Muslims in British Local Government : Representing Minority Interests in Hackney, Newham, and Tower Hamlets [1 ed.] 9789004272262, 9789004269699

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Muslims in British Local Government

Muslim Minorities Editorial Board Jørgen S. Nielsen (University of Copenhagen) Aminah McCloud (DePaul University, Chicago) Jörn Thielmann (Erlangen University)

VOLUME 16

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mumi

Muslims in British Local Government Representing Minority Interests in Hackney, Newham, and Tower Hamlets

By

Eren Tatari

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tatari, Eren.  Muslims in British local government : representing minority interests in Hackney, Newham, and Tower Hamlets / by Eren Tatari.  pages cm. -- (Muslim minorities ; v. 16)  Includes bibliographical references and index.  ISBN 978-90-04-26969-9 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-27226-2 (e-book) 1. Local government-Great Britain. 2. City council members--Great Britain. 3. Muslims--Political activity--Great Britain. 4. Muslims--Great Britain--Politics and government. 5. Minorities--Political activity--Great Britain. 6. Political participation--Great Britain. 7. Representative government and representation--Great Britain. 8. Great Britain--Race relations--Political aspects. 9. Great Britain--Ethnic relations--Political aspects. I. Title.  JS3111.T38 2014  320.8’50882970941--dc23

                  

     2014007082

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities. For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1570-7571 isbn 978-90-04-26969-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-27226-2 (e-book) Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents List of Tables vi List of Figures viii Abbreviations ix 1 Introduction: Muslims in Western Politics 1 2 Muslims and Minority Politics in Britain 10 3 Government Responsiveness to Muslim Interests 51 4 Across London Boroughs 71 5 London Borough Councils and Tower Hamlets 103 6 London Borough of Newham 142 7 London Borough of Hackney 163 8 Comparative Analysis and Muslims in National Government 181 9 Conclusion 199 Appendix A Percentage Muslim Population by Percentage Grant Money to Muslims, 1998–2010 207 Appendix B Average Local Government Responsiveness by Borough 210 Bibliography 211 Index 222

List of Tables 2.1 Population of England and Wales by religion, 2011 16 2.2 Estimated population of England by ethnic group, mid-2001 and mid-2004 17 2.3 Religious groups in Great Britain with highest qualification, 2004 18 2.4 Religious groups who consider their identity to be British, English, Scottish or Welsh, 2004 20 2.5 Religious groups in England and Wales who stated religion said something important about their self-identity, by country of birth, 2001 21 2.6 Turnout at London borough elections as percentage of the electorate 33 2.7 bme turnout in u.k. elections 34 2.8 Data on bme and Muslim councillors in London and England 40 3.1 Hypotheses tested 54 3.2 Causal factors tested 62 3.3 Representative styles 62 3.4 Data sources and types 68 4.1 Indicators of local government responsiveness 72 4.2 Muslim population estimates in Great Britain, 2001–2008 72 4.3 Number of boroughs by percentage of cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials 74 4.4 Number of London cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials, 1998–2010 74 4.5 Number of maintained schools in England by religion, January 2004 76 4.6 Distribution of Islamic schools by borough, 1998–2010 77 4.7 Allocation of grant money, 1998–2010 80 4.8 Number of boroughs by percentage of grant money, 1998–2010 80 4.9 Descriptive statistics for party fragmentation 83 4.10 Political incorporation indicators for Muslim city councillors, 1998–2010 84 4.11 Total number of Muslim councillors in London, 1998–2010 89 4.12 Number of Muslim councillors in London City Councils, 1998–2010 90 4.13 Muslim councillors in London by gender, 1998–2010 92 4.14 Average political incorporation indices by borough 92 4.15 Party breakdown of Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 93 4.16 Number of Muslim councillors in the majority party 94 4.17 Distribution of seniority of Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 94

l ist of tables 4.18 Frequencies of leadership positions held by Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 94 4.19 Frequencies of prestigious committee assignments held by Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 95 4.20 Correlation among independent and control variables 98 4.21 Regression results without the control variables (Model I) 99 4.22 Regression results with the control variables (Model II) 100 5.1 Estimated population of London by ethnic group, 2001–2004 106 5.2 Votes by party in gla elections, 2000–2008 108 5.3 Tower Hamlets data 113 5.4 Ethnic breakdown of Tower Hamlets, mid-2005 114 5.5 Composition of Tower Hamlets Council, 1964–2009 118 5.6 Party breakdown of Muslim councillors in Tower Hamlets, 1982–2010 125 6.1 Newham data 143 6.2 Composition of Newham Council, 1965–2009 148 6.3 Party breakdown of Muslim councillors in Newham, 1982–2010 149 7.1 Hackney data 164 7.2 Composition of Hackney Council, 1964–2009 165 7.3 Party breakdown of Muslim councillors in Hackney, 1974–2010 172 8.1 Comparison of Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Hackney 182–183 8.2 Ethnic breakdown of Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Hackney, Mid-2005 182 8.3 Ethnic minority mps in the House of Commons, 1987–2005 192 8.4 Women mps in Britain, 1918–2005 193 8.5 Percentage of Muslims in parliamentary constituencies in England and Wales 194 8.6 Muslim mps in United Kingdom, 1997–2010 195 8.7 British Muslim meps, 1999–2009 197 8.8 Muslims in the House of Lords, 1998–2010 198

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List of Figures 1 Voter turnout for United Kingdom, 1979–2009 32 2 Percentage Muslim in census output areas by percentage turnout of Muslims, non-Asians, and overall 36 3 Percent turnout by religion and South Asian in street 37 4 Number of Muslims by number of Islamic schools in the borough, 2006–2010 77 5 Number of mosques by number of Muslims in the borough, 2006–2010 78 6 Percentage of grant money allocated to Muslims by percentage of Muslims in the borough 81 7 Average local government responsiveness by borough 82 8 Number of Muslim councillors in London City Councils, 1998–2010 91 9 Muslim councillors and borough demographics, 1998–2010 96 10 Percent Muslim and deprivation scores, 1998–2010 96 11 Structure of government in England 107

Abbreviations aapac Arab American Political Action Committee access Arab Community Centre for Economic and Social Services adc American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee bme Black and Minority Ethnic bnp British National Party bridges Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity cair Council on American-Islamic Relations cllr Councillor coe Council of Europe cpa Christian People’s Alliance crc Community Relations Commission crcs Community Relations Councils cre Commission for Racial Equality dfes Department for Education and Skills echr European Court of Human Rights echrff European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms eu European Union imd Index of Multiple Deprivations isna Islamic Society of North America mcb Muslim Council of Britain mep Member of European Parliament mp Member of Parliament mpacuk Muslim Public Affairs Committee—u.k. nf National Front sacre Standing Advisory Committee for Religious Education sdp Socialist Democratic Party smsp Single-member, simple-plurality electoral system swp Socialist Workers Party ypac Yemeni Political Action Committee

Chapter 1

Introduction

Muslims in Western Politics

West European countries, Canada, and the United States are host to numerous minorities. These groups identify themselves by their religion, ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, disabilities, immigrant, and most are socioeconomically and politically disadvantaged. As such, minority groups pressure their governments to accommodate their particular needs. Yet responses of Western democracies to minority demands vary significantly. Some countries, like Britain, take a universalist approach and strive to accommodate minority needs. Others, such as France, pursue an assimilationist strategy and do not grant group rights. What is more puzzling is that government responsiveness to minority interests varies significantly even within countries. This presents an intriguing research problem; what explains the variation in government responsiveness to minority demands? In this book, I explore this puzzle by analyzing the factors that influence local government responsiveness to Muslim demands in London. Currently, there are eight Muslims in the House of Commons (three of whom are women), thirteen in the House of Lords (five of whom are women), and two in the European Parliament representing Britain.1 More strikingly, since 1980, the number of ethnic minority city councillors in Britain increased by more than 700%.2 There are approximately 146 Muslim councillors (thirtysix of whom are women) in London. Yet the number of Muslim councillors and government responsiveness to minority needs vary drastically across local councils. The aim of this book is to explore which factors facilitate or hinder effective Muslim political representation in Britain, and how representation styles of 1 During the electoral period under research in this book (1998–2010), there were four Muslims in the House of Commons, nine in the House of Lords (four of whom are women), and two in the European Parliament representing Britain. Muslim members of the House of Commons, as of January 2010, were: Sadiq Khan, Muhammad Sarwar, Khalid Mahmood, and Shahid Malik. Muslim members of the House of Lords, as of January 2010, were: Nazir Ahmed, Waheed Alli, Kishwer Falkner, Pola Manzila Uddin, Adam Hafejee Patel, Amirali Alibhai Bhatai, Mohamed Iltaf Sheikh, Sayeeda Warsi, and Haleh Afshar. Muslim members of the European Parliament from United Kingdom, as of January 2010, were: Syed Kamall and Sajjad Haidar Karim. 2 Le Lohé in Saggar (1998) reports the number of ethnic minority councillors in London boroughs increased from 35 in 1978 to 213 in 1994.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004272262_002

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Muslim elected officials shape these factors. To this end, I study the political incorporation, party fragmentation, experiences and perceptions of Muslim councillors in London as well as their impact on government responsiveness to minority needs. In particular, I investigate whether the increasing number of Muslim councillors in Britain leads to substantive representation of Muslim interests. Based on the existing literature on minority representation, I propose the contingency theory of descriptive representation. The contingency theory of descriptive representation posits that descriptive representation is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for substantive representation of minority interests. I theorize that descriptive representation of minorities leads to improved government responsiveness to minority interests contingent on the percentage of minority representatives, the level of their party fragmentation and political incorporation, and the electoral competitiveness of the district. I use multivariate regression analysis to test the effects of these four explanatory variables. Furthermore, I evaluate the specific process of their interaction through case-study analyses of the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Hackney, while also investigating the role of representational styles of Muslim councillors on their political effectiveness. The findings of this study confirm the contingency theory of descriptive representation and suggest that, (a) Muslim identity has become strong and politicized in Britain and shapes political behavior; (b) identity based on faith impacts day to day practices, which are governed by legislation (i.e. halal food provision at hospitals, schools and other public agencies, accommodation of Islamic practices in public schools, Islamic dress code or provision of prayer time and space); (c) despite substantial in-group diversity, British Muslims share common concerns and needs; (d) Muslim elected officials are likely to advocate for the accommodation of unique demands and needs of the community and to mediate when conflicts arise with local and national governments; (e) local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in boroughs with higher proportion of Muslim councillors who are less fragmented along party lines and more politically incorporated. Although Muslims in the West is a flourishing research area, there are few rigorous studies on the political representation of Muslims in Western Europe. Moreover, most studies focus on ethnicity rather than the sociopolitical Muslim identity. Hence, this book is the first to investigate the dynamics of effective Muslim political representation in a liberal democracy. I define effective political representation as high levels of congruence between policy preferences of voters and elected officials. These research questions are significant for a number of reasons. First, there are approximately 16 million Muslims

Introduction

3

living in Western Europe. Recurring riots, violent backlashes and increasing religious extremism demonstrate that the accommodation of Muslim minorities is a pressing issue for West European governments. Dovi argues that the primary goal of a democracy is resolving conflicts fairly, which ensures its legitimacy and stability in the eyes of its citizens; “For if a disgruntled minority or majority holds that democratic institutions are unfair, then such groups are likely to employ undemocratic practices – for example, violence – to settle their political conflicts” (2007, 5). Hence, sociopolitical integration of Muslims, one third of who is under sixteen years old, is of considerable importance for the future of British civic life. Second, scholars point out that political representation is one of the highly effective means of minority integration. As Lovenduski argues, political representation “underpins the legitimacy of democratic states” and “claims for representation are part of the process of claiming membership of a polity” (2005, 3). Political empowerment literature cites that electing a minority representative can alter political attitudes and behavior of minorities, improve perceived legitimacy of the system, enhance trust in government by signaling that their concerns are taken seriously and decisions will reflect their input, and increase their sense of belonging. Therefore, the openness of British political institutions to influence from minority groups is significant for theories of democracy and representation. As such, Muslim political representation is an important venue for inclusion of Muslims in the democratic process. Third, after the 1989 Rushdie affair, Muslims emerged as a political group pressuring the British government for equal rights. Such conflicts have acted as an impetus for Muslims to seek public office, most effectively at the local level. They sought being part of the system to make political and socio-economic change for their communities. This research will shed light on whether Muslim political representation has been only symbolic. Finally, exploring these research questions at the local level, as well as the national level, is important. Muslims have been particularly successful in getting elected to local councils that affect their day-to-day lives and their longterm socio-economic status (i.e. councils have jurisdiction over local education authorities). On the other hand, national legislatures have jurisdiction over immigration, foreign policy, and national security, and they have more visible and prestigious posts. Most scholars agree that “ethnic minority immigration identification with the host country is a function of three main factors: socioeconomic status, social engagement in the mainstream culture, and political/ civic participation …” and that political and civic participation will “increase the likelihood of identifying with the nation through acceptance of national symbols, institutions, and tangible involvement and investment in the

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community …” (Maxwell 2006, 4–5). Likewise, Dovi argues that “… the ability of democratic institutions to approximate their ideals depends, in no small part, on who represents democratic citizens and how they represent them” (2007, ix). Therefore, assessing the effectiveness of minority representation at both the local and the national level would provide invaluable insights about the “continuing struggle by an excluded racial minority to win inclusion and influence in the nation’s preeminent representative institution[s]” (Fenno 2003, 1). Why study Muslim political representation in Britain? After France and Germany, Britain hosts the third largest Muslim population in Western Europe. The arrival of Muslims to Britain from the former Commonwealth countries, also leading to high citizenship rates, and their political mobilization began prior to other Western European countries. Hence, the increase in the number of minority, and in particular Muslim, representatives at the local level has been unprecedented anywhere in Western Europe, Canada or the u.s. This presents a unique opportunity to explore the dynamics of Muslim political representation. Why focus on the local level? Previous research on race and ethnic minority politics in Britain reveals that minority politics unfolds at the local level. Second, the number of Muslim elected officials at the national level is too small to constitute a meaningful analysis. Finally, local governments have jurisdiction over issues like education, zoning laws, and housing applications that affect the day-to-day lives of Muslim constituents. Although the local authorities in Britain “have lost important functions over the past ten years, have experienced dramatic reductions in government grants, particularly for capital expenditure, and have been left with, if any, capacity to raise extra revenues through local taxes” (Atkinson 2000, 2), they are still the face of the government where perceptions about government inclusiveness, equal treatment, and social justice are likely to be formed. How many Muslims are there in Western Europe and what are some of their major characteristics? Although exact numbers are not available, most scholars contend that more than 16 million Muslims live in Western Europe, constituting its largest religious minority.3 In France alone, there are approximately 5 million Muslims, making up nearly 10% of the population. According to the 2001 Census, there were 1.5 million Muslims in the u.k. which increased to 2.7 in the 2011 Census; whereas the number is 3 million in Germany, 3 Some scholar contest that Muslims are the second largest religious minority in Western Europe, questioning the analytical logic of treating numerous Christian denominations as monolithic (Bujis 2002).

Introduction

5

constituting about 3% of the population of both countries. In the Netherlands, Muslims number about one million, reaching about 6% of its sixteen million population. Most European Muslims are second or third generation descendants of immigrants who came to Europe in the early 1960s and 1970s as guest workers drawn to the post-World War II economic expansion. Although none of the West European countries continue to accept guest-workers as such, number of Muslims has been increasing due to family reunification, natural growth rates, Muslim students settling post-graduation, asylum seekers and refugees, and finally, illegal immigration.4 One of the defining characteristics of this minority group is its heterogeneity. Hence, it may be misleading to take European Muslims as one unit of analysis. In France, the majority of Muslims are of North African descent with a contentious colonial history; whereas in Germany, Turkish guest workers and their families constitute the largest minority. In England, on the other hand, most Muslims are more educated and wealthier citizens from former Commonwealth countries. Moreover, even within one country, “Muslims are not a unified constituency. Ethnicity, gender, political outlook, and class are sources of disagreement and dissent” Klausen (2005, 52). One of the consequences of this diversity is that it obstructs the bargaining power of Muslim minorities to achieve their policy demands as a unified constituency.

Defining Political Representation

This research is situated within the broader debates in the political representation literature. What follows is a review of the scholarly literatures that drive this research. Political representation is a highly contested concept in the social sciences. Pitkin defines political representation as “to make present again” (1967, 8). According to this conception, representation is to make the voices of the constituents present in the policy-making process as representatives speak and act on behalf of their constituents. Pitkin (1967) also argues that the nature of political representation is paradoxical, which leads to conflicting conceptions of representation each requiring different assessment methods. For instance, formalistic representation includes institutional arran­gements that result in representation, and involves authorization (how a representative gets into office) and accountability (responsiveness of the representatives to 4 Taspinar notes that “Today, the Muslim birth rate in Europe is three times higher than the non-Muslim one. If current trends continue, the Muslim population of Europe will nearly double by 2015, while the non-Muslim population will shrink by 3.5 percent” (2003, 76).

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constituent demands, and the ability of constituents to hold the representative accountable for failing to act upon their interests). Descriptive representation refers to how much and in what ways the representatives resemble the represented; whereas substantive representation involves actions of the representative on behalf of the represented, which is assessed through policy outcomes. On the other hand, symbolic representation refers to how a representative stands for the represented and the degree of acceptance by the represented. These categories define the different strands of debate within the representation literature. This book primarily explores the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation.

Is Descriptive Representation Desirable?

Scholars advocate descriptive representation by explaining why and how liberal democracy is compatible with group representation (Phillips 1995; Kymlicka 1995; Young 1990; Young 2000; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998). Their arguments in support of descriptive representation focus on trust, psychological benefits (e.g. enhanced feeling of the ability to rule), and increased responsiveness to group interests. In sum, the arguments for descriptive representation can be categorized into four. The role model argument emphasizes the benefits of simply seeing minority members in positions of power. For example, having a woman vice president attests to the possibility of attaining such powerful positions and breaks stereotypes of gender roles. The justice argument maintains that descriptive representation of minority groups somehow compensates for past (and current) injustices. Overlooked interests argument holds that presence of minority representatives in decision-making bodies ensures that minority voices will be heard and responded to positively. Finally, revitalized democracy argument states that the presence of minority representatives is necessary to increase participation, accountability and legitimacy of the democratic system. For example, Williams argues that representatives are the agents to establish trust through the representativeconstituent relationship, and distrust can be “partially mended if the disadvantaged group is represented by its own members” (1998, 14). Whether descriptive representation increases substantive representation of minority interests is one of the most important research questions in the political representation literature. For example, many empirical studies have found that women have distinct representation styles and that their presence in decision-making bodies makes a substantive difference in passing favorable policies and changing the masculine institutional culture of legislatures

Introduction

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(Hawkesworth 2003, 548; Darling 1997, 162; Thomas and Welch 2001, 223; Kathlene 1989, 84; Thomas 1994, 79; Lovenduski 2005; Diamond 1977; Carroll 1991; Reingold 2006; Kelly, Saint-Germain, and Horn 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Barrett 1995; Swers 1998, 2002). Moreover, studies conducted in the u.s. and Western Europe report similar findings, despite institutional and cultural differences. In sum, the literature on descriptive representation argues that “certain groups have been consistently under-represented in legislative bodies, and that without their presence it is extremely likely that their interests will be overlooked and that policies will be biased against them” (Bird 2004, 3).

The Case for Muslim Political Representation

Why are Muslim elected officials necessary? Does religious identity supersede ethnicity or gender? How is religious group representation justified in a liberal democracy? Studies on constituent-elected representative relations find high levels of convergence between the political behavior of elected officials and constituent preferences. This is particularly true for highly salient issues like civil rights and welfare policies (Fenno 1978; Erickson 1978). Yet most scholars emphasize the need for group representation to ensure such congruence. This begs the question, which group identity shall prevail? Individuals have various descriptive characteristics, and their group identifications shift through time. For instance, British Muslims can be represented vis-à-vis their ethnicity, gender, religion, sect, etc. Do scholars, then, impose the religious identity on Western Muslims for analytical purposes? This is not the case for two reasons. First and foremost, Muslim identity has become strong and politicized in Britain, acting as a significant determinant of political behavior and preceding ethnic or racial allegiances. Muslim elected officials are likely to mediate when conflicts arise with local and national governments, and they advocate for the accommodation of unique demands and needs of the Muslim community. Therefore, investigating the group dynamics of British Muslims and their political behavior is analytically rational and indispensable. Moreover, the emphasis on religious identity does not come at the expense of other group affiliations. Muslim women have unique concerns that call for policy responses; Asian minorities pressure government authorities to implement policies that respect their cultural sensitivities; and certain Muslim sects, such as the Ahmadis, demand special accommodations for their religious practices. Despite rejecting totalizing essentialism, and acknowledging that socialization, culture, family, schooling and personal traits render different Islamic interpretations and practices, British Muslims share common concerns and

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needs, which call for Muslim representation. What are the group-specific concerns, accommodations, and interests of British Muslims that require Muslim political representation? Some of the policy issues that arise in several Western European countries are halal food provision at hospitals, schools and other public agencies, and accommodation of Islamic practices in public schools, i.e. Islamic dress code or provision of prayer time and space (Tatari 2009). The candid acknowledgement of the 1981 Bradford Council Report published by the local council demonstrates the need for group representatives. The Bradford Council states that it has no direct knowledge of Asian needs and requirements, and we have no automatic way of knowing the issues they feel important … [We need] some new channel of communication between the Council and the communities – something to compensate for the lack of political representation. Lewis 1997, 103

Furthermore, size and nature of the Muslim community also plays a role in necessitating group representation. Muslims constitute 3% of the total population of Britain, and 8.5% of London. According to mcb data based on the 2001 Census, there is one parliamentary constituency (out of 529) with 49% Muslim population, two with 30–40%, six with 20–30%, thirty-one with 10–20%, sixty-one with 5–10%, and 468 with 0–5% Muslim constituents (see Table 7.5). On the other hand, Islamic political mobilization forces Western governments to reconsider conceptions of secularism and sociopolitical institutions based on Christianity. Islamophobia on the part of governments and societies shape this debate and impact policy making unconstructively. For instance, when Western governments propose initiatives to liaise with their Muslim populations in policy-making, the role of Muslim elected officials becomes indispensable. Pluralism entails multiple groups thriving within the same polity, not through policy silences, but through active policy-making. Moreover, as Malik (2005) suggests sociopolitical, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious plurality moves beyond mere co-existence through constructive pluralism and interaction. Finally, Swain claims that the ability of governments to address minority needs is a test of representative democracy (2006, 3). Although she is referring to racial minorities, her statement is equally true for all minorities and liberal democracies that extend constitutional protections for freedom of religious belief and expression. At times, the test of representative democracy is one of mere responsiveness as opposed to overlooking the needs of a sizable

Introduction

9

constituency. However, at other times, it demands more radical change. For instance, those involved in the civil rights movement recognized that securing desired political and civil rights and liberties and impacting public policy necessitated holding elected office. Once elected in order to maximize their effectiveness and influence, African American legislatures must also practice a politics intended to be system changing. That is, black representatives should advocate and seek support for programs that are directly targeted, at least in part, toward African Americans, and that are likely to result in “radical” changes in social and economic policies. Haynie 2001, 4

The same holds true for all religious minorities and Muslim elected officials. For liberal democracies that extend constitutional protection of religious belief and expression, ensuring effective political representation for religious minorities is an essential test of representative democracy.

