precipitate d a seemingl y endles s chai n o f personalit y conflicts , th e

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most difficul t o f whic h wa s wit h Roge r Keyes , who wa s m y bos s whil e I was running Pontia c an d Chevrole t divisions . He made life unbearabl e fo r me , and he was dedicated t o getting me fired; he told m e so, many times. Fortunately, I had th e protection o f m y ability a s I ran thos e two divisions to fend of f Keyes . But I remember vividl y m y conflicts wit h him , especially when he was irritate d by my style of dress . The corporate rul e was dark suits , light shirts an d mute d ties. I followed th e rul e to the letter, onl y I wore stylish Italian-cut s suits , wide collared off-white shirt s and wide ties. "Goddamit, John," he' d yell . "Can't yo u dres s like a businessman? An d get your hair cut, too." My hair was ear length with sideburns. (9-10) The dynamic s o f th e way s i n whic h ritua l come s t o assum e th e importance wor k shoul d hav e help t o explai n th e dynamics o f th e ritual ization o f work . Fo r th e willingnes s t o allo w one' s behavio r t o b e determined b y meaningles s ritual s come s t o b e justifie d b y a n idealiza tion o f th e organizatio n tha t elevate s it s custom s abov e an d discredit s one's values—one' s sens e o f wha t i s important . Thi s willingnes s t o subordinate an d delegitimate—i n a wor d t o repress—one' s ow n sens e of wha t i s important , eve n abou t matter s tha t shoul d b e withi n th e competence of anyone' s judgment, mus t have its consequences magnifie d when th e matter s i n questio n becom e mor e abstrus e an d difficul t t o make judgments about , a s is the case with rea l executive work. The n th e repression o f one' s value s deprive s on e o f an y basi s fo r makin g suc h judgments an d lead s naturall y t o a superimpositio n o f th e ritual s wit h which on e i s familiar , eve n where , patently , the y d o no t belong . Thi s i s what give s th e horro r t o D e Lorean' s stor y abou t wha t h e foun d whe n he was elevate d t o th e Fourteent h Floor , GM' s executiv e suite , as grou p executive i n charge of th e domestic Ca r an d Truck Group : When I finally move d upstairs . .. I saw that the job . . . often consiste d only of .. . little, stupid, make-work kinds of assignments, things which I thought should have been decided further dow n the line. Some of these things, which had little or no impact on the business, were an insult to a person's intelligence. . .. A s I recall, [for example, my boss] asked me to catalogu e servic e parts number s an d t o prepar e report s o n th e siz e of part s inventories. . . . "This is supposed to be a planning job," I remember thinking. "But I feel like a file clerk. I've spent many years learning to be a good executive . Now I can't use that knowledge." . . . I set u p a meetin g wit h Vice-Chairma n To m Murphy , t o who m I had reported when he held the job I now held. . . .

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"Tom, I think I know what ha s to b e done fo r th e long-term healt h o f G M But I don't get any time to work on it. I just don't get any time to plan my days because of this array of meetings, inane assignments an d tons of endless paperwork." He responded , "Hell , John , whe n I ha d tha t jo b I neve r go t t o pla n on e minute. It was completely planned fo r me . The job just drags you from plac e to place. You don't have time to plan. It is not that kind of job."... "Well that's exactly what's happening to me, and I don't consider it satisfactory," I said. "The system is deciding what I should be working on and what is important; I'm not. I'm not doing any planning of the direction of the company, and this is a planning job. No one else seems to be planning either. We're in for trouble..."... Murphy didn' t sa y muc h further . I suddenly realize d tha t wha t I felt wa s a weakness of lif e o n the Fourteenth Floor , he and others thought was "busines s as usual." They were quite happy to let their jobs drag them fro m on e place to the next, trying to solve problems as they came up, but not getting into the kind of long-rang e plannin g tha t Fourteent h Floo r executive s wer e suppose d t o b e doing.7 . .. I later mentione d m y frustration t o [Presiden t Ed] Cole and he told me: "You've got to go through th e steps. This job is part o f the process." That process didn't seem very attractive and fulfilling t o me. So I quit doing the things I thought weren't worthwhile to the j o b . . .. It quickly evolved that I wasn't a "member of the team." (26—34) De Lorea n explain s th e matte r o f managemen t ritual , a s oppose d t o work, thi s way : A promotional syste m whic h stresse d "loyalt y t o th e boss " mor e tha n perfor mance put into top management executives who, while hard-working, nevertheless lacked th e experience, and i n som e cases the abilit y t o manag e capably o r guide the business. The preoccupation o n the Fourteenth Floor with the appearance of working—putting i n long hours, going through th e motions of the job, occupying tim e with minutiae—i s a direc t resul t o f management' s inabilit y t o grasp the scope of its job and grapple with the problems that arise. (250) Loss o f Creativit y The delegitimatio n o f one' s sens e o f wha t i s importan t give s ris e t o a special cas e o f th e ritualizatio n o f work—th e los s o f creativity . Schei n (1983) describe s th e conditio n o f "conformity " tha t follow s fro m a n insistence b y th e organizatio n tha t al l o f it s norm s b e accepte d a s bein g equally important . Unde r tha t condition , th e individua l "ca n tun e i n s o completely o n what h e sees to be the way other s are handling themselve s that h e become s a carbon-cop y an d sometime s a caricatur e o f them. "

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Consequently, Schei n notes : "Th e conformin g individua l curb s hi s crea tivity an d thereb y move s th e organizatio n towar d a steril e for m o f bureaucracy" (1980) . Maslow (1970 ) give s insigh t int o th e psychodynamic s o f thi s proces s when h e observe s tha t creativit y i s characteristi c o f bot h end s o f th e continuum o f personalit y development , bu t no t o f th e stage s i n th e middle (170-71) . Creativity , thi s suggests , i s a functio n o f spontaneity , a functio n o f takin g seriousl y ou r actua l affect s an d interactin g i n th e world i n consideration o f ou r spontaneou s feelings . But as the self come s to b e dominated b y a concer n fo r ho w thing s appea r t o others , which i s characteristic o f th e middl e stage s o f personalit y developmen t (Schwart z 1983b), creativit y disappear s a s a mod e o f interactin g wit h th e world . As th e organizatio n require s tha t th e individua l subordinat e hi s o r he r spontaneous perceptio n t o an uncritica l acceptanc e of the ideal characte r of th e organization , i t thu s determine s tha t th e affectiv e basi s o f creativ ity will be repressed . The lac k o f creativity , sinc e i t i s a lac k o f something , canno t b e positively demonstrated . A s a n experience , i t make s itsel f know n a s a feeling of missing something different tha t ha s not occurred, even thoug h one doe s no t kno w wha t th e differen t elemen t woul d hav e been . Thus , De Lorea n foun d himsel f introducin g a "new " cro p o f Chevrolet s tha t were not reall y ne w a t all : This whole show is nothing but a replay of last year's show, and the year befor e that and the year before that . The speech I just gave was the same speech I gave last year, written b y the same guy in public relations about the same superficia l product improvement s a s previous years . . . . Almost nothin g ha s changed. . . . there wa s nothin g ne w an d revolutionar y i n ca r developmen t an d ther e hadn' t been for years. (60-61) In benig n times , one ma y experienc e boredom : th e consciousness o f a sameness, a lac k o f originality . Whe n circumstance s ar e harsh , partl y a s a resul t o f th e lac k o f creativit y tha t th e organizatio n neede d i f it was t o have adapted , on e ma y simpl y experienc e th e intractabilit y o f th e situa tion. Addin g u p th e figure s i n th e usua l wa y simpl y show s one , agai n and again , ho w hopeles s th e situatio n is . On e ma y the n experienc e th e loss of creativit y a s a wish fo r a savior who will make th e organization' s problems disappear . In th e har d times , I suspect , on e rarel y come s t o recogniz e tha t th e ideas tha t th e organizatio n neede d i n orde r t o hav e avoide d it s presen t

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hopeless stat e ma y hav e bee n upo n th e scen e a lon g time ago . But th e individuals wh o ha d the m migh t hav e bee n passed ove r fo r promotio n because the y wer e no t "tea m players, " o r perhap s the y wer e mad e t o feel uncomfortabl e becaus e the y di d no t fi t i t in , o r mayb e the y wer e scapegoated wheneve r th e organizatio n neede d a victim. Indeed , ironi cally, th e ver y idea s tha t wer e neede d migh t hav e bee n laughe d a t o r ignored because they were not "the way we do things around here." Dominance of the Financial Staf f Another hypothesis may be used to account for the emergent dominance of th e financial functio n o f th e corporatio n tha t D e Lorea n foun d i n General Motor s an d tha t others , fo r exampl e Halbersta m (1986 ) hav e partly blamed for the decline of American industry. As envisione d b y Alfre d P . Sloan , th e financial functio n an d th e operations side of the corporation were both supposed to be represented strongly a t th e to p leve l o f th e corporation . But , a s D e Lorea n notes , over time , an d specificall y throug h th e ris e o f Frederic k Donner , th e financial sid e came to dominate the corporation. Why? I propos e tha t finance, rathe r tha n operations , offer s th e greate r narcissistic possibilities . A s Nader an d Taylo r (1986 ) note , operations , the productive process, tends to temper grandiosity. The recalcitrance of matter, so to speak, exerts a humbling influence. No t s o with finance. I suggest tha t th e financial worldvie w ca n b e understoo d a s a kin d o f latter-day Pythagoreanis m i n which th e world i s seen as mere instantiation of number, and as imposing no bounds on the imagination's flights. Everything seems possible as long as the numbers can be made to work, and th e on e wh o ca n mak e the m wor k ca n tak e thi s a s a sig n o f omnipotence. Whe n th e matte r come s t o competitiv e elevatio n o f th e organization ideal, who can do it better, who can represent it better than the officer whos e bonds to earthly substance are the lightest. Who better than the specialist in finance? Keller's analysis is similar: Financial people operat e in a rarefied environment . Fo r them, solving a problem means successfull y jugglin g th e number s o n financia l statements . What happen s when th e number s determin e ever y majo r investmen t an d produc t initiative ? Reality gets distorted. (26—27 ) Then sh e goe s o n t o say :

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The tyrann y o f th e number s cruncher s ha s evolved, t o a great extent , fro m GM's reluctanc e t o hea r ba d new s about itself . If th e finance guys can presen t the right numbers, everyone breathes a sigh of relief, and the financepeople look like heroes. There's n o incentiv e fo r executive s in finance positions to give bad news; the mor e facil e the y ca n b e with numbers , the higher thei r fortune s rise . (27-28)

Cynicism an d Corruption ; or, Self-Deceptio n an d the Narcissisti c Los s o f Realit y Referring t o th e way s peopl e ar e relate d t o thei r ow n presentations , Goffman (1959:17-18 ) note s tha t on e ca n eithe r b e take n i n b y one' s own performanc e o r no t take n i n b y it . I n th e latte r case , the individua l uses i t onl y "t o guid e th e convictio n o f hi s audienc e . . . a s a mean s t o other ends. " Such a n individua l i s a cynic , disassociating him - o r hersel f from discrepan t informatio n consciousl y an d throug h deception . I n th e former case , th e individua l "come s t o b e performer an d observe r o f th e same show." Goffma n adds : It wil l hav e bee n necessar y fo r th e individua l i n hi s performin g capacit y t o conceal fro m himsel f i n his audience capacity th e discreditable fact s tha t he has had t o lear n abou t th e performance; i n everyday terms, there will b e things he knows, or has known, that he will not be able to tell himself. (81) Goffman note s tha t thes e person s cu t themselve s loos e fro m discrepan t information throug h repressio n an d disassociation , a poin t tha t corre sponds perfectly wit h psychoanalyti c theor y concernin g th e maintenanc e of th e eg o ideal . Suc h individual s ar e self-deceptive . Thus , i n th e totali tarian organization , n o matte r wha t it s espoused values , promotion an d even continue d inclusio n wil l ten d t o g o t o deceptiv e cynics , whos e moral involvemen t i n thei r organizationa l activit y i s attenuated , o r t o self-deceptive persons , whose involvemen t i n reality i s attenuated . Of th e two , i t i s difficul t t o sa y whic h i s t o b e preferred . Cynic s a t least kno w wha t i s goin g o n aroun d them ; an d i f thei r mora l involve ment i n thei r organizationa l rol e i s attenuated, tha t doe s no t see m inap propriate i n a n organizatio n manage d b y deceptive an d totalitaria n means . Indeed, i n organization s tha t hav e seriousl y degenerate d a s a resul t o f these processes , i t i s ofte n onl y th e cynic s wh o ca n ge t anythin g don e at all .

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Nonetheless, there is no doubt that cynicism tends toward corruption. Corruption doe s not play a major role in De Lorean's picture of Genera l Motors, bu t h e doe s not e it s presence : "ther e wer e disturbin g activitie s in upper management i n which executive s use d their positions o f powe r and knowledg e t o profi t personally i n corporat e business " (83) . M y analysis lead s m e t o suspec t that , a s tim e goe s by , i f G M continue s t o deteriorate, it will become increasingly difficul t fo r even minimally func tioning individual s t o idealiz e it . Then , corruptio n wil l increasingl y be come a problem. For the present, I think the more serious problem comes in with those who deceiv e themselves an d distance themselve s fro m reality . Fo r as the processes I have describe d operat e an d a s th e organizatio n degenerate s accordingly, i t become s increasingl y difficul t t o se e i t a s th e ideal , an d individuals wh o ar e abl e t o d o s o mus t becom e increasingl y self-decep tive. A poin t mus t com e whe n suc h individual s ma y no t b e sai d t o b e psychologically livin g in the same world tha t th e rea l organizatio n i s in. Worse, sinc e thi s capacit y fo r self-deceptio n i s a n importan t advantag e in the race for promotion, the total disassociation o f the individual fro m organizational realit y i s likel y t o b e correlate d wit h th e individual' s position i n the hierarchy. The n th e mos t importan t processes within th e organization com e t o b e unde r th e authorit y o f peopl e wh o ar e no t operating i n the real world a s far as the organization's requirement s ar e concerned. Keller hint s a t thi s i n a wa y tha t wil l b e o f increase d importanc e i n the conclusion. During th e 1970's , a write r fo r Fortune magazin e se t ou t o n a ques t fo r dissenting views at General Motors, and found it hard "to find a top executive at GM who does not evidence enthusiasm for what he or the company is doing." One view might hold that GM had achieved a state of managemen t consensus that would be the envy of any company. But more likely, the lack of dissension was motivated b y self-interest. I t was managerial suicid e to be the person who got labeled a naysayer. There was also an element of denial; in the same way that children of alcoholics often refuse to accept their parents' addiction, GM employees refused to admit the truth about their corporate parent. They didn't want to believe. (65—66, emphasis added)

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Overcentralization The narcissisti c los s of realit y amon g thos e a t th e top o f th e corporatio n may b e a majo r caus e o f overcentralizatio n o f operationa l decision making. D e Lorea n foun d thi s overcentralizatio n i n Genera l Motors , and wit h i t th e tendenc y t o provid e simplisti c answer s t o comple x ques tions. Th e ide a that , havin g rise n t o th e to p o f th e corporation , individ uals woul d hol d themselve s a s bearin g al l o f it s knowledg e an d virtue s follows immediatel y fro m wha t I have bee n saying . Thus, to p managemen t woul d b e likel y t o believ e themselve s mor e capable tha n anyon e els e o f providin g answer s t o an y question s tha t arise. Havin g n o comman d o f specifi c detail s beyon d thos e i n thei r imaginations, th e answer s tha t the y give , an d tha t woul d com e t o bin d the res t o f th e corporation , woul d necessaril y b e simplistic an d inappro priate. Moreover , a s the deca y process continues , and a s the competenc e of to p managemen t decline s accordingly , bot h thei r tendenc y t o impos e simple answer s t o comple x problem s an d th e specific inadequac y eve n of the simplisti c answer s the y propos e woul d ten d t o increase . Moreover , the capacit y o f th e syste m t o correc t itsel f woul d ten d t o decrease , sinc e the increasing power o f th e higher echelon s of th e corporation, an d thei r increasing narcissism , woul d ten d towar d a n attributio n o f blam e t o th e lower level s o f th e organization . Thi s woul d delegitimat e thos e whos e judgment woul d b e necessary t o revers e the decay process. De Lorean provide s a number o f examples . Here i s one: The corporat e progra m fo r maximu m standardizatio n o f part s acros s produc t lines wa s a knee-jer k cost-cuttin g reactio n t o th e incredibl e proliferatio n o f models, engines and parts which too k plac e in the uncontrolled an d unplanne d boom of the 1960's. However, the program was not intelligently thought out. It was not thoroughly analyze d for its actual effect o n the company. On paper the concept looke d goo d an d seeme d lik e a sur e wa y t o sav e money . I n realit y i t wasted money. The car divisions rebelled at various stages of the standardization program. Thei r crie s wer e unanswered . Whe n Chevrole t rebelle d agains t usin g the new corporate U-join t . . . Keyes told me , "Use the corporate on e or I'll get someone in Chevy who will." We used it , at a n investmen t o f abou t $1 6 million i n tooling, and our cost s rose $1.4 0 pe r car . I n addition , th e corporat e desig n faile d i n us e an d Chev y paid out about $5 million extra in warranty claims. Instead o f savin g money , th e standardizatio n progra m a t G M woun d u p costing the corporation abou t $300 million extra per year... . The last straw came in 1972, however, when management asked us: "Why is

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the cost of buildin g a Chevrolet $7 0 closer t o Oldsmobil e today tha n i t was in 1964?" The questio n fro m th e to p wa s offered i n th e usual " y ° u aren' t doin g your job" manner. The irony was incredible. (252-53) Keller's observation s o f thi s sor t o f overcentralizatio n offe r a tru e embarrassment o f riches , especially with regar d t o the attempt t o impos e simplistic answer s t o comple x problems . Indeed , he r accoun t i s in som e ways eve n mor e devastatin g becaus e of it s broader scop e an d becaus e of the highe r price-ta g tha t came , i n time , t o b e attache d t o error s o f thi s type. Perhap s th e mos t importan t cas e sh e report s concern s th e tremen dous capita l investmen t G M mad e i n hig h technolog y factorie s durin g the 1980s . Her overal l verdict : GM's high-tech plants were failures that have triggered a technology backlash in th e company . I t i s estimate d tha t a s muc h a s 2 0 percen t o f th e capita l investments made in plant modernization has been wasted and substantial amounts of machinery have been scrapped. GM ends the decade with its plants unable to build car s a s productivel y a s Ford , whic h ha s ye t t o moderniz e mos t o f it s facilities. Furthermore , th e investmen t progra m wa s base d o n th e assumptio n that GM' s marke t shar e would blossom , necessitating the use of al l facilities a t full capacity . Wit h a shrinkin g share , i t wa s pointles s t o spen d som e o f th e billions on new assembly plants and stamping plants since the decreased penetration didn't warrant it. (254) And th e cause of al l this waste : GM's massiv e capital-spending programs substituted fixed costs for variabl e costs and were undertaken i n a profoundly mistake n belief that the main reason for hig h productio n cost s in th e past wer e strictly a function o f excessiv e compensation to hourly workers and overmanning of the assembly line. To which sh e adds : Ironically, eve n a s the y investe d fortune s i n solvin g th e productivit y problem , their man-hours per car remained higher than both Chrysler and Ford. (213) The Magical Fligh t t o Utopi a Another manifestatio n o f th e narcissistic loss of realit y i s the tendency of the decaden t organization , recognizin g it s beleaguerment , t o tak e re course i n a fantas y o f savin g itsel f throug h a n ac t tha t wil l b e qualita tively differen t fro m anythin g i t ha s don e before . Typically , th e ac t wil l involve some new concept, th e invocation o f which wil l have the magica l

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power o f transformin g th e organizatio n directl y int o th e organizatio n ideal.8 For Genera l Motors , thi s sor t o f Utopia n thinkin g appeare d full blown i n th e 1980 s wit h th e accessio n o f Roge r Smit h t o th e chairman ship. Keller , again , gives a numbe r o f example s o f this , an d GM' s org y of spendin g o n hig h technolog y ma y certainl y b e see n i n thi s light . Perhaps th e clearest exampl e was the Saturn project . Launched i n 198 3 wit h a $ 5 billio n investment , th e Satur n projec t was suppose d t o buil d a ca r tha t woul d b e competitiv e wit h Japanes e imports. Bu t G M neve r conceive d o f i t a s jus t a ne w car . I t wa s t o b e a whole ne w approac h t o th e aut o busines s i n totality . I t would b e devel oped a t Satur n an d the n use d t o transfor m al l of GM . Keller quote s recommendation s fro m th e final repor t o f th e Advanc e Product Manufacturin g an d Engineerin g staff , whic h recommende d th e project. It s goals were : 1. Th e establishmen t o f a car-building projec t tha t wa s not jus t a vehicle program, but an integrated business process. 2. T o operate the project a s a wholly owned subsidiary of GM, with a separate union-management relationship. 3. Th e creation of a separate dealership franchise to operate in conjunction wit h the project. 4. Th e developmen t o f a ne w ca r fo r th e 1990' s tha t woul d b e completel y unique in design and structure. What seem s clea r enoug h i s the elemen t o f fantas y tha t run s throug h the Saturn program . A s NASA did wit h th e space shuttle (se e chapter 7) , GM seeme d t o b e invokin g a deit y tha t coul d rescu e th e compan y fro m its own pas t an d present . But G M coul d neve r creat e a god . Al l i t coul d do , a t it s best , wa s build a car . Indulgin g i n thi s sort o f fantas y would , paradoxically, mak e the compan y i n man y way s less able to buil d goo d car s since GM woul d have t o discar d wha t i t kne w abou t makin g car s tha t ha d retaine d it s validity alon g wit h wha t ha d los t it . Thus , Kelle r quote s a lette r fro m Glenn T . Wilson , a n associat e professo r o f operation s management , t o the Wall Street Journal: GM's Satur n projec t aim s a t producin g a new ca r a t a new location wit h ne w methods and new workers. It might work, but it will require superhuman effort s to avoid producing a bumper crop of lemons. What woul d b e preferable ? I f yo u wan t t o buil d a ne w "gree n field" aut o

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factory ( a dubiou s ide a anyway , whe n there' s s o muc h surplu s capacity) , i t should produce a standard model of car. If you want to test high-tech robots, do it at an existing factory where the workers already know what they're doing. If you wan t t o produc e a small chea p car , d o i t a t a n existin g plan t wher e th e machinery is already fully depreciated. And if you want a cheap car design, why not produce a two-seater designed for local travel by normal-size people, instead of a sedan for a family of four midgets. (224) Taken all together, then, it is not difficult t o see how th e result would be that , a s Le e Iacocc a pu t i t i n hi s boo k Talking Straight (cite d b y Keller, 223): "Sure enough, little by little, Saturn is coming unglued." 9 AN OVERVIE W Before concludin g thi s discussion o f th e practical consequences o f totali tarian management , i t i s worthwhil e t o not e a characteristi c tha t th e consequences mentione d hav e i n common : the y ar e al l cumulativ e an d interactive with each other. They all tend to build within the system and, interacting wit h eac h other , tak e ove r th e syste m bi t b y bit . Thi s i s th e way i n which th e ineffectiveness characteristi c of th e decadent organiza tion become s systemi c an d generalized. Thus, for example, th e accumu lation o f ba d decisions take n within th e syste m suggest s tha t those wh o manifest belie f i n i t a s a n organizatio n idea l mus t increasingl y b e self deceptive or cynical, which in turn decreases the retention of realis m and concern fo r work , whic h lead s t o a furthe r increas e i n ba d decisions , further degradation of the relationship with the environment, an d so on. The result of this is that the rate o f deca y will tend to accelerate. That GM's marke t shar e too k si x year s t o declin e fro m 4 6 percen t t o 4 1 percent, bu t onl y thre e mor e year s t o g o t o 3 5 percen t no w come s t o make a certain chilling sense. One mor e observatio n i s worth makin g i n thi s connection . I t is that , beyond a certai n point , th e deca y proces s become s essentiall y irreversi ble. I t no longe r make s sense , afte r thi s point, t o sa y tha t th e organiza tion needs to do "this" or "that" in order to bring the organization bac k to health . Th e proble m i s tha t ther e i s n o suc h thin g a s "th e organiza tion" tha t ca n mak e suc h change s apar t fro m it s management . Bu t it s management ha s bee n successfull y selecte d fo r it s incapacity , a s fa r a s dealing i n realit y i s concerned . The y canno t solv e th e proble m o f th e organization. The y are th e problem. I fear tha t Genera l Motor s ma y b e in this condition.

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CONCLUSION: ON AVERTING ORGANIZATIONA L DECA Y There i s n o doub t tha t fantas y play s a n importan t par t i n ou r menta l lives. T o sa y thi s on e doe s no t nee d eithe r t o approv e o f fantas y o r t o regret its inroads into the psyche. Fantas y simpl y is. So it is with the ego ideal, which i s a particularly centra l fantas y i n our lives. But th e sam e canno t b e sai d fo r organizationa l totalitarianis m an d organizational decay. These ar e neither necessary nor inevitable feature s of organizationa l life . The y becom e feature s o f organizationa l lif e whe n the desire t o b e th e cente r o f a lovin g worl d become s a demand an d when th e power i s availabl e t o tur n thi s deman d int o a progra m o f action. What thi s suggest s i s tha t organizationa l totalitarianis m an d organi zational decay , whic h migh t appea r t o b e systemi c problem s tha t con cern the organization, ar e at their root existential , moral , eve n spiritual , problems tha t concer n th e individual , an d tha t thes e problem s a t th e individual leve l becom e systemi c problem s fo r th e organizatio n whe n organizational powe r is used to effect thi s transformation . Putting the matter this way suggest s a connection betwee n this analysis of organizationa l decay , o n th e on e hand , an d the Gree k conceptio n of tragedy , on th e other. What is evident in both case s is the horror that comes fro m th e claims of powerfu l mortal s to b e more than mortal. The Greeks calle d thi s hubris an d they kne w tha t th e gods, who m w e migh t refer to as reality, do not stand for it. They demand humility.

