Myth and Ontology in the Thought of John Crowe Ransom

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MYTH AND ONTOLOGY IN''THE THOUGHT OF JOHN CROWE RANSOM

by Gordon H arrison M ills

A d is s e r t a t io n subm itted in p a r t ia l f u lf illm e n t o f the requirem ents fo r the degree o f Doctor o f P h ilosop h y, in the Department o f E n g lish , in the Graduate C ollege o f the S ta te U n iv e r sity o f Iowa December, 1042

ProQuest N um ber: 10831774

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I am s in c e r e ly g r a te f u l to P r o fe sso r A u stin Warren, and to the o th e r mem­ bers o f my com m ittee, fo r generous a s s is ta n c e in the p rep a ra tio n o f t h is d i s s e r t a t io n .

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1 I The s a l i e n t fe a tu r e o f John Crow© Ransom’s l i t e r a r y th e o ry , th e key to h is s p e c u la tio n s on the nature o f p o e tr y , i s h is c o n c ep tio n o f l it e r a t u r e as knowledge. Emanating from t h i s c o n c ep tio n there i s on th e one hand h is attem pt to dem onstrate the g en e ra l c h a r a c te r o f the o n to lo g ic a l knowledge which he a s c r ib e s to a r t , to d if f e r e n ­ t i a t e i t from s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and to a s s o c ia t e i t w ith myth; and on the o th er hand th ere i s h is attem pt to demon­ s t r a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y the s t r u c tu r a l so u rces in lit e r a t u r e o f o n t o lo g ic a l knowledge, and to carry hi© theory in to p r a c tic e . I f he i s ab le to m aintain h is th eo ry , e s p e c i a l l y in i t s more te c h n ic a l a s p e c ts , Ransom’s work w i l l in ­ d u b ita b ly e x e r t an im portant in flu e n c e on l i t e r a r y c r it ic is m ; i f he i s n o t, he w i l l have a t l e a s t th© s a t i s f a c t i o n o f havin g aroused a good d eal o f in t e r e s t in the g en era l approach to l it e r a t u r e fo r which he has argued, and in the is s u e s w ith which he has been concerned. The problem o f , "What i s lite r a tu r e ? " to which Ransom has b o ld ly sought an answer, i s not m erely an a b s tr a c t problem . I t e n t ic e s the young w r ite r out in to the p la in where he i s b ru ised on one sid e by Thomas Wolfe and on the o th er by Robert F ro st and pursued by a sw earing J . T. F a r r e ll behind; i t comes down in t o the classroom o f

z

the tea c h e r o f lit e r a t u r e and demands to know h is reason fo r e x is te n c e *

'ftere Ransom’ s theory o f l it e r a t u r e as

knowledge t o prove p la u s ib le and workable i t would be a g r a te fu l boon to the tea c h e r: when asked to show cause why he should not tu rn over h is work to th© departm ents o f p sy ch ology, r e l i g i o n , p h ilo so p h y , h is to r y and s o c io lo g y , and make h im se lf r a r e , or e x t i n c t , he could then r e p ly se r e n e ly th a t l it e r a t u r e i s a s p e c ia l kind o f know ledge. On© o f Ransom’ s c h ie f i n t e r e s t s has been to combat the id ea th at the su b je c t-m a tte r o f l it e r a t u r e can b© farmed out t o be e x p lo ite d by th e methods o f v a r io u s f i e l d s o f stu dy, the assem bled r e s u l t s to b® co n sid ered a p ie c e o f genuine l it e r a r y c r itic is m *

For example, he tak es Kenneth Burke

to ta sk fo r corru p tin g h is l i t e r a r y c r i t ic i s m by in tr o d u cin g in to i t the methods o f , r e s p e c t iv e ly , anth rop ology, freu d ia n psych ology, and s o c i a l s c ie n c e .* d erived from a method such as one o f t h e s e ,

A c r it ic is m he p r o t e s t s ,

ta k es on ly a secondary i n t e r e s t in th© work o f a r t; i t s primary i n t e r e s t l i e s in some gen eral s c i e n t i f i c or p o l i t i c a l or e t h ic a l th e o ry .

