Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction 978-0415260435, 0415260434

Table of contents :
Front Cover......Page 1
Multiculturalism......Page 4
Copyright Page......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Acknowledgments......Page 8
1. Multiculturalism: a critical introduction......Page 9
2. Multiculturalism and culture......Page 20
3. A typology of multicultural policies......Page 38
4. Multiculturalism and the liberal–communitarian debate......Page 54
5. In defense of multiculturalism......Page 70
6. Culture and equality......Page 92
7. The limits of multicultural accommodation......Page 104
8. Multiculturalism and social cohesion......Page 120
9. Contextual multiculturalism......Page 137
10. Conclusion......Page 156
Notes......Page 160
Bibliography......Page 178
Index......Page 198

Citation preview

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Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction

What is multiculturalism and what are the different theories used to justify it? Are multicultural policies a threat to liberty and equality? Can liberal democracies accommodate minority groups without sacrificing peace and stability? In this clear introduction to the subject, Michael Murphy explores these questions and critically assesses multiculturalism from the standpoint of political philosophy and political practice. The book explores the origins and contemporary usage of the concept of multiculturalism in the context of debates about citizenship, egalitarian justice and conflicts between individual and collective rights. The ideas of some of the most influential champions and critics of multiculturalism, including Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas, Susan Okin and Brian Barry, are also clearly explained and evaluated. Key themes include the tension between multiculturalism and gender equality, cultural relativism and the limits of liberal toleration, and the impact of multicultural policies on social cohesion ethnic conflict. Murphy also surveys the legal practices and policies enacted to accommodate multiculturalism, drawing on examples from the Americas, Australasia, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction is an ideal starting point for anyone coming to the topic for the first time as well as those already familiar with some of the key issues. Michael Murphy is Associate Professor & Canada Research Chair in the Department of Political Science, University of Northern British Columbia. He is author (with Helena Catt) of the Routledge book Sub-State Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Design (2002), and (with Siobhan Harty) of In Defense of Multinational Citizenship (2005).

Routledge Contemporary Political Philosophy

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Edited by David Archard, Lancaster University and Ronald Beiner, University of Toronto

Routledge Contemporary Political Philosophy is an exciting new series for students of philosophy and political theory. Designed for those who have already completed an introductory philosophy or politics course, each book in the series introduces and critically assesses a major topic in political philosophy. Longstanding topics are refreshed and more recent ones made accessible for the first time. After introducing the topic in question, each book clearly explains the central problems involved in understanding the arguments for and against competing theories. Relevant contemporary examples are used throughout to illuminate the problems and theories concerned, making the series essential reading not only for philosophy and politics students but also those in related disciplines such as sociology and law. Each book in the series is written by an experienced author and teacher with special knowledge of the topic, providing a valuable resource for both students and teachers alike. Also available in the series: Theories of Democracy Frank Cunningham Rights Tom Campbell Toleration Catriona McKinnon Political Obligation Dudley Knowles Forthcoming titles: Equality Melissa Williams Public Reason and Deliberation Simone Chambers

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Multiculturalism

A critical introduction

Michael Murphy

First published 2012 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Ave., 8th Floor, New York, NY 10017

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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Ó 2012 Michael Murphy The right of Michael Murphy to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Murphy, Michael, 1962– Multiculturalism: a critical introduction / by Michael Murphy. p. cm.—(Routledge contemporary political philosophy) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. 1. Multiculturalism. 2. Multiculturalism—Political aspects. I. Title. HM1271.M87 2012 305.8-dc23 2011023600 ISBN 978-0-415-26042-8 (hbk) ISBN 978-0-415-26043-5 (pbk) ISBN 978-0-203-15276-8 (ebk) Typeset in Goudy and Gill Sans by Book Now Ltd, London

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For Julia ‘‘In einem Augenblick gewa¨hrt die Liebe, Was Mu¨he kaum in langer Zeit erreicht.’’ (Goethe, Torquato Tasso) and For Floyd The heart of a lion. The soul of a bellbird.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

ix

1

Multiculturalism: a critical introduction

1

2

Multiculturalism and culture

12

3

A typology of multicultural policies

30

4

Multiculturalism and the liberal–communitarian debate

46

5

In defense of multiculturalism

62

6

Culture and equality

84

7

The limits of multicultural accommodation

96

8

Multiculturalism and social cohesion

112

9

Contextual multiculturalism

129

Conclusion

148

Notes Bibliography Index

152 170 190

10

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Acknowledgments

Like most academic books, this one could not have been written without the support and encouragement of a host of generous individuals and institutions. My first and largest debt of gratitude is owed to Margaret Moore, without whose generosity and initiative I would never have become involved in this project in the first place. To David Archard and Ronnie Beiner, the co-editors of this series on political philosophy, and to Adam Swift and Tony Bruce at Routledge: a heartfelt thanks for your patience with the many missed deadlines, and for your flexibility and understanding under the difficult circumstances that arose in the final stages of the editing process. A special thanks also to the three anonymous referees for the press. I know I have not done complete justice to your thoughtful comments and criticisms, but I do believe that this is a better book for the revisions they provoked. For generous financial assistance I would like to acknowledge the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Canada Research Chairs Program. Portions of the book were written and researched while I was a visiting scholar at the Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales, and the Department of Political Science at Concordia University. I would like to thank the faculty and staff at both of these fine institutions for making my time there both enjoyable and productive. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the outstanding efforts of Sean Brennan at the Gilbert and Tobin Centre, and the helpful assistance of James Kelly and Daniel Sale´e at Concordia University. Thanks also to my home institution, the University of Northern British Columbia, for the funds and the flexibility that helped facilitate my research at university libraries in Boston, Montreal, Vancouver, and Toronto. In preparing this book for publication I also benefited from the efforts of many excellent research assistants. These included Kurt Boyer, Pam Flagel, Andrew Kurjata, Dylan Richards, Julia Schwamborn, Pam Tobin and Taggart Wilson. Additional acknowledgement is due to the students in my senior seminar on Democracy, Citizenship and Human Rights, where much of the material for this book was debated and discussed. Your comments and questions proved invaluable in the process of formulating and refining many of the key arguments in this book. Thanks also to Fiona Kelly, Lorene Nagata, Julia Tremaine and John Young for helpful discussions on the subject of religious arbitration in family law. This book is for Julia, who makes everything possible, and for Floyd, who has taught me more about the wonders of diversity than a lifetime of research ever could.

Chapter 1

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Multiculturalism: a critical introduction Introduction Had this book been written some ten years ago it would undoubtedly have begun by extolling the remarkable rise of multiculturalism as a political philosophy, and the growing popularity of multicultural policies in the governing practices of democratic countries around the globe. Indeed, such was the momentum behind this new multicultural turn in theory and practice that as the previous century was drawing to a close Nathan Glazer’s famous pronouncement that ‘we are all multiculturalists now’ was beginning to look less like a rhetorical flourish than a somewhat banal acknowledgement of a new reality (Glazer 1998).1 Times have certainly changed. In today’s political climate one is much more likely to hear about the moral bankruptcy of multicultural theory or the abject failure of multicultural policies, and the sense of quiet confidence that had begun to take hold in the ranks of the multiculturalists is gradually giving way to a sense of unease as a chorus of voices in government, the academy and the wider public have begun calling for an end to the so-called ‘multicultural experiment’ (see e.g. Baubo¨ck 2001; Barry 2001).2 Much of the recent animus towards multiculturalism has been focused on immigrant-driven diversity, and the greatest anxiety has been reserved for Muslim immigrants. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in Europe, where Muslims frequently comprise a significant proportion of the total migrant population, but the effects have also been felt in countries like Australia, Canada and the United States where Muslims count for only a small percentage of new immigrants (Fukuyama 2006: 6–7, 14–15; Kymlicka 2007: 125–6). Feeding this Muslimfocused anxiety is the ever-present fear of Islamic fundamentalism and its links to domestic and international terrorism (Abbas 2007; Schiffauer 2007; Modood 2007). The high profile terrorist attacks in New York, London and Madrid; the horrific public slaying of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh; ethnic riots across France in 2005; the ongoing fallout from the Danish cartoon controversy; and the attempted bombing of New York’s Times Square in 2010—all of these events have helped nourish a climate of fear and mistrust, and the conviction that Muslims are committed to a profoundly illiberal value system which renders them uniquely impervious to even the most open and generous policies of accommodation.

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Fear of Muslims may be the most visible form of multicultural anxiety in Europe today, but it is in fact part of a more general trend towards antiimmigrant sentiment that is manifesting itself in different degrees and forms in countries like Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain (Joppke 2008; Howard 2009). Alive to these sentiments, European policy makers have been quick to condemn the excesses of multiculturalism while placing renewed emphasis on the importance of ‘national values’ and the duty of newcomers to integrate and accommodate themselves to their host society’s way of life. A number of countries have moved to tighten their immigrant screening procedures to weed out applicants with ‘the wrong kind of values and beliefs’, while others have instituted immigrant contracts or periods of probationary citizenship designed to ensure that newcomers are meeting their obligations as potential citizens (Adamo 2008; United Kingdom 2008; Lawton 2009; McGee 2008). Several countries have specifically targeted their Muslim populations, including Switzerland, where voters in a public referendum opted to ban the construction of minarets (despite the fact that Islam is the country’s second most widely followed religion), as well as Belgium and France, where legislators introduced fairly draconian legislation proscribing the wearing of the niqab or burqa in public. Beyond the borders of Europe, the multicultural backlash has been somewhat more muted, but evident nonetheless, and similarly rooted in a sense that the pendulum had swung too far in favor of accommodating minority differences. In the new post-9/11 security environment, countries like Australia and New Zealand began placing greater emphasis on the need to foster a stronger sense of patriotism amongst newcomers, who were also expected to show their loyalty to a core set of national values (Australia 2005; Bromell 2008: 51–4). Similar sentiments were expressed in the American context by Samuel Huntington in his aptly titled Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. The argument of the book is that vast increases in the number of Latinos migrating to the United States (both legally and illegally) threatens to undermine the AngloProtestant creed upon which America’s successful social experiment has been built, and that the multicultural celebration of linguistic, cultural and identitybased differences serves only to accelerate this process of national disintegration (Huntington 2004). Affirmative action policies and efforts to introduce a more multicultural curriculum in America’s public schools have also come under increasing attack from critics worried about the rise of ethnic separatism and a retreat from the shared values and sense of patriotism that kept Americans of all races, creeds and cultures bound together in a unified, indivisible community of fate.3 Even Canada, long considered the poster child of multicultural harmony, has not been immune to these doubts and fears. Nowhere have these doubts been expressed more strongly than in the province of Quebec, where the question of reasonable accommodation of minorities became a dominant issue in the 2007 provincial election, as the populist Action Democratique party campaigned on message that public deference to immigrant diversity was threatening the

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distinctive culture and shared values of ‘traditional’ Quebecers. Seeking to contain the issue in the aftermath of the election, the governing Liberals commissioned a series of province-wide public hearings on reasonable accommodation, led by two prominent Quebec intellectuals. The hearings revealed that while much of the public reaction was driven by more traditional concerns for the survival of the French language and culture in Quebec, there was also a significant underlying current of anxiety regarding immigrant-driven religious diversity, and as in Europe, much of the fear and suspicion voiced in the public hearings was directed towards Muslims. More recently, the Quebec government responded to these sentiments by introducing legislation that would ban women who wear the niqab (or any other form of facial covering) from working in the public sector or accessing public services in the province. This initiative has proven to be popular with the public both inside Quebec and in the rest of Canada. Skepticism about multiculturalism in practice has been mirrored by misgivings about its wisdom as a political philosophy. Somewhat ironically, multiculturalism has been denounced both as a form self-defeating relativism that values all cultures equally and as a form of cultural conservatism that throws its weight behind the supremacy of traditional cultural elites to the detriment of cultural reformers. Multiculturalism is frequently associated with a retreat from enlightenment principles of reason and universality, and with a commitment to preserving cultural diversity at the expense of liberalism’s most fundamental commitments to individual rights and the moral equality of all human beings. Similarly, multiculturalists are accused of being far too willing to tolerate intolerant cultural minorities and far too reluctant to sanction intervention when minorities take advantage of this forbearance to undermine the freedom and dignity of their own members. Serious doubts have also been expressed regarding multiculturalism as a formula for maintaining social cohesion in a culturally diverse democracy. Many critics in fact see it as a recipe for division, disunity and social disintegration. Multiculturalists stand further accused of an unhealthy obsession with cultural difference that not only encourages misleading policy analysis (i.e. recommending cultural policies to resolve non-cultural problems) but which also risks diverting attention and resources from more serious and deep-seated forms of injustice, including racial and gender discrimination and issues relating to class divisions and socio-economic deprivation. These are serious accusations, and one of the primary objectives of this book is to understand them, to ascertain their validity, and to evaluate whether or not they have been adequately addressed by the most influential multiculturalists writing today. A good place to begin this task is by flagging a series of issues that continue to impede clear debate on the potential merits and drawbacks of multiculturalism. The first of these is the tendency to draw sweeping conclusions about the perils of cultural diversity on the basis of limited evidence or short-term political developments. The gross exaggeration of the Islamic threat that has unfairly stigmatized so many innocent Muslims around the world is only the most recent example of this tendency. It’s a situation that recalls the circumstances of earlier waves of immigrants—including the Chinese in North

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America and Australia, the Japanese and the Irish in Canada and America, or ‘Asians’ in the United Kingdom—whose alien cultures and value systems supposedly rendered them impervious to integration—until time proved otherwise. These sorts of exaggerations undoubtedly make for exciting media coverage, and politicians worried about getting too far behind public opinion will find them difficult to resist, but they are singularly helpful when it comes to determining what constitutes a fair and effective policy for coping with cultural diversity.4 It goes without saying that a similar degree of restraint is required when drawing conclusions about the benign effects of diversity. Coping with cultural diversity means coming to terms with some very real, and fundamental, conflicts between values, practices and codes of conduct. It means facing up to the fact that unity, stability and peace is not a given in a society characterized by deep and abiding ethnic, national, linguistic and religious cleavages. And it means accepting the possibility that minority accommodation in some cases may impose limits on the very sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Little is to be gained by either exaggerating or underestimating these challenges. A second major source of misunderstanding in the debate stems from a failure to acknowledge the tremendous diversity of perspectives that exists within the broader school of multicultural political philosophy. For example, it is simply untrue, as a number of critics have charged, that a commitment to multiculturalism implies a categorical valorization of all cultural differences or a blanket acceptance of illiberal or intolerant minority practices. On the contrary, as will become clearer in Chapters 5 and 7 in particular, there is considerable disagreement amongst multiculturalists regarding the kinds of cultural groups that are deserving of recognition, how that recognition should be cashed out in institutional or policy terms, and how minority rights should be balanced against the rights and well-being of individuals. True, the literature can be usefully disaggregated into a number of distinctive thematic nodes around which different groups of multiculturalists congregate, but even within these nodes there are important differences amongst theorists that must not be overlooked, particularly when it comes to determining their susceptibility to the objections of the critics.5 Misunderstandings can also result from a failure to distinguish between multiculturalism as a political philosophy and the multicultural policies adopted by particular states. For not only is it the case that different states practice very different kinds of multiculturalism, these policies frequently have no connection whatsoever to any overarching vision of multiculturalism, let alone a specific political philosophy of multiculturalism. Chandran Kukathas (2003), for example, advances a theory of multiculturalism that is justly criticized for the relatively weak protections it offers to vulnerable individuals, but his theory bears little resemblance to the actual practice of multiculturalism in Australia, Canada or the United States, where such protections are vigorously defended and enforced. Similarly, it makes no sense to ask whether multiculturalism per se enhances or erodes social cohesion, because the answer depends on the specific nature of the multicultural policies in question, the kinds of minorities to whom they are addressed, and the sorts of circumstances in which they are being

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implemented—factors which can vary greatly across different cases and political contexts. This brings us to one final point that still too often goes missing in critical discussions of multiculturalism, which is that cultural minorities themselves are tremendously diverse in terms of their characteristics and circumstances, the nature of the demands they make on the state, and the kinds of policies and institutions most appropriate to the satisfaction of those demands. Neither a political philosophy of multicultural accommodation nor a critique of multicultural accommodation will have much of a purchase on the real world of cultural diversity if it fails to understand the nature and significance of these differences. Perhaps the single most important message to take away from this discussion is that there never has been anything like a single overarching multicultural experiment or a grand unified political philosophy of multiculturalism. There are in fact many ongoing multicultural experiments, a great deal of ad hoc multicultural policy, and a multiplicity of distinctive contributions to the political philosophy of multiculturalism. To understand contemporary multicultural political philosophy (and practice) one must therefore examine it in all of its rich, if inconvenient, diversity. The literature in the field to date has already taken us a good ways along this intellectual journey, and already features several excellent books which defend a specific theory of multicultural accommodation.6 Several additional works focus on more specialized themes within the broader universe of multicultural studies, such as the politics of identity (Kenny 2004; Parekh 2008; Eisenberg 2009), religious diversity (Spinner-Halev 2000), democratic inclusion (Williams 1998; Phillips 1995), nationalism and self-determination (Miller 1995, Tamir 1993; Harty and Murphy 2005), racial difference (Appiah and Gutmann 1998; Hooker 2009), language rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003), gender equality (Deveaux 2006; Song 2007), and the politics of indigeneity (Patton et al. 2000; Turner 2006). There are also a number of excellent edited volumes on multicultural themes, some with a broader focus (Kymlicka and Norman 2000a; Laden and Owen 2007), and others covering specific themes such as toleration (Horton 1993; McKinnon and Castiglione 2003), the rights of internal minorities (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005), sexual justice (Arneil et al. 2007) or multicultural education (McDonough and Feinberg 2007).7 In addition, there is a healthy body of literature that adopts a more critical posture towards multiculturalism, although with the exception of Barry’s Culture and Equality (2001) there is a shortage of book-length critiques that focus on the political philosophy of multiculturalism more broadly speaking.8 Most of these works are instead more narrowly focused on specific multicultural themes, such as American multiculturalism (Bernstein 1994; Hollinger 1995; Schmidt 1997; Wilkinson 1997; Melzer et al. 1998; Huntington 2004), multicultural education policy (again with a strongly American focus) (Schlesinger 1998; Glazer 1998), gender and multiculturalism (Cohen et al. 1999; Fraser 1998) or racial culture (Ford 2005). What is largely absent from this literature is a broad and accessible critical introduction to the political philosophy of multiculturalism that provides clear answers to some very basic but fundamental questions.9 What are

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the intellectual origins of multicultural political philosophy? What are the main approaches to the justification and institutionalization of multiculturalism, and what are their strengths and weaknesses? Who are the most influential critics of multiculturalism, and what are the merits and shortcomings of their arguments? What do multicultural policies look like and what are the different ways in which they are justified? What is the relationship between multiculturalism and social cohesion? What are the limits of multicultural accommodation, and what protections should be made available for the weak and vulnerable members of cultural communities? In its attempt to answer these questions this book does not offer a grand theory of multiculturalism aimed at displacing all of the competitors in the marketplace— indeed I doubt that such a theory would either be feasible or ultimately very useful. The goal instead is to bring a sense of clarity and coherence to what obviously has become a very complex and internally diverse field of study, and to offer some critical insights into the work of the most influential champions and critics of multiculturalism writing today. This is not to say that I intend to remain entirely neutral in this debate, and I should make it clear from the outset that I am convinced that a multicultural approach to policy making offers a surer path towards justice and social cohesion in a pluricultural society than does a strict and unrelenting insistence on difference-blind liberal universalism.10 What do I mean by a multicultural approach to policy making? At the risk of oversimplification, multiculturalism advocates policies which seek to accommodate the different identities, values and practices of both dominant and non-dominant cultural groups in culturally diverse society. The task of multicultural political philosophy, then, is to offer moral justifications for these policies, to assess which kinds of policies are most appropriate for which kinds of groups, and to determine what sorts of limitations on these policies are required on both moral and political grounds. Two further points are in need of clarification here. The first is that although the multiculturalism literature is in many ways focused on addressing the demands of cultural minorities, I agree with Bhihku Parekh that a political philosophy of multiculturalism should be informed by an ethic of mutual accommodation that requires sacrifices and adaptations on the part of majority and minority groups alike (Parekh 2000: 13).11 To adopt such an ethic is to refuse to take for granted the power or privilege enjoyed by dominant ethnocultural communities and their identities, beliefs and practices, but by the same token it rules out a categorical deference to the demands of cultural minorities, which must be regarded as equally subject to critical evaluation and to the give and take of intercultural negotiation and compromise. The second point of clarification pertains to the type of cultural groups to be included under the multicultural umbrella. The focus in this book is on those cultural groups whose members construct their identities (their sense of who they are) around differences of ethnicity, language, religion or nationality.12 Following Kymlicka, I make a further distinction between two different kinds of minority sub-groups: i) ethnonational minorities, such as stateless nations and indigenous peoples, whose existence more often than not pre-dates the

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formation of the states within which they currently reside, and who typically make claims to territory and a significant degree of autonomous self-governing authority ; and ii) ethnocultural minorities such as ethnic migrants or isolationist religious minorities like the Amish, whose claims to accommodation as a rule fall well short of territorially based form of self-determination (Kymlicka 1995: 10–11, 14–15). The differences between these two sub-groups are more fully explored in Chapters 3, 5, 7 and 8. Some might argue that alternative forms of difference such as race, gender, sexual orientation and disability are also profoundly cultural in nature, and as such deserve equal billing in a critical introduction to multiculturalism. My own view, and here again I agree with Kymlicka, is that the cultural issues raised by these identity-related difference are distinctive enough to deserve their own more detailed treatment elsewhere (Kymlicka 1995: 19–20). To do justice to them here would either require a much longer book or a thinning of the existing analysis to the point where it would no longer serve anyone’s purposes. That having been said, even though differences of race and gender are not analyzed independently as forms of cultural difference, the relationship between minority rights and gender equality is taken up in some detail in Chapter 7, and the question of racism and racial hatred is raised in the discussion of the Danish cartoon affair in Chapter 9. Having clarified these points, let me now consider the three core questions that any political philosophy of multicultural accommodation must be capable of addressing: the question of equality, the question of the principled limits of accommodation, and the question of citizenship and social cohesion. The question of equality is what links the multiculturalism debate to the concept of justice—which stipulates that all individuals are of equal moral worth, and that all individuals are therefore deserving of equal consideration and respect. However, whereas virtually every participant in the multiculturalism debates agrees (either implicitly or explicitly) with this moral departure point, they often differ profoundly in their interpretations of what it actually means to treat individuals in a culturally diverse society with equal consideration and respect. For example, staunch critics of multiculturalism like Brian Barry defend the classical liberal view that to treat people equally is to treat them the same (Barry 2001). All individuals are to be afforded equal rights and opportunities, and are to be equally subject to the law, irrespective of their religious, ethnic or linguistic differences. Individuals are free to celebrate and practice their cultures in their private lives, subject to the usual liberal prohibitions on harmful behavior, but the state has no business either endorsing or enabling any particular cultural values or practices as a matter of public policy— on these questions it must remain strictly neutral. While Barry is prepared to accept that minorities should sometimes be treated differently on pragmatic or utilitarian grounds, he is nevertheless adamant that this constitutes a deviation from the principle of equality, and that only in the rarest of cases can such policies find a grounding in principles of justice (see Chapter 6). It should come as little surprise that most multiculturalists reject this view and instead argue that treating the members of cultural minorities with equal consideration and respect will sometimes mean treating them differently, for

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example by exempting them from certain laws, by taking special measures to protect their languages and cultures, or by granting them various kinds of groupdifferentiated rights (see Chapters 3 and 5). Multiculturalists also generally agree that a willingness to depart from strict equality of treatment in a multicultural context is more consistent with the principle of state neutrality than the classical liberal alternative, because it represents an effort to recognize and respect the distinctive identities, values, institutions and practices of both minority and majority groups. Multiculturalists who take this position are fond of observing that, in most countries, state laws and institutions already reflect and reinforce the language, culture and identity of the majority, and that whether they recognize it or not, classical liberals support the dominant position of the majority culture by refusing to grant any public recognition whatsoever to minority practices and beliefs. In other words, although classical liberalism proclaims its allegiance to a principle of cultural neutrality, in practice it turns out to be aligned with a principle of cultural partiality. Be that as it may, to argue that multiculturalism is compatible with groupdifferentiated laws and policies is not to argue that such laws and policies are a necessary requirement of multiculturalism. Three points bear mentioning in this respect. First, not all multiculturalists are of the view that treating minorities differently is compatible with the ends of justice and stability. Perhaps the best example is Chandran Kukathas, whose very radical vision of multiculturalism is built around the idea of a state that is not only agnostic about questions of cultural difference but firmly opposed to the idea of recognizing group-differentiated cultural rights (Kukathas 2003). Second, as has already been alluded to above, treating the members of cultural minorities with equal consideration and respect does not always entail treating them differently. Indeed many of the policies supported by different champions of multiculturalism—such as anti-discrimination legislation or cultural sensitivity training for public officials—are specifically designed to ensure that minorities are not treated unequally or deprived of equal opportunities because of their ethnic, religious, racial or other differences. Similarly, many multiculturalists defend a policy of granting self-governing powers to national minorities as a form of equal treatment, on the grounds that dominant and non-dominant national groups in a multinational state are equally entitled to the right to selfdetermination (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Tully 1995; Kymlicka 1994). Third, it is not as if multiculturalists regard every minority claim to differential treatment as self-evidently justified—on the contrary, most argue that group-differentiated policies must first of all serve some compelling moral purpose, and second of all must be assessed in relation to the risks they may pose to citizens of the wider society and to the weaker and more vulnerable members of the community seeking accommodation. Precisely how this is to be achieved is the second question that any defensible political philosophy of multiculturalism must answer. What are the principled limits of multicultural accommodation? Where should one draw the line between protecting the group rights of cultural minorities and protecting the individual rights of their members? It is important to acknowledge from the outset that there is near-universal agreement amongst

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multiculturalists that every human community must be held morally accountable for the manner in which it treats its own members, and that there are certain forms of conduct (e.g. murder, slavery, child abuse, sexual assault and the like) that should never be tolerated no matter how important they may be to a community’s identity or culture. However, it is also important to acknowledge that most of the cases that test the legitimate bounds of toleration in a multicultural society are not such extreme cases, and it is here that the real differences between multiculturalists (and between multiculturalists and their critics) begin to appear. There are a number of factors that help explain these differences. To begin with, it is frequently the case that multiculturalists who choose different normative starting points for their theories of diversity accommodation end up drawing very different conclusions about where the boundaries of toleration are to be drawn. For example, those whose normative departure point is the principle of individual autonomy tend to take a stricter view on these matters than do those who begin with the principle of toleration itself (see Chapters 5 and 7). Another significant source of division is the question of enforcement, and even theorists who agree on where the moral limits of community conduct should be drawn disagree strongly with respect to the legitimacy, and the potential efficacy, of upholding those standards of conduct by means of external intervention. How this particular question is answered also depends, in many cases, on the type of minority community that is at the centre of the controversy. National minorities in particular are frequently singled out as groups for whom outside intervention is more problematic, on both moral and practical grounds, but similar reservations are sometimes expressed in cases involving isolationist religious communities such as the Amish or Hutterites (see Chapters 2 and 7). Indeed, the further one delves into the literature the clearer it becomes that there is anything but a consensus amongst multiculturalists on how to determine the principled limits of multicultural accommodation. Some have suggested that that this indeterminacy is evidence that the question simply has not been examined with sufficient courage or rigor (Barry 1998: 319; Lusztig 1999: 464). But this is unfair, given that multiculturalists are really just struggling with a version of a problem that has vexed classical liberals since at least the time of Mill, that problem being how to arrive at a determinate formula for judging the acceptable balance between liberty and the prevention of harm in a pluralistic democracy? What constitutes harm? How much harm can be tolerated before the state can justifiably intervene? And what types of intervention are most likely to be effective, and the least corrosive of liberty? If liberals disagree profoundly on these questions, why should we expect more from the multiculturalists? Indeed, why expect more from any political philosophy in a world where easy and indisputable moral truths are so often difficult to come by? These sorts of questions are taken up in detail in Chapters 2, 5, 7 and 9. Social cohesion is the third challenge that any viable political philosophy of multiculturalism must face. What, if anything, is capable of binding together the citizens of a culturally diverse democracy into a cohesive, stable and governable political community? How can the members of different ethnocultural or

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ethnonational groups be encouraged to identify with one another? To trust and make sacrifices for one another? To regard one another as fellow citizens in a shared community of fate? And are multicultural policies an aid or an obstacle to achieving these objectives? There are few easy answers to these questions. Indeed, Kymlicka is not far off the mark when he concludes: ‘‘We simply don’t know what are the sources of social unity in multiethnic and multination states’’ (2007a: 35). Part of the problem is that empirical studies of the impact of multicultural policies on social cohesion continue to be in short supply, although as I indicate in Chapter 8, there are some encouraging signs of change on this front. Easy insights into the relationship between multiculturalism and social cohesion are also elusive for many of the same reasons already mentioned above. As a starter, much depends on the kind of minority one is dealing with and the nature of the multicultural policies being contemplated. For example, are we talking about new immigrants, who by and large tend to desire integration into the host society or are we talking about national minorities, who at minimum are looking to govern themselves more autonomously and may even be interested in independent statehood? Similarly, are we talking about policies like separate ethnic or religious schools, which tend to reinforce the differences between minority and majority communities, or are we talking about policies like affirmative action that are explicitly aimed at integrating the members of cultural minorities into mainstream, social, economic and political institutions? Other factors which come into play include geography (are minority communities concentrated in particular regions or suburbs?); demography (what percentage of the population is made up of new immigrants, and how fast is that immigrant population growing?); history (is there a legacy of inter-ethnic conflict or violence?); and political culture (how thick is the dominant national identity, and does the host society view itself as a multicultural or a monocultural country?). Another key point that is frequently overlooked is that multicultural policies comprise only one small part of the policy arsenal available to governments in their efforts to promote societal integration, and may in fact be far less important than things like a fair and expeditious naturalization policy that encourages newcomers to become citizens or an immigrant selection system that achieves a manageable rate of migrant intake and which more efficiently matches entrants with appropriate labour-market opportunities. Of course, even the most enlightened and well-crafted policies are likely to fall short when different cultural groups simply have no interest in living peacefully side by side in a single state, and in such cases one must also be open to the possibility that justice and stability in a multicultural context may only be achieved through some kind of negotiated political divorce.

Outline of the book The aim of the next two chapters is to introduce the reader to some of the basic building blocks of multicultural political philosophy, and to offer a preliminary

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glimpse of the diversity of perspectives and approaches that characterize this vast and expanding body of scholarship. Chapter 2 examines the complex relationship between multiculturalism and culture. Specifically, it explores some of the key points of debate between the critics and champions of multiculturalism with respect to questions of cultural difference, cultural change and adaptation, and cultural relativism. Chapter 3 provides a typology that categorizes some of the more common multicultural policies, and describes their aims, justifications and the kinds of groups to whom they are most often applied. Chapter 4 is a transitional chapter that links the emergence of multicultural political philosophy to the breakdown of the liberal–communitarian debate in the late 1980s. It examines how three dominant themes in this earlier series of debates—community as a precondition for individual freedom and self-development, the relationship between individual rights and the common good, and the sources of community solidarity—have been carried forward (in modified form) as core concerns in the philosophical literature on minority rights and multiculturalism. Chapter 5 is focused on the philosophical champions of multiculturalism. Rather than aiming to provide a comprehensive survey of this enormous body of scholarship, the chapter focuses on the ideas of some of the most influential theorists whose work is broadly representative of the diversity of perspectives and approaches in the field. Seven common approaches are discussed: liberal culturalism, tolerationist multiculturalism, the value of cultural diversity, the politics of inclusion, deliberative multiculturalism, democratic multinationalism, and the politics of recognition. The next three chapters examine different aspects of the debate between multiculturalists and their critics. Chapter 6 focuses exclusively on Brian Barry’s Culture and Equality. The chapter begins with a brief outline of Barry’s liberal universalist vision of equality, and then moves on to his critique of two alternative multicultural approaches to equality: the rule and exemption approach, and the politics of equal affirmation. Some of the rather unexpected similarities between Barry and his multiculturalist opponents are also discussed. Chapter 7 takes up the question of the principled limits of multicultural accommodation, and the relationship between minority rights and individual rights. Special attention is devoted to feminist and liberal universalist critiques of multiculturalism, and to how well different theories of multiculturalisms are capable of dealing with their various objections. Chapter 8 examines the relationship between multicultural policies and social cohesion, and pays particular attention to how this relationship plays out in the case of immigrant minorities and national minorities. Chapter 9 offers a brief introduction to the idea of contextual multiculturalism, followed by an analysis of two case studies of the politics of diversity accommodation: language laws in Quebec and the Danish cartoon controversy. The chapter is designed to illustrate the benefits of grounding normative theories of multiculturalism in the realities of specific political challenges and political contexts, and to provide the reader with some insights into the challenges faced by policy-makers when there are persuasive arguments to be had in favor of two (or more) conflicting courses of action. The final chapter offers a brief conclusion.

Chapter 2

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Multiculturalism and culture

Introduction One consequence of the tremendous growth in the literature on multiculturalism is what might be called a multicultural identity crisis. There are now so many multiculturalists, and so many different theories of multiculturalism on the market, that many are finding it difficult to say what exactly multiculturalism is and what it stands for. Stanley Fish for one has argued that ‘‘.multiculturalism is an incoherent concept, which cannot be meaningfully either affirmed or rejected’’ (Fish 1998: 78). Not to be outdone, Brian Barry followed up with the suggestion that serious political philosophers long ago came to the conclusion that the literature on multiculturalism was so hopelessly muddled as to be hardly worthy of critique (Barry 2001: 6; 2001a). Even some of the most ardent defenders of multiculturalism admit that the term is so broadly and generally applied that it easily lends itself to misunderstanding and confusion (Kymlicka 1998: 59; 2007: 16–18). Ironically, one of the greatest strengths of the literature on multiculturalism—its capacity to draw so many innovative contributions from such a broad range of political philosophers focused on so many different aspects of diversity—has also become one of its greatest weaknesses. To begin with, there is no set of core normative principles that all multiculturalists agree upon, either as a means of justifying multicultural accommodation or as a means of placing principled limits on those forms of accommodation that can be justified. The recent shift in the literature towards a more case and context sensitive formulation of multicultural principles has further contributed to this process of theoretical fragmentation. Multiculturalists also disagree about which kinds of minorities belong inside the multicultural tent. Whereas some define the scope of multiculturalism more narrowly to include mainly the claims of cross-border migrants (Phillips 2007; Miller 1995), others (including myself) use the term more liberally to include the claims of indigenous peoples and other national minorities (Kymlicka 1995; Kukathas 2003).1 As I mentioned in the preceding chapter, one also finds disagreements over whether race, religion, gender and sexual orientation should be theorized as multicultural issues or as entirely distinct political phenomena (see e.g. Young 1990; Ford 2005; Modood 2007; Hooker 2009).2 Even where theorists agree on the types of minorities that

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are the legitimate subjects of multicultural theory, in many cases they continue to disagree sharply over what a multicultural policy is and what it is not, and over which sorts of multicultural policies are appropriate for which sorts of cultural minorities. For all of these reasons it is fair to conclude that the concept of multiculturalism has, to a certain extent, become a liability from the point of view of accurately communicating a core set of ideas or arguments. All the same, it is difficult to disagree with Kymlicka that, as a general term, one would be hardpressed to find a superior alternative (Kymlicka 2007: 17–18). There is certainly no shortage of candidates, including pluriculturalism, the politics of difference, interculturalism and identity politics but none that are any less subject to the sorts of disagreements and indeterminacies described above. Granted, some might argue that it is better to avoid a general term altogether, and I have some sympathy for this view, but for better or worse that is not how things currently stand in the literature for which this book is intended to be a critical guide. I will therefore follow the methodology of Wittgenstein, by seeking to understand how the term multiculturalism has been used in actual philosophical debates. Chapter 3 takes this question up from a policy perspective, while Chapter 5 examines the different normative theories of multiculturalism. The present chapter sets the stage for these further investigations by examining how multiculturalists conceptualize the relationship between multiculturalism and the all-important concept of culture. The discussion is organized around three main questions. First, what does multiculturalism have to do with the preservation and celebration of cultural differences? This probably sounds like an odd question, for what else could multiculturalism really be about, but my aim is to show that cultural difference is just one of a variety of themes around which the claims of cultural minorities and the many different political philosophies of multiculturalism are constructed. True, the core objective of any multicultural political philosophy is to promote just and stable terms of association amongst individuals and groups whose identities and interests are defined, in part, by their cultural differences, but it is also true that policies aimed at protecting and promoting those cultural differences represent only one small part of what may be required to achieve this larger objective. The second question asks whether multiculturalists overemphasize cultural differences while underemphasizing the value of cultural change, intermixing and adaptation? Several critics have voiced these sorts of concerns, including some who are sympathetic to multiculturalism, but in my view they are largely unfounded. Indeed, the literature reveals that most multiculturalists explicitly reject static and essentialist views of culture as both unrealistic and unattractive. The third and final question is does a commitment to multiculturalism imply a parallel commitment to moral relativism? This view has also proven popular with the critics, but again it finds little support in the literature. The explanation for this disjuncture, in my view, is the tendency to conflate epistemological anti-foundationalism, a view which most multiculturalists (if only implicitly) support, with radical moral relativism, a view which most multiculturalists reject.

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Culture and cultural difference When most people think about multiculturalism the idea that likely first comes to mind is the idea of recognizing and accommodating different cultural beliefs, practices, traditions, languages or lifestyles—what I refer to as objective cultural differences. Following Parekh, culture in this sense refers to a ‘‘body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective lives’’ (Parekh 2000: 2–3; cf. Kymlicka 1995: 18). This particular interpretation of multiculturalism contains an important element of truth. For it is undeniably the case that many ethnonational and ethnocultural minorities around the world are profoundly attached to the various elements of their distinctive cultures. This is clearly visible in the desire of Francophones to preserve and promote the French language and culture in Quebec, in the efforts of the Amish in Wisconsin to shield their children from the culturally corrosive effects of a liberal education, and in the Maori struggle to ensure that their customs and traditions (tikanga) are recognized in judicial and parliamentary procedures in New Zealand. It is only natural, therefore, that the literature on multiculturalism would assign a high level of importance to the recognition and accommodation of these sorts of differences. For example, Parekh argues that ‘‘[m]ulticulturalism .is about cultural diversity or culturally embedded differences’’ (2000: 3). It is about recognizing that human beings are in many ways the products of their distinctive cultural backgrounds, and that public policy in a multicultural society should seek to accommodate the cultural beliefs and practices that add meaning and value to the lives of individual citizens (Parekh 2000: 120–3). In similar terms, James Tully builds his theory of diverse constitutionalism around the idea that culture is an irreducible aspect of the human condition. As he puts it, ‘‘[t]he diverse ways in which citizens think about, speak, act and relate to others.are always to some extent the expression of their different cultures,’’ and these are differences that any diverse democracy has a duty to acknowledge and respect (Tully 1995: 5–6). Cultural differences are also central to the multiculturalism defended by Charles Taylor, because of the role they play in the constitution of human identity, agency, and well-being, and in his view a society that seeks to ignore or undermine these differences risks undermining the very foundations of its own freedom and stability (Taylor 1994a). Without belaboring the point any further, it is safe to conclude that virtually every philosophical champion of multiculturalism places some degree of emphasis on the importance of respecting and accommodating objective cultural differences.3 But is it perhaps the case that they place too much emphasis on culture? The answer, according to critics like Brian Barry, is undeniably yes. In his view multiculturalists have concerned themselves with little else, and it is this more than anything else that is the source of their failing. In his words: The error that I have in mind, which underlies the multicultural diagnosis and therefore invalidates its proposed cures, is the endemic tendency to

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assume that distinctive cultural attributes are the defining features of all groups. (Barry 2001: 305; cf. Barry 1998: 308) Barry is onto something very important here, for it is indeed a mistake to assume that the preservation and promotion of objective cultural differences is the only thing that is important to cultural minorities, and therefore the only issue around which they stake their claims for recognition and accommodation. This is perhaps most clearly evident in the case of indigenous peoples and stateless nations who tend to mobilize around a whole host of different issues, including territorial rights, claims to unceded historic sovereignty, or more pragmatic imperatives like security and survival—none of which have any necessary connection to the existence, or preservation of, a group’s cultural differences (Spinner 1994: 169–70; Moore 1997; Barry 1998: 307–8, 318; Patten 1999: 2; Ivison 2002: 95–111; Buchanan 2004). This is not to say that national minorities have no interest in the preservation of their distinctive languages and cultures—far from it, for linguistic and cultural survival are almost always high on their list of priorities. The point is rather that culture is usually just one of any number of jurisdictions over which groups of this kind seek to extend or consolidate their political control. What is also true is that national minorities tend to justify these claims to jurisdiction not merely on the grounds that they possess distinctive cultural characteristics, but on the grounds that they are distinctive peoples with a democratic right to self-determination. In other words, it is their distinctive political status that justifies their right to exercise jurisdiction over cultural matters, not their cultural differences that justifies their distinctive political status (De-Shalit 1996; Murphy 2001). The broader point to be taken from this example is that the accommodation of objective cultural differences matters in the politics of multiculturalism, but it is not the only thing that matters, and a failure to recognize this fact can have serious implications. For example, it can easily lead theorists or practitioners to misdiagnose the issue at the heart of any given minority challenge, which in turn may lead to inappropriate and ineffective policy recommendations. A good example would be an immigrant integration policy aimed at pressuring newcomers to embrace the shared cultural values of the host society when the real barriers to integration have more to do with a persistent lack of labour-market opportunities for economic migrants. In such circumstances the values-focused policy is not only likely to fail it may even aggravate things by giving migrants the impression that they are being blamed for a problem not of their own creating, and thereby further alienating them from the host society. The relationship between race and culture is another case in point. For example, critics such as Richard Ford have objected to the tendency to equate racial differences with cultural differences and to theorize racism as a form of discrimination that targets these sort of differences. Ford has no problem with the argument that differences in cultural values or practices play some role in the social construction of race and racial categories, but these differences are not, in his

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view, the primary target of racial discrimination (Ford 2005: 7–8; cf. Mills 2007).4 On the contrary, he argues, racism is motivated primarily by differences in objective physiological characteristics such as skin color, facial configuration, hair texture and the like. Quoting from the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah: ‘‘It is not black culture that the racist distains [sic], but blacks.’’ (Ford 2005: 7). Treating race as a cultural matter is therefore not only misleading, in Ford’s view, it is a dangerous distraction in the struggle to design policy instruments that are capable of addressing the real sources of racial injustice (Ford 2005: 31; cf. Phillips 2007: 53–6). Theorists engaged in the struggle against racial injustice are not the only ones to criticize the political philosophy of multiculturalism as what might be called an exercise in the politics of distraction. Others, for example, have accused multiculturalists of overemphasizing the cultural dimensions of nationalism while downplaying its political dimensions, particularly the more chauvinistic, authoritarian and oppressive tendencies of nationalist movements in practice (Walker 1997: 225–6; Barry 1998: 313; Beiner 1999: 8–9). Other critics again have expressed the concern that the enormous popularity of multicultural political philosophy is diverting precious public attention and resources away from issues like gender discrimination and radical socio-economic inequalities—issues that in their view are a more serious and pervasive source of injustice in contemporary western democracies (Walker 1997: 227–30; Barry 2001: 305-6; Ford 2005: 6). Given these sorts of concerns, it seems fair to conclude that any theory of multiculturalism built around the assumption that managing diversity is simply a matter of managing cultural differences will fall short of the mark in both analytical and public policy terms. Yet the question remains: how widespread is this assumption in the literature on multiculturalism? In other words, how well does Barry’s accusation stand up to critical scrutiny? Not very well as it turns out. For dig a little deeper into this literature and it soon becomes clear that the story it tells about the nature of minority differences and the reasons in favor of policies to address those differences is much richer, and more complex, than the one offered to us by Barry. The strand of multiculturalism more commonly known as the politics of recognition offers an excellent illustration of this point. As a rule, the politics of recognition tends to place greater emphasis on the importance of accommodating group-based identities in a multicultural society than on the need to preserve objective cultural differences. Granted, these two goals often go hand in hand but one of the more intriguing insights to emerge from this literature is that a distinctive group identity need not have any connection to a particular set of shared cultural values or characteristics. In fact, there is evidence which suggests not only that a shared identity can flourish in spite of sharp cultural differences within a group, but also that groups which are nearly culturally identical may nevertheless differ profoundly in terms of how they identify themselves (see e.g. Ignatieff 1994; Moore 1999; Modood 2007). Another good example is the body of multicultural theory that focuses on the distinctive claims and circumstances of stateless nations like the Kurds and the Corsicans, and of indigenous peoples

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like the Cree of James Bay or the Yolgnu of Arnem Land. What we find in this literature is not just a story about the cultural distinctiveness of these groups, but also an account of their unique experiences with phenomena such as colonization, land dispossession, and political domination—experiences which in turn have generated a unique set of (non-cultural) moral and public policy challenges (Kymlicka 1989; Tully 1995; Ivison 2002; Turner 2006). Barry’s characterization of multiculturalism also has trouble coping with Will Kymlicka’s distinctive contribution to the field. Much of Kymlicka’s research is focused on the need to distinguish between the very different claims and characteristics of ethnocultural groups like immigrant and religious minorities, and those of ethnonational minorities such as indigenous peoples and other nations without states. In the former case, the primary issue is to secure the protection of the group’s distinctive cultural practices or attributes via a more limited scheme of minority rights, while in the latter case the primary issue is to secure the preservation of the group’s distinctive societal cultures via the right to selfgovernment. The essential thing to understand about the term societal culture is that it does not refer to distinctive cultural characteristics, but to a particular kind of cultural community. As Kymlicka describes it, a societal culture is ‘‘an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland and sharing a common language and history’’ (Kymlicka 1995: 18).5 Indeed, what originally motivated Kymlicka to explore this alternative universe of cultural claims was his feeling that it had been largely overlooked by theorists more interested in examining culture primarily as a question of distinctive cultural characteristics. Justifications for multicultural policies are similarly varied in their composition. In addition to arguments grounded in the value of preserving objective cultural characteristics, one finds several different versions of a democratic justification for multicultural policies, including appeals to the principles of consent and non-domination (Tully 1995; Young 2000; Harty and Murphy 2005), or to the importance of citizen deliberation and the inclusion of minorities in processes of inter-group negotiation and dialogue (Phillips 1995; Parekh 2000; Benhabib 2002). Other theorists have developed justifications for multicultural policies that emphasize the link between group membership and individual wellbeing (Weinstock 1998), the need to redress historic injustice (Song 2007), or the more pragmatic imperative of reducing the potential for conflict and suffering in multiethnic and multinational contexts (Levy 2000). Equally telling is the fact that so many theorists in the multicultural camp have explicitly rejected theories of intercultural justice that place objective cultural differences at their heart. Take Seyla Benhabib, who offers up an approach to multicultural accommodation ‘‘defended in the name of justice and freedom and not an elusive preservation of cultures’’ (Benhabib 2002: 8, emphasis added). Tariq Modood and Anne Phillips have also taken pains to emphasize the limitations, the dangers even, of a multiculturalism that concerns itself exclusively with differences in cultural values, practices or characteristics (Modood 2007: 42–3; Phillips 2007: 8–9).6 Other influential theorists such as Kukathas (2003) and Levy (2000) are

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entirely agnostic about the value of cultural difference, and in their view the justification for multicultural policies is to be found, respectively, in their potential for increasing human freedom or for minimizing human suffering. For many of the more familiar multicultural policies, as well, the bottom line is not always the imperative of respecting or preserving cultural differences. For example, anti-discrimination legislation in the area of employment practices cannot legitimately compel organizations to value or endorse particular minority values or practices but it can require them to ignore such differences, or at least to treat them as irrelevant when making their decisions about hiring and career advancement. True, such policies are directed towards particular classes of individuals whose cultural backgrounds mark them out as different from many of their fellow citizens, but their underlying objective is neither to encourage nor to discourage the perpetuation of the cultural differences in question but only to ensure that individuals are treated equally, regardless of their own personal choices in such matters.7 Similarly, the best justification for policies that permit recent migrants to access government services in their native language is that they help ensure that these future citizens can effectively exercise their civil, political, and social rights until such time as they have mastered the language of their host country. As in the previous example, this is a multicultural policy that serves the interests of individuals who are culturally distinctive, but which has no necessary or essential connection to the imperative of preserving those cultural differences.8 To sum up, Barry is right to conclude that there is much more at stake in the politics of minority accommodation than merely the preservation of objective cultural differences, and that a failure to appreciate this fact is a recipe for poor theory and poor public policy, but he is wrong to suggest that this insight has largely eluded the mainstream exponents of multicultural political philosophy. On the contrary, much of the recent and emerging work in the field is driven by the conviction that the political challenge of multiculturalism is defined, not by a single overarching cultural issue but instead by a series of interdependent and cross-cutting issues, and that theorists and practitioners alike must attend to this diversity of diversities if there is to be any hope of this challenge being met (Carens 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Levy 2000; Tully 2004; Modood 2007; Phillips 2007).

Multiculturalism and cultural change To understand the relationship between multiculturalism and culture one must also understand the relationship between multiculturalism and processes of cultural change. Let us begin by confronting the argument that multiculturalism is underpinned by a commitment to cultural essentialism—the view that cultures must be preserved in their original and authentic form, and their purity and pedigree closely guarded against the possibility of external cultural influences or contamination. We find this argument in Jeremy Waldron’s highly influential cosmopolitan critique of multiculturalism. He puts it thusly: ‘‘To preserve a

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culture is often to take a favored ‘snapshot’ of it, and insist that this version must persist at all costs, in its defined purity, irrespective of the surrounding social, economic, and political circumstances’’ (Waldron 1995: 110; cf. Ford 2005: 156). As Waldron does well to point out, essentialist views of culture are susceptible to a number of criticisms, not the least of which is that they are out of touch with the facts, for most cultures are already the product of substantial external influence and intermixing, and the likelihood of controlling this process of cultural cross-fertilization in a highly globalized setting is close to zero (Kukathas 1992: 130; Waldron 1995: 100–101). Exaggerating cultural differences in this way can also create artificial barriers to cross-cultural understanding, and may even contribute to harmful cultural stereotypes (e.g. that Muslims are inherently hostile to liberal freedoms, or that indigenous peoples are locked inside a pre-modern worldview) that can all too easily be exploited by racist or intolerant elements in society (Phillips 2007: 21–5; Ford 2005: 40–4). Essentialist views of culture can also be a powerful tool in the hands of cultural conservatives looking to stifle the efforts of more liberal-minded cultural reformers. Feminist critics of multiculturalism have been especially vocal on this issue, arguing that well-meaning efforts to protect or empower cultural minorities often have the unintended effect of perpetuating the marginalization and subordination of women within those cultures. They do so by reinforcing the authority of traditional (usually male) cultural elites, who are granted a much freer hand to enforce patriarchal and oppressive cultural norms within their respective communities (Okin 1998, 2005; Shachar 1999, 2001). Essentialist views of culture also lend themselves to a frozen-in-time interpretation of cultural rights, which can lead to situations where minorities are deprived of their rights for no reason other than that they choose to modify their cultural practices to suit their changing circumstances and priorities. Indigenous peoples frequently run up against this sort of logic when seeking judicial recognition of their historic rights to land, resources and self-determination. In Australia, for example, the High Court has argued that indigenous land rights must be defined in relation to the traditional laws and customs of the group claiming rights to the territory in question. So long as the group continues to observe its traditional laws, custom and practices in relation to land ownership their claim can be recognized in court, but deviations from tradition (for whatever reason) can, and in a number of cases have, been fatal to the rights in question.9 There is, in fact, little of value to be found in the doctrine of cultural essentialism, and this likely explains why it is a view that finds little support in the mainstream literature on multiculturalism. On the contrary, there is near universal agreement on the fact that cultures are highly complex, internally heterogeneous and inherently dynamic human constructions that change and adapt over time, both as a result of internal sources of innovation, dissent, and revision and as a result of (voluntary and involuntary) interaction and cross-fertilization with other cultures. It is also fair to say that multiculturalists generally do not regard these processes of cultural change and adaptation as something to be feared or deplored, but as a welcome by-product of human freedom and creativity.10

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Granted, another equally prominent theme in the multiculturalism literature is that cultural minorities often require different forms of assistance, protection or empowerment to help them keep their languages and cultures alive, but the essential point to bear in mind is that these measures are rarely, if ever, defended as a means of stifling cultural change or cultural freedom.11 On the contrary, measures such as these are usually defended on the grounds that they grant minorities a greater degree of freedom to make their own choices regarding the nature, pace and direction of cultural change in their communities, rather than having these choices imposed upon them by the larger and more powerful cultural groups with whom they share a state. The issue, then, is not whether cultures will change (they will), but who is empowered to make choices and decisions around those changes. And if this seems controversial, we need only remind ourselves that this is the same freedom that members of more dominant cultural groups, on account of their size and power, can already take for granted. One final thing to be understood about processes of cultural change and adaptation is that there are limits on how far and how fast they proceed. Cultural identities and cultural practices can take a significant amount of time to develop and solidify, so it is only natural to expect that they will take an equally significant amount of time to transform, weaken or potentially disappear.12 Yet this continues to be a source of confusion amongst both supporters and detractors of multiculturalism. Consider the following disagreement between Brian Barry and James Tully. In Strange Multiplicity, Tully defends the right of the Musqueam First Nation in Canada to engage in a specific resource-harvesting practice (in this case fishing)—on the grounds that this practice has, over a number of centuries, come to be regarded as a crucial aspect of their identity as an indigenous people (see Tully 1995: 172). Barry reads this as an obvious example of essentialist reasoning—as the claim that the practice of fishing a particular coastline is to be regarded as a permanent and unchanging aspect of the Musqueam culture, and that the Musqueam could not possibly continue to exist as an indigenous people without engaging in this practice (Barry 2002: 207). But this is an unduly narrow interpretation of the point Tully is making. His claim is only that this practice is at present, has been for some time, and for some time in the future will likely continue to be, an important and valued part of the Musqueam identity, and for this reason it is entirely understandable that they would want to protect their ability to continue with this practice as a matter of right. On the other hand, there is nothing in Tully’s argument that would compel us to conclude that the Musqueam would be rendered less authentically indigenous if, at some point in the future, they chose to abandon the practice of harvesting fish from their coastlines. What is more important, from Tully’s point of view, is that indigenous peoples like the Musqueam should have the right to make this choice themselves rather than having the decision imposed on them by someone else (Tully 2000a, 2000c). Anne Phillips makes a similar mistake when she criticizes Parekh’s ‘rule and exemption’ approach to minority accommodation: his argument that minorities should sometimes be exempted from the application of certain laws or

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regulations that conflict with their cultural identities and practices. According to Phillips, Parekh assumes that the members of cultural minorities are somehow less able than members of the dominant culture to resist or deviate from the dictates of their cultural backgrounds, and it is this condition of cultural helplessness that justifies granting them exemptions when their inherited beliefs or practices come into conflict with existing laws or regulations (Phillips 2007: 108-12). But this is unfair to Parekh, whose point is not that the members of cultural minorities are helplessly trapped within their cultural worldviews, but rather that they hold certain aspects of their cultures to be of tremendous value and significance, in the same way as do many members of the dominant culture, and that whenever it is reasonable and justifiable to do so these attachments should be accommodated. The reasonable and justifiable provisos here are crucial, because Parekh is not prepared to accept every claim for minority accommodation. Indeed, he argues that in many cases—for example, when minority practices impose unacceptable costs on their own members, or when they conflict with deeply held majority convictions—minorities themselves should be required to change or adapt, and he has few doubts about their capacity to do so. Ultimately, Parekh’s approach to minority differences is driven by a commitment to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and to a careful case by case weighing of the costs and benefits of accommodation—an approach that is nearly identical to the one endorsed by Phillips herself (compare Parekh 2000: 239–48, 262–3; Phillips 2007: 112–13, 127). Even though Phillips misses the mark in her critique of Parekh, there is much to be learned from her more general discussion of the relationship between cultural adaptation and human agency. Of particular value is her account of the uses and abuses of what she calls ‘‘strong notions of culture’’, which grossly exaggerate the extent to which the actions of individuals are determined by their cultural backgrounds (Phillips 2007: 9; cf. Fierlbeck 1996: 14–17; Benhabib 2002: 117–19). Phillips describes how strong notions of culture are frequently invoked as part of the so-called cultural defense in criminal trials. The kinds of cases she considers involve crimes committed against women and children where the perpetrators seek to evade responsibility (and punishment) for their actions by arguing that their behaviour was a natural, and therefore entirely understandable, product of their history of cultural socialization (which taught them to regard such actions as normal and acceptable). In the most disturbing of these cases, the cultural defense has been used to excuse even the most serious of crimes, including rape, kidnapping, aggravated assault and murder (Phillips 2007: 73–99; Benhabib 2002: 87–8; Song 2007: 87–113). Phillips also discusses how the strong view of culture encourages a form of paternalism that undermines respect for female agency. For example, it readily lends itself to the conclusion that women who freely engage in practices that conflict with principles of gender equality are simply the victims of cultural brainwashing, and that their liberation can only be assured by having their stated preferences ignored or overridden (Phillips 2007: 39–41; cf. Barry 2002: 223).13 The real difficulty in such cases, Phillips admits, lies first of all in determining

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when particular individuals are genuinely exercising free and informed agency and when their actions are a result of cultural indoctrination or coercive pressure from their cultural peers, and second of all in deciding what, if anything, is to be done when the answer turns out to be the latter. While Phillips claims to have no definitive answer to these questions, she argues that a good place to start is by paying attention to the individuals whose interests are at stake rather than preforming our judgements on the basis of one abstract theory or another (Phillips 2007: 41, 132, 177–9; cf. Benhabib 2002: 117–18; Shachar 2007: 147, 2008: 588–90).