Chapter 2

Muslims and Minority Politics in Britain When classifying minority policies of Western states, Britain is often categorized as multiculturalist as opposed to France, a hardcore assimilationist state. These terms are used in multiple contexts and therefore need further clarification. According to Klausen, integration “implies a process of give and take on both sides. Assimilation suggests that the immigrants must do the adjusting. If the aim is coexistence or simply toleration of immigrant religions and faith practices, the burden of adjustment is in practice on European society” (2005a,b, 10). On the other hand, multiculturalism refers to taking into account of “group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship and national identity” (Modood 2007, 2). Yet most Western European countries were based on a core ethnic group and are therefore facing challenges to shift from an ethnic to a civic selfdefinition (Kaufmann 2004, 1). According to Kaufmann, the dominant ethnicities as well as minorities within these states are engaged in a process of reviving, constructing and adapting their identities and political strategies to the evolving context of late modernity. Due to their indigenous legitimacy and emotive power, such groups are arguably more central to explaining cultural and political developments than either subaltern minorities or professional state elites … States place the emphasis on the instruments of coercion, government and boundary demarcation within a territory. Ethnic groups refer to communities of (supposedly) shared ancestry, almost always accompanied by notions of an ancestral homeland and cultural boundary markers. Nations comprise an uneasy hybrid of elements from e­ thnies … 2004, 2

There are multiple sources of dominance for ethnic groups, such as demographic, cultural, political, and economic (Kaufmann 2004, 3). The cultural form of dominance undoubtedly encompasses religious dominance as well. Hence, assimilation of another ethnie can take the form of assimilation of its religious beliefs and expressions. Some scholars contend that as part of the  general decline in religion, the dominance of the Protestant faith has ­disappeared almost completely from British politics and national identity (Bruce 2004, 116). According to Bruce, religious identity has been replaced © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004272262_003

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by  a  secular and national identity linked to the “evolution of the British Conservative Party” (2004, 122). It took rather racist overtones when Thatcher and her sympathizers, who were economic liberals and secular social conservatives, defined a “white anti-European Englishness largely derived from borrowing a minor key  from Enoch Powell and the racist right” (Bruce 2004, 123–124). Evidently, when Muslims emerge as a religious minority demanding religious rights, they are faced with many challenges within the British framework of religious de-emphasis. According to Stubbs, Western Muslims are “the victims of the new Europe … Across Europe, Muslims are denied the right to dress as they wish – to express themselves freely. They face some of the highest levels of exclusion from the labour market, live in the poorest housing conditions and have little or no representation through civil and political leadership” (Stubbs 2000, 212). Moreover, Gillborn (1998) argues that ethnic minority ­students in Britain experience significant levels of stereotyping from other ­students as well as teachers. His findings show that racism against Asians is more aggressive than against Caribbeans.

Protection of Religious Belief and Expression in Britain

Understanding the place of religion in British society as well as the regulations on the protection of religious belief and expression provides important insights. Writing in the aftermath of the 2001 race riots that took place in northern Britain, Weller points to the “potentially dangerous cocktail” of socioeconomic deprivation and assimilation of ethno-religious identities (2003, 60). He argues that the United Kingdom has an historical inheritance that differs significantly from the liberal contemporary self-image in respect of religious diversity. Historically, religious and political belonging were often seen as being co-terminal. When and where this has been the case, religious diversity has often been seen as being at least potentially dangerous to the fabric of the state and of society … As a result, British history has seen attempts to impose varying degree of uniformity in the public profession of belief and in religious worship, in which the law itself has also been an instrument of discrimination. In England and Wales, such discriminatory legal provisions included a number of Acts of Uniformity, the Test and Corporation Acts, the Conventicle Acts, and the Five Mile Act. Weller 2003, 60

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The process of secularization gained momentum in the 1960s, confining religion to the private sphere. Hence, by the 1970s and 1980s, minority politics was predominantly concerned with issues of race and ethnicity exclusively. Yet recently religion has begun to re-emerge as “a marker of individual and community identity” for significant segments of British society (Weller 2003, 61). This phenomenon has been painted with religious prejudice, exclusion, and unfair treatment. As Weller contends, stereotyping is “deeply entrenched in relation to the perceptions of Muslims in western societies” (2003, 68). In Britain, the discussion has focused on the discrepancies between the treatment of established and non-established religious groups. Historically, established religions have been afforded access to certain socio-political institutions which are largely denied to non-established religions. The Church of England has had a privileged position, not just in its relations with the Monarch, but also with the Parliament (i.e. specific quotas in the House of Lords). Hence, nonestablished religions are subject to a form of indirect religious discrimination. Tillich claims that there is an “inescapable relationship between religion and secular life, [and] proposes that certain political beliefs are tantamount to ‘secular faiths’ and may be embraced with a fervor equal to that commanded by theistic religions” (Squires 2003, 97). He also contends that since the Anglican Church is the only protected religious group, de jure, all others suffer discrimination (Squires 2003, 97). Culturally exclusive practices with regard to religious worship, diet, clothing, religious festivals and other matters that cover day to day lives of employees, students, and public servants are some examples of the subtle but wide-spread indirect discrimination in recruitment and service provision (Weller 2003, 74). On the other hand, direct religious discrimination occurs when people are deliberately excluded from opportunities or services based on their religion. Regulations on protection of religion and religious expression in Britain fall into two categories. First, all the e.u. member countries belong to the Council of Europe (coe), which addresses human rights and cultural issues, including religious belief and expression. Second, at the British national level, court ­rulings set the tone. European Court of Human Rights (echr) is the final judicial arbiter of the coe constitution, i.e. the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (echrff). The echr assesses whether member countries’ laws and court decisions are compatible with the echrff, and its decisions are binding on all member states. Article 9 and 10 of the echrff outline that freedom of belief and its manifestation are to be protected under law. These articles serve as benchmarks for member states, including Britain, and outline the extent of freedoms and conditions for limitations. The caveat is the debatable power of the e.u. and the coe to enforce member states to abide by its constitution, and the extent non-conformity can

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be reprimanded.1 Paraschos claims that although the general European trend on freedom of worship has been tolerant of non-majority religions, it still permits state interference with religious expression when it is deemed offensive by the dominant religion (2000, 17). He contends that “While progress has been made and some e.u. nations have moved away from the historic ‘State church’ concept, considerable support still exists for the idea that expression on religious issues is more restrainable than other types of expression. Such support has found validation even in the e.u.’s highest court, the European Court of Human Rights” (Paraschos 2000, 17). Moreover, in 2000, the European Commission issued the Employment Directive (2000/78/EC) to ensure “the principle of equal treatment as regards access to employment and occupation … irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (Article I of Employment Directive). The Directive rectifies the long-standing anomaly that discrimination on the grounds of race, but not religion, is prohibited in Great Britain … Previously, in the absence of legislation prohibiting religious discrimination, those who claimed to have suffered unequal treatment on the grounds of religion or belief could not avail themselves of a legal remedy if they were able to show that they had been victims of indirect racial discrimination. Accordingly successful litigants had to prove that they were members of a ‘racial’ (as opposed to a ‘religious’) group whose members enjoyed a long shared history or possessed their own cultural tradition. This meant that faiths such as Sikhism and Judaism, whose members tended to share both religious and ethnic ties, fell within the remit of the Race Relations Act. However, this arrangement failed to offer protection to a wide range of other faith organizations, whose membership was defined primarily by religious rather ethnic or racial factors. This created a series of bizarre anomalies. For example, since Muslims were not, per se, covered by the Race Relations Act, a Pakistani Muslim was only protected from discrimination in so far as their ‘ethnic origin’ brought him/her within the confines of the Race Relations legislation, while a white indigenous British convert to Islam enjoyed no such protection. Cumper 2003, 161–162

1 Other international conventions such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also face enforcement challenges.

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At the British national level, different challenges arise. Since the U.K. has “no constitution, Bill of Rights, or other executive, parliamentary, or judicial document that defines a citizen’s rights, the implication being that British citizens are free to express whatever they wish, as long as their expression does not violate a law” (Paraschos 2000, 14). He draws attention particularly to the offense of blasphemy that criminalizes offensive religious expression. The blasphemy law has been used in England once since 1922, when the courts found a poem attributing homosexuality to Christ blasphemous (Whitehouse v. Lemon/R., 1979). Religious groups challenged this law in the early 1990s, accusing the state for using it exclusively to protect Christianity. For when, in 1991, British Muslims brought the blasphemy law against Salman Rushdie’s “The Satanic Verses,” a British Divisional Court ruled that the law does not extend to religions other than Christianity. Commenting on the dismissal of the Rushdie case, Squires contends that “this unevenness of interpretation of the law does not sit well with many non-Christians in the United Kingdom” (2003, 94). As a response to the wide-spread protests, John Patten, the Minister of State at the Home Department at the time, sent a letter to the influential leaders of the British Muslim community. The letter stated that the government had carefully considered the argument about amending the law to accommodate other religions, but concluded that it would be unwise to do so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was “the clear lack of agreement over whether the law should be reformed or repealed … [and that] An alteration in the law would lead to a rush of litigation which would damage relations between the faiths” (Paraschos 2000, 28–29). Scholars cite this law as one of the reasons why Britain cannot be considered a secular state par excellence. Moreover, although statistics show that church attendance in the U.K. has been dropping steadily for the last fifty years, and in some localities only 2% of residents attend church services, institutional analysis also challenges the common perception of Britain as a secular society. For instance, Squires argues that for the past four centuries, “Religious groups have all promoted their respective claims as to which particular brand of moral conscience should guide policy and the law of the land” (2003, 82). More recently, continuous pressure by British Muslims, who constitute significant percentages of the population in given localities, began to also challenge Britain’s secular identity. For instance, combating injustices motivated many British Muslims to engage in electoral politics. Those who promote a Muslim parliament claim that there can be no ­separation between Church and state and that, in spite of the fact that Muslims have generally voted Labour, Muslims should now consider

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

15

b­ oycotting elections and unite behind a political group dedicated entirely to Muslim concerns. Less extreme, and perhaps more pragmatic, Muslim groups advocate greater Muslim involvement with established political structures. In this way, it is hoped that Muslims will overcome their marginalization by established political parties and stand a better chance of having their needs met. Squires 2003, 97

Hence, the assertion of minority needs from a religious framework contradicts the claim that religion no longer plays a significant role in the political arena. Moreover, considerable tension exists between British Muslims and the ­society at large, often blaming the flexible immigration policies for allowing ­millions to flock into the country. In 1996, Runnymede Trust commission investigating Islamophobia reported that hatred of Islam was pervasive across all sections of the British society.

History of Immigration and Demographics of British Muslims

The majority of British Muslims migrated from the Commonwealth countries for economic reasons. Initially, South Asian male laborers from rural backgrounds came to work as unskilled and semi-skilled industrial workers. The pull factor for this immigration was Britain’s labor shortage caused by World War II casualties and the improving living standards of the working class under Labour’s welfare policies. As a result of these unprecedented opportunities, certain jobs became undesirable for white workers, attracting new comers with little training and poor language skills. Since the British Empire extended British nationality to the Commonwealth citizens, immigration was bureaucratically simple. Overpopulation, high unemployment, and poverty in the ­former colonies were push factors that made even the prospect of menial jobs in a foreign land attractive. As a result, an estimated 50,000 Indian and Pakistanis migrated to the U.K. between 1955 and 1960 (Squires 2003, 87). As their financial stability improved, male immigrants started to bring their families through the 1970s. Although the proportion of highly educated professionals was initially small, it gradually increased with political refugees from East Africa arriving in the late 1960s and 1970s. The most recent waves of Muslim immigration were the political refugees from Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s. As most immigration to Western democracies, large industrial cities with abundant job opportunities have attracted both professionals and laborers newcomers. Hence, British Muslims are scattered in large cities throughout

16

Chapter 2

the U.K., with more than half residing in London. Today, after France’s 5 million and Germany’s 3 million Muslims, Britain is host to Europe’s third largest Muslim population, at nearly 2.7 million, a vast majority (96%) of who live in England (see Table 2.1). Although the 2001 Census reported 1.6 million Muslims, the 2011 Census reports 2.7 million Muslims. In addition, British Muslims constitute nearly 52% of U.K.’s non-Christian population and are mainly concentrated in four regions, London (38%), West Midlands (13.6%), North West (13%), and Yorkshire and the Humber (12%). As depicted in Table 2.2, more than half of British Muslims are of Asian origin. The other half consists of blacks (9%), mixed ethnicities (10%), and Chinese and other ethnicities (13%). Table  2.2 compares population estimates from mid-2001 and mid-2004 in England. The figures are telling in that all the ethnic groups with significant Muslim proportions are either unchanging (Bengalis) or increasing (Indians; Pakistanis; Black Africans; and other white – constituted of mostly Turks, Turkish Cypriots, and Middle Easterners, as well as Eastern Europeans). On the contrary, the white ethnic category as a whole and white British and white Irish ethnic groups are decreasing. Demographic characteristics of British Muslims are similar to the Christian population in certain aspects, such as gender distribution, and drastically different in others like age distribution. The percentage of Muslim males is 3.4% higher than that of Muslim females, whereas the percentage of Christian females is 6.5% higher than that of Christian males. The same pattern of higher Table 2.1

Population of England and Wales by religion, 2011 Population in thousands

All categories: Religion No religion Christian Buddhist Hindu Jewish Muslim Sikh Other religion Religion not stated source: census 2011, office for national statistics.

56,076 14,097 33,243 248 817 263 2706 423 241 4038

17

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain Table 2.2 Estimated population of England by ethnic group, mid-2001 and mid-2004 2001

All people White White British White Irish Other White Non-White Mixed White and Black Caribbean White and Black African White and Asian Other Mixed Asian Indian Pakistani Bengali Other Asian Black or Black British Black Caribbean Black African Other Black Chinese Other

2004

Thousands

Percentage

Thousands

Percentage

49,449.7 44,896.9 42,925.8 628.8 1342.3 4552.8

100.0 90.8 86.8 1.3 2.7 9.2

50,093.1 44,834.0 42,708.9 601.4 1523.7 5259.1

100.0 89.5 85.3 1.2 3.0 10.5

234.4

0.5

257.3

0.5

78.3

0.2

95.2

0.2

187.2 154.3

0.4 0.3

220.1 180.2

0.4 0.4

1045.6 720.0 281.5 243.8

2.1 1.5 0.6 0.5

1167.7 803.0 314.9 294.0

2.3 1.6 0.6 0.6

569.8 491.1 97.4 227.0 222.4

1.2 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.4

585.2 624.0 106.7 312.4 298.6

1.2 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.6

source: office for national statistics and general register office for scotland.

male percentages is also true for Hindus and Sikhs. Among all religious groups, British Muslims have the youngest population where 34% are younger than fifteen, and 37% are between sixteen and thirty-four years of age. Those who are over sixty-five are only 4% of the Muslim population, whereas this figure is as high as 19% for Christians and 22% for Jews. These statistics cause unease among extreme right-wing factions alarmed that the Muslim population may become the majority in a few decades.

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Training and education statistics reveal that British Muslims constitute the highest percentage of people of working age with no qualifications (33%), followed by Sikhs at 21% and Buddhists at 17% (see Table 2.3). Among all religious groups, Jews are the group with the lowest percentage of working age people with no qualifications (7%). Comparing the three predominant religions among the British Asian population, no qualification percentages are in descending order among Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus (see Table 2.3). Of those whose highest qualification is the GCE a levels, Muslims have the lowest percentage (13%) among all religious groups; however, of those who get GSCE a–c or equivalent, a higher percentage are Muslims (15%) than Jews (12%), Hindus (11%), and Buddhists (10%). Employment and labor statistics for religious groups are comparable to ­education figures. Unemployment rate for Muslims is highest (15%) among all religious groups, followed by Buddhists at only 8%. Unemployment rate among economically active Muslim females is higher than Muslim males at 18%. Given that the unemployment rate for all people is 5%, unemployment among Muslims is three times higher than the general population. The 2005 unemployment rates broken down by ethnic group illustrate that unemployment of all ethnic minority groups (12%) is more than twice the rate for whites (5%). The rate for black category (15%) is three times and the Asian category is twice the rate for whites. After Jews (33%), Muslims have the second highest Table 2.3 Religious groups in Great Britain with highest qualification, 2004 Degree or Higher GCE a or GSCE a–c Other No equivalent education equivalent or equivalent qualification qualification

Christian Buddhist Hindu Jewish Muslim Sikh Any other religion No religion Total

16.3 29.8 29.0 43.7 12.4 19.9 23.2

9.0 8.6 5.4 7.5 3.7 5.6 9.4

24.2 15.1 15.1 20.0 13.4 18.2 20.5

23.2 9.5 10.8 12.4 14.8 16.0 19.7

12.0 20.0 25.0 9.1 23.0 19.8 14.3

15.3 17.0 14.7 7.3 32.7 20.5 12.9

22.3 17.6

7.4 8.5

22.9 23.4

22.4 22.5

10.9 12.4

14.1 15.7

*As a proportion of all working age population (Males 16–64, Females 16–59).

source: office for national statistics and general register office for scotland (percentages).

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

19

­percentage of those who are self-employed (19%). This is due to the vast number of Muslim owned restaurants since the highest percentage (34%) of Muslim population works in this industry category.

Politicized Religious Identity

Racial, religious or other types of identities are constructed and reconstructed constantly. Although assuming fixed identities to form analytical categories facilitates social scientific analysis, there are numerous social processes that impact the continuous transformation of individual as well as group i­ dentities.2 One such factor is the country of birth, shaping allegiances. More than half of British Muslims were born outside the U.K. (53.5%), yet since 39% were born in the former colonies of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, they are not necessarily non-citizens. A breaking point in the identity formation of Muslims was the 1989 Rushdie affair. The consensus is that the Rushdie affair has generated an impassioned activism and mobilization, that no previous campaign against racism had remotely done. Many ‘lapsed’ or ‘passive’ Muslims (Muslims, especially the non-religious, for whom hitherto their Muslim background was not particularly important) (re)discovered a new community solidarity. What was striking was that when the public rage against Muslims was at its most intense, Muslims neither sought nor were offered any special solidarity by any non-white minority. It was, in fact, some white liberal Anglicans that tried to moderate the hostility against the angry Muslims, it was inter-faith for a rather than politicalblack organizations that tried to create space where Muslims could state their case without being vilified. Modood 2003, 230

This dominant religious identity politicized through a single determining event has been a persistent identity marker of the British Muslim community ever since. The British Muslim identity has also been strengthened by the “Gulf war protests and, more recently, by urban disturbances across North England in 2001, post-9/11 anti-terrorism operations, and anti-war protests against British and American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Michael 2004, 5). It is also expected for young Muslims to be defensive of their religion that has 2 Political representation discourse entails an assumption about group identities. See KahaniHopkins (2002, 290) for further discussion.

