Multicultural Variations: Social Incorporation in Europe and North America 9780773589049

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Tables and Figures
Preface
Introduction: Problems and Promises of Current Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity
1. Canada: The Challenge and Response to Ethnic Diversity
2. The United States: Changing Recognition of Racial and Ethnic Diversity
3. Germany: Changing Patterns of Ethnic Diversity and Accomodation
4. Italy: Immigration and the Shock of Ethnic Accommodation
5. Greece: From Emigration to Immigration and the Problems of Inter-Ethnic Relations
6. Bulgaria: Inter-Ethnic Relations in an Ethnic Nation-State
Conclusion: Ethnogenesis: Modes of Multiculturalism in Six Societies
Contributors

Citation preview

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multicultural variations

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Series: Comparative Charting of Social Change Series Editor: Simon Langlois

Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960–1990 Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, Bruce A. Chadwick Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960–1990 Simon Langlois, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Fréchet, Madeline Gauthier, Jean-Pierre Simard Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960–1990 Wolfgang Glatzer, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, Barbara Wörndl Recent Social Trends in France, 1960–1990 Michel Forsé, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, Jean-Hugues Déchaux Recent Social Trends in Russia, 1960–1995 Irene A. Boutenko, Kirill E. Razlogov Recent Social Trends in Italy, 1960–1995 Alberto Martinelli, Antonio M. Chiesi, Sonia Stefanizzi Convergence or Divergence? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies Simon Langlois, Theodore Caplow, Henri Mendras, Wolfgang Glatzer Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria, 1960–1995 Nikolai Genov, Anna Krasteva Leviathan Transformed: Seven National States in the New Century Theodore Caplow Changing Structures of Inequality: A Comparative Perspective Yannick Lemel, Heinz Herbert Noll Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960–2000 Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Alipranti, Andromachi Hadjiyanni Recent Social Trends in Canada, 1960–2000 Lance W. Roberts, Rodney A. Clifton, Barry Ferguson, Karen Kampen, Simon Langlois Multicultural Variations: Social Incorporation in Europe and North America Lance W. Roberts, Barry Ferguson, Mathias Bös, Susanne von Below

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Multicultural Variations Social Incorporation in Europe and North America edited by lance w. roberts, barry ferguson, mathias bös, a n d s usa n n e vo n below

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston · London · Ithaca

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2013 ISBN 978-0-7735-4102-3 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-7735-8904-9 (epdf) ISBN 978-0-7735-8905-6 (epub) Legal deposit second quarter 2013 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Multicultural variations : social incorporation in Europe and North America / edited by Lance W. Roberts ... [et al.]. (Comparative charting of social change) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-7735-4102-3 (bnd.). – ISBN 978-0-7735-8904-9 (epdf). – ISBN 978-0-7735-8905-6 (epub) 1. Multiculturalism. 2. Cultural pluralism. I. Roberts, Lance W., 1950– II. Series: Comparative charting of social change HM1271.M833 2013

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Typeset in 11/13.5 Times by True to Type

C2013-901042-4

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Contents

Tables and Figures Preface

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Introduction: Problems and Promises of Current Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity mathias bös and antonio m. chiesi

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1 Canada: The Challenge and Response to Ethnic Diversity lance w. roberts and barry ferguson

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2 The United States: Changing Recognition of Racial and Ethnic Diversity louis hicks and paul kingston

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3 Germany: Changing Patterns of Ethnic Diversity and Accomodation susanne von below and mathias bös

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4 Italy: Immigration and the Shock of Ethnic Accommodation sonia stefanizzi

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5 Greece: From Emigration to Immigration and the Problems of Inter-Ethnic Relations laura maratou-alipranti

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6 Bulgaria: Inter-Ethnic Relations in an Ethnic NationState 233 nikolai genov Conclusion: Ethnogenesis: Modes of Multiculturalism in Six Societies 263 mathias bös, susanne von below, jason d. edgerton and lance w. roberts Contributors

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tables 0.1 The Logical Structure of Different Models of Society with Respect to Ethnicity 22 2.1 Racial and Ethnic Distribution of US Population 77 2.2 Hispanic Proportion of US Population 78 2.3 Total Fertility Rate (average births per woman) by Race and Ethnicity, 1950–1996 81 2.4 Married Proportion of Racial and Ethnic Groups, 1950–1995 83 2.5 Percentage of Children Living with Both Parents, by Racial and Ethnic Group, 1960–1995 84 2.6 Black and Hispanic Male Wages as a Percentage of White Male Wages, 1940–2000 86 2.7 Median Household Income in Constant (2002) Dollars, by Racial and Ethnic Group, 1980–2002 87 2.8 Religious Activity and Perception, by Race 89 2.9 State and Federal Prison Admissions, Racial Proportions, 1950–1995 92 3.1 Foreign Nationals and Total Population of Germany, 1949–1999 118 3.2 Estimated Size of Ethnic Groups in Germany, 1995 119 3.3 Immigration of Ethnic Germans by Area of Origin, 1950–1996 125

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3.4 Immigration According to Country of Origin, 1974–1995 128 3.5 Total Immigration and Net Migration of Foreigners and Asylum Seekers 129 3.6 Birth Rates of Women (between 15–50) in the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany, by German or Foreign Nationality 135 3.7 Graduates According to Type of Qualification Obtained; Foreigners and All Graduates, 1999 136 3.8 Unemployment Rates Overall and of Foreigners, by Nationality, 1980–2000 137 3.9 Right-Wing Extremist and Xenophobic Violence, 1982–1996 141 4.1 Foreign Population of Italy, 1871–2001 164 4.2 Immigrants in Italy, 1971–2000 165 4.3 Residence Permits by Motive to Immigrate, 1999 and 2000 169 4.4 Number of Marriages with at least One Foreign Partner, 1992–1996 170 4.5 Percentage of Marriages with at least One Foreign Partner, 1992–1996 171 4.6 Percentage of Foreign Pupils by Level of School 173 4.7 Migrant Workers Placed by Employment Agencies, per Job Qualification (1997) 176 4.8 Estimates for Irregular Foreign Workers, by Sector and Geographical Area of Employment, 1994 177 4.9 Foreign Associations by Primary Purpose 184 5.1 Foreigners in Greece with Work Permit by Continent of Origin, 1973–1996 202 5.2 Population of Greece by Citizenship, 1951–2001 203 5.3 Applicants for the White Card by Country of Origin and Gender, 1998 208 5.4 Main Features of the 1998 and 2001 Immigrant Legalization Processes 210 5.5 Naturalization: Acquisition of Greek Citizenship, 1981–2000 211

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5.6 Population by Age and Citizenship, 2001 5.7 Aliens by Citizenship, Sex, and Main Reason for Settling in Greece, 2001 5.8 Foreigners by Family Status, Settlement, and Sex for those “who have declared that they have settled in Greece for employment reasons,” 2001 5.9 Foreign Population by Sex and Education, 2001 5.10 Children Registered in Primary and Secondary Schools, by Status of Parents, 2001 5.11 Foreigners employed by Occupational Status for those “who have declared that they have settled in Greece for employment reasons,” 2001 5.12 Unemployment, Greek Citizens and Foreign Residents, 1991–2000 6.1 Population Belonging to Major Ethnic Groups in Bulgarian Society According to Regular Population Censuses (1900–2001) 6.2 Bulgarians, Turks, and Roma According to Residence (Census of 2001) 6.3 Educational Achievement of Major Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria in 2001 6.4 Most Important Source of Personal Income in the Municipality of Pernik 6.5 Self-Identification of Bulgarians and Turks on the Scale “Rich-Poor” 6.6 Electoral Results of the Major Political Parties in Bulgaria, Parliamentary Elections 1990–2001 6.7 Ethnic Affiliation of Detected Perpetrators of Crimes, 1997 6.8 The Social Exclusion of Roma 6.9 Changing Attitudes of Bulgarian Christians towards Granting Rights to Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaria 7.1 Ethnic Fractionalization Indices for Six Nations 7.2 Modes of Multiculturalism as Ideal Types

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figures 0.1 Greeley’s Model of Ethnogenesis 6.1 Perception of Major Risks Facing Bulgarian Society, 1992–2005

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Preface

The International Research Group for the Comparative Charting of Social Change (ccsc) is a consortium of social scientists from ten nations whose work together examines recent social trends since 1960 within and between their societies. Their work comprises both descriptive tracking and comparative assessment of social trends. In addition to dozens of published articles, the ccsc group has published twelve volumes in a McGill-Queen’s University Press series. This volume is the thirteenth in the set. This volume focuses on the social incorporation of ethnic groups in six societies from the 1960s to the 2000s. Social incorporation refers to the processes by which an existing system integrates newer components. The results of social incorporation processes are variable, and conditioned by historical, cultural, and structural factors. The national reports and the conceptual framework presented in this work amply demonstrate the diversity of ethnic social incorporation processes and results. Contrary to predictions and pronouncements made in the mid-twentieth century, ethnic pluralism has increased dramatically in North America and significantly in Europe. The post-9/11 emphasis on international border security may have led to a sourer public tone over issues of migration and multiculturalism, but it has barely affected the forty-year trend of increasing labour mobility and sustained high levels of migration. The ethnic pluralism accompanying the trend of expanding migration has resulted in sustained public debate and academic examination.

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This volume reports on and develops a conceptualization of ethnic social incorporation and multiculturalism in six societies: Canada, the United States, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, and Italy. This group of countries provides a remarkable variety of experiences with, and practices of, ethnic incorporation over the past four decades. It includes two countries built upon very large-scale immigration (Canada and the United States), two countries that, until recently, were characterized by large-scale emigration and are only now experiencing immigration (Greece and Italy), one country that was, until the 1990s, insulated from extensive migration (Bulgaria), and one country that has experimented with large numbers of temporary populations and is currently dealing with permanent immigration (Germany). The introduction to this volume provides the theoretical orientation for the project by examining three major issues. First, using the theoretical distinction between social structure and culture, the chapter provides a systematic overview of major theories of ethnicity since the Second World War. Second, special consideration is given to how these theoretical perspectives relate ethnicity to social change. Third, the chapter concludes with a summary of the major dimensions that can be used to describe ethnic communities as well as the structure and process of their connection to the larger societies in which they exist. The central chapters of the book contain reports from six countries in Europe and North America. The European reports include sections on the social trends and experiences in Germany, Italy, Greece, and Bulgaria. These four societies represent a diverse range of European experience, spanning countries that only recently shifted from emigration to immigration and countries that tried to minimize the permanent presence of non-nationals. The North American experience with continuing migration and ethno-cultural diversity is examined in the national reports on Canada and the United States. The authors of the country reports organized their presentations around three considerations. First, a section on social trends provides an empirical documentation of how the ethnic landscape of each country has changed since 1960. Second, the country reports examine the social landscape and principal social concerns associated with the shift-

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ing ethnic configurations. Third, each report reviews and assesses the social policies that each country has undertaken to manage the adaptation and integration issues associated with enhanced ethnic heterogeneity. The reports reflect the diverse experiences of each country, particularly noting the “path dependency” of each insofar as distinctive immigration policy and social incorporation practices have evolved. The Conclusion develops a conceptual framework for comparing and contrasting different national experiences and policies regarding ethnic incorporation. This chapter examines both divergences in national trends and policies, and convergences of experience. Current conceptualizations of multiculturalism are not sufficiently sophisticated to allow the six countries examined in this work to provide a confirmatory test of a general model. Instead, we opted to develop an exploratory model of multiculturalism that is sufficiently robust to capture the reported case studies. This model provides a framework for future conceptualization and empirical confirmation, which we hope this work will both inspire and provoke. Like all the ccsc group work, this project is focused on understanding social trends in a comparative frame of reference. On a global scale, where reactions to “multiculturalism” and related terms now range from celebration through skepticism to derision, a broad perspective like the one provided in this work (the “theme”) is essential both in theory and in practice. Although every society has to develop approaches to ethnic pluralism aligned to its national uniqueness (the “variations”), we can and should learn from the experience of others. This volume shares important experiences and lessons from societies on both sides of the Atlantic that are coping with social incorporation. Many people assisted us in the preparation and reworking of this collection. The editors would like to thank the members of the Comparative Charting of Social Change research group who encouraged the original project when it was bruited about several years ago and, of course, the contributors who wrote essays and patiently awaited our work on the original – and lengthy – manuscript. McGill-Queen’s University Press has offered great support during the entire process of sub-

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mission, review, and revision. Philip Cercone has continued to support the work of the Social Change Project through many volumes, Joanne Pisano and Jessica Howarth ensured that the review and revision process of this book stayed on track, Ryan Van Huijstee has sustained that support as we moved towards publication, and Michael Helfield has done a superb job of improving our manuscript and readying it for publication. Our thanks to all at the Press who have helped us. We would like to thank the anonymous manuscript readers, notably one who read and reread the manuscript and saw its strengths while pointing out its limitations with a clear sense of the contributions the work could make. We thank our colleagues Lori Wilkinson and Rodney Clifton of the University of Manitoba, who answered questions, read draft material, and shared their knowledge with us. We thank former students, Nathan Hoeppner, Leah Morton (Ferguson), Jason Edgerton and Tim Melnyk (Roberts), who conducted specific research that was most helpful, as well as seminar students in our courses, who have sharpened our understanding of multiculturalism and ethnic accommodation over the years. Margaret Currie kept track of numerous versions of the chapters and ensured that successive drafts were in order. Natalie Johnson provided a crucial editorial review of the entire manuscript at a critical stage and did so with great efficiency and insight. We are particularly grateful that she undertook the very difficult task of blending the work of contributors who wrote in highly distinctive voices, and ensured that the distinctiveness of each would not be lost. Finally, we are delighted to thank the secretary and series editor of the Comparative Charting of Social Change confederacy, Simon Langlois of Université Laval, who has been a wonderful colleague and supporter over the years, at every stage encouraging and assisting the project. It is our good fortune that we have had the privilege of working with and learning so much from such an outstanding scholar over the years.

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Introduction: Problems and Promises of Current Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity mathias bös and antonio m. chiesi

Ethnic pluralism is a fundamental social fact in North America. In Europe, enhanced immigration and the politicization of ethnic identities have raised the profile of ethnic relations issues. The salience of ethnic pluralism in these continents has produced a huge research literature on ethnic relations. This book adds to this growing literature in a distinctive way. Many observers identify the 1960s as a decade marking the turning point for various types of social change in Western societies. Changing ethnic relations followed this pattern. The core of this book centres on describing growing ethnic pluralism between the 1960s and the 2000s in six societies, including Canada, the United States, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Greece. Each report describes how national ethnic diversity has changed in the last half century, what social issues this diversity produced, and what mitigating social policies were introduced. This introduction provides a context for considering the national reports. To this end, the introduction examines three central considerations. First, it provides a definition of ethnicity structured along the distinction between social structure and culture. Second, it connects the concept of ethnicity to the literature on social change. Finally, it provides a review of current theories of ethnicity as they relate to social change. The review of ethnic theories is organized around micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis. The last part of this review introduces the book’s theme on multiculturalism in a globalized world. The intro-

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duction concludes by indicating that the concept of ethnogenesis is useful for understanding both theories of ethnicity and the societal experiences documented in the six national reports. The national reports, which follow this introduction, provide a descriptive understanding of changing ethnic diversity in six contemporary societies. The conclusion uses these national reports to construct a conceptual framework for thinking about varieties of multiculturalism. The resulting conceptualization provides a possibility space that academics and policy makers can use to better understand and manage growing ethnic diversity in contemporary contexts.

definitions of ethnicity Beginning with Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society (1992 [1889]), sociologists have recognized that the relationship between a society and an individual has both structural and cultural dimensions. Sociologists working in the first half of the twentieth century merged these dimensions into what Parsons and Kroeber called a “condensed concept of culture-and-society” (1958, 583). However, by the midtwentieth century, a distinction between the analysis of culture and social structure was routine. One prominent concept used to describe the relationship between social structural and cultural aspects within society is ethnicity, a concept developed in the second half of the twentieth century (Sollors 2001).1 The terms “ethnic group” or “ethnic community” were used from time to time before the Second World War, but the term “ethnicity” was introduced to sociology in the 1940s by Lloyd Warner (Sollors 2001; Warner and Lunt 1941). The first full-fledged analysis using the term was Warner and Srole’s The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups (1945), volume three of the “Yankeetown Studies.” For Lloyd Warner, ethnicity was a feature of the inequality structure of “Yankeetown.” The focus of his analysis lay on the function of ethnicity in stabilizing inequality through regulating access to different positions. His definition of the term explicitly refers to a cultural as well as a structural dimension of ethnicity: “The term ethnic refers to any individual who

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considers himself, or is considered to be, a member of a group with a foreign culture and who participates in the activities of the group. Ethnics may be either of foreign or of native birth” (Warner and Srole 1945, 28). This definition emphasizes the two components that are still important in defining ethnicity today: Ethnicity refers (1) to people who consider themselves and/or are considered by others as culturally different, and (2) who are at least partially engaged in stable group activities.2 For Warner, membership in an ethnic group is produced by descent. Membership in an ethnic group is established via socialization within a distinct ethnic subculture with at least partially distinct institutions (Warner and Srole 1945, 30). Nearly all definitions of ethnicity refer to a believed, specific, and shared origin of the group.3 Which specific characteristics of origin are chosen in sociological analyses depends mainly on the subject of inquiry. Research on continental European societies defines ethnicity rather narrowly as groups with their own language, territory, and history, with ethnic boundaries often seen as more or less congruent with the borders of a nation-state. In North America, a broader perspective is usually adopted; a shared belief in common origins is usually enough to define an ethnic group as an entity within a nation-state. Taken together, then, standard definitions of ethnicity usually include three considerations: (1) a shared belief in common descent; (2) real or perceived cultural differences; and (3) participation in common networks and ethnic events. The first coherent definition of an ethnic group was provided by Max Weber in Economy and Society (1985 [1922]). His definition is found in an isolated chapter on different forms of community building. Shaped by the many examples from the usa, Weber modelled his definition very closely on the American experience: “We shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group

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with concrete social action, like the latter” (Weber 1996 [1922], 56). Subjective beliefs in common descent together with similarities in customs, mostly used to propagate group formation in the political realm, are – according to Weber – central elements of ethnicity. Weber’s important point is that the structural aspects of ethnic groups are not fixed; it is not like a family or clan that is constantly stabilized by daily concrete social action. This can be the case for ethnic groups, but more often than not, ethnic groups have weak structural features, where the presumed identity is used to stabilize relatively arbitrary group formations. As the formulation “similarities of physical type” suggests, Weber subsumed “race” under the concept of ethnic groups.4 This leads to the question of how we handle the differences in usage between the Anglo-Saxon sociology and other national traditions. Whereas British, American, and Canadian sociologists often use the term “race” to denote something that might be related to ethnicity, continental European sociologists try to avoid the term “race” as an analytical category. Most recently, North American scholarship has moved to subsume race as a subcategory of ethnicity, which indicates the subjectivity of the former term, while acknowledging its continuing use (Kivisto 2002, 14–18). Although this volume emphasizes ethnicity, it should be kept in mind that the idea of race is a kind of universal “genealogical myth.” As Schnapper puts it in a key article: “All societies resort to the use of genealogy. The genealogical myth is the first form of historical thought and metaphysical enquiry. The concept of race dominated modes of thought when research into the origins of man developed in scientific terms” (Schnapper 2001, 12700–01). “Genealogical myths” are a common explanation for perceived groups in society. People tend to describe group differences in terms of differences in descent, and they do not differentiate between biological and cultural aspects of heritage. The extensive research in respect of race and ethnicity questions in the 2000 US census has shown that, with the notable exception of university students and professors, Americans do not clearly make separations between ancestry, national origin, ethnicity, and race

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(American Anthropological Association 2000). Many people are not familiar with the term ethnicity or use ethnicity and race synonymously. Race or racial ideas are common features of group descriptions in daily life in all our societies – but this must be separated from the scientific use of the concept. Following Weber’s suggestion, we assume in our analysis that a racial group is a “subtype” of an ethnic group, keeping in mind that the separation of groups solely on the basis of physical features or solely on the basis of cultural features is highly unlikely to exist in societies (Kivisto 2002, 14–18).

ethnicity and social change This book focuses on changes in ethnic pluralism in recent decades. With a definition of ethnicity in place, the question becomes: How is ethnicity related to social change? In Weber’s view, two aspects of social change are related to ethnic group formation. The first aspect concerns the historical experience of the group and asks how the group was incorporated into a larger, culturally distinct political unit. The relevant distinction on this account is whether incorporation is based on migration processes or colonization. The second aspect of social change related to ethnicity is whether ethnic group formation is based on political interests (like separatist movements) or economic interests (like the inclusion or exclusion of people from markets or occupations). Based on these distinctions, the processes of ethnic change can be sorted by various levels of society.5 On the micro level, ethnicity occurs as one dimension of the definition of a situation. This occurs in two ways. On the one hand, belonging to an ethnic group or presuming that someone else belongs to an ethnic group implies certain expectations related to interaction. On the other hand, belonging to an ethnic group structures one’s preferences for action; one can try to use the idea of ethnic membership to influence the actions of others. Change takes place at the micro level of society with respect to cultural features of one’s own group or perceived features of other groups, as well as in the ways in which ethnicity shapes the chance to pursue one’s own interests in a given situation. In addi-

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tion, there can be changes in the ways and patterns in which people are typified as belonging to certain groups. On the meso level, ethnicity refers to a way of defining group membership and relating it to other group memberships. In this way, ethnic group membership is used to structure, for example, participation in the labour market or political participation. Furthermore, there can be ethnic organizations that are developed either to promote participation in other spheres of life or simply to express the life of an ethnic group. On this level, changes can be observed in the rise or decline of ethnic organizations or group sizes. Of even greater interest are changes in the relationship between ethnic membership and participation in other spheres of life, such as the weakening of the link between an ethnic group and particular occupations, or the emergence of new ethnic groups as a result of real or perceived exclusion processes. On the macro level, ethnicity is perceived as one aspect of the nationally constituted society. This again can be seen in two ways: on the one hand, ethnic features are an integral part of the nation building process, exemplified in the development of myths of origins of the nation-state. On this level, long-term changes can be observed in those ethnic aspects that are used to define a nation-state or national identities. On the other hand, ethnicity can be seen as a subdivision of a nationally constituted society. Changes are often discussed that take place in the perceived group structure of a nation-state, ideas that are frequently associated with catchwords like “multiculturalism” or “assimilation.” As this short sketch shows, ethnicity has multiple reference points in the various levels of society. One can be ethnic German on the macro level, Bavarian or even Lower Bavarian on the micro level. One can identify on the micro level with one ethnic group, but nevertheless not take part in ethnic organizations on the meso level. Alternatively, one can be Hispanic according to the macro group structure of American society, but not participate in political organizations on the meso level because one is an immigrant from Spain and identifies oneself with other European Americans. Given this complexity, the term ethnicity fits perfectly into the social structure of modern societies. Since Georg Simmel first argued the

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point, it has been a sociological commonplace that belonging to different overlapping social circles is a precondition of both the structure of modern societies and the freedom of the individual.6 For Simmel, this web of group affiliations was situated within the borders of a nationally constituted society (Simmel 1983 [1908], 311 and 460–526). As Daniel Bell put it approximately seventy five years later: “While one is a citizen of the nation (a legal and political status), the sociological fact is that most persons have multiple social attachments that cross cut one another, and these sociological designations can be emphasized or minimized depending upon the situation in which an individual finds himself. All this is summed up in the terms identity or belonging. Identity has psychological connotations, while belonging or group membership … is sociological” (Bell 1975, 153). From this perspective, ethnicity is one group membership among others within modern societies. Like other group memberships, it can contribute to individualization and serves as a resource for people’s lifestyles. Ethnic group membership has a cultural and a structural dimension. In the cultural dimension, ethnicity is associated with a shared belief in common descent and presumably shared cultural characteristics. In the structural dimension, ethnicity promotes and is itself stabilized by networks and specific ethnic organizations. Both cultural and structural dimensions are subject to constant social change. These changes are not uniform within “a society”; they have different dynamics and trajectories with respect to the micro, meso, and macro levels.7

theories of ethnicity and levels of social change Perspectives on the field of “race and ethnic relations” are highly heterogeneous, and there is no school dominating the field. In most cases, theories of ethnicity are only vaguely related to different theoretical developments in general sociology (Bash 1979). There are only very weak internal relevance structures in the field of race and ethnic relations for sorting out different hypotheses or hypothesized mechanisms. In order to structure some of the current ideas, we will follow the dis-

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tinction of the micro, meso, and macro levels, a distinction that has already been introduced. These levels depict the different backgrounds of theories of ethnicity, and ignorance of these levels of reference is often at the root of difficulties of coming up with meaningful comparisons between different perspectives. The Micro Level: Ethnicity as Orientation On the micro level, ethnicity can be seen as a dimension of the definition of the situation. In this section, we sketch four major approaches to this aspect of ethnicity: ethnicity as culture, ethnicity as rational choice, ethnicity as symbolic membership, and ethnicity as a typification problem. All four approaches have in common the fact that they lay emphasis on the perspective of the actor. In this perspective, ethnicity is a patterned meaning structure that enables the actor to interpret the situation and act accordingly. ethnicity as a cultural meaning structure for individuals One early source for theorizing about ethnicity was the experience of a migrant in the host society. Although they did not use the term “ethnicity,” Thomas and Znaniecki’s The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1958 [1918]) is often cited as the first classic in ethnic research. With their emphasis on the definition of the situation, the authors reconstructed the world of immigrants from the perspective of the actor. Cultural patterns were seen as the indispensable key to understanding why actors behave in a certain way. From this perspective, ethnicity is a pattern of orientation for members of cultural groups who remain culturally distinct within a host society. Although they did not explicitly state as much in this classic work,8 the authors followed the idea that, over generations, people move out of the ethnic enclave and integrate into the larger society. Under the assumption that no new immigrants migrate into the enclave, the whole enclave will disappear over time. The formalized version of such a linear model of ethnic assimilation through everyday interaction was Park’s race relation cycle:

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The impression that emerges from this review of international and race relations is that the forces which have brought about the existing interpenetration of peoples are so vast and irresistible, that the resulting changes assume the character of a cosmic process … Everywhere there is competition and conflict; but everywhere the intimacies which participation in a common life enforces have created new accommodation, and relations which were merely formal or utilitarian have become personal and human … The race relation cycle which takes the form, to state it abstractly, of contact, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and irreversible. (Park 1950 [1926], 149–50) Another commonly used idea about generational change in ethnicity as a cultural pattern is the “Hansen Thesis.” The historian Marcus Lee Hansen attempted to explain the personal orientation of actors through a common experience. Thus the “Hansen Thesis” specifies a trajectory of ethnicization: because immigrants struggle so hard to be integrated into the host society, their children try to assimilate as completely as possible. Because this assimilation is never perceived as total, it is the “problem of the third generation” that they discover their cultural roots again and revitalize their cultural belonging (Kivisto and Blanck 1990). So, even in simple actor-oriented models, we can find two contradictory models for the development of ethnic affiliations over generations. Guided by feelings of alienation or acceptance, the third generation either reacts by becoming totally included or by undergoing a “re-ethnicization.” But the very meaning of what ethnic belonging is changes for each generation. For example, Maffesoli (2007) has argued that ethnicity is increasingly seen as an emotional experience of sharing the same group membership and is quite similar to fandom. ethnicity as rational choice Whereas many actor-oriented perspectives on ethnicity emphasize the emotional character of cultural groups as internalized norms of conduct, rational choice theory tries to interpret the same phenomenon in the opposite way (e.g. Banton 1983; Hechter 1975). Rational choice

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approaches in their purest form are reductionist in two ways: on the one hand, they reduce the explanation for ethnic group membership to the personal aspect of membership, and on the other hand, they reduce this personal aspect to rational behaviour. The “theory architecture” of rational choice theory is so appealing because it situates its main mechanism, rational behaviour, as a quasi-independent process within the mind of each actor. It tries to explain the changes in ethnic groups by a process that is at least analytically exogenous to social structure and culture: “The application of rational choice theory to ethnicity sounds at least counter-intuitive: [Rational Choice Theory] draws its explanations from the central assumption of an individual’s rationality, whereas ethnic hostilities and conflicts are often perceived by many as an example of collective irrationality.” (Maleševic 2001, 193). But in many instances, rational choice theory is able to make the case that ethnically oriented behaviour is in fact often very rational and profit oriented. Many of the cultural and political approaches to ethnicity can be reformulated in the rational choice framework as the expression of personal “maximization of profit” with respect to power or capital. We know that while in economics the assumption of rational choice is the mainstream, in the sociological tradition many outstanding authors have stressed the importance of “non-logical” actions in the realm of social and political phenomena (Pareto 1964 [1916]) and of Wertrationalität, i.e. the importance of norms and culture (Weber 1985 [1922]), in structuring social action. Orthodox rational choice theory has problems in incorporating affective components of human action and the formation of preferences in its theoretical scheme. The formation of a preference hierarchy is in fact the reflection of socialization and structural processes outside the individual. Many strands of rational choice theory try to incorporate these aspects, but by doing so they lose the beauty of the simplified basic assumption of the rational actor. Then they increasingly become victims of the epistemological problems that they are eager to discover in other sociological perspectives.9 From a rational choice perspective, ethnicity is a secondary process of group formation and therefore emerges as a means to reach other

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goals, such as the protection of markets, the establishment of networks, or the gain of political power. In this way, ethnicity is to be seen as a corollary of social change in other fields of life. Depending on the interest of the actor, ethnicity stabilizes or destabilizes social structures that inherently follow a different logic. It is, for example, against the logic of free markets to monopolize chances of offering goods via ethnic criteria; these tensions between different logics of action lead to an inherent instability in ethnic community building processes. ethnicity as symbolic group membership One of the most often cited works in the history of theories of ethnicity is Fredrik Barth’s introduction to a reader he edited called Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969). The two previous perspectives assume that ethnic groups are more or less well defined collectivities, and membership in, or the emergence of, these groups is either motivated through rational behaviour or through internalized cultural norms. In contrast, Barth introduced a cultural point of view with an emphasis upon the “relationships of cultural differentiation” (Jenkins 1997, 12). Barth’s key concept is “ethnic boundary maintenance.” This refers to the process that constitutes the group’s difference with other groups on the symbolic level. In this point of view, the actual culture of a group was considered unimportant. Ethnic groups are in the main defined by their ethnic boundary markers. The flexibility of ethnic boundary markers combined with a weak “cultural content” opens up the possibility of constantly shifting definitions of (imagined) collectivities. A further elaboration of this approach was conceptualizing the relation between the structural memberships and the symbolic memberships within society in a new way. This idea was put forward by Herbert Gans (1999 [1979]) under the heading of “symbolic ethnicity.” Whereas many perspectives saw the stability of an ethnic group in a dense and stable structural framework with a cultural expression, Gans argued that dense cultural expressions may be coupled with relatively weak institutional settings. He developed a model of symbolic ethnicity, which defined an ideal type of ethnicity that fits quite well within modern societies. For him, the prototypes of symbolic ethnicity

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are the Jewish communities in America. In general, the value structures of these communities are nearly indistinguishable from other parts of American society. Nevertheless, the strong ethnic cohesion remains an important identity resource for all members of the group and enables them to survive even better within modern society. Symbolic ethnicity ensures inclusion in the structural membership of a society by the implementation of the general normative structure of society. In addition, it provides a set of cultural symbols that support the symbolic group structure so that it can serve as the basis of identification for each individual. Following the Barthian perspective, the actual “cultural content” of an ethnic group is of minor importance and symbolic ethnicity is able to concentrate on symbols and forms that do not interfere with the larger membership configuration of an individual in society. Instead, the few “left-over” cultural symbols and rituals suffice to constitute symbolic membership in ethnic groups and thus fulfill the personal need for identification. Gans’ important contribution demonstrates a major change in the relationship between ethnic groups and modern societies: ethnicity has been understood as being cultural and identificational, and as a kind of membership that does not necessarily determine other memberships. The relationship of ethnic group membership to other social memberships was eased by weakening or reducing the social structural aspects of ethnic group membership and by “concentrating” cultural ethnic membership in a less encompassing set of symbols, which nevertheless serve as a basis for identification. In this sense, the changing meaning of ethnicity is one of the central features in the “modernization” of ethnic community building. It is only this “modern version” of ethnicity that minimizes conflicts within a society. ethnicity as a typification problem If ethnic groups are merely symbolic, the successful reproduction of ethnic membership is precarious, so this aspect has become a subject matter of research, especially in the usa. The increasing number of intermarriages, most notably between European ethnic groups, has posed an interesting puzzle: if so many people are the offspring of mixed mar-

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riages, why do so few describe themselves as having a mixed ethnic background? Waters’ “Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America” (1990) was a careful analysis of this problem. It showed how Americans are able to choose identities by adopting an ethnic affiliation that suits their daily lives. It provided the example of the “originally Irish” woman who transformed herself into an “Italian mama” after her marriage, not only by learning Italian recipes but also by discovering an Italian ancestor whose cultural heritage was revitalized in her. From this perspective, ethnic mixture is an important precondition for personal freedom, since it enables the individual to choose relatively freely between ethnic identities yet nevertheless stick to the idea that ethnicity is “authentic.” The fact that amalgamation does not necessarily lead to increasing freedom of choice is described in Davis’ Who is Black (1991). Davis demonstrates how the infamous “one drop rule”10 invented by White Americans to stabilize slavery, and later the Jim Crow system, was successfully used by African-Americans to promote a sense of community that was necessary to win the struggle for political freedom. But the relatively fluid nature of the biological membership in American society is not at all reflected in its symbolic representation. Today, the overwhelming majority of African-Americans have in part White ancestors, but because of the “one drop rule,” these people are not “free to choose” their racial-ethnic identity, but are forced to be African-Americans. For example, nobody was surprised that Alex Haley, in his famous book Roots, searched for his African ancestors and not his Irish roots (Davis 1991, chap. 6). Whereas intermarriage or amalgamation of any kind in the case of other racial and ethnic groups produces offspring who are increasingly free to choose between different racial and ethnic identities, every amalgamation in the African-American case produces African-Americans. Some African-Americans with light skin feel obliged to show even higher ethnic identification with the African-American community. The social construction of the biological-ethnic membership with respect to African Americans is still characterized for Americans of any colour by the assumption that this group cannot be assimilated. The basic structure of modern societies demands the possibility of a successful alternation between different types of membership.11 If a

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society denies those possibilities, it inevitably produces large personal tensions and costs, and furthermore it also produces strong cleavages within society. This kind of innovative perspective has generated a genre of historical studies on the redefinition of racial and ethnic groups in America (e.g. Ignatiev 1995; Jacobson 1998). The Meso Level: Ethnicity as Opportunity Structures As noted above, the very word “ethnicity” was first used systematically within the context of the structural analysis of community. For Lloyd Warner (Warner and Srole 1945), the focus of analysis lies in the function of ethnicity in stabilizing inequality through regulating access to different positions. This is fairly close to Weber’s (1996 [1922]) explanation of ethnicity as one mechanism of social closure. But Weber associated ethnic community building mainly with political goals. For him, ethnically interpreted cultural features are an important means of propagating political community building. The honour connected with being a member of a cultural group easily leads to political mobilization. The “mass honour” distributed to all members of an ethnic group, together with the monopolization of life chances, which may be associated with an ethnic group, are the individual motives of an actor. But they only function in the context of successful community formation. In the meso perspective on ethnicity, ethnicity is seen as a collective process that interacts with other spheres of life; as examples on the meso level we sketch ideas about the relations between ethnicity, the political system, and the economic system. These processes can be reinterpreted as processes of ethnogenesis. ethnicity and political interests A very influential introduction to the field of ethnic relations research was Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan’s Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (1975). For them, ethnicity is a new social form that mediates features of structural and cultural membership to the political system. Although the authors take into account the erosion of cultural differences between ethnic groups within modern societies, they argue

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that different ethnic groups still have typically unequal status configurations in society. These different status configurations constitute common interests within the political system, which then can be mobilized around ethnic groups. General trends in social change made ethnicity an efficient means for group mobilization in modern societies (Bell 1975): the tremendous gains in welfare in modern societies made social classes like blue or white collar workers no longer effective for mass mobilization. In search of a stable basis for support, the political system uses ethnicity as a means to structure and mobilize its constituency. Interest mobilization through ethnicity is especially stable because it combines interests with strong emotional affiliation. It is the special combination of social structural features and symbolic features of membership with respect to the political system within modern society that justifies the use of the concept of ethnicity: [R]eligion, language, and concrete cultural differences did, in our judgment, decline, at least in the West, as specific foci of attachment and concern. But the groups defined by these cultural characteristics were differentially distributed through the social structure. The old bases of distinction … became, one may say, increasingly merely “symbolic” – nevertheless they could serve as a basis for mobilization. Thus there is some legitimacy to finding that forms of identification based on social realities as different as religion, language, and national origin all have something in common, such that a new term is coined to refer to all of them – “ethnicity.” What they have in common is that they have all become effective foci for group mobilization for concrete political ends challenging the primacy for such mobilization of class on the one hand and nation on the other. (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, 18) Again, the focus of this contribution lies in the analysis of the relation of ethnic and political membership. Both memberships stabilize each other. The political system requires the mobilization of resources in society. One efficient means of generating loyalty in order to mobilize resources is ethnic affiliation. This investment of resources in the po-

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litical system by ethnic group members pays off in the stabilization of an ethnic group: (1) in any case by the increase in representation of the symbolic aspects of group membership, and (2) in many cases through explicit benefits, like affirmative action, generated by the political system. Stabilized and more resourceful, the ethnic group becomes an even more efficient means to generate loyalty to the political system. In Glazer and Moynihan’s view, it is safe to say that increasing ethnicization is a logical output of the structure of modern societies (1975). From this perspective, finally, ethnicity is more and more a part of the “politics of recognition”; a notion that refers to the importance of different aspects of social identity in political claim making. Many social commentators see an increasing importance of the politics of recognition in our societies since the end of the 1970s (Benhabib 2002, viii; Fraser 1997). ethnicity and economic membership Analyzing the relationship between ethnicity and economic membership is a common approach in sociology to the study of ethnic groups. Such an approach usually sees economic processes as the most important membership processes for stratification in modern society.12 One important development in the 1970s was the increasing awareness of the time horizon of ethnic groups and ethnic group members, which partly determines the economic performance in a society (Bonacich 1973; Piore 1979). From this perspective, it was the expectation of members of ethnic groups that they would return to their countries of origin that led to the increasing acceptance of occupying lower positions in the occupational structure. Such a type of a “short term” or deficient membership configuration in the economic domain in turn encouraged the stabilization of ethnic membership. One of the most prominent economically orientated hypotheses, which relates ethnic group membership to economic membership, is the “split labour market hypothesis” (Bonacich 1976; Bonacich 1972). From this perspective, it is not so much a special cultural feature but a special combination of qualifications and access to the labour market that leads to enduring inequality along ethnic lines. Ethnic group mem-

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bership is used to monopolize life chances, in this case, in the labour market. The interaction between split labour markets and ethnic membership is an example of how different membership structures in society tend to mutually stabilize each other. This stabilization of ethnic groups in order to perform ethnic closure counters the original economic idea of membership: membership is allocated through free markets. Split labour markets reveal how the interaction of ethnic membership with other membership structures hinders the full implementation of the normative structure of a membership domain, in this case, the economic domain. Wilson’s The Declining Significance of Race (1978) reintroduced an important point into the discussion of the relationship between the economy and racial or ethnic groups. In introducing the concept of the “underclass,” Wilson demonstrated that culture and colour-blind economic exclusion processes, such as insufficient education or unemployment, contribute to the stabilization of the deprived membership configuration of ethnic groups, such as African-Americans in the usa. In this sense, Wilson applied Gordon’s (1964) argument of eth-classes to African-Americans: class as an important structural feature of membership in modern society interacts with race and ethnicity. In Wilson’s own words: “[M]any important features of black and white relations in America are not captured when the issue is defined as majority versus minority and … a preoccupation with race and racial conflict obscures fundamental problems that derive from the intersection of class with race” (Wilson 1978, ix). As with the polity, the economy is one of the most prominent domains that is analyzed to describe membership in modern societies. In various models, the special relationship of a group to power or capital is theorized to constitute the main “factor” or “mechanism” of inequality between different groups. The Macro Level: Ethnicity as a Feature of Societies Theories of ethnicity at the macro level can be formulated in two ways – either society as a whole is seen as ethnic, or the internal structure of society is seen as dominated by ethnicity. Anthony D. Smith’s The Eth-

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nic Origins of Nations (1986) belongs to the first group. For him, the nation-building process is characterized by the melting of ethnic features and state authority. A second group of perspectives takes into account the macro-group structure of society, such as Hollinger’s famous “ethnic-racial pentagon” as epitomizing American society (1995). Related to these arguments are perspectives that analyze ethnicity and its connection to globalization; they take into account macro-group structures, but do not restrict them to nation-states.

ethnicity and nation-states In many instances, the term “ethnic group” is used as a synonym for “minority group.” Anthony D. Smith’s The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) makes the convincing argument that majority cultures in national states are ethnic as well. These majority cultures are often promoted by ethnic core groups, which try to homogenize the national cultural space. In Smith’s view, the nation-building process is characterized by the melting of ethnic features and state authority. As Smith and many of his followers have shown, membership in society can be defined as ethnic on a very general level. The expansion of ethnic myths of origin and common faith on the state level provides the basis for demands of solidarity necessary in modern welfare states (like taxes or civil service). This is also reflected in very general membership codifications, like constitutions, which show universal human rights as well as particularistic ethnic aspects (Bös 1993). This general argument has important implications for ethnic aspects of the structure of societal memberships. According to this perspective, one can be a member of different layers of ethnic groups. As an example of the “Russian doll” type of ethnic identities, one can consider the case of the daughter of an immigrant from China: within the Chinese immigrant population in America, she might be identified as “Zhuang”; within the Asian-American community, the label “Chinese” might be sufficient; within the macro ethno-racial group structure of the American membership space, “Asian-American” could be seen as the appropriate term; and for a foreign observer, this person can be simply

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“American.” Thus, membership in a society is not only characterized by a set of overlapping memberships that are piled up in layers from small group memberships to large group or domain memberships – in every layer, there can be groups that are, at least in some respect, ethnic.

globalization, multiculturalism, and assimilationism The awareness of the increasing interconnectedness of the world society in the 1990s led to those new developments in sociological theory that are usually summarized under the heading “globalization.” Robertson’s pioneering work on cultural globalization pointed out that the increasing awareness of ethnicity is in itself a globalization process, since it is increasingly assumed that everybody belongs to an ethnic group. Like the idea of the nation-state, the particular idea of ethnicity becomes universal. Hence the famous definition of globalization as “the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism” (Robertson 1992, 100). This claim is often combined with the observation that migration leads to an increase in heterogeneity within localities and a homogenization between localities (Nederveen Pieterse 2007, 66). What all approaches have in common is that they try to theorize spaces that reach beyond the borders of a nationally constituted society, e.g. Appadurai’s (1990) ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes. This has many implications for a sociology of membership (Preyer and Bös 2002); basically it means that multiple memberships do not stop at the border of the nation-state. Due to migration, membership configurations of individuals are not tied to the nation-state. In this context, the concept of “transnational communities” (Georges 1990) was developed, which points to the structural connectedness of migration communities across national borders.13 Of course, such forms of transnational membership generate new problems, especially for the control mechanisms of citizenship, but there is no need to assume that these social forms cannot be successfully coordinated within the membership space of a society, or as Kivisto puts

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Table 0.1 The Logical Structure of Different Models of Society with Respect to Ethnicity Name

Starting Point

=>

“Ideal” Society

Assimilation (Anglo-Saxon dominance) Assimilation (melting pot) Assimilation (social-structural) Multiculturalism (weak) Multiculturalism (strong)

A+B+C A+B+C IA+B+C A+B+C A+B+C

=> => => => =>

A D IA+IB+IC Abc+Bac+Cab A+B+C

A: dominant ethnic or racial group; B, C: other ethnic or racial group; D: new ethnic or racial group; Abc: a group, which partly preserves original characteristics but incorporates characteristics from other groups; I: participation in important societal institutions. (modified from Bahr, Chadwick, and Strauss 1979, 531)

it: “it would appear most appropriate to consider transnationalism as one possible variant of assimilation” (2001, 571). This last point leads to the problem of defining assimilation in contradistinction to multiculturalism. Assimilation means in its most simplified version “a linear process of progressive adjustment to American life” and is rightfully criticized as such (Rumbaut 1997, 483). But as early as in Gordon’s book (1964) even “Cultural Pluralism” was described as assimilation. This points to the fact that assimilation can also mean becoming similar in certain respects, and does not imply that a society has one monolithic culture and social structure (Brubaker 2001). It would be equally absurd to assume that multiculturalism implies the total structural and cultural separation of membership spaces, which is not possible even between nation-states. The main models employed in the assimilation/multiculturalism controversy can be described according to Table 0.1. Assimilation and multiculturalism are suggestive of two extreme conceptualizations of society: society as one monolithic block on the one hand, and society consisting of totally separated sub-societies on the other. Both images are obviously inappropriate, and all sociological concepts of the relationship between ethnic groups and society only define certain degrees of assimilation or multiculturalism. From this

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perspective, Brubaker’s term “Neo-Assimilationism” is well coined because many of the newer, more complex models also accept processes that point towards an increasing similarity of groups in some dimensions (Portes 1996; Yinger 1994). In a discussion of the term “assimilation,” Brubaker notes that “on current understandings, assimilation is always domain-specific and relative to a particular reference population” (Brubaker 2001, 542). From the perspective of the societal membership space, this simply means that most sociological theories today are able to reflect the different dimensions and layers of the membership space with their different dynamics and trajectories with respect to ethnic membership. Such group-specific “Modes of Incorporation” (Portes and Rumbaut 1990) have of course different implications with respect to the situation of a given group, which makes it very difficult to draw general conclusions about how ethnic groups are assimilated or stabilized in multicultural situations. As pointed out above, assimilation and multiculturalism increasingly denote the same set of propositions on the relations between ethnic groups and society. These propositions can be summarized as follows: (1) Assimilation, or its alternative, multiculturalism, is a matter of degree. (2) Since multiculturalism and assimilation refer to processes on the group level, membership in society generally shifts through intergenerational change. (3) Membership in society is multidimensional; assimilation and multiculturalism are not one-dimensional processes, but multidimensional processes. They may vary between the different domains of membership, such as the economic or the political system, in degree, rhythm, and trajectory. (4) Since membership in society is differentiated along structural, cultural, psychological, and biological lines, multiculturalism and assimilation take place in a structural (integration), a cultural (acculturation), a psychological (identification), and a biological (amalgamation) dimension, often in different ways and trajectories. (5) Assimilation and multiculturalism are two-way processes changing the membership configurations of the majority and the minority. Through these processes, the membership structure in society as a whole changes, or, as Brubaker puts it, this membership constitutes “a shift from one mode of heterogeneity … to another mode of heterogeneity” (Brubaker 2001, 543).

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social trends and inter-ethnic relations This short review of various perspectives in the field of race and ethnic relations has shown the heterogeneity of the different and often contradictory perspectives. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be drawn: (1) Analytically, ethnic dimensions can be found on many different levels and in various aspects of social life; however, societies tend to focus on special levels or special groups that they define as ethnic in public discourse. So one starting point for the analysis in the following chapters is to analyze how, through different historical processes, some groups are defined as ethnic or racial while others are not. (2) It is important to take into account that the ethnic composition of a given society is often more complex than the ethnic groups that are officially recognized. Moreover, sociologists concentrate their attention on groups that are considered to be problematic, and then conclude from their research that ethnic groups in general constitute a social problem. This focus on actually visible minorities is often associated with the “immigration perspective” that dominates continental European sociology and social discourse. (3) On all levels of social change, it is important to realize that ethnic groups consist of social processes. They can only be analyzed properly by taking longer time spans into account. Furthermore, such a temporal perspective is the only way to empirically test the different ideas of assimilation or inclusion processes that have been mentioned. Since ethnic belonging is related to social identity and tends to be inherited from birth, it has long been considered an independent variable in sociological explanation, and is often used as a black box to account for different forms of persistent social inequalities. Globalization has shown that ethnic groups are not defined once and for all, but are an important feature of social change. Since ethnicities are defined and redefined at the level of culture and identity recognition, and emerge and dissolve at the structural level, they can be studied empirically using a set of social trends. The six national reports in the following chapters document a variety of these social trends. These

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Greeley’s Model of Ethnogenesis (Greeley 1974, 309)

trends can be interpreted in light of the rich theoretical debate on ethnicity and ethnogenesis. The empirical dimensions and mechanisms documented in the following national reports fit into a broader theoretical model of ethnogenesis, originally proposed by Greeley (1974). Although Greeley’s model was developed with the American experience of immigration as a primary factor of ethnic identity formation, it can be modified to include emerging European identities that are not always created by migrations. The six national reports that follow document the diversity of scope, concerns, and responses to growing ethnic diversity in Europe and North America. In doing so, they provide a concrete appreciation of the ethnogenesis process over the last half century in a variety of Western societies. Following the six national reports, the concluding chapter situates these six societies on a standardized index. The Conclusion also presents a conceptual framework specifying types of multiculturalism for responding to expanding ethnic heterogeneity.

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notes 1 Like “ethnicity,” the term “identity” has emerged after the Second World War. The term “identity” characterizes as well the cultural and structural dimensions of belonging but from the perspective of the individual in modern society (Gleason 1996 [1983]). 2 This definition is quite similar to the definition of one of the leading scholars in the field today: “The definition of an ethnic group … has three ingredients: (1) The group is perceived by others in the society to be different; (2) the members also perceive themselves as different; and (3) they participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common origin or culture” (Yinger 1994, 3–4). 3 For an overview, see Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Sollors 1996. 4 In part two of Economy and Society, he describes different types of communities. He refers, under the heading of ethnic communities, first to the special case of “race membership,” and then develops his idea of ethnicity; this part ends with some thoughts on ethnic aspects of tribes, peoples, and nations. 5 This tripartite analysis is directly adapted from Smelser (1997), although the author speaks of four levels: micro, meso, societal, and multi-societal or global. 6 “The Web of Group Affiliations” is the elegant translation by Reinhard Bendix of “Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise,” which literally means “the crossings of social circles,” in Simmel (1983 [1908]). 7 To structure different hypotheses along the two dimensions of culture/ social structure and level of analysis is by no means new. For example, Wallace (1974) suggested this approach with respect to the sociology of race relations. He calls these dimensions “types” (culture and social organization) and “levels” (interpersonal, institutional, community, societal, and inter-societal). 8 The text is mainly based on the information the authors found in hundreds of letters of Polish peasants addressed to immigrant relatives in the United States. 9 For a closer examination of these arguments, see Maleševic 2001. 10 The one drop rule and its problematic implications were already described

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by Myrdal (1998 [1944], 113): “The ‘Negro race’ is defined in America by the white people. It is defined in terms of parentage. Everybody having a known trace of Negro blood in his veins – no matter how far back it was acquired – is classified as a Negro. No amount of white ancestry, except one hundred per cent, will permit entrance to the white race.” 11 Historically, these type switches are usually organized by the emergence and acceptance of mixed groups like Creoles and Mulattos, which in turn establish new membership configurations in society that in the long-run allow a switch between ethno-racial types (Davis 1991). 12 For a useful overview, see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992. 13 For a useful overview of recent literature, see Kivisto 2001.

references American Anthropological Association. 2000. Response to OMB Directive 15: Race and Ethnicity Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting: www.aaanet.org (18 October 2002). Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. 1992. Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour, and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle. London, New York: Routledge. Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy,” in Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. M. Featherstone. London: Sage. Bahr, Howard M., Bruce A. Chadwick, and Joseph H. Stauss. 1979. American Ethnicity. Lexington, Mass.: Heath. Banton, Michael P. 1983. Racial and Ethnic Competition. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Barth, Fredrik. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference. (Results of a symposium held at the University of Bergen, 23 – 26 February 1967). Bergen, London: Universitetsforlaget, Allen & Unwin. Bash, Harry H. 1979. Sociology, Race, and Ethnicity: A Critique of American Ideological Intrusions upon Sociological Theory. New York: Gordon and Breach.

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Bell, Daniel. 1975. “Ethnicity and Social Change,” in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, ed. N. Glazer and D. P. Moynihan, 141–76. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bonacich, Edna. 1976. “Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation.” American Sociological Review 41: 34–51. – 1973. “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.” American Sociological Review 38: 583–94. – 1972. “A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market.” American Sociological Review 37:547–59. Bös, Mathias. 2004. “Reconceptualizing Modes of Belonging,” in Advances in Sociological Knowledge over Half a Century, ed. Nikolai Genov, 221– 43. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. – 1993. “Die Ethnisierung des Rechts? Staatsbürgerschaft in Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien und den usa.” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 45:619–43. Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. “The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24:531–48. Caplow, T. 1988. “The Comparative Charting of Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies.” European Studies Newsletter, Council for European Studies, 17 April, 1–9. Davis, F. James. 1991. Who is Black? One Nation’s Definition. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Durkheim, Emile. 1992 [1889]. Über soziale Arbeitsteilung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Forsé, Michel. 2001. “Sept Dimensions du Changement Social.” L’Année Sociologique, vol. 51, no. 2, 51–102. Forsé, M., J. Jaslin, Y. Lemel, H. Mendras, D. Stoclet, and J. Déchaux.1993. Recent Social Trends in France: 1960-1990. Frankfurt, Montreal & Kingston: Campus Verlag, McGill-Queen’s University Press. Fraser, Nancy. 1997. Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition. New York: Routledge.

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Gans, Herbert J. 1999 [1979]. “Symbolic Ethnicity,” in Making Sense of America: Sociological Analyses and Essays, ed. H. J. Gans, 167–202. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield. Georges, Eugenia. 1990. The Making of a Transnational Community: Migration, Development, and Cultural Change in the Dominican Republic. New York: Columbia University Press. Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1975. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gleason, Philipp. 1996 [1983]. “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History,” in Theories of Ethnicity, ed. W. Sollors, 460–88. New York: New York University Press. Gordon, Milton Myron. 1964. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press. Greeley, Andrew M. 1974. Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance. New York: Wiley. Hechter, Michael. 1975. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hollinger, David A. 1995. Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism. New York: Basic Books. Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith. 1996. Ethnicity. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Ignatiev, Noel. 1995. How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge. Jacobson, Matthew Frye. 1998. Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Jenkins, Richard. 1997. Rethinking Ethnicity. London: Sage. Kivisto, Peter. 2002. Multiculturalism in a Global Society. Oxford: Blackwell. – 2001. “Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical Review of Current Efforts.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24: 549–77. Kivisto, Peter and Dag Blanck. 1990. American Immigrants and Their Generations: Studies and Commentaries on the Hansen Thesis after Fifty Years. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

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Kroeber, Alfred L. and Talcott Parsons. 1958. “The Concepts of Culture and of Social System.” American Sociological Review: 582–83. Lemel, Y. and J. Modell. 1990. “Introduction,” in Recent Social Trends in the United States, ed. T. Caplow, H. Bahr, J. Model, and B. Chadwick. Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Maffesoli, Michel. 2007. “From Universal to Particular.” Diogenes 215:81– 92. Maleševic, Siniša. 2001. “Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A Critique.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25: 193–212. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1998 [1944]. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 2007. “Global Multiculture, Flexible Acculturation.” Globalizations 4:65–79. Pareto, Vilfredo. 1964 [1916]. Trattato di sociologia generale. Milan: Comunità. Park, Robert Ezra. 1950 [1937]. “The Race Relation Cycle in Hawaii,” in Race and Culture, ed. R. E. Park, 189–95. Illinois: The Free Press. – 1950 [1926]. “Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific,” in Race and Culture, ed. R. E. Park, 138–51. Illinois: The Free Press. Parsons, Talcott. 1964 [1951]. The Social System. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. Piore, Michael J. 1979. Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Portes, Alejandro. 1996. The New Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 1990. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press. Preyer, Gerhardt and Mathias Bös. 2002. Borders in a Globalized World. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Roberts, Lance W., Mathias Bös, and Susanne von Below. 2001. “Modes of Multiculturalism: Giving Voice to Diversity,” in Giving Voice: Canadian and German Perspectives, ed. H. Braun and W. Klooss, 77–91. Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner Verlag. Robertson, Roland. 1992. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. Newbury Park: Sage.