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Organizational Disaste r an d Organizationa l Decay: The Case o f th e Nationa l Aeronautic s and Spac e Administratio n

Explanations o f disaster s often assum e that the disaster was the result of a single, isolate d decisio n tha t was wrongl y made . Indeed , i t is typicall y asserted tha t th e decision-makin g proces s employe d wa s on e tha t i s ordinarily vali d bu t that , i n th e specifi c case , crosse d ove r som e vagu e boundary and led to the disaster. Explanations like this take for granted that the organizational contex t of th e decisio n wa s basicall y sound . Se t against th e presumed backdro p of th e organization' s continuin g health y activity, th e decisio n an d th e disaster tha t followe d fro m i t ar e seen a s a n aberration, a n unfortunat e accident—as muc h a traged y fo r th e well-meanin g an d generall y com petent individuals who mad e the decision a s for its more direct victims. While thi s scenari o i s certainl y accurat e i n man y instances , ther e ar e other cases in which a n opposing vision may be closer to the facts. Here, the specific decisio n i s seen a s fundamentally flawed an d as taking place within a generall y unsoun d organizationa l context . Indeed , fro m thi s point o f view , th e decisio n i s onl y on e o f man y ba d decision s tha t th e unhealthy organization generates naturally and almost inexorably . But traditional organizatio n theor y doe s no t enabl e u s to understan d organizations tha t are fundamentally unhealthy . Ou r theories of organi zation ar e basicall y functionalis t theories , whic h assum e tha t organiza tional processe s mak e sens e i n term s o f th e overal l purpose s o f th e organization. Withi n thi s paradigm , thes e overal l purpose s g o unques tioned, and the validity of the fundamental organizationa l processe s that carry the m throug h i s take n fo r granted . Thus , withi n thi s paradigm , organizational disaster s an d the bad decisions that lead up to them must be seen as aberrations. The purpos e o f thi s chapte r an d th e nex t i s t o sho w ho w th e theor y of organizationa l deca y ca n b e use d fo r th e analysi s o f organizationa l disaster. Throug h th e proces s o f decay , a n organizatio n ca n becom e 73

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basically unsound ; rationa l proces s ca n becom e th e aberration , rathe r than fault y decision-makin g an d disaster . I n this chapter, I will illustrat e this proces s o f deca y b y a n analysi s o f th e histor y o f th e Unite d State s National Aeronautic s an d Spac e Administratio n a s i t le d u p t o th e Challenger disaster . I n th e nex t chapter , I wil l analyz e th e Challenger disaster o n th e basis of th e theory o f the organization ideal , a theory tha t comes mor e an d mor e t o describ e a n organizatio n a s it decays. THE CHALLENGER DISASTE R A S AN ABERRATIO N It wil l b e usefu l t o begi n th e analysi s b y considerin g mor e traditiona l orientations t o th e Challenger disaster . In a n articl e o n organizationa l culture an d reliability , Weick (1988 ) reasoned : When peopl e thin k the y hav e a proble m solved , the y ofte n le t up , whic h means they sto p makin g continuous adjustments . Whe n th e shuttle flights continued t o depar t an d retur n successfully , th e criterio n fo r a launch—convinc e me that I should sen d th e Challenger—wa s dropped . Underestimatin g th e dynamic nature of reliability, managers inserted a new criterion—convince me that I shouldn't send Challenger. (25) Similarly, Starbuck an d Millike n (1988 ) maintaine d tha t th e catastro phe wa s th e resul t o f "fine-tuning " tha t ha d gon e to o far . Fo r them , th e disaster aros e i n th e contex t o f a natura l intra-organizationa l conflic t between manager s an d engineers : Engineers ar e taugh t t o plac e ver y hig h priorit y o n qualit y an d safety . I f engineers ar e no t sur e whethe r a product i s safe enough , they ar e supposed t o make it much safer than they believe necessary. .. . [But] safet y factor s are , b y definition , suppose d t o b e unnecessary . . . . T o reduce wast e an d t o mak e goo d us e of capacity , a n organizatio n need s t o cu t safety factors down. . . . . . . successfu l experience s mak e safet y factor s loo k mor e an d mor e waste ful. . . . Although engineers may propose cost savings, their emphasis on quality and safety relegate s cost to a subordinate priority. Managers, on the other hand, are expected to pursue cost reduction and capacity utilization, so it is managers who usually propose cuts in safety factors . (333) Thus, incremental reductio n i n safety factor s o n the basis of successfu l experience, a for m o f wha t Starbuc k an d Millike n cal l "fine-tuning, " i s

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a norma l an d natura l organizationa l process— a part , indee d o f th e manager's job . An d i t i s natural , normal , an d eve n commonplac e t o pursue it until disaste r happens. The point is not to stop the fine-tuning, but t o lear n fro m th e disaster s tha t i t inevitabl y create s o n th e roa d t o progress. In thes e arguments , ther e i s n o hin t tha t ther e wa s anythin g wron g with NASA. Indeed , Weick is even worried that a loss of faith in NASA's reliability wil l hav e th e effec t o f decreasing it s reliability . Fo r reliabilit y is "dynamic" and grows ou t of fait h in the reliability of th e system. This faith makes it possible for the system to act. Then, vigilance in the course of the action creates the reliability that had been assumed. Thus: The importanc e o f fait h i n holdin g a syste m togethe r i n way s tha t reduce errors has been discussed for some time as "The Right Stuff." . . . While this mechanism i s sometimes interprete d a s macho bravado , it is important to remembe r that confidence i s just as important in the production of reliability a s is doubt. Th e mutually exclusiv e characte r of thes e tw o determinants can be seen in the growing doubt among astronauts that they have been flying th e safe syste m they thought they were. Notice that the system itself has not suddenly changed character. (27—28) But a close r loo k a t th e contex t o f th e Challenger disaste r reveal s difficulties wit h thes e analyses . Firs t o f all , th e decisio n t o launc h th e Challenger wa s no t base d o n a soun d principl e tha t wa s overapplied . Second, NAS A wa s fa r fro m bein g healthy . Le t u s tak e thes e on e a t a time. To begi n with , Starbuc k an d Milliken' s clai m tha t manager s wer e trying t o remov e unnecessar y safet y factor s i s incorrec t becaus e ther e were n o safet y factors , an d th e manager s wer e blin d no t t o kno w this . The fact is that the shuttle flights were not successes. Many of them were near-catastrophes an d ha d bee n s o fo r a lon g time . Belo w I not e a number of system components tha t regularly had serious problems. Here I shall mention only a few tha t related specifically t o the SRB O-rings: 1. As early a s October 1977 , NASA rejecte d as "unacceptable" Morton-Thiokol's desig n fo r soli d rocke t booste r (SRB ) seal s becaus e "join t rotation" prevented the secondary O-ring s fro m sealing . 2. Afte r test s performed i n Ma y 1982 , NAS A "Accepte d th e conclu sion tha t th e secondar y O-rin g wa s n o longe r functiona l . . . whe n th e Solid Rocke t Moto r reache d 4 0 percen t o f it s maximum expecte d oper -

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ating pressure " (Roger s Commissio n [RC ] 1986 : 126 ) an d therefor e ruled th e sea l system nonredundant . 3. In-fligh t erosio n o f th e primary sea l occurred a s early a s the secon d shuttle flight, i n Novembe r 1981 , and , beginnin g wit h flight 41- B i n February 1984 , i t becam e a regula r occurrence , wit h som e primar y O rings no t sealin g at all . 4. O n flight 51-B , no t onl y di d a primar y O-rin g fai l altogethe r t o seal, but a secondary O-rin g eroded . Thus, NAS A kne w tha t i t coul d depen d o n neithe r th e secondar y O ring no r th e primar y O-ring . I t als o knew , o f course , tha t i f neithe r O ring sealed, the result would b e catastrophic. This condition wa s deeme d so serious that NASA issue d a launch constrain t o n al l subsequent flights —and the n waive d i t in each case. 1 The secon d premise , tha t th e system wa s healthy, als o turns ou t t o b e false. Rather , a close r loo k a t th e organizationa l contex t show s that , despite Weick' s claim , ther e certainl y was somethin g wron g a t NASA . Indeed, th e syste m had change d it s character . T o b e sure , i t ha d no t changed suddenly . Nonetheless , ove r th e years , NAS A ha d becom e a hollow shel l of it s former self . Consider th e problem s tha t ha d arise n i n fou r cross-cuttin g dimen sions: 1. Hardwar e Problems : Th e soli d rocke t booste r joint s tha t wer e found t o hav e cause d th e Challenger explosio n wer e fa r fro m bein g th e only unreliabl e item s i n th e shuttl e system . O n th e contrary , th e Roger s Commission foun d tha t th e wheel , braking , an d steerin g system s wer e all fault y an d tha t th e mai n engine s ha d a numbe r o f seriou s problems , including crack s i n th e turbin e blades , valve failures an d leak s fro m hea t exchangers. 2. Loss of Administrativ e Control : NAS A had virtuall y los t control o f its spendin g an d ha d wasted , accordin g t o federa l audits , a t leas t $3. 5 billion: In th e las t 1 5 years , . . . ba d administratio n an d spendin g abuse s hav e bee n found in virtually every aspect of the NASA operations, from runnin g the shuttle to developing planetary probes, from satellite s to construction of buildings, from space experiment s t o employe e overtime , fro m headquarter s t o field centers , according to the [Genera l Accounting Office] documents . (New York Times, 23 April 1986)

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3. Los s of Technical Control: In its early years, NASA had maintained the technologica l capabilit y an d th e staf f t o overse e it s contractors . Indeed, [James Webb, NASA Administrator from 1961 to 1968] would not allow NASA to fal l behin d it s contractor s technically . H e demanded tha t NASA employee s always know more about their programs than the contractors working for them. When the electronics o f Apoll o seeme d t o go beyon d the agency's knowledge, Webb pushed through a NASA electronics center at MIT. (Trento 1987: 56) By 198 2 thi s technological capabilit y had been lost, and contractors had become fre e t o d o whateve r the y wante d wit h impunit y (Trent o 1987 : 2 0 8 - 9 , 239 ; New York Times, 2 9 June 1986 , Business section). 4. Los s of Contro l over Operations: NASA came to have extreme and increasing difficult y i n conductin g an d coordinatin g th e comple x pro cesses involved i n shuttle operations. The Rogers Commission, in assessing NASA' s difficultie s i n thi s area , maintaine d tha t "a n assessment o f the system's overall performance i s best made by studying the process a t the en d o f th e productio n chain : cre w training " (166) . And , i n thi s regard, the commission quote d astronau t Henry Hartsfield : "Had we not had the accident, we were going to be up against a wall; STS 61-H . . . woul d have had to averag e 31 hour s in the simulator t o accomplish their require d training , an d ST S 61- K woul d hav e t o averag e 3 3 hour s [not e normal time was 77 hours]. That is ridiculous. For the first time, somebody was going to have to stand up and say we have got to slip the launch because we are not going to have the crew trained." (170) On th e whole , th e pictur e o f NAS A tha t emerge s fro m thoroug h investigation i s o f a n organizatio n characterize d b y th e generalize d an d systemic ineffectivenes s tha t w e associat e wit h organizationa l decay — an organizatio n i n whic h th e flawed decisio n t o launc h th e Challenger was not an aberration bu t a normal an d ordinary way of doin g business. James Webb—th e ma n who , mor e tha n an y othe r singl e person , ha d built NASA—pu t i t thi s way : "Ther e wa s a n organizatio n tha t wa s regarded a s bein g perfect , tha t suddenl y doesn' t d o th e simples t thing " (Trento 1987 : vii). Under th e circumstances , th e focu s o f inquir y int o th e Challenger disaster changes. The question becomes not how could a specific decisio n be mad e a t a specifi c time , bu t instea d concern s th e organizatio n a s a

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whole. Specifically , th e questio n concern s ho w a n organizatio n tha t "was regarde d a s bein g perfect, " tha t place d me n o n th e moon , coul d become a n organizatio n tha t "doesn' t d o th e simplest thing. " SOME ASPECTS OF THE DECAY PROCES S A numbe r o f aspect s o f organizationa l deca y ca n b e illustrate d b y th e case o f NASA . Som e o f the m wer e discusse d i n th e previou s chapter . I n this chapter , I shall organiz e thes e aspect s int o a three-par t scheme . Th e first par t i s wha t I cal l th e institutionalizatio n o f th e fiction, whic h involves th e redirectio n o f it s approve d belief s an d discours e fro m th e acknowledgement o f realit y t o th e maintenanc e o f a n imag e o f itsel f a s the organizatio n ideal . Secon d i s th e chang e i n personne l tha t parallel s the institutionalizatio n o f th e fiction. Thir d i s th e narcissisti c los s o f reality, which i s the menta l stat e of managemen t i n th e decadent organi zation. The Institutionalizatio n o f th e Fictio n The Commitment to a Bad Decision. I f th e organizatio n wer e th e orga nization ideal, it would neve r make a bad decision. Since no organizatio n is o r ca n b e th e organizatio n ideal , thi s mean s tha t the y al l mak e ba d decisions soone r o r later . Th e institutionalizatio n o f th e fiction o f th e organization idea l begin s when th e organization, tryin g to justif y it s ba d decision, become s committe d t o i t (se e Staw 1980) . In the case of NASA, the original ba d decisio n was to build th e shuttl e on th e cheap . This decisio n wa s ba d becaus e th e lo w figure fo r develop ment tha t NAS A accepte d seriousl y compromise d quality , an d rule d ou t the origina l ide a o f a reusabl e shuttl e syste m tha t coul d inexpensivel y and reliabl y carr y payload s int o orbit . Denial of Reality Through the Idealization of the Organization. Th e underfunding tha t bega n a t thi s poin t nee d no t hav e cause d th e whol e system t o decay . Wha t ensure d i t wa s that , havin g mad e a dea l t o develop th e shuttl e cheaply , member s o f NAS A managemen t magnifie d their sens e of competenc e an d believe d that , sinc e they wer e NASA, the y could stil l realize the original ide a o f th e spac e shuttle . NASA ha d tw o strategie s tha t coul d hav e le d t o a viabl e shuttl e

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program. The original plan, which would certainl y have been the best in the lon g run , wa s t o buil d a n adequatel y funde d shuttl e syste m tha t would hav e permitte d chea p operation . The secon d feasibl e alternativ e was t o buil d th e shuttl e cheapl y an d sharpl y restric t operations . Th e Nixon administratio n cancele d th e first possibility , bu t th e secon d re mained. However , th e secon d strateg y woul d hav e require d NAS A t o recognize th e severe limitations tha t the restricted developmental budge t had place d o n th e shuttle , an d i t wa s thi s sens e o f limitatio n tha t the y could not accept. Hence, they chose a third strategy: building the shuttle cheaply an d maintainin g it s schedule . Thi s strateg y involve d th e denia l of th e realit y o f th e shuttl e system' s limitations , counterin g i t wit h a fantasy o f the shuttle's perfection a s a product of perfect NASA . Senator an d forme r astronau t Joh n Glenn , interviewe d o n th e new s program This Week with David Brinkley ( 8 Jun e 1986) , describe d NASA's transition this way: Well, I think ther e has been , an d I think bac k i n the day s when I was i n the program I think there was a can-do attitude, a go-for-it attitude, and safety was paramount. Bob Gilruth, when we firstgot in the program, told us back in those days, "You know, any time you have a question about safety, let me know and we'll stop , we'l l change , we'l l d o additiona l tests , we'l l d o whatever. " And I think that can-do attitude, perhaps at least with some people at NASA . .. wa s replaced b y a can't-fail attitude , an d I think that' s unfortunate tha t that crept into the program. And Eugen e Cernan , anothe r forme r astronaut , sai d o n th e sam e pro gram: " I think the y wer e jus t caugh t u p with th e fac t that , 'Hey , we'r e infallible. We can't help but succeed.' " Actually, ther e i s evidenc e o f totalitarianism , a s describe d above , developing a t NAS A over th e issu e o f maintainin g th e ide a o f buildin g the shuttle cheaply. Trento (1987 ) quote s NASA veteran John Naugle to this effect : "I thin k Fletche r [NAS A administrato r unde r Nixon ] fel t sincerel y tha t i f h e couldn't justif y th e shuttl e economically , h e couldn' t mak e i t go . An d tha t was where my feeling was that if he had gone back to Nixon an d said, Ther e is no way Jose that I can justify thi s economically; we either do it as an R&D program because it ought to be done, or we go out of th e manned space flight business.' " (119) But Fletcher did not do that. Rather, when reality intruded upon NASA's idealization o f itself , i t appear s tha t NAS A suppresse d reality . Thus , Naugle says:

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"Up until that er a there , I never worried abou t sayin g what I felt. I always fel t my bosses . . . while the y migh t no t agre e with me , they migh t sla p m e down, they migh t quarre l wit h me , bu t the y wer e no t goin g t o thro w m e ou t jus t because I brought the m ba d news . And somewher e betwee n th e tim e Fletche r came on board and the time he left, I no longer felt that way." (121) Further Decision-Making on the Basis of the Idealization of the Organization. Belie f i n th e organizatio n idea l determine s actions . Th e fate o f th e Challenger wa s seale d b y th e decision s mad e o n th e basi s o f NASA's self-idealization . A goo d exampl e o f th e systemi c natur e o f organizationa l deca y wa s the decision t o declar e the shuttle "operational " afte r onl y fou r flights . The Rogers Commissio n observe d tha t th e use of th e term operational "has encountere d som e criticis m becaus e i t erroneously suggest s that th e Shuttle had attaine d a n airline-lik e degree of routin e operation" (5) . This connotation o f th e ter m operational i s on e tha t NAS A bough t int o entirely, an d a s a result , NAS A place d demand s o n th e shuttl e syste m that simpl y coul d no t b e me t an d tha t woul d have , accordin g t o man y experts, resulte d i n disaste r eve n i f fligh t 51- L had bee n postponed . (Fo r example, see Murray 1986. ) The Roger s Commissio n document s numerou s problem s tha t aros e from th e declaratio n o f th e shuttl e a s operational . On e example , whic h will serve for all , is this: The capabilitie s o f th e Shuttl e processin g an d facilitie s suppor t wor k forc e became increasingly strained as the Orbiter turnaround time decreased to accommodate th e accelerate d launc h schedule . Thi s facto r ha s resulte d i n overtim e percentages o f almos t 2 8 percent i n some directorates. Numerous contrac t em ployees have worked 7 2 hours per week or longer and frequen t 12-hou r shifts . The potentia l implication s o f suc h overtim e fo r safet y wer e mad e apparen t during the attempted launc h o f mission 61- C on January 6 , 1986 , when fatigu e and shiftwor k wer e cite d a s majo r contributin g factor s t o a seriou s inciden t involving a liquid oxyge n depletio n tha t occurre d les s than five minutes befor e scheduled lift-off. (171 ) From th e poin t o f vie w o f th e theor y o f th e organizatio n ideal , th e concept tha t th e shuttl e wa s operationa l wa s a specificatio n an d exten sion o f th e organizatio n idea l an d ha d th e effec t o f ramifyin g th e denia l of reality . As Murray (1986 ) remarks : I thin k the y wer e caugh t u p wit h a n unexamine d assumptio n b y thi s poin t of time, which was that th e shuttle could be operational an d everybody was doing

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his best to make what I think was a myth be true. . .. No t stupid, I think it was bad judgemen t . . . becaus e th e people wer e s o unde r pressur e an d s o blende d into a mold that the shuttle was really a safe, reliable vehicle, that they no longer questioned that assumption. I think they stopped questioning that about four or five years earlier. (6—7) Or, a s the New York Times o f 2 9 June 198 6 reported : " You've got to think it had everything to do with the shuttle going 'operational,' " said on e investigato r . . . I n subtl e ways , he continued , "NASA' s to p manage ment 'conveyed the thought that it didn't want to hear about delays' that would further anno y Congress , which wa s alread y questionin g wh y NASA had falle n behind its plan." (Business section, F8) Thus, commitmen t t o ba d decision s lead s t o th e denia l o f realit y through self-idealization , whic h lead s t o furthe r ba d decisions , an d s o on .

Personnel Change s i n Paralle l wit h th e Institutionalizatio n of th e Fictio n Advancement of Incompetent Individuals on the Basis of Ideology. A s we saw in the previous chapter, t o the extent that the core organizationa l process become s th e dramatizatio n o f th e organizatio n ideal , th e stan dard fo r evaluatio n o f individual s fo r promotio n shift s fro m competenc e to ideological purity . In governmen t service , sinc e th e promotio n system , especiall y a t hig h levels, is controlle d b y individual s i n th e governmen t itself , th e relevan t ideology i s not s o much th e organization ideal , but th e national ideolog y of th e governin g group . In thi s cas e the organizatio n idea l i s understoo d as a representation an d exampl e o f thi s broade r nationa l ideology . Thus, partisan politic s o n th e nationa l leve l come s t o b e th e determinan t o f promotability. Trento (1987 ) provide s evidenc e tha t th e shif t fro m competenc e t o political suitabilit y increasingl y determine d wh o woul d b e promote d t o top leve l administration a t NASA. Conside r thi s progression : [James Beggs, NASA administrator unde r Reagan ] spent a year at NASA under Webb. Beggs' wife Mary remembers Webb introducing them to President Johnson. "Jim was a Republican i n NASA and the y knew it. Jim Webb knew it. .. . He [Webb ] said, ' I wan t yo u t o kno w w e look fo r peopl e wh o ca n d o the job

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in NASA , an d w e don' t loo k fo r part y affiliation, ' " Mrs . Begg s remembers . (179-80) But, NASA was changing under Nixon. Paine agreed to accept political appointees to take over the NASA legal an d legislative affair s offices . Afte r tha t he found the White House pushing for more and more political appointees. (90)

And, During the Nixon administration, people looking for political jobs had to be more than true-blue Republicans. They had to be Nixon loyalists. (96) Then, with the advent of the Reagan administration, things went from bad t o horrible . I n th e ligh t o f th e idealizatio n o f busines s i n Reagan' s administration, conside r wha t th e followin g passag e suggest s abou t th e reasons behind Beggs's choice: [Former NASA Comptroller ] Lill y describe d Begg s a s a "nonentity" i n his earlier stin t a t NASA. Afte r all , t o Lilly , Begg s was first and foremos t a contractor. Unlik e ol d NAS A hands , Begg s believe d tha t th e contracto r an d government were a partnership and not even occasionally adversaries . Such a relationship wa s th e ideal bor n ou t o f a free-enterprise syste m an d representative democracy. (184) However, Although he worked for Reagan's election, he was not one of the new, ultraconservative Reaganite true believers. As a lifelong Republican businessman, Beggs did no t realiz e tha t th e conservatives ' agend a wa s no t subjec t t o th e kin d of compromise that he was used to. If you were not one of them, you were against them. If Jim Beggs was an obstacle, he would be removed. (184) And, For all his experience in the corporate and political world, Jim Beggs was not prepared for the Reagan White House. He did not understand that appearance meant more than substance. That outward adherence to doctrinaire conservative philosophy meant more than the quality of the work. (253) Indeed, Trento suggests that the sin that finally led to Beggs's removal, through th e vehicl e o f a spurious indictmen t engineere d b y th e Reaga n administration, wa s that , whil e h e wa s administrator , forme r radical s Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden were invited to a shuttle launch. As th e politica l criteri a fo r NAS A selectio n becam e mor e important ,

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Trento shows , th e managerial an d administrative competenc e o f it s high officials steadil y decreased . The ultimat e ac t i n thi s traged y cam e wit h the appointmen t o f Willia m R . Graha m a s Beggs' s deputy , a positio n that le d t o hi s appointmen t a s actin g administrato r eigh t day s later , when Begg s wa s force d t o tak e a leave o f absenc e followin g hi s indict ment. Graham wa s force d o n Beggs , who wa s tricke d an d browbeate n int o taking hi m eve n thoug h Graham' s backgroun d wa s no t i n th e spac e program bu t as a nuclear weapons expert , th e largest group he had ever managed wa s twelv e analyst s a t th e RAN D Corporation , Beggs , a s h e himself says , "ha d bee n warne d b y thi s tim e tha t th e gu y wa s a right wing kook , a nut " (Trent o 1987 : 261) , an d NAS A wa s unde r terribl e pressure an d th e jo b o f deput y administrato r wa s n o plac e fo r on-the job training. Since the explosion o f th e shuttl e occurre d onl y tw o month s afte r hi s appointment a s actin g administrator , th e fact o f Graham' s unsuitabilit y for th e to p NAS A pos t wa s no t lon g i n publicl y emerging . H e demon strated tha t hi s knowledg e o f shuttl e operation s wa s deepl y inadequate . This is from the New York Times o f 3 February: William R . Graham , Actin g Administrato r o f th e Nationa l Aeronautic s an d Space Administration , sai d tha t solid-fue l booste r rocket s wer e "som e o f th e sturdiest parts of the entire shuttle system." "They are considered primary structure, and not susceptible to failure," Dr. Graham said... . Dr. Graham also said that, if there had been some warning, the seven member crew might have had time to attempt an emergency landing here at the Kennedy Space Center. (1) All o f thes e statement s wer e fals e an d would hav e bee n know n t o b e false by anyone who had more than a passing acquaintance with NASA's operations. Bu t Graham' s lac k o f knowledg e wa s a t leas t partl y du e t o his lack of experience. While regrettable, this would not necessarily have been hi s faul t an d conceivabl y coul d hav e bee n correcte d i f h e ha d ha d the time. What i s muc h mor e disturbin g wa s hi s apparen t failur e t o recogniz e the limitations in his qualifications—a failur e that would have precluded a serious attempt to correct these inadequacies. Thus, for example, when his nam e cam e fro m th e White Hous e a s a candidate fo r th e job , Beggs said tha t h e ha d offere d hi m anothe r jo b i n NAS A tha t woul d b e

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consistent wit h hi s qualifications . But , accordin g t o Beggs , Graha m re fused t o tak e an y othe r position . Again , o n th e da y h e too k ove r fro m Beggs, accordin g t o Trento , "Graha m . . . tol d a reporter , 'I' m i n ful l charge an d I inten d t o ru n thi s agenc y a s thoug h I am ' " (272) . Thi s arrogance i s what seem s to m e to b e the fatal fla w here , both i n Graha m and i n the system tha t promote d hi m to his position. Conside r i t in terms of th e theory o f th e organization ideal . Remember tha t th e promotio n syste m i n th e totalitaria n organizatio n is geare d t o advanc e individual s wh o idealiz e th e organization . The n note that , a s w e hav e see n above , thi s idealizatio n wil l b e mos t pro nounced towar d thos e wh o mos t represen t th e organization : it s highes t officials (se e Siever s 1986 ; an d Klei n an d Ritt i 1984 : 170-72) . Thus , Graham's arroganc e ma y b e understoo d a s a natura l concomitant , an d even a requirement , o f hi s high positio n i n a n organizatio n lik e this. Hi s position mean t tha t h e could , an d eve n should , idealiz e himsel f an d require tha t other s d o th e same . H e was , accordin g t o hi s ideolog y an d the ideolog y o f a n increasingl y totalitaria n NASA , th e eg o ideal , an d that mean t t o him tha t his ideological agend a wa s the meaning of NASA . Accordingly, a t a tim e whe n NAS A wa s burdene d b y perhap s th e great est degree of pressur e tha t i t had eve r experienced, Begg s says: "I did go about twice a week to pick up my mail and answer phone calls which were numerous. All the NASA people wanted t o tell me what he [Graham ] did today. The first thing he did was issue a lot of directives. He acted like a typical analyst. He sat in his office wit h th e door closed an d wrote directives. The firs t directive he wrote described how you were supposed to wear your NASA badge. The second directiv e h e wrote wa s a standards o f conduc t mem o on what was permissible an d wha t wa s no t permissibl e fo r NAS A employees. " (quote d i n Trento 1987: 277) As Trento reports : Beggs, Kennedy Space Center Director Dick Smith, and others remember that Graham was very concerned about the guest list for the 51-L launch. Beggs said he received a phone cal l a fe w day s befor e th e schedule d launc h o f 51- L fro m the Publi c Affair s Office . "The y said , * What's wit h thi s gu y Graham? ' An d I said, 'I don't know. What's he doing now?' And they said, 'Well he is reviewing in detail the whole guest list.' And I said, 'What's he doing?' Well he [the Public Affairs Officer ] says , 'He's [Graham's ] scratching names out he says he is going to ge t i n troubl e wit h o n th e Hill. ' " Th e publi c affair s peopl e told Begg s that