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Table 2.4 Religious groups who consider their identity to be British, English, Scottish or Welsh, 2004 Total

No religion

Any other Sikh religion

Muslim

Jewish

Hindu Buddhist Christian

94.2

95.5

85.0

91.8

78.5

68.8

58.9

70.4

95.6

source: annual population survey, january 2004 to december 2004, office for national statistics (percentages).

come under constant attack (2002). Yet as depicted in Table  2.4, among all ­religious groups, Muslims have the highest percentage (92%) who consider their identity to be British, English, Scottish or Welsh. It is possible that the “othering” campaign following 9/11, and particularly 7/7, has led British Muslims to reiterate their Britishness. This strong religious identity has challenged the state-church relations in Britain, forcing religion to have a new and amplified importance in policymaking. Since religious identity has taken priority for Asian youth, anti-racist organizations are arguably no longer sufficient to address problems like Islamophobia. At the same time, it is important to note that Muslims are not a monolith group acting in unison on all fronts. It is empirically shown that even among Pakistani Muslims, there are different strands of Islam and regional solidarities (Purdam 2001). This diversity is one of the factors that have hindered the formation of a strong British Muslim block. Yet, for second and third generation British Asians, their Muslim identity is more salient than their ethnic or regional affiliations (Michael 2004, 4). Evidence from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in Britain found that religious affiliation of one’s family is the most important source of self-identity among Britons of South Asian origin. Modood contends that this is a result of a strong sense of community as much as strong personal faith (2003, 234–235). Table 2.5 confirms this finding, showing that Muslims are the second largest religious group who state that religion is important to their self-identity (67%). As religious identity becomes more salient, policy demands are increasingly framed in terms of religious rights. Modood classifies the type of policy demands made by religious groups into three categories in increasing order of how ­unacceptable they are for radical secularists (2003, 234–235). The first demand is that there should not be religious discrimination in employment or elsewhere. The second demand is parity with the native religions, particularly for receiving state support en par with the established religions. The third demand is positive

21

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain Table 2.5 Religious groups in England and Wales who stated religion said something important about their self-identity, by country of birth, 2001

Christian Buddhist Hindu Jewish Muslim Sikh Other No religion All

U.K. born

Non-U.K. born

All

19.7 56.5 53.1 75.9 71.4 55.9 34.7 3.5 16.9

40.4 25.0 50.5 94.1 64.7 64.3 45.5 7.0 41.9

21.1 43.6 51.2 80.3 66.6 61.3 36.0 3.7 19.1

source: home office citizenship survey 2001, home office (percentages).

inclusion of religious groups and that “… religion in ­general, or at least the category of ‘Muslim’ in particular, should be a category by which the inclusiveness of social institutions should be judged in the same way that anti-racists use ‘black’ and feminists use ‘female’” (Modood 2003, 238). However, British antidiscrimination legislation has been exclusively framed in racial terms. The first anti-discrimination legislation was the 1965 Race Relations Bill, which “outlawed discrimination in specified places of public resort, such as hotels, restaurants, cinemas, dance halls and transport facilities, and made it a criminal offence deliberately to stir up racial hatred by publishing or distributing written matter or by speaking in public” (Brown 1983, 51). It also led to ­setting up the Race Relations Board to deal with discrimination complaints. The second Race Relations Act was passed in 1968 and set up a parallel body to the Board, the Community Relations Commission (crc) to promote good community relations. The 1976 Race Relations Act replaced the Board and the crc with the Commission for Racial Equality (cre). All these legislations and ­entities focused exclusively on racial discrimination. Modood argues that the concept of racial equality shifted since the 1960s from an understanding of ‘equality’ in terms of individualism and cultural assimilation to a politics of recognition, to ‘equality’ as encompassing public ethnicity. ‘Equality’ as not having to hide or apologise for one’s origins, family or community but requiring others to show respect for

22

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them and adapt public attitudes and arrangements so that the heritage they represent is encouraged rather than contemptuously expected to wither away …. Multiculturalism (as recent anti-racism has come to be) requires, however, support for both conceptions. 2003, 226

Analyzing the British context in which Muslims are advocating for religious rights, Modood contends that the case for anti-essentialism in the social sciences originated through the works of thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and more recently Foucault and Derrida, contesting such hegemonic ideas as nation-state, class, women, and blacks (2003, 228). Originally, minority politics and the anti-racism campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s in Britain had radical activism and ultra-left tones. Following the Brixton riots of 1981, the concept of political blackness prevailed in the local authorities, trade unions, and the Labour Party. Modood argues that South Asian political activists have initially embraced the racial (black) identity in the early 1980s; however, by the late 1980s, “most Asians were emphasizing a more particular ethnic or religious identity rather than this all – inclusive non-whiteness” (2003, 229–230). Hence, prior to the 1990s, equality discourse shaping antidiscrimination laws in Britain was captured by the view that color-racism was the dominant issue. Ironically, British public policy, in particular anti-discrimination laws, have not followed suit with the development of a salient British Muslim identity. Until now, Muslims are not “recognized as a distinct ethnic group, though Muslims have been able to seek redress under the Race Relations Act of 1976, but any claims rest on their national or individual ‘race’ rather than their Islamic identities (Purdam 2001, 148). Although there are legal frameworks to seek redress on basis of gender, race and ethnicity, Muslims are not protected by the anti-discrimination laws. In 1983, the House of Lords ruled that Sikhs and Jews were considered an ethnic group and are thus protected by the 1976 Race Relations Act (Mandla v. Dowell-Lee).3 Yet in 1988 (Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd),4 the courts ruled that Muslims do not constitute such a group – and, therefore, are not protected by the act – since their regional and linguistic origins are more

3 The case was about a head teacher who refused to permit a Sikh student to wear his turban at school. 4 The case was about an employer who refused time off for an employee for Eid al Fitr.

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

23

diverse. The implications of this ruling were evident in a 1991 case (Commission for Racial Equality v. Precision Engineering Ltd) after an employer blatantly stated that he refused to employ Muslims because he considered them ‘extremist’: he was found guilty only of ‘indirect ­discrimination’ against Asians (since most British Muslims are of such descent), while his anti-Muslim sentiments were unassailed. Vertovec and Peach 1997, 35–37

When finally in 1993 Muslim laborers in Yorkshire accused the employees of unfair treatment with regard to the type of tasks, pay, and holiday benefits they were offered, the Commission for Racial Equality supported measures to redress the concerns.5 Yet, as Vertovec and Peach contend, associational liaisons and new legal frameworks are needed to redress the direct and indirect discrimination of Muslim minorities (1997, 34–35). It is generally assumed that “Muslims and South Asians in Britain develop anti-mainstream identities because they live in impoverished and segregated ghettoes, participate in non-mainstream religions, and politically organize via ethnically and religiously motivated networks” (Maxwell 2006, 1). Maxwell uses survey data from the 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey to test these claims and finds that “Muslims and South Asians are almost as likely as whites to identify as British” (2006, 1). He argues that discrimination plays a more important role in identifying as British than socio-economic challenges and claims that “despite living in ethnically segregated neighborhoods and retaining ethnic and religious social and political networks, Muslims and South Asians have actively built integrated networks, have trust in mainstream political institutions, and are committed to being a part of the larger British community”(Maxwell 2006, 1). The empirical evidence is telling in that despite having the lowest economic indicators, Bengalis and Pakistanis are more likely to feel British than Indians. Likewise, Werbner also denies essentializing Muslims as being antithetical to Western notions of democracy and sees the development of Muslim British civic consciousness as a potential for active participation and citizenship (2000, 307). Moreover, he views the protests and demands by British Muslims as a learning process for a relatively new minority group to gain political clout within a democratic system. British Muslim identity has been subject to many influences, both from different Muslim groups as well as non-Muslim political actors trying to find community interlocutors. One such example is the Islamic Party of Britain and the Muslim Parliament of Britain established in 1992. Kahani-Hopkins investigates 5 Q-News, 2–9 April 1993, U.K.

24

Chapter 2

“how activists seeking to promote different political projects seek to recruit support from British Muslims through invoking Islamic concepts in quite contrasting ways …” (2002, 293). Both organizations aim to transcend within-group divisions and create a politically engaged and unified British Muslim identity despite the vast differences in their political objectives. The Islamic Party of Britain views the pursuit of an Islamic state as a distraction where as the Muslim Parliament of Britain makes it top priority. In 1992, the first leader of the Parliament made the following comments during an Eid message: “If establishing the state of Islam is not possible in Britain, then lower levels of the ‘Islamic state’ can and must be established …. Islam demands that we establish all levels of authority, and as high a level as is possible at any given time and at any given place” (Siddiqui 1997, 6). The Party on the other hand, is involved in British politics, and has even put up candidates during the 1992 general election. Likewise, Muslim religious leaders are strong sources influencing the British Muslim identity. When communities become rooted in new societies they strive for recognition and respect for their values. British Muslims feel that the give and take with mainstream culture lopsidedly necessitates minorities to forfeit elements of their culture. There has been an ongoing debate within the Muslim community in Britain and other Western European countries as to what extent this assimilation or integration into the dominant culture is desirable. Although compromises are inevitable by nature of sociopolitical and economic interactions with the British society, their extent and level depends largely upon “the framework of the dominant society, and its sensitivities and willingness to accommodate difference and diversity” (Khan 2000, 37). To this end, Western Muslims consult religious authorities, both in the West and in predominantly Muslim countries. There are multiple national and international councils of Islamic jurisprudence that are applying the principals of ijtihad (judicial ­reasoning) to extend Islamic doctrines to modern context. Shadid and Van Koningsveld analyze the views of religious authorities on political participa­ tion  of Muslims in western societies and conclude that their views vary considerably: Scholars living in the Muslim world tend to regard this as permissible or recommendable, while advising or obliging Muslims actively participating in non-Muslim political parties to consult the Muslims as a ‘Group’ and coordinate their viewpoints and strategies with it. Scholars living in the Western world itself, however, tend to regard such participation as obligatory, without stressing the necessity of previous coordination with such a Muslim ‘Group’. The European Council [for Fatwas and Research]

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

25

occupies an intermediate position, referring the decision in these matters to the local Islamic foundations and associations. 2002, 167–168

Taji-Farouki, one of the leading experts on Hizb-ul-Tahrir, discusses the political views of the movement and the quest of its members to establish the Islamic caliphate (1996). It denies all relations with Western political institutions and actively protests participation of Muslims in Western politics in any form or shape. The movement’s influence has been increasing in Britain, along with other, less extremist Islamic movements. Disillusionment of many Muslims with the British state and society make the message of groups like Hizb-ul-Tahrir resonate deeper. Yet some scholars and movements emphasize the overlap between Islamic principles and British sociopolitical culture. For instance, the concept of the welfare state is compatible with the Qur’anic doctrine of almsgiving. Rex argues that “it might be better therefore to see British institutions in the political sphere, not as purely secular, but as requiring modification in accordance with moral principles shared between many humanists, Christians and Muslims” (1999, 6). Likewise, Khan points out that perhaps it is this realization of common objectives and values that encouraged the British prime minister, Tony Blair, to acknowledge a common struggle for social values with Muslims. During an address to the Muslim Council of Britain, he emphasized that the British people and his government shared with Muslims, the ‘concept of zakat and equality of races’, and assured the Muslims in Britain that they ‘are a part of Britain’s multicultural society, and that religious or racial prejudice was no longer deemed fashionable in any section of British society’. 2000, 39–40



Muslim Political Participation and Representation in Britain

Several features of the British political system impact whether and to what extend minorities, including British Muslims, get involved in electoral politics. For instance, Norris and Lovenduski analyze the supply and demand models of candidate selection that strongly influence minority political representation. They explain that “On the demand-side selectors choose candidates depending upon their perceptions of how far the applicants’ abilities, qualifications and experience fir their ideas of the role of an mp. Since candidates are rarely well known to most selectors, these perceptions may be coloured by direct or

26

Chapter 2

indirect discrimination about certain types of applicants” (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 159). On the other hand, supply side factors, such as resources and motivation, influence the supply of applicants who aspire a political career (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 162). Norris and Lovenduski (1997) analyze the passages to power in the U.K. and seek to explain the underrepresentation of minorities in the national legislatures. Based on data from the 1992 general elections, they find that “party selectors did not choose candidates on the basis of education, social class, trade union membership, financial resources, ambition or support networks. The evidence suggests that these factors influence supply rather than demand” (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 185). According to the authors, the supply-side factors (i.e. age, class, and education) influence recruitment and the social bias. Their results also indicate that in the Conservative Party under-representation of racial minorities is a problem of supply; while in the Labour Party both supply and demand factors play a role (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 186). They contend therefore that the key decision-makers of who gets to run for a winnable seat and is ultimately elected are the local Labour and Conservative gatekeepers (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 165). Likewise, Crewe also argues that prejudice by candidate selection committees is not the only reason why there are few bme candidates: More important is the common assumption of selectors that a black candidate would lose votes, although this does not explain why so few are adopted in safe or hopeless seats where a small forfeit of votes could not affect the outcome. Two other factors are more important still. The first is the negligible number of Asians and West Indians applying for selection …. The second reason is the criteria applied by selection committees when choosing a candidate. These criteria are complex and difficult to pin down. They vary from seat to seat, are not formally set out, and are only dimly discerned by the selectors themselves. In the Labour party, ideological position appears to count for less than local roots and certain personal qualities. The crucial personal qualities have to do with public ‘presence’ – especially speaking ability and informal sociability – and it is possible that the accents and other culturally distinctive attributes of Asians and West Indians are handicaps in this respect. ‘Local roots’ usually means many years of service as a local councillor, trade union official or party officer – or being the son or daughter of such a person. For obvious reasons very few Asians and West Indians have yet had the opportunity to serve such a long political apprenticeship. 1983, 277–278

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

27

He contends that ethnic minorities are indeed a liability, although less so than in the past (Crewe 1983, 278). Referring to the role of bmes in the British political system, Crewe argues that “It is hard to imagine a political system more illequipped to represent the specific concerns of small and unpopular ethnic minorities” (1983, 260). He cites the single-member, simple-plurality (smsp) electoral system, the nature of two-party competition, and the use of the race card in elections as working against the minorities (Crewe 1983, 260). In further detailing these factors, Crewe outlines six characteristics of the British raceelectoral relations. First, since the smsp system constantly rewards large parties, it is against a separate ethnic party. Second, smsp offers ethnic minorities few prizes, and the only alternative for minorities is to join the large parties. Yet the small number of electoral posts makes it harder for minorities to get nominated as candidates in these parties. Another challenge for candidacy is the singlemember parliamentary constituencies. In many West European countries (except France), political parties can ensure the election of ethnic candidates by placing them high on the lists or in multi-member constituencies. However, this is not the case in Britain, where competition for party nomination in a winnable seat is fierce, and “the slightest drawback – like being black – makes the difference between a long parliamentary career and the political wilderness” (Crewe 1983, 260). Third, the two-party system hinders substantive representation of minority interests due to the electoral disincentive of emphasizing minority interests. Parties have to keep their appeal broad and avoid losing the votes of the majority in expense of an unpopular minority. Hence, rather than seeking elected office, ethnic minorities participate in parties through other means, such as being active in local party organizations and holding office in the parties. Fourth, in the British electoral system, “every one per cent shift in the Conservative-to-Labour vote ratio makes a 30 seat difference to the majority of one over the other,” making unpopular minorities all the more unpopular for parties (Crewe 1983, 260). Fifth, among the larger voter base, including Labour voters, those who can be labeled racist far outnumber ethnic minorities (Crewe 1983, 260). Finally, Crewe contends that “race and immigration can offer easy electoral pickings …” (1983, 263).6 Hence, he ­concludes that the electoral prospects for separate ethnic parties appear slim. The established parties have few prizes to offer by way of candidatures, or an influential voice in party counsels. They are under constant pressure to appeal 6 He particularly refers to the increase in support for the Conservative Party following Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech in April 1968 or Thatcher’s comment on “feelings of being swamped” in 1964.

28

Chapter 2

to, or at least not alienate, the marginal voters among whom there are as many, probably more, racists than black electors. The ethnic communities must cope with a system of electoral politics, which, being shaped before they arrived in Britain, was not designated to accommodate the interests of small minorities. Crewe 1983, 264

He outlines several strategies for British minorities to secure electoral representation. Establishing a separate ethnic party and running as independent candidates are two possibilities, yet largely unrealistic ones. On the other hand, ethnic bloc voting is a more realistic option based on the fact that ethnic minorities are geographically concentrated, and it is documented that without minority support Labour could not win a substantial number of seats. He contends that for the exercise of ethnic electoral power the following conditions must all be met: a) The full electoral mobilization of the ethnic minority, i.e. high registration and high turnout; b) An ethnic bloc vote, i.e. uniform support for one party, or at least against one party, in response to ethnic as opposed to ‘normal’ issues, which shifts en bloc; c) A strategic location of this ethnic vote in marginal constituencies such that it has the potential to deliver seats to one party at the expense of another; d) A net effect in terms of seats over the country as a whole that outweighs that of the white anti-ethnic vote. Crewe 1983, 268

Although electoral mobilization has been rather weak largely due to apathy and the lack of English proficiency, electoral registration rates of ethnic voters have been steadily increasing. Electoral registration rates of Indians match that of whites, yet other South Asian minority groups, like Pakistanis and Bengalis, fall more than nine points below the rate of whites (Dalton 2007, 506). The factors that cause low voter registration rates also exacerbate low turnout rates. Crewe contends that an effective ethnic bloc vote would exist only if the party preferences of minorities are uniform, shiftable as a block, and formed as a response to ethnic issues (1983, 270). Horowitz also defines ethnic voting as members of an ethnic group voting predominantly for one party over another or for a member of the same group regardless of party affiliation (1985, 319). He contends that the party leadership pursues minority support only insofar as it does not threaten the most valuable source of ­support (Horowitz 1985, 292–293). Although all minority groups have been

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

29

predominantly Labour voters, this began to shift slowly in the last decade. According to Crewe, the Labour support of ethnic minorities “weaken, not strengthen, their electoral clout by encouraging the favoured party to take them for granted and the other parties to ignore their existence” (1983, 272). Ensuring responsiveness for minority interests also requires that ethnic minorities reward friends and punish enemies. Likewise, minority political clout depends on whether they are strategically located. Crewe states that ethnic voters in Britain do not constitute an ethnic vote or have the capacity to swing elections because of the size of their electorate, the marginality of seats, and the size and direction of the ethnic swing vote (1983, 273). He argues though that “the exceptional conditions required for the wielding of ethnic electoral power are more likely to arise at local than general elections” (Crewe 1983, 275). Given these conditions, the most feasible alternative for minorities to achieve political clout and increased responsiveness is to get members of their group elected to local and national office. The practical effects of their election and the elevated status of the minority in the eyes of British society as well as the minority group are substantial. Yet their election requires being nominated as a candidate in a winnable seat by a majority of the local party selection committee, ten or so people for a local seat and sixty people for a parliamentary seat. Well organized and mobilized minorities have been able to secure the votes of selection committees, primarily by getting members from their minority group to be on the selection committees. In the last two decades, British Muslims have been accused of such practices in local politics. As discussed above, the strengthened British Muslim identity has shifted the emphasis from race and ethnicity to religion. But, have these developments been translated to the mainstream political arena? How much does race, ethnicity, and religion count when assessing bme political participation and representation? For, according to Saggar, race, ethnicity, and religion discourses cannot prevail on their own, unless they are legitimized by the mainstream political institutions (2000, 25). He contends that although racialization can have both positive and negative results, the politics of race and ethnicity took on a ghetto status in Britain (Saggar 2000, 26). Positive racialisation emphasizes minority underrepresentation and has the potential to achieve increased levels of representation. On the other hand, negative racialisation “identifies ways in which participation and representation may be constrained as a result of, for instance, the ‘ghettoisation’ of these debates arising from their location in particular parts of the country with relatively high ethnic minority populations” (Saggar 2000, 27).

30

Chapter 2

Electoral Power of British Muslims

Electoral power depends largely on numbers of electors, gauged mainly by registration and turnout rates, and elected representatives, gauged through descriptive representation as well as substantive representation of minority interests. Participation of ethnic minorities in elections is seen as “an encouraging indication both of the extent to which they are becoming integrated into the mainstream of political life in this country and of their integration and involvement in wider society” (Anwar 1986, 2). Yet, the crucial role of party leadership as gate-keepers, and the fact that there is still reluctance by white party members to canvass ethnic minority electors and support minority candidates, are significant road blocks (Fitzgerald 1987). Nevertheless, Muslim leaders and organizations, particularly the Muslim Council of Britain (mcb) that was established in 1997 as an umbrella organization, is highly supportive of political participation and launches effective campaigns to increase electoral registration and turnout rates among Muslims.7 Despite small factions that seek to retain Muslims from political participation, mcb’s stance remains the dominant voice among British Muslims. British Muslims are heavily concentrated in certain constituencies within large cities, constituting a significant electorate. According to mcb data based on the 2001 Census, there was one parliamentary constituency (out of 529) with 49% Muslim population, two with 30–40%, six with 20–30%, thirty-one with 10–20%, sixty-one with 5–10%, and 468 with 0–5% Muslim constituents (see Table 8.5). Le Lohé (1990) argues that even though the size and impact of the Muslim vote is substantial, it is often exaggerated. Nevertheless, local politicians “liaise with designated Muslim leaders who promise to deliver ‘the Muslim vote’” (Vertovec and Peach 1997, 34–35). In addition, Bird warns against the tendency of political parties to nominate ethnic candidates almost exclusively in areas with large ethnic minority populations … the Parekh Report in Britain (2000) recommended that political parties should seek to select ethnic minority candidates in ridings where more than 25 per cent of the population are from ethnic minorities. Yet this political logic does not necessarily produce a more just and inclusive society. Rather, it may consign ethnic minority representation to areas where race is deemed to be matter and ware from those where it does not, thereby enhancing the notion that ethnic minority representation is of relevance only for ethnic minorities, and is not a more general representational 7 http://www.mcb.org.uk/vote2005/index1.php.

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

31

dilemma for the whole population – a minority rather than a mainstream issue … 2004, 6

Citizenship rates and in-group fragmentation also impacts the electoral power of minority groups. Compared with other West European countries, British Muslims hold the highest percentage of citizenship by virtue of being formercolonials and the citizenship laws discussed earlier (Vertovec and Peach 1997, 34). Likewise, a vast majority of British Muslims are South Asians connoting a more homogenous group. Still there are several sub-groups within the South Asian community, i.e. Punjabi Muslims in Manchester and Birmingham Sparkbrook, Mirpuri Muslims in Bradford, Bengali Muslims in the East End, etc. As Crewe argues, “Although these communities share a common experience of discrimination in Britain, they do not necessarily respond in concert to political events. It is not unknown for Asian voters to prefer a white candidate of the ‘wrong’ party to an Asian candidate of the ‘right’ party – but the ‘wrong’ origins” (1983, 260). Dissension in minority communities hampers their progress, weakens their political clout as a group, and has been used to keep minorities powerless through in-group competition. According to Bird, the dynamics of group identity, differences in residential patterns, and the consequences for political mobilization arguably create very different political opportunities and obstacles to the representation of ethnic minorities … political parties in many countries are increasingly interested in selecting ethnic candidates, in the hope of reaping electoral rewards from associated ethnic electorates. Ethnic minorities can be quite well represented, especially at the local level and in larger urban centres where a group’s spatial concentration and its ability to mobilize ethnic bloc voting make ethnic candidates an attractive choice for political parties. Differences in electoral rules are also crucial. 2004, 2

Research on race and political participation in the u.s. suggests that there are considerable variations between ethnic, religious and racial groups in electoral participation (Pelissero, Krebs, and Jenkins 2000). For instance, electoral registration in Britain varies geographically (Smith 1991) and across social and demographic groups (Smith 1991; Todd 1981). In particular, scholars have noted substantial differences in registration rates between bme groups (Anwar 1998; Saggar 1998; Smith 1991). Figure 1 depicts the trend in voter turnout in local, general and European Parliament elections in the U.K. between

Chapter 2 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

local elections general elections EU elections

19

77 19 80 19 83 19 86 19 89 19 92 19 95 19 98 20 01 20 04 20 07 20 10 20 13

% Turnout

32

Figure 1

Voter turnout for United Kingdom, 1979–2009

1979 and 2009. Over the forty year period, a downward trend is observed in both local and national elections, although local election turnout has been increasing since 2000. Table  2.6 shows the voter turnout levels in London borough elections between 1968 and 2006, which slightly higher than overall levels. Turnout peaked in 1990 and has decreased since then to as low as 31.8% in 2002, and increased nearly 6% in 2006. Participation of ethnic minorities in the political process is shaped by their electoral registration rates, turnout rates, and how these rates compare with the rest of the population (Anwar 1991, 45). Due to increasing political awareness, electoral registration and turnout levels of ethnic minorities are approaching that of whites, suggesting that bme communities “may be more reliable voters than their white neighbors and are consequently in a better position to influence the outcome of elections where they vote” (Anwar 1991, 49). The Electoral Commission, which is an independent body established by the British Parliament, launched a campaign in 2003 as part of the wider Votes are Power initiative to increase electoral registration amongst bme communities. Sam Younger, Chairman of The Electoral Com­ mission at the time, commented that “Some groups within the black and minority ethnic communities have very low levels of registration and voting. Politi­cians need to address the issue of voter engagement amongst these communities.”8 8 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk.