A fter i t s f i r s t run a t the

work o f a r t i t r e t r e a t s w ith i t s l o o t of s o c i a l or e t h ic a l idea© and a t l e i s u r e m ulls them over in i t s would argue,

l a ir * ' So Ransom

fo r in s ta n c e , th a t G r a n v ille H icks tends to

Ransom, "An Address to Kenneth Burke," Kenyon Review. Spring 1942, pp. 219 ff*

5

ig n o re th e work o f a r t i t s e l f in ord er to ex p ress h i s a t t it u d e towards i t s a t t it u d e towards Marxism; or th a t Joseph Wood Krutch ten d s to ign ore th e work o f a r t in order to ex p r ess h is a t t it u d e toward i t s Freudian im p lic a ­ tio n s ,

From Ransom’ s p o in t o f view such s t u d ie s may he

v a lu a b le but th ey are n ot l i t e r a r y c r i t ic i s m ; t h i s fo llo w s from h is c o n c ep tio n o f l it e r a t u r e a s k n ow led ge,g

S in ce

p o etry i s p rop erly understood a s knowledge, he r e a so n s, c r i t ic i s m should p ro p erly occupy i t s e l f w ith the s tr u c ­ tu r a l b a s e s , in the p©em, o f th a t knowledge.

The b u s i­

n ess o f the l i t e r a r y c r i t i c , he d e c la r e s , i s e x c lu s iv e ly w ith an a e s t h e t ic c r i t i c i s m .

In t h i s r e s p e c t Ransom has

endeavored to meet s c ie n c e on i t s own grounds.

Be has

attem pted to show th a t p o e try i® a kind o f knowledge which can he s e t up b e sid e th a t o f sc ien e© --a kind o f knowledge which he c a l l s " a e s th e tic " , or " a p p r e c ia tiv e ." Because he has d e a lt b o ld ly w ith t h is problem, i f fo r no oth er rea so n , i t i s p la u s ib le to suppose th a t h© w i l l con tin u e to provoke i n t e r e s t and comment, and e x e r t some in flu e n c e on the nature o f c r i t i c a l theory in t h i s co u n try .

C f. A lle n T ate, " L itera tu re as Knowledge," in Reason in Madness. C f. a ls o P h ilip W heelwright, "Poetry, Myth, and R e a l i t y , " i n A lle n T ate, The Language o f P o e tr y .

ransom 's i n t e r e s t s as a w r ite r have in clu d ed r e l i g i o n , s o c i a l problems {in the form o f support to the a g ra ria n movement), and l i t e r a t u r e , as p oet and c r i t i c *

h is

f i r s t book a sid e from poetry^ was God Yi/itfaout Thunder (1 9 3 0 ), which i s an attem pt to d e fin e and d is tin g u is h the s c i e n t i f i c and the r e l ig i o u s a t t i t u d e s , and a p le a fo r th e v a l i d i t y and im portance o f r e l i g i o n as he c o n c e iv e s i t .

T his t h e s i s

i s developed and extended in The W orld's Body (1 9 3 8 ), in which r e l ig i o n i s r e la t e d more c l o s e l y to a r t and to s o c i a l convention*

H is f i r s t f u l l y developed fo rm u la tio n

o f a th eory o f p o e try was p resen ted in 1941 when he was in v it e d to P rin c eto n U n iv e r s ity to d e liv e r one o f a s e r i e s o f fo u r le c t u r e s in l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m .4

The New C r itic is m

(1941) c o n ta in s a development and e la b o r a tio n o f t h i s th eory, and an exam ination o f the p r a c tic e and theory o f s e v e r a l c r i t i c a l w r ite r s . A purpose which runs through a l l th e se sp e c u la ­ t io n s on r e l i g i o n and p o etry i s one which Ptansom c a l l s o n to lo g ­ ic a l*

H is use o f the word " o n to lo g ic a l" i s somewhat m isle a d in g ,

in as much as he i s fr e q u e n tly engaged w ith problems which are more n early e p is te m o lo g ic a ls but fo r the p resen t i t w i l l s u f f ic e to say th a t h i s purpose i s t o make a f ir s t-h a n d acquaintance w ith r e a lit y *