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Graham wa s takin g Democrat s an d an y other s h e perceive d t o hav e libera l leanings off the list. (282) Discouragement and Alienation of Competent Individuals. Anothe r re sult o f th e selectio n o f incompeten t individual s i s tha t realisti c an d competent person s wh o ar e committed t o thei r work los e th e belief tha t the organization' s rea l purpos e i s productiv e wor k an d com e t o th e conclusion tha t it s rea l purpos e i s self-idealization . The y the n ar e likel y to se e thei r wor k a s bein g alie n t o th e purpose s o f th e organization . Some wil l withdra w fro m th e organizatio n psychologically . Other s wil l buy int o th e nonsens e aroun d them , cynicall y o r throug h self-deceptio n (Goffman 1959) , an d abando n thei r concer n wit h reality . Stil l other s will conclud e tha t th e onl y wa y t o sav e thei r self-estee m i s t o leav e th e organization. Arguably , i t is these las t individuals who , becaus e o f thei r commitment t o productiv e wor k an d thei r fir m gras p o f reality , ar e the most productive member s of the organization . Trento (1987 ) cite s a number of instances of this happening at NASA. His account of th e disillusionment o f Rocc o Petrone is typical: In th e terribl e plac e tha t NAS A becam e i n th e year s afte r Apollo , ther e was someone who tried to stop the headlong rush to disaster. There was a man who stood up to Dale Myers and George Low and even James Fletcher and said you cannot do this. Yo u cannot abandon everything learned about management in Apollo to build the shuttle on the cheap. Rocco Petrone was a lone voice. And that is why he quit NASA in 1975 . He did not want to participate in what he believed to be a combination of self-delusion an d lies to sell the shuttle. He was in charg e o f manne d spacefligh t fo r NASA , ye t thi s Wes t Poin t ma n foun d himself wit h les s an d les s influenc e ove r a progra m h e wa s suppose d t o b e running. (238) Petrone argued against taking paperwork and management shortcuts. Petrone told hi s superior s tha t th e on e thin g NAS A learne d fro m Apoll o wa s tha t accountability led to success. As they found out in the Apollo 204 fire,to remove that accountability could be a fatal error. Yet, to save money, that is exactly the road NASA managemen t selected. Petron e argued that Low an d Fletcher were wrong when they said no escape system existed on airplanes and therefore the shuttle did not need one. Because of the success in NASA's track record, Petrone argued that Americans would hav e great difficulty acceptin g th e loss of astronauts. He said that Americans would not accept astronauts dying. He told them they had to have as escape system. Petrone brought in outside experts to look at

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the shuttl e system . Their findings confirmed hi s views fo r th e record . The n h e left NASA. (239) The Narcissisti c Los s o f Realit y amon g Managemen t As w e sa w exemplifie d i n th e cas e o f Willia m Graham , managemen t i n the totalitaria n organizatio n come s to believ e that i t has attaine d it s goal of becomin g agai n th e cente r o f a lovin g world . I t take s itsel f t o b e th e ego ideal an d insist s tha t i t be taken a s such b y subordinates, eve n t o th e extent tha t informatio n tha t conflicts wit h management' s overvaluatio n of itseT f wil l b e withheld . Thi s i s th e cas e wit h informatio n concernin g the stat e o f th e environment , bu t i t i s tru e a s wel l abou t informatio n concerning th e internal stat e of th e organization . Thus, subordinate s wil l kno w tha t thei r securit y an d advancemen t depend o n th e succes s o f thei r portraya l o f th e organizatio n a s th e organization ideal : o f it s managemen t a s perfec t managemen t an d o f themselves a s perfectly integrate d employees . Given thei r nee d t o believ e in the organizatio n idea l an d a s part o f th e cultural transformation , the y may eve n repres s thei r ow n perception s t o believ e this . Whethe r the y believe i n th e organizatio n idea l o r not , thei r dramatizatio n o f i t wil l further decreas e management' s hol d o n realit y an d rende r i t an d th e organization increasingl y ineffective . Thi s i n tur n wil l increas e th e de mands o n th e subordinates t o assis t management i n divorcing itself fro m reality. Thi s narcissisti c stat e o f NAS A managemen t wa s reveale d i n it s response to the Coo k memorandum . Richard C . Cook , a budge t analys t fo r NASA , was assigne d t o asses s the impac t o f an y problem s wit h th e SRBs . I n a memorandu m writte n on 2 3 July 1985 , he warned tha t fligh t safet y wa s being compromised b y erosion o f th e sea l O-ring s an d tha t failur e woul d b e catastrophic. Afte r the explosion, h e wrote anothe r memo , referrin g bac k t o his first , whic h was leake d t o th e Roger s Commission , wh o calle d hi m t o testif y o n 1 2 February. Coo k claime d tha t hi s informatio n wa s base d solel y o n wha t the engineer s workin g o n th e SRB s ha d tol d him , bu t th e Roger s Com mission wa s dismissiv e an d calle d NAS A witnesse s t o refut e hi s charges . In evaluatin g thei r response , recal l tha t thi s wa s befor e i t ha d bee n established tha t th e O-ring s were , in fact , th e problem . ROGERS: Ah,

it's fair then to say that after o r at about the same time Mr. Cook's memorandum wa s writte n i n July , 85 , tha t yo u an d you r tea m were , ha d

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been and wer e at that tim e conducting a lot of investigations , doing a lot of work about the O-rings. [DAVID] WINTERHALTE R [actin g directo r o f NASA' s shuttl e propulsio n divi sion]: That's correct, sir. ROGERS: But in the final analysis , the qualified people , the engineers and other s who wer e assigne d responsibilit y o f thei r decision s hav e t o mak e th e deci sions. WINTERHALTER: That's true . And I pride, I prided mysel f o n our divisio n t o be particularly goo d team workers. We have our differences , w e work 'e m out . . . . A t no time . .. durin g that period did any of my people come to me, give any indication tha t they felt like there was any, any safety o f flight problem s in their area. Q: Was it the view of your division, the propulsion group , that the seal design, as i t wa s installe d an d operatin g i n th e shuttl e syste m wa s ah , saf e an d adequate? WINTERHALTER: It was. (New York Times, 13 February 1986 : Bll) The Times wen t o n t o sa y tha t a "parade " o f NAS A official s testifie d that Mr . Cook' s concern s wer e ou t o f proportio n an d tha t th e issu e o f seal erosio n ha d bee n deal t wit h carefull y b y NAS A engineerin g expert s and managers . The y sai d tha t sea l problem s ha d diminishe d i n 1985. 2 Cook's boss , Michae l B . Mann, sai d h e checke d wit h th e engineer s an d concluded tha t "mayb e th e mem o overstate d thei r concerns. " While th e NASA officials di d no t den y Cook' s assertio n tha t seal s had eroded , the y did clai m that mor e competent professional s tha n h e had conclude d the y were safe . The next day, the Times gav e Cook a chance to respond. In evaluatin g his interpretation , bea r i n min d that , a s subsequen t investigatio n ha s shown, he was entirel y correc t i n his apprehensions : In his first major interview since publication of his internal memorandum,.. . Richard C . Cook , sai d tha t propulsio n engineer s a t th e Nationa l Aeronautic s and Space Administration "whispered " i n his ear ever since he arrived last July that th e seal s wer e unsaf e an d eve n "hel d thei r breath " whe n earlie r shuttle s were launched. But he said suc h concern s got submerge d becaus e the "whole cultur e of th e place" call s fo r a "can-d o attitud e tha t NAS A can d o wha t eve r i t tries t o do, can solv e an y proble m tha t come s up " a s i t "roar s ahea d towar d 2 4 shuttl e flights a year." And, Mr. Cook said he based his warning memorandum las t July on conversations with engineer s i n th e agency' s propulsio n divisio n wh o wer e concerne d abou t

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erosion o f th e rocket' s safet y seals . "The y bega n t o tel l m e tha t som e o f thes e things wer e bein g eate n away, " h e said , "an d rathe r innocentl y I aske d wha t does tha t mean? " "They sai d t o me , almos t i n a whispe r i n m y ear , tha t th e thin g coul d blo w up," h e continued . " I wa s shocked. " I n hi s Jul y memorandum , Mr . Coo k explained, " I wa s simpl y paraphrasin g wha t thi s engineerin g grou p wa s tellin g me. I wa s no t makin g i t u p tha t flight safet y wa s bein g compromise d an d th e results coul d b e catastrophic . I didn' t pu t i t i n m y memorandum , bu t on e o f them sai d t o me , 'When thi s thing goes up, we hold ou r breath. ' " Cook wen t o n t o giv e hi s opinio n o f h o w thi s blockag e o f informatio n takes place . I n a scenari o tha t wil l b e familia r fro m th e las t chapter , h e pointed t o w a r d th e pressur e fel t b y lowe r personne l t o suppor t th e imag e of organizationa l infallibility : Cook sai d that , i n meeting s calle d b y th e shuttl e progra m managers , a middle level engineer wit h safet y concern s i s "just a little guy. " "You aren' t goin g t o find a n enginee r wit h 2 0 years ' experienc e an d a livelihood t o protec t stan d u p an d say , 'Excus e me , bu t w e migh t hav e a n explosion o n th e next shuttl e fligh t becaus e th e O-ring s migh t break . It' s just no t going to happen. ' "If som e di d ge t up , h e woul d quickl y b e brande d a nay-sayer, " Mr . Coo k said. " I neve r sai d a wor d i n thes e meetings . I was a nobody , mor e junio r tha n the vetera n engineers . An d ther e i s always th e naggin g though t i n th e engineers ' minds that, 'Gee , we may be wrong. Maybe nothin g will happen.' " (1 4 Februar y 1986, B4) Again, i t i s fascinatin g t o se e h o w blin d NAS A official s wer e t o thi s constriction, whic h wa s evidentl y commo n knowledg e t o everyon e else , and h o w confiden t the y wer e tha t thing s wer e a s the y wer e suppose d to be : Today, L . Michae l Weeks , deput y associat e Administrato r fo r spac e flight , the spac e agency' s second-rankin g shuttl e official , sai d tha t th e climat e a t th e agency actuall y encourage d individual s tw o o r thre e level s belo w hi m t o spea k their mind s o n safet y concerns . H e sai d tha t working-leve l engineer s "don' t hesitate t o tel l Mik e Week s anything " an d "quit e ofte n wil l argu e righ t o n th e spot a t a significan t meetin g wit h m e o r wit h Jesse, " a referenc e t o Jess e W . Moore, the top shuttl e official . (1 4 February 1986 , B4) F e y n m a n ' s Tes t The detachmen t o f NAS A managemen t fro m realit y offer s a wa y t o introduce a concep t tha t ma y b e though t o f a s a tes t fo r systemi c organizational decay . I call i t Feynman's test.

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Commissioner Richar d P . Feynma n gre w bore d wit h som e o f th e irrelevant detai l tha t h e though t h e wa s bein g subjecte d to , so , a s h e says, "I mad e u p a little game fo r myself": 3 Imagine tha t somethin g els e ha d failed—th e mai n engines , fo r instance—an d we were making the same kind of intensive investigation a s we are now: would we discover the same slipping safety criteria and lack of communication? (Feyn man 1989: 181) He bega n hi s ow n investigatio n o f th e mai n rocke t engine s b y askin g to tal k t o a fe w engineer s wh o worke d wit h them . The y go t togethe r with him , a s di d thei r supervisor , Mr . Lovingood . Feynma n bega n t o focus o n th e question o f wha t thei r estimat e of th e reliability o f th e mai n engines woul d be , curiou s a s t o whethe r the y woul d com e u p wit h th e same wildl y unrealisti c estimate s o f reliabilit y tha t NAS A ha d claime d for th e shuttle syste m itself . In th e cours e o f th e briefin g h e aske d th e engineer s an d Lovingoo d t o write dow n thei r estimate s o f th e reliabilit y o f th e mai n engines . Th e estimates o f th e engineer s range d fro m 1 in 20 0 t o 1 in 300 . Lovingoo d waffled, bu t whe n presse d cam e u p wit h th e sam e figure NAS A gav e fo r the total system , 1 in 100,000 . This suggeste d t o Feynman tha t th e sam e managerial isolatio n fro m realit y wa s a t wor k her e a s i n th e cas e o f th e SRB components. 4 Feynman wen t o n t o tal k wit h th e engineer s an d Lovingoo d abou t other technica l matter s concernin g th e main engines . On th e basi s of th e discussion h e came to this conclusion : When I left th e meeting , I had th e definit e impressio n tha t I had foun d th e same game as with th e seals: management reducing criteria and accepting more and mor e error s tha t weren' t designe d int o th e device , while the engineer s ar e screaming from below , "HELP!" and "This is a RED ALERT!" (185) CONCLUSION NASA was , thus , a decaden t organization . Next , I wil l sho w ho w it s narcissistic processes le d to the decision t o launc h th e Challenger.

6

On the Psychodynamic s o f Organizationa l Disaster: The Case of th e Spac e Shuttle Challenger

That NAS A becam e a decaden t organization , a n organizatio n tha t ha d abandoned realit y fo r fantasy , provide s a perfectly adequat e explanatio n for th e Challenger disaster . Th e physica l worl d i s not a n "enacte d envi ronment" (Weic k 1977) . I t i s no t th e externa l dramatizatio n o f ou r wishes an d whims . O n th e contrary , i t possesse s a resilienc e an d recal citrance tha t wil l moc k th e dreamer . A n organizatio n lik e NASA, whos e business involve s dealin g wit h physica l reality , ha s onl y a ver y limite d margin i n whic h i t ca n indulg e itsel f i n fantas y befor e disaste r become s inevitable. I wis h no w t o sho w ho w th e decisio n t o launc h Challenger emerged fro m thi s indulgenc e i n fantasy . The mos t importan t ke y to the understanding o f th e Challenger disas ter lie s i n wha t I hav e calle d ontologica l differentiation , which , again , involves a twofol d fantasy . Firs t i s th e fantas y o f th e perfectio n o f th e organization, o f th e organizatio n a s the cente r o f creation . Secon d i s the fantasy tha t hig h official s o f th e organizatio n ar e embodiment s o f thi s perfection sinc e they embody th e organization . With regar d t o thi s secon d fantasy , i t ma y b e worthwhile t o observ e again that , fo r th e powerful , th e fantas y o f thei r perfectio n invoke s a great temptatio n towar d rejectin g an y wh o d o no t confor m t o th e story . It wa s afte r all , th e pursui t o f perfectio n tha t committe d thes e partici pants t o th e organizatio n i n th e first place . I n thi s way , organizationa l power become s enlisted i n the process o f fantasy .

NASA AN D TH E ORGANIZATION IDEAL This par t o f th e chapte r will sho w ho w th e psycholog y o f th e organiza tion idea l le d to the explosion o f th e space shuttle . 90

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Technological Russia n Roulett e According t o Roger s Commissio n membe r Richar d P . Feynman, NAS A officials wer e playin g a strang e gam e o f Russia n roulette . Her e i s th e account a s given i n the New York Times o f 4 April : Dr. Feynman . .. sai d that typically in flight readiness reviews, conducted a week or tw o befor e launchings , spac e agenc y official s woul d "agoniz e whethe r the y can go" even though the seals may have eroded on the previous flight. But then, if they decided to launch and the flight occurred safely, he said, on the next flight they lowered their standards a bit because they "got away with it the last time." He described the process as "a kin d of Russian roulette" or a "perpetual movement heading for trouble." Putting the matter i n term s of probabilit y bring s out Feynman' s poin t most clearly . I n th e cas e o f Russia n roulette , wit h on e roun d i n th e cylinder, th e odd s ar e on e i n si x tha t a pul l o n th e trigge r wil l fire th e round. I f th e roun d doe s no t fire o n th e first pull , an d th e cylinde r i s spun, th e odd s ar e agai n on e i n si x fo r th e nex t pul l o n th e trigger . T o some person s unfamilia r wit h theorie s o f probability , i t ma y see m tha t the odd s wit h eac h successiv e pul l woul d b e greater . Thi s is , of course , wrong. But it is equally wrong t o suppos e tha t th e odd s will b e less with each successiv e event . This , however , i s wha t th e NAS A official s ap peared t o believe . The question is , how ca n i t have happened tha t NAS A officials, knowin g ful l wel l th e law s o f probability , coul d hav e mad e such a n error ? My answe r i s that NAS A official s wer e engage d i n th e calculatio n o f two ver y differen t sort s o f probabilities . Bot h calculation s wer e legiti mate withi n thei r domains . Th e proble m i s tha t on e o f th e domain s existed onl y in fantasy . One calculation wa s an engineerin g calculation . Give n what i s known of th e technology , i t i s possibl e t o estimat e roughl y th e degre e o f ris k involved. I t is probable though , tha t th e calculation wa s distorte d b y th e other sor t o f calculation , whic h I call the attributio n o f agency . In orde r t o understan d th e ide a o f th e attributio n o f agency , i t i s necessary to return t o the concept of the organization ideal . As we know , the organizatio n idea l i s a n imag e o f perfection . I t is , s o t o speak , a n idea o f a god. Go d doe s no t mak e mistakes . Having adopte d th e idea o f NASA as the organization ideal , the in iividual wil l believe that, i f NASA

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has made a decision, that decision wil l be correct. I will refer t o decision s made b y NASA , considere d a s th e organizatio n ideal , a s NAS A deci sions. In th e cas e o f NAS A decisions , NAS A ma y b e sai d t o "wor k through" NAS A employees . However , ther e woul d b e anothe r typ e o f decision withi n th e NAS A fram e o f interaction . A s w e saw , narcissis m does no t retur n t o th e individua l i n reality , an d individual s recognizin g this mus t kno w tha t the y an d thei r colleague s ar e no t perfect . Maintain ing a belie f i n th e idea l characte r o f NASA , thes e peopl e ca n sa y o f themselves an d thei r colleague s tha t the y ar e no t full y NASA , eve n though th e possibilit y exist s tha t som e da y the y ma y be . Hence, i f thes e mortals, these people who ar e within th e NASA organization bu t ar e no t NASA, mad e th e decision , i t will b e a different sor t o f decision . Cal l i t a human decision . Human decisions , unlike NASA decisions, are fallible . Now, give n a decisio n withi n th e NAS A fram e o f interaction , th e question become s i s i t a NAS A decisio n o r a huma n decision ? Specifi cally, wa s th e comple x decisio n involve d i n th e desig n an d constructio n of th e SR B seal s a NAS A decisio n o r a huma n decision ? I f i t wa s a human decision , engineerin g standard s o f ris k shoul d hav e prevaile d i n determining whethe r th e shuttl e wa s saf e t o launch . O n th e othe r hand , if the decision was a NASA decision, the reasoning there was simply tha t the Challenger wa s saf e t o launch, sinc e NASA doe s not mak e mistakes . If I believ e i n NAS A decisions , th e first questio n I as k i s whethe r a decision i s a NASA decision , becaus e i f it is, I don't hav e to worry abou t the engineerin g probabilitie s a t all . An d her e th e histor y o f success i s related t o th e determinatio n o f probability . For , sinc e NAS A decision s are infallible , ever y instanc e o f a give n decisio n bein g correc t provide s evidence tha t th e decisio n wa s a NASA decision . Thus , i n thi s question , it make s perfectl y goo d sens e t o decreas e th e probabilit y o f failur e wit h each successfu l launch . Why th e Questio n Concernin g th e Effect s o f Col d o n the Seal s Wa s Not Passe d U p the Chai n o f Comman d When th e Rogers Commissio n ([RC ] 1986 ) determine d tha t th e decision making proces s a t NASA wa s flawed, wha t the y specificall y ha d i n min d was tha t th e question s raise d b y Morton-Thioko l engineer s concernin g the effects o f col d weather o n the SRB seals were discussed a t a relativel y low leve l (Leve l III ) an d no t passe d u p highe r t o Leve l I I or I . It appear s

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that a majo r movin g forc e i n determinin g tha t th e questio n no t b e transmitted upwar d wa s Lawrenc e Mulloy , SR B project manage r a t the Marshall Spac e Fligh t Center . Th e retrospectiv e reasonin g i n Mulloy' s testimony is interesting: . .. I did not discuss with Mr. Aldrich [ National Space Transportation Program manager] the conversations that we had just completed with Morton-Thiokol. CHAIRMAN ROGERS : Could you explain why? MR. MULLOY : Yes, sir. At that time, and I still consider today, that was a Level III issue, Level III being an SRB element or an external tank element or Space Shuttle main engine element or an Orbiter. There was no violation of Launch Commit Criteria. There was no waiver required in my judgment at that time and still today. And we work many problems at the Orbiter and the SRB and the External Tank leve l tha t neve r ge t communicate d t o Mr . Aldric h o r Mr . Moor e [associate administrator for space flight]. I t was clearly a Level III issue that had been resolved. (RC: 98)

MR. MULLOY :

From on e poin t o f vie w Mulloy' s reasonin g make s perfectl y goo d sense. I t was u p t o him , an d hi s Leve l II I colleagues, t o decid e whethe r the specifi c element s i n questio n wer e flightworthy . W e hav e t o plac e this reasoning , however , agains t th e fac t tha t th e discussio n concernin g the effect s o f col d o n th e seal s ha d bee n heate d an d eve n acrimonious , and tha t eve n afte r th e matte r ha d bee n formall y resolved , Alla n Mc Donald, manage r o f th e Morton-Thioko l Spac e Booste r Projec t an d Morton-Thiokol representativ e a t the Kenned y Spac e Center , continue d to argu e vehementl y agains t th e launch . Th e poin t i s that , whil e i n th e formal sense , Leve l H I had th e authorit y t o rul e th e SR B flightworthy , they also had the authority to pass questions on to Levels II and I, which, of cours e had authority ove r the whole system . From this point of view , Mulloy's justification i s simply a non-sequitur. The rea l issu e wa s pose d b y a televisio n commentato r (Georg e F . Will, I believe ) wh o wa s incredulou s tha t anyon e i n a n organizatio n would tak e thi s muc h ris k upo n her - o r himself , whe n everythin g w e know abou t organization s suggest s tha t th e mos t natura l thin g t o d o i s to pas s i t on . Ther e i s a n additiona l elemen t tha t make s th e questio n even mor e interestin g fro m a n organizationa l poin t o f view . I t i s tha t Mulloy justifie d hi s decisio n o n th e basi s o f th e fac t tha t ther e wa s n o Launch Commi t Critero n tha t too k accoun t o f temperatur e an d there fore non e tha t forbad e th e launch . I n othe r words , Mullo y rest s hi s

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defense o n th e fac t tha t h e wa s followin g th e rules , which i s certainly a familiar enoug h organizationa l defense . Bu t typically , i n a n organiza tion, participants follo w rule s to keep themselves out o f trouble. Mulloy , by contrast , appeare d t o follo w a rule tha t coul d ge t him int o trouble — not t o reduc e hi s risk bu t t o increas e it . H e di d so , as we have seen , i n a perfectly gratuitou s fashion . These fact s mak e sens e fro m th e standpoin t o f th e theor y o f th e organization ideal . If , fo r th e committe d participant , th e organizatio n represents th e eg o ideal, then participatio n i n th e organization' s success ful activit y i s a rout e t o narcissism . Accordingly , ther e i s a built-i n tendency t o tak e responsibilit y an d t o exercis e tha t responsibilit y wit h a bias fo r positiv e action . Th e organization' s achievements , afte r all , ar e realized onl y throug h positiv e action . Thus , takin g responsibilit y fo r positive actio n i s a way o f linkin g " I di d it " wit h th e "NAS A di d it " tha t represents perfection . Moreover, simila r consideration s i n fac t mitigat e agains t takin g prob lems t o a highe r level . Th e pursui t o f narcissis m throug h th e participa tion i n the organization is , as we have seen, linked t o movement throug h the hierarch y an d entail s th e assumptio n tha t th e mos t perfec t unio n o f individual an d organizatio n occur s a t th e top . I t i s fo r thi s reaso n tha t those lower dow n i n th e organization fee l i t incumben t upo n themselve s to pla y ou t th e dram a o f th e retur n t o narcissis m o f thos e highe r up . Characteristic o f th e retur n t o narcissis m i s the experience o f everythin g being righ t an d perfect . B y keeping problem s a t a lowe r level , therefore , Mulloy an d hi s colleagues wer e no t onl y optin g fo r thei r shar e of partic ipation i n NAS A perfection , bu t reinforcin g th e dram a o f perfectio n b y dramatizing t o thei r superior s tha t everythin g wa s jus t fine an d tha t NASA was movin g alon g in it s inexorably perfec t way . Nonetheless, a s w e hav e seen , th e retur n t o narcissis m i s onl y a n illusion, an d whil e Mullo y an d hi s colleague s ca n believ e i n tha t illusio n with respec t t o thei r superior s an d i n fac t hel p t o buil d th e ver y illusio n that the y com e to believ e in, their ow n experienc e ma y contai n th e seed s of doubt . For , i f th e perfec t linkag e o f individua l an d organizatio n i s fantasized t o occur at the top o f the organization, this implies that, lowe r down, th e linkag e ma y b e incomplete . Ther e ma y hav e bee n othe r fac tors also . Perhap s th e argumen t wit h Morton-Thioko l engineer s ha d some impact. Her e is where we see the importance o f the rules. The rule s of NASA , i n thi s cas e th e Launc h Commi t Criteria , represen t it s proce -

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dural body . In followin g them , Mullo y an d hi s colleague s coul d touch , as it were, a bi t o f th e livin g flesh of NAS A an d assur e themselves o f th e success of thei r venture . The Reductio n o f Proces s t o Ritua l The emphasi s place d b y Mulloy an d hi s colleague s o n th e Launc h Com mit Criteri a ma y b e pu t i n th e contex t o f a mor e genera l approac h t o NASA procedure s tha t exemplifie s th e transformatio n o f onc e vita l or ganizational processe s int o empt y ritual s (se e chapter 4) . Some evidenc e suggest s tha t twent y year s ag o NAS A wa s a mode l organization no t onl y i n term s o f it s engineerin g achievemen t bu t i n terms o f it s organizationa l characteristics . Indeed , th e NAS A o f twent y years ag o appear s t o hav e bee n a perfec t instantiatio n o f th e sor t o f openly communicating , organic , nonhierarchical organizatio n tha t theo rists lik e McGrego r (1960) , Argyri s (1964) , an d Liker t (1961 ) recom mended. The od d thin g abou t NAS A i s that , i n larg e measure , th e procedure s that represente d thes e organi c processe s appea r t o hav e remaine d i n place. Thus , NAS A an d contracto r engineer s certainl y ha d th e righ t t o question th e safet y o f th e shuttle , and , i n fact , the y di d so . The proble m was tha t thei r concern s di d no t registe r a s importan t i n th e mind s o f NASA management. . Perhaps th e mos t tragi c exampl e o f thi s conditio n wa s th e wa y th e objections o f engineer s t o th e SR B seals— a serie s o f objection s tha t began i n 197 7 (R C 1986:122) , fou r year s befor e th e first shuttl e flight, and neve r ended—wer e disregarde d b y NAS A management . Bu t ther e are othe r instance s o f management' s obliviousness . Consider , fo r ex ample, testimon y describin g th e wa y NAS A treate d th e concern s o f Rockwell official s abou t th e safet y o f flying i n ic y conditions . Th e New York Times reported : Robert Glaysher, a Rockwell vice president, reading from note s at the time, said he had explicitly told launching officials, "Rockwel l can not assure that it is safe to fly." . .. h e testified tha t Rockwell's position was equivalent to saying it was "unsafe to fly." (28 February 1986 : D19) And, th e article notes: Somehow, the message never got across . Arnold Aldrich , the No. 2 man in the shuttle program, said that he thought Rockwel l was expressing "concerns," but

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that h e woul d hav e neve r authorize d a launchin g i f th e prim e contracto r ha d objected. M r Aldrich sai d that , t o hi s mind , "the y di d no t inten d t o as k m e no t to launch." Several commissio n member s sai d tha t the y wer e puzzle d ho w a recommendation agains t launchin g coul d b e mysteriousl y translate d int o a cautiou s rec ommendation i n favor.

