Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors 9781685851767

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Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors
 9781685851767

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1 Culture and U.S. Foreign Policy
2 Myths and Representative Characters in U.S. Culture
3 The Cold War Evangelism of John Foster Dulles
4 The Enterprising Diplomacy of Averell Harriman
5 Robert McNamara: Cold War Manager
6 Assessing the Cultural Shaping Process
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

Myths, Models, a n d U.S. Foreign Policy

MYTHS, MODELS U . S . FOREIGN

8C

POLICY

The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors

STEPHEN W . TWING

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS

BOULDER. L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Twing, Stephen W., 1961Myths, models, and U.S. foreign policy : the cultural shaping of three cold warriors / Stephen W. Twing. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-766-4 (he : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations administration—History. 2. International relations and culture—History. 3. Dulles, J o h n Foster, 1888-1959—Views on foreign relations. 4. Harriman, W. Averell (William Averell), 1891-1986—Views on foreign relations. 5. McNamara, Robert S., 1 9 1 6 - —Views on foreign relations. I. Title. JZ1479.T88 1998 306.2—dc21 98-3322 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America ©

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

For Christina

Contents Preface

ix

1

Culture and U.S. Foreign Policy Culture as Meaning, 1 U.S. Foreign Policy and Symbolic Structures, 7

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Myths and Representative Characters in U.S. Culture The Concept of Myth in the Durkheimian Tradition, 13 The Representative Character Concept, 14 The Meaning and Identity Gap in Early America, 17 The City-on-the-Hill Myth, 18 The Puritan Representative Character, 24 The Market Myth, 27 The Entrepreneur Representative Character, 30 The Pragmatic Myth, 34 Pioneers and Managers as Representative Characters, 39

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The Cold War Evangelism of John Foster Dulles The Early Years, 51 Philosophical Writings—1934-1940, 54 The Quest for a Spiritual Basis for World Order, 58 The Puritan Emerges, 62 The Foggy Bottom Years, 71 Avoiding a Deal with the Devil in Geneva, 72 Reluctant Summiteer, 76 Consistent Sinophobia, 79 Building Spiritual Unity, 79 Conclusion, 83

51

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The Enterprising Diplomacy of Averell Harriman Born in the Shadow of the "Little Giant," 93 Into the World of Business, 97 An Odd Sort of New Dealer, 100

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Contents

Envoy to Churchill, 102 Ambassador to Moscow, 105 Confronting the World Bully, 111 Governor and Critic of the New Look, 120 Into the New Frontier, 123 Struggling for Influence with LBJ, 132 Conclusion, 136 5

Robert McNamara: Cold War Manager T h e Shaping of a Manager, 146 T h e Ford Years, 149 Managing the Pentagon, 152 Emerging Foreign Policy Adviser, 154 Managing the Cuban Missile Crisis, 158 Making Nuclear Strategy, 160 Managing the Vietnam Conflict, 164 Leaving the Pentagon, 177 Conclusion, 178

145

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Assessing the Cultural Shaping Process T h e Myth-Worldview-Policy Nexus of Influence, 188 T h e Representative Character Nexus of Influence, 190 Cultural Analysis as a Complement to Other Approaches, 193

187

Selected

197 203 215

Bibliography

Index About the Book

Preface This work grew o u t of a strong conviction that ideas matter. It examines the shared meanings that members of U.S. society have imposed on the world. It also explores how those shared meanings helped to shape three important U.S. statesmen and their policy app r o a c h e s to the Cold War. As such, it is a work of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , seeking to examine individual worldviews and policymaking behavior in light of the shared meanings that have h e l p e d to d e f i n e for Americans their society and its role in the world. In addition to closely examining three important myths and three important representative characters, the book also suggests a process by which those symbolic structures h e l p e d to influence U.S. Cold W a r - e r a foreign policy by shaping key policymakers. *

*

*

During my work on this project, I have acquired many debts, both intellectual and personal. At the University of South Carolina I benefited tremendously from the guidance and intellectual encouragement of Donald Puchala, Daniel Sabia, and J o h n Sproat. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to my adviser and friend Jerel Rosati for his guidance, encouragement, and friendship. I am extremely grateful to Jeanette Baker for reading the entire manuscript and providing insightful feedback. Completion of the book would never have been possible without the direct involvement, general patience, and encouragement of my wife, Christina. Lynne Rienner, Bridget Julian, and Shena Redmond of Lynne Rienner Publishers were extremely helpful throughout the publication process. Finally I am deeply indebted to my parents, Rhoda Ann and A1 Twing, who always encouraged my curiosity.

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1 Culture and U.S. Foreign Policy

In r e c e n t years t h e r e has b e e n increased interest a m o n g scholars of U.S. foreign policy in cultural influences o n t h e c o n t e n t of that policy. T h e p r o b l e m with m u c h of t h e existing work o n this topic is that its a u t h o r s simply assert that t h e r e is a c o n n e c t i o n between certain strands of U.S. culture a n d certain p a t t e r n s of U.S. f o r e i g n policy b e h a v i o r w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g how (or even w h e t h e r ) these cultural e l e m e n t s actually i n f l u e n c e t h e b e h a v i o r of individual policymakers. T h i s b o o k seeks to e x p l o r e this cultural s h a p i n g process w h e r e b y p a r t i c u l a r symbolic s t r u c t u r e s i n f l u e n c e t h e ways individual policymakers view themselves a n d view a n d act toward the world. Scholars trying to explain t h e c o n t e n t of U.S. f o r e i g n policy o f t e n focus o n two i m p o r t a n t questions: How d o key policymakers view the world? a n d W h a t are the key sources of these worldviews? 1 A l t h o u g h most scholars of foreign policy behavior would agree that policymaker worldviews are an i m p o r t a n t variable in the f o r e i g n policy m a k i n g e q u a t i o n , t h e r e is n o c o n s e n s u s as to t h e source of these worldviews. Some scholars have used theoretical tools f r o m the personality or cognitive fields of psychology. 2 O t h e r s have e x a m i n e d how policymakers' worldviews are s h a p e d by their use ( a n d misuse) of historical e x a m p l e s . 3 A l t h o u g h such psychological a n d historical app r o a c h e s are useful a n d i m p o r t a n t , they d o n o t directly address t h e i m p o r t a n t role of culture. I n d e e d , even with increased scholarly interest, the role of U.S. culture in s h a p i n g the worldviews of American f o r e i g n policy m a k e r s has r e m a i n e d u n d e r e x p l o r e d . O n e reason is t h a t t h e r e is so little a g r e e m e n t a m o n g scholars as to t h e d e f i n i t i o n of culture. CULTURE AS MEANING In the field of cultural anthropology, t h e r e are many b r o a d definitions of c u l t u r e . T h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y British a n t h r o p o l o g i s t 1

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E. B. Tylor defined culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and habits acquired by m a n as a m e m b e r of society." 4 This definition is all-encompassing, a n d since it includes both ideas and behaviors, it would be extremely unwieldy as a basis f r o m which to do research on the relationship between culture and policymaker worldviews. This encompassing behavioral-ideational approach to defining culture is shared by American anthropologist A. L. Kroeber, who writes, "Culture is the mass of learned and transmitted m o t o r reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values and the behavior they induce." 5 O t h e r anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict seem to focus solely on behavioral aspects, arguing, "Culture is that complex whole which includes all the habits acquired by m a n as a m e m b e r of society." 6 Because this definition fails to address ideational components of culture, it does not provide a useful starting point for researching the culture-to-worldview connection. In fact, all three of these anthropological definitions of culture are unsuitable for this type of research. And there are h u n d r e d s m o r e in the cultural anthropology literature that are equally unsuitable. 7 This definitional pluralism within the field of cultural anthropology is not an insurmountable obstacle, however. T h e r e is a fairly rich tradition of sociological thinkers who theorize a b o u t culture and whose conceptualizations of it are useful for exploring the culture-worldview-behavior connection. The three classical sociologists whose works are most relevant for this p u r p o s e are Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber. All t h r e e t h o u g h t extensively about the role of culture in influencing h u m a n behavior. All three thinkers (albeit to differing degrees) a p p r o a c h e d the culture concept f r o m the standpoint of the p r o b l e m of meaning. 8 T h a t is, all operated f r o m the assumption that h u m a n beings have a basic need to make sense of the world and to feel c o n n e c t e d to something larger than themselves. Conceptualizing culture as a system of meaning provides an excellent starting point to look for the behaviorally relevant linkage a m o n g cultural p h e n o m e n a (i.e., myths, religions) and individual policymakers. Of these t h r e e sociological thinkers, Karl Marx probably focused on the problem of meaning the least. In his theory of historical materialism, cultural p h e n o m e n a such as religion and myths are a p a r t of society's superstructure, which is powerfully determined by its economic base. Culture, therefore, is of secondary imp o r t a n c e for Marx in his a t t e m p t to explain macrolevel social change. To the extent that Marx considered cultural p h e n o m e n a , he tended to focus on religion.

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Marx saw the n e e d to conceptualize culture as a system of m e a n i n g but believed that the alienation b r o u g h t on by capitalist relations of production created a void of meaning. For Marx, religion filled this void but was a form of false consciousness: It was created by h u m a n s to help dull the pain of their oppression and their alienation f r o m themselves, their labor, and o t h e r h u m a n beings. 9 And at the same time that it dulled this sense of alienation— caused, he said, by the capitalist system—it obscured and perpetuated it. So Marx did a p p r o a c h culture as a system of m e a n i n g of sorts even as he downplayed its role in his social theory. French sociologist Emile Durkheim tended to focus on religion as an i m p o r t a n t example of culture as a m e a n i n g system. He also held the notion that religion is (at least in part) a symbolic representation of social forces that act on the individual. 1 0 In his study of primitive religious practices in Australia, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, D u r k h e i m shows how religious symbolism serves to represent p r e d o m i n a n t social forces to individuals, thus helping them both make sense of and feel reverence for the society. In his analysis of the totem, he explains that a deity conf r o n t s the individual b o t h as a constraint and as a source of strength and e n n o b l e m e n t . 1 1 H e concludes that the forces of constraint and e m p o w e r m e n t portrayed in religious symbolism are actually representative of social forces acting on the individual: Society presents itself as a deity t h r o u g h the symbolism of the totem. Thus for Durkheim, "Religion ceases to be an inexplicable hallucination and takes a foothold in reality. In fact we can say that the believer is n o t deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power u p o n which he d e p e n d s and f r o m which he receives all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is society." 12 In his definition of religion, Durkheim builds in the notion of religion as a system of meaning: Before all it is a system of ideas with which individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it. This is its primary function; and though metaphorical and symbolic, this representation is not unfaithful. Quite on the contrary, it translates everything essential in the relations which are to be explained: for it is an eternal truth that outside of us there exists something greater than us, with which we enter into communion. 1 3

T h u s f o r D u r k h e i m , religion is a cultural p h e n o m e n o n that supplies the individual with meaning in its most basic form: a sense of connectedness to something larger than ourselves.

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Like D u r k h e i m , Max W e b e r c o n c e p t u a l i z e d c u l t u r e generally a n d religion specifically as systems of m e a n i n g . In his essay "Methodology in Social Science a n d Social Policy," Weber s u m m e d u p his a r g u m e n t t h a t c u l t u r e s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d as a system of m e a n i n g . "The t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of every cultural scie n c e lies n o t in o u r f i n d i n g a certain c u l t u r e o r any ' c u l t u r e ' in g e n e r a l as valuable b u t r a t h e r in t h e fact t h a t we are cultural beings, e n d o w e d with the capacity a n d the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world a n d to l e n d it significance." 1 4 Like those of D u r k h e i m , W e b e r ' s cultural studies involved t h e study of religion. In p e r h a p s his most f a m o u s such study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber analyzed the c o n n e c t i o n between two Protestant doctrines (predestination a n d t h e t h e o r y of t h e elect) a n d t h e s t r o n g motivation a m o n g m e m b e r s of some P r o t e s t a n t sects to a c c u m u l a t e capital a n d succeed in business activities. 15 Weber did n o t a r g u e that these ascetic P r o t e s t a n t beliefs were t h e sole f a c t o r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the rise of capitalism in these societies, b u t h e did m a k e a persuasive case that they played an imp o r t a n t role. A f t e r showing that this Calvinist theodicy played a role in creating the rationalized a n d b u r e a u c r a t i z e d world of m o d e r n capitalism by i m p o s i n g a set of m e a n i n g s o n believers' everyday lives, Weber went o n to l a m e n t that the workers in the m o d e r n capitalist world were s u f f e r i n g f r o m a s h o r t a g e of m e a n i n g . 1 6 T h u s like D u r k h e i m a n d Marx, W e b e r h i g h l i g h t e d t h e u b i q u i t o u s h u m a n n e e d to feel c o n n e c t e d to s o m e t h i n g larger t h a n oneself, the n e e d for meaning. Following in the f o o t s t e p s of Marx, D u r k h e i m , a n d Weber, a new g e n e r a t i o n of sociologists a p p r o a c h c u l t u r e as a system of m e a n i n g . In the works of R o b e r t Bellah, Peter Berger a n d T h o m a s L u c k m a n n , a n d Clifford Geertz, o n e finds an a p p r o a c h to c u l t u r e t h a t is, if anything, m o r e f o c u s e d o n t h e c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e of m e a n i n g f o r the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n t h a n are t h e works of Marx, D u r k h e i m , a n d Weber. By their own admission, all of these later sociologists build o n a n d modify the works of the earlier theorists. 1 7 In his work o n the sociology of religion, R o b e r t Bellah explicitly draws o n t h e work of Marx, D u r k h e i m , a n d Weber. At t h e same time h e criticizes their work f o r b e i n g overly r e d u c t i o n i s t (i.e., f o r b e i n g too quick to r e d u c e religious p h e n o m e n a to material social forces). 1 8 In r e s p o n s e to this p r o b l e m , h e p r o p o s e s a d o c t r i n e h e calls symbolic realism, which treats religious symbolism as an objective entity that c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to material social forces. 1 9 In o t h e r words, Bellah sets o u t to study religious symbolism itself, because of

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the central importance of its meaning for h u m a n beings, n o t in an effort to find out what social forces lie at its foundation. Particularly enlightening is Bellah's discussion of symbols and meaning. Symbols are cultural objects that serve to give meaning to acts or objects by classifying them in categories that include other acts or objects. They provide a context of meaning for discrete acts and objects. Meaning in this sense is location in a context, in a larger interrelated framework defined by values or norms of a more general order than the specific act or object. Human action is almost by definition symbolic action, which is another way of saying that it always involves culture. 20

For Bellah, then, the p r o b l e m of m e a n i n g must be central to a working conception of culture. O f t e n he stresses the cognitive aspects of the h u m a n n e e d for meaning (i.e., the need to make sense o u t of the world). But he does n o t ignore the h u m a n n e e d for m e a n i n g in the noncognitive, m o r e intuitive and affective sense (i.e., the n e e d to feel c o n n e c t e d to something larger than ourselves) . In fact, he laments the lack of sources of this latter type of m e a n i n g in m o d e r n society. 21 T h u s like Marx, Durkheim, and Weber b e f o r e him, Bellah conceives of culture as a socially transmitted system of m e a n i n g , but he focuses m o r e explicitly on two distinct senses in which h u m a n s n e e d meaning. Like Bellah, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann build on the t h o u g h t of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, although not exclusively. 22 They also share Bellah's conception of meaning as location within a context. Berger and Luckmann's classic 1966 The Social Construction of Reality is a powerful theoretical t r e a t m e n t of the dialectical process by which h u m a n subjective meanings b e c o m e objectified into the reality that we experience as society and of how those objectifications allow individuals to live in and make sense of the world. 2 3 In their t r e a t m e n t of this dialectical process, they clearly emphasize the meaning-providing aspect of h u m a n culture. I apprehend the reality of everyday life as an ordered reality. Its phenomena are prearranged in patterns that seem to be independent of my apprehension of them and that impose themselves upon the latter. The reality of everyday life appears already objectified, that is constituted by an order of objects that have been designated as objects before my appearance on the scene. The language used in everyday life continuously provides me with the necessary objectifications and posits the order within which these make sense and within which everyday life has meaning for me. 2 4

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Besides this basic level of symbolic meanings f o u n d in the socially constructed reality of everyday life, Berger and Luckmann discuss f o u r other levels of symbolic meaning frameworks. Although basiclevel meanings are sufficient for helping individuals move through their everyday surroundings, t h e r e are times when m o r e comprehensive m e a n i n g frameworks are needed. These frameworks range f r o m simple explanations at the lowest level (perhaps f u r t h e r categorizations of objects encountered in everyday life) to symbolic universes at the highest level of inclusiveness (e.g., philosophical traditions or religious doctrines). 2 5 Symbolic universes represent the highest level of m e a n i n g integration. Berger and Luckmann, then, provide a detailed conceptualization of culture as a source of meaning. Their scheme of ever-widening spheres of meaning is extremely useful because it allows the analyst of culture to locate particular cultural p h e n o m e n a (i.e., myths, theodicies) within this range of widening comprehensiveness of context. And their systematic analysis of the dialectical culture production process is extremely i m p o r t a n t for providing an u n d e r standing of how h u m a n s impose m e a n i n g on their world, creating social reality and even, to some extent, themselves. Perhaps the most significant cultural theorist of this era is Clifford Geertz. Like Bellah, Berger, and Luckmann, Geertz builds on the t h o u g h t of Durkheim, Weber, and, to a lesser extent, Marx. 2 6 Geertz has probably c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e than any o t h e r thinker to the d e v e l o p m e n t of the semiotic culture concept. H e argues that h u m a n culture consists of socially transmitted symbolic structures that are intersubjectively shared by m e m b e r s of a society who use them to orient themselves to their physical and social world. 2 7 Since h u m a n beings, relative to other animals, are b o r n with few genetically e n c o d e d instructions for behavior, their behavior is, as Geertz puts it, "guided predominantly by cultural rather than genetic templates." 2 8 According to Geertz, with n o rigid genetic templates to orient t h e m to their world, h u m a n beings use these socially transmitted symbolic structures as mental models that guide t h e m through everyday life. 29 In his study of religion, Geertz explores both the cognitive and the intuitive/affective dimensions of the h u m a n n e e d for meaning and shows how religion (and culture more generally) connects o u r everyday lives with a m u c h larger reality, within the context of which o u r everyday world makes sense. 3 0 In this sense religion is what Berger and Luckmann call a symbolic universe. 3 1 For Geertz, however, the affective aspects of symbolic universes are just as imp o r t a n t as the cognitive aspects. Religious symbols may h e l p us

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make sense of the world by connecting us to something larger, but the c o n n e c t i o n itself also fulfills an important n e e d . T h u s in Geertz's treatment o f religion, these societally transmitted symbolic structures fulfill the most basic cognitive and affective human requirements. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND SYMBOLIC STRUCTURES Whereas religion is an important symbolic structure for fulfilling cognitive and affective requirements, it is not by any means the only one. T h e task for the cultural analyst studying U.S. foreign policy is to locate other such symbolic structures transmitted within U.S. society. Upon locating and examining these symbolic structures, the analyst must then attempt to determine how they have influenced the behavior of American policymakers. This is precisely the aim of this book. Scholars of U.S. foreign policy have identified several interesting symbolic structures transmitted within U.S. society that serve as important sources o f meaning for Americans and that have foreign policy relevance. Historian Michael Hunt argues that U.S. foreign policy has been guided by a three-pronged foreign affairs ideology based on liberal exceptionalism and racism. 3 2 Historian L o r e n Baritz argues that the U.S. Vietnam policy was heavily influenced by both a myth o f U.S. technological invincibility and a Puritaninspired "city on the hill" myth that portrays the United States as democratic example and savior for the world. 3 3 Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. agrees that U.S. foreign policy has b e e n significantly influenced by the city-on-the-hill myth. He sees historical phases where U.S. diplomacy was shaped first by the city-on-the-hill myth and then by an experimental or pragmatic myth that has a more realpolitik orientation. 3 4 Whereas the city-onthe-hill myth calls for the U n i t e d States to stay true to its highest ideals in its dealings with the world, the pragmatic myth suggests that since the U n i t e d States is an ongoing and vulnerable democratic experiment, it must doggedly pursue its interests in the world in the most effective way possible. A third foreign policy-relevant myth, the market myth, has b e e n identified by historian William Appleman Williams. Williams argues that since the turn o f the century the United States has followed an economically exploitive "open d o o r " approach to the rest o f the world. 3 5 He argues that underlying this open-door approach has b e e n a mythical c o n c e p t i o n o f U.S. society as the idealized arena for e c o n o m i c competition.

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So Baritz, Schlesinger, and Williams have identified three myths that not only serve as important sources of meaning and identity for Americans but also are relevant for U.S. foreign policy. These three scholars have identified an i m p o r t a n t connection between certain strands of American culture and the content of U.S. foreign policy. Their work suffers f r o m a c o m m o n shortcoming, however. Each scholar identifies a myth (or combination of myths), points to patterns in U.S. foreign policy behavior, and assumes that the myth (or myths) must have somehow shaped the policy, but n o n e attempts to explain precisely how culture shapes policy. The key to understanding the relationship between U.S. culture and foreign policy lies in exploring and examining this mechanism of influence. How does one make sense out of these different myths, two of which (the Puritan and pragmatic) seem to be quite contradictory in their substantive influence on U.S. foreign policy? Some scholars such as Schlesinger argue that these myths alternate over time in exercising the p r e d o m i n a n t influence over U.S. foreign policy with periods of Puritan crusading followed by periods of pragmatic exp e r i m e n t a t i o n . 3 6 Unfortunately, Schlesinger does n o t discuss just what determines whether the foreign policy of an era will be Puritan or pragmatic. Are changes in the cultural orientation of U.S. policy simply responses to changes in U.S. society or in the international environment, or can they be attributed merely to changes in the circulation of policymaking elites? Is it possible that these three cultural traditions could exercise influence over policy simultaneously in tension with each other? O n e way to answer this question is to examine the cultural shaping of individual policymakers. Do individual statespersons suffer f r o m a f o r m of cultural schizo p h r e n i a , conceiving of themselves as Puritans today and pragmatists or e n t r e p r e n e u r s tomorrow? O r is it more likely that some policymakers identify consistently over time with the city-on-the-hill myth, others with the pragmatic myth, and still others, the market myth? After all, these three myths serve as important sources of n o t only collective identity in society b u t also individual identity; they help to answer the question What makes one an American? Thus it would seem that if an individual is i n f l u e n c e d m o r e by one myth than by the others, this identification would tend to be somewhat stable over time. The only way to answer this question is to examine closely the biographies, and thereby the cultural shaping, of individual statespersons. This is also the only way to make the crucial two-part connection between these different societal-level symbolic structures and the worldviews and self-conceptions of leaders and between the worldviews and self-conceptions of leaders and their policy behavior.

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In addition to these myths, t h e r e is a n o t h e r type of societal-level symbolic s t r u c t u r e that w a r r a n t s e x a m i n a t i o n f o r its i n f l u e n c e o n U.S. foreign policy. Closely related to the three myths previously outlined are t h r e e representative characters. Alasdair Maclntyre first identified the representative character in his 1984 moral-philosophical treatise entitled After Virtue; R o b e r t Bellah a n d his colleagues f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d t h e c o n c e p t in Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. W h e r e a s t h e t h r e e myths serve as idealized m o d e l s of U.S. society, various representative c h a r a c t e r s within U.S. c u l t u r e serve as idealized m o d e l s f o r individual behavior. 3 7 T h e t h r e e representative c h a r a c t e r s within U.S. c u l t u r e that c o r r e s p o n d to the city-on-the-hill, pragmatic, a n d m a r k e t myths are, respectively, the Puritan, the manager, a n d the e n t r e p r e n e u r . T h e s e two sets of societal-level symbolic s t r u c t u r e s (the t h r e e myths a n d the t h r e e representative characters, all of which will b e discussed in m u c h m o r e detail in C h a p t e r 2) a n d their i n f l u e n c e o n individual worldviews, self-conceptions, a n d policymaking behavior are the focus of this book. T h e exploration of this cultural s h a p i n g process is c o n d u c t e d via t h r e e case studies. Each closely e x a m i n e s o n e statesman's formative experiences, his evolving worldview a n d self-conceptions, a n d finally his policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d policymaking behavior in light of these societal-level symbolic structures. T h e subjects are t h r e e i m p o r t a n t cold warriors: J o h n Foster Dulles, Averell H a r r i m a n , a n d R o b e r t M c N a m a r a . Analyzing t h e worldviews, self-conceptions, policy p r e f e r e n c e s , a n d policymaking b e h a v i o r of t h r e e cold warriors provides a c o m m o n substantive focus. All t h r e e of these m e n were faced, in their careers as policymakers, with t h e s u p e r p o w e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t d o m i n a t e d t h e global political scene d u r i n g t h e Cold War years. Focusing o n t h e Cold War era thus allows o n e to c o m p a r e a n d contrast t h e way they conceptualized the c o m m u n i s t t h r e a t a n d the strategies a n d tactics they devised f o r d e a l i n g with t h a t t h r e a t . Previous study of Cold W a r - e r a U.S. d i p l o m a t i c history has suggested t h a t these t h r e e s t a t e s m e n d i f f e r e d significantly b o t h in t h e ways they c o n c e p t u a l ized t h e Cold War c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d in t h e strategies a n d app r o a c h e s they p r o p o s e d . P e r h a p s these d i f f e r e n c e s in worldview a n d a p p r o a c h can be partially e x p l a i n e d by the fact t h a t e a c h individual was p r e d o m i nately i n f l u e n c e d by a d i f f e r e n t set of myths a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e characters. Previous impressionistic study of the t h r e e suggests that J o h n Foster Dulles may have b e e n p r e d o m i n a t e l y i n f l u e n c e d by the city-on-the-hill myth a n d t h e P u r i t a n representative character, whereas Averell H a r r i m a n may have b e e n i n f l u e n c e d m o r e by t h e market myth a n d the e n t r e p r e n e u r character, and Robert McNamara

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m a y h a v e b e e n m o r e i n f l u e n c e d by t h e p r a g m a t i c m y t h a n d t h e m a n a g e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r . In o r d e r to g e t at t h e worldviews, self- a n d r o l e c o n c e p t i o n s , policy p r e f e r e n c e s , a n d policy b e h a v i o r of t h e s e s t a t e s m e n , I have m a d e e x t e n s i v e u s e of t h e i r p e r s o n a l pap e r s a n d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . 3 8 A set of basic q u e s t i o n s was d e s i g n e d a n d u s e d to aid in i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r basic n o r m a t i v e a n d d e s c r i p t i v e b e l i e f s a b o u t w o r l d politics in g e n e r a l a n d a b o u t C o l d W a r U.S. f o r e i g n policy in p a r t i c u l a r . 3 9 I n C h a p t e r 2, I discuss t h e societal-level s y m b o l i c s t r u c t u r e s (i.e., t h e m y t h s a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r s ) . I n a d d i t i o n to elabo r a t i n g o n t h e m c o n c e p t u a l l y , I e x p l o r e h o w t h e y h a v e b e e n transm i t t e d t h r o u g h A m e r i c a n society a n d h o w t h e y h a v e i n f o r m e d t h e n a t i o n ' s political d i s c o u r s e . NOTES 1. I am using the term worldview to denote the body of basic descriptive and normative beliefs a policymaker holds about world politics. Typical c o m p o n e n t beliefs in the worldview of a policymaker would address such basic issues as the structure of the international system, identification of the most threatening actors in the system, and the p r e f e r r e d role of the United States in the world. 2. For a classic example of the personality approach see Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1956). For a classic example of the cognitive approach see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 3. See Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986). 4. A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Random House, 1952), 81. 5. Ibid., 84. 6. Ibid., 81. 7. Ibid. 8. Robert Wuthnow, Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press), 35. 9. Karl Marx, "Contribution to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," 43-44, reprinted in Neil Smelser, Karl Marx on Society and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 13-14. 10. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 236. 11. Ibid., 240. 12. Ibid., 257. 13. Ibid. 14. Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," in Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949), 81. 15. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

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16. Ibid., 182. 17. F o r an e x c e l l e n t review o f the i n f l u e n c e o f Marx, D ü r k h e i m , and W e b e r on these later theorists, see Wuthnow, 1 8 - 4 9 . 18. R o b e r t B e l l a h , Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Posttraditional World (New York: H a r p e r and Row, 1 9 7 0 ) , 2 4 8 - 2 5 0 . 19. Ibid., 253. 20. Ibid., 2 6 1 . 21. Ibid., 2 5 5 . 22. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Press, 1966), 6 - 1 8 . 23. Ibid., 1 8 - 2 2 . 24. Ibid., 22. 25. Ibid., 9 4 - 9 7 . 26. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: HarperCollins, 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 0 5 . 27. Ibid., 12. 28. Ibid., 75. 29. Ibid., 44. 30. Ibid., 108. 31. B e r g e r and L u c k m a n n , 9 5 - 9 7 . 32. Michael H u n t , Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 8 7 ) . 33. L o r e n Baritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did (New York: Morrow, 1 9 8 5 ) . 34. A r t h u r S c h l e s i n g e r Jr., The Cycles of American History (New York: H o u g h t o n Mifflin, 1 9 8 6 ) . 35. See William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago: Q u a d r a n g l e Press, 1 9 6 6 ) . See also William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell, 1 9 6 2 ) . 36. Schlesinger, 1 6 - 1 7 . 37. S e e Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (South B e n d : University o f Notre D a m e Press, 1 9 8 4 ) , 2 5 - 3 1 . See also R o b e r t Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 8 5 ) , 3 9 - 4 1 . 38. T h e Dulles case study is the only o n e that makes extensive use o f speeches to tap into the policymaker's worldview. Speeches could be viewed as less than ideal windows into an official's worldview, since in the modern era they are increasingly written by professional speechwriters. Dulles, however, consistently refused the services o f speechwriters, preferring to draft his own speeches, albeit with occasional feedback from colleagues. See Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 149. 39. T h e questions were as follows: l . a . W h a t is the relationship between morality and i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations? l . b . How m u c h weight should moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s carry in the formulation and c o n d u c t o f U.S. foreign policy? 1.e. To what e x t e n t should the Cold War be viewed in moral terms? 2.a. What is the role o f power in international relations? 2.b. How should U.S. power best be used in the Cold War? What forms should it take (i.e., military, diplomatic, e c o n o m i c , ideological/ cultural)?

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2.c. What are the most worrisome sources of Soviet power in the Cold War (i.e., military, diplomatic, economic, ideological/cultural)? 2.d. What is the best strategy for dealing with the Soviets in the Cold War context? Can they be bargained with? 2.e. Should U.S. foreign policy be strictly guided by a set of overarching principles (moral or geostrategic) or should policymakers leave themselves free to react to the global environment as it changes?

Myths and Representative Characters in U.S. Culture

U.S. society, like any other, has b e e n h e l d t o g e t h e r in p a r t by certain symbolic s t r u c t u r e s that have p r o v i d e d its citizens with m e a n ing a n d identity. This c h a p t e r is an e x p l o r a t i o n of the two types of societal-level symbolic s t r u c t u r e s d e s c r i b e d in C h a p t e r 1: the "city o n t h e hill," m a r k e t , a n d p r a g m a t i c myths a b o u t U.S. society a n d the Puritan, entrepreneur, and manager representative character types. 1 T h e idea is to faithfully c a p t u r e the m e a n i n g i n h e r e n t in the stories t h a t A m e r i c a n s have told a b o u t themselves f o r m o r e t h a n 350 years. THE CONCEPT OF MYTH IN THE DURKHEIMIAN TRADITION T h e first type of symbolic s t r u c t u r e that we will e x p l o r e is the myth. T h e American Heritage Dictionary provides a d e f i n i t i o n of myth as "a real or fictional story, r e c u r r i n g t h e m e or c h a r a c t e r type t h a t appeals to t h e consciousness of a p e o p l e by e m b o d y i n g its cultural ideals or by giving expression to d e e p , c o m m o n l y felt emotions." 2 This d e f i n i t i o n p r e s e n t s a n o t i o n of myth that is applicable to m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l societies. 3 It r e p r e s e n t s a t r a d i t i o n of t h i n k i n g a b o u t myth that is best e x e m p l i f i e d by Emile D u r k h e i m . 4 For D u r k h e i m , myth serves to provide collective identity a n d a n e m o tional b o n d a m o n g a p e o p l e . As myths in this D u r k h e i m i a n sense, t h e city-on-the-hill, pragmatic, a n d m a r k e t myths each tell a particular kind of story a b o u t America a n d each e m b o d y a particular notion of what it m e a n s to b e an American. For D u r k h e i m , myths fall into a larger category of socially transmitted symbolic structures that h e calls collective representations. 5 M e m b e r s of a society use collective r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to c o n c e p t u a l ize t h e i r society a n d those things t h a t a f f e c t it. 6 D u r k h e i m a r g u e s that in addition to serving as cognitive heuristic models, collective

13

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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s also serve i m p o r t a n t affective, social-solidaritye n h a n c i n g aspects. H e a r g u e s t h a t t h r o u g h these collective r e p r e sentations society is i n f u s e d with value ( a n d i n d e e d in some cases, sacred qualities). D u r k h e i m ' s n o t i o n of myth flows neatly f r o m his discussion of the collective r e p r e s e n t a t i o n concept: "The mythology of a g r o u p is t h e system of beliefs c o m m o n to this g r o u p . T h e traditions whose m e m o r y it p e r p e t u a t e s express t h e way in which society r e p r e s e n t s m a n a n d the world; it is a moral system a n d a cosmology as well as a history. . . . T h r o u g h it t h e g r o u p periodically renews t h e sentim e n t which it has of itself a n d of its unity." 7 T h u s f o r D u r k h e i m , the m y t h / r i t u a l c o m p l e x is crucial f o r c r e a t i n g individual r e s p e c t a n d reverence f o r the society as well as collective identity. 8 T h e city-onthe-hill, market, a n d pragmatic myths have served to infuse U.S. society with value, a n d this fact is vitally i m p o r t a n t f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g any h u m a n social behavior in that context, i n c l u d i n g U.S. f o r e i g n policymaking behavior. THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER CONCEPT T h e o t h e r key c o n c e p t at the societal level of analysis is the representative character. This c o n c e p t was first d e v e l o p e d by Alasdair Maclntyre a n d later a d a p t e d by R o b e r t Bellah a n d his colleagues. 9 Maclntyre presents the representative c h a r a c t e r as a hybrid between the sociological c o n c e p t of role a n d the c o n c e p t of a cultural ideal. H e describes it in terms of the following d r a m a t i c m e t a p h o r : There is a type of dramatic tradition—-Japanese Noh plays and English medieval morality plays are examples—which possesses a stock set of characters immediately recognizable to the audience. Such characters partially define the possibilities of plot and action. To understand them is to be provided with a means of interpreting the behavior of the actors who play them, just because a similar understanding informs the intentions of the actors themselves; and other actors may define their parts with special reference to these central characters. So it is with certain kinds of social roles specific to particular cultures. They furnish recognizable characters and the ability to recognize them is socially crucial because a knowledge of the character provides an interpretation of the actions of those individuals who have assumed the character. It does so precisely because those individuals have used the same knowledge to guide and structure their behavior. 10 To t h e e x t e n t that an individual is i n f l u e n c e d by o n e of these culturally g e n e r a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e characters, h e o r she takes o n

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certain values and patterns of social behavior. As Maclntyre argues, a r m e d with knowledge of this character-based template, an outside observer is capable of interpreting the individual's actions in their p r o p e r cultural context. Maclntyre argues that a representative character within a culture serves as a sort of ideational f u n n e l that captures broad moral or social ideals a n d focuses t h e m into models of social behavior for individuals to follow. "They are, so to speak," he writes, "the moral representatives of their culture, and they are so because of the way in which moral and metaphysical ideas and theories assume through them an embodied existence in the social world." 1 1 T h u s the notion of a culturally g e n e r a t e d representative character provides a useful conceptual linkage between cultural traditions at the societal level and policymaker self-conceptions. T h e crucial task for the cultural analyst of U.S. foreign policy is to determine whether (and how) these representative characters (and myths) color the worldviews and self-conceptions of these statesmen and influence their policymaking behavior. Several of the representative characters in U.S. culture have already b e e n identified in c o n t e m p o r a r y scholarly works. In their 1985 study entitled Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, A n n Swidler, and Steven Tipton take Maclntyre's representative character c o n c e p t a n d apply it to U.S. culture. They identify five m a j o r representative characters; a m o n g t h e m are the Puritan, the entrepreneur, and the manager. Bellah and his colleagues reiterate Maclntyre's claim for the power of the representative character c o n c e p t to illustrate how cultural ideals and traditions are channeled into modes of individual behavior. "A representative character is a kind of symbol," they write, "a public image that helps define, for a g r o u p of people, just what kinds of personality traits it is good and legitimate to develop." 1 2 According to Bellah and his colleagues, the Puritan representative character flows f r o m the city-on-the-hill myth, first developed by J o h n Winthrop. 1 3 T h e Puritan is characterized by a b u r n i n g drive to obey the word of God and to set u p and maintain a community of God's chosen people. 1 4 The paradigmatic m o d e of social action for the Puritan is conversion and mobilization of followers to fight against evil in the world. T h e implicit epistemology of the Puritan is that truth and the good are revealed by the Bible—an infallible source. T h e Puritan views his community as the locus of good a n d sees the rest of the world as evil. Latter-day Puritans have viewed the United States in the same terms and have seen it as the nation's duty to recreate the world in its (and therefore God's) image.

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T h e e n t r e p r e n e u r representative character flows directly f r o m an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of U.S. culture that arose with the development of a national market during the mid-to-late 1800s. 15 At the core of the moral personality of the e n t r e p r e n e u r is a powerful competitive individualism. 1 6 To the e n t r e p r e n e u r , power means the ability to drive competitors out of the marketplace or at least to drive a hard bargain in a business deal. T h e paradigmatic m o d e of social action for the e n t r e p r e n e u r is head-to-head competition and negotiation in a market context. T h e e n t r e p r e n e u r is u n f e t t e r e d by the Puritan's biblical morality and epistemology of revelation and subscribes instead to the morality (or lack thereof) of laissez-faire and the epistemology of social Darwinism. Thus as the market myth provides a particular model for u n d e r s t a n d i n g U.S. society, the entrep r e n e u r character provides a model for u n d e r s t a n d i n g how an individual should behave in such a society. Although the e n t r e p r e n e u r character continues to be a powerful model, Bellah and his colleagues argue that the d o m i n a n t representative character in twentieth-century U.S. society is the manager. 1 7 They note the irony in the fact that it was the American e n t r e p r e n e u r s or r o b b e r barons who created the m o d e r n context within which the corporate manager operates. 1 8 And whereas both the e n t r e p r e n e u r and the manager characters operate in a business context, there are distinct differences between the two. Direct competition with other e n t r e p r e n e u r s is the paradigmatic m o d e of social action for the e n t r e p r e n e u r ; administration of h u m a n and material resources and social e n g i n e e r i n g is the m a n a g e r ' s primary mode. In other words, the manager's primary role "is to persuade, inspire, cajole, and intimidate those he manages so that his organization measures u p to the criteria of effectiveness shaped ultimately by the market, b u t specifically by those in control of his organization—finally, its owners." 19 T h e j o b of the manager is to experiment with p a t t e r n s of employee and resource manipulation until one that maximizes corporate profit is f o u n d . Thus the manager adopts the morality and the epistemology of a vulgarized pragmatism— whatever works best is good and whatever is b o r n e out by experience (or e x p e r i m e n t ) is true. For the manager, power m e a n s the ability to experiment with h u m a n and n o n h u m a n resources and the ability to manipulate them in ways that will maximize organizational efficiency. Each of these representative characters (the Puritan, the entrep r e n e u r , and the manager) is a symbolic structure transmitted within U.S. society that serves as a model for individual behavior. T h e task for the cultural analyst studying U.S. foreign policy is to

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d e t e r m i n e to what extent i m p o r t a n t policymakers embody these representative characters. This is accomplished by looking for selfc o n c e p t i o n s and p a t t e r n s of behavior that are consistent with the paradigmatic modes of social action and with moral and epistemological profiles of the various representative characters. 2 0 THE MEANING AND IDENTITY GAP IN EARLY AMERICA

W h e n the first E u r o p e a n settlers arrived in America, t h e r e was a significant n e e d for new symbolic structures that would provide new constitutive meanings and a collective identity that fitted the settlers' new situation. T h e myths and representative characters discussed previously h e l p e d fill these m e a n i n g and identity n e e d s quite well. T h r o u g h o u t Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville describes and explains the e m e r g e n c e of a democratic society in the United States by comparing its features with aristocratic societies in Europe. However, de Tocqueville does n o t limit himself to describing the political-structural differences between a democratic society and an aristocratic society. U p o n reading Democracy in America one is struck by the extent to which he renders intelligible the complex economic, social, a n d cultural forces at work at the birth of the American republic. In fact, what de Tocqueville does is provide a "thick description" (to borrow Clifford Geertz's phrase) of the birth of a m o d e r n society in America. 2 1 O n e of the first things that j u m p s o u t at the cultural analyst reading de Tocqueville's work is the m e a n i n g and identity vacuum that faced the m e m b e r s of the e m e r g i n g American society. Again and again de Tocqueville describes the stark contrast between the constricting, convention-laden social milieu of the aristocratic societies in E u r o p e and the extremely egalitarian, i n d e e d nearly chaotic, social milieu of the emerging democratic society in America. This contrast is illuminated nicely in the following quotation: In democracies men are never stationary; a thousand chances waft them to and fro, and their life is always the sport of unforeseen or (so to speak) extemporaneous circumstances, thus they are obliged to do things which they have imperfectly learned, to say things which they imperfectly understand, and to devote themselves to work for which they are unprepared by long apprenticeships. In aristocracies every man has one sole object, which he unceasingly pursues; but among democratic nations the existence of man is more complex; the same mind will almost always embrace several objects at once, and these objects are frequently wholly

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foreign to each other. As it cannot know them all well the mind is readily satisfied with imperfect notions of each. 22 T h e settlers h a d left a society in which identity a n d everyday reality were tightly d e f i n e d by rigid h i e r a r c h i c a l social s t r u c t u r e s a n d f o u n d themselves in a society that was relatively f r e e of such structures. 2 3 A n d yet every society has a n e e d f o r legitimation. P e t e r Berger a n d T h o m a s L u c k m a n n , in The Social Construction of Reality, d e f i n e legitimation as t h e c r e a t i o n of new symbolic s t r u c t u r e s whose crucial f u n c t i o n is to allow individuals to m a k e sense of the social order. 2 4 T h e r e was also a n e e d f o r symbolic structures to provide sources of identity for the citizens of the e m e r g i n g American republic. T h e p r o b l e m of n a t i o n a l identity takes a u n i q u e f o r m in America as c o m p a r e d to m a n y E u r o p e a n countries w h e r e n a t i o n a l identity is developed organically f r o m centuries of c o m m o n history as well as ethnic, linguistic, a n d religious homogeneity. In his American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, Samuel H u n t i n g t o n captures t h e essence of the Americans' u n i q u e identity p r o b l e m : "For most peoples, national identity is the p r o d u c t of a long process of historical evolution involving c o m m o n ancestors, c o m m o n experiences, c o m m o n e t h n i c b a c k g r o u n d , c o m m o n language, c o m m o n culture, a n d usually c o m m o n religion. National identity is thus o r g a n i c in character. Such is n o t t h e case in the U n i t e d States. A m e r i c a n nationalism has b e e n d e f i n e d in political r a t h e r than organic terms." 2 5 H u n t i n g t o n a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r i m a r y sources of A m e r i c a n national identity are the f o u n d a t i o n a l liberal d e m o c r a t i c ideas emb o d i e d in the Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e a n d the Constitution. H e calls this c o r p u s of political ideas t h e "American C r e e d . " 2 6 W h e r e a s H u n t i n g t o n ' s diagnosis of the American identity p r o b l e m is essentially persuasive, his solution to the p r o b l e m is i n c o m p l e t e . This "American C r e e d " is certainly an i m p o r t a n t source of identity f o r Americans, b u t it is n o t the only source. I n d e e d , the very same symbolic structures that served to legitim a t e the social o r d e r in the e m e r g i n g A m e r i c a n society de Tocqueville d e s c r i b e d were also i m p o r t a n t sources of identity f o r Americans. T h e city-on-the-hill, m a r k e t , a n d p r a g m a t i c myths a n d the Puritan, entrepreneur, and manager representative characters h e l p e d A m e r i c a n s m a k e sense of t h e i r society a n d p r o v i d e d t h e m with sources of collective identity. 2 7 THE CITY-ON-THE-HILL MYTH Wee shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when tenn of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies, when he shall

Myths and Representative

Characters

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make us a praise and glory, that m e n shall say of succeeding plantations: the lord make it like that of New England: for wee must Consider that wee shall be as a citty u p o n a Hill, the eies of all people are upon us: so that if wee shall deale falsely with our g o d in this worke wee have undertaken and soe cause him to withdraw his present help from us, wee shall shame the faces of many of God's worthy servants, and cause their prayers to be turned into curses upon us till wee be consumed out of the g o o d land whither we are going. 2 8

This quotation is taken f r o m J o h n Winthrop's sermon entitled "A Modell of Christian Charity." He p r e s e n t e d this s e r m o n to the f o u n d i n g m e m b e r s of the Massachusetts Bay Company on b o a r d the Arbella, which was taking them to the New World in 1630. In this sermon we find the genesis of the first myth of origin of American society. T h e city-on-the-hill myth e m b o d i e d in W i n t h r o p ' s sermon provided an i m p o r t a n t source of identity f o r the Puritans who would people the New England settlement—it d u b b e d t h e m the new Israelites, God's chosen people. It also served to legitimate— that is, explain and justify—the new social order. This myth told them that they were b o u n d individually to each o t h e r as a c h u r c h and polity, and collectively to God, by a holy covenant. 2 9 They were on a divine mission to set u p the p e r f e c t Christian society as an example to the rest of the world, and everything they would be asked to do by their leaders flowed f r o m this premise. 3 0 God was watching closely and would help t h e m as long as they d i d n ' t stray f r o m their mission, but if they failed, He would surely desert them in the wilderness. 3 1 It is hard to imagine a symbolic structure with more legitimating force or one that would provide as m u c h identity as the city-on-the-hill myth first p u t forth by W i n t h r o p in that 1630 shipboard sermon. 3 2 This myth gave the Puritan settlers a p e r f e c t b l u e p r i n t of the social o r d e r they were to build, explained to t h e m why they must do it, and in the process told t h e m exactly who they were. T h e influence of the city-on-the-hill myth and the underlying covenant theology r e m a i n e d very strong in the minds of the first generation of Puritan New Englanders. But by the second and third generations, c h u r c h leaders began to warn that the Puritans were becoming too interested in material concerns, were ignoring their covenant with God, and would surely suffer divine p u n i s h m e n t for this. 33 By the 1660s there existed what might be called a generational crisis of faith in the Puritan church and polity. Many of the secondgeneration Puritans were failing to have the (episodic emotional) conversion experience, which was a r e q u i r e m e n t of full admission

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into the church covenant. 3 4 In 1661, the church leaders held a special c o n f e r e n c e and altered the covenant doctrine to allow these technically "unsaved" individuals partial admittance. 3 5 This doctrinal innovation b e c a m e known as the "halfway covenant," a n d as Perry Miller points out, it started a process of gradually expanding the m e m b e r s h i p to the point that the covenant idea lost its meaning and its ability to legitimate the rigid Puritan church and political hierarchy. 3 6 This expansion process was completed in the Great Awakening of 1740, in which revival leaders such as J o n a t h a n Edwards extended membership in the covenant to all who would hear them. 3 7 Although the Great Awakening of 1740 fatally sapped the power of covenant theory to legitimate the rigid church hierarchy in New England, it did serve to spread the influence of the city-on-the-hill myth beyond New England into the o t h e r colonies. 3 8 I n d e e d , during the decades following the Great Awakening, the city-on-the-hill myth u n d e r w e n t a significant transformation that would e n h a n c e its influence both intensively and extensively. As Nathan Hatch concludes f r o m his survey of New England sermons of the era in The Sacred Cause of Liberty, by the 1750s this Puritan-inspired myth began to be infused with Whig political values by influential clergymen. As Hatch points out, this merging of powerful political values into the city-on-the-hill myth only e n h a n c e d its legitimation and identityf o r m i n g potential at a time when the colonies were faced with the French and Indian War and a gradually developing c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Great Britain. 3 9 New England clergymen achieved this grafting of Whig political values onto the city-on-the-hill myth by imparting to Puritan settlers a tremendous thirst for liberty. 40 This injection of the cause of liberty into the f o u n d i n g myth provided extremely inspirational imagery for colonists entering into a confrontation with the m o t h e r country. Indeed, during the Revolutionary War the city-on-the-hill myth (infused with images of a struggle for liberty) was evoked with great frequency, according to Hatch. 4 1 Thus the f o u n d i n g myth began to be used by religious and political elites to mobilize citizens of the colonies against Great Britain in the r u n - u p to the Revolutionary War. We see in this politicization of the myth an important tendency to d e m o n i z e the adversary (in this case it was Great Britain, b u t during the French and Indian War it was France) and to canonize America. 4 2 Hatch shows how this demonization of Europe and selfcanonization c o n t i n u e d after the revolution and into the Napoleonic era. His survey of sermons d u r i n g this period shows that

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i n f l u e n t i a l c l e r g y m e n saw the w o r l d as a c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e y o u n g A m e r i c a n r e p u b l i c , r e p r e s e n t i n g G o d a n d liberty, a n d t h e n a t i o n s o f E u r o p e , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t e d tyranny a n d the A n t i c h r i s t . 4 3 A s we will see, this m i r r o r - i m a g i n g e f f e c t is an i m p o r t a n t b y - p r o d u c t o f the city-on-the-hill myth a n d significantly a f f e c t s t h e way A m e r i cans u n d e r its i n f l u e n c e r e a c t to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t . 4 4 A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t in this stage o f the e v o l u t i o n o f t h e city-on-the-hill m y t h is t h e f a c t that i n f l u e n t i a l c l e r g y m e n b e g a n to t h i n k that b e f o r e t h e k i n g d o m o f G o d w o u l d c o m e o n earth, A m e r i c a w o u l d first have to spread liberty a n d the r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . 4 5 T h i s n e w d e m o c r a t i c a s p e c t o f A m e r i c a ' s mission is s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e p r i o r to the Revo l u t i o n a r y War, the f o c u s o f the mission was solely o n s p r e a d i n g the t r u e ( r e a d "the P r o t e s t a n t " ) g o s p e l to t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d . T h i s o b l i g a t i o n to b e c o m e a d e m o c r a t i c as well as an e v a n g e l i c a l miss i o n a r y to t h e w o r l d w o u l d b e c o m e a v e r y i m p o r t a n t i d e a t i o n a l f o r c e d r i v i n g U . S . f o r e i g n p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e late n i n e t e e n t h a n d twentieth centuries.46 In the first d e c a d e s o f the n i n e t e e n t h century, w h e n revivalism s p r e a d o v e r t h e e n t i r e c o u n t r y , t h e i d e a o f a U . S . m i s s i o n to imp r o v e t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d b e c a m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in i n t e r d e n o m i n a t i o n a l m i s s i o n a r y associations w h o s e t w o f o l d p u r p o s e was to "save" t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e A m e r i c a n f r o n t i e r a n d t h e n to "save" t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d . 4 7 A s P e r r y M i l l e r a r g u e s , t h e i d e a that t h e U n i t e d States h a d a G o d - g i v e n mission that d r o v e this i n t e n s e a n d g e o g r a p h i c a l l y w i d e s p r e a d missionary e f f o r t b e c a m e the basis f o r a p o w e r f u l vision o f t h e U . S . c o m m u n i t y . 4 8 T h e s e r m o n s a n d o t h e r writings that M i l l e r cites f r o m the l e a d e r s o f these m i s s i o n a r y assoc i a t i o n s c a m e f r o m m a n y d i f f e r e n t d e n o m i n a t i o n s a n d f r o m all over t h e c o u n t r y , w h i c h is a g o o d i n d i c a t o r o f h o w t h o r o u g h l y t h e city-on-the-hill myth h a d s p r e a d by the early n i n e t e e n t h century. 4 9 N o r was t h e s p r e a d o f this m y t h c o n f i n e d to f o r m a l r e l i g i o u s c i r c l e s o r clergy. I n d e e d , H e r m a n M e l v i l l e , o n e o f t h e b r i g h t e s t lights in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y A m e r i c a n l i t e r a t u r e , h e l p e d to s t r e n g t h e n a n d p e r p e t u a t e the myth. In White Jacket, h e writes: And we Americans are the peculiar, chosen people—the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world. . . . God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race; and great things we feel in our souls. The rest of nations must soon be in our rear. We are the pioneers of the world; the advance guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried things, to break a new path in the New World that is ours. . . . Long enough have we been skeptics with regard to ourselves, and doubted whether,

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indeed the political Messiah had come. But he has come in us, if we would but give utterance to his promptings. 50 L a t e r in 1 8 7 6 in a p o e m e n t i t l e d Clarel, Melville would a c c u s e A m e r i c a o f a b a n d o n i n g its c o v e n a n t with G o d a n d would warn o f the consequences.51 Thus he provided strong literary support for t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e city-on-the-hill myth even w h e n h e felt that A m e r i c a was n o t living u p to it. In t h e l a t e - n i n e t e e n t h a n d early-twentieth c e n t u r i e s we f i n d political l e a d e r s using t h e city-on-the-hill myth to praise A m e r i c a a n d to e n c o u r a g e A m e r i c a n s to follow t h r o u g h o n t h e i r God-given mission to i m p r o v e t h e world. In 1 8 9 8 d u r i n g t h e S p a n i s h - A m e r i c a n War, I n d i a n a s e n a t o r A l b e r t B e v e r i d g e e x h o r t e d A m e r i c a n s to fulfill t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s as t h e p e o p l e c h o s e n by G o d to save the world: He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples. . . . He has marked the American people as His Chosen Nation finally to lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for us all profit, glory, happiness possible to man. We are trustees of the world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace. The judgment of the Master is upon us: "Ye have been faithful over a few things; I will make you ruler over many things." 52 Beveridge's remarks during and after the Spanish-American W a r r e p r e s e n t a new k i n d o f p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f t h e city-on-the-hill myth. H e r e we see an i m p o r t a n t political l e a d e r using the myth to m o b i l i z e t h e A m e r i c a n p e o p l e f o r war. B e v e r i d g e r e d e f i n e s A m e r ica's divine mission. It is n o l o n g e r e n o u g h to serve as a s h i n i n g exa m p l e o r to Christianize the rest o f t h e world; now G o d wishes t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s to p r o v i d e all o t h e r s o c i e t i e s with g o o d ( m e a n i n g U.S.-style d e m o c r a t i c ) g o v e r n m e n t . T h e city-on-the-hill myth in t h e h a n d s o f B e v e r i d g e b e c o m e s an A m e r i c a n o b l i g a t i o n to r u l e t h e world. P e r h a p s , as s o m e have a r g u e d , t h e d r a m a t i c e x p a n s i o n o f A m e r i c a ' s o b l i g a t i o n s i n h e r e n t in this myth m e r e l y r e f l e c t s a recogn i t i o n o f t h e growth o f A m e r i c a n power by t h o s e who p e r p e t u a t e d t h e myth d u r i n g this p e r i o d . 5 3 At any r a t e , A m e r i c a ' s God-given mission as p r e s e n t e d by this myth would c o n t i n u e to e x p a n d d u r i n g t h e twentieth century. P e r h a p s t h e m o s t f a m o u s t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y A m e r i c a n statesm a n to invoke the city-on-the-hill myth in r e l a t i o n to f o r e i g n policy

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was Woodrow Wilson. During a 1919 trip a r o u n d the c o u n t r y to offer and explain the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations to the American people, Wilson gave speeches in which he clearly laid o u t America's God-given mission in the world. In Salt Lake City, he proclaimed: I for my part want to go in and accept what is offered to us, the leadership of the world. A leadership of what sort, my fellow citizens? Not a leadership that leads men along the lines by which great nations can profit out of weak nations, not an exploiting power, but a liberating power, a power to show the world that when America was born it was indeed a finger pointed toward those lands into which men could deploy some of these days and live in happy freedom, look each other in the eyes as equals, see that no man was put upon, that no people were forced to accept authority which was not of their own choice, and that out of the general generous impulse of the human genius and the human spirit, we were lifted along the levels of civilization to days when there should be wars no more, but men should govern themselves in peace and amity and quiet. That is the leadership we said we wanted and now the world offers it to us. 5 4

This millennialist vision has the United States responsible f o r n o less than creating a democratic Utopia t h r o u g h o u t the entire world a n d is a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the Beveridge t h e m e of providing good government for the world. Wilson believed very strongly that America—and he personally—had a very special God-given mission to save the world f r o m war and repression. This belief was clearly reflected in his behavior at the end of the war d u r i n g the peace negotiations and d u r i n g his attempts to get the treaty ratified by Congress. 5 5 With Wilson, then, we have a very powerful and influential policymaker who embellishes the city-on-the-hill myth with rhetoric and who seems to be very strongly i n f l u e n c e d by the myth in his conduct of U.S. foreign policy. T h u s over time we can discern a clear developmental p a t t e r n with regard to this f o u n d i n g myth. From its genesis in J o h n W i n t h r o p ' s speech on the Arbella in 1630, the myth has evolved even as it has spread f r o m the Massachusetts Bay settlement t h r o u g h o u t the expanding American republic. For the first Puritans, the mission was simply to be a shining example of a godly community. Later generations of Puritan mythmakers e x p a n d e d the mission to include Puritanizing (not j u s t Christianizing) first England and then the rest of the world. As the myth spread t h r o u g h o u t the growing republic, the mission began to

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include spreading democracy as well as the true religion throughout the world. As America began to grow in power during the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, new mythmakers such as Beveridge and Wilson began to give the myth a much more aggressive and militant tone. The divine mission in the twentieth-century version of the city-on-the-hill myth made America responsible for bringing about a Utopian democratic millennium throughout the world. And twentieth-century mythmakers like Wilson wanted the United States to pursue aggressively this millennial vision with all the power at its command.