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

33

Table 2.6 Turnout at London borough elections as percentage of the electorate

1968 1971 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006

35.8 38.7 36.3 42.9 43.8 45.4 48.1 46.1 34.7 31.8 37.9

source: greater london authority.

Table 2.7 summarizes the available data on turnout rates of bme communities in the U.K. Turnout rates of some bme communities changed drastically over the past fifty years. For example, in the mid-1960s, research in Bradford found that only 13% of Asians turned out to vote in local elections (Le Lohé 1975). Surveys in Bradford and Rochdale found that in the 1974 general election, Asian turnout was 57.7% compared to 54.6% among non-Asians and the overall turnout rate of 72.8% (Anwar 1976). Similarly, a survey of twenty constituencies found that at the 1983 general elections 81% of Asians turned out to vote compared to 60% of non-Asians (Anwar 1980). In eighteen out of these twenty constituencies, turnout among Asians was higher than non-Asians. In addition, at the 1987 general election, 63.8% of Asians, 45.2% of whites, and 36.3% of AfroCaribbeans claimed to have voted, compared to 75.3% total turnout rate (1990). Saggar’s research based on the 1997 British Election Survey reported that 82.4% of Indians, 75.6% of Pakistanis, 73.9% of Bengalis, 68.7% of Black Caribbeans, 64.4% of Black Africans, and 78.7% of whites turned out to vote (1998). According to Anwar, ethnic voting patterns depend on multiple factors and regular contacts between political parties and ethnic minorities, their organization and mobilization at elections, whether the candidate is personally known to the ethnic minority electors, and their party policies generally and about race and immigration issues in particular are important factors in attracting minority votes. Also, recent research shows that the ethnic minorities now vote on party lines and not on ethnic lines

34

Chapter 2

Table 2.7 bme turnout in U.K. elections Source

Year

Local elections

Le Lohé (1975) Anwar (1976)

Mid-1960s 13% Asians 1974

Le Lohé (1990)

1979

Anwar (1980)

1983

Le Lohé (1990)

1984

Le Lohé (1990)

1987

Saggar (1998)

1997

Fieldhouse (2006)

2001

Richards (2003)

2002

General elections

57.5% Asians 72.8% All

81% Asians 60% Non-Asians

24% bmes

63.8% Asians 45.2% Whites 36.3% AfroCaribbeans 75.3% All 82.4% Indians 75.6% Pakistanis 73.9% Bengalis 68.7% AfroCaribbeans 64.4% Africans 78.7% Whites 47% bmes9 56.9% Muslims 59.9% Hindus 58.9% Sikhs

eu elections

37.7% Asians 32.1% All

42.3% Asians 32.6% All

(Anwar, 1984). This was demonstrated recently in a parliamentary byelection in Vauxhall [1989] where two ethnic minority candidates stood in protest against the Labor Party candidate (who was later elected) as that party had not selected an ethnic minority candidate. The two ethnic minority candidates received very few votes. 1991, 52

9 Richards (2003).

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

35

In addition, despite the fact that the U.K. has the lowest rate of turnout at the European elections, turnout rates of the Asian population have been consistently high in European elections. In the 1979 EP elections, Asian turnout in Bradford was estimated to be 37.7%, compared to the national average of 32.1% (Le Lohé 1990). Likewise, in the 1984 EP elections, Asian turnout in Bradford’s University ward was 42.3% of registered Asian voters, which was the highest among any ethnic group including whites (Le Lohé 1990). There is considerably more data on electoral registration and turnout rates  of bmes and Muslims since the 2001 general election, which had the lowest overall turnout (59.4%) since 1918. Fieldhouse reports that 56.9% of Muslims, 59.9% of Hindus, and 58.9% of Sikhs voted in the 2001 general ­election (2006).10 His results confirm previous survey findings that British  Indians (a predominantly Hindu and Sikh group with only 12% Muslims) have the highest level of turnout among all bme communities (Le Lohé 1990). However, his findings disconfirm previous survey evidence suggesting that Muslims are less likely to vote than non-Asians, reporting a 0.3% higher turnout for Muslims than non-Asians (Fieldhouse 2006). According to Michael, one of the factors that led to the significant increase in turnout rates of British Muslims was the increase in bnp candidates after 2001 (2004, 21–22). Yet Fieldhouse and Purdam (2002) contend that despite the high South Asian political participation, Pakistani Muslims are extremely disadvantaged. Other estimates of electoral registration and turnout rates of British Muslims are as follows. In a face-to-face sample survey across five local authority areas, Anwar found that the non-registration levels were 17% for Pakistanis and 13% for Bengalis compared to 18% for whites (1998). Another study by the Electoral Commission found that the non-registration levels were 6% for Bengalis and 8% for Pakistanis, compared to 17% for all bme groups and 6% for whites (Fieldhouse 2008). Fieldhouse and Cutt (2007) report weighted registration rates by religion and ethnicity adjusted for country of birth as 98.5% for the overall population, 88.1% for non-Muslim South Asians, 82% for Muslims, and 86.2% for all South Asians. In the same study, they report turnout rates weighted to be nationally representative and corrected for national turnout as 61.3% for Hindus, 58.5% for Muslims, 59.7% for Sikhs, 59.4% for all South Asians, and 58.3% for non-Asians (Fieldhouse 2007).

10

Percentages corrected for national turnout are as follows: 58.7% Muslims, 61.7% Hindus, and 60.7% Sikhs; in all three groups female turnout rates were slightly higher than that of males.

36

Chapter 2

Taking the 2001 general election as a case study, Fieldhouse and Cutt (2008) investigate the impact of ethnic, racial, religious diversity, segregation, and density on the social cohesion of neighborhoods and levels of social trust and civic engagement. They examine the differences in turnout levels among electors of different religious origins and how this varies by neighborhood context. They test whether turnout of religious minorities is higher in neighborhoods where these populations are most concentrated and find that the turnout of minority groups increases as diversity and the size of the minority population increases (Fieldhouse 2008). Their findings on Muslim turnout rates are particularly telling. Figure  2 shows a negative relationship for overall levels of turnout moving from areas of low Muslim density (less than 5%) to higher density (20% or more). Non-Asian turnout declines as Muslim density increases. For instance, areas with more than 40% Muslims have 11% less turnout among non-Asians than areas with less than 2% Muslims. For the Muslim electorate, there is a clear upward trend in turnout as Muslim density increases, with a gap of nearly 20% points between the least and most Muslim populated areas. Thus it seems that “the high turnout rate in [areas] with more than 40% percent Muslims is being driven by the Muslims, not by the remainder of the population. In other words Muslim turnout is boosting overall levels of turnout in predominantly Muslim areas” (Fieldhouse 2008) (Figure 3). Fieldhouse and Cutt also find a strong positive link between the ethnoreligious composition of the area and turnout of minority and majority groups (Fieldhouse 2008). Their findings on the Asian population is striking 70

% Turnout

65 60

Muslim Non Asian Overall

55 50 45 40

0-1.9%

2-4.9%

5-9.9%

10-19.9%

20-39.9%

>40%

% Muslim

Figure 2

Percentage Muslim in census output areas by percentage turnout of Muslims, non-Asians, and overall Source: Fieldhouse (2008).

37

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain 70 65 Hindu Muslim Sikh Non Asians Total

% Turnout

60 55 50 45 40

Figure 3

0-4.9%

5-9.9% 10-19.9% 20-39.9% Percent South Asian (street)

>40%

Percent turnout by religion and South Asian in street Source: Fieldhouse (2008).

for “the pattern for Asians is the exact opposite of that for the rest of the population: being in an Asian areas seems to have a mobilising effect on the Asian population but has the opposite effect for the rest of the population” (Fieldhouse 2008). In a related study, Fieldhouse and Cutt find that Muslim registration levels are higher in higher Muslim concentration areas, supporting the argument that “minority electors are mobilized through social connectedness and community networks, rather than marginalised through deprivation and segregation” (2008). They report registration rates of Muslims among voting age population as 89.6% (7% lower than the population as a whole), and 96.7% among voting eligible population (Fieldhouse 2008). They find a strong relationship between the size of the Muslim population and their levels of electoral registration. In areas with very small Muslim population (0–4.9%), Muslim registration as a percentage of voting eligible population is 57.8%, yet this rises to 81% in more mixed areas (5–14.9%), and as high as 96% of the voting age population in areas with more than 15% Muslims. They contend that the same pattern is not found for the population as a whole. In other words, areas with large Muslim populations are not simply high registration areas (in fact if anything the reverse is true); rather there appears to be something going on in these areas which is affecting specifically the Muslim population. This is our first piece of evidence in support of the mobilisation hypothesis. In other words, registration appears to be affected by belonging to a ‘religious enclave’ and therefore the potential

38

Chapter 2

mobilising effect of living in cohesive communities. Conversely the relatively isolated are more likely to be excluded from the democratic process. Fieldhouse 2008, 342



Reasons for Low Registration and Turnout Rates

A 2002 Electoral Commission survey found that 43% of black Britons in Greater London and the West Midlands think better representation of black people within politics would be the most important of five factors encouraging them to vote, whereas 37% say they want to see more politicians who are in touch with the concerns of black people.11 21% of bmes claimed to be “not at all interested” in politics, compared to 11% of all British adults. bme adults were also less interested in local and national issues than all British adults; 65% of bmes are interested in local issues compared to 80% of all adults, while 71% of bmes have an interest in national issues compared to 82% of all adults.12 Nevertheless, there is notable diversity between turnout rates of bme groups, with the highest levels among certain Asian communities and the lowest among communities of black African and Caribbean heritage. Electoral registration rates of certain Asian communities are equal to or higher than that of the white population. Research by Anwar (1998), Le Lohé (1990), and by Saggar (1998) has consistently shown that people of Indian heritage are the most likely to vote at U.K. elections. Purdam (2002) cites multiple reasons for low minority registration rates, including concerns about anonymity, fear of harassment, language barriers, administrative inefficiency, having recently moved, alienation from the political system, and deliberate avoidance of registration because of the secondary uses of the register. He adds that bme turnout rates are specifically affected by the younger age profile of these communities, higher levels of socio-economic deprivation, living in urban areas with lower than average turnout levels, and the lack of representation in high-profile public positions (Purdam 2002). According to Purdam, “alienation and disenfranchisement (the view that it makes no difference who wins); apathy (the lack of interest in politics); impact (the view that an individual vote will not make a difference); participation (the view that politics is unrepresentative of bme communities); convenience 11 12

Hothouse Market Research for Electoral Commission/OBV (Base: 1,002 black adults in Greater London and West Midlands, 4–9 October 2002). MORI/The Electoral Commission (Base: 1,500 UK adults aged 18+, 2–11 May 2003 (169 bme adults)).

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

39

(the view that voting is too time consuming)” (2002). Dissatisfaction with political parties, the context of elections (e.g. whether the election is perceived as a close contest or not), perception of parties as not being distinct than one another, marginality of constituencies, also play a part in depressing turnout among bme communities (Purdam 2002).

Muslim Elected Officials at the Local Level

British Muslims have shifted from being objects of policy to being actors in the political process through increased political representation. What facilitate this increase are opportunity structures such as the degree of collective identity within ethnic groups, their capacity to mobilize members politically, the responsiveness of political parties and systems to ethnic groups, citizenship regimes, and institutional features like electoral rules and political culture (Bird 2004, 2–3). This fight for opportunities to represent their communities led a number of Pakistanis into local government as councillors, and their number, once few, is growing slowly. There are an estimated 200 Muslim South Asian councillors across Britain (not all Pakistani), particularly appearing in London and across the north of England (Purdam, 2001). Of these, Pakistanis have been amongst the most active. They are however particularly reliant upon the support and turnout of other Muslims at elections. Michael 2004, 21–22

The first Muslim councillor, Bashir Maan, migrated from Pakistan in 1953 and got elected to Glasgow City Corporation in 1970. He remained in office for over three decades until he stepped down in April 2003.13 In Bradford, the number of Muslim councillors has increased from three in 1981 to eleven in 1992, and the city had Britain’s first Muslim and Asian mayor in 1985–1986 (Lewis 1994). Alongside Muslim city councillors, Leicester has had a Muslim Chief Executive and a Muslim Police Superintendent. In June 1994, Waltham Forest elected the first Muslim woman mayor Meher Khan. Crewe (1983) reports that in 1982 there were seventy ethnic minority local councillors in England. bme councillors were mainly in London; thirteen in Brent, five in Tower Hamlets, four in Lewisham, and four in Islington (Crewe 1983). Le Lohé (1998) reports that the number of ethnic minority councillors in London boroughs increased from 13 http://www.salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/september03_index.php?l=9#abbas.

40

Chapter 2

thirty-five in 1978 to 213 in 1994. Geddes (1998) and Adolino (1998) cite that there were nearly 350 ethnic minority councillors in England in the late 1990s, constituting only 1.6%.14 Since 1980, the number of ethnic minority city councillors in Britain has increased by more than 700%. Table 2.8 summarizes the available data on the numbers and percentages of bme and Muslim councillors in London and in England since 1978. Messina (1989) reports that the number of non-white councillors in London boroughs increased from thirty-five in 1978 to seventy-nine in 1984, and to over 130 in 1986. Le Lohé (1998) estimates that after the 1996 local elections, 215 out Table 2.8 Data on bme and Muslim councillors in London and England Year London bme

1978 1982 1984 1986 1994 1996

1998 2000 2001 2002 2006

14

35 (Le Lohé 1998) 26 (Crewe 1983) 79 (Messina 1989) 130 (Messina 1989) 213 (Le Lohé 1998)

England Muslim

bme

Muslim

70 (Crewe 1983)

49 (Ansari 2004)

83 (Author’s estimate) 63 (Chapman and Versi 2001)

115 (Author’s estimate) 146 (Author’s estimate)

160 (153 labour, 6 liberal democrat, 1 conservative) (Purdam 2001)

2.5% (Richards 2003)

217 (Chapman and Versi 2001)

For research on early British Pakistani candidates, see Anwar (1996). For the growth in the number of minority representatives, see Garbaye (2005).

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

41

of the 1917 London city councillors (11.2%) were from ethnic minorities – 144 South Asians, sixty-six Afro-Caribbeans, five other (Vietnamese, Lebanese, Turkish Cypriots); and 194 Labour, fifteen Conservative, and six Liberal Democrats. Le Lohé (1998) also finds high success rates among Labour Asian candidates at the local level. In the 1996 local elections, 130 out of 179 Labour Asian candidates succeeded, yielding a 72.6% success rate compared to Labour’s overall success rate of 54.5%. Conservative and Liberal Democrat Asian candidates were not doing as well. Eleven out of ninety-three Con­ servative Asian candidates succeeded, yielding an 11.8% success rate compared to an overall success rate of 29.1%. For Liberals, the success rate for Asian candidates was 7% whereas their overall success rate was 20%. Success rates of ethnic minority candidates depends on a complex set of factors, such as the candidate’s “party label, the characteristics of the area of contest, the personal popularity of the candidate, rejection by some white voters on grounds of color, and whether the seat is considered safe. Some of these reasons could equally apply to a white candidate. However, there is enough evidence to indicate that now ethnic minority candidates are increasingly being accepted as ‘party’ candidates” (Anwar 1991, 55). Research on the numbers, attitudes and characteristics of Muslim councillors is scarce because of the scholarly and policy focus on ethnic, instead of religious, minority politics. Purdam was the first scholar to examine the nature of Muslim political mobilization in local party politics (2001, 147). He estimated that as of May 1996, there were 160 Muslim local councillors in Britain; 153 Labour, six Liberal Democrat, and one Conservative. Anwar reports that there were forty-nine Muslim councillors only in London in the same year (2004). A majority of Muslim councillors are concentrated in areas of Muslim population. For example there are 12 Muslim councillors in Birmingham City Council and 11 on Bradford City Council. These numbers are widely expected to increase over the next few years. However, it is clear that so far Muslims have secured election largely with the support of other Muslims. This is, in part, a consequence of the electoral structure of local government in the United Kingdom. Purdam 2001, 149

Purdam (2001) was right to predict that the number of Muslim councillors would increase drastically. Although most Muslim councillors are elected from districts heavily populated by Muslims and other minorities, this is not the case for all of them. Purdam (2001) reports that Muslim councillors were overwhelmingly South Asian men and most self-identified as “Muslim” or “British

42

Chapter 2

Muslim” rather than as “British” or by their ethnic identity. They were mostly professionals and self-employed businessmen, 21% were unemployed, 12% were retired, and less than 5% were manual laborers. Almost all councillors spoke English well and have been in Britain for over three decades. The most recent estimate of Muslim councillors was provided by the London based The Muslim News, reporting that following the May 2000 local elections, there were a total of 217 Muslim councillors in Britain, including sixty-three in London boroughs.15 I estimate that after the 1998 local elections, there were eighty-three Muslim councillors in London. This number increased to 115 after the 2002 local elections and to 146 after the 2006 elections. Hence currently Muslim representation at the local level is fairly close to parity in London, with almost 7% Muslim councillors and 8.2% Muslim population.

British Muslims and the Labour Party

Debates on how to increase minority political participation and representation emphasize various party structures and processes as key to (dis)advantaging minority political activists and potential candidates. When investigating the local dynamics of race politics in the U.K., analyzing Labour Party is indispensable for it has been known as the party of the minorities. Anwar argues that political participation of ethnic minorities is shaped by “the policies and initiatives taken by the political parties. The major political party leaders have openly sought ethnic minority voters’ support in the last few years without the fear of losing white voters. Some political parties have set up special bodies whose role is to attract ethnic minorities’ support” (1991, 52). The role of group identity cannot be undermined in electoral politics since local variations in “interest constellations” of ethnic groups can lead traditional parties to assume particular electoral strategies with respect to ethnic votes, with ethnic candidates playing a key role in such strategies … While parties may be using ethnic candidates instrumentally as part of vote-winning strategy, many ethnic candidates themselves use ethnicity in a highly selective and entrepreneurial fashion, both in s­ eeking party 15

“Over 200 Muslim Local Councillors” by Hamed Chapman and Ahmed Versi. 25 May 2001 (Issue 145), The Muslim News. http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/ (accessed on April 22, 2007).

Muslims And Minority Politics In Britain

43

support for their candidacy, and in mobilizing support from minority and/or majority voters. Bird 2004, 2–3

Saggar argues that the alleged “electoral death of immigration and race” since the 1979 general election, led minorities and political parties to deduce that it is unconstructive to bring issues of bme representation to mainstream campaigns (2000, 27). However, the presence of significant numbers of bme councillors challenges this assumption, at least at the local level. According to Saggar (2000), the three major political parties have had an approach of “ethnicity counts, but for ethnic minorities alone.” Yet this approach is counterproductive and leads to the territorial circumscription and racialisation of minority representation (Saggar 2000, 27). Saggar criticizes the orthodox view of politics of race, which contends that race “only matters to a very limited extent. Where it does count, moreover, its significance is regarded as restricted to a small handful of constituency-level affects” (2000, 41). Contrary to this view, he argues that political concerns of bme communities need to become part of mainstream politics for effective participation in British politics (Saggar 2000, 37). Data from the 1987 general election supports his argument in that ethnic minorities vote issue-based, rather than voting on racial concerns (Saggar 2000, 37). In discussing institutional and spatial constraints on racialised representation, Saggar argues that “party institutional relationships were as likely to embody indirect, non-intentional forms of discrimination and exclusion as any other public or private bodies …” (Saggar 2000, 31–32). He outlines the obstacles that would exclusively impact minority candidates: First, minority hopefuls incur difficulties in gaining entry onto the official approved lists maintained by the major parties although in recent years the party headquarters of all of the major parties have been making considerable efforts to address this complaint. Second, those who do make it onto the approved lists have complained about the lengthy and often futile process of becoming short-listed and then adopted by selection committees. Third, where selected, there is the probability of having been chosen in a no-hope or little-hope constituency. Minority hopefuls stand a better chance of selection in unappealing seats where they f­ requently start from a poor third place. Fourth, they tend to stay in these weak constituencies, standing in election after election without any significant improvement in their actual electability prospects, not least in the eyes of national party officials who remain equivocal about

44

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minorities as electoral liabilities. Fifth, those who make it through to successful election can be expected to defend more vulnerable seats with smaller winning majorities … Finally, according to the under-representation perspective, one of the prime effects of all of these factors is that minority representatives only attain their goal at a significantly later age or stage in their careers … the biggest limiting factor of all. That is, debates about e­ thnic minority representation tend to be focused on seats or clusters of seats where there are sizeable populations of ethnic minority origin. Saggar 2000, 31–32

Likewise, Purdam’s study on Muslim councillors within the Labour Party is particularly telling. His findings suggest that “there is a general feeling among Muslim councillors that Muslims have been unfairly accused of illegal practices of recruitment and have been treated unfairly within their local parties to an extent that goes beyond simple party and candidate competition” (Purdam 2001, 147). Both Saggar (2000) and Purdam (2001) find that party selection and membership procedures can and do marginalize minorities. For instance, as Saggar cites, “party members and officers may express a willingness to favour minority candidates for elected office who are seen to avoid drawing undue attention to their ethnic origin, ethnic identity or public policy questions over racial inequality” (2000, 39). The same is true for the national level, where both women and bmes “often face candidate selection processes that discriminate against them” (Norris 1995). Even though an overwhelming majority of Muslim councillors have been from the Labour Party, “an increasing number are becoming disillusioned with the New Labour government and its alliance with the US in military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Michael 2004, 21–22). Moreover, Labour is not a natural fit for the Muslim community since Muslims tend to be anti-gay, family-oriented, and small business owners. As Councillor Graham Lane explains, younger Muslims, particularly women, have begun to shift to the Conservative Party.16 Yet, referring to his party’s stance on ethnic minorities, the long-standing Redbridge Conservative councillor Asaf Mirza comments that the Conservative Party “is narrow minded, lacking in new ideas and stuck in the past” and that “It is rigid and lacking in communication and they refuse to listen because they do not want to improve the situation.”17 Controversies 16 Interview with Graham Lane, 14 July 2009, Newham Council, London. 17 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/vo010405/ debtext/10405.