The behavio r o f NAS A managemen t agai n make s sens e fro m th e standpoint o f th e theor y o f th e organizatio n ideal . Managemen t an d employees hol d a n articl e o f fait h tha t NASA , proceedin g accordin g t o its essentia l movement , make s infallibl e decisions . T o th e exten t tha t NASA manager s ar e operatin g unde r th e assumptio n o f bein g NASA , and t o th e exten t tha t th e for m o f NASA' s decision-makin g i s followed , they thin k o f thei r decision s a s bein g infallible . A s long , therefore , a s managers "listene d t o th e concerns " o f engineer s an d contractors , th e success of th e venture would b e assured . The proble m i s tha t whil e th e imag e o f NAS A makin g infallibl e decisions i s par t o f th e cultur e o f NAS A fo r it s managers , tha t imag e provides n o guidanc e i n th e makin g o f decision s an d doe s no t i n an y way insur e tha t th e specifi c decisio n wil l b e correct . I n fact , onc e th e assumption o f infallibilit y i s made , i t ma y eve n degrad e th e qualit y o f decisions b y impedin g th e seriou s an d self-critica l consideratio n o f criti cisms an d alternatives . Ironically , thi s hold s tru e eve n i f th e criticism s and alternative s ar e already i n the system, since they ca n no w b e ignore d on th e grounds tha t the y were formall y "listene d t o " before . What become s clea r i s tha t whil e th e for m o f decision-makin g ma y remain th e same, its content become s fre e t o vary; an d t o the extent tha t the form i s relied upon a s a guarantee of success, the content ca n becom e completely arbitrary .

The Disappearance o f Pressur e The scenari o tha t popula r consciousnes s ha s develope d fo r explainin g the disaste r make s a particular appea l t o th e concep t o f pressure . NAS A was unde r pressur e fro m Congress , fro m th e president , fro m th e new s media, an d s o on , an d so , naturally , i t overextende d itsel f an d trie d t o do mor e tha n i t could. I have no doub t tha t thi s is true. What strike s m e as peculia r i s th e remarkabl e unanimit y wit h whic h NAS A official s

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denied tha t the y wer e respondin g t o pressur e or , fo r tha t matter , wer e passing on this pressure to anyone else. From a n organizational standpoint , wha t i s remarkable abou t NAS A management's stanc e i s tha t th e clai m tha t the y wer e respondin g t o pressure would have taken a t least some of th e heat off NAS A and put it on th e entitie s tha t wer e applyin g th e pressure. But , strikingly , the y di d not take this way ou t an d remained insisten t that the decisions tha t they had made were the correct decisions, occasioned b y their own sobe r and professional assessment o f th e situation . A phenomeno n o f thi s sor t simply beg s for an explanation outsid e of the ordinary. From the standpoint o f th e theory o f th e organization ideal , pressur e is not apprehende d becaus e it is inconsistent wit h the idea of the organization a s a n ideal . The organizatio n idea l doe s no t mov e becaus e i t i s pressed t o move . O n the contrary, bein g pressed t o mov e i s a characteristic o f th e finite, limited , vulnerabl e sid e o f ou r individua l existences , which th e ide a o f th e organizatio n idea l i s constructe d t o deny . Thus , the organization idea l move s becaus e of it s own interna l causes . It is the cause of itself—in th e old medieval expression , causa sui. Moreover, the organization doe s not need to put pressure on anything or anybody else. All i t needs t o d o i s t o mak e it s vision clea r t o others , and , i f the y hav e intelligence an d good will , the y will naturall y agree . The reason fo r thi s ready compliance agai n goes bac k t o th e conception o f th e organizatio n ideal a s a projec t fo r th e retur n t o narcissism . Th e worl d i s a lovin g world o f whic h th e organization i s center. Al l th e organization need s t o do is be itself, an d the world will naturally fall into line. There is no need to put pressure on it. The phenomeno n o f th e organization' s bein g blin d t o th e pressure i t has cause d i s eviden t i n th e critica l 2 7 Januar y teleconferenc e betwee n NASA Leve l H I management an d Morton-Thiokol. I n the course o f thi s teleconference, Morton-Thioko l mad e i t clea r t o NAS A managemen t that the y recommende d agains t th e launc h becaus e o f th e effect s col d might hav e o n th e SR B O-rings . Th e discussio n becam e a heate d one . Lawrence Mullo y sai d tha t h e di d no t accep t th e recommendatio n an d asked i f Morton-Thioko l wante d hi m t o wai t unti l Apri l t o launch . A t the sam e time , Georg e Hardy , deput y directo r o f scienc e an d engineer ing, sai d h e woul d no t launc h agains t Morton-ThiokoP s recommenda tion, bu t tha t h e wa s "appalled " tha t the y woul d mak e suc h a recom mendation.

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At thi s point , Morton-Thioko l managemen t aske d t o g o of f th e tele conference loo p whil e the y reconsidere d th e recommendation . Whe n they cam e bac k on , a s th e resul t o f processe s tha t ma y b e signifie d b y Robert Lund , vic e presiden t o f engineering , "takin g of f hi s engineerin g hat an d puttin g o n hi s managemen t hat, " an d despit e th e fac t tha t ther e was no t on e enginee r wh o recommende d th e launch , Morton-Thioko l management ha d bee n abl e t o chang e thei r assessmen t an d ha d com e t o approve th e launch . Eve n so , when the y sen t thei r writte n approval , th e letter stil l brough t u p th e engineerin g ground s upo n whic h Morton Thiokol ha d previousl y recommende d agains t launch . Now i t seem s t o m e tha t anyon e wh o wa s i n th e leas t bi t sensitiv e t o the pressur e h e o r sh e wa s causin g woul d hav e know n tha t thi s wa s a situation i n whic h pressur e ha d bee n exerted . Bu t th e Leve l H I manage ment involve d showe d n o sig n whatsoeve r tha t the y kne w tha t the y ha d exerted pressure . Thi s poin t i s made repeatedl y i n thei r testimon y (New York Times, 2 6 - 2 8 Februar y 1986) , and i t als o manifeste d itsel f behav iorally. I f NAS A Leve l II I kne w tha t i t ha d exerte d pressure , an d there fore tha t th e resolutio n ha d bee n political , the y woul d hav e know n tha t the safet y questio n ha d no t bee n resolve d o n a n engineerin g basis , an d therefore the y woul d hav e bee n worrie d abou t th e safet y o f th e flight . But the y showe d n o sign s o f havin g bee n worried . Thus , Mullo y an d Reinartz mentione d t o Willia m Lucas , Marshal l Cente r director , tha t Morton-Thiokol ha d raise d concern s abou t th e seals , bu t the y men tioned i t in such a way that Luca s had n o impression tha t the matter ha d not bee n entirel y resolved . Again , Mullo y an d Reinhart z sa t fo r severa l hours wit h Aldric h an d Moor e befor e th e launc h withou t eve r mention ing that ther e had bee n a disagreement . Perhaps th e fac t tha t th e 2 7 Januar y teleconferenc e wa s th e mos t minutely investigate d elemen t o f th e disaste r i s th e reaso n tha t i t als o gives u s th e bes t exampl e o f wha t th e denia l o f pressur e look s lik e wit h regard t o th e people who ar e being pressured. For , i t is clear that, o n th e one hand, Morton-Thiokol wa s under considerabl e pressur e to please a n important custome r an d g o alon g wit h NASA' s desir e t o launch , while , on th e othe r hand , i t appear s tha t thi s pressur e wa s no t regarde d b y Morton-Thiokol management , a s oppose d t o Morton-Thioko l engi neers, a s pressur e a t th e time , no r remembere d a s pressur e b y them . Thus, engineer s Alla n McDonal d an d Bria n Russell , a s wel l a s othe r Morton-Thiokol engineers , testified tha t the y ha d fel t pressure , but Jerry

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Mason, senio r vic e president , said : "Ther e wa s som e pressure , bu t I believe i t wa s i n th e rang e o f wha t w e normall y encounter, " an d Jo e Kilminster, vic e presiden t fo r shuttl e projects , said , " I di d no t fee l a significant amoun t o f pressure " t o chang e positio n (New York Times, 26 Februar y 1986) . Evidently, th e differentiation coincide d wit h a disparity i n perception of th e wa y tha t NAS A ha d redefine d th e situation , fro m on e i n whic h they ha d t o prov e tha t i t wa s saf e t o fly, t o on e i n whic h the y ha d t o prove i t wa s unsaf e t o fly. Morton-Thioko l engineer s evidentl y realize d that the situation was being redefined, whil e management did not. Thus, Robert Lunden said: "We have always dealt with Marshall fo r a long time and have always been in the position o f defendin g ou r position t o mak e sure that we were ready to fly, and I guess I didn't realize until after the meeting and after several days that we had absolutely changed our position from what we had before." (RC1986:94) It appear s tha t w e hav e here , i n th e cas e o f Morton-Thioko l manage ment, a n example o f th e dynamic s Freu d (1955 ) associate d wit h leader ship. For Freud, the leader takes the place o f th e follower's eg o ideal. In the process , th e individual' s sens e o f judgment , hi s o r he r reflecting , critical ability , is given over to th e leader, an d consequently th e individual's sens e o f mora l autonom y i s lost . Wit h regar d t o th e Morton Thiokol engineers , thi s ha d no t happened , o r a t leas t no t completely . This i s why th e Morton-Thioko l engineer s fel t pressure , whil e th e managers did not. The experience of pressure involves a sense of onesel f a s a distinct entit y agains t anothe r distinc t entity. Thu s th e engineer s main tained a sens e o f thei r authorit y b y retainin g thei r ow n eg o ideal—a n ego ideal in which their professional engineerin g standards played a large part.1 Fo r th e managers , however , puttin g NAS A i n th e plac e o f thei r ego idea l meant , i n effect , tha t the y ha d take n NAS A a s thei r imag e o f what they should b e themselves, the realization o f thei r own narcissism . In thi s way , th e boundarie s betwee n the m an d NAS A vanished . The y fused wit h NAS A an d gav e u p thei r sens e o f bein g distinc t entities . I n effect, thes e people had given up their own selves. There was no self that could have experienced pressure. Similar considerations appl y t o the questio n o f wh y th e engineers fel t that th e situatio n ha d bee n redefine d t o requir e proo f o f wh y i t wa s dangerous to launch. This is a question that makes sense only if the issue

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being discusse d i s on e o f launc h safety—a n engineerin g issue . Bu t fo r management, thi s doe s no t appea r t o hav e bee n th e question . Th e insti tutional question , th e managemen t issue , a s the y sa w it , wa s ho w t o please NASA , ho w t o confir m NASA' s narcissism , an d whil e th e detail s may have shifted, th e primary tas k remaine d th e same. Hence, when Bo b Lund "Too k of f hi s engineer' s ha t an d pu t o n hi s manager' s hat, " th e issue fo r hi m wa s alread y decided . Indeed , onc e Maso n announce d tha t a "managemen t decision " woul d hav e t o b e made, the issue was alread y decided an d furthe r disagreemen t o n engineerin g ground s becam e irrele vant. Engineers Roge r Boisjoly an d Arnol d Thompson cam e to recogniz e that onc e th e managemen t orientatio n ha d bee n adopted , th e discussio n was ove r an d th e engineerin g questio n ha d becom e irrelevant . Boisjoly' s testimony i s useful i n providing a sense of ho w thi s recognition felt : "Okay, th e caucu s starte d b y Mr . Maso n statin g a managemen t decisio n wa s necessary. Those of us who opposed the launch continued to speak out. . . An d we were attempting to go back and rereview and try to make clear what we were trying to get across, and we couldn't understand why it was going to be reversed. So we spoke out and tried to explain once again the effects o f low temperature. Arnie actually go t up fro m hi s position whic h was down th e table, and walked up to the table and put a quarter pad dow n in front o f the table, in front o f the management folks, and tried to sketch once again what his concern was with the joint, and when he realized he wasn't getting through, he just stopped. "I tried once more with the photos. I grabbed the photos, and I went up and discussed th e photo s onc e agai n an d trie d t o mak e th e poin t tha t i t wa s m y opinion fro m actua l observation s tha t temperatur e wa s indee d a discriminato r and we should no t ignore the physical evidence that we had observed . . . I also stopped whe n i t wa s apparen t tha t I couldn' t ge t anybod y t o listen. " (R C 1986:92) The Denia l o f Disaste r Often, th e organizatio n manage s t o respon d t o externa l pressure s whil e still maintainin g th e ide a o f itsel f a s causa sui b y generatin g a fantas y that rationalize s th e action s i t i s bein g force d t o tak e i n a wa y tha t stil l leaves i t wit h th e concep t o f it s ow n control . Thus , i n a classi c study , Festinger, Riecken , an d Schacte r (1956 ) observe d wha t happene d t o a sect tha t ha d predicte d th e en d o f th e worl d a t a specifi c time . A s tha t time approached , an d nothin g happened , ther e wa s a revelation : Th e world ha d bee n spared a s a result of th e sect's activities, and th e sect was then charge d wit h th e responsibility o f preachin g thi s good news .

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In the case of NASA , as we have seen , the dominan t fantas y ha d bee n the fantas y o f NASA' s infallibility , subjec t t o it s form s an d ritual s bein g followed. I f th e form s wer e followed , succes s wa s assured , an d i t the n became th e responsibilit y o f critic s t o prov e tha t NAS A shoul d no t act , rather tha n fo r the m t o prov e tha t i t should . Thi s i s clea r i n th e testi mony o f Morton-Thioko l engineers . It seem s t o m e t o b e thi s flight int o fantas y tha t wa s responsibl e fo r the most remarkable aspec t o f the public testimony concernin g the disaster—NASA management' s apparen t belie f tha t the y mad e th e righ t decision. The only way thi s belie f coul d b e maintained wa s b y supposin g that makin g th e righ t decisio n mean t makin g th e decisio n i n th e righ t way, regardless o f consequences . This wa s th e impressio n man y o f thes e NASA manager s gave . Thus , t o cit e onl y on e example , Willia m Luca s said: "I' m no t sur e wha t Mr . Roger s mean s i n term s o f th e decisio n process bein g flawed" (This Week with David Brinkley, 8 June 1986) . The differentiatio n betwee n NAS A management' s infallibilit y fantas y and realit y wa s sufficientl y jarrin g t o becom e a focu s o f publi c discus sion. Thus, according t o the New York Times o f 1 7 March 1986 : One Marshal l manage r confide d tha t h e was embarrasse d t o hea r th e center' s officials contendin g tha t th e decisio n makin g proces s leadin g t o th e launchin g was "sound." "The shuttl e ble w u p an d yo u ha d piece s fallin g fro m th e sky, " h e noted . "How could it not be flawed?" REORGANIZING NAS A In respons e t o th e Challenger disaste r an d a s genera l scheme s fo r avert ing disaster , tw o genera l strategie s wer e pu t forwar d a s way s o f reorg anizing NASA. First was wha t ma y b e called th e solution throug h struc ture. Chang e th e organization' s structur e i n som e way, i t was proposed , and th e problem s woul d b e take n car e of . Thi s wa s th e basi c solutio n that th e Roger s Commissio n recommended . Ther e shoul d b e mor e cen tral accountability , th e progra m manage r shoul d hav e mor e authority , astronauts shoul d b e i n management , ther e shoul d b e a shuttl e safet y panel, an d s o o n an d s o forth . Th e proble m wit h program s lik e thes e i s not tha t the y ar e no t desirable , a t least i n the shor t run , bu t tha t the y d o not addres s th e centra l issue , and therefore , i n the long run, the y ru n th e risk o f becomin g par t o f th e problem. I have discusse d thi s alread y wit h

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regard t o th e fac t tha t vita l organizationa l processe s ten d t o becom e ritualized. Actually, I suspect tha t suc h recommendation s ar e often intende d no t so muc h a s offerin g rea l solution s t o problems , bu t a s excuse s fo r avoiding problems . Thi s i s a conclusio n tha t ca n b e supporte d b y Feyn man's (1989 ) observation s wit h regar d t o th e Roger s Commissio n rec ommendations: Sometime in May, at one of our last meetings, we got around to making a list of possibl e recommendations . Somebod y woul d say , "Maybe on e of th e things we should discuss is the establishment of a safety board. " "Okay, we'll put that down." I'm thinking, "At last! We're going to have a discussion!" But it turns out that this tentative list of topics becomes the recommendations —that there be a safety board , that there be a this, that there be a that. The only discussion wa s abou t whic h recommendatio n w e should writ e first, which on e should come second, and so forth. There were many things I wanted t o discuss further. Fo r example, in regard to a safety board , one could ask : "Wouldn't suc h a committee just add anothe r layer to an already overgrown bureaucracy?" There had bee n safety board s before. I n 1967 , after th e Apollo accident, the investigating committee at the time invented a special panel for safety. It worked for a while, but it didn't last. We didn' t discus s wh y th e earlie r safet y board s wer e n o longe r effective ; instead, we just made up more safety boards. (199) The secon d possibilit y ma y b e calle d th e solutio n throug h culture . The New York Times o f 1 0 June 198 6 reported : Some senior NASA officials hav e conceded that as much as changing personnel, the agenc y need s t o instil l a new "culture " i n which lower-leve l manager s an d engineers feel freer to communicate "bad news," such as the poor O-ring perfor mance, t o ke y decisio n makers . The y sai d suc h a cultur e existe d durin g th e Apollo project, which was clearly defined a s a research and development undertaking and in which problem-solving was an accepted part of the process. (22) The difficult y wit h thi s approac h i s that , a s regard s NAS A manage ment a t least—an d o f cours e the y woul d b e th e one s wh o woul d b e charged wit h "instilling " a ne w culture—NASA' s cultur e wa s alread y fine. I n th e cas e o f communicatin g ba d news , fo r example , numerou s NASA manager s testifie d repeatedl y tha t thi s wa s par t o f th e NAS A culture. Th e onl y proble m wa s tha t whil e i t ma y hav e bee n par t o f NASA "culture, " i n th e sens e o f th e wa y i n whic h NAS A managemen t

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saw an d understoo d it s activities , thi s "culture " ha d n o relationshi p t o the truth . We sa w thi s abov e i n NAS A management' s respons e t o th e Coo k memorandum, bu t i t was als o eviden t i n the cas e of NASA's concer n fo r safety. Publi c statement s o f NAS A official s s o ofte n stresse d NASA' s concern fo r safet y tha t i f on e di d no t kno w abou t th e explosio n o f th e space shuttle , on e coul d neve r hav e suspecte d tha t i t happened . Bu t a t the time that thi s supposedly safety-consciou s NAS A was acting to mak e sure tha t n o unnecessar y ris k coul d tak e place , the y wer e cuttin g thei r safety budge t b y half a billio n dollar s (New York Times, 2 4 Apri l 1986 ) and thei r qualit y contro l staf f b y 7 0 percen t {New York Times, 8 Ma y 1986). Argyris an d Scho n (1974 ) refe r t o th e wa y tha t a n organization' s culture ca n b e unrelate d t o it s realit y b y distinguishin g betwee n a man ager's espouse d theor y an d hi s o r he r theory-in-use . They poin t ou t tha t one doe s no t typicall y hav e an y relationshi p t o th e other . Th e theor y o f the organizatio n idea l provide s a complementar y perspective . Here , th e organization's cultur e provide s th e framewor k withi n whic h th e action s of thos e in power ar e justified. Fro m thi s point o f view, what th e specifi c culture is , is of secondar y significance . Wha t i s important i s that organi zational participants , bot h lowe r and , especially , upper , hav e a stak e i n seeing that th e justificatory proces s takes place, no matte r wha t th e fact s are. This i s the point a t whic h fantas y gain s the uppe r hand . Th e ide a o f bringing realit y bac k i n b y changin g th e conten t o f th e fantas y is , o f course, absurd . On Averting Organizationa l Disaster s It becomes clea r that seein g organizational disaster s from th e standpoin t of th e theor y o f th e organizatio n ideal—a s a natura l by-produc t o f organizational decay 2 —poses a seriou s proble m fo r th e organizatio n that i s concerned t o prevent them . I f a disaster i s the product o f a flawed organizational proces s withi n a n organizationa l contex t tha t i s healthy , then i t i s a t leas t conceivabl e tha t th e proces s ca n b e change d t o aver t further disaster s o f th e sam e sort . O n th e othe r hand , i f th e disaste r i s the result of systemi c decay, its cause cannot b e isolated within a specifi c area o f organizationa l functionin g an d repaire d therein . Moreover , th e very mean s tha t ar e require d i n th e repai r o f a n organizationa l proces s

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—such a s feedback , proble m identification , eve n reflexiv e actio n o f th e organization upo n itself—ar e likel y t o b e a s muc h i n deca y a s th e original problemati c process . Preventin g th e occurrenc e an d recurrenc e of disasters , t o th e exten t tha t the y ar e cause d b y organizationa l decay , requires a n organizationa l strateg y o f a different sort . Indeed , i t require s an organizationa l strateg y tha t i s not eve n a n organizational strategy . Organizational deca y is the result o f a denial o f reality an d a concom itant addictio n t o fantasy . Th e realit y tha t i s denie d i s the realit y o f th e individual's separation , limitation , an d mortality. It seems inevitable tha t the solutio n t o th e proble m o f organizationa l deca y mus t involv e th e acceptance o f thi s reality . Within thi s context , th e ide a o f a solutio n t o organizationa l deca y does no t loo k lik e a specifi c progra m tha t powerfu l administrator s ca n impose o n an d throug h a powerful , potentiall y perfec t organization . Rather, i t come s t o loo k lik e a grou p o f limite d me n an d women , tryin g hard eac h da y t o reclaim , withi n th e terribl e constraint s tha t eac h on e faces, a littl e bi t o f th e hol d o n realit y tha t eac h one , him - o r herself , threw away . Thi s i s a matte r t o whic h I shal l retur n i n th e concludin g chapter.