THE PURITAN REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER

Closely related to the city-on-the-hill myth is the Puritan representative character. Like the entrepreneur and manager representative characters, the Puritan is characterized by three basic elements: a distinct epistemological stance, a distinct moral stance, and a distinct paradigmatic mode of social action. The elements of the Puritan representative character emerged from the telling and retelling (in histories and novels about Puritan New England) of the life stories of Puritan political and religious leaders and from intellectual histories of the era. 56 These elements came together to form the idealized model for individual behavior that is the Puritan representative character. The Puritan representative character is unusual in that both its epistemological stance and its moral stance have a biblical source. Put simply, the Puritans believed that the Bible was the only source for conceptions of the true and the good. In fact, as Perry Miller and Thomas Johnson explain in the introduction to The Puritans, the Puritans' strict and literal use of the Bible as a moral and epistemological guide was the main issue dividing them from the Anglicans, whose interpretations of the Bible were much less strict and literal. As Miller and Johnson argue, T h e difference between the Anglican and the Puritan, then, was that the Puritan thought the Bible, the revealed word of God, was the word of God from one end to the other, a complete body of laws, an absolute code in everything it touched upon; the Anglican thought this a rigid, doctrinaire and utterly unjustifiable extension of the authority of scripture. T h e Puritan held that the Bible was sufficiently plain and explicit so that men with the proper learning, following the proper rules of deduction and interpretation, could establish its meaning and intention on every subject, not only in theology, but in ethics, costume, diplomacy,

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military tactics, inheritances, profits, marriages, and judicial procedure. 5 7

The Puritan believed that only the regenerate souls who had received the grace of God were capable of properly interpreting God's word in the scripture and His order throughout the universe. Since only a small number of people in each congregation were considered regenerate or true members, an elite group in the Massachusetts Bay Colony was in charge of determining what constituted the true, the good, and the just for the rest of the colony. 58 As Miller points out in Errand in the Wilderness, this led to a very authoritarian church and polity during the first hundred years of the Massachusetts Bay Settlement, or until the Great Awakening of 1740.59 Puritan religious and political leaders took their responsibility as interpreters of God's will very seriously, and they saw themselves as chosen by God for this crucial role. 60 This led to a double sense of "chosenness" on the part of Puritan leaders such as John Winthrop; he was the chosen leader of God's chosen people. 61 This sense of chosenness and destiny is an important characteristic of Puritan leadership because it tends to be accompanied by an unwillingness to compromise, especially when the leader perceives sacred principles to be at stake. Also, in conjunction with the Puritan's revelation-based moral and epistemological stances, this sense of chosenness gives the Puritan leader a distinct paradigmatic mode of social action: conversion and mobilization of followers to carry out God's will in the world. The first and most powerful example of this Puritan mode of social action may be found in John Winthrop's famous shipboard "model of Christian charity" sermon to the first settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In this sermon, which contains the seeds of the city-on-the-hill myth, Governor Winthrop exhorted his fellow colonists to give their all so that their divine mission to the new world would succeed. 62 T h e sermon is full of Old Testament imagery, which Winthrop used to strengthen the sense that these Puritan settlers were in fact the new Israel and as such were tightly bound to each other and to God in a holy covenant. 63 He told his fellow settlers that even as the Arbella carried them to their destination, the eyes of God and the Christian world were on them and they must not fail. 64 Later generations of Puritan leaders in New England continued to use this style of mobilization. Indeed, the second generation of Puritan religious leaders relied on it heavily in the 1660s and 1670s

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as they f o u g h t to k e e p t h e N e w E n g l a n d P u r i t a n s t r u e to t h e i r c o v e n a n t with G o d by p r e a c h i n g f i e r y j e r e m i a d s . 6 5 I n c r e a s e Mather, o n e o f the m o r e f a m o u s o f the s e c o n d g e n e r ation Puritan religious leaders, was a master o f the j e r e m i a d . In o n e e n t i t l e d " T h e D a y o f T r o u b l e Is N e a r , " h e w o v e i m a g e r y f r o m the O l d a n d N e w T e s t a m e n t s to r e i n f o r c e the c o v e n a n t identity o f the P u r i t a n settlers, r e m i n d t h e m o f t h e i r d i v i n e mission, a n d give an exhaustive list o f the ways they w e r e f a i l i n g that mission. H e finally w a r n e d t h e m o f the divine p u n i s h m e n t they w o u l d s u f f e r if they did n o t m e n d their ways. 6 6 We f i n d a n o t h e r e x a m p l e o f this Puritan style o f p e r s u a s i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n in the R e v e r e n d A r t h u r D i m m e s d a l e in N a t h a n i e l H a w t h o r n e ' s classic n o v e l a b o u t t h e N e w E n g l a n d P u r i t a n s , The Scarlet Letter. Early in t h e n o v e l , we f i n d R e v e r e n d D i m m e s d a l e p l e a d i n g with the l e a d e r s o f the s e t t l e m e n t to allow H e s t e r P r y n n e to k e e p h e r ( a n d u n b e k n o w n s t to t h e l e a d e r s , his) i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d , Pearl. D i m m e s d a l e a r g u e s p o w e r f u l l y that it is G o d ' s will that H e s t e r s h o u l d raise t h e c h i l d b o t h as p u n i s h m e n t f o r h e r sin o f a d u l t e r y a n d as a s a f e g u a r d to k e e p h e r f r o m r e t u r n i n g to h e r sinf u l ways: This child of the father's guilt and the mother's shame hath come from the hand of God, to work in many ways upon her heart, who pleads so earnestly . . . to keep her. It was meant for a blessing; for the one blessing of her life! It was meant, doubtless, as the mother herself hath told us for a retribution too; a torture, to be felt at many an unthought of moment; a pang, a sting, an ever recurring agony, in the midst of troubled joy! . . . Therefore it is good for this poor, sinful woman that she hath an infant immortality, a being capable of eternal joy or sorrow, confided to her care—to be trained up by her to righteousness—to remind her, at every moment, of her fall—but yet to teach her, as it were by the Creator's sacred pledge, that, if she bring the child to heaven, the child will also bring its parent thither. 6 ' In this passage, the R e v e r e n d D i m m e s d a l e illustrates the parad i g m a t i c P u r i t a n style o f p e r s u a s i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n . First h e claims persuasively to k n o w w h a t G o d ' s will is in the matter, t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h i n g his k n o w l e d g e o f the true a n d the g o o d . O n c e h e has p e r s u a d e d t h e town l e a d e r s that it is G o d ' s will that H e s t e r P r y n n e raise t h e c h i l d , they are l e f t n o c h o i c e b u t to g r a n t h e r p a r e n t a l rights a n d to d o so w i t h o u t f u r t h e r discussion. 6 8 T h u s (his own sin n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ) h e shows all t h r e e e l e m e n t s o f the Puritan representative c h a r a c t e r : the revelation-based m o r a l a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l stances a n d the p a r a d i g m a t i c m o d e o f social action.

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T h e manifestation o f elements of the Puritan representative c h a r a c t e r has n o t b e e n l i m i t e d to P u r i t a n p o l i t i c a l a n d r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s , b e they figures historical o r literary. I n d e e d , in t h e d i p l o m a t i c b e h a v i o r o f W o o d r o w W i l s o n d u r i n g a n d a f t e r W o r l d W a r I, w e c a n see all t h r e e e l e m e n t s . In Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, A l e x a n d e r a n d J u l i e t t e G e o r g e p r e s e n t British p r i m e m i n i s t e r L l o y d G e o r g e ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n s o f W i l s o n ' s arrival at t h e Versailles c o n f e r e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to P r i m e M i n i s t e r L l o y d G e o r g e , W i l s o n a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e the g a t h e r e d l e a d e r s to supp o r t t h e i d e a o f a L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s by a r g u i n g that it was G o d ' s will: "Why has Jesus C h r i s t so f a r n o t s u c c e e d e d in i n d u c i n g t h e w o r l d to f o l l o w His t e a c h i n g in these matters? It is b e c a u s e H e t a u g h t the ideal w i t h o u t devising any practical m e a n s o f attaining it. T h a t is t h e r e a s o n w h y I a m p r o p o s i n g a p r a c t i c a l s c h e m e to c a r r y o u t His aims." 6 9 H e r e W i l s o n manifests all t h r e e e l e m e n t s o f the P u r i t a n r e p r e sentative character. His e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a n d m o r a l claims are based o n r e v e l a t i o n — h e k n o w s w h a t G o d ' s will in this m a t t e r is. H e presents h i m s e l f as t h e o n e w h o is c h o s e n to b r i n g a b o u t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f G o d ' s will in the f o r m o f the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s . H e uses his p r i v i l e g e d m o r a l a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a n c e — h i s knowle d g e o f G o d ' s w i l l — t o a t t e m p t to p e r s u a d e the o t h e r leaders. T h u s W i l s o n at Versailles provides a g o o d early-twentieth-century e x a m p l e o f a statesman w h o e m b o d i e d the Puritan representative character.

THE MARKET MYTH T h e m a r k e t m y t h o f A m e r i c a n society provides an alternative to the city-on-the-hill m y t h as a s o u r c e o f collective identity a n d legitimat i o n f o r m e m b e r s o f society. W h e r e a s t h e f o u n d i n g m y t h e n d o w s A m e r i c a n society w i t h a s a c r e d a n d b i b l i c a l m e a n i n g , the m a r k e t m y t h e n d o w s it with a m u c h m o r e worldly, e v e n p r o f a n e , m e a n i n g . T h e city-on-the-hill myth l e g i t i m a t e s U.S. society by l i n k i n g A m e r i cans t r a n s c e n d e n t l y to the c r e a t o r o f the universe; the m a r k e t myth l e g i t i m a t e s U.S. society by g l o r i f y i n g the worldly rewards that c o m e f r o m h a r d w o r k a n d s u c c e s s f u l e n t e r p r i s e in this w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g to t h e m a r k e t m y t h , w h a t m a k e s A m e r i c a special is that it is ostensibly the o n l y p l a c e w h e r e a p e r s o n c a n start f r o m a p o s i t i o n o f abj e c t p o v e r t y a n d little e d u c a t i o n a n d t h r o u g h h a r d w o r k , c o n s t a n t s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t , a n d the c o u r a g e to take risks in "the m a r k e t " e n d u p t h e o w n e r o f a h u g e c o m m e r c i a l e n t e r p r i s e w i t h all t h e attend a n t power, status, a n d worldly c o m f o r t s .

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Unlike with the city-on-the-hill myth, it is impossible to pinpoint precisely the origins of the market myth. O n e problem is that many of the economic ideas that underlie the myth, such as those of Adam Smith and others, had their origins in Europe. T h e r e is evidence, however, that long before the classical liberal economic ideas of Adam Smith and others arrived, people began to think a b o u t U.S. society in terms that were consistent with the market myth. In fact, d u r i n g the early e i g h t e e n t h century, Puritan religious leaders in New England began to warn that citizens were worrying too much about their individual business concerns to the detriment of their sacred obligations as m e m b e r s of a covenant with God. 7 0 Puritan ministers did, however, stress to their congregations that their salvation d e p e n d e d u p o n their having an earthly (i.e., occupational) calling in addition to their all-important, covenantderived religious calling. 71 As Irvin G. Wyllie points out in The SelfMade Man in America, analysis of the early-eighteenth-century sermons of leading Puritan ministers such as Cotton Mather shows the interweaving of a b u d d i n g market ethos and the traditional covenant ethos. 7 2 Cotton Mather's f a m o u s 1710 s e r m o n entitled "Essays to Do Good" is p e r h a p s the most widely read example of this Puritan synthesis of a market ethos and the covenant ethos. 7 3 T h u s we find some of the seeds of an embryonic market ethos coming f r o m the same Puritan tradition that brought us the city-onthe-hill myth. However, within the Puritan tradition, pursuit of an earthly calling was absolutely subordinate to the all-important religious calling i n h e r e n t to the covenant with God. It is only later, in the early n i n e t e e n t h century, that we see a completely secular market ethos beginning to take hold. 7 4 Many scholars of American culture point to Benjamin Franklin as something of a transitional figure between the Puritan-based covenant ethos and the developing secular market ethos. 7 5 As Wyllie points out, Franklin grew u p in Puritan Boston, read Cotton Mather's "Essays to Do Good" as a child, and later would admit that they had a strong influence on him. 7 6 In Franklin's many writings on how to succeed, he provided young Americans with a set of secular commercial virtues that would help them build their fortunes in the p r o p e r way.77 Like the Puritans, Franklin stressed the n e e d to work hard in developing a successful commercial enterprise. 7 8 However, unlike the Puritans Franklin did n o t subordinate commercial activity to an overarching covenant obligation. For him, hard work in the pursuit of business success was i m p o r t a n t because it developed the p r o p e r sort of individual and c o n t r i b u t e d to the public good. It was not a means to salvation. 79

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In the early n i n e t e e n t h century, after his death, Benjamin Franklin was a central figure in the rags-to-riches t h e m e that was so p r o m i n e n t a p a r t of the larger market mythology rapidly developing d u r i n g this time. 8 0 This theme—constantly r e p e a t e d in thousands of self-help books, articles, speeches, and s e r m o n s — f o r m e d the core of the e m e r g i n g m a r k e t myth d u r i n g the second half of the n i n e t e e n t h century. 8 1 As Wyllie demonstrates, spreading the "self-help gospel" became a huge business after the Civil War. Selfhelp books were published and distributed all over the country, and self-help lectures were very heavily attended. 8 2 A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t m e d i u m for the t h e m e was the rags-toriches novel. T h e most f a m o u s a u t h o r of this g e n r e was undoubtably Horatio Alger. T h e heroes of his novels had names like Ragged Dick and Tattered Tom and started out as p o o r city boys. T h e young hero would raise himself u p by cultivating in himself the p r o p e r commercial virtues, working extra h a r d , and staying alert for business o p p o r t u n i t i e s (there was also usually a little luck involved) . 8 3 T h e Alger novels sold over 50 million copies during the late n i n e t e e n t h and early twentieth centuries and as such were an incredibly powerful carrier of the rags-to-riches t h e m e and the market myth. 8 4 These were also sustained in grade school classrooms by the McGuffey Reader textbook, which was used t h r o u g h o u t the country for the final three-quarters of the n i n e t e e n t h century. 8 5 T h e central idea of the rags-to-riches theme was that any young m a n (women were excluded) in the United States who cultivated the p r o p e r virtues and worked h a r d could build u p a substantial business enterprise with all the a t t e n d a n t rewards of material success. 86 America was thus p r e s e n t e d as a u n i q u e land of e c o n o m i c opportunity where there were n o rigid class distinctions. T h e central principles of the m a r k e t myth are individualism a n d competition. For all of the central mythical figures, w h e t h e r they were Horatio Alger's fictional heroes or real people like Benj a m i n Franklin and Andrew Carnegie, the j o u r n e y f r o m poverty to business success was a lonely one. First the h e r o struggled to cultivate in himself the p r o p e r commercial virtues; then to scrimp, save, a n d gain access to capital; a n d then, after he had built u p a successful business or (in the case of Alger's boys) achieved a lofty position in s o m e o n e else's firm, to maintain what he had achieved. Even the great r o b b e r barons like Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, and Harriman all continued to struggle to fight off competitors and e x p a n d m a r k e t share. In all of these success stories that are the stuff of the market myth, the moral of the story was the same: Success is achieved t h r o u g h devoting one's life to it.

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This t h e m e of individual struggle in t h e m a r k e t myth powerfully e x p l a i n e d a n d legitimated the A m e r i c a n f r e e e n t e r p r i s e system. As Wyllie argues, the myth "callously c o n d e m n e d the majority who failed a n d c h a r g e d t h e m with d e l i n q u e n c y [while] reserv[ing] t h e halo of m e r i t f o r those w h o s u c c e e d e d . " 8 7 A c c o r d i n g to t h e logic of the myth, business success is solely a p r o d u c t of intense individual e f f o r t ; t h e r e f o r e , those who d o n o t succeed m u s t be lazy. Also, the successful businessman is entitled to his wealth because h e has e a r n e d it. T h u s t h e m a r k e t myth was a p o w e r f u l i d e a t i o n a l force f o r preserving the e c o n o m i c status q u o in U.S. society d u r i n g the Gilded Age. A n o t h e r r e l a t e d t h e m e in t h e m a r k e t myth is t h e j e a l o u s protection of individual e c o n o m i c striving f r o m g o v e r n m e n t a l interf e r e n c e . T h e m a r k e t myth holds that a large p a r t of the e c o n o m i c developmental success of U.S. society has b e e n the direct result of a strictly e n f o r c e d hands-off a t t i t u d e o n t h e p a r t of g o v e r n m e n t toward c o m p e t i t i o n in t h e f r e e m a r k e t . 8 8 This idea t h a t A m e r i c a achieved its e c o n o m i c success as a result of f a i t h f u l worship at the temple of laissez-faire lends an a d d e d air of historical u n i q u e n e s s to the A m e r i c a n e c o n o m i c success story. It also b e c o m e s the basis f o r a quasi-messianic t e n d e n c y to o f f e r the American e c o n o m i c experie n c e as a m o d e l f o r the rest of the world. 8 9 D u r i n g the Progressive Era t h e self-made-man t h e m e of the m a r k e t myth was u s e d in the a r g u m e n t s of r e f o r m e r s who were trying to establish m o r e governm e n t c o n t r o l over big business a n d break u p the giant trusts. They a r g u e d that these trusts so d o m i n a t e d the m a r k e t that they left n o r o o m f o r individuals to c r e a t e t h e i r own businesses. 9 0 T h u s w h e n the h u g e firms set u p by the h e r o e s of the m a r k e t myth began to restrict the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r u p - a n d - c o m i n g e n t r e p r e n e u r s , r e f o r m ers b e g a n to use some of the imagery of the m a r k e t myth to argue f o r increased g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l over those businesses. THE ENTREPRENEUR REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER D u r i n g t h e late n i n e t e e n t h century, w h e n the m a r k e t myth was perh a p s at the p e a k of its i n f l u e n c e , a new r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r arose in A m e r i c a n culture that nicely c o m p l e m e n t e d it. This representative c h a r a c t e r was d e s c r i b e d variously as t h e " r o b b e r b a r o n , " t h e "mogul," o r the "titan" in U.S. fiction a n d j o u r n a l i s m , b u t following Bellah, I shall call this new c h a r a c t e r t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r . 9 1 T h e e n t r e p r e n e u r was the self-made business m a g n a t e who was, at once, b o t h p r o d u c e r a n d p r o d u c t of the Gilded Age. Bellah a n d his

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colleagues describe the great American entrepreneurs as "captains o f industry who could ignore the clamor of public opinion and rise to truly national power through e c o n o m i c means a l o n e . " 9 2 T h e great entrepreneur has often been the target of intense criticism by liberal and reformist social observers (including Bellah et al.). Nonetheless, this representative character has been a powerful part o f U.S. culture since its advent during the Gilded Age. In America as a Civilization, Max L e r n e r describes the tremendous power with which the e n t r e p r e n e u r character captured the imagination of the American people. Every civilization has its characteristic flowering in some civilization type, the persona of the social mask on which the ordinary man in the civilization models himself. . . . The persona of the American civilization has been the businessman—the "Titan," as Dreiser called him; the "Tycoon" as Fortune called him. Where other civilization types have pursued wisdom, beauty, sanctity, military glory, predacity, asceticism, the businessman pursues the magnitudes of profit with a similar single-minded drive. . . . The survivors in the fierce competitive struggle were those who most clearly embodied the businessman's single mindedness of purpose.93 L e r n e r notes that the great e n t r e p r e n e u r was often attacked by muckrakers in the media, but he argues that the impact o f this new character on the popular imagination was not dampened by these attacks. By the time of the first World War, the Titan had caught the imagination of the novelists as well as the populace. . . . Americans needed no fire breathing imperialist swaggers to express their sense of national importance. The Titan was all the symbol they needed. . . . Even when the muckrakers excoriated him . . . they left little doubt their target was indeed a Titan. The magazine readers glimpsed the outlines of the heroic in the subjects of the biographical exposes and felt more envy than indignation.94 Thus as L e r n e r argues, the entrepreneur character was embraced, warts and all, by many Americans. But what was the essence o f this e n t r e p r e n e u r character? It is perhaps best found in the works o f those American fiction writers who focused on the entrepreneur as their central character. O n e o f the best known portrayals appeared in W. D. Howells's The Rise of Silas Lapham, first published in 1885. Howells's Silas L a p h a m was not a business h e r o on the magnitude o f the real-life r o b b e r barons, men such as Carnegie, Gould, Hill, and Rockefeller.

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Lapham's mineral paint business was very successful both nationally and internationally, b u t his notoriety was mostly limited to the Boston area, where his business was located. 9 5 Nonetheless, we see m u c h of the essence of the e n t r e p r e n e u r representative character in L a p h a m . While developing his paint business, he manifested a single-minded determination to maintain control over and to e x p a n d the business and his profits as far as possible. 9 6 In the course of these efforts, he forced out a p a r t n e r whose infusion of capital during an earlier downturn had kept the business f r o m going under. 9 7 T h e reader is led to suspect, via Lapham's wife's moral criticism, that Lapham had fully intended to force the p a r t n e r out when profits were again realized. 9 8 This kind of c u t t h r o a t tactic in business dealings (often with accompanying social Darwinistic justifications) is very m u c h a p r o m i n e n t behavioral aspect of the e n t r e p r e n e u r representative character. Eventually, L a p h a m showed remorse over this earlier harsh t r e a t m e n t of his partner and m a d e loans to him, an action that indirectly led to the bankruptcy of his paint business. Howells reveals the fiercely competitive a n d shrewd n a t u r e of the e n t r e p r e n e u r involved in business dealings in a later passage in the book wherein he describes L a p h a m trying to negotiate with a competing paint m a n u f a c t u r e r whose operation threatens the success of his own. He found the West Virginians full of zeal and hope, but in ten minutes he knew that they had not tested their strength in the money market, and had not yet ascertained how much or how little capital they could command. Lapham himself, if he had so much would not have hesitated to put a million dollars into their business. He saw, as they did not see, that they had the game in their own hands, and that if they could raise the money to extend their business, they could ruin him. It was only a question of time, and he was on the ground first. He frankly proposed a union of their interests. He admitted that they had a good thing, and that he should have to fight them hard; but he meant to fight them to the death unless they could come to some terms. Now the question was whether they had better go on and make a heavy loss for both sides by competition, or whether they had better form a partnership to run both paints and command the whole market. 99

This passage illustrates perfectly the fierce "survival of the fittest" milieu of the competing e n t r e p r e n e u r s and the hardball approach to business negotiations that are the essence of the paradigmatic m o d e of social action of the entrepreneur. In the real-world struggles between the great U.S. entrepreneurs, or robber barons, during the Gilded Age, some of these businessmen

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a n d t h e i r a p o l o g i s t s e v e n u s e d t h e S p e n c e r i a n t h e o r i e s o f social D a r w i n i s m that w e r e c o m i n g i n t o f a s h i o n to j u s t i f y t h e i r f i e r c e l y c o m p e t i t i v e business m e t h o d s . L e l a n d B a l d w i n d e s c r i b e s this p h e n o m e n o n in The Meaning of America. The Great Entrepreneurs could scarcely avoid the knowledge that their actions were violating even the harsh tenets of Calvinism by ignoring its injunction to social responsibility. What was needed was a philosophical justification of their course. It was the mission of Herbert Spencer to provide this. . . . Darwinism's triumph in the United States was delayed by the Civil War, but soon thereafter it was put to use, under the name of Social Darwinism, to explain and justify the methods of the Great Entrepreneurs and the Finance Capitalists. 100 T h e D a r w i n i s t i c a n d n a t u r a l i s t i c t h e m e o f "survival o f t h e fittest" finds its way into o n e o f t h e best-known f i c t i o n a l portrayals o f t h e A m e r i c a n e n t r e p r e n e u r . In T h e o d o r e D r e i s e r ' s The Financier a n d The Titan, we f i n d p e r h a p s the m o s t f a m o u s f i c t i o n a l portrayal o f an A m e r i c a n e n t r e p r e n e u r in t h e c h a r a c t e r o f F r a n k A l g e r n o n C o w p e r w o o d . Y o u n g C o w p e r w o o d realizes at a v e r y y o u n g a g e that h e wants to c r e a t e a business e m p i r e rivaling that o f any o f the robber barons.101 T h e r e is a s c e n e v e r y early in The Financier in w h i c h t h e y o u n g C o w p e r w o o d is t r y i n g to f i g u r e o u t the n a t u r a l o r d e r o f the w o r l d , a n d h e s t u m b l e s u p o n a fish tank in a l o c a l m a r k e t w h e r e i n a lobster g r a d u a l l y w e a r s d o w n a squid o v e r a c o u p l e o f days a n d eventually d e v o u r s it. 1 0 2 D r e i s e r d e s c r i b e s h o w the d r a m a in t h e fish tank h e l p s C o w p e r w o o d . "That's the way it has to be I guess" he commented to himself. That squid wasn't quick enough. . . . It made a great impression on him. It answered in a rough way that riddle that had been annoying him so much in the past: "How is life organized?" Things lived on each other—that was it. . . . For days and weeks Frank thought of this and of the life he was tossed into, for he was already thinking of what he should be in this world, and how he should get along. 1 0 3 T h u s C o w p e r w o o d i n t e r n a l i z e s at a v e r y y o u n g a g e the "law o f t h e j u n g l e " that h e e v e n t u a l l y c o m e s to live by d u r i n g his b u s i n e s s career. T h r o u g h o u t t h e rest o f The Financier a n d i n t o its s e q u e l , The Titan, t h e r e a d e r is b r o u g h t a l o n g o n F r a n k C o w p e r w o o d ' s v e r y successful business c a r e e r ( w h i c h d o e s have s o m e fits a n d starts o n t h e way). C o w p e r w o o d n e v e r attains t h e m a g n i t u d e o f b u s i n e s s

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empire of the robber barons, a goal for which he desperately and ruthlessly strives. Nonetheless, he does become one of the richest and most powerful businessmen in Chicago, and he does so by opposing anyone who gets in his way. All through these two novels, Dreiser treats the reader to indepth explorations of Cowperwood's philosophy of business and life. The tenets of Cowperwood's personal philosophy reveal the moral essence of the entrepreneur character. Here is a sample from Cowperwood's earlier years in business. T h e moral nature of Frank Cowperwood may at this j u n c t u r e be said to have had no material or spiritual existence. He had never had, so far as he had reasoned at all, a fixed attitude in regard to anything except preserving himself intact and succeeding. His father talked . . . of business honor, commercial integrity, and so forth. Frank thought of this a long time at moments. What was honor? . . . Men seemed to think it referred to some state of mind which would not allow a man to take u n d u e advantage of another; but life experience taught, and was teaching him something different. Honor was almost, he thought, a figment of the brain. If it referred to anything, it referred to force, generosity, power. . . . So far as he could see, force governed this world—hard cold force and quickness of brain. If one had force, plenty of it, quickness of wit, and subtlety there was no need for anything else. Some people might be pretending to be guided by other principles—ethical and religious, for instance; they might actually be so guided—he could not tell. If they were they were following false or silly standards. 1 0 4

Dreiser's Cowperwood provides an extreme example of the "ruin or be ruined" social Darwinistic moral stance of the entrepreneur character. The only principle of concern is self-survival and prosperity. Howells's Silas Lapham was not nearly as morally bankrupt as Dreiser's Frank Cowperwood, but both exhibit the same amoral obsession with building their business empires. THE PRAGMATIC MYTH

The pragmatic myth of the United States is perhaps best understood by contrasting it with the city-on-the-hill myth. Whereas the founding myth derives the central meaning of America in an a priori fashion from revelations of the will of God, the pragmatic myth derives the central meaning of America in an a postiori fashion from the concrete political institutions that have flourished in the United States. America's greatness and uniqueness stem not from divine election or chosenness but rather from the remarkable

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success of the political institutions set u p by the f o u n d i n g fathers. Seen t h r o u g h the lens of the pragmatic myth, the American experience has been a grand experiment in which the social and political ideas of the f o u n d i n g fathers (as e m b o d i e d in the institutions they designed) have been tested constantly and have proven themselves valid. T h e most t h o r o u g h t r e a t m e n t of the pragmatic myth can be f o u n d in Daniel Boorstin's The Genius of American Politics. He states: "The marvelous success and vitality of our institutions is equaled by the amazing poverty and inarticulateness of o u r theorizing a b o u t politics. No n a t i o n has ever believed m o r e firmly that its political life was based on a perfect theory. And yet n o nation has ever been less interested in political philosophy or p r o d u c e d less in the way of theory." 1 0 5 Boorstin argues that Americans have come to believe that "the F o u n d i n g Fathers equipped o u r nation at its birth with a p e r f e c t a n d complete political theory, a d e q u a t e to all o u r f u t u r e needs." He argues f u r t h e r that Americans believe this doctrinal "gift" f r o m the past is kept alive and e m b o d i e d in the American "way of life," even though they never feel the n e e d to make the theory explicit. 1 0 6 To illustrate the u n i q u e way Americans mythologize history to clarify their national identity, he examines the American political hagiography in which the F o u n d i n g Fathers—who supposedly infused American institutions with their guiding values—are in t u r n infused with mythical significance. 1 0 7 H e t h e n goes on to describe the essence of the pragmatic myth: The facts of our history have thus made it easy for us to assume that our national life, as distinguished from that of the European peoples who trace their identity to a remote era, has had a clear purpose. Life in America—appropriately called "The American Experiment"—has again and again been described as the test or the proof of values supposed to have been clearly in the minds of the Founders. While as we shall see, the temper of much of our thought has been antihistorical, it is nevertheless true that we have leaned heavily on history to clarify our image of ourselves. 108

Indeed, as Arthur Schlesinger points out in The Cycles of American History, many of the Founding Fathers and early presidents contributed to the d e v e l o p m e n t of the pragmatic myth by describing the American experience as a political experiment of epic proportions. 1 0 9 In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton evoked experimental imagery when he wrote, "It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their c o n d u c t and example, to decide the i m p o r t a n t question,

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whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force." 1 1 0 In his attempt to persuade the people of New York to support the proposed constitution, Hamilton tried to infuse the decision with extra significance by making it a part of a grand American experiment on behalf of all mankind. George Washington echoed this experimental theme in his first inaugural address: "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment intrusted to the American people." 1 1 1 Like Hamilton, Washington burdened the American people with being involved in a grand experiment on which the political fate of mankind hinged. The experimental theme was later picked up by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address. I know indeed that some honest men fear that a republic can not be strong, that this Government is not strong enough; but would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government that has so far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear that this government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself. I trust not. . . . Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the form of kings to govern him? Let history answer this question. 1 1 2

We see not only clear America-as-experiment imagery in this address but also an interesting preference for the value of experience over the value of a priori theory. In rebuttal to those who, based on their readings of the classical theorists, believed that republican government could not long survive, Jefferson pointed to the actual experience and success of the American political experiment. If there were any doubts about the new system, Jefferson seemed to be arguing, let the test of experience decide its merits and not some abstract theory. This preference for a postiori knowledge over a priori knowledge is an important element of the collective self-understanding that the pragmatic myth provides for the American people. T h r o u g h the lens of the pragmatic myth, they come to see themselves as a people who arrive at the true and the good through experience. T h e American political system is good because experience has proven it to work.

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In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville discusses Americans' p r e f e r e n c e for a postiori knowledge. I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States. . . . Yet it is easy to perceive that almost all of the inhabitants of the United States use their minds in the same manner, and direct them according to the same rules; that is to say, without ever having taken the trouble to define the rules, they have a philosophical method common to the whole people. To evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing better . . . to tend to results without being bound to means, and to strike though the form to the substance—such are the principle characteristics of what I shall call the philosophical method of the Americans. 1 1 3 De Tocqueville's A m e r i c a n s were i n c l i n e d to " a c c e p t . . . existing facts only as a lesson to be used in doing otherwise and doing better." This is the essence o f the collective identity that A m e r i c a n s acquire when they view themselves t h r o u g h the lens of the p r a g m a t i c myth. During the 1 8 3 0 s the public political discourse was still full o f the imagery o f the pragmatic myth. In his farewell address in March 1 8 3 7 , A n d r e w J a c k s o n r e f e r r e d to the " A m e r i c a n e x p e r i m e n t " in the same t e r m s in which G e o r g e Washington h a d d e c a d e s before. The lessons contained in this valuable legacy of Washington to his countrymen should be cherished in the heart of every citizen to the latest generation. . . . Forty years have passed since this imperishable document was given to his countrymen. T h e Federal Constitution was then regarded by him as an experiment—and he so speaks of it in his address—but an experiment upon the success of which the best hopes of his country depended; and we all know that he was prepared to lay down his life, if necessary, to secure it a full and fair trial. The trial has been made. It has succeeded beyond the proudest hopes of those who framed it. 1 1 4 Jackson went on to warn that the e x p e r i m e n t that had thus far g o n e so well could still be u n d o n e and therefore had to be considered as o n g o i n g . 1 1 5 Nonetheless, his assessment o f the "state o f the experim e n t " was m u c h m o r e optimistic than those of the earlier presidents. U s e of the e x p e r i m e n t a l i m a g e r y o f the p r a g m a t i c myth was n o t limited to only presidential addresses. As Rush Welter points o u t in his The Mind of America: 1820-1860, the idea of the U n i t e d States as

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an experiment was very widely seized upon in political discourse. In his book, Welter samples the speeches of clergymen, business leaders, and civic leaders to show that the experimental imagery of the pragmatic myth was widely used during this period. 1 1 6 By the mid1800s, success had made Americans more confident in the outcome of their national experiment than the founding fathers had been. 1 1 7 This confidence in the original "experiment" did not detract from an ongoing interest in experimenting further; the pragmatic myth continued as an influence on the collective identity of the American people. Writing about the character of late-nineteenthcentury Americans, cultural historian Henry Steele Commager sums up the extent to which Americans identified with the pragmatic myth: "The inclination to experiment was deeply ingrained in the American character and fortified by American experience. America itself had been the greatest of experiments, one renewed by each generation of pioneers and each wave of immigrants, and, where every community was a gamble and an opportunity, the American was a gambler and an opportunist." 1 1 8 A good indicator of the extent to which Americans still identified with the pragmatic myth at the end of the nineteenth century is the warm reception they gave to the emerging American philosophical method known as pragmatism. T h e best-known and most widely read pragmatists during the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries were William J a m e s and J o h n Dewey. 119 Pragmatism eschewed attempts to arrive at truth via abstract or a priori reasoning, instead asserting that truth, or, more precisely, pluralistic truths, are arrived at through the interaction of human intelligence with concrete experience. This new American philosophical method of pragmatism was perfectly suited to the American-as-experimenter portrayed by the pragmatic myth. Commager captures this fit better than anyone. These qualities in pragmatism reflected qualities in the American character. . . . It cleared away the jungle of theology and metaphysics and deterministic science and allowed the warm sun of common sense to quicken the American spirit as the pioneer cleared the forests and the underbrush and allowed the sun to quicken the soil of the American West. In a sense, the whole of American experience had prepared for it and now seemed to validate and justify it. For America had been a gamble that had paid off, an experiment that had succeeded. . . . Pragmatism's willingness to break with the past, reject traditional habits, try new methods, put beliefs to a vote, make a future to order, excited not only sympathy but a feeling of familiarity. No wonder . . . pragmatism

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39

c a u g h t o n until it c a m e to be almost the o f f i c i a l p h i l o s o p h y of America.120

Thus going into the twentieth century, Americans had a native philosophical method that suited their image of themselves as experimenters. PIONEERS AND MANAGERS AS REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTERS

T h e pragmatic myth has been complemented by two distinct and context-bound representative characters. The first, dominant during the nineteenth century, was the frontiersman. Later, when the industrial/bureaucratic social milieu of twentieth-century America relegated this representative character to a quaint and distant past, the frontiersman was displaced by the manager. During the early nineteenth century, when Americans were pressing steadily into the western frontier, American authors such as James Fenimore Cooper and Washington Irving produced a significant body of fiction that chronicled the conquest of the continent and produced a new representative character: the frontiersman. 1 2 1 As developed in these frontier novels, the frontiersman embodied the qualities of the American as experimenter and used them to conquer the wilderness. James Oliver Robertson shows the significance of the frontiersman representative character by juxtaposing it with the Puritan character. T h e great, gray Puritan is Christian civilization o n its mission to the N e w World. . . . T h e b r o n z e d , b u c k s k i n n e d Frontiersman is the New World a n d its wildness. T h e Frontiersman is the discoverer, the pathfinder, w h o adapts to whatever he finds and w h o lives in the wilderness. . . . T h e Frontiersman is the h e r o i c survivor, the adaptor . . . the j a c k of all trades. . . . T h e s e two figures are archetypes of A m e r i c a n e x p e r i e n c e , c e l e b r a t e d in A m e r i c a n myth a n d ritual, widely available to A m e r i c a n s as models, explanations, and rationales of themselves and their universe. 1 2 2

Robertson goes on to stress the pragmatic qualities of the frontiersman character. He writes of the frontiersman that "above all he was convinced that diversified, non specialized, jack-of-all trades adaptability was a positive virtue, the only possible way to be in an American community." 123 This representative character was the perfect complement to the pragmatic myth. But by the twentieth century the frontier was

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a distant memory, and the American social landscape had been radically changed by industrialization and bureaucratization. In this modern context, the frontiersman character lost much of its meaning. The rise of the corporation as the predominant pattern of business organization has dramatically changed U.S. society (and indeed all industrialized societies). Within this new social landscape, a new representative character has emerged—the manager. As Bellah and his colleagues argue in Habits of the Heart, "The bureaucratic organization of the business corporation has been the dominant force in this century. Within the corporation, the crucial character has been the professional manager. . . . Although the manager in effect builds upon the work of the entrepreneur and shares with him the drive to achieve and problem solving activism that are old American traits, the social positions and outlooks of the two types differ importantly." 124 Whereas the entrepreneur's drive to achieve is actualized through creating a business empire by fierce bargaining and competition with other empire builders, the manager's drive to achieve is actualized by controlling and manipulating the resources of the corporation in an effort to find the most profitable resource combination. 1 2 5 T h e manager's manipulation of these corporate resources may be seen as an ongoing experiment that is deemed successful when corporate profits are increased. In this quest for effectiveness as defined by profit, the manager is very much a technician. As Bellah and his colleagues put it, "The manager's view of things is akin to that of the technician of industrial society par excellence, the engineer, except that the manager must admit interpersonal responses and personalities, including his own into the calculation of effectiveness." 126 In After Virtue, Alisdair Maclntyre follows Max Weber in examining how the appeal to effectiveness and scientific objectivity provides the modern bureaucratic manager with his authority. 127 In an effort to show how the premises of the moral-philosophical school of emotivism have penetrated (in his view, infected) modern society, he points out that the character of the manager embodies a key premise of emotivism, namely the "obliteration o f the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations." 1 2 8 He goes on to argue that the effectiveness criterion from which the manager derives his or her authority is really a moral fiction. 1 2 9 Maclntyre concludes that the effectiveness criterion is merely "part of a masquerade of social control" because the real-life manager cannot possibly achieve the level of effectiveness that is imputed to the manager representative character. 1 3 0

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41

We shall also have to c o n c l u d e that a n o t h e r m o r a l f i c t i o n — a n d perhaps the most culturally powerful o f them all—is e m b o d i e d in the claims to effectiveness and h e n c e to authority made by the c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r o f the m o d e r n social drama, the b u r e a u c r a t i c manager. . . . T h e claim that the m a n a g e r makes to effectiveness rests o f course on the f u r t h e r claim to possess a stock o f knowledge by m e a n s o f which organizations and social structures can be m o l d e d . S u c h knowledge would have to i n c l u d e factual, lawlike generalizations which would e n a b l e the m a n a g e r to p r e d i c t that, if a state o f affairs o f a certain type were to o c c u r or b e b r o u g h t about, s o m e o t h e r state o f affairs o f s o m e specific kind would result. F o r only such law-like g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s could yield those particular causal explanations and predictions by means o f which the m a n a g e r could mold, influence and c o n t r o l the social environment.131

Although Maclntyre challenges the effectiveness-based claims to authority of real-life managers, at the same time he illustrates the tremendous legitimating power of the manager representative character. The salient question becomes, How did the manager representative character in American culture acquire this aura of effectiveness with its attendant authority to manipulate? The manager's status as high priest in the cult of effectiveness began to develop with the management-efficiency theories of Frederick Taylor and the subsequent emergence of the field of scientific management during the Progressive Era. 1 3 2 The theories that emerged from this field placed upon the corporate manager the burden of maximizing the efficiency of the industrial operation. 1 3 3 Taylor himself was the prototype for the initial version of the modern manager character—the efficiency expert. Writing in the 1930s, American author J o h n Dos Passos captured the essence of the efficiency expert in his novel The Big Money.134 In an introduction to the book Dos Passos drew a character profile of the young Frederick Taylor during the days he was developing his efficiency theories. Production went to his head and thrilled his sleepless nerves like liquor or women on a Saturday night. H e never loafed and h e ' d b e d a m n e d if anybody else would. P r o d u c t i o n was an itch u n d e r his skin. . . . T h a t was the b e g i n n i n g o f the Taylor System o f Scientific M a n a g e m e n t . He was impatient o f explanations, he didn't care whose hide h e took o f f in enforcing the laws he believed inh e r e n t in the production process. . . . He filled the shop with college students with stopwatches and diagrams, tabulating, standardizing. " T h e r e ' s the right way o f doing a thing and the wrong way o f doing it; the right way means increased production, lower costs, h i g h e r wages, bigger profits": the American p l a n . 1 3 5

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Later in The Big Money, Dos Passos described an efficiency expert at an airplane engine plant whose efforts to increase production were driving the p r o d u c t i o n workers so h a r d that they were unable to have sex with their wives when they went h o m e at night. 1 3 6 In a scene designed to convey the Marxist theme of the industrial workplace squeezing the life forces out of the alienated worker, the novel's protagonist, engineer and part owner of the plant Charley Anderson, listened to one of his f o r e m e n , Bill, complaining about the efficiency expert. "Bill wasn't laughing anymore. 'Honestly, n o kiddin'. T h a t d a m n s q u a r e h e a d make the boys work so h a r d they can't get a h a r d on when they go to bed, a n ' their wives raise hell with 'em.' . . . Charley was laughing. 'You're a squarehead yourself, Bill and I d o n ' t know what I can do about it, I ' m just an employee of the company myself. . . . We got to have efficient production, or they'll wipe us out of business. Ford's buildin' planes now.'" 137 With his discussion of the young Taylor in his introduction and his brief description of the efficiency expert in the novel itself, Dos Passos made it clear that he t h o u g h t Taylorism and the rise of the industrial efficiency expert were having a significant (albeit damaging in h u m a n terms) impact on the U.S. industrial workplace. For Dos Passos with his socialist agenda, the rise of the efficiency expert was a decidedly negative development. For people who aspired to r u n profitable industrial enterprises, however, the efficiency expert was viewed as the p r o p h e t of profits. It seems fitting that Frederick Taylor, the original industrial efficiency expert, should have b e e n an American. His constant exp e r i m e n t a t i o n and implicit moral stance (whatever works best is good) were quite consistent with the pragmatic myth of America. Whereas the frontiersman served as the representative character for the pragmatic myth d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century, the efficiency e x p e r t (later fully developed into the m a n a g e r ) served that role during the industrialized twentieth century. Scientific m a n a g e m e n t placed the b u r d e n of efficiency on the manager, b u t it also c o n f e r r e d u p o n him the authority and legitimation that only science can give in the m o d e r n world. As Samuel H a b e r argues, the Taylorites' use of the term scientific to describe the field of m a n a g e m e n t was very m u c h a semiotic power play. "The adjective 'scientific' s t r e n g t h e n e d its appeal f u r t h e r by suggesting disinterestedness, rigor, and a m e t h o d employing the power of laws of nature." 1 3 8 T h e emergence of the field of scientific m a n a g e m e n t also gave rise to the creation of graduate schools of business and to the professionalization of the field of management. 1 3 9 By the 1940s and 1950s the dominant image of the manager was no longer of the efficiency expert standing over the assembly line

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with a stopwatch and a slide rule. T h e new manager could be f o u n d in a plush top-floor office controlling a huge, complex, bureaucratic organization with the help of such m o d e r n m a n a g e m e n t tools as control accounting and operations research. 1 4 0 During the 1950s a n d 1960s a substantial literature a p p e a r e d in which mana g e m e n t consultants and business school professors sought to define the essential intellectual and leadership qualities of the modern manager. 1 4 1 In many of these works, the manager's actions are seen as based on the kind of science and rationality-based authority that is so effectively questioned by Maclntyre in After Virtue. T h e best example of this is in Charles Sumner's "The Managerial Mind." In describing a "factual attitude" as o n e necessary attribute of the managerial mind, Sumner illustrates what Maclntyre calls the "moral fiction" of managerial effectiveness. "The first empirical quality, which might be called the factual attitude, is particularly valuable in the world of managerial action, where the manager has to cause or control specific events in his p r o b l e m situation." 1 4 2 A n o t h e r important intellectual quality of the m o d e r n manager, according to Sumner, is the "quantitative attitude." In describing this attitude, S u m n e r explicitly provides the m a n a g e r with an authority boost by comparing the manager's use of quantitative methods with the use of such m e t h o d s in the world of science. The quantitative attitude satisfies two needs of the scientist. It helps him to be objective, and it enables him to "prove" his relationships or laws. . . . This mathematical predisposition can also be of value to the executive. It can result in improved ways of doing things. . . . Operations research, digital computers, probability and game theory, systems theory, automation, and such social sciences as applied anthropology are all adding to the possibilities for being "scientific" in the sense of measuring the consequences of managerial decisions. 1 4 3

T h u s the m o d e r n m a n a g e r is p r e s e n t e d as having the same strong empirical a n d quantitative orientation toward the world as the scientist. This image of the new American manager wielding the empiricism and quantitative methodology of science also showed u p in the American business fiction of the day. In his 1952 novel Executive Suite, Cameron Hawley described the advent of this new type of manager. "The world was changing. T h e Bullards were defeated, and the Shaws were inheriting the earth. T h e accountants and the calculators had risen to power. T h e slide rule had b e c o m e the scepter. T h e world was overrun with the ever-spawning swarm of figure-jugglers who were fly specking the earth with their decimal

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points, proving over and over again what could be proved true by a clerk with a Comptometer." 1 4 4 In addition to having these scientific qualities (and the authority that comes with t h e m ) , the m a n a g e r was also often presented as having a powerful predisposition toward problem solving. A good illustration of this attribute may be f o u n d in the following quote f r o m David Ewing in The Managerial Mind: Possibly no aspect of the managerial mind is more baffling and frustrating to the nonmanager than this attitude toward problems and difficulties. It is an attitude characterized by a willingness to disturb, to probe, to "look for trouble" and even to "make trouble." He is like the engineer who is never satisfied with his work, however perfect it may seem to others, but is always tinkering with it, stopping the machine to see if he can find a trouble spot or a way of making it run better. 145

Ewing captured the essence of the m o d e r n American manager-asexperimenter. His portrayal was echoed by H e r r y m o n Maurer. 1 4 6 Maurer argued that the m o d e r n American manager still exhibited some of the psychological characteristics of the American frontiersman even as he f u n c t i o n e d within the context of the m o d e r n corporation. The large U.S. corporation is indeed new. Compared with older forms of American enterprise, it is new in appearance. But its motivations are not new to American history. In the large corporation there is the optimism of settlers in a new land who saw bounty instead of scarcity. . . . There are the boyish enthusiasm for growing things where things never grew before, and the zest for surmounting obstacles. There are the frank indifference to abstract theory and the ready urge to experiment. There is in short, a continuity of psychological motives that have helped to make the large corporation a genuinely and uniquely American creation. 147

Thus in its evolution f r o m the efficiency expert of the late Progressive Era to the m o d e r n corporate head of the 1950s and 1960s, the American manager representative character acquired more sciencebased authority while still retaining the aura of the restless and pragmatic American experimenter. Having outlined the d e v e l o p m e n t of the city-on-the-hill, market, and pragmatic myths and the Puritan, entrepreneur, and manager representative characters in American culture, I now t u r n to the Dulles, H a r r i m a n , and McNamara case studies to examine the e x t e n t to which these symbolic structures i n f l u e n c e d the worldviews, self-conceptions, policy preferences, and policy behavior of these three important cold warriors.

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NOTES 1. T h i s is achieved t h r o u g h a survey of i m p o r t a n t c u l t u r a l histories a n d U.S. c h a r a c t e r studies as well as i m p o r t a n t works of U.S. literature a n d o t h e r f o r m s of cultural artifacts. 2. American Heritage Dictionary, 2 n d college e d . (Boston: H o u g h t o n Mifflin, 1985), 827. 3. T h e r e is a t r a d i t i o n of t h i n k i n g a b o u t myth, b e s t e x e m p l i f i e d by E r n s t Cassirer, that focuses o n the p e n e t r a t i o n of the s u p e r n a t u r a l i n t o the everyday world a n d r e f e r s to a type of e x p l a n a t o r y heuristic mostly f o u n d in primitive societies. For a g o o d discussion of t h e various t r a d i t i o n s of t h o u g h t a b o u t myth see H e n r y T u d o r , Political Myth (New York: P r a e g e r , 1972). 4. Ibid., 4 6 - 4 7 . 5. For a d e t a i l e d discussion by D u r k h e i m of t h e collective r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n c e p t , see his 1898 essay "Individual a n d Collective R e p r e s e n t a tions," r e p r i n t e d in Emile D u r k h e i m , Sociology and Philosophy, translated by D. F. Pocock (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953), 1 - 3 5 . See also D u r k h e i m , The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by J o s e p h Swain (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 480-486. 6. D u r k h e i m , The Rules of the Sociological Method, 8 th ed., translated by Sarah Solajay a n d J o h n Mueller (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1966), xlix. 7. D u r k h e i m , Elementary Forms, 419-420. 8. M u c h of D u r k h e i m ' s discussion of the myth c o n c e p t is f o u n d in his studies of primitive societies. This d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t this c o n c e p t is n o t valid f o r t h e study of m o d e r n societies, however. D u r k h e i m himself a r g u e d that t h e m a i n p u r p o s e of his study of primitive religions was to develop an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the basic h u m a n symbolic v a l u e - i n f u s i o n process, which, h e a r g u e d , o p e r a t e d in m o d e r n secular societies n o less t h a n in primitive ones. See D u r k h e i m , Elementary Forms, 15. 9. Alasdair M a c l n t y r e , After Virtue ( S o u t h B e n d : N o t r e D a m e Press, 1981). R o b e r t Bellah, R i c h a r d Madsen, William Sullivan, A n n Swidler, a n d S t e p h e n T i p t o n , Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: H a r p e r a n d Row, 1985). 10. Maclntyre, 27. 11. Ibid., 28. 12. Bellah et al„ 39. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 29. 15. Ibid., 42. 16. Ibid., 43. 17. Ibid., 45. 18. Ibid., 4 4 - 4 5 . 19. Ibid., 45. 20. T h e r e is a g r e a t deal of overlap b e t w e e n t h e types of self-conception a n d behavior p a t t e r n s h i g h l i g h t e d by the representative c h a r a c t e r conc e p t a n d t h o s e h i g h l i g h t e d by t h e personality a p p r o a c h to analyzing policymaking behavior. T h e m a i n d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e c u l t u r a l a p p r o a c h a n d the personality a p p r o a c h is o n e of p u r p o s e . T h e personality a p p r o a c h focuses o n e x p l a i n i n g idiosyncracies in individual self-conceptions a n d behavior a n d seeks to explain as m u c h as possible a b o u t u n i q u e individuals.

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T h e cultural a p p r o a c h seeks to highlight sources o f self-conceptions and behavior that are shared to some e x t e n t by m e m b e r s o f a society. 21. For a discussion o f Geertz's "thick description" concept, see his The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: HarperCollins, 1 9 7 3 ) , ch. 1. 22. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1 9 9 0 ) , vol. 2, 223. 23. O f course, there were exceptions to this generalization about the lack o f hierarchical structures that rigidly defined identity and social reality in America, the most notable being the Puritan settlements in New England. 24. Peter B e r g e r and T h o m a s L u c k m a n n , The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: A n c h o r Press, 1 9 6 6 ) , 92-93. 25. S a m u e l H u n t i n g t o n , American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 8 1 ) , 23. 26. Ibid., 14. 27. It is not my intention to imply that these particular symbolic structures are the only ones to have served these functions in U.S. society; they are merely the most relevant for understanding U.S. foreign policy. 28. J o h n W i n t h r o p , q u o t e d in R o b e r t B e l l a h , The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (Chicago: University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , 1 4 - 1 5 . 29. L o r e n Baritz, City on a Hill: A History of Ideas and Myths in America (New York: J o h n Wiley, 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 7 - 1 9 . 30. P e r r y Miller argues that the primary i n t e n d e d a u d i e n c e f o r this m o d e l Christian society was in fact E n g l a n d and that the Puritans h o p e d eventually to return to E n g l a n d and set up the same kind o f theocracy there. S e e his Errand in the Wilderness ( C a m b r i d g e : Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 2 - 1 3 . 31. Baritz, 1 6 - 1 7 . 32. I n d e e d , as P e r r y Miller points out, the e n t i r e c o v e n a n t theology that the Puritans b r o u g h t with them from England was a much more powerful d o c t r i n e , in terms o f legitimation potential, than the Calvinist doctrine from which it evolved. Miller describes it as an effort to r e n d e r Calvin's god "less inscrutable, less mysterious, [and] less unpredictable" in an effort to provide a m o r e c o h e r e n t moral c o d e and to link that code to the means o f attaining salvation. See Miller, 55. 33. Ibid., 6 - 7 . 34. Ibid., 158. 35. Ibid., 159. 36. Ibid., 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 . 37. Ibid., 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 . 38. Bellah, 177. 39. Nathan Hatch, The Sacred Cause of Liberty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , 4 6 - 4 7 . 40. Ibid., 7 6 - 7 8 . 41. Ibid., 6 0 - 6 1 . 42. Ibid., 8 4 - 8 6 . 43. Ibid., 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 . 44. For a good discussion o f the e f f e c t o f m i r r o r imaging on international conflict in general and on the U.S. c o n d u c t o f the Vietnam War, see Ralph K. White, Nobody Wanted War (New York: Doubleday, 1 9 6 8 ) ; see also

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J o h n D o w e r , War Without

Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific

War ( N e w Y o r k :

Pantheon, 1986). 45. Hatch, 156. 46. During the mid-1840s the doctrine of manifest destiny with its notion of a God-given expansionist mission met with widespread popularity. S e e F r e d e r i c k M e r k , Manifest

Destiny

and Mission

in American

History:

A Rein-

terpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). 4 7 . P e r r y M i l l e r , The Life of the Mind

in America:

From the Revolution

to the

Civil War (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965), chs. 1-2. 48. Ibid., 48. 49. Ibid., chs. 1-2. 50. Ibid. 51. Bellah, 58-59. 52. Albert Beveridge speech, quoted in Edward M. Burns, The American Idea of Mission:

Concepts of National

Purpose

and Destiny

(New Brunswick: Rut-

gers University Press, 1957), 16. 53. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Cycles of American History (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 17. 54. Woodrow Wilson speech in Salt Lake City, September 23, 1919, in Wilson

R a y S. B a k e r a n d W i l l i a m E . D o d d , e d s . , The Public Papers of Woodrow

(1917-1924) (New York: Harper, 1970), vol. 2, War and Peace, 355. 55. See Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1956). See also J o h n G. S t o e s s i n g e r , Crusaders

and Pragmatists:

Movers

of Modern

American

Foreign

Pol-

icy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), ch. 1. 56. The best intellectual histories of Puritan New England include M i l l e r ' s Errand

in the Wilderness

a n d The Life of the Mind

in America.

See also

Ralph Barton Perry, Puritanism and Democracy (New York: Vanguard Press, 1944), and Baritz, City on a Hill. For an excellent collection of Puritan writings on such various subjects as politics, literature, science, and so on see Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, eds., The Puritans (New York: American Book Company, 1938). 57. Miller and Johnson, 43. 58. Miller, Errand in the Wilderness, 162-163.

59. Ibid. 6 0 . E d m o n d M o r g a n , The Puritan

Dilemma:

The Story offohn

Winthrop

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), 86-89. 61. Ibid., 69-71. 62. Bellah, 13-15. 63. Ibid., 14-15. 64. Ibid. 6 5 . M i l l e r , Errand in the Wilderness, 6-9. 6 6 . M i c h a e l G . H a l l , The Last American

Puritan:

The Life

of

Increase

Mather (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 96-99. 67. Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 84-85. 68. Ibid., 85-86. 69. George and George, 230. 7 0 . M i l l e r , Errand

in the Wilderness,

159.

71. This is the theme of Cotton Mather's famous 1701 sermon entitled "A Christian at His Calling," a reprint of which may be found in Moses Rischen, ed., The American Gospel of Success (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1965).

48

Myths, Models, and U.S. Forägn Policy

72. Irvin G. Wyllie, The Self-Made Man in America: The Myth of Rags to Riches (New York: Free Press, 1954), 12. 73. Ibid. 74. A p p a r e n t l y this t r a n s i t i o n b e g a n s o o n e r in o t h e r areas of t h e country. As P e r r y Miller discovered in his analysis of colonial l i t e r a t u r e in Virginia, religious leaders in that colony h a d r e c o n c i l e d themselves to the d e e m p h a s i s of a c o v e n a n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of society a n d the a s c e n d a n c e of a m a r k e t u n d e r s t a n d i n g as f a r back as the early s e v e n t e e n t h century. See Miller, Errand in the Wilderness, 139-140. 75. See Wyllie, 12, a n d Bellah, 69-71. 76. Wyllie, 12. 77. E x a m p l e s of these writings i n c l u d e The Autobiography, Poor Richard's Almanack, a n d " T h e Way to Wealth." For The Autobiography a n d o t h e r essays such as "The Way to Wealth" see B e n j a m i n Franklin, The Autobiography and Other Writings (New York: P e n g u i n Books, 1986). 78. Wyllie, 13. 79. Bellah, 69-70. 80. Wyllie, 13-14. 81. Ibid., 116-133. 82. Ibid., 116-122. 83. J a m e s Oliver R o b e r t s o n , American Myth, American Reality (New York: Hill a n d Wang, 1980), 167-168. 84. Ibid., 169. 85. Wyllie, 126. 86. In his analysis of the self-help works in The Self-Made Man in America, Irvin Wyllie f o u n d they p r e s c r i b e d m o s t f r e q u e n t l y t h e virtues of industry, frugality, sobriety, perseverance, punctuality, loyalty, o b e d i e n c e , a n d initiative. See especially ch. 3 in Wyllie. 87. Wyllie, 151. 88. Edward McNall Burns, The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of National Purpose and Identity (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 162-165. 89. Ibid., 161. 90. See R i c h a r d H o f s t a d l e r , The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 215-227. 91. Bellah et al„ 4 1 - 4 4 . 92. Ibid., 43. 93. Max Lerner, America as a Civilization (New York: Simon a n d Schuster, 1957), 274. 94. Ibid., 276. 95. W. D. Howells, The Rise of Silas Lapham ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a University Press, 1971). 96. Ibid.; see especially ch. 1. 97. Ibid., 45-48. 98. Ibid., 43-45. 99. Ibid., 317. 100. L e l a n d Dewitt Baldwin, The Meaning of America: Essays Toward an Understanding of the American Spirit ( P i t t s b u r g h : University of P i t t s b u r g h Press, 1976), 176-177. 101. T h e o d o r e Dreiser, The Financier (New York: H a r p e r , 1912), chs. 1-4.