Relativism and the limits of multicultural accommodation Any discussion of the relationship between culture and multiculturalism would be incomplete if it failed to confront the specter of relativism. Relativism comes in a host of different forms, but the version most often associated with multiculturalism is a form of radical moral relativism. It goes something like this: in taking a clear-eyed view of the world, we must come to the conclusion that there is no single moral code that can claim universal validity across cultures, but only a multiplicity of culturally embedded moralities whose validity is a matter of intersubjective agreement amongst the members of different cultural communities— and nothing more. We should therefore give up the search for a single truth about morality and accept the fact that there are different moral truths for different cultural communities. What worries critics about this perspective is that it encourages a culture of moral impunity—a radical and indiscriminate regime of toleration where any attempt to judge or criticize, let alone interfere with, the practices of ‘other’ cultural communities, regardless of how harmful or reprehensible they may appear in light of our own moral convictions, is deemed illegitimate, perhaps even an act of moral imperialism (Bernstein 1994; Schmidt 1997; Meltzer, et al. 1998: 3-4; Barry 2001: 131-46). In other words, when it comes to the practices of cultural communities that differ from our own, from the point of view of the multiculturalists, anything is permissible. Critics like Barry have been quick to condemn this ‘anything goes’ multiculturalism, whose protagonists are only too willing to see the rights of individuals trumped by the rights of groups whenever the survival of a distinctive form of life hangs in the balance (Barry 1998: 319). By Barry’s accounting, most multiculturalists are of the view that if a given practice is part of a group’s distinctive culture this is all that need be said in its defense, and regardless of how harmful or oppressive that practice might appear to outsiders (or to those insiders who are on the receiving end of its ill effects), it must be tolerated. As Barry sums it up: ‘‘The whole thrust of the ‘politics of difference’. is that it seeks to withdraw from individual members of minority groups the protections that are normally offered by liberal states’’ (2001: 326). This is particularly bad news for the weakest and most vulnerable members of minority communities, who are likely to

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bear the brunt of the human rights violations that will inevitably ensue. If theoretical arguments alone are not enough to convince the reader of the perils of multicultural relativism, there is a ready supply of examples illustrating the extremes to which a deference to cultural difference can be taken. These include female genital mutilation, the denial of life-saving medical treatment to the children of fundamentalist religious parents, the persecution of gays and lesbians, forced marriages, and the physical and sexual abuse of women and children.14 Thankfully, such practices tell us very little about what is condoned by mainstream multicultural political philosophy or, for that matter, by mainstream multicultural practice.15 Indeed, one suspects that those who dismiss multiculturalism for its relativistic abandonment of fundamental human rights standards may be guilty of selective reading. For example, Parekh can easily be read this way when he concludes that ‘‘. it is difficult to think of a single universal value which is ‘absolute’ or inherently inviolable and may never in practice be overridden’’ (Parekh 2000: 136). However, this isolated statement must be read together with his explicit commitment to the equal dignity and worth of all human beings, his warning that we must be attentive to the potential harms that cultures can do to their members, and his refusal to assign a privileged or untouchable status to any particular cultural value or practice simply because it is part of a community’s cultural heritage (Parekh 2000: 133, 140, 157). Parekh is also clear about the fact that a commitment to multiculturalism in no way entails ‘‘that cultures cannot be compared and judged, that they are equally rich and deserve equal respect, that each of them is good for its members, or that all cultural differences deserve to be valued’’ (Parekh 2000: 337). True, Parekh does defend the view that all communities must sometimes make difficult trade-offs amongst competing rights and principles (consider the examples of capital punishment or limitations on civil liberties in the context of counter-terrorism), and that we should do our best to understand and respect the fact that different cultural communities will sometimes make these trade-offs in different ways. Nevertheless, he is unequivocal about the fact that every human community must be held to certain minimum standards of conduct, and this includes a basic moral duty to safeguard the dignity and well-being of all of their members (Parekh 2000: 126–41). A more difficult case is presented by Chandran Kukathas, who of all the multiculturalists considered in this book comes closest to adopting the sort of radical relativist assumptions deplored by critics like Barry.16 Kukathas himself denies being a relativist (2003: 260, 267), but we need not simply take him at his word on this, for the broad tenor of his theory supports this assertion. Without revealing too much of the detail of that theory here (see Chapter 5), Kukathas supports a very extensive regime of mutual toleration amongst freely associating cultural communities in a liberal state, and he is clearly prepared to take a more hands-off approach to forms of conduct that most other multicultural theorists would find unacceptable (2003: 134–5, 146). Nevertheless, it is still going too far to say that he considers questions of right and wrong to be purely internal to different cultures or that he is happy to embrace virtually any kind of behaviour

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that occurs within freely associating cultural communities (Barry 2001: 142, 145). On the contrary, Kukathas openly endorses the validity of cross-cultural critique, and he is quite prepared to judge certain cultural practices to be worthless or reprehensible (2003: 33–4).17 Moreover, his theory of multicultural accommodation is explicitly anti-relativist in its foundations, being grounded in self-consciously universalist assumptions about the primacy of principles such as freedom, toleration and the moral equality of individuals (Kukathas 1992: 108; 2003: x, 23–4, 29–30).18 The real problem is that Kukathas’ theory fails to provide the sorts of institutional safeguards that would help ensure, in practice, that cultural groups cannot simply do as they please to their own members. The root of this problem is that Kukathas is fundamentally opposed to the idea of granting the state the kind of regulatory authority it would need to monitor and enforce basic standards of human rights protection within its borders. As a libertarian, his view is that the state has only one legitimate function, which is to keep the peace. With the state firmly out of the business of human rights enforcement, Kukathas places his trust instead in freedom of exit (if you don’t like how you are being treated by your community you can simply leave) and various forms of community self-regulation (see Chapters 5 and 7), methods of protection which most of his critics deem hopelessly inadequate (Kukathas 2002: 194–9; 2003: 24–31, 74–6, 95–8, 135–9, 143–6; Kymlicka 1992: 143; Spinner-Halev 2000: 84–5; Barry 2001: 143; Okin 2007: 333–5; Phillips 2007: 134–5, 144). Kukathas’ assurances that he is no moral relativist will therefore come as cold comfort to the many vulnerable individuals in his liberal utopia who will effectively be left at the mercy of those who would deny them freedom, equality and real opportunities for human flourishing—the very things Kukathas so eloquently praises in theory but seems so reluctant to defend in practice. The temptation to conclude that multiculturalism implies an ‘anything is permissible’ attitude towards minority beliefs and practices stems at least partly from a tendency to conflate radical moral relativism with a position I will call moral anti-foundationalism. Moral anti-foundationalism bears some similarities to radical moral relativism, but with at least one essential difference. Starting with the similarities, like the moral relativist, the anti-foundationalist believes that we should abandon the ill-fated quest for universal and timeless moral truths—for some standard of absolute moral certainty that would forever resolve all moral disagreements. The anti-foundationalist makes no claim that there are no universal moral truths, for this itself would be a (self-contradictory) claim to certainty, but only that the existence of such truths is an article of faith, not of rational investigation. Moral realists may therefore continue to believe in universal moral truths, but the anti-foundationalist will never fail to point out that there is no evidence whatsoever in favour of these beliefs, let alone a coherent account of what that evidence might look like were it somehow to present itself for analysis. What this leaves us with, from an antifoundationalist perspective, is a moral universe inhabited by a host of different historically and culturally contingent moral conceptions, none of which are

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capable of establishing, in absolute and objective terms, their credentials as the one and only true morality. Nevertheless, and herein lies the distinction between moral antifoundationalism and radical moral relativism, accepting that all moral judgement is ultimately contingent in no way logically compels us to the further conclusion that we should refrain from cross-cultural moral judgements and learn to tolerate all other moral points of view, even those we unequivocally deplore. Certainly, this is one conclusion that might plausibly be drawn, but one might just as reasonably conclude that the validity of our moral convictions and the legitimacy of moral judgement has never depended upon the existence of universal and cognizable moral truths, and for this reason we should not hesitate to judge, and in some cases even to interfere with, the conduct of other cultural communities, particularly when their actions are in violation of our most cherished moral principles.19 Alternatively, one might reasonably argue that, in the absence of universal moral truths, we have just as much right to defend the superiority of our own contingent moral convictions as any other community, but that from the point of view of inter-communal peace and stability, the best way to proceed is by means of persuasion rather than by force or intervention.20 The broader point to be taken from this discussion is that there is no necessary logical connection between the conclusions one draws with regards to moral certainty and the conclusions one draws with regards to either the legitimacy or the desirability of cross-cultural moral judgement, and that moral realism and moral anti-foundationalism are both logically compatible with virtually any position that lies on the spectrum between comprehensive toleration and comprehensive non-toleration of different cultural practices. While moral anti-foundationalism helps us see that there are many different culturally contingent conceptions of morality, none of which can claim a grounding in some overarching moral truth, it tells us nothing about whether or not any of these contingent moralities are worthy of toleration or respect— it is not an argument for or against toleration but only an analytical departure point from where those arguments may begin.21 Applying this to the multiculturalism debate, my own sense is that most multiculturalists, whether or not they acknowledge it openly, are moral anti-foundationalists, but it is difficult to think of any who qualify as radical moral relativists.22 On the contrary, virtually every multiculturalist agrees that some degree of cross-cultural critique is both legitimate and necessary, and that there are certain basic standards of conduct or decency that every human community should be expected to uphold. In their attempts to theorize the contours of these minimum moral standards, most multiculturalists tread a path that falls somewhere in between the extremes of radical tolerance and radical intolerance of difference. Beyond this very general commonality, however, there are important differences in terms of the conclusions they draw. The details of these differences will have to wait until Chapters 5 and 7, but it is worth foreshadowing some of the themes that generate the major points of convergences and divergence in the literature.

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The first is that theorists who disagree over the best way to justify a theory of multicultural accommodation frequently disagree over where the line draw is to be drawn between tolerable and intolerable forms of group conduct. For example, a liberal multiculturalist like Kymlicka who emphasizes the connection between minority rights and individual autonomy draws the line at forms of conduct that violate autonomy, whereas a libertarian multiculturalist like Kukathas who emphasizes toleration and freedom of association is happy to sanction minority practices that violate autonomy so long as those who object to this sort of treatment are free to exit the community when they so desire (Kukathas 1992, 1992a; Kymlicka 1992).23 That having been said, it would be misleading to suggest that multiculturalists who agree on the normative principles which justify minority accommodation necessarily agree on where the appropriate limits of accommodation should be drawn. For example, Galston (1995) and SpinnerHalev (2000) share Kukathas’ enthusiasm for toleration and freedom of association but are nowhere near as prepared to condone the sorts of illiberal minority practices that in his view the state has no business interfering with (see Chapter 5). Similarly, Shachar (2001: 129–32) follows Kymlicka in placing individual autonomy at the core of her defense of minority rights, but she is critical of his theory for its greater deference to minority practices that conflict with norms of gender equality, particularly in the case of national minorities exercising powers of self-government. It is sometimes suggested that disagreements over the appropriate limits of minority accommodation reflect a clash between liberal and non-liberal approaches to the subject (Taylor 1994b; Tomasi 1995; Parekh 2000), but in my view this distinction adds little but confusion to the debate—the reason being that there is anything but universal agreement on where exactly the boundaries of liberalism begin and end. The predictable result is that where one theorist in the debate sees a liberal champion another sees a liberal heretic. The consequences of this conceptual indeterminacy are played out fully both in the debates amongst multiculturalists and between multiculturalists and their critics, with bewildering and sometimes comical results. For example, whereas Kukathas concludes that Kymlicka is not a liberal Parekh criticizes him for his liberal bias. Kymlicka in turn concludes that Kukathas is not a liberal, but that Parekh is probably about as liberal as he is, to which Parekh responds that his approach is partly inside and partly outside the liberal paradigm. If we ask Barry, however, none of the theorists above qualify as liberals, a criticism Parekh counters with the suggestion that in certain respects he may be more of a liberal than Barry, an observation that is echoed by Chambers, in whose opinion Barry’s approach is not liberal enough, and in a different way by Tully who concludes that Barry is in fact an illiberal liberal.24 Given the absence of any neutral or objective standard for declaring one or another of these competing conceptions of liberalism the ultimate victor, my feeling is that for the purposes of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of any given theoretical account of the limits of multicultural accommodation, we would be better off leaving the question of its liberal pedigree to one side.

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There are, after all, a host of other more concrete issues to be grappled with in this debate. For example, should all minorities be treated equally or are there legitimate reasons for treating some minorities differently? Should groups who claim a right to self-determination, particularly groups who themselves have faced a history of discriminatory or oppressive treatment by the state, be granted greater scope to determine and enforce their own internal standards of conduct? Or should the very fact that such groups seek a measure of independent authority over their own members come with a proportionally greater degree of external oversight to ensure that this authority is not abused? Should ethno-religious minorities who voluntarily isolate themselves from the wider society be granted greater immunity from state interference in their discriminatory religious practices, or should they be subject to the same degree of oversight and regulation as those who choose the path of integration? What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of forcefully intervening in the practices of oppressive minorities? Is it better to go the route of incentive or persuasion, or is it better again simply to ensure that disadvantaged or dissenting individuals are free to exit their communities when they object to the way they are being treated? What constitutes an adequate right of exit, and what role should the state play in ensuring these rights are upheld? And what, if anything, can be done about the more subtle forms of domination and oppression that occur in the private sphere? These are all questions on which multiculturalists reasonably, but nevertheless vigorously, disagree, and at times it seems as if there are at least as many solutions to any given case as there are theorists in the debate. Critics have been quick to fasten on this indeterminacy as evidence of multiculturalism’s intellectual bankruptcy, or even worse, as proof that multiculturalists are unable (or simply unwilling) to stand up for any principle at all (Fish 1998; Barry 1998: 317–19; Lusztig 1999: 464), but there are three things that can be said in response to this charge. The first is that this theoretical untidiness is simply a reflection of the complex nature of the social and moral challenges that need to be faced in a culturally diverse democracy, and for any given challenge we should expect that there will be more than one course of action that could qualify as a reasonable policy response. Second, to say that the solution to difficult multicultural challenges is simply to stand up for one’s principles in many cases simply begs the question, because in the hardest cases our principles may pull us with equal strength in opposing directions.25 The third argument is that principled and effective solutions to difficult cases of inter-cultural moral conflict are unlikely to be derived from inflexible universal formulas. If such cases are capable of being resolved at all, they must be resolved with creativity, with pragmatism, and with careful attention to the specificity of group claims and circumstances, combined with a sensitivity to the constraints and opportunities presented by the different historical and socio-political contexts within which those claims arise (Carens 2000: 1–20; Parekh 2000: 239–63).26 John Horton captures this point nicely in his analysis of cultural difference and legal reasoning:

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. law is typically replete with qualifications, special cases, exceptions, stipulative definitions, excusing conditions, assumptions about what is reasonable.One good reason for law having these features is that laws need to cover a vast range and complexity of differing and sometimes unanticipated situations. Taking account of significant cultural differences can be understood as one such complexity. (Horton 2003: 30; cf. Tully 1995: 169–72) All of which is to say that there is little to be gained in this debate by underestimating the difficulty of the challenges to be faced or by berating one side or another for failing to resolve these challenges with simple solutions. One final point, and this may seem like an unusual way to cap a discussion devoted to cultural difference, is that any critical review of contemporary multicultural political philosophy would be remiss if it failed to account for the emphasis placed by multiculturalists on the many similarities across cultures. Multiculturalists like Phillips even argue that there has been too much focus on the differences between cultures, particularly on the gulf that supposedly exists between western and non-western cultures. Phillips constructs her own approach to multiculturalism around the assumption that ‘‘people are not so very different from one another the world over’’ (Phillips 2007: 24–5). She notes her agreement in this respect with Parekh (2000: 123), who argues that human beings, in spite of their differences, ‘‘share a common nature, common conditions of existence, life experiences, predicament, and so on,’’ which naturally generate commonalities in terms of their basic needs, values and priorities.27 Kymlicka too argues that, in western countries in particular, a stereotypical distinction is often made between liberal majorities and illiberal minority cultures, when in fact the members of most of these ethnocultural minorities share (or eventually come to share) a commitment to basic liberal principles and standards of conduct (2001: 60–3).28 Even when multiculturalists emphasize the differences amongst cultures, they frequently take pains to point out that these differences can be a source of value and enrichment well beyond their community of origin, and that different cultural communities have much to learn about one another, and about themselves, by engaging in a process of intercultural dialogue and exchange (Taylor 1994a: 72–3; Tully 1995: 110–11; Parekh 2000: 167; Montefiore 2005: 98). In this larger view of things, a multicultural society confronts its constituent cultural communities with the challenge of mutual accommodation and adjustment but also with the opportunity for mutual understanding and enlightenment.

Conclusion This chapter has been an exercise in what might be called philosophical brushclearing: it sought to identify and lay to rest three significant misconceptions that continue to impede productive debate amongst the champions and the

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critics of multiculturalism. The first of these is that multiculturalists are obsessed with objective cultural differences to the exclusion of all other issues. Against this view I have argued that although a focus on objective cultural differences is one of the defining features of the literature on multiculturalism, it is by no means the only issue that is deemed relevant or important. The second misconception is that multiculturalism is wedded to an unrealistic and potentially harmful doctrine of cultural essentialism. On the contrary, I have argued that most multiculturalists believe that minorities should be granted some capacity to preserve and promote their distinctive languages and cultures, but it is difficult to think of any multiculturalist who supports the idea of stifling processes of cultural change and adaptation. The third and final misconception is that multiculturalism is a recipe for radical moral relativism and an indiscriminate toleration of minority practices, however harmful they may be. My objective here was to illustrate how one can be an anti-foundationalist about morals without embracing an ‘‘anything goes’’ view of morality, and to remind the reader that most multiculturalists believe there are certain minimum standards of conduct to which every human community must be upheld, and that a defensible theory of minority accommodation must contain basic safeguards for the weak and the vulnerable.

Chapter 3

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A typology of multicultural policies Introduction Multiculturalism is more than just a set of abstract philosophical principles, it also manifests itself in a broad range of policies adopted by governments in response to the facts of diversity within their borders.1 Indeed, much of the earlier work in multicultural political philosophy can be seen as an exercise in seeking normative justifications for multicultural policies and programs that had already been implemented by different countries around the world (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995: 127; Pieterse 2007). A number of these countries, including Australia, Canada and Sweden, are officially multicultural, while others such as Holland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are not officially multicultural but have nevertheless implemented certain multicultural policies. Even a country like the United States, which tends to portray itself as a great cultural melting pot, has adopted a suite of policies whose flavor is decidedly multicultural (Huntington 2004; Hero and Preuhs 2006). The objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with a basic introduction to what these sorts of policies look like, the kinds of issues they are intended to address, and some of the different ways in which they can be justified. Sorting out these very basic issues can be helpful, first of all, because multicultural policies do not look the same the world over. In Europe, for example, it is generally the case that multicultural policies are designed with the claims and circumstances of immigrants and refugees in mind, while multicultural policies in parts of Latin America encompass the very different sorts of claims and circumstances of indigenous peoples (Sieder 2002). In the United States, the term is generally not applied to indigenous peoples but it is applied to African Americans and policies geared towards issues of racial difference and racial disadvantage. Canada’s official multiculturalism casts its net even wider to include immigrants and refugees but also historic religious and linguistic minorities and, against their frequent objections, Aboriginal peoples and the Que´be´cois. A second benefit of addressing these questions systematically is that governments themselves frequently fail to do so. As noted in the opening chapter, multicultural policies are often designed and implemented in an ad hoc manner rather than as part of a coherent or systematic overall strategy, and policy-makers

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themselves may have little or no sense of (or interest in) how these policies relate to different normative theories of multicultural accommodation. To help bridge this gap between theory and practice, I have constructed a typology that offers some sense of the breadth and diversity of multicultural policies that have been defended in the literature and implemented in different countries around the world. I should acknowledge at the outset that the literature already contains a number of typologies that mark out different forms of political voice (Catt and Murphy 2002) or various kinds of cultural rights (Kymlicka 1995: 26–33; Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 24–30; Levy 2000: 125– 60) that are intended to address the claims of ethnocultural or ethnonational minorities. The typology presented here owes much to the work of Levy and Kymlicka in particular, but unlike these theorists my categories are not focused on different types of cultural rights but on different types of multicultural policies. As such, my intention is not to supersede but rather to supplement their efforts, by offering the reader a slightly different perspective on the complex landscape of multicultural theory and practice. Another point that needs to be acknowledged up front is that any effort to devise a definitive system of classification is likely to fall short of the mark. As even a cursory reading of the literature makes clear, there is more than one useful way of categorizing multicultural policies, and within any given system of classification it is bound to be the case that some policies will fit in more than one category (e.g. self-government is a form of autonomy but also a form of political voice), while others may not fit any category at all. Ultimately it is less important to understand which specific category a particular multicultural policy fits within than it is to understand its key features, why it might be justified, and how it is supposed to serve the purpose for which it is intended. With this in mind, I have carved out seven categories, each of which encompasses a different bundle of multicultural policies. The categories are voice, symbolic recognition, redistribution, protection, exemptions, assistance and autonomy.2 Each of the categories carries a brief general description and a series of examples to indicate the range of different policy options it encompasses, the purpose they are intended serve, the types of justifications to which they are subject, and the types of groups to which they are addressed.

Voice Voice refers to a category of policies aimed at including minorities in key decision-making processes that have a direct or indirect impact on their status and interests. There are many different variations on this policy, including measures to increase the presence of ethnic minorities in national and regional legislatures; guaranteed representation for indigenous peoples on land and resource co-management boards; or a process of consulting with racial minority leaders on the content of proposed government anti-discrimination legislation. Some forms of political voice can be implemented using several different methods, as

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in the case of legislative representation. One option is to adopt a form of proportional representation to enhance the electoral prospects of minority candidates or minority parties, as in the South African case, but other options include setting up a guaranteed number of seats for different ethnic groups—a feature of the Fijian constitution prior to its abrogation in 2009. A third option involves redrawing electoral boundaries to create districts where racial minorities comprise the majority of voters, a method that has been employed in the United States to address under-representation amongst blacks and Latinos (Spinner 1994: 113–39; Phillips 1995: 85–6). There is a tendency in the literature to assume that voice is an appropriate policy option for ethnic or racial minorities but not for national minorities or indigenous peoples, groups that are seeking a measure of independence from, rather than inclusion within, state institutions. But this view is too narrow, and ignores the fact that even minorities which exercise substantial self-governing powers in many ways will continue to be subject to the authority of central institutions and for this reason will have an incentive to gain an effective voice in those institutions. In Canada, for example, Quebec Francophones are afforded a degree of autonomy through their separate provincial governing institutions, but they also enjoy a strong voice in national politics, exercised by their representatives in the Canadian House of Commons. In fact, a measure guaranteeing Quebec a minimum of 25 per cent of the seats in the Canadian House of Commons was included in the failed 1992 Charlottetown Constitutional Accord as a means of strengthening the voice of Francophone Quebecers at the national level. Gaining a voice in national institutions can be particularly important for indigenous peoples, who for a variety of practical reasons may find it more difficult to achieve a significant degree of independence from central governments, even after acquiring powers of self-government (Cairns 2000; Williams 2004). Indeed, in countries where indigenous peoples have no access to self-governing powers, representation in the national legislature may be the most effective form of political voice available. This is certainly the case in New Zealand, where Maori have enjoyed a form of guaranteed representation since the late nineteenth century, and it is an option that has also been discussed (but never implemented) in Australia (Murphy 2008). Whether having a political voice translates into a real capacity to represent or defend one’s interests is another question entirely, and is highly dependent on how that voice is institutionalized. Consultation, for example, comes in a variety of different forms which promise varying degrees of empowerment or policy impact (Catt and Murphy 2003). In some cases, stakeholders merely provide input and governments retain the sole authority to decide whether or not that advice will be heeded, while in other cases the full consent of the stakeholders may be required, which effectively provides them with a veto over government policy. In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), for example, the Canadian Supreme Court identified a spectrum of appropriate consultation procedures for government policies that impact Aboriginal constitutional rights, ranging from a less onerous duty of discussion and disclosure to the

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requirement in some cases that full Aboriginal consent be obtained before a government policy or action can proceed. A similar spectrum of influence can be observed in the case of legislative representation. At the weaker end of the spectrum, a small number of guaranteed seats in a national legislature is unlikely to offer minority representatives much in the way of policy impact, while at the other end of the spectrum acquiring a share of cabinet posts in a consociational power-sharing executive is likely to result in significant decision-making power for the group. Numerous justifications have been offered for granting minorities a voice in key decision-making forums (see Chapter 5). One of the most common is the argument that minorities have a unique set of interests and priorities that can only be accurately understood and represented by one of their own members, but this view has been rightly criticized for exaggerating the internal homogeneity of group interests and for underestimating the capacity of non-members to understand and represent minority priorities and concerns (Young 1990: 226– 32; Williams 1998: 5–6). A more moderate version of this argument is that a representative from the group is simply more likely to be acquainted with the group’s priorities, but also more motivated to promote those priorities than would a representative from outside the group (Kymlicka 1995: 131–2; 138–9; Boxill 1998: 114–15). Minority representation has also been linked to principles of justice and democracy. Anne Phillips argues that the under-representation (or de facto exclusion) of minority representatives from political decision-making forums is a violation of political equality, and that special representation rights are an important means of redressing this injustice (Phillips 1993: 99; 1995: 21– 2). Similarly, Iris Young argues that granting previously excluded minorities a political voice is consistent with the principle of democratic consent: the idea that all citizens should have an effective voice in debating and determining policies that have an impact on their interests and well-being (Young 1990: 34, 92–3; cf. Tully 1995: 140–5, 178–81). The voice option can also be justified on a variety of more practical grounds. For example, governments may be able to increase the efficacy and legitimacy of minority-oriented policies by consulting with group representatives to ensure that their needs and priorities are properly understood and accounted for. In addition, efforts to include visible minorities in mainstream representative institutions can be a powerful tool of integration, both by fostering a sense of belonging amongst members of the minority community and by demonstrating to the wider community that minority representatives are active and contributing members of the polity. Minority representation may also serve as a means of conflict-prevention by providing a marginalized and highly disaffected group with an alternative to pursuing their interests and grievances by violent means. Similarly, giving minorities a political voice has the potential to transform majority preconceptions about which groups in society have the right, and the capacity, to participate in political decision-making, and at the same time can help nourish a sense of pride and dignity amongst minority communities whose members gain representation in key decision-making forums (Phillips 1995: 41;

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Williams 1998: 209–10). With a nod to the next category in the typology, group representation has also been defended in terms of its symbolic function. For many Maori, guaranteed parliamentary representation has become a symbol of their unique status as first peoples in New Zealand’s constitutional order. This message has been echoed by indigenous Australians, who have argued that the creation of dedicated indigenous seats in the national legislature would demonstrate the government’s commitment to the principle of indigenous self-determination, and would serve as a powerful symbol of national reconciliation (Australia 1998: 37).

Symbolic recognition It is easy to underestimate the importance of symbols in the politics of multiculturalism. Among skeptics, symbolic gestures are at best politically irrelevant, and at worst are an exercise in the politics of distraction and a substitute for concrete action on key policy issues. There is some truth to both of these interpretations, but they tell only part of the story about symbolic politics. Symbols play an enormously important role in the political life of any community, and are powerful drivers of public sentiment and of actions both commendable and deplorable. One only has to think of the ceremonies surrounding Remembrance Day, of nationalist symbols such as the swastika or the confederate flag, of the momentous handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin in front of the Whitehouse, or of the annual marching season in Northern Ireland to see the truth in this. Above all else, symbols or symbolic gestures play a vital role in the politics of recognition. Symbolic recognition can assume a variety of different forms and perform a variety of significant functions in a multicultural society. Symbols are particularly important as a form of identity-recognition, which has important knock-on effects in terms of national unity and social cohesion. In 2006, for example, the Canadian House of Commons approved a motion recognizing Quebec as a nation within a united Canada. Though largely devoid of legal significance, the motion carried the message that Quebec’s distinctive culture and identity is worthy of recognition and respect, and that these differences should not be viewed as an obstacle to Quebeckers’ sense of belonging to a united Canada.3 A refusal to grant this form of recognition can, on the other hand, provoke anger and resentment that corrodes the bonds of unity in a multination state. Lucien Bouchard, a former leader of the nationalist Bloc Que´be´cois, harnessed this logic in brilliant and highly effective fashion in the campaign leading up to the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, by continually evoking the image of a ‘Que´bec a` genoux’ (Quebec on its knees) in humiliation, begging the federal government for the recognition it was continually being denied, a recognition that would never truly be forthcoming until the people of Quebec voted to become a sovereign nation. Official apologies for past injustice are another significant form of symbolic recognition in multicultural societies, and their popularity has grown immensely

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over the last decade or so. State apologies have recently been issued by countries like Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom for events that included the wartime internment of suspect ethnic populations, for the harsh treatment of indentured foreign laborers, for the Bloody Sunday massacre in Northern Ireland, and for the historic dispossession and coercive assimilation of indigenous peoples. Government apologies are an important means of according respect for the victims of past injustice, and of symbolically restoring to those victims the humanity they were either denied or granted in only the most minimal form by previous governments (Dyzenhaus 2000: 473–4; Barkan 2006: 8–9; Murphy 2011). In addition, official apologies send the message that current generations have repudiated the unjust policies of the past, including the assumptions of minority inferiority by which those policies were frequently underpinned, and are now ready to embark on a new relationship with survivors and their kin (Vernon 2003: 545–6). A refusal to apologize, on the other hand, conveys a sense of indifference to past injustice that can nurture a sense of grievance among victims and their kin which in turn can be a profound barrier to inter-ethnic reconciliation (Kukathas 2003: 167). Multicultural societies must also be attentive to the significance of official public symbols, which can have either a welcoming or an alienating affect on cultural minorities. In Israel, for example, virtually all public symbols, including the flag, national anthem, holidays, national myths and heroes are Jewish, with the consequence that most Israeli Arabs are effectively precluded from identifying with, or feeling that they are equally valued members of, the state (Smooha 1997; Peled 1992). A willingness to modify or augment existing public symbols to reflect a wider range of cultures and identities can therefore be viewed as a means of creating a more egalitarian and inclusive public space in a multicultural state. Even things like the design of public architecture can play a role in this respect. Vancouver’s University of British Columbia, for example, features a First Nations Longhouse, designed under the direction of Aboriginal students, staff and elders, whose purpose is to stand as a very public symbol of inclusion for Aboriginal students with an interest in higher education. Symbols are significant in their own right, but as Levy’s analysis suggests they may also have important substantive knock-on effects (Levy 2000: 154–5). A good example is a policy of granting legal recognition to minority languages. Take the case of Bolivia which, alongside Spanish, grants official status to two indigenous languages: Quechua and Aymara. This policy not only increases the symbolic status or prestige enjoyed by these indigenous languages, it likely enhances their chances for survival by augmenting their capacity to attract public funding, by mandating their inclusion in the curriculum of public schools and training courses of civil servants, and by increasing their presence in public signage. That having been said, it is important to recognize that symbol and substance can also be intertwined in a more negative sense, given that symbolic gestures without substantive backing will likely be regarded as inadequate, perhaps even insulting, by those to whom they are offered. One example from Australia is the common practice whereby government officials publicly acknowledge the

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traditional indigenous owners of the territories they are visiting, when it is well known by all in attendance that government lawyers are simultaneously before the courts arguing that those rights should be denied any substantive legal force. In such cases, symbolic gestures look more like a cynical public relations exercise than a genuine act of recognition.

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Redistribution Redistribution describes a suite of policies aimed at providing disadvantaged minorities with greater access to the resources required to live a decent and fulfilling human life. Redistribution is sometimes used quite broadly to encompass not only economic necessities but also political goods such as sovereignty and access to key forums of political decision-making (e.g. Macklem 1993), but here it more narrowly refers to goods such as land, natural resources and capital. Whichever way you slice it, the relationship between multiculturalism and redistribution is complex and contested (Fraser 1998; Young 1998). Some critics accuse multiculturalists of ignoring the more pressing challenges posed by class inequality and socio-economic deprivation, and argue that as the popularity of multicultural discourse has grown it has increasingly marginalized questions of redistribution in the social imagination (Barry 2001: 63–4: Bannerji 2000: 35). However, while it is probably fair to say that insufficient attention has been paid in the literature to the connection between multiculturalism and socio-economic well-being, it is also true that multicultural political philosophy is itself a response to the near complete disregard of questions of ethnocultural and ethnonational difference by political philosophers in the post-war period, including those focused on questions of socio-economic justice. Moreover, the extent to which multicultural political philosophy is divorced from questions of economic redistribution has been greatly exaggerated. In the first place, many multicultural policies whose primary objective lies elsewhere nevertheless have significant consequences (either directly or indirectly) for redistribution and improved socio-economic outcomes for marginalized groups. For example, the primary motivation for addressing minority legislative under-representation may be democratic, but the effect of such measures could very well be to place minority representatives in positions where they can effectively press for progressive economic reforms that will benefit their communities. To cite another example, researchers in the United States have turned up evidence of a compelling correlation between a policy of granting self-determination to tribal nations and concrete improvements in tribal economic fortunes (Cornell and Kalt 1998; Kalt et al. 2008). Other researchers have found evidence which suggests that black-focused schools improve the retention and graduation rates of black students, which is desirable in itself but also has promising implications for the long term economic prospects and social mobility of individual students (Kymlicka 1998: 82–4).4 There are also examples of multicultural policies whose aim is more directly redistributive. Affirmative action in the area of employment equity is clearly

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redistributive in its focus, one of the clearest examples being its deployment in the United States as a means of fostering the growth and consolidation of an upwardly mobile black middle class (Glazer 1998: 12–13; Kymlicka 1998: 86–7; Freeman 2002: 26). Another good example is the settlement of indigenous land claims. Land frequently carries enormous cultural and spiritual significance for indigenous peoples, but land title and the access it provides to natural resources and commercial development opportunities is also significant because of its potential contribution to the goal of economic self-sufficiency and community well-being. The same applies to the cash transfers that frequently accompany land claims settlements. In symbolic terms, these cash payments represent a form of reparations for the costs and suffering visited upon indigenous peoples by the unjust policies of governments past, but in redistributive terms they are clearly part of an effort to address a stubborn history of socio-economic disadvantage and to serve the ends of economic justice. Indigenous land claims are controversial wherever they are raised, but they throw up some especially difficult moral challenges in countries where other historically marginalized groups have a competing claim to the territory in question. In developing countries, for example, impoverished peasants might argue that their very survival depends upon gaining access to lands over which ownership has been asserted by indigenous peoples as a matter of historic right (Kymlicka 2001: 134–8). In such cases, what constitutes a just policy resolution is far from clear. None of these examples is meant to challenge the conclusion that, on the whole, multiculturalism is more directly focused on efforts to recognize, protect and empower cultural minorities than it is on questions of redistribution and socio-economic well-being. Part of the explanation for this, again, is that multicultural political philosophy arose out of a need to address a distinctive set of justice-related questions that were largely being ignored in the literature. A second explanation is the basic liberal principle that decisions about the just distribution of economic resources and opportunities generally should be made independently of questions of racial, cultural or ethnic difference. All the same, what the examples clearly show is that many multicultural policies have both direct and indirect distributive consequences, and in fact are often necessary to rectify distributive injustices that a difference-blind liberal paradigm alone cannot handle. As such they are meant to drive home the point that redistributive justice and multicultural justice are interdependent not antithetical political projects (Tully 2000: 470; Parekh 2000: 2, 342–3; Kymlicka 2007: 80–1).

Protection Protection carves out another distinctive category in the broader spectrum of multicultural policies. Like the other categories, protection encompasses a range of policies that serve a variety of different purposes. Some protective measures are intended to shield the members of vulnerable minorities from forms of public denigration or vilification that threaten their basic sense of safety and security,

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and which have the potential to undermine their status as equal and respected members of society. Included in this basket of policies are things like government campaigns against racism or prohibitions on ethnically or religiously motivated forms of hate speech. Proponents of such policies argue that the actions and attitudes they target are more than simply offensive, they can easily compromise the capacity of victimized minorities to secure employment, to live safely alongside their fellow citizens, to build social or professional networks or to be free from verbal or physical attack (Modood 1993: 145–7; 2006a; Parekh 2000: 314). All the same, policies such as these, particularly those that involve different forms of censorship, continue to prove controversial. Anti-blasphemy laws or the categorization of religious denigration as a form of hate speech are good examples (Modood 2006b: 60). These issues receive more detailed treatment in the discussion of the Danish cartoon controversy in Chapter 9. Another variant of protection comprises policies to help minorities preserve and promote their distinctive languages and cultures and, in some cases, to help ensure the survival of the minority communities themselves. Many indigenous communities in North America and Australasia are protected by a series of such measures, including those which restrict the rights of non-members to enter or take up residence in the community, to purchase communally held lands, or to participate in community governance (Kymlicka 1995: 43–4, 109–10; Levy 2000: 139–40). The most commonly advanced justification for these restrictive policies (which some consider paternalistic) is that, in their absence, small and vulnerable indigenous communities risk being rapidly overrun and their members assimilated by the much larger societies that surround them. This argument is usually voiced with an eye to the past, when efforts to acquire indigenous land formed a central plank in the historic assimilation policies of governments in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, and the corresponding impact on the integrity of indigenous communities and cultures proved to be both severe and intergenerational.5 Language policy can also serve this protective function, and perhaps no better example exists than Quebec. Although Francophones comprise the majority of residents in the province, the physical fact of being located in a country and continent dominated by Anglophones, combined with the reality that immigrants to the province are overwhelmingly more interested in learning English themselves and raising their children to be English speakers, has contributed to the widespread perception that the survival of French is endangered. Indeed, at the time of the Quiet Revolution and the birth of modern Quebec nationalism in the 1960s, the French language had already lost significant ground to English, particularly in the upper tiers of the economy and in the public face (le visage linguistique) of the major urban centers. To counter this trend the province enacted a series of language policies in the 1970s, covering issues as varied as the language of instruction in public schools, the use of French in the workplace, and the presence of French on public signage (Spinner 1994: 145–9; Carens 2000: 113–15). Most observers agree that these policies have largely succeeded in their aim of consolidating the status of French as the first and official language of the

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province, but by no means have they gone unchallenged. Much of the criticism comes from Quebec’s historic English-speaking minority and from new immigrants to the province, both of whom argue that the policies are a violation of their equality rights (Levine 1990; Richards 2007: 234–42). Others have adopted an even harder line on the language laws, arguing that they are less about protection than they are about asserting the dominance of Francophones over all other ethnic groups in the province (Barry 1998: 312). Quebec typically responds to these sorts of challenges by arguing that, like any other nation with a right to self-determination, it has the right to determine its own language policy, and that in any case this policy not only respects the basic rights and freedoms of Francophones, it also safeguards the rights of the Anglophone minority, and even includes measures to support the teaching and translation of immigrant minority languages (Carens 2000: 124–31). This case is discussed at length in Chapter 9.

Exemptions Another commonly used item in the multicultural toolbox is the policy of exempting minorities from the application of certain laws or regulations. Exemptions are typically justified on the grounds that the law in question disproportionately impacts or disadvantages particular classes of individuals because of their distinctive religious or cultural affiliations (Levy 2000: 128).6 In certain rare cases exemptions have also been applied to governments or their individual agencies. In Australia, for example, various state governments, agencies and publicly funded universities have been granted temporary exemptions from laws against racial discrimination in order to engage in the targeted hiring of indigenous employees. Justifications for these exemptions include the imperative of employment equalization or the need to bring indigenous-specific skills, qualities or expertise to bear in the effort to redress severe socio-economic disparities in the wider indigenous population. Be that as it may, in the vast majority of cases exemptions target individuals, and some of the most familiar examples are the kinds of exemptions sometimes granted to the members of religious minorities. For instance, isolationist religious sects such as the Amish have successfully petitioned to have their children exempted from mandatory high school attendance, by arguing that a secondary education would undermine the younger generation’s commitment to their religious beliefs and lifestyle, and that this in turn would compromise the long-term survival prospects of the community itself (Spinner 1994: 87–108; Galston 1995). Members of the Sikh religion have at times been granted exemptions from rules banning the carrying of dangerous weapons in public, so that they may carry the Kirpan, a ceremonial dagger viewed by many Sikhs as a required component of their religious attire.7 There have also been cases in which Muslim women who wear the niqab (a veil that leaves only the eyes exposed) have been exempted from the standard requirement that facial coverings be removed during the process of giving

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evidence and cross-examination.8 In another interesting case in 2007, the Chief Electoral Officer of Quebec ruled that Muslim women would be permitted to vote in an upcoming provincial election while wearing the niqab, but he was later forced to reverse this decision in the face of a vigorous public outcry. Elections Canada ruled, in contrast, that women voting in three federal byelections in 2007 should not be required to reveal their faces, provided they were able to identify themselves by other acceptable means.9 Amongst the most contentious types of exemptions are those involving the use of the so-called ‘cultural defense’ in criminal trials. In such cases the argument is made that minority defendants should be exempted from the usual criminal penalties associated with their actions, either because their cultural backgrounds predisposed them towards the behavior in question or because the acts in question are not viewed as crimes in the societies in which they were raised (Renteln 2004; Phillips 2007: 73–99; Song 2007: 87–113). Cultural defense-based exemptions have drawn harsh criticism, especially in cases involving the victimization of women and children, but there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the overall legitimacy of this practice. Whereas some feminist theorists, like Susan Okin (1999a), have argued in favor of a total ban on the cultural defense, others like Sarah Song and Anne Phillips have been more qualified in their criticism, arguing that a blanket prohibition may, in some cases, unfairly impair the capacity of minority defendants to defend themselves in court—for example, by preventing them from appealing to standard legal instruments such as the defendant’s state of mind (in this case culturally influenced) at the time the crime was committed as a means of justifying a reduced sentence (Song 2007: 100–109; Phillips 2007: 97–9). There is also substantial disagreement in the literature over whether exemptions support or undermine the principle of equality. On one side of this issue we have Bhikhu Parekh, who argues that exemptions may be a form of unequal treatment, but they are justified as a means of according equal consideration and respect to the identity-related differences of individuals from minority backgrounds. By the same token, he argues that a categorical refusal to acknowledge the disproportionate cultural impact of particular laws or regulations, and a rigid insistence on equal treatment, can be a real source of injustice in a diverse democracy (Parekh 2000: 239–42). On the opposite side of this issue we find Brian Barry, who flatly rejects the idea that treating minorities differently is compatible with the principle of equality (Barry 2001: 11–12). Barry is particularly exercised by what he calls the ‘‘rule and exemption’’ approach to minority accommodation supported by Parekh and others. Barry’s argument is that all laws are more disadvantageous to some than they are to others (e.g. laws against drunk-driving disadvantage drinkers more than they do non-drinkers), hence disproportionality of impact is not, in itself, evidence that the rule in question is unfair and that an exemption is justified. Everything depends on the nature of the disadvantage created by the particular law, and how that disadvantage weighs up against the purpose that law is intended to serve. Which is to say that, in any given case, we must seek to determine which set of reasons—those in

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favor of the uniform law or those in favor of the exemption—are more compelling. Barry’s own feeling on the matter is that rational deliberation in most cases will turn out to favor the option of retaining the law and rejecting the exemption, and that even in cases where there are very strong reasons in favor of granting the exemption the more reasonable option will be to question the legitimacy of the law itself rather than retaining the law and granting the exemption (Barry 2001: 32–62).10

Assistance The category of assistance encompasses another fairly wide and diverse spectrum of policies. One part of this spectrum features policies which help minorities preserve and promote their distinctive cultures. A good example is the provision of public funding for separate minority schools, which play such a vital role in the transmission of minority languages, histories and belief systems to future generations. This form of assistance can be justified in Parekh’s terms as a means of institutionalizing the principle of equal respect for dominant and non-dominant cultures in a multicultural society (Parekh 2000: 103). A parallel argument, cited by Levy (2000: 134) is that dominant groups in a multicultural society tend to be able to take the survival and vitality of their languages and cultures for granted, because they are backed up by so much publicly-funded institutional architecture (e.g. museums, libraries, universities, bureaucracies). Public funding for things like minority education, festivals, cultural associations or media outlets can therefore be justified as a means of reducing the unequal burden these groups must bear in their efforts to sustain elements of their own cultural heritage (cf. Kymlicka 1995: 13–15). Legitimate concerns have been raised that providing assistance to minority cultural institutions promotes ethnic separatism (Schlesinger 1998: 79–104) or the perpetuation of illiberal norms and practices (Spinner-Halev 2000: 118–20), but much depends on whether such policies are combined with parallel initiatives to include minorities in mainstream institutions, and on whether minority cultural institutions, like their counterparts in the wider society, are required to conduct their affairs in line with certain basic standards of human rights protection (Parekh 2000: 33–4; Reich 2007: 318–19). Another part of the spectrum of assistance features policies aimed at helping minorities overcome obstacles to their full and equal participation in the social, economic and political life of the wider society. The obstacles in question include a lack of access to certain essential resources (monetary, educational, linguistic, etc.) that are more readily available to other citizens, or the fact that minorities are confronted with forms of overt or covert discrimination that members of the majority do not face. A good example discussed by Levy involves the provision of minority language services that enable recent immigrants with limited skills in the host-country language to exercise their basic capacities as citizens, including the right to vote and to interact with government agencies and service providers (Levy 2000: 133–4). Affirmative action is another well-known

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assistance policy, and is frequently employed as a means of increasing the presence of minorities in legislatures, judiciaries, armed forces and police services, institutions of higher education, and bureaucracies. In India, for example, a wide array of such policies have been employed to address caste-based discrimination, and in the United States affirmative action is commonly used to combat disadvantage amongst African Americans, Latinos and Native Americans. Affirmative action is an excellent example of a multicultural policy that can perform multiple functions, many of them simultaneously, including redistribution, symbolic recognition and democratic empowerment. Affirmative action also tends to be a lightning rod for controversy, especially when it is directed towards racial or cultural minorities. One of the more common criticisms is that it violates the principle of equality, and in at least three different ways: first, because it discriminates against non-minority candidates who in all other respects satisfy the criteria for selection; second, because it ignores the possibility that not all members of a minority group are equally disadvantaged, which means that some individuals will receive assistance they do not need and to which they should have no legitimate claim; and third, because it overlooks other equally needy populations whose disadvantages stem from factors other than race, culture or ethnicity (Kukathas 1992a: 674–5; Barry 2001: 115). A second criticism is that affirmative action can be a source of mainstream resentment or backlash (e.g. Kukathas 2003: 159), which not only makes these policies more difficult to implement, it can easily undermine the longer-term objectives of integration and social harmony they are intended to achieve. For all of these reasons, liberal opponents of affirmative action articulate a clear preference for universalist approaches to reducing disadvantage or discrimination that avoid targeting specific categories of people. Their critics respond that difference-blind liberalism has already proven itself incapable of addressing the sources of discrimination and deprivation that form a barrier to minority inclusion, and that a refusal to adopt positive, targeted, measures to overcome these barriers is itself a means of perpetuating inequality (Gutmann 1996: 118–35; Ford 2005: 13, 31–6, 103–4). Furthermore, though the champions of affirmative action might agree that majority backlash is a legitimate worry, they are more likely to see a sustained pattern of minority exclusion as the greater threat to integration in a multicultural society. For all the heat that has been generated by the debate over affirmative action, the reality is that there is more overlap between the competing camps than many of the participants themselves seem to recognize. Brian Barry is a good example. While a firm supporter of affirmative action, he also believes that policies which apply universally to deprived individuals regardless of their ethnic, religious or racial background are not only more egalitarian they also stand a better chance of being accepted by members of the general public (Barry 2001: 115). All the same, Barry is prepared to concede that, in some cases at least, affirmative action that targets particular minority groups may very well turn out to be the best policy option, provided every possible effort is made to mitigate the collateral violations of equality by which such policies will inevitably be accompanied (Barry

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2001: 115–16; cf. Freeman 2002: 26). Barry’s position in the end is not all that different than of some of his multicultural opponents, whose support for affirmative action is balanced by their concern to ensure that such policies genuinely serve the interests of the disadvantaged, that their costs are not unduly borne by other sectors of society, and that superior policy alternatives be employed wherever and whenever they are available (Walzer 1983: 153–4; Gutmann 1996; Kymlicka 1999: 114–15).

Autonomy What distinguishes autonomy from every other category in the typology is the fact that it encompasses policies which grant minorities a measure of independent jurisdictional authority and the right to govern aspects of their own affairs relatively free of state oversight or interference. The spectrum of autonomy is fairly broad. At the strong end of the spectrum lies the right to self-determination. Self-determination itself can take many forms, the most extreme of which entails secession and independent statehood. Demands for independence are frequently advanced by nationalists in Quebec, and the idea has had some currency in Scotland and amongst Basques and Catalans in Spain, but for the most part secession is an option that is relatively infrequently demanded by national minorities and almost never willingly acceded to by states (Heraclides 1997; Connor 1999: 168–-9; Keating 2001: 17).11 Exceptions to the latter rule include Ethiopia, which recognizes an unrestricted right to secession in section 39(1) of its constitution, and the former Soviet Union, which granted (in principle at least) a similar right to its constituent republics (Anderson 2008: 78–9). Canada is another interesting case. In the 1998 Quebec Secession Reference, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that although there is no recognized right to secede in either Canadian or international law, if at some point a clear majority of citizens in any province (i.e. Quebec) votes in favor of secession, the federal government is morally bound to negotiate mutually acceptable terms of political divorce.12 Be that as it may, it is important to recognize that in most cases, demands for self-determination can be satisfied through various forms of self-government that fall short of secession, including devolution (Scotland, Wales), multinational federalism (Quebec, Catalonia) or consociationalism (Northern Ireland). Overwhelmingly, demands for self-government are asserted on behalf of stateless nations and indigenous peoples, and in these cases are almost always associated with a territorial claim. Many different justifications have been offered for these claims. One influential liberal argument draws a link between selfgovernment and the preservation of minority societal cultures—the so-called contexts of choice essential to the realization of individual autonomy (Margalit and Raz 1990; Kymlicka 1995).13 Another conceptualizes self-determination as a democratic right of peoples to exercise self-rule in the absence of external interference or domination (Philpott 1995; Murphy 2001). Self-determination has also been defended as a remedial right that addresses a history of political

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subjugation or colonial domination (Anaya 2004: 103–10; Poole 2004: 97–8; Song 2007: 53–61). Indeed, theorists of indigenous decolonization sometimes argue that the question of justification should be turned around, such that the colonizers themselves are required to justify their right to rule over indigenous communities without their consent (Alfred 1995; Tully 2000). Critics have been just as creative in identifying reasons for being skeptical of minority claims to self-determination. Some dismiss these claims on the grounds that they clash with liberalism’s fundamental commitment to upholding individual not collective rights (Schwarz 1991). Others cast doubt on the capacity of any community to preserve its distinctive values and practices in a highly globalized international environment, and argue that there is little evidence to suggest that granting minorities the right to self-determination would substantially change that fact (Kukathas 1992: 130; Waldron 1995: 94–108). Another commonly voiced objection is that acceding to demands for self-government is a recipe for instability and conflict, while other critics have raised the concern that newly self-governing minorities will abuse their power at the expense of their most vulnerable members (Beiner 1995: 6; Benhabib 2002: 54–5, 64–5). Details of these criticisms, and the manner in which champions of multiculturalism have responded to them, feature prominently in Chapters 5, 7 and 8. Granting rights to self-government may be the most common type of autonomy policy, but others do exist. One particularly controversial example is the policy of granting jurisdiction to religious minorities in the area of family law, including matters such as marriage, divorce and child custody.14 The religious courts of different faith communities in Israel have long enjoyed the authority to enforce religious law in the familial domain, and in the past have largely operated in the absence of state oversight and intervention (Shachar 1999: 98– 9).15 More recently, the Israeli government has moved to reduce the jurisdictional scope of the religious courts, and the Israeli Supreme Court has shown an increased willingness to overturn their rulings when they sharply conflict with Israeli civil law or prevailing international human rights norms, but in spite of these developments much of their autonomy has been retained (Shachar 2000: 215; 2007: 133–5; Scolincov 2006: 732–4). Religious control over family law in Israel has been criticized on a number of grounds. One argument is that it violates the equality rights of secular Israelis because no provision is made for civil marriage in the country, even between non-believers.16 A second criticism is that, more often than not, it is the rights of women that tend to be subordinated when family law becomes the primary responsibility of religious authorities, and that in Israel this continues to be the case despite the aforementioned reforms (Halperin-Kaddari 2003: 24–5; Scolincov 2006: 740). Proposals to involve religious authorities in the governance of family law have also been the subject of vigorous debate in countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, and much of this debate has focused on whether Muslims should have the right to apply Sharia law in this domain (Boyd 2004; Williams 2008). The type of religious authority contemplated by these proposals appear very modest by Israeli standards, but this has done little to reassure the critics,

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who regard them as a threat to the secular foundation of the liberal democratic state, and as a giant step backwards for the rights of women and children (Boyd 2007: 468; Eisenberg 2007).17 Supporters of an initiative to extend the practice of religious family law arbitration in the Canadian province of Ontario sought to allay these sorts of concerns by proposing a model of arbitration that would be purely voluntary and subject to significant state regulation and oversight, but ultimately it proved to be too controversial for the general public, and for the Ontario government, and the proposal was rejected. Yet even skeptics of religious jurisdiction are divided in terms of how these cases should be handled in a liberal democratic context. While some clearly oppose any jurisdictional transfer whatsoever others, like Ayelet Shachar, argue that a joint governance model where the state and religious authorities share jurisdiction over issues like family law is not only more respectful of the principle of religious freedom, it is a more effective means of safeguarding the rights of vulnerable individuals, who are much more likely to be victimized by religious practices that are driven underground (and out of sight) by legal prohibition (Shachar 2001, 2007, 2008).18 Shachar’s model of ‘‘transformative accommodation’’ receives more detailed attention in Chapters 5 and 7.