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Rumbaut, Ruben G. 1997. “Paradoxes (and Orthodoxies) of Assimilation.” Sociological Perspectives 40:483–511. Schnapper, Dominique. 2001. “Race: History of the Concept,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 7, ed. N. J. Smelser, 12700–703. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Simmel, Georg. 1983 [1908]. Soziologie – Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Berlin: Dunker & Humblot. Smelser, Neil J. 1997. Problematics of Sociology. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press. Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Sollors, Werner. 2001. “Ethnic Groups/Ethnicity: Historical Aspects,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 7, ed. N. J. Smelser, 4813–14. Amsterdam: Elsevier. – 1996. Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader. New York: New York University Press. Thomas, William Isaac and Florian Znaniecki. 1958 [1918]. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. New York: Dover Publications. Thompson, Richard H. 1989. Theories of Ethnicity: A Critical Appraisal. New York: Greenwood Press. Wallace, Walter L. 1974. “Some Elements of Sociological Theory in Studies of Black Americans,” in Black Sociologists: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. J. E. Blackwell and M. Janowitz, 299–326. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Warner, W. Lloyd and Paul Sanborn Lunt. 1941. The Social Life of a Modern Community. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. Warner, W. Lloyd and Leo Srole. 1945. The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, H. Milford Oxford University Press. Waters, Mary C. 1990. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weber, Max. 1996 [1922]. “Ethnic Groups,” in Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader, ed. W. Sollors, 52–66. New York: New York University Press. – 1985 [1922]. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.

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Wilson, William Julius. 1978. The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Yinger, J. Milton. 1994. Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? Albany: State University of New York Press.

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1 Canada: The Challenge and Response to Ethnic Diversity lance w. roberts and barry ferguson

Immigration has been a major national policy and a source of considerable public conflict throughout Canada’s national history. During the past forty years, the country has arrived at two major policy innovations, a transparent immigration policy for the global recruitment of population, and a multiculturalism policy for managing the integration of newcomers into the polity and society. As a result, Canada’s capacity for social incorporation has become surprisingly successful by most measurements and assessments. This chapter presents the Canadian case regarding the challenges of and responses to ethnic diversity in recent decades. The goals of this national report are threefold: (1) to characterize contemporary social conditions among national ethnic groups; (2) to summarize state policies directed at facilitating the integration of these groups; and (3) to comment on the success of these efforts at social incorporation. The essay examines in detail only one of the three bases of ethnic diversity in Canada – recent immigrants. It does not examine the two other major sources, Aboriginal peoples and French Canadians. These two groups have totally different standing in Canada, recognized under the constitutional and political system in various ways as well as exhibiting different challenges, responses, and successes regarding ethnic pluralism. We shall comment on this distinctiveness in the following section and the conclusion, but the cases of Aboriginal peoples and French Canadians are not directly part of this paper.

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the exceptionality of the canadian case Social science methodology highlights the relevance of “deviant case analysis” (Denzin 1989). Attending to exceptional cases provides an alternate viewpoint that gives opportunities for insights difficult to obtain when examining conventional cases. With respect to ethnic diversity and strategies for accommodation, there is reason to consider the Canadian case as unconventional and therefore worthy of careful consideration (Kymlicka 1998). The primary basis of Canadian exceptionalism stems from the country’s long-standing interest in recruiting permanent immigrants and developing strategies for their incorporation. Here Canada stands aligned with a very small group of states, including Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Israel. Compared to the United States, Canada has a much higher per-capita immigration rate that has resulted in double the proportion of foreign-born residents. Likewise, Canada is recognized (albeit with Australia) as an international leader in the development of multiculturalism policies to assist the social incorporation of immigrants. A second exceptional element to Canadian ethnic diversity is its Aboriginal population. Among Western societies, few countries have such a large proportion of Aboriginal people (about 5 per cent of the population) and, among those that do, Canada is notable for providing constitutional recognition to its Aboriginal peoples. Canada’s 1982 Constitution affirms Aboriginal rights, and the country is committed to recognizing Aboriginal self-government and revising Aboriginal land claims. The third element of Canadian exceptionalism is the existence of the large French ethno-linguistic population. The French and English were Canada’s two founding peoples in constitutional and political terms. The French comprise more than one quarter of Canadians and are concentrated in the province of Quebec. In Quebec, French Canadians are about four fifths of the population and possess full institutional completeness with respect to language, law, education, governance, and

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economic structures supporting distinctiveness and autonomy. The national claims of the community centred in Quebec, and the long-standing and now largely successful efforts at creating a federal system to accommodate these claims (including francophone rights in other provinces), are a basic facet of national life but remain separate from this paper. Signs of success include the “francization” of public life in Quebec and the recognition in 2006 by the Canadian Parliament that Quebec is a distinct nation (Ferguson, Langlois, and Roberts 2009). Even Quebec’s version of multiculturalism is distinct, based as it is on the legal concept of “reasonable accommodation” rather than the political concept of recognition in the rest of Canada (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; Taylor 1994). On all of these counts, the Canadian case is a special one worthy of attention. In the remainder of this paper we focus on one component of this exceptionalism: ethnic diversity related to recent immigration.

the social circumstances of recent immigrants We begin with a summary of the broad social circumstances behind recent immigrants to Canada. This review provides the context for a consideration of the state policies that have been advanced in recent decades to assist the social incorporation of these recent arrivals. Prior to the arrival of Europeans, Canada was populated for at least fifteen thousand years by Aboriginal peoples. These original Canadians displayed extensive linguistic, cultural, and economic diversity and distinctive “national” concentrations (Dickason 2002). Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Europeans arrived in what is now Canada, and the French and British emerged as the most successful competitors with Aboriginal peoples for the control of resources and lands, and overwhelmed them in all regions by the late nineteenth century. The conventional classification by ethnic origins in Canada includes the categories British and French (the “Charter groups”), as well as “all others.” Using this classification, the ethnic composition of the coun-

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try changed little between its Confederation in 1867 and 1971. Over this century, there was a steady decline in the proportion of “British” and a steady increase in the proportion of “all others.” During this period, the proportion of “French” people remained fairly constant. Despite the steady decline in the numbers of Canadians of “British” background, until the 1970s Canada was clearly a bicultural nation with respect to ethnic origins. Since 1971, ethnic diversity in Canada has increased substantially. In 1971, the combination of British and French origins comprised 73.3 per cent of the population. This proportion has slowly declined every decade, reaching 54.9 per cent by 1991 and 51.5 per cent as of 2006. Much of this diversity is attributable to the population increases in those groups with “Asian” origins, with this category increasing from 1.3 per cent in 1971 to 5.4 per cent in 1991 to 11.3 per cent in 2006. An examination of the most recent data in the 2006 census shows that nearly 50 per cent of the Canadian population now report having no British or French ancestry, while 16.2 per cent belong to visible minority groups as of 2006 (see Census of Canada 1971 to 2006). The emerging multiethnic character of Canada is shown by the decline in numbers of the traditional sources of immigration. Between 1981 and 1991, only 7.5 per cent of immigrants came from Britain, with similar low rates being observed in other European groups. By contrast, there has been substantial migration from Asian, Caribbean, Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American regions. In the mid1990s, for instance, over 65 per cent of the 200,000 immigrants per year to Canada came from outside Europe. To solidify this point, consider the following rank-ordered listings of the top ten countries of immigrants (Brym 2004, 262). The dramatic changes between 1968 and 2001 are clear: 1968: United Kingdom, Italy, United States, Germany, Portugal, France, Greece, Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland 2001: China, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Korea, United States, Iran, Romania, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom.

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The result of this substantial shift in the ethnic composition of the immigrant population is a much more multiethnic nation, particularly in urban regions. The most recent census of 2006 reports that over 19.8 per cent of Canada’s population is foreign-born, with this proportion being extraordinary in Canada’s three largest cities. In Toronto, it is 45 per cent, in Vancouver 40 per cent, and in Montreal closing on 25 per cent. While most major metropolitan areas have high concentrations of foreign-born residents, small-town and rural Canada do not. Still, more than half of contemporary immigrants now come from non-European nations. With this growing trend towards greater ethnic diversity, especially from non-European sources, it would be reasonable to anticipate social tensions and dislocations. Contrary to such expectations, however, the large sociological literature on the topic suggests quite the contrary. Without all the appropriate qualifiers found in the extensive literature, a brief selection of the findings on this account is illustrative. The Political Domain Political integration or marginalization can be indicated through a variety of measures, ranging from the ethnic identity of elected officials, through ethnic voting patterns, to citizenship acquisition. Evidence about the ethnic origins of elected officials suggests that federal officials are moving towards being proportionally representative. For instance, in both 1988 and 1993, about 15 per cent of federal Members of Parliament were them-selves immigrants (Black and Lakhani 1997). Currently, about 12 per cent were born outside Canada compared to 20 per cent of the total population (http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Compilations/Parliament/). However, for visible minorities who are recent immigrants, political representatives are in shorter proportional supply. A recent authoritative review has noted that 7 per cent of current Members of Parliament are visible minorities compared to 16 per cent of the total population (Cross 2009). The political participation of immigrants has for the past two decades been quite similar to that of native-born Canadians (Chui, Curtis, and

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Lambert 1991). Moreover, the differences that do exist between these groups, and they are very slight, decrease into insignificance the longer immigrants are in the country (Black 1990; White et al. 2007). It is notable that political participation in Canada has, over the past two decades, been declining quite significantly, but there is no major difference in participation rates between new citizens and old citizens (Ferguson, Langlois, and Roberts 2009). Naturalization rates in Canada are among the highest in the world. Immigrants from Asia and the Middle East quickly acquire citizenship. In contrast, immigrants from Europe and the United States tend to be much slower at becoming citizens (DeVries 1992; DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005). Moreover, in tests about knowledge of Canadian history, political, and civic institutions, immigrants’ scores compare favourably with those of native-born Canadians (Gwyn 1997). To summarize, the available evidence suggests that federal elected officials are moving towards being proportionally representative of immigrants, that immigrants’ political participation is quite similar to that of native-born Canadians, that rates for acquiring citizenship are among the highest in the world, and that in tests about knowledge of Canadian history, political, and civic institutions, immigrants’ scores compare favourably with those of native-born Canadians. The Economic Domain Economic disparities between ethnic groups appear to be relatively small. Although subject to some methodological criticism (De Silva and Palmer 1994; Reitz 1993), a report by the Economic Council of Canada (1991) proposed that there is little substantial discrimination against immigrants in the economic sector. This conclusion was tempered by a study by Boyd (1992), who reports that, in 1986, being foreign-born or a member of a visible minority was correlated with lower earnings, independent of education and occupation. De Silva’s (1996) study estimates this earnings gap between White and visible minority males to be about 3.5 per cent.

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In general, evidence suggests that the occupational and income status of immigrants is roughly comparable to that of native-born Canadians. However, this achievement is somewhat lower than would be expected based on the educational and occupational credentials of ethnic minorities (Li 1996b). This finding and others suggest that the credentials of immigrants do not receive comparable worth in Canada (Galarneau and Morissette 2004). Evidence from the 1990s suggested that the current cohorts of immigrants are not achieving economic integration as rapidly as their earlier counterparts (Beaujot 1996; Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1995). A more recent study based on the early 2000s argues that current immigrants are not achieving income parity as rapidly as in the previous two decades (Walters, Phythian, and Anisef 2006). These results may be due to a variety of factors including assessment of credentials, labour market conditions, and the language skills of new immigrants. Still, the evidence indicates little substantial discrimination against immigrants in the economic sector, with the occupational and income status of immigrants being roughly comparable to that of native-born Canadians. The Educational Domain Until the 1950s, immigrants to Canada were typed by entrance status, with those from northern and central Europe having a higher status than others. This meant that the economic and political elites of the nation were not representative of the population, and that there was considerable ethnic stratification based on education, occupation, and income (Porter 1965). Since then, Canada’s policy shifted to a more meritocratic “points-based” system, where immigrants are selected using educational, skill, and labour market credentials. It is anticipated that this revised selection system will reduce inequalities over time. Regarding education, the evidence suggests that such social incorporation has been quite successful. Davies and Guppy (1998, 139) summarize the results: “First, the evidence is overwhelming that racial

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minorities as an aggregate, both native and foreign-born, have attainments that are superior to Whites and to the Canadian-born ... This is not to deny that some visible minority Canadians may face discrimination and harassment in schools, but it is to say that such problems do not result in inferior levels of schooling. Second, crucial distinctions must be made among racial minorities. Asians appear to be advantaged on all measures; Blacks have mixed attainments.” Although these educational outcomes are quite positive, several reports suggest that the educational process still includes extensive bias against minority groups (Dei 1996; Henry et al. 1995; Galarneau and Morissette 2004). The Residential Domain The traditional literature on residential segregation assumes that these patterns were involuntary and constituted a measure of social disintegration. The “ghettoization” of ethnic minorities was seen as a serious disadvantage in the acquisition of the intellectual and social capital necessary for successful integration (Olson and Kobayashi 1993; Reitz 1988). A competing view suggested that voluntary residential segregation by ethnic minorities may be associated with positive outcomes (Driedger and Church 1974), since such concentrations can provide institutional completeness and social support useful to adaptation. The increasing ethnic diversity associated with immigration since the 1960s led, by the 1980s, to substantial concentrations of southern Europeans and visible minorities in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. In these cities, multiple residential clusters of particular ethnic groups often occurred. Recent trends suggest that new immigration is not resulting in increasing residential segregation and ethnic enclaves. While there is certainly ethnic concentration in all cities, it is not accompanied by significant concentrations of poverty (Walks and Bourne 2006; Hebert 2009). Unlike the earlier process through which ethnic concentrations were diluted over the second and third generation

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dispersal, recent developments indicate that middle-class immigrants are now more likely to settle directly into middle-class suburbs (Balakrishnan and Kralt 1987; Balakrishnan and Selvanathan 1990; Moghadam 1994). In Canada’s medium and smaller cities, there is little documentation of residential patterns for ethnic immigrants. The available evidence suggests that, for western Canadian cities like Edmonton, Calgary, and Winnipeg, the ethnic residential concentrations are not as high as they are in larger centres, most likely due to their characteristic suburban layouts (Balakrishnan and Selvanathan 1990; Moghadam 1994; Loewen and Friesen 2009). The Linguistic and Cultural Domains In Canada, the acquisition of one of the two official languages is correlated with economic integration (Boyd, DeVries, and Simkin 1994). Among recent immigrants, between 10 and 15 per cent of them do not have facility in either English or French. Immigrants who work in “linguistic enclaves” and do not speak English or French in the workplace earn up to 50 per cent less than immigrants who work in either of the two official languages (Boyd 2009). However, as immigrants reside longer in the country, their facility with English and/or French grows. Likewise, over generations, the knowledge and use of ethnic languages declines (Harrison 1990; Harrison and Marmen 1994). Culturally, the general empirical trend is towards assimilation (Weinfeld 1994; Isajiw 1990). Distinctive, holistic ethnic cultures are not retained and replicated in ethnic communities in Canada. Even the most institutionally complete communities, like Hutterites, are displaying signs of assimilation through the acquisition of secondary and post-secondary education. However, while cultural and structural assimilation is the general pattern, there is a substantial commitment to symbolic ethnicity, displayed with respect to ethnic foods, holiday rituals, and mass media outlets.

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The Social Domain The sociometry of the ethnic immigrant experience in Canada is predictable. Recent immigrants tend to associate more closely with members of their own ethnic community, while succeeding generations expand their network to include a more diverse set of contacts. Acceptance of ethnic diversity is reflected in the growing approval of intermarriage over two decades, but the proportion of such marriage is small and growing slowly. Ethnic intermarriage is common and increases over generations, although somewhat less so among the French population due to its high concentration in one geographical area, namely, Quebec (Worts and Boyd 2006). “Mixed unions” are far more likely if persons are Canadian-born. Still, only about 4 per cent of Canadians declare they are in inter-racial mixed unions (Milan, Maheux, and Chui 2010). For intermarriage among Blacks and Whites, for example, the approval rate rose from 57 per cent (1975) to 81 per cent (1995). Likewise, Brym (1993) indicates that exogamy is growing among Canadian Jews, a trend that is continuing into the 2000s (Goldman 2009). Extreme public expressions of racism in Canada are rare occurrences. However, the country is not without discrimination in various guises. Hate propaganda exists on the Internet and elsewhere (Barrett 1987; Kinsella 2001), job applicants from minorities are more likely than Whites to be refused interviews (Henry and Ginsberg 1985), and glass ceilings are evident in the employment arena. Regarding crime and deviance, the evidence indicates that the prison population is not disproportionately foreign-born (Gordon and Nelson 1996). But studies regularly confirm that there is no correlation between immigration and criminality, and indeed that immigrants are in general less likely to commit crimes than non-immigrants (Dinovitzer, Hagan, and Levi 2009). This pattern has been continually borne out by studies over several decades, despite popular opinion and media coverage to the contrary. Indeed, the media regularly identify immigrant “gang” problems in major urban centres, which undoubtedly do exist. Yet measured against broad patterns, these problems are more

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significant as examples of a moral panic than a social trend. Some visible minorities, however, including Blacks and Latin Americans, do have above average incarceration rates. A review of various studies about the specific circumstances of recent immigrants to Canada reveals a general trend of robust, although incomplete, social incorporation. The results of this trend are evident in a summary comparison of how recent Black and Asian immigrants rate on measures of socio-economic inequality, including education, labour force participation, and income. Compared to historic British and French populations, Black and Asian immigrants have higher levels of secondary school completion, post-secondary education, and labour force participation. However, despite these meritocratic advantages, they maintain slightly higher unemployment rates and lower average incomes. Whether these undesirable inequalities are the result of racism and discrimination, or the consequence of recent migration and its attendant problems of credentials recognition and low seniority, remains a matter of debate (e.g. Li 1996; Badets and Howatson-Leo 2000). The changing character of Canadian society, including the dramatic shifts in immigration policy and practice in recent decades, has worked to challenge the portrayal of Canada as a “vertical mosaic.” Porter’s classic study argued that ethnicity and social stratification were intimately linked in Canada (Porter 1965). Recent immigration policies have made the pattern of ethnic stratification much more complex, especially since recent migrants from Asia have consisted largely of skilled, urban professionals of high “entrance status.” The general trend is that, with some exceptions, ethnic status is “increasingly irrelevant among those born in Canada regardless of ethnic origin” (Hiller 2000, 93–4). This is certainly the case for those of European ancestry (Boyd 1981), and, in large measure, is the case for immigrants born abroad (Lautard and Guppy 1999). As the clear, direct significance of ethnicity to inequality fades (Hou and Balakrishnan 1996), the understanding becomes more subtle and complex, and more variable (Li 1988; Breton et al. 1990). In almost every year since 1990, Canada has admitted between 200,000 and 250,000 immigrants, a rate proportionally about double

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that of most other Western nations. Despite the substantial rhetoric about problems created by this liberal immigration practice (Bibby 1990; Bissoondath 1994; Stoffman 2002), the record regarding the social incorporation of these newcomers is quite successful. Kymlicka (1998) summarizes the record by making a number of points: •

•

•

•

•

Despite the fact that fairly limited economic or regulatory incentives to take out Canadian citizenship have lessened, naturalization rates among recent immigrants have been increased in recent decades. Political participation by recent immigrants has been within traditional party structures, approaches proportional representation in the federal Parliament, and is supportive of liberal-democratic values. Recent immigrants show a serious commitment to learning and utilizing at least one of the official languages, with over 98 per cent doing so. Endogamy rates continue to decline while the acceptance of mixed marriages continues to grow. Ethnic enclaves of residential segregation are not a prominent feature of Canadian cities.

It seems fair to conclude, then, that the Canadian experience regarding the incorporation of immigrants is remarkably successful. This record of achievement in recent decades has been paralleled by official government policies related to immigration and multiculturalism. Given the close association between government policy and social experience, the nature of these policies and programs deserves attention, since they are the principal means by which the state has worked towards successfully managing this form of ethnic diversity.

the evolution of canadian immigration policy Canadian national policy has always relied on immigrant recruitment for economic development, but for many decades the country was

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deeply ambivalent about its immigration policies. The goal of attracting large numbers of immigrants to build population and stimulate economic growth was offset by a determination to control immigration in the interest of British and French cultural predominance. These contradictory goals led to perpetual debate, outbursts of nativism and racism, and policy inconsistency until well after the Second World War (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998; Avery 1995; Burnet and Palmer 1988). Canada only embarked upon major changes to its immigration policy and administration after a series of protracted debates and reforms between the mid-1940s and the mid-1970s (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998). The long process by which the modern consensus was reached and its origins in two factors – the slow adjustment of national policy and the constitutional division of power between the federal and provincial governments – show how deeply rooted immigration policy is in Canadian public life. The Evolution of Immigration Policy A brief overview of national immigration policy history shows not only how slowly Canadian immigration policy was built up during the twentieth century, but also how momentous the policy changes made in the 1970s actually were. The original Immigration Act was passed in 1869, two years after Canada was formed. This Immigration Act had two elements that continued for more than a century. These were, first, the high degree of ministerial and official discretionary authority to interpret and implement the Act and, second, the almost imperceptible definition of the actual policy goals behind it. For decades, successive Ministers of Immigration and their senior officials were charged with not only carrying out the terms of the Act but also determining policy at their own discretion (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 62, 324). The 1869 Act – and its subsequent administration – had as its goal the massive recruitment of immigrants to abet Canadian economic development, but it was only one part of a broader set of national economic and political development policies that were created over several decades (see Burnet and Palmer 1988, 187).

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The basic problem Canada experienced from the 1860s to the 1890s was that immigrant recruitment was unsuccessful. Not only could Canada not compete with other parts of the Americas, notably the United States, for European immigrants, but it could not even retain its own population as the lure of the United States drew tens of thousands per year. Until the mid-1890s, therefore, Canada maintained a relatively unsuccessful “open door” policy on immigration. Even before the country began to attract significant numbers of immigrants, from the 1890s to the 1920s, immigration policy had shifted from an “open door” approach to a “controlled access” policy. Regulations aimed at the restriction of what were termed “non-preferred” immigrants, specifically racial minorities, were implemented by officials in consultation with the Minister and, in the most egregious instances of immigration controls, separate agreements and legislation were made to limit or prevent the entry of significant numbers of immigrants from Japan, India, and China, all conducted with British imperial guidance. In the case of China, a separate Chinese Immigration Act and Chinese Immigration Service were created in 1885 to limit the number of Chinese immigrants entering Canada through a steep “head tax.” Agreements with Japan (1907) and India (1908) were reached to almost stop immigration from those countries (Avery 1995; Ward 1990). After the Second World War, cautious efforts were begun to reconsider immigration policy and the reception of immigrants in Canada. A major Parliamentary review of immigration policy was undertaken in the late 1940s, immigration policy was more closely tied to a newlyevolved citizenship policy (uniform Canadian citizenship did not exist until 1947), and regular immigration policy consultations with the wider community and the provinces was initiated (Hawkins 1972, 89ff.). At the heart of the post-1945 policy was a still-ambivalent acceptance of massive immigration, despite the economic motives to do so. Canadian policy was coolly self-interested and decidedly economic in orientation (Hawkins 1972, 91). The policy was also still based upon a “skeletal statutory framework” (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 324) that was designed to preserve the long-held practice of “considerable

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degree of administrative discretion” on the part of federal officials and the Minister to the exclusion of the federal Parliament, provincial legislatures, and the general public (Hawkins 1972, 73). The 1950s and 1960s were decades of heavy immigration that led governments to gauge how well Canada could “absorb” immigrant cultures. Alongside the heavy immigration of the times, there was almost continual political and administrative review of immigration policy. The provinces began to exert some pressure to gain a voice in setting immigration priorities and managing its impact, since they had to educate the new Canadians, providing everything from language instruction for adults to classrooms for children. Moreover, Canadian society was realizing to a greater degree than prior to the Second World War all of the many benefits of immigration to Canadian cultural and political as well as economic development (Burnet and Palmer 1988). All these factors stimulated a new (1957) federal government, the Progressive Conservatives led by a westerner, John Diefenbaker, to rethink immigration policy. A five-year review resulted in a new set of regulations – but not legislation – in 1962 that began a momentous shift in policy. At a stroke of the regulatory pen, Canada swept away longstanding cultural and ethnic biases towards immigrants from the United Kingdom and the United States, and the orientation of Canada as primarily a “British” nation, which had been both formally and informally held for decades of the twentieth century. Regulatory changes and Ministerial decisions did not lead to immediate legislative reform. Governments came and went. In 1966, a reformist Liberal government unveiled a White Paper on Immigration in 1966. Although not the product of widespread consultation, the 1966 White Paper was perhaps the first serious effort to stimulate a major public dialogue in support of the Parliamentary review of immigration policy. The White Paper – a discussion paper in the rubric of Parliamentary government – stimulated sporadic Parliamentary and public debate, and its specific proposals were very influential. These proposals represented the full realization of the previous Conservative government’s goal of ending discrimination and bias in immigration recruitment (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 352–4).

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In 1967, the Minister of Immigration announced a new method of assessing the qualifications of potential immigrants, the “norms of assessment” method. This new “points system” was based on a set of explicit criteria that were graded by immigration officers, and it has become the norm since 1967. Notably, Canada was moving in collaboration with two other countries of immigration, the United States and Australia, in breaking with historic ethnic biases and adopting explicit criteria for entry (Hawkins 1972 and 1991). Canada’s new policy was based upon an assessment of the individual in relation to Canada’s explicit economic needs and political goals. In that sense, it marked the end of “all explicit traces of racial discrimination” in the selection of immigrants (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 351). After a decade of experimenting with the new “norms of assessment”, the 1976 Immigration Act codified the changes of the 1960s. It appeared that an “unprecedented consensus” had finally emerged (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 371ff., quotation 385). The explicit policy goals of the 1976 Act were to “promote the domestic and international interests of Canada” so that immigration would meet Canada’s demographic goals; contribute to cultural diversity and the federal/bilingual foundation of the country; provide for family unification; support international humanitarian goals; and support Canadian economic development (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 390–1, text found in Hawkins 1991, 287–8). These policy goals were “innovative, liberal, and effective,” based as they were on a declaration against ethnic, national, or religious bias in selection (Hawkins 1991, 70). These principles have become central to all subsequent Canadian immigration policy. The Constitutional Framework As in so many areas of its public life, control over immigration has been contested. Constitutionally, immigration is explicitly shared between both the provinces and the central or federal government (the only other explicitly shared area is agriculture) (see Constitution Act, Section 95). This dual responsibility is doubly peculiar because it was ignored for decades and Federal government priority and initiative pre-

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dominated until the mid-1970s. Few scholarly works, notably the critical studies of political scientist Frieda Hawkins, have taken seriously the constitutional rights of the provinces. Hawkins pointed out, as early as 1972, that the absence of consultation with the provinces greatly contributed to the continual absence of a national consensus on immigration policy (Hawkins 1972, 177, 185). In effect, many of the conflicts about immigration policies and practices were the result of federal practices conflicting with provincial aims. These conflicts include important and contentious issues such as disputes about Asian immigration from the 1880s to the 1920s, outbursts of “nativist” reactions against non-British and, if only from Quebec, non-French ethnic immigrants during the 1920s and 1930s, and the recurring QuebecCanada conflicts over the demographic and economic impact of immigration recruitments from the 1930s to the 1970s. The role of the provinces has been uneven but growing in the post1945 period. Ottawa began to recognize the possibility of provincial jurisdiction by the late 1940s and from 1950 to 1958 experimented with joint federal–provincial administrative consultations about immigration goals, although informally and irregularly. This experiment in cooperative federalism only highlighted the limited interest in immigration among the provinces. The province of Ontario, the largest by far in population and economic power, made immigration recruitment part of its economic strategies and educational programs in the 1950s and 1960s. Other provinces awoke to the ramifications of federal policy more slowly. But, by the early 1960s, the province of Quebec, economically and culturally dynamic but politically troubled about the benefits of the federation, took the lead in immigration after decades of disinterest. Quebec recognized the need to integrate its economic and population growth policies to immigration programs and created its own department of immigration in 1966. Despite Ontario and Quebec initiatives, immigration remained an area of “exclusive federal management” until the late 1960s (Hawkins 1972, 185–91, quotations 191, 185). Provincial involvement was explicitly recognized in the revised federal Immigration Act of 1976 (Hawkins 1991, 71). Quebec aggressively pursued the potential of the 1976 changes to national immigration pol-

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icy that invited coordination and consultation with the provinces. A 1978 agreement between Quebec and Canada allowed Quebec considerable autonomy in recruiting immigrants to promote provincial economic and cultural goals, notably recruiting francophones (Hawkins 1972, 203ff. and 213ff.; Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 391–3). It is notable that this agreement was amicably signed between a sovereigntist Quebec provincial government and a strongly anti-sovereigntist federal government. In 1991, Quebec and Canada negotiated a new “Accord” enabling Quebec even greater authority over both selection and settlement policies. Quebec has seen the potential for provincial activity while abandoning its own long-standing ambiguity about the impact of immigration (Symons 2002, 28–46). Five provinces signed similar but somewhat less extensive agreements over the next decade, starting with population-hungry Manitoba in 1996. Some provinces, including such major economic powers as Alberta and Ontario, have sought only limited involvement in recruiting immigrants, chiefly for key professions. In sum, federal priority remains unchanged with the major exception of Quebec and the partial exceptions of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

contemporary immigration policy The 1976 Immigration Act consolidated the new policy, but it was even more remarkable in other ways. First, the proposed Act “explicitly spelled out” Canada’s immigration policy for the first time in legislation rather than in ministerial statements. Second, it “curtailed the sweeping scope of ministerial discretion” and sustained the shift towards due process in the selection of immigrants and in the treatment of controversial cases. Third, the Act recognized the constitutional role of the provinces, which has become central to immigration policy making (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 391). The very departmental names for the Immigration portfolio between 1966 and 1994 had been either “manpower and immigration” (1966 to 1977) or “employment and immigration” (1977 to 1994) (Knowles 1997, passim). Since then it has been “citizenship and immigration.”

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Linking citizenship to immigration showed clearly that the economic basis of immigration has become routine, and the social and political integration of immigrants has become a top priority of the federal government. When the Immigration Act was revised and rewritten in 2002, its new title reflected the shift from narrowly economic to broader social and political goals. The new Act was entitled the “Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.” The new Act pertains at least as much to refugee issues and the attendant pressures leading to undocumented, irregular movements of people, which remain contentious, as to regular immigration, which has become routinized. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration itself emphasizes the shift from economic recruitment to broader social goals in immigration policy.1 The “points system” remains, but it has been streamlined in 2002 from nine to six criteria: Criteria

Maximum Points

Education Language Ability Work Experience Age Accepting Employment Adaptability

/25 /25 /21 /10 /10 /10

The most important changes are found in the greater emphasis on “education” and “language ability,” and in a new factor, “adaptability,” replacing a “suitability” evaluation by the immigration officer. Again, social and cultural factors have displaced mere economic factors in the contemporary assessment process.2

refugees, undocumented immigrants, temporary workers, and student visas Three specific aspects of contemporary Canadian policy merit particular attention. The first and most significant policy question has been

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about refugees and “undocumented” migrants. Refugee policy has been exceptionally prominent at regular intervals in the post-1945 period, but it has been described as the single most important factor in a “fraying of the consensus” about immigration policy since the late 1980s (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 382). Indeed refugee issues have become so contentious that the major surveys of immigration policy written in the 1990s devote entire chapters to the problem. Canada had accepted responsibilities for dealing with displaced persons and refugees through its committed membership in the United Nations and the un’s activist United Nations High Commission for Refugees (Hawkins 1991, 156–60). But Canadian refugee policy was irregular and reactive during the 1950s and 1960s. Its experience had begun with the immediate post-war problem of displaced persons, which saw Canada accept more than 186,000 refugees in the late 1940s. Resistance to the Soviet Union’s political and economic domination occurred in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and this upheaval led to major refugee movements. Canada accepted a significant portion of the refugees, 37,000 Hungarians and 12,000 Czechoslovaks (Hawkins 1991, 165). The effect of these major responses to refugee crises made it clear that Canada had no refugee policy as such. By the early 1970s, it was becoming even clearer that the world refugee problem would only become more serious. The situation during the 1990s was perhaps more severe with major civil wars and international conflicts in Yugoslavia, central and east Africa, and the Middle East, creating a massive refugee crisis out of the ethnic and religious conflicts of the decade (Shawcross 2000). Canada responded at the beginning of this era of refugees, and the Green Paper and the 1976 Immigration Act addressed the problem. The sheer weight of the international problem and the pressure of Canadian humanitarian groups ranging from churches to ethnic organizations combined to make the refugee question a recurring central aspect of immigration policy debate throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. This had an impact on Canada, which accepted 7,000 Ugandans (mostly Ismaili Muslims) expelled by Idi Amin; 7,000 Chileans leaving after a

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military coup; 11,000 Lebanese fleeing a religious-political civil war; and finally about 90,000 “boat-people” refugees, mostly ethnic Chinese expelled from Vietnam. These were significant numbers both as proportions of the total refugee population and as populations for Canada to cope with (Hawkins 1991, 167, 169, and 170–85). Remarkably, the reception of these refugee groups was quite favourable and included many civic and religious organizations taking the initiative to sponsor refugees and to supplement government assistance. Meanwhile, thousands of so-called “undocumented immigrants” (i.e. illegal permanent residents) became a source of political concern in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s. The problem was perceived less as one of deliberate deception on the part of undocumented residents, although there was some of that, and more as one of poor controls over and documentation of temporary residents filling slots in the labour market or shifting from temporary to permanent residency due to opportunities in Canada or the absence of opportunities in their countries of origin. The problem of documenting temporary residents became so serious that on two occasions, amnesties were implemented, dubbed “adjustment of status” periods for illegal or undocumented immigrants. Two amnesties for illegal residents were issued in 1973 and 1983. The amnesties led to far fewer applications for permanent residency than feared by officials or public commentators. By the mid-1990s, the problem of undocumented immigrants had apparently become manageable (Hawkins 1991, 195ff.; Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 382ff.). One of the keys to resolving these two contentious matters – undocumented immigration and refugee accommodation – was the creation in 1987 of a new quasi-judicial agency, the Immigration and Refugee Appeal Board. The Appeal Board was designed to speed up the entry of refugees from international refugee camps run by the un High Commission for Refugees and to ease applications for change of status or regularization of status among immigrants (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 415–16). The new Appeal Board was much more effective than its predecessor. While the old Immigration Appeal Board had accepted only 20 to 30 per cent of applications during the 1980s, the new Board has an acceptance rate of greater than 50 per cent even though

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it dealt with a vastly expanded number of applicants throughout the 1990s. As for the 2000s, the post-9/11 era of heightened tension over international security has struck some observers as an unnecessary tightening of criteria, partly under pressure from the United States (Kelley and Trebilcock, 2010). The most recent source of difficulty has been the intermittent arrival over the past decade of several shiploads of undocumented immigrants (from China and Sri Lanka). The individuals aboard the ships pay illegal agents a great deal of money (upwards of $50,000 in a recent case) and present Canada with a sudden influx of refugees. While the country has been typically generous in dealing with the refugees, it has also been typically uncertain about whether immigration policy has to address the issue. Thus far there is no resolution. The continuing problems of refugees and undocumented immigrants serve as a reminder that not all immigration has been permanent. While Canada has been a country of immigration and has tied its immigration to economic growth, permanency of labour migration has not been a universal characteristic. Indeed, throughout Canadian history, contract labour and temporary terms were either connived at or negotiated by governments and private interests. Between the late-nineteenth century and the Second World War, both private contracts and state-assisted regulations ensured that large numbers of immigrants were in effect guest-workers in Canada. These guest-workers included well-known examples of ethnic recruitments such as Chinese and Irish railway labour and Italian construction and mine labour prior to the First World War (Peck 2000; Ward 1990). Since the Second World War, there have been numerous smaller-scale movements. These have included continuing provisions for domestic servants, chiefly from the Caribbean, and seasonal farm labour from both the Caribbean and Mexico, as well as other measures (Avery 1995, passim; Kelley and Trebilcock 1998, 335; Hawkins 1991, 43). During the 1990s, the Government of Canada was granting visas to approximately 100,000 temporary workers per year under long-standing programs for “Foreign Domestic Workers” and “Temporary Workers.” Over the subsequent decade, the number of temporary workers nearly

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doubled (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998: 399–401).3 The phenomenon of temporary domestic and farm workers has been framed as a human resources issue and has therefore virtually been ignored in public debates over immigration. There has been very little public recognition of widespread undocumented immigration and real social distress among those involved in agricultural labour camps. Nevertheless, the annual migration of about 200,000 temporary workers represents a significant aspect of current immigration practice.

canadian multiculturalism policy One of the most important ways for incorporating ethnic diversity has been Canada’s policy of multiculturalism. To Canadians and non-Canadians alike, multicultural policy emerged as one of the most significant examples of Canadian exceptionalism among nation-states (Kymlicka 1998, 1–5). Still, it should be noted in passing that Australia – Canada’s southern hemisphere analogue in some ways – has simultaneously created a multiculturalist approach (Hawkins 1991). In effect, multiculturalism has been taken as a statement of cultural pluralism to encompass both the host population and immigrants to Canada. The words of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s 1971 statement constituted a startlingly strong expression of cultural pluralism and indeed cultural relativism. “We believe,” he stated to the House of Commons, “that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity. Every ethnic group has the right to preserve and develop its own culture and values within the Canadian context. To say we have two official languages is not to say we have two official cultures, and no particular culture is more ‘official’ than another” (cited in Hawkins 1991, 219–20; Wilson 1993, 655). While subsequent policy, such as the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, and more profoundly, the 1982 Constitution Act and Charter of Rights, might be said to have provided more nuances to the goals of cultural pluralism and caution about its implicit cultural relativism, Trudeau’s statement of 1971 has been the source of vast deliberation; multiculturalism has become the subject of schol-

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arly discourse, governmental summits, and public debate over the past forty years.

the sources of multicultural thinking and policy making Most examinations of multiculturalism start with Prime Minister Trudeau’s 1971 statement and the policies stemming from the 1988 Multiculturalism Act (e.g. Kymlicka, Hawkins). But three long-term factors provide the context for the emergence of modern multiculturalism. The first factor is the pre-reform era history of reception to immigrants. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, Canadian attitudes and policies towards immigrants (outside the preferred British peoples or highly assimilated Europeans from the United States) exhibited the demand for “anglo-conformity,” a variant of the melting pot project that insisted on social and political conformity while providing few avenues for such conformity outside of the schools and the marketplace (Palmer 1976). As the demand for conformity was discredited by experience and failure during the mid-twentieth century, it was replaced by a tolerance of cultural pluralism under the rubric of a “mosaic” of cultures, which admitted not only the strength of ethnic identities and values in the new world, but also interpreted them as beneficial to national life (Palmer 1982, 1976; Bellay 2001). In both periods, Canada had engaged in the recruitment of blocs of European settlers, notably Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians, and allowed for the exemption of religious minorities such as Mennonites and Doukhobors from state policy in such areas as military service and public schooling. Meanwhile, rampant discrimination over religion and race was practiced in education, employment, property holding, and the labour force (Ward 1990; Walker 1997; Backhouse 1999). By the end of the 1940s, the recognition of minority rights was emerging in Canada. This recognition took such forms as the sweeping away from the mid-1940s to the early-1960s of most major forms of discrimination that had pertained to ethnic, religious, and racial mi-

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norities. One major example was the case of Chinese Canadians, who were granted citizenship rights and enfranchised in 1947. A plethora of petty yet vicious pieces of discrimination about hiring practices, educational admissions, housing restrictions, and professional licensing were abandoned or abolished by the provincial, civic, and federal governments in the post-war 1940s and 1950s (Walker 1997). It would be incorrect to state that such practices and laws were removed fully in this period, but the structures and legitimacy of such forms of ethno-cultural hierarchy were soundly rejected. The main symbol of this change lies in the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960. This Act pertained only to federal government institutions, but its eloquent declaration of human rights and fundamental freedoms was echoed in the later and entrenched 1982 Charter of Rights. The Bill of Rights declared that “in Canada there have existed and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex ... human rights and fundamental freedoms,” which were then listed. For the first time in Canada, the strict equality of the application of equality for all people was declared, which set the agenda for twenty years of legal reform and social policy.4 A second and often-overlooked factor in the post-war recognition of cultural pluralist policies was activity at the provincial level. The provinces took the lead in creating Human Rights Acts during the 1940s and 1950s, and then set up Human Rights Commissions during the 1960s and 1970s that banned discriminatory practices and created tribunals to ensure greater access to economic opportunities and social acceptance. All of these initiatives were taken prior to federal government action (Howe and Johnson 2000, chapter 1). Similarly, the entire structure of provincially-regulated school curricula had begun in the inter-war years to emphasize a Progressive educational model of ethnic tolerance if not full equality. This orientation in Progressivism was only strengthened in the post-1945 period, and the provinces also delivered specific language instruction to the thousands of non-English and, to a lesser extent, non-French speaking, children who migrated with their parents to Canada (Rempel 2000, Sutherland 1997).

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A third factor in shifting national policy lies in the demands from francophone Quebec starting with its “Quiet Revolution” of the 1960s. During that decade, Quebec rejected the cultural and political predominance of English Canadians in national life, and insisted that it must come to an end through the recognition of the equality of political and cultural standing of the francophone population (Linteau et al. 1991; Cook 1995). While the evolution of Quebec’s demands for recognition as a province unlike the others and the parallel demand of francophones for national recognition of rights constitute an enormously complex set of issues, they clearly helped to break the hold of the intolerance of the melting pot approach or the more limited tolerance of the cultural mosaic approach in Canada. The importance of the rise of francophone rights is seen in the very origins of multiculturalism in the 1960s in the reconsideration of Canada’s failing bilingual and bicultural partnership.

the shift towards multiculturalist policies In 1963, the Government of Canada initiated a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to examine the serious problems of the French and “English” (sic: British) partnership. Its terms of reference included the problem of including the non-British, non-French peoples. The Commission was asked to advise on “what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups” (cited in Hawkins 1991, 218). During its hearings across Canada, it became apparent that Canadian society was indeed far more complicated than a bicultural one, and that the existing multicultural mosaic demanded recognition. The pressure from the long-established ethnic communities of peoples, central and eastern European in particular, led to a breakthrough volume, The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups, which formed the basis for continued debate about multicultural policies (Hawkins 1991, 218ff.; Burnet and Palmer 1988, 223–5).

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Whatever else the Royal Commission did – the Official Languages Act of 1969 recognizing both English and French as Canada’s two legal languages was its signal legislative result – it stimulated the admission by Prime Minister Trudeau that “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” would henceforth ground Canadian cultural policy (Hawkins 1991). There were four main goals to the declared policy of multiculturalism. These were to encourage ethno-cultural groups to maintain cultural distinctiveness, to assist ethno-cultural groups in overcoming barriers to full participation in Canadian life, to encourage inter-group contact and understanding, and to support the learning of one of Canada’s two official languages (Kymlicka 1998, 15; Hawkins 1991, 220). A dedicated Ministry of State for Multiculturalism, a very small department with a very limited budget, tried to implement the four policy goals of cultural preservation, social integration, inter-cultural understanding, and official language acquisition. By the mid-1980s, Canada was governed by a different federal party, the so-called “Progressive Conservatives” led by Quebecker Brian Mulroney that consisted of a powerful alliance of soft-nationalist Quebeckers and moderate conservatives from the West. This alliance of Quebeckers intent on defending their cultural distinctiveness and Westerners celebrating their own cultural mosaic supported the Multiculturalism Act of 1988. The willingness of a government dominated by these two blocks to strengthen the commitment to multiculturalism appears to have reflected the increased voice of “new” ethnic groups, particularly groups of visible minorities, who themselves had become more numerous as a result of the major shifts in immigration policy in 1962 and 1976. The 1988 Act contained no less than nine cultural development goals and one compliance goal. The Act entrenched a Ministry of State for Multiculturalism, first created in 1972 as a minor portfolio, within larger ministries such as its current home in the Department of Canadian Heritage. The cultural development goals sustained the earlier agenda of ethnic group recognition and the search for equality, but they were now fully buttressed by the 1982 Constitution Act, which en-

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trenched a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which contained a Section 27 on the “multicultural heritage.” The specific declaration was that “this Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Canada Constitution Act 1982, Charter of Rights and Freedoms). The list of multicultural goals included a very wide thematic menu in the nine specific items of multicultural policy. Its goals are captured in its declaration that Canada “recognizes the diversity of Canadians” and that the Act aims “to preserve and enhance the multicultural heritage” all the while aiming to “achieve the equality of all … in the economic, social, cultural, and political life” of the country (Multiculturalism Act 1988, reprinted in Kymlicka 1998, 185). These goals of recognition, preservation, and achievement thus support a wide variety of programs. The kinds of programs and initiatives that are supported under the name of Canadian multiculturalism include the following measures: • • • •

•

•

funding ethnic cultural festivals and ethnic studies programs discouraging ethnic stereotypes in the media creating anti-racist educational programs devising flexible dress codes and work schedules to accommodate religious beliefs and holidays supporting revisions to textbooks and manuals to recognize ethnocultural contributions devising affirmative action programs to increase representation of visible minorities in public institutions

Beyond these goals, the Multiculturalism Act contains an additional measure that may profoundly entrench its impact. Section Two of the Act stipulates that all “federal institutions” must comply with the Multiculturalism Act not least by reporting to the Multiculturalism Department on the ways they have complied with the Act. This extraordinary measure is, as Greg Gauld emphasized, that the Act has a major impact on all those “federal institutions” no matter how effective its own policy development agendas (Gauld 1992, 10–12).

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interpreting contemporary multicultural policy The Multiculturalism Act is fully in keeping with contemporary legislative trends to specify the policy goals of legislation. Yet the Act is so extraordinarily ambitious that it may be wondered whether the goal of policy precision is undermined by the methods of policy extensiveness. The effectiveness of the Act has been gauged by some academic analysts to be defensible only if its purposes are interpreted fairly narrowly. Understanding the practices that multiculturalism does not support is essential to understanding what actually is supported. Simply stated, and contrary to what many critics claim, Canadian multiculturalism policy does not support the development of separate, parallel ethnic institutions, nor does it encourage the replication or promotion of separate ethnic heritages or communities within Canada. In sociological terms, Canada’s multiculturalism policy does not support the development of the “institutional completeness” that ethnic relations researchers have shown to be necessary for socialization into and replication of distinctive, separate ethnic communities. Yet articulate critics, such as the novelist Neil Bissoondath, have railed at the policy for encouraging ethnic separateness that diminishes the potential for individual self-realization and achievement. Others, like the literary theorist Himani Bannerji, claim that the categories of ethno-cultural identity are state-made and diminish the collective capacity to resist dominant political and economic agencies. Thus both individualists and collectivists have condemned multiculturalism (Bissoondath 2000; Bannerji 2000). By contrast, we argue, following such exponents of multiculturalism as Kymlicka, that the Canadian policy of multiculturalism is decidedly integrationist in the sense that it aims to accommodate ethnic diversity only within common institutions. For example, affirmative action programs are aimed at increasing the number of ethnic immigrants in public institutions and encouraging greater inter-group contact and cooperation. Likewise, the various other programs aim at in-

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creasing the level of comfort for members of ethnic groups as they participate in mainstream institutions and activities from the workplace to schools to public spaces. These multicultural initiatives are, of course, important changes from the policies and presuppositions of Canada in the first half of the twentieth century, which cultivated or enforced assimilation through a model of anglo-conformity or the “melting pot” goal. The distinctive goal of multiculturalism is, in the words of its proponent, Will Kymlicka, “to allow people to identify themselves in public with their ethnic group, if they wish to do so, without fear that this will disadvantage or stigmatize them.” In so doing, it seeks to make “the possession of an ethnic identity an acceptable, even normal, part of life in mainstream Canadian society.”

assessment Multiculturalism may not yet be the engine of toleration its defenders often claim. But neither is it a runaway train of cultural relativism. One critic, political scientist V. Seymour Wilson, contended that the “polyethnic” society can only realize its democratic goals when a “tapestry” vision replaces the “mosaic” (Wilson 1993). But that goal may well require a new understanding of the very units that make up a society and a state system. This would mean new ways of thinking about the nation-state that would replace territorial units with cultural ones, and that agenda, despite the efforts of some critical thinkers, seems far from the public agenda (McRoberts 2001). In recent decades, Canada has been a world leader in accepting ethnically diverse populations. This diversity has been particularly shown as the flow of immigrants has shifted from across the Atlantic to across the Pacific. A review of the social landscape shows that, despite this shift, the Canadian record in terms of immigrant adaptation and social integration has been strong. The foundation for this record of achievement has been related to recruitment (i.e. immigration policy) on the one hand, and incorporation (i.e. multiculturalism policy) on the other. Our review of these policies provides a sense of their emergence and intention.

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At the outset, we noted that this discussion of recent immigrants spoke to only one dimension of ethnic diversity in Canada. The record for recognizing and accommodating the ethnic diversity related to Aboriginals and the people of Quebec is not as impressive. The appreciation of how the case of recent immigrants differs from that of these other ethnically diverse populations can be clarified through a conceptual typology (Berry 1998). The Canadian attempts at the social incorporation of recent immigrants and Aboriginals and the people of Quebec represent two very different types of cases. Conceptually, it is possible to identify these cases as different cells in a four-fold typology characterizing social incorporation. The two dimensions establishing the matrix would include answers to the questions: 1 Does the ethnic community value maintaining its cultural distinctiveness and identity? 2 Does the ethnic community value maintaining relationships with the larger society? If simple binary responses are provided to these questions, four possibilities emerge, including: • • • •

Accommodation Assimilation Separation/Segregation Marginalization

(Yes, Yes) (No, Yes) (Yes, No) (No, No)

Employing this typology, it is possible to think of the immigrationbased, multiculturalism-supported, social incorporation of recent immigrants to Canada as an instance of successful “Accommodation.” By contrast, it would appear that the experience of Aboriginal peoples and French Canadians, particularly those residing in Quebec, is quite different, and not of the Assimilation type. Current conceptions of multiculturalism policy do not hold an adequate answer for the accommodation of non-immigrant populations for the reason that

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Aboriginal and French Canadian/Quebecois peoples are categorically different from ethnic immigrants. Specifically, Aboriginal people and the Quebecois are national minorities who increasingly define themselves as having the potential historical, linguistic, political, judicial, religious, and other institutional requirements to be self-governing on distinct territory. In sociological terms, such national minorities have potentially distinctive social systems to support their distinctive cultural systems. Ethnic immigrants do not have this structural capacity, and multiculturalism policy, as we have seen, does not support initiatives to obtain such social resources. If Aboriginal and Quebecois Canadians are to build on their capacities for self-determination, what might it take to move them from Separation/Segregation towards Accommodation? One answer is in a revised form of Canadian federalism. Currently, the predominant conception of federalism in Canada is what has been called “territorial federalism,” in which federalism is used to provide a single national community with a means of dividing and diffusing power in which the units have equivalent shares. For Aboriginals and the Quebecois, who are national minorities intent on acquiring enhanced institutions of self-government and powers of self-determination, this form of federalism is unappealing. It is quite plausible that an asymmetrical form of federalism will be viewed as better accommodating their interests. The identification of “special status” for national minorities (e.g. francophones or Quebeckers) led to ferocious political battles between the 1960s and 1990s, but in 2006 the Canadian Parliament recognized Quebec as a “distinct society” with considerable national support. It seems possible, however, that the continued social incorporation of ethnic diversity in Canada will require giving further consideration to more flexible forms of federal government. Over time, Canada has found a worthwhile and popular model for accommodating ethnic diversity that is rooted in immigration, but is still struggling to find an adequate method of accommodating its settled national minorities.

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notes 1 See Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act summary. Available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/ english/irpa/. 2 Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Self-Assessment Guide. Available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/applications/guides/EG74.html#wp771068. Accessed 17 May 2008. 3 See Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Temporary Foreign Workers. Available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/irpa/fs-workers.html. 4 Statutes of Canada, 1960, Bill C-44: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-12.3/.

references Avery, Donald. 1995. Reluctant Host: Canada’s Response to Immigrant Workers, 1896-1994. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. Backhouse, Constance. 1999. Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada 1900-1950. Toronto: The Osgoode Society. Badets, Jane and Linda Howatson-Leo. 2000. “Recent Immigrants in the Workforce,” in Statistics Canada, Canadian Social Trends. Vol. 3. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing. Balakrishnan, T.R. and John Kralt. 1987. “Segregation and Visible Minorities in the Metropolitan Areas of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver,” in Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities, ed. L. Driedger, 138–57. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman. Balakrishnan, T.R. and K. Selvanathan. 1990. “Ethnic Residential Segregation in Metropolitan Canada,” in Ethnic Demography, Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, ed. S. Halli, F. Travato, and L. Driedger, 399–414. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. Bannerji, Himani. 2000. The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press. Barrett, Stanley. 1987. Is God A Racist? Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Beaujot, Roderic. 1996. Metropolis Literature Review: The Demographic Perspective. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Bellay, Susan. 2001. Pluralism and Race/Ethnic Relations in Canadian Social Science, 1880-1939. Unpublished PhD dissertation, History, University of Manitoba. Berry, John W. 1998. “Social psychological costs and benefits of multiculturalism: A View from Canada,” Trames 2 (52/47): 209–33. Bibby, Reginald. 1990 Mosaic Madnes: Pluralism Without a Cause. Toronto: Stoddart. Bissoondath, Neil. 1994. Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada. Toronto: Penguin. Black, Jerome. 1990. “Ethnic Minorities and Mass Politics in Canada: Some Observations in the Toronto Setting,” International Journal of Canadian Studies 3: 129–51. Black, Jerome and Aleem Lakhani. 1997. “Ethnoracial Diversity in the House of Commons,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 1: 1–21. Bloom, D.E., G. Grenier, and M. Gunderson. 1995. “The Changing Labour Market Position of Canadian Immigrants,” Canadian Journal of Economics 38 (46): 987–1005. Bouchard, Gérard and Charles Taylor. 2008. Building for the Future: A Time for Reconciliation. Quebec: Gouvernement du Québec. Boyd, Monica. 2009. “Language at Work: The Impact of Linguistic Enclaves on Immigrant Economic Integration,” Canadian Labour Market and Skills Research Network, Working Paper No. 41, September. – 1992. “Gender, Visible Minority, and Immigrant Earnings Inequality: Reassessing and Employment Equity Premise,” in Deconstructing a Nation: Immigration, Multiculturalism, and Racism in 1990s in Canada, ed. V. Satzewich, 279–322. Halifax: Fernwood. – 1981. “Status Attainment in Canada: Findings of the Canadian Mobility Study,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 18: 657–73. Boyd, Monica, J. DeVries, and K. Simkin. 1994. “Language, Economic Status and Integration: Australia and Canada Compared,” in Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared, ed. H. Adelman, 549–77. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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Breton, Raymond, et al. 1990. Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Brym, Robert J. 2004. New Society. Toronto: Thompson Nelson. – 1993. “The Rise and Decline of Canadian Jewry,” in The Jews in Canada, ed. R. Brym, 22–38. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Burnet, Jean R. and Howard Palmer. 1988. Coming Canadians: An Introduction to a History of Canada’s Peoples. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. Chui, Tina, J. Curtis, and R. Lambert. 1991. “Immigrant Background and Political Participation: Examining Generational Patterns,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 16 (4): 375–96. Citizenship and Immigration Canada. 1997. A Stronger Canada: 1998 Annual Immigration Plan. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Cook, Ramsay. 1995. Canada, Quebec, and the Uses of Nationalism. Second Edition. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. Cross, William. 2009. “A New Chair in Parliamentary Democracy at Carleton University,” Canadian Parliamentary Review 32 (2): 38–42. Davies, Scott and Neil Guppy. 1998. “Race and Canadian Education,” in Racism and Social Inequality in Canada, ed. Vic Satzewich, 131–56. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing. Dei, George. 1996. Anti-Racism Education: Theory and Practice. Halifax: Fernwood Books. Denzin, Norman. 1989. The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. De Silva, A. and D.L. Palmer. 1994. “A Reply to Reitz,” Policy Options 15: 3–7. DeVries, John. 1992. Becoming Canadian Citizens: An Analysis of Trends Among Immigrants in Twenty Six Countries. Ottawa: Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada. DeVoretz, Don and Sergiy Pivnenko. 2005. “The Economic Causes and Consequences of Canadian Citizenship,” PCERII, Vol. 6, No. 3–4: 435–68. Dickason, Olive Patricia. 2002. Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times. Third Edition. Don Mills: Oxford Canada.