Myths and Representative Characters

49

102. Ibid., 1 0 - 1 5 . 103. Ibid., 1 3 - 1 5 . 104. Ibid., 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 . 105. Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1 9 5 3 ) , 8. 106. Ibid., 9. 107. Ibid., 1 1 - 1 9 . 108. Ibid., 11. 109. A r t h u r S c h l e s i n g e r J r . , " T h e T h e o r y o f A m e r i c a : E x p e r i m e n t or Destiny?" in The Cycles of American History, 1 0 - 1 2 . 110. A l e x a n d e r Hamilton, J a m e s Madison, and J o h n Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: B a n t a m Books, 1 9 8 2 ) , 2. 111. W a s h i n g t o n ' s first inaugural address, April 30, 1 7 8 9 , in J . D. R i c h a r d s o n , A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents: 1789-1902 (Washington, DC: Bureau o f National Literature and Art, 1 9 0 3 ) , vol. 1, 53. 112. Ibid., 322. 113. De Tocqueville, vol. 2, 3. 114. Richardson, vol. 3, 2 9 5 . 115. Ibid., 2 9 5 - 2 9 6 . 116. Rush Welter, The Mind of America: 1820-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 9 7 5 ) , 2 2 - 2 5 . 117. Ibid., 23. 118. H e n r y Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 5 0 ) , 12. 119. For J a m e s on pragmatism see The Will to Believe (New York: Longmans, Green, 1896) and A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, G r e e n , 1 9 0 9 ) . For Dewey on pragmatism see Reconstruction in Philosophy ( B o s t o n : B e a c o n Press, 1 9 2 0 ) and Human Nature and Conduct (New York: H e n r y Holt, 1 9 2 2 ) . For an e x c e l l e n t overview o f pragmatism see J o h n P. Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1 9 9 4 ) . 120. Commager, 97. 121. Cooper's best-known works during this period include The Pioneers ( 1 8 2 3 ) , The Last of the Mohicans ( 1 8 2 6 ) , The Prairie ( 1 8 2 7 ) , The Pathfinder ( 1 8 4 0 ) , and The Deerslayer ( 1 8 4 1 ) . Irving's best-known f r o n t i e r works are The Adventures of Captain Bonneville ( 1 8 3 7 ) and A Tour of the Prairie ( 1 8 3 5 ) . For an e x c e l l e n t analysis o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the f r o n t i e r s m a n character in C o o p e r and Irving see Lucy L. Hazard, The Frontier in American Character (New York: T h o m a s Y. Crowell, 1 9 2 7 ) , ch. 3. 122. J a m e s O . R o b e r t s o n , American Myth, American Reality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1 9 8 0 ) , 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 . 123. Ibid., 144. 124. Bellah et al„ 45. 125. Ibid., 4 2 - 4 5 . 126. Ibid., 45. 127. Maclntyre, 2 6 - 2 7 . 128. Ibid., 30. 129. Ibid., 74. 130. Ibid., 77.

50

Myths, Models, and U.S. Forégn Policy

131. Ibid. 132. Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1 9 6 4 ) . 133. Ibid., 44. 134. J o h n Dos Passos, The Big Money, b o o k 3 o f U.S.A. Trilogy (New York: R a n d o m House, 1 9 3 7 ) . 135. Ibid., 22. 136. Ibid., 309. 137. Ibid., 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 . 138. Ibid., 55. 139. Ibid., 9 4 - 9 5 . 140. Charles E. Sumner, " T h e Managerial M i n d , " in R o b e r t Manley and Sean Manley, eds., The Age of the Manager (New York: Macmillan, 1 9 6 2 ) . 141. F o r example, see ibid. See also David Ewing, The Managerial Mind (New York: Free Press, 1 9 6 2 ) , and P e t e r F. Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: H a r p e r and Row, 1 9 6 6 ) . 142. Sumner, 153. 143. Ibid., 154. 144. Cameron Hawley, Executive Suite, excerpted in Manley and Manley, 189. 145. Ewing, 64. 146. H e r r y m o n Maurer, Great Enterprise: Growth and Behavior of the Big Corporation (New York: Macmillan, 1 9 5 5 ) . 147. Ibid., 103.

The Cold War Evangelism of John Foster Dulles

T h e r e is considerable disagreement a m o n g scholars as to how engaged Eisenhower was in the foreign policy making process, but most will agree J o h n Foster Dulles ( 1 8 8 8 - 1 9 5 9 ) was a very important adviser to the president on foreign policy matters. 1 Dulles brought considerable knowledge about the world to the Eisenhower administration, and he was highly trusted and respected by the president. 2 T h e conventional wisdom regarding Dulles tends toward a portrayal o f him as simplistic, self-righteous, and not overly intelligent. He was, however, a very c o m p l e x and sophisticated individual. H e was full o f contradictions and possessed a powerful intellect. T h r o u g h o u t his careers as international lawyer, leader of national and international church organizations, and finally as civil servant and diplomat, Dulles never stopped thinking and writing about the world and international relations. Consequently, tracing the evolution of Dulles's complex worldview and pinpointing its sources (cultural or otherwise) is a very difficult task. Specifically, I seek to determine to what e x t e n t Dulles's worldview was influenced by any of the three myths and three representative characters discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. T h e task then is to e x a m i n e his policy preferences and policymaking behavior as secretary o f state to d e t e r m i n e the e x t e n t to which they were consistent with his worldview. THE EARLY YEARS O n e o f the most significant aspects o f Dulles's c h i l d h o o d for the shaping o f his worldview was his extremely religious upbringing. 3 His father, Allen Macy Dulles, was pastor o f the First Presbyterian Church in Watertown, New York. J o h n Foster and his four siblings were brought up in a very strict environment. 4 They were expected to attend all c h u r c h functions and participated in rigorous Bible

51

52

Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy

study at h o m e . 5 Interestingly, the effects of this strict religious upbringing do not show u p in Dulles's writings or speeches until the late 1930s. Dulles himself reflected on its i m p o r t a n c e in a speech given b e f o r e his hometown C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e in 1952: "It is n o t surprising that it made an impression. It was an impression that was n o t always enjoyable at the time, b u t the older I have grown and the wider has been my experience, the more I have appreciated that early religious u p b r i n g i n g and have seen how relevant it is to the far-flung and changing scenes of life." 6 Also significant for Dulles's developing worldview was his exposure to a world m u c h larger than Watertown. 7 Both his parents were well educated and well traveled, and they took J o h n Foster and his siblings on many trips to E u r o p e while they were children. 8 More important, Dulles's mother, Edith Foster Dulles, was the d a u g h t e r of J o h n Watson Foster, a successful international lawyer and diplomat whose career included ministerial a p p o i n t m e n t s to Mexico, Spain, and Russia and culminated in his serving as secretary of state u n d e r Benjamin Harrison. 9 As young children, J o h n Foster and his siblings spent a great deal of time at their maternal g r a n d p a r e n t s ' h o m e in Washington, D.C., where they were exposed to their grandf a t h e r ' s political and diplomatic milieu. 1 0 T h e Washington diplomatic setting was a fitting nursery for a boy who would spend his life thinking and writing about world politics and eventually occupy his grandfather's office at the State Department. Another experience that significantly influenced Dulles's worldview was his u n d e r g r a d u a t e career at Princeton University. Dulles e n t e r e d Princeton at the t e n d e r age of sixteen in 1904, and while there he was awarded many h o n o r s for academic achievements in his philosophy and government majors. 1 1 He studied extensively in philosophy, wrote a prize-winning senior thesis in logic, and u p o n graduation was awarded a one-year fellowship to the S o r b o n n e , where he studied u n d e r H e n r i Bergson. 1 2 Just as the influence of his strong religious upbringing remained buried for decades, so too did the influence of this early exposure to philosophy. Dulles's studies in g o v e r n m e n t at Princeton seem to have had a m u c h m o r e immediate impact on his worldview a n d life. T h e main reason was that one of Dulles's professors in government was Woodrow Wilson, also the university president. 1 3 Dulles would later credit Wilson's influence, saying, "The m a j o r benefit I got f r o m Princeton was participating in Woodrow Wilson's courses where I gained my interest in public affairs." 1 4 This interest was e n h a n c e d while Dulles was still at Princeton when his grandfather, J o h n Watson Foster, took him to the Second Hague Conference in May 1907 and gave him a role as a secretary to the Chinese delegation. 1 5

John Foster Dulles

53

Woodrow Wilson's influence on the young John Foster Dulles would continue long past their classroom relationship at Princeton. As Ronald Pruessen shows throughout The Road to Power, in later years, Dulles would frequently point to Woodrow Wilson as an important role model and source for ideas. 16 Dulles borrowed substantially from Wilson's Fourteen Points in putting together his own program for reforming the international system and to a large extent adopted Wilson's crusading style of diplomacy. After Princeton, Dulles's next contact with Woodrow Wilson was at the Versailles peace conference in 1919. On leave from his partnership at the prestigious Sullivan and Cromwell law firm, Dulles went to the conference in the capacity of legal counsel to the U.S. delegation. 17 There he was directly involved in the negotiation and drafting of important parts of the reparations agreements, and he was a central participant in the argument with the Allies over the question of including war costs in the reparations package. 18 As Pruessen points out, Dulles's in-depth involvement with the reparations negotiations at Versailles was important in shaping his worldview.19 Dulles shared with Wilson and his senior colleagues on the Reparations Commission a concern that any heavy reparations burden placed on the Germans would create economic and political instability throughout Europe and the world. 20 This concern is consistent with the somewhat narrow economic focus that came to characterize Dulles's early analyses of international relations. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Dulles's thinking and writing about international relations focused almost exclusively on economic issues such as international trade, finance, and currency exchange. This is not surprising, since during this period, Dulles was back at Sullivan and Cromwell, where he was involved in the legal affairs of huge commercial and financial firms that were conducting business internationally. 21 During the 1920s he focused on how international trade, finance, and currency exchange were being adversely affected by war-related debt and reparations problems. 22 He constantly stressed the need for a rational resolution of the war debt in Europe. 23 He urged the Allies to be realistic about Germany's ability to pay its debts, and in turn he urged the United States to be realistic about the Allies' ability to pay their U.S. war debts. 24 In the conclusion of a 1922 Foreign Affairs article, he warned the U.S. leadership of the economic and political consequences of not dealing with the debt problem. 25 The underlying assumption both here and in Dulles's other writings during this period was that free-flowing trade and capital and stable currency exchange were the primary requirements for a

54

Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy

p e a c e f u l world. This a s s u m p t i o n may b e i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g consistent with the m a r k e t myth, that is, the free m a r k e t is the superior o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e f o r society a n d U.S. society c o m e s closest to achieving the f r e e m a r k e t ideal. Dulles's i n t e r n a t i o n a l analyses of t h e early years of t h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n also reflect t h e m a r k e t myth in t h e i r s t r o n g a n t i p a t h y toward g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e with m a r k e t forces. 2 6 In 1932 h e wrote, "the existing system of c u r r e n c y controls, quotas, clearings, etc. is m o r e a n d m o r e throttling i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade a n d c o m m e r c e . Each new restriction by o n e state has b e e n m e t by a counter-restriction by a n o t h e r state. T h e result is a virtual elimination of tria n g u l a r o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h e r e d u c t i o n of t r a d e to isolated b a r t e r transactions." 2 7 H e went o n to call such g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l s "an intolerable i n t e r f e r e n c e with a n d stifling of individual initiative a n d e n t e r p r i s e . " 2 8 This a b h o r r e n c e of g o v e r n m e n t a l i n t e r f e r e n c e with business, w h e t h e r at h o m e o r a b r o a d , a n d the r e v e r e n c e f o r "individual initiative" is very consistent with the m a r k e t myth of America a n d with the extension of its tenets into the i n t e r n a t i o n a l realm. T h u s a n e x a m i n a t i o n of Dulles's earliest writings o n i n t e r n a tional relations shows that his early thinking o n the subject was primarily focused o n e c o n o m i c c o n c e r n s . It also reveals that his worldview d u r i n g this p e r i o d was m o r e consistent with t h e m a r k e t myth t h a n with the city-on-the-hill o r pragmatic myths. PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS—1934-1940 In The Road to Power, P r u e s s e n characterizes 1934-1940 as Dulles's philosophical p e r i o d ; this is an a p t description of his thinking during these years. 2 9 In 1934, Dulles's writings o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations t u r n e d f r o m a focus o n specific e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s to m o r e abstract theorizing a b o u t world politics. T h e p r e d o m i n a n t t h e m e in these writings was the inevitability of c h a n g e in world politics a n d the absence of an alternative to force as a vehicle f o r c h a n g e . H e constantly criticized f o r m a l p e a c e i n s t r u m e n t s (i.e., t h e League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Pact) f o r n o t recognizing the inevitability of c h a n g e in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a a n d f o r n o t creating alternatives to war as a c h a n g e agent. As h e p u t it in his 1935 "The Road to Peace" in the Atlantic Monthly, "Peace plans, if they are to b e effective, m u s t be c o n s t r u c t e d so as to take i n t o a c c o u n t these two f u n d a m e n t a l facts—namely, the inevitability of c h a n g e , a n d t h e p r e s e n t lack of any a d e q u a t e substitute f o r force as an i n d u c e m e n t to change." 3 0

John Foster Dulles

55

For Dulles, there were two kinds of forces active in world politics, those states that were content with their material position and status in the world, or the status quo powers, and those states that were not, the dynamic powers. Dulles argued that the status quo powers were always the sponsors of peace instruments or treaties such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which were based on the assumption o f indefinitely freezing the status quo. Such plans were doomed to fail because they did not create mechanisms that would prevent pressures for change in the dynamic states (i.e., Germany, Japan, and Italy) from building to the point of general war. 31 Dulles developed these themes much further in a series of articles and speeches from 1934 to 1939 that culminated in the publication of his first book in 1939. 3 2 In War, Peace, and Change, he built on his portrayal of international relations as constant conflict between status quo and dynamic forces and did so on a very abstract level. There he identified the status quo-dynamic conflict as a fundamental problem in all human societies. 3 3 To prevent this conflict from constantly resulting in violence, human societies had come up with solutions he categorized as either ethical or political in nature. 3 4 Ethical solutions sought "to mould the human spirit so that desires will either be so diluted in intensity or so metamorphasized in character that conflicts in desire will be minimized." He categorized as political those "efforts which are primarily directed to creating a scheme of society which provides substitutes for force as the solvent of conflicting desires." 3 5 T h e rest of the book is an effort to determine the extent to which these kinds of solutions could be used at the level of international relations to solve the ever-present conflict between status quo and dynamic forces. It is in these solutions that we are given a good look at his worldview at the time. Dulles's worldview in War, Peace, and Change still showed signs of having been significantly influenced by the market myth, representing continuity with his earlier political-economic analysis. There is also, however, evidence of a developing religious stream of thought that is more consistent with the city-on-the-hill myth. Dulles continued to develop this religious pattern of thought throughout the rest of his life, and it shows prominently in his public statements and correspondence. It is at this stage of Dulles's intellectual development that we begin to see the layered structure of a very complex worldview. It is clear throughout War, Peace, and Change that Dulles still viewed a healthy international economy as a fundamental condition for peace. He argued there and in other writings that a fluid international economy could provide a peaceful outlet for the acquisitive

56

Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy

energies that drive dynamic states f r o m the inside. 3 6 He was very critical of the way national boundaries act to contain the acquisitive energies that build u p inside dynamic states, often to the point that they lead to war. He wrote: Partly as a result of conscious decision, partly in consequence of policies adopted for other reasons, national boundaries have come to be barriers substantially barring those without from availing of opportunities within. Deliberate measures designed to effect this result are, typically, restrictions on immigration and even on temporary visits; restrictions on imports through tariffs, quotas and embargoes; restrictions on exports; restrictions on alien ownership of real estate and upon alien investment in many types of enterprises. Such measures, which are manifold, are deliberately designed to prevent aliens from sharing in domestic opportunities and to conserve them for the national group. 3 7

A liberalized international economy would also minimize the extent to which citizens came to deify their own state as an economic protector a n d b e n e f a c t o r a n d demonize o t h e r states as h o a r d e r s of economic opportunity. 3 8 Dulles used the early history of the United States as a model for preventing the b u i l d u p of dynamic energies inside states a n d red u c i n g the tendency to deify o n e ' s own state and d e m o n i z e others. 39 He argued that with the (admittedly substantial) exception of the American Civil War, the free flow of interstate commerce in the United States r e d u c e d drastically the incidence of violent conflict between the states. 40 He did admit that whereas citizens ceased to personify their individual states, they transferred this personificat i o n / deification to the national state as it solidified. 4 1 Here again, Dulles's arguments were consistent with the market myth of America and its premise that the free market is the superior way to organize a society and that the United States is the perfect realization of the free market ideal. Dulles sought to persuade his readers that if the entire world were organized around the same free market principles, it would be safer and m u c h m o r e prosperous. This view highlights a crusading strain within the market myth that holds up the United States as the ideal model of a market society. We also see in Dulles's worldview the market myth's stress on individualism. The assumption underlying his analysis was that if gove r n m e n t s would stop putting obstacles in the way of individuals trying to improve their situation t h r o u g h commerce, the world would be m u c h more peaceful.

John Foster Dulles

57

This stress on keeping individuals free from government interference is found in the conclusion to War, Peace, and Change, where Dulles wrote: We should not accept the increasing tendency of the group authority [i.e., government] to destroy individual freedom and initiative. It is particularly important that the intellectual freedom of the individual be preserved. Only from such a source can we expect the originality of thought necessary to cope with those crises which successively arise as social concepts, useful in their origin, are carried to dangerous extremes. 4 2

This concern for protecting the enterprising individual from government interference would remain a prominent theme in Dulles's writings for the rest of his life. This may be partly explained by the fact that Dulles spent the greater part of his adult life as an international lawyer, trying to remove obstacles (governmental and otherwise) in the way of large business concerns engaged in international commerce. Whereas certain patterns of Dulles's thinking in War, Peace, and Change show market myth influence, others are inconsistent with the market myth and may be seen as transitional to more of a cityon-the-hill orientation. This view is most evident in his discussion of the ethical solution to war. As was noted earlier, Dulles argued that the tendency of citizens to deify their own state and demonize others was a significant cause of war. He suggested that this phenomenon could be reduced if people substituted a universal religion and deity as an object of adulation. 43 He noted that there was a time when religions had this kind of spiritual grip on populations but that as that grip weakened, the personified state filled the vacuum. 44 He then called for a reversal of that trend: Devotion to an ideal and willingness to sacrifice therefor are among the finest of human traits. Also, they are among the most dangerous. It is indispensable to our well-being that they be invoked only in a truly worthy cause. It has now become indispensable to international peace that they be inculcated on a basis which transcends that of nationality. Such broad causes have been revealed and can again b e c o m e vital. They can absorb that willingness to sacrifice which demands an outlet. Only if this occurs can we expect the personified state to shrink to a diminished role in human imagination. Only if this occurs can we release spiritual forces into a sphere of greater universality. 45

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H e went o n to call f o r a " f o r m of spiritual revival" a n d suggested that t h e universal religion s h o u l d stress "the c o n c e p t of a duty to fellow m a n " a n d should " p r o m o t e the welfare of the h u m a n race." H e n o t e d that these were central objectives of Christianity, p e r h a p s suggesting it as the best candidate. 4 6 As we will see, this p a t t e r n of religious t h i n k i n g , which first manifested in War, Peace, and Change, c o n t i n u e d to develop througho u t t h e 1940s a n d eventually coalesced i n t o a distinct vision of a p r e f e r r e d world o r d e r w h e r e states p a t t e r n e d their behavior (to the e x t e n t possible) according to m o r a l law. T h r o u g h o u t his later writings a n d speeches, Dulles strongly a d h e r e d to this vision while also r e m a i n i n g c o m m i t t e d to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r e e m a r k e t economy. 4 7 Dulles's views o n t h e e c o n o m y were m o r e or less fully develo p e d by the time h e wrote War, Peace, and Change. As Mark Toulouse c h r o n i c l e s in The Transformation of John Foster Dulles, f r o m 1937 to 1945, Dulles devoted m u c h of his thinking a n d writing to e x p l o r i n g a n d p r o m o t i n g an active r o l e f o r religion in c r e a t i n g a p e a c e f u l world. 4 8 D u r i n g this p e r i o d , Dulles was heavily involved with t h e F e d e r a l C o u n c i l of C h u r c h e s , an involvement t h a t c u l m i n a t e d in his b e i n g n a m e d the c h a i r m a n of t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s Commission o n a Just a n d Durable Peace in 1940. 49 THE QUEST FOR A SPIRITUAL BASIS FOR WORLD ORDER Dulles's i n v o l v e m e n t with t h e F e d e r a l C o u n c i l of C h u r c h e s prof o u n d l y a f f e c t e d his p e r s o n a l n o r m a t i v e beliefs a b o u t how to achieve a m o r e p e a c e f u l world. H e d e s c r i b e d this i n f l u e n c e in a 1949 c h u r c h address. I began to understand the profound significance of the spiritual values that my father and mother had taught. . . . Serving at the same time in both religious and political groups made ever clearer the relationship between the two. I saw that there could be no just and durable peace except as men held in common simple and elementary religious beliefs: belief that there is a God, that he is the author of a moral law which they can know, and that he imparts to each human being a spiritual dignity and worth which all others should respect. Wherever these elementary truths are widely rejected, there is both spiritual and social disorder. 50

N o t only did his work with the Federal Council of C h u r c h e s revitalize his a t t a c h m e n t to the religious values h e was t a u g h t while growing u p in a Presbyterian m a n s e , h e also b e c a m e c o n v i n c e d that

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church organizations could play a vital role in creating a "just and durable" postwar peace. Later in the same address he described this role. It is the churches that dependably keep alive and pass on, from generation to generation, belief in God, in moral law, and in the spiritual nature of man. . . . It is the churches that have missionary affiliations that spread great spiritual truths throughout the world. They have central agencies . . . that provide studies of world problems by qualified Christian statesmen. These if used, can create an enlightened public opinion that will directly influence the acts of government and of the United Nations. 5 1

T h e self-defined mission of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace was to educate Christians about world problems, to convince them that Christian principles could help shape a more peaceful postwar world, and to mobilize public opinion in order to push government leaders to take steps that would create a postwar order that reflected these Christian principles. 5 2 This mission reflected very closely Dulles's strong belief in the power of Christian ideas and public opinion. In fact, he was the driving intellectual force behind many of the commission's ideas and programs. 53 It is during the period of his involvement with the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace that we first see Dulles taking on certain aspects of the Puritan representative character. He shared the Puritan's revelation-based epistemological and moral orientation: He held the Bible to be the definitive source of both truth and the moral law, and he believed that the Christian church had the responsibility to spread "these great truths." More important for our purposes, Dulles exhibited during this period the Puritan's paradigmatic mode of social action. He (along with the rest of the commission) was primarily engaged in attempting to mobilize people to do God's work by showing them a divine blueprint for a peaceful world. This is illustrated by the following passage from the introduction (written by Dulles) to the commission's statement of guiding principles. As members of the Christian church, we seek to view all problems of world order in the light of the truth concerning God, man, and God's purpose for the world made known in Jesus Christ. We believe that the eternal God revealed in Christ is the ruler of men, and of nations and that his purpose in history will be realized. For us he is the source of all moral law and the power to make it effective. From this faith, Christians derive the ethical principles upon which world order must be based. 5 4

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Some of Dulles's writings d u r i n g this period also contain passages that are versions of the city-on-the-hill myth. O n e good example comes f r o m a 1942 essay entitled "A Righteous Faith": "We in the U n i t e d States b e c a m e conscious of 'a manifest destiny' and 'American Dream.' . . . We saw that we might fashion here a state of o r d e r e d f r e e d o m that would be a beacon to the world." 5 5 A n o t h e r good example comes f r o m a 1944 speech entitled "A Nation's Foreign Policy": "The American people, f r o m the beginning, charted f o r themselves a clear-cut course. They dedicated themselves to finding as a nation economic, intellectual, and spiritual institutions which would advance the welfare of their own people. By that conduct and example, they felt, they could best aid mankind and as a by-product of that endeavor assure for themselves the good-will of people everywhere." 5 6 Both of these passages contain what might be called a secular version of the city-on-the-hill myth. It is secular because it does n o t stipulate that America's mission comes f r o m God. It is interesting that Dulles would evoke a secular version of this myth during what might be called his most religious period. T h e refusal to identify the United States with a higher religious cause is, however, consistent with some of his o t h e r writings of this period, many of which warned against the tendency to identify one's own nation with some higher cause. 57 Also, Dulles and the commission were not trying to directly mobilize the United States as an international actor b u t rather to mobilize members of Christian churches everywhere to pressure their governments to create international structures (such as the UN and World Bank) that would facilitate just and peaceful change in the international system. However, since the Federal Council of C h u r c h e s was c o n c e r n e d primarily with c h u r c h e s in the United States and since Dulles and other commission members recognized how i m p o r t a n t U.S. leadership would be in the postwar era, they did focus on mobilizing public opinion in the United States to steer policymakers toward creating i n t e r n a t i o n a l structures that were consistent with Christian principles. They were pushing especially for a global f o r u m in which nations' actions would be governed by concern for adherence to moral law and not by power-political considerations. They very m u c h h o p e d that the UN General Assembly would provide such a forum. 5 8 Neither Dulles n o r the other m e m b e r s of the commission were naive e n o u g h to think that nations would completely a b a n d o n power-political considerations in an e f f o r t to a d h e r e to the moral law. T h u s the commission u r g e d c o n c e r n e d Christian citizens to

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temper their quest for a more moral international order with a realistic sense of what was actually achievable. 59 It is important to understand that the Dulles commission did not seek directly to influence policymakers but to influence them indirectly by enlightening and mobilizing public opinion. As Toulouse points out, Dulles often emphasized that the nature of the politician's job required both a quest for power and a concern for the national interest. Dedication to the universal welfare of humankind strikes most politicians as an intrusion from the outside. . . . However, the task of the individual citizen is different from that of the political leader. The American people—especially the Christian audiences he addressed—should, according to Dulles, try to press universal concerns on their political leaders. Thus, out of their mandate to serve the expressed needs of the people, political leaders might occasionally transcend normal behavior by including other than merely national concerns in their policy decisions. 6 0

Dulles consistently posited such a dichotomy between national interests on the one hand and Christian concern for the universal interests of humankind on the other. 61 As Toulouse also shows, Dulles often warned against the tendency of governmental leaders to identify their own national interests with a universal religious cause. 62 This warning is particularly interesting in light of the fact that when Dulles was secretary of state he would frequently identify the interests and policies of the United States with universal religious concerns. Analysis of Dulles's worldview during the period (1937-1945) of his involvement with these religious organizations shows that he had developed a distinctly religious vision of a preferred world order. In developing this religious vision of world order, however, he built on his earlier thinking about how to create a more peaceful world. Specifically, he continued to stress the need to create vehicles for peaceful change in the international system that would accommodate pressures for change from the dynamic states. He continued to believe that a liberalized international economic order was the most important element of such a system. He also continued to believe that the deification/demonization of states was a huge obstacle to peace, and he argued that a spiritual revitalization of universal religion (he seemed to prefer Christianity) could best erode this phenomenon. As World War II was coming to a close, the core of Dulles's normative worldview was his vision of a world where change could occur peacefully because national boundaries would not hamper international commerce and national leaders would be forced by

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enlightened citizenries to consider the moral law in their foreign policy making. With the end o f World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, Dulles would come to feel this vision was increasingly threatened by what he conceptualized as the forces of international communism. Increasingly he would c o m e to identify the United States and the Western alliance as the only defenders of this vision of world order in which he believed so strongly. As he came to identify the United States more and more with his vision o f a moral and liberal world order, he began to infuse more and more city-on-thehill (and to a lesser extent, market) mythical imagery into his rhetoric. In doing so, he would frequently violate his own earlier warnings against the tendency o f leaders to identify their own nations with the forces of righteousness and opposing nations with the forces of evil. Having examined the biography and development o f Dulles's worldview up to the point in the mid-1940s when he began to b e c o m e involved extensively in the making of U.S. foreign policy, I now turn to his late-life career as a full-time policymaker.

THE PURITAN EMERGES In his biography o f Dulles, Toulouse argues that during the early years o f the Cold War, Dulles e x p e r i e n c e d a dramatic transformation, changing from a "prophet of realism" to a "priest o f nationalism." 6 3 According to Toulouse, the p r e - C o l d War Dulles was a "prophet o f realism, because while he worked for a more moral world order, he nonetheless recognized that, for the most part, individual states could not act morally, and that states' claims to moral righteousness were merely used to cloak the self-interest behind their actions in the world." 6 4 With the advent of the Cold War, Dulles was b e c o m i n g a "priest o f nationalism," arguing with increasing fervor that the U n i t e d States and the Western alliance were fighting for morality and righteousness against the immoral forces of international communism. 6 5 This transformation from p r o p h e t o f realism to priest o f nationalism took place during 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 0 . 6 6 Dulles was a delegate to the 1945 UN c o n f e r e n c e in San Francisco and was a regular delegate to the General Assembly from 1946 to 1950. He also attended the foreign minister councils in 1945, 1947, and 1949 and negotiated the J a p a n e s e peace treaty in 1950. 6 7 As Toulouse chronicles, these meetings provided Dulles with face-to-face contact with the Soviets, and he began to note what he believed was a pattern of increasing Soviet intransigence at every meeting. 6 8

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As World War II was c o m i n g to a close, D u l l e s still h e l d o u t h o p e s for m a i n t a i n i n g a constructive postwar relationship with the Soviets. H e e x p r e s s e d the n e e d f o r such a r e l a t i o n s h i p in a 1945 s p e e c h to the E c o n o m i c Club of Detroit. Another overriding task of the next few years will be to develop more friendly relations with the Soviet Union. To us the Soviet governing class seems atheistic and materialistic. The Soviets on their side have little reason to trust us. . . . For many years we sought to prevent their having economic and diplomatic discourse with the rest of the world. O u r public leaders denounced them u p to the m o m e n t when Germany's attack made us perforce comrades in arms. What will happen when the fighting stops? Will our relations revert to what they were when war came? That would be a major disaster for us, for them, and for the world; but it is a disaster that stares us in the face. 6 9 D u l l e s did m e n t i o n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l obstacles to a solid postwar U.S.-Soviet relationship. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h o u g h , h e w e n t o u t of his way to give the Soviets the b e n e f i t of the doubt, actually c o n d e m n i n g prewar U.S. policy toward the Soviets for creating distrust. His portrayal h e r e of the U.S.-Soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p is c o n s i s t e n t with the p h i l o s o p h y of the early D u l l e s ( T o u l o u s e ' s "prophet of realism") in that it legitimated the security c o n c e r n s of the Soviets and did n o t seek to wrap U.S. interests and actions in a cloak of r i g h t e o u s n e s s . T h i s is in stark contrast to the t o n e of his writings o n the Soviets j u s t o n e year later. In a m a n u s c r i p t for a 1946 article for Life m a g a z i n e , D u l l e s wrote: T h e most u r g e n t task of American statesmanship is to find the policies that will avoid a serious clash with the Soviet Union. . . . Indeed the more closely Soviet policies are studied, and the more intimately they are known, the greater does that danger appear. Soviet leaders assume that peace and security d e p e n d u p o n quickly achieving world-wide acceptance of Soviet political philosophy, which suppresses certain personal freedoms in the interest of achieving social harmony. The personal freedoms they would take away constitute our most cherished political and religious heritage. We have in the past f o u g h t to d e f e n d them when they seemed in jeopardy. The methods which Soviet leaders use are repugnant to our ideas of humanity and fair play. It would be foolish to rest our h o p e of peace on any genuine reconciliation of our faith with that now held by Soviet leadership. 7 0 H e r e Dulles's portrayal of the U.S.-Soviet relationship is m u c h m o r e c o n s i s t e n t with T o u l o u s e ' s "prophet of nationalism." T h e U n i t e d

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States is now portrayed as the champion of human freedom, fighting against an aggressive Soviet campaign to destroy human freedom worldwide. Before the U.S. and the Soviet Union were portrayed as two states seeking to achieve security; now there is a confrontation of two "irreconcilable" rival "faiths," one good and one evil. Gone is Dulles's own earlier concern about the danger of wrapping one's own nation's cause in a cloak of righteousness while branding other nations as evil. It is important to remember that between early 1945 and mid-1946 there were developments that began to strain seriously the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and these developments were creating a great deal of pessimism throughout the U.S. foreign policy making elite as to the future of the Grand Alliance. 71 During this period we begin to see vivid city-on-the-hill mythical imagery in Dulles's speeches and writings. In a 1946 speech at Princeton, he proclaimed that the history of the American people was the story of a great mission. He spoke longingly of the early years of the American republic: The American people were imbued with a great faith. We acted under a sense of moral compulsion, as a people who had a mission to perform in the world. Our conduct was largely determined by a religious belief that every human being had a God-given possibility of spiritual development and that to realize this was man's chief earthly aim. Accordingly we sought to organize a society which would promote the spiritual development of the individual. We wanted him to have not only spiritual freedom, but the surrounding conditions of intellectual and economic opportunity without which spiritual growth is seldom realized. . . . We sought through conduct, example and influence to promote everywhere the cause of human freedom. We availed of every opportunity to spread our gospel throughout the world. 72

Dulles went on to lament that the American people seemed to have lost some of this great faith, but he argued that it could and had to be regained. 7 3 The city-on-the-hill imagery is unmistakable in this speech, and it is stronger here than in any previous speeches or writings, one reason being that Dulles added a very powerful theme—the quest for human freedom. There is also for the first time here an implicit notion that the American people's mission was God-given. In his earlier uses of city-on-the-hill imagery, there was no mention of God in connection with this mission. 74 This more religious version of the city-on-the-hill myth clearly evoked the image of an American people divinely destined to be a force for human freedom in the world. Dulles developed this theme much further in a 1947 speech in Chicago, where he explicitly identified past U.S. foreign policy with this divine mission:

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United States foreign policy is made at home. It is the projection abroad of our national will. . . . O u r will flows from the fundamentals of our faith. Our founders believed that there was a moral law which gave reality to such concepts as justice and righteousness. They believed that all men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. . . . They believed that men not only had rights but also duties, to G o d and to each other. They felt a sense of mission in the world . . . . Such basic beliefs have fixed the course of our nation in history. They will continue to fix our course, so long as Americans are true to their tradition. 7 5

Dulles went on to list examples of past U.S. foreign policies that he argued were "external manifestation [s] of American will" to promote liberty in the world. These policies included the Monroe Doctrine, the open-door doctrine, U.S. entry into World Wars I and II, and U.S. leadership in the creation of the UN. 7 6 Dulles concluded that these policies were shining examples of enlightened self-interest on the part of the United States. The four foreign policies I have described reflect the practical idealism of America. They are idealistic because inspired by a desire to promote justice, as we see it, and to preserve human liberty. They are practical because they recognize that our own freedom would be imperiled if there were only wind and water between us and militant dictatorship. . . . Today these policies face a serious challenge from the Soviet Union. T h e professed social goals of Soviet Communism are not unlike our own; but Marxian communism is atheistic in conception and materialistic in its view of man. It does not admit of a Creator who establishes eternal principles of right and justice or who endows his creatures with inalienable rights. It denies the sacredness of the human personality and would force human beings into spiritual straitjackets. 77

This passage is significant because in it Dulles explained nearly two centuries of U.S. diplomatic history using the city-on-the-hill myth. All of these historical watersheds, from the Monroe Doctrine to the creation of the UN, were, according to Dulles, manifestations of America's divine mission to promote liberty in the world. He was thus arguing that U.S. foreign policy behavior had been and should continue to be guided by this divine mission. At the same time, however, Dulles argued that adherence to this divine mission and these lofty principles had historically been consistent with U.S. national interest. Gone is the uneasy tension that Dulles the "prophet of realism" once perceived between national interest and adherence to the moral law. Now we see the easy equation of national interest and moral imperative that Toulouse notes is characteristic of the "priest of nationalism."

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This n e w f o u n d c o n g r u e n c e between national interest and moral imperative facilitated painting the e m e r g i n g Cold War conf r o n t a t i o n between the United States and the Soviet U n i o n in broad moral strokes. It represents a dramatic c h a n g e in Dulles's views regarding the philosophical question of the relationship between morality and statesmanship. This new stance is quite consistent with a city-on-the-hill orientation. I n d e e d , by the early 1950s Dulles's entire worldview showed significant city-on-the-hill influence at both the philosophical and instrumental levels. In 1945, Dulles had proclaimed to the Economic Club of Detroit that in its conduct of foreign policy, "our government should a d o p t and publicly proclaim long-range goals which reflect o u r high ideals." 78 Into the early 1950s, he continued to develop his arg u m e n t for the i m p o r t a n c e of moral principle as a guide to U.S. foreign policy. In a 1952 speech to the Missouri Bar Association, he m a d e it the central t h e m e when he argued that "of course, moral principles do not alone provide all the practical answers that m e n n e e d . . . . But few would d o u b t that the past dynamism of o u r nation has genuinely stemmed f r o m a p r o f o u n d popular faith in such concepts as justice and righteousness and f r o m the sense that o u r nation had a mission to p r o m o t e these ideals by every peaceful means." 7 9 Dulles went on to argue that nonmoral diplomacy was unhealthy because "it inevitably makes for a break between o u r gove r n m e n t and our people. Whether we like it or not—and I like it— o u r people are predominantly a moral people, who believe that our nation has a great spiritual heritage to be preserved. We do not feel happy to be identified with foreign policies which r u n c o u n t e r to what we have been taught in o u r churches and synagogues and in our classrooms in American history." 80 Against this moral U.S. mission in the world, Dulles counterposed the agenda of Soviet-led international communism: "Soviet Communism reflects a view totally different f r o m the U.S. historic view. Its creed is materialistic and atheistic. It does not admit of any moral law."81 This passage is consistent with the tendency on Dulles's part to portray the Cold War as a global moral confrontation between the forces of good and evil. This Manichaean vision of the world is also consistent with the various historical variations of the city-on-thehill myth, especially the original seventeenth-century Puritan version (see Chapter 2). In a 1953 speech at the National War College, Dulles portrayed the Cold War in the simplest of moral terms. We have a world that is—for the most part—split between two huge combinations. . . . These huge concentrations are in conflict

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because each reflects differing aims, aspirations a n d social, political, a n d e c o n o m i c philosophies. We must assume that they will c o n t i n u e to r e m a i n in basic conflict—in o n e way or a n o t h e r — until such time as the communists so c h a n g e their n a t u r e as to admit that those who wish to live by the moral law are f r e e to do so without coercion by those who believe in e n f o r c e d conformity to a materialistic standard. 8 2

Thus Dulles portrayed the Cold War as a battle between those who would live by the moral law (the United States and its Western allies) and those who would prevent this (the Soviets and the rest of the communist world). Analysis of Dulles's early Cold War speeches and writings indicates that he took consistent stands on philosophical questions regarding the relationship of morality and diplomacy, the degree to which U.S. foreign policy should be guided by moral principles, and the extent to which the Cold War should be viewed in moral terms. His consistent moralism regarding these philosophical questions would lead us to expect him to take certain stands on more instrumental, policy-relevant questions about how to deal with the Soviets and the communist bloc. More specifically, we would expect that given his belief in the inherent goodness of the U.S. mission in the world and the evil inherent in the communist agenda, he would be wary of policies that sought to negotiate or compromise with the communists. Analysis of his early Cold War statements on the subject of negotiating do in fact reflect such a wariness. In a 1950 speech at Vanderbilt University, Dulles argued strongly against relying on the ability to negotiate differences with the Soviets and the communist bloc: Let us take first the question of negotiating a n d c o m p r o m i s i n g with the Russian leaders. At first glance that seems a normal thing to do . . . that is what m e n of good will have been, for many years, urging that nations should do. T h e obstacle now is that our present differences relate primarily to beliefs, that can't be compromised. . . . I do n o t see how this issue is going to be compromised. Certainly we are n o t going to compromise, by o n e iota, our belief in the spiritual n a t u r e of m a n a n d our insistence that political institutions must respect that belief. . . . If we ever seemed ready to sacrifice h u m a n f r e e d o m in an effort to bring "peace" that would merely make the Russian communists even m o r e c o n f i d e n t that they are right a n d that their materialism is i n d e e d the wave of t h e f u t u r e . . . . T h a t d o e s n ' t m e a n that n o t h i n g can be negotiated. . . . But d o n ' t let us d e l u d e ourselves into thinking the basic differences are of a kind that can be resolved by T r u m a n and Stalin chatting together over a cup of tea. 8 3

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Thus Dulles posited that the main differences between the United States and the Soviets were at the level of basic beliefs and principles and were therefore irreconcilable. Indeed, for Dulles, for the United States to compromise these beliefs and principles would be to negate what he saw as the core of America's identity as a people. From Dulles's standpoint, failure by Americans to remain true to these principles constituted a failure to remain true to themselves. Dulles was not, however, arguing against any and all negotiations with the Soviets. In fact, in the same speech he cited the negotiations that e n d e d the 1949 blockade of Berlin as an instance where negotiations with the Soviets bore real fruit. 8 4 In this speech and others, however, he did manifest a basic belief that until the Soviets a b a n d o n e d their basic philosophy, t h e r e would be very little room for negotiation or compromise on a general level. In this and o t h e r speeches he also a r g u e d that the Soviets had a history of going back on their agreements with the United States, a behavior pattern that he argued stemmed f r o m their basic philosophy. 8 5 If Dulles was wary of negotiation as a m e t h o d for meeting the Soviet challenge, the question then became how U.S. power should best be used in dealing with the Soviets and what f o r m s it should take. To a large extent, Dulles's answer to this question may be f o u n d in his 1952 critiques of the T r u m a n administration's containment policy. These critiques were written as Dulles was actively campaigning for Eisenhower f o r the u p c o m i n g 1952 presidential election, and as such they were partially politically motivated. As we will see, however, there were e n o u g h substantial strands of continuity with Dulles's earlier writings a b o u t world politics and U.S. foreign policy (and indeed with his later writings) in these critiques to indicate that they were not merely cynical political attacks. Dulles's f u n d a m e n t a l criticism of the existing c o n t a i n m e n t strategy was that (in addition to being too expensive) it was purely reactive and defensive and gave the Soviets complete initiative. 86 He a r g u e d that such a strategy was giving the Soviets time to consolidate their postwar acquisitions while using political subversion tactics to gain more influence around the world. Such a defensive and reactive posture sought only to contain the communist threat but did n o t h i n g to actually diminish it a n d as such was a p e r p e t u a l drain on U.S. resources. He s u m m e d u p this criticism when he wrote, "Our present negative policies will never end the type of sustained offensive which Soviet C o m m u n i s m is m o u n t i n g ; they will never e n d the peril n o r bring relief f r o m the exertions which devour o u r economic, political, and moral vitals. Ours are treadmill policies which, at best might p e r h a p s keep us in the same place until we d r o p exhausted." 8 7

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Dulles went on to argue that whereas the United States should continue to maintain e n o u g h military power to be able to resist o p e n communist aggression, it should also begin a political and spiritual offensive to liberate "captive peoples" held b e h i n d the iron curtain and to win newly i n d e p e n d e n t peoples over by showing the superiority of the ideals and institutions of the "free world." 8 8 Dulles based his a r g u m e n t for this political and spiritual offensive on t h r e e principles f r o m his previous philosophical a n d religious writings: There are three truths which we need to recall in these times: 1) The Dynamic always prevails over the static; the active over the passive. We were from the beginning a vigorous, confident people born with a sense of destiny and mission. . . . 2) Nonmaterial forces are more powerful than those that are merely material. Our dynamism has always been moral and intellectual rather than military or material. . . . We always generated political, social and industrial ideas and projected them abroad where they were more explosive than dynamite. 3) There is a moral or natural law not made by man which determines right and wrong, and in the long run only those who conform to that law escape disaster. This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers, and for that violation they can and should be made to pay. This will happen when we ourselves keep faith with that law in our practical decisions of policy. 89

H e r e we see vivid city-on-the-hill imagery interwoven with the core principles of Dulles's earlier philosophical a n d religious writings a b o u t world politics. Dulles wove all of this into an u r g e n t call for Americans to go f o r t h a n d "liberate" the world f r o m communist despotism. His style here is very consistent with the Puritan representative character. He revealed to his American readers that it was their duty to follow God's moral law and carry o u t God's will that the communist transgressors against this moral law be punished. These passages are also very revealing as to his vision of how the Cold War should be f o u g h t by the American people. H e believed that the "moral and intellectual dynamism" of the American people would be their most p o t e n t weapon against c o m m u n i s m . He told Americans that it was their duty to spread their moral principles and political ideals in o r d e r to bring the captive a n d newly i n d e p e n d e n t peoples into the "free world" by conversion. Thus Dulles's policy of liberation was n o t (as some feared at the time) primarily military in n a t u r e . It was based on maintaining a stalemate militarily (including the use of threats of massive nuclear

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retaliation) while c o n d u c t i n g a political, psychological, and spiritual offensive designed to weaken the Soviets f r o m within and inoculate the developing world against their influence. As Dulles himself concluded, "We should let these truths work in and through us. We should be dynamic, we should use o u r ideas as weapons; and these ideas should c o n f o r m to moral principles. That we do this is right . . . but it is also expedient in d e f e n d i n g ourselves against an aggressive imperialist despotism. For even the present lines will not hold unless our purpose goes beyond confining Soviet Communism within its present orbit." 9 0 Dulles's strong belief in the power of ideas as evidenced in his portrayal of the Cold War as a moral and spiritual battle was just short of Hegelian. It was also quite consistent with m a j o r themes f r o m his philosophical a n d religious writings of the 1930s and 1940s. 91 His principle of the dynamic prevailing over the static comes straight f r o m the pages of War, Peace, and Change, and his belief in the power of spiritual forces a n d the applicability of the moral law in world politics came f r o m his work with the Federal Council of Churches. Given this thematic continuity, it is very difficult to dismiss his critique of containment policy as merely a cynical political attack on the Democrats. In addition to the thematic continuity between Dulles's earlier writings a n d his Cold War writings, there is also a d e e p e r e l e m e n t of continuity in terms of his basic approach to influencing international relations. Both d u r i n g his work with the Federal Council of Churches and d u r i n g his official involvement with the making of U.S. foreign policy (both before and after he became secretary of state), Dulles placed a great deal of stock in the power of moral principles a n d political ideals to mobilize people across state boundaries and thereby alter the course of world politics. This pattern of continuity in his basic approach to influencing world politics is doubly significant because it is remarkably consistent with the Puritan representative character. This use of ideas to "convert and mobilize" people in order to change the world is the Puritan's paradigmatic m o d e of social action. T h e fact that Dulles c o n t i n u e d to a d h e r e to this basic a p p r o a c h to influencing world politics even as the world and his official roles changed is extremely significant. T h e previous examination of Dulles's worldview in the early 1950s in the period right before he became secretary of state clearly reveals his views on such questions as the relationship between morality and diplomacy, the extent to which U.S. foreign policy should be guided by moral principles, a n d how to deal with the

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global c o m m u n i s t t h r e a t . It is also clear f r o m his writings a n d speeches that his worldview was significantly colored by the city-onthe-hill myth. T h e r e is also significant evidence in Dulles's worldview of a basic a p p r o a c h to i n f l u e n c i n g world politics t h a t is remarkably consistent with t h e P u r i t a n representative character. But how did these e l e m e n t s of his worldview i n f l u e n c e his policy prefe r e n c e s a n d actual policymaking b e h a v i o r as secretary of state? It is to this last, very c o m p l e x step in this analysis that we now t u r n . THE FOGGY BOTTOM YEARS After Dulles took office as secretary of state in J a n u a r y 1953, it d i d n ' t take l o n g f o r events to force the new administration to u n d e r t a k e a significant r e a p p r a i s a l of U.S. policy toward t h e Soviets. J o s e p h Stalin died u n e x p e c t e d l y o n March 4, 1953. 92 After a f u n e r a l speech by new Soviet p r e m i e r Georgi Malenkov t h a t was surprisingly conciliatory toward t h e West, Eisenhower a n d o t h e r s within the administration b e g a n to see an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a lessening of Cold War tensions. Dulles, however, saw the s p e e c h as a sign of Soviet weake n i n g a n d a r g u e d that it was a time to t u r n u p t h e pressure o n the Soviets. 9 3 In a m e e t i n g of the National Security Council o n March 12, 1953, Dulles a r g u e d t h a t t h e d e a t h of Stalin c r e a t e d t h e possibility of nationalist discontent within the satellite states a n d that the U n i t e d States should take steps to capitalize o n this o p p o r t u n i t y to weaken Soviet c o n t r o l in the satellites. 9 4 H e was u n a b l e to dissuade Eisenhower f r o m his optimistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Stalin's d e a t h a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t Malenkov s p e e c h , however, a n d t h e p r e s i d e n t instructed his speechwriters to p r e p a r e an address in which h e could r e a c h o u t to the new Soviet leadership. 9 5 H o o p e s argues, in The Devil and John Foster Dulles, t h a t Dulles o b j e c t e d strongly to this m o v e m e n t toward d é t e n t e b u t did n o t feel c o n f i d e n t e n o u g h in t h e s t r e n g t h of his r e l a t i o n s h i p with Eisenhower to directly c o n f r o n t him o n the issue; h e c o n f i n e d his efforts to trying to i n f l u e n c e those in c h a r g e of d r a f t i n g the speech. 9 6 In his m e m o i r s , E i s e n h o w e r ' s speechwriter E m m e t t J o h n H u g h e s describes Dulles's opposition to the speech as follows: Only obliquely to the president, but plainly to me, Dulles murmured his distrust and dislike for the whole project, almost to the end. Initially he voiced concern on the basis of some new signs of a communist "peace offensive," such as Chou En-lai's initiative for a Korean prisoner-exchange and Soviet agreement with the West to support Dag Hammarskjold's nomination at the United Nations

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as Secretary-General. "I grow less keen about this speech," Dulles cautioned, "because I think there's some real danger of our just seeming to fall in with these Soviet overtures. It's obvious that what they are doing is because of outside pressures, and I don't know anything better we can do than to keep up those pressures right now."97 E i s e n h o w e r eventually delivered t h e s p e e c h (with its conciliatory t o n e intact) o n April 16, 1953, a n d it was almost universally l a u d e d by the m e d i a . T h u s Dulles's o p p o s i t i o n to the speech, a n d the softer line toward the Soviets t h a t it symbolized, was virtually without effect. Dulles's stated policy p r e f e r e n c e f o r taking advantage of the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p transition by trying to exploit nationalist u n r e s t in t h e satellite states was q u i t e consistent with his belief that t h e U n i t e d States s h o u l d p u r s u e a dynamic political a n d psychological campaign of "liberation" to u n d e r m i n e the Soviets f r o m within. His aversion to Eisenhower's efforts to reach o u t to the new Soviet leadership was consistent with his belief in the basic irreconcilability of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the U n i t e d States a n d the Soviets. His policymaking behavior (i.e., a r g u i n g in the National Security Council m e e t i n g f o r e f f o r t s to exploit nationalism in the satellites a n d trying to dissuade the speechwriters f r o m m a k i n g t h e speech too conciliatory) were also consistent with his worldview. Even t h o u g h Dulles's policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d policymaking behavior did n o t ultimately shape the policy o u t c o m e in any significant way, this episode d o e s establish m a r k e d consistency b e t w e e n p a r t i c u l a r city-on-theh i l l - i n f l u e n c e d beliefs o n the o n e h a n d a n d his policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d policymaking behavior o n the other. AVOIDING A DEAL WITH THE DEVIL IN GENEVA Dulles's h a n d l i n g of the 1954 Geneva c o n f e r e n c e on Korea a n d Ind o c h i n a provides a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of s t r o n g consistency b e t w e e n the e l e m e n t s of his worldview that were colored by the city-on-thehill myth a n d his policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d policymaking behavior. In this case, however, his p r e f e r e n c e s a n d behavior did strongly influe n c e the policy o u t c o m e (an almost c o m p l e t e lack of U.S. s u p p o r t of b o t h the negotiations a n d the resulting a g r e e m e n t s regarding Ind o c h i n a ) . H o o p e s dramatically sums u p Dulles's impact o n the U.S. position: "None of Dulles' actions was to b r i n g f o r t h a d a r k e r harvest t h a n his refusal to allow U n i t e d States policy to s u p p o r t or even c o u n t e n a n c e a diplomatic s e t t l e m e n t of the F r e n c h colonial war in I n d o c h i n a in the p e r i o d f r o m 1954 to 1956." 98

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As H o o p e s ' s narrative makes clear, f r o m the very start Dulles was opposed to negotiating with the communists to end the first Ind o c h i n a War, a n d he was very effective at making sure that the United States would give as little support as possible to the negotiations and the a g r e e m e n t s they p r o d u c e d . " Dulles had h o p e d , as late as fall 1953, that the French, with substantial U.S. financial assistance, could defeat the Vietminh if they followed the plan of General H e n r i Navarre to increase their troops by 68,000 m e n by the b e g i n n i n g of 1954. 100 By J a n u a r y 1954, however, the French g o v e r n m e n t of Premier J o s e p h Laniel was very n e a r collapse, a n d Laniel realized that he had to push for negotiations to e n d the war or his government would n o t survive. 101 T h e Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in late J a n u a r y 1954 provided the opportunity for the French to set u p such negotiations. Dulles realized that the French g o v e r n m e n t would n o t survive if its delegation left Berlin without an agreement to discuss the Indochina War at the upcoming Geneva conference. He begrudgingly accepted the idea of holding talks on Indochina at the Geneva conference, but not without making it explicit in the c o m m u n i q u e that the presence of communist Chinese at the Geneva negotiations did n o t in any way constitute U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. 1 0 2 He reiterated the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the Chinese in a televised address to the nation after the conference. Some profess to fear that the holding of this conference will imply U.S. recognition of Communist China. That fear is without basis. . . . The United States will not agree to join in a five-power conference with the Chinese aggressors for the purpose of dealing with the peace of the world. The United States refuses not because, as is suggested, it denies that the regime exists or that it has power. We in the United States well know that it exists and has power because its aggressive armies joined with the North Korean aggressors to kill and wound 150,000 Americans. . . . We do not refuse to deal with it where occasion requires. It is, however, one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good. That explains our non-recognition of the Chinese regime. It is that position which is reflected in the final Berlin Conference Resolution. Under that resolution, the communist regime will not come to Geneva to be honored by us, but rather to account before the bar of world opinion. 1 0 3

This is n o t a statement that would be made by someone who expected or wanted f r u i t f u l negotiations with the communists at Geneva. In fact, Dulles made it sound as though the Geneva conference would serve as a court in which to try the communist Chinese

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for "crimes against the moral law." It is all very consistent with Dulles's beliefs about the relationship between morality and diplomacy and the moral nature of the Cold War confrontation. However, as Hoopes points out, Dulles and the Eisenhower administration as a whole were u n d e r a great deal of pressure f r o m the congressional "China lobby" to take the hardest line possible against communist China. 1 0 4 In agreeing to allow the communist Chinese to sit at the table for the I n d o c h i n a phase of the Geneva c o n f e r e n c e , therefore, Dulles exposed the administration to criticism f r o m the China lobby. His concern about this could partially explain the severe tone of the previous statement. However, it would be a gross oversimplification to say that Dulles's strong advocacy of the n o n r e c o g n i t i o n policy was solely politically motivated. T h e r e is simply too m u c h consistency with his previously stated beliefs about the importance of moral law (as represented by "the bar of world opinion") and about the irreconcilable philosophical differences that make it very difficult to negotiate with communists. T h e r e was little n e e d h e r e for Dulles to be cynical because he was protecting his political flank against people with whom he shared many very basic beliefs a b o u t the n a t u r e of the Cold War conf r o n t a t i o n . It is h a r d to imagine that any m e m b e r of the China lobby could have seen more "evil" in the Chinese communists than did Dulles himself. Even as he was attempting to poison the atmosphere for negotiations at the Geneva conference, Dulles was still h o p i n g that the French would n o t go into the c o n f e r e n c e feeling as t h o u g h they had to come away with a negotiated settlement. At a February 26 m e e t i n g of the National Security Council, h e held out h o p e that the French would n o t "push too h a r d for a negotiated settlement provided there was n o real military disaster in I n d o c h i n a prior to and during the conference." 1 0 5 Unfortunately for the French, and for Dulles, this "real military disaster" began to u n f o l d just two weeks later in a place called Dien Bien Phu. Dulles realized that because of the deteriorating French military position, the Laniel government would be forced to pursue aggressively a negotiated settlement with the communists at the upcoming Geneva conference. 1 0 6 At this point Dulles and Eisenhower f o u n d themselves in a very difficult position. Neither was happy about the prospect of the French negotiating with the communists over I n d o c h i n a . At the same time they were being asked by the French for U.S. military intervention in the f o r m of airstrikes to relieve the besieged fortress at Dien Bien Phu, an action that both felt they must resist. 107 Wanting to avoid both the prospect of a French

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"sellout" at Geneva and actual U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, Dulles came up with a concept he called united action. 1 0 8 The plan consisted of a coalition of states (the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and the associated states of Indochina) banding together to form a regional security organization to defend against any further spread of communism into Southeast Asia. Dulles hoped that the organization could be set up before the Geneva conference began so that it would bolster the French negotiating position and keep the French from giving away too much. 1 0 9 He set out in late March to promote his united-action plan both at home and to the European Allies. Much to his dismay, the Allies balked at the plan. Both the British and the French feared that setting up such an organization before the Geneva conference would tend to make the Vietminh and the Chinese communists more intransigent and thus ruin the chances for fruitful negotiations, negotiations they both saw as the best solution to the Indochina problem. 1 1 0 With the failure to get his united-action plan implemented before the conference, Dulles resigned himself to the unpleasant reality of the Geneva negotiations on Indochina. Dulles attended the Geneva conference reluctantly and for only one week, and his behavior there clearly reflected his disdain for the entire enterprise. His displeasure is summed up well by Hoopes. While at Geneva, Dulles "conducted himself with the pinched distaste of a Puritan in a house of ill-repute, quite brusquely refusing to shake hands with Chou En-Lai and instructing the American delegation to ignore at all times the presence and existence of the Chinese delegation." 1 1 1 Dulles did not want the United States to be closely identified with any of the agreements produced at Geneva that legitimized communist territorial gains, and in this he was fully supported by Eisenhower. 112 To achieve this goal symbolically, Dulles made sure that after he left during the first week of the conference, the U.S. delegation would have no member at cabinet rank; all of the other delegations were led by foreign ministers. At the end of the conference, the U.S. delegation, under orders from Dulles, refused to sign the agreements and merely wrote a unilateral declaration stating that the United States "took note" of the agreements, "agreed to refrain from using force to disturb them," and stated that it would "view any renewal of aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern." 1 1 3 In response to European criticism o f the lukewarm U.S. support for the final Geneva agreements, Dulles proclaimed, "The United States has been concerned to find a way

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whereby it could h e l p France, Viet-nam, Laos, a n d C a m b o d i a f i n d acceptable settlements without in any way p r e j u d i c i n g basic principles to which the U n i t e d States must a d h e r e if it is to be t r u e to itself, a n d if the c a p t u r e d a n d e n d a n g e r e d p e o p l e s of the world are to feel that t h e U n i t e d States really believes in liberty." 1 1 4 Dulles clearly t h o u g h t that t h e Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n s h a d p r o d u c e d an a g r e e m e n t legitimizing c o m m u n i s t gains in n o r t h e r n V i e t n a m , s o m e t h i n g h e h a d f e a r e d all along. T h u s h e felt t h a t the U n i t e d States c o u l d n o t a c c e p t this a g r e e m e n t "without p r e j u d i c i n g basic principles." Dulles's belief a b o u t the m o r a l n a t u r e of t h e Cold War conf r o n t a t i o n a n d the resulting moral obstacles to negotiating with the c o m m u n i s t s are clearly r e f l e c t e d in his policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d his policymaking behavior in this episode. In t h e face of a rapidly det e r i o r a t i n g F r e n c h military position a n d irresistible political pressure o n t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t to negotiate, Dulles p o i s o n e d t h e a t m o s p h e r e by insulting t h e C h i n e s e a n d actively s o u g h t alternatives to n e g o t i a t i n g with the communists. W h e n it b e c a m e obvious t h a t t h e F r e n c h would n e g o t i a t e , Dulles i n t r o d u c e d his u n i t e d action p l a n in an a t t e m p t to u n d e r m i n e the n e g o t i a t i o n s . W h e n this plan failed to short-circuit t h e Geneva n e g o t i a t i o n s , h e att e n d e d the negotiations f o r j u s t long e n o u g h to insult the Chinese again a n d i n s t r u c t his d e l e g a t i o n o n how to distance themselves f r o m the p r o c e e d i n g s . W h e n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s finally p r o d u c e d an a g r e e m e n t , h e was quick to show his distaste f o r it, saying in a postc o n f e r e n c e s t a t e m e n t that "the i m p o r t a n t thing f r o m now o n is n o t to m o u r n the past, b u t to seize the f u t u r e o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e v e n t the loss in N o r t h e r n Vietnam f r o m leading to the extension of comm u n i s m t h r o u g h o u t Southeast Asia." 115 T h e lack of U.S. s u p p o r t f o r the Geneva Accords was a central reason f o r their eventual collapse with the start of the Second I n d o c h i n a War in 1958. RELUCTANT SUMMITEER Dulles's consistent opposition to negotiations with c o m m u n i s t leaders c o n t i n u e d into 1955. During spring of that year, many E u r o p e a n l e a d e r s were calling f o r a four-power s u m m i t c o n f e r e n c e with the Soviet l e a d e r s h i p . 1 1 6 Several positive Soviet moves d u r i n g s p r i n g 1955 (most notably t h e signing of t h e Austrian State Treaty) pers u a d e d E i s e n h o w e r t h a t the time was i n d e e d r i g h t f o r a s u m m i t meeting. 1 1 7 Prior to the completion of the Austrian treaty, Dulles h a d strongly a n d consistently advised Eisenhower against any s u m m i t

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meetings with the Soviets, using past instances of Soviet intransigence and dishonesty to buttress his argument. 1 1 8 However, with the completion of the Austrian treaty and with Eisenhower's resolve to go forward with the Geneva summit, Dulles reluctantly realized that the tide was against him, and he began to work with the president on an agenda for the meeting. 1 1 9 In preparing Eisenhower for the summit, however, Dulles went to great lengths to warn him about the dangers that he felt were inherent in such a meeting. 1 2 0 In a presummit briefing memorandum, he warned Eisenhower that the Soviets would try to exploit world opinion to trap the United States into a bad disarmament agreement: "Undoubtedly, one of the major Soviet desires is to relieve itself of the economic burden of the present arms race. . . . Probably the Soviet Union will propose again, as it did in Berlin, a world disarmament conference. They believe that if world opinion can be aroused and focused upon us, we may accept disarmament under hastily devised and perhaps imprudent conditions." 1 2 1 Apparently, Dulles had made up his mind that if the meeting were going to go forward, he would at least make sure that Eisenhower went in with his eyes open. He also wanted Eisenhower to confront the Soviets on the issue of the captive peoples behind the iron curtain. He suggested that Eisenhower should privately "raise the question [and] emphasize that if in fact the Soviets wish to reduce tension with the United States, they must deal with this problem which our people feel is covered by war agreements which have been violated." 122 Finally, Dulles argued that Eisenhower should be ready to use trade as a bargaining chip, but only after the Soviets had given substantial ground on other important issues: "the Soviet bloc is a deficit area and the free world is now a surplus area. No doubt the deficit countries would like to get our surplus. This may be the highest card we have to play. We should not give it away until we know that we are getting what we want in relation to Germany, the satellites, and international Communism." 1 2 3 This last bit of presummit advice to Eisenhower is the most surprising of the three. Dulles's earlier suggestions for Eisenhower to watch out for Soviet manipulation and to privately confront the Soviet leaders on the issue of the captive peoples were in keeping with his well-documented distrust of the Soviets and his moral outrage over the people trapped behind the iron curtain. However, Dulles's suggestion that Eisenhower should use trade as a classical carrotand-stick diplomatic maneuver was quite a departure from all of his previous writings on Cold War diplomacy. It was certainly not in keeping with his previous Puritan style of diplomacy. Perhaps for

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Dulles, if such diplomatic "dealing" with the Soviets could produce the liberation of people b e h i n d the iron curtain, the ends would justify the means. It is not clear f r o m the record of the conference just how much Eisenhower followed Dulles's advice. Eisenhower did make quite an impression on the world by taking the initiative with his "open skies" proposal, and at the end of the conference popular expectations of improved East-West relations were at an all-time high. After the c o n f e r e n c e , Dulles set out immediately to keep these p o p u l a r expectations u n d e r control. 1 2 4 As was the case with the 1954 Geneva conference, Dulles's policy preferences were against negotiating with the communists, and his policymaking behavior consisted of trying to p e r s u a d e Eisenhower against agreeing to the summit meeting. Thus both his policy preferences and policymaking behavior were consistent with his beliefs r e g a r d i n g the moral n a t u r e of the Cold War conflict. This time, however, he was unable to prevent the U n i t e d States f r o m being intimately involved in the talks. Once his initial policy preference was overridden by the president, his policymaking behavior (i.e., his p r e s u m m i t briefings of President Eisenhower) still reflected discomfort with the summit meeting and reflected his belief in the n e e d to take a h a r d line with the Soviets a n d to c o n f r o n t them morally. 125 His efforts to lower public expectations about the summit were consistent with his belief in the ultimate irreconcilability of the basic issues separating East and West. In a postsummit policy statement written for Eisenhower, Dulles argued that the "new Soviet attitude," as reflected in the Austrian treaty and o t h e r actions leading u p to the Geneva summit, was merely a Soviet a d j u s t m e n t to the tough Cold War policies of the United States. 126 He also warned that "Geneva has certainly created problems for the free nations. For eight years they have been held together by a cement c o m p o u n d e d of fear and a sense of moral superiority. Now the fear is diminished and the moral demarcation is somewhat blurred." 1 2 7 He closed by a d d i n g that if the Soviets followed Geneva with tangible actions such as loosening their hold in East Germany a n d the rest of Eastern Europe, the U n i t e d States would c o n t i n u e to work to maintain the c u r r e n t state of relaxed tensions; b u t if the Soviets did n o t follow u p with positive actions, the United States would be forced to revert to "the old state of distrust and tension." 1 2 8 Thus Dulles took quite a h a r d e n e d view of the state of m i n i d é t e n t e that was hailed by h o p e f u l observers as the "spirit of Geneva."