Conclusion The universe of multicultural policies is extraordinarily broad and diverse, and if the reader comes away from this typology with nothing more than a newfound appreciation for this diversity its relatively modest purpose will have been served. Many of the arguments and examples discussed here will be more fully fleshed out in the core theoretical chapters (5–8) and in the case studies in Chapter 9. Before we get there, however, the next chapter offers an account of the origins of contemporary multicultural political philosophy in the liberal–communitarian debate that captured the imagination of so many theorists in the 1970s and 1980s.

Chapter 4

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Multiculturalism and the liberal–communitarian debate Introduction Amongst the first contributors to the philosophical literature on multiculturalism were the many refugees from the liberal–communitarian debate that so dominated western political philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s. The debate between liberals and communitarians did not begin as a debate about multiculturalism, and many of its main protagonists initially had little, if anything, to say on the subject. Nevertheless, a number of the signature themes around which the liberal–communitarian dialogue revolved proved to be naturally suited to this new area of inquiry. In fact, many of the core concepts deployed by liberals and communitarians in this earlier set of debates found much more fertile ground when they were applied to questions of minority rights and the accommodation of cultural diversity. The objective of this chapter is to identify and explore these key themes and concepts in the work of some of the more influential liberal and communitarian thinkers, and to offer a brief account of how they have been carried forward into the literature on multiculturalism.1 The chapter begins with a section devoted to the question of conceptual indeterminacy, and from there moves to a discussion of three core themes in the liberal–communitarian debate: community, freedom and self-development; individual rights and the common good; and political community and citizen solidarity. The concluding section looks briefly at how liberal multiculturalists drew some of their early inspiration from the liberal–communitarian literature, first of all by exploring the significance of community and culture to a liberal theory of freedom, and second of all by using this insight as a foundation for a liberal defense of minority rights. Most of the focus in this section is on Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989), as this work marked both an important transition point in the liberal–communitarian dialogue and the beginning of a new debate on minority rights and multiculturalism.

Liberals and communitarians Gaining a clear sense of the issues dividing liberals from communitarians is no easy task. Part of the difficulty is that the debate has been conducted at such a

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high level of abstraction, and there is little in the way of concrete empirical examples or specific policy recommendations that would help identify where the real differences between liberals and communitarians lie. Another source of difficulty is the lack of conceptual precision and consistency in the literature, which in many instances leaves liberals and communitarians talking past one another about entirely different subjects. Indeed, one of the main reasons for the eventual collapse of the liberal–communitarian debate was that it was increasingly being conducted, as one philosopher put it, at cross-purposes (Taylor 1989). Some have even suggested that the very idea that one can differentiate between two discrete and internally consistent liberal and communitarian schools of thought is misleading and a barrier to constructive debate (Miller 1999; Caney 1992). To gain a firm footing in this debate we must first of all come to terms with the tremendous diversity of perspectives within the liberal and communitarian camps, and second of all we need to understand the similarities (not just the differences) between liberal and communitarian thinkers. A good place to start is by acknowledging that liberalism is not a universal and uniform theory but rather a diverse and contested family of ideas which different liberal theorists have combined, ranked and operationalized in a variety of different normative and institutional configurations (Waldron 1987: 127–8; Mulhall and Swift 1992: vii–ix; Ryan 1993: 291–3; Weinstock 2007: 244). Granted, virtually every liberal agrees with some version of the Kantian notion that respect for the equal dignity and moral worth of every individual is a core element of a liberal political philosophy, and a key benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of liberal institutions and public policies. Respect for the moral equality of individuals in turn entails a commitment to the principle of individual freedom—in public and in private life—and to a measure of toleration such that the members of a liberal polity are at liberty to imagine and pursue their own vision of what constitutes a meaningful and fulfilling human existence. In addition, most liberals believe that liberty and equality should be supported by a regime of individual rights that places limits on the power that can be exercised over us by the state and our fellow citizens, and which grants us the tools necessary for individual and collective self-rule. Yet for all this there are still deep disagreements on everything from the philosophical foundations of liberalism and its defining principles through to the manner in which those principles should inform institutions and public policies in a liberal state. Beginning with the question of foundations, a liberal like Karl Popper contends that the search for higher truths is essential to the vitality and survival of a liberal society, whereas a liberal like Richard Rorty argues precisely the opposite point—that truth-seeking of this nature has no connection whatsoever either to the durability of a liberal society or to the achievement of its core purposes (Popper 1965, 1966; Rorty 1989). One finds an even greater range of opinions when it comes to defining the core principles of liberalism. While liberals like Kymlicka defend individual autonomy as liberalism’s most central guiding light, others like Kukathas emphasize toleration and freedom of conscience

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and association. What is more, both theorists argue that the approach taken by the other is not sufficiently liberal to be deserving of the title (Kukathas 1992, 1992a, 2003; Kymlicka 1992).2 Joseph Raz, on the other hand, approves of Kymlicka’s decision to locate autonomy at the heart of a liberal theory of state and society, but his perfectionist interpretation of this principle leads him to challenge one of Kymlicka’s most central conclusions: that a liberal state should remain neutral with respect to the choices its citizens make about what is good or valuable in human life (Raz 1986: 133, 415; Kymlicka 1989: 80–1). This in turn places Raz at odds with other neutrality-oriented liberals such as Dworkin (1984) and the earlier Rawls (1999). In yet another variation on the autonomy argument, Jeff Spinner-Halev argues that all individuals in a liberal state should have the freedom to choose their own path in life, but against both Kymlicka and Raz he defends the view that a free and fulfilling existence is possible even within groups which reject, or even actively discourage, the cultivation of autonomy amongst their own members (Spinner-Halev 2000: 29–37, 57–85). Brian Barry, on the other hand, takes an entirely different liberal path, rejecting both the autonomy and toleration centered definitions of liberalism in favor of his own equality-oriented alternative. His view is that toleration and autonomy are certainly part of the pantheon of liberal values but they do not define liberalism per se, and may even pose a threat to liberal equality when they are granted too much weight (Barry 2001: 118–23).3 Liberals also vary widely in terms of how they envision liberal principles being translated into concrete policies and practices in a liberal state.4 Rawls and Nozick, for example, share a basic commitment to the moral equality of individuals, but whereas Rawls’ interpretation of this principle leads him to defend a moderate version of the liberal welfare state, Nozick argues in favor of a minimalist state where the taxation of citizens to support welfare redistribution is regarded as a form of forced labor (Rawls 1999; Nozick 1974). According to Buchanan, on the other hand, both Rawls and Nozick are wrong, because liberalism is essentially neutral on the question of welfare redistribution—meaning that liberals can, with equal justification, adopt either a welfarist or an anti-welfarist position. In his view, the true test of the legitimacy of the liberal state is whether or not it fulfills its primary function of enforcing basic civil and political rights (Buchanan 1989: 854). Liberalism may be a complex and contested concept, but communitarianism is an even more amorphous doctrine. Indeed, more than one observer has remarked on the difficulty of identifying any theorists who are openly willing to fly the communitarian flag (Miller 1999: 170–1; Kukathas 1996: 81; Beiner 2003: 67–8, 84–6). Be that as it may, at a very basic level most of the political philosophers who have been associated with this school of thought share a belief that liberalism is an excessively individualist ideology that fails to account for the role played by community in the constitution of human identity, freedom and well-being (Mulhall and Swift 1992: x–xi; Kymlicka 2002: 208). It is also fair to say that most communitarians are comfortable with the observation that the state has a legitimate role to play in ensuring the health and vitality of the communal institutions that foster individual flourishing in these ways—and that

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this in turn requires rethinking the standard liberal conclusion that the state must remain neutral with respect to questions of the common good. Nevertheless, when one moves from generalities to the specific arguments advanced in the communitarian literature things immediately become more opaque. As a matter of fact, one of the most common criticisms of communitarianism is that community—its most fundamental concept—is never clearly and unambiguously defined, leaving the reader with little sense of its content, scope or scale (Waldron 1995: 95–6; Kukathas 1996: 83; Beiner 2003). Critics have also fastened on the lack of a systematic communitarian political program—a detailed account of how abstract communitarian principles translate into concrete institutional reforms or public policies (Gutmann 1992: 132–3). Other observers point to the lack of a clear and consistent liberal–communitarian divide on the key issue of balancing the interests of the individual against those of the community, and to the fact that communitarians sometimes stand together with liberals in clear opposition to the positions adopted by other communitarians (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 9; Mulhall and Swift 1992: 67, 101, 155, 163–4). To search for anything like a grand unified theory of communitarianism is therefore to search in vain. What one finds instead, as in the literature on liberalism, is a number of broad streams of communitarian thought (Miller 1999: 170–1; Kymlicka 2002: 209–10) or a series of distinctively communitarian theses held singly or in combination by different communitarian theorists (Buchanan 1989: 852–3; Mulhall and Swift 1992: 9–33; Caney 1992: 273–3).5 This lack of conceptual precision and determinacy turned out to be a major contributing factor to intellectual stalemate that eventually struck the liberal– communitarian debate, and which ultimately led to that debate’s demise. What is interesting, however, is that this very same phenomenon of conceptual plasticity, in combination with the complementary nature of many of the core liberal and communitarian insights, ultimately proved to be a source of creative synthesis that sparked some of the earliest work in the field of multicultural political philosophy. To understand approximately how this came to pass it is necessary to look more closely at three particular themes that figured prominently in the dialogue between liberals and communitarians, and which have been carried forward in various ways into the debates between champions and critics of multiculturalism: community, freedom and self-development; individual rights and the common good; and political community and citizen solidarity

Community, freedom and self-development One of the more widely shared views amongst communitarian thinkers is that liberalism offers an inadequate explanation of social life that fails to account for the socially embedded nature of human identity, freedom and agency (Taylor 1989: 159–61; Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 3–4; Mulhall and Swift 1992: 10– 13).6 In other words, liberals are blind to the manner in which our characteristically human capacities, including our capacity to make autonomous choices

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about how to lead a good and fulfilling human life, are in crucial respects facilitated by the communities and cultures of which we are a part (Taylor 1985: 204–9; Miller 1999: 172).7 This critique receives its most sophisticated and systematic treatment in some of the earlier work of Charles Taylor. Liberalism, according to Taylor, is committed to an atomist view of social reality: a picture of society as a mere aggregation of individuals whose identities, capacities and ends are largely individualist in their constitution (Taylor 1985: 187–8). Atomists are further committed to the view that the individual and his or her ends are to be granted absolute moral primacy, and that the most important function of the liberal state is to support whatever laws, institutions and rights are necessary to ensure that individuals are free to define and pursue their own life projects in the absence of undue interference or coercion. Taylor himself is a firm supporter of the principle of individual liberty, and in this respect he has no truck with the atomists. In fact, his belief in the value of freedom is in large part what motivates his critique of atomist liberalism. The core of this critique is that the atomists fail to account for the social preconditions in whose absence an individual’s capacity to make free and informed choices would be rendered impossible. Taylor draws inspiration here from the Aristotelian tradition, which holds that the development of all of our distinctively human capacities, including those most highly prized by liberals (e.g. rationality, individuality and autonomy), is vitally dependent on our membership in a particular kind of community, which in reality turns out to be a national community or a nation (Taylor 1985: 189–93; 1989; 1994). According to Taylor, it is precisely this debt to community that the liberal atomist is either unable or unwilling to acknowledge (Taylor 1985: 8, 209). Taylor’s alternative to atomist liberalism is captured in what he refers to as his social thesis. The insight at the heart of the social thesis is that the capacity for living an autonomous human life does not arise in individuals of its own accord, it is a potential that requires certain enabling conditions such that it can be properly developed and exercised (Taylor 1985: 197–8). The source of these enabling conditions is a complex human community (or nation) that supports a rich and vibrant cultural life. Such a community affords us access not only to life’s more practical requirements (i.e. safety and security, the fulfillment of basic needs), but also to a common language, a thriving artistic and literary culture, institutions of higher education, independent public media, and free and open forums for democratic deliberation and decision-making—essentially, the full range of social, cultural and political institutions that help foster, sustain and celebrate human development and human excellence. A community of this nature is essential to individual autonomy in at least two different ways. First, it supports the development of those intellectual capacities which make autonomous deliberation and choice possible in the first place; and second, it provides access to a wide variety of options and alternatives that individuals can explore and experiment with in the process of constructing and reconstructing their individual lives and identities. The main political conclusion Taylor draws from this analysis is that liberals who value individual autonomy must be prepared to do more than simply defend

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a scheme of individual rights that protects people from having choices about how to live their lives forced upon them by others. They must also be prepared to promote the survival and vitality of the communities and communal institutions which help ensure that people actually develop the capabilities necessary to make those decisions themselves, and which ensure that those acts of autonomous choosing are not rendered meaningless for having been made in an environment where the matrix of available options in living is (or has become) radically impoverished (Taylor 1985: 204–9).8 Though some liberals might object that any positive measures adopted by the state in support of a particular vision of human community are necessarily a threat to individual freedom of choice, Taylor dismisses this as a piece of intellectual confusion that in reality threatens to undermine the very liberal rights and freedoms it so vigorously proclaims (Taylor 1985: 198–9). Taylor’s critique of atomism is at its most compelling when it is read against the more radically individualist strains of liberalism, particularly those of the minimalist state variety (see e.g. Nozick 1974; Hayek 1978; Friedman 2002). A libertarian like Nozick is especially vulnerable to this criticism because he places so much emphasis on the formal possession of rights and so little emphasis on the social preconditions necessary for the effective exercise of those rights (see e.g. Sen 2009: 84–5). Other versions of liberalism, however, are less susceptible to this critique.9 Indeed, it is probably fair to say that most liberals would readily accept the conclusion that a healthy and vibrant community life is essential to the formation of our individual identities and to the development and exercise of our most fundamental human capacities, and that the communities within which we are raised have a profound impact on the manner in which we conceive of and deliberate about our individual life plans or visions of the good (Kymlicka 1989: 79–80, 95; Rawls 1999: 456–64; Caney 1992: 276–82).10 In the work of liberals like Rawls and Dworkin, one also finds a keen appreciation of the link between the quality of community life and the overall sense of wellbeing and self-respect experienced by individual citizens (Rawls 1999: 372–91, 456–64; Mulhall and Swift 1992: 198–205). As Dworkin observes: ‘‘. political communities have a communal life, and the success or failure of a community’s communal life is part of what determines whether its members’ lives are good or bad’’ (1992: 207). Liberals of course disagree over what specific policy prescriptions should follow from these observations, but it is by no means the case that every liberal opposes policies designed to strengthen and support communities. A perfectionist liberal like Raz, for example, insists that a liberal state has a much greater role to play in society than merely safeguarding the rights which permit the exercise of individual autonomy. It must also involve itself in the business of actively enabling and promoting this most valuable of capacities amongst its citizenry (Raz 1986: 18–19). Raz of course agrees that it would be illegitimate and selfdefeating for the state to enforce autonomous behavior—for truly autonomous individuals must choose their own ends in life, and for their own considered reasons. Nevertheless, like Taylor he argues that the liberal state has a positive duty

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to support a form of communal life wherein citizens are equipped with the cognitive capacities that render autonomous choice possible, and wherein citizens are afforded access to a rich variety of cultural resources that will inspire and inform their choices as they pursue their own visions of the good life (Raz 1986: 204–5, 372–81, 407–8, 425). Kymlicka is another liberal who defends the communal basis of individual autonomy. He begins with the assumption that, above all else, a liberal society must seek to create an environment wherein individual citizens are free to live their lives in terms which they themselves judge to be worthwhile and fulfilling. There are two key requirements of this environment. The first is that individuals must be accorded the basic civil and political liberties which protect their right to choose their own ends in life, free from undue interference on the part of the state or their peers. The second is that individuals must have the opportunity to change or revise their life plans in light of new information or experiences. In this respect Kymlicka follows Mill in arguing that individuals should be raised in an environment where they are exposed to a rich variety of different views about what makes a life valuable and fulfilling—an environment that also equips them with the capacity to understand and critically evaluate these different options in living. What Kymlicka is describing here is a national community with a common language and the very same range of political, economic, cultural and educational institutions featured in Taylor’s description of the social thesis.11 And like Taylor again, he argues that liberals who value autonomy while neglecting its communal and institutional foundations do so at their peril (Kymlicka 1989: 10–13; 164–6). Where, then, do liberals and communitarians part company when it comes to the socially constituted nature of freedom and identity? Two possibilities present themselves. First, there is a stronger communitarian reading of our social embeddedness wherein the identities, beliefs and practices handed down to us within our respective cultural communities are granted a sort of untouchable status, such that we are denied the freedom to question or challenge them at our own discretion. This is clearly a problem for the vast majority of liberals, who tend to believe that we are and always should be free to reinvent our identities and lifestyles, and that no element of our social makeup has an authority over us that cannot legitimately be questioned and possibly rejected (Kymlicka 1989: 53–7; Caney 1992: 276–9). All the same, as Kymlicka himself concedes: ‘‘It is unclear which if any communitarians hold this view consistently’’ (2002: 227). For example, Sandel and Taylor both at times emphasize the difficulty of standing back from and critically assessing our inherited identities, values and attachments (e.g. to a particular nation, culture or political ideology), but neither theorist categorically denies that this is possible nor does either recommend that we should be coercively dissuaded from so doing (Sandel 1982: 179; Taylor 1989: 163). All of which is to say that an illiberal interpretation of our social embeddedness is not inherent to communitarianism per se, and therefore is not a consistent source of difference between liberals and communitarians. However, there is a second potential point of divergence, and it revolves around the

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question of how to structure the relationship between the rights and interests of individuals and the well-being or ‘good’ of society as a whole. This is the subject of the next section.

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Individual rights and the common good Perhaps the most commonly articulated contrast between liberals and communitarians holds that communitarians favor a politics of the common good, wherein individuals are expected to live their lives in accordance with an authoritatively defined conception of what is good or valuable in human life, whereas liberals believe that individuals must be free to make their own choices in these matters, and that the state, barring any infringements on the basic civil and political rights of others, must remain neutral with respect to the worth or legitimacy of these choices. Liberals view a politics of the common good as a threat to both equality and liberty. It threatens equality by valorizing the choices of those citizens who happen to share the authoritatively given vision of the common good while simultaneously devaluing the choices of those who do not—placing the latter at a clear disadvantage when it comes to competing for the institutional and material supports necessary to the concrete realization of their chosen ends (Kymlicka 1989: 76–7; Mulhall and Swift 1992: 25–33). A politics of the common good is also deemed a threat to liberty because it inevitably leads to the coercion or oppression of those who dissent from the state-sanctioned vision of the good (Kymlicka 1989: 229–35; Young 1990: 229–35). Looking to the communitarian literature it is not difficult to locate the source of some of these concerns. Take the work of Michael Sandel, one of the most articulate and influential communitarian thinkers. In one of his more wellknown articles, Sandel is critical of the highly centralized system of interpreting and enforcing individual rights and freedoms in America—a system whose primary features are the Bill of Rights and United States Supreme Court. He specifically objects to the anti-communitarian and anti-democratic nature of this system—the fact that it erodes the capacity of local majorities to deliberate together on how the appropriate balance is to be struck between the values and ends they share as a community and the liberties to which they are entitled as separate individuals. Now of course there is nothing inherently problematic, from a liberal point of view, with the idea of granting substantial decisionmaking authority to local communities, but the problem with Sandel’s version of the argument is that it offers no concrete assurances that local democracies will not devolve into local tyrannies once their decisions are no longer subject to judicial review under the Bill of Rights (Sandel 1992: 27–8; cf. Taylor 1994a: 57–8). Sandel therefore leaves himself open to the charge that he, like so many of his communitarian fellow-travelers, is too cavalier about the prospects of individual rights and freedoms being sacrificed for the common good, and that he is guilty of underestimating the value of individual rights protections in the basic political structure of a democratic society (Guttman 1985: 132–3; Buchanan

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1989: 871–2). Sandel is not unaware of these criticisms, and he openly acknowledges that a society where individual choice is subordinated to an authoritatively defined notion of the common good would be discriminatory and oppressive. However, although he too would deplore such an outcome, unfortunately he says little about how these consequences are to be avoided in the less rights-oriented forms of communal life he endorses (Sandel 1992: 24). Sandel is by no means the only prominent communitarian thinker to be accused of illiberal tendencies. Another is Charles Taylor (see e.g. Kymlicka 1989: 76–8, 2002: 245). Taylor, to his credit, does more to alleviate these sorts of concerns than does Sandel, but these efforts are hampered by his confusing deployment of the terms neutrality and the common good. The difficulties for Taylor begin when he suggests that ‘‘a democratic society needs some commonly recognized definition of the good life’’ (Taylor 1989: 160; cf. 1994a: 59). If by this he means an authoritatively defined vision of how to live a good and fulfilling life to which all members of society are expected to conform, then his theory is in clear conflict with the liberal doctrine of state neutrality and the underlying principles of liberty and equality it is intended to safeguard. Taylor in fact encourages this interpretation by explicitly emphasizing the distance between his own position and the classic version of neutrality-oriented liberalism defended by Ronald Dworkin (Taylor 1989: 160; cf. Dworkin 1984). It is instructive to compare Taylor and Kymlicka on this point. In Kymlicka’s version of the social thesis, the liberal commitment to neutrality is consciously enshrined in the distinction between the structure of a culture (the cultural community itself, including its language, territory, and key institutions), which a liberal state can and should legitimately support, and the particular character of that culture at any given point in time (the specific cultural beliefs, values or practices of the community members), which the state has no business interfering with. As Kymlicka explains it, by supporting cultural structures the state supports one of the essential preconditions for individual autonomy, but when the state lends its allegiance and coercive power to any particular set of beliefs or practices, as seems to be Taylor’s recommendation, it sets itself up as an opponent, not a facilitator, of freedom (Kymlicka 1989: 166–70).12 This particular interpretation of Taylor’s politics of the common good may be compelling at first blush, but on closer examination it proves to be highly problematic—the main reason being that it simply cannot be squared with so many other core features of his communitarian thinking. First and foremost, it runs contrary to the core purpose of his social thesis—which is to defend the conditions essential to autonomous freedom of choice—but it is also incompatible with his more general support for the flourishing of diversity and for the safeguarding of fundamental human rights (Taylor 1985: passim; 1994a: 59). In addition, although it is true that Taylor emphasizes his differences with a liberal like Dworkin, we should not forget that he places equal emphasis on his differences with theorists at the extremist end of the collectivist spectrum, especially those whose visions of the common good leave little room for the exercise of individual freedom (Taylor 1989: 161). As Taylor himself describes it, his own

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position occupies something of a middle ground, in that it takes seriously the socially constituted nature of human agency ‘‘but at the same time prizes liberty and individual differences very highly’’ (1989: 163). All of which begs the question: how can Taylor’s dedication to freedom and diversity be reconciled with a politics of the common good? The answer becomes obvious once we recognize that Taylor is not using the term common good to refer to a substantive account of how individual members of a political community should live their lives. He is instead referring to what other theorists have more appropriately labelled a ‘communal good’ (Waldron 1987a; cf. Harty 1999; Barry 2001: 80). A communal good is a good upon which all members of a society collectively depend for some aspect of their survival or well-being, and whose nature requires that it be sought in common (Taylor 1989: 168–9; 1994a: 59). Examples of communal goods include a clean environment, a social safety net, or a scheme of collective security. Taylor himself defends a number of different communal goods, but the one he mentions most often is a sense of solidarity that binds together the individual members of a political community, such that they are more willing to make the kinds of mutual sacrifices and accommodations necessary to support the burdens of justice and good government in a democratic polity (Taylor 1989: 165–76; cf. Sandel 1992: 22–4; 1982: 183). When it comes to communal goods of this nature, Taylor argues, the state cannot afford to be disinterested or neutral, for they are essential to the very survival of the liberaldemocratic project. All the same, Taylor is adamant that the state, in actively fostering a communal good such as solidarity, has no business dictating the personal beliefs and lifestyle choices of individual citizens. With respect to these latter sorts issues the state must remain neutral (Taylor 1989: 165–77). In this light, Taylor’s politics of the common good looks immediately less problematic. In fact, many liberals share his conviction that a sense of citizen solidarity is an essential feature of a healthy democracy, and his belief that a liberal state can actively promote this sense of solidarity without undermining its commitment to liberty and equality (see e.g. Schlesinger 1998; Barry 2001; Huntington 2004). But perhaps this particular communal good is exceptional for its degree of compatibility with liberalism? Can the same be said for the other kinds of communal goods that Taylor supports? For example, Taylor argues that democracies are perfectly justified in extending public support to certain collective cultural goods, such as a common language. Support for a common language can take a variety of different forms, including measures which mandate its use in all courts, legislatures, bureaucracies, and publicly funded schools, but also in large businesses and on public signage.13 Now it seems clear that policies of this nature will inevitably disadvantage individuals who do not share an attachment to common cultural good in question, and Taylor acknowledges as much in his analysis. To be fair, he also takes care to emphasize that there are limits to how far such policies can be taken, and that a society in pursuit of strong collective cultural ends must respect cultural diversity and fundamental civic and political freedoms (Taylor 1994a: 52–61; 2004: 42). Nevertheless, Taylor has no problem whatsoever with the conclusion that some restrictions

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on individual freedom are justified when the survival of a collective cultural good such as language is at stake (Taylor 1989: 182; 1994a: 59–61). Surely this is something no liberal could support? The answer to this question is by no means straightforward. For example, whereas a liberal like Kukathas opposes public support for cultural goods of any kind, a liberal like Barry argues that, at least when it comes to a common language, a liberal society could not manage without such policies, on pragmatic grounds if nothing else (Barry 1998: 316; Kukathas 2003: 15). Kymlicka, on the other hand, defends a position very similar to that of Taylor. In his view, most states already support the cultural identities and collective cultural goods of the majority in many of their most basic policy decisions, including those relating to the choice of official languages, public holidays, or the designation of public symbols such as flags and national anthems—and these policies inevitably place the members of cultural minorities at a disadvantage (Kymlicka 1995: 108, 110– 11). Yet Kymlicka does not call for the elimination of such policies. He instead favours a scheme of minority rights that would mitigate their effects by granting a measure of support and recognition to minority identities and cultural goods.14 Moreover, like Taylor, Kymlicka is also prepared to support minor restrictions on individual liberty if the very survival of a community and its culture is threatened, so long as they are kept to a minimum and do not include the more fundamental civil and political rights (Kymlicka 1989: 170–1, 198–9; Taylor 1985: 198–9). Granted Kymlicka is more apt to view these minor deviations from the principles of liberty and equality as just that—deviations from liberalism that can be justified on principled pragmatic grounds—whereas Taylor seems more inclined to view them as consistent with a different model of liberalism (Kymlicka 2001: 286–8; Taylor 1994a: 60–1). But this is what one might call a merely philosophical difference, and it tells us little about where these two theorists part company when it comes to putting their principles into practice. Taylor is especially difficult to pin down on these issues, including where to draw the line between violable and inviolable liberties, what sorts of circumstances can be used to justify restrictions on individual liberty, how these restrictions are to be enforced, or how long they might last.15 This lack of clarity in his analysis leaves ample room for misunderstanding and for the nagging suspicion that Taylor’s antipathy for liberal principles runs much deeper than the words on the page might suggest. On the other hand, in light of his obvious respect for the principle of diversity, his support for the notion that certain fundamental rights and freedoms should be regarded as inviolable no matter how grave the consequences for community and culture, and his consistent emphasis on the value (and fragility) of individual autonomy, it is simply going too far to suggest that he advocate a politics of the common good wherein a ‘‘traditional or dominant way of life’’ can justifiably be imposed against the wishes of individual community members (Kymlicka 2002: 245; cf. Freeman 2002: 18). The same can be said in defence of Sandel, for though he may leave himself open to the suspicion that he favours the interests of communities over those of individuals (see e.g. Kymlicka 1989:

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87–9, but compare Kymlicka 2001: 338), there is little evidence to suggest that he is prepared to sacrifice the more fundamental liberal rights and freedoms in the service of communitarian ends (Buchanan 1989: 881; Mulhall and Swift 1992: 67).16 Perhaps the best way to conclude this discussion, therefore, is with the observation that a communitarian political philosophy could provide comfort to a more restrictive and inegalitarian politics of the common good but this is not a requirement of communitarianism per se, nor is it a view that finds much support in the more influential strains of the communitarian literature. What should also be clear is that when it comes to determining the appropriate relationship between individual freedom and equality on the one hand, and the health and integrity of community on the other, there is no simple and absolute liberal– communitarian divide.

Community and solidarity Of all the issues raised within the communitarian literature, there is one in particular that initially received little attention from liberal theorists: the question of communal solidarity. As we know already from the previous section, communitarians like Taylor argue that a democratic society wishing to govern itself both justly and effectively must actively attend to the sources of solidarity or fellow-feeling that bind individual citizens to one another, and which sustain amongst them a sense that they are all members of a single and enduring community of fate.17 In Taylor’s view, democracies that fail to cultivate this sense of solidarity may find that their citizens are less willing to engage in the compromises essential to the give and take of democratic politics, or to make the kinds of personal sacrifices necessary to support things like redistributive social justice, basic law and order or the defense of the realm (Taylor 1989: 171–2; Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 6). Sandel is another communitarian who has taken up this argument, and he uses it to highlight some of the shortcomings of Rawls’ liberal theory of welfare redistribution. The problem with this theory, according to Sandel, is that it relies implicitly upon the existence of a sense of mutual solidarity amongst the members of a liberal society—for why else would they feel obligated to transfer significant portions of their own resources to support the welfare of others, particularly when those are for the most part faceless strangers whom they have never met? However, it says nothing about the source of this sentiment or about how it can be nurtured and sustained. In other words, Rawls fails to explain why any given set of individuals would come to regard themselves as having strong duties of justice towards one another, or towards anyone else for that matter (Sandel 1982: 149–50; 1992: 22–4, 28; cf. Taylor 1989: 162, 165–7). Taylor and Sandel, on the other hand, are both convinced that this sense of solidarity and mutual obligation arises only amongst individuals who share an identity as the members of a particular kind of political community. For Taylor this means a

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shared national identity—what he also sometimes refers to as a sense of patriotism, while Sandel tends to favor smaller, more localized forms of communal identity (see e.g. Sandel 1992: 26). This difference aside, both theorists are adamant that any government that seeks to impose strong burdens of justice on its citizenry must actively attend to the sources of social solidarity in whose absence those burdens could never be sustained—which is to say that they must promote a sense of shared identity amongst citizens as a matter of basic policy (Sandel 1992: 25–7; Taylor 1989: 174–6). Given the gravity of the issues at stake here, it bears asking why so few liberals initially took it upon themselves to engage with this particular aspect of the communitarian critique. In the first place, it is probably fair to say that for many liberals this question of solidarity did not even appear on the radar, and as such they had nothing to say about it either by way of support or criticism. Another explanation that has already been touched upon in the previous section is that liberals sometimes read the communitarian defense of social solidarity as an effort to enforce a particular view of the good life, which left the two sides in the debate talking past one another about entirely different issues. Amongst those liberals who did accurately perceive the nature of the issue being raised some, like Buchanan, replied that to expect an explanation of the sources of solidarity is simply to expect too much of a theory of liberalism, the sole purpose of which is to ensure the proper safeguarding of basic civil and political rights (Buchanan 1989: 854, 872–3). Others likely agreed with Rawls that something like ‘‘public agreement on questions of political and social justice’’ was more than sufficient to sustain a liberal community of fate and the mutual obligations of liberal citizens (Rawls 1980: 540). Whatever the explanation, the fact is that this question of communal solidarity did not receive any systematic attention from post-war liberal political philosophers until the mid 1990s, by which point the debate between liberals and communitarians had already effectively collapsed. When this question did make it onto the agenda, however, it steadily gained traction and, as we will come to see in Chapter 8, it has since become one of the signature themes in the literature on multiculturalism and minority rights.

Conclusion: liberals, communitarians, minority rights and multiculturalism By the early 1990s the liberal–communitarian debate began to wind itself down, for reasons which included a dearth of common conceptual reference points that kept the various interlocutors talking past one another in a seemingly endless, and ultimately unenlightening, stalemate. Another contributing factor was the fact that the differences between liberals and communitarians turned out to be not nearly as great as had initially been imagined. While some differences of course remained, it nevertheless became increasingly clear that liberals were not blind to the role of community and culture in the constitution of human freedom and identity, and that communitarians were by no means indifferent to the

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rights and well-being of individuals in a society characterized by a politics of the common good. Somewhat ironically, this very same insight contributed both to the falling fortunes of the liberal–communitarian debate and to the rising fortunes of a new debate on minority rights and multiculturalism. Among the early pioneers in this new debate, Will Kymlicka was undoubtedly the most influential. Kymlicka’s first systematic work on the subject offers a liberal defense of minority rights built partly around the idea of community as a precondition for individual freedom—an idea emphasized by both liberals and communitarians—and partly around the more conventional liberal concern for redressing unchosen inequalities amongst the citizens of a liberal polity (Kymlicka 1989). Beginning with the latter theme, Kymlicka argues that liberals as a rule are not in favor of compensating individuals for unequal outcomes in life that are the result of their own free and informed choices e.g. the poverty that results from dedicating one’s life to a particular monastic order or from spending one’s entire life savings in a Las Vegas casino. Liberals can, on the other hand, support policies aimed at mitigating inequalities which arise through no fault of the individual e.g., the disadvantages that are the result of being born into poverty or with a severe disability. This is the vision of equality that underpins the Rawlsian defense of liberal welfare redistribution. Rawls’ objective is to ensure that individuals who are disadvantaged by unchosen inequalities relating to their natural talents or social circumstances receive compensation in the form of the resources and opportunities necessary to afford them access to a decent and fulfilling human life (Kymlicka 1989: 185–6; Rawls 1999: 86–8).18 To connect this up with the idea of minority rights, Kymlicka argues that cultural minorities often find themselves at a disadvantage when it comes to protecting the cultural structures that facilitate the freedom and well-being of their individual members. Through no choice of their own—indeed, in many cases against their will—many minorities end up being surrounded by larger and more dominant communities, whose very existence poses a continual threat to their capacity to maintain their own distinctive languages, institutions and cultural practices.19 Minority rights, in particular the right to self-government, help compensate for this particular unchosen inequality (an inequality which the dominant culture, because of its size and strength, does not face), by granting minority communities the capacity to sustain themselves as distinctive cultural communities without the fear of majority interference or domination. Understood in this way, the minority right to self-government is an equalizing measure, because it helps ensure that individuals in both minority and majority communities have equal access to the primary good of autonomy that a secure cultural structure helps facilitate (Kymlicka 1989: 186–90). Kymlicka is clear, however, that minority rights are not unlimited rights, and that while liberals can support measures to ensure the survival of cultural structures (i.e. cultural communities and institutions), they cannot support measures aimed at establishing a particular cultural form of life as authoritative. Individuals within selfgoverning minority communities must be free to choose their own way of life,

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and they must be at liberty to criticize and reject the community’s prevailing cultural values, beliefs and practices. As soon as minority rights become a tool for restricting rather than enabling individual autonomy they undermine the very purpose they are intended to serve (Kymlicka 1989: 196–8).20 Kymlicka’s early work on minority rights proved to be enormously influential, and in combination with the interventions of several other pioneering theorists it helped give birth to a whole new field of study in twentieth-century political philosophy: multicultural political philosophy.21 A variety of factors help explain this development. The first is that so many of these early theories of minority rights and multiculturalism were built around an imaginative synthesis of ideas drawn from both the liberal and communitarian traditions. This new literature therefore offered both a pathway out of this older, moribund debate, but also a fresh set of challenges to which theorists in both camps could devote their creative energies. Indeed, one of the more interesting features of the new debate over multiculturalism was the unexpected position taken by liberals and communitarians on the question of minority rights. For example, it would have been reasonable to assume that liberals would simply line up behind the individual and that communitarians would line up behind groups, but as it turned out some of the most vigorous defenders of minority rights turned out to be liberals like Kymlicka, while some of the least enthusiastic champions of minority rights turned out to be communitarians like Walzer and Miller (Kymlicka 1989: 186– 90; Walzer 1983: 28–9; Miller 1995: 119–54). The reality is that liberals or communitarians can go either way on the question of minority rights, and the positions they adopt tend to be determined by a variety of different considerations, including the type of minority group in question, whether the group itself is committed to liberal principles such autonomy and toleration, and whether the recognition of minority rights is deemed a threat to the stability and cohesion of the larger national community. Thus, although it is fair to say that the liberal–communitarian debate helped engender the contemporary debate over minority rights and multiculturalism, this new set of discussions is ill-described as a mere extension of that earlier debate. Indeed, many of the leading multicultural thinkers staked out theoretical positions deliberately designed to break with the sterile liberal–communitarian dichotomy (Young 1990, 2000; Kymlicka 1995, 2001, 2007a: 27–30). Events on the ground were undoubtedly a second contributing factor to the rise of multicultural political philosophy, especially the collapse of communism and the corresponding surge of ethno-nationalist conflict that swept through Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Empire in the 1990s. This resurgence of ethnicity came as something of a shock to a generation of theorists raised on the assumption that ethnocultural and ethnonational minorities had long ago been assimilated by the forces of nation-building and socio-economic modernization (Keating, 2001: 1; Kymlicka and Opalski 2001: 82–3; Moreno 2001: 201). Yet this was not the first sign of cracks in the modernization paradigm of political development. Even in the relatively more stable western democracies such as Australia, Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom, stateless nations and

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indigenous peoples had been mobilizing to press for the recognition of their claims to land and self-determination since at least the 1960s. On a second front, accelerated levels of cross-border migration challenged the capacity of states to maintain stable and cohesive civil societies that were becoming ever more ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse. In this climate of rapid change and uncertainty, many theorists were beginning to question the prevailing post-war liberal orthodoxy that minority rights were incompatible with justice and stability in a culturally diverse society (Habermas 1992; Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 369–77; Anaya 2004: 53–6; Harty and Murphy 2005: 20–47; Laden and Owen 2007: 4–7).22 Kymlicka’s work was particularly influential in this respect, because it challenged this orthodoxy from within the liberal paradigm, and in so doing it provoked a vigorous series of debates both within and outside of that paradigm.23 This included a debate with liberals who rejected his theory of minority rights as a threat not only to liberty and equality, but also to the stability and governability of a liberal society (Offe 1998; Barry 2001). It also included debates with theorists who defended minority rights on the basis of a very different set of liberal assumptions (Kukathas 1992; Galston 1995), and with those who sought justifications for these rights somewhere outside the liberal paradigm (Taylor 1994b; Tully 1995; Tomasi 1995). As will become clearer in Chapters 5–8, all three of these strands in the debate continue to be active. The same can be said for many of the marquee issues in the liberal– communitarians debate. The social thesis and its accompanying notion of the culturally embedded individual proved to be especially influential, and became a centerpiece in the literature on liberal nationalism (Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir 1993; Miller 1995).24 The question of how to structure the relationship between individual rights and the common good has carried forward into debates among multiculturalists and their critics regarding whether, or to what degree, the liberty of individuals can legitimately be constrained in order to secure the survival and well-being of distinctive cultural communities (Kukathas 2003; Barry 2001). It also inspired a fresh series of debates amongst liberals about the nature and function of collective rights (Kymlicka 1995: 34–48; Jones 1999), and over the normative principles that properly constitute the core of a liberal theory of justice (Kukathas 1992; Kymlicka 1992; Galston 1995; Rawls 1996). In addition, the issue of communal solidarity has come to figure prominently in debates about social cohesion in the context of immigrant-driven diversity, and about the impact of minority self-determination on unity and stability in multinational states. The true extent of the liberal–communitarian legacy will only start to reveal itself in the next chapter, which critically examines the primary concepts and arguments deployed by some of the most influential philosophical champions of multiculturalism. By the end of the chapter the reader will have acquired a familiarity with most of the main lines of argument in favor of multicultural accommodation, as well as a sense of their main points of convergence and divergence. This will lead us naturally into Chapters 6–8, which engage with some of the more influential critical perspectives on multiculturalism.

Chapter 5

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In defense of multiculturalism

Introduction Coming to grips with the massive, and still expanding, body of literature that champions a political philosophy of multiculturalism is a somewhat daunting task for a single chapter. To make this task more manageable, a couple of different organizational strategies have been employed. First, rather than aiming for a comprehensive literature survey, the chapter focuses mainly on the ideas of some of the more influential multiculturalists, whose work is broadly representative of the diversity of perspectives and approaches in the field. I have tried to be as inclusive as possible in this respect, but inevitably this means that many valuable contributions to the debate have gone unmentioned for no reason other than a lack of space. Second, the discussion is organized around different types of arguments in favor of multiculturalism rather than proceeding on an author by author basis. There are three specific advantages of this strategy. First, it saves time and space by eliminating the need to consider the entire philosophical system of any particular author. Second, it provides greater scope for comparing and contrasting the orientations of different authors with respect to different arguments for multicultural accommodation. And third, it draws attention to the fact that most champions of multiculturalism deploy several of these arguments simultaneously, although often without carefully distinguishing them from one another. Seven different types of multicultural arguments are discussed: liberal culturalism, tolerationist multiculturalism, the value of cultural diversity, the politics of inclusion, deliberative multiculturalism, democratic multinationalism, and the politics of recognition.1

Liberal culturalism Liberal culturalism is one of the most dominant approaches in the literature, a fact which explains both its ongoing influence and the frequency and intensity of the criticisms directed against it by opponents of multiculturalism. While there are a number of interesting variations on the liberal culturalist argument, they tend to follow the same broad pattern, which is to justify minority rights as a means of protecting distinctive cultural communities, the survival of which is

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deemed vital to the freedom and equality of their individual members (Moore 1999: 28–9; Patten 1999: 4–6). One point to be clear on from the outset is that the liberal culturalist argument is largely an argument about the rights of national minorities: groups which generally assert claims to territory and selfdetermination.2 The most sophisticated and systematically articulated version of this argument belongs to Kymlicka (1995), although the broad outlines of his theoretical framework are shared by a number of other thinkers in this school (Margalit and Raz 1990; Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995). Kymlicka’s defense of national minority rights draws heavily on his own previous work in Liberalism, Community, and Culture (see Chapter 4). There are two major claims around which it is structured: first, that individual freedom is tied in a crucial way to membership in a national community; and second, that group-specific rights are capable of promoting equality between dominant and non-dominant nations in a multinational state. Kymlicka’s aim is to prove not only that minority rights are consistent with individual freedom, but also that the cause of liberty often finds its anchor in the autonomy of a national group (Kymlicka, 1995: 52, 75). Kymlicka derives his key principles from prominent figures in the history of liberal thought. From Kant he takes the idea that above all else liberals value the sanctity of individual autonomy, and from John Stuart Mill he takes the idea that because our beliefs about how to live a good and fulfilling life are fallible, we should always be at liberty to revise them in the light of new experiences and circumstances. Working from these assumptions, Kymlicka argues that two conditions are necessary to facilitate the good life for liberal citizens: first, individuals must be afforded the necessary liberties and resources to choose lives which they themselves deem valuable, rather than having these decisions imposed on them by others; and second, in order to make meaningful and informed choices about how to live their lives, individuals must have access to a broad spectrum of different options from which to choose, and the capacity to understand the meaning and value of those different options (Kymlicka 1995: 81–3). The first condition is fulfilled when an individual is securely protected by a scheme of individual rights and freedoms. The second condition is fulfilled when an individual has secure access to a societal culture, which essentially equates with membership in a national community. As we know already, societal cultures (or nations) support rich networks of linguistic, religious, educational, artistic, economic and political institutions that their members can draw upon in the course of formulating, reflecting upon, and possibly re-evaluating the course of their individual lives. They are, as Kymlicka puts it, the cultural contexts of choice in the absence of which individual autonomy would be significantly impoverished if not altogether meaningless (Kymlicka 1995: 76, 85, 93; cf. Tamir 1993: 6–7, 33; Margalit and Raz 1990: 448–9; Miller 1995: 85–6, 146–7).3 From here it is a short step to the conclusion that liberals who value individual autonomy have a compelling reason to support, by means of public policy and public resources, the national communities and cultures that are essential to the proper development and exercise of this most vital of human capacities

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(Margalit and Raz 1990: 456–7; Tamir, 1993: 74–6, 150; Kymlicka, 1995: 84; Miller, 1995: 87–8). The final step in the liberal culturalist argument is to link this analysis to a defense of minority self-determination in multinational states. According to Kymlicka, many liberals in the post-war period simply assumed that liberal states were mononational states, and as a consequence constructed liberal theories of justice that were effectively blind to the claims of national minorities (see e.g. Rawls, 1972; 1992; Dworkin 1984; Barry 1995).4 To correct this oversight, liberal culturalists offer a defense of minority self-determination grounded in the principles of equality and individual autonomy.5 The argument begins with the observation that national minorities too are powerfully motivated to preserve and promote their own distinctive societal cultures, but unlike the dominant nations with whom they share a state, they often lack the resources and political authority to make this a viable project.6 This state of affairs places national minorities at a clear disadvantage in their capacity to provide a cultural context of choice that can facilitate the autonomy of their own members. Dominant nations can take this capacity for granted by virtue of their size and their control of the machinery of state: the very same factors which threaten the cultural security and survival of national minorities. The liberal culturalist solution to this capacity imbalance is to grant national minorities the right to self-government, which provides them with the tools to nurture and sustain their own distinctive languages, institutions and communal identities without the fear of majority interference or domination (Kymlicka, 1995: 75–113; cf. Tamir, 1993: 150). Liberal culturalists suggest a variety of institutionalized forms of self-government suited to different cases and contexts (Tamir 1993: 74–5, 150–2; Kymlicka, 1995: 27–30, 32–33), but regardless of its specific institutional correlates, what justifies the right to self-government is that it supports the flourishing of individual autonomy—an autonomy that should be enjoyed equally by the members of dominant and non-dominant nations in a multinational state. Classical liberals will of course respond by reiterating that the state has a duty to remain neutral with respect to questions of cultural diversity, for otherwise it risks violating the principles of freedom and equality (see Chapter 4). Kymlicka refers to this as a policy of benign neglect. The state does not seek to promote the interests or identities of particular ethnocultural or ethnonational groups by granting them group-specific rights, but neither is it hostile towards them: it simply leaves them free to pursue their own interests in the private sphere with the same individual rights as any other member of the liberal polity (Kymlicka, 1995: 108). Liberal culturalists in turn respond that a policy of benign neglect is neither fair nor coherent. In the first place it flies in the face of the facts, for liberal states already promote the interests and identities of dominant nations in their most basic policy decisions, including those relating to official languages, national symbols and holidays, educational curriculum, and immigration and naturalization (Tamir, 1993: 145–9; Kymlicka, 1995: 108–13). Indeed, most liberal political philosophers can themselves be described as liberal nationalists because they too have assumed, even if only implicitly, that a liberal community

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is a national community united around a single societal culture that is protected and nurtured by a liberal state, and that it is within these communities that the freedom and well-being of individuals is to be realized (Tamir 1993: 117–30, 139; Kymlicka, 1995: 93). It is in this sense that political life in a liberal state can be said to have an inescapably national dimension (Kymlicka, 1995: 194). However, for liberals to then turn around and claim that national minorities should be denied this very same right to defend their own distinctive societal cultures is to invoke a double-standard that itself violates the principle of neutrality. Far from being a policy of benign neglect it is a policy that entrenches majority privilege while placing minorities at a permanent disadvantage in the cultural marketplace (Kymlicka 1995: 109). It is a policy that does its best to pass off as politically neutral what is in fact an act of political domination (Tamir 1993: 145–7; cf. Tully 1995: 191). Hence, from a liberal culturalist perspective, the only way to be faithful to the principles of fairness and neutrality in a multinational state is to grant national minorities the right to self-government. For only in this way can the state ensure that the members of dominant and nondominant nations enjoy equal access to the distinctive societal cultures that are so vital to their freedom and well-being (Tamir 1993: 74–5; Kymlicka 1995: 113). Other critics, however, have challenged this connection between minority rights and individual freedom. One such critic is Jeremy Waldron, who argues that, even if one accepts the link between autonomy and a rich and vibrant societal culture, this gives us no reason to believe that the members of a national minority require access to their own particular societal culture in order to be genuinely free (Waldron 1995: 105). Indeed, one could just as easily conclude that access to any sufficiently rich and vibrant societal culture, including that of the dominant national group, will do the trick. This argument is somewhat easier to rebut in cases where the differences between the societal cultures in question are radical, given that individuals cannot meaningfully choose amongst options they can barely understand, but it is more difficult in cases where the differences are not so great, for example when the members of the national minority have already been substantially integrated into the dominant societal culture (Levy 2000: 119–20). In cases such as these the argument in favor of minority selfgovernment looks to be on shaky ground, because members of the national minority can just as easily exercise their autonomy in this alternative cultural context of choice. Liberal culturalists have responded to this criticism with a supplementary argument, which is that people tend to have a powerful sense of attachment to their own societal culture, which serves as a key locus of their sense of identity, dignity, and self-respect, and which affords them a measure of well-being that comes from a secure sense of belonging (Margalit and Raz 1990: 448; Kymlicka 1995: 89–90).7 In other words, critics underestimate the emotional and psychological costs of leaving one’s own culture for another, and the tenacity with which individuals will continue to identify with, and seek to defend, their own societal cultures even (some would say especially) as their distinctiveness begins to fade.8

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Critics have also objected to the priority assigned to national minorities in the liberal culturalist argument, focusing specifically on the work of Kymlicka. Modood, for one, argues that Kymlicka’s ‘‘multinational bias’’ yields a theoretical approach to multiculturalism that cannot speak to the experience of immigrant minorities in Europe, for whom the right to maintain a distinctive societal culture is largely irrelevant (Modood 2007: 33–5). Parekh takes this argument a step further by suggesting that Kymlicka has established a hierarchy of deserving and undeserving cultural groups, wherein only national minorities qualify for cultural rights while immigrants, because of the voluntary nature of their migration, are expected to forgo any claim to special rights or forbearance in their new country of residence (Parekh 2000: 102–3; cf. Benhabib 2002: 60–3). However, while it is true that Kymlicka devotes the bulk of his attention to national minorities, it is also true that he spends a great deal of time discussing the very different claims and circumstances of immigrant minorities, not to mention those of a wide variety of other distinctive ethnocultural groups. Moreover, although there is indeed an expectation in Kymlicka’s theory that immigrants should integrate into the societal culture of their host nation, an expectation that is in fact shared by a number of his critics (e.g. Parekh 2000: 273; Modood 2007: 14, 146–54), he explicitly rejects the argument that immigrants should be expected to jettison every aspect of their distinctive cultural heritage in the process. Kymlicka instead defends what he calls fair terms of integration that include a range special rights and policies whose purpose is to recognize and accommodate minority values, practices and identities (Kymlicka 1995: 26–33, 96–7, 131–51; 2001: 53–4, 162–3). In other words, just like Parekh and Modood, Kymlicka views integration as a process of mutual adjustment amongst host nation and newcomers, which helps ensure that common institutions ‘‘provide the same degree of respect, recognition, and accommodation of the identities and practices of immigrants as they traditionally have of the identities and practices of the majority group’’ (Kymlicka 2007a: 40; cf. Parekh 2000: 13, 268–73; Modood 2007: 150–2).9 The argument about a minority hierarchy also misunderstands Kymlicka’s purpose, which is not to privilege nations above all other cultural groups but rather to assign different kinds of rights to different kinds of minorities based on a realistic determination of their distinctive needs, demands and capacities. For this reason he is not in principle opposed to the idea of extending the right to self-determination to an immigrant minority, if at some point in time the members of that group become highly territorially concentrated, begin to identify as a nation, and express the desire to govern themselves more independently—his view is simply that in the vast majority of cases immigrants neither need nor demand such a right, let alone have the capacity to exercise it (Kymlicka 1995: 15, 95–6; 1998: 35, 38). A very different sort of criticism of the liberal culturalist argument is that it is insufficiently respectful of minority differences.10 It grants minorities the right to maintain their own distinctive societal cultures, but only under strict and paternalistic liberal conditions (Taylor 1994; Tomasi 1995). The limits of multicultural accommodation is a subject that receives more detailed attention in

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Chapter 7, but suffice it to say for now that liberal culturalists do indeed insist that self-governing minorities in a liberal state have a duty to respect liberal principles of justice—which first and foremost means respecting the autonomy of their own members (Kymlicka 1995: 153, 158; Tamir 1993: 37–8, 71, 163). Liberal culturalists are therefore not prepared to tolerate restrictions on the basic civil and political rights of individuals, and self-governing national minorities must remain open to internal dissent from those who wish to challenge the community’s traditional or established cultural beliefs or practices (Tamir 1993: 48–9; Kymlicka 1995: 36–7, 202, n. 1).11 As Kymlicka neatly summarizes: ‘‘.a liberal view requires freedom within the minority group, and equality between the minority and majority groups’’ (Kymlicka 1995: 152). Precisely how this requirement is to be secured in practice is a difficult and controversial question, but Kymlicka’s own sense is that we should generally avoid directly intervening in the internal affairs of national minorities, except in cases of extreme human rights violations, and that the liberalization of illiberal minorities can be more effectively achieved by means of persuasion rather than force (Kymlicka 1995: 94–5; cf. Kymlicka 1989: 170–1). As will become clearer below and in the chapters that follow, this question of the tolerable limits of minority accommodation continues to be a subject of vigorous debate both between multiculturalists and their critics and between multiculturalists themselves.