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Dinovitzer, Ronit, John Hagan, and Ron Levi. 2009. “Immigration and Youthful Illegalities in a Global Edge City,” Social Forces 88 (1): 337–72. Driedger, Leo and Glen Church. 1974. “Residential Segregation and Institutional Completeness: A Comparison of Ethnic Communities,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 11: 30–2. Economic Council of Canada. 1991. New Faces in the Crowd: Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services. Ferguson, Barry, Simon Langlois, and Lance Roberts. 2009. “Social Cohesion in Canada,” in The Tocqueville Review/La revue Tocqueville 30 (2): 69–104. Galarneau, Dianne and Rene Morissette. 2004. “Immigrants: Settling for Less,” Statistics Canada Perspectives on Labour and Income 5 (6): 5–16. Gauld, Greg. 1992. “Multiculturalism: The Real Thing,” in Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes & Failures, ed. S. Hryniuk, 9–16. Winnipeg: St. John’s College Press. Goldman, Gustave. 2009. “Intermarriage Among Jews in Canada: A Demographic Perspective,” in Jewish Intermarriage Around the World, ed. S. Reinharz and S. Della Pergola, 105–14. New Brunswick: Transaction. Gordon, Robert and J. Nelson. 1996. “Crime, Ethnicity and Immigration,” in Crime in Canadian Society, ed. R. Silverman, J. Teevan, and V. Sacco, 234–44. Toronto: Harcourt Brace. Gwyn, Richard. 1997. Rediscovering Our Citizenship. Toronto: The Dominion Institute. Harrison, Brian. 1990. Measures of Mother Tongue Vitality for Non-Official Languages in Canada. Ottawa: Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada. Harrison, Brian and L. Marmen. 1994. Languages in Canada. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Hawkins, Freda. 1991. Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared. Second Edition. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. – 1972. Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Hebert, Daniel. 2009. “Exploring Minority Enclave Areas in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver,” in Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Research Reports ([email protected]).

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Henry, Frances, Carol Tator, Winston Mattis, and Tim Rees. 1995. The Colour of Democracy. Toronto: Harcourt Brace. Henry, Frances and E. Ginsberg. 1985. Who Gets Work? A Test of Racial Discrimination. Toronto: Urban Alliance on Race Relations. Hiller, Harry. 2000. Canadian Society: A Macro Analysis. Toronto: Prentice Hall. Howe, B. and D. Johnson. 2000. Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Hou, Feng and T.R. Balakrishnan. 1996. “The Integration of Visible Minorities in Contemporary Canadian Society,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 21 (3): 307–26. Isajiw, W.W. 1990. “Ethnic Identity Retention,” in Ethnic Identity and Equality, ed. R. Breton, 34–91. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kallen, Evelyn. 1982. “Multiculturalism: Ideology, Policy and Reality,” Journal of Canadian Studies 17 (1): 51–63. Kelley, Ninette and Michael Trebilcock. 1998 and 2010. The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kinsella, Warren. 2001. Web of Hate: Inside Canada’s Far-Right Network. Second Edition. Toronto: HarperCollins. Knowles, Valerie. 1997. Forging Our Legacy: Canadian Citizenship and Immigration 1900-1997. Available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/legacy/acknowledge.html. Accessed 15 May 2004. Kymlicka, Will. 1998. Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Lautard, Hugh and Neil Guppy. 1999. “Revisiting the Vertical Mosaic: Occupational Stratification Among Canadian Ethnic Groups,” in Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, ed. P.S. Li, 219–52. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Li, Peter 1996a. The Making of Post-War Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. – 1996b. Literature Review on Immigration: Sociological Perspectives. Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada. – 1988. Ethnic Inequality in a Class Society. Toronto: Wall and Thompson. Linteau, Paul-Andre et al. 1991. Quebec Since 1930. Toronto: Lorimer.

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Loewen, Royden and Gerald Friesen. 2009. Immigrants in Prairie Cities: Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth Century Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. McRoberts, Kenneth. 2001. “Canada and the Multinational State,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 34 (4): 23–54. Milan, Anne, Helene Maheux, and Tina Chui. 2010. “A Portrait of Couples in Mixed Unions,” Canadian Social Trends 89. Moghadam, F. 1994. “Ethnic Segregation in a Multicultural Society: A Review of Recent Trends in Montreal and Toronto, and a Reconceptualization of Causal Factors,” in The Changing Canadian Metropolis, Vol. 1, ed. F. Frisken, 237–58. Toronto: Canadian Urban Institute. Olson, S.H. and A.L. Kobayashi. 1993. “The Emerging Ethnocultural Mosaic,” in The Changing Social Geography of Canadian Cities, ed. L.S. Bourne and D.F. Levy. Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Pal, Leslie A. 1993. Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism, and Feminism in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press. Palmer, Howard. 1982. Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. – 1976. “Reluctant Hosts: Anglo-Canadian Views of Multiculturalism in the Twentieth Century,” in Readings in Canadian History. Fifth Edition, ed. R.D. Francis and D.B. Smith, 125–40. Toronto: Harcourt Brace. Peck, Gunther. 2000. Reinventing Free Labour: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American West, 1880-1930. New York: Cambridge University Press. Porter, John. 1965. The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ryan, Phil. 2010. Multicultiphobia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Reitz, Jeffrey. 1993. “Statistics on Racial Discrimination in Canada,” Policy Options 14: 32–6. – 1988. “The Institutional Structure of Immigration as a Determinant of Interracial Competition: A Comparison of Britain and Canada,” International Migration Review 22: 117–36. Rempel, Gwen. 2000. Making Canadians: Citizenship Education and the

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Manitoba Public School Curriculum, 1916-1927. Unpublished M.A. thesis, History, University of Manitoba. Shawcross, William. 2000. Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict. New York: Simon & Schuster. Statistics Canada. 1996. Census: Nation Series. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science, and Technology. Stoffman, Daniel. 2002. Who Gets In? Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter, and Ross. Sutherland, Neil. 1997. Growing Up: Childhood in English Canada from the Great War to the Age of Television. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Symons, Gladys L. 2002. “The State and Ethnic Diversity: Structural and Discursive Change in Quebec’s Ministre d’Immigration,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 34 (3): 28–46. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman, 25–73. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Walker, James W. 1997. “Race,” Right, and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. Walks, R. Alan and Larry S. Bourne. 2006. “Ghettos in Canada’s Cities? Racial Segregation, Ethnic Enclaves, and Poverty Concentration in Canadian Urban Areas,” in The Canadian Geographer/Le Geographe canadien 50 (3): 273–97. Walters, David, Kelli Phythian, and Paul Anisef. 2007. “The Acculturation of Immigrants: Determinants of Ethnic Identification with the Host Society,” Canadian Review of Sociology. 44(1): 37–64. Ward, W. Peter. 1990. White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Weinfeld, Morton. 1994. “Ethnic Assimilation and the Retention of Ethnic Cultures,” in Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape, ed. J. Berry and J. Laponce, 238–663. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. White, Stephen, Neil Nevitte, et al. 2008. “The Political Resocialization of

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Immigrants: Resistance or Lifelong Learning?,” Political Research Quarterly 61 (2): 268–81. Wilson, V. Seymour. 1993. “The Tapestry Vision of Canadian Multiculturalism,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26 (4): 645–69. Worts, Diana and M. Boyd. 2006. “Merging Ethnicities: Shifting Patterns of Ethnic Intermarriage across Immigrant Generations.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Montreal.

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2 The United States: Changing Recognition of Racial and Ethnic Diversity louis hicks and paul kingston

Race has been famously and aptly called the “American dilemma” (Myrdal 1944). Indeed in comparison to European nations, America’s racial and ethnic history is very distinctive. As a legacy of slavery, the United States has had a large oppressed racial minority ever since the nation’s founding. Moreover, voluntary immigrants from almost every corner of the world have swelled the US minority population in various phases throughout American history. For Europeans, “race and ethnic problems” tend to be more recent and are the result of concentrated flows of immigration into relatively homogeneous host populations. America’s dilemma is not the European or Canadian future – too much is distinctive; path dependency is operative. Yet by following the shared format of the national reports in this volume, we hope to contribute to the lessons that can be derived from comparative research – in particular, what truly is distinctive and what is common. In this chapter, we focus on what have been considered “racial groups” in America after the Second World War. This means Whites, Blacks, Asians, Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and Hispanics. These are social designations that have come to have social consequences, not biological distinctions. Indeed, the category “Hispanic” (a Census Bureau creation, as we later explain) makes no claim to demarcating a race, but in practical effect it functions as a racial category in government policy and to a much lesser extent as a social boundary. (We often refer to “racial and ethnic” distinctions to reflect the dis-

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tinctive base of the Hispanic population, but for the purpose of convenience, we discuss “race” in terms of the six large aggregations used in Census Bureau reports). This focus implies an obvious exclusion: ethnic differentiation within the White population. Considered in terms of national origins, the diversity of this population is tremendous, notwithstanding the prevalence of immigrants of British/Irish or German stock. We exclude White ethnic groups because the internal differentiation of the European American population is so much less socially significant than “racial” differentiation. No current national social policy is predicated on the assumption that any White ethnic group represents a “social problem” and that it warrants special consideration in law or administrative practice.1 This situation is reflected in the near exclusion of separate White ethnic groupings in government statistics. In some social settings, different White ethnic identifications can be consequential, but more often ethnic identification is a selectively invoked self-designation linked to secondary cultural expression. On St. Patrick’s Day, for example, we can see “the twilight of ethnicity” (Alba 1990, 1985) as the holiday is celebrated by actual Irish-Americans and an even larger number of “honorary Irish Americans for a day.” In the first part of this chapter, we examine a number of trends that are pertinent to an overall sense of the trajectory and emerging pattern of race and ethnic relations. In the second part, we focus on analytically characterizing the current pattern and provide a broad overview of policies to redress America’s dilemma, with a special concern for the implications of America’s new racial diversity.

social indicators and trends Proportion of Different Ethnic Minorities Any effort to report the proportional representation of ethnic minorities is necessarily contentious. Not only is the meaning of ethnicity contested, but relevant government statistics are conceptually incoherent. Current official government statistics – primarily based on the decen-

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nial census and the annual Current Population Surveys (CPS) – focus on six main groups that in some sense represent a “racial” or “ethnic” grouping, or what may be viewed as an “ethno-racial” grouping. These six groups are: White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and Hispanic. Hispanics further designate themselves as belonging to one of the other racial groups. This official categorization has been shaped by evolving political pressures and bureaucratic interests more than by concerns for analytical value. This is not the place to settle sociological disputes about the meanings of ethnicity and race, or even to fully critique their official operational indicators. Rather, let us simply note that we generally use the six-group categorization because that is the form in which most relevant data are presented. (Some available data use more refined categories; other data are not disaggregated even to this level). This pragmatic decision does not contradict the fact that broad designations such as “Hispanic” (essentially a Census Bureau creation) have uncertain sociological meaning, or that, because of intermarriage, many people are not readily placed within the demarcations that constitute what Lind (1995) has called “official Multicultural America.” Analysts have frequently noted obvious ambiguities and inadequacies in these official categories. The category of “Black” includes recent Caribbean immigrants and multi-generation African Americans, often themselves internal immigrants from the South to the North. The category of “Hispanic” includes people largely united by a common heritage in Spanish-speaking, Catholic countries but differing widely in appearance and resources. But immigrants from the largest country in Latin America, Brazil, would technically not be considered Hispanic because the main language of Brazil is Portuguese, not Spanish. The category of “Asian” includes disproportionately successful descendants of Japanese immigrants as well as poor immigrants from Cambodia. “Pacific Islander” refers to numerically small groups of people such as the descendants of the original inhabitants of the island of Hawaii. Immigrants from Middle Eastern or North African countries do not readily fit into this categorization at all. They are “White, non-Hispanic” ac-

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cording to the Census Bureau, but it is likely that few Arab Americans regard themselves merely as members of the American majority, rather than members of a minority group within the United States. When relevant and possible, we will note how the limitations of the official scheme limit our portrayal of particular social trends. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that these crude designations are sociologically consequential. The fact that these categories and not others are administratively legitimate, legally meaningful, and prominently displayed means that they shape collective understandings of the “racial problem” – and thus policy responses to it. As fascinating as the long history of American racial classification may be, we will restrict ourselves to noting a few facts about the post1970 system. Perhaps most notable, since the start of mail distribution of census forms in 1970, is the fact that racial designations are made by the respondents themselves. The upshot is that, at least for census purposes, “race” is a matter of self-perception and is not determined by externally imposed criteria. (From 1970 to 1990 there was a threefold increase in the number of American Indians, an increase far in excess of any possible natural demographic growth). The self-designation approach has been especially consequential for defining the “Hispanic” population because the objective indicators were so problematic. In the 2000 Census, respondents to the ethnicity question were asked whether they were of “Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or Other Spanish/Hispanic” origin. In previous censuses, the terms “Spanish/Hispanic” or “Mexican” were used. The decennial censuses differentially undercount some subpopulations, particularly males from minority groups. One estimate suggests, for example, that the 1990 Census did not count 8.5 per cent of Black men and 2.5 per cent of non-Black men. These undercounts have generated political controversy because localities with high minority populations have charged that they have been short-changed in populationbased allocations of government funds. Even so, demographers accept the data as adequate to represent the main trends in the racial and ethnic composition of the population. The American racial and ethnic composition is in flux. As of 1 July 2002, the racial distribution was 81 per cent White, 13 per cent

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Table 2.1 Racial and Ethnic Distribution of US Population (per cent) One race

Year

White

Black

American Indian

Asian

Pacific Islander

Some other race

Two or more races

2000 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950

75.1 80.3 83.1 87.7 88.8 89.4

12.3 12.1 11.7 11.3 10.6 9.9

0.9 0.8 0.6 1.5 1.1 0.6

3.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

0.1 2.9 1.5 N/A N/A N/A

5.5 3.9 3.0 N/A N/A N/A

2.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Sources: 2000: Statistical Abstract 2001, 24; 1990 and 1980: Statistical Abstract 1993, 18; and 1950–1970: Caplow, Bahr et al. (1994, 493).

Black, 1 per cent American Indian, 4 per cent Asian, 0.1 per cent Pacific Islander, and 1.4 per cent “multi-racial.” Hispanics, who may be of any race, are 13 per cent of the population (Statistical Abstract 2003, 13). In the earlier half of the twentieth century, non-Hispanic Whites represented more than 80 per cent of the population. In 2002, they were 68 per cent of the population; projections into the middle of this century indicate that non-Hispanic Whites will represent just over half of the US population. The declining proportion of Whites reflects the rapidly increasing proportion of Hispanics, as shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The percentage of Blacks held relatively constant throughout the 1900s (10–12 per cent), and projections suggest little change. Of course, long-term projections are always suspect, and indeed, the categorizations on which they are based may change in the face of new understandings of the distinctions that are sociologically meaningful. Even so, short-term projections strongly indicate that Hispanics will soon be the largest minority group and that the Asian population will continue to grow rapidly. At least since 1970, it has been misleading to think of America’s racial condition as just a matter of Blacks and Whites. And looking ahead, it will be ever less so. The reality of a multi-ethnic America will be grounded in the hard facts of a socio-demographic transformation.

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Table 2.2 Hispanic Proportion of US Population (per cent) Year

Hispanic

Non-Hispanic

2000 1990 1980 1950

13.4 9.0 6.5 2.5

86.6 91.0 93.5 97.5

Sources: 2000, Census Factfile website; 1980, 1990: Heaton, Chadwick, and Jacobson (2000, 3); 1950: Shinagawa and Jang (1998, 75).

Because of their increasing prominence, a few additional words about that disparate category “Hispanics” are in order. Since 1970 a majority have Mexican origins – 50 per cent in 1970 and 58 per cent in 2000. Puerto Ricans constitute the second largest group – 15 per cent and 10 per cent in these years. About 4 per cent of Hispanics have origins in Cuba. Most of the remaining Hispanics – 28 per cent in 2000 – trace their origins to Central and South America as well as to the other islands of the Caribbean. It is also important to bear in mind that about 90 per cent of Hispanics identify themselves as “White” rather than “Black.” This proportion has not changed markedly in the past fifty years and is not expected to change in the coming decades. Immigration and Emigration Rates by Ethnic Groups The oft-told tale is that America is a land of immigrants. True enough, but it is worth highlighting that immigration has been both voluntary and involuntary, has come in surges throughout American history, and at various times has incorporated different ethnic and racial groups into the population. The “involuntary immigrants” represent the Africans brought to the US in the slave trade. In this chapter, we focus on twentieth-century immigration and its effects on race and ethnicity in the United States. Between 1971 and 1995, the US admitted about 17.1 million immigrants, including 1.6 million formerly unauthorized aliens and 1.1 mil-

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lion Special Agricultural Workers. In absolute numbers, this recent surge of immigrants approximated that size of immigration between 1900 and 1925. However, because of the increased size of the American population, the proportional impact was greater in the earlier period. For example, in 1910 the foreign-born proportion of the US population was 14.7 per cent; in 2000 it was 11.1 per cent (Statistical Abstract 2003, 48). Recent newcomers have different origins from the turn of the century immigrants, who were primarily from Southern and Eastern Europe. Almost nine out of ten immigrants since 1965 have come from the Americas (excluding Canada) and Asia, with Hispanics outnumbering Asians. For the first time there are sizeable numbers of voluntary immigrants from Africa. The top five sending countries in recent years have been: Mexico (20 per cent of legal admissions since the 1980s), the Philippines, China/Taiwan, the Dominican Republic, and India. The impact of immigration on population growth is substantial, accounting for more than a third of total growth over the last three decades. Immigrants come to the US with highly diverse skills, although average skill levels still lag considerably behind those of the native population. The overall distribution of immigrants by skill level has been bimodal since at least the 1965 immigration law change. That is, immigrants to America tend to be either highly skilled professionals (e.g. physicians and computer scientists from India) or low-skilled (agricultural workers and construction labourers from Mexico). The overall effect of immigration since 1965 on the racial and ethnic structure of the US has been to increase the Asian and Hispanic proportions, since most immigrants come from countries in Asia or in Central and South America. Emigration from the US has been exceptionally low over the past fifty years. The emigration rates of most minority groups have likewise been low – the emigration rate of Native Americans is practically zero. Hispanic immigrants are a crucial exception to the pattern of non-emigration. Many Hispanic immigrants travel back and forth to their country of origin many times before either settling permanently in the US or returning home permanently. Many Hispanic immigrants (especially

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Mexicans) view America as a temporary work location in which to accumulate capital by saving money from wages earned while working there (Massey 1987). To a much greater degree than other minority groups, Hispanic Americans often return to their country of origin. In a temporal twist on the pattern, many Cuban Americans hope to return to Cuba after the end of the Castro regime. Regional Distribution of Ethnic Groups The various ethnic and racial groups in the US are unevenly distributed across the country. These distributions are the result of geographic proximity, the varied histories of the groups, and mobility opportunities in the past. As late as 1940, Blacks in the US were overwhelmingly concentrated in the states of the former Confederacy – the southeast quarter of the country. War industries desperate for workers recruited hundreds of thousands of Blacks to work in plants all over the country. This dispersed Blacks from the South into other regions, especially the industrial mid-West (e.g. Illinois and Michigan), the Northeast (e.g. Pennsylvania and New York), and to California. It should be noted that this was also a migration from rural areas to cities (especially in the cases of Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles). The Black population is unusual in the US in that it is concentrated both in rural and urban areas, but dramatically under-represented in the suburbs, where the majority of Whites live. In the decades after the Second World War, Blacks continued to migrate out of the South and into other regions of the country, chiefly into the areas noted above. However, Blacks remain over-represented in the South and under-represented in most other states. In 1990, just over half of all Blacks lived in the South (Shinagawa and Jang 1998, 24). The Asian and Pacific Islander distribution was heavily influenced by immigration. The vast majority of Asians and Pacific Islanders entered the country on the West coast, especially California, and this re-

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Table 2.3 Total Fertility Rate (average births per woman) by Race and Ethnicity, 1950–1996 Year

Total US

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

American Indian

1996 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950

2.03 2.08 1.84 2.43 3.61 3.03

1.80 1.85 1.77 2.34 3.51 2.95

2.20 2.55 2.18 3.10 4.54 3.58

3.05 2.96 2.53 N/A N/A N/A

1.91 2.00 1.95 2.18 N/A N/A

2.03 2.18 2.16 2.72 N/A N/A

Note: Some data is averaged for multiple years. For 1950 and 1960, Black is actually Non-White. Source: Sandefur et al. (2001, 64).

mains true today. While there has been considerable dispersion of the population, the Asian and Pacific Islander population is still concentrated in just three states: California, New York, and Hawaii. The geographic distribution of Hispanic Americans is most heavily influenced by the long border that the US shares with Mexico. Indeed, the first large “migration” of Hispanics to the US occurred when that border was shifted hundreds of miles as the US slowly conquered about half of what had been Mexican territory (roughly, the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) during the nineteenth century. Since 1950, Hispanics have dispersed only slowly from these areas and remain heavily concentrated there. In addition, two new concentrations, one in New York and another in Florida, have appeared. The New York concentration formed primarily due to large immigration from the US commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Florida concentration was created by immigration from Cuba and other islands in the Caribbean (Shinagawa and Jang 1998, 76). Native Americans are concentrated in the West. California and Oklahoma hold the largest numbers of Native Americans, and New Mexico and Arizona have the third and fourth largest contingents. In recent decades, there has been some growth in the Native American proportion in the South. Native Americans are also the most rural of the official groups in the US, partly because many still live on reservations

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and tribal lands that are almost entirely undeveloped (Shinagawa and Jang 1998, 97–8). Participation in Different Spheres of Society family Fertility Rate Besides immigration, the largest factor in the changing racial and ethnic composition of the US has been the different fertility of the various sub-groups. From 1950 to 1996, the Total Fertility Rate (tfr) of American women fell from 3.03 to 2.03, with a “Baby Boom” peak of 3.61 in between (in 1960). This represented a decline of over 30 per cent in overall fertility, and, more significantly, a drop below the “replacement level” of 2.1 children per woman. The Black tfr fell more sharply than the White rate: from 3.58 in 1950 to 2.20 in 1996. Still, Black children were relatively more numerous than White children throughout the last half century and this has had the effect of modestly raising the Black proportion within the entire population. Separate figures for the Hispanic tfr do not begin until 1980, when it was 2.53. Since then, it has risen to 3.05 while all other groups’ fertility rates have been declining. This large, anomalous increase in fertility is without a doubt due to the arrival in the 1980s and 1990s of Hispanic immigrants from countries with even higher tfrs. The influx of Hispanic immigrants with much higher tfrs (4–6) was only partially offset by declining tfrs among second-generation and later-generation Hispanic Americans. The tfr of Asian Americans fell from 2.40 in 1965 to 1.91 in 1996. This represents convergence with the overall population pattern and then some further decline. The continuing low fertility of Asians is presumably related to their high levels of education and income (a pattern seen within all the sub-groups and, indeed, throughout the world). The Native American tfr fell from 3.40 in 1965 to 2.03 in 1996. Beyond the usual explanatory factors in fertility decline, this was probably influenced by the wave of increased self-identification that occurred during the same time period when the number of Native Amer-

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Table 2.4 Married Proportion of Racial and Ethnic Groups, 1950–1995 (percentage) Year

Total US

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

American Indian

1995 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950

61 62 66 72 67 67

63 64 67 73 N/A N/A

43 46 51 67 63 64

59 62 66 62 62 59

N/A 59 61 65 N/A N/A

N/A 47 47 58 53 57

Source: Sandefur et al. (2001, 72–3).

icans tripled in about thirty years. As persons who had previously not identified themselves as Native Americans joined the population (at least statistically), the tfr declined because the newcomers were similar to the overall population. Family Composition The increasing difference between the compositions of Black and White families is perhaps the most socially consequential “racial division” in the United States. Throughout the population, for most of the second half of the century, the per cent married has fallen and the per cent divorced has dramatically increased. This general retreat from marriage is further marked by a substantial increase in the age of first marriage and increasing numbers of non-married cohabiting couples. However, this change has been very uneven across racial groups. In 1950, large majorities of adults from all ethnic groups were married; by 1995, 63 per cent of Whites and 59 per cent of Hispanics were married; only 43 per cent of Blacks were married, and 38 per cent had never been married. (These differences partially reflect the age structures of the groups, but the general pattern is evident in age-adjusted rates). Counter to common images of their unusual “familism,” Hispanics have followed the general trend away from traditional, lasting marriages. The recent trends among American Indians are difficult to track because of changes in self-identification within this population. However, throughout the last fifty years, a relatively higher proportion has been single and a relatively lower proportion has been married. The

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Table 2.5 Percentage of Children Living with Both Parents, by Racial and Ethnic Group, 1960–1995. Year

All US

White

Black

Hispanic Asian

American Indian

1995 1990 1980 1970 1960

69 73 77 85 89

76 79 83 89 –

33 38 42 58 67

63 67 75 78 –

– 55 58 69 –

82 84 89 89 –

Source: Sandefur et al. (2001, 78–9).

chief distinguishing characteristics of Asian Americans are later age of first marriage and lower divorce rates. Single-Parent Families Family life for children has become decidedly different because of increasing rates of divorce and childbearing outside of marriage (McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). Overall, the proportion of children under eighteen living with both parents declined from 89 per cent in 1960 to 69 per cent in 1995. For many decades, Black children have been less likely than White children to live with both parents, but by the mid-1990s they had distinctly different arrangements. About three quarters of White children lived with both parents; only a third of Black children did the same. Asian American families are the most likely to have two parents in the home, but even this proportion has dropped slightly in recent years. The proportion for Hispanics is intermediate between Whites and Blacks, though a considerable majority (63 per cent) lives with both parents – more like Whites than Blacks. education Educational Attainment Educational attainment remains significantly stratified by race, though the reduction in racial gaps is one of the nation’s most impressive developments in the latter half of the twentieth century. This reduction was achieved even as the educational attainment of the general population increased dramatically. Blacks are now approaching parity with Whites in high school graduation rates (94 per cent vs. 87 per cent); three decades earlier, the gap

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was 23 percentage points (82 per cent vs. 59 per cent). Hispanics (increasingly composed of recent immigrants) also notably increased their graduation rates, but they still lag behind Blacks and Whites. Among high school graduates, Black–White differences in college entrance are minimal, more than statistically “accounted for” by differences in family income. However, between 1971 and 2000, the proportion of young adults with a college degree increased more among Whites than Blacks. The result was that the racial gap in college completion increased. Young Blacks in 2000 had the same college completion rates of young Whites in 1971. College graduation remains a fairly unusual accomplishment for young Hispanics. Academic Performance Black-White disparities in both college attendance and completion reflect the large racial disparities in academic performance (scores on standardized tests of reading and mathematics). For recent cohorts, Blacks have notably higher college attendance rates than Whites with similar levels of prior academic achievement, and, among college attendees with similar prior achievement, Blacks earned degrees at a rate that matched or exceeded that of Whites. In light of these findings, the “test score gap” commands attention. Although the American debate about the role of education in generating equality has largely focused on degree attainment, it is now shifting to include concern for the racial gaps in academic achievement. These latter gaps have long been recognized but were generally considered too sensitive to discuss. Only recently have relevant data been prominently distributed and discussed. The publication of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray 1994), which strongly suggested a genetic basis for the gaps, prompted a more forthright acknowledgment of the problem – and, among social scientists, an ensuing general dismissal of genetic explanations of social phenomena. The Black-White Test Score Gap, edited by Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips (1998), illustrates both the new candour and the negative reaction to Herrnstein and Murray’s genetic explanations. Trends in racial disparities in academic achievement are difficult to summarize because patterns differ somewhat by age and subject matter. Yet reading scores for 17 year-olds on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (widely considered the best nationally adminis-

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Table 2.6 Black and Hispanic Male Wages as a Percentage of White Male Wages, 1940–2000. Year

Black

Hispanic

2000 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950 1940

75.2 74.5 72.6 64.4 57.5 55.2 43.3

61.9 67.3 70.7 73.7 70.2 73.8 64.2

Source: Statistical Abstract (2001, 621).

tered test of basic skills) illustrates the general broad pattern. In 1975, the racial gap was substantial: about 53 points (sd = 30). By 1999, that difference was substantially less at about 30 points. But virtually all of the progress on this front was achieved before 1990. Since then, racial gaps widened slightly and then narrowed slightly. To place the current gap in perspective, it is estimated that the average Black and Hispanic 17 year-old student has reading, mathematical, and scientific skills roughly equal to the average 13 year-old White student. Differences of this magnitude have important implications for efforts to reduce racial disparities in educational attainment and the labour market. economy Labour Market Segmentation From the beginning of the Second World War forward, barriers to minority involvement in various sectors of the labour force have fallen significantly. Minority participation in the professions has climbed steeply. As shown in Table 2.6, the wages of minority workers rose sharply as a proportion of White wages. In recent decades male Black progress in wages has slowed. The increase in male Hispanic relative wages stopped in 1970 and then reversed direction. This decline was undoubtedly caused by the influx of a large unskilled pool of Hispanic immigrants after 1970.

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Table 2.7 Median Household Income in Constant (2002) Dollars, by Racial and Ethnic Group, 1980– 2002. Year

All US

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

American Indian

2002 1990 1980

42,409 39,949 36,608

45,086 41,668 38,621

29,026 24,917 22,250

33,103 29,792 28,218

52,626 51,299 N/A

N/A N/A N/A

Percentage increase: 1980–2002

15.9

16.7

30.5

17.3

N/A

N/A

Source: Statistical Abstract (2004, 666).

Ethnic Enterprises The recent headline news was “MinorityOwned Firms Grow Four Times Faster than National Average” (United States Census Bureau, 2001). From 1992 to 1997 the number of minority-owned businesses grew from 2.1 million to 2.8 million. However, these businesses continue to represent a disproportionately small amount of US business activity: 15 per cent of all businesses and 3 per cent of all receipts. A vast majority of these firms are sole proprietorships. About one in five of these businesses had any paid employees, and only 4,400 had one hundred or more employees. Minority-owned businesses remain concentrated in the services and retail trade industries (59 per cent). Black-owned businesses get more of their revenue (12.8 per cent) from the government sector than White-owned businesses (6.1 per cent) (Boston 2001, 191). Entrepreneurial behaviour is especially pronounced within the Asian American community and much less so among the African American community. The number of Asian American-owned businesses approximately equals the number owned by Blacks and Hispanics. Reliable long-term trend data are not available. Average Household Income The median household income (in inflation-adjusted 2002 dollars) of all households in America rose by 16 per cent between 1980 and 2002 (from $36,608 to $42,409).

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The increase in the median income of Black households was considerably larger: 30 per cent. This continues a trend that has been running since at least the 1940s – a slow but steady increase in Black household income relative to that of Whites. However, in 2002, Black median household income was still only 68 per cent of White household income. This difference is caused by three main factors: higher unemployment among Blacks; lower wages and salaries; and fewer households with two earners because of a much smaller proportion of married-couple households with both partners in the labour force. (This is the modal pattern in the White population, but it is much less common in the Black population). Most scholars agree that the family composition factor is the most important one, but it is also true that the factors are not completely separable (e.g. higher unemployment rates lead to fewer marriages and more divorces, etc.). Asian Americans consistently have higher median household incomes than the White population. From 1990 – when statistics become available – to 2002, the Asian median income rose from $51,299 to $52,626 at which point it was 17 per cent higher than the White median income. Asian Americans on average have higher household incomes because of the reverse of the factors operating in the Black population: lower unemployment; higher wages and salaries; and more dual-earner households. Native American household income trends are roughly parallel to the trends in Black households: reaching about two-thirds of the average income for the whole population in 1990 (Shinagawa and Jang 1998, 101). The same three reasons are believed to be responsible, though the unemployment factor is even more important among Native Americans. The median income of Hispanic households increased only slightly from $28,218 in 1980 – when statistics become available – to $33,103 in 2002, a much slower growth rate than in the Black population. This sluggish growth is believed to have resulted primarily from the large influx of low-skilled immigrants during the 1980s and 1990s, whose wages are among the lowest in the US labour force.

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Table 2.8 Religious Activity and Perception, by Race (per cent)

Attends church at least monthly Prays at least once a day Considers self extremely or very religious

White

Black

Other

46 51 24

63 75 44

43 52 24

Source: Heaton, Chadwick, and Jacobson (2000, 272–82).

religion Religious Affiliation The US is religiously diverse, more so now than in the past, and this diversity has a distinct racial pattern. Blacks have long been strongly affiliated with Protestant churches, primarily Baptist. About three-quarters of Blacks name a Protestant church as their religious preference. The religious diversity within the White population largely reflects the arrival of Catholic immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe at the turn of the twentieth century, and to a much smaller extent, the arrival of East European Jews. Now, the main religious affiliations of the White population are about half Protestant, one quarter Catholic, and a small Jewish percentage. White Protestants are divided among a huge number of denominations, with Baptists being the most numerous. The recent increase in the Catholic population (now 23 per cent of the total population) largely reflects the influx of immigrants from Latin America. American Hispanics overwhelmingly identify with the Roman Catholic Church, although a vibrant Protestant movement has been gaining adherents in this ethnic group. The spectacular growth rates of other religions – especially Islam and Buddhism – are also attributable to new immigration patterns, but the relatively small absolute numbers involved have yet to substantially transform the religious landscape. Religious Participation Religious participation varies considerably between Whites, Blacks, and other ethnic groups, as illustrated in Table 2.8. The standard explanation for the greater religious participation rates of Blacks in America is that under conditions of slavery, and then seg-

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regation, churches assumed an expanded role in the Black community because of restrictions on Black participation in other institutions. This has been known as the “semi-involuntary thesis” for some fifty years and remains at least partially viable today (Hunt and Hunt 2001, 606). politics Naturalization Rates The naturalization rates of racial and ethnic minorities in the US are less important than in other countries for two reasons. First, US citizenship is conferred automatically on all children born on US soil. Thus, even if immigrants are not naturalized, their children born after arrival become citizens automatically. This feature of the US Constitution has prevented the recent development of any sub-populations that lack citizenship for more than one generation. Second, two US minority groups, Native Americans and Blacks, do not contain significant numbers of recent immigrants; they are all citizens of the US. Among Asians and Hispanics, however, naturalization rates are important, at least for the first generation. Naturalization is relatively easy to obtain. The basic requirements for a legal resident to obtain citizenship include: •

•

• • • • •

a period of continuous residence and physical presence in the United States residence in a particular INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] District prior to filing an ability to read, write, and speak English a knowledge and understanding of US history and government good moral character attachment to the principles of the US Constitution favourable disposition towards the United States.

In practice, these are rather simple requirements. They are even waived (except for “good moral character”) for some categories of residents, such as spouses of US citizens. Ethnic Voting Patterns Racial comparisons of voting behaviour have become meaningful only in the post-Civil Rights era. Prior to the

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Voting Rights Act of 1965, about 7 per cent of Blacks in Mississippi were registered to vote; by 1967, the figure approached 60 per cent. The recent Black-White gap in voter registration is fairly small (6 percentage points), but is actually double what it had been a decade earlier. The gap between Whites and both Latinos and Asians is much larger – 33 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. Again, for both minority groups, registration rates had slightly declined. The pattern for voting rates largely parallels that for registration. The upshot is that large majorities of minority groups do not vote. Racial differences in voting choice are also significant. While Whites tend to split their votes fairly evenly between the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates (the Republican being recently favoured), Blacks, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, are strongly in the Democratic camp. Indeed, counting on a solid Black bloc is a staple of Democratic political strategy. The Hispanic vote has shown some fissures, with the relatively affluent Cuban American community being receptive to Republican appeals. Much like Whites, Asian American voters have divided political allegiances. Ethnicity of Government Leaders Since 1950, the ethnic background of the US Congress has become more like that of the population as a whole because of the entrance of numerous members from minority groups. However, some groups have been much more successful than other groups. Black Americans in 2005 were a significant fraction (about 9 per cent) of the House of Representatives, but a much smaller proportion of the Senate (1 per cent). Senators are elected from states that tend to be much larger than House districts and therefore have population characteristics that are closer to national averages. Only a handful of Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans have served in Congress, though their numbers today are at record highs. Dr. Condoleezza Rice, a Black American, was the Secretary of State during the presidency of George W. Bush. However, very few ethnic minorities have served at the senior executive level of government. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 as the first Black President of the United States is a significant exception of great historical importance; it remains to be seen what impact his election will

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Table 2.9 State and Federal Prison Admissions, Racial Proportions, 1950–1995 (per cent) Year

White

Black

Other Race

1995 1990 1980 1970 1960 1950

51 48 58 61 66 69

48 51 41 39 32 30

1 1 1 N/A 2 1

Source: Hawkins (2001, 43).

have on the future composition of the senior executive level of government. In the other branches of the Federal Government, minority group representation is a complicated pattern. There has been an unofficial “black seat” on the Supreme Court (the highest court in the US) since Thurgood Marshall took his seat in 1967. Minorities have reached the top levels of the US armed forces: General Colin Powell (Black) as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Eric K. Shinseki (Asian) as Chief of Staff of the US Army; Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez (Hispanic) as Commander, Coalition Ground Forces in Iraq. However, as a general rule, minority group members are under-represented in the officer corps and over-represented in the enlisted ranks of the armed forces (Caplow, Hicks, and Wattenberg 2001, 203). The officer corps differential is typically explained by the paucity of minority group members with the required college degree; the enlisted differential is typically explained by the fairer employment situation offered to minorities by the US military relative to civilian labour markets.

social problems and perceptions criminality and violence Criminality Rates As shown in Table 2.9, Black Americans make up a disproportionate number of prison admissions in the US, and this disproportion has grown since 1950.

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Criminologists generally agree that this difference is caused by two powerful factors. First, Blacks commit a disproportionate share of the crimes that are punished by incarceration (especially assault, robbery, rape, and murder). Criminal victimization surveys consistently find that about a quarter of victims of violent crimes in the US report that their attacker was Black, while Blacks only make up about half that proportion of the population. Second, Black suspects and defendants are widely believed to be at a significant disadvantage at the various stages of the criminal justice processing system. Blacks are less likely to be able to post bail, they are much more likely to be defended at public expense, etc. There are also much heavier punishments for offenses that are more common among Blacks (crack cocaine) and lighter punishments for offenses that are more common among Whites (powder cocaine). Violent Incidents against Ethnic Groups Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans are more likely to suffer violence than the majority population. Asian Americans report less victimization than the majority population (Blank 2001, 35). This is true for homicides and other violent crimes. The long-term trend in all these rates since 1950 appears to be rather stable. ethnic identity and attitudes Attitudes Towards Ethnic Minorities Scholarly disputes about racial attitudes are sharp and often ideologically driven. Some scholars (e.g. Hacker 1992; Bell 1992; Feagin 1997) argue strongly that deep abiding racism is widespread in American society. Other scholars (e.g. Thernstrom 1997; Patterson 1997) argue just as strongly that there has been substantial progress in racial tolerance in recent decades. This dispute largely reflects the fact that the broad concept of “racial attitudes” involves multiple facets – and that trends related to each facet are not consistent. Here is not the place to dissect the complexities of this literature (see Bobo 2001), much less settle on the most fruitful conceptual framework or the most decisive indicators. We will simply allude to some data that illustrates the rationale for diverse interpretations. That said, we are inclined to think that too many scholars are unduly resistant to good news. Our report highlights relations between

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Blacks and Whites because this division has been central to American history and can be most thoroughly documented. Consider Whites’ attitudes towards racial intermarriage. In the 1960s, at the outset of the Civil Rights movement, a clear majority favoured laws banning interracial marriage; recently that figure was one in five. At a personal level, the numbers favouring interracial marriage increased from a minute proportion to a considerable majority. To be sure, the number of intolerant Whites remains large, but the “progressive” trend is unmistakable. White attitudes towards school integration also show a “progressive” trend. In the early 1940s, about two-thirds of Whites thought Blacks and Whites should go to separate schools. Now a general endorsement of integrated schooling is almost universal (96 per cent). Similar data about equal housing and employment opportunities are the basis for Bobo’s (2001, 269) conclusion that “the single clearest trend shown in studies of racial attitudes has involved a steady and sweeping movement toward general endorsement of the principles of racial equality and integration.” On the other hand, as this principle is translated into actual situations, it is also clear that numbers matter. Whites’ willingness to live in integrated neighbourhoods or send their children to integrated schools declines as the percentage of Blacks increases. This tendency has remained fairly constant since the mid-1960s. Negative stereotyping – another attitudinal dimension – is still common, though the actual extent is hard to judge because different assessment methods suggest somewhat different conclusions, and trends are hard to assess because relevant data are relatively crude. According to 1990 General Social Survey data, Whites often give Blacks low ratings for intelligence (31 per cent), laziness (47 per cent), inclination to violence (54 per cent), and preference to live off welfare (59 per cent). Whites also rated Hispanics negatively in this regard. How do Blacks and Whites assess the racial situation? One 1997 survey indicates that 40 per cent of Blacks viewed race relations in their community as “excellent” or “good,” as compared to 59 per cent of Whites. This is not a rosy picture and it certainly points to a large discrepancy. Another recent poll indicates that 80 per cent of Blacks think

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Blacks and Whites get along “very well” or “fairly well,” as do 71 per cent of all Americans. This paints a much more optimistic picture and is a sign of cross-racial consensus. The seeming inconsistency of these survey findings may well reflect a real wariness and uncertainty in the population – even if analysts continue to duel with their favoured results. Problems and Attempted Resolutions Perhaps the most quoted remark about race relations in the US is DuBois’ observation: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.” This prescient analyst offered this insight in 1903 – and quite arguably he was right for most of the century. Yet he did not anticipate the rapid and substantial demographic changes of the last few decades. As we have documented, not only is the US an increasingly “minority” society, but it is composed of people from diverse ethnic-racial backgrounds – themselves often fragmented into numerous sub-groups and differentiated in economic success. The current century is likely to be marked by the “problem of color lines” (quoted in Skrentny 2001, 2). We will later consider some of the implications of this new problem (the “Multicultural Dilemma”), but to relate how racial disparities became defined as a social concern, we focus on the Black-White dynamic. Of course, the woeful situation of much of the Black population throughout the twentieth century represents the long legacy of slavery, but only in the years following the Second World War did the Black community and sympathetic White allies successfully mobilize to make the “race problem” a prominent national issue. This success followed substantial improvement in Black living conditions. For the first time, Blacks had achieved a critical mass of well-educated activists with sufficient financial resources to effectively enter the political arena. For the civil rights activists and their supporters, the blatant disparities in life circumstances and basic rights were conditions to ameliorate. In their eyes, America had a race problem because the situation of the Black population grossly violated the American creed, especially in its emphasis on equality of opportunity and equality before the law. Historians

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debate the relative impact of grassroots Black activism and elite White mobilization in generating the civil rights campaign, but these forces made common cause in dramatizing the problem as America’s failure to live up to its central ideals. This appeal had its defining expression in Martin Luther King’s famous 1963 “I Have a Dream” speech. As conceived of in the early Civil Rights movement, the problem was defined as unequal basic rights (especially voting and access to public facilities like schools) and discriminatory hiring practices. The related presumption was that the removal of these unequal and discriminatory practices would lead to the reduction of racial disparities in life conditions. Yet the focus was on the presumed remedy: equality of opportunity. In the 1960s and 1970s, the politics of race was inflammatory – marches, boycotts, and large-scale urban riots met with racist political appeals and increasing “White flight” to suburbs. Indeed, for considerable segments of the majority population, the “race problem” was a matter of controlling the Black population (“law and order” being the code phrase), not improving its condition. The political victories of minorities and their White allies in the 1960s and afterwards did not mean an uninterrupted march to equality. But it is fair to say that government policy became more systematically responsive to minorities’ interests as a result of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s than it ever had been before. Although conservatives often had considerable success in curtailing the scope of initiatives or undermining their enforcement, the presumption that government should do something, especially to eradicate discrimination at the individual level, became part of the national consensus. In the post-Civil Rights era, debates centered on what the something should be. We can sketch the evolution of this debate and the main programmatic commitments that emerged from it in three partially overlapping stages: (1) the nascent pre-1960s movement; (2) the 1960s Civil Rights era; and (3) the affirmative action era. pre-1960s In the 1940s, as part of the war effort, the federal government sought to end discriminatory hiring practices – first in defense industries, then for federal contractors, and finally in federal employment. The

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Supreme Court’s famous 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling banned official segregation in public schools. In 1961, by executive fiat, the Kennedy administration established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in part to monitor compliance with antidiscrimination provisions for federal contractors. These initiatives were all intended to promote equality of opportunity, setting the stage for the focus of activism in the 1960s. the 1960s civil rights era The Johnson administration capitalized on the substantial though restricted momentum of the previous era. President Lyndon Johnson pushed through two transformative legislative acts: the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act was intended to prevent racial discrimination in public accommodations, institutions, programs receiving federal funds, and private employment. The Voting Rights Act was intended to remove barriers (predominantly in the South) to Black political participation and set up monitoring procedures. The court-ordered integration of schools was also central to the Civil Rights era. The Supreme Court’s directive that integration occur with “all deliberate speed” was met in the South with “massive resistance,” including the closing of entire public school districts for years. A concerted effort by the Federal judiciary eventually shattered legal segregation. Although civil rights laws did not explicitly define “discrimination,” they were constituted on the premise that the eradication of adverse treatment of individuals based on their race would lead to the collective improvement of minorities and the greater integration of society. In short, they were justified on the grounds of creating equal opportunities for all individuals; these ideals were not new, but the explicit and dramatic Federal commitment to them was unprecedented. the affirmative action era The starting point of this “era” is difficult to specify, in part because the meaning of the term “affirmative action” has been so elusive and contested. Indeed, the term appeared in Kennedy administration executive orders and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the focus was

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on anti-discrimination law. However, largely through executive branch initiatives, in the 1960s and 1970s, policies were promulgated to promote systematic “out-reach” efforts to minorities and, much more controversially, to direct benefits to minorities. In effect, the “out-reach” efforts were intended to enhance individual opportunities; the latter compensatory efforts were intended to alter results so that minority groups’ shares of desired outcomes (e.g. proportion of government contracts or enrollment at elite educational institutions) were increased. This new government concern for outcomes represented a decisive change in policy, largely prompted by the realization that efforts to equalize opportunity had not eliminated racial disparities. Even if the distinction was not always sharp in practice, the out-reach policies came to be seen as “soft” affirmative action in contrast to “hard,” results-oriented policies. Among the “hard” policies that have been employed are the following: •

•

•

university admissions policies that set specific quotas for minority students (since ruled illegal), that awarded “points” for minority status (also illegal), and that substantially favoured minority students relative to White applicants despite lower performance on standard indicators “set aside” procurement programs so that designated proportions of government contracting were designated for minority contractors (under increasing legal scrutiny) “voluntary” private sector programs are to reserve a proportion of vacancies in training programs for minorities, thus reducing potential liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

The policies noted here underscore the concern for achieving greater representation of minorities. Both incentives and penalties have been employed to ensure compliance. Another significant feature of the early affirmative action era was court-imposed efforts to impose racial desegregation in schools. These court orders required school districts to curtail neighbourhood assignments, which generated segregated schools, and to transport students to achieve more nearly “proportional mixes” throughout the district and

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in some cases throughout a metropolitan area. Compliance was judged by numerical results, not the extent of well-intentioned efforts or the nature of local preferences. Executive branch directives for states to create “majority-minority” voting districts also represent a significant element of the “hard” agenda. These directives went beyond the 1965 Voting Rights Act’s intention of guaranteeing Blacks’ rights to participate in the democratic process. Instead, they were intended to create an outcome: a greater number of Black – and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic – congressmen. These directives were premised on the correct assumption that few Blacks had been elected in majority White districts. The remedy, then, was to force state legislatures to create districts with a substantial majority of minority voters, thus institutionalizing a presumed connection between race and political interest. These map-drawing requirements reflect the “hard” agenda in that they sought to promote a group-based outcome, even if no numerical target was set as the goal. The future of results-oriented affirmative action programs is now uncertain. Republican administrations have been unsupportive, and recent court decisions have tended to rein in their permissible scope. Although the Supreme Court has recently approved “non-formulaic” racial preferences in university admissions, it also expressed the hope that they would be phased out in twenty-five years. Most affirmative action programs are now subject to “strict scrutiny,” essentially meaning they must be narrowly tailored to address specific discriminatory practices, not merely some general racial disparity. Given the unsettled prospects of current affirmative action policies, legislators in some states have begun to turn to non-race based preference programs. Most notable are “top 10 per cent programs,” whereby all students in the top tenth of their high school class are eligible for admittance to a state’s premier universities. Because high schools are significantly segregated by race and economic status, it is claimed, such programs should increase the representation of underprivileged groups of all races while avoiding vulnerability to charges of racial discrimination. This experimentation reflects the general flux and uncertainties of current racial policy.

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At the same time, the large racial gaps in test scores (discussed earlier) have recently been publicly acknowledged and have become a focus of federal government policy. Under the “No Child Left Behind” legislation, the allocation of various resources and sanctions to specific schools is affected by the academic achievement levels of all students in minority sub-groups. This legislation is novel for both its explicit attention to racial differences in achievement (rather than school resources) and for the prominent role it assigns to the federal government (education has long been a local prerogative). This initiative, then, is intended to equalize the distribution of human capital and thus reduce disparities in labour market outcomes, though critics have alleged that it is under-funded and represents a first step towards government subsidization of private education – another “market solution” to a public problem. Bilingual education (and related programs in English as a Second Language) represents the only concerted effort to be responsive to the distinct needs of the great numbers of Spanish-speaking immigrants. The professed aim is to ease the transition to English fluency by conducting many classes primarily in Spanish while students acquire English skills. Despite the fervent advocacy of some Hispanic educators, the pedagogical value of this approach over “immersion” programs is not clear, and a California referendum calls into question the future of bilingual education. ESL (English as a Second Language) programs that involve relatively quick “mainstreaming” of non-English speakers seem to have greater popular acceptance, including among the affected populations. The Verdict Of course, the most general verdict on American race-directed policies is that they have not worked: quite clearly racial disparities in life conditions and chances remain substantial in many respects. But even the more narrow issue of whether they have ameliorated conditions is difficult to address because it is hard to link specific outcomes to specific policy interventions. As we have documented, progress is real and often substantial, but the credit due to post-Civil Rights era policies should not be exaggerated.

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Here we make no effort to be comprehensive in assessing policy impacts. Instead, we briefly survey outcomes in several areas to suggest that: (1) the heat of the debate about some issues has often been disproportionate to their actual impact on institutional practices; (2) that “progress” doesn’t neatly track with policy interventions; (3) that some interventions have plainly not worked and have had unintended negative consequences; and (4) that “successes” have had limited scope. Perhaps the most important point to make is that the Black population made substantial improvements in economic conditions in the 1940s – that is, before concerted government interventions and during a time of official segregation. Progress was also substantial during the 1960s, largely before the impact of anti-discrimination laws could be registered in aggregate economic gains. Progress in terms of male income ratios has been modest since then. And, indeed, the Black/White full-time employment ratios among men have worsened since the late 1960s – that is, in an era of stricter anti-discrimination enforcement and experimentation with various forms of affirmative action in the labour market. Although connections between gross aggregate trends and general stages of policy are weak, specific interventions can be shown to have had at least some of the intended consequences. For one, comparison of minority employment patterns in the public and private sectors suggest the efficacy of anti-discrimination/affirmative action policies. Rates of increase in minority representation from 1970 to 1990 – overall and for managerial and professional positions – were greater in the public sector, where the connection between public policy and practice might reasonably be expected to be tighter. Moreover, while minority workers earned less than Whites with comparable (measured) human capital, their disadvantage was less in the public sector (Badgett 1999). Secondly, having Federal contractor status appears to have boosted minority employment shares. One estimate for California points to a “federal contractor effect” of 0.7 to 1.0 per cent for Blacks and Asians. But the fact that this status lowered the shares of Hispanics in this state market leads to cautions about advancing broad generalizations (Rodgers 1999).