P oetry se r v e s t h i s purpose, in h is

view ; he regards p o e try as p rovid in g a s p e c ia l kind o f know­ led ge o f r e a l i t y . 3 B is f i r s t book o f poems was e n t i t l e d , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , Poems About God* ^ P rin ted in Donald A. S ta u ffe r , The In ten t o f the C r i t i c *

5 II The d i s t i n c t i o n th a t Hansom makes between what he c a l l s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and a p p r e c ia tiv e or e s t h e t i c knowledge i s o f primary importance in h i s thought#

He se y s

" ...w e may sa y , rou gh ly, th a t th ere are two kin ds o f knowledge, and s c ie n c e i s o n ly one o f them: a p p r e c i a t i o n ...." 5

th e o th er knowledge i s

In a s e n s e , h is theory o f p o etry is

d eriv ed from t h is d is tin c t io n *

S c i e n t i f i c knowledge he

d e sc r ib e s as th a t which i s concerned w ith o b je c t s or ©vents w ith a view to t h e ir immediate or u ltim a te p r a c t ic a l v a lu e ; a p p r e c ia tiv e knowledge i s concerned with o b je c ts or e v e n ts fo r t h e ir own sak e, n o t for any p r a c tic a l or economic advantage to be d eriv ed from them.

A lso , s c i e n t i f i c

knowledge i s u s u a lly in t e r e s t e d on ly in c e r ta in a sp e c ts o f an o b je c t, and i t s method i s a b s tr a c tiv e and c l a s s i f y i n g , whereas a p p r e c ia tiv e knowledge i s in t e r e s t e d in the whole o b je c t, and in th© in d iv id u a l as in d iv id u a l w ith a l l i t s p a r tic u la r ity *

P oetry i s a p p r e c ia tiv e knowledge.

The tru e p o e t r y .. .o h ly wants to r e a liz e the w orld, to see i t b e t t e r . P o etry i s the kind o f knowledge by which w© must know what we have arranged th a t we s h a ll not know o th e rw ise. We have e le c t e d to know th e world through our s c ie n c e , and we know a g r e a t d e a l, but s c ie n c e i s on ly the c o g n itiv e department o f our animal l i f e , and by i t we know th© world o n ly as a scheme of a b s tr a c t c o n v e n ien ce s. What we cennot know c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y as s c i e n t i s t s i s the vo rld which i s made o f whole and in d e fe a s ib le o b j e c t s , and t h is i s the world which p o etry reco v ers fo r u s . Men become p o e ts, or at l e a s t they read p o e ts , in order to atone fo r having been 5 " . '

T - ' r “ ri.................................................

Ransom, God W ithout Thunder, p . 206.

6

hard p r a c tic a l men and herd t h e o r e t ic a l s c i e n t i s t s ,® By what might he c a lle d the te c h n ic a l a sp e c t o f h is theory o f p o etry Ransom a ttem p ts to dem onstrate the manner in which p o etry i s thus a "kind o f k n ow led ge." He n o te s a d i s t i n c t i o n betw een the " d isc o u r se ” o f p o e try , and s c i e n t i f i c d isco u rse* The l a t t e r i s a b s tr a c t, s e v e r e ly l o g i c a l , and a d m issiv e of a s l i t t l e ir r e le v a n t d e t a i l as p o s s ib le ; an extrem e exB8$>le i s a m athem atical equation#

But, he argu es, p o e tr y , w h ile

i t has a frame o f l o g i c , o r a "paraphrasable c o r e ,” i s

K

c h a r a c te r iz e d by the presen ce o f much d e t a i l which i s ir r e le v a n t to t h i s paraphrasable c o re , though i t i s not ir r e le v a n t to the d isc o u r se as a p o e tic d is c o u r s e .