7

The Symbo l o f th e Spac e Shuttl e an d th e Degeneration o f th e America n Drea m In th e Sout h Sea s ther e i s a carg o cul t o f people . Durin g th e wa r the y sa w airplanes lan d wit h lot s o f goo d materials , an d the y wan t th e sam e thin g t o happen now. S o they've arrange d to make things like runways, to put fires along the side s o f th e runways , t o mak e a woode n hu t fo r a ma n t o si t in , wit h tw o wooden pieces on his head like headphones and bars of bambo o sticking out like antennas—he's th e controller—and the y wait fo r the airplanes t o land. They'r e doing everythin g right . Th e for m i s perfect . I t look s exactl y th e wa y i t looke d before. Bu t it doesn't work. N o airplane s land. —Richard P . Feynman, Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman

I a m lookin g a t a photograph . Seve n smilin g peopl e loo k bac k a t me . Fiv e o f them ar e men , tw o ar e women; five are white, on e i s black , on e i s Oriental . O f the men, two loo k boyish , one i s gray haired and looks older than the rest. They are al l dresse d i n identica l coverall s tha t giv e n o hin t a t al l o f th e specifi c characteristics o f thei r bodies . Eac h coveral l ha s th e NAS A log o o n it . O n th e table nex t t o the m i s a mode l o f a spac e shuttle . Behin d the m i s a n America n flag. They will be the crew of th e space shuttle Challenger, fligh t 51-L. My imaginatio n take s m e pas t thi s picture . I see the m i n space . The y cavor t weightlessly. The y poin t televisio n camera s ou t th e windo w an d sho w m e ho w Earth looks fro m space . Through th e marvel o f television , I am there with the m in th e spac e shuttle , i n space . Al l American s wer e wit h the m i n space . Eve n th e children ar e there . Fo r on e o f thes e astronaut s i s a teache r wh o wil l conduc t classes in space. There is a feeling o f completenes s tha t comes to me with thi s vision. It is as if my imaginatio n ha s gon e beyon d th e reconfiguratio n o f commo n perceptua l elements an d has entered th e realm o f th e mythic. The picture sing s to me : loo k what America ha s done! America has transcended its cleavages, men and women fly together, th e race s fl y together , th e age s fl y together . Eve n th e childre n ca n fly. W e ar e al l u p ther e i n a machin e tha t manage s t o be , a t th e sam e time , powerful an d thrusting , lik e a phallus, an d warm an d comforting , lik e a womb. Earthly cares are overcome. Eart h and care are overcome. There ar e no limits t o what American s ca n do . Constrain t i s merel y a n illusion . I feel o n th e edg e o f immortality itself . I wrot e thes e word s i n Jun e 1986 , a s par t o f a proposa l fo r a n academic conference . Wha t I di d no t kno w a t th e tim e wa s tha t th e 107

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image that cam e to me from th e picture was the image that was supposed to hav e com e t o me . As I shall sho w later , wha t I had though t o f a s a spontaneous an d creativ e ac t o f m y autonomou s imaginatio n wa s actually th e resul t o f a conscious , carefull y crafte d proces s o f symbo l creation tha t wa s geare d t o produc e thi s effect . I wa s pickin g u p th e image of itself tha t NAS A was transmitting. As Geert z (1973 ) ha s observe d i n hi s analysi s o f th e Balines e cock fight, throug h som e o f thei r institutions , societie s tal k t o themselve s about themselves . Thus: Like an y ar t form—fo r that , finally , i s wha t w e ar e dealin g with—th e cockfight render s ordinary, everyday experience comprehensible by presenting it in term s o f act s an d object s whic h hav e ha d thei r practica l consequence s removed and been reduced (or , if you prefer, raised ) to the level of sheer appear ances, where their meaning can be more powerfully articulate d and more exactly perceived. (443) Similarly, NASA , an d specifically , th e U.S . manned spac e flight pro gram, wa s a way for American s t o tal k t o themselve s abou t themselves . As Trent o (1987 ) ha s show , neithe r th e U.S . military no r th e CI A had any interes t i n manne d spac e flight. Th e meanin g o f th e spac e flight program wa s symbolic fro m th e outset an d remaine d so . In th e case of the spac e shuttl e Challenger, a s we shall see , the image tha t I had of the voyage—Americans transcendin g thei r difference s an d thei r finitude, floating blissfull y togethe r i n space—wa s i n fac t th e meanin g o f th e voyage itself . But when th e meaning of socia l institution s i s symbolic, doe s thi s not raise th e possibility o f a rift betwee n th e meaning o f the symbol an d the social realit y i t is presumed t o reflect ? An d if so, does tha t no t raise the possibility tha t a society may become so enamored o f the image it creates of itsel f tha t th e fac t tha t i t i s onl y a symbo l ma y b e forgotte n o r repressed? An d if tha t wer e t o happen , coul d tha t no t mak e a proble m for th e very existence of the symbol itsel f ? For, a s Goffman ha s shown (1959) , these commentaries , thes e work s of ar t require a staging, and the staging is not, and cannot be , part of the work o f art . If a societ y wer e t o fal l to o muc h i n lov e wit h wha t i t was telling itsel f abou t itself , th e stagin g o f th e performanc e migh t becom e impossible. I propose that the symbol of manned spac e flight that NASA intended , and wa s intended to , project cam e to contradict th e social an d organiza -

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tional realitie s that wer e necessar y fo r its staging. Briefly put , the symbol of manne d spac e fligh t ha d becom e a symbo l o f limitless , effortles s perfection i n whic h constrain t appeare d onl y a s a n illusion . Bu t th e organization o f advanced technolog y canno t take place in an atmospher e of limitless , effortles s perfection . I t require s a self-critica l sobriet y i n which th e consciousness o f limitatio n i s ever present . Rathe r tha n expe riencing constrain t a s a n illusion , on e mus t b e full y consciou s tha t illusion i s a constraint . Unde r th e circumstance s i t wa s inevitabl e tha t something woul d giv e way. It turned ou t to be the space shuttle itself .

NARCISSISM AND AMERICAN CULTUR E In earlie r chapters , I hav e discusse d th e interna l working s o f NAS A i n terms o f a theor y abou t organization s a s project s fo r th e retur n t o narcissism. I n this chapter I would lik e to indulge a train o f thought tha t was suggeste d t o m e b y th e commentato r Danie l Schorr , wh o pointe d out wha t tremendou s pressur e fo r perfectio n ha d bee n place d o n NAS A by the news media . Thi s suggeste d tha t analyse s concentratin g solel y o n what wa s goin g withi n NAS A mis s th e meanin g o f NAS A itself , an d particularly o f NASA' s manne d spac e flight mission . Drawin g th e boundaries mor e widel y I realize d tha t NAS A wa s servin g a symboli c function withi n th e overall America n culture . In effect, upo n NAS A had fallen th e burden o f maintaining the narcissism o f a strikingly , an d perhap s increasingl y narcissisti c America n cul ture (Lasc h 1979 , 1984). Through NASA , Americans wer e telling them selves that, despit e the drubbing th e U.S. Army too k i n Vietnam, despit e the fac t tha t America n industr y coul d no t compete withi n th e America n market, muc h les s abroad , despit e th e fac t tha t man y America n citie s had becom e moder n instantiation s o f Hobbe s "stat e o f nature"—de spite al l this, stil l Americ a wa s perfect. Thi s agai n i s narcissism, bu t on the level of the whole society . Gaining a sense of the place of narcissism in American societ y require s a concep t tha t I have not made muc h us e of before: th e superego. In the normal case , partl y throug h projectio n an d partl y throug h introjection , an individual come s to have a relatively stabl e imag e of the person h e or she i s "suppose d t o be " o r "shoul d be " i n orde r agai n t o becom e th e center o f a lovin g world . Thus , a se t o f obligation s i s understoo d a s

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expressing th e condition s fo r th e attainmen t o f th e eg o ideal . This se t of obligations provide s th e basi s fo r th e superego . The supereg o give s a sens e o f directio n t o one' s lif e an d especiall y t o those area s o f life , suc h a s one' s organizationa l role , that ar e dominate d and motivate d b y a sens e o f th e appropriate . Bu t betwee n peopl e an d within th e sam e perso n a t differen t times , th e balanc e betwee n th e fantastical aspec t o f the ego ideal and it s obligatory aspect , the superego , may differ . Whe n th e obligator y aspec t gain s th e uppe r han d an d dis places the fantastical, w e speak of the person a s an obsessive-compulsive . When th e obligator y aspec t i s very wea k a s compare d wit h th e fantasti cal, w e refe r t o th e perso n a s narcissistic . Suc h person s ma y b e sai d t o identify themselve s wit h thei r ow n eg o ideal . The differenc e betwee n th e narcissisti c an d th e norma l case , then, ha s a developmenta l dimension . Th e obligator y componen t develop s throug h the cours e o f a person' s life— a cours e tha t begin s wit h primar y narcis sism bu t tha t progresse s throug h identification s wit h adult s who m th e individual regard s a s havin g attaine d th e eg o idea l an d who m th e indi vidual strive s t o becom e like . Thus , th e norma l perso n believe s tha t h e or sh e need s t o liv e u p t o certai n standards , t o "becom e somebody " i n order t o attai n th e eg o ideal . Th e narcissist , maintainin g a n infantil e orientation t o th e world , believe s tha t h e o r sh e i s alread y th e eg o idea l and i n on e wa y o r anothe r denie s thos e element s o f realit y tha t contra dict this preferred vision . One o f th e mos t deepl y regressiv e form s o f thi s denia l i s know n i n psychoanalytic theor y a s th e denia l o f difference . A s used b y Freudians , the denial o f differenc e refer s t o th e infantile fantas y tha t th e mother ha s a penis. Chasseguet-Smirgel (1985 , 1986 ) point s t o the function tha t thi s serves in th e preoedipa l emotiona l lif e o f th e mal e child. I t allows him t o think o f th e mothe r a s bein g sexuall y complet e an d no t sexuall y requir ing th e father . I n thi s fashion , th e chil d ca n conceiv e maintainin g it s sense o f unit y wit h th e mother , a sens e tha t woul d no t b e disturbe d b y the child' s recognitio n tha t it s infantil e sexualit y wil l no t suffic e t o kee p the mothe r satisfied . Thu s th e denia l o f differenc e i s a denia l o f sexua l differentiation an d a t th e sam e tim e somethin g deeper— a denia l o f th e difference betwee n th e generations , o f childre n an d adults . Th e chil d denies tha t i t ha s t o becom e lik e th e father—tha t i t ha s t o becom e a n adult—in orde r t o hav e unio n wit h th e mother . I t doe s no t hav e t o d o anything. I t can hav e everythin g just b y being what i t is.

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The denia l o f differenc e i s th e imag e tha t spok e t o m e ou t o f th e picture o f th e astronaut s i n their unise x flight suits : sexual dedifferentia tion an d generationa l dedifferentiation . Ad d t o thi s th e ide a tha t ethni c dedifferentiation represent s a denia l o f rivalr y amon g sibling s fo r exclu sive union wit h th e mother, an d yo u hav e the whole photograph . But a t a deepe r level , an d on e tha t wil l permi t m e t o retur n t o th e proposition tha t the symbol of manned spac e flight ha d becom e inconsistent wit h th e socia l realit y tha t woul d hav e ha d t o suppor t it , not e tha t the denia l o f differenc e i s a t th e sam e tim e a denia l o f th e differenc e between th e worl d an d th e self , realit y an d fantasy , achievemen t an d desire, betwee n technolog y an d magic . A societ y thinkin g o f itsel f i n these terms , livin g it s emotiona l lif e o n thi s level , woul d hav e los t th e motivational basi s for technologica l achievement . THE DEGENERATION O F THE SYMBOL OF MANNED SPAC E FLIGHT: THE SINGLE COMBA T WARRIOR In evaluatin g th e symbo l o f manne d spac e flight presente d i n th e cas e of the Challenger, i t is useful t o compar e i t to a n earlie r symbo l o f manne d space flight, a s described b y Tom Wolf e i n The Right Stuff (1979) . For Wolfe, th e symbol calle d fo r b y the American public , and happil y generated b y th e origina l America n astronauts , wa s th e symbo l o f th e "single comba t warrior. " B y launchin g Sputnik, th e firs t artificia l satel lite, th e Russian s threatened , i n th e word s o f Senat e Majorit y Leade r Lyndon Johnson, t o seiz e "th e hig h ground " (71 ) o f space . America wa s in a panic. When th e origina l astronaut s wer e chosen , durin g a period i n which America n rocket s di d nothin g bu t blo w up , th e adulatio n fo r them wa s instant . They , ou r braves t an d bes t tes t pilots , woul d rid e th e rockets int o space and symbolicall y d o battl e with th e Russians, in muc h the sam e wa y tha t earlie r lon e warrior s ha d stoo d fo r th e armie s o f which the y wer e par t an d prefigure d o r replace d th e battl e betwee n th e armies themselves . Th e publi c woul d gran t the m anything . I t woul d b e the lovin g world o f whic h the y wer e th e center . I t would fulfil l fo r the m the ego ideal . But not e tha t i n thi s cas e ther e i s n o questio n o f jus t bein g oneself . Attainment o f th e eg o idea l her e i s contingen t upo n thes e astronaut s doing something. And , indeed, doing something pretty impressive. Single combat wit h th e Russian s wa s no t regarde d a s a merel y morta l perfor -

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mance. O n th e contrary , th e astronau t woul d tak e upo n himsel f th e rol e of a protectin g god . H e woul d stan d agains t th e hostil e force s tha t surrounded th e whol e natio n an d vanquis h them . A t th e deepes t level , the astronau t woul d challeng e th e separatio n o f sel f an d th e worl d tha t is th e roo t caus e o f ou r anxiet y an d overcom e i t b y overcomin g th e world. T o b e sure , a s wit h Geertz' s cockfight , nothin g o f th e sor t will have take n place . Nonetheless , th e ver y rea l dange r i n whic h th e astro nauts ar e placed make s real suc h overcomin g a s they ma y achiev e and a t least give s a conten t t o th e fantasy . I t give s th e fantas y a n activ e char acter. We ca n se e th e activ e characte r o f th e eg o idea l i n th e symbo l o f th e astronauts mor e clearl y b y focusin g upo n th e creatio n o f th e symbo l from th e othe r side—fro m th e sid e of th e astronauts . There , th e symbo l was a pilot wit h "th e Righ t Stuff. " The ide a o f bein g seen a s pilots, and no t simpl y a s passengers wa s th e equivalent o f requirin g that the y b e seen as being in control, and no t jus t passive participant s ("Spa m i n a can") . I t woul d tur n th e fligh t fro m a mere experienc e int o a n achievement . Thi s aspec t o f th e symbo l wa s s o important t o th e astronaut s tha t whe n the y realize d ho w muc h powe r their iconi c statur e gav e t o them , the y use d tha t powe r t o forc e th e redesign o f thei r vehicl e fro m a "capsule " t o a "spacecraft, " b y addin g elements t o i t tha t woul d approximat e a s muc h a s possibl e th e contro l systems of a n airplane . I f they were to gai n adulation , the y woul d gai n i t by flying. The ide a o f th e "Righ t Stuff, " a s Wolfe describe s it , contain s th e sor t of mythi c element s tha t onl y th e eg o idea l possesses . Wolf e liken s i t t o the Presbyterian doctrin e o f bein g one of the elect. 1 It was not somethin g that on e coul d gain ; on e coul d onl y prov e tha t on e ha d it . An d i f on e had it , a s wit h Presbyteria n grace , on e neithe r had , no r nee d have , an y fear o f death . I t i s clearly a symbo l o f prevailin g ove r death , o f immor tality—the ultimat e i n bein g th e cente r o f a lovin g world . Moreover , i t is immortalit y tha t know s itsel f t o b e immortality . Analogou s t o th e Presbyterian elect' s certainty o f election , to have the right stuff i s to hav e courage withou t tryin g t o hav e courage . Th e proo f o f th e righ t stuf f i s perfect calmnes s i n the fac e o f wha t appear s t o b e absolute catastrophe . But i f th e primitiv e characte r o f th e wis h i s clea r enough , wha t i s equally clear , i n term s o f th e manne d flight program , i s th e demandin g character o f th e proo f tha t on e ha d th e righ t stuff . Thi s proo f wa s

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nothing shor t o f bein g the perfect pilot . The death o f a pilot mean t tha t he did not have the right stuff. No excuses were allowed. The opposition right stuff/deat h wa s absolute—even tautological . A s Wolfe pu t it: "Ther e are no accidents and no fatal flaw s i n the machines: ther e are only pilot s with th e wrong stuff " (34) . Moreover, th e attitude behin d perfectio n i n piloting coul d no t b e on e o f complacency . Absolut e master y o f detai l was required . Thi s i s not to den y self-confidence . O n the contrary, self confidence wa s part o f having the right stuff. But in the same fashion , s o was a n obsessiv e concentratio n o n detail . Bot h wer e expression s o f the right stuff . Take n together , th e emotiona l contro l i n th e attainmen t o f perfect sangfroi d an d the perfection i n the process o f flyin g itsel f adde d to a list of "shoulds " and "supposed tos " that was, perhaps, demandin g beyond wha t huma n being s coul d sustain . Thes e peopl e intende d t o be the cente r o f a lovin g world , bu t the y di d no t thin k o f attainin g thi s position a s an effortless achievement . I t was precisely i n those terms tha t they demande d t o b e accepte d an d i n whic h the y crafted , consciousl y and unconsciously , th e symbo l o f themselve s and , by extension , o f the U.S. manned spac e fligh t program . In comparin g th e symbo l o f th e origina l astronaut s wit h tha t o f the astronauts o f 51-L, I should lik e to consider Rober t T. Hohler's journal istic accoun t (1986 ) o f th e process o f symbo l construction . In this case , what wa s clearly th e most symboli c aspec t o f the program, th e so-called "Teacher i n Space " progra m wa s recorde d wit h a focu s o n Christ a McAuliffe, wh o was eventually chose n t o be the first "teacher i n space " and was exclusively covere d b y Hohler. THE DEGENERATION O F THE SYMBOL OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT: THE DENIAL OF DIFFERENCE AND DISNEYLAN D I N SPACE The manne d spac e flight progra m wa s symbolic i n intent righ t fro m th e beginning. Bu t a s w e hav e seen , th e origina l symbo l wa s on e o f th e astronauts prevailin g ove r deat h throug h competence . The contrast wit h the symbo l constructe d o f th e Challenger astronaut s coul d no t be mor e striking. No t only doe s deat h disappea r i n this symbol , bu t competenc e does a s well. For competence i n overcoming deat h ha s become unneces sary. In developmental terms , the symbol presente d her e has its home in mental lif e befor e th e concep t o f deat h ha s ye t developed . Bu t i f th e

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concept o f overcomin g deat h throug h competenc e ha s becom e unneces sary, i t ha s als o becom e impossible . I t ha s becom e undefined , meaning less. And th e resul t i s that i t becam e motivationall y impossible . The fac t that deat h itsel f followe d fro m thi s regressio n canno t b e surprising . I n an enterpris e a s dangerou s a s th e spac e shuttle's , i t becam e inevitable . All of thes e are aspect s o f th e denial o f difference . Consider th e pictur e o f th e smilin g astronauts . Recal l th e wa y thi s made m y imagination soar : "Loo k wha t Americ a has done! America ha s transcended it s cleavages , me n an d wome n fl y together , th e race s fl y together, th e age s fl y together . Eve n th e childre n ca n fly. " I said befor e that thi s fantas y wa s no t m y ow n construct , bu t wa s th e resul t o f a carefully crafte d symbol . Conside r Hohler' s accoun t o f the shuttle : Its passengers would include Francis Scobee, Judith Resnik, Elisson Onizuka and Ronald McNair , fou r o f th e thirty-fiv e astronaut s wh o wer e selecte d fro m a crush o f mor e tha n eigh t thousan d applicant s i n Januar y 1978 . The y wer e a military pilot , a Jewish woman , a n Asia n America n an d a black— symbols of NASA's commitment to carry America's cultural rainbow toward the stars. (46 , emphasis added) And thi s abou t McAuliffe : On cue , she talked abou t lookin g down fro m th e shuttle on "Spaceshi p Earth " —a Disne y concept—imaginin g a plane t wher e n o difference s divide d black s and whites, Arabs and Jews, Russians and Americans. "It's going to be wonderful t o see us as one people, a world with n o boundaries," she said. "I can't wait to bring back that humanistic spirit." (15) What i s strikin g t o m e abou t thes e image s i s no t onl y th e denia l o f social differentiatio n tha t the y represent , bu t th e wa y the y manifes t th e denial of differenc e i n their failur e t o distinguish th e symbol fro m reality . Christa McAuliff e wil l go into spac e an d "se e u s as one people" with n o differences betwee n black s an d whites , ric h an d poor , an d s o forth . Bu t of cours e ther e ar e differences , an d flyin g a hundre d mile s abov e the m does not reconcil e thos e differences ; i t only obscure s them . Or conside r th e idea o f sendin g America's "cultura l rainbow " towar d the stars. At a time when America' s racia l group s appea r t o b e becomin g irretrievably divided , whe n America' s sexua l relationship s hav e becom e so problemati c tha t a recen t write r ha s spoke n o f ou r yout h a s "th e unromantic generation, " whe n heavil y arme d neo-Naz i sect s ar e tryin g to organiz e th e secessio n o f th e American Northwest , th e ide a o f Ameri -

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ca's cultura l rainbo w a s bein g a unit y i n diversit y i s simpl y absur d an d the ide a o f bringin g i t int o bein g b y flying peopl e i n spac e i s bizarre . Indeed, fro m a psychoanalyti c poin t o f vie w i t i s precisel y th e tension s among thes e groups tha t make s th e symbol of thei r resolutio n attractive . What gives this image its clinical cast is the failure t o distinguish betwee n symbol an d reality . Returning t o Geertz' s analysi s o f th e cockfight , recal l hi s observatio n that th e cockfight , strippe d o f consequences , coul d becom e a for m o f art. Th e sam e ca n b e sai d o f th e spac e shuttl e phenomenon . Bu t i t i s worthwhile t o not e tha t th e Balinese di d no t thin k tha t th e separation o f the cockfigh t fro m th e surroundin g socia l realit y constitute d a replacement o f tha t reality . In th e cas e o f America n culture , th e symbo l ap peared t o represen t precisel y that . Indeed , th e backdro p fo r thi s pla y o f the imaginatio n i n spac e woul d see m t o b e th e ide a tha t distanc e ca n establish th e imaginar y real m a s a n alternativ e realit y tha t ha s a s muc h claim o n th e psych e a s th e worl d i n whic h w e live . This i s the denia l o f difference i n a particularly acut e form . The denia l o f socia l differentiatio n i s a n aspec t o f th e denia l o f difference tha t put s th e sens e of realit y int o a precarious position . Bu t a t least a s a fantas y i t give s a positiv e sens e of directio n t o th e proces s an d a conten t tha t i s relativel y harmless . Muc h mor e insidiou s ar e thos e aspects of th e denia l o f differenc e tha t directl y undermin e th e possibilit y of competence . Th e selectio n o f Christ a McAuliff e a s th e teache r i n space provides a case study o f how thi s happened . If th e sens e o f competenc e wer e t o b e reinforced , an d i f American s were tellin g themselve s somethin g abou t th e necessit y o f bein g abl e t o do somethin g i n orde r t o participat e i n Utopi a an d fulfil l thei r eg o ideal , the selectio n o f th e astronaut s woul d hav e bee n mad e o n th e basi s o f a perceive d difference , a n achieve d difference , betwee n th e astronau t and th e ordinar y person . Bu t a s Hohle r make s plain , th e selectio n o f McAuliffe wa s intende d t o giv e precisel y th e opposit e message . Thus , whatever th e wisdo m o r lac k o f wisdo m o f th e teache r i n spac e progra m itself, man y o f th e othe r finalists ha d considerabl e accomplishment s t o their credit . McAuliff e ha d none . McAuliff e wa s selected , I propose , because sh e wa s jus t lik e everybod y els e an d becaus e sh e wa s prou d of it : Christa wa s no t th e brightes t o f th e te n finalists. On e o f the m wa s a prize winning playwrigh t an d poet , an d anothe r ha d bee n invite d b y th e Frenc h

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government t o stud y language , literatur e an d cultur e ther e fo r a year . Mos t o f them ha d graduate d fro m school s mor e prestigious tha n Christa' s alm a mate r o f Framingham Stat e College . On e ha d eve n graduate d Ph i Bet a Kapp a fro m Stan ford University . On paper , som e o f the m seeme d t o pus h Christ a t o th e bac k o f th e class . There wa s a forme r fighter pilot , a film produce r an d a woma n who , amon g other adventures, had climbed the Andes and Himalayas an d crossed the Atlanti c in a thirty-on e foo t sailboat . Severa l o f the m kne w muc h mor e abou t spac e an d science tha n Christ a knew , an d th e project s mos t o f the m ha d propose d fo r th e six-day journe y mad e Christa' s ide a of keepin g a diary loo k rathe r ordinary . Which of course was the difference. Christa was the girl next door, and more. No other finalist matched her potential for getting NASA's message across. (10 , emphasis added ) W h a t wa s th e message , an d wh y coul d sh e ge t i t acros s s o well ? She wa s eve n a Gir l Scout . Wh o bette r t o sel l th e wonder s o f spac e tha n a woman wh o onc e sol d mor e Gir l Scou t cookie s tha n anyon e i n he r neighbor hood? An d sh e stil l ha d th e touch . Sh e was bold , charmin g an d convincing , an d when sh e said in her teacher' s voic e "I wan t to prove that spac e is for everyone, " people believe d her . (6 ) She tol d Lathlae n [anothe r teache r i n spac e finalist] sh e ha d don e he r bes t t o convince NAS A tha t sh e coul d "humaniz e th e technolog y o f th e spac e age " b y showing th e world tha t "ther e ar e rea l people u p there. " (6 ) When a reporte r aske d he r wh y sh e wante d t o g o int o spac e . . . she talke d about he r journal , abou t ho w he r perspectiv e a s a n ordinar y perso n woul d "demistify" th e spac e progra m an d abou t he r visio n o f th e worl d a s a globa l village, of on e people living together. (106 ) With a pus h fro m NASA , th e medi a ha d stumble d upo n a ne w concept : th e teacher a s hero.. . . Through i t all, Christa wa s one o f us. (180 ) H e r selection , i n othe r words , expresse d th e messag e tha t th e Ameri can publi c di d no t hav e t o d o anythin g t o experienc e Utopi a i n space , but tha t the y coul d d o i t jus t a s the y were . American s wer e tellin g themselves throug h th e mediu m o f McAuliff e tha t the y di d no t hav e t o d o anythin g i n orde r t o attai n th e eg o ideal , t o b e perfect—the y alread y were perfect , an d i t wa s onl y thei r temporar y boundednes s t o th e worl d that cause d thei r anxiety . Spacefligh t wa s see n a s simpl y th e realizatio n of tha t perfection . Th e meanin g o f Christ a McAuliffe' s selection , I sub mit, wa s th e expressio n o f America n narcissism . He r primar y tas k woul d be it s legitimation .

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Thus, if I am correct, the selection of Christ a McAuliffe a s the teacher in spac e represente d a critica l aspec t o f th e denia l o f difference . I t represented th e denial o f th e difference betwee n the generations—of th e fact tha t on e ha s t o lear n t o d o something , t o attai n competence , i n order to attain perfection. But showing ho w th e regressiv e characte r of th e ego idea l i n its mos t acute form is exemplified b y McAuliffe's selectio n requires that one more observation b e made . Wha t need s t o b e finall y understoo d i s tha t th e image o f th e shuttle wa s intende d t o appea l t o childre n an d a t the sam e time to the child in each of us. In this respect we cannot forget that there are virtually myriad s o f ordinar y occupations . Th e choice o f th e teache r from amon g thes e need s furthe r explanation . Eac h o f u s has ha d teach ers, an d childre n hav e teacher s still . Thus , a teache r ca n b e see n a s a universal type . Bu t th e universalit y o f th e symbolis m o f th e teache r i s based upo n th e universalit y o f childhood . Christ a McAuliff e woul d come bac k fro m space , an d the n he r job woul d b e t o sprea d th e news . But she would sprea d the news to children and to the child in each of us. McAuliffe's missio n wa s t o pu t th e symbolis m o f spacefligh t int o a perspective that made sense within the cognitive orientation of the child. McAuliffe's though t concernin g Barbar a Morgan , wh o wa s t o b e McAuliffe's backup , evinces her attitude on the place of children in space clearly enough: She arrived at the space center with a camera dangling from her neck, her eyes aglitter and her dark-brown, shoulder-length hair pulled back on one side with a clip. She looked lik e a child on her first da y a t Disneyland, Christ a thought. She looked like she belonged on the shuttle. (98) Thus, NASA ha d chosen t o cast its ideal a s a child's ideal. Ultimately , it seems to me , this transformation i n its image mos t closel y represente d the rif t betwee n NASA' s imag e o f itsel f an d th e realit y tha t i t required . For there is no place in the child's world fo r th e sort of painstakin g car e that spacefligh t requires . I n a word, th e child' s vie w o f th e worl d doe s not recognize technology; it dwells on magic. Understanding itself within the child' s poin t o f view , NASA' s imag e o f itsel f becam e incompatibl e with its technological necessities . I shall retur n to this shortly, bu t first it will b e usefu l t o conside r th e transformatio n o f symbol s o f manne d spaceflight fro m tha t o f singl e comba t warfar e t o tha t o f Disneylan d i n space.