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Third, in California, cities with minority- and women-owned business enterprise (mwbe) set-aside programs had somewhat higher rates of mwbe participation in public contracting. Also, mwbe rates dropped as cities modified or curtailed their programs in response to court decisions (Larson 1999). The “success” here should be viewed in light of the fact that business formation rates among Blacks and Hispanics substantially lagged behind that among Whites and Asians from 1970 to 1990. Opening Educational Doors Probably no affirmative action policies have been more controversial than those designed to increase minority representation in the nation’s universities and professional schools, especially law and medicine. Formal quota programs have been prohibited since the 1978 Bakke decision, but preferential admissions schemes have remained in place despite increasing legal challenges. Admissions policies receive front-page attention and constant editorial commentary; they have become the prism through which larger debates about social justice are filtered. The related debate exemplifies Hochschild’s (1999, 348) argument that controversies about affirmative action are essentially symbolic, unconcerned about substantive impact: “the debate over affirmative action is predominantly a culture war over what it means to be a good American.” What is lost in all the heat is the recognition that relatively few people are affected, either as a beneficiary or as a “displaced” White. Minority preference schemes significantly apply to about the hundred or so selective undergraduate institutions; the US has more than 3,000 institutions of higher education (Trow 2002). The dramatic increases in Black and Hispanic college attendance rates in recent decades are therefore barely attributable to admissions policies at the relatively few selective schools. Black and Hispanic enrollments at these selective institutions have dramatically increased, from a few per cent up to 10 per cent or so in recent years. With the repeal of affirmative action provisions in California, Black enrollments fell to earlier levels at the flagship campuses in Berkeley and Los Angeles. And estimates for other elite institutions

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suggest that Black enrollments would be 1 to 3 per cent under “raceblind” admissions. From the perspective of the elite institutions, a repeal of preferential admissions would mean a substantial change in minority representation, but from the perspective of aggregate college enrollment, its impact would be minimal. Moreover, even though these policies “work” in the sense that the beneficiaries have good graduation rates (though lesser performance than their classmates), the beneficiaries are disproportionately drawn from relatively advantaged minority families (Bowen and Bok 1998).2 Court-Ordered Desegregation Under a variety of court-ordered plans, urban districts achieved notably more equitable “proportional mixes” in their schools – an indicator of “success” despite considerable White resistance and Black ambivalence. Yet at the same time, the chances that Black students would go to school with a substantial number of White students actually decreased – hardly the desired outcome. This result reflected “White flight” from urban districts, a trend exacerbated by the imposition of busing plans. In effect, districts achieved proportional mixes of decreasingly diverse populations (Armor and Rossell 2002). A significant rationale for desegregation was the presumed benefit to Black academic achievement. Although the evidence is not entirely consistent, the fact that Black children go to school with White children seems to have no systematic impact on their achievement (Armor and Rossell 2002). And, indeed, after substantial reductions in the racial “test score gap” in the 1980s, progress stalled with virtually no further closing of the gap since then (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Disillusionment with the promise of integration is now deep, but efforts to privatize education through voucher programs (the “market solution”) have made very limited headway and have offered little promise of benefit. Electing Minority Congressmen Blacks and Hispanics have had minimal success in winning elections in majority White or Anglo congressional districts: there have been six

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such victories in the nation’s history. All thirty-six of the Black Democrats elected to the House in 1994 represented “majority-minority” constituencies – districts created to meet new federal interpretations of the Voting Rights Act. If the goal is to have Black representatives, the redistricting efforts represent tangible success (Lublin 1995). However, the concentration of minority voters in a district means the concentration of non-minority voters in adjoining districts. Initially, Democratic-controlled legislatures drew oddly configured boundaries to create majority-minority districts and to protect White Democratic incumbents. With increasing legal insistence on “compactness” in the configuration of districts, the retention of the majority-minority districts has meant the corresponding creation of “safe” conservative districts – a pleasing outcome for Republicans and a reduction in legislative votes for policies favourable to Blacks. As Lublin (1995, 125) observes, “In the future, African Americans face the unpalatable alternatives of either accepting a reduction in the number of Black majority districts or paying a steeper price for these districts through a loss of influence within the House.” That was hardly the intended outcome, even if political strategists readily perceived their own opportunities and seized them. The Multicultural (and Class) Dilemma As suggested in the beginning of this section, American policies on race have not systematically confronted the increasing demographic diversity in the nation’s population. In large part this is because of the historical centrality of the Black-White conflict. Moreover, other oppressed minorities have lacked the size (Native Americans) or the internal cohesion (Hispanics) to effectively advance a distinct political agenda. Just after the emergence of the Black Civil Rights movement, activist Native American groups on some tribal reservations and Hispanic groups (largely Mexican Americans in California) did mobilize to pursue particular aims – e.g. changes in labour laws for agricultural workers and bilingual education. “Red power” and “Chicano power” became rallying cries for activists in the 1970s, but their impact never

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matched that of the Black community, nor did calls for unity among “people of colour” ever become much more than occasionally opportune political rhetoric. More significantly, the “other minorities” were piggybacked on the anti-discrimination legislation that was promulgated to bring opportunity to the Black population. Under the logic that government policy should guarantee equal rights to all people, these groups came to acquire legal protections as a byproduct of attempts to improve the status of Blacks. As welcome as these protections were, they were not sufficient in themselves to substantially improve the economic conditions of these groups – a fact dramatized by their ongoing high poverty rates. Yet, the multicultural dilemma becomes most vexing in the era of affirmative action. The future of affirmative action programs may come to be shaped by legal decisions. Both increasing racial diversity and increasing within-race differentiation present sociological challenges to the common justifications for these programs. Clearly, the driving impulse behind the rise of affirmative action programs was to address the deprived status of the Black population. Underlying the common rhetoric of “leveling the playing field” was the recognition that Blacks had an unparalleled history of oppression – and thus, Blacks were “owed” compensatory considerations in order to raise their status relative to the White majority. In effect, proponents argued, Blacks had a distinct moral claim because of a distinct historical experience that restricted current achievement. Crucial to the evaluation of affirmative action policies is the fact they grew out of anti-discrimination legislation. Although anti-Black discrimination was the primary concern of this legislation, it also prohibited all forms of racial discrimination. As affirmative action programs emerged, the designated beneficiaries also became inclusively defined to include large aggregations of non-Euro-American groups: Blacks as well as Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. Decisions about inclusion did not reflect explicit legislative direction or documentation of comparable disadvantage. Instead, the beneficiaries came to be defined by the interaction of bureaucratic initiatives (premised on the assumption

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of relatively uniform disadvantage across all “minority” groups) and interest group politics. Minority groups readily perceived the benefits of inclusion and the advantages of coalition building among themselves. The result of these decisions is that the benefited groups vary substantially in their claims to “deservingness.” In many respects, for instance, despite whatever discrimination they may have experienced in the past, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans are now relatively successful, earning substantially more on average than White Americans. But recent immigrants from Laos are much poorer. Similar diversity is apparent within the Hispanic population. Light-skinned Cuban Americans have enjoyed considerable success; dark-skinned Cuban Americans much less. This within-group diversity undercuts the rationale for policies predicated on the assumption of a relatively uniform between-group disadvantage that applies to each member of a large minority group. Another challenge to conventional justifications for affirmative action is that many of the eligible groups have no substantial history of discrimination in the US. Blacks “deserved” compensatory support, it was often claimed, because they had a history of oppression that precluded them from competing with Whites. Affirmative action was thus justified on the grounds of redressing a historic harm. No doubt many recent immigrants fare badly, but their relatively low status often cannot be attributed to a history of oppression in the US. To the extent that affirmative action is justified as a form of reparations, the claims of many recent immigrants are less compelling. Finally, the increasing numbers of “multi-racials” present a sociological challenge to affirmative action policies. Can the offspring of a White–Black marriage claim eligibility for affirmative action considerations in law school admissions? What about the offspring of a multiracial-White marriage? Such questions have not been systematically confronted, but clearly the children of “mixed” parentage create problems in determining programmatic eligibility. The problems are twofold: what determines eligibility, and who determines eligibility? The rising number of multi-racial people is not readily accommodated in a policy predicated on sharp racial boundaries.

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The concerns raised here are not meant to deny the possible legitimacy of some affirmative action initiatives. For example, affirmative action admissions policies at universities may be justified on the grounds that racial diversity per se is educationally valuable and serves a larger social good – even if many of the beneficiaries are not themselves from disadvantaged families. Yet the realities of current multicultural America mean that it is no longer possible to direct benefits to clearly demarcated groups marked by monolithic economic disadvantage. The complexities of the society have bypassed the simplicities of the remedies. How to Categorize Of course, to resolve a “problem” it is often necessary to define its scope and to measure “success.” In that sense the tools of analysis inevitably shape the policy process. This is not just an abstract academic truism. Census Bureau designations have increasingly become politically contentious as diverse interest groups lobby hard for categorizations that might generate numbers favourable to their cause. After the Office of Management and Budget (omb) issued its Directive No. 15, “Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting,” in 1977, official policy has been to divide the population into four “races” and two “ethnic groups.” That is, all federal agencies were directed to collect data using these categories in order to document disparities and assess programmatic impacts. This directive did not flow from any legislative mandate or even notable public discussion. Instead, the directive was issued by government bureaucrats in a Democratic administration that was relatively supportive of minority concerns in general and affirmative action programs in particular. The expressed rationale was that non-White groups had historically “suffered discrimination and differential treatment on the basis of their race” and that their condition required regular monitoring. Institutional momentum has kept this categorization scheme relatively intact, though it is increasingly being questioned on many fronts. As part of a more general critique of racial preferences, conservative think tanks and some legislators have advanced the argument that racial

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classifications contravene the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (There is an obvious irony here. Before the civil rights era, conservatives had defended racial distinctions in policy while liberals had championed their eradication). Their concern is that if people are counted by race, it will be increasingly presumed that resources should be and will be allocated by race. Their professed objection is principled, but to the obvious charge that their principle is a shield for White privilege, they tend to rejoin that current racial disparities are not sufficiently large to justify race-based policies. So, to reduce remaining racial antagonisms, part of their remedy is to eliminate racial measurement or severely curtail its use. They portray racial measurement as a partial cause of “problems” by focusing public attention on racial matters. For many on the left, racial and ethnic classifications are considered essential to the realization of a just society. To defend this position, Justice Blackman’s dictum (in the 1978 Bakke decision) is invoked almost as a mantra: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.” Whatever the philosophical merits of this view, it has come to prevail. In practical effect, the debate is not whether to measure race but how to measure it – and even more pointedly, how to report it. This debate is fueled by competing assessments of how particular categorizations may advance or impede group claims in the political process. This political struggle is sharply evident in recent changes in Census Bureau procedures. In 1990, respondents were asked to place themselves in one of four mutually exclusive categories with an “other race” option that 4 per cent selected, and also asked to indicate whether or not they were Hispanic. Quite understandably, a rising number of multiracial citizens felt excluded. They lobbied for what may be called categorical recognition. Their cause was furthered by many social scientists, inside and outside government, who felt that unitary designations didn’t accurately reflect demographic reality. At the same time, numerous Black advocacy groups (and White liberal allies) resisted changes on the fear that multi-racial designations would dilute the Black political power that derived from “head count.”

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The result was an evolving compromise. In 1997, omb revised its category guidance. The Asian racial category was split into two categories: (1) Asian and (2) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. The term Hispanic was replaced with the term “Hispanic or Latino.” The formerly common term for minorities in general, “non-White,” was banned from government usage. But the really large change was that no one would any longer be forced to select only one race and only one ethnicity (Hispanic or not). Everyone would be free to choose as many races as they wished. Only 2.4 per cent of respondents reported being of more than one race in the 2000 Census, but this was still 6.8 million individuals (Jones and Smith 2001). The 2000 Census form allowed respondents to “mark one or more races” from the now traditional list. This decision seemed to grant recognition to multi-racial persons (or at least to those who chose that self-designation). Theoretically, it opened up the possibility of a complex enumeration, with up to 128 categories of race and ethnicity. Yet the significance of this change was undercut by the subsequent decision to report the 2000 results in the 1990 categories when they were to be used for the purposes of civil rights enforcement. Respondents indicating a “White” in conjunction with some “minority” background were to be classified as a member of that minority; those designating some “Black” background were to be counted as “Black,” no matter what their other designations. Identity politics (mostly in government conference rooms and not in the larger political arena) drove this compromise. The sociologically sensible policy would be to report gross categories as a first-cut analysis and to use disaggregated categories to fine-tune policies. Furthermore, multi-racial citizens would seem to deserve official recognition as a separate category. The intellectual justification is that their presence is socially consequential and must be understood. The moral justification is that race has been a matter of self-designation in official policy and, therefore, that multi-racials shouldn’t be forced into a category that they didn’t choose themselves. The political justification is that their presence, duly prominent in official “social accounting,” may partially blur racial boundaries as politically salient cleavages. That is, if

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“race” is accurately viewed as less life-defining for individuals, and “races” are less structured into a few monolithic blocs, there are better prospects for a society that is “less stratified along racial lines, less rigidly divided, and thus more communitarian” (Etzioni 2001, 34).

coda Two themes have been central to our analysis: (1) in its racial and ethnic composition, American society is increasingly diverse and can no longer be represented by a simple Black-White colour line; and (2) the political mobilization of minority groups has driven the implementation of policies attuned to their interests. So, the obvious question is: how are we to draw the new race lines? The future politics of race and related government policy are at stake. Here we can just briefly suggest the emergence of a new, more fluid, and less demarcated hierarchy: essentially a light–dark division (Gans 1999) that is “softened” by increasing tolerance, widespread adherence to common values, and increasing intermarriage (Etzioni 2001). The privileged side of this division includes European Americans, most Asians, and many light-skinned Hispanics; the disadvantaged side includes African Americans, darker-skinned Hispanics, Native Americans, and some recent Southeast Asian immigrants. In large measure, this division reflects fairly substantial average differences in economic status and intermarriage patterns. Even so, this boundary becomes blurred because of cultural diversity and economic differentiation within disadvantaged minority groups. For example, there are large differences between recent African and West Indian immigrants and descendants of Black slaves (Vickerman 1999). Similarly large differences exist between the Black middle class and the Black underclass (Wilson 1996, 1990). Sharp racial boundaries are further blurred by the general rise of tolerance and common values that undermine unduly exaggerated fears of the “balkanization” of society with attendant identity politics. Furthermore, this new hierarchy does not uniformly fit all local or regional circumstances. Minority groups are unevenly distributed, creat-

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ing somewhat distinctive configurations. Particularly crucial here is the size and composition of the Hispanic population. That population may be so small that the traditional Black–White fissure remains intact; it may be “layered on” existing divisions; or it may be so large that it becomes a potent “third force.” Given the emerging and fluid nature of this hierarchy, it is difficult to confidently predict how the disadvantaged groups will fare in their efforts to influence government policy. At present, however, there appear few prospects that they will be able to coalesce as an effective political movement and generate substantial change in government policy. Nor does the majority population seem inclined to support substantial change in the status quo. Nonetheless, if policy makers want to be responsive to current racial and ethnic disparities, they must reject the tendency to think in terms of a simple Black–White divide or a White versus “people of colour” divide. Neither accurately represents the reality of contemporary multicultural America.

notes 1 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some communities with large German-speaking populations made explicit accommodations in schools. 2 One could argue that admissions at selective institutions are particularly consequential because they “track” graduates to elite positions. Still, while the prospects of the graduates of prestigious institutions are relatively good, only a small proportion of the American economic elite attended a prestigious institution.

references Alba, Richard D. 1990. Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America. New Haven: Yale University Press. – 1985. Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

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Armor, David and Christine Rossell. 2002. “Desegregation and Segregation in the Public Schools,” in Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America, ed. A. Thernstrom and S. Thernstrom, 219–58. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Badgett, M.V. Lee. 1999. “The Impact of Affirmative Action on Public Sector Employment in California, 1970-1990,” in Impacts of Affirmative Action: Policies and Consequences in California, ed. P. Ong, 83–102. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Bell, Derek. 1992. Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism. New York: Basic. Blank, Rebecca M. 2001. “An Overview of Trends in Social and Economic Well-Being, by Race,” in National Research Council, America Becoming Vol. 1: 21–39. Bobo, Lawrence. 2001. “Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century,” in National Research Council, America Becoming Vol. 1: 264–301. Boston, Thomas D. 2001. “Trends in Minority-Owned Businesses,” in National Research Council, America Becoming Vol. 2: 190–221. Bowen, William G. and Derek Bok. 1998. The Shape of the River: LongTerm Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, et al. 1994. Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960–1990. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Caplow, Theodore, Louis Hicks, and Ben Wattenberg. 2001. The First Measured Century. Washington: AEI Press. Census Bureau. Various years. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Etzioni, Amitai. 2001. The Monochrome Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Feagin, Joe. 1997. “Fighting White Racism: The Future of Equal Rights in the U.S,” in Civil Rights and Race Relations in the Reagan-Bush Era, ed. S. Myers, 29–45. New York: Praeger. Gans, Herbert J. 1999. Making Sense of America: Sociological Analyses and Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

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Hacker, Andrew. 1992. Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal. New York: Scribner. Hawkins, Darnell F. 2001. “Commentary on Kennedy’s Overview of the Justice System,” in National Research Council, America Becoming Vol. 2: 32–5. Heaton, Tim, Bruce Chadwick, and Cardell Jacobson. 2000. Statistical Handbook on Racial Groups in the United States. Phoenix: Oryx Press. Herrnstein, Richard and Charles Murray. 1994. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press. Hochschild, Jennifer. 1999. “Affirmative Action as Culture War,” in The Cultural Territories of Race, ed. M. Lamont, 343–68. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hunt, Larry L. and Matthew O. Hunt. 2001. “Race, Region, and Religious Involvement: A Comparative Study of Whites and African-Americans,” Social Forces 80 (2):605–31. Jencks, Christopher and Meredith Phillips. 1998. The Black-White Test Score Gap. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Jones, Nicholas A. and Amy Symens Smith. 2001. “The Two or More Races Population: 2000,” in Census 2000 Brief. Washington, DC: Census Bureau. C2KBR/01-6. Ladd, Everett. 1998. “The American Ethnic Experience as it Stands in the Nineties,” The Public Perspective, Feb/March: 50–65. Larson, Tom. 1999. “Affirmative Action Programs for Minority- and Women-owned Businesses,” in Impacts of Affirmative Action: Policies and Consequences in California, ed. P. Ong, 133–70. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Lind, Michael. 1995. The Next American Nation. New York: Free Press. Lublin, David. 1995. “Race, Representation, and Redistricting,” in Classifying by Race, ed. P. Peterson, 111–28. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Massey, Douglas. 1987. Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press. McClain, Paula and Joseph Stewart, Jr. 1998. Can We All Get Along? Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics. Second Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview.

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McLanahan, Sarah and Gary Sandefur. 1994. Growing Up with a Single Parent. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers. Patterson, Orlando. 1997. The Ordeal of Integration. New York: Civitas. Rodgers, William M. III. 1999. “Federal Contractor Status and Minority Employment: A Case Study of California, 1979-1994,” in Impacts of Affirmative Action: Policies and Consequences in California, ed. P. Ong, 103–20. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Sandefur, Gary D. et al. 2001. “An Overview of Racial and Ethnic Demographic Trends,” in National Research Council, America Becoming Vol. 1: 40–102. Shinagawa, Larry Hajime and Michael Jang. 1998. Atlas of American Diversity. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. Skrentny, John. 2001. ed. Color Lines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smelser, N., W.J. Wilson, and F. Mitchell. 2001 ed. National Research Council, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences. Vols 1 and 2. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Thernstrom, Stephan. 1997. America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible. New York: Simon and Schuster. Trow, Martin. 2002. “Preferential Admissions in Higher Education,” in Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives on Race and Ethnicity in America, ed. A. Thernstrom and S. Thernstrom, 293–305. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Vickerman, Milton. 1999. Crosscurrents: West Indian Immigrants and Race. New York: Oxford University Press. Wilson, William J. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. New York: Knopf. – 1990. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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3 Germany: Patterns of Ethnic Diversity and Accommodation susanne von below and mathias bös

Contrary to popular opinion, Germany has a very long tradition of successfully incorporating various ethnic groups. The history of ethnic groups in Germany is much older than Germany itself,1 be it those minorities that remained Slavic in times of Christianization and colonization, in the tenth to twelfth centuries, or others that immigrated and were successfully incorporated into German society, such as the Huguenots in the late-seventeenth century, or Polish workers after industrialization. After all, Germany was only founded as one state (“empire”) in 1871, and this German Reich encompassed different peoples with their own cultural traditions. Despite a rapid integration process, it took until the end of the Weimar Republic (1933) for the HigherGerman language to be at least partially adopted by all Germans through the increasing diffusion of mass media like radio and newspapers (cf. von Saldern 1999). After the Second World War, the inflow of 14 million refugees and expellees as well as 16 million guest workers created new challenges for the ethnic composition of Germany. These major challenges to the ethnic landscape of German society in the last fifty years are the focus of this chapter. In contrast to this long tradition of ethnic diversity and incorporation, ordinary Germans as well as social scientists have only very recently become used to employing the term “ethnicity” to describe the internal structure of German society. In Germany, as in many other countries, ethnic metaphors like “common origin or past,” “common ways of

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life,” or a “common future,” are traditionally used in connection with the nation-state itself (Smith 1986). Differences in language and lifestyle are assumed to be congruent with the borders of the nationstate. To define a group within Germany as an ethnic group thus bears in this context the connotation of excluding the group from the nationally constituted society. In this way, the ethnic group concept is often used in relation to certain “guest-worker” minorities, particularly those of the Islamic religion. Like every nation-state, Germany is culturally heterogeneous, with strong regional cultures that differ in many aspects, including customs, food, and dialect. This heterogeneity is partly reflected in the political (federal) structure of Germany. In addition to this large variety of diverse “German ways of life,” different ethnic minorities are developing and have always developed additional forms of “being German.” In 1995, twenty-seven larger (more than 50,000 members) ethnic groups lived in Germany (Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen 1997). Most of these groups are defined by the nationality of their country of origin, like Koreans, Americans, or Hungarians. Others have the same nationality, like Turks and Kurds, but belong to different ethnic groups. In addition to immigration minorities, there are autochthonous minorities like the Sorbs and the Danes, religious minorities like the Jews, and racial minorities like Afro-Germans. A typical German form of ethnic minority are the newly arrived “ethnic Germans” (Aussiedler), mainly from Russia, Poland, and Romania; these groups immigrated as “Germans” and received German nationality upon arrival, but in fact they form different ethnic minorities according to their regions of origin. In this chapter we consider ethnic differences as a common feature of German society. Using this perspective to describe a group as an “ethnic group” does not say much about its “degree of integration” into society. We also use the term “ethnicity” to analyze the “different ways of being German” from a sociological perspective. Therefore we include in this paper all groups that are either considered by others or that consider themselves as culturally or historically different and that “participate in shared activities built around their (real or mythical) common origin or culture” (Yinger 1994, 4).2

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The consequences of reframing internal cultural differences in the context of ethnicity are a challenge, which is discussed from several different perspectives in this volume. In this chapter, we consider ethnic differences as a common feature of all nationally constituted societies. In doing so, we use the term “ethnicity” to analyze the “different ways of being German” from a sociological perspective. We use the term “ethnicity” to show that “different ways of being German” are an important feature of German society and have been for a long time. Today this problem is seen as crucial by various ethnic groups who are often not recognized as such in Germany. As Cooper (2000) expresses it in the case of the Afro-Germans: “Afro-Germans have begun in recent years to reclaim their history and to develop an identity based, in part, on their shared experience of belonging to a culture that does not entirely accept them. In years to come, the question will be whether German society will come to expand its definition of German to encompass different origins, and thereby also embrace Germans of African heritage.” The redefinition of what is meant by “being German” has been constantly expanding over the past decades. Starting with communities like the Danes, Sorbs, and Jews, Germany is currently on the edge of re-typifying the different guest-worker minorities as “German” as well. This chapter begins with a description of ethnic minorities in Germany, documenting the major trends and shifts in various dimensions of inter-ethnic relations and social incorporation. It then goes on to deal with the emerging problems and different attempts at problem solving.

social trends in inter-ethnic relations One of the main trends in the ethnic composition of Germany in the last fifty years is the increasing diversification of ethnic groups accompanied by a growing awareness of ethnic differences that turn out to be a source of identity claims within the public sphere. These processes are especially important for newly arrived minorities, adding new features to the patterns of ethnicity within Germany.

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Table 3.1 Foreign Nationals and Total Population of Germany, 1949–1999

Year

Total population1

Foreign nationals (%)

West-German population

Foreign nationals (%)

East-German population

1949 1960 1970 1980 1990 1991 1995 2001

69,601,900 73,363,300 77,718,900 78,392,600 79,753,300 80,274,600 81,817,500 82,440,300

7.3 8.8 8.9

50,808,900 56,174,800 60,650,600 61,653,100 63,725,700 64,484,800 66,342,000 -

1.0 1.2 4.9 7.2 8.4 -

18,793,000 17,188,500 17,068,300 16,739,500 16,027,600 15,789,800 15,475,500 -

Sources: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerangelegenheiten 1999, Statistisches Bundesamt, Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. 1

Total population for the years 1967 to 1984 as of September 30; after 1985 as of December 31.

Structural Background Official statistics inform us that between 1960 and 2001, the proportion of foreigners in Germany3 increased from 1.2 per cent to 8.9 per cent (see Table 3.1). “Foreigners” in Germany are defined as persons with foreign nationality. Since some members of ethnic minorities, i.e. newly immigrating ethnic Germans, have German nationality while others have been born and raised in Germany but do not hold a German passport, these figures are only a rough indicator of the size of ethnic minorities. As a rule of thumb, the number of non-German nationals in Germany indicates the proportion of ethnic minorities generated by the (predominantly West) German guest-worker system because these groups of people had difficulties acquiring German nationality until the introduction of the new nationality law in 2000. Unfortunately, valid statistical data on members of ethnic minorities with German nationality are often difficult to obtain, since the concept of ethnic origin is hardly ever used in official statistics and has only recently begun to be used in social science surveys. In 1997, the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners4 made an effort to compile a handbook of all ethnic groups in Germany. The book has 191 entries for

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Table 3.2 Estimated Size of Ethnic Groups in Germany, 1995 More than 1,000,000 Turks (excluding Kurds) “Ethnic Germans” from Russia

Between 100,000 and 200,000 1600 1100

Between 200,000 and 1,000,000 Yugoslavs (mostly Serbs, Kosovars) Italians Kurds Frisians Greeks Bosnians Poles Afro-Germans

700 600 500 400 360 320 350 200

Croatians Spaniards Portuguese British Iranians Dutch Romanians US-Americans (without American Forces) French

190 130 120 10 110 110 110 100

Less than 100,000 Moroccans Danish Sinti and Roma Sorbs Hungarians Afghans Jews Tamilians

82 80 80 60 60 58 50 50

Source: Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen (1997), only groups with 50,000 or more members.

different ethnic groups, 114 groups of which are made up of more than 1,000 members and 64 groups of which encompassed more than 10,000 members (Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen 1997). Proportion of Different Ethnic Minorities The two largest ethnic minorities are immigrant minorities that emerged after the Second World War (see Table 3.2): the Turkish minority, which was generated by the guest-worker5 system and Russian Germans who immigrated as ethnic Germans – mostly after German unification in 1991. In the next cluster, with a group size of between 200,000 and 1,000,000, are Italians, Kurds, and Greeks, these groups also arising out of the guest-worker system. People from the former

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Yugoslavia and Bosnians also immigrated, either as guest workers or as refugees. Poles and Afro-Germans are long-established minorities, tracing their origins back before the First World War. Frisians, together with the much smaller communities of the Danes, Sorbs, Jews, and Sinti and Roma are national or autochthonous minorities. The set of smaller groups (less than 200,000 members) originated either from close European countries (the guest workers: Spaniards, Portuguese; and other European countries: British, Dutch, and French) and the US, or from refugee flows (Croatians, Iranians, Romanians, Moroccans, Hungarians, Afghans, and Tamilians). Autochthonous and “Old” Ethnic Minorities Ethnic minorities in Germany can be sorted according to the amount of time they have belonged to the German nation-state. For clarity of presentation we begin with the groups that were established before the Second World War and then we focus on the groups that emerged after the war. Several ethnic minorities in Germany today lived within the area that we now consider the territory of Germany before the formation of Germany. These autochthonous minorities can be separated into those who are associated with certain areas within Germany, like the Danish, Sorbs, and Frisians,6 and those living all over Germany, like the Sinti and Roma, Huguenots, and Jews. Since its foundation,7 Danish and German people populated the Schleswig region in Northern Germany along the Danish border. The Danish minority originated in a referendum in 1920, which led to the separation of Schleswig into a Northern, Danish and a Southern, German part. The Danish minority was one of the few ethnic groups that enjoyed special protection as early as the Weimar Republic (1919– 1933). Taking the membership figures of the Danish organizations as an indicator, the amount of people who declared themselves as Danish exploded during the years of the formation of the German Federal Republic: from 2,500 in 1945 to 74,000 in 1948 (Sigaard-Madsen 1995). Today, official estimates of the size of the Danish community are about

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50,000 (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1999). An additional 20,000 persons of Danish nationality live in the rest of Germany (Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen 1997). The members of the Sorb minority are descendants of the Slavic population that settled in the Lusatia area in the seventh century. The Sorb culture survived many efforts at Germanization, particularly under National Socialism (1933–1945). Taking their language as an indicator, today there are more than 60,000 persons in Germany who speak Sorbic as their native tongue (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1999). This is a relatively stable population size, compared to an estimate of 57,000 in 1933 (Elle 1995). The oldest and largest surviving autochthonous German ethnic minority are the Frisians. Frisian tribes were first recognized during the Germanic wars of Drusus (12 – 9 bce).8 The Frisians succeeded only recently in gaining constitutional rights of protection and promotion (1990). The size of this minority is difficult to estimate: about 65,000 people speak Frisian, but according to estimates, about 400,000 persons consider themselves Frisians (Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen 1997). Important minorities that have lived in the area we now call Germany for centuries are Sinti and Roma, Huguenots, and Jews. Sinti and Roma9 migrated during the Middle Ages into Western Europe and Germany. The constant prosecution by German authorities culminated during the Nazi regime, when hundreds of thousands were killed. Administrative discrimination against Sinti and Roma persisted until the end of the 1960s, when a declaration of the European Council demanded the abolition of all discrimination against Sinti and Roma. Because of their (partly) forced nomadic lifestyle, Sinti and Roma can be considered as a truly European ethnic minority (Heckmann 1992, 9). Today both groups together comprise about 70,000 individuals (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1999). This number has been increasing considerably due to large groups of newly immigrated Sinti and Roma from Eastern Europe – mostly from Romania. Up until 1993, approximately 250,000 Roma have arrived in Germany as refugees; this number has declined sharply with repatriations, voluntary re-migration, expulsions,

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and further migration – in this, Germany has followed a strict line of exclusion and repatriation. Today, there are between 75,000 and 125,000 Roma living in Germany (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 54; Holl and Jonuz 1995). During their entire history, Jewish minorities were an integral part of nearly every German city; in 1933 about 600,000 religious Jews lived in Germany, but only about 17,000 survived the Holocaust (Heckmann 1992, 13). Among the autochthonous ethnic groups, the Jewish community surely faced the most dramatic increase in recent decades, rising from about 25,00010 people at the beginning of the 1950s to about 80,000 at the end of the 1990s, the increase largely due to the immigration of Russian Jews into Germany since the Wall came down in 1989. Jewish emigration and immigration can be separated into two phases: a phase of “through-migration” shortly after the Second World War, and a phase of immigration starting at the beginning of the 1990s. Between 1945 and 1949, about 200,000 Jewish refugees, mainly from Eastern Europe, reached Germany; nearly all of them moved on, either to Israel or the United States. Since the 1950s, only minor immigration and emigration, mostly between Israel and Germany, can be observed. During the 1990s, Jewish immigration reached new heights: between 1991 and 1998, 93,000 Jews immigrated to Germany; in 1998 alone, almost 18,000 arrived in Germany. Distinct from other ethnic immigrating groups, Jews from the former Soviet Union receive the collective status of contingent refugees, which means that their status is similar to that of recognized asylum seekers (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 54). “Old” Ethnic Minorities – Those Immigrating before the Second World War Examples of ethnic minorities who were established in Germany before the Second World War are the Polish minority and the Afro-Germans. The Polish minority in the German Reich consisted of about 4 million Polish people with German nationality. Even after the foundation of

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Poland in 1918, Germany remained one of the main receiving countries of Polish emigration, generating large ethnic enclaves, especially in the Ruhr Valley. According to a 1947 census, about 100,000 Germans whose mother tongue was Polish lived in occupied Germany, together with about 800,000 people of Polish nationality – most of whom had come as forced labourers under the Nazi regime. Nearly all the Polish people who had been in Germany as forced labourers either returned to Poland or emigrated overseas. The size of today’s Polish community is difficult to estimate and is almost certainly larger than the number of 280,000 legal residents of Polish nationality in Germany. At least four other groups of Polish people in Germany should be mentioned: the first group consists of members of the “old Polish community” (80,000 to 100,000), the second group was established by the approximately 300,000 Polish “ethnic Germans” who immigrated shortly after the Second World War and stuck to their Polish lifestyle. A third group consists of ethnic Germans who arrived in the 1980s, and the last group are the approximately 300,000 “seasonal workers” (Stefanski 1995). The inflow of Polish nationals and seasonal workers has been increasing since the beginning of the 1990s, and there are large groups of Polish people living in cities illegally (although with the free movement of labour possible within the eu policy as of May 2011, there is less illegal immigration from Poland). Another group with a long immigration history into Germany is the Afro-Germans. The first considerable number of African immigrants came to Germany during Germany’s short time as a colonial power;11 some of them received German nationality because they worked as civil servants. Another major source of the Afro-German population was the occupation troops of France and Belgium after the First World War and of the United States after the Second World War. These Afro-Germans mostly have German nationality and German is their mother tongue. The most recent source for the Afro-German community is asylum seekers, who have increasingly arrived from African countries since the 1980s. Today, the estimated size of the Afro-German community in Germany is approximately 200,000.

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“New” Ethnic Minorities in Germany The increasing ethnic diversity and ethnic conflicts in Germany after the Second World War were nearly exclusively framed as immigration problems. Three periods can be distinguished that generated in turn three new types of ethnic minorities: (1) the period of refugees and expellees between 1945 and 1959 resulted in ethnic minorities with German identity; (2) the “guest-worker” period between 1960 and 1990 led to the guest-worker minorities; and (3) the period of asylum seekers in the 1990s contributed further to the ethnic diversification of Germany. New types of ethnic minorities in Germany were created following the Second World War. In German they are called Aussiedler, which literally means “people who settle outside” and is usually translated in English as ethnic Germans. The immigration of ethnic Germans can be separated into two phases: (1) about 15 million arrived between 1945 and 1950; and (2) between the 1950s and the late 1990s, approximately 4 million arrived. After the war, immigration of German expellees from the territory of the former German Reich predominated, but was accompanied by the immigration of refugees from Eastern Europe, who had been expelled because of their “Germanness.” Nevertheless, the American military government estimated that about 10 per cent of the expellees did not speak German. Many were so different in historical background and lifestyle that they in fact belonged to different ethnic groups (Gerhardt and Hohenester 2001). This was even more true for ethnic Germans who arrived between the 1950s and 1990s, descendants of emigrants who had left German regions as early as the eleventh century. The actual size of different ethnic groups generated by the immigration of ethnic Germans is difficult to estimate. There are figures on the immigration of all these different groups, but as these groups acquire German nationality upon their arrival, their numbers are not shown in the commonly used statistics on foreigners by nationality. Furthermore, immigration from all these countries is highly heterogeneous; they vary from highly qualified persons with a good knowledge of German to

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Table 3.3 Immigration of Ethnic Germans by Area of Origin (Percentage), 1950–1996

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1996

Poland

USSR

Yugoslavia1 Romania

CSSR2

Hungary

Others3

Total 4

66.87 40.37 28.92 51.16 33.71 0.66

0.00 17.07 1.76 13.35 37.26 96.87

0.38 17.26 7.06 0.55 0.24 0.04

28.02 7.27 24.18 3.33 0.43 0.01

0.01 1.66 2.66 1.13 0.34 0.01

4.70 5.28 1.89 0.20 0.02 0.00

47497 19169 19444 52071 397073 177751

0.03 11.08 33.53 30.28 27.99 2.41

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1

2 3 4

Successor states of Yugoslavia: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Since 1993, Czech Republic and Slovakia. “Others” include immigrants who came via third countries. Since 1990, for the whole of Germany.

poorly educated non-German speaking immigrants. The largest community is certainly the group of Russland-Deutsche that predominated the immigration of ethnic Germans since the beginning of the 1990s; this immigration flow is made up of over 1 million people. These groups have special rights and have received special benefits – which have been recently reduced – such as the reimbursement of their travel costs to Germany, financial compensation for furniture left behind, preferential treatment in the housing market, special tax deductions, intensive German language courses, and aid in finding educational opportunities or jobs. Until 1990, they were entitled to pensions and unemployment benefits, and their employment history in their country of origin counted as if they had contributed in these jobs to the German social security system all their working lives (Münz et al. 1997, 115–17; Koopmans 1999, 641; Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 57–8). Ethnic Germans naturalized in Germany reached yearly numbers between about 200,000 and almost 400,000 between 1987 and 1995 (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 58). In response to the steep increase in “naturalization rates,” the German government reacted first with a quota system and then with a language test (to be taken only once in the country of origin), which has led to a slowdown

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of immigration of ethnic Germans since the mid-1990s; in addition, there are now different statuses among ethnic Germans, so that even within families, persons may have varying rights upon arrival in Germany (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 60). Guest-Worker Minorities The size of the following set of ethnic minorities in Germany is relatively easy to measure because guest workers, asylum seekers, and immigrants from eu countries usually did not acquire German nationality. For these numbers, it is important to keep in mind that they refer to people living in Germany without holding a German passport. Under the old nationality law, which was in place until recently, persons who were born in Germany but who had parents of non-German nationality were considered to be foreigners. Starting in the 1990s, legislation began to change in order to facilitate the naturalization of guest workers who had lived in Germany for an extended period of time (fifteen years or longer). New nationality legislation passed in 2000 has meant that children born in Germany of immigrant parents who arrived under the “guest-worker” regime are eligible to apply for German nationality. They must opt for German nationality before the age of 21 and must not keep another nationality. This new ius soli regulation is an important step for the German state as it moves to converge with nationality laws in other European states (Bös 2000). With the new nationality law of 2000, the validity of the official designation “foreigners by nationality” will decline, since it will underestimate the size of these ethnic groups. From the beginning of the 1960s until the early 1980s, guest-worker migration generated the “new ethnic minorities” in Germany. The guest-worker system was originally characterized by a relatively high “turnover” of people. Between 1960 and 1990, about 16 million foreigners immigrated and about 12 million emigrated (Treibel 1998). Due to the strong bilateral relations between the German Reich and the Ottoman Empire, a Turkish community had been established prior to the First World War. Starting with a bilateral contract to recruit

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“guest workers” in 1961, the Turkish community grew from about 7,000 people of Turkish nationality in 1961 to 2 million today. Today, the Turkish minority constitutes the largest and one of the most visible ethnic minorities in Germany. The heterogeneity of the ethnic composition of Turkey is reflected in the German Turkish community, the two most prominent ethnic groups of Turkish nationality in Germany being Kurds and Armenians. Trends in the size of the Kurdish community are difficult to estimate, but today about 500,000 persons of Turkish nationality are considered to be Kurds (Holl and Jonuz 1995). The second largest group of the new immigrant minorities is made up of people from the former Yugoslavia. Although many of them immigrated as guest workers, the population increased dramatically with the inflow of refugees since the beginning of the 1990s. Due to both forced and free migration during the Nazi regime, about 5,000-10,000 people from the former Yugoslavia lived in the German Federal Republic in 1949. Today, the group of 700,000 persons from the former Yugoslavia largely consists of people from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by people from Serbia. The other guest-worker minorities from Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal are often considered a “success story of integration.” ItalianGerman migration was re-introduced12 with a bilateral treaty in 1955 – which was the first treaty of this kind that West Germany signed. The Italian community grew fast and constituted – with about 400,000 in 1967 – the largest guest-worker community in Germany at that time. Today, about 600,000 persons of Italian origin live in Germany. With a bilateral contract in 1960, an immigration flow from Greece, mainly from the poor regions of northern Greece (Macedonia, Thrace) was established. Today, about 400,000 Greeks, both of Greek and German nationality, live in Germany. In 1959, 2,150 persons of Spanish Nationality lived in Germany. Their population grew to 270,350 in 1971; with the democratization of Spain after 1975, return migration to Spain increased. Today, about 140,000 people of Spanish origin live in the German Federal Republic. The community having the most unstable size among guest-worker communities is the Portuguese; after having approximately 24,000 members in 1967, its size reached a first peak in

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Table 3.4 Immigration According to Country of Origin (Percentage), 1974–1995 1974

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

1996

1997

Europe eu Turkey Yugoslavia Poland Africa America Asia Australia/ Oceania

88.32 38.59 29.86 13.43 2.07 1.81 4.57 4.94

84.97 36.14 26.94 12.45 4.04 2.43 5.91 6.25

82.42 30.74 33.64 6.64 6.65 3.28 3.99 10.04

68.14 25.89 11.94 5.66 18.15 4.90 6.38 20.23

78.87 16.77 10.04 7.83 24.13 4.76 3.86 12.27

77.95 22.28 9.45 6.81 11.33 4.05 3.76 13.99

74.29 24.63 10.57 6.11 11.17 4.96 4.45 16.01

72.68 25.26 9.37 5.36 11.68 5.25 4.97 16.78

0.36

0.44

0.27

0.35

0.24

0.25

0.29

0.31

total

538,405 365,863 630,878 397,593 832,375 846,852 755,446 652,780

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt

1974 (122,000) and then declined – with the democratization process that has been taking place in Portugal since 1975 – to about 130,000 in 1997. Most Recent Immigration: Refugees and Asylum Seekers The increasing flow of refugees and asylum seekers since the early 1980s contributed to the further diversification of ethnic groups in Germany. Between 1988 and 1996, 2 million asylum seekers arrived in Germany – almost half of them have left Germany again (Münz et al. 1997, 144; Koopmans 1999, note 14). Sixty per cent of asylum seekers come from Eastern Europe, just like ethnic Germans, from Poland, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia. The number of asylum seekers declined sharply in 1994 after changes in the German Basic Law; between 1997 and 2002, 740,000 asylum applications were counted (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 50–3). The ethnic minority of people from, for example, Iran (110,000) increased dramatically after the Islamic revolution there, adding to the number of persons who came

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Table 3.5 Total Immigration and Net Migration (in thousands)1 Year

Immigration

Net migration

Asylum seekers

in % of foreigners

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

976.2 367.3 632.3 400.0 842.4 788.0 649.3

541.6 –233.1 246.3 32.2 376.3 227.0 86.5

8.6 9.6 107.8 73.8 193.1 127.9 78.6

0.9 2.6 17.1 18.5 22.9 16.2 12.1

Sources: Münz (1998), Statistisches Bundesamt, authors’ calculations. 1

Since 1990 for the whole of Germany

to Germany during the long history of exchange between Iran and Germany. One of the most prominent groups that immigrated as asylum seekers to Germany from Eastern Europe was the Romanian minority. In 1967, only about 3,000 people with Romanian nationality lived in Germany. The size of the population increased slowly until 1989 (21,000), then it showed a dramatic increase to 160,000 (1992), only to go down again to 110,000 in 1997. In general, the situation is difficult for asylum seekers in Germany. They are not allowed to work, they have no right to individual housing, and they are not allowed to move freely. They are restricted to the area to which they have been assigned and need travel permits if they want to leave these districts. (Since 1996, this has also been true for ethnic Germans who depend on social welfare during the first two years of their stay). (Koopmans 1999, 641). Asylum seekers receive full citizenship rights if their application is accepted, but the acceptance rate in the 1990s was always well below ten per cent. Last but not least, there are large minorities from eu countries. Besides the already mentioned guest-worker minorities, the largest group is the Dutch minority. Between 1967 and the beginning of the 1990s, the size of the Dutch minority was about 100,000 people, but it increased since the mid-1990s to 180,000 in 1997. The British minority

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increased from about 25,000 in 1967 to 115,000 in 1997 and therefore shows a similar pattern to the French minority, which grew from 38,000 in 1967 to 100,000 in 1997. Finally, one can refer to the “invisible minority” of people from Austria: from 1970 until the beginning of the 1990s, its size oscillated between 150,000 and 200,000 and went down to 110,000 in 1997. The share of immigrants from other eu countries is declining. About 50 per cent of all immigrants were from eu countries in the 1960s; that share was a little more than 20 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, it has risen slightly again. The same pattern holds true for the emigration of different eu minorities – this slight rise in population exchange might be seen as an indicator for the increasing integration of the European Union. Excursus: Ethnic Minorities in East Germany All three phases of immigration since the Second World War contributed to the already established ethnic diversity of Germany. But the immigration history of Germany after the Second World War would be incomplete without recognizing the separation of Germany after the war as an important frame of reference for different ethnic groups. There are considerable differences in the history and in the density of ethnic communities between East Germany and West Germany. In 1949, about 38 per cent (18 million) of all Germans lived in the gdr (German Democratic Republic or East Germany); in 1990, it was only a quarter (16 million), and the proportion is still declining. Although the variety of German dialects and different regional traditions was equally large in East and West Germany, the diversity between all ethnic groups was much lower. The three main groups were Soviet soldiers, the Sorbs, and guest workers.13 In numbers, the most important ethnic group in the gdr was composed of soldiers from the Soviet Union. Shortly before unification, between 360,000 and 380,000 soldiers lived in East Germany, together with about 200,000 family members (Müggenburg 1996). They lived mostly separately on military bases or in special quarters. In a large lo-

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gistical effort, and with substantial financial help from the German government, these forces were relocated to Russia at the beginning of the 1990s. As mentioned above, the national minority of the Sorbs lived in the area of the former gdr. Primarily because the Sorbs were considered as “Slavic brother people” by the Soviet Union, the gdr implemented generous protection laws for this minority. The Sorbs are the only major member of the ethnic groups in the former gdr who are now incorporated into the ethnic structure of unified Germany. Since the mid-1960s, the East German government recruited guest workers from other socialist countries. In 1989, about 166,400 foreigners lived in the gdr. They were guest workers mainly from Vietnam (53,000), Mozambique (14,000), Cuba (10,000), Poland (6,500), Angola (1,000), and China (900) (Krüger-Potratz 1991). Different from the situation in West Germany, this was intended to be working migration, so that there was no family migration, and if women became pregnant, they were – until the period just before the Wall came down – sent back to their home countries (Müggenburg 1996, 18). In 1995, less than 10,000 guest workers from these countries still lived in Germany. It is a myth that there were “no foreigners” or “no ethnic minorities” in the former German Democratic Republic. Although these are all rough estimates, the Soviet soldiers, combined with the other minorities, constituted about four per cent of the population in the German Democratic Republic. The main difference between East and West Germany was that foreigners and ethnic groups in East Germany were highly segregated, either in military neighbourhoods, special camps for guest workers, or in the area of the Sorbs. The proportion of foreigners dropped dramatically when Russia withdrew Russian soldiers and their relatives shortly after unification. As a general rule of thumb, even today the density of ethnic minorities in the area of the former gdr is only a quarter of that of other German regions at most: 1.7 per cent of the population in 1997 (after 0.8 per cent in 1991) (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 65); nevertheless, the structure of ethnic minorities in East Germany is gradually becoming comparable to that of the Western part of Germany.

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At the conclusion of this sketch of the current German ethnic landscape, two structural aspects should be mentioned. Firstly, as seen from the review of the various groups, immigration and emigration rates in Germany are quite unstable. Especially in times of high immigration rates, migration issues are widely discussed in German society. The volume of the immigration flow ranges from years with immigration rates of approximately three times higher than in the usa, as in the 1990s, to years with negative net-migration, as in the mid 1970s and the 1980s (Bahr et al. 2002). The inflow of asylum seekers reached a small peak in 1980 but increased dramatically at the beginning of the 1990s. In addition to the inflow of foreigners, the inflow of ethnic Germans also rose at the end of the 1980s. Both flows added up to over a million immigrants in the years between 1989 and 1993, being partly caused by the breakdown of the Soviet Union and coinciding with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of Germany. Primarily due to changes in the legal system, the inflow of asylum seekers and ethnic Germans has been in strong decline since the mid 1990s. Secondly, we have to keep in mind that the proportions and structures of ethnic groups are very different in the various regions of Germany. As a rule of thumb, the highest proportions of all ethnic minorities are in the large metropolitan areas (Hamburg, Berlin, Bremen) and in the southwest of Germany. Looking at the regional distribution of non-nationals, one can say that in nearly all areas of East Germany, except Berlin, the proportions of ethnic minorities is below 3 per cent, whereas in many larger West German cities, proportions over 20 per cent are quite frequent. The prosperous West German city belt reaching from Munich via Stuttgart over the Rhine Valley to the Ruhr Valley constitutes the main area of settlement together with concentrations around Hamburg and in Berlin (Gans and Kemper 2001). The communities with the largest percentage of foreigners (approximately 30 per cent) are most frequent in the Rhine-Main area. More than 60 per cent of foreigners in Germany live in the densely populated areas of Germany; among Germans, this rate is only 41 per cent (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 65).

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participation in different spheres of society By the last decade of the twentieth century, the self-perception of many continental European nations shifted dramatically. Terms like “diversity,” “multiculturalism,” and, last but not least, “ethnicity” were increasingly used to describe group structures and inequalities in these countries. This is especially surprising in the case of Germany. In sociological folklore, Germany epitomizes a nation that sees itself as an ethnically homogeneous people (among many, see Brubaker 1992). In Germany, as in many other countries, ethnic differences such as differences in language and lifestyle until recently were assumed to be congruent with the borders of the nation-state. Defining a group within the borders of Germany as an “ethnic group” in this context bore the connotation of excluding the group from the nationally constituted society. In the same way, the ethnic group concept was and sometimes still is used in relation to some “guest-worker”1 minorities. Family Family structures of the guest-worker minorities are subject to tremendous changes – there is societal change in the countries of origin and immigration, there is generational change between the immigrating and the following generations, and there are changes within the individual families in the family cycle and thus in the family members’ life course (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 75–8). When there is a regular exchange between immigrants and their home countries, it is difficult to describe the family situations of immigrant families using only German statistics – as many marriages, births, and deaths are likely to be recorded outside the German national system, but within the country of origin’s statistics. For example, there are no reliable data on life expectancy for immigrants to Germany. The value of children is very different for the various ethnic groups in Germany, especially with regard to the economic-utilitarian views of having children (Nauck et al.

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1998). On this account, different situations in the different countries of origin and the respective welfare states become apparent, and ethnic Germans have views that are more similar to guest-worker groups than to Germans (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000: 97–101). Birth rates of migrants have over time largely adjusted to those of Germans and did in fact become even lower than those of Germans in 1999 (see Table 3.6) – and to those of the countries of origin, where, as is the case for Italy or Portugal, there has been tremendous demographic change over the past quarter century. Only Turkish women still have much higher reproduction rates than other guest-worker groups – although they still are lower than those of Turkish women in Turkey (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 102). Education The educational system in Germany is mainly run by the different German Länder (states); all Länder have laws that require school attendance for nine or ten years. The German school system is a three-tiered one, where children of different aspirations and qualifications are separated after fourth grade and proceed to three different kinds of schools: (1) Hauptschule (“Main School”) that ends after ninth grade and provides a basis for vocational training; (2) Realschule (“Real School”) that leads up to tenth grade and is traditionally the basis for clerking and administrative jobs; and (3) Gymnasium that ends after twelfth or thirteenth grade and is the only school that provides the entry certificate (Abitur) for university. Children of most foreign nationalities in Germany disproportionately attend Hauptschule and have a much higher drop-out rate than ethnically German children (cf. Alba et al. 1994; Dinkel et al. 1999, see Table 3.7). Among the general population in Germany, the educational levels of foreigners and their occupational positions are considerably lower than those of the German population (von Below 2004b; 2003). This has to do with the approach of having recruited preferably less qualified persons as guest workers (Adam 1994). Since Germany is the nation with the greatest reproduction of social background in the educational system,14 this strong social se-

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Table 3.6 Birth Rates of Women (between 15–50) in the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany, by German or Foreign Nationality Federal Republic of Germany – West

19501 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1999

German women

Foreign women

Overall

N/A N/A 2.01 1.40 1.40 1.30 1.40

N/A N/A 2.18 2.07 1.83 1.46 1.38

2.10 2.37 2.02 1.44 1.45 1.34 1.41

East Germany and East Berlin German women

N/A 0.83 1.16

Foreign women

N/A 1.10 1.04

Overall

Rate of foreign births2

1.52 0.84 1.15

1.93 7.8 13.0 11.9 13.0 12.4

1

Former Federal Republic without Saarland and West Berlin. Data until 1990 are for West Germany only; after that, for East and West Germany together. 3 1962 (the earliest year for which these data are available). 2

Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, cit. by Wolffs (2002, 38); Statistisches Bundesamt 2004.

lection within the educational system applies to the children of less qualified immigrants as well. It can be shown, though, that when they have good language skills, there is no difference between children of immigrants and equally qualified German parents where educational performance is concerned (Deutsches pisa-Konsortium 2001), although Turkish persons remain disadvantaged (von Below 2004a). Generally speaking, it can be concluded that within the German educational system, the children of guest workers are the “newly disadvantaged” (Klemm 2000, 158), but with their growing integration and the increasing numbers who belong to the second and third generations, the distance between immigrants and the German population is continuously decreasing. Participation in the Economy Besides political and social integration, integration into the economic system is a major aspect of the situation of ethnic groups. The major-

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Table 3.7 Graduates According to Type of Qualification Obtained; Foreigners and All Graduates, in Absolute Numbers and Percentage, 1999 Foreigners1 Number No Hauptschul degree (incl. Special Ed. Schools) With Hauptschul degree With Realschul or similar degree Attained in General schools Vocational schools Hochschul-/Fachhochschulreife Attained in General schools Vocational schools total

15,663 33,221 29,722 23,427 6,295 15,302

Percentage

Number

Percentage

16.7 35.4 31.6

83,800 244,300 440,000

7.6 22.1 39.7

16.3

374,300 65,700 339,900

30.7

8,789 6,513 138,932

All Graduates2

234,000 104,900 100.0

1,886,900

100.0

Sources: 1

Berufsbildungsbericht 2000, Übersicht 26, Seite 61, zit. n. Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Bildung und Kultur, Reihe 1, Allgemeinbildende Schulen, Reihe 2 Berufliche Schulen; calculations by Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung. 2 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2001, 50–1; authors’ calculations; these data include nonGerman graduates.

ity of foreign workers in Germany of the first generation held bluecollar positions – in 1997, three quarters of Turks and Greeks were unqualified blue-collar workers, and about half of all Yugoslavs in Germany worked in these positions; for Germans, this rate was about a quarter. In 1989, German workers held more white-collar positions, while foreign employees had increased their participation in qualified blue-collar positions – only Spaniards reached the level of ten per cent in the white-collar classification. Foreign women increased their share in the white-collar segment substantially more than men (Bender and Seifert 1996). In younger cohorts, there are higher positions for many groups of better qualified foreigners, especially those who have been qualified in

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Table 3.8 Unemployment Rates Overall and of Foreigners, by Nationality, 1980–2000 Year

Total

Foreigners

Greece

Italy

Portugal

Spain

FR Yugoslavia Turkey

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

3.5 8.7 6.6 9.0 10.0

4.8 13.1 10.1 16.2 18.0

4.1 11.4 9.7 15.8 15.4

5.5 14.7 10.5 16.2 14.7

2.1 7.6 5.5 12.3 11.1

3.2 8.7 6.8 10.6 11.3

2.3 9.0 6.0 8.8 10.4

4.2 14.8 10.0 19.2 20.2

Notes: • Unemployment rates of Germans and foreigners cannot really be compared since the basis for foreigners only consists of those in dependent employment plus those unemployed (thus self-employed persons are not considered, which is different for the German rate). On German unemployment statistics and its changes, cf. von Below 1999. • Yugoslavia: until 1991 Socialist Federal Republik Yugoslavia (SFRY); 1992, former SFRY without BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia; from 1993 onward SFRY without Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia. • 2000: For all of Germany, until then: only West Germany. Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2004.

the German dual system – who mainly belong to the second generation of immigrants. But even among these groups, there are differences between nationalities. For example, Turks are highly represented in the unqualified segment (Bender and Seifert 1996) and, unlike other groups of foreigners in Germany, cannot put to use their rising qualifications in appropriate positions in the labour market (von Below 2003). This leads to a high and rising rate of unemployment among this group (see Table 3.8). Self-employment is a very important strategy for immigrants, especially for Turks, but also for Italians, in order to make a living in Germany. These ethnic enterprises have expanded considerably, from catering only to their own ethnic groups, to now serving the German population, and expanding as German-ethnic joint ventures – since German businesses do not want to miss out on a growing and relevant segment of the German market (Sen and Ulusoy 2001). A certain, very small, but significant number of professions are restricted to holders of German passports only. These are the traditional tenured civil servant jobs that require special obedience to, and offer special care by, the state; in daily life, these positions are important positions, and include

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teachers, policemen, the army, and the judiciary (Koopmans 1999, 635). Thus, members of many ethnic minorities as well as the German population don’t have much experience with ethnic minorities holding these kinds of positions of authority. Participation in the Political System and Intermediate Organizations Naturalization Rates Naturalization rates in Germany are notoriously difficult to interpret. In general, there are two different categories of naturalization: discretionary naturalization (Ermessenseinbürgerung) and naturalization by right (Anspruchseinbürgerung). Discretionary naturalization is naturalization according to the nationality law. Naturalization by right is originally the naturalization of ethnic Germans. In all of the official statistics and in most sociological studies, the naturalization of ethnic Germans is not counted as “real naturalization”; it is assumed that ethnic Germans are not really foreigners. According to the arguments developed above, this is only partially true – substantial numbers of the immigrating ethnic Germans have to be considered as “real” and culturally different immigrants accompanied by all the problems and disadvantages of immigration – the term “ethnic German” can be considered an ethno-national euphemism (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 59). Until 1989, naturalization rates of immigrants were extremely low in Germany. This was mainly due to the fact that Germany kept the old nationality law of 1913 (for a general overview, see Bös 2000) with only very restrictive naturalization regulations.15 That situation changed after 1989. The total number of naturalizations increased dramatically since the end of the 1980s, after the Iron Curtain had come down and restrictions for ethnic Germans leaving Eastern Europe were no longer applied.16 In addition, German naturalization regulations changed. Since 1993, there has been a naturalization by right for young foreigners and foreigners who have lived in Germany for a long time and had arrived or were born under the guest-worker system (according to §§ 85, 86 Abs. 1 AuslG - Foreigners Law). Between 1981 and 1996, al-

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most 1.9 million people were naturalized in the Federal Republic of Germany – 74 per cent of these between 1991 and 1996. This increase is mainly due to high numbers of ethnic Germans immigrating. The second largest group of immigrants who are naturalized are Turks – the number of their naturalizations was 46,000 in 1996 alone (which is still very small compared to the approximately 2 million people with Turkish passports living in Germany) (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 64). Since 2000, Germany has had a new nationality law that basically adopted the legal structure common to most other countries (Dornis 2002). Although this law led to a further increase in naturalization rates, it is too early to evaluate its impact. Most recent numbers suggest that after many naturalizations under the new law in 2000, the subsequent numbers have been continuously decreasing (Statistisches Bundesamt 2004). Participation in the Political System Participation in the political process by ethnic groups was originally seen as dangerous for the unity of the nation-state because most ethnic groups in Europe were associated with a location they inhabited more or less exclusively, like the Basque or the Bretons, and therefore they were able to pursue secessionist leanings. These groups are still there, but in addition we see a shift in the relationship between location and ethnic groups. While autochthonous minorities are especially associated with a defined space within a national territory, new ethnic minorities usually do not have those special areas. There might be special neighbourhoods, as there are working-class neighbourhoods, but those ethnic groups usually have no legitimate reason to separate these areas institutionally from the surrounding society.

perception and social problems Criminality and Violence Crime Rate Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the more radical groups within the Muslim community came under suspicion. With the notable exception of Kurds, most Muslim immigrant

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communities traditionally kept a very low profile concerning political, partly fundamentalist, agendas. As Koopmans (1999, 636) points out, special public attention is paid to the allegedly high crime rate of foreigners in Germany; this is to a large extent due to the fact that there are many crimes that can only be committed by foreigners (i.e. violation of aliens’ legislation, illegally crossing borders). In the other areas, if one controls for social and demographic factors, there is no difference between the crime rates of foreigners and Germans. In official statistics, no hard data can be found on other ethnic groups – but research done in Lower Saxony shows that immigrant ethnic Germans – the Aussiedler – have a crime rate that is fairly high – which, again, can be related to their social and demographic situation. However, it is certainly not lower among these Germans than among “foreigners,” and only recently a heightened awareness has developed on this topic. With rising numbers and federal assignation to certain regions, new enclaves of ethnic Germans were generated. In these enclaves with mostly Russian language immigrants, high unemployment, and receding support for measures of integration, there is high disillusionment, especially among youths, and their crime rate was found to be higher than among other German youths with similar social backgrounds (Pfeiffer and Wetzels 1999). For these Russian youths, the situation is difficult – in their countries of origin, they were discriminated against as “the Germans,” whereas in Germany they are considered as “Russians.” Also, there is not only discrimination and aggression between ethnic German and German youths, but there is also increasing discrimination and aggression between “Russians” and “Turks” (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000). Violent Incidents Against Ethnic Groups Associated with the wave of right-wing violence against immigrants after unification, the integration of ethnic groups (publicly discussed mostly with reference to the Turkish minority) became one of the major political issues in Germany. The large inflow of asylum seekers, ethnic Germans, and immigrants until the middle of the 1990s was considered a major problem, and there was a strong rise in right-wing extremist and xenophobic violence (see Table 3.9).