So he

co n clu d es th a t "A poem i s a l o g i c a l str u c tu r e having a l o c a l te x tu r e . ”

The l o g i c a l str u c tu r e i s th e paraphrasable co re,

and the l o c a l te x tu r e i s d e t a i l which i s ir r e le v a n t in the sen se mentioned*

This might be i l l u s t r a t e d w ith th e

fo llo w in g b it o f v e r s e . Though I am C h ateau laire who looms A weary lou n ger in b r ig h t rooms Where te a -c u p s c la s h , whose drooping h a ir D is c r e e t ly dyed i s dubious f a i r , Who k i s s e s p o lish e d f i n g e r - t i p s P o e t i c a l l y w ith th in l i p s And murmurs g r a c e fu l commonplaces To d u ch esses w ith pock-marked f a c e s , Think not th a t I am w h olly found Where women laugh and v i o l s sound. ^Ransom, The W orld's Body, pp. x -x i# ^ S ta u ffe r , The In te n t o f th® C r i t i c , p . 110.

The l o g i c a l c o r e , or stru ctu re* o f t h i s v erse might be ex p r essed as fo llo w s : "Though I am found much in S o c ie t y , I am not m erely a m an-about-tow n." o f the v e r s e .

That i s th e argument

What, Ransom would ask , do a l l the d e t a i l s —

fo r in s ta n c e , "Where te a -c u p s © la sh ," — add to the argument? And he would r e p ly th a t to the argument, to the l o g i c a l s tr u c tu r e , th ey add n o th in g; but to the d isc o u r se as p oetry they add p a r t ic u la r it y , te x tu r e .

The d e t a i l un­

n e c e ssa r y to th e l o g i c a l str u c tu r e makes up the te x tu r e . And so in the poem we have, through te x tu r e , an i n t e r e s t in th e in d iv id u a l, unique, p a r tic u la r o b je c t, and t h i s par­ t i c u l a r i t y coh eres in the l o g i c a l str u c tu r e .

I t i s in t h i s

compounding o f l o g i e a l str u c tu r e and l o c a l te x tu r e , Ransom a s s e r t s , th a t th e o n to lo g ic a l knowledge o f p o etry e x i s t s , T his theory w i l l be con sid ered more c a r e f u lly l a t e r ; i t w i l l be h e lp fu l to n ote f i r s t some probable in ­ flu e n c e s on Ransom, and th e manner in which the th eo ry s e e m to have ev o lv ed in h is own mind.

In h is attem pt t o i s o l a t e and d e fin e p o e tic d is c o u r s e , end to d is tin g u is h betw een a p p r e c ia tiv e knowledge and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, Ransom owes a debt t o a number o f p r e d e c e sso r s, a debt which he h im s e lf tr a c e s back to Hume and Kant, and which i s most ob viou s—both in view o f s i m i l a r i t i e s in th ou gh t, end o f acknowledgment on Ransom’s

a p a r t— in con n ection w ith Bergson and T, E* Hulme.

Ransom

remarks th a t the " s c e p t ic a l” p r in c ip le s advanced by modern p h ilo so p h y are r e a l ly two in number* one going back to Hume, th e oth er to Kant*

S c e p t ic a l, th a t is* o f a b e l i e f

th a t th e re are no lim ita tio n ® as to the proper sphere o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge,

"Hume observed th a t s c i e n t i s t s very

g e n e r a lly confused t h e ir f a c t s and t h e ir f i c t i o n s . That i s a the su b stan ce o f Hume’ s c r it ic is m ." And o f Kant he sa y s th a t w h ile he did honor th e se " f ic tio n s " o f s c ie n c e ( e .g .* c a u s e -a n d -e ffe e t) by c l a s s i f y i n g them under c a t e g o r ie s , he a ls o p o in ted out ag ain and again th a t t h e ir p r in c ip le s are s u b j e c t iv e , and n o t— as p r in c ip le s — e m p ir ic a lly v e r i f i a b l e ; th a t he r e a l ly e la b o r a te d Hume’s c r i t ic i s m .