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CONSISTENT SINOPHOBIA With r e g a r d to c o m m u n i s t s , especially t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s , Dulles would r e m a i n steadfast in his o p p o s i t i o n to direct dealings with t h e m . By 1957, most of t h e o t h e r industrialized n a t i o n s were moving toward normalization of e c o n o m i c relations with China, b u t Dulles h e l d firm in his opposition to any such action o n the p a r t of the U n i t e d States, a n d Eisenhower s u p p o r t e d his stand. At a March m e e t i n g in B e r m u d a Dulles tried unsuccessfully to convince British f o r e i g n secretary Selwyn Lloyd t h a t t h e British s h o u l d j o i n the U n i t e d States in its C h i n a policy of n o n r e c o g n i t i o n a n d n o n a d m i t t a n c e to the UN. 1 2 9 In a J u n e s p e e c h in San Francisco, Dulles def e n d e d his policy of political a n d e c o n o m i c isolation of c o m m u n i s t China: Internationally the Chinese communist regime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations. . . . Its foreign policies are hostile to us and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances it would be folly for us to establish relations with the Chinese communists which would enhance their ability to hurt us and our friends. . . . Nothing could be more dangerous than for the United States to operate on the theory that if hostile and evil forces do not quickly or readily change, then it is we who must change to meet them. 130 T h u s at a time w h e n the Western allies were b e g i n n i n g to n o r m a l ize t h e i r relations with the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a , a n d w h e n t h e r e was b e g i n n i n g to b e n o t i c e a b l e s u p p o r t in Congress f o r t h e U n i t e d States to d o so, Dulles m a i n t a i n e d an u n w a v e r i n g opposition to any such action. 1 3 1 T h e fact that congressional opposition to n o r m a l i z i n g relations with C h i n a was weakening at this p o i n t is especially significant b e c a u s e it provides evidence t h a t goes against some Dulles b i o g r a p h e r s who argue that his hard-line stance against the Soviets a n d C h i n a can be explained almost entirely by his n e e d to placate a harshly a n t i c o m m u n i s t public a n d Congress. 1 3 2 BUILDING SPIRITUAL UNITY T h e f o r e g o i n g analysis of Dulles's policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d policym a k i n g behavior shows him to be fairly consistently o p p o s e d to negotiating with c o m m u n i s t leaders w h e t h e r they were Soviet or Chinese. A n d yet Dulles was n o t e d f o r b e i n g an extremely active cold w a r r i o r a n d well-traveled secretary of state. If Dulles was so reluct a n t to n e g o t i a t e with c o m m u n i s t leaders, what was his p r e f e r r e d

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m o d e of Cold War diplomacy? T h e answer is largely that Dulles devoted much of his energy to building and maintaining unity a m o n g the global n o n c o m m u n i s t coalition of nations. Beginning even b e f o r e he b e c a m e secretary of state, Dulles filled his speeches and writings with warnings about the importance of unity in anticommunist alliances. Taken at face value, such behavior would hardly distinguish Dulles f r o m any o t h e r Cold War secretary of state. What sets Dulles apart is the nature of the unity that he sought to build in the n o n c o m m u n i s t world. From almost the beginning of the Cold War he spoke and wrote about the n e e d for a spiritual unity based on c o m m o n a d h e r e n c e to universal moral principles that could bind the a n t i c o m m u n i s t nations together in opposition to the forces of "godless communism." In fact, Dulles's convictions a b o u t the power of a universal moral law as a binding and guiding force in international relations were first manifest in his writings during his World War II involvem e n t with the Federal Council of Churches. With the advent of the Cold War, Dulles began to argue that the universal moral law should bind the n o n c o m m u n i s t nations against the forces of communism and that p a r t of the mission of the U n i t e d States was to mobilize a n o n c o m m u n i s t coalition a r o u n d these moral principles. It is also true, however, that with the advent of the Cold War Dulles began to combine adherence to the religious-based moral law with a d h e r e n c e to liberal-democratic principles such as individual liberty. Nonetheless, by the early 1950s Dulles put a great deal of stock in the potency of these moral principles as a unifying force in the n o n c o m m u n i s t world. In a May 1952 speech in France, Dulles argued for the importance of building a b o n d between the n o n c o m m u n i s t West and the n o n c o m m u n i s t East a r o u n d these shared moral principles. The people of the West believe basically in the equal rights and equal dignity of all men and in the sacredness of the individual personality of all. That faith had its beginning injudea, where east and west met, and it held that all men, without regard to race and color, were the creation and concern of a universal God. That western belief in the nature of man is what has made western colonialism a self-liquidating affair. The political independence and new dignity that other races have won in recent years is not a frustration of western goals, but their fulfillment. Surely we can find ways to make that clear and, in so doing, create, between the free East and the free West, a sense of common destiny. 133

In addition to showing Dulles's belief in the power of ideals as a binding and guiding force in international relations, this also illustrates

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his blending of Judeo-Christian principles with Western liberal democratic principles. Dulles believed in these ideals and principles as a powerful psychological weapon for uniting the developing world against communist expansion. In another 1952 speech, Dulles argued that until then the communists had been more successful than the noncommunists in using their ideas to instill a strong sense of purpose in their followers in the Third World. Those dictators keep their grasp on captive peoples partly by force but also by providing a sense of momentous revolutionary movement. The very violence of their claim carries a conviction of sincerity and purpose which the free world lacks. The attraction of that is great. . . . There are many who acquiesce because they gain the satisfaction which comes from sharing in strong purposes of world-wide scope. They do not feel attracted by freedom which seems barren of purpose and which, as they see it, survives strongly only where it has past accumulations on which to feed. The situation will be totally different when our own conduct and example again brilliantly illumine the truth that men do not have to choose between freedom which is sterile and captivity which is purposeful. 1 3 4 In another speech during the same period, Dulles argued that it was the responsibility of the United States to play the role of moral and spiritual leader in order to maintain morale within the noncommunist coalition. A second reason against divorcing diplomacy from morality is that this strikes at the heart of free world unity. Today, the United States has an inescapable responsibility for leadership. Only leadership that inspires confidence will prevent the free world from falling apart and being picked up, piece by piece by Soviet Communism. United States foreign policies today represent the core of potential unity and that core is rotten unless it is a core of moral principle. . . . Throughout the ages men have experimented with artificial means for binding nations into common action for a common cause. They have experimented with military alliances, with subsidies, with coercion. None of these methods has stood the stress and strain of fluctuating danger. The only tie which dependably unites free peoples is awareness of common dedication to moral principles. 135 In addition to showing Dulles's belief in the necessary connection between diplomacy and moral principle, this passage shows his belief in an American mission to be the moral and spiritual leader of the n o n c o m m u n i s t nations. This is yet another clear example of

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Dulles's using the city-on-the-hill myth to shape his p r e f e r r e d conception of America's global role in the Cold War. T h e t h r e e previous passages taken together also provide evidence in Dulles's worldview of certain elements of the Puritan representative character. H e posited a diplomatic stance toward the Third World that consisted primarily of conversion and mobilization—the paradigmatic m o d e of social action of the Puritan representative character. He argued that the peoples of the developing world must be united a r o u n d certain moral principles and political ideals and thus infused with a powerful sense of p u r p o s e and mobilized against the forces of international communism. This was a continuation of the Puritan character pattern in Dulles's basic approach to influencing world politics that we first noticed during his World War II involvement with the Federal Council of Churches. I n d e e d , the transcripts of some of his speeches to the a n n u a l meetings of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) paint a picture of the Puritan-as-diplomat-in-action. In the conclusion of his speech to the third meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers at Canberra, Australia, Dulles took the tone of a worried pastor showing a wayward congregation how to avoid Satan's clutches. Let us put our own houses in order. Let us avoid communist traps baited with offers of trade and aid. Let us expose communist techniques of subversion. Let us make economic and social progress. Let us build up our educational systems. Let us give fair treatment to minority groups. Let us train capable trade union leaders. Thus we can do much to show other free nations how to seal off effectively the various traditional avenues of communist penetration. 1 3 6

In a similar speech before an annual meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Baghdad Pact, Dulles m a d e an appeal to unity based on his familiar mixture of moral principles a n d political ideals. The greatest danger is always the danger which comes from blindness to danger. Today we see the danger, and we are allied with forces that have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to prevail against the materialistic despotisms. There are, we know, Godgiven aspirations for freedom of mind and spirit and for opportunity. These are beyond the power of man to destroy. So long as we ally ourselves loyally and sacrificially with what is good, what is true, our cause surely will prevail. 137

Dulles spent a great deal of his time as secretary of state flying a r o u n d the world and organizing anticommunist coalitions. O n c e

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these coalitions (such as SEATO a n d C E N T O ) were o r g a n i z e d , h e c o n t i n u e d to a t t e n d their ministerial m e e t i n g s in an a t t e m p t to k e e p t h e m mobilized against t h e f o r c e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u nism. It is in these social contexts that we get the clearest p i c t u r e of Dulles the Puritan-as-diplomat wielding his m i x e d arsenal of m o r a l principles a n d Western political ideals in an a t t e m p t to create spiritual unity in the a n t i c o m m u n i s t world. CONCLUSION T h e f o r e g o i n g analysis has p r o d u c e d significant evidence to indicate that certain e l e m e n t s of Dulles's worldview were i n f l u e n c e d by t h e city-on-the-hill myth ( a n d to a lesser e x t e n t in t h e 1920s a n d 1930s by t h e m a r k e t m y t h ) . T h e analysis of several policymaking cases shows that his policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d policymaking behavior were o f t e n consistent with those city-on-the-hill-influenced elem e n t s of his worldview. T h e r e was substantial city-on-the-hill mythical i m a g e r y in Dulles's c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e g i n n i n g with his World War II involvement with t h e F e d e r a l C o u n c i l of C h u r c h e s a n d t h r o u g h o u t his t e n u r e as secretary of state. O n t h e philosophical level, Dulles believed strongly that t h e r e s h o u l d b e a close linkage between morality a n d diplomacy. Related to this p a t t e r n , b u t o n a less p h i l o s o p h i c a l level, Dulles believed strongly t h a t t h e f o r m u l a t i o n a n d c o n d u c t of U.S. f o r e i g n policy s h o u l d be g u i d e d by m o r a l principles. In a n o t h e r r e l a t e d p a t t e r n , Dulles believed that t h e Cold War c o n f r o n t a t i o n should a n d i n d e e d must b e viewed in m o r a l terms. Two o t h e r related questions yielded responses that are also consistent with a city-on-the-hill orientation: what f o r m s of U.S. power were most effective in the Cold War, a n d what was the best strategy f o r dealing with the Soviets. With r e g a r d to the first question, analysis of Dulles's c o m m u n i c a t i o n s indicates t h a t h e believed military a n d e c o n o m i c power were necessary to c o u n t e r t h e t h r e a t of comm u n i s m , b u t these h a d to b e s u p p l e m e n t e d by a m o r a l / s p i r i t u a l f o r m of power. O n the second, Dulles showed consistent pessimism a b o u t t h e p r o s p e c t s of d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s with c o m m u n i s t leaders—the clearest e x a m p l e of consistency between his worldview a n d policy p r e f e r e n c e s a n d behavior. N o t only were his beliefs consistent with the city-on-the-hill myth, b u t quite o f t e n the statements relating these beliefs c o n t a i n e d vivid city-on-the-hill imagery, a n d at times h e used the myth itself to justify his a r g u m e n t s . At times (e.g., t h e 1955 Geneva S u m m i t ) , his opposition to such negotiations was o v e r r u l e d by Eisenhower; at o t h e r times (such as the 1954 Geneva

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conference on Korea and Indochina), Dulles was able to persuade Eisenhower that the negotiations should n o t be s u p p o r t e d by the United States. The evidence of the Puritan representative character influence on Dulles's self- and role conceptions and behavior is less clear. There is substantial evidence, however, of an overall orientation toward world politics that is consistent with the moral and epistemological stance and the paradigmatic mode of social action of the Puritan. From the time of his involvement with the Federal Council of Churches t h r o u g h o u t his t e n u r e as secretary of state, Dulles communicated his belief in the power of moral principles and political ideals to convert and mobilize people a r o u n d the world and thus to alter the course of world politics. T h e fact that this f u n d a m e n t a l approach to influencing world politics r e m a i n e d stable even as the world and Dulles's roles c h a n g e d is significant. It is precisely this underlying stability in an individual's approach to a changing social world and across roles that the representative character concept is designed to capture. And this f u n d a m e n t a l orientation does indicate some degree of identification on Dulles's part with the Puritan character. This indication is s t r e n g t h e n e d by f u r t h e r evidence in Dulles's self- and role conceptions. T h o r o u g h examination of Dulles's speeches, writings, and letters yielded only two instances where he actually reflected on his role as a policymaker, b u t those two instances do provide interesting insights. 138 T h e first comes f r o m a draft of a 1955 speech entitled "Principles in Foreign Policy." Toward the conclusion of this speech Dulles addressed the age-old question of w h e t h e r statesmen could act morally in their role of trustees of their nation's security: There are some who believe that moral considerations ought not to influence the foreign policy of a nation, that moral considerations are all right for the individual but not for the collective unity. Corporate bodies should be directed only by material considerations. . . . It is indeed the case that those who represent a government operate only for the immediate and direct self interest of the nation they represent. . . . The government of the United States has, I like to believe, a rather unique tradition in this respect. . . . Our institutions reflect the belief of our founders that all men were endowed by their creator with unalienable rights and had duties prescribed by moral law. They believed that human institutions ought primarily to help men develop their God-given possibilities and that our nation, by its conduct and example, could help men everywhere to find the way to a better and more abundant life. 1 3 9

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After describing how this unusual marriage of morality and diplomacy had b r o u g h t great prosperity to the United States, Dulles went on: Thus there is a familiar pattern. Men who feel a sense of duty to some higher being strive here to do his will. Because of their faith, they have power and virtue and simple wisdom. They build not only for the day, but for the morrow; not merely for themselves, but for mankind. . . . No doubt we have made mistakes. But broadly speaking, our nation has played a role which I believe history will judge to have been honorable. It is a role which we could not have played unless those who exercised the power of government had believed that they were justified in putting moral considerations above material considerations. 1 4 0

As these passages show, Dulles conceptualized his role as a statesman as being d e f i n e d by a God-given duty to u p h o l d the moral law. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that he justified this conceptualization using a city-on-the-hill interpretation of the nation's f o u n d i n g . T h u s in this rare glimpse into Dulles's conception of his role as a statesman, we see certain elements of the Puritan representative character. We see the Puritan's strong sense of authority derived f r o m God and a d h e r e n c e to divine law. This is consistent with the Puritan character's moral and epistemological stance—the good and the true are f o u n d in the word and the law of God. T h e only major element of the Puritan representative character missing f r o m Dulles's conceptualization of his role as a statesm a n is the Puritan's paradigmatic m o d e of social action—using divine revelation to convert and mobilize people for God's purposes. T h e o t h e r evidence of Dulles's role conceptions comes f r o m a rare television interview in 1957. O n the NBC show Look Here! Dulles r e s p o n d e d to Martin Agronsky's questions a b o u t how he conceived of his role as secretary of state. At one p o i n t Agronsky asked Dulles to what extent h e believed that h e as an individual could make an impact on the course of h u m a n history. Well I don't say that man is totally independent of his environment or the conditions around him but I do believe whatever the conditions are you have an opportunity to mold them. There is a verse in the Bible I sometimes think about which says—starts out, "All things work together for good." But it doesn't stop there. It says: "All things work together for those who love God in accordance with His holy purpose." Now I think if you have the right kind of purpose, you can take advantage of conditions whatever they are, to make them somewhat different and somewhat better. 141

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A l t h o u g h Dulles's r e s p o n s e was s o m e w h a t vague, h e did seem to claim t h a t b e c a u s e t h e r e was a c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n his p u r p o s e s a n d those of God, h e was m o r e able to m a k e an i m p a c t o n world politics. This is consistent with b o t h the Puritan character's sense of authority derived f r o m God a n d its a d h e r e n c e to God's law. This response with its h i n t of divine a n n o i n t e d n e s s s p u r r e d Agronsky to delve f u r t h e r i n t o t h e i n f l u e n c e of religion o n Dulles's c o n d u c t of diplomacy. H e asked Dulles if it i m p r o v e d U.S. f o r e i g n policy to have a statesman who was constantly trying to apply Christian principles to its practice. Dulles r e s p o n d e d : I believe that there are certain basic principles which undergird the world and are just as important and just as certain as the laws of physics. Now you wouldn't want to run foreign policy in violation of the laws of physics. I don't think any more can you run foreign policy without some of the great moral principles that have prevailed for all time. You can go back to the earliest days of history, you can go to all the great religions and you will find certain basic things, certain basic truths and I don't think you can defy those with impunity. 142

This provides very clear evidence that Dulles conceived of himself as b e i n g g u i d e d in his c o n d u c t of foreign policy by moral principles. This s t a t e m e n t is again quite consistent with t h e m o r a l a n d epistemological stances of the Puritan representative character. Can we t h e r e f o r e confidently classify J o h n Foster Dulles as a Puritan American statesman? H e was an extremely complex individual; it is a p p a r e n t that myriad forces a n d e x p e r i e n c e s s h a p e d Dulles's personality a n d worldview. Nonetheless, the case study does t u r n u p evidence to indicate that Dulles was substantially s h a p e d by b o t h the city-on-the-hill myth a n d the Puritan representative character. NOTES 1. Early interpretations presented Eisenhower as being somewhat disengaged in the foreign policy making process and as leaving many decisions up to Dulles. In the 1970s a revisionist interpretation began to appear, arguing that in fact Eisenhower was very much in charge but managed foreign policy from behind the scenes. For an excellent discussion of both the orthodox and revisionist schools on Eisenhower see Robert Kagan, "Why Like Ike?" The National Interest (Summer 1986): 88-94. For the most recent examples of the revisionist school see Fred Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982), and Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President and Elder Statesman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). 2. Eisenhower's trust and respect for Dulles is reflected throughout the president's memoirs, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

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3. For a good discussion of Dulles's religious upbringing, see Mark G. Toulouse, The Transformation of John Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985), 3 - 1 5 . 4. Ibid., 4 - 7 . 5. Ibid., 5 - 6 . 6. Quoted in Toulouse, 6. 7. Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982), 4 - 9 . 8. Ibid., 5 - 7 . 9. Ibid., 5. 10. Ibid., 8 - 9 . 11. Ibid., 9. 12. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 20. 13. Pruessen, 9. 14. Quoted in Pruessen, 10. 15. Hoopes, 21. 16. Pruessen, 9, 24, 173. 17. Ibid., 31. 18. Ibid., 3 2 - 4 0 . 19. Ibid., 4 4 - 4 5 . 20. Ibid., 4 5 - 4 9 . 21. Ibid., 73. 22. Ibid., 7 8 - 7 9 . 23. J o h n Foster Dulles, "The Allied War Debts," Foreign Affairs 1, 1 (September 15, 1922): 1 1 5 - 1 3 2 . 24. Ibid., 1 2 9 - 1 3 2 . 25. Ibid., 132. 26. Pruessen, 100. 27. Quoted in Pruessen, 141. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., 1 5 4 - 1 5 6 . 30. J o h n Foster Dulles, "The Road to Peace," Atlantic Monthly 156 (October 1935): 493. 31. Ibid., 4 9 6 - 4 9 7 . 32. Pruessen, 155. 33. J o h n Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change (New York: Harper, 1939). 34. Ibid., 9 - 1 6 . 35. Ibid., 9. 36. Pruessen, 163. 37. Dulles, War, Peace, and Change, 121-122. 38. Ibid., 126-127. 39. Dulles's thoughts on the phenomenon of mirror imaging (i.e., deification of one's own state and demonization of other states) are most intriguing in light of his later tendency as secretary of state to engage in mirror imaging in his rhetoric regarding the Soviet Union. This paradox will be explored in more depth further on. 40. Dulles, War, Peace, and Change, 124-125. 41. Ibid., 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 . 42. Ibid., 170.

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43. Ibid., 113-117. 44. Ibid., 116. 45. Ibid., 117. 46. Ibid., 118. 47. One interesting issue that comes to mind is the extent to which these visions of world order are compatible or in conflict. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in his writings that he gave much thought to such questions. 48. Toulouse, 4 7 - 1 3 3 . 49. Ibid., 58. 50. Dulles address at the First Presbyterian Church, Watertown, New York, Sunday, August 28, 1949. Reprinted in Henry P. Van Dusen, ed., The Spiritual Legacy ofJohn Foster Dulles: Selections from. His Articles and Addresses (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 7. 51. Ibid., 11. 52. Toulouse, 5 8 - 6 3 . 53. In his role as chairman of the commission, Dulles was a strong leader both administratively and intellectually, and many of his ideas about achieving vehicles for peaceful change, including the need for a liberalized international economic order, may be found in commission documents. See the commission report entitled "Moral and Spiritual Bases for a Just and Lasting Peace," in Van Dusen, 1 0 0 - 1 0 6 . 54. Ibid., 101. 55. J o h n Foster Dulles, "A Righteous Faith," in Van Dusen, 49. 56. J o h n Foster Dulles, "A Nation's Foreign Policy," speech draft, January 26, 1944, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 23. 57. See, for example, War, Peace, and Change, 6 2 - 6 5 . 58. Toulouse, 8 2 - 8 4 , 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 . 59. Ibid., 81. 60. Ibid., 9 2 - 9 3 . 61. Ibid., 9 3 - 9 5 . 62. Ibid., 97. 63. Ibid., 161. 64. Ibid., 153-157. 65. Ibid., 157-158. 66. Ibid., 158. 67. Pruessen, 261. 68. Toulouse, 160-180. 69. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Appraisal of United States Foreign Policy," speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, February 5, 1945, 8 - 9 , Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 27. 70. Dulles manuscript of "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do About It" (which appeared in Life magazine, J u n e 3 and 10, 1946), 1 - 2 , Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 30. 71. These developments included tensions resulting from Soviet failure to implement Yalta provisions regarding free elections in Eastern Europe, Soviet failure to remove troops from northern Iran, and Soviet pressure on Turkey. Other tension-producing developments during this period include Stalin's bellicose February 1946 speech and George Kennan's subsequent "Long cable" from Moscow. 72. J o h n Foster Dulles, "The United Nations—Its Challenge to America," speech presented at Princeton University on February 22, 1946, 7, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 30.

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73. Ibid., 7 - 9 . 74. Ibid., 21. 75. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Foreign Policy—Ideals, N o t Deals," s p e e c h m a d e b e f o r e t h e I n l a n d Daily Press Association in Chicago, Illinois, February 10, 1947, 1 - 2 , Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 31. 76. Ibid., 2 - 3 . 77. Ibid., 3 - 4 . 78. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Appraisal of U.S. F o r e i g n Policy," 9. For o t h e r e x a m p l e s of this t h e m e see " T h o u g h t s o n Soviet F o r e i g n Policy a n d W h a t to Do A b o u t It" a n d "Foreign Policy—Ideals N o t Deals." 79. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Principle Versus E x p e d i e n c y in F o r e i g n Policy," speech b e f o r e the Missouri Bar Association in St. Louis, S e p t e m b e r 26, 1952, 1, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 64. 80. Ibid., 4. 81. Ibid., 1. 82. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Morals a n d Power," speech at the National War College, Washington, D . C . J u n e 16,1953, 2, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 314. 83. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Our International Responsibilities," commencem e n t address at Vanderbilt University, J u n e 4, 1950, 1-3, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 50. For m o r e examples of this t h e m e see "The Strategy of Soviet Communism," speech by Dulles at the C o m m o n Cause Dinner in New York, March 14, 1950, 6, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 50. See also "Our Foreign Policy: Is C o n t a i n m e n t Enough?" speech by Dulles before the Chicago Council o n Foreign Relations, October 8, 1952, 5-9, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 59. 84. Dulles, "Our I n t e r n a t i o n a l Responsibilities," 3. 85. Ibid., 2. 86. J o h n Foster Dulles, "A New Foreign Policy," m a n u s c r i p t f o r article in Life magazine, May 19, 1952, 1 - 3 , Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 57. 87. Ibid., 3. 88. Ibid., 10-11. 89. Ibid., 11. 90. Ibid., 12. 91. Ibid., 11-19. 92. H o o p e s , 170. 93. Ibid., 170-171. 94. M i n u t e s of t h e 136th m e e t i n g of t h e N a t i o n a l Security C o u n c i l , M a r c h 12, 1953, 8, Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, Microfilm Series, reel 1, University Publications of America. 95. H o o p e s , 171. 96. Ibid., 171-173. 97. E m m e t t J o h n H u g h e s , The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: A t h e n e u m , 1963), 109. 98. H o o p e s , 202. 99. Ibid., 202-205. 100. M i n u t e s of t h e 161st m e e t i n g of t h e N a t i o n a l Security C o u n c i l , S e p t e m b e r 9, 1953, 2, Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, Microfilm Series, reel 2, University Publications of America. 101. H o o p e s , 206. 102. Ibid. 103. J o h n Foster Dulles, " R e p o r t o n Berlin," t r a n s c r i p t of television a d d r e s s to t h e n a t i o n , F e b r u a r y 24, 1954, 8 - 9 , Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 324.

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104. Hoopes, 206. 105. Minutes of the 186th meeting of the National Security Council, February 26, 1954, 6, Minutes of Meetings of the National Security Council, Microfilm Series, reel 3, University Publications of America. 106. George C. Herring, "A Good Stout Effort: J o h n Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 5 5 , " in Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 215. 107. Ibid., 217. 108. As Herring points out in "A Good Stout Effort," Dulles and Eisenhower were caught on the horns of a domestic political dilemma. On the one hand public and congressional opinion would not tolerate unilateral U.S. military intervention in Indochina so soon after Korea. On the other hand they could not afford to be perceived as merely standing by while communists made territorial gains in Indochina, whether those gains were made at the negotiating table or on the battlefield. See Herring, 2 1 8 - 2 1 9 . 109. Ibid., 217. 110. Hoopes, 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 . 111. Ibid., 222. 112. Herring, 225. 113. Hoopes, 239. 114. Quoted in Robert F. Randle, Geneva, 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 322. 115. Press statement by Secretary Dulles, July 23, 1954, 1, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 81. 116. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 505. 117. Ibid., 506. 118. Ibid., 504. 119. Hoopes, 290. 120. Ibid., 295. 121. Dulles memorandum to Eisenhower, J u n e 18, 1955, 1, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 91. 122. Ibid., 2. 123. Ibid., 2 - 3 . 124. Hoopes, 3 0 0 - 3 0 1 . 125. As noted, his advising Eisenhower to be prepared to hold out East-West trade as a "carrot" to extract concessions from the Soviets in other areas was something of an anomaly. It does not seem to fit either his worldview or the larger pattern of his policy preferences or policymaking behavior. 126. Dulles statement on post-Geneva policy written for Eisenhower, September 13, 1955, Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 91. 127. Ibid., 4. 128. Ibid., 8 - 1 0 . 129. Hoopes, 417. 130. Dulles speech before the International Convention o f Lions International, San Francisco, J u n e 28, 1957, 8 - 9 , Dulles Papers/Princeton, Box 356. 131. Hoopes, 415. 132. See Michael Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 130-131.

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133. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Far Eastern Problems," speech b e f o r e t h e F r e n c h National Political Science Institute, Paris, France, May 5, 1952, 3, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 62. 134. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Freedom and Its Purpose," speech before the National Council of Churches, Denver, Colorado, December 11, 1952, 12, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 62. 135. Dulles, "Principle Versus Expediency in Foreign Policy," 4-5. 136. Dulles speech to the o p e n i n g session of the Third Meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers at Canberra, March 11, 1957, 3-4, Dulles Pap e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 353. 137. Dulles speech b e f o r e the F o u r t h Ministerial Council Session of the Baghdad Pact, Ankara, Turkey, J a n u a r y 27, 1958, 6, Dulles P a p e r s / Princeton, Box 360. 138. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the analysis of Dulles's p a p e r s yielded n o clear statements by Dulles on his self-conceptions as distinct f r o m role-conceptions, so we are left with role-conception evidence only. 139. J o h n Foster Dulles, "Principles in Foreign Policy," draft of speech, 7, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 335. 140. Ibid., 8. 141. Transcript of Martin Agronsky's interview of Dulles on NBC show Look Here! Sunday, September 15, 1957, 3-4, Dulles P a p e r s / P r i n c e t o n , Box 355. 142. Ibid., 6.

The Enterprising Diplomacy of Averell Harriman

Averell Harriman was one o f the more influential members o f the postwar foreign policy establishment. Over a period o f almost forty years he served five different Democratic presidents from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to J i m m y Carter in various important diplomatic posts. As Walter Isaacson and Evan T h o m a s point out in The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, he along with Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Charles B o h l e n , Robert Lovett, and J o h n McCloy formed an elite group of advisers who first reached the pinnacle of power by helping Truman shape postwar U.S. foreign policy and indeed the postwar world. 1 This same group came to be known as the Wise Men when at the height o f the U.S. involvement in Vietnam they were called on to advise a desperate Lyndon J o h n s o n . 2 Harriman's influence as a presidential adviser (particularly in the early stages of the Truman administration) is indisputable and is eclipsed only by the tremendous skill he showed as a high-level negotiator. 3 Harriman did not even begin his diplomatic career until he was nearly fifty years old. 4 It is in his years as a famous and successful businessman (and in his childhood years, which served to prepare him for that career) that we must search for the experiences and cultural forces that shaped his later worldview and behavior as a diplomat. BORN IN THE SHADOW OF THE "LITTLE GIANT" W. Averell H a r r i m a n was the eldest (surviving) son o f legendary railroad king E. H. Harriman and Mary Averell Harriman. He was b o r n on November 15, 1891, in their Fifty-first Street mansion in New York City. Mary Williamson Averell came from a wealthy family; her father, William J . Averell, was a successful stockbroker and owned a small railroad near Lake Champlain in upstate New York. 5 E. H. Harriman was the son o f Orlando Harriman, an itinerant minister who filled in for parishes in the New York area for a number

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of years until he l a n d e d his own parish pulpit in West H o b o k e n , New Jersey, at a salary of $200 a year. 6 E. H. excelled in school, but at age fourteen he decided that he n e e d e d to quit school and help support the family. 7 In 1862, he obtained a j o b as an office boy for five dollars a week at a stock brokerage on Wall Street, and by 1869 he was the managing clerk at the brokerage. By 1870, at age 22, he had his own seat on the New York Stock Exchange. He quickly developed a reputation for shrewd investing and soon counted some of the richest and most powerful businessmen in New York a m o n g his clients. 8 He would later use these connections a n d the money he m a d e to gain control of what would b e c o m e a railroad and steamship e m p i r e of u n p r e c e d e n t e d size. 9 By o u t b a r g a i n i n g and o u t m a n e u v e r i n g such business giants as J. P. Morgan and J a m e s J. Hill, H a r r i m a n was able to control a n d dramatically e x p a n d such h u g e railroad companies as the Illinois Central a n d the U n i o n Pacific. 10 T h u s d u r i n g the later p a r t of the n i n e t e e n t h century and the early part of the twentieth, E. H. H a r r i m a n accomplished the journey f r o m p o o r boy to r o b b e r baron. He started out with little formal education and n o capital and e n d e d u p with a personal estate worth $70 million. 1 1 His story is that of the self-made man, the central figure a r o u n d which the market myth of America was built. It was u n d e r the shadow of this larger-than-life American entrepren e u r that Averell H a r r i m a n would spend his childhood years, if not indeed his entire life. By the time Averell was old e n o u g h to realize it, E. H. was a p p r o a c h i n g the pinnacle of his spectacular business career. In his biography of the younger Harriman, Rudy Abramson describes the effect on Averell of his father's developing status as an American business legend. By the time he was ready for school, his father was fighting for control of the Union Pacific. He was not yet ten when his father took command of the Southern Pacific system and precipitated the Northern Pacific panic on Wall Street. By the time Averell reached his teens, E.H. was one of the most controversial figures in America, lampooned by cartoonists, investigated by Congress, and ridiculed by the President. . . . Always there was, from the man accused of ruthlessness and financial piracy, sermonizing on the responsibilities of wealth. . . . And there was pressure—constant pressure—to ride properly, to speak properly, to study, to achieve, to do better. . . . Life was a test, an obligation to please Pappa, to measure up to towering expectations of the man admirers called "the Little Giant," and sensational newspapers portrayed as an ogre. 1 2

E. H. would sometimes take Averell along on business trips, which gave the younger H a r r i m a n the opportunity to watch his leg-

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endary father in action. He would later say that his own operational style was shaped partially by watching his father. In a 1978 interview with Fortune magazine, H a r r i m a n recalled watching his father conduct business on a trip to inspect his railroad: "My f a t h e r used to ask the most precise questions. My impression was that h e asked questions about every aspect of maintenance and operations. It impressed me, his interest in detail and his capacity to grasp detail. I inherited that and I've applied it t h r o u g h o u t my whole life." 13 In the same interview he discussed his father's infamous clash with fellow r o b b e r barons James J. Hill and J. P. Morgan over control of the N o r t h e r n Pacific Railroad. H a r r i m a n spoke rather matter-of-factly about the all-out competition for controlling stock that actually triggered a huge panic on Wall Street. "My father had certain plans. He was very competitive himself a n d he d i d n ' t want to have t h e m blocked. He was a great competitor of Hill's; he was a great competitor of Morgan's. I d o n ' t think he cared too m u c h for Hill. T h e r e wasn't m u c h love lost between them." 1 4 He went on to emphasize his father's sense of social responsibility, d e f e n d i n g him against those who portrayed him as a greedy, soulless ogre: "He has been known as one of the Robber Barons, but he told me f r o m an early age that the railroad h a d a three-way responsibility—to the stockholders, of course, to the employees, a n d t h e n to the public that the railroad served." 1 5 T h e driving competitiveness that H a r r i m a n attributed to his father is a key element of the e n t r e p r e n e u r representative character, fictionalized in portrayals of the e n t r e p r e n e u r f r o m Silas L a p h a m to Frank Cowperwood (see Chapter 2). Not only does the younger H a r r i m a n explicitly refer to his f a t h e r ' s competitive n a t u r e as imp o r t a n t to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the man, he also explains that competitiveness by referring to his father's meager beginnings. My grandfather was an educated man—he'd been to Columbia. My father was born in Hempstead, Long Island, at the rectory there. He was brought up not poverty stricken, but not too comfortable. . . . His father had little money. But at the age of fourteen his father wanted him to get a higher education, and he said "no I'm going to go to work." He must have felt that his father had not made a financial success of his life, and he had a brilliant mind, of course, and I think he wanted to make money—to bring up a family in the way he would like to have been brought up. To make money—after all that's the job of Wall Street. 16

It is significant that H a r r i m a n told his father's story using the classic American rags-to-riches allegory. T h e fact that he used this imagery to describe his f a t h e r ' s rise suggests that he may have b e e n

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influenced by the market myth and also indicates that he identified strongly with his father as an entrepreneur. The extent of this identification is not surprising when one considers how hard the elder H a r r i m a n worked to shape his son in his own image. It is clear f r o m accounts of Averell's childhood that his f a t h e r worked hard to instill in him both competitiveness and the social responsibility of wealth. 1 7 Toward this end, E. H. sent Averell to the f a m o u s Groton p r e p school. T h e Groton School, r u n by a Cambridge-educated Episcopal rector n a m e d Endicott Peabody, was for E. H. perfect for instilling in Averell the p r o p e r values. As Isaacson a n d T h o m a s p u t it in The Wise Men, "Both Peabody a n d E.H. H a r r i m a n stressed the virtue of work, the b u r d e n s of privilege, and the obligation to repay society." 18 Indeed, many wealthy Protestant families sent their boys to G r o t o n to p r e p a r e t h e m for leadership roles. While at Groton, Averell constantly struggled to meet his father's high standards, and his father, in close concert with Rector Peabody, kept a close watch on his academic progress. Peabody would send regular academic reports to E. H., who in t u r n constantly p u s h e d Averell to do better even when his grades had recently improved. 1 9 E. H. also wanted Averell to be competitive in athletics. W h e n Averell and his younger brother, Roland, b e c a m e interested in the Groton rowing team, E. H. hired the coach of the Syracuse crew to train them on one of his lakes for an entire summer. 2 0 Much to his father's satisfaction, Averell went on to be a valuable m e m b e r of the G r o t o n crew and later b e c a m e the student coach of the Yale team. Averell would later credit his father and his experience at Groton with giving him an ethic of obligation that would guide him t h r o u g h o u t his long business and government careers. 2 1 In summers d u r i n g the Groton years E. H. would take Averell along on business trips in the United States and abroad, an experience that allowed the younger H a r r i m a n to watch his father in action. 2 2 Averell was only eighteen when his f a t h e r passed away; it was 1909, and he was p r e p a r i n g to e n t e r Yale. His f a t h e r ' s passing placed a great deal of responsibility on the young college freshman. Averell's mother, Mary, did not want him to wait until he completed college to take on some of the official responsibilities that came with being the heir a p p a r e n t to the H a r r i m a n empire. 2 3 T h u s his college years would not be the carefree four-year interlude that was typical for someone of his pedigree. This pressure was exacerbated by the fact that the New York newspapers followed his every move, keeping their readers i n f o r m e d a b o u t how the f u t u r e h e a d of the

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H a r r i m a n e m p i r e was h a n d l i n g college life. Also atypical was t h e level of responsibilities h e took o n at Yale. His work as coach of the f r e s h m a n rowing crew a n d as technical adviser to the varsity h e l p e d to r e s t o r e t h e p r o g r a m to its f o r m e r glory days. 2 4 H e was also ind u c t e d into the very prestigious Skull a n d Bones society. INTO THE WORLD OF BUSINESS U p o n g r a d u a t i o n f r o m Yale in 1913, the y o u n g H a r r i m a n b e g a n his f o r m a l p r e p a r a t i o n to take over his f a t h e r ' s railroad e m p i r e . 2 5 H e s p e n t the n e x t two years as an i n t e r n at the U n i o n Pacific, w h e r e h e l e a r n e d all of the various o p e r a t i o n a l divisions of the r a i l r o a d bef o r e b e i n g n a m e d a j u n i o r vice-president in charge of purchasing. 2 6 Shortly after, in S e p t e m b e r 1915, h e m a r r i e d his first wife, Kitty. Newly m a r r i e d a n d with a b r a n d new daughter, Averell enjoyed his position at the U n i o n Pacific, a n d h e s u c c e e d e d in c u t t i n g a substantial a m o u n t of waste in the railroad's p u r c h a s i n g o p e r a t i o n s . 2 7 Nonetheless, h e was eager to create a n a m e f o r himself as an entrep r e n e u r , as his f a t h e r h a d d o n e so magnificently. 2 8 His o p p o r t u n i t y to create his own business a n d identity came in fall 1916 as t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n to build u p its m e r c h a n t m a r i n e fleet f o r possible e n t r y into World War I. With the advent of t h e war, H a r r i m a n h a d b e c o m e aware of a w o r s e n i n g worldwide s h o r t a g e of m e r c h a n t vessels, a n d h e b e g a n to e x p l o r e t h e possibility of starting his own shipyards to take a d v a n t a g e of the seller's m a r k e t . 2 9 In J a n u a r y 1917 as t h e U n i t e d States was p u s h e d toward e n t e r i n g the war by the G e r m a n declaration of u n r e s t r i c t e d submar i n e warfare, H a r r i m a n b o u g h t a large shipyard n e a r Philadelphia. By t h e time Congress actually d e c l a r e d war o n the C e n t r a l Powers in early April 1917, H a r r i m a n was ready to bid f o r h u g e governm e n t contracts. H e h a d quickly hired some of the best shipyard engineers in the c o u n t r y a n d in two m o n t h s they h a d developed a revo l u t i o n a r y plan f o r the mass p r o d u c t i o n of the desperately n e e d e d m e r c h a n t freighters. 3 0 H a r r i m a n l a n d e d a g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r a c t to p r o d u c e sixty f r e i g h t e r s a n d was able to get his shipyard u p a n d r u n n i n g in j u s t over f o u r m o n t h s . 3 1 T h e son of the "little giant" h a d seen this g o l d e n o p p o r t u n i t y to l a u n c h his own business a n d h a d seized it adroitly. In a 1921 interview in the Marine Review, H a r r i m a n i n t i m a t e d that in building u p t h e A m e r i c a n m e r c h a n t m a r i n e , h e was following t h r o u g h o n a d r e a m of his father's: "Father always h a d a desire to build u p m e r c h a n t shipping, b u t d u r i n g his day the o p p o r t u n i t y

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was n o t right." 3 2 This venture was only the beginning of his efforts to build his own business empire. As the war e n d e d in a u t u m n 1918, H a r r i m a n anticipated that the government would stop placing orders for his ships, and he developed a plan to launch his own general steamship line. In April 1919 he p u r c h a s e d a one-fifth interest in the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company and was soon n a m e d its president. 3 3 With the backing of his m o t h e r and business partners on Wall Street, he created W. A. H a r r i m a n and Company to finance the rapid acquisition of f u r t h e r shipping interests. He t h e n sought to e x p a n d his shipping business into the vast European market via a cooperative a r r a n g e m e n t with the Germanbased Hamburg-American shipping line. A n o t h e r U.S. shipping firm, the American Ship and Commerce Corporation, was also trying to set u p the same a r r a n g e m e n t with Hamburg-American. In the face of this competition, H a r r i m a n p u t together sufficient capital with the help of his business p a r t n e r s and b o u g h t control of American Ship and Commerce, thus eliminating the competition. 3 4 With an operating style very much like that of his father, H a r r i m a n had consolidated a personal transatlantic shipping empire. 3 5 When asked what motivated him in this effort, H a r r i m a n e c h o e d his father's sermons a b o u t the social obligations of wealth. "The rich m a n must not apply his money or his e f f o r t for purely selfish purposes. His duty is to consider how he can do the most to develop his nation's resources along sound lines and thus provide useful, remunerative employment to as many breadwinners as possible. . . . I am striving to do the thing which is the best and the most important thing I can do for the interests of America." 3 6 Perhaps some of H a r r i m a n ' s sermonizing on the social obligations of wealth is a defensive reaction to the portrayal of his father as an unprincipled robber baron. Nonetheless, it is consistent with the ethic of obligation his father worked so hard to implant in him. H a r r i m a n clearly had a very positive conception of the role of the wealthy e n t r e p r e n e u r in building the U.S. economy. He also seemed anxious to avoid being seen as a wealthy aesthete who had everything h a n d e d to him. In the same interview he proclaimed, "It is the duty of everyone, rich or poor, to work. . . . I love work—I cannot see how anyone would prefer to be idle." 37 In a n o t h e r interview with Forbes magazine during the same period, he described the n a t u r e of the satisfaction he derived f r o m building a business empire. "Money, like most other things in this world must be r e g a r d e d as a means to a larger end. . . . Money in itself can yield n o joy. Joy comes f r o m creating things, developing

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things, h e l p i n g t h e m to grow, and seeing t h e m a f f o r d increasing n u m b e r s of h u m a n beings a comfortable livelihood." 38 Taken together, these statements suggest that H a r r i m a n conceived of himself as an e n t r e p r e n e u r whose p u r p o s e was to build productive enterprises. H a r r i m a n ' s sense of social responsibility would n o t keep him f r o m shifting capital investments when market conditions called for it. By 1926, a n u m b e r of economic and political factors r e n d e r e d the shipping business less profitable, a n d H a r r i m a n decided to r e d u c e substantially his investments in it. W. A. H a r r i m a n a n d Company and the H a r r i m a n Brothers banks, both f o r m e d in partnership with his younger b r o t h e r Roland, were heavily involved in i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c e t h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d , and Averell frequently traveled to Europe to d r u m u p m o r e banking business. 3 9 In 1925, against the advice of U.S. g o v e r n m e n t officials and business associates, he negotiated a large Georgian manganese mining concession with the Soviet government. 4 0 Although this m i n i n g v e n t u r e was u n p r o f i t a b l e and short-lived, it is significant because it provided H a r r i m a n with the opportunity to negotiate at length with various Soviet officials, including Trotsky. 41 This would be the first of many face-to-face negotiations with Soviet leaders. In the late 1920s H a r r i m a n began to eye the b u d d i n g aviation industry as a promising business opportunity. In 1929 he and some business p a r t n e r s b o u g h t control of the Aviation C o r p o r a t i o n of America (AVCO). Within a year AVCO would e x p a n d to include f r e i g h t a n d passenger airlines, aircraft and engine m a n u f a c t u r i n g subsidiaries, airport operations, and even flying schools. Seeming to prefer dealmaking over corporate m a n a g e m e n t , H a r r i m a n was responsible f o r negotiating many of the c o r p o r a t e acquisitions that went into making AVCO so large and diverse a company. 4 2 Mismanagement and the great stock market crash in 1929 weakened AVCO, and in 1932 a onetime competitor in the aviation business was able to gradually purchase a majority of the stock. Ironically, the competitor, E. L. Cord, used the same kinds of u n d e r h a n d e d takeover tactics that E. H. and later Averell had used to get rid of competition. W h e n Cord's bid to take control of AVCO a p p e a r e d unstoppable, Averell quickly resigned his position as c h a i r m a n of the board, a move that some observers said was an e f f o r t to avoid the humiliation of being publicly outmaneuvered. 4 3 His quick exit f r o m the aviation industry did n o t leave Harrim a n with nothing to do. He was still active in banking even though the H a r r i m a n Brothers banks had in 1931 m e r g e d with the Brown Brothers Bank to f o r m Brown Brothers, H a r r i m a n . And in 1932 he

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was n a m e d c h a i r m a n of the b o a r d at U n i o n Pacific, a j o b that took the lion's share of his time a n d energy d u r i n g the early 1930s. In 1932 the U n i o n Pacific was in d i r e straits, having b e e n hit h a r d by the depression a n d by c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m o t h e r developing m o d e s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n such as a u t o m o b i l e s a n d airplanes. 4 4 Harr i m a n l a u n c h e d a c a m p a i g n to revolutionize rail travel by o f f e r i n g low-cost, c o m f o r t a b l e a c c o m m o d a t i o n s to travelers. H e also initiated the d e v e l o p m e n t of diesel-engine streamliner passenger trains, which traveled m u c h faster t h a n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s t e a m - p o w e r e d trains. 4 5 W h e n the first streamliner was ready f o r service, H a r r i m a n showed it off across the country. T h e futuristic m a c h i n e drew h u g e crowds a n d m a d e h e a d l i n e s everywhere it s t o p p e d . T h e publicity r e a c h e d a fever pitch w h e n the new streamliner c a r r i e d H a r r i m a n a n d a g r o u p of dignitaries f r o m Los Angeles to New York in fifty-six h o u r s a n d fifty-five minutes, thus shattering t h e old transcontinental r e c o r d (set by E. H. in 1906) by some f o u r t e e n hours. 4 6 In an e f f o r t to boost passenger business in the Northwest, Harr i m a n developed the Sun Valley ski resort in I d a h o . Its o p e n i n g in 1936 was a t t e n d e d by a crowd of Hollywood stars a n d o t h e r celebrities a n d a t r e m e n d o u s a m o u n t of nationwide publicity. 4 7 H a r r i m a n himself spent a great deal of time at the new resort, socializing with the many celebrities a n d seeming to enjoy the m e d i a spotlight. 4 8 An e x a m i n a t i o n of H a r r i m a n ' s business c a r e e r to this p o i n t t u r n s u p some interesting p a t t e r n s of behavior. Like his l e g e n d a r y f a t h e r , h e s e e m e d to b e constantly driven to m a k e new business deals, to e x p a n d existing business enterprises, a n d to a c q u i r e new ones. In this sense h e exhibited t h e restlessness that characterized his f a t h e r ' s business career a n d seems to have typified the o t h e r ent r e p r e n e u r s of the era. T h e previous interviews suggest that Averell i d e n t i f i e d strongly with his f a t h e r ' s e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l identity a n d style a n d h a d also internalized his f a t h e r ' s s e r m o n s a b o u t the social responsibilities of the wealthy e n t r e p r e n e u r . Unlike his father, however, Averell developed a skill f o r shaping u n a v o i d a b l e publicity in favorable ways. Also u n l i k e his father, h e seems to have enjoyed a n d even e n c o u r a g e d m e d i a coverage of his business endeavors. This affinity f o r power a n d notoriety was probably what drew h i m to W a s h i n g t o n a n d i n t o politics d u r i n g the early years of the Great Depression. AN ODD SORT OF NEW DEALER With t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e New Deal era, H a r r i m a n a n d o t h e r s in the business c o m m u n i t y b e g a n to sense that the real locus of power

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in U.S. society was now in Washington, n o t in Wall Street. 4 9 Harrim a n initially went to Washington because he was deeply c o n c e r n e d a b o u t New Deal securities r e f o r m legislation that was being hamm e r e d out d u r i n g the first h u n d r e d days of the new administration. 5 0 Even t h o u g h he had voted for Roosevelt, he had b e e n angered and f r i g h t e n e d by the new president's rhetorical attack on the financial community (which he r e f e r r e d to as "money changers" and "rulers of the exchange of m a n k i n d ' s goods") d u r i n g his inaugural address. 5 1 H a r r i m a n was c o n c e r n e d that the New Deal r e f o r m e r s knew very little about business and would draft securities r e f o r m legislation that would smother the financial community with government i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d kill any chance for economic recovery. This hostile perspective on New Deal r e f o r m i s m was commonly held by m e m b e r s of the U.S. business community at the time. Such a jealous defense of business f r o m government interference is also a constitutive element of the market-mythical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of U.S. society. 52 T h e securities legislation, which was eventually passed as the Securities Reform Act, e n d e d u p being quite m o d e r a t e . This was due in part to the lobbying of H a r r i m a n and other members of the financial community. 5 3 Nonetheless, H a r r i m a n ' s stay in Washington gave him a taste of the power that could be exercised there, and he decided to b e c o m e involved in the creation and administration of other New Deal programs. T h r o u g h his older sister, Averell was given an e n t r é e into the social milieu of the New Deal brain trust. Mary H a r r i m a n Rumsey was a close f r i e n d of the Roosevelts and of Frances Perkins, Roosevelt's secretary of labor. T h r o u g h h e r powerful network of New Dealers, Averell got himself attached to the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which was r u n by General H u g h J o h n s o n . 5 4 In July 1933, J o h n s o n recruited H a r r i m a n to organize the NRA prop a g a n d a campaign in New York. H a r r i m a n did this so successfully that he was eventually given official positions in the NRA, first as administrator of its heavy-industry division and t h e n as the senior assistant administrator of the entire agency. 55 This p u t him in the ironic position of administering a g o v e r n m e n t agency whose function was to write codes to regulate all aspects of U.S. industry, albeit on a strictly voluntary basis. H a r r i m a n f o u n d himself strongly opposing business leaders who were pushing for the development of codes with built-in price-fixing provisions and o t h e r measures favorable to particular business interests. 5 6 H a r r i m a n ' s rapid metamorphosis f r o m financier c o n c e r n e d a b o u t g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e to m o d e r a t e r e f o r m e r administering the NRA is a bit difficult to explain. Biographer Rudy Abramson

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attributes the c h a n g e to the i n f l u e n c e of his older sister, Mary, who was a d e d i c a t e d liberal r e f o r m e r a n d who h a d always b e e n a strong i n f l u e n c e in Averell's life. 5 7 Whatever may have b e e n the case, Harr i m a n ' s stint at the NRA came to an a b r u p t e n d w h e n the S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d it u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l in spring 1935. This m a r k e d t h e e n d of his work with the New Deal; h e t h e n went back to New York to c o n t i n u e his work o n revitalizing the U n i o n Pacific. H e did, however, r e m a i n abreast of political d e v e l o p m e n t s in W a s h i n g t o n a n d k e p t in contact with Roosevelt, partially t h r o u g h his m e m b e r s h i p in the Business Advisory Council. 5 8 ENVOY TO CHURCHILL H a r r i m a n ' s long diplomatic career did not begin until February 1941, w h e n P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt assigned him to the position of def e n s e e x p e d i t e r to e m b a t t l e d Britain. H a r r i m a n was to b e Roosevelt's personal envoy to Churchill a n d his ministers, h a n d l i n g all war-related m a t t e r s f r o m lend-lease to strategy. Roosevelt told him that his j o b was to "go over to L o n d o n a n d r e c o m m e n d everything short of war that we can d o to k e e p the British Isles afloat." 5 9 T h u s his first diplomatic assignment was o n e of historic i m p o r t a n c e . H a r r i m a n h a d gotten this vitally i m p o r t a n t position by gaining the trust a n d respect of H a r r y Hopkins, who was Roosevelt's closest adviser. 60 Helping Britain hold out against Hitler was n o t just a j o b ; it was also a cause in which h e believed fervently. Since the beginning of the war in Europe, H a r r i m a n h a d argued both privately and publicly that it was vital that the United States take strong measures to help the British stem the Nazi tide. H e gave speeches in which h e argued that the national security of the United States d e p e n d e d on providing effective support f o r the British even at the risk of war. H e also argued strongly for granting emergency powers to Roosevelt so that h e could make this aid to Britain effective. 61 In these speeches, which are some of the earliest statements of his views on U.S. foreign policy, his tone was decidedly realpolitik and pragmatic. T h e United States had to bec o m e involved in the war n o t o u t of duty or in d e f e n s e of principle but because national security d e m a n d e d it. H a r r i m a n reasoned that if Germany controlled all of Europe, it would n o t be long before it took control of Latin America, and the United States would be at its mercy politically a n d economically. 6 2 T h u s H a r r i m a n believed very strongly in the historic task h e was given by Roosevelt. H e discovered t h r o u g h conversations with various officials in Washington that many of t h e m were skeptical of the value of sending