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Table 3.9 Right-Wing Extremist and Xenophobic Violence, 1982–1996 Year

Total 1

With xenophobic background

in %

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

88 76 91 120 189 192 193 255 309 1,492 2,639 2,232 1,489 837 781

43 32 36 50 117 98 103 146 152 1,255 2,277 1,609 860 540 441

48.9 42.1 39.6 41.7 61.9 51.0 53.4 57.3 49.2 84.1 86.3 72.1 57.8 64.5 56.5

Source: Beck (1999). 1

Total of legal offenses with proven or assumed right-wing motivation.

Various political measures have reduced the inflow of asylum seekers and ethnic Germans considerably, and the immigration law that was passed in 2004 will further reduce the already declining immigration rates. But it turns out that many problems of integration are not directly related to the absolute inflow of foreigners, but to policies concerning the integration of immigrants.

emerging problems and efforts at resolution From “Foreigners” to Ethnic Minorities As the short sketch above has shown, the ethnic landscape of Germany has a long history and is highly diversified. The perception of ethnic groups in Germany has dramatically changed in the last few years in the direction of an increasing recognition of ethnic diversity. Contrary to

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these new developments, it must be noted that the post-war political discussions about ethnic groups were dominated by the dichotomy of “foreigners” vs Germans.” This dichotomy can be seen partly as the outcome of the belated nation-building process that emphasized Germanness as a unifying aspect and the racist Manichean worldview of the Nazis. But the stabilization of the foreigner/German dichotomy was due as well to the successful political strategy of the fathers and mothers of the German Basic Law: In an article designed for the transition period after the Second World War (Article 116), they declared all refugees on German territory as Germans in order not to promote ethnic conflicts between expellees and the local population (Leibholz and Mangold 1951, 309, 823). This very inclusive constitutional definition of being German changed during the post-war decades. For about half a century, in the German language, every possible aspect related to immigrants was explicitly identified as Ausländer (“foreign”). There was a foreigners’ crime rate, foreigners’ extremism, and foreigners’ politics (Koopmans 1999, 634). The label “foreigners” only applies to those ethnic groups who do not hold German passports, i.e. not for newly immigrated ethnic Germans. There was hardly ever a reference to “ethnic minorities,” and only a few references to “immigrants.” Today, the term Ausländer is increasingly replaced by the term Migranten (“migrants”), which bears a kind of technical-scientific flavour in the German language. But the awareness of challenges and problems is still mostly concentrated only on certain groups of “foreigners” (read: immigrants). It is only since the 1990s, through the many tensions associated with ethnic Germans from Russia (Russland-Deutsche), that Germans have learned once more17 that “being German” can refer to a group that is in fact ethnically different. At the same time, the second and third generations of the various guest-worker communities started to openly live their own ways of being German. From the standpoint of sociological analysis, one has to be careful in adopting the German parlance of “foreigners” or “immigration problems”; as if immigration as such constituted a problem. Those problems are the outcome of the interaction between two or more groups and are the outcome of interacting traits and processes of ethnic groups,

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immigrants, and the majority. These interactions can consist of “simple” processes like scapegoat mechanisms or economic deprivation; however, ethnic conflicts are always the outcome of a large set of different factors, something which Myrdal famously described as the “principle of cumulation.”18 One example at hand is the violent outbreaks against asylum seekers in some suburbs of East Germany. In the early 1990s, the German government decided that all communities (be they in East or West Germany) had to take the same quota of asylum seekers. Without any infrastructure to handle refugees, East German communities started to refill the vacant apartments in the increasingly depopulated poor suburbs in pre-fabricated rental blocks (Plattenbauten) in East German cities with asylum seekers. In this context, asylum seekers in the neighbourhood symbolized not only the decline of the area but also the “imposed” changes introduced by West Germans during the unification process. They were vulnerable symbols and served as easy targets for violent right-wing youth gangs, who were eager to challenge the “new order,” which was obviously held to be accountable for their own social decline. In this case, as in many other cases, ethnic conflicts are the cumulative effect of many processes that are not necessarily related. Integration politics in Germany is restricted mainly to naturalization and some programs on languages. With respect to naturalization and citizenship rights, ethnic minorities in Germany can be divided into two groups: (1) the autochthonous ethnic groups and old immigration minorities that are naturalized and have full citizenship rights; and (2) the new immigration minorities that emerged after the Second World War. These minorities are in a totally different situation: there are ethnic Germans who are, as a rule of thumb, naturalized upon arrival; then there are guest-worker minorities and refugees, who, under the old nationality law, were not naturalized; and in addition there are eu ethnic minorities for whom naturalization becomes increasingly unimportant. The topic of language and whether immigrants should be obliged to learn German – possibly in special courses – is often discussed in public. This point is often discussed with reference to the Turkish minority, where deficient language skills, especially in the first generation,

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have been shown to be a major hindrance to integration (Deutsches pisa-Konsortium 2001; von Below 2003). Contrary to the solution that was so successfully applied to the Danish and Sorb minorities, the implementation of a double language school system, education in their mother tongue was seen as a problem with regard to the Turkish minority. The policy measures concerning the integration of immigrants in Germany can be roughly sorted according to the three administrative levels on which they are based: the federal level, the state level (Länder), and the municipal level. On the federal level, ethnic Germans are entitled to a six-month language training course in addition to other courses, especially for young people. Programs for other immigrants are mainly restricted to language teaching. There are additional counselling offices to help immigrants that are financed by the federal government and the states. There is, as well, a large array of programs especially for young immigrants, which are co-financed by the federal level. There are different programs on the state level (Süssmuth 2001, 207), but these are mostly co-financing municipal programs; the state level is especially relevant in the sector of education, where the responsibility for the school system lies with the individual Länder (von Below 2002 and above). In addition to the levels elaborated above, the role of intermediate organizations (Wohlfahrtsverbände) is even more important on the municipal level, where different ethnic groups actually live together. There are various activities to support the integration of immigrants, e.g. financial support for institutions that offer counselling for specific groups, courses, other fields of social work, and incentives for social activities among the population (Süssmuth 2001, 208ff.). One influence of increasing importance for policies concerning ethnic minorities in Germany is the European Union, where two major breakthroughs were the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1994). Both of these developments drastically increased the chances of different ethnic minorities in Germany being recognized by the German government. One point of conflict was the recognition of Frisian as a minority language. Following the guidelines of the Eu-

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ropean council in 1999 in Tampere, there will be pressure for changes in the legal system of Germany concerning immigration and ethnic minorities – mainly in the areas of family unification, refugees, and antidiscrimination laws. The new immigration law that was negotiated again between political parties at the beginning of this century did not meet those high expectations; unfortunately, the Christian Democrats in particular use this overdue regulation for their short-term political interests to slow down governmental reform. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Germany faced a tremendous shift in the public perception and in the visibility of ethnic minorities. Media aimed at young people are increasingly diverse. In particular Turkish Germans and Afro-Germans have a growing share in the production of different youth cultures. Although music styles are still dominated by American forms, texts of songs and raps by these ethnic artists are usually in German, whereas “old-fashioned” German pop artists still mostly use English. This increasing hybridization of different levels of German culture is paralleled by xenophobically motivated violence and openly stated Neo-Nazi attitudes. Germany tries to cope with the situation on the one hand with an increase in pressure on NeoNazi groups, with public campaigns, policy observance, and a ban on Neo-Nazi associations – and on the other hand, with increasing efforts to integrate ethnic minorities, as exemplified in the new nationality law.

notes 1 For all general historical facts, see Schulze 1998. 2 These three aspects constitute a kind of minimal definition of ethnicity. For a more elaborate discussion on the problem of defining “ethnicity,” see Yinger 1994. 3 If not stated otherwise, the figures up to 1990 are for West Germany only. 4 The name of the institution changed over the years, from “Bundesbeauftrage für die Belange der Ausländer” to “Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen” and meanwhile “Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration.”

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5 “Guest worker” (Gastarbeiter) is the term that was used officially and by large parts of the population to describe those groups of foreigners who were invited to work in Germany. It was assumed that they would leave as the need for additional labourers diminished. The term epitomizes the ambivalent attitude of Germans towards these minorities. In everyday life, it would be strange to let guests work for their hosts. 6 Only very recently, following the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1994) in Europe, the German government published official reports on these groups. The Danes, Sorbs, Frisians, and Sinti and Roma are officially recognized as national minorities in these reports (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1999). Lower German (Niederdeutsch) is considered a minority language (Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2000). 7 There is archaeological evidence of the struggle between the Danes and Germans from the ninth to the twelfth centuries west of the town of Schleswig. The bishopric of Schleswig was founded in 934. 8 Most peoples living in Germany like Bavarians, Swavians, or Hessians can trace their history back to tribes encountered by Romans during the northern expansion of the Roman Empire. Most of these tribes are described in Germania by Tacitus (De origine et situ Germanorum 98 CE). Although most ethnographical information in this work appears to be correct, the favourable description of the morale of German tribes by Tacitus is mainly motivated by his critical stance towards the – in his view – decadent lifestyle of the Romans at this time. Although these German tribes had been ethnic entities at that time, today most of those distinctions are largely folklore or meaningless, and therefore these peoples cannot be counted as ethnic groups. 9 According to their self-definition, Sinti and Roma constitute two different ethnic groups because of partly different languages and different habits. Nevertheless, their own ethnic organization as well as official publications usually pool Sinti and Roma together, as is the case in this text. 10 If not otherwise indicated, the figures are estimates taken from Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen 1997 for the year 1995. 11 Although some of the German states and many Germans were involved in modern colonialism beginning about 1500, Germany’s history as a colonial

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12

13

14

15

16

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power was largely restricted to the phase of “new imperialism” between 1875 and 1914. After the First World War, the Allied powers divided the German overseas colonies among themselves. Labour migration from Italy, mainly from the Mezzogiorno, was first introduced by bilateral treaties in 1937; most of these 485,000 seasonal workers left Germany with the end of the Second World War. In the 1970s, together with increasing numbers of guest workers, the gdr also admitted a few thousand refugees especially from Chile and South Africa. Their numbers declined in the 1980s. These refugees can be seen as a fourth group of ethnic minorities within the German Democratic Republic. Another, even smaller, group was exchange students, especially those from developing countries (Müggenburg 1996). According to the pisa study, the difference in literacy skills of students from different socio-economic backgrounds is greatest in Germany, compared to thirty-one other oecd countries that participated in the study; the usa is among the countries with a relatively high difference between groups with high vs. low social status, while in Canada, different social backgrounds do not have such a great influence on educational performance (Deutsches pisa-Konsortium 2001). One of the reasons that the German government was reluctant to change this law was that West Germany was still able to define the people of East Germany as German citizens. Any new nationality law that would have included such an inclusion would have been against international law because no state is allowed to declare the whole people of another state as its own nationals (Neumann 1998, 263). This law has a very long history in Germany and was appropriate and functional in times when there was no German nation but many different, German speaking states; a territorial rule for nationality would have been very complicated and legally problematic (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 56). The other reason for the low naturalization rates was the administrative regulations of the German government, which were unevenly (and restrictively) applied in different states of Germany. Based on Article 116a in the German Basic Law, in 1953, a special law for expellees (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) was ratified that granted the right to receive German nationality to people who had been prosecuted because of

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their “Germanness” in communist countries (Bundesministerium für Familie 2000, 57). Since many of these minorities lived in countries where it was illegal to speak German or stick to German habits, it was considered sufficient if they could prove that they had been considered Germans in their home country or that they were of German descent of some sort. With the granting of German nationality, people earned the right to enter Germany – and still could retain their nationality of birth. 17 “Learn again” is meant here in two respects; on the one hand, over the history of Germany, there was typically an ample awareness of cultural differences within Germany – something at least partially forgotten after the Second World War. On the other hand, with respect to refugees and expellees directly after the war, Germans were very reluctant to accept these new Germans as Germans. 18 With respect to the causes of the caste-like situation of African-Americans, he wrote: “In an interdependent system of dynamic causation there is no ‘primary cause’ but everything is cause to everything else” (Myrdal 1998 [1944]).

references Adam, Heribert. 1994. “Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Einwanderungspolitik und Multikulturalismus in Kanada und Deutschland,” Leviathan – Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft: 60–77. Alba, Richard D., Johann Handl, and Walter Müller. 1994. “Ethnische Ungleichheit im deutschen Bildungssystem,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 46 (2): 209–37. Bahr, Howard et al. 2002. “Immigration and Social Inequality,” in New Structures of Inequality, ed. Y. Lemel and H.-H. Noll. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerangelegenheiten, ed. 1999. Migration und Integration in Zahlen. Ein Handbuch. Bonn, CD Version. – 1999. “Unemployment in West Germany: Current Aspects and LongTerm Trends,” in Unemployment - Risks and Reactions, ed. N. Genov, 52–70. Paris-Sofia: Unesco-Most; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

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Below, Susanne von. 2004a. “Die schulische Bildung von Migranten. Zum Einfluss von sozialstrukturellen, regionalen und subjektiven Merkmalen,” in Aspekte der Integration. Wanderungsverhalten, Eingliederungsmuster und Lebenssituation türkisch- und italienisch-stämmiger Jugendlicher in Deutschland, ed. Claudia Diehl and Sonja Haug. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. – 2004b. “Zur doppelten Relevanz der Generation: Bildung und Erwerbstätigkeit junger Migranten in Deutschland,” in Generation und Ungleichheit. Sozialstrukturanalysen Bd. 19, ed. Marc Szydlik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. – 2003. Schulische Bildung, berufliche Ausbildung und Erwerbstätigkeit junger Migranten. Ergebnisse des Integrationssurveys des BiB. Materialien zur Bevölkerungswissenschaft 105b. Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung. – 2002. Bildungssysteme und soziale Ungleichheit: Das Beispiel der neuen Bundesländer. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Bender, Stefan and Wolfgang Seifert. 1996. “Zuwanderer auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Nationalitäten- und geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede,” Zeitschrift für Soziologie 25 (6): 473–95. Berry, John W. 1998. “Social Psychological Costs and Benefits of Multiculturalism: A View from Canada,” Trames 3 (2): 209–33. Bös, Mathias. 2000. “The Legal Construction of Membership: Nationality Law in Germany and the United States.” Center for European Studies Working Paper Series. Harvard University. Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. 2004. Arbeitslosenquoten ausländischer Arbeitnehmer nach Herkunftsländern. Tabelle 33. Nürnberg: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, as cited by www.integrationsbeauftragte.de. Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung. 2001. Grund- und Strukturdaten 2001/2002. Bonn: BMBF. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend. 2000. Sechster Familienbericht. Familien ausländischer Herkunft in Deutschland. Leistungen, Belastungen, Herausforderungen. Familienbericht 6. Berlin. Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1999. Erster Bericht der Bundesrepublik

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Deutschland gemäß Artikel 25 Absatz 1 des Rahmenübereinkommens des Europarates zum Schutz Nationaler Minderheiten. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren. Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 2000. Erster Bericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gemäß Artikel 15 Absatz 1 der europäischen Charta der Regional- und Minderheitensprachen. Berlin: Bundesministerium des Inneren. Canada. 1988. The House of Commons of Canada. “Bill C-93: The Multiculturalism Act,” July 12. Cooper, Belinda. 2000. “Germany,” in Encarta Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience, ed. Henry Louis Gates. Microsoft Encarta. Deutsches pisa-Konsortium. 2001. ed. PISA 2000. Basiskompetenzen von Schülerinnen und Schülern im internationalen Vergleich (Jürgen Baumert, Cordula Artelt, Eckart Klieme, Michael Neubrand, Manfred Prenzel, Ulrich Schiefele, Wolfgang Schneider, Klaus-Jürgen Tillmann and Manfred Weiß). Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Dinkel, Reiner H., Marc Luy, and Uwe Lebok. 1999. “Die Bildungsbeteiligung deutscher und ausländischer Jugendlicher in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Sozialstrukturanalysen mit dem Mikrozensus. Mannheim: ZUMA. ZUMA Nachrichten Spezial 6: 354–75, ed. Paul Lüttinger. Dornis, Christian. 2002. “Zwei Jahre nach der Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts - Bilanz und Ausblick,” in Migrationsreport 2002, ed. Klaus J. Bade and Rainer Münz, 163–77. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Elle, Ludwig. 1995. “Die sorbische Minderheit,” in Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bunderepublik Deutschland, ed. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen and Georg Hansen, 454–68. München: C.H. Beck. Esser, Hartmut. 2001. “Integration und ethnische Schichtung,” Arbeitspapiere 40. Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung: www.bmi.bund.de/Downloads/Esser.pdf. Gans, Herbert. 1999 [1979]. “Symbolic Ethnicity,” in Making Sense of America: Sociological Analyses and Essays, ed. Herbert J. Gans, 167– 202. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

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– 1994. “Symbolic Ethnicity and Symbolic Religiosity: Towards a Comparison of Ethnic and Religious Acculturation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 17 (4): 577–92. Gans, Paul and Franz-Josef Kemper. 2001. ed. Nationalatlas Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Bevölkerung. 4. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag. Gerhardt, Uta and Birgitta Hohenester. 2001. “Transformation of National Identity? Refugees and German Society after World War II.” Protosoziologie 15: 164–99. Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan. 1995 [1963]. Beyond the Melting Pot - The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. – 1975. ed. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Heckmann, Friedrich. 1992. Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation: Soziologie interethnischer Beziehungen. Stuttgart: F. Enke. Holl, Kurt and Sefedin Jonuz. 1995. “Die Minderheit der Roma (und Sinti),” in Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bunderepublik Deutschland, ed. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen and Georg Hansen, 320–433. München: C.H. Beck. Klemm, Klaus. 2000. “Bildung,” in Soziologie des Sozialstaats. Gesellschaftliche Grundlagen, historische Zusammenhänge und aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen, ed. Jutta Allmendinger and Wolfgang LudwigMayerhofer, 145–65. Weinheim, München: Juventa. Grundlagentexte Soziologie. Koopmans, Ruud. 1999. “Germany and its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25 (4): 627–47. Krüger-Potratz, Marianne. 1991. Anderssein gab es nicht - Ausländer und Minderheiten in der DDR. Münster: Waxmann. Kymlicka, Will. 1998. Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Leibholz, Gerhard and Herman von Mangold. 1951. Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts – Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des Grundgesetzes. Band 1. Tübingen: Mohr. Li, Peter S. 1999. Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Don Mills, Ontario; New York: Oxford University Press.

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Meyer-Ingwersen, Johannes. 1995. “Die kurdische Minderheit,” in Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bunderepublik Deutschland, ed. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen and Georg Hansen, 310–28. München: C.H. Beck. Müggenburg, Andreas. 1996. ed. Die ausländischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR: Darstellung und Dokumentation. Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer. Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer. Berlin. Münz, Rainer, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich. 1997. Zuwanderung nach Deutschland. Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven. Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus Verlag. Myrdal, Gunnar. 1998 [1944]. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. (Black and African-American Studies, Vol. 1). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Nauck, Bernhard, Heike Diefenbach, and Kornelia Petri. 1998. “Intergenerationale Transmission von kulturellem Kapital unter Migrationsbedingungen. Zum Bildungserfolg von Kindern und Jugendlichen aus Migrantenfamilien in Deutschland,” Zeitschrift für Pädagogik 44. Jahrgang (No. 5): 701–22. Neumann, Gerald L. 1998. “Nationality Law in the United States and Germany: Structures and Current Problems,” in Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany, ed. Peter H. Schuck and Rainer Münz, 247–98. New York: Berghan Books. Pfeiffer, Christian and Peter Wetzels. 1999. “The Structure and Development of Juvenile Violence in Germany: A Proposition Paper Based on Current Research Findings,” Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen e.V.: KFN Forschungsberichte 76. Hannover. Roberts, Lance W., Mathias Bös, and Susanne von Below. 2001. “Modes of Multiculturalism in Canada: Giving Voice to Diversity,” in Giving Voice: Comparisons of Germany and Canada, ed. H. Braun and W. Klooss, 77– 90. Idstein: Schulz-Kirchner Verlag. Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Kanada-Studien an der Universität Trier 10. Roberts, Lance W., Susanne von Below, and Mathias Bös. 2001. “The Métis in a Multicultural Society,” in The Metis in the New Millennium, ed. L. Barkwell. 193–98. Winnipeg: Pemmican Publications.

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Saldern, Adelheid von. 1999. “Rundfunkpolitik, Nationalidee und Volkskultur (1926-1932),” in Radiozeiten. Herrschaft, Alltag, Gesellschaft, ed. Adelheid von Saldern, 59–83. Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg. Schmalz-Jacobsen, Cornelia and Georg Hansen. 1997. ed. Kleines Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Schulze, Hagen. 1998. Germany: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sen, Faruk and Yunus Ulusoy. 2001. “‘Ausländische Mitbürger’ als Produzenten und Konsumenten - Angebots- und Nachfrageerweiterungen aufgrund der Multikulturalität,” in Integration durch Partizipation. “Ausländische Mitbürger” in demokratischen Gesellschaften, ed. Christian Büttner and Berthold Meyer, 150–62. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag. Studien der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Band 35. Sigaard-Madsen, Edith. 1995. “Die dänische Minderheit,” in Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bunderepublik Deutschland, ed. Cornelia SchmalzJacobsen and Georg Hansen, 134–52. München: C.H. Beck. Smelser, Neil J., William J. Wilson, and Faith Michell. 2001. “Introduction,” in America Becoming, Vol I, 1–20. Washington, DC: National Research Council. Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. Statistisches Bundesamt. 2004. Einbürgerungen 2003 rückläufig. Pressemitteilung v. 24 April 2004. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Statistisches Bundesamt. 2004. “Geburten,” Tabelle 7. Available at www.integrationsbeauftragte.de. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt. Stefanski, Valentina Maria. 1995. “Die polnische Minderheit,” in Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bunderepublik Deutschland, ed. Cornelia SchmalzJacobsen and Georg Hansen, 385–401. München: C.H. Beck. Süssmuth, Rita. 2001. “Zuwanderung gestalten - Integration fördern.” Berlin: Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission “Zuwanderung.” Treibel, Anette. 1998. “Migration,” in Handwörterbuch zur Gesellschaft Deutschlands, ed. Wolfgang Zapf, 462–72. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

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Wallace, Walter L. 1983. Principles of Scientific Sociology. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Pub. Co. Wolfe, Alan. 1989. Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wolffs, Michael. 2002. “Bevölkerung zwischen Dynamik und Stillstand Demografische Entwicklungen im Längsschnitt,” Arbeitspapier Nr. 88. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Yinger, J. Milton. 1994. Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict? (suny series in Ethnicity and Race in American Life). Albany: State University of New York Press.

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4 Italy: Immigration and the Shock of Ethnic Accommodation sonia stefanizzi

Italy’s contemporary encounter with immigration constitutes a major break from its own past. For a century, starting in the 1870s, Italy was one of the great labour-exporting countries of Europe. Millions of people migrated to the Americas and hundreds of thousands moved to Western Europe (Duggan 2007). Since the 1970s, Italy has become a popular, if small-scale, destination for migrants from Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Bade 2000; King 1999). The flow of immigration that started in the late 1970s accelerated in the 1980s and slowed during the 1990s. Today, immigrants exceed two per cent of the population (Bonifazi 1998; oecd 2008). Italy’s new experience as a country of immigration, shared to some extent with Spain and Greece, has coincided with increasing closures of borders and tighter regulations of access by the main labourimporting Western and Northern European countries. Since the 1970s, policies developed by governments in the European Union and Northern Europe have regulated the flow of peoples and reduced opportunities for immigration. The results have been to reduce immigrants’ right of entry and residence in the territory of most European countries (Sciortino 2000). Despite the continuing movement of people, Italy has taken restrictive measures similar to those of the rest of Europe. These restrictions include access to residence permits and social services, controls on family reunions, asylum or refugee applications, and the regulation of citizenship. Italy now experiences a large and diversified

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segment of illegal immigration, which became officially visible during the “legalization campaigns” that have regularly taken place (Reyneri 1998). Four of these amnesties have occurred, in 1986, 1990, 1995, and 1998. They have resulted in more than 600,000 regularizations of residence. In contrast to other developed countries, immigration began to affect Italy only at the end of the industrial Fordist era of economic development. Since the 1970s, industrial states have moved towards a postindustrial, post-Fordist era (Harvey 1990). Countries like Italy have reshaped their forms of industrial organization by replacing industrial mass production with patterns based on the flexible specialization model. They have revised economic regulation by rejecting Keynesian economic policies. They have eroded their welfare state by refusing to grant universal rights and high levels of services. The main social features that granted stability and integration in the so-called “Fordist” societies have therefore either faded or disappeared (Arango 1999; Palidda and Reyneri 1995; Mingione and Quassoli 1999). Substantially lost are practices that integrated migrants into large industrial plants as unskilled workers, granted access to citizenship rights, provided welfare services, created opportunities for political participation through mass parties and trade unions, and ensured patterns of intergenerational upward mobility. Italy itself has a number of distinctive aspects to its political and economic structure. A crucial and long-term characteristic of the Italian economy has been the large underground economy, into which immigrants have been heavily incorporated over the last two decades (Ambrosini 1999; Reyneri 2000). Whether they hold a residence permit or not, large numbers of immigrants have worked in the underground economy, which is characterized by labour exploitation, workplace turnover, and absence of social services. A second characteristic has been robust patterns of territorial mobility. A sizeable number of immigrants from the Mediterranean basin (which represents the vast majority of foreigners) are characterized by circular migration patterns. Many Moroccans who have migrated to Italy spend a few months every year in Morocco, where they have tem-

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porary jobs or start businesses with the money they have earned in Italy (IReR 1994). Albanians, who have arrived in Italy in large numbers since 1991, exhibit similar circular patterns (Barjaba, Lapassade, and Perrone 1996). Immigrants also reveal considerable territorial mobility within the country of immigration. This mobility can be linked both to their rather unstructured pathways of incorporation into the labour market (mainly in the underground economy) and to the increasing flexibility of industrial processes. Moreover, there has been growing mobility within Europe and among other countries (notably Canada and United States) that are destinations for immigrants. This international movement has been prevalent among certain immigrant groups, particularly people from Somalia, the Philippines, and the Yugoslavian states, who appear to consider Italy as merely a step towards a better destination, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, or the United States. As for the political and cultural climate in Italy, immigrants have faced challenging, if not unfavourable, conditions. There have been outbursts of xenophobia, increased criminalization of immigrants, and highly stigmatizing social representations circulated by both the local and the national media (Dal Lago 1999; Maneri 1997) in addition to more difficult circumstances for attaining social integration and access to the rights of citizenship. These characteristics help to explain some peculiar methodological problems concerning the study of immigration. They affect data available on immigrants in Italy and inform data production by different branches of the public administration, as well as the scientific interests around which the current sociology of immigration in Italy focuses and by which it is shaped. There are five major social factors that describe the terms for the incorporation of recent immigrants in Italy: Gender differentiation There is a clear “gender gap” among the new immigrants. The first arrivals are usually males, particularly from southern Mediterranean and West African countries. In some instances however, females migrate first, especially those from Central and South America, the Philippines, Eritrea, Cape Verde, and Nigeria. In both groups, there is a strong tendency to bring family members at a later

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time. Some migrant groups consist from the start of both males and females (Caritas Italiana 1997). Multiple Socio-geographical Backgrounds Immigrants come from both urban and rural settings. Rural immigrants are generally older and less educated and tend to emigrate according to the “traditional” pattern: a temporary, economically motivated stay (Piore 1983). They maintain strong ties with their country of origin, particularly via relatives and fellow nationals, and develop an “instrumental” approach to the job market. They are ready to accept undesirable jobs while minimizing non-survival spending, thus reproducing the well-known model of first-generation migrants. Migrants from urban settings are on average better educated, younger (though this is truer for some groups than for others, for example Moroccans as opposed to Senegalese), and less embedded in networks linked with the country of origin. In many cases, they are much more oriented towards exploratory migration projects and consider Italy a temporary step to other European countries. This has been typical of immigrants from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, they are more open to interacting with Italian culture and society (IReR 1994). With the exception of Somalis, Eritreans and Albanians, recent immigrants come from countries with no historical relationship with Italy. This absence of prior ties has had many consequences. For example, these immigrants often possess very limited mastery of the Italian language, a critical skill in an information economy (Quassoli and Venzo 1997). Relevance of Circular Migratory Patterns It is worth emphasizing the dynamic and largely economic links between migrants and their countries of origin. There is a sort of continuous circular in- and out-migration between Italy and Morocco (IReR 1994). Another typical phenomenon is trabendo, or informal trade between northern and southern Mediterranean cities. For some young people from North Africa, it is an important part of their migration trajectory (Colombo 1998). Similar circular patterns are exhibited by the various waves of Albanians who have come to Italy since 1991. Immigration laws, which are very strict and have not yet acknowledged many of the basic traits of migration to Italy, are the main obstacle to the further spread of this kind of migration.

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Complexity of Social Networks Immigrants are embedded in social and communicative networks usually described by the terms “community,” “clan,” “family links,” “solidarity,” “enforceable trust,” “ethnic enclave,” and the like. However, the concept of network has a much broader meaning and should not be associated with certain ethnic or cultural characteristics of migrant groups. Migrants’ social networks are extensive and heterogeneous (Barbesino and Quassoli 1997). They mainly consist of compatriots, but often involve migrants from other countries and Italians (friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and people working for agencies or public services). Within these networks, different criteria apply to the organization of social relations and the flow of information. The country of provenance is one of the criteria, but not always the most relevant. Religion, socio-economic status, age, and language all play a role in defining network boundaries. Patterns of Socio-economic Integration Migrants in Italy are not evenly distributed over the country. Initially concentrated in Rome and the south, in the past few years their presence in the northern regions has grown. Since 1994, at least half of the immigrants have settled in the north, where job opportunities are greater and more diversified. There are various jobs in the tertiary sector (restaurants, trade, streetselling, domestic services), and in small- and medium-sized firms in the prosperous regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia Romagna, as well as temporary and seasonal work in construction and agriculture (Palidda and Reyneri 1995). The geographical shift to the north also reveals a new trend towards immigrant location stabilization, though mobility within the country remains high. This also means an increasing number of immigrants find regular and stable employment in small industries and some public services. A comparison between the conditions in the south and the north of Italy reveals marked differences. In the south, in the 1980s and early 1990s, conditions for integration into the local society were favourable, while economic opportunities were less so. Labour relations are generally not to the advantage of immigrants. All the sectors are characterized by a high degree of exploitation. The extreme difficulty in obtaining a residence permit inhibits the option of moving to the north for better job oppor-

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tunities. Immigrants usually associate the north with more bureaucracy, police control, and fewer opportunities in the informal sector. Opinions about the north have started to change as immigrants discover that there are job opportunities in the formal as well as the informal sector. This change has been supported by stronger social networks, which assist newcomers in their first contact with local society. That being said, social adaptation is harder in the metropolitan areas of the north and problems of maladjustment and social isolation are more common.

social trends The Nation and Ethnic Minorities In the lexicon of the social sciences, there is conceptual confusion between the definitions of ethnicity, nationality, and nation. This essay will concentrate on “ethnic groups,” as the term most frequently appears in contemporary Italian debates. The complexity shown by the ethnic question has led it to be approached from different perspectives. For example, some European scholars have used the expression “ethnic group” to describe a group corresponding by extension to the “nation” and not to a segment or a sub-group of this wider unit. According to many American social scientists, the notion of a collectivity within a wider social formation is now hinged on the definition of “ethnic group.” Other scholars work between these two positions, thus including the expression “ethnic group” in a family of similar definitions or meanings, such as “minority groups,” “race,” and “nation.” In Italy, the formation of the national state derived from the unification of many regional states under the hegemonic drive of one of them, Piedmont. After unification, the Italian nation, understood as a cultural area, was a weak formation, since it resulted from the amalgamation of a multiplicity of regional cultures, which could themselves be considered micro-nationalities or micro-ethnic groups. Nowadays, thanks to the intense indoctrination work carried out by the state and realized through institutions such as state schools and military service, there is a deep consciousness of belonging to the common Italian nation. The

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“ethnic affinity” among all Italian citizens – including those with their own linguistic and ethnic origins – is strengthened not only by the law common to all of them, which assures them the same citizenship rights, but also because the so-called “ethnic minorities” are guaranteed the right to preserve their cultural heritage of language, creed, and customs. There is considerable regional variation in the condition of ethnic and linguistic minorities. The Italian Constitution states that it safeguards ethnic minorities “by means of special provisions” (Article 6). This principle and other specific regulations are found in Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venetia Giulia, and Valle d’Aosta, which lead to “particular forms and conditions of autonomy, in accordance with special statutes adopted by the constitutional law” (Article 116). Trento, Friuli, and Valle d’Aosta are particularly sensitive areas. They have large minority populations and are located on previouslycontested international border regions. The special statute for Trentino Alto Adige makes extensive provision for the autonomy of the region, covering financial, administrative, and legislative areas. The province of Bozen enjoys a specific law-making power, in contrast to the other Italian provinces, which are not granted such power. Legislation in Bozen grants equal rights to citizens, whatever linguistic group they belong to, and guarantees the use of German in public life (see Art. 84–5 of the Statute). Legislation also states that “in the localities where the Ladino language is spoken, its teaching in the elementary schools shall be guaranteed” (Art. 87 of the Statute). In Valle d’Aosta, there are special provisions concerning the French majority that guarantee the use of French, which has equal status with Italian in this region (Art. 30 of the Statute of the Valle d’Aosta). Finally, in several municipalities in Friuli Venetia Giulia, where the Slovenian minority is well represented, Slovenian can be used in dealing with the administrative and judicial authorities (Art. 5 of the Statute of Trieste). In certain cases, there is evidence of intolerant attitudes towards the minority, even when its members speak Italian well. Similar considerations apply to some minorities, e.g. Albanians in Sicily,

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Catalonians in the City of Alghero, Sardinia, Croatians in Molise, French-Provençals in Valle d’Aosta and Piedmont, and Greeks in Calabria and Apulia. Italian governments continue to examine ways to extend and improve legislation affecting other minorities, notably racial minorities in situations where the distinction between an in-group and an outgroup is much more radical. Since the end of the 1970s, Italy has become a destination for migration flows from countries with extreme poverty or social conflict, such as those in certain sections of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. One such extreme case is the situation of the Roma communities in Italy. These peoples do not enjoy recognition by the Italian State. On the contrary, they are often subject to discrimination. The Italian Roma population is not included in the list of groups whose language and culture are protected and promoted by the law. A specific reference to Italian Roma was deleted from the law during its passage through Parliament, on the grounds that this minority is not linked with a specific part of Italian territory and that the protection of the Italian Roma language and culture could therefore not be the object of specific legislation. Currently there are about 120,000 Roma in Italy and about two thirds are Italian nationals. Italian Roma are, broadly constituted, predominantly living in the south, and the Sinti are traditionally present in the north. Non-Italian Roma include persons born outside Italy – originating mostly from the Balkan region – and persons born in Italy to foreign parents. About one third of the total Roma population – including both Italian (predominantly Sinti) and non-Italian citizens – currently live in camps separated from mainstream Italian society. Living conditions in these camps are harsh, due to a lack of basic infrastructure and facilities, including access to energy, heating, lighting, sanitation, and emergency services. Although the situation is particularly dire in unauthorized camps, the living conditions in many authorized camps are not much better. Above and beyond the question of living conditions in the camps, the practical segregation of the Roma appears to reflect a general approach by Italian authorities to consider the Roma as no-

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mads who want to live apart. This attribution of Roma as nomads also appears to be closely related to a general public perception that all members of the Roma communities are “foreigners” even if, in fact, only a part of the Roma population is non-Italian. This perception is illustrated by the fact that matters concerning Roma are dealt with by administrative offices “for nomads” or for “nomads and foreigners.” Most foreign Roma possess no legal status, and most of those who are legal residents possess permits valid only for short periods of time. Roma are reported to have benefited comparatively less than other groups from the various opportunities for regularization, partly because of their lack of awareness of these opportunities and partly because many of them did not possess the necessary valid documentation from their countries of origin. The difficulties encountered by the Roma communities in obtaining residence permits affect their potential for securing Italian citizenship. The practical segregation of the Roma communities from mainstream social and political life is reflected in virtually all institutions and services, including education, health, and employment. In the field of education, Italian authorities support some initiatives that aim to ensure better access to schools – for example, through the use of cultural mediators – and to adapt the curriculum to a multicultural reality. However, these efforts have had limited results, mainly due to the absence of a comprehensive national policy aimed at dealing with the situation of the Roma communities. Immigration and Emigration Rates by Ethnic Groups The analysis of Italian census data shows the presence of a foreign population as early as the period between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. This initial foreign population came mainly from other European countries bordering Italy and having geopolitical connections with it, such as Austria, Germany, France, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland (see Table 4.1). During the 1920s, other foreigners coming from non-European countries, such as the United States, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, and China began to settle in Italy. Studies carried

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Table 4.1 Foreign Population of Italy, 1871–2001

Year

Foreign residents

Non-resident foreigners Total

Italian population

Foreign residents per 1,000 inhabitants

Foreigners per 1,000 inhabitants

1861 1871 1881 1901 1911 1921 1931 1936 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001

ND ND ND 37,762 ND 89,517 83,027 73,920 47,177 62,780 121,116 210,937 345,149 987,363

ND ND ND 23,844 ND 20,923 54,770 34,677 82,580 ND ND 109,841 279,885 252,185

22,182,377 27,303,509 28,953,480 32,965,504 35,845,048 39,943,528 41,651,617 42,943,602 47,515,537 50,623,569 54,136,547 56,556,911 56,778,031 56,305,568

ND ND ND 1.1 ND 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.2 2.2 3.7 6.1 17.5

ND 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.8 3.3 2.5 2.7 ND ND 5.7 11.0 22.0

ND 60,982 59,956 61,606 79,756 110,440 137,797 108,597 129,757 ND ND 320,778 625,034 1,239,548

Source: istat, Census of Population

out on the migrations of the Chinese population have highlighted two aspects. The origin of these migrations was not usually China, but other European countries, such as France. By the 1920s, the Chinese community registered by the census already contained more than 700 people and settlements were found in the major Italian cities, such as Milan, Rome, Bologna, and Florence (Cologna et al. 2000). The data on residence permits allows the study of the legal component of immigration and its dynamic tendencies. Information at our disposal derives chiefly from data archives that were created for administrative purposes by agencies not responsible for immigration. The data thus collected is a by-product of the activities of these agencies and is generally published without providing information about the context or the data collection methods (inps, Ministry of the Interior, Police, etc.). One important, if controversial, aspect of the reliability of the data was carried out by the Ministry of the Interior on residence per-

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Table 4.2 Immigrants in Italy, 1971–2000 Ministry of the Interior (unfiltered permits)

ISTAT

Year

(reviewed data)

Municipal registers

1971 1981 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

156,179 331,665 450,227 572,103 645,423 490,338 781,138 862,977 923,625 987,405 922,706 991,419 1,095,622 1,240,721 1,250,000 1,341,000 1,388,153

ND ND ND ND ND ND ND 648,935 589,457 649,102 677,791 729,159 986,020 1,023,000 1,033,235 1,251,994 1,388,153

121,100 210,900 ND ND ND ND ND 345,149 573,258 629,165 685,469 737,793 884,555 991,678 1,116,394 1,270,553

Source: Data from istat, Ministry of the Interior, and Caritas Italiana (1999 and 2000).

mits. The data are published by istat (the Italian Institute of Statistics) and are made available at the end of each year. istat is concerned with socio-demographic information on foreigners, such as gender, age, marital status, citizenship, the reason for the permit, and the province where it was issued. This source supplies a measurement of the number of legal immigrants, despite limitations on its reliability. Minors who do not have their own residence permit are not counted, but named on the permit of one of their parents. A number of corrective measures have been proposed to avoid this problem. The best-known is the one used by Caritas Italiana in the diocese of Rome, which multiplies the data supplied by the Ministry of the Interior on residence permits by a variable calculated on the basis of territorial factors, such as the provincial percentage of minors. This variable partly accounts for minors who are not registered as holders of residence permits (Caritas Italiana 1999).1

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The second reason is more closely connected with the quality of the data: the Ministry’s residence permit records contain duplicate permits and expired permits. These factors affect the accurate measurement of permits and the opportunity for transforming stock data into precise measures of immigrant flows. The problem created by data collection is that residence permits may be of a different duration; therefore, the difference between two measurements taken a year apart does not provide flow data relating to new residence permits issued over a set period of time. This is because the count also includes permits issued in the year under consideration that have expired and permits that were valid the previous year, but which have not been renewed during that year.2 Table 4.2 summarizes the considerations just illustrated relating to the quality of official data on the number of foreigners in Italy. As one can see, the difference between the two data collection systems (Ministry of the Interior and istat) are significant, especially during the initial phase of the immigration phenomenon (until the first half of the 1990s). However, this gap has been reduced in recent years, and, since 1999, the two systems seem to have been synchronized.3 In particular, an analysis of the evolution of the foreign presence in Italy between 1980 and 1993 based on data supplied by the Ministry of the Interior provides a clear picture of the problems connected with the use of official data. It may be seen that, in addition to the initial surge in numbers at the time of the passing of Law 943/86, there were changes in the periods 1988–1989, 1989–1990, and 1993–1994, which were hard to link with variations in the actual flows. In the first period, for example, there was a sharp fall in the foreign population in Italy from 645,423 to 490,338 and a rise by almost 300,000 people the following year (to 781,138). Variations of this size may reasonably be attributed to changes in the counting methods or classification systems rather than to social processes gone wild. The nationalities of foreigners obtaining residence permits have varied significantly during the past four decades. In 1970, the largest foreign national group were Yugoslavians, followed by Argentineans (most likely second- or third-generation Italians), Iranians, and Poles.

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Ten years later, Iran, Yugoslavia, the Philippines, and Ethiopia constituted the top four nationalities. By 1990, the southern coast of the Mediterranean predominated, with Moroccans and Tunisians ranking first and second, followed by Filipinos and Yugoslavians. At the end of the century, people from developing countries in North Africa, Southern Europe, and parts of Asia predominated, with Morocco, Albania, the Philippines, Romania, and China ranking first to fifth. The volume of permits granted has increased significantly over the decades, increasing tenfold from about 150,000 in 1970 to over 1,300,000 by 2000. Although the proportion of foreigners living in Italy is much lower than in other European Union countries,4 some important variations in immigration data show the different nature of this phenomenon. Recent Ministry statistics on residence permits can be used as useful indicators in order to understand the main transformations in the composition of immigration to Italy and especially its territorial distribution.5 The granting of residence permits in the 1990s showed a considerable increase in the foreign population (which rose by 77.4 per cent in five years, thus totalling over 1,100,000 people at the beginning of 1999) and their continent of origin. This increase has been mainly due to Albanians and Romanians among Eastern European citizens, Filipinos, Chinese, and Sri Lankans among Asians, and finally, Peruvians among South Americans. This information, like other research work conducted in this field (Caritas Italiana 2000), reveals the peculiar character of immigration in Italy, which is particularly interesting in view of a multi-ethnic society and which can be identified in the heterogeneity of nationalities within the foreign population. At the end of the 1990s, nearly 40 per cent of immigration was from Europe, mostly Eastern Europe, while immigration from Africa was about one third of the total, immigration from Asia nearly 20 per cent, and immigration from South America nearly 10 per cent (ismu 2001). Applications for residence permits reveal a considerable increase in permits granted for work and family reasons (mainly spousal reunions) compared to permits granted for purposes of education or political asylum (see Table 4.3). As of 2000, 850,715 people held a work permit

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(52 per cent of whom were women) and 354,859 people held a permit based on family reasons (78 per cent of whom were women). Approximately 9 immigrants out of 10 were in Italy for work or family reasons. However, even among those who were in the country for other reasons, a sizeable group held a long-term residence permit. Regional Distribution of Ethnic Groups The foreign population living legally in Italy is not evenly distributed geographically. The areas north of Rome, both northern Italy and central regions, attract the most immigrants. In these regions, the increase in immigration by the year 2000 was higher than the national average. The highest inflows are concentrated within a four-sided area comprising a number of provinces in the regions of Triveneto, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, and Marche, which have the highest economic output and employment indices in the country. Moreover, the city/ provinces of Rome (222,588) and Milan (174,460) are still the two main migration poles, followed by three other large cities – Turin (48,737), Naples (44,953), and Florence (42,963) – all but Naples being in the central or northern regions (Caritas Italiana 2001; Bolaffi 2001).

participation in spheres of society Family Family unification has two possible meanings in regard to the process of social integration. Family unification is both a sign of more stable settlement in the host country and also a device to transfer the values and traditions of the country of origin (Natale 1990). Although family unifications most typically improve the overall conditions of immigrants, some scholars have highlighted the contradictory dynamics started by unification processes within the immigrant family. What is certain is that reunited or newly constituted families modify the behaviour of immigrants from a condition of a tangential “social invisibility” to a condition where a more intense relationship is sought, which

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Table 4.3 Residence Permits by Motive to Immigrate, 1999 and 2000 1999 Motives Work Family Other motives total

Total

2000 %

Total

%

758,229 380,228 185,537

60.6 24.6 14.8

850,715 354,850 182,588

61.3 25.5 13.2

1,323,994

100.0

1,388,153

100.0

Source: ismu 2001.

is no longer based solely on the needs of the single immigrant (Ambrosini and Schellenbaum 1993). Residence permits granted for family reasons became more important during the 1990s. In foreign communities with a predominantly male population, female immigration can be ascribed almost exclusively to family unifications. The high proportion of new permits granted to males for family reunion is due – although only in part – to permits granted to minors. For instance, at the beginning of 1999, 30,000 out of 43,000 permits were for people under eighteen years of age, which was about 70 per cent of the total granted for family reasons (Zincone 2001). Another key indicator of stability is the gradual rebalancing of the gender composition of immigrants. During 1999–2000, the number of male foreigners increased on average by 9.4 per cent a year, as opposed to an increase in the number of female immigrants of 3 per cent (Zincone 2000). The female presence has grown partly due to high demand for household workers and caregivers, and partly due to more family unifications where the women coming to Italy are not necessarily workers. Gender structure plays a key role among indicators of integration since large gaps tend to signal other difficulties met by immigrants in social relationships (Zincone 2001). Changes in the composition of the immigrant population by marital status are also connected to the rebalancing gender structure. As of 1999, the percentage of married for-

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Table 4.4 Number of Marriages With at Least One Foreign Partner, 1992–1996

Year

Italian husband/ Foreign wife

Foreign husband / Italian wife

Foreign husband and wife

Total

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

6,000 6,167 6,703 7,416 7,254

2,634 2,616 2,899 3,248 2,621

1,365 1,202 1,415 1,665 2,118

9,999 9,985 11,017 12,329 11,993

Source: ismu 2001

eign citizens living in Italy within most national groups was about 50 per cent. Finally, the presence of minors is a meaningful factor. As of 2000, there were about 23,000 foreign minors residing in Italy, accounting for over 18 per cent of the foreign resident population (Bolaffi 2001). The growing number of foreign minors in Italy is due principally to children coming to Italy through family unifications (about 22,000 as of 1 January 2000), as well as to children who are born in Italian territory, about 21,000 as of 1 January 2000. Other indicators of stability are linked to increasingly important common events that mark the life cycle. A particularly meaningful indicator of integration and stability is found in mixed marriages between foreign and Italian spouses. Mixed marriages are characterized by the wave of social reactions they engender, which involves not only the two main actors, but also their two communities of origin. In the first half of the 1990s, the number of weddings officiated in Italy where at least one person in the couple was a foreigner grew by 21 per cent (Table 4.4). By the mid-1990s, both the bride and the bridegroom were foreigners in about one sixth of the weddings officiated in Italy. Most weddings celebrated in Italy involve at least one Italian citizen and more frequently a foreign bridegroom and an Italian bride (Table 4.5).6 Both types of marriage acquire greater importance when the project of a life together is realized through the arrival of children. The num-

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Table 4.5 Percentage of Marriages With at Least One Foreign Partner, 1992–1996 Year

Foreign wife and husband

At least one Italian partner

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

13.7 12.0 12.8 13.5 17.7

86.3 88.0 87.2 86.5 82.3

Source: ismu 2001

ber of babies born to at least one foreign parent has shown a marked upward trend since the second half of the 1980s. In only eight years (1989–1996), the children who were born to couples formed by at least one foreigner rose by about 145 per cent, and scholars reckon it may be reasonable to suppose that this upward trend could remain stable in the years to come (ismu 2001). If one considers women who have had children, most births have occurred within homogamous couples, and, in 80 per cent of cases, their partner was of the same nationality (ismu 2001). Foreigners’ children born in Italy will probably grow up and study in Italy, although they could remain foreigners until they reach the age of eighteen. Under the current legislation regulating citizenship, we will probably see a second generation of foreigners growing up and gaining their education in Italy but unable to enjoy the same rights as Italian citizens. Data showing the increase of mixed marriages and births indicates that there is a process for the integration of immigrants into Italian society. But data on the births among exclusively foreign-born families suggests that the problem will not easily go away. In sum, evidence suggest the consolidation of the foreign population’s plans to stay in Italy, but also raises questions about the actual possibilities of their integration into Italian society. Educational Participation School enrolment patterns for the children of immigrants are particularly interesting. They show the presence of a second generation al-

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ready dealing with the difficult process of integration into Italian society. Data from the Ministry of Education indicate that the number of foreign pupils doubled in the last half of the 1990s and foreign pupils accounted for over one per cent of the total number of pupils by 2001 (ismu 2001) (see Table 4.6). Foreign-born pupils are now over-represented compared to their Italian counterparts in kindergarten, elementary, and junior high schools. By the 2000–2001 school year, the number of foreign children enrolled in the entire school system was estimated to be 14,000 (Caritas Italiana 2001). Males and females were almost equally represented. There was a higher number of girls enrolled in senior high schools, which suggests a positive trend towards education on the part of both foreign families and foreign girls. As for regions of origin, the last survey (1999–2000) shows that the largest proportion of foreign students comes from European countries outside the eu (47,713 pupils), followed by those coming from Africa (35,030 pupils), Asia (19,241 pupils), and America (13,775 pupils). However, the growing number of foreign pupils, just like the overall foreign presence in Italy, encompasses a wide range of different nationalities. In some provinces there is an especially large variety of origins (and therefore of languages and cultures) in schools. In Milan, 144 different nationalities are counted, compared to 142 in Rome and 114 in Turin (ismu 2001). This varied presence is not evenly distributed throughout the national territory or in the different school levels (ismu 2001). The highest number of foreign pupils is found in the towns of the centre-north of the country, where the job market is more ready to accept foreigners. Lombardy, for example, where foreigners account for 21.3 per cent of the national total, is the region with the highest number of foreign pupils, which represents about a fourth of all the foreign pupils enrolled in the 1999–2000 school year (Zincone 2001). In the 1999–2000 school year, there were 182 nationalities present in Italian schools, with students speaking 78 languages. Religious membership, as will be seen, was varied. In the 1999–2000 school year, there were at least 18 separate religious beliefs professed by the families of pupils in the various levels of schooling. In the major immigra-

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Table 4.6 Percentage of Foreign Pupils by Level of School Type of school

All Pupils

Foreign pupils

Kindergarten Primary school Junior high school Senior high (secondary) school

17.55 32.21 21.18 29.06

20.14 44.26 24.14 11.46

Source: ismu 2001

tion centre of Milan, there were 144 nationalities present in the schools, with 65 languages spoken and 18 religions professed. In the other large centre of Rome, there were 142 nationalities, 64 languages spoken, and 17 religions professed. Similar national, religious, and linguistic diversity is found particularly throughout the central and northern cities (Information System of the Ministry of Education, Universities, and Research 1999–2000). The considerable spread of nationalities, languages, and religions makes multicultural education an increasingly relevant and complex affair. Economic Participation The Labour Market The position of immigrant workers in the Italian labour market should be understood within the framework of the recent transformation of the regulatory framework (Nascimbene 1997, 1995; Pastore 1995; Quassoli 1999). Some foreign workers possess official work permits while others officially reside abroad. The first group is substantially absorbed into the labour force. They are formally equal to Italian workers in the private sector, although they cannot be employed by the state or by two large state organizations, the state railways (fs) and the postal service (Poste). The second group is subject to restrictions. The most important limitation is the priority given to resident workers for any job. Data for the 1992 to 1998 period confirm a stable and slow increase in the number of immigrant employees regularly hired by Italian firms

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(ismu 2001). The absolute number is less than 1 per cent, but inps data show that it has grown, doubling in six years. The regional distribution of immigrants, from the Ministry of Labour, indicates that the majority are employed in the north, which absorbs almost 80 per cent of the total foreign workforce (inps, 1995–1997). Foreign workers are mainly employed in the richest and most dynamic areas, especially the ones with strong industrial orientations, such as Veneto and Emilia Romagna in the north. As far as economic sectors are concerned, trade, the metal industry, and manufacturing absorb the largest share of employees, with 48,000 and 41,000 immigrant workers respectively in 1998. Together, they employ more than 50 per cent of the total foreign workforce, followed by construction (20,000 workers), chemicals (16,000 workers), and textiles (10,000 workers). Different information emerges on household workers regularly employed by families. There are over 100,000 of them, 38 per cent of the total foreign workforce (inps, 1995–1997). The growth rate is even higher than in industry, and more than doubled in just three years in the mid-1990s from 45,000 to 104,000. Most of these workers are female (75 per cent), whereas women account for only 10 per cent of employment in industrial and business firms. The territorial distribution for females is different as well. The main centres of employment are Rome and Milan. The provinces that encompass Rome and Milan together employ about 55 per cent of the total foreign workforce in the service sector. There is, then, considerable job specialization by gender among immigrants in Italy: men usually work in factories and firms, while women typically work in household service. Information about new entrants to the job market is registered by the Ministry of Labour. This source is more exhaustive than the inps data, since it covers the whole private sector, but it is also less reliable because registration does not necessarily involve full-time, long-term jobs. Sectors such as agriculture and tourism, characterized by high levels of variability in the course of a year, are overestimated. However, the data help to complete the portrait of the labour market (see Ministry of Labour 1997).