Tolerationist multiculturalism Debates between multiculturalists frequently turn around competing interpretations of liberalism, and different sorts of liberals often defend different visions of minority accommodation.12 Some of the sharpest differences appear in the debates between liberal culturalists (who identify autonomy as the core liberal principle) and tolerationist multiculturalists (who identify toleration and freedom of association as the core liberal principles).13 On a very general level, the tolerationist position is that a liberal society should protect the right of individuals to freely associate and form cultural communities, and should be prepared to tolerate group practices that deviate from liberal norms, provided those practices are consensual and that dissenting individuals are free to exit the community if and when it is their desire to do so.14 Tolerationists as a consequence tend to be very critical of the liberalizing impulse at the heart of liberal culturalism. They too accuse liberal culturalists of paternalism—of stubbornly refusing to entertain the possibility that individuals can live free and fulfilling lives in communities that reject liberal autonomy (Parekh 2000: 107–8; Spinner-Halev 2000: 19, 30–7, 51–4; cf. Deveaux 2000: 55–6).15 Not only that, they see this impulse as an invitation to interventionism which ultimately threatens to undermine the very communities and cultures liberal culturalists are committed to protecting (Galston 1995; Spinner-Halev 2000; Kukathas 2003).16 The most influential, and also the most extreme, account of tolerationist multiculturalism belongs to Chandran Kukathas (1992, 1992a, 2003).17

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Working on the basis of self-consciously libertarian or liberal anarchist assumptions, Kukathas sketches an outline of a multicultural society as an association of associations, a diverse and loosely affiliated ‘‘archipelago’’ of freely associating cultural communities.18 Cultural diversity has no intrinsic value in this liberal archipelago, and Kukathas firmly rejects the notion that any culture has the right to survive or be preserved (Kukathas 1992: 117; 2003: 29, 96–8). What matters most from his point of view is the preservation of individual freedom, and no freedom is more important than freedom of conscience. In his words, ‘‘The worst fate that a person might have to endure is that he be unable to avoid acting against conscience’’ (Kukathas 2003: 64). Freedom of conscience in the liberal archipelago is protected by the twin principles of toleration and freedom of association. Individuals in this society are at perfect liberty to form cultural communities that reflect and uphold their values and beliefs, but these communities are not granted any special assistance, protections or status from the state—there are no collective cultural rights in the liberal archipelago, only rights which attach to individuals.19 Consequently, neither the survival nor the authority of these communities is assured—this depends solely on the freely given consent of their members, who alone can decide whether or not to abide by their terms. Yet neither does the state enjoy an unfettered right to intervene in the internal affairs of these voluntary association. Kukathas’ view is that a liberal state committed to upholding individual freedom of conscience must be prepared to tolerate the presence of a wide variety of distinctive cultural communities, even (perhaps especially) when the internal practices of those communities are decidedly illiberal, intolerant or inegalitarian. The only proviso is that these communities must in turn uphold the right of dissenting individuals to exit the community (to enter other associations or to form new ones), and must themselves be prepared to tolerate other cultural communities whose beliefs or practices they may abhor (Kukathas 1992: 115– 17, 128; 2003: 74–6, 93–8). ‘‘Live and let live’’ is the motto of this multicultural association of associations (Kukathas 2003: 30). Given his libertarian assumptions, it comes as no surprise that Kukathas assigns the state only the most minimal of roles in the liberal archipelago. The state is not itself an association but more like an institutionalized political arrangement for ensuring that a peaceful and orderly regime of mutual toleration amongst the constituent associations in the liberal archipelago is maintained. In a nutshell: ‘‘The state should not be concerned about anything except order or peace’’ (2003: 252). Kukathas in fact regards the state with a great deal of skepticism and suspicion, and in his view state officials are just as likely to use their powers for self-serving or oppressive ends as they are to use them in the service of liberty or social justice. To guard against these potential abuses, the jurisdiction of the state is to be radically circumscribed, and balanced by the competing jurisdiction of a myriad of highly autonomous cultural communities which, for most intents and purposes, will be internally selfgoverning (2003: 4, 160–1, 265–6). In particular, the state is to have no role whatsoever in enforcing a uniform moral code or an overarching conception of

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justice in the liberal archipelago, nor will it have anything to do with promoting a common sense of identity or solidarity that would bind together its member associations into a unified whole. Both of these projects, Kukathas’ fears, would place an excessive concentration of power in the hands of the state, and as such would pose an intolerable threat to individual freedom (2003: 15, 117, 209–10, 260–1).20 What remains somewhat murky in this account is where exactly Kukathas stands on the question of state intervention in the internal affairs of cultural associations. He was clearer on this in his earlier work, where intervention could be justified first of all as a means of upholding exit rights, but also to prevent practices such as slavery and physical coercion, and other forms of cruel or degrading treatment (1992: 128). How much of this carries forward into the more fully developed version of his argument in The Liberal Archipelago is another question. There the enforceability of exit rights is at least implied, and would seem to be essential for his theory to function in practice, but nowhere is this clearly and unambiguously specified (2003: 4–5, 269–70).21 In fact, his mistrust of the state as an agent of justice leads him to rely heavily on selfregulation and other highly unpredictable informal means of ensuring that less intolerant and illiberal cultural communities will not prey on their own members (2002: 195–8; 2003: 135–45).22 Indeed, Kukathas freely acknowledges that many inhumane and potentially even life-threatening practices (including those committed against the most vulnerable members of those communities) will still be possible in the liberal order he describes, particularly in the case of groups who voluntarily isolate themselves from the wider society (2002: 197–8; 2003: 134–5, 147). It is here that Kukathas most definitively parts ways with his fellow tolerationists (not to mention most other defenders of multiculturalism). For example, unlike Kukathas, tolerationists like Spinner-Halev and Galston are adamant that cruel or inhumane treatment of children can never be tolerated, that adults cannot be harmed without their consent (and even then there are limits), that individuals cannot be comprehensively deprived of the benefits of an education, and that state intervention is justified both as a means of preventing these sorts of practices and as a means of upholding the exit rights of disgruntled or dissenting community members (Galston 1995: 525, 533–4; Spinner-Halev 2000: 71, 79; 2008: 569–70). Indeed, critics of all stripes generally agree that Kukathas’ theory is grossly inadequate in terms of its capacity to protect weak and vulnerable individuals from harm or coercion at the hands of their fellow community members. Many are also perplexed by the fact that a liberal who places such a high value on toleration and individual freedom of conscience seems so reluctant to uphold these principles in the case of individuals who would seek to challenge or dissent from established community traditions or practices (Spinner-Halev 2000: 84–5). Kymlicka, for one, argues that the defining feature of a liberal theory of toleration is that it upholds both the right of cultural communities to be free of state persecution and the right of dissenting individuals within those groups to follow their conscience without fear of coercion (Kymlicka 1995: 158). Given its failure

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to live up to this second requirement, he concludes that Kukathas’ theory simply cannot qualify as liberal (Kymlicka 1992: 143). Of related concern is the weakness of exit rights in the liberal archipelago.23 Kukathas identifies two factors that determine whether an individual is free to exit her community. The first is that she must not be physically prevented from leaving, and the second is that there must be somewhere else (i.e. some other community) to go if and when she decides to do so. As long as these two very basic conditions are satisfied, it can safely be said that an individual is free to exit her community—nothing else is relevant to this determination. So in other words, an individual must be considered free to leave regardless of how high the costs of exit might prove to be in financial, psychological or emotional terms, regardless of whether she has any experience or awareness of life outside her community, and regardless of whether her social and educational background has equipped her with the capacity to understand and reflect upon the different options available to her (indeed, even if she has been deliberately and systematically socialized to be ignorant of such options) (Kukathas 2003: 107–8, 112–13). According to many of his critics, however, it is making a mockery of the idea of freedom to suggest that an individual who has been deliberately and systematically deprived of most of the necessary resources and capacities to make an informed decision about her future, or for whom the cost of exit is so extremely prohibitive as to be almost inconceivable, is no less free as a consequence. It is a position that can only be defended on the basis of a rigid and formalistic conception of liberty that is all but blind to the manner in which individual autonomy can be constrained, sometimes to the point of meaninglessness, by factors other than brute physical coercion (Kymlicka 1992: 143; Shachar 2001: 69; Phillips 2007: 134–5, 143–4).24 To be fair, Kukathas does share some common ground with multiculturalists like Phillips and Spinner-Halev, who also have been highly critical of the tendency simply to assume that every member of a highly traditional or inegalitarian community is a helpless prisoner of his or her cultural background, whose apparent consent to discriminatory or unjust treatment should necessarily be regarded with skepticism (Spinner-Halev 2000: 51–6; Phillips 2007: 8–9, 39-41, 64, 124– 6).25 Nevertheless, whereas Kukathas seeks to avoid this extreme conclusion by embracing another (that physical coercion is the only source of unfreedom), Phillips and Spinner-Halev stake out an intermediate position which stipulates that certain minimum enabling conditions must be in place in order for freedom of choice, and exit, to be adequately realized. These may include measures to ensure that all community members have a minimum level of education, regulations requiring communities to establish compensation funds for departing members so that the prospect of financial disaster is not an insurmountable barrier to exit, or the option of direct intervention in cases where force or violence is used to deny individuals their fundamental human rights or to prevent them from exiting the community when it is their choice to do so (Spinner-Halev 2000: 71–7; Phillips 2007: 138–44).

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The value of cultural diversity One of the distinctive features of this argument is that it focuses mostly on the benefits that cultural diversity offers to the wider society, as opposed to the members of any particular cultural minority. There are in fact several variations on this argument, probably the most familiar being that cultural diversity in the form of ethnic food, festivals, music and dance, etc. creates a richer, more cosmopolitan and aesthetically pleasing society for all (Kymlicka 1995: 121; Fukuyama 2006: 15; Pieterse 2007: 96). In this fairly banal version of the argument, cultural diversity is regarded purely as a source of entertainment or pleasure that enhances our overall quality of life, but without fundamentally changing our views about how our lives should be led. There is, however, another version of the argument wherein cultural diversity is valued precisely because it offers us resources that can change the way we see and act in the world. Such is the view of Bhikhu Parekh, who argues that exposure to the beliefs, values and practices of other cultures not only expands and enriches our knowledge of the human condition, it offers us fresh perspectives from which to question and possibly revise our own established cultural practices and preconceptions. Access to a broad array of alternative cultural resources and worldviews is, in this sense, ‘‘an important constituent and condition of human freedom.’’ in that it encourages us to step outside the confines of our own cultural structures, to see their limitations and their contingency, and to explore alternative ways of living and of giving meaning to our lives (Parekh 2000: 167, also 122–3; cf. Taylor 1985a; 1994a: 72-3; Raz 1994: 181; Deveaux 2000: 34, 60). Parekh here echoes some of the earlier work of James Tully, who argues that exposure to cultural diversity can help awaken us from a sense of complacency about the sufficiency or superiority of our own cultural worldviews. It can encourage in us ‘‘the ability to see [our] own ways as strange and unfamiliar, to stray from and take up a critical attitude towards them and so open cultures to question, reinterpretation, negotiation, transformation and non-identity’’ (Tully 1995: 206, also 202). Criticisms of the diversity argument have come from several different corners. One argument is that a multiculturalism grounded in the aesthetic value of cultural diversity is capable of justifying only a very limited range of multicultural policies. For example, it would be relatively easy to justify a policy of subsidizing multicultural festivals or artistic endeavors because of the pleasure these activities would bring to members of the wider public, but much more difficult to justify policies like affirmative action or guaranteed legislative representation, which carry clear benefits for cultural minorities but have no obvious role to play in enhancing the cultural flavor of public life. A more radical version of this critique has been articulated by Bannerji (2000: 46–55; 2003), who argues that a multiculturalism grounded in the value of minority differences is little more than an exercise in the politics of distraction and containment that keeps far more pressing issues of minority socio-economic and political marginalization safely off the agenda, and as such is incapable of posing any serious challenge to the unequal distribution of resources, power and opportunities in a liberal society.26

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A different variation on the politics of distraction argument animates Jacob Levy’s normative approach to multicultural accommodation. Levy worries that a multiculturalism focused on the value of cultural diversity will divert our attention and energies from a more pressing political task: that of identifying and seeking to mitigate the evil consequences which so often attend the politicization of ethnocultural and ethnonational differences (2000: 5–13, 32–3). His own alternative approach, the multiculturalism of fear, takes no interest whatsoever in assessing the value or respectworthiness of any particular cultural beliefs or practices. On these questions it is essentially agnostic. It proceeds instead by assessing the moral legitimacy of minority rights purely in terms of their potential for either reducing or increasing levels of ‘‘violence, cruelty and political humiliation’’ in human affairs (Levy 2000: 12). The importance of this task cannot be underestimated, according to Levy, because a republic ruled by such forces is a republic of fear that is ultimately corrosive of liberal institutions and liberal freedoms (Levy 2000: 23–4).27 Hence, although there is much to be said in favor of the view that cultural diversity is a valuable source of personal enrichment, enlightenment and critical self-reflection, as a stand alone defense of multicultural accommodation it leaves much to be desired. In the first place, it is difficult to see how the interests of cultural minorities could be adequately served within a policy framework that seeks its justification primarily in the beneficial consequences of diversity for members of the dominant society. In such a framework, minorities could easily become prisoners of public opinion, burdened with the pressure of continually adapting their cultures to suit the shifting tastes of the majority—so as not to lose access to their cultural rights. Moreover, as has already been suggested above, the diversity argument seems capable of supporting only a fairly narrow spectrum of minority rights, and it is particularly ill-suited to the case of national minorities, whose demands include rights to territory, resources and a share of state sovereignty. Reservations such as these have no doubt contributed to the fact that most multiculturalists invoke the value of diversity as just one of a series of complementary justifications for minority rights, and even then it is generally deployed as a secondary or supplementary argument.28

The politics of inclusion 29 The politics of inclusion is driven by the observation that ethnic, religious and racial minorities in many countries are systematically under-represented in key forums of democratic decision-making (see e.g. Phillips 1995: 1–26).30 To address this minority representation deficit, champions of the politics of inclusion recommend a variety of minority-targeted representation policies, including things like setting minority quotas in national legislatures, establishing minority–majority districts, implementing a system of proportional representation or granting minorities targeted vetoes on issues that cut to their core areas of interest (Young 1990: 183–91; Phillips 1995: 27–31; Pettit 2000: 213–14).31

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One of the more common justifications for these measures appeals to the idea that every citizen should enjoy an equal capacity for meaningful political selfdetermination: an opportunity to participate directly in the process of determining the laws, policies and programs that govern and shape their lives (Young 1990: 91; cf. Phillips 1993: 99).32 Special representation rights, in these terms, compensate for the fact that while minorities may have a formal right to political self-determination (i.e. the right to vote or stand for political office) their capacity to exercise that right as decision-makers (i.e. getting elected) is constrained, often drastically, by the overwhelming size and voting power of the majority. In other words, by increasing the size and strength of the minority presence in democratic decision-making forums, special representation rights help equalize the capacity for self-determination enjoyed by members of minority and majority cultures.33 Another justification for special representation rights is that increasing the presence of marginalized groups in national decision-making forums can have an important symbolic impact on a country’s democratic public culture, by demonstrating to the majority that minority representatives are fellow citizens with an equal right and capacity to participate in deliberations over the public good (Phillips 1995: 39–40; Williams 1998: 174, 209–10). It may also contribute to increased inter-communal trust in societies coping with ethnic strife, both by sending the message that minority communities are willing to pursue their interests (and grievances) through democratic rather than undemocratic channels, and by demonstrating to both dominant and non-dominant communities the benefits of a more co-operative approach to governance.34 Others have suggested that increasing the presence of minority representatives in democratic decision-making bodies will enhance the perceived legitimacy of the democratic process itself, because minority constituents, particularly those with a long history of electoral marginalization, are more likely to trust minority candidates and to feel a sense of confidence that those representatives, and therefore the system as a whole, can work to their benefit (Williams 1998: 172–3; cf. Banducci et al. 2004: 538–9, 552).35 Along similar lines, special representation rights have been defended on the grounds that minority representatives are more likely to understand and empathize with the distinctive concerns of their communities and may be more motivated to stand up for those concerns than would be a representative who is not a group member (Young 1990: 185; Kymlicka 1995: 139; Williams 1998: 170–2).36 At the same time, most defenders of minority representation are quick to distance themselves from the more extreme version of this argument: that all members of marginalized groups share an identical set of interests and perspectives, which only group members are capable of understanding and representing. The problem with this view is that in embracing diversity between groups it ignores diversity within groups, and runs roughshod over the notion of individual agency (Young 1990: 229, 234–6; Phillips 1995: 52–5, 100; Williams 1998: 5–6).37 Williams, on the other hand, has defended the view that a group’s common experiences of marginalization or oppression can yield a distinctive (though by no means internally homogeneous) perspective on questions of

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public policy, and that on average a representative from the group is probably better equipped to represent those policy priorities than someone from outside of the group (Williams 1998: 6, 170–2; cf. Boxill 1998: 114–15).38 Granted, there is no guarantee that increasing the presence of minority representatives in legislative bodies will produce much in the way of concrete benefits. Critics have suggested that the impact of a relatively small number of minority representatives will be limited at best, and in most cases will fall well short of a minority veto or a guaranteed capacity to deliver specific policy outcomes. The impact of minority representatives will be further limited by the realities of democratic majoritarianism and the constraints posed by party discipline and executive domination of the policy process (Schouls 1996: 745–7; Knight 2001: 1079–81). Even supporters of increased minority representation are not overly sanguine about its potential to produce significant change, although many would still argue that presence is important even if its only effect is to put minority concerns more firmly on the radar screen of national legislators and the general public (Phillips 1995: 43–5; Fleras 1991: 66–7). Others reply that having some voice in the policymaking process is better than having none at all, particularly for groups with few alternative options for advancing their interests politically (see e.g. Dahlberg 1996: 66–7). It is also important to bear in mind that the constraints of majoritarianism, party discipline, and executive dominance are not peculiar to minority representation but are part of the limitations of mass representative government in general (e.g., specific interests are always going to face defeat at some point in the give and take of majoritarian politics). The point being that we should avoid placing unrealistic expectations on the minority representation option. If one expects an increased minority presence to deliver a minority veto or guaranteed policy outcomes, then this option will never fail to disappoint, but if we temper our expectations somewhat it becomes possible to see this form of political voice in a more positive, even if still relatively modest, light (Murphy 2008a).

Deliberative multiculturalism Closely associated with the idea of inclusion is the concept of deliberative democracy. A good general definition of deliberative democracy is provided by Benhabib: Democracy.is best understood as a model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions of society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals. (2002: 105; cf. Young 1990: 34, 92–3)39 Deliberative multiculturalism, quite simply, refers to the application of deliberative democratic procedures to the domain of minority–majority relations in a

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culturally diverse democracy. Increasing the presence of minority representatives in key democratic decision-making forums is therefore also a core priority for deliberative multiculturalists, but mere inclusion is not enough. It is equally vital that minority representatives become actively engaged in a process of reasoning and debating with their fellow citizens, a process wherein the participants listen to one another with consideration and respect, and wherein the ultimate goal is to negotiate mutually acceptable terms of coexistence in a spirit of openness and compromise (Deveaux 2000: 168–9; Miller 2000: 142; Benhabib 2002: 11, 105–6, 134). Some deliberative multiculturalists support stronger forms of deliberation which impose stricter conditions on both the form of the deliberations and the expected outcomes. Benhabib, for example, stipulates first of all that deliberations cannot be based on just any kinds of reasons, but only reasons which all participants can identify with, and second of all that only those policies, institutions and norms that are the subject of unanimous agreement amongst the participants can be considered legitimate (2002: 134, 141). Critics of strong deliberation, on the other hand, argue that there is often reasonable disagreement about what constitutes a good or acceptable reason in favor of a particular course of action, and that expecting unanimity in this respect is not only unrealistic but possibly unjust. Tully, for one, argues that the manner in which people reason and deliberate is always to some extent the expression of their different cultural backgrounds, and that a just and mutually respectful process of intercultural dialogue should strive to recognize and accommodate participants in their own terms rather than seeking to impose upon them a set of universal deliberative standards or some deliberative metalanguage (1995: 5–6, 24, 29; cf. Deveaux 2000: 168–72).40 For somewhat more pragmatic reasons, David Miller favors a deliberative approach that sets few advance restrictions on the modes of reasoning that can be deployed, since his feeling is that participants are more likely to learn through the actual experience of deliberation which sorts of arguments their fellow citizens will find persuasive or alienating (2000: 59–60, 150–2). Mandating absolute consensus as the standard of legitimacy in every deliberative exercise would also appear to be setting the standard of deliberation too high, especially in cases where the number of groups involved is very large and the issues at stake are very divisive or contentious. In such cases, the best available solution may very well turn out to be something that only a majority of the participants can agree to, even after extensive deliberation. Again, the message here is that the benefits of the deliberative exercise can only be diminished when it is burdened with too many conditions and expectations (Deveaux 2000; Weinstock 2001). Many of the justifications for deliberative multiculturalism mirror those offered in support of minority inclusion, which is to be expected given the overlap between these two different approaches to diversity accommodation. Hence, we encounter the argument that deliberative multiculturalism yields public policies that better reflect minority interests; that it equalizes the capacity for selfdetermination enjoyed by members of minority and majority cultures; that it increases the possibility of mutual understanding across cultures; and that it enhances the overall legitimacy of democratic institutions and the democratic

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political process (Tully 1995: 132–4; Deveaux 2000: 139–46; 2006: 114; Benhabib 2002: 8, 11, 134; Parekh 2000: 128–9, 268–73). Yet there are also a number of distinctive arguments for deliberative multiculturalism, which reflect some of the unique features of this model of minority empowerment. James Tully, for example, argues that a process of intercultural deliberation (or negotiation) is the only means of securing just and enduring constitutional arrangements in a multinational state, for it is only in such a process that the status of the participants as free and self-determining peoples can be appropriately recognized and respected—both formally, in that the terms by which they are to be governed cannot be decided without their consent, and substantively in that they retain the right to represent themselves in their own linguistic and cultural terms (1995, 2000a, 2001).41 Intercultural deliberation receives further support in the literature as a means of addressing the tensions that sometimes arise between the rights of minorities and the rights of their more vulnerable individual members (Parekh 2000: 128–9, 268– 73; Kymlicka 2001: 62–4; Ignatieff 2007: 81–2; Phillips 2007: 41; Song 2007: 134– 41; Young 2007: 84–6). Ayelet Shachar refers to this as the challenge of balancing the requirements of justice between cultural groups with the requirements of justice within cultural groups (2001: 4). Shachar proposes to achieve this balance via a system of incentives that includes both minority rights and minimum standards of conduct that place limits on how those rights can be exercised. If necessary, these standards can be imposed by the state, but her real aim is to encourage both a process of inter-cultural deliberation (between minorities and the wider society) and a process of intra-cultural deliberation (between dominant and non-dominant voices within minority communities), the joint operation of which should ideally result in such standards being adopted voluntarily. Shachar sees at least two distinct advantages of this deliberative exercise: first, both the process itself and the standards that emerge from that process will enjoy greater legitimacy in the eyes of the minority than would state intervention; and second, it offers previously marginalized individuals (women in particular) a level of agency and empowerment in their communities they may not previously have enjoyed (Shachar 2001: 117–18, 122–30, 141–3; cf. Deveaux 2006: 107 n. 58).42 Just how much deliberation can contribute to the resolution of difficult intercultural and intracultural disputes remains, however, an open question. It is certainly no magic bullet. Resolutions by agreement can be very hard to come by, and in some cases may have to give way to compulsion, particularly when the fate of highly vulnerable individuals hangs in the balance. On the other hand, there are few magic bullets to be had in these frequently vexed debates. All the more reason to remind ourselves that if we expect too much of deliberation it will never fail to disappoint, but if we tame our expectations we may come to see that its benefits are not inconsiderable.

Democratic multinationalism Democratic multinationalism focuses exclusively on the claims of ethnonational minorities—groups that share a common national identity and who assert a

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collective right to self-determination. Self-determination for some of these groups means only one thing—secession and independent statehood—but for others it means self-government within the bounds of a multinational state (see e.g. Buchanan 1991: 21; Walzer 1999: 208–9; Miller 2000: 124). Regardless, most groups who assert this right are seeking a substantial slice of independent jurisdictional authority, usually (though not always) within the bounds of a defined territory, and a significant degree of immunity from state interference and oversight within that sphere of authority. Democratic multinationalism locates the justification for minority self-determination in the principle of popular sovereignty: the simple yet very powerful idea that people have a right to form and sustain their own political communities, and to choose how and by whom they will be governed within those communities (Graff 1994: 205; Philpott 1995: 356–7; Tully 1995: 27–9, 41-3, 192). As Kymlicka explains: ‘‘If democracy is the rule of ‘the people’, national minorities claim that there is more than one people, each with the right to rule themselves’’ (1995: 182).43 The right to self-determination is regarded as a basic condition of human freedom, in that it carves out a democratic space within which groups of individuals who share a common national identity can deliberate and make choices about their individual and common futures in the absence of interference or domination by another national community (Philpott 1995: 356–8; De-Shalit 1996: 911; Young 2000: 23–4, 32–3). One way of clarifying our understanding of democratic multinationalism is by examining its relationship with culture or cultural difference. Within a democratic multinationalist frame of reference, cultural preservation is recognized as one of the most common, and highly valued, nationalist objectives, and the right to self-determination is regarded as one of the primary means by which national minorities seek to sustain their distinctive languages and cultures. All the same, cultural difference is not what justifies the right to self-determination, and nations that have largely shed their culturally distinctive features, whether as a matter of choice or circumstance, are no less entitled to claim this right than nations whose distinctiveness has largely been preserved. To reiterate, in the democratic multinationalist framework the right to self-determination finds its normative anchor in the principle of popular sovereignty, and it is this principle that supports a nation’s jurisdiction over cultural matters.44 Furthermore, whether or not a nation uses its cultural jurisdiction to defend its cultural distinctiveness is entirely its own business and has no bearing whatsoever on the continuing legitimacy of its claim to self-determination. The democratic argument for minority self-determination in this way avoids some of the disadvantages of its cultural counterpart. Most significantly, it is not susceptible to the counter-argument, deployed with some frequency in debates over the legitimacy of indigenous rights claims, that as a community’s cultural distinctiveness fades, so accordingly does its right to self-determination.45 By the same token, it places no pressure on communities to conform to popular cultural stereotypes or to distort their own cultural priorities for fear of losing their rights. Democratic multinationalism seeks to place communities in control of their cultures, not the other way around.

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Another signature feature of democratic multinationalism is the observation that minorities asserting a right to self-determination are not, as is commonly assumed, seeking a form of special treatment but a form of equal treatment. Which is to say that national minorities are seeking the same right to selfdetermination that is already enjoyed by dominant nations that control states. This observation poses a direct challenge to the legitimacy of many multinational states as currently constituted, whose governments for the most part have simply assumed their right to rule over their national minorities without their consent.46 For not only is this a violation of the principle of popular sovereignty, it is also a form of moral hypocrisy, in that minorities are denied the very freedom that the majority assumes for itself. From a democratic multinationalist perspective, the more appropriate question to be asked in a multinational state is not ‘‘why should national minorities be entitled to a right to self-determination?’’ but rather ‘‘how can we reconcile the competing rights to self-determination to which minority and majority nations are equally entitled?’’ (Tully 1995: 116–57; 2001: 4–7; MacCormick 1996: 565–6; Moore 2003: 167–8; Harty and Murphy 2005: XX). This argument has a particular resonance in the case of groups with a history of involuntary incorporation into the state. Examples include indigenous peoples and other non-dominant nations whose rights were swept aside in the processes of majority nation-building and socio-economic modernization that accompanied the formation and consolidation of the modern state (Connor 1972; Tully 1995: 70–98; 2000a; Kymlicka 2001: 1–3, 27–9; 2001a: 21–31). In cases such as these, where people were targeted by coercive assimilation policies and subjected to the rule of others without their consent, the democratic argument for self-determination seems more intuitively appealing. Nevertheless, democratic multinationalism is not, in essence, an argument about historic injustice and its redress. It is an argument grounded in a more general principle of respect for human freedom and in this sense its application is not restricted to historically disadvantaged groups.47 Hence, as Daniel Philpott argues, any group that expresses a desire to govern itself more autonomously has a prima facie right to self-determination (1995: 353). It is at this point in the argument that the more skeptical observers of nationalist politics begin to get nervous, because the right to self-determination seems like it is being handed over without any conditions. Should we not, for example, insist that a right to self-determination be granted only in cases where a national minority can guarantee that the interests of the wider society will not be seriously compromised, and that sufficient protections will be provided for the basic rights and freedoms of its own members? Beiner, for one, is critical of those who would grant a blanket or universal right to national self-determination. His own inclination is to make this right provisional: Why start off with the presumption of legitimacy, which is what the ‘‘right’’ announces, and then worry about how to limit and qualify exercise of the right (clawing back the right, so to speak), rather than, as seems more prudent, put

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the onus on nationalists and secessionists to make their case for the reasonableness, in their own situation, of sovereignty or self-determination? (Beiner 2003: 161) But those who champion the right self-determination might ask in return: why place all of the onus on those seeking the right, and why assume the legitimacy of the state’s right to set these conditions unilaterally?48 The more equitable departure point for the debate, from this democratic point of view, is the assumption of mutual provisionality—both of the state’s claim to unfettered authority over the minority in question, and of the minority’s claim to an unfettered right to self-determination.49 Working on the basis of this assumption, the moral legitimacy of any governing arrangements between the state and a national minority can be called into question if they have been determined by imposition rather than by negotiation and uncoerced consent, and the moral legitimacy of a national minority’s claim to self-determination and noninterference can be called into question if it fails to respect the basic rights and well-being of its members (on whose behalf the right has been asserted), or if its actions threaten the safety and security of its neighbors. The real challenge in this debate is not to gain agreement on the proposition that any exercise of the right to self-determination must meet certain basic moral standards to be regarded as legitimate—because most participants in the debate already agree on this point (see e.g., Tully 1995: 191; Philpott 1995: 362–3, 371–2; Young 2000: 257–60; Kymlicka 1995: 152–3; 2001: 88). The true difficulties arise when it comes to determining things like the substantive content of these standards, who is to have input in their design, and how (or whether) they are to be enforced. These sorts of questions are taken up in Chapter 7.50

The politics of recognition The very simple idea at the core of the politics of recognition is that our identities—our sense of who we are as individuals and as members of a particular human community—are of tremendous value and importance to us, and for this reason are deserving of recognition and respect (Taylor 1994a: 25; Modood 2007: 37, 52). Recognition is in fact understood to be partially constitutive of identity, which is to say that our identities are partly shaped by their recognition or non-recognition by others. The idea here is that when others recognize the importance and worth of our identity this contributes significantly to our sense of personal security, self-respect and well-being—our feeling that we are regarded as equal, and equally valued, members of society (Tully 1995: 190–1; Parekh 2000: 8, 239–40). By the same token, non-recognition, or recognition in some diminished or demeaning form can constitute a significant source of personal anguish and diminishment. As Charles Taylor concludes: ‘‘Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being’’ (1994a: 25; cf. Weinstock

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1998: 299; Galeotti 2002: 96–104; Modood 2007: 52).51 Recognition, in other words, is not something that should be taken lightly. ‘‘Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need’’ (Taylor 1994a: 26). A politics of recognition in a multicultural society faces a twofold challenge. First, it must cope with the fact that the identities of many individuals are partly constituted by their membership in a particular ethnocultural, ethnonational or religious community. Second, it must cope with the associated fact that these group-differentiated identities are intimately linked not only to a variety of distinctive values, beliefs and practices but also at times to particular institutions (e.g. schools, places of worship), communal goods (e.g. language, a territorial homeland) and claims to political authority (e.g. the right to self-government). A politics of recognition in a multicultural context is therefore a politics of recognizing and respecting people’s distinctive cultural identities and the distinctive values, practices and entitlements with which those identities are intimately associated. It is a politics of recognizing and accommodating difference: what some theorists have dubbed a politics of difference (Taylor 1994a: 37–8). This mode of recognition constitutes a clear departure from the conventional difference-blind liberal-egalitarian vision of society where all individuals, regardless of their identity-related differences, are accorded an identical set of rights and are governed by a uniform and universally applied set of laws and policies (see e.g. Barry 2001). Such societies are said to be governed by the principle of neutrality, which stipulates that the state must not favor any particular religion, culture, ethnicity or nationality, and that such group-based affiliations are to be strictly divorced from the distribution of rights, resources and political status. Which is to say that the only way to recognize and respect people as moral equals is to treat them equally as a matter of public policy. From the perspective of a politics of difference, however, liberal neutrality in theory rarely, if ever, translates into liberal neutrality in practice, because in most liberal states the language, culture, identity and status of the majority is already reflected in and reinforced by state institutions and state power.52 In this light, a blanket refusal to accommodate the identity-related differences of cultural minorities looks more like a form of discrimination that privileges the identity, practices and institutions of the cultural majority by default (Taylor 1994a: 43–4; Tully 1995: 191; Parekh 2000: 8; cf. Kymlicka 1995: 108, 110–11; Moore 2003: 165–7). In contrast, neutrality in the politics of difference frequently requires a departure from a strictly difference-blind application of law and public policy. In other words, according people equal recognition and respect at times means treating them differently (Parekh 2000: 239–40; cf. Galeotti 2002: 106–9; Modood 2007: 51–7). There are a wide variety of examples in the literature of how a politics of equal recognition and respect translates into differential treatment of minorities in a multicultural society. These include exempting members of religious minorities from the application of specific laws or regulations that make it difficult for them to take advantage of opportunities in the workforce without compromising core aspects of their identity, e.g., permitting Sikh construction workers to wear

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a turban rather than a hard hat, or allowing female Muslim lifeguards to wear a burkini rather than a standard bathing suit. Other examples include the provision of public funding for faith-based schools that enable minorities to pass on their identity-related values and beliefs to future generations, or special representation rights for historically marginalized ethnocultural minorities which not only constitute a sign of public recognition and respect, but may also help these groups leverage their identity-related interests and priorities onto the legislative agenda (Parekh 2000: 241–6, 249–54, 333). A politics of equal recognition and respect can even be used to defend the identity-related rights and entitlements of national minorities, including linguistic rights for stateless nations like the Que´be´cois, or the right of indigenous peoples to govern their communities, territories and resources in a manner consistent with their evolving cultures and traditions (Eisenberg 1994, 2007; Taylor 1994a: 51–61; Tully 1995: 116–29). Like many of the other multicultural arguments considered so far in this chapter, the politics of recognition has been criticized for offering insufficient safeguards for the rights of vulnerable group members, and for failing to address the potentially prohibitive costs of minority recognition to the wider society (Fierlbeck 1996: 20; Tempelman 1999: 21–2; Benhabib 2002: 54–5). Yet here too this charge tends to be overstated, for the reality is that most theorists who advocate a politics of recognition seek a middle ground between the sins of moral laxity and moral imperialism. Indeed, recognition tends to be regarded as a conditional entitlement, to be granted on terms similar to those outlined in the doctrine of mutual provisionality in the previous section. Recognition is taken to be conditional in two distinct senses. In the first place it is to be granted on terms that are equally respectful of majority identities, beliefs and practices, which implies that the potential burdens it imposes on the wider society must be neither unreasonable nor unsustainable. As Parekh argues: ‘‘while a society has an obligation to accommodate the minority way of life, it has no obligation to do so at the cost of it own, especially if it remains genuinely unconvinced by the minority’s defense of its practices’’ (2000: 273). For example, Parekh himself argues in favor of accommodating the identity-related differences of Sikh construction workers by permitting them to wear a turban rather than a hard-hat, but he also argues that these workers should be required to accept a reduced level of accident liability (because of the lesser level of protection afforded by the turban) in order to avoid placing an unfair burden of costs on the rest of society (2000: 243–4; cf. Phillips 2007: 112–13).53 The more general message here is that a politics of recognition calls for a process of mutual accommodation and mutual adjustment amongst dominant and non-dominant cultural groups in a multicultural society. Recognition is conditional in a second sense in that it is to be granted on the understanding that minorities have a corresponding duty to recognize and respect the basic rights and freedoms of their own members (Taylor 1994a: 59–60; Tully 1995: 191; Parekh 2000: 157–8, 172–3).54 According to Taylor, a community seeking recognition must also demonstrate that it too ‘‘is.capable of respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common goals;

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and [that] it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights’’ (1994a: 59). Interestingly, this second condition has attracted the ire of another set of critics, who dismiss the politics of recognition as a conservative and ethnocentric framework of accommodation wherein minorities gain respect solely on the majority’s terms and exclusively in relation to the majority’s categories of value (Bannerji 2003: 38–43). In responding to this charge, Taylor notes that anyone engaged in a process of cross-cultural evaluation (whether she be a member of a dominant or a non-dominant cultural group) inevitably (and unavoidably) begins this process from within her own contingent set of moral standards—what Taylor calls her own moral horizons. The important question is where is she prepared to go from there?55 The non-ethnocentric option, according to Taylor, is to enter into a process of intercultural dialogue with the members of other cultural groups. Within this dialogue the participants will seek to defend their distinctive values, beliefs or practices with the hope that the others will come to see their legitimacy, while always remaining open to the possibility of shifting the boundaries of their own moral horizons in the process (Taylor 1994a: 61–73; cf. Tully 1995: 24–9, 131–6, 206; Parekh 2000: 128–9, 268–73; 2006: 370–1). When all has been said and done, however, critics may legitimately feel that this dialogical solution is no solution at all for it leaves most of the truly difficult questions unanswered. For example, what happens when different cultural groups fail to agree on where the line between acceptable and unacceptable conduct is to be drawn? And at what point does the desire to avoid being ethnocentric become an act of moral irresponsibility and an abandonment of one’s duty to stand up for the interests of the disempowered and the oppressed? In cases of deep disagreement over fundamental moral principles, will there be times when the majority can justifiably assert its will by force or compulsion—to assert that this is simply how we do things here (see e.g. Taylor 1994a: 62–3)? Or is it preferable in such cases to rely on less intrusive measures such as incentives or persuasion? Granted, these are questions that most multiculturalists, and even many of their critics, find difficult to answer, and I will have more to say about the nature of these difficulties in Chapter 7. What also needs to be recognized is that questions such as these are even more difficult to answer in the abstract, which helps explain why more and more theorists from across the multicultural spectrum are turning to a case and context sensitive approach to the accommodation of ethnocultural and ethnonational diversity—an approach that pays greater attention both to the specificity of minority characteristics, circumstances, and demands, and to the constraints and opportunities presented by the political environments in which those demands are to be addressed. I will have more to say about this approach in Chapter 9.

Conclusion The rather modest objective of this chapter was to provide a brief snapshot of some of the more influential arguments in favor of multiculturalism, to indicate

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some of their broad areas of convergence and divergence, and to suggest which aspects of these arguments have proven to be most controversial or objectionable. Its aim was also to reinforce one of the key messages of Chapters 2 and 3: that multicultural political philosophy is not a monolithic body of scholarship, characterized by a uniform set of assumptions and arguments that are applied to all cultural minorities in essentially the same way. In the next three chapters the focus shifts from the champions to the critics of multiculturalism, beginning in the next chapter with a critical examination of Brian Barry’s egalitarian critique of multiculturalism in his Culture and Equality (2001).

Chapter 6

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Culture and equality

Introduction Multiculturalism has attracted its fair share of critics over the years, but few have been more influential than Brian Barry. Barry takes the champions of multiculturalism to task for a wide variety of perceived failings, including a refusal to set principled limits on minority rights and minority autonomy, a misguided hostility to the common sense of citizenship that binds together the members of a democratic community, an unhealthy preoccupation with questions of cultural difference, and a disturbing indifference to the challenge of redressing deeply entrenched socio-economic injustice (Barry 1998, 2001, 2001a, 2002). Barry’s discussion of culture has already been taken up in Chapter 2, and I will examine his arguments about social cohesion and the limits of multicultural accommodation in Chapters 7 and 8. In this chapter I will focus exclusively on his claim that multicultural policies are incompatible with a liberal conception of equality. This claim receives its most extensive treatment in Culture and Equality, which is the most comprehensive critical examination of multiculturalism yet to be penned by a political philosopher. The chapter begins with a brief overview of Barry’s own liberal egalitarian presuppositions. These principles have not been laid out in a very systematic fashion in Culture and Equality, and so must be pieced together from various places in his wide-ranging discussion.1 This is followed by two sections which focus on different features of Barry’s egalitarian critique of multiculturalism. The first section examines the politics of equal affirmation, and the second examines what Barry refers to as the ‘‘rule and exemption’’ approach to accommodating minority differences. Each section begins with a summary of Barry’s argument, followed by an examination of how susceptible different multiculturalists are to his critique. One of the more intriguing insights to emerge from this discussion is that, in certain respects at least, the differences between Barry and his opponents are not as great as might originally have been expected. In part this can be explained by Barry’s fondness for caricature, and his tendency to gloss over the tremendous diversity of opinions and perspectives amongst his multiculturalist interlocutors—many of which overlap, in interesting ways, with his own. A second explanation is that even though Barry rejects most of the multiculturalist

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justifications for group-differentiated rights and policies, he is nevertheless prepared to accept many of those same rights and policies, albeit for a variety of different (non justice-related) reasons.

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Liberal egalitarianism Barry’s liberal egalitarianism is anchored in a couple of key assumptions. The first is that all individuals are of equal moral worth and as such are entitled to equal treatment and respect. The second is that ‘‘human beings are virtually identical as they come from the hands of nature’’ and for this reason it is possible to identify certain universal needs and interests that are basic to a decent and fulfilling human life in any culture (Barry 2001: 262).2 These universal human interests include things like safety and security of the person; access to adequate food, water, shelter, and medical services; and the opportunity to acquire a basic education and to participate in the social and political life of one’s community (2001: 285–6).3 In line with these two assumptions, Barry argues that a liberal society must be organized around ‘‘the idea of a single and undifferentiated grade of citizenship, expressing itself in identical legal and political rights,’’ and ‘‘[t]he idea of uniform rules applying equally to all and decided upon by some majoritarian procedure encompassing all citizens.’’ (1998: 307–8).4 One of the primary functions of this uniform system of rights and rules is to maximize individual equality of opportunity. It does so by carving out a range of possible choices that are available to the citizens of a liberal state, and so long as this range of choices—which Barry refers to as a choice set—is approximately the same for all citizens then opportunities can be said to be equal. Within the bounds determined by this choice set, individuals are free to make whatever decisions they like in charting the course of their own lives, and to base these decisions on their own particular values and priorities—cultural or otherwise. At the same time, however, if in practice the choices made by different individuals lead to unequal outcomes, and Barry expects they often will, the state has no legitimate role to play in redressing these inequalities, either by transferring additional rights and resources to some (thereby granting them an unfair advantage) or by reducing the rights and resources available to others (thereby placing them at an unfair disadvantage). In other words, individuals are responsible for the choices they make in life, and there is no injustice in the fact that these choices at times lead to unequal outcomes, so long as the original range of opportunities available to all was (and remains) equal (Barry 2001: 32, 92–5). Very much like Rawls, however, Barry is convinced that the liberal state does have a legitimate role to play in rectifying inequalities arising from factors or circumstances beyond an individual’s responsibility or control. Barry has in mind here policies like affirmative action, which are designed to rectify the sorts of systematic disadvantages that afflict certain classes of individuals as a result of factors such as poverty, disability or a stubborn legacy of racial discrimination. Policies such as these help to ensure that individuals who are disadvantaged

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through no fault of their own have access to a range of resources and opportunities similar to that enjoyed by their fellow citizens. The only qualifications Barry would place on such policies is that they target opportunities or resources that any individual would be disadvantaged without (i.e. employment, education), that in principle they be available to everyone (even though in practice they will only be accessed by those who are disadvantaged), and that they be temporary, lasting only so long as the inequality they are meant to address persists.5 Subject to these conditions, this particular class of group-differentiated policies is not only compatible with but required by the theory of egalitarian justice Barry defends (Barry 2001: 12–13, 108, 114). One final core feature of Barry’s liberal-egalitarianism is its dedication to the principle of state neutrality on questions of the good life, and to the corresponding notion that matters of diversity should be privatized. What this means is that individuals in a liberal-egalitarian society are free to choose a form of life that reflects their cultural or religious background, but the choices they make are no concern of the state, which has no business either judging their relative worth or aligning itself with one particular choice or another. As Barry is quick to point out, however, the principle of liberal neutrality is not incompatible with policies that publicly recognize diversity, it only stipulates that when such recognition is granted it must be fair and evenhanded, which is to say it must be distributed in an egalitarian manner. He illustrates this point with the example of public funding for religious schools, which can be justified on liberal grounds as long as it is made equally available to all religious denominations.6 By extending such funding, the state is not demonstrating its support for the beliefs of any particular religious group, it is simply facilitating a private choice on the part of parents who want their children to receive a religious education—by granting them the opportunity to designate how their share of the public education budget is to be allocated. By the same token, liberal states must draw the line at the point where the public recognition of diversity confers an unfair advantage on a particular cultural group, for example by funding Catholic but not Protestant, Jewish or Islamic schools, or by making a particular religion the religion of the state (which treats the members of all other religions, as well as secular individuals, as second class citizens) (Barry 2001: 27–9). Having thus defined his principles, Barry’s next objective is to demonstrate their fundamental incompatibility with multiculturalism and the idea of groupdifferentiated cultural rights. Barry is particularly exercised by the fact that multicultural rights and policies are themselves defended under the banner of justice and equality. His own view is that the multiculturalist turn in political philosophy bears an uncomfortable resemblance to pre-Enlightenment celebrations of status hierarchy and special privilege, and as such represents a retreat from the idea of equality properly conceived (Barry 2001: 7–12; 2002: 228). It is this conviction more than any other that explains the vigorous nature of Barry’s antimulticulturalist counter-assault, and one of the arguments to which he has taken the greatest exception goes under the heading of the ‘politics of equal affirmation’.

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The politics of equal affirmation Barry describes the politics of equal affirmation as the view ‘‘that cultures are of equal value—or, at the very least should be affirmed to be of equal value or presumed to be of equal value’’ (2001: 264). He identifies this view in varying forms and degrees in the work of Charles Taylor, James Tully and Iris Young (2001: 264–79).7 In Taylor’s work Barry finds only a much weaker initial presumption of the equality of cultures, something which Taylor himself describes as ‘‘a starting hypothesis’’ that ‘‘involves something like an act of faith’’ whose validity must ultimately be ‘‘demonstrated concretely in the actual study of the culture (1994a: 66–7). Barry locates a much stronger, and more problematic, version of the politics of equal affirmation in Tully’s Strange Multiplicity, where it is linked to the idea of individual self-respect. Tully begins by endorsing the familiar Rawlsian argument that individual self-respect is one of the pillars of social equality in a liberal society, and that the liberal state has a duty to ensure that the social bases (or foundations) of that sense of self-respect are justly distributed amongst citizens. Tully nevertheless parts company with egalitarian liberals like Rawls and Barry when he embraces the further notion that ‘‘the condition of self-respect is met only.[when].the cultures of all the members are recognised and affirmed by others’’ (1995: 190). Tully’s views are not unlike those of Iris Young, who argues that ‘‘some disadvantages that oppressed groups suffer can be remedied in policy only by an affirmative acknowledgement of the group’s specificity’’ and further, that in a culturally diverse democracy ‘‘[g]roups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized’’ (1990: 174). There are two things that Barry finds objectionable about this stronger version of the politics of equal affirmation. First, it violates the principle of liberal neutrality, because the state is asked to take a position on the value of the beliefs, practices or lifestyles of citizens—an issue on which it is supposed to remain agnostic. Barry’s concern is that if we start down this road it may lead us to a place where the state becomes the arbiter of all personal judgements about the value of different cultures or cultural practices, with devastating consequences for individual freedom of conscience, debate and criticism. Barry’s second objection to the politics of equal affirmation is that it is logically incoherent. His explanation is simple: given that ideas about what is right or wrong, good or bad, sacred or profane, aesthetically rich or aesthetically impoverished, etc. will inevitably differ across cultures, it follows that to affirm categorically that all cultures are of equal value is to affirm an abundance of contradictions. It would be like embracing the value of gender equality while affirming the value of a culture that celebrates male dominance, or simultaneously affirming the value of a secular lifestyle and of a religion which proclaims that all unbelievers should suffer for all of eternity in the darkness of hell (Barry 2001: 269–71).8 It is difficult to find fault with either one of these arguments, and even more difficult to disagree with Barry that this strong version of the politics of equal affirmation should be rejected out of hand. But is this the view of cultural

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affirmation supported by either Tully or Young? In my view there are good reasons for concluding that it is not, the most compelling of which is the basic incompatibility between this radical cultural egalitarian thesis and several other features of their respective theories of diversity accommodation. Young, for example, is adamant that her difference-sensitive model of social justice does not sanction public interference in the freedom of individuals to choose their own ends and commitments in life. As she put it: ‘‘Social justice in the sense I intend continues to refer only to institutional conditions, and not to the preferences and ways of life of individuals and groups’’ (1990: 36, emphasis added; cf. Tully 1995: 202–5). Granted, Young also argues that ‘‘no social institutions or public practices should be excluded a priori from being a proper subject for public discussion, expression, or collective choice’’ and Barry reads this as an invitation to indiscriminate government interference in the private lives of citizens (Young 1990: 120; Barry 2001: 269–70). However, Young’s objective here is not to collapse the distinction between public and private (see 1990: 121), but rather to make the case that oppressive practices such as domestic violence or the sexual division of labour in the household should not automatically be immunized from public scrutiny by the mere claim that they are private matters (see e.g. Young 2007: 84–6). On a more general level, both Young and Tully are in agreement that acts of domination or oppression should be the target of criticism and reform wherever they appear (in the practices of both minority and majority cultures), and that the legitimacy of any cultural community’s claim to recognition and respect must be linked to its willingness to accord that same standard of treatment both to the individuals and sub-groups in its midst, and to the members of those other communities with whom it co-exists in a multicultural society (Young 1990: 187, 250–1; 1995; 2000: 251–65; Tully 1995: 172–73, 191; 2002: 106–8; 2004: 99, 103). These views simply cannot be squared with the idea of the state acting as cultural policeman or with the idea that public affirmation and respect should be parcelled out to all cultural communities indiscriminately. So what does the politics of equal affirmation mean to Tully and Young? Perhaps the most important thing to recognize is that both theorists envision this doctrine as the mirror-image of a politics of discrimination—a state of affairs where the culture of the majority is accorded an element of public recognition and respect that is denied to minority cultures. A politics of equal affirmation seeks to combat this form of discrimination in at least three different ways. First, by affirming that policies aimed at promoting the dominance of one particular culture over all others are harmful and unjust; second, by ensuring that members of majority and minority cultures enjoy an equal right to express their unique identities and to pursue their distinctive beliefs and practices in both the public and private spheres; and third, by ensuring that members of both majority and minority cultures are afforded an equal opportunity to see their identity-related differences supported by public policies and public institutions, (Young 1990: 158–68; Tully 1995: 53–7, 189–91).9 All three of these imperatives feature in Tully’s critique of difference-blind theories of liberal constitutionalism. For example, Tully specifically targets the

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view that just constitutional terms of association in a multicultural society are incompatible with the idea of granting special status or recognition to minority groups. Liberals are quick to defend this position by appealing to the familiar doctrine of state neutrality, but Tully is equally quick to observe that what may appear to be an ethic of cultural impartiality in theory, in practice looks more like an ethic of cultural privilege that permits the dominant constitutional position enjoyed by the language, customs, values and institutions of the majority to go unchallenged and, in many cases, unnoticed.10 A politics of equal affirmation seeks to remedy this de facto discrimination by ensuring that terms of constitutional association in a multicultural society are grounded in principles of mutual recognition and mutual accommodation of the different identities, values, practices and institutions of its constituent cultural communities. In other words: ‘‘If a contemporary constitution is to be culturally neutral, it should not promote one culture at the expense of others, but mutually recognise and accommodate the cultures of all citizens in an agreeable manner’’ (Tully 1995: 191; cf. Galeotti 2002: 10–11). It bears pointing out that Tully’s argument here has much in common with Barry’s own endorsement of evenhanded public recognition of diversity (2001: 27–9). Young too has spent much time and energy exploring how the doctrine of liberal neutrality in practice permits the members of dominant cultural groups to ignore both ‘‘their own group specificity’’ and the many ways in which that specificity is privileged in societal norms, policies and institutions (1990: 165). Her work also sheds light on the many ways in which deeply engrained cultural prejudices (what might be called a politics of unequal affirmation) can drastically shrink the basket of resources and opportunities available to minorities in areas like education, housing and social services, employment and politics. A politics of equal affirmation is of particular relevance in this context, according to Young, because standard affirmative action policies may not be capable of redressing these inequalities on their own (1990: 173–4; cf. Parekh 2000: 314; Tully 2004: 93; Modood 2006c: 6). For example, one could imagine a policy of affirmative action in employment being fatally compromised by the reluctance of visible minority workers to take a position in a workplace where most of the employees continued to harbour deeply racist attitudes. Young argues that in cases like these, affirmative action may need to be supplemented by a policy of public affirmation aimed at combating such socially destructive attitudes. For instance, a government could take it upon itself to sponsor a media campaign designed to showcase the positive contributions of visible minorities to the economic and social life of the community.11 Public apologies for past injustices can also function in this way. For example, when the Australian government apologized for its historic role in forcibly removing indigenous children from the care of their families and communities, its objective was not only to acknowledge the suffering of the victims and their families, but also to officially repudiate the racist assumptions underlying those policies, and to send a clear message to the wider public that indigenous languages and cultures should never again be regarded as a barrier to equal citizenship and opportunity in Australian society.12

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Neither of these policies involves the kind of heavy-handed state interference with individual liberty that legitimately concerns Barry and other like-minded liberals. For example, the point of sponsoring positive media portrayals of visible minorities is not to convey the message that their beliefs or practices carry the seal of state approval and that any deviation from this official line will not be tolerated. The intended message is rather that ethnically-motivated fear or hatred is harmful and misguided, and that the members of visible minorities, regardless of their differences or how their fellow citizens feel about these differences, have a right to the same opportunities in the economy and society as anyone else. Both of these policies, moreover, are consistent with the principle that the state has no right to compel people to jettison their ethnic, racial or religious prejudices, and that individuals are free to continue despising, criticizing or otherwise lampooning the beliefs and practices of their fellow citizens so long as they respect their fundamental rights.13 The same point applies to the principles of mutual recognition and mutual respect that inform the ethic of cultural impartiality in Tully’s theory of diverse constitutionalism. In the process of negotiating just and sustainable terms of coexistence, different cultures must recognize and respect each other’s right to live and govern themselves according to their own values and beliefs, but neither side is required to share or embrace what is valued by the other. Granted, Tully does believe that things are likely to go better in a society where different cultural communities learn to value each other’s beliefs and practices, but again, this is not a strict requirement of the terms of their association (see e.g. Tully 1995: 190).

The rule and exemption approach A second feature of multiculturalism that runs afoul of Barry’s liberal egalitarianism is the so-called rule and exemption approach to accommodating minority differences. The rule and exemption approach is perhaps best exemplified in the work of Bhikhu Parekh, but it is fair to say that it enjoys fairly widespread support in the multiculturalism literature. Barry describes it as the view that equality of respect in ‘‘a great many cases’’ requires that cultural minorities be granted exemptions from laws to which all other citizens remain subject, on the grounds that those laws disadvantage them because of their distinctive cultural beliefs or practices (1998: 319; 2001: 33). As we know already from the discussion in Chapter 3, Barry counters this argument with the observation that all laws disadvantage some people more than others, and often deliberately so (e.g., the law against murder is supposed to disadvantage murderers, just as laws against child abuse are meant to disadvantage parents who would subject their offspring to cruel and unusual punishment) (cf. Ford 2005: 130–2). In other words, the mere fact that a law disadvantages some individuals because of their cultural backgrounds is not, in itself, a good reason for granting an exemption. Rather, what must be shown is that the reason for granting the exemption is sufficiently compelling to override the objective the law was intended to serve.