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THE SUCCESSIO N O F SYMBOL S If th e symboli c functio n o f spacefligh t ha d change d fro m tes t pilo t competence t o ordinar y America n mediocrity , a clas h betwee n thes e symbols migh t b e expected . Surel y th e tes t pilot s woul d no t le t th e dramatization o f thei r eg o idea l b e overcom e withou t a struggle . I n fact , there i s evidenc e o f suc h a struggle , bu t i t appear s t o hav e bee n rathe r feeble. Hohle r describe s McAuliffe' s encounte r wit h Dic k Scobee , th e mission commander , thus : Scobee ha d worrie d her . Sh e kne w he r meteori c flas h acros s th e medi a sk y had bre d contemp t amon g a fe w peopl e i n th e spac e agency . Sh e kne w he r promise t o "humanize " spac e trave l ha d no t sa t wel l wit h astronaut s wh o als o claimed t o b e human . An d sh e kne w sh e wa s a n outside r wh o ha d bee n thrus t into on e o f th e world' s mos t exclusiv e club s withou t a vot e b y it s members . Little ha d frightene d he r mor e tha n th e cre w rejectin g he r a s a publi c relation s ornament. . . . She wondered mos t abou t Scobee . At first glance , sh e thought , h e seeme d lik e th e astronaut s o f he r youth , wholesome an d handsome , tall , blue-eye d an d ruggedl y buil t wit h a squar e ja w and a n ai r o f self-confidence . An d righ t fro m th e star t Scobe e lef t n o doub t tha t he was i n charge , that Christ a wa s a member o f a team tha t ha d bee n chose n fo r a spac e mission, no t a joy ride . "Those ar e n o firecracker s they'l l b e lightin g unde r ou r tails, " h e tol d her . "Those thing s ar e fo r real. " But soo n h e ease d up , an d Christ a realize d h e wa s no t th e mach o je t jocke y she had feared . H e was much lik e her, an ordinary person wh o had accomplishe d the extraordinary , th e first enliste d ma n t o ris e throug h th e rank s t o th e astro naut corps . (149 ) And i t appear s fro m Hohler' s accoun t tha t Scobe e woul d no t hav e disagreed wit h thi s unheroi c assessment : When h e returne d fro m hi s firs t shuttl e missio n i n 1984 , h e tol d th e student s at hi s former hig h school , "If I can d o it , anybody can. " Scobee ha d com e t o NAS A headquarter s t o revie w th e preliminar y plan s fo r Christa's shuttl e lessons . H e talke d wit h he r fo r a while an d bega n t o se e a littl e of himsel f i n her , a perso n o f modes t backgroun d and modest talents wh o ha d maintained he r humilit y i n th e fac e o f extraordinar y success . (149-50 , emphasi s added) T o understan d th e ful l significanc e o f thes e judgments , i t i s usefu l t o consider w h a t "extraordinar y accomplishment " an d "extraordinar y suc cess" mea n here . Remembe r i n thi s regar d tha t Christ a McAuliff e ha d

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not don e anythin g ye t an d that , indeed , give n tha t ther e wa s t o b e nothing requirin g competenc e i n th e tas k sh e was t o undertak e i n space , she woul d no t d o anythin g later . Th e conclusio n mus t b e tha t th e accomplishment consiste d i n bein g selecte d itself . Thus , th e traditiona l formulation i n whic h adulatio n arise s fro m achievemen t ha s bee n short circuited: adulatio n is the achievement . On e nee d no t d o anythin g t o b e somebody. This i s a poin t tha t call s fo r som e elaboration . I n earlie r discussio n we sa w tha t i n th e norma l case , th e individua l i s connecte d t o th e fulfillment o f th e eg o idea l throug h th e superego . A n obligation , a deed , stands betwee n th e separat e individua l an d th e individua l a s cente r o f a loving world . Bu t i n th e cas e o f McAuliffe , th e instrumenta l dee d seem s to hav e becom e superfluous . McAuliff e experience d hersel f a s alread y the cente r o f a lovin g world , an d he r selectio n merel y confirme d thi s predestined appointment . I t doe s no t g o to o fa r t o sugges t tha t Mc Auliffe experience d th e connectio n betwee n herself , a s sh e was , an d th e world tha t love d he r a s essential. She could cal l fort h th e loving respons e of other s jus t b y bein g herself . Sh e was thei r meaning , indee d thei r ver y cause. Hence , sh e coul d tak e prid e i n th e fac t tha t sh e wa s selecte d b y others an d se e thi s selectio n a s he r ow n accomplishment , eve n despit e the fac t tha t sh e kne w tha t sh e ha d don e nothin g t o ear n it . Her e agai n is th e denia l o f difference , thi s tim e i n th e for m o f th e denia l o f th e difference betwee n th e sel f an d others . I n suc h a fashio n th e celebrit y replaces th e hero , and competenc e i s overcome. But sa d t o say , symbol s o f competenc e ha d bee n losin g thei r signifi cance fo r som e time . Wolfe describe s part o f thi s process: The prestig e o f th e Astronau t absolutel y dominate d flying, an d th e Ai r Forc e was determined t o b e the prime supplie r o f tha t bree d . . . . To tel l th e truth , th e bras s ha d gon e slightl y banana s ove r thi s busines s o f producing astronauts . The y ha d eve n se t u p a "char m school " i n Washingto n for th e leadin g candidates . Th e bes t o f th e youn g pilot s . . . flew to Washingto n and wer e give n a cours e i n ho w t o impres s th e NAS A selectio n panel s i n Houston. An d i t wa s dea d serious ! The y listene d t o pe p talk s b y Ai r Forc e generals. . . . The y wen t throug h drill s o n ho w t o tal k o n thei r feet—an d tha t was th e mor e sensible , credibl e par t o f th e course . Fro m ther e i t go t righ t dow n to th e leve l o f cotillio n etiquette . The y wer e tol d wha t t o wea r t o th e interview s with th e engineers and astronauts . . . . They wer e told wha t t o drin k a t the socia l get-togethers i n Houston . . . . The y wer e tol d ho w t o pu t thei r hand s o n thei r hips (i f the y must ) . . .

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And th e me n wen t throug h i t al l willingly ! Without a snigger ! The brass' s passion fo r th e astronau t busines s was nothin g compare d t o that o f th e young pilots themselves . Edward s [Ai r Forc e Base , th e Ai r Forc e tes t facility ] ha d always been th e precise location o n the map of th e ape x of th e pyramid o f th e right stuff itself . And now it was just another step on the way up.. . . The glamo r o f th e spac e progra m wa s suc h tha t ther e wa s n o longe r an y arguing agains t it . I n additio n t o th e chance s fo r honor , glory , fam e an d th e celebrity treatment , al l th e ne w ho t dog s coul d se e somethin g els e . . . th e Astronaut Lif e . .. Th e Life contrac t . . . $25,000 a year ove r an d abov e your salary . . . veritabl e mansions i n th e suburb s . . . fre e Corvette s . . . an d th e tastiest youn g cookie s [i.e. , girls ] imaginable . . .. Th e visio n o f al l th e littl e sugarplums dance d abov e the mighty ziggurat [i.e. , the test pilot's ascen t to his ego ideal ] . . . an d al l thes e youn g ho t dog s looke d upo n i t lik e peopl e wh o believed in miracles. (413) Thus, over a period o f time, the astronauts themselve s had abandone d their ow n eg o ideal o f competenc e i n the overcoming o f death . They ha d moved fro m a n eg o idea l the y coul d conceiv e o f creatin g throug h thei r own actions , o f realizin g themselve s in , to th e eg o idea l o f th e organiza tional man—a n eg o idea l create d outsid e o f themselves , fitting someon e else, an d whic h the y coul d approximat e onl y throug h act s o f subservi ence. Competence i n the fac e o f deat h ha d become , not th e condition fo r their eg o ideal , bu t simpl y a selectio n criterio n amon g man y other s i n the pursui t o f a n eg o idea l whos e conten t ha d becom e th e simpl e con sumption o f commodities . They had , indeed , becom e just lik e everybod y else.

PROM RELIGION TO ANIMISM In hi s classi c stud y o n th e origin s o f religion , Totem and Taboo (1938) , Freud differentiate d amon g thre e "system s o f thought" : th e animisti c (mythological), th e religious , an d th e scientific , whic h h e foun d i n bot h the historica l an d th e individua l developmenta l orders . Among the char acteristics differentiatin g thes e stage s i s variation i n th e attitud e towar d what h e calls the omnipotence o f thought : In th e animisti c stag e ma n ascribe s omnipotenc e t o himself ; i n th e religiou s phase h e ha s cede d i t t o th e gods , bu t withou t seriousl y givin g i t up , fo r h e reserves to himself the right to control the gods by influencing them in some way or other in the interests of his wishes. In the scientific attitude towards life there is no longer an y room fo r man' s omnipotence; he has acknowledged hi s small-

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ness and has submitted t o death as to all other natural necessitie s in a spirit of resignation. (875) In thi s differentiatio n i t seem s clea r enoug h tha t th e "singl e comba t warrior" vie w o f manne d spacefligh t belonge d t o th e religiou s stag e o f development. Here , th e astronaut s wer e see n a s gods wh o coul d protec t the peopl e an d upo n who m th e peopl e coul d depend , o r a t leas t upo n whom the y coul d depen d i f th e god s wer e kep t i n th e prope r fram e o f mind. Significantly , Freu d locate s th e religiou s phas e i n th e develop mental period of dependence on the parents. Thus, from this perspective, the shif t o f symbolis m fro m "singl e comba t warrior " to "Disneylan d i n space" ca n b e see n a s a regressiv e shif t fro m th e religiou s phas e t o th e animistic. A key elemen t i n Freud's analysi s o f animis m i s magic. I have argue d that when th e concep t o f spacefligh t wa s cas t i n th e child' s perspective , the concept of technology was lost and replaced by the concept of magic. On magic , Freu d quote s J. G . Frazer : " 'men mistoo k th e orde r o f thei r ideas for the order of nature , and hence imagined that the control whic h they have, o r seem t o have , ove r thei r thoughts, permitted the m to hav e a correspondin g contro l ove r things' " (871) . H e add s tha t th e instru mental factor , th e facto r tha t lead s primitive s t o believ e tha t the y ca n accomplish thing s throug h magic , i s evidentl y th e powe r o f th e wish : "We nee d onl y assum e tha t primitiv e ma n ha d grea t confidenc e i n th e power of his wishes" (872). Thus, the primitive feels that by representing the fulfille d wish , a state comparable t o th e child's play, h e has brough t it about. Moreover : If play and imitative representation suffice for the child and for primitive man, it must not be taken as a sign of modesty, in our sense, or of resignation due to the realization o f thei r impotence; on the contrary, it is the very obvious resul t of the excessive valuation of their wish, of the will that depends upon the wish and of the paths the wish takes. And the n Freu d adds : "I n time th e psychic accen t i s displace d fro m th e motives of the magic act to its means, namely to the act itself" (872). Again, Freu d directl y equate s th e animisti c phas e wit h narcissism , i n the sens e tha t th e overvaluatio n o f psychi c act s tha t giv e ris e t o magi c accounts fo r "th e unshake n confidenc e i n th e capacit y t o dominat e th e world an d the inaccessibility t o the obvious fact s which would enlighte n man as to his real place in the world" (876).

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Thus, i t i s th e narcissis m o f th e animisti c phas e tha t make s magi c seem natura l an d make s scienc e impossible withi n it : Animism, th e first conception o f th e worl d whic h ma n succeede d i n evolving , was therefore psychological . It did not yet require any science to establish it , for science sets in onl y afte r w e have realize d tha t w e do not kno w th e world an d that we must therefore see k means of getting to know it. (877) Finally, Freu d notes : Only i n on e field has the omnipotence o f though t bee n retaine d i n our own civilization, namel y i n art . I n ar t alon e i t still happen s tha t man , consume d b y his wishes, produces somethin g simila r t o the gratification o f thes e wishes, and this playing, thanks to artistic illusion, calls forth effect s a s if it were something real. (877) Here w e hav e th e origina l term s o f thi s inquiry , i n whic h I compare d the U.S . manne d spacefligh t progra m wit h Geertz' s Balines e cockfight , seeing the m a s ar t forms . I aske d wha t woul d happe n i f a symbo l tha t had becom e incompatibl e wit h th e socia l realit y necessar y fo r it s stagin g were actuall y adopte d t o replac e th e reality ? CONSEQUENCES O F THE DEGENERATIO N OF THE SYMBO L Looking a t th e transformatio n i n th e imag e of manne d spaceflight , fro m single comba t warfar e t o Disneylan d i n space , an d seein g i t as represen tative o f a deepe r shif t fro m th e religiou s t o th e animisti c syste m o f thought give s ampl e materia l i n term s o f whic h t o conside r th e los s o f technological capacit y tha t gav e rise to th e space shuttle catastrophe . Consider th e astronaut s a s singl e comba t warriors , see n b y other s a s gods, an d seein g themselve s a s bearer s o f th e righ t stuf f tha t wil l enabl e them t o prevail ove r deat h throug h competence . There i s no conflict her e between th e messag e an d it s staging, the symbol an d th e technology tha t makes i t possible . O n th e contrary , th e astronauts , knowin g tha t th e technology mus t wor k perfectl y i f the y ar e t o surviv e mus t hav e obses sive concern wit h jus t tha t technologica l perfection . Thi s i s an aspec t o f their competence . Moreover , wit h regar d t o other s wh o ar e involve d i n the technologica l process , tha t obsessiv e concer n mus t manifes t itsel f a s a dee p motivationa l thrust . Fo r whil e i t perhaps goe s to o fa r t o sa y tha t NASA an d othe r aerospac e worker s fel t tha t the y ha d t o protec t th e

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single comba t warriors, the y certainl y fel t themselve s a s havin g a stak e in th e warriors ' victory . The y kne w ver y wel l tha t th e missio n wa s dangerous an d tha t victor y wa s no t assure d bu t require d thei r bes t efforts i f i t wa s t o b e attained . Moreover , th e astronauts ' rol e a s god/parent/protector gav e the m authority . Thes e wer e god s tha t ha d t o be loved, honored, an d obeyed i f they were to protect. Competen t work on th e par t of th e aerospac e worker s woul d constitut e thi s love , honor , and obedience. Thus, Wolf e tell s thi s stor y concernin g Gu s Grissom , on e o f th e original astronauts : Gus Grisso m wa s ou t i n Sa n Dieg o i n th e Convai r plant , wher e the y wer e working on the Atlas rocket. .. an d then the astronauts [were] supposed to say a few words, and all at once Gus realizes it's his turn to say something, and he is petrified. H e open s hi s mout h an d ou t com e th e words : "Wel l . . . d o goo d work!" It's an ironic remark, implying: "... becaus e its my ass that'll be sitting on you r freakin g rocket. " Bu t th e worker s starte d cheerin g lik e mad . The y started cheering as if they had just heard the most moving and inspiring message of their lives: Do good work! After all, it's little Gus's ass on top of our rocket! They stood there for a n eternity an d cheered their brains out while Gus gazed blankly upon them. . . . Not only that, the workers—not the management, but the workers!—had a flag company make up a huge banner, and they strung it up high in the main work bay, and it said: DO GOOD WORK. (147-48 ) How ca n anythin g lik e thi s tak e plac e wit h regar d t o Disneylan d i n space? I n the narcissisti c worl d i n whic h NAS A ha d com e t o live , ther e was n o death . Ther e wa s no t eve n an y danger . Certainl y ther e wa s n o more danger than one would find on a good roller-coaster ride—existin g for th e purpos e o f exhilaration . Moreover , perfec t worker s coul d no t make mistakes . Indeed , ther e wa s no t eve n an y necessit y t o pa y atten tion. Afte r all , i f th e ritua l form s wer e followed , th e magi c woul d assuredly take place. Wishing would make it so. The symbol had become incompatible wit h th e possibilit y o f it s stagin g an d ha d bee n chose n over it. In referrin g t o th e powe r tha t th e primitiv e an d th e chil d plac e i n magic, I am goin g bac k t o wha t I have alread y sai d abou t th e denial o f difference. Her e agai n i s th e failur e t o distinguis h realit y fro m fantas y that le d peopl e t o believ e tha t i f the y coul d sen d a harmoniou s socia l mixture int o orbi t aroun d th e worl d the y coul d creat e socia l harmony . In this connection , th e space shuttl e itself becam e a magical instrument , akin t o a magician' s wand . It s purpos e wa s t o transfor m th e wis h int o

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the reality , an d i t di d no t nee d t o b e fusse d ove r i n orde r t o b e abl e t o do that . T o b e sure , th e spac e shi p ha d ha d t o prov e it s efficacy , bu t i t had alread y don e s o durin g th e earl y day s o f spacefligh t whe n i t too k men t o th e moon. Havin g proved it s capacity t o create magica l transfor mations, the space shuttle had nothin g lef t t o show . This i s th e contex t i n whic h th e sort s o f abuse s o f organizationa l process describe d earlie r occurre d a t NASA : appointment s t o technica l position base d purel y o n politics , los s o f technica l capacit y t o properl y oversee contractors , submissio n o f schedule s tha t coul d no t b e met , commitment t o project s tha t wer e grossl y underfunded , extrem e miscal culation o f risks , suppressio n o f unpleasan t information , degeneratio n of organizationa l processe s int o empt y rituals , and s o on . In a word , I submit tha t wha t occurre d wa s a neuroti c regressio n o f the symboli c structur e i n whic h th e America n peopl e sa w manne d spaceflight an d throug h i t themselves . Thi s regressio n wen t fro m a reli gious framework , wher e dange r wa s acknowledged , possibilit y o f failur e was present , an d competenc e wa s required , t o a n animisti c system , i n which safet y wa s assured , perfectio n wa s assumed , an d nothin g wa s required a t all . I n th e first system , technologica l achievemen t wa s pos sible. In the second i t was not . REGRESSION I N ORGANIZATIONA L CULTUR E If indee d a regression ha s occurre d i n th e symbo l o f manne d spac e flight and i f thi s regressio n i s par t o f a large r shif t i n America n culture , the n evidence o f thi s regressio n shoul d appea r i n other cultura l areas , such a s organizational culture . In a n articl e tha t bega n a s the 198 1 presidentia l addres s t o th e Amer ican Academ y o f Management , Cumming s (1983 ) describe d th e ris e o f what he called management by ideology, which , he said, was supplantin g what h e called management by information. The tw o type s o f managemen t diffe r i n a numbe r o f ways , accordin g to Cummings , th e mos t importan t o f whic h fo r th e presen t purpose s i s this: Management b y informatio n encourage s participant s t o engag e i n hypothesi s testing abou t aspect s o f thei r organizationa l existence : t o query , t o question , t o ask, t o explore , and , mos t o f all , t o learn . Managemen t b y ideolog y a s a logi c

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encourages a participant to accept hypothesis confirmation an d affirmation: t o accept, to believe, to commit, to expound accepted doctrine, and even to glorify, and never to question, except in private, sanctioned arenas and audiences. (533) It seems clear enough that the shift fro m managemen t b y informatio n to managemen t b y ideolog y represent s a shift fro m a n orientation towar d reality t o a n orientatio n towar d fantasy—i t involve s th e los s o f th e superego. A s such , i t appear s t o manifes t th e sam e regressio n w e hav e seen in the image of manne d space flight . Furthermore, th e timin g o f Cummings' s observatio n suggest s tha t h e is referring to the same transformation i n organizational cultur e that has seen th e ris e o f symboli c managemen t a s a n importan t focu s o f organi zational change , supplanting , a t least in part, earlier organizational chang e strategies, such as job enrichment . Organizational chang e strategies tend to invoke what I refer to abov e as th e "organizatio n ideal. " A s I note d i n chapte r 2 , th e organizatio n ideal, whic h represent s Utopi a i n th e for m o f a n organization , i s repre sented i n traditiona l theorie s o f organizationa l chang e b y notion s suc h as self-actualization (Argyri s 1957) . Suc h notions impl y that at the peak of individua l an d organizationa l development , ther e ca n b e a unit y o f individual happiness an d spontaneity , o n th e on e hand , an d maxima l performance an d productivity , o n th e other . I n curren t theorie s o f cul tural managemen t th e organizatio n idea l i s represented b y such idea s a s the "excellen t organization " (Peter s an d Waterman 1982 ) an d the "stron g culture" organization (Dea l an d Kenned y 1982) . Bu t notice tha t there is a difference betwee n the traditional an d current theories. In the traditional theorie s the idea of th e organizational participan t as resident in Utopia is clear enough. Thus, fo r example , Hackman , Olson , Janson, an d Purd y (1975 ) like n workin g a t a n enriche d jo b t o playin g golf. Bu t even if th e Utopian elemen t i s a fantasy, i t is at least conceive d as a fantasy in which one can participate only by doing something. Entry into th e Utopia represente d b y the symbolically manage d excellen t organization, b y contrast , i s conceive d o f a s bein g onl y a matte r o f partici pating i n th e organization' s culture—tha t i s t o say , o f believin g an d valuing certai n things . Thus , a s wit h th e regressio n fro m "th e singl e combat warrior " t o "Disneylan d i n space, " th e necessit y fo r satisfyin g the demand s o f th e superego , th e obligatio n t o d o somethin g a s a re quirement for participation i n Utopia has become lost .

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CONCLUSION: AGAINST THE MANIC DEFENS E In attemptin g t o understan d th e shif t fro m managemen t b y informatio n to managemen t b y ideology , Cumming s (1983 ) offer s th e followin g explanation: Now ther e i s a reemergence o f managemen t b y ideology becaus e of turbulenc e in environments, because of rapidity of change, because of the increased sophistication o f th e receive r o f facts , an d . .. becaus e distortio n an d intentiona l untruths are a common, daily fare for many organizational participants. (533) And h e adds: "Withou t thi s return t o managemen t b y ideology, the onl y alternative woul d b e alienation, resentment , an d despair " (533) . There i s no nee d t o dwel l overl y lon g on th e contex t fo r Cummings' s remarks. Th e Unite d States , whic h i n 194 5 trul y wa s th e cente r o f a loving world , ha s los t bot h tha t centralit y an d tha t love . Wha t Cum mings observe s i s th e fac t tha t America n organization s hav e no t re sponded a t al l well to thi s loss. This los s ha s brough t ou t problem s tha t wer e alway s there , bu t tha t were neve r though t t o matte r ver y much . Withi n th e contex t o f Ameri can narcissism , thes e problems hav e come to see m insurmountable . Rathe r than givin g up the narcissis m an d attemptin g to grapple realistically wit h these problems, we have give n u p realis m an d reinforce d ou r narcissism . Thus, what w e see here i s a furthe r developmen t o f wha t I referred t o i n chapter 2 a s th e mani c defense—an d thi s tim e o n th e leve l o f th e whol e society.

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In bringin g thi s projec t t o a close , it ma y b e worthwhil e t o first observ e that ther e i s nothin g i n psychoanalyti c theory , history , o r logi c tha t necessitates a happ y endin g fo r th e accoun t o f deca y tha t I hav e pre sented here . O n th e contrary , histor y especiall y suggest s tha t th e trajec tory tha t take s socia l system s fro m triump h t o hubris an d the n t o deca y is a common one . Thus, Lord Byro n fro m Childe Harold: There is the moral of all human tales: Tis but the same rehearsal of the past, First Freedom, and then Glory—when that fails, Wealth, vice, corruption—barbarianism a t last. Nonetheless, whil e th e huma n capacitie s fo r vanit y an d self-decep tion, whic h o f cours e brin g suc h storie s t o thei r sa d end , ar e mora l fact s that ar e eas y t o observe , s o i t i s als o tru e tha t th e huma n capacitie s fo r honesty an d growt h ar e als o facts . An d if , i n the course of history , i t ha s been true tha t th e positive sid e of th e human mora l balanc e has come u p wanting, s o i t i s als o tru e tha t ther e ha s neve r bee n a tim e whe n huma n moral courag e wa s mor e requisit e fo r huma n surviva l an d when , I suspect, even i f unconsciously, i t has bee n know n t o b e so requisite . CULTURAL MANAGEMENT A S A CORRECTIV E FOR DECADENC E The conditio n o f generalize d an d systemi c ineffectivenes s whic h I hav e attributed t o the advancement o f narcissisti c process, whether o r not on e wishes t o explai n i t in thes e terms , is clear enoug h i n America n industr y and i s even clear to America n industry . A s is their way, having perceive d a problem , American s hav e calle d fo r a n instan t answe r (McGil l 1988) . They hav e no t ha d a grea t dea l o f difficult y i n finding individual s wh o have bee n read y an d willin g t o sel l the m one . The dominan t voice s her e belong t o thos e (Peter s an d Waterma n 1982 ; Dea l an d Kenned y 1982 ) who propos e t o dea l wit h America' s organizationa l problem s throug h cultural o r symboli c management . 127

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This schoo l o f though t provide s a n intellectua l expressio n o f th e regression w e sa w i n chapte r 7 a s wel l a s o f th e totalitaria n impuls e w e have considere d throughou t thi s work . Followin g Weick' s (1977 ) clai m that "realit y i s a metaphor " tha t i s "enacted" rathe r tha n discovered, 1 i t asserts tha t managemen t ca n contro l "reality, " suc h a s i t is , by control ling th e collectiv e min d o f th e organization' s participants—th e organi zation's culture. 2 Wha t w e ca n understan d o n th e basi s o f th e previou s discussion i s tha t thi s ide a abou t th e efficac y o f managemen t i s jus t another expressio n o f th e self-idealizatio n an d th e narcissisti c los s o f reality tha t ar e themselve s centra l dynamic s a t th e roo t o f th e cultura l problem tha t America n industr y manifests . The appea l o f thi s sor t o f thin g t o trouble d America n managemen t i s understandable. I t enable s the m t o conceiv e o f regainin g centralit y i n a loving worl d withou t acknowledgin g tha t i t ha s bee n thei r hubris tha t has made them powerless in a world turned hostile . Moreover, successfu l or not , the y ca n maintai n thei r self-idealization : I f th e organizatio n comes agai n t o prosper , i t i s becaus e th e managemen t change d it s cul ture; i f i t doe s not , i t i s becaus e th e employee s wer e obstinat e i n main taining thei r ba d attitudes . Nonetheless , withi n th e contex t o f wha t ha s been said , i t seem s clea r enoug h tha t thi s for m o f cultura l managemen t is only organizationa l totalitarianis m becom e systemati c an d conscious . To th e exten t tha t i t wa s organizationa l totalitarianis m tha t wa s th e cause o f America n organizationa l decadence , i t seem s unlikel y tha t a distilled for m o f i t is going to be effective a s a cure. Having sai d that , however , I think i t i s time t o not e tha t a goo d dea l of wha t th e theorist s o f cultura l managemen t sa y i s quite correct . Mor e than correct , i t i s obvious . Thus , Peter s an d Waterma n (1982 ) empha size th e valu e excellen t companie s plac e o n qualit y an d service , thei r staying close to th e customer , payin g attentio n t o th e people who d o th e work, givin g peopl e th e autonom y the y nee d t o d o thei r work , an d s o on. I n othe r words , thes e organization s highl y valu e an d suppor t the process of work itself. Indeed , thi s i s a poin t wit h whic h Peter s an d Waterman woul d agree . The y say , fo r example : "th e excellen t compa nies were brillian t o n th e basics " (13) . And the y sa y that i t is this qualit y of placin g importanc e o n thos e basi c matter s tha t directl y suppor t th e work proces s tha t differentiate s th e excellent companie s fro m thos e tha t are mediocre .