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The distribution of immigrant workers is less concentrated territorially, according to Ministry of Labour data, than inps reports. Milan’s region of Lombardy contains the highest share of new jobs but is less dominant. The regional difference may be explained by the less stable supply of jobs in the central and southern parts of Italy compared to the north. The nature of agricultural work helps to explain the regional variation. A very low number of job entrants are registered in Sicily, while regions characterized by the presence of Mediterranean workers – and where studies show the widespread presence of immigrants – appear to have a very low proportion of new jobs for immigrants (Zanfrini 1998). This pattern suggests that in these regions, informal work is widespread (Calvanese and Pugliese 1990; Mingione and Quassoli 1999). Immigrants are mainly employed as unskilled (75 per cent) – or at the most semi-skilled – workers (less than 20 per cent) (see Table 4.7). It is extremely unlikely that immigrants gain access to white-collar jobs or even become specialized workers or technicians. One study has shown that they often do work that is more complex than their formal status suggests and that their jobs have slowly improved in the last few years (Zanfrini 1998). The process is slow and difficult. For a foreign worker, mobility to a higher position has to be negotiated with the internal workforce in order to avoid any objections to their promotion. There are few signs of formal discrimination against immigrants in manufacturing. Labour conditions and contractual relations are basically the same for immigrants and Italians (Mottura and Pinto 1996). Empirical work shows that the presence of immigrant labour is explained by the nature of the work, including strenuous and unskilled jobs, dangerous and unhealthy work environments, longer working hours, and lower wages (Reyneri 1998). The most important difference between foreign and Italian workers is that the former are prepared to accept bad jobs for longer periods of time. In many instances, employers actively seek immigrant workers because they are available for long-term, unskilled jobs.

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Table 4.7 Migrant Workers Placed by Employment Agencies, per Job Qualification (1997) Unqualified workers No. Valle d’Aosta Piedmont Lombardy Trentino AltoAdige Veneto Friuli-Venezia Giulia Liguria Emilia Romagna Tuscany Umbria Marche Latium Abruzzo Molise Campania Basilicata Puglia Calabria Sicily Sardinia Italy

%

Qualified workers No.

%

201 33.8 8,249 79.7 22,131 69.5

46 7.7 1,713 16.6 5,868 18.4

5,782 76.3 22,039 74.5

1,616 21.3 6,409 21.7

3,302 1,957 17,562 9,398 3,372 4,040 4,571 3,484 164 2,455 731 3,740 1,439 9,879 710 125,206

58.0 67.3 74.1 72.5 87.8 79.2 64.3 82.9 91.1 92.9 92.6 87.1 96.1 96.3 80.0 75.4

1,692 882 5,344 3,078 449 894 2,495 641 15 102 57 443 28 318 134 32,224

29,7 30.3 22.6 23.7 11.7 17.5 35.1 15.3 8.3 3.9 7.2 10.3 1.9 3.1 15.1 19.4

Specialized workers

Employees

No.

No.

%

347 58.4 234 2.3 3,206 10.1 127 740

1.7 2.5

505 42 379 280 0 100 24 25 0 72 0 45 2 29 22 6,179

8.9 1.4 1.6 2.2 0.0 2.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 2.7 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 2.5 3.7

%

Total No.

0 0.0 153 1.5 629 2.0

594 10,349 31,834

52 0.7 382 1.3

7,577 29,570

193 27 411 212 20 69 20 52 1 14 1 65 28 32 21 2,382

3.4 0.9 1.7 1.6 0.5 1.4 0.3 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.5 1.9 0.3 2.4 1.4

5,692 2,908 23,696 12,968 3,841 5,103 7,110 4,202 180 2,643 789 4,293 1,497 10,258 887 165,991

Immigrants face great difficulties in their search for work. The unemployment rate among immigrants became extremely high by the late-1990s and was higher than the employment rates according to inps data. Over one quarter of the workforce experiencing unemployment for up to three months were immigrants. More than one third of those experiencing long-term (i.e. over twelve months) unemployment were immigrants (Ministry of Labour, processed by ismu). These are key indicators of the difficulties foreign workers began to face in the late1990s and still continue to face to this day. It seems that most of the un-

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Table 4.8 Estimates for Irregular Foreign Workers, by Sector and Geographical Area of Employment, 1994 (Percentage of Labour Force) Northern

Central

Southern

Total

Agriculture Industry Handicraft Retail trade Tourism Entertainment Food Cleaning firms Housekeeping

27.8 39.8 57.4 49.7 34.7 37.6 61.8 92.9 48.2

44.4 52.0 69.0 49.6 80.0 36.0 84.1 76.7 57.0

79.2 55.9 63.9 68.5 44.7 96.9 57.5 60.0 34.5

49.3 41.8 61.2 51.4 41.6 38.1 73.2 92.6 48.3

total

52.9

58.6

70.8

56.8

Sources: Reyneri (1998); istat, Annuario statistico italiano 1998.

employed immigrants make ends meet by working in the informal economy. The informal economy is large, especially in the south where, according to some scholars, one quarter of the total employment is irregular. According to official estimates, the number of immigrants working outside the formal sector is about 700,000, i.e. 14 per cent of the total irregular employment. According to inspections carried out by the Ministry of Labour, irregular immigrant workers comprise 31 per cent of the labour force in this segment, twice the percentage of the Italian ones (Reyneri and Baganha 1998). Immigrants are disproportionately located in sectors that are at risk in terms of informal work, including household service, construction, and agriculture. The issue is certainly important in agriculture, especially in the south, where the work is conducive to the widespread use of informal employees and the exploitation of immigrants. According to some scholars, one out of ten employees in southern regions is informally employed in this sector. A labour pathway is created for other immigrants – especially illegal ones – who have come to Italy in the last few years. Entering the country illegally, they find a job in the informal agricultural sector that allows them to survive economi-

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cally. As soon as there is a chance for an official residence permit – thanks to the sanatorie (amnesties) – the immigrant tries to move to the central or northern regions to find a better-paying regular job. A movement from the south to the north occurred after every sanatoria. However, as Table 4.8 shows, this problem has been large, and more than 50 per cent of the employees have worked off the books (Reyneri 2000). The continued strength of this sector can be explained more by the preference of employers for having a highly flexible, low-paying, unstable workforce than by the preferences of immigrants themselves (Zanfrini 1999). Their permanence in the informal sector is usually due to their inability to move into formal work. Some studies indicate that, beyond those individuals trapped in the informal (or even the illegal) sector, many are compelled to stay partly in the formal and partly in the informal economy. Part-time workers or immigrants work outside the firms for external suppliers (mainly in co-operatives), but this may also be true for housekeepers and construction workers. This picture makes it possible to portray three models of immigrant integration in the Italian labour market in recent years. These models basically vary according to four variables: economic sector, geographical area, gender, and level of formalization. On the whole, these variables describe how the Italian economy and Italian society are absorbing the immigrant workforce. The first, or subaltern model, pertains to young male immigrants working in small and medium-sized firms in the most industrialized areas of northern Italy, especially Lombardy and the northeast. Firms regularly employ a large percentage of subaltern workers, who receive fair treatment, basically similar to that of Italian workers. However, a striking percentage work at least partly irregularly and, in many cases, firms try to exploit the weakness of this population by creating poor working conditions. Whenever possible, firms employ immigrants indirectly by outsourcing some functions. Why has there been such an increase in immigrant work in these regions? Scholars agree that the main reason is that in a labour market near full employment the hardest jobs are left unfilled by natives. Immigrants fill up the segment of the labour market that is least satisfac-

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tory. In many cases, especially in small and medium-sized highly industrialized towns, the employers themselves organize the search for immigrant workers through their local associations. Usually these are industrial firms and the immigrants are employed as unskilled workers at the lowest ranks of the internal hierarchy. In fact, a large proportion of people designated as unskilled workers had a high level of technical education, especially among the first wave of immigrants. The large number of immigrants formally employed in these regions and in these sectors confirms that the shortage of native workers is often the reason behind the search for immigrant workers. However, many firms in these areas, especially in sectors where competition is still strong, try to exploit the immigrant workforce by re-introducing labour conditions and social protection levels that are no longer acceptable to the local population. In this way, immigrants guarantee the availability of a flexible, structurally weak workforce, an essential condition for reducing costs and coping with competition. The second, or servile model, is mainly diffused in the great cities – Rome and Milan – and pertains to the whole area of personal services (especially household services) and unskilled jobs in the tertiary sector (such as those at cleaning firms). The workforce here is largely female and highly dominated by Filipinas. Labour conditions are quite different from those of industrial employment. Workers are usually employed on an irregular basis and, except for the cleaning firms doing commercial work, work for an individual or a family, which creates a strong sense of dependence. The growth of this sector can be explained by the weakness of the Italian welfare state, which is unable to satisfy the demand for personal services. Most of the women employed as housekeepers come from countries with a Roman Catholic background. The migratory chains have often been triggered by Roman Catholic associations operating as intermediaries between Roman and Milanese families and women from the Philippines, El Salvador, Eritrea, and Somalia. The migratory chains are sustained through family and ethnic connections, which play a crucial role in organizing the arrival of more immigrants. This condition favours the development of ethnic communities and the creation

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of close-knit links among their members. It is usually very hard for an immigrant to change or improve her job situation, as this sector offers few career prospects or links to the surrounding labour market. The third, or exploitative model, is mainly found in the south, especially in agriculture, and in the north and east in the construction and service sectors. The main feature of this model is its irregularity and informality. Many of the workers operate in the underground economy without any formal contracts or regulations. The absence of legal protection allows the exploitation of the immigrant workforce, which is compelled to accept any conditions. In order to survive, immigrants have to work, and yet they do not have a stable job. They are trapped in circumstances that are very hard to escape. There is little detail on how people are recruited into this segment of the labour market, but it is clear that there are mechanisms that exist to supply new workers. The mechanism is particularly active in the south, where organizations regularly bring immigrants to Italy. Once they are in the country, immigrants are easily recruited as a flexible and informal workforce in agriculture, where poorly paid farmhands are sorely needed, in street selling – the streets in the richest cities and the most popular beaches teem with street vendors illegally selling all kinds of goods – and in lowlevel service activities. The informal employment of immigrants is also diffused in the restaurant and construction industries, north and south. Poor labour conditions, low wages, and instability are the usual features of these activities, whose exploitative effects are extremely high. Ethnic Enterprises The mass migration of recent decades has taken place at a time when small businesses and enterprises have flourished in almost every productive sector. The industrial and tertiary sectors (garment, food, retail) are ones in which migrant entrepreneurship has been very active both in northern Europe and in North America. But these are sectors where there has also been a strong history of indigenous entrepreneurship by Italians. Fierce competition among businesses that are active in each of these sectors represents a discouraging factor for immigrants. Data from a recent survey show an increase since 2000 of enterprises owned by foreigners, from 85,049 businesses registered in 2000 to

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125,461 in 2002.7 This increase takes on even greater importance if we consider the number of new business registrations. Among the nearly 285,000 new businesses set up in 2002 as “sole proprietorships” or “private partnerships” new enterprises with owners from outside the eu numbered over 34,000, or 12 per cent of the total. An examination of the 243,000 businesses “closing down” in 2002, those owned by non-eu citizens accounted for just under 6 per cent or 14,000 of the total. Breaking down the data per macro-area, we can see that the majority of new foreign businesses arose in the northwest, where they number 35,000. The main countries of origin for entrepreneurs are Morocco, China, Albania, Senegal, Tunisia, and Egypt. Their activities are primarily distributed in trade (34.5%), construction (24.2%), and manufacturing (35.9%). Businesses owned by women are concentrated mainly in trade (35.9%), manufacturing (16.1%), and in services to companies (7.7%). Male entrepreneurs, who in any case account for almost all foreign businesses (men own 77% of foreign enterprises), are present above all in the building sector (30.9%). Entrepreneurship among migrants involves members of the oldest immigrant groups. In Milan, for example, Chinese, Eritreans, and Egyptians are involved in crafts and restaurants (Baptiste and Zucchetti 1994; Zucchetti 1995; Failla and Lombardi 1993). The forms of social integration that these economic activities tend to produce fall outside the support networks of the immigrant community and require the creation of complex sets of interactions with the local or host society. As mentioned before, one important consequence of the Italian socio-economic structure is the prevailingly informal economic incorporation of migrants. At the same time, this informal incorporation does not carry any connotation of ethnic economies and subcultures. Religious Affiliation The Caritas Italiana organization has estimated the number of immigrants (circa 1,512,324) registered on 31 December 2002 holding residence permits. This figure is lower than the actual number of foreign cit-

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izens present in Italy.8 Among the foreigners officially present in Italy, 690,525 are recorded as Christians (45.7%); 553,007 Muslims (36.6%); 4,203 Jews; 39,416 Hindus; and 37,489 Buddhists. Almost half of the Christians are Roman Catholics (24.1%); one third are Orthodox Christians (13.5%); and one eighth are Protestants (5.6%). In Italy, as in the rest of Europe, the Muslim community is the second most numerous, although it is composed almost exclusively of foreign citizens. The main countries of origin are Morocco and Albania. The regional distribution of the religious groups is highly differentiated. Christians are the absolute majority of foreigners in Abruzzo, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lazio, and Trentino Alto Adige. More generally, the Muslim presence is spread throughout Italy – 36% in the northwest (especially in the Valle d’Aosta), 28.4% in the northeast, 21.5% in the central areas, and the remaining 14% in the south (particularly in Basilicata, Calabria, and Puglia). More generally, data on religious affiliation highlight the multireligious character of contemporary Italian society (Caritas Italiana 2000). This new presence of religious minorities that are now strongly rooted poses specific problems and demands a more adequate formulation of social incorporation. Political Participation and Ethnic Institutions Naturalization Rates An important index of integration concerns citizenship. In Italy, citizenship is granted by either naturalization or through marriage to a citizen. According to the Ministry of the Interior, over 50,000 foreigners were granted citizenship during the 1990s. Focusing on one year, 1997–1998, shows that the acquisition of citizenship occurs through marriage in nine out of ten cases. In Italy, the principle of ius sanguinis (ethnic descent) remains the basic component of naturalization. Although it is true that marriage is but one of the ways to become an Italian citizen, it is in fact the only practicable way. A request for an ordinary naturalization requires ten years of continuous stay in the country. Due to the strict naturalization requirements, the classification of nationalities by number of citizenships granted depends on trends pertaining to the marriage of members of foreign communities to Italian

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citizens (Caritas Italiana 2000). The number of citizenships granted is relatively high among Swiss, Romanian, and Dominican nationals, but it is almost wholly due to mixed marriages. In contrast, citizenship acquisition by Egyptian nationals is rare. Even though they constitute a community with a long immigration history, Egyptians do not tend to marry Italians. In general, the number of citizenships granted is very small, amounting to less than ten thousand per year (Zincone 2001). Participation in Ethnic Institutions Long-term immigrants are extremely interesting for analysis, not only because they are the majority of immigrants, but also because they are creating a new societal component. This novel component can be seen in development of cultural mediation and cultural mediators. Cultural mediation was dealt with for the first time in Italy by law 40/1998 (Turco-Napolitano), which recognized the importance of diversifying legislation according to the length of stay of immigrants. The world of immigration is made up of people who have just arrived and others who have accrued many years of residence in the country. Differentiated needs, and consequently diversified responses, are therefore emphasized in the legislation for these two categories of people. Cultural mediation is provided for in order to encourage cultural meetings and exchanges between the host country and immigrants thereto. There is also a collective dimension promoted by various groups that aim to assist the immigrant population in adapting to the new society. Immigrant associations have a strategic role in this field, not only for their ability to provide linguistic mediators and interpreters, but also, above all, to activate social relations and networks throughout a community, providing information, assistance, and sensitization programs (Caritas Italiana 2002). A recent research study at the national level counted 893 foreign associations9 distributed mainly in central Italy (31 per cent) and the northwest (29.2 per cent). Lombardy and Emilia Romagna are the regions most involved in the phenomenon in question, followed by Tuscany and Lazio. According to this survey (Table 4.9), it is possible to categorize foreign associations according to their membership base and social aims. The majority of the associations studied are marked by a clear ethnic

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Table 4.9 Foreign Associations by Primary Purpose Social aims

% of total

Community Cultural Religious Socio-cultural Social Socio-trade union total

Foreign

Italian

Foreign and Italian

Not reported

26.4 12.9 12.3 22.4 11.4 14.5

60.5 64.9 69.7 66.7 46.7 18.9

0.0 10.5 1.8 8.1 8.9 22.8

4.3 0.0 1.8 1.0 5.9 54.3

53.2 24.6 26.6 24.2 38.6 3.9

100.0

56.1

8.6

9.0

26.3

Source: Caritas Italiana, Rome, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione (data from the Corazzino Foundation 2000).

identity. In 60.5 per cent of the cases, they are linked to the individual foreign state of origin of their members; they address the immigrants themselves and have a “socio-community” aim. In other words, they seek to foster meetings between co-nationals by supplying material and psychological support. Apart from socio-community aims, the associations also have socio-cultural goals (22.4% of cases); socio-trade union aims (14.5%); cultural goals (12.9%); religious goals (12.3%); and social goals (11.4%). In this last case, the primary goals are to help foreigners with regard to job inclusion (10% of the associations in the survey); co-operation in development (7.4%); solidarity (5.7%); the question of women’s rights (4.7%); and political rights (3.7%). The basis of foreign associations ranges from a purely ethnic identity to multi-ethnic identities where members come from different countries (25.6% of cases) and inter-ethnic ones (14.5% of the total, based on collaboration between the immigrant associations and Italian institutions or organizations).

emerging problems and efforts at resolution In Italy, like other European countries, political debate on the immigration issue has increasingly focused on international or trans-national measures to control migration flows and on the criteria for the inclu-

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sion/exclusion of foreigners (Cesarani and Fulbrook 1997; BaldwinEdwards and Schain 1994; Martiniello 1994). The attempts to regulate migration enacted by European governments have been made according to certain shared duties, from the coordinated computerized control of borders to prevent the entry of migrants from outside the eu to the spread of administrative and police controls for foreigners present inside the eu. Legal entry, a basic condition in order to benefit from civil, political, and social rights, such as participation in the labour market, remains subject to the criminal record of applicants. This criminal record check has become the fundamental legal criterion for inclusion/exclusion (Agozino 1997; Brion 1997; Palidda 1997). The link between increasing migratory flows and the rise in crime has become the focus of public debate to the extent that immigration has become the major source of “insecurity” and concern among both the general public (Dal Lago 1998) and state police organizations (Bigo 1992; Palidda 1997). In general, there is public and political debate over whether the presence of a growing number of immigrants in Europe, together with the expectation of future mass migration from developing countries, will produce a dramatic increase in crime rates. This concern is fed by the media, institutional agencies, and experts who regularly supply data demonstrating a clear and worrying surge in crime rates among immigrants. Examining the link between immigration and crime rates is complicated because data of adequate validity and reliability are in short supply. In general, it appears that crimes against property, against persons, and prostitution either declined or remained stable. Drug trafficking, which is very sensitive to selective enforcement, rose somewhat during the period, while the proportion of migratory law violations (which are status offenses) rose considerably. One reading of the connection between foreign immigration and crime can be linked to the handling of immigration policies. These policies have been left for a long time in the hands of the executive branch, in particular the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The police forces have from the start been central to the management of migration, and the

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absence of framework laws and policies for the overall handling of the phenomenon has only increased the discretionary nature of police intervention in handling social problems involving immigrants. The long backlog of immigration cases tends to be created by local police authorities in their administration of immigrants, notably the issuing, modification, and renewal of stay permits. In all other Western European countries, these are the responsibility of local government.10 A comparison between Italy and other European Union countries immediately shows the precariousness of citizenship rights granted to immigrants in Italy and the ease with which they are revoked (Nascimbene 1997). The restriction of so-called “socio-economic” conditions included in legislation regarding residence permits, essential to obtaining almost all public rights, means that applicants must be employed with a regular job, a regular work contract, and the possibility of benefiting from a series of welfare resources (Reyneri 1998; Mingione 1997; Mingione and Quassoli 1999). This is an almost unrealistic condition for most immigrants.

concluding remarks In contrast to other Western European countries, but in common with other countries of Southern Europe, Italy has only recently started to attract immigrants from developing countries. Immigration flows became substantial in the late-1980s, when Italy was already in the typical postindustrial transformations of Western economies and societies. This period in Italy has also witnessed the erosion of the welfare state and of the conditions that facilitated the expansion of social rights. The state increasingly appears unable to grant – both financially and organizationally – universal rights and quality services. The state not only has to solve the fiscal problems linked to maintaining welfare programs, but it also needs to respond to rising demands for quality and specialized services. The main consequences of these processes can be seen in the reduction of universal programs and the implementation of mixed sys-

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tems that combine private and public provision. The situation is rather similar to that in Northern European countries, but, as we show below, “being on welfare” in Italy is not a possibility available to foreign migrants. As noted in the introduction, the social system that migrants encounter in Italy has eroded many of the main features that granted immigrants the chance for stability and integration in the so-called Fordist era. Immigrants in the new wave cannot benefit from a developing industrial economy, which requires a large supply of cheap unqualified labour. Contemporary immigrants instead have to cope with a much more complex society, where the prerequisite to finding a job is to define one’s own occupational identity within a segmented and fragmented labour market. A further important consideration is the role played by the institutional framework in the social construction of migrant inclusion/exclusion in the Italian society and economy. The lack of political intervention – politicians refused to acknowledge that Italy had become a country of immigration after being, for many years, one of emigration – meant that no provision was made for any kind of legal entitlement for immigrants already in the country during the 1970s and 1980s. This state of affairs pushed immigrants who decided to remain in Italy into the informal sector. From the very beginning, they realized that the informal sector provided the only chance of finding a job. Not surprisingly, the legal-institutional framework was the key element in shaping the opportunity structure for migrants. The implementation of policies by the Italian bureaucracy leaves immigrants extremely disoriented concerning their legal status, and therefore, their access to labour markets and services. Great uncertainty surrounds the citizenship rights of immigrants and the types and amounts of resources public agencies are supposed to provide for them. Immigrants often describe Italy as a country controlled by an irrational and unpredictable bureaucracy, contact with which it is best to avoid (Barbesino and Quassoli 1997).11 In sum, besides the formal exclusions produced by the legal framework, the actual functioning of the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus presents a confused system that

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blurs the distinctions between formal and informal arrangements, thus producing the most favourable conditions for the reproduction of informal practices (Reyneri 1998). The structure of public administration and the internal segmentation of functions, tasks, and responsibilities have resulted in weakening the provision of resources, far more so than in private social sectors that, in turn, have limited technical and financial instruments at their disposal. Difficulties of coordination and the segmentation of areas of competence are then generated and compounded by the implementation of rules and regulations. Consequently, a foreigner who wishes to benefit from the services available has to face a multitude of bureaucratic obstacles, which usually prove impossible to overcome. This is the reason why, in most cases, he or she prefers to turn to private sources of social provision, which on the one hand are more attentive and flexible about the variety of requests to be satisfied, and on the other hand, allow an opportunistic fruition without risking severe sanctions – usually just symbolic ones. This is precisely where the non-governmental sector of social provision proves itself to be effective, although this point does not take into account the effectiveness of the actual service provided. Besides efficacy, service accessibility is the most important element in the structuring of the information currently available and the ideas of the network of information. In some cases, immigrants are already aware of non-governmental services before entering the country. This means that non-governmental services take on excluded and precarious users, those frequently “left over” by public services. Volunteer associations fill some of the institutional gaps and, notwithstanding the low level of resources available to them and their limited recognition, deal with difficult users in a usually competent way. Uncertainty over the legal status of immigrants – produced and reproduced through the political decision-making process and the bureaucratic procedures of public administration – and their “invisible” incorporation into the labour market have generated fertile ground for their criminalization by the law enforcement agencies and the judicial

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system. There has been heated debate about crime among migrants in Italy (Barbagli 1998; Dal Lago 1998; Palidda 1998 and 1997; Pastore 1995; Segre 1993). All agree on the guiding role played by the institutional framework in defining the borders between inclusion and exclusion, as well as different types or levels of inclusion. Italy has experienced a transformation from an exporter to a destination for labour, particularly from Eastern Europe, North Africa, and East Asia, and immigrants make up a small but growing proportion of the population. The Italian nation-building process, formed from the amalgamation of regional nations under the auspices of a unified state, has produced an Italian identity that formally recognizes the rights of ethno-linguistic groups. The notable exception to this legislated recognition of ethnic minorities is the stigmatization and segregation of the Roma population, an omission justified on the grounds that they are not traditionally linked to any particular territory. All immigrants are confronted by a number of challenges. The vast majority of immigrants employed legally are found in manufacturing industries in the northern provinces. But the unemployment rate among immigrants is high, and many make ends meet by working in the underground economy. Immigrants holding residence and work permits are formally equal to Italian workers in the private sector, but not in the public sector. In addition, the erosion of the welfare state has placed immigrants in an increasingly precarious position. Eligibility for social protection and benefits has become more restrictive. Gaps in the legal and institutional framework are also explained by the Italian government’s slow and halting response to the continuing inflows of immigration, and the labyrinthine bureaucracy also leaves many people in a legal no-man’s land. Uncertainty over the legal status of immigrants and their invisible incorporation into the labour market has also generated fertile ground for criminalization by law enforcement agencies and the judicial system.

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notes 1 See the estimates supplied by Caritas Italiana of Rome. The data provided by the Ministry of the Interior are multiplied by 1.21, so that the total calculation of residence permits includes renewed permits or renewals issued as new permits and minors not registered as permit holders. (Caritas Italiana calculates the number to be about 100,000). 2 Other data collections of the foreign presence in Italy are available at the City Registries. In theory, they serve to monitor the territorial distribution of foreigners in Italy, but in practice they cannot be directly used for research purposes. This is because, generally speaking, neither the City Councils nor the foreign citizens who move from one municipality to another or leave the country delete the information about them from the records. In addition to this source, there are the data collected by the Ministry of Labour on unemployment and employment registration, judicial statistics, and the registration for inps (the Italian Social Security agency) pensions (Strozza 1994; ismu 1995; Bonifazi 1998). 3 In comparing data from the Ministry of the Interior with those from istat, it is important to recall that, in the case of the Ministry, the data collection is dated as of 31 December of the same year, whereas those of istat are dated 8 January of the following year (Caritas Italiana 1999). 4 In 2001, the foreign population living in Italy represented less than 3 per cent of the total population, as opposed to the European average of 5 per cent, which reaches peaks of 6 per cent and 9 per cent in France and Germany, respectively (Caritas Italiana 2001). 5 This analysis will only consider the indicators concerning the legal immigrant population, although issues linked to illegal immigration and their quantitative estimates have recently acquired an increasing importance and have been making the headlines. This choice has mainly been driven by data availability. 6 One needs to bear in mind that the increase in mixed marriages, especially those where the bridegroom is a foreigner and the bride is Italian, can also be ascribed to some deliberate strategies that allow the bypass of the obstacles to the foreigner’s stay in the country (ismu 2001, 19). In this sense, marriage is obviously not an indicator of integration.

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7 Excelsior Survey, Unioncamere. 8 Most children who are underage and holders of renewed permits are not included in these Ministry data. 9 See the research study promoted by the Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro and carried out by the Corazzin Foundation, Venice, in 2000. The associations captured in the study are fewer than the actual numbers, due to the changing nature of foreign associations. 10 Leaving aside the deliberate policies enacted by police stations in area control and the prevention-repression of crime, this last fact alone increases the opportunities in which the behaviour, legal status, and living conditions of foreigners may become the object of police control (Palidda 1998). 11 During the last amnesty, many immigrants experienced terrible difficulties in obtaining a temporary residence permit. Many of those without papers decided to give up almost immediately. Many others turned for help to lawyers, legal consultant agencies, private associations, and public offices (Reyneri 1998).

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– 1998. “The Mass Legalization of Migrants in Italy: Permanent or Temporary Emergence from the Underground Economy?” South European Society and Politics 3: 83–104. Reyneri, E. and M. Baganha. 1998. “New Migrants in South European Countries and their Insertion in the Underground Economy,” in Migrants’ Insertion in the Informal Economy, Deviant Behaviour and the Impact on Receiving Societies, ed. E. Reyneri. CE/DGXII, tser program. Sayad, A. 1992. L’immigration ou les paradoxes de l’altérité. Bruxelles: De Boeck Wesmael. Sciortino, G. 2000. L’ambizione della frontier. Milano: Franco Angeli. Segre, S. 1993. “Immigrazione extracomunitaria e delinquenza giovanile: Un’analisi sociologica,” Studi Emigrazione 111: 384–415. Strozza, S. 1994. “La presenza straniera in Italia: un esame critico delle possibilità di rilevazione e di stima,” in Ciucci L., Racioppi F. (a cura di), Studi di popolazione. Nuovi approcci per la descrizione e l’interpretazione, 185–214. Dipartimento di Scienze Demografiche, Università di Roma. Zanfrini, L. 1998. Leggere le migrazioni. I risultati della ricerca empirica, le categorie interpretative, i problemi aperti. Milano: Franco Angeli. Zincone, G. 2001. ed. Rapporto sull’integrazione in Italia. Bologna: il Mulino. – 2000. Rapporto sull’integrazione in Italia. Bologna: il Mulino. – 1999. Primo rapporto sull’integrazione in Italia. Bologna: il Mulino. Zucchetti, E. 1995. “L’imprenditorialità etnica,” in Primo rapporto sulle migrazioni 1995. Fondazione Cariplo-ismu. Milano: Franco Angeli.

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5 Greece: From Emigration to Immigration and the Problems of Inter-Ethnic Relations laura maratou-alipranti

historical background Greece has had a lengthy historical experience with population movement. During the millennium of the Ottoman Empire, from the medieval to the modern age, Greeks established themselves in the major cities of Europe. These emigrants created the tradition of a Greek diaspora. Greeks abroad identified themselves as “Greek” and cultivated sentimental, cultural, and financial ties to an imagined Greek state that was created in the early nineteenth century (Chassiotis 1993). In the twentieth century, it is estimated that 1.5 million Greeks were compelled to leave Greece. About 1 million settled in North and South America, 300,000 in Australia and New Zealand, and about 800,000 in Western European countries (Tamis and Gavaki 2002, 21). The Greek diaspora remains large, consisting of up to 4 million people globally. Australia, Canada, and the US account for half of these communities; while the US alone is home to around 30 per cent of the Greeks abroad (Roudometof and Karpathakis 2004). Greek state formation and nation building were lengthy processes. The modern Greek state declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829 after an eight-year conflict. The rubble left by the collapse of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century led to the rise of new states across the whole of the Balkan Peninsula (Brubaker 1996). The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and sub-

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sequently the First World War resulted in a political transformation (Stavrianos 2000, 470–1). By the end of the First World War, most of the countries in Southeast Europe, notably Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, successfully incorporated the main body of national and ethnic groups they had aspired to unify (Aleifantis 1998, 59). Yet no Balkan country, including Greece, achieved ethnic and religious homogeneity (Todorova 1995, 67). In 1913, western Macedonia and Epirus were incorporated into the Greek state. In 1919, western Thrace and eastern Macedonia were ceded to Greece. The “new territories” almost doubled the size of the Kingdom of Greece (see Pavlowitch 1999, 189). These new territories were characterized by ethnological, linguistic, and religious diversity. As a result, Greece had to deal with minority problems on a larger scale. Although there is controversy about the accuracy of official data published at the time, the population in Greek Macedonia, Epirus, and Thrace consisted of Slavic-speaking populations (Greek and Bulgarian), Muslims (of Albanian or Turkish descent), Koutsovlachs (Greek or Romanian), Jews, Armenians, and Russian counter-revolutionaries (see Livani 2000, 75). It is estimated that ethnic Greeks were about twenty-five per cent of the population in the “new territories” (Pavlowitch 1999, 189).

a mid-century survey of the population There is a dearth of official statistics available for ethnic minorities since their members have often been considered to have been Greek citizens. The Greek state has minimized the significance or denied the existence of minorities (Poulton 1993, 175). The only official data on minority groups date from the 1951 census.1 It should be noted that minorities were formally defined according to religious affiliation and primary language. The official classification of the population in the 1951 census by religion and mother tongue creates problems in identifying ethnic groups. For instance, it is hard to separate the Pomaks (Slavic-speaking Muslims) who live in western Thrace from the Turks, due to official reticence in recording data on ethnic minorities (Poul-

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ton 1993, 182). At the same time, there was considerable reluctance among some people to reveal their mother tongue during the turbulent post-1945 period. Greece was and is characterized by religious homogeneity, since 98% of the population is, at least nominally, Orthodox Christian. There were also 28,430 (0.4%) Catholics and 112,665 (1.5%) Muslims, including, among the latter, Turks, Pomaks, and Roma (Clogg 2002, xi). “Today the Catholics of Greece number approximately 53,000 people,” writes Frazee, who notes that “the two Cycladic islands of Tinos and Syros remain centres of Catholicism” (2002, 39). This total excludes any Catholic immigrants. The number of Jews living in Greece was 72,791 (1.2%) in 1928 and 67,661 (0.9%) in 1940. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, their number had decreased to 6,325 (0.1%). At that time, there were also very small numbers of Protestants, Monophysites, other Christians (primarily Jehovah’s Witnesses), and non-Christians residing in Greece. The 1951 census showed that only 4.4% of the population were not native Greek speakers, compared to 7.5% in 1940. It appears that the only sizeable population that did not speak Greek as a native language was the Turkish-speaking minority of 179,895 (2.4%) people, mainly residing in Greek Macedonia (56,549) and Thrace (93,856). Slavic languages coonstituted the mother tongues for 41,017 (0.5%) of the population compared to 86,086 (1.2%) in 1940. Clogg (2002, xi) notes that “the number of mother tongue Slavic speakers is almost certainly too low. The census was taken only a short time after the end of the civil war of 1946 to 1949. Since Slavophones were disproportionately represented in the ranks of the defeated Communist Democratic Army, there would have been a strong incentive for Slavic speakers to play down their linguistic preference” (Clogg 2002, xi). Furthermore, Pomak was reported as the mother tongue of 18,671 people (0.2%), Vlach was given as that of 39,855 (0.5%), and Albanian as that of 22,736 (0.3%) (see Clogg 2002, xi). The Pomaks in western Thrace became the subject of national propaganda and a struggle between Bulgaria and Turkey because of the ethno-linguistic and religious characteristics of the group (Slavic-speaking Muslims). They were regarded

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with a certain amount of suspicion in Greece and were isolated on the fringes of the national society (Tsimpiridou 2000, 38). The Vlachs are a Latin-speaking people – they speak a form of Romanian – and, like the Sarakatsani (Greek-speaking people), are migratory shepherds (see Poulton 1993, 189–90). The existence of Vlachs affected Greek– Romanian relations to a certain extent. On the other hand, the Sarakatsani were never even classified in the population census (Campbell 2002, 165). Orthodox Christians of Albanian descent, known as Arvanites, migrated southwards into Greece during the Middle Ages (see Clogg 2002, xvi; Stavrianos 2000, 98). Arvanites settled mainly in Beotia, southern Euboea, the islands of the Saronic gulf, and Attica. Many of them took a leading role in fighting the Turks during the Greek War of Independence. They defined themselves as “Greeks” and were fully assimilated into the newly formed nation-state. There is little information about the Muslim Albanian minority, the Chams, who reside in the borderlands of Epirus – mainly in Thesprotia. The Chams remained in Greece after the incorporation of Epirus into the Greek state in 1913. According to the 1951 census, the number of Albanian-speaking Muslims remaining in Greece was only 487 because 16,890 of them had fled to Albania after the Second World War, an effect of wartime ethnic conflict encouraged by the occupying Italians (Poulton 1993, 189).

emigration and repatriation of ethnic greeks Greek emigration was continuous throughout the twentieth century, the last important wave occurring from 1945 to 1974. Nearly 1 million Greeks, almost one sixth of the population, emigrated to Western European countries (chiefly to Germany) and overseas (US, Canada, and Australia) (Fakiolas and King 1996, 172). Peaks of emigration were reached during the 1960s, when about 100,000 people departed in most years. This massive emigration acted as a solution to the acute unemployment of that period. However, in the long run, this emigration produced many negative consequences, most notably an aging population

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and rural depopulation (Emke-Poulopoulou 1986; Patiniotis 1990; Kotzamanis 1992; Fakiolas and King 1996). The Greek state signed bilateral agreements with several Western European nations covering equal employment rights and providing for the establishment of Greek schools (Moussourou 2003; Fakiolas 2001). Although bilateral agreements sometimes supported the return of Greek emigrants from Western Europe, the migration outflow continued until the mid-1970s. Greece then began to experience a shift towards positive net migration, especially from the Federal Republic of Germany, which in the 1960s had attracted thousands of Greek workers (Fakiolas and King 1996, 174). By 1986, about 600,000 emigrants had returned home (Petropoulos 1994, 1990; Vgenopoulos 2000). The return movement of emigrants in the 1955–1977 period was much higher from European countries than from overseas. The reasons that led Greek workers to return home included improvements in the political, economic, and social conditions in Greece, especially after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, as well as the slowdown of the German economy and the relative ease of movement between the two countries (Vgenopoulos 2000).

foreign populations in greece In recent years, Greece, like the Balkan region, has experienced a major reversal of the historical pattern of population movement. The region became the destination of large numbers of migrants, including refugees and highly qualified labourers. This migration can be explained by a combination of factors: geographical location, economic and social development, and the transformation of the region to “postFordist” industrial structures (King and Black 1997). During the 1960s, the rapid growth of the Greek economy resulted in labour shortages. By 1970, and throughout the next two decades, the country began attracting foreign workers. After the collapse of Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, illegal migration increased considerably (Linardos-Rilmon 1993; Petrinioti 1993; King and Black 1997; Chletsos 2001).

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Immigrants today fall into three categories: (a) foreign workers, permanent and temporary workers with work permits; (b) foreign workers without residence or work permits; and (c) repatriated ethnic Greeks. The population of foreign workers residing in Greece has many different sources. Until the 1990s, legal migrants – with work permits – were a very small group. The Ministry of Labour was responsible for issuing work permits. Permit holders came primarily from South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and a few European countries. Their numbers increased from about 5,000 in the 1960s to over 20,000 in the 1970s and to about 30,000 in the 1990s. In 1996, only 24,413 foreign nationals had valid work permits. The origin of legal migrants reflects the particularities of the Greek case. Most of them were ethnic Greeks, other European Union (EU) nationals, and Asians. The proportion of women immigrants has increased substantially. Women comprised 26 per cent of all immigrants in the 1970s and 45 per cent of all immigrants in the 1990s (See Table 5.1). Data on work permits indicate that ethnic Greeks received half of all permits issued during the 1980s. This proportion fell to less than 10 per cent after 1990. The proportion of permits for migrants from EU countries has increased, while the proportion for Asians has dropped. The declining number of residence permits during this period resulted from legal changes made in 1991. The permits were granted for one year and were issued by the Ministry of Labour at the request of prospective employers through a series of complicated procedures. Official data from the Greek National Statistical Service (nssg) showed that in 1998, approximately 165,000 foreigners with residence permits lived in Greece; 44,000 of them were European Union citizens working in Greece, mainly administrative and managerial personnel in tourist agencies and multinational firms (See Table 5.2). According to the 2001 population census, the total population of foreigners was 797,093 people (45 per cent of whom were women). Foreigners comprised 7 per cent of the total population of Greece (Greeks and aliens) of 10,964,080 people, a far larger proportion than

62.1 63.8 55.4 42.5 43.0 45.2 48.9 49.7 48.0 48.8 49.8 48.9 49.6 48.1 45.0 46.8 56.5 54.8 61.7 67.9 80.6 57.5

1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1996 6.1 4.1 4.7 4.6 5.2 3.2 3.4 4.1 5.0 5.2 5.8 7.2 7.8 6.4 7.9 8.0 6.7 9.3 5.6 4.9 2.8 -

Africa 10.9 10.2 6.9 10.2 10.5 10.9 11.8 11.9 11.3 10.4 9.3 9.7 9.1 8.8 8.6 8.8 7.5 7.2 5.6 4.7 2.5 -

America EU

26.2 19.9 20.4 17.5 19.7 21.1 24.0 25.2 25.6 23.8 25.4 35.1 38.2 45.8 52.9 55.6 36.9

Unspecified 3.5 3.2 6.4 9.8 10.1 9.8 5.2 1.9 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 -

Australia 4.0 3.8 2.4 3.3 3.3 4.1 4.4 4.7 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.1 26.4 29.0 34.7 31.1 22.6 39.9 43.1 45.3 48.5 47.3 46.8 39.9 35.1 32.9 30.4 28.4 25.4 17.8 14.0 10.9 9.4 20.6

Ethnic Greeks*

18,609 22,906 25,462 26,032 27,501 29,706 29,838 28,628 30,016 29,766 28,736 26,864 28,156 28,000 28,854 26,331 24,662 27,022 29,439 33,912 29,948 24,413

Total (N)

27.0 23.1 24.3 24.6 25.0 24.4 24.4 25.8 26.7 24.4 26.8 27.4 29.5 32.5 35.5 36.7 35.1 35.5 42.1 45.3 46.2 -

Women

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Sources: Ministry of Labour; National Statistics Service of Greece (nssg); unpublished data.

13.4 14.9 24.2 29.6 27.9 26.8 26.3 27.7 29.7 30.2 30.1 29.3 28.9 32.4 34.6 32.5 25.9 25.7 24.7 20.5 12.9 27.8

Asia

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*Greeks from Turkey, Albania, and Cyprus.

Europe

Year

Table 5.1 Foreigners in Greece with Work Permits by Continent of Origin, 1973–1996 (Percentage)

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Table 5.2 Population of Greece by Citizenship, 1951–2001 Year

Greeks

Foreigners in Greece

Total population

1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001

7,602,230 8,333,817 8,676,073 9,568,993 10,092,624 10,166,987

30,571 54,736 92,568 171,424 167,276 797,093

7,632,801 8,388,553 8,768,641 9,740,417 10,259,900 10,964,080

Source: nssg, 1951–2001 Population Censuses

that of most eu countries except Germany. The regional distribution of the foreign population indicates that more than half reside in Athens and Macedonia (Thessaloniki). The rest are settled in other regions.

economic and illegal migrants Since the early 1980s, Greece has also become an attractive destination or transit point for non-regulated migration. Economic conditions encouraging illegal immigrants include the growing underground economy; the inflexibility of the local labour market (limited part-time jobs for young people, housewives, etc.); and the concentrated seasonality of the Greek economy in three major sectors – agriculture, tourism, and construction – where demand peaks in summer (Fakiolas 1993; Baldwin-Edwards and Aranjo 1999). The economic role of migrants in all of the Southern European labour markets is to balance structural faults. There are three main problems: (a) insufficient labour markets in some areas; (b) over-regulated, inflexible labour markets; and (c) uncompetitive low-productivity sectors. Other factors driving increased migration in the 1990s were the political changes in the former socialist countries, the ethnic, political conflicts in the Balkan countries that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as a demographic push in many Third World countries. These factors were common to all Southern European countries. The

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first important migratory flow started in the 1980s with political liberalization in the socialist countries. During the 1980s, migrants from Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria arrived in Greece. In the 1990s, from the collapse of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union to the collapse of Albania, these flows increased. Numerous Albanians entered via the mountainous border with Greece, despite mass expulsions of thousands of them every year. The arrival of migrants from other Eastern European countries continued despite a repressive immigration law that was passed in 1991. In the mid-1990s, the illegal population was estimated to be about 450,000. By the late 1990s, estimates of the illegal population were up to 700,000 (Psimmenos 1995; Fakiolas, 2001).

ethnic greek migration to and from the former ussr From the 1980s onward, there has been a distinctive migration consisting of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union and from Albania. One of the oldest and most familiar routes for Greek migrants had been to Russia. In the twentieth century, after Russian troops yielded Pontos to advancing Turks in 1918, about 200,000 Greeks moved from the Trebizond area and eastern Pontos into southern Russia and the interior of Georgia. There were about 550,000 Greeks living in Russia at the time of the Russian Revolution. During the early years of Bolshevik rule, the Greeks in Russia enjoyed a considerable degree of cultural autonomy. They had their own schools, and newspapers and books were published in the Pontic dialect; there was even a Greek-language theatre in Sukhum, the capital of Abkhazia (Clogg 2002). For a time there was some demand for an autonomous Pontic Republic in southern Russia, but this was quickly suppressed (Karpozilos 1999). During Stalin’s rule, the entire Pontic population of the Caucasus was transported and exiled to southern Kazakhstan in Central Asia. Beginning in 1957, the restrictions of their exile were gradually lifted. From 1965 to 1967, about 13,500 were allowed to leave the ussr. During the period of perestroika and glasnost in the 1980s, many freedoms were gained by the Greek and Pontic communities in the ussr.

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However, the displaced Greeks of Central Asia were caught between rival ethnic groups and faced hard economic times. They were unable to return to their former homes in Georgia because they only spoke Russian. A return migration to Greece itself began. While it is estimated that about 500,000 ethnic Greeks still live in the area of the former ussr, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that 200,000 Greeks, chiefly Pontians, have returned, only about half of whom have a repatriation visa (Kassimati 2003 and 1992). The age structure of ethnic Greek returnees from Pontos is relatively young: 38 per cent are 0–25 years old; 50 per cent 26–55 years; and 12 per cent 56 years and above. Their educational level is also quite high (Kassimati 1992). Immigrants who can demonstrate Greek ethnicity are immediately recognized and entitled to special treatment. They can immediately obtain a work permit and they have rights to social security and other benefits. However, Greeks from Pontos face many challenges. The dialect they speak is not easily comprehensible, and they encounter economic problems such as finding housing and employment, in addition to the challenge of learning Greek (Karantinos, Ioannou, and Kavounidis 1992; Kassimati 2003). The “repatriation” of ethnic Greeks is a major objective of Greek migration policy, and the policy on admittance of the non-indigenous people varies according to whether they can be characterized as “repatriated.” The protective policy that is implemented centres on provisions and facilities: special procedures for acquiring Greek citizenship; imported duty-free goods and moving expenses; recognition of educational titles; establishment of tutorial classes in schools for learning the Greek language; special financial aid; and so forth. Emphasis on the protection of this social group is also apparent in the formation of particular institutions such as the National Foundation for the Reception and Settlement of Greek Refugees (EIYAOPE), which provides different programs, transit centres, and language lessons to the repatriated ethnic Greeks. Protective policies and preferential treatment of repatriated Greeks tend to indicate that they continue to face problems of adaptation.

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ethnic greeks from albania The Vorio-Epirotes (ethnic Greek Albanians) are members of a Greek minority group that was concentrated in southern Albania. Recent Albanian nationalism has resulted in the oppression of national minorities in Albania. Political instability and both open and hidden hostility towards the minorities after the fall of the Communist regime forced a great number of Vorio-Epirotes to leave southern Albania. In the case of the Greeks of “northern Epirus,” there is no reliable data on their number. The Albanian state claims that their number is very small, about 58,000. The General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad estimates that almost 80,000 Albanians live in Greece. The Vorio-Epirotes (northern Epirotes) Association, however, claims a population of between 300,000 and 500,000, mainly concentrated in southern Albania (northern Epirus) (Kassimati 2003; Vergeti 2003). Since the late 1980s, ethnic Greeks/Vorio-Epirotes have received assistance to settle legally in Greece, although official Greek policy is to encourage them to stay in Albania. In general, since the 1997 rebellion and the resulting disarray in the Albanian state, the greatest portion of the active population of the Vorio-Epirotes left for Greece. The integration of the Vorio-Epirotes into Greek society presents problems identical to those of the Pontians (Kassimati 2003). In addition, many ethnic Albanians living in Greece define themselves as Vorio-Epirotes in order to have easier access to employment. Some of them are reported to register with Greek names, while others have been baptized as Orthodox Christians.

efforts at resolution: the legal framework The 1991 Legislation In Greece, legal arrangements involving immigration are cumbersome. Immigrants face significant delays in obtaining residence permits, work permits, requests for family reunion, access to health care and educa-

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tion for children, among other issues. The most important initiatives in Greek immigration policy since the 1970s have been: (a) the 1991 Immigration Law; (b) the 1998 Legalization Procedure (“White” and “Green” card procedures); and (c) the 2001 Immigration Law and Legalization Procedure. Until 1991, the legal framework regulating foreigners was Law 4310, passed in 1929. The 1991 legislation regulated the entry and stay of foreigners in Greece. The 1991 law was little more than a policy of exclusion and expulsion, aimed specifically at Albanians. The basic issues regulated include border controls, entry, stay, labour, temporary departure conditions, and deportation procedures, as well as the criteria of granting asylum. The 1991 law aimed to facilitate family reunions for those who had resided in Greece for more than five years and had been awarded a two-year residency permit. Perhaps the most important provision of the 1991 legislation was Article 31, according to which “the services of the public sector as well as the public entities should refuse a request made by an alien who lives in Greek territory if he/she has no residency permit,” with an exception for emergency medical treatment. The immigration regulations provided by the 1991 legislation resulted in a decline in the number of residence permits granted and in the total number of valid immigrants after it was passed. The new law also slowed the rise of illegal migration (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas 1998). The legal framework in Greece may well be considered to be intended to prevent any increase in the number of economic migrants. State services have a policing and suppression function, and there are no official social provisions for the migrant workers who live in Greece. In addition, most immigrants are not insured, do not have social provisions or unemployment benefits, work for low wages in unhealthy jobs, and have substandard housing (Georgoulas 2003). The 1998 Legislation In 1998, Greece initiated new procedures for the registration and legalization of irregular migrants (Presidential Decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997). This measure was in line with measures taken by three other

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Table 5.3 Applicants for the White Card by Country of Origin and Gender, 1998 Countries Albania Bulgaria Romania Ukraine Georgia Russia Poland Pakistan India Egypt Philippines Moldavia Syria Other countries

Total

% of Foreigners

Women

% Women in total

241,561 25,168 16,954 9,821 7,548 3,139 8,631 10,933 6,405 6,225 5,383 4,396 3,434 24,190 373,788

65.0 6.8 4.6 2.6 2.0 0.8 2.3 2.9 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 6.1 100.0

41,025 14,108 5,137 7,721 4,655 2,301 3,718 51 103 347 4,361 3,160 158 6,986 93,831

43.7 15.0 5.5 8.2 5.0 2.5 4.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 4.6 3.4 0.2 7.3 100.0

Source: Kavounidis (2002, 107–14).

southern eu countries. The project consists of three stages. The first stage provides for acquiring a temporary residency card (“White Card”) and the second stage provides for acquiring a short-duration residency card (“Green Card”). Illegal immigrants who had arrived in Greece prior to 28 November 1997 could register during a five-month window. The validity of the “White Cards” issued in 1998 was about fourteen months, since time extensions were available. During that time, cardholders were required to present forty social security stamps and other documents in order to be issued an annual, renewable “Green Card.” People who could submit the necessary proof of residence were issued a Special Identity Card (“Green Card”), which was valid for three years and renewable. Cardholders have the right of residency, equal treatment in the labour market, free emergency hospital treatment, and the right to enroll children in public schools. Renewal of the “Green Card” requires 150 social security stamps, grants the cardholder most civil rights, and sustains rights in the labour market, excluding

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tenured positions in the public sector. It also allows them, generally, to receive a Schengen Visa, but it grants no voting rights.2 The participation of 371,641 foreigners in this first Greek legalization program makes it the most important plan undertaken by a Southern European country in the 1990s (Kavounidis 2002 and 1999). Nearly all of the applicants were of working age, 15–44 years old. Almost two thirds came from neighbouring Albania (65%); other large groups included Bulgarians (6.7%), Romanians (4.5%), Poles (2.3%), Ukranians (2.7%), Georgians (2.0%), and Filipinos (1.5%) (Kavounidis 2002) (see Table 5.3). About one quarter of immigrants are female. Women come from a wide variety of countries in all continents both as “dependents” (family members) and very often as “independent” economic immigrants. A majority of immigrants from Eastern European countries are women. In some ethnic groups, female immigrants outnumber male immigrants. For example, women make up 78.6% of Ukrainian immigrants, 61.7% of Georgian immigrants, 73.3% of Russian immigrants, and 81% of Filipino immigrants. The large gender imbalances among other nationalities (for example, Indians, Pakistanis, Egyptians, and Syrians) may be due to the different patterns of settlement and residency in Greece. There is, then, a polarization in the distribution of migrants by sex, and there are foreign communities that can be considered male while others can undoubtedly be considered female. Despite good intentions, this procedure has created many problems, the most important of which are the bureaucratic formalities, incomplete information, and the cumbersome two-stage procedure. The Aliens Law of 2001 Further legislation, “On the Status of Aliens and Naturalization,” has in some ways replaced the 1991 legislation. The 2001 legislation devolved the authority to grant one-year work and residency permits to local governments. This legislation also contained a last-minute legalization process. The current policy appears to have two main aims (Fakiolas

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Table 5.4 Main Features of the 1998 and 2001 Immigrant Legalization Processes Main features

1998 process

2001 process

Preparation procedures

Over two years

Over 18 months

Registration period

January–May 1998

June–July 2001

Prerequisites

Illegal residence prior to 23 November 1997

Illegal residence prior to 2 June 2000 OR purchase of 250 Social Insurance Stamps (147 euros)

Certificates granted

White and Green Card

Six-month permit and Green Card

Applications

373,000

367,860

Responsible Ministry

Ministry of Labour

Ministry of the Interior

Sources: For 1998, Presidential Decrees 358,359/1997 and National Employment Observatory. For 2001, Law 2910/2001 and Amendment 2002, Ministry of the Interior.