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In his initial formulation of this argument, Barry took a fairly rigid line, which seemed to leave no room at all for the granting of such exemptions: In a nutshell, my contention is that there are sometimes good reasons (whether everybody accepts them or not) for having laws that prohibit certain kinds of conduct. If the reasons are strong enough, then exceptions should not be made for anybody; conversely, if a good case can be made for saying that exceptions should be granted, this suggests that the reasons for having the law in the first place are inadequate. (Barry 1998: 317)14 So, for example, the mere fact that certain Jews and Muslims are prevented by their religious convictions from consuming the flesh of animals that have been stunned prior to being killed is not, in Barry’s view, a compelling reason for granting an exemption from human slaughtering regulations, the purpose of which is to uphold a legitimate public interest in preventing unnecessary forms of cruelty to animals.15 Similarly, the fact that some members of the Sikh religion are disadvantaged by a law requiring motorcycle crash-helmets (which cannot be worn with a turban) is outweighed by the interest in public safety that such a law is designed to promote, therefore no exemption can be justified (1998: 317–18). Barry is adamant, moreover, that in neither of these cases has any injustice been done. The individuals in question are undoubtedly inconvenienced by these regulations, but their basic rights and opportunities as citizens, including their right to religious observance, are in no way compromised. Observant Jews and Muslims remain perfectly free to act within the bounds of conscience, simply by refraining from eating meat, as do observant Sikhs, who can simply choose not to ride a motorcycle. At the same time, Barry insists that the opportunity to eat meat or to ride a motorcycle is equally available to these individuals, and that they are neither more nor less free than their fellow citizens to avail themselves of these opportunities, even though they are far less likely to do so in practice. Ultimately, Barry’s view is that the state, by refusing to grant these individuals an exemption, is merely refusing to subsidize what amounts to an expensive taste, a taste whose satisfaction cannot be justified in light of the greater countervailing public interest served by the law that prevents it (2001: 33–5; 40–48).16 In his later work, Barry adopts a somewhat more flexible position on the question of exemptions, arguing that although he expects that the number of cases in which an exemption will turn out to be justified is likely to be quite low, such cases ‘‘cannot be ruled out a priori’’ (2001: 33, cf. 62).17 What must be shown is that there is both a compelling reason for granting the exemption and a compelling reason for retaining rather than modifying or abandoning the offending law or regulation (which would eliminate the need for the exemption). Barry in fact concedes that exemptions can be justified on a variety of grounds, including generosity, political prudence or a utilitarian calculation of the balance of advantages to be gained thereby—considerations that ultimately must be evaluated on a case

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by case basis. Hence, he is prepared to accept that Sikh construction workers in Britain should be granted a temporary exemption from the worksite hard hat regulations, because refusing to do so would result in mass Sikh unemployment, which in turn would impose significant hardships on the broader Sikh community, while eliminating a crucial engine of social integration (i.e. employment) and possibly threatening the wider society with serious social unrest (Barry 2001: 49–50).18 There are even cases where Barry argues in favour of exemptions grounded in considerations of justice (although he is quick to qualify this with his intuition that such cases are likely to be few and far between). For example, he argues that members of religious minorities can sometimes be exempted from uniform dress codes in schools or police forces in order to facilitate their equal access to these institutions.19 Similarly, he argues that religious institutions should be exempted from employment equity regulations when determining suitable candidates for religious office, so that they can be free to discriminate on the basis of gender, religious belief and even ethnicity (e.g. the requirement that Rabbis be Jewish). Barry’s view is that, whether we like it or not, to refuse an exemption in such cases is to grant the state authority over the content of religious doctrine, which is a clear violation of freedom of religious practice (Barry 2001: 49, 61–2, 167–8, 175–6; 2002: 213–17, 222; cf. Caney 2002: 83).20 Under certain conditions, therefore, Barry is willing to accept deviations from the formula of uniform rules and rights for all citizens. Indeed, as more than one observer has noted, in spite of his deep antipathy for multicultural political philosophy, Barry is prepared to support many of the same policies recommended by his multiculturalist opponents (Caney 2002: 82–4; Parekh 2002: 147–8; Festenstein 2005: 111–14; cf. Barry 2002: 214–15). In addition to the sorts of exemptions described above, Barry has argued in favour of a wide variety of group-differentiated policies including affirmative action, minority-targeted social programs, multicultural education in public schools, certain forms of minority language accommodation, self-government and various forms of associational autonomy (1991; 1998: 314; 2001: 12–13, 106, 114–17, 147–9, 226, 235). Simon Caney has even gone so far as to suggest that ‘‘Barry’s book is not so much ‘an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism’ as an egalitarian statement of which measures put forward in the name of cultural justice are acceptable and which are not’’ (Caney 2002: 84). Which brings us to an obvious question, namely, where exactly do the differences between Barry and the champions of multiculturalism lie? Several possibilities present themselves in Culture and Equality. One of these is the argument that Barry’s liberal-egalitarian approach to minority accommodation places strict limitations on the authority that cultural communities can exercise over their own members, and deems certain universal standards of protection against harm and oppression to be inviolable, whereas the champions of multiculturalism are only too willing to see such limits and standards transgressed for the sake of preserving cultural diversity (2001: 132–3, 326–7). This is one of the more serious charges that Barry lays at the feet of the multiculturalists and it will be considered in detail in the following chapter.

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Another possibility, suggested by Barry, is that while he insists that exemptions and other policies to accommodate cultural minorities must, in the Enlightenment tradition, be backed up by good reasons, reasons that a majority of citizens can reasonably be expected to accept, multiculturalists are prone to argue that difference in itself (i.e. ‘‘its part of my culture’’) is justification enough for treating minorities with special care and consideration. As Barry rightly concludes, this is in fact a non-argument and should be dismissed as such (2001: 252–8). On the other hand, however, it is difficult to think of any multiculturalist who actually adopts this position. It is certainly not the view of Parekh, who argues that every claim to cultural accommodation must be critically evaluated, both in terms of its potential impact on vulnerable group members and in terms of its implications for the interests of the wider society (2000: 239–94). Feminist multiculturalists like Seyla Benhabib (2002: 86–91) have also been highly critical of this sort of argument, especially when it is deployed as part of the socalled cultural defence in criminal trials, where a defendant claims that he should not be held responsible for his crimes because his cultural background or history of cultural socialization predisposed him to act in the way he did.21 Another good example is James Tully’s work on Aboriginal rights. According to Barry, Tully is of the opinion that if a particular practice is a central feature of an Aboriginal group’s distinctive culture this is reason enough for that practice to be exempted from any law that might interfere with it, regardless of the nature of that practice or its potentially harmful or oppressive consequences (2001: 255–7). Yet here too Barry turns out not to be a very reliable guide. For while it is undoubtedly the case that if a particular practice does in fact occupy a central and valued role in an Aboriginal group’s culture Tully regards this as something to be counted in its favour, he is not of the opinion that this is all that needs to be said in its defence. For example, an equally central consideration is whether the group in question claims the right to engage in that practice as an aspect of its unceded sovereignty (i.e. its democratic right to self-determination) (Tully 1995: 70–82, 116–39; cf. 2000a). More importantly, Tully makes it abundantly clear that the legitimacy of such practices must, in any event, be weighed in relation to their potential impact on broader societal interests and in terms of their implications for the rights and freedoms of group members, which must at all times be respected (Tully 1995: 172–73; 2002: 106–8).22 The mode of the reasoning employed here by Tully, characterized by a careful weighing of the normative and practical costs and benefits of minority accommodation, taking into account the interests of both minority and majority groups and of the individuals of which they are comprised, is a familiar feature of much of the recent work in multicultural political philosophy. It is exemplified in the work of Parekh when he weighs the merits of hard hat exemptions for Sikh construction workers against their potential costs to the wider society (see Chapter 5), in the work of Song and Phillips when they assess the circumstances under which a limited application of the cultural defence might be justified (Song 2007: 100–109; Phillips 2007: 97–9; cf. Renteln 2002), and in the work of Kymlicka when he weighs the advantages and disadvantages (both ethical and

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practical) of intervening in the internal affairs of cultural minorities that refuse to uphold liberal standards of human rights protection (1995: 163–70).23 More significantly from the point of view of the discussion at hand, it bears a distinct resemblance to the more flexible and nuanced form of reasoning eventually adopted by Barry in his discussion of rules and exemptions—although this is a similarity he himself has been reluctant to acknowledge.

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Conclusion By way of a brief conclusion, although it is true that Barry has a tendency to exaggerate his differences with the champions of multiculturalism, it would be a mistake to exaggerate their similarities. As I mentioned at the outset, some of the most vigorous points of disagreement arise in relation to the question of liberal toleration and the sources of social cohesion in a multicultural society— and Barry’s differences with a radical multiculturalist like Chandran Kukathas are especially acute. Before we have that discussion, however, there is a need to confront one other significant source of difference that bears more directly on the themes of the present chapter. The difference is that even when Barry agrees with the policy recommendations of his multiculturalist interlocutors, he almost always denies that those policies can claim a grounding in principles of justice or equality. He accepts this in a few rare cases, but his inclination is to locate the justification for group-differentiated policies elsewhere, in the dictates of prudence, generosity and the like (Barry 2001: 13, 32–3, 38–9). The deeper implication of this view is that Barry does not believe that any multiculturalist has come up with a convincing alternative interpretation and application of the principle of individual equality. This is a bold claim, and its centrality to the case he is building against multiculturalism is obvious. All the more surprising then that he leaves it virtually undefended. Granted, Barry spends a significant amount of time discussing why he differs from the multiculturalists with respect to particular policy recommendations, but rarely if ever does he stop to consider how different multiculturalists interpret and defend the ideas or ideals of equality by which those recommendations are underpinned, or to explain why he believes these alternative theories of equality ultimately fail to convince. For example, multiculturalists like Young and Phillips justify special representation rights for systematically under-represented minorities on the basis of a republican conception of equality that emphasizes active individual self-determination and a notion of freedom understood as non-domination (see Chapter 5). Responding to Young in particular, Barry has been quite critical of the idea of distributing political power along group lines, and he offers some particularly compelling arguments against the option of minority vetoes (2001: 300–5). More to the point, his view is that a ‘one person one vote’ system of majoritarian democracy is more than capable of dealing fairly with the interests of cultural minorities, so long as it contains constitutional safeguards against minority discrimination that are not themselves subject to ordinary majoritarian

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decision-making procedures (Barry 2001: 305). From Young’s perspective, however, this response largely misses the point, because a society governed by the strongest anti-discrimination laws can still be a society where minority representatives are effectively excluded from key forums of democratic decision-making by the sheer power of numbers, and this will not change until that society embraces the more active and agency-oriented vision of political equality she has made it her purpose to defend. Yet it is precisely this alternative vision of equality that Barry has failed to engage with.24 Another case in point is Kymlicka’s liberal-egalitarian defence of selfgovernment rights for stateless nations and indigenous peoples (see Chapters 3 and 4). This is a particularly compelling example, first of all because Barry himself has defended the idea of self-government as a key contributing factor to individual freedom, fulfillment and well-being (Barry 1991: 262; 2001: 117, 226–7), and these insights bears an intriguing resemblance to the link that Kymlicka draws between self-government and individual autonomy.25 What makes this example even more compelling is the fact that Kymlicka grounds his defence of minority self-government in a unique interpretation of the Rawlsian principle that liberals are committed to redressing unchosen inequalities, which is to say inequalities that individuals themselves had no responsibility for bringing about—a principle that Barry himself explicitly endorses in Culture and Equality (Barry 2001: 13, 114). But does Barry support Kymlicka’s particular interpretation and application of this principle? Unfortunately, Barry himself never says. Why is it that Barry largely ignores these alternative theories of equality? One possible explanation is that quite early on in his investigations he came to the conclusion that multiculturalists by and large view cultural preservation as an end in itself, and at that point he simply stopped looking for any alternative explanations for their advocacy in favor of minority rights (Barry 2001: 67–8, 252–8). Another possible explanation is that Barry believes there is only one legitimate interpretation of individual equality—the one he endorses in his own work—and that any alternatives are so fundamentally mistaken as to be not worthy of serious critical attention. But again, this is only speculation, and even if true it is a view that is badly in need of justification, given that equality is a hotly contested term even within the liberal tradition.26 Whatever the explanation, the point is not to give the argument away to the multiculturalists, but only to draw attention to the fact that the debate was never really engaged, and in this respect at least Barry’s egalitarian critique of multicultural political philosophy remains decidedly incomplete.27

Chapter 7

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The limits of multicultural accommodation Introduction One of the most difficult challenges in the politics of multiculturalism is how to strike a principled balance between group-differentiated minority rights and individual human rights. What manner of authority are minorities entitled to exercise over their own members? Should that authority be subject to any principled limits? If so, which parties have a legitimate role to play in establishing and enforcing those limits? And which methods of enforcement are the most legitimate and effective? Even critics of multiculturalism disagree on how these questions should be answered—testimony to the complexity of the issues to be grappled with. In the first part of the chapter I take up the charge that multiculturalists have a strong tendency to prioritize minority rights over individual rights, and for this reason generally fail to provide sufficient safeguards for the interests and well-being of the most weak and vulnerable members of minority cultures. I begin by exploring some feminist criticisms of multiculturalism, focusing heavily on the work of Susan Okin, moving from there to an examination of Brian Barry’s liberal universalist contribution to the debate. The second part of the chapter assesses the accuracy of these charges, with particular attention being devoted to the work of Chandran Kukathas and Will Kymlicka, and to the special case of national minorities.

Critical perspectives A feminist critique Amongst the feminist critics of multiculturalism, the work of Susan Okin stands out for particular attention.1 Although she was by no means the first political philosopher to identify some of the tensions that exist between feminism and multiculturalism (see e.g. Yuval-Davis 1992; Moruzzi 1994) the direct and unflinching nature of her criticisms quickly placed her as one of the most influential and widely cited participants in the debate. Okin herself has drawn criticism on the grounds that her attack on multiculturalism, and her corresponding analysis of gender discrimination in non-western cultures, is lacking in nuance

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(see e.g. Al-Hibri 1999; Gilman 1999; Shachar 2001: 65; and Okin 1999a: 121– 7; and 2005: 69–75 for a reply), but her core concerns about the potential impact of minority rights on gender equality are sound and deserve careful consideration. Okin articulates several interrelated criticisms of multiculturalism. The first is that granting group rights to cultural minorities often contributes to the subordination and oppression of their female members. Specifically, her fear is that traditional elites will use this state-sanctioned authority to perpetuate the group’s patriarchal and inegalitarian cultural practices, and to stifle reform efforts geared towards the emancipation and empowerment of female group members (Okin 1999: 12–20; cf. Tamir 1999: 47–50; Shachar 2001: 84–5).2 Ayelet Shachar refers to this phenomenon as the ‘‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability,’’ a situation where ‘‘well-meaning accommodation by the state may leave members of minority groups vulnerable to severe injustice within the group, and may, in effect, work to reinforce some of the most hierarchical elements of a culture’’ (Shachar 2001: 3). Shachar cites the example of granting jurisdiction over matters of family law to conservative and highly inegalitarian religious groups, who may then use that authority to pass regulations that grossly disadvantage their female members, both in terms of the rights they enjoy inside the marriage and in terms of the post-divorce distribution of property and assets (Shachar 2001: 54–5; cf. Okin 1999: 13, 20). Such a policy could effectively cripple these women’s independence, either by trapping them in an unwanted marriage or by condemning them to a life of poverty if they choose to exit.3 Okin’s second criticism is that multiculturalists devote little, if any, attention to sources of gender inequality and domination in the private sphere (1999: 12– 13). Hence, while she is happy to commend a liberal culturalist like Kymlicka for stipulating that cultural rights come with clear liberal obligations, and for taking an explicit stand against minorities that engage in gender-based forms of discrimination, she is nevertheless critical of his tendency to focus on overt forms of discrimination in the public sphere (e.g. denial of the franchise or the right to a basic education), while overlooking the more subtle but no less destructive forms of gender domination that occur within the family and the domain of intra-communal social relations.4 What Okin specifically has in mind here is the manner in which women in certain cultural groups, through a combination of socialization and social pressure, are conditioned to accept their own oppression and a life where they can never enjoy the same opportunities, freedoms and overall sense of well-being as men. Examples include pressuring young women to accept arranged marriages, socializing them to believe in their subordinate position in the gender hierarchy, encouraging them to be docile and subservient in the presence of men, and discouraging them from pursuing opportunities and roles traditionally reserved for men. Practices such as these are doubly destructive, in Okin’s view, because not only do they perpetuate inequality in the private sphere they drastically restrict women’s access to the resources, opportunities and social supports necessary to achieve equality in the public sphere (Okin 1998: 678–80; 1999: 13–17, 20–3; 2007: 335–9; cf.

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Nussbaum 1999: 29–54). For example, even though a woman raised in a highly patriarchal religious community may be formally free to pursue a career in medicine, Okin is inclined to view her freedom as illusory if she has been heavily pressured to forgo the necessary educational requirements, and comprehensively socialized to believe that her only legitimate role in life is to raise children and tend to the home, leaving the realm of higher education and a fulfilling career path to her husband. Okin’s third criticism is directed towards theories of multicultural accommodation that rely too heavily on exit rights as a means of protecting individuals who are treated unjustly by their fellow community members. There are two major problems with exit, from Okin’s point of view. The first is that it is frequently the case that the most vulnerable and disempowered community members—those whose rights and interests are in fact most in need of protection—whose capacity to exit is most severely compromised, in many cases to the point where it is effectively non-existent. This applies to young children in particular, whose lack of life skills and near comprehensive dependence upon their parents makes the idea of exit rights seem ludicrous at best, but it is also extremely problematic in the case of women whose social and familial history has deprived them of many of the elements—including life experience, educational background, economic independence, and a sense of self-confident agency—necessary to make exit a realistic option in their case (Okin 2007: 325–7, 334–9; cf. Reich 2005: 216, 223–5). Okin is especially critical of the minimalist theory of exit defended by Kukathas, which not only fails to offer a remedy for the compromised exit rights of the most vulnerable members of cultural communities, but openly tolerates the very discriminatory and oppressive practices that make exit so problematic in the first place (Okin 2007: 333–4, 343-5; cf. Shachar 2001: 69). Exit is also problematic, in Okin’s view, when it is relied upon as the only form of recourse for those who are mistreated by their fellow community members. Exit rights are not unimportant, from Okin’s perspective, and she is clear that the exit option should be available for those who would choose it, but she is also clear that for many women this is an entirely unsatisfactory, if not patently unjust, solution to the inequalities with which they are faced. In particular, ‘‘[r]ights of exit provide no help to women or members of other oppressed groups who are deeply attached to their cultures but not to their oppressive aspects’’ (Okin 2007: 343). Okin is in agreement here with Ayelet Shachar that women for whom exit is the only alternative to oppression are placed in an unimaginably difficult, and grossly unfair, situation where they must choose between embracing their rights or embracing their culture (see e.g. Shachar 2001: 68–71, 90).5 In other words, whenever there is a conflict between minority cultural rights and gender equality, all of the burden of adjustment is placed on the aggrieved individual(s), and no burden at all on the cultural community. To help correct this injustice, Shachar recommends distributing the burdens of adjustment more equally between communities and dissenters, by employing a sort of carrot and stick approach to minority rights. The carrot is to offer

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minorities a measure of legally enforceable jurisdiction in areas that are key to the survival and transmission of their distinctive cultures—education and family law for example.6 The stick is to require that groups exercise this jurisdiction in a manner that respects a certain baseline standard of protection for the rights and interests of their members, including their female members. If necessary, these standards can be enforced by the state, but Shachar’s hope is that the jurisdictional carrot will encourage a process of voluntary internal reform, a process within which dissenters who have neither the desire to exit nor the desire to destroy their cultural community will acquire not only a voice but also a sense of active, autonomous agency (Shachar 2001: 4–8, 42–4; 2007: 141–7; 2008: 575– 8, 596–7, 601–2). Similarly, Okin’s view is that questions of gender discrimination and gender oppression should be confronted before the final decision on granting minority rights is made. And like Shachar she specifically recommends that minority rights be subject to a process of negotiation that involves women as equal and active participants alongside the traditional male powerbrokers in their communities—a process that will help ensure that their interests and well-being will not be compromised if or when those rights are eventually granted (1998: 648; 1999: 23–4; 2005: 72–3; 2007: 327, 343; cf. Honig 1999: 40; Friedman 2007: 94).7 Precisely how women should be included in these sorts of negotiations, and how much weight their voices will carry in relation to those of other community stakeholders (e.g. will they have a veto over group rights that fail to fully satisfy their interests?) Okin does not say. In fact, her writings are generally short on detail when it comes to recommending concrete strategies for resolving the tensions she identifies between feminism and multiculturalism, particularly when those tensions arise in the private sphere. Much has been made of Okin’s statement that women raised in a highly patriarchal minority culture might be better off if that culture were to become extinct, leaving them free to integrate into the less sexist culture of the dominant society (Okin 1999: 22). Some see this as evidence that she is prepared to grant the liberal state an unlimited right to interfere with or abolish minority practices that fail to conform with dominant norms of gender equality, even if those interventions threaten the very survival of the cultural community in question. Okin has also been harshly criticized for being insensitive to the circumstances of minority communities which themselves have faced a long history of persecution and oppression at the hands of the state, and for failing to understand that many women who are disadvantaged within their cultural communities are nevertheless profoundly attached to their religious or cultural identities, and would be loathe to see the communal sources of those identities destroyed completely (Al-Hibri 1999: 44–6; Levy 2000: 56; Shachar 2001: 65–8; Benhabib 2002: 100). However, a more balanced reading of Okin reveals that most of these criticisms are overstated. In the first place, she is by no means inherently hostile to the idea of granting protection to cultural minorities and nowhere does she argue that the state should orchestrate the wholesale extinction of patriarchal minority

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cultures. Okin also suggests that any discussion of the legitimacy of state oversight of minority practices must address the possibility that government officials will abuse those regulatory powers in order to persecute unpopular racial, cultural or religious minorities. As a matter of fact, in the case of minorities that have themselves been the subject of oppression she tends to favour a democratic approach where dialogue and deliberation, not intervention, is the first line of response to the tensions that sometimes arise between multiculturalism and feminism (1999: 23; 2005: 85–7). Moreover, much like Shachar, Okin consistently emphasizes the need to empower minority women in this deliberative process, such that they are in a position where they can stand up for the interests of their cultural communities and for their own interests as equally valued members of those communities (1998: 684; 1999: 23–4; 2005: 72–5).8 On the other hand, Okin is crystal clear about the fact that when feminism and multiculturalism come into conflict she prioritizes women’s rights over cultural rights, and even though she frequently indicates a preference for liberation by means of education and persuasion she does not shy away from the option of following through on this commitment with more forceful measures, even when it comes to the more subtle forms of cultural pressure or socialization that occur in the private sphere (Okin 1998: 676; 1999: 22; 1999a: 129–31; 2005: 87; 2007: 343). One final criticism of Okin that needs to be considered is that her analysis of gender oppression in ‘‘other’’ cultures is compromised by an ethnocentric or culturally imperialistic bias. Which is to say that Okin is guilty of imposing western feminist standards of freedom, equality and well-being on non-western cultural communities that have their own, very different, conceptions of what constitutes a good and fulfilling human life.9 In tandem with this charge, Okin is sometimes accused of paternalism for suggesting that women in patriarchal cultures who accept their subordinate position in the gender hierarchy may not be the best judges of their own interests (Al-Hibri 1999: 41, 44–6; Bhabha 1999: 81–4; Gilman 1999: 53–8; Shachar 2001: 65–7).10 In my view, these charges are not entirely fair to Okin. Granted, Okin is guilty of some rather sweeping judgements about the oppressive and discriminatory nature of non-western cultures and religions, and for basing some of these judgements on a somewhat shallow evidentiary base (see e.g. Okin 1999: 14, 17; cf. Nussbaum 1999a: 105–6; Bhabha 1999: 81; Honig 1999: 37–8). It is also fair to say that her analysis sometimes lends itself to the interpretation that women should not always be regarded as reliable judges of the condition of their own oppression (see e.g. Okin 1999: 24, 125). Nevertheless, a couple of things can be said in Okin’s defense. First, the critics’ observation that many non-western cultural communities embrace different views about gender equality misses an important point, which is that in highly patriarchal communities these views may in fact represent only the perspectives of the dominant male cultural elites, because the voices of their female members have been effectively silenced. It is for precisely this reason that Okin is so adamant that these women gain an effective voice in their communities so that their own perspectives on gender equality (culturally informed or otherwise) can be heard.

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The second reply that can be made on Okin’s behalf is that the mere fact that the members of other communities or cultures adhere to moral principles that differ from our own is not in itself a valid objection to the legitimacy of crosscultural criticism. Indeed, sharp differences in standards of moral conduct are often precisely the reason why judgement or criticism is in order. Surely cultures that practiced systematic racism or embraced child abuse would be subjected to harsh criticism, so why not in the case of gender oppression? And to reply that such criticism is ethnocentric is entirely beside the point, because in the absence of universal moral truths (see Chapter 2) all parties in cross-cultural moral debates are necessarily ethnocentric—which is to say that all of us, whether we hail from a western or a non-western culture, inevitably and unavoidably begin from our own historically and culturally contingent moral commitments.11 In moral debates of any kind (whether they be cross-cultural or intra-cultural) the defenders of different moral principles can do nothing else except exchange contingent and culturally bound moral arguments with the hope of persuading one another as to their validity. True, in recognition of our own fallibility, and out of respect for the principle of toleration, we should always remain open to the possibility of shifting our own moral horizons (to use Taylor’s terms), but at the same time we should also be prepared to vigorously defend our most cherished convictions (they are, after all, our convictions), and this is precisely what Okin has done with courage and forcefulness in her own work. A classical liberal critique Okin’s critique of multiculturalism provides an interesting source of comparison and contrast with some of the views expressed by Brian Barry. Barry himself is an intriguing case because he grounds his discussion of the limits of multicultural accommodation in a set of assumptions very similar to those adopted by Kukathas, but he argues those assumptions through to a dramatically different set of conclusions.12 Like Kukathas, Barry extols the virtues of a liberal society that leaves its citizens as free as possible to live lives of their own choosing, and this includes the freedom to participate in forms of associational life that are guided by, and which help reinforce, their distinctive cultural beliefs, values and practices. Like Kukathas again, Barry emphasizes that this approach to diversity involves no judgement as to the value or respectworthiness of any particular set of cultural mores—on such questions the liberal state is obliged to remain neutral and impartial—it is only individual freedom itself, including freedom of association and conscience, that is valued, and this in turn reflects an underlying commitment to the equal moral value of persons. Barry is also closer to Kukathas, and therefore further away from a liberal culturalist like Kymlicka or a liberal feminist like Okin, in his view that communities of freely associating individuals have the right to live lives that are guided by illiberal principles, and this includes lifestyles that conflict with the principle of individual autonomy or which sanction the unequal treatment of women and men (2001: 118–31, 148).13 His conclusion to this effect is unequivocal: ‘‘It is no part of liberalism,

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as I understand it, to insist that every group must conform to liberal principles in its internal structure’’ (2001: 147). Yet this is about as far as the commonalities between these two theorists go, and Barry ultimately dismisses Kukathas’ radical theory of multiculturalism as a grotesque failure. It fails because the state has no authority to proscribe or punish minority practices that seriously undermine the freedom and well-being of vulnerable individuals, nor is it under any obligation to uphold realistic exit rights for individuals who object to the way they are being treated by their cultural communities (2001: 133, 141–6). In Barry’s view, any liberal theory worthy of the name must be prepared to draw a line around certain cultural practices that are so oppressive or inhumane they can never be tolerated, no matter what the consequences may be for associational freedom or cultural diversity (2001: 132–3). Barry himself places two strict conditions on the exercise of associational freedom in a multicultural society (2001: 148).14 First, the individual members of any cultural group must freely consent to the terms of their association, and those individuals must be adults of sound mind. Barry’s primary objective here is to safeguard the rights of children, and to ensure that they are not being victimized by other community members or by their own parents. Hence, the more extreme sorts of practices that Kukathas seems prepared to tolerate, including denial of lifesaving medical treatment or genital mutilation, are absolutely prohibited by Barry in the case of children (2001: 124, 203). Adults, on the other hand, are relatively more free to consent to forms of harmful treatment, but even here there are limitations on what a liberal state should be prepared to condone (2001: 148).15 The second condition on associational freedom is that any individual who no longer wishes to be part of the community must be free to exit. Here too Barry distinguishes himself from Kukathas by defending a very robust theory of exit, wherein the state is assigned a proactive role in ensuring that it is a realistic option for all group members, especially for the most vulnerable group members (2001: 149). For example, a liberal state has a duty to ensure that all children, regardless of their religious or cultural background, receive enough education to make an informed decision about whether or not to remain in the communities in which they have been raised. Barry is therefore fully prepared to compel isolationist religious groups such as the Amish to send their children to high school, or to deny religious fundamentalists the right to exempt their children from core aspects of the curriculum in public schools that conflict with their belief systems (2001: 242–6; cf. Reich 2005: 214–15, 226).16 Barry is also not averse to sanctioning groups that use financial penalties as a means of restricting freedom of exit and dissent amongst their members. He offers the example of the Hutterites, a conservative religious sect whose members live together in agricultural colonies where all assets and property are held communally. Barry has no problem with the Hutterite way of life per se, but their actions cross the line of liberal tolerance when they seek to deny a share of the community’s collectively owned assets to individuals who are either expelled from the colony (usually for reasons of heresy) or who choose to leave voluntarily. The reason he objects to this practice is that it places an enormous amount of pressure on

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community members contemplating exit or dissent, whose only choice is either to forgo their freedom within the community or to live a life of destitution on the outside. This, in Barry’s view, is no choice at all. He therefore wants to expose this practice for what it really is: a thinly veiled form of coercion that qualifies the Hutterite colony as precisely the kind of involuntary association that should attract the scrutiny of the liberal state. Barry’s solution is not to deny the Hutterites the right to expel heretics from their midst, for he feels this would be an unjustified infringement on freedom of association (and freedom of religion). He recommends instead that they be compelled to pay financial compensation to departing members, which will ensure that any individuals who may be contemplating exit or dissent can do so in the absence of crippling financial pressure. As Barry concludes, this is a reasonable price for the Hutterites to pay for remaining an association that is genuinely voluntary (2001: 163–4; cf. 128, 153–4; cf. Ignatieff 2007: 73). Interestingly, one of the reasons why Barry is so keen to uphold a robust right of exit is his conviction that direct intervention in the internal affairs of minority groups is often only a second-best option to providing people with genuine opportunities ‘‘to act themselves so as to avoid oppression, exploitation and injury’’ (2001: 149). Although he never clearly spells out why he thinks intervention is not the best solution, one gets the sense that it has a fair bit to do with his desire not to stifle associational freedom, his belief that individuals should be given a fair degree of scope to decide for themselves which forms of harmful treatment they are willing to subject themselves to, and his estimation that in practical terms forceful intervention might actually undermine liberal protections against injustice and oppression (2001: 138–9, 148–9). Yet Barry is by no means entirely opposed to the idea of intervention. He supports it unequivocally in the interests of child welfare, and in the interest of protecting adults from severe and debilitating forms of harm, even when those harms are inflicted with their consent. Indeed, Barry cites his support for intervention as one of the features that most distinguishes his theory of group rights from that of a liberal multiculturalist like Kymlicka. His reading of Kymlicka’s position is that it is fine to criticize minorities for violating liberal human rights standards, and even to lend one’s support to the liberalizing efforts of internal reformers, but direct intervention is a form of cultural imperialism that cannot be abided.17 According to Barry, this theory clearly fails the liberal litmus test, for a liberal is someone who not only believes in the universal validity of liberal human rights standards, but is willing to stand up for those principles in practice, even if that sometimes means resorting to the use of force (2001: 137–40).18

The debate joined Minorities, states and the limits of accommodation By this point in the book it should be clear that most philosophical champions of multiculturalism believe that minority rights should not come at the expense

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of the fundamental human rights of individual group members. What I propose to consider now is whether the multiculturalist follow-through on this conviction has been adequate, particularly in light of the criticisms raised in the preceding section. Of all the theories of minority accommodation that have been discussed so far, the tolerationist version of multiculturalism defended by Kukathas fares the most poorly. Many of the problems for Kukathas stem from his mistrust of the state. Granted, he does well to remind us that states are not always agents of good, and that even liberal states have proven themselves capable of wielding their authority in the service of minority oppression rather than minority protection (see e.g. Okin 2005: 85 n. 8). However, being wary of state power is one thing and being paranoid about state power is quite another. Kukathas seems more inclined towards the latter position, but the case he offers in its defence is radically unconvincing. For example, he cites a handful of examples from the last several centuries where states (many of which were not, in fact, liberal democracies) persecuted or oppressed minorities within their borders, but all this proves is that liberal states are sometimes capable of injustice and that some liberal states at some point in their history have in fact been agents of injustice (Kukathas 2003: 135–6). What Kukathas fails to prove is that liberal states never have acted or never could act as agents of justice by protecting the rights of the weak and vulnerable, or that things would not become drastically worse for such individuals were the state to be completely removed from the business of enforcing standards of justice. It is difficult to see why anyone with an interest in promoting fundamental rights and freedoms would be willing to accept such a radical option on the basis of such limited evidence, particularly when less drastic alternatives are available. Perhaps the most obvious of these would be a system of constitutional checks and balances aimed at making the state more accountable to its citizens, and less capable of abusing the regulatory power with which it has been entrusted.19 Such a system would offer greater security to members of both minority and majority cultures, for make no mistake, if Kukathas’ vision of the liberal archipelago were to become a reality, the state’s role in enforcing standards of justice and human rights would be eliminated not just in the case of minorities but in the case of all citizens. Kukathas is on firmer ground when he discusses the many limitations of intervention as a strategy for fighting injustice and domination within groups. For example, as he correctly observes, there is no guarantee that outside intervention will make things any better for those on the receiving end of discriminatory or oppressive behaviour. It may even make things worse, for example by provoking a backlash that would see a community cling even more tightly to its unjust practices or become even more radical and oppressive. I also take his point that there is a risk that forceful intervention in the interests of liberalization could inflict significant collateral damage on the community in question, and here there is some overlap with the work of Shachar, who reminds us that many individuals who are oppressed by their fellow group members, and who would like to see those oppressive practices reformed or eliminated, would nevertheless be devastated to see their communities and cultures completely destroyed in the

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process.20 Kukathas also borrows a valuable insight from Mill when he suggests that the use of force may change people’s outward behaviour for a time, but its utility is limited if the aim is to convince people that they should treat their fellow community members more justly (Kukathas 2003: 136–7). These are all reasonable insights, but again, the more reasonable conclusion to be drawn from them is not that state intervention is never the right solution, but rather that it may not be the best solution in all cases. For example, it seems perfectly reasonable to consider intervention as a last resort when all other options have failed or as an emergency measure when individuals are threatened with immediate and grievous forms of harm. What also seems clear is that sound decisions about intervention must also be based on evidence not just abstract arguments, and we are putting the cart before the horse if we seek to make our minds up on this question without first looking at the concrete facts and circumstances of specific cases. I will return to this argument below when I discuss the specific case of national minorities. What of Kukathas’ alternative model of a society of largely self-regulating associations, where the state excuses itself from the realm of justice and focuses exclusively on law and order? What assurances do we have that this society of freedom he describes would not devolve into a ‘‘mosaic of tyrannies’’ (2003: 136)?21 Kukathas offers two arguments in his defence, both of them remarkably weak. The first is that communities with particularly oppressive tendencies are also likely to be members of larger and more liberal associations, and if they expect to retain those rights of membership they will have to moderate or abandon the more harmful and offensive of their practices. Indeed, Kukathas is confident that the pressure of social conformity will also lead illiberal groups to modify their practices as they internalize the more enlightened social norms of neighbouring associations (2002: 195–7; 2003: 143–5). On the other hand, Kukathas offers nothing in the way of concrete assurances that harmful—even extremely harmful or life-threatening—practices will be punished or prohibited in this society of freedom, and this is what makes his argument so unsatisfactory. In essence, Kukathas asks individuals to rely for their protection on the vagaries of chance and circumstance—which is hardly reassuring, especially for the more vulnerable members of oppressive communities that choose to isolate themselves from their more liberal neighbours, rather than conform to their more progressive social norms. The weakness of this ‘guarantee’ is further compounded by the fact that it is paired with an anaemic right of exit that sanctions virtually any form of coercion short of physical restraint, and not even freedom from the latter is guaranteed unequivocally (see Chapter 5). Kukathas’ second line of defence is to argue that smaller, self-regulating associations are less of a threat to liberty because they are less powerful than a centralized state (Kukathas 2003: 137, 265–6). Yet this too is far from reassuring because associations that are relatively less powerful than a state may still be powerful enough to persecute and oppress their own members. Kukathas admits as much when he declares his fundamental lack of confidence in the capacity of any authority to act as an agent of justice (Kukathas 2003: 260–1). Indeed,

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despite his professed dedication to the cause of individual liberty and to shielding dissenters from persecution, Kukathas is fully (and unapologetically) prepared to tolerate the presence of oppressive communities—what he calls ‘‘islands of tyranny in a sea of indifference’’—that will remain free to subject their members to cruel, degrading and even life-threatening forms of treatment (2003: 134–7, 147; cf. 2002: 197–8).22 One can’t help but wonder whether Kukathas’ assumption that ‘‘[t]he worst fate that a person might have to endure is that he be unable to avoid acting against conscience’’ (2003: 64) is at least partly to blame here. For surely one can imagine worse fates, such as to be raped, tortured or murdered or to have these horrors visited upon your family or friends? And surely a political philosophy of multiculturalism that took the prevention of such horrors as its fundamental departure point would look very different than the one on offer by Kukathas?23 A liberal multiculturalist like Kymlicka presents a more challenging case for the critics. The first thing to be noted is that Kymlicka is in fact opposed to many of the group rights that concern a critic like Okin, including the right of religious minorities to exercise independent jurisdiction over family law or to opt out of the requirement of sending their children to common schools (2001: 303–7; 2007: 161 n. 23).24 In fact, he is loathe to grant any cultural group, other than a national minority, the kind of legally enforceable jurisdiction it could use to impose restrictions on individual freedom, to stifle internal dissent or to enforce traditional patriarchal norms against the wishes of its members (1995: 40–1, 202 n. 1, 158; 1998: 64–5). Granted, Kymlicka is willing to grant more latitude to certain isolationist religious groups. For example, he is prepared to grant the Amish the right to exempt their children from attending public high schools—a measure that runs afoul of Okin’s concerns about illiberal forms of cultural socialization and also Barry’s concerns about the relationship between exit rights and informed consent. Nevertheless, Kymlicka is also clear about the fact that this constitutes a rare exception to his standard requirement that religious groups be denied the authority to restrict the basic civil and political rights of their members, an exception that can be justified only for groups who were historically promised this freedom when they decided to resettle themselves in their current location (2001: 306, n. 10).25 Indeed, it is interesting to note that Kymlicka is just as frequently criticized for his willingness to judge other cultures by his liberal standards, and for insisting that groups who lay claim to the protections offered by a liberal scheme of minority rights should be prepared to respect the autonomy and the basic civil and political rights of their members (see e.g. Chaplin 1993: 45–6; Taylor 1994b; Tomasi 1995; Parekh 2000: 107–8). What about Okin’s concerns regarding gender oppression in the private sphere? The issues here are a bit more complicated. To begin with, Kymlicka is unequivocal about the fact that practices which expose women to forms of physical harm or coercion, whether they occur in the public or the private sphere, are categorically ruled out by the liberal theory of multiculturalism he defends (see e.g. Kymlicka 1999a; 2001: 172–6). In fact, it is fair to say that prohibitions on harmful or coercive treatment of women and children, either in public or in

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private, is a widespread feature in the multiculturalism literature (see e.g. Parekh 1999: 70; Levy 2000: 51–2; Spinner-Halev 2000: 79–80; 2001: 105–6; Shachar 2001; Phillips 2007: 9, 32–41).26 Nevertheless, it is also true that one would be hard pressed to find a multiculturalist who was willing to recommend direct interference in the more subtle forms of discriminatory socialization to which many women are subjected in their private lives. Yet the reason for this is fairly obvious: most theorists fear that intervention of this kind threatens to collapse the sphere of private freedom that an open and democratic society is dedicated to protecting. It is worth remembering here that this is not just a minority issue, it is about the right of people in general to structure their private lives around sexist (or other discriminatory) social norms, and to imprint these norms upon their children through a combination of socialization and social pressure. Should the state be granted the authority to monitor the socialization processes that occur in people’s homes? Should parents be required to pass on to their children only state-sanctioned social norms? Should they be punished if they fail to do so, and if so, how? Okin herself says very little about the sorts of coercive measures that can justifiably be taken to combat the sources of gender inequality she identifies in familial and community life. She occasionally flirts with the possibility of punishment or intervention by the state, but she offers no account of how this would be accomplished while leaving intact some semblance of a sphere of private liberty (Okin 1998: 676; 2007: 343; cf. Post 1999: 67). Multiculturalists have suggested some means of addressing this issue, but these suggestions are generally restricted to the kinds of things that can be done in the public sphere, such as ensuring that children have access to educational opportunities that will expose them to a spectrum of alternative social norms and lifestyle possibilities (Kymlicka 2001: 308–9; Spinner-Halev 2000: 198).27 Another possible option would be publicly funded media campaigns to ensure that women of different religious and cultural backgrounds are fully informed of their basic rights as citizens and are aware of the various support services available to them should they choose to leave their families and communities in pursuit of a different life. The state can also compel minorities to set up an exit fund for their financially deprived female (and male) members, and in this way ensure that dissenting individuals have greater freedom to remove themselves from their socially oppressive surroundings (Spinner-Halev 2000: 77–8; 2001: 111; cf. Barry 2001: 163–4). The sort of intercultural dialogue favoured by Parekh (2000), Shachar (2001) and Deveaux (2006) could also be deployed as a means of persuading cultural groups to embrace norms of gender equality in the private sphere. On the other hand, most multiculturalists would agree, and here they would have the full support of a liberal like Barry, that if the state were to adopt more intrusive measures—for example, by comprehensively policing the socialization of women in the private sphere—this would constitute a dangerous arrogation of power and a serious threat to freedom of conscience and lifestyle (Spinner-Halev 2000: 198–9; Ignatieff 2007: 73; Young 2007: 85; cf. Barry 2001: 152).28 I am in fact convinced that Okin herself would have recoiled from such drastic interference in the private lives of citizens, but unfortunately she leaves us without any sense

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of what alternative measures she would recommend, other than the support she has already expressed for increased educational opportunities and intercultural dialogue.

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The case of national minorities One final issue that merits attention in this discussion is the impression amongst critics that multiculturalists apply much laxer human rights standards to national minorities than they do to other kinds of minorities. Kymlicka’s theory is often singled out in this regard. Okin, for one, accuses Kymlicka of simply abandoning his standard requirement that groups be internally liberal when it comes to the case of self-governing national minorities, and here she is joined by Barry who suggests that Kymlicka is unwilling to see these groups interfered with even for the sake of preventing violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms (Okin 1999: 133, n. 6; Barry 2001: 138).29 Both of these criticisms overlook the nuances of Kymlicka’s position. To start with, Kymlicka expresses his unequivocal support for the notion that all minorities, including national minorities, should respect the basic civil and political rights of their members, but in his view the argument that basic human rights standards should always and everywhere be respected does not automatically justify the further conclusion that those standards should be imposed and enforced by an outside authority (Kymlicka 1992: 144; 1995: 164–5; 2001: 62–4). In some cases intervention will clearly be justified—for example, when confronting ‘‘gross and systematic’’ human rights violations such as genocide or ethnic cleansing—but in other cases, particularly where the rights violations are far less severe, the case for non-intervention (or alternatives to intervention) may turn out to be the stronger one (Kymlicka 1995: 169–70; cf. Spinner-Halev 2001: 105–6). Kymlicka’s point, more generally, is that in contemplating the legitimacy, and the potential efficacy, of intervention we must take into account a variety of different normative and practical considerations. This is an insight he shares with several other champions of minority self-determination.30 One of the first points Kymlicka raises is that in weighing up the case for intervention it is important to consider not only the moral imperative of protecting human rights but also the competing moral imperative of respecting the right of peoples to rule themselves in the absence of external domination (see Chapter 5). More often than not in the debate, this competing moral imperative is either passed over in silence or it is simply assumed that the state has a moral right to rule over ‘its’ national minorities, and to unilaterally determine whether or under what conditions minority rights to self-determination are to be recognized (see e.g. Nussbaum 1999: 108–9; Barry 2001: 139; Benhabib 2002: 64–5; Song 2007: 133). This assumption is especially problematic in the case of indigenous peoples and other national minorities who themselves have faced a long history of state-sanctioned oppression and mistreatment (Tully 2000a; Kymlicka 2001: 73–7, 80–2; Spinner-Halev 2001: 94–5, 102–3; Turner 2006: 57–70). National minorities in these circumstances might legitimately ask why the state has any

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right to question the justice of their governing practices when it refuses to question the justice of its own. They might also wonder whether a state that has treated them so harshly in the past can now be trusted to treat them fairly. These are issues that cannot be ignored in any principled discussion of human rights in the context of minority self-determination. At the same time, however, acknowledging the moral force of minority claims to self-determination and recognizing the injustices that minorities themselves have suffered at the hands of the state should not automatically predispose us towards non-interference nor can it ever justify an indifference to the claims of individuals who seek a remedy to their mistreatment or oppression within those groups (see e.g. Friedman 2007: 91, 94). The point is rather that both of these normative claims deserve serious and principled consideration, or as Kymlicka concludes: ‘‘It is not a question of choosing between minority rights and human rights, or of giving priority to one over the other, but rather of treating them together as equally important components of justice in ethnoculturally plural countries’’ (2001: 82; cf. Spinner-Halev 2001: 84–5). Intervention in the case of national minorities can also be problematic for a variety of more practical reasons, some of which we have encountered already in our discussion of Kukathas. For starters, outside intervention could easily provoke a backlash against liberal human rights norms and a turn to even more oppressive or inegalitarian cultural practices, and in some cases it could even provoke groups to defend their autonomy by violent means. Alternatively, intervention might simply end up driving harmful or exploitative practices underground where they will effectively be invisible to policy-makers, leaving vulnerable individuals even more thoroughly at the mercy of the dominant cultural power-brokers within their communities. Others have argued that if the ultimate objective of state policy is to see that illiberal groups develop not just a grudging tolerance for but a genuine commitment to human rights then education, incentives and persuasion are to be preferred to intervention (Levy 2000: 54–7; Spinner-Halev 2001: 95–6; Shachar 2007: 135–6, 141). As Kymlicka himself argues: ‘‘.liberal institutions can only really work if liberal beliefs have been internalized by the members of the self-governing society.’’ (Kymlicka 1995: 167). Indeed, whether we are talking about the specific case of national minorities or about minorities in general, the motto that many multiculturalists seem to follow is intervention if necessary but not necessarily intervention—because in practice the latter may turn out to be less effective than the many other available options, which include dialogue or negotiation, criticism and moral suasion, lending moral and material support to the efforts of internal reformers, or a system of sanctions and incentives such as that favoured by Shachar (Kymlicka 1995: 163–70; 2001: 62–4; Levy 2000: 52–61; Spinner-Halev 2001: 95–6, 105– 6, 107–9; Shachar 2001: 117–28, 141–4; 2008: 575–8; Parekh 2000: 268–94). But again, the same caveat applies, which is that we should not simply accept all of these practical reservations about intervention at face value. For example, although we might agree in principle that intervention to enforce norms of

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gender equality could provoke a traditionalist backlash, this does not relieve us of the responsibility to weigh the specific costs and benefits of intervention on a case-by-case basis, rather than simply concluding in the abstract that it could never provide a net benefit for women who are suffering the consequences of gender domination (Friedman 2007: 96–7). Indeed, if the intention is to find the most effective strategy for realizing our principled commitments in practice, there really is no substitute for rigorous empirical investigation.

Conclusion If there is any overarching message to be gleaned from this chapter it is that finding agreement on the appropriate limits of multicultural accommodation is no simple task. Granted, when it comes to the more extreme cases of human rights violations, such as those involving severe forms of cruelty, coercion and deprivation, one is much more likely to find consensus. Most theorists, whether they be critics or champions of multiculturalism, agree that groups should not have the right to kill, maim or torture their members or to grossly neglect the well-being of their children, and that intervention is fully justified to prevent or punish any and all of these crimes. But not every case is an easy case, and it is precisely when the grey areas begin to appear, and our intuitions start pulling us in competing directions, that the more difficult questions arise. What should we do about the more subtle but no less debilitating forms of coercion that occur in the private sphere? Where in fact should the line be drawn between the public and the private, or should every domain of human activity where domination and oppression is possible be subject to scrutiny and sanction? Should some forms of objectionable behaviour be considered less objectionable if the individuals themselves consent to the way they are being treated? How might the availability of an exit option for dissenters factor into our decision? How do we know when exit is truly free, and if it is not free, is there a moral case for intervention? And will intervention makes things better or will it only make them worse? As should be clear by now, these are questions on which there is much reasonable disagreement, not only between multiculturalists and their critics, but within the diverse ranks of the multiculturalists themselves. For example, a multiculturalist like Spinner-Halev, who tends to prioritize the justice-related claims of historically oppressed minorities will almost inevitably find himself at odds with feminist theorists like Friedman (2007: 94–5) and Okin (1999a: 131) who prioritize the justice-related claims of women, but also with a feminist multiculturalist like Shachar and a liberal culturalist like Kymlicka, both of whom share his desire to respect minority autonomy but whom also harbor a liberalizing impulse he feels is ultimately corrosive of that end (see e.g. Spinner-Halev 2000: 51–6; 2008: 561, 564–5). What makes these differences and disagreements that much more difficult to sort out is the fact that in many cases there are sound moral arguments to be had on opposing sides of the same issue, and in choosing one course of action over another it is inevitable that something of value will be

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lost or sacrificed in the process (Barry 2001: 152; cf. Phillips 2007 179). As Isaiah Berlin reminded us more than a half century ago: ‘‘[t]he world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others’’ (1984: 30). To hope for more—for some universal formula or set of decision rules that will cut through this indeterminacy to provide easy and incontrovertible solutions in every case—is simply to yearn for a world that is far less complex, both morally and empirically, than the one in which we live.

Chapter 8

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Multiculturalism and social cohesion Introduction In this chapter I want to take up the criticism that multicultural policies threaten to undermine the sense of solidarity that helps bind together the citizens of a culturally diverse democracy into a cohesive and stable political community. Critics fear that when this feeling of solidarity is weakened, or when it is not properly cultivated amongst newcomers to the polity, the members of different cultural groups will have greater difficulty trusting and making sacrifices for one another, and will feel less inclined to work together in common institutions in pursuit of common goals. Even more worrisome is the perception that multicultural policies will feed a sense of ethnic separatism, leading to increased interethnic fear, suspicion and rivalry and the possibility of conflict and bloodshed. To a certain extent, therefore, this chapter moves us away from questions surrounding the justice of multicultural policies towards an analysis of their consequences in a more purely practical sense. Yet this is not entirely accurate, for in many ways the moral and practical implications of multicultural policies are interdependent. For instance, the prevention of violent conflict is not only an essential practical prerequisite of stable democratic governance, it also performs a vital moral function by providing a social and political environment that is conducive to the liberty, security and well-being of citizens. Similarly, when critics object that multicultural policies undermine public support for welfare redistribution they are not just voicing a practical concern but also a concern about a pressing matter of social justice. To understand the relationship between multiculturalism and social cohesion is therefore to understand both of these sorts of concerns and how they are connected. In setting out to examine these issues a healthy dose of intellectual humility is in order, for there is much about the sources of social solidarity in culturally diverse societies that continues to be only dimly understood (Kymlicka 2007a: 48 n. 35; Harell and Stolle 2010: 241). What makes this debate even more challenging is the fact that so few studies to date have subjected the competing hypotheses about the impact of multicultural policies on social cohesion to rigorous empirical testing (Kymlicka 2007: 48; Banting and Kymlicka 2006a: 22; Williams 2007: 223–4). More recently there have been some encouraging signs

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of change on this front, and the literature now contains a number of single- and multi-country empirical studies that examine the impact of ethnic diversity on trust and social capital (Putnam 2007), the relationship between multicultural policies and welfare redistribution (Banting and Kymlicka 2006), and the effect of multicultural policies on patterns and trends in immigrant integration (Soroka et al. 2007; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). Although the story told by this evidence is still incomplete, it has undoubtedly shed more light on at least some of the key points of debate amongst multiculturalists and their critics, while setting a more focused agenda for further, and more refined, empirical research. With those caveats in mind, I will first examine some of the competing theoretical perspectives on the relationship between multicultural policies and social cohesion. I follow this up in section two with a discussion of the different sorts of challenges to social cohesion posed by immigrant minorities and national minorities. Particular attention is devoted here to the nature of the claims these groups make against the state, and to the different kinds of multicultural policies that can be used to satisfy these demands and their potential impact on political stability and social cohesion. I will also investigate what the available empirical evidence tells us about the relationship between multicultural policies and citizen solidarity in concrete political settings.