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war materials that were in short supply in the United States to Great Britain. As a result of these conversations he d e t e r m i n e d that his primary j o b would be to convey British needs and strategy back to Washington in a way that would provide effective justification for increasing lend-lease transfers. 6 3 U p o n his arrival in London, he was immediately taken in almost as a m e m b e r of the Churchill family, spending m u c h of his time either at 10 Downing Street or, on weekends, at the prime minister's country retreat at Chequers. Churchill also saw to it that he was given access to all war-related information and that all ministers cooperated with him fully. 64 Having attained this high level of access and cooperation, H a r r i m a n set out to provide Roosevelt with the information he n e e d e d to justify increased flows of material assistance to the British. In this first diplomatic assignment in London, H a r r i m a n develo p e d a distinctive style of operation. From the start he sought to prevent himself f r o m being e n c u m b e r e d in any way by the State Dep a r t m e n t bureaucracy. In addition to jealously g u a r d i n g his indep e n d e n c e , he guarded his access to Churchill as though others' access to the prime minister directly interfered with his own. Before H a r r i m a n ' s arrival, Ambassador J o h n G. W i n a n t had enjoyed unlimited access to Churchill, but W i n a n t was, m u c h to his own dismay, quickly n u d g e d aside by H a r r i m a n . 6 5 H a r r i m a n also f o u g h t h a r d to maintain his access to information f r o m Washington. In a cable to President Roosevelt he complained, "My usefulness will be in direct p r o p o r t i o n to the extent to which I am kept i n f o r m e d of the developments in fact and t h o u g h t in Washington." 6 6 Thus Harr i m a n constantly c o m p e t e d f o r the two essential ingredients of power in the diplomatic world: access and information. Having gained the full confidence of Churchill and full access to war-related information, H a r r i m a n carried out his j o b as defense expediter very effectively. Churchill even sent him on an extended inspection tour of Britain's forces in the Middle East, and he came back with a long list of r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for the prime minister, many of which were followed. 6 7 While H a r r i m a n was on his inspection trip in the Middle East, Hitler launched his attack against Russia, thus changing the entire strategic situation and creating Harrim a n ' s first o p p o r t u n i t y to visit the Soviet U n i o n in a diplomatic capacity. 68 Churchill and Roosevelt picked H a r r i m a n to h e a d a j o i n t U.S.British delegation that was to travel to Moscow a n d meet with the Soviet leadership to discuss Western assistance to the Soviet war effort against Germany. As the delegation was p r e p a r i n g to leave for Moscow, British foreign minister Lord William Beaverbrook made a

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bid to take control of the delegation, b u t H a r r i m a n successfully fought him off, using the argument that the United States would be providing the bulk of the assistance to the Soviets. 69 In the delegation's meetings with Stalin, H a r r i m a n studied the Soviet leader's negotiating style. In the first meeting Stalin was relatively o p e n and easygoing, but in the second he was very r u d e and aggressive to the point of being insulting. After witnessing a relaxed Stalin at the third meeting, H a r r i m a n speculated in a r e p o r t to Roosevelt that Stalin's aggressiveness during the second meeting must have been a calculated effort to bully him and Beaverbrook into offering more aid. 7 0 It was a negotiating tactic that he would see again in later meetings with the Soviet leader. Stalin's bad m a n n e r s notwithstanding, H a r r i m a n left Moscow convinced that Stalin was committed to defeating Hitler and that the Western allies would be able to work with him. 7 1 He also was convinced that he alone had the negotiating skills and u n d e r s t o o d Stalin well e n o u g h to be successful with the Soviet leader. Apparently Roosevelt was convinced of this also, because after this trip, H a r r i m a n became the most i m p o r t a n t personal link between Roosevelt and Stalin. 72 His next face-to-face meetings with Stalin came about as a result of developing friction between the Soviets and their Western allies over the issue of when and where to open u p a western front. The Soviets desperately n e e d e d the Western allies to force the Germans to draw substantial forces away f r o m the eastern f r o n t . Early in 1942, General Dwight Eisenhower had drawn u p a plan for a small cross-channel invasion into France in late 1942 followed by a larger invasion in spring 1943. 73 Roosevelt and his military advisers were in favor of the plan, but Churchill and his advisers had doubts that an effective invasion could be organized and executed so soon. Unfortunately, o p e n British opposition to an early invasion of France did n o t e m e r g e until after Roosevelt had already m a d e a commitm e n t to Soviet foreign minister V. M. Molotov at a meeting at the White H o u s e in May 1942. 74 W h e n it became clear that Churchill would n o t s u p p o r t an early cross-channel invasion, Roosevelt and Churchill decided that the latter must go to Moscow and explain to Stalin why the invasion of France must be delayed. 7 5 At the last minute, it was decided that H a r r i m a n should accompany Churchill to demonstrate that the Western allies were united on the decision to delay the o p e n i n g of the second front. 7 6 At their first m e e t i n g with Stalin, Churchill and H a r r i m a n f o u n d the Soviet leader visibly disappointed by their news of the delay, b u t he eventually warmed u p to their presentation of a plan for an invasion of North Africa. They left the first meeting pleased

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with t h e way t h a t Stalin h a d t a k e n t h e b a d news. 7 7 T h e s e c o n d m e e t i n g with Stalin did n o t go nearly as well. U p o n their arrival, Stalin l a u n c h e d a verbal attack o n the Weste r n allies, q u e s t i o n i n g b o t h t h e i r s u p p o r t of t h e Soviets a n d t h e i r c o u r a g e in t h e face of t h e G e r m a n c h a l l e n g e . 7 8 H a r r i m a n recognized Stalin's attack as a bullying tactic. However, h e could see that Churchill was b e c o m i n g i n f u r i a t e d by the o u t b u r s t , a n d h e quickly h a n d e d h i m a n o t e that read, "Don't take this too seriously—this is the way h e b e h a v e d last year." 79 W h e n Stalin was finished, Churchill l a u n c h e d his own verbal c o u n t e r a t t a c k , a n d Stalin, i m p r e s s e d by the p r i m e minister's fiery spirit, b e c a m e m u c h less bellicose. 8 0 T h e rest of t h e m e e t i n g was m u c h m o r e relaxed, b u t Churchill left the Kremlin a n g r y n o n e t h e l e s s . As they left together, H a r r i m a n reiterated to Churchill his belief that Stalin's aggressiveness h a d merely b e e n a n e g o t i a t i n g tactic, a n d h e correctly p r e d i c t e d that the n e x t m e e t i n g would b e m u c h m o r e pleasant. T h e final m e e t i n g did go well with Stalin a c c e p t i n g C h u r c h i l l ' s e x p l a n a t i o n of the delay of the s e c o n d f r o n t a n d enthusiastically approving the plans to invade N o r t h Africa. Churchill a n d H a r r i m a n left Moscow, a n d the f o r m e r c a b l e d Roosevelt to i n f o r m h i m t h a t "the bitter pill h a d g o n e down." 8 1 H a r r i m a n h a d again gained valuable e x p e r i e n c e in dealing with Stalin face-to-face. At the same time, h e was gaining the c o n f i d e n c e of Roosevelt a n d H a r r y H o p k i n s as s o m e o n e w h o really knew the Soviets a n d how to deal with t h e m . T h e i r increasing c o n f i d e n c e in h i m would result in his b e i n g o f f e r e d t h e position of U.S. ambassador in Moscow in J u n e 1943. AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW A f t e r H a r r i m a n a c c e p t e d t h e Moscow position, his first o r d e r of business was to consolidate his c o n t r o l over the embassy. Previous U.S. a m b a s s a d o r s in Moscow h a d failed to gain c o n t r o l over all of t h e various agencies r e p r e s e n t e d at the Moscow embassy, particularly the military mission. 8 2 H a r r i m a n m a d e certain that h e would n o t have this p r o b l e m . H e quickly r e p l a c e d the key officers in t h e military mission a n d a r r a n g e d to have t h e e n t i r e embassy reorganized so that all embassy p e r s o n n e l answered to him. 8 3 As ambassador, h e was n o t going to tolerate the kind of freelancing that h e himself h a d e n g a g e d in u n d e r Ambassador W i n a n t in L o n d o n . T h u s in consolidating his control in Moscow, h e was quick to use the bureaucracy where it h e l p e d him, whereas in L o n d o n his

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influence had depended on his ability to stay free of bureaucratic constraints. In Moscow he did, however, arrange to communicate with Roosevelt and Hopkins independent of the State Department network, a move that greatly enhanced his influence. 8 4 This shrewd and rapid consolidation of influence and access, which Harriman first practiced during his tour in London, would manifest itself through the rest of his diplomatic career. It would also help him gain a reputation as one of the shrewdest and fiercest bureaucratic infighters in the foreign policy bureaucracy. T h e r e is a strong similarity between Harriman's business style and his diplomatic operating style. As noted, Harriman the businessman worked very quickly and opportunistically to build his business empire. Harriman the diplomat was equally quick and opportunistic in building a bureaucratic power base. In building his business empire Harriman would not hesitate to neutralize a competitor by secretly acquiring enough stock to buy the competing firm. In his first diplomatic assignment in London, Harriman was quick to undermine Ambassador Winant as a rival for access to Churchill. Thus in both careers, Harriman manifested the fierce competitiveness his father had instilled in him during childhood. His first tasks as ambassador in Moscow were to help coordinate the October 1943 foreign ministers' meeting there and to help set up the November 1943 Big Three conference in Tehran. The larger assignment given him by Roosevelt was to help secure Soviet cooperation in both the European and Pacific theaters and in the postwar era. 8 5 Toward these ends, Harriman set out to create more of an atmosphere of trust between the two allies. 86 In order to establish a better working relationship with the Soviets, he would try to maximize his personal contact with top Soviet officials such as Molotov and Stalin. This stress on face-to-face discussions was a carryover from both his business career and his days in London and would continue to be a trademark of the Harriman diplomatic style for the rest of his career. In a cable to Roosevelt sent shortly after his arrival in Moscow, Harriman stressed the mistrust that the Soviets felt toward the United States, and he recommended that the president approve a Soviet request for captured Italian merchant and naval vessels as a trust-building measure. "Suspicions are present in the minds of many in official Soviet circles and Russian people as to the intentions of the United States toward Russia. There is no doubt of this. They have been reading during the past two years the comments and editorials of our press critical of Russia. The acceptance o f this request, we believe, would go far toward allaying these suspicions." 87

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Also in c o n n e c t i o n with building an a t m o s p h e r e of trust between these two allies, H a r r i m a n sent a cable to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in which he r e c o m m e n d e d steps to alleviate the kinds of misunderstandings that had plagued the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the past. He r e c o m m e n d e d that direct communications between Roosevelt a n d Stalin, some of which in the past had b e e n misconstrued, should be sent only after great consideration of the wording and implications. Of course, this step would also e n h a n c e his role as a personal intermediary. He also w a r n e d that U.S. officials n e e d e d to be m o r e careful a b o u t promises that were m a d e to the Soviets: "We have an u n f o r t u n a t e record of offering more than we have been able to carry out. These offers have been made in good faith and with the usual qualifications. We have carried them out to the best of o u r ability and at real sacrifice. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a better policy would be to make our offers more conservatively and attempt to do a little more than had been indicated." 8 8 He went on to complain about the slowness of U.S. responses to Soviet requests. "Prompt responses to the requests of the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t , whether important or trivial, will be an important factor in allaying past suspicions and developing understanding." 8 9 This c o n c e r n with building a constructive diplomatic relationship with the Soviets on b o t h i m p o r t a n t wartime matters a n d postwar issues would color H a r r i m a n ' s policy p r e f e r e n c e s t h r o u g h o u t his involvement with the making of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. U p o n his arrival in Moscow, H a r r i m a n had immediately begun to try to feel out the Soviet leadership on such i m p o r t a n t postwar issues as the f u t u r e of Eastern E u r o p e and of a c o n q u e r e d Germany. Soon after arriving in Moscow he had a conversation with Soviet foreign minister Molotov r e g a r d i n g the f u t u r e of Eastern Europe; h e expressed sympathy (albeit qualified) for the Soviets' position of wanting friendly countries on their western borders. 9 0 In a subsequent cable to Roosevelt he i n f o r m e d the president that he was concerned about Soviet insecurity regarding Eastern Europe but that he t h o u g h t Western interests in the region could be protected in any postwar settlement. 9 1 T h e Soviets, he i n f o r m e d Roosevelt, "indicated that although they would keep us informed, they would take unilateral action in respect to these [Eastern European] countries in the establishment of relations satisfactory to themselves. It is my feeling that this rigid attitude may well be tempered in p r o p o r t i o n to their increasing confidence in their relations with the British and ourselves in the establishment of over-all world security." 92 T h u s H a r r i m a n again showed his belief that by building an a t m o s p h e r e of trust, the Americans and the British would be

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able to win the Soviets over to postwar agreements that were satisfactory to the West. Harriman's confidence in the ability of the Americans and British to negotiate favorable postwar agreements was tested constantly over the next year as he became a firsthand witness to Soviet actions that indicated an unwillingness to cooperate even on small issues. He was especially annoyed at the Soviets' refusal to allow U.S. transport aircraft to come to Moscow to take diplomatic personnel such as himself on official trips. 9 3 T h e lack o f Soviet cooperation was not limited to such seemingly unimportant issues, however. In March 1944, Harriman got word that a Soviet diplomat had approached the Badoglio government in Italy about normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Harriman was quite disturbed by this because the Soviets had not consulted their Western allies on this move. When Harriman approached Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Vishinsky about it, Vishinsky was very evasive and refused to give a straightforward answer. Harriman then recommended that Washington make clear to the Soviets that this type of behavior was harmful to the Grand Alliance. 9 4 Faced with this and other evidence of Soviet bad faith, Harriman began to recommend that Washington consider using economic assistance as leverage over the Soviets. In an embassy cable to the State Department in March, he wrote, "I am impressed with the consideration that economic assistance is one of the most effective weapons at our disposal to avoid the development of a Soviet sphere of influence over Eastern Europe and the Balkans. . . . Such assistance, as I have expressed in other telegrams, is one of our principal practical levers, compatible with our principles, for influencing political action." 9 5 Thus, by 1944 Harriman was still somewhat optimistic about the ability of the United States to reach satisfactory agreements with the Soviets, but he was beginning to think that it would require measured use of the carrot and the stick to bring them around. There were successes in obtaining cooperation from the Soviets on military matters. In February 1944 after long, hard negotiations, Harriman successfully obtained Stalin's permission for U.S. bombers to use Ukrainian bases for shuttle-bombing missions. This agreement gave Harriman great personal satisfaction and was politically and militarily quite significant because it opened the door for similar negotiations regarding the future use of Far Eastern bases for bombing Japan. 9 6 Harriman was also able to secure the release of downed U.S. airmen whom the Soviets had been holding for some time in the Far East. 97 Overall, however, there were more

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discouraging signs r e g a r d i n g the Soviet attitude on c o o p e r a t i o n than encouraging ones. By spring 1944, H a r r i m a n was b e c o m i n g m o r e a n d m o r e conc e r n e d a b o u t the Soviet a p p r o a c h to the p r o b l e m of Poland. T h e Soviets were showing n o inclination to allow any governing role whatsoever for the Polish exile g o v e r n m e n t in L o n d o n , a n d they were pressing h a r d for an adoption of the Curzon line as the new b o r d e r between Poland and the Soviet U n i o n . 9 8 In conversations with Churchill during a May stopover in London, H a r r i m a n tried to make clear to the prime minister how rigid the Soviets were becoming on both the political and the territorial aspects of the Polish q u e s t i o n . " However, while still in London, he expressed to Anthony Eden his belief that if the British a n d Americans would remain firm and continue to instill trust in the Soviets, they would be able to work out a satisfactory arrangement. 1 0 0 The real problems in Poland did not come until late summer and the Warsaw uprising. As the Soviet army approached Warsaw in July 1944, Soviet radio broadcasts exhorted partisans in the city to rise up and fight the Germans in conjunction with the Red Army advance. 101 T h e Warsaw u n d e r g r o u n d did respond with an uprising against the German occupiers, but unfortunately it was so poorly armed that the conflict quickly turned into a slaughter. 102 To the dismay of the British and American delegations in Moscow, Stalin refused to aid the badly outmatched Polish resistance by advancing into Warsaw with the Red Army, although initially he did agree to airdrop supplies to them. 1 0 3 Stalin then changed his mind and decided not to order the airdrops, apparently in response to Polish radio broadcasts that were (in hindsight, correctly) accusing the Soviets of deliberately setting the Warsaw resistance forces up for the slaughter that was occurring. 1 0 4 H a r r i m a n and British ambassador Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr vigorously questioned Molotov a b o u t the Soviet refusal to h e l p the desperate Poles. They were told by Molotov that the Warsaw uprising was "purely adventuristic" and that the "Soviet G o v e r n m e n t could n o t a n d would n o t be held responsible for this u n h a p p y adventure." 1 0 5 They were read a cable f r o m Stalin in which the Soviet leader stated, "The Soviet c o m m a n d has come to the conclusion that it should keep aloof f r o m the Warsaw adventure since it cannot assume responsibility for the action there." 1 0 6 H a r r i m a n and ClarkKerr pressed Molotov for permission for American planes to use the Ukrainian bases to d r o p supplies to the Warsaw resistance. 1 0 7 Molotov said the Soviets did not mind if the Americans used their planes to d r o p supplies over Warsaw, b u t they could n o t give permission for such missions to use Soviet bases. 108

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To add to H a r r i m a n ' s m o u n t i n g frustration, in the same meeting Molotov a n n o u n c e d that the U.S. shuttle-bombing missions would soon lose access to the Ukrainian bases that made such missions possible. H a r r i m a n r e s p o n d e d that this action "would have a most desperate effect on American-Soviet collaboration." 1 0 9 A week after this meeting, H a r r i m a n cabled Roosevelt a n d i n f o r m e d him that the Soviets' failure to assist the Warsaw uprising had caused him to reevaluate Soviet intentions: I find no way to justify Stalin's position. T h e o n e solid faith that I have h a d was the validity of Stalin's word. H e has now broken his promise [to assist the Warsaw resistance] . . . without any a p p a r e n t cause except the ill-advised public statements of the Poles in London. . . . I can only draw the conclusion that this action is for ruthless political considerations in o r d e r that the u n d e r g r o u n d may get no credit for the liberation of Warsaw, and that its leaders be killed by the Germans or give an excuse for their arrest when the Red Army enters Warsaw. 110

He went on to warn that this behavior b o d e d poorly for overall postwar cooperation with the Soviets. Yet he finished the cable by arguing that the United States could still bring the Russians around on i m p o r t a n t postwar issues if it negotiated m o r e firmly and used sources of leverage such as economic assistance, which the Russians badly needed. 1 1 1 Thus even after being shocked and appalled by Stalin's ruthless handling of the Warsaw uprising, Harriman still believed that he could be brought around on important postwar issues. As a u t u m n 1944 wore on, however, H a r r i m a n began to become m o r e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t Soviet intentions in postwar Eastern Europe. In a State D e p a r t m e n t cable in O c t o b e r he warned that the Soviets might try to create economic disruptions in Eastern Europ e a n countries (with the use of harsh reparations demands) in o r d e r to substitute existing governments with communist ones. 1 1 2 On a trip to Washington in early November, he met with Roosevelt several times and warned him of the possibility of the Soviets attempting to dominate postwar Eastern Europe, but he worried that the president was n o t taking these warnings seriously. 113 He also came away f r o m these meetings worried that Roosevelt was overestimating his own ability to personally iron out differences with Stalin. In a m e m o r a n d u m of his conversations with Roosevelt he wrote, "The President still feels that he can persuade Stalin to alter his view on many matters that I am satisfied Stalin will never agree to." 114 Part of the reason Roosevelt did n o t yet wish to initiate a showdown over Poland or Eastern Europe was that he wanted the Soviets

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to c o m m i t to an early e n t r y i n t o t h e war against J a p a n . H a r r i m a n was c h a r g e d with m a k i n g sure t h a t Stalin would e n t e r t h e war as soon as possible after the G e r m a n s were finally d e f e a t e d . 1 1 5 H e was involved in f r e q u e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s with the Soviet l e a d e r o n this subject. Nevertheless, w h e n H a r r i m a n d e p a r t e d f o r the Big T h r e e conf e r e n c e at Yalta in early F e b r u a r y 1945, h e was d e t e r m i n e d to m e e t with Roosevelt b e f o r e h a n d to p e r s u a d e h i m to tackle t h e P o l a n d a n d Eastern E u r o p e issues head-on at the c o n f e r e n c e . Partly d u e to t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s failing health, however, h e never got the chance. 1 1 6 H a r r i m a n t h e n tried d u r i n g the c o n f e r e n c e to p e r s u a d e Roosevelt to get t o u g h o n the issue a n d to get g u a r a n t e e s that the new Polish g o v e r n m e n t would at least c o n t a i n some d e m o c r a t i c elements, b u t the p r e s i d e n t refused. H a r r i m a n went back to Moscow disappointed that the m a t t e r h a d n o t b e e n settled b u t d e t e r m i n e d to negotiate a suitable Polish a r r a n g e m e n t with the Soviets. 117 In early March H a r r i m a n , Soviet foreign minister Molotov, a n d British a m b a s s a d o r Archibald Clark-Kerr c o n v e n e d a c o n f e r e n c e in Moscow to settle t h e m a k e u p of t h e new Polish g o v e r n m e n t . 1 1 8 T h e s e m e e t i n g s quickly p r o d u c e d a d e a d l o c k w h e n Molotov insisted t h a t t h e c o m m u n i s t Poles s h o u l d have the r i g h t of approval over which n o n c o m m u n i s t Poles c o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e deal. 1 1 9 This was completely u n a c c e p t a b l e to H a r r i m a n a n d Clark-Kerr, b u t Molotov would n o t a b a n d o n his insistence o n this p r o c e d u r a l point. 1 2 0 In addition to the Soviet intransigence o n the Polish issue, H a r r i m a n f o u n d extremely f r u s t r a t i n g the Soviets' o n g o i n g refusal to allow t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n of t h o u s a n d s of A m e r i c a n war p r i s o n e r s w h o h a d recently b e e n f r e e d in P o l a n d . 1 2 1 S o m e of his cables to Washington d u r i n g this p e r i o d reflect this f r u s t r a t i o n . In a cable to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius in early April 1945 H a r r i m a n wrote, "I c a n n o t in the compass of this message, list the almost daily a f f r o n t s a n d total disregard which the Soviets evince in matters of interest to us. . . . I must with regret r e c o m m e n d that we begin in the n e a r f u t u r e with o n e or two cases where their actions are intolerable a n d m a k e t h e m realize that they c a n n o t c o n t i n u e their p r e s e n t attit u d e except at great cost to themselves." 1 2 2 CONFRONTING THE WORLD BULLY T h e previous cable n o t only shows t h e d e g r e e of H a r r i m a n ' s frustration b u t also highlights t h e early f o r m a t i o n of a Cold War worldview.

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I n this c a b l e t o S t e t t i n i u s , H a r r i m a n also clearly laid o u t h i s bel i e f t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d a t t e m p t to d o m i n a t e E a s t e r n E u r o p e if t h e U n i t e d States d i d n o t take a m u c h f i r m e r s t a n d o n t h e issue. For m a n y m o n t h s we have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e Soviets have t h r e e lines of f o r e i g n policy. 1 / O v e r a l l c o l l a b o r a t i o n with us a n d t h e British in a world security organization; 2 / t h e creation of a unilateral security r i n g t h r o u g h d o m i n a t i o n of their b o r d e r i n g states; a n d 3 / t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of o t h e r countries t h r o u g h exploitation of d e m o c r a t i c processes by c o m m u n i s t controlled parties with strong Soviet b a c k i n g to c r e a t e a political a t m o s p h e r e favorable to t h e policies of the Soviets. It has b e e n o u r h o p e that, as we have, t h e Soviets would place No. 1 as their p r i m a r y policy a n d would m o d ify their plans for 2 if they were satisfied with the efficacy of plan 1. It now seems evident that they i n t e n d to go f o r w a r d with unilateral action in t h e d o m i n a t i o n of their b o r d e r i n g states regardless of what they may e x p e c t f r o m the World Security O r g a n i z a t i o n . 1 2 3 T h i s is t h e first c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t H a r r i m a n b e l i e v e d a S o v i e t att e m p t t o d o m i n a t e E a s t e r n E u r o p e was i m m i n e n t . H e h a d s p e c u l a t e d a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y b e f o r e , b u t h e h a d always a s s u m e d t h a t p r e s e r v i n g g o o d r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d Britain was a h i g h e r priority f o r t h e Soviets. A f t e r G e o r g e K e n n a n ( w h o h a d b e e n s o u n d i n g this w a r n i n g f o r m o n t h s ) , H a r r i m a n is t h u s o n e o f t h e first p o l i c y m a k e r s to c o n t e m p l a t e a r a p i d p o s t w a r d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f U . S . - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . 1 2 4 Harriman's c o n c e r n a b o u t an i m m i n e n t U.S.-Soviet c o n f r o n t a t i o n were still s o m e w h a t m i t i g a t e d , h o w e v e r , by h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d a v o i d this s c e n a r i o if it a d o p t e d a t o u g h e r d i p l o m a t i c stance toward the Soviets.125 H a r r i m a n w e n t o n to a r g u e that t h e Soviets' h e a v y - h a n d e d n e s s was a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e i r p e r c e i v i n g t h e U n i t e d States as weak: T h e r e is at h a n d evidence which satisfies m e that the Soviets have i n t e r p r e t e d o u r c o n t i n u e d g e n e r o u s a n d c o n s i d e r a t e a t t i t u d e towards t h e m in spite of their disregard of o u r requests f o r cooperation in m a t t e r s of interest to us as a sign of weakness o n o u r p a r t . F u r t h e r m o r e I am satisfied that t h e time has c o m e w h e n we m u s t by o u r actions in e a c h individual case m a k e it plain to t h e Soviet G o v e r n m e n t t h a t they c a n n o t e x p e c t o u r c o n t i n u e d c o o p e r a t i o n o n t e r m s laid down by t h e m . . . . I feel that o u r relations would be o n a m u c h s o u n d e r basis if o n t h e o n e h a n d we were f i r m a n d completely f r a n k with t h e m as to o u r position a n d motives a n d o n the o t h e r h a n d they are m a d e to u n d e r s t a n d specifically how their interests will be adversely a f f e c t e d by a lack o n their p a r t of coope r a t i o n with o u r legitimate d e m a n d s . 1 2 6

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Thus by early 1945, H a r r i m a n ' s view of the Soviets seems to have solidified. It would soon become very influential in Washington. This early manifestation of Harriman's Cold War worldview provides the first o p p o r t u n i t y to subject his key beliefs to analysis. In the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s observed thus far, H a r r i m a n d i d n ' t address the abstract morality-diplomacy relationship at all: H e did n o t directly address to what degree U.S. foreign policy should be guided by moral principle or to what extent the Cold War should be viewed in moral terms. He consistently portrayed the Soviets as a n o t h e r great power with great-power interests (and o n e the United States could influence either positively or negatively). With regard to m o r e directly policy-relevant questions, such as how the U n i t e d States should best use its power in the Cold War (and what f o r m s it should take), H a r r i m a n ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to this point provide a distinct, yet hybrid, answer. He consistently argued that the United States could elicit favorable Soviet behavior if it took a m o r e firm negotiating posture a n d used the Soviet n e e d for economic assistance as leverage. Thus at this early stage of the Cold War, H a r r i m a n believed that the U n i t e d States should focus mainly on diplomatic and economic means to deal with the Soviets. H e would maintain this belief in the diplomatic approach with the Soviets t h r o u g h o u t his career. With regard to the question of what sources of Soviet power were most worrisome in the Cold War, H a r r i m a n ' s answer was again distinct but mixed. As early as 1944, his cables showed concern that the Soviets would a t t e m p t to d i s r u p t the Eastern E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i e s with harsh reparation d e m a n d s . These could be construed as a f o r m of Soviet e c o n o m i c power, b u t they would have b e e n i m p o t e n t without the i m m e d i a t e threat of Soviet military power to back t h e m up. Beginning in spring 1945, H a r r i m a n also showed concern over the Soviets' ability to penetrate Eastern Europ e a n g o v e r n m e n t s t h r o u g h C o m m u n i s t Party participation in the electoral process. Analysis of his communications u p to this point yields little direct evidence of his Cold War worldview being influenced by any of our highlighted myths or representative characters. T h r o u g h o u t his wartime diplomatic career, H a r r i m a n showed a consistent belief in his ability to carry out face-to-face negotiations with J o s e p h Stalin. He showed belief in his ability to wrest postwar cooperation out of Stalin using U.S. economic assistance for bargaining leverage. In his cables to Washington he consistently portrayed Stalin as a leader who could be b a r g a i n e d with if only the U n i t e d States negotiated

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firmly and showed a willingness to adversely affect Soviet interests in response to their uncooperativeness. This overall strategy is consistent with H a r r i m a n ' s business style as well as with the entrepren e u r character's paradigmatic m o d e of social action. George Kennan, who was H a r r i m a n ' s charge d'affairs at the Moscow embassy, c o m m e n t e d on H a r r i m a n ' s "take me to your leader" style of diplomacy. He . . . regarded himself more as an operator than as an observer. He had no great interest in the general run of Foreign Service reporting. Accustomed to doing things in a big way and endowed with a keen appreciation for great personal power, always enjoying, in fact, the mere proximity of the very great, he dealt only with people at the very top. I have no doubt that he felt, and not without justification in a country where power was so highly personalized as in the Soviet Union of that day, that he could learn more that was important in one interview with Stalin than the rest of us could derive from months of pedestrian study of Soviet publications. 127

This "operator" m o d e of diplomacy would be H a r r i m a n ' s trademark style for the rest of his career. H e r e again, one cannot escape the similarity between his style of diplomacy and his earlier style of conducting business. During the days when Harriman was trying to build his own business empire, he did not send teams of corporate lawyers to close i m p o r t a n t deals; he himself bargained with the o t h e r owners and h a m m e r e d out the deal. O n e of his p a r t n e r s in AVCO during the late 1920s c o m m e n t e d that H a r r i m a n had always p r e f e r r e d dealmaking to corporate management. 1 2 8 With Roosevelt's death in early 1945, H a r r i m a n quickly got the chance to p r o m o t e his "get t o u g h " policy to a new president who was a n e o p h y t e in the area of foreign policy. Several days after Harry T r u m a n inherited the Oval Office, he called H a r r i m a n back to Washington. 1 2 9 In his first meeting with T r u m a n , H a r r i m a n told the new president that in his view, the Soviets were pursuing a twotrack strategy of cooperating with their Western allies while simultaneously e x t e n d i n g control over Eastern Europe. He f u r t h e r explained his view that the Soviets were mistaking U.S. generosity for weakness and his belief that if the United States would stand firm on vital issues, the Soviets would cooperate. 1 3 0 H a r r i m a n was pleased to find T r u m a n very receptive to his arguments and in full a g r e e m e n t with his call for a m u c h f i r m e r negotiating stance. 1 3 1 This set the stage for T r u m a n ' s famous meeting with Soviet foreign minister Molotov, in which the president browbeat the astonished

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Soviet diplomat until Molotov protested, "I've never been talked to like that in my life." Truman responded, "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that." 1 3 2 Far from pleased with Truman's toughness toward Molotov, Harriman was concerned that the new president had gone too far and that Molotov and Stalin would interpret it as a sign that Truman would no longer follow the policy of cooperation that Roosevelt had established. Indeed, as Rudy Abramson notes in Spanning the Century, Harriman would later look back on Truman's tonguelashing o f Molotov as the beginning of the Cold War. 133 Throughout the remainder of 1945, Harriman remained in Moscow as ambassador and dealt with Molotov and Stalin on postwar issues. In January 1946 he resigned his Moscow post eager to get back to the United States. 1 3 4 When he first arrived in Washington, he gave speeches and presentations in which he told of the Soviets' uncooperative attitude and called for a tougher U.S. stance. 1 3 5 Truman then sent Harriman to London as ambassador to help settle the dispute that arose when the Soviets delayed their withdrawal from northern Iran, thus making the British (with huge oil interests there) very nervous. His stay in London was very short, however, as Truman called him back to Washington later that year to become secretary of commerce. As commerce secretary, Harriman began to focus on the need to revitalize the world economy and rebuild war-torn Europe. In spring 1947, he was intimately involved in the early planning phases of what would become the Marshall Plan. Two weeks after Marshall's famous Harvard commencement speech outlining the plan, Truman named Harriman to chair a committee composed of business executives, labor leaders, and academics charged with assessing both the needs of Europe and the U.S. ability to meet those needs. In addition to chairing this important committee, Harriman traveled around promoting the Marshall Plan as a good way to both contain the Soviets and create strong overseas markets for U.S. goods. 136 In addition to making him a principal salesman for the Marshall Plan, Harriman's position as secretary of commerce made him a key spokesman for U.S. economic policy both at home and abroad. He wrote newspaper and magazine articles in which he explained to Americans that it was important for them to buy more imports to stimulate the war-ravaged economies and close the dollar gap. As was the case with the Marshall Plan, he said, this type of farsighted economic behavior was not simply altruistic but was also in Americans' long-term self-interest because it helped to create strong foreign markets for U.S. goods. 137

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H a r r i m a n also u s e d his articles a n d s p e e c h e s to rally A m e r i c a n s to t h e w o r l d e c o n o m i c l e a d e r s h i p r o l e that t h e U n i t e d States h a d i n h e r i t e d after W o r l d War II. In a d r a f t article written f o r the United Nations World, H a r r i m a n w r o t e , "It is a l m o s t fair to say that the leade r s h i p o f the U n i t e d States a m o n g the f r e e n a t i o n s o f the w o r l d has b e e n thrust u p o n us. T h i s l e a d e r s h i p has c o m e to us b e c a u s e o f the s t r e n g t h o f o u r n a t i o n a n d b e c a u s e o f the ideals o f f r e e d o m a n d j u s t i c e o n w h i c h it was f o u n d e d . War has s p e n t the vitality o f m a n y o t h e r n a t i o n s , a n d f r e e p e o p l e t h e w o r l d o v e r l o o k to us f o r spiritual l e a d e r s h i p a n d m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e . " 1 3 8 A l t h o u g h h e s t o p p e d s h o r t o f c l a i m i n g that the U n i t e d States h a d a divine destiny to l e a d the f r e e w o r l d , the identity c o m p o n e n t o f this passage is v e r y similar to the identity c o m p o n e n t o f t h e city-on-the-hill m y t h . In b o t h instances m u c h o f the A m e r i c a n identity derives f r o m a l e a d e r s h i p r o l e a n d f r o m s t r o n g a d h e r e n c e to c e r t a i n ideals. T h i s is t h e first city-on-the-hill r h e t o r i c f o u n d in H a r r i m a n ' s writings a n d s p e e c h e s . In o t h e r articles written by H a r r i m a n d u r i n g his t e n u r e as secretary of c o m m e r c e one finds rhetoric containing strong market m y t h t h e m e s . In o n e written f o r the Financial Times of London, Harr i m a n a r g u e d that the U n i t e d States d e r i v e d m u c h o f its s t r e n g t h a n d u n i q u e n e s s f r o m its p e c u l i a r l y c o m p e t i t i v e a n d individualistic b r a n d o f c a p i t a l i s m . H e r e h e b r a g g e d , "It is g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d by p e o p l e e v e r y w h e r e that, w h a t e v e r else c a n b e said f o r it, capitalism, b a s e d o n e n t e r p r i s e , c o m p e t i t i o n a n d initiative a c c o m p l i s h e d a task in t h e initial p h a s e s o f A m e r i c a n d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h p e r h a p s n o o t h e r system c o u l d have d o n e so fast or so w e l l . " 1 3 9 H e w e n t o n to p o i n t o u t h o w s u c c e s s f u l t h e A m e r i c a n b r a n d o f c a p i t a l i s m was in the mid-twentieth c e n t u r y : The United States produces close to two-thirds of the world's output of manufactured goods, owns two-thirds of the world's gold, and is practically its only source of international credit. These figures may arouse various reactions when viewed by non-Americans. But to an American they indicate above all one fact: Namely that the economic system under which he lives has worked well, by and large for him. He is still convinced that capitalism, individual initiative, competition and voluntary economic decisions by people in all aspects of our business life have been eminently successful in getting out the goods, and that generally speaking, all groups in the population have shared generously in this great production. 1 4 0 In this passage H a r r i m a n t o u c h e d o n the identity c o m p o n e n t o f the m a r k e t myth. A m e r i c a n s u n d e r s t o o d that it was n o t simply capitalism that h a d m a d e A m e r i c a so s t r o n g b u t American capitalism. A n d A m e r i c a n capitalism was based o n f r e e d o m a n d individualism,

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core c o m p o n e n t s of the American collective identity. He went on to make the connection between faithfulness to these American ideals a n d e c o n o m i c success m o r e explicit. "Any consideration of the American individual enterprise system cannot be complete without full recognition of the fact that our economic institutions are part of a national culture and political system r o o t e d in a belief in democracy and the worth and dignity of the individual." 1 4 1 American economic prowess and fidelity to American political ideals thus went h a n d in h a n d for H a r r i m a n . In fact, his explanation of the relationship between these political ideals and U.S. economic success came close to taking the f o r m of a theodicy. In a 1947 article, H a r r i m a n again explored this relationship between faithfulness to the ideal of individual liberty a n d economic success. "We have a f f o r d e d greater happiness a n d prosperity than m e n have ever known. Of first i m p o r t a n c e is the preservation of our liberties and second is the expansion of our productivity. T h e release of the energies and initiative of the individual has resulted in our unrivaled productivity. It is only by ever expanding our productivity that we can remain strong and free." 1 4 2 This linkage of the success of the U.S. economy to faithful a d h e r e n c e to foundational political values n o t only h e l p e d legitimize the system b u t also enhanced the power and the identity c o m p o n e n t of the market myth. In a n o t h e r 1947 article, H a r r i m a n made an even more explicit connection between the U.S. free enterprise system and the collective identity of the American people. He also a r g u e d that Americans should be guided by that identity in their relations with the rest of the world. The American record of economic accomplishment since the end of the war is the greatest living testimony to the vigor and soundness of the free enterprise philosophy. In these days when other countries are experimenting with their social and economic institutions in an effort to find a way out of their material and spiritual difficulties, a practical demonstration of the potentialities of our free institutions is of the greatest importance. . . . Through the Office of Information and Cultural Affairs in the Department of State we are carrying on a vitally important program of telling the story about what kind of people we are and what we believe in. . . . I am sure that all persons who believe in our free institutions will support the efforts we are making on a wide front to attack the causes and not merely the symptoms of economic and political unrest. If we continue to live by our own principles and prove their effectiveness in terms of spiritual and material well being of all people, we will meet fully our responsibilities as the first nation in the world. 1 4 3

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In this passage Harriman provided a good insight into what he thought were the most important distinguishing characteristics of the United States as a society. By pointing to the American free enterprise system as an important indicator of "what kind of people we are and what we believe in," he not only clearly evoked a market myth identity for Americans but cast the American free market as a blueprint for the rest of the world to follow. In another article later in 1947, Harriman came close to portraying the Cold War as a competition of economic models between the American free enterprise system and Soviet communism. Americans are increasingly aware of the vital role that their decisions play in world affairs. It is part of the American democratic faith that the people of all nations should have the right to develop their own patterns of political and economic progress. This means on the one hand, as President Truman has stated, that America will never seek to impose her pattern of economic development upon any country. It means also that America will not condone the imposition of any totalitarian power of its economic philosophy on others through the exploitation of chaos and the systematic stimulation of disorder. The United States recognizes that various patterns of economic development must necessarily co-exist and can cooperate. As far as we are concerned, the critical question is: are the governments of other countries controlled by their people or are the people without liberty and sovereign power and hence at the mercy of a totalitarian state. 144

The implication here is that if people were allowed to make a choice, they would choose the free enterprise system. Throughout 1947 and early 1948, Harriman worked hard at promoting the Marshall Plan both at home and abroad. Once the plan was approved by Congress, he was given the task of coordinating its implementation in Europe. In April 1948, he was named special representative of the Economic Cooperation Administration. 145 He was headquartered in Paris, but the task of coordinating the aid flows to the Europeans took him to all of the European capitals, where he was able to stay involved in European security issues even as he was coordinating the Marshall Plan programs. 1 4 6 By spring 1950 the European recovery was way ahead of schedule, and Harriman, feeling he had completed his assignment, wrote to Truman asking to be reassigned to Washington. Truman responded by naming Harriman special assistant to the president for national security affairs. Harriman arrived in Washington just after the Korean War broke out. Among the first tasks Truman gave Harriman was to dampen the feud that had developed

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between Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis J o h n s o n . 1 4 7 H a r r i m a n was able to mediate the ongoing conflict for a time, b u t it eventually e n d e d in J o h n s o n ' s resignation. A n o t h e r big assignment came when T r u m a n sent him to meet with Douglas MacArthur in an e f f o r t to rein in the outspoken general with regard to his tendency to deliver off-the-cuff foreign policy proclamations. 1 4 8 H a r r i m a n had what seemed like productive talks with MacArthur, although as later events showed, he was unable to stop MacArthur's i n d e p e n d e n t attempts at policymaking. In S e p t e m b e r 1951, H a r r i m a n was n a m e d c h a i r m a n of the North Atlantic Commission on Defense. 1 4 9 His j o b was to steer this committee, m a d e up of representatives of the twelve NATO members, in its task of synchronizing the NATO defense contributions of m e m b e r states with their economic capacities. H a r r i m a n pushed the committee relentlessly until it p r o d u c e d a r e p o r t that called for a substantial buildup of NATO forces. Later that fall, he was n a m e d director of the Mutual Security Administration, a position that put him in charge of U.S. foreign aid programs. He remained in this capacity until T r u m a n left office. During his t e n u r e at the Mutual Security Administration, Harriman continued to use articles and appearances to warn the public about the threat posed by Soviet communism. These warnings had b e c o m e m u c h m o r e strident than those in the immediate postwar years. In a November 1951 d r a f t article for the New York Times, he warned, The leaders of the Soviet Union have combined police state methods with ancient imperialism and a will to believe ideological dogma that amounts to religious fanaticism. Having seized control of Russia after World War I and weathered a frightful series of internal strains and emerged more powerful than ever from World War II although at frightful cost, these men are determined to dominate the world. They believe it is their destiny to develop a world revolution and they are utterly convinced they will succeed. 1 5 0

This view that the Soviets were on an ideological crusade to dominate the world contrasts with his earlier view that Soviet expansionist behavior was attributable to traditional Russian insecurity. However, even t h o u g h he described the Soviets as ruthless a n d power hungry, he stopped short of characterizing the Soviet p r o g r a m as evil. This is i m p o r t a n t because it indicates that he still viewed the Cold War as a global political power struggle, n o t as a battle between the forces of good and evil. T h e r e is still n o indication that H a r r i m a n felt either that U.S. foreign policy should be guided by

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m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s o r t h a t t h e Cold War s h o u l d b e viewed in m o r a l terms. In this New York Times article, H a r r i m a n still p o r t r a y e d the most w o r r i s o m e f o r m s of Soviet power as b e i n g derived f r o m military, e c o n o m i c , a n d subversive m e t h o d s . His defensive strategy of military p r e p a r e d n e s s a n d political vigilance was very consistent with the c o n t a i n m e n t d o c t r i n e a d o p t e d d u r i n g t h e T r u m a n years, alt h o u g h h e now p l a c e d m o r e e m p h a s i s o n military f o r m s of U.S. power. 1 5 1 H e also p u s h e d f o r m o r e active e f f o r t s to e x p a n d t h e global f r e e m a r k e t to the T h i r d World in o r d e r to i n o c u l a t e it against the i n f l u e n c e of c o m m u n i s m . We have a much more attractive form of civilization to sell than do the communist propagandists, but we must make certain, by exp a n d i n g the world's economy, developing the underdeveloped areas, and lifting the standard of living of a large part of the world's population, that we practice what we preach and that we eliminate so far as possible those cesspools of poverty which Stalin saw as the breeding ground of future communist adherents. 1 5 2

This s t a t e m e n t is consistent with the articles h e wrote while comm e r c e secretary in which h e a r g u e d that the primary U.S. responsibility was to spread the word a b o u t the effectiveness of the f r e e market. But in this passage, H a r r i m a n wove strands of the m a r k e t myth i n t o his Cold War policy prescriptions. This is t h e first direct evid e n c e of m a r k e t myth influence o n H a r r i m a n ' s Cold War worldview. After laying out a political, military, and economic game plan f o r c o n t a i n i n g the Soviets, h e c o n c l u d e d that the U n i t e d States h a d to "work toward the day when we have created sufficient strength in the f r e e world that once again we may h o p e to settle o u r problems with the Russians by negotiation, a n d expect the Soviet leaders will live u p to their promises." 1 5 3 T h u s even t h o u g h H a r r i m a n was skeptical a b o u t the possibility of f r u i t f u l negotiations with the Soviets in the short term, h e retained his belief, u n c h a n g e d since his earliest communications f r o m Moscow d u r i n g World War II, in the efficacy of negotiation as a long-term strategy. This consistent belief makes him virtually u n i q u e a m o n g important U.S. cold warriors d u r i n g this period. GOVERNOR AND CRITIC OF THE NEW LOOK In t h e years 1952-1958, H a r r i m a n m a d e several a t t e m p t s to gain e l e c t e d office nationally a n d in t h e state of New York. In 1952 h e ran f o r the Democratic n o m i n a t i o n f o r p r e s i d e n t a n d lost by a wide

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margin. In 1954 he was elected governor of New York. During his term as governor he m a d e a n o t h e r unsuccessful attempt, in 1956, to gain the Democratic presidential nomination, and he kept close watch on Washington a n d was one of the harshest critics of the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy. In a 1954 article in Foreign Affairs, H a r r i m a n criticized the Eisenhower-Dulles approach to Cold War diplomacy. He was particularly critical of the Eisenhower administration's "new look" defense posture with its heavy reliance u p o n nuclear weapons: "Our overemphasis on atomic and t h e r m o n u c l e a r weapons has alarmed even those who are confident that we will never in fact begin a war, since they see that it has decreased the strength of our conventional defense a n d the effectiveness of o u r diplomacy." 1 5 4 H a r r i m a n argued that the reduction in conventional forces had weakened U.S. diplomatic leverage with communists in areas such as Southeast Asia (where at the time the French h a d j u s t given u p their fight against the Vietminh). H e r e again is the increasing emphasis on military power in H a r r i m a n ' s Cold War worldview, although he did view military power as an i m p o r t a n t c o m p l e m e n t to diplomatic efforts to contain communism in Southeast Asia. In the same article he was also extremely critical of Dulles's handling of negotiations with the Allies over the situation in Southeast Asia. H e a r g u e d that Dulles's heavy-handed diplomatic app r o a c h to the Allies had b e e n an obstacle to securing British a n d French cooperation in the e f f o r t to contain the southward spread of communism in the area. 1 5 5 Later in this article he r e t u r n e d to the subject of the art of diplomacy and p o i n t e d out the flaws in Dulles's a p p r o a c h to foreign leaders. He outlined the p r o p e r way to negotiate with leaders in the developing world: These discussions must always be conducted as between equals, with full understanding and respect for the problems and compulsions of the other, and on the basis that getting a job well done is of mutual benefit. Above all, every effort must be made to avoid putting foreign leaders in the position of bowing publicly to American will. The art of diplomacy lies in inducing the leaders of other countries to come forward publicly with desirable ideas and proposals, rather than obligating them to support and defend policies publicly demanded by a more powerful country in return for favors granted. 1 5 6

This passage highlights nicely the vast difference in diplomatic style between Harriman and Dulles. Whereas Dulles bluntly attempted to

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b r o w b e a t a n d " c o n v e r t " f o r e i g n l e a d e r s to t h e W e s t e r n cause, Harr i m a n would first l e a r n t h e c o n c e r n s a n d m o t i v a t i o n s o f t h e o t h e r l e a d e r s a n d t h e n work with t h e m to f i n d a s o l u t i o n t h a t b o t h addressed t h e i r c o n c e r n s a n d served U . S . i n t e r e s t s . 1 5 7 F o r H a r r i m a n , such was t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e lost art o f diplomacy. T h i s d i s c o u r s e also h i g h l i g h t s H a r r i m a n ' s c o n s i s t e n t b e l i e f in t h e effectiveness o f p r o p e r l y c o n d u c t e d d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r i n g U . S . i n t e r e s t s in t h e C o l d W a r c o n t e x t . T h e a r t i c l e also provides an i n d i r e c t glimpse i n t o H a r r i m a n ' s r o l e c o n c e p t i o n s . T h r o u g h o u t t h e rest o f H a r r i m a n ' s t e r m as g o v e r n o r o f New York, h e c o n t i n u e d to p u b l i c l y c r i t i q u e E i s e n h o w e r a n d D u l l e s ' s h a n d l i n g o f t h e C o l d War. In a 1 9 5 6 article in t h e Atlantic Monthly, h e a r g u e d t h a t t h e Soviets h a d b e g u n to follow a new strategy f o r g l o b a l c o n q u e s t a n d that t h e E i s e n h o w e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d failed to pick u p o n i t . 1 5 8 A c c o r d i n g to H a r r i m a n , by 1 9 5 3 the Kremlin's drive after World War II—by means of aggression, pressures, threats, and subversion—to extend its control and influence in Europe and the Middle East beyond where its armies were found at the war's end had clearly failed. The West had become so strong and united that further advance by these crude methods was stopped in that area. . . . It was in these circumstances that Stalin shifted the offensive to economic, political and psychological grounds and transferred the center of attention to Asia and other underdeveloped areas. 159 H e went o n to a r g u e that t h e Soviets were masking this new, less overtly aggressive a p p r o a c h b e h i n d t h e i r s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d policy o f " p e a c e f u l c o - e x i s t e n c e . " Specifically, they were taking steps (such as signing t h e 1 9 5 5 Austrian treaty) to c r e a t e a p e r i o d o f r e d u c e d sup e r p o w e r t e n s i o n s d u r i n g which they c o u l d c a t c h u p with t h e West e c o n o m i c a l l y while simultaneously using p e a c e f u l r h e t o r i c a n d econ o m i c aid p a c k a g e s to lure newly i n d e p e n d e n t states i n t o t h e c o m m u n i s t c a m p . H e c r i t i c i z e d t h e R e p u b l i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r ign o r i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f d e v e l o p m e n t aid as a c o u n t e r to c o m m u n i s t i n f l u e n c e in t h e T h i r d W o r l d , a n d h e a r g u e d t h a t t h e b e l l i g e r e n t r h e t o r i c o f S e c r e t a r y D u l l e s played r i g h t i n t o t h e Soviets' a t t e m p t s to paint themselves as the p e a c e m a k e r s . H e c o n c l u d e d t h a t it was n o t t o o late to c o u n t e r t h e new Soviet strategy, b u t t h a t would r e q u i r e a c o m p l e t e r e t h i n k i n g o f U . S . policy in t h o s e areas.160 T h u s we see H a r r i m a n ' s C o l d W a r worldview c h a n g i n g in response to a n o t i c e a b l e shift in Soviet behavior. Now h e p l a c e d m u c h m o r e e m p h a s i s o n d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s to h o l d t h e m o r a l h i g h

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g r o u n d in the eyes of the world. H e also placed more emphasis on developmental and economic aid programs to the developing world as a m e a n s of "inoculating" developing countries against communism. Clearly, p a r t of H a r r i m a n ' s attack o n Eisenhower's f o r e i g n policy was politically motivated; by spring 1956 h e h a d d e c i d e d to seek o n c e again t h e D e m o c r a t i c n o m i n a t i o n f o r p r e s i d e n t . 1 6 1 Even t h o u g h h e h a d a b e t t e r organization this time a n d was able to win the e n d o r s e m e n t of H a r r y T r u m a n , h e was u n a b l e to d e f e a t Adlai Stevenson f o r the n o m i n a t i o n . Back in Albany, h e set his sights o n r e e l e c t i o n as g o v e r n o r in 1958, b u t his bid was unsuccessful. T h u s in 1959 h e f o u n d himself u n e m p l o y e d , a n d h e d e c i d e d to work his way back into the world of diplomacy. In o r d e r to increase his stock in the eyes of what h e h o p e d would b e a new Democratic administration in 1960, h e set o u t o n an extensive schedule of world travel that i n c l u d e d l o n g trips to b o t h India a n d the Soviet U n i o n . 1 6 2 His e x t e n d e d trip t h r o u g h t h e Soviet U n i o n i n c l u d e d a l o n g m e e t i n g with Soviet p r e m i e r Nikita Khrushchev, a n d this m e e t i n g gained him the a t t e n t i o n in Washington h e was seeking. D u r i n g the c o u r s e of t h e m e e t i n g H a r r i m a n a n d K h r u s h c h e v discussed b o t h Soviet domestic policy a n d U.S.-Soviet relations. 1 6 3 In an article in Life magazine, H a r r i m a n described his discussions with Khrushchev in some detail, r e c o u n t i n g Khrushchev's threats of war over Berlin a n d use of military force in s u p p o r t of China's claim to Formosa. 1 6 4 But in spite of K h r u s h c h e v ' s bellicosity d u r i n g the meeting, Harrim a n c o n c l u d e d the article by r e a f f i r m i n g his belief that the Soviets could be dealt with t h r o u g h the p r o p e r use of diplomacy. 1 6 5 INTO THE NEW FRONTIER

As n o t e d , H a r r i m a n ' s m e e t i n g with K h r u s h c h e v received a g r e a t deal of publicity in t h e U n i t e d States, particularly in W a s h i n g t o n , w h e r e h e was h o p i n g to impress J o h n F. Kennedy. K e n n e d y h a d won the Democratic n o m i n a t i o n f o r p r e s i d e n t while H a r r i m a n was in the Soviet U n i o n . H a r r i m a n now s o u g h t to e a r n himself a highlevel diplomatic post in the Kennedy administration by advising the c a n d i d a t e o n foreign policy issues a n d by s u p p o r t i n g the c a m p a i g n financially. 1 6 6 H e h o p e d t h a t h e would be asked to b e secretary of state, b u t t h a t o f f e r never c a m e , a n d h e h a d to settle f o r an app o i n t m e n t as ambassador-at-large. His first big a s s i g n m e n t as a m e m b e r of the K e n n e d y f o r e i g n policy team was to negotiate a settlement of the Laotian crisis, which h a d b e e n i n h e r i t e d f r o m the o u t g o i n g Republican a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .

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Under the guidance of J o h n Foster Dulles, the Eisenhower administration had attempted to convert Laos into an anticommunist stronghold on the border of North Vietnam and China. Eisenhower and Dulles were not satisfied with the neutralist Souvanna Phouma regime, which had been in place since the mid-1950s, so they began to provide military aid to anticommunist general Phoumi Nosavan. 167 In 1959 Nosavan overthrew the neutralist Phouma regime and installed anticommunist Boun Oum as prime minister; this government was in turn overthrown several months later by military supporters of Phouma, who reinstalled him as the head of government. T h e United States continued to provide aid to the anticommunist Phoumi, who not only fought the communist Pathet Lao but also once again overthrew the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma. 1 6 8 At this point the neutralist forces led by Kong Le teamed up with the communist Pathet Lao, and with substantial military aid from the Soviet Union, they routed Phoumi's anticommunist forces and threatened to take over the entire country. This led the UN Security Council to call for a cease-fire and a convention to settle the Laotian civil war. This was the situation the Kennedy administration inherited in spring 1961. Having encouraged Kennedy to back a neutralist solution to the Laotian problem, Harriman was sent to negotiate such a solution at the Geneva conference on Laos in May 1961. 1 6 9 Harriman's desire to work toward a neutralist solution was in stark contrast to the position taken by Dulles and the Eisenhower administration. It will be recalled that Dulles's attitude toward neutralist regimes was very clear: He believed them to be immoral for refusing to take part in the struggle against world communism. Harriman believed that a neutralist solution was the best that could be obtained by the United States unless it was willing to intervene militarily (which would risk intervention by the North Vietnamese and Chinese). 1 7 0 However, Harriman was not sure that the United States would be able to obtain a viable neutralist settlement given its lack o f diplomatic leverage in the regional military context. He therefore prepared a fallback position consisting of a de facto three-way partitioning of the country with the anticommunists controlling the South, the neutralists controlling the central and western regions, and the Pathet Lao controlling the eastern regions. This de facto partitioned Laos would be cosmetically unified by a central coalition government led by the neutralist Phouma but with representatives from all three factions. Harriman was aware that without the dismantling of the Pathet Lao, this solution would only stall their eventual takeover of the entire country. 1 7 1 After more than two

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m o n t h s of meetings in Geneva, it t u r n e d out that H a r r i m a n ' s fallback partition plan was the best settlement he could obtain at the table. 1 7 2 O n c e he realized that this a r r a n g e m e n t was the best he could obtain, he set out to make it work. T h e first problem he faced was constraining both the communist Pathet Lao and the anticommunist forces of P h o u m i Nosavan. H e realized that the Soviets were the only party with leverage over the Pathet Lao. He also assumed (perhaps with hindsight incorrectly) that the Soviets wanted the neutralist solution to work. Thus he spent a great deal of time during the Geneva conference trying to persuade the Soviets to rein in the Pathet Lao. 1 7 3 He did n o t limit these efforts to his own personal meetings with Soviet ministers but also he asked President Kennedy to personally pressure Khrushchev. 1 7 4 At the same time he realized that the U n i t e d States would have to assert control over the anticommunist forces, and he used the threat of cutting off U.S. military aid toward this end. 1 7 5 He also proposed the use of similar econ o m i c leverage to keep the coalition g o v e r n m e n t of Souvanna P h o u m a on a genuinely neutralist course. 1 7 6 H a r r i m a n worked the Laotian crisis in the c o n s u m m a t e dealmaker fashion. First he determined what would be the best arrangem e n t he could get at the table given his relatively weak bargaining position. T h e n , having achieved this agreement, he set out to make all the parties h o n o r the agreement, using whatever forms of leverage he h a d at his disposal. T h u s the H a r r i m a n a p p r o a c h was to make lowest-common-denominator deals and make t h e m work without Dulles's concern for overarching moral principles. By spring 1962 it was obvious that the North Vietnamese had violated the Geneva a g r e e m e n t by staying in eastern Laos, and widespread fighting had b r o k e n o u t between P h o u m i Nosavan's anticommunist forces and the Pathet Lao. 1 7 7 Even t h o u g h H a r r i m a n ' s Laos settlement proved to be very fragile, his stock as a m e m b e r of the Kennedy foreign policy team continued to rise and he was given a new assignment as assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs. In spring 1963 he was appointed undersecretary of state for political affairs. Shortly after his a p p o i n t m e n t he was assigned to lead the team sent to Moscow to negotiate a limited nuclear test ban treaty. Kennedy's instructions to H a r r i m a n were that he should initially strive for a comprehensive ban on testing, but if that was not feasible, he should work for a limited ban. 1 7 8 Once again Harriman settled into the role of dealmaker, feeling the Soviets out on the possibility of a comprehensive test ban. He quickly f o u n d that they would not agree to any on-site inspections,

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which effectively killed the prospects for a comprehensive ban. 1 7 9 He t h e n set his sights on a limited ban that covered only atmospheric, underwater, and space testing of nuclear weapons. His first obstacle was a Soviet suggestion that a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement be linked to the completion of a test ban agreement. U n d e r instructions to avoid such a linkage, H a r r i m a n agreed to m e n t i o n f u t u r e nonaggression pact talks in the final test ban treaty c o m m u n i q u é , and this satisfied the Soviets. 180 In only ten days of negotiating, f r o m July 15 to July 25, 1963, the parties reached an a g r e e m e n t on the text of a limited test ban treaty, and H a r r i m a n r e t u r n e d to something of a h e r o ' s welcome back in Washington. 1 8 1 In the course of negotiating with Khrushchev and o t h e r Soviet leaders, H a r r i m a n developed his own theory about the Soviets' eagerness to conclude some f o r m of test ban treaty. He realized the Soviets were competing with the communist Chinese for the leadership of the international communist movement. He also realized that if the Chinese refused to sign the treaty (which was a likely outcome), they would be discredited in the eyes of the developing nations. He felt that this competitive impulse was the driving force behind the Soviets' push for the treaty. 182 This early recognition of the e m e r g i n g Sino-Soviet split was a significant c h a n g e in H a r r i m a n ' s worldview and one that would have significant impact on his f u t u r e policy preferences and negotiating strategies. His early recognition of this split also m a d e him rare, if not unique, a m o n g high-level policymakers in the Kennedy administration. Aside f r o m this recognition, however, many of the core beliefs in his worldview r e m a i n e d relatively u n c h a n g e d . He still believed that the essence of the Cold War competition was a contest between the superpowers to provide the model of developm e n t for the Third World. In an article for the New York Times Sunday Magazine, he described this competition. It is quite clear that we a n d the Soviets want—and are working f o r — q u i t e d i f f e r e n t worlds. We want a world in which m e n a n d nations are free, in which i n d e p e n d e n t states are able to work in their own way toward goals of their own choosing without the intervention of ambitious a n d aggressive neighbors. . . . T h e communists are d e t e r m i n e d to create quite a different world. They are trying to shape the world in their own image. Their emphasis is on atheism, discipline, conformity and rigid central control over every aspect of political, economic a n d social life. . . . But in spite of this irreconcilability of long-range goals, there are areas of c o m m o n interest or of possible a g r e e m e n t between us a n d the Soviets. 183

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Harriman seemed confident that in spite of the grand modeling competition between the superpowers, there were still areas in which they could negotiate their differences. He also seemed confident that the United States and the West could win this competition to shape the developing world because of the self-evident superiority of the market model. In another article he wrote at length about the triumph of market forces in the rebuilding of war-torn Europe and Japan while simultaneously pointing out the abject failure of centrally controlled industry and agriculture in the Soviet Union and China. 1 8 4 He argued that the United States had to convince the peoples of Asia that the market model was superior in all respects to the communist model and that the United States should serve to show how market forces bring dynamism to a society. "One of the matters of basic importance is bringing home to ourselves and to the rest of the world that ours is the true revolution and that we are still involved in a dynamic, changing and revolutionary society. . . . Today revolutions are taking place almost every year changing our dynamic society to fit our growing needs and our responsibilities." 185 As the previous examples illustrate, Harriman's writings during this period manifested a strong market myth influence. For Harriman it was the success of its special brand of free market system that made the United States a worthy model for the rest of the world. At the philosophical level he viewed the Cold War as a competition between the market model and the communist model for predominance in shaping developing societies. O n the surface, this image of U.S. society as the ideal market model for the rest of the world seems similar to the city-on-the-hill myth, but there are vast differences of meaning between the two. T h e city-on-the-hill myth holds America's uniqueness as derived from its special relationship with the divine creator and the special moral status that therefore attends America's actions in the world. In the market myth, America's exceptionalism derives not from any divinely transmitted moral quality but rather from the tremendous success of its special brand of market society. According to the market myth, Americans have a right to shape the world not because they are morally superior but because their brand of capitalism has proven itself to work better than any other system. For Harriman, then, giving the market model a chance to prove itself in the developing world involved actively countering communist tactics such as infiltration, propaganda, and "wars of liberation." Indeed, an analysis of Harriman's personal politico-diplomatic strategy for Southeast Asia reflects just this kind of thinking.