2003). The first is to legalize as many irregular migrants as possible by advertizing the benefits of regularization and by introducing the purchase of 250 social security stamps as an additional criterion for eligibility. The second is to restrict immigrant flows by strengthening external and internal controls. Although the 1998 and 2001 legalization programs attracted large numbers of applicants, it is estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 irregular migrants did not apply. Reasons for this include lack of knowledge about the program, absence of qualifications, fear of giving information to the police, pressure from employers who benefited from cheap illegal labour, and preference for the flexibility of the informal labour market (Sarris and Markova 2001). Law 1975/1997 had provided that applications for citizenship from foreigners who married Greek citizens could be assessed immediately if they resided in Greece and had Greek children. This provision waived the normal ten-year residence in the country (or five-year residence after the date of submitting the application).

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Table 5.5 Naturalization: Acquisition of Greek Citizenship, 1981–2000

Year

Total

Related to ethnic Greeks or Greek citizens

Foreigners

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

1,145 5,332 3,246 1,811 1,659 1,204 2,216 1,571 1,217 1,090 886 1,204 1,804 324 3,717 1,364 2,314 2,479 1,965 924

959 4,996 2,776 1,444 1,483 807 1,937 1,313 845 691 688 857 1,273 99 2,744 955 1,250 655 599 427

186 336 470 367 176 397 279 258 372 399 198 347 531 225 973 409 1,064 1,824 1,366 497

Sources: Fakiolas (1993; 1995–1999); Eurostat, 2000; European social statistics: 123; 1990–2000: Ministry of the Interior

Refugees Refugees enjoy more privileges than other alien immigrants. Refugees – whether asylum seekers or not – are mostly from the Balkan countries and the Middle East. According to official data, 18,291 people sought asylum in Greece between 1991 and 1999 (Vgenopoulos 2000). Articles 24 and 25 of Law 1975/1991 and Articles 1 and 2 of Law 2452/1996 define Greek policy on refugees in broad conformity with international conventions on the status quo of refugees under the mandate of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. Persons recognized as refugees are entitled to stay and work in Greece for one year, and renewals are permitted (Georgoulas 2003).

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Naturalization Opportunities for persons other than ethnic Greeks to acquire Greek citizenship are restricted to specific circumstances, such as marriage to a Greek national or recognition of official refugee status. Recent changes in the law have created a lengthier naturalization process. Applicants must have been residents for ten years, instead of eight, and their applications are reviewed for five years, instead of three. Children of foreigners who are born in Greece continue to enjoy automatic Greek citizenship. For all other children, their nationality is that of the parents unless they specifically apply for naturalization with their parents (Fakiolas 1999b and 1993). Among ethnic Greek immigrants, the number of naturalizations has significantly increased since 1995. But the number of foreigners who obtain Greek citizenship has remained very low, ranging from 200 to 400 people per year, with a spike between 1997 and 1999.

social trends Greece has only recently become a nation of significant immigration and the process of legalizing foreign workers is also very recent. Data about the demographic and economic characteristics of newly legalized persons has not been carefully collected. Nevertheless, the 2001 population census has some data about demographic, social, and economic characteristics of people “who have declared that they have settled in Greece for employment reasons.” Demographic Characteristics: Age, Sex, and Family Status The analysis of the data of the 2001 census indicates that almost all foreigners were of working age: 91% of the total were 15–44 years old and only 9% were 45–64 years old. This provides more evidence that the majority of immigrants came to Greece for employment reasons. On average, women were slightly older than men, and about

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Table 5.6 Population by Age and Citizenship, 2001 Age group

Total population

Greeks

Foreigners

Total 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70–79 >80

10,934,097 530,743 546,303 586,597 725,715 1,674,091 1,650,393 1,489,598 1,233,903 1,241,968 883,210 371,576

10,171,906 492,309 503,489 540,755 666,080 1,473,137 1,475,104 1,379,619 1,185,400 1,217,943 870,930 367,140

762,191 38,434 42,814 45,842 59,635 200,954 175,289 109,979 48,503 24,025 12,280 4,436

Total population

Greeks

Foreigners

-

-

-

4.9% 5.0% 5.4% 6.6% 15.3% 15.1% 13.6% 11.3% 11.4% 8.1% 3.4%

4.8% 4.9% 5.3% 6.5% 14.5% 14.5% 13.6% 11.7% 12.0% 8.6% 3.6%

5.0% 5.6% 6.0% 7.8% 26.4% 23.0% 14.4% 6.4% 3.2% 1.6% 0.6%

Source: nssg, Population Census 18 May 2001.

84% were 15–44 years of age. For men, the respective proportion was 93.2%. Table 5.6 shows the different age structures of the Greek and foreign populations. It is clear that foreigners are younger than Greeks. On the one hand, the number of “very old” people (>80 years) represents 3.6% of Greeks compared to 0.6% of foreigners. On the other hand, the number of children under ten years old is larger (0.9%) for foreigners. Some demographic studies suggest that the total population has increased in recent years solely due to the positive migration balance. In other words, the rapid increase of the foreign population offsets the negative indigenous birth rate (Bagavos 2003). Nearly one half of all immigrants were single or divorced, with considerable differences between sexes. Women were more often married than men (61% and 49%, respectively). An additional characteristic of female immigrants is the larger proportion of divorced or widowed women (7.7% were divorced and 3.4% widowed; 0.8% and 0.2% of men were divorced or widowed) (Kavounidis 2002). The population census also indicated that the basic reason for the settlement of immigrants in Greece was the search for work (Maratou-Alipranti 2007a).

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Table 5.7 Aliens by Citizenship, Sex, and Main Reason for Settling in Greece, 2001 Total Aliens

Total % Albania Bulgaria

Total

Work

Repatri- Family reation unification Studies

Asylum Other seeking Refugees reason

762,191 100.0 438,036 35,104

413,214 54.3 240,656 27,504

51,694 6.8 11,869 397

9,980 1.3 927 158

99,968 13.1 69,949 2,624

20,787 2.7 8,263 441

2,368 0.3 35 43

164,180 21.5 106,337 3,937

Sources: nssg, Population Census 18 May 2001; unpublished data.

More than 54% of aliens came to Greece to find or take work. Only 6.8% of immigrants came to Greece for “family reunification.” The category “other reasons” should be further investigated because the proportion is so high (21.5%). The family situation of immigrants indicates that about 60% of all migrants arrived in Greece with their families; nevertheless, 40% of them entered alone (Table 5.8). However, for immigrants settled in rural areas, the figures are slightly lower in the category “with family members.” There, 53% settled with family members, compared with the foreigners settled in urban areas, where 62% settled with family members. Gender constitutes a significant variable in the migration process. More than half of the men who settled in Greece (51.2%) were alone and unmarried. In comparison, the majority of women (76%) arrived in Greece with other family members, and 61% of them were married (Maratou-Alipranti and Fakiolas 2003). Population Increase and Fertility Rate The 2001 census allows limited insight into the impact migration has on population change in Greece. It is evident that, during the last decade, foreign citizens have increased the population of Greece. The positive contribution of the migration flows is attributed to both the repatriation of ethnic Greeks who had migrated abroad in previous

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Table 5.8 Foreigners by Family Status, Settlement, and Sex for those “who have declared that they have settled in Greece for employment reasons,” 2001 Total – Both sexes

Male

Female

total country With family Without family

413,241 249,085 164,156

% 60.3 39.7

244,643 125,792 118,851

% 51.6 48.4

168,598 123,293 45,305

% 73.9 26.8

urban areas With family Without family

324,966 201,500 123,466

62.0 38.0

185,237 100,615 84,622

54.6 45.4

139,729 100,885 38,844

72.7 27.3

rural areas With family Without family

88,275 47,585 40,690

53.4 46.6

59,406 25,177 34,229

42.4 57.6

28,869 22,408 6,461

75.9 24.1

Sources: nssg, unpublished data

decades and the inflow of foreign immigrants who account for approximately 92 per cent of total immigration. Unfortunately, the positive influence of migration on the natural increase of the population cannot be accurately estimated because there is no clear distinction between the indigenous and foreign populations in the birth statistics. However, it is definitely positive, as is shown in the younger age structure of the foreign population (birth frequencies are higher than death frequencies) as well as in the analysis of some data on births in public maternity clinics of the country (Drettakis 2001; Bagavos 2003). Level of Education Recent immigrants to Greece and other Southern European countries are comparatively well educated. They are quite different from the twentieth-century peasant emigrants from Southern European countries to North and South America. A large proportion of recent immigrants to Greece are from formerly socialist countries that have had long-established practices of nine years of compulsory school education followed by extensive technical training. Most of the remaining immigrants come from developing countries, many of which tend to

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Table 5.9 Foreign Population by Sex and Education, 2001 Foreign population Level of Education Master’s or Doctorate University graduates (B.A.) Graduates of technological education hnd Secondary school Technical hs Attended 3 grades of secondary education (compulsory education) Elementary school Attending elementary school Attended only some grades of elementary school

Total

Male

Female

Foreign population Total

Male

Female

4,799 2,771 2,028 54,647 24,034 30,613

0.6% 7.2%

0.7% 5.8%

0.6% 8.8%

15,985 6,619 9,366 20,659 8,445 12,214 200,324 101,848 98,476 22,710 14,498 8,212

2.1% 2.7% 26.3% 3.0%

1.6% 2.0% 24.5% 3.5%

2.7% 3.5% 28.4% 2.4%

128,137 75,295 52,842 166,937 101,130 65,807 56,707 29,892 26,815

16.8% 21.9% 7.4%

18.1% 24.3% 7.2%

15.2% 19.0% 7.7%

91,286 51,020

12.0%

12.3%

11.6%

40,266

Source: nssg, Population Census 18 May 2001

keep their children in school longer in order to curb unemployment. Typically, foreign females have higher educational attainments than male immigrants. Among foreigners, about 9% of women and only 6% of men had higher education credentials. Schooling The size of the Greek school population has been gradually declining, especially in the primary schools (Maratou-Alipranti et al. 2002; Drettakis 2001). The number of school-age children of native-born parents enrolled in public schools has declined considerably. The corresponding number of ethnic Greek and migrant children of foreign-born parents has increased quickly, but the absolute number of children of immigrants has not prevented the decline of the total school population. The 86,238 pupils from immigrant parents enrolled in primary and secondary schools in the Fall of 1999 were almost twice as numerous

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Table 5.10 Children Registered in Primary and Secondary Schools, by Status of Parents, 2001 Pupils with parents School year

Migrants

Indigenous

Total

1995–1996 1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999 1999–2000

47,666 54,943 67,210 79,737 86,238

1,484,277 1,450,351 1,404,050 1,352,144 1,271,377

1,531,943 1,505,294 1,471,260 1,431,881 1,357,615

Sources: Ministry of Education Data and Drettakis, “Eleftherotypia,” 31 July 2001.

as in 1995. Immigrant children made up 5% of the total school population in 1995 and increased to over 6.3% in 2000. It is likely that this increase was actually larger, but many pupils born to naturalized ethnic Greek parents are registered as native-born. The distinction between native-born and recently naturalized Greeks is still made in the schools because pupils who do not speak Greek in their families, as a rule, lag behind the others, causing problems for teachers and resulting in racist anti-migrant and xenophobic reactions. There are 26 multicultural schools that help students with the Greek language, but this does not appear to be adequate (Greek-Dutch Seminar 2001, 37–8 and 125). Displaying the well-known capacity of migrants to try hard, more and more children are doing well and a fair number excel, challenging native-born classmates and their parents (Labrianidis and Lymberaki 2000). Since 1997, children of foreign-born parents have been able to enrol in public schools regardless of the legal status of their parents. In hundreds of primary schools, over 10 per cent of pupils are foreign-born. In some schools, this proportion is over 30 per cent. In areas of high migrant concentration (Attica, Elefsis, Thesprotia, the Islands of Mykonos, of Paros etc.), foreigners have repopulated many declining innercity and suburban areas, and their children have re-populated the local schools, forming the majority of the pupils in some classes. The Ministry of Education has begun programs of multicultural education be-

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cause of the large number of foreign students in certain schools (Katsikas and Politou 1999). Economic Characteristics In the 2001 census, the nssg counted 4,102,091 working people. Of these, 391,674 or 9.6 per cent were foreigners, with a majority (226,301) of foreigners being of Albanian descent. Immigrant workers in Greece are concentrated in a small part of a highly segmented labour market. Immigrant workers are concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the traditional sectors of the Greek economy (agriculture, catering, tourism, manufacturing, the merchant navy). They often perform temporary and dangerous work. These are often jobs that Greeks refuse to do, especially in construction, heavy industry, and agriculture. Domestic service is a major employment sector for migrant women (Bagavos and Papadopoulou 2003). According to the 2001 census, the predominant employment of foreign male migrants is in construction (42%), followed by agriculture (23%), industry (12%), and tourism (12%). Female employment is quite different. The majority of female migrants work in housekeeping (52%), with large proportions found in tourism (19%), agriculture (15%), and industry (9%). The large number of small family businesses, the large underground economy, and inadequate labour market inspections together create an environment conducive to the development of a cheap labour supply, stratified according to gender, age, and ethnicity. In the 1990s, immigrants were found in unskilled farm work and in the construction sector, which was booming because of preparations for the 2004 Olympic Games. Surveys done during that period showed that the 20 per cent of immigrants working in small businesses were actually keeping these businesses afloat (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). More generally, it has been recognized that immigrants play an important, even essential, role in the Greek economy (Lianos et al. 1996). As for their spatial location, the majority – about two thirds of the total male immigrant population and 80 per cent of the female immigrant population – reside in urban

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Table 5.11 Foreigners Employed by Occupational Status for those “who have declared that they have settled in Greece for employment reasons,” 2001 Both sexes N

%

Male N

Female %

N

%

Employers Own-account workers Salaried employees Non-paid household members

11,152 25,507 348,455 6,560

2.8 6.4 89.3 1.5

8,069 17,274 244,376 1,052

2.9 6.3 90.4 0.4

3,083 8,233 104,079 5,508

2.6 6.6 86.6 4.2

total

391,674

100.0

270,771

100.0

120,903

100.0

Source: nssg, unpublished data

areas. The relatively high proportion of male immigrants living in rural areas, one third of the total, can be explained by the labour market and the draw of farm work for that segment of the population. As in other host countries, an increasing number of legalized immigrants have become self-employed, while many have established small businesses on their own or in association with Greeks. Nevertheless, the vast majority (90%) of foreigners who have settled in Greece for employment reasons are employees. A few are employers (2.8%) or selfemployed (6.4%) (Table 5.11). The increasing number of legalized immigrants has helped to limit discrimination and other employment complications and to promote social integration. Empirical observations show also that an increasing number of immigrants earn a reasonable and regular income and try to organize their lives as Greek nationals do (Labrianidis and Limberaki 2001; Kavounidis 2003).

emerging problems: consequences of immigration The investigation of the consequences of migration is related to the country of origin as well as to the receiving country. For the countries of origin, the implications seem to be positive. Emigration restricts both the pressures of population increases and the pressures on the labour

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market. There is usually a transfer of income to the country of origin, and, in many cases, the return of the migrants results in the transmission of knowledge. These factors affected Greece during the 1950s and 1960s when Greeks migrated to Western Europe and Australia in large numbers. For Greece itself, the three most important factors of early post-war economic development were shipping, construction, and migration. Migrants transferred an enormous amount of money that was either channelled into consumption or set aside for future investment (Chletsos 2001). As an immigration host nation since the 1970s, Greece has experienced a number of alterations to its labour market. While it is sometimes asserted that immigrants increase the unemployment rate of native workers, especially the unskilled, in fact the effects seem mostly beneficial to Greece. Migrants are usually employed in jobs and sectors in which indigenous workers do not or will not work. Empirical data, carefully analyzed, show that foreigners have contributed approximately 10–15 per cent of the country’s gnp, while their direct impact on wage levels and unemployment rates is low (Georgoulas 2003). Furthermore, Lianos, Sarris, and Katseli (1996) investigated the implications of illegal migration in the economy of Northern Greece. They discovered that illegal migrants received wages that reached only 60 per cent of the wages of Greeks when replacing Greek workers in unskilled jobs. In any case, in the international as well as in the Greek experience, migrants are often employed in jobs that domestic workers will not take. The number of migrants has also been increasing in the “domestic service” sector, chiefly household labour. Greek households today are aided by the presence of migrant family servants. Since social services (nurseries, homes for the elderly) do not suffice, immigrant women solve a major social problem (Maratou-Alipranti and Fakiolas 2003). Perception of Social Problems The sharp and sudden change of Greece to a country of reception surprised both the state and its citizens. The massive entry of economic

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migrants to Greece at the beginning of the 1990s struck Greek society like a lightning bolt. Previously, Greece had had a fairly homogeneous population, and public discussion regarding minorities was taboo (Labrianidis and Limberaki 2001). The new situation created conditions of xenophobic practices and behaviours on the part of both the state and its agencies as well as the citizenry. The legislative framework that existed until the 1990s was fragmentary and served conditions that had become outmoded. However, political reaction was spasmodic, the lack of experience in dealing with emigration pressures led inevitably and initially to the imitation of the Western European model of “guest workers” (Mousourou 1993). The reaction of public opinion ended in the adoption of a legal framework that tended to correlate migration with criminality (Karydis 1996). The refusal to accept that the country has been transformed into a society of reception delayed the implementation of an extensive program to legalize migrants without legal documents and pushed aside the matter of the migrants’ access to or integration into Greek society. Until recently, there were no discussions about immigration from the point of view of a cohesive immigration policy that settled not only the conditions of entry, residency, and conditions of work for economic migrants, but also the conditions for their integration into Greek society. The new laws have been criticized at times and were considered by some to be responsible for fostering the already increasing xenophobic feeling of the native population. The lack of previous experience and knowledge about issues relating directly or indirectly to migration has created various problems. At the same time, it is widely understood that immigrants to Greece play an important role in the Greek economy. The many ways in which Greek industries, businesses, farms, and households employ more and more immigrants indicate the ambivalence of the host response to immigration. The legalization process that has been started will likely act to reduce the number of migrants entering Greece illegally. This is not because border control has become effective, but rather because illegal migrants

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Table 5.12 Unemployment, Greek Citizens and Foreign Residents (Percentage), 1991–2000

Year

Total

Greek/ Greek and other

Foreign

1991 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000

7.62 9.99 10.24 10.76 11.73 11.07

7.78 9.92 10.17 10.66 11.67 11.01

12.50 13.98 13.23 13.33 12.93 12.37

Source: Fakiolas (2003, 553)

are not able to find illegal jobs. In addition, the Greek state does not have a specific policy to support and integrate migrants into Greek society. In any case, if no policies are drawn for organized integration, then the phenomena of racism and xenophobia may increase. Racism and xenophobia in Greece have not yet been expressed through collective political behaviour, as has been the case in other European countries. Nonetheless, studies of attitudes and perceptions about the “other” have shown that there are conservative and negative attitudes towards foreigners. The Eurobarometer and the International European Social Survey verify these tendencies. Many Greeks distrust foreigners and insist on the restriction of migrants’ rights. In addition, many Greeks hold foreigners responsible for unemployment. Unlike in other countries, in Greece the unemployment rate for immigrants has gotten higher, although only marginally, over the past decade than that for nationals (Fakiolas 2003). Although the mass media have largely abandoned their stereotyping of immigrants as criminals, damage has been done in terms of public perception. There is regional variation regarding perceptions of immigrants in Greece, with the most negative reactions being found in regions close to the Albanian border and in the city of Thessaloniki (Macedonia) (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild 1999). In particular, “the region of Macedonia consti-

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tutes the ‘first portal’ for the reception of the influx of immigrants from adjacent countries, and also troubled areas of the Balkans” (Michalopoulou et.al 1998, 67). From the results of a large-scale survey in Macedonia, it is clear that, while the opinion of the vast majority of people can be characterized by attitudes of tolerance towards the “other” or “aliens,” a small but vocal part of the public displays strong prejudice and xenophobia (Michalopoulou et al. 1998, 175). “These feelings are expressed in a clearly stressed manner mainly by the elderly, persons without formal education, the economically inactive, regular church-goers who place themselves on the right of the ‘Left-Right’ scale, and persons who live for the most part in agricultural areas” (Michalopoulou et al. 1998, 175–6). In the social sphere, a study of the political culture of students revealed low tolerance of minority groups and xenophobic attitudes among Greek pupils (Charalambis et al. 2004).3 Different studies have illustrated various integration strategies used by foreigners. For example, Muslim-Albanian families who settle in rural areas arrange to have their children baptized as Greek Orthodox, which requires a Greek godfather who will look after the child’s interests throughout childhood and adulthood (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Criminality During the 1990s, migration flows in the eu countries acquired new characteristics because they were associated with the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. During that period, migration movements were associated with activities of international organized crime. It is also interesting that in every country there is an ethnic group that is perceived to be associated with deviance and criminality. In Greece, the Albanian population lives with this stereotype. Such perceptions are related to the density of the Albanian population and to the fact that the people arrived suddenly and massively without the existence of support networks of earlier migrants (Karydis 2001).

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Measured criminal activity among foreigners living in Greece in recent decades has tended to increase. However, much of this increase is related to the immigration law itself. About three quarters of the total offences that are alleged to be committed by migrants involve violations of the Alien Law, that is, entering the country, and remaining (and working) illegally in it. The available information about foreign offenders by reasons of arrest and reported crimes in the period from 1989 to 1999 indicates that an apparent increase in arrests is due, quite significantly, to shifting policing policies. The total number of arrests of foreigners increased from 4,346 in 1989 to 165,346 in 1999. This increase is related to the growing movement of foreigners to Greece, but a very high percentage of arrests of foreigners are for illegal residence (78 per cent in 1992 and 40 per cent in 1989). In reality, much of the criminality of immigrants is simply the criminalization of the situation in which they live. This kind of offence makes up more than 90 per cent of total criminality for some national groups in Greece (Karydis 1996, 92–3). It appears from the offical Statistical Yearbook of the Greek Police that, although the percentage of foreigners has increased, their offence rate is actually lower than that of the general population. It is estimated at around 3– 4 per cent in the first five years and approximately 10 per cent in 2001. Although there is an increasing number of foreign criminal offenders, their percentage is lower than their share of the general population. Again, it may be concluded that much of this criminality is the result of official determination to declare their residency or labour as “criminal.” Greece continues to deal with the profound effects of the change from a country of emigration to a country of immigration that began in the mid-1970s. According to the 2001 census, foreigners made up 7 per cent of the population. More than half of these foreign nationals reside in the metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki. The growing underground economy has contributed to the flow of undocumented, illegal immigration, which flourishes due to problems particular to the Southern European economies of the adjoining Balkan states in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet system.

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Like other Balkan states, Greece is characterized by ethnic fractionalization, but the level of diversity has been officially denied as part of the nation-building process over many decades. The Greek government has not kept official records of the ethnic composition of the country since 1951. The only officially recognized minority group are the Muslims of Thrace. Although official data are lacking, there are small autochthonous ethno-linguistic minorities such as the Pomaks and the Vlachs. Official immigration policy is focused on the “repatriation” of ethnic Greeks, including the Pontians and Vorio-Epirotes, from abroad, who receive preferential status and assistance with their integration. New legalization processes starting in 1991 and revised in 1998 and 2001 have made it harder for immigrants to enter Greece, more difficult for illegal immigrants to find jobs, and more difficult for immigrants to qualify for social benefits. The fact that there is currently no government policy on the support and integration of migrants into Greek society may well result in a decline in the number of immigrants coming to Greece. However, Greece will continue to face the effects of its transformation from a country of emigration to a country of reception. Immigrants who do qualify for their “Green Card” do gain the same rights as Greek citizens in the labour market, basic access to health care, and access to the public school system. But Greece is far from having a cohesive plan for the social integration of immigrants (Bagavos and Papadopoulou 2006).

notes The author would like to thank Anna Nikolau for providing research assistance in the preparation of this essay. 1 See census results in onsg. 1961. Résultats du Recensement de La Population, 7 April 1951, Volume I. Aperçu historique-Rapport méthodologique – Analyse des résultats Tableaux par superficie et altitude. Athens: 107–15.

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2 Greece is one of seven eu countries (including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg), where non-eu migrants do not have the right to vote and stand in local government, while only some groups of them enjoy such rights in Spain, Portugal, and the UK. In Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the Netherlands migrants have those rights after six months to five years of legal residence (Athens: News 20 September 2002: A12). 3 The study was conducted by the National Centre for Social Research during April and May 1999. It was carried out in fifty-four schools (public and private) throughout the country.

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– 1999. “Immigration and Unemployment in Greece: Perceptions and Realities,” South European Society and Politics 4 (3): 206–21. – 1997. “The Emerging European Immigration Regime: Some Reflections on Implications for Southern Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies 35 (4): 497–519. Brubaker, R. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, J. 2002. “The Sarakatsani and the Klephtic Tradition,” in Minorities in Greece. Aspects of a Plural Society, ed. R. Clogg, 165–78. London: Hurst & Company. Charalambis, D. et al. 2004. Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960–2000. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Chassiotis, I. 1993. Review of the History of the Neohellenic Diaspora (Greek). Thessaloniki: Vanias. Chletsos, M. 2001. “Political Economy of Migration,” in Migrants and Migration: Economic, Political and Social Aspects (Greek), ed. C. Naxakis and M. Chletsos. Athens: Patakis. Clogg, R. 2002. ed. Minorities in Greece. Aspects of a Plural Society. London: Hurst & Company. Drettakis, M. 2001. Migration Inflows and Low Fertility (Greek). Athens. Emke-Poulopoulou, I. 1986. Problems of Emigration and Repatriation (Greek). Athens: imeo/eim. European Commission. 2001. European Social Statistics-Demography. Luxembourg: Eurostat. Fakiolas, R. 2003. “Regularizing Undocumented Immigrants in Greece: Procedures and Effects,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29 (3): 535–61. – 2001. “Greek Migration and Foreign Immigration in Greece,” in Migration Policy and the Economy, ed. R. Rotte and P. Stein, 281–304. Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. – 2000. “Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy,” in Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, ed. R. King et al., 57–78. New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin’s Press. – 1999a. “Socio-Economic Effects of Immigration in Greece,” Journal of European Social Policy 99 (3): 211–30.

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– 1999b. “Greece,” in Asylum and Migration Policies in the European Union, ed. S. Angenendt, 193–216. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag. – 1994. “Demographic Evolution, Labour Force, and Employment,” in Demographic Evolution in Postwar Greece (Greek), ed. B. Kotzamanis and L. Maratou-Alipranti, 331–42. Athens: Livanis. – 1993. Migration from and to Greece. sopemi Report: oecd. Fakiolas, R. and L. Maratou-Alipranti. 2000. “Foreign Female Immigrants in Greece,” Papers: Revista de Sociologia 60: 101–17. Fakiolas, R. and R. King. 1996. “Emigration, Return, Immigration: A Review and Evaluation of Greece’s Postwar Experience of International Migration,” International Journal of Population Geography 2: 171–90. Frazee, C. 2002. “Catholics,” in Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society, ed. R. Clogg, 24–47. London: Hurst & Company. Georgoulas, S. 2003. “Legal Framework of Migration Policy,” in Migration Policies and Integration Strategies (Greek), ed. K. Kassimati, 91–122. Athens: Gutenberg. Greek-Dutch Seminar. 2001. “The Integration of the Immigrants,” Proceedings of the Seminar Organized in October 2001 by the Dutch Embassy (English and Greek). The Institute for the Education of Ethnic Greeks and the Multicultural Education: Ministry of Education, Athens. Karantinos, D. et al. 1992. Social Services and Social Policies to Combat Social Exclusion in Greece. eu Observatory. Athens: ekke. Karpozilos, A. 1999. “The Greeks in Russia and Georgia,” in The Greek Diaspora in the 20th Century, ed. R. Clogg, 137–57. London: Macmillan. Kassimati, K. ed. 2003. Migration Policies and Integration Strategies (Greek). Athens: Gutenberg. Kassimati, K. et. al. 1992. Immigrants from Soviet Pontos: Social and Economic Integration. Athens: Panteion University. kekmokop. Kassimis, C., A. Papadopoulou, and E. Zacopoulou. 2001. “Migrants in Rural Greece,” Sociologia Ruralis 43 (2): 167–84. Karydis, V. 2001. “Migration and Crime in Greece in the Decade of 90s” in Legal and Sociopolitical Dimensions of the Migration in Greece (Greek). Athens: Papazissis. – 1996. Criminality of Foreigners in Greece (Greek). Athens: Papazissis.

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Katsikas, C. and E. Politou. 1999. Gypsies, Minorities, Repatriated and Foreigners in Greek Education. Athens: Gutenberg. Kavounidis, J. 2003. Survey for the Economic and Social Integration of Migrants (Greek). Athens: PAEP. Employment Observatory. – 2002. Characteristics of Migrants: The Greek Legalisation Programme of 1998. Athens-Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas-Greek Labour Institute. – 1999. Foreigners Applying for Temporary Residence Permits: Nationality, Gender, and Geographical Distribution (Greek). Athens: National Institute of Labour. King, R. and R. Black. 1997. ed. Southern Europe and the New Immigrations. Sussex Academic Press. King, R. et al. 2000. ed. Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe. New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin’s Press. Kotzamanis, B. 1992. “L’émigration différentielle dans la Grèce de l’aprèsguerre. Tendances et hypothèses de recherche,” Conference Proceedings, Démographie et Différences, 201–14. Paris: aidelf-puf. Labrianidis, L. and A. Limberaki. 2001. Albanian Migrants in Thessaloniki (Greek). Thessaloniki: Paratiritis. Lazaridis, G. 2001. “Trafficking and Prostitution. The Growing Exploitation of Migrant Women in Greece,” The European Journal of Women’s Studies 8 (1): 67–102. Lazaridis, G. and I. Psimenos, I. 2000. “Migrant Flows from Albania to Greece,” in Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, ed. R. King, G. Lazaridis, and C. Tsardanidis, 170–85. New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin’s Press. Lianos, T.P. et al. 1996. “Illegal Immigration and Local Labour Markets: The Case of Northern Greece,” International Migration 84 (3): 449–84. Linardos-Rilmon, P. 1993. “Emigration et marché du travail en Grèce: Premières Contestations,” Bulletin d’Information de la GSSE, 12–13. Athènes: Institute de la Travail de la GSSE. Livani, L. 2000. Greece and Minorities: The System of International Protection of the League of Nations (Greek). Fourth Edition. Athens: Kastanioti. Maratou-Alipranti, L. et al. 2002. Population and Education in Greece:

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Trends and Perspectives (Greek). National Centre for Social Research. Athens: ekke. Maratou-Alipranti, L. 1996. “Foreign Labour Force: Trends and the Problem of Social Integration,” in Dimensions of Social Exclusion in Greece (Greek), ed. E. Fronimou, D. Karantinos, and L. Maratou-Alipranti, 275– 306. Athens: National Centre for Social Research (ekke). Maratou-Alipranti, L. and R. Fakiolas. 2003. “The Lonely Path of Migrant Women in Greece,” The Greek Review of Social Research Special Issue: Gender and International Migration: Focus on Greece, ed. E. Tastsoglou and L. Maratou-Alipranti, 110: 165–88. Maratou-Alipranti, L. and E. Tastsoglou. 2003. “Gender and International Migration: Conceptual Substantive and Methodological Issues. The Greek Review of Social Research Special Issue: Gender and International Migration: Focus on Greece, ed. E. Tastsoglou and L. Maratou-Alipranti, 110: 5–22. Markova, M. E. and H.A. Sarris. 2001. Earnings Performance of Bulgarian Illegal and Legalized Immigrants in Greece, Discussion Paper, No. 123, Department of Economics, University of Athens. – 1997. “Performance of Bulgarian Illegal Immigrants in the Greek Labour Market,” South European Society and Politics 2 (2): 57–177. Marvakis, A. et al. 2001. Migrants in Greece (Greek). Athens: Hellinika. Mateos Ribas, N. 1997. Greek Immigration Policies: The Impact on Immigrants and their Families. A preliminary report for the TMR fellowship. Athens: National Centre for Social Research. Michalopoulou, A. et al. 1998. Macedonia and the Balkans: Xenophobia and Development (Greek). Athens: ekke and Alexandria Publications. Moussourou, L. M. 2003. Migration and Immigration Policy in Greece (Greek). Athens: Gutenberg. Naxakis, C. and M. Chletsos. 2001. Migrants and Migration: Economic, Political and Social Aspects (Greek). Athens: Patakis. oecd. 2001. Trends in International Migration. sopemi. Paris: oecd. onsg. 1961. Résultats du Recensement de la Population Effectué le 7 Avril 1951, Volume I. Aperçu historique-Rapport méthodologique – Analyse des résultats Tableaux par superficie et altitude. Athènes: Imprimerie Nationale.

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Todorova, M. 1995. “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in Balkans: A Mirror of the International Order, ed. G.G. Özdogan and K. Saybasili, 55–74. Istanbul: Eren. Tsimpiridou, F. 2000. “Pomac Means a Man of the Mountain: Semantics and Experiences of the ‘Place’ in the Construction and Politics of Minority Marginal Identities,” in The Mountainous Space of the Balkan Peninsula: Formation and Changes (Greek), ed. V. Nitsiakos and C. Kassimis, 35–52. Athens: Municipality of Konitsa and Plethron Publications. Vgenopoulos, C.G. 2000. “Migrants and Foreigners in Modern Greece,” in Population Movements and Development, ed. C.G. Vgenopoulos. Athens: Papazissis. Vergeti, M. 2003. Repatriation and Social Exclusion (Greek). Thessaloniki: Kyriakidis.

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6 Bulgaria: Inter-Ethnic Relations in an Ethnic Nation-State nikolai genov

Trends in the small society of Bulgaria may appear to have only peripheral relevance in the broader geopolitical context. However, by studying this national case one may discover important insights into specific regional problems that are significant in a global context. The first regional reference of this type is the involvement of Bulgaria in processes that have shaped the development of the European continent and the world after the Second World War. Another regional reference concerns the place of this national development in the notorious ethnic and religious fragmentation and confrontation in and between Southeast European societies. The major point connected with the common Eastern European experience has very much to do with the worldwide trend towards adjusting national institutions, values, and norms to the emerging global value-normative system. Its core is the concept of universal human rights. In their development after the Second World War, Eastern European societies did not effectively adapt to the process of value-normative universalization based on the idea of the universal human rights of individuals having various ethnic, religious, and political preferences or affiliations. At first glance, this is striking because many efforts were undertaken by the ruling political forces in the region to implant an ideology of internationalism, which actually includes key elements of value-normative universalization. These efforts failed, however, since they did not develop into a well established institutional respect for the

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rights and dignity of human individuals, especially for members of ethnic minority groups. Besides the specific regional traditions in Eastern Europe, the major reason for this failure was the position of Eastern European societies in the polar division of the world into spheres of influence. The region was largely isolated from the competition of the international division of labour, from major world markets as well as from crucial political and cultural processes worldwide. This partly self-imposed isolation of Eastern European societies contributed to the paralysis of their capacity to innovate in order to adapt to the global trend of value-normative universalization effectively. The dissolution of the polar political and military confrontation accelerated the spread of value-normative universalism in Eastern Europe. The idea of the universal rights of human individuals shaped the major constitutional innovation in the region, namely, the shift from the state-dominated common good towards individual initiative and responsibility. In this way, the vision and the legal framework of the progressing worldwide homogenization of values and norms around the idea of the universal rights of human individuals was already at the very centre of constitutional arrangements in the region. At the beginning of the 1990s, one could expect to see the same shift evolving in institutional practice, since the trend had been hampered by the international isolation and the domestic hierarchical structures of political power. However, institutional realities have their own logic and manifestations. The starting point might be the observation that together with the institutional stabilization of values and norms based on the vision of universal human rights, one may also identify manifold deviations from this value-normative ideal in Eastern Europe. Some of them are closely interconnected with the revival of primordial ethnic and religious affiliations, divisions, and confrontations, which were long regarded as outdated and having withered away. As seen from a more specific angle, Southeast Europe offers particularly dramatic examples of the militant revival of ethnic divisions and hostilities after the collapse of state socialism. At the beginning of the 1990s, hardly anyone believed that in the southeast corner of the European continent – and in the immediate neighbourhood of

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Bulgaria – hundreds of thousands of human beings would soon lose their lives in inter-ethnic clashes. But this is exactly what happened in Yugoslavia. This very fact signals that over-optimistic judgments about the development of inter-ethnic relations in this and perhaps in other parts of the world might easily turn out to be premature. One may try to explain these unexpected and very undesirable developments by referring to the multi-ethnic composition of South Eastern European societies. No doubt, this ethnic diversity has far-reaching consequences both in terms of normative regulations and of practical institutional reality. But this is not a specific feature of the societies in this sub-region alone. The multi-ethnic type of cultural life and political organization is becoming more and more influential or even predominant in countries and regions worldwide (Bös 2004). Nevertheless, the point is well taken since the issues of ethnic diversity and of inter-ethnic relations are traditionally important sources of tension and conflict in South Eastern Europe. However, it is questionable if it is really the multi-ethnic composition of societies that primarily provokes tensions and conflicts. One broader hypothesis might read that they are first of all caused by the context of belated nation-building and state-building. These latent problems typically become manifest in times of economic, political, and cultural crises, as was the case in South Eastern Europe during the 1990s. In this period, we observed, for instance, various forms of the ethnicization of politics and politicization of ethnicity (Genov 2004). Now the open question concerns the specific combinations of factors that determine the success or failure of efforts to manage inter-ethnic relations under the specific circumstances of Bulgarian society and in its environment after the start of the profound societal changes that took place at the end of the 1980s. It is exactly in this period that the constitutional and institutional respect for individual human rights was recognized as the key solution to inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. Current processes in South Eastern Europe show that there are substantial differences in understanding, defining, and protecting the individual and collective rights of ethnic minorities. This issue is closely connected to civic and ethnic trends in

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nation-building and state-building. Moreover, the recent history of the sub-region under scrutiny shows that there are powerful economic, political, and cultural factors counteracting the pattern of nation-building and state-building based on the recognition of the universal rights of individuals. The traditional mono-ethnic definitions of nations and states are still quite influential. Therefore, we still have to learn important and sobering lessons from the interplay of constructive and destructive forces in the development of multi-ethnic societies in South Eastern Europe. The learning process is painful, since the peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence and co-operation as well as the clashes of ethnic groups show surprising variety, endurance, and drama. The reason is the multiplicity of factors influencing the orientations, decisions, and actions of relevant actors. For instance, experts and lay people in South Eastern Europe are well aware of the variety of ethnic groups and institutional structures traditionally influenced by different ethnic identities or by religious affiliations to Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam. Nevertheless, it is surprising to note that notwithstanding the crucial political relevance of such issues, studies of the ethnic composition of the societies in the sub-region still face a constant and perennial information problem. The unreliability of information about ethnic groups is typically rooted in political motivations in the work of government statistical offices. In addition, it is not the present-day ethnic composition of societies alone that influences inter-ethnic relations. Many current and future concerns in this context were caused by or connected to historical experiences, cultural traditions, or long-term demographic trends. Against this regional background, the crucial issue to be dealt with is the following: Why was Bulgarian society able to avoid intensive inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts during the 1990s in spite of the fact that there were enough accumulated and situational causes and reasons for such a negative scenario? In order to deal with this issue objectively, one has to pose a second question: Is there still potential for inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in Bulgarian society? The first step in answering these questions must be the analysis of some historical and demographic trends.

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trends in ethnic composition and interethnic relations in bulgarian society Bulgaria is among the oldest states on the European continent. But its tradition of independent statehood was dramatically interrupted by the five hundred years of Ottoman rule that lasted until 1878. This is the major historical background of the ethnic diversity in the country, in which the Bulgarian and the Turkish ethnic groups are traditionally the major ones. More recently, the size and the social relevance of the Roma ethnic group has also come to the fore. The statistical relationships between these three clearly distinct ethnic groups remained relatively stable throughout the twentieth century. Besides these groups, the population censuses report varying numbers of Jews, Armenians, Tatars, and Russians. These populations will be labelled “others,” since none of them has ever reached the critical number that might cause special problems for the inter-ethnic stability of Bulgarian society. The history of the Jewish ethnic group is somewhat exceptional. The census of 1934 identified 48,565 Jews in the territory of the thenBulgarian kingdom. Due to the specifics of domestic politics, they were saved from the Holocaust even though Bulgaria was an ally of Germany. The vast majority of Jews (estimated at 45,000) left in 1948 for Palestine. Another case worth mentioning is the Bulgarian-speaking population that had been converted to Islam during Turkish rule in Bulgaria. The size of this group is estimated to be about 200,000 persons, mostly concentrated in the southwest part of the country. However, the group is not treated in Bulgaria as an ethnic group as it is, for instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The representatives of all the other small ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the territory of the country and are basically integrated into mainstream society. In historical terms, with some reservations concerning the methodological and organizational precision of the population censuses, the long-term trends in the ethnic composition of Bulgarian society are shown in Table 6.1. There is no precise long-term statistical information concerning immigration and emigration of representatives of ethnic groups. The major processes of this type took place after the First World War. Cur-

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Table 6.1 Population Belonging to Major Ethnic Groups in Bulgarian Society According to Regular Population Censuses, 1900–2001 (in thousands) Ethnic group

1900

1910

1934

1956

1965

1975

1992

2001

Bulgarians Turks Roma (Gypsies) Others

2,888 531 90 235

3,519 509 92 218

5,204 591 149 133

6,507 656 198 253

7,231 781 149 67

7,875 731 19 102

7,271 800 313 103

6,655 747 371 156

total

3,744

4,338

6,078

7,614

8,228

8,728

8,487

7,929

Sources: Krasteva (2001); Statističeski spravočnik (2003, 24).

rently, Bulgaria is not a country to which people immigrate. In 2000, there were only 113 applications for Bulgarian citizenship. The increase to 4,165 in 2003 was due to the prospect of Bulgaria joining the European Union in 2007. The substantial difference in the numbers of the population registered by the census of 1975 and by the census of 2001 indicates clearly that in a short period of time during the 1990s, Bulgarian society lost a tangible part of its population to emigration. This ongoing emigration has long-term demographic, economic, political, and cultural consequences, since the emigrants are typically young and well educated individuals who belong disproportionately to the Bulgarian ethnic group. Some obvious deviations of the data in Table 6.1 from the usual demographic trends are mostly due to changes in the definitions of the statistical categories. Usually, these changes have come about on account of political considerations. The uncertainties in the statistical measurement notwithstanding, the long-term trends show the stability of the ethnic majority, which is overwhelmingly Bulgarian by its selfidentification. As to the urban–rural residence of the major ethnic groups, the data from the most recent population census carried out in 2001 reveal tangible differences in the place of residence of the representatives of the Bulgarian and the Turkish ethnic groups. Bulgarians are predominantly residents of urban areas, while rural residence predominates among the

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Table 6.2 Bulgarians, Turks, and Roma According to Residence (Census of 2001)

Bulgarians Turks Roma (Gypsies) Total population

Urban

Rural

74% 37% 54% 69%

26% 63% 46% 31%

Source: Statističeski spravočnik (2003, 24).

Turkish ethnic group. This difference has implications for occupations and lifestyles. The Roma population is almost equally divided between urban and rural residents, as shown in Table 6.2. The territorial dispersion of the three major ethnic groups in the twenty-eight districts of Bulgaria is rather uneven. The Turkish population is mostly concentrated in the northeastern (the traditional region of Dobrudzha) and in the southwestern (the area of the Rodopa mountains) parts of the country. The Roma population is dispersed throughout the country. There are districts in which the Turkish ethnic minority is in fact the local majority ethnic group. In other districts, the Turkish minority is hardly present. As for the Roma ethnic group, it is represented in all districts with large concentrations in some of them. Given the historically stable ethnic composition of the country’s population, the issue of inter-ethnic relations has been traditionally interpreted in Bulgaria by focusing on the relationship between the Bulgarian and the Turkish ethnic groups. There is a clear religious difference between them, since the vast majority of Bulgarians hold to the tradition of Orthodox Christianity, while the Turks are typically Muslim in their religious affiliation. The historical experience of the long Ottoman rule nourishes the traditional suspicion in the ethnic majority about the politics of Turkey concerning the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. This is the major reason for the remarkable inconsequence of the ethnic policies in Bulgaria during the twentieth century. For instance, there was a period after 1944 marked by relative inter-ethnic tolerance and by institutional efforts to facilitate the cultural identity of

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the Turkish population. The ideological background to this was the belief that all ethnic groups would develop a common socialist culture under the banner of internationalism. Already in the 1960s it had become increasingly clear that this ideological and political strategy could not be implemented in practice. What followed the recognition of this fact was the revival of Bulgarian nationalism that was similar to the rise of other nationalisms in other Eastern European societies. It was only logical to expand the rise of nationalism into efforts to assimilate ethnic minorities. The start of the massive campaign for the assimilation of the Turkish minority was the so called “revival process” in 1984 and 1985. At that time, the Turkish-Arabic names of the Turks in Bulgaria were forcefully changed to names typical of the Bulgarian ethnic majority. There were complex considerations behind the campaign. Among other things, its organizers expected that the obvious violation of the basic human rights of the Turkish population and its understandable resistance would strengthen the ethnic consolidation and mobilization of the Bulgarian ethnic group. This spill-over effect was seen as desirable because of the declining legitimacy of the regime at that time. However, the effects deviated from these expectations. The change of names tangibly undermined deeply rooted attitudes of neighbourly relations and ethnic tolerance, and caused a mass exodus of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey in 1989. It also seriously undermined the domestic and international legitimacy of the regime. The major reason for this unexpected development was the fact that profound social changes were already on their way. But the “revival process” left a difficult legacy for the democratization process that followed it at the end of the 1980s. The first reform-oriented governments had to handle the changes very carefully with the clear understanding that the all-embracing transformation of the economic and political organization of Bulgarian society might easily bring about the ethnicization of politics, something that actually happened in the former Yugoslavia. A parallel development of this type in Bulgaria would have imperilled the transition to a market economy and a democratic political system. The implications of such a development for the interna-

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tional position of Bulgaria and for international security in South Eastern Europe could have been disastrous.

the major ethnic groups in bulgaria in the context of societal transformation Fears concerning the possible ethnicization of politics and politicization of inter-ethnic relations were well-founded, and it was not only because of the inter-ethnic tensions during the 1980s. In the course of the transformation, it became increasingly clear that the transition to a market economy and a democratic political system was connected with a substantial drop in the living standards of large segments of Bulgarian society. The minority ethnic groups of Bulgarian Turks and Roma suffered particularly from the effects of the changes after 1989. Before the changes, Turks were predominantly involved in specialized agricultural production (i.e. tobacco growing) that experienced a sharp decline after the disappearance of the huge Soviet market for Bulgarian tobacco products. At the same time, due to their lower educational level, Turks usually were manual workers in industry and construction. These jobs were the first to be cut in the economic depression. Thus, paradoxically enough, it was under the conditions of democratization and development of universalistic culture that traditional patterns of ethnic exclusion could take extreme forms due to the concomitant economic crisis. The most relevant case of this critical development concerns the Roma (Gypsy) population. During the previous decades, the Bulgarian authoritarian state applied various schemes for the economic, political, and cultural integration of this ethnic group into the mainstream of Bulgarian society. “Integration” was intended to actually be assimilation, including the successful change of names and many other coordinated economic, political, and cultural measures. These measures ranged from forceful settlement to positive discrimination at school and in the workplace. Some of these measures, such as the administratively ordered and implemented assignment of Roma children to schools, were relatively effective. Two generations of Roma before 1989 received at least basic ed-

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ucation. Other measures, such as the settling of Roma and Bulgarians in the same apartment buildings, brought about daily tensions and conflict, and eventually failed because of tangible discrepancies in their quality of life. In general, due to the politics of full employment, the basic minimum of income from salaries and wages was secured for the Roma population. In addition, the Roma had access to health care. Efforts were made to develop an infrastructure in the districts populated by this ethnic group. But the price was a statistical manipulation leading to the near disappearance of this ethnic group in the data of the census of 1975. The situation of the Roma changed fundamentally after 1989. They made an impressive comeback in the first democratically organized census, held in 1992. The next census, in 2001, confirmed that the Roma were the only ethnic group in Bulgaria that expanded in both absolute and relative terms. The share of the Roma population was close to 5 per cent of the total population of the country. This is very likely an underestimate because it is widely believed that some Roma declared themselves Bulgarians and others as Bulgarian Turks for social reasons. But the policies aiming at the social integration of Roma through positive discrimination towards representatives of this ethnic group, as practiced under state socialism, could not be continued under the conditions of an administratively and financially weakened state. As a result, unemployment, impoverishment, and criminal activities of the Roma reached high levels. Thus, after becoming statistically visible as a result of the application of democratic census techniques, the Roma also became publicly visible in negative terms. These are just some aspects of a rather complex process. During the years after 1989, Bulgarian society experienced a variety of changes that have had, and will have, lasting consequences. At the beginning of the transformation period, the mortality rate of the country’s population for the first time exceeded the fertility rate, and Bulgarian society reached the point of negative natural growth. Together with mass emigration during the 1990s, these processes resulted in a demographic collapse. Given the inertia of the demographic processes, the country will probably have a population of about 5 million or fewer in 2050, assuming that there is no substantial immigration.

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What is immediately relevant is the fact that not all ethnic groups in Bulgaria are equally affected by the demographic collapse. According to the data of the most recent population census carried out in 2001, during the period between March 2000 and March 2001, 68% of newborns were of Bulgarian ethnic origin, 13% Turks, 13% Roma, and 6% “other.” If this trend continues, radical changes will occur in the ethnic composition of Bulgarian society in the next two or three generations. The major reason for this process is the difference between the reproductive attitudes of the Roma and all other ethnic groups. According to the data from the special study on birth rates carried out in the framework of the population census in 2001, some 13% of ethnic Bulgarians, 16% of Bulgarian Turks, and 33% of the Roma preferred three or more children in their families. The implications of these rather different preferences in family size are easily foreseen for the ethnic composition of Bulgarian society. This national trend of diverging fertility rates of ethnic groups is not unique to South Eastern Europe or to the European continent. Generally, the Slavic population in the sub-region has low and declining birth rates. Together with the mass emigration of young people of Slavic origin, the low birth rates among the ethnic majorities contribute to the looming demographic crisis in Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia (among its Slavic population). The ethnic majority in Romania is basically following the same pattern. Consequently, complicated problems tend to appear in countries with strong ethnic minorities marked by a higher birth rate. The political implications of such an uneven demographic development of ethnic groups might be well exemplified by the demographic and political processes in Kosovo. In addition, with the exception of the Roma population, all other politically relevant ethnic minority groups in South East European societies have an affiliation to ethnic majorities in neighbouring states, as is the case with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. In this way, the local inter-ethnic and minority issues have immediate international dimensions. It is within this geopolitical context that the analysis of ethnic minorities, minority rights, and inter-ethnic relations in the countries of South Eastern Europe receives its real significance.

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Table 6.3 Educational Achievement of Major Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria in 2001 Educational attainment of adults (per cent)

Ethnic group

Illiterate

Primary (4 years)

Elementary (7–8 years)

Secondary

Higher

N/A

Bulgarian Turks Roma (Gypsies)

0.4 3.5 12.7

2.1 15.0 27.4

20.7 53.0 44.9

53.0 23.7 6.9

23.5 2.7 0.3

0.3 2.1 7.8

Source: Socialno-ikonomichesko razvitie. Balgaria (2003, 3).

For example, the representatives of the Roma ethnic group have educational levels and other cultural capital levels that make them less competitive under conditions of high unemployment in an emerging information-based society. More precisely, there are about 400 primary schools in Bulgaria in which pupils from the Roma minority already constitute the majority (in the municipalities of Kotel, Tvarditsa, Maglizh, etc.). The quality of teaching there is low and the percentage of drop-outs is high, even at the level of mandatory primary education. There are projects to introduce teaching in the Roma language, but teachers qualified in the variety of Roma dialects are rare. In municipalities where the Turkish ethnic minority predominates (Kardjali), the level of literacy is lower than the average in the country. There is legally guaranteed teaching in Turkish, but it is associated with unresolved issues of organization and quality (Ignatova 2005). Thus, there are substantial disparities between the educational level of ethnic Bulgarians, on the one hand, and Turks and Roma on the other. These disparities have a long history that is clearly visible in the educational structure of the representatives of the major ethnic groups in the country, according to the data from the population census of 2001. It was mostly this difference in education levels that accounted for the particularly high levels of unemployment among Turks and Roma during the period of societal transformation. While registered unemployment throughout the country reached a peak of about 16–18 per

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Table 6.4 Most Important Source of Personal Income in the Municipality of Pernik (per cent) Type of income

Bulgarians

Roma

Salaries/Wages Profit from private economic activity Temporary income Unemployment benefits Social support

45.1 6.8 2.6 4.1 1.9

8.7 2.9 5.8 8.7 39.1

Note: There are no Turks in the municipality of Pernik. Source: Data from the Representative Empirical Study Labour Market and Unemployment in the Municipality of Pernik carried out in 2001 by a team headed by the present author.

cent in 1992–1993 and again in 2001–2002, the level of unemployment in some municipalities with predominantly Turkish population affected half of the persons of working age. In most municipalities, the longterm unemployment among Roma is between 40 and 60 per cent and in some particularly dramatic cases 90 per cent and higher. The effect is a far-reaching marginalization and ghettoization, particularly of the Roma population, many of whom live mostly on very meagre social benefits that barely sustain survival. The situation in the previously over-industrialized municipality of Pernik, where Roma account for some 7 per cent of the local population, is a typical example of such phenomena (See Table 6.4). There is no doubt that unemployed persons and their families/households were particularly affected by poverty in the transitional Bulgarian society. However, there is an additional sobering truth concerning the social and economic situation in the country. Having a job does not mean that the person under consideration – whatever his or her ethnic origin and affiliation – receives an income sufficient to maintain a decent standard of living. On the contrary, there are large segments of working poor in Bulgarian society. Seen from this point of view, it is understandable why both Bulgarians and Turks – although to a somewhat different extent – describe themselves predominantly as “poor” or “very poor” on the five point scale (See Table 6.5).