Diversity and social cohesion This question of how to maintain stability and social cohesion in the face of diversity has roots that reach back at least as far as the nineteenth century. It was a question that particularly exercised a number of late-nineteenth-century liberal political philosophers. The most well-known of these was John Stuart Mill, who argued that effective governing institutions and stable, unified and peaceful civil societies could only be built on the foundation of a shared national identity: a sense of mutual identification and attachment amongst citizens based on things like a common language, shared customs, traditions or religious convictions, or a set of shared experiences and memories deriving from a common history (Mill 1954: 359–60; Tamir 1993: 140; Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 369; Kymlicka 1995: 50–57). As Mill famously concluded: ‘‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist’’ (Mill 1954: 361).1 The obvious solution to this problem, from Mill’s perspective, was to ensure ‘‘that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.’’ However, Mill also recognized that circumstances were frequently such that this could not be realized in practice, and in such cases his favored solution was the assimilation and absorption of one nation by another.2 This solution was to be especially welcomed in the case of purportedly inferior or backward nations, whose members he believed

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would reap the benefits of citizenship in more cultivated or civilized nations (Mill 1954: 362–5).3 This process of assimilation and absorption, which Walker Connor describes as majority nation-building through minority nation-destroying, would eventually become a standard feature of political development and state formation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Connor 1999: 29–66; Kymlicka 2001: 229–34). A generation of liberal modernization theorists writing in the 1950s and 1960s also welcomed the assimilation of ethnocultural and ethnonational minorities as a necessary by-product of the forward march of economic development and democratic consolidation, as did the architects of the postsecond world war liberal international order, who viewed minority rights and strong minority identities as a threat to peace and stability both within and between states (Moreno 2001: 201–2; Anaya 2004; Harty and Murphy 2005: 41–3). Minority claims, it was hoped, could be satisfied by the extension of universal individual human rights and the benefits of equal citizenship within the bounds of an indivisible sovereign state. However, as we know already from the discussion in Chapter 4, many nationalizing states have not been able to effect the total erasure of minority identities, or to prevent individuals or groups from mobilizing around these identities politically. Indeed, multicultural political philosophy was in many ways a response to the limited success of majority nation-building in practice. Initially, multiculturalists advanced their case almost exclusively in moral terms, and spent the bulk of their energies arguing against the perceived injustices of the liberal-assimilationist model of nation-building. In contrast, the potential impact of minority rights and group-differentiated citizenship regimes on things like stability, societal integration and national unity received hardly a mention in this early literature (see e.g. Kymlicka 1989; Young 1990; and Taylor 1992).4 Nevertheless, this period of inattention proved to be fairly short-lived, and the champions of multiculturalism were soon called upon to respond to a very powerful critique of multicultural policies that focused precisely on the threat they posed to the social bases of citizen solidarity in a democratic society. It is to this critique that I now turn. According to the critics, multicultural policies are corrosive of social solidarity in several different ways, and they work their effect on the dispositions of members of both minority and majority cultures. One argument is that multicultural policies promote a form of ethnic ghettoization that encourages the members of different cultural groups to retreat behind the boundaries of their own group based identities, to focus on what divides them from their fellow citizens rather than on what they have in common, and to orient their interests and their allegiances inward towards the group rather than outward towards the broader national community of which they are a part (Cairns 1993: 200; Miller 1995: 153–4; Beiner 1995: 6, 192–3, 2003: 211; Barry 2001: 79–80).5 As a consequence, the members of those groups may be less willing to learn the national language, to enter the mainstream economy, to participate in civic and political life, or to build relationships or social networks outside of their respective

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cultural communities. That these sorts of dispositions are problematic from an integrationist perspective should be obvious enough, but critics also worry that they might undermine the foundations of social justice by leaving the members of minority communities trapped in a permanent state of economic and political marginalization (Barry 2001: 88–9; Huntington 2004: 104–7; Ford 2005: 40–2, 211–12). Critics also warn that multicultural policies can have a corrosive effect on the disposition of members of the wider society, who may come to resent such measures as forms of preferential treatment that are unfairly denied to other citizens (Freeman 2002: 26). It is also not unreasonable to conclude that multicultural policies, particularly those which grant minorities a degree of institutional or political autonomy, will increase levels of suspicion and mistrust as people begin to question the motives of groups that wish to set themselves apart from the rest of society and which ‘‘refuse to live like the rest of us’’. Members of the majority might even interpret these policies as evidence of the minority’s contempt for their own way of life, and may seek to return the favor by disparaging minority practices and lifestyles. For all of these reasons, critics are concerned that multicultural policies will reduce the willingness of members of the wider society to accept their minority neighbors as fellow citizens to whom they owe duties of justice, allegiance and protection (Cairns 2000: 93, 140–2, 156–7; Ford 2005: 17). Indeed, as Kymlicka observes, some critics see the idea of recognizing and granting institutional support to minority identities and practices as the very antithesis of the idea of common citizenship in a democratic society, for in their eyes, ‘‘[c]itizenship should be a forum where people transcend their differences, and think about the common good of all citizens’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 175; cf. Williams 2004: 103). One final, and more dire, warning from the critics is that multiculturalists seem to have forgotten the chief lesson learned from the enormously destructive series of religious wars that swept through Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: that if states wish to maintain peace and stability in conditions of diversity they must remain staunchly neutral on questions of religious or cultural difference, leaving decisions in these matters to the private choices of individual citizens (Barry 2001: 21; cf. Rawls 1996: xxiv–xxxii).6 Seemingly oblivious of this message the multiculturalists cast the state once again in the role of cultural arbiter, equipped with the authority, and the inclination, to parcel out special rights and entitlements to different communities of identity and belief, and in so doing they set the stage for a destabilizing spiral of inter-group competition for power and privileges, which is at best a recipe for chronic social discontent, and at worst a pathway to violence and bloodshed (Wilkinson 1997: 99–181; Vann Woodward 1998: 59–60). These are serious concerns, and multiculturalists can justifiably be criticized for being slow to address them. Critics like Barry have taken this charge even a step further by suggesting that the multiculturalists have remained indifferent, if not entirely hostile, to the idea of building a sense of common identity and solidarity amongst the citizens of a culturally diverse society (2001: 77, 300–1), but

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this is unhelpful. While it is undoubtedly a plausible description of what some multiculturalists believe, it is a misleading characterization of the field as a whole, which features a wide variety of perspective on how unity, stability and governability can be maintained in a culturally diverse society. To cite just a few examples, Tariq Modood places the issue of inter-communal solidarity at the very heart of his theory of multiculturalism, and he advocates policies that recognize and respect minority identities while encouraging minority integration into a more inclusive overarching national identity (2007: 14, 146–54). Modood draws much of his inspiration here from the work of Parekh (1999a; 2000: 199–206, 262–3), but this emphasis on a multiculturalism built around the complementarity of minority identities and a common national identity is also characteristic of the positions staked out by Spinner (1994: 56–9), Kymlicka (1995: 188–9; 1998: 138–43; 2001: 152–76), Taylor (1991, 2004), Carens (2000: 107–39, 161–99), and a number of others (see e.g. Borrows 2002; Keating 2001; O’Neill 2001). Not surprisingly, one of the few multiculturalists to deviate significantly from this message is Kukathas. Efforts to promote minority integration or the cultivation of a common national identity are in his view a threat to freedom of association and freedom of conscience. His position is that the liberal state should stick to the business of maintaining peaceful and orderly inter-communal relations and forgo the search for any additional social bonding agent such as a common national identity or a shared conception of justice (2003: 15, 31–8, 177). In fact, Kukathas freely confesses his preference for much looser forms of political association, where membership and boundaries are more conditional and fluid, much like the forms of political association characteristic of international society (2003: 38–9, 163–4, 209–10). Hence, he is not in the least bit concerned about the possibility that civility and mutual toleration (and the perceived advantages of living in a society that respects freedom of association and conscience) will not always be up to the task of binding together the constituent communities in a multicultural society. His view is that if any particular community (or group of communities) opts for a peaceful exit from a liberal society, the state has no business getting in their way, even if this compromises the longer-term viability of the society itself. Although there is a certain degree of overlap between Kukathas’ position and the manner in which some multiculturalists approach the question of secession from a multinational state (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995: 186), most of those theorists who have engaged with these issues indicate a clear preference for finding ways to promote unity and social cohesion in culturally diverse democracies, and share the belief that multicultural policies can be a valuable tool in the promotion of these ends. Indeed, many champions of multiculturalism are of the view that refusing to accommodate minority identities and practices is more likely to undermine solidarity and social cohesion in a multicultural society. They argue, for example, that minorities may be less willing to participate in economic and political life or to take up citizenship in their new society if they feel they cannot do so without turning their back completely on their own distinctive

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identities and beliefs. They may even view non-accommodation as a sign that they are not welcome to participate in the wider society or that their identities and beliefs are looked down upon by the majority. This in turn can lead to feelings of alienation and resentment, which is not only a barrier to integration but also a potential source of instability and social unrest (Kymlicka 1995: 184–5; Tully 2000: 479). Conversely, it has been suggested that multicultural policies can help generate a feeling of acceptance and belonging amongst the members of minority communities, who are more likely to feel a sense of attachment to a society that is prepared to accommodate the identities and practices they value so highly (Parekh 1991, 2000: 203–4; Modood 2007: 146–54). There are also reasons to believe that multicultural policies can have a positive effect on majority attitudes towards diversity. Banting and Kymlicka have argued that public suspicion and mistrust of cultural minorities often precedes the introduction of multicultural policies, and that these policies are specifically designed to combat these sentiments and to help ‘‘normalize’’ the idea of diversity (Banting and Kymlicka 2006a: 16; cf. Kymlicka 2010: 263). Examples of such policies include cultural sensitivity training for public officials, the introduction of multicultural content into the curriculum in public schools, or antidiscrimination campaigns. It has also been suggested that many multicultural policies are explicitly integrative in their intent, and are designed to bring the members of minority cultures into the economic and political mainstream where they can live and work as equals amongst members of the majority culture. Affirmative action in the areas of employment, education or political representation is one of the most obvious examples in this category, the idea being that as the number of minority individuals participating in the workforce and in civic and political life increases, the more likely it is that they will develop a sense of belonging to the wider society, and the less likely it will be that members of the majority culture will regard them as outsiders who have no interest in fulfilling their obligations as citizens (Kymlicka 1995: 176–7; 2001: 163–5; Modood 2007: 61–2, 78-9, 117–18). That having been said, there is a healthy degree of recognition in the multicultural camp that a policy of minority accommodation is not always a recipe for stability and social cohesion, and that much depends on the type of minority being accommodated, the kinds of multicultural policies being considered, and the different political contexts within which those policies are expected to function (see e.g. Spinner 1994: 85–6, 161–3; Kymlicka 1995: 173–92; Levy 2000: 11–12; Miller 2006: 335). In other words, there is only so much we can learn from a highly generalized debate about the impact of multicultural policies on social cohesion (see e.g. Myles and St-Arnaud 2006: 341). With this message firmly in mind, the next section takes a closer look at the very different claims and circumstances of immigrant minorities and national minorities, and the distinctive nature of the challenges they pose to social cohesion and national unity in a culturally diverse society.7 Few other distinctions carry such weight in multiculturalist discussions of social cohesion, yet surprisingly it still gets overlooked by many of the critics (see e.g. Hollinger 1995; Wilkinson 1997: 188–93; Berns

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1998; Schlesinger 1998; Ford 2005: 164–5). In revisiting this distinction I will also investigate how the variable of policy choice affects the social cohesion equation, and what the available empirical evidence reveals about some of the competing hypotheses of the champions and critics of multiculturalism.

Immigrant minorities and national minorities

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Immigrant minorities As a rule, multiculturalists tend to regard immigrant minorities as relatively less problematic from the point of view of national unity and social cohesion (see e.g. Soroka et al. 2007: 564–5). This conclusion is linked to the perception that most migrants come to their new society voluntarily, in search of a new life for themselves and for their family members, and for this reason are strongly motivated to avail themselves of opportunities to participate in mainstream social, political and economic institutions.8 Immigrant minorities are therefore more inclined to seek what Kymlicka refers to as ‘‘fair terms of integration’’ in their new society rather than a separate homeland or an isolated ethnic enclave of their own (1998: 53; 2001: 162–72). This is not to say that immigrant-driven diversity is entirely unproblematic from a social cohesion perspective. In fact, there is at least some evidence to the effect that levels of trust and social cooperation are reduced in the presence of increasing ethnocultural diversity (Putnam 2007; Harell and Stolle 2010: 236, 239–41). What is also true is that some forms of diversity can be more problematic than others. For example, there is evidence to suggest that when the physical, cultural or religious differences between immigrants and members of the host society are moderate to minimal the path to integration is likely to be smoother, and that when these differences are greater the path is likely to be more troubled—either because the newcomers prove themselves less willing to adapt themselves to their new society or because that society proves itself less willing to accept them (Jayasuriya 1996: 217–18; Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 8; Fukuyama 2006: 15–17). Consider the case of Canada, which generally has an exceptional record of integrating newcomers, but seems to be having a much more difficult time with immigrants from visible minority backgrounds, particularly those of East Asian, African and Caribbean origin, and there is evidence to suggest that racism in the wider society is a contributing factor (Reitz and Banerjee 2007; Soroka et al. 2007: 584–6; Erickson 2007). Widespread public fear and suspicion of Islamic extremism is also proving to be a serious barrier to Muslim immigration in Europe, and there is a genuine worry that these sentiments may actually contribute to the radicalization of segments of the Muslim population (Fukuyama 2006: 17; Abbas 2007; Banchoff 2007: 8–10; Modood 2007: 10–14; Schiffauer 2007; van den Brink 2007: 351–3, 357–9). Arguably, however, it is in precisely these sorts of difficult cases that the rationale for ‘‘normalizing’’ multicultural policies is the strongest. Some of these

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policies have already been mentioned in the previous section, but others include curbs on hate speech and other racially motivated crimes; government-sponsored media campaigns to promote ethnic, racial and religious tolerance; official endorsements of multiculturalism; and government funding for cultural festivals, artistic endeavors or forms of associational life that increase the opportunities for cross-cultural interaction, education and understanding. The aim of such policies is to convince the public that ethnocultural diversity, far from being a threat, is something to be celebrated as a normal and enriching aspect of human life. At the same time, by signaling that persecution or discrimination on ethnic, racial or religious grounds is unacceptable, and will not be tolerated, these sorts of policies seek to create a safer, more respectful and welcoming environment for immigrants, which may increase the likelihood that they will feel secure and ‘‘at home’’ in their new society. Multiculturalists have also suggested that policies such as the targeted recruitment of minority candidates in the civil service, the police and the armed forces, in combination with efforts to make the dress codes and work schedules of those institutions more accommodating of minority differences, can have a salutary effect on integration by sending a clear message that national institutions belong to citizens of all cultural backgrounds (Spinner 1994: 124; Kymlicka 1998: 42–6; Tully 2000: 478). Along similar lines, Parekh and Modood argue that new immigrants may be more willing to embrace the host country’s national identity if they feel they have an equal and valued role to play in molding the public symbols and institutions through which that identity is supported and expressed. Conversely, newcomers may be more likely to shun the national identity if the expectation is that they have a duty to embrace it but no right to shape it (Parekh, 1999: 453; 2000: 203–4; Modood 2007: 150–3; cf. Laborde 2001: 730–1; Abizadeh 2002: 508). This all sounds persuasive enough in theoretical terms, but what is the evidence for these claims? Empirical studies in this area are still in relatively short supply, and the story they tell is somewhat mixed. On the positive side of the ledger, there is now a fair bit of evidence to the effect that countries with a commitment to multiculturalism and ethnic accommodation have largely avoided the dire scenarios painted by the critics. For example, Canada has pursued a policy of official multiculturalism since the 1970s, and takes in a very large number of immigrants from all over the world, and yet has experienced very little in the way of ethnic ghettoization, ethnic extremism, inter-ethnic violence or a reduction in overall levels of trust and social cohesion—on the contrary, Canada exhibits a ‘‘high level of mutual identification among immigrants and native-born Canadians’’ (Kymlicka 1998: 18–20, 2010: 263). Indeed, a recent multi-country study by Kesler and Bloemraad indicates that multicultural policies in some circumstances are capable of counter-acting (or even reversing) the negative effects of increased immigration on levels of trust and civic integration (2010: 321, 336–7). Evidence from another multi-country study reveals further that there is no consistent difference in levels of social welfare spending in countries that have embraced immigrant-targeted multicultural policies versus those that have

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not—which suggests that multiculturalism has not radically undermined the bonds of social solidarity underpinning public support for welfare redistribution as many of the critics had predicted it would (Banting et al. 2006: 83; Evans 2006; Hero and Preuhs 2006).9 Another body of evidence shows that countries like Australia, Canada and Sweden that have very robust regimes of multicultural accommodation have enjoyed significant success integrating large numbers of new immigrants, and in fact have outperformed many of their nonmulticulturalist counterparts in this regard (Kymlicka 1998: 15–24; 2001: 159– 72; 2005: 114–15; 2010: 261–4; Statistics Canada 2003; Bloemraad 2006; Adams 2007). Summarizing this evidence, Kymlicka concludes: . immigrants integrate more quickly in those countries which have official multiculturalism policies (like Canada and Australia) than in countries which do not (like the United States and France). And these immigrants are not only institutionally integrated, but also active participants in the political process, strongly committed to protecting the stability of mainstream institutions, and to upholding liberal-democratic values. (2001: 170) Nevertheless, this evidence is far from being conclusive, and even supporters of multiculturalism acknowledge that it does not constitute definitive proof that multicultural policies are an aid to integration and social cohesion in societies with high levels of immigrant intake (Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 43–4; Kymlicka 2010: 264). For example, although the available evidence does not support the view that multicultural policies are drastically corrosive of public support for welfare redistribution, it also does not prove that multicultural policies have no corrosive effect whatsoever on the social bases of citizen solidarity, nor does it tell us much about the impact (positive or negative) of specific multicultural policies in this respect (see e.g. Banting et al. 2006: 85–6). Similarly, although the data clearly shows that many countries with strong multicultural policies are very successful at integrating new immigrants, it in no way proves that multicultural policies are responsible for this success. In this context it is important to bear in mind that multicultural policies comprise only one small part of the legislative toolbox available to governments in their efforts to integrate newcomers, and may in fact be far less important than things like a fair and expeditious naturalization policy; an immigrant selection system that achieves a manageable rate of migrant intake, and which more efficiently matches entrants with appropriate labour-market opportunities; or a foreigncredential recognition program that helps ensure that migrants with professional backgrounds are not unfairly disadvantaged in employment competitions (Kymlicka 2001: 155, 171; Jayasuriya 2006: 217–18; Weiner 1996; Myles and St-Arnaud 2006: 341, 350; Reitz and Banerjee 2007: 523–5). There is also some evidence which indicates that the wrong kinds (or the wrong mix) of multicultural policies might actually inhibit immigrant integration. In the Netherlands, for example, multicultural policies were originally

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conceived, not as a tool for integrating potential citizens but as a means of temporarily accommodating a foreign guest-worker population that was expected to depart after the work was finished. With that expectation firmly in mind, the Dutch authorities introduced a particular brand of multiculturalism that encouraged a significant degree of institutional separation between minorities and the wider society (including separate schools, hospitals, media outlets and even separate housing), and which devoted scant resources to encouraging newcomers to learn the national language or to participate in or identify with the host society (Entzinger 2006: 179–81; Joppke 2007: 329–31; Kymlicka 2010: 266). Many have concluded, not unreasonably, that this policy framework has contributed to the elevated levels of inter-ethnic division, suspicion and mistrust recently experienced by Dutch society (Cherribi 2007: 115; van den Brink 2007: 362– 4).10 Yet at the same time it would be a mistake to interpret this as evidence of the failure of multiculturalism per se, because the original Dutch antiintegrationist model stands in stark contrast to the nation-building brand of multiculturalism pioneered by countries like Canada and Australia. In these countries, the disintegrative potential of multicultural policies which recognize minority differences or which institutionalize a degree of minority autonomy is balanced by what David Miller refers to as ‘‘national citizenship policies whose aim is to integrate immigrant groups socially, foster their loyalty to the state, and encourage them to become involved in democratic politics’’ (Miller 2006: 335; cf. Kymlicka 2001: 3, 167–72).11 Such policies can be particularly helpful in reducing the suspicion amongst members of the wider public that multiculturalism is a recipe for ethnic separatism, and that minorities are under no obligation to adapt themselves to their new surroundings (Miller 2006: 335; Myles and St-Arnaud 2006: 341, 354). Indeed, the perceived success of these nationbuilding policies has seen their presence dramatically increase in the immigrant incorporation regimes of many European countries, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands itself, where they have overshadowed, but not entirely eliminated, policies of multicultural accommodation (Banting and Kymlicka 2006: 41; Miller 2006: 335; Joppke 2007: 334–5).12 Of course, choosing the right kinds or the right mixture of policies will never guarantee the harmonious integration of immigrant minorities. Raz, for example, rightly notes that the pace of multicultural policy reform can also be a factor, and that a series of very rapid reforms could very well produce a public backlash (1994: 188). Integration and social cohesion can also be affected by things like the relative health of the host society economy (when times are hard, immigration is more likely to become a focal point of public anger); the length of time an immigration policy has been in place (which affects the degree to which citizens have become used to the idea of accepting newcomers); or extraordinary political events (terrorism, for example) that turn public opinion against particular kinds of minorities or against the idea of multiculturalism per se. One must also take into account the degree to which migrants are committed to remaining in their new country of residence; their willingness to learn the national language and to avail themselves of opportunities to participate in mainstream

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social, economic, and political institutions; and how open they are to modifying or adapting aspects of their cultural practices that conflict with the core values of the wider society. Integration, after all, is a reciprocal process whose success is ultimately dependent on whether both newcomers and established citizens are committed to making it work.

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National minorities National minorities undoubtedly pose a more serious challenge to social cohesion in a diverse democracy, and even theorists who are prepared to defend the idea of minority self-determination acknowledge that when the choice is made to recognize and politically institutionalize national identities at the sub-state level, political unity, stability and even the survival of the state is far from assured (Kymlicka 1995: 181–2; Baubo¨ck 2000; Ignatieff 2007: 129–36). Many nationalists will not be satisfied with anything less than full independence and a state of their own, and there is no shortage of patriotic extremists who are prepared to take whatever steps may be necessary, including the use of violence, to achieve their objectives (Barry 1998: 308–10; Lichtenberg 1999: 174; Beiner 2003: 110, 112–14). Spain’s ETA, the FLQ in Quebec, or Hindu and Muslim extremists in the Indian state of Kashmir are the kinds of examples that usually come to mind in this category.13 However, these are only some of the more extreme examples of nationalist mobilization, and national minorities are no different than immigrant minorities in the sense that not all of them pose the same kind of challenge to social cohesion. In the first place, not all separatists are willing to sanction violence, indeed many have dedicated themselves to achieving their aims by democratic means. Nationalists in Quebec, for example, have overwhelmingly rejected violence in favor of traditional democratic forms of mobilization, including the formation of their own political parties at both the provincial and national levels (the Parti Que´be´cois and the Bloc Que´be´cois), and the organization of two peaceful referendums on independence (both unsuccessful).14 A second point to bear in mind is that not all nationalists are separatists. Indigenous nationalists rarely, if ever, articulate aspirations for secession, and indigenous peoples generally seek to exercise their right to selfdetermination in a way that strengthens, even as it modifies, their existing relationship with the state (see e.g. Grand Council of the Crees 1992; Durie 1998; Poole 2004; Yashar 2005). The secession option has never commanded the support of a clear majority in Quebec and the same can be said for Western European nations like Scotland and Wales. Indeed, aside from the troubles in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in Spain, sub-state nationalism in Western Europe has not been attended by serious secessionist conflict (Heraclides 1997: 302–3; Keating 2001: 17). So not all nationalist claims to self-determination are a surefire recipe for state-breaking, and many national minorities will be satisfied with self-governing powers that can be exercised within the bounds of a multinational state (see e.g. Connor 1999: 168; Gurr 2000: 195–6, 209–10). Yet even when it comes to the

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more moderate cases of nationalist mobilization there is cause for concern. For as Kymlicka observes, demands for self-determination by their very nature call into question the legitimacy of the state and its structures of political authority, and seem to indicate a desire on the part of national minorities to distance themselves from the wider political community. Citizens of minority nations may be more inclined to direct their primary sense of identification, allegiance and obligation inward towards their fellow nationals, while sharing little to no sense of attachment to the citizens or institutions of the wider society. Self-determining peoples may even regard their membership in a larger political association (e.g. a federation or confederation of nations) as conditional, maintaining that they have the right to exit that association unilaterally if they feel it is no longer meeting their needs (Kymlicka, 1995: 181; Tully, 1995: 27). For all of these reasons Kymlicka concludes: .multination federations.are, and will remain, deeply divided societies. Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, India, Nigeria, Russia—all face enduring tensions, and they will never exhibit the level of social and political unity characteristic of single-nation countries. (Kymlicka 1998: 169; cf. Kymlicka, 1995: 182) Indeed, one of the most perplexing, and frustrating, features of these kinds of cases is that both options—recognizing or rejecting a minority right to selfdetermination—can potentially lead to instability and national disintegration (Kymlicka, 1995: 174; 1998: 169–70; Levy 2000: 42–5). On the one hand, a policy of granting national minorities the right to set up their own autonomous political, social and economic institutions seems custom designed to encourage and reinforce a sense of psychological separation from the wider society. Members of self-governing national minorities might even come to feel that they have duties and obligations only to their fellow nationals, and that the only institutions that should command their loyalty are their own national institutions (Cairns, 1993: 192, 200; Smith 2000: 345). To say that this would not be overly conducive to social cohesion and inter-ethnic cooperation in a multination state would obviously be an understatement. Another argument against recognition is that demands for increased powers of self-government are subject to the politics of escalation, and granting an initial set of demands may simply encourage nationalist leaders to launch a set of new demands whose only logical end point is secession and the formation of an independent state (Kymlicka, 1995: 181–2). It goes without saying that secessionist demands are problematic at the best of times, but if they are strongly resisted by state authorities or by different factions within the wider society, they could easily become the trigger for violent conflict, or perhaps even civil war. There are in fact a number of reasons why nationalist demands, and policies designed to satisfy those demands, are not likely to be well received by members of the wider society. There are some similarities here with the case of immigrant minorities. For example, members of the dominant national group might very well

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come to feel that if their national minority neighbors do not share their sense of belonging to the same political community, then they should no longer be entitled to the many benefits that citizenship in that community brings—including things like social welfare transfers or defense from foreign threats (Cairns 1993: 200; 2000: 5–8, 93, 153; Miller 1995: 94–8; Barry 2001: 80). The accommodation of national minorities can also become a focus for public anger and resentment, especially if this is perceived to be a form of special treatment that runs roughshod over liberal standards of fairness and equality. These sentiments are sometimes exacerbated by the impression that concessions to national minorities have been extracted from the state under threat of secession and as such constitute a form of political blackmail (Horowitz 2000: 624). Precisely this sort of public antipathy to nationalist demands has helped scuttle several major initiatives to grant Quebec greater self-governing powers in the Canadian federation. Indeed, the sentiment in some corners of the country has been (and continues to be) that the ‘Quebec issue’ has hijacked the national agenda at the expense of other more pressing concerns, and that the country as a whole might be better off if they were simply to leave (Kymlicka 1998: 163, 167–8; cf. Richards 2007: 249). Yet for all these concerns about the potentially destabilizing consequences of minority self-determination, it is by no means obvious that the accommodation option should be categorically rejected. We must first of all consider the fact that so many individuals worldwide exhibit such a powerful sense of attachment to their national identities, and these identities have proven to be remarkably resilient, even in the face of decades of harsh repression or coercive policies of assimilation (Tully 1995: 197; Connor 1999; Kymlicka and Opalski 2001; Moreno 2001). In other words, refusing to acknowledge these identities or to grant them some form of institutional expression is not going to make them go away. It may even render them more problematic from a national unity perspective. Minorities that are thwarted in their desire to govern themselves more autonomously will undoubtedly feel that they are being denied something that belongs to them by right, and that the real sin against equality is being committed by the dominant national group that refuses to grant them the very liberties it claims for itself through its control of the machinery of state. Nonaccommodation can also be interpreted as a sign of disrespect or as evidence of the state’s commitment to a policy of minority assimilation. Perceptions such as these can only diminish the legitimacy and trustworthiness of state institutions in the eyes of national minorities, who will regard them as powerful symbols of their political and cultural subordination (Glover 1997: 19–20; Baubo¨ck 2000: 375; Parekh 2000: 184–5; Tully 2000a: 37–41). Moreover, in the face of state intransigence, national minorities might simply come to the conclusion that it is futile to work within existing state institutions to achieve their objectives, and that self-determination can only truly be realized by creating a state of their own (Kymlicka, 1995: 183; Connor 1999: 169; Parekh 2000: 189). So perhaps it is worth considering the possibility that social cohesion might be better served by efforts to accommodate the demands of national minorities? A number of theorists have, in fact, argued that the decision to negotiate

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minority self-government arrangements can be an effective means of marginalizing extremists, and channeling nationalist conflict into more peaceful and democratic forums (Gurr 2000: 209; Baubo¨ck 2000: 381; Smith 2000: 346). If self-government measures are to succeed in this respect, they must be sufficiently broad and robust to convince moderate nationalists, many of whom are prepared to settle for some form of autonomy that falls short of secession, that membership in a multinational state can in fact be a vehicle for promoting rather than undermining their interests and aspirations (Kymlicka 1998: 138– 43; Parekh 1999: 453; Horowitz 2000: 628). A genuine commitment to negotiating minority self-government rights also shows a generosity of spirit which can be a fertile breeding ground for mutual trust and co-operation. The idea here is that if national minorities see that their identities and rights are being accorded the appropriate degree of recognition and respect by others they may feel more inclined to reciprocate, and may even come to develop a sense of identification with the institutions of the larger multinational association within which their aspirations as a nation are being accommodated (Glover 1997: 19–20; Tully 1995: 197–8, 205; Borrows, 2002: 156–7). Some multiculturalists insist that a genuine sense of mutual identification amongst national groups is essential to the task of maintaining unity and social cohesion in a diverse democracy and that mere toleration or a grudging acceptance of others will not be up to the job (Kymlicka, 1995: 191; Parekh 1999a: 449; Nussbaum 2007). Others are more skeptical of this claim, arguing that the emergence of a shared identity is unlikely amongst groups with a history of mutual hostility, suspicion, and mistrust, and that nationalists who otherwise would be inclined to accept self-government within the context of a multinational state might be less inclined to do so if they felt pressured to identify themselves as citizens of any nation other than their own. In situations such as these, Melissa Williams argues that stable terms of co-existence can be successfully based on what she calls a sense of citizenship as shared fate. What drives this idea of citizenship as shared fate is the recognition of an unavoidable empirical reality: that for certain ethnonational communities thrown together by historical circumstances ‘‘there is no plausible alternative to living together’’ (Williams, 2004: 104).15 These relations of interdependence may or may not be valued by the communities in question, but the fact remains that their circumstances require the negotiation of terms of political co-existence that both communities can live with (Williams 2007: 229–35). In this sense, a commitment to remaining together need not be based on mutual affection or mutual identification, but on something much more pragmatic such as the recognition that one’s interests are best served inside rather than outside a multinational association (see also Horowitz 2000: 626–8). Looking now to the evidence, there are grounds for feeling cautiously optimistic about the prospect for peace and stability in democracies that choose to accommodate multinational diversity. For example, although the politics of nationalist contestation in multinational federations can certainly be fractious, countries like Canada, Belgium, India, Spain and Switzerland have an established

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track record of managing these tensions through peaceful and democratic means, while avoiding secessionist outcomes (Gurr 2000: 208; Horowitz 2000: 624; Smith 2000: 346; Fraga and Segura 2006: 281; Bhattachariyya 2007; McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 202–3). Indeed, as more than one observer has noted, there has yet to be a single example of an established multinational federation in the democratic West succumbing to the disintegrative forces of nationalist antipathy (Kymlicka 1998: 171; McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 202). The evidence to date would also suggest that the United Kingdom’s experiment with devolution and regional autonomy has not proven to be a slippery slope to secession in either Scotland or Wales, and the institutionalization of bi-national power-sharing arrangements has been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in violent ethnonationalist conflict in Northern Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary 2006: 259–61). In the 1990s, negotiated power-sharing arrangements also proved to be an effective means of heading off violent nationalist conflict in Russia, while efforts to deny or wind back minority autonomy produced the opposite effect (Smith 2000: 365; Gurr 2000: 208, 277; McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 195). Similar evidence can be gleaned from the wide-ranging empirical studies of ethnonationalist conflict conducted by Ted Gurr and Donald Horowitz (Horowitz 1998, 2000; Gurr 2000). One of the primary conclusions to emerge from Gurr’s study is that reduced levels of ethnic conflict in democratic countries in the 1990s resulted partly from the fact that political elites were ‘‘less likely to rely on strategies of assimilation and repression, more likely to follow policies of recognition, pluralism, and group autonomy’’ (2000: xiv; cf. Connor 1999: 169). Horowitz also suggests that a policy of negotiating autonomy arrangements for nations at the substate level can be an effective means of averting secession and ethnic warfare (2000: 622–8). Like Gurr, Horowitz argues that much depends on the timing of the accommodation measures, which should be introduced early on in the conflict before attitudes harden and ethnic extremists gain the upper hand (Horowitz 2000: 625; Gurr 2000: 209). Horowitz also places significant emphasis on the specific nature of the accommodation strategy, and in his view success is more likely in cases where the centrifugal tendencies of group autonomy are balanced by the centripetal tendencies of group representation in central institutions. In his words, Early, generous devolution, coupled with carefully crafted connections of the regional population with the centre, is likely to avert rather than produce separatism. Late, grudging devolution, coupled with a view at the centre that members of a group residing in the autonomous territory should henceforth look exclusively to the regional unit for their satisfaction, is far more likely to encourage departure from the state. (Horowitz 2003: 151; cf. Baubo¨ck 2000: 381; Cairns 2000; McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 198–9) All the same, the message from many of these same studies is that we should not pretend that accommodation is some kind of magic bullet for the resolution

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of nationalist demands or the avoidance of secession or ethnic violence. For there are numerous cases where efforts to negotiate sub-state autonomy did not bring an end to violent nationalist conflict or when successfully negotiated arrangements either failed to take hold or eventually unraveled, leading to renewed bloodshed and state breaking (Gurr 2000: 207, 211; Horowitz 2000: 623–5; Simeon and Conway 2001; Spears 2002; McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 191–2). The factors contributing to the failure of accommodation are numerous, and include an absence of trust amongst the parties to the negotiations, demographic changes that affect the ethnic balance of power, interference by foreign powers, or unforeseen crises that trigger a renewed spiral of violence.16 Most important of all, accommodation cannot hope to succeed if different ethnonational communities are simply not committed to living together in a single state (Gurr 2000: 211; Horowitz 2000: 564-6). In such circumstances there is a case to be made for attempting to negotiate mutually acceptable terms of political divorce, and indeed there are a number of examples where this has been accomplished in a relatively peaceful and humane manner (Buchanan 1991: 102–4; Young 1995; Kymlicka 1995: 186; McGarry and O’Leary 2007: 195).17 Yet secession is by no means a perfect solution, and can just as easily be a catalyst for instability and violence (see e.g. Horowitz 1998). Indeed, one of the underlying messages to emerge from this literature is that in many cases of ethnonationalist contestation there seems to be no solution that is capable of staving off instability and conflict, and many solutions which appear to be successful in the short term in the longer term turn out to be failures. As Horowitz tells it: ‘‘The whole structure of ethnic politics conspires to make the problem of conflict intractable’’ (2000: 566). Nevertheless, for policy-makers attempting to navigate this bewildering landscape Horowitz ultimately counsels not despair, but rather understanding and openness. More precisely: understand the specific nature and source of the conflict you are dealing with and in the search for policy options leave no reasonable stone unturned. For excessive abstraction and political dogmatism will only render the obstacles to success that much more formidable (Horowitz 2000: 564, 566).

Conclusion Horowitz’ message here is in many ways the message of the chapter as a whole, which is that neither critics nor supporters of multicultural policies have discovered the holy grail when it comes to determining the foundations of stability and social cohesion in a diverse democracy. While critics have done well to point out that multicultural policies can be a source of division or disunity, they have not always been as quick to acknowledge that non-accommodation, or a policy of aggressive assimilation, can be at least equally problematic in this respect. Champions of multiculturalism for their part have demonstrated that the worst-case scenarios painted by the critics frequently have not been borne out in practice, and have offered sound reasons for believing that multicultural

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policies can serve a stabilizing and integrative function in a multicultural society. All the same, their efforts have fallen short of providing compelling proof of a causal relationship between the implementation of multicultural policies and increased levels of social cohesion in a pluricultural society. With additional empirical testing and case-study research our understanding of these issues will undoubtedly increase, but while more of this kind of research is to be welcomed, we should not pretend that greater understanding is the only key to balancing the ends of unity and diversity. This will also require enlightened political leadership, fortuitous economic and political circumstances, and most important of all, a basic desire amongst diverse peoples to share a common political space and to manage their differences and disagreements in a peaceful and democratic, if not always harmonious, manner.

Chapter 9

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Contextual multiculturalism

Introduction One of the key developments in the recent history of multicultural political philosophy has been the shift towards more empirically informed or contextual analyses of multicultural questions. What precipitated this shift was a growing sense that the first wave of multicultural political philosophy, led by theorists like Kymlicka (1989), Young (1990) and Taylor (1992), suffered from an excessive degree of theoretical abstraction, a problem that had also plagued some of the earlier debates between liberals and communitarians (see Chapter 4).1 The concern was that by distancing itself from the facts on the ground multicultural political philosophy was undermining its persuasive power and its relevance to public policy and institutional design. Contextualists therefore called for a new approach to multicultural political philosophy that was more sensitive to the specific claims, characteristics and circumstances of different cultural minorities, that paid attention to the different ways in which those demands could be justified and accommodated in policy terms, and that had something to say about the practical feasibility of adopting those policies in concrete political settings.2 The most sophisticated defense and application of the contextualist approach to multiculturalism is to be found in Joseph Carens’ Culture, Citizenship and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (2000: 1–6). Carens cites three interrelated benefits of a contextualist methodology. First, it brings the meaning and implications of our abstract moral principles into sharper relief by showing us how they would cash out in concrete policy terms. This exercise can be especially revealing when our principles turn out to be compatible with policies that sharply conflict with our intuitive sense of what justice requires in any given case. Experiences of this nature might of course lead us to reject our intuitions, but it might also lead us to take a second hard look at our most cherished moral principles and to revise them in light of this new information. A second, and related, benefit of a contextual approach is that it ‘‘encourages us to consider whether existing institutions and practices may embody forms of wisdom that are missed by the prevailing theories’’ and if they do, to take these insights as the basis for theoretical reformulation (Carens 2000: 3). Recognizing, of course, that prevailing political practices are not

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always the embodiment of superior wisdom, Carens places equal emphasis on the potential for theory to inform practice and to serve as the foundation for just and effective policy reform. With a nod to the Rawlsian concept of reflective equilibrium, what Carens has in mind here is a ‘‘reflective disequilibrium, the mutual unsettling of complacent certitudes in theory and practice by their juxtaposition against one another’’ (Carens 2000: 4). A third advantage of contextualism is that it can awaken us from a sense of intellectual complacency bred by familiarity. Each and every theory, according to Carens ‘‘casts some things into the shadows with the very light with which it illuminates others,’’ and in so doing may limit its capacity to yield just and effective remedies outside of a certain limited range of cases (Carens 2000: 4). Carens especially recommends looking at difficult or unfamiliar cases that challenge our preconceptions and which strain the analytical categories that govern the way we view the world. Hard cases, especially those where conflicting courses of action seem equally reasonable or justified, serve up a helpful dose of intellectual humility and a reminder that the ‘best’ solution in some circumstances may be no better than an imperfect moral compromise or a difficult sacrifice of one moral principle in favor of another. In the spirit of this contextualist approach, this chapter examines two different case studies of multicultural accommodation: language laws in Quebec and the so-called ‘‘Danish cartoon controversy’’. Each case study begins with a brief description of the relevant facts, followed by an account of the normative arguments that can be offered on different sides of the issues raised. The aim of this exercise is not to settle these controversies once and for all, but instead to show how difficult this can be by making as strong a case as possible in favor of conflicting resolutions. Readers ultimately will have to decide for themselves which course of action they feel is the right one.

Language laws in Quebec Quebec contains the vast majority (approaching 90 per cent) of Canada’s Francophone population, and French is the first language of approximately 85 per cent of those who call the province home. Government efforts to preserve and promote the French language in Quebec gained momentum in the 1960s, in the period that would come to be known as the Quiet Revolution (see e.g. Thomson 1973: 13–20; Levine 1990: 7–86; Chevrier 1997). This was a period of rapid and intensive social, economic and political transformation that heralded the emergence of a modernized Quebec ‘‘state’’ and a vibrant and assertive Francophone nationalist movement. One of the most powerful and enduring slogans associated with this period of reform was maıˆtre chez nous (masters in our own house), which captured the idea that Francophones should take control of their collective destiny as a people, and to this end the Quebec state would assume a more active role in building a society and economy centered on the French language, while aggressively defending the interests of Quebecers in the

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Canadian federation. These basic goals have continued to define the mission of Quebec governments throughout the contemporary period (MacIver 1999: 245; Seymour 2000: 246). With respect to language in particular, the most significant and enduring initiatives came in the 1970s, with the passage of Bill 22, The Official Language Act (1974) and its successor Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language (1977).3 The stated purpose of this new linguistic regime was no less than ‘‘to make French the language of Government and the Law, as well as the normal and everyday language of work, instruction, communication, commerce and business’’ (Quebec 1977). The legislation designates French as the official language of government and all public institutions, including the legislature and courts of law. French also became the language of business, and companies with 50 or more employees were required to conduct their operations primarily in the province’s new official language. The legislation further mandated that French must be the dominant language on public signage, as a way of helping the province preserve its visage linguistique (French face).4 Yet perhaps the single most important feature of this new linguistic regime were the laws relating to the language of instruction in public schools. These provisions have also generated the most controversy, both inside and outside the province. The legislation stipulates that for the vast majority of students in Quebec, public education at the primary, secondary and Ce´gep level is to be provided in French.5 Quebec also provides funding for English language public schools, which primarily serve the province’s historic Anglophone minority. Attendance in these schools is generally restricted to the children of Canadian citizens, at least one of whom received his or her elementary school instruction in English in Canada, although exceptions are made in a small number of other cases.6 Most other students, including the children of immigrants arriving from outside of Canada, the children of noncitizens who have moved to Quebec from other parts of Canada (unless one of those parents received the majority of their primary education in English in Quebec), and the children of Quebec residents who were both educated in French, are required to attend French public schools. To understand the rationale for this linguistic regime one must first understand the sense of linguistic insecurity that has motivated public and elite opinion in Quebec over the last several decades. This sense of insecurity has several sources, including the historic dominance enjoyed by the Anglophone minority in urban centers like Quebec City and Montreal.7 Prior to the Quiet Revolution, English was in fact the dominant language of business, the civil service, higher education and communication in the public sphere (including public signage) in Quebec. Francophones may have enjoyed a healthy edge over Anglophones in demographic terms, but the opportunities to work, study and be upwardly mobile in French were nevertheless increasingly difficult to come by. A second source of this insecurity is the fact that immigrants to Quebec are far more likely to choose to learn English than French, and before the language laws came into force these new arrivals were overwhelmingly exercising their right to have their children educated in publicly funded English schools. The longer-term prospects for

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French in Quebec therefore seemed doubly precarious (Levine 1990: 7–38; Spinner 1994: 145–6; Chevrier 1997; Carens 2000: 114; Richards 2007: 234–6). A third source of insecurity stems from the simple but significant fact that Quebec exists as a predominantly Francophone enclave in a country and continent dominated by Anglophones. This very basic reality helps feed the impression that the French language and culture is continually threatened by demographic, socio-cultural and economic forces from the outside (Lise´e 2001: 109). For all of these reasons, the architects of Quebec’s language policy concluded that French would not long survive as a vibrant, living language in the absence of a sustained effort by government to maintain a critical mass of language speakers and to ensure that those individuals had access to a rich and varied range of opportunities to live, work and express themselves in French (Levine 1990: 50–5, 113–14; Chevrier 1997; Spinner 1994: 146–9; Kymlicka 2001: 156–7, 286). More than three decades on from the passage of Bill 101, the evidence is clear that this experiment in linguistic engineering has been a spectacular success. The language laws have re-established the predominance of French in the daily lives of provincial citizens, and this has done much to reassure Francophones anxious about the fate of their language and culture.8 There is also reason to believe that this increased sense of linguistic security has had a moderating influence on Quebec’s political culture, and has reduced public support for secession and more radical forms of ethnic nationalism (Levine 1990: 111–228; Richards 2007: 236–42; Kymlicka 2001: 286–8; Rioux 2008).9 Other observers have argued, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the success of the provincial language regime has contributed significantly to the emergence of a more open and multicultural Quebec society, first of all by encouraging new immigrants to integrate into the French-language community, and second of all by helping a new generation of young Quebecers become more comfortable with the idea of a culturally diverse Francophone nation (Sale´e 2002: 167–9; Mendelsohn et al. 2007: 40). Nevertheless, while few observers deny the practical success of Quebec’s language laws, many question their legitimacy. The language of instruction provisions have proven to be especially controversial, and for this reason they will form the focus of our discussion. While Que´be´cois defend these policies as an essential aspect of their right to self-determination, critics dismiss them on the grounds that they are discriminatory, a barrier to equal opportunity, and a clear symbol of ethnic domination. In the next two sections I will expand on these claims by considering the normative arguments for and against Quebec’s language of instruction policies. The case against Quebec’s policy of mandating French as the primary language of instruction in the province violates individual rights to liberty and equality and is therefore clearly unjust. This injustice manifests itself somewhat differently vis-a`-vis Francophones, new immigrants to the province, and the historic Anglophone

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minority. To begin with, the law barring the children of Francophones and nonCanadian immigrants from attending English language public schools is discriminatory on its face, because the members of both of these groups are denied a right which is enjoyed not only by members of the Anglophone minority within Quebec but also by most English-speaking Canadians who migrate to Quebec from other parts of the country (see e.g. Fukuyama 2006: 9). It goes without saying that in a liberal democracy publicly funded institutions should be made equally accessible to all members of the public, rather than being reserved for the privilege of a particular ethnic, religious or linguistic constituency. What makes things worse is that this policy violates the principle of equal opportunity, because the education offered to Francophones and immigrants places these individuals at a distinct disadvantage in the competition for things like employment or access to higher education in the rest of Canada, where the primary language of communication is English.10 For example, whereas immigrants to British Columbia are entitled to an education that potentially opens doors to them across the entire country, immigrants to Quebec are entitled to an education that offers them opportunities in very few locations other than Quebec. Granted, Francophones and immigrants to Quebec are still free to have their children educated in private English schools, but for many parents this freedom is more illusory than real because it is so prohibitively costly. The same goes for the alternative option of exiting the province to gain access to publicly funded English schools elsewhere in Canada, where the costs involved are not only financial, but also in many cases personal (e.g. separation from friends and family). Even in cases where the costs involved may not be so prohibitive as to make a mockery of the idea of free choice, the question remains: why should members of these two groups be required to pay financial and personal penalties to gain access to a public service that Anglophones are entitled to receive costfree? A second unjust feature of Quebec’s language of instruction regime is that it interferes with individual rights to freedom of association and dissociation. For example, foreign immigrants to the province, and especially the children of those immigrants, are effectively compelled to integrate into the dominant Francophone society, even though most would prefer to become members of the English speaking community (again, because this would open up greater opportunities for them in the wider Anglophone society and economy outside Quebec). For Francophones, on the other hand, the language of instruction laws are a barrier to freedom of dissociation. Again, these restrictions are felt mainly by their children, whose capacity to acquire the linguistic competency necessary to exit the Francophone community is greatly reduced by the law barring their enrolment in English-language public schools. Following Barry, these linguistically coded access restrictions essentially convey the message to Francophones (and their children) that they have a duty to perpetuate the language of their ancestors, whether they wish to or not, and that if need be this duty is enforceable by the state. This is clearly unjust. It is one thing for a state to facilitate the right of citizens to choose a life in their native tongue by providing that language with

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the necessary resources and institutional supports, but the key issue here is choice, and a society that respects individual freedom must draw the line at policies which compel individuals to acquire or preserve a language they would prefer to forgo (Barry 2001: 65).11 It may very well be the case that the survival of French in Quebec would be threatened by a more liberal language policy, as more and more Francophones and immigrants chose to educate their children in English, but even though such a turn of events might be a source of regret it would not be a source of injustice, because languages (or cultures) have no right to be preserved beyond the desire of their members to see them preserved (Barry 2001: 65; Kukathas 2003: 252). The situation of immigrants and Francophones in Quebec is somewhat different than that of Anglophone Quebecers, who do not face the same educational constraints on their associational freedom. Anglophones can choose to have their children educated in the English public school system, which will help them become full and active members of the English language community in Quebec (or in other parts of Canada), or they can choose to enroll their children in the French public school system, where they can acquire the skills to integrate into the province’s French language community.12 At the same time, however, the provincial language regime has imposed a number of other restrictions on the freedoms and opportunities of Anglophone Quebecers. In fact, the government of Quebec has been very astute in its efforts to ensure that the English language and English-language institutions are officially relegated to a subordinate position in the province, and that the lion’s share of public resources and institutional supports go towards building a society that operates predominantly in French (see e.g. Barry 1998: 312). One obvious example is the law which proscribes English-only public signage, and which stipulates that bi-lingual signs are to be tolerated only on the condition that the French portion of the sign is clearly predominant. Anglophones have also seen their opportunities to seek gainful employment in both the public and private sectors reduced by the law which mandates the use of French in the workplace. And though it is true that the language of instruction laws do not directly restrict the educational choices of Anglophones, they have a very real impact on the medium to long-term viability of the English public school system by starving it of potential students from the Francophone and immigrant communities. This in turn affects the long-term survival prospects of the Anglophone community itself, which continues to see its numbers reduced as its members, particularly those who are younger and well-educated, choose to leave the province in search of the English-language opportunities that the government’s language regime has made increasingly unavailable to them in Quebec (see e.g. Levine 1990: 119–22; Lise´e 2001: 109). To sum up, Quebec’s language of instruction laws have been a central pillar of a provincial language regime that has largely succeeded in restoring the French language to its place of prominence in Quebec. However, this victory was secured by deliberately weakening the position of the English speaking community in Quebec, and by restricting some of the most basic rights and freedoms of provincial citizens. These are trade-offs which simply cannot be justified in a

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liberal political community. For as Rawls reminds us, in such a community ‘‘Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom is made right by a greater good shared by others’’ (Rawls 1999: 3).

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The case for The beauty of Quebec’s language of instruction regime is that it strikes a just balance between the rights and interests of the Francophone majority and the competing rights and interests of the Anglophone and immigrant minorities in the province. The first thing to be acknowledged in this case is that Quebec is a nation whose members, like the members of so many other nations around the world, lay claim to a democratic right to self-determination (see Chapter 5). In exercising this right to self-rule, Quebec citizens are entitled to authorize their elected representatives to take whatever reasonable measures may be necessary to preserve and promote the language that constitutes such a central aspect of their identity as Que´be´cois (Carens 2000: 79–80).13 This is no different than what Japanese and Argentine citizens can legitimately ask of the governments of Japan and Argentina, or what English-speaking Canadians can legitimately ask of the government of Canada (see e.g. Kymlicka 1998: 155–60). Critics may respond that Quebec is a province and that only states have a right to selfdetermination under international law, but this is simply a substitution of fact for moral argument that privileges the moral rights of dominant nations over those of non-dominant nations by default. Once it is accepted that nations in general have a democratic right to self-determination (and this is already assumed in the case of nations that control states) it must be accepted that this right should, in principle, be enjoyed equally by non-dominant nations like Quebec. Either that, or critics of self-determination must explain why it is that some nations are to be regarded as more equal than others. Some critics of Quebec’s language of instruction policy are not in fact opposed to the idea of minorities exercising a measure of collective control over language policy. Barry for one argues that it would be unjust to impose a single dominant language in a country comprised by a federation of different language communities (as in the case of Quebec) or in cases where historic language communities have been involuntarily incorporated into a settler state. In such cases, ‘‘liberals must accept certain group rights: the different linguistic communities have a valid claim to conduct their collective life in their own language’’ (Barry 1998: 314; 2001: 226). Yet if Barry accepts that groups such as the Que´be´cois have this right, he has no reason to object to the fact that the children of new immigrants to Quebec are required to attend French public schools, nor to the fact that the children of Francophones are not entitled to a publicly-funded education in anything other than the province’s official language—French (see e.g. Barry 2001: 65-6).14 Neither of these measures are regarded as illegitimate when they are implemented by any liberal-democratic country. In other words, nobody would accuse Finland of stifling individual freedom of association by taking

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measures to ensure that immigrants acquire proficiency in the Finnish language—indeed, one could argue that the Finnish government has a duty to do so, given the vital connection between majority-language competence and equality of opportunity (see e.g. Barry 1998: 315–16; Carens 2000: 80). Similarly, nobody would accuse the government of Portugal of condemning its citizens to a life lived in Portuguese, or of unjustly depriving Portuguese children of the opportunities to be had in foreign economies, if it refused to commit itself to a ‘‘language of choice’’ model of publicly funded education. The only reason that Quebec is held to a different standard is that it is not a state (see e.g. Carens 2000: 130), but to reiterate, this distinction between the rights of nations that control states and the rights of nations without states is arbitrary, and therefore irrelevant, from a moral point of view. Its almost as if the critics assume that every individual in Quebec has a fundamental right to be educated, at public expense, in the language of his or her choice. But if Quebec adopted such a policy it would surely be the only jurisdiction on the planet to do so. And the reason why no one has ever gone down this road is quite simple. Governments that wish to maintain thriving economies, effective systems of political representation, smoothly functioning bureaucracies, and cohesive civil societies cannot afford to be neutral or laissez-faire on the language question—they must designate one or more languages as the common medium of communication in all of these areas, and then utilize whatever resources, incentives or pressures are necessary to ensure that they are widely acquired by members of the polity (Miller 1995: 189; Barry 1998: 316; Carens 2000: 77–9; Kymlicka 2001: 212–15). This is precisely what Quebec has done. It has declared French the official language of the province, and it has taken measures to ensure that new immigrants to the province are equipped with the linguistic skills necessary to integrate and become upwardly mobile in the province’s predominantly French-speaking economy and society. At the same time, moreover, Quebec has pursued its official language policy while vigorously supporting the language rights of its historic Anglophone minority. In fact, it is probably fair to say that Quebec has done more to secure the rights of its Anglophone minority than many other Canadian provinces have done for the rights of their French-speaking minorities. Anglophones in Quebec not only enjoy the right to receive a public education in English, but also the right to access health and social services in English, and to use English before the courts of law in the province (Carens 2000: 114; Sale´e 2002: 190 n. 10).15 Regardless, Quebec is continually singled out for its supposedly discriminatory language policies.16 Fukuyama, for one, seems to be under the impression that while Quebec is busy discriminating against Francophones and immigrants by denying their children the right to a publicly-funded education in English (the province’s minority language), parents elsewhere in Canada remain free to choose the language of instruction (Fukuyama 2006: 9). But this is simply untrue. In every other Canadian province the dominant language of instruction in public schools is English, and the children of English parents do not enjoy anything like a guaranteed right to attend public school in French (the minority language in

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Canada outside Quebec). In fact, admission to French public schools outside Quebec is generally reserved for the offspring of Francophone parents who meet the same sorts of requirements as those laid out for the Anglophone minority in Quebec.17 A similar confusion surrounds the accusation that Quebec’s language of instruction policy violates the principle of freedom of association. True, the public education options for Francophones and immigrants in Quebec are more restricted than they would be under a laissez-faire language regime, but no more so than in any other jurisdiction that endeavors to establish and maintain a shared medium of communication amongst its citizenry. Furthermore, just like their counterparts in any other liberal-democratic state, Francophones and immigrants in Quebec are free to opt out of the dominant language community—for example, by paying for private schooling in another language or by moving to another jurisdiction where that language is publicly funded. Indeed Francophones and immigrants in Quebec arguably enjoy greater freedom in this respect because of the proximity of English Canada and the availability of private schooling options in English in Quebec. Granted, these so-called exit options from the dominant language community may very well prove to be too difficult and costly for many individuals, but the Quebec government commits no injustice by refusing to subsidize something which is most aptly described in Barry’s terms as an expensive taste (Carens 2000: 85, 129; c.f. Kymlicka 1989: 195). Indeed, if Quebec acceded to the demands of immigrants to be educated in their language of choice, it would only be a matter of time until English became the dominant language and Francophones would experience drastically reduced opportunities in French (Spinner 1994: 159), with no corresponding alternative option (other than perhaps to move to France). Anglophones may complain that this policy threatens the viability of their own community, but again, Quebec has done much to protect the rights of English speakers in the province and even if it could arguably do more it cannot reasonably be expected to take measures that would compromise the long-term survival of French.