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His proposals reflect an emphasis on expanding trade and developmental assistance as instruments of Cold War diplomacy. However, though he focused on the economic and development aspects of the Cold War, he did not ignore the regional military competition that formed the context within which these market societies would have to sprout. Indeed, he viewed economic development strategy and military strategy as being complementary elements in an overall plan to bring market forces to Southeast Asia. In a May 1962 article for the New York Times Magazine, Harriman laid out his preferred politico-diplomatic strategy for Southeast Asia. 186 He pointed to a January 1961 speech by Nikita Khrushchev as evidence that the Soviets had adopted a strategy of using propaganda, economic aid, and other diplomatic instruments to persuade the developing world that communism was the best development model available. He also noted that the Soviets were not relying solely on the merits of the communist model but instead were supporting local military proxies such as the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese in Laos and the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in South Vietnam. 187 Harriman argued that the United States had to accept the Soviets' challenge to show which model worked best but that first the United States had to take steps to counter the local communist military proxies so that the economic, psychological, and social competition could take place on a level playing field. Our willingness to accept this challenge is based not only on our desire to see the evolutionary struggle in Southeast Asia resolved peacefully, but also on our confidence that communism is not "the wave of the future" and that free peoples can devise more attractive solutions to the problems of Southeast Asia than can communists. The fact is, however, that in Southeast Asia the North Vietnamese are not pursuing "peaceful co-existence" but instead are engaging in armed aggression. Therefore, before we can respond to Khrushchev's challenge on political, social, and economic grounds, it is necessary that the North Vietnamese stop their armed aggression. 1 8 8

Both in Vietnam and in Laos, Harriman drew up similar tactics for creating a level playing field. In both cases he advocated holding international conferences to achieve agreements between the superpowers and between their local proxies that would outlaw the military presence of any outside power in those countries (as well as any superpower military aid to factions there) so that development could take place unhindered. 1 8 9 As was discussed earlier, the Laotian conference actually took place, and Harriman pursued an

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a g r e e m e n t that would achieve these goals. Unfortunately, the International Control Commission set u p to e n f o r c e the a g r e e m e n t was weak, and the Soviets proved unable or unwilling to rein in the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. In South Vietnam, however, Harriman was trying to bring about an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t that he h o p e d would e x t e n d and strengthen the provisions agreed to at the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam, provisions that he had h o p e d would secure South Vietn a m f r o m outside interference so that it could develop into a prototype of a new Southeast Asian market society. In a m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, written while he was in Geneva trying to wrap u p the Laotian conference, H a r r i m a n r e c o m m e n d e d that he be allowed to make "a direct a p p r o a c h to the U.S.S.R. t h r o u g h o u r present relationship at the Geneva conference on Laos." 190 T h e purpose of this a p p r o a c h would be to convince the Soviets to restart talks on Vietn a m within the framework of the o n g o i n g Geneva c o n f e r e n c e on Laos. H a r r i m a n argued that the Soviets should be given the message that the progress made toward the settlement of the Laos question is meaningless if hostilities continue in neighboring Viet-Nam. The United States believes that an effort should be made to resolve that situation peacefully and end the aggression against SVN. The violation of the 1954 Accords by NVN has caused the United States to support SVN. A peaceful settlement should be built on the foundation of the 1954 Accords. The U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom . . . should bring together a small group of the powers directly concerned to review the Accords to see how compliance can be secured and how they can be strengthened to meet today's needs. 1 9 1

H a r r i m a n based his a r g u m e n t for such an approach on his personal observation that "there are some indications that the Soviet U n i o n would be interested in the establishment of a peaceful and stable situation in Southeast Asia." 192 This was consistent with his strengthening conviction that the Soviets wanted Southeast Asia to serve as a b u f f e r zone against southward expansion by the communist Chinese. According to Harriman, once the Vietnam talks were r e o p e n e d , the United States would push for an enforceable agreem e n t that stipulated the "cessation of hostilities, a n d acceptance . . . of the division of Viet-Nam with non-interference of any kind by one side in the other's affairs." T h e r e would also have to be "agreem e n t that eventual reunification [of Vietnam] be sought only by peaceful means." 1 9 3 Finally, he called for an a g r e e m e n t that would create "mutually advantageous trade a n d e c o n o m i c relations

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between North and South Vietnam" and a "strengthened and modernized ICC [International Control Commission]" for enforcement of the agreement. 1 9 4 Harriman concluded the memorandum with an interesting assessment of political conditions inside South Vietnam: "The best any international settlement can do is to buy time. If the government of South Vietnam continues a repressive, dictatorial and unpopular regime, the country will not long retain its independence. Nor can the United States afford to stake its prestige there. We must make it clear to DIEM that we mean business about internal reform." 1 9 5 Over the next two years, Harriman would become the symbolic head of a growing faction within the State Department's Far Eastern Bureau that viewed the corrupt Diem government as untenable unless drastic reforms were made. 1 9 6 Harriman would continue to push this argument until summer 1963, when he and others would decide that Diem could not be salvaged as an effective leader. T h e previous memorandum to Kennedy shows that Harriman believed strongly in a political as opposed to a military approach to the Vietnam problem. Most significant, he believed he could negotiate a diplomatic settlement with the Soviets whereby they would restrain the North Vietnamese from further interference in South Vietnam in return for reduced American involvement there. In hindsight, it appears that Harriman's early settlement proposals might have provided the United States an early way out of the Vietnam quagmire it was slowly wading into. Others in the State Department, such as George Ball, would make similar arguments before the United States became fully committed militarily; 197 however, Harriman's proposal is remarkable in that it appeared as early as 1961. This proposal fits with a consistent pattern in Harriman's overall Cold War modus operandi. From the end of World War II, when Cold War tensions first began to flare, Harriman's preferred approach was firm negotiation. This is consistent with the entrepreneur representative character's paradigmatic mode of social action and with Harriman's preferred mode of operation during his business career. O f course, we can never know how successful Harriman's attempt at a diplomatic settlement would have been, but it is hard to imagine how the United States or the South Vietnamese could have fared any worse than they eventually did. As noted, Harriman's belief in the efficacy of negotiating with the Soviets is in marked contrast to the Cold War modus operandi of J o h n Foster Dulles, who viewed sitting down with communists as

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a compromise of American principles. This contrast is especially stark when one thinks of Dulles's attitude toward the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam. He wanted nothing to do with the conference, which he felt would lend legitimacy to communist aggression. Seven years later, H a r r i m a n wanted n o t only to revive the 1954 Geneva framework b u t to use the Soviets as close diplomatic partners in the enterprise. H a r r i m a n ' s proposed diplomatic solution to the Vietnam problem was also consistent with his overall philosophical a p p r o a c h to the developing world as evidenced in his writings. He believed that if the United States could find a way to remove communist subversion and military i n t e r f e r e n c e in developing societies, the market model of d e v e l o p m e n t could c o m p e t e with the communist model on a level playing field, where it would inevitably win out. 1 9 8 This is m o r e evidence of substantial market myth influence on H a r r i m a n ' s Cold War worldview. T h e r e was also consistency between Harrim a n ' s worldview and his policy p r e f e r e n c e s and policymaking behavior. In this case his policy preference was to sit down with the Soviets and negotiate a neutral South Vietnam that would be p r o t e c t e d f r o m outside i n t e r f e r e n c e with its (inevitable f r e e market) development. His policymaking behavior (sending a cable to Kennedy in which he tried to sell this approach) was also consistent with his Cold War worldview as evidenced in his writings on the communist challenge in Southeast Asia. H a r r i m a n ' s proposal for a "Geneva solution" to the Vietnam p r o b l e m was ignored by Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, a n d others, who by fall 1961 were already focusing on a course of forced nationbuilding a n d reinforcing South Vietnam militarily. 199 H a r r i m a n would continue to believe that something like his Geneva solution was possible right u p to the end of the J o h n s o n administration, and he would pursue it until the bitter end. H e was never able to persuade Kennedy of the merits of such a diplomatic approach, who in the remaining two years of his administration followed the advice of McNamara, Rusk, and others who felt that militarily strengthening the South Vietnamese government was the p r o p e r course. As m e n t i o n e d , by the time he b e c a m e u n d e r s e c r e t a r y of state for political affairs in spring 1963, Harriman was convinced that the Diem regime could n o t last unless Diem got rid of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and r e f o r m e d his c o r r u p t government. 2 0 0 T h e last straw for H a r r i m a n had b e e n Diem's brutal handling of the Buddhist uprising in spring 1963, which led to a string of highly publicized selfimmolations by Buddhist monks. By s u m m e r 1963, H a r r i m a n and o t h e r State D e p a r t m e n t officials including undersecretary of state

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George Ball, assistant secretary of state f o r Far Eastern affairs Roger Hilsman, a n d Vietnam e x p e r t Paul K a t t e n b u r g b e g a n to a r g u e that the U n i t e d States should withdraw its s u p p o r t of the c o r r u p t Diem r e g i m e unless Diem i m m e d i a t e l y r e m o v e d N h u f r o m t h e governm e n t a n d b e g a n reforms. 2 0 1 By late August, H a r r i m a n a n d Hilsman b e g a n to a r g u e that t h e U n i t e d States s h o u l d e n c o u r a g e a c o u p against Diem by anti-Diem generals. 2 0 2 O n t h e w e e k e n d of August 24, while P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y a n d Diem s u p p o r t e r s such as M c N a m a r a , Rusk, a n d CIA d i r e c t o r J o h n M c C o n e were o u t of town, H a r r i m a n a n d H i l s m a n sent a c o n t r o versial cable to t h e new U.S. a m b a s s a d o r to Saigon, H e n r y C a b o t Lodge. 2 0 3 T h e cable never explicitly asked Lodge to set t h e wheels in m o t i o n f o r a c o u p against Diem, b u t the cable's essence was that t h e U n i t e d States c o u l d n o l o n g e r t o l e r a t e D i e m ' s i n c o m p e t e n t r u l e . As M c N a m a r a recalls in his m e m o i r s , L o d g e n o n e t h e l e s s int e r p r e t e d the cable as authorization to a p p r o a c h South Vietnamese generals a b o u t t h e possibility of a c o u p , a n d h e did so. 2 0 4 Many of the Diem s u p p o r t e r s in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were infur i a t e d by H a r r i m a n a n d H i l s m a n ' s s e n d i n g t h e cable while they were o u t of town, considering it an u n d e r h a n d e d b u r e a u c r a t i c e n d r u n . 2 0 5 Such behavior o n the p a r t of H a r r i m a n was n o t o u t of character, however; by this time h e h a d developed a strong r e p u t a t i o n as a b u r e a u c r a t i c infighter. Roger Hilsman, H a r r i m a n ' s coconspirator in the Lodge cable episode, c o n f i r m e d this r e p u t a t i o n , saying that H a r r i m a n "had m o r e e x p e r i e n c e in t h e guerilla w a r f a r e of interagency policy battles t h a n anyone else." 2 0 6 At any rate, this episode illustrates t h a t H a r r i m a n h a d n o t lost his j u n g l e - f i g h t i n g instincts over the years. In early N o v e m b e r 1963 the c o u p took place, a n d t h r e e weeks later JFK was killed in Dallas. Kennedy's d e a t h a n d the succession of Lyndon J o h n s o n to the presidency b r o u g h t a b o u t a drastic decrease in H a r r i m a n ' s power a n d i n f l u e n c e within the f o r e i g n policy making circle. STRUGGLING FOR INFLUENCE WITH LBJ J o h n s o n did n o t h o l d H a r r i m a n in the same c o n f i d e n c e a n d esteem as h a d previous presidents Roosevelt, T r u m a n , a n d Kennedy. 2 0 7 Ano t h e r p r o b l e m was that H a r r i m a n ' s f o r c e f u l anti-Diem a r g u m e n t s a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the L o d g e cable d u r i n g s u m m e r 1963 h a d severely a l i e n a t e d Secretary of State D e a n Rusk. 2 0 8 W h e n J o h n s o n took over, Rusk b e c a m e m u c h m o r e p o w e r f u l d u e to his s t r o n g

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relationship with the new president, and as a result H a r r i m a n became increasingly isolated a n d was virtually cut out of the policymaking i n n e r circle. 209 H a r r i m a n remained isolated and was given marginal diplomatic assignments until finally he was again n a m e d ambassador-at-large in February 1965. 210 H a r r i m a n ' s isolation and loss of policymaking influence h u r t him deeply. Longtime f r i e n d and colleague Milton Katz describes this period as a low point in H a r r i m a n ' s life. Separated from his role in important affairs, he had a horrible feeling that he had no personal significance as a human being. There wasn't an independent, defining sense of who he was. When you got down to the inner core, you found it wasn't filled. There was a vacuum, and he sensed it himself. He was at his best when he had a big job, as he had in World War II, the Marshall Plan, and NATO days, and in a sense he was at his worst when he didn't have a big job, because he was fleeing the vacuum inside him. 2 1 1

T h u s H a r r i m a n had come to genuinely n e e d to be an i m p o r t a n t diplomatic player, n o t just for his ego but for his very identity. H a r r i m a n would struggle f o r the r e m a i n d e r of J o h n s o n ' s administration to gain his confidence a n d to get him to pursue seriously a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Working f r o m his position as ambassador-at-large, H a r r i m a n c o n t i n u e d to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement brokered in cooperation with the Soviet Union. In March 1965, he conveyed to J o h n s o n his belief that the intensifying competition between the Soviets and the Chinese could be exploited by the United States. It could convince the Soviets to help broker a settlement to head off the d e e p e n i n g U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. 2 1 2 In private conversations during this time H a r r i m a n expressed f r u s t r a t i o n at J o h n s o n ' s failure to allow him to explore the potential of a j o i n t U.S.-Soviet b r o k e r e d settlement. In such a conversation with A r t h u r Schlesinger Jr., he said, "I wish we had a little m o r e willingness to e x p e r i m e n t h e r e . . . . We have got to have a settlement. Why d o n ' t we try to do something? Why d o n ' t we have some imagination a b o u t trying to develop some relationship? [Walter] L i p p m a n n for the first time wrote sensibly about the 'carrot and the stick' in Viet-Nam. We are applying the stick without the carrot." 2 1 3 Of course, while H a r r i m a n was trying to develop support for a negotiated settlement, the rest of the administration was rapidly committing the United States to a military course in Vietnam with the start of the b o m b i n g campaign known as O p e r a t i o n Rolling

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T h u n d e r and with rapid increases in the number of U.S. combat troops being sent to Vietnam. 2 1 4 Harriman would not give up, however. On April 1, 1965, he sent a memorandum to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, who had much more influence with Johnson than Harriman. In this memorandum, Harriman laid out his whole theory about the intensifying Sino-Soviet competition and the potential for the United States to exploit it. He also explained how a settlement could be made attractive to all the communist entities whose interests would be involved, including the Soviets, the North Vietnamese, and the Chinese. He argued that the president should make a "statement to capture world opinion as well as to give the enemy a political and economic carrot." T h e statement should imply that NVN could have a political and e c o n o m i c future free from fear o f Chinese domination. It would also imply that NVN would be recognized as a state and would share in the development of the area. . . . T h e statement should propose a non-aligned area for Indochina with its security guaranteed by the U.S., USSR, Red China etc. This would assure the Soviets against Chicom advance to the south. . . . By the nonaligned set-up, Peiping could have the security of a comfortable buffer area. They might be ready to accept such a buffer, as long as they were sure that there would be no attempt to make it a western bastion. . . . To achieve these purposes, the statement should propose a close e c o n o m i c relationship among the four Indochinese countries. This e c o n o m i c relationship should include free e x c h a n g e of products, and c o m m o n development planning. . . . T h e U.S. should indicate a willingness to be generous, but show no desire to c o n t r o l . 2 1 5

This proposal for a negotiated settlement was vintage Harriman. It was very consistent with his Cold War worldview as expressed in his writings on Southeast Asia since the early 1960s. In fact it was remarkably similar to the settlement proposal he recommended to President Kennedy in November 1961. 2 1 6 He premised both proposals on the emerging Sino-Soviet split and the motivation that might give the Soviets to work for a neutral buffer zone in Southeast Asia to block southward expansion by the Chinese. Both proposals also offered an economic "carrot" to the North Vietnamese by suggesting that they could participate in a regional cooperative development plan. Aside from being a carrot to the North Vietnamese, the regional economic development plan also represented continuity in Harriman's belief in the importance of expediting the spread of market forces to Southeast Asia as a way to

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prevent further communist expansion there. This was consistent with Harriman's Cold War writings from as early as the mid-1950s. This latest proposal was incredibly ambitious, and the negotiations to bring it about would be very complex. T h e fact that Harriman thought it could be done was also consistent with his strong belief in the effectiveness of diplomatic negotiations for solving difficult problems when handled by the right people (i.e., himself). It was also further indication of Harriman's consistent entrepreneurial style as a statesman. Although t h e r e is n o direct evidence that J o h n s o n was persuaded by H a r r i m a n ' s proposal, there is evidence that after Bundy received H a r r i m a n ' s m e m o , he and McNamara u r g e d J o h n s o n to a n n o u n c e publicly a U.S. willingness to start negotiations on Vietnam. 2 1 7 Shortly thereafter, J o h n s o n gave his highly publicized J o h n s H o p k i n s speech, where he indicated U.S. willingness to begin negotiations a n d p r o p o s e d a h u g e Mekong valley cooperative develo p m e n t project that would include the North Vietnamese. 2 1 8 T h u s J o h n s o n ' s proposal certainly resembled H a r r i m a n ' s in i m p o r t a n t ways. Later in May, J o h n s o n agreed to a brief b o m b i n g pause to see if the North Vietnamese would negotiate, but nothing came of it. 219 For the next three years, as the J o h n s o n administration became m o r e and more committed to a d o o m e d military effort, H a r r i m a n c o n t i n u e d to push for a negotiated settlement. Finally, on March 31, 1968, after realizing that the Vietnam War had r u i n e d his presidency, J o h n s o n gave his bombshell speech a n n o u n c i n g his decision n o t to r u n for the Democratic n o m i n a t i o n in the u p c o m i n g campaign and to deescalate the war. In that same speech, he designated H a r r i m a n as the h e a d of the U.S. negotiating team in peace talks that he h o p e d could now begin. 2 2 0 T h u s H a r r i m a n finally had the diplomatic assignment he had wanted for years. But it was to be a very f r u s t r a t i n g six m o n t h s for him. W h e n his team left for the peace talks in Paris, J o h n s o n and Rusk gave it very rigid negotiating instructions. 2 2 1 And when the White House received a tip in J u n e f r o m Soviet p r e m i e r Aleksey Kosygin that a b o m b i n g halt might stimulate m o r e cooperation f r o m the North Vietnamese, J o h n s o n ignored H a r r i m a n ' s pleas to try it. 222 Defense Secretary Clark Clifford i n f o r m e d H a r r i m a n that J o h n s o n could n o t stand the idea of South Vietnamese cities being shelled while H a n o i went unt o u c h e d . 2 2 3 H a r r i m a n came to view this as a lost o p p o r t u n i t y of m o n u m e n t a l p r o p o r t i o n s , a chance to commit the Soviets to the point where they might pressure the North Vietnamese to be more cooperative at the bargaining table. 2 2 4 With that J u n e opportunity lost, the Paris peace talks d r o n e d on t h r o u g h the summer, and H a r r i m a n struggled to find a diplomatic

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solution within the tight negotiating parameters given him. He finally r e t u r n e d to Washington in J a n u a r y 1969 as the incoming Nixon administration was taking over the negotiating process. At age seventy-eight, Harriman went into semiretirement. His further involvement in official diplomatic affairs would be limited to participation in several official U.S. delegations to foreign headof-state funerals and UN conferences. He died in 1 9 8 6 . 2 2 5 CONCLUSION T h e foregoing exploration turns up some interesting patterns of continuity in both Harriman's worldview and behavior. T h e analysis of his childhood and business years produces evidence that Harriman was substantially influenced by his father's career as one of the highprofile American entrepreneurs of the Gilded Age. There is evidence in some o f Harriman's communications during this period that he identified rather strongly with his father and wanted to build his own business empire. During the years when he was doing so, he developed a style of business operation characterized by a preference for negotiations and dealmaking over day-to-day administration. His competitive and aggressive style o f dealing with rival business owners carried over into his diplomatic career; h e developed quite a formidable reputation among his colleagues as a bureaucratic infighter. With the exception of his years in the J o h n s o n administration, Harriman showed great skill in quickly building a bureaucratic power base with each new assignment. Unfortunately, examination o f H a r r i m a n ' s communications during his diplomatic career yields no solid evidence of his self-conceptions. T h e evidence o f a representative character influence, based as it is on patterns o f operational style, is merely suggestive. T h e evidence for market myth influence on Harriman and on his Cold War worldview is somewhat stronger. Starting in the late 1940s, Harriman's communications began to show substantial evidence o f market myth influence. His speeches and articles during this period contained not only clear market myth imagery but also appealed to the market myth for a collective identity for the American people. In the mid-1950s, Harriman began to weave strands of the market myth into his Cold War worldview and policy prescriptions. He began to argue that the best way to inoculate the developing world against the spread o f c o m m u n i s m was to show T h i r d World leaders the dynamism and developmental potential o f the free enterprise system while expediting the spread o f free market forces to those regions.

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When Harriman officially reentered the foreign policy bureaucracy at the b e g i n n i n g o f the Kennedy administration, his policy p r e f e r e n c e s and policymaking behavior regarding the situation in Southeast Asia were clearly consistent with his market m y t h influenced Cold War worldview as it had evolved since the late 1940s. He proposed diplomatic settlements (to be pursued with the Soviets as cosponsors) that would neutralize Laos and South Vietnam in order to rid them o f communist interference and thus allow them to (inevitably?) develop into market societies. Although his efforts regarding Laos failed fairly quickly, he continued to push for this kind o f solution for South Vietnam until the end o f the J o h n son administration. A n o t h e r important pattern o f continuity in Harriman's worldview was his consistent b e l i e f — f r o m his wartime term as ambassador to Moscow to his assignment as head o f the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks in 1 9 6 8 — i n the efficacy o f negotiations with the Soviets as a way o f influencing their behavior. This b e l i e f n o t only was a constant part o f his worldview from the end o f World War II until 1968 but also was reflected in his policy p r e f e r e n c e s and policymaking behavior during this period. This consistency across time and, more important, across many different official assignments is very significant and is also extremely rare (if not unique) a m o n g senior policymakers during the high Cold War. Taken together with his operational style of preferring dealmaking and negotiation to administration that spanned his business and diplomatic careers, we have a pattern o f continuity that supports the notion o f his being influenced by and identifying with the entrepreneur representative character in U.S. culture.

NOTES 1. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 19. 2. Ibid., 20. 3. Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life ofW. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York: William Morrow, 1992), 17. 4. Ibid., 16. 5. W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin: 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 37. 6. Abramson, 29. 7. Lloyd Mercer, E. H. Harriman: Master Railroader (Boston: Twayne, 1985), 8-9. 8. Ibid., 10. 9. Ibid., 10-25. 10. See Abramson, ch. 2.

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11. A b r a m s o n , 91. 12. A b r a m s o n , 65. 13. Rush Loving J r . , "W. Averell H a r r i m a n R e m e m b e r s Life with Father," Fortune (May 8, 1 9 7 8 ) : 2 0 6 . 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 2 1 6 . 16. Loving, 198. 17. Isaacson and T h o m a s , 4 2 - 4 3 . 18. Ibid., 4 9 . 19. A b r a m s o n , 7 2 - 7 4 . 20. Ibid., 79. 21. Isaacson a n d T h o m a s , 49. 22. Ibid., 74. 23. Ibid., 92. 24. A b r a m s o n , 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 . 25. Ibid., 107. 26. Loving, 2 1 6 . 27. A b r a m s o n , 108. 28. Ibid., 119. 29. Ibid. 30. V. G. I d e n , "W. A. H a r r i m a n Seeks a n d Wins F r o n t R a n k in M a r i n e F i e l d , " Marine Review ( M a r c h 1 9 2 1 ) , 124. 31. Ibid., 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 . 32. Ibid., 121. 33. A b r a m s o n , 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 . 34. Ibid., 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 . 35. Ibid., 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 . 36. I d e n , 122. 37. Ibid., 122. 38. B. C. F o r b e s , "New Business Star: H a r r i m a n I I , " Forbes ( O c t o b e r 30, 1 9 2 0 ) : 65. 39. H a r r i m a n a n d Abel, 4 7 . 40. Abramson, 142-143. 4 1 . Ibid., 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 . 4 2 . Ibid., 1 9 0 - 1 9 2 . 4 3 . Ibid., 2 0 2 - 2 0 6 . 4 4 . Ibid., 2 0 9 . 4 5 . E . J . K a h n , "Profiles P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y : W. A. H a r r i m a n , " New Yorker (May 10, 1 9 5 2 ) : 51. 46. A b r a m s o n , 2 1 9 . 47. K a h n , 5 2 . 48. A b r a m s o n , 2 2 8 - 2 3 1 . 49. Ibid., 2 4 3 . 50. Ibid., 2 3 8 . 51. Ibid., 2 3 9 - 2 4 0 . 5 2 . I n d e e d , t h e m a r k e t myth a t t r i b u t e s A m e r i c a ' s r e m a r k a b l e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t to an a l m o s t total lack o f g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e with business activity. 53. Abramson, 243. 54. Ibid., 2 4 5 - 2 4 9 . 5 5 . Ibid., 2 5 5 - 2 5 6 .

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56. Ibid., 259. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid., 260. 59. Harriman and Abel, 3. 60. Ibid., 2 7 0 - 2 7 6 . 61. See Harriman speech before the Yale Alumni Association, New York, February 4, 1941, Harriman Papers/Library of Congress (HPLC hereafter), chronological file, January-February 1941, Container 158. See also Harriman speech before the Traffic Club of Washington, February 13, 1941, HPLC, chronological file, January-February 1941, Container 158. 62. Abramson, 266. 63. Harriman memorandum of conversations before leaving Washington for London, March 11, 1941, HPLC, chronological file, March 1 - 1 7 , 1941, Container 158. 64. Harriman and Abel, 23. 65. Ibid. 66. Harriman cable to President Roosevelt, April 10, 1941, HPLC, chronological file, April 1941, Container 158. 67. Abramson, 2 8 3 - 2 8 7 . 68. Harriman and Abel, 66. 69. Abramson, 290. 70. Harriman and Abel, 8 7 - 9 3 . 71. Abramson, 295. 72. Ibid., 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 . 73. Abramson, 325. 74. Ibid., 328. 75. Ibid., 331. 76. Harriman and Abel, 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 . 77. Ibid., 1 5 4 - 1 5 5 . 78. Ibid., 1 5 6 - 1 5 8 . 79. Abramson, 340. 80. Harriman and Abel, 156-157. 81. Quoted in Abramson, 341. 82. Harriman and Abel, 228. 83. Abramson, 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 . 84. Ibid., 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 . 85. Harriman and Abel, 2 2 6 - 2 2 7 . 86. Harriman cable to Roosevelt, November 5, 1943, HPLC, chronological file, November 1 - 7 , 1943, Container 170. 87. Harriman telegram to Roosevelt, October 25, 1943, HPLC, chronological file, October 2 1 - 2 5 , 1943, Container 170. 88. Harriman memorandum to Hull, November 1, 1943, HPLC, chronological file, November 1 - 7 , 1943, Container 170. 89. Ibid. 90. Harriman memorandum of conversation with Molotov, October 23, 1943, HPLC, chronological file, October 2 1 - 2 5 , 1943, Container 170. 91. Harriman cable to Roosevelt, November 5, 1943, HPLC, chronological file, November 1 - 7 , 1943, Container 170. 92. Ibid., 6. 93. Harriman letter to Foreign Minister Molotov, March 10, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, March 9 - 1 5 , 1944, Container 171.

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94. Harriman cable to Hull, March 12, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, March 9 - 1 5 , Container 171. 95. Harriman telegram to the Department of State, March 13, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, March 9 - 1 5 , 1944, Container 171. 96. Abramson, 364. 97. Ibid., 378. 98. Harriman cable to Hull, March 10, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, March 9 - 1 5 , 1944, Container 171. 99. Harriman memorandum of conversations in London, May 2, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, May 1-15, 1944, Container 172. 100. Harriman memorandum of conversation in London, May 4, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, May 1-15, 1944, Container 172. 101. Harriman and Abel, 335-336. 102. Ibid., 336-339. 103. Harriman memorandum of conversation with Molotov, August 11, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, August 8-12, 1944, Container 173. 104. Harriman memorandum of conversation with Clark-Kerr and Molotov, August 17, 1944, 3, HPLC, chronological file, August 17, 1944, Container 173. 105. Ibid., 2. 106. Ibid., 3. 107. Ibid., 7. 108. Ibid., 1. 109. Harriman memorandum of conversation with Clark-Kerr and Molotov, August 17, 1944, "Operation Frantic Bases," 1, HPLC, chronological file, August 16-18, 1944, Container 173. 110. Harriman cable to the president and secretary of state, August 25, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, August 19-25, 1944, Container 173. 111. Ibid. 112. Harriman State Department telegram, October 16, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, October 15-16, 1944, Container 174. 113. Harriman memorandum of conversations with Roosevelt during trip to Washington, D.C., October 21-November 19, 1944, 8, HPLC, chronological file, Container 174. 114. Ibid., 8. 115. Harriman memorandum of conversation with Stalin and Anthony Eden, October 15, 1944, HPLC, chronological file, October 15, 1944, Container 174. 116. Abramson, 389. 117. Ibid., 390-391. 118. Ibid., 391. 119. Minutes of the Polish Commission, Moscow, March 5, 1945, 1-5, HPLC, chronological file, March 3-6, Container 177. 120. Ibid., 3. 121. Harriman and Abel, 419-420. 122. Harriman cable to Stettinius, April 6, 1945, 3, HPLC, chronological file, April 5 - 9 , 1945, Container 177. 123. Ibid., 1. 124. George Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 222-226. 125. See Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 75-85. Yergin

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calls H a r r i m a n ' s early mitigated Cold War worldview the "world bully" perspective because it portrays the Soviets as a bully who might be m a d e to behave if s o m e o n e would only stand u p to them. 126. H a r r i m a n cable to Stettinius, April 6, 1945, 3. 127. Kennan, 233. 128. Abramson, 191. 129. Ibid., 395. 130. David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon a n d Schuster, 1992), 371. 131. Abramson, 395. 132. Yergin, 83. 133. Abramson, 396-397. 134. Ibid., 404. 135. Ibid., 407. 136. Ibid., 414-417. 137. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , "Buy American Is a Dead Slogan," Washington Post (April 13, 1947): 6. 138. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , "The State of the World Economy," draft article written for United Nations World, J u n e 17, 1947, 1, HPLC, article file, Container 853. 139. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , "America's Faith in Free Enterprise a n d Individual Initiative," d r a f t article written f o r the Financial Times of London, November 1947, 3, HPLC, article file, Container 853. 140. Ibid., 7. 141. Ibid., 9. 142. Averell H a r r i m a n , "U.S. Task in P r o m o t i n g World Peace," Commercial and Financial Chronicle 166, 4624 (August 28, 1947): 9. 143. Averell H a r r i m a n , "Our Primary Task—A Healthy Economy," Commercial and Financial Chronicle (May 8, 1947): 8. 144. H a r r i m a n , "America's Faith in Free Enterprise and Individual Initiative," 11. 145. Abramson, 426. 146. Ibid., 439. 147. Ibid., 444. 148. Ibid., 449-453. 149. Ibid., 463. 150. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , d r a f t of "The Road to Peace," New York Times, November 1, 1951, 1, HPLC, article file, Container 853. 151. Ibid., 9. 152. Ibid. 153. Ibid., 12. 154. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , "Leadership in World Affairs," Foreign Affairs 32, 4 (July 1954): 528. 155. Ibid., 528-529. 156. Ibid., 536. 157. For a description of the Dulles diplomatic style with leaders of the developing world, see Chapter 3. 158. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , "Danger Unrecognized: T h e Soviet Challenge and American Policy," Atlantic Monthly (April 1956): 42-47. 159. Ibid., 42-43. 160. Ibid., 43-47. 161. Ibid., 533-536.

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162. Ibid., 5 7 3 . 163. H a r r i m a n draft o f eighth article on Russian trip, H P L C , article file, Container 854. 164. Ibid., 3 3 - 3 4 . 165. Ibid., 35. 166. Abramson, 5 7 7 - 5 8 1 . 167. Ibid., 5 8 2 - 5 8 3 . 168. Ibid., 583. 169. Harriman m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, May 8, 1961, HPLC, chronological mission files, Container 5 2 7 . 170. Ibid., 2 - 3 . 171. Ibid., 4 - 5 . 172. Abramson, 587. 173. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m o f conversation with Soviet minister Pushkin, J u n e 7, 1961, H P L C , c h r o n o l o g i c a l file, J u n e 1 - 1 6 , 1961, Container 5 2 7 . 174. Harriman m e m o r a n d u m to the president on Laos, S e p t e m b e r 5, 1961, 1, HPLC, chronological file, S e p t e m b e r 1961, Container 5 3 8 . 175. Abramson, 5 8 9 . 176. Harriman m e m o r a n d u m o f White House conversation on Southeast Asia, August 29, 1961, Papers o f J o h n F. Kennedy, J F K Library, Boston (hereafter J F K Papers), national security files, B o x 217 A, 2. 177. Abramson, 5 9 0 - 5 9 1 . 178. Ibid., 596. 179. Ibid., 597. 180. H a r r i m a n telegram to Rusk, July 13, 1963, 1, HPLC, chronological file, Container 540. 181. Abramson, 599. 182. H a r r i m a n telegram to Rusk, July 18, 1963, 1 - 2 , H P L C , c h r o n o logical file, Container 540. 183. W. Averell Harriman, "An Appraisal o f Khrushchev by H a r r i m a n , " draft o f article f o r New York Times Sunday Magazine, August 25, 1963, 1 - 2 , HPLC, article file, Container 854. 184. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , " T h e U n i t e d States and the Far East," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 342 (July 1 9 6 2 ) : 90-95. 185. Ibid., 97. 186. W. Averell H a r r i m a n , "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia," New York Times Magazine, May 27, 1962, article draft f o u n d in H P L C , article file, C o n t a i n e r 854. 187. Ibid., 2. 188. Ibid. 189. F o r a g o o d overview o f H a r r i m a n ' s diplomatic strategy f o r the 1961 Geneva c o n f e r e n c e on Laos, see Harriman m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, May 15, 1961, H P L C , c h r o n o l o g i c a l file, May 9 - 3 1 , 1961, C o n t a i n e r 5 2 7 . For his r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for a similar c o n f e r e n c e on Vietnam see Harriman m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, November 11, 1961, J F K Papers, national security files, meetings and m e m o r a n d a , B o x 194. 190. Harriman m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, November 11, 1961, 1. 191. Ibid., 2. 192. Ibid., 1.

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193. Ibid., 3. 194. Ibid., 4. 195. Ibid., 5. 196. Abramson, 609. 197. For an excellent discussion of Ball's efforts to get LBJ to pursue a diplomatic solution in fall 1964 and early 1965, see Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 156-159. 198. H a r r i m a n , "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia," 2. 199. This two-track a p p r o a c h was largely the result of the findings of the Taylor-Rostow mission to Saigon in October 1961. For an excellent discussion of this mission, its findings, a n d its impact on U.S. policy in Vietn a m see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: P e n g u i n Books, 1972), ch. 9. 200. Abramson, 616. 201. Ibid., 619-623. 202. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m of c o n f e r e n c e with the p r e s i d e n t on Vietnam, August 28, 1963, JFK Papers, national security files, meetings a n d m e m o r a n d a , Box 316. 203. McNamara, 52-55. 204. Ibid., 55-56. 205. Ibid., 55. 206. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration offohnF. Kennedy (New York: Dell Books, 1968), 139. 207. Abramson, 627-632. 208. Ibid., 621-623. 209. Ibid., 632. 210. Ibid., 635. 211. Q u o t e d in Abramson, 631. 212. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m to President J o h n s o n , March 15, 1965, 3, HPLC, chronological file, March 1965, Container 567. 213. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m of conversation with Arthur Schlesinger Jr., March 20, 1965, 1, HPLC, chronological file, March 1965, C o n t a i n e r 567. 214. For an excellent discussion of this see McNamara, ch. 7. 215. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m to Bundy, April 1, 1965, 2-3, HPLC, chronological file, April 1965, Container 567. 216. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, November 11, 1961. 217. McNamara, 180-181. 218. Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 192-193. 219. Ibid., 193-194. 220. Abramson, 657. 221. Ibid., 658-660. 222. H a r r i m a n m e m o r a n d u m of review, D e c e m b e r 14, 1968, HPLC, trips/missions file, Paris peace talks, Container 562. 223. Ibid., 3. 224. Ibid., 1. 225. Abramson, 675-696.

Robert McNamara: Cold War Manager

Robert S. McNamara was clearly one of the most influential foreign policy advisers in both the Kennedy and J o h n s o n administrations. T h e r e is also little doubt that he was one of the most influential secretaries of defense ever to hold that position. In his eight years at the head of the D e p a r t m e n t of Defense, he revolutionized the way business was conducted at the Pentagon, rationalizing its worldwide operations with the same kinds of statistical control m e t h o d s used in the m a n a g e m e n t of h u g e corporations. In addition to forever c h a n g i n g the way the Pentagon was r u n , he overhauled U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and strategy. Given these impressive achievements, it is somewhat sad that many people r e m e m b e r McNamara simply as o n e of the principal architects of America's tragic military involvement in Vietnam. T h e r e is n o d o u b t that McNamara was one of the key participants in the many decisions that led the United States into that quagmire. 1 But ironically, it was McNamara's growing doubts a b o u t the o n g o i n g war that p u t him at odds with Lyndon J o h n s o n a n d b r o u g h t about his not-so-subtle reassignment to the World Bank in late 1967. Both Kennedy and later J o h n s o n were greatly impressed by McN a m a r a ' s overpowering intellectual and managerial style. Before going to Washington, McNamara's u p b r i n g i n g , education, a n d t r e m e n d o u s drive had channeled his extraordinary intellectual talents toward a career at the top of Ford Motors. But almost as soon as he r e a c h e d the presidency at Ford he was s u m m o n e d to Washington by a young senator f r o m Massachusetts one year his j u n i o r who had himself just scaled the pinnacle of American politics. In The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam describes how McNamara's pragmatic operating style fit so perfectly with the leitmotif of the Kennedy administration and m a d e him an indispensable m e m b e r of the Kennedy team.

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He was very much a man of the Kennedy administration. He symbolized the idea that it could manage and control events in an intelligent, rational way. Taking on a guerilla war was like buying a sick foreign company; you brought your systems to it. He was so impressive and loyal that it was hard to believe . . . that anything he took command of could go wrong. He was a reassuring figure not just to both presidents he served but to the liberal good community of Washington as well; if McNamara was in charge of something he would run it correctly; if it was a war, it would be a good war.2

THE SHAPING OF A MANAGER R o b e r t Strange McNamara was b o r n J u n e 9, 1916, in San Francisco, C a l i f o r n i a . 3 His father, R o b e r t J a m e s M c N a m a r a , was a sales m a n ager of a wholesale s h o e d i s t r i b u t o r a n d t h e son of Irish Catholic immigrants. His m o t h e r , Claranel Strange, was f r o m a middle-class M e t h o d i s t family with Scottish a n d English ancestry. W h e n McNam a r a was seven, his family moved into a middle-class n e i g h b o r h o o d in O a k l a n d , partially b e c a u s e t h e location o f f e r e d g o o d public schools f o r y o u n g R o b e r t a n d his y o u n g e r sister, Margaret. 4 Young Bobby, as h e was called as a child, was noticed very early o n f o r his intelligence by his p a r e n t s a n d teachers. In t h e classic A m e r i c a n middle-class p a t t e r n , his p a r e n t s (particularly his m o t h e r ) raised him to b e relatively f r e e of e m o t i o n a n d drove him relentlessly to achieve in school. 5 In his m e m o i r s , M c N a m a r a described t h e i m p a c t of this early p a r e n t a l pressure on the course of his life. "My drive f o r scholastic e x c e l l e n c e r e f l e c t e d t h e fact t h a t n e i t h e r my m o t h e r n o r my f a t h e r h a d g o n e to college (my f a t h e r h a d never g o n e b e y o n d e i g h t h g r a d e ) , a n d they were fiercely det e r m i n e d t h a t I would. T h e i r resolve s h a p e d my life." 6 M c N a m a r a r e s p o n d e d to this pressure by excelling in school a n d by c o m p e t i n g aggressively in c h i l d h o o d athletic activities. After f o u r years of overachieving in high school, M c N a m a r a enrolled at t h e University of C a l i f o r n i a at Berkeley, starting in fall 1933. M c N a m a r a b i o g r a p h e r D e b o r a h Shapley argues that his studies a n d e x p e r i e n c e s d u r i n g those years at Berkeley were crucial f o r the f o r m a t i o n of his identity. 7 T h e Berkeley intellectual milieu was d o m i n a t e d by the growing belief in rationalism a n d scientific methods that was taking the c o u n t r y by storm in the 1930s. 8 Building o n his s t r o n g h i g h school m a t h b a c k g r o u n d , M c N a m a r a quickly l e a r n e d how to use statistical t e c h n i q u e s a n d f o r m a l logic to build persuasive a r g u m e n t s . 9 T h e value of these t e c h n i q u e s was m u c h m o r e t h a n merely i n s t r u m e n t a l to the y o u n g McNamara, however.

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McNamara told Shapley that during those college years, attacking problems with quantitative analysis gave him a sense of personal style and identity. 10 Majoring in economics, McNamara was named to Phi Beta Kappa after his sophomore year and went on to become a member of the leading secret societies at Berkeley, all of which made him a leading member of the student body. 1 1 Nonetheless, Berkeley's biggest contribution to McNamara's intellectual development seems to have been his discovery of quantitative analysis. Shapley sums up the importance of this discovery. "He had discovered an internal identity, bolstered by his talent for numbers and logic. To a young man growing up in a working-class household, this was not just any talent. His facility matched the forward direction of the age, possibly yielding him the special insights in the new gospel of rationalism that some Cal faculty preached." 1 2 In his memoirs, McNamara reflected on the importance of his Berkeley experience as a shaping influence. 1 3 He emphasized the impact of his introduction to logic and quantitative analytical techniques. T h e defining moments in my education . . . came in my philosophy and mathematics curricula. T h e ethics courses forced me to begin to shape my values; studying logic exposed me to rigor and precision in thinking. A n d my mathematics professors taught me to see math as a process of t h o u g h t — a language in which to express much, but certainly not all, of human activity. It was a revelation. To this day I see quantification as a language to add precision to reasoning about the world. O f course it cannot deal with issues of morality, beauty, and love, but it is a powerful tool too often neglected when we seek to overcome poverty, fiscal deficits, or the failure of our national health programs. 1 4

We can see that McNamara's undergraduate years at Berkeley had a profound effect on his epistemological orientation toward the world. There he developed a high degree of confidence both in his own reasoning ability and in the power of quantitative analytical methods for helping policymakers understand a complex social reality and solve complex problems. This quotation supports Shapley's conclusion that while at Berkeley, McNamara began to build an identity around his newfound analytical powers. We also see in this passage the first evidence of an epistemological hubris similar to that which Alasdair Maclntyre argues is used to justify managerial authority within the modern corporation (although without the appeal to covering laws). 15 On graduating from Berkeley, McNamara was accepted into the graduate program at the prestigious Harvard Business School in fall

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1937. At Harvard, McNamara was introduced to the new approach to corporate management known as financial or statistical control. This was a revolutionary new method of corporate accounting that allowed for all aspects of the production and distribution process (i.e., production labor, materials, transportation, etc.) to be assigned specific cost values and to be inventoried statistically using these cost values. 16 This information could then be compared with statistical information about income from sales to give managers a precise measurement of profits and rates of return. This in turn gave corporate managers the ability to measure precisely the performance of corporate divisions and to make future cost and income projections. 17 Needless to say, McNamara found himself perfectly suited to learning this new statistical control approach to managing huge corporations, and this facility was reflected by his excellent grades at Harvard. In her interviews with McNamara's Harvard classmates Shapley learned that they were in awe of McNamara's analytical abilities. 18 It seems that McNamara picked up at Harvard where he had left off at Berkeley. He mastered statistical control techniques with lightning speed and used them with an amazing ability to find optimal solutions to hypothetical management problems. 19 McNamara finished Harvard with a distinguished record and went home to work for Price Waterhouse in San Francisco as an accountant. But he was unhappy with this simple job and after a year accepted an instructor position at Harvard. 2 0 Before returning to Cambridge, he married his longtime girlfriend, Margy Craig. He taught at Harvard for a year and a half, until the United States entered World War II, when he became restless to join the war effort. 21 His chance came when General Hap Arnold approached the Harvard Business School about having some of its instructors install a statistical control system for the Army Air Forces, which he commanded. With the U.S. entry into the war, the AAF was forced to expand instantly, and the generals had no way to keep track of and allocate the thousands of new flight crews and new airplanes and operate the huge maintenance infrastructure. With this new statistical control system they could manage the vast resources of the AAF the same way corporate chiefs managed mammoth manufacturing firms.22 McNamara had his first opportunity to apply the methods of statistical control to a real-world management problem, and he went into the project with energy and confidence. 23 Although developing a statistical control system for an ongoing and ever-expanding air war was a huge challenge, McNamara and colleagues from Harvard were up to the task of teaching hundreds

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of AAF officers t h e system while simultaneously getting the reporting system u p a n d r u n n i n g . 2 4 First M c N a m a r a s p e n t time developing the system in E n g l a n d , w h e r e the air war against G e r m a n y was j u s t getting u n d e r way; t h e n , after a stint in Kansas m o n i t o r i n g the m a n u f a c t u r e of B-29s, h e was assigned to t h e T w e n t i e t h B o m b e r C o m m a n d in t h e I n d i a - B u r m a - C h i n a t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s . T h e r e h e m o n i t o r e d the d a n g e r o u s t r a n s p o r t of b o m b e r s , crews, a n d supplies f r o m I n d i a over the Himalayas i n t o C h i n a (a r o u t e known as t h e H u m p ) , w h e r e they would be r e a d i e d f o r b o m b i n g o p e r a t i o n s against J a p a n . 2 5 F r o m India h e went to the Pacific in 1944 to monitor t h e m o u n t i n g b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n against J a p a n ; h e was t h e n t r a n s f e r r e d briefly to t h e P e n t a g o n a n d t h e n to Wright Field in O h i o , which h a d b e c o m e the h e a d q u a r t e r s of the worldwide statistical c o n t r o l o p e r a t i o n . 2 6 At t h e e n d of t h e war, t h e statistical c o n t r o l o p e r a t i o n was d e e m e d a h u g e success by t h e army, a n d M c N a m a r a a n d his colleagues were d e c o r a t e d f o r a j o b well d o n e . M c N a m a r a a n d his fellow statistical c o n t r o l officers came away f r o m their war e x p e r i e n c e in awe of the seemingly u n l i m i t e d power a n d c o n t r o l that this new system c o u l d p u t i n t o t h e h a n d s of l e a d e r s of large b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations. 2 7 With t h e war over, M c N a m a r a h a d i n t e n d e d to r e t u r n to his t e a c h i n g c a r e e r at H a r v a r d , b u t his wife, Margy, was s u d d e n l y stricken with polio a n d paralyzed. They f a c e d the p r o s p e c t of h u g e medical bills that would devour his m e a g e r teaching salary. H e was a p p r o a c h e d by Charles T h o r n t o n , who h a d b e e n o n e of the leaders of t h e statistical c o n t r o l t e a m in the army. T h o r n t o n ' s idea was to m a r k e t the brightest m e m b e r s of the statistical c o n t r o l t e a m en masse to various c o r p o r a t i o n s that were in financial t r o u b l e a n d t h e r e f o r e in n e e d of a statistical c o n t r o l system. 2 8 After e x p l o r i n g several smaller corporations, T h o r n t o n f o c u s e d o n the financially troubled Ford Motor Company, which was in dire n e e d of a new mana g e m e n t system. H e m a d e a deal with Ford to hire his g r o u p of ten. M c N a m a r a , who was c o n s i d e r e d o n e of t h e brightest of the "whiz kids," as they would come to be called, was offered a salary of $12,000 a year, m o r e than f o u r times his teaching salary at Harvard. 2 9 THE FORD YEARS M c N a m a r a ' s wife gradually r e c o v e r e d completely, a n d h e a n d t h e o t h e r whiz kids settled in to b r i n g the struggling Ford e m p i r e back to financial h e a l t h . T h e task was m o n u m e n t a l . T h e a u t o m a k i n g

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giant was lurching t h r o u g h the transition f r o m war- to peacetime production with an organizational scheme riddled with duplication and poorly defined lines of responsibility. 30 T h o r n t o n a n d the others set out to create a statistical control system that would provide the top-level managers with detailed cost and income inventories. T h e precise cost a n d profit projections m a d e possible by this i n f o r m a t i o n could t h e n guide their all-imp o r t a n t production and marketing plans. 3 1 McNamara was first assigned to h e a d the company's p l a n n i n g and financial analysis office; in 1949 he was p r o m o t e d to controller of the firm.32 In these positions h e was given access to all of the cost and sales statistics that filtered u p f r o m the bottom of the organization. He became a master at interpreting those reams of statistics (without the aid of computers) and used his interpretations to give sage planning and financial advice to the top managers of the company. 3 3 It was in these meetings with Ford's upper-level m a n a g e m e n t that he developed his highly impressive yet intimidating intellectual style of rattling off endless streams of seemingly u n i m p e a c h a b l e statistics (without notes) to bolster his arguments. 3 4 J o h n Byrne describes how McNamara used this aggressive debating style at Ford. He would fire away, one question after another until people were overwhelmed, if not terrified. McNamara's personal style was to rush through everything at high speed, cowing subordinates and peers with how much he knew and how much they didn't. . . . He was so dominating at meetings that people were afraid to contradict him and tended not to say what they really thought. If you took issue with Bob, you had to be as ready as he was to do battle with a flurry of facts and numbers. Bob did not tolerate fools gladly. 35

This style would become his trademark in the Kennedy-Johnson years and would create many enemies in those administrations. It flowed naturally f r o m his belief that there was virtually n o problem he could not solve as long as he was armed with the relevant, quantitatively coded "facts" of the situation. Once he had access to those "facts," p r o p e r rational and objective analysis would lead to the optimal solution. Byrne provides an excellent description of his problem-solving approach at Ford. He brought to the job a tremendous discipline. It had to do with the way Bob thought through a problem, lusting for every detail, then assembling all the facts and coming up with as logical and rational a decision as possible, a decision based solely on the numbers. . . . It required dispassionate analysis devoid of intuition or

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emotion or of that gut feel so many of the auto men often relied on to base their decisions. . . . Those who "felt," those whose "gut" led them to a conclusion were scorned and scolded, compelled to base their decisions on imperative fact. 36

He had begun to believe in his analytical powers and the power of statistics in his undergraduate and graduate years. His wartime experience in setting up the AAF statistical control system strongly reinforced those beliefs. Now his experience at Ford was showing him just how much bureaucratic power and influence this statistically based knowledge could give him. But statistics did not always suit his purpose, and during his time at Ford, it seems he developed a disturbing habit of altering them either to support his argument or to remain in agreement with superiors he wanted to please, such as Henry Ford II. 37 Perhaps this tendency of the professional McNamara to stifle personal doubts or convictions in order to remain in good graces with superiors—and thus to remain in power—could be characterized (in a superficial sense) as loyalty. Whatever the case, it would stay with him throughout his tenure as secretary of defense. From his position as controller in 1949 McNamara used his statistics and his loyalty to Ford to gain power in the company and rise through the upper-management ranks until he was named president of Ford Motors on November 9, 1960. Ironically, this was one day after Kennedy was elected president. A month after he had been made president, he was contacted by Kennedy's transition team and asked to meet with the president-elect about the possibility of his serving as secretary of defense. After a couple of meetings with Kennedy, McNamara accepted the nomination for the position on December 13, I960. 38 An examination of McNamara's biography up to this point yields some very definite patterns. His experiences at Berkeley and Harvard and later in the AAF and at Ford gave him tremendous confidence in both his own reasoning abilities and ability to use quantitative analytical techniques for solving complex problems. His manipulation of a complex bureaucratic organization using these techniques is the paradigmatic mode of social action of the manager representative character. Maclntyre argues that the manager's claim to effectiveness is based on the "stock of knowledge by means of which organizations and social structures can be molded." 39 In fact, McNamara's confidence in the "facts" and his debating style are almost a textbook example of this orientation. As noted earlier, he learned how to dominate policy debates by forcefully showing his mastery of "the numbers." 40 He also exhibited the "factual" and "quantitative" atti-

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tudes that, according to Sumner, characterize the "managerial mind." 41 Before he even joined the executive corps at Ford, McNamara was clearly exhibiting many of the key attributes of the manager representative character. And his climb up the corporate ladder at Ford only reinforced these attributes. MANAGING THE PENTAGON

Upon taking office as secretary of defense in January 1961, McNamara set out to implement Kennedy's campaign promises to enlarge and revitalize the nation's defenses. His first task was to close the "missile gap" that the Kennedy campaign alleged had widened during the later Eisenhower years. Soon after taking office, however, he received intelligence reports indicating that no such gap existed and that in fact the United States was substantially ahead in numbers of nuclear missiles.42 Nonetheless, McNamara began to expand U.S. nuclear forces to counter the growing (albeit still numerically inferior) Soviet nuclear forces. Almost immediately he ordered a substantial expansion of the navy's Polaris SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile) program, an expansion of the air force's Minuteman ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) program, and an increase in the percentage of manned bombers to be on constant fifteen-minute alert. 43 Whereas the force expansions themselves were significant, the way that McNamara decided on these changes is even more interesting. Upon arriving at the Pentagon, McNamara was dismayed to find that rational planning of defense programs had been rendered nearly impossible by interservice rivalry and pork barrel political pressures in Congress. 44 Coming fresh from Ford, where he had been instrumental in utilizing the methods of financial control to rationalize planning and operations, McNamara decided that a similar system was needed at the Department of Defense. He set out to develop a comprehensive system for force planning and budgeting of defense programs. His comptroller at the Pentagon, Charles Hitch, had previously worked at the RAND Corporation and had been working on developing just such a system. 45 When Hitch presented his system (the Planning-Program Budgeting System, or PPBS), McNamara ordered that it be set up at the Pentagon as quickly as possible. Using the proven methods of statistical or financial control, McNamara would be able to assess accurately the cost effectiveness of individual weapons programs. This would allow him to recommend to the

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president and Congress the optimal mix of weapons systems to provide the necessary combat or d e t e r r e n t capability for the least amount of defense dollars. 46 Decisions on which weapons systems to f u n d would no longer be based on irrational political wrangling between the military services or between members of Congress looking out for their districts. McNamara later described his new system to a congressional subcommittee: "The basic objective of the management system we are introducing and trying to operate, is to establish a rational foundation as opposed to an emotional foundation for the decisions as to what size force and what type of force this country will maintain." 4 7 In a later description of PPBS he argued that he was "convinced that this approach not only leads to far sounder and more objective decisions over the long r u n but yields as well the maximum a m o u n t of effective defense we can buy with each defense dollar expended." 4 8 Thus McNamara picked up at the Pentagon where he had left off at Ford in his quest to harness the quantitative techniques of financial control to rationally guide the behavior of huge bureaucratic enterprises. In his memoirs McNamara indicated that he viewed the task of guiding the Defense Department as being basically no different from managing Ford. I had no patience with the myth that the Defense Department could not be managed. It was an extraordinarily large organization, but the notion that it was some sort of ungovernable force was absurd. I had spent fifteen years as a manager identifying problems and forcing organizations—often against their will—to think deeply and realistically about alternative courses of action and their consequences. My team and I were determined to guide the department in such a way as to achieve the objective the president had set: security for the nation at the lowest possible cost. 4 9