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Table 6.5 Self-Identification of Bulgarians and Turks on the Scale “Poor-Rich” (per cent) Poor Bulgarians Turks

26.9 29.7

Rich 36.8 40.6

30.8 25.0

5.4 4.7

0.1 0

Source: http://www.asa-bg.netfirms.com/documents/F_report.htm

There is a dearth of explanatory studies connecting the level of education and professional attainments, on the one side, with the religious affiliation of groups in Bulgarian society, on the other. The major reason for this deficit is the widespread belief that ethnic Bulgarians are not particularly guided by religious orientations in their lives. This assumption has some historical basis, but it neglects the intensity of religious belief among the Muslim population of nearly 1 million persons. In the beginning of the 1990s, one could assume that the cultural vacuum after the collapse of the state socialist ideology would be filled in by traditional or modernized religious beliefs. In fact, the trend of the revival of religious beliefs and practices is obvious. However, in most cases this revival has taken the form of the revitalization of religious communities and the better maintenance of religious sites, and much less the strengthening of the value-normative core of specific religious beliefs. The reason for this is the massive disenchantment with all kinds of ultimate values, with the exception of those values having an immediate personal relevance, such as health and family. Nevertheless, under the conditions of economic misery and value-normative uncertainty, some fundamentalist religious teachings find followers. The promising positive outcome from this situation of value-normative uncertainty seems to be the strengthening of the modern “secularized religion” of universal human rights, which has immediate appeal to the daily concerns of the citizens. Given this complex picture of ethnic and religious differences, one has to recognize that far-reaching changes in the economic and politi-

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cal situation of ethnic groups came about in the 1990s in the context of radical changes in the value-normative system of Bulgarian society. Besides economic decline, a difficult economic recovery, and political instability, Bulgaria had to face substantial difficulties in developing and maintaining its value-normative integration. In the public mind, there are still mutually exclusive views concerning the past, the present day situation, and the desirable future state of Bulgarian society, as well as the place of the various ethnic groups in it. In fact, one cannot expect a different picture, given the profound changes in international politics, in the political and economic organization of Bulgarian society itself, as well as in its social structure. The changes have brought about general insecurity and a turn to survival strategies characterized by a short-term agenda of personal planning and activity. Many of these changes are also explainable by the fact that during the decades after 1944, the internal integration of Bulgarian society was typically maintained by political force or by the threat of political repression. After the repressive mechanisms were gradually softened, and internationalism turned out to be ineffective as a means for cultural integration, many open questions concerning the value-normative integration of Bulgarian society appeared. Given the historical experience, one might hardly expect a tangible and well organized revitalization of traditional Bulgarian nationalism. No doubt, nationalism could function as a uniting and mobilizing force under the rather different conditions of the newly established states stemming from the former Soviet Union or from the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic identities returned there as burning issues after having been systematically suppressed by political and ideological means. But the reinvention of the “imaginable community” of the Slovenian or Croatian nations (Klemenčič and Žagar 2004) could not have its parallel in Bulgaria because of its already long tradition as a nation-state. Moreover, it is rather difficult or virtually impossible to mobilize Bulgarians under the banner of nationalistic ideology after the futile efforts to achieve ethnic unification and national consolidation in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), as well as in the First and the Second World Wars.

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On the contrary, one could imagine a strengthening of the ethnic self-consciousness of the Turkish ethnic group, which suffered cultural suppression in the 1980s. In the worst case scenario, this reinvention might have particularistic consequences for social inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, there were such examples over the Bulgarian border in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, as a result of the very cautious ethnic politics of all institutions and political forces in Bulgaria, the country managed to avoid substantial inter-ethnic tensions during the transformation period. The sensitivity to ethnic issues was clearly documented in the democratic Constitution of 1991. Its formulations indicate that attention was paid to ethnic minority rights, as well as to the means of dealing with them. Dealing with the then-burning issues of the forceful change of the names of persons belonging to the Turkish minority group in 1984 and1985, and with the fresh memory of the mass exodus of Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1989, the authors of the Constitution incorporated key ideas of modern law concerning ethnic minorities and minority rights while also maintaining some longterm traditions of Bulgarian politics and culture: article 6 [human dignity, freedom, equality] (2) All citizens shall be equal before the law. There shall be no privileges or restriction of rights on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic self-identity, sex, origin, religion, education, opinion, political affiliation, personal or social status or property status. article 11 [political parties] (4) There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial, or religious lines, nor parties, which seek the violent usurpation of state power. article 13 [religion] (3) Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.

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article 36 [language] (1) The study and use of the Bulgarian language is a right and obligation of every Bulgarian citizen. (2) Citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall have the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language. article 44 [association] (1) No organization shall act to the detriment of the country’s sovereignty and national integrity or the unity of the nation, nor shall it incite racial, national, ethnic, or religious enmity or an encroachment on the rights and freedoms of citizens. article 54 [culture, creativity] (1) Everyone shall have the right to avail himself of the national and universal human cultural values and to develop his own culture in accordance with his ethnic self-identification, which shall be recognized and guaranteed by the law. (Source: http://www.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en)

The generalized form of the above arrangements notwithstanding, the new Bulgarian Constitution facilitated the democratization of interethnic relations in the country. Together with the democratization of other institutions, they contributed to the tangible decline of interethnic tensions and conflicts and substantially reduced the intensity of the perception of inter-ethnic relations as a major risk facing Bulgarian society, as shown in Figure 6.1. The precision and practical relevance of the above constitutional arrangements should not be overestimated. Taking the controversial experience during the 1980s into account, the Constitution clearly prohibits, for example, the establishment of political parties on an ethnic basis. Nevertheless, political opportunism made it possible to establish

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Fig. 6.1 Perception of Major Risks Facing Bulgarian Society, 1992–2005 (percentage) (National surveys, five-point scale. Position 5 = “a very serious problem”). Source: Data from the annual national surveys on Transformation Risks and Quality of Life carried out by a team headed by the present author.

a party on an obviously Turkish ethnic basis, namely the Movement for Rights and Liberties (mrl) (See Table 6.6). Ironically enough, it was this party that contributed heavily to the stabilization of the democratic political order and to the stabilization of the inter-ethnic relations in the country after 1989. The Movement participated in several coalition governments and managed to keep the political emotions and aspirations of the Turkish ethnic minority under control. Despite the efforts of its leadership to present the Movement as an inter-ethnic political force, its electoral results closely followed the share of the Turkish population in the country. The preservation of inter-ethnic peace and stability notwithstanding, due to economic depression, political destabilization and value-normative disorientation, Bulgarian society experienced a high wave of crime in the 1990s (See Table 6.7). It is not surprising that the Roma ethnic group, which was most affected by the negative consequences of

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Table 6.6 Electoral Results of the Major Political Parties in Bulgaria, Parliamentary Elections 1990–2001 (percentage of valid votes) Political Party

1990

1991

1994

1997

2001

Bulgarian Socialist Party Union of Democratic Forces Movement for Rights and Liberties National Movement, Simeon II

47 36 6 -

33 34 8 -

44 24 5 -

22 52 8 -

15 18 7 43

Table 6.7 Ethnic Affiliation of Detected Perpetrators of Crimes, 1997 (per cent) Type of crime

Bulgarians

Turks

Roma

Other

Total

Robberies Thefts Burglaries Pickpocketing

65.5 55.0 56.2 25.1

4.8 6.1 5.7 1.9

28.2 38.3 37.4 72.1

1.5 0.6 0.7 0.9

100 100 100 100

Source: Mantarova (2000, 212).

the transformation, reacted with an over-proportional rise of criminal activity. Under these precarious conditions, traditional negative stereotypes about the Roma were strengthened. There is nothing exceptional in this development, since in times of economic recession and political crisis, xenophobic emotions and movements typically receive broader support. The major issue is, however, inherently connected to the fact that the economic, educational, and value-normative distances between the Roma and all other ethnic groups in Bulgaria were traditionally substantial and have remained so, perhaps even having deepened to some extent. Therefore, the prospects for the social inclusion of the Roma in the mainstream of Bulgarian society are not necessarily good. The most sensitive indicator in this respect is the readiness to accept a representative of this ethnic group as a member of the family. As shown in Table 6.8, the potential for future inter-ethnic tensions due to the

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Table 6.8 The Social Exclusion of Roma Respondents to this survey were asked whether they would accept a representative of the Roma (Gypsy) ethnic group being in any of the following social roles. The following data (in percentage) reflect the answers given by those who answered in the negative. Social role

1995

2000

2005

Neighbour Colleague at the workplace Close friend Member of the family

63.7 56.4 75.3 87.4

67.2 60.9 79.6 89.4

63.7 56.2 78.0 89.1

Source: Data from the annual national surveys on Transformation Risks and Quality of Life carried out by a team headed by the present author.

persistent systematic exclusion of Roma from mainstream society is easily recognizable, as shown by the stereotypes held by the vast majority of the population in Bulgaria about this ethnic group. Thus, the new democratic legal arrangements in Bulgaria are definitely focused on the universal human rights of individuals, whatever their origin, age, sex, or ethnic/religious affiliation. There are no socially relevant actors in the country questioning this universalistic constitutional order. But the tensions between universalized value-normative structures and specific ethnic, religious, and other identities, which incorporate the diversity of cultures, leave their deep imprints on the present day value-normative and institutional situation of Bulgarian society, and will continue to powerfully influence its culture and politics in the future. A special issue in this broad context concerns the dynamic relationships between the revival of traditional religions and the rise of non-traditional sects. The uncertainties in this context indicate that religiously based cultural conflicts have a potential future in Bulgarian society – possibly even a rather important one. Institutional achievements and their implications for everyday life should not be overestimated. It took a long time to get education and broadcasting in the Turkish language relatively well established in the country. These improvements notwithstanding, the social distance between representatives of the major ethnic groups in the country remains significant.

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Some possible and desirable developments for improving the situation might start with changes in the constitutional provisions. Their shortcomings concerning minority rights can be better understood if compared with the provisions of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro passed by the Federal Parliament in 2003. The Charter includes the results of a difficult learning process about the complexities of inter-ethnic relationships and ethnic minority rights. But it also refers to conceptual and institutional innovations, which took place in international law, and institutional regulations concerning ethnic minorities’ rights during the 1990s. The major innovation in the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro is formulated in Article 8. It declares that a special Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms (2003) forms an integral part of the Constitutional Charter. Compared to the Bulgarian Constitution, which deals with ethnic minority rights only in terms of individual rights, the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms introduces the explicit formulation of collective minority rights: article 47 [rights of persons belonging to national minorities] Persons belonging to national minorities shall have individual and collective rights, rights that are exercised individually or in community with others, in accordance with the law and international standards. Collective rights imply that persons belonging to national minorities shall, directly or through their elected representatives, take part in the decision-making process or decide on issues related to their culture, education, information, and the use of language and script in accordance with the law. Nevertheless, the Charter does not explicitly allow the establishment of political parties on ethnic or religious grounds. But it also avoids the explicit prohibition of this legal option as it is stipulated by the Bulgarian Constitution. Thus, due to the specific circumstances of the disso-

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Table 6.9 Changing Attitudes of Bulgarian Christians towards Granting Rights to Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaria (percentage of positive answers)

Minority Rights To establish cultural organizations and associations To have their own members of parliament To publish books in their language To have their representatives in the local government of their community To have their own newspapers To become officers and non-commissioned officers in the Bulgarian army To have their own political parties

Bulgarian Christians, 1997

Bulgarian Christians, 2003

67 50 52

76 71 66

47 45

64 63

21 25

48 43

Source: Yanakiev (2004, 59)

lution of the multi-ethnic former Yugoslav state, to the experience from the bloody inter-ethnic wars in its territory, and especially to the painful experience of the conflict in Kosovo, the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Freedoms is a major breakthrough in the constitutional arrangement concerning ethnic minority issues in South Eastern Europe. Given some recent debates in Western Europe (the issue of carrying religious symbols in public places, for example), the arrangements incorporated in the Charter might even be seen as relevant in a broader cultural context. Constitutional arrangements may be the only safe basis for resolving social issues. The institutional practice of approaching these issues might deviate from the constitutional arrangements because of the specifics of the economic, political, and cultural situations. Since they are often complicated and dynamic in South Eastern Europe, social reality often deviates from them. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 6.9, comparative data clearly demonstrate positive changes in the basic attitudes of the Bulgarian ethnic majority to the issue of ethnic minority rights. Even the right of political organization and collective representation of ethnic minorities is becoming more and more acceptable to the public mind.

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concluding remarks Eastern European societies, Bulgarian society included, have recently experienced a new and powerful move forwards in their modernization. This movement is, for various reasons, full of tensions. Developed modern societies are marked by their individualized rights, initiatives, and responsibilities. Achievements or failures are measured by the results of the activities of human individuals. But ethnic characteristics are basically collective. The problems of inter-ethnic relations and the efforts to resolve these problems inherently refer to collectives (ethnic communities). This understanding guides the well known policies of positive discrimination, affirmative action (etc.) concerning ethnic groups. The rationalized policies in modern democratic societies are focused on individual needs, achievements, and failures, and have to be corrected in the context of affirmative ethnic policies, or, more specifically, in the area of affirmative policies concerning the education of minority ethnic groups. This is not an easy task nor is it one free of controversial effects. The strengthening of primordial collective feelings could easily have implications for political separatism, especially under conditions of real or perceived economic deprivation, political oppression, or cultural disadvantage for a particular ethnic group. The legal and political dilemmas of this situation are difficult: Should universal individual rights be legally and institutionally strengthened with the hope that self-conscious and mature individuals would contribute to both the stability and dynamics of society? Or, should the legal and institutional strengthening of collective rights – for instance, of ethnic groups – be preferred as a mechanism for alleviating and eradicating deprivations and for fostering sustainability? There is no clear-cut solution for resolving the dilemma. Recent experiences in South Eastern Europe bear witness to the large variety of options and pitfalls in making decisions and implementing them under conditions of intensive inter-ethnic tension and conflict. Developed modern societies are basically meritocratic. Achieved statuses and roles matter more than ascribed statuses and roles together

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with the privileges and deprivations connected with them. Achievement belongs to the value-normative and institutional foundation of modern markets and competitive politics, since it is inherently connected to the basic idea and institutionalized practices of the universal rights of human individuals. However, it is obvious that every kind of special support, positive discrimination, affirmative action (etc.) that is aimed at the efficient participation of disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities specifically questions these meritocratic principles. The reasons for the proactive policies are clear and persuasive enough. Without the positive discrimination in education and work, the differences between ethnic groups might become deeper. As a result, the division of labour, the democratic political system, and the cultural integration of society would suffer, with destructive economic and political implications. Put in general terms, the social cohesion and the sustainability of society would suffer if differences on an ethnic basis were reproduced and became more pronounced in the long-run. This is the pragmatic calculation that makes positive discrimination on an ethnic basis in some cases very much advisable or even practically unavoidable. Nevertheless, this institutional solution is not without its dark side. At least temporarily, it creates and maintains privileges that are intended to reduce disadvantages. It is a matter of the sensitivity and practical efficiency of decision makers to avoid the reproduction of privileges that have become obsolete and therefore undermine basic principles of the meritocratic social order. Besides the general theoretical and practical issues already discussed, there is one more historically relevant point connected with the policies concerning ethnic minorities in South Eastern Europe. The point refers to the context of the progressive regionalization and globalization of social problems and social policies. What happens in the southeastern corner of Europe is relevant not only to the stability and future prospects of particular nations or states in this sub-region of the European continent. In fact, events like the beginning of the First World War urge us to realize that problems and processes in the Balkans have already had important implications for the fate of Europe and the world. Thus, the efforts to develop and apply effective policies for increasing

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the chances for social integration, and therefore the life chances of ethnic minorities in South Eastern Europe, have a strong moral impetus for the universal rights of human individuals as well as a strong pragmatic relevance. The present and future European Union needs a well-educated labour force meeting the requirements of a knowledge-based society and the conditions of fierce global competition. Thus, seen strategically, the success or failure of policies concerning ethnic minorities in this European sub-region is increasingly a matter of immediate relevance for the European Union itself. The inter-ethnic intolerance will be further nourished by the widespread absolute poverty in South Eastern Europe. This will also take decades to overcome. The relative poverty vis-à-vis the developed countries may persist even longer. Poverty does not only have to do with the level of income that provides for biological survival. An important feature of the backwardness of South East European societies is the underdeveloped infrastructure that is reflected in the poverty of information, exemplified, for example, by the share of Internet users among the population. Without determined national and international efforts, the various manifestations of persistent poverty will continue to lead to discontent and, consequently, to social tensions and political instability. Given the ethnic mixture in the sub-region in general and in Bulgaria in particular as well as the clear ethnic dimension of poverty, there are and will be individuals and groups who are ready to interpret the difficult economic situation and the general underdevelopment in ethnic terms and to draw political conclusions accordingly. Privatized mass media may facilitate the process to a great extent. Readiness to move in the direction of inter-ethnic confrontations has been linked to mass unemployment, which is a major cause of mass poverty. Because of the rather limited capabilities of the Bulgarian national social security system, unemployment usually translates into poverty. In particular, this applies to the long-term unemployment that cannot be overcome by local accumulation and investment. Only foreign investments, mostly from the European Union, may slowly alleviate the problem. The quality of new job opportunities is also very important, since there is a tendency to preserve or to create low quality

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jobs, as for example, in the tourism industry. Thus, it is not only the reduction of unemployment alone that matters, but also the quality of jobs with a view to the prospect for personal and social development as well as for the development of a knowledge-based society. Bulgarian society has to manage difficult tasks in this context in order to prevent the further brain-drain of the most highly educated and well trained members of its labour force. In addition, it will be difficult or impossible in many cases to reintegrate the long-term unemployed into the active labour market due to their lack of education and training corresponding to the new conditions of production and services. Against the background of the above-mentioned economic processes, it is not surprising that the national statistics register negative trends in the main spheres of the reproduction of human capital. The share of gdp invested in education declined during the 1990s in both absolute and relative terms. The consequences of this financial neglect of Bulgarian education, which had fared well in international comparisons before 1989, were manifold. The proportion of children staying absent from primary school has increased. This applies especially to children belonging to the Roma ethnic group. Primary schools lack the equipment – especially computers – to prepare pupils for the challenges of the information age. The strong increase in the number of university students is not a particular reason for optimism, since for many of them higher education is only an alternative to unemployment. The introduction of tuition fees and the establishment of private universities are contradictory developments under the present circumstances, since they place economic limitations on access to universities. In practical terms, this means an increase in the probability that the economically weaker ethnic minorities will remain excluded from commercialized higher education. The questionable reforms of the Bulgarian health care system contributed to the deterioration of the social situation as well. According to the Constitution of 1991, health care in the country is still defined as free of charge. In reality, however, health care has become increasingly commercialized and is paid for by the patients directly. For many of them – poor Bulgarians and especially representatives of ethnic mi-

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norities – health care thus became out of reach due to economic reasons. Neither public nor private health insurance can work effectively under the given conditions of low incomes and low levels of capital accumulation. Unlike other societies in South Eastern Europe, the multi-ethnic composition of Bulgarian society is not the fertile soil for problems of belated nation-building and state-building. More precisely, there is no visible clash between the civic and ethnic trends in nation-building and state-building. But there are still elements of such tensions because of the constitutionally recognized respect for the universal individual rights of the representatives of ethnic minorities together with the lack of constitutional recognition of the collective political rights of ethnic groups. In the complicated situation of Bulgarian society, it is easy to foresee future difficulties as a result of diverging interests or of inconsistent policies due to changing preferences among ethnic communities. International circumstances may easily trigger or facilitate the process. Indeed, all components of politics and especially of social policies in Bulgaria are still determined by the need to manage quite serious risks. The policies of the state and political forces have to cope with situations that are far removed from the key parameters of sustainable economic, political, and cultural development. This applies, for instance, to medical insurance. Large parts of the Turkish and the Roma minorities are currently excluded from this system because of their involvement in the shadow economy or because of a number of other economic, political, and cultural reasons. The only effective counter-strategy should be to focus on the economic stabilization of the country. These and other examples clearly show that the social situation in general, and the situation concerning the inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria in particular, will be marked by intensive risks in the future. The transfer of institutional experience for handling risks continues to be needed urgently. It will take decades before the health care systems in the country will reach the level of correspondence with the criteria of a modern social policy. Therefore, the national and international efforts to improve social policy and thus to reduce the concomitant inter-

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ethnic tensions will continue to run under the headings of addressing emergency (Kausch 2001). Since Western European societies also have to address urgent social problems today and in the future, social policy is increasingly becoming a burning and permanent issue in an enlarged Europe. A step-bystep solution to this problem in its various manifestations should be the object of long-term strategic planning on the part of the European Union. The strategy has to be carefully coordinated with activities decided at the eu Summit in Lisbon in March 2000 to reach the ambitious goal of transforming the European Union into the leading power in research and development. A specific but important problem in this context concerns the situation of the Roma ethnic group. It can be addressed separately, but it would be advisable to discuss it in the broader context of inter-ethnic relations. Indeed, the major conclusion from the experience of dealing with inter-ethnic relations in Europe is this, namely, that they should be studied and dealt with in accordance with the multidimensional and dynamic local and international context. Thus, contrary to some optimistic expectations and to some global trends of value-normative universalization, various particularisms of thinking in categories of ethnic and religious divisions and confrontations have not disappeared in Bulgarian society, in Eastern Europe, or in the southeastern sub-region of Europe. The potential divisions and confrontations have not vanished; they are alive and well just below the surface. This development supports the point that the strengthening of the universalistic value systems does not imply any end of the history of struggling particularistic ethnic views or of inter-ethnic conflicts. Facing a similar situation at the end of the First World War, Max Weber registered the decline of large ideological systems, but also predicted the rise of competing value orientations in everyday life (Weber 1992 [1919], 101). The major reason for the value-normative instability in Bulgaria is widespread absolute or relative downward mobility and the stabilization of the economic position of large groups at the low end of the stratification scale. This downward mobility strengthens the readiness to meet precarious social situations by embracing particularistic patterns of thinking and behaviour. This is fertile soil for nationalism and po-

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litical and religious extremism to grow as alternatives to the universalization of value-normative systems. Most probably, it will be a long time until Bulgarian society, together with other societies in the South Eastern Europe, can eliminate the dangers of the devaluation of values and norms bringing about social anomie. The promising perspective is only a stable economic development in which initiatives and responsibilities are guided by clearly defined and widely followed moral and legal norms. Another potential stabilizing factor might be the widespread conviction that the active participation of individuals and large groups in political decisions and actions will help control matters. Indeed, this is the promising prospect for the development of the uniting value-normative system of democratic Bulgarian society. The role of the political and cultural elites in the country is crucial in this respect. Rules of government having firm roots in the local traditions and intrinsically linked to the universalistic culture of respect for human rights and tolerance still have to be elaborated and observed. But the mutual adjustment of local traditions, present day cultural habits, and the modern ethics of initiative and responsibility will take time. The reforms should be guided by this strategic task, the solution of which takes specific forms with particular ethnic groups. Citizens’ initiatives might be quite effective in strengthening the influence of democratic values as a fruitful background to the process. This is currently quite important since the value-normative situation of Bulgarian society is still in flux. A culture of peace, tolerance, and development has a real chance of success. However, the demons of envy, hatred, and suppression are alive and may have a chance of success as well.

references Bös, Mathias. 2004. “Reconceptualizing Modes of Belonging. Advancements in the Sociology of Ethnicity and Multiculturalism,” in Advances in Sociological Knowledge, ed. N. Genov, 221–44. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

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Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 2003. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 43 (3): 77–87. Dimova, Lilia. 1999. Ethnic Minorities in the Changing Labour Market in Bulgaria. http://www.asa-bg.netfirms.com/documents/F_report.htm Genov, Nikolai. 2004. “Introduction. Ethnic Minorities in South Eastern Europe: Normative Regulations and Social Realty,” in Ethnic Relations in South Eastern Europe, ed. N. Genov, 9–32. Münster: LIT. Ignatova, Elisaveta. 2005. “Ethnicity and Educational Policies in Bulgaria,” in Ethnicity and Educational Policies in South Eastern Europe, ed. N. Genov, 48–63. Münster: LIT. Kausch, Irina. 2001. ed. Addressing Emergency: Welfare State Reform in South Eastern Europe. Belgrad: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Klemenčič, Matjaž and Mitja Žagar. 2004. The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook. Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: ABC Clio. Krasteva, Anna. 2001. “Ethnic Minorities,” in Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria 1960-1995, ed. N. Genov and A. Krasteva, 440–7. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Mantarova, Anna. 2000. “Unemployment and Crime,” in Continuing Transformation in Eastern Europe, ed. N. Genov, 205–14. Berlin: Trafo. Socialno-ikonomičesko razvitie. Balgaria 2002/Socio-economic Development: Bulgaria 2002/(2002) Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Statističeski spravočnik 2003/Statistical Handbook 2003/(2003). Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Weber, Max. 1992 [1919]. “Wissenschaft als Beruf,” in Gesamtausgabe. Max Weber. Bd.17. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Yanakiev, Yantsislav. 2004. “Public Perceptions of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Bulgaria,” in Ethnic Relations in South Eastern Europe, ed. N. Genov, 47–65. Münster: LIT.

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Conclusion: Ethnogenesis: Modes of Multiculturalism in Six Societies mathias bös, susanne von below, jason d. edgerton, and lance w. roberts

As a process of group formation, ethnogenesis is common to most modern countries. The opening chapter in this volume provided an overview of theoretical approaches to ethnicity. The country reports that followed shifted from the abstract to the concrete and examined the cases of enhanced ethnic pluralism in six societies. Although the differences in ethnic diversity and size of groups are sometimes astonishing and the differences in the degree of ethnic integration vary tremendously within and between countries, each society faces a trend towards cultural pluralism and policies for managing the transition. Among the countries showcased, large variations exist in the interaction between political reactions to diversity, the implementation of different laws, and the “statistical recognition” of each group. This institutional variation forms the basis for different modes of multiculturalism that can be analyzed. All these dimensions and mechanisms fit into a broader theoretical framework of “ethnogenesis” outlined in the introductory chapter. Ethnogenesis emphasizes that “ethnicity” is not something given, but something that emerges historically and that is socially negotiated. Although it is safe to assume that most groups see an increasing “common ground” culturally and structurally, every ethnic group still shows at least some symbolic traits that separate it from the larger society. Of course, there are groups where this integration process takes

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much longer than in other cases, or some cases where the process even reverses itself, and the perceived communality between the majority and the ethnic minority increases again. Although this model of ethnogenesis was developed with the American experience in mind – and is mainly based on immigration as the primary factor in ethnic identity formation – it can be modified to include emerging European identities that are not always grounded in migration. This closing chapter speaks to two issues related to the consideration of growing ethnic diversity. The first consideration is empirical and situates the six national reports using the fractionalization index. Using this measure, it is evident that the six societies selected for consideration cover the broad range of ethnic heterogeneity evident in North American and European societies. The second consideration is conceptual and presents a typology of different modes of multiculturalism. Given the diverse social realities in terms of national ethnic heterogeneity, the question becomes: what kinds of multiculturalism are possible? The conceptual framework provides a guide to thinking about possible multicultural variations.

the changing ethnic landscape in six societies Three general impressions emerge from the different national reports: (1) each country has a more complex ethnic composition than is officially recognized; (2) the ethnic composition of each country is the outcome of historical processes in which some groups are defined as ethnic or racial while others are not; and (3) ethnic groups emerge from a social process that changes their position within the macro group structure of different societies. The national reports included in this volume represent a wide range of cases with respect to ethnic diversity. Table 7.1 illustrates the different levels of heterogeneity using various indices of “fractionalization.” The fractionalization index is a measure of the degree of

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Table 7.1 Ethnic Fractionalization Indices for Six Nations Nation

Index* 11

Index 22

Index 33

Index 44

Bulgaria Canada Germany Greece Italy United States

0.31/4 0.77/6 0.12/3 0.10/2 0.08/1 0.58/5

0.4021/4 0.7124/6 0.1682/3 0.1576/2 0.1145/1 0.4901/5

0.220/4 0.755/6 0.026/3 0.099/2 0.089/1 0.501/5

0.225/4 0.769/6 0.141/3 0.085/1 0.114/2 0.575/5

* Note: Each column includes both the fractionalization index score and the nation’s rank order on the index. 1

Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Index, Average 1960s–1980s. (Annett 2001). Ethnic Fractionalization. (Alesina et al. 2003) 3 Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), 1961. (Roeder 2001) 4 Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), 1985. (Roeder 2001) 2

ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences in a society. It is a conventional but very useful measure of cultural heterogeneity. “Fractionalization” indices range between 0 and 1, and indicate the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a society will not belong to the same ethnic group. Higher fractionalization scores, then, indicate greater diversity. Table 7.1 includes various measures from the existing literature that, for present purposes, illustrate two points. The first point emerges from comparing the 1961 (Index 3) and 1985 (Index 4) scores. This comparison indicates that the trend in these six nations is one that is found across modern nations generally, namely, that ethnic heterogeneity is increasing. The second point evident in the table is the stability of the diversity and rank orderings of the countries. The nations included as case studies range from comparatively low ethnic heterogeneity (Italy) to high diversity (Canada). Moreover, the relative ranking of the countries in terms of ethnic diversity is almost identical on the different measures. In short, the case studies featured in this volume cover the range of ethnic heterogeneity found in North American and European

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societies. Italy is at one end of the range, and Canada, a statistical outlier, is at the other.

modes of multiculturalism As the definitions and elaborations in the introductory chapter of this volume clarify, inherent in the notion of ethnicity is “difference” at the micro, meso, and macro levels. The six country reports demonstrate how ethnic differences are growing trends in each of the national case studies. This enhanced ethnic diversity leads to public policy challenges, which the country reports demonstrate are being met in different ways. In summary, these points underscore just how salient a social fact multiculturalism has become in modern societies. While academics debate the specific features to be included in the definition of “modernization,” there is general agreement that a salient feature of modernity is the recognition and extension of “pluralism.” The diversity associated with pluralism is manifest in the cultural, social structural, and psychological domains. The hallmarks of modern (complex) societies are their more diversified set of values and belief systems (worldviews), their more extensive and rationalized divisions of labour (social differentiation), and their socialization of individuals to display greater intellectual flexibility (cognitive complexity). To say that the pluralism associated with ethnic diversity has made multiculturalism a salient social fact in modern societies is descriptive. Such description is not to be confused with public policy prescriptions about multiculturalism. After decades of growing consensus in both Europe and North America about the desirability of “multiculturalism” as a public policy, the consensus appears to be wavering. Headlines of current events illustrate the trend, as is shown by Germany’s Angela Merkel’s claim that “the notion of multiculturalism has fallen apart.” Shifting support for multiculturalism policy does not, however, change the social fact of ethnic pluralism. As the case studies in this volume report, this fact is now an embedded feature of modern societies. The policy issue question is how to think constructively about the nature of the challenges growing ethnic diversity poses.

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Given the high salience of ethnic diversity as a growing social fact and the public policy challenges this pluralism represents, much discussion of the issue lacks the sophistication of being embedded in a conceptual framework. Typically, policy discussion is rooted more in ideology than in analysis. The following sections raise some issues aimed at encouraging a more sophisticated discussion about ethnic diversity and multiculturalism policy. Specifically, the aim is to provide a clearer understanding of the issues related to the following questions: What is the central social challenge that enhanced ethnic diversity poses? What are the principal components of “multiculturalism”? What types of multiculturalism are possible? How do different types of multiculturalism operate? What policy implications are related to the varieties of multiculturalism? The aim of addressing these questions is to construct a conceptual space that encourages a systematic discussion of issues related to ethnic incorporation in Europe and North America. The concept of pluralism highlights variety and heterogeneity among the components of a system. Whether the “system” in question is micro (e.g. encounters between individuals from distinct ethnic traditions), meso (e.g. relationships between ethnic communities in an urban centre), or macro (e.g. accommodating ethnically distinct populations within a nation), the central social challenge is conceptually similar. Systems, at any level, are comprised of “components” and “relationships” between the components. In systems where the challenge concerns ethnic incorporation, the “components” of interest are the various ethnic groups and their members, while the “relationships” refer to the character of the interactions both within and between distinctive ethnic groups. Using this framework, the central organizational challenge posed by enhanced ethnic pluralism can be stated as follows: what systemic arrangements optimize the autonomy of

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ethnic groups and members to pursue their valued interests while maintaining social stability? Addressing this question involves the generic concepts of adaptation and integration, which are fundamental to the analysis of all social systems. The concept of “adaptation” focuses on the “components” of a social system and stresses the processes through which these parts attempt to pursue their valued interests by adjusting to the surrounding environment. By contrast, the notion of “integration” shifts perspective from the parts to the whole, and emphasizes the processes through which the components are able to coordinate their interests. In short, adaptation highlights the autonomy of the components, while integration highlights their interdependence. Applied to extended ethnic pluralism, “adaptation” refers to the attempts of particular ethnic units to organize themselves and act in ways that optimize their culturally based individual, community, or national interests. “Integration” refers to the adjustments ethnic units make to accommodate the actions of other ethnic units which, like themselves, are employing their resources to adapt as well as they can. As ethnic pluralism increases in modern states, the challenge for individuals through institutions becomes one of finding an optimal set of norms to guide constructive interaction. Because ethnic units have distinct interests, the issue of integration becomes more problematic, and some means must be found for coordinating potential conflicts of interest. At the individual level, this translates into a socialization issue; at the institutional level, a public policy issue. Governments, the institutions concerned with managing collective interests through the development of coordinating mechanisms, are now confronted with developing “multiculturalism” policies to deal with increasing ethnic pluralism. As the national reports included in this volume make plain, these efforts have taken a wide range of forms. Moreover, as current events unfold, debates continue about what, if any, policies should be in place for managing multiculturalism. The following sections develop a conceptual space for locating these alternatives.

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Components of “Multiculturalism” A review of the recent literature confirms that little has changed since Mazurek’s (1987, 146) remark about multiculturalism: “everyone seems to define it differently … we have yet to settle upon agreement of what, exactly, multiculturalism is.” Since vagueness and ambiguity are precursors of misunderstanding, it follows that any clear discussion of multiculturalism policies and their practical importance must try and clarify what multiculturalism means. As we hope to demonstrate, although multiculturalism does not have a single, unitary conceptualization, it does have meaning. Grasping the multiple referents of the term becomes a critical first task. Our conceptualization of the multiple referents of “multiculturalism” is rooted in the fundamental distinction between the two central components of social systems – culture and social structure. House (1981, 542) succinctly captures the distinction when he characterizes culture as “a set of cognitive and evaluative beliefs … that are shared by members of a social system and transmitted to new members” and social structure as a “persisting and bounded pattern of social relationships (or pattern of behavioural interaction) among the units (i.e. persons or positions) in a social system.” Applied to ethnic diversity, these distinctions emphasize the importance of separating the shared sets of symbols that identify what members of various ethnic groups believe and value (culture) and their collective patterns of conduct (social structure). “Culture” represents the shared symbolic blueprint that directs action along an ideal course and gives life meaning. “Social structure,” by contrast, signifies the constraints on individual conduct arising from the connections and dependencies existing in all organized communities. Of course, culture and social structure are intimately and reciprocally linked in actual experience. Nonetheless, it remains relevant to distinguish between “what members of a social system believe [and value] from what they collectively do” (House 1981, 543). Conceptually, then, multiculturalism is signified by greater diversity

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in culture and social structure. Consequently, ethnic pluralism poses challenges because of the enhanced variance in what individual and communities believe, value, and do. The cultural and social structural components of multiculturalism are variable, which underlines the fact that cognitive and affective orientations of ethnic group members, as well as their collective patterns of conduct, can change over time. To note the potential independence and variability of cultural and social structural components of an ethnic group’s social system is to appreciate that various configurations can emerge. One outcome is “assimilation,” which refers to the process of “becoming alike” signified in the image of a “melting pot.” Ethnic pluralism, by contrast, when it is underwritten by policies of multiculturalism, identifies an opposite condition – where ethnic groups retain their distinctiveness. Although assimilation and ethnic pluralism may well stand in contrast to one another, the fact that the cultural and social structural dimensions of an ethnic group are distinct variables suggests that “multiculturalism” can take several forms. In short, multiculturalism has several referents and can take various forms. Specifying the modes of multiculturalism helps distinguish the varied meanings and implications of its associated policies. From the understanding of culture and social structure as variables, it follows that ethnic diversity may be maintained on either of these two levels. One is the level of cognitive and affective orientations (culture); the other is the level of shared patterns of conduct (social structure). From the intersection of these two levels, it is possible to specify several ideal types of multiculturalism, and the opposite, “assimilation.” Table 7.2 utilizes the cultural and social structural dimensions and distinguishes three ideal types of multiculturalism as they contrast to assimilation. Table 7.2 presents the situation from the viewpoint of a particular ethnic group interested in maintaining its cultural distinctiveness from the surrounding society. Maintaining distinctiveness can be accomplished, with varying degrees of success, on both the cultural and social structural levels. “Success” in the maintenance of ethnic distinctiveness

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Table 7.2 Modes of Multiculturalism as Ideal Types Cultural Constraints Social Structural Constraints

high

low

high low

Institutionalized Symbolic

Ritualistic Assimilation

is accomplished through “constraint.” Culturally, where ethnic constraints are high, the community is able to successfully internalize its value and belief systems in its members. In terms of social structure, high constraint is evident by social arrangements that encourage members to act in accordance with the distinctive social expectations of the community. “Assimilation” indicates lack of success in maintaining ethnic distinctiveness on the part of an ethnic group on both the cultural and social structural dimensions. Assimilation occurs when an ethnic community lacks either the motivation or the power to constrain its members in ethnically distinct ways. Lacking the motivation indicates that the “absorption” into the surrounding society is “voluntary”; a shortage of power indicates the community lacks the resources required to resist external forces towards assimilation. In direct contrast to assimilation is the ideal type called “institutionalized multiculturalism.” In this mode, an ethnic group is able to command conformity from its members to the group’s normative expectations through their thoughts, feelings, and actions. The label “institutionalized multiculturalism” indicates a close alignment between the group’s distinctive ethnic ideals and the conduct of its members. This strong form of multiculturalism is evident in ethnic enclaves that exhibit a high degree of control over their members. “Ritualistic multiculturalism” represents a different ideal type of multiculturalism. In this form, the ethnic group is still able to command behavioural conformity, but is less successful in instilling the culture’s distinctive values and beliefs in its membership. In this mode,

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conformity with the group’s expectations is due less to internalized ideals than it is to instrumental contingencies the group is able to manipulate. The label “ritualistic multiculturalism” indicates that conformity is less inspired or informed by cultural ideals. The third ideal type is “symbolic multiculturalism.” In this mode, ethnic members identify cognitively and affectively with the symbolic system of the group, but are less constrained in their conduct by the community’s social structure. In other words, under conditions of symbolic multiculturalism, instrumental contingencies other than those under the group’s control play a significant role in shaping members’ conduct. Members, however, remain aware of and sympathetic to the values and beliefs of the ethnic community. To summarize, utilizing the idea that cultural and social structural dimensions are fundamental and variable components of social systems, it is possible to distinguish three ideal types of multiculturalism from the assimilationist alternative. These modes are identified by the degree of alignment between the ethnic group’s “hold” on both the cognitive and affective, as well as on the behavioural dimensions of conduct. These distinctions imply that, when the term is used, it is important to be clear about the type of multiculturalism being talked about. Such clarification is important because different modes of multiculturalism rely on different organizational mechanisms and have distinctive policy implications. Commitment Mechanisms and Some Policy Implications Specifying the different ideal types of multiculturalism reminds us that, if ethnic groups are going to maintain their distinctiveness in a multicultural society, they must, in one fashion or another, constrain the conduct of their members. Such constraints are necessary because modern, pluralistic societies present individuals with a variety of alternatives that are in competition with the distinctive expectations that make an ethnic community unique. Without constraint, assimilation is the default value.

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For multiculturalism to operate, the organizational question becomes: through what organizational mechanisms can an ethnic community command the allegiance of its members to maintain its distinctiveness? Different modes of multiculturalism acquire commitment through different mechanisms. Symbolic Multiculturalism In its ideal form, this type of multiculturalism is characterized by a high degree of cultural constraint coupled with a low degree of social structural constraint. In this case, members of an ethnic group have considerable cognitive understanding of and affection for the shared symbolic system that characterizes their ethnic group, yet display little of this distinctiveness in their conduct. The reasons for this disjunction between cognition and affect, on the one hand, and conduct on the other are many, and go beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it is quite easy to imagine situations in which ethnic-group members find the rewards for conforming to a set of employment practices not aligned with the expectations of their ethnic group to be so attractive that they re-orient their behaviours in that direction. This kind of multiculturalism is labelled “symbolic” because it depends on a set of shared, commonly defined as symbols that constitute “culture.” The symbolic label is also appropriate because it parallels what Gans describes as symbolic ethnicity, the “nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation … a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour” (Gans 1979, 9). This conceptualization is also aligned with what the literature has labelled the “new ethnicity.” In practice, in symbolic multiculturalism an ethnic group exerts its influence over its members through the process of identification. Members possess a sense of solidarity or cohesion based on sympathy with and for the distinctive elements of their ethnic culture. In this sense, the conformity shown by ethnic group members under symbolic multiculturalism is similar to what is called “doctrinal conformity,” which occurs when persons state institutionalized beliefs to others. Ritualistic Multiculturalism In its ideal form, ritualistic multiculturalism is the opposite of symbolic multiculturalism in that it

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represents low cultural and high social structural constraints imposed by an ethnic group. In this case, members have limited knowledge of or affection for the distinctive beliefs, norms, and values that comprise their ethnic culture; nonetheless, they act in a manner that is consistent with these cultural symbols. Again, the reasons for this misalignment between culture and conduct are multiple, but for this condition to occur, the ethnic group must be able to constrain its members’ conduct so that, independently of their thoughts and feelings, they act in accordance with the group’s expectations. As the adjective “ritualistic” suggests, in this form of multiculturalism ethnic group members “go through the motions” and thus appear outwardly ethnic, while possessing limited internal commitment to the group’s cultural symbol system. To gain the outward compliance of group members, this kind of multiculturalism operates on the basis of instrumental considerations and involves a kind of cognitive/rational calculation and commitment. Kanter (1968, 500) calls this arrangement “continuance commitment.” It occurs “when profits and costs are considered, participants find the cost of leaving the system would be greater than the cost of remaining ... profit compels continued participation.” The kind of conduct expected under conditions of ritualistic multiculturalism is called “behavioural conformity,” defined as the circumstance where, whatever their attitudinal position, members act in accordance with values and norms. Institutionalized Multiculturalism The type of multiculturalism that compels the greatest allegiance among ethnic group members combines high cultural and social structural constraints imposed by an ethnic community. The “institutionalized” label points to a clear alignment between ethnic group members’ acceptance of the cultural beliefs, norms, and values of the group, and their practice of the distinctive ethnic expectations based on these cultural symbols. This dovetails with the understanding of “institutionalization” as the development of stable patterns of social interaction (social system) based on formalized beliefs and values (cultural system). Such cultural and social structural arrangements enable ethnic communities to exert strong control over their members, since

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conformity is primarily based not on sentiment (as it is in symbolic forms) or instrumental considerations (as it is in ritualistic forms), but on a set of internalized commitments. Such internalization results in the orientation that the “demands made by the system are evaluated as right, as moral, as just, as expressing one’s own values, so that obedience to these demands is a normative necessity, and sanctioning by the system is regarded as appropriate” (Kanter 1968, 501). Under the conditions of institutionalized multiculturalism, we expect to find the “attitudinal conformity” that occurs when individuals grant legitimacy to designated institutional values and norms. Here there is both private acceptance and public compliance with the cultural beliefs, norms, and values of the ethnic group. To summarize, different ideal forms of multiculturalism present alternative visions regarding the place and character of ethnic communities within a society. In turn, different forms of multiculturalism encourage ethnic groups to use different strategies to commit and mobilize their membership to the adaptation process. Institutionalized multiculturalism rests on commitment generated by the internalization of distinct ethnic values and beliefs, while ritualistic multiculturalism rests on the power of instrumental considerations, and symbolic multiculturalism on identification processes. These different forms of ethnic expression must be taken into account by public policies aimed at coordinating a society’s diverse ethnic groups in order to address the issue of integration. The ideal types of multiculturalism involve different cultural and social expressions of ethnicity. And they use different mechanisms to retain varying types of commitment among their membership. In terms introduced earlier, these mechanisms allow different types of ethnic “adaptation” to the surrounding society. In social systems, “integration” represents the flip side of the adaptation issue. With respect to ethnic pluralism, where the different modes of multiculturalism encourage different adaptive strategies, the challenge of integration is finding ways to coordinate different expressions of ethnicity. Public policy is one primary integrative mechanism, so it is worth commenting on some policy implications of

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the different modes of multiculturalism. For present purposes, the policy implications are grouped into the “stronger” (institutionalized) and “weaker” (symbolic and ritualistic) forms of ethnic maintenance. Institutionalized Multiculturalism Institutionalized multiculturalism is the “fullest” expression of multiculturalism primarily because it involves a distinctive set of shared symbols (i.e. ethnic culture). It is also the fullest in the sense that the conduct of ethnic group members is most constrained. In this form of multiculturalism, the ethnic group’s promotion of its distinctive ideas and ideals is accomplished through a system of social arrangements with sufficient surveillance and sanctions to assure the group’s cultural orientations are put into practice. The first policy consideration related to institutionalized multiculturalism involves noting that ethnic groups will require a sufficiently developed social structure to perpetuate a coherent cultural heritage. Practically, this means that the internalization of ethnic beliefs and value systems requires the support of ethnic social structures. To help insulate their memberships from direction by competing cultural orientations, ethnic groups require some social structural means of controlling the conduct of their memberships. The social structural foundation of the internalization of norms comes in the form of a set of parallel ethnic institutions that are sufficiently complete to satisfy the needs of ethnic group members and shape their conduct. The idea of “institutional completeness” (Breton 1964; Rosenberg and Jedwab 1992) captures this point. The argument is that an ethnic group’s identity is directly related to the group’s ability to maintain its boundaries. These boundaries, in turn, depend on the range of ethnic organizational structures that the community manages to operate, including schools, places of worship, newspapers, recreational centres, and employment agencies. Moreover, it is not just the quantity of parallel ethnic institutions that supports the transmission of cultural distinctiveness, the qualitative character of these institutions is also important. Specifically, successful ethnic boundary maintenance is related to the group’s ability to “impose,” rather than merely “propose,” expectations on members of their ethnic community. By imposing expectations, the discretionary

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element of conduct is reduced. Where ethnic organizations are only able to propose expectations, individual autonomy is enhanced, since individual interpretation of performance requirements is allowed and, perhaps, even encouraged. As individual interpretation increases, ethnic groups become more susceptible to external influence, and the risk of assimilation rises. Where institutionalized multiculturalism is public policy, governments will promote parallel ethnic institutions that are extensive (quantitatively complete) and pervasive (qualitatively tight). Government policy is likely to promote this sort of pluralism under very restricted conditions. Kymlicka (2002) identifies these conditions as being of two types. One type is that associated with indigenous peoples, such as the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, or the Sami of Scandinavia. Governments historically have followed policies of assimilation for these groups, as can be illustrated through tools such as reservations, residential schools, language eradication, and discrimination. More recently, however, assimilationist policies are being abandoned in favour of encouraging indigenous cultural expression and development. Land claims are being settled, self-government alternatives are being explored, traditional languages are being encouraged, and discriminatory practices sanctioned. The second type of condition in which government policies support institutionalized multiculturalism is that associated with “national minorities,” such as the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol, Italy, or the Spanish-speaking majority of Puerto Rico in the United States. Again, historical government policy has been geared towards suppressing the ethno-cultural nationalisms of these communities through practices such as restricting language rights, abolishing regional self-government, and encouraging diluted territorial settlement. Recently, however, many nations are coming to adopt policies that allow these minorities to express their “nationalism” through cultural and social structural uniqueness. Where ethnic pluralism is on the rise in many modern states, these two cases for institutionalized multiculturalism are the exception rather

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than the rule. The reason why institutionalized multiculturalism is bound to be an exceptional public policy is related to the tension between adaptation and integration. Through the cultivation of institutionally complete communities, institutionalized multiculturalism may help members of ethnic groups to adapt to life in a modern society. However, as the established distinctiveness of multicultural communities grows, integration issues become more salient. Successful institutionalized multiculturalism means that established communities may aspire to different goals (based on their culturally distinctive values), utilize alternate means (related to their distinctive norms), be committed to alternate truths (stemming from diverse belief systems), and be prepared to act on the basis of these distinctive orientations. Clearly, these predispositions, however desirable and necessary they are in selective cases, generate serious integration challenges. Symbolic and Ritualistic (Ceremonial) Multiculturalism For the purposes of policy discussion, the ideal types of symbolic and ritualistic multiculturalism will be grouped into the broader category of “ceremonial multiculturalism.” As the term “ceremonial” suggests, these forms of multiculturalism are less complete than the institutionalized form, since they involve either more limited cultural or social structural constraints. For various reasons, ceremonial multiculturalism is likely to be a more typical public policy response in modern nations. One of these reasons is related to the character of ethnic membership. In contrast to the “tight” socio-cultural conditions required by institutionalized multiculturalism, the situation of most groups in modern societies can be described as “loose.” Not only do modern people value individual autonomy, but the collective expectations of ethnic groups of their association are not very binding. In these respects, the “fit” of ceremonial forms of multiculturalism is more appropriate to the character of most immigrant ethnic groups. Ceremonial multiculturalism is also well aligned with the purposes of ethnic connection in modern societies. Commonly associated with modernity are issues connected to the ideas of powerlessness and

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meaninglessness. Connection to an ethnic community can help provide a form of social anchorage that assists in the alleviation of experiences of alienation. Ethnic communities can help restore some of the continuity and meaning that is apparently lacking in so many modern lives. Whatever meaning life has, it is gained through an interactive connection with some culture. However, this sense of culture and heritage must be presented in a form that is palatable to modern people, which is exactly what ceremonial multiculturalism does. Symbolic multiculturalism, for example, allows members of an ethnic group to participate and benefit as members of a complex, modern society, while retaining the sense that they belong to a smaller, more intimate community. In other words, members can have a psychological attachment to an ethnic group that they can use as a reference group, without being constrained by full-fledged membership in it. Thus symbolic multiculturalism permits the flexibility associated with identification with an ethnic community without the commitments and constraints associated with institutionalized multiculturalism. In this way, members can respect and celebrate their ethnic heritage without having to display a behavioural allegiance to it. Symbolic multiculturalism allows flexibility because its basis is psychological rather than social; it serves individual more than community needs, and, therefore, is less subject to forces beyond an individual’s control. Under conditions of symbolic multiculturalism, ethnic members need not belong to a structured community that is capable of exerting systematic pressure for conformity to community standards. The important feature of symbolic multiculturalism is its voluntary quality; it can be taken or left as preference dictates. This adaptability does not mean that symbolic multiculturalism is unimportant. However, it does suggest that because its expression is not embedded in social structure, it is less consistently displayed in action. Ceremonial multiculturalism fits well with the character of most ethnic communities’ membership; it is also a policy that is aligned with general policy directions in modern societies. Particularly, ceremonial multiculturalism fits with emphases on rights and integration issues.

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In terms of rights, the trend in modern societies is towards individual (versus group) rights. This emphasis, of course, fits with modern values of autonomy and freedom of choice. Symbolic multiculturalism, with its greater degrees of freedom and interpretation, is well aligned with an individual rights emphasis. This stands in direct contrast to the requirements of institutionalized multiculturalism, whose social structural requirements emphasize collective/group rights over individual rights.

concluding comments The emphasis of most public policies is placed on meeting the challenges of integration, that is, coordinating existing, diverse interests in a manner that encourages social stability. Policies encouraging symbolic multiculturalism fit with these goals since they assume that members of ethnic groups will participate in the dominant social structures of the society (i.e. its economic, social, cultural, and political life). Where government policies support ethnic festivals, conferences, and the like (as symbolic multiculturalism policies do), the outcomes can perpetuate the expressions of ethnicity that allow members to identify with these heritages if they wish to; if they find it appropriate for assisting their adaptation to the larger, surrounding society. In this way, policies encouraging ceremonial forms of multiculturalism do not risk exaggerating integration problems the way institutionalized forms might. This chapter has outlined a conceptual space in which alternatives to “assimilationist” policies can be understood as the major responses to growing ethnic pluralism in modern societies. As the country reports make plain, enhanced ethnic diversity is both a fact and a trend in European and North American societies. The interests of ethnic groups, and the failure or rejection of traditional assimilationist policies, mean that public policies must be developed that come to terms with ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism policies – transparent and explicit ones – are required in contemporary societies in order to manage growing ethnic

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heterogeneity. This chapter has shown that multiculturalism can take several forms and has argued that the various forms have different consequences for both adaptation issues of ethnic communities and larger societal integration concerns. Our conceptualization suggests that “institutionalized” multiculturalism is feasible only for a narrow range of ethnic groups who have special, historic status. By contrast, the characteristics of “symbolic” multiculturalism are well suited for both the interests of most ethnic communities and the nation as a whole. A current concern with ethnic diversity is the challenge it can present to the social contract that is the foundation of liberal democracies. Symbolic multiculturalism is amenable to preserving this contract since liberal values will continue to serve as the core commitment and the fundamental theme. Within this fundamental liberal democratic framework, however, symbolic multiculturalism allows variations that support the development of a commodity that ethnic minorities desperately seek. This is the commodity of “self-respect.” Self-respect – a person’s feelings of worthiness or value – is a fundamental (perhaps the fundamental) human need (Rawls 1971; Sennett 2003), and one that is founded in the character of our interaction with those around us. For members of ethnic minorities, especially those recently arrived and of lower socioeconomic status, the challenge of trying to relate in a meaningful manner to the surrounding society makes self-respect difficult to maintain. Appropriate multiculturalism policies provide opportunities for enhanced individual self-respect, since ethnic connections constitute “mediating institutions,” whose scale allows participants to “make a difference.” By encouraging self-respect, appropriately designed and implemented multiculturalism policy also promotes more tolerant inter-group relations. As Rawls (1971, 441) notes, “the more someone experiences his own way of life ... as fulfilling, the more likely he is to welcome attainments by others.” The six country reports in this volume examine the unique circumstances of ethnic communities in states that have diverse experiences with migration and multiculturalism. But they also illustrate a

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crucial general point – namely, that growing ethnic diversity represents a serious challenge in modern nations. This social fact will not be well managed where political rhetoric overrides social analysis. The modes of multiculturalism represent a starting point for thinking more critically about what policy forms might be most appropriate to specific national histories and social landscapes.

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Mazurek, Kas. 1987. “Multiculturalism, Education, and the Ideology of Meritocracy,” in The Political Economy of Canadian Schooling, ed. T. Wotherspoon, 141–63. Toronto: Methuen. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Roeder, Philip G. 2001. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985. 16 February. Available at http//:weber.ucsd.edu\~proeder\elf.htm. Rosenberg, Michael and Jack Jedwab. 1992. “Institutional Completeness, Ethnic Organizational Style, and the Role of the State,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 92 (3): 266–87. Sennett, Richard. 2003. Respect in a World of Inequality. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Wallace, Walter L. 1983. Principles of Scientific Sociology. New York: Aldine.

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mathias bös, Philipps-Universität Marburg antonio m. chiesi, Università degli Studi di Milano jason d. edgerton, University of Manitoba barry ferguson, University of Manitoba nikolai genov, Freie Universität Berlin louis hicks, St. Mary’s College of Maryland paul kingston, University of Virginia laura maratou-alipranti, National Centre for Social Research, Athens lance w. roberts, University of Manitoba sonia stefanizzi, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca susanne von below, Federal Ministry of Education, Berlin

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