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It seem s t o me , however , tha t th e foregoin g analysi s give s a differen t slant t o Peter s an d Waterman' s observations . Instea d o f askin g ho w organizations ca n recreat e th e cultur e tha t generate s excellence , we nee d to as k ho w i t is , since tha t cultur e simpl y consist s i n th e positiv e valua tion o f work , tha t i t go t lost ? Ho w i s i t possible , i n othe r words , tha t work organization s cease d valuin g work? Indeed , it appears tha t ther e is something abou t th e cultur e o f th e wor k organization s thes e theorist s criticize that seem s t o imped e th e work process . How di d tha t happen? 3 Answering thi s questio n require s tha t w e procee d throug h analysi s o f another phenomenon , als o though t t o represen t a narcissisti c disorde r (Kernberg 1975)—addictio n generall y an d alcoholis m specifically . ALCOHOLISM AN D ORGANIZATIONA L DECA Y To sa y tha t alcoholis m i s a narcissisti c disorde r suggest s tha t th e func tion o f drinking , fo r th e alcoholic , is to us e the chemical ethy l alcoho l a s a wa y o f weakenin g th e superego , deadenin g th e pul l o f realit y agains t his or he r narcissisti c fantasies , an d thereb y allowin g those fantasie s fre e reign. Thus , fo r th e alcoholic , drinkin g i s a wa y t o induc e a mani c defense. Within thi s analysis, one has become an alcoholic when th e selfcentered worl d a s see n withi n th e intoxicate d stat e i s taken a s one's rea l world. Hence , on e need s t o drin k i n orde r t o resum e contac t wit h an d verify one' s ow n reality . I t follow s fro m thi s that , a s on e come s t o tak e one's narcissisti c fantasies a s reality, th e mor e ou t o f touc h wit h th e rea l world on e becomes , henc e th e mor e on e need s t o drin k i n orde r t o "verify" one' s fantasies , and , again , th e furthe r ou t o f touc h on e be comes. Withi n thi s logi c w e ca n see th e progressiv e elemen t o f th e alcoholic's disease . If thi s i s so , i t enable s u s t o dra w a paralle l betwee n alcoholism , o n one hand , an d th e orientatio n take n towar d th e organizatio n i n organi zational totalitarianis m an d decay , which a s we have seen , als o involve s the mani c defense. 4 Here , i t i s th e fantas y o f th e organizatio n idea l tha t is take n a s th e bedroc k o f reality . Th e fac t tha t th e organizatio n i s no t the organization idea l ma y b e explained b y one's ow n imperfec t identifi cation wit h th e organization . A s we know , thi s i s thought t o b e curabl e by deeper immersio n i n the organization fantasy , an d especiall y b y risin g in the hierarchy .

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Thus, th e struggl e fo r statu s become s compulsiv e i n muc h th e sam e way a s th e alcoholic' s drinking . A s w e hav e seen , th e highe r one' s organizational status , the more acute is the difference betwee n th e isolation o f one' s existenc e an d th e centralit y i n a lovin g worl d tha t on e i s supposed t o experience . An d thi s reinforce s th e tendency fo r thos e wh o gain powe r withi n th e organizatio n t o us e tha t powe r t o enforc e th e dramatization o f thei r ow n perfectio n an d th e perfectio n o f th e organi zation. I n thi s way , realit y i s pushe d farthe r an d farthe r away , whic h calls for mor e an d mor e radical step s to b e taken to preserve the dramatization o f th e organizatio n ideal , suc h a s th e adoptio n o f a consciou s strategy o f "cultura l management. " Thus , th e progressiv e characte r o f organizational totalitarianis m an d deca y procee d accordin g t o th e sam e logic as the progressive disease of alcoholism . It is clea r enough , then , wh y th e positiv e valuatio n o f wor k tend s t o fall awa y befor e th e forc e o f th e organization' s self-idealization . Work , after all , bring s u s int o contac t wit h realit y (Freu d 1961) , an d th e organization's mytholog y i s directe d agains t reality . Wor k force s u s t o see an d recogniz e ou r limitations . I t make s u s se e tha t ther e i s only s o much tha t we ca n do. I t requires us to understand tha t doing somethin g well require s effort . I t impose s upo n u s th e fac t tha t w e ar e dependen t on others who ar e outside of ou r control. None of thes e has any place in the organization fantasy . Dramatizin g that fantasy, therefore , mus t impede the process of wor k an d demean its importance. The organization ideal , like th e alcoholic' s drinking , i s a denial. An d i t i s exactl y th e fact s tha t the proces s o f wor k call s t o ou r attentio n tha t th e organizatio n idea l arises to deny . Alcoholics, in this analysis, are not likely to quit drinking because it leads to the denial of reality. The denial of reality is the reason why they drink. If th e parallel betwee n alcoholis m an d organizationa l totalitarianis m and decay i s correct, i t suggests tha t there ma y be utility i n pursuing a n approach t o th e treatmen t o f organizationa l deca y throug h considera tion o f th e metho d employe d b y a n organizatio n widel y accepte d a s being successful i n that area—Alcoholics Anonymous . In what follows I offer som e preliminar y an d tentativ e observation s fro m a stud y I have been conducting of that organization.

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ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AN D TH E RECOVERY FROM NARCISSIS M The ide a o f alcoholis m a s a narcissisti c disorde r accord s wit h way s tha t AAs characterize alcoholis m bot h withi n th e A A literature an d a s recur rent theme s i n th e storie s tha t AA s tell i n meetings. For AAs , alcoholis m is a *'disease " o n thre e levels : physical , mental , an d spiritual . O n th e mental level the disease is characterized b y grandiosity, self-centeredness , the nee d fo r control , th e feelin g o f bein g someon e specia l (i.e . "termi nally unique") , th e feelin g tha t on e shoul d b e judged b y one's intention s rather tha n one' s actions , an d s o on . Wha t thi s add s u p t o i s th e belie f that th e worl d shoul d revolv e aroun d oneself , takin g on e i n th e bes t possible light . Thos e wh o d o no t d o thi s ar e experience d a s violatin g some kin d o f la w o f nature , a s bein g "bad " peopl e agains t who m on e i s justified i n holdin g grievance s an d resentments . Th e narcissisti c tren d here seems to m e clear enough , eve n though AA s do not typically use th e term. More importan t fo r ou r purpose s i s th e fac t tha t th e A A program , seems directe d agains t narcissis m an d aime d a t th e developmen t o f a viable way o f lif e withou t narcissism , o r a t leas t without it s pathologica l aspects. I n wha t follow s I wish t o offe r a n absolutel y minimalis t expla nation a s t o ho w th e Alcoholic s Anonymou s progra m bring s thi s about. (1) The first step —Hitting bottom. Th e first ste p o f th e A A progra m says: "W e admitte d w e were powerless ove r alcohol—tha t ou r live s had become unmanageable. " Th e readines s t o mak e thi s admissio n arise s from wha t A A calls "hitting bottom. " AA members regar d thi s a s th e doorwa y int o th e program . I t i s wha t makes th e progra m possibl e an d keep s i t possible . For , i n fact , th e consciousness o f onesel f a s a n alcoholi c need s t o b e maintaine d a t al l times fo r th e res t o f one' s life . A s A A says , onc e on e ha s becom e a n alcoholic, one remains a n alcoholi c until on e dies. AA member s believ e thi s mos t directl y wit h regar d t o th e physica l aspects of th e "disease " of alcoholism . They believ e that alcoholic s mus t abandon th e ide a o f eve r bein g socia l drinker s again , becaus e an y amoun t of drinkin g wil l lea d alcoholic s bac k t o thei r forme r leve l o f indulgenc e within a brie f perio d o f time . Fo r ou r purposes , however , i t i s perhap s

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more importan t t o se e wha t thi s admissio n doe s o n th e menta l leve l t o the claim s of narcissisti c grandiosity . What w e se e her e i s a ver y powerfu l an d profoun d recognitio n o f one's limitations. To the nonalcoholic, the degree of limitation expresse d in the fact tha t on e cannot eve r drink alcoho l agai n ma y not seem severe. For th e alcoholic , however , i t i s a profoun d limitatio n indeed . B y defin ing themselve s a s alcoholics , whic h i s afte r al l wha t go t the m int o Alcoholics Anonymous , A A member s plac e thi s sens e o f thei r ow n limi tation righ t a t th e cente r o f thei r identity . I t doe s no t g o to o fa r t o say , then, tha t eve n ove r an d abov e th e abandonmen t o f th e grandiosit y inherent i n th e intoxicatio n experienc e itself , th e acceptanc e o f onesel f as a n alcoholic , an d th e admissio n o f one' s powerlessnes s ove r alcohol , focuses th e directio n o f one' s lif e directl y agains t one' s ow n tendencie s toward grandiosity .

(2) Spirituality and mutuality. I f th e A A program offere d onl y th e rejec tion o f one' s narcissism , i t woul d no t b e ver y appealing . Wha t AA s se e as th e positiv e offerin g o f th e A A progra m i s wha t the y cal l "spiritual ity," whic h i s introduce d i n th e secon d an d thir d step s o f th e program : (2) "Cam e t o believ e tha t a Powe r greate r tha n ourselve s coul d restor e us t o sanity; " an d (3 ) "Mad e a decisio n t o tur n ou r will an d ou r live s over to the care of Go d a s we understood Him. " It i s importan t t o note , i n understandin g thes e steps , that AA s differ entiate strongl y betwee n spiritualit y an d religion. 5 Religio n i s what the y learned a s children . Typically , the y hav e littl e goo d t o sa y abou t it . O n the contrary , the y se e i t a s par t o f th e punitiv e worl d fro m whic h the y were trying to escape through drinking . Indeed , my observation ha s bee n that i t is the reluctance to have anything to do with anythin g that smack s of religio n tha t i s th e greates t stumblin g bloc k i n th e AA' s progres s through th e progra m an d indee d i s a hurdl e tha t man y potentia l Alco holics Anonymous member s simpl y canno t overcome . That i s perhap s wh y th e secon d an d thir d step s ar e s o carefull y worded t o avoi d callin g upo n th e beginnin g A A membe r fo r mor e com mitment tha n h e o r sh e i s likel y t o b e abl e t o giv e a t thi s point . Thus , step 2 says "could" restor e u s to sanity , permitting the A A to hedge wit h "if on e existed. " An d ste p thre e say s "Mad e a decisio n t o tur n ou r wil l and ou r live s ove r . . ." rathe r tha n "turned " the m over . Finally , o f

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course, ther e i s th e provis o tha t th e Go d t o who m on e decide s t o tur n things over is God "a s we understoo d Him. " At any rate, AAs see the function o f the second and third steps as that of openin g th e mind . The y believ e tha t i f on e open s one' s min d t o th e possibility o f spiritua l experience , spiritua l experienc e wil l com e alon g to fill it . The y offe r testimon y fro m thei r ow n case s tha t thi s happene d to them . I f thei r testimon y i s t o b e believed , thei r developin g belie f i n their Higher Powe r i s the direc t result o f fel t spiritua l experience , an d is not simpl y a n abstrac t an d disembodie d belie f i n anything . An d indee d the chang e fro m th e unifor m skepticis m o f beginnin g A A member s provides evidence that something profound mus t have happened. It ha s bee n m y observatio n tha t i n mos t case s th e ne w A A membe r accepts th e Alcoholic s Anonymou s grou p itsel f a s hi s o r he r Highe r Power. T o som e extent , i t seem s t o me , thi s remain s th e cas e fo r A A members generally . Thus , AA member s agre e that regula r attendanc e a t meetings an d participation i n the AA group remain essentia l fo r contin ued spiritual growth , n o matte r ho w lon g th e AA has been sober. "Go d speaks throug h th e peopl e aroun d th e table s o f A A" i s a frequentl y heard expression of thi s view. How th e AA group works in this way and what the AA experience o f spiritualit y mean s generally ar e suggested b y Ernest Kurtz (1979) . For Kurtz , th e first critica l insigh t tha t th e Alcoholic s Anonymou s member needs , an d whic h i s represente d i n th e first step , i s tha t h e o r she i s no t God . Th e secon d critica l insigh t i s tha t h e o r sh e i s not-God , which is to say tha t he or she shares an identity with other s who ar e not God an d wh o recogniz e themselve s a s such . I t i s thi s experienc e o f shared identity, in felt contrast with the essential loneliness and isolation of the alcoholic, tha t i s experience d a s bein g a power greate r tha n th e self. Thus , fo r Kurtz , th e acceptanc e o f one' s ow n limitatio n leads , i n paradoxical fashion , t o a strengthenin g mutua l bon d wit h other s wh o are als o limited . An d thi s leads , agai n paradoxically , t o a n enrichmen t of the self that a denial of limitatio n coul d not provide. Kurtz puts the matter this way: The insigh t tha t weaknes s necessaril y precede s strengt h an d strengt h arise s precisely ou t o f weaknes s ca n chec k [the ] spira l o f insatiability. Th e acknowl edgement of essential need to receive from others does not lead within Alcoholic s Anonymous t o infinitel y increasin g nee d t o receive , bu t rathe r beget s th e abilit y to give . Acknowledgin g an d acceptin g nee d remove s th e coerciv e powe r an d

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insatiability tha t need imposes when denied. The recognition an d acceptance of both self an d others a s not-God, an d so mutually needful, mitigate s impositio n and demand. Awareness of this mutuality of needing others gives rise to a special kind of dialectic that sets limits to both the conviction that self is limited and the awareness o f other s a s limited . Th e shared , hones t acceptanc e tha t limitation , and specifically vulnerabilit y to self-centeredness, is mutual, limits the very sense of vulnerability—the limitatio n o f self-centeredness—from whic h i t arises: this is the heart of the fellowship of Alcoholics Anonymous. (224) Thus, t o pu t th e matte r int o psychoanalyti c terms , th e profoun d acceptance o f one' s ow n narcissis m a s a problem, an d no t a s a veridica l orientation towar d th e world , make s possibl e th e retur n t o mutualistic , mutually dependent , relation s wit h other s wh o hav e don e s o a s well . I t makes possibl e th e recognitio n o f th e othe r a s an-other . I t was fro m thi s recognition, an d th e attendan t messag e o f limitatio n an d vulnerability , that narcissism , i n th e beginning , seeme d t o offe r a retreat— a retrea t that th e experienc e o f hittin g botto m reveale d a s bein g illusory . Wha t we see here i s the recognitio n tha t th e nee d fo r other s as others, an d no t just a s element s o f th e sel f (Kohu t 1971) , give s a meanin g t o lif e tha t narcissism canno t give . Limitation , thus , appear s no t a s a contradictio n to meaning , but , fo r th e human , a n essentia l preconditio n (Bettlehei m 1984). Thus, t o quote Kurt z again : In some of A.A.'s more explicitly religiously inclined derivations, the confrontation with self by way of honesty about self with others that is outlined in Steps Four throug h Te n le d t o a n understandin g o f th e fundamenta l therapeuti c dy namic of "The Answer to Addiction" as "devotion to truth." At root, Alcoholics Anonymous presented a simultaneously ver y modern an d ver y ancient religiou s perception. Th e embrac e o f not-God-nes s le d easil y t o th e acknowledgments : "Accept reality, for realit y affirms you" ; "Be devoted to truth, and the truth will set you free." Whether or not to capitalize "reality" or "truth" was left by A.A., with cautious strategic wisdom, to the individual believer. (185)

CONCLUSION: ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AN D TH E RECOVERY FRO M ORGANIZATIONAL DECA Y The acceptanc e o f reality , th e sens e of limitation , an d th e mutualit y tha t we hav e see n it s acceptanc e t o mak e possibl e ar e o f cours e th e ke y t o Klein's (1975 ) concep t o f th e depressiv e position . Withi n th e depressiv e position, th e reparativ e process , th e proces s o f makin g amend s t o thos e

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whom w e hav e injure d throug h th e narcissisti c demand s tha t w e hav e made o n them, 6 provide s a n importan t basi s fo r suc h hop e a s w e ma y manage i n th e presen t conditio n o f societ y (Hirschhor n 1988) . An d a s part of a process of mutua l affirmatio n wit h th e other, it provides a rich motivational basi s for doing good work. 7 As Lapierr e (1989 ) observes , th e depressiv e positio n als o offer s a sound basi s fo r th e managemen t o f organizations , an d on e tha t i s i n perfect accor d wit h th e trut h w e foun d i n th e cultura l managemen t literature concernin g th e importanc e excellen t organization s plac e o n doing work. For , in the depressive position, the organization is seen very simply a s the organization of the work process, an d management is nothing but the management of the work process. I t does not require the reduction o f other s t o th e rol e o f supportin g actor s i n a drama starrin g the manager, an d therefore i t makes possible rea l communicatio n abou t work an d mutual respec t fo r doin g it . I t involves the mutual acceptanc e of limitatio n an d doe s no t therefor e requir e th e pretens e o f perfectio n that necessitates th e denial of th e self an d its own realisti c perceptions. I could g o o n lik e this , bu t fo r th e presen t i t ma y b e mor e usefu l jus t t o make on e observatio n tha t would sum u p al l th e rest : this organizatio n would no t b e th e manager' s rout e t o th e eg o ideal , an d therefor e i t would no t requir e the imposition o f irrationalit y upo n the work proces s to maintain its motivational integrity . In term s o f th e presen t crisi s o f organizations , an d specificall y wit h regard t o th e problem s o f narcissisti c proces s tha t ar e s o prominen t among them , ther e ar e bot h positiv e an d negativ e consequence s o f th e perspective o f th e depressive position. O n th e negativ e sid e is the recognition tha t th e us e o f powe r canno t avai l i n "doin g something " abou t this problem. Thi s perspectiv e suggest s tha t narcissism , lik e alcoholism , requires a self-diagnosi s befor e i t ca n yiel d t o treatment . Bu t denia l i s one of its primary symptoms. This means that a cure cannot be imposed. The narcissist, like the alcoholic, must hit his or her own bottom . What make s thi s frightenin g i s tha t th e narcissist s w e hav e i n min d are those who hav e becom e addicte d t o th e use of organizationa l powe r to maintai n thei r sens e o f thei r ow n grandeur . The y ma y no t reac h bottom unti l th e use of organizationa l powe r in the service of denia l ha s exhausted organizationa l power—when , i n othe r words , organization s no longe r hav e powe r becaus e the y ar e no longe r functionin g organiza tions. In the case of a n organization lik e General Motors, one easily gets

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the feelin g that , lik e th e choru s o f a Gree k tragedy , on e i s watchin g powerless, i n aw e an d horror , a s th e tragi c flaw play s it s wa y ou t t o inevitable an d fina l catastrophe . On th e optimisti c side , I believ e on e mus t coun t th e gain s tha t ar e being mad e b y th e societ y i n recognizin g th e addictio n tha t lie s a t it s core and , finally, beginnin g t o d o somethin g abou t it . On e mus t se e th e growth o f organization s lik e Alcoholic s Anonymou s a s havin g a n influ ence tha t extend s beyon d th e physica l treatmen t o f alcoholis m an d toward th e rebirth o f a society tha t will b e sober i n a much deepe r sense . Thus, i n th e end , wha t w e nee d t o se e is that hop e lie s in the possibil ity o f a cultura l change . I n thi s I find mysel f i n agreemen t wit h th e champions o f cultura l management . Wher e w e disagre e is , o f course , that they see this change taking place through th e power of the powerful . Cultural chang e ca n indee d b e imposed, bu t whe n i t is imposed, i t bear s with i t th e narcissisti c assumption s tha t underli e it s attempte d promul gation. Spiritua l growth , i n othe r words , canno t b e imposed; onl y total itarianism ca n be . Th e evidenc e fro m ou r ow n organizations , no t t o mention tha t fro m th e collaps e o f th e Communis t regime s o f Easter n Europe, makes i t clear enoug h tha t thi s sor t o f thin g doe s not wor k ver y well. The lesso n o f Alcoholic s Anonymou s i s tha t th e sor t o f chang e w e have i n min d wil l no t b e cause d by th e powerful . Rather , i f i t happens , it wil l happe n to th e powerfu l i n exactl y th e sam e wa y i t happen s t o everybody else . And, i f i t happens, i t will no t happe n quickl y an d once and-for-all. Rather , lik e th e slo w growt h o f th e recoverin g alcoholic , i t will happe n onl y gradually , slowly , painfully , an d alway s partially . A s they sa y i n AA , "I t too k yo u a lon g tim e t o ge t sick ; i t wil l tak e yo u a long time to get better. "

Notes

1. THE CLOCKWORK OR THE SNAKEPIT 1. Th e text by Klein and Ritti (1984) is a notable exception. 2. O N THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OP ORGANIZATIONAL TOTALITARIANIS M 1. Puttin g th e matte r mor e precisely , I might sa y tha t psychologica l involve ment i n th e organizatio n i s a resul t o f takin g i t a s a n eg o idea l an d tha t commitment i s the case in which th e organization i s the individual's exclusive ego ideal. Since I am concerne d t o discus s th e psychology an d consequences of taking the organization a s the ego ideal, it seems appropriate to concentrate on the "ideal case" of commitment. Nonetheless, much of what will be said here applies to cases of less exclusive psychological involvement as well . Som e o f th e totalitaria n processe s describe d i n thi s chapte r serv e strongly t o strengthe n th e importanc e o f th e organizatio n a s eg o idea l b y rendering othe r involvement s untenable . Othe r circumstance s tha t lea d t o exclusive commitment will be discussed in the next chapter. 2. I hav e elsewher e (1983b ) develope d a psychodynami c interpretatio n o f Maslow's hierarchy. 3. Not e th e connectio n betwee n thi s dept h dimensio n an d Schein' s (1980 ) concept of organizational centrality. 4. Fo r a furthe r discussio n o f th e psychodynamics o f hierarchy , see Schwartz (1987). 5. Wha t ha s bee n sai d wit h regar d t o cognitiv e bia s could hav e bee n sai d a s well i n term s o f th e theor y o f retrospectiv e sense-makin g (Weic k 1969) . Here, a distinction would be noted between the leader, whose retrospective justifications woul d b e take n a s valid , an d followers , wh o woul d hav e t o adapt t o the retrospective sens e of th e leader while being subject t o having the sense of thei r ow n action s determined fo r the m by the leader. Alternatively, th e differentiatio n coul d hav e bee n draw n i n term s o f Argyri s an d Schon's (1974) distinction between espoused theories and theories-in-use. In this case , th e espouse d theorie s o f th e leade r woul d hav e t o b e take n b y followers a s being the leader's theory-in-use, while the followers' theory-in use would always be available to be held up by the leader as differing fro m the acceptable espoused theories—espoused theorie s that, as has been noted, must be publicly declared as guiding the behavior of the leader. 137

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4. TOTALITARIA N MANAGEMEN T AN D ORGANIZATIONAL DECA Y 1. I am indebte d t o Harr y Levinso n fo r insistin g tha t I address thi s point . 2. Not e th e connectio n her e wit h th e findings o f Luthans , Hodgetts , an d Rosenkrantz (1988 ) o n th e unrelatednes s o f competenc e an d organizationa l success. Fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f th e theor y o f organizationa l decay , th e further intriguin g possibilit y present s itsel f tha t thes e researcher s hav e man aged t o captur e onl y a phas e o f th e deca y process . O n th e basi s o f th e considerations adduce d here , one woul d expec t t o find tha t a s the organiza tion decaye d further , th e correlatio n betwee n competenc e an d organiza tional succes s woul d becom e negative . I n organization s o f thi s sort , ba d management drive s out good . 3. I t i s interestin g t o not e tha t th e isolatio n o f managemen t fro m criticis m takes plac e outsid e o f th e corporatio n a s well. Thus, i n th e 2 8 Augus t 198 9 issue o f Fortune magazine , a n articl e b y Julie Connell y calle d "Th e CEO' s Second Wife " detail s wha t happen s t o th e first: As thei r husband s ris e i n th e corporation , first wive s ma y becom e convince d that powe r i s corruptin g th e presumabl y wholesom e lad s the y married . "The y be come self-appointe d critic s an d consciences, " say s Manhatta n psychiatris t Cliffor d Sager, who specialize s in marita l therapy . "The y tr y t o cut thei r husband s down t o size." {55) 4. I n retrospect , i t seems clear enough t o m e that a good man y o f th e processe s described i n thi s wor k ar e thos e discusse d b y Janis (1982) . Th e advantag e of th e present approac h i s that i t provides psychodynamic groundin g fo r th e concept o f groupthin k an d show s th e workin g o f thes e processe s i n a number o f organizationa l dimensions , rathe r tha n jus t decision-making . 5. Th e contras t betwee n th e benig n worl d o f th e rol e performanc e an d th e malevolent worl d o f th e performer s i s illustrate d i n TerkeP s (1974 ) inter view with Larr y Ross , a former presiden t o f a conglomerate. Thus : You wal k dow n th e corrido r an d everybod y bow s an d says , "Good morning , Mr . Ross. How ar e you today?" As you go up the line, the executives will say, "How is Mrs. Ross? " Until yo u ge t t o th e highe r executives . They'll say , "Ho w i s Nancy?" Here you socialize, you know each other. Everybody plays the game. (411) But: As he struggles in this jungle, every position he' s in, he's terribly lonely. He can't confide an d tal k wit h th e guy working unde r him . He can't confid e an d tal k t o the man he's working for. To give vent to his feelings, his fears, and his insecurities he'd expose himself. This goes all th e way u p th e lin e until h e gets to b e president. The president really doesn't hav e anybod y t o tal k to , becaus e th e vic e president s ar e waiting fo r hi m t o di e or mak e a mistak e an d ge t knocke d of f s o the y ca n ge t his job. (408) 6. Actually , wha t w e hav e her e i s a for m o f "retrea t fro m language " o f th e type that concerne d John R . Searle (1969 : 198 ) whe n h e wrote:

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The retreat from th e committed us e of words ultimately must involve a retreat fro m language itself , fo r speakin g a language.... consist s o f performin g speec h act s according to rules, and there is no separating those speech acts from th e commitments which form essential aspects of them. (Cited in Hummel 1987) Also see Hummel's interestin g discussion o f th e separation o f language fro m meaning in bureaucracy . 7. DeLorean' s accoun t her e is in accordanc e wit h Mintzberg' s (1973 ) observa tions o f manageria l work . I t i s temptin g t o speculat e tha t muc h o f wha t Mintzberg wa s observin g wa s no t manageria l work , a s such , bu t rathe r a decadent for m o f it . 8. Ket s de Vries and Miller' s (1984 ) discussio n o f "utopia n culture " is related. 9. Th e word aroun d Detroit , a s I write this, is that the Saturn wil l have nothin g special t o recommen d it . O f course , a s Kelle r (1989 ) notes , if people d o no t buy th e Saturn , th e whol e "revolutionary " proces s tha t ha s suc h sale s as it s end wil l b e rendered meaningless . 5. ORGANIZATIONA L DISASTE R AN D ORGANIZATIONAL DECA Y 1. I t i s absolutely essentia l tha t th e reade r understan d tha t w e ar e no t engage d in "20-2 0 hindsight " here , bu t tha t NAS A managemen t wa s makin g error s that a reasonable perso n woul d no t hav e mad e given the information available at the time, A reading o f chapte r 6 of volume 1 of th e Roger s Commis sion repor t will , I believe, convince anybod y o f this , but i t ma y b e usefu l t o give som e ide a o f th e sky-blue—heave n thinkin g tha t NAS A managemen t was usin g in employing such concept s a s "safety margin. " I quote here fro m the Roger s Commissio n report : From the beginning, Thiokol had suspected the putty was a contributing factor in O-ring erosion, even after STS-2 . In April 1983, Thiokol reported on tests conducted to stud y th e behavio r o f th e joint putty. On e conclusion o f th e report was that th e STS-2 erosion wa s probably cause d b y blow holes in the putty, which allowe d a jet of ho t ga s t o focu s o n th e primar y O-ring . Thioko l discovere d th e focuse d je t at e away or "impinged" on portions of the O-ring. Thiokol calculated that the maximum possible impingement erosion was .090 inch, and that lab test proved that an O-rin g would sea l at 3,00 0 ps i when erosio n o f .09 5 was simulated. This "safety margin " was the basi s fo r approvin g Shuttl e flights while accepting the possibility o f O-rin g erosion. (133) 2. Reader s will b e aided i n coming to a proper appreciatio n o f NAS A manage ment b y knowin g tha t seve n ou t o f nin e flight s durin g 198 5 wer e foun d t o have had erosio n an d tha t si x of the m ha d blow-b y (R C 1986 : 130-31) . 3. A n earlie r gam e tha t Feynma n mad e u p fo r himsel f wo n hi m th e Nobe l Prize. 4. I n respons e t o Feynman' s skepticism , Lovingoo d offered : "Sir , I'l l b e gla d to send you th e document tha t contain s this estimate, so you can understan d it." Referrin g bac k t o th e previou s sectio n o n ho w th e organization' s self -

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idealization distort s it s view o f reality , i t i s worthwhile t o quot e Feynman' s comment o n wha t followed : Later, Mr . Lovingoo d sen t m e tha t report . I t sai d thing s lik e "Th e probabilit y o f mission success is necessarily very close to 1.0"—does that mean it is close to 1.0, or it ought to be close to 1.0?—an d "Historically, thi s high degre e of missio n success has give n ris e t o a difference i n philosoph y betwee n unmanne d an d manne d spac e flight programs ; i.e. numerical probability versus engineering judgment." As far a s I can tell, "engineering judgment" means they're just going to make up numbers! The probability o f a n engine-blad e failur e wa s give n a s a universa l constant , a s i f al l blades wer e exactl y th e same , unde r th e sam e conditions . Th e whol e pape r wa s quantifying everything . Just about every nut and bolt was in there: "The chance that a HPHTP pipe will burst is 10 -7 . " Yo u can't estimate things like that; a probability of 1 in 10,000,000 is almost impossible to estimate. It was clear that the numbers for each par t o f th e engine were chosen s o that whe n yo u ad d everythin g together you get 1 in 100,000. (183n) 6. O N TH E PSYCHODYNAMIC S O P ORGANIZATIONA L DISASTER 1. Strictl y speaking , the y retaine d thei r professiona l standard s a s par t o f thei r superego—the se t o f obligation s understoo d a s expressin g th e condition s for th e attainmen t o f th e ego ideal . This distinctio n wil l b e explored furthe r in the next chapter . 2. Pauchan t an d Mitrof f (1988 ) reporte d th e result s o f a study tha t foun d tha t organizations wit h nonnarcissisti c culture s ha d integrate d crisi s manage ment programs, while organizations wit h narcissisti c cultures di d not . 7. TH E SYMBO L O F TH E SPAC E SHUTTL E AN D TH E AMERICAN DREA M 1. Compar e her e Ma x Weber' s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Ne w York : Scribner' s 1958) . 8. CONCLUSION : ADDICTIO N AN D RECOVER Y 1. Elsewher e (Weic k 1977) , I have noted tha t "realit y i s a metaphor" . . . By that, I meant that talk about "a reality" is simply one way that people try to make sense out of the stream of experience that flowsby them. To say that there is a reality, an environment , an d the n t o searc h fo r an d discove r underlyin g pattern s i n thos e superimposed structures is one way to make sense of that stream. But the tenuousness of this process, as well as the actor's central role in its execution, are captured only if we remain attentive to reality as metaphor. . . . And h e adds : Literally, t o enac t a n environmen t ca n mea n t o "creat e th e appearanc e o f a n

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environment'* o r t o "simulat e a n environmen t fo r th e sak e o f representation. " . . . Members act as if they have environments, create the appearance of environments, or simulate environments for the sake of getting on with their business. These organizing acts are acts of invention rathe r than act s of discovery, they involve a superimposed order rathe r tha n a n underlyin g order , an d the y ar e base d o n th e assumptio n tha t cognition follows the trail of action. (Weick 1977: 278) The fac t i s that Weick denie s the existence of a n external world : While the categories external/internal or outside/inside exist logically, they do not exist empirically. The "outside" or "external " world cannot be known. There is no methodological process by which one can confirm th e existence of an object independent of the confirmatory process involving oneself. The outside is a void, there is only the inside. A person's world, the inside or internal view is all that can be known. The rest can only be the object of speculation. (273, emphasis added) Weick i s evidentl y no t awar e tha t i n denyin g a referen t t o th e concep t outer h e abolishe s th e meanin g o f th e distinctio n inner/outer an d thereb y also lose s th e meaningfulnes s o f inner. Wha t w e ar e lef t with , o f course , i s the predifferentiate d matri x o f infant/mother , self/othe r wit h whic h w e ar e familiar. 2. Th e actua l methodolog y goe s lik e this : first , yo u ge t peopl e t o ac t th e wa y you wan t the m to ; Then , yo u manag e th e meanin g the y plac e upo n thei r action s o tha t the y com e t o interpre t i t th e wa y yo u wan t the m to . Thi s i s from Peter s an d Waterma n (1982) : only if you get people acting, even in small ways, the way you want them to, will they come t o believ e i n wha t they'r e doing . Moreover , th e proces s o f enlistmen t i s enhanced by explicit management of the after-the-act labelin g process. (74) And: The role of th e leader, then, i s one of orchestrato r an d labeler : takin g what ca n be gotten i n th e wa y o f actio n an d shapin g it—generall y afte r th e fact—int o lastin g commitment to a new strategic direction. In short, he makes meanings. (75) The proble m wit h thi s approac h i s not merel y tha t i t applie s t o adult s a model o f consciousnes s tha t properl y pertain s t o fetuse s an d infants . Th e main proble m goe s much deeper . In on e sense , o f course , Weic k i s quit e correct . On e canno t prov e th e existence o f a n externa l worl d ("Prov e i t t o whom? " on e migh t ask. ) Bu t this says less about th e existence o f a n externa l worl d tha n i t does about th e nature o f proof . I t say s tha t i f th e existenc e o f th e externa l worl d (o r anything else) does not g o into th e proof a s a premise, it cannot emerge a s a conclusion. Bu t ther e i s n o new s i n this , an d ha s no t bee n sinc e th e Greek s began thei r exploration s int o th e nature o f logic . What i s frightenin g i s th e wa y suc h skepticis m abou t th e simples t fact s of existenc e lead s t o th e deman d fo r total , irrationa l commitmen t t o th e most elaborat e fabrication s i n th e totalitaria n system . Evidently , whe n experience ha s bee n delegitimated , fo r tha t i s wha t w e ar e talkin g abou t

142

NOTES here, the onl y criterio n o f trut h become s conformit y t o th e official doctrine . And th e determinatio n o f th e conten t o f thi s doctrin e come s t o b e decide d by pure , unconstraine d power—powe r whic h recognize s n o necessit y t o justify itself . Conside r cultura l managemen t i n th e contex t o f thi s fro m George Orwell' s 1984: In th e end th e Part y woul d announc e tha t tw o an d tw o mad e five, and yo u woul d have to believe it. It was inevitable that they should make that claim sooner or later: the logic of their position demanded it. Not merely the validity of experience, but the very existence of externa l realit y was tacitly denie d b y their philosophy. The heresy of heresies was common sense. And what was terrifying wa s not that they would kill you fo r thinkin g otherwise, bu t tha t the y migh t b e right. For , after all , how do we know that two and two make four? O r that the force of gravity works? Or that the past is unchangeable? I f both the past and the external world exist only in the mind, and if the mind is controllable—what then ? (69)

3. Fo r an earlie r attemp t t o answe r thi s question se e Schwartz (1985) . 4. Fo r a similar analysis , see Schaef an d Fasse l (1988) . 5. "Religio n i s fo r peopl e wh o don' t wan t t o g o t o hell . Spiritualit y i s fo r people who hav e bee n t o hell and don' t wan t t o go back," say s Don C . 6. Reparatio n i s a n integra l par t o f th e A A program . I t i s referre d t o mos t specifically i n th e eight h an d nint h steps : "Mad e a list of al l persons w e ha d harmed, an d becam e willing to make amends to them all " and "Mad e direc t amends t o suc h peopl e whereve r possible , excep t whe n t o d o s o woul d injure the m o r others. " 7. I hav e writte n o n th e subjec t o f reparatio n a s a psycholog y o f wor k i n a n unpublished pape r (1984) . Larr y Hirschhor n (1988 ) make s reparatio n a major elemen t o f hi s theor y o f postindustria l culture . I n contras t t o hi s approach, I se e reparatio n a s involvin g a n attemp t t o compensat e fo r rea l damage t o rea l other s an d therefor e a s takin g plac e withi n th e psychody namics of guilt. He seems to see it as the reconstruction o f a n illusion, takin g place withi n th e psychodynamic s o f shame . I hav e als o discusse d wor k within th e context o f th e superego (Schwartz , 1983a , 1983b) , which I see as being a specific structur e withi n th e depressive position . Actually, I thin k ther e i s a n emergin g vie w amon g psychoanalyticall y oriented writer s o n organization s tha t th e classi c supereg o ha s becom e outmoded. Hirschhorn , wh o perhap s bes t represent s thi s view , note s tha t the superego represent s punishing voices from th e past; bu t punishing voice s from th e pas t ca n n o longe r serv e ou r purpose s i n th e comple x an d rapidl y changing present . Th e unconsciou s guil t tha t th e Freudia n supereg o repre sents mus t giv e way befor e conscious , responsibl e choic e betwee n th e bette r and th e worse . Repressio n i s n o longe r viabl e a s a mean s o f directin g ourselves. W e must , a s h e contends , hav e ou r affect s presen t t o u s i n ou r work.

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Index

Actual selves , 3 7 Alcoholics Anonymous : an d th e depressiv e position, 134 ; an d mutuality , 132 ; an d spirituality, 132 ; and treatmen t o f nar cissism, 131-3 4 Alcoholism: an d denia l o f reality , 130 ; a s a narcissisti c disorder , 129-31 ; progressive character , 129-3 0 Aldrich, A. , 93 , 95 , 9 8 Alford, C . F. , 3 9 Alignments, 1 4 Antisocial actions , 31—45 ; in obedienc e t o authority, 38 , 39 ; self-directed , 3 9 - 4 1 Apollo program , fire, 85, 10 2 Arendt, H. , 2 3 Argyris, C, 13 , 21, 59, 103 , 125 , 13 7

Convair Corporation , 12 3 Cook, R . C , 86-88 , 10 3 Corruption, 6 7 Corvair, 5 4 - 5 5 , 6 0 Culbert, S. , 1 3 Cultural (symbolic ) management : an d "management b y ideology, " 125 ; a s proposed solutio n fo r organizationa l ineffectiveness, 125 , 127 , 128 , 136 ; and totalitarianism , 128 , 141 , 14 2 Culture, 18 ; American, 32 , 109 , 115 ; regression i n American , 124-26 ; change an d Alcoholic s Anonymous , 136 Cummings, L . L., 124—2 6 Cynicism, 3 , 26 , 66 y 67 , 71 , 8 5

Baum, H . S. , 3 7 Becker, E. , 9 , 18 , 4 1 Beggs,J., 81-8 4 Beltz, J., 5 7 Boisjoly, R. , 10 0 Burns, J. M. , 5 4 Byron, G., 12 7

Deal, T. , 125 , 12 7 De Lorean , J., 4 9 - 5 1 , 5 3 - 5 7 , 5 9 - 6 5 , 67-70, 13 9 Denhart, R. , 1 9 Denial o f difference , 110 , 111 , 113-17 , 119, 12 3 Depressive position , 17 , 134 , 142 ; an d management, 134 , 13 5 Diamond, M. , 1 9 Donner, F., 65 Drucker, P. , 6 0

Casesa, J. A. , 5 0 Cernan, E. , 7 9 Challenger disaster : a s aberration , 74 , 75 ; as arisin g fro m deca y o f NASA , 7 4 78, 124 ; an d th e theor y o f th e organi zation ideal , 90-10 3 Challenger, 49 , 74-77 , 80 , 89 , 9 0 - 1 0 1 , 107, 108 , 11 1 Chasseguet-Smirgel, J. , 4 , 11 0 Chrysler Corporation , 6 9 CIA, 10 8 Clockwork organization , 7 - 1 0 ; argument s for teaching , 10-1 4 Cole, E. , 54, 57 , 6 3 Connelly, J., 13 8

Ego ideal , 4 , 66, 72 , 84 , 86 , 135 ; an d Christa McAuliffe , 115—17 ; degeneration of , 118—20 ; and leadership , 99 ; and ontologica l function , 3 4 - 3 5 ; o f original astronauts , 111-12 ; an d return t o narcissism , 9 , 16-22 , 40 , 94 , 110; an d socializatio n fo r organiza tional commitment , 41 , 43; an d super ego, 110 , 119 , 140 ; an d totalitarian ism, 15 , 24 ; an d unattainability , 12 , 14, 3 6 - 3 9 147

INDEX

148 Fassel, D. , 14 2 Festinger, L. , 10 0 Feynman, R . P. , 89 , 9 1 , 102, 10 7 Feynman's test , 88-89 , 139 , 14 0 Fletcher, J., 79 , 8 5 Fonda, J., 8 2 Ford Moto r Company , 20 , 2 1 Frazier, J. G. , 12 1 Freud, S. , 4, 9 , 16-19 , 22 , 99 , 110 , 1 2 0 22, 13 0 Geertz, C , 108 , 112 , 115 , 12 2 General Motor s Corporatio n (GM) , 4 9 51, 5 4 - 7 1 , 13 5 Gerstenberg, R. , 5 7 Gilruth, B. , 7 9 Glaysher, R. , 9 5 Glenn, J., 7 9 Goffman, E. , 9 , 18 , 66, 85 , 10 8 Graham, W . R. , 83-8 5 Grissom, G. , 12 3 Groupthink, 13 8 Hackman, J. , 12 5 Halberstam, D. , 65 Hardy, G. , 9 7 Hartsfield, H. , 7 7 Hayden, T. , 8 2 Hierarchy, 13 , 20, 28 ; an d th e "organiza tional jungle, " 58 ; an d los s o f reality , 67; an d retur n t o narcissism , 2 2 - 2 5 , 37, 94 , 129 ; an d totalitarianism , 1 5 Hirschhorn, L. , 134 , 14 2 Hobbes, T. , 4 1 , 10 9 Hodgetts, R . M. , 13 8 Hohler, R. , 113-1 8 Horney, K. , 18 , 3 7 Hubris, 72 , 127 , 12 8 Hummel, R. , 13 9 Iaccoca, L. , 7 1 Identity: instabilit y of , 9 , 14 , 3 2 - 3 5 ; an d ontological differentiation , 23 ; and on tological function , 32 , 3 5 - 3 9 ; organi zational, 14 , 4 2 - 4 4; an d self-con sciousness, 1 6 Ingrassia, P. , 5 1

Janis, I. , 58 , 13 8 Janson, R. , 12 5 Johnson, L . B. , I l l Keller, M. , 50 , 56, 58 , 65, 67, 69, 70 , 139 Kennedy, A . A. , 125 , 12 7 Kennedy Spac e Fligh t Center , 84 , 9 3 Kernberg, O. , 12 9 Kets d e Vries , M., 13 9 Keyes, R., 62 , 6 8 Kilminster, J. , 9 9 Klein, M. , 17 , 34, 13 4 Klein, S . M. , 11,84 , 13 7 Knudsen, B. , 55 Kohut, H. , 13 4 Kurtz, E. , 133 , 13 4 Lapierre, L. , 13 4 Lasch, C , 10 9 Lathlaen, P. , 11 6 Levinson, D. , 2 2 Levinson, H. , 13 8 Lichtenstein, H. , 9 , 32 , 3 3 Likert, R. , 9 5 Lilly, B. , 8 2 Lovingood, J. , 89 , 139 , 14 0 Low, G. , 8 5 Lucas, W. , 98 , 10 1 Lund, R. , 98 , 10 0 Luthans, F. , 13 8 McAuliffe, C , 113-1 9 McDonald, A. , 93 , 9 8 McDonough, J . J., 1 3 McGill, M . E. , 12 7 McGregor, D. , 9 5 McNair, R. , 11 4 Manic defense , 17 , 126 , 12 7 Mann, M. , 8 7 Marshall Spac e Fligh t Center , 93 , 98 , 99 , 101 Maslow, A . H. , 2 1 , 64, 13 7 Mason, J. , 99 , 10 0 Mead, G . H. , 16 , 2 0 Milgram, S. , 3 8 Miller, D. , 13 9

INDEX

Milliken, F. , 74, 75 Mintzberg, H. , 139 Mitroff, I. , 140 Moore, J., 88, 93, 98 Morgan, B. , 117 Morton-Thiokol Corporation , 75 , 9 2 - 9 4, 97-101 Mowday, R. , 35 Mulloy, L. , 93, 94, 97, 98 Murphy, T. , 57, 62, 63 Murray, B. , 80 Myers, D., 85 Mythology, 1 8 Nader, R. , 60 Narcissism, 4 , 16 , 89; and alcoholism , 129; an d American culture , 109 , 116, 123, 126 ; and animistic phase , 121, 122; dramatizatio n o f retur n to , 15, 61, 94 ; and ego ideal (retur n t o narcis sism), 9 , 17-19 , 22 , 24, 34, 35, 40 , 53, 92 , 94, 97, 99; and loss of reality , 65, 66, 68 , 69, 78, 86, 128; narcissistic persons , 110 ; and organizationa l ineffectiveness, 30 , 49, 127; and the "organizational jungle, " 58; of organi zations, 4 3; and self-enhancement bias , 25, 28 ; of teachers , 11 ; recovery from , 130-36 National Aeronautic s an d Space Adminis tration (NASA) , 49, 70, 7 3 - 1 0 3, 1 0 79, 114 , 116-19, 122-24 , 139 ; NASA decisions versu s huma n decisions , 91 — 92; propose d reorganizations , 1 0 1 - 3 ; symbolic functio n i n American culture , 108-9; take n a s organizational ideal , 91-101 Naugle,J.,79 Nazi party , 2 3 Nixon, R . M., 79, 8 2 Oakland University , 2 2 Olson, G. , 125 Onizuka, E. , 114 Ontological differentiation , 2 3 ; and Challenger disaster , 90 ; and hierarchy, 2 3, 24; an d totalitarianism, 24 , 25 Ontological function , 32 ; and organiza -

149 tional commitment , 3 5 - 3 8 ; an d self rejection, 3 3 - 3 5 ; why required, 32 , 33 Organization: an d depressive position , 135; a s drama, 9 , 55, 58 , 59, 6 1, 66, 138; clockwor k versu s snakepi t con ceptions, 7 , 8; formin g mora l commu nity, 19 , 20, 3 1, 32; functionalist theo ries of, 73 ; as narcissism project , 3 , 4, 18, 56 , 94, 95; normative theorie s of , 2 1 ; relationshi p t o environment, 32, 3 9 - 4 1 , 60 , 6 1; shameful undersid e of , 10, 15 , 18, 23, 37 Organizational commitment , 18 , 19, 3 1 , 32, 3 5 - 3 8 , 90 , 94, 137; and antisocia l actions, 3 8 - 4 1 ; an d anxiety, 58 ; socialization for , 4 1 - 44 Organizational culture , 28 , 54, 74; as collective min d o f organizationa l partici pants, 128 ; at Genera l Motors , 56; narcissistic versu s nonnarcissistic , 140; at NASA , 87 , 96, 102; as the way management understan d it s activities, 102, 10 3 Organizational decay , 49 , 5 3; and acceler ation o f rat e o f decay , 7 1 ; and change s in personne l policy , 5 5 - 5 8 , 8 1 - 8 6 ; and commitmen t t o bad decisions, 53— 55, 78—89 ; and cynicism an d corrup tion, 66; and development o f hostil e relationship t o environment, 60 ; and dominance o f financia l staff , 65; and the institutionalizatio n o f th e fiction , 7 8 - 8 1 ; an d isolation o f management , 59; an d loss of creativity , 63 ; and magical fligh t t o Utopia, 6 9 - 7 1 ; an d organizational jungle , 5 8 - 5 9; an d overcentralization, 6 8 - 6 9 ; an d self-de ception an d the narcissistic los s of real ity, 66, 61, 8 6 - 8 8 ; an d transpositio n of wor k an d ritual, 95 , 96 Organizational development , 2 1 , 125 Organizational disasters , 7 3; as aberra tions, 73 ; and organizational decay , 73-74 Organizational ideal , 19—22 ; antisocia l actions a s defense of , 3 8 - 4 1 ; conten t of, 36 ; and NASA an d Challenger di saster, 90—103 ; maintenance o f illu sion of , 2 2 - 2 4 , 36 , 37; and ontologi -

150 Organizational idea l (Continued) cal function , 3 4 - 3 8 ; an d organizational commitment , 3,!)- 3 8; and socializatio n fo r organizationa l commitment, 4 1 - 4 4 ; an d totalitarian ism, 2 4 - 2 7 , 54 , 129 , 130 ; i n tradi tional versu s curren t theorie s o f orga nizational change , 12 5 Orwell, G. , 14 2 Paine, T. O. , 8 2 Paranoid-schizoid position , 1 7 Parsons, T. , 2 4 Pauchant, T. , 14 0 Peters, T. J., 44 , 125 , 127-29 , 14 1 Petrone, R. , 8 5 Piers, G. , 1 5 Porter, L . W. , 3 5 Purdy, K. , 12 5 Quality o f workin g lif e programs , 23 , 5 9

INDEX Self-consciousness, 1 6 Self-enhancing bias , 2 5 Shorris, E. , 16 , 23 , 2 4 Sievers, B. , 8 4 Silkwood, K. , 3 1 , 45 Singer, M . B. , 1 5 Sloan, A . P. , 65 Smith, D. , 8 4 Smith, R. , 56, 7 0 Splitting, 1 7 Sputnik, 11 1 Stanley, W. , 2 0 Starbuck, W. , 74 , 7 5 Staw, B . M., 53, 7 8 Steers, R. , 3 5 Superego: a s conditio n fo r attainmen t o f ego ideal , 109 , 110 , 119 , 140 ; los s of , 119, 125 ; a s punishin g voice s fro m th e past, 142 ; weakenin g of , throug h alco hol, 12 9 Symbols o f th e astronauts : Disneylan d i n space, 113-18 ; singl e comba t warrior , 111-13

RAND Corporation , 8 3 Reagan, R. , 81 , 82 Reinartz, S. , 9 8 Reparation, 134 , 14 2 ResnikJ., 11 4 Riecken, H . W. , 10 0 Ritti, R . R. , 11,84 , 13 7 Rockwell Corporation , 9 5 Rogers (W . P. ) Commission , 76 , 77, 80 , 86-88, 9 1 - 9 3 , 95 , 101 , 102 , 13 9 Rosenkrantz, S . A., 13 8 Ross, L. , 13 8 Russell, B. , 9 8

Taylor, W. , 65 Terkel, S. , 20 , 13 8 Thompson, A. , 10 0 Totalitarianism: organizationa l totalitari anism, 15 , 16 , 2 2 - 2 5, 136 , 137 ; an d organizational decay , 5 3 - 7 2 , 79 , 84 , 86; paralle l wit h alcoholism , 129 , 130 ; psychological consequence s of , 15 , 16 , 2 5 - 2 7 , 29 ; an d symboli c management , 128, 141-4 2 Trento, J., 77 , 79 , 8 1 - 8 3 , 84 , 85 , 10 8

Sager, C , 13 8 Sartre, J.-P., 9 Saturn project , 7 0 - 7 1 , 13 9 Scapegoating, 2 2 Schacter, S. , 10 0 Schaef, A. , 14 2 Schein, E. , 35 , 4 1 - 4 3, 63, 13 7 Schon, D . A. , 13 , 103 , 13 7 Schorr, D. , 10 9 Schwartz, H . S. , 19 , 37, 39 , 137 , 14 2 Scobee, R , 114 , 11 8 Searle, J. R. , 13 8 Self-actualization, 2 1 , 12 5

Wanous,J. P. , 1 1 Waterman, R . H. , 44 , 125 , 127-29 , 14 1 Webb, J., 7 7 Weber, M. , 14 0 Weeks, M. , 8 8 Weick, K . E. , 42 , 74 , 75, 90 , 128 , 137 , 140, 14 1 Weiner, B . I., 2 5 White, J. B. , 5 1 Will, G . F. , 9 3 Wilson, G . T. , 7 0 Winterhalter, D. , 8 7 Wolfe, T. , 111-13 , 11 9

INDEX Work, 123 , 128-30, 135 ; cultural support of, 128 ; and depressive position, 135; and exchange relationship, 40— 42; loss of significance of , 3 , 4, 49, 55,

151 56, 61-63, 85, 129, 130 ; in organization ideal, 7; psychological significanc e of, 29 , 31, 123, 130 Wright, J. P., 49

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