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over social values are also present among Muslim councillors in the Liberal Democratic Party. In 2006, Southwark Liberal Democratic councillor AbdurRahman Olayiwola, who is a Muslim of Nigerian origin, was deselected to run for elections. Cllr. Olayiwola was accused for saying that the council executive committee had a disproportionate number of gays, and this rule by a “gay clique” resulted in lack of ethnic minority representation.18 As a result, he ran as an independent in May 2006 elections and lost. Muslims have accused the Labour Party of “discrimination, prejudice in candidature selection, delays in the acceptance of membership applications and exclusion from meetings” (Purdam 2001, 149). Purdam reports that of those interviewed 73% were aware of discrimination in the Labour party and 60% experienced prejudice (2001,152). This disillusionment of Muslim councillors with the Labour Party stems from Labour’s policy silences on Muslim issues, its failure to select Muslim candidates for secure seats at the local and national level, and its reluctance to promote Muslims to senior positions in the party ranks. Similarly, Anwar (1996) argues that Pakistani councillors have not been able to secure senior council positions despite their high numbers. This lack of Muslims in high profile public office causes disillusionment with the democratic process …. There is a proliferation of small cliques, which can effectively act as a bottleneck for both ­representation and resources (Werbner 1991, Purdam 2001). Even where such a clique is absent, leaders are continuously under suspicion. Werbner argues that this is because the majority of ethnic leaders at the local level deal with the state on the state’s terms, and their access to elite networks through their leadership positions “makes them ­suspect, even as they are often esteemed for their communal work” (1991:17). Michael 2004, 21–22

While British Muslims widely criticize the Labour Party on such issues, they have also been accused of ethnic entryism. The charge is that Asian activists have led ethnic-based campaigns that are not in congruence with Labour Party’s spirit and purpose (Fielding 1998). Moreover, Muslim Labour party members have been accused of “illegally recruiting or inventing members in order to secure the selection of a Muslim candidate in … and of using council funds to bribe Labour party members to secure support for a particular Muslim 18

“‘Gay Clique’ Council Deselected for Poor Attendance Local Party Says” By Benjamin Cohen, 18 April 2006, http://www.pinknews.co.uk/news/articles/2005-1186.html.

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Labour candidate” at both the local and national levels (Purdam 2001, 149). Another criticism staged against Muslims is that patronage politics and tribal allegiances known as biraderi identities is prevalent among this minority (Purdam 2001; Solomos 1995; Werbner 2002). According to Michael, leadership among British Muslims has been historically constructed through patronage, mainly because “those with good English skills and knowledge of local processes for the acquisition of employment and housing found themselves acting as intermediaries between newcomers, and the local state …” (2004, 19). Ironically, the system of political patronage has been maintained by British politicians “to secure the votes of minority communities, who in the early days of settlement, could be easily influenced and were heavily dependent upon political interest to secure facilities and services …” (Michael 2004, 23). Anwar (1991) also analyzes the role of ethnic minority leaders and organizations (e.g. social, welfare, religious, educational, political and professional at local, regional and national level) in the political process as an indication of their civic engagement.19 He emphasizes the importance of ethnic minority votes in constituencies with significant bme concentration as an illustration of the increasing levels of political awareness (Anwar 1991, 45). Although political parties did not include ethnic minorities in their campaigns, they have sought their votes in local and general elections since 1974 (Anwar 1991, 45). They pursue minority votes through formal and traditional leaders of these communities, further reinforcing patronage politics. Finally, Bird addresses another problem with party selection processes and argues that the committees tend to select candidates who are not necessarily representative of their communities it is important to asses both the number of ethnic minorities in elected office, and the extent to which the individuals selected as candidates and eventually as representatives will be effective substantive representatives of ethnic minority interests … the definition of ethnic minority “interests” is itself a complex matter. Ethnic minorities in established democracies are increasingly diverse with respect to social-economic status, and political ideology and interests (Saggar 2000). Nevertheless, there appears to be a tendency for parties to select as ethnic candidates, individuals who are models of entrepreneurial and economic success. While these 19

Anwar (1991) categorizes bme leaders as formal leaders: in organizations, elected, nominated or self-appointed, inter-ethnic relations; and traditional leaders: kinship groups, intra-ethnic relations, patronage.

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may be more appealing candidates from the perspective of the party, it is not clear that they have any strong relationship with or share any of the substantive concerns of the dispossessed portion of the minority group most in need of political representation (Dovi 2002). Bird 2004, 6

Referring to the accusations on Muslims, Purdam advocates that “while there is a need to ensure that all participation is democratic the concerns of Muslims themselves and the discrimination they have encountered should be addressed” (Purdam 2001, 147).

Impacting Public Policy

Scholars have also been intrigued about how and to what extent Muslims have been able to impact public policy at the local and national levels. For example, Khan posits that the presence of Muslims tests the principles of liberal pluralism in Europe as well as Britain (2000, 29–30). This is primarily true from a public policy perspective, when the local and national authorities are faced with policy demands from British Muslims to accommodate their religious and cultural needs. Although it is true that “no society can ever ensure full equality to all its cultural minorities,” the very foundation of liberal democracy is to seek to ensure such parity for all its citizens (Parekh 1998, 411). The way and extent to which British Muslims have been able to influence public policy and extort friendly policies has been influenced by group politics as well as other factors. As Jacobs argues, “differences in political participation of ethnic minorities are linked to differences in ‘civic community’, primarily seen as the amount of ‘ethnic’ social capital (participation in ethnic associational life) of the relevant group” (2004, 419). Likewise, according to Vertovec and Peach: Each effort in mobilizing and lobbying – whether successful, unsuccessful, or still in process – has brought new experience and, thereby, new confidence in Muslim organizational efforts. This, in turn, has encouraged the engagement in recent years of new spheres of concern and activity around access to resources and social service provision. Examples of such activity can be seen in applications by Muslim women’s groups seeking public funding for education and community activities, the rise of Muslim housing associations and employment advice centres, and

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calls by Muslims for special promotion of health awareness campaigns and programmes and the provision of suitable hospital facilities (see British Muslims Monthly Survey, 1995). 1997, 28

Negative perceptions of Muslims obstruct public accommodation and recognition of Islamic practices. According to Khan, colonial experiences still have formal and informal influence on British mainstream, and Muslim minorities do not only face racism based on color but also based on their religion (Khan 2000, 36). Although, British government has officially committed to policy activism for inclusion of all ethnic and religious minorities, and respecting and protecting their right to participate in all aspects of British life while maintaining their own values and cultures, implementation of this commitment has not been easy (Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All 1997, 1). Issues of concern for British Muslims cover a wide range of policy areas, and Muslims have been successful in some more than others. Issues that still need to be addressed include: Same-race adoption and fostering policies which place black Muslims with black Christians, and Asian Muslims with Hindus and Sikhs; social work based on Asian needs which can be lead to a Muslim being given a Hindu home-help who does not know about Muslim sensitivities or whose own inhibitions (about meat for example) prevent her from fulfilling her duties; the recent decision by the Housing Corporation to reserve its policy of registering housing associations catering for religious communities in favor of race; recruitment monitoring and targeting in terms of ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ statistics which obscure the level of Muslim disadvantage and under-representation and fail to measure whether the equal opportunity policies are making any difference to the Muslim position; arts funding for anti-Muslim but not Islamic artists; racial harassment figures which fail to register that the majority of victims are Muslims and that there is a specific anti-Muslim harassment which even white Muslims suffer. Vertovec and Peach 1997, 28

A survey administered in the mid-1990s reported 950 Muslim organizations in Britain, most dealing with local issues (Vertovec 1996, 175). Yet, their influence in domestic and foreign policy-making has been minimal. Many scholars are interested in why the extent of Muslim influence over public policy in Britain as well as other West European countries has been limited. For instance, Radcliffe (2004) examines the role of British Muslims in the making of British

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foreign policy, focusing on the lobbying activities of the Muslim Council of Britain (mcb). According to Radcliffe, mcb rapidly established relations with British government “due in part to its presenting itself as an organization that would work with government, that is, pursuing an ‘insider’ role” (2004, 371). The two instances that demonstrate the nature of mcb’s participation in foreign policy making are “the formation of the British Hajj Delegation; and the detention of several British Muslims in Yemen” (Radcliffe 2004, 375). However, Radcliffe finds disparities between mcb’s access to government officials and its limited influence in foreign policy (2004, 365). He explains the reasons for lack of mcb’s decisive influence as follows: First, on the level of foreign policy, Britain’s objectives internationally are numerous and, at times, conflicting. While the government may share similar foreign policy goals with the British Muslim community – issues about which it asks for advice and expertise – these are often not prioritized in the same way … Second, the British Muslim community is still weak politically. Although the largest religious minority in Britain, the community still only makes up 2.7% of the total population. Moreover, despite the political advantage of being geographically concentrated into a handful of urban areas, ethnic, linguistic, generational and political divisions have hindered a strong and unified voice as well as an agreed focus on a limited number of international issues. The competition between organizations and individuals for the role of representative means that the British Muslim voice is weakened in the corridors of power. Competing policy positions and recommendations dilute the potential strength of the community’s voice. Additionally, the number of representative groups weakens the potential power of the community’s numerical strength, since each group’s credibility is lowered by representing fewer people. Radcliffe 2004, 380–382

In addition, political strength of British Muslims was harmed by a negative image of Muslims in the larger British society. Radcliffe also cites institutional weakness, lack of strategic planning and long-term initiative, reactionary politics, lack of resources, full-time staff, and lobbying expertise as hampering the influence of the organization (2004, 380–382). Warner and Wenner also emphasize the importance of unification to gain policy accession, “Political parties do not (like to) deal with amorphous interest groups, or groups which are merely a congeries of battling factions …. Although the obvious lesson is that Muslim immigrants would do well to organize into a unified bloc; the

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catch is that to the extent that they are informed by their religion, they are not (save the Shi’as) likely to do so” (2002, 20–21). However, their claim that “Muslim immigrants have not organized as Muslims to gain representation in the policy process” does not hold ground for British Muslims. Nonetheless, it is true that in Britain and other West European countries, no umbrella organization emerged to speak on behalf of the Muslim community.

Chapter 3

Government Responsiveness to Muslim Interests What explain the variation in local government responsiveness to Muslim interests in Britain, and does Muslim political representation improve local government responsiveness to Muslim interests? I explore these questions by looking at the case of Muslim councillors across the thirty-two London boroughs. For the purposes of this study, Muslim is defined as those who self-identify as Muslim, regardless of the specifics of their belief or practice. Hence, Muslim does not necessarily denote a religious identity but may have religious, ethnic, political or cultural dimensions.1 In addition, Muslim political representation refers to the presence of Muslim elected officials and their efforts to advocate on behalf of Muslim constituents, whereas political representation of Muslims indicates the representation of Muslim interests by Muslim or non-Muslim representatives.2 I propose the contingency theory of descriptive representation that bridges across several literatures and tests for the effect of four explanatory variables on local government responsiveness to minority interests. The contingency theory of descriptive representation posits that descriptive representation is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for substantive representation of minority interests. It theorizes that descriptive representation of minorities leads to improved government responsiveness to minority interests contingent on the percentage of minority representatives, their level of party fragmentation and political incorporation, and the electoral competitiveness of the district. Hence the term contingency connotes that the relationship between 1 Councillors may identify with one or more of these dimensions simultaneously. Also, according to this definition, those who denounce their ties with Islam while being brought up Muslim by Muslim parents would not be included in the analysis. For instance, Richmond upon Thames councillor Munira Hassam converted to Christianity from Islam eight years ago; hence is not included in the dataset. Most works on Muslims in Western politics take a broader definition and include such cases as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, an ex-parliamentarian from The Netherlands. Ali’s political career has been framed by her critical stance against Islam and vocal atheism. Although she is no longer a self-proclaimed Muslim, her political behavior and how she is perceived by other politicians and the public is shaped by her attitude towards Islam. Hence, this comprehensive definition of Muslim is not analytically meaningful for the purposes of this research. 2 See Saggar (2000), p. 10 for a more detailed discussion of these terms.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004272262_004

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descriptive representation and substantive representation is conditional on these four explanatory factors. The following are the four hypotheses tested in this study. I use the following independent variables to test these hypotheses.

Local Government Responsiveness

Scholars have defined government responsiveness broadly as change in public policy in response to constituent needs or demands (Haynie 2001; Hero and Tolbert 2004; Ward 1981). For the purposes of this study, I define local government responsiveness as positive change in local government policies as a response to legal demands from Muslim constituents and representatives that are within the jurisdiction of the council.3 Responsiveness of an individual councillor and the responsiveness of a city council are two separate variables. London borough councils are composed of forty-six to seventy councillors grouped along party lines, and decisions are taken by majority vote in the council chamber or in committees. In this study, I code for local government responsiveness, defined not as the aggregate of the responsiveness of individual councillors, but as a collective policy outcome of the whole council. I analyze whether or not, to what extent, and specifically how Muslim councillors individually contribute to the collective policy outcomes through the case studies of Tower Hamlets, Newham and Hackney Boroughs. Scholars measure government responsiveness through either constituent perceptions of how responsive the government is to their demands and needs (Hero and Tolbert 2004), or through objective measures, such as government spending on programs that directly target or is likely to benefit minorities (Ward 1981). Utilizing constituent perceptions as an indicator for government responsiveness has complications, since a range of factors may influence constituent perceptions. For instance, the type of government-constituency relation, such as how often and in what manner the constituent interacts with the face of government, impacts their perception of government responsiveness (Hero and Tolbert 2004). Hence, objective measures of government responsiveness are better assessment tools. 3 Haynie defines government responsiveness as “changes in public policy that are correlated to and explained, at least in part, by changes in” minority representatives’ level of political incorporation (2001, 71) . Yet this definition is problematic since the dependent variable is defined as a function of the independent variable.

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What are Muslim interests? The term interest is a highly contested concept in the social sciences, which makes identifying group interests even more challenging. Nevertheless, scholars routinely designate and measure interests, using either objective (e.g. unemployment, poverty rates, income and education levels) or subjective (e.g. feelings and temperaments of group members) indicators (Swain 1993). Advanced survey and polling techniques are useful to measure these, otherwise hard to gauge, subjective indicators. Another difficulty with measuring group interests is that groups are not monolithic with regard to attitudes, historical background, immigration patterns, cultural and religious beliefs and traditions, etc. Therefore, expecting total cohesiveness and consistency on policy preferences, ideology, and candidate support is unreasonable. Nonetheless scholars distinguish between tangible and intangible minority interests, and their objective and subjective indicators. Tangible interests refer to such provisions as obtaining council housing and funding for community organizations. On the other hand, intangible interests consist of, for instance, “the need of African Americans to feel that their contributions as a group are valued by society at large” (Swain 2006, 6). Some objective indicators of group interests are relative economic position, unemployment statistics, income levels (median household income), levels of poverty, poverty among children, and education statistics. Subjective indicators of Muslim interests are harder to identify through empirical data and are measured more accurately through surveys and opinion polls. Currently, no opinion poll on British Muslims exists that identifies their local concerns vis-à-vis their city councils. During the interviews with city councillors and political activists in London, several issues that concerns the Muslim constituents, and for which they frequently seek help from local authorities, emerged. They include, but are not limited to, establishing Muslim cemeteries in the district, getting approval for planning application for mosques, obtaining council grants for cultural and religious organizations, getting approval for planning applications for Islamic schools, getting halal food served at schools, securing council housing, establishing a Muslim housing association in the borough, and receiving mediation in conflicts between police and Muslims (Sinno and Tatari 2008). I use four of these issues as indicators to measure local government responsiveness; namely, the ratio of Muslim cemeteries, the number of mosques, the ratio of Islamic schools, and the ratio of council grant money given to predominantly Muslim organizations. These indicators were selected primarily because local councils have jurisdiction over these issues, and the decisions are taken at the council level. I exclude securing council housing because the process entails a formal application, where waiting lists are compiled based on

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need. Councillors have little or no discretion in securing housing for a constituent. Also, there are only a few Muslim housing associations across Britain (one of which is in Hackney), and Muslims do not necessarily require one for their accommodation needs. I also excluded the number of public schools serving halal food because London public schools respect dietary restrictions of students upon parental request, not necessitating council interference. Finally, when Muslims seek mediation in conflicts between police and the Muslim community, individual councillors respond to this demand by organizing or attending meetings to liaise between the two parties. This demand does not necessarily require an official response from the local government but is fulfilled by individual councillors who feel obliged to help. Therefore, these four issues are not appropriate indicators to measure local government responsiveness. For this reason, I only use the ratio of Muslim cemeteries, mosques and Islamic schools, and council grant money allocated to predominantly Muslim organizations as indicators to measure local government responsiveness to Muslim interests (see Table 4.1, Table 3.1).

The Relationship between Descriptive and Substantive Representation Hypothesis 1 Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts where the percentage of Muslim councillors is higher.

Table 3.1

Hypotheses tested

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 4

Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts where the percentage of Muslim councillors is higher Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be lower in districts where Muslim councillors are more divided along party lines Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts where Muslim councillors are more politically incorporated Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts that are more electorally competitive

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Descriptive representation refers to “the representation of historically disadvantaged groups by members from those groups” (Dovi 2007, 21). It emphasizes the existence (or the absence) of representatives in decision-making bodies who share descriptive qualities, experiences, and interests of a minority group. For its proponents “what matters is not just the policy outcome but who takes the decisions. By this standard a Parliament which does not ‘look like Britain,’ no matter how much it claims to speak on behalf of its constituents, remains fundamentally unrepresentative” (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 186). On the other hand, substantive or effective representation refers to the quality of the representation of minority interests either by elected officials regardless of their background. Although descriptive representation is not unanimously deemed as a prerequisite for substantive representation, most scholars consider it as a necessary condition (Diamond and Hartstock 1981; Gould 1996; Mansbridge 1999; Philips 1995, 1998; Sapiro 1981; Williams 1998a, b; Young 1990; Young 2000). They argue that descriptive representation is likely to improve the substantive representation of minorities because simply put, women represent women better and blacks represent blacks better. Conversely, tokenism may occur when there are minority representatives yet their presence in decision-making bodies is only symbolic and does not translate into minority friendly policies. In this study, I use descriptive representation to indicate the presence of minority representatives in decision-making bodies, and substantive representation, to connote the content of policy outputs that may be attributed to their presence. Concurring with the advocates of descriptive representatives, I argue that the social background of representatives shapes their representational roles, styles, and policy preferences. In other words, their political attitudes and behavior is a partial outcome of their social background. Hence, I hypothesize that government responsiveness to minority interests is likely to be higher in districts where the percentage of minority representatives is higher.

Party Fragmentation among Minority Councillors Hypothesis 2 Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be lower in districts where Muslim councillors are more divided along party lines.

Strong party discipline is one of the defining characteristics of the British political system. Gianetti and Laver define party discipline as a “‘top down’ phenomenon—the outcome of a strategic game played within the party in

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which rank and file members respond to rewards and punishments created by some internal decision-making regime” (2005, 2). Electoral rules, such as the FPTP system used in Britain, give power to party leaders to choose candidates and produce strong party discipline (Schugart 2001). Even though decisions are made through a general council vote, councillors vote as a unified bloc based on decisions taken in the party group. According to Copus (2004), the party group within each political party is a discrete and discreet party organization and has its own rules and procedures. Furthermore, each party group elects a whips office and a chief whip, which is “charged, amongst other things, with ensuring the group retains its coherence and unity in public, and that members are aware of group policy and decisions on all issues” (Copus 2004, 93). These arguments carry serious repercussions for the theories of representative democracy and deserve careful scrutiny. I therefore test the role of party control on government responsiveness to minority interests by analyzing whether party fragmentation among Muslim councillors significantly influences the level of local government responsiveness to Muslim interests. Fragmentation among minority representatives is likely to decrease their ability to work cohesively to advocate minority interests. Muslim councillors are bound by party agendas, which is likely to encumber cross-party cooperation on Muslim issues and lead to lower local government responsiveness.

Political Incorporation of Minority Councillors Hypothesis 3 Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts where Muslim councillors are more politically incorporated.