He went on to say that his approach to managing the Pentagon flowed from a basic philosophy of management he had developed since Harvard. This all reflected an approach to organizing human activities that I had developed at Harvard and applied in the army during the war and later at Ford. . . . Put very simply it was to define a clear objective for whatever organization I was associated with, develop a plan to achieve that objective, and systematically monitor progress against the plan. Then, if progress was deficient, o n e could either adjust the plan, or introduce corrective action to accelerate progress. 5 0

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M c N a m a r a conceived of his role at t h e t o p of t h e P e n t a g o n as that of a m a n a g e r . His d e s c r i p t i o n of his m a n a g e m e n t p h i l o s o p h y r e a d s like t h e s u m m a r y of t h e r a t i o n a l actor m o d e l of decisionm a k i n g in an u n d e r g r a d u a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations t e x t b o o k . It also indicates an e x t r e m e d e g r e e of c o n f i d e n c e in his ability to m o n i t o r a n d c o n t r o l t h e behavior of the largest bureaucracy in the world. H e r e again we see the paradigmatic m o d e of social action of t h e m a n a g e r c h a r a c t e r : m a n i p u l a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s of t h e b u r e a u cratic organization until the optimal resource mix is f o u n d . H e also e x h i b i t e d t h e m a n a g e r c h a r a c t e r ' s myopic m o r a l stance: Whatever works is g o o d . D u r i n g his first year in office, M c N a m a r a u s e d his new system to show that f u t u r e increases in strategic n u c l e a r forces s h o u l d be in ICBMs r a t h e r t h a n in m a n n e d b o m b e r s (which were t h e sacred cow of the air force) because the ICBMs provided m o r e mission capability f o r less money. 5 1 This m e a n t t h a t t h e air f o r c e ' s new p e t b o m b e r project, the B-70, would n e e d to b e discontinued (although n o t , as it t u r n e d out, w i t h o u t a f i g h t f r o m s u p p o r t e r s in t h e air force a n d in Congress). 5 2 EMERGING FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER M c N a m a r a was quick to take c h a r g e of t h e P e n t a g o n a n d d e f e n s e policy; his e m e r g e n c e as a f o r e i g n policy adviser to t h e p r e s i d e n t came a bit m o r e slowly. His p e r f o r m a n c e as an adviser to K e n n e d y d u r i n g t h e r u n - u p to the Bay of Pigs fiasco was less t h a n exemplary. H e is o n r e c o r d as having d o u b t s t h a t t h e invasion c o u l d s u c c e e d w i t h o u t substantial U.S. military involvement, b u t h e voted to go a h e a d with t h e o p e r a t i o n w h e n K e n n e d y asked f o r a final show of h a n d s f r o m his advisers. 5 3 It wasn't until t h e Berlin crisis of s u m m e r 1961 t h a t M c N a m a r a really surfaced as an influential voice.among Kennedy's foreign policy advisers. After K h r u s h c h e v h a d p r e s e n t e d K e n n e d y with an ultim a t u m o n Berlin at the J u n e 1961 V i e n n a summit, K e n n e d y p u t his f o r e i g n policy t e a m to t h e task of c o m i n g u p with the best way f o r d e t e r r i n g t h e Soviets f r o m violating U.S. a n d W e s t e r n interests in Berlin. 5 4 Working with f o r m e r secretary of state Dean Acheson a n d o t h e r s o n a Berlin task f o r c e t h a t h e c h a i r e d , M c N a m a r a carefully analyzed the relevant military balance in Berlin. T h e task f o r c e quickly discovered that existing Western plans to c o m b a t a Soviet move o n Berlin r e l i e d heavily o n a n early use of tactical n u c l e a r weapons, a n d they set o u t to r e m e d y this i m m e d i -

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ately. In addressing this overreliance on nuclear weapons, the group began to develop the outlines of what would come to be known as the doctrine of "flexible response." 55 Although McNamara and Acheson agreed that the best way to deter the Soviets in Berlin was to vastly increase U.S. and Western conventional capabilities as a show of resolve, they disagreed on what form the show of resolve should take. Acheson argued for an immediate declaration of national emergency and early call-up of the reserves, and McNamara argued that the president should put off asking Congress for a declaration of national emergency and should initiate the call-up of reserves in phases rather than immediately. McNamara believed that the delayed mobilization of reserves would preserve flexibility of action (coupled with the conventional forces buildup) while still sending a message of resolve to the Soviets.56 His concern was that the U.S. signal to the Soviets be sufficiently firm yet not overly provocative, and eventually his argument persuaded Kennedy that delayed reserve mobilization was the best course. 57 Eventually, in August 1961, the Soviets solved their German emigration problem by building the Berlin Wall, but Khrushchev never carried through on his threat to sign a treaty with the East Germans, which would effectively have negated Western rights in West Berlin. Looking back on the summer 1961 Berlin crisis, McNamara became convinced that supplementing the U.S. nuclear deterrent with improved conventional capabilities had sent an effective signal to the Soviets and had led to Khrushchev's backing down from his earlier ultimatum. 58 This belief in the efficacy of manipulating the military context of a superpower confrontation in order to influence the Soviets' behavior would continue to guide McNamara's policy prescriptions in the years to come. It is not really until 1962 that we begin to see McNamara making statements about the world political situation that are broad enough to allow a glimpse of his Cold War worldview. In most of his statements during this period, McNamara laid out what he considered to be the Soviets' strategy for extending their influence in the world, and then he put forth his preferred counterstrategy. In a February 1962 speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, McNamara began by warning of Khrushchev's intention to support and foster "wars of national liberation" throughout the developing world. "What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings, I prefer to describe as subversion and overt aggression. We have learned to recognize the pattern of this attack. It feeds on conditions of poverty and unequal opportunity, and

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it distorts the legitimate aspirations of peoples just beginning to realize the reach of human potential." 59 H e argued that the Soviets had adopted this low-level conflict strategy because they realized that high-level conflict between the superpowers would probably end in general nuclear war. A n d although they wanted to avoid nuclear war, they wished "to keep alive the threat of nuclear war as a means of intimidation, a f o r m of blackmail intended to discourage the free world f r o m resisting Communist encroachment at other levels." 60 Thus we begin to see McNamara's conceptualization of the ladder of escalation that forms the basis of the flexible-response strategy. Having laid out the Soviet military threats that confronted the United States across the spectrum of conflict intensity, McNamara argued directly for flexible response as the proper strategy for dealing with those threats. But it is equally clear that we require a wider range of practical alternatives to meet the kind of military challenges that Khrushchev has announced he has in store for us. Unless the Free World has sufficient forces organized and equipped to deal with these challenges at what appears to be the highest appropriate levels of conflict, we could be put into difficult situations by the communists. In such situations we could lose by default; or we could lose by limiting our response to what appears to be the highest appropriate level—but a level at which we may be inferior; or we could resort to thermonuclear war—the level at which we are superior— but at costs which could be out of proportion to the issues and dangers involved. 61

Here we see McNamara conceptualizing the superpower confrontation as though it were a strategic game-theory scenario, reflecting the influence the game theorists from the R A N D corporation had on his thinking during this period. 62 For him, the proper U.S. response to this strategic escalation and bargaining game was to ensure the ability to respond to Soviet uses of force at the appropriate level of conflict intensity (or on the appropriate rung on the ladder of escalation). For if the United States relied only on nuclear deterrence, it would become vulnerable to "salami slice" tactics, repeated acts of aggression so low on the scale of intensity that a nuclear deterrent against those acts was simply not credible. T h e r e is no need however, for the Free World to be vulnerable to this dangerous Soviet [salami slice] tactic. An adequate level of non-nuclear military strength will provide us with the means to meet a limited challenge with limited forces. We will then be in a

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position of being able to choose, coolly and deliberately, the level and kind of response we feel most appropriate in our own best interests; and both our enemies and friends will know it. 63

Implicit in this argument is the notion that if the United States responded at the proper level of conflict intensity, the Soviets would behave "rationally" and deescalate the conflict. O n e thing that stands out immediately in these statements is McNamara's tendency to focus on the military aspects of the Cold War. This is no doubt partly a function of role constraints. 64 As Pentagon chief, his primary responsibility was defense policy. This focus also makes sense because the military dimensions of the Cold War were one aspect of U.S foreign policy over which he could exert some degree of personal control. There is little evidence that McNamara put much faith in the use of diplomatic negotiations to resolve superpower conflicts. He did seem to think the Soviets could be bargained with, albeit at gunpoint. McNamara did not directly address the question of whether U.S. foreign policy should be guided by a set of overarching moral or geostrategic principles. But his emphasis on maintaining as wide a range of response options as possible suggests that his policy recommendations were not based on such principles. Further, he viewed moral principles as constraining U.S. behavior in the Cold War while not similarly constraining the Soviets or the rest of the communist bloc: To the extent that we deter the Communists from initiating larger wars, we may anticipate even greater efforts on their part in socalled "wars of national liberation." . . . We must face up to the fact that the Communists have a distinct advantage over the democracies in this type of conflict. They are not inhibited by our ethical and moral standards—political assassination, robbery, arson, subversion, bribery are all acceptable means to further their ends. We still have a long way to go in devising and implementing effective countermeasures against these techniques. 6 5

Thus although McNamara considered moral principle to be a factor influencing U.S. foreign policy, it was a negative constraint (putting the United States at a disadvantage in the Cold War) rather than a positive guide for the formulation of that policy (as conceptualized by John Foster Dulles). Up to this point there is no direct evidence (i.e., mythical imagery contained in statements) that his Cold War worldview was influenced by any of the three societal-level myths. However, two elements of McNamara's worldview are consistent with the pragmatic

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myth. His discussion of the merits of flexible-response doctrine with its emphasis on adaptability in the face of Soviet aggression is very much in the spirit of this myth. And the implication that the United States would be more effective in its prosecution of the Cold War if it were unhindered by moral principle does not have to be expanded very far before one arrives at the vulgarized pragmatic dictum that "whatever works is good." MANAGING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The next major confrontation with the Soviets after the 1961 Berlin crisis was the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet attempt to secretly put offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba was discovered by U-2 reconnaissance overflights on October 14, 1962. McNamara first found out about the Cuban missiles the evening of October 15, and working with his Pentagon subordinates, he immediately began making the necessary preparations for U.S. military operations against the missiles. 66 The first meeting with Kennedy to discuss the missiles was held on Tuesday, October 16.67 Initially McNamara argued that the United States should launch a quick airstrike against the missile sites (before the missiles could be made operational), as well as the Cuban airfields, some of which contained Cuban air defense forces and some of which contained Soviet bombers that were capable of carrying nuclear bombs to targets in the southeastern United States. He argued further that the United States should be prepared to follow the comprehensive airstrikes with an invasion of Cuba. 68 Following the Tuesday morning meeting, McNamara spent the afternoon conferring with his subordinates at the Pentagon, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he began to think through the possible consequences of the military actions he had recommended that morning. At lunch he and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, played an informal wargame, going through the likely Soviet responses to possible U.S. military actions against the missiles in Cuba. This exercise convinced McNamara that some form of blockade would be the best initial option because it would not sharply provoke the Soviets and would preserve all other U.S. military options. 69 It also reveals McNamara's continued belief in his ability to manage the most emotionally intense Cold War confrontation by conducting rational and objective analyses of possible escalatory scenarios. At a Tuesday evening meeting, McNamara presented three separate courses of action to the group: a public diplomatic protest of

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the Soviet moves in Cuba (suggested by Rusk in the morning meeting), a comprehensive airstrike followed by an invasion, and a middle course consisting of open, continuous surveillance of the island together with a blockade to prevent further offensive systems from reaching Cuba. 70 He quickly discounted Rusk's diplomatic option because, in his words, it "seemed likely to lead to no satisfactory result, and it almost stops subsequent military action." 71 He disapproved of the diplomatic option because if taken it would (by alerting the Cubans and Soviets to U.S. knowledge of the missiles and giving them a chance to hide or speed up activation of the missiles) preclude taking other more forceful actions later. Having argued against Rusk's diplomatic option, he then warned of the possible consequences of the military attack options (airstrike and invasion): It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of direct military action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type some place in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we should pay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility, and moreover, we must recognize it in a variety of ways. We must recognize it by trying to deter it, which means we probably should alert SAC, probably put on an airborne alert, perhaps take other alert measures. 72

McNamara's argument for increasing the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces is another subtle example of his preference for manipulating the military context of a confrontation in order to influence Soviet behavior. After discussing the escalatory dangers associated with direct military action against the Cuban missiles, McNamara advocated the middle course of intensive aerial surveillance combined with a blockade (to stop additional offensive systems from reaching the island) and an ultimatum to the Soviets stating that any attack on the United States by offensive weapons in Cuba would be treated as an attack by the Soviets and would bring a retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union. 7 3 McNamara had become a strong advocate for the "quarantine" strategy because it preserved maneuveriug room for both the Soviets and the United States. 74 The following Monday night, October 22, President Kennedy announced to the American people the discovery of the missiles in Cuba. He also announced the decision to follow McNamara's strategy, and he passed on the ultimatum to Khrushchev that McNamara had suggested. During the next several days McNamara maintained a very close supervision of the U.S. navy's implementation of the

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quarantine strategy because he was afraid that the navy commanders did not understand the delicate political nature of the operation. 75 McNamara shared Kennedy's concern that the blockade be implemented in as unprovocative a fashion as possible. 76 He wanted to create as many opportunities as possible for the Soviets to act "rationally" and back down without seeming to be humiliated. Much to his dismay, the navy commanders wanted to run the blockade according to long-standing naval regulations, which called for— among other things—drawing the quarantine line hundreds of miles off the Cuban coast (giving the Soviets less decision time) and forcing Soviet submarines to surface. 77 McNamara's micromanagement of the quarantine operations greatly disturbed Chief of Naval Operations George Anderson. After a confrontation with Anderson over the quarantine, McNamara resolved to see that Anderson would not be reappointed as chief of the navy, a resolution he carried through on the following year. 78 The following Sunday, the crisis was resolved as a result of Khrushchev's promise to remove the offending missiles in return for Kennedy's agreement not to invade Cuba (supplemented by a secret agreement for the United States to remove Jupiter missiles in Turkey). McNamara's later statements indicate that he was favorably impressed by the effectiveness of the quarantine strategy with its preservation of escalation options and its nonprovocative approach to the Soviets. 79 His later statements also indicate that the Cuban crisis had a profound effect on his thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war.80 MAKING NUCLEAR STRATEGY

McNamara had initiated a major réévaluation of U.S. nuclear strategy almost immediately on taking office in January 1961. In early February 1961 he had toured the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command near Omaha, Nebraska. There he and a group of his subordinates had been fully briefed on the nation's nuclear war fighting plan, known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). McNamara was greatly dismayed by the plan as the generals presented it to him. 81 Plan 1-A of SIOP called for immediately releasing all of the U.S. nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe in response to an actual (or even merely threatened) Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 82 McNamara was concerned by the inflexibility of

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the plan, which gave the president (and himself as number two in the nuclear chain of command) no choice except to launch a full nuclear strike, killing hundreds of millions of people and ensuring a full retaliatory strike on the United States. 83 This lack of options did not fit with McNamara's belief in the potential for managing and controlling superpower conflict, and he quickly set out to develop a nuclear strategy that had more flexibility. A week later, on February 10, 1961, McNamara was given a briefing by William Kaufmann of the RAND Corporation. Kaufmann presented a new strategic concept he had developed that he called "counterforce/no cities." 84 According to this plan, the United States would limit its initial nuclear strike to military and strategic nuclear targets and withhold a large reserve force that would remain targeted on Soviet population centers. The United States would, in effect, hold the Soviet population hostage and would use the reserve force as leverage with the Soviets to end the hostilities under conditions favorable to the United States. 85 The Kaufmann counterforce concept was based on game-theory research being done by economists and mathematicians at the RAND Corporation. 86 Although McNamara did see some problems with the counterforce strategy, he found that its advantages outweighed its disadvantages. He was impressed with the counterforce approach's flexibility and its allowance for the preservation of options even once a nuclear exchange had begun, thus giving the president more control over any escalating superpower conflict. 87 Immediately after the Kaufmann briefing, he set out to make the counterforce concept the foundation of U.S. nuclear doctrine. 88 In addition to being attracted to the inherent flexibility of the counterforce concept, McNamara thought this approach might limit the destructiveness of a nuclear exchange and even provide a way to bring a nuclear conflict to an end. 8 9 In a January 1962 speech in Chicago, he highlighted the flexibility as well as the damage-limiting and bargaining-leverage aspects of the concept. Our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retaliate with a single massive attack. Or we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon—by threatening further attack. In any case our large reserve of protected firepower would give an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to

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choose among several operational plans but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interest of the United States, our Allies and the rest of the free world. 90

Here again we see a tendency to avoid commitment "with respect to doctrine" that is very consistent with the pragmatic myth. Perhaps more important, the bargaining aspect of the counterforce strategy, called intrawar deterrence by the inventors of escalation and bargaining theory at RAND, was consistent with McNamara's policy preferences in previous situations of superpower confrontation— both the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. 91 In both these situations McNamara sought to manipulate the military context of the confrontation in an effort to make the Soviets "act rationally" and deescalate the conflict. McNamara seems to have thought that U.S. leaders would be able to exert intrawar deterrence to make the Soviets back down in the middle of a nuclear conflict. This assumption of rational behavior on the part of government leaders (Soviet or American) in the midst of a nuclear exchange is indeed a dubious one, but the ability to inject such rationality into conflict situations was something that McNamara seemed to constantly strive for and was consistent with his style of management and his belief in his ability to manage conflict. McNamara continued to promote the counterforce strategy through most of 1962. After the Cuban missile crisis, however, he began to have serious doubts about it. In an interview with Shapley, he indicated that the dramatic events of the Cuban missile crisis made him question his belief that a nuclear exchange could be rationally managed in the way that the counterforce strategy assumed. 92 And as Shapley points out, U.S. public opinion had been reawakened during the crisis to the potential horrors of nuclear war, and therefore it became less politically acceptable for leaders to talk about rationally managing and bargaining within a nuclear exchange. 93 There were other factors that began to sour McNamara on the counterforce strategy. One was that despite his best efforts to promote it to the Soviets as a nonprovocative damage-limitation strategy, they sent signals that they considered it a U.S. effort to achieve first-strike capability. 94 Another development was a July 1962 intelligence review of Soviet nuclear forces that determined the Soviets would have a survivable second-strike capability within two or three years. 95

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This 1962 intelligence finding started McNamara thinking about basing U.S. nuclear doctrine on the principle of mutual and stable deterrence instead of war fighting and damage limitation. 96 Throughout 1963, he began to back away from the counterforce strategy in favor of one that would come to be known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). He commissioned some of the "whiz kids" from the RAND corporation to produce a computer-based quantitative study to determine the force size and structure that would provide a survivable second-strike capability for the United States.97 The study, complete with graphs and computer printouts, showed that a nuclear force of roughly 400 megatons would destroy 50 percent of Soviet industrial capacity and 30 percent of the population. The study's charts showed further that increasing the survivable yield over 400 megatons would not produce appreciable gains in the percentage of Soviet industry and population destroyed. 98 This was the kind of quantitative analysis that McNamara had used to solve problems since his statistical control days with the Army Air Forces, and its logic appealed to him immediately. He went on to use the 400-megaton figure as his basic measure of nuclear sufficiency, and he used the findings of the study as the foundation of his new strategy of mutually assured destruction. 99 McNamara believed that MAD would not only produce a better deterrent posture vis-à-vis the Soviets but also would allow him to hold down requests from the service chiefs for new weapons systems. 100 Thus he was impressed by its economic logic. In spring 1964, McNamara's assistants from RAND produced another quantitative study the economic logic of which would finally destroy damage limitation-counterforce as a viable strategy in McNamara's mind. 101 This new study showed that a damage limitation-counterforce strategy (which would include large-scale antiballistic missile deployment) would simply not be cost-effective in the face of Soviet quantitative and qualitative improvements in offensive forces. The study's graphs illustrated the point that costly U.S. investments in antiballistic missile systems and improvements in counterforce capabilities could be effectively offset by much less costly Soviet offensive improvements. The economic logic of this study was irresistible to McNamara, and he used it to publicly kill counterforce as official U.S. nuclear strategy. 102 Thus the game-theory propositions of one set of whiz kids from RAND had sold McNamara on the counterforce strategy, and the quantitative studies of another set of whiz kids had now given McNamara "objective evidence" that the counterforce strategy was not viable. The graphs of the latest counterforce study showed clearly

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that a counterforce strategy was simply not cost-effective. This is yet another example of McNamara's reliance on the quantitative control methods he had learned at Harvard Business School. It shows that his faith in this quantitative "spotlight on the truth" was as strong as ever. Interestingly, though, even with his conversion to MAD as official U.S. nuclear doctrine, he continued his established pattern of attempting to influence the Soviets by manipulating the military context of the confrontation. Having seized on the concept (which was n o t his invention) of maintaining a stable d e t e r r e n t balance, McNamara set out to send signals to the Soviets that the United States welcomed the establishment of such a balance. In December 1962 (the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis) McNamara had told journalist Stewart Alsop that he would welcome the Soviet development of a survivable second-strike capability "the sooner the better." 103 Although this remark brought down a firestorm of criticism from the right wing in the United States, it may also be seen as a tension-reducing signal to the Soviets. 104 When McNamara elaborated on the logic of mutually assured destruction, he noted with great interest and pleasure the number of copies of the statements that the Soviet embassy in Washington purchased. 1 0 5 MANAGING THE VIETNAM CONFLICT This pattern of policy preferences and behavior may also be found in McNamara's involvement in the decisionmaking that led to the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. His major involvement in Vietnam decisionmaking did not begin until fall 1961, when Kennedy sent General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to Vietnam on a major factfinding mission. Taylor and Rostow returned to Washington in early November 1961 and reported that the situation on the ground in Vietnam was deteriorating due to increasing Vietcong strength. 106 They r e c o m m e n d e d an enlargement of the U.S. advisory role in South Vietnam as well as an increase in U.S. logistical support and the start of U.S. development programs to "win the hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese peasants. 1 0 7 Perhaps most significant, they recommended that 8,000 combat troops be sent to South Vietnam (disguised as flood control workers). 108 In response to the Taylor-Rostow report, McNamara drafted a m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy more or less in support of it: The fall of South Vietnam to communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or the complete accommodation to communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia

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and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient would be extremely serious. . . . The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale.109 He went on to argue that the introduction of a U.S. force of the magnitude of an initial 8,000 men in a flood control context will be of great help to Diem. However it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business. Moreover, it will probably not tip the scales decisively. We would be almost certain to get bogged down in an inconclusive struggle. . . . The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.110 McNamara also wrote that the total U.S. forces needed to accomplish the mission outlined would probably not exceed 205,000. 111 He finished the memo by stating, "We do not believe major units of U.S. forces should be introduced unless we are willing to make an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum. We are inclined to recommend that we do commit the U.S. to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism and that we support this commitment by the necessary military actions. 112 In this m e m o r a n d u m to Kennedy, written on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, and himself, McNamara clearly showed a preference for using military force to influence the behavior of the North Vietnamese (as well as the communist Chinese and the Soviets). 113 He eschewed the policy of sending only 8,000 U.S. troops because that would fail to "convince the other side that we mean business." This approach clearly fits the previously noted pattern of McNamara's policy preferences and behavior in confrontations with the Soviets. He again attempted to modulate the use of U.S. military force in order to persuade the communist adversaries to change their behavior. Kennedy rejected the recommendations of the McNamara m e m o r a n d u m and in fact even rejected sending the 8,000 combat troops that Taylor and Rostow had recommended. He did, however, agree to the increased advisory, logistical support, and development roles that had been r e c o m m e n d e d by the Taylor-Rostow report.

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Thus although Kennedy did not follow the McNamara-JCS-Gilpatric recommendations to commit large numbers of combat troops in 1961, he certainly did not take steps to lessen the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and in fact he expanded it. McNamara set out immediately to implement the steps that Kennedy had authorized. 114 For most of the remainder of Kennedy's term as president, the administration's policy remained one of propping up Diem as the South Vietnamese president while providing him with massive advisory, logistical, and development support and avoiding the introduction of U.S. combat troops. By 1963 there were signs that the repressive and corrupt Diem regime was unable both to maintain civil order and to successfully prosecute the war against the Vietcong. A faction within the State Department led by Averell Harriman began to argue that the United States must force Diem to broaden and reform his government. 1 1 5 Others in the administration including McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk argued that the United States must continue to support Diem militarily, that the war was being won under him, and that there was no alternative to him. 116 McNamara was by far the strongest advocate of staying with Diem. A big reason was that the statistics bubbling up to him through his Vietnam reporting system were telling him that the war was being won. 117 Unfortunately, officers at every level of the reporting system felt pressure to give their superiors what they wanted to hear—news that the war was going well—so that by the time the statistical information made it to McNamara, it had been significantly skewed in an optimistic direction. 118 So while journalists' reports indicated that the South Vietnamese army was corrupt and ineffective in the field and that Vietcong control over the South Vietnamese countryside was expanding, McNamara's statistical indicators (body counts, kill ratios, infiltration rates, etc.) were telling just the opposite story. When members of Harriman's anti-Diem faction argued that Diem was losing the loyalty of the population in the South, McNamara would ask them for percentages (which they were unable to provide). 119 McNamara, meanwhile, could rattle off reams of impressive-sounding statistics to bolster his argument that the war was being won. This is an excellent example of McNamara's epistemological hubris. He argued in meetings as though his statistical control methodology gave him a window on the true conditions in Vietnam. Anyone who did not use statistical information to build policy positions was seen as "epistemologically underprivileged." 120 Feelings of loyalty or disaffection among the peasants could not be

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operationalized into a clean statistical indicator, yet this was the basis of the argument being made by Harriman's anti-Diem faction at the State Department. Its more interpretive arguments were dismissed by McNamara as "poetry." 121 McNamara's epistemological hubris is, again, very consistent with the manager representative character's knowledge-based claims to authority, as discussed in Chapter 2 and by Alasdair MacIntyre. 122 McNamara had learned very early in his career at Ford that he could use quantitative analysis to give himself an epistemologically privileged position that would greatly enhance his power within the bureaucracy. This behavior in the context of Vietnam decisionmaking is merely a continuation of a consistent and significant behavior pattern that is nicely illumined by the representative character concept. In his memoirs, McNamara wrote about his continuing faith in quantitative measurements of war progress even though the reports on Vietnam had been flawed. I always pressed our commanders very hard for estimates of progress—or lack of it. The monitoring of progress—which I still consider a bedrock principle of good management—was very poorly handled in Vietnam. . . . Uncertain how to evaluate progress in a war without battle lines, the military tried to gauge its progress with quantitative measurements such as enemy casualties (which became infamous as body counts), weapons seized, prisoners taken, sorties flown, and so on. We later learned that many of these measures were misleading or erroneous. 1 2 3

This passage provides important evidence indicating that McNamara conceptualized his role in running the U.S. military effort in Vietnam as that of a modern rational manager: He developed a bureaucratic action plan, quantitatively measured the progress of its execution, and then made adjustments if progress was unsatisfactory. In summer 1963 a major Buddhist uprising and an accompanying brutal crackdown by the Diem regime further convinced the Harriman faction that the war against the Vietcong could not be won under Diem's leadership. 124 It began to argue that Washington should begin to think about alternative leadership for South Vietnam. McNamara and others such as Dean Rusk continued to argue that support for Diem (combined with pressures on him to reform) was the proper policy to follow. 125 McNamara argued that there was no viable leadership alternative to Diem in South Vietnam, and therefore U.S. support of a coup against Diem was ill-advised. 126 Eventually the anti-Diem faction in Washington won out, and in

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November 1963 a group of South Vietnamese army officers staged a coup. 127 After the Kennedy assassination and in the aftermath of the Diem overthrow, extremely pessimistic reports began to flow out of Vietnam. 128 In December 1963, President Johnson dispatched McNamara to Vietnam to investigate. 129 In his report to Johnson on his return, McNamara warned that "Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup." H e recommended that the United States redouble its efforts to strengthen the South Vietnamese government and military, but he stopped short of recommending a major increase in the U.S. military presence there. 130 In winter and spring 1964, McNamara and Johnson's other foreign policy advisers were faced with increasing evidence that the Vietcong were gaining strength in the South. In addition to finding ways to strengthen the South Vietnamese government and military against this threat, McNamara and others began to focus on ways to coerce the North Vietnamese government into withdrawing their support of the Vietcong. In late February 1964, McNamara ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to explore actions against North Vietnam. In his memoirs McNamara wrote that these actions were "designed to induce that government to terminate its support and encouragement of the insurrection in South Vietnam." 131 This is another example of McNamara's confidence in his ability to influence the behavior of a communist adversary by carefully modulating the application of U.S. military force. One of the ideas implemented was Operation Plan 34-A, which consisted of low-level covert actions against various North Vietnamese facilities. 132 T h e explicit rationale behind the 34-A operations was to increase the cost to the North Vietnamese of their support for the Vietcong in the hopes that they would discontinue this support. 133 In addition to the covert actions of Plan 34-A, McNamara and others began to plan for the use of bombing strikes as a coercive measure against the North Vietnamese. 134 Returning from a March 1964 fact-finding trip to Vietnam, McNamara wrote a report to Johnson in which he recommended that the Pentagon begin to plan for such coercive airstrikes against the North Vietnamese. In the report, McNamara called for planning to begin on "retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a titfor-tat basis by the GVN [South Vietnamese government] against N V N [North Vietnamese government] targets." H e also recommended that the Pentagon begin planning "graduated overt military pressure by GVN and U.S. forces. This would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets."135 The purpose

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of these attacks, according to McNamara, would be to erode the morale of the Vietcong as well as to persuade the North Vietnamese to stop supporting them. It is important that McNamara was merely recommending that the bombing strikes be planned for and was not yet advising that they be carried out. 136 Nonetheless, these recommendations are significant because Johnson did accept them, and this set in motion the planning of what would become the extensive U.S. air war against North Vietnam. In response to McNamara's recommendation to begin planning a coercive air campaign against North Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up a list of ninety-four North Vietnamese targets of military or industrial importance. McNamara, however, viewed the chiefs' bombing plans as too extensive and dangerous because they might provoke a large-scale North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam or the intervention of Chinese forces. 137 By summer 1964 McNamara was beginning to prefer a carefully controlled and limited air campaign against the North Vietnamese, one that would not risk provoking a larger war, His thinking on this approach was being influenced by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton. 138 McNaughton had been a protégé of Thomas Schelling, a professor of political economy at Harvard who had developed theories of bargaining using the game-theory approach familiar to McNamara's whiz kids from RAND. 139 Schelling had written about using bargaining strategies in war that were similar to the coercive strategy that was the foundation of Kaufmann's counterf o r c e / n o cities nuclear doctrine. 140 McNaughton adapted Schelling's theories to the problem of limited conventional war in Southeast Asia. He argued that carefully controlled and limited bombing strikes could be used to convince the North Vietnamese to stop supporting the Vietcong. The idea was not to destroy North Vietnam with the bombing but rather to gradually increase the level of pain inflicted by the bombing until the North Vietnamese gave in. 141 McNaughton's game theory-inspired bombing plan appealed to McNamara because it seemed to avoid the risk of provoking a larger war with China and because it would seemingly be subject to his control. 142 McNamara and McNaughton both believed that in order to make U.S. strikes less provocative vis-à-vis the Chinese, they would have to be timed so that they would appear to be reprisals for Vietcong or North Vietnamese actions. 143 In early August 1964, U.S. officials declared that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam, assuming it to be part of a Plan 34-A harassment

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operation that had attacked coastal facilities in the area two days earlier. 144 President Johnson ordered the Maddox and another destroyer to return to the same waters two days later, and he ordered U.S. carrier-based aircraft to stand by to b o m b North Vietnamese targets if the destroyers should be attacked again. Johnson' also prepared a request to ask Congress for what would become the infamous Tonkin Gulf Resolution. On the night of August 4, 1964, the two U.S. destroyers came u n d e r what they thought was an attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats. 1 4 5 Despite the ambiguous evidence on the attack, Johnson seized the opportunity to ram through the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and to launch limited reprisal attacks against North Vietnamese targets. 146 T h e air war against North Vietnam had begun. In the m o n t h s following the Tonkin Gulf reprisal raids, McNamara and McNaughton continued to plan for the limited air war, alt h o u g h publicly the subject of Vietnam fell into the b a c k g r o u n d with the November presidential elections coming up. In October, Undersecretary of State George Ball p r o d u c e d a long p a p e r questioning all of the secret plans to involve the U.S. military m o r e deeply in Vietnam. 1 4 7 More significant f r o m McNamara's point of view, Ball argued forcefully that once the United States became militarily involved in the war, it would n o t be able to control its escalation. 1 4 8 Ball questioned the effectiveness of the limited air war. He a r g u e d that the b o m b i n g would n o t improve the morale of the South Vietnamese forces and that, more important, bombing would not significantly lessen the North Vietnamese war-making capability in the South. To bolster his a r g u m e n t h e cited the results of the Pentagon's Sigma II war games showing that the North Vietnamese could fight on even after all of the ninety-four proposed b o m b i n g targets were effectively hit. He argued f u r t h e r that since the bombings would have no military effect, they would also fail to give the United States the type of bargaining leverage that McNaughton and McNamara had planned for. 149 McNamara was disturbed by Ball's m e m o r a n d u m , partly because Ball did not share his belief in the ability of the United States to coerce the North Vietnamese while controlling the escalation of the war a n d partly because he did not share McNamara's assumption that the United States had n o choice but to d e f e n d the South Vietnamese against the communists. McNamara dismissed Ball's arguments, as did Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, arid, most important, President Johnson. 1 5 0 T h r o u g h o u t November and December, J o h n s o n was presented with d i f f e r e n t b o m b i n g plans with McNamara arguing for his coercive escalation b o m b i n g plan and the J o i n t Chiefs arguing for m o r e

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massive bombing attacks.151 During this period, Johnson refused to commit to any sustained-bombing plan. An analysis of McNamara's communications in winter and spring 1965 indicates that he believed the communists had given up on general war as a means of achieving their objectives and the most dangerous communist challenge stemmed from their support of wars of national liberation. He laid out his view of the state of the Cold War in a February 1965 appearance before the House Armed Services Committee. Like their predecessors, the new leaders of the Soviet Union fully appreciate the perils of general nuclear war and the dangers of local wars escalating into nuclear war. I also believe that the leaders of Communist-China, too, are reluctant to challenge the full weight of our military power. But both the Soviet Union and Communist China continue to support "wars of national liberation" or "popular revolts" which we know as covert armed aggression, insurrection and subversion. 152

In this same testimony he elaborated on the threat posed by these wars of national liberation, but he put this threat in the context of an emerging Sino-Soviet split. He argued that the Chinese were trying to establish themselves as the symbolic leaders of the communist world by proving the effectiveness of their model of revolution. A Communist Chinese success in South Vietnam would be claimed as proof positive that the Chinese communist position (vis á vis the Sovie'ts) was correct and they will have made a giant step forward in the struggle for control of the world communist movement. Such a success would also greatly enhance the prestige of Communist China among the non-aligned nations and strengthen the position of their following everywhere. Thus the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to communism. . . . Thus the choice is not simply whether to continue our efforts to keep South Vietnam free and independent but, rather, whether to continue our struggle to halt communist expansion in Asia. If the choice is the latter, as I believe it should be, we will be far better off facing the issue in South Vietnam. 153

With the exception of his acknowledgment of the Sino-Soviet split, McNamara's Cold War worldview was much the same as in his earlier communications. He still viewed the Cold War as mostly a military struggle, and he still viewed wars of national liberation as the most dangerous communist challenge. 154 In late January 1965, McNamara teamed up with National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to persuade Johnson that the deteriorating

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situation in South Vietnam called for decisive U.S. military action. 1 5 5 On January 27, Bundy presented Johnson with a memo in which he and McNamara argued that the time had come to use U.S. military power to force a change in the behavior of the North Vietnamese. 1 5 6 Both of us are now pretty well convinced that our c u r r e n t policy can only lead to disastrous defeat. . . . We are p i n n e d to a policy of first aid to s q u a b b l i n g políticos and passive reaction to events we d o not even try to control. Or so it seems. B o b a n d I believe that the worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role. . . . We see two alternatives. T h e first is to use our military power in the Far East a n d to force a c h a n g e in C o m m u n i s t policy. T h e s e c o n d is to deploy all our resources a l o n g a track of negotiation. . . . B o b a n d I tend to favor the first course, but we believe that both s h o u l d b e carefully s t u d i e d a n d that alternative programs should be a r g u e d out b e f o r e y o u . 1 5 7

In a meeting to discuss the memo with Bundy and McNamara, J o h n s o n told them that he was persuaded and was ready to "move strongly." 1 5 8 Just over a week later, Vietcong forces attacked an American barracks at Pleiku in the Central Highlands, killing eight Americans and wounding sixty more. That same day the National Security Council met and the members unanimously advised Johnson that a reprisal strike should be launched immediately. 1 5 9 The strike that was promptly carried out was code-named Flaming Dart. A subsequent Vietcong attack on a U.S. base at Q u i Nhon was answered by another reprisal bombing operation code-named Flaming Dart II. 1 6 0 The tit-for-tat series of bombing signals to the North Vietnamese that McNamara had envisioned had begun in earnest. Only now, pressure was being generated elsewhere in the national security bureaucracy to widen the airstrikes into more than simply reprisals for specific Vietcong attacks. On returning from a trip to Saigon in early February, McGeorge Bundy wrote a memorandum (partially drafted by John McNaughton) to President Johnson in which he recommended a bombing policy he called "sustained reprisal." 1 6 1 In essence this policy linked reprisal attacks not to specific communist attacks but to the aggregate of communist activity in South Vietnam. 1 6 2 The Bundy memo explained, We are convinced that the political values of reprisal r e q u i r e a continuous operation. Episodic responses g e a r e d on a one-for-one basis to spectacular o u t r a g e s would lack the persuasive f o r c e o f sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it o p e n

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to the communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. . . . It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort. 1 6 3

Although Bundy and McNaughton proposed a significant escalation over the controlled-bombing tactic, they were operating on the same premises about the utility of coercive, signal-sending bombing campaigns that McNamara and McNaughton had adopted in summer 1964. Implicit in the proposed new "sustained reprisal" policy was the assumption that the United States could influence Hanoi to reduce its efforts in South Vietnam by threatening an increase of bomb-induced "pain." In the memo, Bundy noted that the bombing was still a "means of effecting the will of Hanoi." 1 6 4 Bundy's policy of "sustained reprisal," along with a variation developed by Maxwell Taylor called "graduated reprisal," became the basis for the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam known as Rolling Thunder, which President J o h n s o n formally approved on February 13, 1965. T h e operation did not begin until March 2, 1965. After the first round of Rolling Thunder attacks, McNamara indicated that although he was satisfied that the bombing attacks had communicated "our political resolve," he was concerned about their cost effectiveness. 1 6 5 In a memorandum to J o h n s o n recording an April 20 meeting in Hawaii with the Joint Chiefs and the country team from Vietnam, McNamara reflected the consensus among that group that Rolling Thunder and sustained reprisal were correct policy. He wrote that the group agreed that "the present tempo [of bombing attacks] is about right [and] that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation." He also noted that there was a "shared view" among the group "that it was important not to 'kill the hostage' by destroying the NVNese assets inside the Hanoi donut." 1 6 6 This shows McNamara was still firmly convinced of U.S. ability to manipulate Hanoi with a carefully modulated bombing campaign into reducing its efforts in the South. Years later he reiterated his belief at the time that bombing could persuade Hanoi to settle the war on terms favorable to the United States. "I never did believe bombing could win wars. And I didn't believe bombing could stop infiltration or destroy the war-making capacity of North Vietnam. I did not believe it was likely we could win a military victory. I did believe that the military action should be used as a prod towards moving

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towards a political track: to increase the chance of initiating or achieving or movement on the political track." 167 Although McNamara may have believed in the efficacy of coercive bombing in April 1965, by summer of that year he was receiving substantial evidence that the North Vietnamese were not responding to the bombing the way that McNaughton's game theorizing said they should. Reports from Vietnam showed that infiltration rates from the North were increasing fast, and intelligence indicated that the communists were preparing a massive offensive to cut South Vietnam in two. 168 In June McNamara was persuaded by Commander William Westmoreland of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) that only a large-scale commitment of U.S. troops could save South Vietnam from the communists. Westmoreland also convinced him that a sufficiently large American force using an attrition strategy could be effective against the communists. 169 In a July 20 memorandum to President Johnson, McNamara recommended that the United States should deploy 175,000 combat troops into South Vietnam to defend against the communist forces and to persuade them that they could not win in the South. 170 In his memoirs, McNamara emphasized the signal-sending aspects of the recommended troop deployments. "My memo centered on the idea that U.S. and South Vietnamese military strength should be increased 'enough to prove to the VC that they cannot win and thus to turn the tide of the war.' " 171 Here is yet another example of McNamara attempting to influence the behavior of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong by manipulating the military context (in this case increasing the number of U.S. troops on the ground). The purpose of the troop deployment was not to militarily defeat the communists but rather to "send a signal" of U.S. resolve in the hopes of persuading them through coercion to alter their aggressive behavior. This is consistent with the manager character's quasi-experimental, manipulative mode of social action. President Johnson accepted McNamara's recommendation and soon announced that the United States would be sending the requested numbers of combat troops. 172 In addition to the combat troops, McNamara recommended that extensive bombing raids (which included B-52s) be used to support military actions against the communists in the South, and Johnson accepted this recommendation also. 173 McNamara had hoped that these actions would indicate U.S. resolve to the communists and persuade them to deescalate their efforts in South Vietnam, but by fall 1965 he had substantial evidence that the opposite was in fact occurring. Intelligence showed that the North Vietnamese infiltration was increasing

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to match the U.S. buildup. 1 7 4 In a N o v e m b e r 30 m e m o r a n d u m to President J o h n s o n he n o t e d the dramatic increase in c o m m u n i s t force levels in the South and advised that a n o t h e r 200,000 U.S. troops be deployed in order to counter that increase. 1 7 5 In spite of the fact that the North Vietnamese were not deescalating in response to his b o m b i n g campaign and troop deployments, McNamara did n o t give u p o n his efforts to manipulate the military context of the confrontation to persuade the North to "behave rationally." In the November 30 m e m o to J o h n s o n he recomm e n d e d that a b o m b i n g halt of several weeks be attempted to see if the N o r t h Vietnamese would r e s p o n d by slowing down their infiltration of the South: It is my belief that there should be a three or four week pause in the program of bombing of the North before we either greatly increase our troop deployments to VN or intensify our strikes against the North. . . . The reasons for this belief are, first that we must lay a foundation in the mind of the American public and in world opinion for such an enlarged phase of the war, and second we should give NVN a face saving chance to stop the aggression. I am seriously concerned about embarking on a markedly higher level of war in VN without having tried, through a pause, to end the war or at least having made it clear to our people that we did our best to end it. . . . The best chance of achieving our stated objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails, by the deployments mentioned above. 176 In an earlier N o v e m b e r m e m o to J o h n s o n , McNamara had arg u e d that the United States should be prepared to conduct a finely orchestrated combination of military moves, not to defeat the communists militarily, but to persuade the communists that they could not win and that they should negotiate a settlement. H e described this m e m o in his memoirs. After analyzing alternative courses open to us, I recommended: (1) increasing U.S. troop commitments to 350,000 by the end of 1966, compared with the 275,000 Westy [Westmoreland] had estimated in July; (2) implementing a month-long bombing pause . . . and (3) making an all out effort to start negotiations. I recognized that negotiations at that time seemed unlikely to succeed, but I argued a bombing pause "would set the stage for another pause, perhaps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement." If a pause proved fruitless, I recommended intensifying Rolling T h u n d e r strikes against North Vietnam—not to win the war (which I considered impossible short of genocidal destruction) but as one prong of a two prong strategy to prove to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese that they could not win in the South while penalizing Hanoi's continued support of the war. 177

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One cannot help but notice the experimental quality of his thinking here. It is as though he was convinced that the perfect combination of military moves existed that would motivate the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to act as the United States wanted them to act; all he had to do was find that perfect combination. In late December 1965, President Johnson halted the bombing of the North for thirty-seven days. The North Vietnamese responded by dramatically increasing their infiltration of the South during those days, which infuriated Johnson and led him to resume the bombing at prepause levels. 178 After the Christmas bombing pause failed to bring the North Vietnamese around, McNamara began to reassess his strategy of calibrating and modulating the application of military force to alter their behavior. He anticipated that they would greatly increase their infiltration and large-unit actions and again recommended that Johnson authorize an additional 200,000 American troops to counter the communist buildup. 179 However, now McNamara was worried that the spiral of escalation was beginning to work in favor of the North Vietnamese. In a memo to Johnson he shared this fear: Even though the communists would continue to suffer heavily from our ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any U.S. intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test U.S. capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (U.S. killed-in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month). . . . It follows, therefore that the odds are about even that, even with the recommended deployments, we will be faced, in early 1967 with a military standoff at a much higher level. 1 8 0

Yet even though he was beginning to worry that the North Vietnamese might be getting into a position where they could use military force to "test U.S. capabilities and will to persevere," he still clung to the idea that the United States could pressure the communists into negotiations. He concluded his discussion as follows: "This prospect intensified my conviction that the United States needed negotiations leading to a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. I hoped our increased effort would 'condition' [Hanoi] toward [such] negotiations and an acceptable end to the war." (brackets and quotation marks in original). 181 Throughout spring 1966 McNamara was under a great deal of pressure by the Joint Chiefs to expand the bombing campaign in the North to include heavy industrial targets and petroleum-storage facilities. In June McNamara finally came to agree with the Chiefs, and he recommended a major escalation in the bombing campaign. 182

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This more than doubled the number of bombing missions against the North, but the communists merely responded by increasing their activity in the South. McNamara finally began to realize that the bombing could have no effect on the behavior of the North Vietnamese. 183 He was also beginning to realize that the war could not be won, but he would not begin to air these doubts to Johnson until later in 1966. LEAVING THE PENTAGON

When McNamara finally did begin to share his growing doubts about the war with Johnson, the effect was to alienate the president, who did not want to hear bad news about the war effort. By 1966 McNamara had commissioned his chief whiz kid, Alain Enthoven, to run a thorough statistical control analysis on the effectiveness of existing and hypothetical troop deployments to Vietnam. This analysis provided "hard" proof for McNamara that dramatic increases in new troop deployments along the lines of those being requested by Westmoreland would be futile. 1 8 4 McNamara began to see these requested increases in troop deployments (as well as arguments for intensifying the bombing campaign) as not only militarily ineffective but as representing a new phase in the war wherein the U.S. involvement and commitment in Vietnam was beginning to spin out of the control of the policymakers. 185 In May 1967, McNamara presented Johnson with a long memo in which he laid out his arguments against intensifying the bombing campaign and against the deployment of the 200,000 additional troops requested by Westmoreland and the Chiefs. This memo, in which McNamara relayed his concerns that the war was escalating out of control, argued for carefully limiting the bombing of the North, and argued for keeping additional troop deployments under 30,000, had an explosive impact within the top policymaking circles in the Johnson administration. McNamara described this event in his memoirs. "My May 19, 1967 memorandum to the president unleashed a storm of controversy. It intensified already sharp debate within the administration. It led to tense and acrimonious Senate hearings that pitted me against the Joint Chiefs of Staff and generated rumors they intended to resign en masse. It accelerated the process that ultimately drove President Johnson and me apart. And it hastened my departure from the Pentagon." 186 For the remainder of 1967 until McNamara was reassigned to the World Bank, he was virtually alone among Johnson's principal advisers in arguing for deescalation of the war. After that May

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memorandum, he became increasingly alienated from the president. It is deeply ironic that McNamara's estrangement from the inner circle of power should be brought about as a result of his growing fears that the conflict in Vietnam was in danger of escalating beyond his control. His hubristic sense in 1964 and 1965 that the situation in Vietnam could be controlled had helped him to persuade Johnson to Americanize the war. It is not surprising that when, in May 1967, he pointedly argued that the United States should now reverse course, Johnson would begin to question his value as an adviser. CONCLUSION

Analysis of McNamara's Cold War worldview as it evolved during his tenure at the Pentagon turned up no direct evidence (i.e., mythical imagery in statements) that he was influenced by any of the three myths highlighted in this study. However, certain elements of his worldview were remarkably consistent with the pragmatic myth. His early emphasis on adaptability (i.e., flexible response) in Cold War confrontations and his complaints about adherence to moral principle putting the United States at a tactical disadvantage in the Cold War both have a distinct pragmatic myth ring to them. This case study also provides strong role evidence to suggest that McNamara was greatly influenced by the manager representative character. It is clear from examination of his early biography that he was exposed to an educational milieu that shaped him in some very definite ways. At Berkeley in the 1930s, he was heavily affected by the predominant rationalistic and scientistic intellectual currents. According to his own recollections, it was at Berkeley that he first discovered his talent for quantitative analysis and developed tremendous confidence in his reasoning abilities, in effect finding a new identity. At Harvard he was initiated into the field of scientific management and given the tools of statistical control that he would later use to revolutionize both Ford and the Pentagon. By the time he arrived at Ford, he was already showing many of the attributes of the manager representative character. Throughout his career at Ford and at the Pentagon, he manifested an epistemological hubris, an extreme overconfidence in his ability to discern the "facts" of a complex bureaucratic operation and to use these "facts" to manipulate the behavior of the bureaucracy to achieve optimal performance. This manipulation of human and material resources fits the paradigmatic mode of social action

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of the manager representative character perfectly. This mode of social action may also be seen in McNamara^s role conceptions. 1 8 7 Further, his hubristic attitude fits Maclntyre's description of the manager representative character's knowledge- and effectivenessbased claims to authority. 188 McNamara used his mastery of statistical facts and his reputation for managerial "effectiveness" to intimidate people into supporting his positions in policy debates. He was making a claim to authority based on his knowledge and his "effectiveness" in much the way that Maclntyre describes. McNamara came to Washington convinced that the same statistical control techniques he and others had used to centralize and control Ford Motor Company could be used to rationalize the Pentagon and to evaluate the success or failure of U.S. political and military operations abroad. Using these modern business accounting methods, he would simply quantify and measure the resources that the U.S. government was using to achieve its goals (which could also be quantified) and then determine whether these goals were being met in the most efficient manner. If the current approach to the problem wasn't working efficiently, he would simply look for an approach that would work. At the foundation of this technocratic approach to foreign policy making lies an important (although unchallenged at the time) epistemological assumption—that a complex sociopolitical phenomenon (i.e., the guerrilla war in Vietnam) can be intellectually grasped by breaking it down into component material facts or discrete statistical indicators (i.e., rate of infiltration from the North or number of Vietcong killed annually) that can then be quantitatively analyzed like industrial factors of production to yield the proper operational solution (number, types, tactics, and locations of U.S. forces) to achieve the stated goals (e.g., forcing the communists to cease their attacks in South Vietnam). That McNamara consistently operated under this assumption is borne out in his statements over and over again. This leads to another unexamined assumption—that the behavior of the adversary in a confrontation (whether the Soviets, the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, or the Vietcong) can be manipulated by simple modulation of the amount of force being used against it. McNamara's policy preferences and policymaking behavior (from the 1961 Berlin crisis to the escalation of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam in 1965-1966) consistently reflected this belief. Thus this case study provides strong evidence that McNamara's role conceptions, policy preferences, and policymaking behavior were influenced by the manager representative character.

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NOTES 1. For the single best history of the political and decisionmaking process that led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, including McNamara's role, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Penguin Books, 1972). 2. Ibid., 264. 3. Henry Trewhitt, McNamara (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 26. 4. Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 8. 5. Ibid., 8-10. For an excellent discussion of this pattern of twentiethcentury child rearing and motivation, see Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 78-80. 6. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 4. 7. Shapley, 12-15. 8. Ibid., 12-13. 9. Ibid., 13. 10. Ibid., 13. 11. Trewhitt, 32. 12. Shapley, 17. 13. McNamara, 4-6. 14. Ibid., 6. 15. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (South Bend: Notre Dame Press, 1981), 76-78. See also Chapter 2 in this volume. 16. Shapley, 22. 17. Ibid., 23. 18. Ibid., 21. 19. Ibid. 20. Trewhitt, 36. 21. Ibid., 36. 22. Shapley, 30. 23. Shapley, 31-36. 24. Shapley, 31-33. 25. Ibid., 34. 26. Trewhitt, 38-39. 27. Shapley, 37. 28. Halberstam, 281. 29. John A. Byrne, The Whiz Kids: The Founding Fathers of American Business and the Legacy They Left Us (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 88. 30. Trewhitt, 43. 31. Shapley, 47. 32. Trewhitt, 44. 33. Shapley, 47-50. 34. Ibid., 48. 35. Byrne, 248. 36. Ibid., 254. 37. Shapley, 52. For his tendency to alter statistics to support his arguments, see also Byrne, 254. 38. Shapley, 85.

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39. Maclntyre, 77. 40. For excellent discussions of McNamara's debating style see Byrne, 254. See also Shapley, 64-65, a n d Halberstam, 288-289. 41. Charles E. Sumner, ' T h e Managerial Mind," in Robert Manley and Sean Manley, eds. The Age of the Manager (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 153-154. 42. Ibid., 97. 43. William W. K a u f m a n n , The McNamara Strategy (New York: H a r p e r a n d Row, 1964), 69. 44. Shapley, 99. 45. Trewhitt, 86-87. 46. Ibid., 87-88. 47. Quoted in James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1970), 69. 48. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 96. 49. McNamara, 22-23. 50. Ibid., 24. 51. McNamara memorandum to JFK, October 7, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, JFK Library, Boston (hereafter JFK Papers), Department of Defense file, Box 270, 1. 52. Ibid., 2. For a good discussion of the fight over the B-70, see Shapley, 106-107. 53. Shapley, 114-115. 54. Trewhitt, 100-101. 55. Shapley, 117-118. 56. Minutes of National Security Council meeting, July 20, 1961, 3, JFK Papers, national security files, NSC minutes, Box 212. 57. Trewhitt, 102-103. 58. Shapley, 141-144. 59. Robert McNamara, "The Communist Design for World Conquest," reprinted in Vital Speeches 28 (March 1, 1962): 296-299. 60. Ibid., 297. 61. Ibid., 297-298. 62. For a good discussion of the influence of RAND corporation game theorists in the McNamara Pentagon see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), chs. 12-15. 63. McNamara, "Communist Design," 298. See also "Major National Security Problems C o n f r o n t i n g t h e U n i t e d States," speech delivered b e f o r e the Economic Club of New York, November 18, 1963, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin (December 16, 1963): 914-921. 64. In an April 1961 speech to the Associated Press, McNamara disclosed a P e n t a g o n regulation that he e n a c t e d "against statements of foreign policy or foreign affairs by officials of the Defense Department." See "National Defense Policies," r e p r i n t e d in Vital Speeches (May 1961): 452-455. Obviously over time McNamara would come to disregard this gag rule, b u t it is significant that he began his career as secretary of d e f e n s e u n d e r this self-imposed constraint. 65. McNamara testimony b e f o r e the A r m e d Services Committee, February 18-24, reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (February 26, 1965): 313-315.

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66. Shapley, 165-167. 67. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992), 86. 68. Transcript of the first Executive Committee meeting, October 16, 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, 89-91. 69. Shapley, 169-171. 70. Ibid., 169-170. 71. Transcript of the second Executive Committee meeting, October 16, 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, 100-101. 72. Ibid., 101. 73. Shapley, 170-171. 74. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: J . B. Lippincott, 1966), 81. 75. Trewhitt, 106-108. 76. Shapley, 176-178. 77. Ibid., 177. 78. Ibid., 178. 79. Ibid., 180. 80. Ibid., 185. 81. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 270-271. 82. Ibid., 271. 83. Shapley, 139. 84. Kaplan, 260. 85. Ibid. 86. Shapley, 139. For an excellent intellectual history of game theorizing at the RAND corporation and its impact on McNamara era nuclear strategy see Freedman, chs. 12-15. 87. Kaplan, 261-262. 88. Shapley, 140. 89. Ibid., 139. 90. Quoted in Kaufmann, 75. 91. Freedman, 209-210. 92. Shapley, 185. 93. Ibid., 188. 94. Freedman, 238-241. 95. Shapley, 191-192. 96. Ibid., 192. 97. Kaplan, 316-317. 98. Ibid., 317. 99. Shapley, 195. As Shapley points out, in order to rationalize the larger forces that were already in existence, McNamara simply argued that each leg of the strategic nuclear triad should be able to retain at least 400 megatons of retaliatory punch after a Soviet first strike. Thus the 400-megaton figure was actually multiplied by three. 100. Kaplan, 319. 101. Although MAD did replace counterforce as the Pentagon's official public nuclear doctrine, the counterforce strategy remained the guiding principle of the military's nuclear war fighting plan (SIOP) for many years after McNamara's official public adoption of MAD. See Shapley, 201. 102. Kaplan, 320-325.

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103. Shapley, 191. 104. Ibid., 192. 105. F r e e d m a n , 248. 106. Halberstam, 209. 107. Shapley, 133. 108. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, S e n a t o r Gravel edition ( B o s t o n : B e a c o n Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , vol. 2, 107. 109. Ibid., 108. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid., 109. 113. In his Vietnam memoirs, McNamara wrote that he began to have second thoughts about this m e m o to Kennedy within a day or two after he sent it. See McNamara, In Retrospect, 3 8 - 3 9 . 114. Shapley, 133. 115. Abramson, 6 1 2 - 6 1 5 . 116. Shapley, 2 5 6 . 117. Halberstam, 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 . 118. Shapley, 250. 119. Halberstam, 3 1 4 - 3 1 5 . 120. Ibid., 3 1 4 . 121. Ibid., 3 1 5 . 122. Maclntyre, 7 6 - 7 7 . 123. McNamara, In Retrospect, 48. 124. Ibid., 2 5 5 - 2 5 8 . 125. Ibid., 54. 126. M e m o r a n d u m o f c o n f e r e n c e with President Kennedy, August 29, 1963, 1, J F K Papers, national security files, meetings and m e m o s on Vietnam, B o x 316. 127. Abramson, 6 2 4 - 6 2 5 . 128. T h i s was partly a function o f the collapse o f Diem's systematically biased military r e p o r t i n g system. With this r e p o r t i n g system n o l o n g e r in place to artificially " b r i g h t e n " the reports on the military situation in the S o u t h , accurate reports b e g a n to filter back to Washington, showing the true deterioration that had b e e n occurring. See Shapley, 292. 129. Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, 3 0 - 3 1 . 130. Ibid., 31. 131. McNamara, In Retrospect, 111. 132. Halberstam, 4 2 5 - 4 2 6 . 133. Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, 151. 134. Halberstam, 4 2 6 . 135. Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, 503. 136. Ibid., 5 0 4 . 137. Shapley, 301. 138. Ibid., 302. 139. Kaplan, 330. 140. Ibid., 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 . 141. Ibid., 3 3 3 - 3 3 4 . 142. Shapley, 3 0 3 . 143. Ibid.