Q

Without

g o in g in to t h i s , i t may be remarked th a t Hansom, h old in g to t h i s view o f s c ie n c e , c o n c eiv es th a t h is own ta sk i s t o dem onstrate how p o e tr y p rovid es a d if f e r e n t kind o f knowledge• As r e p r e se n tin g a kind o f theory o f a p p r e c ia tiv e knowledge, Hansom p r o fe s s e s sympathy w ith Schopenhauer’s co n cep tio n o f a r t as the n e g a tio n o f the W ill in th e con­ tem p lation o f the pure Idea, a sympathy which he extend s to Kant’s th eory o f "pure" b eau ty,

Kant d is tin g u is h e d

between ”pure" beauty and "dependent" or "adherent" beauty: th e l a t t e r i s a s s o c ia te d w ith some p r a c t ic a l i n t e r e s t , and w ith an idea o f what th e th in g ought t o be— as the beauty ”

1c S ‘ " " “

11

' 1 " "r ‘

1

1

aRansom* God Without Thunder, o . 210. Loc. c i t . -■■■

-*■

9 o f a horse , f o r exam ple, a s Kant sa y s , or the beau ty o f a r c h ite c tu r e ; "pure" beauty i s s t r i c t l y form al, w ithou t p r a c t ic a l i n t e r e s t , and does not presuppose any co n cep tio n o f what the th in g s ought t o b e.

T his theory o f pure

beauty i s in accord w ith Hansom’s d i s t i n c t i o n betw een s c i e n t i f i c and a p p r e c ia tiv e k n o w led g e--a p p r ec ia tiv e knowledge b ein g d is in t e r e s t e d .

However, an o b je c t whose

p e r c e p tio n p ro v id es the ex p erien ce o f pure b eau ty is n ot an o b je c t o f v e r i f ia b le r e a l i t y , fo r Kant, and because Ransom never commits h im se lf e x a c tly as to the u ltim a te nature o f r e a l i t y , t h i s comparison between him and Kant must h a lt a t the p o in t o f th e d i s t i n c t i o n n oted .

H is g e n e r a l a t t itu d e

toward Kant i s su g g ested in the fo llo w in g ; Kant c a r e f u lly disengaged th e a r t i s t i c m otive from "pleasure" in the common se n se ; then from u s e fu ln e s s , which would in v o lv e i t in alab or fo r th e sake o f p le a su r e ; th en from the p u r s u it o f the e t h i e a l good and "determ inate c o n c e p ts ," . . . .A rt i s r a d ic a lly not s c ie n c e , and not a f f i l i a t e d w ith the i d e a l i s t i c p h ilo so p h y , and Kant does ev er y th in g p o s s ib le to prevent the c o n fu sio n . The f a c t t h a t ...C h e tends to confuse them l a t e r o n ) . . . might be ev id en ce th a t a r t i s not r e a l ly so " u n iversal" a human a c t i v i t y as s c i e n c e .1^/ Kant g e ts o f f r a th er l i g h t l y h ere, f o r h is " la te r con­ f u s i o n ," but Schopenhauer, though recogn ized as having conoeived o f a knowledge fo r having made " P la to n ic

w ithout d e s ir e , i s sh a rp ly chided ideas" th© o b je c t o f th a t

k n o w le d g e ,^ r a th er than "Ding© in th e ir D in g lic h k e it r

^Ransom, "An Address to Kenneth Burke," Kenyon Review. Spring 1942, p. 231. J ^Ransom , The World’s Body, p. 325,

f

10

r

fA s im ila r it y to Hansom i s found ©gain in the thought o f Croce#

Croce makes fo u r d iv is io n s of th®

a c t i v i t y o f the mind, o f which two are the i n t u i t i v e , and th e conceptual*

Conceptual knowledge may be d e fin e d as

knowledge o f u n iv e r sa l r e l a t io n s ; i t i s th e l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y , and i t s instrum ent i s the i n t e l l e c t .

I n t u it iv e

knowledge, on th e o th er hand, i s knowledge o f p a r tic u la r th in g s; i t i s th© e s t h e t i c a c t i v i t y , and I t s instrum ent i s th e im a g in a tio n .

I t i s s c a r c e ly n ec essa ry to p o in t out the

p a r a lle l between t h is kind o f theory and Hansom*© theory o f the two kinds o f knowledge,

Croce*s i n t u i t i v e knowledge'

may be a s s o c ia te d w ith Hansom’ s a p p r e c ia tiv e knowledge; and C roce’ s co n cep tu a l knowledge w ith Hansom’s s c i e n t i f i c knowledgeJ T

f i n Bergson there i s th is same g e n e ra l kind o f p a r a l le l .