Haynie (2001) defines political incorporation as “the extent to which a group is strategically positioned to exercise significant influence over the policymaking process,” and contends that it is “a precondition to having a meaningful effect on government policies and programs” (13). Likewise, according to Browning et al., political incorporation refers to the degree “to which a group has been able to achieve a position from which strong and sustained influence can be exercised” (1984, 241). Research on political incorporation has revealed that an increase in the number of minority representatives (descriptive representation) is not sufficient to lead to significant change in minority friendly policy outputs (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Sonenshein 1993). Hence, the theory of political incorporation developed by Browning et al. (1984) and Sonenshein (1993) states that increased minority political incorporation in decision-making bodies results in

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substantive policy changes on minority issues. Most importantly, Browning et al. (1984)’s findings suggest that periods of increased political incorporation of minorities at the city council level precedes significant policy change at the municipal level. They contend that a group that has achieved substantial political incorporation has taken a major step toward political equality. It is in a position to articulate its interests, its demands will be heard, and through the dominant coalition it can ensure that certain interests will be protected, even though it may not win on every issue. The group will have successfully opened the system and gained the kind of ability to make its interests prevail that other groups have already achieved. 1984, 27

They measure political incorporation as “a composite scale of the number or percentage of African American office-holders present in the policy-making arena, their presence in important leadership positions, and their active participation in dominant ruling coalitions” (Haynie 2001, 64). Using this composite scale to measure political incorporation of African Americans at the municipal level, Browning et al. (1984) found that political incorporation was positively associated with change in urban policies (e.g. use of minority contractors), appointment of more minorities to city commissions, the establishment of police review boards, and better city services in neighborhoods with high minority populations. Likewise, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) discovered that African American political incorporation was linked with higher levels of political engagement and participation. Based on the political incorporation literature, I hypothesize that local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts where Muslim councillors are more politically incorporated. In order to analyze the political incorporation of Muslim councillors in the thirty-two London city councils, I calculate the political incorporation scores for each council in three consecutive terms from 1998 to 2010. I construct a political incorporation index to measure leadership positions, seniority, and strategic institutional positioning. First, city councillors’ seniority is likely to generate more knowledge and experience about the policy making process, the council rules, and procedures, as well as more networking with councillors and other key players in service delivery and local party politics. These are assets for building more effective negotiation and coalition building skills (Meyer 1980). Second, leadership positions contribute to the potential power and influence of councillors due to the control over agenda-setting, cabinet appointments, and committee

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assignment process. Finally, since decisive debates and votes are held in committee meetings, committee assignments are significant for councillors’ impact on policy outcomes (Stewart 2000).

Party Representation and Electoral Competitiveness Hypothesis 4 Local government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in districts that are more electorally competitive.

Analyzing Muslim access to decision-making bodies and the effects of their presence on government responsiveness necessitates a thorough investigation of the role of the political parties in local politics. Based on the literature on political parties and electoral politics, I test the impact of political parties on the effectiveness of minority councillors to represent group interests through the proxy of electoral competitiveness of the district. Political parties are influential in several steps of the representation process. First, political parties act as gatekeepers by controlling the candidate selection process. The relevant research question to explore is, have the political parties incorporated minorities as political actors? How does the variation in the selection processes of political parties impact the number of minority representatives elected (i.e. centralized versus decentralized selection mechanisms, quotas, selection criteria, etc.)? Do they appoint, nominate, and support minorities who deemphasize minority issues? Second, once minority candidates are elected, do parties hinder or facilitate their efforts to represent group interests? Finally, how influential are parties in the long-term political careers of minority representatives (i.e. promotion to prestigious committees and posts)? This research focuses on the second and third stages and examines whether parties facilitate or hinder effective representation of group interests. In investigating the dynamics of political representation, scholars have categorized political systems based on the roles political parties play. For example, the responsible party government model is one of the defining characteristics of the British political system. Proponents of this model argue that democracy reaches its ideal when political parties provide alternative policy programs, voters choose parties based on an informed assessment of their platforms and performance, and regular free and fair elections are held to ensure the alternation of power and party accountability (Norris 1997, 7). Political parties have prime importance in this model, since “what matters for defending the interests of the poorer, less-educated sectors of society, women and ethnic minorities is getting policies accepted by parties which

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defend their interests” (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 186). Also, the strong party discipline creates a political structure where parties are responsible for the political recruitment process (e.g. who gets initiated into the hierarchical and professional political career leading to the Parliament) as well as agenda setting and policy formulation. Hence, in the responsible party government model, the focus of representation is no longer the individual representative but the political party. The party mostly dictates the representative styles and votes of elected officials, and they may use discretion only on politically insignificant issues where the party does not have a clear stance. Dissent is punished in several ways ranging from not selecting the candidate for reelection to not promoting to prestigious positions. Hence, in the responsible party government model, parties control the extent of council responsive­ness to constituent demands regardless of the number of minority representatives. Analyzing the role of local parties, Copus argues that British local government is party-based government where “local representation has been reduced from broad ideals of citizen empowerment and involvement to a narrow focus on party loyalty and party interest” (2004, 10). He introduces the concept of party persons who are first and foremost loyal to their party, and their primary goal is to serve party interests (Copus 2004, 3). A problem of representation arises when parties are not concerned with local interests, and they deter “well-qualified potential candidates from seeking local office … subjugating the needs of the community to the needs of the party” (Copus 2004, 1). Moreover, Copus states that political parties have little or no loyalty to recognizable local com­ munities as such. Rather, they are concerned with capturing control of a council—a specific local government unit—the boundaries of which are more likely to be drawn for administrative convenience and to meet technocratic and managerial needs, rather than reflect communities of place … it is power and the control of those units, more than community representation, that interest political parties. 2004, 7

To test these arguments, I take a Downsian perspective and follow the spatial models of party competition, which emphasize electoral incentives and “policy-oriented voters who support parties based on ideological or issue proximity to party platforms” (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005, 2). Scholars have found that politicians elected from competitive districts are more responsive to their median constituents (Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr., and Stewart III 2001;

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Jacobson 1987; Kayser and Linzer 2007; Mayhew 1974).4 Hence, based on the literature on electoral competitiveness and policy responsiveness, and the fact that there is strong party discipline across London councils, I hypothesize that government responsiveness to Muslim interests is likely to be higher in boroughs with high electoral competitiveness. Parties, as vote-maximizers, would be more willing to respond to constituent demands and exert less pressure on minority representatives’ advocacy work in order to attract deciding votes in elections.

Representative Styles of Elected Minorities

I explore the role that representational styles of Muslim councillors have on local government responsiveness through case studies. In particular, I analyze the in-depth interviews to assess the representation styles of Muslim councillors and to evaluate their impact on the causal mechanisms related to the four explanatory variables. Discussions on representative styles have been at the core of democratic theory. Scholars have theorized that legislative behavior is highly correlated with representative styles (Gross 1978). Gross argues that “One can distinguish two classes of role orientations which relate to the representational relationship: the focus of representation and the style of representation. The focus of representation refers to the legislator’s ideas as to whom he ought to represent while the style of representation refers to the legislator’s view of how he ought to represent” (1978, 361). Unlike Gross (1978), I use the term representative style to refer to elected officials’ view on who and how they should represent.5 Fenno (2003) emphasizes the importance of analyzing the personal goals of representatives (what politicians wanted to accomplish by entering elective politics) in order to evaluate their political activity. For their motivations and ambitions shape their representational strategy, which in turn shapes their choices (Fenno 2003, 255). Representatives pursue a mix of goals; namely, election, reelection, and the second-order goal, which is “often the same that attracted 4 This is also called the marginality hypothesis. Griffin (2006) argues that studies that found no relationship between electoral competitiveness and responsiveness used biased measures of both variables. 5 A related term is political character. Dovi (2007) defines political character as “the stable habits, dispositions, and attitudes of representatives that guide their actions as representatives” (11). However, this term is rather general and does not emphasize the representation of interests.

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them to politics in the first place. In the observable mix of goals, it is this second-order goal that turns out to be the distinguishing feature of each member’s district-level representational relationships” (Fenno 2003, 7). Hence, representative styles are affected by a set of factors that are mostly related to the ethnic and religious background of the representative. Writing about African American legislatures in the us, Haynie argues that they face a duality dilemma “rooted in the concurrent pressures and expectations associated with living, working, and participating in the dominant white society while attempting to maintain an identity and connection with African American community” (2001, 7). Anderson defines the duality dilemma as having to balance being a race man or a sell-out (1997, 116). African American legislatures are expected to simultaneously represent black interests, be responsible legislators, and integrate into political institutions while trying to transform them (Haynie 2001, 8). I contend that the duality dilemma equally applies to Muslim representatives in the West, because “of the demands from atypical constituents, the potential for different personal priorities, and backgrounds in minority issues or alternative political situations, these legislators may face more conflicts. They may find it more difficult to meet … the requirements of a ‘majority’ institution. To the extent that they do, they may be perceived as failing to represent their own constituents or as selling out to moderates” (Friedman 1993, 30). Hence the role of race representative may be incompatible with the demands, expectations, and pressures placed upon African American representatives by fellow legislators, political parties, and the legislature as an institution … Consequently, the legislative life of black legislators, perhaps more so than with other representatives, involves a perpetual concern with achieving some kind of workable balance between representing racial group interests and pushing for fundamental institutional reform on the one hand, and advancing a more mainstream agenda and seeking greater incorporation or integration into the legislative process on the other. Thus in order to be effective in performing day-to-day legislative duties, African American representatives must have in their repertoire the skills and ability to manage the conflicts and dilemmas that result from these seemingly incompatible representational roles. Haynie, 2001, 6

Four representative styles emerge from the literature to describe how minority representatives cope with the duality dilemma (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3).

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Table 3.2 Causal factors tested Independent variables

Dependent variable

Percentage of Muslim councillors in the council (H1) Party fragmentation among Muslim councillors (H2) Political incorporation of Muslim councillors (H3) Electoral competitiveness of the district (H4)

Local government responsiveness

Table 3.3 Representative styles Representative style

Primary loyalty and advocacy

Responsible representative Group representative Balancer Party representative

District Group District and group Party

Master (1961) describes the prototype responsible legislators whose political behavior aims to enhance the prestige of the institution. They are moderate in ideology and approach, not seeking drastic policy changes but gradual synthesis of opposing views. Moreover, “no matter how firm his convictions and no matter how great pressures upon him, he demonstrates a willingness to compromise” (Masters 1961, 352). Scholars contend that such representatives gain the reverence of their colleagues, obtain more prestigious committee assignments, and are more influential in their representational roles (Asher 1975; Davidson and Oleszek 1989; Friedman 1993; Huitt 1961; Keefe and Ogul 1993; Matthews 1960; Rosenthal 1981, 1990). However, commenting on African American state legislatures, Haynie (2001) argues that, given the enormity and persistent nature of the economic and social problems facing large segments of the African American community, attempting to follow or adopt the characteristics, norms, and predominant traits of legislative institutions and the “responsible legislator” imposes significant constraints on African American representatives who are expected or may feel pressure to pursue black interests. (6)

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For the purposes of this study, responsible representatives refer to those who self-identify as representatives of the entire constituency and whose advocacy work focuses on furthering the interests of their constituency at large. When faced with a conflict between the interests of their district and that of their group interests, they choose the former. Writing on the experiences of African American elected officials, Anderson (1997) develops the concept of race representative, elected officials who feel and act as if they are responsible to solve all the problems of their race, and they publicly put matters of race first and seek to advance the African American community. The concept of race representatives can be applied to all minority representatives by modifying the term to group representatives. Hence, I use the term group representatives to refer to elected officials from minority groups whose primary concern is to represent their group interests. Haynie (2001) notes the challenges of being a group representative in institutions established by the norms and priorities of the majority usually elected from districts which the majority of the voters and constituents are African American or members of various racial and ethnic groups. Coming from such jurisdictions, they are expected to formulate and enact public policies that serve the interests of black people. However, one of the many ironies of African American politics is that in seeking to formulate and enact policies that address the particular needs and interests of the black community, African American legislators must operate in a political system and within political institutions that are biased against drastic or revolutionary change, and where the advocacy of black interests may be incongruent with both policy successes and professional advancement (Barker and Jones 1994; Dymally 1971; Friedman 1993) … The political system and its institutions are designed and structured in ways that repel the very kinds of fundamental social and economic changes that African American representatives often must advocate. (4–5)

Facing similar challenges, group representatives have two strategies for obtaining their policy goals. They may either become legislative outsiders (Huitt 1961) by prioritizing race issues, or they may choose to deracialize their legislative agendas (Barker and Jones 1994). Legislative outsiders are “those legislators who sometimes may stand in opposition to their party, and who do not necessarily conform to the norms and traditions of the institution …” and potentially become less effective and less influential (Haynie 2001, 9). On the other hand, deracialization refers to “the practice of blacks articulating political demands

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in terms that are not racially specific so that they appeal to a broader group and presumably do not alienate those who are disposed to oppose black efforts” (Barker and Jones 1994, 321). This strategy may increase their coalitionbuilding success and therefore chances of advancing minority interests. For instance, Wilson (1987) advocates universal programs instead of race or group specific strategies in order to address problems of African American communities. Yet, as Haynie (2001) notes, it is not too clear how race-related problems can be solved with non-race-specific solutions. For the purposes of this study, I conceptualize group representatives as those who feel they represent their minority group(s). They primarily advocate their group interests, and when the interests of their district and minority group conflict, they choose the latter. Canon (1999) identifies a third representative style for elected minorities, the balancing perspective. This is a middle-ground strategy, trying to balance the first two representational roles. In this perspective, minority representatives pursue their group interests without resorting to “the divisive language of separatism,” and they take into consideration that their group interests and interests of other constituents may collide (Canon 1999). They try to balance their representative responsibilities and work on group-specific issues as well as issues of concern to the entire constituency. Canon (1999)’s balancer perspective has common characteristics with the democratic representative Dovi (2007) outlines. He offers three standards that democratic representatives must fulfill, “the virtue of fair-mindedness, through which a representative contributes to the realization of the value of civic equality; the virtue of critical trust building, through which a representative contributes to the realization of the value of self-governance; and, finally, the virtue of good gatekeeping, through which a representative contributes to the realization of the value of inclusion” (Dovi 2007, 7). Dovi (2007) maintains that democratic representation is more than simply responding to citizens’ policy preferences as the delegate view of representation suggests. He argues that democratic citizens should evaluate their representatives by the way in which they advocate—that is, by how they advance public policies on behalf of democratic citizens. Democratic representatives represent democratically only when, in advancing public policies on behalf of their constituents, they aim to foster the legitimacy of democratic institutions, to promote citizens’ participation, and to increase their identification with democratic institutions. Those who represent in a democratic fashion honor these constraints on their advocacy work. Dovi, 2007, 3

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For the purposes of this study, I conceptualize balancers as those representatives who are concerned with the interests of their minority group(s) as well as the interests of the constituency at large. They self-identify as representatives of their minority group and their district. Their advocacy work focuses equally on furthering their group interests and the interests of their district. And as Canon (1999) outlines, they do not use a divisive language but may rely on general concepts (e.g. equality, justice for all, and equal opportunities) to justify their advocacy work. Finally, Copus (2004) introduces the concept of a party persons who are first and foremost loyal to their party and place party interests above their group and district interests. Based on this conception, I develop a fourth representational style, the party representative, whose primary objective is to serve party interests, and who places party loyalty before serving the interests of their district or group. I analyze whether Muslim councillors act as responsible representatives, group representatives, balancers, or party representatives, and explore the impact of these representational styles on the four explanatory variables. I expect that acting as balancers would enable Muslim councillors to advocate for all group and district interests, to build working coalitions with nonMuslim councillors and constituents, to bring minority as well as majority votes to their parties, to be promoted to prestigious committees and leadership positions, and to have successful political careers. I interviewed Muslim councillors across London boroughs to evaluate the role of representative styles on local government responsiveness and to explore whether Muslim councillors deemphasize their religious identity or use it strategically to advance politically.6 I use three categories of questions to assess the representational roles and styles of Muslim councillors; namely, the role definitions of Muslim councillors, advocacy work of Muslim councillors, and council work style of the Muslim councillors.

The Control Variables

There may be other factors that impact government responsiveness to minority interests yet are not within the scope of this study. For instance, certain demographic characteristics of the district may affect the types and extent of 6 As Childs suggests, “If we want to know whether women representatives seek to represent women substantively, we can, as Reinhold suggested, simply ask them” (2002, 143).

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constituent demands as well as the level of government responsiveness. Therefore, in order to measure the impact of the explanatory variables discussed above, I control for two district characteristics. It is likely that higher percentages of ethnic minorities would lead to more group specific demands. This may either hinder government responsiveness as the council becomes overwhelmed with the pressures on its resources, or it may facilitate responsiveness by creating a collegial and diverse environment in and with the council. On the other hand, when there is not a critical mass of minority constituents, the council may be unaware of or unreceptive to their demands. Alternatively, it may be more accommodating of the small volume of minority demands. Likewise, the socio-economic indicators of the district may impact local government responsiveness. For instance, councils in districts with lower socio-economic indicators may receive more demands for council grants for community projects, welfare subsidies, council housing, etc. On the other hand, Muslims who live in a district with higher socio-economic standards may raise the required funds to purchase private land to establish a Muslim cemetery. To this end, I use the index of multiple deprivation (imd) of the district, which is measured through seven types of deprivation including income deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and training deprivation, barriers to housing and services, living environment deprivation, and crime.7

Why Study London?

First, London boroughs have highly similar administrative rules and institutional designs, allowing me to use Mill (1941)’s method of difference to conduct large-N regression analysis as well as controlled comparisons across the three boroughs. Second, approximately half of British Muslims live in London, and they are mainly concentrated in these three boroughs (Hackney 13.8%, Newham 24.3%, and Tower Hamlets 36.4%). Third, there 7 The index of multiple deprivation (imd) is based on “the concept of measuring different dimensions of deprivation individually, and then combining them to give an overall score. The latest imd was published in 2004 by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (odpm). The purpose of the index is to identify areas of need, so scores are produced based on small geographical areas of a consistent population size (around 1500 people) called super output areas  (SOAs)”  (http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/Services/CouncilDemocracy/StatisticsCensus Information/IndicesOfDeprivation.htm).

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are approximately 146 Muslim councillors across the thirty-two London boroughs (and more than 217 in Britain), and about fifty of them serve in these three councils. Finally, the percentage of Muslim councillors in Newham and Hackney are very similar, whereas the government responsiveness varies significantly (Sinno and Tatari 2008). I can explore the impact of other factors on government responsiveness while controlling for the percentage of Muslim councillors. On the other hand, Tower Hamlets is unique among the thirty-two London councils where more than half of the councillors are Muslim. It is one of the few councils that established a Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (sacre), and a Refugee Forum focusing on minority issues. Through a case study of Tower Hamlets, I can examine the effects of substantial numbers of Muslim councillors (majority) on local government responsiveness and council dynamics. There are four major data sources for this study (see Table 3.4). First is the Census Data obtained from the Office for National Statistics. The 2001 Census was the first to ask about the ethnicity and religious affiliation of citizens. Second is Interview Data obtained by conducting approximately ninety minute semi-structured interviews with close and open-ended questions. I identified the Muslim councillors across the thirty-two London boroughs from their names, which were confirmed during interviews. I also contacted all nonMuslim councillors in the three case study councils to set up interviews with the respondents. Additionally, I interviewed editors of local newspapers (e.g. Muslim News) and activists advocating for Muslim interests (e.g. Muslim Council of Britain). Third data type is Participant Observation Data obtained by observing relevant council and committee meetings in the Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Hackney councils. I also participated in several community meetings attended by Muslim councillors. Final data type is Council Data provided by city councils (e.g. data on councillors, surgeries, and other publicly available data on council services). I collected data on government responsiveness indicators and councillors from council web pages and archives as well as phone interviews. In this study, I design a comparative study according to Mill (1941)’s method of difference and use both quantitative and qualitative methods to test my hypotheses. Mill (1941)’s method of difference permits me to control the variables that are not the focus of this study (such as administrative rules of London councils), while allowing the variables of interest to fluctuate. By building a robust research design that enables control, I can analyze causal mechanisms thoroughly. I use multivariate regression analysis (fixed-effects model) to test the effects of the four independent

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Table 3.4 Data sources and types Data types

Data source

Census Data

Office for National Statistics

Data type

1. Percent of Muslim constituents 2. Percent of ethnic minorities 3. Index of multiple deprivation 1. Self-identified representative Interview Data 1. Muslim City Councillors roles and styles of Muslim in three case study councils councillors 2. Non-Muslim councillors 2. How non-Muslim councillors in three case study councils 3. Editors of local newspapers perceive and interact with Muslim councillors 4. Activists advocating for 3. How local media portrays Muslim interests roles of Muslim councillors 4. How activists work with or against Muslim councillors Participant 1. Council meetings in Tower 1. Observation of the represenObservation Data Hamlets, Newham, Hackney tatives roles, styles, advocacy work of Muslim councillors Councils and the response of non2. Relevant committee Muslim councillors meetings in Tower Hamlets, Newham, Hackney Councils 2. Observation of the involvement of Muslim councillors in 3. Relevant community community meetings and how meetings in Tower Hamlets, they are perceived by Newham, Hackney constituents Council Data Council web pages 1. Data on councillors Council archives 2. Data on government responsiveness indicators

variables on local government responsiveness. I also conduct three case studies to interpret and validate the quantitative findings and to identify omitted variables.8 8 George and Bennett refer to such studies as theory testing and heuristic case studies respectively, and state that a single research design can accomplish both these objectives simultaneously (2005, 76).

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To model the relationships between the independent and the dependent variables, I use multivariate regression analysis. The unit of analysis is the council, and the universe of cases is the entire population of local authorities in Britain. The sample is the thirty-two London boroughs that allow for Mill (1941)’s method of difference research design, assuming unit homogeneity. In order to increase the number of cases and avoid the too many variables, too few cases problem, King et al. (1994) and Lijphart (1971) suggest the use of cases at regional or lower levels of organization or examining cases longitudinally. Although the unit of analysis for this study is the council (the thirty-two London boroughs), I include data from 1998–2002, 2002–2006, and 2006–2010 terms longitudinally, increasing the number of observations to ninety-six and the degrees of freedom to ninety-two. The data set is panel data containing observations on multiple phenomena observed over multiple time periods. The fixed effects estimator (otherwise known as the within estimator) assumes fixed effects and imposes time independent effects for each entity that are possibly correlated with the regressors. Such models assist in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time and correlated with the independent variables. The fixed effect assumption is that the individual specific effect is correlated with the independent variables. In the second part of the study, I conduct case studies of three London boroughs. Case studies are necessary for this study to explore omitted variables and to validate and interpret the quantitative findings. Eckstein (1975) points that case studies may spark ideas about relations which may, upon further examination, turn out to be generalizable into theory and used to probe the viability of hypothesized relations. Likewise, George and Bennett argue that “case studies can test deductive theories and suggest new variables that need to be incorporated” (2005, 111). Hence, in-depth case studies may reveal other relevant variables that have not been accounted for in the regression analysis. Moreover, in-depth case studies help assess the representative styles of Muslim councillors in comparison to non-Muslim councillors and the specific causal mechanisms behind the four explanatory variables. Quantifying representative styles to include in the regression would critically sacrifice measurement validity. The main advantage of the case study method is that focusing on a few cases facilitates intensive examination (Lijphart 1971). Hence, having direct interaction with the councillors and conducting in-depth interviews help to explore the meanings councillors assign to their representative roles and to uncover the reasons underlying their political behavior. Moreover, rigorous and carefully designed case studies are necessary to identify the configuration of contingencies of in the proposed theory. To identify and explain the causal mechanisms in the case studies, I utilize theory-oriented process-tracing

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methodology and use interviewing and participant observation tools to collect relevant data. Defining variance based on prior case familiarity is crucial in case selection. As such, preliminary research in London conducted during Summer 2006 informs the research design and case selection of this study. I selected Hackney and Newham based on the variation in the dependent variable, and Tower Hamlets based on an extreme value on one of the key independent variables (the percentage of Muslim councillors). Even though this selection is not random, the three cases display variance in both the dependent and the independent variables, and they will be used to complement the large-N regression analysis. Furthermore, case study findings can suggest if the causal relations are necessary, sufficient, linear, or involve more complex causal relations such as equifinality and interaction effects.