The Danish cartoon affair In September of 2005, the editors of Jyllands-Posten, a popular conservative Danish newspaper, commissioned a series of political cartoons on the Prophet Muhammad.18 The invitation came in the wake of a story about a Danish author, Ka˚re Bluitgen, who was struggling to find an illustrator for a children’s book about the life of Muhammed. As many of the potential illustrators were no doubt aware, some Muslims regard any pictorial representations of Muhammed, regardless of their design or intent, as extremely offensive.19 Many members of the Danish artistic community were particularly worried about how those illustrations would be received by Muslim extremists, and for this reason declined to participate in the book project. The cartoon initiative was therefore launched in order to highlight the dangers associated with this kind of media self-censorship and to

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provoke a public debate around the corrosive effect of religious fundamentalism on freedom of expression. Indeed, part of the exercise was to determine how many members of the Danish Cartoon Society would have the courage to respond to the editors’ invitation. Twelve in fact did so, and on September 30, 2005 their cartoons were published under the caption ‘‘The Face of Muhammed.’’ The artists’ offerings range, as one commentator aptly observed ‘‘from the anodyne and perhaps even amusing to the offensive’’ (Hansen 2006: 8; cf. Bleich 2006: 18).20 Amongst the most offensive and inflammatory is a depiction of Muhammed with a bomb in his turban, and another which shows the Prophet perched on a cloud in heaven greeting a line of suicide bombers with a line that reads something like ‘‘Stop, stop, we have run out of virgins!’’ (the reward for their martyrdom). Somewhat less provocative is an image of a cartoonist looking nervously over his shoulder as he puts the finishing touches on his rendering of the Prophet. This image, perhaps more than any other, directly addresses the issue of media self-censorship. The message conveyed by some of the other cartoons is more ambiguous, such as the one which shows a police line-up containing seven figures, six men and one woman, all wearing turbans, and an observer who says he is unable to recognize ‘‘him’’ (the Prophet, presumably). The female figure is in fact the right-wing Danish politician Pia Kjærsgaard, a well known critic of Muslim immigration, who is lampooned along with a smiling Ka˚re Bluitgen— shown holding a sign offering consultations on public relations. The remaining five figures are of uncertain identity although as a number of commentators have suggested at least one of the five could be a caricature of Muhammed. Some of the other cartoons point their barbs in the direction of the cartoon exercise itself and the players behind its initiation. One such entry depicts a young boy named Muhammed standing in front of a blackboard on which is written (in Persian) ‘‘the editors of Jyllands-Posten are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs.’’ Another depicts Ka˚re Bluitgen holding a stick-figure drawing of Muhammed, and wearing a turban topped by an orange on which is written ‘‘PR-Stunt.’’ In many respects, the cartoon controversy offered an eerie flashback to the events surrounding the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in the United Kingdom (Hansen 2006: 7–8; Lægaard 2007; Davies 2008). As with the Rushdie affair, reaction to the cartoons was relatively mild at first—a calm that belied what would eventually follow. Some two weeks after their publication, a crowd of approximately 3,500 individuals mounted a peaceful protest in Copenhagen and demanded an apology from Jyllands-Posten, the same day that the paper was publicly condemned by representatives from 16 Danish Muslim organizations for insulting Muslims and their beliefs. Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2005, a group of 10 ambassadors from countries with Muslim majorities requested a meeting with Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to discuss the government’s handling of the cartoon affair and to encourage him to take action against Jyllands-Posten. Rasmussen declined the invitation and reaffirmed his support for a free and independent Danish press (CBC News 2006; Keane 2008: 858–9). The initial response from Jyllands-Posten was also defiant. The paper declined the invitation to apologize, and its cultural editor

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Flemming Rose defended the decision to publish the cartoons, arguing that ‘‘Religious feelings cannot demand special treatment in a secular society’’ (CBC News 2005). Angered at these reactions, a group of Danish Muslims organized a campaign to bring the images to the attention of Muslim governments and publics overseas, and in December 2005 a dossier containing the cartoons and several unrelated but even more highly offensive images was shown to politicians, religious leaders and media organizations in various countries across the Middle East. The key event appears to have been the circulation of the images at a December 6 meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Mecca, which produced an official statement of condemnation and calls for a United Nations resolution against religious defamation that would include sanctions against offending countries or institutions (Abdul Ghafour and Hannan Faisal Tago 2006; Howden et al. 2006; Keane 2008: 858–60). The conflict quickly escalated from this point forward as countries such as Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arabia recalled their diplomatic representatives from Denmark amid calls for a global boycott of Danish products. Public protests spread to dozens of Muslim and non-Muslim majority countries, and while a number of these were mainly peaceful others turned violent and led to significant property damage and loss of life. Meanwhile, death threats against the cartoonists and the editors of JyllandsPosten heightened tensions within Denmark, and concerns for the safety of Danish citizens overseas led the Danish foreign ministry to issue travel advisories for several Muslim majority countries (CBC News 2006; Howden et al. 2006). In an attempt to defuse the situation, on January 30, 2006 Jyllands-Posten issued a letter of apology on their website in Danish, English and Arabic. Chief editor Carsten Juste was careful to note, however, that the apology was only for the offense caused by the cartoons and did not extend to the original decision to have them published, which he continued to defend on grounds of freedom of expression. In similar terms, the Danish Prime Minister expressed his personal distress over the fact that some Muslims viewed the cartoons as insulting and defamatory, but simultaneously voiced his unqualified support for the freedom of the Danish press. While some Muslims were satisfied with these qualified apologies, including a spokesman for Denmark’s Islamic Faith Community, on the whole the reaction against the cartoons continued to intensify, particularly overseas where violent protests led to additional loss of life and to the firebombing of Danish embassies in Beirut and Damascus. Adding further fuel to this fire was the decision by several newspapers in Europe, the United Kingdom, North America and elsewhere to republish the cartoons as a sign of solidarity with the editors of Jyllands-Posten. This decision drew the ire of the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, who accused the papers of a preference for provocation over constructive dialogue with the opponents of the cartoons (Cowell 2006; Bransten 2006; Keane 2008: 860–1).21 This cycle of provocation and counterprovocation continued into 2008 when Danish police uncovered a plot to assassinate Kurt Westergaard, the author of the cartoon depicting Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. Jyllands-Posten and several other Danish newspapers responded by reprinting Westergaard’s cartoon, a decision soon followed by a

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fresh wave of terrorist threats against Danish citizens and violent attacks against Danish Embassies overseas, including an incident in Pakistan that killed six. In 2009 a second assassination plot was uncovered, this one targeting both Kurt Westergaard and Flemming Rose, and in the most recent installment of this saga, in January 2010 a 28-year-old Somali man, with links to the radical Islamist al-Shabab militia, was apprehended by police after breaking into Westergaard’s home with an axe and a knife, threatening to kill him (CBC News 2006; Keane 2008: 845–6; Bone 2009). The cartoon controversy begs a number of compelling questions, but I want to focus on one in particular: should the cartoons have been published or should they have been banned? This deceptively simple question brings us face to face with some particularly challenging issues, including the potential tensions that arise between freedom of expression and religious tolerance, the difference between satirical speech and hate speech, the impact of negative stereotyping on the security and well-being of ethnic or religious minorities, and the role of civic multiculturalism in promoting tolerance and social cohesion in a culturally diverse democracy. I will consider three different answers to cartoon question: i) the cartoons were harmful, served no valuable purpose and should have been banned; ii) the cartoons were a legitimate exercise of free speech, served an important public function, and should not have been banned; and iii) the cartoons should not have been banned, but the decision to publish them was unsound and deserves to be roundly criticized. The case for banning the cartoons One does not have to be an opponent of freedom of expression to argue that the cartoons should have been banned. Most liberal states and liberal-minded theorists regard as axiomatic the assumption that freedom of expression has its limits, and that censorship can be justified as a means of protecting other vital human interests and preventing serious and substantive harm (see e.g. Mill 1978: 9, 53; Parekh 2000: 320; Galeotti 2002: 137–68). Granted, the potential for harm must always be assessed in relation to the potential benefits of freedom of expression, and in cases where the benefits clearly outweigh the harms censorship cannot be justified. Nevertheless, in this particular case it is difficult to interpret the decision to print (and then later reprint) the cartoons as anything other than an act of naked provocation (Pieterse 2007: 180; Carens 2006: 37, 40).22 The editors at Jyllands-Posten were well aware that the images would prove to be offensive to many Muslims, and would be likely to provoke anger and outrage—especially given the paper’s links with right-wing parties that have been highly critical of Muslim immigration and Muslim customs and beliefs (Bleich 2006: 17; Carens 2006: 40–1; Keane 2008: 864, 867–8). The editors would also have been aware of the elevated levels of suspicion and mistrust directed towards European Muslims in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York, London and Madrid, and it is simply not plausible for them to claim they had no idea that publishing the cartoons in this volatile political climate

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would aggravate anti-Muslim sentiment and reinforce negative Muslim stereotypes. For both of these reasons, the caricatures of Muhammad were not particularly well suited to the task of increasing mutual understanding and amongst Muslims and non-Muslims in Denmark, or to the task of inspiring a reasonable public debate on the problems of self-censorship and religious intolerance (see e.g. Burcharth 2006). Quite the opposite—the cartoons were virtually customdesigned to undermine the possibility of reasonable dialogue and debate, which clearly contradicts the stated justification for their publication. To reiterate, harmful speech can be justified in a free and democratic society if it serves a valuable public function, but if the nature of the speech act is such that it undermines that very same public function it can justifiably be restricted (see e.g. Mendus 1993: 205; cf. Modood 1993: 148). Even if we accept that the cartoon exercise was not entirely without merit, the harmful nature of the images was more than sufficient to outweigh whatever marginal benefits might have been gained from their publication. True, some of the images are relatively tame, while others mock both Ka˚re Bluitgen and the Jyllands-Posten editors, but others are extremely offensive and some are clearly designed to promote religious hatred—and not just hatred of Muslim beliefs but hatred of Muslims. The most obvious example is Kurt Westergaard’s cartoon of Muhammed wearing a bomb-laden turban, which more than one commentator has appropriately categorized as an example of racist hate speech. The image is racist because it is meant to represent not just Muhammed but all Muslims, and it carries the message that all Muslims are prone to terrorist violence (Bleich 2006: 21; Modood 2006c: 54; Gemie 2006: 31).23 Racism and the promotion of racial hatred is objectionable enough in itself, but it also has corrosive knock-on effects on the rights and opportunities of those who are its targets. It hardly needs mentioning that racism is hurtful and degrading and can easily undermine the dignity and self-esteem of its victims, poisoning their daily existence with feelings of self-doubt, resentment and anger. Acts of racist vilification also promote feelings of fear, mistrust and hatred of the target group which can drastically reduce the opportunities available to their members in areas such as education, employment, housing and political participation. It may even undermine their ability to feel safe and secure, let alone welcome, in the wider society (Modood 1993: 145–7; Parekh 2000: 314).24 Some have responded to these charges by arguing that the cartoons do not express hatred of Muslims but at most only hatred of the Muslim religion (O’Leary 2006: 23–5).25 Yet even if we accept this point it effectively changes nothing, because regardless of what name we give to the offence perpetrated by these hateful images, their poisonous effects—on Muslims and on the public perception of Muslims—is the same, and for this reason their publication should have been prohibited. In defense of the cartoons The editors at Jyllands-Posten had every right to publish the cartoons, and should be commended for their courage in doing so. Any effort at censorship—whether

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state enforced or self-imposed—would have constituted a serious setback for freedom of expression in Denmark, and would only have further emboldened those who rely on fear and intimidation to stifle the open exchange of ideas and criticism. Several of the cartoons were indeed provocative but not gratuitously so as some commentators have suggested (see e.g. Carens 2006: 37, 39–40).26 On the contrary, the images served several important functions, the first of which was to draw attention to the very real problem of media self-censorship both in Denmark and, given the number of foreign newspapers that refused to reprint the cartoons, in numerous other countries in Europe and around the world. Some of the cartoons also drew much-needed critical attention to the reality of religiously motivated violence, intolerance and inequality (particularly gender inequality).27 True, this connection is sometimes exaggerated by those who assume that religious devotion necessarily predisposes an individual towards violent or intolerant behavior, but there is no denying the fact that a great deal of suffering, bloodshed and oppression has been perpetrated in the name not only of Islam but also Christianity, Judaism and other world religions (Hansen 2006: 12).28 These issues warrant fearless and clear-eyed debate in any country committed to the freedom, dignity and well-being of the individual. We should also remember that open dialogue and debate can be an effective tool for marginalizing extremists, in that it opens up a space where the voices of religious moderates can be heard (see e.g. O’Leary 2006: 24; cf. Parekh 2000: 331; Spinner-Halev 2000: 150–3). A point that went largely unmentioned in the cartoon controversy is that the kind of dialogue sought by the editors at JyllandsPosten in fact offered significant benefits to the vast majority of Muslims who renounce violence and intimidation as means of defending their beliefs. By participating in such a dialogue, Muslims could have taken the opportunity to separate the fact from the fiction about their practices and beliefs, to persuade their fellow citizens that the threat of Islam has been greatly exaggerated, and to present their views on what the reasonable accommodation of the Islamic faith might look like in the Danish context. Granted, dialogue of this sort is often difficult and adversarial, and there are no guarantees that it will lead either to mutual understanding or mutual accommodation, yet it still offers more hope than the alternative, which is to let the outstanding issues be ‘‘settled’’ by an appeal to force or fear. Indeed, from this perspective, the true villains in the cartoon affair are those who preached and perpetrated violent acts as a means of stifling this opportunity for constructive Muslim–non-Muslim engagement. Some critics have nevertheless argued that the harmful nature of the cartoons far outweighs the possible benefits to be obtained from their publication, but on the whole these arguments fail to stand up to critical scrutiny. To begin with, none of the cartoons—not even the most offensive examples—are unequivocally racist (Hansen 2006: 11–12; O’Leary 2006: 23–6; Lægaard 2007: 189–90). True, some of the cartoons are open to this interpretation. For example, one plausible reading of the suicide bomber cartoons is that all Muslims are either vicious terrorists or hapless fools who murder for the sake of sexual gratification in the afterlife. However, another equally plausible, non-racist interpretation of these

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images is that some Muslims are this way, just as some Christians, some Jews and some individuals from thoroughly secular backgrounds are this way—and for a variety of reasons other than their inherent racial or religious predispositions. Like most of the cartoons, these two images are in fact subject to multiple different plausible interpretations, and it is simply arbitrary to declare that they carry only the message of racism or religious hatred. Granted, this still leaves us with the argument that, regardless of whether the cartoons should be considered racist, the fact remains that many of them were highly offensive to Muslims who regard any pictorial representation as blasphemous—and this fact alone is reason enough to condemn their publication (Carens 2006: 37).29 But the obvious reply here is that there is no such thing in a liberal society as a right not to be offended by others. Individuals have the right to hold and express their religious beliefs, to celebrate those beliefs in communion with other believers, and to be protected from persecution and discrimination on the basis of those beliefs, but their fellow citizens cannot legitimately be compelled to respect those beliefs or to refrain from criticizing, mocking or lampooning them no matter how much distress or offence this may cause (Hansen 2006: 13–15; O’Leary 2006: 23–4, 29; cf. Barry 2001: 264–71).30 Consider in this context the common multiculturalist refrain that it is unjust to banish religion and religious reasoning to the sphere of private life while secularism is allowed to dominate the public sphere (Parekh 2000: 322–31; Spinner-Halev 2000: 142–65; Casanova 2007: 61–5; Modood 2007: 72–9). Fair enough, one might reply, but if you want to be part of the public discourse in a free and democratic society you must accept what that discourse brings—even if that sometimes means harsh, and possibly disrespectful, criticism. As Randell Hansen correctly observes (2006: 16), aggrieved Muslims have the same rights as any other citizens, religious or secular, to criticize and protest this sort of treatment. They are also free to respond with insulting or disrespectful speech of their own (though a more effective strategy might be to seize the moral high ground by calling for mutually respectful dialogue) but it is going too far to call for the banning of the cartoons or the prosecution of the publishers and cartoonists. Indeed, if we were to accept the principle that speech which is merely offensive should be censored we would probably have to consider banning some of the classic works of political philosophy like the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, where Marx compares religion to an insidious drug and caricatures religious believers as the hapless dupes of an ideology that helps keep them enslaved to their capitalist masters (Marx 1978: 54). A similar fate would likely be in store for the enormously popular anti-faith writings of evolutionary scientist Richard Dawkins, who compares religious belief to a form of mental illness and describes the God of the Old Testament as ‘‘a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sado-masochistic, capriciously malevolent bully’’ (2008: 51). We might also have to do without the works of influential feminist theorists like Susan Okin and Martha Nussbaum, who have excoriated religions of all stripes for contributing to the misery, oppression,

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abuse and needless death of countless women around the world (Okin 1998, 1999; Nussbaum 1999: 29–54). In fact, religious groups would be just as likely to find their own activities censured under such a regime. Fundamentalists would have to think twice about referring to women as harlots for wearing immodest dress or about telling non-believers they are evil and bound for the fires of hell, and they would certainly face restrictions on their right to publicly denigrate and degrade non-heterosexuals. Free speech is what permits all of these things to be said or written, and members of religious minorities in particular should be careful to avoid calling for the removal of the very protections available to offensive speech which also shield them from censorship at the hands of the dominant majority. Freedom of expression is simply too vital a right to be sacrificed for something as trivial as the right not to be given offence (see e.g. Jones 1993: 132–3). It is only when speech presents a serious and immanent danger to others that it can justifiably be restricted. Examples that fall into this category would include speech that poses a serious risk to public order and safety, such as the incitement to riot, or speech which threatens the safety and security of particular groups or individuals such as incitement to racial hatred or violence (Mill 1978: 50–3; Galeotti 2002: 150–60; O’Leary 2006: 27).31 Granted, there will always be grey areas and in some cases it will be difficult to determine whether a particular speech act has crossed the line from acceptable to unacceptable, but the Danish cartoons clearly did not pose this kind of a threat and their publication was entirely justified. Defending freedom of expression, condemning the cartoons, and a comment on the importance of civic multiculturalism Critics of the censorship option are correct in their assessment that the cartoons are neither racist nor an expression of hatred for Muslims (at least not unambiguously so) even if they are offensive to some members of the Islamic faith. They also rightly conclude that the cartoon affair raised important issues that need to be vigorously debated in any democracy—issues like the fragility of freedom of expression, the darker sides of religious belief, and the role of the media as a shaper of public opinion. It is also fair to say that, even though the editors at Jyllands-Posten are guilty of underestimating Muslim reaction to the cartoons, they could not reasonably have foreseen the rapid globalization of the images and the violence and bloodshed they would precipitate beyond the borders of Denmark. All of which is to say that the decision to publish the cartoons deserved to be protected by the right to freedom of expression. But was the decision to publish the cartoons a wise decision? No, it was not, and for this reason the editors deserve to be roundly criticized (Carens 2006: 33–4; cf. Jones 1993: 132–3). As more than one critic has pointed out, the editors must have known that many Muslims would be highly offended by the images. They also would have been aware that some of the images would likely stoke anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly given the elevated levels of Islamophobia in Denmark and Europe at the time of publication. Could they not see how

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both of these factors would work to poison and polarize the ensuing debate (see e.g. Shearmur 2006: 25)? If the editors were indeed serious about provoking a thoughtful debate, a much wiser strategy would have been to commission a series of thoughtful articles on the dangers of self-censorship, the limits of religious tolerance, and the challenges of integration and mutual accommodation in a culturally and religiously diverse democracy. A more balanced debate would also have been more likely had Jyllands-Posten canvassed a range of Muslim perspectives on the taboo surrounding pictorial representations of Muhammad, and had they offered Muslims an opportunity to comment on how the chilling effects of religious extremism on freedom of expression should be addressed. Jyllands-Posten instead opted for a more inflammatory strategy, and what is worse, they persisted with this strategy when all of the available evidence pointed clearly to its failure. Most notably, in the aftermath of the foiled plot to assassinate Kurt Westergaard and Flemming Rose Jyllands-Posten again opted for insult and provocation by republishing the most offensive of the cartoons. This may have been the most instinctive and viscerally satisfying reaction but it was not a sign of sound or measured judgement. Rather than seizing the opportunity to divert the trajectory of the cartoon affair onto a more constructive path—perhaps by publishing a series of articles penned by Muslim and non-Muslim moderates condemning the extremists and calling for constructive engagement and dialogue—the editors chose a path that was more conducive to perpetuating and escalating the conflict. The conduct of Jyllands-Posten in the cartoon affair is a prime example of a breakdown in what might be called civic multiculturalism, by which I mean those voluntary and non-enforceable norms or standards of conduct that help foster a climate of tolerance and civility in a culturally diverse society. For example, although the editors did nothing that could legitimately make them the target of legal sanction, their actions fell well short of what can be considered beneficial or praiseworthy, and did far more damage than good for Muslim– non-Muslim relations in Denmark.32 Jyllands-Posten’s failure is all the more notable because of the significant power it wields as a shaper of public opinion in Denmark. Those who wield such power have a special moral responsibility to use it wisely and responsibly, particularly when it comes to dealing with vulnerable or vilified minorities (Carens 2006: 40–1; Pieterse 2007: 180). Yet the editors were not the only parties at fault in the cartoon affair, and the responsibility for the breakdown of civic multiculturalism must be laid at the feet of several other actors in this drama, including those Muslims who chose violence and intimidation over peaceful protest and dialogue as a means of airing their concerns. Such tactics may have been well-suited to the purposes of extremists, but for moderates looking to build bridges of mutual understanding and respect with members of the wider society the use of violence or intimidation is extremely counterproductive, not to mention entirely unjustified. Others who must bear some responsibility in this conflict are those members of the general public who chose to hear only the extremists and not the moderate voices in the Muslim

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community, those who propagated only the most negative and sensationalist interpretations of Islam, and those who refused to subject the judgement and motivations of the cartoonists or the editors at Jyllands-Posten’s to any kind of critical evaluation (Carens 2006: 35–8; Shearmur 2006: 24–5). And what of the Danish government? Do they have a legitimate role to play in fostering civic multiculturalism? This is a more difficult question. On the one hand, the state in a liberal-democracy has no right to compel either the press or individual citizens to show respect for or to refrain from criticizing the religious beliefs of their fellow citizens. On the other hand, the state does have a legitimate role to play in maintaining peaceful and stable relations amongst the diverse groups making up its civil society, and in creating a political climate in which citizens can feel safe and secure regardless of their religious beliefs and convictions. The Danish government did in fact make some efforts in this regard, for example by speaking out against the demonization of its Muslim citizens (Brogger 2006), but it could easily have done more. For example, it could have agreed to the meeting requested by the Muslim ambassadors in 2005 as a sign of its willingness to hear out all sides in the conflict, and as a means of reducing the potential for further escalation of the conflict. Furthermore, although the government was fully justified in its decision to support press freedom, it could also have shown more leadership by working to support a public debate on the key issues when it became clear that such a discussion was not going to emerge spontaneously (see e.g. Shearmur 2006: 25; cf. Modood 2006b: 61). To conclude then, censorship was not the correct response to the publication of the cartoons but neither was a blind reliance on the virtues of free speech. In an increasingly culturally diverse society like Denmark, which faces significant challenges with integration and social cohesion, and a minority that is often regarded with suspicion and hostility, what is also required is the wisdom, and the will, to use that freedom constructively to promote mutual toleration, and mutual respect amongst its Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.

Conclusion One of the greatest benefits of a contextual approach to the challenges of multicultural accommodation is that it keeps our theories grounded in reality and helps prevent political philosophy from becoming effectively irrelevant to political practice. As James Tully has argued (2004: 93–5), if our aim is to arrive at just and effective resolutions to struggles for cultural recognition it is vital that we understand what those struggles are really about, and the best way to do so is not to start with some abstract theory but by examining specific instances of such struggles and by paying particular attention to how the participants in those struggles articulate their claims. Contextualism, in other words, is a more accurate means of assessing the nature of the challenges faced by theorists or practitioners of diversity management. In addition to its more practical benefits, contextual multiculturalism has the advantage of being more democratic.

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Specifically, by taking people’s concrete claims and circumstances as the departure point for debate, contextualism embodies a signature principle of deliberative democracy, which is to listen to one’s interlocutors and to respect their right to present their case in their own terms (see e.g. Taylor 1994b: 260). I don’t pretend to have done full justice in this chapter to the richness of the contextualist methodology, but I do hope to have left the reader with a small taste of the potential fruits of such an approach, and of the pressing need to cultivate an interdependent relationship between the worlds of theory and practice in tackling the difficult challenges of mutual accommodation in a culturally diverse democracy.

Chapter 10

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Conclusion

Multicultural ‘‘crises’’ will continue to come and go, and as they do the popularity of multicultural policies will continue to wax and wane in the public imagination. Yet as students of political philosophy, and as responsible citizens, it is our duty to take a more measured view, and to see that ill-informed and intemperate analysis is countered with fact and sound argument. It is therefore worth repeating a few of the core messages that emerged from this study. The first is that multiculturalism is a term that looks increasingly unequal to the task of describing a field of political philosophy that is becoming ever more rich and internally differentiated. Indeed, the term itself is at least partly responsible for the confusion that continues to impede progressive debate on the difficult question of accommodating ethnocultural and ethnonational diversity. As I suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, it nourishes the misleading impression that in every culturally diverse democracy around the world policy makers are engaged in the same multicultural experiment, that every philosophical champion of multiculturalism seeks to defend the same kinds of cultural minorities and the same kinds of cultural rights, and that the preservation of cultural differences is the one and only objective of a politics of multicultural accommodation. Perhaps the most obvious solution to this problem is to avoid a generic term like multiculturalism altogether, and as I argued in the second chapter there is much to be said in favor of this option. Another approach—the one taken in this book—is to continue using the term while making a systematic effort to sort through its many complexities and shades of meaning.1 Indeed, one of my objectives was to demonstrate that many multiculturalists themselves have taken great care to distinguish between the different kinds of cultural minorities and their distinctive demands (both cultural and non-cultural); the different kinds of multicultural policies that might be used to satisfy these demands (some of which relate to the preservation of cultural differences, others which do not); the different ways in which these policies can be justified (in both moral and more pragmatic terms); and the different challenges these policies pose for human rights protection and social cohesion. Granted, this makes for a much more complicated story, but as I argued in Chapters 1 and 9, to understand contemporary multicultural political philosophy one must examine it in all of its depth and diversity. The relationship between multiculturalism and equality is a case in point. As I have emphasized throughout the book, most (though certainly not all)

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multiculturalists argue that treating minorities with equal consideration and respect sometimes (but not always) requires treating them differently, and that strict adherence to a policy of difference-blind liberal universalism can itself be a source of injustice (and perhaps instability) in a culturally diverse democracy. Yet it is also true that some multicultural policies (e.g. affirmative action) are designed to ensure that minorities are not treated unequally on account of their ethnic, linguistic or religious differences, while others that are frequently mistaken for a form of special treatment (e.g. the right to self-government) are in fact aimed at addressing a previously unnoticed form of discrimination whereby minorities are denied a right which the majority already claims for itself (see Chapters 3 and 5). It is also worth remembering that multiculturalists don’t always agree on the kinds of group-differentiated rights or policies that are deserving of recognition in a liberal democracy, that some of these very same measures have also proven acceptable to liberal opponents of multiculturalism (though not always for the same reasons), and that in some versions of multiculturalism the idea of treating minorities differently than anyone else is ruled out entirely (see Chapters3, 5 and 6). What I also hope to have shown in this book is that multiculturalism, by and large, is not an ‘‘anything goes’’ political philosophy that offers comfort to any and all minority practices regardless of how offensive or harmful they may be to outsiders (or to some of their own members). Granted, most multiculturalists can be fairly characterized as anti-foundationalists about questions of moral truth, but I cannot think of any who would be comfortable with the radical moral relativist’s conclusion that cross-cultural moral judgement is, by its very nature, illegitimate. Kukathas alone skates close to this line, but even in his case this is more a failure of execution than of conviction (see Chapters 2, 5 and 7). For everyone else, the bottom line is that there are certain minimum standards of conduct that any human community is bound to uphold, and that minorities (like majorities) have a duty to ensure that the well-being of their weak and vulnerable members is not sacrificed to the interests of the community as a whole. In other words, minority rights come with certain minority responsibilities. What should also be clear by now is that multiculturalists generally agree that decisions about whether minority claims can or should be accommodated must be taken with due consideration and respect for the interests and well-being of members of the wider society, who should not be expected to shoulder all of the burdens of adjustment. On the contrary, as theorists like Kymlicka, Parekh and Tully take care to emphasize, multiculturalism should be regarded as a political philosophy of mutual accommodation that requires sacrifices and adaptations on the part of majority and minority communities alike (see Chapters 1, 5 and 6). Of course, it is important not to underestimate the difficulty of determining where, precisely, the bounds of mutual accommodation should begin and end, and one could be forgiven for the impression that there are at least as many answers to this question as there are theorists in the debate. Critics have fastened on this indeterminacy as a symptom of the more general lack of coherence in the literature on multiculturalism or as evidence that the champions of this

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doctrine lack the courage of their moral convictions—particularly when it comes to determining an appropriate balance between minority rights and individual human rights. However, while it is true that some multiculturalists have not said nearly enough about how their abstract principles are to be translated into concrete protections for the weak and vulnerable, the absence of a neat and universally accepted multiculturalist formula for determining the limits of toleration in a pluralistic democracy should come as no surprise, given that classical liberals themselves have failed to arrive at a consensus on this question after nearly a century and a half of debate (see Chapters 1, 2 and 7). Indeed, as I have argued in several different places in the book, to ask for a universal formula that will cut through this indeterminacy to provide easy and incontrovertible solutions in every case is to ask too much of any moral philosophy. The theme of indeterminacy also proved relevant to the discussion of social cohesion and national unity in Chapter 8. To recap that discussion, although there is a fair bit of evidence which suggests that multicultural policies can have a positive impact on stability and social unity in a pluricultural democracy, even champions of multiculturalism concede that this evidence frequently falls short of compelling proof, and that many cases exist where multicultural policies simply failed to counteract inter-ethnic suspicion, mistrust and conflict, and may even have made things worse. Critics, on the other hand, have tended to exaggerate the disintegrative effects of multicultural policies, and have largely failed to confront the destabilizing potential of a difference blind policy that leaves no room whatsoever for the accommodation of ethnocultural or ethnonational differences. Another lesson to emerge from this discussion is that multicultural policies represent only one small part of the legislative toolkit available to decision-makers engaged in the business of maintaining unity and social solidarity in conditions of diversity, and ultimately they may be less important than a fair and expeditious naturalization regime that encourages high levels of citizenship uptake, or an economic development strategy which helps to ensure that separatist sentiments are not aggravated by the effects of regional economic inequality. Which brings us to one final point: whether the aim is to promote stability or justice in conditions of diversity, there are limits to what public policy on its own can accomplish. This is why I have emphasized the importance of civic multiculturalism: those voluntary and non-enforceable norms or standards of conduct that help foster a climate of tolerance and civility in a culturally diverse society (see Chapter 9).2 The mantle of civic multiculturalism can be taken up by members of the majority culture, through their willingness to educate themselves with respect to the nature and purpose of multicultural policies, to subject those policies to reasonable discussion and debate, and to resist the efforts of those whose objective is to sow public hysteria rather than informed debate on questions of minority difference. Minorities also have a role to play by granting due recognition to the different traditions, values and practices of the majority, even if this sometimes requires adaptations to their own codes of conduct, and by choosing dialogue and persuasion rather than violence and intimidation as a

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means of mediating their differences, and their grievances, with the wider society. As I argued in Chapter 9, the practice of civic multiculturalism is especially important in the case of powerful civil society actors such as the media, whose capacity to shape the attitudes and opinions of the public is enormous. Media can occupy this role responsibly by avoiding potentially harmful minority stereotypes, and by opting for methods of critical or investigative journalism that are more likely to inform rather than merely to sensationalize. Governments themselves can take various measures to foster a spirit of civic multiculturalism, but it goes without saying that they cannot compel the various actors in civil society to embrace this ethic. True, democracies can outlaw discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds, they can make hate speech a crime, and they can require children in public schools to learn more about diversity. But they have no right to force people to treat their minority coworkers with friendship or civility, to deny media the right to lampoon the beliefs of religious minorities, to compel students to embrace the merits of ethnocultural or ethnonational diversity, or to make illiberal minorities believe in equality or the merits of democratic dialogue. Civic multiculturalism, in other words, is largely a voluntary affair, and if this responsibility is not taken up by citizens on both sides of the minority–majority divide, then the prospects for securing just and harmonious relations amongst individuals and communities in a culturally diverse democracy will be that much dimmer. Indeed, as I argued in Chapter 8, in the quest for mutual accommodation in a pluricultural society, there simply is no substitute for the basic desire amongst diverse peoples to share a common political space, to treat each other justly, if not always courteously, and to work together to manage their differences and disagreements in a peaceful and democratic, if not always harmonious, manner.

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Notes

1 Multiculturalism: a critical introduction 1 Even some of the sharpest critics of multiculturalism were conceding its success in drawing attention to previously neglected forms of injustice (see e.g. Schlesinger 1998; Barry 1998: 313–15). 2 Most recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron have both made public speeches decrying the failure of multiculturalism in their respective countries (BBC 2011; Siebold 2010). 3 Even relatively sympathetic critics like Glazer exhibit a clear preference for a regime of difference-blind egalitarian liberalism in the United States (Glazer 1998). 4 As Kymlicka correctly observes, much of the retreat from multiculturalism has in fact been more rhetorical than real (2007: 122–4). That official pronouncements on multiculturalism should be at odds with the policies that are currently being pursued on the ground should come as no surprise, given that governments often strive to contain negative public sentiment around a course of action they otherwise believe to be sound. 5 For this reason, the generic term ‘‘multiculturalists’’ can be misleading. I will use it throughout the book for sake of convenience, but with the recognition that there is no such thing as a unified or homogeneous school of multiculturalist political philosophy. 6 The truly pioneering works in the multiculturalism literature included Kymlicka’s Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989), Iris Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), and Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (1992). See also Kymlicka (1989, 1995, 1998, 2001), Young (1990, 2000), Taylor (1994a), Spinner (1994), Tully (1995), Carens (2000), Deveaux (2000), Parekh (2000), Levy (2000), Benhabib (2002), Kukathas (2003), Modood (2007), and Phillips (2007). It should also be noted that the early flourishing of the multiculturalism literature was spurred on by a parallel renaissance of scholarship on the theory and practice of democratic citizenship. On the latter see Kymlicka and Norman (1994), and Isin and Turner (2003). An account of the different phases in the debate over multiculturalism and minority rights can be found in Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 1–41), Kymlicka (2001: 7–39), and Kymlicka (2007a: 25–59). 7 Good overviews of the different themes and phases in the multicultural debates can also be found in Kymlicka and Norman (2000) and Kymlicka (2007a). 8 See also Kelly (2002), an edited volume of critical commentaries on Barry’s book. 9 A notable exception is Festenstein (2005). 10 I should say that my sense of confidence in the multicultural option is also tempered by a keen awareness that accommodating diversity is by no means a cost-free enterprise, that it may require difficult trade-offs among competing rights and interests,

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and that even the best multicultural policies will frequently fail to secure their desired objectives. 11 A similar ethic informs James Tully’s (1995) principle of mutual recognition, Joseph Carens’ doctrine of evenhanded justice (2000) and Tariq Modood’s notion of multicultural integration (2007: 151–2). 12 This focus enjoys broad support in the literature. In addition to Kymlicka (1995, 2001) see Spinner (1994), Tully (1995), Carens (2000), Levy (2000), Kukathas (2003), Modood (2007) and Phillips (2007).

2 Multiculturalism and culture 1 National minorities themselves frequently object to being classified as cultural minorities, and tend to regard official (state-sponsored) multiculturalism as a strategy deliberately aimed at undermining their efforts to achieve recognition as nations with the right to self-determination. Quebec nationalists see Canada’s multicultural policy in precisely this sort of light (see e.g. Padolsky 2000: 147–9). 2 While some multiculturalists are concerned about the injustice of an under-inclusive approach to cultural diversity, others worry that a more expansive approach will lead to an unworkable proliferation of cultural rights claims (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995: 145). 3 The title of Anne Phillips Multiculturalism Without Culture (2007) suggests that she is an exception to this rule, but her argument is not that objective cultural differences are irrelevant (e.g. 15, 52), but only that they have been overemphasized in various unhelpful ways (e.g. 8–10, 21–5). 4 Phillips (2007: 56–8) largely agrees with Ford on this point but cautions against adopting an overly narrow interpretation of racism that ignores its links with factors such as ethnicity or religious difference (cf. Modood 2007: 38). Hooker (2009) also makes a strong case for a multiculturalism that analyzes questions of cultural and racial difference simultaneously. 5 The function of this concept in Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural accommodation is discussed in Chapter 5. 6 Compare Deveaux (2006: 106): ‘‘struggles over the meaning and validity of contested cultural traditions in liberal states are more centrally about the concrete interests of group members and the distribution of power and decision-making authority in these communities.’’ 7 Affirmative action can also be defended as a means of promoting integration and social cohesion, or as a means of addressing a persistent history of discrimination that has relegated particular classes of individuals to the social, economic and political margins of society (see e.g. Dworkin 1985: 293–303). 8 Minority language preservation may nevertheless be a by-product of this multicultural policy. Most multicultural policies are capable of serving several different functions simultaneously, some of which relate to the preservation or celebration of objective cultural differences and others which do not (see Chapter 3). 9 See, for example, the decisions in Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, and Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2003) 194 ALR 538. Similar arguments have been deployed in relation to the adjudication of Aboriginal rights in Canada, New Zealand and Latin America. See da Cunha (1992), Barsh and Henderson (1997), Barcham (2000), Murphy (2008) and Hooker (2009: 161–2). 10 For a sample of these views see Young (1990: 168–73), Spinner (1994: 76–7), Kymlicka (1995: 101–5), Tully (1995: 9–14), Parekh (2000: 142–78), Benhabib (2002: 1–23), and Phillips (2007: 11–41). It goes without saying that multiculturalists generally do not support coercive forms of cultural change, such as aggressive and punitive state-sponsored assimilation policies.

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11 Granted, there is no guarantee that minorities will not take advantage of these measures and seek to stifle the freedom of their own members, which explains why multiculturalists generally seek to develop safeguards for the rights of vulnerable individuals or internal minorities. I discuss these issues in Chapters 5 and 7. 12 Kymlicka (1996: 126–8) makes a similar point with respect to the formation and transformation of national identities. 13 This criticism has also been leveled against feminist critics of multiculturalism like Susan Moller Okin (1999). See, for example, Shachar (2007: 120–3). 14 See, for example, Nussbaum (1999), Okin (1999), Barry (2001), Phillips (2007), and Song (2007). 15 My focus here is mostly on multicultural political philosophy, but suffice it to say that in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, where multicultural policies are tempered by a foundational commitment to individual human rights, such extreme violations against individual liberty and security of the person would be regarded as deviations from acceptable standards of minority accommodation. 16 Barry also accuses Will Kymlicka, Iris Young and Michael Walzer of harboring relativist convictions. See Young (1990: 36–7, 250–1) for evidence to the contrary. Walzer’s earlier work in Spheres of Justice (1983) is perhaps more susceptible to this criticism, but in his later work (e.g. 1997: 63–4) he sets clear limits regarding the sorts of minority practices a liberal society should be prepared to tolerate. Kymlicka, interestingly enough, is also commonly accused of intolerance for his uncompromisingly liberal approach to minority rights (see Chapter 7). For his own arguments against relativism see Kymlicka (1989: 636, 231–3; and 2001: 144–5). 17 Admittedly, Kukathas has not been entirely consistent on this point. See, for example, his critique of Kymlicka’s ‘‘liberalization impulse’’ in Kukathas (1992: 122). 18 In an earlier work Kukathas (1992: 128) sets out certain minimum standards of conduct that any community should be expected to uphold, including prohibitions on slavery, physical coercion and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It is unclear, however, whether he wishes these standards to carry over into his later work. 19 In other words, the moral convictions of any cultural community are no less valid for their contingency, and recognizing this as one of their unavoidable features should have no bearing whatsoever on their adherents’ willingness to defend them against competing—equally contingent—moral principles. For a helpful discussion of the anti-foundationalist take on morality see Rorty (1989a, 1992). 20 On the question of persuasion in the absence of strong universal truths see Wittgenstein (1974) and Rorty (1989). 21 For another take on the link between anti-foundationalism and relativism, coined in the language of cultural incommensurability, see Moore (2005: 275–8). While Moore and I agree that an anti-foundationalist moral stance does not necessarily lead to radical moral relativism, our accounts differ in that she places Tully, and to a lesser Parekh and Kukathas, in the relativist camp. 22 Taylor’ position straddles the realist/anti-foundationalist divide. He accepts the antifoundationalist arguments that the proofs for moral universals are unavailable to us, but he also insists that if people at least believe that such moral truths exist, this will have salutary effects on their moral conduct (Taylor, 1989a: 503, 513–21). 23 These debates sometimes reflect an unhealthy tendency towards value-reductionism—the idea that a single core value, such as autonomy, toleration, freedom of association or the like should be elevated above all others to govern decisions on where the limits of minority accommodation are to be drawn. Criticisms of this tendency can be found in Taylor (1994: 250), Spinner-Halev (2008: 567) and, in a somewhat broader context, in Berlin (1984).

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24 See Kymlicka (1992: 143; 2001b:133–5), Kukathas (1992: 123), Parekh (2000: 107– 8; 2002: 149; 2006: 370–1), Barry (2001: 132–3, 279–80; 2002: 231–2), Chambers (2002: 157–68), and Tully (2002). 25 Barry to his credit concedes that there are often powerful moral arguments on both sides of an issue (2001: 152). 26 Compare Macedo (2007: 433–4): ‘‘Hard cases do arise, and while different scholars advance competing abstract theories designed to solve a wide range of hard cases, solutions are liable to be tentative and experimental, involving difficult balances, and calling for reasoned judgment rather than the application of abstract formulae.’’ 27 Kukathas (2003: 43) makes virtually the same point: ‘‘Human beings are the same the world over, though human life takes different forms in different parts of the world— shaped by circumstances.’’ 28 Indeed, this proves to be an interesting point of convergence with critics of multiculturalism, including Barry (2002: 285–6), who believes that there is probably something like universal agreement across cultures on certain basic standards of human conduct, human decency and human needs.

3 A typology of multicultural policies 1 For a useful discussion of multiculturalism as a fact (the existence of cultural diversity), as a norm (a justification for accommodating cultural diversity), and as a policy (a means of institutionalizing diversity accommodation) see Wieviorka (1998: 883). 2 Exemptions and assistance are categories employed by Levy (2000: 127), and what he calls symbolic claims I call symbolic recognition. 3 The point is not that symbolic recognition always enhances national unity—in fact there are good arguments which suggest that such measures might embolden a national minority, and thereby increase the likelihood of secession—but only that symbolism can have a very real impact, be it positive or negative, on the political stability of a multination state. 4 It should be acknowledged that the evidence to this effect is limited, and inconclusive. See, for example, Dragnea and Erling (2008). 5 Joseph Carens discusses the contrasting case of Fiji, where the colonial governor’s decision to protect communal land holdings helped spare the indigenous inhabitants the severe cultural and social consequences experienced by indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world (Carens 2000: 200–59). At the same time, the cost of these policies has been partially borne by the Fijian descendents of indentured laborers brought over from India in the nineteenth century to work these lands for agricultural purposes. More than a century later these ‘‘Indo-Fijians’’ are still prohibited from owning these lands, which continue to be held communally by the indigenous Fijians, and this policy is a significant source of ongoing inter-communal tension in Fiji. 6 Not every exemption serves this purpose. The tax exemptions that are available to members of Aboriginal First Nations in Canada, for example, are typically justified on the grounds that indigenous peoples are entitled to the right to self-determination and therefore should not be subject to the taxation authority of another jurisdiction (i.e. Canada). 7 In 2006, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that a Sikh high school student in Montreal had a right to wear his Kirpan to school, arguing that a ban on this practice was an undue violation of his religious freedom. However, the Court also ruled that public safety concerns could, at times, outweigh the religious right to carry the Kirpan. The justices cited the specific example of the legitimate banning of the Kirpan on commercial airliners (see Multani v. Commission Scolaire MargueriteBourgeoys (2006) 1 S.C.R. 256).

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8 One such request was denied by a New Zealand Court in 2004, while in 2009 an Ontario Superior Court judge ruled that the issues should be decided by presiding judges on a case-by-case basis (Powell 2009). 9 Two acceptable alternatives were identified: i) providing two pieces of official identification (photo not required); or ii) having another registered voter in their riding attest to one’s identity. There is some debate over whether this does, in fact, represent an exemption from existing legislation. The Chief Electoral Officer argued that visual identification is not in fact a requirement of the Canada Elections Act (and noted that many Canadians cast their vote by ballot), while the Canadian government took the opposite view (CBC News 2007). Eventually, the government backed off on a threat to impose its interpretation of the Act by means of a legislative amendment (CBC News 2009). 10 Barry’s debate with the multiculturalists is taken up more thoroughly in Chapter 6. 11 In addition, there is no recognized right to secede in international law. 12 For discussion see Tully (2000b). 13 The concept of a societal culture is defined on page 17. For another argument linking self-government to the interests of individuals see Barry (1991). 14 For a discussion of the variety of different forms that religious jurisdiction over family can take, see Shachar (2008). 15 Shachar also discusses examples from India and Kenya (2001: 78–85). Religious jurisdiction in the area of family law is by no means alien to the experience of Western democracies. See, for example, the discussion of religious arbitration of family law in Canada, prepared by the Women’s Legal Education Action Fund (LEAF) (DondyKaplan and Bakht 2006). 16 The possibility of reforming this policy has been the subject of recent debate in Israel, but to date has not resulted in any concrete action. 17 Enlightening discussions of secularism in a multicultural setting can be found in Parekh (2000: 322–31) and Modood (2007: 72–9) 18 A number of theorists who oppose granting religious authorities any sort of formal (legal) jurisdiction over family law often have no trouble supporting their right to regulate these matters informally in the private sphere, provided the parties involved have given their consent (Barry 2001: 157–9; Spinner-Halev 2008: 564–6).

4 Multiculturalism and the liberal–communitarian debate 1 The objective is not, on the other hand, to offer a comprehensive overview of the liberal–communitarian debate. For that see Mulhall and Swift (1992), Avineri and de-Shalit (1992) and Kymlicka (2002: 208–83). 2 Other theorists skeptical about the centrality of autonomy to liberal theory include Galston (1995) and the later Rawls (1996). For a reply to these skeptics see Kymlicka (2002: 228–44). 3 Additional candidates for liberalism’s guiding normative principle include consent (Waldron 1987) and the prevention of suffering and cruelty (Skhlar 1989; Rorty 1989). 4 As Rawls himself observes: ‘‘A deep disagreement exists as to how the values of liberty and equality are best realized in the basic structure of society’’ (Rawls 1992: 190). 5 Miller for one identifies three broad orientations in the literature: left, right and centrist-liberal communitarianism (Miller 1999). 6 A second strand of this critique, with only marginal relevance to the present discussion, involves a more abstract metaphysical claim: that liberalism is grounded in a philosophically incoherent conception of the self (i.e. what it means to exist in time

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13 14 15 16 17 18

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21 22

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and space as a human subject with human needs and human interests). Sandel levels this charge against Rawls (1982:179; 1992: 14–24). For a response to Sandel on this point see Rawls (1992: 203–4) and Kymlicka (1989: 51–3). For other versions of this argument see McIntyre (1984: especially chap. 15); Taylor (1985: 8); and Mulhall and Swift (1992: 13–18). This distinction between the freedom to choose and the conditions that make choice possible and meaningful is sometimes cashed out as the difference between positive and negative freedom. See Taylor (1985: 196) and the competing perspectives presented in Berlin (1984) and Taylor (1979). Taylor himself acknowledges as much (1985: 188–9; 1989: 160) An interesting exception in the liberal camp is Kukathas, who argues that liberals and communitarians both overemphasize the value and centrality of community (1996: 81–2, 84–90). In his later work Kymlicka refers to this as a societal culture. See his definition of societal cultures on page 17. Raz takes a slightly different position. He argues that the liberal state should support particular values and practices it deems morally worthy while discouraging those it deems morally repugnant, but only by means of incentive and reward and never by means of coercion—which is legitimate only as a means of preventing acts which are harmful or which violate autonomy (Raz 1986: 417–19). These are all aspects of Quebec’s official language policy (see Chapter 9). Taylor and Kymlicka are both firm supporter of cultural minority rights. See Taylor (1994a) and Kymlicka (1995). Kymlicka has gone much further than Taylor in seeking clarity on these matters (1995: 152–72; 1998: 60–71). Iris Young is another theorist who explicitly distances herself from these more extreme communitarian conclusions (Young 1990: 36). It is important to distinguish this issue from the related communitarian desire to encourage a more active and participatory model of republican citizenship (see e.g. Avineri and de-Shalit 1992: 9–10; Taylor 1989: 177–80). Kymlicka acknowledges that Rawls and other influential liberals like Ronald Dworkin had little to say on the subject of cultural minorities, but in his view a robust defense of minority rights is not only compatible with—it is required by—the core normative principles they defend (Kymlicka 1989: 177–8, 185–90). It is important to recognize that Kymlicka’s theory is built around the specific needs and circumstances of national minorities like indigenous First Nations in Canada— groups that challenge the terms of their incorporation into existing states, and which assert their right to self-determination. As noted already above, Kymlicka argues that certain restrictions on individual rights may be justifiable on a limited or temporary basis when the very survival of the cultural community is at stake (1989: 198–200). This issue receives more detailed treatment in Chapters 5 and 7. Other early contributors include Young (1990), Parekh (1991), and Taylor (1992), followed closely by a second wave that included Phillips (1993), Tamir (1993), Spinner (1994), Miller (1995) and Tully (1995). Many nineteenth- and early twentieth-century liberals defended the rights of national minorities as an essential component of liberty and stability in a multinational state (Kymlicka 1989: 207–10, 1995: 49–74; cf. Russell, 1994). Granted, many other liberals in this period argued strongly in favor of minority assimilation, a point of view that was shared by some of the more radical critics of liberalism such as Marx and Engels. See Nimni (1995), and Ward and Lott (2002) for discussion. Kymlicka credits Vernon Van Dyke (1995) for being the first theorist to challenge post-war liberalism in this way.

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24 Interestingly Taylor, the originator of the social thesis, chose to anchor his own theory of multiculturalism in the concept of recognition (Taylor 1994a).

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5 In defense of multiculturalism 1 Arguments based on redressing historic injustice also feature in the literature, but in my view they are sufficiently different to warrant their own separate treatment. For a sample of these arguments see Ivison (2002), Anaya (2004) and Song (2007). 2 For this reason the argument is commonly classified under the rubric of liberal nationalism, but here I will continue to use the more general term liberal culturalism. For the distinction between ethnonational and ethnocultural minorities see pages 6–7. 3 For doubts regarding the utility of Kymlicka’s concept of a societal culture see Waldron (1995: 105–8); Walker (1997: 216–25), Carens (2000: ch. 3), Benhabib (2002: 60–3) and Festenstein (2005: 17–23). For a response to some of these concerns see Kymlicka (1995: 103–4). 4 Rawls develops a framework for just relations among nations, but the examples he has in mind are nation-states not nations within states (Rawls, 1992). 5 Kymlicka accepts other justifications for self-determination, including historical agreements and the value of cultural diversity, but these justifications are normatively subordinated to the autonomy argument (Kymlicka, 1995: 116–22). 6 National minorities may find themselves in this position for a variety of reasons, including conquest, colonization, or unfavorable terms of federation with another nation. 7 For an interesting critical discussion of the link between national identity and selfrespect (or self esteem) see Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse (2003). I thank one of the anonymous referees for bringing this article to my attention. 8 For the observation that cultural identities and attachments actually increase as cultural differences decrease see Taylor (1991), Kymlicka (1995: 88) and Cairns (2000: 48). 9 Kymlicka acknowledges that the integration expectation is more problematic in the case of refugees, who for the most part are involuntary migrants (1995: 16, 25, 98– 100). He might nevertheless be criticized for neglecting the involuntary nature of other forms of immigration, for example in the case of those who would prefer to remain in their country of origin but are compelled to migrate out of dire economic need (see e.g. Carens 2000: 80–81). On the other hand, it is by no means obvious why mutual accommodation is not the fairest available option in these cases as well. 10 Another criticism of liberal culturalism that I will not have time to consider here or elsewhere in this book is that the liberal commitment to the equal moral worth of individuals is much more compatible with ethical cosmopolitanism—which calls for the transcendence (in whole or partial terms) of the principle of national partiality rather than its defense. See, for example, Nussbaum (1994; 1999: 29–54), Lu (2000), Waldron (2000), Weinstock (1999), and the collection of essays in Brock and Brighouse (2005). For a critique of some of this literature see Harty and Murphy (2005: ch. 6). 11 Tamir, however, is critical of Kymlicka for allowing exceptions to this liberal condition. See Chapter 7 for discussion. 12 Different interpretations of liberalism are also frequently at the heart of disputes between multiculturalists and their critics (see Chapter 6). That having been said, there seems to be no necessary connection between any particular interpretation of liberalism and any particular take on multiculturalism. Kukathas and Barry, for example, both sing the praises of freedom of association but could hardly be further apart in their opinions on multiculturalism.