The nature o f the e s p e c ia l a t t r a c t io n that

B ergson’s p h ilosop h y has fo r Ransom i s su g g ested in h is comment on a fundamental d iff e r e n c e between Bergson and Hume, S c ie n c e , to Hume, s e e s a l i t t l e more machinery or p e r s o n a lity than i t can ev er dem onstrate. To B ergson, s c ie n c e i s c a r e fu l not to see a l l the s e n s ib le f a c t s . I t i s Hume's view th a t s c ie n c e t e l l s more than the tru th ; i t i s B ergson’s view th a t s c ie n c e t e l l s l e s s than the tr u th . Both are j u s t i f i e d , but in d if f e r e n t c o n te x ts , ^ R a n s o m ,Pod Without Thunder, pp, 2 1 6 -2 1 7 .

'

11

The c o n te x t in which Ransom's l it e r a r y theory i s s e t i s th a t which b e lie v e s th a t s c ie n c e t e l l s l e s s than th© truth*

f

f i t was th is same elem ent in B ergson 's thought

f

th a t a ttr a c te d T. E. Hulme, and in H u lm e 's thought th ere i s a development somewhat ak in to R ansom 'sj

In view o f h is

fondness fo r Bergson, and because o f h is l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t y in the years j u s t b efore the f i r s t World War, Hulme i s f

e s p e c i a l ly in te r e s tin g *

(Be was a fr ie n d o f Ezra Pound in

the l e t t e r ' s e a r ly years in London, and i s probably b e s t known as the o r ig in a to r o f the gen eral theory adopted by th e Im a g ists, a sc h o o l o f p o etry which emphasized technique and im agery, both q u a l it i e s which share Hansom's in t e r e s t , althou gh he fin d s Imagism a b it n a iv e , A c lo s e p a r a lle l to Ransom's thought appears in some o f Hulme's n o te s; fo r example; I lo o k a t th e r e a l i t y , a t London stream , and d i r t , mud, power, and th en I th in k o f the p a le shadowy annlogy th a t i s used w ith ou t th in k in g by th© autom atic p h il­ osop h ers, th© "stream o f tim e," Th© p eop le who t r e a t words w ithout r e fe r e n c e , who use a n a lo g ie s w ithout th in k in g o f them: l e t us alw ays remember th a t s o l i d r e a l stream and the f l a t t h in v o ic e o f the m etap h ysician , "the stream o f tlm e .^j We m y say th a t th© read er h a b it u a lly tak es words as £> w ithou t the meaning a tta c h e d . Perhaps th© n e a r e st analogy i s the h airy c a te r p illa r * Taking each segm ent o f h is body a s a word, the h a ir on th a t segm ent i s th© v is io n the p oet s e e s behind i t . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to do t h i s , so th a t the p oet i s forced to use new a n a lo g ie s , and e s p e c ia lly to con­ s tr u c t a p la s t e r model o f a th in g to e x p r e ss h is ©motion a t the s ig h t o f th e v i s i o n he s e e s , h is wonder and e c s t a s y . I f he employed the ordinary word, the reader would on ly se e i t as a segm ent, with no h a ir , used fo r g e t t in g a lo n g . And w ithout th is c la y , s p a t ia l

12 image, he does not f e e l th at he has ex p ressed a t a l l what he sees* The ordinary c a t e r p i ll a r fo r cra w lin g alon g from one p o s itio n t o another* The h a ir y one f o r b ea u ty , to b u ild up a s o l i d v is io n o f r e a l i t i e s * 13 This p a r a d o x ic a l c a t e r p i ll a r , b e in g the s c i e n t i f i c peram bulating c a t e r p i ll a r , and the h a ir y p a r tic u la r c a te r ­ p i l l a r , p r e s e n tly ( i f I may be f a c e t io u s ) i s transform ed in to the sp le n d id P a ra -d o x o lo g la P o e tie u s Kansomus moth, a v e r it a b le l i v i n g Hymn to Being* I t i s in s t r u c t iv e to c o n sid er the in t e r e s t taken in Bergson by Hulme*