Chapter 4

Across London Boroughs The following four indicators were used to measure local government responsiveness (see Table 4.1). Although the definition of local government responsiveness indicates a response to a given demand, I do not include the percentage of applications granted by the city councils. For there is no reason to assume that Muslims in a given locality would demand establishing more or less Islamic schools or mosques than Muslims in another district, except the number of Muslim constituents. Hence, the z-scores for the indicators are adjusted to reflect the percentage of Muslims in the borough. Muslim population for 1998–2002 term was coded based on the data provided by the 2001 Census and is adjusted for the subsequent terms based on the Labor Force Survey.1 Labor Force Survey reveals that Muslim population in Britain has grown by more than 800,000 to 2.4 million in just seven years (see Table 4.2). Hence, total Muslim population increased by 52.4% from 2001 to 2008 (an average of 7.4% per year). On the other hand, the overall population of Great Britain in 2001 was 57,103,927 and the mid-2008 estimate is 59,608,000; hence, the overall population increased by only 4.4% in seven years. Taking the 2001 Census figures for the total borough population and Muslim population in each borough as the base, I calculated the adjusted overall populations and the adjusted Muslim populations for the 2002–2006 and 2006–2010 terms. Although the most recent estimates are 2.7 million according to the 2011 Census, for the purposes of this research, the above figures were used to control for the effect of size on the four indicators of government responsiveness. Dividing each indicator by the percentage of Muslims in the borough enables control for the different proportion of Muslims in each borough. In other words, the ratio of cemeteries that accommodate Muslim burials over total cemeteries is normalized by the percentage of Muslim population. Cemeteries The first indicator of local government responsiveness is the ratio of the number of cemeteries that accommodate Muslim burials in a given borough 1 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/census2001.asp.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/9789004272262_005

72 Table 4.1

Chapter 4 Indicators of local government responsiveness

Name of indicator*

Explanation

Cemeteries (DV1)

Ratio of the number of cemeteries that accommodate Muslim burials to the total number of cemeteries in the borough; and satisfaction scores Ratio of the number of Islamic schools to the total number of schools in the borough Number of council licensed mosques in the borough Ratio of council grant money allocated to Muslim religious and cultural organizations to total grant money allocated by the council

Islamic schools (DV2) Mosques (DV3) Grant money (DV4)

*These indicators are controlled for the percentage of Muslims in the borough and coded for the 1998–2002, 2002–2006, and 2006–2010 terms. Table 4.2 Muslim population estimates in Great Britain, 2001–2008 Year

2001 (2001 Census) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of Muslims

1,588,890 1,870,000 2,017,000 2,142,000 2,327,000 2,422,000

source: labour force survey.

over the total number of cemeteries in that borough as well as the cemetery satisfaction scores. The provision of Muslim burial grounds and accommodation of particular religious needs in existing cemeteries are religious matters that lead to heated controversies because of the sensitivity of the issue. For instance, Islamic burial practices require the body to be buried wrapped in a white piece of cloth without a casket, while the head is placed towards Mecca. In almost all West European countries, including Britain, cemeteries are run by local officials and/or national churches according to Christian rituals. Hence, where no concessions are granted to religious minorities, Muslims are left with no choice but to send their dead to their countries of

Across London Boroughs

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origin.2 This diminishes their sense of belonging and increases frustration with local authorities. Hence, cemetery ratio and satisfaction scores were selected as an indicator for government responsiveness because there have been ongoing efforts by British Muslims in London to fundraise and lobby city councils to establish separate burial grounds for Muslims, ensure accommodation for Islamic burials in existing burial grounds, or establish separate sections for Muslims in existing cemeteries. Furthermore, Muslim councillors who were interviewed have identified this issue as one of the top challenges facing the Muslim community, for which they seek help from the council. Data is coded for cemeteries that are owned and run by Muslims and council owned cemeteries that have a designated section for Muslims or accommodate Islamic burials. The total number of cemeteries is calculated by adding the number of cemeteries and crematoria run by the borough council and the number of Muslim run cemeteries. In some cases, there are cemeteries located in borough A that are run by council B. Data is coded for council B that owns and runs the cemetery. If council A has an agreement with council B to use its burial grounds, data is coded for a burial ground for both councils A and B (such is the case in Tower Hamlets). When and if a cemetery or crematorium is owned and run by two councils, data is coded for both councils. In order to exclude very small cemeteries in church yards, only the cemeteries that are larger than one acre are included in the data set. Also, cemeteries are included in the data set even if no more burials take place. Table 4.3 depicts the number of boroughs for each term by the percentage of cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials. Although in all three terms, the numbers are disproportionately accumulated in the 0–20 and 20–40 percentiles, there is a slight increase towards the 60–80 and 80–100 percentiles as we move from the 1998–2002 to the 2006–2010 term. Table 4.4 shows the increase in the total number of London cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials. In the 1998–2002 term, forty-seven out of the 148 London cemeteries had some form of accommodation for Islamic burials, whereas this figure increased to fifty-five in the 2006–2010 term. In addition, a cemetery satisfaction score was computed and combined with the cemetery ratio discussed above. Leaders of the largest mosques in each borough were asked to give a score (1 = least satisfactory and 10 = most 2 For instance, in Sweden, cemetery councils have recently been issued directives to work with Muslim religious authorities to facilitate Islamic burials. On the other hand, Danish Muslims have been struggling to obtain a land to establish a Muslim cemetery for over a decade and have yet to succeed, whereas both Jews and Catholics were granted special permissions to buy cemetery land for their congregations (Tatari 2009).

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Table 4.3 Number of boroughs by percentage of cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials Percentage of cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 80–100 Total

11 12 4 2 3 32

11 9 3 4 5 32

9 11 3 4 5 32

Table 4.4 Number of London cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials, 1998–2010 Term

Number of cemeteries that accommodate Islamic burials

Total number of cemeteries

1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010

47 53 55

148 149 150

satisfactory) as to how satisfactory the cemetery accommodations for Islamic burials were for the Muslims living in their borough ten years ago (1998–2002) and now (2006–2010). The number of answers differed for each borough, and the average of the answers were calculated. The averages of the two scores were assigned to the 2002–2006 term cemetery satisfaction score. Hence, the cemetery indicator (DV1) for the dependent variable was calculated by adding the mean z-scores for the cemetery ratio and the cemetery satisfaction scores.

Islamic Schools

The second indicator for local government responsiveness is the ratio of the number of Islamic schools in a given borough over the total number of schools in that borough. British Muslims, particularly in large cities with high concentration of Muslims, have been trying to establish Islamic schools through fundraising efforts and lobbying local councils to obtain licensing and planning

Across London Boroughs

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permissions. As Squires explains, there has been dissatisfaction with local authorities with regard to this issue: In spite of the million and a half Muslims in Britain, up to half of whom are of school age, there is no voluntary-aided Muslim school … Sahib Mustaqim … who is the spokesman for the Muslim parents in Batley, claims that the Batley city council practiced apartheid by concentrating Muslims in certain schools and then denying them halal meat and the right to worship according to their religion. He also claims that the council is guilty of discrimination by not supporting the application from the local Islamic girls’ school for voluntary-aided status. Moreover, Christians and Jews are given a state-funded right to religious education, while Muslims are not. The Association of Muslim Schools claims that the government ‘wishes to maintain a Judeo-Christian monopoly in controlling the minds of youth in the state education system’. Squires, 2003, 91

There are several reasons why establishing Islamic schools is of concern to British Muslims, such as the problems with the teaching of Islam in school curricula. In some West European countries, there have been public debates over whether to teach Islam in religious studies courses, what the content should be, and who should teach it (Tatari 2009). Most Muslim parents want their children to receive Islamic education at schools yet are concerned about misrepresentation of Islam in textbooks. European states, on the other hand, seek to ensure that a Western friendly version of Islam is taught to Muslim students, if taught at all.3 The second issue is obtaining religious exemptions at public schools. Muslim parents have raised questions about their children having to participate in co-ed physical education classes, in particular swimming classes, sex education classes, and some even resent art, music or biology classes (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Another issue is obtaining public funding for Islamic schools. Public funding for religiously affiliated schools has been an issue of debate in many West European countries. Some argue that no religiously affiliated school should receive public funding, while others contend that if one religious group receives tax money then all others should be granted the same 3 In some countries, Islam is taught in comparative religions course and evidently textbooks pick and choose the version of Islam that is to be taught. In Germany, “Since no Muslim group has yet achieved public corporation status, Land school officials do not feel obligated to provide Islamic instruction or to consult formally with Muslim leaders on the content of any such classes” (Fetzer and Christopher Soper, 2005, 112).

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Table 4.5 Number of maintained schools in England by religion, January 2004

Primary Number of schools Number of FTE* pupils Number of FTE teachers Secondary Number of schools Number of FTE pupils Number of FTE teachers

No religious character

Christian

Jewish Muslim Sikh Other Total religious

11,449 2,930,250 129,070

6281 28 1,173,290 8270 51,750 380

2 430 20

1 200

1 190 10

17,762 4,112,630 181,230

2819 2,805,780 164,610

581 5 512,500 5000 30,260 310

2 710 40

1 430 20

1 290 10

3409 3,32,700 195,240

*FTE, full-time equivalent.

source: annual census of schools january 2003, department for education and skills.

right. Amidst these discussions, Muslims have succeeded to obtain public funding in Britain.4 Yet, as seen in Table 4.5, the numbers are very small (four) to constitute a meaningful analysis. The list of Islamic schools in London was compiled from several online sources and list of schools on Local Education Authorities’ web pages by identifying Islamic schools from their names. Some schools are located in one borough and are part of the Local Education Authority of another borough. They are coded for the borough of the Local Education Authority they are part of. Their founding dates were determined either from their web pages or by calling school administrations. The total number of schools includes public schools, independent schools, special education schools, including Islamic schools, at the primary and secondary level. These numbers were obtained from 2006 DfES tables provided online. Schools that have primary and secondary levels were counted twice. No gender or capacity restrictions were applied in the inclusion criteria; weekend or supplementary schools were excluded; 4 Muslims have succeeded to obtain public funding in Germany whereas in France there is not a single publicly funded Islamic school despite the fact that in theory under the Debré Laws of 1959, upon the demonstration of qualified teachers, large number of students, and clean facilities, any five-year-old Islamic school is eligible for public funding as do Jewish and Catholic schools (Fetzer and Christopher Soper, 2005). Muslims in France feel particularly frustrated with this fact since their taxes are used to finance Jewish and Christian schools while they are being deprived of the same right.

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Across London Boroughs Table 4.6 Distribution of Islamic schools by borough, 1998–2010 Borough

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Brent Bromley Ealing

8 1 3

8 1 3

8 1 3

Hackney Hammersmith&Fulham Kensington&Chelsea

3 1 1

4 1 1

4 1 1

2 1 1 10 1 2

2 3 1 12 1 3

3 4 2 13 2 3

Lambeth Newham Redbridge Tower Hamlets Waltham Forest Wandsworth 14

Number of Islamic schools

12 10 8 6

2006

4

Linear (2006)

2

90 00 18 6 30 19 6 01 22 2 44 23 8 94 25 7 04 29 5 65 32 1 56 38 2 48 44 2 20 47 1 85 54 7 25 99 3 58 4

42

12

82

65

30

13

0 Number of Muslims in the borough

Figure 4

Number of Muslims by number of Islamic schools in the borough, 2006–2010

and only those Islamic schools that are licensed by the Local Education Authorities were included. In the 1998–2002 term, there were thirty-four Islamic schools (out of 2877 total) compared to forty in the 2002–2006 term (out of 2882 total), and fortyfive in the 2006–2010 term (out of 2887 total). Given the level of organization, fundraising, and lobbying efforts, an increase of six and five Islamic schools

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respectively is noteworthy. As depicted in Table 4.6, Islamic schools are concentrated in certain boroughs. There are Islamic schools in twelve of the thirtytwo London boroughs, within which Brent (eight) and Tower Hamlets (thirteen) have the highest numbers. As highlighted in Table  4.6, the number of Islamic schools increased in seven out of the twelve boroughs that have Islamic schools. Also, as expected, there is a positive correlation between the number of Muslims in the borough and the number of Islamic schools (see Figure 4). Mosques Obtaining planning permissions to build new mosques, to convert buildings into mosques, and to have extensions or renovations done in existing mosques, is a constant struggle for British Muslims. Each planning application causes upheaval from local communities, heated discussions in council hearings by disgruntled non-Muslim residents, and extensive controversial media coverage. Hence, having councillors who are sympathetic to their demands for mosque projects becomes crucial for the Muslim community at all stages of the application and licensing process. Also, Muslim councillors assist the applicants in advising about red-tape, successfully advocating their cause in council hearings, and keeping in line with city code. The number of council licensed mosques is selected as an indicator of local government 45 40

Number of mosques

35 30 25 20

2006

15

Linear (2006)

10 5 0

0

Figure 5

20000

40000

60000

80000 100000 120000 140000

Number of Muslims in the borough

Number of mosques by number of Muslims in the borough, 2006–2010

Across London Boroughs

79

responsiveness due to these reasons, in addition to the fact that it was identified by Muslim councillors as a top priority issue for which Muslim community seeks help from Muslim councillors. A list of mosques in London was compiled through the directory of mosques provided on the online Muslim Directory.5 All mosques were included in the coding regardless of sectarian affiliation, size, or services provided. There has been a significant increase in the number of mosques in the last decade from 207 in 1998–2002, to 265 in 2002–2006, to 306 in 2006–2010. As expected there is a positive relationship between the number of mosques in a given borough and the number of Muslims in that borough (see Figure 5).

Council Grant Money

Local governments in Britain have sizeable budgets distributed to voluntary community organizations that show promise of benefiting constituents. Some borough councils allocate as high as 14 million pounds per fiscal year in small and large grants (i.e. Croydon). Given the poverty levels of many minority communities in Britain, particularly Bengali and Pakistani Muslims who, according to the 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey, have the lowest economic indicators, obtaining grant money for minority voluntary sector community organizations is essential (Maxwell 2006, 4–5). Total grant money includes all categories of grant money for which data is available, including corporate management, public resources, education and libraries, and small grants. These sums are provided for each fiscal year. To determine the average of grant money for a given term, the average of the number of fiscal years for which data is available was taken. Likewise, the average of grant money allocated to predominantly Muslim organizations for a given term was calculated by taking the average of grant money allocated to such organizations for the number of years within that term for which data is available. Predominantly Muslim organizations include ethnic, religious, women’s, children’s, or special purpose associations that exclusively or predominantly serve Muslim constituents. Table 4.7 depicts the total amount of money allocated to Muslim organizations in the thirty-two boroughs in each term compared with the total grant money allocated to all voluntary sector organizations. The percentage that is allocated to predominantly Muslim organizations increases slightly between each term. 5 http://www.muslimdirectory.co.uk.

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Table 4.7 Allocation of grant money, 1998–2010 Term

Grant money allocated to Muslim organizations (£)

Total grant money (£)

Percentage

1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010

4,817,692 5,456,133 7,067,384

88,370,198 97,599,190 118,078,764

5.45 5.59 5.99

Table 4.8 Number of boroughs by percentage of grant money, 1998–2010 Ratio of grant money (%)

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

0–5 5–10 10–15 15–20 Total

11 9 6 0 28

13 9 4 3 31

12 6 12 1 32

Table 4.8 depicts the number of boroughs by percentage of grant money given to predominantly Muslim organizations. For the 1998–2002 term, data was available for twenty-eight of the thirty-two boroughs, primarily due to the fact that councils are obliged to retain data for only seven years. The numbers are heavily concentrated in the 0–5 percentile in all terms. However, in the 2006– 2010 term, twelve boroughs allocated 10-15% of their voluntary sector grants to predominantly Muslim organizations. Appendix A compares the adjusted percentage of Muslim population living in each borough during the three consecutive terms and the percentage of grant money allocated to predominantly Muslim organizations in these terms. Out of the ninety-six cases, data was available for ninety-one cases. Percentage of grant money allocated to Muslims was zero in five out of ninety-one cases, and it was more than 10% below the percentage of Muslim population in thirteen cases (14.3%), (marked with an asterisk in Appendix A). However, in twenty-five of the ninety-one cases (27.5%), percentage of grant money allocated to Muslims was higher than or within 1% of the percent of Muslims in the borough (highlighted in Appendix A). Figure 6 shows the relationship between the percentage of Muslims in the borough and the percentage of grant money allocated to predominantly Muslim

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Across London Boroughs

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%

0.83% 1.60% 2.17% 3.83% 5.08% 5.41% 6.58% 7.11% 8.01% 8.88% 9.05% 10.51% 11.33% 11.94% 13.54% 14.99% 17.32% 19.21% 24.31%

Percent of grant money to Muslims

25.00%

Percent of Muslims in the borough Adjusted percentage of Muslim population in borough Figure 6

Percentage of grant money allocated to Muslims by percentage of Muslims in the borough

organizations. A line was fitted to depict the trend of the relationship. Albeit many oscillations, there is a positive relationship between the percentage­of grant money allocated to Muslims and the percentage of Muslims in the borough. Appendix B summarizes the average local government responsiveness for the three consecutive terms for each London borough in ascending order. Since the dependent variable is calculated by adding the z-scores of each indicator, there are negative values as well. The z-scores for each of the indicators are adjusted to reflect the percentage of Muslims in the borough and to control for the effect of minority size. Richmond upon Thames Council has the lowest (−0.77) and Tower Hamlets Council has the highest (2.13) average local government responsiveness. Figure 7 depicts the values summarized in Appendix B

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Tower Hamlets Newham Brent Redbridge Haringey Camden Westminster Southwark Waltham Forest Barking and Dagenham Ealing Hackney

Figure 7

Average local government responsiveness by borough

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Sutton Islington Harrow Greenwich Enfield Kingston upon Thames Hammersmith&Fulham Lewisham Hounslow Merton Havering Croydon Wandsworth Lambeth Barnet Kensington&Chelsea Bromley Hillingdon Bexley Richmond upon Thames

83

Across London Boroughs

as a graph. London councils differ widely in their responsiveness to demands of Muslim constituents.

Measuring Party Fragmentation

Party fragmentation variable measures the impact of party affiliation of minority representatives on local government responsiveness. Researching whether Labour women MPs in the 1997 Parliament act for women, Childs finds that “in British politics at least, acting for women is informed by both party and gender identity” (2002, 143). Her findings confirm the importance of party identity in representative styles and political behavior and the argument that “the gender/party framework provides important insights into the substantive representation of women by women representatives” (Childs 2002, 152). Scholars have developed numerous ways to define and measure fragmentation in different contexts. For the purposes of this study, I define party fragmentation as the number of political parties among Muslim councillors in a given council. Based on this definition, I measure party fragmentation as the number of parties among Muslim councillors in a given council divided by the number of Muslim councillors, where the greater the number, the greater the fragmentation. If all the Muslim councillors in the council are from the same party, fragmentation is zero. If a Muslim councillor changed his or her party in the middle of a term, I code that councillor for the original party s/he got elected from. Since there are no Muslim councillors in fourteen cases, excluding a denominator of zero yields fourteen missing cases, N = 82. Table 4.9 shows the descriptive statistics for the number of parties among Muslim councillors. In 56.3% of the eighty-two cases where there was at least one Muslim councillor in the council, all Muslim councillors in the council belonged to the same party. In other words, in more than half of the cases, there Table 4.9 Descriptive statistics for party fragmentation Term

No Muslim councillors (%)

One party (%)

Two parties (%)

1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010 Total

6 (18.8) 3 (9.4) 5 (15.6) 14 (14.6)

19 (59.4) 21 (65.6) 14 (43.8) 54 (56.3)

6 (18.8) 6 (18.8) 9 (28.1) 21 (21.9)

Three parties (%)

1 (3.1) 2 (6.3) 4 (12.5) 7 (7.3)

Total

32 32 32 96

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was no party fragmentation among Muslim councillors. In 21.9% of the eightytwo cases, Muslim councillors were divided between two political parties; and in only 7.3% were they divided between three political parties. The decrease in the percentage of cases from 2002–2006 where all Muslim councillors belonged to one party (65.6%) to 2006–2010 (43.8%) is caused by defection of Muslim councillors from Labour Party after the involvement of Britain in the Iraq War.