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13 In the discussion that follows, I will refer to this group of theorists simply as ‘tolerationists’. 14 This argument tends to be applied to cultural groups whose demands fall short of selfdetermination, although for Kukathas (1992, 2003) it also seems to extend to national minorities like indigenous peoples. 15 Kukathas (2003: 58–62, 69) takes this position the furthest, arguing that a life of autonomous choice and different experiments in living can often produce unhappy outcomes, and that more cloistered forms of life where individuals are not even aware of other options in living, can produce great happiness and satisfaction (a kind of ‘ignorance is bliss’ argument). 16 Spinner (1994: 97) makes a distinction between ‘‘weak ethnics’’, on the one hand, who manifest a desire to integrate into and become citizens of the wider society, and partial citizens, on the other, who deliberately isolate themselves and have no interest in participating in or being accepted as citizens in the wider society (he includes here groups like the Amish and Native Americans). In his view, liberalization should be encouraged in the first group but not in the second. For a similar distinction see Kukathas (2002: 197), and Parekh (2000: 176–8). 17 For a balanced and illuminating critical analysis of Kukathas’ work see Festenstein (2005: 100–9). 18 Kukathas (2003: 163–4) freely admits that his view of domestic liberal society bears much in common with international society (i.e. an association of states). 19 Kukathas adopts a somewhat ambiguous position on the question of self-determination. In his earlier work (1992: 130–2, 139, n. 1) he was more dismissive of these claims but more recently he offers at least qualified support for a right to political self-determination (2003: 103–6, 204–5, 240–2, 252–3). However, he does not square this support with his more general opposition to group rights. 20 Like Kukathas, Spinner-Halev (2000, 2008) also believes that a degree of communal autonomy can provide an effective counterweight to an unhealthy concentration of state power, but he is much less skeptical of the state’s capacity to support the cause of justice. 21 Kukathas is clearer about the fact that intervention is justified if the external conduct of individuals or communities poses a threat to the peace and stability of the broader multi-communal association. 22 These alternative methods are discussed in Chapter 7. 23 For additional criticisms of Kukathas’ account of exit rights see Chapter 7. 24 Spinner also believes that Kukathas’ exit argument fails on the grounds that other communities are not bound to accept dissenters, meaning that some individuals may end up with no alternative than to remain where they are. 25 Phillips (2007: 177–9) argues that in many cases it is difficult to know for certain whether an individual is acting freely or under some sort of influence or compulsion, but that even in cases where an individual has been thoroughly brainwashed it would be difficult to justify forcing her to choose otherwise—forcing her to be free, in other words. Ignatieff, on the other hand, adopts a more black and white perspective, arguing that ‘‘Victims are victims only if they say they are’’ (2007: 45). 26 For another version of this argument see Dhamoon (2007). 27 Levy’s approach owes much to the liberalism of Judith Shklar (1989). I borrow the term republic of fear from Kanan Makiya (1998). 28 Kymlicka (1995: 121–3), for one, concludes that the diversity argument has only limited relevance to the case of national minorities, and is only slightly more useful in the case of other types of ethnocultural groups. In both cases, the diversity argument takes a back seat to a justice-oriented argument linked to the principle of equality. 29 Phillips refers to this as the politics of presence: the idea that in democratic politics it is not just the representation of ideas and interests that matters but also who those

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representatives are and who gets to play a direct role in democratic decision-making (Phillips 1995: 1–5). Phillips (1995) also applies this argument to the case of women, and Young (1990) to an even wider range of marginalized social groups. For the argument that some theorists might cast the net of inclusion too widely see Deveaux (2000: 160–2), and Kymlicka (1995: 145). The need for inclusion is somewhat less pressing in the case of stateless nations and indigenous peoples, whose claims to self-determination are usually understood as a means of gaining distance or protection from state institutions (see e.g. Phillips 1995: 122, but compare 126). There is, nevertheless, a case to be made for the complementarity of inclusion and collective self-determination. For discussion on this point see Kymlicka (1995: 142–4), Catt and Murphy (2002: 95–9, 115–21), Williams (2004) and Murphy (2008a). Minority vetoes can be more contentious than guaranteed minority representation. For a critique of the former see Barry (2001: 302–5). For a somewhat different equality-based argument for increased minority representation see Boxill (1998: 115–16, 118–19). In Phillips’ opinion (1995: 31, 46), a case for increased minority presence does not automatically follow from the principle of political equality. This must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and in relation to a number of other supplementary arguments (see below). The cooperative governance argument is frequently emphasized in the case of indigenous representation in New Zealand. See, for example, Mcleay (1980: 62) and Fleras (1991: 89). Critics take the opposite position, arguing that special representation rights will only generate anger and resentment amongst members of the majority, thereby eroding the bases of inter-communal trust and the perceived legitimacy of the democratic system. These arguments are taken up in Chapter 8. Williams argues further that the greater sense of trust felt for minority candidates may improve the quality and frequency of constituent-representative communication and the translation of constituent interests into concrete legislative initiatives. Neither Williams nor Phillips argues that marginalized groups must be represented by their own members (or that an outsider could never understand or adequately represent the group’s interests). Their point is rather that minority groups should enjoy a greater capacity to choose their own representatives, which includes the freedom to decide whether or not these representatives will be group members (see e.g., Phillips 1995: 91–4; Williams 1998: 170). Kymlicka (1995: 140–1), Phillips (1995: 100–1) and Deveaux (2000: 160–1) are more skeptical of this kind of argument. Compare Deveaux (2000: 139): ‘‘. deliberative democracy starts from the thought that the legitimacy of democratic norms and institutions is secured through a process of actual moral argumentation among citizens.’’ See also the discussion of cultural accommodation and political dialogue in Festenstein (2005: 119–36). Deveaux argues that there may also be good reasons for excusing certain culturally sensitive subjects from the purview of deliberation. See, for example, her discussion of the Hindmarsh Island case in Australia (2000: 95–7). Kymlicka offers a very different twist on the link between deliberation and multiculturalism, arguing that minority language rights may be an essential precondition for democratic deliberation. As he sees it, ‘‘democratic politics is politics in the vernacular,’’ (2001: 13) by which he means that people are much better equipped to engage in democratic dialogue in their mother tongue. Measures to ensure the survival of minority languages can therefore be defended as a means of ensuring that those who speak them have the same opportunities for political participation as do members of the linguistic majority (2001: 213–14). For an application of this argument in the European context see Holt and Packer (2007: 140–2).

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42 Shachar’s views receive further treatment in Chapter 7. 43 For a different take on the relationship between democracy and self-government see Barry (1991). 44 Cultural difference might, however, serve in a secondary or supplementary role to the democratic argument for self-determination. 45 For a critique of this argument see da Cunha (1992) and Barcham (2000). Kymlicka’s liberal culturalist argument for self-determination partially avoids this problem, because it is anchored in the value of a distinctive cultural community (a societal culture) rather than the value of distinctive cultural practices and beliefs. Nevertheless, it is not entirely immune to this objection in the sense that the argument still hangs on the distinctiveness of that cultural community. Kymlicka’s most recent work on minority self-determination avoids this difficulty by grounding itself in democratic multinationalist principles (e.g. 1998: 138–43; 2001: 75–7, 212–16; 2007a: 38–9). 46 As noted by Tully (2000c: 42) with respect to Canada’s indigenous First Nations: ‘‘What has remained constant through these phases [of Aboriginal-state relations in Canada] is the colonial assumption that Aboriginal peoples are subordinate and subject to the Canadian government, rather than equal, self-governing nations.’’ 47 This is probably an advantage, given the many shortcomings of arguments grounded purely in historical injustice and its contemporary redress. For discussion see Kymlicka (2001: 137, 148, 127–9), and Waldron (2002, 2003a). 48 This assumption is common amongst both champions and opponents of multiculturalism. See, for example, Okin (1999), Benhabib (2002: 64–5), Reich (2007: 309–11), Song (2007: 117, 131–3), and Barry (2001: 139). For a critique of this assumption see Spinner-Halev (2001: 94–5, 102–3). 49 This notion of mutual provisionality is implicit, I believe in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Reference Re Secession of Quebec. (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217. For an insightful discussion of the decision that invokes many of the themes raised in this section see Tully (2000b). 50 In Chapter 8 I will take up the additional charge that granting rights to selfdetermination is a recipe for instability, violence and state-breaking. 51 Weinstock does not explicitly invoke the concept of identity, but in linking the value of group membership to an individual’s sense of well-being and self-respect his argument very closely parallels the logic behind the politics of recognition. In his own words: ‘‘.my suggestion is that ensuring that citizens possess the social bases of selfrespect requires in certain cases that the importance and worth of the communities to which they belong be affirmed by their fellow citizens’’ (1998: 299). 52 We have encountered this argument already in the section on liberal culturalism. 53 See also Tully’s discussion of minority and majority identities and Quebec’s sign law (1995: 171–2). 54 Parekh qualifies this somewhat by arguing that different cultural groups may balance and prioritize rights differently, and that liberals should give up on the idea that there is only one universally legitimate ordering of rights to which all communities must conform (2000: 136, 139). However, he also insists that ‘‘.all existing cultures need radical changes because of their deep-seated sexist, racist and other biases which cause considerable suffering to large sections of their members’’ (2000: 169). 55 For discussion on this point see Rorty (1991).

6 Culture and equality 1 For additional background, the reader should consult Barry’s Justice as Impartiality, the objective of which is to advance a ‘‘universally valid case in favour of liberal egalitarian principles’’ (1995: 3; cf. 2001: 132–3, 137–8).

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2 Multiculturalists like Parekh (2000: 123), Kukathas (2003: 43) and Phillips (2007: 24-5) have come to very similar conclusions. 3 Barry regards the acknowledgement of such human universals as entirely consistent with the recognition that communities also differ with respect to their cultural or religious beliefs, values and practices (2001: 263). 4 As a committed social democrat, Barry also believes that universal civil and political rights must be supplemented by ‘‘universalistic social and economic rights’’ and the requisite suite of policies and programs designed to give the least advantaged members of society an equal opportunity to live a free and fulfilling life (2001: 12). 5 Barry has reservations about group-differentiated equalization policies that are either under-inclusive (e.g. an economic redistribution policy that targets racial poverty rather than poverty in the population as a whole), or over inclusive (e.g. an affirmative action policy that affords preferential employment access to every member of a disadvantaged ethnic group, not all of whom are in fact disadvantaged). Nevertheless, if it can be shown that such ‘‘imperfectly just’’ policies are likely to produce better outcomes than the alternatives (i.e. tackling deprivation on a universal basis or doing nothing at all) then Barry is, in principle, willing to support them (2001: 114–16). 6 Barry is adamant, however, that all schools must uphold certain minimum standards with respect to the education and well-being of their students (2001: 194–249). 7 Barry also targets the work of Fraser, whose views I will not consider here (Barry 2001: 274–9; cf. Fraser 1998). It is also worth reminding ourselves here that multiculturalists like Levy and Kukathas are entirely uninterested in judging the relative value of different cultures or cultural practices (see Chapter 5). 8 Barry gets some support here from Taylor, who suggests that to take such a view is to fail to take other cultures seriously. It is a form of cultural condescension whose message is that the beliefs and practices of others are not important enough to be deserving of critical engagement (Taylor 1994a: 70–2; cf. Festenstein 2005: 32–3). 9 The principle of equality of public recognition is also endorsed by Barry (2001: 27–9). 10 This argument has already been canvassed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 11 Measures such as these can also be taken on voluntarily by the media or by civil society organizations. For example, newspaper editorialists can (and frequently do) respond to instances of hate crime committed against minorities by condemning the crime and the negative minority stereotype it implies. 12 For the text of the apology see Australia (2008). 13 A more difficult question is where the line is to be drawn between permissible criticism and the incitement of hatred, and whether or not a liberal state can justifiably restrict speech that is deemed hateful. See Chapter 9 for discussion. 14 Barry has been criticized for failing to notice that the conduct at the center of many of these cases is often interpreted differently by people with different cultural backgrounds, which leads to equally reasonable but conflicting conclusions about whether the actions in question should be covered by the prohibition in the first place (Levy 2000: 130–1; Horton 2003: 28–9). For example, Barry views the Kirpan as a dangerous weapon that (like all other knives) should be banned from public places (2001: 38, 152). However, many Sikhs would argue that the Kirpan was never intended to be used as a weapon—it is a religious symbol and should be interpreted as such. Barry might reply that intent is not the issue here, but if this is the case, why not ban the carrying of anything that could possibly be used as a weapon, such as darts, hockey sticks or cricket bats (Horton 2003: 28)? Barry is right, of course, that a line will need to be drawn somewhere, but the problem in this case (and many others) is that there appears to be more than one reasonable way of drawing that line in the evenhanded manner that Barry himself recommends. 15 There is some debate as to which method—stunning or not stunning prior to killing—is in fact more painful or cruel. Barry is aware of this debate and his position

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is simply that if it can be shown that Kosher and Halal methods of slaughter do not cause more suffering than the standard alternative, then he is quite happy to accept them (2002: 213). The term ‘expensive’ is used broadly in this context. So the cost of Kosher and Halal butchery is the pain that it inflicts on animals (and on those who abhor cruelty to animals), and the cost of riding a motorcycle without a helmet is measured in terms of the potential for injury or death to the individual, but also the costs to society of caring for helmetless motorcycle accident victims. Barry seeks to distance himself in this respect from the multiculturalists, who in his view are inclined to believe that ‘‘exemptions for cultural minorities [are] required in a great many cases by egalitarian liberal justice’’ (2001: 33). However, this is more of an intuition than an argument, and it is difficult to see how the matter could be settled in the absence of systematic empirical comparison. In the interest of safety, Barry favors a policy of gradually phasing out this exemption for future generations of Sikh construction workers (2001: 50). Whether this approach would successfully avoid the same sorts of negative consequences he identifies is an open question. In line with his overall approach, Barry argues that in cases where a uniform dress code has nothing reasonable to be said in its defense (i.e. if it serves no purpose that is particularly vital to the functioning of the institution in question), the best approach may be to do away with the dress code entirely rather than allowing some to be exempted from its application (2001:59). For a dissenting opinion see Shapiro (2002: 181–2). The argument here takes the form of ‘‘my culture made me do it.’’ See, for example, Honig (1999). Tully does, on the other hand, differ from Barry in that he accepts the legitimacy of limited restrictions on individual rights and freedoms for the sake of cultural preservation. See, for example, his discussion of the Quebec sign law, where he agrees with the Supreme Court of Canada that minor limitations on freedom of expression are justifiable in the context of efforts to ensure the vitality and survival of the French language in Quebec (1995: 169–72, 174–6). The case in question was Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. This mode of reasoning is also a defining feature of Levy’s multiculturalism of fear and Carens’ ‘‘contextual exploration of justice as evenhandedness’’ in the realm of cultural and identity-related differences (Levy 2000: 3–39; Carens 2000: 1–20). For an account of the competing visions of equality endorsed by Young and Barry see Kelly (2002b). Barry and Kymlicka are also very similar in terms of how they conceive of the relationship between political self-determination and linguistic competence (Barry 2001: 227–8; Kymlicka 2001: 212–15). To cite just a few examples, for Rawls (1999) it means fair equality of opportunity, for Nozick (1974) it means formal equality of rights, and for Sen (1992) it means equality of basic human capacities. As Barry himself concedes, ‘‘the case for universalism is set out only briefly in Culture and Equality and.there is no systematic exposition of the kind of non-multiculturalist egalitarian liberal politics that I would like to see’’ (Barry 2002: 233–4; cf. Caney 2002: 90–7).

7 The limits of multicultural accommodation 1 By feminism, Okin (1999: 10) simply means ‘‘the belief that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be recognized as having human dignity equal to that of men, and that they should have the opportunity to live as fulfilling and freely chosen lives as men can.’’

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2 Okin is also critical of multiculturalist opponents of group rights like Kukathas, who take a hands-off approach to internally oppressive group practices (1999: 11). 3 In another commonly cited example, indigenous groups that have been granted control over their own membership codes as part of their right to self-government, have sometimes used that authority to discriminate against female members who marry outside the group (Shachar 2001: 18–20; Song 2007: 114–41). 4 Okin (1999: 22) concedes that Kymlicka has expressed some sensitivity to the more subtle and informal manifestations of gender discrimination in his other writings (see Kymlicka 2002: 394–8) but notes that he has failed to carry this over to his work on multiculturalism. 5 Interestingly, Shachar (1999: 67–8, 70–1) believes that Okin is forcing this very same choice (either your rights or your culture) on the female members of oppressive minorities. In my view, however, this is a misreading of Okin’s argument, and I tend to agree with Okin herself when she observes that her position on exit rights is not all that different than that adopted by Shachar (Okin 2005: 70–5). 6 Shachar is at odds here not only with Kukathas, who rejects the idea of minority rights altogether, but also with most other multiculturalists who are prepared to grant this sort of jurisdiction only to national minorities. Most of the cases she deals with involve religious groups seeking some manner of jurisdiction in the area of family law. 7 Okin argues that it is particularly important to include the voices of younger women, because older women ‘‘often have become co-opted into reinforcing gender equality’’ (1998: 648). For a reply to Okin on this point see Shachar (2001: 67). 8 This emphasis on female agency is a prominent feature of feminist discussions of multiculturalism (Benhabib 2002: 117–19; Deveaux 2006: 15–17; Friedman 2007: 94–5; Phillips 2007: 8–9, 38–41) 9 For a variation on this argument in the debate over Aboriginal rights see Turpel (1989–1990). 10 We have encountered another version of this critique already in Chapter 5: 21–2. 11 I have adapted these arguments from the work of Richard Rorty (1989, 1989a, 1991, 1992). See also the discussion of Taylor on page 82. 12 For an excellent summary of the similarities between Barry and Kukathas see Festenstein (2005: 92). 13 Indeed, Barry is sometimes accused of being less of a liberal than some of his multicultural opponents. See, for example, Chambers (2002) and the exchange between Parekh (2002: 149) and Barry (2002: 231–3) on this point. 14 Barry also cites a third external condition, namely that the actions of the group must not threaten the rights or interests of outsiders. 15 Barry never provides a systematic account of these limits, but presumably he has in mind things like torture, slavery, the infliction of grievous bodily harm and the like (see e.g. 2001: 148). 16 Barry argues further that fundamentalist parents should not be able to evade these requirements by subjecting their children to a restricted curriculum in a religious private school or in a home-school setting (2001: 246–7). For a very different take on these issues see Spinner (2000: 109–41). 17 The focus here is on Kymlicka’s defence of non-interference in the case of national minorities. 18 Barry’s defense of liberal universalism appears at (2001: 284–6). As Barry himself readily admits, this part of his theory remains highly under-developed. 19 Kukathas does support the idea of checks and balances (2003: 265–6), but in his version of the doctrine the state enjoys no power to enforce standards of justice within groups. Its regulatory power relates only to the maintenance of peaceful and stable relations amongst associations themselves (2003: 252).

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20 Shachar nevertheless argues that Kukathas’ model of minority accommodation offers little to women who want to remain a part of their cultural communities while challenging the prevailing traditions or practices of those communities (Shachar 2001: 71). 21 This term was coined by Leslie Green (1994: 116). 22 The point is not that Kukathas wants to see people harmed or oppressed—he does not—but in remaining true to his theory he is prepared to tolerate it. 23 Perhaps the best example here is Levy’s multiculturalism of fear (2000). 24 Kymlicka does not insist that children receive their entire education in common schools, but only that this should be required ‘‘at some point in the educational process’’ (2001: 307). Kymlicka is also skeptical about separate schools for racial or ethnic minorities, but he is prepared to accept them for pragmatic reasons (e.g. if they are the only alternative to common schools that fail to provide a hospitable learning environment for children of minority backgrounds) (Kymlicka 1998: 84–6; 2001: 304–5). 25 Kymlicka is therefore opposed to extending this exemption to new groups such as Christian fundamentalists. Spinner offers another justification for the Amish exemption: that since the Amish voluntarily isolate themselves from mainstream society, taking little interest in and making few demands upon the state, the state in turn should make fewer demands upon them (e.g. by not insisting that their children receive the educational skills necessary to think and participate as democratic citizens). His conviction that the educational exemption neither grievously harms Amish children nor poses any serious risk to the overall quality of citizenship in the wider society (because the Amish are small in number) are other reasons he counts in its favor (Spinner 1994: 87–108; cf. Williams 2005: 34). What also bears mentioning is that the Amish represent a ‘‘hard case’’ involving difficult questions of fact (e.g. what level of education do children require to make autonomous decisions?) and principle (e.g. how do we decide conflicts between liberal autonomy and religious toleration?) on which different theorists reasonably disagree. This helps explain why the Amish case is so frequently discussed, and why liberals, liberal multiculturalists and liberal feminists can be found on either side of the issue. 26 Some theorists, on the other hand, are guilty of saying too little about how to set appropriate limits on multicultural accommodation. Good examples include Raz (1994: 170–91) and Modood (2007). This charge has also been leveled, with some justification, against Taylor (see Benhabib 2002: 84–5). 27 Education provides this exposure in terms of the formal curriculum but also via the opportunity to interact with children from a variety of different social, cultural and class backgrounds. 28 Barry also rejects the more general feminist claim that liberals have been inclined to take a hands-off approach to injustice and oppression in the private sphere, particularly in the domain of family life. See, for example, his discussion of Mill (2001: 130–1). 29 For the opposite argument, namely, that Kymlicka’s theory is guided by an inherently interventionist logic, see Kukathas (1992: 121–2; 1992a: 678–9; cf. Tempelman 1999: 28–9). For a reply, see Kymlicka (1992: 144–5). 30 Barry also accepts the need to perform a cost-benefit analysis when contemplating the forcible imposition of liberal human rights protections. However, he sees the relevance of such an analysis only when the offending community is a sovereign state. In the case of national minorities he regards it as virtually irrelevant (2001: 138–9).

8 Multiculturalism and social cohesion 1 Mill’s views contrast with those of other liberals in this time period, who defended the idea of a multinational state. See the discussion in Russell (1994) and Kymlicka (1995: 50–7).

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2 Mill also acknowledged that, in certain circumstances, the best option was a political divorce (i.e. secession) (1954: 365–6). 3 Mill was by no means exceptional for his civilizationist assumptions, which were widely shared by theorists in both the liberal and Marxist traditions. For discussion see Tully (1993: 137–71), Nimni (1995), Kymlicka (2001: 205–6), Ward and Lott (2002) and Murphy (2009). Contemporary examples of civilizationist thinking can be found in Flanagan (2000) and Windschuttle (2002). 4 Taylor (1989) is one of the few theorists who tapped into the salience of this issue early on in the debate. See Chapter 4 for discussion. 5 Beiner and Miller both distinguish between integrative and disintegrative multicultural policies, so they are not critics of multiculturalism per se, but only a form of radical multiculturalism that encourages ethnic separatism (Beiner 2003: 212; Miller 2006: 332–8). 6 Interestingly, Kukathas (2003: 39, 262) deploys this same message in defense of his libertarian theory of multiculturalism. 7 Other minorities that pose a distinctive challenge from the point of view of citizenship and social cohesion include religious isolationist groups like the Amish or the Hasidim. These groups differ from most immigrant minorities in that they voluntarily isolate themselves from the wider society, but they are also very different from national minorities in that their demands for accommodation generally fall well short of political self-determination. The members of such groups are sometimes referred to as partial citizens, because they choose to forgo much of what it means to act or identify as citizens (Spinner 1994: 95–108). This term also has some application in the case of indigenous peoples, whose members sometimes resist identifying themselves with or participating in state institutions. 8 Granted, the idea of ‘voluntary’ migration is much more problematic in the case of individuals whose only other option is a life of extreme poverty and deprivation in their country of birth, but moral questions aside, in such cases the practical incentives for integration into the host society, including the promise of a much higher standard of living, are arguably even greater. In the case of refugees, migration is even more obviously involuntary, but here too the practical incentive to build a new life as citizens of a new country can be powerful. On the other hand, these incentives will likely be much weaker in the case of refugees (or immigrants) for whom the prospect of a return home is a realistic possibility in the near to medium term. 9 The study yielded the same results for multicultural policies targeting national minorities. 10 In this case too it is important to consider what other policies or factors might have contributed to reduced levels of social cohesion. Kymlicka for one has argued that there is little evidence to the effect that multicultural policies were the cause of Holland’s struggles with social cohesion (2010: 266; cf. Joppke 2007: 333). 11 It is worth noting that both champions and critics of multiculturalism have recognized the role of these nation-building policies in promoting social justice, most notably by encouraging newcomers to acquire the basic linguistic and educational competencies they will need to participate as equals in the economic, political and civic life of their new country (Kymlicka 2001: 53–4; cf. Barry 2001: 104–7). 12 The Netherlands had already moved to a more integrationist model of multiculturalism in the 1980s, but the emphasis on integration has increased over the last decade or so. 13 ETA stands for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom), and the FLQ for Front de Libe´ration du Que´bec (Quebec Liberation Front). 14 Similar examples of peaceful democratic nationalist mobilization can also be found in Spain and Kashmir. 15 Williams’ discussion here carries echoes of Kant’s (1991) theory of ‘‘cosmopolitan right’’: the idea that the peoples of the world have been thrown together by the

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circumstances of history and now need to work out mutually acceptable terms of coexistence. For a discussion of this idea in a contemporary context see Waldron (2000). 16 To this Gurr adds: ‘‘There is also the risk that strategies of accommodation will be subverted by advantaged groups who resist loss of privileges or—what amounts to the same thing—subverted by political entrepreneurs who build political movements that capitalize on resentment against minorities’’ (2000: 211). 17 Examples include Norway from Sweden in 1905, Iceland from Denmark in 1944, Estonia and Latvia from the USSR in 1991, and the Czech and Slovak Republics from one another in 1993. I will not take up the question of the moral legitimacy of the secession option. For discussion see Buchanan (1991), Patten (2002), Miller (1998) and Philpott (1998).

9 Contextual multiculturalism 1 The wave metaphor belongs to Kymlicka and Norman (2000). 2 See, for example Spinner (1994), Kymlicka (1995), Kymlicka and Norman (2000a), Carens (2000), Levy (2000, 2007), Parekh (2000), Gagnon and Tully (2001), Tully (2004), Harty and Murphy (2005), Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (2005), Smits (2005) and Robinson (2007). Contextualism has even proven influential among some of the harshest critics of multiculturalism, including Brian Barry (2001: 34–5). 3 See Levine (1990: 67–112) for a comprehensive overview of these policies and the politics surrounding their development and implementation. 4 Signs in languages other than French were originally banned outright, but this more draconian measure was struck down by the Canadian Supreme Court as unconstitutional. Quebec eventually responded with legislation that permits other languages to co-exist with French on public signs, so long as French predominates. For discussion see Russell et al. (1990: 557–81), Tully (1995: 168–72), and Eisenberg (1994: 19–20). 5 Ce´geps are a form of post-secondary institution that offer both a technical college type education, but also are used to prepare students for further education at the university level. Private educational institutions in Quebec are not subject to the language laws. It should also be noted that English as a second language is taught in French schools. 6 For the full list of exceptions see Quebec (1977: Chapter VIII). 7 This insecurity was further aggravated by the increasing trend towards urbanization in Quebec. More recently, the city of Montreal, as the destination of choice for the majority of new immigrants to the province, has become the primary source of anxiety for Que´be´cois (see e.g. Levine 1990). 8 On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration to say that these anxieties have been entirely laid to rest (see e.g. Mendelsohn et al. 2007: 36–7). 9 The Canadian government itself recognizes this, which helps explain its support for Quebec’s language policies. See, for example, Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) (2005), where the Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada intervened on behalf of the Quebec government to defend the constitutionality of its language of instruction provisions. The case was brought by French-speaking parents objecting to the fact that they could not send their children to English schools. 10 Granted, the majority of Francophone parents in Quebec prefer to educate their children in French, but there are those who would like to see their children educated in English-language public schools (see e.g. Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General)). This is often based on the parents’ belief that an English education opens more doors for their children in Canada and North American but also internationally. 11 Compare Kukathas: ‘‘Quebec is acting illiberally in forbidding its citizens to opt out of French the official language: those who want to school their children or conduct their

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business in another language should be free to do so, even if the language of government is French’’ (Kukathas 2003: 244 n. 70). The Quebec government is obviously happy to grant this latter freedom because it suits the overarching purpose of the provincial language regime, which is to build and nurture a vibrant community of French speakers in Quebec. Quebec’s right to promote its distinctive language and culture has also been defended in terms of the compact or consent model of federation (see e.g. Tully 1994). In factual terms, Quebec enjoys legislative jurisdiction over language and culture in the province, but this jurisdiction is not exclusive—it is held concurrently with the Canadian federal government. Kukathas’ position in the debate is equally puzzling. He is clearly opposed to the kinds of language policies Quebec has adopted (see Kukathas 2003: 244 n.70), but it is unclear to me how he squares this position with his broader philosophical commitments. In fact, I see no principled grounds in Kukathas’ theory for arguing that a distinctive language community whose members voluntarily empower their government to pass and enforce laws to protect their language and culture should not be free to do so, as long as freedom of exit is upheld and its actions do not pose a grievous threat to the interests of other communities. Quebec even provides publicly funded educational programs to support new immigrants in their efforts to preserve their heritage languages as they learn French (Carens 2000: 116). One of the great ironies of this debate is that the charge of discrimination only arises because Quebec does such a good job of recognizing minority language rights, and that if these rights were simply eliminated this accusation would no longer have any basis. Minority language rights in every province, including Quebec, are also governed by section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. More detailed accounts of the events leading up to and following the publication of the cartoons can be found in Keane (2008). The author’s stated purpose for writing the book, which has since been published, was to promote religious tolerance among Danish children by increasing their understanding of Islam (see e.g. Keane 2008: 857–8). The author’s motives have been questioned by observers like Carens (2006: 36) who wonders why he would ‘‘deliberately present information to children about another religion in a way that the author knows will be offensive to many followers of the religion?’’. The images are widely available on the internet. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also criticized the republication of the cartoons as ‘‘provocative . offensive . [and] insensitive’’ (Annan 2006). Compare Modood: ‘‘the republication of the cartoons across continental Europe . was deliberately done to teach Muslims a lesson’’ (2006c: 5). For a discussion of the relationship between religious hatred and racism see Modood (2006a). It is also worth noting that the publication of the cartoons struck a serious blow against efforts to promote integration and social cohesion in Denmark, which has profound implications for a country where Muslims number roughly 270,000 or approximately 5 per cent of the population (Modood 2006c: 6–7). Hansen (2006: 12–13) is more equivocal on this point. Bleich (2006: 18) also points out that some of the cartoons convey a rather more positive image of Muslims. The best example is the image of the young student in front of the blackboard, who comes across as a well-integrated, politically savvy individual who is ‘‘perhaps representative of Muslims not only in Denmark but also of those across Europe.’’ Several of the cartoons draw attention to the links between Islam and the subordination of women.

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28 For an example of the cruder take on the relationship between religion, intolerance, domination and violence see Dawkins (2008). For a more balanced take on these issues see Taylor (1989a: 518–21). 29 It should be noted that Carens objects to the cartoons not just because they are offensive, but because they gave offence for no demonstrably good reason. 30 For a much more ambivalent take on the conflict between freedom of expression and the [right] to be protected from disrespectful or blasphemous speech see Waldron (2003). 31 In cases of deliberate and seriously harmful speech we should have no regrets about imposing restrictions or condemning the intentions of the authors in question. There may, however, be times when censorship should be regarded as more of a regrettable (and ideally temporary) necessity, as in cases where a particular form of expression has significant artistic or intellectual merit but is nevertheless likely to cause serious unrest or violence. For example, Parekh argues that banning Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses could be justified in India because of that country’s history of religious violence, but not in Britain where it was far less likely to be greeted by riots and bloodshed (2000: 320–1). 32 Contra O’Leary, who holds that Jyllands-Posten was not only within its rights to publish the cartoons but also within the bounds of ‘‘public manners’’ (2006: 25).

10 Conclusion 1 A third option is to search for a better generic term, but as I suggested in Chapter 2, none of the available candidates looks any more promising than multiculturalism itself. 2 On the role of civil society in a multicultural context see Parekh (2000: 296–319), Modood (2007: 151–2) and Van den Brink (2007).

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Index

Aboriginal: peoples 30, 35, 161; rights 32–3, 93, 153, 155, 164; see also First Nations; indigenous peoples; Native American Action Democratique 2 affirmative action 2, 36–7, 41–3, 85–6, 89, 117, 149, 153, 162 African Americans 16, 30, 32, 36, 37, 42 agency 14, 21–2, 49–50, 55, 73, 76, 95, 98, 99, 164 Amish 7, 9, 14, 39, 102, 106, 159, 165, 166 Anglophone 38, 39, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137 Annan, K. 168 anti-foundationalism 23, 24, 25, 154 apologies 34–5, 89 Appiah, K.A. 16 Arafat, Y. 34 Argentina 135 Aristotle 50 assimilation 35, 38, 60, 78, 113–14, 124, 126, 127, 153, 157 assistance 41–3, 20, 68, 155 atomism 50–1 Australasia 38 Australia 1–2, 4, 19, 30, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 60–1, 89, 120, 121, 154, 160, 162 autonomy: collective 7, 10, 31, 32, 43–5, 63, 68, 78, 84, 92, 109, 110, 115, 121, 123–7, 159; see also liberalism, and autonomy Aymara 35 Bannerji, H. 36, 71, 82 Banting, K. 117 Barry, B. 7, 11, 12, 14–15, 16–18, 20, 22–3, 26, 40–1, 42–3, 48, 56, 84–95, 101–3, 106, 107, 108, 115, 133–4, 135–6, 137,

154, 155, 156, 158, 160, 161, 1, 162–4, 165, 167 Basques 43, 122, 166 Benhabib, S. 17, 74, 75, 93 Beiner, R. 78–9, 166 Beirut 139 benign neglect 64–5 Belgium 2, 123, 125–6 Berlin, I. 111, 154, 157 Bill 22 (The Official Language Act) 131 Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language) 131–2 black-focused schools 36 blasphemy 38 Bleich, E. 168 Bloc Que´be´cois 34, 122 Bloemraad, I. 119 Bloody Sunday 35 Bouchard, L. 34 Bluitgen, K. 137, 138, 141 Bolivia 35 Boxill, B. 160 British Columbia 32, 35, 133 Buchanan, A. 48, 58, 167 burqa 2 burkini 81 Cameron, D. 152 Canada 1, 2–3, 3–4, 20, 30, 32, 34, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44, 60–1, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125–6, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 167 Canadian: Charter of Rights and Freedoms 168; House of Commons 32, 34 Caney, S. 92 Carens, J. 116, 129–30, 152, 153, 155, 158, 163, 167, 168, 169 Catalans 43

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INDEX

Chambers, C. 26 Charlottetown Accord 32 checks and balances 104, 164 Ce´geps 131, 167 censorship 38, 140, 141–2, 143–4, 146, 169; self 137, 138, 141, 142, 145 children: and custody 44, see also indigenous child removal policy; and harm 9, 23, 40, 69, 90, 101, 102, 103, 106–7, 110; education of 14, 21, 39, 86, 102, 106, 107, 131, 133–6, 151, 164, 165, 167; and Islam 137, 168; rights of 45, 98, 102; socialization of 107 citizenship: and civilization 113–14; and immigrant integration 116–17, 121, 150; and social cohesion 84, 114, 123–4, 165, 166; and the common good 115; as shared fate 125; liberal 85, 114; partial 159, 166; probationary 2; republican 94, 157; theory 152 class 3, 36, 37, 85, 153, 165 colonization 17, 44, 155, 158; see also indigenous decolonization communal goods 55–6, 80 community of fate 2, 10, 57, 58; see also citizenship as shared fate Connor, W. 114 consent 17, 32–3, 44, 68, 69, 70, 76, 78–9, 102, 103, 106, 110, 156, 168 consociationalism 33, 43 contexts of choice 43, 63–4, 65 contingency 24–5, 71, 82, 101, 154 Copenhagen 138 Corsicans 16 cosmopolitanism 18–19, 71, 158, 166–7 Cree 17, 122 cruelty 69, 72, 90, 106, 110, 154, 156; to animals 91, 162–3 cultural: change and adaptation 6, 18–22, 29, 72, 118, 121–2, 150, 153, 161; conservatism 2–3, 19, 56, 67, 70, 82, 97, 99, 102–3, 106, 110; defense 21, 40, 93, 163; differences 2, 3–4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14–18, 19, 22, 23, 28–9, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 59, 64, 65, 66–7, 68, 71–2, 77, 80–1, 82, 86, 88, 90, 92, 93, 99, 101–2, 115, 116–17, 118, 119, 121, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 158, 159, 161, 163, 168; essentialism 13, 18–19, 20–1, 29; imperialism 103; indoctrination 21–2, 93, 97, 98, 100, 106, 107, 159; extinction 99–100; neutrality 17–18,

191

54–5, 64–5, 80, 86, 87, 89, 101–2, 115, 136; relativism 3, 13, 22–5, 29, 149, 154; rights 8, 19, 22, 31, 66, 68, 72, 97, 98, 100, 148, 153; similarities 28, 155 culture: and equality 3, 7–8, 11, 64–5, 73, 84–95, 163; and democratic multinationalism 77; and liberalism 56, 58–9, 62–70; and patriarchy 19, 97–101, 106; and race 5, 7, 12, 15–16, 89, 101; non-western 28, 95–6, 100–1; Parekh’s definition of 14; societal 17, 43, 63–5, 66, 156, 157, 158, 161; strong view of 21–2; structure vs character of 54, 59 Czech Republic 167 Damascus 139 Danish cartoon: controversy 1, 7, 11, 38, 137–46; society 138 Dawkins, R. 143, 169 Deliberative: democracy 74, 147, 160; multiculturalism 11, 74–6; see also dialogue, and negotiation Denmark 2, 139, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 167, 168 devolution 43, 126 Deveaux, M. 107, 153, 160, 164 Dhamoon, R. 159 dialogue 17, 28, 46, 49, 75, 82, 100, 107–8, 109, 131, 141, 142, 143, 145, 150–1, 160; see also negotiation disability 7, 59, 85 discrimination 18, 21, 31, 41, 42, 80, 88–9, 94–5, 117, 119, 143, 149, 151, 153, 168; see also gender; feminism; racism disintegration 2, 3 121, 123, 126, 150, 166; see also integration; social cohesion Dragnea, C. 155 dress code 92, 119, 163 Dworkin, R. 48, 51, 54, 153, 157 Eisenberg, A. 167 equality 7–8, 21, 24, 33, 39, 40–1, 42, 44, 48, 53–4, 55, 56–7, 59, 61, 63, 64, 67, 100, 124, 132–3, 136, 142, 151, 156, 159, 160, 162, 163; and inequality 36, 59, 150; moral 3, 24, 47, 48; see also culture, and equality Erling, S. 155 Ethiopia 43 Estonia 167 ethnic: conflict 1, 10, 17, 38, 73, 80, 90, 108, 119, 126–7, 150; discrimination 92,

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119, 133, 149, 151, 162; diversity 61, 71–2; ghettoization 114–15, 118, 119; nationalism 132; representation 31–2, 72–4; separatism 2, 41, 112, 121, 126, 132, 166; tolerance 119 ethnocentrism 82, 100–1; see also cultural imperialism ethnocultural minorities: and social cohesion, 118–22; definition of 7, 17 ethnonational minorities: and social cohesion 122–7; definition of 6, 17 Europe 1–2, 3, 30, 60, 66, 115, 118, 121, 122, 139, 140, 142, 144, 160, 168; religious wars 115 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 122, 166 evenhandedness 86, 89, 129, 153, 162, 163 exemptions 8, 20–1, 80–1, 84, 39–41, 90–4, 102, 106, 155, 156, 163, 165; see also rule and exemption approach exit rights 24, 26, 27, 67–70, 97–9, 102–3, 105, 106, 107, 110, 116, 123, 133, 137, 159, 164, 168 expensive tastes 91, 137, 163 extremists 54, 122, 125, 126, 137, 142, 145 feminism 163, 165; see also feminist critique of multiculturalism; gender Festenstein, M. 152, 158, 159, 160 Fiji 32, 155 Finland 135–6 Fish, S. 12 First Nations 157 Fogh Rasmussen, A. 138 Ford, R. 15–16, 153 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General) 163 France 1, 2, 120, 137 Francophone 14, 32, 38, 39, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 167 Fraser, N. 162 freedom: of association 26, 48, 67–9, 101–3, 105, 116, 123, 133–7, 154, 159; of conscience 47–8, 68–9, 87, 91, 101, 106, 107, 116; of dissent 27, 53, 67, 68, 69, 98–9, 102–3, 106, 107, 110, 159 Friedman, M. 110 Front de Libe´ration du Que´bec (FLQ) 122, 166 Fukuyama, F. 136 gender 3, 5, 7, 12, 16, 21, 26, 87, 92, 96–7, 98, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 110, 142, 154; see also feminism

Germany 2, 152 Glazer, N. 1, 152 Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) 167 Green, L. 165 Gurr, T. 126–7, 167 Haida Nation v. British Columbia 33 Halal 163 Hansen, R. 143, 168 Harty, S. 158 Hasidim 166 heretic 26, 103 Hindu 122 historic injustice 17, 34–5, 78, 89, 110, 158, 161 Horowitz, D. 126–7 Horton, J. 27–8 human rights 23, 24, 41, 44, 54, 67, 70, 94, 96, 103, 104, 108–10, 114, 148, 150, 154, 165 Huntington, S. 2 Hutterites 9, 102–3 Iceland 167 Ignatieff, M. 159 illiberal: values and practices 1, 4, 26, 28, 41, 53–4, 67, 68, 69, 97–8, 99, 101–2, 104–7, 108–10, 151, 165 immigrant: contracts 2; driven diversity 1, 2–3, 61, 118; integration policy 15, 113, 115–18, 118–19, 119–21; minority 10, 17, 20, 38, 39, 41, 66, 113, 117, 118–22, 123, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 166, 167, 168; screening procedures 2, 10, 120; see also refugees immigration: and naturalization 64; and social welfare spending 119–20; and trust 1, 10, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 140, 141; involuntary 158 India 42, 122, 123, 125–6, 155, 156, 169 indigenous: decolonization 44, 78, 161; child removal policy 89; exemptions 39, 155; land claims 37; languages 35, 38, 89; peoples 6–7, 12, 16–17, 30, 35–6, 43, 60–1, 108–9, 155, 159, 166; representation 31, 32, 34, 160, 34; rights 19, 20, 77; self-determination 34, 122; self-government 81, 164; see also Aboriginal; First Nations; Native American integration 2, 4, 10, 15, 27, 33, 42, 65, 66, 92, 99, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,

INDEX

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119, 120, 121, 122, 128, 132, 133, 134, 136, 145, 146, 153, 158, 159, 166, 168 intervention 3, 9, 25, 27, 67, 68, 69, 70, 76, 94, 99, 100, 103, 104–5, 107, 108–10, 159, 165 Israel 35, 44, 156 Islamic fundamentalism 1, 3, 118, 142 Islamophobia 3, 144 Italy 2 Japan 135 Judaism 142 Juste, C. 139 justice 55, 57–8, 68–9, 85, 86, 104, 116, 129, 132–3, 135, 159, 161, see also evenhandedness; and diversity 3, 6, 8, 10, 17, 33, 37, 40, 61, 64, 67, 76, 85, 86, 88, 91–2, 94, 97–9, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 114, 115, 134, 137, 149, 150, 152, 153, 159, 163, 164, 166, see also discrimination, racism; and equality 7, 16, see also culture and equality; socioeconomic 36–7, 57, 84, 112, 115, see also liberalism, and distributive justice; welfare, and redistribution; sexual 5, see also feminism; gender Jyllands-Posten 137–42, 144–6, 169 Kant, I. 47, 63, 166–7 Kashmir 122, 166 Keane, D. 168 Kenya 156 Kesler, C. 119 Kirpan 39, 155, 162 Kjærsgaard, P. 138 Kosher 162–3 Kukathas, C. 4, 8, 17–18, 23–4, 26, 47–8, 56, 67–70, 94, 98, 101–2, 104–6, 116, 149, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 162, 164–8 Kurds 16 Kymlicka, W. 6–7, 10, 13, 17, 26, 28, 31, 47–8, 52, 54, 56, 59–61, 63–7, 69–70, 77, 93–4, 95, 97, 101, 103, 106–7, 108–9, 110, 115, 117, 118, 120, 123, 129, 149, 152, 153–61, 163–7 language: and autonomy 50; and deliberation 65, 160; and identity 6, 14, 80, 113; and societal cultures 17, 52, 54; as a communal good 55–6, 80; dominant 8, 41, 56, 64, 80, 89; laissez-faire regime of 136–7; minority

193

20, 29, 35, 38–9, 41, 59, 64, 77, 153, 160, 168; policies 18, 55, 89, 92; rights 5; see also Quebec language laws Latin America 30, 153 Latinos 2, 32, 42 Latvia 167 Levine, M.L. 167 Levy, J. 17–18, 31, 35, 41, 72, 155, 159, 162, 163, 175 liberal: anarchism 68; archipelago 68–70, 104, 159; cultural reformers 19; culturalism 43, 62–7, 97, 101, 110, 158, 161; education 14; egalitarianism 84–6, 92–5, 133, 152, 161, 163; individualism 48, see also atomism; multiculturalism 26, 46, 103, 106; nationalism 61, 64–5, 158; neutrality 7–8, 48–9, 53–5, 64–5, 80, 86, 87, 89, 101, 125; Party of Quebec 3; rights and freedoms 19, 22–3, 44, 51, 56–7, 58, 63, 67, 72, 92, 101, 103, 108, 109, 134–5, 158, 165; universalism 6, 11, 24, 27, 42, 80, 85, 88–9, 92, 96, 103, 111, 149, 150, 161, 162, 163, 164; utopia 24 liberal–communitarian debate 11, 46–58, 129, 156; and minority rights 58–61 liberalism 3, 113, 157, 158; and atomism 49–53, 156–7; and autonomy 9, 26, 43, 47–8, 49–52, 54–5, 56, 59–60, 63–5, 67, 70, 95, 101, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 165; and community 51–2, 58, 59–60, 64–5, 157; and distributive justice 37, 48, 57, 59, 71, 85–6, 95; and freedom of expression 140–6, 162; and harm 7, 8, 9, 69, 92, 102–3, 105–6, 140–2, 157, 164, 165, 169; and language policy 55–6, 134, 135–6, 167–8; and modernization 114, 166; and secularism 45; and selfrespect 87; and solidarity 55, 57–8; and the common good 53; and toleration 23–4, 26, 47–8, 60, 67–70, 94, 98, 102, 106, 116, 150, 154, 165; classical 7, 8, 9, 64, 101–3, 150; competing conceptions of 26, 47–8, 51–2, 61, 67, 69–70, 95, 156, 158, 163 liberalization 67, 104, 154, 159 libertarianism 24, 26, 68–9, 166 Libya 139 London 1, 140 Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] 153 Madrid 1, 140 Macedo, S. 155

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INDEX

majoritarianism 74, 85, 94–5 Makiya, K. 159 Maori 14, 32, 34 marginalization 19, 33, 36, 37, 71, 73, 76, 81, 115, 125, 160 Marx, K. 143, 157, 166 Mcintyre, A. 157 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria 153 Merkel, A. 152 Mill, J.S. 9, 52, 63, 105, 113–14, 165, 166 Miller, D. 60, 75, 121, 156, 157, 166, 167 minority: accommodation 4, 6, 7, 18, 20–1, 26, 29, 40–1, 66, 67, 81, 90–4, 104, 116–17, 149, 154, 165; defendants 50; differences 2, 14–18, 21, 66, 71–2, 84, 119, 121, 150; isolationist religious 7, 9, 27, 39, 69, 102, 105, 106, 159, 165, 166; languages 35, 39, 41, 92, 136, 153, 160, 168; nation-destroying 114; representation 31–4, 36, 42, 72–4, 75–6, 95, 160; rights 4, 7, 11, 17, 26, 46, 56, 58–61, 62–3, 72, 76, 84, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103–4, 106, 109, 114, 149, 150, 152, 154, 157, 164; schools 10, 41, 81, 86, 99, 121, 165; self-determination 44, 59, 61, 64–5, 66–7, 73, 77–9, 95, 108–9, 122–4, 125, 126, 161; stereotypes 19, 77, 141, 151, 162; sub-groups 6–7, 10, 66, 106; veto 74, 94, 160 minority–majority districts 72 moderates 122, 125, 142, 145 modernization 60, 78, 114 Modood, T. 17, 66, 116, 119, 153, 156, 165, 168, 169 Montreal 131, 155, 167 Moore, M. 154 moral horizons 82, 101 mosaic of tyrannies 105–6 Muhammad 1, 137, 138, 139, 141, 145 Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys 155 multicultural: approach to policy-making 6; backlash 1–4; education 2, 5; experiment 1, 5, 148; identity crisis 12–13, 148; policies 4–5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17–18, 30–45, 92, 94, 112–13, 114–15, 116–17, 118–21, 127–8, 148, 149, 150, 152–3, 154, 166; political philosophy 3, 4, 5–6, 13, 37, 60, 83, 114, 129, 148, 152 multiculturalism: American 5; and culture 13–29; and equality 7–8, 148–9, 84–95; and mutual accommodation 6, 8, 66–7, 81, 149; and social cohesion 1–3, 9–10,

112–28, 150; and the limits of accommodation 4, 8–9, 22–8, 96–111, 149–50, 154, 165; and the politics of recognition 16, 79–82, 158, 160; as anti-Enlightenment 3, 86, 93; civic 145–6, 150–1, 169; contextual 82, 129–57, 167; defined 5–10, 13, 152; deliberative 74–6; feminist critique of 3, 5, 16, 19, 21–2, 26, 40, 93, 96–101, 106–8, 109–10, 143–4, 154, 164, 165; of fear 72, 159, 163, 165; tolerationist 67–70 multinational: federalism 43, 123, 125–6; states 8, 10, 17, 34, 61, 63, 64, 65, 76, 77, 78, 116, 122, 123, 125, 155, 157, 165 multinationalism: democratic 76–9, 161 Muslims 1–2, 3, 39–40, 44–5, 91, 118, 137–46, 168 Musqueam 20 mutual provisionality 79, 81, 161 nation-building 61, 78, 114, 121, 166 nations: civilized 114; dominant 64, 65, 77, 78, 123–4, 135–6; inferior 113; stateless 6–7, 15, 16–17, 43, 60–1, 81, 95, 136, 160; tribal 36; see also Aboriginal peoples; ethnonational minorities; First Nations; indigenous peoples; national minorities; Native Americans national: citizenship policies 121; communities 50, 52, 60, 63, 65, 77, 114, see also nations; disintegration 2, 123; identity 2, 10, 58, 76, 77, 113, 116, 119, 122, 124, 154, 158; integration 66, 125; language 114, 119, 121; minorities 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 26, 32, 43, 60–1, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 77, 78, 79, 81, 106, 108–10, 114, 117–18, 122–7, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 164, 165, 166; partiality 158; reconciliation 34; self-determination 5, 15, 37, 39, 43–4, 61, 64, 77–9, 93, 108–9, 122–5, 132, 135, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 166; symbols 34, 35, 56, 64; unity 34, 114, 117, 118, 124, 150, 155; values 2 nationalism 5, 16; and Quebec politics 34, 38–9, 43, 122, 124, 129–30, 132, 135, 153, see also Quebec; and separatism 122, 123, 126–7; liberal 61, 64–5, 158; sub-state 122 Native Americans 42, 159; see also Aboriginal; indigenous; nations

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negotiation 6, 10, 17, 43, 71, 75, 76, 79, 90, 99, 124–5, 126, 127 Netherlands 1, 2, 30, 120–1, 166, New York 1, 140 New Zealand 2, 14, 30, 32, 34, 38, 153, 154, 156, 160 Nigeria 123 niqab 2, 3, 39–40 North America 38, 139, 167 Northern Ireland 34, 35, 43, 122, 126 Nozick, R. 48, 51, 163 Nussbaum, M. 143–4 Okin, S. 40, 96–101, 106–8, 110, 143–4, 163, 164 O’Leary, B. 169 Ontario 45, 156 Organization of the Islamic Conference 139 Pakistan 140 Parti Que´be´cois 122 paternalism 21–2, 38, 66, 67, 100 patriotism 2, 58 perfectionism 48, 51 persuasion 25, 27, 67, 100, 109, 150, 154 Parekh, B. 6, 14, 20–1, 23, 26, 28, 40, 41, 66, 81, 90, 107, 116, 119, 149, 154, 156, 161, 162, 164, 169 Phillips, A. 17, 20–2, 28, 33, 40, 70, 72, 93, 94, 153, 157, 159–60, 162 Philpott, D. 78, 167 political: blackmail 124; divorce 10, 43, 127, 166 politics: in the vernacular 160; of difference 13, 22, 80 Popper, K. 47 popular sovereignty 77–8 Portugal 136 positive vs negative freedom 157 power-sharing 33, 126 proportional representation 32, 72 protection 37–9 public–private distinction 7, 27, 47, 64, 86, 88, 97–8, 99, 100, 106–8, 110, 115, 143, 156, 165 Quebec: Language Laws 38–9, 130–7, 157, 163, 167–8; Language and Culture 3, 14, 38, 130–2, 134, 135, 136, 137, 163, 167–8 Quechua 35 Quiet Revolution 38, 130–1

195

Rabin, Y. 34 race 2, 7, 12, 42; see also culture, and race racism 3, 7, 8, 15–16, 19, 30, 31, 38, 39, 85–6, 89, 90, 100, 101, 118, 119, 139, 141, 142–3, 144, 151, 153, 161, 168 Raz, J. 48, 51–2, 121, 157, 165 Rawls, J. 48, 51, 57, 58, 59, 85, 87, 95, 130, 135, 156, 157, 158, 163 redistribution 36–7, 42, 162; see also justice; welfare, redistribution Reference Re Secession of Quebec 161 reflective equilibrium and disequilibrium 130 refugees 30, 158, 166 relativism see cultural relativism religion 87; and discrimination 92, 100, 119, 151; and patriarchy 98, 107; Catholic 86; Christian 142, 143, 165; Islamic 2, 39–40, 91, 142; Jewish 86, 91–2, 143; Protestant 2, 86; Sikh 39, 80–1, 91–2, 93, 155, 162, 163; see also Muslims; Amish; Hindu; Hutterites religious: conflict and violence 115, 142, 144, 169; control over family law 44–5, 106, 156; courts 44; defamation 139; diversity 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 39, 42, 61, 99, 102, 113, 115, 118, 143, 145, 149, 153, 162, 164; freedom 45, 91–2, 103, 143–4, 146; fundamentalism 23, 97, 102, 138, 142, 144, 145; hatred 38, 141, 142–3, 168; institutions 63, 92; minorities 7, 9, 17, 27, 30, 39, 44, 72, 80, 86, 91–2, 106; prejudice 90, 100, see also Islamophobia; public recognition of 86; schools 10, 86, 102, 106, 164; tolerance 119, 140, 141, 145, 165, 168 republic of fear 72, 159 Rorty, R. 47, 154, 156, 161, 164 Rose, F. 139, 140, 145 rule and exemption approach 11, 20, 90–4; see also exemptions Rushdie, S. 138, 169 Russia 123, 126; see also Soviet Union Satanic Verses 138, 169 Saudia Arabia 139 Scotland 43, 122, 126 secession 43, 77, 79, 116, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 155, 156, 161, 166, 167 self-determination 5, 7, 15, 19, 27, 34, 36, 37, 39, 43–4, 61, 64, 66, 73, 77–9, 93, 94, 108–9, 122–5, 132, 135, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 166

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Sen, A. 51, 163 Shachar, A. 26, 45, 76, 97–100, 104–5, 107, 109–10, 154, 156, 161, 164–5 Sharia law 44–5 Shklar, J. 159 Slovak Republic 167 social: capital 113; cohesion 3, 4–5, 6, 7, 9–10, 34, 60, 61, 94, 112–28, 140, 146, 148, 150, 153, 166, 168; thesis 50–1, 52, 54, 61, 158 Song, S. 40, 93, 158, 161, 164 South Africa 32 sovereignty 4, 15, 34, 36, 72, 79, 93, 14, 165 Soviet Union 43, 60 Spain 2, 43, 60, 122, 123, 125–6, 166 Spinner-Halev, J. 26, 48, 69, 70, 110, 116, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167 Sudan 139 suicide bomber 138, 142 Sweden 30, 120, 167 Switzerland 2, 123, 125–6 Taylor, C. 14, 49–52, 54–6, 57–8, 79–80, 81–2, 87, 101, 129, 154, 157, 158, 162, 165, 166 territory 4, 7, 15, 17, 19, 36, 37, 43, 54, 63, 66, 72, 77, 80, 81, 126 terrorism 1, 23, 121, 140, 141, 142 Theiss-Morse, E. 158 toleration 3, 5, 9, 22, 25–6, 29, 90, 101, 109, 119, 125, 134, 140, 141, 142, 145, 146, 150, 168, 169; see also liberalism, and toleration trust 1, 10, 69, 73, 104, 109, 112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 125, 127, 140, 141, 150, 160

Tully, J. 14, 20, 71, 75–6, 87–9, 90, 93, 146, 149, 153, 154, 161, 163, 168 United Kingdom 2, 4, 30, 35, 60, 121, 126, 138, 139, 154 United Nations 139 United States of America 1, 2, 4, 5, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, 53, 120, 152, 154 Van Dyke, V. 157 Van Gogh, T. 1 visage linguistique 38, 131 voice 31–4, 74, 76, 99, 100, 142, 164 Waldron, J. 18–19, 65, 156, 158, 10, 161, 166–7, 169 Wales 43, 122, 126 Walzer, M. 60, 154 weak ethnics 159 Weinstock, D. 17, 158, 161 Westergaard, K. 139–40, 141, 145 welfare: child 103; redistribution 48, 57, 59, 112, 113, 119–20, 124; societal 135; state 48 Wieviorka, M. 155 Williams, M. 73–4, 125, 160, 166–7 Wittgenstein, L. 13, 154 Women’s Legal Education Action Fund (LEAF) 156 Yolgnu 16 Young, I. 33, 87–9, 94–5, 129, 152–4, 157, 160, 163

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