I ©hall reproduce her© hi© account o f

B ergson ’s d i s t i n c t i o n between th e two Kinds o f knowledge which he propounds, and n ote Hulme*s own co n cep tio n o f the r e l a t i v e p o s it io n o f th e a r t is t * He d e c la r e s th a t the v ery e sse n c e of B ergson’s p h ilosop h y l i e s in h is d i s t i n c t i o n between the f a c u lty o f i n t e l l e c t and the f a c u lt y o f i n t u i t i o n , —a d i s t i n c t i o n which made p o s s ib le an a n a ly s is o f c e r ta in m ental p r o c e sse s bound up with our resp on se to a r t , and o f the f a c t th a t o r d in a r ily we do not p e r c e iv e th in g s as th e y a re, but o n ly con ven tion al types*

Prom t h i s i s deduced th© fu n c tio n o f the a r t i s t . Man’s primary n eed , he c o n tin u e s, i s not knowledge

but a c tio n .

H is f i r s t i n s t i n c t i s p r a c t i c a l, and the

f a c u lt y through which t h is i n s t i n c t o p e r a te s i s the i n t e l l e c t , -■

n . , „

......... ...................... ............................ ............

Quoted in Glenn Hughes, Imagism and Im a g ists.p* 20.

13 However, by i t s very n a tu r e , t h is f a c u lt y i s in cap ab le o f un derstand in g l i f e

its e lf*

m ech an ical, m a te r ia l f a c t s . e sca p es i t .

I t can d eal on ly with The " in te n tio n " o f

V it a l phenomena are o n ly d is to r t e d

life by i t ,

fo r

i t e x h ib it s them m erely as complex m echanical phenomena. But to o b ta in a com plete p ic tu r e o f r e a l i t y man has r e s o r t to another f a c u lt y a© w e ll, which Bergson c a l l s I n t u it io n . This f a c u lt y comprehends th ose a s p e c ts o f human e x p e r ie n c e (th e " in te n tio n " o f l i f e ) which are a b s o lu te ly "u nseizab le" by th e i n t e l l e c t *

To th e se p a r t ic u la r a sp e c ts o f ex­

p erien ce Hulme g iv e s th e name " In te n siv e m a n ifo ld s," can

How

i t be shown, th en , th a t in te n s iv e m anifolds and

in t u it i o n s o f them a c t u a lly e x is t ? The natu re of an in t e n s iv e m anifold i s th a t i t i s a f i n i t e th in g whose p a rts are in sep a ra b ly in te r p e n e tr a te d , whose p a rts cannot be analyzed o u t.

An example

o f such a

th in g i s our m ental l i f e , and i t i s t h is example th a t Bergson u sed .

(Th© dem onstration i s the su b je c t o f Time

and f r e e - W ill. ) W© speak o f " s t a te s o f mind," but i t becomes e v id e n t, upon r e f l e c t i o n , th a t no such th in g e x i s t s .

At

l e a s t , no c le a r l i m i t s can be s e t between one s t a t e o f mind and an oth er, fo r every s t a t e i s co lo red by th© whole person­ a l i t y o f th e in d iv id u a l,

Tou sa y , "He f e l t annoyed,"

But

i t i s im p o ssib le t o sep a ra te with p r e c is io n t h is s t a t e from p reced in g and f o llo w in g s t a t e s .

On th e oth er hand, i t i s

14 ob viou s th a t you ©an s u p e r f i c i a l l y d e sc r ib e the flo w o f m ental l i f e in ju s t th e se term s. This I s e x p la in e d by the e x is t e n c e o f the two f a c u l t i e s , or two " s e lv e s * *

Fundam entally the mind con­

s i s t s o f a flu x o f in sep a ra b le in te r p e n e tr a tin g elem en ts but on th© su rfa ce th ere i s a "cru st o f c le a n -c u t p sy ch ic s ta te s "

(annoyance, d is g u s t , d e lig h t , e t c . ) which can be

i d e n t i f ie d and described*

These s u p e r f i c ia l " sta te s"

serv e th© purpose o f a c tio n and communication, th e purpose o f the i n t e l l e c t .

But through the f a c u lt y o f i n t u it i o n

one has com plete knowledge o f th e se s ta t e s *

The sim p le st