Measuring Political Incorporation

Scholars have developed different indices to measure political incorporation depending on the specific level of government and minority group in question. Nelson use an index of political influence that takes into account leadership and committee positions (1991, 94). Based on Nelson (1991), Browning et al. (1984), and Haynie (2001),6 I develop a political incorporation index for city councils in Britain, which is a composite measure of three factors, (a) mean seniority of Muslim councillors; (b) the number of leadership positions held by Muslim councillors; and (c) the number of prestigious committee assignments held by Muslim councillors (see Table 4.10). Leadership positions are: Table 4.10 Political incorporation indicators for Muslim city councillors, 1998–2010 Variable and range

Seniority (0–17) Leadership positions (0–16) Prestigious committee assignments (0–58)

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Total

Mean

Number

Mean Number

Mean

Number

Mean

Number

2.29 0.77

20

3.98 1.52

44

4.21 2.11

57

3.52 1.48

121

0.52

13

3.66

106

6.39

179

3.63

298

6 Building upon Nelson’s (1991) and Browning et al. (1984)’s indices of political incorporation, Haynie (2001) constructs a more comprehensive political incorporation index to measure the impact of African Americans in state legislatures in five us states. He uses a composite measure of six factors: (i) the number of African Americans in the legislature; (ii) what percent of the Democratic Party is made up of African American legislators; (iii) the number of prestigious committee assignments held by African American legislators; (iv) seniority levels of African American legislators; (v) leadership positions held by African American legislators; (vi) the presence of an African American speaker, majority leader, or minority leader (66).

Across London Boroughs

85

mayor, deputy leader, chief whip, cabinet member/executive member (Stewart 2000). I also include party spokesperson for any party, council leader, and shadow cabinet members. Prestigious committee assignments are: budgetary/ finance, planning/development, standards committees (also known as audit, overview or scrutiny), licensing.7 Based on Haynie (2001)’s index and measurements, leadership positions and prestigious committee assignments are weighted by multiplying by three and two respectively. Leadership positions are prestigious posts that provide opportunities for influencing the decisionmaking process, and they also allow minority representatives to be high profile role models. These leadership positions are crucial for all minority groups, since “Such appointment are doubly useful in that, in addition to providing opportunities for policy leadership, the appointees serve as high profile public role models to which other Latinos, especially the young, can relate” (Garcia 1997, 230). On the other hand, prestigious committee assignments are the committees that oversee crucial decisions for minority communities as well as the council at large. They are not necessarily as prestigious as the high profile leadership positions. I add the standardized values of the three factors to calculate the political incorporation index for each case. Based on this index, political incorporation scores are computed for the 1998–2002, 2002–2006, and 2006– 2010 terms for the thirty-two London councils. To calculate the seniority of Muslim councillors, I code zero for a councillor who got elected for the first time in 1998; four if s/he got elected again in 2002; and eight if elected for a third term in 2006. If a councillor is elected in byelections, for instance in 2005, I code zero for the 2002–2006 term. If s/he gets reelected in 2006, I code one for the 2006–2010 term. To code for leadership positions, I searched committee and council meeting archives (minutes, agendas, and reports) on council web pages. In some cases leadership positions change every fiscal year and in others it lasts until the next term. I code for each leadership position held within a given term (including substitute or reserve membership), regardless of the number of years the position was held. To code for prestigious committee assignments, I searched committee and council meeting archives (minutes, agendas, and reports) on council web pages. I excluded membership in sub-licensing or sub-standards committees 7 To my knowledge, no study on local government in Britain designated important committees. I have selected these three committees as the prestigious and influential committees based on their responsibilities and interviews with councillors. Council committees take on different names yet every council has approximately 10–20 committees covering the basic services and duties of the council. Standards committee may also be called audit, overview and scrutiny committee, yet their duties overlap.

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since their jurisdiction and responsibilities are limited in scope. I code for each prestigious committee assignment held within a given term, regardless of the duration of time the position was held. In some councils, membership in these committees is fixed for a four year term (unless a committee member resigns or is recalled by the party leader, which occurs rarely; i.e. Enfield), yet in others there is high turnaround rate (i.e. Tower Hamlets). This increases the chance of Muslim councillors to be on these committees, and positively biases political incorporation index for these councils. Table 4.10 depicts the political incorporation indicators and their descriptive statistics. In the 1998–2002 term, the mean seniority among all Muslim councillors was 2.2 years. It increased to 3.98 years in the 2002–2006 term, and to 4.06 years in the 2006–2010 term. The number of leadership positions held by Muslim councillors was twenty in the 1998–2002 term, forty-four in the 2002–2006 term, and fifty-seven in the 2006–2010 term. The average number of leadership positions held by each Muslim councillor was 0.77 in the 1998–2002 term, 1.52 in the 2002–2006 term, and 2.11 in the 2006–2010 term. The number of prestigious committee assignments held by Muslim councillors was thirteen in the 1998–2002 term, which is drastically lower than the 2002–2006 figure primarily because of data unavailability. Muslim councillors held 106 prestigious committee assignments in the 2002–2006 term, and 179 in the 2006–2010 term. In addition, the average number of prestigious committee assignments held by each Muslim councillor was 0.52 in the 1998–2002 term, 3.66 in the 2002–2006 term, and 6.39 in the 2006–2010 term.

Measuring Electoral Competitiveness

Although electoral competition is a crucial political construct utilized in numerous studies, there is no consensus on how to measure it.8 Bartels (1991) measures district competitiveness by using the incumbents’ share of the vote in the most recent election. This measure is problematic because district competitiveness will be affected by how constituents were represented in the prior term. Moreover, as Ansolabehere et al. contend, “an incumbent’s margin of victory in the previous election is not as good an indicator of prospects in 8 Studies on congressional elections and redistricting in the us use a dichotomous variable for competitiveness and determine marginal seats as those where the winning candidate receives more than 60% of the vote (Jacobson 1987; Mayhew 1974; Jacobson 2004; Cox and Katz, 2002). This measure of electoral competitiveness is not suitable for multi-party systems and leaves out other significant indicators of competitiveness such as vote share in gubernatorial elections.

Across London Boroughs

87

the next election as it once was” (1992, 27). Likewise, Gulati argues that objective measures of interparty competition should “describe the relative chances that each party has of winning … take into account the results of elections over a number of election cycles, sufficiently long to allow stable patterns to be evident yet not so long as to obscure major alterations of relative strength … take into account the results for different offices, specifically including those contests that are relevant for the research question” (2004, 505). Hence, he constructs an index of electoral competition averaging three indicators, the averages of the percentage of the vote received by the opposition party’s presidential and senate candidates in the state between 1980 and 2000, and the percentage of voters in each state who identified with the opposition party. Based on these different measures of electoral competitiveness, I develop a measure of electoral competitiveness for local authorities in Britain that takes into account the idiosyncratic characteristics of British political context. I calculate the electoral competitiveness of each London borough by constructing a measure using three indicators relevant to local elections in Britain. First, acknowledging the scholarly debate concerning whether Britain has a two or multiparty system, I develop a measure that is suitable for both two-party and multiparty systems.9 First, I take into account the relative strength of the two parties with the highest number of council seats, and include the percentage of council seats they hold in the term I code for. I use the term majority party to refer to the party with the highest percentage of seats, and not necessarily the party that has overall control of the council or the party that receive more than a certain percent of the votes or seats. By the same token, opposition party refers to the party that has the second highest percentage of council seats. These parties may be different for each of the three terms I code for. Also, there are a sizable number of councils where no political party obtains enough votes to obtain overall control of the council (generally referred to as the No Overall Control (noc) councils). For instance, after the 2006 local elections, eight out of thirty-two councils are not controlled by the three major parties. With the 9 Before World War I, Britain effectively had a two party system, with Tories (which later became the Conservative Party) and the Whigs (which later became the Liberal Party). After World War II, the two main parties were the Conservative and the Labour Parties. Yet, some scholars do challenge the view that Britain is still a two party system and argue that the relative success of the Liberal Democrats merits Britain to be classified as a multiparty system (Williams, 1998a, b). Although the share of the Liberal Democratic Party rose from 7.5% in 1970 to 19.5% in 1974 elections, and has fluctuated between 15-25% in recent elections, it could not electorally challenge the two dominant parties into winning the parliamentary majority. It is important to note though that the Liberal Democratic Party has been more successful in winning council majorities. Comparing the results of 1979 local and general elections, Waller (1980) finds that the Liberal Democrats have performed better in the local elections.

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way majority party and opposition party are coded, these noc councils are accounted for in the analysis. When there is a tie between two parties in the number of seats they hold in the council, I code for majority and opposition parties based on the results of the previous election. Second, I include the average of the percentage of votes received by the majority party in the borough in the last two local elections.10 Finally, scholars have found that “In borough constituencies there seems generally to be a close correlation between the major parties’ performances at local and parliamentary level” (Waller 1980, 445). Hence, I include the averages of the percentage of votes received by the two parties in the last two national elections.11 Hence, I calculate the electoral competitiveness of the borough (ec) by subtracting the electoral strength of the opposition party (sop) from the electoral strength of the majority party (smp), where lower values indicate a more competitive borough. Percentage of seats held by the majority party in the council in a given term = a Average of the percentage of votes received by the majority party in the borough in the last two local elections = b Average of the percentage of votes received by the majority party in the last two national elections = c Electoral strength of the majority party = smp = a + b + c Percentage of seats held by the opposition party in the council in a given term = d Average of the percentage of votes received by the opposition party in the borough in the last two local elections = e Average of the percentage of votes received by the opposition party in the last two national elections = f Electoral strength of the opposition party = sop = d + e + f Measure of electoral competitiveness of the district (ec) = smp – sop 10

11

For the 1998–2002 term, the last two local elections are 1998 and 1994 local elections; for the 2002–2006 term, they are 2002 and 1998 local elections; for the 2006–2010 term, they are 2006 and 2002 local elections. For the 1998–2002 term, the last two national elections are 1992 and 1997 general elections; for the 2002–2006 term, they are 1997 and 2001 general elections; for the 2006–2010 term, they are 2001 and 2005 general elections.

89

Across London Boroughs



Descriptive Statistics of Muslim Councillors in London

The numbers of Muslim councillors were compiled for the thirty-two London boroughs for the three consecutive terms constituting ninety-six cases. Muslim councillors were identified from their names and the lists were confirmed during the interviews or verified through emailing the councillors. There were eighty-two cases where there was at least one Muslim councillor in the council. Table 4.11 shows the total number of Muslim councillors in each term as well as the numbers and percentages of female and male Muslim councillors. The total number of Muslim councillors in London increased steadily from eightythree in the 1998–2002 term, to 115 in the 2002–2006 term, and to 146 in the 2006–2010 term. Hence, in a decade, the percentage of Muslim councillors increased from less than 5% to nearly 8%. Table 4.12 depicts the number of Muslim councillors in each borough in the three consecutive terms. The highest number (thirty-four) is in Tower Hamlets in the 2006–2010 term, where Muslim councillors constitute majority of the fifty-one seat council. On the other hand, Bromley did not have any Muslim councillors during these three terms. Figure 8 depicts the number of Muslim councillors in each of the thirty-two London boroughs in the three consecutive terms. As is seen in the chart, there is drastic difference among the councils. As shown in Table  4.13, the number of female Muslim councillors also increased in each term, being as low as ten in the 1998–2002 term, to seventeen in the 2002–2006 term, and as high as thirty-six in the 2006–2010 term. Hence, currently one in four Muslim councillors in London is female. As Table 4.14 depicts, the average of Muslim political incorporation indices ranged from −0.6 in Lambeth to 2.2 in Tower Hamlets. Muslim political incorporation increased in all boroughs from 1998 to 2010. Table 4.15 shows the breakdown of Muslim councillors in London by political party in each of the three consecutive terms. Although a vast majority of Table 4.11 Total number of Muslim councillors in London, 1998–2010 Term

Total number of London councillors

Total number of Muslim councillors

Percentage of Muslim councillors

1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010

1884 1871 1871

83 115 146

4.4 6.1 7.8

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Table 4.12 Number of Muslim councillors in London City Councils, 1998–2010 Borough name

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Barking and Dagenham Barnet Bexley Brent Bromley Camden Croydon Ealing Enfield Greenwich Hackney Hammersmith&Fulham Haringey Harrow Havering Hillingdon Hounslow Islington Kensington&Chelsea Kingston upon Thames Lambeth Lewisham Merton Newham Redbridge Richmond upon Thames Southwark Sutton Tower Hamlets Waltham Forest Wandsworth Westminster Total

1 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 3 2 5 2 6 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 9 3 0 1 1 21 5 3 2 83

1 1 2 5 0 3 2 1 6 1 10 2 4 2 0 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 1 10 3 0 3 4 31 7 3 3 115

1 1 0 6 0 6 4 3 7 1 9 0 8 5 0 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 13 7 1 8 2 34 13 0 6 146

91

Across London Boroughs Number of Muslim councillors

Camden Croydon Ealing Enfield Greenwich Hackney Hammersmith and Fulham Haringey Harrow Havering Hillingdon Hounslow Islington Kensington and Chelsea Kingston upon Thames Lambeth Lewisham Merton Newham Redbridge Richmond upon Thames Southwark Sutton Tower Hamlets Waltham Forest Wandsworth City of Westminster 1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010

Figure 8

Number of Muslim councillors in London City Councils, 1998–2010

40

Brent Bromley

35

Barnet Bexley

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 Barking and Dagenham

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Table 4.13 Muslim councillors in London by gender, 1998–2010 Term

Number of Muslim female councillors

Number of Muslim male councillors

Percentage of Muslim female councillors

Percentage of Muslim male councillors

1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010

10 17 36

73 98 110

12 14.8 24.7

88 85.2 75.3

Table 4.14 Average political incorporation indices by borough Borough name

Political incorporation index

Lambeth Barnet Lewisham Bexley Richmond upon Thames Sutton Merton Harrow Southwark Hillingdon Ealing Westminster Camden Croydon Kensington and Chelsea Kingston upon Thames Enfield Brent Greenwich Islington Wandsworth Hammersmith and Fulham Hounslow Haringey

−0.60 −0.57 −0.53 −0.47 −0.45 −0.45 −0.45 −0.44 −0.43 −0.34 −0.30 −0.29 −0.24 −0.19 −0.19 −0.19 −0.15 −0.11 −0.09 0.09 0.11 0.115 0.12 0.25

93

Across London Boroughs Table 4.14 Average political incorporation indices by borough (cont.) Borough name

Political incorporation index

Waltham Forest Redbridge Hackney Barking and Dagenham Newham Tower Hamlets

0.37 0.40 0.49 0.62 0.87 2.24

Table 4.15 Party breakdown of Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 Term

Labor

1998–2002 2002–2006 2006–2010

Conservative

Liberal democrats

Respect

Total

%

Number

%

Number

%

Number

%

Number

Number

83.1 75.7 70.0

69 87 89

8.4 7.0 6.8

7 8 10

6.0 13.9 13.0

5 16 19

0 0.01 11.0

0 1 16

83 115 146

Muslim councillors are from the Labour Party, this percentage has been decreasing over the last three terms. Table  4.16 summarizes the percentiles of the distribution of the Muslim councillors in the majority party for the three terms. The percentages of Muslim councillors in the majority party concentrated in the 80–100 and 100 percentiles during the 1998–2002 and 2002–2006 terms. However, during the 2006–2010 term, they are concentrated in the 40–60 and 60–80 percentiles. Again, this is mainly due to defection of Muslim councillors from Labour Party. The distribution of the mean seniorities of Muslim councillors in the three terms is shown in Table 4.17. The highest mean seniority was seventeen years in Barking and Dagenham in 2006. In twenty-three out of eighty-two cases where there was at least one Muslim councillor in the council, the mean seniority of the Muslim councillors serving in the council was zero. In other words, in nearly quarter of the cases, Muslim councillors were novices to the system. The distribution of the number of leadership positions in the three terms is shown in Table  4.18. The highest number of leadership positions held by Muslim councillors was sixteen in Tower Hamlets 2006. In forty out of the

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Table 4.16 Number of Muslim councillors in the majority party Percentile

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Total

0 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 80–100 100 Total number

6 0 5 4 6 21 38 83

10 0 3 8 7 38 39 115

8 13 12 56 43 0 14 146

24 13 20 68 56 59 91 344

Table 4.17 Distribution of seniority of Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 Mean seniority

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Total

0 0–5 5–10 10–15 15–20 Total

12 8 4 0 0 24

7 14 6 2 0 29

4 14 7 1 1 27

23 38 17 3 1 82

Table 4.18 Frequencies of leadership positions held by Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 Number of leadership positions

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Total

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 16 Total

14 9 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 26

15 5 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 26

11 5 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 27

40 19 8 6 3 1 2 1 2 82

95

Across London Boroughs

eighty-two cases where there was at least one Muslim councillor, Muslim councillors held no leadership positions. Table 4.19 depicts the distribution of the number of prestigious committee assignments held by Muslim councillors. The highest number of prestigious committee assignments held by Muslim councillors was fifty-eight in Tower Hamlets in 2006. In twenty-nine out of the eighty-two cases where there was at least one Muslim councillor in the council, Muslim councillors did not hold any prestigious committee assignments. What are the demographic characteristics of the boroughs that tend to elect more Muslim councillors? Do most Muslim councillors get elected from districts with high Muslim concentration? Figure 9 depicts the relationship between the percentage of Muslim councillors in the borough councils and the percentage of Muslim population. There is a positive relationship between the percentage of Muslim councillors and the percentage of Muslim population in the borough, supporting the claim that most minority representatives get elected from areas with high Table 4.19 Frequencies of prestigious committee assignments held by Muslim councillors, 1998–2010 Number of prestigious committee assignments

1998–2002

2002–2006

2006–2010

Total

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 19 40 58 Total

19 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25

7 8 5 3 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 29

3 3 7 2 2 0 2 3 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 28

29 15 12 5 3 3 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 82

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Percent ethnic population and percentage of Muslims in the borough

80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% Adjusted percentage of Muslim population in borough

30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00%

Figure 9

IMD Scores

Percentage of ethnic population in borough

70.00 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 .00 0.00%

0

10 20 30 Number of Muslim councillors

40

Muslim councillors and borough demographics, 1998–2010

IMD Scores

10.00%

20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% Percent Muslim in the borough

60.00%

70.00%

Figure 10 Percent Muslim and deprivation scores, 1998–2010

minority concentration. Figure  10 depicts the relationship between the adjusted percentage of Muslim population in the borough and the imd scores of each borough. The socio-economic indicators of the district may impact local government responsiveness. For instance, councils in districts with lower socio-economic indicators may receive more demands for council grants for

Across London Boroughs

97

community projects, welfare subsidies, council housing, etc. On the other hand, Muslims who live in a district with higher socio-economic standards may raise the required funds to purchase private land to establish a Muslim cemetery. To this end, I use the index of multiple deprivation (imd) of the district, which is measured through seven types of deprivation including income deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and training deprivation, barriers to housing and services, living environment deprivation, and crime.12 The linear trend line shows a positive relationship between the imd scores of the boroughs and the percent Muslim population. Hence, taken together, these figures show that Muslim councillors tend to be elected from boroughs with high Muslim population and high deprivation scores.

Presentation and Discussion of Regression Results

In this section, I present the regression analysis and the results for Model I and Model II. Model I includes only the four independent variables as outlined above. Model II includes the four independent variables as well as the two control variables. Before running the regression analysis, correlation tables were created. Table  4.20 shows the covariance among the four independent variables and the two control variables. There were not significant levels of correlation among any of the variables (see Table 4.20).13 The percentage of Muslims in the borough and the percentage of Muslim councillors are highly correlated (0.91), which suggests that it is technically unfeasible to regress these two variables in the same multivariate regression. Also, regressing the percentage of Muslim councillors in lieu of the percentage of Muslims in the borough in Model I and Model II would yield highly similar regression coefficients. Hence, it is not possible to statistically determine if councils are responsive due to high proportion of Muslim constituents or the 12

13

The index of multiple deprivation (imd) is based on “the concept of measuring different dimensions of deprivation individually, and then combining them to give an overall score. The latest imd was published in 2004 by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (odpm). The purpose of the index is to identify areas of need, so scores are produced based on small geographical areas of a consistent population size (around 1,500 people) called super output areas (SOAs)” (http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/Services/Council Democracy/StatisticsCensusInformation/IndicesOfDeprivation.htm). As a rule of thumb, correlations between independent variables that are higher than 0.6 signal multicollinearity (Buckingham and Saunders 2004).

Local government responsiveness

Control variable 2 (ethnic population)

Control variable 1 (imd scores)

Electoral competition

Political incorporation of Muslim councillors

Party fragmentation

Percentage of Muslim councillors

Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N 96 0.229 0.038 82 0.388 0 96 0.04 0.7 96 0.224 0.028 96 0.172 0.094 96 0.273 0.007 96

1

82 0.026 0.815 82 −0.157 0.158 82 −0.027 0.807 82 −0.071 0.525 82 0.006 0.957 82

0.229 0.038 82 1

96 0.265 0.009 96 0.247 0.015 96 0.421 0 96 0.410 0 96

0.388 0 96 0.026 0.815 82 1

96 0.119 0.248 96 0.139 0.175 96 0.133 0.195 96

0.04 0.7 96 −0.157 0.158 82 0.265 0.009 96 1

96 0.128 0.214 96 0.212 0.038 96

0.224 0.028 96 −0.027 0.807 82 0.247 0.015 96 0.119 0.248 96 1

96 0.590 0 96

96

0.273 0.007 96 0.006 0.957 82 0.410 0 96 0.133 0.195 96 0.212 0.038 96 0.590 0 96 1

ness

population)

scores)

0.172 0.094 96 −0.071 0.525 82 0.421 0 96 0.139 0.175 96 0.128 0.214 96 1

responsive-

2 (Ethnic

councillors

government

variable

1 (imd

of Muslim

tation

councillors

variable

competition

incorporation

fragmen-

of Muslim

Local

Control

Control

Electoral

Political

Party

Percentage

Table 4.20 Correlation among independent and control variables

98 Chapter 4

99

Across London Boroughs Table 4.21 Regression results without the control variables (Model I) Source

Numerator df

Denominator df F

Sig.

Intercept Percentage of Muslim councillors Party fragmentation14 Political incorporation of Muslim councillors Electoral competition

1 1 1 1

77 77 77 77

0.899 13.144 10.566 3.502

0.346 0.001 0.002 0.065

1

77

2.339

0.130

high numbers of Muslim councillors in the council. However, the fact that there is near complete correlation suggests that these two variables measure the same phenomenon. Table 4.21 summarizes the results of the regression analysis for the mixed model analysis with fixed effects without the control variables (Model I). Residual estimate is 0.15 and the standard error for the residual is 0.02. The percentage of Muslim councillors and the party fragmentation are highly significant with r = 0.001 and r = 0.002 respectively (p