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144. Ibid., 305. 145. Due to a severe storm, the crews of the destroyers were never able to identify visually any attacking patrol boats; their radar and sonar equipment indicated that they were under torpedo attack. See Shapley, 306-307. 146. Halberstam, 500-503. 147. Ibid., 602-605. 148. Ibid., 604. 149. Shapley, 310-311. 150. Ibid., 313-318. 151. Halberstam, 607. 152. McNamara testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, February 18-24, 1965, reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (February 26, 1965), 313. 153. Ibid. 154. For other communications that contain these same themes see transcript of McNamara press conference, April 26, 1965, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin (May 17, 1965). See also transcript of McNamara testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, January 20-25, 1966, reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (February 26, 1966). 155. Congressional Quarterly (February 26, 1966), 628-629. 156. Shapley, 317. 157. Bundy-McNamara memo to LBJ, quoted in McNamara, In Retrospect, 168-169. 158. Ibid., 319. 159. Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, 302. 160. Ibid., 306. 161. Ibid., 308-311. 162. Ibid., 312-315. 163. Ibid., 313. 164. Ibid. 165. Ibid., 332-333. 166. Ibid., 705-706. 167. Quoted in Shapley, 323. 168. Shapley, 328. 169. Ibid., 338-339. 170. Pentagon Papers, vol. 4, 297. 171. McNamara, In Retrospect, 192. 172. Ibid., 299. 173. Ibid., 340-341. 174. Ibid., 355. 175. Pentagon Papers, vol. 4, 623. 176. Ibid. 177. McNamara, In Retrospect, 219-220. 178. Shapley, 364-365. 179. McNamara, In Retrospect, 236. 180. McNamara memo to Johnson, January 24, 1966, quoted in ibid., 237. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibid., 366-367. 183. Ibid., 367.

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Shapley, 414-415. Ibid., 417-419. McNamara, In Retrospect, 273-274. See McNamara, In Retrospect, 22-24, 203. The managerial knowledge stock discussed by Maclntyre does, consist of lawlike generalizations. See Maclntyre, 76-77.

6 Assessing the Cultural Shaping Process

The city-on-the-hill, market, and pragmatic myths are metaphorical models of U.S. society and have filled important collective identitygenerating and legitimation functions in this society. The Puritan, entrepreneur, pioneer, and manager representative characters have provided idealized identity and behavioral templates that correspond loosely to specific myths. For example, the market myth portrays American society as an idealized grand arena for individual economic competition, and the entrepreneur representative character provides an idealized model for individual behavior in this society. The many symbolic structures that make up what is often portrayed as a monolithic and coherent U.S. culture are extremely complex, as are the relationships among them. This complexity is especially evident among the symbolic structures highlighted in this study. Narratives reflecting the city-on-the-hill, market, and pragmatic myths often contradict each other as to the meaning of the United States and what it means to be an American. The Puritan, entrepreneur, and manager representative characters often provide contradictory templates for individual social behavior. That these symbolic structures infuse the American experience with quite different meanings has important significance for the analyst trying to discern how American culture influences individual policymakers and U.S. foreign policy as a whole. Taken together, the three biographical case studies in this book provide evidence to suggest that the worldviews, self-conceptions, and policymaking behavior of each statesman were significantly shaped by at least one myth or representative character (or a myth-character combination) and that this cultural shaping led in each case to a distinct Cold War outlook and diplomatic or policymaking style. The case studies also generate some other interesting insights and generalizations about the cultural shaping process, and it is to these that we now turn.

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THE MYTH-WORLDVIEW-POLICY NEXUS OF INFLUENCE

The first type of culture-to-policy relationship examined in the case studies was between specific myths and worldviews and between those myth-influenced worldviews and policy preferences and policymaking behavior. In the Dulles and Harriman case studies there was strong evidence of mythical influence and of consistency between worldviews and policy preferences and policymaking behavior. In the McNamara case the evidence of mythical influence was less substantial because of the lack of actual mythical imagery in any of McNamara's statements. However, there was indirect evidence of mythical influence in the form of consistency between some of his beliefs and certain themes of the pragmatic myth. The evidence for a particular myth influencing worldview, policy preferences, and policymaking behavior was strongest in the Dulles case study, particularly with regard to the city-on-the-hill myth. 1 Both philosophically and instrumentally, his beliefs regarding the relationship between morality and diplomacy and regarding the moral nature of the Cold War confrontation were consistent with this myth, and at times his arguments on this issue were justified using city-on-the-hill imagery. His beliefs regarding the most important sources of U.S. power in the Cold War (he emphasized moral and spiritual power resources) and the best strategy for dealing with the Soviets (he believed bargaining and compromise with communists to be immoral) were also consistent with this myth, and his arguments on these matters also contained imagery from the myth on occasion. Dulles's policy preferences and policymaking behavior were significantly consistent with these beliefs. Dulles nearly always opposed efforts to negotiate with the Soviets (as well as the communist Chinese and Vietminh). Sometimes his opposition was overridden by Eisenhower, but other times it was not (i.e., the 1954 Geneva conference). Nonetheless it represented a clear pattern of policy preferences and policy behavior that was consistent with his city-on-the-hill beliefs about the moral nature of Cold War confrontation and the immorality of compromising with the Soviets (or more generally the communists). There was also significant consistency between his city-on-thehill belief in the importance of moral power as a weapon in the Cold War and his frequent quasi-evangelistic efforts in writings and speeches at Alliance meetings (i.e., SEATO, CENTO) to create a spiritual bond within the anticommunist world. Dulles's early policy preferences and policy behavior in support of an active liberation policy aimed at the Eastern European satellites were also consistent

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with this city-on-the-hill-influenced belief a b o u t the potency of moral or spiritual power as a weapon in the Cold War. T h e H a r r i m a n case study provides some evidence of myth-toworldview-to-policy influence, but the evidence is n o t as strong as in the Dulles case study. 2 Although H a r r i m a n ' s Cold War worldview showed slight evidence (in one article) of city-on-the-hill myth influence, the p r e d o m i n a n t imagery was f r o m the m a r k e t myth. In the mid-1950s, H a r r i m a n began to conceptualize the Cold War as a competition between the United States and the Soviets to see who would provide the p r e d o m i n a n t model for social and economic development in the Third World. He thus began to focus on U.S. economic power (in both a material and an ideational sense) as a primary weapon to prevent Soviet (and m o r e generally communist) expansion. In his articles f r o m the mid-1950s a n d into the early 1960s h e began to a r g u e that the U n i t e d States should answer "Khrushchev's challenge" for a competition of development models (although the U n i t e d States would first have to make the Soviets cease their s u p p o r t of wars of national liberation so the m o d e l i n g contest would be f o u g h t on a level playing field). His a r g u m e n t s along these lines were consistent with the m a r k e t myth a n d also contained market myth imagery. T h e r e was also consistency between this m a r k e t myth-influenced belief and his policy preferences and policymaking behavior while working on Indochina policy in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. In both Laos and South Vietnam he argued for U.S.- and Soviet-brokered neutralization settlements that would protect each country f r o m communist insurgencies so that they could choose a d e v e l o p m e n t m o d e l without communist coercion (aided by U.S. bribery in the f o r m of massive d e v e l o p m e n t assistance). Having p e r s u a d e d Kennedy on the merits of this strategy, he actually achieved such a neutralization settlement in Laos, although it was short-lived. He also tried to persuade both Kennedy and later Johnson to follow a similar plan for South Vietnam, but he was unable to do so. T h u s his policy p r e f e r e n c e s and policymaking behavior in this area showed significant consistency with his m a r k e t m y t h i n f l u e n c e d belief in the potential of the American free-enterprise system as a model for development. Each of the Dulles and H a r r i m a n case studies t u r n e d u p imagery f r o m at least two myths in the communications of the policymakers. McNamara's communications contained no imagery f r o m any of the t h r e e myths. Perhaps it makes sense that s o m e o n e who was as driven as McNamara to always remain objective and rational in his analysis would shun a conceptual device as imprecise and

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irrational as myth for explaining or justifying a belief or policy preference. Perhaps he felt that logic and "facts" were sufficient. This would certainly be consistent with his role conceptions and descriptions of his management philosophy and with others' accounts of his intellectual style. There is, however, indirect evidence of myth-to-worldview influence in the form of consistency between some of his beliefs and themes of the pragmatic myth. For example, his prevailing belief in the importance of preserving a wide range of response options in the face of possible Soviet aggression was consistent with the pragmatic myth's theme of American ingenuity and adaptability. Also, his implication that the United States was tactically disadvantaged in its Cold War struggle because of its adherence to moral principles is consistent with the pragmatic adage "whatever works is good." McNamara's belief in adaptability and modulation of military force to promote rational behavior was consistent with his policy preferences and policy behavior. The case study evidence that individual worldviews, policy preferences, and policymaking behavior were influenced by specific myths may be used to construct a heuristic model of this process. In the three biographical case studies (especially in the Dulles and Harriman cases) there is evidence that key beliefs within the policymaker's worldview were colored or shaped by a specific myth. In both the Dulles and Harriman cases, statements of certain key beliefs even contained actual imagery from the city-on-the-hill and market myths, respectively. This suggests that a significant "nexus of influence" existed between specific myths and individual worldviews. This myth-to-worldview nexus of influence makes up the first half of the myth-influence model. The second half of the myth-influence model posits a nexus of influence between the policymaker's worldview and his policy preferences and policymaking behavior. In all three cases (especially those of Dulles and Harriman) there was substantial evidence of stable policy preference and policymaking behavior patterns that were consistent with the highlighted myth-influenced components of the individual's worldview. This myth-to-worldview-to-policy model provides us with a useful heuristic for understanding the process by which myths shape the worldviews and behavior of policymakers. THE REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER NEXUS OF INFLUENCE

The second culture-to-policy relationship examined was that between specific representative characters and self- and role conceptions,

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policy preferences, a n d policymaking behavior. In all t h r e e case studies there were very solid patterns of policy preferences and policymaking behavior that were consistent with the paradigmatic modes of social action of the three representative characters. T h e evidence that individual policy preferences and policy behavior are consistent with the profiles of the representative characters is greatly r e i n f o r c e d by evidence that the individual actually conceived of himself or his role in ways that are consistent with the representative character structures. This was the case in both the Dulles and McNamara case studies; examination of H a r r i m a n ' s communications during his diplomatic career failed to yield such a clear picture. In the Dulles case study the role-conception evidence was very consistent with the moral and epistemological profile of the Puritan representative character. In describing his role as statesman Dulles both conveyed the Puritan's sense of divine annointedness and exhibited the moral and epistemological stances of the Puritan character. H e likened any attempt to make foreign policy without heeding the moral law as revealed by God to trying to make foreign policy "in violation of the laws of physics." Missing f r o m his role conceptions was a description of the paradigmatic m o d e of social action of the Puritan representative character. However, in some communications he did argue that the American people had a duty to spread their moral principles and political ideals in a conversion and mobilization campaign to build u p the free world. This is in essence a collective version of the Puritan's paradigmatic m o d e of social action. Definite patterns in Dulles's policy preferences and policymaking behavior were consistent with his role conceptions. Early in his t e n u r e as secretary of state he argued for a liberation policy that is consistent with the conversion and mobilization process just described. T h r o u g h o u t his t e n u r e as secretary of state he traveled a r o u n d the world and made quasi-evangelistic speeches on building a moral and spiritual b o n d within the anticommunist coalitions. During his wartime involvement with the Federal Council of Churches, Dulles exhibited the same approach to influencing world politics. This behavioral continuity across time a n d across f o r m a l roles provides additional s u p p o r t f o r the viability of the representative character concept. T h e McNamara case study also provides solid evidence of representative character influence. In fact, the self- and role-conception evidence is significantly stronger because t h e r e is m o r e of it. In his memoirs, McNamara reflected on his exposure to the rationalistic a n d scientistic milieu at Berkeley and his discovery of his

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analytical talents as profoundly shaping his identity and also on his role conceptions while secretary of defense. These statements reflect the manager character's paradigmatic mode of social action— quasi-experimental manipulation of bureaucratic resources in an attempt to find the optimal resource mix—and the manager character's myopic moral stance: whatever works is good. Other statements exhibit an epistemological and operational hubris that is consistent with what Alasdair Maclntyre describes as the manager character's knowledge- and effectiveness-based grounds for his claim to authority within the bureaucracy and society.3 There is also remarkable consistency between McNamara's role conceptions and his policy preferences and policymaking behavior. Throughout his tenure as secretary of defense his approach to Cold War confrontations (whether with the Soviets, the Chinese or the North Vietnamese) showed a consistent pattern. His steadfast assumption seemed to be that he could find the exact level or mixture of force application that would cause the adversary to behave "rationally." This is remarkably consistent with the manager representative character's paradigmatic mode of manipulating bureaucratic resources in a attempt to find the optimal mix. Even though the Harriman case study does not provide direct evidence of representative character influence, it does provide some support for the viability of the representative character concept. His worldview, policy preferences, and policymaking behavior throughout his diplomatic career reflected a strong and stable belief in negotiations, and this belief and behavior pattern is consistent with the entrepreneur representative character: competition and negotiation in business deals. The persistence of this belief and behavior pattern across time and formal roles does lend some support to the viability of the representative character concept. Harriman's operating style as a businessman—he had a preference for dealmaking over administration of his extant businesses—was consistent with his "take me to your leader" style of diplomacy. The case study evidence that these individuals' self- and role conceptions, policy preferences, and policymaking behavior were influenced by specific representative character structures allows for the construction of a second heuristic model of the cultural shaping process. This second model posits a "nexus of influence" between a specific representative character and an individual's selfand role conceptions and a further nexus of influence between these conceptions and policy preferences and policymaking behavior. Specifically, this model would lead one to expect to find stable patterns of policy preferences and policymaking behavior that are

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consistent with the individual's representative c h a r a c t e r - i n f l u e n c e d self- a n d r o l e c o n c e p t i o n s . This was certainly t h e case with b o t h Dulles a n d McNamara. This r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r nexus-of-influence m o d e l t h u s s u p p l e m e n t s the myth nexus-of-influence m o d e l as a useful heuristic f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g how societal-level symbolic s t r u c t u r e s s h a p e policymakers a n d thereby policy. From the s t a n d p o i n t of comparative f o r e i g n policy analysis, these two m o d e l s may serve as a u s e f u l starting p o i n t f o r e x p l o r i n g how societal-level symbolic s t r u c t u r e s i n f l u e n c e policymakers a n d policy in o t h e r cultural contexts. CULTURAL ANALYSIS AS A COMPLEMENT TO OTHER APPROACHES This b o o k is n o t an a r g u m e n t f o r cultural d e t e r m i n i s m . Its overriding message is r a t h e r that culture must be c o n s i d e r e d an i m p o r t a n t variable in any analytical f r a m e w o r k t h a t seeks to e x p l a i n f o r e i g n policy behavior. 4 This f r a m e w o r k i n c l u d e s such individual psychological variables as personality a n d cognitive processes as well as such social-psychological variables as small-group dynamics a n d social identity processes. O t h e r i n f l u e n c e s that have to be c o n s i d e r e d f o r any given bit of foreign policy m a k i n g behavior are institutional factors (i.e., b u r e a u c r a t i c politics a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l process), domestic politics, a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l systemic factors. A l t h o u g h this list is certainly n o t exhaustive, it d o e s give an i n d i c a t i o n of j u s t how many d i f f e r e n t influences the analyst must e x a m i n e in o r d e r to provide a c o m p l e t e e x p l a n a t i o n of a given foreign policy behavior. Cultural shaping analysis—the study of socially transmitted symbolic s t r u c t u r e s a n d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e o n policymakers a n d policy— can b e used to c o m p l e m e n t a n d s t r e n g t h e n these o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s to u n d e r s t a n d i n g U.S. foreign policy behavior. This is t h e case particularly with the individual-level a p p r o a c h e s based o n personality or cognitive psychology. Personality a n d cognitive a p p r o a c h e s t e n d to a p p r o a c h h u m a n behavior f r o m a p r o c e d u r a l angle; they f o c u s o n how the policymaker operates. Personality a p p r o a c h e s highlight p a t t e r n s in t h e way t h a t policymakers deal e m o t i o n a l l y with situations or p e o p l e , a n d cognitive a p p r o a c h e s highlight p a t t e r n s in t h e way policymakers process i n f o r m a t i o n . C u l t u r a l analysis can supp l e m e n t these p r o c e d u r a l insights with substantive ones. For e x a m p l e , a personality study may tell us that Woodrow Wilson's c h i l d h o o d relationship with his f a t h e r left h i m u n a b l e to comp r o m i s e with S e n a t e leaders o n t h e Versailles treaty. 5 T h e cultural

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approach may focus on similar aspects of Wilson's childhood in order to explain his crusading style of diplomacy (i.e., examining Wilson's father as a Puritan role model). The difference between the two approaches in this case is largely one of purpose. Whereas the personality analyst will examine Wilson's childhood in order to fully explain his behavior as a unique individual, the cultural analyst will use the representative character concept to explain Wilson as a recurring type of American statesman—the Puritan diplomat. By analyzing Wilson in the light of the Puritan representative character, we can then compare Wilson's identity and behavior patterns with those of other American statesmen (Dulles, for example) to establish shared patterns. Thus the cultural approach allows us to generalize across individuals in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Undertaken together, personality and cultural analyses not only yield a richer explanation of Wilson the individual but also allow us to begin to generalize about a recurring type of U.S. policymaker. Cultural shaping analysis can strengthen a cognitive study by showing the cultural sources of the subject's core beliefs, selfconceptions, and role conceptions, all of which help determine what a given situation means to a subject. Whereas the cognitive approach tells us how the subject's beliefs filter incoming information, cultural shaping analysis—by exploring the cultural roots of those beliefs and of the self- and role conceptions of the policymaker—allows us to determine the extent to which certain beliefs and stable behavior patterns might be shared by other policymakers who were influenced by the same s6cietal-level symbolic structures. Thus in addition to complementing and strengthening other approaches to explaining foreign policy decisions, the cultural shaping approach allows the analyst to identify recurring belief and behavior patterns among policymakers within the same cultural system (e.g., Woodrow Wilson and John Foster Dulles as Puritan diplomats). Establishing such recurring belief and behavior patterns among policymakers with similar cultural backgrounds could even allow analysts to make loose predictions about how "culturally typed" policymakers would react given certain situations. Although the symbolic structures studied here are transmitted throughout U.S. society (and may therefore be considered a societal phenomenon ontologically), the place they exert their influence on policymaking is in the minds of individual statesmen. The three case studies provide strong evidence that the worldviews, selfand role conceptions, policy preferences, and policy behavior of three very important cold warriors were substantially influenced and shaped by different symbolic structures.

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M o r e i m p o r t a n t , they show that it seems to m a t t e r a great deal (for h e l p i n g to u n d e r s t a n d significant p a t t e r n s o f beliefs a n d behavior over t i m e ) exactly which symbolic s t r u c t u r e s p r e d o m i n a t e l y i n f l u e n c e d e a c h policymaker. This is a m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the cultural shaping a p p r o a c h , since ultimately it is individuals who m a k e policy.

NOTES 1. There was market myth imagery in some of Dulles's earlier writings on international relations but no evidence of market myth influence in later communications. 2. Part of the reason is that Harriman did not communicate his beliefs with the frequency that Dulles did. It seems that Dulles poured out his basic beliefs about the world almost every time he had an audience. Also, Harriman never addressed some of the basic philosophical questions (i.e., regarding the relationship between morality and diplomacy). 3. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (South Bend: Notre Dame Press, 1981), 76-77. 4. For an excellent example of such an analytical framework, see Eugene Wittkopf, ed., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 1-10. 5. For the personality argument on the Versailles episode, see Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: Dover, 1956).

Selected Bibliography BOOKS Abel, Elie. The Missile Crisis. New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1966. Abramson, Rudy. Spanning the Century: The Life and Times of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986. New York: William Morrow, 1992. Alexander, Jeffrey, ed. Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Ambrose, Stephen. Eisenhower: The President and Elder Statesman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Baker, Ray S., and Dodd, William E., eds. The Public Papers ofWoodrow Wilson, 1917-1924. 2 vols. New York: Harper, 1927. Baldwin, L. D. The Meaning of America: Essays Toward and Understanding of the American Spirit. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976. Baritz, Loren. City on a Hill: A History of Ideas and Myths in America. New York: John Wiley, 1964. . Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did. New York: Morrow, 1985. Bellah, Robert. Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a PostTraditional World. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. . The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in a Time of Trial. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Bellah, Robert, Madsen, Richard, Sullivan, William, Swidler, Ann, and Tipton, Steven. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Berger, Peter, and Luckmann, Thomas. The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Press, 1966. Boorstin, Daniel. The Genius of American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power: United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Burns, Edward M. The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957. Byrne, John A. The Whiz Kids: The Founding Fathers of American Business and the Legacy They Left Us. New York: Doubleday, 1993. Chang, Laurence, and Kornbluh, Peter. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader. New York: New Press, 1992. Commager, Henry S. The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. 2 vols. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 197

198

Bibliography

Dewey, John. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1920. . Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt, 1922. Diggins, John. The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernity and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Dreiser, Theodore. The Financier. New York: Harper, 1912. Drucker, Peter. The Effective Executive. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Dulles, John F. War, Peace, and Change. New York: Harper, 1939. Durkheim, Emile. The Rules of the Sociological Method, 8th ed. Translated by Sarah Solajay and John Meuller. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1966. . Sociology and Philosophy. Translated by D. F. Pocock. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953. . The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Collier Books, 1961. Eisenhower, DwightD. Waging Peace. New York: Doubleday, 1965. Ewing, David. The Managerial Mind. New York: Free Press, 1962. Franklin, Benjamin. The Autobiography and Other Writings. New York: Penguin Books, 1986. Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973. George, Alexander, and George, Juliette. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York: Dover, 1956. Greenstein, Fred. The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. New York: Basic Books, 1982. Guhin, Michael. John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Haber, Samuel. Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972. Hall, Michael. The Life of Increase Mather. Middleton: Wesleyan University Press, 1984. Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John. The Federalist Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. Harriman, W. Averell, and Abel, Elie. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin: 1941-1946. New York: Random House, 1975. Hawthorne, Nathaniel. The Scarlet Letter. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978. Hillsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration ofJohn F. Kennedy. New York: Dell Books, 1968. Hofstadler, Richard. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973. Howells, W. D. The Rise and Fall of Silas Lapham. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1971. Hughes, Emmett J. The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years. New York: Atheneum, 1963. Hunt, Michael. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. Huntington, Samuel. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. Isaacson, Walter, and Thomas, Evan. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

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James, William. The Will to Believe. New York: Longmans, Green, 1896. . A Pluralistic Universe. New York: Longmans, Green, 1909. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Johnson, Thomas, and Miller, Perry, eds. The Puritans. New York: Harper and Row, 1938. Kaplan, Fred. The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Kaufmann, William. The McNamara Strategy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Kennan, George. Memoirs: 1925-1950. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Kroeber, A. L., and Kluckhohn, Clyde. Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. New York: Random House, 1952. Leites, Nathan. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw Hill, 1951. Lerner, Max. America as a Civilization. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957. Maclntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981. May, Ernest, and Neustadt, Richard. Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Makers. New York: Free Press, 1986. Maurer, Herrymon. Great Enterprise: Growth and Behavior of the Big Corporation. New York: Macmillan, 1955. McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. McNamara, Robert. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. . In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995. Mercer, Lloyd. E. H. Harriman: Master Railroader. Boston: Twayne Books, 1985. Miller, Perry. Errand in the Wilderness. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. . The Life of the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965. Morgan, Edmond. The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States ' Decisionmaking in Vietnam. Senator Gravel edition, 5 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. Perry, Ralph B. Puritanism and Democracy. New York: Vanguard Press, 1944. Pruessen, Ronald, fohn Foster Dulles: The Road to Power. New York: Free Press, 1973. Randle, Robert F. Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War. Princeton:,Princeton University Press, 1969. Richardson, J . D., ed. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents: 1789-1902. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1903. Rischen, Moses, ed. The American Gospel of Success. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1965. Robertson, James O. American Myth, American Reality. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980. Roherty, James M. The Decisions of Robert McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970.

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Rosati, J e r e l . The Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Fort Worth: H a r c o u r t Brace, 1993. Schlesinger, A r t h u r Jr. The Cycles of American History. New York: H o u g h t o n Mifflin, 1986. Shapley, D e b o r a h . Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993. Smelser, Neil. Karl Marx on Society and Social Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. Starr, Harvey. Henry Kissinger: Perceptions of International Politics. L e x i n g t o n : University of Kentucky Press, 1984. Toulouse, Mark. The Transformation ofJohn Foster Dulles: From Prophet of Realism to Priest of Nationalism. Macon, GA: M e r c e r University Press, 1985. Tudor, Henry. Political Myth. New York: Praeger, 1972. Trewhitt, Henry. McNamara. New York: H a r p e r a n d Row, 1971. Van Dusen, H e n r y , ed. The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles: Selections from His Articles and Addresses. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960. Williams, William A. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: Dell, 1959. . The Contours of American History. Chicago: University of C h i c a g o Press, 1966. Weber, Max. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: F r e e Press, 1949. . The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: C h a r l e s Scribner's Sons, 1958. Welter, Rush. The Mind of America: 1820-1860. New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1975. Wuthnow, Robert. Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Wyllie, Irvin. The Self Made Man in America: The Myth of Rags to Riches. New York: Free Press, 1954. Yergin, Daniel. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: H o u g h t o n Mifflin, 1977. ARTICLES Dulles, J o h n F. "The Allied War Debts." Foreign Affairs 1 ( S e p t e m b e r 15, 1922): 115-132. . " T h e Road to Peace." Atlantic Monthly 156 ( O c t o b e r 1935): 492-499. Forbes, B. C. "New Business Star: H a r r i m a n II." Forbes ( O c t o b e r 30, 1920): 5-15. G e o r g e , Alexander. "The O p e r a t i o n a l Code: A Neglected A p p r o a c h to the Study of Political L e a d e r s a n d Decision Making." International Studies Quarterly 23 (1969): 190-222. Glad, Betty. "Black a n d White T h i n k i n g : Ronald R e a g a n ' s A p p r o a c h to Foreign Policy." Political Psychology 4, 1 (1983). H a l b e r s t a m , David. "Dead W r o n g " (Review of R o b e r t M c N a m a r a , In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam). Los Angeles Times, Book Review Section, April 14, 1995. H a r r i m a n , W. Averell. "Our P r i m a r y Task: A H e a l t h y Economy." Commercial and Financial Chronicle (May 8, 1947): 5 - 4 1 .

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. "U.S. Task in P r o m o t i n g World Peace." Commercial and Financial Chronicle (August 28, 1947): 31-33. . "Leadership in World Affairs." Foreign Affairs (July 1954): 525-539. . "Danger Unrecognized: T h e Soviet Challenge a n d American Policy." Atlantic Monthly (April 1956): 42-47. . "My Alarming Interview with Krushchev." Life Magazine (July 1959) : 14-18. . "The United States a n d the Far East." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 342 (July 1962): 90-95. Iden, V. G. "W. A. H a r r i m a n Seeks a n d Wins Front Rank in Marine Field." Marine Review (March 1921): 119-125. Loving, Rush. "W. Averell H a r r i m a n Remembers Life with Father." Fortune (May 8, 1978): 197-201. Walker, S t e p h e n . "The Evolution of O p e r a t i o n a l Code Analysis." Political Psychology 11, 2 (1990): 403-418. ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS Defense D e p a r t m e n t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e of R o b e r t McNamara. J o h n F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA. J o h n Foster Dulles Papers. Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. W. Averell H a r r i m a n Papers. Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Index AAF. See Army Air Forces A b r a m s o n , Rudy, 94, 101, 115, 137-143, 183, 197 A c h e s o n , Dean, 93, 119, 154, 155 Agronsky, Martin, 85, 86, 91 Ambrose, S t e p h e n , 86, 197 A m e r i c a n Creed, 18 A n d e r s o n , Admiral George, 160 Army Air Forces (AAF), 148-151, 163 A r n o l d , G e n e r a l H a p , 148 AVCO. See Aviation C o r p o r a t i o n of America Averell, Mary Williamson. See Mary Averell H a r r i m a n Averell, William J. ( H a r r i m a n ' s m a t e r n a l g r a n d f a t h e r ) , 93 Aviation C o r p o r a t i o n of America, 99, 114 Austrian State Treaty (1955), 76-78, 122 B a g h d a d Pact 82, 91. See also Central Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n Baldwin, Leland, 33 Baritz, L o r e n , 7, 11, 46, 47, 197 Beaverbrook, L o r d William, 103; c o m p e t i t i o n with Averell H a r r i m a n , 104 Bellah, Robert, 4 - 6 , 8, 10, 11, 14, 45-49, 198; o n culture a n d religion, 4, 5, 15, 20, 30, 31, 181; o n representative characters, 8, 14-16, 28, 30, 40; o n symbolic realism, 4, 5 Benedict, Ruth, 2 Berger, Peter, 4 - 6 , 11, 18, 46, 198 Bergson, H e n r i , 52 Berlin C o n f e r e n c e of Foreign Ministers (1954), 73, 77, 103

Beveridge, Albert, 22-24, 47 Bohlen, Charles, 93 Boorstin, Daniel, 35, 49 Brown, Seyom, 118, 143, 197 Bundy, McGeorge, 134, 135, 143 Burns, Edward McNall, 22, 30, 47, 48, 197 Byrne, J o h n , 150, 180, 181, 197 Carter, Jimmy, 93 C E N T O . See Central Treaty Organization Central Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n ( C E N T O ) , 82, 83, 188. See also B a g h d a d Pact C h i n a Lobby, 74 China, P e o p l e ' s Republic of, 73-74, 79, 123-124, 127, 134, 149, 160, 169, 171 Churchill, Winston: a n d Averell H a r r i m a n , 102-106, 109, 137, 198; a n d J o s e p h Stalin, 104-105, 137, 198 city-on-the-hill myth, 7 - 9 , 13, 18, 23, 27-28, 44, 127; a n d Albert Beveridge, 22, 24; a n d Dulles, 9, 54-55, 57, 60-62, 64-72, 81-86, 188-190; a n d H a r r i m a n , 116, 127, 189, 190; a n d H e r m a n Melville, 22; origins of, 15, 19-24, 46-47, 197; a n d P u r i t a n representative character, 7, 8, 14, 24-25, 187; a n d Woodrow Wilson, 22-24; a n d J o h n W i n t h r o p , 15, 19, 25 Clark-Kerr, Sir Archibald, 109, 111, 140 Clifford, Clark, 135 cognitive psychology, 1, 10, 44, 193, 200, 201

203

204

Index

collective identity, 8, 13, 17-19, 27, 36-38, 187; a n d Dulles, 84, 191; a n d H a r r i m a n , 116-117, 136. See also collective representations; myth; and specific myths collective representations, 8, 13, 14, 45. See also collective identity; D ü r k h e i m ; myth Cooper, J a m e s F e n i m o r e , 39, 49 Commager, H e n r y Steele, 38, 49, 197 Commission o n a J u s t a n d Durable Peace, 58-61, 88. See also Federal Council of C h u r c h e s c o n t a i n m e n t policy: Dulles's criticisms of, 68, 70, 89; a n d H a r r i m a n , 115, 120, 121 c o u n t e r f o r c e / n o cities strategy, 161-165, 169, 182 Cowperwood, Frank, 33, 34 C u b a n missile crisis, 158-160, 162, 182, 197 cultural d e t e r m i n i s m , 193 cultural s h a p i n g analysis/process, 1 - 2 , 7 - 1 0 , 14-15, 187, 191-194; a n d Dulles, 9, 51, 188-189; generalizing f r o m , 8 - 1 0 , 14-15, 194; a n d H a r r i m a n , 9, 93, 189; a n d McNamara, 9, 189-190; a n d o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s , 1, 45, 193, 194; types of policymakers, 9, 15, 16 culture, 1 - 2 4 , 28, 40-41, 45, 187-195; definitions of, 1 - 6 , 10; as myths, 2, 6 - 9 , 13-14, 17, 187-188; a n d religion, 2-7, 15, 17-19; as representative characters, 8 - 9 , 13-16, 44, 194; as a system of m e a n i n g , 2-6, 1 3 - 14, 17, 187-188; a n d U.S. foreign policy, 1, 7-10, 12, 15-16, 188, 193-195; a n d U.S. history, 17-24, 28, 30-31, 38 D e p a r t m e n t of Defense, 145, 152-153, 181, 183, 199, 201. See also P e n t a g o n Dewey, J o h n , 38, 49, 197 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 130-132, 165-168, 183 Dien Bien P h u , 74 Dimmesdale, Arthur, 26

Dos Passos, J o h n , 41-42, 50 Dreiser, T h e o d o r e , 31, 33-34, 48-49 Dulles, Allen Macy (father), 51, 58 Dulles, Edith Foster ( m o t h e r ) , 52, 58 Dulles, J o h n Foster, 9, 11, 51-91, 188-191, 193-195, 198-201; a n d America's divine mission, 60-62, 64-65, 69-70, 72, 75-76, 79-81, 84-86; c h i l d h o o d , 51-52; a n d city-on-the-hill myth, 54—55, 59-60, 62-66, 69-72, 81-83, 86; a n d Commission o n a Just a n d Durable Peace, 58-61; Cold War worldview d e v e l o p m e n t , 62-71; o n constructive Soviet relationship, 63; criticism of c o n t a i n m e n t policy, 68, 70, 121-122; crusading style, 53, 59-60, 125, 130-131, 157; a n d c u r r e n c y controls, 53-55; a n d d a n g e r in negotiating with communists, 67-68, 72-79, 83; e c o n o m i c focus of writings, 53-57, 61; a n d Eisenhower campaign, 68; a n d Federal Council of C h u r c h e s , 58-60, 70, 80, 82-84; a n d f o r e i g n minister councils, 62; a n d Geneva C o n f e r e n c e (1954), 72-75, 83-84, 131; a n d Geneva S u m m i t (1955), 76-78, 83; o n g o v e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e in market, 54, 56-57; at H a g u e C o n f e r e n c e (1907), 52; a n d J a p a n e s e Peace Treaty (1950), 62; a n d Kellogg-Briand Pact, 55; o n League of Nations, 55; o n liberal e c o n o m i c order, 53-54; a n d liberation policy, 61, 69, 72, 77; m a r k e t myth i n f l u e n c e u p o n , 53-56, 62, 77-78; a n d massive retaliation, 69-70; a n d morality a n d statesmanship, 55, 58-9, 62, 66, 74, 79-81, 84; o n morality a n d U.S. policies, 58-59, 61, 64-66, 77, 79, 81; a n d morality versus national interest, 57, 60-62, 65-66; moral n a t u r e of Cold War, 62-63, 69-70, 74,

Index 76-77, 80-82; a n d the Monroe Doctrine, 65; opposing Eisenhower's overtures to the USSR, 71-72, 76-77; philosophical focus, 52, 54, 66-67, 70, 83; at Princeton, 52; a n d Puritan representative character, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69-72, 79, 82-86, 191, 194, 199; on the religious needs of the world, 57-59, 61, 65; religious strains in worldview, 52, 55, 57-61, 65-66, 71, 80, 83-85; religious writings, 52, 58-60, 70; a n d religious upbringing, 51-52, 58; and reparations, 53; a n d role conceptions, 84-85; a n d role consistency, 84; status q u o versus dynamism, 54-56, 61, 69-70; on structuring international relations, 53-55, 57-61; at Sullivan and Cromwell, 53; theory of international relations, 53-56, 58-59, 61, 70, 80; and trade barriers, 53-55, 77; and UN, 59-60, 62, 65; War, Peace, and Change, 55-57, 58, 70; and western alliance, 80-83; and Woodrow Wilson, 52-53; and Versailles Conference (1919), 53 Durkhiem, Emile, 3-5, 10-11, 14, 197, 198; on culture, 3, 5, 13; on myth, 13-14, 45; on religion, 3, 45, 198 Economic Cooperation Administration, 118 efficiency expert, 41-42, 44 Eisenhower, Dwight, 89, 121, 123, 197-198; and Dulles, 51, 68, 71-79, 86, 121-122, 124, 188; and the Geneva Conference (1954), 75, 83-84, 90; a n d the Geneva Summit (1955), 76-78, 90; m a n a g e m e n t style, 51, 86; and the "missile gap," 152; and Stalin's death, 71; and World War II, 104 e n t r e p r e n e u r representative character, 8, 24; and Robert Bellah, 15-16, 30-31; and

205

T h e o d o r e Dreiser, 33-34; and Averell H a r r i m a n , 9, 94-100, 114, 130, 135-137, 192; a n d E. H. Harriman, 93-97, 100, 136; and Max Lerner, 31; and the market myth, 9, 13, 16, 18, 30-32, 34, 44, 187; profile of, 16, 18, 30-34, 40; a n d social Darwinism, 16, 32-34 Ewing, David, 44, 50, 198 Federal Council of Churches, 58, 60, 70, 80, 82-84, 191. See also Commission on a Just a n d Durable Peace Federalist Papers, 35, 49, 198 Ford Motor Company, 42, 145, 149-153, 167, 178-179 Foster, J o h n Watson (Dulles's grandfather), 52 Franklin, Benjamin, 28-29, 48, 198 Freedman, Lawrence, 181-183 French and Indian War, 20 Geertz, Clifford, 4, 6-7, 11, 17, 46, 198 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina (1954), 72-76, 78, 83-84, 90, 131, 188, 199; a n d Vietnam War, 129 Geneva Summit (1955), 76-78, 83, 90 George, Alexander, 10, 27, 47, 195, 198, 200 George, Juliette, 10, 27, 47, 195, 198 Gilpatric, Roswell, 158, 165-166 Great Awakening of 1740, 20-21, 25 Greenstein, Fred, 86, 198 Guhin, Michael, 90, 198 Haber, Samuel, 42, 50, 198 Hague Conference (1907), 52 Halberstam, David, 143, 145, 180-181, 183-184, 198, 200 halfway covenant, 20. See also Great Awakening of 1740 Hamilton, Alexander, 35-36, 49, 198 H a r r i m a n , Averell, 9, 93-143, 191, 195, 197-198, 200-201; as ambassador-at-large, 123, 133; as

206

Index

ambassador to L o n d o n , 115; as ambassador to Moscow, 105, 137; o n American capitalism's u n i q u e n e s s , 116-118, 127; a n d American Ship a n d C o m m e r c e C o r p o r a t i o n , 98; a n d American Steamship Company, 98; as assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 125; a n d Aviation C o r p o r a t i o n of America, 99, 114; b u r e a u c r a t i c style, 105-106, 114, 132, 136; a n d Beaverbrook, 103-104; Brown Brothers, H a r r i m a n , 99; o n "carrot a n d stick," 108, 133-134; c h i l d h o o d , 93-96, 136; Churchill, 102-106; Cold War a n d best use of U.S. power, 122, 130; Cold War worldview d e v e l o p m e n t , 111-113, 115, 119-120, 122, 131, 136; as c o m m e r c e secretary, 115; competitive business style, 95, 98-99, 103-104, 132, 136; consistent advocate of negotiation, 107-108, 110, 113-114, 129-130, 135; consistent e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l characteristics, 97-100, 106, 117, 131, 136-137, 141; a n d E. L. Cord, 99; a n d crew team, 96; o n cultivating Soviet trust, 106-107; critic of Eisenhower-Dulles policies, 121-122, 130-131; as d e f e n s e e x p e d i t e r to Britain, 102-103; o n d e t e r i o r a t i o n of U.S.-Soviet relations, 111-113, 115; o n Ngo D i n h Diem, 130-132; a n d Economic Cooperation Administration, 118; o n e c o n o m i c leverage, 108, 113, 134; a n d e n t r e p r e n e u r representative character, 95-96, 98-99, 114; f a t h e r ' s influence, 93-98, 136; Georgian m a n g a n e s e v e n t u r e , 99; as G o v e r n o r of New York, 120-121; at G r o t o n School, 96; a n d H a r r i m a n Brothers Banks, 99; a n d Khrushchev, 123, 125-126, 128, 142; a n d L y n d o n B . J o h n s o n , 93, 132-135, 143; a n d m a r k e t myth, 94-96, 98-99,

115-118, 127-128, 131, 136, 138, 141; a n d m a r k e t spread to T h i r d World, 116-118, 120, 122, 126-127, 136; a n d Marshall Plan, 115, 118; a n d Mutual Security Administration, 119; a n d National Recovery Administration, 101-102; negotiating f o r Poland, 109-111; negotiating f o r shuttlebombings, 108, 110; negotiating for U.S. A i r m e n , 108, 111; negotiating o n Laos, 123-125, 128-129, 137, 142; negotiating test b a n , 125-126; o n negotiating with Soviets, 110, 112-114, 130; a n d New Deal 100-101; at Paris peace talks, 135-136; presidential bid (1952), 120-121; o n the responsibilities of wealth, 95-96, 98-100; o n Sino-Soviet split, 126, 133-134; Southeast Asia strategy, 121; Soviet expansionism, 109-110, 112-113, 119, 126; Soviet power analysis, 120, 141; a n d Stalin, 103-111, 113, 115, 122; a n d Sun Valley Ski Resort, 100; a n d T e h e r a n C o n f e r e n c e (1943), 106; a n d T r u m a n , 114-115, 118-120; as u n d e r s e c r e t a r y of state for political affairs, 125, 131; at U n i o n Pacific, 97, 99-100; against a Vietnamese military solution, 128-137, 142-143; o n V i e t n a m ' s neutralization, 129-131; a n d W. A. H a r r i m a n a n d Company, 98-99; a n d Warsaw uprising, 109; as Wise Men m e m b e r , 93; world bully theory, 110, 140-141; World War I shipbuilding, 97-98; at Yale, 96-97, 139; Yalta C o n f e r e n c e (1945), 111 H a r r i m a n , E. H. (father), 29, 93-98, 100, 106, 136-138, 199; competitive style, 95-96, 98, 100; d e a t h of, 96; a n d m a r k e t myth parallels, 95-96; a n d responsibilities of wealth, 95-96, 98, 100 H a r r i m a n , Kitty (first wife), 97

Index

H a r r i m a n , Mary Averell ( m o t h e r ) , 93, 96 Harriman, Orlando (grandfather), 92-93, 95 H a r r i m a n , R o l a n d ( b r o t h e r ) , 96, 99 H a r r i m a n , W. Averell. See H a r r i m a n , Averell H a t c h , N a t h a n , 20, 4 6 - 4 7 Hawley, C a m e r o n , 43, 50 H a w t h o r n e , Nathaniel, 26, 47, 198 H e r r i n g , G e o r g e C., 90 Hill, J a m e s J., 31, 9 4 - 9 5 Hilsman, Roger, 132, 143 Hitch, Charles, 152 H o o p e s , Townsend, 11, 71-75, 87, 89-90, 198 Hopkins, Harry, 102, 105-106, 135 Howells, W. D„ 31-32, 34, 48, 198 H u g h e s , J o h n E m m e t t , 71, 89, 198 Hull, Cordell, 107, 139-140 H u n t , Michael, 7, 11, 198 H u n t i n g t o n , Samuel, 18, 46, 198 identity g a p in early U.S., 17-18 Irving, Washington, 39, 49 Isaacson, Walter, 93, 96, 137-138, 198

207

K a u f m a n n , William, 161, 169, 181-182, 199 K e n n a n , George, 124, 141, 199 Kennedy, J o h n F., 143, 198; assassination of, 132, 168; a n d Berlin crisis, 154—155; a n d C u b a n missile crisis, 158-160; a n d H a r r i m a n , 123-126, 129-132, 134, 136-137, 142-143, 189; a n d Khrushchev, 123, 125, 154-155, 159; a n d Laotian crisis, 123-124, 129, 142, 189; a n d limited test b a n treaty, 125; a n d McNamara, 132, 145-146, 151-161, 164-166, 181, 183, 201; a n d Vietnam, 129-132, 134, 142, 164-166, 168, 183, 189 Khrushchev, Nikita, 123, 156; a n d the C u b a n missile crisis, 159-160; a n d H a r r i m a n , 123, 125-126, 128, 142, 189; a n d Kennedy, 123, 125, 154-155, 159 K l u c k h o h n , Clyde, 10, 199 Kosygin, Aleksey, 135 Kroeber, A. L„ 2, 10, 199

Jackson, Andrew, 37 James, William, 38, 49, 199 J e f f e r s o n , T h o m a s , 36 Jervis, Robert, 10, 199 J o h n s o n , G e n e r a l H u g h , 101 J o h n s o n , Louis, 119 J o h n s o n , L y n d o n B.: a n d Averell H a r r i m a n , 93, 131-137, 143, 189; a n d Kennedy's d e a t h , 132; a n d R o b e r t M c N a m a r a , 145-146, 150, 168-178, 184; a n d O p e r a t i o n Rolling T h u n d e r , 172-173, 176-177; a n d D e a n Rusk, 132-133, 135; a n d Sino-Soviet split, 133-134; a n d Vietnam, 93, 133-135, 168-178, 189 J o h n s o n , T h o m a s , 24, 47, 199

Laniel, J o s e p h , 7 3 - 7 4 Laotian crisis: a n d Dulles, 75-76, 124; a n d H a r r i m a n , 123-125, 128-129, 137, 142, 189; a n d neutralist solution, 124- 125, 128-129, 137, 142, 189 L a p h a m , Silas, 31-32, 34, 48, 95, 198. See also W. D. Howells Le, Kong, 124 Lerner, Max, 31, 48, 199 liberation policy, 69, 72, 78, 188, 191 L i p p m a n n , Walter, 133 Lloyd, Selwyn, 79 Lloyd George, David, 27 Lodge, H e n r y Cabot, 132 Lovett, Robert, 93 Loving, Rush, Jr., 93 L u c k m a n n , T h o m a s , 4—6, 11, 18, 46, 197

Kagan, R o b e r t , 86 Kaplan, Fred, 182-183, 199 Kattenburg, Paul, 132 Katz, Milton, 133

MacArthur, G e n e r a l Douglas, 119 Maclntyre, Alasdair, 11, 14-15, 40-41, 43, 45, 49, 147, 151, 167, 179-181, 183, 185

208

Index

Malenkov, Georgi, 71 m a n a g e r representative character, 9, 24; a n d R o b e r t Bellah, 15-16, 40; d e v e l o p m e n t f r o m the pioneer, 39-40; a n d J o h n Dos Passos, 41-42; a n d C a m e r o n Hawley, 43; a n d Alasdair Maclntyre, 40-41, 43, 147, 151, 167, 179, 185; a n d McNamara, 9, 44, 145-148, 150-154, 167, 174, 178-179, 191-192; m o r a l fiction of, 16, 40-42, 44, 154, 167 178-179, 192; a n d pragmatic myth, 9, 13, 16, 18, 39-44, 154, 187; profile of, 16, 39-44; a n d scientific m a n a g e m e n t , 16, 40-44, 148, 150-154, 167, 174, 178, 192; Charles Sumner, 43, 151-152 m a r k e t myth, 8 - 9 , 13-14, 16, 18, 27-30, 44, 187; a n d H o r a t i o Alger 29; a n d Dulles, 53-58, 62, 83, 195; a n d B e n j a m i n Franklin, 28-29; a n d Averell H a r r i m a n , 95-96, 99, 101, 115-118, 120, 127-129, 131, 134, 136-137, 189-190; a n d E. H. H a r r i m a n , 9 4 - 9 6 ; a n d C o t t o n Mather, 28; a n d McGuffy Reader, 29; a n d the T h i r d World, 30, 56, 118, 120, 134, 136-137, 189; a n d U.S. as ideal m o d e l of, 7, 27, 30, 56, 127, 131, 138 Marshall Plan, 115, 118, 133 Marx, Karl, 2-6, 10-11, 42, 65, 200 Massachusetts Bay Company, 19, 23, 25 massive retaliation policy, 69-70, 161 Mather, Cotton, 28, 47 Maurer, H e r r y m o n , 44, 50, 199 May, Ernest, 10, 199 McCloy, J o h n , 93 McCone, J o h n , 132 McNamara, Claranel Strange ( m o t h e r ) , 146 McNamara, Margy Craig (wife), 149 McNamara, R o b e r t J a m e s (father), 146 McNamara, R o b e r t Strange, 9, 13, 145-185, 188-193, 199-201; a n d

G e o r g e Ball, 170; Berkeley e x p e r i e n c e , 146-147, 151; a n d Berlin crisis, 154, 162; c h i l d h o o d , 146; Cold War worldview, 155-156, 171; consistent m a n a g e r i a l characteristics, 151-154, 162, 167, 174, 176, 178-179, 191-193; c o u n t e r f o r c e / n o cities strategy, 161-164; C u b a n missile crisis, 158-160, 162; d e b a t i n g style, 150, 166, 179; Ngo D i n h Diem, 166-168; d o u b t i n g the utility of force, 162, 170, 174, 176-177; epistemological h u b r i s of, 147, 151, 166-167, 178-179; a n d flexible response, 155-157, 160-161, 178; a n d f o r c i n g rational behavior, 157-158, 162, 169-177, 179, 190; as Ford M o t o r C o m p a n y president, 145, 151; as Ford M o t o r C o m p a n y whiz kid, 149; a n d H a r v a r d e x p e r i e n c e , 147-148, 151, 164, 178; as H a r v a r d Business School instructor, 148-149; o n managability of n u c l e a r conflict 159-164; m a n a g e m e n t philosophy, 146, 148, 150-151, 153-154, 162; m a n a g e m e n t style of, 145-146, 150, 159; a n d m a n a g e r representative character, 151-152, 167, 178, 191-193; a n d R o b e r t J a m e s McNamara, 146; military power's i m p o r t a n c e 157, 171; morality constraints o n policy, 157-158, 178; a n d Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 163; a n d Planning- P r o g r a m B u d g e t System (PPBS), 152-153; a n d p r a g m a t i c myth, 154, 157-158, 162, 178-179; quantitative attitude, 146-147; r e c r u i t m e n t into K e n n e d y administration, 145, 151; r e s h a p i n g n u c l e a r d o c t r i n e , 145, 152, 154-156, 160-163; r e s t r u c t u r i n g P e n t a g o n , 145, 152-154; secretary of d e f e n s e role c o n c e p t i o n , 145; a n d statistical alteration, 151, 166; a n d statistical control at the

Index

Army Air Forces, 148-149, 151; a n d statistical control system, 145, 146, 148-154, 163, 167, 177-179; a n d statistical use at Ford, 149-151; and statistics in Vietnam, 166-167, 177, 179; Taylor-Rostow Report, 164-165; Vietnam and managing conflict 145, 164-165, 168-172, 190; a n d Vietnamese airstrikes, 169-176; for a Vietnamese military solution, 164-165, 168, 171-176; and World Bank reassignment, 145, 177 McNaugh ton, J o h n , 169-170, 172-174 Melville, H e r m a n , 21-22 Merk, Frederick, 47 Miller, Perry, 20-21, 24-25, 46-48, 199 mirror imaging effect, 21, 46, 87 Molotov, V. M., 104, 106-107, 109-111, 114-115, 139-140 Morgan, E d m u n d , 47, 199 Morgan, J. P., 29, 94-95 Mutual Security Administration, 119 myth: definition of, 13-14; legitimation role of, 9-10, 45; link to representative character, 2, 8-10, 13-19, 187-193; source of collective identity, 2, 6-7; U.S. cultural history, 7, 13, 15-16, 19-44, 187. See also city-on-thehill; market; pragmatic myth myth-worldview-policy influence model, 188, 193 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Navarre, General Henri, 73 Neustadt, Richard, 10, 199 New Deal, 100-102 "new look" defense policy, 120, 121 nexus of influence model. See mythworldview-policy influence model; representative character nexus of influence model North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 119, 126, 133 Nosavan, General Phoumi, 124-125

209

Operation Plan 34-A, 168-170 Operation Rolling T h u n d e r , 133-134, 173, 175. See also Lyndon B . J o h n s o n Oum, Boun, 124 Paris peace talks (1968), 135-137, 143 Pathet Lao, 124-125, 128-129 Peabody, Endicott, 96 Pentagon, 145, 149, 152-154, 157-158, 168, 170, 177-179, 181-184, 199. See also D e p a r t m e n t of Defense Perry, Ralph Barton, 47, 199 personality studies, 1, 10, 45, 193-195 Phouma, Souvanna, 124-125 pioneer representative character, 21, 38, 187; and James Fenimore Cooper, 39, 49; a n d Washington Irving, 39, 49; and James Oliver Robertson, 39. See also manager representative character; pragmatic myth Planning-Program Budgeting System (PPBS), 152-153 pragmatic myth, 7-9, 13-14, 18, 34, 38-44; a n d Founding Fathers, 34-37; and McNamara, 157, 162, 178, 188, 190; a n d Alexis de Tocqueville, 37 Progressive Era, 30, 41 Pruessen, Ronald, 53-54, 87-88, 199 Puritan representative character, 8-9, 13, 39, 187, 193-194, 199; and Arthur Dimmesdale in The Scarlet Letter, 26; and Dulles, 9, 59, 62, 66, 69-71, 75, 77, 81-86, 191, 194; profile of, 15-16, 18-20, 23-28, 46-47; a n d Vietnam, 7. See also Woodrow Wilson; J o h n Winthrop rags-to-riches theme, 29, 95-96; a n d Horatio Alger, 29; definition of, 29; and Benjamin Franklin, 28-29; The McGuffy Reader, 29 RAND Corporation, 152, 156, 161-163, 169, 181-182

210

Index

Randle, Robert, 90, 199 Red China. See China, People's Republic of representative character: definition of, 14-15; model for behavior, 8 - 9 , 14-15, 192-194; ties to myths, 8 - 9 , 14-15, 187-193; and U.S. culture 15-18, 24, 3 0 - 3 1 , 3 9 - 4 1 , 44 representative character nexus of influence model, 1 9 0 - 1 9 3 Revolutionary War, 2 0 - 2 1 Robertson, James Oliver, 39, 4 8 - 4 9 , 199 Roherty, James, 181, 199 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 93, 101-107, 110-111, 114-115, 132, 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 Rumsay, Mary Harriman (sister), 101-102 Rusk, Dean, 131-132, 135, 142, 159, 166-167, 170 Schelling, Thomas, 169 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 7 - 8 , 11, 35, 47, 49, 133, 143, 200 Scarlet Letter, The, 26, 47, 198 scientific management, 4 1 - 4 4 , 178 Second Hague Conference (1907). See Hague Conference (1907) SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization self-help industry, 29 Shapley, Deborah, 146-148, 162, 180-185, 200 SIOR See Single Integrated Operational Plan Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 160, 182 Smith, Adam, 28 Social Darwinism, 16, 3 2 - 3 3 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 8 2 - 8 3 , 91, 188 Soviet Union, 11-12, 7 1 - 7 2 , 8 8 - 9 0 , 99, 115, 120, 123-125, 129-131, 137, 201; competing with U.S. for Third World, 6 3 - 6 4 , 66, 6 8 - 7 0 , 81; and Cuban missile crisis, 158-160; deteriorating U.S. relations, 6 2 - 7 0 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 108-115, 122, 140-142, 188-190; and Dulles as secretary of state,

7 1 - 8 1 ; and limited test ban treaty, 125-126; Sino-Soviet split, 126, 133-135, 171; and U.S. nuclear strategy, 152, 154-158, 160-164, 171, 182; as World War II ally, 63, 103-111 Spanish-American War, 22 Stalin, Joseph, 67, 88; death of, 71; and Harriman, 104-108, 110-111, 120, 122, 137, 140, 198; and Warsaw uprising, 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 statistical control system, 145-146, 148-152, 163, 166-167, 1 7 7 - 1 7 9 status quo-dynamic conflict, 5 5 - 5 8 ; ethical solutions, 55, 5 7 - 5 8 , 66, 6 9 - 7 0 , 72; political solutions, 55, 61 Sullivan and Cromwell, 53 Sumner, Charles, 43, 50, 151, 181 Taylor, Frederick, 4 1 - 4 2 Taylor, General Maxwell, 164—166, 173 Taylor-Rostow Report (1961), 143, 164-166 Thomas, Evan, 93, 96, 137-8, 198 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 17-18, 37, 46, 49, 197; on meaning and identity gap, 17; pragmatic character of Americans, 37 Thornton, Charles, 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 Toulouse, Mark, 58, 6 1 - 6 4 , 66, 8 7 - 8 8 , 200 Trewhitt, Henry, 180-182, 200 Truman, Harry, 93, 114-115, 118-120, 123, 132, 141, 143,' 197, 199; Dulles's criticism of, 6 7 - 6 8 Tudor, Henry, 45, 200 Tylor, E. B „ 1 - 2 United Nations (UN), 124; and Dulles, 60, 62, 65, 79; and Harriman, 136 Van Dusen, Henry, 88, 200 Vietnam, 7, 11, 4 6 - 4 7 , 143, 183, 197, 199; and Dulles, 73, 7 5 - 7 6 , 124, 131, 188; and Dwight Eisenhower, 75, 8 3 - 8 4 , 90, 124; and Harriman, 93, 121, 124, 128-135, 137, 142-143, 166-167,

Index

189; a n d L y n d o n B. J o h n s o n , 93, 133-135, 138, 143, 168-178, 189; a n d J o h n F. Kennedy, 129-132, 134, 142-143, 164-166, 168, 183, 189; a n d Laotian crisis, 125, 128-129, 142, 189; a n d M c N a m a r a , 132, 135, 143, 145, 164-180, 183, 192, 199-200 Warsaw uprising (1944), 109-110; and influence on Harriman's view of Stalin, 110 Washington, George, 36-37, 49 Weber, Max, 2-6, 10-11, 40, 200 Welter, Rush, 37-38, 49, 200 "whiz kids," 149-150, 163, 169, 177, 180, 197. See «¿so RAND C o r p o r a t i o n ; Ford M o t o r Company Williams, William A p p l e m a n , 7, 11, 200 Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 197-198; a n d i n f l u e n c e o n Dulles, 52-53; a n d L e a g u e of Nations, 23, 27;

211

Puritan character, 22-24, 27, 47, 193-194; a n d the Versailles C o n f e r e n c e (1919), 23, 27, 53, 193, 195 Winant, J o h n G„ 103, 105-106 W i n t h r o p , J o h n : Arbella S e r m o n , 18-19, 23, 25, 46; a n d city-on-thehill myth, 15, 19, 23, 25; a n d Puritan representative character, 19, 25, 47, 199 worldview: a n d behavior, 8 - 9 , 15, 44, 187-195; d e f i n i t i o n of, 10; a n d Dulles, 51-56, 61-62, 66, 70-72, 81-83, 86, 90, 1 8 8 - 190; a n d H a r r i m a n , 93, 111-113, 120-122, 126, 131, 134, 136-137, 140-141, 189-192; individuals' sources of, 1 - 2 , 8 - 9 , 11, 15, 187-195; a n d M c N a m a r a , 155, 157, 171, 178, 189-190 Wuthnow, Robert, 10-11, 200 Wyllie, Irvin, 28-30, 48, 200 Yergin, Daniel, 140-141, 200

About the Book In what ways does national culture influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy? What are the mechanisms through which culture shapes policy outcomes? Stephen Twing's thoughtful analysis illustrates precisely how certain cultural elements influenced the policy preferences and policymaking behaviors of three Cold War-era statesmen: J o h n Foster Dulles, Averell Harriman, and Robert McNamara. Drawing on a wealth of primary source materials, Twing traces the evolution of each statesman's thoughts about world politics. His study lucidly demonstrates that each was powerfully shaped by at least one central U.S. myth or "representative character"—and that all three men behaved in the policymaking arena in ways highly consistent with their culturally influenced worldviews. Stephen W. Twing is visiting assistant professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

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